

Rethinking the near collapse of certification programmes in commodity value chains: A temporal myopia perspective

Abstract

Drawing on temporal myopia as a lens, we explore the near collapse of certification programmes in commodity value chains. Developing our contribution in the context of the Ghana cocoa industry, data for our inquiry comes from semi structured interviews and focus group interviews with loosely connected industry actors, including, farmers, certification officers, regulators, and licenced buying companies. Providing insight into the performative drivers and sustenance of certification programmes, we argue that the pursuit of short-term advantages derived from a repertoire of micro-practices constitutively impede certification programmes. These uncoordinated practices, in reinforcing short-term preferences, we found, precipitates the decoupling of certification standards from present and future value capture, inevitably, producing the delayed and catastrophic problem of the near collapse of the certification programme. The implications for the theory and practice of commodity value chains are presented.

KEYWORDS: Certification programmes, commodity value chain, cocoa, temporal myopia

Introduction

Commodity certification programmes have become a tool or mechanism for controlling production, trade, and consumption trends across developed and emerging economies (de Jesús-Crespo et al., 2016; Ingram et al., 2014). Referred to as a set of voluntary standards aimed to making sustainable agricultural production in socio-economic and environmental, also serve as a mechanism to improving the livelihood of commodity producers, their families, and communities (Astrid Fenger et al., 2017; Ansah et al., 2020), and are frequently promoted as a gateway to sustainability and a framework for sustainable production across global markets (Rueda and Lambin, 2013). Often developed by non-governmental certification bodies and global lead firms, these certification programmes encourage the adherence to best practices known to promote environmental conservation (Ruben and Fort, 2012), positive

socioeconomic conditions, and offering price premium to commodity producers and access to a global market (de Jesús-Crespo et al., 2016; Ranjan Jena and Grote, 2017).

Successful third-party certification programmes have been credited for democratizing best practices with their tailored training for farmers and other actors within the Agricultural commodity chain (Astrid Fenger et al., 2017). For instance, UTZ-Rainforest Alliance, a non-governmental certification body focusing on the cocoa, tea, and coffee value chain in the developed and emerging economies is cited as to having significantly help their certified cocoa farmers improve their production, their net income, profit, and price premiums (Iddrisu et al., 2020; Takahashi and Todo, 2017).

Nevertheless, an emerging literature has started to explore the challenges in the implementation of third-party certification programmes, their impact on commodity producers, as well as the context within which they enable (or impede) sustainable value capture (Ansah et al., 2020; Brako et al., 2021). The thread running through these studies suggest that some of these programmes and their certifications are being doled out to actors who just needs to comply with very basic off-farm and on-farm certification requirements (Richard and Alexandros, 2021). In this regard, many of these certification programmes are gradually outliving their usefulness (Basso et al., 2012; Ingram et al., 2014; Oya et al., 2017; Astrid Fenger et al., 2017) and have come to represent mere certification badges, leaving room for (non) certified commodity producers to exploit their country's weak institutions and cooperatives to even sell certified produce to conventional buyers and by simply smuggling their produce across borders to neighbouring countries for immediate cash (Amankwah-Amoah et al., 2018; Gockowski et al., 2013). Of particular note here is the extent to which weak institutions and other loosely coupled actors in the CVC have decoupled certification objectives from practice, resulting in them been frequently viewed with mistrust, and how

they frequently get exploited by private and public entities for their own gain rather than improving commodity producers and their respective families' livelihoods as well as their communities (Beuchelt and Zeller, 2011; Blackman and Rivera, 2011; Giuliani et al., 2017; Almeile et al., 2022). Surprisingly enough, however, CVC scholars have remained silent on these social and environmental phenomena.

Against this backdrop, our purpose in this paper is to explore how the differential and competing organizing practices of the actors' in CVCs combine to precipitate the near collapse of the certification programmes which seeks to promote sustainable agricultural production and livelihoods in the global south. This issue is particularly important given that the government(regulator) and certification organisation's ability to capture the full benefits of certification practices is partly predicated on the ability to curtail the floundering certification programmes. Drawing on TM as a theoretical lens, we focus on how the organising practices of actors in the cocoa value chain may combine to impede the successful implementation of these certification programmes. Our TM approach seeks to provide insight into the how and why various actors in the value chain tend to (un)consciously develop and adopt damaging organizing practices that has the potential to destroy certification programmes. Empirically focussing on the Ghana cocoa sector, data for the inquiry comes from interviews, focus group discussions and publicly available documents with 'loosely coupled actors' in the CVC, made up of farmers, certification officers, regulators, and buying companies in Ghana's cocoa sector.

We make two key contributions to literature on certification programmes in commodity value chain. First, drawing on TM as a lens (Ridge et al., 2014; Opper and Burt, 2020) we provide a searing insight into how the actions and decisions of a range of loosely coupled actors embedded in CVCs within the contingencies of global changing demands and requirements, may contribute to the rapid floundering of certification programmes in CVCs.

Second, in emphasising how the desire to capture price premiums drives the actions and decisions of actors in CVCs, our study does not only extend our understanding as to why certification programmes in some CVCs may be successful than others. It shed light on how taken for granted everyday organizing practices could combine to facilitate (or impede) the rapid demise of a certification programme.

The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: First, we review the literature on commodity certification programmes and TM with the aim of developing a unified perspective on the implementation of certification programmes and how TM plays out in organising. The next section describes the methodology employed for this study and set out the approaches to the data collection and analysis. Next is the research findings after which we discuss the implications of our findings to the theory and practice of certification programmes in CVCs.

Commodity certification programmes in CVCs

Agricultural commodity certification programmes have evolved to contribute to improving production, product quality, and governance in trade and value chain relationships (Auld 2010; Herzfeld and Jongeneel 2012). In recent times, a growing body of literature have come to conceptualise these commodity certification programmes as a strategic mechanism to improving the livelihood of commodity producers, their families, environment, and respective communities across developed and emerging economies (Ruf and Schroth 2015; Iddrisu et al., 2020). Thus, third-party certification programmes typically use market mechanisms to change production and trading practices that, in turn, impact consumer and producer welfare, their families and the ecosystems (Barham and Weber 2012; Ruben and Zuniga 2011). Notably, certification among agricultural food safety standards is an important

part of the global food chain and is becoming more of a need for commodity producers to access high-value markets (Henson and Reardon 2005). That notwithstanding, the popularity of third-party certification programmes in the CVC may be seen as a response to growing public concern about healthy living, social injustices and environmental degradation associated with conventional agricultural production across emerging economies (Lazaro, Makindara and Kilima 2008).

In that regard, a bundles of commodity certification programmes aimed at improving the well-being of farmers and agricultural workers, including standard setting and compliance, consumer advocacy, farmers capacity building, supply chain development, price premiums, and the implementation of acceptable labour standards have emerged and are all geared towards agricultural best practices (Gockowski et al., 2013; Basso et al., 2012; Ingram et al.,2014; Ansah et al., 2020). These bundles of interventions seek to have an impact, directly or indirectly, on different intermediate outcomes on farmers and other loosely coupled actors within the commodity value chains (Ingram et al., 2014). For instance, prices of produce, yields, farm revenues and wages, household income are advocated by chain actors through certification programmes across developed and emerging economies. Furthermore, Oya et al. (2018) argues that most of these third-party certification programmes use a combination of standard-setting actions, compliance, capacity building, and training for farmer groups, institutions, and cooperatives, corporate social responsibilities, as well as various market interventions such as cash premiums, and credit facilities to achieve their certification objectives especially in the emerging economies.

Other scholars like Auld (2010), Herzfeld and Jongeneel (2012) was of the view that certification among agricultural commodities have also grown through a variety of mechanisms, including governance tools in trade and value chain connections, and frequently

employ market forces to modify production and trading performances, affecting consumer and farmers welfare as well as their environment across developed and emerging economies (Ruben and Zuniga 2011; Barham and Weber 2012; Astrid Fenger et al., 2017). This means certification programmes in CVC is seen as global tool or mechanism in driving trade and connecting production networks, while maintaining sustainable eco-environment.

In keeping with these arguments is the view that commodity certification programmes have contributed to the development and improvement in the livelihood of commodity producers and their respective families and communities in the developed countries. On the contrary, several studies have found that third party certification programmes practices have not been fully materialised in the global south. Prior literature has started to examine the challenges in the implementation of certification programmes, their impact on commodity producers, as well as the context within which they enable (or impede) sustainable value capture (Ansah et al., 2020; Brako et al., 2021). Prior studies have reported that some of these certification programmes are doled out to actors who just have to comply with very basic requirements, and that many of these certification programmes are gradually outliving their usefulness (Basso et al., 2012; Ingram et al., 2014; Oya et al., 2017; Astrid Fenger et al., 2017). This epistemic-reality gap as observed by many commentators have left room for (non) certified commodity producers to exploit their country's weak institutions to even sell certified produce to conventional buyers by simply smuggling their produce across borders to neighbouring countries for immediate cash (Amankwah-Amoah et al., 2018; Gockowski et al., 2013). Of particular note here is the extent to which weak institutions and other stakeholders in the CVC have decoupled certification objectives from practice, resulting in them been frequently viewed with mistrust, and how they frequently get exploited by private and public entities for their own gain rather than improving commodity producers and their

respective families' livelihoods (Beuchelt and Zeller, 2011; Blackman and Rivera, 2011; Giuliani et al., 2017). The upshot of these decoupling in practice is the potential savings for commodity producers because noncompliance or divergence from standards might lead to decreased investment in new or more demanding socio-environmental practices (Giovannucci, Byers, and Liu, 2008; Bray and Neilson, 2017; Giuliani et al., 2017). As a result, commodity producers often suffer the cost of certifications programmes, yet may not be able to sell all their certified produce or be compelled to sell their goods as non-certified and at a reduced price to conventional buyers (Pierrot, Giovannucci and Kasterine, 2010; Dumont et al., 2014; DeFries et al., 2017). In the next section we provide a brief overview of TM, and how it may play out to contribute to the perceived floundering of commodity certification programmes in organising.

Temporal myopia in organising

The word 'myopia' in medicine, is used to describe the ophthalmic condition of short-sightedness, emphasizing a refractive error impeding an individual from bending to see other directions (Fredrick, 2002). Assimilated into management studies, the condition has been frequently used to describe managers or organization that tend to over-focus on the short-term, and in turn, struggle to see or consider the long-term outcomes of their actions within the contingencies of organizing (Maskell and Malmberg, 2007; Katelaris, 2011; Chikudate, 2015). Kim and Zauberman (2009) describe temporal myopia (TM) as a syndrome that impede organisational members ability to consider the future implications of their present actions and decision. TM in this regard points to individuals or organizational members placing emphasis on what could be described as short-term advantages that could be derived from their behaviour in practice, without considering the potential long-term disadvantages of those

behaviours (Ridge et al., 2014). The net present value of the short-term advantages as perceived by these members, we argue, reduces their capacity to evaluate the potential long-term disadvantages of their present behaviours in the future. This way of thinking then reinforces short-term preferences, inevitably producing what Mella and Pellicelli (2017: 6) describe as ‘delayed and large, often catastrophic, problems when the effect of the disadvantages becomes evident’. TM therefore has the potential to helping people to understand their environment and decisions but prevents them from engaging in active thought analysis of their actions and decisions (van der Wal et al., 2018; Blagoev et al., 2021).

Conceptualising how TM may play out in the implementation of certification programmes in CVCs, we argue that the overwhelming pressures on actors to meeting their present needs tends to capture their attention, thereby decreasing their cognitive bandwidth (Sarpong et al., 2023), and changing how they organise and make decisions related to the creating and capturing value from the certification programmes within the contingencies of the socio-economic environment in which they are operate.

Serving as a blocking mechanism to thinking in time streams (Sarpong et al., 2019), TM makes it difficult for ‘loosely coupled actors’ in the CVC, made up of farmers, certification officers, regulators, and produce buying companies in the commodity value chain to escape their past as they keep ‘re-inventing the wheel’ and laser focusing on what they could potentially capture from certification programmes in the present. The actions and decisions that goes into capturing value from the programme gets decoupled from the past and the future. In doing this, they ignore both the past, which normally includes the context in which they operated, and the future— the socio-economic and environmental implications of their present practices on their future value capture. This, we argue, leads to the translation of certification programmes as sole mechanism to capturing premium prices.

This sole focus on value capture, we argue, prevents the actors from engaging in active thought and analysis of their actions and decisions within the contingencies of global changing demands and requirements. The upshot of this, we argue, is the floundering, or near collapse of certification programmes in commodity value chains. In the next section, we present the methodology and methods driving our empirical inquiry.

Methodology

4.1 Empirical research context

We develop our contribution in the context of the Ghana cocoa industry. Empirically, we chose Ghana's cocoa sector, given that the country is positioned as the world second largest cocoa producer (COCOBOD news, 2021), contributing approximately 800,000 – 1000,000 tonnes of certified and conventional cocoa annually (Ghana Cocoa Board, 2019). Despite, numerous attempts by the industry players to diversify Ghana's economy after discovery of oil in recent years, the cocoa sector remains a pillar in the Ghanaian economy. However, over decades the cocoa industry has also witnessed issues such as crop safety, pollution, and social justice have tended to dominate CSR strategies and MNCs driven certification initiatives in most commodity food value chains (Toussaint et al. 2021; Barry Callebaut 2020; Falck and Hebllich 2007; Bartikowski and Berens 2021; Mohiuddin Babu et al., 2022). The underlying goal of certification programmes has often been framed as an effort to mitigate the environmental burdens of CVCs, while at the same time contributing to the sustainable economic benefits to commodity producer's livelihood and the environment (DeFries et al., 2017). To be certified, cocoa farmers are required to follow the labels guidelines and undergo a verification process carried out by technical inspectors from the cooperatives or a license buying companies and other external auditors from the certification bodies. In Ghana certification programmes are

ran by these non-governmental certified organisations such as UTZ certified, Rainforest Alliance, and Fairtrade through the various farmer groups—cooperatives and license buying companies in a public-private agreements. These certification organisations first go through a sensitisation process to find potential cocoa farmers and to communicate the objectives of the certification programme in their various cocoa growing communities. Importantly, if the leaders of the targeted cocoa-growing community agree to proceed with a particular cocoa certification label, the certifying organization (RA, UTZ, Fairtrade) launches a community-wide dissemination certification campaign, where cocoa farmers of 18years and above are invited to join through cooperatives/associations and other farmer groups associated with a license buying company (LBCs).

Trade associations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and charities play a major role in implementing certification programmes in the cocoa sector, through advocacy, farmer training, research developments, and sometimes even offering funding directly at the local level to support certification programmes since its adoption in 2010 in Ghana's cocoa sector (Rainforest Alliance, 2015). Other actors such as financial institutions (rural banks, agricultural development banks) also provide funding support through their credit unions, by given farmers soft loans and other incentives on credit basis which goes a long way to improve production (Attipoe et al., 2020). In addition, third-party certifiers (UTZ-RA, Fairtrade) inspect/audit certified cocoa farms and LBCs to confirm compliance with certification standards. Ghana produces less than 20% certified cocoa with over 80% been conventional beans. In all, cocoa farmers farms are mapped, then they are educated, trained, and audited on best practices such spraying, approved pesticides usage by COCOBOD, child labour, pruning, weeding (three times a year), fermentation of the cocoa beans (6 days), wearing appropriate PPEs, etc. When cocoa farmers comply with all these best practices, their

farms are certified and paid a price premium at the end of the cocoa season base on their produce.

Nonetheless, most of these certification programmes in the Ghanaian cocoa sector are not delivering on their promises and are bound with drawbacks. These challenges in practice spans across financial, operational, and institutional which pose major barriers to the widespread adoption of certification in Ghana. The high cost of implementing certification programmes in the cocoa sector has an impact on both smallholder producers and off takers who buys this certified produce. The internalisation of the procedures outlined in certification standards, in particular, requires that multinational cooperations make significant changes to their operations (Basso et al., 2012; Ingram et al.,2014). This changes in practices typically demands significant financial commitments, which may be beyond the financial capabilities of some farmer associations and cooperatives, as well as LBCs engaging in certification in Ghana. Moreover, certified bodies and farmer groups frequently needs to recruit specialised and technical personnel to oversee internal certification procedures and train other staffs and farmers on certification standards, both of which demand considerable financial investment. Similarly, the cost that farmers, may incur to adjust farm operations might be prohibitive (e.g., pesticide acquisition and other farm inputs). Apart from costs associated with changes in internal operations, certification implementation entails external auditing from certification bodies, which can further increase costs for multinational cooperations, produce buyers and certification organisations. Besides, heavy bureaucracy, lack of farmer groups, and difficulties localising certification principles also constitutes some challenges to certification programmes in Ghana. In addition, the extensive documentation of certification principles, guidelines, and criteria as well as the bureaucracy when dealing with national and regulatory authorities—the Ghana cocoa and the Forestry commission of Ghana, and the hardship of securing

documentation often discourage certification bodies in practice. Also, the lack of farmers' organization often adds to the time and effort for locally implementing certification standards. As well, farmer group formation requires a lot of work by LBCs and cooperatives and is frequently complicated by dynamics within groups and individual agendas during decision-making (Buehler and Schuett, 2014; Dompreeh, Asare and Gasparatos, 2021). These behaviour among cocoa farmers hinders the development of certification practices, due to the divergence views among farmer groups which turn to decouple the local certification standards from practice. Finally, a number of policy issues also prevent certification from being adopted and implemented effectively in Ghana. These issues include uneven government regulations, a lack of clarity regarding tenure for certificate holders, and, most significantly, the absence of a comprehensive national certification policy.

Data collection

We relied on multiple data sources collected from the loosely coupled actors (farmers, certification officers, regulators, and produce buying companies), to develop an in-depth understanding of the organising practices to the floundering certification programmes in CVC. The data for the empirical enquiry collected the second and third quarter of 2021 from three main sources: Interviews, focus group discussions and publicly available archival documents.

Interviews

Data was chiefly collected using semi-structured interviews. As shown in table 1, A total of 52 interviews were conducted with certification bodies (5), Ghana cocoa board (5), License buying companies (10), farmers (25) and cooperatives (7). Following the collection of the

biographical information from our respondents, our interviews focussed on getting our respondents to explicate their understanding of the certification programmes, their perception of the programme's value to their everyday practices. We then thrilled down into how the certification has come to influence their work, the opportunities, and challenges they face in working integrating the certification processes, and standards in their work. In signing off, we invite them to recount their hopes, fear, potential anxieties about the future of their work in a changing world where certification has become important to accessing global markets and commanding premium prices. Each interview lasted for at least 1.5 hours were tape recorded and transcribed within 24 hours of collection.

4.2.1 Focus group discussions

With the goal to complement the farmer interviews, we performed four semi-structured focus group discussions, between April and August 2021, using a questionnaire with main, additional, and clarifying questions as proposed by Laforest (2009). To facilitate free talking among cocoa farmers, we selected farmers who belonged to the same farmer group/association or originated from the same community under a certified LBC. The focus groups consisted of 11 farmers. A total of 44 cocoa farmers participated in the four focus group discussions.

4.2.2 Other data sources

We supplemented our interview data with secondary data in the form of publicly available documents. These included general certification related information and documents available on the websites of the Ghana cocoa board, and various certification bodies including Rainforest Alliance, UTZ certified, and Fairtrade. From Some Interviews granted by some industry actors on cocoa certification which we found on YouTube were also added to our data set. Table 2.0 provides summary of data sources and the information retrieved.

Table 1.0: Summary of Data collected

No.	Methods	Producers	Cooperatives	Certification Bodies	License Buying Companies	Ghana Cocoa Board	Total
1	Interviews	25	7	5	10	5	52
2	Focus Groups (4)	44	-	-	-	-	44
3	Publicly available archival documents	6	2	5	3	4	20
4	Social Media (YouTube)	-	-	2	2	-	4
	<i>Grand total</i>						120

Table 2.0: Other Data Sources and information retrieved

No.	Data Sources	Information retrieved
1	Rainforest Alliance and UTZ website	Company history, Code of conduct and practice, Press Releases
2	Ghana Cocoa Board	Agricultural programmes, Regulatory procedures, Annual reports, Subsidiaries roles
3	Cooperatives (Cocoa Abrabopa, Eco-Agro)	Company history and practices, Mapping zone, Corporate Social Responsibilities
4	Social media (YouTube)	LBCs views on Ghana's cocoa certification, UTZ-RA contribution to farmers https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Pu14iHa4-1A ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qDfDsPul7bg

Data analysis

Owing to the paucity of research on the challenges facing the certification programmes in CVCs, we adopted an exploratory research approach for our inquiry (Swedberg, 2020). We started by re-reading the transcribed field data to ensure that the transcription and the narratives from participants—loosely coupled actors matched what we heard in the fields. Following this, all the textual data from different sources were triangulated to form a whole and ensure their completeness (Natow, 2020). The main data analysis then followed three main stages. First, we engaged in open coding by reducing the textual data into simple and topical codes or categories reflecting the organizing activities of the various actors in the CVC, contexts, and the consequences.

The second stage, akin to axial coding, involved putting the data back and making connections between the initial categories. We probed the data further to identify more connections between our initial categories and went further to merge those initial categories that appeared very similar. We continued to probe the new categories to explore how they reflected or link into the contexts within which they were generated or produced. Drawing on theoretical insights from the extant literature on certification programmes and TM, the identified segments were then analysed and interpreted iteratively until common themes emerged and became saturated (Strauss and Corbin, 1997; Suddaby, 2006).

We then moved onto the third stage of selective coding. Here, we systematically probed and validated the linkages we gave made between our emerging categories. This was also an opportunity to refine some of our categories that served as a basis for the storyline we employed to frame the accounts of our research participants. These themes were then sorted, reconstituted (Strauss and Corbin, 2008) and indexed to generate the analytical categories of technical concerns for inability of actors to escape past practices, re-invention the certification

wheels in the present, and the inability to (re) invent practices for the future. Probing further the connections and conceptual properties of the respective categories, we developed the aggregate theoretical dimensions organised around the past, present, and future certification practices in CVCs, which we used to explore viable theoretical explanations of certification programmes in organising. Finally, we used our emerging patterns to develop greater insight and form descriptive explanations as to how TM may induce loosely coupled actors in their situated practice in CVCs. In the next section, we present the fine details of our research findings.

Research Findings

Our data evidence suggests that third-party certification programmes are struggling to get translated and embedded in the commodity value chain we studied. In particular, we found the lost in translation of uncoordinated practices variations among the loosely coupled actors in the CVC resulting in the decoupling of certification standards from the organizing practices of these actors. In this regard, rather than adhering to global best practices introduced by certification bodies, the actors tend to approach certification programmes as a sole mechanism to capturing premium prices. The sole focus on value capture, we argue, prevents the actors from engaging in active thought and analysis of their actions and decisions within the contingencies of global changing demands and requirements. We present the fine details of our findings along three lines of attention: Inability of actors to escape their past practices, Inability to (re) invent their organizing futures, and the visceral re-invention of the certification wheels in the present.

Inability of actors to escape past practices

Inability to escape the past certification practices as used in organising our findings, refers to chain actors' inability to forego past certification practices in the present due to TM inducing their cognitive bandwidth in their situated practices. The upshot of this syndrome among loosely couple actors in certification practices is to induce them from adhering to global standard agricultural best practices introduced by these certification bodies and NGOs in the CVCs. Its influence on certification practices manifests itself when loosely coupled actors such as cocoa farmers forego the standard global certification practices to their traditional farming practices. As argued by one of certification managers:

I have come to realised that cocoa farmers and the regulator of the sector are content with the current farming practices in the cocoa sector, that why after registering our farmers onto the certification programme, educating, and training them on the global standard best practices they still go back to the old farm practices with the notion that certification is extra work and capital intensive to implement (Certification Manager).

While the certification managers emphasised that the cocoa farmers who are the main implementers of the certification programme and the regulator (Ghana cocoa board) were content with the performance and outputs from the cocoa sector, the regulator of the sector thinks certification is voluntary and certification bodies—UTZ-Rainforest Alliance, and Fairtrade cannot impose the voluntary practices on the farmers. For the Ghana cocoa board, sustainability arguments trump over certification practices and that influence their regulatory decisions in the cocoa sector.

We keep saying certification is voluntary and for a small number of produce buyers, every farmer has the right to redraw from the programme after signing on. As a regulator we are much concern on sustainable cocoa production and not certification, if the farmers are going by their traditional farming practices over certification, I believe is their choice (Dep Research Director).

We argue that been content to pursue practices on the blind side of the global standards set the stage for these loosely coupled actors to wilfully defy certification requirements in the

cocoa sector. Even with(out) certification the cocoa sector is able to meet their global and domestic demands since there is a high market demand for sustainable cocoa and not certified.

This was the case of another respondent:

Over the years, we have encouraged and promoted sustainable agricultural and have contributed to high yield in meeting our market demands. I think is the best way to growth in our cocoa sector is to ensure that our farmers are not short-change in their farm practices and not certification (Marketing Manager).

The commodity value chain operates through different stakeholders and intermediaries in connecting both the downstream and upstream activities (Browne et al., 2000). This study findings shows how loosely coupled actors especially the Ghana cocoa board and other actors have substitutes resources for creativity. The certification bodies, cooperatives, and LBCs interviewed confirmed they have invested in mechanised farming, corporate social responsibilities which support the call to certification standards and resourced their farmers with farm inputs in order to improve certification. Despite these on(off) farm resource contributions to sustainable certification practices in the cocoa sector, we found out that there is still low production for certified cocoa with a small number of loosely couple actors adhering to the certification standards. An interview with a cocoa farmer, revealed that the long-term returns from cocoa production, in the face of rising inflation and high pesticides prices, compel most of them to engage in their past practices rather focusing on supports from the certification bodies and the government. He shared his opinion and had this to say:

Certification is costly, even the farm inputs that the Ghana cocoa board through their cooperatives and LBCs supply to us are not for free, they sell them to us. As a farmer if I have to go through all these compliance measures and still earn a small amount of cash premium and also sell my certified cocoa as same price as conventional, then there is no need to waste time on certification practices. I still go by my old farm practices, even though I have acquired basic training in certification (Farmer).

Although some loosely coupled actors were content with content with the current certification practices and performance, we also found instances where some chain actors with different interest keep reinventing past wheels in their present certification practices. We explore these practices in the next section.

5.2 The re-invention the certification wheels in the present

This study revealed that loosely coupled actors in their situated certification practices tend to repeat same past practices which does not support the program 's growth in the present stage. For instance, over emphasising on the payment of cash premium to cocoa farmers to 'capture their minds 'in order to obtain the needed value from cocoa production, which tend to be unsustainable in meeting certification objectives (Ansah et al., 2018; Ingram et al., 2014). Meanwhile, many of these loosely coupled actors—certification bodies (UTZ- RA, FLO) and license buying companies (LBCs) in this study believe that, certifying farmers, and paying price premiums at the present stage is the best way for farmers to conform to global certification best practices and a means to alleviate any social and environmental unethical conducts that is associated with commodity production (de Jesús-Crespo et al., 2016). In that regard, these certification managers and other actors keep emphasising and paying cash premiums to farmers over the years, which cocoa farmers indicated in this study that it has not been a sustainable incentive to improve livelihood. As observed by a certification manager of a Cocoa cooperative, who reported that her company had been paying cash premiums through their LBC to their farmers over the years, and that has become the selling story to get cocoa farmers to sign onto a particular certification label. Thus, obviously, as a source of motivation to disseminate a particular certification label to cocoa farmers in the cocoa growing communities. In the words of the certification manager:

In our annual reviews, we propose new mechanisms to improve the certification programme, for instance other social interventions to replace cash premiums, but all these suggestions have not been materialised because of different interest among stakeholders we work with in the cocoa sector. Premium payments have been the spotlight story for all certification bodies and LBCs engaging in certification of which our farmers keep complaining is not a better option as the objective of certification labels emphasised.

The decision by cooperatives and LBCs on premium payments was not different when we sort the views from the regulator of the cocoa sector, thus the Ghana cocoa board on how these practices among LBCs, and certification bodies tend to impede the development of Ghana 's cocoa certification programmes. Officials at the Ghana cocoa board revealed that cash premium has been a source of motivation for cocoa farmers, and a requirement for LBCs engaging in certification. Even though they agreed that the premiums are not enough to sustain their farmers all year round, they could not share any new innovative substitutes to cash premiums which they keep paying over the years. One manager has this to say:

The certification code of conduct mandates MNCs who wants to buy certified cocoa from Ghana to pay premium for every bag of cocoa purchased. This premium is an extra cash cocoa farmers receive for engaging in certification, and we can't change it. What we do is to ensure that this premium is paid to cocoa farmers. We also pay bonuses to our farmers after every cocoa season, we know they are not enough but is better than nothing.

We found out that certification officers and the Ghana cocoa board (COCOBOD) considers the immediate success factors of the certification programme, such as premium payments, rather than exploring new ideas and opportunities to improve the certification programmes in the present which tend to improve the future. In addition to the above findings, the narratives from some cocoa farmers show how they engage in some non-conforming practices at the blind side of various certification labels requirements and the global standards. Thereby decoupling global standards from local certification practices. Decoupling in certification practices we argue is as a result of improper supervision and monitoring of the certification

standards by these key actors. Some cocoa farmers who participated in the focus group shared their views on how they have decoupled standards from practice, and some have resorted to the use of unapproved chemicals on their farms irrespective of regulators and global education on banned pesticides usage. One cocoa farmer shared his view on decoupling in practice:

Once a while, the technical officers from COCOBOD comes to our community to educate us on farm management and the required pesticides to use, they sometimes come with some of the pesticides and even directs us to where to get some to buy in the market. Our problem is that they don't go to our farms to even see if we are applying the chemicals correctly. Also, its sometimes difficult getting the exact type to pesticide to buy in the market, because of such attitude from them, I buy any pesticide which is available on the market, I know is not prescribe by COCOBOD or Rainforest Alliance (Cocoa farmer).

As pointed out earlier, and of particular notice from the narratives from participants is the extent to which these loosely couple actors in the cocoa sector have decoupled certification objectives from practice, resulting in them been frequently viewed with mistrust, and how they frequently get exploited by private and public entities for their own gain rather than improving livelihoods and the environment (Beuchelt and Zeller, 2011; Blackman and Rivera, 2011; Giuliani et al., 2017). The upshot of these non-conformance in practice is the floundering of many of these certification programmes especially in the cocoa sector. Consequently, these compelling issues surrounding certification practices in the cocoa value chain have led to a reduction in certified cocoa production among producers and exports, because of the shift by cocoa farmers not complying to the global standards. This is because, monitoring and enforcement of voluntary certification requirements are less than ideal. Owing to the fact that actors in the sector are numerous and geographically dispersed, especially across the remote areas in Ghana's which gives way for noncompliance behaviour among these loosely coupled

actors especially cocoa farmers who are the field implementers of the certification programmes (Blackman and Naranjo, 2012). Besides, while global purchasers awarding in-house socio-environmental certification place equal emphasis on social and environmental issues and establish many norms and criteria to guide cocoa farmers' behaviour, these regulations may be poorly defined in the global south, making compliance even more challenging for cocoa farmers especially in the emerging economies. The following revelations emerged from interviews with the cocoa farmers: one of them said:

Our cooperative leaders and COCOBOD are not supporting us with enough farm inputs, financial support, PPEs, and other incentives to help improve our farms. These have compelled most of us to shift our attention from the certification requirements and implementing our own practices just to sustain our farm and livelihoods. It obvious that certification is expensive and if we have no support, it difficult for us to continue implementing the standard requirements introduced by the cooperative.

Even though, decoupling certification standards from practice may serve as a means to save some cocoa farmers money because noncompliance or divergence from standards might lead to decreased investment in new or more demanding socio-environmental practises, however, it also makes it difficult for cocoa farmers to benefit from certification programmes, which contributes to reduction in their operating cost (Ortiz-Miranda and Moragues-Faus, 2015; Ibanez and Blackman, 2016). As one cocoa farmer who has been victim during the focus group discussions succinctly puts this in perspective:

Yes, I did not comply with most of the requirements introduced by Rainforest Alliance because of the cost factor. Also, I am over 60 years, and cannot comply with all these standards, which is difficult and expensive. So, I use other means to keep my farm moving. Well, the effect is that I had very low yield at the end of the cocoa season and some of the cocoa trees are also dying because of the pesticides, pruning, and the weedicide I did not apply correctly. It also affected the amount of premium I received.

In contrast, decoupling standards from practise can have a variety of rationales among chain actors in a commodity value chain (Giuliani et al., 2017; Jamali, Lund-Thomsen and Khara,

2017). Certain divergent practises by these chain actors may be established in good faith and influenced by local specificities that prevent complete execution of the requirements (Wälti, 2012; Giuliani et al., 2017). In that regard, some cocoa farmers have diverted from the main certification standards introduced by certification bodies (RA- UTZ, and FLO) through various cooperative and LBCs and have resorted to their traditional agricultural practices. One cocoa farmer asserted that:

I did not follow the pruning processes I learnt during my training with the cooperative. I taught the training was not the best, and I adopted my own way of pruning my cocoa farm and is working for me. Other farmers who implemented the pruning procedures, most of their cocoa trees are dying.

Although the management of certification programmes had put in place measures to overcome decoupling in practices in order to cushion cocoa farmers from the substandard practices arising out of poor supervision and monitoring of the certification programmes in particular, nonetheless, these cocoa farmers were deeply etched in their present practices. We explore this in the paragraphs that follow.

5.3 Inability to (re) invent certification practices for the future

Focusing on the past, present and the future practices enable chain actors to plan themselves backwards and forward in meeting their long- and short-term goals (Suddendorf, 2007: 299; Sarpong et al., 2019). From this insight, this study supports Cunha (2004) arguments that been able to reinvent the past practices in the present would be a beneficial in achieving future objectives. The expert interviews suggest that loosely couple actors—managers of the certification programmes were deeply etched in their present certification practices. Thus, there were content with their present practices and unable to reinvent these practices for the future. But rather laser focusing on what they could potentially capture from certification

programmes in the present without considering how they could transfer the present success practices into the future. We argue that the inability of certification officers and other chain actors to reinvent the past and present success practices into the future is a result of TM syndrome inducing these actors from thinking within timestreams from connecting the past and the present into the future. The following excerpt is illustrative of the potential outcome of inability to reinvent into the future certification practices:

I can see that managers of the certification programmes are stacked in their present practices. They are unable to learn from the past and even transfer some success stories from related commodities and countries into the future. I think if you are doing something which is been implemented globally you can learn from other experiences and draw on their opportunities and weakness, which will serve as a guide in current practices and even invent it into the future (District officer, LBC).

Another manager has this to say:

Over the years technologically innovative solutions such as drones, non-adjustable weighing scales, point of interest mapper, integrated pest management program have been introduced by certification bodies and the regulator to ensure sustainable agricultural practice. The challenge is that managers of the certification programmes are unable to transfer these technology and pesticides reduction initiative in the future. After a year or two the initiative is abandoned, we are only interested in the immediate benefits, that why our certification programmes keep floundering.

Regardless of the training, innovative mechanisms, and other practices to improve certification programmes in the CVCs, we observe that most farmer groups and their leaders in the cocoa value chain were vulnerable to certification rules and the global standards. Thus, they were unable to escape past certification practices and keep 're-inventing the wheel' and a lesser focusing on what they could potentially capture from the certification programmes in the present. Which in turn can produce a non-sustainable outcome even if the practices of loosely coupled actors are rational to global certification standards.

Discussion and conclusion


The purpose of this paper was to explore certification programmes in the CVC, drawing on temporal myopia as a lens to examine the differential and competing organizing practices of the actors' in CVCs combine to precipitate the near collapse of the certification programmes which frequently seeks to promote sustainable production and livelihoods. We examined the issues in the context of cocoa producers, license buying companies, certification bodies, farmer groups and cooperatives, and the Ghana cocoa board practices. Our study uncovered how TM induce loosely coupled CVC actors to pursue short-term advantages while ignoring the disadvantages and challenges such practices pose for the future and sustenance of the certification system. Table 3.0 is a summary of some of the signature practices that combine in various ways to constitutively impede the sustenance of certification programmes in the CVC we studied.

Table 3.0 Examples of CVC actors signature practices impeding certification programmes

Loosely coupled actors in CVC	Signature practices
1 Farmers	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Excessive agro-chemical application by cocoa farmers. ▪ Emphasis on cutlass over motorised pruning and the use of banned pesticides by cocoa farmers. ▪ Farmers not declaring the right farm size for mapping and certification; engaging children in the certification farm activities. ▪ Certified farmers can choose to sell their produce to non-certified LBCs without incurring any penalties.
2 Certification Officers	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Digital transformation of farmland inspection records by certification officers. ▪ Emphasises on farmers registration charges over global certification standards. ▪ Focusing on English language in training than local language of cocoa farmers.
3 Regulator	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Distribution of certification work across divisions rather than having a certification division or unit ▪ Over promotion of agrochemicals and the cheap sale of inorganic fertilizers to farmers to score political points. ▪ Perceived wrong timing of cocoa health and extension division (CHED), pruning and mass spraying exercises on cocoa farms. ▪ COCOBOD demands for portion of farmers premiums and takes \$20 per ton as charges before shipping certified cocoa.
4 Produce buying companies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Low promotion of certification standards among produce buyers ▪ No data shared among license buying companies engaging in certification ▪ Loosely coupled actors working in silos

Our findings suggest that overemphasising on price premiums, decoupling in practice, resources substitute for creativity, chain actors' content with their current practices and performance, and some cocoa farmers vulnerable to certification rules and global standards were all contributing factors to the floundering certification programmes in the CVCs. We argue that weak institutions and the differential competing interest of loosely coupled actors in the CVC have decoupled certification objectives from practice, resulting in frequently exploited by these public and private entities for their own gains rather than improving the livelihoods cocoa farmers, their families, and their environment. The inadequate regulatory and compliance measures and the associated lack of adequate enforcement of the certification programmes codes of conduct and practice due to their differential participating interest emboldens the loosely couple actors to decouple certification standard from practice in the CVCs. Our unifying model as shown in figure 1.0 highlights how actors inability to escape their past practices, their continuous 'reinvention of the wheels' of practices within the contingencies of organizing in the present, and their inability to invent the future, come together to form analytically complementary ways to extend our understanding of how the synergistic relationships between the signature practices we identified may cohere to precipitate temporal myopia in practice.

Figure 1. Temporal myopia in commodity value chains



The study makes two key contributions to the literature. First, by exploring the organising practices and the differential competing interest of loosely couple actors in the CVC, our study responds to call by CVC scholars to explore how TM plays out in commodity certification programmes in organizing. Although prior studies have examined activities of actors in the commodity sector, the process through which TM induce loosely couple actors in commodity certification practices remains unclear. The existing stream of research, however, obscures rather than exploring the issue and warrants further scholarly attention of organising practices of certification programmes in the commodity industries. Our work moves beyond the existing literature by demonstrating how TM induces various loosely coupled actors to focus on present certification practices, where they can potentially capture immediate value. Which provides spaces for farmers and other actors in the cocoa sector to forgo certification objectives, but rather see certification programmes as payment of price premium to farmers to acquire the needed certified cocoa beans in the global south. Our study helps in enriching our understanding of how TM can induce these loosely coupled actors in the cocoa sector to foresee the future of certification programme but focus on present practices and some redrawing to implement their old farming practices. In addition, our study extends existing scholarly work by integrating CVC literature (Ansah et al., 2020) and the TM (Opper and Burt, 2020) to demonstrate how activities of loosely coupled actors in the commodity industry contributed to the floundering certification programmes in the global south.

From a practical standpoint, our findings have the following implications. First, we encourage certification bodies and other loosely coupled actors to use our findings to overcome TM in their certification practices. Thereby helping cocoa farmers and other actors to focus on certification objectives rather than price premiums as a means for sustainable

certification practices in the global south. Second, certification bodies entering other commodity market can use the model (see Fig. 1) to overcome TM in their practices to avoid certification programmes been floundering in other commodity markets, especially in the global south. In addition, all the certification programmes explored in this study claim to be based on fair standard practices, however, there is the need for more educational programmes aimed at raising farmers and other chain actors within the cocoa sector awareness of the global standard practices as a means to overcome the floundering certification programmes.

Lastly, our findings indicate that payment of cash premiums to cocoa farmers have not been the best option to improve the livelihood of cocoa farmers and their respective families, therefore, we suggest there should be a dialogue between the COCOBOD (regulator) and other stakeholders within the cocoa sector to substitute premiums payment with other interventions which will have direct impact on cocoa farmers, their families, and their respective communities.

Our study is not without limitations, which in turn open opportunities for further research. First, the focus of the researcher and views from the participants on the practices leading to the floundering certification programmes in the CVCs was based on a single country (Ghana), a country with different institutional, environmental, and socio-cultural settings. These limit the generalisability of the study findings to other commodity sectors but is widely applicable to the cocoa sector than other commodities in the global south. Taken together, these factors point to a number of promising directions for future research, including other commodities and other countries in the global south to analyse the limitations of our findings.

Another plausible step for future research would be to investigate how cash premiums can be substituted with other social interventions in the CVC. Future research is needed to

explore alternate social interventions that can improve the livelihood of commodity producers, their families, and communities in the CVC. Given that cash premium is often not the main benefit from certification, some of these benefits to certification programmes can be replaced with a regulatory framework that strengthens the natural and financial capitals of farmers— though this requires concerted efforts and capacities that are often not present in many commodities producing countries, but collective dialogue with local and international partners.

Finally, as the study has revealed how the differential competing interest of loosely couple actors combine to contribute to the floundering certification programmes, and the inability of the regulator to regulate the agro-chemical industry causing a damage to cocoa beans and lowering global market demand for Ghana's cocoa. Therefore, more research is needed to extend our understanding of how these loosely coupled actors can overcome TM in their situated certification practices for successful organising.

REFERENCES

- Ainslie, G. (1975). Specious reward: a behavioral theory of impulsiveness and impulse control. *Psychological bulletin*, 82 (4): p.463.
- Almeile, A.M., Chipulu, M., Ojiako, U., Vahidi, R. and Marshall, A., 2022. Project-focussed literature on public-private partnership (PPP) in developing countries: a critical review. *Production Planning & Control*, pp.1-28.
- Amankwah-Amoah, J., Debrah, Y.A. and Nuerterey, D. (2018). Institutional legitimacy, cross-border trade, and institutional voids: Insights from the cocoa industry in Ghana. *Journal of Rural Studies*, 58: pp.136-145.
- Ansah, E.O., Kaplowitz, M.D., Lupi, F. and Kerr, J. (2020). Smallholder participation and procedural compliance with sustainable cocoa certification programmes. *Agroecology and Sustainable Food Systems*, 44 (1): pp.54-87.

- Astrid Fenger, N., Skovmand Bosselmann, A., Asare, R. and de Neergaard, A. (2017). The impact of certification on the natural and financial capitals of Ghanaian cocoa farmers. *Agroecology and Sustainable Food Systems*, 41(2): pp.143-166.
- Attipoe, S.G., Jianmin, C. and Opoku-Kwanowaa, Y., 2020. Evaluating the impact of rural finance on cocoa farmers productivity: a case study of bodi district in Ghana. *Asian J. Adv. Agric. Res*, 12, pp.36-45.
- Auld, G. (2010). Assessing certification as governance: effects and broader consequences for coffee. *The Journal of Environment & Development*, 19 (2), pp.215-241.
- Barrientos, S. (2016). Beyond Fair Trade. *The economics of chocolate*, p.213.
- Basso, K., K. Schouten, T. Renner, and M. Pfann. (2012). Cocoa Certification: Study on the costs, advantages and disadvantages of cocoa certification. International Cocoa Organization.
- Barham, B.L. and Weber, J.G. (2012). The economic sustainability of certified coffee: Recent evidence from Mexico and Peru. *World Development*, 40 (6), pp.1269-1279.
- Barry Callebaut (2020). 2019/2020 Forever chocolate progress report. https://www.barry-callebaut.com/sites/default/files/2020-12/Forever-Chocolate_Report-%202019_20.pdf Accessed 5 July 2021.
- Bartikowski, B. and Berens, G., 2021. Attribute framing in CSR communication: Doing good and spreading the word–But how? *Journal of Business Research*, 131, pp.700-708.
- Beuchelt, T.D. and Zeller, M. 2011. Profits and poverty: Certification's troubled link for Nicaragua's organic and fairtrade coffee producers. *Ecological Economics*, 70 (7): pp.1316-1324.
- Blackman, A. and Rivera, J., 2011. Producer-level benefits of sustainability certification. *Conservation biology*, 25(6), pp.1176-1185.
- Blackman, A. and Naranjo, M.A., 2012. Does eco-certification have environmental benefits? Organic coffee in Costa Rica. *Ecological Economics*, 83, pp.58-66.
- Brako, D.E., Richard, A. and Alexandros, G. (2021). Do voluntary certification standards improve yields and wellbeing? Evidence from oil palm and cocoa smallholders in Ghana. *International Journal of Agricultural Sustainability*, 19(1): pp.16-39.
- Browne, A.W., Harris, P.J., Hofny-Collins, A.H., Pasiecznik, N. and Wallace, R.R., 2000. Organic production and ethical trade: definition, practice and links. *Food policy*, 25(1), pp.69-89.
- Blagoev, B., Von Guttenberg, L. and Schoeneborn, D. (2021). From temporal myopia to foresight: Bridging the near and the distant future through temporal work. In *Academy of Management proceedings*, (Vol.2021, No. 1, p. 14570). Briarcliff Manor, NY 10510: *Academy of Management*.
- Bray, J.G. and Neilson, J. (2017). Reviewing the impacts of coffee certification programmes on smallholder livelihoods. *International Journal of Biodiversity Science, Ecosystem Services & Management*, 13 (1): pp.216-232.
- Buehler, B. and Schuett, F., 2014. Certification and minimum quality standards when some consumers are uninformed. *European Economic Review*, 70, pp.493-511.

- Chkanikova, O. and Sroufe, R. (2021). Third-party sustainability certifications in food retailing: Certification design from a sustainable supply chain management perspective. *Journal of Cleaner Production*, 282, p.124344.
- Chikudate, N. (2015). HOW Do We Use Collective Myopia Thinking? In *Collective Myopia in Japanese Organizations*, Palgrave Macmillan pp: 165-179, New York.
- Chiaburu, D.S., Oh, I.S., Berry, C.M., Li, N. and Gardner, R.G. (2011). The five-factor model of personality traits and organizational citizenship behaviors: A meta-analysis. *Journal of applied psychology*, 96 (6): p.1140.
- de Jesús-Crespo, R., Newsom, D., King, E.G. and Pringle, C. (2016). Shade tree cover criteria for non-point source pollution control in the Rainforest Alliance coffee certification program: A snapshot assessment of Costa Rica's Tarrazú coffee region. *Ecological indicators*, 66: pp.47-54.
- Deans, H., Ros-Tonen, M.A. and Derkyi, M. (2018). Advanced value chain collaboration in Ghana's Cocoa Sector: an entry point for integrated landscape approaches? *Environmental management*, 62(1): pp.143-156.
- DeFries, R.S., Fanzo, J., Mondal, P., Remans, R. and Wood, S.A. (2017). Is voluntary certification of tropical agricultural commodities achieving sustainability goals for small-scale producers? *A review of the evidence. Environmental Research Letters*, 12(3): p.033001.
- Dompreh, E.B., Asare, R. and Gasparatos, A., 2021. Sustainable but hungry? Food security outcomes of certification for cocoa and oil palm smallholders in Ghana. *Environmental Research Letters*, 16(5), p.055001.
- Dumont, E.S., Gnahoua, G.M., Ohouo, L., Sinclair, F.L. and Vaast, P. (2014). Farmers in Côte d'Ivoire value integrating tree diversity in cocoa for the provision of ecosystem services. *Agroforestry systems*, 88 (6): pp.1047-1066.
- Falck, O. and Heblich, S., 2007. Corporate social responsibility: Doing well by doing good. *Business horizons*, 50(3), pp.247-254.
- Flick, U. (2018). Triangulation in data collection. *The SAGE handbook of qualitative data collection*, pp.527-544.
- Fredrick, D.R. (2002). Myopia. *Bmj*, 324 (7347): pp.1195-1199
- Fried, Y. and Slowik, L.H., 2004. Enriching goal-setting theory with time: An integrated approach. *Academy of management Review*, 29(3), pp.404-422.
- Giuliani, E., Ciravegna, L., Vezzulli, A. and Kilian, B. (2017). Decoupling standards from practice: The impact of in-house certifications on coffee farms' environmental and social conduct. *World Development*, 96: pp.294-314.
- Giovannucci, Daniele and Byers, Alice and Liu, Pascal. (2008). *Adding Value: Certified Coffee Trade in North America*. Published in: Value-adding Standards in the North American Food Market - Trade Opportunities in Certified Products for Developing Countries. pp. 33-49.

- Gockowski, J., Afari-Sefa, V., Sarpong, D.B., Osei-Asare, Y.B. and Agyeman, N.F. (2013). Improving the productivity and income of Ghanaian cocoa farmers while maintaining environmental services: what role for certification? *International Journal of Agricultural Sustainability*, 11(4), pp.331-346.
- Guest, G., Bunce, A. and Johnson, L. (2006). How many interviews are enough? An experiment with data saturation and variability. *Field methods*, 18 (1), pp.59-82.
- Handley, S.M. and Benton Jr, W.C. (2012). The influence of exchange hazards and power on opportunism in outsourcing relationships. *Journal of Operations Management*, 30 (1-2): pp.55-68.
- Hatanaka, M., Bain, C. and Busch, L. (2005). Third-party certification in the global agrifood system. *Food policy*, 30 (3), pp.354-369.
- Henson, S., and T. Reardon. (2005). Private agri-food standards: Implications for food policy and the agri-food system. *Food Policy* 30 (3):241–53.
- Herzfeld, T. and Jongeneel, R. (2012). Why do farmers behave as they do? Understanding compliance with rural, agricultural, and food attribute standards. *Land Use Policy*, 29 (1), pp.250-260.
- Iddrisu, M., Aidoo, R. and Wongnaa, C.A. (2020). Participation in UTZ-RA voluntary cocoa certification scheme and its impact on smallholder welfare: Evidence from Ghana. *World Development Perspectives*, 20, p.100244.
- Ingram, V.J., Waarts, Y.R., Ge, L., van Vugt, S.M., Wegner, L. and Puister-Jansen, L.F. (2014). *Impact of UTZ certification of cocoa in Ivory Coast. Assessment framework and baseline* (No. 2014-010).
- Ibanez, M. and Blackman, A., 2016. Is eco-certification a win-win for developing country agriculture? Organic coffee certification in Colombia. *World development*, 82, pp.14-27.
- Jamali, D., Lund-Thomsen, P. and Khara, N., 2017. CSR institutionalized myths in developing countries: An imminent threat of selective decoupling. *Business & Society*, 56(3), pp.454-486.
- Katellaris, A. (2011). Short-sightedness puts Australia at risk. *The Medical Journal of Australia*, 195 (9): p.487.
- Keough, K.A., Zimbardo, P.G. and Boyd, J.N., 1999. Who's smoking, drinking, and using drugs? Time perspective as a predictor of substance use. *Basic and applied social psychology*, 21(2), pp.149-164.
- Kim, B.K. and Zauberan, G. (2009). Perception of anticipatory time in temporal discounting. *Journal of Neuroscience, Psychology, and Economics*, 2 (2): p.91.
- Lazaro, E., J. Makindara, and F. T. M Kilima. (2008). "Sustainability standards and coffee exports from Tanzania", Danish Institute for International Studies, DIIS Working paper, Copenhagen

Laforest J., 2009. Safety diagnosis tool kit for local communities. Guide to Organizing Semi-Structured Interviews with Key Informants. Institute national de santé publique du Québec, Québec. https://www.inspq.qc.ca/sites/default/files/publications/1437_guideorgaentretiensse_midiriginformcles2eed_va.pdf. [Accessed 12 September 2022].

Lee, J., Gereffi, G. and Beauvais, J.(2012). Global value chains and agrifood standards: Challenges and possibilities for smallholders in developing countries. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 109(31): pp.12326-12331.

Maskell, P. and Malmberg, A. (2007). Myopia, knowledge development and cluster evolution. *Journal of Economic Geography*, 7(5): pp.603-618.

Mahrizal, L., N. Lanier, L. D. Bruce, and P. Jennie. (2012). Necessary price premiums to incentivize Ghanaian organic cocoa production: A phased, orchard management approach. *HORTSCIENCE* 47 (11):1617–24.

Michel, P. and de La Croix, D. (2000). Myopic and perfect foresight in the OLG model. *Economics Letters*, 67(1): pp.53-60.

Mohiuddin Babu, M., Akter, S., Rahman, M., Billah, M.M. and Hack-Polay, D., 2022. The role of artificial intelligence in shaping the future of Agile fashion industry. *Production Planning & Control*, pp.1-15.

Natow, R. S. (2020). The use of triangulation in qualitative studies employing elite interviews. *Qualitative Research*, 20(2): pp.160-173.

Opper, S. and Burt, R. (2020). Social network and temporal myopia. *Academy of Management Journal*, (ja).

Ortiz-Miranda, D. and Moragues-Faus, A.M., 2015. Governing fair trade coffee supply: dynamics and challenges in small farmers' organizations. *Sustainable Development*, 23(1), pp.41-54.

Oya, C., Schaefer, F., Skolidou, D., McCosker, C. and Langer, L. (2017). Effects of certification schemes for agricultural production on socio-economic outcomes in low-and middle-income countries: a systematic review. *Campbell Systematic Reviews*, 13 (1), pp.1-346.

Patton, M.Q. (1999). Enhancing the quality and credibility of qualitative analysis. *Health services research*, 34 (5 Pt 2), p.1189.

Paschall, M., and D. Seville. (2012). Certified Cocoa: Scaling up farmer participation in West Africa. In Case study series, new business models for sustainable trading relationships, ed. Sustainable Food Lab, Hartland, VT: *International Institute for Environment and Development*, Vol. 28.

Pierrot, J., Giovannucci, D. and Kasterine, A. (2010). Trends in the trade of certified coffees. *International Trade Centre Technical Paper*.

Rainforest Alliance, 2015. Impact of UTZ certification on cocoa producers in Ghana 2011-2014 (online) Available <https://www.rainforest-alliance.org/resource-item/impact-of-utz-certification-on-cocoa-producers-in-ghana> Accessed 10 November 2022.

- Ranjan Jena, P. and Grote, U. (2017). Fairtrade certification and livelihood impacts on small-scale coffee producers in a tribal community of India. *Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy*, 39 (1), pp.87-110.
- Ridge, W. J., Kern, D. and A. White, M. (2014). "The influence of managerial myopia on firm strategy", *Management Decision*, Vol. 52 No. 3: pp. 602-623.
- Rueda, X. and Lambin, E.F. (2013). Responding to globalization impacts of certification on Colombian small-scale coffee growers. *Ecology and Society*, 18 (3).
- Ruben, R. and Fort, R. (2012). The impact of fair-trade certification for coffee farmers in Peru. *World development*, 40 (3): pp.570-582.
- Ruf, F., Schroth, G. and Doffangui, K. (2015). Climate change, cocoa migrations, and deforestation in West Africa: What does the past tell us about the future? *Sustainability Science*, 10(1), pp.101-111.
- Ruben, R. and Zuniga, G. (2011). How standards compete: comparative impact of coffee certification schemes in Northern Nicaragua. *Supply Chain Management: An International Journal*.
- Sarpong, D., Eyres, E., & Batsakis, G. (2019). Narrating the future: A distinctive capability approach to strategic foresight. *Technological Forecasting and Social Change*, 140, 105-114.
- Sarpong, D., Maclean, M., Oruh, E. S., & Botchie, D. (2021). On the consequences of scarcity mindset: How 'having too little' means so much for ethnic venture failure. *European Management Journal*.
- Saunders, B., Sim, J., Kingstone, T., Baker, S., Waterfield, J., Bartlam, B., Burroughs, H. and Jinks, C. (2018). Saturation in qualitative research: exploring its conceptualization and operationalization. *Quality & quantity*, 52(4), pp.1893-1907.
- Spector, P.E., Dwyer, D.J. and Jex, S.M. (1988). Relation of job stressors to affective, health, and performance outcomes: a comparison of multiple data sources. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 73(1), p.11.
- Suddendorf, T. and Corballis, M.C., 2007. The evolution of foresight: What is mental time travel, and is it unique to humans? *Behavioral and brain sciences*, 30(3), pp.299-313.
- Swedberg, R. (2020) Exploratory research, In C. Elman, J. Gerring, J. Mahoney (Eds.), *The production of knowledge: Enhancing progress in social science*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (2020), pp. 17-41.
- Takahashi, R. and Todo, Y. (2017). Coffee certification and forest quality: evidence from a wild coffee forest in Ethiopia. *World Development*, 92: pp.158-166.
- Toussaint, M., Cabanelas, P. and González-Alvarado, T.E., 2021. What about the consumer choice? The influence of social sustainability on consumer's purchasing behavior in the Food Value Chain. *European Research on Management and Business Economics*, 27(1), p.100134.
- Van der Wal, A.J., van Horen, F. and Grinstein, A., 2018. Temporal myopia in sustainable behavior under uncertainty. *International Journal of Research in Marketing*, 35(3): pp.378-393.

Wälti, S., 2012. The myth of decoupling. *Applied Economics*, 44(26), pp.3407-3419.

Yamoah, F.A., Kaba, J.S., Amankwah-Amoah, J. and Acquaye, A. (2020). Stakeholder collaboration in climate-smart agricultural production innovations: insights from the Cocoa industry in Ghana. *Environmental Management*, 66 (4): pp.600-613.