

DOCTORAL THESIS

An examination of the management of Russian civil society

Sergej Ljubownikow



**AN EXAMINATION OF THE MANAGEMENT OF RUSSIAN CIVIL
SOCIETY**

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Doctor of Philosophy

ASTON UNIVERSITY

May, 2011

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THESIS SUMMARY

This thesis begins by examining the concepts of civil society and social capital. Specifically, it outlines the role of health and education third sector organisations (TSOs) in building civil society and generating social capital which is conducive to democratisation. Following this, the thesis presents literature on civil society development in the context of the Russian Federation, highlighting a void in our understanding of health and education TSOs in this context. The literature review examines cultural-historic antecedents and their impact on civil society development. These antecedents result in three constraints which limit TSOs ability to establish civil society as an autonomous space. In light of these constraints, the thesis explores the present day realities faced by Russian TSOs and proposes that the all-dominant nature of the Russian state leads to managed civil society arrangements. Consequently the thesis addresses the question of how a managed civil society manifests itself in the context of the Russian Federation. Using a qualitative research design, the thesis investigates the control mechanisms created by legislative framework, the ability of third sector organisations to substitute for the state, and the organisational characteristics of TSOs within a managed civil society space. Based on interview data from 82 TSOs across three geographical regions, the empirical chapters explore these three aspects in-depth. Firstly, the thesis demonstrates how a specific legislative framework is used as a legally mandated method to manage civil society. Secondly, the thesis explores more subtle attempts by the state to manage civil society. And thirdly, the thesis highlights ways in which the state controls TSOs and coerces them to mimic marionette organisations. Overall, the evidence presented throughout the thesis highlights the idiosyncratic nature of managed civil society arrangements in Russia in which the state is able to control and direct civil society.

Keywords: civil society, Russia, third sector organisations, third sector, service provision.

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CHAPTER 1: Introduction

1.1 Introduction to thesis

This thesis investigates civil society arrangements in the Russian Federation. It puts forward the argument that in the context of the Russian Federation, civil society arrangements are managed by the state. The thesis delineates theoretically and empirically the contextual factors and particular state-society relations of such civil society arrangements. To facilitate this discussion, the thesis draws upon the theoretical constructs of civil society. Following Neace (1999, p. 150), civil society is defined as “the social space between the individual family and the state”, which is constituted of “autonomous, freely chosen, intermediary organisations” or third sector organisations (TSOs). Furthermore, the thesis operationalises the construct of social capital. Social capital is defined as “features of social organisation such as networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit” (Putnam, 1995, p. 67). The thesis discusses these concepts in turn, according to their specific relevance to the research question of how emergent managed civil society arrangements manifest themselves in Russia. In this discussion, and throughout this thesis, the principal understandings and assumptions of conventional autonomous state-society relations, which is the mediating role of civil society and the universal applicability of the civil society-democracy trajectory, are challenged. This thesis illustrates the limitations of these understandings by demonstrating, characterising and illustrating the facets of managed civil society arrangements in Russia. Consequently, the thesis addresses the research question about how managed civil society arrangements are manifested in the Russian Federation. In answering this question, the key contribution of this thesis is the proposition that in the context of the Russian Federation, civil society exists within a managed setting which does not correspond to traditional models of civil society. In so doing, this thesis illustrates the mechanisms put in place by the state to manage civil society, as well as outlining the limitations of the state to mould civil society in this specific way.

1.1.1 Background

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has undergone a process of rapid democratisation and economic transformation. In order to achieve this transition from a planned economy and a communist regime, to a modern society embracing a market economy and a liberal democratic regime, civil society and its development are ascribed with a pivotal role (Diamond, 1994). Furthermore, given that Russia is an industrialised country, a member of the G8, as well as a country in possession of nuclear weapons, an understanding of Russia's governance structures (i.e. the role of the state and society in shaping such structures), of which civil society forms a part, is particularly important. In order to demonstrate the successful completion of the transition process, Russia now aims to portray itself, at least notionally, as a democratic country (Shlapentokh, 2009). Consequently, the existence of the impression of an autonomous third sector that subjects the government to scrutiny and holds the state accountable is important.

Nevertheless, despite the importance attributed to civil society, the assessment of its contribution to the democratisation process in Russia in the past, as well as within contemporary considerations, remains predominantly downbeat (Crotty, 2009). Traditionally civil society constitutes the lynchpin for democratisation, and thus the development of societies with functioning institutional environments and governance structures, which facilitate the creation of wealth and prosperity (North, 1991; Ostrom, 1990; Williamson, 2000). In order for such a development to take place and institutionalise democratic governance, state-society relations are critical. Autonomous organisations or Third Sector Organisations (Neace, 1999) known as TSOs play an important role in shaping these relations. TSOs are characterised as doing “things business and government are either not doing, not doing well, or not doing often enough”, (Levitt, 1973, p. 49) and therefore provide a valuable lens to examine wider state-society relations.

In the context of the Russian Federation, state-society relations and civil society arrangements have taken a somewhat different form in the past. As is argued throughout this thesis, characteristics that develop in the Soviet period remain intact, and post ante shape the development of civil society arrangements. Since the ascendance of the Putin/Medvedev administration to power, Russia has witnessed the strengthening of the state and the re-emergence of a strong executive power (*vertikal' vlasti*) (Hale, 2010; Mommen, 2001). This represents a shift away from the democratisation process set in motion during the 1990s, towards establishing a more illiberal regime (Shleifer & Treisman, 2005) which has been characterised as a sovereign or managed democracy (Balzer, 2003; Schröder, 2005). The strengthening of the state has entailed some advantages, specifically with regard to economic development (Hanson, 2002). However, the state's leverage of this new powerbase into politics, the economy and the space of civil society has also been argued to be "detrimental to the process of democratisation" (Konitzer & Wegren, 2006, p. 517). This strong Federal state draws on past paternalistic traditions, which are evidently less conducive to individual rights of a liberal tradition, not only to direct the political landscape but also to manage civil society. In turn, the ability of civil society space to emerge as an institution of democracy and facilitate continuing democratisation is likely to be limited. It is doubtful that within such a regime where the state manages democracy (Balzer, 2003; Schröder, 2005), and in which some democratic institutions exist to cover an authoritarian regime (Hale, 2010), that an autonomous civil society space is likely to develop.

These recent developments reflect the "resurrection of the traditional Russian state" (Hedlund, 2006, p. 775) with its claim to be the all-dominant actor resulting in paternalistic state-society relations. The subsequent weakness of the rule of law and lack of democratic accountability of the state even as they are in theory contradictory to the development of a democratic society, yet they are necessary for the Russian state to ensure the continuous functioning of its

(managed democratic) regime (Hedlund, 2006). This in turn influences the nature of civil society arrangements that can evolve and, as argued throughout this thesis, means that such arrangements rather than being autonomous are managed by the state. Therefore, civil society is unable to form a bridge between the state and society by holding the state accountable, a pivotal function civil society assumes in traditional arrangements (Taylor, 2006). Hedlund (2006) argues that recent political developments and a strengthening of the state continue the tradition of Russian politics in which the state is very important for society. Consequently, it enables the Putin/Medvedev administration to develop “a system in which market economy [co-exists with] state control, authoritarian rule with democratic election” (Sevcova, 2006, p. 6). The emergent and managed nature of civil society arrangements discussed in this thesis is a reflection of such developments, and an illustration of the ongoing penetration of this logic into all societal structures. Hence, applying this understanding of civil society to the activities of TSOs in Russia, such managed arrangements would imply that TSOs do exist, but do not create, build, or institutionalise civil society as an autonomous space.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, civil society development in the context of the Russian Federation has received increasing attention within the academic literature. However, such studies have predominantly focused on the environmental movement (Crotty, 2003; 2006; 2009; Henry, 2002; 2006), the women’s rights movement (Richter, 2002; Sperling, 1999), trade unions (Baglione & Clark, 1998; Kubicek, 2002), or human rights organisations (Mendelson & Gerber, 2007; Sundstrom 2005). Hence the existing collective literature lacks a clear and in-depth assessment of Russian TSOs, their activities and contribution to civil society development, particularly those advocating and engaging in health/welfare and education (Salmenniemi, 2008). As stated above, the period since the collapse of the Soviet Union in the Russian Federation has been characterized by rapid democratization and the implementation of neo-liberal oriented welfare reforms. In turn this has meant that the state ‘retreated’ from arenas that have traditionally been within its purview (Sil & Chen, 2004). As

neo-liberal reforms took hold, the health and education sector in particular faced this retreating state. Hence TSOs which are active in these areas have been forced to take up the gap left behind by the state. Specifically for health and education organisations this has included addressing both past social problems such as the societal integration of the disabled as well as newly emerging problems such as HIV/AIDS (Hoppenbrouwer, Sergeyev, & Nietzsche-Bell, 2005). In addition to this and similar to other agents of civil society, health and education TSOs are faced with the attempts by the state to control and manage agents of civil society and thus challenge their independence. Therefore, as well as to building civil society like most agents of civil society, health and educational TSOs also have to deal with a broader variety of challenges, which means that investigating them is important. In addition, such TSOs constitute the bulk of organisations which make up civil society (Salmenniemi, 2008) and thus provide a more representative picture of TSOs in Russian Federation. Hence by focusing on health and educational TSOs rather than the environmental movement, trade unions or other non-governmental organisations, this thesis extends the academic inquiry and provides an important additional perspective to the functioning and development of Russian civil society.

Contrary to the assessment that Russian civil society resembles a statist/corporatist model (Domrin, 2003; Hale, 2002; Hudson, 2003), this thesis illustrates that contemporary Russian civil society embeds within itself aspects of both statist and liberal facets of civil society arrangements (see chapters 3 and 8). Therefore, the thesis highlights that the state is unable to re-establish the much more restrictive societal arrangements of the Soviet period. Nevertheless, managed civil society arrangements are unlikely to nurture the norms of democracy, hold the state accountable, and pluralise participation in decision making, as assumed in traditional civil society thinking (see Chapter 2). It seems that civil society is turning into a mechanism of Russia's political machine. At the same time, this seems to reflect the most appropriate arrangements given Russia's current political environment.

Therefore, this thesis challenges the assumptions of democratisation literature and its romance with civil society, in which civil society becomes a panacea for democratisation. Thus, the thesis argues that managed arrangements do not encourage democratisation but instead reflect the ability of the state to ‘manage’ state-society relations. It is set against such considerations that this thesis proposes and examines the emergence of managed civil society arrangements and asks the question of how such arrangements are manifested in the Russian Federation?

1.1.2 Aims of thesis

In addressing the research question, the aim of this thesis is to investigate the emergent managed civil society arrangements in Russia. To achieve this aim the thesis explores three research objectives, which will be illustrated in turn. Firstly, given the lack of available literature and evidence-based assessments, the thesis examines the impact of recent legislative changes as providing the legal basis for such specific civil society arrangements. The aim here is to understand the incentive system created by the legislative environment, specifically the 2006 NGO law, and how this influences the activities of TSOs, their ability to remain independent, the impact on the way they organise themselves, and how they assess the impact of this framework on shaping civil society development. Furthermore, the limits of this legislation to further the establishment of managed civil society arrangements are explored. Consequently, this outlines objective one of this thesis;

Objective 1: To investigate the impact of the legislative changes on the day-to-day workings of TSOs in Russia and establish the limits of this law on furthering the Russian state’s agenda vis-à-vis a managed or controlled civil society and/or third sector.

Secondly, the thesis aims to explore the implications of TSOs becoming providers of public and semi-public goods (i.e. service providers) in the context of the continuous withdrawal of

the state from service provision (Sil & Chen, 2004). Whereas Russian third sector organisations have been researched in the past (by, amongst many, Crotty, 2003, 2006, 2009; Henry, 2006), organisations at the forefront of service provision, particularly in the area of health and education, have received little attention (Salmenniemi, 2008). Therefore, with the focus here on health and education organisations, this thesis not only serves to extend our existent understanding about the agents making up the Russian civil society space, but also illustrates the role they assume in mitigating a retreating state. The objective is to assess to what extent TSOs see themselves as substituting (i.e. cooperating in equal partnerships) or complementing (i.e. cooperating in vertical partnerships) the Russian state. This will provide an insight into the relationship between TSOs and the state on a micro level (i.e. local and regional), and the impact on their ability to contribute to the creation of an autonomous civil society space. Therefore, the second objective of this thesis is as follows;

Objective 2: To establish the impact of Russia's retreat away from state service provision in the health and education sectors on TSOs working in these areas, and assess how TSOs now act as state substitutes.

Thirdly, the thesis aims to establish the sort of organisations that will be considered 'legitimate' in managed civil society arrangements. The objective is to determine the nature and type of such organisations, and what role they are playing in consolidating managed civil society arrangements and thus the managed democratic regime. In so doing, characteristics of managed arrangements are illustrated. Furthermore, in exploring such organisations, the limits of the state's pursuit to establish managed civil society arrangements will potentially be highlighted. Hence, objective three of this thesis is;

Objective 3: To investigate the characteristics of a state managed civil society and to establish the limits of the Russian state's ability to control or mould civil society in this way.

These three research objectives allow this thesis to illustrate different facets of managed civil society arrangements. In addressing these objectives, the thesis will not only contribute to our understanding of how practices of civil activity evolve in an era of increasing state control and the effects these have on democratisation in Russia, but also what the wider implications are for 'traditional' civil society theory. It is the assessment of traditional civil society theory and cultural-historic antecedents to Russian civil society development that inform the proposed managed style civil society arrangements (see Chapters 2 and 3). The empirical evidence illustrates facets of such emerging arrangements, and is indicative of their institutionalisation as the overarching logic for civil society arrangements in the context of the Russian Federation.

1.2 Structure of thesis

This thesis is structured into eight chapters. As illustrated in this chapter, the focus of the thesis is on exploring the emerging managed civil society arrangements. Having provided a background to such considerations, chapter two delineates the conceptual frameworks informing this thesis. Chapter two discusses the theoretical concepts operationalised in this thesis, namely civil society and social capital. The chapter builds on the theoretical-historic origins of civil society theory to illustrate the traditional model of civil society, often referred to as the western model, and presents what can be considered pro-typical civil society agents in the form of third sector organisations. It discusses the role of TSOs in building civil society. The concept of social capital is also outlined, focusing on its relevance to civil society and its importance vis-à-vis facilitating associational life, which is at the heart of traditional civil society arrangements. Further, the interdependence of civil society with democracy and

democratisation is presented. The challenging of this civil society-democracy orthodoxy is a pivotal contribution of this thesis. In concluding, the chapter highlights contemporary debates in the extended literature in order to draw out the relevance of operationalising the traditional concept of civil society for the study of a non-traditional context such as Russia.

Chapter three builds on the insights of chapter two, and explores the cultural-historic antecedence as well as present day realities of Russian civil society. These considerations firmly establish the emergence of managed civil society arrangements. The chapter assesses the legacies of Soviet period state-society relations, highlighting the peculiar institutionalised civil society arrangements that existed. The chapter also identifies that issues of trust have created an hourglass society (Rose, 1995), which reflects a detachment of the state from society. The discussion of post-Soviet civil society development of the 1990s illustrates the constraints resulting from such arrangements. Specific cultural and societal norms, which are rooted in the Soviet period, continue to shape civil society arrangements by leading to a fragmentation of civic activism, a lack of public support and participation, and a lack of resources. Contemporary civil society arrangements are also considered with a particular focus on contextual issues that influence civil society development, such as changes in the economic, political, and legal environment. Chapter three clearly illustrates how these, in combination with Soviet period legacies, are indicative of a shift in civil society arrangements. Reflecting managed democracy and a corporatist economy, these are indicative of emerging managed civil society arrangements. The consideration of the specific literature on Russian civil society also indicates that such arrangements are likely to be based on strong and dependent relations between TSOs and the state.

Chapter four provides a detailed description of the research methodology adopted to explore managed civil society arrangements. In line with best practice in areas where no or little literature exists about a particular phenomenon, this thesis adopts a qualitative research

design. Firstly, chapter four highlights the philosophical paradigm which guided the research of this thesis. In discussing the research design in more detail, chapter four provides a description of the selection criteria used to identify and select participating TSOs. The chapter also offers a description of the cases which formed the basis for analysis. An overview of the analytical techniques is then provided, illustrating the three themes which guided analysis. The quality and robustness of the study is discussed by assessing the study's research strategy against best practice recommendations.

Chapter five presents the results of the first analytical theme examining managed civil society arrangements. The chapter explores the respondents' understanding of the NGO law, depicting how the effects of NGO law are perceived. The chapter also presents results concerning the pivotal issues of registration and reporting requirements outlined in chapter three. In so doing, the chapter highlights the existence of three distinct groups. Each of these groups, and the discourses respondents within construct to rationalise and use to portray the impacts of the NGO law, are discussed in turn. This section of the chapter illustrates that TSOs within this study either portray the law as improving organisational capabilities by forcing them to become more professional, or as constricting their activities by bureaucratising the way they operate. A minority of TSOs have not registered out of protest against the restrictive nature of the NGO law. In relation to managed civil society arrangements, these insights highlight the all-encompassing nature of the state and the creation of an incentive framework that enables the state to manage civil society arrangements.

Chapter six goes on to present a second major facet of managed civil society arrangements in Russia. It illustrates that in line with the theoretical proposition put forward in chapter 3, TSOs in this study are increasingly focused on acting as service providers. The chapter explores how activists in this study perceive their activities as either being complementary to,

or substituting for the state. In so doing, the chapter presents insights about the way TSOs see state-civil society relations, reaffirming the all-encompassing nature of the Russian state. TSOs see themselves, rather than as a political force that can hold the state to account, as service providers that act according to the policies of the state. These considerations illustrate that in the context of the Russian Federation, an opting in of TSOs, rather than a contracting out of state service provision as within traditional welfare state, motivates service provision in Russia. The chapter develops this insight to explore issues of state-substitution or complementation. In so doing, the chapter examines what effect these developments have on the ability of TSOs to act in their traditional advocacy roles. Drawing on these results, the chapter concludes that TSOs equate advocacy with service provision and subordinate themselves to the Federal state.

Chapter seven goes on to examine indicative insights illustrated in chapters five and six about the potential of specific organisations becoming the only ‘legitimate’ civil society agents. The key focus of this chapter is the exploration of the role of marionette organisations in such managed arrangements. The chapter highlights that there is an increase in organisations with marionette-like characteristics. The chapter presents these marionette-like characteristics within each of the three regions. This leads to the argument that within the proposed managed civil society arrangements, the pro-typical understanding of marionette organisations needs to be extended because many TSOs within this study engage in mimicking marionette-like characteristics. In so doing, the chapter reports TSOs as aiming to establish the ties necessary to become marionette organisations, trading in their autonomy and independence. The chapter illustrates the institutionalisation of organisations with marionette-like characteristics as the main legitimate and only officially recognised (autonomous) agents of civil society. By outlining these aspects, the chapter highlights how such organisations are themselves facilitating the institutionalisation of such managed civil society arrangements. Therefore,

chapter seven concludes that such arrangements reflect an extension of Russia's managed democratic system to civil society.

Finally, chapter eight provides a general discussion of the findings and conclusions of this thesis. The chapter revisits the core research question about how managed civil society arrangements are manifested in the Russian Federation by discussing how the empirical findings of the thesis answer the research question by exploring the three research objectives outlined in chapters one and four. The chapter then provides a detailed discussion of the implications and theoretical contributions that this thesis makes to the literature on civil society and democratisation. Drawing upon the various debates and discourses on the key constructs outlined earlier in the thesis, chapter eight discusses how the insights of this thesis further extend and deepen our theoretical understanding of civil society, third sector organisations and social capital. Following this, the chapter discusses policy implications of the research. Before concluding, the chapter outlines limitations and caveats of the research design and potential future research avenues. The chapter then concludes with a brief summary of the thesis, reiterating the major findings and conclusions.

Following the outline above, this thesis will first turn to a discussion of the major constructs guiding the analytical process, with chapter two outlining civil society, third sector organisations and social capital in turn.

CHAPTER 2: Theoretical Framework

As illustrated in the previous chapter, this thesis addresses the question of how managed civil society arrangements are manifested in the Russian Federation. Chapter one details that to do so, the thesis operationalises the constructs of civil society, third sector organisations and social capital. The aim of this chapter is to discuss these constructs in turn by reviewing contemporary literature. This indicates that these constructs are assumed to be essential to the development of democracy.

Discussions of modern societies, no matter where these debates begin, always arrive at evaluating civil society (Van Rooy, 1998). This is because civil society is considered the lynchpin of an effective institutional environment and political governance structures (Putnam, 2002). Civil society is attributed with ensuring the rule of law, transparency and accountability of authorities, and the protection of individual rights, which ensures development and prosperity (North, 1991; Ostrom, 1990; Williamson, 2000). Consequently, in discussing modern societies and specifically democracy, considerations of civil society play a pivotal part. This is particularly the case in the context of the Russian Federation, which following the end of the Soviet Union, began processes of economic and social transformation and democratisation. Therefore, examining and evaluating Russian civil society is important. The construct and concepts present in this chapter assist this thesis in this process.

In order to delineate and discuss the theoretical frameworks of civil society, third sector organisations, and social capital, this chapter is divided into five sections. The first section provides a brief introduction and key definitions relevant for this study. This section also illustrates the importance of this study focusing on aspects of democracy. The second section of the chapter discusses civil society. Defining and understanding civil society is vital to

operationalising this construct. The chapter then moves on to examine civil society in more detail. In order to do so, civil society actors and their activities are discussed as they offer a lens into civil society arrangements. The fourth section of this chapter presents the concept of social capital. In so doing, this section focuses on the social capital embedded in civil society actors. Finally, the chapter concludes by presenting contemporary debates in the literature and drawing out the relevance of these concepts to the research questions at hand.

2.1 Introduction

Civil society is the intermediary space between the individual and the state, where the state is defined as an “ensemble of institutions and practices with powerful cultural consequences” (Salmenniemi, 2008, p. 5). Therefore, as Mercer states (2007, p. 7) in order to investigate civil society, the state and its interactions vis-à-vis civil society are important, because “the state and civil society [are] separate from, yet essential complements to, one another”. In the context of the Russian Federation, the power of the state and its territorial division is particularly important. Following Salmenniemi (2008), this thesis refers to state power on different levels, each of which has particular practices, policies and thus effects on civil society. The aspects of state power are the Federal level of state power (central legislative and executive in Moscow), the regional level (Federal subjects), and municipal level (city and villages) (Salmenniemi, 2008). As has been highlighted in chapter one, the Russian Federal state has effectively penetrated the various other levels, enabling it to create a managed democratic environment (Balzer, 2003 Schröder, 2005). Taking into account the insight illustrated, investigating civil society offers a powerful lens to understand both Russia’s future path of democratisation, as well as the shifts of wider state-society relations. The empirical findings and their theoretical contextualisation within this thesis assert that civil society in Russia is shaped by a strong Federal state. Specific aspects of civil society development in Russia will be discussed in chapter three.

Within the literature on democracy and democratisation, civil society has become a critical concept (Uhlen, 2006). Other strands of the literature, such as the management literature, in particular that on cross-sectoral partnerships, corporate social responsibility (Muthuri, Matten, & Moon, 2009) or the area of non-profit management, also contribute and draw extensively on civil society as a theoretical construct (DiMaggio & Anheier, 1990). Thus, it is not surprising that there is an ample array of definitions of civil society (Jensen, 2006). Most of them understand civil society as an autonomous sphere of society that is neither the government nor business (Jensen, 2006). This thesis follows such understandings and adopts Neace's definition of civil society as "the social space between the individual family and the state" (Neace, 1999, p. 150). As will be discussed below (see section 2.2) this definition captures the essence of what civil society is, namely an intermediary area between the private (individual) and the public (state) (Sukel, 1978). Understanding civil society as an intermediary space enables the thesis to establish agents, participant, activities, and the particular contribution it makes to contemporary societal arrangements.

Civil society is "made up of autonomous, freely chosen, intermediary organisations" (Neace, 1999, p. 150). Within the literature these organisations are also known as 'third sector organisations' or TSOs, and are characterised as organisations which "do things business and government are either not doing, not doing well, or not doing often enough" (Levitt, 1973, p. 49). By engaging in such activities, TSOs ensure that public participation in decision-making is pluralised (Mercer, 2002), and thus they contribute to democracy (Linz & Stepan, 1996). Following this train of thought, this thesis defines democracy as "a mode of decision making about collective binding rules and policies over which the people exercise control [and] where all members of the collective enjoy equal rights in such decision-making" (Uhlen, 2006, p. 17).

Within the literature, the orthodox assumption is that civil society makes democracy function (Diamond, 1994). More specifically, civil society facilitates democracy in three ways (Taylor, 2006). Firstly, individuals freely associated in TSOs, engage in collective activity, which transmits the norms and values of democracy (Putnam, Leonardi, & Nanetti, 1993) such as civil behaviour (Shils, 2003). Civil society creates the space where individuals practice the norms and values of democracy, building generalised social trust and norms of reciprocity (Taylor, 2006). Civil society plays a critical role in shaping citizens and citizenship skills (Ossewaarde, 2006), transforming society from *Gemeinschaft* to *Gesellschaft* (Toennies, 1955). Secondly, such engagement allows TSOs to act as a “counterweight to the state” (Foley & Edwards, 1996, p. 39) holding and tempering the power of the state (Taylor, 2006). As an autonomous and intermediary sphere, civil society aggregates and represents interest (Fish, 1991), often that of minorities, and through that acts as a counterweight to the state. As a counterweight, civil society is able to hold the state accountable for its actions and thus ensure the state’s civil and democratic behaviour. Thirdly, it allows TSOs to work together with the state to develop and consolidate democracy (Taylor, 2006). Civil society pluralises the democratic arena and participation in decision-making. Civil society ensures that no one societal actor is able to dominate policy-making (Oxhorn, 2001) and thus strengthens democracy.

It is not surprising therefore, that in particular the democratisation literature often considers civil society as synonymous with democracy (Chandhoke, 2007; Diamond, 1994; Kaldor, 2003; Putnam, Leonardi, & Nanetti, 1993). Thus, civil society has the dual responsibility of democratising the state and its institutional environment, as well as democratising the individual and society (Uhlen, 2006). This is of particular importance in the context of the Russian Federation and the process of rapid democratisation that it has undergone.

“A robust civil society, with the capacity to generate political alternatives and to monitor government and state, can help start transitions, help resist reversals, help push transitions to their completion, and help consolidate and deepen democracy.”
(Linz & Stepan, 1996, p. 18)

Subsequently, civil society becomes both a path towards democracy as well as a roadblock to any reversal.

Another critical aspect of the debate on civil society and democracy is often discussed in terms of TSOs building social capital (Putnam, 1995). This thesis adopts Putnam’s definition of social capital, who defines it as “features of social organisation such as networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit” (Putnam, 1995, p. 67). This definition dovetails with the above described function of civil society to foster norms and values of democratic governance (Fukuyama, 2001; Newton, 2001a; Newton, 2001b; Putnam, 1993; Welzel, Inglehart, & Deutsch, 2005; Woolcock, 1998). Much of the importance of social capital is attributed to the associational life it fosters (de Tocqueville, 2003 [1848]). Individuals get together on a voluntary basis, forming associations and networks for a variety of purposes, such as playing cards, bowling (Putnam, 1995) or saving the environment. Such civic activism or engagement is the basis of associational life, which manifests itself in TSOs. Social capital is critical for these intermediary organisations to enable them to bridge between the individual and the state (Portes, 1998). The ability to bridge across the gap between the individual and the state is pivotal for civil society in order to hold the state accountable, as well as cooperate with it to consolidate democracy. In addition, the concept of social capital pays attention to informal interpersonal practices that Hann (1996) argues are important in “explorations of civil society” (p. 3). This chapter presents these concepts in more detail, forming the basis for an examination of the literature on civil society in the context of the Russia Federation in chapter three.

2.2 Civil society

As mentioned above, civil society has become a key concept when analysing democracy and democratisation (Bernhard, 1993; Diamond, 1994; Linz & Stepan, 1996). However, as a concept it stretches back to as far as ancient Greece (Aristotle, 2003 [1983]). In the 17th and 18th century, civil society received particular attention from a variety of different philosophical streams and perspectives (Carothers, 2000; Ferguson, 2003 [1767]; Hegel, 2003 [1821]; Kant, 2003 [1795]; Madison, 2003 [1787]; Marx, 1978; Pain, 2003 [1791]; Smith, 1993 [1776]; de Tocqueville, 2003 [1848]). It is these early discourses that have shaped civil society as a construct, and their contributions to the history of civil society are well-documented (Cohen & Arato, 1992; Ehrenberg, 1999; Keane, 1988; Kubicek, 2002; Kumar, 1993). However, a detailed discussion is beyond the realm of this thesis. Of particular importance for this thesis is the contribution these historic debates made to the idea of civil society as contributing to democratic governance and social capital, (de Tocqueville, 2003 [1848]) and considering it as a space which is non-state and non-economic (Gramsci, Hoare, & Smith, 1971). Those considerations, which shape our understanding of civil society and our assumptions about civil society, are integral to democratic societies. This illustrates the importance of presenting the concept of civil society in this thesis. As a notional democratic country, civil society in the Russian Federation should aim to mirror the form, function, and structures associated with civil society. Therefore, clarifying the concept of civil society and how it contributes to democratic governance is a central objective of this chapter. The following two subsections dissect the understanding of civil society to provide a comprehensive overview of its form and function within modern societies. The first section will outline key definitions and contemporary conceptual debates. The second section sheds light on the current issues, particularly with regard to the role of the state.

2.2.1 Definitional issues and assumptions

At the heart of debates about civil society is the pursuit to uncover what constitutes a ‘good society’ (Foley & Hodgkinson, 2003). In the past, civil society has been seen as the constitutional state (Lock, 1965), a system of needs (Hegel, 2003 [1821]), associational life (de Tocqueville, 2003 [1848]), or a realm of conflict (Gramsci, Hoare, & Smith, 1971). These perspectives have transcended into contemporary debates, where civil society is either understood by its function or as a space (Jensen, 2006). The former aims to outline what responsibilities, tasks, and functions civil society should be performing. The latter understands civil society as a distinct space outside the state and business. As a space, civil society is shaped by the public (the state and business) and private (the individuals and family) realms of society. The analytic distinction between space and function is particularly relevant for examining civil society in the context of the Russia Federation (Salmenniemi, 2008). As a debate, it greatly influences the assessment of civil society in Soviet Russia, and is at the heart of the argument about whether civil society existed, or whether it was institutionalised in the Soviet Union (see chapter 3.2). The functional perspective’s inherent assumptions of liberal democratic state-society relations (Fukuyama, 1992; Fukuyama, 2001; Seligman, 1992) mean that an autonomous civil society did not exist in the Soviet Union. However, as discussed in more detail in chapter three section two, the rudiments of civil society were present in Soviet society in places such as trade unions, sports organisations (Salmenniemi, 2008) or an autonomous nature protection movement (Weiner, 1999). These were not necessarily ‘autonomous’, ‘intermediary’ or even ‘freely chosen’. However they did provide a space for social interaction, which was non-state and non-economic (see chapter 3.2). Therefore, investigating civil society from a spatial perspective bears a more fruitful lens for examining civil society in the context of the Russian Federation.

2.2.1.1 Spatial approaches to civil society

Spatial definitions of civil society do not have the inherent normative constraints often associated with functional understandings. Within such understandings, civil society is demarcated as “situated between the state and the market” (Kuchukeeva & O'Loughlin, 2003, p. 557) or the market, the state and the individual (Chandhoke, 2007; Cohen & Arato, 1992; Hyden, 1997; Lovell, 2007). As mentioned above, civil society encompasses the interactions that are non-state and non-economic (Gramsci, Hoare, & Smith, 1971). Kaldor (2003) points to the fact that a constitutional state, the rule of law, or clear boundaries of the public and private realm are often assumed in spatial understandings of civil society, but frequently do not reflect realities within transitory or developing contexts. Consequently, civil society is often understood very narrowly as “the realm of organised social life that is voluntary” (Diamond, 1994, p. 5).

Nevertheless, this limits the ability of civil society as a concept to capture the ‘life of society’ outside such frequently formalised settings. In the context of the Russian Federation for example, such narrow approaches to civil society have led literature to be preoccupied with organisations which have enjoyed foreign funding, or are aimed at the protection of human rights, or advancing democratic governance (Salmenniemi, 2008; see also chapter 3.3). This has led to other agents and actors situated within civil society being neglected in research activities. Nonetheless such agents also play an important role in establishing and creating a civil society space (Kaldor, 2003). Thus, defining civil society as a space provides this thesis with a useful tool to examine actors and agents, be they formal or informal, of civil society and their capability to build civil society as a bridge between the individual and state. Thus, this thesis operationalises civil society as the “space between the individual family and the state” (Neace, 1999, p. 150).

Drawing on this discussion, a central aspect and assumption of the spatial concept of civil society is the equi-distance between spheres. Effectively equi-distance demarcates civil society from the individual family (private sphere) and the state (public sphere), asserting that there are clear boundaries to civil society. Further, it means that civil society is an autonomous space, which is critical to the three democratic functions: conveying norms and values of democracy, holding the state accountable, and collaborating with the state to strengthen democracy (Taylor, 2006).

The idea of an autonomous sphere juxtaposes civil society with the state, and is central to its contribution to democracy (Walzer, 1992; Whittington, 2001; Warren, 2001; Foley & Edwards, 1996; Wood, 2001). Only as an autonomous space, can civil society, through its agents, facilitate collective action and hold the state accountable (Fukuyama, 1997; Putnam, 1995; Thomas, 1996). Autonomy allows civil society to take up a role of agency vis-à-vis the state as well as the market (Keane, 2005; Walzer, 1991). However, civil society as an autonomous space requires institutions, which ensure its separation from the state, such as political competition, independent judiciary, rule of law, and freedom of expression (Shils, 2003).

Interlinked with the issue of equi-distance and autonomy is the role of civil society in acting as a bridge between the individual and the state (Portes, 1998). The function of bridging the gap between the individual and the state allows civil society to aggregate and represent the interests of individuals (Fish, 1991; Foley & Edwards, 1996). By bridging the gap between the individual and the state, civil society is able to mediate interest and demands, facilitating problem solving through collective action (Habermas, 1982). Nevertheless being a bridge assumes that civil society is a) legally permitted and b) equal to the state. Further, it is crucial for civil society to be able to aggregate, represent, and promote interest, which requires its agents to mobilise broad public participation and support. Such activities enable civil society

agents to generate norms of reciprocity and social trust. However, for civil society to be able to act as a bridge between the individual and the state, the state needs to acknowledge the existence of civil society by being responsive, cooperative, and open to accommodate demands arising from civil society agents. Such civil society arrangements extend formal democratic structures such as elections and ensure that a more democratic mode of decision-making emerges (Uhlen, 2006).

2.2.1.2 Civil society and the state

Edwards and Foley (2001) argue that the state provides the “constitutional, legal, political, and moral framework” (p. 13). Through this framework, the state creates an environment in which civil society facilitates government and strengthens democracy (Foucault, 1991 [1978]). Civil society becomes a political institution in itself, with the aim to limit the actions of the state (Shils, 2003 [1997]). A vibrant civil society is thus a crucial pillar for the ability of a modern state to exist and a government to govern (Mann, 1984). Thus, strong and effective political institutions are critical to both civil society and modern states (Berman, 1997). In such an environment, civil society can hold the state accountable without the fear of retribution by the state. Consequently, civil society and the state cooperate to build democracy (Taylor, 2006) and develop symbiotic mutually dependent relationships (Walzer, 1992) as depicted in Figure 2.2.

For Walzer (1992) these symbiotic relationships are a result of the historic path which the concept of civil society has taken within western political debate. Effective civil society-state relations arise when political elites are tolerant of civil society and formalised mechanisms of interaction exist (Bremeo, 2000; Kubik, 2005). Ehrenberg (1999) highlights that any state can “create, support, manipulate, or repress” (p. 238) civil society, and therefore, interaction mechanisms have to be formalised and the autonomy of civil society has to be institutionalised and legally protected (Uhlen, 2006; Weigle, 2000). In turn, the nature of these

state-civil society relations determines the political opportunities available and constraints faced by civil society and its agents (McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1996; Tarrow, 1998; Uhlin, 2006). Consequently, an autonomous and independent civil society becomes a pivotal institution of democratic governance. The issue of state-civil society relations provides a central analytical perspective within this thesis. Specific civil society-state relations have developed in different contexts. In light of rapid democratisation, it is likely that such relations have significantly evolved and changed in the context of the Russian Federation (see chapter 3). In particular, democratising contexts have less clear cut boundaries between the state and civil society (Mercer, 2002). In such contexts, this often involves movements of particular individuals between civil society organisations and state structures. However, clear boundaries and civil society-state relations, which preserve the autonomy of civil society, are vital to its democratic functionality.

As discussed above, autonomy from the state also ensures the existence of a pluralistic associational life (Frumkin & Galaskiewicz, 2004). Nonetheless, Uhlin (2006) warns that too much autonomy could “delegitimize the state” (p. 29). In such cases, civil society strengthens at the expense of the state, and often fails to produce the democratic outcomes such as pluralisation of the democratic arena, or bridging between the state and the individual (Berman, 1997; Luong & Weinthal, 1999). Therefore, an autonomous civil society that is good for democracy cannot exist in an environment in which the state does not have sufficient strength to enforce the rules of the game (North, 1991). However, neither can an autonomous civil society exist where the state refuses to acknowledge it.

Within developed democratic settings, close interaction between civil society and the state are desirable and unavoidable (Uhlin, 2006). The state’s cooperation with civil society strengthens associational life (Skocpol, 1987; 1996). In effect, cooperation on an equal basis is the key to improving policymaking (Hadenius & Ugglå, 1996). A democratic state is more

likely to provide “channels of influence, arenas for interaction and a facilitative legal-administrative framework” (Hadenius & Uggla, 1996, p. 1630). In these circumstances, the power civil society exercises vis-à-vis the state comes from

“changing political discourse, legitimisation of particular forms of collective action, the establishment of policy-oriented institutions within civil society, and protest activities that leads to governmental response” (Uhlen, 2006, p. 30).

Effectively, the state becomes more responsive to bottom-up impetus, and develops cooperative relations with agents of civil society although not at the expense of the autonomy of civil society. Nonetheless, such arrangements are very different from the paternalistic traditions that governed state-society arrangements in Soviet Russia. Such considerations assume that the state is willing to share its power base, something that is inherently new to the post-Soviet Russian state. Consequently, understanding the level of autonomy of Russian civil society arrangements is critical to the examinations presented in this thesis. Clearly civil society as a societal space is unable to take on these functions. Its manifestations and agents such as TSOs, on the other hand, engage with the state and its institutions. Therefore, the following section discusses TSOs, their role, and function in building civil society and democracy.

2.3 Third sector organisations

The discussion in the previous section focused on discussing civil society as a space. As a space, civil society manifests itself in various agents, actors, and institutions. This section examines networks, associations, groups, organisations, and other agents and manifestations, which make up civil society (Renshaw, 1994). These elements are representations of civil society and empirical investigations use them as lenses to examine civil society. It is those manifestations which also constituted civil society in Russia, and therefore, such elements

need to be defined and discussed. As illustrated above, civil society is delineated against the state and the market, and as a result often referred to as the third sector (Uphoff, 1993). Within the literature, civil society organisations are referred to as non-profit, non-government (NGOs), voluntary or third sector organisations (TSOs) (Salamon & Anheier, 1997). TSO is the most commonly used term to describe civil society organisations. As will be discussed below, the term TSO carries a normative connotation, which restricts its usability for empirical inquiry (Mercer, 2002). Taking this into account, this thesis still refers to agents and manifestations of civil society as TSOs.

TSOs span the spectrum of informal associations such as neighbourhood watch associations, and formal associations such as trade unions (Borris, 1998). Based on membership, and the way members interact with each other and with the organisation, TSOs are classed into three different typologies; primary, secondary and tertiary (Offe & Fuchs, 2002). In primary TSOs, members interact with circles of families and friends (Offe & Fuchs, 2002). In secondary TSOs, members interact with individuals outside their family networks in a face-to-face manner (Offe & Fuchs, 2002). Tertiary interaction refers to organisations where individuals remain anonymous and mainly contribute via financial means with Greenpeace, Cancer UK, or Caritas Internationalis being prime examples. Despite the potential overlapping of these three ways of interaction, TSOs are generally dominated by one specific typology. Evidently, the larger in size and membership a TSO becomes, the more tertiary its interactions. Further, these interactions can

“take quite different forms in different national settings, reflecting differences in cultural traditions, legal structure, and political histories” (Gibron, Kramer, & Salamon, 1992, pp. 2-3).

In the literature, TSOs are attributed with various responsibilities. As will be discussed below in more detail (see section 2.3.1), the literature illustrates the role of TSOs as providing public and quasi-public goods as social services in response to the crisis of the welfare state (Brenton, 1985; Green, 1987; Offe, 2000). However, in countries undergoing democratisation TSOs emerged as driving forces for political democracy (Mania, 1998; Stephenson, 2000). One strand of the academic literature on TSOs sees them as outcomes of political opportunities (McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1996). TSOs are a result of the failure of the state to ensure a ‘good life’. In response to these failings, individual citizens associate together in TSOs to complement the state’s activities. In turn, this engagement in associational life opens up political opportunities that TSOs can use to improve circumstances and ensure a ‘good life’. The participation of individuals enables TSOs to partake in public affairs and decision making. Frequently the literature characterises TSOs as institutions in the democratic process which provide marginal and disenfranchised groups (Mercer, 2002) with an outlet to voice their needs. Consequently, individual TSOs pursue a broad spectrum of agendas. However, as discussed above, their common characteristic is reflected in doing “things business and government are either not doing, not doing well, or not doing often enough” (Levitt, 1973, p. 49). No matter which activities TSOs pursue, whether they are the provision of welfare services or advancement of political interest, they contribute to pluralising the democratic arena (Mercer, 2002) as well as strengthening and deepening democratic governance (Linz & Stepan, 1996). TSOs, as areas of direct participation and indirect participation, become channels of interest representations and generators of social capital, and thus contribute to democracy.

Through encouraging participation, TSOs strengthen civil society and thus democratic governance (Bratton, 1989). TSOs accommodate the conflicting interests, values, and views that are the basis for democratic societies (Dahl, 1982). As mentioned above, in particular western thought tends to associate and equate the third sector with TSOs (Salamon &

Anheier, 1997; Mercer, 2002). They are often seen as “officially established, run by employed staff (often urban professional or expatriates), well-supported (by domestic or, as is more often the case international funding), and that are often relatively large and well-resourced” (Mercer, 2002, p. 6). However, even though TSOs only represent a small part of civil society they are often equated with it. This results in the orthodoxy of TSOs = Civil Society = Democracy (Salmenniemi, 2008). Mercer (2002) argues that the merging of civil society and TSOs is problematic because:

- a) they are seen as the inherent bearers of democracy neglecting all other actors,
- b) they are understood and defined differently depending on the context which authors look at, and
- c) they do not necessarily deepen and widen participation and thus democracy.

Therefore, TSOs need to be disentangled from civil society and they have to be understood as a lens and manifestation of it, rather than equal to civil society. In particular research from democratising countries such as Russia has shown that TSOs can often be

“internally undemocratic, characterised by authoritarian or charismatic personalised leaderships, competitive, driven along class, gender, religious, regional, spatial and ethnic faultlines, and steered by either the state or donors, or both” (Mercer, 2002, p. 13).

Even though some TSOs will facilitate the rule of law, hold the state accountable and encourage voluntary association, TSOs are not democratic just because they are situated within the space of civil society (Mercer, 2002). In particular, within a democratising context, TSOs often fail to contribute to building an autonomous civil society space. Therefore, in themselves, TSOs do not guarantee the positive democratic contribution that is associated with civil society (see section 2.2).

For TSOs engaged in providing public and semi-public goods (see section 2.3.1), remaining internally democratic as well as building a civil society conducive to democratic governance poses a particular challenge. As illustrated in chapter one, Russia's transition process has been characterised by a withdrawal of the state, providing opportunities for TSOs to deliver public and semi-public goods. However, TSOs taking up such frequently service providing roles tend to receive the majority of resources for their activities from the state (Hall, 2002). This leads to TSOs becoming resource dependent on the state, which creates issues with regard to the ability of TSOs to advocate and hold the state accountable, ensuring democratic order. In particular, the discourse constructing TSOs as part of the 'new public management' agenda highlights these issues with regards to transparency and accountability (Anheier, 2009). In the UK, the government has consciously expanded the use of TSOs to provide services by increasing funding to civil society organisations significantly (Chew & Osborne, 2009). As will be discussed in chapter three, Russian TSOs are facing a similar trend. The transformation of TSOs into public service providers has led Young (2000) to argue that relationships between the state and TSOs can be seen as substituting, complementing, or advocating. Whereas TSOs are not exclusively locked into a specific relationship (Young, 2000), in the context of the Russian Federation (see Chapter 3) it could be expected that TSOs which are either substituting or complementing the state, are less likely to also engage in advocating activities.

2.3.1 Third sector organisations as service providers

Despite the existence of a broad cross-section of organisations, within the research literature on civil society, the focus is frequently on TSOs which can be considered as service providers (van Til, 2009) or which are also referred to as professional non-profit organisations (Richter, 2002; Salamon, 1995; Salamon & Anheier, 1998). Several authors have attempted to outline and theorise the reasons why such organisations exist (DiMaggio & Anheier, 1990; Hansmann, 1987; 1996; James & Rose-Ackerman, 1986; Weisbrod, 1975). The majority of

these approaches came as a response to the difficulties faced by welfare states in the 1970s and 1980s and focused on TSOs 'stepping in for the state'. Economic and financial difficulties faced by the state and the rise of the liberal capitalist agenda (Friedman, 2002) meant that states began to withdraw welfare and social services provided in the past. However, these services were still required and alternative service provision channels were needed. Several alternative approaches were suggested (Brenton, 1985), all with the aim of pluralising welfare provision (Evers, 1995). Consequently, Salamon (1995) points out that the state evolved into a provider of funding rather than direct welfare services. Through grants and social contracting, the state engaged TSOs in providing public and quasi-public goods and services (Anheier, 2009). In effect, TSOs began to compete, supplement, and substitute for the state (Young, 2000).

Considering the literature on TSOs as service providers is critical for the research objectives of this thesis (see chapter 1). Past research on Russian TSOs has focused on the environmental movement, women's organisations, human rights organisations, and trade unions (see chapter 1). Therefore, as illustrated in chapter one, this thesis investigates TSOs that pursue a health and educational agenda. This dovetails with the literature on TSOs as service providers, which frequently focuses on TSOs in health and education (Gilson, Sen, Mohammed, & Mujinja, 1994; Robinson & White, 2001). In the context of health, TSOs are often found to be working with the disabled, children, or acting as supports of research (i.e. Cancer Research UK), as well as engaging in advocacy to improve social integration, justice and equal treatment of the mainly marginal groups they represent (Tomlinson & Schwabenland, 2010). In the educational area, TSOs engage directly in the educational process by running schools (i.e. many private Schools in Germany or faith-based schools in the UK), as well as indirectly providing support and assistance in educational matters. Frequently, indirect educational activities are aimed at empowering the poor and marginalised groups of society.

Thus, generally TSOs should fulfil two functions: a) as members of civil society they act as a bridge between the state and the individual and b) as service providers they supersede or complement the state by providing public and semi-public goods. However, as stated above, in engaging in such activities TSOs rely on the state for resources and in particular funding. This resource dependency means that TSOs are responsible for the way services are delivered, but the state retains its ability to define who is able to receive services. However, Trudeau (2008) observes an important aspect of how TSOs conduct service provision. He illustrates that vital to the success of TSOs as service providers is their ability to considerably stretch the boundaries set by the state. Therefore, as Chaves, Stephens and Galaskiewicz (2004) show, in a stable, developed and liberal democratic context such as the US, service-providing TSOs still managed to fulfil their political potential to strengthen democracy despite their resource dependency on the government (Child & Grønbjerg, 2007; Mosley, 2009). Hence, regardless of engaging in such activities, these organisations still form the feedback loops of democracy (Habermas, 1996), and thus mediate between the individual and the state, pluralising political participation and strengthening democracy. In turn, in less autonomous civil society arrangements such as in the context of the Russian Federation, TSO resource dependency on the state is likely to limit the ability to generate these democracy conducive externalities.

The potential of organisations situated within civil society for providing social services to a wider part of the population is not a recent consideration within literature or public policy (Pestoff, 1992). As stated above, enlisting TSOs as service providers became popular with neo-liberal reform agendas, promoting a shrinking and contracting welfare state (Salamon, 1995). The post-Soviet transition agenda, as chapter one illustrated, reflected such developments, as the state frequently withdrew from service provision (Sil & Chen, 2004). As part of the neo-liberal reform agenda which many countries such as the US and the UK pursued in the 1970s and 1980s, the state began to contract out public service to TSOs, which

were considered to provide services that were more appropriate and more efficient. Supported by the argument of greater efficiency, such developments advocated welfare pluralism (Evers, 1995), allowing service users more choice. TSOs providing services meant that services became more participatory, less bureaucratic, more cost effective (Kettl, 2000) and better at reaching the poor and disadvantaged groups within society (Bardhan, 1993; Brett, 1993). Consequently, by engaging in service provision, TSOs improved equality in particular with regard to access to services (Tomlinson & Schwabenland, 2010). However, TSOs also need to be able to engage in activities which are “aimed at influencing the social and civic agenda and at gaining access to the arena where decisions that affect the social and civil life are made” (Schmid, Bar, & Nirel, 2008, p. 582), thus they have to engage in advocacy type activities. In effect, it is the advocacy objectives of most TSOs that result in their engagement in service provision (Anheier, 2009).

The shift into service provision has had a variety of impacts on TSOs. In order to “ensure survival” (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978, p. 260) TSOs in countries such as the US or the UK have undergone a phase of ‘marketisation’, transforming themselves into more business-like organisations (Anheier, 2009). Research in the third sector of the UK also indicates that the transition of service provision has been accompanied by TSOs adopting professional management practices (Chew, 2006). As will be highlighted in chapter five, some TSOs within this study do want to portray themselves as also having undergone a similar transition. In order to survive, Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) highlight how TSOs changed their activities in response to resources for service provision. However, as argued above, subsequent research shows that this development has not constrained the political potential of civil society.

Despite not affecting their political potential, the ‘marketisation’ of TSOs means that these organisations are becoming less engaged in advocacy activity (Craig, 2009). Such activity has become the primary focus for smaller and less formally organised grass-roots organisations or

groups (Craig, 2009). Trudeau (2008) argues that another result of such ‘marketisation’ is the increasing entrepreneurial nature of TSOs (in the literature this is often referred to as social entrepreneurship). As a result, TSOs now focus on aspects such as revenue management, marketing, and branding (Anheier, 2009), or the positioning of themselves in a ‘positive’ light vis-à-vis public perception. Therefore, Anheier (2009) observes that in western democracies TSOs are moving from the space of civil society into the business space/the space of the second sector. Subsequently TSOs lose their position between the state and society and as a bridge between the state and the individual. However, despite such a change, TSOs still contribute to democratic governance by generating social capital (Putnam, 1995). The following section discusses the concept of social capital in more detail.

2.4 Social capital

2.4.1 Defining social capital

Similar to civil society, social capital is now a widely used analytical concept (Portes, 1998) used across various disciplines and contexts. Social capital has served as a lens into a wide variety of issues, such as schooling (Coleman, 1988), democracy (Fukuyama, 2001), or economic development (for an overview see Woolcock, 1998 or Woolcock and Narayan 2000). Despite the variety of applications, the basic tenets of social capital refer to the interaction of individuals and the resulting ties/bonds with each other (Granovetter, 1973). Therefore, social capital creates the bonds, which keep associations, networks, and thus societies together (Narayan, 1999). It explains how associations exist and why people interact with each other (Edwards & Foley, 2001). However, contrary to the other forms of capital, such as human, physical, or financial, stocks of social capital cannot be owned by an individual (Adler & Kwon, 2002; Burt, 1992; Newton, 2001a; Norris, 2002; Robison, Schmid, & Siles, 2002), but are embedded within the networks of society.

Social capital is critical to understanding civil society and its contribution to democracy. It is relevant to civil society because it leads to “trust, norms [of reciprocity] and horizontal networks” (Marsh, 2000, p. 183), which facilitate the existence of civil society and TSOs. Further, social capital facilitates collective action of networks and associations within civil society (Welzel, Inglehart, & Deutsch, 2005). In effect social capital is what makes civil society and TSOs work (Inglehart, 1997). For Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti (1993) TSOs contribute “to the effectiveness and stability of democratic governance (...) because of their ‘internal’ effects on individual members and because of their ‘external’ effects on the wider polity” (pp. 89-90). Internally these TSOs organise in a democratic manner, encourage “habits of co-operation, solidarity, and public-spiritedness” (Putnam, Leonardi & Nanetti, 1993, pp. 89-90), and thus nurture norms and values of democracy (Taylor, 2006). Externally, as discussed above, TSOs aggregate and represent the interest of the polity, and through that hold the state to account (see section 2.1).

The concept of social capital was established by Bourdieu and Coleman (Edwards & Foley, 2001). For Bourdieu, social capital helps to explain the different structures which societies have assumed (Edwards & Foley, 2001). Coleman, on the other hand, understands social capital by its function and “facilitating certain actions” of individual actors (Coleman, 1988, p. 98). This approach to social capital focuses on the ability of individual actors to access resources by “virtue of membership in a social network” (Portes, 1998, p. 6). The social network of an individual actor decides his/her social capital stock (Burt, 1992; Coleman, 1988; Granovetter, 1973; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998; Tsai & Ghoshal, 1998). The structural approach often centres on the individual and their specific actions, rather than more macro aspects of social networks. Further, this perspective often neglects power and conflict (Schuller, Baron, & Field, 2000), which as mentioned above are critical aspects of civil society (see section 2.1 & 2.2). Such individualistic approaches tend to understand social capital as always having a positive impact on democracy (Schuller, Baron, & Field, 2000),

which is not necessarily the case. Therefore, for this thesis a more collectively orientated definition is required.

Adler and Kwon (2002) find that definitions of social capital can be grouped into ones focusing on external relations (structural approaches) and ones focusing on internal relations (collective approaches). Internal definitions consider “social capital of a collective (organisation, community, nation)” (Adler & Kwon, 2002, p. 21), and generally focus on the internal structures and its outcomes. These types of definitions are more collectively orientated. This thesis examines how TSOs, or networks of people, contribute to civil society and hence democracy. Therefore, in order to be able to examine social capital within manifestations of civil society, a collective definition is more appropriate. For that reason this thesis adopts Putnam’s (1995, p. 67) definitions and understands social capital as “norms and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit” and which manifests itself in “features of social organisation such as networks”.

Within this thesis, networks are understood as the basis for TSOs, however within this section, both terms are used interchangeably. Networks consist of both direct/strong and indirect/weak ties between people (Granovetter, 1973). Amongst network members, norms govern cooperation and outline which actions are acceptable or unacceptable (Putnam, 1995). Woolcock (1998) refers to such norms as norms of reciprocity, which form one of the cornerstones of social capital because they provide meaning to exchanges as well as establishing a sense of fairness (Putnam, Leonardi, & Nanetti, 1993). Further, for Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti (1993) trust is another cornerstone of social capital. Trust is defined as “socially learned and socially confirmed expectations that people have of each other, of organisations and institutions in which they live, and of the natural and moral social orders that set the fundamental understandings for their lives” (Barber, 1983, pp. 164-165). Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti (1993) distinguish between personal trust and social trust. Personal trust

is associated with more direct or strong ties, and is frequently the basis for networks such the nuclear family (Putnam, Leonardi, & Nanetti, 1993). However, social trust is understood as being more indirect in nature, important for the development of weak/indirect ties (Putnam, Leonardi, & Nanetti, 1993). It is social trust that must dominate for modern societies to function, as well as being central to social capital generation and conducive to contributing to democracy (Putnam, Leonardi, & Nanetti, 1993). Social trust enables the sort of de Tocquevillain networks of associations illustrated in chapter two, which are pivotal to an autonomous civil society space. Both types of trust facilitate reciprocity, and thus cooperative and coordinating behaviour. Further, reciprocity and networks of social organisation lead to the development of social trust (Putnam, Leonardi, & Nanetti, 1993). However, not all TSOs contribute to democratisation. Despite facilitating collective action, TSOs might not necessarily generate social capital because they might operate undemocratically internally (Diamond, 1994). For the positive relationship between civil society and democracy to hold, the possibility of generating social capital through associational life is pivotal (Newton, 2001a; Ostrom, 1990; Putnam, 1995). Therefore, the key to how civil society can contribute to democracy consolidation is the question of how social capital is generated.

2.4.2 Social capital and civil society

As discussed previously, civil society contributes to democratic governance through its variety of manifestations, such as “interest groups, intermediary associations, civic associations, social movements and voluntary organisations” (van Deth, 1998, p. 1). These manifestations generate social capital which facilitates democratic governance. Further, social capital is what makes these manifestations work. Thus, TSOs are a source (Chan, 2008; Field, Schuller, & Baron, 2000), as well as a manifestation, of social capital (Chan, 2008; Fukuyama, 2001; Inglehart, 1997).

The discussion of social capital and civil society pays particular attention to civic engagement and civic activity within TSOs (see section 2.2). Civic engagement is crucial to creating norms and values conducive to the creation of social capital (Putnam, 1995). On the one hand, Putnam (1995) argues that only active face-to-face participation within civil society is beneficial to social capital and democracy. Others disagree (Foley & Edwards, 1996), and subsequent research has highlighted the contribution that tertiary organisations make (see section 2.3 above; Minkoff, 2001; Newton, 1997). Others argue that the generation of social capital cannot be considered without the state (Berman, 2001; Booth & Richard, 2001; Edwards & Foley, 2001; Kenworthy, 2001; Levi, 1996; Skocopl, 1987; Woolcock & Narayan, 2000). Proponents of this institution/state-centred perspective argue that social capital generated through civic engagement is an outcome of the institutional arrangements of the state (Berman, 2001; Levi, 1996; Warren, 2001). TSOs are only able to generate social capital if the institutional environment enables an autonomous civil society to exist. Nevertheless, with regards to TSOs' ability to facilitate democratic governance, the positive as well as negative outcomes of social capital need to be considered.

2.4.2.1 Bonding and bridging social capital

Clearly, the voluntary participation in TSOs and subsequent fostering of norms of reciprocity requires a state that ensures the autonomy of the civil society space. Nonetheless, aspects of social capital can result in negative outcomes such as exclusion (Whittington, 2001), the restriction of individual autonomy, and lead to the fragmentation of society (Portes, 1998). These are detrimental to democracy. Social capital leading to such outcomes is commonly referred to as bonding social capital. On the other hand, social capital that results in *positive* outcomes is referred to as bridging social capital (Rose, 2001). For Putnam (1995), this distinction between bonding and bridging is central to determining the contribution of social capital, hence TSOs to democratic governance. The distinction between bonding and bridging

types of social capital evolved from Granovetter's (1973) original idea of the existence of strong and weak ties in social interactions of agents.

Bonding social capital links like-minded people leading to homogeneity and often resulting in the exclusion of others (Putnam, 1995). Extending Granovetter's (1973) strong ties to networks, the strong ties of these tight knit social networks are the basis for "thick trust" (Newton, 1997, p. 578), or social ties which bond networks together (Kearns, 2003; Widmalm, 2005; Putnam, 1995). The externalities of strong ties are the fragmentation of society and the detachment of networks from the broader public, which frequently leads to a lack of social cohesion at macro societal levels (Granovetter, 1973). Consequently, bonding social capital is usually negatively associated with democracy because it leads to social exclusion, the fragmentation of society, and atomised social networks and associational life (Newton, 1997; Widmalm, 2005; Portes, 1998; Adler & Kwon, 2002). Fukuyama (2001) argues that the persistence of such networks leads to rent-seeking behaviour, and results in associations which seek to appropriate public resources for their own benefit (Levi, 1996; Rose, 2001; Welzel, Ingelhart, & Deutsch, 2005). However, Putnam and Goss (2002) argue that such rent-seeking or other parasitic network behaviours are not exclusive to networks with high levels of bonding social capital. Such behaviour constitutes inward-looking social capital (Putnam & Goss, 2002). Inward-looking networks consist of exclusive ties, some of which can be 'bonding' in nature (Putnam & Goss, 2002). These ties enable network members to 'get by' rather than contributing to democracy consolidation. Such networks use their stocks of both bonding and bridging social capital to "promote the material, social, or political interest of their own members" (Putnam & Goss, 2002, p. 11) at the expense of the wider polity. This leads the networks to behave undemocratically, undermining the building of an autonomous civil society. Such considerations are critical in examining both historic and contemporary civil society arrangements in Russia, as they provide a lens for understanding

the internal democratic set-up of TSOs, as well as their potential to contribute to democratisation.

Bridging social capital “refers to social networks that bring together people who are unlike one another” (Putnam & Goss, 2002, p. 11), and as such connects actors across social cleavages often leading to heterogeneity of, and within, networks. Bridging social capital is a reflection of dominant weak ties (Granovetter, 1973) and credited with the democracy supporting role of civil society. Such interactions enable networks and associations to create “thin trust” (Newton, 1997, p. 578) and bridge across to others, embedding themselves in civil society and creating a bulwark against authoritarian tendencies within the state (de Tocqueville, 2003 [1848]). Edwards (2004, p. 10) outlines bridging social capital as creating “horizontal trust and reciprocal connections between heterogeneous groups”. Bridging social capital makes possible the creation of civil society as an autonomous space, and strengthens this space through facilitating horizontal cross-network interaction. Thus, bridging social capital is vital to civil society’s function of holding the state accountable (Evans & Boyte, 1986; Putnam, 1993). Such networks are more likely to “concern themselves with [the] public good” (Putnam & Goss, 2002, p. 11), and are outward looking. In effect, such altruistic networks and organisations form the basis for the western understanding of TSOs. Hence, understanding and examining the ability of networks or TSOs to bridge with others, the private realm and the state, are vital to investigating how civil society contributes to democracy consolidation.

As the discussion has outlined, the distinction between bonding and bridging social capital is pivotal to the discussion of civil society. Frequently the civil society debate has focused on the quantity of TSOs, neglecting qualitative aspects such as ties within and across TSOs (Paxton, 2002; Stolle & Rochon, 1998). Bonding and bridging social capital helps to explain the organisation of networks and TSOs. These aspects are of particular importance within the

context of the Russian Federation (see chapter 3). In particular, the deficiencies of strong ties (Granovetter, 1973) characteristic of inward-looking bonding social capital such as fragmentation have affected civil society development in Russia (see chapter 3.3). However, to gain a more comprehensive insight into how social capital is used within civil society, the bonding-bridging axis needs to be supplemented by aspects of the inward-looking and outward-looking usage of social capital. Bridging/bonding and inward/outward social capital provides a vital lens to understanding the contribution of networks, associations and hence TSOs to democracy building.

2.5 Conclusion

This chapter presented the construct of civil society by reviewing classic and contemporary literature relevant to this thesis and the research objectives (see chapter 1). The chapter draws on the concepts of civil society, third sector organisations, social capital and democracy, to present a theoretical and conceptual framework which allows the examination of contemporary civil society development and state-society relations in Russia. Understanding these constructs and their interdependencies are vital to the research question this thesis addresses, of how managed civil society arrangements are manifested in the Russian Federation. Civil society is operationalised as the “space between the individual family and the state” (Neace, 1999, p. 150). As a separate space between the private and the state, civil society is autonomous, intermediary, and an institution of democratic governance (see section 2.2). Further, civil society contributes to democracy through enabling citizens to learn the norms and values of democracy. As an autonomous sphere, it aggregates and represents interest, pluralising the democratic arena and counterweighing the state. Set within a supportive state, civil society is able to strengthen democratic practices and thus governance. However, as outlined in chapter one, in the context of the Russian Federation, the state is not conducive to an autonomous civil society space. Section two of this chapter illustrates the importance the state plays in enabling civil society. In turn to evaluating the effects of

legislative changes on civil society provides an insight into potential legal attempts to managed civil society (see chapter 1.1.2, objective 1).

This chapter shows that civil society can be theorised at multiple levels, and in this study, an organisational level perspective is used. Thus, an autonomous space of civil society consists of “freely chosen intermediary organisations” (Neace, 1999, p. 150). From an empirical perspective, these third sector organisations provide a looking glass into civil society. TSOs represent the unit level of analysis, which allows us to make inferences about civil society more globally. TSOs are characterised by doing “things business and government are either not doing, not doing well, or not doing often enough” (Levitt, 1973, p. 49). Through complementing the state (Berger & Neuhaus, 2003 [1977]), TSOs work with the forgotten sections of society and have the extraordinary opportunity to widen public discourse and integration (Habermas, 1996). TSOs build civil society, and contribute to democracy by pluralising polity and shaping civil society as an autonomous space (see section 2.3). However, research in the post-Communist context focused mainly on advocacy organisations within specific movements such as human rights or the environmental movement. Salamenmi (2008) observes that other organisations focused on service provision, often smaller or established during the Soviet period, have received only little attention. Nonetheless, it is these organisations that often assume activities characteristic of TSOs. By investigating such TSOs, this thesis addresses this void within the literature. This chapter illustrates that in developed democratic contexts, TSOs act as substitutes for the state, maintaining their independence and autonomy. Thus, elaborating the extent to which TSOs act as state substitutes forms another vital part in elaborating on managed civil society arrangements (see chapter 1.1.2, objective 2).

As discussed in the section above (see section 2.4) the contribution of TSOs, and thus civil society, towards democracy is framed as generating social capital. The thesis operationalises

social capital as “norms and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit” (Putnam, 1995, p. 67). With its aspect of bonding and bridging social capital, as well as inward and outward looking usage of social capital, this analytical construct provides a lens into TSOs (see section 2.4.2.1). As outlined, social capital is pivotal to civil society’s democratic contribution (see section 2.4.2). Nonetheless, not all forms of social capital lead to a democratic outcome (see section 2.4.2.1). Thus, not all activity within civil society contributes to democracy. Effectively, TSOs need to not only be a platform for broader social cooperation, but also build ‘norms and social trust’. In particular, aspects of bonding and bridging social capital provide a lens to assess these aspects. Civil society that builds ‘positive’ social capital makes democracy work and advances democratisation. However, democratisation is a process, and it requires the developments of several other aspects, only one of which is civil society (Linz & Stepan, 1996). Therefore, developments within civil society provide a starting point to infer progress in other areas. Civil society literature recommends assessing civil society’s contribution to democratisation by considering whether it is a space for inclusion and cooperation, whether it broadens participation, whether it pluralises the institutional arena and whether it legitimises the state’s democratic efforts.

2.5.1 Civil society strengthening democracy and democratisation

Democratisation can be seen as “the creation, extension and practices of collective decision-making based on the principles of popular control and political equality” (Uhlin, 2006, p. 18). As a result of the transitions of authoritarian regimes towards democracy, the issue of democratisation has become prominent within the literature (Uhlin, 2006). Frequently, democratisation is associated with a focus on the structural and institutional changes necessary, such as the establishment of a working parliamentary system, elections, or political parties (Uhlin, 2006). However, such considerations do not include the developments within civil society, and its contribution to both the process of democratisation as well as its outcome. Civil society ensures the working of formal democratic structures, as well as

widening and deepening of democracy through popular control and decision-making (Mercer, 2002). This process of democracy consolidation is crucial for the sustainability of democratic governance (Diamond, 1994; Linz & Stepan, 1996). In addition, socio-economic developments (Diamond, 1994; Hadenius, 1992; Hadenius & Teorell, 2005; Lipset, 1959), societal cleavages (Berglund, Hellen, & Aarebrot, 1998), and power and class relations (Moore, 1966; Rueschmeyer, Stephens, & Stephens, 1992) influence the democratisation process.

Linz and Stepan (1996) outline five key areas that need to develop for democratisation to succeed. First, the existence of the rule of law, which mirrors early scholars of civil society who see it as a precondition for civil society (Hegel, 2003 [1821]; Lock, 1965). Second and third, political as well as economic society need to be democratic. Fourth, Linz and Stepan (1996) put forward the argument that the state bureaucracy needs to democratise. In effect this means that the state needs to become more responsive to the demands put upon it. Finally, civil society needs to become more democratic and a sphere of social inclusion and cooperation. The process of achieving such outcomes is subdivided into a transitory and a consolidation stage (Diamond, 1994; Mercer, 2002). According to Mercer (2002) during the transition phase, civil society acts juxtaposed to the state with the aim of promoting formal democratic changes. In the consolidation stage, civil society acts as an auditor of the state keeping authoritarian tendencies at bay (Foley & Edwards, 1996) and democratising society. However, a rich, strong and autonomous associational life does not necessarily mean a more democratic civil society (Uhlin, 2006), in particular when paternalistic power relations between the state and civil society exist (see chapter 3). If civil society itself does not become more democratic, more pluralistic and stronger vis-à-vis the state, it is likely to consolidate the political system it exists within (Gramsci, Hoare, & Smith, 1971). Hence, to contribute to the democratisation process, civil society needs to evolve into an autonomous sphere (see section 2.2).

Civil society is “said to promote the stability and effectiveness of democratic polity through both the effects of associations on citizens’ habits of the heart and the ability of associations to mobilise citizens on behalf of public causes” (Foley & Edwards, 1996, p. 38). However, rather than driving democratisation, civil society is also a by-product of democracy (Berman, 2001; Booth & Richard, 2001; Foley & Edwards, 1998; Kenworthy, 2001; Rose, 2001; Woolcock, 1998). This raises a fundamental analytical question for this thesis; whether or not civil society can exist within a managed democratic setting in which it is like to succumb to attempts of being controlled by the state, and maintain its contribution to further democratisation (see chapter 1). Therefore, as illustrated in chapter one, this thesis aims to elaborate on the limits of the state’s ability to control and manage civil society arrangements and hence investigate the resilience of TSOs in acting as agents of democratisation (see chapter 1.1.2; objective 3).

As illustrated above, the literature states that civil society strengthens democracy in three ways (Mercer, 2002). Firstly, civil society challenges state power and consequently legitimises the state’s democratic governance structures (Mercer, 2002). Secondly, civil society broadens participation in the collective decision making process. Thirdly, civil society “pluralises and therefore strengthens the institutional arena” (Mercer, 2002, p. 8). As argued above, democratisation is not only a political process of creating the right set of institutions, but is also an adaptation of cultural norms and values (Putnam, Leonardi, & Nanetti, 1993) which reflect the incumbent “economic, social, and political trajectories” (LiPuma & Koelble, 2009, p. 7). Further, Mercer (2002) notes that the language used within the democratisation discourse, namely that of strengthening or weakening civil society, “betrays a normative view of how democratic development should be ‘done’” (p. 20). As a result, democratisation debates frequently neglect the context in which TSOs are embedded and how this affects their contribution to democratisation (Mercer, 2002). TSOs become the focal

actors, but relations with the state and their subsequent organisational impacts are neglected. This thesis address such issues in chapter three, where it expands on how cultural and historic legacies are indicative of managed civil society arrangements in the context of the Russian Federation.

Within the context of democratisation, literature on civil society illustrates the fact that civil society does not necessarily strengthen democracy or democratisation (Ossewaarde, 2006). Despite being credited with democratising Latin America, as well as Central and Eastern Europe (Hyden, 1997; Kocka, 2004), contemporary accounts such as the one presented in this thesis portray civil society as contributing less to democratisation than outlined above (see section 2.2). This has led to the critique of a model of civil society that emphasises autonomy and democracy (Chandhoke, 2007; Edele, 2005; Frolic, 1997; Hale, 2002; Kaldor, 2003; Kasif, 1998; Kubik, 2005; Oxhorn, 2001). Such an understanding has been branded as a western model reflecting the values, norms and political discourses that have shaped the civil society construct (Lewis, 2002). Because of the western experience, underlying this classic civil society conceptualisation, there is an argument to be made for the limited applicability of the concept outside this context (Blaney & Pasha, 1993). In particular the development literature argues that tranposing this model into a non-western context such as Africa, Latin America or the post-Communist context should be done carefully (Lewis, 2002). Disheartened with what are considered normative restrains, empirical investigations in non-western contexts focus on identifying institutional arrangements which perform similar functions to western civil society institutions, but which might not necessarily mirror their features (Kubik, 2005). However, Flynn and Oldfield (2006) argue that existing constructs and frameworks have an explicatory capacity to the changes taking place in post-socialist societies. Therefore, the western model of civil society is still of relevance because, even though TSOs' practices and activities might differ across contexts, it provides a lens into examining civil society's ability to contribute to democratisation (Lewis, 2002).

Consequently, in investigating how managed civil society arrangements are manifested in the Russian Federation, it is this western model and its considerations of democracy that provide the three key areas which underpin the research objectives of this thesis (see chapter 1.1.2). Understanding state-civil society relations, that is legislative arrangements, TSOs as service providers, that is a substitute for the state, and the ability of TSOs to remain autonomous, that is the state's limitation to mould managed civil society, are essentially an evaluation of the potential of civil society to manifest its democratising externalities. Thus in examining these objectives, the thesis answers the questions of how managed civil society arrangements are manifested in the Russian Federation.

As discussed in this chapter, historical considerations have shaped our understanding of the constructs of civil society, third sector organisations, and social capital, and their relationship to the democratisation processes. In light of these insights, chapter three examines civil society development in the context of the Russia Federation. It reviews civil society development from a cultural-historic perspective, to outline historic antecedents and present day realities. Therefore, chapter three highlights the key particularities that have shaped civil society development in Russia, such as aspects of Soviet legacy and the effects of shock-therapy, rapid democratisation, and the impact of civil society building. In so doing, chapter three firmly demonstrates the emerging nature of managed civil society arrangements in Russia.

CHAPTER 3: Russian Civil Society – Historical Antecedents and Present Day

Realities

3.1 Introduction

The previous chapter outlined and defined key analytical and theoretical concepts positioning this thesis within the wider literary debate on civil society. Extending on chapter two, this chapter presents the chronological development of civil society in Russia in order to outline specific aspects that have impacted its development. Chapter two illustrates that civil society contributes to the establishing and working of an effective institutional environment, which acts as the lynch-pin for development and prosperity (North, 1991; Ostrom, 1990; Williamson, 2000). Therefore, civil society is the crucial hinge that makes modern societies work (Keane, 2005).

This thesis operationalises civil society as a “the space between the individual and the state” (Neace, 1999, p. 150). Its agents, in this thesis specifically third sector organisations (TSOs), pluralise democratic participation (Mercer, 2002) and provide a space for “individuals to practise citizenship” (Salmenniemi, 2005, p. 737). Chapter two highlights that this is essentially a western model of understanding civil society (see chapter 2.5). Some commentators challenge the applicability of such western models in the context of the Russian Federation (Golenkova, 1999; Vorontsova & Filatov, 1997). Acknowledging these possible limitations, this thesis follows other scholars in operationalising a western model of civil society within the context of the Russian Federation (Crotty, 2009; Kennedy, Kawachi, & Brainerd, 1998; Mendelson & Gerber, 2007). Despite possible drawbacks, this concept of civil society and the historical perspective used in this chapter provide a useful lens to examine democratisation and the building of democratic structures and governance (Lewis, 2002).

In order to present this development, this chapter is divided into four sections. The first section assesses the legacies of Soviet state-society relations in order to illustrate historic antecedents that have shaped civil society ever since. The second section examines the development of civil society in post-Soviet Russia during 1990s, to illustrate the constraints that Russian civil society faced. It argues that specific cultural and societal norms with roots in the Soviet period continued to play a key role in shaping civil society arrangements in the post-Soviet period. The third section discusses contemporary civil society arrangements under the Putin/Medvedev administrations. In particular this section examines how recent changes in Russia's economic, political and legal environment have been reflected in shifts in Russia's contemporary civil society arrangements. The final section synthesises the previous discussion and issues in order to highlight the path-dependency of civil society development in the Russian context. In this section it is argued that, similar to Russian-style democracy and market economy, there are indications for emerging managed civil society arrangements. Within this model of civil society, its agents, networks and organisations are likely to develop and maintain strong and dependent relationships with the state. The propositions put forward in this section and throughout this chapter underpin the research objectives presented in chapter one.

3.2 Civil society in Soviet Russia

The chronological overview presented within this chapter compares and contrasts civil society in Russia with the western model outlined in chapter two. Such a chronological approach allows the tracing of cultural-historic legacies, and their effect on the development of Russian civil society. This section will elaborate on civil society in Soviet Russia to provide the basis for further considerations.

In assessing civil society arrangements in the Soviet Union, civil society has been described as either non-existent (Kennedy, Kawachi, & Brainerd, 1998; Shlapentokh, 1989; Uhlin,

2006), or institutionalized (Evans, 2006a; Rose, 1995; Mishler & Rose, 1997). Supporters arguing for the non-existence of civil society illustrate that civil society can only exist in an autonomous space (see chapter 2). However, such generalisations and macro-level considerations do not sufficiently explain the peculiar state-society relations that could be observed in the Soviet Union. Therefore, other authors argue that civil society was institutionalised as part of the state's power apparatus (Evans, 2006a; Rose, 1995; Mishler & Rose, 1997). They outline how the state organised institutions which took on similar roles to western TSOs, such as sports and social clubs (Evans, 2006a; Bernhard, 1996). However, because these organisations were created and operated by the state, Evans (2006a) argues that civil society in the Soviet Union was institutionalised within the structures of the state.

These government-organised organisations/movements such as, for example, the *Komsomol*, served as monopoly organisations for their assigned constituency (Krainov, 1993). This “intricately organised series of state-controlled organisations” (Howard, 2002b, p. 293) meant that Soviet civil space was institutionalised within the political environment. Unlike Western (traditional) civil society arrangements, in the Soviet period the realm of ‘voluntary’ associations representing civil society was not separate from the state. To Soviet citizens, these government-organised organisations were portrayed as spaces of participation and activism. However, rather than relying on voluntary participation, participation was mandatory and seen as a patriotic duty (Evans, 2006a). Subsequently, a culture of voluntary participation was prohibited from developing. Not only did this institutionalised nature of civil society leave a legacy of rejection of voluntary activity, but it also led Russians to fear “any association with independent collective activity” (Smolar, 1996, p. 33).

Despite the autonomy in running themselves, these organisations did not set out to challenge the dominance of the state (Uhlen, 2006). A case in point is the environmental movement, which was the only autonomous movements permitted (Crotty, 2006). The All-Russian Union

of Conservationists was the only mass-movement to officially exist in addition to the Communist Party (Weiner, 1999). However, this movement did not aspire to engage in collective action but

“hoped to persuade and enlighten bureaucrats to invite them into the circles of power”
(Weiner, 1999, p. 10).

Therefore many members of this movement opposed establishing organisations which would be completely separate and autonomous from the state (Evans, 2006a; Weiner 1999).

The majority of government-organised organisations/movements aimed to provide services to Soviet citizens, and served as an administrative buffer between the state and society. Individuals received these services on the basis of their contribution to the Communist collective and not their need (Wengle & Rasell, 2008). As part of the *nomenklatura* system, the leadership of these organisations was appointed by the Communist party. Through this “étatisation” (Fish, 1991, p. 301) of civil society life, the state was able to organise “socio-cultural life” (Migranian, 1988, p. 24) within the Soviet Union. Soviet civil space became a part of the vertical power structures the state used to coerce participation and monopolise public discourse (Stephenson, 2000). Therefore, and conversely to western civil society arrangements, the role of these organisations was to monitor society rather than monitoring the state (Bernhard, 1996). This nurtured mistrust towards the elites and the state (Howard, 2002a), reflecting that civil society was a space of fear and conformity, rather than a space for free speech and controversy, which is integral to its aggregation of interest functionality (see chapter 2).

Consequently, and alongside institutionalised civil society, small and personalised networks and mainly ‘illegal’ grass-roots organisations existed (Fish, 1991). These independent

networks formed around intelligentsia circles, which consisted of “opposition-minded intellectuals” (Mendelson & Gerber, 2007, p. 57). They were “tight-knit, highly insular, and mutually suspicious circles” (Mendelson & Gerber, 2007, p. 57) and often met informally in the flats of members (Gibson, 2001). These “kitchen circles” (Gibson, 2001, p. 54) were outlets for discussions and the discourse which was unable to take place within the ‘official’ civil society sphere. Furthermore, ordinary Russians relied on similar informal personal networks to offset arising shortages and uncertainty present throughout the Communist regime (Rose, 1995). Soviets used these networks to circumvent the continuous scarcity of basic consumer goods, as well as to gain access to other necessary resources (Ledeneva, 1998; Rose, 2000). Consequently, social interaction and activity of individuals took place in an informally and officially ‘illegal’ setting (Uhlin, 2006). The constriction of the space of civil society via controlling its agents bred a culture that favoured “circles of intimacy and trust among family members and close friends” (Evans, 2006a, p. 47). In particular, Soviets became very proficient at circumventing authority and the state (Rose, 2000). In turn this further aggravated the mistrust vis-à-vis the state and the elites (Rose, 1995).

In 1985 Gorbachev initiated a process that, amongst other reforms, aimed at democratisation (Moses, 1989) and liberalisation (Schroeder, 1989) of the Communist regime. This process aimed at democratising and pluralising the communist system, but fundamentally changing it (Evans, 2006a; Remington, 1989; Uhlin, 2006). The liberalisation which took place during this period resulted in the flourishing of alternative and more independent associations and organisations, leading to, for example, the strengthening of the environmental movement (Crotty, 2006), or the emergence of alternative political parties (Fish, 1991) and movements with specific political demands (Uhlin, 2006). However, the state remained closed and largely unreceptive to the demands of this emerging civil society (Fish, 1995; Uhlin, 2006). As a result, many of these organisations remained informal, and neglected their organisational development (Fish, 1991).

The *perestroika* period prompted the development of social movements rather than an institutionalisation of an autonomous civil society space which would manifest itself in the creation of TSOs acting as intermediaries between state and society (Fish, 1991). These movements, as historical events show, were able to command broad public support and participation (Fish, 1991). However, the aim of regime change led to the focus on one specific campaign, rather than the development of sustainable ways of interest aggregation and representation (Fish, 1995). Therefore, mass-participation in demonstrations and other of the movement's activities did not transfer into the formation of more 'formal' representational arrangements. Autonomous and intermediary TSOs able to mediate, bridge, and institutionalise democratic ways of interaction with the state did not materialise. Even though the *perestroika* period led to the end of monolithic Soviet-style civil society, the result was not a space or middle ground for collective action which would bridge between the individual and the state. The lack of genuine democratisation of the state and its structure, and failure to fundamentally change state-society relations, meant that the informal ways of the past persisted. A majority of these informal networks often pursued undemocratic and "uncivil objectives" (Kennedy, Kawachi, & Brainerd, 1998, p. 2038).

Even as democratisation and liberalisation progressed, public action was primarily taking place within the boundaries set and defined by the state. As discussed above, these arrangements were characterised by a lack of generalised trust and the reliance on informal networks at either end of the society (Evans, 2006a). Rose (1995) termed such societal arrangements as reflecting an hourglass.

3.2.1 The hourglass society

The hourglass society, by definition, consisted of two halves containing elites on one side and ordinary citizens on the other. The top-half was characterized by a rich political and social life

amongst the elites (Rose, 1995). Networks of cooperation existed in an informal manner, allowing individuals to secure their own (mainly political) goals. The bottom-half was also characterized by a rich social life (Rose, 1995). These networks were based around the nuclear family and friends. Effectively, the hourglass society made the private sphere and the state into two separate and isolated spaces (Sundstrom & Henry, 2006). Networks outside the official structures were 'illegal' or 'anti-state', and therefore had to remain informal. Networks within the state were used for personal benefit and thus aimed to remain informal. The concept of the hourglass demonstrates that there was no civil space available for civil society to develop and act as a bridge between the individual and the state (see chapter 2).

Notwithstanding the institutionalised versus absent debate in the literature, the concept of the hourglass society highlights the effect such arrangements had on societal as well as state-society relations. Institutional arrangements that were meant to reflect civil society either existed within the top half, that is the state, or the bottom half of the hourglass (Mishler & Rose, 1997). Networks in the bottom half were dominated by personal trust (see chapter 2.4), and were informal in nature as well as suspicious of network outsiders and therefore isolated from each other. This created a society in which individuals were atomised and distrustful (Bahry & Silver, 1987; Smolar, 1996). Individuals relied heavily on social networks consisting of 'strong ties' (Granovetter, 1973). These networks did not engage in collective public action, but focused on 'individual action' for the benefit of the network and its members, (Rose, 2000) and served as a defence against the economic shortcomings of state (Rose, 1995; Gibson, 2001).

The hourglass nature of society and its effects on state-society relations meant that civil society development and democratisation would always face a substantial challenge. The lack of outward-oriented social capital and dominance of inward-oriented social capital (Gibson, 2001; Paldam & Svendsen, 2000) limited the potential of civil society networks to contribute

to democratisation (see chapter 2.4). Mistrust towards elites and the insulation of the top and the bottom halves of society did not allow a culture of collective action to develop (Smolar, 1996), and resulted in the reliance on informal networks. In addition, voluntary collective action outside the state organised outlets was prohibited. The institutionalisation of civil society meant that a rejection of voluntarism and ‘formalised’ civil society activity was cultivated. These effects persisted after the break up of the Soviet Union (Mishler & Rose, 1997; Rose, 2008) and affected the development of civil society and the creation of intermediary TSOs in post-Soviet Russia (Rose, 2001). At the onset, the *perestroika* period promised to fundamentally change the underlying state-society relationship. However, the lack of change of the state meant that the hourglass nature of society persisted (Crotty, 2006). Drawing on this assertion, the following section examines civil society in the 1990s to highlight the impact that these legacies have had on the development of civil society in post-Soviet Russia.

3.3 Post-Soviet civil society in the Yeltsin era

In the 1990s, as part of the ‘shock therapy’ program, the Russian state implemented market economic reforms and continued with the process of democratisation (Schroeder, 1996). Over the course of this, the state withdrew from various activities and responsibilities which had been within its purview (Crotty, 2006). In particular, the provision of social services to vulnerable groups was affected by the withdrawal of the state, as it occurred without the emergence of institutions or organisations able to take on these roles and responsibilities (Poznanski, 2001; Wengle & Rasell, 2008). As illustrated in chapter two, in the democratic context it was the TSOs which took on these activities. Even though Soviet-style civil society organisations did not fit the classical conceptions of civil society (see chapter 2.3), from the perspective of Russians, they often provided services which were needed now more than ever before (Evans, 2006a). However, the state’s economic difficulties (Hanson, 2003; Lavigne, 2000) meant that resource support for the flagships of Soviet social activism all but ceased

(Evans, 2006a). In effect, the Russian state was unable even to contract out service provision to TSOs (see chapter 2.3). As a result, large parts of Russia's population, such as the disabled, veterans, and politically repressed were effectively 'forgotten' by the state (Kennedy, Kawachi, & Brainerd, 1998; Henderson, 2008). Despite this, many Russians still relied on the state, or at least expected it to provide many of these abandoned and often basic services (Crotty, 2003). These circumstances increased the uncertainties of daily lives (Dowley & Silver, 2002; Luong & Weinthal, 1999), forcing Russians to fall back on their tight-knit informal networks.

Further, the democratisation process was aimed at the decentralisation of political power. This meant the transfer of decision making to regional power holders, which substantially weakened the power base of the Federal centre (Cappelli, 2008). Such political changes were accompanied with 'market' reforms. These reforms resulted in a controversial process of privatisation of former state-owned businesses (Schroeder, 1996; Shlapentokh, 2003), which reduced the state's involvement in economic activity. It also allowed the members of the old *nomenklatura* to enrich themselves, re-enforcing distrust vis-à-vis the elites (Linz & Krueger, 1996). This excessive cutting back of the state neglected the creation of structures and institutions that would be necessary to facilitate the development of a democratic society and state (Gel'man, 2004; Rose, 2000). Sil and Chen (2004) label all these developments as "state over-withdrawal" (p. 363). However, the state acting as a 'rule' setter and enforcer is as important for the development of civil society as its acknowledgement of civil society as an autonomous space (see chapter 2.2). As the previous section indicated, the attitudes and structures needed to develop an autonomous civil society space were absent from the institutional memory of the Russian state. Consequently, the post-Soviet emerging institutional environment remained unreliable, unfair, opaque, and overly complicated (Rose, 2000). Therefore, Soviet period mechanisms to 'get by' and access necessary resources,

which served most so well in the past, persisted. Thus, Russians continued what they did best in the past, and relied on their informal networks (Rose, 2000).

This “second economy and polity” (Gitelman, 1984, p. 241) helped individuals not only to insulate themselves from the state’s institutions, but also allowed them to exploit the state. The use of these ‘anti-modern’ tactics, for example personal connections, were pivotal to both coping with the uncertainties of transition and profiting from the transition process (Ledeneva, 1998; Rose, 2000). Subsequently, the limited interaction between both halves facilitated by social movements that emerged in the *perestroika* period all but disappeared. Newly emerging TSOs, and TSOs that sprung out of former Soviet organisations, struggled to make ends meet and engrained themselves even more within either the top or the bottom half, which led to a polarisation of civil society (Kennedy, Kawachi, & Brainerd, 1998). As a result civil society remained intact as the hourglass society.

3.3.1 The ‘building’ of civil society

As discussed above, in an environment of over-withdrawal and rapid democratisation, civil society had the possibility to expand its constricted space by taking on and replacing activities formerly conducted by the state (see chapter 2.3). For the first time, voluntary associations and autonomous TSOs received legal recognition. This led western observers to argue that emerging civil society arrangements would support and stimulate political transition and democratisation (Lindenberg, 1999; Reiner, 1991). However, due to the cultural and social legacies inherited from the Soviet past, TSOs faced a number of problems which inhibited them and the development of an autonomous civil society. The following section examines in more detail the deficiencies of civil society development in the Yeltsin era. These deficiencies have been the key constraints that have hindered the development of civil society as an autonomous space conducive to democratisation (see chapter 2.2).

3.3.1.1 Constraint 1 – fragmentation

As discussed, civil society life in the *perestroika* period was dominated by independent social movements seeking regime change (Fish, 1991). This was an objective that such movements shared with the broader public, and therefore they were able to mobilise mass-support. However, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, and subsequent rapid democratisation, these movements lost their *raison d'être* and fragmented into many single issue groups and organisations. During the *perestroika* period, social movements were able to form by coming together around a common objective and goal that was shared by the majority of the population. However, the rapid development of the groups driving these social movements meant that they were unable to develop “a common identity” (Crotty, 2009, p. 89) that could sustain them beyond achieving the regime change objective. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, politicking within the various social movements which contributed to the downfall of the communist party meant newly emerging TSOs mistrusted one another (Evans, 2002). The majority of these emerging TSOs focused on narrow and local issues, and found it difficult to connect with like-minded groups elsewhere in the country, the same region, or even the same city (Crotty, 2006). These TSOs formed around personalised networks (Baglione & Clark, 1998; Cook & Vinogradova, 2006), and faced with economic difficulties, pursued objectives that served the core group and not a wider constituency (Evans, 2002), thus re-enforcing the fragmentation process. However, in order to create an autonomous civil society space that is able to bridge between the individual and the state, collaboration amongst TSOs is vital (see chapter 2.2 and 2.4).

The tight-knit and personalised nature of the networks at the heart of TSOs meant that they were reluctant about participation of people outside the core network. This hindered them in devising and implementing strategies to acquire new members (Salmenniemi, 2005) and thus broader public support. Very often networks engaged in ‘anti-modern’ behaviour, focusing on advancing the economic or political interest of their core group rather than the needs and

demands of their designated constituency (Evans, 2002). As discussed above, this reflects past practices. Now, such inward-oriented networks (see chapter 2.4) often use the funding they receive to “provide services to a selected number of acquaintances” (Sundstrom & Henry, 2006, p. 311). As a result, TSOs mistrust not only the state but also each other and thus have lost their legitimacy as aggregators and representatives of public interest.

The failure of TSOs to institutionalise themselves as intermediary organisations which any individual could join freely and voluntarily limited their ability to bridge between the individual and the state (see chapter 2.2). Furthermore, it exacerbated the fragmentation of civil society. After a short period of dominant social movements, (Fish, 1991) civil society reverted to consisting of atomised networks unable to come together to form meaningful, influential, and broadly supported movements building an autonomous civil society. The fragmentation of civil society, and the subsequent behaviour of TSOs, meant that they are unable to act as intermediary organisations able to initiate collective action between the state and the individual. The failure to move from ‘institutionalised’ Soviet civil society to institutionalising civil society as an intermediary sphere (see chapter 2.2) meant that TSOs’ contribution to the democratisation process was limited. TSOs did not seek to position themselves in between the state and society, but continued to exist within the upper or lower half of the hourglass. Therefore, similar to civil society in the Soviet Union, there were no TSOs bridging between the two halves of the hourglass.

3.3.1.2 Constraint 2 – lack of public support

The absence of public support and participation was a central deficiency that impeded the development of TSOs in the ‘middle ground’ between the state and the individual. Broad based support and participation are critical for interest aggregation, representation and mediation (see chapter 2.2). The lack of public support not only constrained TSOs’ ability to conduct activities, but also limited their legitimacy to engage in interest aggregation and

collective public action. During the *perestroika* period, social movements enjoyed broad participation. However, as discussed, with the disintegration of the Soviet Union this mass-support faded away. The lack of public participation has substantially limited the ability of TSOs to institutionalise a civil society sphere that is both a counterweight and an equal partner to the state. Without public support TSOs were ‘invisible’ to the state and lacked the ability to participate in policy making (Crotty, 2009).

For Russians, past government-organised organisations/movements were the most relevant because they provided much needed services (Sundstrom & Henry, 2006). However, due to their past association with the communist regime, they were unable to attract support. Furthermore, as participation used to be mandatory in these organisations, these TSOs lack the capabilities and skills to attract participation. TSOs that emerged during the *perestroika* period or thereafter were also unable to solicit public support. On the one hand, as discussed above, this was a result of the tight-knit personalised structure of the networks at the heart of such organisations (see chapter 3.3.1.1). These TSOs were often parochial in nature, and thus could not be the playground for practicing democratic values (Chapter 2.3). On the other hand, these TSOs often represented and advanced issues which did not address the needs of ordinary Russians at the time. Only when TSOs addressed issues of concern for the wider population were they able to mobilise people outside the core network (Sundstrom, 2005). Nonetheless, such events were a rare occurrence (Henry, 2006). Subsequently, TSOs did not appeal to ordinary Russians and were unable to establish themselves as aggregators of public opinion, a crucial role of TSOs in order to bridge between the individual and the state (see chapter 2.2).

Another factor inhibiting participation and thus the institutionalisation of democratising and effective civil society arrangements, were the effects of forced participation in Soviet social organisations. As argued above, Russians had no experience of, or will to, volunteer or be

active in formalised TSOs (Sundstrom & Henry, 2006). This culture of anti-voluntarism was further accentuated by disappointment and disillusionment with political change since the end of the Soviet Union (Luong & Weinthal, 1999; Sundstrom & Henry, 2006). As illustrated in chapter two, volunteerism is pivotal to the development of both civil society and activities of TSOs. However, TSOs themselves did not engage in countering this anti-volunteering culture (Smolar, 1996). Furthermore, Soviet period distrust towards the state evolved into distrust towards newly emerging democratic structures including TSOs (Shlapentokh, 2006; Sundstrom & Henry, 2006), which, in a similar way to new 'market' economic structures, were seen as serving the old elites. Therefore, membership in TSOs remained low and public support limited.

Such organisational weaknesses constrained TSOs when engaging with local communities and authorities (Crotty, 2009; Luong & Weinthal, 1999), and as a result civil society was unable to institutionalise itself as a separate intermediary sphere. Social and political life continued to persist within either the lower or top half of the hourglass (Crotty, 2006). As a consequence, this inhibited TSOs to act as bridges between the state and ordinary citizens - a central role of TSOs in modern democratic societies (see chapter 2.2). Therefore, the contribution of TSOs to the process of democratisation and democracy consolidation was limited.

3.3.1.4 Constraint 3 – resources poverty

In addition to the fragmentation and lack of public support, civil society development in post-Soviet Russia faced limited availability of domestic resources (Evans, 2002). Domestic support through the state was insufficient, and channelled into basic services (Richter, 2002) and uncontroversial charitable causes (Rutland, 2006). Such support was often used to keep afloat former Soviet social organisations of TSOs closely associated with the state. For other TSOs, foreign funding offered the possibility to circumvent this lack of resources, and

Russian TSOs quickly became reliant upon it (Hemment, 2004). However, all too often foreign support resulted in the development of vertical networks between donors and TSOs, in which the latter focused on competing for foreign grants rather than creating civic communities or stimulating collective action (Henderson, 2002; Mendelson, 2001; Sundstrom, 2005). This “principle clientelism” (Henderson, 2002, p. 140) discouraged TSOs from working as agents of Russian society. Further, TSOs dependent on foreign funds were seen as “creatures of foreign agitation and unsuited to Russian conditions” (Sundstrom & Henry, 2006, p. 313) by the state.

Under the auspice of the “good governance agenda” (Richter, 2008, p. 278), foreign donors provided both funding and ideological support (Crotty, 2003). Nonetheless, in a similar way to which western style corporate governance structures and frameworks were imported into the Russian business environment (McCarthy & Puffer, 2008), this imported model of civil society neglected the historical-cultural norms, values and institutions already in place. Foreign support often meant that TSOs reshaped their priorities, and subsequently donors set the agenda of TSOs (Sundstorm & Henry, 2006). Hence activities pursued by TSOs were not grounded within the values and norms of Russian society, and did not reflect what Russians needed (Crotty, 2003). At the heart of foreign supported activities were agendas that promoted advocacy and the counterweight functionality of civil society (see chapter 2.2). As discussed above, the lack of building democratic institutions meant that appropriate channels within the political environment for such advocacy activities were missing (Henderson, 2008). Conversely to its intentions, foreign support often meant that TSOs did not “reach out to the Russian public” (Crotty, 2009, p. 91). Consequently, TSOs receiving foreign support were unable to connect with either the public or the state. Even though they positioned themselves in the ‘middle ground’, they lacked the legitimate recognition and societal grounding to bridge the gap between the individual and the state (Richter, 2002).

Nevertheless, foreign support for civil society in post-Soviet Russia has had some success in contributing to the development of organisational capabilities (Mendelson, 2009) and democratising TSOs (Mendelson, 2001). However, even though the space for public interaction was available, existing organisations were not developed enough to take advantage of this. Foreign funding on a micro-level improved the capabilities and capacities of specific TSOs in an organisational sense, and helped them to survive (Crotty, 2009; Sundstrom, 2006). On the macro-level, foreign funding only had a minimal effect on the progress of democratisation (Crotty, 2009; Mendelson, 2009). Foreign support failed to contribute to the institutionalising of civil society or triggering of fundamental changes in societal arrangements and state-society relations (Weigle, 2000). Activists turned to foreign funding not because they agreed with the western civil society arrangements, but because they lacked domestic resources to develop their own model of civil society arrangements. Thus it was not surprising that such a western ‘built’ civil society was a model that was often far different from what Russian activists envisioned (Hemment, 2004).

3.3.1.5 Impacts on post-Soviet civil society development

The three constraints discussed above have far reaching consequences, and are the reason why civil society remains weak and constricted. Civil society is unable to participate in policy decision-making processes, which is critical to democracy (see chapter 2.2). The chronic fragmentation of civil society has limited TSOs from coming together to form strong social movements able to aggregate and articulate particular interest. As a consequence, TSOs are unable to pluralise public discourse. Further, the lack of public support and resources has limited TSOs to occupying the role of intermediaries bridging between the individual and the state. Thus, effectively TSOs remained in either the lower or top half of the hourglass. Even though foreign support encouraged TSOs to become intermediary organisations and counterweights to the state, the way such support was distributed meant that they remain

disconnected from the public and the state (Crotty, 2009). Overall these three constraints meant that TSOs lack legitimacy as representatives of civil society.

TSOs are unable to contribute to either building civil society or the democratisation of the formal institutional environment (see chapter 2.3). Therefore civil society is assessed as weak (Hale, 2002), and its development stalled (Howard, 2002a; Simon, 2004; Maxwell, 2006). Despite the will to break with Soviet practices of personalized networks and a paternalistic state, the reality of civil society development means that this did not materialise (Richter, 2008). The cultural and societal norms which developed in the Soviet period continue to stall the development of civil society in post-Soviet Russia. Consequently, TSOs as agents of civil society were unable to develop and institutionalise civil society as a space and a key actor of Russia's emerging democratic governance structure. Russia's historic legacy and specific institutional traits resisted reform (Hedlund, 2008). This hindered civil society arrangements in which TSOs would be situated in an autonomous space, and could act as an intermediary between the state and the individual. Civil society as an autonomous space (see chapter 2.2 and 2.5) insufficiently addresses the cultural-historic trajectories of a dominant state (Hyden, 1997). In particular, the idea of a relatively limited role of the state in society is something that is arguably historically and culturally alien in Russia (Hedlund, 2006). In addition, the development of civil society was constrained by the lack of state-building and subsequent absence of structures, institutions and state-society relations which would facilitate civil society arrangements; for example a functioning and independent judiciary, a system of social contracting or formalized ways for state-civil society interaction (Henderson, 2008). The combination of these factors have "hindered the development of a robust civil society" (Mendelson & Gerber, 2007, p. 58).

In summary this section has outlined the critical constraints to the development of a vibrant civil society as outlined in chapter two. Despite the 'kernel' of civil activism that contributed

to the collapse of the Soviet Union (Crotty, 2009), this section has outlined that they have not materialised into the development of civil society as an autonomous space. Subsequently, civil society has only made a limited contribution to democracy consolidation (Linz & Stepan, 1996). TSOs are weak and unable to connect with the public to date, or act as bridges between individuals and the state (see chapter 2.2). Further, ordinary Russians, as well as the elites, continue to rely on personalised networks, which keep the hourglass nature of Russia intact. These circumstances weaken civil society. As will be outlined in the following section, such weaknesses of civil society provide the state with ample opportunities to manage civil society.

3.4 Civil society under Putin/Medvedev

Following Putin's ascendance to power in 2000, the state's influence over economic and political life in Russia has increased (Balzer, 2003). Russia has become wealthier compared to the 1990s, but not more democratic (Shleifer & Treisman, 2005). Many formal aspects of democracy have been abolished, such as the division of power (Shlapentokh, 2008). Russian voters have witnessed a decrease of political options in elections (Konitzer & Wegren, 2006), as well as an increase of security service and military control over the administration (Benz, 2006; Rivera & Rivera, 2006). Once again a party of power has been established which assumes the role of ensuring institutional conformity, at least of formal governance institutions (Gel'man & Lankina, 2008), and the implementation of government policy across Russia's many regions (Easter, 2008; Gel'man, 2006; Remington, 2008). After what the state saw as the privatisation of political power by regional officials and businessmen (Krystanovskaya & White, 2005), these new developments constitute a forceful recentralisation of power (Squier, 2002). However, thus far the success of ensuring compliance is patchy (Gel'man & Lankina, 2008). Nonetheless, as argued in this section, the active curtailment of civil society activity creates an additional channel for the strengthening power of the state (Taylor, 2006).

The recentralisation of power has led to a “sovereign” (Shlapentokh, 2009, p. 318) or “managed democracy” (Wegren & Konitzer, 2007, p. 1025), in which society and all social structures are deemed to be subservient to the state (Oversloot, 2007). In this Russian style democracy, the state or *gosudarstvo* plays a directing and managing role. Involvement and participation of citizens in politics is limited and only possible within clearly defined boundaries (Gill, 2006). The ideology of putting the state first has become the driving ideology behind the state’s re-engagement with civil society. In extending such arrangements to civil society, TSOs need to become “*gosudarstvenniki*” (Oversloot, 2007, p. 43), which loosely translates as ‘supporters of the state’, to facilitate strengthening the power of the state and the creation of statehood (*gosudarstvennost*). In the economy, the resurgent state manifests itself into the emergence of a Russian-style market economy in which the state plays a dominant role, which results in state-corporatism (Hanson & Teague, 2005). This development has subsequently reinvigorated Soviet norms of paternalism (Hedlund, 2006; Rosefielde, 2005). This consolidation and strengthening of the Federal power impacts the future of the democratisation process in Russia (Hashim, 2005). Further, TSOs as agents of democratisation (see chapter 2.3), experience a more restrictive approach (Domrin, 2003; Evans, 2006b; Hudson, 2003; Maxwell, 2006) and a curtailment of activity (Crotty, 2009). Yet, as previously discussed, these developments are facilitated by both the Soviet period and the Yeltsin era. Ever since Putin ascended to power, he has proactively sought to control the activities of TSOs. The first attempt to draw TSOs in and make them subservient to the state was the ‘civil forum’ (Nikitin & Buchanan, 2002). This was followed by the implementation of a legislative framework aimed at gaining influence over TSOs. Pivotal to this process was a law entitled ‘On Introducing Amendment into Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation’ (The International Centre for Not-for-Profit Law, 2009), which is commonly paraphrased as the 2006 NGO law or Russian NGO law (Crotty, 2009), and is outlined in the following section.

3.4.1 The 2006 NGO law

The 2006 NGO law has refocused civil society development as a process driven by domestic forces. With the argument that TSOs are harbouring foreign spies (Reynolds, 2007), as well as the fear of a colour revolution similar to the ones that took place elsewhere in the region (Ambrosio, 2007; Parfitt, 2006; Reynolds, 2007), Russia's political elites moved to restrict the freedom of TSOs. Whereas the threat of colour revolutions might have been at Russia's doorstep, the main aim of the new legislation was to restrict foreign influence over civil society (Maxwell, 2006). The NGO law clearly outlines the boundaries and threshold conditions that TSOs need to fulfil in order to legitimately participate in Russian civil society, one of which is the limitation of foreign funding (see section 3.3.1.4 for agency issues related to foreign funding). The restrictive nature of the 2006 NGO law serves to encourage the exchange of the former foreign principles by the state, or structures/organisations under close control of the state (Livishin & Weitz, 2006,) and thus provides the state with leverage to manage civil society.

Mirroring changes in politics and the economy, which provide the state with more influence, the Russian government introduced this new law to govern TSOs. These changes regulate TSOs in four specific ways. Firstly, the legislation granted authorities far-reaching grounds to deny registration to both newly established TSOs, as well as incumbents who were compelled to seek re-registration (The International Centre for Not-for-Profit Law, 2009). The necessary documentation requires detailed personal information of all members and founders. Second, the law also provides supervisory authorities with far reaching powers to audit TSOs. Authorities have the power to request all internal financial statements, as well as attend public and private meetings of TSOs. Furthermore, the supervisor authorities check on an annual basis whether TSOs adhere to their own stated goals (Maxwell, 2006). Furthermore, the law makes a clear distinction between foreign and domestic TSOs. The former are subject to more stringent monitoring and reporting requirements. This power incorporates the ability to view

and amend governance structures of TSOs. Third, the NGO law also regulates the funding TSOs receive and how they use it, in particular if funds are provided by foreign donors. In a recent amendment to the law, donations, be they domestic or from abroad, are taxed at 24% if the donor is not on a government approved list (The International Centre for Not-for-Profit Law, 2009). Fourth, the NGO law also regulates the membership criteria of TSOs. The law clearly outlines people who are a) able to form and run TSOs, and b) allowed to participate in the activities of TSOs. Furthermore, the law regulates the liquidation of TSOs, which do not meet reporting and registration deadlines or are deemed to violate the law in other ways.

The overall judgment on whether or not the 2006 law will be the end of an independent civil society is yet to be made (Maxwell, 2006). It has to be acknowledged however that the law strengthens the state's powers vis-à-vis TSOs, in particular those which take up advocacy and regime critical roles (Mendelson & Gerber, 2007). The law also affects organisations conducting activities similar to those of government structures, i.e. organisations that take up activities and roles from which the state has previously withdrawn (for example in areas such as health and education). However, it should be recognized that this encroachment of the state might have positive repercussions. Proponents of the NGO law argue that Russian civil society has been weak and its development slow for some time now (Maxwell, 2006). They argue that the 2006 law will improve, stabilise as well as make the working environment for TSOs more predictable (Maxwell, 2006; Reynolds, 2007). Consequently, within this environment, the state encourages TSOs to focus on their organisational deficiencies, addressing structural and organisational issues which have hindered voluntary mass participation (Henderson, 2008; see section 3.3.1.1-3.3.1.3). It seems that in a Foucauldian manner, the law creates an incentive system that directs TSOs to act according to the roles envisioned for them by the state. Hence, it is the NGO law's nature which provides the state with necessary legal leverage to manage civil society. As part of these civil society arrangements, the state has brought to life more structured and formalised ways for TSOs-

state interaction (Richter, 2009). Despite the restrictive approach vis-à-vis funding and activities, these more formalized ways of interaction grant TSOs more access to the state and possibly influence in policy-making (Henderson, 2008). Nonetheless, in an environment where personalised networks are dominant, structured and formalised access allows the state to make this access more exclusive (Oversloot, 2007). However, empirical evidence of the law's impact on TSOs is lacking - a void addressed in this thesis when examining the 'external' conditions for managed civil society arrangements (see chapters 1 and 5). However, the law is only one pillar of emerging managed civil society arrangements. In addition to the legislative framework, the state also curtails civil society activity by controlling and directing TSOs directly (Crotty, 2009).

3.4.2 Curtailment of organisational activity

According to Crotty (2009), curtailment of organisational activities takes place via marionette organisations. TSOs which are controlled and directed by the state are referred to as "pseudo" (Crotty, 2006, p. 1324) or "marionette" (Cook & Vinogradova, 2006, p. 34), and are defined as "artificially constructed TSOs controlled by the state bureaucracy" (Cook & Vinogradova, 2006, p. 32). Such organisations are characterised by their proximity to the authorities and inherent lack of independence. They display their closeness by legitimising, complementing and supporting the state's ideological standpoint. Marionette organisations are able to survive because they maintain mutually dependent and profitable relationships with the authorities, portraying themselves as independent, yet at the same time acting in accordance to the strings which are being pulled by their puppet masters. However, such organisations are not new within the context of the Russian Federation. Marionette organisations are a legacy of the Soviet variant of civil society (Uhlin, 2006). Many contemporary marionettes have sprung out of former 'institutionalised' actors of Soviet civil society. They survived the Yeltsin period due to their inherent embeddedness in elite structures (Uhlin, 2006). Now under the

Putin/Medvedev presidencies, marionette organisations are becoming more prevalent within Russia's civil society landscape (Evans, 2006b).

Marionette organisations can be seen as competitors to independent TSOs. Their aim is to limit the influence of latter in civil society, and ultimately assist the state to control and manage social activity (Hedlund, 2006). These government affiliated organisations are key to help “demonstrate unity of opinion between the administration and the public” (Nikitin & Buchanan, 2002, p. 149). Therefore, they serve the objectives of the Russian state, to only pay lip service to civil society (see chapter 1). As mentioned previously, the leeway that the new NGO law provides in terms of implementation means that the political elites can use the law to ban and dismantle independent TSOs in order to allow their own marionette organisations to take up these roles. At the same time, the state aims to capture and influence the leaders of TSOs, creating hybrid marionette organisations.

Hybrid marionettes are dependent on the state, but also have the capabilities and capacities, if necessary, to challenge local political elites and bureaucracy, and bring them in line with the priorities of the Federal centre. Contrary to marionettes, which are associated with specific political networks, factions, or individuals, frequently at local or regional level, the allegiances of such hybrid marionettes lie with the policies and ideologies of the Federal state. It is the allegiance of hybrid marionettes to the Federal state which enables them to challenge state authorities on a local level (see chapter 2.2 for an outline of the importance of considering state power at various levels in Russia). Unlike marionettes, hybrid marionettes are not directly controlled by state bureaucrats. The state manages such hybrid marionettes via their ideological buy-in and provision of resources. As will be illustrated in chapter seven, section two, the Federal state has created various incentive systems to achieve such ideological buy-in. Mirroring what are understood as multi-purpose hybrid TSOs (Hasenfeld & Gidron, 2005), hybrid marionettes are thus not catalysts for social change but maintainers

of the paternalistic cultural logic shaping civil society arrangements, acting as invaluable service providers in light of state withdrawal. Consequently, these are independent organisations, which behave like *gosudarstvenniki*. Therefore, by encouraging TSOs to become hybrid marionettes, the Federal state is providing a tool to enforce political power structures (Taylor, 2006) and controlling social activity (Hedlund, 2006; Rosefelde, 2005). Thus such developments are indicative of the emergence of civil society arrangements that are fundamentally different to the understanding of civil society as an autonomous space.

These recent trends, in combination with the constraints that affected civil society development (see section 3.3.1), have created a difficult working environment for TSOs. Their ability to build a vibrant civil society able to facilitate further democratisation is in doubt. However, these contemporary developments are the manifestation of past and deep rooted civil society arrangements. These circumstances will provide the state post-ante the Soviet period with the ability to manage civil society. This renders many TSOs merely servants to the state, providing particular services (see chapter 2.3), and effectively becoming shadow structures of the state. As the authorities are looking for the best political value for their resources, TSOs which address unpopular issues such as HIV/AIDS will find it even more difficult to access necessary resources. It is against this background of emerging managed civil society arrangements that this thesis investigates how such arrangements are manifested (see chapter 1).

3.5 Conclusion

This chapter has presented a chronological review of civil society development in Russia, outlining the constraints that have limited development. The overview clearly shows that a civil society as presented in chapter two does not exist within Russia. Therefore, Russia's civil society has thus far only made a limited contribution to democracy development in Russia. Civil society arrangements in Russia are not yet the space "between the individual

family and the state” (Neace, 1999, p. 150). Chapter two describes civil society as consisting of intermediary organisations that are able to bridge the gap between the individual and the state. However, post-Soviet Russia was faced with societal arrangements in which the networks at the heart of such TSOs were positioned at either end of the hourglass (see section 3.2.1). Traditionally TSOs are able to cooperate with the state, and at the same time hold it accountable, acting as a counterweight to it (see chapter 2.3). Russia’s peculiar arrangements mean that civil society is constricted and limited in its ability to act as a counterweight to the state (see chapter 3.3.1.1-3.3.1.3). Nevertheless, the underlying ability to bridge across leads TSOs to create social capital that facilitates democratic practices, and hence contributes to democratic consolidation (see chapter 2.1 & 2.5). Consequently, this thesis addresses how managed civil society arrangements, outlined throughout this chapter and the following paragraphs, manifest themselves in the context of the Russian Federation?

The literature points out that TSOs in post-Soviet Russia have been affected by three major constraints outlined within this chapter (see section 3.3.1.1-3.3.1.3). These constraints have limited the institutionalisation of civil society as an autonomous space, bridging between the individual and the state and keeping the state in check. With the Russian state now managing all “levers of power and patronage” (Cappelli, 2008, p. 554), it has become dominating, directing and all-encompassing. As a result actors, structures, and institutions of civil society are required to maintain strong, structured, and ultimately dependent relationships with state structures. These peculiar civil society arrangements are rooted in Russia’s cultural-historic trajectories. Therefore, to underpin the research objectives (see chapter 1.1.2) this section will draw on chapters two and three to discuss state ‘guided/managed’ civil society development in Russia.

As discussed in chapter two, section two, civil society and the state are autonomous of each other, however their cooperation on equal terms strengthens democracy (Taylor, 2006).

Nevertheless, the development of civil society outlined within this chapter shows that civil society arrangements in the context of the Russian Federation do not resemble those outlined in chapter two. Thus, parallel to the changes in the political and economic environment, Russian civil society arrangements are indicative of managed civil society arrangements. Comparing civil society development in Russia with the theoretical understanding outlined in chapter two illustrates that the ability of civil society to contribute to democratisation remains limited. Further, it shows that the state has taken on a directing and managing role when it comes to civil society development.

Civil society as outlined in chapter two relies upon the participation of individuals and the state's responsiveness to this grass-roots impetus. However, in the post-Communist context, civic activity and participation remain low (Howard, 2002a; Salmenniemi, 2008), and similar issues are encountered in the African and Latin American context (Chandhoke, 2007; Kaldor, 2003). The assumptions of a state responsive to bottom-up impetus is culturally alien to many 'non-western' contexts, such as, for example China (Frolic, 1997), India (Chandhoke, 2007), or many African countries (Lewis, 2002). Within the context of the Russian Federation, the paternalistic traditions of the state and the "supremacy of the state in all aspects of social life" (Avtonomov, 2006, p. 3) suggest that an equal partnership between civil society and the state are unlikely to occur. Therefore, civil society in Russia might be an intermediary but not necessarily autonomous space.

However, as outlined in chapter two, the separation, in terms of content, activities, and agendas, between the state and civil society is central to liberal democracy (Held, 1993). This is not necessarily the case in the Russian managed democracy variant. Managed democracy does still need a civil space, but not one that is able to stimulate social change and democratisation. Within liberal democratic civil society arrangements, TSOs offer the ability to engage and participate in decision-making that goes "beyond periodic voting" (Held, 1993,

p. 25). In this way TSOs ‘drag’ ordinary people out of their private sphere, making them active citizens in the process (Held, 1993). Similarly, a managed Russian civil society might encourage participation and activities, however rather than ‘dragging’ people out of the private sphere, TSOs exist to deliver services to them. This reflects a political mentality of the state, which is not about creating ‘active citizens’ that can challenge the state, but about creating ‘taken care of citizens’. Therefore, if TSOs embrace these managed/controlled civil society arrangements, it would challenge these epistemological assumptions which have been the driving forces of much civil society and democracy theory (see chapter 2).

The second section of this chapter outlined underlying issues in societal structure, the role of social networks and traditions of social engagement in the Soviet Union. These have limited the ability of TSOs to contribute to democratisation. As a result, on the one hand TSOs do not assume the role of transmitting values and norms of democracy (see chapter 2.3). On the other hand, TSOs fail to encourage the positive social capital generation that would enable civil society to contribute to democratisation (see section 2.4). The Soviet period resulted in an hourglass society (see section 3.2.1), which meant that norms of cooperation for mutual benefit did not extend beyond the personalised and closed network, and thus social trust was severely limited (see section 3.2.1). However it is these aspects of social capital which are seen as the building blocks of democracy (Putnam, 1995).

The legacy of the Soviet Union means that civil society is fragmented and TSOs do not interact with each other (see section 3.3.1.1). Thus, civil society is unable to establish itself as a middle ground between the private and the public (see chapter 2.2). Civil society remains constricted and unable to act as a counterweight to the state (see chapter 2.2), restricting its ability to contribute to the democratisation process. Russians lack trust vis-à-vis TSOs, which hampers their efforts to recruit new members. This results in a lack of public participation. Thus TSOs are unable to aggregate and represent the interests of society vis-à-vis the state,

and so TSOs are unable to bridge the gap between the individual and the state (see section 2.1).

Further, TSOs remain restricted to pre-existing social networks which are inward-looking (see chapter 2.4) and unable to advance the activities of their organisations (Salmenniemi, 2008; see section 3.3.1.2), and suffer from a shortage of resources (see section 3.3.1.3). Foreign support provided some relief in the past, but its reach and effect in establishing civil society as a middle ground and bridge between the individuals and the state remained limited (see section 3.3.1.3). Hence TSOs are unable to create “public [collective] action between the individual and the state” (Richter, 2002, p. 30). This means that civil society is not an autonomous, intermediary space which counterweights the states and subsequently contributes to democratisation (see chapter 2.5). The literature on civil society and TSOs in Russia shows that both are weak, offering some platform for social cooperation, but failing to generate social capital conducive to contributing to democracy and pluralising the democratic arena (see chapter 2.5). This explains the limited impact that civil society has had in the democratisation process in post-Soviet Russia. As established in chapter two, civil society’s propensity to generate democratic externalities is dichotomously opposite the state’s ability to manage civil society. In light of the literature discussed in this chapter, this raises questions of the potential for the emergence of a ‘managed’ civil society underpinning research objective three of this thesis (see chapter 1.1.2). Therefore, this thesis investigates the characteristics of a state managed civil society, and the limits of the state’s ability to control and mould civil society in such a particular way (see chapter 1.1.2 objective 3).

As outlined in the preceding section, the weaknesses of civil society provide the state with various ways to assert its influence. For civil society, this process of encroachment has thus far culminated in a legal framework that provides authorities with ample leeway to limit the independence of TSOs. The intention behind such developments is not to dispose of civil

society, but to subordinate it to the state. Other than in traditional civil society arrangements which centre on the advocacy of issues by independent TSOs (Henderson, 2008), state-civil society relationships in Russia are likely to lead to subservient TSOs. The legislative changes discussed in this chapter provide a potential foundation for such a *renationalisation* of civil society. Consequently, civil society arrangements are characterised by strong and dependent relationships between TSOs and the state. In the context of the NGO law, it is likely that TSOs will focus on complementing and extending the state, rather than creating an autonomous space for action between the individual and the state. These trends have similarities to the Communist regime of Russia's past (Hedlund, 2006; Rosefielde, 2005). In the context of Russia's present day political set up, this effectively leads to a civil society that is less confrontational and more supportive of the state (Evans 2006b). Chapter two demonstrated that despite cooperating with the state, TSOs should aim to remain autonomous and independent in their activities to be able to act as agents of democratisation. The NGO law limits this ability. Therefore, to understand the effects of the NGO law, this thesis investigates the impact of the legislative changes on the day-to-day workings and *modus operandi* of TSOs in Russia (see chapter 1.1.2). This will enable this thesis to explore the limits of this legal framework in furthering the Russian state's agenda vis-à-vis a managed/controlled civil society (see chapter 1.1.2 objective 1).

Shifts in political as well as economic arrangements provide the state with the necessary influence in the respective areas (Frye, 2002). However, the lack of "organised civil society" (Richter, 2009, p. 49) means that during the transition period, civil society was no longer integrated within power structures (Hedlund, 2006). Therefore, re-capturing the leadership of civil society actors (TSOs) and integrating them into a governance system is vital for the emerging political regime of Russia. It allows the state to cement and extend its dominance (Mann, 1984). This capture of civil society actors provides the state with alternative routes for the mobilisation of citizens in accordance with its own agenda. It allows the state to direct

civil society activities and encourage activism that centres on issues of “patriotism rather than political protest” (Henderson, 2008, p. 18). In turn, this could effectively lead to the sidelining of organisations which fail to mobilise around the priorities of the state. This chapter outlined that the Russian state has withdrawn from service provision (see section 3.3), meaning that organisations focusing on service provision are increasingly important. Because such service providing organisations are able to deliver public and quasi-public goods they are more likely to be resource dependent on the state (Hall, 2002). Chapter two highlights such organisations as pro-typical TSOs. Thus their ability to engage in their activities, which theoretically substitute the state, (see chapter 2.4) provides an important manifestation of civil society arrangements. Investigating such TSOs underpins the research objective of examining the extent to which such organisations act as a substitute for the state (see chapter 1.1.2 objective 2).

This chapter outlines that civil society in Russia is shaped by the trajectories and tensions created by Soviet legacies, demands put upon TSOs in post-Soviet Russia, as well as recently emerging contextual constraints such as the 2006 NGO law. These trends are indicative of a managed civil society which is investigated in this thesis. At first glance, such civil society arrangements characterised by strong, structured, and dependent relationships between TSOs and the state, reflect Hale’s (2002) statist model of civil society development. However, at the same time, the institutionalisation of ‘constructive cooperation’ between TSOs (see section 3.4) and the state highlights the evolution of more liberal facets (Johnson, 2006). Therefore, these managed civil society arrangements have to be seen as being distinctly different from western civil society arrangements (see chapter 2), or the statist arrangements of the Soviet period (see section 3.2). Consequently, answering the research question of how managed civil society arrangements are manifested in the Russian Federation enables this thesis to make a unique contribution to the literature on civil society, both in Russia as well as more generalistic considerations (see chapter 8.3.3)

In summary, the outlined issues in this chapter show that the state is now in a more dominant position vis-à-vis civil society. As noted above, this will facilitate the growth of organisations that past research has singled out as being marionettes. The majority of these, similar to the Soviet period, will be embedded within the elite structures. Other social networks will remain within the private sphere. Therefore, the literature on Russian civil society development is indicative of the emergence of a Russian-style civil society which is managed by the state. Nevertheless, there is no empirical evidence in the literature that supports such a proposition. In addressing three specific research objectives (see chapter 1.1.2), which relate to exploring the NGO law, examining TSOs acting as substitutes for the state, and investigating the characteristics of a state managed civil society, this thesis provides empirical findings that demonstrate such managed arrangements. This managed civil society facilitates the consolidation of today's Russia as a society exhibiting all of the common traits of a quintessential hourglass society. The roots of this development stretch back further than the Presidencies of Putin and Medvedev. Civil society development in the 1990s was impaired, and unable to address and reconfigure Soviet period societal arrangements and state-society relations. The development of arrangements aimed at creating "public [collective] action between the individual and the state" (Richter, 2002, p. 30) were not embraced by the Russian state, Russian civil society activists, or the Russian populace. Thus a managed civil society space in Russia represents a case of "continuity theory" (Hedlund, 2008, p. 204), where cultural-historic institutional traits have resisted fundamental change and have thus provided a fruitful ground for such arrangements. The empirical chapters five, six and seven will further explore the research question and objectives illustrated in this chapter as well as chapters one and four. Before these findings are discussed however, the study's research design and methodology are presented.

CHAPTER 4: Research Methodology

4.1 Introduction

Chapters two and three elaborate on traditional civil society theory (see chapter 2.5) and Russian civil society development (see chapter 3.5). Specifically, chapter three illustrates that post ante the Soviet Union, Russian civil society development has faced several limitations and inherent weaknesses. Such insights mirror the continuing dominance of cultural historic traits which facilitated the Russian state's attempts to manage civil society (see chapter 3.5). Therefore, the research question of this thesis is:

How does managed civil society manifest itself in the Russian Federation?

In order to address this question, the experiences of respondents are important. It is the experiences of organisational decision makers which shape their decision-making (Simon, 1955), and therefore these insights will enable this thesis to demonstrate facets of managed civil society. This thesis aims to explore respondents' experiences of running TSOs in Russia, as a construction and rationalisation of their realities, and how this is actually representative of macro-level changes in social arrangements in Russia.

Chapters two and three have illustrated the importance of civil society to democratic governance and democratising contexts such as the Russian Federation. As an industrialised country with membership of the G8, as well as being in possession of nuclear weapons, understanding Russia's governance structures, of which civil society forms a part, is particularly important. Russia aims to portray itself as a democratic country (Shlapentokh, 2009), and consequently an autonomous third sector that subjects the government to scrutiny and holds it accountable is important. However, as illustrated in chapter three, the cultural-historic trajectory, as well as present day developments indicate both the susceptibility and

emergence of a managed third sector. Chapter one and three highlight that this has not yet been carefully investigated.

To fill this void, this thesis examines three aspects of civil society. First, the literature on Russian civil society is lacking an assessment of the effect of legislative changes on TSOs. As the discussion in chapter three demonstrates, these legislative changes represent a potential legally mandated attempt to manage civil society. This thesis explores the legislative changes, and addresses this gap in our understanding of Russian civil society. Second, the thesis investigates organisations active in health and education, which have only received limited attention within in the literature thus far (see chapter 3). Since the end of the Soviet Union, the state has withdrawn from service provision (see chapter 3) and continued with such neoliberal reforms (Hemment, 2009). This retreating state is likely to have a bigger impact on organisations within the health and education areas, increasing the demand for such organisations to offset the retreating state, and therefore making such TSOs more susceptible to being captured and managed by the state. In so doing, the thesis address the void in our understanding about the work of ‘pro-typical’ TSOs (see chapter 2.3) in the context of the Russian Federation. Third, chapter three illustrates that the Russian state traditionally infiltrates civil society by creating marionette organisations. Juxtaposing such insights with the state’s attempt at managing civil society, this highlights that formerly independent TSOs are likely to be turned into marionettes. The potential of the state to effectuate this process provides the thesis with an insight into the ability of the state to manage civil society. In so doing, the thesis contributes to our understanding of the Russian state’s ability to manage civil society. These three aspects are synthesised into the following research objectives (see chapter 1.1 and 3.5):

Objective 1: To investigate the impact of legislative changes on the day-to-day workings of TSOs in Russia, and establish the limits of these laws on furthering the

Russian state's agenda vis-à-vis a managed or controlled civil society and/or third sector.

Objective 2: To establish the impact of Russia's retreat away from state service provision, in particular in the health and education sectors, on TSOs operating in these sectors. To what extent do TSOs now act as state substitutes?

Objective 3: To investigate the characteristics of a state managed civil society, and to establish the limits of the Russian state's ability to control or mould civil society in this way.

Chapters five, six, and seven will look at each of these objectives in turn. However, before presenting the results, this chapter, in five sections, will outline the methodological and analytical approach employed. First, the chapter establishes the ontological and epistemological understanding which underpins this study. Second, it illustrates the selection of the research strategy employed. The compliance of the research process to ethical standards, as well as data collection methods, are discussed. Further, the chapter details the selection criteria used when deciding on participating organisations, as well as offering a description of the cases. Third, the chapter presents the data analysis procedure and specific techniques employed. The analysis is based on three units of analysis: the sector the organisations are active in, the regions in which the organisations are located, and the type of organisations they are. As shall be outlined, data analysis was conducted thematically (King, 1994), illustrating three major themes which are discussed in more detail. Fourth, the chapter demonstrates the rigour and robustness of the research design. Finally, a chapter summary is provided.

4.2 Ontology and epistemology of the study

The research question and objectives illustrated above (see also chapter 1) incorporate implicit assumptions about the ontology (the way we think about the world) and epistemology (our understanding of what constitutes knowledge). Considerations of ontology and epistemology are vital in assuring that the most appropriate research methodology has been chosen (Morgan & Smircich, 1980). Further clarifying these aspects helps to explain not only the specificities of the research methodology, but also facilitates the determination of the workable techniques within the design (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, & Lowe, 2003). Thus, in order to establish the rigour of the analytic process and improve the empirical argument (Ketokivi & Mantere, 2010), outlining the underlying paradigm is of similar importance to establishing the broader theoretical discourse (see chapter 2 and 3). The view of the world and knowledge informing this study is positioned within the paradigm of social constructivism (Burrell & Morgan, 1979).

Social constructivism's key assumption is that that reality and its manifestations are socially constructed (Burrell & Morgan, 1979). The experience of individuals as they engage with the world leads them to develop a multitude and variety of meanings and understandings of the world (Creswell, 2009). Hence, in terms of epistemology, understanding and knowledge emerge from social interactions, of which the researcher is a part (Bryman & Bell, 2003; Denzin & Lincoln, 2003). Ontologically, this perspective considers that the individuals' consciousness consists of multiple realities, which are an outcome of interaction (Bryman & Bell, 2003; Burrell & Morgan, 1979). This perspective encourages the researcher to explore these multiple meanings (Creswell, 2009). Therefore, this paradigm favours the use of interpretative studies in which the researcher engages with the research subject. This way, the researcher is able to gain an insight into the understandings and meanings the subject attributes to the investigated phenomena (Burrell & Morgan, 1979). The aim is to draw upon the participants' view of a situation (Creswell, 2009).

In this research, research subjects are individuals who act as agents or representatives of TSOs, and thus construct the social reality of these organisations. In engaging in TSOs, these individuals participate in constructing civil society arrangements in the Russian Federation. In exploring the understanding of human action and following the social constructivist perspective, the methodological choices of this research are rooted within hermeneutic/phenomenological traditions (Alvesson & Sköldbberg, 2000). In adopting this tradition, scholars are interested in the interpretation of text (Prasad, 2002) and the social-cultural forces that influence these texts (Moustakas, 1994), and thus reality. This study adopts a particular strand of the hermeneutic/phenomenological tradition, descriptive empirical phenomenological research, which encourages the focus on the individuals' textual accounts such as transcribed interviews, to identify the essential and underlying structures of the world of the research subject (Moustakas, 1994).

Following Eisenhardt's (1989) and Yin's (2003) seminal work legitimising case study methodology, studies grounded within the social constructivist perspective have increased (Piekkari, Welch, & Paavilainen, 2009). Specifically, management studies (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007), studies of organisations (Chia, 2000), or as relevant to this thesis, studies of organisations in countries in transition (Abbott & Wallace, 2007; Crotty, 2003; 2009) frequently adopt methodologies aligned with a social constructivist perspective. Specifically, for examining contexts with limited theoretical knowledge, the use of inductive strategies, which are grounded in the social constructivist perspective, are recommended (Eisenhardt, 1989). As chapter three illustrates, traditional literature on civil society and its related constructs seems to have only little relevance in the context of the Russian Federation. Further, studies of Russian civil society have been limited to specific parts of, and movement within, civil society. By reinvestigating traditional civil society theory in a Russian context, this thesis deconstructs fundamental assumptions (i.e. democracy-civil society orthodoxy, see

chapter 2), and presents insights into social arrangement in this and similar contexts (Edmondson & McManus, 2007). Therefore, this thesis investigates an area where theoretical knowledge is limited in explaining specific phenomena. Consequently, adopting a social constructivist perspective, and subsequent research strategies, allow the researcher to gain a fuller and more in-depth understanding.

As illustrated above, this study focuses on the realities that shape TSOs' activities, which in turn depend on the individual respondent's perception and rationalisation of these realities. Seeing realities as socially constructed phenomena reveals new insights into how civil society theory operates in the Russian context (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). In line with the social constructivist perspective and consideration of building theory (Eisenhardt, 1989), this thesis's methodological approach is that of a case study.

4.3 Research method – case study approach

In order to explore Russian civil society arrangements a multiple case study approach was operationalised (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2003). A multiple case study approach allows for comparisons between the accounts and experiences of individuals across different cases (Eisenhardt, 1989). Each of the cases serves to explore the activities, events, and processes that shape TSOs (Creswell, 2009) in the context of the Russian Federation. Case studies in particular lend themselves to qualitative research techniques, which are most relevant if existing theory does not allow feasible answers (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Yin, 2003), as is the case for TSOs and civil society in Russia (see chapter 3.5 and section 4.2). The multiple case study approach allows the research process to account for potential idiosyncrasies within each of the cases, and enables broader theoretical considerations, therefore providing more substantiated arguments for modifying and refining civil society theory (Siggelkow, 2007). Further, a case study approach is helpful when the research question begins with pronouns such as why, what, and how (Yin, 2003). Consequently, in line with the social constructivist

perspective and considerations of the voids in the literature, a case methodology is the most appropriate research strategy for this study. The following sub-sections detail the data collection process. These sections present ethical considerations relevant to the study, the selection of cases, participants, and description of the case sites. Further, the various sources used for data collection: observations, interviews, textual publications are outlined.

4.3.1 Ethical considerations

The ethical behaviour of the researcher and an ethically sound research process are important in social science research (Miles & Huberman, 1994), in particular when operationalising qualitative techniques (Silverman, 2001). In order to ensure this, and before fieldwork was undertaken, the study was submitted to and approved by the Aston Business School's Research and Ethics Committee. This review process provided valuable insights into developing the consent form (see Appendix C), as well as ensuring good quality interview questions (see Appendix D for the semi-structured interview protocol used in this study). Aston Business School's Research Ethics guidelines adhere to the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) Research Ethics Framework which governs social science research studies in the UK.

Access to organisations was sought via telephone, and during the course of a call the study was outlined (see Appendix C for a consent form that incorporated the information used in such conversations; see also section 4.3.2 for a detailed description of how cases and respondents were selected). There were no obvious hazards associated with the study. In order to minimise any potential hazards to the respondents, their confidentiality and anonymity was assured. During the telephone conversation to establish access, as well as before the formal interview took place, respondents were reminded of the no-commitment basis of the interview, and that they were allowed to withdraw at any time. The usage of a recording device was crucial because the interviews were conducted in Russian, and a record of the

interview facilitates the translation process. However, before the interview, the researcher also established whether the interviewee would be comfortable with being recorded. Furthermore, each respondent was provided with a consent form to sign (see Appendix C). In most organisations, interviews were only conducted with the director, leader, or key decision maker of this particular organisation. Due to time constraints, it was not possible to interview all members or all staff from all organisations. Interviewees agreed voluntarily to take part in the study. Before each interview, not only was the respondent's consent obtained, but they were also informed about the purpose of the study (i.e. that it was part of a PhD thesis research project of the researcher), as well as again being offered to be able to withdraw at any time. All interviews, after clarifying and receiving the approval of respondents, were taped in order to allow the researcher to be more involved within the interview process. After the interview, respondents were debriefed.

In addition to the agreement put forward in the consent form (see Appendix C), for each participant oral confidentiality and anonymity agreements were reached. Most respondents and organisations agreed that for the purpose of this thesis and academic publications, their position, as well as organisational name could be used. For participants and organisations that did not agree to the usage of their organisational name, the name has been substituted with a short and relevant description of the organisation. Therefore in order to ensure anonymity, all organisations were coded, for example Org01Sam for organisation one in Samara, or Org01Per for organisation one in Perm. Consequently, no real identities of participating individuals are revealed. Furthermore, any organisational material collected, which is not in the public domain, is treated confidentially. The collected data, that is the interview data as well as the transcribed interviews, are stored on a password protected computer which is located in a locked room not accessible to unauthorised individuals. The guidelines outlined here shaped the case selection and data collection process described in the following sections.

4.3.2 Case selection

As is appropriate to the study's focus, an ethnographic approach is adopted, allowing data to be collected via observations and interviews (Yin, 2003). Informed by the voids in the literature (see chapter 2, 3 and section 4.1), the research strategy, and thus case selection, aimed to examine the perception, experience, and understanding of health and educational TSOs, which have only received little attention thus far. The following sections outline the selection of both TSOs as well as the distinct geographical locations in which these organisations were recruited.

4.3.2.1 Selection of Regions

Replicating other research studies of TSOs in transitory contexts (Abbott & Wallace, 2007; Cook & Vinogradova, 2006; Crotty & Crane, 2004), this study investigates distinct geographical locations in Russia. For the purpose of this study, three geographical locations were selected. These regions are Samara, Sverdlovsk, and Perm. A justification for choosing these regions will now be discussed.

A primary concern of fieldwork in the Russian Federation is the regional differences both in political and economic terms which are widely discussed in the literature (Bradshaw & Prendergrast, 2005; Dienes, 2005; Hanson & Bradshaw, 2000). There are 83 so called Federal subjects within Russia which, as part of the recentralization of power discussed in chapter three, are organized into seven Federal districts (Dienes, 2005). These 83 subjects vary with regards to their political autonomy and economic activities. Whereas a specific discussion of the various economic activities are beyond the scope of this thesis, Bradshaw and Prendergrast (2005) argue that subjects can generally be classified as either being primarily extractive, agricultural, industrial or service based. The 83 Federal subjects can be divided into 46 *Oblast's* (regions) and nine *Krai's* (territories) where the President of the Russian Federation proposes a governor then elected by the regional government. Furthermore, there

are 21 *Respubliky* (republics) amongst the 83 Federal subjects which enjoy a more autonomous status within the Federation. The remaining Federal subjects are classified into four *Avtonomny Okrugy* (autonomous areas), one *Avtonomaya Oblast'* (autonomous region) and two *Goroda Federal'nogo Znacheniya* (Federal cities). These Federal cities are Moscow and St. Petersburg. Hanson and Bradshaw (2000) argue that most of the development of Russia's financial sector has taken place in these Federal cities, which makes them unique not only in terms of their political status but also with regards to their composition of economic activities, these being predominantly now service based. Indeed, the urban centres of Moscow and St. Petersburg are considered to be more developed economically (Hanson, 1997), and thus do not provide a mirror of provincial and industrialized Russia (Crotty, 2003). Given that the aim of this thesis is to investigate managed civil society arrangements in the Russian Federation, Moscow and St Petersburg were therefore not considered as suitably representative case regions for the fieldwork. Therefore, the objective of selecting regions to examine TSOs was to find typical regions outside the urban centres of Moscow and St. Petersburg, more autonomous republics and autonomous areas within the Russian Federation. Given the recentralisation of power, regions now have little freedom of action (Bradshaw & Prendergrast, 2005) in particular vis-à-vis fiscal autonomy (Dienes, 2005). Therefore focusing on *Oblast's* or *Kraii* allows this thesis to examine the Federal state attempts to develop and manage civil society. This captures a more representative setting amongst Federal subjects. Further it enables minimising regional factors to act as explanatory influences which a selection of republics or autonomous areas would most certainly entail due to their political autonomy and typical organisation along ethnic lines (Bradshaw & Prendergrast, 2005). Hence focusing on *Oblast's* and *Kraii* also provides a more representative setting of typical Russian regions.

The next stage in selecting case *Oblast's* and *Kraii* was to locate similar regions in different Federal districts or different regions within the same Federal district. Due to time and

resource constraints (discussed in-depth in chapter 8.3.1.1) the final selection of regions relied heavily on the willingness of potential partner universities to participate in the research (see section 4.3.2.2 for a discussion of access negotiations with the partner universities). Nevertheless, the selection process adhered to the basic considerations of Federal districts (i.e. meso-administrative and political factors) and economic factors. The composition of economic activities was particularly important because the regional economy was a significant factor in 1990s which regions used to establish the level of regional political autonomy from the Federal Russian state (Bradshaw & Prendergrast, 2005). With regards to the economic dimension, the selection of case regions focused on regions within the same Federal district. The researcher was able to draw upon personal networks to establish a partnership with the Samara state university (see section 4.3.2.2); Samara Oblast' was selected as a case region. The economy of the Samara Oblast' operates primarily on a manufacturing/industrial base (Hanson et al., 2000) and thus the second region within the Volga Federal District needed to have a different economic profile. Therefore, Perm Krai, with its predominant resource extractive economy, lent itself well as the second site for research. This provided the study with two geographical regions with different economic profiles within the same meso-administrative set-up. As illustrated before this middle level of state administration has been introduced to centralise Federal state power. Therefore, by selecting a third region from a different Federal district the thesis was able to investigate similarities amongst TSOs and civil society arrangements across different meso-levels of state administration. This resulted in the selection of Sverdlovsk Oblast' as the third and final case region. Consequently, in selecting these regions, this study was able to examine contrasts and similarities between these regions. In particular, the latter considerations enabled this thesis to draw conclusions about the representativeness of civil society arrangements, as illustrated in the empirical chapters five to seven.

Overall, despite the recentralisation of power under Putin (see chapter 3.4), Dienes (2005) argues that Russia's regions are still fragmented and therefore regional factors such as ethnicity, economic activity, regional power holders and regional identity might act as explanatory factors. This dovetails with the assertions made within the civil society literature discussed in chapter two. There is the possibility that the civil society arrangements in which TSOs are active at the regional level are influenced by the aforementioned regional factors. Table 4.1 summarises the key economic, social and political aspects of the three regions selected for this study.

Region	Social and Economic Parameters					
	Population in million (2002)	GRP in bln	GRP per capita and rank in RF (2008)	Unemployment	Per capita income (per month)	Higher education (thousand)
Perm	2.7	609.2	224,532 (19)	10,1%	16723	105.4
Samara	3.1	706.5	222,726 (20)	6.1%	18175	174.4
Sverdlovsk	4.2 (2010)	823.8	n.a.	8.8%	20351	n.a.
Political Parameters						
	Type	District/Governor	Ethnic Composition	Nature of TSOs		
				Health	Education	Other
Perm	Krai	Volga Appointed 2004	70-80% Russian	14	7	3
Samara	Oblast'	Volga Appointed 2007	70-80% Russian	13	9	2
Sverdlovsk	Oblast'	Ural Appointed 2009	70-80% Russian	24	7	0

Table 4.1: Key economic, social and political parameters of the three case regions

All data December 2009 in ruble unless otherwise stated. RF stands for Russian Federation. Education refers to enrolment at beginning of academic year 2008/2009. Data from Gosgomstat and its regional divisions: Sverdlosk Oblast': <http://sverdl.gks.ru/default.aspx>. Perm Krai: <http://permstat.gks.ru/default.aspx>. Samara Oblast': <http://www.samarastat.ru/default.aspx>. Ethnic data based on 2002 Russian Census. TSOs data from Appendix E.

As Table 4.1 illustrates the three case regions are fairly similar along key social, economic and political indicators and hence regional factors which might account for why the results are also similar. Despite the influence of regional factors, all three regions have undergone continuous democratisation, economic development, and modernisation which have together created similar pressures across the regions, specifically on TSOs, to address past social problems stemming from the withdrawal of the state, and emerging issues such as the

HIV/AIDS epidemic (Hoppenbrouwer, Sergeyev, & Nitzsche-Bell, 2005) or social integration of the disabled (Wengle & Rasell, 2008). TSOs in the areas of health and education are more likely to experience the impact of such pressures, specifically in terms of the demand of their services (see chapter 2). Considering the emergence of state managed civil society arrangements explored in this study, as the potential demand for their service and thus existence increases, it is likely that such organisations will be more significantly impacted by such changes. The following section discusses the selection of TSOs.

4.3.2.2 TSO selection

With regards to selecting participating organisations, theoretical considerations illustrated in chapter 2, and context specific insights (see chapter 3), guided this process. Using a theoretical approach to selecting participating TSOs, the organisations were chosen depending on their activities and objectives, focusing on prototypical and similar organisations across the three regions (see section 4.3.3 for detailed description of participating organisations). Before the fieldwork period, the researcher used web-based resources (such as: <http://www.nko-ural.ru/>, <http://www.perspektiva-inva.da.ru/>), personal correspondence during May 2008 with the USAID Russia office, and a consultant working for the BEARR Trust to indentify contact details of approximately 35 organisations across the three regions (see Appendix A for a full list of organisations which participated in this study). During the fieldwork period, the snowballing technique was used to increase the number of potentially participating organisations, which also provided the research with an understanding of the interaction amongst TSOs in the various regions. During this process, the definition of TSOs and theoretical selection criteria was deliberately understood loosely in order to include all types of organisations prevalent in the context of the Russian Federation (see chapter 3). This enabled the research to gain a better and more precise understanding of what civil society would emerge (Dörner, 2008). Therefore, in this study the key selection criteria applied were whether or not organisations can be attributed to the educational or health realm, as well as

whether or not they understand themselves as third sector organisations (i.e. *obschestvenii organisatii*). The potential ambiguities that such a selection process entails are considered a strength of this approach, as it ensures that the study includes cases (TSOs) which are at the periphery of civil society. Understanding such ‘outlier’ cases adds depth and insight into understanding the Russian civil society space.

In order to recruit the identified organisations, the assistance of local Russian partner Universities in Perm, Samara, and Yekaterinburg was sought. Access to partner Universities was established through personal networks (Cassell, 1988) as well as ‘cold’ calling (see Appendix B for the access letter sent to universities that declared an interest). Over a period of two months, successful access negotiations took place with the Perm State University, Samara State University, and Ural State University. During the fieldwork period, these universities assisted in organising accommodation, visa procedures, providing support with negotiating access to TSOs and scheduling interviews. As project partners, the Universities assisted in verifying contact details of organisations and provided support in contacting and arranging interviews with TSOs.

Initially TSOs were contacted via telephone. The aim of this contact was to set up an interview date with the leaders, directors, or senior decision makers of the TSOs. During the telephone conversations, the details of the research study were used to inform and recruit TSOs (see Appendix C for the Consent Form, which participants signed, and which formed the basis for the information provided in telephone conversations). Most phone conversations were concluded with the agreement of a date and time convenient for participants to take part in a face-to-face interview with the researcher. If the relevant person was unavailable, messages were left and return calls were made. The majority of interviews were scheduled to take place on the premises of the TSOs. If TSOs did not have premises, then the interview was arranged to take place in a quiet coffee place conveniently located for the respondents, or

in some cases in the homes of respondents. This process gave the selection and recruitment of participating TSOs a pragmatic nature (Barley, 1990). The cut-off point for data collection was due to time and funding constraints, which meant fieldwork was restricted to one month per region. In the cumulative time period of three months, respondents from 82 organisations were interviewed across the three regions (see Appendix F for a detailed list of all respondents). The next section presents the various data collected during the fieldwork period.

4.3.3 Data collection and generation

Following the qualitative methodological techniques employed in this study, the research process collected data from a variety of sources (Yin, 2003). These sources can be either classified as generating naturally occurring data, or data provoked by the researcher (Silverman, 2001). Naturally occurring data was generated by observations, published materials, as well as artefacts such as other materials provided by TSOs for example banners, stickers, or internal documentation. These were partly captured in the researchers' reflective fieldwork diary. Research provoked data was generated via interviews. Using these two types of data provided a basis for triangulating data sources (Yin, 2003). The following two sections describe the practicalities of collecting these two types of data.

4.3.3.1 Naturally occurring data

As indicated by the category, this data exists without the researcher's need to intervene. Such data does not only hold analytical value, but also enables researchers to familiarise themselves with the setting, and can potentially indicate thematic developments for the analytical process (Alvesson & Kärreman, 2007). The main sources of such data are publicly available, and also from internal documentation provided by the participating organisations. This data sometimes includes 'outcomes' of the work of TSOs, such as books they published or the ability to look through photo albums documenting their activities. Key insights gained from this data, such

as the actual activities of organisations or their communication to ‘outsiders’ of the organisations, provided a basis for the analysis presented in this thesis.

In addition, naturally occurring data was also collected via the researcher’s detailed and reflective observational notes. The notes include the physical setting of the organisations’ premises (if they had some) or the interview environment. Further, these notes include observations about participants and the emphasis and content of informal discussions before and after the interview. The notes were typed up immediately after each meeting and facilitated contextualisation of the analytical process. Such naturally occurring data also assisted in the reflective periods of the data collection process (Alvesson & Skoldberg, 2000).

4.3.3.2 Researcher provoked data

Contrary to the naturally occurring data, this category would not exist without the present and active engagement of the researcher (Silverman, 2001). In line with the adopted research paradigm (see section 4.2), such data is created by the interaction of the researcher and participants of this study. In this study, the researcher engaged in two ways to generate data: informal conversations and semi-structured interviews.

Informal Conversations. Preceding and following interviews, and whenever possible the researcher extended the stay at the research site for observations and/or informal conversations with organisational members. This served to not only build a rapport with respondents, making them more at ease in the interview, but also provided contextual nuances which were recorded in a field work diary, and provided helpful background information when analysing data. Such informal discussion also allowed the researcher to break the ice with participants to create a more ‘trusting’ environment for the interview. Furthermore, informal conversations following formal interviews served to verify impressions as well as

establishing contacts with gatekeepers to operationalise the snowball sampling technique (see section 4.3.2).

Semi-structured Interviews. The central data source for this study was semi-structured interviews. A semi-structure interview protocol (see Appendix D for an example of the interview protocol) was used, because during such an interview approach the researcher is able to retain a relatively neutral position within the data generation process (Blaikie, 2000). The interview protocol, and hence fieldwork, is informed by theoretical considerations such as the nature of civil society or civil society development in Russia (see chapter 2 and 3), to ensure that the data generated is relevant for the subject of this study (Alvesson & Kärreman, 2007). As the study aims to establish the participant's perception and understanding of their reality, open and interpreting questions characterised the interview protocol (see Appendix D). The interview protocol also contained probing questions to facilitate a "reliable framework for cross-case analysis" (Perry, 1998, p. 792).

Following Cook and Vinogradova (2006), the interview protocol focuses on four specific organisational aspects as well as three theoretical considerations relevant to this thesis. The organisational aspects under consideration focused firstly on the background of TSOs, hence their objectives, activities and staff/members as well as funding and the history of the organisations (Cook & Vinogradova, 2006). Second, relationships with the public were a feature of the interview protocol (Cook & Vinogradova, 2006). Third, the interview protocol inquires about the relationship and interactions with the state, state authorities and institutions (Cook & Vinogradova, 2006). Fourth, the protocol also enables participants to illustrate the 'effectiveness' of their organisations, be it in influencing policy, increasing membership, or access to funding sources (Cook & Vinogradova, 2006). Theoretically, the interview protocol encouraged interviewees to elaborate on issues with regard to the legislative changes which have taken place (see chapter 3 for a discussion on the proposition of legislative change and

its impact on TSOs and chapter 5), the issues of ‘third sectorisation’ of Russian civil society (i.e. the change of TSOs from advocates of society to service providers), the potential for crowding-out of the state by TSOs (see chapter 2 and chapter 6), and aspects surrounding the role of marionette organisations (see chapter 3 and chapter 7). In so doing, the interview protocol allowed the generation of data to examine the research objectives of this thesis (see section 4.1). The following section provides a detailed overview of participating organisations in order to illustrate the cases which provided the basis for analysis.

4.3.4 Case descriptions

Adhering to Eisenhardt (1989) and Yin (2003) in this section, the chapter details the cases that have formed the basis for analysis. This enabled the study to outline the commonalities and differences across organisations and regions, and forms the basis for cross-case analysis (Eisenhardt, 1989). The majority of organisations participating in this study were formed after the collapse of the communist regime. However, some participating organisations evolved out of the social organisations established by the Soviet regime (see chapter 3.2). A full list of participating organisations is available in appendix A, and full list of respondents is presented in appendix E (both of these lists are anonymised). The following sections offer descriptions of the various organisations within the three different regional research sites.

4.3.4.1 TSOs in Samara region

During the Soviet period, Samara was known as Kuibyshev and played an important role in Soviet manufacturing, specifically in the automotive and aerospace industries. Following relatively higher levels of foreign investment in the transition era, the Samara region has evolved into an area of relative prosperity (Hanson, 1997). Similar to other regions, and as illustrated in chapter three, TSOs in this area were classified into either grass-roots organisations, policy/advocacy organisations or marionette organisations (Crotty, 2003; 2006; 2009). For this study, 24 senior representatives of TSOs were interviewed, most of whom

were located in Samara city, the capital of the Samara region. Ten of these organisations were situated within the educational sector, and twelve in the health area (see Appendix E.1). Two organisations were characterised as other types, and refer to TSOs in Samara which consider themselves as ‘funding’ and ‘building’ civil society (see Appendix E.1). These organisations were interviewed for two reasons: first they were able to provide a good starting point for snowballing (see section 4.3.2.1), and second, these organisations’ insights into the activities of other TSOs frequently enriched the picture and added depth to the understanding of other TSOs, and thus civil society in Samara.

The majority of organisations in the health category (see Appendix E.1) emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and most of them were formed in the early 2000s (see Appendix A). These organisations were mainly membership based and frequently did not have paid staff. In this study, the majority of health TSOs engage in either disability related issues or issues related to substance abuse. The former, specifically TSOs founded following the Soviet Union, developed out of parental initiatives. An exception is Org16Sam (see Appendix A), which was founded a group of wheelchair users. TSOs which engage in issues relating to substance abuse, are mainly a result of the engagement of medical ‘professionals’. From the organisations participating in Samara, Org14Sam was an exception in the health area, because it was founded by as a self-help group of people suffering from HIV/AIDS. Only after this group formalised itself into a legally recognised organisation did ‘professionals’ such as social workers and lawyers enter the organisation. In the health category, there are also TSOs which are successor organisations to past Soviet civil society organisations (see chapter 3). These include Org15Sam, Org17Sam and Org24Sam, which are all local chapters of organisations that are active nationwide. Despite its focus on helping children (see Appendix A), the local chapter of Org24Sam has to be understood as a health TSO, as its key activity consists of providing humanitarian and medical aid to children’s homes. In contrast to the majority of post Soviet TSOs, these organisations have good office facilities resembling

bureaucratised/professionalised non-profit organisations (Mercer, 2002). Furthermore, these organisations have closer relations with state authorities, displayed in photos with local politicians or material textual evidence of cooperation with authorities on specific projects.

TSOs engaging in educational activities, of which as, outlined above, there were ten amongst the participating organisations in Samara, reflect a similar pattern to the group of health TSOs. The majority of educational TSOs were also formed after the Soviet Union. The Org05Sam was the only organisation that understands itself as a successor to a Soviet era social organisation, namely the Soviet period youth organisation (see chapter 3). Similar to the health organisations participating in this study, the majority of TSOs were located within the vicinity of the city of Samara. However, in order to recruit participating organisations that could be characterised as within the educational field, some flexibility in the understanding of ‘educational activities’ was required. Thus, organisations attributed to the educational sector engage in a wider range of activities than health TSOs. The activities of educational TSOs range from providing additional language training to socially disadvantaged children, to engagement with adolescents and children in an educational setting focusing on, for example, developing volunteerism or providing citizenship education. Org06Sam (see Appendix A) was the only organisation that despite understanding itself as a health organisation also engaged directly in educational activities. Overall, both the educational and health TSO groups of participating organisations reflect a broad cross-section of TSOs in the Russian context.

4.3.4.2 TSOs in Perm region

Similar to Samara during the Soviet period, Perm was a centre for industry and manufacturing with a focus on the production of chemicals, aviation, and the extraction of natural resources (mainly oil and potash). In the transition period, the privatisation process resulted in the private, mainly Russian ownership of most parts of the oil extraction and refining industry in

Perm. During most of the Soviet period, Perm was a closed city, meaning that no foreigners were allowed to enter, and even Russians needed special permits to leave the city. However, following the opening of the city in the Soviet period, there was increased interest, particularly from the UK, which led to the Oxford-Perm Fund. This collaboration organised cultural exchanges, but most relevantly for this study, also commissioned seminars, work shadowing, and ‘master-classes’ for TSO leaders in order to stimulate civil society development. In particular, during informal conversations respondents frequently referred back to these ‘civil society building’ activities.

Fieldwork in Perm followed the fieldwork period in Samara. A reflective period preceded data collection in Perm. The approach to recruitment and access to TSOs was similar to that taken in Samara (see section 4.3.2.1). Due to the similarity of Samara and Perm in terms of population, 23 TSOs were interviewed, all of which were located in Perm, the capital of Perm District (*Permsky Krai*, see Appendix E.2). Similar to Samara, the majority of participating organisations can be characterised as active within the health area focusing on substance abuse issues and disability. Apart from Org05Per, Org08Per, and Org23Per - again local chapters of disability organisations active Russia wide (see Appendix A), disability TSOs developed post ante the Soviet Union. In contrast to Samara, where there were several TSOs focusing on specific ‘disorders’, such as Down Syndrome or autism, in Perm there was a lack of such specialist health TSOs. Further, and different from Samara, the researcher was unable to locate TSOs, which solely focus on HIV/AIDS issues. However, organisations such as the Org21Per, which dealt with drug related issues such as rehabilitation, were also involved in the HIV/AIDS thematic. Nevertheless, this was generally not their main objective.

In comparison with Samara, out of the 23 TSOs in Perm only five can be characterised as being active in the educational sector. The key issue for this weak representation was that despite extensive use of snowballing and active help from the local University, the researcher

was unable to find educational TSOs. This can be explained by a two factors. First some of the organisations found by the researcher or the University contact could not be located. Second the population of educational TSOs seemed generally weak. However, similar to Samara, in Perm several organisations characterised in the health area, due to their specific client group, engaged in extensive educational activities, such as Org07Per, which provided skills training for the disabled. In contrast to Samara, in Perm it was more difficult to separate organisations into either the educational or health category. Many organisations portray themselves as primarily ‘rights’ protecting in nature (see chapter 6 for a discussion of advocacy amongst TSOs within this study).

Another aspect that differs between TSOs in Samara and Perm was that more organisations in Perm highlight the receipt of regular income from a wide variety of different sources (see chapter 6 for an examination of funding provision). Therefore, this might create an impression that overall TSOs in Perm are more ‘professional’ or better-resourced, potentially resulting in specific bias when conducting analysis (see chapter 8 for a discussion of specific limitations and how they were addressed). However, it also reflects the potential lack of grass roots type organisations, which in itself is of analytical importance (see chapter 8).

4.3.4.3 TSOs in Sverdlovsk region

Yekaterinburg (formally Sverdlovsk) served as an industrial and administrative centre and the door to Siberia in the Soviet period. During the transition period, Yekaterinburg became the trading centre and transportation hub between European and Asiatic Russia. Trade in precious materials such as gold and fur brought relative prosperity and development. However, similar to Samara and Perm, these developments have also led to social issues which fall into the categories which TSOs within this study ought to address (see chapter 2 for a discussion of normative assumptions about the activities TSOs ‘should-be’ doing, and their relevance to this study). Similar to Perm and Samara, the majority of organisations participating in this

study were within the vicinity of Yekaterinburg, the capital of the Sverdlovsk Region (see Appendix E.3 for a list of all respondents). Amongst all three case cities, Yekaterinburg is the biggest and economically most developed city. Reflecting the larger size of Yekaterinburg, 34 organisations participated in this study (see Appendix E.3), 22 of which are active within the health area and nine organisations which can be characterised as being active within the educational area. The fewer participating organisations which can be characterised as educational in both Perm and Yekaterinburg does reflect the difficulty the researcher had in both localities in locating, accessing, and subsequently recruiting such organisations for this study (see section 4.5 on aspects of quality and limitations of this study). Similar to Perm and Samara, educational TSOs in Yekaterinburg also focused on children and adolescents. Only the organisation Org29Yek (see Appendix A) engaged in educational services targeted at adults, for example Yoga classes.

Similar to Samara and Perm, health TSOs consisted of organisations which developed from past Soviet social organisations (for example Org11Yek or Org26Yek), as well as organisations founded post ante the Soviet Union, in particular in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Similar to Perm but different from Samara, there was a lack of ‘disorder’ specific TSOs (see section 4.3.4.2). However, mirroring the other regions, the group of health TSOs focusing on disability issues were dominated by organisations dealing with movement disabilities such as Org03Yek. With regard to health TSOs focusing on medical issues, Yekaterinburg was more similar to Perm in the fact that the majority of the organisations aimed to deal with issues of substance abuse. However, similar to Org14Sam in Samara, the organisation Org05Yek focused specifically on the HIV/AIDS problem. Therefore, the three regions reflect a similar composition of health TSOs.

4.3.4.4 Education and health TSOs

Thus far this chapter has highlighted the ‘geographical’ cases, describing the regional context and specificities of the make-up of participating organisations in each region. Due to the sometimes significant differences across Russia’s regions (Tragakes & Lessof, 2003), such considerations are important. Equally, an overview of the communalities and characteristics of educational and health TSOs are important. These are illustrated in this section. Out of the 80 organisations which participated in this study, 48 are active in the health area and only 24 can be allocated to the educational sector (see Appendix E.1 – E.3). As mentioned above, this primarily reflects the difficulty in locating the educational organisations. Eight organisations in the study can be classified as other types, which include human rights organisations, civil society support organisations, and local foundations. However, all of these have either educational activities or activities related to health issues (see Appendix E.1 – E.3). Therefore, all organisations in this study are either directly or indirectly located in the area of health and education, which is the focus of this thesis.

The majority of health organisations in this study work in the field of disability, engaging in activities from protecting rights to running and managing large disability workshops. The majority of these TSOs focus on physical disabilities, in particular on people in wheelchairs. Only a few organisations across the participating TSOs engage with more challenging disabilities such as autism or Down’s Syndrome. Such organisations typically emerged from parental initiatives and remain within such an ‘initiative grass roots’ setting (see Appendix A for a list and description of all TSOs participating in this study). The other major group of health TSOs in this study are active within the HIV/AIDS problem and/or drug related issues. In general, such organisations are larger and better resourced, and only a few of such health TSOs can be characterised as grass roots type organisations.

Educational TSOs have a larger variety of activities they engage in, such as additional language education, running of museums, or providing citizen education. Further, the majority of such organisations also engage in various other activities, such as providing after-school activities or activities on weekends to children with the aim to fostering volunteerism. As illustrated above, locating such TSOs has been more difficult, which suggests that there are fewer organisations engaging in such activities. The majority of such organisations can be classed as ‘youth and children’, and range from the successor organisations of the Soviet Komsomol, to student organised volunteering associations. The nature of the organisations described thus far clearly demonstrates that the majority of participating organisations will help this thesis to address the void within the literature and our understanding of health and educational TSOs in Russia. Following the description of the case and the data collection, the subsequent section presents the way this data has been analysed.

4.4 Research method – data analysis

As illustrated above, this research looks at the emergence and manifestation of managed civil society arrangements in Russia. Taking on board Hedlund’s (2008) insights into cultural continuity, as well as Crotty’s (2006) observation of a constricted civil society space, the study examines various aspects of TSOs’ activity to elaborate on potential intended and unintended consequences for future development. In theoretical terms, this research looks at the relevance of traditional civil society thinking (see chapter 2), with regard to how respondents understand their organisations and the environment in which they operate, in the context of the Russian Federation. An analytical category that enables us to capture this social construction of life and their world is that of discursive aspects (Silverman, 2001). In its original understanding, discourse analysis takes into account the environment of respondents and is therefore an analysis of what people do (Potter, 1996), which is critical for being able to make inferences about civil-society state relations and arrangements. The semi-structured interview protocol allows for capturing the narratives and discourse constructed by each

participant. It reflects the respondents' description of reality and the participants' subjective perception of it, which is critical for understanding and analysing the macro-discourses to which participant subscribed. This in turn illustrates the subjectively perceived 'state/situation' of civil society that guides the decisions of individuals (Simon, 1955). In order to enable the analytical process to achieve these objects, the analysis uses several units of analysis.

4.4.1 Units of analysis

This section illustrates the interrelated units of analysis: a) individual respondents' accounts; b) geographical location; c) textual artefacts.

The first unit of analysis is the individual respondents' accounts reflecting on their organisations, activities, and civil society developments. It refers to the perception, narrative, and understanding that respondents aim to portray in their response to the interview questions. While these accounts might elaborate on experiences not associated with the organisation, or illustrating aspects more positively, this unit of analysis only refers to accounts that have an opportunity to highlight organisational issues and issues regarding civil society.

The second unit of analysis is geographical location. Geographical location refers to the region in which organisations are located as well as the 'sector' to which they can be assigned. This provides a distinct unit of analysis, as it allows for analytically separating organisations and constructing the specific impressions within a geographical location. This enables comparison across geographical locations and activities, thus providing a unique insight, as well as conclusions that are more representative.

The third unit of analysis is textual artefacts. Textual artefacts are not the individual accounts referred to above, but are made up of naturally occurring data sources such as textual

publications, internet pages, brochures or flyers. Generally textual artefacts are considered as background material, however this study follows Silverman's (2001) recommendations and regards them as part of the social interactions. The materials provide additional information about activities, social relations, potential funding sources, and the 'image' that organisations aim to create. The latter is of particular importance, as it is potentially indicative of managed civil society arrangements based on how organisations want to be seen by the state. The insights emerging from this unit of analysis also assist with triangulation during the analysis process.

4.4.2 Analytical method

In line with the descriptive empirical approach outlined above (see section 4.2), and reflective of the social-interpretative approach (Burrell & Morgan, 1979) of this study, the analytical approach was to transcribe interviews, code the resulting data into themes, and then draw conclusions from these themes regarding Russian civil society. This section will elaborate in more detail on these aspects. As is typical for qualitative research, the analytical process of this study went through two analytical stages (Miles & Huberman, 1994; Strauss & Corbin, 1998); coding and interpretation. The data analysis is informed by the proposition of the emergence of a managed variant of civil society and the three research objectives (see section 4.1).

4.4.2.1 Coding phase

Following the data collection process (see section 4.3), the interviews were transcribed and translated *in situ*. Following this process, coding began, which is central to case research, and provided the basis for further analytical work (Eisenhardt, 1989; Miles & Huberman, 1994). As illustrated above, a thematic or template approach to coding was operationalised (King, 1998). This is most appropriate in a setting where data is studied for common themes (King, 1998) as set out by the three research objectives. However, this approach allows less *in vivo*

coding and categorising than other qualitative coding and analysis methods (King, 1998). Despite, the research objectives providing predetermined key themes (Bryman & Bell, 2003), *in vivo* coding, thus the emergence of codes from the data, is still possible within the premise of these themes (King, 1998). This study's coding focuses on three themes emerging from the literature, which needed clarification in order to explore potential managed civil society arrangements: legislative changes, the retreat of the state and TSOs acting as service providers, and the characteristics of a managed civil society and the limits of the Russian state's ability to mould civil society in this way.

This coding process facilitates the interpretation process (King, 1998), and consequently the coding process becomes part of the analytical process of this study. Another important aspect of thematic coding is the need to organise emerging *in vivo* codes hierarchically (King, 1998). Reflecting grounded theory's axial coding (Bryman, 2001), this means that codes are clustered together in order to produce higher categories or subthemes within specific themes (King, 1998). It is these subthemes that create a structure which facilitated the presentation of the data in the subsequent chapters (see chapter 5, 6, and 7). Following Bryman (2001) the interview data was coded to generate three levels. The first level established the preference of the respondent, enabling the study to gain an insight into the 'category of organisation' (see case descriptions in section 4.3.1), potential 'group' allegiances, and focused on developing new *in vivo* codes. The second level focused on the content of the respondent (Bryman, 2001) which illustrated the narratives respondents' created, the discourses they contributed and ascribed too, as well as the opinions, ideas, and hence constructed reality of these respondents. This stage of coding also produced new *in vivo* codes (a list of codes and related coding hierarchy after 20 interviews is available in Appendix F.1). Reflecting grounded theories selective coding, the third level of coding related the information to the broad analytic themes (Bryman, 2001) in order to determine core categories to guide the empirical story presented in chapters five, six and seven. Furthermore, parallel coding of segments of

interview data, i.e. the classifying of segments into two or more codes was also practised (King, 1998).

The coding scheme (see Appendix F.1) was further refined and developed and, as illustrated, provides a structure for the presentation of the data. In order to develop the codes and categories, the coding process consisted of reflective periods in which the researcher consulted the literature as well as already coded interviews. Over the course of reflective thinking and discussions with field experts, coding categories were re-classified into different themes. The emerging categories were, in consultation with the supervisor team, the literature, and content of the interview at hand, subordinated to the three key themes. The legislative changes theme and its coding categories provides the basis for chapter five answering the research question of how legislative changes have impacted TSOs in this study. Operationalising Eisenhardt's (1991) proposition of comparative logics the researcher turned to the literature on non-profit management, and the American tradition of third sector organisations, which emerged from traditional forms of understanding civil society (see chapter 2 and chapter 6) in elaborating the categories for the 'TSOs as service providers theme'. This facilitated the creation of higher category codes within the 'TSOs as service providers theme', and enabled a comparative approach in the interpretation phase of the analytical process. The 'limits of the Russian state' theme provides the basis for chapter seven, pulling together the categories that enable elaboration on the ability of the state to mould civil society and incentives in place for TSOs to subordinate themselves to the state.

To assist with managing the rich dataset during the coding process, the researcher used the computer assisted programme for qualitative research NVIVO 8, as well as MS Excel spreadsheets. NVIVO 8 was primarily used to group transcribed accounts geographically as well as tracking changes to the coding framework. Thus this software was only an aid to the organisation of empirical material, however it provided the researcher with an invaluable 'one

stop-shop' overview of all the data, an effective way of managing this data. Coding itself was conducted within MS Word, where passages were coded and then copied and pasted into an Excel spreadsheet, organised in accordance with the coding framework, to have an overview over all relevant passages.

4.4.2.2 Interpretation phase

The interpretation phase refers to the process of drawing inference from the empirical data (Symon & Cassell, 1998). The social-constructivist perspective adopted in this thesis assumes that the researcher is not neutral in the generation of the data, and therefore the phenomena which are under scrutiny (Mir & Watson, 2000). The interpretation of results needs to account for this and therefore needs to draw on existing theory (Mir & Watson, 2000). This interpretation and inference process is the second phase of the analysis within this study and this section illustrates the various methodological techniques used in this interpretation process.

The guiding principle of the interpretation process was to 'inference to the best explanation', which requires the researcher to select the theoretical best fitting explanation (Ketokivi & Mantere, 2010). The guiding principles in this process are interestingness, usefulness and simplicity, and conservativeness (Ketokivi & Mantere, 2010). This process relied on the contextualisation of the coded material. However, the process of coding reduces material and thus de-contextualised empirical data (Bryman, 2001). By the means of using the researcher's research diary, empirical contextual issues remained in consideration throughout the interpretation process. Throughout the empirical chapters of this study (chapters 5, 6, and 7), such empirical contextualisation (Ketokivi & Mantere, 2010) was supplemented by theoretical contextualisation, meaning that theory (see chapters 2 and 3) was used to "justify particular explanations" (Ketokivi & Mantere, 2010, p. 324). In particular, the considerations illustrated in chapter three are important as they illustrate the contextual idiosyncrasies.

According to Sklar (1975), such theoretical contextualisation is a widely accepted approach to consolidate and hence extend theoretical discourse as is done in this thesis. Similar to the refinement of the coding categories, the process of interpretation also incorporated reflective phases (Alvesson, 2003).

In addition to the theoretical contextualisation, the interpretation process was guided by the question: If a respondent said this, what does this suggest about their experience of the world? An appropriate way to examine data in such a particular way is the use of discourse analysis. Discourse analysis helps to understand the broader discourses that are reflected within the response of the respondent (Potter, 1996). It can be used on both interviews and other text (Silverman, 2001), the former constituting the main data source used within this study. Discourse analysis tends to operationalise the analytical concepts of interpretative repertoires, stakes, and scripts. Interpretive repertoires help to identify the broader discourse reflected in the respondents' narrative (Silverman, 2001), thus the story that respondents tell. In an analytical sense, this ensured that the researcher looked for similarities within the individual accounts of respondents. However, both Potter (1996) and Silverman (2001) criticise institutional repertoires as too broad and only relevant in well established settings. As chapter two highlights, generally civil society is characterised as a somewhat fuzzy concept (Ehrenberg, 1999). Taking into account these considerations and Silverman's (2001) recommendation, discourse analysis in this thesis focuses on the concepts of stakes and scripts. Insights from operationalising these two constructs then assist in creating the repertoire of respondents (Silverman, 2001).

The first concept is that of stakes. Considering stakes in the analytical and interpretation process enabled the incorporation of the language respondents. Stakes represent the choice of words or sentences, which aims to "discount the significance of an action" (Silverman, 2001, p. 183). Effectively it provided an insight into the positionality of the respondent with regards

to the broader discourse uncovered in the analysis process. Following is an excerpt from the interview with Respondent 16 from Org17Sam (see Appendix A and E.1), with language signifying a 'stake' in bold.

Researcher

What is your opinion of the Public Chamber?

Respondent 16

I have heard of it. But we are not part of it. I think that if we were more active than we would be part of the Public Chamber. But **I do not really believe in the Public Chamber** anyway.

Researcher

Why do not you believe in it?

Respondent 16

I do not know, probably because I do not believe that they [people in the Public Chamber] will listen to me there. On the whole I am **sceptical about the chamber**. I personally think that a lot is built on personal relationships. I am afraid that if you are **too active**, then someone might not like it, which **would mean difficulties**. So it's **better not to be in the Public Chamber**. On the other hand, I have acquaintances in the administration that could help us, if we need help.

In this excerpt Respondent 16 displays his opposition to the Public Chamber and discounts this institution as creating potential difficulties for his organisation. Thus the concept of stakes helped the researcher to determine, for example, whether respondents were for or against particular aspects. The insight gained by considering stakes facilitated the process of inference and interpretation in establishing explanations.

The second concept is that of scripts. Scripts, similar to stakes, also focus on the language and content of the account of respondents. Respondents use scripts to

“invoke the routing character [of] events in order to imply that they are features of some general pattern” (Silverman, 2001, p. 184).

Following is an example of a script from an interview in Perm (interview with Respondent 28 from Org04Per).

Researcher

You mentioned earlier that you cooperate with the department of sport...

Respondent 28

Yes, yes our organisation is under the patronage of it [the department of sport]. We are a separate organisation, a non-commercial organisation [common term used for TSO], but we, with the department of sport, it is not called department but agency. With them we sign a contract about cooperation each year. This contract enables the agency [the department of sport] to give us funds [for activities].

In this instance Respondent 28 implies that his organisation's regular contract with the state is something replicated across the whole third sector. However, as will be illustrated in chapter six, this is not the case. Consequently by using scripts, respondents construct their narrative to provide moral acceptance for their actions, (Silverman, 2001) indicating the 'institutionalisation' of the observed developments reflected in the various discourses. The combination of the use of these concepts during the coding process helped to analyse the underlying issues, motives, and beliefs that influence the answers of respondents, and therefore reflect their reality. Further, during the coding process the application of these techniques facilitated coding itself. Textual artefact served to triangulate the responses, as

well as assisted in interpreting stakes and scripts. During most parts of this discourse-analytic process, the researcher worked on the transcribed and translated accounts. However, as part of the analytical process, the researcher went back and listened to the recorded data during analysis (Silverman, 2001).

Following these analytical considerations, short geographical case descriptions around the three themes were produced (Eisenhardt, 1989). These were considered as standalone cases in order to gain an insight into any potential regional specific results that needed consideration. The next step was to systematically search for issues within each single theme that reoccurred across each geographical region as well as sector. This way, critical constructs and patterns in the data were determined (Eisenhardt, 1991), which informed the interpretation and explanation presented in chapters five, six, and seven. As illustrated above, using theory and quotations from the interviews the interpretative conclusions are justified. The interpretation phase combined the analytical considerations of the coding process with more fine-grained considerations of the language used by respondents (i.e. discourse analytical considerations). This provided the basis to look at differences and similarities (in terms of content), as well as sub-groupings (in terms of TSOs) within the data, providing in-depth and nuanced insights into the research questions.

4.5 Quality of research

Weick (1989) highlights that all studies, this one included, have limitations. To ensure that potential limitations are addressed, demonstrating the study's rigour and quality is important. A discussion of the specific limitations of this study, including that of methodological ones can be found in chapter eight. This section aims to outline the rigour of this study to facilitate the understanding of the reasoning process, which is otherwise difficult to demonstrate (Lipton, 2004; Kuhn, 1996). This chapter has thus far illustrated the methodological approach and techniques used. Nevertheless, in demonstrating the quality of this study, this section

strengthens the validity and reliability of the research informing this thesis. However, as concepts of a positivistic research paradigm, reliability and validity are considered inappropriate for the evaluation of qualitative methods (Symon & Cassell, 1998) as operationalised in this study. Guba and Lincoln (1985) suggest that instead qualitative research needs to be evaluated against its own set of criteria. They suggest four specific categories, which make up the trustworthiness of qualitative research: credibility, transferability, dependability, and conformability. These concepts and their relation to the research are now discussed in turn. An explicit discussion of these criteria and how the research adheres to them is pivotal to illustrate the quality of this study (Cepeda & Martin, 2005).

Credibility in qualitative research can be established by considering the match of the respondent's account of a phenomenon to the researcher's representation of the same phenomenon. In this study, this was ensured in the following five ways. First, the analysis examined the respondents' views on various aspects of civil society. In case of ambiguities, during interviews the researcher asked the participant to clarify using prompts which were not part of the interview protocol such as 'What do you mean?' This way, meaning and clarification was provided by respondents and did not depend on the inference of the researcher. Communalities across accounts indicated similar perspectives and thus groupings, whereas diverging opinions highlighted opposing understandings. Second, collected and analysed interview data was triangulated with data from other sources such as textual artefacts. Furthermore, the constant use of theoretical contextualisation provided a consistent basis to match the various analytical patterns (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Third, reflective periods during data collection and analysis shaped the researcher's understanding of the study context and content (Alvesson & Sköldbberg, 2000; Ketokivi & Mantere, 2010). Fourth, the recordings of interviews enabled the transcription of the original conversation. Translations of transcripts were verified with Russian native speakers as well as experts in the field. Fifth,

findings were verified with experts in the field via presentations and discussions at relevant conferences. In turn this enabled the conformation and extension of proposed interpretations.

Transferability refers to the contextualisation of the findings and their potential transferability to other contexts. Thus, this refers to the contextual uniqueness and generalisation to theoretical propositions. In this study, transferability was ensured by keeping a research diary during the data collection period recoding events and instances. This diary was updated regularly and formed the basis for a thick case description for analysis. Further, the analytical inductive approach meant a ‘back-and-forward’ consideration of theory and data as part of theoretical contextualisation during the analytical process.

Dependability is concerned with the consistency of the empirical material and its explanation. Vital to ensuring dependability is the traceability of theories, data, and questions underlying interpretation over the course of the research process. This study ensures dependability in two ways. First, during the data collection process, interview protocols, transcripts, and observations were documented and discussed with the researcher’s supervisory team to determine the continuous course of action. Second, during the data analysis phase, an analysis diary kept track of analytical choices made. To assess theoretical inferences, initial findings and analytical developments were discussed with the researcher’s supervisory team.

Confirmability refers to the fact that the findings can be confirmed by the data itself, rather than reflecting the bias which is embedded in the researcher’s interpretations. In order to do so, the research needs to illustrate how conclusions, interpretations, and recommendations are traced back to the data. Reflecting best practice in qualitative analysis (Silverman, 2001), the analytical process was made up of deductive as well as inductive inference periods. The theoretical considerations provided the key themes for the analytic process in a deductive

manner. In addition, confirmability was also ensured by extensive *in vivo* coding throughout the refinement of the coding scheme assisting with inductive inference.

4.6 Summary to chapter 4

Chapter 4 illustrated the research methodology operationalised, defended, and rationalised its selection. In order to do so, the chapter started by outlining the ontological and epistemological perspective guiding data generation, collection, and analysis. A qualitative approach was deemed most appropriate because it allowed the researcher to look beyond and beneath currently held knowledge, as well as gain an in-depth and nuanced view of how civil society in Russia is developing, and thus answering the research question addressed. The chapter shows that qualitative methods are useful for an environment such as Russia due to the dynamics that make this context so unique. As part of illustrating the methodology, the chapter specifically presented the selection of cases, the collection of data, and the analytical methods in use in this study. The study adopted a multiple case study investigating health and educational TSOs in three Russian regions, addressing specific gaps in our understanding outlined in chapter three. Each of the cases was described to provide additional contextual information. For the cases, data was collected and generated in two ways. On the one hand, naturally occurring data was collected, which included documents and observations. On the other hand, researcher provoked data was generated via interviews with respondents of TSOs. The data analysis process focused on three analytical units; textual interview accounts, geographical location and textual artefacts. This process consisted of two phases. In the coding phase, data was coded into themes informed by the literature and research objectives (see chapters 1, 2 and 3 as well as section 4.1). In the interpretation phase, theoretical contextualisation established the best explanation of the finding. As in all qualitative research, these phases took place in parallel to each other. The quality of research was evaluated using Guba and Lincoln's (1985) framework. Overall, this chapter has illustrated the appropriability of the methodology operationalised to answer the research question of how

managed civil society manifests itself in the context of the Russian Federation (see section 4.1). Now that the method has been presented, this thesis will embark on presenting the empirical section of the study. These will illustrate the research objectives presented at the beginning of this chapter, and will begin with objective one (see chapter 1 and section 4.1) investigating the impact of the NGO law on the day-to-day workings of TSOs in Russia in chapter five.

CHAPTER 5: The Effects of the 2006 NGO Law

5.1 Introduction

The previous chapters have outlined the theoretical frameworks operationalised within this thesis (chapter 2), the development and present-day realities of Russian civil society (chapter 3) as well as the research design of this study (chapter 4). This chapter builds on these considerations to present the empirical findings of this study. Specifically this chapter investigates objective one of this thesis namely *assessing the impact of the legislative changes on the day-to-day workings of TSOs in Russia* (see chapter 1.1.2 and chapter 4.1). In doing so it elaborates whether the legislative framework is a legally mandated attempt to manage civil society. With regards to the research question of how managed civil society manifests itself in Russia, examining legislative changes outlines the legislative facet of the state's agenda to manage civil society. In particular, this chapter focuses on the impact of legislative changes, also known as the 2006 NGO law. As illustrated in chapter three the NGO law significantly shapes the legal environment of TSOs. Chapter three demonstrates that the 2006 NGO law aims to rein in TSO activity and therefore in assessing its impacts this chapter will be able to provide one facet of how managed civil society manifest itself on the context of the Russian Federation. In order to do so this chapter answers the following two interrelated questions:

How does the NGO law impact the day-to-day workings of TSOs?

How do respondents portray the NGO law and its effects on TSOs?

Addressing these two questions this chapter presents its findings in two sections. The first section examines the respondent's understanding of the NGO law presenting findings on the effects of registration and reporting requirements. This section presents and analyses the various discourses that respondents construct to explain and rationalise the impact these

requirements have on TSOs. The second section discusses these findings in light of the literature reviewed in chapters two and three and the proposition of the NGO law representing a legally mandated attempt to manage civil society arrangements.

5.2 The impact of the 2006 NGO law

The objective of this section is to present the empirical evidence for the first theme established in the analysis process (see chapter 4.4.2.2 and Appendix F.2). In examining the impacts of the 2006 NGO law (see chapter 3.4) the primary focus is to outline the potential changes to the day-to-day activities which have come as a result of the law. Chapter three highlights the law's restrictive nature, which is said to lead to the closing down of TSOs, or at the very least mean that the majority of organisations remain unregistered and informal (Mendelson & Gerber, 2007). Consequently, such TSOs would be deprived of access to resources, domestic or foreign, which would reduce their ability to hold the state to account (Crotty, 2009). Even though informal groups and organisations are vital to civil society (Putnam, 1995), well developed formalised and registered TSOs, which are recognised by the state and able to interact with it are equally important for the democratisation potential of civil society (Taylor, 2006). The law's restrictive nature is based on the tight regulation of four specific aspects which affect TSOs. Firstly, the NGO law requires all TSOs to complete new registration documents, detailing personal information of each member and founder. Secondly, TSOs must report all donations, specifically foreign ones, and outline how these resources have been spent (Maxwell, 2006). Thirdly, the law only allows domiciles of the Russian Federation to establish and participate in TSOs. Fourthly, the NGO law extends the supervisory powers of the state enabling it to see all TSO's documentation, such as internal memoranda, financial statements as well as attendance at organisational meetings, including private policy meetings and campaigning activities (Maxwell, 2006). Not adhering to any of these requirements allows state authorities to shut down and liquidate TSOs. Therefore, and

as highlighted in chapter three, the 2006 NGO law is criticised for leading to the closure of TSOs as well as the end of autonomous civil society space (Maxwell, 2006).

Reflecting earlier anecdotal evidence (Vinogradov, 2006), and highlighted in appendix A, the majority of TSOs participating in this study remained registered. These superficial findings are counterintuitive in particular given the criticism levied against the NGO law (see chapter 3.4). Therefore, illustrating the perceptions of respondents of the NGO law needs further examination. Remaining on the register of non-commercial organisations, that is adhering to the legislative requirements of the NGO law, reflects a reoccurring discourse amongst respondents outlining the importance of being on said register. Membership on this ‘register’ is important so TSOs ‘can participate in grants’ (Respondent 4, Org04Sam, Samara) and for survival as otherwise ‘you will not be able to exist’ (Respondent 66, Org17Yek, Yekaterinburg). Despite the importance of remaining registered, TSOs portray the impact of the NGO law in different ways and in doing so constitute three different groups. These groups can each be characterised according to the amount of staff or the amount of members of TSOs, their organisational type (see chapter 3) and whether TSOs portray themselves as being able to win grant funding from the Federal centre or only from the municipal level. The perception and portrayal of the law of each of these groups are described in turn.

5.2.1 ‘Professionalising’ TSOs

The first group that can be established are organisations that in various ways highlight the NGO law as ‘professionalising’ their organisation. In effect, this discourse argues that the NGO law leads to improved effectiveness of TSOs through the establishment of professional structures and ways of operating as organisations. This group, as summarised in table 5.1, consists of 15 organisations. On average TSOs which belong to this group are ‘older’, with the majority being founded in the late 1990s or during the Soviet period. Furthermore, they are also larger in size, most of them state having more than 6 staff members or highlight that

they have a large membership base. This group of organisations encompasses both marionette organisations (see chapter 3.4.1) as well as organisations which are best classified as “policy or advocacy organisations” (Crotty, 2009, p. 90). In addition, many of these organisations describe themselves as having received foreign donations and having the ability to secure Federal grants.

Number	Organisational Code	Registered	Date, Membership/Staff (current)
1	Org01Sam	YES	1991, 8 S
2	Org07Sam	YES	2003, ca. 20 M
3	Org15Sam	YES	2005 (1988), 2 S
4	Org16Sam	YES	1998, 23 S
5	Org04Per	YES	1995, 6 S
6	Org08Per	YES	1926, 22 S
7	Org22Per	YES	1998, 3 S
8	Org23Per	YES	1988, ca. 15 S
9	Org04Yek	YES	2000, 5 S
10	Org15Yek	YES	1999, 22 S
11	Org16Yek	YES	1995, 2 S
12	Org26Yek	YES	1988, 5 S
13	Org27Yek	YES	1961, 4 S
14	Org29Yek	YES	1998, ca. 40 S
15	Org32Yek	YES	2005, ca. 20 S

Table 5.1: TSOs portraying the NGO law as professionalising

In order to portray the ‘professionalization’ discourse this section is divided into four sub-sections. First, it outlines how respondents in this group portray the effect of registration requirements. The second sub-section elaborates on references made to funding issues when discussing the NGO law. The third section examines the respondents perception of the effects of government supervision. The fourth sub-section is concerned with investigating the adjustments respondents highlight their organisations made in response to the NGO law.

5.2.1.1 Registration requirements

As illustrated above the registration requirements are characterised as providing the state with the ability to bar TSOs from formally operating (Maxwell, 2006). Contrary to this, TSOs in this group depict the NGO law as a catalyst for improving the way organisations operate, portraying themselves as having achieved the necessary level of ‘professionalism’ to pass registration requirements. Consequently, the discourse constructed by this group of TSOs highlights that they registered ‘without problems’ (Respondent 15, Org16Sam, Samara). Extending this assessment of no problems in the registration process is the portrayal that the law had ‘little impact on the activities and structures of our TSO’ (Respondent 65, Org16Yek, Yekaterinburg) and constitutes an important process in ‘bringing to paper’ (Respondent 65, Org16Yek, Yekaterinburg), that is formalising the work of TSOs. Therefore, for this group of TSOs the NGO law presents an important pillar for the development of civil society. They highlight that the NGO law provides the state with control over civil society ensuring the all organisations are active.

I think that this law is very important because in the third sector there are many organisations but there are very few which are actually active. That is why the government has to have a control over the third sector. Now everyone will be able to know which organizations are active and which are not. Those organisations which handed in their documents to the registration office are written down into the register of TSOs, so you know straight way, who is active and who is not.

Respondent 7, Org07Sam, Samara

For TSOs in this group, in order for civil society to develop, the state needs to ensure that it consists of organisations which are active. Such active organisations have ‘already a very developed management system’ (Respondent 64, Org15Yek, Yekaterinburg) and ‘you [have to be] professionally organised’ (Respondent 47, Org22Per, Perm). In this case ‘filling in this

[registration] document is not a problem' (Respondent 1, Org01Sam, Samara). These portrayals of the NGO law suggest that organisations in this group consider TSOs which are not able to adhere to the law as not good enough or not active enough to be members of civil society.

Today the law requires of TSOs the same as of commercial organisations, but the level of development, the level of the people that work in many TSOs is not always on that level. But we have no such problems.

Respondent 48, Org23Per, Perm

Thus, respondents from this group illustrate the NGO law as 'cleaning' civil society of organisations which they understand as not being active. However, contrary to the criticisms of a substantial amount of TSOs closing (Maxwell, 2006; see chapter 3.4) respondents do not consider this cleaning as a problem because as far as 'I am aware only 10% [of organisations] closed' (Respondent 1, Org01Sam, Samara). Furthermore this group of TSOs highlights the responsibility for closure lies with TSOs themselves.

The fact that some organizations were not re-registered is true, but not because there were obstacles in the process, but because they have ceased to exist. These organisations just did not want to carry on. They stopped working, but not because they had to be re-registered.

Respondent 1, Org01Sam, Samara

In effect TSOs in this group argued that the majority of organisations, which did close down following the new registration requirements were 'inactive' and thus they were not shut down for political reasons. By illustrating the law in this particular way, TSOs hope to highlight that the law has not had the predicted negative impact. The surprising aspect to this is that TSOs

constituting this group encompass both marionettes as well as organisations which would previously has considered been as independent (Crotty, 2009). Going by the assessment of the NGO law in chapter three, the latter type of TSOs should have portrayed the law as more restrictive in nature. However, neither ‘past autonomy’ nor ‘ideological’ (i.e. marionettes) allegiance seems to matter when TSOs within this group highlight the effects of the law. Consequently, respondents in this group demonstrate that in their perception the effects of the law’s registration requirements are weaker than the criticism of the law illustrated in chapter three. Hence, for respondents of this group the NGO law does not represent the end of civil society (Maxwell, 2006). Furthermore, for this group of TSOs, the NGO law is an encouraging development as it ensures that TSOs become more professional in response to the NGO law.

5.2.1.2 Funding requirements

Chapter three highlights that the NGO law limits the ability of TSOs to access funding, in particular from abroad. The group of TSOs understanding the NGO law as professionalising organisations outlines that the NGO law has improved transparency vis-à-vis the state. By being a ‘transparent organisation, [because] we adhere to the law’ (Respondent 48, Org23Per, Perm) and ‘because we are open’ (Respondent 14, Org15Sam, Samara), TSOs consider themselves as more eligible for resource support from the government.

But if we want to have government funding, if we want to be equal partners, then we need to provide information about us.

Respondent 65, Org16Yek , Yekaterinburg

Another similar respondent

We are very good at writing grants and this [law] imposes a discipline on us, and makes sure that the money does not disappear; that we are responsible for what we say we do. This makes organisations become more professional.

Respondent 81, Org32Yek, Yekaterinburg

Thus, TSOs in this group identify that because they adhere to the law, they are able to access resources and in turn the NGO law makes them more professional and accountable. This suggests that TSOs ‘sell out’, by adhering to the law, in order to survive and use the professionalization narrative as a way to highlight themselves as the future agents of civil society. They are adjusting to the state’s wish to manage civil society.

For TSOs in this group acquiescing to the law makes them more transparent to the state, in turn demonstrating that they do not pursue ‘misaligned’ objectives (i.e. democratisation or holding the state to account) which have motivated the NGO law (Reynolds, 2007; see chapter 3.4). It is because of ‘how foreign TSOs [used to] work, this is why we have these controls’ (Respondent 78, Org29Yek, Yekaterinburg). Nevertheless, this group of TSOs understand this law as important.

I was very happy about the law, because it shows that the government takes a more serious approach with regards to TSOs.

Respondent 81, Org32Yek, Yekaterinburg

For respondents of this group, the law not only represented the managing of civil society but they also understand such arrangements as fundamental to their ability to interact with the state. Not only does this group acquiesce to access funding but their acquiescence is also motivated by, it seems, the potential of working in alliance with the government. Acquiescence and working with the government is a narrative that extends the

professionalization discourse when considering the stricter government supervision associated with the NGO law (see chapter 3.4)

5.2.1.3 Government supervision

Chapter three highlights that the NGO law has introduced stringent government supervision of TSOs. In addition to the ‘professional approach’ TSOs in this group portray vis-à-vis the registration requirements, their portrayal of the yearly reporting requirements, which form the heart of the law’s government supervision agenda is similar. TSOs in this group also consider that they ‘never had a problem with anything [regarding the reporting requirements]’ (Respondent 49, Org01Yek, Yekaterinburg). It is their ability to ‘be a professional organisations’ (Respondent 52, Org04Yek, Yekaterinburg), which means they have no problem with these requirements. However, TSOs in this group understand such ‘professionalism’ not necessarily the adoption of ‘business-like’ structures (see Anheier, 2005 and chapter 2.3). For TSOs in this group it is the presence of ‘professions’ such as accountants and lawyers.

We have a qualified accountant, my daughter, and a lawyer. Therefore, we were able to adapt our structures and had no problems with the law. This level of professionalism helps us to adapt our structures so that we can work within the requirements of the legal system.

Respondent 52, Org04Yek, Yekaterinburg

In particular the presence of an accountant is associated with being professional as well as able to conform to the NGO law. The phrase ‘we have an accountant’ (Respondent 14, Org15Sam, Samara) or ‘we have a very good accountant’ (Respondent 75, Org26Yek, Yekaterinburg) is reoccurring amongst the majority of TSOs in this group with regards to the requirements of adhering to the NGO law. For these TSOs, the NGO law’s requirements have

encouraged them to attract such ‘professions’. However, as indicated in the above quote, such professions are often recruited from within the family or social network at the heart of such organisations. Thus recruiting such professions does not demonstrate an increasing ability of such TSOs to attract the broader public, a crucial constraint to civil society development in Russia (see chapter 3.3.1.2). It also lends support to the argument that the majority of civic engagement and participation remains confined to the realm of private networks (Cook & Vinogradova, 2006; Salmenniemi, 2008; see chapter 3.3.1). These findings mirror observations made in other research, which found that TSOs have increasingly become an outlet for various ‘professions’ such as teachers, accountants, and lawyers (Salmenniemi, 2008). Even though this group of TSOs wants to portray the law as having led to more ‘professional’ organisations, the understanding of ‘professionalism’ carries a different meaning to how ‘professionalism’ is understood within the academic literature (Chew & Osborne, 2009; see chapter 2.3).

Further, TSOs portraying the NGO law as ‘professionalising’ highlight that new reporting requirements create synergies with the requirements of various other supervisory bodies. For this group of TSOs, complying with the NGO law is only one aspect of the complex Russian regulatory environment. Therefore, stringent annual requirements for the registration service assist TSOs with the requisites of other state authorities.

It [the law] forces us to be organised. Often TSOs do not have secretaries or similar staff and we neglect our paperwork. But thanks to such requirements, we are able to get our paperwork in order. Following the annual accounts to the FRS [Federal Registration Service], we also have tax inspections. We need to prepare these documents anyway. I think that the law professionalises the way TSOs do their work; at least now most of them are on top with their paperwork.

Respondent 64, Org15Yek, Yekaterinburg

In effect, this group of organisations argues that adhering to NGO law leads to improved effectiveness of TSOs through the establishment of professional structures and ways of operating as organisations. In turn this portrays the NGO law as a catalyst for improving the (micro)organisational level of Russian civil society. Effectively TSOs use their ‘professionalization’ discourse as a way to justify their acquiescence to the NGO law. However, the ability of the state to ‘impose’ such changes via the NGO law reflects the legislative attempt to manage civil society. Whether or not such changes can address the limitation to civil society development (see chapter 3.3.1.1 – 3.3.1.4) is questionable. These aspects become clearer when examining how respondents from this group portray the NGO law’s effect on their day-to-day activities.

5.2.1.4 Protraying the day-to-day impact of the NGO law

Despite portraying the NGO law as ‘professionalising’ their organisations, respondents from this group of TSOs do not perceive the law as affecting their day to day activities. TSOs within this group consider the law as having influenced only the formal aspects of their organisations.

Most changes [required by the law] only concerned the formal part of the organisation.

Now we have the duty to hand in information on our activities from the previous year.

Filling in this document is not a problem for us.

Respondent 1, Org01Sam, Samara

Because they are ‘professional’ in filing annual accounts this is not a problem and ‘does not at all influence our work’ (Respondent 15, Org15Sam, Samara). Therefore, respondents portray their organisations as doing the activities that ‘we did, we are still doing them the same way’ (Respondent 74, Org27Yek, Yekaterinburg) and ‘as we have worked before we are working

now' (Respondent 32, Org08Per, Perm). Hence despite illustrating the impacts of the NGO law as professionalising their organisations, respondents did not feel that these impacts had an impact on their activities. In effect respondents of this group portray the law as 'just paper work' (Respondent 28, Org04Per, Perm). Actually, respondents of this group of TSOs portray the law as having had no real impact. This provides insights into the activities of TSOs active in the health and education sector. First, it highlights that their activities have not been political in the past, hence they do not challenge the sovereignty of the Russian state (see chapter 3.4.1). Not only does this set out a signal of the activities of TSOs that enable them to adhere to NGO law, but also ensures that TSOs remain depoliticised and do not encounter problems with the law and its requirements. This highlights that the NGO law is a legally mandated attempt to manage civil society. Second, the assertion of 'no effect on TSO activities' dovetails with the literature suggesting that Russian TSOs have made a limited contribution to democratisation (Crotty, 2009; see chapter 3.3.1). Given the restrictive nature of the NGO law (see chapter 3.4), the inability of TSOs to contribute to the democratisation process provides the only viable explanation for their portrayal of the law not impacting their activities. It is indicative of the fact that, at least TSOs in this group, do not understand or do not want to understand themselves as agents of democratisation. On the contrary, they like the resulting arrangements as it enables them to interact with the state, something they would be unable to do if they would not register or adhere to the law. Clearly respondents understanding the NGO law as professionalising TSOs, see their acquiescence as providing benefits to their organisations, in particular resources. Therefore, this group of TSOs feels comfortable within arrangements in which the state manages civil society.

Further, in adopting this 'professionalization' discourse TSOs can represent themselves as flourishing in the eyes of the state. However, at the same time this is indicative of the mechanism the NGO law creates so that the state can manage civil society arrangements. As a result of adopting such a specific rhetoric, TSOs in this group hope to position themselves as

viable partners for the state. Thus in effect TSOs in this study consider themselves as ‘assistants’ to the Federal state helping it to ensure Russia’s socio-economic development. In turn TSOs contribute to the stability of the ‘Federal’ state. TSOs within this ‘professionalization’ group do not directly attribute such a development to the NGO law, but highlight the assumption that only organisations that are able to adhere to the law can take up the state’s offers of cooperation (see chapter 7 for an illustration of state-TSO interaction).

This professionalization discourse clearly points out that some Russian TSOs want to be seen as professionally organized and effective working organisations. Compliance with the NGO law serves as their narrative to portray this image. Despite this rhetoric, as discussed above when compared against the limitations of civil society development in Russia, this effectively shows that TSOs subordinate themselves to the state. This group of TSOs use the NGO law as a way to highlight how well they operate rather than outlining the law’s actual effects. As a result the only effect that the professionalization discourse attributes with the NGO law is a change of the forms, structures, and staffing of TSOs, trends which seemed to have already commenced prior to the law’s introduction. By highlighting such ‘cosmetic’ changes, TSOs hope to show their support for the state and its policies. The desire to highlight the ‘benefits’ of the NGO law also show that the state is clearly in control of civil society. TSOs contributing to the ‘professional’ discourse are very much situated in the upper half of the hourglass, as frequently evident from their well-established relations within state institutions. The ‘professionalization’ discourse and the group of TSOs promoting this discourse also indicates that an increasing number of previous “professional policy or advocacy organisations” (Crotty, 2009, p. 90) move into the upper half of the hourglass. Past research has attributed these types of organisations as the only few, which inhabit the Russian civil society space (Henry, 2009). Thus, effectively the professionalization discourse highlights that Russia’s civil society space remains constricted (Crotty, 2006). The professionalization discourse outlines those TSOs that portray the NGO law as a good development as they

consider it strengthening civil society. However, this is not the case, because it enables the state to manage civil society or at the very least have an intimate knowledge of their activities. Consequently, the NGO law is a legally mandated attempt to manage civil society. Nevertheless, the professionalization discourse only represents one group of TSOs within this study. As mentioned above TSOs engaging in this discourse are already ‘professionalised’ TSOs or marionette organisations. However, other and frequently smaller organisations construct the effects of the law as increasing bureaucratisation. Their ‘bureaucratisation’ discourse is illustrated and discussed in the following section.

5.2.2 Bureaucratising TSOs

When examining how TSOs portray the NGO law, the second group emerging from the data collected are organisations that describe it as bureaucratising their organisations. This argues that the NGO law means that TSOs are becoming more bureaucratic because they are burdened with more formal requirements. This group is summarised in table 5.2 and consist of 16 organisations across all three regions. The bureaucratisation group of TSOs are on average newer than the organisations making up the ‘professionalization’ discourse. There are no organisations that can be classed as Soviet successor organisations. Most of these organisations have at most 6 staff members and a small membership base. This group of TSOs highlight that once in a while they have received foreign funding in the past. Only some of the TSOs in this group portray themselves as receiving municipal funding which is enough to survive. None of these organisations state that they have received grants or funding handed out at a regional or Federal level. The group thus consisted of what are quintessential formal groups or grass-roots TSOs.

Number	Organisational Code	Registered	Date, Membership/Staff (current)
1	Org13Sam	YES	1998, ca. 15 M
2	Org23Sam	YES	2000, ca. 60 M
3	Org07Per	YES	1993 , 4 S
4	Org09Per	YES	1997, N.A.
5	Org13Per	YES	2000, 60 M
6	Org14Per	YES	1997, 70 M
7	Org20Per	YES	1994, 11 S
8	Org02Yek	YES	2005, 1 S
9	Org03Yek	YES	1999, 1 S
10	Org05Yek	YES	2001, 10 M/S
11	Org07Yek	YES	2002, ca. 30 M
12	Org12Yek	YES	1998, 1 S
13	Org17Yek	YES	2002, 9 M
14	Org21Yek	YES	1992, 8 S
15	Org28Yek	YES	1998, 1 S
16	Org31Yek	YES	2004, 3 S

Table 5.2: TSOs portraying the NGO law as bureaucratising

5.2.2.1 Registration requirements

TSOs portraying the NGO law as bureaucratising their work, highlight that the law has put additional requirements on their organisations. It requires of them to organise their paperwork and in effect they outline that this means that they need to be much more bureaucratic. For some respondents in this group the registration requirements create such much additional work that ‘we could not deal with it ourselves, too much paperwork’ (Respondent 18, Org19Sam, Samara). Such organisations needed to find resources to pay a law firm to facilitate the registration process. TSOs that were unable to access such resources outline themselves as enduring the bureaucratic pressures. They had to dedicate their time to achieve registration and one respondent outlines it as taking ‘six months to register’ (Respondent 38, Org13Per, Perm) and that ‘there were very many problems’ (Respondent 33, Org09Per,

Perm). It is thus not surprising that this group of TSOs portrays the NGO law and the registration process as difficult and time consuming.

Under the new law it was very difficult to register, there are so many requirements. For example if you are a TSO, you want to register, you write yourself a mission and collect all the necessary documents. You hand them in and they find a small mistake, some inaccuracy, a misprint, then you have to start again.

Respondent 61, Org12Yek, Yekaterinburg

Despite these considerations, as illustrated in Appendix A and table 5.2 above, respondents in this group also highlight that their organisations have remained registered. Rather than protesting against the difficulties and remaining unregistered, it seems that TSOs in this group consider being on the register as important as the professionalising TSOs. The registration requirements do not deter TSOs in this group from registering, despite the burden on time and resources this creates. Hence it seems that TSOs in this group conforming to the NGO law, in expectation that membership on the TSO registers provides benefits to their organisations.

5.2.2.2 Funding requirements

Chapter three highlights that the NGO law limits the ability of TSOs to access funding in particular from abroad. However, due to the fact that this group of TSOs has had limited access to foreign funding, this group of respondents does not consider any financial implication in terms of the yearly reporting requirements.

The only problem for everyone is the financial reporting requirements and the very bureaucratic system of complying and handing in accounts.

Respondent 50, Org02Yek, Yekaterinburg

It is the state's requirement for annual accounts that presents problems to such TSOs. However, for this group of TSOs this is only an exercise in filling in forms because 'we receive very little funding' (Respondent 22, Org23Sam, Samara). Consequently the majority of them hand in 'empty declarations, I mean I just put a zero everywhere' (Respondent 22, Org23Sam, Samara). The motto of this group of respondents seems to be no funding, no problem. Nevertheless, they seemingly want to remain as a registered organisation, primarily to be able to access the little funding they do receive. For these TSOs, consideration of funding is just another bureaucratic hurdle that they need to overcome in order to conform. Acquiescence enables them to receive some resources and support, but in effect this reflects their existence as afternoon tea and coffee clubs without the means to challenge the state.

5.2.2.3 Government supervision

For TSOs in this group, the yearly reporting requirements, and thus supervision by the state are the most challenging. Similar to the registration process, TSOs in this group portray the law as formalising order and structure within civil society and straining their resources. Respondents in this group portray reporting as 'very tight now, which makes life difficult' (Respondent 53, Org05Yek, Yekaterinburg). For them these reporting requirements are 'so difficult, I was tearing my hair out' (Respondent 50, Org02Yek, Yekaterinburg). TSOs find in particular the required time commitments as difficult because the law 'makes you submit all your protocols, they want so many documents that a year is not enough to get them all together' (Respondent 55, Org07Yek, Yekaterinburg). Alternatively TSOs need to maintain back office operations, which means that 'you need to have computers and maintain quite few staff' (Respondent 45, Org20Per, Perm) something which the majority of TSOs in this group are unable to do. This group of TSOs highlights that the audits following the submission of their annual statements are 'very tough, [and] you need a lot of time' (Respondent 31, Org07Per, Perm). Consequently for TSOs in this group, the yearly reporting requirements have been more than just an annoyance and straining the organisations resources.

Generally, when they were introduced these new rules gave us a headache. We are not able to keep an accountant on staff, but we had to hire one and take some of the money we use for projects to pay him.

Respondent 24, Org13Sam, Samara

Furthermore, TSOs illustrating the effect of the NGO law as bureaucratising highlight that supervisory authorities do not aim to support TSOs but manage them. TSOs that understand the effect of the law as bureaucratising emphasise the presumption of guilt under which they feel the NGO law operates. They highlight that it is ‘your responsibility to fill the reports correctly’ (Respondent 55, Org07Yek, Yekaterinburg) and even ‘if it they make a mistake, you have to proof that they were wrong’ (Respondent 51, Org03Yek, Yekaterinburg). Hence TSO in this group feel they have to work for the state authorities.

But it should be the other way around, we should not work for them but they should be working for us.

Respondent 33, Org09Per, Perm

Adhering to the NGO law allows TSOs to prove their worth to the state which means they have to overcome these bureaucratic hurdles. Hence, the presumption of guilt seemingly embedded within the law looks as if it is crucial to TSOs portraying the NGO law as bureaucratic. Because of the NGO law TSOs are required to keep a record of every single activity and all aspects and issues relating to them. This in turn means ‘so much paperwork, this stretches your organisations’ (Respondent 77, Org28Yek, Yekaterinburg). Respondents in this group portray the NGO law as even governing the semantics, which they can use in their own organisational documentations.

Now we have four projects, we call them this way, but apparently, it is not correct to say so. Because a project has to be written, it has to have a beginning and an end, and all sorts of other details, all the financial details have to be written out. So now we have to call what we do directions.

Respondent 66, Org17Yek, Yekaterinburg

TSOs feel that the NGO law does not facilitate their work. Instead of being able to pursue their objectives or carry out their activities, they are made to fill out forms and use specified language to describe their work. As a result, respondents have to spend significant amounts of time away from the activities of their TSOs. Nevertheless, despite seeing this as bureaucratising their activities, respondents in this group do adhere to these requirements ensuring their organisations remain registered. It seems that this way, respondents in this group hope to portray themselves as credible partners of the state. One reason for such silent acceptance might be the lacking organisational capacity to challenge the law. However, when considering smaller TSOs dealing with disability issues, these organisations do seem have the capacity to challenge legislative changes they do not agree with. Reflecting the observations of other researchers (Henderson, 2008; Wengle & Rasell, 2008) and examples concerning legislative changes monetising welfare benefits provided by Org07Yek, these organisations are able to take up positions and activities challenging legislative changes. However in the case of the NGO law and specifically with regards to the increasing resource strain, TSOs seem to have chosen to remain neutral and silently accept these changes and their implications. This is indicative that respondents within this group of TSOs understand civil society as subordinate to the state; arrangements that are firmly established with this new NGO law. Hence respondents, despite not being happy with the NGO law, accept it as a framework to guide their activities. In as such the state is succeeding in its legal attempt to manage civil society. With regards to civil society development this demonstrates that, similar to their 'professionalization' counterparts, TSOs within this group do not consider themselves

as challenging or opposing the state. Their acquiescence to the NGO law highlights the superiority of the state and the acceptance that the Russian state has the right to manage civil society (see chapter 3.5). Effectively this highlights that respondents do understand the need for the development of civil society as an autonomous space (see chapter 2.5) and catalyst for democratisation. Such insights are substantiated when examining how TSOs in this group portray the law's impact on their day to day activities.

5.2.2.4 Protraying the day-to-day impact of the NGO law

This group of respondents has portrayed the NGO law, rather than creating transparency, accountability, professionalism, or facilitating the development of civil society, as increasingly bureaucratising and formalising their work. Similar to the group that illustrates the NGO law as professionalising TSOs, respondents in this group highlight that 'it does not impact our work as such, [however adding that] it just takes a lot of time' (Respondent 80, Org31Yek, Yekaterinburg). Similar to the TSOs portraying the NGO law as professionalising TSOs, this group of respondents portray the law as 'creating more paperwork' (Respondent 70, Org21Yek, Yekaterinburg). The bureaucratic nature of the law means that respondents outline, once this paperwork is out of the way they are able to pursue their activities as they did before.

Honestly speaking, it [the law] did not affect us very much. (...) But they [supervisory authorities] do not look at what work organisations do, what good things they do, what incredible projects they have. They look at whether there is an annual [members] meeting in a year, are there minutes for that meeting. They only control the formal aspects.

Respondent 51, Org03Yek, Yekaterinburg

Contrary to the professionalization discourse (see section 5.2.1), this section suggests that the NGO law has not led to an improvement in the activities that TSOs do. Also, the bureaucratisation discourse cannot be understood as criticisms of the state. Many of the organisations in this group portray the NGO law as ‘introducing a more stringent accountability, but I thought that this was very good’ (Respondent 39, Org14Per, Perm). In this train of thought the bureaucratisation discourse can also be seen as a way of TSOs to gain legitimacy as viable partners for the state. Once TSOs are able to overcome the hurdle of the NGO law, they become eligible and legitimate participants in civil society and therefore a potential partner. The answer to question of why TSOs choose to take on these bureaucratic hurdles is best captured in the following quote.

Of course we have to be registered, because now everything is more structured. Without adhering to the official requirements you will not be able to exist. If we have people coming to our courses, they want a certificate, so we have to be official so we can get paid.

Respondent 66, Org17Yek, Yekaterinburg

TSOs within this group acquiesce to the NGO law in order to function, a clear indication of the management of civil society. Respondents in this group of TSOs perceive the law as creating unnecessary hurdles making TSOs more bureaucratic. This highlights how the NGO law has started a transformation of TSOs into organisations that at some point might resemble state authorities rather than voluntary and autonomous institutions of civil society. In particular, smaller TSOs illustrate that the NGO law and adhering to it puts considerable strain on resources both human and financial. However, rather than closing down or remaining unregistered, the majority of TSOs have a ‘do-it-yourself’ attitude when it comes to the NGO law and are willing to sacrifice time and resources to comply with it. For many respondents, in particular in smaller TSOs, these organisations not only form an outlet to

socialise but consist of a vital part to access key information and resources (Evans, 2002). Therefore, it is not surprising that the more bureaucratic aspects of TSOs work has not deterred them from running their organisations. The bureaucratisation discourse is also indicative of the increasing power of the state (see chapter 3.4). Further, it demonstrates that the state is able to leverage its power in order to ‘manage’ civil society. Thus, the bureaucratisation discourse indicates the reshaping of civil society-state relations and hence civil society arrangements (see chapter 3.4). No longer does it seem viable to expect Russian civil society to develop into an autonomous sphere situated between the state and the individual (see chapter 2.2). The bureaucratisation discourse and the fact that most TSOs in this study chose to remain registered shows that activists understand adherence to the laws ‘bureaucratic’ registration and reporting requirements as a threshold condition to be part of Russian civil society. The bureaucratisation discourse is constructed of TSOs traditionally found within the lower half of the hourglass (Crotty, 2006). For these organisations which remind one of afternoon ‘tea and coffee’ friendship circles or clubs, the NGO law does resemble a ‘bureaucratic’ roadblock to their usual *modus operandi*. However, they still adhere to the law, because they consider it as important for their existence and do not see a link between the administrative burden and it deflecting them from ‘holding the state to account’ (Taylor, 2006). Nevertheless, the professionalization and bureaucratisation discourses only represent two of the three groups portraying the effect of the NGO law that can be distinguished. The TSOs remaining unregistered highlight their decision as a response to the law and will be discussed in the following section.

5.2.3 Protesting the NGO law

The third group that can be established are the organisations that in protest to the NGO law have not re-registered. They argue that the NGO law limits their ability to function as civil society organisations. This group, consists of only four organisations. This protest group are primarily small grass-roots type organisations similar to the ones making up the

bureaucratising group of TSOs. The majority of these organisations want to remain unregistered to avoid the bureaucracy associated with the law and to ensure that they continue their work and activities as before. Adhering to the NGO law, that is being registered, would be too much paper work which is ‘a problem and we do not have the resources to do this’ (Respondent 21, Org22Sam, Samara). Thus for some of the TSOs in this group it is the strain on resources and paperwork that has prompted them not to register.

All though it would make a lot of sense form one point of view to register Org10Per as an official charity in Russia. But we just do not want to do it because the amount of bureaucracy and paperwork that we would have to go through.

Respondent 34, Org10Per, Perm

However, outlining the protest nature of this group, they highlight the NGO law was ‘one reason why we left this sector’ (Respondent 58, Org09Yek, Yekaterinburg). This group of TSOs highlight that they feel ‘that everything became too organised, there are too many controlling structures’ (Respondent 57, Org09Yek, Yekaterinburg). Consequently, for this group of TSOs the law has ‘a very restricting effect’ (Respondent 34, Org10Per, Perm). In turn this means that once an organisation is registered, the NGO law provides the state with too many opportunities to influence and liquidate their organisations.

I, like anyone else, understand that there is always something which can be criticised, there are always some formal aspects that they can use to disturb your activities. So you end up writing reports explaining yourself, and not get anything done. This is why I do not want to register. For what we do, a non-registered organisation is enough.

Respondent 12, Org12Sam, Samara

This outlines that a minority of TSOs in this study choose not to register to avoid and protest the law. The fact that only so few organisations have undertaken this step outlines that the majority of TSOs, even if they consider the NGO law as harmful to an autonomous civil society, acquiesce to it. Not being registered restricts the ability of TSOs within this group to access funding and resources, both from abroad and domestic. It is a positive sign that this protest group of TSOs took the active decision not to register, as it represents that some organisations are unwilling to submit themselves to the state's management of civil society. However, it also means that such organisations are 'overlooked' by the state, starved of resources and that their power to influence the state is going to be limited.

5.3 Conclusion

This chapter has examined how respondents portray the NGO law and its impact on their day-to-day activities. In doing so the chapter delineates three groups of TSOs. Group one portrays the NGO law as professionalising TSOs and is made up of larger well resourced organisations. Group two outlines the law as bureaucratising and difficult to comply with by themselves as maintaining their registration. Group three portray themselves as not registering out of protest against the law. Other than predicted in the literature (see Maxwell, 2006; see chapter 3.4) the majority of TSOs remain registered. With the contraction of funding available from abroad as a result of the NGO law (see chapter 3.4), remaining on the Russian TSO register is the only way to be able to access the resource and funding provided by domestics, mainly government (see chapter 3.3.1) sources. This points out why, TSOs, despite illustrating 'bureaucratisation', remain registered. The fact that the majority of organisations remain registered also indicates that TSOs do not oppose state managed civil society arrangements, in which they are likely to serve as surrogates to the state. Despite the differing portrayal of the NGO law, the communality of group one and two within this study is that they consider themselves as benefitting from remaining registered and conform to the law's

demands. When considering all TSOs within this study, bar the ones protesting the NGO law, the majority of organisations portray the law as the *right* law.

TSOs are not opposed to being managed by the state underlying the importance for organisations to adhere to the state's demands. It reflects the state and its demands as an integral fabric of the official life of any organisation in Russia and consequently means that in the context of the Russian Federation, managed civil society is the norm. This highlights the 'continuity' of past arrangements (Hedlund 2006) and the cultural-historic trajectory of the Russian Federation (see chapter 3). The cultural-historic examination indicates that in the past, legislation had a restrictive and controlling rationale and the 2006 NGO law mirrors this tradition (see chapter 3.4). Thus it is not new for TSOs to conform to restrictive legislation in order to survive. This demonstrates the need to engage with the cultural-historic past within the Post-Soviet context to understand elements of contemporary arrangements (Flynn & Oldfield, 2006).

Adhering to the NGO law and adjusting form and structure provides TSOs in this study a way to seek legitimatisation as members of Russian civil society. Consequently, the NGO law has provided the state with a framework that enables it to manage civil society arrangements. In turn this might mean that the state's coercive pressures (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977) taking the form of the NGO law, could lead to the emergence of isomorphic tendencies amongst TSOs, aspects which are explored in more detail in chapter seven. In illustrating acquiescence to the NGO law, TSOs indicate a bleak future for the development of Russian civil society as an autonomous space. These portrayals, which as discussed are counterintuitive, demonstrate that TSOs think that the law is 'a good thing' and further worsening the prospects of an autonomous space. Essentially TSOs have become willing participants in a managed civil society because it provides them a way of accessing funds. Hence the state has bribed TSOs into acquiescing. Therefore the NGO law represents the

state's legally mandated attempt to manage civil society and evidence presented in this chapter demonstrates this management of civil society by the state as a *fait accompli*.

The general adherence and abidance to the rule of law, not only by state institutions but also by all other 'citizens' has been an central issue in President Medvedev's current rhetoric calling for the modernisation of Russia (BBC, 2009; Krawatzek, 2010). In the 2009 presidential address Mr Medvedev explicitly called for the adherence to the rule of law and fight against corruption (BBC, 2009). Based on the evidence outlined above, with regards to adhering to the rule of law, TSOs seem to have taken up this request. The acquiescence to the law dovetails with this meta-political rhetoric. For TSOs, the impact of the NGO law is that it has introduced a 'clear set of rules' which set out the defining condition to be a member. In response TSOs have undertaken formal adjustments (professionalization, bureaucratisation, protest), however changes to their day-to-day activities were not needed as their contribution to democratisation has been limited (Taylor, 2006; see section 5.2.2). It seems that as rational actors, TSOs have adapted to the coercing forces of the NGO law. Constricting the potential of TSOs to contribute to democratising was outlined as a key objective of the NGO law (Maxwell, 2006). In creating a restrictive legal environment (see Maxwell 2006 and chapter 3.4) the 2006 NGO law ensures that the state can take advantage of the pre-existing weaknesses of civil society. With such arrangements in place, TSOs will be unable to address the micro or organizational weaknesses (resource and public acceptance and legitimacy issues) as well as weaknesses at a macro or civil society level (fragmentation and participation issues) which have limited its democratisation potential. Consequently, the NGO law ensures that there is 'no change' in the inability of civil society to develop into an autonomous space able to hold the state to account. Hence, this chapter demonstrates that TSOs remain unable to develop civil society as an autonomous space, meaning that civil society remains weak and constricted (Crotty, 2006) and Russia's hourglass society intact (see chapter, 3; Rose, 1995).

Therefore, reflecting other scholars (Henderson, 2008; Javeline & Lindemann-Komarova, 2008; Richter, 2009) this demonstrates a change in state-civil society relations, which are not conducive to the Gramscian ideal of civil society as a counterweight to the state (Foley & Edwards, 1996). In turn civil society remains deprived of its key functionality and contribution to the democratisation process. Conversely, as this thesis argues, such arrangements become mechanism to sustain the current managed democratic regime (Balzer, 2003). Therefore, the NGO law achieves its political objective of ‘depoliticising’ civic activity and ‘neutralising’ its democratisation potential. Hence, the NGO law provides the state with the legal framework to manage civil society.

In answering the question on how respondents perceive the NGO law and how it affects TSOs day-to-day activities, it has to be stated that the law creates a Foucaultian incentive system in which TSOs now act according to the roles the state envisions for them. In a similar fashion to the state’s actions in the economy (Hanson & Teague, 2005), the various angles that TSOs illustrate about the effects of the NGO law outlines how the law has recreated a mechanism of suspended punishment (Ledeneva, 2006) for the civil society sphere. This demonstrates that managed arrangements represent a ‘transformation’ of Russian civil society into a third sector aimed at “mobilising to help the state” (Salmenniemi, 2005, p. 747), encapsulating a vision of what civil society is, that is aligned with its cultural-historic trajectory (Evan, 2006b). Hence the NGO law leads to the state management of civil society. Yet it does not matter as civil society was underdeveloped, ineffective, and weak (Crotty, 2009; see chapter 3.3.1) beforehand. With the arrangements established and institutionalised by the NGO law, civil society is unlikely to develop into an independent and autonomous space able to hold the state to account (Taylor, 2006). In turn this makes Russian TSOs no longer ‘pluralisers’ of public discourse or decision making or drivers of democratisation (Uhlin, 2006; see chapter 2.5). For the objective of this thesis to portray manifestations of managed civil society, the NGO law makes apparent the legally mandated attempt to manage civil society. Consequently, the NGO

law in itself is a manifestation of Russian managed civil society. In the subsequent chapters, this thesis will further investigate the question of how managed civil society arrangements manifest themselves. The following chapter examines research objective two (see chapter 1 and 4.1). The focus is on the retreat of the state from service provision and the effect on education and health TSOs and their ability to act as substitutes for the state (see chapter 6). Chapter seven investigates research objective three (see chapter 1 and 4.1) and further explores marionette organisations as characteristics of state managed civil society arrangements to establish the limits of the Russian state's ability to control or mould civil society in this way (see chapter 7).

CHAPTER 6: Understanding TSO activity in Russia

6.1 Introduction

While chapter five examined the effects of legislative changes, highlighting the NGO law as a legal attempt to manage civil society, in chapter six the focus of the analysis shifts to the activities of TSOs in order to examine more subtle attempts by the state to manage civil society. Specifically this chapter examines research objective two of this thesis namely *to elaborate on how TSOs act as state substitutes* (see chapter 1.1 and 4.1). In looking at health and education TSOs, this chapter not only contributes to filling a void in the understanding of such organisations in Russia, but it also investigates the impact state withdrawal has on TSO activities such as service provision and advocacy.

The literature discussed in chapter two demonstrates that in a context such as the UK (also referred to as democratic contexts; see chapter 2.2) service provisions by TSOs is common place (Pestoff, 1992; Salamon, 1995; also see chapter 2.3). Further the literature argues that in addition to engaging in such activities, TSOs continue to act as agents of an autonomous civil society by aggregating interest, bridging between the individual and the state, and holding the state to account (Foley & Edwards, 1996; Taylor, 2006; see chapter 2.2). In fulfilling both these roles TSOs act as builders of an autonomous civil society space contributing to democratic governance or democratisation (Taylor, 2006; see chapter 2.5). Understanding whether TSOs in the context of the Russian Federation assume such roles provides another lens to investigate the research question of this thesis of how managed civil society manifest itself in the Russian Federation. Specifically and following on from chapter five's examination of the NGO law, studying the role of TSOs will provide insight into the potentially more subtle attempts to manage civil society. To do so, this chapter addresses the two following questions:

How TSOs perceive their activities and themselves?

What role TSOs consider themselves as assuming?

To answer these two questions the chapter draws the analytical theme from objective two (see chapter 1.1 and 4.1. and appendix F.2). This chapter is organised into two sections. The first section outlines the activities of TSOs. First it highlights the formal and informal advocacy activities of TSOs. Second it examines the service providing activities of TSOs to illustrate the role that TSOs portray themselves as assuming. The second section of this chapter discusses these findings in light of the literature presented in chapter two and three and the proposition that understanding state substitution offers an insight into more subtle attempts to manage civil society.

6.2 The activities of Russian TSOs

As chapter one and three highlights, past research has focused on civil society actors such as human rights organisations (Mendelson & Gerber, 2007, Sundstrom, 2005), environmental protection organisations (Crotty, 2003, 2006; Henry, 2006), women's rights organisations (Richter, 2002; Sperling, 1999) or trade unions (Kubicek, 2002). In the context of democratisation such organisations are portrayed as agents for advocating rights and improving and influencing policymaking via advocacy activities (Taylor, 2006; Uhlin, 2006; see chapter 2.5). It is this advocacy nature of TSOs, which is considered critical to civil society's contribution to democracy and democratisation (Taylor, 2006). Furthermore, often associated with the type of organisations investigated in this thesis, the majority of TSOs engage in advocacy activities in which they provide specific, often welfare related services, to the public (Hall, 2002). In order to answer the questions of how TSOs portray and perceive their role and engagement in activities, this section will look at how and if TSOs in this study engage in informal and formal advocacy activities and service providing activities. Examining

the former enables this thesis to draw inference on the ability of the TSOs to act confrontationally vis-à-vis the state and holding it to account. The latter provides insights into whether TSOs substitute the state and most importantly how these organisations understand these activities and thus their respective roles as builders of civil society (see chapter 2.5.1).

6.2.1 Formal advocacy activities

This section highlights the formal advocacy or lack thereof illustrated by respondents within this study. As chapter two outlines, formal advocacy is important as it enables holding the state to account. Such formal or also public advocacy consists of, for example “writing letters to the editor, working with advocacy coalitions, issuing policy reports, and conducting a demonstration” (Mosley, 2009, p. 6; see chapter 2.2). It is this behaviour of TSOs, which demonstrates an autonomous civil society. With regards to formal advocacy activities, appendix A highlights that the missions and/or objectives of most organisations refer to the protection of rights. In turn this leaves the impression that organisations in this study are similar to our understanding of pro-typical TSOs (see chapter 2.3). However, as will be highlighted in this section, this is not the case. A similar picture emerges when looking at the documentary evidence which organisations have provided (see chapter 4). For example Org16Sam provided several copies of their newsletter titled ‘Judicial protection of disabled rights in Russia’. In a section entitled ‘Rights Page’ (*pravovaii stranitshka*) the organisation outlines new legal initiatives which affect the disabled and outlining the implications, such as in this case the re-assessment of the disability status.

We think, that re-assessment [of the disability status] is not necessary for those disabled, where their doctor was unable to improve the disability or injury over the past four years.

Newsletter January-March 2008, p. 8, Org16Sam, Samara

It is this sort of activity that TSOs in this group understand as formal advocacy activities. Furthermore, TSOs highlight their formal advocacy activities as ‘writing letters to the social protection department’ (Respondent 50, Org02Yek, Yekaterinburg) or providing ‘legal advice and assistance’ (Respondent 13, Org14Sam, Samara). These sort of activities are predominantly illustrated by organisations which are smaller and constructing the bureaucratisation discourse in chapter five and portraying themselves as ‘never received a penny from these [Federal] presidential grants’ (Respondent 55, Org07Yek, Yekaterinburg). On the other hand, larger TSOs highlight a myriad of interaction platforms where formal advocacy could take place.

[What we do with regards to advocacy]. Well firstly we participate in all meetings, committees, roundtables, conferences which are organised by the government. Soon we have another seminar like that with the government authorities. We are going to talk about what work they are doing and what the legislative basis for our work with the disabled is. So you can see such work is done, it might not be very noticeable, but basically we try to know what the governments wants to do and try to provide our suggestions so that they are considered.

Respondent 29, Org05Per, Perm

Similarly, respondent 64 outlines that such roundtables should be a setting ‘where you should speak your mind’ (Respondent 64, Org15Yek, Yekaterinburg). Furthermore, Org15Yek in Yekaterinburg, for example, outlines how as part of their advocacy activities they try to be elected into the regional Public Chamber as well as attempting to receive a place on the ‘roundtable’ at the department for social protection. Thus rather than aiming to change policymaking, the aim is to establish ‘working relationships’ with the state; relationships that yield access to resources as well as personal connections. This begs the question of whether these consultations have an influence on the decision making process. This seems unlikely as

respondents highlight such roundtables as ‘a good way for the government to tell us about changes to the law’ (Respondent 10, Org10Sam, Samara) or for them to ‘approach the authorities with a problem’ (Respondent 48, Org23Per, Perm). TSOs do seem to realise that once the state has implemented new legislation such roundtables are not able to ‘change the law [which] is more difficult than do it the right way from the beginning’ (Respondent 64, Org15Yek, Yekaterinburg).

The existence of roundtables and committees also explains the lack of direct or public advocacy activities outlined by respondents. Hence, there is little evidence in the discourse and narratives of the respondents that their organisations in this study engage in advocacy activities with the aim to influence decision or policy making (Uhlin, 2006). The following example from respondent 31 running an organisation to place people with disabilities into employment provides an insight into why public advocacy of a confrontational nature is lacking. This organisation was invited by the regional department for social security (*sozialnia sashita*) to contribute to a working group to propose a new regional welfare policy with a key pillar being to improve the employability of the disabled. However, respondent 31 outlines that the policy, which was implemented, did not include a single suggestion of this working group and he concludes:

You see we do want to work to influence policy. So we participate in all roundtables, well the ones that we get invited too. But we are not always invited, the administration usually only invites Org05Per, Org08Per, Org23Per. And they always agree with what the administration says. With the social protection and employability roundtable we were fortunate to be invited, but as I said it leads to nothing. I think that one of the problems why we do not influence policy that often, is that TSOs do not really work together. We meet and talk quite often, but real collaboration – not that often. For example as part of a TACIS [European Union program ‘Technical Aid to

Commonwealth of Independent States'] project, the English donors made all or quite a few disability organisations sign a memorandum that we would work together. But since then nothing has happened, it has been two years now. Nobody comes and checks.

Respondent 31, Org07Per, Perm

This illustrates a lack of cooperation amongst TSOs on advocacy activities. Cooperation with other TSOs is seen as 'helping us mainly morally' (Respondent 6, Org06Sam, Samara) and 'not really cooperation, it is more an exchange of ideas' (Respondent 50, Org02Yek, Yekaterinburg). The building of coalitions to engage in formal and confrontational activities is missing. Thus in turn TSOs outline that 'there is no love or friendship lost' (Respondent 27, Org03Per, Perm). It seems that there is a need for external pressure, in the past donor funding (Henderson, 2001) so that TSOs engage in cooperative campaigns (see Sundstrom, 2005 for evidence that external influences can also be global norms of humanity). In effect this demonstrates that TSOs do not understand the need for cooperation with each other as a vital step to building an autonomous civil society (Hasenfeld & Gidron, 2005). In turn it is no surprise that TSOs in this study do not associate any effectiveness with confrontational activities. For respondent 12 this has a historic legacy as

during the Soviet Union, TSOs did not do any advocacy work and I think such stereotypes are still there [amongst the state authorities]

Respondent 12, Org12Sam, Samara.

Consequently, a large group of TSOs in this study mention that 'it would be good to have a specialist with regards to rights in our organisations' (Respondent 27, Org03Per, Perm) and thus be able to engage in advocacy activities. The respondents from this group highlight that as organisations they just 'do not engage in this kind of activity' (Respondent 27, Org03Per,

Perm) or that they ‘do not provide some form of direct legal help’ (Respondent 59, Org10Yek, Yekaterinburg). This, many respondents in this group feel, is better left to other organisations as the following dialogue with respondent 26 from Org02Per in Perm demonstrates.

Interviewer

Do you engage in advocacy activities?

Respondent 26

No, no we do not.

Interviewer

Why do you not engage in such activities?

Respondent 26

We have some specialised organisations here in Perm. I think these are the organisations that should do this. We are here to provide a service to people.

The group of TSOs outlining that they do not engage in advocacy activities is primarily made up of many smaller TSOs, a large part of which portrayed the NGO law as bureaucratising (see chapter 5.2.2) and marionette organisations, organisations which perceived the NGO law as professionalising TSOs (see chapter 5.2.1). The latter constituents of this group of TSOs also demonstrated themselves as adverse to any sort of public advocacy activity underlying that ‘we do not do big actions and activities’ (Respondent 52, Org04Yek, Yekaterinburg). Some of these organisations highlight it as the responsibility of ‘the level of our Russia wide organisation based in Moscow’ (Respondent 10, Org10Sam, Samara) and that the effort to engage in advocacy it is not worthwhile because ‘today it is very difficult to change the situation for the better on a regional level’ (Respondent 42, Org17Per, Perm). Consequently, direct and public advocacy does not extend beyond writing letters. Other more public and confrontational tactics are not something TSOs in this group feel comfortable engaging in.

I do not like working through demonstrations at all. Even if people are informed they do not understand the situation. And I observe that at demonstration people are manipulated according to the interest of the organisers and I do not like that. So I do not like this approach to work.

Respondent 48, Org23Per, Perm

Effectively, the evidence on formal advocacy shows that TSOs in this study do not engage or do not want to engage in public and direct approaches with regards to their advocacy activities. Respondent 12 sums this sentiment up, illustrating the ‘fear’ of losing resources that prevents TSOs from engaging in formal advocacy activities.

I am more than convinced that if I took more than one rouble from the ministry of social protection, how would I later be able to go to one of their orphanages and outline any illegal activities?

Respondent 12, Org12Sam, Samara

This highlights that TSOs continue to contribute little in terms of democratisation (see chapter 3.3.1 and chapter 5.3). In addition to being bribed into being managed by the state (see chapter 5.3), TSOs effectively ‘sell out’ by forgoing confrontational public advocacy in order to gain potential resources from the state. This suggests that TSOs in this study do not consider their role as building an autonomous civil space or holding the state to account. It seems that they are more comfortable in providing services that will be explored in more depth later in this chapter. The lack of direct advocacy activities points towards a more subtle management of civil society arrangements in which the state clearly assumes the role of the manager. This section has demonstrated the limited nature of formal advocacy activities. The following section outlines informal advocacy activities.

6.2.2 Informal advocacy activities

Rather than in formal advocacy activities, when considering informal advocacy activities a more nuanced and ‘active’ picture of TSOs within this study emerges. Respondents frequently illustrate that they ‘can just give them [people in the authorities] a call with the problems I might have’ (Respondent 50, Org02Yek, Yekaterinburg). Informal advocacy activities or insider tactics refer to TSOs using their personal connection to influence policy makers (Mosley, 2009; see chapter 2.3). However, assessing whether or not TSOs are actually influencing policymaking, rather than just using these tactics to deal with bureaucratic difficulties is impossible. The informality of such activities, in particular in the context of the Russian Federation prohibits an objective assessment of the success of TSOs. Nevertheless, illustrating the various ways in which TSOs engage in such activities provide some insights into the potential managed nature of civil society arrangements. Within this study, two different groups of TSOs can be distinguished based on their use of insider tactics.

The first group consists of both smaller grass-root type as well as larger TSOs which could be understood as being independent and which have personal connections to state authorities. These connections are ‘university friends or friends I made around that time’ (Respondent 79, Org30Yek, Yekaterinburg). Primarily such connections are within the same area of the administration within which TSOs operate. TSOs in this group use these connections to informally advocate but not to change policies (i.e. the big issues) to speed things up and solve ‘operational’ issues they might encounter in their service provision activities.

I get in touch with the person, which can solve this problem informally. We know other organisations with which we cooperate sometimes, we organise a roundtable with them, and some of them are able to get us access to the mayor for such informal meetings.

Hence TSOs are happy to use informal advocacy activities to ‘address bureaucratic road blocks’ because ‘the formal channels make the work much harder, maybe ten times harder’ (Respondent 47, Org22, Perm). Thus in effect TSOs within this group primarily use insider tactics to ensure that they are able to engage in their other service providing activities. Similar to Evans’ (2002) observations of TSOs being used to advance the ‘self-interest’ of senior organisational members, these personal ‘advocacy’ connections are frequently used to solve individual problems. Hence this group of TSOs uses their connections to advocate informally, but shy away from confrontational activities or formalising these activities. Thus TSOs seem to be afraid to jeopardise their informal connections if they would engage in formal advocacy or confrontational activities. Consequently, these TSOs do not engage in ‘systematic’ advocacy work but focus on delivering services based on ‘knowing people’ in relevant authorities.

Portraying their insider connections as advocacy highlights how the primary consideration of TSOs in this group is not focused on establishing their independence from the state. Thus it is not a surprise that organisations attribute little value in engaging in confrontational tactics to influence policy (see section 6.2.1). A lack of cooperation and project based approaches (see section 6.2.1) which is also observed by others (Chebankova, 2009; Crotty, 2003, 2009), represents a weakness of civil society which the state is able to exploit and in a subtle way to manage civil society. This is indicative of the lack of understanding of TSOs in this study, that it is they, as agents of civil society, who are builders of civil society. In turn this demonstrates that the state is able to exploit the fragmented nature of Russian civil society (see chapter 3.3.1.1 discussing constraint 1) to manage it.

The second group is constituted by TSOs which have evolved out of ‘Soviet’ social organisations and thus by default have inherited a long established connection with the nomenclature. Good relationships with the authorities are not only illustrated by ‘personal connections’ but frequently manifested in access to ‘facilities’ such as office space, a luxury for most Russian TSOs. For example, the head office of the Org26Yek in Yekaterinburg is housed in the building of the Department of Social Protection of the regional administration. Similar to the first group of TSOs, respondents from this group highlight that ‘informality’ is the most efficient way to solve problems. However, they also portray that confrontational advocacy activities or organisations engaging in ‘demonstration and similar things, the authorities turn away from them and mainly cooperate with us three [referring to the three marionette disability organisations]’ (Respondent 32, Org08Per, Perm). TSOs seem to indicate that the state does not mind if they engage in advocacy activities as long as they remain informal. Therefore, this group of organisations is keen to outline that ‘we never go to court’ (Respondent 48, Org23Per, Perm). The following statement is reflective of how TSOs in this group understand their advocacy activities.

People come to us not with pleasantries but with their problems and we have to solve the problems for them. They come to us when their rights are being violated or when they are unable to get something from the government, because a civil servant thinks that they are not eligible for it [a specific service or welfare benefit]. So we act like a buffer, we take on all the problems, just imagine if they [the disabled] would all go to the authorities straight away. This is what we do day in day out. Events such as going on to the street and shouting give us this, give us that, we do not do this. We do not want conflict with the authorities or the government.

Respondent 32, Org08Per, Perm

Hence this second group of TSOs demonstrate that informal advocacy is critical to their existence. However, as a trade-off to maintain access to the necessary networks with the state, TSOs in this group are willing to forgo engagement in confrontational advocacy activities and unwilling to formalise these informal mechanisms. It seems that in order to be able to maintain such ‘personal’ relations, TSOs are willing to keep their engagement in confrontational activities to a minimum because otherwise ‘the bureaucrats will make it more difficult for you’ (Respondent 48, Org23Per, Perm).

The evidence outlined thus far (see section 6.2.1 and 6.2.2), highlights that, other than TSO research in developing a democratic context suggests, neither larger organisations (Child & Grønbjerg, 2007) nor the ability to use insider or informal advocacy (Mosley, 2009) results in TSOs engaging in advocacy as understood in the literature (Lauderdale, 2009). Even though TSOs might engage in activities that could be classified as advocating in nature, they do not do so publicly and do so frequently as part of providing legislative services. The outlining of formal as well as informal advocacy activities highlights that neither funding source nor proximity to the state explains the preference of TSOs to use informal advocacy channels. Thus far this chapter has established the presence of both formal and informal channels of advocacy. Furthermore, it demonstrated the preference of TSOs to use informal advocacy activities. Formal advocacy activities focus on for example getting elected to participate in roundtables, but there is an absence of suing the state, lobbying Federal bodies to make changes, or embarrassing the state into making legislative or policy changes. It is thus not surprising that most TSOs in this group delineate their advocacy work as providing legal services rather than campaigning for legislative improvements. In effect, TSOs in this study equate advocacy to service provision.

6.2.3 Advocacy as service provision

Presenting service provision as advocacy is not exclusive to previously independent TSOs, but to marionettes. This is an important difference to the findings outlined in chapter five as it demonstrates that all groups of TSOs regardless of their funding or proximity to the state dress up their service provision as advocacy. Respondent 48 for example highlights that they teach their constituents about their rights in a ‘right protection school’ by publishing a regular column in the local Permskiye Novosti newspaper titled ‘Legal advice for the disabled’. This column presents case studies about how disabled people have dealt with issues accessing the health system or sorting out benefit problems.

This is our way to provide advice. We would be unable to deal [with requests] if all the disabled people would come to see us. This way we can tell them, look that is what someone else has done, try that.

Respondent 48, Org23Per, Perm

In a similar manner other TSOs in this study highlight that ‘we offer legal advice and assistance’ (Respondent 13, Org14Sam, Samara), ‘enlighten people about their rights’ (Respondent 54, Org06Yek, Yekaterinburg), or aim to ‘increase the legal understanding of parents of their situation and what rights they have’ (Respondent 7, Org07Sam, Samara). TSOs highlight that with regards to advocacy they have an ‘individual approach’ (Respondent 43, Org18Per, Perm) providing it as a service and only sometimes ‘write a complaint’ (Respondent 38, Org13Per, Perm) but as pointed out above never go to court. It is this context of solving a problem for someone, which is why personal connections are important for TSOs. This means that TSOs informally advocate on an ad hoc basis and focus on smaller issues, such as individual problems. TSOs use solving problems as a catalyst to dress up service provision as advocacy. Therefore, TSOs in this study act as providers of legal services but not as political advocates. In perceiving themselves as service providers TSOs in this

study indicate that they consider that their role is one of serving the state rather than holding it accountable. In managed civil society arrangements, as proposed in this thesis, this is of no surprise as it enables the state to not 'lose face' keeping potential discontent to a minimum and at the same time enables TSOs to raise awareness of some specific issues (see chapter 3.5). Despite engaging in informal advocacy activities, TSOs in this study do not understand themselves as responsible to hold the state to account and as contributors to an autonomous civil society space (see chapter 2.3). Having looked at the question of how TSOs perceive their activities and themselves, as service providers but not political advocates or builders of civil society, understanding how TSOs portray these activities is also important. The literature in chapter two points out that TSOs which are primarily service providers, take on the roles and responsibilities associated with the state and therefore entails substituting or complementing the state (Young, 2000, 2001). Both of these aspects are discussed in the following section.

6.2.3.1 Substituting and complementing the Russian state

Having established how TSOs equate advocacy activities as service provisions, this raises the question of whether TSOs consider their activities as substituting and/or complementing the state. In exploring these issues, the questions of how TSOs perceive their activities and what role they see themselves as assuming will provide further insight into potentially more subtle attempts to manage civil society. In examining this it also explores the opinion of respondents on whether they feel that their organisations should be doing such activities.

In addition to equating advocacy activities with service provision, TSOs in this study engage various types of activities that used to be under purview of the state. This is due to the forced withdrawal of the state (see chapter 3) from service provision in the 1990s (Sil & Chen, 2004) and the state has voluntarily continued this process thereafter (Hemment, 2009; Wengle & Rasell, 2008; see chapter 3.3). Despite these developments it is safe to assume that the state

will continue to assume a role in both health and education, the focus of this thesis (see chapter 1). The empirical material dovetails with this proposition and highlights that TSOs do substitute for the state. An example of such developments is the controversy surrounding the monetisation of welfare benefits for the disabled enacted in 2005 (Wengle & Rasell, 2008). Within this study the respondents of various local chapters of nationwide active disability organisations, all of which originated in the Soviet Union, saw themselves, much like in the past, as cushioning the economic shortfall of their members. Even though respondents outline that the state did not directly encourage them to do so, they do highlight the existence of implicit assumptions that they have to take on these activities. The following quote reflects such circumstances.

In the past, the disabled would receive free transport, but this was also cut [as part of the monetisation of welfare benefits]. What else, the monetisation of *l'gote* [welfare benefits] means that now you get money to pay for medicine and other things, but what is handed out is not enough. Many people opted to have the money [instead of vouchers], but when you think about it a bit, you will find out that the amount you receive does not compensate for the loss of a free service. Consequently, many of them come to us.

Respondent 48, Org23Per, Perm

These TSOs highlight that they are unable to turn away people seeking help. Subsequently, documentary data on these organisations illustrates their engagement in the provision of services, in turn offsetting the withdrawal of the state in this case by offering free transportation. In light of the past and continuous 'retreat' of the state from welfare provision, such developments are evidence that TSOs within this study should consider themselves as substituting for the state. This example clearly indicates that TSOs, in addition to equating advocacy to service provisions are also substituting activities that used to be under the

purview of the state. Herein, organisations in this study reflect pro-typical TSOs as doing what the government does not do (Levitt, 1973; see chapter 2.3).

Similarity exists when considering TSOs as engaging in service providing activities to complement the state. In this case organisations often highlight and articulate their feeling that the services provided by the state are insufficient. This leads to the fact that ‘some come here when their individual rights are violated’ (Respondent 60, Org11Yek, Yekaterinburg) and TSOs need to act ‘against discrimination against them [in this case people suffering from HIV/AIDS] by doctors in hospitals’ (Respondent 13, Org14Sam, Samara). As such, organisations in this study mirror the behaviour of pro-typical TSOs (Levitt, 1973; see chapter 2.3), however it also demonstrates the equating of advocacy to service provision. Reflecting the arguments in the literature (Kettl, 2000; Evers, 1995; see chapter 2.3), the state’s insufficient service provision is rationalised as a result from the bureaucratic nature of state authorities, a fact which the following representative quote mirrors.

For some time now, we have been arguing with the [state-run] Aids centre. They are a very closed institution. Their main doctor [chief executive] might be a good specialist, but he is a bad administrator. The Aids centre is supposed to help people with HIV/AIDS, help them to get the right stamps [in their paperwork] so they are able to go to the hospital for treatment. That centre has neither a psychologist nor the possibility to have group meetings and consultations and the building itself is in a bad condition.

Respondent 13, Org14Sam, Samara

These considerations prompt the question how TSOs understand advocacy equated as service provision and service provision activities. Despite acknowledging that ‘we are replacing the authorities, we are doing their work’ (Respondent 51, Org03Yek, Yekaterinburg), that is

substituting the state, TSOs understand themselves as predominantly wanting to complement it. TSOs in this study highlight that ‘we only want to support the government and not do it [the work] for it’ (Respondent 32, Org08Per, Perm). In outlining their activities in this manner, respondents highlight that they feel it should be the state doing these activities. Perversely this seems to suggest that TSOs challenge their own existence. It further indicates that they clearly understand themselves as subordinated to that state, existing at its mercy and will to provide them with resources. The wide spread understanding of complementing the state is due to the fact that TSOs still attribute ultimate responsibility for the services they provide. For example Respondent 61 of Org12Yek in Yekaterinburg focuses on delivering ‘humanitarian aid’ to children’s homes and psychiatric hospitals. This TSO collects and delivers basic food produce and vitamins to said locations, however understands itself as complementing the state despite highlighting that the state ‘should be providing such services’ (Respondent 61, Org12Yek, Yekaterinburg). The following statement from Org15Per running a hospice as well as an outreach program for the terminally ill, provides a representative statement of how TSOs in this study attribute their activities as the responsibility of the state.

I would love to close all this, if the government institutions would take this on, as it is done in civilised countries.

Respondent 40, Org15Per, Perm

Effectively this suggests that TSOs have to substitute and complement the state because the state’s provision is inadequate. Nonetheless, TSOs in this study consider that to all intents and purposes the responsibility for such activities should lie with the state. This is pivotal to TSOs’ portrayal of complementing rather than substituting the state. In perceiving their activities in this manner, TSOs in this study portray the state as not only responsible for their activities but also more broadly, civil society. It is the state’s prerogative to take on such

activities or outsource them to TSOs. This further highlights the subordination of TSOs to the state and its ability to manage civil society.

Conversely, because the state does not do these activities, and thus TSOs have to exist, respondents raise the issues of funding with regards to such activities. They consider it the responsibility of the state to ‘help us financially’ (Respondent 05, Org05Sam, Samara) or ‘fund our programmes, I think this would be normal’ (Respondent 44, Org19Per, Perm). Therefore, in understanding themselves as complementing the state, TSOs illustrate that in such a case they consider the state as responsible for funding such activities.

In Russia, it is mostly TSOs, which take care of that [social support for people with HIV/AIDS], and the government supports these activities by giving grants and offering projects

Respondent 18, Org19Sam, Samara

Other TSOs highlight that the ‘government provides us with subsidies’ (Respondent 60, Org11Yek, Yekaterinburg) or ‘finances single projects and events’ so that they can engage in their activities (Respondent 65, Org16Yek, Yekaterinburg). However, in turn this evidently strengthens the perception that respondents hold vis-à-vis the state’s responsibility to provide these services and subsequent portrayal of themselves as complementing the state. The wish of respondents for the state to fund their activities clearly creates resource dependency of TSOs on the state. For many TSOs, government funding is becoming increasingly vital for their existence and activities.

Well, basically we have no [resource] limitations for our projects, because you see, the state helps us. We would be unable to do this [referring to their activities] without such help.

In examining the question of how TSOs perceive their activities and themselves, the evidence highlights that ultimately they consider the state as responsible for service providing activities. Given that TSOs equate advocacy to service provision (see section 6.2.2), they outline that this is also the responsibility of the state. This in turn means that TSOs understand themselves as assuming a role of complementing the state. Such perceptions of their own activities are indicative of TSOs to not consider themselves as builders of an autonomous civil society space. On the contrary, TSOs perceive themselves as subordinates to the state, acting as its service providers, demonstrating the managed nature of civil society arrangements. These observations also demonstrate that TSOs do not seem to understand their role as builders of an autonomous civil society, and the potential compromise to such activities that come with state funding in the context of the Russian Federation. This leads to depoliticised TSOs and highlights a more subtle attempt of the state to manage civil society. Further, such developments are indicative of TSOs giving away any independence they might have left (see chapter 3.3.1) and it dovetails with the argument put forward that Russian civil society arrangements are managed by the state (see chapter 3.5).

6.3 Conclusion

This chapter has focused on further analysing the management of civil society in the context of the Russian Federation and the question of how managed civil society arrangements manifest themselves. Extending on chapter five, which looks at the legislative attempt to manage civil society, this chapter examined more subtle approaches to manage civil society. In order to investigate such attempts, the chapter addresses a gap in our understanding of Russian civil society by looking at health and educational TSOs and how they act as state substitutes. In doing so this chapter has examined the questions of how TSOs perceive their activities and themselves and what role TSOs consider themselves as assuming. By

examining the perception of respondents about how the work and activities of their organisations relates to the responsibilities of the state, this chapter is able to show the dominant and all-encompassing nature of the Russian state and illustrate the ensuing managed civil society arrangements. In doing so this chapter has portrayed the way in which TSOs engage in formal and informal advocacy activities.

This chapter has demonstrated that TSOs engage in some formal advocacy activities, but do not confront or hold the state accountable. TSOs are afraid of engaging in confrontational activities and portray themselves as more comfortable in using informal advocacy activities, preserving personal connections within the state and access to resources. Informal advocacy does provide more scope to influence the state (Mosley, 2009), but at the same time, given the lack of resources and fragmented nature of Russian TSOs (see chapter 3.3.1), this allows for more scope for the state to ‘capture’ or ‘manage’ TSOs. Furthermore, it means that TSOs are unlikely to engage in campaigns to confront the state or cooperate with other TSOs to build strong coherent social movements able to challenge and hence hold the state accountable (Taylor, 2006). These insights highlight that the state has created formal, taking the shape of the NGO law, and informal barriers to the freedom of assembly and thus the TSOs ability to contribute to democratisation (Taylor, 2006). In addition TSOs equate these informal advocacy activities as service provision and holding the state to account. The literature points out that service providing TSOs are less likely to engage in direct advocacy activities challenging the state (Anheier, 2009; Hall, 2002; see chapter 2.3). An observation that is reflected in the evidence outlined. Such considerations are indicative of the Russian state’s attempt to depoliticise TSOs. In effect, TSOs portray themselves as providing advocacy through their services. Research evidence from a developed democratic context shows that in order to be effective in providing services TSOs need to publicly advocate, confront the state, and hold the state to account (Foley & Edwards, 1996, Anheier, 2009). The evidence

discussed in this chapter highlights that this is not the case and therefore indicates the management of Russian civil society.

With regards to service providing activities and mirroring Soviet mentality (see chapter 3), TSOs aim to portray a state that is taking care of its citizens, hence a strong state. Rather than understanding any of their activities as substituting for the state, TSOs in this study consider their activities as complementing the state. Seeing themselves as complementing the state allows TSOs to depict the state as doing its part and portray themselves picking up the areas in which “the state is not doing enough” (Levitt, 1973, p. 49). These aspects play an important part when determining the potential of civil society to contribute to democratic governance and in the case of Russian democratisation. The insight of this chapter shows that civil society is not autonomous and subordinates itself to the state by illustrating the state as being ultimately responsible to take care of its citizens and civil society. In this way, TSOs illustrate the state as being strong and in control. TSOs portraying a weak state image would mean a delegitimizing and undermining of state authority (Batley & McLoughlin, 2010), something alien to the context of the Russian Federation. Furthermore, TSOs in this study highlight that if the state does not take up such activities, it needs to fund TSOs. However, TSOs in this study do not understand the potential impediments to their autonomy, specifically when juxtaposed with the restrictive NGO law (see chapter 3.4), which the acceptance of such resources will bring in turn. This again highlights the lack of understanding of TSOs in this study of their role as building civil society. Similarly, as in the NGO law, the state takes advantage of this to further manage civil society.

Chapter two illustrates that TSOs frequently become dependent on the resources associated with such contracts (see chapter 2.3). Resource dependency, as the literature argues (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) provides external agents with the ability to influence the objectives and activities of organisations. With regards to TSOs, the literature outlines that the contracting

out of services by the state has meant that such organisations are in a resource dependent relationship with the state (Smith & Lipsky, 1993). Considering the context illustrated in this chapter, TSOs are specifically vulnerable to state influence and in particular because they ‘want’ the state to fund their activities and take care of civil society. Therefore as this chapter highlights and contrary to the empirical insights from developed democracies (Chaves, Stephens, & Galaskiewicz, 2004; Child & Grønbjerg, 2007), within Russia’s managed civil society arrangements, the original proposition of resource dependency theory, that with government funding a limit of the political and therefore advocacy activity of TSOs (Smith & Lipsky, 1993), is occurring.

The provision of resources by the state enables it to take on the role of the ‘principal’ (see chapter 3.5 & Henderson, 2002) shaping agendas and activities of TSOs. In a comparative perspective, this is no different to western democracies such as the United States of America or the United Kingdom where the state also acts as the major resource provider for TSOs (Mercer, 2002). However, other than in developed democracies, the empirical evidence demonstrates that this has limited the political agendas of these organisations. This accelerates the process of depoliticising TSOs and the *institutionalisation* of these *new* management mechanisms established by both the NGO law (see chapter 5.3) and more subtle attempts illustrated in this chapter. Consequently, areas that have the potential to generate positive political return, such as disability, children, or veterans are more likely to receive resource support. Therefore, in addition to the incentives created by the NGO law (see chapter 5) the focus on the activities of TSOs demonstrates the mobilising of civil society around “patriotism rather than political protest” (Henderson, 2008, p. 18). The evidence shown in this chapter highlights that TSOs take this up as part of their *raison d’être*. Effectively this demonstrates the state’s subtle attempts to manage civil society.

The weakness of Russian civil society stems from its weak contribution to democratisation; circumstances which TSOs engagement in service provision are unlikely to change. On the contrary, it provides the state with an opportunity to ensure stability of its regime. Service providing TSOs offer the state the possibility to distribute minimal social welfare provision needed for the system of a managed democracy to operate (Hemment, 2009). The state increasingly acknowledges the usability of TSOs to facilitate the managed democratic regime (Balzer, 2003). It seems that similar to Soviet social organisations, contemporary depoliticised TSOs act as surrogates for the state, which is further explored in chapter seven when examining marionette organisations.

Chapter two argues that civil society is situated between the individual and the state and the ‘transformation’ of TSOs in this study into service providers reshapes their relationship with state authorities, into hierarchical and dependent arrangements (see chapter 3.5). As specialised service providing organisations TSOs will be less conducive to ‘aggregation and representation’ of interest driving ‘big issue’ advocacy type activities (Taylor, 2006), and key for civil society’s democratisation potential. TSOs are likely to be unable to attract public support and participation (see chapter 3.3.1) making such organisations depoliticised in nature and no longer assuming the role of builders of civil society. In effect this chapter, similar to chapter five, demonstrates that the underlying social relations shaping civil society (see chapter 2.4) have not changed. It is the lack of change in these underlying social relations that the state is able to exploit in these subtle attempts to manage civil society.

To conclude and summarise this chapter and its focus on more subtle attempts of managing civil society, the evidence shows that TSOs in this study in effect equate advocacy with service providing activities. They substitute for the state but see themselves as complementing. Further, they consider the state as taking care of civil society. In doing so, TSOs feel that the state should be doing their activities and hence they should not exist.

However, if the state does not do this, it should at least fund TSOs. This clearly highlights that TSOs in this study do not (or do not want to) understand the role of TSOs as builders of civil society. Hence, similar to the 2006 NGO law, the state takes advantage of the weakness of civil society. In turn this leads to a depoliticising of TSOs and the potential prevalence of such organisations as surrogates of the state (i.e. marionette organisations). Chapter seven further investigates the subordination of TSOs to the state to highlight the management of *complete* civil society and establish potential limits to the state's ability to control and mould civil society this way.

CHAPTER 7: Organisational characteristics of state management

7.1 Introduction

Chapters five and six have highlighted the attempts of the Russian state to manage and mould civil society. This chapter examines research objective three of this thesis (see chapter 1.1 and 4.1) which is *to investigate the characteristics of managed civil society and potential limits to the state's ability to mould civil society in this way*. To do so, this chapter examines the organisational level outcomes of the state's attempt to manage civil society. This contributes to answering the question of how managed civil society arrangements manifest themselves in the Russian Federation.

A recurring conclusion of chapters five and six was that TSOs consider themselves to be subordinated to the state which is further explored in this chapter. Therefore this chapter looks at the mechanism with which the state attempts to capture and subordinate TSOs to ensure that they are subordinated. In turn TSOs are likely to mimic marionette like characteristics. As outlined in chapter three, marionette organisations are characterised by their proximity to the authorities and inherent lack of independence (Cook & Vinogradova, 2006) and can be defined as government organised nongovernmental organisations (Khanna, 2009). Marionettes assist the state in creating the image of a democratic society that has TSOs and a functioning third sector (Cook & Vinogradova, 2006; see chapter 1 and 4). Marionette organisations are able to survive because they maintain mutually dependent and profitable relationships with the authorities, portraying themselves as independent, yet at the same time acting in accordance to the agenda of the state. This chapter also examines the characteristics of marionette like behaviour amongst TSOs in this study. Specifically it outlines the differences and communalities between the three regions. Similar to insights from research in other areas of Russian civil society (see chapter 3) this section outlines that TSOs are becoming part of public institutions, reflecting a 'nationalisation' of civil society. However,

extending the literature (see chapter 3.4) this chapter focuses on the examination of TSOs mimicking marionettes rather than just marionette organisations and highlights the increase of marionette like characteristics amongst once independent TSOs. TSOs with marionette like characteristics increasingly become the only ‘legitimate’ inhabitant of Russia’s civil society space as only they can access resources or interact with the state. With regards to the research question of how managed civil society manifests itself in the context of the Russian Federation, the chapter outlines that this facilitates the management of civil society. Therefore, this chapter addressed the following two interrelated questions:

Why are TSOs mimicking marionette organisations?

How do TSOs with marionettes like behaviour differ to marionettes?

To examine these questions, this chapter is divided into two sections. The first section looks at the mechanism with which the state attempts to capture TSOs to encourage them to mimic marionettes. Further, this section examines the characteristics of marionette like behaviour amongst TSOs in this study. Specifically it outlines the differences and communalities between the three regions. The second section concluding this chapter examines the differences between TSOs mimicking marionettes and marionettes as illustrated in the literature in light of the research question of how managed civil society arrangements are manifested in the Russian Federation.

7.2 Capturing health and education TSOs

As highlighted in chapter three, funding government-organised organisations to demonstrate the existence of a third sector is not a recent phenomenon in Russia (Cook & Vinogradova, 2006). In turn these organisations, also known as marionettes, enable the state to infiltrate civil society in an attempt to curtail TSOs activity and manage civil society. During the Soviet

period, marionettes provided the state a channel to address social issues as well as manage non-political participation (Alekseeva, 2010). Marionettes represent depoliticised civil society organisations managed by the state. The evidence presented and discussed in chapters five and six indicates explicit and subtle attempts to manage civil society and depoliticise TSOs. Depoliticised TSOs do not confront the state or act as a counterweight to it, creating a third sector or civil society that operates according to the directive given by the state. The following quote from Respondent 16 exemplifies this mentality.

Russia is a country where the role of the government is important. If the government does not support something, then the TSOs have difficulties doing something in this direction. If the government says this needs to be done only then will TSOs work in this direction, otherwise nothing will happen this is how it works in Russia. It does not matter what the topic is. For example if the government says our policy is to support a healthy way of life, then more TSOs will be founded that work in this area. Without the help of the government, you cannot achieve anything. People understand that, this is why they feel that their time and money is wasted founding and working in such organisations [which do not work according to the government's policies].

Respondent 16, Org17Sam, Samara

This quote highlights that TSOs in this study have a *directional* perception of the state. In order to be able to operate as an effective organisation, the activities of TSOs have to reflect the aims and objectives of the state. Thus it seems that TSOs are waiting to be told what areas they need to engage in, rather than in a grass-roots manner deciding it for themselves. TSOs can choose not to follow the objectives set by the state, however they do so with the knowledge that they are less likely to be successful. TSOs portray themselves as not following the instructions of the state are often the ones that are unable to access resources and engage in activities such as meeting for tea and biscuits. Consequently in examining the

controlling of health and education TSOs, two groups of organisations exist (see Appendix G for a tables of both groups). The first group of TSOs not displaying marionette characteristics are organisations which illustrate themselves as lacking personal and close connection within the state, not being invited to participate in formal mechanisms of state-TSO interaction, and unable to access resources from the state. The second group of TSOs, many of which display some marionette characteristics or behaviours can be delineated as having closer and more personal connections with the state, being part of formal state-TSO interaction mechanism, able to access resources of the state, and aligning themselves with the directional approach illustrated in the quote above. These groups are described in detail in the following sections before examining the structures and incentives that encourage TSOs to mimic marionettes.

7.2.1 TSOs without marionette characteristics

The first group of organisations (see Appendix G.1 table G.6) consists of TSOs that do not mimic marionette organisations or display marionette characteristics. These organisations do not portray themselves as having a connection within the state. They also highlight that civil society is divided into ‘red disability organisations and white disability organisations’ (Respondent 55, Org07Yek, Yekaterinburg) meaning that some are able to interact with the state and others are not, referring to themselves as the latter. It is only *preferred* organisations that are invited to participate in formal interaction mechanisms such as roundtables.

The administration only works with the organisations they like, the ones that do not ask questions. We do ask questions and so we are not invited [to these round tables].

Respondent 31, Org07Per, Perm

This highlights that the activities, rhetoric, and objectives of these TSOs do not seem to conform to the aims of the state. This group of TSOs considers other organisations which do participate in such interaction as being in an insufficient critical position towards the

government' (Respondent 54, Org06Yek, Yekaterinburg), because these forms of interaction are initiated and controlled by the state. TSOs in this group do not adhere to these informal (directing) and coercive pressures and hence remain at the fringes of civil society resembling afternoon tea and coffee clubs. Many of these organisations engage in politically *unsafe* or contested topics such as HIV/AIDS (Zigon, 2009) or activities that are not part of the aims or objectives of the state. This limits the ability of such organisations to operate effectively.

As soon as people hear the word HIV/AIDS or drug abuse, they close their door. They do not want to support activities of TSOs that work in such areas.

Respondent 13, Org14Sam, Samara

Therefore, another important factor that delineates the two groups of TSOs in this study is their ability to access resources. TSOs in this group of organisations portray themselves as unable to access domestic funding. For these 'have-nots', as Org12Sam in Samara highlights, their entire budget is usually made up of membership fees and they do not tend to win grants from the state or 'receive and resource from the government' (Respondent 38, Org13Per, Perm). Respondent 55 from Org07Yek in Yekaterinburg highlights the plight of TSOs in this group of 'never received a penny from the state'.

I have not received a single penny [*kopeka*] from the state. The local councillor has his office just down the hall from our room here. But we have not received anything of the city.

Respondent 55, Org07Yek, Yekaterinburg

In turn this starves such TSOs of the resources to conduct their activities effectively. The group of TSOs that do not display marionette like behaviour can be characterised as not subordinating themselves to the directional approach of the state. However it highlights that

by not engaging in this way, they are unable to operate in an effective way, making them into afternoon coffee and tea clubs for friends and family to meet and socialise. Furthermore, this limits their ability to hold the state to account. The second group of TSOs in this study are organisations that portray themselves as displaying marionette like characteristics.

7.2.2 TSOs with marionette characteristics

Surprisingly this is the larger group of TSOs (see Appendix G.2 table G.7) in this study illustrating the increase of marionette like behaviour amongst TSOs, which were independent in the past. This group encompasses marionettes as well as TSOs that mimic marionette organisations. The latter are different to marionettes primarily because they lack the political embeddedness, something discussed in more detail in the conclusion of this chapter. TSOs in this group illustrate themselves as loyal to the Federal state reflected in the following quote taken from an informal chat with respondent 61 referring to a speech addressing the state by President Medvedev the day before

Now I am upbeat about the third sector. He said so many good things yesterday, that we need to root out corruption. If you would have asked me yesterday, what I think about our work, and then I think I would have given you a negative assessment. But now, after he said all these positive things, that the state needs to work with us and not against us, that he will address the negative attitude of the local bureaucrats, this is all very promising

Respondent 61, Org12Yek, Yekaterinburg

This illustrates the absence of hostility of TSOs within this group against the state. This is further highlighted by the proximity many of the organisations in the group aim to portray in stating that they have ‘friends in the administration’ (Respondent 79, Org30Yek,

Yekaterinburg), or that ‘when we work with the state, it is always a win-win’ (Respondent 52, Org04Yek, Yekaterinburg)

Apart from working ‘closely together with the government authorities’ (Respondent 05, Org05Sam, Samara) or that their organisations are ‘not confrontational’ (Respondent 49, Org01Yek, Yekaterinburg) this group of organisations illustrate that they profit from following the directives of the state. An example of such behaviour is outlined by respondents when referring to the year of the child and family the Russian government declared in 2007. The majority of TSOs in this study adjusted their projects, programs, and activities to focus on children. The following statement reflects such comments:

Of course when they [the state] announced the year of the child and family it was easier for us to go to donors and ask for support. It was easier to access [local] government structures; we were able to say to everyone, look the government supports us.

Respondent 59, Org10Yek, Yekaterinburg

Aligning their activities with the agenda of the (Federal) state helps TSOs to access resources. Thus it is not surprising that this group of TSOs portray themselves as being able to access resources from the state. For example, in the informal chat following the interview, Org23Per was proud to convey that the regional administration now has a provision in its budget, which means that the organisations receive regular income from the state. Similarly, Org32Yek outlines how the city administration invited them to attend the budget meeting, which enabled them to receive resources directly from the budget without the need to participate in grant competitions.

I have a meeting with the city council. Today they have their final discussion of the budget. I have to be there for 1 o'clock, so I can see if we get some money directly from the budget.

Respondent 81, Org32Yek, Yekaterinburg

Hence for the organisations that *have* state resources, keeping relations and personal connections in tact is vital. Considerations of independence or building an autonomous civil society are clearly not a primary importance to respondents and TSOs in this group. Despite respondents of this group emphasising different ways of how they access funding from the state, directly from the state or via grants, they still consider themselves as privileged representatives of civil society.

Yes we do write grants, and considering this, our projects [*pragrami*] must be good, so we always receive something. Every time we participate [in a grant competition] we receive something. I cannot remember when we did not receive a grant [which they applied for]. This is quite interesting, because I know that very many people write them, but not everyone receives them, but our organisation is always supported.

Respondent 78, Org29Yek, Yekaterinburg

As for being part of this group, it seems that TSOs understand themselves as selected by the state to help it build civil society. This indicates the lack of understanding of what role TSOs should be assuming (see chapter 2.3). And thus resembling the conclusions made about the 2006 NGO law (see chapter 5.5) that the state takes advantage, using the offer of funding and resources to further the management of civil society. However, for this group of TSOs, by mimicking marionettes demonstrates that as organisations they are reacting in a rational manner to the incentives created by the state. These incentives aim to create social arrangements, which facilitate a civil society that *fits* with the managed democratic regime.

TSOs operate on the instructions of the state and it is these instructions that facilitate marionette like behaviour of TSOs. Therefore the following section discusses the various ways in which the state aims to capture (i.e. instruct) TSOs and therefore encourage them to mimic marionette organisations.

7.2.3 Mechanism of capturing TSOs

In chapter three, this thesis outlined that the lack of an organised civil society (Richter, 2009) means the state needs to capture TSOs (Hedlund, 2006, see chapter 3.5). This section will illustrate ways in which the state captures TSOs. In turn this enables the state to create the image of a functioning third sector. The state does this by providing resource incentives as well as establishing formalised ways of interaction between the state and civil society. TSOs highlight that in contemporary Russia there are ‘lots of modes of interaction of TSOs with administrative structures’ (Respondent 15, Org16Sam, Samara) and this way the state provides ‘moral and material support’ (Respondent 76, Org27Yek, Yekaterinburg). Therefore the state creates a mechanism to select organisations for *preferred* access to the state. Access to the state is important for TSOs in this study as is illustrated by the dominance of informal advocacy (see chapter 6). For marionettes to exist and TSOs to become marionette-like, a vital ingredient is that they are sponsored by the state. The illustration of resource dependency in the following section indicates the monetary way in which the state sponsors TSOs and encourages marionette like behaviour.

7.2.3.1 Resource dependency

As discussed in chapter six, TSOs are reliant on personal connections within the state and engage in service provision which they consider as complementing the state. This inevitably makes TSOs less independent and highlights that they do not understand themselves as builders of civil society. The increase in resources made available by the state via state or quasi-state organisations for TSOs further serves to strengthen this position (Cook &

Vinogradova, 2006). The provision of resources and funding, even though often minimal, has existed in the past particularly at the regional level (Cook & Vinogradova, 2006). However, more recently funding has been made available directly from the Federal centre (The Public Chamber of the Russian Federation, 2008). Funding from the Federal centre is provided through several organisations, which have been set up by the Federal Public Chamber, a body organised by the state to *manage* state-civil society interactions (Nikitin & Buchanan, 2002; Richter, 2009). TSOs refer to the available funding via these organisations as presidential grants. Table 7.1 highlights the various organisations that are set up, and their orientation, that is activities which they are meant to fund, as well as the amounts of funding they administered in 2008 (The Public Chamber of the Russian Federation, 2008).

Specialised Funding Organisations	Thematic area of projects to receive funds	Total amount of funding (Number of projects)
“Social Designing Institute”	Opinion polling and monitoring of the state of civil society	56 Million Roubles (30)
“Znanie” [Knowledge]	Education, arts, culture and public diplomacy	253 Million Roubles (270)
“In Support of Civil Society”	Protection of human rights and freedoms and legal education of the public	127 Million Roubles (115)
“National Health League”	Promotion of healthy life style; protection of public health and environment	141 Million Roubles (251)
“National Charitable Foundation”	Support of and social care for the poor and socially vulnerable groups of citizens	374 Million Roubles (411)
“Governmental Club”	Youth initiatives; youth movement and organisation projects	216 Million Roubles (146)

Table 7.1: Presidential grants and their distribution adapted from annual report of the Public Chamber of the Russian Federation

Table 7.1 outlines that in 2008 the six specialised organisations distributed 1250 million roubles to 1223 projects (The Public Chamber of the Russian Federation, 2008) meaning an average project contribution of just over 1 million roubles or around 20,000 British pounds. In comparison municipal or regional authority grants are less attractive.

Now we have a system of municipal grants, but the money which they pay out is not very much. I think it is around 100,000 roubles. With that you can organise maybe two events.

In a context in which the state has restricted the ability of TSOs to access funding outside of Russia (see chapter 3.4.1 and chapter 5) available domestic resources are increasingly important. This facilitates the state's attempt to manage civil society. For TSOs it often reflects increased competition, competition that ensures that TSOs do not cooperate, making their management easier for the state.

Now there is very stiff competition for resources on what I would say a very small market [meaning limited supply]. So you might cooperate in projects or something similar, but when it comes to funding then you do not.

Respondent 47, Org22Per, Perm

It is thus not surprising that despite more competition attribute to presidential grants, TSOs are more inclined to apply for such funding. This becomes clear when juxtaposed against the observations made by the Federal Public Chamber of the Russian Federation (The Public Chamber of the Russian Federation, 2008). They have registered a decrease in activities aimed at protecting rights, which can be classified as counter the state, and an increase of activities providing social benefits, education or offering leisure or sport activities which can be classified as depoliticising, which is not surprising (The Public Chamber of the Russian Federation, 2008).

Respondents understand the resources provided by the state as 'government grants for the TSO sector' (Respondent 42, Org17Per, Perm) and indicate that the state is 'finally taking care of TSOs' (Respondent 09, Org09Sam, Samara). This is something many feel is long overdue after neglecting TSOs in the 1990s (see chapter 3.3.1). This sentiment is demonstrated in the following quote from the director TSOs in Perm:

On the level of the government they have develop this grant system. Now the government makes sure that we have TSOs.

Respondent 26, Org02Per, Perm

The majority of TSOs in this study welcome that the state is taking care of civil society but this is another indication that they understand themselves as being subservient to the state. Due to the fact that the funding TSOs receive is administered by the Federal centre of local authorities, the sentiment that it is the states responsibility to take care of civil society which is an indication of a worrying development amongst TSO decision makers. It demonstrates that respondents do not seem to understand the roles of TSOs as builders of an autonomous civil society. Conversely, they attribute this role to the state. Furthermore, the willingness to access funding from the state demonstrates that TSOs in this study do not acknowledge how compromised they will be if they take the state's money. TSOs are willing to give away their independence, and seem to feel more comfortable within civil society arrangements managed by the state.

I think the grant is a form of supporting and nurturing the development of TSOs. This way they [the state authorities] stimulate the activities of such organisations and also their creation.

Respondent 54, Org06Yek, Yekaterinburg

Respondents understanding of the state taking care of civil society, indicates the state's attempt to manage civil society. Further, it reflects contemporary arrangements in the economy in which a dominant state subtly manages the economy using the mechanism of state-corporatism (Fish, 2008; Hanson & Teague, 2005; Kubicek, 1996) which has led to Russian style capitalism (Gustafson, 2001). Similarly the issue of resource dependency

provides the state with an effective mechanism to capture and manage civil society. The fear of losing state resources has been a recurring motivation of TSOs behaviour in chapters five and six. Another mechanism of state capture is the ideological buy-in of TSOs and is reflective of the directional approach by the state. This leads TSOs to adjust their activities and engagement in accordance to state policy. The illustration of the ideological buy-in in the following section indicates a more subtle way of the state sponsoring TSOs and encouraging marionette like behaviour.

7.2.3.2 Ideological buy-in

In displaying marionette characteristics, TSOs associate proximity to the state with benefits such as access to resources because ‘funding availability has changed towards Russian governmental financing’ (Respondent 10, Org10Sam, Samara). For marionette organisations, state funding is an integral part to both their creation as well as continuous existence and reflected in their ideological buy-in. However, it also points out a crucial incentive for TSOs which were previously independent to *marionettes* themselves. With regards to the ideological buy-in, the objective of state is to ‘change the aims [of TSOs] and focus on the cooperation with such organisations that are active in a non-critical way’ (Respondent 45, Org20Per, Perm). Thus TSOs will engage in activities in line with the Federal state’s agenda, as they are more fruitful to ensure survival of their organisations. Respondent 59, reflecting the impression of other respondents, highlights how a change in the priorities of the state benefited their organisation.

If for example our project matches a [government] program, then they will take it on board [meaning funding it]. You know the government’s priorities are now based around preserving families and supporting families and this is very good for us, because our objectives and project overlap with this.

Respondent 59, Org10Yek, Yekaterinburg

Respondent 59 demonstrates that because their activities overlap with the priorities of the state, this has been beneficial for their organisation. This signals that there are benefits for TSOs if they align their activities with state policy and in effect mimic marionette organisations. With regards to the activities of TSOs, this quote is indicative of the state controlling and directing organisations to what are *preferred* activities as ‘it is the government itself who decides which programmes are needed and which are not’ (Respondent 57, Org09Yek, Yekaterinburg). This demonstrates that the state can decide which organisations to fund and interact with and it does so based on whether or not they *fit* with its political priorities. This encourages the ideological buy-in of TSOs. It also indicates the negotiated nature of legitimacy (i.e. marionette like behaviour) in managed civil society. TSOs align themselves with the policies of the state becoming marionette like and in turn become legitimate to interact with the state. In turn TSOs become public institutions.

Well in Yekaterinburg people think that our organisation is already a part of the government structure. This is because we work very closely with the municipal administration and we have our offices in the building of the administration, so many think that we are a government structure.

Respondent 51, Org03Yek, Yekaterinburg

As a result TSOs begin to reflect marionette like features. Thus the ideological buy-in represents another way in which the state is able to capture TSOs. Furthermore, ideological buy-ins also enables TSOs to access ‘different meetings, committees, round tables, public meetings, and public chambers’ (Respondent 15, Org16Sam, Samara), that is direct and formal ways of accessing the state. The Public Chamber is discussed representatively for these ways of access and a method of capturing TSOs. The illustration of the Public Chamber

in the following section indicates the institutionalised way of the state sponsoring TSOs and encouraging marionette like behaviour.

7.2.3.3 The Public Chamber

As chapter three outlines, the Public Chamber has been initiated by the state to formalise and manage interaction between TSOs and state authorities (Nikitin & Buchanan, 2002; Richter, 2009; see chapter 3.4.1). Despite some critical and confrontational behaviour towards the Federal Public Chamber, the regional or city equivalents display a less confrontational stance (Richter, 2009). The Public Chamber seemingly serves to legitimate marionettes as agents of civil society as well as capture TSOs, which subsequently then exhibit marionette like behaviour. The invitational aspect of Public Chamber ensures that TSOs remain politically inactive outside these formal interaction mechanisms in order to be able to maintain their membership. TSOs which are invited consider the structure and the development of the Public Chamber as normal in the Russian context.

What I can tell you, this [the Public Chamber] is one of the reins of the government to control the TSOs. In particular when it comes to administering grants, they ask you these questions, what kind of office space do you have, how many computers do you have, how many staff members. Such questions help them [the state] to establish a database of TSOs. Well it is a desire to control the market, this is normal.

Respondent 59, Org10Yek, Yekaterinburg

However, considering the development prospect of civil society as an autonomous space, control of TSOs as normal highlights a worrying prospect. This underlines that TSOs do not understand civil society as an autonomous space, but as a space that is controlled and managed by the state. In turn TSOs appear more like marionettes than autonomous and

independent agents of civil society. Hence, TSOs in this group consider the Public Chamber as an important part of being able to engage in their activities.

I think that it [the Public Chamber] is indispensable. It can be helpful, if it is working. This is a structure that could be able to represent opinions to which the government has to listen. The only thing, as far as I know, government organs create all these Public Chambers; from the beginning, they are already marionettes. Therefore, they do not work properly, but the idea of such is very good.

Respondent 81, Org32Yek, Yekaterinburg

In regards to the management of civil society it aligns with the wishes of respondents in this group seeking proximity to the state. Even more than an institution for access to the state, the Public Chamber is a signal to TSOs, that in order to be able to gain proximity to the state, they will need to alter their activities. In turn this means that TSOs have to depoliticise themselves and in effect become marionette like organisations. Therefore, the institution of the Public Chamber provides a way for the state to capture TSOs. Further, as this section has argued, this creates incentives for TSOs to behave marionette like. This represents the completion of the management of civil society; TSOs with marionettes like behaviour are therefore the organisational consequences or outcomes of managed civil society arrangements. The following section illustrates the marionette like features TSOs have adopted across the three regions.

7.2.4 TSOs with marionette like behaviour

This section explores marionette like behaviour amongst TSOs (see chapter 3.5). The aim is to understand to what extent TSOs are becoming servants of the state and enforcers of the Federal state's infrastructural power (Mann, 1986) as well as differences of such behaviour across the three regions. The previous section has outlined the structures and incentives in

place creating coercive pressures (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) for TSOs and forcing them to resemble marionettes. Therefore, in exploring how TSOs behave like marionettes, it enables the chapter to draw conclusions whether the state has completed the management of civil society. As this chapter has pointed out, with regards to health and educational TSOs there are various incentives for such organisations to behave in a marionette like fashion. Furthermore, TSOs in this group, focus on building alliances and developing cooperation with the state, rather than remaining autonomous. Displaying marionette like characteristics enables TSOs to do so. The following sections outline the characteristics and nature of such organisations in the three regions of Yekaterinburg, Samara, and Perm.

7.2.4.1 Marionette like behaviour in Yekaterinburg

The earlier illustrated incentive structures of round tables, committees, or the public chamber to encourage marionette like behaviour provide the critical parameters to highlight marionette like behaviour in all three regions, and particularly in Yekaterinburg. Many respondents highlight that by engaging with the state in round tables or committees they have been drawn into working for the state. In particular respondents outline their new role within the state as overlapping with the work of their TSOs. For example, respondent 51 points out that part of her part-time role with the regional authorities means that she oversees the city's regulations to make buildings more accessible for people in wheelchairs. At the same time, the main objective of Org03Yek to promote accessibility into public buildings and spaces. Rather than considering this as compromising the organisation's ability to remain autonomous, respondent 51 considers this as a good way to collaborate with the state. Respondent 65 provides another example of similar arrangements where TSO decision makers are 'sucked' into state structures. Arguing that their organisation was faced with a lack of resources, respondent 65 highlights that through engaging in committees they were able to interact with the government. As a result the relevant government authorities have hired respondent 65 and the organisation's employees as full time staff with the objective to run this specific TSO.

To solve this problem [of financing our employees], the department for sport created a special section for adaptive sports and we are employed by this department. We receive our salary from a government institution but work here in this TSO.

Respondent 65, Org16Yek, Yekaterinburg

In effect such organisations are becoming part of the state and its structures. This represents a ‘sucking in’ of TSOs. This sort of characteristic is particularly dominant amongst TSOs which portray themselves as having received foreign funding in the past or which could be classified as ‘advocacy or policy organisations’ (Crotty, 2006). As opposed to the insight that the state creates marionettes (Cook & Vinogradova, 2006), this highlights that amongst health and educational TSOs a reverse movement takes place. This might facilitate informal advocacy illustrated in chapter six, but does not encourage TSOs to act as counterweights to the state or building an autonomous civil society space.

Another characteristic of marionette like behaviour is that TSOs are ‘spun off’ from the government. Even though resembling the ‘creation’ of organisations by the state (i.e. marionettes; see Cook & Vinogradova, 2006), organisations that are spun off, highlight that they have not been created by the government. These sort of spin offs seem to be particularly common amongst health TSOs focusing on ‘capital intensive’ service provision activities such as drug addiction or alcohol abuse. Respondent 52 highlights that Org04Yek was founded while still working within the relevant government department.

I used to work in the department of education. We had a big problem with disabled children in schools. So I decided to set up a TSO and a centre that would address some of these problems. As there were many nursery buildings which were in decay we

were given this building here. I just went to the municipality with my idea and they were happy to give it to me.

Respondent 52, Org04Yek, Yekaterinburg

Subsequently, respondent 52 used this organisation to parachute herself into new employment, maintaining her relations with the department of education as well as providing employment for her immediate family. Similar to the ‘sucking in’ of TSOs to the state, such spinning off also ensures that such organisation maintain their loyalty to the state. TSOs do not consider their role as building civil society, but much rather as extending the state and complementing the state’s service provision (see chapter 6). As key decision makers have been part of the state structures, TSOs that have been spun off from the state, illustrate their membership in round tables and committees.

7.2.4.2 Marionette like behaviour in Samara

Whereas in Yekaterinburg several respondents indicated that they have effectively spun off from the state, in Samara, none of the TSOs indicate or portray themselves as such. There are TSOs such as Org15Sam which were founded by the encouragement of the state. However as in case of Org15Sam, which is a local chapter of a nationwide organisation, such encouragement has taken place at the Federal level. Even though none of the TSOs in this study located in Samara portrayed themselves as spin offs from the government, the reverse movement of ‘sucking in’ TSOs does take place. Similarly to the respondents in Yekaterinburg, an overlap of responsibilities can be observed, in which respondents in their employment for the state are responsible for the areas in which their TSOs primarily engage in. For example Respondent 19 is responsible for the implementation of the city’s youth program and policies as part her ‘day job’ in the state, and at the same time, the TSO’s main activities are targeted at young children and adolescences.

I do not work here all the time. I work for the government and I focus on the development of youth policy.

Respondent 19, Org20Sam, Samara

This highlights a clear similarity to the arrangements outlined in Yekaterinburg. Consequently, it becomes difficult for TSOs to criticise the work of the state, as many would criticise themselves personally. However, for some TSOs, this sucking in means that they are able to establish closer ties with the authorities.

Besides I am not only a member of staff at the department of education but I am also a member of the committee for the rehabilitation of disabled children which the department put into place. So you see we are very directly involved with it and our contact to the department is quite close.

Respondent 15, Org16Sam, Samara

Again reflecting the discourse of interaction and alliance with the state, the sucking into the state provides a good stepping stone to such arrangements. As illustrated above this indicates that TSOs see that marionette like behaviour provides them with access to the state.

Without between sector interactions you would not survive a day, so we build good relations with the regional powers. These relations are constructive because we offer services and programs which they [the state] accept and support.

Respondent 1, Org01Sam, Samara

Despite less clear evidence of marionette like behaviour amongst TSOs in Samara, respondents paid particular importance to working and collaborating with the state. Interactions that facilitate as argued above marionette like behaviour. Hence, TSOs in Samara

displaying marionette like characteristics have moved closer to the state, but they are not as embedded within the state as other marionette organisations found in the Russian context (Cook & Vinogradova, 2006; Crotty, 2006; Henry, 2006).

7.2.4.3 Marionette like behaviour in Perm

With regards to moving closer to the state, TSOs in Perm resemble those of Yekaterinburg and Samara. However, other than their counterparts in the other two regions, TSOs in the group mimic marionettes in Perm are more uneasy about the outcomes for their activities and particular consequences for other TSOs.

I think the danger is that an elite of TSOs are emerging. As a result, the state will only interact with them and other organisations will have no chance to work with the state.

Respondent 37, Org12Per, Perm

This respondent considers himself as a member of the ‘elite’ of TSOs. In other sectors of Russian civil society, marionettes, because they are set up by the political elite, are often seen as organisations of the elite (Cook & Vinogradova, 2006). With regards to examining the nature of organisations mimicking marionettes in the three regions, this represents being ‘sucked’ into the state which is more explicitly illustrated by respondents in Samara and Yekaterinburg. It is those organisations that are selected by the state; for interaction and to ‘develop’ civil society.

We basically find the elites [decision makers] of civil society and work with them to develop that sector.

Respondent 83, GovOrg01Per, Perm

Hence TSOs seem to believe that it is the state that selects TSOs to interact with and it is the states' prerogative to develop civil society. Similar to Samara, respondents attribute high importance to the collaboration with the state. For example Org02Per not only outlined that they participate in all round tables or committees, but because of their good relations to the relevant government department, they assisted the researcher in recruiting respondent 83; a government official (see Appendix A). It is thus not surprising that many TSOs portray how closely they work with the state.

In all honesty, we work very closely with the administration of the governor of the Perm region. We have very good relations with the department of health and the department for education. Also we have a very good understanding with the Ombudsman for Human Rights for the Perm region. [This is a position within the administration of the governor of the region and appointed by the governor of Perm]

Respondent 29, Org05Per, Perm

Hence similar to the other two regions, organisations describe a clear wish to collaborate with the state. In turn this is indicative that such TSOs do not want to or do not understand the role they should be playing in building an autonomous civil society space and facilitating democratisation.

Other than in Yekaterinburg and Samara, in Perm TSOs seem to portray being 'sucked in' less explicitly. However, there are some organisations that, similar to Yekaterinburg, portray themselves as being spun off from the state. An example of such organisations in Perm is Org21 Per. The founder of this organisation used to work for the department of health and the current director as an adviser to several politicians of United Russia; United Russia being the 'party of power' of the current political regime (Krystanovskaya & White, 2005). Hence similar to marionette organisations in other sectors, such organisations appear to offer a space

to employ friends, family, and political allies. However, Org21Per and other such spun off TSOs highlight the state as playing only a supportive role.

Our organisation, I know for sure, was not created through the initiative of the government but with its direct support.

Respondent 46, Org21Per, Perm

The fact that this organisation was created with the support of the government rather than by its initiative highlights how such TSOs want to portray themselves as independent. This is a vital characteristic of marionette-like behaviour in particular vis-à-vis their role of creating the image of a functioning third sector.

A further observation relating to organisations with marionette like behaviour is their attitudes towards the Public Chamber. In Yekaterinburg and Samara respondents portrayed this institution as a positive improvement for the development of civil society. However, in Perm TSOs displaying marionette characteristics rallied against the proposed regional Public Chamber. The following quote from respondent 47 mirrors the outlook of others on the Public Chamber.

Well I have a more negative assessment. It does bring some good and I have participated in several events of the [Federal] Public Chamber. At the Federal level let it exist and help TSOs to promote their interests. But here in the region it is a totally unnecessary structure. We do not need to formalise these things that we can already do. We talk to whomever we need to without it [the Public Chamber].

Respondent 47, Org22Per, Perm

However, in outlining their opposition to the Public Chamber, TSOs re-iterate their marionette like nature. In Perm, rather than offering a way to work in alliance with the state, respondents consider the Public Chamber as a challenge to their established ties with the administration. TSOs fear that the process of establishing the Public Chamber will challenge their *preferential* access to the state, as the authorities might engage with other organisations displaying more marionette like features and characteristics. It underlines the indication that TSOs displaying marionette like characteristics, confirming that the state has completed the management of civil society.

7.3 Conclusions

This chapter has examined the nature of marionette like behaviour amongst TSOs within this study. In doing so it not only highlights how the Russian state is succeeding in completing the management of civil society but also provides new insights into the mimicking of marionettes amongst many health and education TSOs. To elaborate on these aspects the chapter first examined which TSOs are mimicking marionette organisations and then illustrated the incentives and structures to highlight why they engage in this behaviour. This section demonstrates that to be able to become a member of organisations which are able to interact in such structures (i.e. Public Chamber) TSOs need to be mimicking marionette organisations. Being unable to be part of such structures reduces TSOs to nothing more than afternoon tea and coffee clubs unable to hold the state accountable. This chapter demonstrates clear and strong incentives for TSOs to adopt such marionette characteristics. In turn this further weakens civil society as a force for democratisation (Taylor, 2006; see chapter 2). The chapter highlights resource dependency, ideological buy-ins, and the Public Chamber as a mechanism used by the state to capture TSOs. However, not all TSOs can access these channels of sponsorship. This enables the state to select organisations and send out signals to others about the expected behaviour of TSOs. These mechanisms to capture and *marionettise*, enables the state to divide-and-conquer civil society, ensuring continual fragmentation (see chapter 3.3.1)

and its collective weakness. It dovetails with chapters six and the argument put forward of a more subtle management of civil society.

The chapter also illustrates the marionette like characteristics of TSOs within this study. The chapter delineates such organisations as the ones that are primarily able to access domestic resources the chapter highlights three specific features of marionette like behaviour. First, health and educational TSOs overlap with observations about marionettes in other sectors (Cook & Vinogradova, 2006; Crotty, 2006; Henry, 2006; see chapter 3.4.1), organisations across the three regions portray themselves as spun off from that which is created by the state. Yet, other than marionettes amongst environmental organisations (Crotty, 2006; Henry, 2006), such organisations aim to highlight that they are autonomous from the state, but well-connected enabling them to work in alliance with the state. However, in actual fact such TSOs become part of the public infrastructure, in particular as all of them are funded by the state.

The second feature across the three regions outlined by respondents is the ‘sucking in’ of TSOs. This creates *preferred* organisations which are likely, in addition to the ones spun off by the state, to reflect the only legitimate representatives of civil society. This sucking in of TSOs has not been clearly articulated as features of marionette organisations in the literature (Cook & Vinogradova, 2006; Crotty, 2006, 2009; Henry, 2006). However, the drawing in of key TSO staff or members into government structures limits the potential confrontational nature of such organisations. In turn this encourages TSOs to mimic marionette organisations. The sucking in of TSO decision-makers in the sector of health and education TSOs highlights the emergence of what this thesis terms hybrid marionettes (see chapter 3.5). These hybrid marionettes demonstrate the increase in marionette like behaviour amongst TSOs, in particular amongst formally independent organisations, and thus the successful management of civil society by the state. Even though it is frequently the case within western democratic civil societies (see chapter 2) that leaders or directors of TSOs, who are active on a voluntary

basis, might also work in state structures, such arrangements are of a more peculiar nature in the context of Russia Federation. The evidence illustrated here highlights that rather than civil servants being engaged in voluntary activities in their spare time, respondents portray this as being invited to work in state structures.

The third characteristic of marionette-like behaviour is the TSO's portrayal of working in alliance with the state. Again working in alliance with the state also occurs in democratic western contexts (Anheier, 2005, 2009; see chapter 2.3). However as the alliances occur due to the 'sucking in' of decision-makers and the alignment of TSOs activities with the aims of the state, it indicates the mimicking of marionette organisations rather than emancipation of state-TSO relations. The dominance of informal advocacy and lack of willingness to formalise such activities also highlights the hierarchical and dependent relationships that underlie such alliances. Nevertheless respondents consider the engagement in a formalised structure of interaction with the state as vital. In this, TSOs mimicking marionettes overlap with marionettes in other areas of civil society (Cook & Vinogradova, 2006). However, it seems that respondents are unaware of compromising their position as builders of an autonomous civil society space. For managed civil society arrangements to function, TSOs with marionette like behaviour are important as it enables the state to excerpt influence over, for example, the handling of social issues in turn stabilising its political regime (Mann, 1986). In effect this illustrates the development of *quid pro quo* arrangements where the state and TSOs exchange loyalty for survival.

In the literature, marionette organisations are illustrated as founded by the state and aligning their activities with the objectives of the state (Cook & Vinogradova, 2006). Furthermore, marionettes are embedded within the political elite working with the state rather than confronting it, legitimising state policy, and portraying themselves as independent (Cook & Vinogradova, 2006). Comparing TSOs displaying marionette like behaviour to pro-typical

marionettes highlight several communalities. Similar to marionettes, TSOs mimicking marionettes depend on the state for resources and it is the organisations that are able to access such resources that display such behaviour. However, other than marionettes, TSOs in this study illustrate that they are ‘sucked into’ the state. This shows that TSOs mimicking marionettes lack the embeddedness in the (local) political elite displayed by marionettes. In effect TSOs mimicking marionettes have to be understood as hybrid marionettes. As TSOs still display the ideological buy-ins, the resource dependence, and aligning with the aims of the (Federal) state, they display marionette like behaviour. However, their lack of political embeddedness means that, at least on the local level, TSOs can theoretically act more confrontationally. This is not the case as the dominance of informal advocacy in chapter six demonstrates. Nevertheless, hybrid marionettes facilitate the state’s attempts to manage civil society. The state does not need for these organisations to be embedded in the political elite to control such TSOs because in fear of losing their access and associated resources, TSOs mimic marionettes. The advantage of their hybrid nature for the state is that it facilitates the portrayal of a functioning and independent third sector yet at the same time manages civil society. In addressing the question of how TSOs with marionette like behaviour differ to marionettes this chapter outlines that differences are minimal. Furthermore, the hybrid nature of marionettes facilitates the management of civil society by the state.

The consideration of mimicking marionettes and accessing domestic resources also highlights the bi-polarity of Russian civil society. Organisations which do not display marionette like characteristics are not only unable to interact with the state but also lack access to resources and thus the ability to be active agents of civil society. It is these organisations that resemble afternoon tea and coffee clubs, which are situated in the bottom half of Russia’s hourglass (Rose, 1995). Their lack of resources, support, and recognition by the state inhibits their ability to bridge across or effectively hold the state accountable. As a result civil society will remain constricted (Crotty, 2006; see chapter 3) and unable to fulfil its democratising role

sufficiently. Addressing the gap in the literature (see chapter 3 & 4) vis-à-vis our lack of understanding of health and education TSOs, the characteristics described here broaden our understanding of such organisations. The importance of alliances with the state and the sucking in of key individuals of TSOs demonstrates a side of marionette like behaviour previously not clearly articulated (Cook & Vinogradova, 2006; Crotty, 2006, 2009).

TSOs mimicking marionettes (i.e. hybrid marionettes) play an important role in the Russian state's attempt to shape and mould civil society to its own ends. As a G8 state, nominal democratic country with nuclear weapons, the Russian state has to at least give the impression of a society that has TSOs and a functioning autonomous civil society (see chapter 1). However, civil society of such a nature does not, as illustrated in chapters one and three, align well with the present managed democratic regime. Thus TSOs with marionette like characteristics demonstrate that the state is able to capture civil society but maintaining the image of independence. However, capturing in the context of the Russian Federation is an exchange process in which TSOs trade resources for survival by mimicking marionettes. As a result the state provides *napravleniye* to TSOs directing and managing civil society. Therefore, the majority of TSOs in this study remain subservient to the state limiting the emergence of more liberal, democratising, and unmanaged civil society arrangements conducive to democracy (Taylor, 2006). The marionette-like nature of TSOs serves as a source of infrastructural power (Mann, 1984) for the Federal state. At this macro-level civil society-state relation are statist resembling the control mechanism for Russia's both corporatist economy (Hanson & Teague, 2005; Lane, 2000; Radygin, 2004) and managed democratic regime (Wegren & Konitzer, 2007).

Consequently, the marionette-like characteristics of TSOs not only highlight the management of civil society but also the further limitation of the democratisation potential of TSOs. Many TSOs within this study, which might have been seen as forming the constricted middle

ground of this hourglass society in the past (Crotty, 2006; Rose, 1995), now display marionette like features. In addressing the research question of this thesis, of how managed civil society arrangements manifest themselves in the Russian Federation, the marionette like behaviour of TSOs is an indication of completion of the management of civil society. The following chapter will discuss these aspects in light of the literature and contribution to the literature this thesis makes. Therefore, chapter eight provides a comprehensive and coherent characterisation of managed civil society as well as its implications for democratisation in the Russian Federation and the relevance of civil society theory to understand developments within Russian contemporary society.

CHAPTER 8: Discussion and Conclusion

8.1 Introduction

This chapter extends the discussion of managed civil society arrangements by considering the insights from the empirical evidence (see chapter 5, 6, & 7) and demonstrating the contributions made by this thesis. Before presenting the discussion and contributions, the chapter recaps the starting point of the thesis. Within the thesis, the notion of a managed civil society arrangements is put forward and explored. Throughout the thesis, both theoretical and empirical factors explore state-society relations to illustrate these arrangements. In order to do so the theoretical construct of civil society is operationalised. Civil society is defined as “the space between the individual family and the state” (Neace, 1999, p. 150) and a space made up of “autonomous, freely chosen, intermediary organisations” (Neace, 1999, p. 150), which are referred to as Third Sector Organisations (TSOs). Another construct related to civil society and operationalised is social capital. Social capital is defined as “features of social organisation such as networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit” (Putnam, 1995, p. 67). Both these concepts are credited with improving democracy and democratic governance (Taylor, 2006). The discussion of these constructs (chapter 2) as well as the development of civil society in the context of the Russian Federation (chapter 3) challenges these dominant understandings and assumptions of conventional autonomous state-society relations, the mediating role which civil society assumes between the individual and the state, and the universal applicability of the civil society-democracy orthodoxy. Consequently this thesis investigates the research question of how managed civil society arrangements are manifested in the Russian Federation.

All three empirical chapters provide a unique insight into health and education TSOs in the context of the Russian Federation, a group of organisations that have received little attention in the past (see chapter 3 & 4). Throughout all three empirical chapters, the discourses of

respondents and their portrayal of their organisations, and civil society demonstrate their desire to work in alliance with the state. The following quote captures this sentiment amongst respondents in this study:

We think that it is important to work together with government rather than to fight with them. The way to change anything in these institutions [in Russia] is actually by working together with them, rather than tell them what they are doing wrong and that we do things right.

Respondent 34, Org10Per, Perm

Cooperating and working in alliance with the state is something that TSOs within this study embrace. However, it also highlights that TSOs in the context of the Russian Federation are not the agents of democracy they are meant to be (see chapter 2.5). Therefore, both discourses illustrate a change in understanding civil society. Such assertions run counter the argument of the transition of Russia into a democratic country (Shleifer & Treisman, 2005) and rather highlight a transformation where the state remains an integral part of the societal fabric. TSOs are willing to give up their autonomy and independence to ensure that they are able to establish such relations, highlighting that they do not understand their role as a builder of an autonomous space and drivers of democratisation. These conclusions are supported by other research that asserts a rhetorical shift amongst Russian civil society activists from the politically laden understanding of civil society (as a counterweight to the state) to the apolitical understanding of the third sector (Salmenniemi, 2008; see chapter 2). In addressing the research question of how managed civil society manifest itself, the contribution of this thesis is

the evidence based-proposition that in the context of the Russian Federation, civil society exists within a managed form, which does not correspond to traditional models of civil society.

In order to discuss and highlight the contribution made by this thesis, this chapter is divided into two sections. The first section of this chapter discusses each of the objectives in turn. The second section of this chapter illustrates the contributions this thesis makes to civil society literature, its constructs, and discourses within. The section presents the theoretical contributions of this thesis drawing on the literature review (see chapter 2 and 3) and the voids highlighted. It explores potential for future research addressing methodological issues as well as future theoretical directions. The section also illustrates potential policy implication. The thesis concludes with a short summary and some general concluding remarks.

8.2 Discussion

This section discusses the conclusions of chapters five, six, and seven. It explores each of the research objectives in turn.

8.2.1 NGO law as mechanism for managed civil society

The previous three empirical chapters have illustrated several facets of contemporary Russian civil society. In so doing chapters five, six, and seven have outlined a Russian civil society that is managed by the state. In investigating the impact of the legislative changes on the day-to-day workings (see chapter 1 objective 1) chapter five demonstrates that the implementation of the 2006 NGO law is the legally mandated attempt to manage civil society. The chapter outlines three different groups with regards to their perception of the NGO law. Despite some TSOs not registering out of protest, the majority of TSOs acquiesce to the NGO law. Adhering to the law and thus being managed by the state is important for TSOs and also

highlights how the state is able to exploit pre-existing weaknesses of Russian civil society (see chapter 3.3.1). It illustrates that the state has bribed TSOs into adhering to the NGO law. Consequently TSOs are unlikely hold the state to account (Taylor, 2006). These considerations clearly demonstrate the prevalence of statist civil society arrangements (Hale, 2002), in which the law acts as a management mechanism of such arrangements.

As the cultural-historic considerations in chapter three demonstrate, the past legislation had a restrictive and controlling rationale and the 2006 NGO law mirrors this tradition. There is little literature on how the Russian regulatory framework (i.e. the 2006 NGO law) shapes civil society arrangements (see chapter 3), and this thesis addresses this void. Chapter five illustrates how acquiescing to the 2006 NGO law provides TSOs with legal recognition (Meyer & Rowan, 1977) and thus access to resources. Achieving legitimacy has been made out as a key motivation for organisations to behave in specific ways (Greenwood, Oliver, Sahlin-Andersson, & Suddaby, 2008), and Russian TSOs in this study reflect these insights. The process of attaining legitimacy focuses on the audience and the type of legitimacy established (Greenwood, et al., 2008). In the context of the Russian Federation, the state and its threshold condition of playing by its rules (i.e. acquiescence to the NGO law) enables TSOs to achieve legitimacy. In the context of the NGO law, being an acquiescence has become a taken-for-granted position (Zucker, 1977) that TSOs need to assume in order to exist.

With regards to Taylor's (2006) observation of civil society facilitating democracy this development has further implications. Because the state and no other audience confer legitimacy in the context of the Russian Federation, TSOs have to subordinate themselves (reflected in the alignment with the dominant political discourse) to the state, rather than establishing an autonomous space of equal strength and importance. Therefore, the NGO law is a vital tool to manage civil society arrangements. The theoretical predicted isomorphic

developments as a response to such legitimacy seeking (Meyer & Rowan, 1977) are illustrated by developments such as the ‘mimicking’ of marionette behaviour highlighted in chapter seven. Consequently, the 2006 NGO law’s ‘suspended punishment’ nature (see chapter 5) enables the state to use the administration of legitimacy as a mechanism to manage civil society arrangements.

In examining the NGO law closer, the findings presented in chapter five, illustrate two competing discourses to which TSOs which adhere to the law subscribe too. This illustrates a dividing line in how respondents understand the NGO law’s impact on their organisations. Some organisations see it necessary to illustrate the NGO law as improving their organisations. Improved accountability, transparency, and thus effectiveness are all outcomes, which are currently high in the academic, political, and popular discourse on TSOs in developed democratic nations such as the US (Anheier, 2009). However, in the context of the Russian Federation these outcome improvements refer to improving accountability and transparency in the eyes of the state thus portraying the state as all-dominant. Hence, the idea of improving organisations mirrors the subordination of TSOs to the state. In turn, TSOs do become potential partners with the state, but rather than being equal, such relations are characterised by vertical and dependent relationships. With regards to democratisation, the idea of more accountable and transparent organisations is certainly something that needs to develop in Russia. Nevertheless, at the moment such rhetoric reflects realities closer aligned with managed civil society rather than traditional liberal civil society.

Contrary to this ‘professionalization’ discourse, some TSOs in this study highlight the bureaucratisation potential of the law. This is characteristic of coercive isomorphic pressures (Meyer & Rowan, 1977) that lead to TSOs resembling state structures. In turn such organisations do not build civil society as an autonomous space. Nevertheless, TSOs remain legitimate members of civil society, but at the same time, this highlights the dominant

position of the state vis-à-vis civil society. Therefore, both discourses rationalising the effects of the 2006 NGO law are illustrative of managed civil society arrangements. These discourses illustrate how the 2006 NGO law has created a control mechanism which enable the state to manage TSOs.

Despite the difference in opinions about the impact of the NGO law on their organisations, proponents of both discourses align themselves with the general *positive* assessment of the NGO law. It is thus not surprising that TSOs highlight that the NGO law does not influence their activities adversely. Therefore, assessing the effects of the NGO law indicate a potential decoupling of the structure and form of TSOs from their activities (Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 2008; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). It is the neglect of the impact of the NGO law and this *decoupling* that demonstrates that TSOs contribute little to democratisation or building a civil society as an autonomous space. Therefore, TSOs remain unable to develop civil society as an autonomous space, meaning that civil society remains weak and constricted (Crotty, 2006) and Russia's hourglass society intact (see chapter, 3; Rose, 1995). Such insights also illustrate that the democratisation potential of TSOs remains constrained (see chapter 3) and therefore the NGO law provides the basic tenet for managed civil society arrangements.

TSOs use the NGO law and adherence to it as a way to portray themselves as legitimate participants of Russian civil society. They adapt to the coercing forces of the NGO law as all rational organisational actors do. This also means that TSOs are less likely to be situated between the state and the individual (Neace, 1999). In such arrangements, TSOs are unlikely to address legacy issues such as lack of public support or fragmentation, which have constricted civil society development post ante the Soviet Union (see chapter 3.3.1). This highlights the objective of the NGO law to neutralise and limit the democratisation potential embedded in TSOs and depoliticise their activities. In so doing this also illustrates that managed arrangement represent the transformation of Russian civil society into a third sector

aimed at “mobilising to help the state” (Salmenniemi, 2005, p. 747), encapsulating a truly Russian vision of what civil society should look like (Evan, 2006b) and is aligned with the managed democratic regime and corporatist economic arrangements. Other than in the traditional understanding of civil society facilitating democracy and acting as an accountant of the state (Taylor, 2006), conformity to the state’s vision is more important. Hence, Russian TSOs are no longer ‘pluralisers’ of public discourse or decision making and can no longer be understood as drivers of democratisation.

8.2.2 TSOs as substituting the state

Chapter six examines how TSOs now act as state substitutes and in so doing outlines more subtle attempts of the state to manage civil society. The chapter highlights that TSOs prefer to engage in informal advocacy activities addressing small problems rather than the bigger issues. Furthermore, such advocacy activities are equated to service provision for which TSOs expect the state to provide resources. However, TSOs in this study do not acknowledge the compromising position that this puts them in with regard to the state. In so doing chapter six demonstrates how TSOs develop into depoliticised organisations. Furthermore, it highlights that social relations which shaped and weakened civil society development in the past have not changed. This demonstrates how the state exploits pre-existing weaknesses such as the fragmentation of civil society (see chapter 3.3.1) to subtly manage civil society.

Chapter six highlights that TSOs are equating advocacy to service provision and do not portray themselves as engaging in confrontational activities vis-à-vis the state. This is contrary to the literature that understands service provision as the contracting out of the welfare state (Smith & Lipsky, 1993; Frumkin & Galaskiewicz, 2004). In the literature, both the substitution of state service provision, by offering similar services, and complementing state service provision, by extending the service offered by the state, are understood as positive or beneficial partnerships for both TSOs and the state (Kramer, Lorentzen, Melief, &

Pasquinelli, 1993). However, in the context the Russian Federation TSOs that illustrate that they are substitutes for the state could be understood as being too strong. In turn strong TSOs taking on the responsibilities of the state would delegitimize and undermine the authority of the state (Batley & McLoughlin, 2010). Therefore, TSOs always refer to their service provision as complementary. This way TSOs ensure that the ultimate responsibility for a service remains with the state which is hence taking care of its citizens. These arrangements reflect Young's (2000) complementary relationship; the state directs service provision via vertical relationships in which it retains the dominant power base. As such, TSOs become helpers to the state and consequently their organisational identities are being transformed if not destroyed (Brinkerhoff, 2002).

Consequently, chapter six outlines that TSOs are tools of the state, which enable it to smooth the impact of neo-liberal welfare reforms (Hemment, 2009). However, the rolling back of the state is not taking place in terms of handing over responsibility (Csaba, 2009), but rather in coercing TSOs to engage in service provision. Service providing TSOs are the ideal distribution channels of social welfare services to both smooth the continuous retreat of the state (Sil & Chen, 2004) as well as ensuring stability and security of the regime (Henry, 2009). Thus, it is not a surprise that Henderson (2008) observes a mobilisation of TSOs around patriotic ideals and not political protest focusing on the modernisation (i.e. democratisation) of the political regime. Consequently, the activities of TSOs reflect state policy and not bottom-up driven agendas. TSOs seek to be close to the state, however contrary to Kuhnle and Selle's (1992) assertion that the *nearness* of the state and the TSOs reflect a state friendly society, in the context of the Russian Federation such *nearness* is a reflection of the state's ability to control and manage society. As subordinates, TSOs are likely to be used to achieve political goals (Mendel, 2009), rather than facilitating democratisation and public participation in decision-making (Taylor, 2006). Reinforcing the conclusion drawn from examining the NGO law, the analysis of how TSOs substitute for the

state highlights the management of civil society. These aspects herald the end of the ‘Gramscian’ tradition and logic (i.e. civil society as a counterweight to the state (see chapter 2)) of civil society. However as illustrated in chapter three, this logic was removed from what Russian TSOs envision and therefore their embrace of such changes are not surprising. Nevertheless, in considering TSOs as service provisions this thesis is able to provide a more nuanced understanding of the more subtle attempts to a managed civil society.

8.2.3 Curtailing and managing organisational activity

Chapter seven examines the organisational level characteristics of managed civil society and in turn demonstrates the completion of the management of civil society by the state. By highlighting incentives and structures put in place by the state to encourage marionette-like behaviour and presenting the marionette-like characteristics of TSOs, chapter seven indicates organisational level outcomes and the management of civil society. Marionette-like behaviour will not address the problem of limited level of social mobilisation (Oldfield, 2001) and hence consolidate the pre-existing weakness of civil society. However, respondents do not see such developments as negative for their TSOs but an “impetus for greater interaction between government agencies and NGOs” (Oldfield, Kouzmina, & Shaw, 2003, p. 165). It seems that they understand the managed civil society as the appropriate adaption of this concept to the Russian context.

Chapter seven outlines that many TSOs in this study have begun to *mimic* traditional marionettes in both rhetoric and frequently, behaviours. In turn, such TSOs trade in their independence and autonomy for financial support and sponsorship from the state. Formalised and state-controlled structures of interaction such as the Public Chamber (Richter, 2009), provide the foundation for such state managed arrangements. As a result some organisations are being pulled upwards by the state. TSOs that do not belong to this *club* drift towards the bottom half and as a result of resource deprivation begin to resemble Soviet area ‘kitchen

circles' (Gibson, 2001). In effect the prevalence of marionette-like behaviour is evidence for the institutionalisation process of managed civil society arrangements.

Other than in the areas of human rights (Mendelson & Gerber, 2007) or environmental protection (Crotty, 2006; Henry, 2006) chapter seven highlights that in the sectors of health and education TSOs, many of them display marionette-like characteristics. However, demarcating TSOs mimicking marionettes as marionette organisations similar to the ones discussed in the literature (Crotty, 2006; Henry, 2006) is becoming increasingly difficult in managed civil society arrangements. The evidence in this thesis illustrates that in particular, organisations that used to be considered advocacy-policy organisations are more actively seeking to adopt and mimic marionette characteristics. However, such organisations lack the cultural-historic elite embeddness of marionettes. Other than marionettes which are displaying 'integrate dependency' (i.e. full funding by the state and very close state control), TSOs mimicking marionettes are 'separately dependent' which means that they receive partial funding as well as being subject to either direct or indirect top-down controls by the state (Kuhnle & Selle, 1992). The combination of these two dependencies enables the state to exert control over civil society. By establishing separate dependent relationships, TSOs are able to attain legitimacy which, as demonstrated in chapter seven, they are able to leverage to access domestic, but non-governmental funding and resources. Thus in addition to the coercive forces of the NGO law, this demonstrates mimetic isomorphic developments (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) amongst TSOs. In this sense, TSOs are becoming increasingly homogeneous settling within the top half of the hourglass (see chapter 3 and Rose, 1995) and mimicking marionettes. On the other hand such isomorphic developments also apply to TSOs, which do not display such marionette characteristics (see chapter 7). However, rather than mimicking marionettes, such organisations seem to turn into afternoon tea and coffee clubs. In addition to the insight that these considerations provide us about managed civil society arrangements, such developments also illustrate the isomorphic developments that serve as

evidence for the institutionalisation of such arrangements (Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 2008; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Greenwood, Oliver, Sahlin-Andersson, & Suddaby, 2008; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Zucker, 1977).

A pivotal insight offered by the examination of marionette like characteristics is that in addition to ‘hard approaches’ of state-sponsorship such as, for example, the provision of resources, ‘soft approaches’ to state-sponsorship also exists (Brinkerhoff, 2002). Mirroring Hales (2010) observation of political party funding, hard as well as soft state-sponsorship provides TSOs with a seal of approval that enables them to access additional resources from businesses or private donations. In addition to the hard approaches to state-sponsorship that result from resource dependency, formal and structured arrangement for the interaction between TSOs and the state (Richter, 2009) (e.g. Public Chamber) form the heart of soft approaches to state-sponsorship. The membership in these often *exclusive* structures portrays to outsiders (be they local or council bureaucrats or civil servants, business people, or private donors) the state’s acceptance of a specific organisation. However, as demonstrated in chapter seven in order to be able to become a part of such exclusive structures, organisations need to display marionette like traits and characteristics. In turn, the quintessential structure of an hourglass is being re-established, which leads to civil society arrangements that are much closer to Russia’s cultural-historic social arrangements (Rose, 1995; Mishler & Rose, 1997). In line with the continuity theoretical idea (Hedlund, 2008) that informs managed civil society arrangements, the “prevailing social structures” (Salamon & Anheier, 1998, p. 228) (i.e. the hourglass society) have shaped the development path of TSOs and thus civil society. Therefore, the prevalence of marionette like organisations not only signals the institutionalisation of managed arrangements, but is also evidence of the continuation of past social arrangements (Hedlund, 2008). Arrangements that chapter three demonstrates are limiting civil society and its contribution of democratisation (Taylor, 2006)

8.2.4 Summary of Discussion

As this discussion highlights in managed civil society arrangements TSOs seek legitimate membership in civil society in several of ways; TSOs who acquiesce to a restrictive law, do not act confrontationally and exhibit marionette like characteristics. This highlights formal and informal rules for Russian civil society agents as well as the effects on such agents. Without adhering to these requirements TSOs are starved of resources. Consequently, civil society ‘lacks the teeth’ to ensure that it holds the state accountable which would facilitate democratisation. It outlines the management of civil society as an exchange relationship between TSOs and the state in which the former trade in their independence for resources and survival. Consequently, the ‘managed’ space of civil society is both an outcome and facilitates the functioning of Russia’s corporatist ‘managed’ economy and ‘managed’ democratic order.

The elements that make up managed civil society also interlink with Hale’s (2010) assessment of Russia being a hybrid regime. In such a regime the state, in this case the authority of the president, subordinates all political processes and powers into one “single pyramid of power” (Hale, 2010, p. 33). TSOs are subordinated via the control of resources and a potential system of suspended punishment (Ledeneva, 2006) created by the NGO law. Such a hybrid regime, combining democratic aspects and authoritarian ones (Hale, 2010), means that in the case of Russia the state is not interested in creating a civil society as *sui generis* but as this thesis shows favours to manage civil society. Russia aims to portray itself as a democratic country (Shlapentokh, 2009) and the existence of an autonomous third sector holding the government to account is pivotal to this objective. Traditionally, such a civil society space acts as the lynchpin for the establishment of governance structures and institutions that further development and prosperity (North, 1991; Ostrom, 1990; Williamson, 2000). However, as this thesis has demonstrated post ante the Soviet Union, rather than reflecting an autonomous space, the Russian state remains all-dominant and manages civil society arrangements. Thus

this hybrid political system hinges on a strong government (Hale, 2010). A strong government is frequently recommended for the continuous and sustainable development of a country, its institutions, and more importantly an emancipated civil society space (Skocpol, 2002). Consequently, managed civil society arrangements constituted another piece of evidence of the deliberate rejection of an open society post ante the Soviet Union (Rutland, 2008). In exploring managed arrangements this thesis outlines the consolidation of the hourglass (Mishler & Rose, 1997; Rose, 1995) as well as the institutionalisation of civil society arrangements characterised by strong, structured, and dependent relationships between TSOs and the state.

8.3 Implications and Contributions

This thesis examined the question of how managed civil society arrangements are manifested in the Russian Federation. To address this question this thesis draws on the bodies of civil society theory and the research literature on civil society in Russia (see chapter 2 and 3). This informs three research objectives. First, this thesis looks at the impact of legislative changes on TSOs, concluding that they represent a legally mandated attempt to manage civil society. Second, the thesis outlines how TSOs act as state substitutes which provide an insight into subtle attempts of the state to manage civil society. Third, the thesis investigates the effect of state managed civil society on TSOs. In so doing the thesis concludes that this encourages TSOs to mimic marionettes and represents the completion of the management of civil society. This section outlines the theoretical contribution made by this thesis. This is followed by practical implications and discussing the limitations to this study as well as future research avenues.

8.3.3 Theoretical Contributions

Civil society is frequently seen as the lynchpin to the development of an institutional environment that ensures development and prosperity (North, 1991; Ostrom, 1990; Putnam,

2002; Williamson, 2000), no more so in the context of the Russian Federation with its nuclear weapons and *notional* democratic order. The process of democratisation is considered integral to the transition process Russia is said to be undergoing (Shleifer & Triesman, 2005) and as part of such considerations civil society is inadvertently intertwined with democracy (Diamond, 1994; Linz & Stepan, 1996; Mercer, 2002; Salmenniemi, 2008). However, the evidence in this thesis highlights that when considering civil society, Russia has not undergone a transition towards an autonomous space. On the contrary, civil society has transformed into a space managed by the state and reflecting the importance the Russian state places in Russia's societal fabric. This thesis outlines that Russian civil society does not reflect this *positive* relationship between TSOs and democracy. Therefore, this thesis contributes to the discussion about the universal applicability of western models of civil society (Glasius, Lewis, & Seckinelgin, 2004; Lewis, 2002). Even though this study illustrates the limited explanatory power of traditional civil society theory, the concept remains a useful tool to examine the space attributed to civil society (Lewis, 2002). Thus on a theoretical level, managed civil society arrangements constitute an extension of our understanding of civil society highlighting that its autonomous nature is relevant for democracy but not necessarily for the existence of civil society itself.

8.3.3.1 Civil Society and Democratisation Theory

The preceding sections highlighted the manifestation of managed civil society arrangement. As chapter three discusses, managed civil society arrangements are an outcome of the effects of shock therapy, rapid but uncompleted democratisation, and misguided civil society building. This thesis outlines that despite being credited with democratising Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe (Hyden, 1997; Kocka, 2004) civil society's contribution to democratisation in Russia is minimal. Consequently, civil society cannot be considered a space which is autonomous, nor a space for democracy education (Chandhoke, 2007; Edele, 2005; Frolic, 1997; Hale, 2002; Kaldor, 2003; Kasif, 1998; Kubik, 2005; Oxhorn, 2001).

Even though Russian managed civil society does not mirror traditional arrangements, it reflects institutional arrangements that perform similar functions (i.e. the provision of services (Kubik, 2005)) albeit in different ways.

The literature challenging the orthodox assumption of civil society = democracy has been growing (Mercer, 2002; Taylor, 2006). In repressive regimes, the “cost of organising” (Hadenius & Ugglå, 1996, p. 1629) is increased and therefore only state managed civil society is able to exist. These civil society spaces are different in the fact that they lack the autonomy associated with the traditional model (see chapter 2). Such managed civil society is less likely to be able to *democratise* these regimes. In such an environment, civil society activity is permitted within the areas from which the state withdrew and only within officially legitimised associations and organisations (Hadenius & Ugglå, 1996). Therefore, the state uses various incentives to consolidate and maintain its position of power vis-à-vis civil society (Mamdani, 1996). In turn, associational life can only exist if sponsored by the state (Khanna, 2009) leading to phenomena such as government-organised associations, government manipulated groups and government regulated and initiated associations (Edele, 2005; Uhlin, 2006) or in the context of Russia, marionette organisations (Cooch and Vinogradova, 2006). The dominance of such organisations limits the political opportunities, which can be created by civil society agents (McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1996). The insight from this thesis and Russian managed civil society arrangements dovetails these insights and conclusions. The thesis outlines that TSOs in this study trade in their autonomy and ability to act as agents of democratisation for survival and resources.

In various contexts, civil society co-opted and bestowed by the state is central to the state’s ability to govern (Frolic, 1997). Similar to the insights in this thesis, the Chinese experience shows that despite co-optation, civil society enjoys some autonomy, however in return it is required to engage in disciplined cooperation on the terms of the state (Frolic, 1997). Russian

managed civil society reflects similar arrangements where TSOs mimic marionettes and do not publicly confront the state. Managed arrangement should not be considered a negative sign for civil society development per se, but an outcome of past and present political, social, and economic arrangements. Consequently, this thesis extends our understanding of civil society arrangements in contexts where the state is traditionally less responsive to bottom-up impetus such as China (Frolic, 1997), India (Chandhoke, 2007), or African countries (Lewis, 2002). Consequently, managed civil society does not have to be an autonomous space or contributing to democratisation. This is a pivotal extension to democratisation literature which focuses on developing civil society as an autonomous space to *democratise* the state (see chapter 2.5.1).

8.3.3.2 Civil society literature in the context of the Russian Federation

This thesis adds to our understanding of civil society in the context of the Russian Federation in two ways. First, by examining health and education TSOs, it addresses organisations that have thus far only received limited research attention. Second, in examining managed civil society this thesis provides an insight into contemporary civil society arrangements.

Through a traditional civil society lens, Russian managed civil society remains politically weak (Sundstrom & Henry, 2006). This thesis illustrates that despite this political weakness, TSOs are able to develop into service providers. This thesis illustrates that a weak civil society does not mean that its development is stalled (Howard, 2002a; Simon, 2004; Maxwell, 2006). On the contrary, TSOs remain active and are becoming more active as service providers, however as their acquiescence to the NGO law highlights, within the boundaries set by the state. This thesis highlights that TSOs want to be approved by the state and are happy to receive orders from it (see chapter 7). TSOs in this study do not seem to make a distinction between influencing the state and working together, which illustrates the limited democratisation potential contained in civil society. With regards to the contribution to

literature on civil society in Russia, this thesis illustrates that TSOs remain ineffective as change agents and are primarily situated at either ends of the hourglass (Crotty, 2006; 2009; see chapter 7). The ineffectiveness of TSOs to stimulate change to social arrangements and in particular underlying social relations (see chapter 3, 5, 6, & 7) highlights the institutionalisation of managed civil society arrangements (Piven & Cloward, 1977).

This thesis also contributes to the understanding of health and education TSOs in the context of the Russian Federation. Illustrating that such TSOs engage in mimicking marionettes provides us with insights into the potential future behaviour of such organisations in Russia. These TSOs highlight various ways through which the state encourages such mimicking behaviour. Therefore, the emergence of TSOs with marionette-like characteristics assists the state to cement its dominance (Mann, 1984). The existence of TSOs mimicking marionettes echoes Overshoots' observations that agents of civil society can be seen as "*gosudarstvenniki*" (2007, p. 43). Consequently, Russian TSOs are not organisations, which are driven by increasing public participation or membership, but by pleasing the state demonstrating that the Russian state now manages all "levers of power and patronage" (Cappelli, 2008, p. 554). Effectively, this is evidence of a fundamental shift in the understanding about the role civil society should be playing in Russia. As this thesis argues, this is a shift away from a Gramscian civil society against the state, to civil society for and with the state which is more aligned with the cultural-historic importance of the Russian state. Consequently, managed civil society is an extension and manifestation of Hedlund's (2008) continuity theory observed in the economy and development of Russia's political regime.

In summary, this thesis contributes to the democratisation literature by extending our understanding of civil society and its link to democracy. The thesis demonstrates that civil society can exist and operate without necessarily producing democratic outcomes or

contributing to democratisation. With regards to the literature on civil society in Russia, this thesis addresses the void in our understanding about health and education TSOs.

8.3.2 Policy Implications

This section looks at the policy implications of this research. This thesis highlights that the cultural-historic context of the Russian Federation means civil society is not a driver for democratisation. On the contrary, it is managed and directed by the state. The thesis highlights that it is the state, which drives these managed arrangements putting in place various pressures to coerce TSOs into compliance. It is the state that has implemented the 2006 NGO law restricting foreign funding as well as tightening supervision over TSOs. Furthermore, the state has created a context in which TSOs displaying marionette-like behaviours thrive and where they do not want to formalise their informal advocacy activities for fear of losing access to the state. Given the active role of the state in creating such managed arrangements this leaves only limited scope for policy recommendations or implications for the Russian state. Such recommendations draw on civil society theory operationalised in this thesis (see chapter 2) and hence focus to counteract such arrangements. Clearly policies which would provide TSOs more autonomy, less direct state control, facilitate equal interaction between the state and civil society, encourage collaboration amongst TSOs effectively turning TSOs into ‘schools of democracy’ would catalyse the development of an autonomous civil society. However, for the state, managed civil society is an extension of its policies used to direct the economy and politics. Therefore, it is unlikely that the state is interested in changing its course and encourages the development of a civil society that is autonomous and independent, bridging between the individual and the state, and holding the state to account.

Conversely, this demonstrates that Russia is now a truly managed democracy. The recent denial of entry to Luke Harding, a Guardian newspaper journalist (BBC, 2011), and the

domination of media airtime by United Russia during elections (Klomegah, 2011) indicated the all-dominant state. The state now controls the media (Balzer, 2003), the economy (Hanson, 2003), and as illustrated in this thesis civil society. These managed and controlled arrangements increase the gap between the state and its citizens (i.e. the hourglass nature of society; Rose 1995; see chapter 3.5) and lead to a lack of government responsiveness to its citizen's demands. It is this gap, which has catalysed the current uproars in Tunisia, Egypt, and other parts of the Middle East. However, in Russia this swell of public dissent remains absent, as the state is able to control civil activity by subtly managing civil society, it ensures that such tendencies remain constricted. Consequently, the question arising is how the international community should interact with such a managed democracy. Therefore, the policy implications of this thesis will need to focus on the highlighting potential policy recommendations for the international community.

The recent events in the Middle East have put the international community in a precarious position. Regimes that once acted as friends in the region or reliable partners face a challenge to their legitimacy. Even without the active dissemination of the idea of civil society as agents of democracy, recent uproars display the importance of collaborative action of civil society agents in holding the state to account and challenging the legitimacy of regimes. However, Russia has a less friendly relationship to most of the international community specifically to democratic countries such as the US and UK (Shalpentokh, 2009). Thus it is not surprising that support for an autonomous civil society is considered as an external challenge to the regime's legitimacy (Shalpentokh, 2009). Other than in the recent uprising in the Middle East when the international community encouraged the regimes restraint to enable an autonomous civil society to challenge the state, it is in no such position towards the Russian Federation. The main problem, in particular for European countries is that an open challenge and support for popular uprising will strain vital economic ties with Russia. Thus, the international community will have to encourage more gradual pro-democracy changes aimed at 'freeing'

civil society from the management of the state. The evidence in this thesis highlights that many respondents and hence TSOs are content with current arrangements and would be unlikely to support a system that would see them lose their resources. Therefore, the international community will need to create systems with which they are able to circumvent the NGO law. However, these approaches need to be more subtle with regards to their democracy promotion agenda than civil society support in the past. The Charities Aid Foundation might provide an example. It has registered in Russia in a bid to be able to access funding from Russian donors as well as being able to distribute funding from foreign donor sources (CAF Russia, 2011). This way the international community can attempt to reduce the resource dependency of TSOs and highlight the compromising position TSOs assume in taking government resources. Furthermore, such attempts need to focus fostering across TSO collaboration not only in their activities but to build coalitions that are able to challenge the state. For example donors could make resources available only to a coalition of Russia TSOs, rather than individual ones. Furthermore, based on the experience in recruiting TSOs for this study, many organisations have close ties to local universities, and thus such programs need to focus on the knowledge exchange between, for example European and Russian scholars. These exchanges need to aim at encouraging shared interest of citizen participation and other democratic activities. Consequently the key focus of the international community is to facilitate the development of TSOs' organisational capacities to act as autonomous collaborating agents. It is the organisations that are apprehensive to managed civil society which are likely to be most conducive to such programs and policies. It is unlikely that such policies will show to be successful quickly as the Russian state, as demonstrated in this thesis, is an integral fabric of economic, political, and social life. Even though the research was undertaken in the context of the Russian Federation, the implications may apply to other transitory and democratising context displaying similar characteristics.

A second aspect of the policy recommendation of this thesis needs to focus on TSOs which are outside or at the fringes of managed civil society arrangements. The question is how TSOs can hold the state accountable despite a lack of resources and interaction. The thesis has demonstrated that TSOs want access to resources and that they play an important role as service provider for the retreated state. It is these activities where TSOs have the ability to catalyse their contribution to democratisation. TSOs not reliant on the state for resources will need to focus to become more openly confrontational and challenging the state within the context of their activities. TSOs should consider and portray this as a way to improve their effectiveness in delivering service rather challenging the legitimacy of the state. It is the latter which is likely to create difficulties for TSOs in managed civil society arrangements. The drive of TSOs to become more effective will automatically force them to become more confrontational vis-à-vis the state. In turn they will aggregate the interest of citizens and act as bridges between the state and the individual (Taylor, 2006). Furthermore, TSOs outside the managed arrangements need to collaborate with each other even if active in different areas. TSOs should not consider their activities in, for example the health sector as an obstacle to building a coalition for advancing an autonomous civil society with organisations engaged in education. As illustrated earlier the international community can support such collaborative activities. In effect, because of the withdrawal of the state since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the state is somewhat reliant on TSOs to offset the social ills caused by such a development. In turn this means that TSOs need to recognise the bargaining power they do have vis-à-vis the state. However, only in a collaborative arrangement will they be able to take full advantage of their bargaining power. It is down to the TSO's decision makers to drive such collaboration. Civil society gains its credibility from campaigning on things that are important to citizens. When TSOs in Russia start to group together and address issues important to citizens they will be able to challenge the state. Consequently, TSOs outside managed arrangements need to broaden their public appeal by actively engaging in activities at the heart of many citizens.

Given the theoretical lens taken in this thesis on policy implication, be it for the international community or TSOs in Russia, it focuses on the advancement and encouragement of building shared values around democratic governance. These policy implications and their implementations need further attention and need to be seen in light of the limitation of this thesis, both of which are highlighted in the following section.

8.3.3 Implications for Future Research

Given that our understanding of Russian civil society is still in its early stages, the proposition of managed arrangements provides various avenues for further research. In order to outline these avenues the limits of this study need to be acknowledged.

8.3.1.1 Research and methodological limitations

While the regional comparative approach could be said to be representative of many industrial regions within the Russian Federation, one must be careful in transcending the insights and conclusions drawn here to rural regions, autonomous republics, and the economic centres of Moscow and St. Petersburg. Consequently, the consideration of research and methodological limitations is important to be able to infer the representativeness of the insights of this thesis. These limitations refer to the choice of methodological techniques and subsequent decisions regarding the selection of participants and analysis. This section outlines limitations that result from the research setting. In particular, these illustrate limitations of working in the *Russian* environment, language, and cultural issues as well as problems of positionality of the research. With regards to the focus of this study and the data collected, this thesis has not examined the internal configuration or ‘operational aspects’ of TSOs. However, these internal aspects are another factor that shapes the behaviour of such organisations and therefore can have an impact on macro developmental aspects similar to those considered within this thesis.

Nevertheless, an in-depth internal consideration of all participating organisations was beyond the realm of this thesis.

Despite the fact that the results presented in this thesis illustrate a strong extension of the results gathered from other studies of Russian TSOs (see chapter 3), the thesis only focus on a limited group of TSOs. It is conceivable that different regions or different sectors might have led to different insights and thus the theoretical relationship with the existent literature. Furthermore, the study adopted a western perspective on civil society in which volunteerism, participation, and civil society as an autonomous space are important. Adopting a different framework and drawing on different concepts might have led to different propositions, themes, and results.

Further, in operationalising a qualitative methodology it is important to acknowledge the limitations this entails. With regards to respondents there are two issues which need addressing: the selection of respondents as well as respondents themselves. The theoretical and snowballing approached used within this study (see chapter 4), though appropriate, might lead to a critique over the generalisability of these results outside the core context, which are health and educational TSOs in Yekaterinburg, Samara, and Perm. The implication for the findings might be that other geographical locations and similar sectors might lead to somewhat different conclusions. Confirming the findings in different geographical areas and sectors of Russian civil society could have strengthened this study and it needs to be considered in the future. However, the restriction on time and resources did not allow the extension of this research project. The use of theoretical contextualisation throughout the interpretation process (see chapter 4) aimed to address these issues of generalisation and if not ensuring generalisation in a statistical sense to a population, it enables generalisation to theoretical propositions. Furthermore, using leaders and organisational decision makers as respondents frequently based on the recommendation of others might have meant that the

people participating in this study reflected similar mental models, ideas, and opinions. In this way findings could have a ‘bias’ leading to a particular interpretation represented in the study. However the use of local project partners helped with the selection of a variety of highly knowledgeable respondents (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007).

Another methodological limitation lies with the usage of interviews as the primary data collection techniques. Despite the rigor of the approach (see chapter 4.2 and 4.4) with regards to choosing participants there was potential ‘self-reporting’ bias within their responses. Thus, respondents might have used interviews to appear favourable in the eyes of the researcher as well as providing answers, which they believe the researcher wanted to hear. To address these aspects, discourse analytical techniques as well as triangulating of the data across three regions was operationalised. As qualitative methodology draws its strength from the richness and contextual considerations, observations, meeting notes, and the research diary served to re-contextualise the coded interview accounts aiding triangulation. Furthermore, memory effects, where the respondents do not remember or do not want to remember past experiences, might also influence interview accounts. Triangulation also assisted with these aspects, as some of the textual artefacts were produced in the past.

Another potential limitation of the qualitative research methodology operationalised is the large amount of data collected (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Using the coding process (see chapter 4) the researcher selected the data to be included in the analysis. Despite the aim to use data from all sources, the time constraints and the focus of this thesis (see chapter 4) also facilitated the data reduction process and breadth of data used. However, because the raw data remains in the researchers’ possession, in future, additional aspects that were outside the realm of the thesis can be explored using additional theoretical considerations.

Concerning the analysis process, a potential limitation arises from the difficulty of the researcher being able to ‘bracket out’ their background in the interpretation process (Creswell, 2009) as this adds subjectivity to this process. Assumptions about the world, the gender of the researcher, the cultural context of the researcher’s upbringing and education all influence the interpretation process. Triangulation of data sources (see chapter 4) assisted in counteracting such tendencies. In addition reflective periods and discussion with field experts assisted to ‘neutralise’ the researcher’s background in the interpretation processes. Furthermore, continuous theoretical contextualisation during the interpretation processes also aimed to ‘bracket out’ potential subjective conclusions.

This last consideration with regards to limitations illustrates the problem of the positionality of the researcher (Deetz, 1996). This is of particular importance in a ‘low-trust’ environment (Mishler & Rose, 1997) such as Russia. The insider/outsider dichotomy is important in all qualitative research studies but particularly when conducting the study in a ‘foreign’ country. Insiders are usually people grown up in the same country as respondents (Herod, 1999). The discussion of positionality of the researcher influences the generation and hence interpretation of data (Deetz, 1996). The particular context of this study also means that the issue of positionality of the researcher needs to be considered. The researcher’s positionality impacts the recruitment of respondents (Herod, 1999) and also the information provided by respondents. The Russian low-trust environment (Mishler & Rose, 1997) means that respondents have a tendency to be less open towards outsiders, aiming to portray their own cultural environment more positively. Consequently, their interview accounts can have a positive bias aiming to make themselves, their organisations, culture, relevance for this study, their state and government look favourable towards outsiders. To address these limitations the researcher aimed to shift his positionality. In this study this was attempted in four ways. First, the researcher used Russian in all communications with respondents. Second, the researcher emphasised his Russian roots and family heritage. Third, informal chats before and after the

interview, sharing personal information, allowed the researcher to build trust and thus limit the perception of being an outsider. Fourth, the researcher revisited, whenever possible organisations to gather observational data by attending meetings, seminars, or other organisational activities. This had the potential to shift the perception of respondents about the researchers' outsider position and consider the researcher as an insider in particular during the informal conversations that took place on such occasions. However, time and resource constraints meant that not all organisations could be revisited.

Language is another potential limitation. All qualitative analysis is sensitive to the language used (Alvesson & Kärreman, 2007) but the Russian language is rich in words and full of idiomatic expressions which are difficult to capture during the translation process. Therefore, the process of translation might have lost some of the contextual issues and riches of the language, which would have enriched the dataset. However, to counter such issues the researcher consulted bilingual native speakers to assist in translating the meaning of such expressions.

8.3.1.2 Future Directions

Taking into account the limitations of this research project, this section elaborates on future research avenues. Five potential avenues are discussed. First, further research should 'validate' the emerging managed civil society arrangements in different regional contexts and sectors. Clearly when considering the NGO law, advocacy activities, or aspects of marionette behaviour there is a potential that other sectors to health and education might have a different experience. Validation of the proposition of a managed civil society in other areas of civil society is therefore of paramount importance. This could lead to different themes and insights about Russian civil society and further aid our understanding of whether and to what extent civil society is managed by the state. Although unlikely given the importance of the Russian state, it could be that other sectors rather than displaying evidence of management, signal the

advent of de Tocqueville's 'communities of associational life'. Only with further research, in different regions and different sectors will we understand whether managed arrangements represent a Russian-style civil society. This avenue of research would also need to engage in more quantitative work to establish and examine issues of generalisation.

Second, future research needs to take a more in-depth approach of specific organisations to explore how such managed civil society arrangements impact the internal configuration, such as governance structures, membership recruitment, or the ability to form social movements. Only then can we understand how managed arrangements affect TSOs and their adjustment to these institutional factors more specifically. Furthermore, legislative changes take a long time to materialise and therefore more longitudinal approaches to study these effects and other aspects need to be part of a future research agenda. Such considerations will also enable us to gain a more specific insight into the logic that drives some of the isomorphic developments outlined in this thesis and whether or not TSOs behave as institutional entrepreneurs attempting to shape the isomorphic pressures in alternative ways.

Third, given the importance attributed to comparing civil society in context such as the Russian Federation's with traditional theoretical understandings (see chapter 2) another avenue for future research needs to focus on the comparative exploration of civil society across democratising contexts. This will extend our understanding of the concept of civil society and enable researchers, rather than to referring to 'traditional models' versus non-traditional ones, to understand the communalities across democratising contexts. It will also provide new insights and understandings of civil society in both democratising and developed democratic contexts. In light of some of the issues faced by developed democracy, such as democracy fatigue and a change in associational activities and life (Maloney, 1999; Newton, 1997; Putnam, 2002; Whiteley, 1999), such comparative studies could potentially provide

valuable insights into alternative forms of social capital generation and non-traditional arrangements into which civil society might transform.

Fourth, re-conceptualising civil society and making it appropriate to contextual factors also offers an additional avenue for political scientists studying various political regimes. Future research in the area would provide us with a better understanding of how managed civil society arrangements are situated within the bigger picture of macro political governance. Specifically combining the managed civil society consideration in this thesis with Hale's (2010) analysis of hybrid political regimes could provide the researcher with a more comprehensive way to understanding the functionalities and roles of various social space in such regimes.

Finally, future research also needs to focus on issues of practice and in particular best practice of TSOs. Evidently, as indicatively illustrated in this thesis, some organisations, despite being 'left out', 'pulled upwards', or unable to engage in advocacy are still able to teach citizens norms and values (Taylor, 2006) and thus occupy the space between the state and civil society (Neace, 1999). Examining the different approaches of organisations and deducing best practice for TSOs to engage in this way within managed civil society arrangements would be fruitful for both our understanding of Russian civil society and assisting in its development to nurture and stimulate democratisation. Overall, these various avenues of future research could offer new exciting insight into when and why civil society contributes to building modern democratic societies.

8.4 Concluding Remarks

This thesis has set out to examine civil society in Russia. In so doing it has operationalised the concepts of civil society, third sector organisations, and social capital. In doing so this chapter has investigated the question of how managed civil society arrangements manifest themselves

in the context of the Russian Federation. Collecting and analysing the data across three Russian regions has enabled this thesis to illustrate such arrangements. The thesis highlights the 2006 NGO law is an explicated attempt to managed civil society. The thesis also demonstrates that there are more subtle attempts by the state to manage civil society. Furthermore, in chapter seven the thesis outlines the increase in marionette-like behaviour amongst TSOs which facilitated the management of civil society. This highlights that civil society in the Russian Federation does not bridge the gap between society and state, develop an autonomous civil society space, and so its influence on the democratisation of political governance remains limited.

The thesis illustrated that civil society in Russia does not develop *sui generis*, but needs to be understood as being adapted to the cultural-historic trajectories shaping the social relations at the heart of such arrangements. Oldfield (2001), referring to the concept of sustainable development, highlights the need to seek a Russian perspective on issues that at their heart reflect a western idealised model of development. Managed arrangements have to be seen as the adaptation of the construct of civil society to the particularities of the Russian context. Managed civil society is not an argument for the death of civil society in Russian *per se*, but rather represents an important addition to the conceptual understanding of civil society. It highlights the contextual and path-dependent nature of this theoretical construct. Russian civil society outlined in this thesis shows us the exploratory limits of the traditional model outlined in chapter two. It also provides additional insights into how civil society arrangements in democratising contexts differ to western arrangements. Civil society in Russia illustrates the need to understand civil society as a space, which is shaped by its context, rather than constituting a driving force for democratisation within that context. Civic engagement is possible within structures and forms that are at odds with a traditional understanding of civil society. As shown in this thesis meaningful engagement can take place in civil society arrangements in which the state plays a prominent and all-encompassing role in defining the

boundaries of civil society activity. Conversely, this managed model of civil society is closer to the traditional model than it seems, as it emphasises, similar to the new public management discourse in the latter, state-civil society cooperation and voluntary civic participation. However, the boundaries in which this is possible are more restrictively defined.

Nonetheless, the development of a managed civil society also means that like in many other authoritarian and semi-democratic regimes (Kubik, 2005), activities which are antagonistic towards the state or which hold the state accountable are less of a focus for TSOs. The strong and dependent relationships that dominate civil society offer the state the possibility to use these organisations to legitimise its actions. Mirroring Evan's (2006b) predictions, this thesis illustrates that the state does not completely absorb civil society, as in the Soviet period, but that it dominates civil society. From our traditional perspective we know that only when there are circumstances that allow TSOs to stay independent of the state will they be able to engage in effective advocacy to improve the situation for their respective constituencies. If TSOs fail to maintain their independence, it is likely that they will become tentacles of the Russian state supporting it for better or for worse. However, after the failure to import western-style civil society, the evidence presented suggests that Russian civil society activists are becoming increasingly comfortable with the idea of managed civil society arrangements. TSOs yield their political rights and potential in exchange for the pledge of the state to provide resources and co-operative partnerships. Thus managed arrangements are as much an exchange relationship as a directing of civil society by the state. Civil society as a lens to understand state-society relations in Russia shows that little has changed since the end of the Soviet Union. Despite a process of democratisation, the state and society are just as isolated from each other as they were in Rose's 1995 hourglass characterisation of Russian society (Rose, 1995). Today's Russian civil society is neither a space for pluralism nor a space for conflict and confrontation. It seems that civil society in Russia has partially developed backwards into

arrangements where it once again aligns with the interests and priorities of the vertical power structures, and as a result, becomes subordinated to and managed by the state.

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Appendices

Appendix A: List of participating organisations

Code	Date, Membership/Staff (current)	Main Objective	Region	Register
Org01Sam	1991, 8 S	Assisting civil society development and NGOs	Samara	YES
Org02Sam	2001, 1 S	Helping other NGOs, working with young people on legal initiatives and spreading advanced pedagogical technologies.	Samara	YES
Org03Sam	2007, 6 S	Developing, administering and running charitable programmes	Samara	YES
Org04Sam	2000, 2 S	Developing and recruiting volunteers	Samara	YES
Org05Sam	1992 (1918), ca. 3000 M	Supporting and activating young people	Samara	YES
Org06Sam	1991, 2 S	Working for children with hearing problems and impairments	Samara	YES
Org07Sam	2003, ca. 20 M	Helping and supporting families with disabled children	Samara	YES
Org08Sam	2000, 3 S	Providing additional education about the folklore and history of the Russian people	Samara	YES
Org09Sam	1997 (1993), 3 S	Promoting the practical application of advanced forms educating children and the youth, the education of human rights and legal culture as well as love for the nation	Samara	YES
Org10Sam	2001, 60 S	Working with people with drug addiction, HIV/AIDS and the most vulnerable groups of society	Samara	YES
Org11Sam	2002, 3 S	Providing additional education of different languages for people from all circumstances	Samara	YES
Org12Sam	2003, 100 M	Assisting families that have children with Down Syndrome	Samara	NO
Org13Sam	1998, ca. 15 M	Promoting orienteering as a sport and a healthy way of life	Samara	YES
Org14Sam	1999, 7 S	Supporting, assisting and protecting the rights of people with HIV/AIDS	Samara	YES

Org15Sam	2005 (1988), S 2	Promote the needs of the disabled	Samara	YES
Org16Sam	1998, 23 S	Integrating the disabled into society, protecting their rights, and providing additional help	Samara	YES
Org17Sam	1985, 5 S	Promote a healthy way of life	Samara	YES
Org18Sam	2005, ca 4 S	Organising Youth exchanges and volunteers	Samara	YES
Org19Sam	2007, 3 S	Providing help to people with HIV/AIDS	Samara	YES
Org20Sam	1992, 3 S	Helping and promoting the issues of children by encouraging voluntary activity and association and lobbying	Samara	YES
Org21Sam	1999, 3 S	Educating the medical profession about HIV and working on the prevention of the spread of HIV infections in vulnerable groups	Samara	YES
Org22Sam	1998, 1 S/ca 10 M	Advancing the issues of children and fighting corruption in the public services	Samara	NO
Org23Sam	2000, ca. 60 M	Helping parents with children with autism, promoting the rights of autistic children for education and social integration	Samara	NO
Org24Sam	(1924-1933) 1987, 5 S	Helping children in difficult life situation, poverty and in children's homes. Conducting humanitarian aid for children	Samara	YES
Org01Per	1999, 3 M	Promoting drug awareness, fighting drug addiction, promoting drug rehabilitation and providing support to families affected by drug addiction	Perm	NO
Org02Per	1868, 12 S	Providing domestic primary care, organising humanitarian actions and charity events	Perm	YES
Org03Per	1999, ca 20 S	Helping the disabled to find work, conducting social projects for the disabled, developing commercial activities to fund our projects	Perm	YES
Org04Per	1995, 6 S	Promoting and organising disability sport at the professional level (Paralympics) to armature and hoppy level	Perm	YES
Org05Per	1938, 38 S	Promoting the interests (rights/accessibility/social integration) of the blind, organising employment and the cultural life for them	Perm	YES
Org06Per	2006, N.A.	Promoting political activity of the youth	Perm	YES

Org07Per	1993, 4 S	Promoting the employability of the disabled	Perm	YES
Org08Per	1926, 22 S	Promoting the interests of the deaf, organising employment, supporting education and cultural activities for the deaf	Perm	YES
Org09Per	1997, N.A.	Promoting the interest of the severely movement disabled, supporting and promoting the creation of a rehabilitation centre for the severely movement disabled	Perm	YES
Org10Per	1998, 4 S	Assisting children in difficult life situations, Empowering Russia's Most Vulnerable Children and Young People	Perm	NO
Org11Per	1992, ca 18 S	Running the Gulag Museum and promoting the Memory of the political repression, Promoting human rights and citizenship education	Perm	YES
Org12Per	1998, 4 S	Promote the memory of political repression, promote human rights and citizenship among the youth	Perm	YES
Org13Per	2000, 60 M	Promoting and employing the all disabled	Perm	YES
Org14Per	ca 1997, 70 M	Helping families with children with autism, promoting the rights of autistic children and young people	Perm	NO
Org15Per	1994, 50 M	Supporting families with members dying of cancer in the hospice and domestic	Perm	YES
Org16Per	2005, 10 M	Ensuring fair elections and educating the public about the electoral process	Perm	NO
Org17Per	1996, 16 S	Providing legal support to other TSOs. Assisting TSO in their PR and marketing campaigns	Perm	YES
Org18Per	2005, 9 M	Promoting housing associations and assisting people in setting up TSOs. Teaching people about their rights	Perm	YES
Org19Per	2003, 20 M	Educating people about citizenship and human rights. Engaging school children in civic behaviour	Perm	YES
Org20Per	1994, 11 S	Protecting individual and collective rights and assisting citizens in protecting their own rights	Perm	YES
Org21Per	2006, 4 S	Providing assistance to people with drug problems	Perm	YES
Org22Per	1998, 3 S	Supporting social initiatives and implementing social projects, providing research service to the state	Perm	YES

Org23Per	1988, ca 15 S	Promoting the rights of the disabled, providing social support for the disabled	Perm	YES
Org01Yek	2003, 5 S	Working with young mothers, providing psychological pre- and postnatal help. Providing family consultation	Yekaterinburg	YES
Org02Yek	ca 2005, 1 S	Promoting the rights of people in wheelchairs	Yekaterinburg	YES
Org03Yek	1999, 1 S	Promoting the rights of people in wheelchairs, promoting an accessible city	Yekaterinburg	YES
Org04Yek	ca 2000, 5 S	Running and providing a centre for psychological support to families with disabled children.	Yekaterinburg	YES
Org05Yek	2001, 10 S/M	Promotion of healthy lifestyles and the protection of citizens' health. Improving the moral and psychological state of citizens. Strengthening the prestige and the role of family in society.	Yekaterinburg	YES
Org06Yek	2001, ca 5 M	Promote the integration of people in wheelchairs, improving their technological ability of people in wheelchairs	Yekaterinburg	YES
Org07Yek	2002, ca 30 M	Promote the integration of the disabled. Establish an inter-cultural centre for the disabled	Yekaterinburg	YES
Org08Yek	ca 2000, 20 S	Running rehabilitation facilities for drug users	Yekaterinburg	YES
Org09Yek	1996, 0	Promote the rights of the disabled, Encourage the creation of TSOs run by the disabled - DISSOLVED	Yekaterinburg	YES
Org10Yek	2000, 7/8 S	Improving childcare and the situation of children	Yekaterinburg	YES
Org11Yek	1918, 10 S ca 7000 M	Promoting the needs of the Blind. Providing employment to the blind. Providing cultural life appropriate for blind people	Yekaterinburg	YES
Org12Yek	1998, 1 S	Providing Humanitarian Aid to children in children's homes.	Yekaterinburg	NO
Org13Yek	2004, 1 S	Providing afternoon and out of school programs to children based on martial arts	Yekaterinburg	NO
Org14Yek	2003, 20 M	Protecting the rights of the disabled. Creating employment for the disabled focusing on the environment. Improving the standard of life of the disabled. Providing psychological and legal to the disabled.	Yekaterinburg	YES

Org15Yek	1999, 22 S	Providing support to people, in particular young mothers with HIV/AIDS	Yekaterinburg	YES
Org16Yek	1995, 2 S	Organising special Olympics	Yekaterinburg	YES
Org17Yek	2002, 9 M	Solving problems and educating people to work with children with strong and difficult developmental difficulties.	Yekaterinburg	YES
Org18Yek	2007, 6 M	Promoting freedom and world peace amongst young people. Encouraging and educating young people	Yekaterinburg	NO
Org19Yek	1992, 32 M	Promoting and engaging in humanitarian activities. Helping and supporting children's homes	Yekaterinburg	YES
Org20Yek	1999, ca 30 M	Helping families with disabled children suffering from cancer and onco-hematological diseases - DISSOLVED	Yekaterinburg	NO
Org21Yek	1992, 8 S	Assisting families that have disabled children. Providing rehabilitations and integration services to families with disabled children	Yekaterinburg	YES
Org22Yek	1996, 2 M	Assisting children with movement impairments	Yekaterinburg	NO
Org23Yek	1998, 3 S	Education children with hearing impairments. Assisting families with children with hearing impairments	Yekaterinburg	YES
Org24Yek	1999, ca. 10 S	Representing the interest of students. Organising students and student participation	Yekaterinburg	YES
Org25Yek	1992 (1918), ca. 17 000 M/ ca 25 S	Supporting and activating young people	Yekaterinburg	YES
Org26Yek	1988, 5 S	Promote the needs of the disabled	Yekaterinburg	YES
Org27Yek	1961, 4 S	Providing additional education to children. Running of an after school-club	Yekaterinburg	YES
Org28Yek	1998, 1 S	Promote family life and work life balance for women	Yekaterinburg	YES
Org29Yek	1998, ca. 40 S	Rehabilitating drug users using Christian-orthodox values	Yekaterinburg	YES
Org30Yek	2003, ca. 450 M	Promoting and supporting the rehabilitation of people suffering from multiple-sclerosis	Yekaterinburg	YES

Org31Yek	2004, ca. 3 S	Promoting the integration of migrants. Supporting and educating the law enforcement agencies as well as migrant communities about rights and responsibilities	Yekaterinburg	YES
Org32Yek	2005, ca. 20 S	Providing employment to the disabled. Promoting and protecting the rights of the disabled.	Yekaterinburg	YES
Org34Yek	2000, 1 S	Promoting a healthy life without drugs, alcohol, cigarettes and other addiction. Promoting more effective drug treatment. Providing support for drug users and influencing social policy to support drug users. Protecting children and supporting people with HIV and hepatitis.	Yekaterinburg	YES

Table A.1: List of participating organisations

S = Staff/M = Members.

Appendix B: Letter of Access

Appendix B.1: Letter of access to Russian universities – English



Aston Business School

Aston University
Aston Triangle
Birmingham B4 7ET
United Kingdom

Tel +44 (0)121 204 3000

www.abs.aston.ac.uk

Dear,

We would like to invite your organisation to participate in a piece of research which is to be conducted by members of the Economics and Strategy Group at Aston Business School, Aston University, United Kingdom over the coming months.

The purpose of the research is to investigate non-governmental and grassroots organisations that are active within the Russian health and educational sector. As part of my doctoral research, I want to explore the way in which these organisations conduct their activities and learn more about how they interact with different aspects of their environment.

What's involved?

We would like to ask for your assistance in making contact with and negotiating access into non-governmental and grassroots organisations that are active around issues relating to health and education. The research will employ a qualitative methodology and therefore we would hope that a small number of senior members of these organisations would be willing to participate in semi-structured interviews which will last no longer than one hour. Upon request the interview questions can be made available before hand. The project we propose has gained the approval of the Aston Business School Research Ethics Committee. All data and information provided by organisations and participants will be anonymous and their responses treated with complete confidentiality. Further, we would very much like to meet with local officials of the Federal Registration Service who may be able to provide us with registration statistics concerning these types of organisations.

The research will be overseen by Dr. Jo Crotty, a Lecturer at Aston Business School. Jo's research team, whose members include Dr. Peter Rodgers and Sergej Ljubownikow, have extensive research experience in Commonwealth of Independent States, China and the UK. In addition Aston Business School has worked closely in recent years with a large number of organisations as well as several other academic institutions both in the UK and abroad. As a result, we have a strong reputation in both academia and business.

We aim to begin data collection at the beginning of May 2008 for a two month period. Hence, the purpose of this letter is to ascertain whether your organisation would, in principle, be interested to participate in the research and help us negotiate access into local organisations.

A member of the research team will contact you shortly to discuss the project. Alternatively, you can contact us directly on 0044-121-204-4986, or e-mail ljubowns@aston.ac.uk. Thank you for your consideration,

Best Wishes,

Sergej Ljubownikow

Doctoral Student
Aston University
Aston Business School
Economics and Strategy Group
Birmingham, B4 7ET
United Kingdom
Tel: 0044 (0)121 204 4986
Email: ljubowns@aston.ac.uk
www.aston.ac.uk

Appendix B.2: Letter of access to Russian universities – Russian



Aston University
Aston Triangle
Birmingham B4 7ET
United Kingdom
Tel +44 (0)121 204 3000
www.abs.aston.ac.uk

Уважаемые Господа,

Мы приглашаем Вас для совместной работы в одном из исследовательских проектов, который будет проводится в ближайшие месяцы сотрудниками экономической и стратегической группы Астонской Бизнесшколы, Астонского Университета в Великобритании.

Задачей этого проекта являются исследования негосударственных организаций и организаций неориентирующихся на экономическую выгоду, активно принимающих участие в вопросах здравоохранения и образования.

Как часть моей докторской работы, мне бы хотелось исследовать в каких направлениях эти организации работают и ознакомиться с их влиянием на разные аспекты окружающей среды.

О чем идет речь?

Мы хотели бы Вас попросить помочь нам вступить в контакт с вышеназванными организациями. Наши исследования используют качественные методики и мы надеемся, что квалифицированные работники этих организаций смогут принять участие в заранее составленных интервью, которые длятся около одного часа. При желании, вопросы интервью будут представлены заранее для ознакомления.

Проект, который мы Вам предлагаем, одобрен этическим и исследовательским отделами Астонской Бизнесшколы. Все данные и информации полученные нами, останутся анонимными и не подлежат разглашению. В дальнейшем, мы хотели бы встретиться с представителями местного Федерального Бюро Регистрации для получения регистрационной статистики.

Все исследования будут проводиться под наблюдением Др. Джо Кротти, одной из преподавательниц Астонской Бизнесшколы. Исследовательская группа вокруг Др. Джо Кротти включает в себя вместе с другими сотрудниками, Др. Петера Роджерса и Магистра Сергея Любовникова. Эта группа имеет огромный исследовательский опыт в странах Комменвел, Китая и Великобритании. Эта школа проводила совместные работы со многими организациями и университетами не только в Англии, но и за её пределами. Результатом этих работ является значительная репутация в академических и экономических кругах.

Мы хотели бы начать сбор информации с начала мая 2008 г. на протяжении двух месяцев. Цель нашего письма узнать Ваше мнение по предложенному нами проекту. Хотели бы Вы принять участие в нем, оказав нам помощь для вступления в контакт с местными организациями.

Один из участников проекта вступит с Вами в контакт для обсуждения возможностей этого проекта. При желании возможна прямая связь по тел.0044 121 204 4986 или по электронному адресу ljubowns@aston.ac.uk.

Большое спасибо за оказанное внимание.

С наилучшими пожеланиями

Аспирант Астонской Бизнесшколы
Сергей Любовников

Appendix C: Consent form

Appendix C.1: Consent form – English



Third Sector Organisation in the Russian Federation

I would like to invite you to participate in a piece of research which is to be conducted by a member of the Economics and Strategy Group from Aston Business School. The purpose of the research is to investigate NGOs and GROs in Russia.

What is involved?

We would like participants to take part in a tape recorded interview that will last no longer than one hour. The researcher will be asking ten preset question that can be made available before hand upon your request.

Please be aware that participation in this research will have no adverse effects and there are no penalties for non-participation. All data will be stored in accordance with the UK Data Protection Act (1998) and the confidentiality of your data will be maintained at all times. All tape recordings of interviews will be transcribed by the researcher, ensuring that any information that may make participants identifiable is anonymised. A small team of subject matter experts from within Aston Business School will then assist the researcher in the analysis of this data. Please be aware that you have the right to withdraw from the research at any time and that there are no adverse consequences for withdrawal.

Your participation will provide data for the PhD thesis of the researcher, Sergej Ljubownikow, and anonymous results may be published in academic journals. Therefore, your participation in this research would be greatly appreciated and will form a valuable contribution towards improving our understanding about NGOs and GROs in Russia. If you are happy to participate, please complete the attached consent form before the interview.

Any further questions, please do not hesitate to e-mail Sergej at ljubowns@aston.ac.uk or telephone 0044 (0) 121 204 4986

Kind Regards,

Sergej Ljubownikow

Consent Form

Participant's Statement

In relation to the 'NGOs and GROs in Russia' study, I have been fully informed, in writing, about the purpose of the study and exactly what is required in order to participate. I have read and fully understood the covering sheet to this consent form and agree to participate in a tape-recorded interview.

Named Researcher

Sergej Ljubownikow,
Doctoral Researcher,
Economics and Strategy Group,
Room SW713
Aston Business School,
ljubowns@aston.ac.uk
Tel: 0044 (0) 121 204 4986

Signature:	
Full Name (in Print):	
Name of Organisation:	
Date:	

Thank you for your participation in this research



**Негосударственные Некоммерциальные Организаций и
Организаций Неориентирующихся на Экономическую Выгоду
в России**

Дорогие Участники,

Я хочу пригласить Вас принять участие в исследований, которое проводится сотрудником экономической и стратегической группы Астонской Бизнесшколы с Самарским Государственным Университетом. Цель этого исследования является изучение негосударственных некоммерциальных организаций и организаций неориентирующихся на экономическую выгоду в России.

О чем идёт речь?

Мы приглашаем Вас принять участие в интервью, который будет записан и не длится больше часа. Ведущий интервью задаст Вам 10 вопросов, с которыми Вы можете заранее ознакомиться, если Вы желаете.

Участие в этом интервью для Вас абсолютно безопасно и Вы так-же можете отказаться от участие в интервью. Все данные собранные в результате интервью будут храниться в соответствии с законодательством о защите частных дат (закон 1998 г.). Вес на плёнке записанный интервью будет писменно переведен ведущим интервью. Он несет ответственность что-бы никто из участников интервью не мог быть идентифицирован.

Группа сотрудников Астонской Бизнесшколы занимающихся изучением проектом окажут помощь ведущему интервью в анализе собранного материала. Примите во внимание, что Вы можете в любое время отказаться от дальнейшего участие в этом проекте, без всяких для вас ослажнений.

Мы гарантируем полную анонимность Вашей совместной с нами работы. Результаты этого исследования не будут предоставлены для пользования другими организациями.

Эта совместная работа даст основу для моей докторской работы и результаты этой работы могут быть опубликованы в академических изданиях. Поэтому Ваше участие в этом проекте оказало бы мне большую помощь и расширила-бы наше понимание о существующих НКО в России.

Если Вы хотите принять участие в этой работе, заполните пожалуйста до интервью прилагаемое подтверждение вашего участие.

Если у Вас возникнут вопросы, Вы можете написать мне e-mail: ljubowns@aston.ac.uk или позвонить по телефону: 0044 (0) 121 204 4986

С наилучшими пожеланиями

Сергей Любовников

Подтверждение о принятии участия в интервью

Я письменно информирован/а о целях исследования «Негосударственные некоммерческие организаций и организаций неориентирующихся на экономическую выгоду в России» и ознакомлен/а с вопросами которые будут исследоваться. Я прочитал/а и понял/а предлагаемое письмо и согласен/согласна принять участие в записаном интервью.

Ведущий интервью
Sergej Ljubownikow
Doctoral Researcher
Economics and Strategy Group
Room SW713
Aston Business School
ljubowns@aston.ac.uk
Tel.: 0044 (0) 121 204 4986

Подпись:	
Ф.И.О.: (печатными буквами)	
Название организаций:	
Число:	

Спасибо за Ваше участие в интервью

Appendix D: Interview protocol

Interview Questions:

Background

1. Can you tell me about the development of your organisation?

How was it founded, what was the motivation to create it, what was its purpose, what were some of your original projects/activities?

2. How has the working environment changed over the last 5 years?

3. How do you recruit new members into your organisation?

Are you successful?

How many people do you have now versus five years ago?

4. What projects is your organisation currently involved in?

List the most important ones and describe each of them.

5. Why do you conduct these projects?

6. How do you go about conducting your projects?

How do you plan them?

How do you execute them?

How successful/unsuccessful have they been?

7. What factors impact/limit your work on these projects?

8. How do you finance yourself?

9. Are you engaged in advocacy or rights protection activity?

What do you do in this line of work?

How effective do you think your work is?

State-substitution

10. Do you work with partners on any of your projects?

Who are these organisations? (Are they state organisations, Are they pseudo state organisations?)

11. Do you know how your partners fund themselves?

12. Why do you interact these particular organisations?

13. How does your collaboration work?

How do you divide up responsibility?

Why do you do so in this way?

What works, what does not?

What is good, what is bad?

14. Have any of these projects or activities been previously performed by the state?

Which ones?

15. Does the state or state institutions/structures conduct projects or activities similar to yours?

16. Are there other organisations which do the same/similar activities?

17. How did you form your partnership with these state organisations?

NGO-legislation

18. Are you aware of the legislative changes of 2006 regarding non-commercial organisations?

What about your partners, are they aware?

19. How has the new legislation impacted your organisation?

Its resources, funding, membership?

Activities and projects you undertake?

Impacts on a day-to-day basis?

20. What do you think about the NGO law?

What will happen to your organisation?

Is it good or bad?

Who do you think profits from the law?

How will affect civil society?

Marionettes

21. What do you think of civil society in your region?

22. Do you know of any NGOs that have been created by the state?

Why did they come about?

What impact do you think they will have?

Do you work with any of these organisations, How and Why?

23. Do you participate in the local Public Chamber?

Why do you participate?

How did you become part of it?

What impacts does it have on your organisations and its activities?

24. How will your work be affected by the planned reforms on education/health?

25. Do you have any statistics or information about your organisations that you could give me?

26. Do you know anyone else I could talk to?

Appendix E: List of Respondents by Region

Appendix E.1: Respondents Samara

	Gender	Organisation	Category	Field of Activity
Respondent 1	Female	Org01Sam	Director	Other
Respondent 2	Female	Org02Sam	Director	Education
Respondent 3	Female	Org03Sam	Director	Other
Respondent 4	Female	Org04Sam	Leader	Education
Respondent 5	Male	Org05Sam	Leader	Education
Respondent 6	Female	Org06Sam	Director	Health
Respondent 7	Female	Org07Sam	Director	Health
Respondent 8	Male	Org08Sam	Leader	Education
Respondent 9	Male	Org09Sam	Leader	Education
Respondent 10	Male	Org10Sam	Director	Health
Respondent 11	Female	Org11Sam	Director	Education
Respondent 12	Female	Org12Sam	Leader	Health
Respondent 13	Female	Org14Sam	Leader	Health
Respondent 14	Female	Org15Sam	Director	Health
Respondent 15	Male	Org16Sam	Director	Health
Respondent 16	Male	Org17Sam	Deputy Director	Health
Respondent 17	Female	Org18Sam	Leader	Education
Respondent 18	Female	Org19Sam	Leader	Health
Respondent 19	Female	Org20Sam	Leader	Education
Respondent 20	Male	Org21Sam	Director	Health
Respondent 21	Female	Org22Sam	Leader	Education/Rights
Respondent 22	Male	Org23Sam	Leader	Health
Respondent 23	Female	Org24Sam	Director	Health
Respondent 24	Male	Org14Sam	Leader	Health

Table E.2: Respondents Samara

All but “Project April”, “AIDS NGO Chapaevsk” and “Impulse” are located in Samara City.

“Project April” is located in Tolyatti. “AIDS NGO Chapaevsk” and “Impulse” are located in Chapaevsk.

Appendix E.2: Respondents Perm

	Gender	Organisation	Category	Field of Activity
Respondent 25	Female	Org01Per	Founder/Leader	Health
Respondent 26	Male	Org02Per	Director	Health
Respondent 27	Female	Org03Per	Deputy Director	Health
Respondent 28	Male	Org04Per	Director	Health
Respondent 29	Male	Org05Per	Director	Health
Respondent 30	Female	Org06Per	Assistant to Director	Education
Respondent 31	Male	Org07Per	Director	Health
Respondent 32	Female	Org08Per	Director	Health
Respondent 33	Female	Org09Per	Leader	Health
Respondent 34	Female	Org10Per	Co-Director	Health/Education
Respondent 35	Male	Org11Per	Director	Education
Respondent 36	Female	Org11Per	Deputy Director	Education
Respondent 37	Male	Org12Per	Leader	Education/Rights
Respondent 38	Female	Org13Per	Founder/Director	Health
Respondent 39	Female	Org14Per	Founder/Leader	Health
Respondent 40	Female	Org15Per	Director	Health
Respondent 41	Male	Org16Per	Leader	Education/Rights
Respondent 42	Male	Org17Per	Director	Other/Rights
Respondent 43	Male	Org18Per	Leader	Other/Rights
Respondent 44	Male	Org19Per	Director	Education/Rights
Respondent 45	Male	Org20Per	Director	Other/Rights
Respondent 46	Male	Org21Per	Director	Health
Respondent 47	Male	Org17Per	Director	Education/Other
Respondent 48	Female	Org23Per	Director	Health
Respondent 83	Male	GovOrg01Per	Liaison Officer	Health/Education/Other

Table E.3: Respondents Perm

All organisations are located in the city of Perm.

Appendix E.3: Respondents Yekaterinburg

	Gender	Organisation	Category	Field of Activity
Respondent 49	Female	Org01Yek	Director	Health
Respondent 50	Male	Org02Yek	Director	Health
Respondent 51	Female	Org03Yek	Director	Health
Respondent 52	Female	Org04Yek	Director	Health
Respondent 53	Female	Org05Yek	Director	Health
Respondent 54	Male	Org06Yek	Director	Health
Respondent 55	Female	Org07Yek	Director	Health
Respondent 56	Male	Org08Yek	Director	Health
Respondent 57	Male	Org09Yek	Director	Health
Respondent 58	Female	Org09Yek	Co-Director	Health
Respondent 59	Female	Org10Yek	Marketing Director	Education/Health
Respondent 60	Male	Org11Yek	Director	Health
Respondent 61	Female	Org12Yek	Leader	Education
Respondent 62	Male	Org13Yek	Leader	Education
Respondent 63	Male	Org14Yek	Founder/Leader	Health
Respondent 64	Female	Org15Yek	Director	Health
Respondent 65	Female	Org16Yek	Director	Health
Respondent 66	Female	Org17Yek	Director	Health
Respondent 67	Male	Org18Yek	Leader	Education
Respondent 68	Male	Org19Yek	Director	Education/Other
Respondent 69	Female	Org20Yek	Director	Health
Respondent 70	Female	Org21Yek	Director	Health
Respondent 71	Male	Org22Yek	Director	Health
Respondent 72	Female	Org23Yek	Director	Health
Respondent 73	Female	Org24Yek	Divisional Director	Education
Respondent 74	Female	Org25Yek	Director	Education
Respondent 75	Male	Org26Yek	Director	Health
Respondent 76	Female	Org27Yek	Leader	Education
Respondent 77	Female	Org28Yek	Leader	Education/Health
Respondent 78	Female	Org29Yek	Leader	Health
Respondent 79	Male	Org30Yek	Leader	Health
Respondent 80	Female	Org31Yek	Director	Education/Rights
Respondent 81	Female	Org32Yek	Director	Health
Respondent 82	Male	Org34Yek	Director	Health

Table E.4: Respondents Yekaterinburg

All but “Blagoe Delo” and “Development” are located in the city of Yekaterinburg. “Blagoe Delo” is located in the village of Verkh-Neivinskiy and “Development” in the city of Pervouralsk.

Appendix F: Coding scheme and chapter structure

Appendix F1: Codes and coding hierarchy after 20 coded interviews

Themes	Categories	Codes
Legislative Change	NGO Law	Perceived Effect
		Public Chamber
		Registration
		Reporting Requirements
		Tax
	Funding	Lack of Funding
TSOs as service providers	Activities	Limits and Problems of Activities
		Rights Protection and Advocacy Activities
		Outcomes
	Funding	Russian Private and Business
		Other Russian
		Foreign
	Interaction	Relationships with authorities
		Relationships with NGOs
		Cooperation with NGOs
		Cooperation with the state
Role of Marionette organisation	Interaction	Personal connections with authorities
		History of organisation
		Constituency
		Motivation for foundation
		Personal information about Interviewee
		Organisational information
	Funding Sources	Ability to receive funding from domestic non-state sources
		Ability to receive funding from domestic state sources
	Portrayal of civil society	Understanding of the relationship between the state and TSOs

Table F.5: Coding scheme after coding 20 interviews




Figure F.1: Coding scheme and structure chapter 5

Appendix F.3: Refined coding scheme and structure chapter 6




Figure F.2: Refined coding scheme and structure chapter 6

Appendix F.4: Refined coding scheme and structure chapter 7




Figure F.3: Refined coding scheme and structure chapter 7

Appendix G: TSOs mimicking marionettes

Appendix G.1: TSOs not displaying marionette characteristics

Organisational Code	Registered	Date, Membership/Staff (current)
Org11Sam	YES	2002, 3 S
Org12Sam	NO	2003, 100 M
Org14Sam	YES	1999, 7 S
Org22Sam	NO	1998, 1 S/ca 10 M
Org07Per	YES	1993, 4 S
Org09Per	YES	1997, N.A.
Org10Per	NO	1998, 4 S
Org13Per	YES	2000, 60 M
Org16Per	NO	2005, 10 M
Org02Yek	YES	ca 2005, 1 S
Org06Yek	YES	2001, ca 5 M
Org07Yek	YES	2002, ca 30 M
Org09Yek	NO	1996, 0
Org14Yek	YES	2003, 20 M
Org17Yek	YES	2002, 9 M

Table G.6: TSOs not displaying marionette organisations

Appendix G.2: TSOs displaying marionette characteristics

Organisational Code	Registered	Date, Membership/Staff (current)
Org21Yek	YES	1992, 8 S
Org24Yek	YES	1999, ca. 10 S
Org25Yek	YES	1992 (1918), 17 000 M
Org26Yek	YES	1988, 5 S
Org27Yek	YES	1961, 4 S
Org28Yek	YES	1998, 1 S
Org29Yek	YES	1998, ca. 40 S
Org30Yek	YES	2003, ca. 450 M
Org32Yek	YES	2005, ca. 20 S
Org15Yek	YES	1999, 22 S
Org16Yek	YES	1995, 2 S
Org10Yek	YES	2000, 7/8 S
Org11Yek	YES	1918, 10 S ca 7000 M
Org12Yek	NO	1998, 1 S
Org03Yek	YES	1999, 1 S
Org04Yek	YES	ca 2000, 5 S
Org01Yek	YES	2003, 5 S
Org21Per	YES	2006, 4 S
Org22Per	YES	1998, 3 S
Org23Per	YES	1988, ca 15 S
Org14Per	NO	ca 1997, 70 M
Org15Per	YES	1994, 50 M
Org11Per	YES	1992, ca 18 S
Org12Per	YES	1998, 4 S
Org08Per	YES	1926, 22 S
Org02Per	YES	1868, 12 S
Org03Per	YES	1999, ca 20 S
Org04Per	YES	1995, 6 S
Org05Per	YES	1938, 38 S
Org06Per	YES	2006, N.A.
Org24Sam	YES	(1924-1933) 1987, 5 S
Org20Sam	YES	1992, 3 S
Org21Sam	YES	1999, 3 S
Org15Sam	YES	2005 (1988), S 2
Org16Sam	YES	1998, 23 S
Org17Sam	YES	1985, 5 S
Org01Sam	YES	1991, 8 S
Org02Sam	YES	2001, 1 S
Org03Sam	YES	2007, 6 S
Org04Sam	YES	2000, 2 S
Org05Sam	YES	1992 (1918), 3000 M
Org06Sam	YES	1991, 2 S
Org07Sam	YES	2003, ca. 20 M

Org08Sam	YES	2000, 3 S
Org10Sam	YES	2001, 60 S

Table G.7: TSOs displaying marionette characteristics