Executive Dominance and the British Constitution

Abstract

This thesis examines executive dominance within the British constitution. The analysis within this thesis not only explores and defines the concept of executive dominance but also further illustrates the existence of excessive executive dominance. The analysis within this thesis enables the thesis to introduce two novel concepts of executive dominance. The first is natural dominance, which the thesis demonstrates is both a necessary and acceptable level of executive dominance. The second is excessive executive dominance; this is a level of executive dominance that is not necessary for the constitution to function properly. Instead, this dominance hinders the efficient functioning of the British constitution. In differentiating between the two novel concepts, this analysis explores various factors that exist within the British constitution that contribute to executive dominance. To demonstrate the presence of excessive executive dominance within the constitution, the thesis breaks the definition down to create a two-step test. The satisfaction of both steps illustrates the presence of excessive executive dominance. The thesis applies this two-step test to illustrate the presence of excessive executive dominance and evidence the consequences of the concept within the British constitution. Namely, the undermining of constitutional principles, the changing of constitutional facts and the modifying of parliamentary sovereignty. This application of the test offers an alternative explanation to judicial treatment via case law analysis while also highlighting the presence of excessive executive dominance in the Brexit process and the UK’s approach to the Covid-19 pandemic. This thesis contributes to the existing literature on executive dominance by introducing two novel concepts, a legal yardstick for determining the presence of excessive executive dominance within the British constitution, two case studies that evidence the concept's existence.