

**APPLYING A PUBLIC POLICY EVALUATION METHODOLOGY  
FOR LOCAL SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACTS:  
AN EXPLORATION IN REALISTIC MODELLING**

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Developing a Public Policy Evaluation Methodology for Local Socio-  
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Thesis Summary

This research seeks to evaluate public policy impacts through a socio-economic indicators approach. To explore this, the research focused on the privatisation process of the British Steel Corporation. A review of the literature on privatisation confirmed a research gap concerning privatisation impacts at local levels. The research also identified the need to derive a public policy evaluation methodology that can adequately measure these local socio-economic impacts. An appraisal of the methodologies currently in use in public policy evaluation and the key findings of several studies of public policy initiatives in communities supported the choice of a realistic evaluation approach, originated on the causal chain of Context, Mechanisms and Outcomes – CMO.

This methodology was then developed through the application of four asset-based capital concepts (Economic, Human, Social and Physical). These indicators enabled the systematic arrangement of social and economic indicators. The research applied the case study approach in relation to two English ‘steel’ communities: Wolverhampton (West Midlands) and Sheffield (South Yorkshire). Applying the criteria analysis of narrative, ‘counternarrative’ and Braudel’s three-tiered historiographical time concepts, the research concludes that the privatisation programme ignored different variables that both communities presented before the implementation of the programme. As a consequence, privatisation did not generate the desired local outcomes. The realistic evaluation model explored in this research interprets the outcome of an intervention in terms of a set of generative mechanisms and the contexts in which those mechanisms are set to work. In both case studies presented, the privatisation programme was unable to induce appropriate local adaptation. Indeed, the programme served to aggravate failures in both communities’ asset bases.

Contributions from this research are both theoretic and empirical. Firstly, the research applies a CMO model to an economic programme (privatisation) in order to explore not only economic, but also human and social consequences. Secondly, the research incorporates refined notions of time and of the nature of the value creation process into the abstract CMO logic. Finally, the research uses qualitative approaches adopted from other social sciences beyond Public Administration to structure and analyse the cases and generate appropriate policy-rich findings and conclusions.

Key Words:

Realistic Evaluation, Asset-based Capitals, Case study Approach, Privatisation.

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To my husband Ricardo, who travelled with me on this journey into the social sciences, and our daughter Renata, who is always reminding us to continue to see the world with curious eyes.

History may be divided into three movements: what moves rapidly, what moves slowly and what appears not to move at all.

(Fernand Braudel, June 1976)

To understand the present, examine the past.

(Chinese proverb)

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## CHAPTER I – INTRODUCTION

The main objective of this thesis is to explore the consequences of a public policy through the application of evaluating model's based on sets of socio-economic indicators. The specific policy focus here is the privatisation process of the British Steel Corporation, finalised in December 1988 and its attendant general local impacts.

The author's interest in researching public policy evaluation began in 1998 when she developed a case study at Ipatinga, a medium-sized city in Minas Gerais State, Brazil (Gomes and Freitas, 1999). That research sought to understand the socio-economic effects of a privatisation at local levels. The next section presents a summary of this earlier research, the results, limits and unanswered questions.

### **1.1 Privatisation in Brazil: limited analyses and unanswered questions**

Privatisation has been part of Brazilian policy since early 1980s, and has passed through several distinct phases. In the 1980s, the main movement was characterised by the 'reprivatisation' of 38 companies that had been absorbed by the Government, in most cases, due to financial problems. At this time, the Government did not have plans to implement a large-scale privatisation programme. In this phase, the main purpose was to keep the government from increasing its presence in the productive sector of generating revenue for the Treasury (Gomes, 1996).

In 1990 the Brazilian's Government developed the National Privatisation Programme – PND (BRASIL, 1990) and privatisation became an integral part of the economic reforms initiated by the Government. The magnitude and scope of the privatisation process were expanded significantly. The Brazilian steel sector was the first of the Nation's portfolio of public companions to be privatised, with the eight public steel companies being fully transferred to the private sector between 1991 and 1993. This

privatisation was the most significant in terms of asset values to be achieved to that date.

The sale of USIMINAS in October 1991, for example, resulted in proceeds of more than double that of the entire 1980s. Thus, the PND focused its efforts on the sale of companies from the productive sector in sectors previously strategic to the development of the country, as illustrated by the inclusion in the programme of companies in the steel, petrochemical and fertiliser sectors. Between 1990 and 1992, the priority on fiscal reform resulted in the significant use of the so-called 'privatisation currencies' (securities representing federal public-sector debt) in the purchase of state-controlled companies. In the period of 1993-1994 the companies' privatisation process in the productive sector intensified, and the last state-controlled companies in the steel sector were privatised (Gomes and Freitas, 1999).

Between 1995 and 1996, with the new administration entering office, higher priority was placed on the privatisation process. The PND was selected as one of the fundamental instruments for the reform of the state and became an integral part of the then current administration. The National Privatisation Council (CND) was created to substitute the Privatisation Commission (then responsible for the PND) and the privatisation of state-sector companies in the productive sector was almost concluded (Gomes and Freitas, 1999).

Since its creation in 1991, 67 companies and minority holdings in companies owned by the federal government have been transferred to the private sector, the majority from the steel, chemicals, petrochemicals, fertilizers and electricity sectors. According to BNDES (Brazilian Development Bank), the companies also transferred to the private sector through the granting of concessions were seven regional networks of the Federal Railroad Network (RFFSA), plus Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro Docks Companies, Sao Paulo Railroad Network, DATAMEC and Port of Salvador (CODEBA). The consolidated results of the PND to December 31st 2002 were US\$ 39.68 billion (BNDES, 2002).

Brazil's top-level public agency charged with the control of the public accounts at a federal level is the Tribunal de Contas da União - TCU. This is Brazil's Supreme Audit Institution. There is also a State Court for each Brazilian state, which is in charge of controlling the tasks with controlling public accounts at state and local levels. The remit of the TCU includes, inter alia:

- ✓ Judging the abilities of public managers with regard to the spending of public money, and maintenance of possessions and worth of public assets;
- ✓ Evaluating the enterprises' privatisation process included in the National Privatisation Programme - PND (BRASIL, 1988, 1990).

Since 1995 the TCU has been improving its analytical techniques, as well as acquiring know-how from research institutes in Brazil, the United States and the United Kingdom. However, the instruments that have been developed through these exchange programmes do not focus systematically on the socio-economic impacts of a public policy programme (BRASIL, 2000). Furthermore, eight medium-sized cities (three in Minas Gerais State, plus one in each of the following States: Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Espírito Santo, Rio Grande do Sul and Pernambuco) grew up with these Brazilian state-owned steel companies, and the potentially significant impact of privatisation on these largely single-industry communities has yet to be systematically evaluated.

This early research defined as focus the privatisation of Brazilian public steel companies, and a pilot case study (USIMINAS) was elected among three possible Minas Gerais State's different steelworks, privatised between 1991 and 1993. The primary objective of this research was to identify possible benefits of the privatisation process at local levels. As a result, the author - a lecturer from Viçosa Federal University at Minas Gerais State, Brazil - with the collaboration of an undergraduate student as research assistant, developed a social and economic set of indicators. It was intended to be organised in time series that could demonstrate how was the community situation before, during, and

after the privatisation programme process.

Based on several relevant time-based indicators' sets analysis, that earlier research highlighted the need to develop a more effective methodology for appraising community impacts - one that went beyond merely financial concerns. No such instruments were identified in the course of that research. The only evaluative methodology in use at that time in Brazil was based on the auditing of the relevant public accounts.

This research also faced other dilemmas. The fieldwork strategy concentrated in one day-long visit at USIMINAS, where four semi-structured interviews were made with senior employees that were working in the plant at the time of the privatisation. Another three day-long visits were made in Ipatinga, when a further range of interviews was applied. Some of these stakeholders were identified in a prior review of the USIMINAS privatisation process. This review had the objective to build a picture of Ipatinga – its cultural inheritance, its relation with the steel industry and possible confrontations or negotiations that the community conducted at the time of the USIMINAS privatisation (1991). However, the majority of the stakeholders identified in the local history review were unable to be localised. The research then focused on interviewing local social and economic representatives and leaders, in an attempt to cover at least comments about the years after the privatisation. This situation contributed for a perception of a lack of information of the local community prior the privatisation, with its only source being the senior USIMINAS employees' answers and local archives and newspapers' clippings. Also, this limited numbers of day-visits, as a consequence of reduced resources, undermined the data collection. Many stakeholders that were not available for interviews during the fieldwork were eliminated due to the impossibility of a new day-long visit to be arranged.

An additional impasse that this research confronted was the lack, or sometimes the immaturity and unsuitability of data sets that were available at the time of the research. A review, elaborated before the fieldwork, did not accuse any previous research that applied

set of socio-economic indicators to evaluate public policy programmes. As a consequence, the author decided to use a range of pre-elaborated indicators from various sources:

- Local information and socio-economic indicators developed by the Minas Gerais Government for each of its 853 local authorities and updated periodically;
- A local diagnostic of Ipatinga elaborated by the independent agency SEBRAE (Micro and Small Enterprise Support Service), elaborated and published in early 1998;
- The Municipal Human Development Index (IDH-M) for the Minas Gerais State, developed by the João Pinheiro Foundation (FJP - MG, Brazil), the Institute of Economic Applied Research (IPEA - RJ, Brazil) and the PNUD.

Despite these sets of indicators being ambitious at the time of their publication, they were not specifically designed to support a public policy evaluation analysis, and most of the time series previously proposed were unable to be constructed properly. Specially, the author observed a lack of local social information like statistics about education and health for the 1980s. At that time, there were few statistics at local level.

The results of this case study pilot demonstrated that:

- Different steel companies conducted different privatisation processes, although being inspired by only one programme, the PND. For example, USIMINAS was the only one that focused basically in encourage retirements, during the five years before the privatisation, using redundancies only in very few cases;
- After the privatisation, the company continued to stimulate retirements, with a total reduction of personal of 33.3 % by 1998. These vacancies remained unfilled. Despite these reductions, USIMINAS continued to produce the same volume of steel;

- For the local community, USIMINAS' privatisation forced a rupture of a dependent economic relationship that the city had since the company creation, in 1962. For example, after the privatisation, the number of new businesses created locally between 1991 and 1998 were 3,548 in comparison to 910, between 1981 and 1990. Other numbers confirmed that Ipatinga struggled but gradually created a more diversified local market. This economic growth reflected on the development of the city as an attractive regional market among other communities in the area;
- However, the major challenge that Ipatinga was unable to tackle soon after the privatisation, according to this earlier research results, was the development of labour market alternatives, especially for the youngsters. The 'old culture' to stimulate sons and daughters to 'inherit' the parents' job at USIMINAS after their retirement finished abruptly and no early local alternative was identified.

Despite these findings, some unanswered questions remain:

- How to understand the role of the local authority in this process? The research did not recognise any particular evaluation methodology where the role of the local Government could be properly analysed;
- How to build a structure of considerable amount of indicators in a visible and understanding method, in order to facilitate the analysis?
- How to employ these indicators in an evaluation methodology that can adequately measure socio-economic impacts?
- Despite this considerable amount of indicators, there was not sufficient length of time since the privatisation. Judgments about the privatisation process were still influenced by the 'heat of the moment'. These opinions were radically against or backing of the privatisation, with almost none

constructed arguments to support them;

- Finally, how to narrate the ‘local history’? This research did not recognise, at the time of the analysis, any method that could facilitate the organisation of the amount of data collected in a fluent way to ‘tell’ the history of the local privatisation and its socio-economic impacts.

## **1.2 Implications of the Previous Investigation for a new Research Proposal**

The unanswered questions in this previous research influenced the decision to investigate public policy evaluation methodologies that can adequately measure socio-economic impacts at local levels. The author decided to continue to research socio-economic impacts of the steel sector privatisation, at this time the case of the United Kingdom. There were three main reasons for selecting the United Kingdom as the case study location:

- First, United Kingdom is recognised to be first country globally to make use of the privatisation as an economic public policy (Hossain and Malbon, 1998).
- Second, the leading Britain steel company - British Steel plc (formerly the British Steel Company) and the Dutch private firm, Koninklijke Hoogovens, which together formed the Corus Group on October 6, 1999, is of global significance. This Company is the third largest steel producer in the world, the largest steel producer in Europe and employs 64,600 people (with 33,800 of these in the UK) as at April 2000.
- Third, the length of time that has elapsed since the privatisation of the British Steel (in 1988) gives the necessary ‘social space’ in which stakeholders’ interactions in given localities may be played out and longer-term impacts registered.

The author expected by the start of this current research, that public policy

evaluation methodologies currently applied in United Kingdom could answer this early expectation. In fact, a new challenge just became apparent, when the author realised that no current evaluation methodology could adequately be applied to investigate socio-economic impacts. A proper evaluation methodology might be generated, initially.

Nevertheless, the opening questions for analysis are:

- ✓ What sort of socio-economic impacts are generated by a single economic public policy developed at national level and applied in different communities?
- ✓ What are the temporal and causal relationships that underpin the communal adjustment process?
- ✓ How might these inter-communal effects be most systematically measured?

It was also recognised early in the process of scooping and structuring the current research that a degree of choice and delineation would be required. The research agenda identified in Gomes and Freitas (1999) would in all likelihood prove being too ambitious. The themes arising from the author's previous research were set out above. A number of these were successively jettisoned. These themes and the rationales for setting them aside are set out in Table 1.

The implications of these choices are now discussed in somewhat greater detail in the following Chapters. The next Chapter presents the privatisation as a national public policy, and its choice for socio-political and geographic arena to research, derive and test an evaluation methodology. Thus, the chapter includes:

- ✓ An analysis about the steel industry;
- ✓ A historical background about the privatisation; together with a description of the process suffered by the then British Steel Corporation;
- ✓ An analysis of the privatisation from a public policy perspective, pointing especially the gap in the literature about the privatisation impacts at local levels.

**Table 1: Focussing the Current Research**

<b>Research Theme</b>	<b>Rationale for Exclusion</b>
Analysis of different steel companies' privatisation processes	Each one of these companies applied different privatisation processes, despite being inspired by a unique programme, the PND. To investigate the nature of socio-economic impacts generated, the current research must focus on a single economic public policy applied in different communities. The British Steel privatisation offers this condition.
Dealing with the excessive amount of indicators referent to social and economic conditions	The previous research required a proper approach to consider the huge indicators previously collected, but unfortunately no indicators were located. In result, these numbers did not offer strong support for the research analysis and conclusions. In order to make a better use of them, it is necessary to reduce the numbers and make it more robust. In other words, to apply an assemblage of indicators in asset-based capitals.
Approach for telling and analysing the community experiences	The previous research did not identify among the literature review any appropriate instrument that could assist the author to structure and analyse the data collected. Consequently, the final report did not expose entirely possible relationships and linkages of the privatisation process results. The current research chose to apply Braudel's time-space conceptual framework, seeking to explore these possible networks not immediately visible at the time of the data collection.

The next seven chapters of this thesis are structured in this order: second chapter introduces privatisation as a national public policy, and clarifies why it was chosen as a socio-political and geographic arena to derive and test an evaluation methodology. This Chapter therefore, opens with an analysis of the British steel industry, its broad sector development and competitive status. Chapter III examines key public policies evaluation methodologies. This Chapter also summarises the methods and key findings of researchers seeking to analyse the impacts of public policies initiatives on spatial communities, and introduces a synoptic methodology that may be used to further public policy evaluation, based upon a basket of indicators derived from secondary research. Finally, Chapter III reflects upon the “three-tiered historical framework” presented by Fernand Braudel and its potential as a tool for structuring a CMO model. Chapter IV discusses the research methodology possibilities while researching public administration, and presents the case study approach as strategy to collect data. This chapter also portrays the criteria to interpret the findings and how Braudel's time-space conceptual framework is applied to analyse the findings.

Chapters V and VI present the case narrative of the ‘steel’ communities elected as case studies. Each chapter encompasses the political, social, demographic and economic developments and the transformation that each community suffered in the starts of the 20th century. In addition, Chapters V and VI reveal a detailed account of the respective community context in the 1980s, a presentation of the privatisation programme impacts in the community in the year of the British Steel privatisation and its outcomes in the following years.

Chapter VII explores the data generated from the case studies, analysing first each case separately and then performing a cross-case analysis for both results. This Chapter also discusses the relationship between the research findings and scientific rigour approaches presented in Chapter IV. Finally, Chapter VIII discusses the empirical and theoretical contributions from the research, as well as limitations and suggestions for further enquires about evaluating socio-economic impacts of national programmes at local level.

## CHAPTER II - EVALUATING LOCAL IMPACTS: THE CASE OF PRIVATISATION

This Chapter introduces privatisation as a national public policy, and clarifies why it was chosen as a socio-political and geographic arena to derive and test an evaluation methodology. The Chapter therefore, opens with an analysis of the British steel industry, its broad sectoral development and competitive status. This is followed by a brief historical overview of the processes underpinning privatisation policy in the UK. These insights are then applied to the specific processes by the then British Steel Corporation. The final sector of this Chapter addresses privatisation from a public policy perspective, seeking to analyse the broad range of impacts arising from the privatisation process. The Chapter concludes with an appraisal of the literature on privatisation impacts at local levels.

### 2.1 The Steel Industry in the United Kingdom – Brief Review

Hudson and Sadler (1989) argue that the historical development of the steel industry may best be understood through a comparative international analytical approach.

‘Thus, explaining the collapse of steel employment in places such as Consett in UK...has to start from a global perspective with the restructuring of this key manufacturing sector, mediated in various ways through, the policies of national states and on occasion an embryonic supranational state. It also has to incorporate a more local dimension and address issues such as: exactly how steel closures came about; why campaigns fought in an often bitter attempt to prevent closure almost always resulted in failure; and why political strategies devised nationally and fought for locally to compensate for loss of steel jobs came to display such an extraordinary degree of similarity in different countries and continents’ (Hudson & Sadler, 1989, p.2).

Globally, the geography of the steel was formed in three main stages:

1. First, sectoral location was originally largely shaped by nature and the natural environment, by the locations of likely resources, given contemporary production and transport technologies.
2. From the 1950s, major technological changes impacted. These included the introduction of basic oxygen steelmaking (BOS), cutting the necessary labour time to convert liquid iron to steel from around eight hours, using open-hearth

technologies, to around forty-five minutes. This invention, more than any other, promoted changes in the geography of steel production. In particular, it accelerated a move to coastal locations, for two reasons:

- i. Such locations facilitated imports of raw materials, especially richer iron ores to help satisfy the greatly increased demands for hot iron;
- ii. They also allowed major modifications to be made to existing coastal or quasi-coastal plants or the construction of totally new ones, often mirroring the massive innovative Japanese complexes.

According to Hudson and Sadler (1989), the UK government seized this chance to reorganise the intranational geography of production and simultaneously, to use the steel industry as an instrument of regional policy, concentrating investment in new capacitation in peripheral problems regions.

Before this, in 1945, the UK steel industry underwent fundamental changes of structure and ownership. It was nationalised in 1949, practically denationalised from 1953 onwards and then predominantly renationalised in 1967. British Steel Corporation was then formed by 14 of the major UK steel producing companies. These companies together accounted for approximately 90% of UK crude steel production and employed more than 250,000 people in 1967 (Fevre, 1989; Vaizey, 1974). The starting problem was that only the risky bulk steelmaking sector was nationalised, against the opinion of steel companies' managers. So, important and profitable sectors of the industry were left in private hands (Bryer et al, 1982).

'The fourteen firms which were nationalised were not themselves giants, though among the bigger British companies. But combined they had a book value of £1,400 million, their turnover was £1000 million...There were thirty-nine crude steel producing works, including twenty-on that were fully integrated, together with a great miscellany of other assets. Some of the firms were mostly located in one area – Colvilles in Scotland for example, and SCOW in South Wales; some specialised in broadly one type of steel product, such as SCOW in sheet and tinplate, Consett and South Durham in heavy steel plate and sections, and Stewarts & Lloyds in Tubes; but the remainder, for example, English Steel, John Summers, RTB, and above all United Steel, were geographically dispersed and produced a range of products...If the Corporation decided not to continue the existing firms, should it seek to have specialist groups, or geographical groups?'

(Vaizey, 1974, p. 181)

The intention of the government and the then BSC's chairman, Lord Melchett, soon after the nationalisation of 1967, was to pursue an expansionist strategy based on the Japanese model: large-scale, integrated steelworks, producing tonnage steels that were marketed in sufficient amounts to secure economies of scale (Tweedale, 1993a). Scale economies were considered so significant, indeed, that a throughout measure was chosen to divide the public and private sectors. Only firms producing 475,000 tonnes a year or more were to be included in the BSC (*ibid*).

3. After 1974 the global steel demand declined substantially, while the effects of this decline were intensified by the pressures of international competition of lower-cost procedures. In this way, the future of the older inland plants became an increasingly precarious.

The coastal expansion of ordinary steels' bulk production was taking place at a time of increasing demand for steel so that the longer-term implications of this growth for smaller inland plants, using either open hearth or BOS technologies, were substantially veiled in the early 1960s and 1970s. Even in those cases where coastal expansion would lead to some net loss of jobs, the apparent promise of secure long-term employment for most steelworkers neutralized trade union opposition to reorganisation. In fact, steel unions were often enthusiastic supporters of plants to invest heavily in new capacity, even if this resulted in some alteration in production and employment characteristics (Hudson and Sadler, 1989).

The impact of the post-1973 recession heavily felt in the steel industries of the Western Europe and the USA, and accentuated by the growing output of newly industrialised countries, as Brazil and South Korea. The situation in the United Kingdom reflected these global trends. The UK's main steel producer, British Steel Corporation

(BSC), reduced its output from 25m tonnes in 1971 to 17m tonnes in 1976. The Company's total workforce fell from 250,000 to 210,000 in the course of the same years (Hudson and Sadler, 1989, p.64).

During the 1970s, BSC invested heavily to expand its production capacity in order to meet projected demand. However, the production arising from these capital expenditure schemes began to come on stream in the late 1970s at a time when demand for steel was weak, following the first oil crisis of 1973/74. In 1975/76, BSC incurred the first of a series of large losses that continued for ten years. Over-capacity and falling demand restricted BSC's ability to raise prices in order to recover increased production costs, resulting in a price/cost restrain.

Since February 1973, BSC had embarked on a plan called "Ten-Year Development Strategy", when a £3,000 million investment programme (at 1972 prices) was to concentrate on the five 'heritage sites' of Llanwern and Port Talbot in South Wales, Scunthorpe and South Teesside in England, and Ravenscraig in Scotland. One-third of the investment was to be allocated to South Teesside creating a giant modern costal works with an annual capacity of some 12m tonnes. In parallel with the commissioning of this new capacity, however, older plants at inland locations would be closed. Some of these closures were made at BSC in the mid-1970s, especially of older open-hearth steelworks. Table 2 gives examples of BSC plants closures at this time, and the consequent jobs loss.

**Table 2: Some BSC's closures 1979-1980**

Local	Year	Jobs Loss
Corby (partial closure)	1979	6,000
Bilston Steelworks (Wolverhampton)	1979	2,500
Consett	1980	3,700
Port Talbot (partial closure)	1980	5,549

Source: data from research

The recession that followed the second oil crisis in 1979 was particularly severe in the UK and led to a further substantial contraction in domestic steel demand. Between 1975/76 and 1979/80, the Government provided some £3.3 billion to BSC to help finance its activities. In December 1979, the Board of BSC resolved on drastic measures (Aylens, 1988):

- ✓ To reduce labour capacity by 30% until 1983;
- ✓ To utilise remaining capacity fully;
- ✓ To rationalise working practices;
- ✓ To change the principles for determining pay settlements.

Although the implementation of these measures was delayed by a national steel strike in the UK in early 1980, Hudson and Sadler (1987) argue that employment at BSC has been cut from 186,000 in 1980 to 54,000 in 1986. In addition, whole market segments were sold to the private sector through a series of joint ventures, known as 'Phoenix companies' (ibid).

By the time of the general election of 1987, BSC's workforce had fallen more from 166,400 in 1979 to 51,600. The Conservative Party's 1987 election manifesto signalled further major changes for BSC in terms of detailed proposals for its privatisation. The next sections detail exactly how the Government managed the privatisation process.

## 2.2 Privatisation: Historical Background

The public policies adopted by an increasing number of countries since the 1980s have placed a growing emphasis on a process that had its beginnings in the United Kingdom and then spread out from there: privatisation. Seeking to reduce its asset base in the economy, the State transfers its assets and patrimonies to the private sector. This is a quasi-permanent arrangement, as different from the contracting out of public interests – known as ‘temporary privatisation’.

The objectives of asset transfer are highly contested (see, for example, Hossain and Malbon, 1998). However, privatisation was originated by a desire to address multiple expectations, one of which was to improve the productivity and yield of the state-owned industrial sectors through an injection of entrepreneurial resource and culture. According to Hossain and Malbon (1998), three distinct tactical approaches have been adopted in relation to the process of privatisation. They suggest that these tactics have been pursued with different vigour in differing regions of the world economy:

- The ‘big-bang’ approach being pursued in Latin America and the Caribbean region,
- The ‘go-slow’ and institutional approach characteristic of the Asian and East Asian nations, and
- The ‘marketisation’ political approach of East Europe.

In sectoral terms, the most developed countries have directed their privatisation strategies towards industries and utilities, like electricity, water and gas. Regardless of these distinctions, a momentum to privatise state industries has been apparent across the world. What are the claimed benefits that underpin privatisation? Gould (quoted in Hossain and Malbon, 1998), claimed that privatisation will:

- Raise funds and reduce borrowing to improve a nation’s effective fiscal and macroeconomic management;
- Increase efficiency at the enterprise level;

- Reduce government and bureaucratic interference in the day-to-day business of an enterprise;
- Increase the share ownership dispersion in key enterprises;
- Create competition in the market;
- Promote discipline in the market place.

In many nations, regulators have been established during the privatisation process to protect the interests and activities of three major players, namely consumers; privately owned new companies; and governments. However, such regulation does raise some important distributional issues, including:

- How are any benefits to be distributed between these groups?
- How to identify exactly to whom the privatisation will be benefic in what circumstances?

The privatisation implications are complex and depend upon a number of factors, including whether or not the enterprise will be more profitable and efficiency under private than continued public ownership. In addition, other factors are the change in the market value after privatisation; and the performance before and after the privatisation.

The administrations led by Margaret Thatcher (1979-1990) in the United Kingdom have been dubbed the 'privatisation period' (Evans, 1997). A 1979 'statement of intentions' set out her government's primary intentions with regard to privatisation (Fevre, 1989). Vickers and Yarrow (1988) explain that until 1979, there was a clear trend in the direction of bringing greater numbers of enterprises under public ownership. This formed a part of the so-called "post-war consensus" (Atkinson, 1992). The year of 1979 was a decisive breakpoint. Since then, the privatisation programme has produced a sharp movement in the opposite direction. The reasons of adopting privatisation as an political action of the 1979 Conservative Government are described by Parry (1990) as a mechanism to reduce the market power of public employees and to give more scope to

private enterprises. Atkinson (1992) indicates that the Thatcher government firmly believed that the State's role (particularly in the industry policy) should be reduced to a minimum and that, a priori, the private sector was a more efficient and effective provider of goods and services.

To understand the conviction behind the Thatcherite privatisations, it is necessary to recognise the economic situation of the United Kingdom at this time. The 1970s in Britain were marked by an important change in the priorities of government economic policy, and by a growing disillusion with the Keynesian approach on which much post-war policy had been based. Increasing importance was attached to the problem of controlling inflation, rather than holding down unemployment. The Keynesian approach had emphasised the role of spending (aggregate demand for goods and services) in determining the economic activity level. By regulating the spending level, governments controlled the unemployment level and the inflation rate; and by maintaining a steady increase in spending, the government stimulated increases in productivity and in standards of living. According to Dunn and Smith (1992), between 1945 and 1965, the Keynesian policy of demand management based on fiscal policy appeared to work tolerably well. In order to maintain the exchange rate, however, British governments were then forced to restrain public spending, hence slowing down growth. The public spending controls impacted particularly heavily on nationalised industries in terms of long-run investment.

The new Thatcher government took office with three basic economic objectives, which they perceived to be complementary:

- To reduce inflation;
- To control the trade unions power;
- To reduce the government economic role.

The first of these objectives could be achieved, following the Thatcher government's thinking, only by reducing the government's spending growth rate by controlling the

money supply. The high exchange rate most directly affected those economy sectors exposed to foreign competition – that is, primarily the manufacturing sector. Employment in the public sector (with the notable exceptions of steel and shipbuilding) was maintained. Thus, to hold spending with cash limits, it was necessary to reduce the ‘quality of provision’ and investment in public services, and to increase substantially the changes made for services (in other words, to privatise services).

The control of the power of trade unions and the effect labour market reform, several successive Acts of Parliament were passed. Table 3 briefly summarises the most significant of these.

**Table 3: Labour Market reform under Thatcher**

<b>Act</b>	<b>Objective</b>
1980 Employment Act	Outlawed secondary picketing and restricted the operation of the ‘closed-shop’.
1982 Employment Act	Made unions liable for damages if held responsible for unlawful industrial action, while narrowing the definition of a ‘lawful’ trade dispute, and strengthening individuals’ protection against closed shops.
1984 Trade Union Act	Required secret ballots and made unions liable for damages incurred during a secret ballot.
1988 Employment Act	Gave members still further powers vis-à-vis their trade unions.

Source: Seldon and Collings (2000)

The measures brought the unions back within the scope of civil law, reversing the immunity from civil action they had acquired in the 1906 Trade Disputes Act. Labour market and pay flexibility were assisted by the Wages Act (1986), which reduced the role of Wages Councils to fix wage levels, and profit-related pay and decentralised pay bargaining procedures were encouraged (Seldon and Collings, 2000).

The emphasis changes in economic policy started in 1979 may be seen essentially as a variation of the monetarist view. In this view, if the money supply in one country is growing faster than in other countries, this ‘excess’ money will flow out through the foreign exchange markets, causing the exchange rate to fall.

Privatisation lay at the heart of the economic approach of the 1980s (Dunn and Smith, 1992). Privatisation took three specific forms:

- ✓ ‘de-nationalisation’, through the publicly owned assets and equity (shares) sale to the private sector (for example British Rail, British Telecom, British Gas);
- ✓ ‘contracting-out’, by subcontracting the government financed goods provision and services to private contractors (for example refuse collection, hospital cleaning);
- ✓ ‘De-regulation’, by removing inhibitions and regulatory restrictions on enterprise and competition. Measures included ending the opticians’ dispensing monopoly or diluting coach transport regulations.

The Thatcher years privatisation could be identified in three phases described in

Table 4.

**Table 4: The Phases of Privatisation under Thatcher's government**

Phase	Principal Actions
1979-1982	Sale of council houses, of certain publicly owned assets, and of firms already in competitive market. Deregulation to increase competitive pressures generally and specially on publicly owned firms.
1983-1988	Sales of the major public monopolies, notably British Telecom, British Gas, British Airways and British Steel. Creation of regulatory agencies. The process of privatisation proved successful in terms of wider share ownership involving a broad cross-section of the community (the “popular capitalism”). However, many small shareholders kept their stocks only long enough to realise quick profits and then sold them back again to large institutions, especially pension-funds.
1989-1990	The move to privatise the huge public utilities, particularly water supply and electricity generation and supply. Not only does the sheer scale of these sales differ, but also a significant change in public attitudes became apparent. Public opinion was no longer nearly so much in favour of these privatisations, fearing the consequences of the creation of such powerful private monopolies. The record of agencies whilst not itself poor, had seemingly failed to convince the public as consumers that regulation would prevent prices rising and services declining.

Source: Dunn & Smith (1992).

According to Dunn and Smith (1992), the utilities privatisation overall impacts could probably not be assessed until a full business cycle had passed and the investment decisions impact taken under private ownership took effect. The immediate the privatisation’s process beneficiaries were, they argue, the initial shareholders, the government’s financial and legal advisers, the senior managers in the former public corporations and the taxpayers. The shareholders usually obtained their investments at a discount, and most of them had their privatisation shares perform better over the period 1982-1990 than the Stock Market as a whole. Dunn and Smith also argue that the

government's advisers earned large sums working for the companies but being paid by taxpayers. The senior managers' salaries rose some 250% in real terms over 1979-1988. Finally, the taxpayers could observe a reduction in public spending and increased government income generated by the disposals. There is little in Dunn and Smith, however, concerning impacts on specified local communities.

### **2.2.1 The Privatisation of the British Steel Corporation**

On 10th July 1983, the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry told the House of Commons of the Government intention to denationalise all of those industries reporting to him during the life of that Parliament. The privatisation of British Steel Corporation (BSC) finally took place in December 1988 – a considerable delay. The principal reason for this delay is clear. Until 1988, nobody wanted to buy the firm, because it was unprofitable. It took the Government nine years to turn BSC into a profitable company (Fevre, 1989). Fevre also notes, however, the Government's determination to pursue its privatisation programme to completion:

- The Government showed itself willing to privatise utilities like gas and telecommunications, even though many people believe that State ownership of these services avoids wasteful duplication of supply networks;
- The Government continued to encourage privatisation even when it is shown, as in the case of the National Health Service (NHS), that this frequently leads to deterioration in services and may well cost the nation more in long term period.

The economic recession in the UK deepened in 1980. Output in the manufacturing and the construction industries fell by 8.7% and 5.5% respectively, with motor vehicle production dropping by around 11%, and total deliveries of steel to the UK market in that year from all sources were the lowest since 1951. BSC's combined losses after exceptional

items in 1979/80 and 1980/81 were in excess of £2.5 billion.

The major causes of BSC's production loss were not, however, recession-related. Rather, an ill-considered investment strategy generated losses of market share and revenues to importers. Technological constraints amplified BSC's loss competitive position vis-à-vis the private sector. Private competitors were allowed to undercut BSC by using a technology (electric arc steelmaking in mini mills) from which BSC was effectively excluded. Finally, the 'economies of scale' argument put by BSC managers convinced both Government and the Civil Service to let them close down what they claimed were "obsolete plants" and replace them with new big ones (Rowthorn and Ward, 1979; Bryer et al, 1982).

Against this background, UK volume capacity (measured at the hot rolling stage) was reduced by 21% between 1980 and 1985. Steel demand in the western industrialised countries is closely related to the level of general economic activity; the recovery from recession in those countries, which began in the early 1980s, materially assisted the world steel industry.

Growing recovery in global steel markets did ultimately result in major improvements in BSC's competitiveness and financial performance between 1980/81 and 1987/88. BSC substantially reduced its steelmaking capacity through a number of measures, including major plants total and partial closures. New and more flexible working practices were introduced and the principle that pay increases should be largely related to the achievement of improved performance and cost reductions was established.

The preparation for privatisation in the integrated plants (that supply steel not only to external consumers but also to other BSC operating sites) took the form of a reduction in direct employment and a parallel increase in the work proportion undertaken by private contractors (Fevre, 1989). From 1980, BSC brought in increasing number of contracting workers in place of direct employees. In consequence, between March 1980 and April

1988 the Corporation's UK establishment fell from 166,400 to 53,000 (British Steel, 1988). Fevre calls this reduction in direct employment a 'quiet privatisation'. In his analysis, the growth in contracted work at Port Talbot in Wales resulted in downward social mobility, falling incomes and periodic unemployment.

### **2.3 Researching Privatisation Process in the United Kingdom**

Analysing the privatisation process in the UK in the 1980s/90s and the situation of firms transferring into competitive markets, Bishop and Green (1995) conclude that these firms took advantage of commercial and managerial freedoms that had been denied to them prior to privatisation. In particular, some firms were able to restructure their operations and reduce their workforce in recession onset anticipation whilst others were able to limit their exposure to recession by diversifying into less cyclical business. The authors fail, however, to address at any point the privatisation consequences for the local and regional economy, nor consumers' or customers' opinions.

Hossain and Malbon's (1998) edited contribution is explicitly dedicated to analysing the distribution of benefits from privatisation. They seek to explore the privatisation impact, and the ramifications in terms of regulatory reform. The benefits and costs of privatisation are appraised in a variety of countries from various perspectives. One conclusion that the regulators established to oversee privatised services might be judged to have failed in their efforts to extract an appropriate or adequate proportion of the net surplus from privatisation for domestic consumers. These studies certainly shed light on the dynamic efficiency and impact of the privatisation process on monopolistic state firms. However, the socio-economic effects of privatisation on public corporations that were already operating in deregulated and competitive markets (like BSC) appear to be less well explored.

Wilding (1990), analysing the experience of the three Thatcher administrations in

the UK, suggests that privatisation policy can be analysed under three headings: economic, political and social factors. The economic focus is based on the belief that market provision is always more efficient than public sector provision. Two further propositions underpinned this:

- ✓ That management practice in the private sector is superior to that in the public sector and that such practices are transferable to newly privatised industries;
- ✓ Those in market situations, the consumers have much more power relative to producers. This implies that freedom is enhanced when individuals buy and sell goods and services in market relationships and reduced when services are publicly provided.

The contention of the beneficence of the free market lay at the heart of the government's privatisation policy in the 1980s.

Privatisation policies change the incentives structure and the criteria used to judge success. In particular, divergent definitions of 'efficiency' may fundamentally alter the change impacts evaluation. Jackson & Price (1994) are surely correct to argue that the literature on privatisation has tended to focus upon technical efficiency and ignore allocative efficiency – who gains and who loses. Technical efficiency requires that firms produce the output demanded by consumers at the lowest possible cost subject to the technical production constrain. The input mix is, therefore, efficient. On the other hand, allocative efficiency requires that firms produce the output level, mix and quality at a price where it is not possible to re-arrange the outputs of an economy and make one consumer better off without making another worse off (Pareto optimality). The singular focus on technical efficiency may result in policies that are directed at cost cutting while policies that might result in price reflecting costs more closely are often ignored.

Jackson and Price (1994) pose the following question: has privatisation resulted in improvements in efficiency as was hoped for the advocates of the programme? The

authors answer that only in efficiency 'technical' or 'productive' interpretation terms. The long term socio-economic privatisation effects must be appraised not only in terms of efficiency or cyclical fluctuations, but also in wealth distribution terms (and not only income) and structural stabilisation of the firm. In summary, a privatisation full evaluation of must also address both dynamic efficiency and 'allocative efficiency' for the wider society.

Aylens' (1988) study of the UK steel industry concludes that the the British Steel Corporation performance has improved since privatisation. In 1980, British Steel was one of the lowest performing UK companies producing steel at prices significantly higher than its competitors. By the middle of the 1980s this had reversed and the privatised British Steel Corporation was among the world's leading steel producers. This turnaround was not only achieved by the changing ownership (privatisation). Aylens describes the radical managerial and organisational reforms that were introduced. Decentralised business units with clear commercial objectives, which focused on outcomes, were established. Productivity bonuses were paid with which in 1987 represented about 20% of the steelworkers' total earnings. The improvement in performance reflects these changes to the incentive structure facing both management and the workforce.

Raju & Thanassoulis (1994) researched a number of privatisations of large publicly owned UK companies. Their analysis identified the factors range relevance, including dividend yield, market capitalisation and the change in the market value of the company on the first day of share trading, after privatisation. Their objective was to see how the experience gained from past privatisations might be used to the taxpayer's future advantage. Their research provides financial guidance for any future privatisations on how better to price assets and state enterprises to maximise the benefits to taxpayers.

Parker and Martin (1996) examine the privatisation effects on the use of inputs and hence on labour, capital and other supplies in eleven firms which were privatised in the

United Kingdom in the 1980s. Their findings indicate that privatisation does seem to have been associated with higher profitability and labour does seem to have lost out in terms of income shares, though to a lesser degree in terms of employment and wage relativities and in purchases and out-sourcing. However, they note that both sets of results need further investigation. Parker and Martin also suggest that the performance of each privatised company is partly determined by the environment in which it operates. For example, in 1985 the UK steel industry had surpassed the steel industries of Germany, France and the USA in terms of technical efficiency. However, since then, its performance has been more lacklustre. The authors suggest that the change in the capital market did not lead to obvious performance gains, although whether British Steel would have weathered the economic recession after 1989 worse (or better) under state ownership is impossible to know.

In a further study, published in 1998, Parker and Wu analysed the performance of BSC before and after privatisation in 1988. They measure performance in terms of trends in labour and total factor productivity and profitability, on the one hand, and by comparing the technical efficiency of the UK steel industry with that of six other major steel producing countries, on the other. Their research method uses Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). The results confirm relative efficiency gain in British Steel before privatisation but since then, again, relative performance has worsened. Their work indicates the range of research methods being used to try to establish the firms performance privatisation impact concerned over time. It also suggests a continuing concern with the privatisation impact on differing interest groups. Table 5 resumes research studies selective cohorts key aspects in terms of their objectives, methods and main conclusions.

**Table 5: Key Studies in Privatisation**

Author	Objectives	Methodology	Conclusions
Aylens (1988)	Examine the possibilities of BSC with its eminent privatisation	Focus on financial performance	Privatisation is suggested as a way to remodel the steel industry in UK and Europe
Raju and Thanassoulis (1994)	Analyse the privatisation of large publicly owned firms	Focus on financial performance (change in market value of company on first day of trading of shares)	Some UK experience showed that privatisations benefited taxpayers
Jackson and Price (1994)	Analyse the different issues related to privatisation efficiency	Explore allocative efficiency with the objective of understanding privatisation policy	Privatisation policy emerged and developed in UK rather than being planned rationally as an element of political strategy
Bishop and Green (1995)	Analyse the performance difference of UK firms before and after privatisation	Firms' document analysis	Privatised firms took financial and managerial advantage of "freedom"
Parker and Martin (1996)	Examine the effects of privatisation on the use of inputs in eleven UK firms	Firms' document analysis	Regressive impact of privatisation in terms of income shares, to a lesser degree in terms of employment and purchases. Also indicates needs for further investigation
Parker and Wu (1998)	Analyse the performance of BSC before and after privatisation	Measure comparative performance (DEA instrument)	BSC gains before privatisation, but since then performance more insufficient
Hossain and Malbon (1998)	Appraise who gains and who loses with privatisation in various countries	Document analysis of distinct countries' experiences	Regulators failed to redistribute welfare for domestic consumers

Source: data from research

## 2.4 Conclusions

This Chapter introduced privatisation as a national public policy, discussing why it was chosen as a socio-political and geographical arena within which to derive and test an evaluation methodology. Addressing privatisation from a public policy perspective, this Chapter highlighted the broad range of impacts that arises from the privatisation process, some of them not yet fully investigated.

This Chapter also reviewed a selected bundle of research studies, and concluded that, in financial/managerial terms, the privatisation' processes analysed here were succeeded (Aylens, 1988; Parker and Martin, 1996). On the other hand, these studies fail to focus on the privatisation consequences for the local and regional economy, neither

consumers' nor customers' opinion (Hossain and Malbon, 1998; Parker and Wu, 1998).

This review also indicated that studies about privatisation frequently ignore the 'allocative efficiency' – who gains and who loses - in this process (Jackson and Price, 1994). In sum, it reviewed the literature about the evaluation of local socio-economic impacts generated from privatisation programmes. The Chapter then concluded that there was no register of this particular interest in the present public policy evaluation literature.

As a result, this research focuses now on public policy evaluation methodologies. An assortment of authors including Chen (1990), Goldman et al (1997), Guba and Lincoln (1989), Lichfield (1996), O'Connor (1995), Patton (1997), Pawson and Tilley (1997), and Philliber (1998), Reese and Fasenfest (1997), Weiss (1995) has discussed the analysis of the impact of a public policy for whom and in which circumstances. Their contributions and approaches will be presented in the next chapter, in the subsequent periods: the first section discusses essential methodologies used currently in public policy evaluation as outlined in the evaluation literature. The second section summaries the researchers methods and key findings seeking to analyse the public policy impacts initiatives on communities. The third section introduces a synoptic methodology that may be used to further public policy evaluation, based upon several indicators presented in section two. Finally, the last section considers the three-tied historical framework presented by Fernand Braudel and its potential as a tool for structuring an evaluation methodology approach.

### **CHAPTER III – PUBLIC POLICY EVALUATION: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE**

This Chapter will appraise the key methodologies currently in use in public policy evaluation as delineated in the evaluation literature. The Chapter also summarises the researchers methods and key findings seeking to analyse the public policies initiatives impacts on spatial communities. The third section introduces a synoptic methodology that may be used to further public policy evaluation, based upon a basket of indicators derived from secondary research. Finally, section four reflects upon the three-tiered historical framework presented by Fernand Braudel and its potential as a tool for structuring a CMO model.

This Chapter's central objectives are to develop a literature review capable to discuss among key methodologies in public policy evaluation, one that can adequately measure local socio-economic impacts of a major public programme. Plus, this Chapter intends to review several researches that focused the policies programmes local impact identifying methods, key findings and gaps, in order to support the evaluation methodology development of a general model.

The literature reviewed to this end was sourced initially from the search results of key words as evaluation, local impacts, community evaluation, plant closures, community indicators, privatisation, and British Steel. A sort of reference books and articles from specific journals were then reviewed. The researcher spent at least eight months to examine this massive amount of information.

The discussion opens with a critical appraisal of key methodologies in public policy evaluation, with the objective of identify one that can adequately measure socio-economic impacts at local levels.

### 3.1 Key Methodologies in Public Policy Evaluation

Geva-May and Pal (1999) propose a theoretical distinction between the concept of policy analysis and evaluation. Policy analysis is understood as a process that is designed to choose the best policy direction from among a set of alternatives, where this process is evidence-based. Evaluation is seen as the application of relatively neutral, social scientific research techniques to policy issues. For the authors, clients establish the evaluation studies goals and objectives. Data have to be interpreted and filtered through some sort of values that help to determine what is significant and what is not. Consequently, evaluation is a subset or phase of policy analysis that is primarily research-oriented. The evaluation tries to provide answers to causal questions. These questions include, for example: what happened to a community after its biggest and formerly state-owned employer was privatised? The aim is to give answers to questions of impact. They suggest some methods to evaluate a public policy:

- ✓ Cost-benefit analysis;
- ✓ System analysis;
- ✓ The use of case studies (experimental or comparative);
- ✓ The use of both qualitative and quantitative research, with the objective being to emphasise measurements reliability and validity.

These methods are hardly exhaustive, as the various compensation techniques to be found in the Means Collection (1999) illustrate.

Goldman et al (1997) propose eight steps for evaluating a public policy economic impact. Table 6 explains each step in turn. For Goldman et al (1997), economic impact studies need to provide information about how a project will affect the community's overall environment as well as more tangible goods like jobs, income and housing. It is, they argue, it is relatively easy to estimate total benefits and costs but it is much more

difficult to estimate the differences in distribution of income and costs between social groups within the spatial community. It is also necessary, they suggest, identifying both the aggregated and the distributional impacts of each alternative policy in turn. The aggregate economic impacts include the total effects in one sector such as the aggregate employment impacts or the aggregate impact on quality of local housing. On the other hand, distributional impacts are those that affect some individuals, groups, institutions, businesses and communities more than others. It is notable that this methodology is designed to analyse an economic impact before the public policy is implemented ('prior appraisal').

**Table 6: Eight steps for a public policy economic impact evaluation**

Step	Main Actions
01	Define the scope of the study and the alternatives to be considered in the analysis
02	Define exactly what decisions need to be made, what information is being requested, and what questions the study should answer
03	Determine how detailed the analysis should be
04	List all fundamental assumptions and limitations
05	List all economic impacts that are to be considered, including all public services that will be affected
06	Determine what data are needed, what are available, and how they will shape the study
07	Analyse the effect of each alternative on the individual economic areas being considered and assess the indirect effects (or cross-impacts) among the economic areas
08	Present results so that the alternatives can be compared – this involves identifying both the aggregated and the distributional impacts of each alternative.

Source: Goldman et al (1997)

Can it be certified, however, that such evaluation studies' findings actually will be used to reorient a public policy? Patton (1997), reflecting on how to get evaluation results used appropriately and meaningfully, proposes an utilisation-focused evaluation methodology. To this end, the author presents four standards for evaluating the quality of evaluation work: utility, feasibility, propriety and accuracy. Utility is intended to ensure that an evaluation will serve the practical information needs of intended users. Feasibility is intended to ensure that an evaluation will be realistic, prudent, diplomatic and careful.

Propriety is intended to ensure that an evaluation will be conducted legally, ethically, and with due regard for the welfare of those involved in the evaluation, as well as those affected by its results. Finally, accuracy is intended to ensure that an evaluation will reveal and convey technically adequate information about the features that determine worth or merit of the programme being evaluated.

The first challenge in evaluation, according to Patton (1997), is therefore to answer the following questions: who needs evaluation? Who cares about its findings? The next step is to localise and identify the primary users, narrowing the list of potential stakeholders to a much shorter, more specific group of 'primed rate' intended users. Their information needs, that is, their intended uses, should focus the evaluation. Another important observation is that a particular evaluation may involve multiple levels of stakeholders and therefore need multiple levels of stakeholder involvement. Summarising, utilisation-focused evaluation methodology discusses the most appropriate design to apply to an evaluation. It is a process for matching intended uses and intended users. The author suggests three evaluation findings primary uses: to judge merit or worth; improve programmes; and generate knowledge. Each use is defined below:

- ✓ The use for judging merit or worth is exemplified by many summative evaluations; accountability audits; quality control systems; cost-benefit decisions; and accreditation/licensing initiatives;
- ✓ The use to improve programmes is exemplified in formative evaluations. These may encompass: strengths and weaknesses identification; continuous improvement; quality enhancement; learning organisation commitments; other managerial modernisation initiatives; and proprietary models' local adaptation;
- ✓ Finally, the use for generating knowledge includes for example, generalisations about effectiveness; principles extrapolation about what works; theory building; patterns synthesising across programmes; scholarly publishing and policymaking.

Each use that Patton (1997) proposes for evaluation findings focuses on a particular aim of the user. Such research is seeking to generate knowledge through careful generalisations about what works, for whom and in what socio-economic contexts.

The Fourth Generation Evaluation methodology, presented by Guba and Lincoln (1989), focuses on the stakeholders' 'claims concerns and issues'. The starting point of this type of evaluation is to capture and understand the perceptions of those groups involved with and affected by the programme examined. In other words, instead of using public policy programme objectives, the stakeholders articulate their point of view about the associated risks and benefits. In the authors' words,

'Fourth Generation Evaluation, as we shall show, rests on two elements: responsive focusing – determining what questions are to be asked and what information is to be collected on the basis of stakeholder inputs – and constructivist methodology – carrying out the inquiry process within the ontological and epistemological presuppositions of the constructivist paradigm' (Guba and Lincoln, 1989, p. 11).

Guba and Lincoln (1989) present detailed methodological guidelines for Fourth Generation Evaluation. These guidelines are grounded in the principle of the hermeneutic dialectic circle and in the methodology of naturalistic inquiry. Table 7 shows the Fourth Generation Evaluation's twelve steps.

Guba and Lincoln (1989) argue that the twelve steps described below should not be necessarily used in sequence. Rather, the table indicates progression only in a general way; the authors suggest that frequent back and forward movements, and also sometimes jumping over multiple steps, is not only possible but also desirable.

**Table 7: The Fourth Generation Evaluation methodology**

Step	Main Actions
1	Initiating a contract with the client or sponsor commissioning the evaluation
2	Organising the evaluation
3	Identifying stakeholders
4	Developing within-stakeholder-group joint (collaborative, shared) constructions via the hermeneutic/dialectic circle process, specifically focusing on claims, concerns, and issues
5	Testing and enlarging within-stakeholder-group constructions by introducing new or additional information and by enabling group members to achieve higher levels of sophistication in dealing with such information
6	Sorting out resolved claims, concerns, and issues – those on which consensus has been achieved
7	Prioritising unresolved claims, concerns, and issues
8	Collecting information bearing on unresolved claims, concerns, and issues
9	Preparing agenda for negotiation
10	Carrying out a negotiation
11	Reporting via the case study – the joint construction as product, and
12	Recycling the entire process

Source: Adapted from Guba and Lincoln (1989, p. 185-7)

Reese and Fasenfest (1997) consider which kind of evaluation works best. They discuss the values underpinning the public policy evaluation, specifically, economic programmes. For the authors, what works best for local economic development (LED) purposes hinges first on specification of the term ‘works’. What is the community trying to achieve? Is the focus to be on economic growth or on larger systemic change? Economic growth is expressed, in the local development context, in terms of jobs created numbers and the best use of the local tax base at the lowest price. A larger systemic change is presented by the authors as an:

- ✓ Increase in the stability as well as the income gross level for the population;
- ✓ Increase in local control over both market and government operations, particularly in those aspects that affect citizens in poverty;
- ✓ Increase in economic and political empowerment of all sectors of a community, including individual citizens.

Therefore, defining the local economic development goal precisely as development

rather than simply growth directly affects the type of measures and indicators incorporated in a policy evaluation and, as Reese and Fasenfest suggest, this avoids some of the pitfalls noted when the two foci of growth versus development are compared. In the authors' words,

'In the final analysis, local development policy is deemed successful if it appears to have positive effects on the business climate... improves the economic base in terms of changes in per capita income or employment...or, in some cases, if projects are completed at all...' (Reese and Fasenfest, 1997, p. 197).

Reese and Fasenfest (1997) discuss how goals are to be conceived. They locate goals in terms of a 'production of value' function. The crucial differences that they draw between inputs, outputs, outcomes and impacts are explained below:

- ✓ Inputs - resources and efforts directed at accomplishing a goal;
- ✓ Outputs - specific activities that directly result from inputs;
- ✓ Outcomes - the direct consequences or results that follow from an activity or process;
- ✓ Impacts – changes that reflect those implications for the society as a whole.

Examining these definitions, assessing outcomes and impacts are conceptually more problematic, since causal attribution is more complex. Inputs and outputs are related in assessing the development efforts' efficiency. Outcome analysis means assessing resulting change in conditions and impacts require the investigation of long-range changes in attractiveness and quality of life in the community. This distinction is better visualised as in Table 8, where the social (representing broader impacts) and economic (representing more specific outcomes) perspectives are explained in a set of indicators terms. Table 8 suggests that it is quite tenable to 'decompose' goals (as located at different points in the Production of value function) into sets of indicators. This point will be more fully retrieved below.

**Table 8: Economic Development Measures**

Outcome measures	Employment change by sector Income distribution Job generation by sector Wage and non-wage employment Change in percent in poverty Diversity of the economic base Extent of citizen input Job security Pay levels of new jobs Quality/Challenge of new jobs Recession-proof Economy
Impact Measures	Value in use of new products Racial isolation/dispersion Life expectancy Health Care coverage Literacy Educational Attainment Homelessness Housing Quality Infant Mortality Crime Rates Environmental Quality Governmental Responsiveness Personal Satisfaction with job, community

Source: Adapted from Reese and Fasenfest (1997).

Pawson and Tilley (1997) present proposals for 'realistic evaluation'. Their argument is founded on the proposition that programmes work (achieve outcomes) only insofar as they introduce the appropriate ideas and opportunities (mechanisms) to groups in the appropriate social and cultural conditions (contexts). These three concepts, outcomes, mechanisms and contexts, inform the authors' overall (rationalist) theoretical contribution.

Defending policy as a cyclical, interactive process, they argue that the choice of evaluation method has to be carefully tailored to the exact form of hypothesis developed earlier in the realist evaluation cycle. The authors explain that the circuit goes full cycle. The knowledge obtained from any particular inquiry feeds back into further theoretical development, which might include mechanisms contexts and outcomes' interplay reviewing accounts, so that subtle variations in programme beneficiaries are hypothesised. This leads to further observations, employing different methods, so gradually laying down outcome typologies in which the successes and failures of whole programme families are explained.


Outcomes provide the key evidence for the ‘realistic evaluation’ in any recommendation to ‘...mount, monitor, modify or mothball a programme’ (Pawson and Tilley, 1997, p. 217). The authors argue that programmes cannot be understood as undifferentiated entities. Instead, programmes ‘... fire multiple mechanisms having different effects on different subjects in different situations, and so produce multiple outcomes’ (Pawson and Tilley, 1997, p. 217). Finally, outcomes must be analysed in order to find out if the assumed mechanism/context theories are confirmed.

As a result, the challenge described by Pawson and Tilley (1997) is to create cumulative findings from evaluation research, in order to devise more effective policies, to achieve objectives and to make improvements in value for money. In this end, the authors propose ‘realistic forms of cumulation’s basic model development. As they suggest:

‘...cumulation is a matter of deepening, specifying, focusing and formalising our understanding of programme mechanisms, contexts and outcome patterns. ...cumulation in realistic evaluation is a matter of traversing between general theory (abstract configurations) and empirical case studies (focused configurations)’ (Pawson and Tilley, 1997, p. 116).

Figure 1 below illustrates the principles of Realistic Evaluation.

**Figure 1: The realistic evaluation cycle**



Source: Pawson and Tilley, 1997, p. 85

Pawson and Tilley (1997) also identify the social actors who can most immediately contribute to the construction of 'realistic data'. Their stakeholders are defined in terms of who might be expected to know what about the programme. These are the key 'informants' – made up of the policy-makers; the subjects; the practitioners and the evaluators. Policy-makers will have some notion about how the programme will generate positive benefits. Hence, their thinking is critical in the programme formulation. The subjects have rather a personal view of choices made by the time the policy was applied. The practitioners translate programme theories into practice. The researcher cannot really expect from them any systematic charting of "what works for whom in what circumstances". Finally, evaluators are likely to be stronger on form than context, and may lack the local detail of the type that practitioners and subjects can best supply. They conclude that the data construction in evaluation must be done by a cross-fertilisation between these different interpretative currents.


A variation of Realistic Evaluation is the Theory of Change. The approach has been studied, among others, by Chen (1990, 1997), Weiss (1995, 1997a, 1997b), and Judge et al (1999). This evaluation theory is a systematic and cumulative study of the links between activities, outcomes and contexts of the initiative. It builds over time towards a theory of how and why an initiative works. This approach is a hybrid process and outcome analysis; a type of outcome evaluation without a comparison group that is used to get at behaviours and outcomes that are not easily measurable. The Theory of Change examines change conditions of programme implementation and mechanisms that mediate between processes and outcomes as a means to understand when and how programmes work. It requires an articulation of short and long term goals and assumptions about:

- ✓ What types of intervention lead to specific consequences;
- ✓ Specified consequences that result in particular outcomes;
- ✓ The desired short and long term goals.

There are seven key elements of the Theory of Change approach:

1. It delineates the pathway of an initiative by showing both the outcomes (early, intermediate and long term) and the action strategies that will lead to the achievement of these outcomes;
2. Quality of the theory is judged by four explicit criteria - how plausible, feasible, testable and meaningful it is;
3. A theory of change is generated by moving back ( in production of value terms) from long-term goals and outcomes to the conditions needed for producing them, and then to activities required to achieve early outcomes;
4. The approach considers: whether change will occur, how much change is expected; for what populations; in what settings; and when;
5. It examines expectations for outcomes and activities in view of available resources;
6. It encourages multiple stakeholders to contribute to the articulation of the theory of change;
7. It recognises that the theory of change can be modified as it is tested during the initiative.

**Figure 2: Producing a theory of change**



Source: Adapted from Judge et al (1999).

The bold arrow in Figure 2 indicates the complete analysis that has to be made

following a properly articulated analysis among all of the steps described. For each step in the Theory of Change framework, stakeholders in a policy or programme must agree on four dimensions:

- ✓ Indicators – which indicators will best measure whether those elements' outcomes are changing?
- ✓ Populations – which target populations should be showing change on these indicators?
- ✓ Thresholds - how much change on these indicators is good enough in terms of meeting programme expectations?
- ✓ Timelines – how long will it take to achieve these thresholds?

Judge et al (1999) describe five possible benefits of a Theory of Change approach:

- ✓ It facilitates measurement and data collection;
- ✓ Different contexts facilitate rather than hinder learning;
- ✓ It reduces problems of attributing cause;
- ✓ It concentrates scarce evaluation resources;
- ✓ It generates more useful policy learning: what works for whom in what circumstances?

Finally, to generate a Theory of Change evaluation, several questions must be answered:

- ✓ What longer-term outcomes are desired?
- ✓ What contextual conditions are necessary to produce these outcomes?
- ✓ What activities should be initiated to achieve outcomes, and why?
- ✓ What are the expected consequences or targets that result from these activities?
- ✓ What resources are required to implement and maintain these activities, and how are they to be obtained?

In terms of process management, Judge et al (1999) argue that the key to

developing a Theory of Change evaluation is to involve the community in the day-by-day search for outcomes, where these are broken down into three categories, namely: early wins, intermediate, and long-term outcomes.

Chen (1990) advocates the Theory of Change approach to conceptualise evaluation as a specific response to two questions:

1. Why is it that programmes appear to fail?
2. How is it that so little has been learned from all of the evaluations that have taken place?

Chen (1990) criticises what he believes to have been the predominant approach to evaluation of the 1960s and 1970s, what he calls a “black box impact assessment”. This was often insensitive to the hopes and aspirations invested in the programme by its diverse set of stakeholders. Such assessments addressed issues that were either not at all, or only a partial set of the goals imputed by programme stakeholders. Chen also criticises these “black box impact assessments” because they did not yield the most appropriate information for designing programmes that work. They tended to provide information on whether or not a programme succeeded or failed to achieve a statistically significant impact. According to Chen, the question of why the programme succeeded or (more often) failed was not (and could not) be addressed in such evaluations.

Chen (1990) then argues that evaluation research is not primarily a matter of technical or methodological expertise. Indeed, the most valuable methodological understanding that effective evaluators need is, he contends, ‘substantive knowledge’. Substantive knowledge is defined as a set of interrelated assumptions, principles, and (or) propositions to explain or guide social actions. Substantive knowledge informs what the author calls ‘theory-driven’, as opposed to ‘goals-oriented’ evaluation (Reese and Fasenfest, 1997).

Different theory-driven evaluations require the use of distinct research methods.

There is no best single method for all evaluation needs. The usefulness of a particular method depends entirely on the questions to be asked, the stakeholders' needs, the research situation, and the nature of the programme: the particular method is then contingent on these wider contextual considerations. According to Chen (1990), because each type of theory-driven evaluation has its own unique characteristics, functions and structure, its methodological requirements must be more or less peculiar. Methods have to be elaborated, refined, or developed to fit these requirements. As a result, a programme theory is a specification of what must be done to achieve the desired goals, and what other important impacts would be generated. The programme theory consists of two parts:

- ✓ The normative theory, which deals with what the structure of a programme should be, including treatments (the implementation's policy theory), outcomes, and implementation processes that are related to the values of the programme;
- ✓ The causative theory, which explores the underlying causal mechanisms that link the relationships among programme treatments, implementation processes, and outcomes.

Accordingly, the normative theory provides the rationale and justification for the programme structure and activities. On the other hand, the causative theory is usually empirically based, and important in understanding the roots of programme effectiveness. It also provides information both on the impacts generated by the programme and how the impacts were generated. Chen (1990) defines the major 'domains' in programme theory as follows:

- ✓ In normative theory: treatment, implementation environment, and outcome;
- ✓ In causative theory: impact, intervening mechanisms, and generalisation.

Each of these domains has a specific set of tests associated with it. Chen concludes these unique tests in a logic statement terms. These domain 'specifics' are set out in Table 9.

Chen (1990) argues that a systematic combination of all six-domain types constitutes a “superordinate” programme theory. Generating such a subordinate theory is desirable, but this does not imply that these six domain theories have to be evaluated simultaneously in every evaluation. Due to time and resource constraints, an evaluation may often require that only one or a few of the domain theories need to be evaluated in accordance with the stakeholder’s specific concerns.

**Table 9: The Basic Types Domains' Specification**

Normative Theory		Causative Theory	
Treatment Theory	The nature of the programme treatment should be...	Impact Theory	The causal effect between the treatment and the outcome is...
Implementation Environment Theory	The nature of the contextual environment within which the programme should be implemented is...	Intervening mechanism theory	The underlying intervening processes operate by...
Outcome Theory	The nature of the programme should be...	Generalisation theory	Evaluation results can be generalised to the topics or circumstances of interest to stakeholders by...

Source: Adapted from Chen (1990).

Chen (1990) also affirms that the normative domain theories and causative domain theories are related to each other. In particular, the information found in evaluating normative theories provides knowledge of the contextual and intervening factors needed to explain or interpret the empirical findings in the causative domains. On the other hand, the evaluation findings from the causative domains can in due course provide information on the normative domains’s performance and can indicate how to improve these domains.


These six domain theories allow one to systematically derive two general categories of theory-driven evaluations: basic and composite. The basic types are derived directly from each class of domain theory (see Table 4). Composite types are constructed from combinations of these basic types, which produce various new types of evaluations. Chen (1990) focuses on two types: the ‘normative treatment-impact’ evaluation and the normative ‘implementation environment–impact’ evaluation. The ‘treatment-impact’

composite type functions in part to pinpoint crucial components in the treatment that affect the outcomes. These might then be interpreted as the 'critical success factors'. A 'treatment-impact' evaluation attempts to systematically elaborate these treatment components in the impact evaluation to provide information on each component's relative effectiveness. As an example, a programme often contains a number of components, and stakeholders may want to know which components contribute the most to programme effectiveness.

The second composite type of theory-driven evaluation discussed by Chen (1990) – the 'implementation environment-impact' – either enables a strengthening in programme structure before an impact evaluation or provides useful contextual information for improving a programme effectiveness. It might identify, for example, the exact factor in the implementation environment that caused the programme's failure or success. There are two types of the 'implementation-environment impact' evaluation: 'summative' and 'formative'. In the summative type, the information generated is utilized not to improve the same programme but to explain the programme's failure or success as found in the impact evaluation. Consequently, this type of evaluation is carried out alongside or after the impact evaluation. Conversely, in the formative type of 'implementation-environment impact' evaluation, the information obtained from the implementation environment is utilised for improvement in the design and delivery of that selfsame programme.

Continuing in this formative theme, Ling (2000) tables a proposal to sensitise policy-making evaluation in relation to a variety of possible futures. The author explores one established technique that might be used to this end, namely, scenario planning (or more broadly, scenario thinking as a heuristic). This technique can be used as part of an ex ante policy evaluation process, that is, before the policy implementation. Figure 3 embeds scenario planning into the ex-ante evaluation process.

**Figure 3: Scenario Thinking in an Ex-ante Evaluation**



Source: Adapted from Ling, 2000, p. 11.

The use of the scenario in an ex-ante evaluation should identify manageable risks; required skills to develop; and phenomena to monitor and influence. It should also enable creative thinking concerning the impact of a policy in plausible but different futures. Plus, the use of this tool means seeks to understand the nature and impact of the most uncertain and important driving forces affecting a public programme. Ling's (2000) proposal above searches exactly for this: alternative images instead of extrapolating current trends from the present. Hence, Figure 3 sets up objectives in the first column, in order to define boundaries and establish focus – in this case programme users and the outcome driven. Next, some inputs quoted need to be explored in preparation for the scenario building activity. This scenario building might be necessarily characterised by the outputs described in column three: multi-level, multi-purpose, necessarily ambiguous and some times, intangible. The next step is to develop possible outcomes, being them intended or not. Others influences, as denoted in Figure 3, would help to synthesise and refine the various scenarios constructed through this analysis. Consequently, Ling (2000) assures that with rich decisions made, more secure actions (programme implementation) would be


completed.

Judge et al (1999) demonstrate how they plan to employ these two approaches to inform their examination of the community health improvement processes that might take place in Health Action Zones in England. The authors employ realistic evaluation methodology to explore the ways in which specific change mechanisms interact with the circumstances prevailing in particular local contexts to yield observed outcomes. They also apply a Theory of Change approach to highlight the importance of encouraging stakeholders to engage in quite difficult and time consuming processes that yield more convincing strategies and rationales for the interventions they select. These processes are also intended to enable them to specify the purposeful investments in activities, interventions and processes' expected consequences.

Figure 4 illustrates the approach adopted. The starting point is the context within which initiatives operate – the resources available in the communities and the challenges that they face. The first step is to specify a rationale for intervening in relation to priority issues. This strategy should be translatable into clearly defined change mechanisms – what Judge et al (1999) call 'purposeful investments in activities, interventions and processes'. The challenge is to specify targets for each of these investments that satisfy two requirements:

- ✓ They should be articulated in advance as the action expected consequences;
- ✓ These actions and their associated targets should form part of a logical pathway that leads to strategic goals or outcomes's directions.

**Figure 4: Community Health Improvement Process**



Source: Judge et al, 1999, p. 20

As Judge et al conclude:

‘within this approach, evaluation and learning occur across the entirety of the community health improvement process. Evaluators work with local stakeholders to elicit their rationales and strategies and sharpen their community resources available to refine and develop the health improvement process in the future’ (Judge et al, 1999, p. 20).

This approach highlights the importance of evaluating policy, following its implementation. However, proper instruments to evaluate the socio-economic impacts of a regional public policy post-implementation are not yet available.

This section has critically reviewed some of the principal evaluation methodologies developed over recent years. It is apparent that continuing ambiguity surrounds the policy responsibility of evaluation, its role in securing effective policy implementation, the degree of requisite stakeholder involvement and the specific types of value to be appreciated through the evaluative process. There is a range of choices available in the literature in relation to each of these themes. The choices that are made (as between the social constructivism and Fourth Generation Evaluation and the exploratory dynamic of the Theory of Change approach) may profoundly affect the evaluative work results. It may also be anticipated (following the persuasive logic of Realistic Evaluation) that the specific policy contexts within which evaluations are conducted may also shape their conduct. The

next section therefore reviews those available evaluations conducted into community-level adaptation and change.

### **3.2 Evaluation in Community Contexts**

O'Connor (1995) explores what she describes as the 'impasse' between evaluation research and community-based initiatives. Whereas evaluation research has grown in prestige since the 1960s in the United States, the federal government, in contrast, has reduced its emphasis on community-based interventions. These two policy strands can be seen as two different components of an approach to social change that is predicated on the purposeful application of knowledge – where knowledge takes the form of experience, scientific investigation, or both – as a strategy for social improvement.

Community-based initiatives work with a set of assumptions and operate principles that have proved stable in the face of changing circumstances. These include (O'Connor, 1995):

- ✓ An analysis of social problems that emphasises their environmental origins, their complexity, and their interrelatedness;
- ✓ A recognition of the geographically bounded area's importance, whether rural small town or urban neighbourhood, as the communal social bonds's basis, as a manageable landscape for achieving social reform, and/or as a legitimate unit for social scientific analysis;
- ✓ An emphasis on institutions as key dominance points for stimulating change, both in individuals and in society at large;
- ✓ A faith in knowledge as the basis of planning, public education, and learning for the sake of social betterment;
- ✓ A belief that the poor's spatial and social isolation is a key factor in causing and

perpetuating poverty and social inequality.

According to O'Connor (1995), these principles, applied primarily in low-income urban settings, have translated into an approach to social change that seeks to be comprehensive, rooted in the community, participatory, and informed by accumulated knowledge. After an extensive historical review of the United States experience, the author suggests three major conclusions that should guide current efforts to evaluate comprehensive community-based initiatives:

- ✓ The barriers to developing effective evaluation strategies for community-based initiatives have been political and institutional as much as methodological and substantive;
- ✓ Evaluators should explore in greater depth the persistent dilemmas that community-based initiatives have encountered over the years, in the hope of promoting historical as well as cross-initiative learning. Examples of these dilemmas are, inter alia: the tension between the need to maintain a comprehensive vision of problems and objectives and the practical demand to focus; and the difficulty of achieving genuine integration among the individual components that make up community-based initiatives;
- ✓ Finally, no matter how rigorous the method, evaluative evidence will play only a limited (and sometimes unpredictable) role in determining the political future of social programmes.

Consequently, an important goal that remains in this approach is to develop appropriate methods and indicators to assess the community-based initiatives' impact. Another challenge is identifying the socio-economic conditions and policy environments under which local initiatives can be more effective vehicles for change. O'Connor (1995) contrasts this with what she perceives to be the current focus, namely, how community-based initiatives can achieve modest goals while working against discrepant realities.

Weiss (1995) presents a theory-based approach to the evaluation of community level change. The concept of a 'learning evaluation' in the Theories of Change approach admits that social programmes are based on both explicit and implicit theories about how and why the programme will work. For Weiss, the evaluation should surface those theories and lay them out in as detailed a manner as possible, identifying all the assumptions and sub-assumptions built into the programme. It follows, methodologically, that evaluators should construct methods for data collection and analysis that support the surfacing of these assumptions. The objective here is to examine the extent to which programme theories hold among the competing stakeholders.

Weiss (1995) argues that the evaluation should explore which of the assumptions underlying the programme are most likely to break down; where they break down in the casual chain; and which of the several theories underlying the programme are better supported by the evidence. The author emphasises that community-based policies need to deal with multiple factors at the same time to increase the chances of achieving desired effects. This makes it necessary to work on the whole array of needs and social constraints when applying a public policy.

Weiss (1995) argues that theory-based evaluation can support the four major purposes' achievement:

- ✓ Focusing on programme's key aspects as given;
- ✓ Generating knowledge about key theories of change;
- ✓ Making assumptions explicit, defining methods, and clarifying goals;
- ✓ Influencing policy.

In sum, the theory-driven approach to evaluation avoids many of the pitfalls that she believes threaten evaluation, like results that do not appear to connect to the programme activities. However, Weiss (1995) also concedes that theory-based evaluation faces serious challenges in implementation, including problems of theorising,

measurement, testing, and interpretation. These are briefly appraised below.

The problem of theorising captures the social change's innate complexity. To surface basic theories in a multi-stakeholder environment like a community is no simple task. An example of this difficulty is the government policies' evaluation. They are so imbued with politics that evaluators may be tempted to take their research questions and their success measures from the political sphere and to concentrate on issues and options that fit the current political agenda.

The measurement problem relates to the developing techniques' challenge for measuring the extent to which each evaluation's step has taken place. Theory-testing faces data collection problems that mean that any stated programme theory could be vulnerable to alternative readings. Finally, the problems of interpretation relate to the uncertainty surrounding how generalisable the particular initiatives' account will be to other domains.

Philliber (1998), discussing the Theory of Change approach, argues that it can provide a measure of clarity and singularity of purpose, but cannot insure that staff will deliver as promised or that the programme will be targeted, as agreed, or even that the planned intervention will occur at all. For her, Theory of Change methods are useful to the evaluation of programmes, but not sufficient. The author proposes two questions to reveal what evaluators call 'programme process' and 'programme outcomes' (Philliber, 1998, p.2):

- ✓ 'What do you do here exactly? Tell us what you plan to deliver, to whom, by when';
- ✓ What do you expect to happen in the short run and in the longer term as a result of what you are delivering? Tell us whom it will happen to, by when'.

As the questions are answered, the resultant Theory of Change is captured in a horizontal format in causal order: processes on the left, short-term outcomes in the centre, and longer-term outcomes on the right. These horizontal formats are designed to enable

everyone to see immediately the causal sequence they are suggesting. Philliber (1998) also warns against the use of “vague-speak”, objectives for programmes that use ambiguous words like ‘promote’, or ‘encourage’. She advocates the use of specific verbs as ‘increase’ or ‘decrease’.

Gambone (1999) identifies wraps of restrict in the problem of measuring change in community change initiatives. Using the Theory of Change approach, she suggests means of delineating what should be measured, how, and when.

‘A theory of change requires, first and foremost, that all stakeholders be clear about an initiative’s intended goals, which in turn should provide general guidance about what to measure at baseline and over the long term. Also, a theory of change demands some level of clarity about the pathways intended for getting to the longer-term goals. Those pathways are generally made up of a series of activity-outcome sequences, which are, in principle, measurable. Thus, a theory of change should help guide decisions about what aspects of an initiative should be measured and in what order the measurement should take place’ (Gambone, 1999, p.2).

Gambone (1999), as a result, presents a general measurement model that can serve the purpose of gauging effects, progress, and context individually. The model, presented in Figure 5, describes key dilemmas associated with each measurement issue cited above. The intention is to enlarge on the issues that must be considered to produce a multi-purpose research design. According to Gambone (1999), evaluators should measure ‘contexts’ by asking about historical, geographic, economic and political conditions, and the situation of the population of the community at the start of the initiative. In relation to measuring ‘progress’, the author commends an exploration of:

- The involvement of individuals or groups into the community; how decisions are made, any obstacles or facilitators;
- The people or organisations’ problem, if new or restructured activities are undertaken, with new or restructured resources;
- Events, meeting or civic activities undertaken.

Finally, Gambone (1999) suggests a multi-levelled approach to measuring

outcomes. It is necessary, for example, to analyse change processes at the level of individuals, families, organisations, institutions and whole-community. Each one of these levels will be considered based on the evaluation design chosen at the beginning of the process.

**Figure 5: A Measurement Model of Community Change Initiatives Evaluations**

	<b>Measuring Context</b>	<b>Measuring Progress</b>	<b>Measuring Effects</b>
	Historical Conditions and ongoing dynamics	Activities and interim outcomes	Long-term outcomes
Questions	Under what conditions is the initiative operating?	How are activities catalysed and implemented?	What long-term outcomes result from community change initiatives activities?
		What community change initiative activities are undertaken?	
		What early and intermediate outcomes result?	

Source: Adapted from Gambone, 1999, p. 3

Lichfield (1996) presents another, quite distinct set of proposals for community impact evaluation. He focuses on how to devise planning interventions that can be clearly justified in terms of need, cost of planning, and the impact on individual freedoms and bureaucratic implications. Starting the discussion with cost-benefit analysis, the author sets out three critical questions, which are relevant to the current research focus:

- ✓ Whose cost and benefits are to be accounted for?
- ✓ Which costs and benefits are to be counted in geographical terms?
- ✓ Should the policy decision relate simply to efficiency or also to equity and social justice?

Lichfield then proposes a methodology to show the importance of analysing not only the impact of a public policy programme, but also the wider effects of a given policy on people (defined here as the spatial community). His work, thus, illuminates the gulf between ‘effects’ and impacts already noted in relation to Reese and Fassenfest (1997).

According to Lichfield, these effects could be defined as the physical and natural changes resulting, directly or indirectly, from development. Impacts are the consequences or end products of those effects as represented by attributes in the environment on which an objective or subjective value can be placed. Lichfield (1996) also presents several categories of impact. The two principal types are direct and indirect. The direct impacts – or ‘first order’ consequences – fall directly on the environment as a project input result. The indirect impacts are generated by activities that result from the project. The other impacts are cumulative; short-, medium- or long-term; permanent or temporary; reversible or irreversible. According to Lichfield, they can be either positive or negative. Table 10 below summarises some of the relevant methodologies used in evaluation: The text sets out alternative methodological frameworks, analytical concomitants, and in the final column, the broad conclusions that might flow from each evaluation method.

**Table 10: Public Policy Evaluation Key Methodologies**

Approach	Methodological Framework	Analytical Sequence	Outputs
Goldman et al (Economic Impacts)	Define intervention scope and alternatives Define decisions to be made, information to be requested and questions to be answered How detailed should the analysis be? List Economic Impacts Determine available data and its influence Specific project and options	Analyse: Effect of each alternative on the individual economic area Cross-impact among the economic areas	Present both , each alternative's aggregated and distributional impacts
Lichfield (Cost-Benefit Analysis)		Decision-taker's objectives Stakeholders' objectives Constraints on both Criteria of Efficiency and Equity Predict and assess the economic impact Identify costs and benefits of different impacts Measure and value cost and benefits Adjust (discount) for time	Evaluation: conclusions of the analysis
Lichfield (Generic Method of Community Impact Evaluation)	Plan-making implementation and operation Project description Plan variables Specification of project options by plan variables Changes in the urban and regional system through project evaluation	Effect assessment of options by plan variables Impact Evaluation of options by plan variables	Summary of alternative preferences and ranking Consultation, bargain, negotiation Evaluation Report Choice Decision Decision Communication

**Table 10: Public Policy Evaluation Key Methodologies (cont.)**

Approach	Methodological Framework	Analytical Sequence	Outputs
Patton (Utilisation Focused Evaluation)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ List primary intended users</li> <li>✓ Specify intended uses</li> <li>✓ Define purpose of the evaluation</li> <li>✓ Establish criteria</li> <li>✓ Connect decisions to uses</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ Select methods</li> <li>✓ Agree time lines</li> <li>✓ Establish priorities about goals</li> <li>✓ Interaction between evaluator, user</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ Communication about goals and results</li> </ul>
Pawson and Tilley (Realistic Evaluation)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ Choose the evaluation theory</li> <li>✓ Analyse the stakeholders' ideas</li> <li>✓ Define hypothesis</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ Do observations</li> <li>✓ Data Construction</li> <li>✓ Programme Specification</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ Define types of decision</li> <li>✓ Input the knowledge obtained into further theoretical development</li> </ul>
Chen (Theory-driven Evaluation)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ In depth communications and negotiation between evaluators and key stakeholders to identify such concern as:                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Issues related to which domain(s) are the main concerns;</li> <li>• Type(s) of theory-driven evaluation relevant to address these issues;</li> <li>• Theory approach most appropriate to use.</li> <li>• Use of normative or causative theory</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ Define long-term goals and outcomes;</li> <li>✓ Conditions needed for producing them;</li> <li>✓ Define medium term outcomes;</li> <li>✓ Define early outcomes;</li> <li>✓ Define activities to achieve them</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ Process and Outcome analysis</li> </ul>
Weiss (Community-initiative Evaluation)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ Concept of "learning evaluation" in theories of change: social programmes are based on explicit or implicit theories about how and why the programme will work</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ Surface the theory relevant for community level purposes</li> <li>✓ Identify assumptions built into the programme;</li> <li>✓ Construct methods for data collection and analysis</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ A wider analysis of social problems that emphasises their environmental complexity, that region</li> </ul>

### 3.3 Community Impact Evaluation Cases: a Review

This section examines several authors' efforts that attempted at different times and in different locations, to measure the policy change's wider impacts on a given community or communities. The objective here is to critically appraise the evaluative effort in this field to date and analyse a public policy' local and regional socio-economic impacts, in specific cases, approaches and applications. This section therefore constitutes a 'meta-evaluation'.

In an early article published in 1979, Rowthorn and Ward elaborate an exercise in 'social accounting'. The authors seek to estimate the economic implications of the closure of a steel-making plant at Corby and the transfer of production to Redcar on the Northeast coast of England. They argue that projects should not be evaluated solely on the narrow commercial criterion of profit and loss to the firm in question. When comparing various alternative investment strategies, the broader socio-economic implications (especially for the community in question) should be explicitly taken into account. They conclude that to close Redcar and retain Corby and other plants would yield the best social return. The indicators that they use to reach this conclusion include effects on employment, public sector revenue, public sector expenditure and social stress indicators, such as health and crime. These social indicators were measured as a percentage of the total indicator incidence occurring in the fifth year following a 1% change in the unemployment rate.

'The expenditure implications of changes in the incidence of illness and crime are estimated by assuming that any change in these indicators gives rise to the need for a proportionate change in current expenditure on the government's health programme and law and order programme, as shown in the annual public expenditure White Paper. As regards the health programme, only the implied expenditure on people in the 16-64 age group has been included... On this basis, it is estimated that a sustained rise in unemployment of 1million would give rise to additional public expenditure of £280 million on law and order £280 million on health and community services over a five-year period in the UK' (Rowthorn and Ward, 1979, p. 338).

The following list shows the indicators used by Rowthorn and Ward (1979, p. 339) to estimate these social returns:

<p>Employment</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Local GDP</li> <li>➤ Number of registered people as employed in localities</li> </ul> <p>Public sector revenue</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Council tax rates</li> <li>➤ Income tax rates</li> <li>➤ Corporation tax rates</li> <li>➤ National insurance contributions</li> </ul> <p>Public sector expenditure</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Welfare benefit</li> <li>➤ Unemployment benefit</li> <li>➤ Supplementary allowance</li> </ul> <p>Health</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ State mental hospital admissions</li> <li>➤ Cirrhosis of the liver mortality</li> <li>➤ Cardiovascular – renal disease mortality</li> <li>➤ Suicide</li> </ul> <p>Crime</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Prison sentences</li> <li>➤ State prison admissions</li> <li>➤ Murders</li> </ul> <p>Public sector finances</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Total expenditure of then –BSC</li> <li>2. Imports of then – BSC</li> <li>3. Domestic expenditure of then - BSC (1-2)</li> <li>4. Effect on 3 on net income of rest of public sector of which:             <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Nationalised industries profits</li> <li>b. Tax revenue</li> <li>c. Welfare benefits</li> <li>d. Health, law and order</li> </ol> </li> <li>5. Effect of 2 on UK final expenditure</li> <li>6. Effect of 5 on GDP at factor cost</li> <li>7. Effect of 2 on net income of public sector of which:             <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Nationalised industries profits</li> <li>b. Tax revenue</li> <li>c. Welfare benefits</li> <li>d. Health, law and order</li> </ol> </li> <li>8. Net gain to public sector finances (4 + 7 - 1)</li> </ol>
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These indicators are, perhaps, more detailed than those of Reese and Fasenfest (1997) as set out in Table 8. There is, however, significant overlapping on a number of indicators generated by both sets of researchers.

The Joint Unit for Research on the Urban Environment (JURUE) developed an

interesting assessment of the impacts of a possible closure of the Bilston Steelworks, at Bilston, Wolverhampton, between November 1978 and February 1979. The study used two broad perspectives. First, it focused on the cash flow arguments that characterised BSC's approach to closure proposals. Second, it made use of a step-by-step approach to steel industry restructuring together with recognition of the wider economic and social impacts of plant closures. JURUE (1979) interpreted these wider economic and social impacts, in terms of the:

- Direct impact on employment - plant jobs and jobs tied in to on-site firms;
- Secondary impacts on suppliers and other local firms - impact on jobs in local firms and other (multiplier-related) job losses to follow as local income declines over time;
- Secondary impacts on customers - the customers will have to find and adapt to alternative sources.

The main objective of the work is to come to a conclusion as to which of the two main alternatives facing Bilston Works – closure or new steel making investment – is the best option if social costs are fully taken into account. Table 11 describes the main economic and governmental sectors and organisations that would be affected by the closure or new steel-making investment decisions in respect of Bilston according to whether they are located within or outside the West Midlands regional economy.

**Table 11: Main sectors affected by investment decisions about Bilston Works**

National Economy	Effects of decision net gain or loss	West Midlands Regional Economy	Effects of decision net gain or loss
<b>BSC</b>		BSC Bilston's employees	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Fixed cost change</li> <li>• Cash flow change</li> <li>• Market share loss</li> <li>• Redundancy payments</li> <li>• Remedial investments</li> </ul>		BSC Bilston's inputs and services' suppliers	
<b>Central Government</b>		BSC Bilston's regional customers	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Redundancy rebates</li> <li>• Unemployment benefits</li> <li>• Supplementary benefits</li> <li>• Retraining</li> <li>• Rate support grant</li> <li>• Loss of taxation</li> </ul>		Regional private steel sector	
		General industry, commerce transport, etc.	
		Local Authorities (especially Wolverhampton Metropolitan District Council)	
Private Steel sector outside West Midlands Region			
E.C.S.C			
Net gain or loss		Net gain or loss	
Overall net gain or loss			

Source: JURUE (1979)

The conclusions are summarised in Table 12. The authors used the cash-flow methodology to demonstrate the overall quantifiable cost savings and cost increases to society which would result from implementation of the closure, or adaptation of electric-arc and Q-Bop options respectively.

**Table 12: Costs and Benefits\* generated by alternative options for Bilston**

	Closure	Option Electric-arc	Option Q-BOP
	£ m ±	£ m ±	£ m ±
<b>Net internal savings to BSC</b>	+ 45.9	+ 27.4	+ 19.3
<b>Net external costs to society **</b>	- 35.0	- 11.7	- 10.8
<b>Net overall balance</b>	+ 10.9	+ 15.7	+ 8.5

Source: JURUE (1979)

\*Costs and benefits discounted over a five year period

\*\* Excluding the costs of remedial investments

Table 12 shows that all three options generate substantial cash-flow savings to BSC. In the case of closure, the internal savings will be greater than those for either electric arc or Q-Bop investments. However, all three options result in net costs to society, the costs of closure being much greater than those for the investments options. As JURUE

observe:

‘these costs would be largely borne, in real terms, by the local economies of Wolverhampton and Bilston but would be offset in large measure by transfer payments from central government, the cost of which would ultimately fall on the general taxpayer’ (JURUE, 1979, p. 8).

Consequently, in terms of the cash-flow effects, both closure and new steel making investment at Bilston would be likely to produce overall net gains to the economy. On the other hand, although closure will produce better cash-flow savings for BSC itself in the short term, this does not hold for benefits to society as a whole. This is because new steel-making investment is likely to produce better returns for the economy as a whole when full account is taken of the wider economic and social impacts. Despite these conclusions, Bilston Steelworks closed in October 1979. This outcome provides a sharp reminder of evaluative work’s limited impacts on policy-making process.

Hudson (1986) argues that implementation of nationalised industry policies has been the primary proximate cause of deindustrialisation in UK regions over the early-1980s. Nationalised industries’ investment decisions in peripheral regions, in his view, preceded and triggered disinvestments from them by transnational capitals in the late 1970s and 1980s. Hudson (1986) describes the case of the British Steel Corporation (BSC). According to him, BSC had been used

‘as an illustration to private capital of the government’s determination to reduce the scope of the public sector and of the sort of drastic restructuring that it must undertake to increase labour productivity, international competitiveness, and profitability’ (Hudson, 1986, p. 14).

Hudson (1986) argues that between 1977 and 1983, BSC cut employment by 61%. Yet according to him, similar attitudes had informed the operation of other nationalised industries, such as coal mining, shipbuilding, and vehicle production, with the effect of acceleration of industrial decline and employment loss in traditional industrial regions.


‘A comparison simply at the level of total jobs lost in nationalised industries with those job gains allegedly “caused” by regional industrial policy reveals that losses from the first considerably exceed gains from the second, and indeed, the losses from nationalised industries were a precondition for the “success” of regional industrial

policy “creating” jobs via the re-creation of substantial labour reserves in those regions in which nationalised industries were concentrated’ (Hudson, 1986, p. 21)

Hudson advocates a regional industrial policy along the lines set out in Figure 6

below:

**Figure 6: Interest Forces in the Regional Industry Policy Agenda**



Source: Adapted from Hudson, 1986 p. 12.

Hudson argues that the analysis of the particular interests and relationships between capital, labour, and state is fundamental to understanding the way that regional industry policy was implemented. The author is persuaded that their interests substantially overlapped, if not coincided, but it would be erroneous to believe that there are symmetrical power relations between capital, labour and the state. This analysis would suggest, by extension, that different stakeholders have different capabilities in terms of defining key aspects of the public policy process.

Boulding et al (1988) examine the effectiveness of economic policy in places where Enterprise Zones had been targeted. Two urban areas were chosen for the research, namely Consett and Corby. Consett had been a steel community since the 1840s but British Steel closed its steelworks there in 1980. Steel working at Corby dates from the 1930s, despite the partial closure of the steelworks in 1979, also by British Steel. Boulding et al demonstrated that, notwithstanding government claims to the contrary, job-creation efforts

have not replaced and (in their view) cannot hope to replace all those jobs that were lost in the traditional steel sector of these communities' economies. The two key indicators used by the authors were total employment/steel employment's the ratio (January and July 1979/1986); and cumulative total of jobs in projects assisted by Enterprise Zones.

Boulding et al (1988) used a widely distributed questionnaire survey administered in Corby during 1985 and early 1986. They argue that incentives are crucial only to attract businesses to the community (or to encourage small firm creation) but cannot guarantee those businesses' survival, nor increase their rate of employment growth. Given this finding, the authors ask: what lies behind the kinds of local policy responses adopted at Consett and Corby and mirrored across the UK? The answer is noted in the development agency creation's politics on the part of then Thatcher government. At this time, basically the only economic policy option available to local government was via a public/private sector route (Boulding et al, 1988).

An alternative perspective on local development initiatives is set out by Hudson and Sadler (1987). They argue that effective local strategies depend upon a favourable political climate which allows the coherent co-determination of policies at national and local levels, worked out in consultation with those employed in local industries (Hudson and Sadler, 1987).

Hudson et al (1992) analysed the then latest phase in the downsizing of UK steel production that involved a continuing challenge to the industry in Scotland and culminated in British Steel's decision to close its substantial Ravenscraig works in 1992. They show the limited effectiveness of re-industrialisation policies for UK steel closure areas during the 1980s, even in their own restricted conceptions of 'success'. To this end, they examined four aspects of the employment picture in fifteen Scottish local districts. These aspects concerned the total stock of jobs; manufacturing/service sector employment ratios; male/female employment; and full-time/part-time employment. Their conclusions

included:

- ✓ Increased insecurity for employees, and financial difficulty for failed new companies's directors and owners' great majority;
- ✓ The need for greater selectivity in both, the choice of projects backed, and the kind of new economy being sought at a policy level, with less pay-off in the short-term ones but the potential of greater stability in the longer-term ones.

Hudson et al (1992) also argue that the conventional re-industrialisation policies applied in UK should involve calculations not just of economic renewal, but also of broader social welfare.

Weiss (1995) proposes indicators that could cover a gamut of community conditions before, during, and after policy interventions, with the objective being to apply a theory-based evaluation framework:

- ✓ School attendance rates, drop-out rates, graduation rates, scores on standardised tests;
- ✓ Infant mortality and low birth-weight rates;
- ✓ Unmarried childbearing rates;
- ✓ Overall crime rates, auto theft rates, arrests of minors, and other crime statistics;
- ✓ Numbers of families with children receiving social benefits from the government;
- ✓ Numbers of families moving off welfare in a twelve-month period;
- ✓ Unemployment rates for teenagers and adults;
- ✓ Numbers of clubs and associations active in the community and average attendance at meetings and events;
- ✓ Attendance at religious services;
- ✓ Registration and voting rates;

- ✓ Numbers of books borrowed from local libraries;
- ✓ Usage of hospital emergency rooms.

These indicators represent gross measures of the community's status, not of individuals in the community. To find out about individuals, Weiss (1995) recommends that indicator data be supplemented by survey data on a random sample of individuals in the community.

Swyngedouw (1996) suggests that the results of policies designed to deal with Belgium's coal mining restructuring had very little impact in terms of job creation and additional investment. Nevertheless, public policy had impacted in the following terms:

- ✓ Altering the institutional basis of key decision making procedures towards a more authoritarian and exclusive system;
- ✓ Reducing the national and regional state's power;
- ✓ Accelerating the already politically weak socio-economic groups's systematic social, economic, cultural and political exclusion.

In summary, Swyngedouw argues that public policy induced the forging of new social movements and alliances, while others broke down and was reconfigured. The asymmetry in power relations as restricting proceeded reminiscent of Hudson (1986) discussion on UK nationalised industry policy impacts.

Hoare (1997) explores how the macro-level policy implemented throughout a political economy can have varied and unforeseen spatial effects at a micro-scale within that economy. The problematic that Hoare is addressing here is how to decompose a privatisation programme's national objectives into sub-national outcomes. According to Hoare, the complex transmission mechanism challenges precise prediction and should not simply be interpreted in terms of the explicit policies set in train by central government. These outcomes need to be studied in their specific contexts. Outcomes would include, for example:

- ✓ Locational reassessments:
  - New production systems in new locations
  - Run-down and closure of “non-viable” plants
- ✓ Ownership changes:
  - Externally (more corporate freedom to take decisions)
  - Internally (challenge to administrative boundaries)
- ✓ Local spin-offs and interactions:
  - Gains in efficiency, profitability or quality of service generating local social or economic multiplier benefits
- ✓ Divisions and exclusions within the local society:
  - Exacerbation of existing wealth and welfare divisions or,
  - Creation of relative uniformity (social, spatial or both)
- ✓ Physical environment

Hoare (1997) analyses how, in Bristol, different privatisations can interact, and suggests that the stimuli to and direction of privatisation can be at least locally partially based rather than simply national. He concludes that local context is far from simply a neutral stage for the playing out of the complex and contradictory national privatisation policy’s outcomes. The collective impact of this combination of local and national privatisations can be very significant as far as changing local economic landscapes are concerned.

Hoare (1997) argues that the detailed sub-national outcomes of privatisation defy precise prediction. In other words, these outcomes cannot be interpreted from the policies set in train by central government, but should be studied in their particular contexts. Moreover, any local analyses have to grapple with similar methodological issues to those that confront national evaluations. The familiar key questions include: Impact on whom? Impact on what? Impact, when?

Chadwick and Glasson (1999) present the findings of a post-auditing study that compares the actual and predicted socio-economic impacts (including traffic movements) of a major power station construction project in the UK. They summarise a further set of indicators designed to capture that impact:

- ✓ Employment impacts;
- ✓ Accommodation and housing impacts;
- ✓ Local service impacts;
- ✓ Local suppliers's use and other project-related expenditure's impacts;
- ✓ Road traffic impacts;
- ✓ Compliance with development conditions and undertakings;
- ✓ Perceived impacts (complaints made by local residents; concerns of community representatives; local press coverage; views of local residents more generally).

These indicators are clearly domain-specific, but they may have more general applicability, not least in the present research.

Tomaney et al (1999) describe the closure of a Tyneside shipyard and clarify the wider issues concerning plant closure and impacts on the local economy. They argue that the complexities of the yard's closure and its local economic consequences can be better understood when the political and economic contexts of the local economy are surfaced. Moreover, the closure was not a single event, but the contested outcome of a development long run process and must be analysed accordingly.

Tomaney et al (1999) also suggest three different research analysis's levels in relation to plant closures:

- ✓ The workforce, seen as a collection of interest groups, each with different skill profiles and labour market expectations;
- ✓ The typically one-industry community, where the new jobs offer after the closure does not cover the redundant employees' existing skills;

- ✓ The manner in which the closure decision was made, connecting the decline of the industry systematically to national policies.

Table 13 summarises the efforts to measure the impacts of privatisation in different communities appraised above. It shows the instruments, the focus, and the varying definitions of the term ‘community’ used therein.

**Table 13: Secondary Research on Community Impacts Summarised**

Author(s)	Instruments	Focus	Nature of Focal Community
Rowthorn and Ward (1979)	Quantitative data and scenario analysis	Implications of steel closure areas	One-industry community (Corby)
Hudson (1986)	Census of Employment and Primary and Secondary data from each region	Implications of regional industry policies	Various steel industry communities in United Kingdom
Boulding et al (1988)	Questionnaire survey	Unemployment and development policy	One-industry community (Corby)
Hudson et al (1992)	Census of Employment	Implications of steel closure areas	Comparison between fifteen local authority districts
Weiss (1995)	A range of community conditions before and after interventions	Community-based initiatives and analysis of social programmes	45 American communities
Swyngedouw (1996)	Primary and Secondary data from each region	Implications of coal-mining closure areas	Various Belgian regions
Hoare (1997)	Secondary data on five privatised firms in one city	Five ‘sub-national’ outcomes of privatisation in one community	One city (Bristol)
Chadwick and Glasson (1999)	Repeated measurement of selected socio-economic parameters for eight years	Comparison between actual and predicted socio-economic impacts	Sizewell, on Suffolk Coast (and some of adjacent towns up to six miles distant)
Tomaney et al (1999)	Questionnaire survey	Unemployment impacts, redundancy and local economy	One-industry community (Tyneside)

In research terms, this issue of identifying the appropriate boundaries to the impact community is a difficult one. Lichfield (1996) presents the concept of a ‘relevant community’. He argues that a community’s economic sectors defined as relevant communities will not aggregate into a single identifiable entity, but must instead be made up of overlapping geographical boundaries. These boundaries will not be orderly at all, and can be seen having the compliance of particular individuals or families conform which of


their different lives are impacted. According to the author, because as these different communities are stakeholders, their decision frameworks will have an effect. Plus, because as any of these communities have prevailing power, their decisions will have the power to succeed (Lichfield, 1996). Lichfield discusses by way of example the several divergent meanings that the term, project-affected 'relevant community' may take. These are resumed in Figure 7.

Accordingly, when faced with an impact assessment on options, individuals or family may be able to give a simple approval or disapproval reaction to any particular option. Lichfield summaries the complexities in the individual's calculus of 'expected net gain' in the following terms.

'Each will need to weigh up the package of impacts on himself/herself; and each family will need to assess/evaluate the composite picture in terms of the family's "social decision". From this it follows that individuals or families cannot in reason ally themselves for or against particular projects in relation to particular impacts unless they have somehow resolved the balance of their individual and social choice. However, in practice, they probably react against the impacts they recognise to be adverse in particular options, in the hope of ameliorating them and thus advancing their expected net gain. And the chances are that they are not considering the opportunity costs in relation to the other impacts, should the options they resist be abandoned' (Lichfield, 1996, p.159).

As this research's objective is to explore the public policies's consequences through the application of evaluating model's based on sets of socio-economic indicators, this research will focus on the three first levels of the 'relevant community' described by Lichfield in Figure 7. These three first levels geographically support the analysis of the local impacts generated by the privatisation process of the British Steel Corporation.

**Figure 7: The 'relevant community' - multiple meanings**




Source: Lichfield, 1996, p. 160.

The next section introduces a provisional instrument developed from the reviews and conclusions presented in this section and previously in this chapter.

### **3.4 Indicators for Evaluating Community Socio-economic Impacts**

The key evaluation methodologies' review presented in part 2.1 points to the choice of Realistic Evaluation as a basic instrument for the proposed research. Figure 8 illustrates the parameters of choice here:

Figure 8: The Evaluation Methodology Choice



Source: Data from research

The aim of this research is to derive a summative evaluation that is sensitive to local circumstances, one, moreover, a method that can be transferred across local contexts, capable of analysing differential policy impacts across localities. Figure 8 sets out two parameters: formative/summative; and place-specific, versus transferable. Four quadrants result. Quadrant 4 would contain approaches that appear to offer formative and transferable qualities. Thus, the first quadrant shows two methodologies, both of them described in Lichfield (1996). These two approaches consider impacts; the literature review did not, though, identify techniques that facilitate inter-local generalisation of the methodology and findings. They thus appear to be both summative and place-specific. Quadrant two features Guba and Lincoln's (1989) Fourth Generation Evaluation. This methodology works with specific concerns and issues of specific stakeholders, but focusing on programme improvement. Patton's (1997) utilisation-focused evaluation approach proposes a methodology that can be transferable and adapted for summative or formative purposes: thus, it straddles quadrants three and four. Chen's (1990) suggestion (quadrant 4) focuses a

programme at its beginnings. However, this research aims to exercise an evaluation methodology through the British steel privatisation programme, which took place in 1988. Subsequently, the public policy evaluation instrument to be derived and tested is based on Pawson and Tilley's (1997) Realistic Evaluation (Contexts, Mechanisms, Outcomes, or 'CMO') model, as highlighted in bold in Figure 8. These key concepts - contexts, mechanisms and outcomes - are briefly defined below:

- Contexts are social and cultural conditions which set limits on the efficacy programme mechanisms;
- Mechanisms are the means through which ideas and opportunities are introduced to groups or communities. There are three key identifiers of a mechanism (Pawson and Tilley, 1997, p. 66):
  - To reflect the entrenched of the programme within the stratified nature of social reality;
  - As a set of propositions which will provide an account of how both macro and micro processes constitute the programme;
  - As a mean of demonstrating how programme outputs follow from stakeholders' choices (reasoning) and their capacity (resources) to put these choices into practice.
- Outcomes are the description of the programmes' achievement.

The instrument been sought here will seek to analyse the social and cultural conditions and the public policy programme outcomes through indicators organised in asset-based categories for both, the context and the outcomes. Asset-based capital analyses have been recently applied, for example, for local community assessments (Pretty and Hine, 1999), or as a strategy model for sustainable development (Davis, 2000, Gladwin, 1999). The literature search reviews few attempts to apply the Realistic Evaluation's procedures to spatial-territorial change at local level. The one exception appears to be the

work of Ho (1999). She seeks to apply the CMO configuration to multiple local communities across England, evaluating the receipt of Single Regeneration Budget funding.

Assets's taxonomies are still being developed and vary accordingly. Thus, Pretty and Hine (1999) argue that:

'economic systems at all levels, from farms, livelihoods, communities and national economies, rely for their success on the value of services flowing from the total stock of natural, social, human, physical and financial capital' (Pretty and Hine, 1999, p. 2).

According to them, these five assets can be succinctly defined as:

- ✓ Natural Capital: nature's goods and services (including water and climate regulation);
- ✓ Social Capital: the cohesiveness of people in their societies (the trust, reciprocity and exchanges between individuals which facilitates co-operation);
- ✓ Human Capital: the status of individuals (health, nutrition, education, skills and accessibility for these services), plus the individuals' leadership quality;
- ✓ Physical Capital: local infrastructure (housing and other buildings, transportation and communication);
- ✓ Financial Capital, stocks of money and access to affordable credit (Pretty and Hine, 1999, p. 2).

On the other hand, Gladwin (1999) proposes four types of 'primary' capitals that can complement what the author calls 'manufactured' capital. The latter consists of stocks of producer and consumer goods, such as factories, buildings, machines, tools, technologies, infrastructure and products. The four classes of primary capitals are defined as:

- ✓ Ecological (renewable resources, processes, functions and services);
- ✓ Material (non-renewable or geological resources);

- ✓ Human (people's knowledge, skills, health, nutrition, motivation);
- ✓ Social (social cohesion, trust and so forth) (Gladwin, 1999).

Finally Davis (2000) proposes five assets in order to 'explore how human and natural systems interrelate under the pressure or driving-force of socio-economic development' (Davis, 2000, p. 6). They are:

- ✓ Financial, economic or manufactured Capital: social exchanges that are typically expressed in monetary terms;
- ✓ Human Capital, defined as the degree of fulfilment of basic individual needs;
- ✓ Social Capital, that represents 'the relationships that bond people together and enable common action, whether for good or ill, and the links that bridge between different communities and enable people to access needed resources from 'outsiders' (Davis, 2000, p. 6);
- ✓ Natural Capital, which characterises the stock of fauna and flora, minerals, atmosphere, water and other services that they generate. It is usually divided in critical natural (non-renewable) and renewable capital;
- ✓ Public Goods Capital is defined as 'the infrastructures that have strong public goods qualities and that are usually funded by governments' (Davis, 2000, p. 7).

To resume, the application of asset-based capitals approaches in social science is extremely recent and there is no definitive description for each one. The current research will employ four asset-based capitals, namely: Economic (Davis, 2000); Human (Davis, 2000; Gladwin, 1999; Pretty and Hine, 1999); Social (Davis, 2000; Gladwin, 1999; Pretty and Hine, 1999); Physical (Pretty and Hine, 1999). These will be used to arrange the context and outcomes indicators collected through the research fieldwork. These categories may also enable a more nuanced analysis of the socio-economic indicators's sets.

Before starting the fieldwork properly, the researcher undertook a systematic review of the literature concerning the socio-economic indicators already developed in social sciences research, especially in community studies. About a hundred different indicators were identified and, after more reflection and discussion with colleagues and supervisor, a more modest family of indicators was selected. These were then arranged and allocated among the four principal asset bases, in order to facilitate the posterior data presentation and analysis.


Finally, the mechanism indicators correspond with how a national public policy programme was perceived by the locality and how the community reacted on it.

The research set out here needs to answer two questions, based on the CMO model:

- ✓ What are the mechanisms for change set off by a programme and how do they offset or accentuate the existing social processes?
- ✓ What are the social and cultural conditions necessary for change mechanisms to operate and how are they distributed within and between programme contexts?

The instrument presented below is intended to function as a general model to research and evaluate socio-economic impacts from public policy programmes in communities with steel production concentrations. For each community to be analysed, suitable variations and adaptations will be generated.

**Figure 9: Applying Realistic Evaluation: the Proposed Abstract Configuration**



The three large columns in Figure 9 represent respectively the Context, Mechanisms and Outcomes present in the Realistic Evaluation model. Both Context/Outcomes columns include the four asset-based capitals defined above: Economic, Human, Social and Physical. The central column represents the Mechanisms that are generated after an idea or opportunity's introduction (in this case, the privatisation programme) to the target communities. Each Mechanism is related with a key identifier defined by Pawson and Tilley (1997, p. 66), presented above. The two thin columns with vertical written (National Action and Local Action) are contextual factors - or moderators - as defined by Dahler-Larsen (2001, p. 336) that will (in the case of the first column) generate the mechanisms after the implementation of a public policy programme, or (in the case of the second column) generate local outcomes for each community in which the instrument can be applied. Dahler-Larsen (2001) proposes a programme typologies (competing, magic and tragic) demonstrating that each one influences their contexts in different ways and consequently, has implications for evaluation. The 'competing'

programme occurs when more than one programme theory may come into play in a given context and strain to influence a moderator. 'Magic' programmes affect positively a moderator that it helps enact an idea in the programme theory. Finally, 'tragic' programmes unintentionally obliterate the conditions of their own functioning, since it exercises a negative influence on a moderator relevant for its programme theory. 'Moderators', according to Dahler-Larsen (2001)

'describe phenomena that must be in place in order for the programme to work but these moderators are often not specified and moreover, they may be difficult to keep in place. They are variables, in reality and in the minds of programme advocates who invariably believe strongly in their own ideas and attempt to achieve them' (Dahler-Larsen, 2001, p. 333).

Moreover, as a proposed abstract configuration, the instrument does not present any connection between its columns because it is yet to be applied in the field.

The following list presents the indicators used to define the status of the four asset bases for each case community. An audit of status was to be attempted at two stages in the development process: for the 'context' before the privatisation programme, and 'outcomes' of the privatisation programme. When possible, each indicator will display time series from 1981 to 1988 (Context) and 1989 until 1998 (Outcomes).

**Economic Capital**

Total Employment by sector; Unemployment rate local (or TTWA)/national average; Net change of the VAT Registered per sector; Unemployment by ward; Total announced redundancies in town; Percentage of companies survival rates after three years registering for VAT.

**Human Capital**

GCSE results (5+ A\*-C) per national average; Students' primary destination after GCSE; employed workforce qualified to at least NVQ Level 3 percentage; Participation in Education and Training of 16 year olds (full-time); Mortality per 1,000 live births; Death rate from coronary heart disease for under 65 per 100,000; Death from stroke for under 65 per 100,000 population; Death from lung cancer – men under 75 per 100,000 population; All birth with low birth-weight (< 2,500g) percentage; Number of tuberculosis notification (per total population); teenage abortion's rate (under 16s per 1,000).

**Social Capital**

Number of crimes committed by type; Detection rate for all crimes undertaken; Minors' arrest; Electoral Turnout.

**Physical Capital**

Average house price per type (terraced, semi-detached, detached).

The option to use the CMO configuration, four asset-based capitals and a range of indicators to evaluate local public policy programmes's socio-economic impacts that do not manage completely what Tomaney et al (1999) denominate the 'flow' of events. According to Tomaney et al, the closure of the Swan Hunter yard and its consequences for the local economy was not a single event, but an outcome of a long process of development. Thus, it must be examined in a wider view. The instruments proposed until now for this research do not have an ideal framework to understanding the historical time that the current research includes. The four assets-based presented above are on the subject of structuring diverse social phenomena, and the indicator sets listed above is logically structured streams of evidence that suggest lines of causal change. However, how they manage the 'flow' of events as described by Tomaney et al (1999) in the current research? The option is to search for a conceptual framework that proposes modelling time in the social science literature. Next section presents and discusses Braudel's time-space

conceptual framework, with the objective to support the instrument presented in Figure 9.

### 3.5 Reviewing Braudel's Conceptual Framework for the Realistic Approach

This section reflects upon the framework presented by Fernand Braudel and its potential as a tool for structuring the CMO model in the specific domain evaluated here. Mulrone (1998) comments on the thrust of Braudel's contribution to historiography. He casts Braudel as:

'a spatial thinker who defines his conception of the modern world by defining the physical arrangements of that world. The spatial mapping plays different roles in his three significant works... in which physical and human geography appear in different proportions. An unmistakable characteristic of Braudel's work is the relationship between societies and the area they inhabit. That relationship is defined by the struggle to bridge, to overcome, to control physical space' (Mulrone, 1998, p. 266).

Thus, Braudel's use of geography and physical space is interwoven with his exchange networks's discussion. In Braudel's writings there are five frequently used concepts: 'longue durée', 'conjoncture', 'event-history', 'economie-monde' (economic world) and 'total history' (Lai, 2000). Given their theoretical centrality, it is striking that Braudel 'never rigorously defines these concepts, nor did he try to test them consistently by using historical evidence' (Lai, 2000, p. 65). Notwithstanding this gap, Lai is persuaded that Braudel's work is relevant in constructing and structuring history.

'In the development of concepts of historical time, Braudel's long-term (longue durée), mid-term (conjoncture) and short-term (event-history) views are innovative in the sense that they remind us that it is possible to have several concepts of historical time co-existing within a single subject of analysis' (Lai, 2000, p. 65).

Braudel's framework uses the overlay of long-term structural changes and conjectural or cyclical changes to better understand interpret and evaluate short duration events (van Roon, 1981). The three different historical rhythms are: the longue durée, durée moyenne (conjoncture), and the durée courte (event-history) (Rayward, 1996). As Rayward (1996) notes, different kinds of evidence and narrative are attached to each chronology. The longue durée is measured '... in perhaps thousands of years. This is the

context within which we see the emergence and gradual transformation of the basic stages of human civilisation' (Rayward, 1996, p. 12). The concept of *longue durée* is grounded in an understanding of time as a full evolution of events rather than one limited by dates as historically established, as Savitt notes.

'It is clearly a temporal concept that encompasses a number of events and forces. The *longue durée* is a particularly complex idea that is in great part defined by the consequences of the event that is being studied, and "true history is the narrative of events that have consequences. It is in the end, the consequences that count" (Bairoch, 1988, p. 2). These are bound up in synthesis of various elements and forces (Braudel, 1992, p. 383). In reality, the *longue durée* is a structural model that Braudel describes in process terms (Savitt, 2000, p. 90)'.

According to Lai (2000), the *longue durée* is 'not a technical tool; it is a notion that serves as Braudel's cornerstone and is embodied in his overall framework' (Lai, 2000, p. 68). Its unit of analysis may be a century or longer in duration.

Rayward defines the *durée moyenne* in the following terms.

'Change that occurs at a rate of hundreds of years... This is what might be described as "social" time, which involves man (sic) in relation to groups and groupings. Within its compass are conjunctures, cyclic social, economic, and technological movements or rhythms slow enough not generally to be perceptible to those who live through them but profoundly implicated in any attempt to understand historical developments' (Rayward, 1996, p. 12, italics in the original).


Lai (2000) comments that the status of the *durée moyenne* as conceived by Braudel remains unclear, because he never attempted to explain the inner mechanism of changes in conjuncture. According to Lai (2000), the conjuncture unit of analysis fluctuates between ten and fifty years.

Finally, the *durée courte* captures change that is measured, according to Rayward, 'in months or years or decades. This is time measured on a personal scale and its concern is with evenements, the rapidly moving circumstances and events of the moment' (Rayward, 1996, p. 12, italics in the original).

Braudel seeks to analyse the overall environment, its structure and movement, emphasising the impersonal, collective aspects of historical changes. This approach shuns the method of using 'exact dates, places, names and cause-consequences in a logically structured way of

writing history’ (Lai, 2000, p. 71). Lai points out that *durée courte* may represent weeks, seasons or years (Lai, 2000, p. 67), and that Braudel’s sources were archival and secondary literature (documents), offering details and ‘telling stories’ to the reader (Lai, 2000, p. 71). The divergence within the literature on Braudel – and in Braudel himself – concerning the periodicity of his key concepts reflects their highly provisional nature, in historiographical terms. Nevertheless, these concepts offer some promise in terms of the current research. Figure 10 sets out a representation of Braudel’s framework.

**Figure 10: Braudel’s Structural Framework**



Source: Adapted from Braudel (1984, 1992)

To Braudel, the three columns (geographic, socio-economic and political) represent what this research denominates the principal assets, which the three levels of historical analysis might encompass. The longer the periodicity, the broader the range of that may be involved in the development process. This is indicated by the ovals’ breadth in Figure 10. This structural framework was the base for the most of Braudel’s research.

‘...Braudel investigated on a panoramic scale the social, economic, geographic as well as, political features of a distinctive Mediterranean civilisation in the sixteenth century which had evolved at different time spans’ (Rich, 2002, pp. 336-7).

The literature did not offer enough examples of relating the *durées* to a particular field of study, such as public administration (Rayward, 1996). Rayward is not persuaded of empirical worth, deeming Braudel’s structural framework as ‘more fanciful than useful’ (Rayward, 1996, p. 14). However, Rayward emphasises that, when researching a particular

field of study, Braudel's framework is important 'to see beyond it to deeper questions and problems that, reaching further back, will allow more general understanding' (Rayward, 1996, p. 14).

### **3.6 Conclusions**

This Chapter had the objective to exploit a review of the literature capable to discuss among key methodologies in public policy evaluation, one that can adequately measure local socio-economic impacts of a major public programme. The choice was made for the Realistic Evaluation (CMO model) proposed by Pawson and Tilley (1997). This Chapter also reviewed several researches that focused the policies programmes' local impact, identifying methods, key findings and disparities. This task demonstrated the need to develop appropriate methods and indicators to assess the impact community based initiatives.

This Chapter exercised a meta-evaluation when critically appraised different effort of research cases about community impact evaluation. The analysis introduced several authors that applied a range of instruments to focus their research, using a variation of definitions for the term 'community'. The discussion about the concept of 'relevant community', surfaced by Lichfield (1996), was also presented in this Chapter.

Subsection four of this Chapter presented an instrument intended to function as a general model to research and evaluate socio-economic impacts from public policy programmes in communities with steel production concentrations. Also was presented the twenty-two indicators elected after a previous selection, and distributed between four assets-based capitals (Economic, Social, Human and Physical). However, the instrument presented as general model to be applied in the current research did not adequately recognise what some authors, as Tomaney et al (1999) defines as the 'flow' of events. As a result, this Chapter presented and discussed Braudel's time-space conceptual framework. Braudel's framework employs the overlay of long-term structural changes and conjunctural

or cyclical changes to better understand interpret and evaluate events of short duration, through three different historical rhythms: the *longue durée*, *durée moyenne*, and the *durée courte*. These three historical rhythms transpose three principal research dimensions elected by Braudel: geographic, socio-economic and political, as pictured in Figure 10. This framework will assist the application of the general model developed in this Chapter and presented in Figure 9.


The next Chapter presents the research methodology, strategy and design applied in the current study. The first section discusses each choice's cost and benefits made when researching social sciences. Section two examines the rationale behind the option of a case study approach as a research strategy and details the choice of the case studies that encompass the core of the present study. The last section describes the data collection design process and presents the analytical criteria used for interpreting the finding, including the analysis of the prospective use of Braudel's (1984, 1992) framework to the current research.

## CHAPTER IV – RESEARCH METHODOLOGY, STRATEGY AND DESIGN

This Chapter is divided into three principal sections. The first section situates the research proposal in a wider social science methodological context. According to Descombe (1998), the social researcher is faced with a variety of options and alternatives and has to make strategic decisions about which to choose. Each choice made will bring advantages and disadvantages. Section two discusses the rationale behind the adoption of a case study approach as a research strategy and sets out the case studies' choice that comprise the core of the current study. Finally, section three outlines the data collection design process and presents the criteria of analysis used for interpreting the findings. As part of this, the section analyses the potential of applying Braudel's (1984, 1992) framework for the current research.

The research question set out at page 19 above frames the discussion regarding that which can be defined as theory and that which can be defined as research in the social sciences. Theory, as conceptualised by Berg (1998), is a system of logical statements or propositions that explain the relationship between two or more objects, concepts, phenomena or characteristics of humans – what are sometimes called variables. The idea of research is to suggest new problems for theory, require theoretical innovation, refine existing theories, or serve to verify past theoretical assumptions. The research process could follow an inductive or deductive focus. These alternative designs are described in Figure 11.


Figure 11: The Research Process



Source: Adapted from de Vaus, 1986

Berg (1998) presents an alternative model for the research enterprise, a model that encompasses both the research-before-theory (inductive research) and theory-before-research (deductive research) model. Figure 12 illustrates his conception.

**Figure 12: Berg's model of research activity**



Source: Berg (1998)

This conception challenges the assumption in deVaus (1986) of a linear progression in a single, forward direction. Rather, the research spirals forward, never actually leaving any stage behind completely (reflected in the red stippled arrows). According to Berg (1998), this is a research model that could work better in researching the social sciences. Social science research may have to use quantitative and/or qualitative approaches alone or in combination.

Quantitative and qualitative studies contain the same basic elements, but use somewhat different assumptions and approaches (Berg, 1998). The following section evaluates the contrasts and the common problems that qualitative and quantitative approaches provide in social science research.

#### **4.1 Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches: Contrasts and Common Problems**

It appears that quantitative and qualitative studies admit the same basic elements but use somewhat different premises and approaches. This section's objective is to discuss the differences and the shared problems that qualitative and quantitative research present in social science research. Table 14 outlines some of the principal differences between the two methods.

**Table 14: Quantitative and Qualitative Approach: Some Contrasts**

Characteristics Associated with ...	Quantitative Approach	Qualitative Approach
<b>Phrases</b>	Empirical, statistical	Descriptive, word-oriented
<b>Key Concepts</b>	Statistical significance	Social construction
<b>Designs</b>	Structured, predetermined	Flexible, negotiated
<b>Sample</b>	Large, stratified, control groups, random selection, representative	Small, theoretical or purposive sampling
<b>Techniques</b>	Experiments, surveys, structured interviewing, data sets	Observation, participant observation, reviewing documents, open-ended interviewing, discourse analysis
<b>Data</b>	Quantitative: measures, counts, quantifiable coding	Descriptive: field notes, official documents, audio and video tapes, transcripts
<b>Instruments and Tools</b>	Inventories, questionnaires, scales, test scores, indexes	Researcher, tapes, transcripts, notes.
<b>Data Analysis</b>	Deductive, Statistical, occurs at conclusion of data collection	Inductive, ongoing, constant comparative method
<b>Problems in Using</b>	Controlling other variables, approach obtrusiveness, validity	Time consuming, reliability, generalisability

Source: Adapted from [www.iptv.org/finelink/publications](http://www.iptv.org/finelink/publications), accessed on May 2000.

#### 4.1.1 The Contrasts

Many authors have debated the importance of qualitative and quantitative approaches to the social sciences. Berg (1998) distinguishes these approaches:

- Quantitative research refers to counts and measures of things;
- Qualitative research refers to the mechanisms, concepts, definitions, characteristics, metaphors, symbols and descriptions of things.

Thus, the quantitative approach concentrates on the elementary amount of something, and the qualitative approach on the nature of things - in other words, what, how, when and where of a thing - its essence and ambience.

Stake (1995) highlights three major differences between qualitative and quantitative emphasis that merit attention:

- ✓ The distinction between explanation and understanding as the purpose of inquiry;
- ✓ The distinction between a personal and impersonal role for the researcher;
- ✓ A distinction between knowledge discovered and knowledge constructed.

The first item relates a difference in searching for causes versus searching for happenings, and understanding the complex interrelationships among all that exists. Thus, quantitative researchers understand what is happening in terms of descriptive variables and represent events and acts with scales, measurements and specially, numbers. On the other hand, qualitative researchers comprehend what is happening in key episodes or affirmations and represent these happenings with their own direct interpretation and narratives.

The second fact on relates to the interpretation as a method. Thinking about research questions, the quantitative studies seek out a relationship between a small numbers of variables, always foreseen before gathering data. Contrarily, qualitative studies are typically oriented to cases or phenomena, seeking patterns of unanticipated as well as expected relationships.

Stake (1995) also describes other significant characteristics of qualitative research:

- ✓ The emphasis on holistic treatment of phenomena. This means that the phenomena should be understood in their temporal, spatial, historical, political, economic, cultural, social, and personal scope;
- ✓ Qualitative researchers are not interventionists. They always seek not to disturb their subject in action;
- ✓ Qualitative researchers should search for patterns (consistencies in their issues). The quantitative researcher calls these patterns correlation or co-variation.

Bryman (1988) argues that much of the discussion and conflict about these two research traditions has created exaggerated examples of their differences.

‘These discussions reflect a tendency to treat quantitative and qualitative research as though they are mutually antagonistic ideal types of the research process’ (Bryman, 1988, p. 93).

While there are differences between the two research traditions, there is also a

number of points at which the differences are not as inflexible as the programmatic assertions often imply. Bryman contrasts features in quantitative and qualitative research in order to expose these flexible points. Table 15 sets out eight differences between quantitative and qualitative research. The subsequent discussion examines these issues and the scope for reconciliation between them.

For Bryman (1988), the exploratory and unstructured approach associated with qualitative research means that it is often depicted as useful as a way of generating hunches and hypotheses that can be tested more rigorously by quantitative research. In contrast, qualitative researchers see it as an end in itself, in particular because of its capacity to expose actors' meanings and interpretations, which is the approach's central requirement.

Bryman (1988) asserts that the relationship between researcher and subject (people being studied) in quantitative research is fairly fleeting or even non-existent. For example, while the data collection phase often extends over many months, the contact with each individual is usually brief. On the other hand, qualitative research entails much more sustained contact, when, for example, participant observation is the central method.

The quantitative researcher adopts an outsider's posture looking in the social world. A pre-ordained framework is applied to the subjects being investigated and they are involved as little as possible in that world. This posture may be termed a positivist one. Bryman (1988) suggests that qualitative researchers are motivated by a 'strong urge to "get close" to the subjects being investigated – to be an insider' (Bryman, 1988, p. 96). For these researchers, it is only by being proximate to their subjects and becoming an insider that they can view the world as a participant in that scene.

**Table 15: Differences between Quantitative and Qualitative Research**

	<b>Quantitative</b>	<b>Qualitative</b>
Role of qualitative research	Preparatory	Actors' interpretations means to exploration
Relationship between researcher and subject	Distant	Close
Researcher's stance in relation to subject	Outsider	Insider
Relationship between theory/concepts and research	Confirmation	Emergent
Research Strategy	Structured	Unstructured
Scope of findings	Nomothetic	Ideographic
Image of social reality	Static and external to actor	Processual and socially constructed by actor
Nature of data	Hard, reliable	Rich, deep

Source: Bryman, 1988, p. 94.

Commonly, quantitative research designs imply that theories and concepts are the starting point for investigations carried out within its framework (Bryman, 1988). Quantitative research is often depicted as a routine practice whereby theories and their integral concepts are simply operationalised with a view to verify their validity. Conversely, qualitative researchers often reject the idea of using theory as a precursor to an investigation, 'except perhaps as a means of providing an initial orientation to the situation as in grounded theory' (Bryman, 1988, p. 97). This is because theory may not reflect subjects' views about what is going on and what is deemed by them to be important. Consequently, qualitative research is marked by a concern with the discovery of theory rather than the verification of theory (Filstead, quoted in Bryman, 1988, p. 97).

The quantitative research strategy tends to adopt a structured approach to the study of society. This tendency is a product of the methods with which it is associated; both surveys and experiments require that the issues to be focused upon be decided by the outsider. By contrast, qualitative research tends to be more open. For example,

'many ethnographers advocate that the delineation of a research focus be deferred as long as possible... Consequently, many qualitative researchers refer to a sensation of being overwhelmed during their early days in the field, since everything they observe is potentially "data" ' (Bryman, 1988, p. 99).

Thus, one of the undoubted strengths which qualitative research affords the practitioner, by its unstructured nature's virtue, is precisely this capacity to encounter the unexpected and possibly to allow change in direction.

The distinction drawn in Table 15 between the scope of findings in qualitative and quantitative research derives from the kind of research being pursued. A nomothetic approach seeks to establish general law-like findings, which can be deemed to hold irrespective of time and place. An ideographic approach detects its findings in specific time-periods and localities, which are highly contextually specific.

Quantitative research conveys a static social reality's view, tending to ignore the impact and role of change in social life. For example, surveys examine co-variation among factors at a particular juncture; experimental research usually entails a variables's restricted range exploration within a restricted time period. However, as Bryman (1988) observes, others differences prevail.

'While both styles of research examine connections between variables, the proponents of qualitative research argue that quantitative research rarely examines the processes which link them. They also charge that the "independent" and "dependent" variables fail to take account the flow of events in which these variables are located' (Bryman 1988, p. 101).

As a result, the qualitative researcher is in a better position to consider the linkages between events and activities and to explore subjects' interpretations of the elements that produce such connections.

The data arising from quantitative studies are often depicted as hard, rigorous, and reliable. These adjectives suggest that such data exhibit considerable precision, having been collected by systematic procedures. Another investigator may thus readily check them. These positive attributes are often taken to mean that quantitative data are more persuasive and hence more likely to gain the policy-makers', evaluators' and stakeholders' support, despite the different cultures and learning constructs that these groups may have.

As Bryman (1988) suggests, qualitative researchers routinely describe the data

deriving from their research as rich and deep, often drawing a contrast with quantitative data, which tends to be summarised as superficial. These denotations are generally indicative of the attention to often complex detail that many qualitative researchers evidence. Their assumed high degree of contact with the people they study permits a penetrating account, which can explore issues in great detail and can elucidate their subjects' accounts's full extent a phenomena's variety.

#### **4.1.2 The Common Problems**

The eight contrasted dimensions between quantitative and qualitative research discussed in last section frequently taken to suggest that these two approaches are mutually exclusive models of the research process. Bryman (1988) argues that there should to be a connection between epistemological positions and methods of data collection. For the author, this view implies that:

‘researchers should be much more sensitive to the wider epistemological context of methods of data collection and that they are not neutral technical devices to be deployed under a variety of auspices. Choosing to conduct a survey or an ethnographic study would mean accepting a package of views about social reality and how it ought to be studied’ (Bryman, 1988, 124).

This epistemological connection is the most compelling example of the fact that quantitative and qualitative research may share common problems. Hence these common problems are the challenge presented by the ideas – new research proposals – that frequently occurs in the social science field. According to Bryman (1988, 2001), these two approaches (quantitative and qualitative) must work together, with the objective to understand the social reality's complexity.

The next section discusses primarily possible models for researching public administration. The section also discusses the usefulness of the case study as research instrument, combining qualitative and quantitative tools. Finally, the section presents the criteria for electing case studies in the current research.

## 4.2 Researching Social Science: Public Administration in Focus

White and Adams (1994) present three models of research available in social science: explanatory (or positive), interpretative and critical. The explanatory research strategy seeks to control social events through prediction that relies on lived experience day-by-day's world explanation. The interpretative research strategy pursues an understanding of social events and artefacts, in an effort to expand the meaning of life. Finally, the critical research social science paradigm questions the efficacy of social beliefs and actions in an attempt to enable collective self-development. White and Adams (1994) argue that scientists and philosophers of science have largely ignored the role of interpretation and criticism in social science. This happens because these models of reason have historically been associated with the humanities, which were thought to follow logics of inquiry different from science. Another possible explanation for this criticism's negligence is the fact that philosophers of science reconstructed the logic of scientific inquiry too narrowly, overlooking the role that interpretation and criticism play in scientific endeavour.

This argument suggests, firstly, that no single technique is likely to prove adequate for the conduct of research into public administration. This kind of work should be conducted through the combination of various techniques, like the administrative or policy process'analysis of the field's historical interpretation or parts of it, deductive arguments, philosophical critiques, personal reflections on administrative experiences, and hypothesis testing. This last approach could be founded on experimentation or the use of descriptive and inferential statistics. As can be seen, there are many different techniques available, in both qualitative and quantitative approaches to social science research.

The choice made in this study is to develop the research using a qualitative approach, with quantitative indicators used to support the findings, through a case study strategy. The specific contribution of case studies is now assessed in greater detail.

#### 4.2.1 Researching Public Administration through Case Studies

A case study can be understood in the following terms.

‘...An empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real life context, when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of evidence are used’ (Yin, 1993, p. 4).

The use of the case study as a research strategy in public administration was first registered in 1951, with the formation of the Inter-University Case Programme (ICP), which included members from almost 50 institutions in the United States (Jensen and Rogers, 2001, p. 236). The group members met to develop ideas for cases and to refine the case method, publishing cases on many public administration’s aspects. Jensen and Rogers (2001) define an ICP case study in public administration as a narrative of decision processes, a definition that centres on the method of analysis as opposed to the research setting or the particular entity being studied.

Berg (1998) asserts that the case study approach involves systematically gathering enough information about a particular person, social setting, event or group to permit the researcher to effectively understand how it operates or functions. Berg (1998) also notes, however, that case study work is not actually a data-gathering technique in itself, but a methodological approach that incorporates a number of data collection measures. This exercise may thus employ a number of data technologies such as life histories, documents, oral histories, in-depth interviews, and participant observation.

Stake (1995) defines a case study as a single research environment’s particularity’s and complexity’s exploration, coming to understand its activity within important circumstances. Consequently, a case study can be defined as an approach or strategy of research, which employs various techniques from both qualitative and quantitative research. In the current study, the purpose is to adequately understand a community’s experiences after an economic programme has impacted on it and to conduct

comprehensive examination through cross-comparison of cases.

Bailey's (1992) research into case studies and public administration research argues that public administration should be practitioner-oriented in the sense that business, medicine, and engineering are practitioner-oriented, and that researchers need to define what that orientation means for the field. Her contribution on this matter consists of two principal theses:

- Case studies are an appropriate means for addressing many research questions in public administration;
- Even practitioner-oriented case studies can be designed to pass tests of scientific rigour.

The focus of this current research – public administration – demands a multiple approach in order to explore its objectives, because of the nature of the field and its larger social context. Consequently, the choice of case studies as a strategy of research appears at least defensible.

Donmoyer (2000, pp. 62-65) presents three advantages of case studies: accessibility; seeing through the researcher's eyes; and decreased defensiveness. These advantages are now briefly discussed more fully.

- ✓ Accessibility means that the case studies allow the researcher to experience vivid, unique situations and unique individuals acting within their own culture. The purpose of the research is to expand the range of interpretations available to the research audience;
- ✓ Seeing through the researcher's eyes indicates that case studies allow the readers to look at the world from the researcher's perspective and, in the process, to see things they otherwise might not have seen. Briefly, a case study can facilitate those who are uninitiated into a particular theoretical viewpoint and enable them to come to understand that viewpoint;

- ✓ Decreased defensiveness signifies that vicarious experience induced by the ability to see through the researcher's eyes is less likely to produce resistance to learning.

According to Descombe (1998), the decision to use a case study approach is a strategic choice that relates to the scale and scope of an investigation, and it does not, at least in principle, dictate which method or methods must be used. As noted above, the strength of the case study approach is just this - which it allows for the use of a variety of methods depending on the circumstances and the specific needs of the situation. This decision - what methods to use to gather data, and subsequently what methods to use to analyse the data - will be defined in the second phase of the research. Kirk and Miller (1986) define this second phase as the 'discovery' phase. In the discovery phase, qualitative researchers must first consider the issue of timing: how and when they will have opportunities to collect the required data.

According to Yin (1994), the data collection and data analysis strategy of the case study approach:

'...copes with the technically distinctive situation in which there will be many more variables of interest than data points, and as one result relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a triangulation fashion, and as another result benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data collection and analysis' (Yin, 1994, p. 13).

Yin (1994) comments that the data collection for case studies can hinge on mainly six evidence's sources: documentation, archival records, interviews, direct observations, participant-observation, and physical artefacts. The author stresses that 'no single source has a complete advantage over all the others' (Yin, 1994, p. 80). Table 16 sets out the strengths and weaknesses of each of these sources.

**Table 16: Six Sources of Evidence: Strengths and Weakness**

Source of Evidence	Strengths	Weaknesses
Documentation	Stable, can be reviewed repeatedly; Unobtrusive, not created as a result of the case study; Exact, contains exact names, references, and details of an event; Broad coverage, long span of time, many events, and many settings.	Retrievability, can be low if biased selectively, or if collection is incomplete; Reporting bias, reflects (unknown) bias of the author; Access, may be deliberately blocked.
Archival Records	Same as above for documentation, plus precise and quantitative	Same as above for documentation, plus accessibility due to privacy reasons
Interviews	Targeted, focuses directly on case study topic; Insightful, provides perceived causal inferences	Bias due to poorly constructed questions; Response bias; Inaccuracies due to poor recall; Reflexivity, interviewee gives what interviewer wants to hear.
Direct Observations	Reality, covers events in real time; Contextual, covers context of event.	Time consuming Selectivity, unless broad coverage; Reflexivity, event may proceed differently because it is being observed; Cost, hours needed by human observers.
Participation-Observation	Same as above for direct observation plus insightful into interpersonal behaviour and motives	Same as above for direct observations plus bias due to investigator's manipulation of the events
Physical Artefacts	Insightful into cultural features; Insightful into technical operations.	Selectivity Availability

Source: Yin, 1994, p. 80.

Yin (1994) highlights that 'except for studies of preliterate societies, documentary information is likely to be relevant to every case study topic' (Yin, 1994, p. 81). However, unlikely it, the archival records:

'will vary from case study to case study. For some studies, the records can be so important that they can become the object of extensive retrieval and analysis' (Yin, 1994, p. 81).

Another source classified by Yin as important for the case study is the interview, the significance of which will vary depending on the focus of the research. According to Yin (1994), not all sources are relevant for all case studies. The choice of which to use will vary depending on the objective of the research.

Yin (1994) also argues that the strengths of these sources of evidence can be maximised if the researcher observes three principles: the use of multiple sources of

evidence (data triangulation), the creation of a case study database (decision for organising and documenting the data collected), and the maintenance of a chain of evidence (allowing an external observer to follow any evidence from initial research questions to eventual case study conclusions). These three principles must be applied, according to him, in order to increase the reliability of the research.

If case studies aim to pass the test of scientific rigour, they must also produce results that are generalisable, transferable, and replicable (Bailey, 1992). Table 17 defines each of these key terms.

**Table 17: The Case Study Approach and Scientific Rigour**

Term	Definition
Generalisable	Refers to the ability of a case to be uniform across organisations or events. A case study does not represent a 'sample of one', but provides the opportunity to expand and generalise theories (analytic generalisation) and not to enumerate frequencies (statistical generalisation).
Transferable	Means that the findings or research solutions can be applied in other similar organisations, either in total or with minor modifications for situation - specific conditions.
Replicable	Refers generally to being able to reproduce the method of experimentation and analysis. Given the same conditions and using the same methods, the same or similar results should be obtained in other studies or with other organisations.

Source: Bailey (1992).

A key characteristic of scientifically rigorous case study research is the capacity to generalise from results. Thus, generalisable results should provide the building block of theories. An example of the building theories' process from a case study approach is described by Eisenhardt (1989). The author suggests the direction of this building theories' process, from specifying the research questions through to reaching defensible conclusions. Table 18 summarises this process.

**Table 18: Process of Building Theory from Case Study Research**

Step	Activity
Getting Started	Definition of research question Possibly a priori constructs
Selecting Cases	Neither theory nor hypotheses Specified population Theoretical, not random, sampling
Crafting Instruments and Protocols	Multiple data collection methods Qualitative and quantitative data combined
Entering the Field	Overlap data collection and analysis, including field notes Flexible and opportunistic data collection methods
Analysing Data	Within-case analysis Cross-case pattern search using divergent techniques
Shaping Hypotheses	Iterative tabulation of evidence for each construct Replication, not sampling, logic across cases Search evidence for 'why' behind relationships
Enfolding Literature	Comparison with conflicting literature Comparison with similar literature
Reaching Closure	Theoretical saturation when possible

Source: Adapted from Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 533

What logic underpins each of these steps? At inception (Step 1), the research begins only with a specific problem, some potential variables, and reference to extant literature. However, the researcher must avoid the theory under consideration's premature definition; eschew testable hypotheses, and especially, back away from thinking about specific relationships between variables and theories.

The act of selecting cases is crucial, because:

'the population defines the set of entities from which the research sample is to be drawn. Also, selection of an appropriate population controls extraneous variation and helps to define the limits for generalising the findings' (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 537).

The importance of combining qualitative and quantitative evidence is described in stage three of Table 18. According to Eisenhardt (1989), quantitative data can indicate relationships that may not be accessible through a solely qualitative approach. Qualitative data is, on the other hand, useful for understanding the rationale or theory-underlying relationships revealed in the quantitative data or may directly suggest theory, which can then be strengthened by quantitative support.

Collecting and analysing data from a theory-building process allows the investigator to look beyond initial impressions and view the evidence through multiple

lenses. In this case, any necessary adjustments could be made, including the addition of new data sources in selected cases. This act will permit the researcher to become very familiar with each case as a stand-alone entity, allowing the unique patterns of each case to emerge before the investigator attempts to generalise patterns across cases. Probing the assembled data in many divergent ways helps to orient the search for any cross-case patterns. These developing generalisations constitute the 'frame' of theory building.

The next step is to compare systematically the emergent frame with the evidence from each case in order to assess how well or poorly it fits with case data. This process effectively constitutes a search of the evidence for the 'why' behind the observed relationships. This will help to build internal validity.

Step seven in Table 18 considers a broad range of literature, the objectives being to seek both similar and contradictory secondary research, and to explore the roots of convergence and divergence. Comparing the literature with emergent concepts, theory, or hypotheses discovered through the cases helps to ground generalisability, improves construct definition, and raises the acuity of theory building from case study research.

The final issues relate to closing this iterative research process, specifically: when to stop interacting between theory and data, and when to stop adding cases? In relation to the first question, Eisenhardt (1989) argues that the interaction process stops when the incremental improvements to theory become minimal. The question regarding the number of necessary cases will again depend on when the research reaches the point at which incremental learning is insignificant, because the investigator is just observing phenomena seen before. Eisenhardt (1989) concludes that there is no ideal number of cases to be investigated in a case study research process. Nevertheless, her view is that a number between four and ten could work well (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 545). The building theory from case studies' iterative process' final products may include:

- ✓ Concepts;

- ✓ A conceptual framework;
- ✓ Propositions or ‘middle range’ theory (Eisenhardt, 1989).

Finally, Eisenhardt (1989) emphasises that the value of theory built from a case study approach is greater in the early stages of research on a topic or to provide originality in perspective on an already researched topic.

Nevertheless, Dyer and Wilkins (1991) criticise Eisenhardt’s position regarding the right number of case studies for generating theory, commenting that it ‘neglects some of the strengths of the classic case study method’ (Dyer and Wilkins, 1991, p. 613). The authors present their criticism in relation to:

‘three critical areas: (a) the in-depth study of a single case (context) versus the study of multiple cases (contexts); (b) deep versus surface description, and (c) the telling of good stories versus the creating of good constructs’ (Dyer and Wilkins, 1991, p. 613).

Thus, according to Dyer and Wilkins, the Eisenhardt’s assertion that between four and ten cases would be an ideal number to pursue for a case study research is flawed.

‘Such a view is clearly at odds with what most social scientists would consider classic case studies in the field. For example, some of the more important studies might include Selznick (1949 1 case); Blau (1955 2 cases); Becker, Geer, Strauss, and Hughes (1961 1 case); Dalton (1959 4 cases, although only 1 case, the Milo plant, was studied in depth); Lipset, Trow, and Coleman (1956 1 case); Crozier (1964 2 cases); Whyte (1943 1 case); Michels (1949 1 case); Gouldner (1954 1 case); and Kanter (1977 1 case). Indeed, these classic studies greatly advanced the theorising of social scientists at the time they were published and continue to have an impact on the field of management even today. Thus, in our opinion, to assume that a single case cannot be a useful unit of analysis for theory building ignores important exceptions (Dyer and Wilkins, 1991, p. 614).

Dyer and Wilkins (1991) argue that Eisenhardt misplaces the essence of case study research when she argues that the more cases a researcher study, the more convincing the story. For them, the careful study of a single case, that leads to recognise new theoretical relationships and question old ones, is advantageous. This advantage is explained by Dyer and Wilkins as ‘the deep understanding of a particular social setting and the benefits of comparative insights’ (Dyer and Wilkins, 1991, p. 614).

Another relevant point in Dyer and Wilkins (1991) critique of Eisenhardt relates to her stress on the use of contrasting observations from multiple cases to produce and

emphasise theoretical constructions. In emphasising this, she focuses attention on general constructs, not to the context of the constructs and the role that these constructs play in a particular environment.

Finally, Dyer and Wilkins (1991) argue that focusing on 'telling good stories' instead of 'creating well constructs' would unveil the dynamics of the phenomena, facilitate similar dynamics' identification in other research, and assist in the understanding of the daily social life.

The cases to research's number problem and consequently, how to generalise from the case study approach is discussed by other authors, including Stake (1995). The author suggests that the case study seems to provide a poor basis for generalisation.

'Generalisations about a case or a few cases in a particular situation might not be thought of as generalisations and may need some label such as petite generalisations, but they are generalisations that regularly occur all along way in case study' (Stake, 1995, p. 7).

Stake (1994, 1995) suggests that case studies can be classified into three different types: intrinsic, instrumental, and collective case studies. Reflecting on these different forms provides a basis for exploring the case studies' generalisation's limits:

- An intrinsic case study is undertaken because of its uniqueness or ordinariness. The purpose is not to understand or test abstract theory or to develop new theoretical explanations. Instead, the intention is to better understand intrinsic aspects of a particular entity;
- An instrumental case study is examined to provide insight into some issue or to refine some theoretical explanation. It is investigated in depth, with the objective being to help the researcher to better understand some external theoretical question or problem. The choice of a particular case for study (a single case) is made because the investigator believes that the understanding of some other research interest will be advanced through that case;
- Collective case studies involve the extensive study of several instrumental cases.

The selection of these cases is intended to allow better understanding or perhaps an enhanced ability to theorise about some yet larger group of cases.

Jensen and Rodgers (2001) criticise the claim that the case study approach provides poor quality outcomes. This seems to arise, in part, from the perception that they are not generalisable, and thus cannot be cumulated. When case studies are considered cumulatively, they argue, a wide variety of special conditions can be recognised so as to establish whether the findings are generalisable (or not). If the generalisation requires that there be comparison across entities, Jensen and Rodgers (2001) suggest the use of meta-analysis as an exercise of accumulation in case studies. For them, meta-analysis systematically tests the case study results' generalisability by using evidence that examines the same phenomena with different methodologies. The results from a case studies' summary analysis reflect the cumulative evidence from many studies of the same setting, policy, process, or programme.

Jensen and Rodgers (2001) claim that the value of each case study must be appreciated in terms of the whole research's network and the final synthesis that it supports, instead of treating outcomes of each specific case study as independent findings. They suggest that the data from single case studies are the pieces from which a complete study evidence's database, organised around a specific unit of analysis, can be constructed. The data are then entered into a data set of findings and analysed using the tools and methods of meta-analysis. Consequently, the individual case studies' generalisability can be evaluated only in terms of the additional increment of evidence that they provide to a set of several case studies through such meta-analysis. In order to cumulate knowledge from case studies, Jensen and Rodgers believe that care needs to be taken to address the beginning of the process through the framing of the research question (Eisenhardt's Step 1).

Because the meta-analyst can test generalisability only by cumulating across

entities, the context of each single case study becomes important, and the research question must explicitly address it. The second fundamental issue to apply if cases are to contribute to a meta-analysis is the case study design. The design used to address the research question will provide data to the meta-analyst for a systematic and quantitative analysis of findings, towards possible generalisation. This current research, however, do not intend to perform towards meta-analysis. Nevertheless, the meta-analysis and cumulation's principles discussed above will support further considerations in the two final Chapters.

Pawson (2002a, 2002b) criticises meta-analysis and narrative review as strategies for evidence-based policies. He argues that 'meta-analysis ends up with de-contextualised lessons and narrative review concludes with over-contextualised recommendations' (Pawson, 2002a, p. 179). Pawson (2002b) then proposes an approach called 'realist synthesis' to fill the gap that he perceives in these two strategies. The 'realist synthesis' utilises a 'generative' approach to causation. This perspective argues that it is not 'programmes' that work, but rather, the underlying reasons or resources that they offer to subjects that generate change. As he notes:

'...realist synthesis assumes that the transmission of lessons occurs through a process of theory building rather than assembling empirical generalisations...The task of evaluation by these lights is to gather evidence to see if the process occurs as planned and, if it should not, then to amend the theory to account for the divergent outcomes' (Pawson, 2002b, p. 347).

Thus, as an alternative to meta-analysis's comparative thrust, Pawson's (2002b) propositions are based upon the fortunes of a dominant mechanism, through which it is assumed that a programme 'A' works. The mechanism is, then, only a subset of the much broader set of actions that constitute the social domain.

'Realism assumes that each time a programme mechanism is brought into operation, it will meet with both success and failure. Programme A is then reviewed with the aim of trying to distinguish for which subjects and in which circumstances it has been successful and unsuccessful...The reviewer's basic task is to sift through the mixed fortunes of the programme attempting to discover those contexts that have produced solid and successful outcomes from those contexts that induce failure. The review process is then repeated across other initiatives featuring the same underlying mechanism with the aim of gathering together the various permutations of success and failure...The aim is to differentiate and accumulate evidence on positive and negative CMO configurations' (Pawson, 2002b, p. 345).

This constitutes a meaningful shift in focus – towards the relation between mechanism and context and away from the more eclectic causal modelling of case study meta-analysis. Another challenge that must be met when using case study strategy in qualitative research is ascertaining the number of cases that may be representative when doing the fieldwork. In order to help researchers to choose between single or multiple case studies, Jensen and Rodgers (2001) suggest a typology of case studies that can be applied to accumulation:

- “Snapshot” Case Studies – provide a description of a single entity at a single point in time, using qualitative or quantitative approaches, or some combination of the two. Hypotheses may be tested through these;
- Longitudinal Case Studies – a time-ordered analysis of events that occur during a period of an entity’s history. These may be quantitative or qualitative and may involve a formal report and analysis of critical events or processes;
- Pre-post Case Studies – provide evidence on the outcomes of implementing a particular programme, policy or decision. They are longitudinal in design, but also include an assessment before implementation and follow-up assessment after implementation. Once results are systematically aggregated, cause-and-effect assertions become possible;
- “Patchwork” Case Studies – integrate several case studies that have evaluated a particular entity at different points in time according to snapshot, longitudinal, or pre-post design. These are limited in the sense that they focus only on a single entity;
- Comparative Studies of Cases – these aims to provide cross-unit (as opposed to within-unit) comparison, in an effort to uncover generalisations about an underlying commonality reflecting a policy, process, programme or decision.

Yin (1994) also discusses the generalisability of case studies, presenting two types of generalisation, namely statistical and analytic:

- Statistical generalisation is done when an inference is made about a population (or universe) on empirical data collected about a sample's basis. It is the most common way of generalising when doing surveys;
- Analytic generalisation is done when a previously developed theory is used as a template with which to compare the the case study's empirical results. If two or more cases are shown to support the same theory, replication can be claimed. The empirical results may be considered yet more potent if two or more cases support the same theory but do not support an equally plausible, rival theory. According to Yin, this kind of generalisation can be used in a single-case or multiple-case study.

Yin (1994) argues that the major step in designing and conducting a case study is defining the unit of analysis (the case itself). This is equivalent to Eisenhardt's Step 2. Yin considers that a single case (a common design for doing case studies) is justifiable under certain circumstances:

- Where the case represents a critical test of existing theory;
- Where the case is a rare or unique event;
- Where the case facilitates a revelatory purpose.

The author describes two situations in which a single case study shall be applied: holistic designs and those using embedded units of analysis. The holistic design examines only the global nature of an act, as a programme, or an entity, or as an organisation. Holism is worthwhile when no logical subunits can be identified and when the relevant theory underlying the case study is itself of a holistic nature. However, there could be disadvantages to using this approach, especially if it encourages the investigator to avoid examining any specific phenomenon in 'day-by-day' detail.

Yin (1994) denotes the embedded case study design as a situation in which the same case study may involve more than one unit of analysis. These subunits can add significant opportunities for extensive analysis, enhancing the insights possible from a

single case. He concedes that, if too much attention is given to these subunits and the holistic aspects of the case are then ignored, the case study itself will have changed both its orientation and its nature.

Yin also suggests that multiple-case design should be used when the same study contains more than a single case. In this type of design, every case chosen should serve a specific purpose within the overall scope of inquiry. Multiple- and single-case designs each have strengths and weaknesses.

‘The evidence from multiple cases is often considered more compelling, and the overall study is therefore regarded as being more robust... At the same time, the rationales for single-case, the critical case, and the revelatory case are all likely to involve only single cases, by definition. Moreover, the conduct of a multiple-case study can require extensive resources and time beyond the means of a single student or independent research investigator’ (Yin, 1994, p. 45).

Thus, Yin points out the dilemma that this current study’s researcher faced: as the focus of this study reveals the necessity of a multiple-case design, how could this be accomplished, with restrict resources, time constraint and a single investigator?

In sum, the analysis presented above discussed an amount of possibilities to design a case study. However, this study opted for specific characteristics of design. Table 19 sets out these options adopted in the methodology design.

This strategy would support the search for theory that successfully articulates the public policy effects of initiatives developed at national level and applied at local levels. Yin (1994) suggests that a case study approach has five important components in its research design: a study’s questions, its propositions, if any, its unit(s) of analysis, the logic linking the data to the propositions, the criteria for interpreting the findings. Thus, this research aims to answer these two questions:

- What sort of socio-economic impacts are generated by a single economic public policy developed at national level and applied in different communities?
- How might these inter-communal effects be most systematically measured?

**Table 19: Current Research Design Categorisation**

Case Study Category	Rationale for application
Collective (Stake, 1995), but with few cases (Dyer and Wilkins, 1991)	British Steel had, at the time of privatisation, a number of plants in different 'steel communities'. A single-case design would not cover different communities'different aspects. On the other hand, the researcher opted to accomplish few cases in order to have a greater understanding of few particular locations, generating comparative insights' benefits.
Pre-post and comparative (Jensen and Rodgers, 2001) in their design	The pre-post design matches the CMO structure proposal for policy evaluation. Both include an appraisal before implementation and follow-up evaluation after implementation. Furthermore, after the systematic results' aggregation, cause-and-effect assertions could become possible. The comparative design supports the cross-unit analysis'necessity, with the objective to expose possible generalisations.
Focusing analytical generalisation (Yin, 1994; Jensen and Rodgers, 2001)	As the study applies cross-unit analysis to construct possible generalisations, the analytical focus is intended to discuss the privatisation policy proposal and its projected results.

The unit of analysis is two 'steel' communities. Several criteria were applied to select these two case studies. They are described below. The data collection process and the analysis criteria followed procedures in order to facilitate possible surface of connections between the data and the the research's objective. These procedures are also described in the next pages.

#### **4.2.2 Case Study Research in Communities: which cases to investigate?**

As stated above, this research focuses on the purpose and reach of the public policy objectives relating to privatisation, particularly in relation to their community level socio-economic impacts. The literature review suggests that this is a major lacuna in current research. According to Berg (1998), case study research in communities can be defined as the systematic gathering of enough information about a particular community to provide the researcher with understanding and awareness of:

- ✓ What occurred in that community;
- ✓ Why and how they happened;
- ✓ What social forces bound together members of this community?

Berg (1998) suggests that mutually exclusive strategies can be deployed to focus

this kind of research. Investigators may be very general in their focus, offering approximately equal weight to all community's various aspects and its lifeworld, or focus on selected phenomena that impact on that community. Berg (1998) also specifies some of the key foci for data collection to be covered in pursuit of community case studies. These include:

- ✓ Published sources, like census data, local histories, newspapers;
- ✓ Maps and others geographical information sources;
- ✓ Human ecological concerns.

This last factor deals with how various physical and environmental elements shape the lives of people in a community or the life of the community itself. It is interesting to note that some Berg's suggestions equivalent as that highlighted by Yin (1994) in Table 16.

One of the first decisions required to start a case study research process is the selection of which cases to investigate. This choice needs to be justified, firstly, on the basis of "suitability" and, secondly, on a "pragmatic" basis (Descombe, 1998). The 'suitability' selection criterion may be based on three strategies, namely:

- ✓ 'Typical',
- ✓ 'Extreme instance',
- ✓ 'Test-site for theory'.

The 'typical' case is pursued where it is similar in crucial respects to a family of others that might have been chosen, on the basis that the findings from the case study are likely to apply elsewhere. The 'extreme instance' provides something of a contrast with the norm – a specified factor is seen in relief, highlighted in its effect. Finally, the 'test-site for theory' criterion is based on the relevance of the case for previous theory exploration. The case must contain crucial elements that are especially significant, and from these the researcher should be able to predict certain outcomes if the theory holds true.

A case study choice's 'pragmatic' basis could be a matter of convenience, and should only come into play in two scenarios: when deciding between equally suitable alternatives; or where a case presents a particularly attractive proposition. In this instance, the case chosen should be intrinsically interesting. Descombe (1998) cautions that it is erroneous to use pragmatic reasons as the principal or the sole criterion for selecting a case, because in this situation the researcher will be criticised for the weak conclusion validity.

A 'criteria range' shaped the choice of communities in the current research. These criteria included steel plant type (integrated steelworks/other main operation site) and the historical change's pattern in plant type; the product mix; and community inhabitants' total number (resident population). The criteria range was used to seek out a diversity of cases, in accordance with Stake's (1994) collective cases design's concept. These choices were shaped by the information to be found on the 'Offer of British Steel' map (British Steel, 1988, p. 26). This described 25 main operational sites in 1988, the year of BSC's privatisation. This was set against a second map drafted in the year 2000 by the Corus Group, specifying the main manufacturing locations at that time (Corus Group, 2000). Annexes 1 and 2 reproduce these maps. Annex 3 presents all 25 sites as they were defined in December 1988, with key statistics on their local communities and other important criteria used for case selection.

Since the option of a single case study strategy could not represent the communities' diversity where BSC operational sites existed in 1988, the choice was made to select two communities as cases: the cities of Wolverhampton (West Midlands) and Sheffield (South Yorkshire).

Wolverhampton was chosen for two reasons. The choice is both 'typical' and 'pragmatic' (Descombe, 1998), because the community had three different plant types (integrated steelworks, other operation site and [at the time of writing] a service centre) that operated throughout the critical historical period. All 'steel communities' identified in

Annex 3 have (or had) at least one of these types of plants. Therefore, Wolverhampton's choice as the first case study is representative and coherent with the criteria range used.

The second community chosen, Sheffield, is justified as an 'extreme instance' (Descombe, 1998) case. Sheffield has been associated with a particular 'steel culture' heritage that featured both the development and exploration of the steel industry proper and diversity in steel use (cutlery, manufacture of steel and steel tools). Table 20 is extracted from Annex 3. It summarises some comparative information about Wolverhampton and Sheffield, where the case studies were developed.

Another justification for the choice of Wolverhampton and Sheffield as the case studies is the scale of the transformation that both cities experienced in the 1970s and 1980s. This transformation is briefly discussed in further detail below.

The Index of Multiple Deprivation published by the Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions (DETR) in August 2000 (IMD2000)<sup>1</sup> shows that on an average of ward scores out of 354 English Districts, Wolverhampton was ranked in 29th position. On this indicator, Wolverhampton comes within the top 8.2% of deprived districts. In the West Midlands, only Sandwell and Birmingham have a higher rank on this indicator. Each ward in the city is ranked with regard to deprivation as well. The three highest ranked wards for deprivation in Wolverhampton are Low Hill, East Park and St. Peters. St. Peters has the highest level of employment deprivation<sup>2</sup> and housing deprivation<sup>3</sup>. Low Hill has the highest level of income deprivation<sup>4</sup>, the highest level of education deprivation<sup>5</sup>, and the highest level of child poverty deprivation<sup>6</sup>. These deprivation areas correspond with areas that also experience higher rates of crime

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<sup>1</sup> The Index of Multiple Deprivation combines the scores from 36 separate social and economic indicators for each electoral ward in England. Wards are then ranked from 1, the highest level of deprivation, to 8414, the lowest level, for each set of indicators, and for the overall index, the IMD. Ward scores are also aggregated to produce Local Authority scores (Sheffield Health Authority, 2001, p. 3).

<sup>2</sup> People who want to work, but are unable to do so through unemployment, sickness or disability.

<sup>3</sup> People living in unsatisfactory housing.

<sup>4</sup> Families in receipt of means tested benefits.

<sup>5</sup> Lack of qualifications amongst adults and children of different ages.

(Wolverhampton City Council, 2001).

**Table 20: Wolverhampton and Sheffield: initial information**

	<b>Wolverhampton</b>	<b>Sheffield</b>
British Steel Corporation's original sites and respective products	Bilston Steelworks (closed in 1979, steelmaking strip products)	BSC Stainless (created in 1976, today AvestaPolarit 7, stainless steel)
	Wednesfield (closed in 1995, Small-bore tubes)	Stocksbridge Works (Corus Group, Engineering steels and stainless steel)
	Midland Service Centre (Corus Group - opened in 1996, Hot rolled long products)	Tinsley Park Mill (Corus Group, closed in December 2000, Engineering steels and stainless steel)
GDP composition (% by industry, 1995)	37.50	36.30
Total Population percentage change (1981-1994)	-4.5%	-3.2%
Population (1991)	240,700	502,840
Ranking from Index of Deprivation 1991 (where '1' is the worst)	27	35
Ranking from Index of Deprivation 2000 (where '1' is the worst)	29	60
Income Support Beneficiaries (November 1994)	22%	18%
Percentage of claimant unemployed which are long-term unemployed (1994)	39.1%	40%
Percentage of population economically active (Spring 1995)	59.9%	56.3%
Area (sq. km); population density (persons per sq. km)	69; 3,562	369; 1,443

Source: 1991 Census of Population; Regional Trends 1996; Data from Research

Data from the Index of Multiple Deprivation may also be used to analyse the proportion of a local authority's population that lives in the most deprived 10% of wards in the country (the EXTENT score). Wolverhampton's rank is 25th worst, with 41% of its inhabitants living in the lowest socio-economic standards.

According to the Wolverhampton Crime Audit 2001 (Wolverhampton City Council, 2001, p.17) the City is one of four sites nationally where research conducted by Durham University is taking place to try and understand, in a local context, the link between alcohol and crime. The Council suggests that the link is a strong one.

<sup>6</sup> Proportion of children under 16 years of age living in families on means tested benefit.

<sup>7</sup> See page 271 for details of the mergers that created AvestaPolarit.

'Initial findings indicate that alcohol is involved in a significant number of incidents of violence and disorder in Wolverhampton. In the Wolverhampton Crime Reduction and Community Safety Questionnaire 2001 75% of respondents felt that alcohol played a major role in crime in the City centre, 42% felt it played a major role in other local centres, and 48% felt it played a minor role in their neighbourhood. This mirrors the British Crime Survey which found that in over half (53%) of all incidents of stranger violence the victim described the perpetrator as being under the influence of alcohol' (Wolverhampton City Council, 2001, p. 17).

In Sheffield, the most current disparity's evidence in socio-economic and deprivation conditions across its wards was provided again from the Index of Deprivation for 2000. This report demonstrated that Sheffield had higher overall deprivation's levels than the majority of Local Authorities, but lower levels than many other large cities.

'About one third of Sheffield's wards have consistently high scores on most indicators placing them within the most deprived 10% of all wards in England. Some of these wards are amongst the most deprived 1% on several indicators. Five Sheffield wards out of 29 are in the lower half of all English wards of levels of deprivation and, usually for a large city, two are in the least deprived 5% of wards. The range from most to least deprived is very wide, making Sheffield one of the most unequal cities in the country. This is particularly the case on indicators of educational attainment and child poverty. There are stark differences between Sheffield's four newly formed Primary Care Trusts with highest concentrations of the most deprived parts of the city in the area covered by North Sheffield PCT, followed by the South East PCT and then the West PCT. All the areas of lowest deprivation fall within the South West PCT area, although that Trust also has the widest variations in its population' (Sheffield Health Authority, 2001, p.3, emphasis added).

It is interesting to note that the southeast Sheffield area also once formed the concentration of steel manufacturing plants in the city. Sheffield ranks 60th highest out of 354 local authorities on the combined index of multiple deprivation<sup>8</sup> (Sheffield Health Authority, 2001). Sheffield's ranking on the Extent score is 48 out of 354, with just 30% of the city's population living in one of the most deprived 10% of wards in the country. Another measure that the IMD2000 produced is the CONCENTRATION score. This indicator compares the scores of just the most deprived 10% of each local authority's population, ranking Sheffield at 14 out of 354. This indicates that deprivation's levels of the population's most deprived 10% are higher than in most other English local authorities.

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<sup>8</sup> The six domains of the index are income (9 indicators), employment (5 indicators) health deprivation and disability (5 indicators, including <65SMR, limiting long term illness and low birthweight), education, skills and training (6 indicators), housing (3 indicators), geographical access to services (4 indicators, including GP access) (Sheffield Health Authority, 2001, p.4).

When the wards of Sheffield are analysed based on an overall index of the IMD2000, it is apparent that ten wards comprising 30% of Sheffield's resident population rank within the most deprived 10% of all wards in England. Three wards, Southey Green, Burngreave and Manor, were contained within the most deprived 1% of wards. In total, 24 of the 29 wards are ranked in the upper half of England's 8414 ward IMD scores. Of the five wards in the lower half, two, Broomhill and Ecclesall are ranked in the least deprived 5% of all wards.

Only one other ward across all the major English cities, in Bristol, is in this lowest 5%. In summary, Sheffield is recognised as 'an average city of great extremes' (Sheffield Health Authority, 2001, p. 12). Its most deprived wards experience greater levels of deprivation than almost any other parts of England. In contrast to this, however, around 20% of the population of Sheffield lives in wards which are in the deprivation ranking's lower half. Table 21 sets out the rank of Sheffield's wards based on the IMD2000, indicating this socio-economic disparity.

In summary, Sheffield and Wolverhampton are different in social, demographic and economic terms, even while both are heavily urbanised, with strong roots in the steel industry. Both cities had experienced the shock of major plant closures and disinvestments, coupled with a loss of population over the years analysed. Yet, their capacity to adapt may diverge. Thus, both cities had improved their position in the Index of Deprivation's ranking from 1991 to 2000. Sheffield's position in the ranking improved significantly, as it overtook 25 other authorities. Meanwhile, Wolverhampton only managed to overtake two other authorities over the same period. These examples demonstrate that the two 'steel communities' selected as case studies have on one hand, general similarities that could be found in other such steel communities in the 1980s and the 1990s: an economy highly dependent on industry, vulnerable to plant closures and beset by high unemployment. On the other hand, the distinctiveness of each city may have shaped locally a major national

economic programme's impact, like the British Steel privatisation.


**Table 21: Overall Index of Multiple Deprivation 2000 in Sheffield Wards**

Ward Name	Ranking on IMD score out of 8414 England wards
Southey Green	43
Burngreave	60
Manor Park	76
Firth Park	98
Castle	129
Nether Shire	198
Darnall	369
Owlerton	561
Brightside	605
Sharrow	635
Norton	1059
Handsworth	1064
Birley	1314
Netherthorpe	1766
Heeley	1787
Intake	1909
Walkley	2169
Mosborough	2587
Hillsborough	2800
Stocksbridge	3121
Chapel Green	2140
South Wortley	3872
Nether Edge	3942
Dore	3987
Beauchief	4369
Hallam	5609
Broomhill	7309
Ecclesall	7953
	8105

Source: Adapted from Sheffield Health Authority, 2001, Table 4.

Source Note: National Rank is position out of 8414 electoral wards (smaller number = more deprived)

Colours Key:



### 4.3 Applying a Case Study Approach in the Field: collecting and analysing data

Kirk and Miller (1986), Stake (1995) and Yin (1994) and set out a general strategy for approaching the ‘field’ (the concrete research environment) based on a case study approach. Figure 13 synthesises their work.

**Figure 13: Accessing the Field through the Case Study Approach**

Action		Search for
Checking the Validity	⇒	Research problem and tools (place, time, sources)
Checking the Reliability	⇒	Data Strength (documented ethnographic decision making)
Collecting Data	⇒	Begin to establish the meaning about the cases: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Direct interpretation of the individual instance;</li> <li>• Aggregation of instances until something can be said about them as a class.</li> </ul>
Doing Triangulation	⇒	Multiple Data Sources Multiple Methods
Doing analysis and interpretation	⇒	Correspondence, patterns, meanings, absolute consistency, consistency within certain conditions

Source: Adapted from Kirk and Miller (1986); Stake (1995) and Yin (1994).

Kirk and Miller (1986) demonstrate that the qualitative research’s validity problem is handled by field research. The validity of qualitative research that is recognised as authentic is called its theoretical or ‘construct’ validity. In this research, there is substantial evidence that the theoretical paradigm systematically corresponds to observations done. This will be specified in the following Chapters.

To check validity, the following processes need to be deployed: an evaluation of working in the field, a research situation’s components’ consideration, as place, time, informant, and the research problems and tools. On the other hand, the problem of reliability in qualitative research is addressed by documented ethnographic decision making, or alternatively, by explicitly described observational procedures. Reliability also requires data’s strength assessment. The issue is one of whether or not (or under what conditions) the researchers would expect to obtain the same finding if they tried again in the same way.

The act of collecting data through the case study approach requires the researcher

to focus on two research strategies simultaneously. First, the researcher needs to search for the emergence of meaning from the repetition of phenomena, utilising mainly quantitative techniques. Second, the inquiry should adopt a qualitative focus when searching for the emergence of meaning in the single instance.

The act of collecting data through the case study approach also permits the researcher to analyse it in one of two possible ways (Yin, 1994): relying on theoretical propositions, or developing a case description. As indicated by Yin (1994), the act of hinge on theoretical proposition represents following such propositions that led to the case study. The original objectives, design, research questions, literature's review and new insights will be shaped by these propositions. In other words, the propositions help to focus attention on certain data and to ignore other data.

On the other hand, when the researcher chooses to develop a case description, this denotes that a priori theoretical propositions are absent (Yin 1994, p. 104). Occasionally, a case study's original purpose may have been descriptive. As a result, the descriptive framework also organises the case study analysis. In other circumstances, the case study's original objective may not have been descriptive, but a descriptive approach may help to identify the appropriate causal links to be analysed. The research purpose addressed here requires a case description in order to discover possible associations through which context, mechanisms and outcomes can be linked.

#### **4.3.1 Data Collection Process**

This subsection describes how the data collection process was accomplished. The study questions and purpose have been presented in Chapter I. The unit of analysis (Yin, 1994) is defined as 'steel communities'. The choice was made in favour of Wolverhampton (West Midlands) and Sheffield (South Yorkshire). The time boundaries were defined as 1981 (seven years before the privatisation programme of British Steel in 1988) and 1995, seven years after. Obviously, there was some previous (before 1981) and some contemporary (post-1995) data that was salient to the research process. Where clearly

pertinent, such data was included in the case modelling process. Additionally, for each community, time series indicators were formed to support the qualitative evidence presented. Unfortunately, not all of the time series data points could be completed for each year that comprises the 'Context' and the 'Outcomes'.

In order to link the data with the research purpose, the information's collection was guided by the following questions:

1. What are the local change mechanisms set off by a privatisation programme?
2. How do the change mechanisms conflict with the ongoing social processes?
3. What are the social and cultural conditions necessary for the change mechanisms to operate as intended by the policy designer?
4. How are the social and cultural conditions distributed within and between programme contexts?
5. What was the plant(s)' situation in the reference community in 1988? What was the situation after the privatisation?
6. What reason(s) were attributed by BSC in support of a redirection/closure before and after 1988?
7. What is the situation in the community, local economy and steel sector today?
8. What Local Economic Development (LED) strategies were being pursued before and after the change? Can any movement in LED strategies reasonably be attributed to the BSC decision?
9. Are there any evaluations/analyses of this policy's impacts and its effects already in existence?
10. Were there any effective LED investments forthcoming on privatisation? If so, where were these sources from?
11. What were the local reactions's sources to the redirection/closure news?
12. How did the local authority, the population and the media react?

13. Was there a local action campaign forthcoming? How did it develop and end?

The investigator started the data collecting with the case of Wolverhampton, performing twenty-one day-long visits to the city between September 2001 and March 2002. A further day-long visit was made in July 2002, with the intention of filling some gaps that had arisen in the first version of the description of the case.

The first local institution visited was the Wolverhampton Central Library, where the reference section supplied the researcher with basic information about the city's history. The second and principal local institution used for data collection was the Wolverhampton Local Studies and Archives, where the major information needed for the study was located. This institution holds some books that address the subject under study, a considerable local statistics' collection and extensive local newspaper clippings, some of them in hard copy version and others on microfilm. These clippings embrace more than two hundred different sector classifications, and from them the body of the Wolverhampton case description (Chapter V) was derived. These clippings' exploration consumed the most of the time spent in Wolverhampton. Other information sources were the Wolverhampton Health Authority, the West Midlands Police Headquarters and the local City Council.

The data collection process for Sheffield was accomplished between April and August 2002, through a total of ten day-long visits. The first local visit was made to the Kelham Island Museum, which is specialised in local steel history. Unfortunately, the museum archive was closed for external visits until January 2003, which, given the timetable for this research, precluded its use. The second and main location was the Sheffield Central Library, with the reference section providing the basis of Sheffield's history. Unlike Wolverhampton, Sheffield does not have an independent Local Studies department, with local studies being integrated into the City's Central Library. Most of the time spent in Sheffield was expended in the Central Library's Local Studies section. Local

Studies has, among other data, a collection of hard copy local newspaper cuttings from 1996 to the present day, some microfilmed local newspapers in the 1980s'copies, and a considerable collection of books about Sheffield history, and particularly about its steel sector heritage. On these books the Sheffield case description body (Chapter VI) was based. These books' reading and assimilation consumed the most of the time spent in Sheffield. Other sources of information were to be gained at the South Yorkshire Police Headquarters, the Sheffield Archives and the local City Council. In addition, the investigator consulted the Birmingham Central Library, Aston University Library & Information Services and Birmingham University Main Library before and after the fieldwork, with the aiming to develop an initial understanding of each case and filling in some gaps encountered at the study location.

#### **4.3.2 Criteria for Organising and Interpreting the Findings: the Analysis**

Formal criteria were used to develop early and conclusive analyses about the data collected. These were adapted from the models suggested by Eisenhardt (1989), as described in Table 18 and from Yin (1994):

1. Collect all relevant information about the community and its steel history held in local archive and libraries. This process is intended to generate:
  - a. An understanding of the community's origins and strengths, and locate steel production in the community's history;
  - b. An insight into the British Steel plant(s)' development in the case community, and the BSC investments' importance analysis for that community;
  - c. An evaluation of the possible responses on the local authority's and local civil society's part to the changes made before, during and after the 1988 process.
2. Complete a preliminary report summarising this early information, highlighting

possible gaps, lines of investigation, and possible recurrences/particular contexts comparable with cases completed before.

3. Statistical data from the indicators embedded in the CMO model.
4. A second stage report based on the information collected in steps one and three.
5. A comparison of the findings with the literature review presented in Chapter II, seeking similarities and contradictions, and outlining provisional explanations for these.
6. Propositions and generalisations based upon the research questions and the research instrument used to explore them.

The next task imposed by the research is how to organise the data collected for presentation. Various authors (Bryson and Lowe, 2002; Funnell, 1998; Savitt, 2000; van Roon, 1981, among others) have discussed the concept of 'story-telling' and its implications for research findings's presentation. Bryson and Lowe (2002) present 'story-telling' as an important part of everyday life, both capturing and creating experience, influencing, legitimating the exercise of power and maintaining the status quo, by continually reinforcing a particular events reading. According to them:

'story-telling affects the way in which individuals perceive the organisation for which they work, particular cultures, countries, regions and cities. Every city, region as well as organisation, will have its own central story which will play an important role in generating that area's or company's local, national or global reputation. Such stories are socially constructed and consist of past sequences of events that are shared between those telling and receiving stories. The socially constructed nature of stories implies that accounts of past events are shared amongst organisational members. Stories can also be disseminated to a wider audience and attempts to control a particular interpretation of events can be made by the continual repetition of a particular story' (Bryson and Lowe, 2002, p. 24).

Story-telling thus functions to enable individuals, institutions and governments to comprehend, as well as construct, their everyday realities, attempting to 'make-sense out of a set of events' (Bryson and Lowe, 2002, p. 25).

Funnell (1998) presents the narrative as one of the story-telling key techniques, arguing that it has been used as the way in which academics in various fields write up their

research. The narrative is defined as a form of writing, or the method of telling a story about events after they have occurred. In addition, narratives are seen as the representation of history that most closely reflects enacted experience (Funnell, 1998). However, the narrative had been misunderstood as:


‘an isomorphic representation of everyday life... the narrative arose from the pattern and structure of life where events occurred not just in succession but with the order of events giving meaning to those which were previous and those subsequent. For a written narrative to be regarded as a work of history it could not be an artificially construed rendition of life’ (Funnell, 1998, p. 143).

Thus, Funnell concludes that ‘narratives can be the means to privilege particular accounts of the past, to exclude others and thereby to deny them a voice in the present’ (Funnell, 1998, p. 144). This Thesis presents the fieldwork results through a narrative of two steel communities’ everyday life from the end of the 1970s until the end of the 1990s, emphasising not only economic, but also social and human consequences. It is intended that the cases should function – in Funnell’s (1998) as a ‘counternarrative’.

The Thesis also uses Braudel’s three-tiered historiographical time concepts (*longue durée*, *durée moyenne*, and *durée courte*) to assist the construction and presentation of the two case study chapters (V and VI). Figure 14 demonstrates how Braudel’s framework might be integrated into the in the CMO framework proposed earlier. The first and third rows are set out the four capital assets that form the primary focus the case study chapters. The analysis highlights the ‘before-after’ capital assets’ distribution for the communities, set against the three different historical rhythms suggested by Braudel. Thus, the long *durée* is represented in this research by the political, social, demographic and economic developments and the successive transformations that the communities witnessed over the course of industrialisation. The *durée moyenne* contextualises for each community the privatisation policy process and its consequences (outcomes), until the end of 1990s. Finally, the *durée courte* presents, with the 1988’s ,highlighted evenements British Steel Corporation privatisation proper process and its proximate local effects. These two

theoretical systems – the CMO and Braudel’s structuralist historiography – are designed to ensure that the counternarratives presented in the following chapters are both causally rooted and sensitive to the complexities that are inherent at making local histories.

Figure 14: A proposal framework for analysis



#### 4.4 Conclusions

The main task of this Chapter was to present and discuss the methodology, strategy and current research's design. The present research shall be conducted as an inductive basis, using the case study approach as the principal research strategy, employing both qualitative and quantitative data in case construction. The case study approach adopted here was designed to be simultaneously collective (Stake, 1995), pre-post and comparative (Jensen and Rogers, 2001), in pursuit of analytical generalisation (Yin, 1994).

The research scheme followed Berg's (1998) recommendation that the cases should converge on selected phenomena that impact on each community (in this instance, the privatisation of BSC). The research design also observed the key foci for data collection indicated by Berg: local secondary data, geographical sources, and physical and environmental elements that could shape the inhabitants in their communal lifeworlds. The selection of the specific cases to investigate, among the universe of 21 'steel communities' quoted in Annex 3, was undertaken with the suitability and pragmatic criteria set out by Descombe (1998) in mind.

Finally, this chapter proposed criteria with which to present and analyse the findings: the narrative and 'counternarrative' concepts (Funnell, 1998), and Braudel's three-tiered historiographical time concepts ('longue durée', durée moyenne, and durée courte). The next two chapters present the case narratives for Wolverhampton and Sheffield, respectively. Each case encompasses:

- ✓ A political, socio-demographic and economic development narrative of each community;
- ✓ A detailed account of the community context in the 1980s;
- ✓ An evaluation of exactly how the mechanisms of privatisation impacted on the case communities in 1988 (the year of the privatisation);
- ✓ The outcomes from this policy in the following years for each community.

## CHAPTER V – THE CASE OF WOLVERHAMPTON

### 5.1 Introduction

This Chapter sets out the first of the two steel community case studies – of Wolverhampton in the English West Midlands. Its purpose is twofold:

- To explore a number of the methodological and conceptual issues highlighted in Chapter IV;
- To assess, through the application of this model, what happened in Wolverhampton, when and why. This involves generating narratives and counternarratives as appropriate.

The Chapter is structured as follows:

- A broad historical overview of Wolverhampton's future city origins;
- A political, socio-demographic and economic development narrative of the community;
- A detailed account of the community context in the 1980s;
- An evaluation of exactly how the privatisation mechanisms impacted on the Wolverhampton's case in 1988 (the year of the privatisation);
- The outcomes from this policy in the following years for the city.

### 5.2 Historical Overview

Wolverhampton, founded in 994, became a service centre for the local agricultural community since the middle Ages, and its relative prosperity was founded largely on wool. However, industrial revolution changed Wolverhampton entirely. Wolverhampton's advantage in this respect was the coal and iron local availability. The town had easy access to coal and somewhat more remote access to iron. Wolverhampton was not, however,

particularly favoured with transport infrastructure: it had no seaport and no major rivers over which to transport raw materials or to distribute finished products. The first metal working industries in Wolverhampton had therefore to produce small items, which were easily transportable. It was only the canals and then the railways coming that made larger items' trans-shipment practicable. The town rapidly became engaged over the 19th century in the production of various metalware industries, including lock making. New roads, new canals and new railways assisted this expansion. It also resulted in some people moving out of town whilst the old town became more crowded and unsanitary. Although industry became the major part of the town's economy, it still maintained a thriving market function, serving the needs of the town itself and a wide agricultural hinterland, well into the 20th century. Wolverhampton is part of the 'Black Country', an ensemble of small settlements that has grown to form a contiguous area. Gale (1966) defines the conurbation as

'...A group of industrial towns and villages, now an almost continuous urban concentration lying to the north-west of the city of Birmingham. It is mainly in the southern part of the county of Staffordshire, though a portion lies in the north of Worcestershire, and it actually adjoins Birmingham on one side' (Gale, 1966, p. 1)

Wolverhampton's development's broad lines are now briefly reviewed, in terms of political and economic development forces.

### **5.3 Political Development**

In political terms, following the Reform Act of 1832, Wolverhampton returned two members to the Westminster Parliament. This situation remained until the boundary changes of 1966 created the need for a third constituency. In 1848, Wolverhampton was incorporated as a borough, with an elected town council supplanting appointed commissioners. The division of the borough into east and west in 1885 radically altered the political design, for the 'west-enders' were considerably wealthier, and more conservative, than the 'east-enders'. Reflecting this, Wolverhampton West (later South-West) has

typically returned a Conservative and Wolverhampton East (later North-East) has elected a Liberal and (after 1945) a Labour Member of the Parliament. The massive Labour victory of 1 May 1997 was the first time that the party had won all three seats in the borough (Upton, 1998).

On 1 April 1966 the new County Borough of Wolverhampton came into existence under the West Midlands Order 1965. The new borough consisted of the previous County Borough, together with Bilston's borough, Tettenhall's and Wednesfield's urban districts, parts of Coseley's, Sedgley's, Darlaston's and Willenhall's urban districts and parts of Lower Penn, Wombourne, Wrottesley, Brewood and Essington's parishes. The process of change had started nine years earlier in November 1957, with the publication of the Local Government Bill revealing six 'review areas' – five in the provinces and one in Greater London. The Local Government Commission was to oversee investigations and proposed that five new county boroughs should be created in the Black Country – Dudley, Smethwick, Walsall, West Bromwich and Wolverhampton. Each of these five would take in part of the surrounding area, which, in the case of Wolverhampton, included the existing borough of Bilston and Tettenhall's and Wednesfield's urban districts. All of these were two-tier authorities at the time, carrying out some functions themselves but also looking to Staffordshire County Council for some local authority services (Mills, May and Williams, 1998).

The reaction against these proposals came from across the whole Black Country, particularly in the smaller areas that feared being absorbed by 'avaricious' neighbours, losing their civic pride and separate identity in the process. Staffordshire County Council accepted that there were too many small authorities in the Black Country but it objected to the Commission's proposals and came up with alternative plans for some of the smaller boroughs and urban districts to combine with each other.

Bilston was in 1957 a town with 33,500 people and was a borough in its own right,

and a campaign was launched under the slogan 'Bilston for the Bilstonians' in June 1961 (Mills et al, 1998, p. 7). Likewise, Wednesfield unitary district Council defended its two-tier government system and sought the maintenance of the status quo. It also rejected the County Council's scheme, which would have seen it merge with Willenhall. Wolverhampton's view was that the Local Government Commission's proposals would result in a more coherent Government system.. Political concentration would replace a patchwork of more than twenty local authorities across the Black Country with five of them capable of discharging a whole range of local government activities.

The Commission's main argument was that Bilston, Wednesfield and Tettenhall were all linked to Wolverhampton by continuous urban development. Much of these areas' population worked in Wolverhampton and the Commissioners also took this Travel-to-Work rationale into account.

Following the announcement in August 1962 that the five proposed county boroughs would be created, the threatened boroughs and urban districts vowed to carry on fighting. The proposals were set to take effect from 1 April 1964 but the decision of Wednesbury, Darlaston, Bilston, Willenhall and Sedgley councils to contest the Local Government Commission inquiry's legality considerably delayed events. The council's High Court action took place in May 1965 and when the ruling was made that the inquiry was valid, the councils decided to go to the Court of Appeal. In July 1965 the five towns lost the appeal battle and were refused leave to appeal to the House of Lords. The five towns nonetheless persevered until October 1965 but were then forced to accept their demise. The West Midlands Order 1965 was approved by Parliament on 16 December 1965 to come into effect in April 1966. In 2001, Wolverhampton was designated a city.

Table 22 sets out the Council's political control after the May annual elections each year since 1983. From 1972 to the 1987 elections, the Labour Party had control of the Council. An alliance between Conservatives and Liberals (1987-1988) and Conservatives

and Liberal-Democrats between 1992 and 1994 were the only periods in recent Wolverhampton history when the Labour Party lost effective control of the Council.

The protracted and acrimonious disputation over local government reorganisation, couple with high degrees of socio-economic segregation between east- and west-enders is suggestive of a heterogeneous ‘communities of place’ borough each with strong topophilic attachments. These ‘localist’ affiliations are based however, on a dynamic demographic history. Thus, social change has continued to reshape apparently settled communal identities. It is to these lines of social and demographic change that the discussion now turns.

**Table 22: Wolverhampton Council Political Control after Annual Elections (1983-2002)**

Year	Labour	Conservative	Liberal Democrats	Liberals (Alliance)	Independents	Vacant
1983	34	24	-	1	0	1
1984	35	23	-	2	0	0
1985	34	23	-	2	0	1
1986	37	19	-	4	0	0
1987+	30	23	-	7	0	0
1988	31	23	-	6	0	0
1989	31	23	5	1	0	0
1990	31	23	4	1	0	1
1991	35	22	3	-	0	0
1992+	29	28	3	-	0	0
1993*	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1994	32	25	3	-	0	0
1995	39	19	2	-	0	0
1996	46	12	2	-	0	0
1998	43	14	2	-	0	0
1999	39	17	3	-	0	0
2000	33	22	5	-	0	0
2002	34	21	5	-	0	0

Source: Wolverhampton Archives and Local Studies, BBC news website – <http://news.bbc.co.uk>

NA: number not available.

+ No Overall Control after Council elections

\* Liberal Democrat Councillor Richard Whitehouse became his party’s first Mayor in town, beating by two-vote majority Labour’s choice.

## 5.4 Social and Demographic Development

Under the pressure of industrialisation, Wolverhampton’s population increased rapidly, fuelled by falling death rates and immigrants’ first generation arrival, especially

from Wales and Ireland. Growth continued steadily from then on. The influx from Wales tended to arrive in distinct periods associated with depressions in the mining or iron and steel industry there. After a pause, immigration commenced again in the late-1930s, when many people, mostly but not exclusively Jews, left Germany.

After the Second World War, immigrants arrived from more widely dispersed parts of the world. Some prominent groups in Wolverhampton came from Poland and Italy. The Italian immigrants typically sought economic gain. Many of the Polish immigrants fled from Nazi occupation, and others were serving with the Polish armed forces. A significant proportion of these were unable or unwilling to return to Poland after hostilities ceased. In this respect they may contrast with the Dutch, who were stationed in and around Wolverhampton in large numbers during the war - to the extent that the Dutch crown jewels were stored, throughout the conflict, in Wolverhampton's Town Hall (now the Magistrates' Courts). However, after the war period, many Dutch citizens chose to return to the Netherlands.

The next immigrants' wave came to Wolverhampton in the 1950s, principally from Jamaica. At much the same time came people from the Indian sub-continent. The figures indicate that those who ended up in Wolverhampton were drawn mainly from India, and they were mostly Sikhs from the Punjab but with a number from Gujerat (1991 Census of Population). There were relatively few who originated from Pakistan and Bangladesh. Severe restrictions on immigration started in 1962 and later legislation, in 1968, 1971 and 1982, tightened up immigration even further. The total population based on the 1991 Census was 242,445. Table 23, again drawn from 1991 Census, shows Wolverhampton residents' birth countries.

Gender has also powerfully shaped the City's recent history. The male-dominated 'steel' culture of the town can be illustrated with reference to a 1968 article from a local newspaper, the 'Wolverhampton Chronicle' (Branton, 1968). Branton sets out an

interesting steelworkers' day-to-day life's description, as a masculine, hard and companionable environment. Women, as the article underlines, '...do not intrude on the hearths and walks of the furnaces. This is very much the man's world. Perhaps it is right that it should stay that way'. Women were only allowed into this semi-closed environment in some clerical niches (Branton, 1968). Upton (1998) confirms this 'male-dominated' working culture: by 1971, the proportion of males employed in manufacturing in Wolverhampton was 75%, compared to a national average of 70%.

**Table 23: Wolverhampton Residents' Country of Birth, 1991**

Country of Birth	Residents
UK (England, Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland and part not sated)	217,518
Outside UK (Channel Islands, Isle of Man, Irish Republic)	2,148
Old Commonwealth (Australia, Canada, New Zealand)	216
New Commonwealth – Africa	1,224
New Commonwealth – Caribbean	4,430
New Commonwealth – Asia	13,572
New Commonwealth – remainder	199
European Community	1,149
Remainder of Europe	945
Turkey	12
USSR	347
Non-Commonwealth Africa	183
Non-Commonwealth America	146
Non-Commonwealth Asia	356

Source: 1991 Census of Population

## 5.5 Economic Development

From the start of the 20th century Wolverhampton's economic base shifted from small-scale to heavy engineering, including the manufacture of:

- ✓ *Bicycles.* The first factory opened in 1868. However, the last factory to close was ironically one of the first to open. Wearwell closed their Colliery Road factory in 1972, after 104 bicycle production years.
- ✓ *Motorcycles.* Starting production in the late 1890s, the industry was a big employer in the town until the Second World War. The motor scooter factories survived only until the 1960s.
- ✓ *Cars.* 1902 saw in Wolverhampton the promotion of the first (steam-driven) Turner car. Full-scale production began in 1909, but the industry suffered constraints during the First World War. After this, production expanded, even riding out the depression of the 1930s. However, by the end of the Second World War, there were only a few, albeit large, manufacturers.
- ✓ *Lorries.* The industry benefited from the First World War, when large numbers of vehicles were needed for the war effort. The most successful and long lasting manufacturer was Guy Motors, whose products were sold in large numbers throughout much of the world. They produced commercial vehicles for no less than 64 years, finally closing in 1978 after becoming one of the country's leading manufacturers.
- ✓ *Buses.* Bus and coach building started in a very small way, with the pioneering work carried out by the Electrical Construction Company at Bushbury, who supplied battery powered buses to a London bus company in 1891. In the late 1920's Wolverhampton Corporation decided to adopt trolley buses, and so the scene was set for a whole new manufacturing industry. Guy Motors were the first to respond, and began supplying the town with trolley buses in 1926. They were soon followed by Sunbeam, who would become one of the largest bus manufacturers in the world. Sunbeam and Guy eventually merged and became the largest trolley bus manufacturer in the world. They also produced large numbers of motorised

buses that were sold worldwide. Sadly, the industry went into decline in the late 1950s and never recovered. The last trolley buses were produced at Fallings Park in 1962, and the works finally closed in 1978 after 64 years of production.

- ✓ *Aeroplanes.* The aircraft industry in Wolverhampton benefited from the two world wars when large numbers of aircraft were produced. Numerous local companies produced all kinds of small components for aircraft, including nuts and bolts. After the Second World War the industry collapsed, and most of the manufacturers returned to making their pre-war products. This eventually led to Norwich based Boulton & Paul Ltd selling off its aircraft department. This came to Wolverhampton in 1934, and Boulton Paul became an important manufacturer of both aircraft and components. It continues to this day as part of the Dowty Group.

In addition, the town had a long association with railways and railway engines were made there. The first locomotive built in Wolverhampton dated from 1859, and a total of 800 more were produced by 1908 (Upton, 1998, p. 83). Inevitably, a number of major ancillary firms grew up around it, given the importance of the railways to the local economy. A number of companies had internal railway lines, for example the British Steel works at Horseley Fields and Bilston (formerly Stewarts and Lloyds), the Wolverhampton Gas Company, and British Oxygen.

As well as sectoral specialisation, patterns of industrial ownership have also shaped Wolverhampton's industrial development trajectory. By the 1970s, many of the family businesses that had once provided the spine of the local economy were being acquired by multinational corporations. For example, taking just 1969, Star Aluminium became a subsidiary of Alusuisse; Ever Ready became part of the Hanson Empire and H.M. Hobson was taken over by Lucas Aerospace (Upton, 1998). Once great industries in Wolverhampton began rapidly to 'downsize'. At its peak (in 1962) Goodyear, for example, had employed 5,500 workers, a number that that halved by the mid-1990s, and Tarmac, the

construction company based in Wolverhampton, had discarded 9,000 jobs worldwide between the 1970s and 1993. Star Aluminium, which had once been the largest British exporter of foil, closed in September 1981. According to Upton (1998), perhaps the most difficult closure of all (for sentimental as well as financial reasons) was the announcement in May 1970 of the imminent closure of Courtaulds, a factory which had employed over 3,500 workers, many of them women, before the Second World War. The demolition of its famous chimneys in June 1973 was felt to be the end of an era in Wolverhampton's industrial history. A detailed evaluation of the decade of the 1970s in Wolverhampton and the industrial depression's consequences, particularly in relation to employment, are set out below.

## **5.6 Context**

*'The Legislative Programme of the 1980s proved once for all that the services taken for granted as public utilities – light, heat, transport, water, education – were nothing of the kind. It turned back the clock, in fact, to the 19th century, when none of these were in municipal or national hands' (Upton, 1998, p. 335).*

This section presents a critical appraisal of Wolverhampton's economy in the period from the early 1970s until the year of 1988, when British Steel was privatised. The discussion concentrates on the 'social and cultural conditions that sets limits on the efficacy of the programme mechanisms' (Pawson and Tilley, 1997, p. 66).

### **5.6.1 Economic Capital**

The following section explores how Wolverhampton's economy performed in the 1980s, as it sought to cope with the attenuated effects of the 1970s economic crisis. The section also presents the adaptation's mechanisms that the community and its civic institutions constructed as a part of the changing process.

Wolverhampton was badly hit by the industrial depressions of the 1970s and 1980s, with factories closing and unemployment relatively high. The signs of industrial weakness predated this, however. Between 1961 and 1971 Great Britain lost 3.4% of its

manufacturing jobs; in Wolverhampton the figure was 14.8% (Wolverhampton Archives and Local Studies). Wolverhampton was undeniably a manufacturing town, in a country that was by tradition a manufacturing nation, but it was also a highly specialised and potentially obsolescent one. At the peak, over 85% of manufacturing jobs in the Borough were in metals or rubber. Table 24 compares the employment structure of Wolverhampton, the West Midlands and Great Britain in 1971, when decline in jobs was already advancing.

**Table 24: Employment in Wolverhampton, West Midlands and Great Britain (1971)**


Employment Sector	Wolverhampton	Region		Great Britain
	Approximate number of employees	Total Employed Labour Force (in %)		
Manufacturing	79,000	57	53	38
Services	50,000	36	39	52
Others	10,000	7	8	10

Source: adapted from Upton, 1998, p. 161

Over the early 1970s, the shedding of jobs in the town’s metal working industries was not being matched by any noticeable rise in either higher value-added manufacturing or in the service sector.

Wolverhampton’s service sector had been concentrated particularly in the ‘entertainment’ industries, for example pubs, recreation and gambling, and these too were suffering from the lack of money in the local economy. Figure 15 below sets out the total announced redundancies in Wolverhampton in the 1980s. The total for 1980 includes the redundancies after the closure of Bilston Steelworks.

**Figure 15: Total Announced Redundancies in Wolverhampton (1980-1988)**



Source: Wolverhampton Archives and Local Studies

The steel industry in Wolverhampton started with the production of small items made of metal, such as steel jewellery and toys. This was augmented with decorative techniques such as enamelling and japanning. Bilston found world renown in this kind of manufacture. The latter half of the nineteenth century saw a revolution in the iron industry. A new material – mild steel – was produced from pig iron. The first factories were founded by pioneers such as Stewards and Lloyds; and William, Moses Bayles and Co. (established in 1826). In 1891, a company was formed to take over Round Oak iron works and build the first basic open-hearth furnaces in South Staffordshire. The advantage of the open-hearth furnace was that it could take a mixture of scrap iron and pig iron, and scrap was plentiful in the region. These historic ‘New Level’ blast furnaces were demolished in 1957, but steelmaking has continued using electric arc furnaces fed entirely on scrap.

By the end of the 19th century metalworks developed large numbers of domestic hollowware and similar goods and this continued long after the other trades had either vanished or been greatly reduced. Tools of all kinds, including edge tools, were also largely made here, thriving into the 20th century.

The steel industry in Wolverhampton developed particularly in two localities: Bilston and Wednesfield. The location of steelworks at inland sites like Wolverhampton had been increasingly questioned after 1945 (Staffordshire County Council Education Committee, 1978). Private companies planning new works looked to coastal sites and to harbours where iron-rich foreign ore could be landed near the steelworks. After the 1967 steel industry nationalisation, the new British Steel Corporation (BSC) put forward a national development plan for the industry. This foresaw the end of small old-established steelworks in inland sites and concentration on a few extremely large coastal sites. At that time, BSC had two sites in Wolverhampton: Bilston Steelworks and Wednesfield. The Bilston Steelworks’ contested closure over the late-1970s marked the decline of steel production in Wolverhampton. The next section details this process.

### 5.6.1.1 The Bilston Steelworks' Closure

Originally a Stewards and Lloyd's factory, Bilston steelworks became a BSC plant after British steelmaking's re-nationalisation through the Iron and Steel Act, 1967, and the fusing of the UK's 14 main steel producing companies, on 28th July, 1967. The British Steel Corporation's 'Ten Year Development Strategy' was approved in 1973. The Plan required the expenditure of £3,000 million over the period 1973-83. The plan's objective was to convert BSC from 'a large number of small scale works using largely obsolete equipment, to a far more compact organisation with highly competitive plant. Steelmaking was to be in five main areas: South Wales, Sheffield, Scunthorpe, Teesside and Scotland' (British Steel Corporation, 1988, p. 13).

Bilston Steelworks' position appeared in the context of the Plan to be precarious. Reflecting this, in January 1975, the 3,000 workers set up a committee to contest the possible closure. In December 1976, the then Corporation's new chief executive, Sir Charles Villiers addressed the workforce directly, declaring that:

'Bilston iron and steelworks is not going to be abandoned by the British Steel Corporation. It should still be making steel in 1982 and later, for two reasons: it has a good workforce, and is closer to its market than any other Corporation plant' (Villiers, cited in Express and Star, 1976).

Despite the difficulties that appeared to be reducing Bilston into a mini- steelworks, Villiers went on to reassure the workers in the following terms.

'Run the plant as hard as it will go, keep your open hearth furnaces going as long as you can and in seven years I am sure natural solutions will appear' (ibid; emphasis added).

Notwithstanding these reassurances from the Chief Executive, Wolverhampton trade unionists launched in November 1977 a campaign to save Bilston from planned closure in 1980. In their estimation, up to 10,000 jobs would be lost at the plant and in supply chains and through multiplier effects in the Wolverhampton area in the event of closure (Express and Star, 1977). In addition, fewer job opportunities for school-leavers would remain. Contemporaneously, and stoking the workforce's fears, 'Elizabeth', the last steel blast

furnace still working in the Black Country, was shut 'for either six months or until steel sales improve' (Express and Star, 1977). Next year, in February, the workers sought to re-open 'Elizabeth', without success. Following this closure, Bilston was forced to produce steel less rapidly and at greater cost, using cold iron plate from South Wales. Another pointer to closure, according to workers, was that orders for Bilston were being redirected elsewhere in the Corporation (Express and Star, 1978a).

The months of June and July of 1978 saw a final decision from British Steel about Bilston Steelworks. On 29th June 1978, the Company told unions that it was planning to end steelmaking at Bilston on October 31st 1979, and to cease rolling steel there on March 31st of the next year. In July 1978, Sir Charles Villiers told a group of West Midlands MPs that Bilston was an obsolete steel plant and would have to close. This volte face in 30 months was certainly hastened by BSC's deteriorating financial position. Losses of £443 million were announced for 1977. Villiers declared:

'It is just one of the open-hearth works that has to go, because of the high cost of making steel there' (Express and Star, 1978b).

The Labour MPs responded by focusing on the closure's social consequences, not only at the works itself but also in allied industries.

On August 11th 1978, Bilston workers marched from Hyde Park to the British Steel headquarters, in London. They were joined by steelworkers from the Corby plant, also facing closure, and after a protest at British Steel, went on to lobby MPs at the House of Commons. The Labour Government's Industry Secretary, Mr. Varley, told MPs that the government would not interfere. British Steel would be left to make its own commercial decisions about the future of both, Bilston and Corby.

Another move towards Bilston Steelworks' closure was made in February 1979. As a result, nearly 100 Bilston workers marched to the Iron and Steel Trades Confederation headquarters in London to press for full union support for the campaign to save the plant

from closure. Councillor Edwards, Wolverhampton South East MP, declared that the plant 'produces the cheapest and highest quality iron in any of the steelworks within the structure of the BSC. Closure of the plant would double unemployment in the Wolverhampton area, which is already plagued by closures of many of its important traditional factories' (Express and Star, 1979a).

On March 5th 1979 a report from Aston University commissioned by West Midlands County Council and Wolverhampton District Council was presented to the West Midlands County Council's Industry Committee. Entitled 'The Future of Bilston Steelworks – an Appraisal', the Joint Unit for Research on Urban Environment (JURUE) examined the steelworks issues between November 1978 and February 1979. JURUE concluded that the steelworks should not be closed until the case for new investment was examined. It also recommended that closure should not happen until the problems of funding and finding suitable alternative employment in the Wolverhampton and Bilston area had been fully examined and resolved. Three days later, Dr. Colin Phipps, Dudley West MP, called for a public inquiry into the Bilston closure, based on the conclusions of the report. However, Bilston workers, perhaps surprisingly, sided with the government's refusal to allow a public inquiry. According to Labour Councillor Dennis Turner, the workers believed that the government had already been persuaded to keep the works open (Express and Star, 1979b).

In May 1979, Wolverhampton District Council's Development Committee started the search for new firms to replace BSC on the steel site. The EEC, British Steel and the Government supported the Council's efforts. In the same month, the first 600 workers from the melting shop and blast furnaces left the plant. Two months later, the Co-operative Development Agency was called in to help attract new industry to the former Bilston Steelworks site. It was estimated that nearly 10,000 people would be out of work in Wolverhampton by the end of July, including 1,900 steelworkers from Bilston and school-

leavers. Only 450 men remained at the rolling mill, and this was shut down in July 1980. Mr. Dennis Murray, director of the BSC division that controlled the Bilston works, set out the reasons for closure: the works had been rolling only 1,800 tonnes of steel per week, representing but 40% of capacity. The losses had reached more than £50 per tonne. Even if the plant were fully loaded, increases in energy input costs and BSC's inability to negotiate price increases would still have meant losses running at about £25 per tonne.

Perhaps the most symbolic and poignant act that marked the end of the Bilston Steelworks was the demolition through detonation of charges of 'Elizabeth' in October 1980. As previously noted, 'Elizabeth' was the Black Country's last blast furnace and had been a landmark in Wolverhampton's built environment for more than 25 years. Reyburn (1980) discusses some closure's emotional and social capital impacts, one year later. He conjured up the 'spectre of tumbleweed blowing down High Street'. Based on interviews with several former steelworks and commercial owners, Reyburn concluded that the locality 'was dying'. One typical resident, Mr. Terry Calloway, then aged 35, reflected on his experience:

'It was only after I left I realised how lucky I was. It was a very well paid job. I was getting about £137-140 a week, we only had one strike for a few weeks – when I was an apprentice – in all the time I was there and you couldn't have worked with a better set of people. The community spirit was fantastic. It was like a great big family' (cited in Reyburn, 1980, p. 3)

Mr. Calloway used almost half of his redundancy money to pay off the mortgage on his home. At the time of publication, he had had no full-time job for a year (Reyburn, 1980).

In basic local economic indicator terms, one of the closure's directly attributable consequences was that the ward of Bilston had by January 1980 the highest unemployment rate in the West Midlands (Express and Star, 1980a). At the same time, Wolverhampton's unemployment had risen by 604 to 10,696 in January 1980. At 7.3%, it had by far the worst jobless rate in the West Midlands. Such was the socio-economic climate in Wolverhampton in the early-1980s.

On March 4th, 1980, British Steel (Industry) unveiled the 'Bilston Job Revival Plan', a project originally conceived by JURUE and Ward, Ashcroft and Periling, Liverpool-based consultants. The plan's implementation was led by Peter Hardwick, Property and Small Business Development Manager for BSC (Industry). The Birmingham Post, commenting on the Plan, affirmed that the first new factories to 'rise from the ashes of the Bilston Steelworks could take on their first workers this year' (The Birmingham Post, 1980). BSC (Industry) worked in partnership with the then West Midlands County Council, Wolverhampton Metropolitan Borough Council and the European Coal and Steel Community on the project.

Bilston Steelworks site's redevelopment proved controversial – at least, for the local council. In April 1980, the Express and Star newspaper reported divergent views among elected members on both local accountability and mix of final uses.

'Wolverhampton councillors have clashed over the speed at which redevelopment of the former Bilston British Steelworks site should go ahead. Councillor Ken Purchase told Wolverhampton Council planning committee last night that it seemed people were "hell bent" on going ahead without any thought for local people' (Express and Star, 1980b).

According to the same article, the original proposals in the JURUE masterplan included:

- ✓ Light, medium and heavy industry on 100 acres of land;
- ✓ 245 houses on a further 17 acres;
- ✓ About 20 acres of public open space plus landscaping and environmental improvements in nearby housing areas.

The members' discussion focused on the allocation for 'heavy industry' purposes, with clear disagreement among councillors as to the required public financial contribution.

However, Councillor Arthur Stevenson declared:

'We have set our stall out to attract money from Europe and West Midlands County Council. I hope to God you are not going to stop it now' (Express and Star, 1980b).

The year of 1983 saw the first business occupying the former Bilston Steelworks site. A group of nine ex-steelworkers set up a co-operative to run a training school, with 20

teachers and 85 teenagers as students. Nevertheless, local plans for the site's future redevelopment were wholly disrupted in 1984 by proposals for opencast coal mining. Local Councillors Alan Garner and Bob Burden enumerated the local residents' concerns regarding the proposed development: the increasing traffic's volume and the blasting atmospheric effects; coupled with minimal planning and landscaping (Express and Star, 1984a).

In May 1984, Wolverhampton Council's Economic Development Committee's meeting discussed a report showing that four of the six most unemployed districts in the country were in the West Midlands, with Wolverhampton the second worst. Only Liverpool had a higher percentage (50.3% in its travel to work area) of people who had been out of work for more than a year than Wolverhampton (48.7%), followed by Birmingham (47.6%), Dudley and Sandwell and St. Helens (both on 46.9%) and Walsall with 45.6% (Express and Star, 1984b).

This report would form the basis of the Black Country's proposal for priority regional assistance. However, the Committee members also emphasised the need not only to support the Black Country's case, but also to underscore Wolverhampton's special situation. Councillor Lawrence warned against complacency. In his words, 'the town had to push as hard as possible to prove its case'. Conservative economic development spokesman, Councillor Inglis, said, 'the purpose of regional aid was to equalise the attractiveness of various areas'. 'It is important', he continued,

'...that service industries should be given considerable priority in the submission for regional aid from the Government, rather than old-fashioned industries' (emphasis added) (Express and Star, 1984b).

In response, the Committee Chairman Councillor Turner, observed that 'the first aim is to argue the need for regional aid for the Black Country' (Express and Star, 1984b).

The proposals for the redevelopment of the former Bilston Steelworks site generated an increasingly acrimonious local debate over 1984. In 1985, Wolverhampton Councillors

agreed to visit an opencast mining site as part of their investigations into the National Coal Board application. However, the final decision did not lie with them but rather, with West Midlands County Councillors, and they refused the application. Overall unemployment in Wolverhampton continued to climb, however, peaking at 19.8% in November 1985, by which time 25% of families in town were on some form of income support (Upton, 1998, p. 159) This marked the lowest point in the economic decline of Wolverhampton (Upton, 1998, p. 162). This decline imposed its own pressures on the local political system.

The National Coal Board appealed against the decision of the West Midlands County Council, and a public inquiry was held between 13 and 22nd May 1986. The contending sides at the inquiry were, favouring the proposal, the National Coal Board, and British Steel, the landowner (Ettingshall Developments). In opposition were local residents, under the leadership of the ex-councillor Dennis Turner, plus Wolverhampton Council. The final decision was vested in the new Environment Secretary, Nicholas Ridley, who accepted the proposal articulated by the BSC and National Coal Board. Mining activity started in March 1987. Wolverhampton Council reacted by funding a £40,000 survey to form the basis of any compensation claims for damage caused by the mining operation.

Wolverhampton Polytechnic's Centre for Unemployment Studies published a report in May 1986. According to a 437-firm survey, carried out with accountants Price Waterhouse, the Black Country's progression back to prosperity would need to be measured in decades rather than in years. Any climb out of recession back to the economic and employment levels of the 1970s would be 'slow and painful', with unemployment continuing to blight the sub-region. Only a reduction in the cost of borrowing would enable firms to expand into new markets and take on extra workers (Express and Star, 1986b). The report affirmed that the worst hit sector of the local economy was the traditional 'metal bashing' industries – still then the Black Country's major employers. Black Country


MEP Terry Pitt commented on the report in the following terms.

'It sets out clearly the catastrophic collapse of manufacturing in the Black Country, and the pathetically slow rate of growth of employment in new industries and the service sectors. Local management is clearly calling for low bank rates, and for Government commitment to help exports. Unless that comes we shall stay with today's local figure of 24 people on the dole chasing each new job vacancy' (Express and Star, 1986b).

Figures 16 and 17 set out the net change in number of firms that were VAT-registered by sector in Wolverhampton during the 1980s. Both figures demonstrate that Agriculture and Transport were the sectors that suffered most acutely from the 1980s economic crisis. The Agriculture sector saw a delayed and a halting recovered in 1984 and 1985, with its best year in 1986. After this, the sector declined again. Transport sector lost firms continuously until 1986, when a recovered occurred.


The Wholesale, Retail and Catering sectors followed a more erratic path. The Wholesale sector had two negative net changes in the years of 1984 (-1.1%) and 1988 (-1.5%). The Retail sector saw small falls in numbers of firms in 1984 (0.1%), and in 1987 (-2.2%). The Catering sector, despite two negative net changes in 1985 (-0.1%) and 1987 (-2.6%), witnessed underlying growth, fluctuating for example, from a growth of 3.5% of in 1982 to only 0.3% in 1984, and then accelerating to 5.3% in 1986.

Figure 16: Net Change in Number VAT-registered Firms by Sector (1981-88)



Source: Wolverhampton Archives and Local Studies.

**Figure 17: Net Change in Number VAT-registered Firms by Year (1981-88)**



Source: Wolverhampton Archives and Local Studies.

The Finance sector only saw a negative net change (-1.4%) in 1983, recovering rapidly since. Another sector with only one year with negative net change (-10.4%) in 1986 was the Motor Trades sector. Only three sectors grew continuously between 1981 and 1988. These were, perhaps surprising, the Production, Construction and Other Services industries. It is interesting to note that, notwithstanding the economic crisis that appeared pervasive in Wolverhampton at that time, the town’s economic basis, Production and Construction sectors, seems to have begun to ‘reinvent’ itself. The relatively rapid growth of the Other Services sector, particularly in 1983 (10.8%) and 1987 (15.3%) appears to affirm the potential of a ‘diversification’ strategy for the City’s economy.

In June 1980, Wolverhampton Council's General Purposes Committee voted to accept a plan to apply for an Enterprise Zone (EZ) to be based on the Bilston site. Central Government rejected this application six months later. However in June 1980, Industry Secretary Sir Keith Joseph had promised to reconsider Bilston for Government Bid. This followed the exclusion of Bilston from the 'Special Development Areas Scheme', established to assist areas suffering high structural unemployment caused by steel closures or cut backs.

Given the rejection of Bilston for EZ funding, the Borough Finance Committee decided that, from 1st April 1981 the Authority's 'void rating' system should not be applied to developments completed after that date on the site. This decision meant that owners of property on the former Bilston site would not be surcharged for empty buildings. This surcharge had been introduced in 1974 to stop speculators from keeping premises empty while property values increased.

In March 1984, the Government approved a 9% increase over the previous year in the town's Inner Area programme for 1984-1985 to £4.84 million (Express and Star, 1984c). The local inner area committee agreed to use 40% of its allocation for economic schemes to help the jobless and firms to re-invest. The rest would be split evenly between environmental and social schemes. The Committee chairman declared then that the biggest challenge facing the Authority was unemployment, but the inner areas programme only accounted for 4% of the Council's total budget, so aid from that source was likely to be of only marginal effectiveness (Express and Star, 1984c).

In September 1984, consultants Colin Burchanan and Partners issued a report criticising the Black Country councils for 'fragmented economic development' and a lack of encouragement for medium size firms. It is significant that Dudley, Sandwell, Walsall and Wolverhampton Councils had commissioned this critical report. Consultants also suggested that the councils should set up a Black Country-wide development agency

(Express and Star, 1984d). Key criticisms made in the report included:

- ✓ The area's dependence on sub-contracting;
  - ✓ Lack of investment in new products and processes;
  - ✓ Fragmented efforts of District Councils in economic development;
  - ✓ Inadequate local authority efforts to attract new industries, particularly medium-size firms;
  - ✓ A poor external image making it an unattractive area for new technology industries
- (Express and Star, 1984d).

The new agency began operations in 1987, as the 'Black Country Development Corporation' (BCDC) (Cheeseright, 1993, p. 1). Its aim was to create 25,000 jobs in a circa ten years' lifespan, bringing new companies and helping the expansion of those already into one of the United Kingdom's most derelict industrial areas. Its jurisdiction encompassed only parts of Wolverhampton, not the whole district. The biggest area covered 550 acres east of the town, between the A4124 and A454 trunk roads, lying between Wednesfield Road and Willenhall Road. A 90-acre site on the north-east fringe of the town centre was also included as well as 100-acre site, known as 'the Lunt' (Bilston), which lay to the west of the Walsall canal. The original budget for these areas was £15 million for the first five years (1988-1992) (Sheppard, 1987).

The BCDC first task was to establish wider awareness of the opportunities present in the Black Country. As Ian Page, then the BCDC's external affairs director noted, 'our initial technique in the early days was to get the name of the Black Country across to people – where it is and the role of BCDC as a facilitator' (Cheeseright, 1993, p. 1). In the late 1980s, BCDC had completed a land assembly process, in a situation in which land ownership was historically fragmented. This was intended to draw property developers into the area. With the economic decline in early 1990s, BCDC was forced a change its emphasis in relation to land assembly and sales, looking towards to end-users and

occupiers (Cheeseright, 1993, p. 1).

In January 1986, Conservative Councillors petitioned the Council to extend inner area status to the whole town. They argued that money paid under this programme would better serve Wolverhampton as a whole if it were no longer ring-fenced to those wards with the most severe unemployment. However, Labour leaders on Wolverhampton Council had ruled out an early change in the boundary, which governed the Government's Inner Cities programme's payment. They were persuaded that the boundary's abolition would take vital resources from the 'really deprived' areas of the town (Express and Star, 1986j). In April of the same year, the Authority's inner areas chief executive claimed that the £4.84 million announced by the Government for the period 1987-1988 was a 'drop in the ocean', despite the Environment Minister's declaration that Wolverhampton had achieved a great deal over the past seven years in its inner areas (Express and Star, 1986a).

The year of 1987 saw a growing demand for factory units and offices in Wolverhampton. Brookes (1987) suggests that the main factor encouraging this growth was low rental levels. The same low rents had also however, discouraged developers from investing in new premises in the area.

In 1988, Wolverhampton was awarded an 11.4% increase in its inner area programme grant, taking the allocation to £5.39 million. The grant included £100,000 for crime prevention measures and £120,000 over four years to help young jobless disabled people to find permanent work (Wolverhampton Chronicle, 1988a).

### **5.6.2 Human Capital**

This section reviews the local literature on trends in the status of Wolverhampton's residents over the 1980s, where human capital status is defined in health's, vocational education's, training and employment indicators' terms.

The then Employment Under-Secretary Jim Lester revealed in July 1980 the figures for unemployed people under the age of 20 in Wolverhampton: over 400 youngsters out of work for more than six months, and 134 for more than a year. Meanwhile, the town's

principal careers officer, Dominic Clarke declared a few days later that, without the Government-backed Youth Opportunities Programme, the community would be a 'disaster area' for thousands of school-leavers (Express and Star, 1980c). According to him, while 3,250 teenagers had registered with the careers office in hope of finding work, less than 100 job vacancies per month were forthcoming.

Youth opportunity schemes, run by the Manpower Services Commission (MSC – a Central Government body), served to alleviate the impact on workless school-leavers. Mr. Clarke said that about 150 youngsters each month joined youth opportunity programmes for the duration of six months to get some work experience and their 'wage' of £23.50 per week, paid by the MSC. The situation worsened in August, when 4,736 people under the age of 20 were registered as unemployed (Express and Star, 1980d) and fifty youngsters were pursuing every job vacancy offered. In this same month, Wolverhampton's jobless rate was 11.2%, against the national average of 8.3%.

Another attempt to create jobs for some of the 3,000-plus unemployed school leavers in town was made in 1980 with a £2.7 million Government grant to the Inner Area Programme, which had been assisting Wolverhampton since 1977 (Express and Star, 1980e).

The year of 1981 saw 15% of the West Midlands' working population unemployed. In Wolverhampton, in the Wednesfield and Bilston area alone, 20% of the male working population and 12% of the female working population were jobless. These were, of course, the wards where British Steel had disinvested. In April, the Government approved a further round of more than £3 million of public investment through the Inner Area Programme for Wolverhampton. This time, the Council decided that the resources would be concentrated on the Bilston area and schemes would include landscaping of the former steelworks site (Grundy, 1981).

In June 1982, Wolverhampton had 16.6% of the working population unemployed,

compared with a national average of about 11%. This was second worst only to Walsall in the county's ranking (Express and Star, 1982a).

A Council meeting in February 1983 launched a youth training scheme, in anticipation of a national Government scheme to be introduced in September the same year. This scheme sought to persuade companies to offer 12 month long places for training in order to help to reduce youth unemployment in the community. In this year, 3,000 16-year-olds left school in Wolverhampton, many without clear career prospects, or further education plans.

In April 1983, a report was presented to Wolverhampton Council's Economic Development Committee's members, forming a part of a submission to the Environment Department in support of extending European Community regional development assistance to towns suffering from high levels of unemployment. This report (cited in Express and Star, 1983b) showed percentage increases in unemployed between 1971 and 1981. The largest rise was in Bilston North, where unemployment had increased by 466% in ten years. Table 25 sets out the variation by ward in the community. The unemployment change's variation degrees in across the Borough is striking.

**Table 25: Unemployment by Ward of Wolverhampton**

Ward	Unemployment Increase 1971-1981	Unemployment April/83
Bilston East	400.8 %	19.48%
Bilston North	466.4 %	17.22%
Blakenhall	294.2 %	17.66%
Bushbury	168.4%	16.45%
East Park	347.9 %	21.23%
Ettingshall	380.8%	20.05%
Graiseley	232.3 %	20.47%
Low Hill	260.1%	23.44%
Merry Hill	167.8 %	8.33%
Oxley	213.4%	10%
Park	161.3%	14.58%
Fallings Park	271.1%	20.56%
Penn	186.3%	7.1%
St. Peter's	266.5%	24.85%
Spring Vale	401.4%	14.24%
Tettenhall Regis	72.7%	5.44%
Tettenhall Wightwick	147.6%	7.18%
Heath Town	215.9%	10.3%
Wednesfield North	213.6%	12.17%
Wednesfield South	279.4%	12.9%

Source: Adapted from Express and Star, 1983b.

The local media focused three key issues concerning education in Wolverhampton. These were corporal punishment and truancy; the direction of adult education; and discussions about expenditure and statistics regarding what was deemed a problematical of local students' achievement level.

In October 1981, the Borough Education Committee decided that the use of the cane in primary and special schools in Wolverhampton would be suspended, on an experimental basis of one year from September 1982. However, Labour Councillor Norman Davies, the then Education Committee chairman, declared that teachers would still be able to 'use enough force to restrain children, or smack their bottom if they considered it necessary' (Express and Star, 1981b). Notwithstanding the ban, a 1984 survey carried out by the Society of Teachers Opposed to Physical Punishment (STOPP) revealed that caning in schools was still widespread and Wolverhampton was well above the national average for meting out corporal punishment (Lanning, 1984). Of the then 20 secondary schools in town, 18 still used the cane or the strap to restrain undesirable

behaviour. This prevalence of corporal punishment may reflect a local education culture still heavily immersed in blue-collar codes of discipline.

Absence from schools represented a growing problem in Wolverhampton in the mid-1980s. The Council's initial reaction to this was to threaten students playing truant with court action. Truancy did not, however, adequately capture the nature of the school absence's problem, according to Local Councillors Alan Garner and Paddy Bradley, Council's Education Committee's members. They defended the idea that 'there is every form of social malaise responsible for children being absent and truancy was not a strong enough word to describe problems today's children faced' (Express and Star, 1985b). Councillor Garner announced therefore, that all cases of over eight weeks's absence from school should be reported to the sub-committee, reinforcing the link between the Local Authority's Education and Social Services Departments.

Later, in January 1986, Wolverhampton Council discussed the possibility of setting up a special panel dedicated to reducing the increasing number of children avoiding school lessons. The panel would also aim to cut the number of truancy cases going before magistrates' courts (Express and Star, 1986c). However, three months later councillors dropped proposals to set up this school attendance scheme to interview truants. At that time, they had only successfully conducted one interview (Express and Star, 1986c).

An example of dissent among Wolverhampton's councillors concerning training strategy occurred in October 1984. A meeting of the Council's Training and Temporary Employment Committee discussed the merits of a West Midlands County Council scheme offering training in various manual skills at a cost of £25,000 in Wolverhampton. It sought to provide 28 training places for women, plus practical experience in areas that included welding, plumbing and carpentry. The Conservative Training spokesman Councillor Patten claimed that he favoured equal rights, but 'some jobs just are not suitable for women', asserting a strong and innate gendering to workforce.

‘Women are special creatures and their position is not in construction or coal mining. Maybe it would be interesting for them to learn but they will not be able to put their training to further use. I cannot imagine any women taking up this sort of job and retaining their feminism’ (Express and Star, 1984e).

Labour Councillor Garner responded by arguing that youth training schemes nationally were open to all young people, and to deny girls an opportunity to take part in this specific scheme was wrong (Express and Star, 1984e). This exchange attests to the continuing gendering in the working environment and controversy on gender matters in Wolverhampton’s political culture at the time.

The West Midlands Low Pay Unit (WMLPU) revealed in October 1983 that thousands of people in Wolverhampton were living below poverty line. Key characteristics of the community’s deprivation were:

- ✓ 34,200 people were receiving supplementary benefit;
- ✓ Nearly 70% of council tenants were in receipt of rent and rate rebates;
- ✓ Of 70,000 workers covered by the Wages Council, 18,000 were not being paid the full wage to which they were entitled;
- ✓ The percentage of full-time manual male workers paid a low wage was 7% whereas the full-time female manual workers on a low wage’s proportion was estimated at 75% (Wolverhampton AdNews, 1983).

The WMLPU also suggested that, at that time, the metal goods trade was the industry with the highest weekly earnings in the region (Wolverhampton AdNews, 1983), but the figures varied drastically as between men and women. For men, the average weekly wage was £125 and for women it was only £80. There had been a sharp deterioration in the local people’s relative earnings since 1972. The region then had the second highest average earnings for full-time adult workers in the country. By 1983, it had the second worst (Wolverhampton AdNews, 1983).

A report on youth unemployment, published in 1985, received significant local press coverage (Slaughter, 1985; Savill, 1985). The report had been commissioned by

Wolverhampton Council and carried out over a two-year-period. It concluded that, on leaving school at 16, many local young people went into a state of 'suspended animation'. This situation arose, because the old transitions of work, wages, and courtship, buying their own homes and becoming consumers were not open to them. Instead, the unemployed youngsters suffered alienation, depression, distrust, cultural poverty and exclusion from an 'increasingly self-engrossed working society' (Willis, 1985). The report recommended all policies affecting youth in Wolverhampton's the systematic co-ordination and this required moving away from the idea that youth services were mainly to be based on leisure.

In relation to adult education, the biggest challenge in the early 1980s was a cultural one: that many unemployed people were unwilling to commit themselves to full-time courses because it reduced the amount of time they had to look for jobs. In response, Wolverhampton Adult Education Service proposed part-time educational courses for the over-40s. These courses were designed to help local people to improve on their education, or review opportunities that they missed at school (Express and Star, 1981a). The local reaction to this offer was exceptional; according to the organisers, almost all of the 1,000 courses available in 80 local centres were fully subscribed on the enrolment's first day (Wolverhampton Chronicle, 1981). It is unclear if this group of applicants included substantial numbers from the unemployed labour force.

In December 1982, the then Department of Education and Science (DES) released figures showing that Wolverhampton was near the bottom of the national distribution in relation to examination results, notwithstanding the Council being one of the biggest spending education authorities in the Country at that time. According to the DES, less than one in seven pupils in Wolverhampton gained five or more passes in O level or CSE grade one examination. Wolverhampton's Education Committee chairman, Councillor Norman Davies, defended local efforts.

'We try to give as good education as is humanly possible for all our pupils. We aim for value for money because we could not simply base education on examination results with all the areas of deprivation and problems we have' (Express and Star, 1982b).

The Wolverhampton Teachers' Association declared in March 1983 that education cuts and the growing school leavers' numbers entering directly into unemployment were having a drastic effect on morale in schools. Denis Parsons, the Association's President, underscored a general air of educationalist pessimism.

'In all this depressing and discouraging atmosphere, teachers are struggling hard to maintain morale with added difficulties of motivating young people to work hard and achieve results when thousands of school leavers cannot find jobs, and growing numbers of well qualified young people can no longer gain university or college places. Any cuts are foolish, short-sighted and divisive when the nation stands in urgent need of wisdom, vision and unity. They represent a failure to grapple with the real issues of our time' (Express and Star, 1983a).

In early January 1985, the Council announced that it had received approval for a 4.3% rise in education spending from April of that year. The £74.4 million budget for education made up more than 70% of total council spending in the year. Notwithstanding this budget increase, councillors did not agree on how and where more savings could be made (Express and Star, 1985a). In the following year's budget round, Conservative education spokesman, Councillor Roy Watson, demanded cuts in spending on schools and colleges because of the falling number of students. This was despite previous efforts by the Labour-controlled authority to rationalise provision through four secondary schools' closure and all sixth forms and the opening of two tertiary colleges for the education of everyone aged over 16. This proposal was blocked by the then Education Secretary, Sir Keith Joseph (Express and Star, 1986d).

Wolverhampton Polytechnic's Centre for Unemployment Studies stated at a meeting of the Council's Economic Development Committee in March 1986 that the nearly 9,000 long-term unemployed in the town had effectively lost contact with the labour market and that their skills had become redundant. Committee chairman Councillor Lawrence (Labour) opined that the frustrations being suffered by long-term jobless people were 'alarming'. Councillor Richards criticised Government initiatives to encourage long-term unemployed to start up in business on their own.

'There was no chance whatsoever of people out of work for a long time being able to find the £1,000 needed to start up in business. It is quite ludicrous to expect them to have that sort of money available' (Express and Star, 1986e).

The most systematic and comprehensive examination performance's analysis, explicitly accounting for socio-economic conditions, was undertaken in 1987 by researchers at Sheffield University. The researchers used a 'handicapping' system, weighting social disadvantage against examination success in individual education authority areas. They calculated the proportion of school leavers who would be expected to get five or more O levels or the equivalent. They came up with a 'predicted' percentage, which was compared with an 'actual' percentage to give each authority a ranked score. This study put Wolverhampton in 13th place out of 96 English education authorities, and top of the Midlands. The Education Committee chairman Councillor John Kyte reacted to the study with understandable relief.

'We have been doing our best to cater for all socially disadvantaged in the borough and we have obviously had a large degree of success according to this study' (Wolverhampton Chronicle, 1987).

After the Conservative Party assumed control of the Council in 1987, Labour councillors warned that a decision to cut the budget by 1% would 'destroy' the education service (Lovering, 1987).

In relation to health conditions in the 1980s, the local literature highlights the influence of the impoverishment of the local community on mortality and morbidity. In February 1982, the Sunday Times published an analysis of the welfare situation in the United Kingdom, using Wolverhampton as an example. The text commented that the underlying 'disease' affecting the welfare system was that the demands on welfare were mounting - more aged, more jobless, falling expectations of which ailments doctors should be able to cure - but the supply of funds in a languishing economy was not forthcoming. Wolverhampton had, at that time, little large-scale unemployment's previous experience. Only with the decline in manufacturing from 1980, and the attendant rise in unemployment

to nearly 18%, did the benefits claims' pressure intensify (Hilton, Gillie & Wallace, 1982). The benefits system, hospitals and caring services in Wolverhampton's decline was thus a reflection of two factors, according to the Sunday Times. The first was a unique demography causing the town to reach a 'geriatric bulge' – a surge in old people per head of population's number – earlier than any comparable place in the country. The second was a high number of unemployed. Both factors placed escalating pressure on the welfare system. The result of these symptoms of system stress included, among others:

- ✓ 1,500 elderly demented people and only 71 beds available for them;
- ✓ After 19 years of age, the physically and mentally handicapped being offered only a few days a week in a day centre, retraining for a job that would likely never come because of the rise in unemployment;
- ✓ A surgery waiting list time that had doubled between 1976 and 1982;
- ✓ A typical wait to reach the counter at an about two hours' supplementary benefit office.

Early-1983 saw the health authorities in Wolverhampton dealing with a budget cut of £478,000, required by Central Government. Initial responses included staff accommodation's selling, reviewing the authorities' cash reserves and temporarily closing wards at holiday times. According to local Council Treasurer Eric Booth, 'these are the easy savings. The next ones will begin to hurt' (Express and Star, 1983c). 1983 also saw an increase in the number of tuberculosis cases in the town. In 1981, Wolverhampton had 74 cases, and in 1982, 90 (Express and Star, 1983d). By November the then community doctor, Dr. Sam Phillips, declared that the disease was 'slowly' being eradicated, despite the fact that it 'seems to persist among the Asian community' (Express and Star, 1983e).

In 1985, senior managers at Wolverhampton Health Authority set out key facts about health expenditure in the town. For example, the number of prescriptions issued in 1984 per head of population was 6.65 for England – in Wolverhampton, it was 7.47

(Smith, 1984).

In July 1987, a study undertaken by the Centre for Health Economics of the University of York declared that Wolverhampton was the unhealthiest place in the country. People in the community reported more illness and claimed to be in poorer health conditions than the remainder of the West Midlands – who in turn, were in poorer health conditions than the rest of England and Wales. According to the authors, a potential factor in this was the diet of young people. Residents typically consumed more fat than the rest of the Midlands, with 40% of the men in the study having ‘fry-ups’ at least three times a week (Weekes, 1987).

There was an increase in the number of infant deaths in Wolverhampton between 1985 and 1988. While the mortality rate in the West Midlands had fallen, the town had seen a 25% rise. In aggregate, almost 10% of new-borns in the region died at birth or before they reached their first birthday. Wolverhampton South-East Labour MP Dennis Turner once again laid the responsibility for this with Central Government.

‘The reasons behind these figures are high unemployment, reduced benefits, poor housing and inadequate health service resources’ (Express and Star, 1988e).

A senior Council’s officer, Terry Gilbert, declared in May 1988 that long-term unemployment in Wolverhampton was ‘dropping sharply’. According to him, statistics from April that year showed that overall unemployment fell by 517 in the previous month and by 4,222 compared to April 1987 (Express and Star, 1988b). In July of the same year, Wolverhampton Task Force and Business in the Community launched a new initiative designed to challenge community business executives to recruit workers from unemployed, disabled and ethnic minority backgrounds (Wolverhampton Chronicle, 1988b).

However, in December 1988, a local newspaper article demonstrated the economic insecurity that Wolverhampton residents shared in common with their counterparts across the West Midlands. The MSC anticipated from survey evidence that there would be a fall

in the number of new jobs to be created in 1989. According to them, only around 18% of the companies in the West Midlands expected to increase staff in the first quarter of 1989, fewer than for the same period in 1987, when the figure was 29% (Express and Star, 1988f).

### 5.6.3 Social Capital

This section discusses critical incidents in social participation and crime that local people faced in the 1980s. Many of these problems were attributed in contemporary commentary to inadequate levels of council resourcing. The continuing high unemployment's levels and resulting community impoverishment continued, however, to underlie Wolverhampton's social malaise.

In February 1980, the Federation of Wolverhampton Tenants Associations issued an appeal to the Council asking for tax rebates for tenants unable to pay their rents (Express and Star, 1980a).

In 1981 Wolverhampton's Citizens Advice Bureau appeared to be failing to cope with a 50% increase in inquiries which the agency attributed to the recession. The Bureau was in need of two 'debt counsellors', whose role would be to give specialist advice to people in financial distress (Express and Star, 1981c). Unfortunately, cash limits meant that the vacancies went unfilled.

In March 1985, a seminar organised by the then Wolverhampton Polytechnic's Centre for Unemployment Studies concluded that the unemployed people's living standards in the community were 'deteriorating and hopeless'. Dr. Portwood, from the Centre observed that:

'there were two distinct groups of jobless people, those who had previous work and those who had never had a job ... the unemployed were caught in a trap of deteriorating living standards and a pre-occupation over debts. They had no privacy because they were receiving benefits and the only people they met were officials' (Express and Star, 1985c).

In terms of long-term unemployment, Wolverhampton had, at this time, an 'army' of

26,000 jobless – 20% of the population, with a third of young people aged between 16 and 24 in the town out of work or in further education (Express and Star, 1985c).

Wolverhampton and Bilston Citizen's Advice Bureau were dealing with nearly 50,000 inquiries a year by 1985, largely due to the high unemployment's level in the Borough. In that year, the Bureau's Annual Report revealed that twice as many people were seeking help with multi-debt problems compared with the year before. There had also been an increase in clients who had lost their homes because they could not keep up their mortgage repayments with only unemployment benefit for income. Finally, more people were turning to the Citizen's Advice Bureau in relation to their marriage breakdowns – again rooted in unemployment. Priscilla Hudson, the report's author, was clear about the causal links between the mass breakdown in domestic relationships and worklessness.

‘We give them practical advice rather than counselling but we never know if we have succeeded in helping to mend a marriage – the successes never come back. Most of the problems they deal with arise from recession. I am very sad to say that business is booming. These people have difficulties because they can't get work’ (Express and Star, 1985d).

There were problems with culture and leisure as well. Tettenhall's ward's residents protested in December 1988 against the Labour administration's closure plans for Tettenhall Regis library. The Council observed that the savings of £48,000 arising from the closure would ensure the future of the town's 'First Byte' computer learning project. The protesters insisted however, that the library, the only community facility in the area, was heavily used, giving updated job opportunities on a daily basis, providing a meeting place for pensioners and acting as a mini citizens' advice bureau (Express and Star, 1988g).

Another contentious decision concerned the cancellation of a mobile library for schools. Subsequently, loans of 400,000 books a year through 140 schools across Wolverhampton stopped. The toy library service, which since 1986 had provided free toys for children aged less than five living in the town's deprived areas, had its operations guaranteed only until March of 1989 (Express and Star, 1988h). These reductions in basic

literacy support's access to and provision appear only to have accentuated problems in the local educational system. The effects of these reductions in educational infrastructure would, however, only become manifest in the longer term.

Overall, crime figures in Wolverhampton rose by 13.5% in 1980 compared to the previous year – a rise largely attributable to more frequent house break-ins and thefts from cars. Detective Superintendent Tom Banks, based then at regional police headquarters in Birmingham, sought to explain the trend.

'It is difficult to pinpoint the reasons for the larger numbers of burglaries, but current unemployment may have contributed to the situation' (Chronicle Trader, 1980).

This hypothesis received further support two months later, when Wolverhampton's unemployment's high rate was blamed for an increase in local violent crime (Nuttall, 1981). Police records showed that, with 866 violent crimes including murder, manslaughter, serious woundings and assaults in 1980, Wolverhampton had the worst figures in the Black Country. Chief Superintendent Roy Massey, then head of Wolverhampton police, rooted many of these problems again in economic deprivation.

'There seems no doubt that the increases are related to the unsettled times and that lack of employment has something to do with it. People are feeling the pinch so they start thinking about stealing other's people property. The increase in violence is probably due to the same cause. People are frustrated, they start to drink and so they get involved in violence' (Nuttall, 1981).

Teenage gangs in the Wednesfield ward had attacked shops, started fires and smashed windows with airgun pellets in the early 1980s. In April 1983, Wolverhampton Council unveiled plans for a novel scheme to discourage teenage gangs from continuing to disrupt order in the ward of Wednesfield. The local authority sought £40,000 from West Midlands County Council to match its contribution of £30,000. The objective of the scheme was to set up a games 'barn' to gainfully occupy young people, many of them unemployed (Express and Star, 1983f).

Another effort to control youth violence in 1983 was delayed because of costs. A

scheme to produce 120,000 football picture cards by Wolverhampton's crime prevention panel did not proceed because it had been unable to secure financial backing for the project. The cards were to feature colour photographs of Wolverhampton Wanderers Football Club players with crime prevention tips for youngsters printed on the back. Wolverhampton's crime prevention officer, John Vincent, estimated at the time that the scheme would cost more than £2,200. Approaches to various firms in the community for sponsorship failed to raise the money and it was abandoned (Express and Star, 1983g).

The development of 'Neighbourhood Crime Watches' in Wolverhampton was first broached in early-1984. The first community watch scheme was launched in July of that year by families and police in the Dovecotes district of Pendeford (Express and Star, 1984f). Later that year, households in Park ward, working with the Council and police, formed a 'crimewatch' scheme. This gained them dedicated detectives whose remit was to try to reduce the crime's increasing incidence (Wolverhampton AdNews, 1984a). In April 1986, the residents of Tettenhall Regis ward set up a community watch scheme, after the apparent success of a similar scheme in Tettenhall Wightwick (Express and Star, 1986f).

Notwithstanding the slow but continued growth of community crime watch schemes in Wolverhampton, the town had, by July 1986, the worst record for crimes of violence in the West Midlands (Express and Star, 1986g). Two months later, police and firms launched a 'Business Crime Watch' scheme that aimed to reduce crime in Wolverhampton town centre (Express and Star, 1986h).

The increase in both recorded crime and fear of crime to 1986 was attributed by Labour Councillor Purchase to economic decline and central government policy.

'Since 1978 the crime rate has increased by 51% in the West Midlands, and criminal damage has shot up by 90%. It is quite clear that the massive unemployment caused by this Government, together with cuts in public expenditure, particularly in Wolverhampton, has completely undermined the efforts of our police force. Life has been made intolerable for people who want nothing more than to feel that their homes and families are safe from burglary and attack. Tory promises of law and order have collapsed in the face of the mayhem now being experienced by people in their everyday lives. We need more policemen on the beat, and above all, we need the economic recovery that alone can bring Britain back to being a place of which to be proud' (Williams, 1986).

By 1987, according to the Express and Star local newspaper, Wolverhampton was acknowledged as the most violent division in the West Midlands force. Prostitution and other criminal problems faced by police in the town were detailed in a dossier prepared by the police authority to support Chief Constable Geoffrey Dear's case for extra officers for the West Midlands Police force in 1987. In addition, the report claimed that it was 'no secret' that members of the West Indian community were involved in attempts to keep police out of certain areas of Wolverhampton. The dire situation in the town prompted the police force to reveal that:

- ✓ A special 34-strong-officers-squad had to be permanently available to tackle town centre disorder;
- ✓ More than 1,250 shoplifters were arrested in 1986 by the town centre squad alone;
- ✓ The vice problem was 'second to none' in the West Midlands, with 1,223 women arrested, 49 men prosecuted for kerb-crawling and 13 men taken to court for living off immoral earnings;
- ✓ A late-night patrol van was needed to deal with disorder and hooliganism and to prevent attacks on patrolling officers;
- ✓ A priority response system had been introduced to prioritise calls from the public, which had reached 26,000 in total at each of the town's three police stations (Express and Star, 1987b).

In December 1987, more than forty shopkeepers in the Scotlands area of Wolverhampton had agreed to collaborate in order to address a 114% increase over the previous year in break-ins and vandalism to their property (Williams, 1987). 1988 saw the introduction of a further 150 watch schemes in Wolverhampton southwest, covering more than 5,000 homes. The southwest crime watch organiser, George Paddock asserted that the schemes had helped bring about a fall in the domestic burglaries in town's number (Express and Star, 1988a).

Table 26 sets out the numbers of crime per type in Wolverhampton in the 1980s, as well as the detection rate for all crimes investigated in the period.

**Table 26: Crimes per Offence Numbers in Wolverhampton (1983-1988)**

Offence	Year	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988
Against the person		1,116	1,196	1,095	1,101	1,056	1,225
Against property – burglaries		7,008	7,667	7,536	8,885	8,888	7,081
Against property – thefts		10,822	10,895	12,989	14,584	16,085	15,086
Criminal Damage		1,683	1,995	2,131	2,379	2,676	2,355
Other Offences		42	36	25	21	25	47
Detection Rate for all Crimes Undertaken		36.2%	29.8%	29.4%	30.7%	36.8%	47.1%

Source: Annual Reports of the Chief Constable for the West Midlands Police Force

Note: data from 1980-1982 not available

In September 1987, three illuminating episodes excited public opinion in Wolverhampton. First, the Manpower Services Commission's annual report showed that the Midlands were allocated the equivalent of only £116 per head of aid for job creation and training. Just London and the wealthy south-east regions received less. The report said that the Commission found work, or provided training, for one in eight of Wolverhampton's working population (Express and Star, 1987c).

The second episode concerned image and perceptions. Black Country leaders from Dudley, Sandwell, Walsall and Wolverhampton contracted the Gallup Institute to undertake a survey with the objective of highlighting myths about the region. The interviewers questioned leading national figures, regional 'opinion makers' from business, industry, trade unions, political organisations and local people. The results generated apparent surprise: the contractors asked people to describe what sort of place they thought the Black Country was – and found a high level of unawareness. For example, the national public survey showed that 72% had heard of the Black Country – but only 40% knew where it was. Forty per cent did not know what the Black Country was famous for producing. Wrong impressions included associating the area with mining and the Potteries. Locally, only 65% of interviewees in the four boroughs perceived themselves to be living

in the Black Country. These figures provided the basis for a follow-on project designed to improve the poor public image of the Black Country; help attract more European grants and tempt more firms to the area; improve the tourist industry; and encourage new families to move into the area (Express and Star, 1987d).

The third episode confirmed the high political visibility that the closure programme had accorded the area. The then Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, visited Wolverhampton on 22nd September 1987. A few days earlier, the monthly rate of unemployment in the town was announced – 15.7% - a marginal decrease. The objective of this visit was to familiarise the Prime Minister with the West Midlands' unemployment 'black spots', and explore how the region was acting to reduce the unemployment problem. The Prime Minister saw young people participating in training schemes, inspected new business, visited homes built on the former Bilston Steelworks' land and was briefed on ongoing public investment. The local response to her visit can be summarised as sincere surprise for some (the visit was not announced until a few hours ahead of her arrival) and indignation for others. Students at Handsworth Technical College held the only demonstration against her. The Prime Minister reinforced a constantly 'enabling' message: that ministers had no 'magic wand and only create the right circumstances for talent to flourish' (Express and Star, 1987e). The local press supported this message. The Express and Star newspaper ran the headline: 'the Government helps those who help themselves' (Express and Star, 1987e).

During her visit, the Prime Minister also took the opportunity to launch the Government's Inner City Task Force. This initiative was a Central Government's 'Action for Cities' Campaign's component. In Wolverhampton, the Task Force was based in Chapel Ash, and was one of sixteen throughout the country. Each Task Force was made up of a small team, selected from central and local government and the private sector. Four key areas defined their purpose: employment (creating jobs); employability (providing

training); enterprise (encouraging business) and environment (encouraging the community). In February 1989, Wolverhampton Task Force claimed to have undertaken projects, which had created 150 jobs and set up 150 new businesses (Express and Star, 1989h).

#### **5.6.4 Physical Capital**

Wolverhampton had been struggling with housing problems since the end of the Second World War. A newspaper report from July 1965 proclaimed the construction of some ten thousand new homes in the town since 1944. Despite this building programme, about 4,500 families remained on the waiting list (Toasland & Collard, 1965).

In the 1970s, emerging problems with the high rise flats and their council tenants were registered. Councillor Dennis Turner called for an inquiry into 'life at the top' of multi-storey blocks. He expressed his concerns about the living conditions of families, especially those with young children. However, the then housing chairman, Alderman Peter Farmer rebutted the proposal in categorical terms.

'They (the tenants) do not need and certainly would resent surveys and inquisitions. I cannot accept that council tenants in high-rise developments should be subject to any special inquisition of the kind proposed' (Express and Star, 1971).

He defended the view that careful attention had been given in Wolverhampton to tenants's needs in designing and managing high-rise developments and that they had therefore avoided some of the more serious problems that faced other local authorities. Councillor Turner's call for an inquiry was therefore rejected (Express and Star, 1971).

Three years later, the Housing Management Committee adopted a new policy to move families out of tower blocks, where alternatives were available. The Committee chairman, Councillor Larkin, stressed that the Authority was concerned about 'broken marriages, social problems and dangers to children in concrete developments' (Express and Star, 1974). An example of the problem was described in the local press.

'The Heath Town development is causing particular concern. Mothers have complained about lack of playing facilities for toddlers; the danger of children falling over balconies; and the need for proper fencing for a nearby railway line' (Express and Star,

1974).

The Council's response to this and other complaints was to abandon any further high-rise flats' development in Wolverhampton. The Council also identified further problems in need of resolution:

- ✓ There were about 500 council houses lying empty in the town and 7,000 households on the waiting list, necessitating more flexible and faster decisions regarding tenancy;
- ✓ What to do in cases of families separated because of suitable accommodation' lack;
- ✓ Whether the 12-month probationary period before applicants' points was considered should continue (Express and Star, 1974).

The year of 1981 witnessed a rapid escalation of problems involving housing in the community. In February, Conservative Councillors denounced the fact that houses remaining empty for weeks were costing the local authority £500,000 a year in lost rent (Express and Star, 1981d). In July, the gap between the 'ready-to-rent' council houses' and candidate tenants demand's supply stood at about 700 dwellings. The Council also faced a need to carry out 1,200 modernisations each year. There were also over 10,000 pre-1914 homes needing repairs. Of these, 1,717 were unfit to live in, 5,102 lacked inside lavatories and hot water and 3,470 needed repairs costing at least £2,500 each. There were also 9,910 council tenants (23% of the total), receiving rent deduction and a further 4,594 had applied for help with their rents. Wolverhampton's Housing Development Committee chairman, Councillor Steventon, declared at that time that 'poor housing conditions are a major cause of social stress and together with high unemployment have sparked off the social unrest'. He continued by explicitly linking housing quality to economic development prospects.

'The limited housing opportunities and poor conditions existing makes it more difficult for us to attract business to reduce unemployment, which is causing trouble on our streets' (Express and Star, 1981e).

In late-1982, it was apparent that the community was still experiencing chronic public housing problems. A report by Shelter and the Campaign for Single Homeless People

(CHAR) predicted that by 1984, the average waiting time for a council house in the West Midlands was likely to be more than 10 years. In that year, the waiting list for a council home in Wolverhampton had reached 16,000, including 7,000 requests for transfers (Chronicle Trader, 1982). The high number of requests for transfers illustrates the difficulties that the local authority was having in meeting its refurbishment plans. In January 1983, the Council estimated that £1.8 million would be necessary in order to make repairs and redecorations to 1,700 empty council houses (Express and Star, 1983h). In June of the same year, housing officers wrote off bad debts totalling more than £71,000, representing 0.16% of the £45.5 million collectable from tenants in that year (Express and Star, 1983i).

Given the magnitude of housing problems in the community, residents began to organise themselves in pursuit of better living conditions. As an example, in October 1983 people in Burton Crescent and neighbouring Hilton Road, Springfield, formed a residents' association, then led by a former Wolverhampton councillor. The main objectives of the association were to assess the best ways of addressing environmental problems and explore how to attract and retain 'reliable' tenants in the neighbourhood (Chronicle Trader, 1983). Elsewhere, council tenants from Ruskin Road, Bushbury, organised a petition demanding a 10-foot high fence topped with barbed wire at the bottom of their gardens backing on to Moreton School. The objective was to keep out burglars who had broken into their homes eleven times between 1981 and 1982 (Express and Star, 1983j).

The rise in council rents was another issue discussed in early November. Housing Services Committee chairman Councillor Stevenson declared in a local newspaper that one of the possible drivers for rent increases was the sale of council houses, because the council had spent more than £19 million to date in discounts to tenants buying council homes. Another problem was the cut in Central Government housing subsidies - £10 million a year, since 1979. The local authority had spent £72 million in that period on new

buildings, modernisation and other housing improvements. At that time, Wolverhampton had sold 3,517 council houses and the rent had been increased in nominal terms from £5.48 in 1979 to £15.36 per week in 1984 (Express and Star, 1983k).

The rise in council house rents brought another problem: thousands of families waiting several months for an answer about their housing benefits claims. These delays had been partly blamed for a rise in council house rent arrears to £3.6 million. The Labour leader, Ken Purchase, readily conceded the Council's failure to manage this congestion.

'We had made a damn mess of this because we have not employed enough staff. Besides pensions, this is the major benefit paid in Britain. The DHSS did a better job than us' (Express and Star, 1983l).

In 1984, 67% of the Council's 41,165 tenants were receiving help to pay their rent and rates. The average rebate was £18 per week. Mr. Bailey, Assistant Director of Housing, was expecting the figure to reach 70% in the near future. He observed that 'people claiming benefits are effectively in the poverty trap' (Wolverhampton AdNews, 1984b).

Labour and Conservative Councillors disagreed on both housing policy and budget planning and management. An example was provided in discussions surrounding the housing budget for 1986. The then Housing Committee Chairman Councillor Turner appealed in October 1985 to local Conservative Councillors not to obstruct the Council's bid for £34 million of Central Government monies to be spent on housing projects in 1986. Leader of the Conservative opposition group, Councillor Clarke, attacked the Labour group for its high bid when it had not spent the budget for 1985 of less than half that sum. Councillor Turner denied the accusation, and declared that their bid was not overstated; it was realistic, he believed, based on the local population's needs. According to the Labour Party in Wolverhampton (Express and Star, 1985e), the local authority had in 1985 spent £3 million more than the £9-million-Central-Government-allocation by using cash from house sales and it was possible that £15 million could be spent by the end of that year. Councillor Turner pointed to problems in budget 'phasing' over the fiscal year.

'One major problem is that we have to allocate money in a 12-month period and we cannot guarantee when owner-occupiers are going to apply for renovation grants'. (Express and Star, 1985e).

Another big disagreement between Labour and Conservatives on housing policies arose over the empty homes' problem. Conservative Councillor Jones estimated that the council homes standing empty's costs in rent and rates summed £7 million between 1981 and 1985. In response, the then Labour leader Councillor Bird explained that many private houses also stood empty in the town, with the annual loss of £600,000 in rates. According to the Housing Services Committee chairman, Councillor Turner, 1,869 council houses were void - 524 because of modernisation plans – while 2,073 private homes were standing empty (Express and Star, 1986i).

A variety of contextual factors have been considered in the above analysis. This local history's segment reconstruction's process has, wherever possible, used local media and local actors' the verbatim sentiments. Thus is intended to convey a 'structure of feeling' (Williams, 1990) – an overall tenor and a sense of community 'spirit'. It is difficult to conclude from this that Wolverhampton's zeitgeist was anything but flagging in the period leading up to 1988.

### **5.7 1988 and the Privatisation of British Steel in Wolverhampton**

This section describes Wolverhampton's socio-economic situation in 1988, with special reference to the British Steel privatisation process' local impact, and its immediate repercussions.

In March 1988 the then Employment Secretary Norman Fowler revealed that the jobless total in the West Midlands region had fallen below 10% for the first time in ten years (Express and Star, 1988b). This was closely related to the robust growth in the UK economy associated with the 'Lawson Boom'.

The Wolverhampton travel to work area continued to under-perform in

employment terms, however. Its unemployment rate stood at 14.5%, still the highest in the region. A further report in March relating to unemployment gave a mixed account of the local economy. Council officials highlighted the town's continuing high number of long-term jobless (Express and Star, 1988b). Counterbalancing this, however, 32% of local companies expected to expand in 1988, and the large recent losses in employment in existing companies appeared to be coming to an end. By 1988, unemployment rates per ward in Wolverhampton were as following:

**Table 27: Unemployment Rate per Ward in Wolverhampton (1988)**

Ward	Rate (April/88)	Ward	Rate (April/88)
Bilston East	17.9%	Oxley	12.7%
Bilston North	16.5%	Park	17.9%
Blakenhall	19.6%	Penn	7.8%
Bushbury	13.8%	St. Peter's	26.4%
East Park	19.7%	Spring Vale	11.0%
Ettingshall	20.3%	Tettenhall Regis	9.5%
Fallings Park	19.7%	Tettenhall Wightwick	6.5%
Graiseley	18.7%	Heath Town	20.8%
Low Hill	24.2%	Wednesfield North	8.7%
Merry Hill	9.9%	Wednesfield South	11.4%

Source: Express and Star, 1988

The long-term unemployment's prevalence also began to influence school-leavers' planning decisions. A survey undertaken in early 1988 by Sandwell and Dudley Local Employer Network found that fewer than one in five Black Country pupils showed any interest in careers in the engineering industry – still, the local economy's heartland. In addition, with the number of school-leavers declining year-by-year, local firms were encountering some unexpected and novel recruitment situations. The survey highlighted the refusal of a young man to accept an offer as a craft apprenticeship as symptomatic. He did not see career prospects in engineering, despite the fact that he belonged, at that time,

to a group where the unemployment was pervasive in the 1980s (Rhodes, 1988).

Wolverhampton Council's Economic Development Committee took a number of initiatives to expand the training opportunities available to local residents and to address skill shortages that could hinder economic recovery. For example, the Committee approved a report on construction training and employment in the community in October 1988. The study, jointly funded by the Committee, the Wolverhampton Task Force and the Training Commission (the successor body to the MSC), revealed that there were shortages of bricklayers, carpenters, plasterers and skilled plant operatives in the town's construction industry, despite local construction demand being relatively flat at that time (Wolverhampton Ad News, 1988a).

### **5.6.1 The British Steel privatisation process in Wolverhampton**

The privatisation of British Steel had been featured in Central Government plans for years. However, the first official local announcement appeared only in mid-1988. British Steel published a two-page commercial feature in a local newspaper in July 1988, revealing that it was on the cusp of a welcomed privatisation. Anticipating its annual results the report aimed to show, mainly for prospective buyers, the enterprise's revival after the recession in the early 1980s.

'During the past 10 years thousands of people have lost their jobs in the steel industry, but investment in modern methods has raised productivity. British Steel, second largest in the EEC, is now competitive in world markets' (Robins, 1988, pp. 24-25).

Reports about the British Steel's privatisation first appeared in the main local newspaper as late as October 1988. The newspaper article commented that after Trade and Industry Secretary Lord Young announced the impending BSC privatisation's details, 'fears grew that as much as a third of the shares could go overseas' (Hipwood, 1988). A potential loss of local control underpinned these 'fears'.

On 23rd November, the flotation price for British Steel was announced. According

to reports from Wolverhampton, it was 'a bargain' (Express and Star, 1988c). The Government decided to offer BSC for sale at a price of 125p a share (with 400 shares' minimum purchase), and the Labour Party immediately condemned the sell-off price. Despite the fall in pre-ready share prices, thousands of investors ignored stock market signals and sought to buy shares in British Steel, when the offer closed at 10 am on 2nd December. However, three days later, trading started in British Steel shares at a price of 62.25p, leaving investors in the partly paid 60p shares with very little profit.

Table 28 sets out the key 'mechanisms', at work in Wolverhampton in responding to the BSC privatisation. It will be recalled that mechanisms are defined by Pawson and Tilley (1997, p. 66) as the 'introduction of ideas and opportunities to groups or communities'. Each of their three key identifiers is related to the mechanisms proposed for analysis and then mapped against the Wolverhampton situation in 1988.

Table 28 is based on a fusion of the general theoretical pointers to be found in Pawson and Tilley (1997) relating to the general form that propositions regarding mechanisms may take, on the one hand, and the decision paths actually evident in the specific Wolverhampton's case, on the other. Accordingly, the column on the left quoted the three key identifiers proposed by the authors. The central column presents these general mechanisms' the related translation, locally. The right column exemplifies each of these local translations of mechanisms performing in Wolverhampton during the 1980s.



## 5.8 Outcomes

'If you are looking for signs of recovery in the UK economy, do not go to Wolverhampton. The heart of the metal-bashing Black Country is most depressing. The people and businesses of the town, however, are phlegmatic about their plight. It is as if nothing can hurt after Wolverhampton's experience in the last recession...' (Cole, 1991, p. 2)

The following section presents a critical analysis of Wolverhampton's situation from the climactic year of 1988, until the end of the 1990s. This account is intended to provide a platform for overview of the principal outcomes of the steel closure and redirection in the community in the late-1980s. It will be recalled that Pawson and Tilley (1997) define the outcomes of a change process as 'the description of the programmes' achievement' (p.66). In this study, socio-economic indicators have been utilised better to understand the privatisation's consequences' wide ranging on the local community.

### 5.7.1 Economic Capital

Wolverhampton gained £4.8 million for the 1989-1990 year from the Inner Area Programme to regenerate run-down areas. This was a disappointing outcome, given the council's bid of £7 million (Express and Star, 1989a). The Programme also received £5.5 million in improvement funds to continue its regeneration schemes for the 1990-1991 periods. The 15% increase for the town compared favourably with the 6.3 per cent average rise across the country (Express and Star, 1990a).

The last days of 1988 found Wolverhampton Council preoccupied with the community charge's implementation, or 'poll tax', which came into effect in April 1990. The then Labour Council made every effort to emphasise that, despite being responsible for collecting it, the tax system originated from Central Government. Reflecting this 'distancing' the then all-Labour Policy Committee decided that the poll tax offices should be as far away as possible from the Civic Centre, where the local authority has its offices (Express and Star, 1988d; Wolverhampton AdNews, 1988b; Wolverhampton Chronicle, 1988c). In January 1989, officials estimated that this new tax's the implementation cost to Wolverhampton taxpayers would be nearly £1 million, including renting accommodation

at the former St. George's Church (Express and Star, 1989b).

In February 1990, Wolverhampton Council defined at £420 the sum for the first Community Charge to be paid by each adult in the town. This value was £150 more than the Government claimed should be charged. The Labour Council insisted that the amount was necessary, since services had already been capped to keep local tax down to the value announced (Express and Star, 1990b). However, Conservative Councillors characterised the figure as 'horrifying' (Express and Star, 1990b).

By June 1990, around 60,000 Wolverhampton residents – nearly a third of those eligible to pay the tax – had not paid. The figure was the highest in the West Midlands. In October, it was announced that up to 400 people were due to appear before Wolverhampton Magistrates for non-payment of the poll tax (Wolverhampton Chronicle, 1990). The situation worsened to the point that, by 1993, more than 30,000 court summonses had been sent out by Wolverhampton Council in an effort to collect about £5 million owed by poll tax eligible taxpayers in the borough (Express and Star, 1993a). In September 1996, three years after the poll tax was removed, more than £2.6 million was still owed to Wolverhampton Council by poll tax debtors (Express and Star, 1996a).

In July 1991, Wolverhampton was awarded £37.5 million by the Government after a successful bid for City Challenge funding. The town was to receive around £7.5 million each year for the next five years to regenerate two of the worst unemployment concentrations in the region – Low Hill and St. Peters. Proposed measures included anti-crime initiatives and an improved physical and built environment for the 22,000 people – nearly half of them Asians and Afro-Caribbeans – in the targeted areas. The Council's Action Plan also sought to:

- ✓ Develop Wolverhampton Racecourse into the region's only grass and all weather track, with hotel and conference facilities;
- ✓ Create two access centres that would provide guidance on education, training and

job opportunities;

- ✓ Create specialist training to link local people to new job opportunities;
- ✓ Involve residents in a new Estate Action Programme in Low Hill and a new Housing Renewal Area in St. Peter's;
- ✓ Improve the canal system from Broad Street basin to Valley Park School and upgrade the rail corridor from Wolverhampton Station to the Inter-City line (Express and Star, 1991a).

The progress of Wolverhampton's City Challenge appeared impressive. Executive Director Chris Khamis revealed in 1994 that more than 1,000 jobs had been created or saved by the programme since 1991 (Express and Star, 1994a). The third year of the City Challenge programme set a target to create or safeguard a further 800 jobs in town. It also envisaged that 18 new businesses would be launched, more than 1,500 training places supported, millions of commercial floorspace's square yard created or improved and nearly 350 homes built or improved – about 60 for sale – in the regeneration area (Express and Star, 1994b).

The City Challenge programme's last phase proposed to spend almost £6 million on the biggest remaining derelict site's reclamation in Wolverhampton. The area comprised about 20 acres of contaminated land behind the Science Park. The land was part of the former gas works and EEC factory site, and had high contamination levels, composed of toxic waste, heavy metals and spent oxides (Hammond, 1996). This project had an explicit job creation element.

In July 1992, Wolverhampton Council bid for a second City Challenge, this time for the Bilston area, but this was rejected (Henbury, 1992a). The Department of Environment outlined the reasons for the negative response.

'While your proposals for Bilston had an interesting environmental theme, and the area clearly needs revising, on balance we felt that they fell short of the very high standard of the winning bids. In particular, we considered the plans for training, job creation and housing needed further development, and the problems of crime, health, and the needs of the ethnic minorities were not fully addressed' (cited in Henbury, 1992a, p. 1).

In late-1993, Wolverhampton Council unveiled a new economic strategy with the declared objective of transforming the town into the 'most prosperous centre between Birmingham and Manchester' (Express and Star, 1993b). The report predicted investments in industry, roads and other services, but also signalled the weak points in Wolverhampton's economy at that time.

'The rate of economic recovery has been slow and patchy. Business performance and employment remain prime concerns. The past year has seen Wolverhampton's economy stabilise. Unemployment has fallen slightly to about 16,000, 15 per cent of the working population. However, 40 per cent of the unemployed have been unemployed for over a year. Long-term unemployment remains a significant problem. The town still suffers from a lack of good quality sites and premises for development. The development of Springvale Industrial Park in Bilston and the University Science Park on the Stafford Road are crucial to the ability of the town to create employment opportunities' (cited in Express and Star, 1993b).

In light of these continuing problems, local economic development (LED) policy remained of great political significance. Diversification was pursued in a functional areas' number. Thus, the Wolverhampton Science Park was formed in 1993 as a private limited company through a partnership between the University of Wolverhampton (formerly, Wolverhampton Polytechnic) and Wolverhampton Council. Located about one mile north of the city centre, the Park's mission was and remains:

'to support the growth of sustainable and innovative business by providing a quality physical environment and associated support services to a range of science and engineering technology sectors in order to attract inward investment to the city from UK and overseas businesses' (Wolverhampton Science Park, 2001).

In January 1994, Wolverhampton Council's Economic Development and Property Committee approved the Science Park's number, with leisure facilities' development's possibility (Williams, 1994). In 1996, five firms had already taken up units after the Wolverhampton Science Park's development's first phase was completed. At the time of its official opening in October, 100 people were already employed on the site. The Park's Chief Executive, Dr. Cooper, was explicit at the ceremony regarding the Park's diversification role.


'The development of this zone gives Wolverhampton a really exciting opportunity to move its economy away from an over-reliance on metal-forming industries' (cited in

Employment Minister James Paice, while sympathising with the concerns of the MPs, sought to quash expectation of direct intervention. 'I don't think it is for me or the Government to question the commercial judgement of the businesses employing them' (Express and Star, 1995b). He also observed that 'unemployment had been falling in Mr. Purchase's constituency and Wolverhampton had won an extra £16.5 million in regeneration last year' (ibid).

The last British Steel plant in Wolverhampton's closure in 1995 meant the direct loss of 520 jobs, an estimated £5 million withdrawn from the local economy and the approximately £8 million on redundancy and closure costs' expenditure. British Steel defended the closure by highlighting a surplus of seamless tubes on the world market. This, the Company claimed, meant that there was no prospect of improvement at the plant in the Wednesfield ward (Express and Star, 1995a).

Figure 18 sets out the total redundancies announced in Wolverhampton between 1989 and 1995, across all economic sectors.

**Figure 18: Total Announced Redundancies in Wolverhampton (1989-1995)**



Source: Wolverhampton Archives and Local Studies

After British Steel announced its plant in Wednesfield ward's closure, the Company unveiled plans to build a new social club for the community on a part of its works site. However, the proposal prompted opposition from Wasddensbrook households, and they signed a 60-name petition calling for the scheme to be rejected. Residents feared that the development would bring traffic and noise problems and the loss of trees on the

site, as well as devaluing their homes. A final decision was to be made by the Black Country Development Corporation, which was the planning authority for the area (Express and Star, 1995c). That outcome is described in the next section.

The former Bilston steelworks site lay derelict for four years after opencast mining's the cessation by British Coal. It was then developed to become the Springvale Business Park, including both industrial and leisure development. The Park had, at the beginning of 1997, 75% of the 90-acre site occupied with tenants that provided around 1,150 jobs. Mr Orriss, development manager for the site, declared that the main reason for the success of the Park was the Black Country Route's opening, providing the site with different options for road links (Wood, 1997).

In 1996, the Black Country Development Corporation announced that its initial target to create jobs, investment and build roads across derelict factory sites in Wolverhampton and the Black Country had been realised in less than 10 years. Up to March 1996, the agency had stimulated the creation of 15,520 jobs by new companies, and 24,000 others from employers whose businesses had been possibly affected by the area's general regeneration (Wolverhampton Chronicle, 1996b). In its final planning board meeting on 19th March 1998, the BCDC approved schemes creating more than 300 jobs. The agency finished its activities and handed overall planning power back to the Black Country councils of Sandwell, Walsall and Wolverhampton on 31st March 1998 (Williams, 1998).

Also in 1996, a conference organised by the Wolverhampton Race Equality Council declared that unemployment among African Caribbean and Asian communities in town was twice as high as the jobless rate for white people. For example, 46% of the black community aged 25 or younger was unemployed (Cotton, 1996). The reasons identified for this included continuing prejudice among some white employers and under-achievement of children from ethnic minorities in schools (ibid).

By 1997, two surveys, commissioned by the Council's Economic Development Department, indicated that job prospects in Wolverhampton were improving. One survey found that nearly 40% of a 200 manufacturing companies' sample was expecting to increase their workforces over the coming 12 months. The findings of a second one reflected similarly positive employment prospects over 1998. These results were highlighted in the Council's draft Economic Development Strategy covering 1997-98. This noted that Wolverhampton's economy had continued to grow over 1996, with unemployment falling year-on-year. The drop was, according to the draft, partly the result of investments in the area and a growth in business for many companies, some of which were beginning to experience recruitment problems (Hammond, 1997).

#### **5.7.1.1 Steel Sector Changes and Multiplier Effects**

Wolverhampton had enjoyed a strong steel industry tradition since the 19th century. However, the economic and privatisation policies in the late-1970s and the 1980s brought a huge and rapid transformation in the steel sector. According to the UK Steel Association<sup>9</sup>, Wolverhampton's only steel enterprise registered with the Association in 2002 was the Midland Service Centre, a Corus Group plc branch.

A slightly different picture emerges from the Corus Group plc<sup>10</sup> itself. Wolverhampton has, they note, five different service centres from among the 60 distributed across Europe. Four of them form the Steelpark complex, built on the British Steel Seamless Tubes plant's former location at Wednesfield, which closed in 1995. The fifth is a strip product service centre, located at Fordhouses, Oxley. Figure 19 presents the five centres with each specialisation identified.

The Steelpark was officiated opened in December 1999, after two years' work and with an investment of £40 million. The Automotive Service Centre opened in 1996. The

Deputy Prime Minister and Secretary of State for the Department of Environment, Transport and Regions, John Prescott was guest of honour at the opening ceremony for Steelpark. He talked of the new facility in optimistic terms.

‘This world class steel supply and processing operation puts Corus at the cutting edge of competitiveness in today’s knowledge driven economy. It is a fine example of the private sector, local authorities and development agencies working together to transform a brownfield industrial site to produce a well designed facility which will benefit the local community both economically and environmentally’ (Corus Service Centres, 1999).

According to Corus Group<sup>11</sup>, the 50-acre development incorporates a 30,000 m<sup>2</sup> long products and engineering bar centre, a 16,000 m<sup>2</sup> coil slitting facility, a 13,000 m<sup>2</sup> automotive processing centre, and office accommodation. It claims to offer the most comprehensive range of steel products and downstream processing services in Europe and has an overall supply capability of 500,000 tonnes per annum. By the time of the opening ceremony, the site employed 350 people.

**Figure 19: Wolverhampton’s Corus Service Centres**

Centre	Location	Specialisation
Multi Product Service Centre	The Steelpark, Wednesfield	Multi range of steel sections, plate, tube, pre-cut sheet, engineering bar and related processing services
Coil Slitting Centre		Offers a full range of strip mill products, such as hot rolled, cold reduced and others in a gauge 0.35 mm to 6.0 mm thick
Automotive Service Centre		Provides specialised materials and services, including laser welding and cutting, designed to meet the needs of the automotive industry
Laser Welding Centre		Manufacture of laser welded tailored blanks
Strip Products Service Centre	Boundary Industrial Estate, Fordhouses, Oxley	Supplies strip steel, including uncoated, metallic and organic coated grades, processed to size and specification detailed by client.

Source: <http://www.corusservicecentres.com>, accessed: 18 March 2001.

<sup>9</sup> <http://www.uksteel.org.uk>, last updated on January 1<sup>st</sup>, 2003.

<sup>10</sup> <http://www.corusservicecentres.com>

<sup>11</sup> *ibid.*

### 5.7.2 Human Capital

The already noted skilled labour's shortage problem in Wolverhampton limited, at least in the early-1990s, the opportunities for businesses to expand. John Rice, Chief Executive of the local Chamber of Commerce made this point.

'Development land was becoming scarcer and the drastic fall in the birth-rate meant that there would be fewer school leavers available to fill a growing number of jobs' (Rice, cited in Williams, 1989).

A consumer and company satisfaction survey undertaken at the end of 1988 revealed that a growing number of business executives were concerned about unemployment and particularly the shortage of skilled labour. The survey sampled old and new companies in retailing, commerce, manufacturing and service sectors operating in various wards of the town, and employing between five and 1,000 workers. The survey showed that only 46% of companies planned to expand in the next 12 months; 37% stated that their expansion plans were being restricted by a lack of skilled labour and 21% claimed that they were thinking of moving from the town because of poor expansion opportunities (Williams, 1989).

In March 1989 Central Government had announced the Task Force for Wolverhampton's closure by the end of that year. Wolverhampton Task Force had helped set up over the period 1987 to early-1989 some 100 businesses and supported the creation of around 200 new jobs. It had also funded training schemes for more than 1,000 people. The Council leader Councillor Davies reacted negatively to its closure.

'If some of the schemes the Task Force has initiated do not prove to be self-sufficient, who picks up the tab? Will they just fade away and leave us to go back to square one?' (Davies, cited in Express and Star, 1989c)


Councillor Davies noted that Wolverhampton still had higher unemployment than the national average, and its long-term unemployment figure was higher than anywhere else in the country. Further criticism on Central Government came from Labour MP for Wolverhampton South East, Dennis Turner.

'My own reaction to your announcement is that it is typical of the way the Government is treating the major problem of inner cities. Once the cameras have left, the glossy

schemes that are heralded with such publicity can be quietly withdrawn' (Turner, cited in Express and Star, 1989c).

Figure 20 sets out the unemployment rates claimant in Wolverhampton between 1989 and 1998.

**Figure 20: Wolverhampton Unemployment Rate Claimant (June 1989-1998)**



Source: Wolverhampton Archives and Local Studies

The West Midlands Low Pay Unit confirmed, on an independent survey's the basis, that the Poll Tax would shift the burden of taxation from the rich to the poor and claimed that Government figures showed that low-income families would pay considerably more. Those who lost out would be large, extended families living together in small properties in deprived inner city areas. Small families or single people in large houses in affluent areas would gain most. Sick and disabled people as well as women and the young would also be particularly adversely affected by the new system (Wolverhampton Archives and Local Studies).

The then Employment Secretary Michael Howard launched in October 1990 the Wolverhampton Training and Enterprise Council (TEC). He described it as a 'bold venture', which would help to regenerate the local economy. In his words, 'Wolverhampton had played an important part in the industrial revolution and was now well placed to build on its illustrious past' (cited in Express and Star, 1990c). The

Wolverhampton TEC – one of 80 set up throughout the country – heralded a shift in vocational education and training decision-making processes away from Whitehall. Executive responsibility was to be vested in a local Board composed by local employers and other representative bodies. The TEC's chairman, Roy Carver, declared that:

‘A match has got to be found between those people who are out of work and the skill shortages which employers tell us exist in the town. We want to restore the Wolverhampton TEC area as a powerhouse of the UK economy’ (Carver, cited in Express and Star, 1990b).

Wolverhampton TEC assisted more than 300 people to gain jobs during its first year. However, the underlying problems of skill development remained. At that time, one in three teenagers was leaving school with no qualifications (Express and Star, 1992a).

By late-1991, the UK economy had moved into recession and unemployment was rising across the Black Country. This was accelerating, in turn, longer-term changes in the labour market and posing an increasing challenge for the four Training and Enterprise Councils (TECs) established in the sub-region. By August, the rate of unemployment was 9.48% in Dudley, 11.2% in Walsall, 12.8% in Sandwell and 13.8% in Wolverhampton. There were pockets within this overall figure of severe labour market stress. In the ward of St. Peters (including Wolverhampton town centre), the unemployment rate had been running at more than 20% (Cheeseright, 1991a).

The underlying reason for the continuing high relative unemployment figures had been acceleration in the number of jobs lost from manufacturing. This was only partially offset by growth in the fledgling service industries in the area. While the balance between manufacturing and services employment moved closer to the national average, it only partially reduced the dependence of the Black Country in general and Wolverhampton in particular, on manufacturing. These sectoral changes ramify in terms of the structure of the labour market, for example in the scale and composition of female work. In Wolverhampton, 42% of the female workforce in 1990 worked part-time (Cheeseright, 1991a). The question that remained for policy makers was: what to do with the male long-

term unemployed that could only offer increasingly obsolete industrial skills?

Thus, Wolverhampton's unemployment rate continued to exceed the national average. Moreover, large numbers of the unemployed were enduring long-term unemployment – one in three jobless people in 1991 had been out of work for more than a year. In contrast, Wolverhampton's large Asian community was then at the centre of a growing textiles industry. Finally, leading employers, like the construction company Tarmac and the tyre company Goodyear had no plans to reduce operations. Service sector companies had grown in prominence, but not by as much as in the UK as a whole (Cole, 1991).

There was to be little improvement in labour market conditions over the following two years and unemployment remained a major concern in local political discourse. In October 1992, more than 800 residents demonstrated in Wolverhampton for jobs – and to protest against cutbacks in council services, at that time, under Conservative leadership. The then Bishop of Dudley joined local MPs and trade unionists at St. Peter's Square and criticised pit closures' and other economic changes' social consequences.

'It is not only a mad economic policy but also an unfeeling policy that loses sight of human needs. The situation is not just an argument about economics but it is also about the welfare and happiness of men, woman and children. I ask for the Government to do its sums again. Not only the sums they do for profit and loss accounts, but to calculate the cost to the nation when more and more people are thrown out of work' (cited in Express and Star, 1992b).

In December 1992, a council report revealed that Wolverhampton would have the sixth highest spending target per head of population of all the then 36 metropolitan authorities for the next year (Express and Star, 1993b). Conversely, according to Government figures from August 1993, Wolverhampton Council had the lowest council tax collection rate of any metropolitan authority (Wolverhampton Chronicle, 1993a). In November, the Department of the Environment divulged that the town was at the bottom of a league table of council effectiveness in recouping council taxes. A spokesman for the then Conservative Council attributed this to technical differences in accounting practices (Express and Star,

1993c). Indeed, by December, nearly two-thirds of the £27.5 million owed by the council taxpayers had been collected (Express and Star, 1993d).

The MP for Wolverhampton North-East drew attention to unemployment's the costs in August 1993.

'The Government's official figures put the cost of unemployment at £9,000 per person per year. This means a cost of unemployment in Wolverhampton North-East, since the last General Election, of a staggering £66.5 million. The way to turn this around and begin to build a real recovery is not by cutting public services, or raising taxes on working people, but by putting people back to work' (Purchase, cited Wolverhampton Chronicle, 1993b).


By early 1993, the town continued to stagnate in second place in the West Midlands jobless table, and a third of the town's unemployed were aged less than 25 years (Foster, 1993). In February, one in five men was out of work – and 129 people were chasing each job vacancy (Express and Star, 1993e).

Research conducted in 1989 indicated that Wolverhampton apparently needed to continue to invest in its residents' skills – especially in relation to specific demographic groups facing exclusion from the local labour market. According to this report, published in January 1990, 442 white pupils (approximately 18% of the total) went successfully straight from school to paid employment in 1989. On the other hand, only 4% of the total number of Caribbean pupils and 5.2% of Asian pupils were successful in securing a first employment experience. A Wolverhampton community relations co-ordinator interpreted these figures as evidence that employers were still frequently discriminating against black people (Express and Star, 1990d).

The same report indicated distinct work destinations for different school leavers. For example, over half of all Asian 16-year-olds were continuing in education, with around one in six going on to a Youth Training Scheme (YTS). Just over a third of Caribbean pupils opted for further education, with around the same number progressing to YTS. However, only a quarter of white pupils stayed on at school, less than a fifth went on to college and just under a third progressed into YTS. This group's greatest success was,

however, in finding a job straight from school (Express and Star, 1990d). Discrimination may indeed have played a role in reducing choice for ethnic minority pupils; it is equally plausible that choices were being informed by quite distinct labour market strategies. Figure 21 sets out the full-time participation in Education and Training of 16 years old in Wolverhampton compared with the England average.

**Figure 21: Wolverhampton and England Average Participation in Full Time Education & Training (16 years old)**



Source: DfES

In 1992, Central Government allocated extra resources to Wolverhampton plus Dudley and Birmingham, to help to improve young children's poor reading standards. The boroughs were near the bottom of reading league tables for seven-year-olds after the first national tests. In Wolverhampton, 26% of Year 2 students could not read properly (Hipwood, 1992).

Towards the end of 1992, Asian community leaders in Wolverhampton were active in organising an effort to save 'mother tongue' language classes from cutbacks in the education budget. The lessons were provided as part of the primary schools timetable, as well as at Saturday morning classes, available at 28 venues in the town. The then Education Committee Chairman, Councillor Mrs Bradley, appeared less than optimistic about saving all the Saturday morning lessons, which cost more than £80,000 a year to run. The Council needed to make a £3.5 million cutback in the education budget that year


(Express and Star, 1992c). In the end, only the Saturday classes were suspended.

In 1994, the National Union of Teachers (NUT) predicted a funding crisis for educational services in the borough. NUT researchers suggested that Wolverhampton would be affected by a 'double whammy' in the next three months, in which rule changes over funding would see the borough's schools budget cut by £2.8 million. The Education Committee Chairman Councillor Bradley sought transitional relief from Central Government but also cautioned against alarm. 'We don't know what will happen in the future but Wolverhampton schools are safe at present. There is no crisis in this town thanks to our good housekeeping' (Bradley, cited in Smith, 1994).

Another attempt to reduce the continuing problem of truancy was launched in 1994. Central Government invested £180,000 into the 'Wolverhampton Truancy Watch', following the apparent success of a pilot programme run in Stoke on Trent. In this project, shopkeepers and police challenged youngsters found loitering in shopping centres during school hours. There was a significant fall in shop-related crime in that town (Wolverhampton AdNews, 1994). A national conference that took place in Wolverhampton in 1995 highlighted the town scheme's success, including awards for secondary school pupils with 100% attendance records (Express and Star, 1995d).

The National Consortium for Examination Results disclosed a marked improvement in GCSE and A-level examination results achieved by pupils in Wolverhampton in 1995. Percentage passes were still below the national average for local authority schools, although the gap was closing. In that year, just over 30% of Wolverhampton pupils gained five or more A\*-C grades in GCSE examinations (Express and Star, 1995). Figure 22 compares the percentage of pupils with five or more A\*-C grades in GCSE examinations in Wolverhampton and the national average in the late 1990s. Despite the efforts, until recently Wolverhampton educational achievement rates remain below the national average.

Figure 22: Wolverhampton and England GCSE A\*-C Achievement in 1997-2000



Source: Wolverhampton Archives and Local Studies

The health situation in Wolverhampton did not improve markedly in the 1990s, either. In March 1989, the 'World in Action' television documentary series declared that about 150 people in Wolverhampton had died unnecessarily since 1979. The claim was based on death certificates' study extrapolation carried out in 1983 by Professor Walter Holland of St. Thomas's Hospital, London. His research team listed 13 conditions<sup>12</sup> that should never lead to death if properly treated. They looked at all the death certificates with those conditions on them and drew up a league table of health authorities, adjusted for social factors. Wolverhampton was fourth from bottom, with Walsall at the very bottom.

'World in Action' suggested that the Holland report had catalysed Walsall into making improvements, but Wolverhampton had failed to act. However, Dr. Kelleher, then senior registrar in community medicine in the local NHS, defended the town's health policies.

'We have acted on the Holland report and are doing everything we can to improve our perinatal mortality rates, which was the main problem it picked up. A lot of the things behind this are caused by social factors which are out of the health authority's control' (Express and Star, 1989d).

When Professor Holland's team updated its figures to 1987, it found that Wolverhampton

<sup>12</sup> The 13 conditions were: anaemia, high blood pressure, cervical cancer, pneumonia/bronchitis, tuberculosis, asthma, appendicitis, hernia, perinatal mortality and death in childbirth, chronic rheumatic heart disease, acute respiratory infection, bacterial infection and Hodgkins disease.

was still among the worst ten health authorities for preventable deaths: 541 people died from the thirteen conditions identified between 1983 and 1987. Wolverhampton Health Authority District General Manager Mr. Jackson denied that the Health Authority had been slow to act.

‘At the time, the health authority focused on perinatal mortality, which makes up half the deaths, and we have done a great deal to try to get those figures down. We also, with the local authority, commissioned a report which showed social factors were to blame for more than half the effect’ (Express and Star, 1989e).

Wolverhampton Health Authority funded an investigation into the local response to the Holland report, with six months to report conclusions (Talbot and Williams, 1989). However, the local press failed to register the results of this inquiry.

In November 1991, Wolverhampton Health Authority’s Annual Report declared that more than 757 people in town died from heart-related problems in 1990 – 12% above the national average for women and 5% for men. The report also revealed that the number of people who smoked was about the national average, and that 178 people died from lung cancer in the town in 1990 (Wolverhampton Health Authority, 1991).

By 1992, deaths from heart disease ran at 60% above the national average for men, and the same rate as the previous year for women (12%). Wolverhampton Family Health Services launched a programme inviting men and women aged between 35 and 60 to attend their doctor’s surgeries and undergo a computerised screening service. This represented an attempt to extend preventive medicine practises in the town (George, 1992).

In June 1992, a report authored by Dr. Kevin Kelleher, Director of Public Health at Wolverhampton Health Authority, revealed that death rates of people over 45 in Wolverhampton were among the highest in the developed world, particularly from heart disease. The other frequent causes were cancer and strokes. Kelleher was only too willing to draw a strong link between poverty and poor health.

‘The issue is that none of us expect to die before we are 65 and that is the big problem in Wolverhampton. We have high levels of unemployment and there are high levels of poverty. What do you think is more stressful? Not having a job and having to live on

£30 a week with two children, or earning over £100,000 a year in the City?' (Cited in Express and Star, 1992d).

Chris Bonnard, general secretary of Wolverhampton Voluntary Sector Council agreed: 'there is no doubt that poverty and unemployment can lead to health problems and stress' (Express and Star, 1992d).

Later that year, in a continuing debate, David Maslin, then senior lecturer in physiology at the University of Wolverhampton suggested that stress could encourage people to take comfort in fatty or sugary foods, cigarettes and alcohol. 'Such a chain of events is especially plausible where financial or social deprivation or a repetitive job produces little freedom of action' (Maslin, cited in Express and Star, 1992e).

In October 1993, a long-term plan was unveiled to improve the community's health to the year 2000. The Wolverhampton Health Strategy highlighted six key problem areas where action was needed:

- ✓ Coronary hearth disease;
- ✓ Strokes;
- ✓ Cancer;
- ✓ Mental health;
- ✓ Sexual health;
- ✓ Stillbirths and newborn babies' deaths.

Goals included reducing the number of pregnancies among under 16-year-olds by half and cutting stillbirths and baby deaths by 20%. At that time, Wolverhampton's abortion rate for 11-15 years olds was twice the national average and the highest in the Black Country (Express and Star, 1993f).

Sexual health statistics remained generally poor. The Director of Public Health noted that prostitution, drug abuse and poverty were among the causes of a high number of HIV cases in Wolverhampton. Indeed, the town was second highest to Birmingham in the

number of cases reported across the West Midlands. The Borough had the third highest conception rate among girls under 16 and the second highest rate of gonorrhoea in the West Midlands (Weeks, 1994a). Cases of tuberculosis (TB) in town remained a concern to health officials. Dr. Kelleher was prepared to conclude that there was a strong linkage between material deprivation and poor health.

'My public health report, due to be circulated next week, shows a distinct link between TB, poverty and poor housing. This is very true in Wolverhampton and goes right across the age range in such areas' (Weeks, 1994b).

The 1995 Wolverhampton Health Authority Annual Report showed that people living in some of Wolverhampton's most deprived areas were three times more likely to die before the age of 65 than those in richer areas. For example, Heath Town had the worst death rate, with around 170 men and 150 women under 65 dying between 1988 and 1992. In Tettenhall Regis, a ward with an approximately equal population base, only 50 men and 60 women died in the same period. The national average for both sexes was 100. The Health Authority report also noted that deprived wards in the town also had more people being admitted to hospital accident and emergency departments.

'Unfortunately over a number of years part of the population has not benefited to the same extent as the rest of the population from the improvement in the economy. This has left them in relative poverty, and here is evidence to show that this means individuals have less control over their lives and are therefore more susceptible to ill health' (Wolverhampton Health Authority, 1995, Foreword).

Dr. Kelleher also explored this link at the level of individual wards.

'The death rate in Heath Town worsened over the period 1984 to 1992 while in Tettenhall it improved over the same period. Local data appears to suggest that certain wards in Wolverhampton have a worse health experience than others. There is a strong correlation between emergency admissions and the degree of deprivation in wards' (George, 1996).

Notwithstanding efforts to improve the community's health, the number of under-age pregnancies in Wolverhampton rose in the early-1990s, despite a downward trend nationwide. The town also led the region for the number of 13 to 15-year-olds who had abortions. More than half of all conceptions were outside marriage and one in five women

who became pregnant had an abortion (Wolverhampton Chronicle, 1995a).

The Health Authority had also made a case for a strong linkage between health and access to basic goods and sewerage. In March 1996, a survey commissioned by the Council revealed the extent of decay in local housing, showing that about 1,000 houses in Wolverhampton still did not have an inside toilet and a bath or shower. Moreover, more than one in 10 households were overwhelmed by damp and condensation, and in council-owned properties, this figure was nearly doubled to just one in five houses. The survey also exposed that more than one third of Wolverhampton's housing stock was still owned by the council – a much higher proportion than the national figure (Wolverhampton Chronicle, 1996a).

The community's health's situation in 1996 was that one in four people would die of cancer, it being the second most common cause of death in Wolverhampton, after heart disease. The most common types of cancer were lung cancer among men and breast cancer among women. There was also a rising trend in the number of abortions carried out late on in pregnancy. The number of deaths caused by accidents had fallen in the 1980s, and the suicide rate had dropped by 33 per cent since 1990. There was, however an increase in food poisoning cases from 69 in 1986 to 524 in 1995. (Express and Star, 1996c).

### **5.7.3 Social Capital**

By July 1989, financial problems were forcing Wolverhampton Citizen's Advice Bureau (CAB) effectively to discard many inquiries, because there was not enough staff or volunteers to run the two telephone advice lines on a regular basis. The several Bureau offices were having difficulty in finding new volunteers despite the spiralling number of calls from the public. The CAB management had historically benefited from unemployed volunteers, but they were increasingly being taken on by Employment Training Schemes. The Council Committee responsible for the bureau offices disagreed on how best to support the CABs. The Conservative council spokesman Councillor Davis sought to blame the Labour administration for underfunding the CAB. As he observed, 'the bureau

are doing a very good job but there is only so much money in the budget. The Labour council is making real cuts'. Labour Councillor Clifford, passed the blame to Central Government.

'This is not a one-off situation. Things are going to get worse and worse; especially with the introduction of the poll tax' (cited in Bray, 1989).

The Annual Report and Accounts of the Wolverhampton Bureau for 1990-1 revealed that one in four people seeking advice that year were in serious debt. Nearly one half of the Citizen's Advice Bureau branches themselves had severe money problems, with some facing bankruptcy (Express and Star, 1991b).

Over the following year, the number of residents worried about a build up of debts and companies forced into bankruptcy rose sharply, and Wolverhampton Citizens Advice Bureau were having severe problems in managing a queue for assistance. Ms Hudson, then manager of Wolverhampton CAB, admitted the concerns of CAB staff and volunteers. She observed that the attempts to cope with increasing stress in the recession-affected town were being hampered by a lack of funds. The Bilston bureau had no deputy manager, Pendeford existed on voluntary contributions alone and Wolverhampton was struggling to cope with no clerical assistant, despite sending out 9,000 letters a year. She saw no prospect of immediate respite.

'I can't even see things improving within the next 12 months, even if the economy improves by then. It takes an awful lot of time afterwards for everyone else to get back on their feet' (cited in Henbury, 1992).

These various situations appear to demonstrate that Wolverhampton's impoverishment was reflected in impoverished public services for the poorest.

There had been a reduction of 10% in reported crime in Wolverhampton in 1988, being the first overall fall for 20 years. Juvenile crime as a proportion of all reported crimes had fallen from 25.9% in 1987 to 20.7% in 1988. This was the lowest figure for many years and at least some senior police offices attributed this fall to better employment

standards. At the same time, the town had the highest homicide number in the Black Country: ten murders (Express and Star, 1989f).

By February 1989, crime in the town centre had fallen drastically. Inspector Mackie, then head of the town centre squad, declared that the low figures were the result of combined action involving the police, public and stores throughout the town centre (Express and Star, 1989). This was the first registered success of the community crime watch schemes combining residential neighbourhood and business premises. A further claim of success was made in May, when Detective Chief Inspector Firth, of Dunstall Road police revealed that crime in Wolverhampton was continuing to fall – with robberies, burglaries, thefts and the taking of cars running at lower levels than in the preceding year. He attributed the overall reduction in part to the success of neighbourhood watch schemes and other similar initiatives (Express and Star, 1989g).

Wolverhampton Polytechnic had launched a neighbourhood watch scheme's development in an effort to eliminate crime around Molineux Street. It was a joint venture between Polytechnic staff and students, funded by the Home Office's Safer Cities Programme with help from West Midlands Police (Express and Star, 1990e).

Over the next months, however, car crime and theft from cars in town increased steeply. A Police Superintendent opined that most of these crimes were 30 or 40 people's responsibility, 'some are arrested 40 to 50 times a year. If you locked them up you would seriously reduce the crime rate' (Express and Star, 1991c). The community's reaction was the creation of Vehicle Watch, a scheme designed to impact on car thieves. Car owners used hard-to-remove stickers to alert police to the likelihood of theft (Express and Star, 1991d).

In November 1992, the Home Office revealed that the community watches crime schemes created in Wolverhampton was effectively bucking the national trend by keeping down crime figures. Sergeant Wright, from the police town centre unit, declared that,

'these initiatives, plus the surveillance cameras, have helped cut down on crime to property, to cars and to people' (cited in Foster, 1992).

In the first six months of 1993, crime rates in town dropped a further 11% compared with the same period the year before. The local police declared that the only logical reason was that residents were actively pursuing crime prevention measures (Express and Star, 1993g). By 1994, Wolverhampton had around 500 neighbourhood watch schemes, and according to local police, their success was undeniable. Indeed, some insurance companies even offered discounts on property cover to watch members, since homes which were not in a neighbourhood watch scheme were twice as likely to be burgled (Weeks, 1994c). This reduction in key categories of reported crime appears to have continued into the mid-1990s (Wolverhampton Chronicle, 1996c). Table 29 sets out the numbers of crime per type in Wolverhampton in the 1980s, as well as the detection rate for all crimes undertaken over the period.

The 1995 City Challenge Annual Report revealed a reduction in the reported crime in the area. For example, home burglaries had fallen by 40% and car crimes had reduced by more than a half over a three-year period (City Challenge Annual Report, 1995).

**Table 29: Crimes per Offence in Wolverhampton (1989-1995)**

Offence	Year	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
Against the person		1,353	1,424	1,408	1,576	1,439	1,325	1,042
Against property – burglaries		6,289	7,608	9,118	10,940	8,616	7,623	7,192
Against property – thefts		13,285	15,994	17,581	15,883	13,959	12,541	13,690
Criminal Damage		2,647	2,916	3,261	3,568	3,319	2,852	2,182
Other Offences		96	103	109	111	131	193	216
Detection Rate for all Crimes Undertaken		45.8%	40.5%	36.3%	32.1%	33.3%	33%	25.6%

Source: Annual Reports of the Chief Constable for the West Midlands Police Force

Note: Statistics for 1996 and 1997 not available. From 1998 the data was no longer detailed per type.

#### 5.7.4 Physical Capital

Although discussions about refurbishment and letting of empty council homes had marked the 1980s, Central Government pressure to increase council house rents by nearly

three times the inflation rate and the write-off of rent debts dominated the first years of the 1990s (Howarth, 1994).

In the 10 months to January 1990, Wolverhampton had written off more than £300,000 in rent arrears. The Assistant Housing Director declared that it was former council tenants, many of whom were untraceable, who owed the cash (Express and Star, 1990f). In February 1992, it was revealed that Wolverhampton Council was highest on the list of rent arrears in the Midlands, with more than £5 million owed to them in uncollected payments (Wolverhampton Chronicle, 1992).

When the Conservative party won the local elections in May 1992, they launched new measures aimed at 'bad payers'. Measures considered included: a 'shame list's possible publication of nearly 600 tenants who owed at least £1,000 in rent; and a tenants whit tent arrears' immediate block on rehousing or transferring (Foster, 1992b).

The year of 1995 saw the discussion about empty council homes and growth in the waiting list return (Wolverhampton Chronicle, 1995b). By July, the target of selling 382 council homes over the period to the end of the financial year, following the 'Right to Buy' Government policy, already looked in doubt. Only seven sales were completed, and the reasons for this were resumed in a report to the Housing Management Sub-Committee.

'Members will recognise that Right to Buy is not the natural choice for all tenants, for the majority of whom renting continues to offer security, peace of mind and value for money, particularly when coupled with an effective rent rebate service, for which 74 per cent of our tenants qualify. All the signs are that the council also continues to provide an attractive rented sector service particularly in times of economic uncertainty, unemployment and short-time working' (cited in Wolverhampton Chronicle, 1995b).

In relation to waiting lists: at the end of 1995, 664 homes were waiting to be let, while 4,000 applicants continued to wait on the list, depriving the Council of valuable rents (Express and Star, 1995e). Despite significant press coverage at that time, no clear explanation of the nature or problem's possible resolutions was evident.

By 1996, the council houses' rate selling in town had risen. A Housing Committee report showed that 317 sitting tenants bought their homes at an average price of £16,000

after discounts, contributing net receipts of £5 million in the 1995-1996 periods (Express and Star, 1996d).

The council rent arrears' problem continued to receive coverage in local newspapers in 1996. At this time, Wolverhampton council tenants' rent arrears had hit their highest level in six months – just over 12,000 tenants owed approximately £1.9 million (Williams, 1996). In October, a further £345,000 in rent arrears was set to be written off by council housing management (Express and Star, 1996e). A secular gap between supply and demand of council houses opened further over early-1997. According to the West Midland regional office of the National Housing Federation, more than 450 extra rented homes were needed each year to keep pace with demand. Unfortunately, Wolverhampton could produce only 211 homes each year, largely because of Central Government investment's the levels at that time. Michael Kent, Chief Executive of the Housing Association, explained the possible consequences of this situation.

‘The figures are clear – the state of housing in Wolverhampton is getting worse. We expect more overcrowding, long housing waiting lists and more homelessness because future demand for housing in the town is being neglected by successive cuts in government funding’ (Kent, cited in Express and Star, 1997).

Table 30 sets out the average house price for selected types of houses in Wolverhampton in the 1990s.

**Table 30: House Average Price (£) in Wolverhampton (1991-1997)**

	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
<b>Terraced</b>	39,500	NA	NA	NA	43,996	39,157	35,500
<b>Semi-detached</b>	52,000	NA	NA	NA	46,526	45,794	52,000
<b>Detached</b>	121,700	NA	NA	NA	82,808	86,094	73,500

Source: Halifax Building Society

Note: NA = Not available

## 5.9 Conclusions

This Chapter had the objective to explore a number of the methodological and conceptual issues highlighted in Chapter IV. Furthermore, it aimed to assess, through this

model's the application, what happened in Wolverhampton, when and why. This involved generating narratives and counternarratives as appropriate.

Wolverhampton's historical overview and its political and economic development forces' the broad lines revealed various singular features. Until the 2nd World War, the town was dominated by heavy engineering industry, being a highly specialised manufacturing city (metal/rubber). Wolverhampton's main economic local characteristic of was the "big family" businesses. They were in vigour until the 1970s, employing thousands of employees. However, during the 1970s and 1980s industrial depression accelerated, with factories closing, rapidly rising unemployment and family businesses being sold to multinationals with subsequent downsizing and closure. Plus, the closure of the Bilston Steelworks marked the end of an era for Wolverhampton.

One of the aspects highlighted in Wolverhampton's Context was the long-running dispute over re-use of derelict land at the former Bilston Steelworks, with the first post-closure activity started only in March 1987 (mining). During the 1980s, the city exposed a high unemployment among people under 20 and unemployment rates above national average. Meanwhile, local Conservative Councillors advocated diversification strategy into service industries and small business. However, there was no agreement between Labour and Conservative local representatives on how to use budgets and develop policies.

Wolverhampton Context illustrates a community depletion's example: 34,200 people were on supplementary benefit and nearly 70% of Council tenants benefited from rate rebates. 1985 was the worst year before BSC privatisation, when 25% of local families were on some form of income support. Another significant Wolverhampton Context's features discussed in this Chapter were the 25% increase in infant mortality between 1985 and 1988; the continuous problems with truancy and with adult education's delivery; a high per capita expenditure and local students' low achievement; the closure of ward libraries, mobile library for schools and toy library service. Plus, Wolverhampton Citizen's

Advice Bureau had a 50% increase in consultations attributed to the recession. By 1987, the town was deemed the 'most violent division' in the West Midlands force, with the worst incidence of prostitution in the region. There was a growing Council house waiting list of future tenants, with many pre-1914 Council houses waiting for repairs and redecoration, and no money to complete the task. In sum, Wolverhampton's Context, as described in the pages above, was setting social limitations (constrains) on the efficacy of the programme mechanisms triggered by the BSC's privatisation.

The research set out here needs to answer two questions, based on the CMO model:

- ✓ What are the mechanisms for change set off by a programme and how do they offset or accentuate the existing social processes?
- ✓ What are the social and cultural conditions necessary for change mechanisms to operate and how are they distributed within and between programme contexts?

In the Wolverhampton's case, the following mechanisms were identified as setting of by BSC's privatisation:

- 1) Embeddedness of programme within stratified nature of social reality - Local Action Social reality in 1988: a depressed town, with unskilled men in long-term unemployment; antecedents to BSC privatisation programme: effects concentrated in specific localities (mobilisation against Bilston Steelworks closure (1980). 1988 privatisation process received with apathy (reflected in low-level local press coverage).
- 2) Propositions to account for both macro and micro processes constituting programme - BSC privatisation: unclear local impacts – plant closure or redirection? Closure (1980), redirection (1988), and then closure (1995). Macro processes: BSC offered for sale at 125p a share's basement price; Micro processes: How many people in town did buy shares from BSC? How many

lost their jobs?

- 3) Demonstration of how programme outputs follow from stakeholder choices (reasoning) and capacity (resources) to put choices into practice - Local Diversification Strategies: Stakeholders' choice limited, depending mostly on Central Government' transfers; slowness in search for economic alternatives in the 1980s, hampered by dissensus in political establishment. Local Hedging Strategies: local investments postponement (education, welfare, economic development).

This Chapter also described and analysed features of Wolverhampton's Outcomes, for example, the shortage of skilled labour and 42% of the local workforce being female and part-time by 1990; the closure in 1995 of the last British Steel plant in Wednesfield, with 500 jobs' the loss; the percentage of jobless remained higher than the national average (male long-term unemployed with industrial skills) until 1997 and the search for alternative industries. This search resulted in the creations of the Wolverhampton Science Park in 1993 and the Springvale Business Park the next year.

Despite looking for local economic alternatives, Wolverhampton continued to depend on Government programmes, as the Inner Area Programme. It remained receiving cash from 1980 to 1993. Other examples were the launch of the Training and Enterprise Council (TEC) in 1990 and the City Challenge Programme, which continued from 1991 to April 1997. This Chapter also highlighted the lack of consistent data (statistics, information and analysis) about the steel industry after the 1980s. In relation to the local steel industry, it noted that only Service Centres were registered at UK Steel Association today.

Some of the social problems faced by Wolverhampton during the 1990s were the heart-related problems killing 12% above national average by 1991 and 60% in 1992; the high levels of stress because of social deprivation; tuberculosis' high incidence and poverty related disease in a report from 1994; teenage pregnancies doubling national average;

higher unemployment among black school-leavers than white pupils (1990); car crime and theft from cars increasing by 55% in 1991 compared with the previous year, and the consequent creation of the Vehicle Watch Scheme.

In relation to local education, Wolverhampton tried to handle issues as the low progression to further education among all demographic groups – especially Caribbean youth; cutbacks in education budget, especially in 1991 and 1992; by 2001, the percentage passes from GCSE and A-level were still below national average.

Some local reactions against these problems were noted, as the launch of the Wolverhampton Truancy Watch in 1994 and the Community Crime Watch Schemes (neighbourhood and business). Despite this, there were a continuing pressure on Wolverhampton Citizen's Advice Bureau by the public, calling for advice about debts, benefits and poll tax and by 1995, 74% of council tenants were qualified for rent rebate, and 664 homes were waiting to be let with 4,000 applicants on the waiting list.

The next Chapter presents the second case study, the City of Sheffield, South Yorkshire.

## CHAPTER VI – THE CASE OF SHEFFIELD

### 6.1 Introduction

This Chapter sets out the last of the two steel community case studies – of Sheffield in South Yorkshire. Its purpose is also twofold:

- ✓ To explore a number of the methodological and conceptual issues highlighted in Chapter IV;
- ✓ To assess, through the application of this model, what happened in Sheffield, when and why. This involves generating narratives and counternarratives as appropriate.

The Chapter is structured as follows:

- ✓ Sheffield's city origins' broad historical overview;
- ✓ A political, socio-demographic and economic development narrative of the community;
- ✓ A detailed account of the community context in the 1980s;
- ✓ An evaluation of exactly how privatisation's mechanisms impacted on the Sheffield's case in 1988 (the year of the privatisation);
- ✓ The outcomes from this policy in the following years for the city.

### 6.2 Historical Overview

'A town of considerable note for its manufactures' (Revd. Edward Goodwin – Gentleman's Magazine, 1764)

'But even Wigan is beautiful compared with Sheffield. Sheffield, I suppose, could justly claim to be the ugliest town in the Old World... if at rare moments you stop smelling sulphur it is because you have begun smelling gas. Even the shallow river that runs through the town is usually bright yellow with some chemical or other. Once I halted in the street and counted the factory chimneys I could see; there were 33 of them, but there would have been far more if the air had not been obscured by smoke'. (George Orwell, *The Road to Wigan Pier*, 1937)

Historical information on Sheffield city's early history reveals that the area was home of a

small number of Iron Age hill forts and a single Roman fort at Temple borough, to the northeast of the present city. In the middle Ages, the Sheffield region remained sparsely populated, primarily because of its hilly topography and isolation from the major transport routes used at that time (Taylor, Evans and Fraser, 1996). The Sheffield sense of apartness has been sustained additionally by its folklore, which invokes that the city grew up ‘like Rome’ – upon seven hills. This diffuse notion of ‘otherness’ is underscored by Taylor et al. (1996).

‘Even in the early nineteenth century, this sense was confirmed by the routing of the main London-Scotland rail links through Doncaster, well to the east of Sheffield. It was not until 1870 that the opening of the Midland Station made available a direct line to London’ (Taylor et al, 1996, p. 37).

Sheffield developed around three interconnected industries: cutlery, steel tools and steelmaking (Hey, 1998). Sheffield’s cutlery trade originates in the presence of iron in the area, mined as early as the thirteenth century. By the sixteenth century, growing numbers of smiths and cutlers were making full use of the water pouring down from local hills to power their forges, importing iron from Russia, Spain and Sweden. Established local craftsmen quickly saw the need for cutlery trade’s regulation. The Manor of Sheffield’s ‘View of Frankpledge’ was drawn up in 1565. It set out the conditions of a local monopoly, an apprenticeship’s formal system and two periods (a fortnight in August and a month from Christmas day) of total cessation of output. These days were still known locally, as late as the 1970s, as ‘the stop weeks’ (Taylor et al, 1996).

An Act of Parliament of 1624 established the Cutlers’ Company as a self-governing corporation. It exercised a continuing influence over the city of Sheffield throughout the nineteenth century on behalf of the small craftsmen. The cutlers were known as ‘Little Masters’ and enjoyed the support of successive Lord Mayors. The only notable local industries outside the Company’s jurisdiction were nailing making and workshops

involved in old Sheffield plate's<sup>13</sup> manufacture. Thus, before the Industrial Revolution, Sheffield's area was already a well-established centre not just of the cutlery trade, but also of a specific system for the governance and regulation of that local trade and others, associated with it.

A key moment for Sheffield's steel industry was the arrival in the district, in the 1740s, of Benjamin Huntsman, a Lincolnshire-born clockmaker. Huntsman was interested in finding a more reliable method for the production of refined steel for use in clock springs and pendulums. He began to experiment using large clay pots, or crucibles, in which he could melt steel, adding a flux that would harden the steel, or 'cast' it. The resulting steel, unlike all previous versions, had little tendency to break and could be used in making razors and knives, as well as clockpieces (Taylor et al, 1996). Matthew Boulton, John Wilkinson and others quickly adopted his methods and by 1787 there were seven large converters in the area working on a version of Huntsman's crucible. Seventy years later, there were 135 steelmaking firms in the city. This local steel industry's massive expansion was to receive a further stimulus in 1856, with the discovery by Thomas Bessemer of a method<sup>14</sup> for purifying pig iron in its molten state through air pressure. All through the last years of the nineteenth century and into the period leading up to the First World War, the ironmasters of Sheffield experienced an almost uninterrupted period of growth and prosperity, much of it bound up with the steel utilisation in the armaments' production (Taylor et al, 1996).

According to Hey (1998), steel surpassed cutlery as Sheffield's major industry in the second half of the nineteenth century. For the first time, the steel manufacturers ceased

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<sup>13</sup> This is a technique for forging, discovered in 1742 by Thomas Boulsover.

<sup>14</sup> The Bessemer method used an egg-shaped furnace, which was open at one end so that for about 30 minutes air could be blasted into molten pig iron, causing it to burn with fierce intensity. The oxygen in the blast rapidly burnt the carbon and other elements and thus converted the iron into steel. No fuel was required. Steel could now be made in much greater quantities, at about a fifth of its previous price. The crucible process was not abandoned, however, for it produced steel of a higher quality than the converter, and continued to be used for cutlery and edge tools (Hey, 1998).

to look primarily to the cutlery industry for their customers. Rather, the new steelworks responded to international demands for railway stock and later for armaments. At first, the steel that was produced in the east end of Sheffield was made in crucible and cementation furnaces, but from the 1860s it was largely manufactured by new methods, starting with the Bessemer converter. These new developments enabled Sheffield to retain its position as the world's most famous steel manufacturing centre, a position that it had held since Huntsman had perfected the art of making cast steel in crucibles (Hey, 1998). The next sections detail the political, socio-demographic and economic development of Sheffield until the 1980s.

### **6.3 Political Development**

After the Second World War, the city of Sheffield had become widely known nationally as a 'Labour town', because five of the six parliamentary constituencies have consistently returned a Labour member. The strength of this Labour vote continued to increase during the 1980s, against the national trend. Taylor et al (1996) explain this perverse development in terms of the benefits arising from the careful city's rebuilding and planning, in the 1940s and 1950s. Sheffield had been significantly damaged by the blitz of December 1940, and also by post-war housing developments.

However, even prior to the Second World War, Sheffield had been a noticeably working-class city and this was reflected in its politics since the early 20th century (Seyd, 1990). The first Labour MP was elected in the city in 1909 and by 1929 the number had grown to five, since when the Party's predominant parliamentary representation has been maintained. The first Labour councillor was elected in 1905. By 1926 Labour controlled the City Council – the first large English urban council to be won by Labour. Since then, the Party has managed the city's polity without interruption - a Conservative administration interceded for but one year (1968-1969), and a Liberal/Democrat alliance

only in 1999 and 2000. After this, the political control remained in the Labour Party control. According to Seyd (1990):

‘Labour control of the city of Sheffield produced a distinct municipal socialism based upon a commitment to spend money on developing local services. For over 50 years Labour councillors were engaged in council housing and slum-clearance programmes, in expanding educational opportunities, in establishing the city’s own direct labour force, in stimulating the local arts and libraries and in protecting the local environment’ (Seyd, 1990, p. 336).

Table 31 sets out the number of elected councillors by party in Sheffield in May annual elections since 1980.

**Table 31: Sheffield Council Political Control after May Annual Elections (1980-2003)**

Year	Labour	Conservative	Liberal/Democrat*	Other
1980	60	18	9	-
1982	60	18	9	-
1983	61	18	7	1
1984	61	17	9	-
1986	64	14	9	-
1987	65	13	9	-
1988	66	12	9	-
1990	69	11	7	-
1991	70	11	6	-
1992	67	11	9	-
1994	NA	NA	NA	NA
1995	NA	NA	NA	NA
1996	NA	NA	NA	NA
1998	50	1	36	-
1999	39	1	47	-
2000	36	2	47	2
2002+	43	2	42	-
2003	49	1	37	1

Source: Adapted from Seyd, 1993, p. 155; Sheffield City Council website - [www.sheffield.gov.uk](http://www.sheffield.gov.uk), and BBC news website - <http://news.bbc.co.uk>

NA: numbers not available

+ No Overall Control after Council elections

\*From 1982 onwards the figures have been calculated by combining the vote of all Liberal, SDP, and Liberal Democrat candidates.

The Local Government Act, 1972 mandated new structures and powers for the local authority. A new body, the Sheffield Metropolitan District Council, came into being on 1st April 1974, adding Stocksbridge Urban District and Wortley Rural District’s Bradfield and Ecclesfield parishes, all of which had previously been part of the West Riding County Council, to the old Sheffield County Borough (Seyd, 1993). The new

authority doubled in size from 45,000 to 90,000 acres, but the additional space contained very few inhabitants: thus, the population increased by only 50,000. Even though the City's political boundaries were extended, its administrative powers were reduced as it lost responsibility for police, fire services and structural planning to the newly created South Yorkshire Metropolitan County Council.

The city's external boundaries remained unaltered in the 1980s, but structural changes to local government affected the city's powers:

- ✓ The South Yorkshire Metropolitan County Council was abolished in 1986 and its powers were transferred either to the four local district councils' joint boards (police, fire services and transport) or directly to the local district councils (environmental and structural planning);
- ✓ The city council lost planning powers for part of its territory when an Urban Development Corporation was established in the lower Don Valley (Seyd, 1993, p. 154).

The Labour Party's control over Sheffield in recent times is explained, according to Seyd (1993) by:

- The manual workers' predominance among the city's population;
- The labourist values' strength in the community;
- The population' spatial distribution (concentration of the non-manual workers in a few wards to the city's southwest);
- The public's satisfaction with their local services' the quality.

In spite of this, when a Labour Central Government failed to keep their electoral promises during the 1970s, with reductions in public expenditure, cuts in workers' real living standards and curbs on trade unionists' wage-bargaining powers, antagonisms arose among Labour's traditional supporters in Sheffield. This disappointment and Labour's earlier local election defeat in 1968 provided the impetus for the emergence of a new left in

Sheffield, with new social ideas and new styles of political behaviour. It was however, only after the 1979 general election that the local authority 'assumed major significance in its own right in Labour left thinking as an agency for socialist transformation' (Seyd, 1990, p. 336).

A group of left-wing councillors, based in the Brightside parliamentary constituency, gradually took over the leadership of the local Labour Party. By 1980 they were in control (Coulson and Baker, 1986). David Blunkett was elected Sheffield's Labour leader in 1980, symbolising this new left's emergence to power. Over the next five years, many other symbols of this new radicalism were prominently displayed. For example, the Council flew the red flag from the Town Hall on May Day and contributed £100,000 to the miners' support fund during the year-long coal dispute (Seyd, 1990). This 'new left' political orientation contributed to a particular way of intervening in the local economy. For example, the Labour Party consensus in 1981 about the Employment Department's purpose was that:

'Sheffield's economic reconstruction would not be based upon attracting footloose, irresponsible, corporate capital. A very clear anti-capitalist ethos prevailed and this was reflected in the department's active support for organised labour in local disputes. Restructuring of the local economy in the interests of labour rather than capital was its goal' (Seyd, 1990, p. 338).

Sheffield has 29 wards. These have remained unchanged since 1980 when last reviewed, apart from small changes consequent upon the external boundary amendments in 1994 (Sheffield First Partnership, 1997). Table 32 details Sheffield's population variation at ward level between 1981 and 1998.

**Table 32: Sheffield's Population Change (1981-1998) per Ward**

Ward	1981	1991	1998	Ward	1981	1991	1998
Beauchief	19,000	18,500	18,700	Intake	20,500	19,600	19,100
Birley	21,300	19,300	19,100	Manor	18,400	12,700	13,200
Brightside	17,700	17,600	17,300	Mosborough	22,700	32,000	34,900
Broomhill	17,400	17,800	20,800	Nether Edge	17,200	17,500	17,500
Burngreave	17,600	15,700	14,500	Nethershire	17,100	16,500	16,700
Castle	19,300	14,600	14,800	Netherthorpe	17,000	16,100	16,000
Chapel Green	22,900	24,000	23,600	Norton	17,500	15,900	15,200
Darnall	19,300	19,100	19,500	Owlerton	18,100	16,600	16,000
Dore	20,700	19,700	18,800	Park	18,600	16,900	14,800
Ecclesall	20,100	20,200	20,500	Sharrow	17,100	16,300	17,700
Firth Park	18,800	18,000	17,600	Southey Green	17,200	16,100	15,000
Hallam	18,000	18,200	18,600	South Wortley	23,000	23,200	23,700
Handsworth	19,300	17,900	18,600	Stocksbridge	14,200	13,900	14,000
Heeley	19,800	18,700	18,500	Walkley	18,100	17,800	17,400
Hillsborough	19,600	18,900	19,000	Sheffield	548,000	529,300	531,100

Source: Sheffield First Partnership, 2000, p. 7.

Source note: there is some uncertainty about the precise figures in those wards where most students live – Broomhill, Sharrow, Netherthorpe and Nether Edge.

#### 6.4 Social and Demographic Development

The town's population paralleled the steel industry's growth, increasing by over 20% in each decade of the nineteenth century and, during 1851 to 1861, it grew by 37% (Taylor et al, 1996). Consequently, during the reign of Queen Victoria, Sheffield acquired much of the character that it retains today. The central streets were remodelled as a commercial centre, giant new steelworks were erected in the east end, rows of red-brick, terraced houses were built in the working class suburbs, and the middle classes retreated to the west, away from the smoke and the grime (Hey, 1998). In 1893, Sheffield was given the status of a city in recognition of its growth and the international reputation of its products. By 1911, the population had overtaken that of Leeds, making it the most populous place in Yorkshire and the fifth largest city in England, behind only London, Birmingham, Manchester and Liverpool.

An important moment in the city's renovation in the years after the Second World War was J. Lewis Womersley's appointment as City Architect in 1953. Under his lead the Corporation Housing Department became a pioneer in public housing development's the

design and layout. The Corporation was responsible for, among others (Taylor et al, 1996):

- The high-rise deck-access development on Park Hill, overlooking the Midland Station;
- The development of medium-density neighbourhood estates on green-field sites in suburban town's areas;
- The construction of 2000 new homes a year by the 1960s;
- The existence of almost 75,000 council houses by 1973.

Notwithstanding the extant national legislation, Sheffield steel industry's wages' and conditions' settlement was dominated by local Sheffield masters in the steel and cutlery trades. The rise of the steel industry in the latter half of the nineteenth century changed the local labour market's composition and created a massive steelworks labour force. Taylor et al (1996) affirm that, even in 1981, there was far less social polarisation in Sheffield than in many other cities. In that year, 62.1% of Sheffield's population was employed in skilled or unskilled manual labour and only 4.6% were classified as 'professionals' (Taylor et al, 1996, p. 88). Sheffield may not have added a significant number of 'professionals' to its population in the period between 1945 and 1981, but the city and region was transformed in many other respects. For instance, combating its historically negative reputation as a dirty industrial environment was high on the agenda of the post-war Labour Council. After the passage of the Clean Air Act in 1956 (Taylor et al, 1996), the Council imposed a series of local smoke-control orders all over the industrial areas. In little over a decade, the local air's quality's analysis allowed the Council to make the claim that Sheffield was now 'the cleanest industrial city in Europe' (Taylor et al, 1996).

This improving reputation was carefully constructed in the 1950s and the 1960s. It was further enhanced in the 1970s with the South Yorkshire County Council's decision (led at that time by councillors from Sheffield), to subsidise the operation of local buses for

whom effectively needed them, making the bus fares in the region the cheapest in the country. Taylor et al describe the climate at that time in Sheffield:

‘with the continuing expansion of other social services and hospitals in the city, many local residents were confirmed in their belief that they had the good fortune to live in a well-managed city, with a real commitment to the population. The City Council continued to return an ever-increasing Labour majority. The only clouds on the horizon were the continuing complaints of local businesses about the levels of tax they were required to pay in Sheffield (which some members of the Chamber of Commerce claimed was, in effect, a business subsidy for socialist policies) and a creeping awareness of a lack of flexibility and competitiveness in the local economy’ (Taylor et al, 1996, p. 88).

Sheffield’s total population had declined from 561,500 in 1974 to around 530,000 by the late 1980s, losing an average of 2,000 residents per year. Since the late 1980s, the population has been more stable at around 530,000. This stabilisation has a number of roots:

- Births have slightly exceeded deaths;
- There has been a large expansion in students resident at the two Universities to around 30,000 full time students (this has counteracted the usual migration losses);
- There has been some international migration into Sheffield, including students from abroad (Sheffield First Partnership, 1999).

Sheffield’s birth rate has been below the national average for the whole of the last 20 years. In the period 1986-93 births were relatively stable averaging around 6,600 per year. A reduction is now beginning to take place, with the 1996 figure down to 6,090. By 1991, Sheffield had a much lower Indian proportion of people from the sub-continent than nationally (0.3% compared with 1.7%), but a higher Pakistani population (1.8% compared to 0.9%). Otherwise the demography is reasonably close to the England and Wales average. Table 33 sets out Sheffield residents’ ethnic origin.

**Table 33: The diversity of Sheffield residents' Ethnic origin (1991)**

<b>Ethnic Origin</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
White	94.9%
Black Caribbean/"Black Other"	1.4%
Black African	0.2%
Indian	0.3%
Pakistani	1.8%
Bangladeshi	0.2%
Chinese	0.3%
Other Asian	0.2%
Other	0.7%
<b>Total</b>	<b>100%</b>

Source: 1991 Census of Population

Source note: 'Black Other' category appears to relate to mainly young people described as Black British.

These facts suggest that at least 26,000 people resident in Sheffield in 1991 were from Black or Other Ethnic Minority Groups (5.1% of the population).

### **6.5 Economic Development: Steel, Cutlery and Tools Industries until the 1980s**

In the late nineteenth-century and early twentieth-century, Sheffield's craftsmen invented and perfected many of the alloy steels for which the city became famous. At the same time, the traditional Sheffield methods remained the only ones that could produce tool steel of sufficient quality. From the 1860s onwards the arms trade absorbed for much of the City's steel output (Hey, 1998).

The demand for guns, shells, and armour-plated ships during the First World War encouraged Sheffield's firms to expand to an even greater size and to install electric-arc furnaces. By 1915, up to 25,000 tons of steel a week left Sheffield for use by the Allied forces. From this year, women were recruited in large numbers, especially in the workshops where millions of shells were produced (Hey, 1998). In 1918 the Sheffield steel industry was vacillating, with danger signs coming. For example, the market for arms quickly vanished at the end of the war, and American and Continental competitors had caught up with Sheffield technology in special steel. The First World War had ruined many of Sheffield's best markets – American tariffs hit Sheffield exports hard, and Germany,

Russia and France no longer bought Sheffield's tool steel. Sales were therefore directed towards Australia, Canada, South America, China, Japan and the British Colonies, and to meet the home demand from the aircraft, car and motorcycle industries. Some firms rose to the challenge, but others failed to adapt (Hey, 1998).

Between the wars, Sheffield's steel firms struggled to recover their former confidence. One response to the new economic difficulties was to merge the largest firms into huge combines (Tweedale, 1995). At that time, production methods in the east end steelworks were a curious combination of the old and the new, the latest technology from research and development departments operating alongside the traditional crucible steel manufacture's methods. The demand for crucible steel declined steadily during this time, but the process survived until the 1960s. The electric arc furnaces had been introduced during the First World War, and by the late 1930s, all the major tool steelmakers had abandoned crucibles in favour of electric induction melting. These investments, along with the mergers, helped Sheffield maintain its lead in special steel technology between the Wars (Hey, 1998). Tweedale (1995) characterises the concentration in ownership as a 'defensive' strategic move.

'The mergers and diversifications, then, were essentially a defensive response to reduced orders, increased competition, and the inevitable need to switch from war to peacetime work' (Tweedale, 1995, p. 241)

During the Second World War, increased orders for the cutlery trade's staple products were offset by serious disruptions of production. Nevertheless, Sheffield's most ancient industry was again adapted to the supply of such things as fighting knives and helmets.

The Second World War was not followed by an economic depression, as in 1921. Full employment continued, even with increasing female participation, throughout the 1950s and 1960s, but the composition of the job market was changing (Hey, 1998). By 1951, women formed 32% of the gainfully employed labour force, while employment in the service sector of the economy had risen to 29.6%. The city remained unusual in having

57.5% of its workforce employed in manufacturing, with 44.4% of them in traditional 'heavy' and 'light' trades (Hey, 1998).

When Australia put duties on imports in 1951, the Sheffield cutlery industry was badly affected. However, the trade shared in the boom of the 1950s and its old firms revived. In 1957 no fewer than 650 of the cutlery firms in the United Kingdom, were located in Sheffield. The international competition intensified by the early 1960s, with Hong Kong and Taiwan entering the cutlery trade. Ten years later, South Korean firms made cutlery with labour costs one-seventh of those in Sheffield. Foreign imports increased from the mid-1960s onwards. The number of Sheffield's residents employed in the cutlery trades dropped from 10,000 to 2-3,000 by the early 1990s. Today, only a few firms survive (Hey, 1998).

The tools industry in Sheffield suffered similar problems, but hand tools' the production increased in the 1950s and the 1960s, when DIY retail stores opened throughout Britain (Hey, 1998). This trade has helped to offset the decline of industrial demand for tools. However, foreign competition became severe in the 1970s. It was countered by improved technology and marketing, and by mergers. By 1989, the workforce had declined to 3,650 (Hey, 1998). Many tool firms closed in the 1980s, but Sheffield has remained the centre of the United Kingdom hand tool industry. In 1990 Sheffield-owned tool companies employed over 36% of the national workforce and were responsible for approximately two-thirds of the country's output.

According to Taylor et al (1996), Sheffield's steel industry never involved the construction of local monopolies like those which dominated, for example, the 'steel towns' of the United States. In 1949, the Labour Government announced that the largest steel firms were to be nationalised. This policy was bitterly opposed by the Sheffield steel owners. In the end, some of the biggest family businesses, notably Arthur Lee and Samuel Osborne, were not nationalised. At that time, the private steel sector included such old and

well-known names as Balfour, Beardshaw, Bedford, Huntsman, Ibbotson, Jessop, Jonas & Colver, Kayser Ellison, Sanderson Bros & Newbould, Vessey, and Wardlow (Hey, 1998).

When the 1953 Conservative Government began to de-nationalise the steel industry, Sheffield's technical knowledge's traditional advantages, a vast pool of human skill, and a unique clustering of metal-working and engineering industries continued to give the city a competitive advantage. Sheffield remained a major centre for steel research and its firms quickly adopted new technology (Hey, 1998). In the late 1950s, the industry comprised a complex mix of over a hundred firms of various sizes, including some specialised steel firms that were nationalised, initially as the English Steel Corporation (1946-67), and, later, as the British Steel Corporation (1967-1988). Such monopolisation's absence may be one reason for the relative lack of confrontation between local steel owners and workers, at least until the national strike of 1980. In addition, the industrial relations in the town's steel industry took the form of:

‘direct and localised negotiation between relatively small workforces in individual plants and personnel departments, often with the mediation of the local Trades and Labour Council’ (Taylor et al, 1996, p. 44).

The option chosen in 1967 – partial nationalisation - brought interesting consequences for Sheffield, as Tweedale (1993a) observes.

‘This crude benchmark was politically and administratively expedient, but in ignoring output value it lacked industrial logic; as was soon apparent in Sheffield. The BSC took over some 90% of crude steel production, but it left in the private sector (besides the balance of crude steel output) a significant proportion of the forging, rolling and special steels industry, much of it located in Sheffield. The actual turnover figure left outside the BSC was about a third of the total at £1,200 million, these companies being concerned with higher value steels as well as engineering activities’ (Tweedale, 1993a, p. 185).

In Sheffield, only the then English Steel Corporation (ESC), Park Gate and United Steel were nationalised; the remaining companies – about fifty - were left in private ownership (Hey, 1998). The nationalisation's results in Sheffield are controversial. Its supporters argue that from the broadest perspective the BSC through its special steel division was able to provide the massive investment necessary to compete in world steel in mass-produced


products such as stainless steel (Tweeddale, 1993a). On the other hand, critics (Tweeddale, 1993a) allege that the insecurity in the years before nationalisation prevented firms from investing and then generated an untimely and unprecedented rush to modernise, and that the creation of a closely juxtaposed private and public sector in one city – a unique situation in its degree in the country – promoted commercial disorder.

Figure 23 sets out how a British Steel Corporation plant in Sheffield (British Steel Stainless) was created, tracing the antecedent mergers in its construction. The chart also demonstrates what happened after the privatisation in 1988 until today. The Figure attests to the historical complexity in steel ownership stretching back to the 1820s, as well as the rapid internationalisation apparent post-privatisation.

As Britain's share of overseas trade declined in the early 1970s and the downstream domestic demand for alloy steel in the engineering industry, producing ships, cars and aircraft suffered from the recession, the BSC's plans for expansion were cancelled. By the later 1970s Sheffield no longer produced as much alloy, as did countries like Brazil, Italy, Spain and Sweden (Hey, 1998). As a result of the recession, a drastic national restructuring was agreed upon. In 1976 British Steel Stainless was created and its Sheepcote Lane site was developed into the biggest purpose-built stainless steel plant in Europe (Tweeddale, 1995). Meanwhile, well-known names in private industry disappeared in new mergers. For example, in the tool steel-manufacturing sector, Balfour's were amalgamated with Darwin's, and Sanderson Bros & Newbould were merged with Kayser, Ellison. This centralisation was not enough to deal with the crisis; the number of workers fell from 20,000 in 1970 to 1,200 in 1991. Until the late 1970s, despite the recession, Sheffield's unemployment rates were consistently below the national average (Pedler et al, 1990). However, monetarist policies' adoption from 1979 was to induce a shock in the City's civic system. This shock correlated with the physical and industrial transformation attendant upon the dominant engineering and metal manufacturing trades' collapse.

According to Pedler et al (1990), the changes were concentrated largely in the industrial heartlands to the north and east of Sheffield, and were felt most in the adjacent inner city housing areas and council estates. The middle-class residential areas in the south and west remained largely unscathed. Consequently, Sheffield entered the 1980s fearful of an unprecedented collapse, with its traditional economy set to suffer a big and permanent transformation.

Figure 23: British Steel Stainless Heritage



Source: adapted from British Steel Stainless (1989); Tweedale (1995); Hey, Olive and Liddament (1997); AvestaPolarit (2002)

## 6.6 Context

'Factory closures and derelict land and building became familiar sights. Demolition programmes turned much of what had been known as "Steel City" into a wasteland. As they said locally, what the Germans had failed to do in the early 1940s, the British government accomplished in the early 1980s. The apparently irrevocable loss of its industry was perhaps the most difficult and profoundly depressing aspect of what Sheffield had to come to terms with. Gloom spread everywhere' (Pedler et al, 1990, p. 2)

This section presents a City of Sheffield's critical evaluation from the late 1970s until the year of 1988, when British Steel was privatised. The text concentrates on the 'social and cultural conditions that sets limits on the programme mechanisms' efficacy (Pawson and Tilley, 1997, p. 66).

### 6.6.1 Economic Capital

The following section presents how Sheffield's economy performed in the 1980s, and the institutions that the community and its civic agents created to react to the economic crisis.

In 1979 Sheffield's manufacturing base began to reduce drastically. Both the British Steel Corporation and private steel firms had faced serious difficulties from foreign competition and the declining home market in engineering. During the 1970s, BSC lost £2,836 million, its annual production of steel fell from 24.2 million to 14.1 million tonnes, and its national workforce was reduced from 252,400 to 166,400. Sheffield firms were forced to strive for even higher quality in their special steels. They had, however, to reduce labour costs and to make steel in sufficient bulk to justify investment (Hey, 1998).

Dabinett (1990) observes that like other communities, Sheffield had been losing manufacturing jobs since 1971. Between the years 1981 and 1986, however, the city was to lose a further 40% of its manufacturing employment. This was concentrated in the steelmaking, heavy engineering, hand tools, cutlery, engineers tools and related engineering sectors.

According to Pedler et al (1990), between 1979 and 1985 the numbers of people

unemployed in Sheffield trebled to 45,000 on the official count and to 60,000 on best guesses of the 'true' total given the frequent adjustments to the government's methods of calculating their figures. Job losses averaged 1,000 per month between 1979 and 1983, the steel industry alone losing 21,000 jobs. By 1984, six out of every ten jobs disappeared, in a once proud manufacturing city. Sheffield was moving perforce from a male, skilled and semi-skilled manual productive economy to a service based economy. As a result, there were large numbers of skilled production workers within unemployed population, but also related management, technology and engineering professionals (Dabinett, 1990).

The 1981 Sheffield Census Report (Sheffield Corporate Management Unit, n.d.) surfaced another dimension to the impact of unemployment. It showed that Sheffield's unemployment was worse in the national context than the official figures suggested, and that this was generally true for major urban areas. The official unemployment rate for Sheffield was 11.3% in April 1981 and, with the 27% increase in unemployment in Sheffield to April 1982, it would appear that the figure was now likely to be 14.4%. However, unemployment's geographical distribution also showed wide inequalities between wards: the unemployment rate varied from 21% (Castle Ward) to 4.6% (Hallam Ward). A clear 'geographical pattern' was evident for unemployment in Sheffield. The Inner Area, which covers a half of the city, was then estimated to have an overall unemployment rate at just less than 20%.

After the re-election of a Conservative Central Government for a second term, the City Council's Employment Department gave a local labour market's state's gloomy account.

'One in every seven people in Sheffield is now out of work, and there are 55 unemployed people for every vacant job... For women, older people, ethnic minority groups and the 10,000 young unemployed in Sheffield, the situation is even worse' (Sheffield City Council, 1983, quoted in Dabinett, 1990, p. 4).

Job losses' analysis over time by sector shows that, between 1981 and 1991, there were substantial reductions in the numbers of jobs in the steel and metals producing sector.

These two sectors alone lost nearly 20,000 jobs, or almost three quarters of the workforce over the inter-Censual period. The engineering/metal goods' manufacturing sector also contracted substantial by a third, losing nearly 14,000 jobs during that period (Sheffield First Partnership, 1998). Some sectors did increased jobs between 1981 and 1991. These included the financial's and business' services sector and in the other services sector that comprises public or personal services. These changes' implications in the traditionally male dominated industries were that the numbers of male full time employees reduced by nearly 30,000 between 1981 and 1991. By 1997, the number of male full time jobs was a third fewer in the city than in 1981 (Sheffield First Partnership, 1998). In the wider Sheffield Travel to Work Area, the unemployment rate in 1977 was below the national average. However, the redundancies and closures in the steel and engineering industries had generated large-scale job losses, such that unemployment climbed to stand 4% above the national average in 1986 (Dabinett, 1990). Table 34 sets out the unemployment rate in the Sheffield TTWA, compared to the national average over the 1980s.

**Table 34: Unemployment Rate, Sheffield TTWA vs. National Average 1981-88**

Year	Sheffield Travel to Work Area	National Average
1981	11%	12%
1982	13%	12%
1983	14%	12%
1984	12%	11%
1985	15%	11%
1986	16%	11%
1987	15%	10%
1988	11%	8%

Source: Sheffield Local Studies Library

The steel strike of 1980 was widely reported in Sheffield's local newspapers. For example, The Morning Telegraph followed the 13-week strike with daily publications containing local reflections on the dispute. According to the paper, the strike cost British Steel about £220 million and its Sheffield division alone, up to £36 million. There was considerable local bitterness surrounding the eventual national settlement.

'South Yorkshire strike leaders, who have consistently demanded 20%, reacted angrily to the news that the Iron and Steel Trades Confederation executive have accepted the 15.5% settlement put forward' (The Morning Telegraph, 1980a, first page).

After the return to work, in April 1980, the steelworkers in Sheffield faced a recurring problem: redundancies. Mr. Pennington, then BSC Yorkshire and Humberside's managing director declared at that time, 'If we do not recover our market share sufficiently quickly then it must put a question mark over what manning capacity we need' (cited in The Morning Telegraph, 1980a, first page).

BSC had had to rethink its expansionist strategy after losses in the mid-1970s. In the 1980s a new strategy emerged, the 'Phoenix', which featured joint-ventures between the BSC and the private sector.

Thus in late June 1981, the 'Phoenix 1', a joint venture between Allied Steel and Wire Company and BSC's Wire and Rod Mill Scunthorpe, was formed. Phoenix 1 had been under discussion for some three years. According to Abromeit (1986), this project originated not in Central Government circles but as a result of discussions between BSC and GKN. The formation in 1982 of Sheffield Forgemasters (half-owned by the BSC and Johnson & Firth-Brown) constituted the first Phoenix scheme in Sheffield ('Phoenix 3'). Another initiative, which took five years to negotiate, was a joint BSC-GKN venture, which issued on encompassed United Engineering Steels (UES) in 1986 (Tweedale, 1995). UES (Phoenix 2) encompassed the major BSC sites in Rotherham and Stocksbridge, plus GKN's Brymbo steelworks and its string of forging subsidiaries. According to Abromeit:

'...negotiations start(ed) even before those for Phoenix 1 had been concluded, since the worsening recession in the steel industry attached considerable urgency to all attempts at rationalisation (whether combined with privatisation or not). The original participants in the second Phoenix were to have been Tinsley Park, Templeborough and Stocksbridge (BSC - all electric-arc plants in the Sheffield area), Round Oak, Brymbo (GKN), Hadfields and Duport' (Abromeit, 1986, p. 237).

After Duport, Hadfields and Round Oak withdrew, BSC and GKN were left as sole participants, with discussion of 'what plant to close' (Abromeit, 1986, p. 237).

Dabinett (1990) describes Sheffield's local economic structure in the early 1980s'

fragility. He highlights five key problems:

- The closure of small local companies as well as the major ones. The local businesses (often sub-contractors) were unable to find new markets in time;
- Long term unemployment, and the deskilling this brought with it;
- Loss of training capacity, as apprenticeships almost disappeared and many private companies withdrew from training altogether;
- A negative multiplier effect as a result of a reduction in the demand for services;
- A property market flooded with large derelict sites and buildings. Many of these were unsuitable for re-use due to environmental and pollution problems or due to their design.

According to Dabinett (1990), Sheffield City Council became one of the first local authorities to make an overt policy commitment to address these local economic and social problems. This followed a period of adversarial relationships, as Dabinett & Ramsden (1999) observe.

‘In the 1980s the local authority refused to become involved in the deregulation experiments of Enterprise Zones and early declaration of UDCs, and did not receive special urban policy status through Task Forces or City Action Teams. Conflict and division grew between the controlling Labour nexus (the council, the party and the wider movement) and private capital interests in the city’ (Dabinett & Ramsden, 1999, p. 170).

According to the then Labour Councillor David Blunkett, an Enterprise Zone’s creation in Sheffield’s east end could lead to the ‘return of the evils of 19th century laissez-faire capitalism’ (cited in *The Morning Telegraph*, 1980b). According to him, Attercliffe, the proposed 500-acre zone was typical of areas of Sheffield that had been the victims of laissez-faire capitalism in the past, and the Labour Party had spent 50 years ‘pumping money into areas of the city made derelict by the enterprise zones of the 19th century’ (*The Morning Telegraph*, 1980b). Despite these early political signs, after his election as Council leader in May 1980, Mr. Blunkett did not interfere when the Sheffield Labour

Party launched an 'all-out effort' to win an Enterprise Zone for the locality. This effort failed (The Morning Telegraph, 1980c).

In 1981, the Council created an Employment Committee and an Employment Department. These were intended to 'challenge the principle of production through the private market mechanism geared primarily to individual consumption' (Bennington, 1986, quoted in Dabinett, 1990, p. 6). The activities pursued by the Committee and Department sought to address three areas of economic transformation (Dabinett, 1990, pp. 6-7):

- Campaigning efforts to save the town's steel and cutlery industries; challenge redundancies from plant closures; and provide assistance to unemployment centres. This was combined with support for campaigns against low pay and for equal opportunities; and public investment's exploration led alternatives, such as railway electrification and house building, which could create work for the unemployed steelworker;
- Supporting Municipal Enterprise. The Department worked to protect public service employment and to improve, through contract compliance, jobs' quality in the private sector. This action was pursued against a Central Government policies' background which restricted public expenditure and the ability of local authorities to use their own taxation base (Dabinett, 1990). It is important to note that this work was to precede the campaigns on privatisation, which arose out of Central Government actions to push back the role of the public sector even further;
- Attempting to create new jobs by setting up exemplary projects. The Department supported training for women and ethnic minorities and in technology, and developed initiatives in the area of socially useful production.

The Sheffield Employment Department stimulated a relationship between the public and private sectors' and the employment generation's function's reappraisal in all

the Council's service departments. In an 'Initial Outline' from January 1982, the Council's Employment Coordinator, John Bennington set out four broad objectives for the new Employment Department. These all required ordinate and corporate City Council intention to: role

- Prevent further jobloss in the City;
- Alleviate the worst effects of unemployment and to encourage effective training for new skills and jobs;
- Stimulate new investment, to create new types of employment and to diversify job opportunities;
- Explore new forms of industrial democracy and co-operative control over work (Sheffield City Council, 1982).

When the Department was set up in 1981 there was considerable optimism that its policies would provide a concrete demonstration of the 'alternative economic strategy' that the anticipated Labour Government would put into practice nationally. However, after the Labour Party's failure to win the general election of May 1983, Sheffield Council reviewed its position.

The departmental budget for economic initiatives was small in these early years, and was less than 1% of the Council's total expenditure in 1982-83 (Seyd, 1993). As Seyd (1993) observers, there was no specific legal power to support such spending.

'The council was able to spend only up to the product of a two-penny rate on local economic policy. No statutory provision for such expenditure existed and therefore the council was reliant upon Section 137 of the 1972 Local Government Act' (Seyd, 1993, p. 161).

Lawless (1996), commenting on the Employment Department's activities' results in the first half of the 1980s draws a distinction between broader strategic issues and programme implementation. In terms of the latter, he argues, many projects initiated by the Council proved effective and innovative. The Authority assisted a number of co-operatives in

setting up. A range of new socially useful products, including equipment for the disabled, an advanced humidifier and software for the blind, were progressed in a product development unit supported by the Council. However, these limited benefits have to be set against some difficulties, manifest as tensions between the Department and other more 'pragmatic' sections within the authority. The resources available, £18 million in its first seven years of existence, were insignificant in the context of investment patterns in steel and heavy engineering. Other councils across the country managed to acquire larger resources by using their own pension funds to invest in equity and by creating independent enterprise boards. The Metropolitan County controlled Sheffield Council's employee pension fund, and a decision was made not to create a local enterprise board (Lawless, 1996). These constraints undoubtedly reduced the already severely circumscribed powers of intervention, even while private sector investment remained at a low level: hardly any retail, commercial, or industrial development took place in the city in the first half of the 1980s. As Lawless (1996) concludes:

'the Department of Employment's experiment in radical local intervention in the early 1980s attracted remarkable academic and institutional interest; the beneficial effects for communities and individuals are harder to identify' (p. 6).

By 1990, the Department enjoyed a budget of over £20 million and owned a worthy ventures', in the form of training workshops, product development centres, and worker cooperatives (Seyd, 1990).

In 1981, the old industrial structure's collapse with, as yet, no significant alternatives' development, had led to a high proportion of the residents of places like the Manor being in benefits' receipt, with low disposable incomes, lacking the skills for employment and, essentially, becoming associated with non-work (Pedler et al 1990). The Manor, in previous times the site of Sheffield's nobility and of a large deer park, became, in the 1920s and 1930s a huge council estate of some 4,000 houses for workers employed in the heavy industries in the Don Valley. According to Pedler et al (1990), by the late

1970s the region was classified as an area of 'worst deprivation' by the City Council. In 1981, 32.5% of all under 25 year olds were out of work, compared with 18% for the city as a whole; 76% of households had no access to a car; and the disabled's and one-parent families' proportion was well above average (1981 Census of Population).

The Manor Employment Project started as a result of discussions between residents and a group of 'professionals' – some of whom had been involved in setting up cooperatives, with community work and with managing voluntary organisations, in June 1980 (Pedler et al, 1990, p. 4). From its earliest beginnings, the Manor Employment Project sought to involve local people in a process of inquiry and action. In the spring of 1981, the Council offered a large redundant worksite to enable it to commence activities. Over six years, to December 1987, the Manor Employment Project, despite frustrations and problems, helped to develop and create employment and business opportunities in the area. In its last year, the Manor Employment Project transmuted into the Manor Training and Resources Centre (MaTReC).

The Council continued to work in defiance of Central Government policies until the mid-1980s, when, facing the deep recession's realities, they effectively abandoned confrontation. The turning point came in 1985, when 20 Labour councillors refused to follow the party leadership and voted with the opposition on local tax rates, splitting the local Labour Party (Hey, 1998). A few months later, a leading group of business executives who were prominent in the Chamber of Commerce approached the Labour group on the Council to establish a working relationship that would promote Sheffield and attract new jobs. In December 1986, the Sheffield Economic Regeneration Committee (SERC) was created as a collaborative venture between the public and private sectors, with the objective of regenerating the Lower Don Valley. According to Hey (1998), 'the shift in council policy from an interventionist stance to a market-led approach was remarkable' (p. 245).

The Economic Regeneration Committee launched two initial campaigns to attract new industry, investment and jobs: a city-centre Sheffield Science Park (for high technology industry), and a Cultural Industries Quarter (for media, design, and music). These two initial projects show the Council adopting clear diversification strategies. According to Hey (1998, p. 246), Sheffield was increasingly promoted as a tourist and conference centre, while sport and leisure were identified as future jobs' key providers and as an area where Sheffield could claim an important role as a national centre of excellence.

In 1987, the City Council launched the Twin Valley Strategy. This plan followed previous efforts by the Council's planning and economic development functions to regenerate two areas of the city, the Lower Don Valley and the Sheaf Valley. The Lower Don Valley was the traditional Sheffield's steelmaking and manufacturing area. As Dabinett (1990) notes, it was the last major area of flat land within the city but was also an area of great dereliction. The dereliction and contamination problems of the Valley area were severe. Of 300 hectares identified as available for development in 1986, 208 hectares were unsuitable for immediate building. The Sheaf Valley was an area bestriding the city centre, characterised by a depressed property market, physical decay and an infrastructure requiring substantial investment.

The local authority sought to play a central role in planning the economic future of the City. Yet, it did not alone have the resources to bring about the regeneration required. The City Council's resources were therefore to be used to lever public and private capital. The local authority's strategy did not consist of a fixed plan but rather, of an approach linked to a vision to be shared by all groups in Sheffield. Dabinett (1990) resumes the content of the strategy:

- The Twin Valley Programme, requiring areas' physical and environmental redevelopment, focused on the Science and Technology Parks and a Cultural Industries Quarter;

- A Business and Technology Programme, developing a training, business and technology advisory and support services' network;
- A Promotion and Services Programme, developing tourism, inward investment and office accommodation opportunities;
- An Infrastructure Programme, developing economic support projects, such as enhanced rail and air links.

Consequently, when the City Council prepared the 1987 Employment Plan, it argued that jobs could be created by changes in Government policies towards major industries and municipal activities, but also that effective local economic strategies could contribute to national growth and employment creation.

Furthermore, the Conservative Government's re-election in 1987 and some prominent local councillors' departure for new careers as Members of Parliament signalled the end of confrontation between the local council and Central Government, and facilitated the creation of the Sheffield Development Corporation (SDC). The Government had been encouraged by the progress of the London Docklands scheme, and offered large sums of money for derelict areas' regeneration elsewhere, provided that the responsible body was not the local council, but an unelected Urban Development Corporation. Despite some initial disagreement, by December 1988 the Sheffield Development Corporation staff was installed at Don Valley House, in what had been the steelmaking district's heart. The Sheffield Development Corporation had an initial budget of approximately £50 million over its planned seven-year life, reporting to Parliament through the Secretary of State for the Environment. It was constituted as the planning authority for the Lower Don Valley.

The Local Authority, Central Government and local private sector consensus on the regeneration of Sheffield happened in parallel with the City's successful bid to host the World Student Games in 1991, with the City Council committing itself to an ambitious and controversial £100 million programme to make Sheffield into a major sports and cultural

centre. The broad thrust of the strategies adopted by the City Council in the 1980s is resumed in Table 35.

**Table 35: Sheffield Strategies for Economic Regeneration in the 1980s**

Strategy	Period	Key Objectives	Policy Instruments	Funding	Agencies for Renewal
'Labourist Tradition'	1979/80	Enhanced investment in collective consumption	New housing; educational investment; cheap transport; zoning and servicing land	Local and Central Government; nationalised industries	Local Government in aspects of consumption; National Government, nationalised and private sector in production
'Radical Era'	1980-85/86	Public sector intervention in local economy; job creation; proselytising function	Employment Department; financial equity in firms; Co-ops; equal opportunities; product development	Local Authority	Local Authority
'Emerging Partnership'	1985/86-1989	Collaboration-based programme of economic development; improving image of city; better 'business environment'	Flagship projects in retailing, leisure, commercial development, etc.	Largely private; 'pump-priming' Local and Central Government expenditure	Local Authority, private sector, through Sheffield Economic Regeneration Committee (SERC); Sheffield Development Corporation

Source: Lawless, 1996, p. 7

### 6.6.2 Human Capital

This section presents the trends in Sheffield residents' the status, comprising health, vocational education, training and employment in the 1980s.

Until 1981 Sheffield's post-war unemployment level was continuously below the national average, but the city's workforce was seen to be dangerously dependent on its traditional industries (Hey, 1998).

Education did not attract reforming proposals to the same extent as social services and housing areas in Sheffield in the 1980s. On the contrary, when the City Council,

proposed a 49% rise in rates in January 1980, it also announced plans for primary school closures, to take effect by September 1981 (Dignan, 1980). This proposal, among others, was designed to limit the 1981 rate increase to below 50%. Among other proposals were:

- Closing Norfolk Park hostel for severely mentally-handicapped children whose parents needed respite;
- Closing Unstone Grange, a residential centre for courses in community and youth work;
- Cutting Sheffield City Polytechnic's budget by £200,000.

Party activists within the Hallam Constituency Labour Party campaigned to abolish school uniform and corporal punishment in the early 1980s, and this was adopted by the District Labour Party and written into the 1982 election manifesto (Sapsted, 1980; Seyd, 1993). Both Councillor Peter Horton, then chairman of the education committee and education department officers was opposed to the proposal because there had been no consultation with local teachers. Consultation had been an education service's Council's past administration's prominent characteristic (Seyd, 1993). The education department, seeking to delay the proposal, devised an elaborate consultative scheme with school governing boards. Despite the general opposition voiced by the school governors, both commitments were introduced in local schools after Labour's local election victory in 1982 (Seyd, 1993).


City Councillors had only limited control over what was taught in local schools by the mid-1980s. According to Seyd (1993), some interest was expressed in the school curriculum's content. In particular, areas such as political education, equal opportunities, racial awareness and peace studies should, councillors contended, form a part of all secondary pupils' education. However, little concern was expressed with pupils' performance in schools and, in particular, with their differential attainment rates. Only after the publication of a study on non-attendance in Sheffield schools, did the Council

even discuss the problem. Seyd comments on the results of this debate:

‘a positive action working party was created within the education department, composed of city councillors and teacher representatives, but it soon became submerged in the delaying tactics of education officials and teachers who regarded this as an issue within their professional competence and therefore best left alone by politicians. This working relationship between teachers and officers tended to reinforce conservative practice in schools, irrespective of any radical political rhetoric. This was one example of the gap between myth and reality...Sheffield’s radical reputation in the educational field was belied by much of the practice within its schools’ (Seyd, 1993, p. 165).

In May 1985, Her Majesty’s Inspectors completed an inspection of the education service in Sheffield. They noted that Sheffield was achieving success—albeit at a high financial costs (Birch, 1993). Figure 24 sets out the GCSE achievements of students in Sheffield in the 1980s.

**Figure 24: A\*-C GCSE Achievements of Pupils in Sheffield (1981-1988)**



Source: DfES’ Local Studies section, Central Library, Sheffield

The decline of pupil numbers in Sheffield was greater than the national average: 44% between 1981 and 1991, compared with a national fall of 30%. This decline was not spread consistently across the city, owing partly to demographic variations and partly to the effects of planning and housing policies (Birch, 1993).

The quality of school buildings, their state of repair and fitness for purpose was another source of concern. This prompted an invitation to Sir Keith Joseph, Secretary of

State for Education and Science, to view the situation at first hand, which he accepted in September 1985 (Birch, 1993). By 1987, the problems went beyond the recurrent leaking roofs, spalling concrete, dry rot, asbestos, inadequate insulation, increasing vandalism and arson. Eleven schools of timber-frame construction and many similar buildings at other schools were found to be affected by rot in the main structural parts (Birch, 1993).

The Sheffield Unified Multicultural Education Service (SUMES) originated from discussions between ethnic minority groups and the Council's ethnic minorities unit, a community inquiry and a Home Office review of the Authority's provision funded under Section II of the Local Government Act 1966 (Birch, 1993). The aim of SUMES was to provide a framework within which to co-ordinate existing provision and use of Section II funding and to plan future expansion in a coherent and effective way. The plan as developed included:

- Restructuring the English as a second language service;
- A community languages and bilingual resources unit;
- Provision for the under-5s and for children with special educational needs;
- Community liaison teachers;
- An Afro-Caribbean support service (Birch, 1993, p. 335).

Several reports produced in the 1980s linked health indicators with social inequalities in Sheffield. For example, in 1985, Thunhurst (1985) analysed the geographical distribution of the population and the incidence of certain diseases, what he called 'social epidemiology'. The author looked for health problems' correlations' evidence with social, economic and environmental aspects. He concluded that geographical variations showed different health experiences among Sheffield's population. The mortality's overall distribution illustrates his conclusions. The author used primary mortality types containing information on all individual deaths that occurred within Sheffield, coded by postcodes to electoral wards. Employing ward/age distributions,

derived from the 1981 Census of Population, standardised mortality ratios were computed for 'all causes' and for specified disease categories by ward. These ratios were estimated for the years 1981 to 1983. Thunhurst (1985) concludes that:

'the five wards of Sheffield Central show consistently elevated standardised mortality ratios both for men and for women respectively, Burngreave 119 and 113, Castle 108 and 96, Manor 111 and 107, Netherthorpe 114 and 107, Sharrow 110 and 122. All, but one, are well over one hundred' (Thunhurst, 1985, p. 53).

'100' constitutes the city average. Sheffield Central constituted the most impoverished electoral ward in the 1980s. As the other end of the epidemiological spectrum stood Sheffield Hallam's wards. These were, again respectively for men and women, Broomhill (90 and 80), Dore (86 and 87), Ecclesall (71 and 84), Hallam (84 and 85), and Nether Edge (94 and 90).

The Sheffield Health Authority published another study along similar lines in 1986. This noted that Sheffield residents enjoyed, at that time, radically different health experiences, depending on their place of residence: 'tenfold differences in morbidity ratios (comparisons of disease) might occur in localities only a few hundred yards apart' (Sheffield Health Authority, 1986, p. 105). The report also suggests that a:

'... similar picture emerges for standardised mortality ratios (comparisons of death rates). For instance, there is far more lung cancer, heart disease and cancer of the cervix in deprived wards than in more prosperous ones. The range for all cause mortality varies from 14% below the national average to 29% above, with certain diseases having a particularly high incidence. For instance, male deaths from lung cancer for the city as a whole are 24% above the expected figure, which means 75 excess deaths a year, and heart disease in women is 10 percent above average, producing 78 excess deaths annually' (Sheffield Health Authority, 1986, p. 105).

In summary, Sheffield's health in the 1980s was characterised by large variations in mortality and morbidity between electoral wards, which strongly correlated with measures of socio-economic deprivation at that time (Sheffield Health Authority, 1986). Table 36 sets out key health indicators for Sheffield between 1981 and 1988.

**Table 36: Key Health Indicators for Sheffield, 1981-88**

	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988
Number of deaths per 1,000 live births	9,7	11,0	9,6	8,8	8,9	9,2	10,9	7,4
Percentage of low birth-weight (<2,500 g)	6,4	6,7	7,2	7,0	7,7	7,8	7,3	7,1
Rate of abortion in teenagers (under 16s per 1,000)	43	40	55	50	48	46	43	42
Number of Tuberculosis notifications (total population)	80	64	56	54	55	58	70	50
Number of deaths from coronary heart disease for under 65s	462	433	429	429	402	434	Na	Na
Number of deaths from stroke for under 65s	92	105	77	99	53	59	Na	Na
Number of deaths from lung cancer – men under 75s	418	397	355	383	313	335	Na	Na

Source: Sheffield Health Authority Annual Reports

Na: Not Available

### 6.6.3 Social Capital

This section presents critical issues in social participation and crime that Sheffield residents faced in the 1980s.

Under David Blunkett as chair of the Council's family and community services committee (1976-1980), particular priority was accorded to improvement in the provision of personal social services. During the 1980s, the local authority improved the services' provision's level for the elderly; established neighbourhood support units and expanded both residential care and local warden units. However, services' the provision for other groups, notably children and the disabled, suffered from a lack of resources (Seyd, 1993).

The greatest administrative change in Sheffield's Police Force since its formation in 1818 came in 1974. Under the provisions of the 1972 Local Government Act, the Sheffield Police Force was fused with Doncaster, Barnsley and Rotherham Forces to become the South Yorkshire Police (Vickers, 1992). This meant that in 1975, the South Yorkshire Police, with an establishment of 2,754 regular officers, serviced an estimated

population of 1,317,200. In addition to the staff at Police headquarters, there were three divisions in Sheffield, 'D', 'E' and 'F'. These had, at that time, a total strength of 1,063 officers.

'D' Division covered the City Centre, Wybourn, Park, Sky Edge, Broomhall, Attercliffe, Pitsmoor, Tinsley, Wincobank, Darnall, Handsworth and Manor. This area had an approximate population of 70,000 with minority representation's high levels. 'E' Division policed the south-western area of Sheffield, with a population of approximately 250,000, including a substantial number of Asian/Afro-Caribbeans. 'F' Division covered the rest of the City, including part of the inner city, the Hillsborough football ground, part of the Peak National Park, two major hospitals and the Sheffield University complex.

The period 1980 to 1991 saw rises in most types of crime in Sheffield. Offences against the person, which were 1,136 in 1985, increased to 3,240 in 1989. Offences in connection with motor vehicles rose from 17,084 to 19,489 between the same dates. When crime in South Yorkshire rose by 26% in the first two months of 1980, the Chief Constable James Brownlow declared that the rise was partly because police had been 'kept busy on steel strike picket line' (The Morning Telegraph, 1980d). Another cause of trouble was the non-payment of the Community Charge (or Poll Tax). According to Vickers (1992), there were many robust demonstrations against this tax. In Sheffield, some 6,000 people were summonsed. 4,000 people attend a dozen hearings arranged over five months and 2,000 actually appeared in court. Table 37 sets out the crimes committed by type in the City between 1981 and 1988. Note that the numbers are from all three divisions quoted above and therefore include surrounding hinterland's areas.

**Table 37: Total Crimes Committed by Category in Sheffield 1981-88**

	Offences against the Person	Offences against Property – burglaries	Offences against the Property – thefts	Criminal Damage	Other Offences	Arrest of Minors (10-16 years old)
1981	1,536	7,300	17,220	2,110	186	Na
1982	1,694	8,557	19,708	2,211	181	1,151
1983	1,611	9,634	20,776	2,400	226	1,169
1984	1,573	10,481	21,324	2,665	257	1,052
1985	1,802	9,126	19,803	2,902	297	1,068
1986	1,734	10,681	23,165	3,022	239	1,000
1987	1,850	11,780	23,918	3,478	301	797
1988	2,003	10,323	21,174	3,805	292	762

Source: Annual Reports of the Chief Constable (1981-1988); Sheffield Local Studies Library.

#### 6.6.4 Physical Capital

This section presents the local infrastructure situation in the 1980s, comprising ‘housing and other buildings, roads and bridges; energy supplies; communications; markets; air, water and rail transportation’ (Pretty and Hine, 1999).

The local housing department’s reputation, at least until the 1980s, was for building council houses. By the 1970s it was involved in clearing the last remaining Victorian slums, and replacing them with low-rise projects. However, the ‘new-left’ councillors were critical of the housing department, which they regarded as badly organised (Seyd, 1993).

When the new housing committee chairman Clive Betts assumed his position, the first task was to appoint a new housing director; Ray Gridley, with a reputation for innovation and management at the housing department in Manchester. The new housing director started by decentralising the department, with the city divided into 15 local housing areas. Each was to have an area office, which would deal with the administration of council property and would be the council tenant’s first point of contact (Seyd, 1993).

By 1984 a tenant consultation policy had been introduced which enabled tenant’s representatives to sit on area housing committees and provided them with administrative facilities and an independent source of funding from rent revenues. This represented a

major effort to improve the service to the city's 92,000 council house tenants (Seyd, 1993).

Since 1979, successive Conservative administrations had pursued three broad housing policy objectives:

- Increasing owner occupation;
- Changing local authorities' role, from providing housing to a strategic enabling role, with a residual welfare housing element;
- Promoting an independent rented sector through action to deregulate private lettings, combined with increased investment in Housing Associations (Foley & Lawless, 1992).

Sheffield felt this housing policy's effects, with changes occurring to tenure within the city. Absolute totals of public sector accommodation fell in the 1980s due to the enforced sale of council dwellings and declining resources for local authority housing's the construction. According to Hey (1998), between 1951 and 1991, while 100,900 new dwellings were built, over 55,000 old houses were demolished in Sheffield.

In 1981, the Council owned 45% of the city's housing stock, despite the Housing Act (1980) giving tenants the right to buy their council houses or flats. By the end of 1990 just over 14,500 Council dwellings had been sold (16% of the stock), against a national average of 20%.

Seyd (1993) explains the halting progress of the 'Right to Buy' central government housing policy in Sheffield.

*'There were strong pressures from within the District Labour Party for a confrontational refusal to implement government policy, but David Blunkett's appeal to party activists to support his leadership strategy of resistance but not illegally prevailed. So the Council tried to make it uneconomic for tenants to buy their houses by maintaining low rent levels and subsidising rents from rates, and by providing a good repair and maintenance service for tenants' (Seyd, 1993, p. 163)*

Household's average size has declined in Sheffield and across the country. In 1961, only 12% of households in the United Kingdom consisted of one person: by 1990, that figure has risen to 26%. This trend to smaller households might be important in the Sheffield

context because any increase in demand for Central Area housing was likely to come predominantly from relatively younger, single (and two) person households and from elderly people living alone or with their partner (Foley & Lawless, 1992). Furthermore, the number of private rented accommodation dwellings continued to decline in the 1980s, while Housing Associations were less active in Sheffield than in many other comparable cities (Foley & Lawless, 1992).

### **6.7 1988 and the privatisation of British Steel in Sheffield**

The year of 1988 saw Sheffield struggling with the recession, derelict sites and unemployment, and acting upon its regeneration schemes. At that time, manufacturing in the city was located primarily on the valley floors, the main activities being concentrated in the Don Valley, with a southward extension along the Sheaf Valley. There were also compact industrial activities in the north and east of the city in Stocksbridge, Chapel Green, Darnall, Handsworth and in the peripheral Holbrook industrial estate in Mosborough. Sheffield had relatively few of those small industrial estates that exist in the suburban areas of other towns of a similar type. According to Watts, Smithson and White (1989), this resulted in part from the lack of an outer ring road such as had brought industry to suburban areas of Leeds and Derby, for example.

Following the steel industry's large parts' closure at the beginning of the 1980s, Sheffield's job opportunities fell by 40,000 between 1981 and 1987. This loss meant that unemployment rose from being below to above the national average during the 1980s, reaching over 16% in 1986. However, this figure masked ward unemployment rates ranging from 5% to over 26%. Moreover, these job losses led to a fundamental change in the structure of the local economy – manufacturing's share of employment fell from 35.5% in 1981 to only 27.3% in 1987 (Sheffield City Council, 1992).

Sheffield's three largest manufacturing employers in 1988 were British Steel

Corporation, with 2,500 employees (mainly in the Lower Don Valley); Bassets Foods, with the majority of its 2,150 employees in a factory at Owlerton in the Upper Don Valley; and United Engineering Steels, with just under 2,000 employees at Stocksbridge (Watts et al, 1989).

Many of Sheffield's manufacturing industries were geared to supplying other manufacturing firms, notably, at that time, firms in the motor vehicle industries and its manufacturing sector was dominated by three activities of approximately equal importance – metal manufacturing, mechanical engineering and the manufacture of metal goods. These accounted for two-thirds of the city's manufacturing employment. Only two other industries employed more than 5% of the labour force. These were the food and drink and the non-metallic mineral products' manufacture. There were few representatives of 'modern' industries such as electronics and pharmaceuticals in Sheffield's industrial structure (Watts et al, 1989).

The metal manufacturing sector included the then largest locally owned steel firm (Arthur Lee), manufacturing wire, steel trip, and bright bars; and one of the then largest UK producers of steel wires (Tinsley Wire). A number of firms were involved in forging and foundry work. The biggest of these, with around 1,700 employees, was Sheffield Forgemasters, which operated the most extensive industrial site in the Don Valley (Watts et al, 1989). It is interesting to note that Sheffield's steel was made, at that point, in electric arc furnaces and it had no integrated iron and steel works. Output consisted mainly of high quality engineering steels and stainless steel.

Davy McKee in Darnall, which manufactured rolling mills and processed plant for the steel industry, dominated the mechanical engineering sector. This industry also included mining machinery, mechanical lifting and handling equipment's, and metal cutting tools' manufacture (Watts et al, 1989).

The manufacture of metal goods formed the third main element in Sheffield's

manufacturing economy. The main type of activity was the production of hand tools for both industrial and domestic use. Producers included Stanley Tools and James Neill. Within this category too, came Sheffield's cutlery industry that then employed less than 2,500 workers and was dominated by small, although widely known firms. A large part of Sheffield's industry was therefore serving other industries (intermediate goods) and not the final consumer (Watts et al, 1989).

### **6.7.1 The British Steel privatisation process in Sheffield**

According to the Employment Department of Sheffield City Council, the British Steel privatisation process in Sheffield started in the early-1980s. In 1983, the Department published a report titled 'Steel in Crisis', in which reasons for the problems in Sheffield steel were listed. According to Sheffield Employment Department, the steel industry as a whole was set to fail because of:

'the structure imposed by the incomplete nationalisation of steel in 1967 and the cut in demand for steel which has resulted from an international crisis, plus cuts in nationalised and manufacturing industry in Britain' (Sheffield City Council, 1983, p. 2).

Moreover, Sheffield Council identified Government policies as having made the major contribution to the lower demand for steel; specifically, BSC's financial problems and private steelmakers' failure (Sheffield City Council, 1983). The Council pointed to three main areas in which the privatisation of BSC had had negative impacts, namely:

- ✓ Sales below value;
- ✓ The merging of public and private enterprises, with local examples including the Phoenix experiments;
- ✓ Contracting out, for example of canteen and cleaning services (Sheffield City Council, 1983).

This 'early' British Steel privatisation's social costs in Sheffield were enumerated as:

- ✓ Redundancy payments;
- ✓ Keeping workers unemployed (unemployment benefits);
- ✓ Decrease in money in circulation (income multiplier effects) in the local economy (shop corners, pubs and others);
- ✓ Redundancies in other firms that failed to survive after the steel closures (sales multiplier effects);
- ✓ Ill health and psychological strains that usually accompany redundancy (Sheffield City Council, 1983).

Consequently, since the start of the 1980s Sheffield had been in a sense, preparing for British Steel's effective privatisation's possibility. At that time, 'privatisation' connoted 'closure' and 'unemployment' to the Council and steelworkers. The Council identified seven so-called 'myths' disseminated by the Government, concerning the benefits of privatisation and then proposed some alternatives and tactics, including:

- ✓ Campaigns against closures and redundancies;
- ✓ Fighting against the Phoenix schemes;
- ✓ Exploration of alternative domestic uses of iron and steel products (Sheffield City Council, 1983).

Until 1986, Sheffield had two local daily newspapers - The Star and The Morning Telegraph. In February 1986, the latter ceased publication after more than a hundred years of circulation, because of financial difficulties. Thus, in 1988, 'The Star', was the only daily local newspaper. However, no commentary or official advertisement concerning British Steel's privatisation could be located in 'The Star' in 1988 or in the new 'Sheffield Telegraph', now a weekly publication, in its first edition in late-1989. This suggests a remarkable lack of local interest in the privatisation process in this key year, after an almost a decade of discussion, protests and campaign against steel privatisation and closures. It is, of course, recognised that press coverage is always partial, but the lack of

comment remains marked, given the sector's centrality to the local economy.

Abromeit (1986) comments that, according to the Government, the main objectives of the Phoenix projects were 'rationalisation and privatisation' (pp. 238-9). However, the author also argues that:

'opinions on this matter, from those involved, are as contradictory as those on the question of "who pays?" which should come as no surprise, since the two matters are closely connected. According to the then Minister of State...Norman Tebbit, the joint ventures are to be "free-standing companies" and should not...be dependent upon subsidy and not have recourse permanently to injections of capital from the public sector – but this, of course, is exactly where the doubt lies. If, however, the Phoenix ventures are but a clandestine method of pumping public money into the private sector (any support that the BSC gives to one or other of its subsidiaries does not have to be declared as a state subsidy) it is doubtful if the whole scheme can, in truth, still be termed "privatisation" (Abromeit, 1986, p. 239).

Abromeit (1986) alludes to two more aspects to the debate on whether or not the Phoenix schemes constituted an early quasi-privatisation:

- ✓ 'Which side puts more, and more valuable, assets into a particular venture?'
- ✓ 'What is the new status of the new companies?' (Abromeit, 1986, p. 240)

The author reaches ambivalent conclusions.

'The first Phoenixes are half-way houses, hybrids, with a future as yet undecided. But on what this future will be, the private sector is split (although the majority seems to support these projects, for one reason or another): Phoenix could be a new means of state control, instead of privatisation. On the other hand it is also a means whereby private investors in steel can avoid bankruptcy; it is a way of weakening "big brother" by hiving off the most profitable parts; and, in the long run, these hybrid companies could spread further into the BSC and lead to the total hybridisation of BSC and the end of public ownership' (Abromeit, 1986, pp. 240-1).

Table 38 sets out the key 'mechanisms' at work in Sheffield in responding to the BSC privatisation policy. It will be recalled that mechanisms are defined by Pawson and Tilley (1997) as the 'introduction of ideas and opportunities to groups or communities' (p. 66). Each of their three key identifiers is related to the mechanisms proposed for analysis and the situation in Sheffield in 1988.

**Table 38: Identifying Mechanisms in Sheffield**

Key Mechanism Identifiers*	Local Translation of General Mechanisms	Sheffield's situation
Embeddedness of programme within stratified nature of social reality	Local Action	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ Social reality in 1988: large scale unemployment in the industry; rise in most types of crime; social inequalities reflecting in health indicators;</li> <li>✓ British Steel's privatisation programme only created a huge local reaction in the early 1980s (against the Phoenix schemes). The 1988' process was received with apathy.</li> </ul>
Propositions to account for both macro and micro processes constituting programme	<p>BSC privatisation: unclear local impacts – plant closure or redirection?</p> <p>Redirection (1988), mergers (1992, 2001) and closure (2000)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ Macro processes: Phoenix schemes</li> <li>✓ Micro processes: closure of small and medium sized companies as multiplier effects of the steel industry decline impact; how many lost their jobs?</li> </ul>
Demonstration of how programme outputs follow from stakeholders choices (reasoning) and capacity (resources) to put choice into practice	Local Diversification Strategies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ Stakeholders' choice: creation of Employment Department; until 1985, independence from the Government and private initiatives, planning and financing local regeneration plans;</li> <li>✓ In search for economic alternatives in mid-1980s: partnerships with private sector (SERC) and Central Government (SDC) in order to improve local economic development.</li> </ul>

Source: Data from research

\* Following Pawson and Tilley, 1997, p. 66

## 6.8 Outcomes

'Reality will be somewhere between these two images. Quite where depends upon how successfully the city competes with other cities for new business. There are two ways to do this: either attract outsiders or support local initiatives. Outsiders such as Norwich Union or Abbey National have an impact almost immediately – the Development Corporation needs a major player. Local initiatives like the cultural industries quarter take years. However it is geared to provide opportunities to locals, whereas at Meadowhall locals fill the shelves while outsiders, at least initially, fill the higher positions' (Fine, 1992, p. 103).

This section presents a critical account of Sheffield's situation from 1988 until the end of the 1990s. Pawson and Tilley (1997) define the outcomes as 'the description of the programmes' achievement' (p. 66). Socio-economic indicators have been utilised better to understand the privatisation policy's consequences' wide range on the local community.

### 6.8.1 Economic Capital

By 1989, Sheffield's economy was dominated by the service sector, which employed 73% of the workforce, but among English cities Sheffield's dependence on manufacturing (27%) was exceeded only by Birmingham (Watts et al, 1989). Partly as a consequence of this dependence on manufacturing, the City's official unemployment rate in mid-1988 was 13%, some 5% above the national average (Watts et al, 1989). The major employers were the City Council, with 34,000 employees (making up 20% of total service sector employment) and the Sheffield Area Health Authority, with 15,000 employees and 9% of service sector employment. Employment in hotels and catering, which in 1989 represented 6% of the service sector, grew by 21% between 1981 and 1984 but nearly three-quarters of the increase was in part-time jobs (Watts et al, 1989). The service sector was also well represented in retailing (15%) and wholesale distribution (6%) by 1989.

Official employment statistics for 1989 showed that there had been a recovery in the economy during 1987-89, both absolutely and relatively. Total jobs rose by over 13,000 – 6% growth compared with only 4.5% nationally. Furthermore, the job gains had come from sectors outside of the City's traditionally strong steel and engineering industries. Other manufacturing, construction, distribution and finance all experienced expansion well above the national average. The job increase was stimulated by a development activity's significant expansion, particularly in the leisure and retail sectors, which pushed estimated quarterly construction activity on major projects up from £35 million at the start of 1988 to £124 million two years later (Sheffield City Council, 1992).

The City Council, using data relating to August 1989, estimated that the numbers of unemployed fell by 405 between May 1987 and August 1989. However, they were concerned that this improvement in the local economy would not benefit all areas equally. The percentage reduction in households dependent on income support in the outer city area (12%) was twice the percentage in the poorest eight Inner City wards (Sheffield City Council, 1991). In sum, poverty in Sheffield in the late 1980s and early 1990s was still

high and was affecting the city unevenly.

Poverty can be both other deprivations' reflection and in itself deprivation's a cause (Sheffield City Council, 1991). For example, being poor reduces access to good quality housing. In the private housing market, the poor would tend to be concentrated primarily in the cheapest housing in the worst condition and poorest environment. Being trapped in poor housing in a poor environment may have adverse effects on residents' health either directly (for example through moist use or hypothermia during winter) or indirectly, through increased stress and depression. Benefit take-up provides one indicator of the city's impoverishment: by 1996, 46,187 householders in Sheffield were receiving income support, and 28,856 other householders were receiving housing/council tax benefits. The total of householders in some kind of benefit support stood at 215,967 at the end of that year.

In 1992, attempts to regenerate the Sheffield economy were hampered by the continuing lack of demand in the national economy, with the country having been in slowly recovery recession since 1990. In addition, the Council identified four other factors (Sheffield City Council, 1993):

- Slow-down in the world economy, with recession threatening key export markets for Sheffield firms;
- Continued restructuring by major companies across the sectors – from finance to utilities;
- The growing deficit in government finances, with tightening restrictions on City Council and other public organisations' expenditure in the city;
- Acute crisis in the construction and development sector, from which recovery would be slow.

These factors had led to growing job losses in Sheffield and the country. As national unemployment broke through the 3 million barriers in January 1993, the numbers

of those out of work in the Sheffield City Council area rose to 33,889 – an estimated rate of 12.9%, compared with 10.8% nationally. In five inner city wards, more than one in five of the working population was registered unemployed (Sheffield City Council, 1993).

Table 39 demonstrates changes in employment during the period 1981 to 1991, disaggregated by key industry sectors. The Table also sets out the percentage changes in employment between 1981 and 1991 for Sheffield, in comparison with Great Britain.

**Table 39: Industry Variation of Employees in Sheffield (1981-1991)**


Industry (1981 SIC major groups)	Totals		Percentage Changes	
	1981	1991	Sheffield	Great Britain
Agriculture	339	288	-15	-22
Energy/water	6,069	3,005	-50	-39
Steel/chemicals	27,072	7,314	-73	-29
Engineering	42,503	28,792	-32	-28
Other manufacturing	16,246	13,143	-19	-18
Construction	11,233	9,736	-13	-11
Distribution/Catering	44,540	44,509	-0.1	-13
Transport/Communication	13,600	12,930	-5	-5
Finance/business services	15,885	22,944	39	51
Other services	64,248	69,944	9	15
Totals	241,735	211,764	-12	1

Source: Adapted from Lawless, 1996, p. 3

The data illustrate de-industrialisation's and restructuring's process, as manufacturing employment levels fell rapidly, reducing the absolute and relative importance of this sector in Sheffield's economy. In 1991, only 23% of employment was in manufacturing (Lawless, 1996).

Figure 25 sets up a comparison between the local unemployed rate and the national average in the 1990s.

Figure 25: Sheffield Local Unemployment Rate versus National Average (1989-96)



Source: Sheffield Local Studies Library

The Sheffield Development Corporation (SDC), established in 1988, represented one of the 'new' generation UDCs in England and Wales, which were of a smaller scale in terms of resources and area than for example, the UDCs in London and Merseyside (Raco, 1997). According to Raco, the SDC:

'was given planning authority status and funded to regenerate a section of land, east of the city centre, known as the Lower Don Valley. This area had traditionally been the stronghold of metal manufacturing in the city and, up until the early 1980s, it provided thousands of jobs and represented a thriving industrial area, so much so that during the late 1970s Sheffield was regarded as an area of relative prosperity' (Raco, 1997, p. 386)

The SDC was set up to regenerate 2,000 acres at the bottom of the valley. Given a £50 million budget, and a seven-year time-scale, it planned to create 20,000 new jobs and attract as much mobile capital investment as possible. The SDC's approach, according to Raco:

'Represented a continuation of the UDC strategies which had characterised other inner-city areas of Britain, based on property-led regeneration and the notion that environmental upgrading and the preparation of "brownfield" sites would encourage investors from outside the area to relocate and bring the valley new jobs and a new aesthetic landscape' (Raco, 1997, pp. 387-388).

The Sheffield Development Corporation's first operations included, among others (Sheffield Development Corporation, 1992):

- Work on the first Supertram line linking the city centre and the new shopping

centre in the Lower Don Valley region;

- A new business opened by Abbey National involving a new building of 35,000 sq.ft. and up to 200 jobs;
- A new Royal Mail Sorting Office on a 10 acre site involving up to 600 jobs;
- Progress on the City Airport site, with 40 million cubic metres of fill due to be moved;
- Agreement with Norwest Holst for the £70 million development of the Canal Basin;
- Restoring 32 acres for industrial use at Atlas North.

However, Sheffield Development Corporation's expenditure's biggest single item was the new Don Valley Link Road, costing £30 million (Hey, 1998). It provided quick access from the M1 road and the city centre to purpose-built premises on attractive sites, with ample parking. The first business to occupy the site was the Carbrook Hall Business Park, soon filled with offices including, for example, the Abbey National share registry headquarters. The second was the Meadowhall shopping centre. Its creation is described below.

The Council's option to look for economic strategic redirection since 1985 was added to the decision to build an American-style shopping mall on the site of the former Hadfield's East Hecla Works. The original Meadowhall shopping centre was actually located on the hilltop on the other side of the Blackburn Valley, but the name was thought to be more attractive for a shopping centre than East Hecla (Hey, 1998). Meadowhall cost £250 million to build, financed from private sources and an Urban Regeneration grant. The shop fitting and associated costs added another £200 million. When finished, it offered a totally enclosed shopping district, with free parking for 11,000 vehicles, and 1.2 million square feet of shops. Trains and trams stop close by, and the proximity of the M1 motorway was intended to bring shoppers from other cities. Meadowhall was opened in

September 1990.

Another project undertaken by the SDC was at the city centre end of the valley, with the canal basin transformed and re-named Victoria Quays. The River Don was restocked with fish (Hey, 1998). The Prince of Wales officially launched this scheme, involving a hotel, restaurant, offices, a design innovation centre, art gallery, craft market, heritage centre, and facilities for open-air events, in the winter of 1994. The SDC's existence was extended to 31 March 1997, after which the City Council resumed its authority in the Lower Don Valley. The last SDC's project was the opening of the business airport at Tinsley Park.

The Lower Don Valley Business Association (LDVBA) was formed in the late-1980s with the objective of challenging the strategy of the then newly formed SDC (Raco, 1997). The local resistance to the Lower Don Valley's renewal was based on the threat of potentially great disruption to extant trade networks. The SDC, seeking to establish a new economic structure in the Valley, was implicitly suggesting that 'what had previously existed provided a non-viable platform from which to regenerate the local economy' (Raco, 1997, p. 388). Since manufacturing organisations still predominated in the Valley when the SDC was created in 1988, it is apparent that they were not to be the focus of the new strategy. It was to be service firms that were to be promoted as the key agents of change, in accordance with central government and Development Corporation ideologies.

Within three months of the establishment of the LDVBA, its leadership committee had developed a detailed strategy document, which was designed to set out a clear response to the SDC's earlier proposals. This document listed proposals for the forms that the regeneration should take, based on assisting local small business to grow, rather than developing sites into which inward investing firms could move. It suggested six major changes to the SDC's strategy:

- The SDC's sectoral focus should shift from leisure, tourism, housing and

offices to increased industrial land use;

- Immediate Compulsory Purchase Orders' withdrawal (CPOs). The SDC sent out 450 CPOs in late December 1988, a huge number considering that there were only around 800 firms in total in the Valley;
- Get the existing business community involved in the regeneration;
- Target other metal firms in the country and sell the 'advantages' of locating in the Lower Don Valley;
- Establish an industrial sites' phased development's policy;
- Reduce the scale of the proposed road scheme through the Valley (Raco, 1997).

These recommendations were squarely opposed to the SDC's plans. However, the LDVBA attempted to make clear that it was not opposed to the regeneration as such, but was only disagreeing with the details of the SDC's plans. As matters turned out, as Raco (1997) comments,

'The LDVBA had little direct political leverage and therefore its ability to influence the SDC through a route of diametrical opposition was severely circumscribed by the structures of local governance which allowed the SDC to ignore opposition if it wanted to, a factor that has appeared to place local communities in a position of relative political impotence... At the same time, shifts in the wider political and economic contexts turned against the SDC proposals, and to the advantage of the LDVBA in general' (Raco, 1997, p. 395)

Among the reasons for the relative lack of success of the SDC's strategy were:

- The anticipated income of the SDC, based as it was on securing private-sector joint funding and returns on land sales, fell sharply;
- The boom in land prices in Sheffield was shorter-lived and less-marked than for cities of comparable size;
- Most of the major investment proposals that were taking place, such as the World Student Games and the Supertram network's construction were public sector led, not private (Raco, 1997, p. 396).

As a result, the SDC failed to accomplish its ultimate objectives, and began to seek other ways of improving the Valley's aesthetic appearance. These were to be based on utilising existing indigenous resources rather than focusing exclusively on attempting to attract new types of investment. In mid-1991, the SDC began withdrawing its relocation CPOs and gradually replaced them with refurbishment CPOs, whereby firms were given grants of up to 66% of the refurbishing their existing premises' costs. This was something, according to Raco (1997) that the LDVBA had long campaigned for. The SDC's plans for the spine road which was to sever the Valley and affect hundreds of firms in the process were considerably scaled down and increasingly focused on the upgrading of existing roads, again meeting one of the LDVBA's chief demands. As Raco concludes:

'It would be incorrect, however, to credit the LDVBA as having directly brought about these major changes in the SDC's strategy through its influence. The large-scale alterations to the SDC's programmes were, rather, a direct consequence of the SDC's inability to fund their original proposals. However, in promoting a positive, non-defensive logic of influence, the LDVBA found its position changing from being a pressure group excluded from decision-making processes to one which was increasingly consulted on individual SDC-small-firm negotiations' (Raco, 1997, p. 396).

Central Government announced in spring 1989 its intention to establish local Training and Enterprise Councils (TECs), and the White Paper 'Employment for the 1990s', stated that between 80 and 100 TECs would be created over a three to four year period, each based in a distinct locality. Their main purposes were 'for employers, in partnership with the broader community, to reskill the workforce and stimulate business growth' (Field, 1990, p.5). Sheffield had successfully bid for a local TEC and by 1995; the following issues and priorities had been identified (Sheffield TEC, 1996):

- The 'Investors in People' Human Resources standard's lack of awareness amongst SMEs;
- Sheffield companies that were over-dependent on local markets' high percentage;
- Continuing relevance within the local economy on traditional industries with

poor growth prospects;

- Demographic trends indicating that the local workforce was ageing.

A Coopers Lybrand report on the Lower Don Valley, commissioned by the Sheffield Economic Regeneration Committee and published in 1987, articulated the need for 'a flagship investment' in the area (Seyd, 1993). Considering that in the past it had been private investors who had built Forgemasters, Hadfields, Firth Brown, Vickers, and other such steel mills in this location, it was now public investment that went into the Don Valley stadium, the Sheffield Arena and the Ponds Forge sporting complex. These facilities were to constitute a new wave of 'prestige projects' for Sheffield, as Seyd (1993) notes.

'The Coopers Lybrand recommendation confirms a point made about "municipal entrepreneurialism" that every city competing for mobile capital requires a specific feature, such as a convention or garden centre, shopping mall, or Disneyworld to distinguish itself from its competitors. Sheffield's distinctiveness was to be its sports stadium' (Seyd, 1993, pp. 174-75).

According to Vickers (1992), after the successful Sheffield bid to promote the 1991 World Students Games, preparations started with the construction in the city centre of an Olympic-standard swimming pool and diving pool, with seating for over 3,000 spectators, plus an associated sports complex on the old Ponds Forge's site. A basketball stadium and leisure centre was also opened on Penistone Road, while the Don Valley Stadium was also constructed, with covered seats for 10,000 spectators and room for many more on the open terraces. Nearby, the 12,000-seat Arena was erected, as an indoor entertainment centre, and home to the Sheffield Steelers ice-hockey team.

An anarchist group published a trenchant critique of the Council's decision to promote the Games and how the financial management was conducted.

'4,552 competitors, 1,424 officials, 1,014 sporting encounters, 130 countries, massive new sports facilities, £150m worth of building work... Eh?? £150m works out at least £25 per-person per-year for at least 22 years, and the cost is still rising, added to all our Poll Tax bills. The games will also cost a further £27m to run, this is supposed to be coming mainly from private sponsors but the amount over £2.5m that the council has already ploughed into this is anybody's guess' (Steel City Anarchist Group, 1990, p. 1).

The World Student Games were indeed a huge drain on the city's finances, but they can also be considered (as Hey does) to be a 'psychological turning-point', because 'the city at last started to look outwards rather than inwards' (Hey, 1998, p. 250). However, no serious cost-benefit analysis of the games initiative was conducted prior to the bid's acceptance.

'By the time it became clear that both the operational and capital costs of the games were much greater, and the income much lower, than originally envisaged, the options of cancellation or slimming down would have harmed Sheffield's modernising image. Once the city had adopted this 'mega-event' strategy it had to be maintained at the level originally intended' (Seyd, 1993, p. 176).

The Games themselves went well. Other council services appear, however, to have suffered as a result of the large debts, as Hey (1998) argues.

'Deteriorating school buildings, closed libraries, and a general shortage of money for all services are a legacy of the games. Politically, Labour lost much of its local support in the following years. The disruption created by the Supertram installation increased the dissatisfaction, though the council was not directly responsible. The Liberal Democrats capitalised on this unrest, capturing seats in the Labour heartland as well as replacing the Conservatives as the main opposition party in the city. After the local elections in 1996 only one Conservative councillor retained his seat in the Town Hall' (Hey, 1998, p. 250).

Sheffield failed in two bids for City Challenge funds in 1991 and 1992, but was then successful in obtaining Single Regeneration Budget (SRB) challenge funds in 1995, 1996 and 1997 (Dabinett & Ramsden, 1999).

In 1992, key organisations in Sheffield formed a partnership, namely the City Liaison Group. The Group's role was to provide appropriate leadership and establish a framework to foster the economic development, through partnership, of Sheffield. In April 1994, the Group published 'The Way Ahead', a discussion document that defined an agreed overall strategic framework for economic regeneration in Sheffield. It identified 59 action points, and attributed responsibility to partners for these action points along with targets and milestones. The Group intended to review progress on the action points, which were drawn from a number of objectives. These included:

- To develop action plans with quantified targets for the key business sectors in which Sheffield was strong or where there were opportunities to grow;

- To develop more world class companies producing quality goods and services for international markets;
- To improve educational attainment by increasing staying-on rates, GCSE attainment and by achieving the National Targets for Education & Training (NTET) (Sheffield TEC, 1994a, p. 10).

The mid-1990s saw the completion of four major transport investments in Sheffield:

- The Mosborough Link Road;
- The Penistone Road;
- The Don Valley Link Road;
- The South Yorkshire Supertram (Lawless, 1999).

The Mosborough Link Road was completed in 1994, at a cost of £27 million. This road provides access to developing industrial and residential suburbs to the city's southeast, thus also enhancing access to the M1 motorway via the Sheffield Parkway. The upgrade of the Penistone Road cost £18.5 million and improved the major arterial route, the A61, to the city centre's northwest. It runs along the upper Don valley, and serves large residential suburbs to the city's north.

The construction of the Don Valley Link Road consumed £33 million and was completed in 1996. It was the key element within the Sheffield Development Corporation's strategy. The Link runs from the city centre to the M1 junction close to the Meadowhall shopping centre. It also passes along a series of industrial sites, which were cleared and decontaminated by the SDC.

The South Yorkshire Supertram (SYS) investment cost £240 million and parallels the configuration of major new road schemes. The system started to carry passengers in March 1994 when the first section opened, running from the city centre to the Meadowhall shopping centre. All sections were open by the end of 1995 and now the 29 km route has

three arms. The longest of these runs out to the southeast of the city centre, leading eventually to the Mosborough suburbs. The other two arms lead along the Upper and the Lower Don valleys.

One further delayed project, The STOL airport, is built on the 50ha site of a former steelworks. The basic development cost had been met by the opencast mining of some 1.5 million tonnes of coal. The original developers went into receivership at the end of 1992, but the site for the runway had been prepared by early 1997. It provides short-haul flights off a 1200 metre runway and has also stimulated related business activity on approximately 90,000 m<sup>2</sup> of industrial and commercial space.

The Deprivation Indices published by the Department of the Environment in 1994 ranked Sheffield as a whole as the 35th worst of all Local Authority Districts in England. The index, a composite of a basket of deprivation indicators, also suggested that Sheffield's worst performing wards ranked 18th worst of all wards in the UK. According to a Sheffield TEC (1994b) report, Sheffield performed worse on all these rankings than did the other Local Authorities in South Yorkshire. They also suggested that a major feature of Sheffield was a particularly wide disparity between the worst and best performing wards on deprivation indices and some of the most contrasting wards were actually adjoining each other (Sheffield TEC, 1994b).

#### **6.8.1.1 Steel Sector Changes and Multiplier Effects**

In order to understand the privatisation policy for Sheffield's steel sector's consequences, it is necessary to summarise its situation in the 1980s. By 1981, all the metalworking trades together employed only 27.5% of the Sheffield workforce, and all the other manufacturing activity employed only another 8%. Sheffield followed national tendencies, as Hey (1998) describes.

'The trend, as in other parts of the country, was towards employment in services. Half the registered workforce in the city (50.8 per cent) now worked in services, and another 5.6 per cent found jobs in transport and communications. The steel industry accounted for but 9.9% of the workforce in 1981, since when it has fallen by more than half. Many of the old jobs had been skilled, male and well paid. However, many of the new jobs

went to women, for less pay, and often on a part-time basis. By the mid-1990s, two-thirds of the jobs in Sheffield were in the service sector, with only one-quarter of the workforce to be found in manufacturing (Hey, 1998, p. 244).

Yet according to Hey, the leading employers were all in the service sector: the City Council, the Sheffield Health Authority and the two Universities. The Meadowhall shopping mall, with 7,000 workers, employed more people than any of the local steel companies.

Despite the huge contraction in its steel sector, Sheffield remained the location in the late-1990s of almost the whole Britain's special engineering and stainless steels production. Hey (1998, p. 244), observes that 'modern technology has destroyed jobs, but more steel is now made in Sheffield than during the Second World War'. In 1993, over half of Sheffield's top twenty companies (by value of output) were either in steel or related industries. However, the local economy was more diversified than before. According to Hey (1998), Sheffield followed national trends, becoming increasingly dependent on small- and medium-sized companies with a turnover of between £5 million and £100 million. In 1995, the City had over 3,200 small businesses, which employed between 10 and 200 people. Further, local businesses continue to play an important role in Sheffield's economy, but at the end of the 1990s, the city had also followed national trends in supermarkets' and other household names stores' provision, both in the city centre and in disused quarries in the suburbs (Hey, 1998). Table 40 presents sectoral employment in Sheffield in 1981, 1991 and 1995.

**Table 40: Employment in Sheffield by Industrial Sector (000s of employees)**


	1981	1991		1995
	(1981 SIC)			(1991 SIC)
Energy and Water Supply	6.1	3.0	Energy and Water	1.6
Extraction of Minerals, Manufacture of Metals	27.1	7.3	Manufacturing	41.6
Engineering and Metal Goods Manufacturing	42.5	28.8		
Other Manufacturing	16.2	13.1		
Construction	11.2	9.7	Construction	7.9
Distribution, Hotels and Catering	44.5	44.5	Distribution, Hotels and Restaurants	46.0
Transport and Communication	13.6	12.9	Transport and Communications	13.2
Banking, Finance, Business Services	15.9	22.1	Banking, Finance and Insurance	31.3
Other Services	64.2	69.9	Public Administration, Education and Health	55.5
			Other Services	8.2
<b>Totals</b>	<b>241.3</b>	<b>211.3</b>		<b>205.7</b>

Sources: Sheffield First Partnership, 1998, Statistical Supplement, p. 3.

Analysis of data from 1988 to 1995 shows that Sheffield's registered businesses' average annual growth rate was greater than the regional average but lagged behind both the rest of the sub-region and the UK as a whole. Thus, between 1988 and 1996, the stock of VAT registered businesses grew by 0.8% in Sheffield. This was marginally higher than the rate achieved in the Yorkshire and Humber region as a whole (0.7%) but was slightly lower than that achieved in the neighbouring parts of South Yorkshire - Barnsley/Doncaster and Rotherham. Both had 1% growth rates over that period, which was on a par with the national rate (Sheffield First Partnership, 1998).

Before 1992, during the pre-recession period, Sheffield had a higher registrations' rate than nationally but to counterbalance this, it also had higher de-registrations' rates. Between 1993 and 1995, rates of both registrations and de-registrations were lower than the national average. This may indicate a more stable business stock than elsewhere, but it also suggests poor new business activation's rates (Sheffield First Partnership, 1997).

**Figure 26: Companies' Survival Rate Percentage in Sheffield after Three Years' Registration for VAT (1989-1995)**



Source: Sheffield First Partnership (1997)

In the early-1990s, Sheffield presented a paradox, according to Tweedale (1993a).

*'On the surface, the immediate impression was one of catastrophic decline. Steelmaking had long fled the city centre, while in the industrial districts, such as Neepsend and Brightside; the factories lay silent and idle. Against this depressing scene, however, could be set the not widely appreciated fact that around Sheffield were some of the most advanced and productive steel melting facilities in the world' (Tweedale, 1993a, p. 191).*

In the 1980s, major steelmaking plants in the area had gravitated to three main sites: Rotherham, Stocksbridge (both United Engineering Steels) and Shepcote Lane (British Steel Stainless). As indicated by Tweedale (1995), the evidence that Sheffield's decline was only relative lay in the fact that for example, at Stocksbridge, two large electric furnaces of 100 and 150 tonnes capacity each produced half a million tonnes of liquid steel per year. Since the other UES and British Steel plants were capable of producing close to two million tonnes of steel a year, it meant that Sheffield, at least in the early 1990s, could produce far more than it had done in the Second World War and early 1950s, and with a

far smaller workforce. According to the UK Steel Association, by January 2003, fifteen<sup>15</sup> steel plants were located in Sheffield. Table 41 identifies each one with their respective headquarters' location and product outputs.

**Table 41: Sheffield Steel Sector (2003)**

Name	Headquarters' Location	Product Group*
Allvac Ltd	<i>Sheffield</i>	Special Steels; High Speed, Tool and Stainless Steel
AvestaPolarit	Sweden and Finland, three branches in Sheffield Alloy Steel Rods Ltd Avesta Sheffield Precision Strip Sheffield Works Stocksbridge – Precision Strip UK	Special Steels Special Steels; Narrow Strip Special Steels; Steelmaking and Semis Special Steels
BEKAERT Fencing Ltd.	<i>Sheffield</i>	Mild and Hard Wires, Wire Products
Bridon International Ltd	Doncaster, one branch in <i>Sheffield</i> (Bridon Stocksbridge)	Stainless Steel Wires
CORUS GROUP Plc	London, two branches in <i>Sheffield</i> (Stocksbridge Works) (Tinsley Park Mill)	Steelmaking and Semis; Special Steels; Hot Rolled Long Products Hot Rolled Long Products
ERASTEEL	France, one branch in Sheffield (ERASTEEL (UK) Ltd.)	Special Steels
FIRTH RIXSON Special Steels Ltd.	<i>Sheffield</i>	Special Steels
Hemmings Wire	<i>Sheffield</i>	Stainless Steel Wires
Kiveton Park Steel Ltd.	<i>Sheffield</i>	Bright Steel Bars; Special Steels; Wires
SANDVIK Steel Ltd.	Walsall, one branch in <i>Sheffield</i> (Sandvik Metinox)	Special Steels
Sheffield Forgemasters Ltd	<i>Sheffield</i>	Steelmaking and Semis
Tinsley Wire Ltd.	<i>Sheffield</i>	Wire, Wire Products
UNSCO Ltd.	<i>Sheffield</i>	Bright Steel Bars; Special Steels; Wires
William Cook Ltd.	<i>Sheffield</i> (William Cook Parkway)	Mineral Extraction, Processing and Movement; Material Handling and Trunks
Winterbottom Wire Ltd.	<i>Sheffield</i>	Stainless Steel Wires

Source: UK Steel Association - [www.uksteel.org.uk/fullmemblist.htm](http://www.uksteel.org.uk/fullmemblist.htm) , accessed on February 2003 \* According to UK Steel Association classification

### 6.8.2 Human Capital

This section sets out the trends in Sheffield residents' status, comprising health, vocational education, training and employment in the 1990s. Education-business

<sup>15</sup> The membership of the UK Steel Association comprises 95% of the steel producing firms and many of the steel processing companies in the country. The data was last updated in January 2003.

partnerships were formalised in Sheffield in January 1988, with the creation of a contract between the LEA and the business community's representatives. This was designed to:

- Improve mutual understanding;
- Raise labour market information's standards;
- Make education and training more responsive and relevant to the requirements of employers (Birch, 1993).

This partnership comprised of collaboration between individual schools, colleges and businesses, on one hand, and the Sheffield Education-Business Partnership (SEBP), on the other. The SEBP was set up to co-ordinate and deliver an activities' programme while also seeking to direct relationships between the LEA, higher education's institutions, the Training and Enterprise Council and senior business leaders. One key area that underpinned their work was the education and career choice being made post-GCSE by young adults in Sheffield. Table 42 sets out Year 11 school leavers' first destinations in Sheffield, between 1989 and 1997. The Table demonstrates that, prior to 1997, the number of young people remaining unemployed had fluctuated year on year, varying between 4% and 10%. The lack of any clear pattern may be due to an impact combination of various stages of recession and growth in the economy and size's fluctuations in the 'not known' group. The take up of college education rose between 1989 and 1992 and then plateaued. The total young people's proportion entering some form of government-sponsored training halved between 1989 and 1996, from 39% to 20%.

**Table 42: Students' Primary Destination after GCSE in Sheffield (1989-1997)**

Destination*/ Year	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
Sixth Form	12%	14%	14%	14%	17%	17%	18%	19.5%	21%
College	27%	27%	35%	39%	39%	39%	39%	39%	38%
Modern Apprenticeship+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1%	2%
Careership+	37%	27.5%	28%	29%	26%	25.5%	21%	19%	12%
Employment	12%	14.5%	8%	7%	6%	7%	7%	9%	8%
Unemployment	5%	10%	7%	4%	10%	8.5%	10%	7.5%	12%
Miscellaneous and Not Know	7%	7%	8%	7%	2%	3%	3%	5%	7%


Source: Sheffield Careers Guidance Service (1998).

\* Following Sheffield Careers Guidance Service classification.

+ Forms of government-sponsored training.

According to a 1994 report from Sheffield TEC, a very significant percentage – almost 1 in 5 – of Sheffield's workforce was, at that time, employed in unskilled occupations. Moreover, most 'Managers', 'Professionals', 'Technicians', 'Skilled Manual' and 'Plant Operatives' were men, whilst women held more 'Secretarial/Clerical', 'Sales', 'Personal Service' and 'Unskilled Manual' jobs. In short, men tended to get better-paid, higher status jobs than women. The TEC committed itself and exhorted its partners to promote the current and potential women workers' best use and development business in the city (Sheffield TEC, 1994b).

**Figure 27: Percentage of Employed Workforce Qualified to at least NVQ Level 3**



Source: Sheffield Training and Enterprise Council (1997).

The Sheffield Health and Illness Prevalence Survey (SHAIPS), published in 1994, showed that 7.4% of the population reported symptoms suggesting depression. The survey also compared illness' levels in the city's different areas. For example, people with depression in the deprived Castle ward's percentage was 12%, some four times higher than that for the relatively wealthy Chapel Green. People living in Sheffield's more deprived areas were much more likely to be depressed than people living in affluent areas (Sheffield First Partnership, 1998). Furthermore, over 27% of all respondents from across the City reported a long-term illness, which was substantially higher than prevalence at a national level as measured in the 1991 Census using the identical question. Sets of twenty-two socio-economic indicators were used at electoral ward level, mostly derived from the 1991 Census. These indicators were used to compare SHAIPS findings on the prevalence of particular health problems with deprivation's measures. The results demonstrated:

'marked differences in the strength of the association between indicators of socio-economic disadvantage and the health problems covered in the survey. Looking at the findings as a whole, the prevalence of depression and respiratory disorders show relatively high association with such indicators. Other conditions such as angina-like symptoms, stroke, hearing problems, irritable bowel syndrome and musculo-skeletal disorders show more modest associations with indicators of socio-economic deprivation' (Sheffield Health Authority, 1994a).

The 1994 SHAIPS illustrated that for many common health problems, not just mortality, variations at a local level among populations in close geographical proximity and served by common health care services and resources, were often extreme. Table 43 sets out these variations by ward in relation to three health indicators.

A second SHAIPS was completed in 2000, with the respondents asked about their general health status. Questions ranged from the very general to the very particular, dealing with specific symptoms. Six of the health conditions surveyed were included in both SHAIPS1 and SHAIPS2, using the same questions (counting chronic cough, chronic sputum and bronchitis once only). Of these, four conditions recorded a fall in prevalence: possible angina, depression, long-term limiting illness, and stroke. The largest fall was in

reported angina symptoms, down by 25% on the first SHAIPS survey, followed by long-term illness, down by 10%. However, the measures relating to respiratory conditions, asthma and bronchitis recorded an increased prevalence (Sheffield Health Authority, 2002). Additional factors were surveyed for the first time in 2000. Key findings included:

- ✓ One in eight respondents lived in households dependent on some kind of income support;
- ✓ 20% of respondents reported being daily smokers, and;
- ✓ Chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, which can result in significant levels of disability but is often not detected until it is quite advanced, was reported by 3% of respondents – which could mean as many as 12,000 sufferers, across Sheffield.

According to the SHAIPS2 report, two aspects of Sheffield's health picture stood out:

- ✓ The data analysed showed a continuing and consistently high relationship between ill health and deprivation at ward level's indicators (using the Government's Index of Multiple Deprivation). The parts of the city that reported the highest health problems' levels in 1994 were virtually the same as those with the highest levels in 2000. Equally, those areas with the health problems' lowest prevalence in 1994 were virtually the same as those in 2000;
- ✓ Even though there was an overall reduction in prevalence for most conditions included in both surveys, this was typically geographically uneven. In other words, the differences in the rates between the wards with the lowest prevalence and those with the highest prevalence have increased for five of the six conditions measured in both surveys (Sheffield Health Authority, 2002).

**Table 43: Health Indicators (SHAIPS1) by Ward in Sheffield**

Wards	Standardised Mortality Ratio	Infant Mortality Rates	% of Adults with Depression
Beauchief	96	2.1	6.2
Birley	100	4.7	7.9
Brightside	112	11.9	9.1
Broomhill	69	6.7	6.4
Burngreave	119	17.8	7.7
Castle	131	7.7	11.9
Chapel Green	89	8.1	3.4
Darnall	131	13.0	8.4
Dore	84	3.6	4.1
Ecclesall	64	3.9	4.8
Firth Park	133	6.8	10.1
Hallam	71	3.5	4.4
Handsworth	132	13.0	8.9
Heeley	108	11.5	7.8
Hillsborough	106	2.7	6.2
Intake	109	6.4	6.3
Manor	161	10.0	9.7
Mosborough	107	6.8	7.0
Nether Edge	78	14.9	5.6
Nether Shire	129	8.9	7.0
Netherthorpe	150	10.7	8.7
Norton	114	12.8	8.1
Owlerton	126	12.4	9.0
Park	129	10.8	10.1
Sharrow	108	12.6	11.7
South Wortley	79	4.5	5.3
Southey Green	125	12.9	9.0
Stocksbridge	99	8.5	7.1
Walkley	108	8.2	8.0
Sheffield	108	8.9	7.4

Source: Sheffield First Partnership (1998).

Source Notes: Standardised Mortality Ratios – for persons aged 0-74, 1993-95;

Infant Mortality Rates – five year average (1991-95);

Depression – based on Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (1994).

In summary, SHAIPS2 revealed that health problems were spread very unevenly throughout the city in a pattern very similar to that found in 1994. Health problems were consistently much greater in Sheffield's parts that experienced high deprivation's parts on other measures – economic, educational, housing and employment. The extent to how the gap between the two extremes widened over the late-1990s is also quite apparent. Areas with higher levels of reported health problems in 1994 either improved more slowly than the others or actually deteriorated where others improved.

### 6.8.3 Social Capital

For the latter part of the 1980s and the years 1990/1991, Sheffield's libraries, like so many other institutions in the city, had difficulties with finance. These drove cuts in service, especially in the smaller branch libraries. One branch library, High Green, was completely closed in December 1990. Other branch libraries were being threatened. Because fewer new books were being bought, issues fell as follows:

- 1987/88 – 6,744,405;
- 1988/89 – 6,154,558;
- 1989/90 – 5,934,627 (Vickers, 1992, p. 227).

Despite these problems, a Library Shop, selling many books by local authors, opened on the ground floor of the City Library in 1987.


Sheffield theatres were making a major impact on the region following the Lyceum's re-opening in 1991 and the continued success of the Crucible. By 1992, the combined theatres had an annual audience estimated to be about half a million people for drama alone. Approximately three quarters of this audience came from Sheffield postcode districts (Foley & Lawless, 1992).

Meanwhile, running alongside the 1991 World Student Games programme, Sheffield held an arts festival called the Spirit of Ninety One. Held in July, it consisted of a Festival Parade, dancing, various bands, living sculpture, acrobatics and all kinds of music from classical to rock. In addition, the City Council supported numerous kinds of entertainment given by groups of artists from different parts of the world (Vickers, 1992).

The electoral turnout in Sheffield between 1987 and 1996 oscillated within the range of 28-41%. Generally higher turnouts were recorded over the 1987-1991 period compared with more recently. There was an unusually low turnout in 1992 because local elections took place one month after the general election. Within Sheffield, variations in turnout at a ward level are quite substantial. In the 1996 election, turnout lay within the

range 17-25% for most inner city wards. In 1988, turnout was higher, in the range 25-30% for most of these wards (Sheffield First Partnership, 1998).

**Figure 28: Sheffield Electoral Turnout**



Source: Sheffield First Partnership (1998)

In 1998, Sheffield's voluntary sector comprised of some 1,000 organisations. By 1990, 47% of all adults in Sheffield were members of at least one group. This was somewhat lower than the 54% recorded nationally's average (Sheffield First Partnership, 1998).

In 1999, Sheffield City Council and Sheffield Health Authority established a Citizens Panel to provide an ongoing sample of Sheffield citizens who could be consulted on policy issues in the city. Both organisations sought to ensure that, within its 2,000-strong membership, the Panel was representative of the population with regard to gender, age, ethnic origin and location in the city. Factors like employment status, car ownership, disability, length of time resident in the Sheffield area and household composition were also monitored. Invitations to participate were sent out across the city. The response rate was consistent with many other social indicators, since the highest responses were from the west of the city and the lowest from the east (containing the poorest areas). The answer variation rate was between 14.6 –17.5% in the South West and 5.8 – 8.62% on the Manor/Castle and Darnall region (Sheffield First Partnership, 1999).

Turning now to criminal justice indicators: in 1989, the Chief Constable's report

stated that there was convincing evidence that the increase in violence's root cause, whether it was murder at one extreme or boisterous behaviour at the other, was drink-related. This strong drink's misuse was again stressed in the Chief Constable's Report of 1990 (Vickers, 1992).

During 1990, the situation at the three police divisions in Sheffield was:

- 17,896 crimes were reported in 'D' Division, an increase of 1,800 upon the previous year. Drug-related offences continued to be a major problem within the Division;
- 13,140 crimes were recorded in 'E' Division, an increase of 2,185 on 1989. Despite support and encouragement for Neighbourhood Watch schemes, burglary from dwellings increased from 3,524 in 1989 to 4,080 in 1990;
- The total number of crimes recorded in 'F' Division increased from 12,141 in 1989 to 14,349 in 1990.

In 1992, the South Yorkshire Police underwent another restructuring; with two police divisions ('E' and 'F') were now responsible for Sheffield. In 1995, the most recent change, four divisions of the South Yorkshire Police Force was made responsible for Sheffield.

Table 44 sets out the total number of crimes that were reported in Sheffield between 1989 and 1998. Due to the changes in structure discussed above, the figures are for incidents not by division, but for all of Sheffield.

Neighbourhood Watch Schemes had been established in Sheffield prior to 1996. Over this period, the South Yorkshire Police had offered only tacit encouragement to residents to set up undeclared groups, without trademark street signs attached to lamp posts, in order to avoid intimidation by criminals (Whitehouse, 1996). Despite the force's efforts, some residents in the suburbs chose not to be involved. For example, in the Burngreave area, police sent out 200 letters to families asking for help, but none of them

responded. According to a local newspaper, intimidation was the most probable explanation for this.

‘The area has been plagued with street crime, drugs and illegal all-night clubs causing problems for residents. But fears of revenge attacks are believed to have left local people afraid to help police’ (The Journal, 1996).

**Table 44: Total Crimes Committed per Type in Sheffield (1989-1998)**

	Offences against the Person	Offences against Property – burglaries	Offences against Property – thefts	Criminal Damage	Other Offences
1989	2,145	10,655	22,014	4,059	319
1990	2,097	12,915	25,757	4,252	382
1991	2,010	15,587	28,500	5,027	425
1992	2,143	18,673	30,150	5,907	532
1993	1,983	23,466	32,483	7,027	515
1994	2,065	22,191	33,380	7,837	678
1995	1,882	20,283	35,042	9,487	689
1996	1,798	19,218	36,382	9,690	765
1997	1,811	17,024	28,742	8,002	634
1998	2,421	14,515	26,765	9,817	1,442

Sources: 1989-91 data – Annual Reports from Chief Constable; 1992-98 data – CDD Service Improvement Unit, South Yorkshire Police Headquarters.

Note: Arrest of Minors information not available.

#### 6.8.4 Physical Capital

Most property types’ average price in Sheffield stayed relatively constant in real (inflation-adjusted) terms between 1991/92 and 1995/96, though the bungalows’ average prices fell from 1992/93. During 1995/96 the average private sector house price in Sheffield was £53,324. Average prices in Sheffield rose by 2.95% over the previous year although they had remained relatively stable over the previous five years (Sheffield First Partnership, 1998). Table 45 sets out the average house prices by type in Sheffield during the 1990s.

**Table 45: Average House Price (£) in Sheffield (1990-1998)**

Type/Year	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Terraced	37,669	39,387	38,978	37,967	37,504	36,805	39,842	40,519	40,239
Semi-detached	49,722	53,657	49,360	50,202	50,035	46,639	49,881	51,285	56,778
Detached	99,954	94,039	84,229	89,149	81,736	84,185	90,988	91,545	99,084

Source: Sheffield First Partnership, 1998

The Council's 1994 housing needs survey revealed that 31% of households in the city who would like to buy (46,500 households) had gross household incomes of less than £200 a week. By April 1997, there were approximately 225,100 dwellings within Sheffield of which 65% were in the private sector. The local authority owned 31% of the total stock, while 4% was owned by housing associations. The local authority had at this time 1,623 empty properties available for let or waiting for minor repairs out of a total of stock of around 68,500 lettable properties. Local authority empty properties' proportion rose from 2.12% in 1995/96 to 2.34% in 1996/97. A comparison with the Audit Commission Performance Indicators showed that empty properties' proportion in Sheffield was higher than the average for metropolitan districts (Sheffield First Partnership, 1997).

By 1998, Sheffield's population was moving away from the north and east of the city, towards the more prosperous west and south (Sheffield City Council, 1999). The population change between 1981 and 1998 was:

- +1% (Suburbs);
- +7% (South and West Inner City);
- -11% (North and East Inner City).

According to the local authority, this increasing polarisation was a feature of all British cities throughout the 1980s and 1990s. The reasons for this phenomenon are complex, but two noticeable factors include:

- Major economic decline's effect on local housing markets during the 1980s;
- Housing markets' subsequent stagnation, putting more attractive neighbourhoods within the reach of many working households living in inner city areas, primarily families and couples (Sheffield City Council, 1999).

Concerning this matter, Sheffield local authority commented that:

'the stark division within the city are confirmed by almost every indicator, including unemployment and benefits, educational attainment, ill health, and burglary rates. The division is also reflected strongly in property values. Over all values have remained steady in Sheffield, and the market has generally picked up in more desirable areas of the city. But values remain low in the east and north, and in some areas prices have

Those without the means to move, along with older people unwilling to uproot, had been 'left behind'. In areas of Council housing, they were joined by younger single people, able to access tenancies increasingly easily as rehousing lists fell. Apart from estates within walking distance of the city centre, the universities and the south-western suburbs, the young people forming households were likely to be unemployed or economically inactive (Sheffield City Council, 1999).

## **6.9 Conclusions**

This chapter had the objective to explore a number of the methodological and conceptual issues highlighted in Chapter IV. Furthermore, it aimed to assess, through this model's application, what happened in Sheffield, when and why. This involved generating narratives and counternarratives as appropriate.

Sheffield's historical overview recognised three manufacturing industry's key sectors: steelmaking, cutlery and steel tools. Political development review demonstrated that the city had been a distinctly working-class city and this was reproduced in its politics since the early 20th century. The emergence of a new left in Sheffield from 1968 and the conquest of the city Council's leadership in 1980 contributed to a particular way of intervening in the local economy, as described later in the economic capital's Context part.

The steel industry's rise in the latter half of the 19th century influenced the local labour's composition market and created a massive steelworks labour force. Until early 1980s, the majority of Sheffield's population was employed in skilled or unskilled manual labour and less than 5% were classified as 'professionals'. After the Second World War and during the 1960s and the 1970s, Sheffield improved the 'well-managed' city's reputation, with continuous expansion of social services and hospitals.

Sheffield's three key manufactured sectors' economic development had the contribution of many skilled craftsmen, inventors and managers. The steel industry, for example, learned how to adapt itself (specially promoting mergers), invest in new technologies and redirect its efforts since the end of the First World War, when it faced its first crisis. The relative lack of confrontation between local steel owners and workers – at least until the 1980s national strike – demonstrated a singular pattern in Sheffield's industrial relations. The research acknowledged a possible cause and effect issue for this:

- The 'View of Frankpledge'- a regulation of the cutlery industry local monopoly and other issues concerning the sector, dated from the 16th century;
- Consequently, an absence of local monopolies, even in the steel industry, distinguishing Sheffield from other 'steel' towns.

Notable characteristics in Sheffield's Context – as classified as economic capital - included the manufacturing base's reduction from 1979, because of foreign competition and decline on home market in engineering, with consequential unemployment and local BSC-private 'Phoenix' joint venture's schemes. The 1980s in Sheffield is remembered by the local economy's fragility (closures, long-term unemployment, loss of training capacity and negative multiplier effect). Also, the city Council collided with Central Government, refusing schemes like Enterprise Zones and Urban Development Corporations in the early 1980s. An early local reaction against the economic unrest was the creation of the Employment Department. Another initiative, this time through the community was the Manor Employment Project. A sudden turning point in the local authority's orientation is identified from 1985 onwards, when the Council accepted a wider relationship with local business (SERC) and Central Government (SDC).

Sheffield also presented social inequalities that reflected in some health indicators, with variations in mortality and morbidity between electoral wards strongly correlating with measures of socio-economic deprivation. There were cuts in early-years education in

order to cap local rates increase below 50%. A good notice was received in 1985: the education in the City categorised as 'doing well', despite the shortage of investment. There were, however, concerns about quality of school buildings and suitability for purpose. The local Authority had to choose where to spend, and the research identified some service provision for the elderly's improvement and a resources for children and disabled people's lack. Furthermore, most categories of crime rose from 1980. An absolute total of public sector accommodation was falling in the 1980s decade, with Council houses' slow construction; failure of private rented sector and the 'Right to Buy' policy in Sheffield: the Council maintained low rents, making it uneconomic for tenants to buy.

The research set out in page 90 two questions, based on the CMO model:

- ✓ What are the mechanisms for change set off by a programme and how do they offset or accentuate the existing social processes?
- ✓ What are the social and cultural conditions necessary for change mechanisms to operate and how are they distributed within and between programme contexts?

In the Sheffield's case, the following mechanisms were identified as setting of by BSC's privatisation:

- 1) Embeddedness of programme within social reality's stratified nature - Local Action-Social reality in 1988: large scale unemployment in the industry; rise in most types of crime; social inequalities reflecting in health indicators; British Steel's privatisation programme only created a huge local reaction in the early 1980s (against the Phoenix schemes). The 1988' process was received with apathy;
- 2) Propositions to account for both macro and micro processes constituting programme - BSC privatisation: unclear local impacts – plant closure or redirection? Redirection (1988), mergers (1992, 2001) and closure (2000). Macro processes: Phoenix schemes. Micro processes: small and medium sized companies' closure as multiplier effects of

the steel industry decline impact; how many lost their jobs?

- 3) Demonstration of how programme outputs follow from stakeholders choices (reasoning) and capacity (resources) to put choice into practice: Local Diversification Strategies - Stakeholders' choice: creation of Employment Department; until 1985, independence from the Government and private initiatives, planning and financing local regeneration plans; in search for economic alternatives in mid-1980s: partnerships with private sector (SERC) and Central Government (SDC) in order to improve local economic development.

Four asset-based capitals also presented in Sheffield's outcomes were distinguished in this Chapter, namely economic, human, social and physical. In relation to economic capital the year of 1989 found Sheffield's economy dominated by the service sector, but with dependence on manufacturing (27%), exceeded only by Birmingham. By 1991, labour force participation in the manufacturing sector fell to 21%. On the other hand, the unemployment in mid-1988 was rated by 13%, five percentage points above national average.

The 1990s saw the Sheffield Development Corporation in action, regenerating 2,000 acres at the Lower Don Valley region: Don Valley Link Road, Meadowhall, Airport, and Supertram. However, SDC strategy increasingly focused on existing indigenous resources rather than seeking new types of investment.

The Local Authority was looking for alternatives. Among them for example, the research identified the dispute for the right to welcome the 1991 World Student Games and Single Regeneration Budget. Additionally, the research noted a partnership's creation to foster economic development: the City Liaison Group.

Social and human capitals in the 1990s' Sheffield had these significant characteristics:

- ✓ Wide socio-economic disparity between wards;

- ✓ Epidemiological gap between wards grew between 1994 and 2000;
- ✓ Health problems were great in localities where education, housing and employment were impoverished as well;
- ✓ Almost 1 in 5 of Sheffield's employees was employed in unskilled occupations by 1994;
- ✓ Between 1988-1991 there were cuts in library services and the High Green library's closure.

In addition, the leading employers were in the service sector, despite the steel sector was still recognised as a powerful employer, but with fewer vacancies and more specialised than ever. 1990 saw an increase of crimes reported, specifically drug-related offences. Despite encouragement for Neighbourhood Watch Schemes, the city had a noticeable increase in burglary from dwellings, with some suburban residents afraid to create a Watch Scheme because of possible retaliation. Finally, physical capital's features in Sheffield suggested an increasing polarisation to the south and west inner areas, where the socio-economic indicators were more positive. The next chapter presents a sustained analysis and interpretation of the two case studies' findings, exploring them separately in the two firstly sections. Section three sets out a findings' cross-analysis and section four examines the research findings through the lens of scientific rigour.

## CHAPTER VII – EVALUATING THE CASE STUDIES

This Chapter analyses the findings presented in Chapter V and VI, respectively the cases of Wolverhampton and Sheffield. This task is undertaken in order to ultimately answer the research questions:

- ✓ What sort of socio-economic impacts are generated by a single economic public policy developed at national level and applied in different communities?
- ✓ What are the temporal and causal relationships that underpin the communal adjustment process?
- ✓ How to measure and generalise from them?

The next two sections explore separately the data from the two case studies. In the following section, a cross-analysis of the findings is presented and discussed. Thus, this section explores the possible scenarios that the findings surfaced. Finally, section four concludes with some impressions about the realistic approach's relevance in this research.

### 7.1 Exploring the Wolverhampton data

This section analyses the Wolverhampton data, utilising as require, Braudel's framework discussed in Chapter III. The first subsection presents data from research identified as constituting the long *durée*. Subsection 7.1.2 discusses the *durée moyenne*. Subsection 7.1.3 discusses the *durée courte*. Subsection 7.1.4 discusses the community's evenements identified in the analysis. Finally subsection 7.1.5 applies the CMO model based on the Wolverhampton findings.

#### 7.1.1 Wolverhampton origins – the long *durée*

The signs of the long *durée* in Wolverhampton can be seen in the original local availability of coal and iron. However, these assets were not particularly accessible, given a seaport or major rivers' lack for transport and distribution. This particular geography encouraged, at least until the start of the 20th century, the production of small iron items that could be easily transportable. Being a service centre for the local agricultural

community since the Middle Ages, Wolverhampton was also slowly forming 'dependency communities' in its surroundings. The population of various settlements started to converge on the city looking for employment and trading activities, thus according to Wolverhampton a regional importance (Mills et al, 1998). However, only after the railways' development did the economic base shift to heavy engineering. This sectoral specialisation was represented by the manufacture of bicycles, motorcycles, cars, lorries, buses, aeroplanes and railways, developed in the city since the end of the 19th century.

Wolverhampton had at least three immigration's identifiable waves through its history, two driven by economic depression and one because of the Second World War. The change in the economic base and the immigrants' characteristics, at least in the first wave, contributed to what was defined in Chapter V as a 'steel culture' in the community, with a working class residents' relative preponderance. Another notable characteristic of Wolverhampton's development relates to its geopolitical definition. This process created great agitation, as detailed in Chapter V, and contributed to increased social division within the town: the wealthier and conservative west set against the working class and liberal-labourist east-enders. Wolverhampton is thus a newly created city with strongly 'localist' affiliations and a visible division between the residents of west and east, and with a multicultural background. Over the past 30 years, the Labour Party has maintained its political majority on the Council; on only two occasions (May 1987-88 and May 1992-94) did the Conservatives in a Liberal Democratic alliance obtain a majority on the Council.

### **7.1.2 The Wolverhampton *durée moyenne***

The 1981 Census of Population showed that Wolverhampton had a social class distribution that differed from the average across England and Wales. A smaller proportion of the population was in Groups I, II and III non-manual (30% as opposed to 44%) and a correspondingly higher proportion were manual workers: 70% against 56%. The 1991 Census of Population presents an astonishing transformation in Wolverhampton in only ten years: there were then 40.7% of workers in Groups I, II and III (non-manual) and 50.9% of

manual workers.

In order to assimilate the substantial data collected in the fieldwork, Tables 46 and 47 summarise the condition of each capital asset in Wolverhampton before and after the privatisation (Context and Outcomes). It is clear that the town's run-down since the economic crisis in the 1970s, the consequent local authority's and population's impoverishment are registered in each asset of Table 46. This suggests that what was a secularly poor situation in sustainability's terms was worsened as a privatisation's result experiment. The City's economic crisis in the 1980s can be summarised as follows:

- ✓ Difficulty in adapting to the changes because of a high degree of manufacturing specialisation, and particularly a highly specialised (metal and rubber) sector with potentially obsolescent traditions;
- ✓ A steel industry suffering from obsolescence and underinvestment. Bilston Steelworks's closure, despite late and ineffective protests, contributed to an increase in unemployment, which then spread across a range of sectors;
- ✓ Controversy in Bilston Steelworks site's redevelopment;
- ✓ Central Government's rejection as Wolverhampton as an Enterprise Zone;
- ✓ Exclusion of Bilston from the 'Special Development Areas Scheme'.

Despite these problems, there are positive points to be noted:

- ✓ Continuing investment through the Inner Area Programme (since 1977);
- ✓ The launch of the Black Country Development Corporation (from 1988);
- ✓ Outcomes from the Inner City Task Force (1987-1989).

**Table 46: Wolverhampton Context - Summary**

ASSET	KEY INDICATORS OF STATUS
Economic Capital	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ Until 2nd World War; dominated by heavy engineering industry;</li> <li>✓ A highly specialised manufacturing town (metal/rubber);</li> <li>✓ 1970s/1980s: industrial depression – factories closing and rapidly rising unemployment;</li> <li>✓ 1985: the worst year before privatisation – 25% of families were on some form of income support;</li> <li>✓ Until 1970s: “big family” businesses employ thousands of employees;</li> <li>✓ 1970s/1980s: crisis – family businesses, sold to multinationals, subsequent downsizing and closure;</li> <li>✓ The long-running dispute over re-use of derelict land at the former Bilston Steelworks – first post-closure activity started only in March 1987 (mining);</li> <li>✓ High unemployment among people under age of 20;</li> <li>✓ Unemployment above national average through the 1980s;</li> <li>✓ Local Conservatives advocate diversification strategy into service industries and small business;</li> <li>✓ Community depletion: 34,200 people on supplementary benefit and nearly 70% of Council tenants with rate rebates.</li> </ul>
Human Capital	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ By 1986, 9,000 long-term unemployed had ‘lost contact with’ the labour market and their skills were classed as ‘redundant’;</li> <li>✓ ‘Geriatric bulge’, creating pressure in the welfare system;</li> <li>✓ 25% increase in infant mortality between 1985-1988;</li> <li>✓ Contest over corporal punishment;</li> <li>✓ Problems with truancy;</li> <li>✓ Problems with delivery of adult education;</li> <li>✓ High per capita expenditure on education and local students’ low achievement.</li> </ul>
Social Capital	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ Closure of ward libraries, mobile library for schools (cash reduction) and toy library service;</li> <li>✓ 50% increase in Wolverhampton Citizens Advice Bureau consultations attributed to the recession;</li> <li>✓ Teenage gangs’ prevalence;</li> <li>✓ Neighbourhood Crime Watches launched in 1984;</li> <li>✓ Efforts to control youth violence delayed because of police officers’ and cash’s shortfall;</li> <li>✓ By 1987, town deemed the ‘most violent division’ in the force, with the worst incidence of prostitution in the West Midlands.</li> </ul>
Physical Capital	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ Growing Council house future tenants’ waiting list;</li> <li>✓ Many pre-1914 Council houses waiting for repairs and redecoration, and no money to complete the task;</li> <li>✓ No agreement between Labour and Conservative councillors on how to use budgets and develop housing policies.</li> </ul>

Source: Data Analysis

**Table 47: Wolverhampton Outcomes - Summary**

ASSETS	KEY INDICATORS OF STATUS
<b>Economic Capital</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ Skilled labour's shortage;</li> <li>✓ Jobless' percentage remained higher than the national average (legacy of male long-term unemployed with industrial skills) until 1997;</li> <li>✓ Search for alternative industries: Wolverhampton Science Park (1993); Springvale Business Park (1994);</li> <li>✓ Implementation and sharp local reaction against the 'poll tax';</li> <li>✓ Inner Area Programme remained receiving cash (1980-1993);</li> <li>✓ Launched Training and Enterprise Council (TEC – 1990), in town;</li> <li>✓ Won City Challenge Programme (April/91-April/97);</li> <li>✓ Long-term male unemployment still a problem;</li> <li>✓ The last British Steel plan's closure (Wednesfield), loss of 500 jobs (1995);</li> <li>✓ Only Service Centres registered at UK Steel Association today;</li> <li>✓ Consistent data's lack (statistics, information and analysis) about the steel industry after the 1980s.</li> </ul>
<b>Human Capital</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ Widespread unnecessary deaths;</li> <li>✓ Heart-related problems killing 12% above national average (1991) and 60% in 1992;</li> <li>✓ High stress' levels due to social deprivation;</li> <li>✓ High incidence of tuberculosis and poverty related disease (1994);</li> <li>✓ Teenage pregnancies double national average (1994);</li> <li>✓ Higher unemployment among black school-leavers than white pupils (1990);</li> <li>✓ Low progression to further education among all demographic groups – especially Caribbean youth;</li> <li>✓ Cutbacks in education budget (1991, 1992);</li> <li>✓ Wolverhampton Truancy Watch launched in 1994;</li> <li>✓ Percentage passes from GCSE and A-level still below national average (2001).</li> </ul>
<b>Social Capital</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ Continuing pressure on Wolverhampton Citizens Advice Bureau by a heavily indebted public;</li> <li>✓ First overall reduction in crime in 20 years (1989);</li> <li>✓ Community Crime Watch Schemes (neighbourhood and business), making a difference;</li> <li>✓ Car crime and theft from cars increasing by 55% (1991), compared with the previous year: creation of the Vehicle Watch Scheme.</li> </ul>
<b>Physical Capital</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ Pressure by Government to increase council rates;</li> <li>✓ Loss of council rates by local authority (writing off debts – 1990-1996);</li> <li>✓ By 1995, 74% of council tenants qualified for rent rebate, 664 homes were waiting to be let with 4,000 applicants on the waiting list;</li> <li>✓ Failure of Council homes sales: the 'Right to Buy' scheme did not encourage community investment in housing.</li> </ul>

Source: Data Analysis

Investment in Human Capital in Wolverhampton suffered in parallel with the economic crisis. Being a traditional highly specialised manufacturing town, male inhabitants with industrial skills continued to suffer from long-term unemployment. This figure remained higher than the national average during the 1980s and the 1990s, despite efforts at retraining. In addition, unemployment among the under 20s was growing fast. Along with this pessimistic future perspective, young people in Wolverhampton appear to

have been discouraged from considering radical alternatives to received ways of organising their live, health and education indicators from that period seem to confirm this. Wolverhampton suffered serious health problems in the 1980s and the 1990s, some of them clearly related to the impoverishment of the population.

In relation to Social Capital, the efforts of Wolverhampton's CABs to support and advise a population with often severe economic problems were hampered by the local authority's financial problems. This problem was also responsible for ward-level's, mobile's and toys libraries' closure. Crime was another key issue for Wolverhampton in these years. Despite the Neighbourhood Crime Watches' successful launch in 1984 and their progressive expansion in the 1990s, by 1987 the town was the 'most violent division' in the West Midlands force, with the worst incidence of prostitution. 1989 saw the first overall crime reduction in 20 years. Wolverhampton's Physical Capital developed from discussions about refurbishment and the empty Council homes' letting in the 1980s, to Council rates' loss by the local authority (manifest in the large-scale and recurring writing off of debts between 1990 and 1996) and the pressure from Government to increase Council rates. In every policy domain, the lack of circulating money in town – whether to pay Council rent or to improve Council houses - is evident. Another issue was Council homes sale programmes' failure: the 'Right to Buy' policy appears to have fallen on stony ground in this community.

Figure 29 resumes the economic development and regeneration programmes applied locally in the 1980s and 1990s. It displays a 'timeline' representation, as applied by Davis and Brockie (2000, p. 205). This representation seeks to localise in historical terms these multiple programmes in Wolverhampton's *durée moyenne*. The Figure also presents the times of inception and exit for each programme, with the year of 1988 emphasised, when the British Steel Corporation's privatisation occurred. Thus, Figure 29 can be examined vertically, when analysing each of the programmes described in Chapter V, and

horizontally, when analysing each one of the years that compose the 1980s and the 1990s, respectively, the Context and Outcomes of Wolverhampton. Figure 29, added with the details provided in Chapter V, indicates that the local Council found it difficult to address strategically the local economic problems' range. It was always dependent on the Government for financial support and policy leadership. The lack of consistent data about Wolverhampton's steel industry after the 1980s is itself revealing. Neither in the Central Library nor the Wolverhampton Archives were there any edited volumes, articles, books or other publications concerning the local steel industry at the end of the 20th Century, at least when the fieldwork finished in Spring 2002. This experience can be interpreted as an example of 'de-learning'. The 'de-learning' occurs when organisations, suffering from successive reforms, endure a loss of 'memory', as described by Pollit (2002). This concept could, by extension, also be applied to community of place's recall's processes. Another gap to be observed concerns recorded data on the local economic development and regeneration programmes' achievements highlighted in Figure 29. There is, for example, no local information about the Wolverhampton Redundancy Action Programme's fate; or the local Training and Enterprise Council's long-term impacts.

**Figure 29: Wolverhampton LED and Regeneration Programmes - Timeline**

	Bilston Jobs Renewal Plan	Inner Area Programme (since 1977)	Inner City Task Force	BCDC	Training and Enterprise Council	City Challenge	Wolverhampton Redundancy Action Programme
1980	Closure of the Bilston Steelworks						
1981	↓	£3 million (Bilston area)					
1982	↓						
1983	First occupations and discussion about coal mining	£4.84 million p.a., until 1988					
1984	↓			Creation heralded			
1985	↓						
1986	↓						
1987	Mining activity started in March		Launched in September	Created			
1988	↓	£5.39 million	↓				
1989	↓						
1990	Mining activity ended		Closure at the end of the year				
1991	↓				Created in October	£37.5 million over five years	
1992	↓						
1993	↓	Last available information				Creation of the Wolverhampton Science Park	Created
1994	↓						
1995	Springvale Industrial Business Park creation						
1996							Last available information
1997					Last available information	End of the programme	
1998				Ended activity on 31/3			

Source: Data from research

 Year of the British Steel privatisation

### 7.1.3 The Wolverhampton *durée courte*

The *durée courte*, or short-term analysis is represented in this study's context by the British Steel privatisation event in Wolverhampton and the related adjustments immediately associated (in a causal sense) with it. As suggested in Chapter V, impending privatisation's announcement provoked surprisingly little local reaction. After almost a decade of economic crisis and continuous attempts to sustain local economic development strategies, the community's majority of the population appeared to ignore or were resigned to this event or specific episode.

However, the process of BSC privatisation deepened the population's impoverishment, especially after Wednesfield plant's closure in 1995. Long-term unemployment remained a significant problem as well. The town was suffering from a lack of good quality sites and premises for development. These characteristics highlight some blockages to local development, as Healey and Dunham (1994) report in their analysis of 'constrained development' in Coventry.

Moreover, the employment opportunities' quality remained a concern, with job vacancies characterised by low hourly wage rates. There was but a belated increase in job opportunities for skilled persons or graduates and these could not offer, by definition, any immediate progression opportunities to long-term or unskilled persons. Local economic programmes developed by the Council demonstrated – albeit in a halting and contested manner – a growing determination to move on from the City's metal-forming industry inheritance. The Wolverhampton Science Park's creation in 1996, designed to stimulate high technology industries, provides an example. An initial discussion about a science park's creation in Wolverhampton occurred in March 1984, when local executives proposed and tried to gain the Council's political and financial support for the initiative, without success at that time (Express and Star, 1984c). However, the Council returned to this idea in 1991, when the successful bid for the first City Challenge programme already included the science park's proposal creation (Express and Star, 1991a). The

Wolverhampton Science Park was finally formed in 1993 as a private limited company through a partnership between the University of Wolverhampton and Wolverhampton Council.

As Figure 16 registers for the 1980s, high unemployment continued to generate a 'undesirable socio-economic impacts' range in the 1990s. Wolverhampton was still characterised by a skilled labour's shortage, higher unemployment than the national average and long-term unemployment figure higher than anywhere else in the country. Through the 1990s, GCSE results continuously presented below the national average. The 'preventable deaths' problem that occurred in Wolverhampton between 1983 and 1987 and only registered in the early-1990s exposed social factors, many of which were beyond the local Health Authority's control. There was made a linkage between material deprivation, poor health, and emergency admissions to local hospitals, as well as an association between health and access to basic goods, such as sewerage.

#### **7.1.4 The Wolverhampton Evenements**

This subsection analyses the evenements, or 'critical events' that occurred in Wolverhampton during the period considered in this research. The process of the Bilston Steelworks closure and the long and often acrimonious discussions about the former steelworks site's redevelopment, described in details from page 152, offers various examples.

'Elizabeth', the last steel blast furnace still working in the Black Country, was shut down in 1977, with BSC promising to re-open it when 'steel sales improve'. This act has two representations, one economic and the other, more symbolic. Elizabeth's closure's total value needs to be sensitised to, and account for, both representations. With this closure, the Steelworks was forced to use cold iron plate from elsewhere, producing steel less rapidly and at greater cost in consequence. This contributed, in turn, to the case for outright closure, in a self-reinforcing cycle. Furthermore and in a symbolic sense,

Elizabeth's closure and posterior demolition, in October 1980, represented the final defeat not only of the steelworkers' movement to 'save' Bilston Steelworks, but also of a whole way of life in which at least some Wolverhampton's communities of place had been deeply rooted. This sentiment is explicit in Reyburn (1980), when he opined that the locality 'was dying' (see p. 156 above).

The protracted discussions that occurred about the possibilities for redevelopment offered by the former Bilston Steelworks site, also suggest a number of potential insights. There is a record of first occupations by 1983 (see p. 164 above). It is illuminating that such a long debate ensued on this matter – extending over four years - until mining activity started in March 1987. Despite this extended debate over the National Coal Board application, when the mining activity finished, in 1989, the site persisted as a derelict area for four more years. The reasons for this apparent disinterest lie in various arenas. Though a series of regeneration programmes were under way at that time in Wolverhampton, none specifically focused on the Bilston area. The local council submitted a belated bid for a City Challenge targeted single at Bilston in 1992, but it was rejected by the Department of the Environment, on the grounds that the programmes were ill thought through. This situation highlights the local council's systematic high dependency on Central Government investment plans. With the Bilston bid rejected, regeneration had to wait for the inception of the Black Country Development Corporation (another Central Government initiative). It was the BCDC that ultimately led the former steelworks site's regeneration in the Springvale Industrial Business Park's and other developments' form.

In September 1987, another three important evenements, detailed at pp. 180-182, occurred in Wolverhampton. The first one was the annual report of the MSC. This explicitly observed that the Government did not recognise the Region's unemployment problems' depth at that time, as reflected in seemingly perverse funding decisions.

The second episode concerned image and perceptions. The results of a major

survey concluded that the Black Country had a poor public image both nationally and locally. Non-residents' misperceptions included geographic position and the nature of local production. More noteworthy, however, was the negative recognition of 35% of all Black Country residents as living in the area. For them, the Black Country, with their deep socio-economic problems at that time, was not their domicile. This vision suggests that the way the socio-geographic division in Wolverhampton originated, as described in Chapter V, had their consequences. First of these influences seems to be the division of Wolverhampton into east and west in late 19th century, in order to reorganise the political design of the then new borough. The 'west-enders' were considerably wealthier, and more conservative, than the 'east-enders'. This geographical and political divisions would reflect later in the electoral options pursued by the local population (Upton, 1998). Another influence is Wolverhampton's new County Borough creation's effect. It came into existence on 1st April 1966, with the diverse urban districts' and parishes' annexation, plus the then Borough of Bilston. These localities reacted vigorously against these changes, trying to protect their own identity, and not recognising themselves as part of Wolverhampton (Mills et al, 1998).

The third episode confirmed the political visibility that the closure programme had accorded the area, but also reinforced the picture that the Central Government had, at that time, about a fundamentally contrapreneurial Black Country. The discourse used by the then Prime Minister, when she visited Wolverhampton in 1987, emphasised the 'self-recuperation' of the community - at that time enduring unemployment of over 15%. According to her, the Government could only enable, not command the community adaptation's processes. It could do so by offering the 'right circumstances' (regeneration and other relevant programmes applied locally) for 'talent to flourish' - the idea of the 'self-made man' (Express and Star, 1987), featured in the Government discourse when promoting self-employment's option for unemployed people.

In Chapter V, it was observed that British Steel's privatisation in 1988 did not appear to catalyse or mobilise the local community, unlike the Bilston Steelworks' closure ten years before. Furthermore, as noted in the *durée moyenne* subsection, no information was available locally about Wolverhampton's steel industry after the privatisation programme. This is itself perplexing. It seems that the town wishes to remove this part of its history from the collective memory. This impression was strengthened when the researcher sought further information on steel published in the 1990s in Wolverhampton's Local Archives and Studies section. The archivist responsible, surprised at the question, declared that such information was non-existent, because 'nothing was left. We do not make steel here anymore' (personal conversation with the Author).

In the 1990s, Wolverhampton very slowly recovered from the previous decade's economic instability, mainly through development and regeneration programmes founded by the Government. The recovery was, however, a modest and halting one, continually impeded by key economic assets' shortages .

The closure of the last British Steel plant in Wolverhampton (Seamless Tubes, Wednesfield), in 1995 meant the loss of a further 500 jobs and further hastened steel manufacture's obliteration from the local collective memory. The only remains of this legacy are now the five Service Centres, four of them occupying this former plant's site in Wednesfield.

When the television programme 'World in Action' announced in 1989 that about 150 people in town had died unnecessarily over the previous decade, this prompted a series of reports and studies about the local health conditions. Indeed, a more pro-active position from the Wolverhampton Health Authority is observed through its Annuals Reports from 1990, featuring serious studies exploring the link between poverty and poor health. These studies were quoted in the local press throughout the 1990s, stimulating debates in the community. In conclusion, Wolverhampton's evenements, as depicted in this subsection,

display some interesting local features. Wolverhampton was a town with a strong steel, metal and rubber fabrication tradition. After the economic crisis at the end of the 1970s, the town began slowly and painfully to move from this manufacturing base towards a service-led economy. However, this movement brought, as commented in Chapter V, profound and serious consequences for human, social and physical capitals' local stocks in an adjustment process that continues into the present.

### **7.1.5 Applying the CMO Model to Wolverhampton**

This section extends the basic CMO model as presented in Figure 9. Figure 30 sets out a specific model using the Wolverhampton data summaries in Tables 46 and 47. Figure 30 thus constitutes the 'focused configuration', in Pawson and Tilley's (1997) terms. The objectives of the Figure are to:


- ✓ Identify context, mechanisms and outcomes from the narrative detailed in Chapter V,
- ✓ Define the underlying situation prevailing in Wolverhampton when the privatisation policy was implemented.

In Figure 30, the CMO model uses as a starting point two Economic Capital attributes (highly specialised manufacturing town facing economic difficulties and human and social capitals' stress) as 'Context', and presents successively 'national action' moderators (M1) and local action moderators (M2). National action moderators are Mechanisms triggered by Central Government (a major employer's closure and initial response from the Central Government concerning reskilling). Local action's moderators (M2) are defined as Mechanisms that generated local outcomes identified through the fieldwork. Finally, ideal (black arrow) and actual (red arrow) critical paths underpinning the programme's progression generate 'Outcomes'. Figure 30 also portrays a 'full cycle' for the CMO configuration, as defined by Pawson and Tilley (1997, p. 85). Thus, the 'Outcome' pointed by the actual critical path (red arrow) in the first horizontal line is


summarised in the second one, and analysed as a 'Context'. Figure 30 is set out over two pages:

- Page 313 examines the decade of the 1980s;
- Page 314 outlines the Wolverhampton 'Context' in 1988, plus ideal and actual 'Outcomes' generated from it.

**Figure 30: An Illustrative CMO Model for Wolverhampton**



**Figure 30: An Illustrative CMO Model for Wolverhampton (cont.)**



The research findings also surface another issue. Huberman and Miles (1998) comment that:

‘qualitative studies...are specially well suited to finding causal relationships; they can look directly and longitudinally at the local processes underlying a temporal series of events and states, showing how these led to specific outcomes, and ruling out rival hypothesis. In effect, we get inside the “black box”; we can understand not just that a particular thing happened, but how and why it happened’ (p. 191).

Huberman and Miles (1998) then argue that causality has four key characteristics:

- ✓ It necessarily brings in the question of time as part of an explanation - prior events are assumed to have a connection with later events;
- ✓ It is local – the immediate causal nexus is always facing the researcher;
- ✓ A determination of causality cannot be precisely rule bound;
- ✓ There is always causal multiplicity – causes are always multiple and ‘conjunctural’, combining and affecting each other as well as the supposed effects.

Yet according to the authors, causes and effects must be seen as configured in networks, themselves deeply influenced by the local context. Even so, a useful causal explanation:

‘should apply to more than one case. Through analytic induction...a causal account obtained in one case can be tested elsewhere, be it supported, qualified, or subjected to revision’ (Huberman and Miles, 1998, p. 193).

Thus, Huberman and Miles’ (1998) view of causality supports the cause and effect cycle presented in Figure 31. This sets out the key cause and effect relationships between several of the problems that emerged from Wolverhampton’s experience in the 1980s. Davidson (2000) suggests inferring causality’s several methods: causal list; ‘modus operandi’; temporal precedence; constant conjunction; influence’s contiguity; association’s strength; biological gradient; coherence; and analogy. In Figure 32, the arrows connecting each box employ one or more of these methods. When the arrow has a single sign, it represents direct effect on the pointed box. However, when the arrow is pointed to both ends, it

represents that the both boxes linked are each other's cause and effect.

**Figure 31: The Cycle of Decline**





Figure 32 starts by demonstrating the causal relationship between the depression in the global steel industry from 1975, when the energy crisis severely affected world steel consumption, and the local effects of this decline. As Wolverhampton's economy was highly dependent on steel/metal (a 'steel community'), with the city's major employers to be found in this sector, unemployment rose dramatically in the early 1980s. This local unemployment was concentrated among men and was also frequently, long-term in nature. It generated, in turn, a gradual community's impoverishment. Figure 32 then identifies four attributable effects caused by this communal impoverishment: an increase in supplementary benefit; more numerous housing benefits claims; rising social stress; and deteriorating housing quality. Each of these four effects generated further, attributable and specific consequences, but each one also converged to promote an increase in demands on local and national welfare systems. This escalating demand contributed to one of the biggest problems that the Local Authority faced at that time: currency's scarcity to better support a depleted community with conventional benefits and allowances, and stimulate local economic development and regeneration. This situation abided to the end of the period surveyed. Wolverhampton appeared to face insurmountable difficulties in breaking through this cycle of impoverishment. Figure 32 sets out the key causal relation underpinning this cycle of decline.

As Figure 32 also demonstrates, Wolverhampton was only able to promote economic and regeneration programmes with the Central Government's financial support.

**Figure 32: Wolverhampton's Cause and Effect Cycle (1980s)**



**Key to Figure 34**

	Economic Capital
	Social Capital
	Human Capital
	Physical Capital

## 7.2 Exploring the Sheffield data

This section analyses the Sheffield case findings in a parallel manner to that undertaken for Wolverhampton above. The first subsection presents Sheffield's long *durée*, identifying key issues in the long run City's socio-economic development. Subsection two discusses particular facets of the *durée moyenne* that Sheffield experienced. Subsection three examines Sheffield's *durée courte* over the privatisation period. Subsection four analyses the community evenements that occurred during the period studied. Finally, a CMO model based on the findings from Sheffield is applied in subsection five.

### 7.2.1 Sheffield's origins – the long *durée*

Sheffield's specific differences have profoundly shaped its development. The city is characterised by an upland isolation, with a direct rail link to London arriving relatively late. Sheffield industrialised around three interconnected sectors: cutlery, steel tools and steelmaking. Cutlery-making developed first, having been present in the area since the sixteenth century. Sheffield acted as magnet for researchers and entrepreneurs exploring steel appliances and refining. The city's steelmaking industry thus developed from the eighteenth century and surpassed cutlery as the major local industry in the second half of the nineteenth century. These three steel derived local industries survived economic crisis' incidents through the ensuring period. All are still present in the Sheffield economy. Steel production is concentrated in the east of the city, with the working class terraces being constructed around the plants. The middle class assembled in the southwest of the city. This local socio-geographic division would deepen during the 1980s and 1990s with the economic crisis.

Sheffield's population grew in line with the steel industry's development. That growing population's composition was highly skewed. Thus, Sheffield has long been known as a 'working-class' city. In 1981, about 6 in 10 of the working population were

employed in skilled or unskilled manual labour and less than 5% were classed as 'professionals'.

Sheffield had also been associated with a distinctive 'municipal socialism', one component of which was a Council culture not averse to spending money on developing local services. The first steel crisis, after the First World War, taught Sheffield's steel industry how to re-invent itself, redirecting sales, conducting mergers, trying to survive foreign competition and finally, fighting the re-nationalisation in 1967, when the British Steel Corporation was created. These mergers addressed the steel crisis of the 1970s, but prompted the steel sector labour force's contraction since then.

### **7.2.2 The Sheffield *durée moyenne***

In relation to Economic Capital, the independent local spirit suggested in the fieldwork data was most evident when the Council's control was in a 'new-left' Labour administration's hands (1980-1985). This refused to accept early Conservative Central Government schemes for development corporations and enterprise zones, and severely criticised how the Government was conducting regeneration programmes. The local authority was committed to focusing local economy's restructuring on labour rather than capital's interest. The Council was not alone in its hostility to central policy; the community was clearly hostile to such proposals, as well. The Manor Employment Project's local initiative in the early 1980s (p. 257) and the local reaction in the small business community to the SDC's plans (pp. 282-284) both signify this wider community discontent.

Skilled production workers, plus manufacturing, technological and engineering professionals, women and young people largely composed the unemployed population in Sheffield during the 1980s. Most of them were living in the east end and the city's inner areas. Tables 48 and 49 summarise each capital asset's conditions for Sheffield at the Context and Outcomes stages in the CMO cycle.

**Table 48: Sheffield Context - Summary**

ASSETS	KEY INDICATONS OF STATUS
Economic Capital	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ Three manufacturing industry's key sectors: steelmaking, cutlery and steel tools;</li> <li>✓ Manufacturing base reducing from 1979, due to foreign competition and decline in home market for engineering, with consequential unemployment;</li> <li>✓ BSC-private 'Phoenix' joint venture schemes' creation locally;</li> <li>✓ Local economy's fragility (closures, long-term unemployment, loss of training capacity and negative multiplier effect);</li> <li>✓ City Council collides with Central Government, refusing schemes like Enterprise Zones and Urban Development Corporations in the early 1980s;</li> <li>✓ Employment Department's creation and other early local reaction: Manor Employment Project,</li> <li>✓ From 1985 onwards: Council's strategic redirection, accepting a wider relationship with local business (SERC) and Central Government (SDC)</li> </ul>
Human Capital	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ Social inequalities reflecting in some health indicators: variations in mortality and morbidity between electoral wards strongly correlating with socio-economic deprivation's measures;</li> <li>✓ Cuts in early-years education in order to cap local rates increase below 50%;</li> <li>✓ In 1985, education in the City categorised as 'doing well';</li> <li>✓ Concern about quality of school buildings and suitability for purpose</li> </ul>
Social Capital	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ Improvement in service provision for the elderly;</li> <li>✓ Lack of resources for children and disabled people.</li> <li>✓ Most categories of crime rose from 1980</li> </ul>
Physical Capital	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ Absolute totals of public sector accommodation falling in the 1980s;</li> <li>✓ Council houses' slow constructions; private rented sector's failure;</li> <li>✓ A 'Right to Buy' policy's failure in Sheffield: the Council maintained low rents, making it uneconomic for tenants to buy.</li> </ul>

Source: Data from Research

**Table 49: Sheffield Outcomes - Summary**

ASSETS	KEY INDICATIONS OF STATUS
Economic Capital	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ 1989: Economy dominated by the service sector, but with dependence on manufacturing (27%), exceeded only by Birmingham. By 1991, labour force participation in the manufacturing sector fell to 21%;</li> <li>✓ Unemployment in mid-1988: 13%, five percentage points above national average;</li> <li>✓ Sheffield Development Corporation in action, regenerating 2,000 acres of the Lower Don Valley region: Don Valley Link Road, Meadowhall, Airport, and Supertram. However, SDC strategy increasing focused on existing indigenous resources rather than seeking new types of investment;</li> <li>✓ Looking for alternatives: 1991 World Student Games, Single Regeneration Budget;</li> <li>✓ Partnership to foster economic development: City Liaison Group;</li> <li>✓ Wide socio-economic disparity between wards;</li> <li>✓ Leading employers now located in the service sector;</li> <li>✓ Steel sector still a powerful employer, but with fewer vacancies and more specialised than ever</li> </ul>
Human Capital	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ Between 1994 and 2000, epidemiological gap between wards grew;</li> <li>✓ Health problems are great in localities where education, housing and employment are impoverished as well;</li> <li>✓ Almost 1 in 5 of Sheffield's employees was employed in unskilled occupations by 1994</li> </ul>
Social Capital	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ 1988-1991: cuts in library services and High Green library's closure;</li> <li>✓ 1990 saw an increase in crimes reported, specifically drug-related offences;</li> <li>✓ Despite encouragement for Neighbourhood Watch Schemes, the city had a noticeable increase in burglary from dwellings;</li> <li>✓ Some suburban residents afraid to create a Watch Scheme because of possible retaliation</li> </ul>
Physical Capital	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ Increasing internal migration to the south and west inner areas, where the socio-economic indicators were more positive</li> </ul>

Source: data from research

### 7.2.3 The Sheffield *durée courte*

The local economy's fragility in the 1980s can be characterised by four issues:

- Small local companies' as an early multiplier effect of the changes in the steel industry;
- Long-term unemployment;
- Training capacity's loss;
- Stagnation in the property market.

However, it is interesting to note that the response from Sheffield City Council was early and focused on local needs: promoting municipal enterprise and trying to create jobs for those who had lost them. The turning point of local council policy came in 1985, with the acceptance of private capital as partner in local economic development. This

represented not this policy's failure, but a more audacious investments' redirection, in the shape of Meadowhall and the prestige projects –Lower Don Valley's LED regeneration.

The local economy in the early 1990s suffered from the slow-down in the world economy, aggravating the reduction in key export markets for Sheffield firms. The continuing companies' restructuring with mergers and acquisitions by non-local firms and the growing deficit in local government finances were two other characteristics of this period. This was accentuated by a crisis in the construction and property development sector. These issues largely constituted a continuation of 1980s economic problems. The economic shock that Sheffield suffered, despite being early addressed, required long years of subsequent regeneration. During the 1980s and 1990s, Sheffield's economy shifted from industry to services. However, 'steel city' industry production continued to be significant. The change in the steel sector was represented by a more concentrated, specialised production's pattern and fewer workers' employment than ever. This is what Sheffield offered as a solution to the steel crisis.


Yet during the 1980s, the disparity in socio-economic and deprivation indicators across the wards of Sheffield increased rapidly (Thunhurst, 1985; Sheffield Health Authority, 1986). The gap continued through the 1990s, as described in the Sheffield Health and Illness Prevalence Survey (SHAIPS) of 1994, demonstrating the key challenge for Human Capital in the city. Health problems were great in localities where education, housing and employment were also poor. The 2000 SHAIPS confirmed the continuing relationship between ill health and deprivation's indicators at ward level, confirming a 'geographical pattern', linking poor health and socio-economic deprivation in Sheffield.

The trend in Social Capital in the decade of the 1980s was likewise problematic. Cuts in public services testify to the Council's financial problems over the decade. The local authority tried to reallocate the sparse money available to functions where urgency was greatest. Finally, the stocks of Physical Capital in Sheffield were drawn down in the

1980s, with absolute totals of public sector accommodation units falling, Council houses' slow construction, and the private rented sector's related failure . Each of these difficulties reflected the financial gap suffered in the City. In the 1990s, the key issue was the increasing polarisation of relatively well-off households to the south and west inner areas, where the socio-economic indicators were more positive.

Figure 33 sets out a 'timeline' of the more important initiatives undertaken to regenerate Sheffield's economy. It runs from the Sheffield Employment Department's creation in 1980 until 1997, when the Sheffield Development Corporation concluded its activities.

Figure 33: Sheffield LED and Regeneration Programmes - Timeline



■ Year of the British Steel privatisation  
 Note: (L) = Local provenance of the programme

(C) = Central provenance of the programme

Figure 33 also distinguishes schemes and initiatives in terms of their local or central government provenance – local schemes are denoted with an (L) after their title; central government schemes, with a (C). This demonstrates that until 1988, every regeneration scheme was of local origin. The critical event that modified this pattern was the agreement to create the Sheffield Development Corporation, in December 1988. After then, a significant increase in partnership schemes developed in the city is apparent. Figure 33 can be examined vertically, when analysing each of the programmes described in

Chapter VI, and horizontally, when analysing each one of the years that compose the 1980s and the 1990s, respectively, the Context and Outcomes for Sheffield.

#### **7.2.4 The Sheffield Evenements**

This subsection analyses the evenements that occurred in Sheffield during the period considered in this research. Chapter VI portrays distinctive characteristics of Sheffield's socio-economic formation as a 'steel community' in the United Kingdom. Known as the 'steel capital of the world' since the 19th Century (Hey, 1998), Sheffield's development over the period of this research surfaces some revealing evenements.

The first of these is an Employment Committee and an Employment Department's creation in 1981, with the purpose of restructuring the local economy 'in the interests of labour rather than capital' (Seyd, 1990, p. 338). This attitude was unusual (Seyd, 1990; Hey, 1998), at a time when Central Government was implementing various economic programmes based on 'monetarism'. The Council also refused to become involved in deregulation experiments, such as the Enterprise Zones and early Urban Development Corporations (UDCs). The pro-active and interventionist Council was the single most important agent responsible for development and regeneration programmes in Sheffield until 1985.

The great reaction against the 'Phoenix' joint-ventures schemes pointed to another evenement. The local authority's publication of 'Steel in Crisis' in 1983 listed the social costs of this 'early privatisation', especially possible local social and economic effects. The publication also criticised what were termed 'myths' – disputed benefits from the privatisation - articulated by Central Government, in order to promote steel privatisation. As noted in Chapter II, while BSC privatisation was belatedly achieved in December 1988, the Government had set out its intentions since the early 1980s. This local effort to oppose the 'Phoenix' schemes seems to have exhausted Sheffield's politic body. Thus, when privatisation arrived, there was little local interest or protest.

The Council's policy moved from an interventionist to market-led approach from the mid 1980s. An important event then followed: the creation of the Sheffield Development Corporation (SDC), and the local reactions that it provoked over its lifetime. The SDC started to issue Compulsory Purchase Orders (CPOs) to more than a half of the businesses located in the Lower Don Valley in late December 1988. It was persuaded that those businesses offered no basis for regenerating the local economy. This catalysed local resistance to the way that the region's renewal was being conducted and led to the Lower Don Valley Business Association's creation (LDVBA). Most of the LDVBA achievements appear to have been based on the SDC's own difficulties' exploitation, as Raco (1997, p. 396) notes. Its activities nonetheless represented a striking example of an independent pressure group being formed from within the local community to mobilise and act on common problems in a practical way.

When the SDC was created, one of its objectives was to search for alternatives to improve the City's image and economy. Sheffield's bid and preparation for the 1991 World Student Games involved a significant call on the City's finances, causing reactions from different groups, among them opposition Councillors and an anarchist group. No serious cost-benefit analysis was made before the project was accepted, and it attracted few powerful sponsors. The SDC and the Council had therefore to assume lead responsibility for the Games, requiring in turn, cut-backs in other areas, like education. This situation was an example of the harsh choices that the Local Authority had to make during the 1980s and early 1990s, in order to promote local regeneration.

In conclusion, Sheffield's events, as described in this subsection, demonstrate that the City experienced a series of challenges over the twenty years that comprised the research. These challenges generated a singular response, one that was characterised by a high degree of pro-activity and localism; accentuating autonomous action, whether on the part of threatened business (LDVBA), or neighbourhoods (the Manor Project, for

example), trying to transform an obdurate and unyielding economic reality.

### **7.2.5 Applying the CMO Model to Sheffield**

This subsection seeks, as with Wolverhampton earlier, to apply the CMO model to the Sheffield findings. The following objectives guide this effort:

- ✓ To identify context, mechanisms and outcomes from the narrative detailed in Chapter VI;
- ✓ To structure the ‘Context’ that Sheffield offered when the privatisation policy was implemented.

Thus, in Figure 34, the CMO model employs as its starting point one Economic Capital attribute (manufacturing industries’ key sectors suffering retraction from 1979 with unemployment as an early consequence) as ‘Context’ in the first horizontal sequence. It then presents successively ‘national action’ moderators (M1), like the Phoenix Schemes. Local action moderators (M2) are also identified, together with ideal (black arrow) and actual (red arrow) critical paths – the ‘Outcomes’. Figure 34 also presents a ‘full cycle’ CMO configuration. Figure 34 spans over two pages:

- ✓ Page 328 examines the 1980s;
- ✓ Page 329 captures the Sheffield ‘Context’ in 1988, plus ideal and actual Outcomes generated from it.

**Figure 34: An Illustrative CMO Model for Sheffield**





Figure 34: An Illustrative CMO Model to Sheffield (cont.)




Glossary

→	Ideal critical path (What could work for whom in what circumstances)
→	Actual critical path (What really worked for whom in what circumstances)

Figure 35 demonstrates the underlying cause and effect process in Sheffield, utilizing as before Huberman and Miles' (1998) view of causality and Davidson's (2000) methods for inferring causality. The world steel industry recession stimulated two different attempts to rationalise the local steel industry. One was developed by Central Government – the 'Phoenix' joint ventures – and another one by the local private sector, with mergers and product specialisation and diversification. However, both strategies served to worsen the local socio-economic situation from the beginning of the 1980s. The reduction in jobs' number in the steel and metal producing sector drove the increase in unemployment in Sheffield, with a clear geographical pattern as between different wards, as discussed in Chapter VI. As happened in Wolverhampton, the high unemployment also led to stress' increase in the welfare systems, while Sheffield City Council experienced a funding's general scarcity with which to improve services. Despite this funding crisis, Sheffield Council led early reactions to the underlying economic problems. Between 1980 and 1984, it financed alone the first attempts to regenerate and develop the local economy, focusing always on local solutions to local problems. The Council then moved to pursue other forms of financing local regeneration and development programmes from 1985, when partnerships with the private sector and Central Government marked the new strategy.

In conclusion, Sheffield displayed an early reaction to the world steel crisis and managed to weaken the negative causal chain noted in Wolverhampton. Despite this, the Context in which the privatisation programme impacted locally in 1988 was also one of an impoverished community, with high socio-economic divisions.

Figure 35: Sheffield's Cause and Effect Process (1980s)



Key to Figure 35:

	Economic Capital
	Social Capital
	Human Capital
	Physical Capital

### 7.3 Wolverhampton and Sheffield Case Studies' Cross-Case Analysis

This section presents a cross-case analysis, comparing and contrasting the two case studies undertaken in the present research. The section also explores the scenarios that both communities presented when the privatisation programme was enacted.

Braudel's long *durée* perspective suggests that both cities faced geographically rooted limitations to their development. While Wolverhampton started producing small items that were easily transportable, Sheffield diversified by specialising in three manufacturing industry's key sectors since the 19th Century. These three key sectors did not appear simultaneously in Sheffield's history, but these specialisations have been maintained, despite economic adversity, until the present day.

The research findings suggest that, despite both being known as 'steel cities', communities in Wolverhampton and Sheffield that had BSC plants in their territories seem to have developed quite distinct 'steel culture' values. It is interesting to note that both cities had most residents engaged in manual trades through the 1980s, but the equivalence finished there. Rooted perhaps in its inheritance of entrepreneurial 'Little Masters', Sheffield demonstrated an independent and pro-active cultural values' set. This was symbolised in its efforts to rebuild the local economy by focusing primarily on the labour force's interests.

Wolverhampton, on the contrary, exhibited largely reactive responses to its principal production site's closure, the Bilston Steelworks, in 1980. Being a highly specialised heavy manufacturing town (metal and rubber), Wolverhampton's development was led by 'big family' businesses. Some of these family concerns were engaged in steel fabrication and their assets were nationalised in 1967, along with thousands of residents' employment contracts. When these businesses started to be sold between the 1970s and the 1980s, the workforce learned, for the first time in generations, the downsizing and closures' full cost. The shock was both significant and enduring. The different cultural

resources available to each community were grounded in both communities' steel traditions and generated different contexts when the privatisation policy was applied.

Human and Social Capital stocks in both cities were seriously depleted over the 1980s and 1990s. Sheffield's already significant social inequalities worsened over these twenty years. The local authority faced difficult decisions regarding budget cuts. Crime rose along with the social inequalities. The situation in Wolverhampton demonstrated a depleted community with problems in virtually every social and human arena: education, health, social services, social participation, and crime. Notwithstanding these broadly equivalent difficulties, there are some clear areas of divergence, as revealed by a number of socio-economic indicators, like GCSE attainment scores. Sheffield's GCSE scores were maintained at a higher than national average level through the 1980s and the 1990s. Wolverhampton is still struggling to reach national averages. Physical Capital in both cities was constrained by the lack of money to construct new Council houses. The 'Right to buy' policy's failure in both cities may also have contributed to decline.

### **7.3.1 Exploring 'Realistic' Scenarios**

There is some equivalence in the Wolverhampton and Sheffield 'stories', but both communities presented different adaptation's patterns when other features emerge. The IMD (Index of Multiple deprivation) ranks for the years of 1991 and 2000, quoted in Table 20, reveals considerable differences. While Wolverhampton only managed to overtake two other authorities in the period, Sheffield's position in the rank listing improved significantly, as it overtook 25 other authorities. Why was there such a difference between these two localities in this regard? When contrasting the respective asset-based capitals for both cases, some features are especially noteworthy.

Table 50 summarises the Context, Mechanisms and Outcomes for the two communities, in order to contrast each capital asset and Mechanisms that the fieldwork surfaced. In Table 50, the differences between the two 'steel cities' originate in the sectoral

mix that each specialised in. Another difference is noted one in the Context's Economic Capital line. Sheffield's local authority initiative and independence from Central Government resources, at least until 1985, contrast with Wolverhampton's long and continuing dependence. Human Capital is another asset where interesting distinctions emerge. Both communities struggled with scarce capital in the 1980s, but Sheffield consistently maintained its GCSE results above the national average. Meanwhile, Wolverhampton, as consistently, failed to reach this level. Furthermore, both local authorities faced financial problems in delivering social services.

However, evidence from the fieldwork reveals that Sheffield successfully reallocated its spending to try to reach those most in need. Wolverhampton, however, was not able to do this, since its financial problems impacted on the entire Social Capital asset base in the 1980s.

**Table 50: A Comparison between Context, Mechanisms and Outcomes from the two Cases**

	<b>Wolverhampton</b>	<b>Sheffield</b>
<b>CONTEXT</b>	Manufacturing industry (Rubber/metal)	Manufacturing industry (steelmaking/cutlery/steel tools)
Economic	Depletion after the industrial depression and closures, especially 1980's BSC; high unemployment in the 1980s	Local economy fragile; BSC 'Phoenix' schemes launched; distance from Central Government initiatives until 1985, then, partnerships with private sector/ Central Government
Human	Impoverishment-related health problems; discouraged and disaffected youth	Social inequalities reflect in some health indicators; cuts in early years education
Social	Local Authority financial problems brought difficulty in supporting citizens; libraries closure; crime increasing	Local Authority financial problems brought resources' reallocation (cuts for some, improvement for others)
Physical	Local Authority financial problems fuelling growth of housing waiting lists; 70% of Council tenants with rent rebates	The 'Right to Buy' Central Government policy's failure; slow construction of Council houses
<b>MECHANISMS</b>		
British Steel privatisation's action	Closure (1980 – Bilston Steelworks); Redirection (1988) then Closure (1995 – Wednesfield plant); creation of Midland Service Centre (1999)	Redirection (1980 – 'Phoenix' schemes) Redirection (1988) then mergers (1992; 2001 – AvestaPolarit); Closure (2000 - Tinsley Park Mill)
Local Action	1988 process received with apathy – community reaction only in 1979-80 (Bilston)	1988 process received with apathy – community reaction only in the early 1980s ('Phoenix')
Diversification Strategies	Stakeholders' choice limited by dependence on Central Government transfers; slowness in search for alternatives	Stakeholders' choice: independence from Central Government (1980-85); partnership (1985 onwards)
<b>OUTCOMES</b>		
Economic	Looking for alternatives: transformation into a services economy , inclusive of steel; skilled labour's shortage	Looking for alternatives: service sector dominating, but continuing dependence on manufacturing; deepening of partnerships
Human	High levels of illness, TB and stress caused by social deprivation; fragile local education	Social Inequalities growing: greater health problems in localities with educational, housing and employment problems
Social	Citizens with debts continuing to demand support from CABs; Crime Watch Schemes making difference	Cuts in library services; increase in drugs-related crimes
Physical	74% of Council tenants with rent rebates; 'Right to Buy' Central Government policy's failure	Increasing internal migration to the south and west inner areas, where social indicators are better

Source: Data from Research

Figures 32 and 35 demonstrate different causalities that were identified in the 'Context' analysis for both case studies. While Wolverhampton's case demonstrates a


fairly continuous downward causal spiral, the research findings observe that in Sheffield's case surfaced a cause and effect process. These different features did not facilitate the Councils to react successfully against the economic and steel crisis that reached both communities. Despite this, it reveals a different 'steel culture' and consequently, a different 'Context' where the privatisation programme acted. In both communities, until recently can be pointed out problematic social and economic negative outcomes. These outcomes were evident in terms of the degree of successful local adaptation. Thus, this cross-case analysis suggests two different situations where a major policy programme is triggered to produce outcomes. It is significant that a major national programme – in this case, the BSC privatisation - was generated like a storm - 'waves' - that washed all over the country from BSC's headquarters in London, as portrayed in Chapter II. This national programme (which was effectively exogenous to those local communities that it affected) encountered different conditions where it impacted.

Figure 36 presents a theoretical framework's abstraction for analysis presented in Figure 14. In Figure 36, the CMO model is represented in terms of a hierarchical causal mechanisms' set reaching across different temporal frames and interacting to interfere with, or reinforce ongoing social processes. The Figure also assists in possible scenarios' generation in which the privatisation programme might perform and possible 'Outcomes' scenarios created from it.

The community *longue durée*, as defined by Braudel (1984, 1992), illuminates how each community developed its social, human, physical and economic capitals over recent history. In Figure 36, the community *longue durée* involves at least four important issues that influence a community's ability to react and adapt to a national policy programme. They are highlighted in the lower shaded box of the diagram. The upper shaded boxed area represents the *durée moyenne*, or better, an arbitrary 'social time' (Rayward, 1996) that encompasses the years before, during and following the local implementation of a major

national policy programme. In this research, the *durée moyenne* focuses on local issues that took place eight years before and eight years after the BSC privatisation. Finally, the *durée courte*, representing the rapidly moving circumstances and events of the moment, is to be found in Figure 36 in the internal Mechanisms in the CMO model.

**Figure 36: The CMO Model Causality Diagram**



Source: Data from research

The first issue that the *longue durée* box highlights is the initial assets' distribution that a community has at its disposal to (re)-act to a policy programme. Thus, Wolverhampton found itself in 'low-skills equilibrium'. According to Finegold and Soskice (1988), a town is trapped in a 'low-skills equilibrium' when '...the majority of enterprises staffed by poorly trained managers and workers produce low-quality goods and services' (p. 22). The authors suggest that 'equilibrium' connotes a self-reinforcing network of societal and state institutions, which interact to restrain the demand for improvements in skill levels. This set of institutions included industries, firms, the

industrial relations system, financial markets, the state and political structure, as well as the operation of the education and training system. Wolverhampton, as its *longue durée* analysis reveals, had an economic capital base that was apparently paralysed, with a highly specialised (metal and rubber) sector with potentially obsolescent traditions. This problem was compounded by underdeveloped local financial markets and low attainment rates in post-GCSE education. Thus, with these initial assets, Wolverhampton would not be able to break the 'equilibrium' or the progressively negative 'cause and effect' cycle that the privatisation programme triggered when the storm wave reached the city.

On the other hand, the Sheffield case exposed several difficulties of four-asset based capitals analysed. However, the same narrative did not recognise a stagnation of the assets. Sheffield's initial assets included, *longue durée* analysis suggests, a pro-active community with an independent local spirit. This independence brought unique reactions when the privatisation programme took effect. These included, for example, the Local Authority's early mobilisation against the economic crisis, and later, the LDVBA's reaction to the Sheffield Development Corporation's initial plans effectively to clear whole and long-established business communities.

As a second issue, the community *durée moyenne* is described by Rayward (1996) as a 'social time' in which the relation between social groups produces cyclic social, economic and technological movements. These movements can act over time to influence the historical developments' comprehension. In this research, the *durée moyenne* encompasses a period almost ten years before and ten years after the British Steel Corporation's privatisation, in 1988. In Figure 38, there are two topics to mention when analysing the *durée moyenne*: a national (or exogenous) shock – in this case, the BSC privatisation - that triggered the episode under analysis, and the possible outcomes then gauged in terms of successful local adaptation's degree. Both Chapters V and VI described in detail how the process of BSC privatisation was locally received by each community.

The re-election of a Conservative Central Government in 1983 brought the prospect of steel privatisation and other public enterprises to the policy foreground. However, BSC privatisation's halting nature triggered different local responses. Many in Wolverhampton did not believe – at least initially – that the Bilston Steelworks could effectively and rapidly be closed, and this generated often ill-considered and weak protests. Sheffield was also suffering from the economic crisis that affected the manufacturing industries in the beginning of the 1980s, but reacted earlier with decisive local government actions, as described in Chapter VI.

On the other hand, Figure 36 hypothesises units' depiction of the *durée moyenne* those outcomes that could be deemed to constitute successful local adaptation. These 'degrees of adaptation' in fact represent possible scenarios generated by a national programme. When the latter acts at the same time in different localities, it necessarily acts through the particular assets at each community's disposal. Consequently, a national programme, even at its inception, is influenced by the actual local reality, generating through this transmission mechanism necessarily different degrees of success in its outcomes. In this research, Chapters V and VI indicated that both Wolverhampton and Sheffield in many ways and to differing degrees, largely failed to adapt to BSC privatisation by 1988. While Wolverhampton had a depleted community with problems in virtually every social and human arena, Sheffield's already significant social inequalities were exacerbated over these twenty years, with the local authority facing difficult decisions regarding budget cuts.

Finally, Figure 36 places the community *durée court* between the two moderators – as described by Dahler-Larsen (2001, p. 336). The *durée court* is defined as the time where the 'events of the moment' (Rayward, 1996) unravel and where they can be more easily measured. This research defined the *durée court* as the year of 1988. In Figure 36 inhibiting factors that could block sector responses to privatisation and community

adaptation are specifically highlighted as the moderators of the Mechanisms, as described in Figure 9. It is essential to note that these moderators are generated from within the specific community, and identified when the community *longue durée* are analysed.

In summary, Figure 36 is an abstraction of the fuller framework for analysis presented in Figure 14, being a likely causal mechanisms's theorisation. These causal mechanisms were explored further in the two case studies' cross-case analysis. Figure 36 also allows the two 'Context' different scenarios' analysis where the privatisation programme performed and possible 'Outcomes' scenarios generated from it.

The community 'adaptability' that surfaces when the model in Figure 38 is applied (low levels of adaptation for Wolverhampton and a greater flexibility for Sheffield) inhibit these same communities to generate possible adaptation movements. In both cases, the *longue durée* legacy for each community composed of a particular built environment, and a low adaptative social capital base (with its associated 'steel culture') impacted upon how the CMO for each community developed.

#### **7.4 Conclusions**

This research sought to explore socio-economic impacts' range generated by a single economic public policy, when developed at national level and applied in different local communities. In addition, the research aimed to explore how to measure and generalise from such diverse impacts. After electing to adopt realistic evaluation as the preferred approach, the research generated an instrument (Figure 9) that could depict socio-economic indicators for both Context (before) and Outcomes (after) of a public policy implementation process. These indicators were structured and distributed among four asset-based capitals, as presented in section 2.4. The instrument portrayed in Figure 9 was then applied in two different 'steel'-communities, with the fieldwork findings presented in Chapters V and VI, respectively.

The analysis' results demonstrate that a complex local socio-economic impacts' range is generated from a single economic public policy. The privatisation programme was not sensitised to the specific Contexts of each idiosyncratic 'steel'-community. Despite the fact that each case study locality had different 'steel cultures' embedded in it, a similar 'Context' was perceived - impoverished communities fighting against an economic crisis. These specific 'Contexts' generated, however, different local Mechanisms to deal with the problem, as discussed above. Moreover, 'Outcomes' from both case studies present a mix of similarities and conflicting divergences. When comparing the asset-based capitals from Sheffield and Wolverhampton (as set out in Table 48), some intriguing anomalies surfaced. The descriptors of economic capital for each case demonstrated a local search for economic alternatives, with both communities adopting new service industries. Only in Sheffield, though, was a serious attempt made to develop a 'new' image as a sports city, especially after the 1991 World Student Games.

Human capital in both cities had been negatively affected by the consequences of the economic crisis of the early 1980s. The privatisation programme served to intensify this situation, as detailed in Chapters V and VI. In Sheffield, the social inequalities already evident across communities were worsened, while Wolverhampton confirmed the strong links between social deprivations, high illness' levels and low educational attainment.

Social Capital investment in both cities declined as a financial deterioration experienced by their local authorities' consequence. Sheffield spent the 1980s and early 1990s carefully selecting which services to cut, in order to maintain others. Wolverhampton Council was unable to care for citizens with debts and in need of advice and support from local CABs. Despite this, Wolverhampton launched a number of successful Crime Watch Schemes, contributing to a slow but solidifying local revival.

Finally, physical capital's analysis suggested a common thread to both case study localities' experiences. The failure of the 'Right to Buy', a Central Government housing

policy - first implemented in the 1980s and extended in the 1990s may have had quite wide-ranging consequences.. The failure had its roots, however, in different processes. While residents in Wolverhampton were not encouraged to buy their council homes, apparently because the majority of them qualified for rent rebates, Sheffield City Council sought to counter this policy by making it uneconomic for the Council's tenants to buy their houses. This was pursued through low rent levels' preservation and good repair and maintenance services' provision.

To conclude, the realistic evaluation approach proposed by Pawson and Tilley (1997) and applied in this research understands the outcome of an intervention – in this case, the British Steel privatisation programme – as the result of generative mechanisms and those mechanisms' contexts. An analysis of mechanisms involves examining the causal factors that restrain or encourage change when an intervention occurs. In both case studies presented, the privatisation programme did not function to encourage progressive local change. Thus, the programme served to aggravate a situation previously present in both communities' contexts.

The next Chapter considers the research findings through the lens of tests for scientific rigour. The Chapter also discusses this research's overall implications, along with its contribution, limitations and recommendations for possible further investigations.

## CHAPTER VIII – CRITICAL REFLECTIONS: IS REALISTIC EVALUATION A FEASIBLE APPROACH TO APPRAISING LOCAL SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACTS?

This final chapter presents a critical perspective on the overall implications of the research, discussing its generalisability and limitations. This is followed by a series of recommendations for further research. The first question that needs to be addressed, however, is the overall policy relevance of what has been attempted here. It is after all the case that the tide of privatisation activity has largely ebbed in the UK.

Recent literature corroborates the continuing importance of generating a research model to evaluate public policies, in particular privatisation processes, in order to measure and interpret local socio-economic impacts. As previous chapters have argued, the interpretative process needs to include both capacity's (asset-bases) and of adaptation processes' (social learning and delearning) measures. Prizzia (2001) provides a synthesis and critical evaluation of existing research on privatisation in international terms' results, utilising relevant factors in nations' economic and social performance's comparative analysis. The author concludes in the following terms.

'The economic benefits of privatisation activities promoted as a panacea by many public and private sector managers, are on average modest at the best, while the social benefits are often mixed and uneven. Moreover, it seems that the role of privatisation as a means of reforming the public sector has expanded internationally in scope and at such a rapid pace, that in many cases, the importance of objective and balanced measures of its overall effectiveness and impact on the affected communities need to be re-examined' (Prizzia, 2001, p. 450).

Prizzia (2001) also argues that those policy-makers, public administrators and other stakeholders responsible for planning future public policies like privatisation programmes should reflect on the present economic emphasis and seek equilibrium between economic and social factors. The explicit goal here would be to expand long-term benefits for all sectors of the 'affected communities'. This hypothesis recognises previous privatisation efforts' significant social failings. Yet Prizza's recommendations in this regard are modest: he only proposes a broadened basket's use of social as well as economic indicators. He

does not suggest any kind of instrument or interacting evaluative framework through which the process of 'sense-making' may be organised. Prizzia (2001) conclusions do however, highlight the continuing importance and contemporarily of the present research.

In other work, Prizzia (2003) still recommends that the responsible for planning interfering economic activities, as privatisation for example, should refocus a probably economic emphasis and attempt for an economic and social performance's balance to improve long-term benefits for all affected communities' sectors. However, the author is reluctant to discuss possible methodologies that could evaluate public policies effects and impacts, either with economic or social objectives.

The next sections explore firstly, the findings' and research question's pertinence in relation to the previous literature received in Chapters II and III. Section two reflects on the empirical and theoretical contributions that the research may claim to have achieved. Section three discusses the research limitations imposed by the elected strategy and design. Finally, section four presents suggestions for further investigations that this research offers.

### **8.1 Reconciling the Literature Review with Research Analysis**

Chapters II and III of this Thesis set out literature reviews focusing on the impact of privatisation and how to measure this impact at local levels (communities of place). This subsection seeks to reconcile this secondary literature's contribution with the current research's conclusions. This analysis raises a number of questions, including:

- The need to sensitise privatisation impact evaluation to a broader historical context rooted in specifically local factors;
- Local action's efficacy as either a counteracting or catalytic force in social adaptation.

### **8.1.1 The Need for Contextualisation & Localisation**

Chapter II detailed research methods' range being used to try to establish privatisation's impact on firms' performance over time. The principal conclusion was that impacts' evaluation on different interest groups is still a significant concern and constitutes a gap in the research literature. For example, O'Connor (1995) discusses the community based initiatives' 'dilemmas' and their poor interface with evaluation policies. She criticised how current evaluation methodologies fail to deal effectively with community-based interventions. The set of assumptions and principles described by O'Connor (1995) and appraised more fully above may be interpreted in terms of an approach to understanding social change that seeks to be, as she perceives, comprehensive in nature. This means, in turn, an approach that is rooted in the community, participatory, and informed by accumulated knowledge. The instrument developed here, based as it is on the CMO model (see Figure 36) includes the identification of inhibiting factors that blocked both sector responses to enacted public policy and the community level adaptation to this public policy. These factors can be related to the identification of the 'dilemmas' that O'Connor (1995) discusses, since the model presented in Chapter VII explicitly recognises these factors' importance and influence for evaluation practice. It is clearly not, though, participatory in any direct sense – nor was it intended to be.

Chapter III reviewed a modest sample of research that was specifically aimed at evaluating the impact of policies at the community level. This generated some useful observations – especially concerning the class context in which public policy is situated. Hudson (1986), for example, suggests that a regional industrial policy's intentions and effects need to be considered in terms of a broad range of stakeholders' interests, including impacts on private capital, central government and the working class. To understand the way that a regional industry policy was implemented; evaluators should explore the relationship between capital, labour and the state's particular interests in specific environments. Their interests can overlap, but will never be symmetrical.

The secondary literature also provides time importance's indicators in understanding context. Tomaney et al (1999) argue that the complexities of a plant closure and its local economic consequences could be better understood where the political and economic context of the local economy explicitly accounted for. They highlight two particular factors as notable and relevant to the present discussion:

- A closure is not a single event, but the contested outcome of a long-run process of development that must be analysed, and which the closure is but an 'episode' (see Mandjak and Durrieu, 2000, for a discussion of the components of 'episode value'). This hypothesis has been addressed in the present research through the *longue durée* approach's use;
- Research needs to be sensitive to three analytical levels when exploring plant closure and its effects: workforce, community and the specifics of the closure decision.

These two hypotheses are, it is contended, addressed in the present research in the 'story-telling' approach used for the case studies, and applied in Chapters V and VI. Even if Sheffield did not face a BSC plant closure, at least in the 1980s (unlike Wolverhampton) the two communities experienced analogous traumas and these traumas were reflected in their mechanisms (local action) and outcomes. The application of the three analysis' levels suggested by Tomaney et al (1999) is useful in exploring the different local actions that resulted on both the local authorities and the cities' civil societies' part. Wolverhampton reacted with a degree of apathy to the 1988 privatisation, after early and ineffective protests against the Bilston Steelworks closure. The local authority in Sheffield, on the other hand, reacted promptly to early attempts at local BSC privatisation (the Phoenix schemes). Broader local mobilisation against the general economic problems and their consequences is registered as well, as exemplified in the Manor Project's creation and development.

Swyngedouw (1996), commenting on Belgium's publicly owned coal mining industry's restructuring, argues that this particular public policy impacted on the local community not only in job creation's and destruction's terms, but also by accelerating the systematic social, economic, cultural and political exclusion of already weak socio-economic groups. Both case studies in this research reach the same conclusion. When an intervention planned centrally is not sensitised to the particular local context, it is unlikely that the outcomes desired would be obtained.

The set of assumptions and principles described by O'Connor (1995) highlight the link between geography and social practice. She calls for a:

'recognition of the importance of the geographically bounded area...as the basis of communal social bonds, as a manageable landscape for achieving social reform, and/or as a legitimate unit for social scientific analysis' (O'Connor, 1995, p. 2).

This relationship between space and community is a most complex one, however. Sheffield was marked, at least over the *durée moyenne* evaluated here, by overlapping and competing cultural identities. It was self-consciously a steel city par excellence. It was also two cities, when considered as a socio-economic space. Na east-west divide intensified with the rapid relative decline in the steel and allied sectors' importance. It was finally, a city characterised by an unusual and articulated political ruling elite, seeking to define the city as a quasi-socialist civil society.

Hoare (1997) also argues that the impact of privatisation in Bristol (see pp. 77-79) needs to be disaggregated and localised. He outlines a method for decomposing national privatisation objectives into sub-national outcomes. This task needs, he suggests, to be approached through specific, complex and localised contexts' construction. Hoare (1997) also suggests that detailed sub-national outcomes of privatisation defy precise prediction, precisely because of the existence of strong localisation effects. The CMO model applied above explicitly requires a structured context's production. This encourages, in turn, a specific analysis of a privatisation programme at defined moment's relevance, when both


communities were struggling with an economic recession that was more severe for them than the national average might suggest. By using the same CMO model structure to analyse the privatisation programme stories for both Wolverhampton and Sheffield, this research seeks to generate the necessary detail (Hoare, 1997) to unveil the complex and contradictory outcomes of national privatisation policy. Those outcomes are interpreted here in successful local adaptation's degree's terms.

### **8.1.2 The Scope for Local Action**

Hoare's comparative analysis of five sites in one city was designed to explore the comparative impact of local factors on a single national policy instrument. The approach taken here is broadly comparable. There were strong similarities in the evaluated cases. Both cities were long established centres of heavy industry. Both also faced serious structural barriers to adaptation: in the built environment, 'constrained development' represented a serious obstacle to modernisation; in the workforce, likewise, 'low-skill equilibrium' implied human capital assets with obsolescent capabilities. These shared contextual factors undoubtedly limited the scope for adaptation and creative social change. What is then remarkable is that clear differences in both mechanisms and outcomes as between the two cases are evident. This raises the issue of the underlying scope for localisation in responses to exogenous shocks like privatisation.

There is a little research literature that explicitly addresses this problem. Gladwin (1999) is exceptional in this regard. He discusses different long range mechanisms through which to achieve social sustainability. His work identifies four different developmental trajectories, namely: a humanisation's zone; impoverishment's zone; naturalism's zone; and sustainability's zone. Four scenarios of possible community adaptation are built on these trajectories. Figure 37 reproduces Gladwin's analysis.

Figure 37: A Model for Community Sustainability Analysis



Source: Gladwin (1999).

Note: NC = Natural Capital; HC = Human Capital; SC = Social Capital; FC = Financial Capital.

Gladwin (1999) argues that a society would become increasingly sustainable as it organises its economy to invest in and expand existing stores of primary capital (human, social, ecological and material). It moves in a north-easterly direction across this four-quadrant representation in consequence. Societies that maintain themselves only through a one-time inheritance's exploitation of natural capital, with no investment in conservation or replacement are localised in the zone of impoverishment. These societies also disinvest in individuals and permit the forces of mobile economic capital to revalorise civic and social communities. Yet, societies where the operations of the economy are increasingly brought into conformity with natural imperatives are localised in zone of naturalisation. This often comes, according to Gladwin (1999), at the expense of human and social capital. Social change is often contradictory and can take the form of:

‘eco-inspired’ agricultural biotechnology that threatens traditional farmers with redundancy or cleaner automated factories which eliminate assembly and manufacturing jobs’ (Gladwin, 1999, p. 4).

The zone of humanisation is characterised by societies in which the operations of the

economy are progressively endowed with a human character. However, this can come at the expense of diminishing natural capital. In other words, jobs or communities are constructed on natural capital's systemic depletion's basis, and those will be unsustainable over the longer term. In sum, Gladwin (1999) defends the idea that economic and technological development must be simultaneously people-centred and nature-based.

Gladwin's approach was not designed specifically with localities in mind or with areas under severe economic stress in view. Yet, the exercise is potentially fruitful. The evidence highlighted in Chapter VIII concerning adaptation's degree attained in Wolverhampton and Sheffield after the privatisation of British Steel suggests that both fit within the zone of impoverishment. However, Sheffield's position is more ambiguous, with elements of humanisation evident. This community's case description demonstrated how the Council and the community both reacted with early response to the threat of privatisation, and searched for local offsetting alternatives. Of course, at that time, the priority was to reinvigorate the local economy in order to improve the employment prospects of the population. Problems in the natural capital asset base were not the first priority. Wolverhampton, on the other hand, stagnated in a cycle of unemployment and scarcity of investment in the 1980s that generated poor investment in social and human capital, as demonstrated in Chapter V. The continual investment in housing's postponement and – particularly telling in this context – the closure of child-centred assets, provide clear illustrations of Gladwin's theses. These represent asset draw-down and inter-generational postponement: classic symptoms of unsustainable practice.

It will be recalled that Jackson and Price (1994) argued in relation to UK privatisation policies that those policies often have the effect of changing the criteria used to judge 'success'. They claim that the literature on privatisation tends to ignore allocative efficiency – who gains and who loses - in order to focus singularly on issues of technical efficiency. This Thesis has, conversely, sought to analyse the degree of 'success' of the

British Steel privatisation through social efficiency's broad conceptions.

## **8.2 Research Contributions**

This section focused on the Thesis' contributions to the theory of public policy evaluation and reflects on the research methods that were used here. This process of reflection seeks to meet the injunction set out in Bryman (2001): 'the inductive nature of qualitative research means that the concepts and theories that are generated from an investigation must be clearly identified and discussed' (p. 468).

### **8.2.1 Theoretical Contribution**

The key evaluation methodologies' review undertaken in Chapter II persuaded the Researcher to apply the Realistic Evaluation framework as a basic instrument for research. The application of the CMO model as policy evaluation methodology is a relatively recent development in the literature. Examples include Byng, Norman, Redfern and Jones, 2002; Davis & Wright, 2002; Kazi & Spurling, 2000; Ho, 1999; Soukas, Peters and Green, 2002. These contributions applied the CMO configuration in order to:

- ✓ Explore causal factors;
- ✓ Value the results of a programme;
- ✓ Determine the contexts in which specific mechanisms (programmes) contribute to expected outcomes;
- ✓ Understand those elements in the contexts which prevent the programme mechanism from contributing to outcomes (expected and unexpected);
- ✓ Identify which programme components were themselves ineffective or implemented inadequately;
- ✓ Develop policies and practices based on data's analysis including outcomes, mechanisms and contexts, in order to achieve desired outcomes.

It is interesting to note that the majority of these research efforts focus on the evaluation of social programmes (with the partial exception of Ho, 1999). The present research adopts a somewhat different emphasis, exploring through CMO analysis the working and effects of what was essentially an economic programme: privatisation (Conservative Party, 1983, p. 8). The intention was to explore not only economic outcomes, but also human and social consequences.

The tailored CMO model applied in this research was demonstrated to be both flexible and functional when adapted to evaluate such diverse local impacts. It was based on three mechanisms identified and generated from two different sources. These were, first (issuing from the central government), the actual privatisation programme; second, (both located at the local level) economic diversification strategies and local action on the community's part. This configuration can also generate multiple outcomes through complex causal relationships that straddle different historical time-frames (see Figures 30 and 34). In summary, the realistic evaluation approach appears to be a feasible approach to evaluating socio-economic impacts that arise not only from social policies, but also those generated by economic policies.

### **8.2.2 Empirical Contribution**

This research applied qualitative analytical approaches to reflect upon the research findings presented in Chapters V and VI. The Braudel's framework's application in order to structure the story-telling for the two case studies and subsequently, to analyse the findings seems to be a new departure in public administration research and public policy evaluation. In fact, a review of the literature concerning the application of Braudel's three-tiered framework found no examples of its use beyond historiography. The same appears to hold with the 'story-telling' concept. The review in Chapter IV identifies several papers in different field of knowledge where this research tool is discussed (Bryson and Lowe, 2002; Funnel, 1998; Savitt, 2000; van Roon, 1981). There were no examples, though, of the

application of 'narrative story telling' as an instrument in evaluating public policies.

### **8.3 Research Limitations**

Although the research generated a number of positive outcomes, some limitations must also be conceded. The research focused on the privatisation programme, particularly in relation to British Steel. As a result, the realistic evaluation approach necessarily concentrated on mechanisms specific to the privatisation programme. This focus does however, limit attempts to generalise. Other economic or social programmes' evaluation will need to generate their own unique mechanisms in order to sustain a CMO analysis.

In this manner, the suitability of chosen realistic evaluation model verified itself as, at least, fragile, as the last Chapter discussed. If the key problem for evaluation research was to find out how and under what conditions a given policy will produce its impacts, it – the evaluation research - might be prepared with an understanding of how policies would produce varying impacts in different circumstances. The policy maker would be better able then to decide what policies to implement in what conditions.

However, in any realistic evaluation study it is necessary to develop CMO theories, since an evaluation's empirical part comprises a CMO theories' test (Pawson and Tilley, 1997). The initial stage of any evaluation is concerned thus with working through some CMO theories. These can come from various sources: social science theory, results of previous evaluations, discussions with policy practitioners, and other sources. If realistic evaluation is accordingly, a kind of theory driven evaluation – or theory based evaluation- it differs from some other forms of theory driven evaluation is that the constituents of the theories are specified in realistic terms. Consequently, it seems to be a limitation for applying the realistic evaluation on a public policy without an earlier evaluation results or other sort of sources to construct the 'initial stage'.

Therefore, at this point, can be concluded that the realistic approach can more

appropriately be used in the formulation and refinement of social policy and practice. It needs to be recognised that policies and practices implemented in the realistic approach's spirit will need sensitive, informed and critical application in regard to the detail of local conditions. As this research proposed to evaluate an economic programme through the CMO model, the methodology design was not able to recognise a program logic based upon a program theory in order to identify optimal program content including all its components and their relationship (stages), neither an application of a mechanism or causal model based on best information (literature, experts, stakeholders).

The choice to perform no more than two case studies is another moot issue. In Chapter IV this choice was discussed in pro and cons' terms of the case study approach's use as research strategy, and why these two case studies were eligible. In addition, though, the choice of just two case studies – characteristic of an experimental endeavour – recognised the limits of time and resources. This research had to observe a tight timetable with limited resources to fund travel, collect and reproduce data. Moreover, this research did not employ a group of investigators to complete the fieldwork and analysis, but was accomplished through the single-handed efforts of the researcher. This problem was also recognised by Yin (1994), when he discussed the conduct of a multiple-case design by a single researcher (Yin, 1994, p. 45).

The time, financial and human resource limitations caution against undue generalisation of the results. Both mechanisms and outcomes may be specific to industrial sectors, like water, energy, and transport, for example. It may be that different indicators related to the four-asset capitals based on the analysis of the context and outcomes must be included, and other possible indicators excluded. Moreover, other sectors may develop at different rates over time and their articulation within Braudel's temporal structures may then also vary.

The use of socio-economic indicators to support the qualitative data proved to be

problematical. This was compounded by the fact that some of these indicators were difficult or simply impossible to collect. Some indicators previously selected, for example GCSE results for Wolverhampton in the 1980s, were unavailable for the timeline chosen<sup>16</sup>. Other indicators started to be collected only in the 1990s<sup>17</sup>, making it impossible to use them for comparison before and after the BSC privatisation. Furthermore, other indicators appeared to be produced only at regional level, at least in the 1980s, obscuring the underlying situation at the local level, and bringing out problems of validity of the data collected.

#### 8.4 Research Findings and Scientific Rigour

Chapter IV indicated that this research was intended to produce ‘analytic generalisation’ (Bailey, 1992). This refers to the ability of a case to be uniform across organisations or events. According to Bailey, if a case study provides the opportunity to expand and generalise theories, then the analytic generalisation is confirmed. The research findings confirmed, in part, Bailey’s proposition. The same single economic programme was applied in different ‘steel-communities’ and generated equivalently profound social and economic outcomes that were not articulated in the policy objectives. The CMO model generated and applied in this Thesis adequately measured these outcomes, through socio-economic indicators’ sets. In contrast, the strategy of collecting data was not sensitive to answer validity questions. As commented in Chapter IV, in order to check validity, the following processes need to be deployed: an evaluation of working on the field, a consideration of the research situation’s components, as place, time, informant, and the

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<sup>16</sup> After successive enquires about Wolverhampton GCSE results from 1980s at the DfES Statistics Services, the answer was that they were ‘not available’. Neither the Local Authority nor the Local Archives had the information.

<sup>17</sup> As for example, *pupil unauthorised absence in maintained primary and secondary schools per England average*. These indicators started to be collected only in 1994.

research problems and tools. The collecting data strategy in this research could not use the same kind of data sources in both case studies, simply because for each one, different information about the research problem was available. Consequently, it was not possible to exercise the triangulation commented on page 130 (Figure 13); the researcher was not able to collect multiple data sources through multiple methods for the two case studies elected.

Yin (1994), commenting on 'analytic generalisation' as a possible research strategy, argues that it should be pursued when a previously developed theory is used as a template with which to compare the empirical results of the case study. Chapter II reviewed a selection of research studies that investigated privatisation processes. That review concluded that, in strictly financial/managerial terms, it was a successful policy. However, these studies largely ignored the social and economic privatisation's consequences for the communities in question. This was despite the observations of Hossain and Malbon (1998) concerning the difficulty in identifying exactly whom the privatisation benefits and in what circumstances. Jackson and Price (1994) similarly bemoan the frequent marginalisation of 'allocative efficiency' criteria – who gains and who loses – in these analyses. An exception is provided by some early studies of community impact evaluation reviewed in Chapter III. A meta-evaluation appraised the different efforts of a range of authors who applied different instruments to focus on economic programmes' local impact. Several relevant conclusions emerged from these studies:

- ✓ The broader socio-economic implications of an economic programme should be always and explicitly taken into account (Rowthorn and Ward, 1979);
- ✓ A local or regional policy should be analysed through the particular interests and relationships between capital, labour and the state (Hudson, 1986);
- ✓ Job-creation efforts are not universally successful in replacing all those jobs lost in economic programmes in communities that grew up around a few

industries/organisations and suffered closures (Boulding et al, 1988);

- ✓ Effective local strategies depend upon a favourable political climate which would allow coherent policies'co-determination at national and local levels. These should be achieved in consultation with those employed in local industries (Hudson et al, 1992);
- ✓ A range of community conditions before, during and after policy interventions could be encompassed by indicators measuring the status of the locality (Weiss, 1995);
- ✓ National public policies could induce the creation, break down or reconfiguration of different social movements and alliances (Swyngedouw, 1996);
- ✓ Local outcomes generated from national policies could not be interpreted from the objectives set by a central government, but should be studied in their particular contexts (Hoare, 1997);
- ✓ Local impacts of an economic programme could be better understood if the political and economic contexts of the local economy were surfaced (Tomaney et al, 1999).

The results of the fieldwork described in Chapters V and VI seem to support and confirm the conclusions of these previous studies – a suggestion of considerable scope for 'analytic generalisation' (Yin, 1994).

The decision to perform the fieldwork in only two 'steel communities' within a universe of 20 possible choices (see Annex III) was based on each elected case's specific qualities. This was based on the criteria range previously presented in Chapter IV, seeking diversity and contrast – cases that could highlight specific causal patterns. Could the findings be applied in other similar communities? In other words, are the results transferable? The research highlighted the differences between the two 'steel cultures' as

they developed in the two communities, but the two case studies' results' transfer to other BSC 'steel communities' seems possible. This is because each 'steel community' in which BSC had a plant in the 1970s/1980s was also suffering from economic crisis, with steel market stagnation and the short-term consequences of this situation. Moreover, the privatisation of BSC impacted relatively evenly on all BSC plants in 1988. Each faced at least a closure or redirection in its production activities, always including redundancies.

Are the results replicable? In order to answer this question, it is necessary to recollect aspects of the research proposal and methodological design. This research used an inductive design to pursue an evaluation methodology for appraising local socio-economic impacts. This qualitative research approach was coupled with a case study strategy to organise the collection of documents from secondary data sources (books, official documents, reports, local newspapers) to construct for both cases a 'story' about the local impacts of a national policy. Consequently, this research presents a mixed analytical method that is unusual in public administration research - not effortless but feasible. Applying Braudel's framework to analyse the fieldwork findings brought new insights to the fore, especially where some essential indicators were non-existent or not available. Thus, the indications in relation to reliability appear positive: given the same research conditions and using the same methods, the same or similar results concerning the local impacts of national policy and programmes should be obtained.

### **8.5 Recommendations for Further Investigations**

The task of developing an evaluation methodology that can adequately measure socio-economic impacts at local levels and actually testing it in the field represented a challenging research proposition. The length of time spent collecting and analysing data for the two chosen case studies limited the possibility of testing the model in other 'steel communities'. Further application of the CMO model based on the four capital assets

available to these communities would be very valuable. This would enable a more rounded judgement to be made on particular indicators' inclusion or exclusion. It would also support a further exploration of possible 'asset mixes' (as discussed in Gladwin, 1999) to be made. Such cumulation would provide, finally, further evidence on the scope for generalisation of the findings.

Further research in other policy arenas might build on some of the methods deployed here. Braudel's framework's use to disclose possible temporal issues in the two cases proved to be essential to the analysis. Public administration research, particularly policy evaluation work, could be strengthened through the careful assimilation of logical frameworks originating in other social science disciplines, including History, Sociology, Politics and Anthropology. The framework and concepts generated from these social sciences, where they are usefully incorporated into future multi-disciplinary research efforts, could generate additional observations of the problem and contribute to the analytical task.

Further exercises that seek to apply the CMO model based on the four capital assets to evaluate other economic programmes is also, it is contended, desirable. The current research and its associated literature review did not register any previous research with these characteristics. The model's replicatin across multiple contexts with different mechanisms at work will enable the benefits and costs in the present model to be more rigorously appraised. This should also improve public policy evaluation theory's quality.

In the introduction to this Thesis, the author set out the reasons that motivated her to develop a methodology for evaluating socio-economic impacts at the local level. In this regard, her prior experience in understanding the development and effectiveness of public policies in Brazil was seminal. As observed in Chapter I, Brazil has been, since 1995, developing diversified public policy evaluation methodologies. These have often developed in opposition to a narrowly conceived but hegemonic practice of public,

auditing of the relevant public accounts. However, the Country does not yet have reliable models of public policy evaluation that can gauge local impacts as they are generated from national programmes. There has been significant movement in this direction by researchers, academics and public administrators. A notable symbol of this progress has been the recent establishment (August 2002) of REBRAMA (Brazilian Evaluation Net), where researchers from both public and private institutions have an opportunity to exchange information from research results and develop new techniques. In addition, with the new central government more interested in developing social programmes that effectively achieve stated goal, the Brazilian context for further exploring the model developed here appears positive. It is intended that this Thesis results should constitute a genuine contribution to her country's aims and aspirations regarding public policy, its social and economic efficacy, and its evaluation.

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
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
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ANNEX 1: MAIN BRITISH STEEL MANUFACTURING LOCATION (1988)



Source: British Steel Corporation, 1988, p. 26

ANNEX 2: CORUS GROUP'S MAIN MANUFACTURING LOCATION (2000):



Source: Corus Group (2000a).

ANNEX 3: BASIC INFORMATION ON BRITISH STEEL SITES (1988)

Site Name	Refereed Community	Typei	Empl. (1988)	Empl. 2001 (Aug)	Quoted as a MML by Corusii?	Final Product Today	GDP % by industry	GDP per headiii (1981)	GDP per head4 (1991)	GDP per headiv (1998)	Pop. (1981)	Pop. (1991)
Ravenscraig	Motherwell, Strathclyde, North Lanarkshire, Scotland	IS	4,000	-	Closed in 1992, lost of 800 jobs	-	32,80	7,935	17,209	9, 573•	149,863	140,521
Dalzell		OMOS	600	250	Yes	Plates						
Clydesdale*	Bellshill, Strathclyde, North Lanarkshire, Scotland	OMOS	1,200	-	Closed in 1991	Large-bore tubes	32,80	7,935	17,209	9, 573•	NA	NA
Imperial*	Airdrie, Strathclyde, North Lanarkshire Scotland	OMOS	400	NA	Sold in 1994	Pipes/ Tubes	32,80	7,935	17,209	9, 573•	NA	55,825 (2000)
Workington	Workington, Allerdale, West Cumbria	OMOS	NA	NA	Yes	Rails, Sleepers and Track accessories	37,30	1,830	4,679	10,556	96,700	96,715
Shelton Bar	Stoke-on-Trent, Staffordshire	OMOS	NA	-	Closed in 2000, lost	NA	37,50	3,188	7,542	10,738	252,400	244,317



Troste	Llanelli, Dyfed, Wales	OMOS	NA	NA	Yes	Steel	36,00	1,313	3,257	8,258	75,400	73,672
Vellindre		OMOS	NA	NA	No	?						
Port Talbot	Port Talbot, Neath Port Talbot, West Glamorgan, Wales	IS	NA	NA	Yes	Steelmaking products	36,00	1,277	2,762	10,121	54,700	49,894
Llanwern	Newport, Gwent, Wales	IS	4,100	NA	Yes, but closed in Jan 2001	Steelmaking, plate and strip products	36,00	1,313	3,257	12,424	131,500	130,504
Orb		OMOS	620	NA	No	Electrical steels						
Whisthead		OMOS	350	NA	No	Narrow strip						



