Lead arranger reputation and the structure of loan syndicates


This study explores the effects of information asymmetry and arranger reputations on syndicated loan structures. The moral hazard problem arising from information asymmetries between borrower and syndicate can be overcome only by the most reputable arrangers. Both moral hazard and adverse selection problems appear when arrangers have an information advantage over other syndicate participants. However, the adverse selection problem arises only when low-reputation arrangers lend to opaque borrowers.

Publication DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.intfin.2015.05.021
Divisions: College of Business and Social Sciences > Aston Business School
Additional Information: © 2015, Elsevier. Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Publication ISSN: 1873-0612
Last Modified: 29 Jan 2024 08:17
Date Deposited: 15 Nov 2018 13:32
Full Text Link:
Related URLs: https://linking ... 042443115000748 (Publisher URL)
PURE Output Type: Article
Published Date: 2015-09-01
Authors: Chaudhry, Sajid M. (ORCID Profile 0000-0001-8769-8920)
Kleimeier, Stefanie

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