False memories, nonbelieved memories, and the unresolved primacy of communication


Mahr and Csibra make a compelling case for a communicative function of episodic remembering, but a less compelling case that this is its primary function. Questions arise on whether confirming their predictions would support their account sufficiently, on the communicative function of preserving rich nonbelieved memories, and on the epistemic benefits of developing false memories via the acceptance of misinformation.

Publication DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X17001455
Divisions: College of Health & Life Sciences
Additional Information: This article has been published in a revised form in Behavioral and Brain Sciences https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X17001455. This version is free to view and download for private research and study only. Not for re-distribution, re-sale or use in derivative works. © copyright holder.
Publication ISSN: 1469-1825
Last Modified: 01 Apr 2024 07:19
Date Deposited: 10 Jul 2017 14:50
PURE Output Type: Letter
Published Date: 2018-03-01
Published Online Date: 2018-01-22
Accepted Date: 2017-05-13
Authors: Nash, Robert A. (ORCID Profile 0000-0002-2284-2001)



Version: Accepted Version

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