

1 **Title Page (with Author Details)**

2 **Title: Insights into Blockchain Implementation in Construction: Models for**
3 **Supply Chain Management**

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28 **Insights into Blockchain Implementation in Construction: Models for Supply** 29 **Chain Management**

30 **Abstract**

31 The interest in the implementation of distributed ledger technologies (DLTs) is on the rise in the
32 construction sector. One specific type of DLT that has recently attracted much attention is blockchain.
33 Blockchain has been mostly discussed conceptually for construction to date. This study presents some
34 empirical discussions on supply chain management (SCM) applications of blockchain for construction
35 by collecting feedback for three blockchain-based models for Project Bank Accounts (PBAs) for
36 payments, Reverse Auction-based Tendering for bidding and Asset Tokenization for project financing.
37 The feedback was collected from three focus groups and a workshop. The working prototypes for the
38 models were developed on Ethereum. The implementation of blockchain in payment arrangements
39 was found simpler than in tendering and project tokenization workflows. However, the blockchain
40 integration of those workflows may have large-scale impacts on the sector in the future. A broad set
41 of general and model specific benefits/opportunities and requirements/challenges was also identified
42 for blockchain in construction. Some of these include streamlined, transparent transactions and
43 rational trust-building, and the need for challenging the sector culture, upscaling the legacy IT systems
44 and compliance with the regulatory structures.

45 **Keywords:** blockchain; construction; supply chain management; models; Ethereum

47 **Introduction**

48 There is a surge in the interest in distributed ledger technologies (DLTs) in the construction sector
49 (Elghaish et al., 2020; Li et al., 2019a; Nawari and Ravindran, 2019; Wang et al., 2020). DLT is a digital
50 system for recording the transaction of assets in which the transactions and their details are recorded
51 in multiple places at the same time on a network of computers (Kuo et al., 2017). One specific type of
52 DLT that has recently gained prominence is blockchain, a peer-to-peer, distributed data storage
53 (ledger) structure that allows transactional data to be recorded chronologically in a chain of data
54 blocks using cryptographic hash codes. It is the underpinning technology of the world's first
55 cryptocurrency, *Bitcoin* (Nakamoto, 2008). When a transaction is executed over blockchain, the

56 transaction is packed with other transactions in a block. The validator nodes (miners) – computers
57 connected by a specific blockchain network - analyze the transaction and validate the block by a
58 predefined consensus protocol. Each identified block is then recorded with a unique crypto-identifying
59 hash code and linked with the preceding chain of blocks on the network. The key aspects of blockchain
60 are (Turk and Klinc, 2017): (i) decentralization, functioning across a peer-to-peer (P2P) network built
61 up of computers as nodes; (ii) immutability, once blocks are chained; (iii) reliability, provided all nodes
62 have the same copy of the blockchain that is checked through an algorithm; and (iv) a proof-of-work
63 procedure that is applied to authenticate the transactions and uses a mathematical and deterministic
64 currency issuance process to reward its miners. Blockchain's core innovation lies in its ability to
65 publicly validate, record and distribute transactions in immutable ledgers (Swan, 2015). Therefore,
66 many regard blockchain as a disruptive technology and believe that it will have profound effects on
67 various sectors by allowing individuals, organizations and machines to transact with each other over
68 the internet without having to trust each other or use a third-party verification (Wang et al., 2019).

69 Construction is deemed to be a low-productivity/low-innovation sector (Ozorhon et al., 2014)
70 with one the lowest research and development activity (Oesterreich and Teuteberg, 2016). McKinsey
71 Global Institute reports a global productivity gap of \$1.6 trillion USD can be tackled by improving the
72 performance of construction (Barbosa et al., 2017). For blockchain to gain a foothold in the sector, it
73 needs to address some of the key challenges in construction such as structural fragmentation,
74 adversarial pricing models and financial fragility (Hall et al., 2018), dysfunctional funding and delivery
75 models, lack of trust and transparency (Li et al., 2019a), inability to secure funding for projects
76 (Woodhead et al., 2018), corruption and unethical behavior (Barbosa et al., 2017), and deficient
77 payment practices leading to disputes and business failures (Wang et al., 2017).

78 As of January 2020, a blockchain keyword search yields approximately 8700 publications on the
79 *Scopus* database; only a very few of which are within the construction and built environment (BE)
80 domains, despite the recent interest in blockchain research and application (start-ups) (Lam and Fu,
81 2019; Li et al., 2019a). Moreover, most of the existing blockchain discussions in construction are

82 conceptual (Hunhevicz and Hall, 2020; Li et al., 2019a). Lack of empirical discussions, working
83 prototypes and actual implementation cases are conspicuous (Hunhevicz and Hall, 2020). Collecting
84 empirical evidence and insights for blockchain in construction is therefore necessary (Das et al., 2020;
85 Shemov et al., 2020). Hence, this paper presents some empirical discussions as research outcomes on
86 the implementation of blockchain in SCM in construction. The aim of the study is to explore whether
87 blockchain can help the construction sector overcome some of its key challenges by developing and
88 collecting feedback for three blockchain-based SCM models (working prototypes) for empirical
89 research. The contribution of this research is: (i) identification of three opportunities in SCM workflows
90 for blockchain; (ii) development of blockchain-based working prototypes on Ethereum for the SCM
91 opportunities (models), (iii) collection of feedback for the requirements, utility and applicability of the
92 models for practical implementation in real-life; and (iv) identification of a set of benefits,
93 opportunities and general requirements as well as challenges for blockchain in construction over the
94 models. The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section presents the blockchain
95 research background, introducing the SCM workflows the models were developed for. The section
96 that follows describes the research methodology used in conducting the study, followed by the
97 explanation of the models' requirements and details. The empirical findings from the focus groups
98 and workshop are presented in the next section. The final section provides a discussion and summary
99 of the findings with conclusions.

100 **Research background**

101 Blockchain deployment outside finance has been experimental with testing efforts by large
102 organizations like Hyundai, Walmart, Tata Steel, BP and Royal Dutch Shell (Kshetri, 2018; Wang et al.,
103 2019). SCM is a strong fit for blockchain and will be affected by it (Kshetri, 2018; O'Leary, 2017;
104 Treiblmaier, 2018; Wang et al., 2019), where blockchain may facilitate the main SCM targets of
105 regulatory cost reduction (O'Leary, 2017), speed (Perera et al., 2020), dependability, risk reduction,
106 sustainability (Kshetri, 2018), flexibility (Kim and Laskowski, 2018), transparency (Francisco and
107 Swanson, 2018), sense-making, trust-building and reduction of complexities (Wang et al., 2019).

108 The technology will affect the structure and governance of supply chains as well as relationship
109 configurations and information sharing between supply chain actors (Wang et al., 2019). It is therefore
110 important to experiment with new SCM models for blockchain to better understand its implications
111 (Queiroz and Wamba, 2019; Treiblmaier, 2018). There are also serious challenges before blockchain
112 implementations in SCM (Kshetri, 2018; Sulkowski, 2019): complex, multi-party global supply chain
113 environment operating on diverse laws and regulation, integration challenges relating to bringing all
114 the relevant parties together, and controlling the boundary between the physical and virtual world for
115 fraudulent activities. Wang et al. (2019) group these challenges under five main categories: (i) cost,
116 privacy, legal and security issues; (ii) technological and network interoperability issues; (iii) data input
117 and information sharing issues; (iv) cultural, procedural, governance and collaboration issues; and (v)
118 confidence and related necessity issues.

119 Blockchain research in the BE is progressing over seven strands (Li et al., 2019a): (i) smart
120 energy; (ii) smart cities and the sharing economy; (iii) smart government; (iv) smart homes; (v)
121 intelligent transport; (vi) Building Information Modeling (BIM) and construction management; and (vii)
122 business models and organizational structures. Despite blockchain's potential, various general
123 challenges and requirements for blockchain have been identified for the construction sector such as
124 identifying high-value application areas (Wang et al., 2017), developing practical implementation
125 strategies and plans, ensuring resource, process and workforce readiness (Li et al., 2018), compliance
126 with regulations and laws (Li et al., 2019b), upscaling the legacy IT systems, and capturing and
127 documenting benefits and issues in practice (Tezel et al., 2020). The potential blockchain benefits and
128 challenges outlined for construction supply chains are in line with the blockchain discussions in the
129 general SCM literature (Heiskanen, 2017; Perera et al., 2020). Procurement (Barima, 2017; Heiskanen,
130 2017), payments (Barima, 2017), financing of projects (Elghaish et al., 2020; Wang et al., 2017), and
131 real and digital product/component tracking (Turk and Klinc, 2017; Wang et al., 2020) come to the
132 fore as potential blockchain application areas for construction supply chains.

133 A key area of interest in this domain is the application of smart contracts with blockchain
134 (Ahmadisheykhsarmast and Sonmez, 2020). A smart contract is a self-executing contract with the
135 terms of the agreement between buyer and seller being directly written into lines of code. The code
136 and the agreements contained therein exist across a DLT (Mason, 2017). Smart-contracts are created
137 by accounts (addresses) and can only be updated by their owners. There exists among practitioners a
138 fear of the unknown and the doubt that a full contract automation and reduction in contractual
139 disputes are possible when value (money) transaction is involved in particular, with an
140 acknowledgement that smart contracts and blockchain could be beneficial for simple supply-type
141 contracts and for reducing the amount of paperwork involved in contract administration (Cardeira,
142 2015; Mason, 2017; Mason and Escott, 2018). Although their outputs are not directly observable, Badi
143 et al. (2020) suggest that smart-contracts can be applied to construction in a bilateral fashion between
144 supply chain actors.

145 The fragmentation of construction requires a higher integration and trust in supply chains for
146 better sector performance (Koolwijk et al., 2018). From a wider perspective, trust-building in
147 construction supply chains has been mostly narrated through a relational view focusing on the actors
148 and their interrelations to improve trust and information flows across supply chains (Maciel, 2020).
149 Blockchain shows potential in transforming the trust in construction supply chains from relational to
150 technological (Qian and Papadonikolaki, 2020). In short, blockchain applications can contribute to
151 building system-and cognition-based trust in construction supply chains reducing the need for setting
152 up relation-based trust (Qian and Papadonikolaki, 2020).

153 The research project of which this paper is one of the outcomes is concerned with developing
154 blockchain-based SCM models for the construction sector. There are very few discussions available in
155 the literature on models or working prototypes in this respect (Wang et al., 2020; Woodhead et al.,
156 2018). Furthermore, it is recommended that researchers and practitioners validate first whether a
157 blockchain-based solution would be suitable for their needs using one of the DLT decision-making
158 frameworks (Li et al., 2019a; Mulligan et al., 2018). Following that validation process, Li et al. (2019a)

159 previously identified the suitability of Project Bank Accounts (PBAs) for blockchain; however, the
160 authors did not present any model or working prototype for PBAs. Building on these scarce discussions
161 in the field, the authors of this paper initially ran a two-day scoping workshop in Northern England in
162 early spring 2019 with two experienced construction project managers with interest in and knowledge
163 of DLTs, and two experienced DLT developers. After reviewing and exploring some available
164 candidates from the literature and practice in terms of technical feasibility, value and validity, three
165 blockchain-based prototypes for Project Bank Accounts (PBAs) for supply chain payments, Reverse
166 Auction-based Tendering for procurement and bidding, and Asset Tokenization for project financing
167 (crowdfunding) were developed for blockchain integration. There is an optional link between the PBA
168 and Reverse-Auction based Tendering model as explained in the subsequent sections (see **Figure 8**).
169 The Asset Tokenization model was envisioned on the premise that funders or donators are part of a
170 project supply chain. Similarly, the models were developed targeting mainly
171 clients/owners/developers as the main users. The models are grouped under the general name of
172 SCM as the main domain, as payment, procurement and project financing practices can be categorized
173 under SCM in construction (Briscoe and Dainty, 2005).

174 For the blockchain infrastructure of the prototypes, the public and permissionless Ethereum
175 blockchain was adopted for its scalability, relatively fast processing times and transaction affordability
176 (Yang et al., 2020). As of October 2019, the Ethereum blockchain could process about 50 transactions
177 per second with an average time of 20 to 60 seconds for a transaction (Etherscan, 2019). The situation
178 of a transaction can be easily tracked online (e.g. <https://etherscan.io/>) using crypto addresses or
179 transaction hash codes. As of October 2019, the average and median fees for an Ethereum transaction
180 were \$0.119 USD and \$0.066 USD respectively (BitInfoCharts.com, 2019). As explained in the research
181 method section, the models were coded with Ethereum integration, deployed online as prototypes
182 and tested/reviewed with practitioners and academics for feedback after this initial scoping workshop.

183 ***Project Bank Accounts***

184 Delayed or retained payments represent one of the major problems for the construction sector
185 (Mason and Escott, 2018; Wang et al., 2017; Yap et al., 2019). A PBA is a ring-fenced bank account
186 from which payments are made directly and simultaneously to the members of a hierarchical
187 contracting supply chain with the aim of completing payments in five days or less from the due date
188 (Cabinet Office, 2012). This eases cash flow through the system and supports closer working within
189 the supply chain. According to Griffiths et al. (2017:325):

190 *“Under a PBA arrangement, the main contractor submits its progress payment to the client under the*
191 *main contract showing a breakdown of payments to each of the suppliers. Once approved, the client*
192 *pays the total amount of the progress payment into the PBA, and payment is then made out of the PBA*
193 *to each of the suppliers with the dual agreement of the client and main contractor. Direct payment to*
194 *the suppliers from a PBA enables the traditional lengthy contractual payment credit terms, which*
195 *typically exist in subcontracts within the construction industry, to be bypassed ensuring a much quicker*
196 *flow of funds down through the supply chain. “*

197 According to a study commissioned by the Office of Government Commerce of the UK, public
198 sector projects could expect to save up to 2.5% with PBAs through reduction for cash collection, cash
199 flow risk certainty and Trade Indemnity Insurance (Office of Government Commerce, 2007). However,
200 there have been doubts expressed questioning whether such a saving is realistic (Griffiths et al., 2017).
201 Additionally, the Cabinet Office of the UK underlines some knock-on benefits such as greater
202 productivity and reduction in construction disputes, and supply chain failures (Cabinet Office, 2012).
203 In 2012, it was announced that the Government Construction Board in the UK had committed to
204 deliver £4 billion worth of construction projects using PBAs by 2018 (Cabinet Office, 2012). In 2014, it
205 was announced that £5.2 billion worth public construction projects were being paid through PBAs in
206 the UK (Morby, 2014). In 2016, the Scottish government announced that PBAs would be used on all of
207 its building projects valued more than £4 million. In 2017, the Welsh government announced that
208 PBAs would be used on all public building projects over £2 million.

209 ***Reverse Auctions***

210 In the procurement of goods and services, different types of auctions (e.g., English auctions
211 (ascending), Dutch auctions (descending), sealed first price auctions, sealed second price auctions,
212 and candle auctions) are being used. In recent years, electronic auctions have been popular due to
213 their convenience and efficiency (Chen et al., 2018). Strategic valuation, communication, winner and
214 payment determination are critical issues while executing open-bid auctions (Chandrashekar et al.,
215 2007). Electronic reverse auctions as a form of auction for supply chain procurement have been
216 adopted widely in many sectors with price benefits of the order of 20% through price competition
217 (Wamuziri, 2009). Reverse auctions are essentially Dutch auctions where the auctioneer starts by
218 setting a relatively high price that is then successively lowered until a bidder is prepared to accept the
219 offer (Shalev and Asbjornsen, 2010). A reverse auction involves an auctioneer setting the starting bid
220 and inviting bidders, who are generally pre-qualified suppliers, to compete in successive rounds of
221 downward bidding. The auction will close when no new bids are received and the closing time has
222 expired (Wamuziri, 2009).

223 The process is relatively simple, reasonably quick, iterative as competitors are able to submit
224 more than one bid, and provides price competition (Hatipkarasulu and Gill Jr, 2004; Wamuziri and
225 Abu-Shaaban, 2005). However, service providers, suppliers and contractors in particular are
226 concerned with the structure of electronic auction systems that is prone to unethical behavior such
227 as bid shopping (i.e., disclosure of the lowest bid received to pressure other bidders to submit even
228 lower bid) and shill bidding (i.e., when someone bids on a product or service to artificially increase or
229 decrease its price) (Majadi et al., 2017; Wamuziri, 2009). Therefore, reverse auctions are deemed
230 better suited to perishable items such as hand tools and consumables, in other words, for items and
231 services for which many suppliers of similar utility or quality features are available in the market (Pham
232 et al., 2015). To help resolve the trust problem and to eliminate the third-party intermediary costs for
233 the auction validation, it is suggested that blockchain can be adopted for public and sealed bids (Chen
234 et al., 2018; Galal and Youssef, 2018).

235 ***Asset Tokenization (Crowdfunding)***

236 Crowdfunding is a financing method which allows entrepreneurs, small businesses or projects,
237 through a crowdfunding platform, to collect funds from a large number of contributors in the form of
238 investment or donation. In comparison to the conventional funding collected from a small group of
239 high-level investors, each individual funder normally needs to invest only a small amount. Therefore,
240 a crowdfunding platform obviates the need for conventional intermediaries such as banks, which are
241 often an obstacle to access financing, especially for small and innovative enterprises (Belleflamme et
242 al., 2014; Dorfleitner et al., 2017). Furthermore, the costs of crowdfunding platforms are lower than
243 finance institutions' (Lam and Law, 2016). There are four distinct crowdfunding forms. These are
244 donation-based crowdfunding, reward-based crowdfunding, crowdlending, and equity crowdfunding
245 (Dorfleitner et al., 2017). Asset tokenization involves turning a tangible or intangible asset into a digital
246 token for crowdfunding where the associated ownership and transactions are recorded on blockchain
247 for immutability and security. Tokenizing assets can help simplify fundraising, especially for start-ups,
248 small businesses, or non-traditional, innovative enterprises. In theory, companies and individuals can
249 sell tokens as if they are stock interests, by-passing the onerous rules and regulations of the finance
250 sector.

251

252 **Research Methodology**

253 This study follows the Design Science Research (DSR) methodology. The methodology differs to other
254 explanatory approaches, and tends to focus on describing, explaining and predicting the current
255 natural or social world, by not only understanding problems, but also designing solutions to improve
256 human performance (Van Aken, 2005). It involves a rigorous process to design artefacts to solve
257 observed problems, to make research contributions, to evaluate designs, and to communicate results
258 to appropriate audiences (Hevner and Chatterjee, 2010). The DSR process commonly involves the
259 problem identification and motivation, design and development, demonstration, evaluation and
260 communication elements (Peppers et al., 2007). Due to its applied character, DSR is adopted for
261 problem solving in real world through innovation and creation of solutions. Such solutions could be

262 artefacts, theoretical models, algorithms, process models that can contribute to creating new theories
263 (Peppers et al., 2007). Three blockchain-based working prototypes (i.e., Project Bank Accounts, Reverse
264 Auction-based Tendering and Asset Tokenization) were developed for this study as the DSR artefacts.

265 To ensure relevance to the real world, this study has adopted an iterative research process with
266 feedback loops from application to development (Holmström et al., 2009). To this end, the research
267 process was divided into the following stages and steps, considering the DSR elements:

268 • ***Stage 1: problem setting/understanding - for problem identification and motivation, and***
269 ***initial artefact design and development***

270 ○ *Step 1: Literature review*

271 ○ *Step 2: Scoping workshop*

272 ○ *Step 3: Initial model development*

273 • ***Stage 2: artefact development -for detailed artefact design and development***

274 ○ *Step 4: Detailed model development and coding for Ethereum*

275 • ***Stage 3: analysis and testing – for demonstration, evaluation and communication***

276 ○ *Step 5: Three focus groups for model validation and feedback collection*

277 ○ *Step 6: One workshop for model validation and feedback collection*

278 Stage 1 starts with problem identification and motivation. At this stage, there is a need to carry
279 out primary research to investigate and determine the nature and prevalence of the problem. The
280 research could involve self-interpretation through reflection or an initial literature review (Hevner and
281 Chatterjee, 2010). Diagnosing the problem was achieved through the existing knowledge base by
282 reviewing the literature (Step 1) (scientific articles, industry reports, and code snippets).
283 Consequently, no substantial exemplary use cases or working prototypes for blockchain-based SCM
284 models for construction were identified. March and Smith (1995) suggest that DSR artefacts need to
285 be evaluated against the criteria of value or utility, which are adopted in this study. To guarantee the
286 utility of the artefacts, the theoretical input was combined with input from practice, first through the
287 initial scoping workshop (Step 2) later in Stage 1, and then through the analysis and testing of the

288 artefacts in Stage 3. The initial scoping workshop helped define the scope, focus and objective of the
289 solution(s), which is to enhance the identified SCM practices in the construction sector through
290 blockchain.

291 In Stage 2, considering the aforementioned objective, the artefacts were developed in terms of
292 their frontend/backend coding, online deployment and testing (Step 4). Creating a technological
293 solution in DSR requires that the process can be automated and the solution facilitates a
294 change/improvement in current work practices (Hevner et al., 2004).

295 In Stage 3, the artefacts were analyzed through three focus groups and a workshop with 28
296 participants for feedback collection, following a protocol as suggested in construction management
297 and automation research (Hamid et al., 2018; Osman, 2012; Tetik et al., 2019; Wang et al., 2014). The
298 utility of DSR artefacts must be demonstrated via evaluation methods (Hevner et al., 2004). The focus
299 group and workshop participants were asked of the potential of the artefacts (working prototype
300 models) in enhancing and improving the current SCM applications in question as well as the
301 applicability of the artefacts in practice. See **Table 1** and **Table 2** for details of the focus group and
302 workshop participants respectively.

303 Interaction and collaboration are key aspects of this type of evaluation, where the participants
304 and the evaluator can both ask questions while testing the artefacts, and the evaluator can guide the
305 participant in the right direction while using the prototypes. The focus group participants were given
306 the opportunity to directly interact with the prototypes after a demonstration. The prototypes were
307 demonstrated to the workshop participants on a large screen, and although they could not control the
308 prototypes directly, each element of the prototypes was gone through with the participants answering
309 their questions for each step. The research process can be seen in **Figure 1** with each step involved in
310 the three main stages and their objectives in brackets. The first feedback for the prototypes was
311 collected from the scoping workshop participants after finalizing the model development process
312 (Step 4). They recommended some model usability and interface related changes, which were
313 incorporated in the prototypes. Feedback was also collected from the analysis and testing stage (Stage

314 3), which is summarized in the model feedback and evaluation section. However, most of the
315 requirements/feedback from this stage are strategic, long-term focused and comprehensive in nature,
316 requiring a full participation of supply chain stakeholders for future efforts.

317 **(Please insert Figure 1 around here)**

318

319 **(Please insert Table 1 around here)**

320

321 **(Please insert Figure 2 around here)**

322

323 **(Please insert Table 2 around here)**

324

325 **(Please insert Figure 3 around here)**

326

327 **Models Requirement and Development**

328 Model development details, including the demand and justification for each model, the architectures
329 for the working prototypes, and their integration with Ethereum are explained in this section. The
330 development process took place over Stage 1 and Stage 2 in the research process (see **Figure 1**).

331 ***Project Bank Accounts (PBA) Model***

332 ***Demand for a PBA model and problem setting***

333 Smart contracts can embed funds into a contract, which will protect contractors, subcontractors and
334 other supply chain members from insolvency (Wang et al., 2017). They could automate the -currently
335 manually administered- principles of payment under a PBA, increasing efficiency, decreasing pay-out
336 time, and minimizing the risk of fraud, back-office costs and other operational risks (Nowiński and
337 Kozma, 2017). The appropriateness of the PBA arrangement for blockchain was identified in the
338 literature (Li et al., 2019a). However, no real model or working prototype has been identified to
339 validate such an arrangement. Therefore, the purpose of the proposed PBA model on blockchain is to
340 automate and streamline the payment process through a construction supply chain, and to render it
341 more secure, traceable and transparent.

342 ***Development of the PBA model***

343 The modelling requirements are that this payment model will be adopted mainly by public and large
344 client organizations as envisioned previously (Li et al., 2019a), where upon the creation and approval
345 of a payment for a work package by the client, the payment is executed instantly over cryptocurrency
346 through the supply chain members. Therefore, a blockchain-based payment model mimicking PBAs
347 was developed as shown in **Figure 4**. The model was coded ([https://github.com/huddersfield-uni-](https://github.com/huddersfield-uni-smart-contracts/contract.eth)
348 [smart-contracts/contract.eth](https://github.com/huddersfield-uni-smart-contracts/contract.eth)) to integrate with Ethereum and deployed online ([https://contract-](https://contract-eth.herokuapp.com/)
349 [eth.herokuapp.com/](https://contract-eth.herokuapp.com/)) for demonstration and feedback collection purposes. The escrow arrangement
350 was adopted in the model, which is a financial arrangement where a party holds and regulates the
351 payment of funds required for two parties involved in a given transaction. It helps render transactions
352 more secure by keeping the payment in an escrow account, which is only released when all of the
353 terms of an agreement are met as overseen by the escrow company (O'Neil, 1986).

354

355 **(Please insert Figure 4 around here)**

356

357 In **Figure 4**, the client (owner of the contract and the transaction executor) creates the initial
358 escrow smart-contract, which details the requirements needed to fulfil the contract. After being
359 approved by a validator, the client will build the second smart-contract for payments. The payments
360 smart-contract details the rules for payments to be executed for the supply chain members. The
361 accounts on the system are created and validated using each party's unique crypto-wallet code, a
362 unique code that allows cryptocurrency users to store and retrieve their digital assets, which is also
363 used for the value transaction. A validator is an account which approves/rejects transactions from the
364 client into the escrow. The validator could be a senior contract manager at the client organization or
365 a Tier 1 contractor responsible for supervising the task executions in the supply chain. The payment
366 smart-contract is responsible for holding the information about the payment variables. Payments can
367 be withheld for different reasons such as the work package not being completed to the required
368 standards or problems arising. The task of the validator is to step in when there are disagreements,
369 but otherwise, the monetary flow should be left untouched. See **Figure 5** and **Figure 6** for the smart
370 contact creation and approval respectively.

371

372 **(Please insert Figure 5 around here)**

373
374

(Please insert Figure 6 around here)

375 Smart-contracts authenticate and validate the transactions blockchain real-time with full
376 traceability of who does what and when. In addition to reducing contract execution related disputes,
377 which is very common in construction (Cheung and Pang, 2013), this system may reduce the costs
378 associated with procurement administration. They instantly generate electronic documents in
379 contrast to the traditional process, which necessitates the use of hard copies of documentation and
380 authentication by a third party (Wang et al., 2019). The transactions of creating, approving or rejecting
381 the contracts, creating the second contract and executing the payment to the supply chain take
382 approximately 80 -240 seconds by the prototype on Ethereum. For reference, bank payments need
383 between three to five workdays for the payments to be fully processed and settled. Comparisons
384 between cryptocurrencies and credit/debit cards should be excluded, given the later are payment
385 processors, not payment settlers, a function executed only by banks.

386 ***Reverse Auction Model***

387 ***Demand for an Auction Model and Problem Setting***

388 Unlike PBAs, no comprehensive discussion on the suitability of electronic reverse auctions for
389 blockchain was identified in the literature. To check that suitability, the decision-making framework
390 developed by the World Economic Forum (WEF) (Mulligan et al., 2018) to support businesses in
391 assessing whether a blockchain or DLT-based solution would be suitable for their needs was used at
392 the initial scoping workshop. The decision-making framework was gone through with the scoping
393 workshop participants to validate the implementation of blockchain by answering the *yes-no*
394 questions shown in **Figure 7**. The green arrows on **Figure 7** represent the answers for each decision-
395 making point. Depending on the required level of transaction control and transparency, a strong case
396 for both public and semi-public/private blockchain was found for transaction recording.

397

(Please insert Figure 7 around here)

398

399 ***Development of the Auction Model***

400 After this initial validation, a blockchain-based reverse auction model was developed
401 (<https://github.com/huddersfield-uni-smart-contracts/auction.eth>) as shown in **Figure 8** to integrate
402 with Ethereum and deployed online (<https://auction-eth.herokuapp.com/>). As shown by Galal and
403 Youssef (2018), to apply smart contracts to the auction process, bidders submit homomorphic
404 commitments to their sealed bids on the contract. Subsequently, they reveal their commitments
405 secretly to the auctioneer via a public key encryption scheme. Then, according to the auction rules,
406 the auctioneer determines and announces the winner of the auction. After the winner is confirmed
407 by the validating party, and the workflow comes to an end, the escrow smart-contract as explained in
408 the PBA model could optionally manage the payment workflows to mimic PBAs. Both smart contracts
409 could be linked so that after the bidding process is completed, the winner can enjoy the continuous
410 advantages of having payments going through a linked smart contract.

411 In **Figure 8**, the purpose is to allow clients to deploy Auction smart-contracts so that approved
412 companies in the ListBid smart-contract can bid for work packages (quantities, milestones, payments
413 conditions) represented by the WorkPackage smart-contract. When a bid is accepted by the client,
414 that information is automatically recorded in a Procurement smart-contract that is only accessible by
415 the client and validators. The client creates a ClientCompany smart-contract with all information
416 regarding the transaction, which contains the work package information and auction results, and can
417 be verified by anyone. The nodes represent the agents interacting in the smart-contracts. The agents
418 can be: (i) owners, as in the addresses (clients) responsible for creating the smart-contracts; or (ii)
419 companies, as in the agents that participate in the auction bidding. The company nodes represent
420 companies that are bidding for the work package. The client is able to short-list a few bidders and
421 invite them for further negotiations, if need be. The transactions of creating the contracts, contract
422 bidding, accepting the winning and rejecting the losing bids, and contract finalization take
423 approximately 120 – 360 seconds on Ethereum, considering only the party with the most steps
424 (contract creator and finalizer) in the prototype.

425 **(Please insert Figure 8 around here)**

426 ***Asset Tokenization (crowdsale/crowdfunding) Model***

427 ***Demand for an Asset Tokenization Model and Problem Setting***

428 Transparent crowd-sale, commonly known in the crypto-sphere as a Decentralized Autonomous Initial
429 Coin Offering (DAICO), is a decentralized way of raising funds within a specific blockchain protocol –
430 usually Ethereum – in order to develop a project, idea or company (Adhami et al., 2018). The DAICO
431 contract starts in a “contribution mode”, specifying a mechanism by which anyone can contribute to
432 the contract and receive tokens in exchange. This could be a capped sale, an uncapped sale, a Dutch
433 auction, an interactive coin offering with dynamic per-person caps, or some other mechanism the
434 team chooses. Once the contribution period ends, the ability to contribute stops and the initial token
435 balances are set. From there on, the tokens can become tradeable (Butterin, 2018). By creating a
436 public sale, communities could raise auditable funds for construction projects and allocate them
437 transparently to companies, developers and client organizations looking to undertake such projects
438 (crowdfunding) (Wang et al., 2017). This is also the purpose of the developed model. Blockchain is
439 well-suited for the financial and management needs of that kind of a token-based asset transaction
440 (Chen et al., 2018; Mason, 2017; Wang et al., 2017).

441 ***Development of the Asset Tokenization Model***

442 A blockchain-based project crowd-sale/crowdfunding model was developed as shown in **Figure 9**. The
443 model is considered to be used for either donation or investment purposes, where upon the creation
444 of the tokens for a project or its parts, the funds are collected and tracked over crypto-tokens. The
445 model was coded (<https://github.com/huddersfield-uni-smart-contracts/tokenit.eth>) to integrate
446 with Ethereum and deployed online (<https://token-eth.herokuapp.com/>).

447

448 **(Please insert Figure 9 around here)**

449

450 In the proposed model (**Figure 9**), the party seeking investment (owner address) creates a Token
451 smart-contract which functions as “shares” or “representations of the money given to complete a
452 milestone”. After the approvals are put in place, a Whitelist smart-contract is created to allow for the

453 previously approved addresses to participate in the crowd sale. This means that the funders or
454 donators are able to participate in different stages of the funding, depending on the investment
455 seeking party's needs. When the tokens are issued, they can be destroyed or given utility depending
456 on the purpose of the crowd sale. For example, the tokens may enable companies to vote on how the
457 funds to be used or can be traded for money in the future, much like regular shares. Depending on
458 the purpose and goals of each investment seeking party and milestone, the token-utility can be
459 adjusted. In **Figure 9** for instance, after the Token, Whitelist and Crowdsale contracts (Milestone 1 and
460 Milestone 2) are created, Company A participates in the initial milestone funding while Company B
461 participates in the second milestone funding. In **Figure 9**, the nodes represent the agents interacting
462 with the smart-contracts. Agents can be: (i) investment seeking parties, as in the addresses (clients)
463 responsible for creating the smart-contracts; or (ii) companies, as in the agents that participate in the
464 crowd sale. In this example, the client uses two different owner accounts to manage the smart-
465 contracts. This could be a security measure to avoid one account owning all the decision-making
466 power. The company nodes represent the entities willing to fund the project.

467

468 **(Please insert Figure10 around here)**

469

470 The tokenization smart-contract will enable individuals and organizations to fund projects by
471 milestones, and track the funds transparently. If aligned with automated payments (escrows), it is
472 possible to enable a new way of distributing value among all the network participants. Crowdfunding
473 on blockchain may help projects by streamlining and democratizing their funding needs with full
474 traceability.

475 ***Model Implementation and Integration with Ethereum***

476 The implementation of the proposed models requires building and storing an Ethereum architecture,
477 as in a private Ethereum node, to verify the transactions and to store the blockchain data. The
478 Ethereum node holds the private-public key-pair that signs the transactions by sending Ether
479 (Ethereum's digital asset bearer – similar to a bond or other security) (Atzei et al., 2017) to another

480 agent or to a smart-contract. Any application will be able to connect to the private node by submitting
481 transactions or by querying the node for information. The communication between an application and
482 the node is through a JSON remote procedure call (RPC) interface as represented in **Figure 11**.

483

484 **(Please insert Figure11 around here)**

485

486 The private Ethereum node is responsible for broadcasting the transactions to the entire
487 Ethereum blockchain. To an outside source, this will seem like a regular transaction, even though there
488 will be instructions encoded in the transaction bytecode that can only be accessed by the smart-
489 contract operators, achieving a certain degree of privacy even in a public distributed ledger. Older
490 applications, such as traditional Web 2.0 applications, can easily communicate with the newer Web
491 3.0 applications through the application programming interfaces (APIs) connecting to distributed
492 Ethereum servers (e.g., Infura).

493 Although one can use cloud-based services to store the apps information (server-side) in a
494 private manner and can still adopt a public-blockchain ledger to store the transaction data, it is
495 assumed that private-blockchains may be preferred in practice by subscribers of the cloud services
496 offered by some of the largest technology conglomerates (e.g., IBM, Microsoft, Google, Amazon). In
497 essence, if an organization chooses to opt for blockchain-as-a-service (BaaS), they will not be running
498 their Ethereum private node, meaning they are not verifying transactions and trusting a third-party
499 machine to do so, which defies some of the purposes of blockchain implementation-cases. A
500 representation of the architecture for such an arrangement, which was also envisioned for the
501 prototypes, can be seen in **Figure 12**. The architecture mimics a public chain executed on a cloud-
502 server computer. By using cloud-services, private-chains that use tokens to exchange value can be
503 deployed quickly instead of needing to use the Ethereum-public chain.

504

505 **(Please insert Figure12 around here)**

506

507 **Model Feedback and Evaluation**

508 The feedback collected for the blockchain-based SCM models/working prototypes, and blockchain
509 implementation in the construction sector in general from the focus group studies and workshop is
510 summarized in this section by each model, which was realized in Stage 3 in the research process (see
511 **Figure 1**).

512 ***Focus Groups for Model Evaluation and Feedback***

513 ***PBA Model***

514 The focus group participants found the PBA model applicable in a shorter-term particularly in
515 open-book or partnering/alliancing type procurement arrangements, where through the model, as
516 stated by one of the participants, one can achieve “a true open-book arrangement”. The system was
517 noted as a potential first step or gateway to the DLT and blockchain world for construction
518 organizations. According to the participants, the model could be of immediate interest to clients
519 dealing with a large group of suppliers such as public client organizations, housing associations and
520 councils in the UK. The participants found the model’s application relatively simpler provided
521 regulatory and contractual bases for the model are in place. Another potential benefit of the model
522 was found in achieving traceable and correct taxation through payments for governments. The
523 transparent payments discussion was presented as a “double-edge sword”, where although
524 automation and streamlining of the payment approval process would be beneficial to the sector, the
525 participants questioned whether clients were ready to transparently automate payments to such
526 degree. They underlined clients’ need to control value transfer and the culture of using payment
527 control as a source of power in the sector. Also, it was noted that most of the delays and issues
528 associated with payments to supply chains are due to clients’ and Tier 1 contractors’ slow internal
529 processes, which should also be streamlined alongside the model. There is also politics involved,
530 where gatekeepers use the payment process as a bargaining tool for projecting power to their supply
531 chains. Another concern highlighted by the participants is data resilience for the correct data to be
532 used for automated payments on the immutable blockchain, which will be demanded by clients. A link
533 between the PBA model and the existing accounting systems was requested by the participants. The

534 payment mechanisms in the standard form of contracts (e.g. NEC and JCT) should be incorporated in
535 future blockchain-based payment systems. Beyond payments and the procurement process, the focus
536 group participants also underlined the relevance of recording near critical data from site operations,
537 such as wind speed and ambient temperature, for blockchain.

538 ***Reverse Auction Model***

539 A high value potential was attributed to the reverse auction model by the participants,
540 particularly for inducing transparency, record-keeping, audit trailer and data security in obtaining best
541 price in e-reverse auctions or in public/government procurement. The participants also found the
542 system potentially inclusive for smaller service providers, which large clients want to support in the
543 sector as there is not much investment required from those smaller organizations other than having
544 a crypto-wallet address to participate in the proposed decentralized system. However, the
545 participants noted the implementation of the reverse auction model would be more complex. The
546 issue with the legacy IT systems in the construction sector that need to be aligned with a blockchain-
547 based environment was highlighted as a general barrier. Moreover, to render the system fully
548 transparent and trustworthy, it was found necessary to link the system with the emerging digital
549 organizational identification document (ID) and passport initiatives on blockchain as a future
550 improvement suggestion. This will also support awarding the best value service or product provider
551 beyond just the price parameter, where a client will be able to see the past performance of different
552 bidders in a trustworthy fashion. The participants highlighted that insurers for the sector would be
553 highly interested in the digital passport idea for tendering arrangements. Due to the required scale of
554 implementation and the need for incorporating the existing auction-based procurement and
555 tendering regulations, the reverse auction model was found more difficult to implement than the PBA
556 model with a higher potential value to the sector nevertheless. To render the prototype more scalable,
557 it was suggested that some auction limitation options such as time or price limit could have been
558 added. This was incorporated in the prototype. Who should bear the cost of recording the transactions
559 was also a subject of discussion among the focus group participants. Some participants believe if the

560 cost of transactions on blockchain is transferred to the bidders, that may encourage them to consider
561 their bid more carefully before submitting it. This led to discussions on the cost uncertainty and
562 volatility of cryptocurrencies, which in some form are necessary to record the transactions on a public
563 blockchain, consequently rendering cost forecasts for the procurement and tendering processes more
564 difficult for both clients and service providers.

565 ***Asset Tokenization (crowdfunding) Model***

566 The crowdfunding application of the asset tokenization model for donation purposes was found
567 easy to implement with a high potential in rapidly and transparently raising donations for construction
568 projects, which may be of immediate interest to communities, councils and aid organizations.
569 However, for investment purposes, the participants noted that implementing the model would be
570 complicated as the value of tokens is subject to serious fluctuations at the moment. This will
571 potentially put investors off without any return guarantee on the tokens. Additionally, in the
572 cryptocurrency space, most of the utility tokens cannot distribute dividends. A potential remedy for
573 this, until a significant portion of commerce/business in the future is executed on smart contracts and
574 crypto tokens, can be having specific investment tokens issued by governments, big conglomerates
575 (e.g. Facebook's crypto coin Libra) or super-national organizations such as the EU. This may lead to a
576 stock-exchange market like establishment in the sector for asset tokens. The participants agreed that
577 one other way of overcoming the investment barrier through tokens on blockchain for project
578 development is having an *oracle*, an intermediary identity between the conventional and crypto asset
579 worlds. The *oracle* regulates the amount of dividend or benefit the investors of a project will receive
580 based on their token quantities in hand as project shares. However, the *oracle* could still be
581 manipulated through different methods such as corruption, bribery, misinformation etc. According to
582 the participants, another complication or question relating to the investment through tokens is
583 whether or not the token holders will have or demand voting rights for project management and
584 governance. This will introduce further complications to the asset tokenization issue. There was a
585 general agreement on that the potential integration of the models with digital passports on blockchain

586 for identity trust will enhance the models' value and adoption in the future. The participants
587 underlined the relevancy of blockchain for legal project documents beyond contracts such as planning
588 and development permissions. The participants think the asset tokenization model for investment will
589 be of interest to investors and asset developers in particular. A summary of the findings from each
590 focus group can be seen in **Table 3**.

591 **(Please insert Table 3 around here)**

592
593 ***Blockchain Workshop***

594 The attendees mostly attributed a very high or high value to the PBA model (see **Figure 13**). The
595 applicability of the PBA model was also found relatively easier than the other models. The need for
596 streamlining internal payment processes with the PBA prototype was highlighted by the workshop
597 attendees as well. Also, some attendees mentioned the need for convincing client organizations and
598 main contractors for faster/direct payments, which may make them feel insecure in terms of
599 controlling their projects and supply chains. Some discussions about changing the culture in the sector
600 for more openness and collaboration were conducted.

601 The attendees mostly attributed a high or moderate value to the reverse auction model. The
602 applicability of the model was found easy or moderate. The attendees argued that although the
603 system has potential in increasing trust and transparency in auction-based tendering arrangements,
604 suppliers and service providers in the sector are generally hesitant in participating in reverse auction
605 tenders. The integration of the model with digital passports may further increase trust in those tender
606 arrangements. This may possibly change the attitudes of the service providers and suppliers.

607 The attendees generally saw a high potential in the asset tokenization model for both
608 investment and donation purposes. However, the applicability of the model, particularly for
609 commercial investment purposes, was found moderate or difficult. Similar to the focus groups, the
610 attendees indicated a mechanism to stabilize the value of the investment tokens is necessary to render
611 the model attractive for investors. The results of the questions regarding the applicability and value

612 of the models that were obtained from the workshops participants through an online audience
613 interaction system can be seen in **Figure 13**.

614 **(Please insert Figure 13 around here)**

615

616 **Discussion and Conclusion**

617 Blockchain is an emerging technology with potential to disrupt the SCM practices in many sectors,
618 including construction. However, the technology is still immature and its requirements, consequences,
619 and value have not been well-understood yet. The lack of empirical research beyond conceptual
620 discussions is more evident in construction. To some, blockchain is a hyped buzzword that will fade in
621 time or fall short in living up to its hype, and to some it offers a revolution in value transactions
622 (Hunhevicz and Hall, 2020). In this context, three SCM workflows suitable for blockchain were
623 identified. Three blockchain-based models for the SCM workflows as working prototypes for the
624 construction sector were presented with their feedback from academics and practitioners as part of
625 the DSR approach. In this section, the potential benefits, opportunities as well as the challenges and
626 requirements, specifically for the models/prototypes and generally for blockchain in construction, are
627 summarized and discussed as the final contribution of this research. The findings in general confirm
628 blockchain's potential in solving the sector's problems associated with streamlined and transparent
629 payments and tendering processes (Kinnaird and Geipel, 2017; Li et al., 2019a; Wang et al., 2017) as
630 well as easier access to project finances (Elghaish et al., 2020). However, they also highlight the
631 sector's expectations for the technology's maturity for its day-to-day use (Li et al., 2018), calling for a
632 wider view to blockchain with its potential implications beyond its benefits. The rest of this section
633 elaborates on these points. A summary of the highlights of the models alongside their benefits against
634 the traditional workflows can be seen in **Table 4**

635 **(Please insert Table 4 around here)**

636 ***Blockchain Benefits and Opportunities***

637 The identified benefits of blockchain for construction SCM from this study is a combination of
638 the proposed models' features, Ethereum characteristics and blockchain capabilities in general. In this

639 section, the model/prototype specific benefits as well as the common benefits shared by the three
640 models/prototypes are summarized;

641 ***PBA Prototype***

- 642 • Of the three prototypes, the PBA prototype could be implemented first with its simpler
643 requirements acting as a gateway for further DLT applications (see **Figure 13**). On the
644 other hand, despite their more complicated requirements and needs, the auction and
645 tokenization prototypes may lead to large-scale impacts in longer terms (see **Figure 13**
646 and **Table 4**).
- 647 • Payment transaction times can be streamlined when compared to the conventional
648 methods through the PBA prototype (approximately 80 -240 seconds on Ethereum
649 versus bank payments needing between three to five workdays).
- 650 • It is deemed of value especially for clients managing large supply chains with many
651 suppliers and service providers with expedited payments.
- 652 • Correct taxation monitoring can potentially be facilitated.
- 653 • Further payment automation is possible through the prototype's integration with other
654 technologies such as sensor networks for site data input.

655 ***Reverse Auction-based Tendering Prototype***

- 656 • Integration of the tendering and payment processes into a single collection of
657 information that will create the basis for an integrated approval and value transaction
658 system ,which has been deemed of value for the sector (Das et al., 2020; Dujak and
659 Sajter, 2019).
- 660 • Increased inclusivity for smaller tenderers can be achieved with its simpler working
661 mechanisms and access features, which is a priority for larger clients.
- 662 • Reduced transaction times when compared to the conventional project financing and
663 tendering arrangements with lengthy regulatory durations (Ashuri and Mostaan, 2015),
664 which take on average 120-360 seconds on the reverse auction prototype.

665 • Unethical practices such as shill-bidding in procurement (Ahsan and Paul, 2018) can
666 potentially be overcome.

667 ***Asset Tokenization (Crowdfunding) Prototype***

- 668 • Easy access for smaller service providers and suppliers to project financing instruments,
669 helping large clients with supporting smaller organizations for inclusivity and social
670 sustainability (Kuitert et al., 2019; Montalbán-Domingo et al., 2019).
- 671 • Increased accessibility to commission-free project financing for investment or donation
672 over DLT tokens without having to include third-party organizations as in the traditional
673 project financing.
- 674 • Further democratization in project governance through issued project tokens, if voting
675 rights are given to the token owners.
- 676 • With support from super-national organizations such as the EU, mass use of blockchain
677 systems by the public, potentially leading to a crypto token-exchange market for
678 construction investments and web services for construction tendering.

679 ***Common Benefits and Opportunities***

680 Increased transparency is a common benefit of the prototypes as the transactions can be easily
681 tracked online (e.g. <https://etherscan.io/>) in terms of where in the process any transaction is sitting,
682 which is a key concern in conventional SCM practices (Meng et al., 2011) and in establishing
683 cooperative partnerships (Gunduz and Abdi, 2020). Similarly, all stakeholders can participate and input
684 information in the models at any time, and data is available to all relevant parties for augmented
685 interoperability. The prototypes present an advantage over the conventional relational databases,
686 where the traditional workflows sit, in terms of providing a robust, fault-tolerant way to store critical
687 data on Ethereum (Galal and Youssef, 2018), which most of the SCM data (commercial) can be
688 categorized as. Moreover, Ethereum transaction fees are affordable at the moment (\$0.066 USD
689 median cost per transaction) against the expensive database investment and maintenance costs. The
690 prototypes' being open-source and flexible, as consortia on Ethereum are not locked into the IT
691 environment of a single vendor, should be also underlined. As identified from the focus groups, the

692 prototypes can facilitate relational contracting practices, and new business and cooperation models
693 by helping achieve a true open-book arrangement and transparent transactions for payments
694 (Koolwijk et al., 2018). The frequently pronounced transparency and openness induced by the
695 prototypes support the claim that blockchain may help change the trust-building in construction
696 supply chains from relational (soft) to rational (technological) (Qian and Papadonikolaki, 2020) so that
697 entities can trust the information but not necessarily each other (Lumineau et al., 2020).

698 ***Blockchain Requirements and Challenges***

699 The empirical findings from the model development process confirm the general requirements
700 for blockchain in the construction sector, some of which have been conceptually outlined in the
701 literature;

702 ***PBA Prototype***

- 703 • The prevalent business culture (power dynamics) in construction supply chains, using
704 payments as a power projection mechanism (Wang et al., 2017), should be challenged
705 for the adoption of automation in payments as in the PBA prototype.
- 706 • Blockchain-based systems' current compliances with the existing accounting systems,
707 regulations/frameworks, standard contracts and laws should be increased (Li et al.,
708 2019b), which was also identified from this study.
- 709 • As identified from the focus groups and workshop, mechanisms allowing to modify the
710 immutable data (e.g. payment amounts in case of any payment changes, change orders
711 or penalties) (Das et al., 2020) are required in blockchain-based applications.

712 ***Reverse Auction-based Tendering Prototype***

- 713 • The need for blockchain-based systems' compliance with the existing accounting
714 systems, regulations/frameworks, standard contracts and laws (Li et al., 2019b) was
715 also identified over this prototype.
- 716 • Fluctuating and volatile token values and transaction costs may pose various challenges
717 for the execution of this prototype. In line with this, there is a need for clarifying what
718 party will bear the transaction costs in blockchain-based tenders.

719 • Suppliers' and service providers' negative perceptions against some blockchain-suitable
720 tendering arrangements (e.g. reverse auction) (Assaad et al., 2021) in the sector may
721 pose a challenge for the prototype.

722 ***Asset Tokenization (Crowdfunding) Prototype***

723 • Fluctuating and volatile token values and transaction costs on blockchain may pose
724 various challenges for the execution of this prototype as well.

725 • Complications regarding the governance of projects with many token-holders.

726 • The current technical challenges associated with distributing and controlling dividends
727 over blockchain will affect the adoption of the prototype for investment purposes.

728 ***Common Requirements and Challenges***

729 The need for upscaling the legacy IT systems in the sector for blockchain, which is highlighted in
730 the literature (Tezel et al., 2020), was also identified from this study. The sector practitioners
731 emphasized that validating the real-life data to be recorded on blockchain is necessary. This increases
732 the importance of data resilience questions from real-life to digital in the sector in terms of controlling
733 the boundary between the physical and virtual world for fraudulent activities (Kshetri, 2018;
734 Sulkowski, 2019). In that regard, legislative reforms to confirm the immutability of data stored on
735 blockchain along with the elucidated rights and primacies related to funds arranged in smart contracts
736 will be required. Streamlining internal/organizational processes in line with blockchain, potentially
737 through some enabling technologies such as digital passports, remote sensing or the IoT (Li et al.,
738 2018), will be necessary for fully exploiting the blockchain features. Further maturity in the technology
739 to execute multi-party SCM arrangements (e.g. reverse tendering and project tokenization) with
740 shared value (Blockchain 2.0) and digital identity (Blockchain 3.0) capacities respectively (Swan, 2015)
741 is essential. An expectation for more blockchain use cases executed by informed individuals (human-
742 resources) for further blockchain validation was observed. This may be understood as a cautious
743 requirement for blockchain business case. The amount of potential employment loss in the sector due
744 to the automation and P2P transactions facilitated by blockchain is a general concern.

745 Beyond those generic requirements and challenges, future blockchain based models should be
746 analyzed for their specific requirements and challenges as identified from the asset tokenization
747 (crowdfunding) model for investment, for instance, where the issues of dividend payments, project
748 governance rights and the requirement for a prevailing crypto-token by national or super-national
749 legislative bodies came to the fore. Furthermore, questions relating to the practical application of the
750 models such as who (client, service providers or both) will bear the transaction costs on a DLT and
751 perhaps more importantly, who owns/operates (i.e., joint or single ownership of an actor(s))
752 blockchain-based solutions for SCM arrangements in the sector may lead to interesting discussions
753 and findings. Blockchain protocol-wise, it is suggested that organizations fully understand the trade-
754 offs and compromises across the different protocols and not consider the private and permissioned
755 protocols only due to some reservations relating to “losing the control” (Wang et al., 2019). Large and
756 public clients in particular are in the “wait-and-see state” and looking for guidance from policy -makers
757 (e.g. frameworks) to position the technology in their day-to-day workflows at the moment. Summary
758 of the general and model specific findings can be seen in **Figure 14**, where the opportunities and
759 benefits are grouped on the left, and the challenges and needs are grouped on the right.

760 **(Please insert Figure 14 around here)**

761 ***Conclusion and Future Directions***

762 The real-life implementation of the prototypes could not be realized within this study, which is
763 a research limitation. The authors intend to test the models empirically in real-life construction
764 projects as a follow-up study. As for future steps for the models, linking the models with digital
765 passports (ID) on blockchain is deemed to be an important milestone. Alongside the development and
766 investigation of actual implementation cases, identification of key project or asset
767 information/document types to be recorded on blockchain over the project life-cycle presents another
768 prospective research opportunity. In this regard, systematically analyzing SCM workflows in the sector
769 for blockchain-suitability by following a decision-making framework as demonstrated in the reverse
770 auction model’s development constitutes a research opportunity. Some of the SCM workflows that

771 could be considered for this analysis are product and service provider authentication (e.g. responsible
772 sourcing, licensing), logistics management and tracking (e.g. off-site/prefabricated components),
773 property/project/shareholder portfolio data management on a DLT, life-cycle data management on a
774 DLT for plant, materials and components, legal documentation and approvals (e.g. planning/building
775 permissions, land registry records), due diligence workflows, contractually binding documentation
776 (e.g. change orders), tendering decisions over different stages (e.g. two-stage tendering or
777 negotiation), project sponsors' or core-groups' meeting records in relational contracts and data
778 transactions for handover/facilities management .

779 Additionally, developing a blockchain benefit realization model with quantifiable benefit
780 parameters, understanding the change requirements for blockchain in the current procurement
781 systems/structures, how DLTs can positively or negatively affect digitalization, and their implications
782 on data management and flow in construction supply chains will be useful. Investigations into the
783 interaction between blockchain and other popular technologies such as remote sensing, the IoT, data
784 analytics and BIM will increasingly continue. The definition and role of data resilience in the DLT era,
785 reviewing the standard payment mechanism, contracts, procurement and commercial laws and
786 regulations for DLT, analyzing the implications of important decisions on SCM practices such as what
787 blockchain protocols to be adopted or who should own and govern the DLT arrangements, and
788 investigations into steps toward establishing blockchain process standards for the construction sector
789 remain as important topics of future research in this domain.

790 **Data Availability Statement**

791 Some or all data, models, or code that support the findings of this study are available from the
792 corresponding author upon reasonable request.

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Table 1. Focus group studies

Focus Group	Supply Chain Role	Participants	Years in Industry
1	Contractor	Operations Director	20-25
		Finance Manager	20-25
		IT Systems Manager	15-20
		IT Systems Developer	15-20
		Non-Executive Director	25-30
2	Academia/ DLT Application Development	Professor of Construction Project Management	25-30
		Professor of Supply Chain Management	20-25
		DLT Developer	10-15
		DLT Developer	10-15
3	Client	Procurement Manager	15-20
		Senior Quantity Surveyor	15-20
		Contract Manager	20-25
		Commercial Manager	20-25
		IT Systems Manager	15-20
		Project Director	25-30

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Table 2. Workshop participants

Workshop Attendees' Background	Number of Attendees
Academia	10
Contractor	4
Client	4
Consultant	3
Designer	3
IT Professional	2
Maintenance/Facilities Management	1
Public Servant/Government	1
Total	28

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Table 3. Summary of the focus group studies

<i>Model Name</i>		<i>Focus Groups</i>					
		<i>Contractors (Focus Group 1)</i>		<i>Blockchain Developers and Academics (Focus Group 2)</i>		<i>Clients (Focus Group3)</i>	
		<i>Application</i>	<i>Value</i>	<i>Application</i>	<i>Value</i>	<i>Application</i>	<i>Value</i>
<i>Project Bank Accounts (Escrow Payments)</i>		Easy	High	Easy	High	Easy	Moderate
<i>Reverse Auction based Tendering</i>		Doable	Very High	Doable	Very High	Doable	High
<i>Asset Tokenisation</i>	<i>Crowdfunding (Donation)</i>	Easy	High	Easy	High	Easy	High
	<i>Investment</i>	Not so Easy	Very High	Not so Easy	Very High	Not so Easy	Very High

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Table 4. Highlights from the developed models

Developed Models	Requirement	Process	Advantages over Traditional Workflows	Overall/Long-term Benefits	Issues
Project Bank Accounts (PBA) model	<p>Automating payments to the supply chain members to be a substitute for the conventional PBA</p> <p>Protecting contractors, subcontractors and other supply chain members from insolvency</p>	<p>Overcoming gatekeepers for interrupted value flow through (almost) immediate and transparent payments</p> <p>Creating, validating, authenticating and auditing contracts and agreements in real-time, across borders</p>	<p>Quicker payments (approximately 80 -240 seconds) for minimal transactional costs (\$0.066 USD median cost/transaction)</p> <p>Transparent tracking and execution of payment transactions and secondary liabilities such as taxes at all times.</p>	<p>Ensuring a much quicker flow of funds down through the supply chain</p> <p>Reducing contract execution related disputes, reducing costs associated with administration of procurement</p>	<p>Sector culture related issues that may not favor automated payments,</p> <p>Need for integrating the model with clients' accounting systems</p>
Transparent reverse auction model	<p>Allowing transparency and facilitating the identification of best-value bids in reverse auctions</p> <p>Allowing clients to deploy Auction smart-contracts so that approved companies can bid in work packages. The payment mechanism</p>	<p>Relatively simple, reasonably quick, and iterative</p> <p>Transactions of creating the contracts, contract bidding, accepting the winning and rejecting the losing bids, and contract finalization</p>	<p>Allowing competitors to submit more than one bid, and providing price competition with less regulatory processing-automation of regulatory tendering tasks.</p> <p>Helping overcome the transparency and bid ethics related concerns surrounding reverse auctions at reasonable transaction costs (\$0.066</p>	<p>Paving the way for the creation of a web-based project tendering system on blockchain for the public.</p>	<p>Need for integrating the model with digital IDs, accounting systems and the existing contracts and frameworks</p>

	is linked with the PBA model.		USD median cost/transaction) and transaction speeds (120-360 seconds) with increased inclusivity for smaller organizations.		
Asset tokenization (crowdfunding) model	Creating tokens for a project or its parts, collecting funds and tracking over crypto-tokens	Holding the information about the token being created, the approved companies' information, and each crowd sale milestone	<p>Quick access to project financing sources for both small and large organizations (crowdfunding) without third party costs, lengthy regulatory procedures and financial liabilities</p> <p>Enabling individuals and companies to easily fund projects by milestones (project progress) for investment or donation purposes, and track/audit their funds transparently</p>	Paving the way for the creation of a token-exchange market similar to the stock-exchange market for project financing, investment and governance	Issues with fluctuating token values, dividend payments over tokens and governance-rights of projects over tokens

