Prott, Volker. "Assessing the "Paris System": Self-determination and Ethnic Violence in Alsace-Lorraine and Asia Minor, 1919–23." *Sovereignty, Nationalism, and the Quest for Homogeneity in Interwar Europe*. Ed. Emmanuel Dalle Mulle, Davide Rodogno and Mona Bieling. London,: Bloomsbury Academic, 2023. 85–104. *Bloomsbury Collections*. Web. 9 May 2023. <http://dx.doi.org/10.5040/9781350263413.ch-5>.

Assessing the "Paris System": Self-determination and Ethnic Violence in Alsace-Lorraine and Asia Minor, 1919–23

Volker Prott

The Alsatian capital Strasbourg is a long way from Smyrna (today's Izmir), the main seaport of western Asia Minor (Anatolia). Yet in the wake of the First World War, both cities were gripped by the same, powerful new historical force that tied national self-determination and minority rights to interstate conflict and ethnic violence. Across Europe and in several parts of Europe's colonial sphere, the quest for sovereignty and self-determination wound up with looting, deportations, massacres, and mass expulsions of minorities.[1] Robert Gerwarth, John Horne, and others have placed the violence following the armistice of November 1918 in the context of a "Greater War" that stretched from 1913 to 1923.[2] If seen from this perspective, the rhetoric of national self-determination had both a stabilizing and a destabilizing effect. On the one hand, it mobilized Allied forces and populations to bring the fighting to a successful end. But on the other, it infused international politics and nationalist movements with a powerful new idea with which to challenge the territorial status quo beyond the end of the war. As the cases of Alsace-Lorraine and Asia Minor indicate, the resulting dynamics of violence and political strife between 1918 and 1923 cut across simple divisions of a civic, politically unified, and peaceful "West" versus an ethnically fragmented and violent "East."[3]

Despite the growing number of studies on postwar violence and the "Greater War," we still lack a systematic comparative framework to assess and explain why the "Paris system" caused such regionally diverse dynamics.[4] Most of the above-cited studies focus on a single case, loosely placed in a wider postwar setting. While there are a few insightful works juxtaposing two regions affected by conflicts involving minorities, these are predominantly concerned with the cases at hand and only in passing, if at all, allude to more general factors, patterns, or mechanisms driving these conflicts.[5] Recent French and German accounts of the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 and its repercussions highlight the complexity, contradictions, and multiple limitations of the emerging international order; yet they offer little by way of analytical guidance and systematic comparison of different regional settings.[6] More recently, Roberta Pergher and Marcus Payk have provided an excellent and concise survey of territorial

and domestic ethnic conflicts across several European and colonial settings in the aftermath of the Paris Peace Conference.[7] Yet they too touch upon the contours and inner workings of the "Paris system" only briefly and in general terms, defining the postwar order rather vaguely as "an informal, dynamic combination of various related promises, practices, and proclamations" that "provided a new language and understanding of nationalism and internationalism, sovereignty and territoriality, ethnicity and popular participation."[8]

A more promising approach is offered by the work of several international historians who have made important inroads toward a more systematic study of both the regional diversity and overall functioning of the Paris system. Thus, Carole Fink and Mark Mazower have demonstrated how the Great Powers used minority treaties as instruments to maintain their supremacy within the emerging international system of formally equal nation-states.[9] Erez Manela's work reveals the unintended consequences of self-determination as a transnational political idea and practice, revealing a broader pattern of frustrated expectations causing rebellions in four very different colonial settings.[10] In a much-cited article, Eric Weitz offered the first synthesis of this new strand of research on the Paris peace settlements, arguing that the entanglement—not the opposition, as Woodrow Wilson and the Allies claimed—of self-determination and minority rights with ethnic violence and deportations was the fundament of the "Paris system."[11] Weitz used the term "population politics" to capture the common thrust of ethnic violence and self-determination, which for him represented "two sides of the same coin."[12] Meanwhile, other scholars have explored the regional diversity of the "Paris system" and the crucial role of varying regional and local conditions as well as the transformative impact Allied decisions and the rhetoric of self-determination had on these regions.[13]

This chapter builds on these recent scholarly advances and takes further steps toward a systematic comparative examination of the peace order that followed the First World War. Comparing two different regions affected by the Paris peace settlements, Alsace-Lorraine and Asia Minor, it examines the respective local conjunctures of self-determination and ethnic violence. The central aim of the chapter is to determine which international, national, and local factors fueled the two conflicts, which more general mechanisms were at play, and how we can explain the diverging dynamics of violence in the two cases.

While Alsace-Lorraine and Asia Minor are not the only or even the most prominent examples of peacemaking and ethnic conflict after the First World War, they effectively reveal the crucial facets of the Paris system. The comparison of these two postwar conflicts, which are highly diverse in their outcomes and intensity but surprisingly similar in the mechanisms that drove them, allows us to examine how the new international order operated in different regional settings and where and why it failed. Both regions were marked by competing national claims, disputes about self-determination, and, following territorial changes after the war, they both saw ethnic violence and forced removal on a comparatively large scale. In Alsace-Lorraine, French authorities carried out a "triage" of the local population and expelled a significant proportion of the remaining German population, a policy that in its initial fervor differed markedly from other postwar disputes in Western Europe such as

Eupen-Malmedy, Schleswig, or South Tyrol.[14] Asia Minor, in turn, plunged into a full-blown war accompanied by large-scale deportations and mass killings of civilians. In contrast to Alsace-Lorraine, where the new border prevailed throughout the interwar period, the conflict in Asia Minor ended in a major caesura for the Paris system: when the Allies and the rulers of the new state of Turkey signed the Treaty of Lausanne in July 1923, they effectively declared defunct the earlier Treaty of Sèvres that had been concluded with the Ottoman Empire in August 1920. It was the first reversal of the Paris peace treaties caused by violent revisionism.

The comparison of Alsace-Lorraine and Asia Minor also helps us bridge the divide between "Western" and "Eastern" European regions, which is one of the central aims of this volume. Comparing cases from different parts of the continent, this chapter seeks to overcome older notions of a "civilized" West and a "violent" East. Instead, examining the two cases at multiple levels, ranging from the local and national to the international, the chapter explores regional variations of the Paris system that frequently cut across a simple East-West dichotomy while at other times reaffirming wider regional differences in often surprising ways.

In view of the striking similarities between Alsace-Lorraine and Asia Minor, the chapter argues that the "Paris system" was indeed a common ideological and political framework that generated a transnational set of concepts, incentives, and mechanisms that operated across diverse regional settings. Yet the chapter also finds that the same mechanisms and incentives functioned in highly diverse ways depending on different international, national, and local circumstances. The incentive to use ethnic violence to legitimize and strengthen territorial control, for instance, was nearly ubiquitous in disputed border zones in postwar Europe. Upon closer inspection, however, we find that cases ranged from comparatively peaceful settlements such as Eupen-Malmedy or Schleswig right up to civil war-like situations as in Upper Silesia and the genocidal violence that shattered Asia Minor.

To disentangle and explain this regional divergence, the chapter identifies five key factors: (1) the (political, geographic, and economic) adequacy of territorial decisions with regard to local conditions; (2) the strength of state actors involved in the dispute; (3) the degree of international military, political, and economic commitment; (4) the nature and strength of local political identities; and (5) pre-existing traditions of ethnic violence and conflict resolution. Taken together, the five factors reflect the multi-level dynamic of the Paris system: two concern the broader international dimension (1 and 3), one deals with the specific national context (2), and two address the local context of the conflict (4 and 5). Further research would be needed to examine whether and to what extent the factors used here are applicable to other settings, how they operated there, and whether there are other mechanisms or categories that have greater explanatory power across a broader range of cases.

The two main sections of the chapter examine the two case studies, Asia Minor and Alsace-Lorraine, along the lines of the five factors mentioned above and place them in the wider context of the Paris system. The chapter concludes with a few reflections on the nature of the Paris system as an international order and perspectives for future research.

The Greek-Turkish Conflict, 1919–22

The Greek-Turkish war and the violence it generated must be understood in the context of violent nationalist policies in South-Eastern Europe and the late Ottoman Empire that predate the First World War.[15] The Young Turks, who assumed power in the Ottoman Empire in 1908, saw population exchanges and the promotion of a Turkish identity as a means to accelerate modernization and strengthen internal coherence in view of domestic weakness and external military threat.[16] The Balkan Wars of 1912–13 provided an indication of the devastation that ideas of national homogeneity or ethnic "unmixing," in Lord Curzon's infamous wording, could bring to villages and civilians across the warring states.[17] On the eve of the First World War, deportations of Christian minorities and negotiations for a first Greek-Turkish population exchange were well under way.[18]

The outbreak of the First World War raised the stakes and at the same time created a fundamentally different, open-ended situation. The decision of the Greek government under Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos to join the Entente in October 1916 suddenly made a national myth, the "Great Idea" of a resurrected Greek Empire in the Aegean, a diplomatic possibility.[19] In view of the crumbling Ottoman Empire, it seemed that Greece could, as a loyal ally of the alliance of liberal and democratic states, resume control of Constantinople and bring Western "civilization" to the alleged "backward" lands of the Ottoman rulers. Venizelos was particularly apt at cloaking Greek territorial aims in Asia Minor in the parlance of national self-determination. In a pamphlet on Greek territorial claims, hastily written up in Paris in January 1919 after numerous meetings with British, French, and American experts, Venizelos based Greek claims on population statistics and ethnicity, political will, and history, but also alluded to the allegedly superior degree of civilization of the Greek Orthodox inhabitants.[20]

Such language fell on fertile ground. It not only aligned with the Allies' geostrategic vision for a European-dominated Asia Minor, but it also resonated with Romantic notions of the ancient "Hellenic civilization" shared by many British, American, and French experts, diplomats, and policymakers.[21] Thanks to the existence of a sizeable minority of Greek Orthodox inhabitants in the city of Smyrna and along the Western coastline of Asia Minor, Greek claims also appeared to be rooted, at least to some extent, in ethnicity, which meant that they could be supported by government census data and visualized in persuasive ethnographic maps.[22] While doubts remained, the decision to award Greece with a portion of Ottoman territory resulted from a momentary conjuncture of inter-Allied rivalry, persistent pressure by the Greek delegation, and ambivalent recommendations emanating from the expert advisors.[23] On May 10, 1919, the "Big Three"—Georges Clemenceau, David Lloyd George, and Woodrow Wilson— used the temporary absence of the troublesome Italian allies to green-light the landing of Greek forces in the Ottoman city of Smyrna, ostensibly to protect Christian minorities, but in reality to set in motion the partition of the Ottoman Empire.

The Greek landing at Smyrna and its violent aftermath neither "civilized" the Muslim population of Asia Minor, nor did it anchor Western influence in the region. Instead, it was the spark that ignited the rise of modern Turkish nationalism. As the Turkish nationalist writer Halide Edib, who would soon join Mustafa Kemal in eastern

Asia Minor, remarked in her memoires: "Nothing mattered to me from that moment to the time of the extraordinary march to Smyrna in 1922. I suddenly ceased to exist as an individual: I worked, wrote, and lived as a unit of that magnificent national madness."[24] Kemal himself stated that without the Greek landing, the Turkish movement "might have gone on sleeping."[25] On the day of the Greek landing, Kemal, still in the service of the Sultan, was in the Black Sea region to inspect the eighth army and pacify the area.[26] In July 1919, Kemal was discharged from government service and began mobilizing the local Muslim population against the Greek occupation forces, thus setting the fundaments of a revisionist, anti-Allied Turkish nationalist government.[27]

Since their landing in Smyrna in May 1919, the Greek occupying forces found themselves trapped in a predominantly Muslim region without clear geographical, economic, or historical borders. Challenged by recurring attacks of Muslim bands of brigands and the growing force of Kemal's troops in the east, the Greek army soon pushed further inland in the quest to quell Turkish nationalist resistance and bring the Smyrna zone under control. As Arnold Toynbee and other Western observers noted, the Greek army engaged in mass deportations and attacks against local Muslims with the help of local brigands to change the demographics of the territories under their control.[28] A keen observer, Toynbee detected the systematic character of this violence. When he visited the military front between the Greek and Turkish forces near Gemlik in June 1921, Toynbee detected "a definite 'danger line'" that coincided with the northernmost expansion of the Greek army before it was forced to retreat: "The object of the atrocities, on this showing, was to exterminate the Turkish inhabitants of districts which it was no longer convenient for the Greek Army to hold."[29]

Meanwhile, the Turkish national forces, organized from the summer of 1919 by Mustafa Kemal, gained strength and began first to halt and finally to reverse the advances of the Greek army. Over the course of the war, they employed the same social engineering or "population politics" in reverse.[30] For the Turkish side, the Greek-Turkish war was as much a struggle for liberation as it was an exercise in violent nation-building responding to the new international order.[31] After the decisive defeat of Greek forces near Afyonkarahisar between August 26 and 28, 1922, and the subsequent collapse and disordered retreat of the Greek army, Turkish nationalist forces burned Greek and Armenian houses and deported and massacred thousands of Christian inhabitants on their way to Smyrna.[32] Already before, since the Greek landing in Smyrna and systematically from July 1921, the Turkish nationalists had joined forces with local Muslim brigands to terrorize, deport, and kill several tens of thousands of Greek and Armenian citizens in the Black Sea region.[33] The reports of Western observers, most often American relief workers and teachers, have strong reminiscences of the deportations and mass killings that occurred within the context of the Armenian Genocide during the First World War.[34]

The climax of this mass ethnic violence was the burning of Smyrna on September 13–14, 1922. While there is still scholarly dispute over who exactly started the fire and to what extent Kemal and his entourage were implicated,[35] the mass of archival evidence in French, British, and American archives points to the systematic spreading of the fire by Turkish soldiers and officers to destroy the Greek, Armenian, and European quarters of the city.[36] The result was the estimated death of at least 25,000 people in the

night of the fire alone,[37] and the exodus of an estimated 1.6 million Greek Orthodox inhabitants of Asia Minor to mainland Greece, which was later reflected rather than stipulated by the Lausanne Agreement of 1923. The Treaty of Sèvres was the first of the Paris peace treaties to be successfully revised by the military might of a revisionist army fighting in the name of national self-determination. How can we explain this violent escalation of the conflict?

First, the Allied decision to award Greece with a zone of occupation around the city of Smyrna was untenable in geographic, economic, and political terms. As notably the American experts of the Inquiry had warned, the lack of a natural or historical border of the Greek zone destabilized it, while the new border cut important economic ties between the Aegean coast and its hinterland. Moreover, even Greek statistics indicated that the Greek Orthodox population was in a minority, with 33.3 percent Greeks, 57.4 percent Turks, and 3.9 percent Armenians residing in the area claimed by Greece.[38] Notably, this figure hardly reflected the actual desires of the local inhabitants, which are difficult to assess with any precision, but appeared to point to a preference for some form of mandate by a disinterested power, possibly the United States. On March 11, 1919, for instance, the American Commissioner in Constantinople, Lewis Heck, reported on his impressions of a recent visit of Smyrna to Secretary of State Robert Lansing: "All the Turks were united in declaring that they would welcome American control with open arms … In fact, the hopes placed in the United States and its disinterested policy are so high to be almost pitiful in their intensity."[39] Heck also warned of "bloody consequences" should the region be awarded to Greece.[40] Reports by local Western observers clearly indicated that like in so many other disputed regions, the equation of ethnicity—in this case derived from religious affiliation—with national identity was questionable to say the least. In late August 1922, shortly before the Smyrna fire, the British Lieutenant Intelligence Officer W. E. N. Hawksley Westall characterized the majority of "native" Orthodox and Muslim citizens as different only in religion, while only the upper classes had developed some sort of national identity.[41]

In addition to an ill-conceived territorial decision at Paris, a second destabilizing factor was the weakness of state actors directly involved in the conflict. While the influence of the Sultan in Constantinople was quickly fading, the Greek forces and civilian administration proved unable to provide for security and rule of law across their zone of occupation. Chronic banditry not just continued to plague the region, but the Greco-Turkish conflict further exacerbated the problem. As normal economic activity was severely disrupted or altogether collapsed due to the war, many people saw little choice but to join bands of brigands to survive.[42] Moreover, as mentioned above, both the Greek and the Turkish armies co-opted brigands in their attempts to establish control over disputed territories, which usually meant giving them a free hand in looting and destroying entire villages.[43] Much of the dynamic of ethnic violence in the Greek-Turkish conflict, including the mass killings and deportations of the Pontic Greeks and the burning of Smyrna, resulted from the interplay between weak state and military actors, on the one hand, and paramilitary units, on the other. The effect of the "Paris system" and its premium on nationally homogeneous territories was to politicize and ethnicize the activities of brigands,

who began targeting members of a particular religious group, which most of them had not done before the war.[44]

The eroding international commitment to the Greek presence in Asia Minor was another crucial factor in the collapse of the Greek Army in August 1922. Even before, it undermined any attempt to enforce the Allied decision of May 1919 and the Treaty of Sèvres of August 1920. From the start, the decision to establish a Greek zone around Smyrna excluded the Italians, while the Americans and French gradually withdrew their support. Neither the Americans nor the Kemalists signed the Treaty of Sèvres, while the French government concluded an agreement with the Kemalists in October 1921 that practically amounted to diplomatic recognition.[45] Britain too gradually withdrew its support of the increasingly costly and desperate Greek endeavor.[46] Lacking legitimacy, funds, and commitment by the states and Great Powers directly involved, the Greek occupation was indeed highly vulnerable and fragile.

Two further factors—the nature and strength of local political identities and an existing tradition of state-led violence against religious minorities—help explain the large-scale ethnic violence that accompanied the collapse of the Greek army. As in many other parts of early twentieth-century Europe, the majority of the population in the late Ottoman Empire had little sense of a "national" identity. In such a situation of "fluid identities,"[47] religion became a powerful marker of difference, and ethnic violence was the most effective tool to mobilize and enforce these new "national identities." Moreover, as the systematic attacks by the Greek army against Muslim civilians, mass deportations of Pontic Greeks, and the burning of Smyrna demonstrate, both sides in the war were able to use established forms of state-led violence against religious minorities.[48]

Taken together, these five factors allowed strategies and decisions that involved mass ethnic violence to take the upper hand in Asia Minor and to determine the nature of the conflict. Deportations, looting and terror, massacres of religious minorities in specific territories, and genocidal violence were hardly held in check by effective state control, international commitment, or a wider legitimacy of Allied decisions. Instead, the Kemalist forces not just defeated the Greek army and revised the Treaty of Sèvres, but they also added the forced exchange of populations, sanctioned in the Lausanne Agreement of 1923, to the repertoire of international politics in an already weakened Paris system.[49]

The Return of Alsace-Lorraine to France, 1918–19

Contrary to Asia Minor, Alsace-Lorraine was a non-issue at the Paris Peace Conference. Toward the end of the war, the French government had successfully persuaded its British and American allies to accept its claim to the region as part of the armistice stipulations of November 11, 1918. From 1915, focusing predominantly on the United States, the French had launched numerous propaganda campaigns and sent several of their experts and diplomats abroad to prove the legitimacy of the French claim from the perspective of national self-determination.[50] Molding French claims to suit their American counterparts of the "Inquiry," French expert Emmanuel de Martonne

visited Washington, DC and highlighted the deep-seated and unbroken attachment of the Alsatians and Lorrainers to the French Republic since the French Revolution, countering the (in his eyes) superficial and less important fact that the vast majority of the population spoke German or a Germanic dialect.[51] The French line of argument culminated in the claim that the Germans had not only violated the Alsatians' and Lorrainers' right to self-determination in 1871, but that they had also forfeited any possible claim to the region when they had attacked France yet again in 1914. This argument found expression, albeit in a somewhat ambivalent phrasing, in Woodrow Wilson's eighth point, according to which "the wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine, which has unsettled the peace of the world for nearly fifty years, should be righted, in order that peace may once more be made secure in the interest of all."[52]

Despite French efforts to align their territorial claim to the new language of self-determination, the silence over Alsace-Lorraine at the peace conference came as a surprise to many contemporaries. In the late nineteenth century, "Alsace-Lorraine" had become, and continued to be, the synonym of an unresolved national dispute. Usually referred to as the "question" of Alsace-Lorraine, the fate of the borderland was discussed controversially by French and German historians from the 1870s onward, leading Ernest Renan to his famous definition of the nation as an "everyday plebiscite."[53] The dispute over the national character of the region preoccupied socialists across Europe, who sought to find an amicable solution of the issue at the Stockholm peace conference in 1917, albeit with little tangible results.[54] A number of Alsatian writers and politicians such as René Schickele pursued a regional or rather transnational path to overcome the issue, placing emphasis on the benefits of the borderland's "double culture" and its important function as a bridge between France and Germany.[55]

The refusal of any form of self-determination for the Alsatians and Lorrainers caused uneasiness at the Paris Peace Conference and on the ground. At Paris, the young British historian and member of the British expert team at the conference, James Headlam-Morley, repeatedly expressed his concern over the silence around Alsace-Lorraine to his French colleagues. On one occasion, he remarked to French diplomat André Tardieu that he considered French policy toward the region to be "radically and completely wrong and unjustifiable."[56] His chief concern was that the people had had no say in the fate of their region. On the ground, the new French administrators sought ways to sidestep the issue. In early December 1918, French President Raymond Poincare declared in a speech in Alsace's capital of Strasbourg to the cheering masses that "the plebiscite is done."[57] While there is strong evidence that the majority of Alsatians and Lorrainers welcomed the arrival of the French troops, recent studies have found that in their enthusiasm, many people expressed relief over the end of the war and the lifting of martial law rather than a preference for French rule.[58] Contrary to the claims of French propagandists, therefore, the situation in the borderland remained confusing. Many Alsatians and Lorrainers had supported the German war effort.[59] And although many had departed before the arrival of French troops, there was still a sizeable minority of Germans from the interior, making up between 12 and 18 percent of the population.[60]

The French administrators sought to handle this, in their eyes, embarrassingly ambivalent situation by a policy of forced assimilation, ethno-political classification of the population, and mass expulsions of Germans and those Alsatians and Lorrainers who had been deemed politically untrustworthy.[61] Between November 1918 and June 1919, when the Versailles Treaty was signed, the French authorities expelled at least 100,000 Germans from Alsace-Lorraine.[62] There were cases of looting, denunciations, and sporadic violence against so-called "boches," a derogatory term for Germans from the interior. Local associations called for the arrest and mass expulsion of the entire German population of Alsace-Lorraine.[63]

The scene seemed set for an escalation of the conflict, yet the violence remained remarkably limited. Even before the Versailles Treaty came into force, French administrators began to allow exceptions in the classification scheme.[64] From March 1919, they slowed down the pace of expulsions, allowing persons deemed politically inoffensive or of eminent importance for the economy to remain in their homes and jobs. After the treaty of Versailles had been signed, the French government restored rule of law in the provinces, and expulsions almost subsided. In the case of Alsace-Lorraine, we therefore need to identify not just the factors that fueled the violence, but notably also those that worked to contain it.

In an international order defined by adherence to national self-determination and arbitration, the return of Alsace-Lorraine to France without consultation of the population undermined the legitimacy of the new border. As in western Asia Minor, moreover, the initial territorial decision of the Allies inadequately corresponded to local conditions in that it rested on the fiction of the national unity of an ethnically mixed region. Like in the Greek zone around Smyrna, the mismatch between the imperative of national homogeneity emanating from the Paris system, on the one hand, and a more complex mixture of ethnic and political identities in situ, on the other, produced a strong pull for administrators and parts of the local population to sort the "question" of national belonging out by use of violence. There were strong incentives for administrators and local Alsatians and Lorrainers to forge a new national unity around the expulsion of the German minority and the suppression of anything "German" more generally.

Nevertheless, and contrary to the Greek zone in Asia Minor, the new Franco-German border was firmly rooted in history and public debate around the "question" of Alsace-Lorraine. The return of the "lost provinces" was France's only public war aim, and there was little illusion among Germans or Alsatians and Lorrainers that French victory would mean the end of the short-lived experiments of local rule that had followed the collapse of the German army.[65] Although the Allied decision lacked legitimacy, therefore, it had a clear historical precedent and corresponded to the general expectations about Allied policy at the end of the war. Overall, the return of Alsace-Lorraine to France was therefore less disputed and considered less controversial than awarding Greece with territory in western Asia Minor.

With regard to the second factor, the power of the states immediately involved, we encounter a similar initial asymmetry between victors and defeated as in the Greek-Turkish case. The collapse of the German army not only forestalled popular consultation and negotiation over the fate of the region, but it also deprived German diplomacy and

the German minority in Alsace-Lorraine of any real bargaining power. Letters written by Germans in the first couple of months after the end of the war express this feeling of being left at the mercy of the French administration. In one typical case, an inhabitant from Ars-sur-Moselle near Metz wrote that "we intend to stay, but this depends on how we will be treated. Our parents were not Lorrainers, but we are, because we were born in this country. I would regret much to leave it. Alas! We cannot do anything if they chase us away."[66] This asymmetry of state power allowed French administrators to ignore the recommendation of a gradual policy of integration developed by the central wartime body of experts and diplomats for the region, the *Conférence d'Alsace-Lorraine*.[67] Instead, acting under orders from Clemenceau, Under-Secretary of State Jules Jeanneney initially pursued a policy of accelerated and complete assimilation while pushing for the mass expulsion of the German minority.[68]

Yet the abrupt assimilation of the region into the French state coupled with economic difficulties generated growing resentment in the local population, giving rise to the so-called "malaise alsacien."[69] From the early spring of 1919, the initial euphoria over the end of the war and German military rule began to give way to a more sober assessment of the realities of life in a laical and centralized nation-state that seemed to have forgotten about its promises of respecting local customs and specificities. Many Alsatians and Lorrainers remembered the promises made by French General Joffre in November 1914, when he had solemnly declared to the inhabitants of Thann in French-occupied Upper Alsace: "Our return is definitive, you are French for good. With all the liberties it has always represented, France will treat your own liberties with respect: Alsatian liberties, your traditions, your convictions, your mores."[70]

Acting within the constraints of a liberal democratic state, the French government could hardly ignore this erosion of popular support. In an internal memo dated February 12, 1919, the legal advisor to the French Ministry of War, Paul Matter, demanded that French policy refrain from "acts of violence."[71] Instead, it should reclaim "this spirit of liberalism and goodwill that is our honor and our strength." By henceforth adopting a more accommodating policy toward the region, French policymakers sought to mitigate economic disruption and prevent the formation of a strong anti-French movement.[72] A significant national opposition to French rule in the region would not only have been costly to suppress, particularly in peacetime, but it would have been internationally embarrassing given France's outspoken claims about the fundamentally French character of its "lost provinces."

Facing no noteworthy local, national, or international opposition to their claim to the region, the French government was not only able to assert control quickly, but it could also afford to de-escalate its policy of ethnic classification and gradually slow down expulsions and measures of assimilation when they began to have a negative effect on the attitudes of the local population and the economy. After the signing of the treaty of Versailles in June 1919, the French government restored rule of law and democracy in its newly acquired provinces. In the following years, the French government was able to come to diplomatic terms with Germany over the new border in the Locarno agreements of 1925, an outcome that was diametrically opposed to the mass ethnic violence, large-scale population exchange, and reversal of the Paris peace treaties that resulted from the Greek landing at Smyrna.

At first sight, the lukewarm international commitment to the return of Alsace-Lorraine to France resembled the elusive alliance of the "Big Three" for a Greek zone in Asia Minor. The uneasiness mentioned above and much of the agitation surrounding the "question" of Alsace-Lorraine in the interwar period drew on the lack of explicit support that the decision had attracted from France's chief allies, the United States and Britain. Upon closer inspection, however, international commitment to the new border—even if it merely came in the form of acquiescing in taking the issue off the agenda of the Paris Peace Conference—was strong enough to stabilize Franco-German relations in the 1920s. For all its lack of legitimacy, the national and international commitment to the new border brought the benefit of clarity and, along with it, much-desired stability and peace. Indeed, the mixture of strong commitment and bilateral agreements between France and Germany anticipated the stabilization of Franco-German relations after the end of the Second World War.

In several ways, the fourth and the fifth factors—local identities and a tradition of ethnic violence—pushed for an escalation of the conflict. The war had polarized and politicized hitherto multilayered, predominantly regional, class-based, and religious identities of local inhabitants across Alsace-Lorraine. After the war, as Alison Carrol writes, it was "impossible (or at the very least very difficult)" for anyone who lived in this disputed borderland to remain indifferent to the issue of national identity.[73] The classification of the population into "native" Alsatians and Lorrainers and German "foreigners" exacerbated the tensions. Crucially, as the new authorities issued identity cards based on the classification scheme, they created clear markers of difference that lend themselves to discrimination and ethnic violence.[74] Likewise, the recent experiences of war and martial law established if not a tradition, then at least precedents of state-led violence against civilians.

While clear markers of difference and the wartime precedent of state-led violence against civilians increased the potential of ethnic violence, the region's long-standing tradition of democratic politics and rule of law worked to contain violent escalation. In marked contrast to Asia Minor, Alsace-Lorraine provided its new rulers with a tight-knit web of associations, trade unions, political parties, and a regional parliament that, despite the recent disturbances caused by the war, allowed the French administration to restore law and order comparatively quickly and without the support of paramilitary units and, at least in the longer run, nationalist zealots. While there was strong grassroots pressure to "cleanse" the region of its German minority, state control was effective in taking charge of the expulsion process and forestalling large-scale lawlessness and banditry—unlike the polycratic dynamic of the expulsion of the Greeks from Smyrna in September 1922. The complaints by the German delegation at the Interallied Armistice Commission at Spa, while vociferously decrying the "de-Germanization" of Alsace-Lorraine, rarely mentioned serious assaults against German citizens, let alone anything resembling the violence endured by both Christian and Muslim minorities during the Greek-Turkish war.[75]

Overall, in the case of Alsace-Lorraine, the five factors discussed here balanced each other out, leading to the mixed result of a brief and intense initial period of discrimination, dispossession, and expulsion of a significant part of the region's German minority that soon gave way to policies of stabilization and the restoration of

rule of law and democratic procedures. Crucially, strong commitment by the French state coupled with the constraints of a liberal democratic framework and a generally expected and clear, if not fully legitimate, territorial decision meant that the signing of the treaty of Versailles effectively ended mass expulsions of German citizens and allowed for a process of normalization that culminated in the Locarno agreements six years later.

Conclusion

The comparison of Alsace-Lorraine and Asia Minor demonstrates that the same set of factors and mechanisms operated in these highly diverse and geographically disparate settings, albeit in a fundamentally different manner. In both cases, the initial territorial decisions by the Allies proved to be inadequate responses to the complex realities of ethnically mixed regions. The resulting discrepancy between the pretense of national homogeneity and an ambivalent situation on the ground generated incentives for state administrations and local citizens to use violent "population politics" to close the gap between their territorial claims and local reality. In both cases, moreover, there existed clear markers of difference among the population that lend themselves to discrimination and targeted ethnic violence. The (in)adequacy of the initial Allied decision and the nature of local identities, in combination with three other factors—state power, international commitment, and traditions of ethnic violence—go a long way in explaining why ethnic violence escalated in Asia Minor but was contained in Alsace-Lorraine (see Table 1).

Thus, the "Paris system" was neither merely a loose point of reference, nor was it a coherent international order. Rather, the period between 1917 and 1923 saw the emergence of a common—but highly uneven—global order organized around the ideal of ethnically homogeneous nation-states.[76] Compared to the period after 1945, the "Paris system" was indeed no rigid international order. Yet compared to the period before 1914, it certainly provided a meaningful political, legal, economic, and ideological framework that not only prompted politicians, experts, and local activists to rearrange territories along "national" lines, but also guided their political action and decision-making according to the same fusion of nationality, ethnic homogeneity, and state sovereignty. The Paris system is so hard to pinpoint because it was an emerging international order that was as much about redefining national territories and identities as it was about debating and fighting over the nature of sovereignty and legitimacy of political action.[77]

The contradictions in the system—notably between the universal emancipatory premise of "making the world safe for democracy", on the one hand, and the system's hierarchies and the limits of Allied power and commitment, on the other—created incentives for violent action, both at the level of diplomacy and on the ground. In disputed areas, depending on the specific local circumstances, politicians and military leaders often saw ethnic violence as an effective tool to create ethnically homogeneous spaces to legitimize their claims of territorial control and state sovereignty. Ethnic violence was less a consequence of "flawed" decision-making than a constitutive

Table 1 Comparison of Asia Minor and Alsace-Lorraine

	Asia Minor	Alsace-Lorraine
(1) Adequacy of territorial decision	Inadequate, severe lack of legitimacy	Inadequate and lack of legitimacy, but generally expected outcome of the war and based on well-established historical border
(2) State power	Weak, collaboration with warlords and brigands	Strong, within the constraints of a liberal democracy
(3) International commitment	Temporary and weak, Treaty of Sèvres not signed or accepted by national Turkish forces	Strong, although some ambivalence remained; Treaty of Versailles signed and accepted by both sides
(4) Local identities and markers of difference	Fluid identities, religion as clear marker of difference	Fluid but recently politicized identities, clear markers of difference
(5) Tradition of ethnic violence	Tradition of peaceful co-existence of religious groups, but also more recent episodes of genocidal violence against minorities; lack of rule of law and democratic traditions	Recent episodes of state-led violence against civilians, but longer tradition of rule of law, strong associations, and democratic procedures
Outcome	Gradual escalation: full-blown war, deportations, massacres, genocidal violence, forced removal of populations	Temporary escalation (mass expulsions, dispossession, sporadic physical violence) but quick containment of violence

element of the peace order. Diplomatic and in situ violence frequently resulted from the limitations and inconsistencies of self-determination and the subsequent frustration by local populations about decisions taken at Paris. More fundamentally, this same violence forced distant lands and politically detached populations into the new international order, both as a resource for politicians and military leaders and as agents who themselves shaped the system.

The conflicts in Alsace-Lorraine and Asia Minor emerged within the same international order that placed a premium on ethnic homogeneity, clear-cut national borders, and state sovereignty. Within this shared international order, the interplay of several factors and mechanisms determined whether and to what extent the conflicts escalated—not a simple dichotomy between an ethnically mixed and backward "East" and a nationally mature and progressive "West." As we have seen, several—but not all—of these factors cut across the East-West divide. We need further systematic comparisons of territorial and national conflicts in the aftermath of the Paris Peace Conference to map out the tectonics of the Paris system with greater precision. Such an endeavor promises to provide us with new answers to older but still very much open questions, most notably why and how exactly the interwar international order collapsed. This chapter has attempted to take a few tentative steps in this direction.

Notes

1　See Jochen Böhler, "Enduring Violence: The Postwar Struggles in East-Central Europe, 1917–21," *Journal of Contemporary History* 50, no. 1 (2015): 58–77; Julia Eichenberg and John Paul Newman, "Introduction: Aftershocks: Violence in Dissolving Empires after the First World War," *Contemporary European History* 19, no. 3 (2010): 183–94 (and the other articles in the same special issue); and Marcus M. Payk and Roberta Pergher, eds., *Beyond Versailles: Sovereignty, Legitimacy, and the Formation of New Polities after the Great War* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2019).

2　Robert Gerwarth and John Horne, "The Great War and Paramilitarism in Europe, 1917–23," *Contemporary European History* 19, no. 3 (2010): 267–73; Robert Gerwarth and John Horne, "Vectors of Violence: Paramilitarism in Europe after the Great War, 1917–1923," *Journal of Modern History* 83, no. 3 (2011): 489–512; and most recently Robert Gerwarth, *The Vanquished: Why the First World War Failed to End* (New York: Farrar Straus and Giroux, 2016).

3　See the studies by Carlile Aylmer Macartney, *National States and National Minorities* (New York: Russell & Russell, 1968) and Richard Hartshorne, "A Survey of the Boundary Problems of Europe," in *Geographic Aspects of International Relations*, ed. Charles C. Colby (Port Washington: Kennikat Press, 1970). See also the excellent historiographical overview and discussion of the East–West divide in Tara Zahra, "The 'Minority Problem' and National Classification in the French and Czechoslovak Borderlands," *Contemporary European History* 17, no. 2 (2008): 137–65, here 141–4.

4　The term "Paris system" was coined by Eric D. Weitz, "From the Vienna to the Paris System: International Politics and the Entangled Histories of Human Rights, Forced Deportations, and Civilizing Missions," *American Historical Review* 113, no. 5 (2008): 1313–43.

5　See Zahra, "'Minority Problem'" and Timothy Wilson, *Frontiers of Violence: Conflict and Identity in Ulster and Upper Silesia, 1918–1922* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).

6　See, for example, the recent monographs by Georges-Henri Soutou, *La grande illusion: Quand la France perdait la paix, 1914–1920* (Paris: Tallandier, 2015); Klaus Schwabe, *Versailles: Das Wagnis eines demokratischen Friedens 1919–1923* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2019); Jörn Leonhard, *Der überforderte Frieden: Versailles und die Welt 1918–1923* (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2018); and Eckart Conze, *Die grosse Illusion: Versailles 1919 und die Neuordnung der Welt* (Munich: Siedler, 2018).

7　Marcus M. Payk and Roberta Pergher, "Introduction," in *Beyond Versailles*, ed. Payk and Pergher.

8　Ibid., 5–6.

9　Mark Mazower, "Minorities and the League of Nations in Interwar Europe," *Daedalus* 126, no. 2 (1997): 47–63; Carole Fink, "The League of Nations and the Minorities Question," *World Affairs* 157, no. 4 (1995): 197–205; and Carole Fink, *Defending the Rights of Others: The Great Powers, the Jews, and International Minority Protection, 1878–1938* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

10　Erez Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment: Self-determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

11　Weitz, "Paris System"; see also Eric D. Weitz, "Self-determination: How a German Enlightenment Idea Became the Slogan of National Liberation and a Human Right," *American Historical Review* 120, no. 2 (2015): 462–96.

12　Weitz, "Paris System," 1313.

13 See, for example, Omer Bartov and Eric D. Weitz, eds., *Shatterzone of Empires: Coexistence and Violence in the German, Habsburg, Russian, and Ottoman Borderlands* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013).

14 On the cases of Eupen-Malmedy and South Tyrol see Emmanuel Dalle Mulle and Mona Bieling's chapter in this volume. On Schleswig see, for example, Peter Thaler, "A Tale of Three Communities: National Identification in the German-Danish Borderlands," *Scandinavian Journal of History* 32, no. 2 (2007): 141–66 and Jan Schlürmann, *1920—Eine Grenze für den Frieden: Die Volksabstimmungen zwischen Deutschland und Dänemark* (Kiel: Wachholtz, 2019).

15 For a concise outline of the historical background, see Erol Ülker's chapter in this volume.

16 See Tim Jacoby, "A Comparative Perspective on the Origins of Turkish Nationalism," *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism* 1, no. 2 (2001): 27–36, here 31; Erol Ülker, "Contextualising 'Turkification': Nation-building in the Late Ottoman Empire, 1908–18," *Nations and Nationalism* 11, no. 4 (2005): 613–36; Uğur Ümit Üngör, "Seeing like a Nation-state: Young Turk Social Engineering in Eastern Turkey, 1913–50," *Journal of Genocide Research* 10, no. 1 (2008): 15–39; Spyros A. Sofos, "Nationalism in Greece and Turkey: Modernity, Enlightenment, Westernization," in *Nationalism in the Troubled Triangle: Cyprus, Greece and Turkey*, ed. Ayhan Aktar, Niyazi Kızılyürek, and Umut Özkırımlı (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); Taner Akçam, *The Young Turks' Crime against Humanity: The Armenian Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing in the Ottoman Empire* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), ch. 3; and Taner Akçam, "The Young Turks and the Plans for the Ethnic Homogenization of Anatolia," in *Shatterzone of Empires*, ed. Bartov and Weitz.

17 On the Balkan Wars in this context, see Eyal Ginio, "Paving the Way for Ethnic Cleansing: Eastern Thrace during the Balkan Wars (1912–1913) and Their Aftermath," in *Shatterzone of Empires*, ed. Bartov and Weitz.

18 The most extensive studies on this issue are Yannis G. Mourelos, "The 1914 Persecutions and the First Attempt at an Exchange of Minorities between Greece and Turkey," *Balkan Studies* 26, no. 2 (1985): 389–413 and Matthias Bjørnlund, "The 1914 Cleansing of Aegean Greeks as a Case of Violent Turkification," *Journal of Genocide Research* 10, no. 1 (2008): 41–58. See also Mustafa Aksakal, "The Ottoman Empire," in *Empires at War: 1911–1923*, ed. Robert Gerwarth and Erez Manela (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 22; and Ellinor Morack, "The Ottoman Greeks and the Great War, 1912–1922," in *The World during the First World War*, ed. Helmut Bley and Anorthe Kremers (Essen: Klartext Verlag, 2014), 219–21.

19 On the "Great Idea" (Megali Idea) see Ioannis Zelepos, *Die Ethnisierung griechischer Identität 1870–1912: Staat und private Akteure vor dem Hintergrund der "Megali Idea"* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2002); Marc Terrades, *Le drame de l'Hellénisme: Ion Dragoumis (1878–1920) et la question nationale en Grèce au début du XXe siècle* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2005), 27–47; and Nicholas Doumanis, *A History of Greece* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 180–5. On the "Great Idea" and the specific diplomatic context in 1919, see Georgia Eglezou, *The Greek Media in World War I and Its Aftermath* (London: Tauris, 2009), 30 and Volker Prott, *The Politics of Self-Determination: Remaking Territories and National Identities in Europe, 1917–1923* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), ch. 3.

20 Eleftherios Venizelos, "Greece before the Peace Congress," in The National Archives, London (henceforth TNA), Foreign Office (henceforth FO) 608/37/1, file 19, pp. 1–15 (also available at http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924027901127, accessed June 27, 2022).

21 See David Ernest Roessel, *In Byron's Shadow: Modern Greece in the English & American Imagination* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).

22 See Jeremy W. Crampton, "The Cartographic Calculation of Space: Race Mapping and the Balkans at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919," *Social & Cultural Geography* 7, no. 5 (2006): 731–52.

23 See Michael John Llewellyn Smith, *Ionian Vision: Greece in Asia Minor, 1919–1922* (London: Hurst, 1998), 77–85 and Prott, *Politics of Self-Determination*, ch. 3.

24 Halidé Edib, *The Turkish Ordeal* (London: John Murray, 1928), 23.

25 Quoted in Philip Mansel, *Levant: Splendour and Catastrophe on the Mediterranean* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011), 207.

26 See Klaus Kreiser, *Atatürk: Eine Biographie* (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2014), 134–42.

27 On Kemal's activities in the Black Sea region, see Stéphane Yérasimos, "La Question du Pont-Euxin (1912–1923)," *Guerres mondiales et conflits contemporains* 153 (1989): 9–34, here 19–20.

28 On the Greek army's use of brigands, see ibid.; Nicholas Doumanis, *Before the Nation: Muslim-Christian Coexistence and Its Destruction in Late-Ottoman Anatolia* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 161–3 and Prott, *Politics of Self-Determination*, ch. 6.

29 Arnold J. Toynbee, *The Western Question in Greece and Turkey: A Study in the Contact of Civilisations* (New York: Howard Fertig (reprint 1970), 1923), 315–16.

30 For a discussion of population politics, see Peter Holquist, "To Count, to Extract, and to Exterminate: Population Statistics and Population Politics in Late Imperial and Soviet Russia," in *A State of Nations: Empire and Nation-making in the Age of Lenin and Stalin*, ed. Ronald G. Suny and Terry Martin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Weitz, "Paris System," and Prott, *Politics of Self-Determination*, 24.

31 Most recently, in a well-researched but also controversial study, the Israeli historians Benny Morris and Dror Ze'evi have argued that the entire period between the Armenian massacres of 1894 and the Greek-Turkish war constituted a single "thirty-year genocide" that formed the basis for the modern Turkish nation-state. See Benny Morris and Dror Ze'evi, *The Thirty-year Genocide: Turkey's Destruction of Its Christian Minorities, 1894–1924* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2019). For more balanced views that examine the violence against Christian minorities in the context of the massacres and deportations of Muslims from the Balkans prior to the First World War and highlight the specificity of the period between 1912 and 1923, see the studies referenced in footnote 16 above.

32 See Smith, *Ionian Vision*, ch. 13 and Prott, *Politics of Self-Determination*, ch. 6.

33 On the Pontic Greeks see Tessa Hofmann, "Γενοκτονια εν Ροη - Cumulative Genocide: The Massacres and Deportations of the Greek Population of the Ottoman Empire (1912–1923)," in *The Genocide of the Ottoman Greeks: Studies on the State-sponsored Campaign of Extermination of the Christians of Asia Minor, 1912–1922 and Its Aftermath: History, Law, Memory*, ed. Tessa Hofmann, Matthias Bjørnlund, and Vasileios Meichanetsidis (New York: Aristide D. Caratzas, 2011); and Morris and Ze'evi, *Thirty-Year Genocide*, ch. 9.

34 See Prott, *Politics of Self-Determination*, ch. 6.

35 While some scholars have refrained from making a definite statement, the majority has placed the blame on the Turks. Only few Western scholars support the official Turkish position, according to which the Armenians and Greeks set fire to their own city. For an overview of the debate, see Biray Kolluoglu Kirli, "Forgetting the Smyrna

Fire," *History Workshop Journal* 60 (2005): 25–44 and Leyla Neyzi, "Remembering Smyrna/Izmir: Shared History, Shared Trauma," *History & Memory* 20, no. 2 (2008): 106–27.

36   See the British reports in TNA, FO 371/7886, 7894, 7898, 7902, 7949, 7950; French reports in the Archives du Ministère des affaires étrangeres, Paris, Series E Levant (1918–1929), vol. 55 and American reports in National Archives and Records Administration, Washington (henceforth NARA), Record Group (henceforth RG) 59, file 867.4016/773. For published primary documents on the Smyrna fire, see Constantine G. Hatzidimitriou, "American Accounts Documenting the Destruction of Smyrna by the Kemalist Turkish Forces," in *American Accounts Documenting the Destruction of Smyrna by the Kemalist Turkish Forces, September 1922*, ed. Constantine G. Hatzidimitriou (New York: Caratzas, 2005); George Horton, *Report on Turkey: USA Consular Documents* (Athens: The Journalists' Union of the Athens Daily Newspapers, 1985), 180; and Dora Sakayan, *An Armenian Doctor in Turkey: Garabed Hatcherian: My Smyrna Ordeal of 1922* (Montreal: Arod Books, 1997), 10–11, 14.

37   According to the report by Percival Hadkinson, September 20, 1922, TNA, FO 371/7898, file no E10382/27/44, p. 48.

38   See Paul Masson, "Smyrne et l'Hellénisme en Asie Mineure: Rapport présenté à la séance du 2 décembre 1918," in *Tome Second: Questions européennes*, ed. Comité d'études (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1919), 799. Masson used the statistics of the Greek Patriarchate of 1912.

39   Lewis Heck to Lansing, March 11, 1919, NARA, RG 59, file 867.00/859, p. 4 (in the report).

40   Ibid., 6.

41   Report by Hawksley Westall on the political situation in Smyrna, August 30, 1922, TNA, FO 371/7885, file no E8734/27/44. This ambivalent situation corresponds to widespread "national indifference" among European populations in this period. See Maarten van Ginderachter and Jon E. Fox, eds., *National Indifference and the History of Nationalism in Modern Europe* (London: Routledge, 2019) and the literature cited therein.

42   See, for example, Toynbee, *Western Question*, 157, Yérasimos, "Question du Pont-Euxin," and Smith, *Ionian Vision*, 210.

43   For examples see Prott, *Politics of Self-Determination*, ch. 6.

44   See Resat Kasaba, "Greek and Turkish Nationalism in Formation: Western Anatolia 1919–1922" (EUI Working Papers, RSC No. 2002/17, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, Florence, 2002).

45   See Soutou, *La grande illusion*, 344–5.

46   See Smith, *Ionian Vision*, ch. 12.

47   On "fluid" identities see Peter Thaler, "Fluid Identities in Central European Borderlands," *European History Quarterly* 31, no. 4 (2001): 519–48 and Alison Carrol and Louisa Zanoun, "The View from the Border: A Comparative Study of Autonomism in Alsace and the Moselle, 1918–29," *European Review of History* 18, no. 4 (2011): 465–86.

48   See notably Üngör, "Seeing like a Nation-state," 16; Erik Jan Zürcher, *The Young Turk Legacy and Nation Building: From the Ottoman Empire to Atatürk's Turkey* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2010), 96, 108; Akçam, *Young Turks' Crime against Humanity* and Morack, "Ottoman Greeks and the Great War."

49   On the role of the Lausanne agreement as a positive model for the deportations during and after the Second World War, see Bruce Clark, *Twice a Stranger: The Mass Expulsions That Forged Modern Greece and Turkey* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006); and Matthew Frank, *Expelling the Germans: British Opinion and Post-1945 Population Transfer in Context* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), ch. 1.

50   See Prott, *Politics of Self-Determination*, 69–72.

51   On de Martonne's visit to the United States, see Taline Ter Minassian, "Les géographes français et la délimitation des frontières balkaniques à la Conférence de la Paix en 1919," *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine* 44, no. 2 (1997): 252–86 and Prott, *Politics of Self-Determination*, ch. 2.

52   See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fourteen_Points#Text (accessed June 27, 2022). Adopting passive voice, Wilson's eighth point does not specify *by whom* or *how* the "wrong" shall be "righted"—it could still mean a plebiscite. See also the discussion in Prott, *Politics of Self-Determination*, 55.

53   Ernest Renan, *Qu'est-ce qu'une nation? Et autres essais politiques: Textes choisis et présentés par Joël Roman* (Paris: Presses pocket, 1992), 55. On the Franco-German dispute over Alsace-Lorraine and what constitutes a nation, see Michael Heffernan, "History, Geography and the French National Space: The Question of Alsace-Lorraine, 1914–18," *Space & Polity* 5, no. 1 (2001): 27–48, here 28-30 and Laurence Turetti, *Quand la France pleurait l'Alsace-Lorraine: Les "provinces perdues" aux sources du patriotisme républicain, 1870–1914* (Strasbourg: La Nuée Bleue, 2008), ch. 1.

54   See Jürgen Stillig, "Das Problem Elsass-Lothringen und die sozialistische Internationale," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 23, no. 1 (1975): 62–76 and Prott, *Politics of Self-Determination*, 65–8.

55   On Schickele, see Dieter Lamping, *Über Grenzen: Eine literarische Topographie* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2001), ch. 2.

56   James Headlam-Morley to George Saunders, June 12, 1919, in James Headlam-Morley, *A Memoir of the Paris Peace Conference 1919: Edited by Agnes Headlam-Morley, Russell Bryant, Anna Cienciala* (London: Methuen, 1972), 143.

57   As quoted in *Le Temps*, December 10, 1918, 2.

58   See Christopher J. Fischer, *Alsace to the Alsatians? Visions and Divisions of Alsatian Regionalism, 1870–1939*, vol. 5 (New York: Berghahn Books, 2010), 121, 128; and Francis Grandhomme, "Retrouver la frontière du Rhin en 1918: L'entrée des poilus en Alsace et le retour à la France," *Revue d'Alsace*, no. 139 (2013): 237–58. For a more sceptical account cf. Alfred Wahl and Jean-Claude Richez, *L'Alsace entre France et Allemagne, 1850–1950* (Paris: Hachette, 1993), 251–2.

59   On the situation of the local population in Alsace-Lorraine during the First World War, see Volker Prott, "Challenging the German Empire: Strategic Nationalism in Alsace-Lorraine in the First World War," *Nations and Nationalism* 27, no. 4 (2021): 1009–25 and Volker Prott, "A Stress Test for German Nationalism: Protective Custody in Alsace-Lorraine during the First World War," *German History* 39, no. 4 (2021): 542–59.

60   The 1910 census specified the number of Germans from the interior resident in Alsace-Lorraine at 295,436, corresponding to 15.8 percent of the total population of 1,874,014. See Joseph Rossé et al., *Das Elsass von 1870–1932: IV. Band: Karten, Graphiken, Tabellen, Dokumente, Sach- und Namenregister* (Colmar: Alsatia, 1938), 37, 46.

61   See David Allen Harvey, "Lost Children or Enemy Aliens? Classifying the Population of Alsace after the First World War," *Journal of Contemporary History* 34, no. 4

(1999): 537–54; Laird Boswell, "From Liberation to Purge Trials in the 'Mythic Provinces': Recasting French Identities in Alsace and Lorraine, 1918–1920," *French Historical Studies* 23, no. 1 (2000): 129–62; Carolyn Grohmann, "From Lothringen to Lorraine: Expulsion and Voluntary Repatriation," *Diplomacy and Statecraft* 16, no. 3 (2005): 571–87 and Prott, *Politics of Self-Determination*, ch. 5.

62 By contrast, expulsions of "native" Alsatians and Lorrainers probably amounted to less than 100 cases. For numbers see Prott, *Politics of Self-Determination*, 169–70.

63 Ibid., 159.

64 Ibid., ch. 5, also for the following.

65 On the brief period between the armistice and the arrival of French troops in Alsace-Lorraine, see Joseph Rossé et al., *Das Elsass von 1870–1932: I. Band: Politische Geschichte* (Colmar: Alsatia, 1936), 488–505 and Stefan Fisch, "Der Übergang des Elsass vom Deutschen Reich an Frankreich 1918/19," in *Das Elsass: Historische Landschaft im Wandel der Zeiten*, ed. Michael Erbe (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2002).

66 Report of French postal control (Metz) on the period of December 1–7, 1918, December 8, 1918, Service historique de la défense, Paris, 16 N 1464.

67 See Joseph Schmauch, "Préparer la réintégration des provinces perdues: La Conférence d'Alsace-Lorraine et les services d'Alsace-Lorraine à Paris," in *Boches ou tricolores: Les Alsaciens-Lorrains dans la Grande Guerre*, ed. Jean-Noël Grandhomme (Strasbourg: La Nuée Bleue, 2008) and Prott, *Politics of Self-Determination*, ch. 2.

68 See Rossé et al., *Das Elsass vol. I*, 559–71; Fischer, *Alsace to the Alsatians*, ch. 5; and Prott, *Politics of Self-Determination*, ch. 5.

69 See Rossé et al., *Das Elsass vol. I*, 543–50, 563–5; Joseph Schmauch, "Les services d'Alsace-Lorraine face à la réintegration des départements de l'est (1914–1919)" (PhD diss., École Nationale des Chartes, Paris, 2004), 495–532; and Fischer, *Alsace to the Alsatians*, 134.

70 Quoted in Prott, *Politics of Self-Determination*, 148.

71 Paul Matter, "Note sur le rapport de M. J. Kastler," 4, February 12, 1919, Archives départementales du Bas-Rhin, Strasbourg, 121 AL 902, also for the following quotation.

72 As Alison Carrol's chapter in this volume demonstrates, French policy continued to oscillate between more rigid and more tolerant approaches toward regional particularities throughout the interwar period.

73 Alison Carrol, *The Return of Alsace to France, 1918–1939* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 17. See also Carrol's chapter in this volume.

74 On the classification scheme and identity cards, see, among many others, Harvey, "Lost Children or Enemy Aliens," 548; Boswell, "Purge Trials," 144; Fischer, *Alsace to the Alsatians*, 149; and Prott, *Politics of Self-Determination*, 154–6.

75 On the work of the interallied peace commission at Spa, see ibid., 172–4.

76 The quantitative dimensions of this fundamental shift to an inter-national order are captured well in Figure I.I in Andreas Wimmer, *Waves of War: Nationalism, State Formation, and Ethnic Exclusion in the Modern World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 2.

77 See Leonard V. Smith, *Sovereignty at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).