Charity registration and reporting:a cross-Jurisdictional and theoretical analysis of regulatory impact


Increasingly governments worldwide regulate charities, seeking to restrict the number of organizations claiming taxation exemptions, reduce abuse of state support and fraud. Under public interest theory governments may increase philanthropy through public trust and confidence in charities. Under public choice theory regulators will maximize political returns, ‘manage’ charity-government relationships, and avoid regulatory capture. Phillips and Smith (2014) suggest that charities’ regulatory regimes should coalesce, despite jurisdictional diversity. We analyse charity regulatory regimes against underlining theories of regulation, and assess regulatory costs and benefits. Thus regulators can reduce regulatory inefficiency, and balance accountability and transparency demands with charities’ abilities to deliver.

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Divisions: College of Business and Social Sciences > Aston Business School > Accounting
College of Business and Social Sciences > Aston Business School
Additional Information: © 2017 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License (, which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way. Funding: JSPS KAKENHI: [Grant Number 15K12993].
Uncontrolled Keywords: Charity accountability,Regulatory costs, Regulatory theory
Publication ISSN: 1471-9045
Last Modified: 05 Apr 2024 07:13
Date Deposited: 11 Oct 2017 15:50
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Related URLs: http://www.tand ... 37.2017.1383717 (Publisher URL)
PURE Output Type: Article
Published Date: 2018
Published Online Date: 2017-10-06
Accepted Date: 2017-09-07
Authors: Cordery, Carolyn J. (ORCID Profile 0000-0001-9511-7671)
Deguchi, Masayuki

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