Tacit collusion, firm asymmetries and numbers:evidence from EC merger cases


This paper estimates the implicit model, especially the roles of size asymmetries and firm numbers, used by the European Commission to identify mergers with coordinated effects. This subset of cases offers an opportunity to shed empirical light on the conditions where a Competition Authority believes tacit collusion is most likely to arise. We find that, for the Commission, tacit collusion is a rare phenomenon, largely confined to markets of two, more or less symmetric, players. This is consistent with recent experimental literature, but contrasts with the facts on ‘hard-core’ collusion in which firm numbers and asymmetries are often much larger.

Publication DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2010.05.005
Divisions: College of Business and Social Sciences > Aston Business School > Economics, Finance & Entrepreneurship
College of Business and Social Sciences > Aston Business School
Uncontrolled Keywords: tacit collusion,collective dominance,coordinated effects,European mergers,asymmetries,Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering,Industrial relations,Strategy and Management,Aerospace Engineering
Publication ISSN: 0167-7187
Last Modified: 08 Dec 2023 09:32
Date Deposited: 13 Feb 2013 11:24
Full Text Link:
Related URLs: http://www.scop ... tnerID=8YFLogxK (Scopus URL)
PURE Output Type: Article
Published Date: 2011-03
Authors: Davies, Stephen
Olczak, Matthew (ORCID Profile 0000-0001-6808-3832)
Coles, Heather



Version: Accepted Version

Export / Share Citation


Additional statistics for this record