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POLICY ISSUES IN RURAL AREAS:
AN EXAMINATION WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO CUMBRIA

By

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SUMMARY

This thesis develops the requirements of the Cumbria Division of the MAFF to have detailed information on a number of rural topics of particular concern to the area's socio-economic advisory service. Information was generated upon the effects of road developments upon agriculture; the possibility of economic and employment growth through tourism, industry, forestry and agriculture; and upon their relationship with conservation and development control issues generally. A working conference was organised (The Whitbarrow Exercise) to review in specific terms a number of the above problems, in which representatives of the major groups active in rural policy formulation and implementation participated. The study was extended to consider these policy issues on a more prosperous agricultural estate; and in the county of Cumbria as a whole. An examination of the development and likely future impact of agricultural policy upon rural policy generally was also undertaken. All the research was set in the context of an extensive literature review.

The results indicate that while state intervention to relieve those problems collectively known as rural deprivation still has an important place in modern rural policy, the scope for such intervention to be successful is limited. Opportunities for employment and wealth creation through tourism, forestry, industry and agriculture are limited for social and economic reasons; developments in these sectors can have adverse effects upon the environment; can compound existing problems; and are often resisted by local people. The lack of success of such ventures indicates continued structural change within rural communities, with some adverse effects for the less privileged members. Recognising this it is argued that rural policy seeks to adapt to, rather than attempt to fundamentally alter inevitable change, recognising that in the long term social and structural problems will resolve themselves. It is further argued that a reduction in state support for agriculture appears inevitable, and this can bring considerable conservation benefits, even in upland areas where positive links between agriculture and conservation have been found by some commentators. It is also argued that for social and economic reasons, and because of the declining importance of agricultural land, a vigorous landscape and ecological conservation policy is pursued by planning authorities and is reasonable. With regard to road developments on agricultural land, the research has shown that although it is the norm for the agricultural community to experience severe difficulty during developments, these can be overcome by increasing the resources of professional expertise available to affected farmers. This indicates a possible important increased role for the MAFF in the development process.

KEY WORDS. RURAL POLICY, RURAL DEVELOPMENT, AGRICULTURAL POLICY, ROAD DEVELOPMENTS.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AHDS	=	Agriculture and Horticulture Development Scheme
AHGS	=	Agriculture and Horticulture Grants Scheme
ADAS	=	Agricultural Development and Advisory Service
AMC	=	Agricultural Mortgage Corporation
BTA	=	British Tourist Association
CTT	=	Capital Transfer Tax
CAS	=	Centre for Agricultural Strategy
CPRE	=	Council for the Preservation of Rural England
CoSIRA	=	Council for Small Industries in Rural Areas
CLA	=	Country Landowners Association
DoE	=	Department of the Environment
ETB	=	English Tourist Board
EEC	=	European Economic Community
FHDS	=	Farm and Horticulture Development Scheme
FHGS	=	Farm and Horticulture Grant Scheme
FLD	=	Friends of the Lake District
HIDB	=	Highlands and Islands Development Board
JURE	=	Joint Unit for Research into the Urban Environment
LDPB	=	Lake District Planning Board
LDSPB	=	Lake District Special Planning Board
LASDO	=	Landscape Areas Special Development Order
LFA	=	Less Favoured Area
MAFF	=	Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food
NCVO	=	National Council of Voluntary Organisations
NUAAW	=	National Union of Agricultural and Allied Workers
NEDC	=	National Economic Development Council
NFU	=	National Farmers Union
NFHA	=	National Federation of Housing Associations
NCC	=	Nature Conservancy Council

OPCS	=	Office of Population Censuses and Surveys
OECD	=	Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development
PTRC	=	Planning and Transportation Research Computation Company
RCU	=	Road Construction Unit
SSSI	=	Site of Special Scientific Interest
SIA	=	Special Investment Area
SMD	=	Standard Man Day
TGO	=	Timber Grower's Organisation
TRRU	=	Tourism and Recreation Research Unit
UMEX	=	Upland Management Experiment
UMAS	=	Upland Management Service
UDC	=	Urban District Council
WTB	=	Wales Tourist Board
WG	=	Westmorland Gazette

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION: THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE RESEARCH

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION: THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE RESEARCH

While Britain does not have a rural policy, it does have policies for rural areas. Yet these appear to represent a highly complex and seemingly uncoordinated mesh of inter-relating facets. However, in spite, or perhaps because of this apparent lack of a comprehensive approach to rural areas and their problems, the present rural debate has been carried on at an arguably greater intensity than at any time since the Second World War. The rapid change in the social make up of rural communities; the technological revolution in agricultural practices; the increasing resource use of rural areas as leisure and conservation pools, are trends which have continued unabated over a long period of time. Yet the pace of change in rural areas has now aroused considerable pressures upon policy makers to control or ameliorate their effects. These pressures emerge not least, because of an increased awareness of the problems faced through the volume of new research now available, and the fact that there is a widespread national interest in rural affairs generally. Clearly a thesis dealing with policy issues in rural areas, is nothing if not topical. However, as with many dynamic and popular spheres of study, the speed and range of the rural debate often leaves not only the casual observer, but the well informed policy maker uncertain as to future policy directions as they attempt to distinguish which of the many, often contradictory, theories and claims are correct.

A major problem, must lie in the fact that the nature of rural areas is inherently multi-faceted. Not surprisingly many academic attempts to draw together the threads of the different problems, falter due to the fact that the various problem areas are often treated individually by subject, or by type of research. The agricultural economist, the geographer, the sociologist, the planner, the regional planner and the ecologist amongst others have added their perspective to the overall analysis. This in itself produces not only a multitude of differing approaches, but a plethora of different answers to the questions raised. Into this melee the inter-disciplinary researcher clearly has a significant role in bridging

the gaps between these various analyses, producing concrete answers and proposals for a wide variety of complex problems.

But in taking this approach it is essential that the researcher remains neutral in order to rid himself of discipline bias. In this particular case the very close liaison with the MAFF and the NFU may well render the casual reader suspicious of the general line the research is likely to take. Closer reading however, will refute such trepidations as unfounded. This is not so much a case of disloyalty, or even of strength in not providing the collaborating organisations with what they might wish to see, but an independent critique mindful of their aims. This was helped by the broad minded realism of those individuals representing the organisations concerned, not least of whom the industrial supervisors, Mr J F Cottam, and at the time of the commencement of the thesis Northern Region Socio-Economic Adviser and Dr M Bell (formerly of the Wolfson Group) of the Parliamentary Division of the NFU.

The research, as will be explained later, basically followed a framework set out by the MAFF. The MAFF was a major collaborating organisation during the research period, and has been involving itself to an increasing extent in attempting to resolve a wide range of rural issues. The research following MAFF's requirements as the main collaborating organisation, essentially followed two distinct paths. The first research area can be seen as a furtherance of work done by the Wolfson Group on the impact of major new roads upon agriculture, as researched by Bell and Hearne. They essentially reviewed the economic and compensation aspects of road development on agricultural land. Their research arose out of the concern being expressed at the continual problems the agricultural community faced during road developments. The research recorded in this thesis isolates social factors as the main source of these problems, indicates how the problems arise, their nature, and how they can be removed by greater and more effective state involvement.

The second research path within MAFF's initial framework, deals with those difficulties arising from flux within the rural economy and community itself. The

MAFF required a number of important issues to be considered. First, it was important to consider the effect of socio-economic change within the rural community itself. This includes the well known problems of rural deprivation such as the decline in the level of service provision in rural areas, the changing population size and social mix of communities, and the shortfall of rural employment opportunities. Second, the research considers the scope for controlling or ameliorating these trends through employment and wealth creation in rural areas. The third research area considers the environmental consequences of change within rural areas, especially that resultant from agricultural and urban type development. This clearly represents a very wide remit for the individual researcher. Yet before going into further detail regarding the research, it is essential to lay the background of the IHD Scheme and how the research developed.

The Interdisciplinary Higher Degrees' Scheme (IHD), is a solely postgraduate department devoted to the furtherance of interdisciplinary research. As Cochran (1981) indicates, the IHD scheme has its origin in the general debate in the mid 1960's on the narrowness of traditional PhD's. As a result of the Swann Report (1968) the IHD Scheme was created with the aims of equipping graduates for work situations; to encourage industry/university co-operation; to broaden students tendency towards specialisation after their first degree; and to extend knowledge by bringing together disciplines which do not normally collaborate. The student usually works with a company or organisation which is a "problem owner". It is the students task to solve the given problem or problems to the collaborating organisations' satisfaction.

In 1974 Dr D J van Rest, a IHD Senior Tutor was awarded a research grant by the Wolfson Foundation to consider, "The Impact of Motorways and Other New Principal Road Schemes on Agriculture". With this grant Dr van Rest with Dr C Vick, Research Fellow, successfully supervised two doctoral submissions under the titles of "The Impact of Major New Roads Upon Agriculture: Legal and Administrative Aspects" (Bell 1978) and "The Impact of Major New Roads Upon Agriculture: Economic and Procedural Aspects" (Hearne 1977), in collaboration

with the National Farmers Union and Rural Planning Services Ltd., respectively. Bell and Hearne produced a considerable amount of material indicating inequity in compensation practice for road developments, and how the full costs to the nation in agricultural land loss are not adequately considered during the planning of major roads. The research reported in this thesis commenced in September 1979, with the exploration of a number of themes as a continuance of post-1973 Land Compensation Act procedure with regard to holdings affected by road developments; the effect of new roads upon the development control system; and the degree to which MAFF could be more fully involved in the planning and construction phases of new roads.

Some initial fieldwork was undertaken to obtain experience of the various disciplines needed and to develop a sound research base. These included attending public inquiries on the M42 at Droitwich, the A50 at Uttoxeter, interviews with farmers affected by the M42 Solihull development, and an analysis of planning decisions near the M5 at Bromsgrove. These exercises provided invaluable training experience and reflected a portfolio of potential research directions. However, none of these were carried out in sufficient detail to merit inclusion in the thesis. The various research paths open, were supplemented by the offer of an excellent opportunity to work with a major government department. This very quickly became the main thrust of the research.

In January 1980, Dr van Rest and myself were contacted by the Cumbria Division of the MAFF. The communication concerned the effects of the realignment of the A590 from the M6 to Barrow in Furness where it traversed the Whitbarrow Estate just outside the village of Witherslack in South Cumbria, on the borders of the Lake District National Park. The owner of the estate and his son who farmed a portion of it, were disturbed at the effect the road was having upon individual holdings. Added to this the son, a local county councillor, was very interested in attempting to improve the economic vitality of rural areas and the estate in particular.

The owner's son, Mr Trevor Farrer, was an active member of the Cumbria

NFU, and had close contacts with the Secretary of the Cumbria NFU Mr David Hellard. Mr Hellard had been an IHD "industrial" supervisor to both Bell and Hearne and was keen to enable the MAFF to become actively involved with the wider aspects of rural problems. As the politically sensitive road planning phase was over, both he and Mr Farrer approached the MAFF with the idea of organising a closer study of the problems and potentials of the estate, especially with regard to the compensation money, and suggested that Aston University would be an excellent catalyst in helping to bring this about. Both the Divisional Agricultural Officer of the MAFF, Mr T E Wathan, and the Northern Region Socio-Economic Adviser Mr J F Cottam, after some initial fieldwork, decided to organise a conference to consider these and other related issues with the aid of various bodies interested in rural affairs. A similar exercise had been held in 1972, however, the issues discussed were not as varied, or detailed as those to be considered in 1980. Added to this the exercise was not fully written up and the lessons drawn not acted upon. While the MAFF were prepared to use their influence in inviting different groups to participate in the exercise, the task of Aston University was to aid them in drawing up a framework of discussion, to provide some of the necessary research information, and to draw together and develop the results of the whole operation.

It was decided that the best way in which the exercise could be conducted, would be through compiling a set of papers for discussion at a conference to which the major actors in formulating and implementing rural policy would be invited. As is reported in Chapter Five a series of reports were prepared outlining the hypothetical socio-economic nature of the estate (Mr Cottam), the effects of the road development (myself), the potential for agricultural intensification (ADAS), the scope for developing enterprises ancillary to agriculture (the Cumbria Tourist Board, the Forestry Commission, CoSIRA, the Game Conservancy Council) and the conservation aspects of the estate (the Nature Conservancy Council). The results were then discussed at a one day conference. Briefly, they showed that farmers do suffer severe problems when faced with road developments, and the official organisations directly involved appear to be unsympathetic to their problems. It

was also clear that opportunities for wealth and employment creation on the estate appear to be few, and that any such developments may well have an adverse effect upon the environment.

While the Whitbarrow Exercise provided an excellent case study, the research was clearly not enough to provide answers to all the questions MAFF had raised. The MAFF required not only guidelines for policy towards Whitbarrow, but for Cumbria and the nation as a whole. The Whitbarrow Exercise posed more questions than it answered. Was the estate exceptional in being unable to resolve its social and economic problems? How did it compare to other agricultural estates in the same area, and with trends within the county as a whole? On a more basic level, the question had to be asked, why should the state involve itself in resolving the social problems of rural areas as a whole and what are the likely results of such an interventionist policy? With these very basic questions in mind the following thesis framework was developed.

Chapter Two lays the foundation of the thesis acting both as an introduction to the various topics considered, as a review of the available literature on them, and as the genesis of certain hypotheses to be discussed later in the thesis. It reviews trends within rural policy itself, including planning, conservation, agriculture, employment creation, and the problems created by major new road developments for agriculture. It also considers the increasing role MAFF is taking in rural affairs. Chapter Three is a general analysis of rural problems within Cumbria. This was carried out in order to place the Whitbarrow Exercise in its county setting; to develop and make use of the excellent contacts built up as a result of the exercise; and because the county reflects many of the problems experienced in the rest of rural Britain, and apparently has considerable potential for alleviating them. The chapter considers the economic structure of the county, with special emphasis upon the rural economy, and the scope for wealth and employment creation in tourism, rural industrialisation, agriculture and forestry. Rural deprivation is considered as well as conservation issues. The valley of Longsleddale is examined as it is typical of much of upland Cumbria.

Chapter Four considers the Lowther Estate, seat of Lord Lonsdale, situated

near the town of Penrith in Cumbria. On the recommendation, and through the good offices of Mr J F Cottam, Lowther were approached and asked if they would be willing to allow the estate to be used as a case study, to which they kindly agreed. The Lowther Estate, although in many ways different from Whitbarrow, does make an interesting vehicle for comparison. It has successfully negotiated the development of the M6 through its land and has created a diverse economic base. Chapter Five deals comprehensively with the Whitbarrow Exercise. Chapter Six brings together the conclusions of the first four chapters, and discusses them. This major chapter has been left for most of the discussion, so as to compare the previous chapters in one comprehensive form, and because the length of the earlier chapters does not allow detailed discussion as soon as points of interest are raised.

Chapter Seven considers the general trends that have taken place in agricultural policy over the years. This chapter was included for a number of reasons. First agricultural policy is the single most important arm of Britain's rural policy. Agriculture is still an employer of rural labour, and is seen by many as the bastion of the rural community. Second, as the MAFF is taking upon itself and being given a more "social" role in rural areas, it is important to examine how it has applied itself to this role in the past, and how its primary remit of increasing agricultural production and productivity, relates to certain welfare functions. Third, there is a considerable gap in knowledge regarding the relationship between agricultural policy and rural planning generally. This chapter intends to help fill this vacuum. Chapter Eight considers the conclusions of all the previous chapters, and draws them together to create a new policy framework.

The research draws together into a comprehensive form a wide ranging analysis of rural issues. The original MAFF remit not only attempted to define guidelines for its own use, but for the many other organisations involved in rural policy formulation and implementation. The interdisciplinary framework has provided an excellent vehicle for this analysis. As the thesis has questioned many basic assumptions of rural policy, it is hoped that the conclusions reached will not only be useful for those organisations they are directed towards, but will stimulate further discussion and research in this field.

CHAPTER 2

AN INTRODUCTION TO RURAL PROBLEMS

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2.1. Introduction

Rural problems incorporate a diverse series of difficulties found in rural areas. This chapter analysis a number of these problems, concentrating upon those which were apparent during the Whitbarrow Exercise and were in the original MAFF remit for the research. These include the problems of administering the many facets of rural life; structural change in agriculture; the problems of economically disadvantaged agricultural areas; the relationship between agricultural activities and conservation; conservation and recreation in rural Britain with particular reference to the National Parks; the notion of rural deprivation; and the relief of deprivation by employment creation through the development of industry, tourism, and forestry. Consideration is also give to the problems that arise for agriculture as a result of major new road developments. Therefore, this chapter presents an introduction to a wide range of issues to be researched later; an overview of recent opinion and study; and develops hypotheses which are to be tested later in the thesis.

2.2:1. The Multi-Role Nature of Rural Areas

In carrying out an overview of rural problems and their possible solutions it is inevitable that one has to broach the thorny question of how exactly is the term "rural" defined. Of the many rigorous academic attempts to examine this problem Cloke (1979) has presented us with perhaps the most comprehensive analysis, by creating an "index of rurality". Gilg (1980) has confronted the problem in a less pretentious manner, with a series of definitions based on "extreme rural", "intermediate rural" and "urban dominated". Moseley (1980) has carried out research based on the old shire counties. However, in relation to rural sociology, Newby (1982), after illustrating the difficulty in categorising rural areas, comes up with the more simple definition:

"Rural sociology is best defined as the sociology of geographical localities where the size and density of the population is relatively small".

It is not the intention of this thesis to add further to this already overworked debate, other than adding the caveat that too close an analysis of the term "rural" can understate the immense variety and subtlety of the rural entity and detrimentally simplify the approach of the researcher.

The multi-role nature of the countryside has been noted by many observers. Newby (1979) considering the conflict between farmers and conservationists says:

"Farmers regard the landscape as a factor of production a source of profit. Supporters of the environmental movement, on the other hand, look upon the countryside as a source of visual pleasure, as a habitat for wildlife - something to be consumed".

Wibberley (1976) is more comprehensive when he lists the demands made upon rural areas. He sees them as being a reservoir for urban development; a recreation reservoir; a conservation reservoir; as the basis for rural community life; as an unchanging environment in a capricious world; a retreat from industrial life; and as an "agricultural reservoir".

2.2:2. Multi-Role Agencies as Rural Problem Solvers

In recent years there seems to have been an increased awareness of the competition between these various demands in rural areas and a greater emphasis has been placed upon attempts to resolve them. Rural policy is an amorphous notion, with a number of separate government departments initiating policy often in contradiction to each other. Because of this, many, if not most, influential commentators on rural affairs, see a need for greater consensus and compromise between apparently divergent policies. It is usually believed that extension of the power of one of the existing active agencies in rural affairs will resolve this problem. Cherry (1976), and MacEwen (1976), see the extension of the role of the Department of the Environment as being the most promising. While Wibberly (1976) has said:

"I would like to turn MAFF into a Ministry of Rural Planning and Development, and give them specific links

with county and local planning organisations. The Forestry Commission, Nature Conservancy Council, and the two Countryside Commissions would have to come under the umbrella of this new Ministry".

The Strutt Report (1978) although not desiring to see MAFF leading a large "Rural Ministry", did however wish to see it playing a much wider role in countryside activities, taking the lead in an inter-departmental body at national level, and co-ordinating rural affairs, with ADAS having a greater role to play in rural affairs generally.

Because agriculture is a major component of rural policy, and because the MAFF is mainly concerned with rural affairs, there has been an increasing tendency to give the MAFF a wider role in rural policy. Under EEC Directives 72/161/EEC and 75/268/EEC, the MAFF has responsibility for taking rural affairs generally into consideration rather than purely agricultural. As a result of the contentious Wildlife and Countryside Act (1981), the MAFF has been instructed to:-

- a) Give advice to persons carrying on an agricultural business on the interaction and enhancement of the natural beauty and amenity of the countryside.
- b) Give advice to such persons on diversification with other enterprises to the benefit of the local community.
- c) Give advice to government departments and others exercising statutory functions on the promotion and furtherance of such diversification.

These three important pieces of legislation have drawn the MAFF closest to becoming the implementor of a more comprehensive rural policy. Local authorities and the Department of the Environment also have importance in relation to change of land use, provision of services and employment. However, because the MAFF is totally involved in rural affairs and because its actions have implications on activities other than purely agricultural, it is seen as a logical focus for a comprehensive rural policy. Present legislative trends appear to bear out this hypothesis, the general effects of which will be discussed in Chapters Seven and Eight.

Agriculture is the major land use in rural areas, and a substantial employer. It also has an influence on the ecological and aesthetic value of the countryside. It

is therefore, necessary at this stage to consider agricultures' role as a major, if not the central component of rural policy.

2.3:1. Change in the Structure of Agriculture

The formulation, operation and effect of agricultural policy is dealt with fully in Chapter Seven. However, it is important to note the more significant changes that are occurring within agriculture, and the MAFF itself. With regard to the latter purpose this will relate particularly to MAFF's role in Less Favoured Areas, and in the operation of its Socio-Economic Advisory Service. These are of considerable importance to this thesis from the role of the Northern Region Socio-Economic Adviser in setting up aspects of the fieldwork, and the preponderance of upland farming in the Lake District, centre of much of the research.

Agriculture is the foremost rural industry, and developments within it have implications not only upon the agricultural community in terms of manpower and income, but also upon land use in general. There has been a continuing trend over many years to reduce the size of the agricultural workforce and increase the size of holdings. The continued fall off in the size of the agricultural workforce is shown in Table 2:1.

Table 2:1. Change in the Size of Agricultural Workforce in the UK ('000's)

Year	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981
Workers	379	374	358	353	344
Farmers	296	303	304	298	295
Total	675	677	662	651	639

Source: MAFF 1982.

Added to this farms are tending to become larger with the average size of holdings increasing from 112 hectares in 1976 to 119 hectares in 1981 (MAFF 1982).

The problems of the agricultural industry, are made worse by the lack of stability in farmers incomes. Table 2:2. gives an example of this.

Table 2:2. Variety of Net Income by Type of Farm in England

Year	1977	1978	1979
Type			
All Dairies	100	115	89
Hill and Upland	100	115	52
All Lowland Livestock	100	112	65
All Cropping	100	182	182
Pigs and Poultry	100	147	120

Source: TRRU 1981.

Although the rate of change in the agricultural workforce size, and in the structure of farms appears to be slowing, the Government continues a policy of increasing labour productivity which will ensure that the workforce size, and farm numbers will continue to decline (MAFF 1979a). The Countryside Review Committee (1978) and the Agricultural Development Council (NEDC 1977) estimate that the labour force will continue declining at a rate of 2 per cent per annum. Buckwell and Shucksmith (1979) foresee farm structure changes into the 21st century. They estimate that by the year 2000, 7 per cent of farms will occupy 32 per cent of the crops and grass area in England and Wales.

The fundamental basis for this sustained, comparatively rapid change in the agricultural workforce, has been defined as more efficient machinery, buildings, agricultural methods and the improved quality of inputs (NEDC 1977). This being financed to a large degree by borrowed money (Reid 1981). The degree to which farmers have adapted to new technology, is to a considerable extent the result of the work of MAFF and in particular ADAS. Helme (1975) in his account of ADAS's

development, defines their functions as:

"To help the industry make the best use of its resources (and thus improve its standard of productivity) by providing professional and technical advice and instruction (whether personal or scientific) in agricultural matters, and also to provide the department and other departments or bodies with professional advice so as to help them carry on their functions". (Helme 1975).

Hence the main advisory body of the MAFF is geared to increasing agricultural productivity. The role of MAFF in promulgating rural change be considered more fully in Chapter Seven.

2.3:2 Less Favoured Areas and the MAFF

Although the MAFF has the prime aim of increasing agricultural productivity, it does have a number of socially orientated roles as well. The MAFF's "social role" is of greatest importance in the upland areas of Britain, where due to problems of climate and topography, financial support is given by the state in order to offset disadvantage in the market place. The first legislative measure of this type was the Hill Farming Act 1946. This was enacted at a time when it was deemed essential to increase home agricultural output. This Act defined hill land as:

"Mountain, hill and heathland which is suitable for use for the maintenance of sheep of a hard kind but not sheep of other kinds, or which by improvement could be made so suitable". (Hill Farming Act 1946).

The Act gave grants to improve the productivity of the farm holding, through such measures as the erection and improvement of buildings, farm houses and cottages, pens, fences, fertilising, pest and weed destruction, and machinery provision. Sheep and cow subsidies were also introduced on a headage payment basis. The 1946 Act was extended by the Livestock Rearing Act 1951, which provided extra money for the hill farmer. These Acts formed the basis of British upland agricultural policy until entry into the EEC, where it was replaced by the Less Favoured Areas Directive 75/268/EEC. The Less Favoured Areas covered by this Directive, basically consist of the disadvantaged regions formerly covered by

national policy. Directive 75/268/EEC, has the aims of sustaining a minimum population, conserving the countryside, promoting rural crafts and providing for leisure needs, as well as providing grants on a headage payment basis, and subsidising capital improvement schemes. However, the MAFF has not seen fit to implement Article 10 of the Directive, allowing for rural development, as they feel this will overlap the functions of other bodies such as the Tourist Boards.

MacEwen and MacEwen (1982) argue that under the present conditions the basis of support for upland agriculture is ambiguous. A number of rationale have been given for this support including:-

1. Upland farming plays a valuable role in the nation's agricultural production, providing produce that would otherwise have to be imported (Davidson and Wibberley 1956).
2. Upland pastoral farming provides a disease free pool of animals (Sinclair and MacEwen).
3. Upland farming is vital for the maintenance of remote rural communities (Coleman 1979).
4. Upland farming prevents the landscape from becoming untidy (LDSPB 1978).
5. The continued existence of upland farming prevents the spread of forestry (Sinclair and MacEwen 1983).
6. Upland farming provides, and maintains services used by tourists (NFU 1977b).

In spite of large amounts of public subsidy for upland farming, the uplands have been subject to considerable change, and there has been much discussion regarding the means available to halt their apparent social and economic decline. Sinclair and MacEwen (1983), propose a revised system based upon reformed headage payments; a conservation orientated upland management grant; and the drawing up of farm management plans for individual holdings. The TRRU (1981) argue for greater departmental co-operation, agricultural policies to take account of recreation and conservation, and for employment subsidies with MAFF giving greater attention to socio-economic welfare issues. These arguments take as their basic premise that the state has a duty to support the upland farmer. Very few

have argued against this support except perhaps the CAS (1980). However, before analysis of the subsidisation of upland farming proceeds the net benefits of such support should be examined, a major deficiency in Sinclair and MacEwen (1983) and the TRRU (1981) report. Chapter Six will seek to correct this.

2.3:3. Socio-Economic Advice and the MAFF

Three directives which have had an important effect in shaping modern British agricultural policy are Directives 72/159/EEC; 72/160/EEC and 72/161/EEC. These give the MAFF an explicitly social, as well as an economic role. They arose largely out of the "Memorandum on the Reform of Agriculture in the EEC" better known as the "Mansholt Plan". This grew out of the recognition that continuing high cost over production, developed from there being too many small farmers, who were leaving the agricultural industry too slowly, and was being made worse rather than better by the Community's agricultural price structure. This prompted a fresh look at the structural problem (Marsh and Swanney 1980). The Directives are as follows:-

- 1) Directive 72/159/EEC involves the modernisation of farms in which farmers prepare six year development plans under the Agriculture and Horticulture Development Scheme.
- 11) Directive 72/160/EEC, provides for the cessation of farming and the reallocation of the utilised area for structural improvement.
- 111) Directive 72/161/EEC, involves the provision of socio-economic guidance for the acquisition of occupational skills by persons engaged in agriculture.

The details of EEC Directive 72/161 are:-

1. To inform generally the agricultural population as to the possibilities open to them for improving their socio-economic situation.
2. To study and examine individual cases with a view to adjustment to changing conditions.
3. To put persons interested in changes of policy on their farms in contact with the competent advisory service.
4. To give those concerned, information and advice on the following matters:- continuing an occupation in agriculture; choice of an occupation outside agriculture; retirement from all occupational activity.

5. To inform those concerned as to the opportunities existing for persons engaged in agriculture to receive further training, and also the prospects for their children in agriculture and in other occupations.
6. To direct interested persons according to the decisions contemplated or taken by such persons to the competent specialised services.

To accomplish this nine regional socio-economic advisers were appointed to advise farmers on their problems. They were subsequently reduced to six in 1980. They were supported by a number of special interest advisers. Woods (1980) has produced an excellent critique of their effectiveness in Britain which concludes that the MAFF has not given sufficient commitment to Directive 72/161/EEC in terms of resources, and that there has been a lack of clarity in defining the role socio-economic advisers should play. Greater attention will be given to this problem in Chapter Seven.

2.4:1. Agricultural Land Conservation and Planning Control

One of the primary aims of Town and Country Planning is to protect agricultural land from urban development. This objective is also built into current agricultural policy, as the White Paper "Farming and the Nation" says:-

"The supply of land is limited, and the agricultural area is declining. The Government intend to pursue rigorously their policy protecting agricultural land of better quality, and will improve their information on the quantity and quality of land going out of agricultural use". (MAFF 1979a).

The firm protection of agricultural land is supported by Coleman (1979), Carter and Sayce (1979) and the NEDC (1977). The Strutt Committee (1978) recommended that MAFF should examine all planning applications more diligently, and that they should be consulted on all applications involving more than 5 acres of agricultural land.

Outside the MAFF the most vigorous call to protect agricultural land from urban encroachment has come from the Land Decade Educational Council (1979). In this publication Coleman asserts that planners have failed to protect agricultural land adequately by allowing housing to be built at too low densities, and by encouraging the spread of population from cities into "greenfield sites". She

argues that they have also encouraged the spread of the urban fringe with its associated problems. The basis of the argument is that agricultural land needs to be protected, because of the impending crisis in world food supply. This view is concurred with by Moss (1981), who calls for a greater use of derelict land within cities for development.

Although the Land Decade Educational Council reflects an extension of traditional attitudes towards agricultural land protection (Lowe and Goyder 1981), they have amassed a considerable amount of opposition to their ideas. Best (1981) argues that the MAFF figures on land loss contain inaccuracies, that agricultural land quality does not necessarily reflect present and future production from that land (Boddington (1978) also supports this idea), and that Coleman (1979) does not take into account changes in productivity. From his analysis Best (1981) argues that there is a greater scope for lower housing densities. Wibberley (1981) argues that there is a dangerous philosophy of:

"Agricultural fundamentalism prevalent which will lead to higher food prices, greater surpluses, the extension of mechanistic factory farm type landscapes, cruelty to farm animals through over-confinement indoors, the continued reduction of numbers of variety of natural fauna and flora, the exclusion of public access from many farming areas due to the belief of one small but dominant part of our mixed society that farming is next to Godliness".

Wibberley's quote neatly sums up the manner in which agricultural land conservation has widespread side effects across a whole sphere of rural interests. The seriousness of these side effects necessitates a rigorous examination of the nature of agricultural policy to see if they can to some extent be avoided, by change within that policy itself. This will be considered in Chapter Seven.

2.5:1. Conservation and Recreation in Rural Britain

The conservation of flora, fauna and landscape has been subject to a surge of interest in the past two decades. Of course conservationists have been in existence for many years. The Lake District provides an excellent example of conservation orientated groups, working to provide protection for an undeniably

beautiful section of the countryside (Sheail 1975); (Berry and Beard 1980).

The Town and Country Planning Act 1947, and the National Parks and Access to the Countryside Act 1949, are the foundations of government involvement in planning for conservation. The basis for the Town and Country Planning Act 1947, lay in the widespread concern about land-use, such as the loss of good agricultural land to suburban development and inequality between the regions. Hall (1973) states that planning is a social movement with a threefold programme of containing the large cities, preserving the countryside, and constructing new communities. The complexity of the philosophical basis of planning is well illustrated by Faludi (1973) and Eversley (1973).

The major aims of the National Parks and Access to the Countryside Act 1949 were:-

1. To make provision for National Parks and the establishment of a National Parks Commission.
2. To confer on the Nature Conservancy and local authorities, powers for the establishment and maintenance of nature reserves; to make further provision for the recording, creation, maintenance and improvement of public paths, for securing areas of open country, and to amend the law relating to rights of way.
3. To confer powers for preserving and enhancing natural beauty.

The next major piece of legislation with implications for the conservation of the countryside came in 1968 with the Countryside Act, and the Nature Conservancy Council Act 1973. Under the 1973 Act the Nature Conservancy became the Nature Conservancy Council with with a remit to:-

1. To advise departments, companies and individuals upon conservation.
2. To establish, maintain and manage nature reserves which contain many types of habitat, wild plants and animals, as well as distinctive geological and physiological features.
3. To carry out research based upon nature conservation.

In the 1968 Act, the National Parks Commission, was changed into the Countryside Commission; a separate Countryside Commission had been established for Scotland, 1967. The Countryside Commission's remit was to conserve and enhance the natural beauty and amenity of the countryside and encourage the provision and improvement of information for persons resorting to the countryside,

of facilities for the enjoyment of the countryside and of open-air recreation in the countryside. Thus, the Countryside Commission is charged with the responsibility to at once, preserve, and enhance landscape as well as provide for recreation (Countryside Act 1968).

However, there have been some recent changes in the attitude towards the Countryside Commission's work. These include a greater emphasis upon resolving conservation conflicts with agriculture through the means of persuasion and management agreements. This results largely because of the fact that the Countryside Commission is relatively powerless to influence events in the countryside as it does not own land; does not have field staff; and cannot instruct anyone what to do or not to do (Countryside Commission 1982). This is especially important in relation to agriculture which is now widely regarded as the major threat to the conservation value of rural areas.

2.5.2. Conservation and Agriculture

Concern over conservation in relation to agriculture, is primarily based on the scope and pace of agricultural change. The problems occur when the ecological nature of an area is disrupted, and when there are adverse effects upon its landscape value. For example, in recent years there has been a significant increase in the use of herbicides. Herbicide use has become the main method of weed control due to their simplicity and due to saving in money and time. Growth regulating herbicides have reduced the number of poppies, charlock and other weeds, and their decline must have led to the reduction of animal species dependent upon them (Moore 1977). Where once hedgerows and fields were ablaze with colour, to now see many species of wild flowers is something of a novelty (Fryer and Chancellor 1970). Apart from aesthetic value, the predominance of single grass leys has severely reduced ecological diversity (NCC 1977).

The ecological problems created by pesticides were noted as long ago as the early 1960's with Rachel Carson's book "Silent Spring", according to Newby (1979) initiating a whole new sphere of thought regarding the widespread use of

agro-chemicals (Carson 1962). Pesticides are used to kill insect pests but are also very likely to kill other organisms in the ecosystem. For example Potts (1971) found that because fewer insects are found in land treated with pesticides, when bad weather prevails partridge chicks suffer a protein shortage and die.

Although the ecological effects of modern agriculture have come under considerable scrutiny, the results of general farm "improvements" through hedge removal, the clearing of woodlands, and land reclamation have recently been brought to general attention by the publication of one notable work, "The Theft of the Countryside" (Shoard 1980). In this provocative book Shoard catalogues the sustained destruction of the ecological, recreational and landscape value of rural areas and advocates the extension of the planning control system to cover changes to farmland and an increase in the number of National Parks from ten to sixteen. As can be expected Shoard's book did not meet with popularity from the farming press.

The farming community has consistently attempted to appear reasonable and concerned in matters regarding conservation. The NFU and CLA joint publication, "Caring for the Countryside", expresses this view-point clearly (NFU 1977a). Christensen (1980) indicates how modern farming can be reconciled with nature conservation, and to their credit the NFU and CLA have organised competitions to find and encourage the most conservation orientated farmers.

However, some very disturbing facts have been made known regarding the process of destruction of areas of conservation merit by agriculture. In 1977 the Nature Conservancy Council published a report entitled "Nature Conservation and Agriculture". This pointed out that damage to sites of special scientific interest was substantial (NCC 1977). Few figures were produced until the NCC announced the 4 per cent of SSSI's were damaged or destroyed each year. This figure was later increased to 10 per cent. In 1960 it was found that Dorset's heathland was only one third of what it was in 1811, while a further study found that half of what then remained was removed (Webb and Haskins 1980). Mossland has come under similar attack with 87 per cent of the original mosslands being destroyed.

As for chalk downlands, NCC preliminary figures point to a drop of around 70 per cent in the amount of traditional chalk downland since 1966. Between 1978 and 1980 16 per cent of Oxfordshire's flood plain meadows were lost (MacEwen 1981).

The 1982 Annual Report of the NCC (NCC 1982) claimed that 15 per cent of 20,000 acres of SSSI's were damaged by agricultural operations in Britain, and that one third of Dorset's SSSI's had been damaged in this way. In March 1982 it was discovered that 40 acres of SSSI marshland in Limpenholes had been ploughed up (The Guardian 1982), while the Halvergate Marshes in the Norfolk Broads, and Walland Marsh on Romney Marsh had also been threatened by an expansion of agricultural operations (Secrett and Rose 1982).

The reaction of the Government to this continued and increasing threat to areas of conservation value came in the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981, the most important piece of conservation legislation since 1949.

2.5:3. The Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981

By the time of the General Election of May 1979 the Labour Government's Wildlife and Countryside Bill was among a number of pieces of legislation that had almost completed their passage through Parliament. Labour's Bill had addressed itself only to the protection of individual species and did not deal with the more fundamental problem of protecting the natural habitats essential to their breeding and feeding. The new Conservative Government had to introduce its own Bill to meet obligations arising from five international agreements. The EEC Bird Directive; the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species; the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands; the Convention on Migrating Species; and the Berne Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Habitats (Caufield 1981).

The new Bill began its life in the House of Lords in November 1980 and received an unprecedented number of amendments; over 1,000. Perhaps the most fundamental of these was an attempt by the Labour Party to impose planning controls on all agricultural and forestry operations, as they are primarily

responsible for the accelerating loss of wildlife habitat and landscape. While this was greeted with enthusiasm by many conservation groups, the NFU stated that it was, unnecessary and would result in undue constraints on the agricultural industry (New Scientist 1981). The House of Lords felt it similarly unpalatable and threw it out.

Of major importance is the fact the conservation became a party political matter. The main source of divergence being increased control of land use. The Conservative Peer Lord De La Warr summed up the position of his party, while offering a rebuke to others on his bench. He said:

"There are just a handful of maverick Peers on my side who, in their obsession about this subject as they are good countrymen, have forgotten the simple fact that the Tory Party does not believe in compulsion but believes in letting people do things on a voluntary basis unless it is absolutely necessary to legislate". (Hansard 1981a).

The greatest contention was based around Sites of Special Scientific Interest. The role of SSSI's is at once to protect certain species of flora and fauna as well as providing the range of habitats regarded as the minimum necessary to support most of the species in Britain. The Act provides for codes to be drawn up for the owners of SSSI's for their guidance. A number of SSSI's will become "super" SSSI's and these will have legal requirements inserted. No user can carry out any operation unless he:-

1. Has the NCC's written consent.
2. The operation is carried out in accordance within the terms of a management agreement.
3. Or that three months have expired after he gives notice.

The NCC can enter into management agreements with users or can compulsory purchase land.

The farming community is, in general, in favour of compromise rather than control. After great deliberation the Bill was passed, and falls into three parts. Part 1 was the most satisfactory as far as the conservationists were concerned as it outlaws certain methods of killing and expands the lists of species that receive

special protection, although the Ministry of Agriculture can issue licences to kill protected species. Part 2 dealt with habitat protection, the issue at the heart of the bill. As mentioned before, the government is to introduce a voluntary code for owners of SSSI's while special protection will be given to 40 or 50 super SSSI's. Moorlands in National Parks received no special protection. What many considered one of the most important parts of the Bill, the "Sandford Amendment" which required the MAFF to provide grants for the general economic regeneration of rural areas was watered down to that as seen earlier. Part 3 dealt with public rights of way.

Caufield (1981) claims that the conservationist case was lost because of strong pressure from the farming interest within the Conservative Party and quotes a close source of cabinet as saying:

"...It's the landowners on the Cabinet Committee especially Pym, who are sticking on this point, they're more protective of farmers than the NFU is".

Indeed, although the NCC and the Countryside Commission were supportive of the Bill, other more independent observers have been less so. The reliance upon management agreements has been particular concern. Management agreements have been defined as:

"A formal, written agreement between a public authority and an owner or occupier of land who undertakes to manage the land in a specified manner to satisfy a particular need. Management agreements are usually restrictive and prevent the landowner from carrying out certain practices". (Feist 1978).

Green (1981) has claimed that management agreements can be very costly. MacEwen (1981) estimates that to produce a management agreement for the Halvergate Marshes would amount to £65,000 a year. The NCC have estimated that they need substantial extra resources to carry out their work properly (NCC 1982).

The Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981, is undoubtedly the most important piece of conservation legislation, since The National Park and Access to the Countryside Act 1949. Yet, in the opinion of many informed observers and commentators upon conservation issues, both individuals and organisations, there is doubt that the Act will be able to cope with the threats to the conservation

interest in modern Britain. As this concern is closely linked to the problems created by technological innovation in British agriculture, it clearly necessitates a closer look at the dynamics of agricultural policy.

2.5:4. National Parks: Adjustment to Rapid Change

The National Parks of England and Wales, contain many of the conservation and social problems inherent in much of rural Britain, although often in a more concentrated form. The Lake District National Park particularly is subject to considerable pressure. As this area forms a substantial component of the fieldwork for this thesis, this section will briefly explore some of the more general problems of National Parks, in order to lay a basis for further examination.

As noted earlier, the ten National Parks of England and Wales were set aside in 1949 as areas which were of national importance in terms of conservation and recreation. However, Shoard (1980) argues that the role of the National Parks and the areas chosen reflect the character and inclination of the individuals instrumental in their creation; Sheail's comprehensive account of the National Parks campaign from 1900 - 1950, appears to confirm Shoard's suspicions (Sheail 1975).

Despite this criticism the National Parks do contain areas of great beauty, and recreational opportunity. But as MacEwen and MacEwen (1982) note, they have been subject to considerable pressures from a number of quarters, which not only undermine the intrinsic value of the National Parks, but also the whole National Park concept.

Of studies carried out on National Parks the most significant to date has been by the National Parks Review Committee, which was given the remit:

"To review how far National Parks have fulfilled the purpose for which they were established, to consider the implications of the changes that have occurred, and may be expected, in social and economic conditions, and to make recommendations as regard future policies...". (Sandford 1974).

In discussion of the previous administration of the Parks the Committee was moved to report:

"Some excessive or incongruous development has taken place and the natural beauty of some of them has been further reduced by afforestation and the improvement for agricultural purposes of open country".

But then they go on to say that but for designation much worse would have befallen them. Added to this the Committee argued that measures have not been taken to cope with the huge increase in numbers of people visiting the Parks. In the light of this the Committee recommended that recreation provision should not be made at the expense of conservation.

"...And where a choice has to be made quality should never be secondary to quantity...".

Sandford went on to make recommendations about other aspects of National Parks such as agriculture, forestry, intrusive sports, and traffic control.

MacEwen and MacEwen (1982), accuse Sandford of being "superficial", and making "no significant recommendations". They also accuse the government's response to the report, DOE Circular 4/1976 of accepting:

"A host of minor recommendations while rejecting or failing to implement most of the more important".

The difference in time gap between Sandford and the MacEwen's, also reveals a shift in approach to the problems of the uplands. While recreation was considered the primary problem, especially in relation to conservation, now more emphasis is being placed upon the social role of upland communities and the conservation value of upland hill farming (Sinclair and MacEwen 1983).

The interest in conservation, and the social well-being of the inhabitants of the National Parks appears to be growing, although this does not appear to reflect itself in government thinking. It was pointed out earlier how the government effectively emasculated Lord Sandford's amendment for an increased social role for the MAFF. In the House of Commons in December 1981 a debate was held dealing with National Parks; after covering a whole range of problems, including the conflict between the Tourist Boards, road planners, the MAFF, local people and the National Park Boards, yet even so a lightweight resolution was passed stating:

"That this House, being aware of the many statutory organisations involved within National Park areas, notes that many of the real issues of concern to those resident in the National Parks remain unsolved by their activities and call upon Her Majesty's Government to take such steps as be made necessary to avoid duplication, conflict and lack of overall effectiveness which remains a problem in such areas". (Hansard 1981b).

The National Parks are suffering from economic and social decline. Upland farming has been suffering severe economic problems, which has led to an amalgamation of holdings, a decline in the working agricultural population, and dramatic changes of landscape. Added to this National Parks have been the recipient of mass tourism. The National Park authorities, although the MacEwens say relatively powerless, have not been lax in attempting to reconcile the conflict between tourists and agriculture. The Upland Management Service (UMAS) of the Lake District and Snowdonia has provided finance for farmers to provide better facilities for tourists, such as gates and signposts, easing tension and providing a small income for the farmer. This will be discussed more fully in Chapter Three; however, it is generally agreed that the policy has been fairly successful.

The National Parks represent important areas of great conservation and recreation value, although they have been under great pressure from tourism, and internal socio-economic change. The extent to which these problems can be resolved is affected by their general remoteness; reliance upon dependent industries; and rigorous planning control. Chapter Three will consider the problems experienced in the Lake District National Park, and the resulting analysis will explore the potential for relieving difficulties found in these beautiful areas.

2.6:1. Interim Conclusions

Agriculture is an industry in a constant state of flux. However, this change impinges on many aspects of rural life. Because of this fact, of all policies within rural areas, agricultural policy is central in determining the amount of urban development that takes place in rural Britain; the conservation value of the countryside; and the social fabric of many rural communities. Agricultural policy is

largely formulated, directed and implemented by the MAFF. Recognition of this fact has led to the MAFF being given an increasing and widened role to play in rural life. Yet, it is unclear how well suited the MAFF is to directing the more general aspects of rural policy, other than those directly concerned with agriculture.

The most dependent of farmers upon governmental support, are the upland farmers within the Less Favoured Areas. There is continued pressure to maintain and even increase the number of upland farmers, especially as governmental support has concentrated upon headage payments, and has not been totally successful in helping the smaller farmer continue his business. Although there is a continued demand for the state to increase its support for the upland farmer, by a number of means, there is lacking a general critique upon the social and economic validity of subsidising the upland farmer, and this may well weaken the case of protagonists on his behalf.

The conservation of flora, fauna and landscape has aroused considerable public interest in recent years. This interest has come about at a time when the conservation value of many areas is under threat, not least from agricultural change. The Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981 recognises this and has placed some controls upon the action of farmers. However, some commentators feel that the Act is not strong enough to counter the pressure from agriculture. Because of this it is important to gauge both the potential for ecological and social change as a result of agricultural policy, and the scope for inducing change within it.

It is in the National Parks that many of the changes and conflicts that arise from agricultural policies are most clearly apparent. Added to this there are other problems related to recreation, conservation and general economic change. Hence an analysis of the problems of a National Park, in particular the Lake District National Park, can provide lessons that can be applied to the rest of rural Britain.

2.7:1. The Concept of Rural Deprivation

Policy makers for rural areas face the particularly difficult task of having to attempt to alleviate, if not solve, the set of problems collectively known as "rural deprivation". Yet, according to McLaughlin (1981), despite many attempts to define rural deprivation:

"It still remains an elusive concept which is probably easier to define in terms of what it isn't".

He goes on to argue, that rural deprivation is not just confined to poverty, that it is not absolute, but rather is based on the theme of set standards for the provision of services and facilities against which the degree of deprivation can be measured.

The fundamentals of rural deprivation can be set out as low incomes, poor employment prospects, low female economic activity, de-population, poor housing provision, an unbalanced community structure, a decline in community, the disappearance of services and the lack of mobility and accessibility.

Moseley (1979), sees the fundamental root of rural deprivation lying in the lack of "accessibility" in rural areas. He argues that access deprivation, as opposed to problems of mobility in rural areas, is both spatial and social. It relates not only to the individuals ability to move, but also to his access to opportunities:

"Which may or may not present themselves as a result of his moving". (Moseley 1979).

Moseley et al (1977) found that the worst affected by access deprivation, were the elderly, teenagers and children, and housewives. The problem being linked to a decrease in public transport facilities and a greater expectation of standard of life. With rising car ownership and less financial support available for public transport schemes, the situation is bound to worsen. Here Moseley (1979) argues that while a need will remain for a basic network of scheduled services, alternative forms of transport will have to be developed.

The various alternative schemes available have been summarised by Woollett (1981). These include community buses operated by a community-based organisation, running on a non-profit making basis; car sharing, which has been made simpler by the 1980 Transport Act, as it can now be advertised; social car schemes, where owners are prepared to use their own cars for regular and one-off

journies on a community orientated basis; postal-buses, where passengers are taken on the usual postal round; and greater use of school buses. The success of these schemes depends greatly on the amount of support that can be engendered for them in the areas concerned. A Planning Exchange Report (1979) provides a good resume of their relative success.

However, many other services have been withdrawn or are in decline. These have been catalogued by the Standing Conference of Rural Community Councils (SCRCC 1978). Village shops have been closing through a general loss of trade and strong competition, and rural post offices have suffered a similar fate (NCVO 1981); rural public telephones have been removed (SCRCC 1978), and doctors' surgeries and pharmacies have been closing. There has been a general problem with regard to social services in rural areas, linked to the problem of a widespread population (Heller 1979).

Another major problem is that of the difficulty local people have in obtaining housing in rural areas. According to the National Federation of Housing Association's (1981), rural housing problems have their base in too tight planning controls; the loss of tied and rented accommodation; little council housing; up-market private development; an ageing population and lack of water and sewage supplies. Planning controls have prevented sporadic and unsightly development in the countryside, although some relaxation has been called for in their application (NFHA 1981); (Shucksmith 1981). A change away from a key settlement policy is called for, partly because it attracts people away from the remoter areas (Gilder 1979).

The building of more council houses has been requested, as has the ending of council house sales by local authorities. The 1980 Housing Act, made it compulsory for local authorities to offer council houses for sale except in National Parks and AONB's, in addition to rural areas accepted or designated as stress areas by the Department of the Environment. As Rogers (1976) points out, rural housing problems result from:

"An absolute shortage of housing in a rural area or a relative shortage of the right type of housing".

Both of these trends are exacerbated by the tendency towards second home ownership, well illustrated by Shucksmith (1981); Winter (1980); and Bennet (1976). Although as Shucksmith (1981) points out, it is difficult to attribute one single cause for rural housing problems. Yet however intractable the problem seems some relief is offered by self-help local initiatives in the form of Housing Associations.

Another major problem to affect rural areas is that of depopulation, of which Hannan (1970) provides one of the most comprehensive accounts. It has been contended that once depopulation begins it tends to perpetuate itself (HM Treasury 1976). The Treasury in their extensive study found that the remoter areas of Britain lost 6.7 per cent of economically active males in a ten year period, with a total population loss of 20 -30 per cent in the North Pennines and North Norfolk. This was the result of a low rate of natural increase and above average net migration. Unemployment was regarded as a major factor, and it was estimated that 2,500 jobs were needed per annum in the relevant areas to stem this outflow. Depopulation is encouraged by the fact that incomes are often low in rural areas as a result of a heavy dependence upon agriculture (Thomas and Winyard 1979).

However, since the 1981 Census it has been realised that a process of counterurbanisation and rural rejuvenation has occurred in Britain. Champion (1981) has recorded a marked increase in the population of rural areas, with counties such as Cornwall, Powys and Somerset, recording an increase of 10 per cent or more, although this surge came in the late 1960's and early 1970's until the oil price increase of 1973. Since then the counterurbanisation process has been somewhat slower. Yet as Moseley (1980) notes the 1971 Census did not show that all rural areas were becoming depopulated, but that many rural areas were becoming increasingly popular with industry and migrants.

With the increasing locational fluidity of some industries, there may be some scope from industrial movements into rural areas (NCVO 1980). The increase in migrants especially the elderly, also tends to increase the population of many remoter areas. According to Law and Warner (1981), about 10 per cent of elderly move on retirement, with the South Coast, South West England, North Wales, the

Lake District, parts of the Scottish Borders, Northumbria and East Anglia, being the most popular destinations. Yet immigration into rural areas can result in a process of "gentrification" and a dichotomy occurring between the affluent "incomers" and the rural poor (Newby 1979).

In solving the problems of rural areas, one important development in recent years has been the creation of Rural Voice, a coalition of eight rural organisations. The members are the National Federation of Women's Institutes, the NFU, the NUAAW, the CLA, the CPRE, the National Association of Local Councils, the Standing Conference of Rural Community Councils and the NCVO. Rural Voice came into being in 1980, with a call for a comprehensive rural strategy. As yet it is too early to estimate the effect of this group, or the weight given to it in government policy making.

One important aspect of much thought on rural deprivation is the notion that rural areas have been neglected. Thomas (1963) argues against this saying:

"Rightly or wrongly, intentionally or unintentionally, steps have been taken to keep an active and prosperous rural economy in Britain. Agriculture is directly subsidised, and also supported by the expensive agricultural advisory service and its ancillaries, roads, power, water, education, postal and telephone services, all costing more than country people are prepared to pay for them".

Indeed the Treasury (HM Treasury 1976) found that services in the remoter areas cost per head more than in urban areas. While the political power of agriculture goes far beyond the size of the rural community, with strong pressure groups such as the NFU and CLA, the landed interest in the Conservative Party, and the immense political muscle of the MAFF (Wilson 1977).

2.7:2. Interim Conclusions: Rural Deprivation

The collective term "rural deprivation" is difficult to define, although at its most basic level means the absence of many services and opportunities, either previously enjoyed, or demanded by present expectations. The extent to which rural communities already receive services at the cost of the wider community has been noted, although not criticised on a widespread basis.

In alleviating these problems, especially at a time of reduced government expenditure, greater emphasis is being placed upon voluntary action as a more flexible and economic means of providing services. Chapter Three will consider Cumbria's success in countering rural deprivation in this way. However, the problems of rural areas often appear to be the result of their geographical isolation, and the need to restrict development for conservation reasons. If this is true, then it may be found that the scope for alleviating some forms of rural deprivation is limited.

2.8:1. Rural Employment Creation: Rural Industrialisation

Although voluntary schemes are useful, if not vital in reducing some forms of deprivation, the most successful way of doing this would be to provide a sound economic base through rural development. Hodge and Whitby (1981) give the rationale for rural development as:-

1. The utilisation of resources which would otherwise remain idle but which may be profitably utilised in the economy, especially labour and land.
2. The increase in the range of employment opportunities which are open to the local labour force.
3. The maintenance or development of an acceptable local service base and social environment for rural residents.
4. Creating an improved standard of living and quality of life in assisted areas.
5. The reduction of pressures on urban areas.

Hodge and Whitby have carried out a full examination of the employment potential of a number of industries including tourism, the development of manufacturing industries in rural areas, forestry and service industries. Yet the term development has a different connotation to that of simple employment creation, as Prattis (1977) notes:

"Development policy is useless unless it is designed to alter the structure of relationships between the marginal area and the modern sector".

However valid this view is, and it will certainly be taken into consideration during the discussion, at present government initiatives simply aim to encourage employment into rural areas.

The problems of marginal regions have been well catalogued, although little consensus exists on either the cause or the remedies for the structural economic problems that arise there. Certainly the effects of regional policy have been contested by a number of authorities, perhaps because of the complexity of analysis. As Law (1980) notes, in the field of regional development there is no universally accepted model, but only a collection of ill-fitting ideas.

Some argue that because of the natural process in the capitalist system of the centralisation and concentration of capital, marginal regions will automatically suffer as they de-industrialise, and are no longer able to compete with a central core (Holland 1976). This tendency is exacerbated, it is believed, in a state of free trade, where the concentration of capital becomes internationalised (Carney et al 1980). Keeble (1976) counters this argument by saying that peripheral areas have certain attractions to employers in terms of labour supply and this is further confirmed by a strong regional policy. Even so, after large sums of money have been spent on regional policy, the areas in greatest need in the 1930's remain those in greatest need now.

Nichol and McKean (1980) found in a resume of various regional policy studies, the main effects of it have been good in general terms, although considerable disagreement remains on the specific effects. As Watts (1980) says:

"The large amount of industrial movement within the United Kingdom was very much a phenomenon of a particular time period".

There has been some quite considerable movement to rural areas in recent years, as Fothergill and Gudgin (1982) note. They claim that 40 per cent of new investment in buildings has been in rural areas, while little significant investment has taken place in the inner city.

This has arisen they claim, due to the fact that individual workers are

being replaced by machinery that requires more space. In urban areas firms are being hemmed in by other developments, and therefore are having to go outside the city to find space. Yet not all areas benefit to the same extent from this urban-rural shift, with Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland, the North, the North West and the West Midlands, faring worse than the South-West, South and the South East (including East Anglia) because they are economically peripheral. Thus not all rural areas benefit from this trend, or are many of the remoter areas ever likely to. The present government has compounded this problem by reducing the total area eligible for regional incentives.

Even that development that does take place in rural areas, has only a marginal impact upon the surrounding regions (Moseley 1973). Regional policy in rural areas has sought to assist in a redistribution of industry and growth (Manners et al 1980); yet as Moseley (1973) says a policy of directing investments to a few selected towns is likely to generate little economic expansion beyond its immediate commuting area except in large cities. This view is shared by Bryant (1980).

What makes companies locate in a rural area has been studied by Spooner (1972). He found that the prime criteria was the environmental attractiveness of the area, although within a region their distribution was primarily urban. Archer (1970) concurs with this view. Perhaps realising this the Highlands and Islands Development Board have had a policy of concentrating industrial development in growth areas (Gilg 1976). Yet as Carter (1980) argues this has merely placed industry in already fairly successful areas, and has had a "devastating" effect upon the hinterland. O'Farrell (1978) found that towns of over 20,000 population had an advantage over most other areas in attracting industry. This is confirmed by Hodge and Whitby (1981) who point out that to attract industry, land, housing and services must be available; it therefore follows that urban areas, even if comparatively small have an advantage over remoter rural areas.

One consistent worry is the form of employment that is attracted to deprived areas. Bertrand and Osbourne (1959) have found that the introduction of low-pay industries into rural areas, with an emphasis upon female employment has had the

effect of depressing wages generally, and not absorbing labour released from primary industries. This trend was also found by Cooke (1982) in Wales. The introduction of branch plants into deprived areas, often means that they are deficient in "white collar" jobs, and have little reliance upon internal services (Watts 1981). Carter (1980) was concerned at the growth of external control in deprived areas. Henderson (1980) argues, that in similar areas, policies to introduce industries can result in too great a dependence upon a single product, market or process. He also found that up to 4.3 per cent of new firms in Scotland closed annually, and criticised government for encouraging high risk industries into deprived areas. A general instability, although less dramatic than Henderson's figure was found by Sant (1975), Townroe (1974) and O'Farrell (1976). Henderson (1979) also found that smaller plants had the highest closure rate, a fact concurred with by the Select Committee on Unemployment (1982) which found that 35 per cent of male unemployed in Britain had been previously employed in small firms which composed of only 12 per cent of all British firms. As it is the smaller firm that agencies such as CoSIRA attempt to attract into rural areas this is a worrying trend.

The introduction of industry into rural areas can also have harmful effects upon the local community. Forsythe (1980) found that an influx of migrants into an Orkney community meant an increase in house prices, increased competition for jobs and eventually a political "take over". Cawley (1979) found that a "them and us" situation arose in the rural regions. While Singh (1968) argues that rural industrialisation is simply the implantation of an urban complex into a hitherto rural area.

Although there is some evidence from the British Isles that rural development can be harmful to the existing social structure, that it can be exploitative, and that it is difficult to create alternative employment in rural regions, a great amount of emphasis is placed upon the capacity of government, both local and central, to create work within peripheral areas. In English rural areas, the Development Commission and its agency CoSIRA are the most active central government bodies.

Local authorities are asked by the Development Commission to identify disadvantaged areas, which are designated by means of "Action Plans". These plans indicate not only the level of deprivation in the area, but also suggest sites for factory construction, and indicate what complementary action the local authority plan to take to accommodate the factory and its workers.

Within the government's Assisted Areas, Development Commission factories are designed and constructed by the English Industrial Estates Corporation. Added to this CoSIRA has also recently started a programme of very small workshops for the Commission in "Pockets of Needs" outside the Assisted Areas and Special Investment Areas (SIA's) (Development Commission 1980). The Development Commission also aids a number of self-help voluntary organisations. The SIA's are located in the south west fringe areas of the West Midlands, the Peak National Park, the Fens, parts of East Anglia, Cumbria and North Lancashire. The Commission aims to create 1,500 jobs annually.

The Commission says:

"The problem of rural depopulation, unemployment, and general decline can be overcome only if public authorities, private enterprises, voluntary bodies, and the local people work in harmony to rebuild the economic and social fabric of the countryside". (Development Commission 1982).

Elsewhere in Britain the Development Board for Rural Wales, the Welsh and Scottish Development Agencies, and the Highlands and Islands Development Board have a similar function.

Hodge and Whitby (1979;1981), have carried out studies on the work of the Development Commission in the Eastern Borders and found it was successful in creating employment, this concurs with similar studies in Mid-Wales (Law and Howes 1972). However, they did not use market economic criteria, rather relied upon the rather amorphous notion of social opportunity costs.

2.8:2. Rural Industrialisation: Interim Conclusions

One major problem with encouraging rural industrial development is that even on a basic level no complete understanding exists of the cause, and therefore the cure of the regional economic problem. A decline in the strength and effectiveness of regional policy has been noted, a trend which may have severe adverse consequences for rural development schemes. Even so, there has been a marked movement of industry into rural areas in recent years, although the extent to which remoter areas will benefit is uncertain. Yet even if industry does move into rural areas, evidence exists that the overall economic impact can be slight, and severe problems may be encountered in the areas "hinterland". Added to this the industries may endure significant and often adverse changes in community structure. The conclusions from this section appear to be diverse and essentially negative. Chapter Three will consider the potential and problems associated with attracting industry into a rural area and whether these conclusions accurately reflect experience.

2.9:1. Tourism as an Employment Generator in Rural Areas

Often those forces which may serve to discourage industry from moving into rural areas, such as remoteness from urban centres, attract tourists. Robinson (1976) has noted that rural areas are used as a recreational base for a number of reasons, these being:-

1. The desire to be in an open space.
2. To be able to enjoy a pleasant view.
3. To be able to holiday outdoors.
4. To be able to obtain certain educational advantages.

The Countryside Commission (1979), found that the most popular activity throughout the year in Britain was visiting the countryside. They also found that families with children visited the countryside the most. However, a strong correlation was found between useage of the countryside as a recreational resource and car ownership and income. There was also a linkage between the number of visits made to the countryside and the general economic climate.

A considerable growth has taken place in the amount of rural recreation within Britain; Table 2:3. gives some indication of this.

Table 2:3. Some Indices of Growth in Rural Recreation

Organisation	1970	1980	% Increase
Camping Club (Members)	110,000	187,000	70
Caravan Club (Members)	84,000	235,000	180
Youth Hostel Assoc. (overnight stops)	1.45million	7.94million	448
National Trust (visits to property)	3.1million	6.6million	113

Source: Countryside Commission 1982.

The boom in rural recreation has in many ways, run in parallel with concern over the poor economic opportunities available in some rural areas and the resulting deprivations. The contribution that tourism can make to the income of farmers has long been recognised. Studies into farm tourism have been carried out by Burton (1967); Davies (1969); (1971); (1973); (1975); Capstick (1972); Jacobs (1973); Bull (1976); and Denman (1978). The Countryside Commission (1974) splits farm tourism into three types; those that provide tourist accommodation; those that are resource based; and those that cater for day visitors. The main conclusions of their study was that tourism has grown dramatically in recent years; that there was scope for further growth; and there that should be a concentrated effort to encourage farm tourism.

This call has been echoed in many corners. The NFU (1977b) has called on government agencies:

"To accept and promote farm based tourism and recreation as a legitimate rural land use and valuable sources of supplementary income for certain members of the farming community".

The MAFF through its socio-economic service have recognised the benefits that farm tourism can bring and have carried out a series of regional studies (MAFF 1979b). The Tourist Boards have also taken an interest (Wales Tourist Board 1977).

Yet although the potential for farm tourism seems to have been confirmed by these studies, some problems have been noted. Wibberley (1973) has been quoted as saying:

"If a farmer is having difficulty in managing efficiently an enterprise based on livestock and crops, he will probably have worse management problems if he introduces human beings into the complex".

Cottam (1976) has said:

"The establishment of a tourist enterprise is not an undertaking to be entered into without thought and consideration".

The Countryside Commission have said (1974):

"There is in fact an irony which many writers have observed, both in this country and abroad, that small farmers, which perhaps most need the supplementary income, often lack the space to cope with the guests, while the larger farms with lesser need can take the visitors".

Denman (1978), confirms this by showing that although the medium size of farm in Scotland is 51 acres, the medium size farm having tourist facilities is 193 acres. He estimates that 13.1 per cent of holdings in Scotland have tourist facilities, with a tremendous scope for many more. However, some holdings it appears will never develop tourism as the farmers are just not interested; are against tourism in general; lack time and space; are concerned with its practicability; and have other personal reasons for not entering the tourist market. Even so he recommends more resources to be spent on farm tourism from governmental funds.

Few studies of farm tourism exist which do not dwell on the purely theoretical. Perhaps because farm tourism is regarded as such a highly important element in rural revitalisation measures, few feel inclined to question its validity. However, a wide range of criticism does exist on the effects of tourism generally.

Tourism is regarded as a poorly paid and seasonal industry by many observers. Labour Research (1978a) says:

"The industry is notorious for poor pay and conditions which tend to be exacerbated by the seasonal nature of the work, large numbers of part-time workers, extensive use of casual labour, and the fact that hotel workers are located in many small establishments".

A TRRU study of tourism in Greater Tayside, found that only two out of five jobs lasted for a whole year (TRRU 1975). While Adams (1977) found in the Highlands and Islands Development Board area 70 per cent of those employed were female. Brownrigg and Grieg (1976) noted that 42 per cent of people employed in tourism on the Isle of Skye, came from outside the island. Riley (1973) reports that a substantial number of outsiders are imported to work in the Cumbrian tourist industry as the work is not popular with local people. The TRRU (1977) commented upon findings in East Anglia that showed that 38 per cent of people employed in the tourist industry in the area terminated their employment after six months. Labour Research (1978a) found that 92 per cent of employment in the London tourist industry was terminated between the months of April and July. The level of unionisation is also very low with it being estimated that only one in five restaurants in London is unionised.

Apart from seasonality and low pay, it has been argued that the benefits that accrue to the local community in terms of economic development are variable. The regional multiplier can vary quite significantly. In small regions such as the Scottish Islands and remote rural communities the multiplier effect is minimal. Brownrigg and Grieg (1976) and Brougham and Butler (1977) have found that there are tremendous leakages out of small local communities, mainly as a result of the goods demanded by tourists having to be imported. Thus Brownrigg and Grieg (1976) argue that most of the benefits of tourism are more apparent than real. As Brougham and Butler (1977) in their study of Sleaford say:

"The benefits of tourism are recognised by most residents but are confined to a minority involved in offering accommodation, retail or special services, or who are employed in such areas. The multiplier effect, although not investigated specifically, is undoubtedly very low and leakages out of the area very high".

As Archer (1978) says:

"In general the smaller the economy the fewer trading linkages there are between business establishments".

Even he, as the most experienced advocate of the multiplier theory, is moved to argue that insufficient evidence is available to form firm conclusions about the local costs and benefits of tourism, and more research is needed into the economic,

social and other costs and benefits which tourism creates at the local regional level Archer (1980).

Denman (1978) has pointed out that the larger operation is more popular. Hodge and Whitby (1981) note that:

"Large-scale developments in particular localities may make a substantial contribution to employment, while small-scale, part-time and seasonal activities will have a diffuse impact".

Adams (1977) argues that large-scale enterprises tend to contribute to larger leakages from the local economy, with them often being controlled by corporate capital from outside. He also notes the tendency for tourist enterprises to be concentrated in already popular areas, and criticises the HIDB policy of concentrating tourist development in the already most heavily used areas. The tendency towards larger schemes has been confirmed by research done for the Forestry Commission, which using a 13 per cent rate of return basis, found only the larger schemes were profitable (Forestry Commission 1974a).

Long asks the question:

" Could the answer be the creation of new second home settlements, complete with harbours, shops and leisure facilities? Certainly some continental countries think so". Long (1974).

Others apparently, do not. For example the Lake District National Park Plan (LDSPB 1978) makes it quite clear that pressure for large developments will be resisted. While Duffield and Long (1981) argue that because of the small numbers of benefits that such operations bring to the local community and because of their socially disadvantageous effects, encouragement should be given to locally controlled groups, preferably co-operatives.

The encouragement of tourism often has profound effects upon the environment. As Kaspar (1980) notes:

"Tourism may be considered a particularly powerful element in the destruction of the environment. The human environment, the source of the existence of tourist activity, is deeply affected by it. The destructive power of an incorrectly formulated tourism subject to little or no control, carries the negation of what tourism basically aspires to".

The conservation, transportation and agricultural problems created by tourism have been documented (see section on National Parks). However, cultural problems have been less so. Duffield and Long (1981) quoting Noronha (1977), note that induced tourism directed by outsiders, often means that vast changes are required in community structure to accommodate them, as opposed to organic tourism which is controlled by local institutions without requiring any changes in the social structure or cultural roles. Brougham and Butler (1977), in their study of the fragile Gaelic speaking community of Sleat, note how not only the language is being threatened by the influx of tourists, but also such things as rigorous Sunday observance. As a result of this Brougham and Butler recommend that only the culturally sympathetic tourist should be encouraged.

One supposed benefit of the tourist industry according to the Department of the Environment (1979) is that it suggests it sustains:

"A wide range of amenities and services that would not otherwise be viable if they depended entirely upon local patronage".

Brougham and Butler (1977) refute this, while Duffield and Long (1981), state that the provision of facilities for tourists adversely affects the local community, as the community focus tends to be shifted to the hotel bar and local entertainers are replaced by those imported from outside.

Another problem of tourism that has recently become much more apparent is that of the industry's vulnerability to economic recession. As can be seen from Table 2:4 the industry has not fully recovered from the effects of the 1973 oil price rise and as Table 2:5 shows employment in tourism has not increased significantly, while the number of males employed has not increased since 1974.

Table 2:4. Holiday Tourism by British Residents in Britain

Millions (rounded)	Trips	Nights	Estimated spending
1973	85	465	£1,075
1974	70	415	£1,300
1975	71	430	£1,550
1976	75	420	£1,700
1977	73	415	£1,825
1978	72	405	£2,200
1979	71	410	£3,625
1980	75	415	£3,025

Source: BTA 1981.

Table 2:5. Employment in Residential Tourism in Britain

Thousands	Hotels and other Resident Establishments		Total
	Males	Females	
1974 June	101	151	252
1975 June	103	153	256
1976 June	104	159	263
1977 June	105	163	268
1978 June	104	166	270
1979 June	104	173	277
1980 June	102	169	271
1981 June	100	170	270

Source: Department of Employment 1983.

What must be remembered is that tourism is not a static industry, but rather changes with trends in society. According to Self (1981) there has been a significant rise in self-catering tourism, with it increasing by 10 per cent from 1975 to 1980. Although this change is cheaper for the tourist, it brings little benefit for the local community. As the TRRU (1975) says:

"Self-catering creates very much less benefit per visitor day than serviced accommodation, and its development cannot be pursued on economic development grounds where alternatives are available".

Another important problem is the cost of tourism to local authorities. Apart from local authority support for tourist ventures, the provision of services is also costly. Edwards (1976) has worked out that in 1974, tourism cost local authorities in the South West some £4.5 million. Of this half was spent on highways, improving them for the seasonal peak and one seventh upon extra hospital provision. He also estimated that an increase in tourist numbers meant an increase in cost of £1 per tourist head, per stay at 1974 prices.

2.9:2. Tourism: Interim Conclusions

Because of the intrinsic value of rural areas for recreational activity, the MAFF, the Department of the Environment and various other official and unofficial bodies and commentators, view tourism as a significant, if not the major, means of revitalising rural economies. Yet, many other commentators have noted considerable disadvantages associated with relying upon tourism as a major form of economic activity. Low pay, a high rate of female employment, and the seasonal nature of the work can compound rather than remove structural economic problems, while the benefit to the whole community as a result of the multiplier effect is often small, especially in remoter areas. Added to this, the stagnation of the industry and the marked shift towards self-catering tend to reduce existing, let alone future employment opportunities. There can also be disadvantageous effects as regards conservation, community structure and the increased cost of service provision. There is also some doubt as to how individuals, especially in the farming community can satisfactorily provide facilities for tourists. These rather negative

conclusions will be tested later to determine the effects of tourism in one area, and the potential for its growth within the area, and on two agricultural estates. From this, it will become clearer, whether or not the encouragement of tourism is a valid means of engendering economic growth and stability in rural areas.

2.10:1. Forestry as a Rural Development Agent

One important tool in the hands of the rural developer is that of forestry. Not only does forestry provide employment, directly on the plantation and indirectly in the processing industries, but it also utilises poorer quality ground in the remoter regions, which otherwise might only be used for extensive sheep farming. The attractiveness of forestry is added to by the fact that there is massive state financial support for the industry.

The growth of state forestry in Britain occurred as a direct result of the massive consumption of timber and depletion of Britain's forests during the First World War. As timber took a disproportionate amount of shipping space, especially critical during the U Boat campaign, the Acland Report (1918), decided that it was in the national interest to have a state planned forestry scheme. In 1919 the Forestry Commission was created to carry out this task.

During the Second World War similar difficulties were found. The Robinson Committee 1943, recommended a massive expansion of Britain's afforested area. However, as Mather (1978) indicates, problems of financial stringency, labour shortages and difficulty in finding rural housing meant that the ambitious programme of over 4 million acres was not completed until 1955. Financial support was also given for private forestry in the Dedication Scheme with a target of over 160,000 acres set, which was exceeded by 1955.

In 1955 two influential reports noted the importance forestry had in creating rural employment (Mid-Wales Investigation Report 1955); (Taylor Commission 1955). In 1957, the Zuckerman Report argued that the strategic importance of forestry had been reduced because any major war in the future would be nuclear, and therefore short. Because of these reports, a stronger

emphasis was placed upon social objectives in forestry policy. Planting was carried out at a rate of around 114,000 acres a year. The amenity value of woodlands was also gradually noticed, with the Forestry Commission opening up picnic areas, forest walks, nature trails, and camping and caravanning parks.

In 1972, the Government undertook a policy review, which essentially confirmed that there are no strategic considerations - defence or commercial - relevant to new afforestation; that new afforestation fails to produce a 10 per cent social rate of return; and that new planting compares unfavourably with hill farming in the replacement of an economic resource (HM Treasury 1972). However, as Gilg (1978) points out, the government largely ignored the results of the study and returned to the philosophy that import saving, job creation and recreation provision, although not necessarily an economic proposition, still represented a useful return in overall resource management terms, although tax concessions for forestry were lifted in 1972, only to be reintroduced in 1977.

In 1972 the Conservative Government also reduced afforestation to around 44,000 acres a year, and stated that while it saw social objectives being important, they would not be pursued regardless of cost. Under the Forestry Act (1981) the present Conservative Government reaffirmed its acceptance of the need to expand the nation's forest area, but directed the Commission to dispose of £40 million worth of plantation, both in the rationalisation of small plantations, and the selling of larger blocks to release capital. The Act also further increased encouragement to the private forestry operation.

The incentives for the private woodland owner are as follows. Under Schedule B, income tax can be assessed at one third of the annual value of the land growing trees, or one can elect to be taxed under Schedule D which enables expenditure on the planting and establishment of woodlands to be treated as a loss which can be offset against income. In terms of capital gains tax, woodlands will only be taxable insofar as they outstrip increases in the retail price index. For capital transfer tax, afforested land will qualify as a business which means that its value is reduced by 50 per cent in assessing liability.

The Forestry Commission (1974b) found that the overriding impetus to plant trees lay in the wish to create a valuable capital asset, and increase the value of the whole proprietary unit. Grayson (1977) argues that investment in forestry is influenced more by confidence in the stability of taxation than by economic forecasts. While Mather (1978) isolates the relative strength of hill farming as the major factor, and Williams (1981) the fact that an investment in forestry is virtually inflation proof.

Indeed, the economic advantages of forestry, in terms of selling wood produced have not been great to individual landowners. This is clearly seen in Table 2:6.

Table 2:6. Returns from Private Forestry: Inflation Linked

Forest Year	Expenditure		Income		Deficit	
	<u>£</u>	<u>/ha</u>	<u>£</u>	<u>/ha</u>	<u>£</u>	<u>/ha</u>
1976	81.15		71.71		9.44	
1977	80.57		70.60		9.97	
1978	84.83		66.04		18.79	
1979	81.90		66.39		15.51	
1980	84.12		68.86		15.26	
1961-1980 20 year mean	90.37		70.11		20.26	

Source: Dolan and Russell (1982).

Digby and Edwardson (1976) isolate four distinct categories of woodland owner. They are:-

1. Woodlands on traditional private estates.
2. Institutional woodlands
3. Woodlands acquired and managed by private forestry companies.
4. Small scattered woodlands, the property of a large number of different owners.

The amount of land owned by the Forestry Commission is 38 per cent as opposed to 62 per cent privately owned (Forestry Commission 1970). However, the

performance of the Forestry Commission is better understood when it is realised that in 1947 the state only controlled 18 per cent of woodland.

Certain landowners, especially those with a tradition of forestry have an advantage in developing the industry (Forestry Commission 1974b);(Mutch & Hutchinson 1980); (Walmsley 1978). As Walmsley (1978) points out an estate with a sawmill does not have to employ a buyer; nor does it have to waste its resources in competing for supplies of timber; nor do large haulage costs have to be met. Mutch and Hutchinson (1980) found that the smaller agricultural holding would find difficulties in turning over land to forestry, as it would require substantial changes in the farming pattern, although it was found on a number of holdings that net production and net employment was increased through the integration of farming and forestry. However, as Hodge and Whitby (1981) state, economies of scale are important within forestry. This is confirmed by the Forestry Commission (1974b) which found that the average size of the forestry plantation is 7,792 acres, with the average size in the north of England being 13,234 acres.

Although significant investment has taken place over the years in forestry, and while there is continued support for the industry by government, there have been a number of voices raised which question the subsidisation of the industry. One area of criticism is the emphasis given to a projected shortfall in timber products. As Norman (1980) says, Forestry Commission forecasts are based upon continued economic growth yet developed countries have recorded slight and even negative growth in recent years. He also challenges the assumption that growth in timber consumption is linked to economic growth. Miller (1981) argues that long range assumptions are usually incorrect. He also questions the fact that no consideration is given for progress in technology. For example technological advances have produced thinner and better plywoods, cheaper products such as fibreboard and chipboard have become increasingly used, and plastic packaging is replacing traditional brown paper. Other advances which will have an effect, are paper substitution by microtechnology, and building and furniture manufacturers making greater use of plastic, steel and aluminium and a greater capacity to recycle (Kumar 1982).

Because the returns to the nation from investment are very low, (HM Treasury 1972); (CAS 1980), greater emphasis is laid upon the amenity value of forests. However, Thomson and Whitby (1975) argue that under most of the assumptions used, forestry fails to produce a 10 per cent social rate of return. Miller (1981) has argued that if the public were given the chance, they may wish to spend their money on something else. While the Ramblers Association one of the most virulent protectors of rural amenity, have argued that forests have a negative effect upon recreation, and have called for the winding up of the Forestry Commission (Ramblers Association 1971; 1980).

It has been argued, that large-scale afforestation of the uplands will bring ecological benefits. Eyre (1975), claims that forestry can help to improve soil conditions. Coleman (1979) has stated that the removal of bracken will improve both animal and human health, as bracken is carcinogenic. It has also been claimed that the number of animal species living in Britain, as well as the number of birds, insects and fungi will increase (The Ecologist 1981), although a call has come for the Forestry Commission to mix softwoods and hardwoods to increase ecological quality (Earl of Bradford 1980).

Yet forestry has come under sustained criticism through the blanket planting of conifers. This not only destroys the quality of the landscape (Fairbrother 1970) but also reduces substantially the amount of bird and animal life available because it stifles ground cover. As well as this forestry operations have polluted water courses through fertiliser run off, while the mass spraying of plantation with pesticides has had harmful effects upon wildlife.

One important economic argument that has been much criticised is that forestry aids the balance of payments. A CAS report (CAS 1980) notes that substantial benefits can be derived in terms of import saving, while the Forestry Commission says:

"If there are serious and long lasting balance of payments deficits it becomes necessary to reduce domestic demand and this tends to create unemployment".
(Richards et al 1977).

But as Miller (1981) argues, this presupposes a fixed exchange rate system and a determination to avoid devaluation at all costs. If this assumption is removed, especially at a time when many feel the pound is overvalued, it becomes unnecessary to pay more for timber to save imports.

The economic argument against further investment in British forestry is compounded when it is realised that Britain is not a particularly efficient producer of timber, as Table 2:7 shows.

Table 2:7. Comparisons of Timber Growth

<u>Country</u>	<u>Species</u>	<u>M³ growth per hectare per year</u>
United Kingdom	Sitka Spruce	10
New Zealand	Pines	18 - 30
East Africa	Pines	25 - 45
Central Africa	Eucalyptus	15 - 25
Latin America	Eucalyptus	30
Tropics	Hardwoods	25 - 35

Source: Miller 1981.

Recent events in the British timber industry point to the fact that even processing wood in the United Kingdom can be expensive. Three pulp mills have closed down since 1980 in Britain, these being the Wiggins Teape mill in Fort William, the Bowater UK mill in Ellesmere Port, and the St Annes Board Mill in Bristol. The reasons for this being mainly high energy and distribution costs, and falling demand. With the closure of these mills, pulpwood is being exported to Scandinavia for processing.

The strategic argument is also weak for forestry. As seen earlier the Zuckerman Report (1957) noted that a future major war would be nuclear. Hackett (1980) confirms that most informed opinion believes that a future war will be nuclear, and short. The days of blockades appear to be over.

The job creation role of forestry has also come in for much criticism. The Forestry Commission employs about 8,000 people and private forestry 5,600. In

1980, 14,600 people were employed by the processing side of the industry. Although the Forestry Commission has an important role as an employer, and creator of labour, it has been increasing efficiency, and reducing its workforce in recent years. As well as this it has been argued that forestry is not a large scale employer after the planting period until thinning, some eight to ten years on; there is then a large gap until harvesting. Because of this Hampson (1972) argues that even a twenty per cent increase in expenditure on forestry would result in only 4,500 additional jobs.

2.10:2. Forestry: Interim Conclusions

There is little doubt that without considerable state intervention there would only be a small forest industry in Britain today. State intervention in forestry came about as a result of the severe shortages created during two world wars. Since then, the argument has moved away from the strategic need to maintain timber supplies. Now, an increased reliance is placed upon home-grown timber as a substitute for imports; as a protection against future supply problems; and as a creator of employment in rural areas. For the private investor however, these have little importance, with the lucrative tax incentives offered by government ranking highest in their estimation.

In terms of employment creation, forestry does not appear to be a particularly useful device. As with any industry it needs to ensure that efficiency is being maintained and improved; this results in the situation observed at present, where the Forestry Commission is actually decreasing its workforce. There are also long lapses between the major labour consuming periods, planting, thinning and harvesting. The industry is also low-pay, employing workers at the agricultural rate. Processing industries which are thought to be an important and beneficial side effect of forestry development, have recently come under severe world competition, and are faring badly.

There are also significant arguments against forestry from an economic and environmental point of view. Commentators argue that not enough account is

given to technological progress, dampening future timber demands. Nor, it is claimed, is there enough attention being given to Britain's poor economic performance in terms of timber production as compared to the rest of the world. Recreation and conservation groups have also criticised forestry for spoiling the rural landscape, reducing wilderness areas recreation opportunities, and creating a limited ecosystem, while contributing to pollution.

The degree to which forestry is beneficial to rural areas is therefore questionable. Fieldwork recorded later in the thesis, will analyse its impact in Cumbria, and examine the investment and employment opportunities the industry creates on two estates. The future role of forestry within rural development policies will also be considered, as well as the potential for major policy changes.

2.11:1. Land Ownership and Rural Development

Although there is a persistent view that rural areas, if given the appropriate financial and administrative support, will be able to generate employment and wealth, a certain amount of emphasis is given to the agricultural estate, as the potential focus for this development. The major exponent of this role is the CLA (CLA 1972, 1980). Yet this should not mask the fact that agricultural estates do have a number of advantages over the small individual landowner. These can be categorised as follows:-

1. They may have substantial woodlands, with an estate sawmill, and a tradition of wood processing (Walmsley 1978).
2. They may have a number of disused buildings in good repair and in a central location (Featherstonehaugh 1980).
3. They may have a large central building to convert into tourist accommodation (Clemenson 1982).
4. They may have enough land to administer flexible multiple use (Clemenson 1982).
5. They may have entrepreneurial and management skills (Massey & Catalano 1978).
6. They may have a history of paternalistic concern for local people (Featherstonehaugh 1980). (Massey and Catalano 1978).
7. They may have the ability to raise substantial amounts of capital (Massey and Catalano 1978).

The landed aristocracy and gentry in Britain, contrary to much popular opinion, still hold a position of great wealth and political importance, although their position has declined dramatically since the nineteenth century. Perrot (1968) shows that the estates of the titled nobility declined by an average of 74 per cent in England and Wales and 59 per cent in Scotland over 50 years, yet because of the substantial resources they originally owned, they still own a significant proportion of Britain's land area, 31.6 per cent, according to Massey and Catalano (1978). Their significance increases when it is realised that half of them are over 10,000 acres in size. As agriculture, especially in the uplands where many of these estates are concentrated, is not particularly remunerative, and because the aristocracy often has substantial reserves of money, they have diversified their activity to such an extent that only 24 per cent of landowners can be classified as "landowners only" (Perrot 1968).

Massey and Catalano (1978) have suggested that the post-war period has seen a reassessment of the aristocrats' land assets, primarily as a result of increased economic pressures, such as high land values, capital taxation and tax relief incentives. As a result of this, significant changes have taken place in the social relationships between the estate owner and his workers, and an adaptation to capitalism of functions performed and positions held, prior to the establishment of the dominance of the capitalist mode of production (Massey and Catalano 1978).

The next stage down from the aristocrats are the landed gentry, who Massey and Catalano (1978) define as being:

"Without titles or even as a group, any formalised position or duties, they have none-the-less down the centuries retained a coherent and identifiable role in country society".

They own on average 1,500 acres each and in total of about 4 per cent of Britain's land area. Thus Massey and Catalano (1978) say:

"The commitment of the landed gentry to a specific piece of land and the inherited social duties which define their place within country life, means that for them too, land ownership retains connotations of social relations which go beyond and significantly differentiate them from the interests of purely industrial capital".

Therefore, large estates hold a total of 36 per cent of the nation's agricultural land area. Thus with large financial and management resources; with estate size large enough to integrate a number of activities within its bounds; with the ability to achieve economies of scale; with an experience of non-agricultural activity; with pressures to develop their capital resources; with a pool of residual skilled labour within the estate and a social position dependent largely upon paternalism, the agricultural estate is a promising environment for any scheme in rural development.

Attention has so far been placed on what can be termed the incremental problems of rural areas. While these are no doubt the most significant problems to which government should turn its attention, considerable difficulties have been noted when urban type development occurs in the rural environment. This change is usually government inspired or administered, or at least receives a certain amount of government support. Of these, highway developments constitute a major source of direct change in rural areas, and create a significant number of problems, especially to the farming community.

2.12:1. Highway Development and its Effect Upon the Agricultural Community

Surprisingly little information exists on the effects of public developments generally in relation to agriculture and the local community. Oxford Polytechnic (1979) have carried out a study on how the construction of a large power station affected a local community from a socio-economic point of view. They noted that the local employment increase due to the construction was only some 10 per cent. They also found that the local multiplier effect was minimal, with 99 per cent of money being spent outside a ten mile radius, and that many of the employees were immigrants to the area.

Although this remains the major study on the socio-economic effects of a public development, there exists some considerable information on the effects of road developments on the local agricultural community. Leat (1978) in his study of the development of the A 30 in Devon, found that the farmers were generally sympathetically considered by the road developers. However, a member of the local Road Construction Unit admitted that the degree to which farmers are

considered varies from one road development to another. Hearne (1977) in a more extensive survey, noted that no objective account was taken by the road planner of the impact on individual farm holdings; that few farmers have any conception of the highway planning process; that significant disruption occurs during the construction of a major road; that farmers are more concerned with physical damage than they are about the economic impact to their holdings; that farmers are dissatisfied with the level of contact they have with the road planners and construction teams; that compensation proceedings are slow; and that contractors are concerned with getting a road constructed as quickly as possible, almost regardless of the damage that may be done to the farm unit. van Rest (1981) summarised the Wolfson Group's findings, noting that there is a tendency towards "skimping" in the design of the road, that there can be poor workmanship, a failure to meet specification, and a failure to take due account of the farmer.

One reason for this Hearne (1977) found, is that farmers do not appear to be taken into adequate consideration during the public inquiry period of a road construction. This has been confirmed by Twinn (1978), who claims that the majority of groups protesting at a public enquiry are middle class, with the main aim of preventing the road being built. Farmers are therefore alienated in that they may only wish to see minor changes of alignment, as opposed to the essentially environmental approach of the other objectors.

In order to overcome this problem, the Wolfson Group prepared a document which explained the way in which a farmer should present a case at a public enquiry (Bell et al 1978). The booklet advised the farmer if he has a significant case to put forward, not to represent himself, but to hire a surveyor or an agricultural consultant. It advised the farmer to lay out clearly the present farm structure, to detail the physical impact of the road and to indicate his personal economic loss. This was the companion volume to a document produced to enable the farmer to understand and deal with the administrative problems that occur during a road development (Bell et al 1977). This advised the farmer to hire the services of a land agent as soon as the road proposed is mooted as farmers:

"All too often make the mistake of waiting until the problems start before realising the need for specialist advice".

Apart from employing an agent, the next most important advice is to keep a detailed record of all occurrences, of people they reported them to, and their responsibilities. The farmer was also advised to ensure that the road planners fully understood the problems of severance and access, that fencing was constructed correctly and that severed drainage was caught. It was thought essential for farmers to make contact with the consulting engineers and the contractor. They also advised that a "statement of condition" regarding the land before entry be prepared, and that all temporary leasing should have certain legal stipulations regarding the condition of land leased.

The information pack was supplied to all NFU County and District Secretaries as well as to a number of farmers, and the effect was held to be positive (Bell 1978). A second printing with a corrigenda was sold widely to farmers, agents, officials and engineers. Bell (1979) found that there were many problems with regard to both farmers waiting too long for a compensation repayment, and a considerable number of farmers failed to achieve a settlement equivalent to their agricultural losses. He recommends that farms ought to have a development grant to reorganise a disrupted farm. That there should be incentives to improve the farm structure, that there should be a 10 per cent solatium on land prices to reflect the reality of an unwilling seller and the local "land hunger" that ensues after a road development, that there should be a prompt reimbursement of professional fees and compensation. He also recommended a fuller involvement by the MAFF. At present they play only a limited role, advising on the route that is least agriculturally damaging and giving advice on accommodation works. But Bell sees them giving advice right through the road development to the other agencies involved, especially the District Valuer, and producing a "Farm Recovery Plan" for the farmer.

In essence it can be seen that there are considerable problems to be faced by farmers during a road development. The complexities of public enquiries, administrative work and compensation negotiations, all compound the physical disturbance caused to the holding, especially as regards severance and drainage.

All this is added to by what van Rest (1981) calls "horse trading" over the allocation and positioning of access bridges and underpasses, and the fact that contractors tend to ignore the farming interest in a bid to get their own work over as quickly as possible.

2:13. Chapter Review

This chapter has had three aims. First it acts as a general background to subjects raised later in the thesis. Second it considers the present state of thinking on the most important aspects of rural policy, and third it creates statements of position to be tested later by fieldwork. The direction that rural policy takes in the future is of great importance to the nation in terms of the use of financial resources, the protection of amenity, and the alleviation of rural deprivation. This chapter has suggested that many rural policies and preconceived notions may be inadequate, inefficient or unwarranted, and that there is the opportunity for a major reassessment of rural policies. It is to test the effectiveness of present rural policy and to explore options for the future that the rest of the thesis is directed.

CHAPTER 3

CUMBRIA: AN ANALYSIS OF A COUNTY'S RURAL PROBLEMS AND POTENTIAL

CUMBRIA: AN ANALYSIS OF A COUNTY'S RURAL PROBLEMS AND POTENTIAL

3:1. Introduction

The county of Cumbria was chosen as the basis for a major case study, in order to fulfil a number of needs. First, it was necessary to place the Lowther and Whitbarrow Case Studies in their local perspective; a great deal of goodwill had been formed with many organisations acting in Cumbria's rural policy formulation and implementation as a result of the Whitbarrow Exercise, and these links aided the development of the research. Second, Cumbria is a predominantly rural county with much of it designated as a Less Favoured Area and containing a National Park. As a result it experiences a strong conflict of resource useage between conservation, tourism and general development. The county also has severe rural deprivation problems. Clearly many of the difficulties and much of the potential of rural areas generally is reflected in Cumbria. This chapter considers a wide range of rural policy issues including employment and demographic change in Cumbria, structural change within Cumbrian agriculture; general conservation and deprivation issues in the county; and the potential for tourism, light industry, and forestry to increase rural employment opportunities.

3.2:1. The County Setting

Cumbria, with an area of 6,809 km² (2,205 square miles) and a population of 487,038 is England's second largest county by area, and thirtieth by population. There are an average of 72 persons to each square kilometre, which compares to an average of 324 for England and Wales. Between 1971 and 1981, there was an increase of 2.3 per cent in Cumbria's population, as compared to a 0.8 per cent increase in England and Wales. In Cumbria as a whole, 21.7 per cent of the population was aged under 16 years, and 18.9 per cent were of pensionable age, as compared to Great Britain's figure of 22.3 per cent for the former and 17.7 per cent for the latter.

Cumbria is split into six districts as shown in Map 3:1. These are Allerdale,



Aston University

Illustration removed for copyright restrictions

Source: Cumbria County Council 1980

Map 3:1. The Administrative Sub-Divisions of Cumbria

Barrow, Carlisle, Copeland, Eden and South Lakeland. Added to these, the Lake District National Park has its own Planning Board, an autonomous local planning authority which sets its own budget, the Lake District Special Planning Board (LDSPB). It has the development control functions of the County and District Councils, and publishes its own structure plan, which is incorporated in the Cumbria County Council structure plan to form the Joint Structure Plan. The area of the National Park is 2,243 square kilometres, a third of Cumbria's total. Its population in 1971 was 44,385 persons, representing 19.8 persons per square kilometre. It therefore contains only ten per cent of the county's population, and is essentially more rural in character than the rest of Cumbria.

Within Cumbria there is a diversity both of landscape, and of economic and social conditions. The west Cumbrian towns, especially Workington, Barrow and Cleator Moor, developed as a result of the iron and steel industry. However, the decline in employment in both steel production and coal mining, has been apparent since the world economic crisis of the late 1920's. The central core of Cumbria in the mid-nineteenth century came more and more under the influence of tourism, which helped to slow down persistent outmigration from agricultural communities (Walton and McGloin 1982).

The diversity is clearly apparent in population trends as Table 3.1. shows.

Table 3:1. Usually Resident Population in Cumbria by District

Districts	1971 total	1981 total	Percentage change
Allerdale	92,877	94,244	1.5
Barrow in Furness	76,145	72,647	-4.6
Carlisle	100,285	99,504	-0.8
Copeland	70,856	71,457	0.8
Eden	41,738	42,425	1.6
South Lakeland	87,476	91,419	4.5

Source: OPCS 1982.

Table 3:1. indicates that the industrial areas of Carlisle and Barrow have been experiencing some level of depopulation, a general increase however, being recorded elsewhere though most significantly in South Lakeland. As yet not enough information is available to indicate why changes have been taking place, although some leads do exist. Table 3:2. shows that South Lakeland has the highest percentage of population of pensionable age, perhaps indicating a degree of inward migration by the elderly.

Table 3:2. Percentage of Population of Pensionable Age in Cumbria by District

District	Percentage of Pensionable Age
Allerdale	18.4
Barrow in Furness	18.0
Carlisle	18.6
Copeland	15.6
Eden	18.9
South Lakeland	23.1

Source: OPCS 1982.

Table 3:3 indicates, that South Lakeland is the most prosperous district with the lowest unemployment rate. This in itself will probably slow down out-migration.

Table 3:3. Unemployment in Cumbria April 1981 by District

Districts	Percentage unemployed
Allerdale	10.3
Barrow in Furness	9.1
Carlisle	9.6
Copeland	9.2
Eden	5.7
South Lakeland	5.5

Source: OPCS 1982.

Clearly Cumbria as a county has both administrative and economic diversity. The industrially stagnant west contrasts with the apparently prosperous core region. In some areas there is high immigration; in others population loss. However while this gives an idea of setting, it allows little illustration of Cumbria's position as an area suffering from a number of often severe rural problems. The following detailed analysis will shed light on these problems, first describing agriculture, the base of rural land use and much rural economic activity .

3.3:1. Agriculture in Cumbria

As noted earlier, Cumbria is predominantly a rural county, with some 462,549 hectares of its land, excluding common grazing land (117,070 hectares), devoted to agriculture. Overall, the quality of land in Cumbria is generally poor. As seen in Table 3.4., using the MAFF Agricultural Land Classification of England and Wales, most of Cumbria's land area falls in Grades 4 and 5, that is land of limited potential.

Table 3:4. Land Quality in Cumbria.

Grade	1	2	3	4	5
Percentage of total	nil	1.7	30.3	23.4	44.6

Source: MAFF 1981c.

Cumbria produces only some 2 per cent of the United Kingdom's total agricultural output in economic terms, with in 1979/1980, a total approximate value of £162 million. How this is made up can be seen in Table 3:5. This also shows the basic structure of the industry in Cumbria.

Table 3:5. Cumbria's Agricultural Output 1979/1980

ARABLE

CROP	HECTARES	OUTPUT £
Wheat	503	249,000
Barley	25,791	8,800,000
Oats	1,474	507,000
Potatoes	1,051	2,400,000

LIVESTOCK

ENTERPRISE	NUMBERS	OUTPUT £
Dairy Cows	159,121	70,000,000
Beef Cattle (home reared)	246,082	28,200,000
Total beef		35,600,000
Sheep & lambs	1,644,000	18,000,000
Pigs (sows)	5,832	2,700,000
Poultry	5,000,000	9,000,000
HORTICULTURE		2,800,000
Grand Total (Approx)		152,000,000

Source: MAFF 1981c.

From Table 3:5. it can be seen that dairying is the single most important agricultural activity contributing some 47 per cent of Cumbria's total agricultural economic output. There are 2,322 dairy farms in Cumbria, some 36 per cent of all holdings. These farms mainly lie in the Eden Valley, the Solway Plain, and the Cumberland Plain. Here high rainfall and fairly good quality land engender excellent grass growth. Cumbria has some 6 per cent of the dairy herd of England and Wales, and is the third major dairy county after Devon and Dyfed. Of the 650 million litres of milk produced annually in Cumbria, only 128 million litres are consumed within the county. The rest is either transported as liquid milk, or processed at one of the county's four large dairies.

In addition to the dairy herd, Cumbria's beef herd produces some 8 per cent of the England and Wales total. Most beef cattle are found in the uplands of Cumbria, although some are run alongside the dairy herd. Every year, some 3,000 Irish bred cattle are imported into the county for finishing, although on very few farms are complete beef systems operated. In total beef cattle contribute some 20 per cent of the total agricultural output of the county. Cumbria is not noted for intensive livestock production with little of Cumbria's beef produced in this way, and the county only contains some 1 per cent of the pigs and poultry of England and Wales.

As noted earlier, most of Cumbria's agricultural land is of poor quality. Some 60 per cent of the county's land area is designated as a Less Favoured Area under EEC Directive 75/268. As can be seen from Map 3:2. most of this lies inside the National Park. 1,580 agricultural holdings lie within this area, 24 per cent of Cumbria's total. This fact partly explains why Cumbria's sheep population constitutes some 12 per cent of the total for England. Indeed some 48 per cent of Cumbria's holdings are devoted to fattening cattle and sheep. 2,441 farms, 37 per cent of the total, are classified as part time.

Cumbria has little arable farming, with only 26,235 hectares (1981) devoted to it; 93 per cent of the arable crop is barley. There is little trading of cereals in the county as nearly all produce is consumed on the farm of production. Grain is





Illustration removed for copyright restrictions

Source: Cumbria County Council 1978a

Map 3:2. Areas of Unprofitable Agriculture in Cumbria

usually stored as harvested as only a few growers have drying facilities. Some potatoes are grown on Cumbrian farms, although they are declining in importance.

3.3.2. Structural Change in Cumbrian Agriculture

Within Cumbrian agriculture, significant structural change has been taking place over a period of many years, and, as with the rest of British agriculture it is still continuing. Table 3:6. shows the changes that have taken place in the five years up till 1981, in the size of farm holdings.

Table 3:6. Changes in Farm holding Size in Cumbria 1976-1981

Farm size (hec)	Number of Holdings		
	1976	1981	Percentage change
Under 19.9	2,055	1,734	-15.6
20-49.9	2,458	2,207	-10.2
50-99.9	1,688	1,698	+0.6
100-299.9	596	667	+11.9
300 and over	<u>21</u>	<u>31</u>	<u>+47.6</u>
Total	<u>6,818</u>	<u>6,337</u>	<u>-7.05</u>

Source: MAFF 1976 and 1981b.

As can be seen, the number of smaller holdings has fallen dramatically. The total of all farms below 50 hectares has fallen by nearly 13 per cent. Middle-sized farms have remained fairly stable while large farms have grown rapidly. These figures clearly indicate that a great deal of flux is taking place within the industry, with the smaller farms being particularly vulnerable. This is not to say that farms in the 50 to 100 hectare range are very much more stable, for decreases in their number may be made up by increases in the size of smaller farms. However, the general tendency towards an average increase in size is shown by the rapid growth in the larger sized farms, with very substantial holdings of over 300 hectares, although few in number, showing the fastest increase of any.

The demise of a farm holding can be the result of many factors. In Cumbria, the

most common trend appears to be for speculators to buy a farm that comes on the market, and then sell it off in lots, including the main buildings, realising significant profits (LDSPB 1978).

While the number of farm holdings has been declining, there has been a parallel decrease in the number of people working on farms. Table 3:7. compares the change in the agricultural workforce for England and Wales, and Cumbria. It can be seen from this, that a significant decline in full-time and part-time workers in both Cumbria and England and Wales has taken place. The proportion of regular farm workers in Cumbria is 29 per cent of the total agricultural workforce, as compared to 38 per cent for England and Wales, indicating the emphasis upon the family farm in the county. The increase in seasonal and casual work shows that farmers are preferring to hire labour only during busy periods, or to carry out a major task, while the lower increase in salaried managers in Cumbria than the rest of England and Wales may be indicative of the lack of popularity the area has for institutional interests. Although the number of farmers, partners and directors has increased in Cumbria, the number working full time has decreased by 6 per cent.

3.3:3. Agriculture in the Cumbrian Rural Economy

Throughout Cumbria, agriculture is only a minor employer of labour providing some 6 per cent of total jobs, although the proportion would be higher if directly related work was considered. How important agriculture is as an employer in the rural parts of Cumbria, is difficult to ascertain. In upland areas, Capstick (1972) maintains that only 2.2 per cent of residents are actively engaged in agriculture. However, the Hartsop Valley Report (Rural Planning Services 1976), in their study of the remote valley, found that some 50 per cent of the economically active population there were employed in agriculture. In the Lake District National Park, some 13.8 per cent of those economically active in 1971, were engaged in agriculture, a figure that must have since been significantly reduced. Clearly the importance of agriculture as an employer is variable. Some areas will have experienced a faster decline in agricultural employment than others for a variety of reasons, including land quality, size of holding, acquisitions of land by other

**Table 3:7 Changes in the Agricultural Workforce of Cumbria & England & Wales
1976 1981**

Workers	1976		1981		%Change	
	Cumbria	England & Wales	Cumbria	England & Wales	Cumbria	England & Wales
Regular Whole-time	3,688	177,512	2,956	142,174	-19.8	-19.9
Regular Part- time	1,107	63,658	942	58,425	-14.9	-8.2
Seasonal or Casual	1,123	70,778	1,442	86,863	+28.4	+22.7
Salaried Managers	85	6,489	86	7,036	+1.1	+8.4
Farmers, Partners & Directors	8,022	224,829	7,882	229,995	+1.7	+2.3
Total	14,025	543,266	13,308	524,493	-5.11	-3.5

NB: This table does not include wives of farmers, partners or directors, as this information was not collected before 1977.

SOURCE: MAFF 1976, MAFF 1981d.

farmers when it comes on the market, landlords tenancy policies and other social factors.

Because agriculture's importance in terms of employment, even in rural areas is variable, tending towards slight, a greater emphasis is being placed upon upland agriculture in particular for its conservation value, in preventing the "dereliction" of the countryside through the spread of scrub, and ill-kept walls and outbuildings. Because of this, considerable interest has been shown in forecasting change in agricultural employment in Cumbria. A statistical analysis of agricultural problem areas was undertaken as part of the research work for the Joint Structure Plan by Cumbria County Council and the Lake District Special Planning Board. In attempting to identify the problem areas, a number of factors were noted. These included a fall in the residential population of a parish; the agricultural land grades, with a special emphasis upon Grade 5 land; a predominance of sheep farming; and the size of farms. All were taken as indicative of a level of economic vulnerability (Cumbria County Council 1978a). The areas where severe problems were noted are shown in Map 3:2. As can be seen a significant proportion of the county falls into this category, and most of the National Park.

Upland farming is heavily dependent upon government support, with it being widely recognised that any removal of subsidies and grants would lead to its collapse. Expenditure within the National Park upon agriculture is significant as shown in Table 3:8.

Table 3:8. Agricultural Spending in the Lake District National Park in 1978

Type of assistance		<u>£ thousands</u>
Hill livestock compensatory allowance		1,521.1
FHDS:	Buildings	189.3
	Infrastructure	16.2
	Land Improvements	43.9
	Other	276.3
FCGS:	Buildings	123.1
	Land Improvements	107.6
	Other	36.0
	Infrastructure	20.6
Total		<u>2,334</u>

Source: TRRU 1981.

MacEwen and MacEwen (1982), note how the amount of support a farmer receives is dependent upon the number of animals he keeps, and this they argue discriminates against the smaller farmer. The interests of the smaller farmer have been considered important in Cumbria, with such measures as UMEX 3, (to be dealt with fully later) specifically designed to help them. Even so, some tension does exist between the smaller and larger farmers in the NFU. One Sedbergh farmer accused the local NFU of being dominated by larger farmers, leading to a lack of consideration and an attitude that what is good enough for the large farmers is good enough for the small, although this is not the case reported the Westmorland Gazette (WG September 18th 1981). Clearly it would be simplistic to consider farmers in Cumbria as a united homogenous group.

3.3:4. Agriculture and its Relationship with Conservation in Cumbria

Conservation problems within the National Park tend to hinge on what farmers do not do, rather than what they do. The decline in manpower and the growth in size of individual farms has meant that they are run now more extensively. This has resulted in the dry stone walls becoming dilapidated, weeds and other water-loving plants encroaching on good agricultural land, while the spread of gorse and bracken goes on almost unabated. This problem as is recognised by the LDSPB is economic, and only economic measures can solve it (LDSPB 1978).

However, some intensification, especially on the better land does take place. The major concern here is the reduction in diversity of plant life through the improvement of old hay meadows. Under the Agriculture and Horticulture Capital Grants Scheme, the farmer is now required to present a plan of his proposed work to the LDSPB. If they find any fault on environmental grounds within two months of the plan being submitted, it will be for the Minister of Agriculture to decide whether the grant will be refused. In the first 6 months after the new scheme, the LDSPB reviewed 127 notifications and no formal objections were made, but in a few cases farmers agreed to some amendments to their schemes to protect the landscape and ecological value of their land (LDSPB 1980).

Another area where upland farming does have an adverse affect upon the environment, is in the prevention of the regeneration of woodlands through sheep grazing. This is important because the disappearance of broadleaved woodland is a major worry in the Lake District. There are 11,600 hectares of broadleaved woodland in the Lake District, about 4.6 per cent of the total area. Over the past 30 years, 110 hectares of broadleaved woodland have been turned into conifer plantations; 1,600 hectares were felled during the Second World War and never replanted; and another 390 hectares were lost due to other reasons (LDSPB 1978c). Attempts to stop sheep eating new shoots and saplings, have tended to come in the form of denying them access to the woods and the LDSPB gives grants under the Upland Management Service (discussed later), to farmers to fence them off. However to protect all 11,600 hectares, substantial amounts of time, money and farm co-operation would be needed, which are clearly not available.

A significant conflict between agriculture and conservation comes with the construction of new farm buildings. Yet even in the National Park the planning authorities have no control on the siting of buildings; only the external appearance can be controlled through the Landscape Areas Special Development Order (LASDO). In view of this the LDSPB encourages the MAFF to make provision for screening agricultural buildings, in order to reduce visual problems.

The Board will also allow the construction of housing for farm workers, as long as the need is proved by the MAFF. Added to this, the Board supports the provision of facilities for farm tourism and other ancillary enterprises, and is generally more flexible in granting permission for these than is usually the case. Farmers are also able to make use of legislation which allows any area of more than five acres to be used up to 28 days, in any one year, by three caravans at a time or by any number of tents.

Even so, some degree of resentment against the LDSPB does exist. One area where this is particularly felt is the conversion of disused barns into houses and tourist accommodation. The LDSPB have formulated a comprehensive policy on barn conversions, noting that no conversion will be allowed until the

effect upon the building itself, the landscape, design, access and the nature of the proposal is closely examined. The Board said it would look particularly at whether the development is isolated from other buildings, the effect of car parking, electricity wires and the amount of traffic generated (LDSPB 1978). This policy has left a great many redundant barns, increasingly becoming dilapidated; a severe irritant for those farmers who see the potential for developing them (see Appendix 1).

Agriculture does and has created conservation problems outside the National Park, although these usually concern the greater intensification of agricultural operations through drainage improvements, increased fertiliser application and hedge removal. However, the severity of the problem is as yet uncertain, as no documentation has been made of the changes that have taken place, but the low level of arable farming probably indicates that it is less severe than many other parts of Britain.

3.3:5. Agriculture in Cumbria: Interim Conclusions

Although Cumbria is a predominantly rural county, agricultural employment only accounts for a small percentage of the working population. The farming carried out is primarily based upon livestock, of which a significant proportion lies in what is defined as a Less Favoured Area. Dairying is the predominant agricultural activity, with cattle and sheep for meat production also being very important. As with the rest of Britain there has been a decline in the number of holdings worked, a general increase in size, and a fall in the numbers employed in the industry. Agriculture in the upland area of the county has an important relationship with landscape conservation, although there are pressures to construct new farm buildings and develop disused ones. In the lower parts of the county, this apparently symbiotic relationship is less pronounced.

The predominance of livestock production in Cumbria, means that the agricultural structure of the county while already changing, is vulnerable to further change. The extent to which upland farming is dependent upon government support has been noted. However, the continued oversupply of dairy products in the

EEC as a whole may lead to dramatic policy measures to reduce production. The effect any changes in agriculture will have upon rural communities in Cumbria, is both variable and uncertain, although as a general rule it can be claimed that agriculture is not particularly important to their maintenance.

The National Park Plan (LDSPB 1978), recognises the importance of agriculture in the remoter uplands, especially with regard to landscape conservation. The "untidiness" of the landscape the LDSPB wishes to prevent, hinges upon the deterioration of drystone walls and the spread of scrub, a process that is rapidly taking place all over the county. However, although the spread of scrub concerns the LDSPB, the fact that it often consists of broadleaved trees means that its encouragement should have some ecological value. This will be discussed more fully in Chapter Six.

One result of the decline in agricultural employment amongst other factors, has been rural deprivation, a problem to which many commentators have turned their attention in recent years.

3.4:1. Rural Deprivation in Cumbria

As indicated in Chapter Two, rural deprivation is a difficult concept to define. The lack of a tight and comprehensive definition of the problem, presented Cumbria County Council with difficulty when they attempted to carry out a survey of deprivation in the county, on which to base policies for the structure plan. However, they did manage to isolate factors such as type, occupation and provision of housing, car ownership levels, availability of public transport and the age balance in the community. All parishes within the county were analysed using 1971 Census data, although they were forced to admit that the "rural analysis was less conclusive than had been hoped". (Cumbria County Council 1978b).

They went on to say that although some evidence indicates that deprived conditions do exist on some farms, they are in a minority and that there is no convincing evidence of widespread disadvantage outside the major towns, yet:

"It cannot be denied that opportunity in rural areas is more limited than in urban areas, and the more personally felt problems of loneliness, isolation and lack of facilities cannot be identified in this study".(Cumbria County Council 1978b).

Using different criteria Cumbria County Council's Development Project Group attempted to define areas where rural deprivation was prevalent in order to make an application for Development Commission aid. In 1978, an application was made for such aid, based primarily upon depopulation criteria. Research showed that the most rapid population losses were recorded in the remote settlements of the Lake District, an area to the east of Carlisle, Penrith and Kendal stretching the whole length of Cumbria, an area to the west of Carlisle around Wigton, and two smaller areas in the south west around Millom and Backbarrow. Figures were given showing that in Eden District, 53 out of a total of 73 parishes lost population between 1971 and 1977, with 6 of these recording losses of more than 20 per cent. In the same period Carlisle lost population in 27 out of 37 parishes, South Lakeland 13 out of 29 and Allerdale 37 out of 61. It was also noted that between 1961 and 1971, over 2,000 jobs were lost in agriculture and forestry, and over 3,000 in mining and quarrying. Between 1951 and 1971, male activity rates fell from 87 per cent to 81 per cent, while those for women increased from 35 per cent to 43 per cent (Cumbria County Council 1978c).

For their submission in 1981, the County Council used a set of different criteria for determining where investment should take place, drawing up an index of need. The criteria used were:-

Population change	1961 - 1977
Male economic activity rate	1971
Female economic activity rate	1971
Male unemployment rate	1971
Female unemployment rate	1971
Households without a car	1971
Level of bus services	1973
Male net unemployment	1971
Female net unemployment	1971

The Council admitted that the data it was using was old, but said it had held meetings with various interested groups in Cumbria, who confirmed that the trends identified in 1971 were still applicable in the early 1980's. As a result of this, a map of areas where significant problems exist was produced (Map 3:3). As can be seen, it covers most of rural Cumbria, including the Lake District (Cumbria County Council 1981).

Since the 1981 Census, only a limited amount of information on population movements in Cumbria has been available, and this is reproduced in Table 3:9. This shows that there has been an increase in population. South Lakeland still records the fastest population growth, although its rate is slower than the ten years from 1961. Although little can be said without more data, it can be postulated that some rural communities have stemmed, if not reversed their population loss.

Table 3:9. Population Present on Census Night in Cumbria 1961 - 1981

Districts	1961	1971	%change	1981	%change
Allerdale	95,369	94,945	-0.44	97,121	+2.29
Barrow	75,245	75,269	+0.03	73,189	-2.76
Carlisle	100,745	100,817	-0.10	101,092	+0.24
Copeland	73,519	71,794	-2.35	73,140	+1.87
Eden	42,463	41,945	-1.22	44,191	+5.35
South Lakeland	82,791	91,335	+10.32	98,305	+7.63
Total	470,130	476,133	+1.28	487,038	+2.29

Source: OPCS 1982.

3.4:2. Problems of Accessibility in Rural Cumbria

While depopulation trends in some parts of Cumbria may have been reversed, the problems regarding accessibility in rural Cumbria still loom large. Nearly 40 per cent of households in Cumbria do not own a car and many members of car owning households are dependent upon public transport for access to school, work,



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Source: Cumbria County Council 1978 (c).

Map 3:3. Areas Designated for Development Commission Aid in Cumbria

shops and essential services. Therefore a high reliance is placed upon rural public transport. Stage carriage services are protected by revenue support, which amounted to £1,750,000 in 1981/1982, yet a substantial decline has taken place in the provision of rural bus services, especially in rural areas, where as Map 3:4. shows, some areas have no public transport service at all. However, of the total subsidy to public transport, about half goes on rural routes.

The public transport system has recently worsened to a considerable extent in Cumbria, due to the National Bus Company now operating a full costing formula, as opposed to the previous practice of urban-rural cross-subsidisation. As a result of this, some of the more poorly used rural bus services have been discontinued. In all, some twenty-five villages will be affected by the withdrawal of five services. There is also increased competition from a private bus company which operates alongside the National Bus Company in Whitehaven, which is putting pressure on rural route subsidisation.

The County Council holds that as a basic criterion, if a parish has less than two daily return trips, then it has an inadequate public transport system. 35 per cent of parishes fall into this category, with a total of 50 per cent of parishes having trips to work and shopping services, though 58 per cent have no evening services. In relation to private transport, the County Council carried out a survey in rural parishes and found that 87 per cent of households had at least one car.

If these figures are related to the figure of 40 per cent of total Cumbrian households not owning a car, it becomes apparent that rural Cumbrians, in terms of car ownership, are substantially better off than their urban counterparts. However, 42 per cent of rural Cumbrians claimed that they required a car for their own use sometime during the day, indicating a degree of deprivation (Cumbria County Council 1978e).

The greatest users of rural public transport are the 40-59 age group, and old age pensioners. Cumbria County Council (1976), found that although public transport accounts for only 6 per cent of trips made, it does provide a vital service for non car-owning households. These households not surprisingly tend to make



Illustration removed for copyright restrictions

Source: Cumbria County Council 1976

Map 3:4. Public Transport Provision in Cumbria

only half the number of total trips made by car-owning ones, and take greater advantage of lifts in private cars.

The decline in public transport in Cumbria has resulted in increasing physical and social isolation for many people. In order to counter this problem, a number of less conventional forms of transport services operate in Cumbria. There are three post-bus schemes; a community run bus; a voluntary social car scheme; and a shared hire-car service; of these the voluntary social car scheme is the most popular, with 39 such schemes now in operation, all working effectively. Indeed, one member of a voluntary service organisation said that he was often delighted when a bus service was closed down, as it gave the much more effective voluntary social car scheme a better chance of starting well (Private Communication 1981a).

At present, the general pattern of operation of the social car scheme is that the County Council pays the driver a mileage allowance; but in the future with the Transport Act 1980, the passenger will be able to pay his own fare to meet the cost. This system will soon be in operation in Cumbria. The total cost of the scheme in Cumbria from March 1981 to March 1982 was £2,267. 1,721 trips were undertaken mostly for medical treatment, covering some 14,335 miles (Cumbria County Council 1982). This clearly represents a flexible and efficient system being offered to those most in need.

3.4:3. Problems of Educational Provision in Rural Cumbria

Educational establishments can provide not only learning facilities, but are often centres for community interaction, and stimuli for economic growth. In terms of higher education, Cumbria as a county can be considered as being "deprived", due to the fact that it does not have a university or polytechnic, although it does have an agricultural college. The absence of such an institution is keenly felt because of the existence of heavy and technologically orientated industry on the west coast. However, the greatest concern in Cumbria comes as a result of the decline in rural primary schools.

Primary school numbers have been falling in Britain due to rural

depopulation, a growth in the number of elderly, a fall in the birth rate and an increase in educational standards. The Plowden Report (1967), set the minimum basic educational unit for children in the 5 to 11 years age range as 55 pupils and 3 staff. 27 per cent of Cumbria primary schools fall below this standard, with 54 per cent of Eden District's schools and 50 per cent of Carlisle's falling outside. Although some disruption may be caused to local communities through the reorganisation of schools, the planning document "Choices for Cumbria" (Cumbria County Council 1976), notes that many advantages can be gained from reorganisation such as better facilities for children, and lower overall costs. Although this same document notes that the effect school closures have on community life is impossible to quantify, a loss may occur of a building suitable for community use, while the development of nursery and community education will be severely hampered. Local voluntary play-groups tend to be linked to small schools so a loss of that school will create difficulties. As well as this school closures mean added transport costs.

In relation to rural schools, in October 1978 the County Council issued a policy repeated in the structure plan saying:

- (i) The closure of rural schools should only be an option in the case of schools with one teacher.
- (ii) Rural schools are to be considered as an important community resource ready if possible to be adapted for community use. (Cumbria County Council 1980).

Added to this the Joint Structure Plan said:-

"The County Council will retain rural primary schools, wherever feasible on educational and economic grounds, in recognition of the need to maintain some small schools or groups of schools in isolated communities". (Cumbria County Council 1980).

The National Park Plan said:

"The Planning Board will discuss with the education authority, the needs and means of retaining village schools wherever possible, in areas where policies to encourage local housing and employment opportunities are being pursued. In particular areas showing declining population, schools will be looked at carefully" (LDSPB 1978)

The closure of rural primary schools has been a continuous process in Cumbria, with 25 being closed between 1955 and 1967; 40 between 1967 and 1974; and 15 between 1974 and 1979; a total of 80 over 24 years (JURE 1981). Yet more recent closures have been met with sustained criticism. In 1976, after an unsuccessful campaign to retain a village school near Shap, the Cumbrian Association for Rural Education (CARE), was formed and produced a report entitled, "The Case for the Small Rural School" (CARE 1978). This indicated that educational standards in Cumbria's rural schools are high, that the population of rural areas is increasing, and that their benefit to the rural community cannot be measured in purely financial terms.

However, the cost of keeping open rural schools in Cumbria is high. In July 1980, the Council issued figures showing that empty school classrooms were costing the county around £500,000 a year, there being 5,000 empty places each costing £100 a year to maintain. A County Council official estimated that retaining schools at the 1980 level, would mean 12,000 wasted places in ten years, a cost of £1,200,000 per annum.

Recently, a number of cases of fierce resistance to school closures have been reported. For example in 1980, the parents of two small schools Winton and Musgrave, protested at plans to close their schools, and for their children to be transferred to Kirkby Stephen, although parents at another school, Crosby Garrett, agreed to the transfer. The parents from the two schools brandished banners and petitions at the meeting of the County Council where the closure was to be discussed, and they managed to get the council to defer the decision. Yet their protests produced no results as the schools were closed by the middle of summer 1980 (WG 16th and 23rd May 1980).

In 1980 the Council made cutbacks of £2,500,000 in the education budget, and as a response to this parents started buying their own books. One primary school near Kendal bought a whole new library. While at a secondary school near Windermere, the headmaster asked local industry and parents to help purchase books and equipment. (WG May 15th 1981). Once again financial restrictions

appear to be creating a need for self help, a need being responded to, and also a seemingly greater community awareness.

3.4:4. Housing Problems in Rural Cumbria

As indicated in Chapter Two, there are severe problems in many rural areas with regard to housing supply for local people. This stems from a number of causes including tight planning restrictions, low local incomes, pressures on the market from outsiders and high building costs. In the Lake District National Park, the housing problem has reached considerable proportions, with much local concern being expressed.

The LDSPB have levelled the blame for the poor housing situation upon second homes. As the 26th National Park Report stated:

"Second homes and demand for holiday accommodation were pushing house prices beyond the reach of locally employed people ... overall there was a decline in the quality of village life, and the decrease in population led in turn to decreased services and facilities, schools were closing, bus services curtailed, shops changing to the the tourist trade, and community spirit flagging". (LDSPB 1978a).

The attitude of the Board was re-emphasised in the National Park Plan:

"The Planning Board sees no justification for continuing the policy of increasing the housing stock when the use of the houses so provided does not benefit the local community". (LDSPB 1978).

In order to both restrict housebuilding and ensure a housing stock for local people, the LDSPB introduced in 1977 a system under Section 52 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1971, by which occupation of houses newly built in the Lake District would be restricted to local people only. Before granting permission for a new dwelling, the applicant has to sign an agreement which ensures that the occupant, or any other future occupant is employed or about to be employed locally, or retired from local employment.

Although the policy appears to resolve the conflicts between a stringent conservation policy, the need to consider the interests of local people, and the high demand for housing from outside the National Park, the amount of controversy

aroused by this has hardly been matched by any other single issue. By far the most comprehensive consideration of the application of Section 52 agreements has been made by Shucksmith (1981). Shucksmith begins his discussion by noting the tenure pattern within the National Park; as Table 3:10 shows, there is significantly less local authority housing in the Park, and more privately rented, than the rest of rural Britain.

Table 3:10. Tenure of Households 1971

	Lake District %	English Rural Districts %	Great Britain %
Owner occupied	51.3	54.5	48.3
Rented from L.A.	15.8	23.0	30.4
Privately rented unfurnished	29.4	21.0	16.7
Privately rented furnished	3.5	3.3	4.5

Source: Shucksmith 1981.

Shucksmith then introduces figures regarding the sale of houses, for example he claims local people bought 48 per cent of houses, people retiring bought 24 per cent, second home owners 18 per cent, and holiday home owners 10 per cent. While houses being sold were 60 per cent formerly in local occupation; formerly second homes, and retirement homes 20 per cent; and newly built houses 20 per cent. This represents a significant demand from outsiders for Lake District housing. In examining the question of need, Shucksmith points out that need is often greater than shown in housing waiting lists, indeed that is significant enough with a waiting list total of 1,219 in 1980. Of these 44 per cent were old age pensioners.

However, Shucksmith finds it difficult to isolate any single major factor limiting the supply of homes, as he sums up succinctly:

"There is no doubt that the combined effect of the demand for commuter homes the demand for homes for retirement, the demand for second homes and the demand for holiday cottages has been to raise the price of housing, and when this "heavy urban demand" is accompanied by a declining private rented sector, a poor record of provision by local authority housing departments and a planning policy of restrictive development control, then the consequence is to severely diminish the opportunities for local residents to find accommodation".

He goes on to make the point that poor employment prospects are also an important element of depopulation. Even so, Shucksmith argues that Section 52 agreements will lead to a contraction in housebuilding, because developers will not build, if long standing conditions which may prevent or deter prospective buyers, are included in the planning permission leading to an increase in house prices generally.

The main discussion on this problem took place during the examination in public of the Joint Structure Plan. In it the Board said it would:

"Seek means by which all further housing development can be retained for occupation by local people as full-time residences, except in the case of improvement of existing dwellings or where site factors dictate that a particular development will be provided well beyond the reach of the local needs which the Board is seeking to meet". (DOE 1980a).

In the examination, the Board claimed that between 1952 and 1976, 5,000 new houses were constructed in the National Park, although the population decreased. Thus as speculative house building was bringing no benefit to the Park control was necessary. Shucksmith's analysis which noted that house prices had started to increase already was criticised. The Board claimed that a general boom had taken place in house prices at the time of control of occupancy, and that new houses without conditions attached were coming on the market. They also claimed that they only wished to see 79 new residences built in a year, and that room exists for only 1,000 more. The Panel at the public examination also felt that the case against Section 52 agreements was not strong enough to merit its deletion (DOE 1980b).

Although the policy has appeared to have been under threat from the Department of the Environment since the Conservatives took office in May 1979, it has not as yet been altered or removed. All that can be said however, is that a significant amount of support for the policy does exist in Cumbria, and without it there is the threat of no house building at all.

3.4:5. Rural Deprivation: Interim Conclusions

While the problem of rural deprivation is difficult to define, Cumbria County Council seemed to find even greater problems in actually producing firm data on its extent within the county. Even so, there is undoubtedly some "deprivation" within Cumbria, although attempting to quantify it is virtually impossible. One of the main features of rural deprivation is depopulation, this is because when people in rural areas become unemployed they tend to leave the area. However, people may leave for other reasons and not feel deprived in so doing, while a steady outflow of people may be disguised by an as great or even greater inflow of others. Clearly mapping the pattern of rural depopulation is a very difficult task. The figures produced for Cumbria in Table 3:1 show at the very basic level that the problem of depopulation in rural Cumbria may well have been reversed, as in much of rural Britain. If a lot of people are migrating to an area and counteracting a steady outflow, it does indicate that many find it both economically feasible and attractive to live in rural Cumbria.

Mobility is a major problem in rural areas, and has been for a considerable period of time. It appears that this problem has been largely met in Cumbria by higher car ownership. This however does not mean that everyone in rural Cumbria is adequately mobile, and hence there is a continued subsidised bus service on many routes. Yet the cost of subsidising these routes is high, and there is continual pressure to reduce them even further. A number of less conventional transport schemes have been introduced into the county. Of these the voluntary car sharing scheme has undoubtedly been the most successful, representing an efficient and cheap alternative to bus transport, and one where there is obviously greater scope for expansion.

The number of rural primary schools in Cumbria has been falling for many years. Keeping school places open is obviously costly, and with falling numbers the cost will increase. The increased population of some areas may save some schools, though economic logic appears to indicate further closures.

With regard to housing shortages, Shucksmith (1981) notes that there are

many causes. In the National Park, one prime reason for the situation is restrictive planning. It might be easy as Shucksmith recommends, to relax controls, and have a more flexible approach to granting planning permissions, but this does create a serious conflict between the national purpose of the Park and local interests, one not easily resolved. If, as the LDSPB believe the situation results from competition from outsiders, then the problem must lie in the weakness of the local economy. Therefore, perhaps a strengthening of it will provide the solution to rural deprivation.

3.5:1. Employment Problems in Cumbria

Structural unemployment has long been a problem in Cumbria. The industrial structure of the west coast has long been based upon steel manufacture, shipbuilding and mining, all of which have been shedding labour in the area since the 1920's. As Marshall and Walton (1981) point out, the main reasons for the decline of industry on the west coast, was the increasing exhaustion of local reserves of coal and iron ore and the development of improved methods of steelmaking elsewhere. In the early 1930's, Cumbria was designated as a Special Area for economic aid, and a number of industrial estates were established. During the Second World War there was a resurgence of economic activity with the planting of strategically important industries and government service establishments. After the war the special employment problems of the area were recognised, by designating the west coast a Special Development Area, and the rest of Cumbria a Development Area.

3.5:2. Present Day Encouragement to Industry in Cumbria

Encouragement to industry in Cumbria tends to fall into two separate parts, advice, and financial incentives. On the advice front Cumbria County Council has an Industrial Promotion Section, manned by a team of specialist officers who provide information on sites and sources of finance. Planning advice on the suitability of various sites can be obtained from the planning departments of the

County Council and the two National Parks. Advice is also provided by CoSIRA, based in Penrith, to firms employing under 20 people in rural areas throughout Cumbria, and for the whole of Cumbria by the Department of Industry's Small Firms Service. The Employment Services Division of the Manpower Services Commission, is able to assist employers in recruiting staff from other areas.

On the finance side, Regional Development Grants are given by the Department of Industry, in areas designated as needing special support. At the time of the General Election of 1979, west Cumbria was classified as a Special Development Area, and the rest of Cumbria a Development Area. However, in August 1982 following the Government's policy of concentrating regional assistance in areas of most need, west Cumbria was classified as a Development Area, while the rest of Cumbria was not designated at all.

In west Cumbria companies starting up can claim 15 per cent of the cost of new plant, machinery, buildings and works from the government, while £5,000 grants are available to service industry for each job created. Added to this selective loans are available for specific projects, which are viable, create employment, strengthen the national economy, and need money if the project is to go ahead. Government built factories are also available at a less than market rent. Grants towards the cost of land and for new buildings are available from the County Council throughout Cumbria. Loans and advice can be obtained from CoSIRA, and for small co-operatives from Industrial Common Ownership Finance Limited. Finance can also be obtained from the European Investment Bank, the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund, and the European Social Fund. Factories are also available from the Development Commission.

Although there has been a significant incentive for firms to invest in Cumbria, it is not altogether clear that a strong regional policy has greatly helped. As "Choices for Cumbria" states:

"... In spite of a good measure of success in providing new employment, the closure of the service establishments and the continued rundown of employment in traditional industries, coal and steel, have prevented any return to the rapid economic expansion and radical changes in the settlement pattern characteristic of the 19th century".(Cumbria County Council 1976).

Indeed the high preponderance of chemical and textile industries in the list of attracted industries, may only have further undermined the areas economic soundness, as these industries are in a state of sustained national decline. While according to Cumbria County Council, migrant firms are no less unstable than the indigenous ones, with 19 per cent of those that have moved to the area since 1945, closing down (Cumbria County Council 1978d). As an added encouragement for industrial development in Cumbria an Enterprise Zone, that is an area of land where planning regulations are relaxed, and where there are certain rate relief incentives, was announced for Workington in 1982.

Cumbria's industrial policy is clearly geared to the urban west coast, with Barrow, Workington, Millom, Carlisle and Whitehaven receiving 97 per cent of the employment created by migrant firms in the county. However, although emphasis is given towards urban areas, considerable concern exists for the plight of rural Cumbria in terms of the various forms of rural deprivation that exist in the county, as earlier described. In a bid to alleviate the deprivation problem, Cumbria County Council have been working closely with the Development Commission to provide employment opportunities, through the advance provision of factories. In Cumbria as a whole, some 17,190 square metres of workshops exist, with another 6,500 square metres planned. In addition the council has initiated a small business grant scheme which operates in the East Fellside Project Area (to be discussed later). Although 17,190 square metres have been constructed, only 3,060 square metres have been let (1982). This consists of 7 units, which employ an approximate total of 150 people, although 60 per cent of these are employed in just two factories in Kirkby Stephen. In total there are 14 unlet factories. Cumbria County Council (1978c) admits that there:

"...Have been considerable problems in letting units in rural areas".

This they say is due to there being too little demand in some areas, rents being too high and workshops being too large.

Because of this an increased emphasis has been given to smaller workshops and more novel forms of attraction. One example of this, is that the Development

Commission has promised to give Eden District Council help with rural housing, by providing accommodation alongside craft workshops. As the chairman of the Development Commission, Mr Nigel Vinson said:

"Not only does this enable the small self-contained one-man business to start up and operate from home, but it will also bring back the craftsmen who have been driven away from the rural areas. Initially a pair of buildings will be provided in three different locations".

(Cumbria Weekly Digest 1981).

While Cumbria County Council strongly supports rural job creation, the LDSPB is less enthusiastic about promoting rural industries. The National Park Plan (LDSPB 1978), says that it does not want to see a large scale expansion of forestry, mining or quarrying in the Park, nevertheless, some scope is seen for the development of small workshops in the area. The Board says that it hopes:

"That the initiative to set up small scale industries will come from enterprising individuals. The best sites for industrial purposes are likely to be within established settlements but there may be cases where redundant farm buildings may be acceptable for conversion providing other planning considerations such as amenity and access are acceptable". (LDSPB 1978).

Although the LDSPB is generally orientated toward conservation, a feeling is held by many people that the Board is discriminating against industry. The Park authorities themselves refute this. For example in 1979 they claimed that although 42 industrial planning applications were received from firms, only 4 were refused. Those allowed, included two extensions for local quarries and provision for eight pottery businesses. But the Board did admit that they only wished to see industrial development of a "suitable type" (LDSPB 1979). Indeed, although the Board does accept about 40 industrial applications a year, they tend to be small businesses with a limited impact both upon the environment and local employment. In the Joint Structure Plan, a total of only 9 acres were identified as suitable for industrial development. The Board is obviously not in favour of significant rural development.

3.5:3. Local Resistance to Industrial Development

One very major problem those hoping to develop industry in rural Cumbria face, is the adverse reaction of many members of local communities to the whole concept. As the Chief Executive officer for Eden District Council said:

"The inhabitants of some villages are frankly opposed to any intrusion even of light industry". (WG March 27th 1981).

One example of this occurred outside the National Park in the south Cumbria village of Milnthorpe, where Cumbria County Council were encouraging the building of some light industrial units. A set-back occurred as the villagers at their Parish Council meeting, made it quite clear that they did not want them. As one local County Councillor said:

"In view of the local concern it would be wrong to ride rough-shod over the local people here". (WG July 11th 1980).

Another said:

"Some of us have been striving for years to get small factories of this sort in villages and small towns. Parish Councils and such like people conjure up visions of Workington steel works, or the Pirelli factory at Carlisle being plonked down in the middle of the village next to the school. These factories are no more than small workshops". (WG July 11th 1980).

On May 8th 1980, the Westmorland Gazette published an editorial saying that although rural industries are necessary:

"The enterprises will have to be closely linked with the character and tradition of the countryside, if they are not to be an intrusion onto the rural scene". (WG May 8th 1980).

In Troutbeck, Windermere, in the National Park, a whole village expressed outrage at the plan to convert a disused farm into a workshop. A petition was granted and out of 126 people, only two refused to sign it. The main complaints were that the conversion would introduce an alien commercial enterprise into the village. Added to that it was thought that the proposal would detract from the character and appearance of the village and create traffic congestion. In the end the LDSPB turned down the application.

The scene of one of the greatest controversies over industry in the National Park, was the small village of Lindale on the A590. The LDSPB gave planning permission for a road haulage firm to start in Lindale. The residents were worried

that the application brought industry near to a residential site. One villager wrote to the Westmorland Gazette saying:

"In this village we have the continuous development of a car sales business far beyond village scale, a new huge prominently sited corrugated transport warehouse and the latest inspired decision of yet another haulage warehouse". (WG 16th January 1981).

The Vice-Chairman of the Parish Council said:

"There is a particularly strong feeling that Lindale is rapidly becoming an industrial estate. The village already has 6 haulage depots and three large car distribution centres. This sort of commercial development and activity is without parallel in the National Park". (WG 23rd January 1981).

Obviously the villagers of Lindale had the bit between their teeth, as they later persuaded the LDSPB to close down a local scrap-dealer.

In an effort to overcome this problem, the County and District Councils have asked parish councils to come forward with their own suggestions for sites in "Village Appraisals". However, as a County Council planner pointed out:

"Everyone is happy with the idea of small workshops until they have one next to them". (Private Communication 1981b).

Yet, one would be under a misapprehension to imagine that once having found a site, and filled it with a viable firm, one's problems are immediately solved. Kirkby Stephen in east Cumbria has two factories employing 90 people; to examine the effects of this upon the local community an "Impact Study" was carried out. This found that the factories had helped cause a general shortage of housing in the area, a situation so bad that it was recommended that no further factory units should be considered. The study also found that the factories have had no effect on the depopulation of surrounding villages, and the firms had few economic links with the rest of Cumbria (Cumbria County Council 1980 b).

3.5:4. Integrated Development Schemes in Cumbria

Cumbria County Council and the LDSPB, have been keen to formulate development schemes which involve the interaction of major governmental departments and agencies with an interest in rural affairs, and have been very successful in engendering the required support. Two major schemes have been set in motion in Cumbria, these being the Upland Management Experiment Stage 3 (UMEX 3) and the East Fellside and Alston Moor Project.

3.5:5. The Upland Management Experiment Stage 3 (UMEX 3)

UMEX 3, grew out of the UMEX Stages 1 and 2, which are discussed more fully under the tourism section. In 1975, Rural Planning Services Ltd., were asked to undertake a limited study of the Hartsop Valley, with terms of reference:

"... To draw up conclusions, which would help the National Park authority to select a policy at a local level, which might better meet the objectives of the National Park, than the present combination of planning controls and the existing Upland Management Experiment work".

On publication of their findings in "A Study of the Hartsop Valley", Rural Planning Services (1976) concluded, that only solutions that embraced the whole upland economy would be able to secure the conservation of the landscape and improve the provision for employment in it. The LDSPB, the Countryside Commission and the MAFF entered into discussions on how this objective could be achieved; as a result of this UMEX 3 was launched in October 1977, with the remit:-

- a) To conserve and enhance the farmed landscape through agreed schemes of agricultural improvement and conservation.
- b) To improve public access to the countryside and the public enjoyment and understanding of it, by emphasising the interpretive role of farming, and further involving the farming community in the provision of facilities for public enjoyment.
- c) To stabilise and strengthen the local agricultural economy by:-

(i) Making better use of agricultural resources.

(ii) Making better use of non-agricultural resources.

(iii) Finding a more complete and technical back-up to the skill, imagination and hard work of the farmer, farm workers and their families. (LDSPB 1978b).

The experiment included 25 farmers who had been accepted for an FHDS grant, and who wished to develop non-agricultural facilities on their farms. Advice was first to come from ADAS, and as the project developed other bodies such as the Cumbria Tourist Board, CoSIRA, the Forestry Commission and the Countryside Commission were to become involved. A steering committee was set up with members from the NFU, CLA, NUAAW and LDSPB, and the Countryside Commission. In essence, nearly all spheres of interest in rural affairs were brought into the experiment.

With such widespread governmental involvement, with farmers showing an active interest in developing ancillary enterprises on their farms, and with high tourist attraction potential, the experiment looked as if it would be an instant success. However, UMEX 3 has been an unqualified failure, although very few like to admit it. From 25 farmers who submitted a development plan, not one has gone ahead with it.

MacEwen (1982), argues that the reason for this failure lies in a number of quarters. First he says, because MAFF only wanted to include farms that had already had a development plan under the FHDS, many smaller farmers needing the money most, were excluded. Second the scheme offered no access to capital for the farmer. Third, there was too strict planning control. These factors were understandably important, although others such as the lack of will and adequate training on the part of local ADAS officers, high interest rates, and concern over the profitability of tourism and small industries added to the problem. Farmers, already economically vulnerable are clearly not prepared to further undermine their position.

3.5:6. The East Fellside and Alston Moor Project

While UMEX 3 has been a major initiative in attempting to improve Cumbria's rural economy, it is not the only one. Outside the National Park, in the Eden District, the East Fellside and Alston Moor Project was launched in August 1980. The Project came basically from the initiative of the Cumbria Branch of the NFU. The Eden District Council gave it support, and finance was obtained from the Development Commission, the English Tourist Board, and the Countryside Commission. While non-financial help came from the Forestry Commission, the MAFF, Cumbria County Council and the Cumbria Tourist Board. Again, a broad based integrated scheme. The aims of the Project are:-

1. To confront the social and economic problems of this beautiful part of Cumbria.
2. To encourage community initiatives and new job opportunities.
3. To provide the means for people to earn a satisfactory living.
4. To encourage new farm enterprises which will provide continued employment for farm families.
5. To maintain a high quality of life and a well kept environment.

The project area contains 230,000 acres in 32 parishes, for whom the major problem has been rural depopulation.

In 1950 there were 35,000 people living in the area, now (1981) there are 11,000, while many parishes lost 30 per cent of their population in the period 1961-1977. As in many rural areas this was the result of a significant reduction in agricultural employment. From 1971 to 1976 there was a drop of 25 per cent in the numbers working in agriculture.

The Project is based on a local Project Officer, who feels that it is his job to act as a kind of catalyst, promoting, encouraging and advising people on new businesses with his own enthusiasm helping to create some limited successes. One of the most important of these is the creation of Eden Valley and Alston Moor Holidays. This is a newly formed group of independent owners of holiday accommodation, who can provide the holiday maker with a choice of farmhouse,

self catering, bed and breakfast, and caravan accommodation. The vacancy advisory service is open to holiday makers at peak times, and a free booklet is provided for potential customers. As the group was only formed in March 1982, it is too early yet to judge its success. In all 35 owners have subscribed to the scheme. As part of the general encouragement of tourism in the area, the Project Officer organised and drove the "Fellrunner", a community bus to show tourists the beauty and history of the area. Added to this, over 100 guided walks are planned to fulfil a similar purpose.

Farmers have also been encouraged to plant trees on their land, with a leaflet being published on the various grants available for planting woodland and shelter belts, while a demonstration of forestry and fencing took place at Newton Rigg College of Agriculture and Forestry. However, the uptake on the offer of advice has been very limited. Another disappointment has been the scheme to encourage farmers to come forward with redundant barns for conversion into small business premises; the response to this has been very small.

The goals set for the Project and the limited financial and manpower resources available to it i.e. a Project Officer and one secretary, tends to confirm the element of unreality that exists in relation to the rural problem. While the Project Officer has certainly set many good ideas in motion, little or no proof yet exists of their success, or any recognition of the fact that even if successful, the advances made will be limited. This project has received much national publicity and is treated as being a major step forward in employment creation in rural areas. However, apart from a small scale farmhouse tourism marketing scheme, it has as yet achieved no tangible success or shows any sign of so doing.

3.6:1. Tourism in Cumbria

Chapter Two has indicated how a number of commentators have felt that tourism can be a beneficial job creating industry in rural areas. Cumbria has been a major tourist centre for many years, with Walton and McGloin (1982) pointing out that as long ago as the mid-nineteenth century tourism helped to stem the decline and stagnation of many Lake District towns, and to some extent halted the general

migration out of the area altogether.

Tourism today is of great importance to the Cumbrian economy. For example, Archer (1979) has estimated that it maintained over 540 jobs in Kendal of which over half were full time, while people in the town benefited in revenue terms between £150 and £180 per person, and between £36 and £42 in income. In Carlisle 900 jobs were created, representing an income per person of between £24 and £30. In the whole of Cumbria in 1978, visitor expenditure was £70 to £80 million, representing an income of £38 million to the resident population.

Tourism in Cumbria enjoyed a growth period right up to the 1973 oil crisis, however, since then, as shown in Table 3.11 it has not been able to reach its former level.

Table 3:11. Tourism in Cumbria. Numbers of Trips and Nights (Millions)

Year	Trips	Nights
1973	4	15
1974	3	12
1975	3	13
1976	3	12
1977	3	12
1978	2	10
1979	2	12
1980	3	13

Source: Cumbria Tourist Board 1978; 1981.

Added to this, there were changing trends in the type of accommodation used, as seen in Table 3:12.

Table 3:12. Type of Accommodation used by Holidaymakers in Cumbria (%)

Type of Accommodation	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980
Serviced	39	36	34	40	37	33	27
Self service	37	37	37	30	38	41	48
With friends	20	24	28	20	24	22	25
Others	4	5	2	10	3	4	1

Source: Cumbria Tourist Board 1978; 1981.

As average bed occupancy remained fairly static at around 54 per cent, it is quite clear that there has been a decrease in the provision of bed space. This coupled with the increase in self catering in an already static market has meant less local employment, both direct and indirect, though no figures are available on this.

Although there is a general stagnation within the industry, and a decline in job opportunities, a considerable amount of money is spent on developing tourism in the area. For example, in 1980 Tourist Board assistance in Cumbria came to £4 million on grants for 98 new enterprises and created 150 new jobs. This works out at £27,000 per job and £41,000 per enterprise.

Tables 3:13, 3:14, 3:15, show the amount and type of assistance given by the Cumbria Tourist Board to a variety of schemes.

**Table 3:13. Cumbria Tourist Board Assistance April 1981 to April 1982:
Projects under £20,000**

Product Profile	No of enquiries	No of projects assisted	Amount of grant offered £
Serviced accommodation	56	10	46,550
Self catering	22	7	40,900
Camping and caravans	3	-	-
Activity holidays	4	2	9,500
Entertainment facilities	5	-	-
Visitor attractions	9	3	14,000
Sporting facilities	6	-	-
Miscellaneous	15	1	2,500
Total	120	23	113,450

Source: Cumbria Tourist Board 1982.

**Table 3:14. Cumbria Tourist Board Assistance April 1981 to April 1982:
Projects Between £20,000-£250,000**

Product Profile	No of enquiries	No of projects assisted	Amount of grant offered £
Serviced accommodation	84	23	167,550
Self-catering	74	24	165,300
Camping & caravanning	12	9	48,000
Activity holidays	22	2	29,000
Entertainment facilities	11	2	27,000
Visitor attractions	19	5	121,750
Sporting facilities	9	-	-
Miscellaneous	8	-	-
Total	239	65	558,600

Source: Cumbria Tourist Board 1982.

**Table 3:15. Cumbria Tourist Board Assistance April 1981 to April 1982
Projects Over £250,000**

Product Profile	No of enquiries	No of projects assisted	Amount of grant offered £
Serviced accommodation	6	2	175,000
Self-catering	12	-	-
Camping & caravanning	-	-	-
Activity Holidays	-	-	-
Entertainment facilities	1	1	50,000
Visitor attractions	-	-	-
Sporting facilities	-	-	-
Miscellaneous	-	-	-
Total	19	3	225,000

Source: Cumbria Tourist Board 1982.

The tables show that for serviced accommodation the Cumbria Tourist Board spent £206,200 on grants while for self catering, including camping and caravans a total of £254,200 was spent. This makes it clear that a considerable emphasis is placed upon low employment self-catering. More interesting however, is the fact that more money is being spent on the larger projects, with only £113,450 being spent on projects under £20,000, and some £783,600 being spent on those over £20,000. This can be taken to indicate a number of factors. First it could be argued that those people who generate the smaller schemes are unaware of the grants available to them; this however is unlikely as the Cumbria Tourist Board advertises its services well and regularly. Second, that preferential treatment is given to larger schemes, this may indeed be the case, as in employment terms they may have greater potential, a more professional attitude on the part of the entrepreneur may encourage grant aid, and the scheme may be assured of more financial success. Third, all indications are that to establish a tourist enterprise is very expensive. For example, in a personal communication Cumbria Tourist Board provided figures showing that even at a conservative estimate to convert and equip a disused farm building into a self catering unit, will cost between £30,000 to £40,000. At a 12 per cent rate of repayment this means at £40,000 an annual cost of £4,800. If it is assumed that there is a season of 20 weeks, at an average charge of £100 a week, only £2,000 will be earned, not even half of the interest repayment.

However, even when tourism is successful it does not necessarily produce a great amount of economic benefit. Riley (1973) in his study of Cumbrian tourism concluded that:

"Tourism in Cumbria does not have the characteristics which are desirable in a basic industry".

He showed that women outnumber men in the industry on a ratio of 2:1; that there is little opportunity for employment in skilled catering grades, because of the predominantly small size of residential and catering establishments; the work force appears to be highly mobile, and not members of the settled population; there

is low pay and inconvenient shift work; and that 50 per cent of jobs for men and 66 per cent of jobs for women in hotels and other residential establishments are for the summer season only. Clearly Cumbrian tourism, although highly developed exhibits many of the disadvantages, indicated by Chapter Two, elsewhere in Britain.

3.6:2. Environmental Problems Created by Tourism in Cumbria

Although tourism can be beneficial to the rural economy, it may bring serious environmental problems in its wake. This is especially so where the scale of the individual enterprise is large. Hodge and Whitby (1981), note that the larger enterprises can bring significant economic benefits to the community. However, they are often visually unattractive, take up a considerable amount of land, and concentrate tourist activity in one place with the associated problems of congestion. Within the Lake District National Park there is considerable pressure to develop the larger enterprise. For example, in 1981 a plan was put forward to build 80 self catering chalets, a swimming pool, squash courts, tennis courts and a new hotel in Langdale. Although the scheme was turned down, a great deal of local hostility was aroused. As a letter in the Westmorland Gazette said:

"... The developers who have purchased the estate are prepared to sink a vast amount of money into it. Obviously for viable reasons it will have to be constructed and used to full capacity. Surely we see enough of this in Bowness and Windermere".

(WG October 16th 1981).

Another writer claimed it was:

"... An instance of planned legalised vandalism".

(WG October 16th 1981).

A further typical scheme involved the sending in of three applications, asking for permission for 100 touring caravans, or 160 chalets or 300 tent sites in the central Lakes. All three applications were turned down by the LDSPB, although a substantial but smaller time-sharing scheme was later permitted in Langdale.

The usual refusal by the LDSPB to grant planning permission for larger

schemes, means that there have been pressures on areas outside the Park for development. For example in December 1980, plans were revealed for an international holiday centre costing £19 million near Penrith, with 300 holiday chalets accommodating 1,000 people, with a restaurant, swimming pool, laundry facilities, grocery shops and a pony trekking centre. As the Friends of the Lake District said:

"It is now clear that areas of high landscape value outside the National Park are becoming targets for holiday development sites". (Friends of the Lake District 1980).

However, this scheme was refused.

An owner of an agricultural estate near Levens, south east Cumbria, with a large house situated in an AONB, claimed he needed planning permission for 188 chalets in order to maintain the house. This raised the wrath of local inhabitants who immediately formed an action group. As the local action group leader said:

"How can we tuck away 188 bungalows with accomodation for 500 to 700 holiday makers in a small AONB".
(WG 25th September 1981).

This application was turned down also.

While the actual provision of tourist enterprises can create severe environmental problems, pressure from the tourists themselves can be very harmful. As will be noted later the Upland Management Experiment came about largely as a result of tourist pressure on farmland. However, popular attractions such as Beatrix Potter's "Hill Top Cottage", visited annually by 90,000 people, has created severe traffic problems in its vicinity, and the sheer weight of numbers has affected the building's structure. Similar problems have occurred at Wordsworth's house at Grasmere.

Tourist pressure on the lakes themselves has created significant problems. Sporting activities on the lakes can profoundly alter their character. In order to control sporting activities on three of the lakes, the LDSPB submitted to the Department of the Environment, plans to place 10 miles per hour speed restrictions for boats on Derwentwater and Ullswater. On Ullswater the restrictions would not apply for 5 years. On Windermere, plans were drawn up to register all power driven vessels over one brake horse power or 80 cc capacity. So many complaints

about this were received, that in the summer of 1976, the Home Office initiated a public inquiry. The main objectors were the British Water-Ski Federation, the Northern Sports Council, Ullswater Ski Club, the Water Space Amenity Commission and Derwentwater Ski Club. The argument concentrated mainly on Ullswater where motorboating is most widespread.

The Inspector gave his report in January 1978, and proceeded it by naming the six principles that guided his decision.

1. The national interest in the Lake District National Park must be recognised and given effect to.
2. When the twin purposes of the Lake District National Park conflict, the main emphasis must be on attempting to reconcile the conflict.
3. When conflict between the two purposes are irreconcilable, priority must be given to the conservation of natural beauty.
4. Noisy pursuits except in some locations and in some degree, or pending transfer elsewhere, are usually out of place in a National Park, and subject to limited exceptions, provision should not be made for them.
5. The problem of fast power boating on the three lakes must be looked at in the context of the Lake District National Park as a whole.
6. The object of the proposed bylaws, is to impose speed limits on vessels exercising a public right to navigate on the three lakes.

The Inspector decided that the Boards plans should be confirmed, hinging his decision on the fourth principle he said:

"The mere presence of other people may intrude upon enjoyment of the senses, particularly of sight and sound, and the more intrusion the less enjoyment there may be. Thus control and management is needed so that no single activity takes up a share of the natural amenities, which is disproportionate in the numbers involved in that activity compared to others and which intrudes upon the senses of those involved in other activities to their detriment". (LDSPB 1978b).

Clearly, in this instance, the National Parks principles were upheld especially in the light of the Sandford Report, which placed the conservation interest above the recreation interest (Sandford 1974).

Another serious consequence of large scale tourism is traffic congestion.

3.6:3. Traffic Problems Created by Tourism

In Cumbria, the undoubted major centre for tourist traffic is the National Park. Miles and Hammon (1977), in a series of roadside interviews found that one quarter of all holiday traffic was heading for the towns of Keswick and Windermere, while if these two destinations are added to the flows to Ambleside, Bowness, Grasmere, Coniston and Patterdale, they then account for over half of all tourist traffic in the Park. This appears to indicate a considerable concentration of traffic in particular areas, and roads such as the A591, going through Kendal, Ambleside, and Keswick, and the A66 which links Keswick to the M6, being severely congested.

The Lake District Traffic Survey (LDSPB 1976), found not surprisingly that there was a considerable peaking of traffic on many roads during the summer months, with in August a "peak within a peak" occurring. As 'Choices for Cumbria' says:

"... There is an acute peaking of demand (in the summer months) with the absolute peak sustained for only a few hours in the year". (Cumbria County Council 1976).

In choosing the routes upon which they travel, Miles and Hammon (1977) found that most recreationists preferred scenic value to speed. This, as they note, on the more narrow roads can add to congestion problems and adversely affect safety.

In 1965, the Lake District Planning Board (LDPB 1965) found that the greatest problem lay in providing adequate car parking space. Considerable effort has been put into providing extra space and deterring parking in unsuitable places. However, as the National Park Plan states, where car parking conflicts with conservation objectives, the LDSPB will restrict all parking while not constructing a new car park (LDSPB 1978).

The National Park Plan also indicates, that it will only support alterations to existing roads where a proven safety hazard exists, and any changes will have to be undertaken as sympathetically as possible, having regard to the character of both the road and the area. The refusal of the Board to accept major changes in the provision of car parking space and road quality, has led it to develop a policy of

traffic management. The National Park Plan (LDSPB 1978) indicates that the Board will seek to prepare a plan where the suitability of each road for particular classes of traffic will be defined, warning signs will indicate which vehicles would be best advised not to use the route, and in some areas traffic regulations will be applied. Added to this pleasure motoring and coach touring will not be encouraged by the Board, and, as mentioned above, in environmentally sensitive areas parking control will be implemented.

Since then, a ban on heavy vehicles using the A591 except for access, has been enacted by the County Council, and some parking restrictions have been implemented, although given the scale of the traffic problem in certain areas, these can only be considered slight in their effectiveness.

Another area where problems resulting from tourism have shown themselves, is in relation to agriculture, where continual trespass and vandalism have led to the creation of the Upland Management Service.

3.6:4. The Upland Management Experiments in the Lake District

The growth in tourism during the 1960's had quite significant disadvantageous effects upon Cumbrian farming, especially that centred in the most popular areas of the National Park. In 1969, the Countryside Commission set in motion an experiment with two objectives. These were:-

- (i) To test a method of reconciling the interests of farmers and visitors in the uplands, by offering financial encouragement to farmers to carry out small schemes which improve the appearance of the landscape, and enhance the recreational opportunities of the area.
- (ii) To assess what effect if any, this method will have on farmers attitudes to recreation and landscape.

The experiment known as UMEX 1, was set in part of the Snowdonia National Park and the valleys of Martindale, Patterdale and Ullswater in the Lake District. These areas were selected after consultation with the MAFF, who seconded an officer from the Agricultural Land Service, to spend one third of his time working on the experiment. Because of the success of UMEX 1, the scope of the experiment was widened and a full time officer was employed independent of MAFF. In 1976,

UMEX 2 became the Upland Management Service (UMAS), fully incorporated into the Lake District administration, and funded by the LDSPB. The UMAS covers the whole of the National Park, and employs two full-time project officers, one covering the north of the Park and the other the south. As MacEwen and MacEwen (1982), note the success of UMAS has been considerable in terms of minor works, such as erecting stiles, bridges, gates, walls, fencing woodlands and so forth, and has won the support of much of the farming community. Even so the limited resources of UMAS, and the scale of the problem encountered in the National Park, must mean that the total effects of the service are negligible.

3.7:1. The Importance of Forestry as a Rural Development Agent

The Forestry Commission has an important role to play in rural areas as was indicated in Chapter Two. Within Cumbria they own some 23,777 hectares of land, in the Lake District they own 11,300 hectares, and in the rest of Cumbria 12,477 hectares. Additional to this are private forestry operations, which own a total of 4,590 hectares of land in the Lake District, and 10,409 hectares in the rest of Cumbria, making a final figure of 39,136 hectares of land in Cumbria under commercial afforestation, or about 12 per cent of the county's land area. Even so, forestry is not a significant employer of labour in Cumbria, with only 384 jobs directly created by it. There are a number of saw and board mills in the county, however they only procure 10 per cent of their timber requirements from Cumbria (Cumbria County Council 1976).

Large scale afforestation has long been a source of controversy and contention in Cumbria, especially in the Lake District. When in 1935, the Forestry Commission purchased seven thousand acres of land in the central Lake District, there was a national campaign of disapproval led by the Council for the Preservation of Rural England (CPRE) and their representative in the Lake District, the Friends of the Lake District. Although the Forestry Commission refused to sell the land they had acquired, they were persuaded to refrain from planting on the payment of £2 per acre, which was raised by public subscription. Even so, the most significant result of these negotiations, was the so called 1936

Agreement between the CPRE and the Forestry Commission, whereby the Forestry Commission agreed not to plant in a 300 square mile portion of the central Lake District. In 1962, a voluntary agreement was drawn up between the Lake District Planning Board and the Timber Growers Organisation (TGO), representing private forestry commercial interests. Under this agreement, plans for the afforestation of bare land are sent to the Board, who then consult with a small standing committee of the CLA and the TGO, to see if modifications can be made if necessary.

Added to these two agreements, is a form of Forestry Commission consultation that exists throughout Britain's National Parks. Under this, a planning authority is informed of a plan to plant some land, a meeting will then be arranged to discuss this with the Regional Advisory Committee of the Forestry Commission. After this a report is sent by the Forestry Commission to the Minister of Agriculture, to decide whether to help fund the scheme or not. Because of the secrecy which surrounds this MacEwen and MacEwen (1982) attack it as being undemocratic, noting how in 1976, the LDSPB protested most strongly about the afforestation of Hudsons Allotment in a very sensitive part of the Lake District, only to find that after the above procedure, the Minister of Agriculture decided to go ahead with the planting without any indication of how that decision was reached.

In the National Park Plan, the LDSPB formulates a strong policy against further afforestation, indicating that it only wishes to see planting that does not adversely affect the landscape, although some small plantings will be considered to the east and north of the central area of the Park (LDSPB 1978). In the rest of Cumbria, the Joint Structure Plan says that:

"New plantations will be encouraged where they can be integrated with agriculture and are of a scale and location compatible with the landscape and the needs of wildlife conservation".

(Cumbria County Council 1980).

The document goes on to say that forestry will be accepted as the dominant land use where conflicts with landscape, nature conservation and agricultural policies can be reduced to a minimum.

Forestry clearly has a limited role to play in creating employment and wealth in Cumbria. As it stands the employment level throughout the county is low, while serious environmental damage would be caused through its expansion.

3.7.2. Rural Employment Creation in Cumbria: Interim Conclusions

The employment problems that exist in the whole of Cumbria are no doubt considerable. Structural unemployment has been endemic in the county for a considerable period of time, and although a strong regional policy has been applied for many years, unemployment levels still remain high. While regional policy may well have prevented the total industrial collapse of west Cumbria, it has not created a self-sustaining, vigorous local economy, indeed the presence of branch plants and the encouragement of certain "vulnerable" industries may well lead to future problems.

Away from the industrial west coast, the inner core of the county has appeared to have remained fairly prosperous. This may to some extent be illusory, as rural unemployment has tended to solve itself by outmigration. The inner core of Cumbria may also have benefited from a strong tourist trade, continued support for agriculture and better communication links with the rest of Britain. Even so, some pockets of "deprivation" do exist, and it has not been thought acceptable by central and local government, that people should either remain in a state of "deprivation", or move because of it. One of the basic causes of "deprivation" are poor employment opportunities. Recognising this, a number of government inspired schemes have been set in operation. One of the most significant of these is the construction of small factories by the Development Commission. Yet even though Cumbria has certain advantages, such as excellent communication links and a pleasant environment, severe problems have occurred in letting them.

Although it appears difficulties do exist in letting units once constructed, a general feeling exists that the LDSPB is against industry. The LDSPB argues that this is not so, although it maintains a severe restrictive policy against most forms of development in the National Park. This policy is reinforced by the

determination of many communities, not to have industrial development of any sort in their villages. This is clearly not isolated and appears to be accepted as general by many planners. This attitude must have implications upon the future level of investment in small industrial units in rural Cumbria. Added to this it has been noted in Kirkby Stephen, that even after sites have been found for industrial development and units filled, severe problems can be created by them actually being successful.

A number of integrated development schemes have been set in motion in Cumbria. In many respects the notion of integrated development appears to be excellent for it allows the full resources of certain interested groups to be concentrated upon solving the particular problems of an area. Even so, little or no success has been achieved from these schemes within Cumbria. UMEX 3, has undoubtedly been a failure, while the success of the East Fellside Project is likely to be slight. The reasons for this are many, and are involved, but they must inherently lie with the lack of opportunity for employment creation in Cumbria.

Tourism has long been regarded as a useful device for encouraging employment in rural areas. However, the Cumbrian experience has shown that the tourist market has been stagnant for a considerable period of time. Added to this there are decreasing employment opportunities, due to greater demand for and greater provision of self-catering units, a demand that shows no sign of abating. Tourism still remains important to the local economy as a whole, although it does have a number of disadvantages. In terms of employment it tends to be seasonal, low pay orientated and unpopular with local people. Added to this tourism causes in the most popular areas severe congestion problems. There is also a demand for large tourist enterprises which although resisted by planning authorities, remain an ever present threat to many beautiful areas.

Forestry is another industry which is commonly noted for its employment creation benefits. Within Cumbria the industry provides very few jobs, either direct or indirect, and is generally unwelcome to planning authorities because of the disadvantageous effects it has upon the environment. Clearly within Cumbria forestry does not provide a long term solution to the area's employment problems.

3.8:1. Appendix 1: The Longsleddale Valley

During the fieldwork study period, information was collected on the valley of Longsleddale, which lies within the National Park to the north of Kendal. The valley appeared fairly typical of many in the National Park. In relation to agriculture in the valley, Appendix 1 notes how there has been a steady pattern of farm amalgamation. This has been the result of many factors, although the desire amongst farmers for more land has certainly aggravated the problem. Clearly the responsibility for farm amalgamation lies partly with the community itself, although the increase in size represents a natural expansion of successful farms at the expense of others; a trend under present circumstances that is unlikely to stop.

One result of this has been a gradual decline in farming standards, as farmers have no time to maintain their larger holdings. This means that walls remain unrepaired, and that there is a general spread of "scrub" throughout the valley, although the effect of this upon the landscape can be attractive in its own terms.

There is a considerable demand for planning permission in the valley although most applications were for agricultural enterprises. Those non-agricultural applications were turned down; this clearly reflects the determination of the LDSPB to stop all developments which appear to be against the interests of the National Park.

At certain times of the year tourist pressures are very marked especially in terms of traffic congestion. Most farmers appear to accept the problem as a natural consequence of living in a National Park, although a certain amount of resentment emanates from one well known figure in the valley.

In many ways the valley can be described as "deprived". There is no bus service, the local school has been closed for a number of years, there is some house purchasing from outsiders and there is a certain amount of outmigration. However, there has been a sustained process of adaptation, especially with regard to increasing car ownership.

Longsleddale contains one of the few truly "part-time" farmers in Cumbria, in that he has another job apart from farming. The farm is small, devoted to

livestock, and qualifies for support under the EEC's Less Favoured Areas Directive. It exhibits many of the problems faced by hill farmers throughout Cumbria. To supplement his income, the farmer has acquired two caravans which are let at a competitive rate. These are undoubtedly an asset because they make up a substantial proportion of his income, although this is not to be taken as an indication of tourism's success because his income is very small. Subsidies also make up a considerable proportion of his total income, £1,346 out of a farm income of £1,948. Without government support it is unlikely that he would continue farming.

The various issues and problems revealed in the rest of Chapter Three are clearly present in the valley, indicating that these are general trends to be found throughout most of Cumbria and in particular the Lake District National Park. They show a number of areas where there is conflict, and deprivation, and indicate that the problems appear very difficult to overcome.

3.9. The Cumbria Case Study: Concluding Remarks

This chapter has considered a wide range of rural issues within a regional setting. Not only does Cumbria present a considerable number of rural problems and conflicts in a marked form, but has also been the basis for concerted attempts to ameliorate them. This chapter indicates the complexity of rural policy formulation and implementation, especially with regard to the resolution of competing resource useage demands. Of major importance is the economic vulnerability of rural areas, and the difficulties experienced by government in attempting to counter rapid social change. All these various features of the Cumbrian experience will be discussed more fully in Chapter Six.

CHAPTER 4

PART 1

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PENRITH BY-PASS
AND THE LOWTHER ESTATE

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4.1:1. The Development of the Study

Chapter One indicated that the research has been essentially derived from the results of the Whitbarrow Exercise, which is recorded in Chapter Five. This considered a number of rural policy issues in relation to one specific estate. These included the effects upon agriculture of a major road development; the potential for agricultural improvement; the development of wealth and employment creating enterprises ancillary to agriculture, and related conservation matters.

While this Exercise provided interesting and stimulating results, it was considered useful to compare the experiences of Whitbarrow, with those of another agricultural estate, to verify or discuss the conclusions already reached. To make comparison easier, it was considered important to select another Cumbrian estate, and preferably one which had positively met the challenges faced at Whitbarrow. Any divergence of experience could then be considered.

Locating such an estate entailed drawing upon the experiences of the Cumbrian Division of MAFF. After consultation with the MAFF it was concluded that Lowther Estate (seat of James Lowther, 7th Earl of Lonsdale), near the market town of Penrith would make an ideal model for comparison. This was because the officers of the MAFF considered the administrative capabilities of the estate to be second to none. This high degree of management expertise was particularly noticeable in the manner in which the estate handled the development of the Penrith By-Pass section of the M6 through their land, and in the way in which the estate developed its full economic potential. An approach to the estate was made through the good offices of the MAFF's Northern Region Socio-Economic Adviser, Mr J F Cottam. The estate then very kindly offered all the assistance they could.

Chapter Four falls into two parts. Part One considers the development of two sections of the M6 in Cumbria; the Penrith By-Pass, and the Tebay to Hackthorpe Section. It records the early planning of the road, and the estate's

involvement in it; the detailed planning of the road; the compensation negotiations; and the construction period. It not only indicates the complexities involved in planning and developing major roads, but illustrates how an agricultural estate can protect and improve its interests.

Part Two of this chapter considers the economic development of the estate, particularly of agricultural, timber and tourist enterprises. Generally these developments came chronologically later than the road construction, and were in part inspired by it. This occurred not only through the investment of considerable compensation payments and increased accessibility, but also through the managerial organisation so successfully developed for coping with the road development, being transferred to the estate's economic development.

However, before going in to consider the road development further, it is worth noting some background information on the estate.

4.1:2. Background to the Historical Development of the Lowther Estate

The Lowther Estate lies in Cumbria, south of the market town of Penrith. The Lowther family according to Sutherland (1973), are unique in England in being able to trace their ancestors back before the Viking invasion. He goes on to say:

"Perhaps no other family in England has continued to produce in each generation so exactly the characteristics of the last. Sagacious, courageous in their judgements and loyal to their friends, they have epitomised the strength and endurance of the dalesman, clinging to what they own, and adding to it at every opportunity".

Although large agricultural landowners, the real wealth of the family was built up in the eighteenth century on the huge coal and iron reserves that were found in west Cumbria. The family enjoyed the fruits of the industrial revolution and political patronage; steadily increasing its wealth, until the emergence of Hugh Lowther, the 5th Earl of Lonsdale. Hugh Lowther inherited in 1893 upwards of fifty thousand acres of agricultural land, and the mineral and sporting rights to another fifty thousand acres of common land; he also owned Windermere, Grasmere, and Haweswater Lakes; the whole of Whitehaven; a number of mines; Whitehaven Castle; a number of mansions; yachts; and agricultural and hunting land

in the Midlands. By the time he died in 1944, the lakes, the mines, Whitehaven and the land in the Midlands had all been sold.

However, the land at Lowther was still intact, partly as a result of Hugh selling his remittance to finance a disastrous cattle rearing scheme in America. The remittance was bought by the estate, which was represented by a group of trustees. The 5th Earl, in his continued attempts to maintain his high spending, drained the estate dry of most of its resources. Little or no investment took place, with much agricultural land having its fences flattened, to make Lowther Park the largest deer park in Britain. The asset stripping Hugh undertook, and the increasing financial impoverishment of the estate, was not untypical of the trend that was taking place throughout Britain at that time; however, the rate of the estate's demise was somewhat exceptional.

The 6th Earl of Lonsdale, survived only nine years after succeeding to the Earldom, the title was then inherited by the 7th Earl, James Lowther in 1953. At the time of his inheritance the Lowther Estate, consisted of some 40,000 acres of agricultural land and 45,000 acres of common land. Even so the estate had suffered from considerable under-investment, and had debts owing to mortgages and estate duty totalling over three million pounds. Although this situation would seem daunting to many, the new Earl set himself the task of balancing the books, and making the estate economically viable. How this was done will be seen in Part Two of this chapter.

4.1:3 The Research Base

Information for Part One of this chapter which details the development of the M6 was gathered and verified in a number of ways. First, as one would expect, a large and important estate such as Lowther has extensive archives; these include records of the road development, all memos, records of telephone conversations, letters, maps, indeed all written information concerning the estate's activities are kept. Once the initial introduction had been made to the estate, they became very helpful in allowing access to relevant material. This helpfulness extended to the lending of valuable archive material on the road development and

allowing it to be taken and examined at the University of Aston.

The data from the estate clearly revealed the relationship between all the various parties involved, including the planners, developers, the MAFF and the District Valuer. They also revealed to some extent, the political atmosphere in which decisions were being made. However, in order to obtain a wider perspective of the development process, an approach was made to the MAFF Library in Carlisle, requesting permission to consult their files on the road development. Unfortunately, the MAFF indicated that no such permission could be granted without a contravention of the Official Secrets Act. It was pointed out however, that files on the road development would be kept by Cumbria County Council and these would not be covered by the Act. The County Council kept these files, as they replaced Cumberland County Council who constructed the road on behalf of the Ministry of Transport. The County Surveyor of Cumberland County was approached and he very kindly gave permission to examine the Council's files.

This provided a considerable amount of information on how the road planners were viewing the development, the relationship between the planners and the Ministry of Transport, the MAFF, the District Valuer, local business organisations and other pressure groups, and the local elected Council representatives. Thus important MAFF material which acted as an input into the road and which could not be viewed at their own offices, could be legally examined at the County Council.

This information was supplemented and verified by personal interviews with MAFF and County Council personnel who were associated with the road development; and the questioning of Mr Kenneth Wise, Lowther Estate's Surveyor, and by having him and Mr J F Cottam, Land Commissioner at Carlisle during the road development, check and agree the authenticity of the record as presented in this chapter.

With regard to Part Two of this chapter information came from two sources, the estate office (descriptive material), and from Companies House (financial data). With regard to the latter source, all limited liability companies are obliged by law to lodge copies of their accounts at Companies House, 55, City Road,

London. For a fee, members of the public are allowed to view the accounts, and take copies away. This provides a very useful service for the researcher, and one which should be continued.

While the methodology of data collection is being discussed, it is important to note the contrasting research collector approaches used in examining the two estates. The Whitbarrow data was drawn from three main sources. First a questionnaire was constructed and applied to the estate's tenant farmers. Second, interviews were undertaken with the estate's owner's son, Mr Trevor Farrer, a farmer on the estate; the estate's agent; members of the MAFF involved in the road development (i.e. the realignment of the A590); members of the North-West Road Construction Unit (NWRCU); and local people generally. The third means of data collection was a conference to which important groups and individuals were invited to give their opinions on the various issues raised.

Data collection at Whitbarrow took place in a completely different atmosphere to that at Lowther. While at Lowther a considerable period of time had elapsed since the road development, and the estate was prepared to talk openly about events, and allow perusal of archive material, at Whitbarrow the development was still a live issue.

Thus, because of the politically sensitive nature of the exercise, access to some written material was restricted, as the main actors were concerned lest their interests be affected by the premature disclosure of information. This also, as will be seen in Chapter Five, placed some constraints upon the researcher in that it would not be ethically correct to obtain information from individuals, or a group of individuals, and then use it to prejudice their interests.

The questionnaire that was constructed to present to the farmers at Whitbarrow, is reproduced in Appendix 3. Some difficulties were encountered in administering it, as it was long, and the farmers were reluctant to answer the more personal questions. Because of this the questionnaire became used more as an "aide memoir", with a conversational, rather than an inquisitive tone being used. The farmers found this less intimidating, and responded more readily.

The conference held at Whitbarrow, has already been discussed in Chapter One. However, it is worth noting that a wide range of groups with an interest in rural affairs were invited to discuss various issues as they affected the estate. The conference was a success in that it opened up a wide varying discussion, based upon factual information eliciting official viewpoints. In this respect the conference proved to be a useful research tool.

The two differing research approaches undertaken at Lowther and Whitbarrow, were essentially the most effective means of obtaining information given the differing political atmospheres. At Whitbarrow a discussive questioning approach was undertaken, while at Lowther, stress was laid upon obtaining information from archive sources. Each approach had its strengths. The Lowther papers, for example, provided accurate, and relatively accessible data, and a remarkable opportunity to study a road development from conception to completion. This enabled the examination in detail of the complex relationships between the various parties involved, and their respective roles.

This wealth of correspondence was not made available at Whitbarrow, as this would involve some intrusion into personal liberties. This meant greater reliance had to be placed upon verbal reports from the various actors, which were then cross-checked with the other actors involved. Even so, while relying upon verbal reports can be less satisfactory than relying upon archive material, the system did have some advantages. For example, the researcher was able to discuss in detail, particular aspects of the road development as they occurred. Those involved were able to report their anxieties; the problems that arose, however small; their opinions of the other actors in the road development; and their expectations for the future. While some of the reports may have at first sounded confused or exaggerated, they did provide a first hand account of how people reacted to a particular event, without the benefit of hindsight. It also allowed comparison between farmers, particularly as regards to how they coped with the road at set intervals, and how their perceptions changed with the passing of time. This general approach enables the researcher to have a greater grasp of the more personal, sensitive social problems of a road development, than can be obtained from simply

consulting archive material. This understanding was supplemented by the views and experiences elicited during the Whitbarrow Conference.

This discussion of the methodologies employed, does not imply that one form of data collection is superior to another; rather, the form of examination should always attempt to maximise the volume and quality of information generated, while being sensitive to political considerations involved in the field of study.

4.2:1. The Planning of the Penrith By-Pass Section of the M6 and the Lowther Estate

As noted the Lowther Estate was inherited by the present Earl, James Lowther in 1953, and although still considerable in extent, was in an advanced state of economic decline. In order to rectify this, Lord Lonsdale undertook a policy of economic regeneration, in doing which he was supported by his agent Derek Pattinson, and his surveyor Kenneth Wise, both of whom had served the estate for many years. With their help Lord Lonsdale turned the estate into a highly professional business organisation, although in the tradition of most large estates, a very paternalistic one.

The Earl of Lonsdale's lands include a large section which stretches from north of Penrith to south of Shap, following the present M6 in an almost continuous block (see Map 4:1). Previous Earls and their agents had since 1930, always been conscious that plans for a major road development were being mooted. Penrith is a small market town, containing narrow streets and restricted pedestrian walkways; an already significant traffic problem became worse with the growth of motor useage, especially as the main arterial north-south link, the A6, ran straight through the centre of town. As a result of this a plan for a by-pass to the west of Penrith was prepared in 1930 and a protected route declared. The cost at that time was to have been £180,000 which was later reduced to £140,000 with the omission of a link road with the A66. Although detailed plans had been drawn up, the scheme was shelved as a result of pre-war austerity measures.

In 1947 the Ministry of Transport asked Cumberland County Council to draw up preliminary plans for a by-pass, and by the 2nd February 1950 these had been completed, with a line to the west of Penrith thought of as most suitable. The plans



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were then sent to the County Surveyor of Westmorland for comment. He replied that if that line were chosen, there would be complaints over the archeological sites of King Arthur's Table, Brougham Castle and Brougham Roman Fort, although he pointed out that it would be the "Ministry's task to appease them". By October 1950, a number of interested bodies had been sent copies of the line in order to comment on them. The preliminary plans involved a 12 foot verge on each side, dual 22 foot carriageways, and a central reservation of 12 feet. The cost of the by-pass was estimated to be £925,000.

The plans were then sent to the Ministry of Transport who did not reply until 1953, when they asked the County Surveyor of Cumberland, Mr F L Broughton to carry out a traffic census in Penrith to ascertain how much of Penrith's traffic was "by-passable". These actions led to a murmur of discontent in the area, especially amongst trades people who were concerned that their business might be funnelled away. The Conservative controlled and business orientated Penrith Urban District Council, sent a letter to Broughton on the 17th September 1953, informing him that Penrith itself had only a few congestion points, and that most members felt that a by-pass was an unnecessary waste of money. Broughton replied on the 22nd September that he was surprised that the UDC took such a view as members of the Council had sat on the 1930 Working Party that had recommended the scheme.

Over the next two years the worries of the traders subsided as the Ministry of Transport was still incapable of making up its mind on the by-pass. However, on the 24th May 1955, a message was sent from them informing Broughton that he could go ahead with the scheme. They also informed him that they wanted a dual carriageway road and single level roundabouts. This news did not really satisfy Broughton, as he had long been convinced that the by-pass should be built to motorway standards, as the ever increasing number of motor-vehicles would necessitate larger roads in the future. Yet the Ministry would not fit in with his suggestion.

A mixture of hesitancy and bureaucratic inefficiency held up the construction of the by-pass, and other roads in the region. This antagonised some local opinion

to such an extent that a deputation of local MP's, councillors and dignitaries including Lord Lonsdale, went to meet the Minister of Transport in order to press him to speed up road construction in the north-west. This deputation probably had some effect, for early in 1957 a series of surveys were carried out on potential lines for the by-pass. It was at this stage that Lowther Estate realised that the road would not be long in the offing. So on the 7th May 1957, Mr Derek Pattinson the estate's Chief Agent, sent a letter to Broughton, saying that he had seen County Council staff carrying out a soil survey south of Eamont Bridge, and would like to know details of the line of the road if they were known. He also added that Lord Lonsdale was a member of the deputation which met the Minister of Transport to discuss this and other road developments in Cumberland and Westmorland, and that he was very anxious to know the outline of the scheme and its progress.

At this point a relationship was founded between Broughton and the estate which was to last many years during the construction of the Cumberland and Westmorland section of the M6. Broughton immediately arranged a meeting with the estate, himself, and the Deputy Surveyor of Cumberland. This was held on the 16th May 1957. The estate was somewhat shocked by the amount of land severance that was to have taken place, and Lord Lonsdale asked why an eastern route was not taken which would reduce this. He was informed that although an easterly route would be preferential in terms of agricultural land, it would involve too steep a climb for traffic, and would not remove traffic from the streets of Penrith which wished to turn westwards into the Lake District. Lord Lonsdale announced at the meeting that he was prepared to accept the chosen route for the road on engineering grounds alone, but would like to see a detailed examination undertaken of the eastern route. Broughton promised to conduct such an examination especially for him.

On the 29th May 1957, Broughton met the two local Members of Parliament for the area, William Whitelaw and William Vane (later Lord Inglewood). They too were shocked by the amount of land severance which would take place. However,

Broughton said:

"I explained that while Lord Lonsdale had referred to the more serious severance of the westerly route, I had undertaken to investigate fully whether there were any possibilities of securing an easterly route with reasonable gradients.....although I feared this might prove impossible".

Broughton was still pressing for the by-pass to be built to motorway standards reaching an opinion that the by-pass should not be viewed in isolation, but rather as an integral part of a north-south road. A letter from the Ministry on the 6th June 1957 rewarded his efforts to an extent. It read:

" I think we ought to make provision for grade separations and construct the road on motorway lines although it will remain an all-purpose road. Added to this I think we should try to eliminate all accesses including agricultural accesses on the by-pass, so that if at any time in the future the motor road should be extended northwards there would be no difficulty in incorporating the by-pass in it".

Shortly after this Broughton completed a comprehensive report regarding the easterly route. He concluded that the gradient would be too steep for a fast road, that traffic going to the Lake District would still have to pass through Penrith, it would take a considerably longer time to traverse the route, and that a westerly by-pass route would be some £750,000 to £1,000,000 cheaper. He immediately sent the report off to Lowther saying:

" As soon as you have had an opportunity of perusing this report, I should be grateful to hear from you and if you consider that it would be helpful to you if we were to have a further meeting, I should only be too pleased to fall in with this idea".

Lord Lonsdale replied:

" I must thank you and congratulate you on the amount of trouble you have taken in this very important matter".

On the 27th November, Lord Lonsdale again wrote to Broughton saying that he had considered the report, and would be:

"Very pleased to support the construction of a westerly by-pass and afford every facility where possible".

Although Lord Lonsdale supported a westerly by-pass, he asked Broughton if it would be possible for the southern end to cross to the east of Clifton village, to save land. Broughton was responsive to this suggestion but he felt that the crossing of a railway cutting would be very expensive, however he said he would look into the matter. Broughton's opinion of his dealings with Lowther Estate was outlined in a letter he sent to the Ministry of Transport saying:

"It is very desirable to carry local opinion with us even at this early stage".

And again on the 5th March 1958:

"I think you agree with me, that it is always well to take with us landlords and to discuss any problems, removing objections as they occur".

On the 19th December 1957 the Ministry of Transport informed Broughton that they felt the Penrith By-Pass should be built to a motorway standard. Broughton immediately got in touch with Lord Lonsdale to inform him of this new state of affairs, for which he was thanked.

The publication of the Penrith town map in 1957, with an outline of the possible route of the by-pass created a flurry of objection within Penrith, with the Town Council, and various local business organisations all expressing concern. Broughton was afraid that this show of displeasure might make the planning and construction of the by-pass more difficult. He was therefore relieved, when Mr Whitelaw M P sent him a letter saying:

"In these circumstances I am bound to say that I believe a by-pass for Penrith to be an essential development, and I do not think that the risk of an adverse effect on trade in the town is sufficient to justify opposition".

However, Whitelaw and especially Vane, were still very concerned about the amount of agricultural severance the by-pass would create. This was expressed at a meeting held on April 11th 1958 between Lord Lonsdale, his agent, Broughton and themselves, at which Vane pressed Broughton to reinvestigate the southern portion of the by-pass. Broughton asked the County Surveyor for Westmorland to do this. He was willing to do for he was also under pressure from the Sub-Committee for

Highways of Westmorland County Council, who were also concerned about the amount of severance. He produced two routes, a red one following the proposed line, and a blue one passing to the east of Clifton as Lord Lonsdale had wanted. Although the Ministry of Transport wanted the red route, Westmorland County Council decided the blue route would be more satisfactory, therefore, for the time being no decision was made. Broughton became increasingly frustrated at the continued concern over agriculture and in April 1958 he wrote to the Ministry of Transport saying:

"There is obviously bound to be a direct conflict of land use between the highway and agriculture wherever we locate the line of the new road. I had thought that we together had chosen the best line possible from an engineering point of view.....letting accommodation works do the rest".

Yet the Ministry of Transport were not prepared to take agriculture so lightly. In June 1958, they wrote to Broughton advising him when planning the motorway, to consider agriculture fully, as MAFF had been vociferous in protecting good quality land, and also they advised him to take the road through Lowther Park to avoid agricultural severance. This was thought acceptable as Lowther Castle was not occupied.

Lord Lonsdale had meanwhile been pressing for a meeting to discuss the by-pass passing Clifton to the east. Broughton did not reply, and a letter asking why not was sent from Lowther. Broughton explained that there was a good chance that the by-pass would become an integral part of the national motorway system, and so if this was to be the case, then there would be some extra planning needed, especially in relation to the linking point where the by-pass would meet the motorway. Broughton was proved correct for in March 1959, the Ministry of Transport finally decided that they wanted the by-pass to fit into a national south-north road system.

Because of this change in policy, the Minister appointed the engineering consultants Scott, Kirkpatrick and Wilson to consider the line of the by-pass now that it was to link into a north-south road. They were given the task in May 1960, and completed their report in July 1962. They concluded that the new motorway

should follow the route considered in previous years, going to the west of both Penrith and Clifton. Therefore, only a few amendments were necessary to previous plans, mainly due to the greater width of the motorway.

Meanwhile the CLA were concerned about the future of the by-pass. Broughton, anxious not to alienate them wrote:

"I would add that it is the wish of my Chairman, Major Graham and myself, to keep your Association fully informed and to take them along with us as the design of the by-pass proceeds and not to wait until the line proposals are advertised by the Minister and observations statutorily invited".

Broughton, who was carrying out the preliminary survey on the route, received a letter from the Surveyor of Westmorland County Council, saying that the line of the by-pass should be extended southward by 2½ miles to Hackthorpe. Broughton agreed to consider this. At this stage Broughton was considering thirteen possible variations on the same route, and in September 1962, he sent the Ministry of Transport a list of the number of severances created by each. These can be seen in Table 4:1.

Table 4:1. Routes Considered for the Penrith By-Pass

Line	Total number of severances	Cost £'s
1	32	3,187,900
2	30	3,224,550
3	33	3,292,000
4	38	3,436,500
5	30	3,377,400
6	39	3,386,050
7	32	3,493,000
8	35	3,526,300
9	32	3,544,450
10	31	3,600,600
11	38	3,663,600
12	37	3,665,750
13	34	3,723,325

As can be seen the principle line, Line 1, lies equal third in the agricultural severance table. Although this figure is low, it must be remembered that a route to the east of Penrith was now not being considered. By May 1963, the final route had been settled by the Minister, and Broughton said that he would like a meeting with the estate as soon as possible. He also informed them that the by-pass would extend to south of Hackthorpe.

4.2:2 Section Summary: The Early Planning of the Penrith By-Pass

The planning of a major new road is not only an extremely long process, but also a highly complex one. In planning the road, Broughton had a number of considerations to take into account, of these the primary ones were of finance, which dictated the standard to which the road should be built, and engineering concerns. Damage to agricultural holdings and local dissent were of secondary importance.

Yet it cannot be claimed that agriculture was taken lightly, nor was it unrepresented, for apart from Lord Lonsdale himself, there were two local MP's and the Highway's and Bridges Committee of Westmorland County Council were also very concerned about the effects upon farmland, and managed to get Broughton to consider a number of less agriculturally damaging routes. However, the final route was chosen mainly upon financial and engineering grounds.

Broughton did take the estate into the planning process, indeed, Lord Lonsdale was placed in a rather privileged position, for this treatment was not extended to every other landowner. Although Lord Lonsdale's suggestions did not bear fruit at this stage, they did contribute to the overall planning, while at the same time giving Lord Lonsdale the feeling that his interests were being catered for. This though, could only have taken place by the estate expressly wishing to enter the planning process, being a major landowner on the route, being organised and competent enough to make informed suggestions, and being trustworthy. However, it also meant that the planners had to be sensitive enough to treat Lowther's views seriously.

4.3:1 The Detailed Planning of the Road in Relation to the Estate

Section 4.2:1 indicated the role of the estate in planning the line the M6 and has given attention to the nature of the road planning in general. Although the estate was included in the overall planning, it had already indicated that it was prepared to accept the final line on engineering grounds alone. This acceptance of the inevitability of the road development left the estate to consider very early on the attitude which it would take towards ameliorating the road's effects.

As the estate had never had experience of a major road development before, it set out to research the problems of other landowners who had recently experienced a major road scheme. Lord Lonsdale had a contact in the south of England, who offered to provide as much help as he could give. The estate then sent Mr Kenneth Wise, to look in detail at the way this particular estate had dealt with the difficulties that occurred during the road development. This coupled with other background information, led the estate to isolate a number of factors which would cause the greatest problems during the development, these being severance; disturbed drainage and other damage caused through neglect; and slowness and administrative difficulties in the payment of compensation. After isolating these problem areas, the estate developed the theory that the only way in which they could be contained would be through comprehensive and efficient planning on their part. Added to this and largely as a result of Lord Lonsdale's business acumen, the estate recognised that the road scheme opened up opportunities for economic development and financial gain. These came in three forms:-

1. General improvements to the farms, which would be carried out as part of the accommodation works.
2. In terms of goods and services that might be sold to the contractors.
3. The large amount of money realised from the compensation, could be re-invested in the economically expanding areas of the estate.

4.3:2. The Estate and the Provision of Fencing

Lowther Estate, as will be seen in Part 2 of this chapter, has a substantial amount of afforested land, and a considerable holding in a large local saw-mill. The estate recognised that the Penrith By-Pass would have to be fenced to a high standard, a process that would involve some considerable expenditure on the part of the Ministry of Transport. Therefore, a large market might be opened up for their products within the boundaries of the estate. Lowther brought up the question of gaining the contract for the fencing at the very first meeting they had with the road planners in May 1957.

By September 1962, plans for the motorway were well under way and the estate were continuing to show an interest in providing the fencing for the scheme. They wrote to Broughton saying that they had a "first class fencing gang" and that Mr Pattinson would be "only too willing to come and discuss the matter". To back up his point, Pattinson included two photographs of comparable fencing carried out by his gang. Pattinson also enquired if the Ministry of Transport kept a list of approved suppliers of fencing, and if so could Lowther be placed on it. Broughton replied that although the Ministry did not keep a list, it would be worthwhile writing to them for information on the supply of home grown timber and fencing. He finished his letter by saying:

"Nevertheless be assured I shall keep you posted of possible opportunities in Cumberland".

Pattinson immediately wrote to the Ministry of Transport Motorway Branch saying:

"Lord Lonsdale has asked me to write to you and ask if you have an approved list of suppliers for materials for fencing motorways".

He also informed them that the estate had a large acreage of woodland and a modern saw-mill with a pressure treating plant, which had in the past supplied motorway fencing materials. They were also informed that as Lowther had a highly specialised fencing gang they would like to apply direct for the contract. The Ministry replied that they did not let separate contracts for fencing but placed a contract for the whole of the motorway scheme with one or more civil engineering contractors, who sub-contract as necessary. They added:

"Your best course would, therefore, be to approach the civil engineering firms direct who tender for such works or are awarded the contract for a motorway scheme".

In general policy terms they said that amenity was the prime factor for choice of timber, and that home grown timber would be used for fences wherever possible.

Although pressing hard for the fencing contract, the estate was more interested in drawing up comprehensive plans regarding ameliorating the effects of

the road upon land holdings. This could not be done until a fairly firm plan of the route became available. In early 1963, Broughton indicated that he had drawn up a detailed route of the road, which he was certain would be confirmed as the final line.

4.3:3. 1963 Detailed Plans of the By-Pass Become Available

Losing no time on the 14th January 1963, Pattinson wrote to Mr Wark the Chief Planning Officer for Westmorland, asking for a tracing 6" to the mile of the planned route. He sent him a 2½" sheet showing in red, the suggested line of the road but added:

" As you will appreciate that this has not yet been confirmed by the County Council nor has Cumberland's County Surveyor who is acting as agent for this project consulted any parties whatsoever, I should be most grateful if you would at this stage treat the enclosed as personal and confidential".

Pattinson acknowledged this favoured treatment immediately.

By the 28th March, events were moving fast, and a joint meeting of the Roads and Bridges Planning Committee was held. At this Broughton gave a description of the line that Wark had given to Pattinson. He listed the advantages of the scheme as being:-

1. It ensures that all by-passable traffic will in fact by-pass Penrith.
2. It permits two good accesses to Penrith, one from the south and one from the north.
3. It gives a clear direct connection to the Lakes, Keswick and the West Cumberland industrial area.
4. It does not conflict with other planning proposals for Penrith or the surrounding areas.
5. It ensures that Penrith really becomes "a gateway to the Lakes" by putting it within very easy access of the motorway where traffic can enter or leave and go east, west, north or south.

The total cost was estimated to be about £5,140,000.

Yet at this stage things were not running smoothly with Broughton. On the 27th April 1963, the Cumberland and Westmorland Herald, published a plan which

purported to be the final route of the motorway. This newspaper report spurred the estate into action. On the 16th May 1963, Pattinson wrote to Broughton asking if he may have the finalised route of the motorway stating:

"You will appreciate that the motorway effects quite a number of the estate's farms and we shall have to reallocate a certain amount of land, some farms may indeed become redundant, and it would, therefore, be unwise to spend money on them during the coming months".

Broughton who had repeatedly told people that the final line was not available for viewing, was embarrassed by this, and wrote to Lowther saying that:

"The plan has been made up entirely by the "Herald" without any reference at all to myself. The Minister is in fact as you may know, very sensitive about releases prior to his approval of any particular major project such as a motorway".

Broughton said that his task, was not made easy as:

"It is always difficult to know when to approach landowners affected by such proposals and I always hesitate to approach people until I am reasonably certain that what I am proposing is acceptable to the Minister".

However, he then said that the final line had been confirmed by the Minister and that the time was right to enter into negotiations with the estate, on the basis of the plans which he sent them. The meeting was fixed for the 13th May 1963.

The meeting on the 13th May, included Lord Lonsdale, his brother Captain A E Lowther, the estate agent Mr Pattinson, the estate surveyor, Mr Wise, the Chairman of the County's Highways Committee, Major Graham, Broughton and his Senior Assistant Surveyor, Mr T D Wilson. As the estate had had a chance to examine the plans, they prepared themselves with a detailed list of points to raise. The points discussed, involved access to one farm, Low Moor Farm which was particularly badly severed, access to fields east of the motorway, the daylighting of some small parcels of land, the mechanics of taking agricultural drainage into the motorway's drainage and the siting of a motorway service station, plans for which Broughton had included.

At the meeting the estate expressed very firmly their concern over drainage. The drainage on the estate was "inch and collar" drainage, installed many years

earlier which gave a greater area of catchment to each pipe used. To facilitate this the drains had to be dug deeper than usual, and so locating them and funnelling them into the motorway drainage system was comparatively difficult. Thus the estate wished to ensure that all drains were caught by the motorway's drainage system.

Detailed discussion also took place on the location of a service station, at the customary thirteen miles distance. Although it was not planned that one should be built immediately, a reserved space was necessary. The County Council proposed a service station at Hackthorpe but Lord Lonsdale objected to this on the grounds that good agricultural land would be lost, and that it was some distance from centres of available labour. He suggested that it should be moved to Clifton. Regarding accommodation bridges, the estate indicated where they thought it would be best to place them and the planners appeared to be responsive. They went away promising to look closely at all suggestions made.

Broughton was obviously impressed by the care the estate had put into considering the plans and also with the helpful and responsible manner in which they reacted to the development. He wrote to the estate after the meeting saying:

" I feel sure that the passage of the Penrith By-Pass proposals through all the various procedures before it eventually reaches the construction stage, would be greatly simplified if all owners had such a progressive outlook".

Broughton enclosed a plan showing the southern portion of the by-pass between Hackthorpe and the River Eamont saying how important it was:

"That this matter be kept confidential but, nevertheless I am anxious to assist you in planning any re-arrangements which might become necessary as a result of the By-Pass".

In less than a month, Broughton was able to reply to the issues raised by the estate at the meeting. He felt that a resiting of the service station where Lord Lonsdale had wanted it was practicable, that he would be prepared to place an access road at Low Moor Farm, where it had been requested, plus in accordance with the estate's wishes accommodation bridges where requested. Once the estate had received confirmation that a new access road would be constructed at Low Moor Farm, Pattinson wrote requesting that cattle grids be provided at the

entrance of the farm yard from the A6 to Lowther, and at the farm yard itself. He also suggested that there should be a lay-by at the top of the road, near the A6, as the road would be travelling over very boggy ground and if a vehicle went over the edge it might become stuck. Broughton replied that the facilities required were reasonable, but that the estate must ensure they make these points clear in negotiations with the District Valuer.

Soon after, Broughton wrote to the estate informing them that a major alteration of the plans was necessary where the A6 crossed the M6 in the vicinity of Bainbridge Gate, due to the fact that the new works would seriously disturb main GPO cables as the bridge in the original plans was on a heavy skew, and because it was a large and heavy structure, the GPO installation would have to be diverted during the bridge construction and be re-located after the new bridge was built. The cost of this would be very great, apart from the interruption to communications that would occur, he therefore suggested a diversion of the A6 eastwards, reducing the angle of skew, but taking up more land.

The estate was not happy with this, for the land to be taken belonged to Abbots Lodge Farm the best holding on the estate. In an attempt to reduce the land taken, the estate sent Broughton their own alternative plan. Broughton wrote back to the estate, thanking them for their letter, but said the estate's plan was far below the minimum standard and therefore, could not be accepted. The estate, acting reasonably as always replied:

"I note from the plan enclosed the minimum acceptable to you and the Westmorland County Surveyor and confirm that this is acceptable to Lord Lonsdale".

In July 1963, Broughton wrote to the estate saying that there had been some concern over the re-alignment of the A6 near Hackthorpe Hall, and that he had presented Mr Wise with a revised re-alignment which he was delighted to report was satisfactory to all. He ended his letter by saying:

"Thank you for helpful co-operation in all matters in which the motorway has affected the Lonsdale's Estate".

He then went on to say that he was now able to send the estate the complete plans of the by-pass.

While the estate were studying the complete plans of the motorway, Broughton had run into problems with the Ministry of Transport over the siting of the service station at Clifton village where Lord Lonsdale requested it. The main objection to it was the fact that it lay on low lying ground. Broughton pointed out that if the estate were to allow a picnic area to be included in the plans, with the restaurants sited on higher ground then it would make the service area location sufficiently attractive to motorway planners that they would not alter the site. Lowther was quite happy with this arrangement and even suggested an improvement. They wondered if the picnic area might not be extended to include a camping site, thus fulfilling a dual purpose. Although Broughton was sympathetic to this, he thought that the Ministry of Transport would not be, as the camping area need not be used by motorway users, and this meant a division of responsibility within the service area. Although nothing had been decided, the estate wanted detailed plans of the service area so that they could make arrangements to sell the farm house and buildings of one ruined holding, and dispose of the remaining land. Broughton asked them to be cautious as nothing was yet confirmed. Pattinson then wrote to Broughton informing him that if the camping site was unacceptable then they would be content to settle just for a picnic area. The Ministry of Transport eventually gave permission for a service station, although its building was postponed. It has not been built, nor are there any plans to build it in the foreseeable future.

On the 30th October, the estate's first contact with the MAFF came with a letter from the Land Commissioner at Carlisle. The first name terms used in the correspondence indicate the excellent relationship between the Ministry and the estate. The Ministry wrote, saying that they were proposing to mark the farm boundaries. The estate replied that they were only too willing to help in every way and if any problems were encountered, the Ministry should get in touch immediately with Mr Wise for assistance. The MAFF replied that they would like to avail themselves of this kind offer.

The next major stage in the planning of the road came with the drilling of

boreholes. These are drilled, sometimes to considerable depths to discover the geology of the land for engineering purposes. When this was first mooted, the estate demanded detailed knowledge of where the boreholes were to be located, and the type of equipment used. They also asked for an assurance from the Ministry of Transport that it would be responsible to make good any damage caused whatsoever through the installation of the boreholes, and that the estate tenants would be compensated for any loss of production. The estate also asked if the representatives of the company which was to carry out the drilling would contact the estate office before entering the farms.

Broughton was concerned not to enter legal matters and felt that a programme could be worked out with the estate, the road engineers and the contractors. In this way:

"I hope to ensure the best possible arrangements as far as the agricultural work is concerned and that entry to the land is by amicable agreement and not by legal restrictions".

He added:

"It is hoped that there will be no damage but if by any chance some does occur the responsibility for payment of compensation will rest with the contractors, but I do not want damage to occur unless in the last resort, hence the arrangements referred to above".

On the 25th June 1964, Lowther wrote to the tenants informing them of the number of boreholes they were to have on their land; the total number being ninety-five. On the 3rd July 1964, the tenants were sent a full explanation of the work that was to be carried out, along with the name and telephone number of the engineer in charge of the operations. The tenants were also told that in the event of anything going wrong they should inform the estate office immediately.

In relation to the general planning of the road, the estate had taken the problem out of the hands of the tenants. Although the estate had discussed all matters fully with the road engineers, not all of the tenant farmers were very happy with the arrangements made. The tenant of Hackthorpe Hall, was the most unhappy. He came to the estate office and complained that under existing arrangements he would have to drive his stock some considerable distance along

the A6, in order to gain access to his fields on the east side of the motorway. The estate had already complained about this, but Broughton had informed them that it was unlikely anything could be done, as the Ministry of Agriculture felt an access to the fields was unwarranted. After the complaint from the tenant, Pattinson wrote to Broughton saying:

"Hackthorpe Hall is one of our most valuable farms, and I wonder if you could reconsider your earlier decision and have an underpass or overpass installed opposite the farmhouse".

Broughton wrote back saying it was unlikely that an access could be provided, because traffic on the A6 after the motorway was built would become lighter, and it would, therefore, be convenient for animals to be moved along it. He added:

"My own enquiries have not given me any hope that the Ministry will change their minds".

Pattinson was unsatisfied with this and advised the tenant to approach the problem through the NFU.

Another problem occurred with the occupier of Town End Farm, Hackthorpe, whose planned access road, he felt, was unnecessarily long. Pattinson informed Broughton of this but Broughton replied saying that it was necessary to have such a length as there would be a problem of gradient which would create difficulties for heavily laden agricultural vehicles. However, Broughton promised to look into the matter when he prepared more detailed plans.

The drilling of boreholes on the estate was soon completed. Although a great deal of care was taken, one farmer did damage his mower by hitting a peg in a hay field. The estate sent the bill for repair, £8, to Broughton stating that an early settlement would be appreciated.

Problems over fencing emerged on November 11th, when the estate complained that the fencing proposed by the Ministry of Transport, namely four rails and two wires was not satisfactory. This was because that when snow lay in drifts, it would be easy for sheep to climb the fence and get onto the motorway. The Ministry of Agriculture supported the case, saying that the best form of


fencing would be oak posts with approximately six foot centres, seven plain wires, and a jumping wire set off at an angle on the top. The Ministry of Transport accepted the MAFF's recommendations.

Whilst this was happening Lowther had been busy planning the reorganisation of its farming structure to accommodate the new road. Lowther was fortunate in this as two farms on the estate were about to be vacated, thus increasing scope for the reallocation of land. As can be seen from Maps 4:2 and 4:3 the reallocation of land substantially reduced severance, and increased the size of the holdings to more than account for land lost. Under the accommodation works discussed in Section 4.4:1, the estate had hedges and fences removed to ensure that the motorway fencing became a true field boundary. As the upkeep of motorway fencing is the responsibility of the Ministry of Transport, this saves the estate a considerable amount of money. Substantial drainage and access improvements were carried out under the accommodation works, and in all, the estate's farms became better structured and more financially sound as a result of the new road, than they had been previously.


4.3:4. The Role of the MAFF in the Planning of the Road

While the MAFF had a role to play in providing advice when required to the road planners and commenting on the general effects of schemes, it was not until late 1964 and early 1965, that Broughton met with the MAFF on a regular basis to consider the agricultural effects of the final line. Broughton wrote to the Ministry of Transport saying:

"These meetings have been most productive in arriving at schemes which reduce the effect of severance without burdening the overall costs. In fact these considerations have had the effect of eliminating two farm crossings previously envisaged, this being done in the case of the the crossing at Buckholme Drive at the cost of providing 1,500 additional yards of accommodation road. It should be noted that all crossings of the motorway except that to accommodate Milestone Farm carry a public highway, although in the case of Town End Underpass; Tinklers Lane, Clifton Hall and Earl Henry's Drive, these are public footpaths and in the case of Fowlerside this is a bridle road".



Map 4:2. Lowther Estate Farms on the Penrith By-Pass Before Reorganisation



on the Penrith By-Pass After Reorganisation

He also informed them that he had discussed the question of accommodation works, bridges and underpasses with many of the landowners and tenants on the line, although the District Valuer was not consulted about these and while the MAFF were consulted they were not present at the meetings. As part of the preparation of their case the MAFF prepared a number of reports; an example of the layout of which is given in Table 4:2. The total number of words ranged from 200-300. Although these reports were concise, they included only the bare essentials of what was needed for compensation and accommodation work assessment. It would be difficult for the MAFF to argue they did a comprehensive job on behalf of the farmer, they did only the minimum necessary for efficient road building, obviously feeling that more detailed work would be the task of the farmers themselves and their agents.

4.3:5. Section Summary

During the early detailed planning of the road, the estate took the opportunity, not only to protect its own interests, but also to further them. In doing this, forward planning and disciplined organisation on their part was of paramount concern. In planning for the road they were helped by the road planners, who gave information to them as soon as it became available. This reflects in many ways, the sympathetic approach of the locally based Mr Broughton. Because of this, during negotiations the estate was able to present comprehensive plans to be considered. This provided for efficient planning, and a useful exchange of information.

Another aid to negotiations was the fact that the estate handled all the tenants' affairs for them. In doing this they relieved the tenants of the task of dealing with the road planners, while ensuring the estate presented a united front and that its interests were catered for. While this may seem overduly paternalistic, this system did work, and did make for easier communication and decision making. The tenants however, were not totally deprived of a voice. The estate office had, and does have an "open door" policy, therefore complaints or problems could be

Table 4:2

An Example of a MAFF Farm Survey Report

CONFIDENTIAL

6 inch Ref = 18/17

Inspection Report

Motor Road

MAFF Ref

Date of Inspection MOT Agency Ref

Present _____

Farm Survey Report

Name of Occupier

Name of Holding

Name of Owner

Other Holding in Occupation

Type of Farm

Acreage

Severance

Purchase

Condition of Hedges and Fences

Condition of Drainage

Labour

Stocking

Machinery and Implements

Services

Condition of Farm Buildings

General Comments on Effects of Proposals

discussed. The fact that there were no complaints from the tenants of "maladministration" on the part of Lowther, illustrates the successful nature of the operation and the degree of trust, that existed between the tenants and the estate in allowing them to manage their affairs. It was all the more important that the estate did this, for the MAFF played a very minor role in the planning of the road doing no more than the minimum necessary.

The genuine constructive rapport the estate built up with the planners, probably rested with both the importance of the estate in controlling so much of the land planned for the road, and the personal influence of Lord Lonsdale. Yet, even if these points are taken as valid, they do not remove the fact that the interchange led to effective and efficient planning on both sides.

4.4:1. The Early Meetings with the District Valuer

As early as May 1963, Lord Lonsdale had decided that negotiations with the District Valuer should end and the sale of land be completed before work on the motorway commenced. It was his wish to obtain the compensation money as quickly as possible, both to pay for past capital schemes, and to initiate new ones. As a businessman, Lord Lonsdale did not wish to see his money tied up with people other than himself any longer than possible.

On the 8th April 1965, the first meeting took place between the estate and the District Valuer regarding land acquisition for the motorway. The estate had had contact with the District Valuer on other matters and so a working relationship had already been formed. The estate had been busy since the motorway was planned encouraging its tenants to grant vacant possession on all land that was to be claimed for later. This was a simple matter for a number of reasons. First, an excellent relationship existed between the tenants and the estate, which meant that the tenants could rely upon the estate to do their utmost for them and not deceive them in any way. Thus, when the estate assured them that they would be compensated for their loss according to current law, the tenants could trust their

word. Second, the tenants were already grateful to the estate, for as a result of the re-structuring of the farms, most were left with more land than before. Third, the tenants were aware that the estate had, and would invest more money in their farms, and so any deal that was beneficial to the estate, would be beneficial to them.

At the meeting, the District Valuer was informed of this plan, that permission to enter would be forthcoming when requested, and that the purchase of land would be agreed at the prices current at the date of entry. The estate told the District Valuer that they would pay the tenants on the normal compensation basis adopted for motorway schemes.

At that time, in order to progress with the scheme, it was necessary for the Ministry of Transport to have returned permission to enter forms. With regard to this, the estate signed the forms on condition that vacant possession had been given, that the work area would be adequately fenced during construction and that any removal of trees or fencing would necessitate permission from the estate. The District Valuer anxious to please, and happy that events were running smoothly said:

"Would you kindly accept, and convey to his Lordship my appreciation of the co-operation he has shown in this connection".

The estate had been employing one man full time, working out a complete set of accommodation works which the estate believed to be necessary. The list of accommodation works was exhaustive. The more general terms included:-

1. All fences to side roads, unless shown otherwise on the accommodation works plans and schedules, are to be of wood posts and woven wire.
2. Temporary access across the road works to be maintained to severed portions of land, and the water supplies maintained until such times as the permanent to those severed portions of land is constructed or until the alternative water supplies have been installed.
3. In the event of the motorway fence being of the standard wooden post rail type, sheep netting or additional strands of wire should be provided, and the fence then would be the subject of the Ministry's special provisions which covers these special appendages or additions.
4. All areas covered by licences for earthwork grading to be soiled and seeded at the completion of the works.

5. Land which is disturbed or damaged in the exercise of the rights obtaining under licence or easements, should be made good to the reasonable satisfaction of the vendors, by soiling and seeding where necessary.
6. All land drains affected by the motorway proposals to be picked up by cut off drains and led to suitable outfalls.
7. Reference on the plot plans to footpath diversions to be dealt with by way of dedication.

The estate sent these requests off to the District Valuer noting that it may take some time for them to be studied and offered the estate's services if there were any queries. Concluding his letter enclosing the Schedule of Accommodation Works Pattinson said:

" I hope that you will be able to agree to our suggestions and when we reach this stage perhaps we can get together to discuss valuations. I very much hope that we will be able to reach complete agreement by the end of this year, so that you can authorise the Ministry to pay us in the New Year 90 per cent of the agreed money. This will enable us to commence re-organising the estate farms which will be affected by the motorway".

The estate received a letter on the 9th September 1965, informing them that the District Valuer had considered the accommodation works and was prepared to discuss them. The meeting went off without problems, as the District Valuer thought that all the demands made by the estate were reasonable. The estate was delighted to have cleared this matter so easily, and were understandably anxious to settle the problem of valuations, hoping that they would be completed by early 1966.

On the 2nd December 1965, the valuation of property and the claims for disturbance were discussed. The estate had drawn up a list of items and although no money had been discussed, it was made quite clear, that the estate was not going to miss any item for which they could claim. At the meeting, the estate stated that if a settlement was reached with regard to the amount of compensation payable, they would require under the terms of entry, the Ministry to pay 90 per cent of the agreed sum prior to making entry on the land or, alternatively, an undertaking that the conveyancing would be completed and the full amount of compensation paid by the 1st May 1966.

The District Valuer had completed his review of valuations and a meeting on the 22nd December 1965 proved to be very amicable, with both parties in total agreement. The amount settled on was £56,000 although this did not take into consideration compensation for easements and so forth. Added to this, the estate said that it would let the Ministry of Transport have the permission to enter forms, signed by the tenants as these had been held back while the estate was waiting for settlement. Pattinson was obviously delighted that a settlement had been reached, as he wrote to the District Valuer:

"I would like to express my appreciation of the manner in which the negotiations have been conducted and hope that the relationship will continue for many years".

4.4:2. The Compensation Payment: Some Unforeseen Problems

January 1966 started auspiciously with a meeting on site, between Mr Pattinson and the Chief Resident Engineer on the scheme, Mr Dean. Pattinson went through the accommodation works agreed between the estate and the District Valuer, ensuring that Dean was fully aware of what was needed, including the creation of larger fields by the removal of trees, hedgerows and fences; the construction of new fences and gates and changes in the water supply to different fields.

As with most expanding businesses, Lowther Estate had a certain cash flow problem. This no doubt was the reason for concern when the Ministry of Transport announced that it planned to revise the Date of Entry from the 1st May 1966, to the 1st July 1966, and hence the payment of the compensation money. The problems for the estate were compounded when they learned that the Agricultural Mortgage Corporation, from whom they had borrowed a substantial sum, demanded a repayment of some £10,000. The reason for this was that some of the land to be sold had been improved on AMC finance and on hearing that the estate was selling it, they wanted their money back. The estate's Solicitor said :

"I do not think that they dispute the fact that there is ample security, but are taking the opportunity of getting a repayment from this loan which is at a considerably lower rate than they can now lend money".

The security was indeed very great, with the estate's remaining land being valued even on a conservative basis at over £1,000,000 in 1966. Pattinson wrote to the

AMC asking them to reconsider their demand saying:

"The rents have been increased on two occasions since we took out the mortgage and I am negotiating a further increase. In view of this I feel that your demand for the return of part of the loan is unjustified".

The AMC eventually reconsidered their position and dropped the demand after it being pointed out that:-

1. It was a forced sale to the Ministry of Transport.
2. The capital was required for estate improvement.
3. That there was a considerable amount of land included in this sale not subject to an AMC mortgage.

The cash flow crisis was temporary for the money was paid on the 1st July 1966, but it did illustrate the problems that can occur when one banks upon government to pay money immediately. It also shows that there are dangers in being too efficient; the problems regarding compensation were not however over, although they did not reveal themselves until into 1967.

As stated earlier, the tenants agreed to accept their compensation from the estate, while handing back the tenanted land they held, for the estate to sell under vacant possession. The estate settled with the tenants on the basis of two years rent for land lost, while disturbance was reckoned to be £7.00 per acre^{*} lost, for two years. The estate being fair to its tenants gave generously within the compensation law of that time, so that the tenants did not have any disbenefit from claiming compensation from them, as compared to the District Valuer.

The tenants agreed to the compensation on the 15th February 1967, yet by the 24th February two serious problems had occurred. The first problem arose out of the difficulty in obtaining money from the Settled Land Trust. The Settled Land Trust came about when Hugh Lowther the 5th Earl sold his reversion to the Settled Land Trust, which controlled all the estate's financial dealing with regard to land. (The financial development of the estate is explained in more detail in Part 2 of this chapter).

The second problem came with a newspaper report quoting a Ministry of

*NB. The measurement "acre" as opposed to "hectare" is used to maintain the verisimilitude of the date: 1 acre = 0.4 hectares.

Agriculture official, who said that the compensation received by tenants as a result of a road scheme would most probably be altered in the future to ensure that they had a fairer deal. This created a problem for the estate due to the fact, that they had already budgeted for the tenants' payments, and agreed with the tenants an amount substantially less than they would receive under any new regulations.

With regard to the first problem, a great deal of discussion had taken place between the estate and the Trustees, in an attempt to gain approval for paying the compensation money out of Trust funds. This was compounded by the increasing demands of tenants for the money agreed. The estate felt that as they had entered an agreement they must conform to it, primarily in order to maintain a position of trust between the estate and its tenants. The Trustees however, felt that they could not part with any money as there was no part of the Settled Land Act which dealt with this situation.

Pattinson wrote to the estate's solicitors pointing out, that the estate by gaining vacant possession had increased the value of the land by at least £150 an acre, and therefore, could see no moral reason why the money could not be paid over. However, the solicitors felt that to do so would require a contravention of the law. The estate then went to seek the QC's advice on the matter. He recommended that the Trustees would have to apply to the courts in order to gain permission to pay the money.

The estate was still in considerable difficulty, as it already owed the tenants £4,864, which had to be paid in the near future, with a further estimated £1,300 to be paid later. This meant that the estate now had a serious cash flow problem, for as Lord Lonsdale admitted, it had little chance of obtaining the money from elsewhere as the estate was already heavily in debt. Added to this negotiations had already started with the District Valuer on the next stage of the motorway, Tebay to Hackthorpe. The problem with having to go to court would increase the time tenants were waiting for the money, perhaps upwards of six months. In the event, the Trustees managed to get the court case finished before the long summer vacation and the money was released and paid to the tenants.

In relation to the second problem, a less satisfactory conclusion emerged. Pattinson wrote to the District Valuer informing him that he had completed his negotiations with the tenants, only to find that the amount that they felt they should receive, would be substantially greater than that already agreed. Therefore, he requested that the amount of money he agreed upon be increased. As Pattinson said:

"Although we agreed that the basic agricultural value for the land was £275, I should not have accepted any less than £300 if I had known I should include compensation for the tenants on the basis of six years rent.... I will be very much obliged if you will take the matter up with the Ministry of Transport and ascertain whether we will be compensated for this extra amount".

A letter on the 17th March 1967, from the District Valuer said he could not see the Ministry of Transport allowing anymore money as the new proposals did not yet apply. Pattinson wrote again, saying that:

"It does of course put us in a very embarrassing position, as all the farmers are naturally expecting five to six years rent for disturbance, so I feel most strongly that we ought to receive further compensation, and I hope you will fight very hard for this on our behalf".

As was expected, the Ministry of Transport felt that they could not re-open negotiations as an agreement had already been made; added to this the new proposals were not in operation. Although this placed the estate in an uncomfortable situation, especially as they promised the tenants that they would fight to achieve the best situation as regards them, it was not a disastrous mistake. It could be explained that the proposals were not law, and so they would not be compensated on that basis anyway. However, there was the potential for some degree of ill feeling, although in the event this was not forthcoming. The amounts paid to the tenants can be seen in Table 4:3.

4.4:3. Section Summary: The Compensation Negotiations

Both the estate and the District Valuer entered the compensation negotiations with a positive attitude. The District Valuer and the estate were already well known to each other, which meant that both realised that the other

Table 4:3. The Level of Severance and Disturbance Suffered by the Estate's Tenants, and the Amount of Compensation Received

Farm	Acres					Disturbance £	Loss of Profit £	Improvements £	General Inconvenience £	Total £
	Acreage	Severance	Land Loss							
Clifton Moor	150	21	7		300	620	55	-		975
Low Moor	176	14	7		85	450	50	-		585
Midtown	78	48	4		45	135	7	40		227
Mount Clifton	123	34	6		65	200	18	-		283
Abbot's Lodge	127	11	16		193	360	31	100		684
Town End	191	104	14		141	506	31	-		678
Hackthorpe Hall	386	139	23		198	660	18	-		876
Eamont Bridge	163	86	23		120	200	36	200		556

knew the fair price of land. This in itself made the negotiations simpler. The relationship between the estate and the District Valuer was amicable, but businesslike. The estate had expressed the wish that they hoped to complete negotiations rapidly, a decision the District Valuer clearly respected.

As noted earlier, the estate had managed to obtain vacant possession from the tenants, and thus increase the total amount of compensation received. While this showed the level of trust and respect between the estate and the tenants, it also indicated the high level of business acumen within the estate.

The District Valuer responded to Lowther's positive attitude, by reacting quickly to their demands and suggestions. Over the question of the accommodation works there was little disagreement. The estate looked upon the road as an opportunity to re-organise its farms, while the District Valuer, recognising that the estate was creating opportunity out of adversity, attempted to make as few complications for them as possible. Similarly, the question of compensation was settled quite quickly to the mutual satisfaction of both sides. In this, the estate's ability to be reasonable with the agencies it was negotiating with and to set itself goals and achieve them, produced net advantages.

The estate were however, upset when the Ministry of Transport revised the Date of Entry onto the estate's land and hence the date of the compensation payments. This, although only a duration of two months, created a temporary cash flow crisis, indicating that bureaucratic inefficiency can create serious problems for even a well organised team such as Lowther.

The problems with regard to the payment of the tenants' compensation money, can be classed as an oversight; clearly the mechanics of trust funds were not completely understood even by Lord Lonsdale, who in the past had set up a trust fund of his own. The problem was not so much that the estate could not get the money, as they were certain that it would be obtained at some time, but rather the estate felt that they had a moral obligation to pay the tenant's money as quickly as possible; the estate obviously wished to retain the trust and respect of its tenants.

A similar situation occurred with the rumour that tenant's compensation money would be increased. The estate had concluded legal and binding agreements with the District Valuer, under the existing law, yet they were prepared to fight to get the tenants a fair deal. As it happened, the District Valuer felt he could not increase the compensation money agreed and the rumour did not manifest itself into law until 1973.

In the final analysis, the problems that occurred, show that even with a highly organised and effective approach to a road development, significant difficulties can emerge. However, the better organised one is, the more these problems can be contained.

4.5:1. The Relationship Between the Estate and the Contractors

While the self-created, but unforeseeable problems regarding compensation were developing, the estate was creating an excellent working relationship with the contractor building the road. Once the contract had been awarded, Broughton, anxious that the construction should progress smoothly wrote to the estate on October 12th 1966, saying:

"I am writing to inform you that the contract for the Penrith By-Pass has been awarded to MacAlpine's who are in association with Messrs Fairclough. I have asked MacAlpine's to get in touch and let you have details of the various officials who will be responsible for undertaking the work, and I hope to call and see you fairly soon to explain the progress of the work".

Within a few days Lord Lonsdale and Pattinson had met A H Mason the land-agent for MacAlpine's. The meeting was cordial, with Mason explaining exactly what they planned to do and within what timescale. The estate explained that they were concerned that the work should be carried out as quickly and efficiently as possible, but that they were not prepared to accept any lack of attention which may harm the estate or its tenants. The estate also asked for a complete list of the directors of MacAlpine's to contact in times of severe difficulties. Mason then explained, that during the construction, the work area would be temporarily fenced off, as the estate had insisted, along the exact boundaries of the motorway. The

temporary fences were to be substantial to avoid difficulties with stock straying and in order to contain people working on the contract.

Although Mason claimed that there was likely to be very little sub-contracting as MacAlpine's were planning to do most of the work themselves, there would be an opportunity for the estate to quote for the permanent and temporary fencing. Mason also said there could be an opportunity for the estate to quote for the facing of bridges, although this was a matter for Fairclough's to decide.

MacAlpine's were considering land owned by Cumberland County Council to use as headquarters, yet the estate were keen to get them on their land both for financial and strategic reasons; having the site headquarters close at hand would be extremely convenient. In respect of this the estate suggested a site at Eamont Bridge, close to the river very attractive administratively and aesthetically. They were also keen that MacAlpine's should use minerals from the estate. They gave details of a deposit of gravel at Skirsgill which could be worked and then turned into a lake for amenity. They also had limestone quarries which they considered MacAlpine's might find useful. MacAlpine's said that although they were intending to open their own quarry in the area, provided planning permission could be obtained, they were interested in the estate's. The only problem was that the specification of existing quarries was rarely up to the required standard, and that only in a very few cases would they be able to supply the quantity of stone required while fulfilling other commitments. He also thought there might be some difficulty in the local quarries supplying stone in the height of the summer holiday season along the A6. The estate then pointed out the convenience of a previously abandoned quarry in Lowther village to which Mason responded with interest, although the estate indicated that there may be some problems in acquiring planning permission to open up a new face.

They then discussed the disposal of top soil. Mason said that areas of $1\frac{1}{2}$ acres in extent were required at $1\frac{1}{4}$ mile intervals, these usually being situated in the corners of fields. Pattinson said that he could easily make the arrangements for this as he was acting on behalf of all the tenants, and a large number of owners

along the route. A preliminary discussion then took place over rents, with a figure of £150 - £200 per acre per annum being mooted.

The disposal of sub-soil also created a problem, especially as at least 30,000 cubic yards had to be dumped at the construction of the interchange south of Hackthorpe. Here Pattinson suggested that the area sloping down towards the railway could be stripped of its top-soil, filled up with sub-soil, and then spread over with the topsoil and reseeded. Pattinson pointed out other areas of the estate's land where there were dips, where a total of 130,000 cubic feet of subsoil could be stored. Mason was appreciative of this help, and pointed out that MacAlpine's usually paid a figure of £50 per acre per annum for this operation, and were responsible for levelling off and reseeding. Pattinson felt this figure to be too low, he was also concerned about the effect of these operations upon field drainage, insisting that a new field drainage system would have to be installed once the area had settled. Bailey Bridges were to be constructed over the rivers Lowther and Eamont, and additional land would be required on a temporary basis. Pattinson said he could foresee no problems with regard to this, he then went on to suggest that if MacAlpine's were to make a present of a Bailey Bridge, and construct it over the River Lowther at Low Garden's Bridge, the estate would find it most useful. Mason was not unsympathetic to this suggestion.

As regards the manner in which MacAlpine's should liaise with the tenants, Pattinson informed Mason that he should visit each tenant before any operations were commenced. He also asked Mason to write to each tenant informing them who would be in charge of the contract, and who the officials acting for the County Council were.

On the 21st October 1966, a further meeting with Mason took place. At this Mason was informed that that estate required £100 per acre, per annum for the rent of the top soil tips, which totalled some 25 acres in extent, and that MacAlpine's would be responsible for paying the cost of re-instatement and for temporarily fencing off the areas during the tipping period.

With regard to the permanent tips, the estate required a figure of £200 per

acre as well as the cost of putting in new drains which would be in the region of £75 - £80 per acre. In addition, there would have to be compensation for the loss of land value due to the mixing of top soil and subsoil. The estate had also arranged for a tip to be made near Earl Henry's Drive, the road running through Lowther Park, and here larger sums would be required as the area had been dedicated in a Forestry Commission Scheme. Mason ruled out the re-opening of the quarry near Lowther village, as he thought planning permission could not be obtained as it was too close to the village. In response to this, Pattinson mentioned that there was a quarry, which the estate controlled at Sweetholm, which he suggested would be ideal for MacAlpine's purposes because it would give access to the by-pass without traffic having to traverse the A6.

By early 1967, MacAlpine's had already started their work, and although a number of minor problems arose, mainly over accommodation works, they were solved almost immediately by negotiation. Pattinson was obviously very pleased with how things were progressing, even at this early stage. In a letter to Broughton, Pattinson praised the Chief Engineer, Mr Dean, for being "most helpful", and commented that MacAlpine's appeared to be setting about the construction of the by-pass in "a most business-like manner".

Business with MacAlpine's was also prospering. At a meeting on the 13th January 1967, Pattinson concluded the sale of 400,000 tons of sand from the estate to MacAlpine's at a cost of 6d a ton. The sale included a condition that they restored the twelve acres of land from which it was taken when the abstraction was completed. At the same time the estate took the opportunity of getting a number of jobs done which were not included in the accommodation works, these involved the removal of hedges and the improvement of farm roads, at a total cost of £1,476; far less expensive than if the estate had employed someone else to do the work. Added to this MacAlpine's obtained a second hand Bailey Bridge which was erected for less than £250. Although the bridge was £1,500 less than the price of a new one, MacAlpine's felt that making a present of it would be too expensive.

By the 20th January 1967, the estate had been keeping a sharp watch on the

construction team, and had noted that in one field the "inch and collar" drainage had not been catered for properly, and that in another the contractors were laying the drains in sand. Pattinson immediately got in touch with the Chief Resident Engineer, saying diplomatically:

"Although supervising the work is not our responsibility I am rather worried that the manner in which the drainage is being dealt with at present, will require MacAlpine's to replace them at a future date".

However, the estate could be too "businesslike". One example of this was when Fairclough's wanted some land to rent in order to construct a culvert, although a rent of £100 was agreed Fairclough's later wrote:

"We do believe, however, that six months is all that will be necessary to complete our work. In view of this fact, and comparing this price with that of other land hired from you, your rent appears to be extremely high...., we trust, that you will endeavour to keep the price low in the future so that this high price will be balanced throughout the contract".

The estate was not adverse to putting financial pressures on the contractors. MacAlpine's wished to use part of the main road through Lowther Park, Earl Henry's Drive, as an access point to a construction site on the by-pass. The estate agreed to let them use the drive only after stipulating a set of conditions, including an advance payment of £100, the drive to be resurfaced after use, and no use to be made of it until the contractors had constructed an agreed access road to one of the estate's farms, which MacAlpine's had not yet built.

MacAlpine's always sought permission before carrying out any tasks. In this spirit, before carrying out any activities at the quarry at Sweetholm, they informed the estate. They wrote once that they wished to fell 250 yards of woodland to enable them to take out stone. The estate concurred with this but Pattinson advised that:

"It would be better if they felled say 100 yards now and the rest as the quarry develops, otherwise the planners may get a little excited".

Apart from drainage, fencing was the next major problem for the estate. In March 1967, Pattinson had noticed that MacAlpine's were not keeping to the

original boundaries fixed and wrote to the District Valuer informing him and stated that the conveyance should be altered to include the extra land taken. MacAlpine's very shortly after revised their fencing boundaries. Another difficulty was that the estate felt that some of the permanent fencing being constructed, did not have adequate straining posts, or properly strained wire. The Chief Engineer was informed about this and resolved the problem.

As expected some isolated incidences of flooding took place, with one potato field being ruined. MacAlpine's were very worried about this and wrote:

"We must again apologise for the inconvenience caused in this respect and trust that in future you will have no further cause for complaint".

All this time the estate was earning money from various agreements it was making with the contractors. By September 1967, a schedule of agreements and the estate's fees had been drawn up as shown in Table 4:4.

Table 4:4. Financial Agreements made with the Contractors

Agreements	Consideration £	Fee on scale 5a £ s d
A 592 diversion	540	27.5.0
Farm accesses	300	18.18.0
River Lowther tip	4,000	69. 6.0
Bailey bridge easements	200	14.14.0
Four drainage outfall accesses	100	10.10.0
Various topsoil areas	3,110	59.17.0
Various spoil tips	8,403	115.10.0
Land at Hackthorpe Hall	200	14.14.0
Sand from Cliburn	10,000	52.10.0
Total	26,853	383. 4.0
Grand total	27,236	

In negotiations with MacAlpine's, the estate had a major advantage in controlling a long length of motorway. Often construction companies tend to play one farmer off against another in an attempt to reduce tip site costs. Yet Lowther had complete control of deals, knowing exactly what price was being given all the way along.

Added to this, MacAlpine's knew that any slackness on their part with regard to reinstating or payment of fees would result in serious difficulties in renting more land from the estate.

Throughout the construction of the by-pass, the camaraderie between the estate and MacAlpine's grew, not only did the leading actors in the construction team regard the estate as trustworthy and efficient businessmen, but also as friends. In this respect the estate's agents, and the surveyors of MacAlpine's were on first name terms, visited each others houses and went shooting together. MacAlpine's agents also shared their vast experiences with the estate, especially with regard to reducing tax liability on land deals.

It was also appreciated that having the estate office so close to the construction site enabled decisions to be made quickly. For example, the County Council discovered that they had to build an accommodation bridge ten yards to the north of where it had been planned. Thus, there had to be a further acquisition of land. They got in touch with the estate, informed them of their plans, and gained immediate approval. The Chief Resident Engineer wrote to the estate:

"I would like to express my appreciation of Mr Wise's co-operation in giving this decision which was vital to the road construction of the structures to this area".

With construction, time means money, and saved time means money saved.

4.5:2. Section Summary: The Construction Period

The estate approached the construction period of the road in the same manner as they conducted the earlier stages of its development. Undoubtedly, this stage is often the one where the most significant problems arise for the farmer. Yet, as has been shown, the construction of the road went without serious problems, almost with ease.

Again, this was achieved by the estate, through organisation and reasonable behaviour. Once the contractors recognised the estate's determination to get through this phase with as few difficulties as possible, they were obliged to ensure that their action concurred with the estate's wishes. Yet, while the estate was

rigorous in its demands, it was also very helpful, giving aid and advice wherever possible. This enabled MacAlpine's to significantly quicken both the administration and construction of the road development. Indeed, such was the level of respect, and ease of communication between both parties, that deep and lasting personal relationships were built up between the respective individuals involved. The estate also recognised numerous opportunities to develop its own interests, benefiting considerably from MacAlpine's presence on their land. This may be termed as good business sense, reflecting a high degree of opportunistic behaviour.

4.6:1. The Tebay to Hackthorpe Section of the M6

The Tebay to Hackthorpe section, was investigated at a later stage than the Penrith By-Pass; in general terms events on this section moved at about one year later. During 1965, the estate was shown plans by the consultants working on the scheme and the County Council. By December 1965, the accommodation works had been agreed with the District Valuer expressing:

"My thanks for the facilities provided, and the helpful discussions that took place".

During the winter of 1965, the civil engineers Marples Ridgeway had been carrying out a series of site investigations, involving the drilling of boreholes and the digging of trial pits for engineering purposes. When this had been done previously on the by-pass little damage had been done, but when Marples Ridgeway started to work, a number of problems began to occur. Lord Lonsdale's grouse shoot on Crosby Ravensworth Fell, fell by 100 per bag and he received £75 compensation for this. At one farm, stock entered a field due to poor fencing arrangements, on another pits were left unfenced and the farmer refused to allow the animals into the fields, and in another a sheep drowned in a water filled pit. As well as this a hay crop of $2\frac{1}{2}$ acres was ruined by motor vehicles travelling across it. The negotiations for compensation were carried out with the District Valuer, and a total of £796 was agreed to be split amongst seventeen farmers. Yet, a problem emerged that three tenants had not received their compensation by the time

Marples Ridgeway wished to return and carry out supplementary soil investigations. As a result of this, the estate asked its tenants not to sign the permission to enter forms until the money had been received; a cheque was sent within a week.

The design consultants, Scott, Wilson and Kirkpatrick, made every effort to be helpful, while asking favours of the estate. A letter on March 8th 1966 asked the estate whether they minded a public footpath travelling along an agricultural underpass rather than having the two duplicating each other. The estate seeing the reasonableness of this suggestion agreed. Yet the estate also managed to gain favours. Lord Lonsdale had decided that he did not want an access road to one of his farms which passed through Lowther Park to be fenced within the Park. To facilitate this he asked that a cattle grid be placed at the point where the access road entered the Park. The consultants agreed with this suggestion.

Compensation negotiations for the motorway south of Hackthorpe commenced on the 6th October 1966. The estate made it clear that they wished to work on a similar basis to the by-pass which meant agreeing to accommodation works which would be necessary when the road passed through estate property, and compensation for land on the basis of vacant possession. One interesting aspect of the compensation was that a relatively new house had to be knocked down for the motorway. Pattinson sent the District Valuer details of the house saying:

1. The cost of actual construction was £7,000 excluding the value of the site.
2. It was constructed in such a way that an additional two bedrooms could be added.
3. It was situated in a delightful aspect.
4. It had some connection with Sir Winston Churchill.
5. It was unlikely that any other new development would have taken place in the vicinity.
6. It was within a quarter of an hour driving distance of the Lake District.

In the meantime, the site investigators had completed their second round of boreholes and trial pits. The fact that the contractors took more care is shown in that the claims were substantially lower for each farmer. As shown in Table.4:5.

Table 4:5. Compensation for Damage During Site Investigation

	4.4.66	7.10.66
	£	£
Hackthorpe Hall Farm	50	10
Thrimby Farm	27	10
Thrimby Grange Farm	33	15
Low Hall Farm	30	5
High Farm	62	10
Rise Bank Farm	40	10
Hutton Farm	135	10

Although the number of boreholes and trial pits is not recorded, it may be assumed they were roughly similar on both occasions. The contractors were clearly taking more care after the estate's anger the first time round.

Pattinson was getting concerned about the compensation for "Churchill House" as it was called. The house was occupied by the farm manager of Lowther Park Farms, and the estate wanted a replacement house for him as soon as possible in order to avoid having him "homeless". Yet because of the complexity of the Trust governing the estate, a house could not be built until money was received. The cost of a replacement house had already been ascertained. In respect of this the District Valuer asked for the plans of the house, and rather embarrassingly the estate sent the plans for the new house they wished to build. The District Valuer kept these for rating purposes. By December 1966, Pattinson was still pressing for discussions on the valuation of both the house and the land.

Additional to land purchase a degree of mineral sterilisation would take place due to the motorway running over this land. In respect of this the estate employed a mineral valuer in Whitehaven who already had close connection with the estate, to place a value on the minerals which included some areas of sand and gravel, and the stone which would be taken out of cuttings and used in the motorway.

The motorway also went over common land, which although the estate did not own it, had the mineral rights. Thus the mineral valuer stated that he thought 57,000 cubic yards of stone would be taken from the common land, this represented approximately 200,000 tons, which valued at a royalty figure of six old pence a ton meant a final figure in the region of £5,000. Added to this, a quarry owned by the

estate, would also be sterilised which meant a figure of £4,000 lost production over twenty years.

Yet the compensation negotiations for the minerals did not go as easily as the estate had hoped. The District Valuer pointed out that in his opinion the estate was not entitled to compensation unless it could prove that it had planning permission for removing the stone.

On the 21st February 1967, Pattinson wrote to the estate's solicitors informing them that he was hoping for a settlement within the next month, and he wished to complete the sale before the contractors entered the land in October 1967. Added to this, the estate asked the solicitors to attempt to get an advance of £11,000 on the compensation for Churchill House, so that construction could start on a new one. The new house planned by the estate was to be larger than the old one, covering a floor area of some 2,020 square feet as compared to the old one of 1,966 square feet. Pattinson and the District Valuer met on February 20th and agreed a substantial proportion of the compensation, valuing most of the land in the Tebay and Hackthorpe Section, totalling £62,700.

On the 6th February 1967, another meeting took place with the District Valuer, at which more land and sporting right loss were discussed and an agreement made totalling £15,255, although the estate was only entitled to £5,255 of this as a substantial proportion went to the commoners and a shooting syndicate. In addition, a further £5,000 was obtained for the use of minerals on the road, and their sterilisation, although those mineral areas without planning permission were not accepted for compensation. A number of minor problems were resolved with the District Valuer on the 12th May 1967, and a final compensation figure of £73,500 was agreed.

In addition to this, the estate supplied fencing material for both the Penrith By-Pass and the section south of Hackthorpe. In all, the motorway showed itself to be financially lucrative to the estate, as Table 4:6. shows.

Table 4:6 Payments to the Estate through the Construction of the M6

	Amount £
Compensation from:-	
Agents fees	1,500
Penrith by-pass section	56,000
Boreholes and trial pits	400
Agreements with contractors	16,700
Fencing	5,000
	<u>79,600</u>
Agents fees	1,500
South of Hackthorpe section	73,000
Boreholes and trial pits	400
Agreements with contractors	10,000
Fencing	5,000
	<u>89,900</u>
Total	<u>169,500</u>

4.6:2. Section Summary: The Tebay to Hackthorpe Section

The Tebay to Hackthorpe Section was a southward extension of the Penrith By-Pass. The estate suffered in the first phase with damage caused by borehole contractors. The estate put pressure upon them and the situation improved the second time around. The estate had an excellent relationship with the design consultants and with the District Valuer, producing successful results. They also benefited significantly in terms of extra work done in the farms, and from other financial arrangements. Although the Lowther Estate is extremely wealthy, it was prepared to claim for everything it was entitled to, however small that item may be. This clearly shows good business sense, and the ability to make opportunity from adversity. Although no source material exists upon the relationship with the contractors, the estate claims they worked with them well. Visual perusal of the farms in the area indicates that this is likely to be true, as no lasting damage, for example water laden fields or patches of poor vegetation growth could be seen.

4.7. The General Conclusions

The development of the Penrith By-Pass illustrates how a major agricultural estate tackled the construction of a large inter-urban road upon its land. Without exception, all stages went well, with no significant problems arising. On the part of the estate, this was due to three major factors. First, the estate carried out research in order to isolate the problems likely to occur, and planned in advance to ensure that they would not arise. Second, by being well organised, they kept tight control over everything that was happening that threatened the estate's interests in any way. Third, in all their actions, the estate accepted that the road was inevitable and thus did everything in their power to ease its development. Added to these major factors, they refused to look upon the road as a major disaster, but viewed it as the means of opening up many possibilities of financial advancement. In all this they were helped by the fact that the agencies involved responded to their demands in a sympathetic manner, while they themselves benefited from the estate's reasonable and informed advice.

Chapter Four Part 1, has shown that most of the problems that arise for the agricultural community during a major road development are completely unnecessary. Therefore, this study presents itself as a unique model of a successful road development. Chapter Five will examine a more typical example of a road development traversing agricultural land, and comparison between the two case studies will be made in Chapter Six.

CHAPTER 4

PART 2

THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE
LOWTHER ESTATE

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4.7:1. Introduction

Chapter Two indicated that as a focus and as a resource for rural development, agricultural estates have been cited as having excellent potential. Lowther Estate, under the dynamic leadership of Lord Lonsdale, has developed to a significant extent, both agricultural and non-agricultural business activities. This sub-chapter aims to examine how this was done, and more importantly, to consider the success of their rural developments in the light of the present economic crisis. Added to this, the breadth of Lowther activities, will provide a useful example of integrated rural development.

Each of the different operations on the estate is split into a separate limited company. This allows each separate operation to be financially accountable without detriment to the rest of the estate. It also allows the management to isolate the relative profitability of the different companies. The accounts for the individual companies were obtained, and analysed using the methodology explained in Appendix 2. All the companies mentioned here are subsidiaries of Lakeland Investments Limited, with the exception of Lowther Caravan Park Limited, in which Lakeland Investments has a 40 per cent holding.

The information provided by the accounts, must however, be treated with some caution. All the companies are private, which means that not only is there less open scrutiny by the Stock Exchange and investors, but there is a considerable incentive not to produce too significant profits for taxation purposes. For the publicly quoted company even though profits are taxed, investors like to see them being made.

Profits can be "hidden" through the undervaluing of stock, manipulating depreciation charges, giving cheap loans to other group companies, and by skillful use of capital allowances on tax. These and various other accounting devices can obscure the true state of the company. However, even with these caveats, the

accounts do give an indication of the way the companies operate and their relative success. (Reid and Myddleton 1971).

One important item is the debt ratio, or gearing of the companies. This shows the degree to which companies operate in debt, and is usually expressed as:-

$$\frac{\text{Long term debt}}{\text{Net Assets}}$$

Long term debt usually appears in the balance sheet under "Source of Funds" and includes such items as mortgages and debentures. However, bank overdrafts and loans from other companies can and do in the case of the Lowther companies, make up a considerable and ongoing source of funds. Although theoretically bank overdrafts can be recalled in seven days, companies often have long term borrowing arrangements worked out with the banks. This is the case with the Lowther companies. However, in the accounts the bank overdrafts and loans from other companies in the group are termed "current liabilities". To take account of this, "Debt Ratio 1", includes bank overdrafts and borrowing from other group companies alongside these long term debts indicated under "Source of Funds". "Debt Ratio 2" takes the more orthodox approach of including only specified long term debts (Reid and Myddleton 1971).

4.8:1. Background to the Economic Development of the Lowther Estate

As noted earlier, as soon as Lord Lonsdale succeeded to the Earldom he took upon himself the role of managing the estate in a proper and efficient way, becoming directly involved with decision making rather than leaving this aspect to others, and living the life of the absentee landlord. With the help of his surveyor, Derek Pattinson, Lord Lonsdale set to his first task of creating a viable agriculture within the estate. The first stage of this was a ten year development plan, which was worked out to provide an effective guideline for operations. The development

plan, considered each tenanted farm individually. Starting from basics, it ensured that the land was properly drained, that there were adequate water supplies to each farm, and that efficient and practical animal housing was constructed. Later, as the pace of intensification quickened, came the provision of milking parlours, outbuildings and silage pits. It was a major element of estate policy to use all available government grants. As well as this, substantial loans were taken out from the Agricultural Mortgage Corporation.

The Earl decided that the estate needed to be consolidated, in order that it could run more efficiently. The estate had been scattered throughout Scotland and northern England, and it was decided to sell off those parts which could not be effectively controlled. This of course also created income with which to pay off the huge debts owing on the estate, as well as financing investment. The most substantial portion of the estate was concentrated around Lowther Castle, near Penrith. This it was decided would be the focus for all future development, as the estate's office at Hackthorpe was in sight of many of the tenanted farms. In all, some 13,000 acres (5,000 ha) of agricultural land were sold in the rationalisation of the estate.

4.8:2. Farming on the Estate 1: Lowther Park Farms Limited.

Much of the land farmed around Lowther, is tenanted by Lowther Park Farms Limited, a company set up by Lord Lonsdale in 1969. The land farmed is almost entirely within the boundary of the old Lowther Deer Park. This was created by the 5th Earl just before the First World War. In doing so, he flattened the boundaries of twenty farms, creating the largest deer park in Britain. During the Second World War, the park was used as a tank training ground, which did considerable damage to what remained of the drainage. However, at the end of the war the government restored the land to agriculture, under the supervision of the MAFF. As a result of this, 3,000 acres (1,215 hectares) of land in good condition and untenanted, provided an excellent basis for the development of Lowther Park Farms.

On the land tenanted from the estate, by Lowther Park Farms, Lord Lonsdale has attempted to integrate farming systems, with each enterprise complementing the other, and the topography and climate of the area in which it is positioned. The principle outputs from the company, are fat cattle and fat sheep, milk and broiler chickens. On the higher ground, which is eligible for Hill Compensatory Allowances, there are 330 suckler cows, with Charolais and Hereford bulls being used. In an attempt to condense calving, Prostaglandin and artificial insemination are used. The cattle are inwintered, being fed on silage and home produced barley.

On the middle ground there is a flock of 1,000 North Country Cheviot ewes and 350 Greyface ewes. The lambs from the ewe flocks are added to annually by 2,200 purchased Scottish Blackface store lambs. The estate until recently, had a policy of keeping only North Country Cheviot ewes, but as part of the continued drive to increase productivity and income, Greyface ewes have been introduced and crossed with Dorset and Suffolk rams. By this means, it is hoped to increase the breeding flock to 1,800 ewes.

On the lower land, a partly pedigree Friesian dairy herd is kept. At present they number around 240, although there are plans to increase the herd to around 280. All breeding is done by pedigree bulls, although heifers are mated to a Hereford bull and the poorer cows to Charolais bulls. All the young cattle from the dairy herd are reared on a separate small farm which contains a specialist building with both loose yards and cubicles. This is used to rear the steers until nine months of age, and dairy heifers until the bulling heifer stage. A 400 head slatted beef fattening shed accommodates the output of both the dairy and the suckler herd. On average about 430 animals are fattened annually and sold mainly as deadweight.

In total there are 6 broiler houses which accommodate somewhere in the region of 115,000 birds. These intensive houses produce 4.5 crops a year, with a turnover of 517,500 birds per annum. All of these birds are then sold to Chickpac Limited, of Carlisle, which is owned by West Cumberland Farmers Limited, a company partly owned by Lord Lonsdale.

Besides animal production, some 1,250 acres (500 ha) of land are down for crop production. Some 360 (146 ha) acres of barley are grown, most of which is used for home consumption, but some is grown on contract for seed. As well as this 80 acres (32 ha) of roots are grown. The estate always demands high yielding strains of crop and is continually experimenting with new strains as they come on the market. Altogether 570 acres (230 ha) of silage are grown which with a second cut is increased to 927 acres, (375 ha) and some 225 acres (91 ha) of hay. As well as this 21 acres (8 ha) are down to oilseed rape.

Except for the permanent pastures on the higher land where conventional seed mixtures are used, the estate favours the use of Ryegrass, Timothy and White Clover mixtures. On the dairy cow grazing land, the estate applies about 305 units of nitrogen per acre, while on silage ground, 100 units are used followed by K nitro for a second cut. Hay ground receives rather less, with 70 units of nitrogen being applied for early or late grazing. Added to this, broiler litter and slurry from the farms intensive units, is applied throughout the winter. Lime and super slag are applied as they are required.

The company prides itself upon its mechanisation, having a whole range of equipment to suit the diverse enterprises carried out on the farm, although a significant reliance is placed upon contractors for specialist jobs such as hedging, ditching, combine harvesting and road haulage. The farm itself has 22 tractors principally Massey - Ferguson, two Land Rovers and a van. In all Lowther Park Farm employs 21 full time staff, including one managing director, one assistant manager, four unit foremen, one full time secretary and one student.

4.8:3. The Financial Position of Lowther Park Farms Limited

Company accounts, as noted earlier, do not often show the complete picture of a company's business operations, and extreme care has to be taken in interpreting them. However, it can be seen from Table 4.2:1 that during the early and middle 1970's, the company was building up substantial assets, mainly in

Table 4.2:1 Lowther Park Farms Ltd

	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980
Net Assets £	100,457	126,062	140,885	164,427	210,067	249,590	333,817	389,479	401,187	381,463
% Annual Growth	-	25.48	11.76	16.71	27.76	18.81	33.75	16.67	3.00	-4.92
Turnover £	161,542	267,490	322,960	367,137	371,554	550,617	654,270	735,996	1,029,435	891,660
% Annual Growth	-	65.58	20.73	13.68	1.20	48.2	18.82	12.49	39.87	-13.38
Debt Ratio 1 %	86.23	128.71	26.54	61.00	51.07	38.36	15.32	46.65	55.09	70.11
Debt Ratio 2 %	86.00	75.8	4.59	2.81	1.32	0.37	0	0	0	0
Return on Net Assets %	3.92	19.48	22.10	19.61	21.37	41.66	21.70	20.46	8.62	1.62
Return on Equity %	16.51	15.86	10.53	7.04	13.50	28.57	19.45	14.38	4.85	1.07
Asset Turnover	1.6	2.12	2.29	2.23	1.77	2.20	1.96	1.89	2.57	2.34
Profit Margin %	2.43	9.98	10.00	8.78	12.07	18.88	11.09	10.83	3.36	0.74

broiler houses and farm machinery. This has helped to increase production and productivity.

Turnover has been extremely variable, although has shown consistent growth up till 1980; farming does provide varying returns, and this can be partly responsible for this. Also the fruits of large scale investment, for example in a new broiler house, can boost sales. Significant capital investment in 1975, was largely responsible for the considerable increase in turnover recorded in 1976.

The company, as shown in the Debt Ratio's, runs primarily upon debt. The massive fall in Debt Ratio 2 in 1973, is explained by the fact that, a significant loan from the Countess of Lonsdale was transferred into share capital. Since then borrowing from other group companies, but most significantly from the bank, declined until 1978. However, it appears that falling returns have started to increase the amount of borrowed money necessary to maintain the business, although as can be seen, little of this is going towards capital investment. Returns on net assets have been generally high, although a recent dramatic fall off has been recorded.

Considering that the company operates, to a large extent, upon debt, and that returns on net assets are calculated without consideration of interest repayments, this could lead to serious problems with regard to debt financing. However, as the company has financial reserves of over £370,000 built up during the period of prosperity, there is little chance of it becoming bankrupt; indeed the bank has allowed a substantial increase in borrowing, as can be seen in Debt Ratio 1, 1980. Returns in equity have, until recent years also been high, although they have also fallen off considerably. The reason for this must be related to the fall in farming income that has taken place in recent years, coupled with high interest charges on the large debt.

The rate at which assets are used to generate sales, has been variable, but has generally shown a tendency to increase. Profit margins have fallen significantly over the same period. Since 1980, farming incomes have increased, with improved profits and returns on capital, Lowther Park Farms, with sustained capital

investment and the confidence of the money lenders, it is probably well positioned to take advantage of this upturn. Whether this materialises or not, is not yet clear.

From the foregoing a number of important indications emerge. First, all farming operations, however large can be vulnerable to recession, and changes in agricultural policy. Second, as Reid (1981) has noted, farms are relying more and more upon debt, and Lowther Park Farms are no exception. Third, even with investment, asset turnover has not increased substantially, either indicating that assets are not being used efficiently, or rather, that financial pressures have been increasing at such a rate, that farmers need to invest, not so much to increase profit, but to remain in a similar situation as they were before. If, a diversified and well run company as this is having problems, then there may be clear disincentive for this and other large scale operations to invest considerable sums in the future.

4.8:4. Farming on the Estate 2: The Tenanted Farms

The rest of the estate not including Lowther Park Farms, consists of some 19,100 acres (7730 ha), which are tenanted by 80 tenants, whose holdings range in size from 33 acres (13 ha), to 1,700 acres (687 ha) but generally average about 250 acres (100 ha). All the estate's farms are let on annual tenancies, with the landlord being responsible for the main walls and roofs, underground waterpipes and sewer drains, as well as the provision of spouts, slates, timber for repair to doors and loft floors, drain tiles and so on, with the tenant having to undertake all other repairs.

Over the past thirty years, considerable investment has taken place on the farms, somewhere in the region of two million pounds. Added to this, the tenants are encouraged to invest their own money on the farm, and many have carried out major programmes of their own. The rents on the farms are reviewed every three years and the capital spent by the estate is taken into consideration when the rents are revised. In general the 1980 rent level per acre, ranges from £20 for marginal farms, to £34 for the deep loam farms near Penrith. Hill farmers pay their rent based on animal headage, assessed at £3 per breeding ewe and £30 per suckler cow.

In order to maintain a regular cash flow into the estate and also to avoid any increased bureaucracy, the farmers pay their rents monthly on the basis of a bankers order. The estate has a policy of investment in farming, with a planned investment of over one million pounds over the next ten years. This confidence in agriculture, has in the past paid dividends, although stress is laid upon production and productivity before other goals are taken into consideration.

Yet, on those patches of land which are unsuitable for agriculture, trees are planted for shooting, landscape and ecological reasons. This approach is in many ways a retention from the days of the 5th Earl of Lonsdale, who refused to allow the felling of woodland that harboured game. Indeed, there are six small pheasant shooting syndicates on the estate.

The relationship between the estate and the tenants, as was revealed during the construction of the M6, is excellent. The estate fully involves itself in the day to day running of the farms, engendering a close and co-operative relationship. Such is the relationship that the estate has never been involved in a single rent arbitration case. Added to this, something like 90 per cent of all farm transfers were from father to son, representing a significant continuity in the farming operations. However, since the Agriculture Miscellaneous Provisions Act of 1976, which extended the rights of tenants, the estate feels that it is no longer able to re-let properties once they become vacant. This is unfortunate as they had a policy of letting some of its available farms on the open market, especially the smaller ones, to act as a stepping stone for younger people wishing to enter farming. The estate also recognises that age is an important determinant of how effectively a farmer farms, and has an active policy of encouraging the more elderly farmers to retire, to make way for more forward looking sons.

The estate does not believe in supporting uneconomic farms, and there is a continual programme of farm rationalisation. The *raison d'etre* behind this policy was first to create farms of an economically viable size; secondly, to contain all farms within a ring fence; and third to ensure a balance of land quality throughout the holdings. As already indicated, the construction of the M6 on Lowther's land, provided an ideal opportunity to carry out a major land rationalisation policy.

4.9:1. Forestry on the Lowther Estate

Another major economic activity the estate is engaged in, is the production and processing of timber. The estate owns some 6,000 acres (2482 ha) of forest, 3,000 (1214 ha) of which were inherited by the present Earl, another 1,000 acres were purchased in the 1960's, and a further 2,000 acres (810 ha) have been planted upon estate land. In the early years of the estate, timber sales helped considerably, not only in contributing to debt repayments, but also in funding investment. The estate's woodlands are well run with a staff of 23; indeed, Lord Lonsdale himself is the President of the Association of Professional Foresters, and takes a keen interest in the forestry operations on the estate.

In order to both provide a local outlet for timber products and bring about an integration between growing and processing timber, Lord Lonsdale set about developing a sawmill operation of his own. Lowther and Croasdale Sawmills Limited, were originally a joint enterprise between Lord Lonsdale and the Croasdale family, who already owned a sawmill in Penrith. The sawmill is based on the estate, and is now one of the largest in England employing nearly 100 people. Added to this there is a small estate sawmill, which processes the inferior timber from the estate woodlands into fencing posts, gates and timber cubicles. Lowther and Croasdale Sawmills, are able to benefit from the estate woodlands in that they buy in timber from outside when it is cheap, and use their own when the price rises. This means that they can keep their prices reasonably stable and competitive.

The sawmill itself is highly mechanised, and specialises in producing pallets, up to 6,000 a week. Linked in with the successful forestry operations, are Lowther Forestry Services. Lowther Forestry Services are designed to both encourage the expansion of the estates woodland and sawmills, and to provide services for clients, such as harvesting, marketing, the establishment and maintenance of plantations, the supply and erection of fencing posts and gates, cow cubicles, jumping poles, timber treatment plants and sawmills.

Using the services as a base, it is planned to consolidate the estate's forestry operations and diversify in the timber market, in order to achieve the full potential of their large forestry reserves. In respect of this, attempts have been made to manufacture chipboard and expand local markets. While great inroads have already been made into the Cumbrian market, the estate hopes to expand its market area into Lancashire, Scotland and north-east England. Strict management control is needed, as the estate hopes to raise its production from 15,000 cubic metres per annum to 23,000 cubic metres by the end of the decade.

The financial analysis of Lowther and Croasdale Sawmills Limited, shown in Table 4.2:2, indicates a significant increase in the firm's net assets, largely as a result of investments in machinery. The purchase of large capital assets, accounts for the major increases in net assets in 1973, 1974 and 1978. Linked to considerable investment has been a rapid increase in turnover, although the company also has a rigorous marketing policy. Because of this, even in the present recession, the company has been able to maintain and expand sales.

As with most Lowther companies, the sawmills operate to a considerable extent upon debt. In the middle 1970's the company was managing to decrease its debt, but since 1978 it has started to rise significantly, at first to increase fixed assets, and then in 1979 and 1980, to pay off creditors and maintain the business after a series of falling returns. Most of the money borrowed comes from a large bank overdraft.

Returns on net assets have been high, although along with returns on equity, they have been falling off since 1978. Indeed the 1980 figure for return on equity is high only because the company benefited from a substantial tax rebate. Asset turnover has been extremely variable, although it has been gradually falling, indicating no significant increase in capital productivity. Profit margins have also been variable, although are tending to become lower.

The sawmills are undoubtedly large, well run and benefit from a close relationship with the rest of the estate. In the past they have been very profitable, although this has now been reversed. The company has undoubtedly been badly hit

Table 4.2:2.

Lowther and Croasdale Sawmills Ltd: The Financial Performance 1971-1980

	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980
Net Assets £	40,527	22,626	74,761	154,162	156,894	218,727	222,257	410,503	486,802	509,926
% Annual Growth	-	47.17	230.42	106.21	1.77	39.41	1.61	84.71	18.59	4.74
Turnover £	306,789	280,048	446,192	662,995	721,285	1,000,126	1,357,012	1,375,186	1,836,057	2,227,214
% Annual Growth	-	-8.72	59.33	48.59	8.79	38.66	35.68	1.34	33.51	21.30
Debt Ratio 1 %	93.75	148.60	2.22	41.81	17.44	21.69	23.71	39.58	50.60	55.62
Debt Ratio 2 %	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	20.54	19.61
Return on Net Assets %	23.72	-30.21	98.21	17.60	16.50	37.11	31.91	10.10	13.7	9.06
Return on Equity %	15.13	-67.49	69.44	27.46	20.69	35.45	23.69	5.07	5.03	21.32
Asset turnover	7.57	12.38	5.97	4.30	4.60	4.57	6.11	4.47	2.82	4.36
Profit margin %	3.13	-5.50	16.46	12.88	8.76	8.12	5.23	2.26	4.87	2.08

by the present recession, with a falling demand for pallets and general timber products for construction. As the recession appears to be showing little sign of improvement, the company will continue to face economic problems.

4.9:2. Lowther Wildlife Park

Lowther Estate has always suffered from a certain amount of trespass, with the usual associated damage and disruption to agriculture. Because of this, Lord Lonsdale had considered setting up an alternative attraction to get people off his agricultural land. In 1968, the Countryside Act was passed, which gave local authorities the power to compulsory purchase land which it thought suitable for turning into a country park. Lord Lonsdale was under the impression that some of his land might be acquired for this purpose, and in order to thwart this, and solve the trespass problem, he decided to create his own tourist attraction.

At that time, other estates were busy setting up wildlife parks and so Lord Lonsdale decided that some 130 acres (53 ha) of remaining parkland would be ideal for this purpose. In order to obtain capital and expertise, he invited the leisure company Totaliser and Greyhound Holdings Limited, to lend the company £25,000 in the form of a debenture, and to take two of the five company directorships. These directors however were replaced when the debenture was repaid in 1975.

The park, which attracts about 150,000 visitors a year, is normally open for a 20 week period from mid-May to the end of September. Access to the park is very convenient, with signposts clearly marking its directions from the M6/A66 interchange just south of Penrith. It occupies some 130 acres (53 ha) of the grounds of Lowther Castle, although only the castle walls remain, as the roof and interior were removed in order to avoid paying rates. The chief attractions of the park are a childrens play area, a five acre lake with many species of birds, a woodland walk, and more than 100 acres in which the visitor is free to roam at will observing the wildlife. There is also a cafeteria and gift shop. The park is safe to walk around, as there are no dangerous species of animal. Among the attractions to be seen are red deer, fallow deer, Japanese Sika deer, cranes, flamingoes, monkeys and giant tortoises.

The analysis of the company's accounts shown in Table 4.2:3, indicates that the company is very small, with net assets in 1980 only totalling £50,859. Since 1971, there has been no significant expansion, although turnover has been steadily increasing, partly as a result of vigorous marketing policies. As with all Lowther companies, the Wildlife Park operates mainly upon debt, although the proportion of net assets owed has been gradually declining. The returns upon net assets has been extremely variable, as have the returns on equity. The cause of these variations in profits cannot easily be identified, though it is important to note that the park itself tends to lose money, while the cafe and gift shop are both generally very profitable. Thus less spending in these two profit generating concerns can adversely affect profit, while increased stocks and feed prices can seriously undermine a small company. The generally variable and uncertain performance of the company, and its small size, means that it is not an ideal recipient for further capital investment. However, as noted earlier, other reasons than purely financial, lie behind its *raison d'etre*, and these are clearly enough to ensure its continued existence.

4.9:3. Lowther Caravan Park

Lowther Caravan Park Limited started operations in 1972. It is situated on the estate next to the M6, although because it lies on low ground, the motorway is not visible and there is little disturbance from noise. The park has room for 146 touring caravans, 50 tents, and 375 permanent caravans and chalets, situated on 50 acres (20 ha) of ground, making it the fourth largest site in Cumbria. The park is well provided with facilities, and charges competitive rates.

With regard to the company's financial performance, as analysed in Table 4.2:4, it can be seen that the company has not expanded very rapidly since its conception. This is mainly due to the fact that the site had grown to its maximum capacity early on and there has been little call for any increased investment. Even so, turnover has been increasing rapidly, as more people have used the park, the large increase in turnover in 1980 was largely the result of a significant increase in fees.

Table 4.2:3.

Lowther Wildlife Park Ltd: The Financial Performance 1971-1980

	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980
Net Assets £	26,835	31,246	30,590	31,247	29,780	27,089	26,967	28,966	38,901	50,859
% Annual Growth	-	16.44	2.10	2.15	-4.69	-9.04	-0.45	7.41	34.30	30.74
Turnover £	NRA	NRA	NRA	NRA	89,957	115,517	127,536	139,498	153,276	181,026
% Annual Growth	-	-	-	-	-	28.41	10.40	9.38	9.88	18.10
Debt Ratio 1 %	99.73	87.22	118.42	98.15	109.07	64.32	86.25	97.09	86.77	61.86
Debt Ratio 2 %	93.17	80.01	81.73	80.01	79.75	60.91	61.19	56.93	42.42	39.73
Return on Net Assets %	16.07	25.83	8.52	21.69	1.51	54.37	-9.14	26.29	-3.58	33.25
Return on Equity %	64.81	70.06	-11.5	10.51	-24.32	30.57	-38.89	26.41	-8.36	47.62
Asset Turnover	-	-	-	-	3.02	4.26	4.72	4.82	3.94	3.56
Profit Margin %	-	-	-	-	0.5	1.25	-1.82	5.47	-0.91	9.34

NRA = Not Reported in Accounts

Table 2.4:4.

Lowther Caravan Park Ltd: The Financial Performance 1972 to 1980

	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980
Net Assets £	42,641	71,239	83,793	95,268	102,055	105,886	108,836	100,278	102,220
% Annual Growth	-	67.00	17.62	13.70	7.12	3.75	2.79	-7.86	1.93
Turnover £	12,054	37,659	47,650	88,911	110,545	185,681	199,894	207,305	266,639
% Annual Growth	-	212.67	26.43	86.59	24.33	67.97	7.65	3.71	28.62
Debt Ratio 1 %	143.67	99.93	80.63	63.35	44.00	33.09	48.06	41.97	47.04
Debt Ratio 2 %	0	35.09	29.84	26.24	19.60	9.44	4.59	0	0
Return on net Assets %	-12.32	3.94	19.00	18.73	22.12	30.01	2.87	1.95	3.79
Return on Equity %	-74.15	-7.20	21.35	16.33	11.34	14.56	7.71	-0.64	1.01
Asset Turnover	0.25	0.53	0.57	0.93	1.08	1.75	1.84	2.07	2.61
Profit Margin %	-58.69	6.38	41.30	20.07	20.47	17.11	1.56	0.94	1.45

As with all Lowther companies, Lowther Caravan Park operates to a great extent upon debt, although most of this is bank borrowing. Returns on net assets have been very high, although, with returns on equity, they have been falling off since 1978. Asset turnover has increased considerably, indicating higher occupancy of sites, although profit margins have been steadily falling since 1976.

Lowther Caravan Park represents a large well run leisure enterprise, benefiting from an excellent location and economies of scale. Even so, it is interesting to witness that even though asset turnover has been increasing, profits have been steadily declining. The fact that an operation such as Lowther Caravan Park should be facing such intense financial problems, clearly indicates the depth of the recession in the tourist industry.

4.9:4. Lowther Construction Limited

Lowther Construction Limited, formerly Lowther Builders Limited, was set up in 1959 after the takeover of a local builders firm in Penrith and the extension of the small construction team on the estate. It carries out general construction work throughout Cumbria. Although it cannot be termed a purely rural enterprise, it does indicate the degree of diversification of the estate's activities, and what can be built up from existing rural resources.

The financial analysis of the company is shown in Table 4.2:5. From this it can be seen that the company has shown a variable growth in net assets and turnover. The company borrows heavily, and was substantially in debt in 1980. Returns on net assets have been variable, though generally high, while good returns on equity have been recorded. Although the very high return in 1980, came from a substantial tax rebate, asset turnover has been variable, as have profit margins.

The construction industry is very prone to industrial recession and having variable returns, i.e. they might have a large profitable project one year, and little work to do the next. Even so the company has remained fairly healthy, prosperous and viable.

Table 4.2:5. Lowther Construction Limited

The Financial Performance 1971-1980

	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980
Net Assets £	78,597	72,306	75,365	99,609	109,732	103,847	129,348	135,634	155,921	154,309
% Annual growth	-	-8.00	4.23	32.16	10.16	-5.36	24.56	4.86	14.95	-1.03
Turnover £	529,306	523,067	435,646	475,179	471,237	737,518	933,617	953,943	1,164,235	1,456,043
% Annual growth	-	-1.18	-16.71	9.07	-0.83	56.51	26.59	2.18	22.04	25.00
Debt Ratio 1%	85.56	65.65	106.29	79.07	50.24	40.77	11.77	65.47	126.66	101.1
Debt Ratio 2%	43.16	14.18	11.61	7.28	5.24	0	0	0	0	0
Return on Net Assets %	14.85	13.69	25.15	17.60	16.50	12.89	25.14	23.80	29.06	28.00
Return on Equity %	2.86	3.33	8.51	8.13	7.05	6.42	19.60	13.26	6.94	35.14
Asset Turnover	6.73	7.23	5.78	4.77	4.29	7.10	7.22	7.03	7.47	9.44
Profit Margin %	0.23	1.89	4.35	3.70	3.84	1.82	3.48	3.38	1.93	3.71

4.9:5. Lowther Estate Management Services

Realising that on his estate, there was a huge amount of expertise in a wide range of business operations, Lord Lonsdale decided that it would be feasible to market it to others in need of advice, thus the Lowther Estate Management Services came into being. Such has been the success of the estates Management Service, that apart from the estate itself, it now manages over 100,000 acres of agricultural land and forestry throughout the north of England. The management team is based on the estate itself, and has grown to employ twenty people, including two full-time architects, and a busy surveyors department. Recently, with the increase of interest in forestry operations, the management team has placed an emphasis on providing advice on forest investments and woodland management. The firm has purchased and managed for clients substantial areas of woodland in Scotland, Lincolnshire and Staffordshire, as well as advising woodland owners throughout the country.

Added to this, Lowther Estate's Management Services, sell houses and property, particularly farms and farmland. In 1977, they sold £1,250,000 worth of property, including the Gowbarrow Hall estate, a 950 acre (384 ha) property situated on the shores of Ullswater. In general terms the Management Services sell and purchase homes, farms and land, manage farms, woodland and estates, value and negotiate problems such as tenants rights, capital transfer tax, compensation, compulsory purchase claims, farm improvement schemes and house and cottage improvements. In all a widespread and diverse set of operations.

4.10:1. Lowther Estate's Business Activities

Lowther Estate represents an excellent example of how an agricultural estate can create a diverse economic portfolio. The estate has recognised areas of potential growth, and through careful planning and investment has developed them, reversing many of the deprivations caused as a result of years of neglect.

Lowther's farming operations are highly sophisticated, with little scope for sentimentality. The variable and generally low returns achieved from Lowther Park Farms indicates the severe financial problems British agriculture has been facing. Although since 1980 farm incomes have tended to increase, with some effect upon Lowther's viability, the vulnerability of the industry, especially with regard to the potential for radical reform of the EEC cannot be in doubt. The most obvious lesson to be learned here is that rural areas must not look towards agriculture for significant wealth or employment creation in the future.

The estate has also taken advantage of its large acreage of woodland, and has sensibly carried out some integration, with it processing most of its own timber. It has also created large tourist enterprises taking advantage of its proximity within a particularly popular tourist area, and its increased accessibility as a result of the construction of the M6. Indeed, the road has probably extended the market for all Lowther products.

While Chapter Six will discuss more fully the mechanism for development in rural areas, it is worth noting here that although Lowther's rural enterprises are large, well positioned and excellently managed, the financial records do indicate a degree of vulnerability and structural weakness. The period considered represents a continuing slow down in economic growth, and towards the end, actual recession. As Lowther's industries are predominantly rural based and deal either in providing raw materials, low-cost bulky finished goods or leisure services, they are extremely vulnerable to recession. This is not so much due to the weakness of Lord Lonsdale's planning but reveals the poor structural nature of the rural economy itself. In stimulating rural development, the entrepreneur, whether farmer, industrialist or craftsman, is unlikely to have the advantages of Lowther's huge resources. Clearly if a concern such as Lowther is experiencing economic problems, then this must act as a deterrent for others considering investing in rural enterprises; a problem which emerges in Chapter Five.

CHAPTER 5

THE WHITBARROW EXERCISE

CHAPTER 5

THE WHITBARROW EXERCISE

5.1. Introduction

Chapter Four has illustrated how a large estate with considerable resources both financial and professional, has managed a road development and created a diverse economic base. This chapter details the response of another agricultural estate in a comparable situation. However there are significant differences in resources, size and organisational ability between the two. These will become apparent in the chapter.

During the research and writing up period, the road development, the socio-economic problems of the estate, and the way in which it was attempting to solve them were "live issues". This placed restrictions upon the extent to which data was made available by the estate's agent and the individual farmers. The problem regarding sensitive pieces of information was compounded by the fact that the owners of the estate are a well known and influential Cumbrian family. The son, Mr Trevor Farrer, until 1980 a tenant farmer on the estate, is leader of the Conservative Group on Cumbria County Council, as well as holding other important local posts in the NFU and other organisations.

In the end, the researcher must be the final arbiter in achieving the balance between producing worthwhile, useful, interesting and academically sound evidence, while suppressing sensitive information, which, but for the help of the estate in creating a freedom of movement and access, would not be known outside certain family and professional circles. It is hoped that this balance has been achieved.

5.2:1. The Whitbarrow Exercise: It's Genesis

Chapter Two indicated that there is a considerable interest in the problems of rural areas in Cumbria, not least from governmental organisations, particularly the Cumbrian division of the MAFF which is concerned not only with the plight of the agricultural labour force, but of rural areas generally. This is in no small

measure due to the recognition of the important role MAFF plays in rural affairs by the former Divisional Agricultural Officer, Mr T Wathan and the former Northern Region Socio-Economic Adviser, Mr J F Cottam. The son of the present estate owner, Mr Trevor Farrer, contacted the MAFF in 1980 asking them if they would like to arrange a study of the realignment of the A590 from Meathop to Sampool which had a significant effect upon the estate. The MAFF had carried out a similar exercise in 1972, which concentrated on the opportunities the estate had for economic development.

They were, therefore, very keen to carry out such an exercise again and responded positively, although indicating that they did not have the resources to carry out such a study themselves. At this point it was suggested by the Cumbrian NFU County Secretary Mr David Hellard, that the Wolfson Group at the University of Aston had carried out some interesting research into the effects of road developments upon agriculture, and would perhaps be amenable to carrying out such a study. Mr Cottam then contacted Dr David van Rest of the Wolfson Group who agreed that such an exercise could make a useful contribution to knowledge.

The MAFF then drew up a series of points they thought should be considered, in a letter in February 1980. These being:-

1. How was the compensation money paid?
2. What are the farm management changes deemed necessary by the road?
3. What are the severance problems encountered?
4. What problems have there been during construction?
5. What has been the effect upon the people concerned?
6. What is the potential for the development of ancilliary farm enterprises?
7. What has been the involvement of agents and solicitors?

While this remit was primarily concerned with the road development, it was the MAFF's intention to consider more widely the economic potential of the estate and other related factors. During the research it was decided to further extend the authoritative input, and widen interaction by holding a conference to consider various aspects of the estate's development potential. On each topic chosen for

consideration, a paper was to be prepared by an invited party, who would present it at the conference to be held later in the year. This will be considered in more detail later.

5.2:2. The Whitbarrow Estate: It's Social and Geographical Setting


Before going on to consider the Whitbarrow Exercise in more detail, it is important at this stage to give an outline of the estate's social and geographical setting, in what was, up to the reorganisation of local government in 1974, Westmorland (see Map 5:1. and 5:2.).

The estate has been owned by the Farrer family since 1865, although their main economic assets lie in manufacturing industry. The estate at present consists of some 1100 acres (444Hec). It lies in the Parish of Witherslack and is bisected by the A590, which also acts as a southern boundary to the Lake District National Park. Most of the land on the estate is classified as Grade 3, in the MAFF Agricultural Land Classification Series. The land to the south of the A590 is of the Downholland Series, which has 20-30cm of peat overlying tenacious blue/grey silty clay representing flat estuarial conditions. To the north of the A590, the land rises quite steeply, and is of various qualities from well drained Grade 3 land, to rocky outcrops, with scrub grass. The area is one of high rainfall, and has a high water table.

The farms are maintained for social and economic reasons. A reflection of this is that low rents that are paid, in general about one half of the national average for similar land. The owner and his son have run the estate on a fairly extensive basis, not developing agriculture intensively on the farms, or any other form of economic enterprise. The owner has not developed the estate because he has other more pressing financial and social commitments, but he wishes to maintain as many viable farm units as possible. Hence, there is a predominance of small, fairly unremunerative farms, generally of 250 to 300 SMD's in size. They are also fragmented, partly in order to ensure that each farm has a fairly balanced distribution of the various land qualities.



Illustration removed for copyright restrictions



Map 5.2. The Whitbarrow Estate and the Realignment of the A 590

5.3:1. The 1972 Conference

Because there has been no significant economic development of any sort, the estate served as a good basis upon which to develop and test hypothetical plans for increased economic investment. In 1972, with the help of the owner, a conference was organised on the estate, to consider how the development of agriculture and forestry could take place without damaging its conservation and amenity value.

Most records of the conference no longer exist, and no report was made from its findings. However, a set of the prepapers is available. This indicates that the only major conclusion the conference made, was that the development of its agricultural resources would prove very profitable. To develop agriculture on a hypothetical farm, closely based on the one Mr T Farrer tenanted, a capital investment of £30,000 was required. If this money was to be borrowed, a ten year write-off period would have been needed which, based on a 10 per cent interest rate, would mean a repayment of £4,500 per annum. If the money was not borrowed, then there would of course be an opportunity cost on the money if an adequate return on investment was not forthcoming. The breakdown of costs is as follows in Table 5:1.

Table 5:1. Capital Requirements for an Intensification of Farming in 1972

	£
Buildings for 120 dairy cows at £30 nett/cow	3,600
Buildings for 40 dairy replacements at £25/unit nett	1,000
Buildings for 100 18 month beef calves at £25/unit nett	2,500
Silos-open-clamp nett	2,000
Parlour,bulk-tank and necessary works	4,000
Alterations to existing buildings for calves	700
Slurry lagoon	500
Tower base for slurry	1,200
Machinery	3,000
Drainage machinery	500
55 Extra dairy cows at £200	11,000
Total capital requirement	<u><u>30,000</u></u>

In 1972, the estate was as now, being run on a very low key basis, hence capital intensification would be costly. Because of this added to the level of uncertainty in agriculture, and more lucrative investment opportunities in industry, no intensification of farming took place.

However, as Tables 5:2 and 5:3 show, there would have been significant advantages from investing as advised. After nine years an income of about £30,000 per annum would have resulted. We must conclude that the decision not to intensify was a costly mistake; although in intensifying, two full-time jobs would have been lost.

The fact that the 1972 Conference remained unrecorded underlines its low key character. For the 1980 Conference following joint discussions it was agreed to utilise the availability of the author and the backing of the University and NFU to attempt a more fully documented review. Before any invitations were sent out, it was agreed that background research would be undertaken into the kind of problems facing the estate's tenants. For this a comprehensive questionnaire was sent out to the tenant farmers. This can be seen in Appendix 3.

5.4:1. The Application and Results of the Questionnaire

The questionnaire was designed to encompass the points raised by the MAFF. The first part covered the economic basis of farming on the estate, the general effects of the road upon the farming pattern, and the consultations the farmers had with the road planners and construction team. It attempted to ascertain the relationship with the farmers and the members of the construction team, and examine the farmers' perceptions of the road development. The second part covered the social nature of the estate; the aspirations of the farmers; the way they planned for the future; the perception of their work and life style; and the degree of interest they had in developing non-agricultural enterprises. The questionnaire was very long and somewhat difficult to administer, not least because of the reluctance the farming community of Whitbarrow had in answering personal questions. In the end, it was found more informative to use the questionnaire as an "aide memoir" making it less intimidating to the individual farmer. From this a picture was drawn up of the socio-economic nature of the estate. Two farms were not considered for sensitive personal reasons unrelated to the road development.

TABLE 5:2.

BALANCE SHEET OF AGRICULTURAL INTENSIFICATION IN 1972

OUTPUT

Milk	- 120 cows at 900 gallons each at 19p per gallon	£ 20,520
New Calved Cows	- 25 at £180	4,500
Cull Cows	- 15 at £80	1,200
Cull Heifers	- 5 at £80	400
Cull Stirks	- 5 at £60	300
18 months beef	-100 at £110	11,000
Calf Subs	-100 at £10	1,000
Wintering Hoggs	-200 at £2	400
	Total	39,320

VARIABLE COSTSConcentrates

Dairy Cows	- 120 at £45	5,400
Dairy replacements	- 40 at £50	2,000
18 months beef	- 100 at £50	5,000

Miscellaneous costs

Dairy Cows at £8	960
Dairy replacements at £6	240
Beef at £5	500
Fertilizers at £10 per acre	3,050

Total 17,150

Gross Margin 22,170

FIXED COSTSLabour

2 men at £1,700	3,400
Student at £1,800	1,000
Rent	- £8 on 305 acres
Machinery	- £12 per acre
Sundry costs	- £5 per acre
	1,525

Total Fixed Costs 12,025

Margin to cover farm income and financing costs 10,145

Annual Financing Charge £4,500

Farm Income 5,645

TABLE 5:3.

THE RESULTS OF AGRICULTURAL INTENSIFICATION IF IT HAD BEEN
CARRIED OUT AS ADVISED 1980 RESULTS

<u>OUTPUT</u>		£
Milk	- 120 cows at 1,100 gallons each at 56p per gallon	73,920
Newly Calved Cows	- 25 at £435	10,875
Cull Cows	- 15 at £240	3,600
Cull Heifers	- 5 at £210	1,050
Cull Stirks	- 5 at £220	1,100
18 months beef	- 100 at £300	30,000
Calf Subs	- 100 at £50	5,000
Wintering Hogs	- 200 at £11	<u>2,200</u>
Total		127,745
 <u>VARIABLE COSTS</u>		
<u>Concentrates</u>		
Dairy Cows	- 120 at £215	25,800
Dairy Replacements	- 40 at £215	8,600
18 months beef	- 100 at £114	11,400
 <u>Miscellaneous Costs</u>		
Dairy Cows at £30		3,600
Dairy replacements at £20		800
Beef at £16		1,600
Fertilizers at £18 per acre for 302 acres		<u>5,436</u>
Total		<u>57,326</u>
Gross margin		70,419
 <u>FIXED COSTS</u>		
<u>Labour</u>		
2 men at £5,025		10,050
Student at £2,765		2,765
Rent -	£12.4 per acre	3,782
Machinery -	£36 per acre	10,980
Sundry costs -	£20 per acre	<u>6,100</u>
Total fixed costs		33,677
Margin to cover farm income and financing costs		36,742
Annual Financing charge £4,500		
Farm Income		<u><u>32,242</u></u>

5.4:2. The Socio-Economic Structure of the Tenanted Farms in 1980

The questionnaire enabled a comprehensive survey to take place of the tenanted farms. The farmers are dealt with in this section individually and are not recalled by name for reasons of confidentiality. The farms configurations are given in Maps 5:2; 5:3; 5:4; 5:5; 5:6, and 5:7. This section intends to give a deeper understanding of the nature of the estate, presenting leads as to the role the various individuals might play in relation to the realignment of the A590, and in an economically rejuvenated estate.

Farmer A

Farmer A farms some 142 acres (57 hec) mainly dairy under a joint tenancy with his son. He has lived in the area all his life and enjoys his work finding it mostly interesting liking most of all "working with animals". He likes least of all having to get up early in the morning. He has never considered leaving farming and cannot imagine another job which he could do as an alternative. He does not think his position with regard to other workers is deteriorating. He considers his "lifestyle" to be average and he has never considered starting up an ancillary enterprise, as he is too involved in farm work.

Farmer B

Farmer B farms 47 acres (18 hec) and is predominantly a "milk producer". He is 32 years old and comes from Warwickshire. He came to Cumbria as a farm labourer for Mr Trevor Farrer. Being good at his work, he was offered the possession of a tenancy. He has no educational qualifications. His wife was born in Grange-over-Sands and helps on the farm. He finds his job very interesting, enjoying his independence most of all. He has always worked in agriculture and has never considered leaving it as he would not find any other work as satisfying. He does not feel that his position in comparison with other industries is deteriorating. Most of his friends live in the area and he is a member of the Young Farmers Advisory Committee. He does take in some tourists on a Bed and Breakfast basis, but finds it very hard work.

Farmer C

Farmer C is in his middle fifties, running a farm of 62 acres (25 hec) devoted to dairy farming. He has lived in the area for 45 years and has run the farm for 26 years. He has two daughters who live away from home and he has a milk round, processing and selling his own milk. This he finds is very hard work and makes heavy demands upon his wife. He also has a retirement bungalow which he lets during the summer months for self catering holidays.

Although he finds his work hard, he also thinks of it as being "mostly interesting" and likes least of all being tied to the home. He has no educational qualifications and has never had a job outside farming. He likes the area very much and his main social activity is visiting whist drives. All his friends live in the area and all of his wife's relations. He does not take in tourists, firstly because it would create too much extra work and secondly, the farm house would be too small to accommodate them.

Farmer D

Farmer D is over 65 years old running a farm of 70 acres (28 hec). As in the normal farming cycle he has changed from the hard work of the dairy industry, to more extensive beef and sheep rearing. He has lived in the area most of his life and has two children, a son and a daughter, neither of whom are interested in taking on the tenancy after him. He was going to leave farming but decided to stay on till he receives his compensation money. He finds his work interesting all the time, but has found the long hours increasingly tiring. He has never had any job other than farming and all his friends and most of his relations live within the vicinity. He enjoys the community atmosphere of the area but finds he enters less and less into social occasions.

Farmer E

Farm E is farmed in joint partnership, a father aged 49 and a son aged 23. It is based on dairy and sheep and is 84 acres (34 hec) in size. The two farmers' wives work around the farm, apart from doing their own "housewives chores". As time goes by the son is taking on more and more of the father's functions. Neither

farmer has any educational qualifications, nor have they had any jobs outside agriculture. They find their work mostly interesting although they admit that this could be because they were "born into their work". They like particularly their independence, and the fresh air, although they often feel tied to the farm. All their friends and relations live in the area but they do not have an active social life. They have never considered starting any ancillary enterprises, partly because their farmhouse is too small and because they value the privacy of their own home.

5.4.3. Section Summary

The tenanted farms are small and highly fragmented; because of this they will tend to be of low income. The information on the farms was collected with an assurance of confidentiality and so no detailed attempts have been made to ascertain income levels. However, using very basic criteria, and using normative data for typical farms of this type, (Nix 1981) the following income estimates of annual net farm income for 1980 can be made.

Table.5:4. Estimated Farm Incomes of the Whitbarrow Farmers 1980

<u>Farm</u>	<u>Net Income Band</u>
Farmer A	£4500 - 5000
Farmer B	£2000 - 2500
Farmer C	£3000 - 3500
Farmer D	Below £1000
Farmer E	£2500 - 3000

As with most small farmers, the farmers at Whitbarrow are suffering from a low income problem. This, coupled with the "tie" to the farm and the long working hours involved in dairying appears to indicate a relatively disadvantaged situation.

Yet surprisingly the farmers appear content with their work, and consider their "lifestyle" to be average, enjoying their independence. This phenomenon has also been recorded by Gasson (1973).

Gasson (1973) in her study of farmers scale and values demonstrated that farmer's values tend to differ according to farm size. In her analysis, she divided "values" into four types. These were instrumental, where farming is seen as an instrument in obtaining income and security; intrinsic, where farming is valued in its own right; social, where it is carried out for the sake of human relationships; and expressive, where farming becomes a means of self-expression.

Gasson found that smaller farmers valued more highly intrinsic factors such as independence, and the pleasure of working in the open air, more highly than larger farmers who placed more emphasis upon instrumental and social aspects of their work, valuing more highly progress and challenge.

Yet Gasson takes her analysis further by arguing that although small farmers do value their independence highly, this comes about as a result of the other benefits of farming being less clear. In other words she argues, farmers look for the positive side of their work, rather than the negative, and reconcile themselves to the fact that they are unlikely to achieve any marked economic progress. In this respect farmers are socialised to adopt values appropriate to their future role. Thus Gasson argues, agricultural policies which directly affect farmers should not threaten them with a loss of independence if they are to be successful.

Ilbery (1978) concurs with this view by saying:

"Aspiration levels tend to adjust to the attainable, to past achievement levels, and to levels achieved by other individuals with whom he compares himself".

The aspiration levels of the Whitbarrow farmers appear to be low, largely because of their social and economic situation. Gasson (1969) in her study of the immobility of small farmers, found them generally to be poorly educated, and to have

had little experience outside farming. Small farmers are immobile in employment terms because they have skills which are not transferable, and that to accept relatively menial unskilled work, means the farmer suffers a considerable fall in status. Added to this, because small farmers lack a general experience of other work, they fail to appreciate the gap between their own, and other living standards.

As can be seen, the farmers at Whitbarrow roughly correlate with these studies by Gasson, in that they are poorly educated, have little work experience outside farming; are relatively immobile; and consider their lifestyle to be roughly average, although this is clearly not the case. Added to this the farmers do value highly their independence, probably in the absence of any other apparent benefits of their way of life.

Using Gasson's findings as a base, Ilbery (1978;1979;1983), extends further her analysis regarding farmers goals and values. Ilbery (1978) argues that the main aim of farmers is to obtain and secure a stable farm business. Once this security is obtained, then farmers are more influenced by social and personal considerations in carrying out the enterprise which gives them most satisfaction.

Ilbery (1979) argues that it is important to determine exactly why farmers make particular farming decisions, in order to understand fully the spatial patterns of land-use types. Thus, Ilbery (1983) argues, that studying farmers goals and values provides a better understanding of motivation and attitudes in farming, and helps to explain realistically farmers economic behaviour. Taking this further, in relation to the farmers at Whitbarrow, it can also help explain their attitudes and actions in relation to the realignment of the A 590.

Ilbery (1979) has also carried out examinations into farmers goals and values in relation to decision making in the mixed farming country of north-east Oxfordshire, and has considered how they affect the spatial patterns of land-use. For his study he divided the farms under examination into ten types, based on farming patterns rather than farm size. The most numerous enterprise types were mixed, and dairy and sheep with general crops.

The next stage of his examination was to present the farmer with a list of 19 economic and socio-personal factors which might be of importance in decision making. Each farmer was asked if each factor was in general relevant, and whether it had influenced the choice of major enterprises, or a decision to continue certain enterprises. The farmers were then asked to indicate how important each factor was in influencing their decision to adopt certain enterprises on a scale of one to four. From this Ilbery found that the top five decision making factors were a stable market, regular income and above average profits (economic); and experience and personal risk (socio-personal).

Extending this Ilbery then grouped the farmers according to their degree of similarity in relation to the decision making function they found most important, farm size and eight preselected socio-characteristics of the farmers. These were the farmers' age, education, practical training, status, whether full or part-time, when the farmers thought they would stop farming, importance of wife, and the amount of information received from agricultural journals, radio and television, and other farmers. From this Ilbery produced eight farmer types.

In this instance, Ilbery's work is peculiar to north-east Oxfordshire, although he has carried out a similar examination amongst the hop farmers of Hereford and Worcester (Ilbery 1983). In the two studies Ilbery does not attempt to fix descriptive labels, but rather lists a set of distinguishing characteristics for each group. In the Oxfordshire study the distinguishing characteristics are the size of farm, importance of income, preferred enterprise, age, training, market demand, prior knowledge of enterprise and free time.

While it is impossible to transpose Ilbery's typologies into the Whitbarrow farmers, because they relate specifically to north-east Oxfordshire, it is possible to consider them more generally in the light of Ilbery's and Gasson's findings.

The farmers at Whitbarrow have no experience of work outside farming, and no transferable skills. This not only means that in employment terms they are immobile, trapped in their situation, but that they have a misplaced view of other peoples

lifestyles, and of their own lifestyles in relation to them. The farmers themselves stress the intrinsic, socio-personal benefits of their work, especially their independence. However, their views must be coloured by the fact that they are in a situation where material and social progress is unlikely. the farms are small; there is a shortage of both capital and expertise; the lands inflexibility obliges the farmers to concentrate upon livestock, and there is little chance of significant farm size growth, simply because this would involve splitting some farms up, and this is not estate policy. Clearly, in their situation, to be ambitious would be to be continually frustrated.

However, this being said, the farmers are income conscious, and attempt to make the best use possible of the resources at their disposal, although they have reduced their standard of living to a minimum. Contrary to Ilbery's two case studies the farmers at Whitbarrow can do little except keep livestock, and, if they wish to earn a reasonable income dairy cattle. In this case personal preference is of only limited importance. Two farmers do attempt to earn money from ancillary enterprises, although these limit the amount of free time they have available. Added to this, apart from the milk round, the two tourist enterprises are unlikely to add any more than a few per cent to the farmers gross income.

The farmers themselves tend to be relatively old, and have no agricultural training. This reflects itself to some extent in the farming pattern, especially as the father's influence in the estate's two joint partnership tenancies appears to be strong. The paternalistic nature of the estate in not pressuring elderly farmers has perhaps exacerbated this problem.

Another characteristic of these small farms is the fact that the farmers wives are heavily involved in the farm work, not only supplying labour at peak periods, but even replacing some hired labour altogether.

These small farmers are not untypical of many of Cumbria's smaller dairy farms. While they lack the enterprise flexibility of Ilbery's Oxfordshire farmers, the actual manner in which they farm is largely reflective of their age, training, farm size,

aspirations, and, perhaps most important of all the attitude of the estate. In this sense it confirms the view that socio-personal factors are of considerable importance in farming (Ilbery 1979).

For the farmers at Whitbarrow to continue this arduous and poorly rewarded existence is obviously their choice, the disadvantages being offset in many ways by the relatively uncomplicated cycle of livestock rearing. Yet, it can be imagined, that when these low income, poorly educated, parochially orientated farmers face a complex problem, such as a major road development, significant problems are bound to occur.

5.5:1. The Realignment of the A 590 and the Whitbarrow Estate

The MAFF in Cumbria are well aware of the problems that the agricultural community faces during a road development. As noted in Chapter Four, although Lowther Estate was able to manage the development of the Penrith By-Pass without difficulty, it is something of an exception. The fact that the Whitbarrow Estate is not run on a profit only basis, that there has been little financial commitment to the farmers by the estate, that the farms are small and badly fragmented, and the tenants are generally poorly educated and insular, all seems to indicate the potential for a series of crises.

5.5:2. A Technical Description of the Realignment of the A 590

The Meathop to Sampool Bridge improvement is one of a series of schemes on the A590 trunk road, to improve access to south-west Cumbria generally, but particularly to the industrial area of Barrow-in-Furness. The previous alignment was in a poor structural condition, contained a number of severe bends and blind spots, and had a carriageway only 6 metres wide. A decision to improve the road

was not taken until the two main alternatives, the Morecambe Bay Barrage Scheme and the Barrow (Arndale) Link Road, were ruled out on cost and conservation grounds.

The new route of the road is 6.4 kilometres (4 miles) long and runs to the south of the old A590, crossing it twice. The ground it covers is silty clay of high plasticity, with rock outcrops and peat. At one part of the road a length of 400 metres had to be traversed over waterlogged peat, over 6 metres (6.5yards) in depth. There are four junctions on the road, three bridges and three underpasses. Extensive diversion of the electricity supply was also carried out. The road has 2 kilometres (1.24 miles) of dual carriageway at its west end, and 1.8 kilometres (1.11 miles) at its east end, while the central section of 2.6 kilometres (1.6 miles) is single carriageway only. Because of the flat estuarial condition of the land, the carriageways were constructed on an embankment throughout. A fabric sheet was laid prior to embankment construction and the embankment was allowed a year to settle. In all some 482,000 cubic metres of rock fill was used.

Three underpasses were constructed. They were provided for the passage of livestock and consisted of a reinforced concrete base, with reinforced concrete wing walls having a patterned effect. An underpass was provided at Farm B measuring 3 metres wide x 2.4 metres high x 33.3 metres long. At Farm C the underpass was the same size in width but only 22.4 metres long and at a Farm E 29 metres long.

The total works cost of the road, amounted to approximately £9,000,000. The tender value was £6,037,345 plus £116,000 for resurfacing the existing carriageway.

5.5:3. The Planning of the A 590 and the Estate

Although there had been an indication for sometime that the A590 was possibly due for realignment, the estate was not aware of a line until August 1976, when a map showing the proposed line of the road was sent to the estate in an attempt to discover who owned or tenanted land in the vicinity. The estate replied confirming the ownership and tenancies indicated on the map, with a number of

minor alterations along with a letter asking for a meeting with a representative of the NWRCU. The RCU responded quickly and a meeting was held with Mr. Lawton, the Group Engineer (Land's) of the North-West Road Construction Unit (NWRCU). At this meeting the general effects of the realignment were considered, with a draft series of ideas for ameliorating the general effects of the road put forward. At this stage the RCU had decided that only two underpasses were necessary for the estate, but the estate's agent considered that this was not enough, and requested a third. They also wanted an access to the road moved slightly, to be in line with the farm holding. The RCU feeling that the demands were reasonable, accepted them.

Little happened between then and the time the line was fixed on the 20th February 1978, except that a number of boreholes were drilled on the estate. During this process no major problems occurred. The estate had sought not to object to the road, as it felt that once the other routes had been ruled out, then the A590 realignment was the only solution to creating better access to Barrow-in-Furness. Hence, a public inquiry would only act as a blocking device, putting off what was considered inevitable. Another reason for the estate not objecting, was that in general, the realignment was popular with local people, as the existing A590 was hazardous.

Once more detailed plans of the realignment were made available, the estate was able to set about drawing up a full set of accommodation works. Plans of the road were sent to the tenants and arrangements were made for the estate's agent, a member of a private firm, and two members of the RCU to walk the line to discuss the accommodation works with the farmers. After spending a day talking with the individual farmers, a schedule of accommodation works was agreed. This was done in a loose way without any written formalities, rather just an exchange of notes on the day's proceedings. Hence, when the RCU sent in their version of what had been agreed, it differed substantially from that the estate had, omitting some fifty per cent of what they had considered confirmed. The agent wrote to the

RCU pointing this out, only to be informed that the contract had already been let with the RCU's version of the accommodation works included. Because of this, the RCU said there could be no way of altering them. The agent now apparently has a verbal agreement, that the accommodation work can be included in each tenant's separate claim sent to the District Valuer. As these claims have not yet been sent in, the response of the District Valuer is not known.

The estate made no input into the general planning of the road, apart from suggesting accommodation works. They were not involved in locating the road in any way, nor was any contact made with the road planners during the basic stages. The accommodation works decided upon by the estate were also very limited, primarily because they relied heavily on information from the farmers. Yet even at this level problems arose either through negligence, lack of organisation, or design, in that the estate did not get completed all that they required. The estate's own version of the accommodation works agreed was not typed or reproduced in a readable manner, and extended to only a few pages of handwritten foolscap paper. Later discussion with the tenants confirmed that the accommodation works done were minimal.

The farms on the estate are badly fragmented, small, and suffer from a lack of investment. There was the chance for some considerable reorganisation to take place and for extensive accommodation works to be undertaken. The estate did not attempt to leave the farms after the road, better than they were before, rather it could be argued, general difficulties and constraints upon farming were increased.

Because the estate owner and his son, are heavily involved in commitments away from the estate, both financial and social, the tenants were largely left to their own devices. However, as will be seen, the tenants were not able, in terms of finance, time or education, to enter fully into the planning of the road. They did not systematically study the plans made available to them, did not appear aware of planning procedure or law, and did not explore the full range of opportunities opened up. The tenants also relied upon the estate's agent to do most of the administration for them.

Their lack of inclusion in the planning process was to a considerable extent their own fault. Opportunities to participate were open, if not explicit, although the quality of their input would be suspect. Relying on the tenants as an information source was clearly unsatisfactory, both for the estate in general and the tenants individually. It therefore, can be concluded that the estate did not adequately plan for the road. It made mistakes due to a lack of time and care on its part; it made itself vulnerable to bureaucratic inefficiency; it did not seize the full range of opportunities available to it; and relied too heavily upon the tenants satisfactorily representing their own interests.

5.5:4. The Construction of the Realigned A590 and the Estate

It was indicated earlier, that some significant engineering difficulties were encountered during the A590 realignment, mainly due to the fact that the construction was to take place on peaty ground in flat estuarial conditions. This led to a certain amount of shrinkage and sinking in soil. In fact, from the time the road's foundations were laid in 1980 in the space of one year, they sank some 8 metres, and a process of sinking at a slower rate is still continuing. While constructing a road in such an environment is problematical, similar problems are found in attempting to farm in it, with the low lying peaty ground found on the estate to the south of the A590, being subject to heavy rainfall making drainage in the area a problem.

The main worries of the estate and the tenants when the final plans were drawn up, was the drainage. Any major development such as a road can seriously disrupt settled drainage patterns, particularly where, as at Whitbarrow, the drains on the land are predominantly tile drains, which are very vulnerable to breakage by heavy vehicles. Because of this, the estate insisted that it was most important that the field drainage should be protected. This was fully understood by Mr Lawton, who then ensured that the contractors were made aware of the problem. The estate was informed in late 1978, that the contract had been awarded to Sir Alfred MacAlpine and Son Ltd, and construction commenced in July 1979. A letter

was sent out to the tenants, informing them who the contractors were, who the Chief Resident Engineer was, and who should be contacted in an emergency. However, only one of the farmers in the first year of construction could remember receiving such a letter, or could name the main actors involved in the scheme.

The relationship between the estate and the contractors, was on the whole workable. This appeared to be due to the fact, that the estate made very few demands upon them. The estate's agent met them very rarely, and tended to communicate their wishes through Mr Lawton. The estate also did not ask for a Statement of Condition to be drawn up before construction commenced. The only time when the estate got in touch with the contractors, was when a major problem occurred. One example of this, was when the contractors failed to catch all the drains on the side of the road, and had to replace their main drain. Another arose out of the contractors loading the foundation of the road with too much weight too early. This caused the banks of one section of the road to be raised up. This not only seriously interfered with the tenants' farming activities, taking some land out of cultivation, but also meant that the farm's drainage was disrupted. Other problems were basically due to the land becoming wetter. While many tenants thought this was the result of the road, the estate's agent claimed that it was partly this, and partly the wet summer weather that had been experienced during the construction period. He also expressed the feeling that this sort of problem is bound to occur anyway.

The estate tended to distance itself from minor difficulties that occurred, leaving the tenants to tackle them on their own; the agent's role being to deal with only the more serious problems. This meant that there were no regular meetings with either the RCU, or the contractors, as witnessed at Lowther. Rather meetings were only held when a problem occurred, and tended to concentrate upon that single issue.

Relying upon the tenants to solve their own problems, was, for the most part unsatisfactory. As was indicated earlier, the tenants had let the road emerge upon them without any pre-planning, thus even when they received a letter detailing the

main actors in the construction team they were to disregard it. This meant, not only did they not understand the organisational structure of the construction team, but that they did not know who to contact in a moment of crisis, or even how to get simple jobs done. When a problem did occur, the usual pattern was for the tenants to consult the workmen on site. If the tenant was fortunate, the worker would direct the problem to someone who may or may not solve it; if the problem was relatively minor, then the worker might attempt to solve it himself. In the usual circumstances, the problem went unreported and unresolved.

5.5:5. Compensation and the Estate

Up till 1981, no discussion had taken place on compensation, nor had the 90 per cent of the District Valuers estimate of the compensation, payable to farmers, been claimed. This appears to have been an oversight by the agent.


5.6:1. The Problems Faced by the Individual Farmers

In order to more completely understand the problems faced by the individual tenants, this section outlines in detail their response to the realignment of the A590.

Farmer A

Farm A is farmed under a joint tenancy by a father and son, and is the largest tenanted farm on the estate, consisting of some 142 acres (57 hec). As can be seen from Map 5:3, the farm is fragmented but contains a considerable proportion of the estate's better land, i.e. that south of the A 590. The farm has 155 cattle mainly dairy. Farmer A made use of the estate's own agent.

Field D is the largest holding, and with fields C and E, used for cropping, with two cuts for silage being common. Fields A and B on the poorer ground are grazed all the year round. The farmstead and buildings are conveniently situated near the main grazing area, although they are some considerable distance from field D. The farm is served by an underpass which leads to field E; and is placed at the point



Key

-  Access Point
-  Farmstead

Map 5:3. Farm A and the Realignment of the A 590

where most movements took place before the new road was constructed.

The farmer's son, in his middle thirties, is the most active of the partnership and reacted to the road calmly. Although not actively participating in the planning of the road, he did not feel agrieved at its existence, and apparently felt that he had little input to make to the overall planning.

The effect of the road upon the total holding was slight; only taking some 4 acres, although badly severing fields E and D. The tenant however, felt that the road's advantage lay in the fact that road crossings could be made more easily than before. The busy nature of the A590 made it difficult to cross cattle twice daily in the three months when they were allowed to graze the bottom fields. As well as this, problems were noted in getting machinery across the road during silage making.

Because of the limited land loss, Farmer A has intensified grass production on holding D which has more than recompensed the original loss. The major worry has been field E. While Farmer A has still managed to stock both sides of field E and obtain a grass crop, he has found some serious problems emerge with the drainage; the field periodically becoming water laden. This problem Farmer A feels will resolve itself when the road settles.

Farmer A does not feel that the new road has brought many new significant problems. The difficulties that have arisen, and the small amount of land loss have been more than compensated by the ease with which the A590 can now be crossed with cattle. The farmer privately agreed with the contractors to have some hedges removed to increase the size of holding D. Farmer A was not charged for this and was grateful to the contractors for their help. As a result he was the only farmer to claim that his working relationship with the contractors was "good". He was also aware of the name of MacAlpine's foreman, although surprisingly he did not know of the existence of the Chief Resident Engineer.

Generally, Farmer A found himself well able to cope with the road construction, being able to get a number of favours done to improve his holding. He has regarded the difficulties encountered as not particularly serious, and has benefited from an increased ease of access in crossing the new road.


Farm B

As can be seen from Map 5:4, Farm B is very small and highly fragmented, consisting of some 57 acres (23 hec). However, this problem is tempered by the fact that most of the land held is of good quality. The land is farmed by one of the estate's newest and youngest tenants, a former farm worker from Warwickshire, who impressed the landlord with his hard work, and managed to obtain the vacant tenancy for this farm. He started working the holding in 1979. The farm system is predominantly milk, containing 30 milk cows, 12 heifers, 40 lambing sheep and 4 sows. Holdings A,B,D,E and F are used for silage and haymaking, while field C is under permanent grazing.

When first approached in March 1980, Farmer B appeared well aware of the problems that were likely to occur, although he had taken on the holding when the road was already planned. His main worry was that of drainage. He felt there had been no serious attempt to find out exactly the drainage pattern of his farm, and was expecting problems to continue for many years because of this. Farmer B was also very concerned about the fact that he would have to take his animals across the new road, for night grazing in field C. Another worry was the severance of holdings B and D. Holding B was now more difficult to work, and Farmer B felt it would be impossible to do anything with the upper facing part; he also felt that the working of holding D would pose problems.

Of all the farmers, Farmer B appeared to be the best organised. Even in 1980 he had made a number of private arrangements with the contractors to get work done for him; he had appointed his own agent, and had already been considering the amount of compensation money he would be receiving, and the use he would put it to.

As time went on, Farmer B became more and more dissatisfied with the way in which the RCU and the contractors were handling the development. The problems regarding drainage, which he had feared, emerged with the fields becoming very wet. He went on to say that although some felt that it was the result of heavy rain, he believed that it was a failure of the contractors to catch



Map 5:4. Farm B and the Realignment of the A 590

all the drains. Added to this, the contractor's own cut-off drains at the side of the road had become flooded and spread water into his fields.

Farmer B also had problems with provision of water to the water troughs for the severed fields. After being promised by the contractors that they would be provided, he waited some months until, exasperated, he got in touch with the RCU. They then claimed it was the North-West Regional Water Board's fault for not connecting the troughs to the water supply. At this Farmer B got in touch with the Water Board, only to find they had not connected the water troughs as they were still waiting for payment from the RCU. Farmer B promptly got in touch with the RCU and the job was completed within three days.

Another problem he had was that the contractors placed too much weight on the road too soon, causing it to sink dramatically and raise up the land at the sides. Not only did this decrease the already limited grazing land, but also interfered with the farm's drainage system. While this was perhaps an accident which happens in working on difficult soil conditions, it created significant problems for a small farm in already difficult circumstances.

At the beginning, Farmer B felt that he would have to obtain more land to replace that which had been lost to the road. He managed to obtain some 8 acres (3.24 hec) of land for summer grazing, although he had to pay a premium rent for this. He also hopes to obtain some land from Farm D, when it becomes vacant. In general, Farmer B has intensified his farm, although the effects of this are marginal as he was farming it intensively anyway.

Farmer B received a compensation pre-payment by August 1982 and kept a diary throughout the proceedings. Farmer B had a good agent and was himself well organised. This, however, did not make his problems any the easier. The main reason for this he felt was that there was a certain amount of negligence on the part of the planners and contractors, both in terms of catching the drains, and in getting small but important jobs done quickly.

Farmer C


Farmer C works a very small holding of only some 62 acres (25hec). Added to this, his holding is very badly fragmented (Map 5:5). He lost $6\frac{1}{2}$ acres (2.6 hec) of land to the new road, which he felt he could ill afford, and three of his main cropping fields have been very badly severed. Farm C is devoted to milk production with 22 cattle and 36 replacements being kept. Because Farm C is very small, hay is cut on all holdings except H. Farmer C does not make silage. As his income directly from farming is small, Farmer C also bottles and delivers milk. This he freely admits, makes his life extremely arduous.

Of all farms, Farm C is the most badly affected by the new road development, the problem being compounded by the fact that the better land held has been badly severed, only leaving the land of poorer quality untouched. In May 1980, Farmer C felt that he would lose about 5 or 6 of his milk cows due to land loss and severance, if he was unable to get more land. Farmer C has also the problem of having a Dutch Barn severed in field D, making it impossible to use for any purpose. The degree of severance also worried Farmer C, because he believed he would have to elicit his wife's help to get his animals under the underpass, as they were unlikely he felt, to go under undirected. Farmer C's worries also centred upon drainage with him feeling that fields D, E and F would suffer badly. This would place him in an unfortunate position if they were to flood, because he has so little land anyway.

In March 1980, Farmer C was very pessimistic about his continuing in farming. He has two daughters, both of whom are not interested in continuing the farm, and he saw his livelihood being destroyed, but felt he was trapped in agriculture, as he had no other alternative employment to go to.

By August 1981, Farmer C was in a somewhat happier frame of mind. The main reason for this being that he was able to rent a further 13 acres (5hec) of land, which enabled him to keep his herd numbers up to their former level. As well as this, he was also able to obtain some summer grazing.

Although Farmer C feels his problems have been eased, he is not satisfied



Map 5:5. Farm C and the Realignment of the A 590


with the planning and construction of the road. He is, as are all the farmers, worried about drainage problems and feel the fields are a lot wetter than they have ever been. He also felt that the farmers together, should have made more of a stand to protect their interests, especially during the construction of the road. The contractors he found very lax, especially as they did not bother to clean up after their work. One example of this is that the contractors damaged a bridge over a dyke and then repaired it, but in so doing pulled a great deal of material out and left it lying in the fields. Another example of carelessness was the fact that when putting up some fencing, the contractors left a gap which was not filled in until Farmer C had made repeated and strenuous representations to them. Farmer C did not make any private agreements with them and had only minor accommodation works done on his farm. Farmer C had not received any compensation prepayment by August 1981.

Farmer C was reprieved from a very serious situation by the fact that he was able to obtain more land to maintain his business at the former level. However, he felt that there was greater scope for farmers to work together to solve their respective problems as they emerged.

Farmer D

Farmer D is in his late 60's, ending his days with very extensive beef and sheep farming. His holding consists of some 70 acres (28 hec) of which he has lost 3 acres (1 hec) to the road. As can be seen from Map 5:6 his farm is very widely dispersed. The farm has 16 breeding cows, 22 store cows and 70 half-bred sheep. Field E is backland and is used for both pasture and hay. Fields F and G are used for permanent pasture, as is field D fields C, B, and A are used for silage and hay.

Farmer D has taken the road development calmly as he plans to retire from farming as soon as he receives his compensation money. As his children do not wish to take on the farm, he cares little about the effects of the new road upon his holding. Added to this, as he is already running down the farm business, the problems can be borne more easily.



Map 5:6. Farm D and the Realignment of the A 590

In May 1980, Farmer D felt that he would have to part with 6 suckler cows and calves and some 20 sheep. He also felt he would have to use field B for hay. As regards the severance problem, he felt that the placing of an underpass would ease the present problem of having to get animals across the busy A 590.


In August 1981, Farmer D's most serious problem was his ailing health. An arthritic hip had made walking difficult and, therefore, seriously impeded farming operations. When he wishes to move his animals he usually gets help from his daughter or grand-daughter who live very close. Because of his hip, the severance problems he was experiencing have worsened. Owing to this Farmer D does not make use of the underpass provided, relying rather on moving his stock by a tractor or trailer.

Added to this as expected, production has decreased. The farm has lost some 3.7 acres (1 hec) of land, however, this is not the greatest cause of loss. The small bits of land left in the fields C and A cannot be cut for silage, as they will not take heavy machinery. Thus, whereas Farmer D used to cut two crops for silage, he now gets one crop of hay. This is especially important as the land severed and lost is the best on the farm. Now Farmer D has had to cut his beef herd by seven animals, buys in his calves, and has reduced his sheep flock by 15.

Farmer D has not had many problems during construction and has found the RCU and contractors helpful. The compensation money, which he has not yet received, will be a useful retirement present. The farm was being run down in the usual farming cycle and, therefore, the land loss and severance compounded an already low productivity system.

Farmer E

As can be seen from Map 5:7 this farm holding is the most compact of all the tenanted farms. The farm comprises of 84 acres (34 hec) after losing 6 acres (2.43 hec). The farm is mixed dairy, beef and sheep. There is a partnership between the son and father being respectively in their mid- twenties and mid- fifties. Farmer E made use of the estate's agent.



Map 5:7. Farm E and the Realignment of the A 590

The main worry of Farmer E in 1980, was over severance. The new journey he had to take going through the underpass, was considerably longer than his route before the new road was built. As machinery was not able to use the underpass, a problem would emerge during silage making, where the tractor and trailer would have to cross the dual carriageway, often with vehicles travelling at a fast speed. There was also the continuing worry over drainage with a number of drains missed by the contractors. In general Farmer E felt that he would have to intensify his farming operations, taking more land into till and adopting a policy of better management.

In the event, the main worry was centred on the problem of drainage. Some drains laid were not draining properly, and in one field new ones had to be laid. In solving these problems the tenant did not feel that he was receiving enough help from the RCU or the contractors. He also felt they did not do enough research to discover the peculiar qualities of the land.

Other problems he regards as being created by the contractors negligence. For example, an electricity pylon in one of the fields was knocked down to make way for the road. When demolishing it, the contractors carted heavy machinery across the field, dug up the concrete base of the pylon, dug a large hole and buried it in it. This in turn brought clay to the top, which then caught water, creating pools. The whole of this field had to be reseeded.

Another difficulty lay in the problem of getting a water trough connected to the water supply. After a great deal of complaint, Farmer E managed to get the supply connected; however this created significant difficulties during the duration of the interruption.

A general reorganisation has taken place on the farm. The fodder shortage created by land loss has meant that some young stock have had to be sold off, and more second cropping of grass carried out. However, Farmer E feels his problems will be eased as the landlord will now lease him an additional field of some 12 acres.

5.6:2. Section Summary:

The Whitbarrow Estate is not run on the same basis as Lowther. The owner has not invested the same level of resources into the estate as Lowther, and whereas Lowther was able to maintain a separate and well staffed estate office, Whitbarrow, being smaller, was unable to. This led to a reliance being placed upon one agent, who had other business affairs to cope with.

Because of this, no detailed preliminary research was carried out, the estate did not involve itself in the early planning of the road, nor did it draw up any comprehensive plans for accommodation works. This meant that not only were opportunities missed, both to ameliorate the effects of the road, and to improve the estate's economic position, but it also allowed mistakes to occur. Added to this, compensation money, that is 90 per cent of the District Valuer's estimate, was not claimed, which meant money for investment was kept out of hand.

These problems were compounded by the fact that liaison between the estate and the contractors was crisis orientated, spontaneous and fragmented. This was clearly not toally the fault of the agent, for whom administering the realignment of the A590 was a part-time activity. Rather it lay in the lack of commitment and resources given to the problem by the estate owner.

The tenants of the Whitbarrow Estate found themselves in a difficult situation as regards the road development. Their already small and fragmented farms, were to undergo a significant degree of severance and land loss, a problem made worse as the road tended to run through the better land on the estate. They therefore, faced a situation where they either had to run down production, or intensify. With the already poor return they were receiving, for all but one farmers, Farmer D, the latter alternative was the only one they could pursue. While this intensification might be just part of the farm's economic development, the fact that it was undertaken to directly mitigate the effects of the road, means that the farmer's options for the future are considerably reduced. It also implies an increased work load for the already busy wives.

Considering the economic impact the development was to have upon the farms, it is surprising that they reacted in such a muted manner to its arrival, with only one farmer showing any degree of hostility. No farmer apparently wished to enter fully into the planning process, this no doubt having some basis in the poor economic and educational standing of the farmers. Yet because the estate left the farmers to cope with the problems created by the road on their own, this resigned attitude, and the resulting lack of inclusion in the overall planning and construction process, meant that their interests became seriously disadvantaged.

The farmers also did not make satisfactory use of their agents, apart from perhaps Farmer B. No farmer had proper accommodation works schemes drawn up. There was no tight control of the contractor's operations, and no prepayment of compensation. This meant that opportunities to improve the holdings were missed, and a great deal of unnecessary worry and inconvenience suffered, which could have been removed by better planning on their part. This problem was made worse by the fact that farmers had a lack of appreciation of the proper channels to go through in order to get problems resolved. Added to this, they could have had compensation money in hand to re-invest. Thus, while all farmers hired agents, negligence and maladministration did occur. Clearly, as will be further elaborated in Chapter Six, employing an agent, as advised by the MAFF, the RCU and other official bodies involved, does not imply that all problems will be resolved.

5.7:1. The 1980 Conference: It's Organisation

The setting up of the conference by the joint efforts of the MAFF's Socio-Economic Advisory Service, and the Wolfson Group has already been discussed. The aims of the conference were very broad, but a special emphasis was placed on the effects of the realignment of the A590 on the estate, and the opportunities on such an estate for rural employment and wealth creation. To this end, a wide range of organisations, with an interest in the countryside, were invited to send representatives to the conference. In all, some 34 people attended, representing over 19 separate interests, as seen in Table 5:5.

Table 5:5. Participants in the Whitbarrow Conference

Organisation	Number of Representatives
Ministry of Agriculture Fisheries & Food	8
National Farmers Union	2
Country Landowners Association	1
Lake District Special Planning Board	3
South Lakeland District Council	1
North West Road Construction Unit	1
Council for Small Industries in Rural Areas	1
Cumbria Tourist Board	1
District Valuer	1
North West Water Authority	1
Forestry Commission	2
Holker Estates	2
Game Conservancy Council	1
Countryside Commission	1
University of Aston	2
University of Lancaster	3
Local Agent	1
Landowner	1
Press	1
	<hr/>
Total	<u>34</u>

A number of short papers were prepared by the MAFF the Wolfson Group, the Forestry Commission, CoSIRA, the Cumbria Tourist Board, the Nature Conservancy Council, and the North West Water Authority. All farmers named, and boundaries given are fictional. The papers were presented in a separate folder (MAFF 1980).

The first paper written by Mr Cottam, gave a hypothetical description of an estate owner and one of his tenants. It analysed the problems they both faced and gave a number of scenarios as to the estate's future, including the potential for agricultural intensification, for the development of tourist and industrial facilities, and the expansion of forestry. Mr Psmith-Smith the estate owner, was portrayed as a man with financial interests other than agriculture, although he does wish to develop the estate for his children. Mr Starkadder, the tenant, is an elderly man running an extensive farming system, who is to retire due to poor health. The estate, therefore, has an incentive to develop and, with Mr Starkadder leaving, a certain amount of freedom of action. Added to this there are a number of buildings suitable for development and some capital available.

The second paper was written by two members of ADAS and concerned the opportunities for agricultural intensification on the estate. This showed that both Mr Psmith-Smith's farm, Gilpin Farm and Mr Starkadder's farm, Low Fell End, produced very low incomes, £1,532 and £3,324 respectively. The paper then analysed the effects of further investment in agriculture on the farm and came to the conclusion, that at Low Fell End the income would not repay the interest charges if the money was borrowed, and at Gilpin Farm the returns were also very low. Clearly prospects for further investment in farming making adequate returns, were not promising.

The third paper written by myself, indicated that Mr Starkadder found the road construction very trying. He was not well organised and suffered some difficulties during the construction of the road. Mr Psmith-Smith seemed to suffer no constructional problems, although drainage was a major concern. Apprehension was also expressed regarding the size of remaining fields severed by the road and

problems of access. It was noted, that the compensation payments, especially Mr Starkadder's would not be high, although for Mr Psmith-Smith, there may be some opportunity for its investment in wealth-creating activities other than agriculture.

A paper was submitted by the Forestry Commission, which commented that the forestry on the estate, some 285 acres (115 hec) had been well tended. However, it was noted that there was in general little room for expansion and that a return of only some 5 per cent per annum should be expected from plantings.

A description of the tourist potential of the estate was given by a member of the Cumbria Tourist Board. He indicated that the opportunities for setting up a riding school and converting Whitbarrow Lodge into self-catering flatlets, with chalets built in the grounds and converted cottages were good, providing planning permission for the various enterprises could be obtained.

A paper was sent from the Nature Conservancy Council. This indicated that the study area is of significant conservation importance , having two SSSI's within it. The Whitbarrow SSSI contains a wide variety of habitats including grass, heath, scrub and limestone pavements. Present management techniques, and any agricultural intensification, would not adversely harm the ecology of the area. With regard to the Morecambe Bay SSSI, which contains a wide variety of bird life, there was little danger of development on the estate adversely threatening it. In relation to the land outside, the SSSI's, the NCC said that it contributes to the diversity and richness of the general countryside and management practices should aim to conserve the full range and maximum amount of their habitat types.

A full report of the proceedings of the conference was written up and published (Cottam et al 1980), including a transcription of the discussions. The main points are here briefly summarised.

5.7:2. The Day of the Conference

The conference day, the 23rd October 1980, began with a tour of the exercise area, with stops for discussion. These included a view of the new road construction, and some flooding that had taken place as a result of it; a look at the

Whitbarrow Lodge, with comments by the representative of the Cumbria Tourist Board; and a visit to some disused outbuildings at Low Fell End Farm, and Gilpin Farm, where the CoSIRA representative discussed the potential for conversion into small workshops. He pointed out that while demand was good, there may be problems with regard to planning permission, and keeping within health and safety laws.

Mrs Margaret Capstick of the LDSPB and the University of Lancaster, had very kindly agreed to chair the meeting. After preliminary discussion, the subject of the problems created by the road development were tackled.

5.7:3. The Discussion of the Effects of the A590 on the Estate

As will be recalled from Chapter Two, a great deal of discussion has taken place on the problems facing agriculture during the road planning and construction period therefore, discussion of the problems of agriculture during road developments proved both interesting and timely. At the conference, a number of interested people chose to speak about the effects of roads upon agriculture generally. They were members of the Ministry of Agriculture who have had experience of road planning and compensation negotiations, a member of the North West Road Construction Unit, a member of the National Farmers Union Land Use Department, a farmer who had had experience of an earlier improvement to the A590, the Leader of the Wolfson Group, and myself.

It was indicated at the start of the discussion, that while the road would have quite a serious effect on farming, in an already difficult farming situation, the main problem was that it stood as a psychological barrier to progress. As the author said in introducing the paper on the effect of the A590 on the farming community:

"With farming as an industry in decline, the new road construction would not be an encouragement to intensify farming. It might even discourage the continuation of some farming activity and would act as an intrusion on the farming community". (Cottam et al 1980).

The conference moved quickly on to discuss the problems regarding

compensation payments. The speed with which the conference turned to this matter is perhaps an indication of the seriousness with which the problem is held. The first point made by the representative of the CLA that unless Mr Psmith-Smith (the hypothetical landlord) moved into action immediately to settle his claim, he stood to lose a percentage from the compensation figure for all the years that went by. This was because Mr Psmith-Smith would be paid money at only 1 per cent above the bank rate and lower than the rate at which money is borrowed. It was pointed out that the problem is that if claims are set high, the District Valuer will attempt to "beat it down". This means some time is taken for compensation claims to be completed.

Dr David van Rest said that the agent must make his 90 per cent claim promptly, and seek advice on what he is to do with it, if he wishes to claim roll over relief. Although, a great emphasis was placed by the conference on getting an efficient agent, some difficulties were noted with regard to their payment. Agent's fees were not paid by the acquiring authority until a notice to treat had been served. As Dr Malcolm Bell said:

"If a public inquiry had taken place and had been lost, the initial talks about accommodation works might well have started with the Road Construction Unit".

Up to this point farmers were paying all their agent's fees out of their own pockets. This creates some difficulties in getting a man on the ground to agree a Statement of Condition in advance, and therefore, sets the whole proceedings off on a improper basis. Dr Bell went on to add that the scale on which agents are paid (scale 5A) is not adequate. As he said:

"An agent negotiating £34,500 would end up with a fee of £250 and that is not going to pay the agent for doing the job on the ground, negotiating in detail".

The conference then went on to consider the wisdom of settling early. Mr Farrer, said that:

"There is a considerable disincentive for a tenant farmer to settle at an early stage because injurious affection and damage only became observable subsequent to the completion of the work. Those who settle early lose out altogether, but if a farmer settles late, he has all the running costs to pay".

The CLA representative then added that when he was affected by a road development, if he had settled early and taken the 90 per cent of his original offer, he would have had hardly enough money to pay his agent; and as his land trebled in price he was wise to wait.

Dr Bell then stated that the difference in price one receives after negotiations from that originally offered, has serious national implications. Dr Bell's research had shown that usually the final figure is 50 per cent more than that originally offered. As the original figure is then fed into the cost benefit analysis:

"The land cost and compensation cost which were giving out the cost benefit analysis were low and they were showing too high a return on capital".

The representative of the North West Road Construction Unit then said, that the cost benefit analysis excluded land costs and included only contract costs. This statement however, was incorrect.

The role of the MAFF during the road construction and planning period was then discussed. It was made clear by Mr Cottam of ADAS that the MAFF acted as a sort of "honest broker", advising the District Valuer and the Department of Transport. Yet ADAS cannot act as agents for the farmers. They can only tell them what is planned and advise them to keep a diary and get an agent. Mr Wright (ADAS) added that apart from being involved in the land-use exercise, when alternative lines for a route were being considered, local officers were involved in attending public inquiries as independent witnesses.

The Chairman then asked Dr van Rest what happened to the farm after a road had gone through, whether in general was the decision to intensify production or to retrench and farm less extensively? He replied:

"The farmer in these circumstances is left with less land and with a local land hunger, it is difficult to replace the land even if compensation is satisfactory, and the farmer is faced with the increasing difficulty of access".

Dr van Rest then went on to say that the most common trigger was that of

retirement; often, any re-organisation that took place was not done in a calculated way but carried out more through instinct. In some cases the re-organisation that has taken place has made things a lot worse. Yet, also, some of the changes which have taken place were beneficial, for example the creation of a caravan park near a motorway interchange, however there was some difficulty in knowing which enterprise to move into, especially if capital investment was required. But, on the whole, he judged that the tendency was to be cautious, retrench, or retire altogether.

In the next stage of the discussion, the representative of the North West Road Construction Unit made a complaint regarding one of the papers presented. Mr Lee complained that, although he knew that it was a hypothetical exercise, certain parts of the exercise were factual;

"And in this instance facts put forward were not true. No heifers have destroyed themselves or have been frightened by bulldozers".

On being assured that the paper presented was hypothetical but these things do happen quite regularly, Mr Lee turned his attention towards the paragraph in the discussion paper, which commented on the fact that Mr Starkadder was said not to know who the main actors in the construction team were but he would have had a letter with this information. The problem emanated from Mr Lee equating the farmers being "informed" who the main actors were, with them "knowing" who the main actors were. Other participants in the conference who had had some experience with attempting to communicate with the farming community, then went on to point out to Mr Lee that sending a letter to the farmers is not an adequate way of making themselves known to them. As Mr Cottam (ADAS) said:

"Farmers of Mr Starkadder's type, the older generation who had left school at 14, had got a bad heart and might receive a letter and be quite prepared to swear 6 months later on oath that they had never had it".

Mr Cottam then went on to say that farmers of Mr Starkadder's type are a dying race, and he did not think that there would be so much of a problem with the younger generation.

5.7:4. Section Summary

The attention of the conference was centred upon two specimen farms on an agricultural estate. Both of these farms suffered from considerable under investment, and have low incomes. The situation, although hypothetical, was not dissimilar to the existing state of affairs at Whitbarrow. Although, official bodies claimed that the estate was ripe for development, one significant problem did affect it, namely that of a major road development.

It was noted that compensation problems are often apparent after a road construction, especially with regard to the time taken to settle. It was held that there are advantages and disadvantages in settling early. Added to this, because of the time taken to receive money, farmers are discouraged from hiring an agent early on, to ensure everything starts on a proper basis. The low level of fees paid to agents, restricts the time available for them to negotiate in detail.

The role of the MAFF in road developments was also elaborated. It was stated that they act as a source of advice for the RCU and the District Valuer. They do not become involved with the individual problems of farmers. The RCU on the other hand, although it has direct contact with farmers, in the view of the conference, often fails to understand their more personal problems.

The re-organisation of farms after a road development can be hampered by a local land shortage, lack of planning and psychological disruption. Because of this, many farmers either retire or farm less intensively. Although as seen earlier on the Whitbarrow Estate, most farmers did intensify production, this reaction was instinctive rather than planned and the obtaining of more land was mainly due to good fortune and the considerate attitude to the owner.

5.7:5. The Discussion and the Proposals for Agricultural Intensification

At the previous conference held in 1972, it was decided that the estate would be well advised to go ahead with agricultural intensification and, as has been seen, the effects of this would have been undoubtedly economically advantageous. However, as the MAFF paper presented to the conference showed, to intensify

production at present would involve a high capital outlay and produce poor returns.

Because of this, discussion tended to centre on the effects of agricultural intensification upon the environment. The first problem was in relation to agricultural buildings necessary to cater for the increased number of dairy stock at Gilpin Farm. Here an area of 1,200 square metres would be developed and an 18 metre diameter slurry store $4\frac{1}{2}$ metres high, and a 40 metres by 20 metres silage clamp $2\frac{1}{2}$ metres high. Mr Sim (ADAS) stated that he would not pretend that these buildings would be attractive. With regard to the appearance of the buildings he wondered whether the higher set of standards the LDSPB required for farm buildings in the National Park, would add appreciably to the cost of construction. The Principle Planner of the LDSPB commented that:

"A slightly higher quality of working finish might be asked for, the colour being more important than the actual material. Buildings could be landscaped but in open valleys where landscaping is not practical the end product would not be satisfactory and would not be insisted upon. Simply designed buildings are best with gables rather than extraneous additions to a smaller building. With a simple building, the cost factor should not be more than elsewhere".

Mr Wright representing the Lands Division of ADAS said that:

"The extra cost of a modern building to fit in with the landscape features was generally very small".

The problem of the slurry tower, it was thought would not be that great, as although they were $4\frac{1}{2}$ metres high, the buildings would be almost as tall so there would not be that much of a problem.

The representative of the Countryside Commission expressed concern over the fact that an increased application of fertilizer would take place on the grassland if there was greater intensification of agriculture. As the Chairman pointed out, this was especially important in the Levens Valley, as it did not have fast-flowing streams, but a slow-flowing system of drainage dykes. This could perhaps create excessive weed growth which would lead to problems with regard to the new pumping scheme proposed. But Mr Gregson of the North West Water Authority did not think that the problem would be any more than that which

already existed, as:

"All slow-flowing streams were weed-growing streams, and the degree of weed growth varies from one season to another".

But weed growth could be controlled by chemicals or by cutting. The problem here was that the cutting would only be done by the Water Authority within their watercourses designated as main rivers, not within drainage channels, but farmers would be free to apply chemicals as they wished.

5.7:6. The Development of Forestry on the Estate

One form of enterprise which is thought to have great potential for rural areas, especially in terms of job creation, is forestry. A paper on forestry and its potential development on the estate was presented by the Forestry Commission, which had as its main conclusion, that any large scale tree planting scheme would not be economically feasible. As the Forestry Commission's representative said:

"Costs of £300-£400 per hectare would be necessary - of this about £100 would come from grants. The discounted revenue would be in the region of a few per cent, and Mr Psmith-Smith would have to wait 20 years for profits from thinning".

Because of this, forestry would not provide a solution to the estate's financial problem.

The Forestry Commission representative felt that it would be a good idea to try and improve the sporting value of the woodlands, but the representative of the Game Conservancy Council was of the opinion that it was:

"No good looking to the sporting for revenue".

It was not a viable proposition for a full time game keeper, or was there sufficient area to release and harvest enough pheasants on a commercial basis to achieve a return on costs.

5.7:7. The Potential for Tourist Development on the Estate

As seen in Chapter Three, Cumbria is a national tourist centre. Because of this there has been a great emphasis upon tourism as a means of boosting the income of the farming community. The Whitbarrow Estate set close to popular walking and mountaineering country, within half an hours drive of the southern lakes, twenty minutes drive from Kendal, and near the seaside resort of Grange-over-Sands, appears to be well placed to develop tourist enterprises. Even so only one farmer on the estate engages in Bed and Breakfast provision, although another lets his bungalow for self catering.

The estate, according to the Tourist Board representative, has a number of strong advantages. It is well positioned for holidaymaking; it has a large lodge, capable of conversion to self-catering units; has attractive woodlands in which to build chalets; and has out-buildings suitable for conversion into an equestrian enterprise. While Chapter Three has shown that tourism is generally a declining industry in Cumbria, there is significant demand for more self-catering facilities, especially on a large scale. However, while these may benefit the owner, the LDSPB has set itself against allowing such developments, as they can contradict the aims of the National Park. For Mr Psmith-Smith permission to build chalets in the estate's woodlands, would undoubtedly be a substantial financial coup. Yet any such hopes he had, would have been dashed by the response of the Principle Planner of the LDSPB, Mr Pattinson. Mr Pattinson said that the LDSPB would discourage the building of self-catering chalets. He went on to say that chalets might be allowed in towns and villages, or on farms where they would be required to maintain viability, the same with the conversion of outbuildings, but considering the proposed idea for industrial units and the tenancy for the cottages associated with them, the holding did not warrant further development. In relation to the suggested pony-trekking enterprise in a number of the outbuildings, he did not think that there would be any planning objections, assuming that the bridle paths were capable of catering for it.

5.7:8. The Potential for Industrial Development on the Estate

Tourism has been recognised as one of the least attractive ways of bringing employment into rural areas. It is seasonal, and has certain environmental drawbacks. Small businesses, however, can employ people on an all the year round basis, are locally controlled, and can fit more comfortably into the existing social structure. The estate has a number of centrally placed redundant farm buildings in good condition. On the morning of the exercise, these were shown by the CoSIRA representative to be capable of conversion into "mini-factories". An added advantage of these was that housing could be provided along with them.

At the conference, before discussion on CoSIRA's proposals took place, their representative Mr Dodgeson, made two comments. First it was stressed that CoSIRA had no intention of bringing industry into the countryside whatever the cost. It was made clear that CoSIRA was an advisory body and that it was their job to make sure that the industries that came into rural areas were viable and prosperous in themselves and good for the surrounding areas.

With regard to the types of people who set up a small business in the countryside, it was said that they usually tend to be people who had been made redundant for one reason or another. "Unfortunately" he went on to say:

"Some of them were people who came from a cloistered existence, who did not really know what the world was about".

But often people who start up businesses in the countryside had good ideas and it was up to CoSIRA to ensure that they provided wealth creation opportunities within rural areas, not only job creation, although it was an important aspect.

Although superficially the idea of creating ancillary enterprises has appeal, a number of problems stand in the way of any such development, not least of which is the necessity of obtaining planning permission. With regard to the proposals put forward, the Principle Planning Officer of the LDSPB said, he would want to know what sort of industry was likely to come into the building apart from the usual considerations of access, and adequacy of the site. With regard to the buildings at Ravens Lodge which are contained within the farm building structure, conversion:

"Would be an acceptable idea and that it would be a sensible and logical use".

Problems arose, though with redundant farms in open country, Mr Pattinson said that:

"In making an exception to settled policy, it is easier to justify it if local employment was being given rather than making an attractive studio in the wrong location for some outside firm who had no intention of making a business out of it".

However, the representative of South Lakeland District Council, expressed doubt as to whether any great demand existed for such business premises in rural areas, and that it would be more profitable to convert the disused buildings into houses.

5.8:1. General Conclusions

The potential for economic development on such an estate as Whitbarrow appears limited. Even though the exercise estate is agriculturally based, there appears little indication of Mr Psmith-Smith or his tenant achieving significant benefits from substantial capital investment in it. The expansion of forestry on the estate was ruled out by the representative of the Forestry Commission, because it provided only poor economic returns. While there was no scope for developing hunting facilities.

The development of tourism on the estate will be curtailed by strict planning control, especially with regard to the lucrative construction of chalets. Although planning permission would be available to the estate, to convert the more centrally placed buildings into industrial units, it is not clear what the success of the small businesses that move in, would be. The fact that this caveat was given by the representative of CoSIRA, means that Mr Psmith-Smith would have to think seriously before embarking upon such a venture. Indeed, the information presented in Chapter Two, appears to confirm the suspicions generally held that small businesses are usually neither very stable or successful. The report of the proceedings was circulated and followed up. There were no disagreements except from Mr Lee (RCU) indicating the gulf of misunderstanding still existing.

While there is very little that can be done to improve such an estate's

economic position, other important questions resulting from these conclusions do arise. For example the probability of any of an estate's tenants benefiting from the above developments is very low. All of these would be sponsored either directly by the estate owner, or by outside interests. Added to this, if an under-developed estate well positioned according to official sources, ripe for a substantial injection of capital, cannot be economically improved, then what can be done to improve the financial position of the rest of rural Britain? Planning control, has obviously placed restrictions upon the development of such estates. Because of this it can be concluded, that a less restrictive control of development is necessary throughout rural areas?

Developing an agricultural estate, is not simply a matter of identifying resources available, and then investing capital into them. It is a complex problem, involving market research, a comprehension of planning law, and rigorous investment analysis. The results from Whitbarrow clearly show that the whole notion of rural development needs to be more thoroughly explored than it has been, and it is to this that Chapter Six will turn its attention.

The economic problems of the estate, especially the low agricultural incomes have been compounded by a major road development. Clearly those factors which aided Lowther Estate in their successful negotiation of the Penrith By-Pass, have not been reproduced at Whitbarrow. Chapter Six will isolate and discuss each of these factors, and on the basis of these policy recommendations will be made in Chapter Eight.

CHAPTER 6

THE CASE STUDIES CONSIDERED

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THE CASE STUDIES CONSIDERED

6.1. Introduction

An examination has taken place of the problems of a large rural county, a sizeable agricultural estate, and a smaller less prosperous one. The study areas were considered in the light of a literature review, which indicated the current state of knowledge in each of the issues analysed. The studies were carried out, with a view to developing a broader and fuller knowledge of a number of specific rural problems, and the potential that exists for solving them. The conclusions reached at each stage were often self-explanatory, however the aim of this chapter is to draw them all together and develop certain themes.

6.2:1. The Problem of Rural Deprivation

Chapter Two indicated that rural deprivation, not only has many roots, but is a difficult concept to define. This results from a number of factors. First, many of the problems regarded as deprivation, are essentially intangible personally felt problems defying empirical measurement. Second, levels of deprivation are likely to vary within a community, so that an area or even a small collection of individuals cannot so easily be defined as deprived; a problem not encountered to such a great extent in the city, where a more rigid class/space structure exists. This has serious implications for the rural policy maker, and makes a flexible approach on their part essential. Undoubtedly, the major cause of deprivation is the poor economic base of many rural communities, and not as some commentators feel, the lack of political power they have. Indeed considerable state support is funnelled into rural areas in the form of agricultural subsidies, aids to forestry, and the cross-subsidisation of public telephones, water and electricity supplies. Even so, many feel that greater effort ought to be made to relieve "rural deprivation"; although as the Cumbrian case study showed, the problems are largely intractable. It is worth at this stage looking more closely at the problem as it exists in that county.

6.2:2. Access Deprivation: The Cumbrian Experience

Access deprivation in Cumbria, is the result of a low and decreasing provision of public transport services. This basically emanates from there being too small a number of people in any one rural area to justify an economic public transport service, and that small pool of potential users, declining because of increased car ownership. However, many rural communities have been without public transport facilities for a considerable period of time. For example, the valley of Longsleddale has been without a bus service since the 1930's. At the time of its removal there was a great deal of concern, reminiscent of the reaction of many modern rural communities in a similar situation. Yet the interesting point to note here, is the capacity for communities to adapt. Every household now owns a car, and organises its activities around its availability. They express no particular feeling of being deprived, but rather seem to acknowledge it as being a fact of living in a relatively isolated situation.

The indications are that a similar pattern has been set in the rest of Cumbria, with 87 per cent of households owning at least one car. Even for those without a car there is a strong possibility that in the case of need, a relative, friend or neighbour will have one available. The voluntary car scheme in Cumbria clearly extends and formalises this arrangement, providing a flexible, co-ordinated and relatively inexpensive transport system. As an added advantage, it also provides direct contact between individuals in the community, and can act as a catalyst in building up relationships.

The future, for what remains of conventional public transport, is bleak. Rural transport is expensive to provide, and with continued pressure to control public expenditure, and increased private urban competition with the state owned National Bus Company, provision will undoubtedly be reduced even further. Yet it cannot be conclusively argued that this is necessarily undesirable. Rural communities have shown a spirited ability to adjust, and non-conventional measures can be remarkably successful. Public transport in itself cannot meet the needs of many of the elderly and infirm, while if someone is in severe difficulties, the local

authority has a duty to provide accommodation for them, in an area or settlement more suited to their situation.

The emphasis must clearly be towards recognising the inevitability of a sustained decline in rural services such as public transport, and encouraging rural areas to adjust with as much care as possible to this situation. Those unsuited to living in rural areas may well be eased out and replaced by those more economically suited to absorbing the extra costs involved. This will allow rural communities, in transport terms at least, to be less reliant upon the caprice of state support, and become more self contained.

6.2:3. The Housing Problem in Rural Cumbria

A natural desire of many people is to own or rent a dwelling in an area where they have built up social and economic ties. However, in many rural areas, especially those of great scenic attraction, young people particularly have found difficulty in finding accommodation. Shucksmith (1981) in his study of housing problems in the Lake District, indicates that the accommodation shortage has many roots. These include restrictive planning policies, a high demand from outsiders for retirement and holiday homes, and the inability of local people to compete in the housing market because of low local incomes.

The poor economic base of the area, with its prevalence of declining industries, coupled with environmental pleasantness, has meant that many homes are taken over by retired people or holiday home owners. While retirement homes are in full use all the year round, holiday homes are vacant for much of the year, seemingly a wasteful use of potential accommodation. However, they can also be viewed in a more positive light. Holiday home purchases took place largely at a time of steady outmigration, due to a contraction of local labour demand, and an expansion of opportunity elsewhere. This meant that a great amount of surplus housing stock came onto the open market at very attractive prices. The holiday home owner in purchasing this surplus, prevented it from falling into decay and often improved it. If, as there are indications, there is an increased demand for

continuously occupied dwellings in the Lake District, which will push up house prices generally, then the holiday home owner may find the potential income from selling, greater than the perceived benefits of retaining his house. No indication was given of this happening in Cumbria, although it must represent a future possibility.

Those seeking retirement homes in the Lake District are usually outsiders, who now having a great deal of leisure time, wish to spend it in a pleasant environment, a right to which they are so entitled after a long and presumably arduous working life. If house prices in the National Park are above the national average, then the additional cost, is the increased value the buyer is prepared to pay for amenity, which is protected by restrictive planning. If local people sell a house to an "incomer", and then move out of the area themselves, they will benefit from the surplus between the average national value they are likely to pay elsewhere, and the "amenity" value. This surplus will help ease out those who move searching for a better standard of living.

The incomers, even if retired, make a valuable contribution to community life. They may have a greater concern for conservation than local people, and they may be better suited economically to the changing trends placed upon the rural community. If, however, they find living in a rural area a burden, they have the opportunity financially of relocating in an area more suited to their needs. On the other hand housing may be taken over by economically active "incomers", who through being more affluent than their rural rivals in the housing market, will not only spend more within the community, but improve it by expanding, diversifying and strengthening its economic base.

Even though there are local and national benefits from a change of housing control, this does not mean that some individuals do not suffer short term deprivational problems during the adjustment process. There are two main ways in which the problem can be overcome, either by a greater relaxation of planning controls allowing housing supply to increase, or by more public housing construction. The relaxation of planning controls is unlikely to bring any substantial benefits to the local community, for the demand for all kinds of housing

for holiday and retirement homes is high, with the LDSPB estimating that even on a conservative basis 2.5 houses would have to be built to meet the demands of one local person (DOE 1980b). Large scale construction of cheaper housing may well increase interest and demand from outsiders looking for new homes.

More important than this however, is the fact that the relaxation of building controls will contradict the purposes of the National Park to protect the environment, and any attempt to do this would cause both a local and national outcry. This would be especially so, when the high level of construction is considered that would be required to satisfy both local and national demands for Lake District housing. It must also be remembered that the natural environment is one of Cumbria's few economic strengths, supporting a large tourist industry with the associated benefits of spending through the multiplier effect. If the pleasantness of the Lake District environment is threatened, then undoubtedly this will have adverse effects upon the tourist industry.

The relaxation of planning controls will not significantly benefit the local community, and will compromise the national purposes of the National Park. The same tight planning controls are also likely to restrict the activities of housing associations and local authorities. Even so, district councils do not appear keen to expand local authority housing, due to their political composition, that is right of centre, and there is very little housing association activity in the Park itself. If housing associations or local authorities do wish to make use of the limited amount of land available for development within the Park, then clearly the legislation exists to enable them to do so, if they wish to forgo this opportunity, then again it is their own decision.

The LDSPB has recognised that local people have and are suffering from a degree of housing deprivation, and have responded to this by introducing the controversial Section 52 Agreements, controlling the occupancy of newly built houses. However, the LDSPB have admitted that the policy will only have a limited effect and appears to be an ineffectual response to a largely intractable problem.

Once again the shift in housing occupancy represents a reaction to a changing local economy in rural Cumbria, and the new role it plays in the nation's life. A process of adjustment has occurred over a period of many years and undoubtedly will continue for some years to come. While there are short-term problems associated with the adjustment process, even though cheaper housing exists in urban Cumbria, in the long term the rural community will be strengthened by it. To artificially support those who are unsuited to the new economic situation in Cumbria, is apparently extremely difficult given the scale of the problem, and may in the long term be unhelpful in easing the situation.

6.2:4. Rural Primary Schools in Cumbria

A matter of great concern amongst a number of rural communities in Cumbria, is the decline in rural primary school numbers. Local authorities have been under pressure for many years to close schools, which according to national standards, fail to maintain a set minimum number of pupils. This pressure, however, has increased as a result of reductions in public expenditure levels. The closure of many small primary schools, is resisted for a number of reasons. It can be inconvenient for children and parents to reach the next available school; schools provide an important local community focus; and the buildings can fulfil a number of other social functions apart from education.

The economic case for supporting small rural schools is very weak, as they are expensive to maintain and divert funds from other areas of the education budget. The social aspect of support is also variable. Some extra costs may be placed upon the individual, although this depends upon how distant they are from the nearest school, with the local authority obliged to provide free transport for distances over three miles. While schools do act as a community focus within villages, there can be no case for supporting their existence simply upon this basis. Village communities have tended to look outwards into the nearest towns for their social lives, often neglecting former social centres such as the Church. It can also be argued, that if people feel very strongly that village social life needs to be

improved, then they can attempt to do so by such means as forming village societies, or pressing for the construction of a village hall.

There is no evidence from Cumbria to show that because a school is closed down, a village ceases to function, or that families will undergo extreme hardship; rather educational standards will probably be improved and a wider variety of social contacts formed. Even though village communities will have to face the result of past economic and demographic change, and the full cost of living in rural areas, some significant benefits can be achieved for the wider community, and the short term hardships faced need not necessarily be great.

6.2:5. Interim Summary

Cumbria's rural deprivation experience, results from the constantly changing economic and corresponding social conditions. Three main areas of concern have been examined in Cumbria, although the findings will equally apply to the provision of costly services such as telephones, electricity and water. While in the long term the adjustment process is beneficial to rural areas, there are many disadvantaged groups, who will be unable to adjust to the new role of rural areas without some degree of deprivation. The most important of these groups are those who Moseley (1979), defines as being "locked" into rural areas. They may be locked in by their employment, by living in rented accommodation, or by retiring to an area they are fundamentally unsuited to living in.

It can be argued however, that the adjustment process need not necessarily be insensitive to the needs of these groups. In the first place, service provision in rural areas has always been low, especially in an area such as Cumbria. This makes the local community better able to adapt to the minimal service provision. Second, if an employee's income is so small that he cannot afford to live in a given area, then obviously his income is too low. To artificially support this, may underwrite an exploitative and weak economy. Third, the policy of keeping people in work simply because it is some sort of employment, is not necessarily successful. In recent years, those industries which have received the most state support, have

been the most vulnerable to employment loss. Indeed, in few areas of the economy, has employment been maintained purely upon social objectives, and in this respect it is not clear why rural areas should be a special case. Obviously, at present, some considerable disadvantage is being caused to many during the adjustment process. Clearly the aim should be not to have policy attempts to stop the adjustment process, as this is costly and very difficult to achieve, but rather to accept it, and in so doing attempt to refine it and make it more humane. This is a subject to which Chapter Eight will turn its attention.

Some inconvenience is and will be created in the future to those that suffer access problems due to income deficiencies, age, disability, and the fact that cars do not satisfy the total transport needs of the family. Those who suffer income deficiencies are clearly unsuited to living in rural areas and must necessarily adjust to a new situation more in keeping with the resources at their disposal. Those who are retired or disabled, may well be highly unsuited to using the public transport system as it exists, with it being infrequent, difficult to use, especially for those with wheelchairs, and often unloading passengers at some distance from their destination. For these the voluntary car schemes, which have worked so successfully in Cumbria, will suit their needs far more than conventional public transport. Those families without cars during certain parts of the day, will have to accept this as being one of the disbenefits of living in a rural area, as has been the case in Longsleddale. Indeed, with the adjustment process already well developed in many rural areas that continued support often means that the poorer urban members of the community are now subsidising the needs of the richer rural dweller.

Another argument put forward, is that in the adjustment process, certain financial costs are imposed upon the individuals involved and the community at large. Yet, while there has been a concentration upon the costs involved to those who leave an area, there are undoubtedly benefits to be achieved from this process. There may be significant benefits to those who leave due to greater opportunities and service provision elsewhere, there may be benefits from the immigration of the

more financially secure, with higher spending potential, who are less of a financial burden upon others, and who have an interest in the many merits of rural life. These benefits are of course unquantifiable, although very real, and must not as they have been be ignored by policy formulators.

6.3:1. Rural Economic Initiatives

While rural deprivation is difficult to alleviate simply through state intervention, the cycle of rural decline might be broken by the creation of new employment opportunities and stimulating the local economy. If successful, a rural employment creation policy will help maintain an increased population level, will increase job opportunity and diversity, help to keep intact rural communities, enable local people to compete in the housing market and maintain service levels.

Within Cumbria there has been a considerable emphasis upon rural development as a means of solving rural deprivation. There has been support for development ventures from local government, central government agencies and other unofficial groups with an interest in rural affairs. Cumbria, although a predominantly rural area has a number of features which may well stimulate and attract the potential entrepreneur and the relocating business. It has a very pleasant and varied environment, excellent transport links, it is fairly close to large population centres, it has a history of local crafts and industries, a large tourist industry, and land and buildings awaiting development.

Research was undertaken to consider the potential for developing industry in the whole of rural Cumbria, and on two agricultural estates considering the development opportunities they have, the results that have been achieved, and the potential for future development that exists. From this analysis, more specific conclusions regarding rural development can be drawn.

6.3:2. Tourism as an Agent of Development

It was indicated in Chapter Two, that those features which have discriminated against remoter rural areas developing a sound economic base, can

act in favour of them becoming a leisure resource. These include remoteness from industrial areas, low population densities and unspoiled scenery. Cumbria and in particular the Lake District, has been a major tourist destination for many years. The Lake District provides attractive scenery within easy reach of a large urban population, and can cater for a variety of visitors including the car orientated tourist, the rambler, and those who wish to spend their vacation in one particularly attractive spot. If Cumbria therefore, with its long history of tourist activity, and its many environmental strengths, finds difficulty in developing further its tourist industry, or even maintaining past achievements, then severe doubts must be cast upon the capacity of rural Britain as a whole to generate further tourist trade.

Chapter Two illustrated that while many commentators feel that tourism provides an excellent tool for economically supporting rural communities, there are a number of disadvantages associated with it as a basic or major industry. Riley (1973), confirmed national trends by showing how the Cumbrian tourist industry is largely seasonal, low pay based and predominantly female employing. Because of this he argues, it brings few real benefits to the local community and is unpopular as a job choice with Cumbrians.

Even though it is widely recognised and accepted that this basic problem exists with relying upon tourism as a major industry, it can be claimed that if tourism helps to maintain as a single unit one farm holding, or a community in the process of decline and disintegration, then it should be valued and encouraged. However, the research indicated that to achieve even this very limited objective would be difficult.

One of the most important reasons for this, is that with tourism as with most other industries, there are economic benefits from a large size of operation, a fact borne out by the amount of assistance given to the larger enterprise by the Cumbria Tourist Board, and the considerable pressure in the most popular areas to develop the large tourist scheme. Lowther Caravan Park represents an excellent example of the large tourist enterprise. Lowther Caravan Park has caravans, and caravan and tent pitches for 579 individual groups or families at any one time.

However, the park employs very few people, nine at most during the peak season, clearly bringing minimal benefit to the local community.

The single operator will not only have to compete against the larger enterprise but, due to economies of scale within the industry, accept lower profit margins. The large operator, through better marketing and often cheaper overall prices, will also syphon off most of the tourist market. Against these the smaller enterprise will be increasingly and perpetually marginal, and the local community will not be able to benefit significantly through wealth or income creation.

Another problem facing the community as a whole wishing to benefit from tourism, is the increased demand for self-catering accommodation. The trend towards self-catering in Cumbria is very marked. This is disturbing because of the fact that the industry is stagnant if not declining in the area. Therefore, an increase in self-catering provision does not mean an increase in the total number of tourists, but rather a diversion of tourist spending, from a high employment sector to a low employment one. In encouraging and giving grants to help self-catering enterprises, the Tourist Board underwrites the creation of unemployment in an already economically vulnerable area. Yet not only is employment hit by the extension of self-catering, but also total tourist spending tends to be lower, reducing the multiplier effect. If the accommodation is owned by a large organisation, even more money will actually leave the area. The trend towards self-catering clearly reduces the benefits local communities obtain from tourism.

Even though the individual landowner may wish to enter the tourist market, there are a number of hurdles he must first surmount, not least of these is the need for planning permission. At Whitbarrow, the failure of the potential entrepreneur to gain planning permission, prevented any large expansion into the tourist industry, while in UMEX 3 the LDSPB showed that although they were more sympathetic to the demands of farmers, they were not prepared to significantly relax planning restrictions to help them. In taking this stance the LDSPB must be supported because they both protect the national purposes of the National Park, and by preserving the environment ensure the continuance of an amenity based

tourist industry.

Apart from planning restrictions, a second major difficulty the potential entrepreneur faces, is that of cost. A barn conversion is commonly regarded as a simple way for a landowner to develop redundant farm buildings into a useful economic asset. Yet, at even a conservative estimate the cost will be around £30,000 to £40,000 for a conversion, depending upon the barn's condition. If the conversion costs £35,000, assuming the money is borrowed at an interest rate of 10 per cent, then for a 16 week season the owner will have to charge £219 per week simply to cover his interest charges. Owning and letting caravans can be cheaper and more lucrative. The Longsleddale example shows how a farmer with two caravans managed a 26 per cent net return on capital; however this totalled only £616, clearly not enough to determine whether most farmers remain in business or not, and a bad season will reduce this figure even further. If, of course, a farmer wished to have more caravans then he may do so, but planning controls, the size of holding concerned, and uncertainty over total demand will probably limit his venture.

Apart from planning law and other constraints, on tenanted farms the consent of the landlord may be required to carry out such things as conversions, something he may not wish the tenant to do, especially if he feels the tourist enterprise will detract from their farming operations.

The smaller farmer, the one that rural development must be aimed at if it wishes to protect and improve the economic lot of the local community, also faces other significant social problems. It was seen in Chapter Five, many farmers are unable or unwilling to enter the tourist industry because their houses were too small, or that they valued their privacy too greatly, or that they were working too hard on their farms to spend any time on developing a tourist enterprise. With regard to this latter point many people wrongly regard farm based tourism as "pin money" for the farmer's wife. As was seen in the Longsleddale case study, with the decline of hired labour on farms, farmers wives often work as long hours on the farm as their husbands. Chapter Five also indicated that some small farmers may

face managerial problems in administering a tourist enterprise.

The financial benefits from tourism are also variable and uncertain, and will probably deter many from investing their already limited funds in such a venture. The fact that tourism is not a growing industry with some overcapacity, is a deterrent in itself. The returns of Lowther Caravan Park, show a marked fall in profit over a period of some years, indicating an industry under sustained long term pressure. If they, with expert management and considerable marketing resources at their disposal, are unable to make a success of tourism, then the scope for the smaller concern making a profit with more restricted financial and management resources, will be limited.

While further investment in tourism is unlikely to bring major benefits to the local community, the disbenefits wrought by mass tourism can be considerable, especially those imposed upon the natural environment by larger scale tourist developments such as campsites. Often these tend to be visually intrusive, and create servicing problems, especially in relation to access. They also tend to account for more concentrated incidents of sheep worrying, trespass and vandalism. Large scale tourism has resulted in general crowding problems in the Lake District, both of vehicles and individuals, and in so doing, has had severe detrimental effects on many of the most pleasant locations. Tourism increased the necessity for better planning and the management of tourists, which in itself increases local authority costs and restricts tourist freedom. There is no doubt, that not only the charm of much of the Lake District is threatened by large scale tourism, but the national purpose of the Park is compromised when a saturation point is reached. Clearly the utility of attracting more tourists into the area must be questioned, simply because of the environmental damage caused by them.

The social and cultural effects of mass tourism, are probably less marked in Cumbria than in the Gaelic speaking islands of Scotland. However, the encouragement of tourism by various official and private bodies, may well have increased the demand for holiday and retirement homes in the area, increasing competition with local house seeking inhabitants. More important may be the

effect of more affluent visitors, upon the farming community. The farmers at Whitbarrow considered that they had an average standard of living, which even taking into account the perceived benefits of farming as a way of life, is clearly not the case. They or their children after witnessing the spending capacity and leisure time available to many visitors, may well decide to leave farming or the community, a reaction which would directly contradict the purpose of rural development.

The potential of tourism as a tool for rural development, is undoubtedly very limited. The industry can no longer be regarded as a means of ensuring economic growth within rural areas, or maintaining sustained employment opportunities. The industry also creates severe environmental problems in areas of great natural beauty. Because of these facts, it must be recognised that policy measures for rural areas should no longer consider tourism in itself, or even in part, as a significant instrument for rural development. This will be considered more fully in Chapter Eight.

6.3:3. Rural Industrialisation as an Agent of Development

The concept of introducing manufacturing processes into rural areas, as seen in Chapter Two, has achieved wide support, not least because many concerned with rural development, have recognised the weakness of tourism as a development agent. Even though there exists tremendous public and private support for the development of industry in rural areas, Chapter Two has noted that there may well be severe, if not intractable problems in developing wealth creating, employment generating industries.

At the base of this apparently pessimistic hypothesis, is the fact that there is no clear or full understanding of the regional economic problem, of which rural problems are but one facet. The lack of consensus about the very nature of the problem makes it difficult, if not impossible, to determine solutions to it. Investing large sums of public money into the regions alone has clearly not brought about sustained economic growth, and strong regional economies.

While there has been a certain amount of industrial movement into rural areas, it has generally not been to the remoter parts of Britain, where the most significant problems exist, with industries preferring to move to the large rural towns, within easy access to markets and services. Clearly, this indicates that if many rural areas were unable to prosper during a period of considerable industrial fluidity, then they are unlikely to benefit from industrial movement in times of economic stringency.

The form of employment created by assisted industries, and the very nature of these industries themselves has been held by many commentators to be undesirable, or at least unsatisfactory. Employment tends to be based upon low pay, female labour, deficient in white collar jobs and bringing little economic or social benefit to the local community, while the industries themselves are vulnerable to closure. This is especially true of small businesses, the most common form of new industry in rural areas. Assisted areas can also become too reliant upon a single product, while the introduction of industry into larger rural towns can have a devastating social effect upon the rural hinterland. However, while all these arguments have been proved true, many argue that it is better to create some jobs rather than none, and by doing so, stop the already serious economic problem of many rural areas from deteriorating even further.

Cumbria has been the recipient of considerable regional aid over many years, especially in the declining industrial areas of the west coast. The new firms attracted to Cumbria, appear to be vulnerable to closure, produce in already declining sectors of the economy, and have a tendency to employ large amounts of female labour. Cumbria has not altered its industrial structure, or its economic relationship with the rest of Britain, which as Prattis (1977) maintains, is the fundamental determinant of regional policy success. Cumbria relies heavily upon imported goods and services, including technological innovation, and in this respect cannot be regarded as self-sustaining. Clearly, if Cumbria's urban areas, with services, factory space, housing, a large pool of skilled unemployed and substantial government aid, cannot satisfactorily resolve its economic problem, then there is

obviously limited scope for rural economic rejuvenation in the county.

Within rural Cumbria, regional policy has tended to revolve around the provision of advance factories in sites identified by local authorities, and developed by the Development Commission and its agent CoSIRA. Firms can also take advantage of other financial assistance in the form of cheap loans and advice services. However, even though rural Cumbria does have these and numerous other attractions, there has been some difficulty recorded in letting factories once built. Why this difficulty exists has not been satisfactorily explained by the developers, except to say that the premises constructed have been too large. Yet although this may be one reason, those factors which have impeded development in west Cumbria, must also be important in restricting Cumbrian rural development, especially the fact that the county is economically peripheral to the main markets of Britain and Western Europe.

Instead of the factory programme being abandoned however, there will now be a greater emphasis upon the construction of smaller units, although at present no information is available to suggest that this policy will be any more successful. Chapter Two indicated, that smaller businesses are more vulnerable to closure than large, and as the representative of CoSIRA at the Whitbarrow Exercise pointed out, there is a great danger that those who set up small businesses, are often unaware of the problems likely to be experienced in successfully managing a profit making firm. In Cumbria the problems in letting units has been so great, that there have not been enough firms actually in business to enable a researcher to see if there are severe viability problems with attracted small businesses.

While managing to fill constructed units and ensure continuous occupation is a major problem, to actually obtain planning permission for a factory site is something of an achievement. The Whitbarrow Exercise showed that there was a reluctance on the part of planning authorities to allow the development of units in open land. This clearly limits the scope for development to within village boundaries, where it will compete with housing for suitable land. This policy however, is essential, not only to protect the environment but to ensure that

factories are located within easy reach of services, such as electricity and water, and that they have well developed access facilities.

It was noted that the development of industry in rural areas arouses considerable opposition from those people the policy is designed to help, namely the local community. The Cumbrian experience indicates that the problem is widespread, and very significant in hampering development initiatives. The opponents are usually very vociferous in protecting the amenity value of their area, and represent a significant and important section of the local community, who must be convinced of the value of rural development if the process is to achieve any success.

Because of the requirements of both planning law and the local community, an emphasis is placed upon attracting environmentally suitable industries into rural areas. This was clearly seen in Chapter Five. As these industries must generate little atmospheric or visual pollution, they tend to be based upon light industry such as crafts. This in itself limits the success of any development policy, as deprived areas are often prepared to forsake some detriment to the environment in order to attract employment; notable examples of this are Enterprise Zones. These industries will often not be tolerated in more prosperous areas, but are a legitimate way of creating employment. If a deprived area chooses to reject these industries, then it must compete with more prosperous areas for the remaining "acceptable" forms of economic activity. Something Cumbria clearly finds difficult.

Indeed, in general it is difficult to see what benefits will accrue to the local community from the development of small industry, especially those of the smallest kind. The entrepreneur will probably be an outsider and middle-aged especially if he has developed the industrial skills, capital and confidence to go into business on his own. His children, if he has any, will be likely to be beyond primary school age, and it is unlikely that he will make use of local public transport. The national failure rate of small businesses, implies that it is unlikely that the business will expand to employ local people; even if it does, the process will take some

time, by which it is probable that the most deprived will have already left the area. Indeed if the business does expand, then for planning reasons the firm may have to look for facilities elsewhere. In say the National Park where larger sites are few, this may entail a movement beyond its boundaries.

The Whitbarrow Exercise indicated how unsuited the local community is to taking advantage of the development of small industry. The farming community on the estate does not possess any marketable skills, except agricultural ones, and do not have any industrial training. They are clearly not of the entrepreneurial material to be attracted into setting up small businesses, and employing them would be difficult, not least because of the high number of elderly farmers. Thus, if the buildings at Whitbarrow were converted into industrial units, the farmers themselves would not achieve any tangible benefits, although they are apparently some of the most important members of that community.

Often, where there has been success in developing industrial premises and filling them, other, unforeseen problems can emerge. The small Cumbrian town of Kirkby Stephen, has attracted migrant firms to its two available factory units. However, no more industrial units are planned in Kirkby Stephen because the already acute housing shortage has been exacerbated. If, as the census results indicate, rural towns are experiencing a growth in population, then housing problems can be expected to get worse, rather than better if such schemes are introduced. Indeed, if the industries are based primarily upon low pay, female labour, then local people are still unlikely to be able to compete against the relatively better off incomers.

Most industrial schemes initiated in rural Cumbria are public developments. The lack of private investment in providing small premises for industrial use is clear to understand. For example, say an estate such as Whitbarrow has a building capable of conversion into a small workshop, then the cost of that conversion, keeping within the relevant health and safety laws, can be around £20,000 at a very conservative estimate. This means to merely get a return of capital of ten per cent, a rent has to be charged of £40 per week; very high for the new business. Added to this will be some uncertainty as to whether the business will collapse, or

go through periods of non-payment of rent, which would substantially reduce profitability. As was indicated during the Whitbarrow Exercise, if a building managed to achieve planning permission for conversion into an industrial unit, then it certainly would for a house, which in itself would make a more desirable economic proposition.

The attractions of Cumbria are clear to see, a pleasant environment and good access facilities, yet severe difficulties have been noted in not only attracting businesses to the area, but in developing suitable sites. Many commentators have noted significant problems associated with industry in rural areas, and this research has extended that already large number. The limited benefits, financially and socially of rural industrialisation schemes have been noted within Cumbria, and this has serious implications for future developments involving public funds.

6.3:4. Forestry as a Replacement for Low Productivity Farming

Forestry is seen as a major arm of rural development policies for a number of reasons. It can utilise poorer quality land which might otherwise only be used for extensive sheep farming; it can create both direct and indirect employment; and, in certain circumstances it can fit comfortably into the natural rural environment. Chapter Two has indicated that without substantial state support, it is unlikely that there would be a forest industry in Britain of any size. The objectives behind state involvement in forestry have changed over the years. At first strategic considerations were paramount, with it being recognised that there was a need for home produced timber in case of blockade. With the advent of nuclear weapons, the argument became increasingly invalid, and emphasis was placed upon forestry as a means of aiding the balance of payments, making full use of national resources, and creating employment in rural areas.

As was shown in Chapter Two, forestry policy in Britain has many critics, and that the basic policy itself may well be fundamentally unsound. The number of people employed within the industry has been falling as a result of increased productivity, while the economies of scale prevalent in forestry, tend to act

against the small producer. Britain is also not particularly well suited to processing wood products, being unable to compete for example with the large integrated Scandinavian processing units. The economic benefits of timber production within Britain are negative, a situation which may well deteriorate as a result of technological change, introducing wood product substitution or recycling. Investment in forestry in Britain, does not substantially help the balance of payments, and there is a strong case for using the money more effectively elsewhere. Added to these primarily economic considerations, the afforestation of land can have a serious effect upon its amenity value.

There is clearly a strong case against the expansion of forestry in Britain, something which the Cumbrian research tends to confirm. In the first place there is a considerable resistance to forestry spreading throughout Cumbria, especially within the National Park, mainly for landscape reasons. Only a small portion of the National Park can be afforested without the breaking of binding agreements. While in the rest of Cumbria significant opposition exists to forestry schemes, especially those of a larger size. This, in effect reduces the scope for the expansion of forestry within the county considerably.

Another point against it is the fact that although a large part of Cumbria has been afforested, direct and indirect employment in the industry is low. The scale of the problem is such that if every hectare of Cumbria was planted with trees, then based on present productivity levels there would only be 13,500 new direct jobs created. The problem is further compounded by the fact that there exists little correlation between timber production and its processing. Indeed the wood processing industry throughout Britain is declining, and so scope for further employment opportunities in this field in Cumbria, will be limited. In fact the recent closure of a paper and board mill in Workington has considerably reduced employment within the processing part of the industry in the county.

The problems that exist for the individual landowner in developing forestry enterprises on his land, were made clear at Whitbarrow, where for the relatively small estate, it would not be profitable to embark upon a planting scheme. The

Lowther example shows how important economies of scale are in developing a viable plantation and associated processing works. The estate has a wide area of woodland, which is fully integrated into a large saw-mill. The development of this sort of operation will clearly not be possible for most estates to benefit from, yet, even if they were, the vulnerability of the industry as shown at Lowther would probably deter investment.

Obviously the potential for widespread afforestation within Cumbria is limited, and therefore, it can only act as a limited source of employment. This, added to other profound limitations of forestry, draws into question the whole role of the industry in rural affairs, and the community's subsidisation of it.

6.3:5. The Importance of Conservation in Cumbria

Britain's rural policy lays a great emphasis upon the importance of conservation, both of nature and landscape. Yet, as has been shown in the previous analyses, there are great dangers in taking an unquestioning attitude towards the rural policy issues generally. This is particularly so as regards conservation in a county such as Cumbria, where the emphasis upon it has considerable repercussions upon the area's socio-economic welfare.

Ratcliffe (1976) argues that Britain needs a vigorous conservation policy because conservation itself fulfils three vitally important purposes. It provides a base for scientific analysis and discovery; it provides an important educational resource; and its aesthetic and amenity role is vital for the nation's social welfare. These are essentially non-economic reasons for economic resources to be spent upon conservation, or for economic benefits to be forgone in the pursuit of non-economic conservation aims. However, Shoard (1980) argues that the conservation of the landscape is important in economic terms as it helps maintain the tourist industry.

Whether Shoard's argument is correct or not, conservation policy itself is largely unquantifiable in economic terms alone. This in itself means that any such policy must be based upon values; clearly a difficult problem for the rural policy

maker, for it is not always possible to ensure that the values of the policy maker adequately reflect the views of the majority. In attempting to gauge how vigorous conservation policy should be, the policy maker has to determine the level of importance given to conservation by the public; its importance to the economy of a particular area and the nation as a whole; and the overall scientific, educational and aesthetic/amenity benefits to be gained.

Taking Cumbria as a specific area, it is difficult to gauge the reactions of local people, and the nation as a whole to conservation within the county, however, some pointers can be found. A long history of concern over the conservation value of the Cumbrian countryside, by local people does exist. This has revealed itself in the campaign against afforestation in the Lake District, culminating in the 1936 Agreement with the Forestry Commission. There was also a strong locally based campaign for a Lake District National Park (Sheail 1975). Recent expressions of concern for the conservation value of the National Park come from the Friends of the Lake District, and numerous other amenity groups based within the county; from the local Conservative, Labour, Liberal parties, and the Independents represented on local councils; and from the local concern expressed at various large scale development schemes sent before public inquiry, for example the development of the A66, the extraction of water from Wastwater and Ennerdale, and the control of boating on the Lakes. Local concern is also expressed at small scale industrial and residential schemes which threaten to damage the amenity of individual communities. Although there may be some dissent against National Park ideals, it is less vociferous, badly organised, and more sporadic than that of the pro-conservation lobby. While many commentators have argued that non-protest is often an acquiescence to, rather than an acceptance of policy, it is quite clear that the strength of support for conservation within the county, ensures that it is the policy makers' primary concern.

Of more importance than local feeling, in a small homogenous country such as Britain, is the level of national support for a vigorous conservation policy in Cumbria. In terms of the Lake District National Park, the expression "national"

indicates its wider role, although some provision is made for the well being of local inhabitants. The demand for a National Park in the Lake District spread far beyond the confines of the Lakes, and the spectacular nature of the scenery still fulfils a national rather than purely local role. This can be verified at its most basic level, by the number of people that visit the area each year. As a major tourist destination the Lake District provides attractions which are not found in the tourists own area. As the National Park Plan (LDSPB 1978) shows, the overwhelming attraction is the scenery, as this is protected by the LDSPB, then it can be assumed that those who visit the area support the National Park purposes.

The indications are then, that there is strong support for conservation both within Cumbria and outside it, especially in the National Park. This allows the policy maker to make conservation, as a goal in itself, a primary aim. However, there are many other interests competing with conservation and which in themselves undermine it. The task of the rural policy maker, and in particular the planning authorities, is to arbitrate between them. Within the Lake District there is a considerable pressure to develop land for economic benefit, and the LDSPB has largely resisted this. Yet in economic and particularly social terms can this policy be questioned?

For local people the benefits of a relaxation of development control are likely to be few. In terms of tourism, much of the capital, especially of the larger more prosperous schemes comes from outside the area, and from individuals who are not at a social disadvantage. Added to this, the type and level of employment created are unlikely to be of any significant advantage to local people. Where local people could perhaps gain is through the extension of small scale, family based tourist enterprises; with regard to these, the planning laws can seem unduly petty. Even so, there is no doubt small sporadic schemes can be as environmentally disadvantageous as the larger more concentrated ones. In these cases a balance has to be drawn between purely local individual needs, and the national purposes of the Park. In most cases, the national benefits of conservation will override local economic ones.

Yet apart from this there are fairly strong economic reasons why the environment should be protected. The environmental pleasantness of the area, provides the base for an important basic industry, namely tourism. If the pleasantness is threatened, it can be argued, so is the viability of this already pressurised industry. Yet holiday makers do find the so called "honeypots" such as Bowness and Keswick attractive, and if they find these attractive then it can be argued they will find no difficulty in accepting a lack of rigorous control over general development operations; indeed they may find the increased services available more satisfactory. While this argument does hold some credibility, it is unlikely that it is likely to be wholly correct. The visitor to the Lake District is usually discriminating. The area itself, has little of the "commercial" attraction of say Morecambe and Blackpool, two nearby resorts, even in the so-called "honeypots". It is therefore likely that if the visitor is seeking more commercial, rather than purely "aesthetic" pleasures, then these other areas will be more attractive.

Industrial provision, especially that of any large scale, will significantly affect the conservation value of the area. It would not only use up space, but would require extra services and facilities. For the local community there would probably be little benefit, as skilled workers would have to be imported from urban areas, who would then compete in the local housing market. Indeed, it cannot be assumed there is any industrial demand for factory space in rural Cumbria, especially considering the poor record of regional policies in Cumbria as a whole.

The relaxation of controls on housing is unlikely to be of any significant benefit to the local community, as past experience has shown. There is an almost insatiable demand for housing from outsiders in rural Cumbria, and the building of cheaper housing will largely benefit those from outside who are at present excluded from second, or retirement home ownership.

Any relaxation of planning controls, especially in the National Park will have a considerable effect upon the scientific and education value of the area. This in itself is difficult to quantify, although the presence of one major environmental research centre, and numerous educational information centres, with associated

books and guides indicates a position of some importance within national life which should not be lightly disregarded.

Yet not all of Cumbria lies within the National Park, and here it can be argued that the conservation purpose as a primary aim should be less. But simply because some areas lie outside the National Park, it should not automatically mean that they are ripe for a secondary conservation status. Many areas of Cumbria are complementary to the National Park, rather than simply an adjunct to it; any significant reduction in the conservation status of these areas, will result to some extent, in an undermining of the whole National Park concept. Added to this, much of rural Cumbria outside the Park is beautiful, although opportunities for recreation are likely to be somewhat fewer.

The conservation problems of rural Cumbria outside the Park, have parallels with much of the rest of rural Britain. Here development pressures are fewer, and the scenery often less spectacular. Yet there is no indication that Cumbrians as a whole view this area as secondary to that of the National Park, or that they are not concerned at actions which undermine its conservation value.

As with the rest of rural Britain which does not receive a special protection status, rural Cumbria provides an important recreation and environmental resource, in which an unparalleled level of interest and concern, at local and national level exists. Because of this concern, conservation should still be kept as a primary aim. Yet these areas should not, indeed cannot, remain completely devoid of development. The argument here, must be for balance; a balance between conservation and the socio-economic demands of the nation, and the local community. Conservation must be kept as a primary aim, which all other demands must exceed in terms of importance, if conservation principals are to be relaxed.

The argument here is for a rigorous conservation policy, but not a dogmatic one. Yet how that balance is to be achieved is a difficult question. The answer must lie at its basic level in democracy. There is a pressing need for a more accountable planning system; for the widespread availability of information on which planning decisions are based; and greater involvement by the general public.

This essentially involves greater education of the public regarding planning functions and practice, so that they can express and pursue their own interests; it involves greater liaison between planning officers and both the elected representatives and the public; it involves more research, increasing the data base available; and it involves the free dissemination of data upon which decisions are based. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to consider how the planning system should be more democratic in dealing with the various competing resource demands, except to say it requires more of an adjustment of the present system than its dismantling. It is, however, an area where the rural policy maker should increasingly turn his attention.

6.4:1. The Two Estates and Rural Development

The Whitbarrow Exercise and the analysis of Lowther Estate's handling of the development of M6, and its diversification into enterprises ancillary to agriculture, clearly revealed two extremely different economic operations. Consideration of what factors have made them so different from one another, will give leads upon which recommendations for future policy initiatives can be made.

Chapter Two indicated that agricultural estates are often an ideal focus for rural development. Massey and Catalano (1978), point out that many estate owners have been spurred into developing all aspects of their property because of increased financial pressures. An excellent example of this was the £3 million Lord Lonsdale was forced to pay in 1953, on death duties, tax and mortgage repayments. One caveat however, must be noted. The evidence from Cumbria indicates that although estate owners may be under strong financial pressure to develop their resources, not all are prepared to do so. The reasons for this are numerous. At Whitbarrow there was a certain apathy due to the fact that the estate was owned by Mr Farrer's father. Unfortunately, he does not have the time or energy to develop the estate, and because of the uncertainty over who is to inherit it, the son does not feel sufficiently motivated. The family also has other substantial investments apart from the estate, and so have little financial need to develop

their property; in this particular case reversing Massey and Catalano's (1978) thesis.

The respective abilities of those who own estates are also of considerable importance with regard to their economic development. Lord Lonsdale's personal qualities include an excellent business sense, tremendous energy, and motivational capability. The estate also has the added advantage of being large enough to have its own estate office with full time workers. These were experienced in the legal aspects of land development, and trained to recognise business potential when they saw it. The estate also had excellent relations with all governmental agencies with whom they came in contact, which no doubt helped them to receive governmental support whether local or central, for their various ventures. At Whitbarrow however, these advantages were generally lacking. Even so some generalisations can be made.

The Lowther and Whitbarrow Estates are very different from each other in size and form. The most significant difference is clearly size, with Lowther being over 26,000 acres, and Whitbarrow some 700 acres. Under the classification developed by Massey and Catalano (1978), Lowther Estate is obviously an "aristocratic" estate, and Whitbarrow owned by "gentry". This has implications upon the way in which the estates have developed. For example at Lowther there is a large castle with associated grounds, which have enabled the creation of the Wildlife Park and the Caravan Park without detriment to the farming structure, utilising land which although having an amenity value to the Lowther family was not economically productive. At Whitbarrow, a similar exercise would not be possible as the main house, Whitbarrow Lodge, does not have a large area of unutilised land attached to it; any developments here would unseat a number of tenant farmers.

Scale and topography have also been of significant benefit to Lowther Estate. Lord Lonsdale was able to find sites well suited to developing his enterprises, sheltered and invisible from surrounding roads. The estate also benefits from being outside the National Park which allows him more development flexibility, although

as earlier indicated, the LDSPB is not necessarily more restrictive than other planning authorities.

At Whitbarrow, the introduction of a wildlife park or a large caravan park, in any position, would be impossible without creating an unsightly intrusion on the landscape. The estate as earlier mentioned, is bisected by the A590, which runs along low lying ground to the south of Whitbarrow Lodge; this means all land to the north and south of the road is visible from it. Even if the estate were not in the National Park, planning permission would be difficult to come by. Added to this, no large development could take place without the removal of at least two farmers, something the estate would be loath to do.

The development of timber processing operations on estates, is similarly also dependent upon size. For example, at Whitbarrow the acreage of woodland is not extensive enough, or the estate's own demands enough, to engender the necessity of even a small sawmill. On the other hand, Lowther produced a significant demand itself for timber products, which enabled it to have a small sawmill of its own. Lowther was able to expand the scope of its operations by the acquisition of part of a local large sawmill, to process its own timber. The degree of flexibility open to the estate through this integration, would be lost on any smaller estate.

Both estates should have been able to have benefited from excellent access. They are both well served by major inter-urban roads, allowing very easy access for the visitor. This has undoubtedly helped to benefit Lowther, although Whitbarrow is seemingly unable to take advantage of the opportunities open to it. Clearly, while access is a major determinant of business success, it is not the only one, and if an estate as well positioned as Whitbarrow, is unable to satisfactorily develop business facilities, and one such as Lowther, be finding it very difficult to make profits, then for the majority of estates, or agricultural holdings, less well served by roads, the opportunities for development must be even more limited.

The general economic climate is also important in determining whether or not an estate will embark upon development schemes. Lowther's investment in various enterprises, took place at a time when the economy was relatively

prosperous, and there was growth in certain markets. However since then dramatic changes have taken place in the British economy. As has been indicated, Lowther Estate represents a sound, well run organisation with many benefits, including its size, its favourable location, its ability to raise capital based upon its agricultural prosperity, and its dynamic leadership. Yet even they have experienced a considerable fall off on return of capital in recent years, with tourism, timber processing and agriculture badly hit by the recession. Under present circumstances, underdeveloped resources such as those found at Whitbarrow, are probably best left as they are.

6.5:1. Agriculture in Cumbria

Agriculture within Cumbria has been subject to similar pressures as found in the rest of Britain, with a decreasing workforce and a tendency towards fewer and larger farms. Agricultural employment has fallen to such an extent, that now it is not the major rural employer even in many remoter areas. Because of this, as a general rule, further changes will not have dramatic effects upon the viability of local communities.

The capacity for further change within the agricultural industry is significant. That part of Cumbria which is defined as a Less Favoured Area, has an agriculture which relies heavily upon government support, and without it, upland farming would undoubtedly collapse. This does not mean, however, that other areas of Cumbrian agriculture are impervious to change. Change can arise as a result of the expansion of successful farms, or it may be forced upon the agricultural community through structural changes within the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the EEC. This is especially with regard to the dairy and beef industry, which is already placing a heavy burden upon the CAP. As Cumbrian agriculture is dependent upon dairy and beef for much of its income, it is potentially in a very vulnerable situation, a problem which will be analysed more fully in Chapter Seven.

Making general statements about agriculture, is of course often dangerous, as

individual agricultural enterprises tend to differ from one to another. An excellent example of this lies with the two estates analysed earlier. Lowther Estate represents the financially conscious landlord, developing efficient and productive farming upon his estate. If this type of operation were repeated throughout Cumbria, production would undoubtedly increase, along with efficiency. Yet there would be fewer farms and farmers, less ecological diversity, more unsightly development and some decline in hedgerows, trees and stone walls.

At Whitbarrow, a different approach to farming was noted. Here farms are maintained as individual units, beneficial both to those who wish to farm, and to the environment. The farmers receive relatively low incomes, although they appear to be content with them. However, if there is greater intensification and productivity within agriculture, these smaller farms will undoubtedly become increasingly marginalised, with the inevitable falling returns, or greater dependence upon state support. Yet, under recent conditions, the economic benefit of intensifying agricultural operations are suspect, and will create a certain amount of detriment to the social and conservation value of the area. There may also be some disbenefit to the nation through the increased production of agricultural produce already in surplus.

Increased production and productivity on agricultural estates, brings few benefits to the local community, and clearly does not represent an option in alleviating their problems. Indeed the vulnerability of agriculture to change may well create serious social and ecological problems in the future, a hypothesis analysed more fully in Chapter Seven.

The agricultural enterprise most vulnerable to change both within Cumbria and the nation as a whole is upland farming. Upland farming has received support over many years, based upon a number of rationale that are not always very clear. However, a list of the most important of these was given in Chapter Two and is worth repeating.

1. Upland farming plays a valuable role in the nation's agricultural production, providing produce that would otherwise have to be imported.
2. Upland pastoral farming provides a disease free pool of animals.

3. Upland farming is vital for the maintenance of remote rural communities.
4. Upland farming prevents the landscape from becoming "untidy".
5. The continued existence of upland farming prevents the spread of forestry.
6. Upland farming provides, and maintains services used by tourists.

Sinclair and MacEwen (1983) note that the agricultural arguments for supporting upland farming are weak. Production from the uplands is small, somewhere in the region of 4 per cent of the nation's total, and the form of production is not very efficient, with it being inherently inflexible in responding to technological change. However, as the second point indicates, the upland system of farming does have some advantages over lowland production, in that it is relatively disease free. A symbiotic relationship of some importance exists between the uplands and lowlands, with upland farmers selling store lambs to lowland farmers for fattening over winter. Yet these arguments used in support of continued subsidisation of upland farming, are becoming increasingly invalid. Veterinary skills have reduced disease problems to such an extent that it is now possible to maintain intensive commercial sheep rearing units, while practices such as "clean grazing" are reducing incidences of intestinal worms. The inter-relationship between upland and lowland farming is also likely to decline, with the EEC sheepmeat regime encouraging farmers to finish their animals for slaughter, a trend enabled by government aided farm improvements. Indeed, even if upland farming were to cease entirely, lowland farmers would be quite capable of producing adequate supplies of sheepmeat for the home market.

Perhaps more important than purely agricultural considerations, is the role upland farming plays in preserving remote rural communities. Yet Chapter Three indicated that the degree to which upland communities depend upon farmers to maintain their numbers is variable, and has been declining over a period of many years. Even so, many commentators view the upland farmers as being vital to the continuance of the rural community in its original form. However, to subsidise upland farming for the sake of the rural community, it must be shown that it has something worth preserving.

Undoubtedly a strong rural culture in Britain existed into the twentieth century, yet as a result of sustained social pressure this has gradually been eroded.

Williams (1956), in his study of the Cumbrian village of Gosforth said:

"That the social structure, and inheritance from the past was not designed for a world where every individual is conceived of as a highly mobile unit, and does not seem capable of adaption to suit this concept".

While Emmett (1964), talking of Welsh rural culture said:

"If the new found prosperity of the farmer makes them less dependent upon each other and places them at a social distance from their neighbours, the essential solidarity of Welsh culture will be undermined".

While Pahl (1965), in his study of suburban Hertfordshire says:

"A new population is invading local communities bringing in national values and class consciousness, at the same time that a new community, associated with dispersed living is emerging".

Indeed, even if it were clear that a special rural culture exists, more recent studies by Bell et al (1978) and Newby (1977), indicate a degree of class control and exploitation which many consider, may not represent a social system worthy of maintaining.

In Longsleddale, every family now has a television set. Kendal is the local servicing area, within easy reach by car, the large number of which have meant increased accessibility for the valley. The decline in the number of farmers and farm workers, has reduced the economically active population, and has resulted in greater self reliance and fewer strong social ties, a factor compounded by the significant influx of "incomers". In Longsleddale, as with most of rural Britain, there has been a steady "urbanisation" of the community. The Longsleddale case study has also shown that as farmers and farm workers move out of the area, their housing is taken over by "incomers", who can not only add greatly to the local community themselves, but also maintain services and facilities for tourists; even holiday home owners fulfil this useful function.

The agricultural and social rationale for a long term support policy for upland farming appears weak. Perhaps because of this, increasing importance is being placed upon the farmers role in preserving the landscape. In the Lake District National Park, farmers have been seen as the preservers of an historic landscape,

that is and has, undergone a rapid "deterioration" in the form of unrepaired stone walls and barns, and the spread of scrub. In some areas, however, such as Exmoor, it is increased agricultural intensification that is believed to have undermined the uplands conservation value.

The demise of the upland farmer and his animals, would undoubtedly induce considerable landscape and ecological change, yet this would not be necessarily undesirable or disadvantageous to the conservation value of upland areas. Unfortunately little research has been carried out on what would happen to ground vegetation in the uplands, if agricultural practices ceased, although this clearly is what the very long term trend will be towards. At present, the most up to date and authoritative research carried out on what would happen if animals were withdrawn from the uplands, has been by the Institute of Terrestrial Ecology (Countryside Commission 1978). They note that the result will vary according to geographical position, topography, land type and existing vegetation. They divide their observations into a number of different vegetation categories, describing how each would react under the above circumstances.

With heather dominated short scrub communities, if burning and grazing ceased, the long term trend will be towards scrub and woodland. The speed of the process can vary from 5 to 60 or more years, depending upon the availability of seed. Bent/fescue grassland, will also tend towards scrub and woodland, as well as mat-grass, purple moor grass and heath-rush grasslands, taking much the same time period as heather dominated land. Bracken communities, because of the density of the canopy, can take centuries to develop into shrubs and trees, while marsh communities will revert at a faster rate, similar to that of heather. Sub-montane and montane communities, will develop significant scrub up to a height of around 760 metres.

The above findings of the Institute of Terrestrial Ecology, can be applied generally throughout upland Britain, and as Bockock and Adamson (1976) maintain, directly to the Lake District. For example, if sheep were removed from Longsleddale, where the development of woody scrub has been recorded, within a

period of 100 years all the hillsides would be covered by deciduous woodland, probably oak dominated, as this is the major existing species in the valley.

Smith (1983) has carried out a comprehensive analysis of upland vegetation types, and their response to management by man. He has considered broadleaved woodlands, heather moorland, grass moor, blanket bog and northern haymeadows. In broadleaved woods, lack of control of livestock has resulted in little or no regeneration in many existing sites; although fencing can be carried out it is very expensive. Heather moors can be severely damaged by burning for sheep and grouse. With regard to upland grass moor, dominated by mat and purple moor grass, these he considers as no more than upland deserts directly encouraged by sheep grazing. Blanket bog, subject to excessive grazing can be severely eroded, while the plant diversity of haymeadows is being destroyed by modern management techniques. Added to these problems, farmers are fertilising and ploughing many environmentally important areas, and are allowing old barns and field boundaries to become derelict. Under modern agricultural policy, these trends are likely to become exacerbated.

Realising some of the adverse affects both of deintensification and intensification, many commentators have put forward various proposals with a view to altering the manner in which payments are made to farmers in Less Favoured Areas. Most notable of these are Sinclair and MacEwen (1983), who have argued that farmers should be paid management grants to ensure the landscape is preserved and improved, i.e. a return to its former "tidy" state, and that part time farming should be encouraged. However, a number of flaws are apparent in their analysis. First, the present landscape form is not necessarily that of the most conservation value, and other alternatives do exist which rely upon minimal interference by man. Second, farmers have not shown themselves to be the most conservation conscious members of society, and their own desire and capabilities as paid conservationists must be suspect. Third, such an approach would require very significant interference in the land market, controlling the size of farms, and the amount of payment made to individuals would fall off as farm size increases. This

would have severe effects upon the price of land; would discriminate against those with large investments in the industry, especially those who have borrowed money; and would be strongly resisted by the farming community. For such a policy to succeed it would require the total commitment of all the area's farmers; this is unlikely to be forthcoming.

The fourth reason why such a policy is unlikely to be successful, lies with the fact that it will require a significant amount of bureaucratic control, expensive in itself, and very much against much of the basic ethos of the farming community, and perhaps the MAFF itself. Fifth, it is not clear why farmers should necessarily be chosen as the protectors of the landscape, if a "tidy" landscape is what is wanted, then why not employ special, local authority funded staff to carry out the work, probably with greater flexibility, and cheaper than the management grant scheme. Sixth, such a policy will commit the state to continue support indefinitely. This will not remove the upland farmer from his present vulnerable position, and will be a constant drain upon the nation's finances. Seventh, the research indicates that the scope for farmers to obtain occupations ancillary to agriculture is extremely limited; it condemns them to very hard work; and takes employment from other sections of the rural community. Eighth, the effects upon the landscape of farming in upland areas is probably limited by the fact that over fifty per cent of upland land is not directly used for agriculture (Countryside Commission 1983).

If the notion of state funded conservation grants is impractical and politically unacceptable, then clearly the question must be asked, what future will present agricultural policy bring to the hills? Forecasting any change is difficult, however, certain basic qualified statements can be made. The short term future will be that the situation will remain fairly static. The number of farmers in the uplands will continue to fall at around one per cent per annum, as the size of farm is still largely uneconomic, i.e. over fifty per cent of farms are under 250 SMD. The numbers of livestock are likely to be maintained, and capital intensification will continue. However, labour costs are likely to remain high, so historic landscape

features will not be maintained. Over the longer term, upland farming will attempt to keep pace with increases in productivity in lowland farming by continued labour removal, most likely now through farm amalgamations, and by the limited adaptation of technology. Yet the increasing disparity in costs between the two forms of farming will lead upland farmers to an increased reliance upon the state for support. If the state does not provide this, then the incentive to invest and produce will decline, with perhaps an increased rate of fall on the total number of farmers. Yet, as will be shown in Chapter Seven, agricultural policy is not the most stable instrument of government, and changes in its very structure are extremely likely, especially with regard to containing public expenditure on agriculture, and reducing total production. The anachronistic system of upland farming is one area the agricultural policy maker cannot ignore.

The ecological value of such a significant decline in upland farming would be profound, with an increased diversity and number of species and animals, thriving upon the woodland habitat. While as Pearsall (1973), and Pearsall and Pennington (1971) note, there will be long term benefits to the soil, with its nutrient value being improved, a slowing in erosion and a better soil profile developing.

The landscape will change dramatically in many areas, with the broad sweep of the hills being replaced by scrub and woodland. For many, this change will be difficult to accept, especially in the first period, where grassland begins to revert slowly to the various stages of woodland development. However, this may be seen as a short term loss for long term gains, and the increased "wildness" of the scenery may well add to the already romantic grandeur of the mountains. Indeed the LDSPB have noted the importance of woodlands to the National Park, and give grants to extend them (LDSPB 1978). Added to this, there will remain areas in the British Isles where it will be impossible for trees to grow through topographical and climatic reasons, or will be managed for grouse and other non-agricultural activities. These should provide interest for those concerned with "grass" only landscapes. In many areas, access to ramblers may be impeded through scrub growth, yet they could adapt by going to wilder regions such as parts of Scotland;

the creation of walks through deciduous woodland could also be an interesting form of recreation. Clearly the removal of support for upland farming, will not result in a social and environmental catastrophe, but will engender opportunities for conservation, recreation, and the re-direction of resources.

Of course, as Ball et al (1982) indicate, some degree of landscape management will be necessary, as the availability of seed, and the soil profile will have changed so much over centuries of degeneration. Bracken eradication and seed scattering could be carried out for environmental reasons speeding up the regeneration process. The spread of forestry, one reason for continuing upland farming would have to be contained (for landscape reasons) by bringing it under planning control, something widely advocated by many reputable sources including the LDSPB. There is likely to be some continuance of livestock rearing in many areas. While sheep will not be removed entirely, with significant deintensification the balance will be tilted in most areas towards regeneration, which will be impossible to contain economically, and will eventually force a significant reduction in the already diminished sheep flock. Added to this, those areas where sheep rearing could still be carried out on a fairly intensive basis profitably, should not, as Sinclair and MacEwen (1983) point out, be benefiting from an "across the board" upland subsidy payment anyway. Indeed, the likely decline in income will probably halt the disadvantages of intensification, especially the ploughing up of moorland. Another resort open to the rural planner could be to place controls upon the number of sheep kept, or on them being kept at all; however, this may be a politically unattractive alternative, although it works well in the National Parks of Northern America.

The important point to note is that the continued subsidisation of upland farming represents a misallocation of scarce resources, and is unlikely to survive in its present form into the distant future. Although the continuance of upland farming has a certain emotional appeal, it is not a logical one. A more critical review of policy on the uplands will undoubtedly sway opinion to a more realistic appraisal of the problem.

6.5:2. Interim Summary

Although the notion of rural development has appeal, the research undertaken in Cumbria has indicated that there is little evidence to show that significant achievements can be made using tourism, industry, forestry or agriculture as tools individually, or in conjunction with one another. It has also been noted that they carry with them certain undesirable features, which are not beneficial to rural areas. Indeed, it is only through the existence of a strong planning system that excesses have been contained. The maintenance and strengthening of this system will be considered more fully in Chapter Eight. It has also been shown that considerable environmental and financial benefits can be achieved by decreasing the influence of man in upland areas and increasing the influence of nature. This shall also be considered more fully in Chapter Eight.

6.6:1. Major Road Developments and Agriculture

It was indicated in Chapter Two, that it is the norm rather than the exception, that agricultural enterprises will suffer serious problems as a result of major road developments on their land. There are numerous reasons for this unhappy state of affairs which arise primarily because planners do not take full account of the social and economic impact a road development has upon the individual farm holding, during the design period. This is compounded by the fact that few farmers have any conception of the highway planning process. Farmers also feel dissatisfied with the level of contact they have with planners and contractors during the construction period, a time, when due to the contractors desire to complete their task as quickly as possible, avoidable damage is done to farm holdings. Completion of compensation negotiations, are usually found to be slow and often end unsatisfactorily from the farmers viewpoint. Because all these problems are almost certainly bound to occur, farmers are advised to employ an agent; to make early contact with the planning and construction teams; and to prepare a statement of condition before the contractors enter their land. It has also been recommended that there should be greater MAFF and District Valuer

involvement, to ease the farmers problems and aid his economic recovery.

The problems raised by road developments and the way the individual landholder reacts to them are extremely variable. Two Cumbrian estates were studied, which had had significant road developments imposed upon them. From the information gathered, it was clear that there was a considerable difference in the level of success in coping with the problems raised between the two. It is the purpose of the following discussion, to analyse the causes of these differences and understand more clearly the most suitable way for agricultural enterprises to deal with major road developments.

6.6:2. The Initial Planning of the Penrith By-Pass and the A 590

The handling of the development of the Penrith By-Pass by the Lowther Estate, was undoubtedly a success, with them experiencing few of the problems that are the norm for other agricultural enterprises facing a similar situation. Of the numerous reasons for this, one of the most important is the careful pre-planning that took place prior to the construction of the road. For the estate to be able to pre-plan for the road, it was essential that they were fully involved and informed during the early planning period. The planners, under the sensitive and sympathetic guidance of the Chief County Surveyor for Cumberland, Mr F L Broughton, ensured a constant flow of information into Lowther's hands. Undoubtedly, this was partly the result of the political influence of the estate in the area, with Lord Lonsdale's own position in local and national affairs, and his links with the local councils and Members of Parliament. Added to this, Lowther had tremendous power through the fact that a substantial proportion of the proposed road went through their land. If they had wished to be difficult or obstructive, then they could have easily been so.

But while Lord Lonsdale's political influence made it important that he should not be alienated during the planning and construction of the road, there is no doubt that the estate's own attitude engendered a respect and interest on the part of the

planners. Lord Lonsdale indicated to the planners that while he in no way wished to hamper the progress of the development, not only was he determined to safeguard his own economic interests, the interests of his tenants and his heirs, but he wanted to add to them at every conceivable opportunity. To do this, he had to ensure that he was fully involved in the planning of the road and had access to all pertinent information as it became available. Yet at the same time, because he accepted the inevitability and necessity of the road development, all demands made were very reasonable. Because the planners understood and respected Lord Lonsdale's plans and intentions, they were happy to accept suggestions made by the estate, and convince them that they were taking all practical measures to protect their interests.

However, such a degree of involvement could not take place without the estate being competent or organised enough to make useful suggestions. Realising that the road could bring substantial problems in its wake, Lord Lonsdale sent the estate's surveyor on a fact finding exercise, in an attempt to discover the exact nature of the problems that could arise and how they might be avoided. Thus, by the time the estate had its first major meeting with the planners, they were well prepared and able to make practical suggestions and sensible responses to matters raised.

The estate organised itself effectively, so that they were able to sift through all the information provided by the planners, making speedy and concrete suggestions which the planners could either accept or reject. In this respect, the planners task was made relatively easy, being able to have the authoritative viewpoint of the estate on certain sensitive issues speedily, to which they could reply without fear of being treated unreasonably.

Because of this, the estate was able to plan accommodation works, aid in the siting of a large service station, plan the re-organisation of its farms and discuss construction difficulties with the planners. The planners were able to benefit by having their suggestions responded to quickly, by gaining from the estate's long experience of the land concerned, and by not having to deal with a reluctant or recalcitrant landowner.

What sets Lowther apart from many other agricultural enterprises facing a similar situation, is that fact that the road was perceived not as an instrument of destruction but rather as an opportunity to develop the estate and earn money. Because of this the estate viewed every suggestion made by the planners with the view of not only protecting the estate's interests, but furthering them. However, to take this approach needs great organisation and planning. By doing this the estate managed to re-structure farm holdings, much to their betterment, and get a large number of accommodation works done, which substantially improved holdings, and which only could have been carried out at great expense.

At Whitbarrow, a quite different situation to that at Lowther emerged. Neither the estate owner or his son appeared, obviously for their own personal reasons, to have the commitment of Lord Lonsdale in protecting their interests. While Lowther ensured that they were involved and informed during the whole planning process, Whitbarrow tended to allow the planners to create their own regime. They did not ask for information, nor did they press to be included in the planning process; rather the line of the road was sent to them as a fait accompli, and negotiations took place to solely consider the accommodation works.

One major problem here, was that the estate left its business in the hands of an agent, who was not able to devote his time fully to considering the effects of the development on the A590. Instead he was only able to consider the problems created by the road for a short portion of his time. This contrasts with Lowther, where apart from Lord Lonsdale and the estate's agent being closely involved, the estate devoted the energies of an employee full time to the problem.

Another difficulty was that Whitbarrow placed a greater reliance upon the tenants during the planning process, than Lowther. This was clearly unsatisfactory, as the tenants only had a limited knowledge of the problems or potential of the situation. As a result of this, neither the interests of the estate as a whole, nor the individuals concerned were satisfactorily protected or improved.

Because of the lack of organisation and pre-planning on the part of the estate, and the general lack of commitment, a number of problems arose. The

most important of these, was that the RCU did not agree to all the accommodation works suggested by the estate. This situation occurred because the estate's agent walked around the estate with two road engineers, asking individual farmers what they would like done; these suggestions were then written down on the spot. However, when the RCU sent in their version of what had been agreed, it differed significantly from that held by the estate. Little could be done at this stage to resolve the situation, as the "agreed" accommodation works had already formed part of the let contract. If the estate had carried out proper research, drawn up a comprehensive list of accommodation works, and discussed them fully with the RCU, then this situation would have been unlikely to arise.

6.6:3. Major Road Construction and the Two Estates

For individual farmers, the road construction period can be the most problematic phase of the whole development. Difficulties can arise as a result of negligence, lack of careful pre-planning, or simply because of the fact a large stretch of road is being constructed across worked agricultural land, where problems are bound to arise. However, even though Lowther Estate was faced with the construction of a very large and complex road, few problems arose.

One reason for this, was that the estate was well organised and well informed. They ensured that they met the contractors almost as soon as the contract was let, and dealt with them in an efficient and businesslike manner. They indicated to the contractors the problems which they believed might occur, and suggested various means by which they could be avoided. Over matters of the greatest concern, they laid down firm guidelines which they intended MacAlpine's to follow and made it clear that they would not hesitate to get in touch with the company's directors if any severe problems arose. However, the estate tempered their almost over-bearing efficiency, by at all times attempting to be reasonable in their demands. This attitude was reciprocated by MacAlpine's, who recognising the professionalism of the estate's approach clearly wished to maintain their goodwill.

As important as ensuring that all work was carried out properly, was the fact

that the estate viewed the construction period, as it did the rest of the development, as an opportunity. It recognised that a market had been opened up for materials such as fencing and minerals, and the financial benefits that would accrue through the renting of sites for soil tips. By suggesting suitable sites, not only for the tips, but for such things as MacAlpine's administrative offices, they were able to keep the construction process under some degree of control. The estate also noted that the presence of a large number of men and machines on their land, opened up the opportunity of getting a number of tasks completed cheaply; an opportunity the estate was not slow to take up.

In forming and developing their undoubtedly close and successful relationship with the contractors, Lowther was fortunate in having the estate offices virtually on site. This meant that Lowther's surveyors were able to keep the activities of the contractors under continual surveillance, fully expressing their opinion when they felt work was not being done properly. Added to this, Lowther's staff had full authority to make any agreements they saw fit with the contractors. This meant that the contractors were able to obtain speedy decisions whenever a crisis arose. For example, if the contractors needed a site for a top soil dump, under normal conditions this would entail time consuming negotiations to find a suitable site and agree compensation. At Lowther, in times of difficulty the estate would send out one of their men, who would immediately agree on a site and a price. As the relationship of trust and respect developed, a shake of hands would be all that was necessary to complete a deal.

As during the planning of the road, all major aspects of the negotiations were taken out of the hands of the tenants. This policy had a number of advantages. In the first place it relieved the tenants of a great deal of bureaucracy, which saved them time and anxiety. Second, the contractors and their workmen did not receive a string of irksome and often naive complaints from them. Third, the estate ensured that the tenants did not make any private agreements which might have been against the estate's interest. Fourth, for the estate it ensured a

comprehensive planning regime directed from the estate office. While many might find this form of paternalistic attitude on the part of the estate demeaning and potentially disadvantageous for the tenant, the system worked well. The tenants fully trusted the estate, which has a long history of close tenant and landlord co-operation, while they also recognised the considerable expertise the estate had.

At Whitbarrow, the whole construction process did not pass as satisfactorily as it had at Lowther. As during the planning of the road, the management of the construction phase was left to the estate's agent and the individual farmers. It was known at the beginning of the construction period, that difficult problems were likely to arise due to the peaty, estuarial conditions of the land being developed, and the fragile tile drainage system in operation. Yet, even though these potential problem areas were realised, there was no attempt by the estate to draw up a statement of condition, or to express firmly at the very start of operations, exactly what the estate required or expected.

The agent employed by the estate did not work full time on the road development, but tended to act as a crisis manager, waiting for problems to emerge and then dealing with them. As was seen, he only became involved in major difficulties, with the tenants solving their own problems themselves, or, in only one case, the help of their agent. The tenants' problems generally tended to be fairly small, created by negligence and took a long time to resolve. As a general rule, these problems could have been dealt with far more quickly, and would probably not have arisen at all, if there had been more comprehensive planning on the part of the estate, and, as a result of this, more care taken on the part of the contractors.

The time, worry and financial loss incurred by the tenants, shows that it is preferable not to rely upon them to look after their own interests, and in so doing the interests of the estate. It was indicated in Chapter Two, that planners and contractors are not sympathetic to the agricultural case, and lack a clear understanding of farming problems. This was shown during the Whitbarrow Conference recorded in Chapter Five, in which the representative of the North

West Road Construction Unit showed how insensitive road planners can be to the needs of the farming community. Against this form of bureaucratic and unsympathetic behaviour, the tenants of Whitbarrow, with their limited education and knowledge of the industrial world stand little chance of manipulating the system in their favour.

The estate as a whole failed to take advantage of the opportunity opened up as a result of the road development. It did not reorganise the farms to fit the new road pattern, nor did it in any way attempt to improve the existing agricultural holdings. Some farmers did gain more land, although this was more by circumstance than design.

While it took a long time to solve the relative small items, the more serious problems of long term damage to land, remain unresolved. At this stage it is difficult to note their extent, although the flooding that has taken place on some farms, appears to indicate that significant disturbance has taken place to the farm drainage pattern. If this is the case, then it further re-emphasises the necessity of careful and comprehensive pre-planning as done at Lowther.

6.6:4. Compensation Negotiations and the Two Estates

Compensation negotiations are often one of the most difficult phases of a public development that farmers face. It usually takes a long time for a settlement to be arrived at, and often individual landowners do not feel satisfied that they have been properly compensated for their time, income and land loss. Yet, in spite of the number of problems that do arise for the agricultural community during compensation negotiations, Lowther Estate managed to complete theirs very satisfactorily. Their success, however, was dependent upon a number of factors.

One of the most important of these, was that Lord Lonsdale had decided he wanted the compensation negotiations completed before the contractors entered his land, so that he could have the money to re-invest in the estate. This gave the

estate a target to be met, ensuring that on their part all the necessary research would be done to complete the negotiations, while at the same time motivating the District Valuer to come to a speedy decision.

In negotiating with the District Valuer, the estate was undoubtedly helped by the fact that they had had many dealings with him in the past. Both sides were well aware of what constituted "fair prices", and this enabled a speedy conclusion to discussions. This fact meant that there was little of the "horse trading" that van Rest (1981) claims characterises many compensation negotiations.

Lowther, as always, were keen to make opportunity out of potential adversity, and this was especially so in relation to the compensation claims. The estate managed to persuade the tenants to grant vacant possession on the land to be bought by the Ministry of Transport. The estate promised to repay the tenants on the normal compensation basis. This did, however, bring about some unforeseen technical problems, which although resolved, show how easy it is even for the best organised landowners to run into severe difficulties with complex compensation procedures. Even so, the result was very remunerative for the estate, and shows the benefits to be gained from careful research, pre-planning and organisation, and taking a reasonable attitude, noting opportunities when they emerge.

It is unlikely that a similar situation will emerge at Whitbarrow, where a degree of disorganisation was already noted, when the estate had not claimed the 90 per cent of the District Valuer's estimate, to which they were entitled. Nor had compensation negotiations started in autumn 1982, although the agent says he does not wish to start until the full effects of the road emerge. As yet, the outcome of the negotiations is uncertain, though as the agent wishes to claim £10 an hour for farmers time wasted during the construction; a long period of negotiating appears to be in the offing. Added to this, the farmers failed to accept the advice of the agents and the RCU to keep a diary of all that happened. Therefore, they will not be able to claim for all the problems and inconvenience they faced. Again, however, it should be emphasised that the situation is no different from the norm, although clearly in comparison with the manner that Lowther handled their affairs, the situation is far from satisfactory.

6.6:5. Interim Summary

As a general rule, agricultural enterprises will suffer severe difficulties as a result of road developments. However, as the documented research has shown, this need not necessarily be the case. The following discussion will draw together those factors which determine the successful completion of a road development, from an agricultural estate's point of view.

Of primary importance, must be the interests and motivation of the landowner. His level of commitment to the estate will ultimately determine the resources he will allocate towards ensuring a successful road development. Other features, such as his entrepreneurial skills, business acumen, educational and intellectual prowess, and his standing in the local and national community, are all social factors of importance.

Apart from this the size of the estate and the financial resources it has at its disposal are also determinants of success. The larger estate has greater flexibility in planning a road by having more choice of where to place such things as soil tips. As well as this, the larger an estate, the less will be the overall effect of a road development. Estates the size of Lowther, also have the advantage of having their own estate office with full time surveyors well acquainted with the estate's land. At Whitbarrow, a much smaller estate, the owner had to rely upon the services of a part-time hired agent.

Another factor determining success, is the degree to which the individual landowner is included in the planning process. If included, the landowner can better protect his own interests; can advise the planners on problems they might meet; build up a useful rapport with them; and feel he is taking part in a democratic process. It also enables the landowner to see and create opportunities for the estate's betterment, when they arise. However, for any estate to benefit from being involved in the planning process, it needs to be both well informed and well organised; Lowther exhibited both these features. Yet it also needs sensitive and sympathetic planners, aware of local feeling and requirements.

At Whitbarrow, the estate was not fully integrated into the planning process, not only because of their lack of knowledge and organisation, but also because the planners never made any serious attempt to involve them. This meant that they were unable to either protect their own interests, or allow the planners to benefit from their knowledge and experience.

During the construction phase, it is also important for landowners to devote resources to researching problems that might occur, organising themselves properly and, if not being in firm control of the contractors, being party to their major decisions. This is especially important because contractors are under strong temptation to rush their work, with the associated skimping and negligence. Even if a relationship of mutual respect is not built up, then it is within the power of landowners and tenants to get their demands realised, by placing pressure upon the contractors.

The need for an estate such as Whitbarrow to protect its own interests, particularly with regard to individual holdings, is especially important considering the very low key role taken by MAFF during the planning of roads. When MAF's role is compared to the planners determination to get a road finished as quickly and economically as possible, with agriculture having only secondary importance to the engineering and financial constraints placed upon them, it places greater onus upon the landowner to ensure that there is little or no detriment to his holding.

Another noticeable difference between Lowther and Whitbarrow was the seeming lack of concern the planners had for local feeling. Although they might have felt that the fact that there seemed little concern on the part of the estate over what was happening, their generally distant and unhelpful approach did nothing to foster the spirit of well-meaning and satisfaction that brought so many benefits to both planners and estate at Lowther. Any governmental department must ensure that those it has dealings with are satisfied with their conduct and be sensitive to local concern and comment. In the absence of this an aberration from the policy process can result in a feeling of powerlessness on the part of those involved and a lack of the benefits that accrue from democratic participation.

One of the most fundamental ways in which the two estates differed in their approach to the road construction, lay in the extent to which they relied upon their tenants for information. At Lowther, all technical concerns were taken out of the hands of the tenants, a system which appeared to create no resentment on their part, and worked extremely well. At Whitbarrow, the estate tended to leave the tenants to solve their own problems, and even relied upon them to decide what accommodation works were needed. The tenants had clearly shown that they were uncomfortable when dealing with road planning matters; had a low level of educational attainment; had relatively little experience of occupations other than farming; and were already hard pressed to make a living from their farms. Therefore, they were fundamentally unsuited to protecting their own interests and the interests of the estate.

With regard to completing the compensation negotiations, Lowther were clearly more successful than the average agricultural enterprise. The estate set itself objectives and acted at all times in a reasonable manner. This coupled with the respect shown to the estate by the District Valuer, enabled a speedy and satisfactory ending to the proceedings. The lack of Lowther's qualities, will probably mean a complicated and extended negotiating period for Whitbarrow. Not entering into negotiations too soon and waiting for the full effects of the road to emerge may in some circumstances be the preferable policy, especially at Whitbarrow, where it is likely that serious problems can be expected in relation to drainage. Yet on the other hand, if the road development has been carried out in a proper manner and effectively supervised, then there will be little need for this policy.

The two case studies have shown, that it is not necessarily the rule that agricultural enterprises will suffer severe difficulties as a result of a major road development. However, those factors which made Lowther so successful in dealing with the Penrith By-Pass, cannot necessarily be repeated on all agricultural enterprises, whether estates or individual farms. It is how those factors which helped Lowther so much, can be engendered in enterprises such as Whitbarrow, that Chapter Eight will turn its attention.

CHAPTER 7

THE DEVELOPMENT OF AGRICULTURAL POLICY IN BRITAIN

THE DEVELOPMENT OF AGRICULTURAL POLICY IN BRITAIN

7.1. Introduction

The previous chapters have all considered rural problems and their possible solutions. However, the major difficulty facing rural policy formulators is the continuing significant change that is taking place within agriculture as a whole. Agriculture is important as a focus for rural policy, because any changes in its nature and form will affect not only the conservation value of land, but employment prospects within, and the social character of many rural communities.

This chapter will examine the recent historical development of agricultural policy; those aspects of agricultural policy which deal specifically with the most economically vulnerable members of the farming community; the disadvantages of governmental financial support for agriculture; trends within the agricultural industry; and the market pressures upon and likely associated developments within farming itself. In considering the nature of agricultural policy, this chapter aims to present the rural policy formulator with a clearer understanding of the dynamics of agriculture, in order that they may be encapsulated in more effective co-ordinated policy creation.

7.1:2. Agricultural Policy: The Academic Perspective

Government involvement in any sphere of the economy, has repercussions upon that industry and the economy in general. Although the huge amount of government support given to the agricultural industry during the Second World War up to the present day, has had a considerable number of economic, environmental and social effects, the main analysis of policy has come from agricultural economists, concentrating upon the central themes of production and efficiency. Recently, however, interesting work has been carried out by rural sociologists considering the interplay of interests revealed in agricultural policy. Attention to agricultural policy is also being shown by the increasingly politicised conservation

movement, who realise the profound implications it has upon the conservation value of the countryside.

The reasons for the relative lack of an organised social analysis of agriculture lies perhaps in the complex nature of the agricultural industry itself. Agriculture has perhaps little of the intrinsic appeal for the sociologist of other research areas, such as race relations, industrial conflict and the rise of multi-nationals, while many other academic groups have attempted to use their expertise to "corner the market" in terms of rural issues. Planners and their various subdivisions, including those interested in regional development, agricultural geographers, conservationists and economists of all shades and inclinations, have tended to consider rural problems, including agriculture, as a whole, and produced a diffuse, unco-ordinated analysis of agricultural policy, lacking in the depth necessary for it to be seriously used in rural policy formulation.

Another disadvantage of social research in agriculture, is the total inadequacy of data provided by the various responsible bodies especially the MAFF. Bell and Newby (1974) complain that for all the legions of statistics gatherers, little information of any sociological use can be found. The Northfield Report (1979), complained frequently about the lack of information on social change in agriculture. Another problem in analysing agricultural policy is the wide difference in its effects over the nation. Bell et al (1978), in their study of East Anglian farmers, were undoubtedly fortunate in choosing an area where agribusiness is as developed as anywhere in Europe. When it comes to an analysis of the decline of the family farm, the nature of its business activity, and even its survival, it becomes difficult to place this in the context of the "post industrial society".

Clearly, the diverse analyses of agricultural policy within Britain, have not been linked in such a way as to produce a comprehensive understanding of the social and economic objectives of it, or the problems engendered by it, necessary for comprehensive rural policy creation. This task is undoubtedly difficult to carry out, although it is possible to develop certain themes and trends related to agricultural policy, and of importance for a fuller understanding of rural problems

generally. An essential part of this is to consider how agricultural policy as it reveals itself today, has been derived.

7.1.3. The Foundation of British Agricultural Policy

The state has been involved in what might be loosely termed as "agricultural policy" for centuries. However, modern state involvement can be traced back at least to the Enclosure Acts, and the passing and repealing of the Corn Laws. Yet it was only with the changing political, economic and strategic position of Britain during and after the Second World War, that large scale government intervention was considered necessary for British agriculture, although quite substantial support had been given to agriculture in the 1920's and 1930's. Venn (1931), estimated that the British taxpayer supported agriculture to the sum of £70,000,000 in the years between 1920 and 1930. Added to this, some internal re-organisation took place under the Agricultural Marketing Acts of 1931 and 1933, which succeeded to some extent, in stabilising prices through the regulation of supplies and the market.

During the Second World War, the government had taken upon itself massive powers with regard to British agriculture. Keeping a watch over the standard of farm management, production and productivity, the War Executive Committees, made a substantial impact on home food production. Financial incentives, including guaranteed prices, and grants for farmland improvement were introduced, which meant an increased income for farmers.

In 1942, the Scott Report on land utilisation was published, which helped lay the foundations of the present town and country planning system. The Report saw the need to maintain a viable and healthy agricultural industry to ensure Britain's self-sufficiency in food, to check the drift of people away from rural areas, and to maintain the landscape (Scott Report 1942).

The Scott Report's recommendations were based primarily upon the expectation that the nations demand for food would remain large, and the traditional style of farming would continue, much as it had done in the past. However, in his Minority Report, Professor S R Dennison pointed to a number of

false assumptions made in the Majority Report. He argued that the Majority Report called for a "balanced agriculture", without any form of economic criteria being added, thus agricultural planning would take place on a basis primarily of sentiment and value judgement; secondly, the emphasis given by the Majority Report to agricultural efficiency would inevitably result in increased rural unemployment; thirdly, while the quality of food consumed may vary, the quantity would be fairly inelastic; and finally, British agriculture would be subject to the changing conditions of world trade. By recognising that agriculture was unlikely to maintain employment or rural communities themselves, Dennison was perceptive in foreseeing future trends. However, Dennison's observations did not fit in with the spirit of the time, for the Majority Report helped lay the foundations of both the 1947 Town and Country Planning Act, and the 1947 Agriculture Act.

7.1:4 The Theoretical and Pragmatic Reason for Agricultural Policies

The Agriculture Act, 1947 according to Gilg (1978), is one of the most successful and longstanding pieces of major legislation in British Parliamentary history. The aims of the Act were to produce:-

"...A stable and efficient agricultural industry, capable of producing such part of the nation's food and other agricultural produce as it is desirable to produce in the United Kingdom, and of producing it at minimum prices, consistent with proper remuneration and living conditions for farmers and workers in agriculture, and an adequate return on capital invested in the industry".
(Agriculture Act 1947).

Before going on to consider the application of agricultural policy in Britain since 1947, it is worth considering the theoretical and practical reason for a comprehensive agricultural policy.

As indicated above, the Second World War had a profound effect upon the structuring of Britain's land use policies, and in particular its agricultural policies. One aspect of this was the contrast between the impoverished state of pre-war agriculture, compared to the immense demands made upon it by the war-time crisis.

British agriculture had never properly recovered, except for a brief interval of the First World War, from the availability of cheap foreign food imports in the middle nineteenth century. However, in the late 1920's, the effects of industrial recession began to take hold. During this period, up until the outbreak of war in 1939, both agricultural incomes and the intensity of cultivation fell, and investment and maintenance virtually ceased (Bowers and Cheshire 1983).

To ease the immense problems that ensued, the government only carried out minor measures such as allowing 100 per cent rate relief on farmland, and the passing of two marketing cuts to protect the producer, stabilise prices, and regulate supply to meet demand. But as Thompson (1979) says:

"The Government were still committed to a cheap food policy which meant that to an extent, home agriculture would have to manage with piecemeal protective measures".

Clearly, therefore, the stress laid upon home agricultural production during the War, contrasted markedly with the pre-war atmosphere.


Undoubtedly, as an industry agriculture is highly favoured in having an intricate, comprehensive and stabilising centrally determined economic policy. The reasons for such a high degree of governmental involvement, in Britain and in other developed countries, are not solely strategic, but rather lie with the basic structure of the industry itself.

In most advanced economies stability is ensured by guaranteeing prices. This operated in Britain before entry into the EEC in the form of the deficiency system, where farmers were paid the difference between the price guaranteed by government, and the price actually received. When Britain entered the EEC, she accepted a system of intervention, where Intervention Boards, on behalf of the European Commission, physically purchased produce, if prices fell below those guaranteed. All this has been underpinned by a system of tariffs on imported goods, and agreements with exporters, which maintain artificially high prices (Marsh and Swanney 1980).

The most serious problem that faces agriculture, and which agricultural policy attempts to ameliorate, is that of its tendency towards instability. One major

cause of instability, is the fact that the industry tends to be "cyclical". The most marked case where cycles exist, is that of pigs, where definite three to four year cycles of large supplies and low prices, followed by low supplies and high prices have been noted (Capstick 1970).

The problems of cycles in agriculture arises from the fact that in the short-term supply is comparatively inelastic. This arises from two facts. First, it takes agricultural producers a considerable amount of time to react to changes in price, because of the long production period involved. Second, farmers are unable to store most produce until a desired price is reached, rather, such items as pigs, lambs and perishable commodities must be sold when they have become appropriately mature. However, while supply tends to be inelastic, price is elastic, and reacts quickly to changes in supply levels. This gives rise to the cobweb theorem. The cobweb theorem can be best explained by the use of a diagram. In Diagram 7:1, when the equilibrium price is 10, the quantity falls to 9, and the price rises to 11. The rise in price encourages producers to plan a larger production which amounts at the price of 11 to 11 units. In period 2, after a time lag the extra production is marketed, and the price falls to 9. In period 3, farmers have reduced production, and therefore price increases. This is known as a stable cycle. Cycles can be "convergent", where equilibrium is gradually reached, or "exploding" where prices eventually, in theory at least, fall to zero.



Source: Hallett 1971

Diagram 7:1 A Stable Cobweb Cycle

Although most agricultural products are prone to cycles, pigs are perhaps more susceptible than others. Cycles themselves have the unfortunate effect of eroding confidence in the industry, because planning is made more difficult, and increasing the risk of financial failure. Because of this, agricultural policy attempts to provide confidence for the producer in guaranteeing prices in times of surplus production.

Yet cycles are not the only supply problem that exists. One of the most important of these is the fact that when prices rise, supply responds, and more producers are attracted into the market. However, when price falls, supply does not necessarily react, not only because producers must sell their produce when it becomes marketable, but also because as long as their marginal costs remain covered, then they are at least making use and obtaining some return on their investments (fixed costs). Such a problem leaves farmers almost continually in a state of impoverishment, without having the resources to invest, until some factor, climatic or otherwise, reduces overall supply and causes prices to rise.

While Hallett (1981) considers this to be one explanation of supply inelasticity, he quotes (Kaldor 1952) in theory of the "backward sloping supply curve". This theory argues that when farmers achieve high prices they tend to produce less being content with what they have; however, when prices fall, farmers produce more in order to maintain their former income level. Hallett (1981) argues that there is little empirical support for this theory.

Clearly some degree of central government control is necessary to support farmers' incomes, and prevent widespread impoverishment as a result of the inelasticity of supply. However, low incomes do not only arise from this problem. Hill and Ingerset (1977) as will be seen in Sections 7.2:1, note five explanations for the low income problem. These are the trade model theory, which notes falling demand, and increased supply due to farmer immobility and technological improvement dampening prices. The imperfect competition theory, which see farmers as a weak diffuse, group of small producers, forced to sell their produce to a small number of highly concentrated firms; the asset fixity theory, which states that as farm assets have a low resaleable value farmers are encouraged

to keep producing with them than to sell them and stop producing, the decreasing cost theory, which argues that larger farms produce cheaply and dampen prices, and the smaller producer is forced to accept low prices, and the treadmill theory. While all the other theories are accepted to some degree by commentators, the treadmill theory is perhaps the most commonly accepted explanation of the low income problem. Hill and Ingerset describe it by saying:-

"Technological innovations by farmers increases agricultural supply, so that unless there is a corresponding shift in aggregate demand, and assuming that aggregate demand is less than perfectly elastic, the technologically induced increase in supply must result in a lowering of the equilibrium market price".

The existence of guaranteed prices and marketing boards, does help to ameliorate the worst effects of income depression. However, as Hill and Ingerset (1977) point out, it must be realised that guaranteeing prices, while increasing confidence in the industry and helping to smooth out cycles, does not necessarily stabilise incomes, as supply can vary according to climate, disease and season.

An important aspect of income support and price setting, is the need to induce confidence in the industry, to encourage investment, and therefore efficiency. This is particularly important because of the fact that agriculture is "highly geared", that is it relies heavily upon borrowed money. Thus for the banks and other credit organisations to lend and for the farmer to borrow, they must all be assured of a reasonably stable market. Added to this, if farmers lack confidence in the market, then there will be a tendency to diversify, which is less efficient than specialisation.

Efficiency in agriculture, as throughout the economy, is considered to be a useful goal in its own right. Efficiency is not only encouraged by confidence, specialisation and investment, but through making grants towards farm investment, and through structural policies. In Britain the two main investment grants are the Agriculture and Horticulture Development Scheme, and the Agriculture and Horticulture Grants Scheme (see section 7.3:2). Structural improvement necessarily entails the improvement of holdings through making them larger, reducing fragmentation, and removing low income farmers. However, as will be seen in Sections 7.2:4 and 7.2:5, while British and EEC structural policies have failed,

there has been considerable uptake of capital investment grants, which has in itself encouraged the oversupply of certain products.

Efficiency in agriculture is also important because of the need to produce relatively inexpensive food. Consumption of food is inelastic, and while there are shifts in taste, quantity varies little. However, the poorer one is, the greater is the proportion of one's income that is spent on food; this is Engles Law (Hallett 1981). This is of particular importance in ascertaining the means by which agriculture is financially supported by government. As mentioned earlier, prior to Britain's entry into the EEC, agriculture was financed from progressive taxation. Yet under the Common Agricultural Policy support largely comes from the consumer paying higher prices, which in itself means that there is less distribution of wealth (Josling and Hamway 1976). In this respect, if a major reason for the financial support of agriculture, is the need to maintain farmers' incomes, then the poor are largely funding a governmental social policy.

Another reason for an agricultural policy which encourages home production, is the strategic need for food in case of war, and the effect of agricultural imports upon the balance of payments. The strategic arguments for a high degree of home agricultural production is probably less important now than it was immediately after the Second World War, and can be compared with the situation as regards timber products (see Section 2.10:1). With regard to the balance of payments problem, Bowers and Cheshire (1983) argue that the argument for import substitution is weak; and that there is only a serious problem when there is a fixed exchange rate, (see also Miller 1981); and that there is a real long term cost to British industry, as it is there that our comparative economic advantage lies.

While all these lay the theoretical economic arguments for considerable government involvement in agriculture, there are also important political reasons why farming is supported. Pearce (1983) notes that the Common Agricultural Policy is subject to more political than economic pressure. She argues that this arises because of extensive organisation by farmers at national level; that the

technicalities of agricultural policy are understood only by a relatively small group of officials, politicians and academics, who are generally sympathetic to the needs of the sector; that farmers are self-employed and thus highly motivated; and that certain nations such as the Republic of Ireland and France, have a national economic interest in maintaining high CAP prices.

Within Britain, the farming community, particularly the NFU has considerable influence, and these links extend to the MAFF and the ranks of the Conservative Party (Wilson 1977; Caufield 1981). As will be seen later in this chapter, the influence of large companies upon agricultural policy can also be profound.

The agricultural policy formulator therefore has a complex range of social and economic interests and problems to consider. To help him understand the economic implications of policy decisions, an array of economic models have been produced. Petit (1977) breaks down attempts at modelling into three types, these being econometrics, that is a statistically based economic model; programming models, particularly linear programming models which attempt to produce optimum solutions to situations which either minimise costs or maximise returns; and simulation models, which have as their objective the simulation of farmers activities, and is basically a derivative of a systems approach.

Of these models, the econometrics and linear programming models are the most popular. Of the econometric models, Nerlove's model of elasticity of supply is by far the most popular (Brault 1982). This model hypothesises farmers' reactions in terms of price expectation and for partial area (or production) adjustments. Askari and Cummings (1977), have carried out a survey of the use of Nerlove's model by forecasters, and have found considerable variations in results, even when the same commodity in the same country is being considered. This occurs because the data used is variable. For example, Askari and Cummings note in terms of price, that there are a number of different inputs that can be used. They ask, is it the price received over a number of years; the ratio of price to some consumer price index; or a ratio of price received by farmers to some index of the price of inputs, or comparative crops? In fact, the divergence of results and the lack of

consensus between modellers on what data should be used, has prompted them to argue that, considering the narrow requirements of policy makers, econometrics can do little to help unless a new generation of evidence is uncovered and evaluated.

Thomson and Buckwell (1979) have been involved in the development of the Newcastle supply model and a linear programme. They have attempted to construct a microeconomic model of British agriculture that will assist in the evaluation of policy changes at the farm, regional and national level. Even so they are aware of the problems of what data to use, and argue that for the creation of such a large model strong team discipline is essential, in order to prevent subjective distortions. As regards the models overall usefulness, Thomson and Buckwell say:

"If the sole objective of this study is to produce projections, it would be extremely difficult to justify the large resource requirements of the aggerative linear programming approach".

They also counsel against comparison with the results of other similar models. Petit (1977) notes that linear programming, as all other forms of economic modelling, is influenced by the objectives and perceptives of the modeller, which in turn distorts results. Added to this, linear programming is an optimising technique, yet farmers do not necessarily seek to maximise profits. Capstick (1983) notes that even the most sophisticated models have limitations simply because they fail to record social patterns. Indeed he argues that it may be impossible to gauge supply elasticity at all.

Clearly, the divergent results of economic models limits their usefulness. Thomson and Buckwell (1979) sees them as useful in their own right, as a training instrument. Petit (1977) argues that they can organise a multitude of information in a relevant manner; Walker (1977) says that they can sort out important variables in the system, and help evaluate alternative systems.

Once the limitations of agricultural economic models are taken into account, then they can be a tool in the hands of the decision maker. Yet, as will become clear in the rest of this chapter, agricultural policy is not simply an economic policy but rather a complex interplay of business, national and social interests.

7.1:5. British Agricultural Policy Since 1947

As has been noted the tendency during, and immediately after the Second World War, was to encourage the agricultural industry to produce as much as was possible. This policy worked well, for the pre-war index of production was raised from 100 to 143 in 1950. But by 1951, surpluses in some commodities were already occurring, especially milk, eggs, potatoes and wheat (MAFF 1951).

In 1952, the Conservative Government stated, that too great an emphasis upon supporting agriculture, placed a restraint upon civil investment. They said:

"In future, home agriculture cannot be asked to produce a given amount of any particular commodity irrespective of cost. To do so in the present circumstances would place an undue strain on the national economy, and would handicap our competitive power in world markets".

It was also added that farmers would have to pay more attention to quality and consumer choice (MAFF 1952).

In line with this philosophy, the government set about dismantling fixed prices for products, and replacing them with guarantees. Using these as a tool, the government attempted to reduce production of those products in oversupply, while encouraging an improvement in crop yields, and economy in the use of concentrated feedstuffs.

In 1955, adverse weather conditions meant poor yields for farmers, and lower incomes, and so the government raised the guaranteed prices. In 1956, Britain's balance of payments problem was worsening and agricultural import substitution, especially of animal feeds, was seen as a good way to improve the situation. The government reiterated its objectives of maintaining a large arable acreage with a special emphasis on barley, and producing more good quality beef and lamb. However, there was still overproduction of milk and eggs. In 1957, a new system of guaranteed pricing was introduced, which meant that guarantees would not be less than $97\frac{1}{2}$ per cent of their total value in the preceeding year, and that guarantees for each commodity would not fall below 96 per cent of the previous year's value (MAFF 1955,1956,1957).

In 1958, the government announced its assistance for farmers in the Small Farmers Grant. In it the government stated, that the key to the small farmers

survival was sound business management. The farmer was, therefore, required to submit a plan to improve his holding, which would then be eligible for grant aid. However, the government said that:

"It must not be expected to provide special financial assistance to help fundamentally uneconomic farms to remain in being, although such businesses will continue to benefit from general agricultural subsidies". (MAFF 1958).

The 1959 Annual Review noted a series of good signs in agricultural production. These included the maintenance of the arable acreage; an increase in the number of beef animals; and a fall in milk and pig production. However, in 1961 and 1962, milk, pig, cereals and egg production started to grow and there was need for a reduction in guaranteed prices for some products (MAFF 1959,1960,1961,1962).

By 1964, it was recognised that there would have to be some control of imports to improve the phasing and marketing of home grown produce. This was not to increase prices, but to ensure that only limited demands were placed upon the Exchequer. Voluntary agreements were worked out with bacon and cereal exporters to Britain; with regard to cereals, none were to be imported under a certain price. The system of standard quantities, over which reduced prices would be paid, was introduced for cereals. The system already existed for milk, pigs and eggs. In 1964, it was also noted that the milk supply was decreasing, and it was thought possible to raise producers incomes by increasing guaranteed prices (MAFF 1964).

In 1965 the new Labour Government announced its agricultural objectives as:-

1. The maintenance of stability in the industry.
2. The further progressive introduction of new technological improvements, better farm management, and improved marketing.
3. To encourage farmers to obtain benefits of scale.
4. To encourage agriculture to release manpower resources for use elsewhere in the economy.

These objectives were to be achieved through improved farm management; the better control of animal diseases; improving the productivity of smaller farms; and

the removal of those farms which were structurally unsound (MAFF 1965).

Also in 1965, the National Plan was published which foresaw a 1.3 per cent increase in demand for agricultural products per annum up to 1970. The government wanted British producers to take their fair share of this, and so selective expansion of certain products was to be encouraged. Beef was of particular concern, although it was recognised that as two thirds of the beef herd came from the dairy herd, some expansion of milk production was to be expected. Pig and sheep production was to be expanded as well as cereals for animal feedstuffs, credit, and Farm Improvement Schemes (HMSO 1965).

However, by 1967, agricultural production had not expanded to the extent the government had hoped; agricultural production actually fell, and so did the rise in productivity. Because of this, a larger award than the government planned was given to agriculture as a stimulus for more capital investment. It was also noted, that the devaluation of the pound in that year, made it more essential for Britain to produce a higher proportion of her own food (MAFF 1967a).

By 1968, expansion had occurred in all sectors of agriculture, a phase the government encouraged by giving increased incentives. In 1969, it was decided that the policy of selective expansion should be rolled over to 1973, with special emphasis upon wheat, barley, beef and pigmeat. The government increased guarantees to both help the industry expand, and to recover from the problems of poor weather and disease that had affected it. There were also to be some voluntary import restrictions on cheddar type cheeses and poultry. Hill sheep subsidies were increased in an attempt to allow the lowlands to be used for other purposes (MAFF 1968,1969).

In 1970, the need for Britain to produce more of its own food was re-emphasised by the fact that accession to the EEC was imminent. Voluntary import agreements were to be worked out with regard to bacon, butter and cheese. All capital grants were to be raised to help expansion. By 1971, the government was altering the mechanisms of farm support, so that it would be more in line with EEC policies. A mixture of guarantees and levies existed side by side. One of the main effects of this, was to create a better market for manufacturing milk. In 1972, it

was recognised that farmers would have to increase their competitiveness to benefit from EEC membership, and that milk and beef production should continue to be expanded (MAFF 1970, 1971, 1972).

In 1973, Britain started to adapt fully to the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). The aims of the CAP are very similar to those of the 1947 Agriculture Act. They are to increase agricultural productivity; to ensure a fair standard of living for the agricultural population; to stabilise markets; guarantee regular supplies; and ensure reasonable prices. The manner in which the CAP is applied, is significantly different from the way in which British agricultural policy had been applied before the 1970's. The historical trading patterns were different, with a stress being laid upon increasing self-sufficiency in the community. The relatively large size of the agricultural workforce, and their smaller holdings, also contrasted with Britain's. The level of power of the farming community in EEC activities, and the need for larger scale income support also differed.

Since entry into the EEC, significant increases in the production of all agricultural commodities have occurred. For example, food in 1973 accounted for 22 per cent of British imports, in 1983 it is only 12 per cent. There has been a 51 per cent increase in cereal production and a 24 per cent increase in milk. Home production of cheese, sugar and meat has increased by over 50 per cent and butter over 300 per cent. However, eggs, bacon and horticultural products have suffered from severe competition from EEC countries (EEC 1983).

Farmers incomes during the period of EEC membership have been variable, but probably higher than they would have been under a more liberal regime. Shortages of cereals in the early 1970's raised the cost of imported grain and animal feedstuffs, while the oil price rise of 1973 induced inflationary pressures upon farming. The higher prices farmers were receiving under the CAP encouraged considerable borrowing to finance production. Subsequent increases in interest rates severely hit many farmers. This was coupled with the so called "prudent pricing" policies of the EEC, which generally kept farming incomes below inflation. Indeed farmers suffered a fall of 32 per cent in income between 1978 and 1980.

Since membership of the EEC, national control of agricultural policy has declined significantly, although White Papers have been published indicating the government's desires for the industry. In 1975, the government published an agricultural White Paper, which re-emphasised the need for continuing expansion, based primarily upon foreign exchange considerations. An expansion of beef and sugar was encouraged, as well as arable crops. Greater use of grass was also made an objective for beef and milk herds. As well as this, some increase in milk production was thought beneficial. Sheep production was to be encouraged, both for exchange reasons, and because of the pattern of farming in the uplands. Increased efficiency in the production of pigs, poultry and eggs, was also to be encouraged. The net expansion was to have been in the region of 2 per cent a year. The necessity for higher productivity was also noted (MAFF 1975a).

In 1979, another White Paper, "Farming and the Nation" was published. This came about as a result of the referendum decision to remain in the EEC; greater governmental control over agricultural prices as a result of changes in the "green currencies"; continuing inflation; and the set backs of the 1975 and 1976 droughts. It considered the likely price and availability of imports, and the need for greater self-sufficiency as an insurance against unexpected scarcity. It also considered the likely effect on national income of allocating resources to encourage higher agricultural output. Yet, the White Paper went on to say:

"Overall the government's conclusion is that import prospects and the need for insurance, continue to point to the desirability of increased agricultural output in this country, but not so strongly as to justify seeking the maximum output increase regardless of the cost to the consumer, or to the economy at large, or of its impact on the environment". (MAFF 1979a)

7.1:6. Interim Summary

Agricultural policy has basically differed little from the original objectives of the 1947 Agriculture Act. The central themes of production and productivity, have been continually expounded, although they do sometimes contradict other aspects

of policy. Agricultural support has certainly helped to increase Britain's self-sufficiency in temperate foodstuffs, as shown in Table 7:1. a trend extended by membership of the EEC.

Table 7:1.

Agricultural Self- Sufficiency in Selected Commodities in the United Kingdom
(Domestic supplies as a proportion of total supplies).

COMMODITY	Ave.					
	1936-37	1953-54	1965-66	1970-71	1975-76	1982
Barley	47.2	66.8	97.7	90	107	128
Pork	75.7	88.3	96.9	100	99	101
Eggs	62.2	80.2	96.4	99	98	100
Oats	94.0	97.2	97.4	109	97	101
Beef & Veal	49.1	65.8	72.1	84	92	90
Potatoes	96.9	97.8	96.2	97	91	85
Cheese	24.1	37.5	43.8	46	67	71
Wheat	22.7	40.9	47.2	44	57	106
Mutton & Lamb	37.9	35.4	44.4	42	56	64
Sugar	18.9	19.4	28.5	33	25	54
Butter	9.9	9.2	8.2	14	19	64

Source: Bowler (1979) and MAFF (1983).

Whether the present level of self-sufficiency in certain agricultural products, especially cereals and milk products, is desirable both in economic and social terms is questionable. Yet, at present there are few signs that production is to be reduced, or even if it is, that it will be done at the expense of productivity. The fact that is of great importance for rural areas, is that agricultural policy is primarily and overwhelmingly an economic tool. However, by providing economic support to agriculture, governments have funded both efficient and inefficient producers, large farms and small, a policy which has created its own problems.

7.2:1. The Vulnerability of the Small Farmer

Low incomes in agriculture have been a problem for many years, although agricultural economists are not universally agreed upon their cause. Hill and Ingerset (1977) note five explanations, they are:-

1. Those based on trade models, which note a steady falling demand coupled with increased supply created because of the immobility of the labour force and technological improvement.
2. The "treadmill" theory, which means that technological improvement increases supply, which in turn dampens prices, so that more must be produced for less return.
3. The decreasing cost theory which is based upon the notion that as farms get larger they can produce more cheaply.
4. The imperfect competition theory which maintains that farmers are forced to sell their produce to large highly concentrated firms, who because of their power in the market are able to control prices.
5. The theory based on asset fixity states that as farm assets have a low value when they are resold, they must be kept on the farm to recoup investment which means lower productivity.

Apart from the above arguments, another put forward by Johnson (1960), is that small farmers have a low managerial ability, and therefore their returns reflect that input.

Rather than emanating from any one of the above models exclusively, the low income problem probably derives from an amalgam of them. However, those who suffer most from the low incomes, are the smaller farmers. They are not able to reap economies of scale; have a smaller total return from their holdings; are less able to take advantage of technological change than larger farmers; and are less of a force in the market place. The smaller farmer has been regarded as something of a hinderance to a cost effective agricultural policy, and because of this, structural policies have been formulated to reduce their number.

Left to the market, structural improvement is very slow, as only one to two per cent of Britain's agricultural land is sold in any one year (Northfield Report 1979). As well as this, whenever land does become available, it is not always certain that it will be split up amongst surrounding farms, as demand from new entrants is high. The problem of a relatively stagnant land market, has a great deal to do with the nature of the farming itself. Farmers are highly immobile, being often unable to find jobs in other spheres of the economy. Even if they do find other work, it is probable that they will suffer a decline in social status (Gasson 1969). Added to this, land itself is a valuable asset which has risen in price faster than most other investments, which may make it worthwhile remaining in agriculture, even though agricultural returns may not be high. If land is sold, then capital gains tax will remove some of the benefit accrued, while there are capital transfer tax advantages from owning land, which may make many farmers, especially the older ones, wary of selling.

7.2:2. Small Farmers and the 1967 Agriculture Act

The Labour Government of 1963 as already noted, had seen agriculture as an important economic tool in helping to end the balance of payments problem, in promoting economic growth, and in supplying labour for the workforce. Therefore, it was seen as being in the interests of the nation, to have a strong structural policy.

The 1967 Agriculture Act set up Farm Structure Schemes which sought to establish the two-man unit as the minimum size for a farm business. The scheme gave financial support, either a lump sum or an annuity to farmers who gave up their farms in favour of amalgamation; assistance was given to cover part of the cost of merging two or more farms; and aid was given for rationalising farm boundaries. The Act also created Rural Development Boards, with a remit to cater for the special needs of upland and hill areas. The Act recognised that there was a need for:

"The formation of commercial units of agricultural land in such areas; the need of an overall programme for guidance in making decisions as to the use of land

in such areas for agriculture and forestry, so that the two uses are complementary; the need for improved public services in such areas in step with their development for agricultural and forestry purposes; and the need for preserving and taking full advantage of the amenity and scenery in these areas in the course of their development for these purposes".
(Agriculture Act 1967).

Under these broad objectives, the Boards were to have responsibilities for regulating the use of land as well as encouraging rural development. As an official document put it:

"Their main task will be to encourage the promotion of voluntary arrangements, for example for enlarging farms to adjust farm boundaries, for afforestation where desirable, for providing tourist facilities on farmsteads and forest properties, and for improvements in communications and public services".
(MAFF 1967b).

The Rural Development Boards were allowed to purchase any land within their area; manage and improve farms; and sell or let any of their land. They could acquire any farming business, equipment and stock; and carry on, or commission inquiries in connection with their functions. Added to this, consent from the Boards was needed for any land sale within its area. Consent would not be forthcoming if the land could be dispersed for amalgamation, forestry, or some ancillary purpose. The Boards controlled almost all private forestry planting, and had power to draw up co-ordinated plans for any area to improve agricultural structure.

As Capstick (1980) points out, although the intentions of the Act were clear, how policy was to be applied was left in the hands of the Boards. Therefore:

"The range of policies which it could have adopted, went from a hard policy of approving no transfers, except those which would have led directly or indirectly to the creation of a two-man unit, to a soft policy of non-intervention except where a demonstrably viable farm was to be split up into fragments".

7.2:3. The North Pennines Rural Development Board

The North Pennines Rural Development Board, was set up under the auspices of the 1967 Act. It was located in a large area that ran from Skipton in the south, up to the Scottish Borders. The area contained many small farms, fragmented holdings, and the potential for large scale forest planting. In this area of upland farming, given the Board's wide remit, a great deal could have been done to carry out farm amalgamations and create viable farms. However, the Board failed to live up to expectation, and was dissolved in 1971. The reasons for its dissolution are varied, but generally they relate to the impotence the Board showed when faced with major decisions.

The Board, as indicated earlier, was given substantial powers to develop their policies as they saw fit. But in its creation, the Board met a certain amount of hostility from the farming interest. The creation of the Development Board with a remit to interfere in land transactions, was seen as a threat to the basic right of land-ownership, compounded by the fact that the Board was a creation of a Labour Government. There was also a fear that the Board would have a negative effect upon land prices (Childs and Murray 1977).

Yet as Capstick (1980) points out, even if the Board had carried out an aggressive policy (which it did not), its actions were limited by the fact that in the two years of its operation, less than two per cent of holdings came on the market. Capstick also noted that many other difficulties were to haunt the Board. She went on to say that the reluctance of many of the Board's members to pursue a rigorous policy, lay in the fact that the Board was not given enough power to create new employment for those farmers displaced, and were, therefore, reluctant to intensify rural depopulation. Added to that, many people did not give the Board their full support, because their functions could have been carried out by the MAFF, the Forestry Commission and local planning authorities who already had substantial powers in these matters.

The Board was also disadvantaged in the composition of its membership. Capstick maintains that the MAFF saw the Board as a typical agricultural

committee, and flooded it with agriculturalists, thus depriving it of the benefits of diversity. As well as this the Board was not elected, which meant it had less standing in some circles, and the committee being of twelve members was too big for effective decision making. Capstick saw another problem in the fact that the Board's chairman, a civil servant, held too much power. As he was committed to a non-interventionist policy, his influence permeated through to the rest of the committee.

The general performance of the Board was very poor. In terms of commitment to a viable unit size, it allowed seventy two transactions, of which fifteen were under fifty acres in size, and twenty three were between fifty and one hundred acres. In terms of grant aid, although it disposed of some £34,000, the cost of servicing the Board, ran to over £70,000. In forestry matters its hesitancy resulted in dissatisfaction, even among those who did not support the Board's interference in land transactions. In consequence, the North Pennines Rural Development Board, was an unqualified failure.

7.2:4. The Effectiveness of Farm Structure Schemes

As mentioned earlier, the 1967 Agriculture Act, set up the Farm Structure Scheme, with the aim of creating two man units with financial assistance given to support this policy. Yet as Table 7:2. shows, the level of interest in the scheme was low, and the total effect negligible.

Table 7:2. The Estimated Response Rate to the Payments to Outgoers Scheme, by Countries, to March 1970

COUNTRY	NO OF HOLDINGS 100-599 S.M.D.'s IN 1966	RESPONSE TO SCHEME AS A PROPORTION OF HOLDINGS IN ELIGIBLE SIZE GROUPS	
		APPLICATIONS	APPROVALS
England	91,600	1.90%	0.46%
Wales	21,000	2.21%	0.57%
N.Ireland	34,900	1.65%	0.63%
Scotland	15,700	6.84%	1.32%
U.K. total	163,200	2.36%	0.59%

Source: Hine 1973.

Hine (1973), considers that the Farm Structure Scheme failed for a number of reasons. First, not all small farms were eligible for help. Examples of exclusions are, out-goers who received most of their income from outside agriculture, and those amalgamations which resulted in farms going to more than one single ownership body. Added to this, a covenant was included which meant that any land purchased could not be sold off separately for fifty years; this discouraged some purchasers and sellers.

Hine also feels that the actual sums paid to outgoers were too small. For example in 1970, a farmer could expect a lump sum payment of between £1,400 to £2,000, or £220 to £275 per annum, in the form of an annuity. Another problem was that although one of the aims of the Farm Structure Scheme was to bring down the age of farmers, no upper limit on retirement was placed, and so farmers were encouraged to "hang on". Even so, the total effect of the scheme must have been negligible, as half of the small farms being sold at the time were being amalgamated anyway.

7.2:5. Farm Structure Policies in the EEC

The European Community has continually suffered from a generally poor farming structure. Limited structural policies were initiated in 1962, but by 1967 the situation had shown little improvement. The realisation that the situation was made worse rather than improved, by a price policy constrained by the need to maintain the incomes of existing producers, prompted a fresh look at the structural problem (Marsh and Swanney 1980).

The Commission examined the problem, and the "Memorandum on the Reform of Agriculture in the EEC" was published, better known as the Mansholt Plan (EEC 1968). The Mansholt Plan recommended that farmers should be encouraged and helped to take up alternative occupations or retire, and those who remained should be given help with the modernisation of their farms. No action was taken on the memorandum until 1972 when three directives were introduced covering:

- (i) The modernisation of farms, Directive 72/159/EEC.

- (ii) The cessation of farming and the reallocation of the utilised agricultural area for structural improvement, Directive 72/160/EEC.
- (iii) The provision of socio-economic guidelines for the acquisition of occupational skills by persons engaged in agriculture, Directive 72/161/EEC.

Although much was expected of the EEC structural reform, in the event the results have been regarded as disappointing. Considerable uptake of Directive 72/159/EEC has been noted, although as the Commission itself says:

"Because of the lack of success of Directive 72/160/EEC, concerning the measures to encourage the cessation of farming and the reallocation of agricultural land for the purposes of structural improvement, the modernisation of farms in accordance with Directive 72/159/EEC, has been more or less synonymous with the intensification of farming systems within the framework of existing farm structures". (EEC 1977a).

For example, in Britain only 1,333 farmers took advantage of Directive 72/160/EEC between 1975 and 1979, while 5,147 took advantage of Directive 72/159/EEC in 1981 alone (EEC 1982).

Because of increasing dissatisfaction with this performance, changes to the directives were introduced. The minimum requirement that 85 per cent of land should be released by a retiring farmer, was reduced to 66 per cent. As well as this a premium, based on a sliding scale, was introduced which was at its peak for farmers in their fiftieth year. As the Commission said:

"Greater efforts must be made, so that the Directive serves its purpose of funding an alternative income for elderly farmers, especially those in the less favoured regions, and promoting the allocation of all land releases to farms submitting a development plan".

Added to this, finance was provided for farmers taking educational courses, and specific programmes on integrated development set up (EEC 1977a).

Directive 72/160/EEC has been variable in its implementation. For example in 1979, while Germany had 481 socio-economic advisers, Britain had only 11. Woods (1980), has carried out an examination of the effectiveness of the socio-economic advisory service of the MAFF. She found that the service was unable to carry out its required tasks due to there being too few advisers, the advisers relying on

agricultural solutions to economic problems, concentrating too much on larger farms, and the advisers not fully understanding their duties or role.

7.2:6. Interim Summary

Agricultural policy has attempted to take account of the small farmer by introducing structural measures to rationalise holdings and thereby increase farming efficiency. However, the level of success achieved has been low. Farmers have been unwilling to leave agriculture on the scale required, and attempts to implement a vigorous structural policy have failed, partly due to a lack of commitment on the part of those institutions involved. One reason why there no longer exists a firm structural policy is that governments are afraid of the social implications of such an action, although in agricultural and economic terms, the need for such a policy has not diminished. At present, the EEC policy of dampening prices, keeping them below inflation, helps to squeeze farmers out, particularly the smaller ones who are most hard hit by income restraints. It might be argued that a concerted effort to remove them in a more humane manner is needed, if the costs of agricultural policy are to be contained.

7.3:1. Agricultural Policy and the Disadvantaged Farmer

While agricultural policy has to some extent recognised that the small farmer represents a hinderance to creating a viable and efficient agricultural industry, it also attempts to ease the plight and improve the lot of many disadvantaged farmers. Farmers can be disadvantaged because of the small size of their farm, or their topographical position. In terms of the second problem, legislation was enacted in the Hill Farming Act 1946. This defined hill land as:

"Mountain, hill and heath land which is suitable for use, for the maintenance of sheep of a hardy kind, but not of sheep of other kinds, or which by improvement could be made so suitable".

This Act gave grants to improve the productivity of the farm holding, through such

measures as the erection and improvement of buildings, farm-houses, cottages, pens, fences, and grants for fertilising, pest and weed destruction, and machinery provision. Sheep and cow subsidies were also introduced on a headage payment basis. The 1946 Act, was extended by the Livestock Rearing Act 1951, which provided extra money for the hill farmer. These Acts formed the basis of British upland agricultural policy until entry to the EEC, where it was replaced by the Less Favoured Areas Directive 75/268/EEC. This Directive has continued giving support upon a headage basis, and allowing capital grants at an improved rate. At present, over 44,000 farmers benefit from the Less Favoured Areas Directive in the United Kingdom, and under it some £127 million was spent in 1982 in the United Kingdom (MAFF 1982).

7.3:2. Measures to Help the Smaller Farmer

The Small Farm Grant (1959-1965), has already been alluded to. It gave farmers the means to enable economically marginal farms to become properly equipped, stocked and managed. A revised scheme introduced in 1965, was the Small Farm (Business Management) Grant, required the farmer to keep and use farm business records as an aid to improved management, and emphasised the efficiency of resource use rather than the intensification of capital. These have been replaced by the FHDS (Farm and Horticultural Development Scheme), and the AHDS (Agriculture and Horticulture Development Scheme).

The (AHDS) was designed so that the middle range of farmers could achieve a target income. Under this, grants are paid at a rate of up to 50 per cent for land improvements, such as ploughing or reseeding, or 70 per cent for drainage. The farmer himself must find the balance, and commit himself to a six year development plan agreed to by ADAS. Farmers who do not qualify for the AHDS, or who do not wish to commit themselves to a six year plan, can be grant-aided at lower rates under the AHGS, Agriculture and Horticulture Grants Scheme.

7.3:3. Government Aid and the Disadvantaged Farmer

Government aid for agriculture includes an important element to help the disadvantaged farmer, and this has been of great help to the smaller farmer in his quest for survival. However, as Bowler (1979) notes, they have not been the main beneficiaries of this support. Table 7:3. indicates that generally subsidies account for as much, if not more, in proportion to gross output for the larger farmer. As the larger farmer produces more than the smaller, he obviously receives more government aid.

Table 7:3.

Subsidies in £ per £100 Gross Output for a Sample of Farms in Wales and East Anglia.

Type of Farm	Size of farm (hec)			
	0-40	41-80	above 80	All farms
Dairy (better land)	15	12	14	14
Dairy (poor land)	14	16	21	16
Mixed (better land)	20	18	22	20
Mixed (poor land)	24	24	23	24
Livestock rearing (better land)	33	33	29	31
Livestock rearing (poor land)	35	34	33	34
Arable	19	20	21	20
Pigs and Poultry	23	26	27	25

Source: Bowler 1979.

The larger farmer is clearly better able to reap the benefits from production subsidies, as he is able to produce more, and is more suited to taking advantage of capital grant schemes, as he has more capital to invest at the beginning. In relation to capital grant schemes in upland areas, Bowler (1979) notes, that many farmers cannot afford the basic costs the grants require them to meet. He says:

"In retrospect it appears likely that those upland areas most in need of assistance have failed to benefit under schemes which require farmers to be the instigators of an application for aid".

7.3:4. Disadvantages of Support for Agriculture

As has been seen the larger producer benefits from headage payments because he has more animals, and from capital grants, because he has more money to invest. Yet added to this, other disadvantages of support can be noted. Ashton et al (1976) say that because subsidies are linked to production, a substantial portion of the farmers income must go on capital equipment, while the tenant farmer finds himself with higher rents to pay, which in turn results in a desire to take the level of rents into account in formulating future price levels, inducing inflationary tendencies. Clarke (1975) states that:

"When agriculture is subsidised, or given tax concessions, or helped in any other way, the benefit accumulates in the form of a rise in the price of land, rather than in the income of the farmer as such".

Rosine and Helmeburger (1974), have found that in the United States, for every dollar of benefit from a farm support programme, ninety two cents accrue to the landowner in an increase in land price. Traill (1980) in Britain has found that a one per cent increase in product price, leads to a ten per cent increase in land values. Apart from increasing land values, which have the effect of increasing tenants rents, and restricting entry into farming for younger entrants, it has also been argued that subsidies encourage larger farms to expand, due to the fact that they take a disproportionate part of the benefit (Stabler 1975).

The huge demands placed upon the EEC's budget by agriculture, largely results from the high cost of supporting numerous uneconomic farms, and subsidising the resulting considerable oversupply of agricultural produce. The problems created by this are undesirable. It places high costs upon certain individual countries, who are large importers of food from third countries; it prevents money from being spent elsewhere in the EEC; it distorts world trade, especially through the subsidisation of exports; it maintains high food prices within the EEC; it prevents the restructuring of agriculture; and has some adverse effects upon the environment.

As an economic tool, the CAP cannot be regarded as a success. As Davy et al (1976) say, although the problems of the CAP relate to the position of low income farmers, it is not altogether clear that measures to restrict imports help low income farmers more than high income farmers. They go on to say, that the CAP has set prices high enough to satisfy the higher cost farmers. The lower cost farmers have been encouraged to expand production, and the added profitability has been written into higher land prices. Clearly while the present price policy has enabled a significant number of medium sized farmers to adapt to changing circumstances and to finance their growth, it has brought disproportionate benefits to these large and specialised farmers, who would be able to adjust even under a low price level.

Looking to the long term, changes within CAP support are inevitable as a result of continuing pressures upon the system. The need to reform the CAP, has arisen because of the strains it places upon intra-community relations; the threat of a world trade war; the growth in productivity and production throughout the EEC resulting in considerable surpluses; and the problems likely to occur as a result of expanding the EEC. All aspects of the community budget are likely to suffer as a result of cost cutting, although those which take the highest proportion of the budget, namely dairy products and cereals, are under the most threat. Any such changes in the application of the CAP without counterbalancing national programmes, will undoubtedly adversely affect the agricultural economy of such areas as Cumbria, where agriculture is heavily dependent upon dairying, beef production and Less Favoured Area support.

7.4:1. Trends Within the Agricultural Industry

Over recent years, technological change within agriculture has been very rapid. Bowler (1979), maintains that the nature and pace of technological change in the production of competing products, appears to have been a more important influence on agricultural trends than guaranteed prices. As can be seen from Table 7:4. the greatest change has come with pigs and fowls, the two animals most

amenable to intensive production. Such has been the pace of technological development, that about one quarter of all livestock is now intensively reared, with 88 per cent of pigs being reared in herds of over 200, and 99.8 per cent of broiler fowls being reared in flocks of over 1,000 (MAFF 1981d).

Table 7:4.

Changing Structure of Agricultural Production in the United Kingdom 1960-1975

	ENGLAND & WALES		SCOTLAND		N IRELAND	
	A	B	A	B	A	B
Dairy Cows	5.8	-8	6.9	-9	7.4	-9
Beef Cows	5.2	9	6.7	17	8.5	12
Breeding						
Ewes	3.4	0	5.3	1	4.4	-8
Breeding						
Pigs	9.7	-12	9.8	-7	4.2	-26
Laying						
Fowls	9.9	-22	8.4	-22	12.1	-50
Broilers	18.9	N/A	18.2	N/A	14.6	N/A
Wheat	6.2	-3	4.7	N/A	N/A	N/A
Barley	4.0	1	2.8	N/A	0.1	-10
Potatoes	4.5	-5	4.0	-16	0.9	-35

(A) average annual increase in size of enterprise, livestock per herd or flock, crop area per producer.

(B) change in proportion of holdings having each enterprise (1964-75), per cent.

N/A=Not Available

Source: Bowler 1979.

The increased specialisation witnessed on farms becomes more apparent when it is realised that with regard to poultry holdings, flocks of over 1 million produce 12.5 per cent of total production, yet only make up 0.3 per cent of broiler houses, while pig herd holdings of over 5,000, only account for 0.4 per cent of pig rearing holdings, they produce 10.1 per cent of total production (MAFF 1981d).

Apart from the increased specialisation of production on farms, another trend has been noted; an increase in regional specialisation. Bowler (1981), in a study of Scotland, found that economic pressures have led to production concentration, and regional specialisation as areas best suited to production are used. The results of this will be some regions will be less economically sound, vulnerable to a fall in price level in individual products; also ecological disadvantages may arise in certain areas, for example, due to an increase in cereal production in an area, more hedgerows may be removed (Bowler 1981).

The trend towards the concentration of production has been spurred on by rapid technological change and increased productivity. This has helped undermine the position of the smaller farmer. Although governments had long seen the need for a more efficient agriculture, and have carried out a large scale policy of encouraging structural change, the government felt concern enough, at the fact that farms were becoming larger, to set up a committee of inquiry into the whole problem. The "Northfield Committee" was set up on the 16th September 1977, to:

"Examine recent trends in agricultural land acquisition and occupancy as they affect the structure of the agricultural industry, and to report".

The committee came to its conclusions in 1979. It introduced its conclusions by noting three periods of acquisitional change. In 1908, only twelve per cent of landholdings were owner-occupied, yet by 1978, this figure had risen to sixty three per cent. This came about because of industrialists diversifying their interests in the 1920's and buying farms; in the 1950's and 1960's the cost of maintaining large agricultural estates grew, and so land was sold to help the upkeep of them; in the 1970's inflation and rent increases encouraged the sale of land. Because of this the total number of holdings fell from 509,000 in 1908, to 244,000 in 1977. Although

these changes were widespread and profound, little interest had been shown in considering their impact, particularly from a policy perspective.

When considering the aims of their study, the Northfield Committee noted four factors of primary importance. First, the need for an efficient agriculture; second, the desirability of encouraging personal commitment and incentive in farming; third the conservation and preservation of the countryside; and fourth the maintenance of viable rural communities.

One impediment in achieving these objectives, is the increased interest of financial institutions in agriculture. Newby (1979) points out, city institutions fall into three categories. These are insurance companies, pension funds and unit trusts. As the Northfield Report (1979) indicated, one reason why they have been attracted, is that land prices had risen during the 1970's at a considerably higher rate than inflation, the Financial Times Share Index, and the Net Farm Index. As well as this, as Trott (1979) points out, agricultural land is made more attractive, than some other investments, by the fact that agricultural rent is preferred income before profits, and thus it is substantially more secure than an ordinary dividend.

According to the Northfield Report, agricultural institutions only own 1.2 per cent of Britain's land. Although many see advantages to be gained for financial institutions who enter farming, Northfield found some who did not enter the market because they felt that yields were too low; the agricultural market was too thin and volatile; agriculture has become too technical; and the law is weighted too much in favour of the tenant. The level of individual institutional involvement is also variable. For example the Prudential Assurance Company which disposes of eight million pounds a week, maintains that its agricultural land holdings will never rise above two per cent (Chapman 1979). While, for the Pension Fund Property Unit Trust, agricultural land makes up about twenty per cent of its holdings. Although these figures seem comparatively low, when it is considered that accruals of new money to pension funds are now over seven billion pounds a year, it is obvious considerable sums of money are involved (Davey 1979). Financial institutions

purchase between six to ten per cent of all land coming on the market, with most of their purchases tending to be concentrated in East Anglia, although interest is now being shown in better quality land in the west of Britain (Davey 1979). Up till recently institutions have tended to purchase land and rent it out, due to their own lack of expertise, but now there is a marked tendency for them to take land in hand themselves, and appoint a manager (Northfield 1979).

Of less significant influence in the market have been overseas purchasers. Land prices within Britain have been much lower than those in the rest of Europe, and have induced purchases by foreigners. Northfield (1979) found, that one per cent of the total area of agricultural land in Britain is owned by foreigners. They concluded that although the present figure of ownership is small, the conditions in the next ten years are more likely to further overseas purchases than to restrict them, and that the potential for an increase exists and is starting to be realised.

All of the above factors, including increasing land prices, a fewer number of holdings, and greater interest from city and overseas buyers, has meant that there is less and less chance for young people to enter farming. This is thought especially sad as the demand for farms from new entrants is very high. The Northfield Committee felt that young farmers were essential because the industry constantly needs initiative and drive. In respect of this problem, the committee suggested that policies should be developed which encouraged self-help; the creation of a new and effective career structure for managers; a farm share scheme; the development of part-time and starter holdings; an increase in co-operation; substantial loans; and the termination of farm amalgamation schemes (Northfield 1979).

Another source of concern and contention in agriculture, is the taxation system. Agriculture has certain tax advantages over other industries because of a number of factors. These include the fact that agriculture is highly capitalised and receives low returns on investment; this is especially important in relation to transference on death. The tax relief available for farmers is shown in Table 7:5.

Table 7:5.

Assets Qualifying for Valuation Reliefs, and Percentage Relief Available in 1981

The sole farmer and partner in land owning partnership.	Agricultural property relief %	Business property relief %
Interest in agricultural land and buildings:		
- agricultural value	50	
- non-agricultural value		50
Interest in other farming business		
Assets. e.g. farm implements and livestock		50
Partner owning assets used by the partnership. Land owned by the partner and occupied by the partnership in circumstances such that the partner can obtain vacant possession with 12 months.		
- agricultural value	50	
- non-agricultural value		30
Land owned by the partner and occupied by the partnership with security of tenure under the Agricultural Holdings Acts:		
- agricultural value	20*	
- non-agricultural value		30
Machinery and plant owned by a partner and used for farming purposes by the partnership		30
The non-farming owner of agricultural land (e.g. the retired farmer or an investor)		
Interest in agricultural land and buildings		
- agricultural value with vacant possession	50	
- agricultural value with tenancy	20*	
- non-agricultural value	-	-

*50% in the case of certain tenancies granted before 10th March 1982

Source: Hill 1981.

Because of the variable incomes farmers receive, they can take two successive years' income and average them, and then pay tax on that average. They also are able to get an initial investment allowance in taxable income of twenty per cent, while they are then allowed an annual allowance of ten per cent until the investment is written off.

While capital transfer tax (CTT) can be a problem for the farmer, there are various ways of avoiding it. First, one can enter a partnership with one's wife, and

thus share the CTT burden and reduce it; second is to create a farming tenancy, which reduces the value of the farm; third is to incorporate the farm; fourth is to create a charitable trust; fifth is to take advantage of assurance policies; and sixth is to gradually give away part of the farm, with gifts of £3,000 per annum per individual being exempt from capital taxation. There can be some disadvantages involved with planning for capital taxation, such as not trusting one's spouse, or a general reluctance to part with property. However, there is a general feeling that the present taxation measures allow considerable savings to be made, and in general, capital taxation is not harmful to the farmer (Northfield 1979), (Hill 1981).

The Northfield Committee's findings after their comprehensive analysis were generally low key. In general terms, proposals for action included the need to maintain agricultural estates by granting them tax concessions; a relaxation of the tenancy laws; and a transfer of a small amount of land to a National Land Trust, offering tenancies on smaller and medium sized farms to help restore the missing rung on the ladder. Yet the committee rejected land nationalisation, because widespread purchases would be too costly, and a proposed conversion of freeholds into 99 year leaseholds, they felt could discourage investment. But the most important reason for rejection, was that there was nothing to prove that agriculture would become more efficient if nationalised. As well as this, limits on farm size were ruled out because the best farms should, the committee felt, be allowed to grow bigger.

The committee also saw the need for local development bodies in rural areas. They thought that these bodies could have a role in relation to farm size, land use, including acquisition by foreign buyers, the development of farm structure and the needs of young farmers. They went on to say:

"Intervention of this type would be a major step and we do not think it can be justified at the current time on agricultural grounds, although there may be social and environmental reasons for a greater degree of involvement by government".

With regard to the high price of land, they said:

"In all circumstances we are doubtful whether in view of the purchasers expectation of continued profitability in the industry, inflation, and the value of land as an investment, it is justifiable to assert that agricultural land in general is over-valued".

Attached to the main report, was a minority report, which recommended that succession rights should not apply to more than 1,000 acres, multiplied by six in Less Favoured Areas; the belief that amalgamation policy should be reviewed; that more credit should be made available for farmers; that there should be greater taxation relief for landlords; and that a special land court should be established with judicial powers over a wide field of procedure concerning land, its occupation and use (Northfield 1979).

7.4:2. Interim Summary

Because the government has intervened to protect agriculture from the more vigorous market forces, it is required to support not only the most cost-effective farms, but also the least. As a result of this, these disadvantaged farmers are financially better off than they would have been without market support. However, even though policy aims to help the disadvantaged farmers, because of its bias towards rewarding production and efficiency, it tends to benefit the "advantaged" producer as opposed to the "disadvantaged". The policy also has adverse side effects in terms of encouraging over-production, increasing costs in other areas of the economy, upsetting world trading patterns, increasing land prices, and preventing structural reform. Obviously support for the disadvantaged farmer under the present system, is not only generally ineffective, but is often contradictory.

There are also continuing pressures upon farmers from increased productivity and concentration, all exacerbated by growing institutional and overseas investment in farmland. The Northfield Committee found these features disturbing, and suggested policy measures to ameliorate them. However, they also showed that the trends witnessed were part of a long term pattern, resulting as a

natural consequence, of changes in the agricultural and national economy. They also failed to provide an effective explanation of why farmers should be socially supported, as opposed to farming being supported to achieve economic goals; the social assumptions put forward by past commentators, have already been questioned in Chapter Six. Therefore, while the Northfield Committee effectively drew attention to the fact that agricultural communities were under pressure, they did not make out a sound case as to why the state should intervene to prevent further decline.

7.5:1. Market Pressure Upon Agriculture

Rural sociologists have recently been carrying out interesting studies on the nature of agricultural policy, attempting to place agriculture in a modern setting. One major theoretical problem has been the survival of the small family farm, and the state's intervention in order to protect it. Many social commentators during the nineteenth century saw little future for the continuance of the small family farm. Not least of these was Karl Marx. However, Marx's analysis of change and transformation in agriculture due to capitalist pressure, has been found wanting. For example, Marx believed that landholdings in Ireland would change dramatically from small farms to large holdings, with few counteracting tendencies. Yet Marx did not take into consideration the effect that emigration from Ireland had upon local labour, creating massive shortages that maintained the small tenant; nor did he correctly judge the low level of enterprise of the Irish peasant farmer (Hagelkorn 1981).

Kautsky, in 1899, noted a number of conditions which were thwarting the extension of capitalism into agriculture. First, unlike machinery or tools, land as a means of production is limited in quantity. Second, its quality may differ according to natural conditions. Third, there was a general lack of suitable and willing agricultural labour. Fourth, small farmers often do other work and thus ease their condition. Fifth, the small farmer is able to reduce his living costs to the lowest denominator, relying upon his own and his family's labour power to work

the land. Sixth, emigrants supply income to those remaining in farming. Only, according to Kautsky, when agriculture comes fully under the dominance of the capitalist mode of production, will the smaller farmer give way, and in that process the smaller farmer will be proletarianised (Kautsky 1980).

While Kautsky's thesis does provide some interesting viewpoints on how the family farm has managed to survive pressures from capitalist expansion into agriculture, modern thinking renders this somewhat simplistic. Mann and Dickinson (1980), argue that because of the increased importance of agricultural inputs, such as fertiliser and machinery, and of the increased role of the processing industry, the state's activities support the interests of these groups, rather than the agricultural producer. They go on to note, that because agriculture has a fixed and lengthy production time, and is subject to violent fluctuations, under normal conditions agriculture has little attraction for private capital. The state, therefore, has to intervene to prevent a collapse of the industry. Yet at the same time, the state provides resources for the agricultural community to purchase capital inputs, while ensuring a continuous supply of cheap produce for processing and marketing.

Buttel (1980) says, that although the state has appeared to help the small farmer, it has really helped the large. As Buttel points out, larger farmers use more inputs; are more dependable, especially with regard to contractual agreements; and they are also more ideologically supportive of "agribusiness". Although they are in the same system of "exploitation" as small farmers, they tend to gain because of a coincidence of interest with non-farmers in the agricultural system. As Buttel says:

"All farmers, even large operators, suffer from the understandable inclination of commodity purchasers to pursue state policies that depress farm prices, although the large operator maintains a relatively privileged position in this melee".

The theories put forward by radical rural sociologists, provide an interesting new analysis of agricultural policy. Yet there are certain areas of their philosophy which are questionable. For example, if the state acts in the interests of industrial

capital, squeezing as much as possible out of the smaller farmer, why then does it support very uneconomic forms of farming, such as those in Less Favoured Areas through incentives? Or why does it maintain trade barriers, when foreign foodstuffs are cheap and plentiful, to simply support costly farming practices? It might be argued that the state does have, even under "monopoly capitalism", a welfare function, and if farmers remain in farming after attempts to remove them through structural policy have failed, then they should be economically supported. Yet as was seen, structural policy has not been carried with the same fervour as recent industrial rationalisation schemes. It could of course be argued that the producers of inputs such as fertilisers, encourage the state to support home farming to provide a market for themselves. But still multinational companies may find more advantage producing and selling overseas, with cheaper labour, compliant governments, and higher profit margins.

Clearly, although the rural sociologists appear to answer many complex questions, their approach cannot be regarded as totally comprehensive, especially in considering the position of Britain. However, their research does indicate areas where those concerned with rural policy matters should concentrate, if they wish to analyse pressures upon agriculture, in a bid to forecast future trends, namely those firms that pressurise farmers into producing foodstuffs more cheaply, the providers of inputs, the processors and the retailers.

7.5:2. Market Pressures Upon Agriculture in Britain

While nearly all analysis of agricultural policy from a sociological viewpoint has taken place outside the United Kingdom, the British agricultural industry exhibits many of the features noted elsewhere. Hill and Ingerset (1977), believe that the production, marketing and distribution of agricultural products is becoming increasingly sophisticated for a number of reasons. First, advances in technology have made it possible for products to be produced to "specification", and processed in a fresh condition. Secondly, the optimum scale of operation has been increasing, especially in processing and distribution. Added to this, selling

methods have been developed, based on both brand names and quality.

For vertical integration to take place, Allen (1976), notes five pre-conditions. First, that production should be concentrated in an area which is relatively distant from the final market. Second, that producers are not greatly protected from uncertainty over supply and prices. Third, the purchasers demand good quality produce; fourth, the existing grading schemes are insufficient to meet this, and fifth, agricultural advisers are not adequately attuned to the need of innovation. Within Britain, general agricultural policy and especially the existence of marketing boards, has impeded the trend towards vertical integration in agriculture. However, in some industries a high level of vertical integration has occurred. Of these, the poultry industry is perhaps the most vertically integrated. The rise of the large, vertically integrated poultry firm has been rapid, with them pushing out the small producer by sheer size. For example, in the early 1960's the median initial flock size for individually established plants, was 6,000, whereas the organisational plants that are set up now have over 50,000 chickens (White and Watts 1977). The rapid removal of the smaller poultry producer has resulted in the fact that now, in the United Kingdom, six producers share two thirds of the market of around 350 million chickens a year. The largest firm supplies eggs to hatcheries, fattens the chickens, owns thirteen large abattoirs, and supplies thirty per cent of the poultry in the British market. This same firm (Imperial Group) recently purchased a group of nineteen feed factories, and buys in chickens to be sold under its own name (OECD 1981).

The British poultry industry constitutes an oligopoly, and although collusion does not take place between the various members, a tacit agreement does exist based on statistical information. The MAFF produces statistical information every month based on the number of chicks placed for broiler production; the number of grandparent and parent stock placed for production; and the number of eggs placed in hatcheries. In their joint bulletin, "Poultry Magazine" the three main poultry associations (the British Poultry Meat Association, the British Turkey Federation, and the British Hatcheries Association), complete and analyse data supplied by the

MAFF. The OECD says:

"All producers are always on the alert and attach great importance to the analyses of the monthly statistics..... The hatcheries are thus shielded from the irregular swings of the market, thanks to the moderate behaviour of the producers". (OECD 1981).

This form of economic activity has effectively forced out of production the smaller producer, reduced diversity on farms, and increased concentration and specialisation. This system also contains some dangers for the consumer, in that there is less spread of choice available and the opportunity for price fixing. However, Wolfe (1978), for example says:

"Some forms of tactical control upon supplies is in the interests of not only producers as a whole, but also the consumer and distributor, who also suffer in times of shortages or wide fluctuations of prices".

In no other areas of agriculture, has vertical integration been as great as with poultry, although as Newby (1979) points out, the tendency towards it, is being shown in pig production. In place of vertical integration, large processing firms have preferred to rely upon contract farming, where to quote George (1980) they have preferred: "To let real farmers take the risks of inclement weather and blight".

The last major study of contract farming took place in 1971, and Table 7:6. shows the percentage of farm produce sold in this way.

Table 7:6. The Percentage of Farm Produce Contracted 1971

PRODUCE	PERCENTAGE CONTRACTED
Fat pigs	43
Poultry	29
Eggs	22
Fruit	15
Vegetables	11
Potatoes	9
Fat Cattle	2
Sheep	2

Source: Royal Commission on Contract Farming 1972.

Table 7:7. shows that contract farming is more popular amongst large farmers.

Table 7:7. The Number of Heavily Committed Holdings by Holding Size 1970-71

S.M.D	275-1199	1200-2399	2400+
Percentage of Total Holdings in Group.	1.6	1.9	3.8

Source: Royal Commission on Contract Farming 1972.

Contract farming can place the farmer under severe pressure. Although it can provide him with a guaranteed market, shift the burden of risk and provide easier access to credit, technical advice and marketing expertise, the farmer usually cedes some of his independence. He is brought into close contact with large industrial corporations with all the attendant risks of dependence and a weak bargaining position (Newby 1978). Metcalfe (1975), notes that contract farming creates a downward pressure upon prices, increases the creation of larger farms, makes quality specification more important, and leads to a gradual decline in the management role of the farmer.

It is likely that contract farming has increased since the Royal Commission of 1972. Yet while pigs, broilers, eggs and vegetables are well suited to packing, canning or freezing, other products such as milk, beef, potatoes and grain have other outlets apart from contract farming, and the existence of guarantees and marketing boards do not make the ideal environment for contract farming to thrive.

Although the prevalence of contract farming is a danger to farmers in some sectors of the agricultural economy, as much to those that do participate as those who do not, the direct control of food processing by a small number of producers has inherent disadvantages, for their power in the market place can be so significant as to control market prices considerably (Ritson 1977).

The impact of large companies upon the market place, and the disadvantages that this can entail for the producer, are well rehearsed (Galbraith 1972). They exert their power through concentrating production in a few hands, and to some

extent dictate the purchasing price of raw materials and the selling price of finished goods. Galbraith (1972), notes some of the features of these firms. First, there is a good flow of information between them. Second, price rises are generally based upon agreement. Third, there is often an elasticity of demand which is not much greater than unity, and fourth, oligopolists usually prefer to keep some degree of freedom so as to increase and exploit their negotiating powers. The degree of concentration within British food processing industries is considerable. For example, meat production has increased in the EEC due to policies encouraging the domestic production of livestock. The animals are usually slaughtered in a small number of large abattoirs after being sold privately. As an EEC report said:

"These abattoirs are increasingly being situated in animal production areas and owned or financed by large vertically integrated meat company groups forming a direct chain of distribution from the farm to the retail outlet". (EEC 1977b).

As well as meat, the processing of dairy products within Britain is highly concentrated, as Table 7:8 shows, the top four firms control nearly 67 per cent of the market.

Table 7:8. The Concentration of Butter Production in Britain 1973-74

FIRM	PERCENTAGE OF THE MARKET
Unigate	33-35
Express Dairy Company	12-13
Co-op and Northern Dairies	8
Milk Marketing Board	25

Source: EEC 1975b.

Table 7:9. shows that in 1968, the top four cheese processors controlled nearly 70 percent of the market.

Table 7:9. The Concentration of Cheese Production in Britain 1968

FIRM	PERCENTAGE OF THE MARKET
Unigate	30
Express Dairy Company	17
Milk Marketing Board	10
Kraft	10

Source: EEC 1975b.

Yoghurt production was also closely controlled, as shown in Table 7:10.

Table 7:10. The Concentration of the Yoghurt Industry in Britain 1968

FIRM	PERCENTAGE OF THE MARKET
Express Dairy Company	38
Unigate	18
Van den Burgh	11
Marks and Spencer	8

Source: EEC 1975b.

In terms of condensed milk, Carnation Foods and Nestles hold three quarters of the market, while Unigate controlled two fifths of milk powder products in. In margarine, the five largest manufacturers accounted for ninety four per cent of production in 1974, while Tate and Lyle and the British Sugar Corporation, held eighty per cent of the sugar market in that same year (EEC 1975b).

Another area where concentration is considerable is in the frozen food sector as shown in Table 7:11.

Table 7:11. Concentration in the Frozen Food Sector

FIRM	PERCENTAGE OF THE MARKET
Unilever	61
Nestles	18
Imperial Food Company	8

Source: EEC 1975b.

The reasons for this high level of concentration, are based on the fact, that to enter the market requires heavy expenditure on advertising and marketing. Also much capital investment is required, not only in a manufacturing plant, but also in establishing distributive linkages. As well as this, cabinet space in retail outlets is extremely limited.

Canning is also an area of food processing where there is a high degree of concentration, although figures do not exist on this. But when one considers cross ownerships, with Unilever, Nestles and the Imperial Group, owning between them, Batchelors, John West, Walls, Crosse and Blackwell, H.P. and Smedleys, it can be seen that multinationals have a substantial control of the market.

Another highly concentrated industry, is bread production, which is worth £800 million a year, and two companies Rank Hovis MacDougall (RHM) and Associated British Foods (ABF) control more than sixty per cent of the market. At one stage, Spillers were also involved in bread making, and these three large companies controlled eighty five per cent of the market. When Spillers left, their

business was taken over substantially by RHM and ABF (Labour Research 1981b).

The financial power of the main multinational food processors is huge, as can be seen in Table 7:12.

Table 7:12. The Turnover of Britain's Largest Food Processors.

FIRM	SALES TO END OF 1979 (£ million)
Unilever	10249
Allied Breweries	2138
Associated British Foods	1822
Dalgety	1679
Rank Hovis MacDougal	11379
Tate and Lyle	1109
Cadbury Schweppes	1006
United Biscuits	791
Brooke Bond Liebig	649

Source: Labour Research 1981b.

In overall terms, the level of concentration in all food processing is high as the figures in Table 7:13. show.

Table 7:13. Levels of Concentration in the Food Processing Industry

TYPE OF COMMODITY	PERCENTAGE OF MARKET HELD BY THE FIVE LARGEST FIRM!
Biscuits	82
Confectionery	69
Bread and Flour	67
Grain Milling	62
Animal and Poultry Feed	61
Brewing	53
Milk and Milk Products	49
Vegetable Oils and Fats	44
Fruit and Vegetables	42
Starch	42
Bacon Curing, Meat and Fish	33

Source: Department of Industry 1981.

While as Table 7:14. shows that the employment level and value of production is considerable.

Table 7:14 Employment and Output Levels in the Food Processing Industries in 1979

ENTERPRISE	PERSONS'S EMPLOYED	VALUE OF NET OUTPUT /£Mp.a.
Grain milling	20700	249
Bread and flour	101300	622
Biscuits	43400	256
Bacon curing, meat and fish	102600	831
Milk and milk products	55700	697
Sugar	13500	198
Confectionery	74000	510
Fruit and vegetable	59000	506
Animal and poultry feeds	26000	433
Margarine	62	101
Starch	<u>32700</u>	<u>396</u>
TOTAL	528,962	4,799

Source: Department of Industry 1981.

Because of the way companies present their figures, it is impossible to say quite how much money they make from their individual enterprises, but as we can see, their market strength is enormous. It can be argued that large firms benefit the consumer, yet there is great concern over their increasing power in the market, and their ability to control purchase and selling prices. The mechanics of oligopoly control are well rehearsed, and even the most conservative commentators have noted that the food manufacturing industry can reduce the final share of consumer expenditure, received by the farm sector. Added to this, processing companies tend to place quality controls upon farmers, that are difficult to meet without heavy capital investment. For example, a standard quality of apple can only be achieved by the application of pesticides and fertiliser. The pressure is increased by the power of advertising which displays to the consumer, agricultural produce, with a near perfect appearance; thus, consumers tend to reject produce such as fruit which has a maggot hole in it, in preference to that which has a better appearance, regardless of the fact that the latter may contain pesticide residues (Tait 1975).

Yet, not only are the food processors highly concentrated, but also those who finally sell the finished product have a tight control of the market. During the 1970's, the multiple retail stores managed to obtain a very much increased share of the retail market, mainly at the expense of small, fragmented independents, as Table 7:15 shows.

Table 7:15. Percentage of Retail Sales by Type of Organisation in the United Kingdom

TYPE	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980
Independents	38	37	34	31	29
Multiples	40	43	46	49	52
Co-operatives	7	7	7	6	6
Department Stores	8	8	8	8	8
Other	5	5	5	5	5

Source: Mintel 1981.

The concentration that inevitably follows a growth in multiple retail stores, is shown in Table 7:16

Table 7:16. Concentration in Food Retailing in the United Kingdom

TYPE	NO. OF BUSINESSES			
	1971	1976	1977	1978
Grocery	85,634	55,827	51,365	41,423
Large Food Retailers	179	193	271	348
Dairymen	6,712	6,249	6,158	5,686
Butchers	25,164	13,822	15,437	15,400
Fishmongers	4,804	2,625	2,935	2,439
Greengrocers	23,433	12,372	13,434	12,497
Bread & Flour	8,291	7,362	7,848	7,151
Off-License	3,967	3,484	3,113	3,267

Source: Mintel 1981.

In terms of all packaged grocery, the top seven retailers control fifty-three per cent of the market, with their market share steadily increasing in a time of contraction in the general food market. The power and importance of multiples is realised when we consider that they control fifty-two per cent of the market valued at over seventeen billion pounds. Supermarkets sell seventy-five per cent of canned food and fortyfive per cent of frozen, forty eight per cent of processed meat and twenty

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two per cent of fresh meat. Concentration is difficult to control in the retail industry. First, the vast size of the markets, mean that few firms meet the twenty-five per cent market share criterion before a reference can be made to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC), and the five million assets criteria is generally unused. Secondly, the neutral stance of the MMC towards mergers, means that in practice, few will be prevented unless they are evidently unsatisfactory.

Because of a desire to keep prices low, to increase profits and to encourage sales, great pressure is placed upon the manufacturer to reduce his prices, as one was reported saying:

"Our greatest problem is the retailers concern with price. Manufacturers by and large are caught in the High Street endeavour to be cheap and manufacturers end up paying for it". (Mintel 1981).

If manufacturers are being pressured by retailers, then they must themselves be pressuring farmers. We have already seen that food processors are in an extremely strong condition; the weakest link in the chain is of course the farmer.

Although it is claimed, as it always is, that price wars are detrimental to the industry involved, it appears that for all their price cutting, the multiple retailers are not sacrificing their profits in order to increase their sales, as Table 7:17 shows.

Table 7:17. Profits in Food Retailing

FIRM	LATEST YEAR	PRE-TAX PROFIT (£M)	% CHANGE FROM PREVIOUS YEAR
Tesco	Feb 81	38.5	-2.5
J Sainsbury	Feb 81	62.1	+41.6
Nurdin & Peacock	Dec 80	8.6	+23.0
Kwik Save	Aug 80	15.2	+25.2
W.M.Morrison	Jan 81	6.0	+29.9
Bejam Group	June 80	8.3	+36.9

Source: Labour Research 1981b.

Through their large buying power, the multiple retailers are able to engage in price cutting wars which effectively destroy their competition, while placing the burden of reducing costs primarily on the food processor and producer. Because of the market structure, it must be assumed that the producer is more greatly impoverished than the processor.

Another area of concentration apart from that of the retail outlets, is the provision of inputs for agricultural production purposes. In terms of modern farming, fertiliser is essential in order to maintain the high productivity recorded on British farms since the war. In 1977, the size of the fertiliser market stood at £750.2 million, with an annual growth rate of six per cent. The fertiliser market is completely dominated by one firm, ICI, which has a long term cheap gas contract with British Gas and thus is able to supply products more cheaply than its competitors. Because of its price policy, ICI has been able to drive one of its major competitors out of business, while forcing the others to make poor profits or even losses. ICI's hold on the market is further strengthened, by the fact that it supplied half of Fison's ammonias under contract. Until it left the fertiliser business in 1973 Fison's was ICI's next major rival (Jordans 1978).

The pesticide market in 1977 was worth £299.6 million, and was growing at a rate of seventeen per cent per annum, the fastest of all chemical subsectors. Again the market leaders are ICI and Fisons. Concern was expressed at the pricing policy of Fisons, yet the Price Commission upheld their claim that high prices were necessary because of the high cost of research, although research only accounted for four per cent of costs, while only two per cent of this went on development (Price Commission 1978a).

Tait (1975), has shown that farmers have been locked into a system of expensive chemical use by the "hard sell" tactics of the large companies, using sales representatives and mass media coverage, and the technically orientated Ministry of Agriculture advisory system. Added to this consumers are being educated to accept a product that can only be produced with widespread petrochemical useage.

Apart from chemicals, another major input into the farm is animal feed. The

market share of feedstuffs is as shown in Table 7:18.

Table 7:18. Market Share of the Compound Foodstuff Industry

	COMPANY	MARKET SHARE %
1.	BOCM - Silcock Ltd	21.4
2.	Spillers Farm Feeds Ltd	8.5
3.	RHM Agriculture Ltd	8
4.	J. Bibby & Sons Ltd	6.3
5.	Nitrovit Ltd	<u>6.1</u>
		<u>43.1</u>

Source: Price Commission 1978 b.

It is clear from Table 7:18, that the largest five firms do hold a substantial amount of power in the industry, a power that has increased with the merging of Spillers and Dalgety. BOCM Silcock is in fact a price setter, having such a large proportion of the market. In becoming more concentrated, a large number of take-overs, mergers, and rationalisations have taken place. Added to this, the Price Commission report on the price, costs and margins in the production and distribution of compound feeding stuffs, found that the companies had introduced a wider range of services, more deliveries in bulk, and additional services, ranging from extended credit, to specialised advice on nutritional and technical matters. At present the market is large, in 1979, worth £1,500 million (Jordans 1980). The Price Commission found that price competition in the industry was limited, with some price co-ordination between the majors, but, in characteristic style, declared that "no major reforms were needed". (Price Commission 1978b).

In 1977, the agricultural machinery sector was worth £1,150 million. Within the United Kingdom only five firms make tractors, and with the exception of BL, are all North American owned, and about seventy-six per cent of production was exported. However, Britain's tractor industry is in a state of decline as multinationals restrict their operations and make their goods elsewhere; coupled to this is the decline in world demand, which makes production and growth unattractive (Labour Research 1978b).

Another area of pressure for farmers, is the growth in the amount of money they borrow. Credit imposes restrictions in a number of ways; firstly to qualify, one must be credit worthy; second, one must use that credit efficiently in order to recoup investment and pay interest. Thus, agriculture becomes directly influenced by interest rates and bankers policies. Although British farmers have tended to borrow less than their continental partners, they have increased their borrowing by 363 per cent between 1970 and 1978. Reid (1981), notes a number of factors which have created the increased dependence upon credit. First the adoption of new technology, which in itself requires investment in secondary and tertiary investment, since a farmer has to incorporate a complete system if he is to gain full efficiency. Secondly, the drive for income comparability with sectors outside agriculture, has led to increased investment. Third, land prices have risen, but acquisitions have continued. Fourth, taxes prevent the farmer investing from his own resources, while fifth, farmers are wishing to improve their lifestyle and do so through borrowing. Bank borrowing has increased with farmers owing £4,000 million; some 2,000 farmers went bankrupt in 1980, and between 5,000 and 7,000, were in serious difficulties as a result of this (The Times 1982).

7.6:1. General Conclusions

The future shape and direction of agricultural policy, is arguably the most important rural policy issue of today. State involvement in agriculture has developed over a period of many years, and has helped shape the British agricultural industry, although the adaptation of technology has probably been an equally vital force. Yet agricultural policy is not a static instrument, but rather reflects a number of the economic and social desires of government at any particular time. A number of trends have been witnessed in policy in the post-war period. During and immediately after the war, there was a policy of increasing output in all commodities. The farming community responded well to the incentives given, and coupled with a resumption of world trade it was decided that too high a production of some commodities would place a burden upon the

Exchequer. Economic efficiency in farming was encouraged and has remained an integral part of agricultural policy. The import saving role of agriculture became more important, as well as the fact that it released manpower for the expanding requirements of the economy. Entry into the EEC meant an even greater expansion of home production, with the emphasis upon import substitution. This occurred even in those sectors where government had attempted to ensure that production was kept to a limited level, especially dairy products. By accepting EEC membership, Britain has ceded much of its control over agricultural policy, and now, after many years of fairly prudent policy making, accepts a high cost agricultural system. However, at present the most important concern affecting EEC agricultural policy, is the need to contain the costs of overproduction. This in itself is likely to induce dramatic changes in policy application.

Agricultural policy is primarily an economic tool of government, although policy decisions do not necessarily reflect agricultural market conditions; but often have been used to reinforce the wider, more general aims of economic policy. By accepting a degree of control over the market for agricultural produce, governments have been forced to accept the responsibility for the protection of the disadvantaged members of the farming community. This arises not only out of a social obligation, but the fact that once prices are set above market level, then those who would not continue to operate under market conditions, are encouraged to remain even if that requires reducing their living standards to a basic minimum. Yet this practice is costly to the nation as it hampers the development of efficiency in the industry, and continues the burden of cost upon both the taxpayer and the consumer for an indefinite period. Because of this, policy has attempted to ease disadvantaged farmers out of the industry by structural measures. However, these have failed both because of a lack of commitment to them by the MAFF, and the promise of further subsidisation if farmers remain. While the notion of a strong structural policy is not without merit, especially as the social reasons for supporting essentially uneconomic farmers do not stand close scrutiny, it clearly has to be underpinned by a strong advantage to the farmer in leaving, or conversely, a significant disadvantage in their remaining.

EEC policies, largely for social and historical reasons have been unable to resolve the contradiction between the state supporting agriculture for economic reasons, and the automatic social welfare function that follows. This has resulted in costly overproduction, larger farmers taking a disproportionate share of what are inherently social welfare payments; increases in land prices; the threat of trade wars; the hampering of wider EEC objectives by too much being spent on agricultural policy rather than on say, industrial policy; and damage to the environment.

Even so, with all the disadvantages of large scale support of agriculture, government still expresses concern at the occupational change of agricultural land. Yet, as has been witnessed the increase in the size of farms, and the corresponding decrease in the number of farmers and farm workers, is not out of line with general agricultural policy. Nor is the involvement of large firms, finance houses or foreign investment. Indeed, the economic and social reasons why the number of farmers should remain static appear tenuous.

State support for agriculture, has a highly complex and often contradictory history. Often as a result of policy, changes within agriculture have not directly reflected changes in the rest of the economy, and financial support for agriculture does not necessarily parallel support for other industries. While there are clear economic reasons for the considerable involvement of the state in agriculture, rural sociologists have added a further dimension to our understanding of this support, and the problems the state has in resolving the contradictions inherent in it. Using their basic paradigm of analysis, a number of factors become apparent in British agriculture. First, there is an increasing sophistication and concentration in the marketing and distribution of agricultural products within the United Kingdom. Second, there is in parallel, the increasing power of the producers of agricultural inputs, food processors and retailers. Third, there is an increase in vertical integration. Fourth, there is the rapid development and adaptation of technology within agriculture sponsored by large firms and, fifth, the resulting development of a more business orientated farmer, an extension of farm borrowing, and a gradual loss of farming independence.

The increasing power of these various groups, leaves the farmer as the most vulnerable link in that chain which develops, produces, processes and retails agricultural produce. They induce an environment in which only through the adaptation of expensive and sophisticated technology, is the farmer able to produce enough to remain viable, and of the right quality to ensure a market. The price received for his produce is dampened by the limited number of purchasers, especially processors, who in themselves are curtailed by the limited and declining number of retailers. In these circumstances the farmer is gradually relinquishing effective control of his operations, and accepting constant revolutionary change in his farming pattern.

It would be simplistic to describe the role of the state in this scheme of things, as simply a pawn in the hands of multi-national firms. The direction that the large firms are at present channelling agriculture, is not against agricultural policy in general, as they help to ensure increased production, productivity and quality of product. They create the economic environment in which MAFF and particularly ADAS work, and this in itself probably indicates as much as anything why MAFF has failed to take on its "social" role with any degree of real commitment. Yet, these trends themselves force MAFF to accept and pay the social costs that are inevitably engendered. At present it appears that it is only the inflexibility of EEC policy that has thwarted attempts to reduce these costs, although the EEC is itself increasingly recognising the need to do so.

The scenario for the future must basically lie with the power and influence of all groups, except the farming community, growing. There is likely to be little concern for the environment on the part of farmers, as they are enmeshed in a treadmill situation, compounded by the control of the large companies. These companies themselves will give little attention to the environment as they are concerned above all else with profit maximisation. Those farmers already disadvantaged, especially those who have a limited capacity to adapt to new technology will become increasingly unprofitable. This will either mean an increase in state social support, or the reduction of this in real terms, and a decline

in the number of farmers operating. The trend appears to be towards the second option. Any clamp down on over-production will severely affect areas such as Cumbria with a high reliance upon livestock farming. The gradual deintensification of agriculture in many areas which have been prosperous is a serious long term possibility. Added to this the role of the state in ensuring a supply of produce at reasonable prices is being replaced by large companies with some degree of control over supply and demand; indeed it can be argued that the state has now become the major source of instability in the agricultural industry.

The need here is for the rural policy formulator to recognise the long term, rather than short term trends within the agricultural industry, and attempt to formulate policy to take account of them as opposed to vainly seeking to interrupt them. The policy maker must realise that the number of farmers will continue to decline, with significant social effects in some areas; that a deintensification of agriculture will take place on a widespread scale, and that this process will alter the conservation value of the land as radically as the present intensification of the lowlands has. How these factors can be incorporated into rural policy will be discussed in Chapter Eight.

CHAPTER 8

POLICY ISSUES IN RURAL AREAS:

SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

POLICY ISSUES IN RURAL AREAS: SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

8.1:1. Introduction

The previous chapters have considered a wide range of rural policy issues. As was indicated in Chapter One, the project was essentially focussed as a result of the Whitbarrow Exercise, in which the MAFF, the "problem owner" wished to examine a fairly small agricultural estate as an illustration of the issues of compensation and development potential. Chapter Two shows that MAFF has been given an increasing role to play in attempting to solve rural social and environmental problems, a role which it has accepted with some vigour in Cumbria. Added to this, there has been a growing emphasis placed upon co-ordinating government action in resolving a wide range of rural problems. The MAFF, in being the primary instigator of the exercise, showed the desire to act as a major force in co-ordinating rural problem solving.

The fact that the exercise was undertaken at all, indicates two important facts. First, the MAFF believed greater emphasis needed to be given to co-ordinated action in rural areas, even if at its lowest level of simply sharing views and experience. Second, they recognised that there was a need for greater information on rural problems and the scope for solving them. However, their collaboration with the University made it easier to establish a neutral forum where all could meet for a frank interchange. The task of the researcher in this was not only to carry out some of the necessary research for the exercise, but also to draw together the information gathered during the research and conference period, presenting the MAFF with a detailed policy outline as to how rural problems might be tackled. Yet, although the MAFF has been given an increased role to play in rural areas, it does not have overall jurisdiction over the other bodies and organisations involved. Therefore, many policy proposals would have to relate directly to other organisations active in rural policy formulation and implementation.

The Whitbarrow Exercise was the first major piece of recorded research

carried out for this project, and its results were somewhat inconclusive. This made the task of the researcher more difficult, in that it would have been simpler to argue for, say, more co-ordinated action in rural areas, and more exercises similar to those carried out at Whitbarrow, and rural prosperity and understanding would ensue. The results could not have justified such an approach. The results from Whitbarrow were then tested against experiences in Cumbria as a whole; against the experience of a large more prosperous estate, which had managed to implement seemingly successfully, similar measures to those proposed at Whitbarrow; and against the available literature in the various fields covered. Added to this, the findings were placed in the context of agricultural policy, which has a very significant impact upon the social and environmental fabric of rural areas.

The results from the overall research, have tended to verify the original findings from Whitbarrow. This should have not been surprising, as the Whitbarrow Exercise drew information from a wide range of interested organisations in Cumbria. Indeed, the exercise was something of an achievement for inter-organisation collaboration in the county. The results from all the research had to be refined and developed for use in determining future policy initiatives. Chapter Six not only dealt with the problems already recorded, but extended analysis of them into theoretical aspects. This developed the results in a critical manner, and questioned the basic rationale behind policy initiatives in rural areas.

It might however be argued that as the findings relate specifically to Cumbria, they cannot be applied to all rural areas. Indeed, Chapter Two argued against attempting to provide watertight definitions of rural areas. Cumbria for example cannot be compartmentalised. The county can be regarded as peripheral to the main area of economic growth, namely the south east, and it does have remoter rural and urban areas suffering economic and social decline similar to the rest of northern Britain. But it also has the attraction for the retired reminiscent of the south and south west; it has development pressures, similar to the south east; and excellent communication links comparable to the major conurbations. However, it can be argued that it is generally more favourably suited

to rural development, than many other remoter areas due to the already large tourist industry; excellent communications; and its very beautiful scenery. Obviously, if rural development is difficult to achieve in Cumbria, then severe doubt must be placed upon the capacity of the rest of remote rural Britain to do so.

The general policy recommendations result from an amalgam of the Cumbrian and national experience. It is well recognised that problems and potential will differ from area to area, even within a comparatively small unit such as Cumbria, and they must be administered with some degree of flexibility. However, they do represent a serious long term solution to the problems of all rural areas within Britain, and can be applied generally.

The conclusions with regard to the general rural policy framework fall into two types. Those for use on the ground, under present circumstances by various bodies within Cumbria itself, and those conclusions and recommendations for a new national approach to rural problems. However, in terms of the second research path taken, concerning the effects of major road developments upon agricultural communities, the information gathered from Cumbria indicates that the problems faced by farmers are no worse or better than those in the rest of Britain, and the response of the farming community is similar to those recorded in other studies. The information gathered, and the suggested adjustment to policy, therefore, apply directly to the rest of Britain. The basic conclusions upon which the suggested adjustment to policy are based are outlined below.

8.1:2. Rural Industrialisation: Key Factors

1. British industry has been facing a significant contraction in production, creating a very hostile environment for the creation of new firms and the expansion of old ones.
2. Due to problems of access, lack of linkages with other firms, fewer services and oversupply of industrial space in urban areas, rural areas are at a natural economic disadvantage. This is perhaps a major reason for the lack of success recorded in letting rural industrial units.
3. Regional policy has not managed to sustain high levels of employment in deprived areas, and shows few signs of ever so doing.

4. Migrant firms are susceptible to closure.
5. Small firms are susceptible to closure.
6. The very nature of the rural environment restricts the type and variety of enterprises that can be developed.
7. The demand for craft and other tourist-related industries is likely to be limited due to contraction in the industry.
8. As rural industry is attracted to the larger rural town, this often has adverse affects upon the surrounding rural communities.
9. The influx of workers, coupled with the maintenance of the existing community and competition from outsiders for retirement or holiday homes can create severe housing shortages.
10. Rural communities can become dependent upon one or two particular industries and will suffer considerably if they falter or fail.
11. Industrial premises can take up valuable housing space within villages.
12. Industrial expansion into rural areas can decrease their amenity value, apparently a major asset.
13. Industrial expansion into rural areas can compromise the objectives of the planning system.
14. The construction of industrial premises is often vehemently opposed by rural communities themselves.
15. Research from elsewhere indicates that industrialisation can upset the community balance.
16. The ability of rural communities to generate their own industries is in doubt.
17. It is not clear how many small industries maintain or create jobs for local people, or maintain services.
18. The lack of skills available in rural areas limits job opportunities, and makes the area rely generally upon low skill low pay industries.
19. Even if successful, the expansion of small firms locally can be constrained by planning requirements.
20. Population levels in rural areas are stabilising and in most cases increasing. By providing state supported premises for "in-comers", this trend is subsidised with seemingly little benefit for the local community.
21. The low multiplier effect in rural areas, means that outside the actual point of employment, the immediate rural area will benefit very little.
22. The encouragement of industries into prosperous and environmentally attractive areas can deter investment in, and compete with urban areas where land, labour, services and depopulation are very severe problems.
23. In terms of the scale of the problem faced, small factories represent no solution, and may compound existing difficulties.

8.1:3. Tourism in Rural Areas: Key Factors

1. The tourist industry within Britain is stagnant, and at present experiencing contraction in many sectors, representing an unsuitable environment for investment.
2. The economic benefits from tourist enterprises have been shown to be very poor.
3. Economies of scale exist within the industry and help to undermine the smaller enterprises.
4. Smaller farmers often find some difficulty in running tourist enterprises.
5. Large farmers tend to benefit most from tourist enterprises.
6. There is preferential treatment as far as the Tourist Boards are concerned for larger schemes, as they are considered to be the most viable.
7. The trend towards and the subsidisation of self-catering units, is helping to undermine already vulnerable local economies.
8. The growth of large tourist operations, and of self-catering has undermined the multiplier effects of tourism on the local economy.
9. Large schemes employ proportionally fewer people.
10. There has been a tendency towards an oversupply of bed-space in established holiday areas.
11. Work in tourism is seasonal, low pay, and generally unpopular with local people.
12. Mass tourism can have very adverse effects upon the environment.
13. Large scale tourism within attractive areas creates tremendous development pressures which are only resisted by strong planning law.
14. Mass tourism engenders the creation of regulations which, by restricting the freedom of tourists, helps to maintain the peaceful enjoyment of rural areas.
15. Tourism can conflict with agriculture.
16. Tourism can encourage the taking up of local housing for retirement and holiday homes.
17. Mass tourism in National Parks can challenge their basic objectives.
18. Mass tourism creates high service costs to the local and national community.
19. Tourism cannot make more than a small contribution towards tackling existing rural problems and this is generally offset by its tendency to compound them.

8.1:4. Forestry: Key Factors

1. Forestry is heavily dependent upon government support and is, therefore, vulnerable to changes in policy.
2. The rationale for continued state support of forestry is very dubious.

3. The social rate of return from forestry is very low.
4. Forestry is vulnerable to technological change from timber product substitution.
5. With timber growing, economies of scale are very important. Economies of scale are also apparent in the timber processing industries.
6. Timber processing is very vulnerable to economic recession and foreign competition.
7. The already low and falling employment rates in forestry will continue to fall as a result of technological advance.
8. The landscape can be harmed through the spread of coniferous forests.
9. The enjoyment of walking can be seriously disrupted by mass afforestation.
10. Rural communities are often vehemently opposed to the encroachment of forestry, as is much of the environment lobby.

8.1:5. Agriculture: Key Factors

1. The trend towards increasing productivity in agriculture will continue due to external pressures upon the industry.
2. The trend will continue to be towards larger farms and fewer farmers.
3. All farms are under pressure to increase their productivity, and this will result in increased specialisation and concentration. Many areas will become increasingly uneconomic in agricultural terms.
4. Agricultural prosperity is increasingly having to be maintained through government intervention.
5. Government support to agriculture can be costly to both tax-payer and consumer; helps create wasteful overproduction; and imbalance in world trade.
6. Reform of agricultural policy to reduce costs appears inevitable. This will undoubtedly reduce the overall prosperity of the agricultural community.
7. The rationale for subsidising uneconomic farms, especially in the Less Favoured Areas has been found wanting. There is a strong case for ending this support.
8. Agricultural policy both seeks to protect and remove the small farmers; a contradiction that has not effectively been worked out.
9. Small farmers are often caught in a poverty trap.
10. Structural policy has not been implemented with appropriate rigour by the MAFF or the EEC to make it effective.
11. The social role of the MAFF is contradictory to its primary aim of increasing agricultural efficiency.
12. Farmers no longer make up the most significant proportion of the rural community.
13. Farmers can no longer in many areas be regarded as the natural conservators of the landscape.

14. Agricultural policy has profound effects upon Britain's land policy.

8.1:6. Conservation: Key Factors

1. The landscape as it exists at present is under threat from agricultural operations.
2. The ecological value of many rural areas is also under threat from agricultural operations.
3. The landscape is also under threat from forestry operations.
4. The landscape directly reflects economic progress in agriculture. As a result of rapid change, much of the traditional British landscape is becoming increasingly historic.
5. The conservation value of rural areas is a major economic asset.
6. The MAFF is not well suited to protecting the conservation value of the countryside as this can contradict its primary purpose of encouraging increased agricultural productivity.
7. There are considerable pressures to develop land in areas of great natural beauty.
8. Attempts to relieve rural deprivation can compromise the planning system.
9. Mass tourism can adversely affect the conservation value of many areas.
10. The conservation value of many areas could be dramatically improved as a result of radical adjustments to agricultural policy.
11. The conservation of agricultural land through restricting urban development is likely to become less important in the future.

8.1:7. Rural Communities: Key Factors

1. Rural communities have been in a state of flux for a considerable period of time, and their basic nature has changed considerably.
2. The rural community, apart from its geographical location, no longer acts as a realistic alternative to urban community life.
3. Rural communities through their geographical location and population size have long accepted lower service levels than their urban counterparts.
4. Flux within communities has engendered continuing decline in service levels.
5. Rural communities have shown considerable flexibility in adjusting to low service levels.
6. Maintaining services in rural areas can be very expensive.
7. Self-help measures are useful tools with which to counteract the decline in service levels.
8. Attempting to stop social change by maintaining service levels can in itself perpetuate existing problems.

9. Migrants into rural areas can make a positive contribution to rural community life.
10. Attempts to help the disadvantaged in rural areas can in some circumstances compromise the planning system.

8.1:8. Major Road Developments and the Agricultural Community: Key Factors

1. The planning, construction and compensation stages of road developments, are long and costly, and farmers find them very difficult to administer.
2. Planners attempt to find the most favourable route in engineering and cost terms; the agricultural interest is of secondary importance in the planning process.
3. MAFF involvement in ameliorating individual farmers' problems is minimal.
4. Planners themselves as a general rule do not fully understand the problems facing farmers.
5. Construction teams aim to complete the road construction as quickly as possible and this can disadvantage the farming interest.
6. Compensation negotiations are often unnecessarily slow.
7. Many of the problems that emerge as a result of road developments can be ameliorated by better pre-planning and organisation on the part of the farmer; and greater respect for the farmer on the part of the other agencies involved.
8. Although farmers are advised to employ Land Agents to help them through their problems, they are often not experienced in the tasks they are given.
9. If farmers view road developments as major opportunities, they may gain economically to a great extent.
10. There are considerable benefits for the planners, construction companies, and the District Valuer in developing a better relationship with farmers.
11. Although farmers do have a certain amount of power during road developments, this diminishes corresponding to the size of the holding.
12. Farmers are often treated with a lack of consideration during road developments, especially with regard to being taken into the planning system and provided at an early date with appropriate information.
13. If farmers are taken into the planning system and treated with respect by the agencies involved, significant material and psychological benefits can accrue.
14. It is essential that farmers respond immediately to proposed road developments, and that planners and contractors are made aware of the potential problems that can arise.
15. Even minor problems can create serious physical damage to farms, and psychological damage to farmers.
16. As these problems are imposed by the state upon farmers, it is to be expected that it would regard itself as having a duty to protect them. To date this has been far from apparent.

8.2:1. Rural Problems in Cumbria

This section deals with the conclusions reached as a result of the specific field research in Cumbria. The recommendations give an indication of how, in the light of the research, the various official bodies developing and implementing policies could respond under the constraints of present policy.

8.2:2. Industry in Cumbria

The research has indicated, that the scope for rural industry to be a major development force is extremely limited. The county already has an oversupply of industrial space both in urban and rural areas. Regional policy has not shown itself to be effective in resolving the problems of west Cumbria, even after large sums of money have been spent, both directly on industry and improving service provision such as roads. Those factors which have counted against industrial growth in west Cumbria are likely to impede rural development in the county. Indeed it can be argued, that an increase in industrial space in rural Cumbria will create competition with west Cumbria and result in further urban deprivation and underuse of facilities already funded by the state.

The economic potential of rural industry to be viable in its own terms, is in severe doubt, and needless to say this is one reason why the state has had to take the lead in development initiatives. Even so, the potential net benefit of these state sponsored schemes to rural communities, even if they were successful, which they are often not, must be in doubt. The larger schemes can create additional pressures upon the limited housing stock, while the smaller ones have a negligible effect upon local employment prospects and service use. Schemes also take up land in villages and towns which could be used for housing.

Problems of dependence and exploitation have already been noted in Chapter Two, as well as the vulnerability of small industries. Even those industries based upon tourism and timber, two local resources, are not necessarily competitive with producers in other areas and are vulnerable to recession. It is interesting to note

that the Lowther sawmills rely to a considerable extent upon timber imported from outside the area.

Apart from the economic constraints upon the expansion of industrial development within Cumbria, there is the added problem that rural industrialisation is not popular with rural communities themselves. These communities are concerned that any industrial development within their midst will have a negative effect upon the environment. It is often thought by the planning authorities, that the main criticism comes from middle class "incomers", as those who move into rural areas often appear to place a greater value upon amenity than the indigenous population. Even though this has not been proved, it has already been indicated that "incomers" have a valuable role to play in rural life, and that their presence and actions should not be seen as harmful to it. The views of local communities should not, and generally are not, disregarded by planning authorities, as they are an integral part of the planning process. Their vigilance and actions help protect the Cumbrian countryside from developments which will undermine its pleasant character.

Recommendations

1. Planning authorities within Cumbria, should continue to resist industrial development in rural areas where it will have an adverse effect upon the environment; where it will create housing problems; where it will increase service costs; and where it is strongly resisted by the local community.
2. Industrial development should not be viewed as a useful means of creating employment or wealth in rural Cumbria and officially supported or sponsored local initiatives to encourage it should be reviewed.

8.2:3. Tourism in Rural Cumbria

Although tourism makes a significant contribution to the Cumbrian economy, the industry itself has been in a state of decline since 1974. As a result of this there now exists a position of oversupply of accommodation, in particular serviced accommodation. The very hostile environment in which tourism operates within the county and the limited returns the investor is likely to achieve, no doubt will deter further private investment, apart from large scale speculative self-catering

schemes. This in itself will limit the prospects for employment growth in the area based on the industry.

The employment profile overall, with regard to the already established industry, is unimpressive. The dramatic rise in self-catering provision, coupled with the decline in the serviced market, must have had an already significant effect upon employment in tourism, especially in the economically vulnerable urban areas. This disturbing trend, as has already been noted, has to some extent been underwritten by Tourist Board grants.

The scope for the indigenous population to benefit from tourist developments is very much in question. Many local people will be deterred from entering the industry as it is high risk, profits are often small, and, especially for the most vulnerable of the community, capital, expertise and motivation are often lacking. Indeed it is fortunate that those prepared to invest under UMEX 3, eventually failed to do so, realising the problems involved. Work within the industry itself is seasonal, poorly paid, and as shown by Riley (1973), unpopular with locals, while the increase in self-catering will no doubt reduce the amount of money spent in the area, and thereby also reduce the number of subsidiary jobs. The problems facing the small tourist enterprise will no doubt be compounded by the fact that economies of scale are real within the industry. In respect of this they will forever be on the margin when compared to the likes of Lowther Caravan Park.

Pressures within Cumbria for permission to develop tourist facilities tend to come from the larger operator. However, such large developments do not necessarily fit into the landscape, social or service patterns of the area. They also tend to have only a minor effect upon employment. Encouraging tourism generally tends to help the large provider of accommodation rather than the small, and the large scale developments that ensue can undermine not only the spirit of the National Park, but also the intrinsic beauty of those areas outside it. The adverse effects of mass tourism upon the environment have already been indicated. Any further increases in tourist activity, especially in the area of the central lakes is something to be strongly resisted.

The relaxation of development control policies with regard to tourist enterprises, will not only irrevocably damage the most spectacular and nationally important areas of Cumbria, but will undermine the whole amenity of the area, which in reality is a great economic strength. The danger not only comes from large schemes, but many of the smaller sporadic schemes as proposed during the Whitbarrow Exercise, can be as equally damaging to the environment. Both the LDSPB and the other development control authorities within Cumbria have recognised this, and have maintained a strong position against the further increase of facilities. The balance already achieved, and it is a tenuous one, must not be tipped by any relaxation or liberalisation of planning control; even at the expense of short-term benefits to the local community.

Recommendations

1. There must clearly be some doubt over the overall utility of grants to tourist enterprises within Cumbria. While all funding cannot be halted at local level, it is strongly recommended that grants are given with more discretion. This will entail helping those areas of the industry most under threat, and most beneficial to the local economy, namely serviced accommodation, and enterprises within urban areas, at the expense of self-catering, and those enterprises developed on a part-time basis.
2. Local authorities throughout Cumbria, should maintain a strong stance against allowing tourist development in environmentally sensitive areas.
3. The environmental problems created by mass tourism could be controlled more easily by ensuring greater co-ordination between the Cumbria Tourist Board and Cumbria County Council. Although Cumbria Tourist Board receives financial assistance from a number of sources, the County Council is by far the largest individual source. It is, therefore, recommended that the County Council ensures that the Cumbria Tourist Board takes full account of structure plan policies in order to ensure more effective policy making.
4. It is strongly recommended that tourism is no longer viewed as a useful tool with which to significantly improve the prosperity of rural areas. All local initiatives based upon, or including tourism as an employment or wealth generator should be reviewed.

8.2:4. Agriculture in Cumbria

Cumbria's agriculture is primarily livestock based, reliant upon dairy, beef and sheep production. The prosperity of farming varies considerably according to geographical factors. The structure of Cumbria's agriculture has been undergoing considerable change, in line with national trends. The result of this has been a general increase in farm size, with a reduction in the number of farmers and farm workers. This in its turn has meant a decrease in local job opportunities, and a decline in the importance of the agricultural community in rural community life. Under present agricultural conditions, with a continuing emphasis upon productivity, this trend is likely to continue, although the rate of change will be largely dependent upon government policies.

The section of the farming community which suffers most as a result of the push for increased productivity is the small farmer. Recognising this, there have been attempts to ease his situation by encouraging him to diversify his activities away from farming. However, these have largely failed, and he remains as much under pressure now as he ever was.

Change within agriculture is having effects upon the environment. These are most noticeable in upland Cumbria where many landscape features which resulted from labour intensive agricultural activities, are now showing signs of what is often termed "dereliction". In the lowlands, where intensification of production is taking place, hedges are being removed, drainage is being improved, new farm buildings are being constructed, and increased fertiliser, pesticide and herbicide application is altering the ecological balance. Yet, because of the very small acreage devoted to cereals, it is doubtful whether these changes are as significant as those recorded in eastern and southern England. A form of planning control over agricultural operations already exists in the National Park, where the LDSPB inspect all applications for grants for agricultural improvements. This system works very well, although it must be remembered that the LDSPB recognises the importance of farming to the present landscape pattern, and the main conservation problems do not result from agricultural intensification. There is, however, a danger that if

planning control was extended to the lowlands, it could detrimentally upset the relative prosperity of the industry in an already vulnerable economy.

A more dangerous threat to Cumbria's agriculture derives from the fact that its most prosperous sector, dairy farming, is producing products that are already in surplus within the EEC, and are placing the greatest burden upon the Community budget. Any radical attempts by the EEC to reform the CAP in order to remove over-production in this sphere, will undoubtedly have effects upon the prosperity of Cumbria's agriculture. Upland farming is also very vulnerable to changes in agricultural policy, with any removal of subsidies effectively ending most agricultural operations in the hills. However, at present there are no demands for a cut in expenditure in Less Favoured Areas, even though it is of little community value, and damaging in some respects to the environment.

Recommendations

1. Agriculture should not be relied upon to maintain population and service levels rural communities, as it is extremely vulnerable to change; of little general community value; and increasingly damaging to the environment.
2. Attempts should not be made to help farmers economically against long term national and international trends. This means that part-time farming, or other activities ancillary to farming should not be actively encouraged.
3. While some degree of planning control over agricultural operations appears to work satisfactorily within the National Park, there is a clear need for local authorities to have greater powers to control farm buildings, both within and without the National Park. This should be pressed for by all Cumbria's planning authorities at national level.

8.2:5. Forestry in Cumbria

The research has indicated that the scope for forestry as a resource use, and as a social and economic tool within Cumbria is extremely limited. Employment within the industry itself is not high, and is likely to fall as a result of increased productivity. Timber processing industries are currently under great strain as a result of world economic conditions and the lack of competitiveness shown in Britain. Forestry itself is heavily dependent upon state support, and the basic premises of a forestry policy within Britain have been questioned. As a result of this there can be little doubt that as an industry, forestry is extremely vulnerable, and its long term future both with regard to government financing and changing patterns of demand for timber products is uncertain.

Of more importance within Cumbria however, is the fact that there are strong environmental pressures restraining forestry's spread. The 1936 Agreement, limits the area available for planting, and outside this there is a general antagonism against further intrusion by forestry. Although local authorities do not have planning control over forestry operations, there is a consultative procedure which they are party to, which may prevent incongruous plantings. At the same time well organised opposition from powerful pressure groups such as the Friends of the Lake District, can create serious difficulties for the potential planter. However, this concern over the effects of planning is not unwarranted, nor should it be seen as anti-social. The spread of conifers in the area, even with sensitive planting measures detracts from its visual and recreational amenity, an important economic and national resource. It is only through the action of such groups that the area has not already been denuded of its natural attraction by afforestation.

Recommendations

1. Forestry should not be encouraged in Cumbria to fulfil social requirements, either through employment creation or integration with agriculture.
2. Local authorities within Cumbria should press strongly to bring forestry operations under planning control.

8.2:6. Rural Conservation in Cumbria

Cumbria is a county renowned for its considerable natural beauty. The most spectacular area is undoubtedly the National Park, although it should not be assumed that the rest of Cumbria is necessarily of secondary conservation importance. A strong conservation policy needs to be maintained outside the National Park, not only because it is complementary to the Park, but because in a highly urbanised country such as Britain, such unspoiled lowland scenery needs to be protected.

In terms of agriculture, lowland Cumbria has been largely untouched by the spread of cereal farming witnessed elsewhere in Britain. This in itself has meant that the landscape has not been subject to the dramatic changes evident elsewhere. Even so, some damage is caused by chemical applications on farms, and drainage schemes, yet not enough to merit widespread concern at present. However, a major anomaly does lie in the fact that farm buildings are beyond planning control. As modern farm buildings can have a significant impact upon the landscape, there can be no doubt that planning authorities, especially within the National Park ought to have more control over the siting of farm buildings. There is of course the argument that if planners start to interfere with the agricultural work pattern, then they may help undermine the industry. Yet it has been shown that the National Park authorities are very concerned to protect farming and the local people dependent upon it. Undoubtedly they will be able to maintain a balance between agricultural prosperity and the local and national demands of the Park.

All of this being said the major conservation concern within Cumbria is without doubt, the decline of farming within the upland region. It has long been recognised that the reason for this decline is primarily economic. However, attempts to solve the economic problems of farming have failed, and as the research indicates, it is unlikely that they will ever achieve any success. The research shows farming does to some extent, help preserve the relatively "neat" scenery of upland Cumbria. Yet, the present landscape is not the only alternative open to the planner. A long term solution to the problem (and conservation is

essentially a long term ideal), would be to let the present trends take their course. Under present agricultural policies, this trend is occurring anyway, and there does not appear any sign of a change in direction. Because of this, it appears more apt for the LDSPB to concentrate less upon maintaining the present environment, and create a more flexible approach recognising inevitable long term trends.

The pressures for development within rural Cumbria, especially in and around the National Park are very strong, and the planning authorities have been firm in resisting them. Within the National Park a balance between the conflicting demands has largely been met. The danger now lies, not so much in the further strengthening of development policies, but in demands for their relaxation. The LDSPB could allow increased development of tourist and full time accommodation, and this in the short term may alleviate some social problems. Yet such an action would not completely solve the plight of the most underprivileged; would undermine the area's amenity value and therefore its prosperity; and would seriously affect Cumbria's role in the nation's conservation strategy. Clearly no relaxation of planning law should be considered. This applies not only to the large schemes, whose adverse effects are well known, but also to the smaller ones, which can also seriously undermine the conservation value of the Park.

Recommendations

1. The present tight planning controls in the National Park, and those areas under development pressure, should be maintained and if necessary strengthened.
2. Planning authorities, especially in the National Park should no longer view the present farmed landscape, as the only one acceptable. There are numerous alternatives available, and it can be argued that a decline in farming, which is essentially the long term trend, if accompanied by a flexible but positive approach to landscape planning, can result in a far more attractive, varied and rich environment than the present. It is, therefore, strongly recommended that the National Park authority makes plans as to how it is to deal with the inevitable decline in upland farming in landscape terms, indicating where significant change will take place; where some landscape management is needed; and the funds and powers that would be required to do this.
3. The planning system which is satisfactorily resisting large scale developments, must ensure that small scale developments which create environmental problems, are not allowed, even if they are designed to help the local community.

8.2:7. Rural Communities in Cumbria

The concern over the plight of the Indigenous rural population of Cumbria, is as well developed within the county as elsewhere in Britain. This concern has been reflected by the local authorities, the MAFF, the Countryside Commission and various other agencies with an interest in rural affairs. It has been well recognised that the problems rural communities face, emanate from a poor economic base, and concerted efforts have been made to solve them. Yet in spite of this, very little success has been achieved, and the research indicates that little can be expected in the future.

This of course confronts the policy maker in Cumbria with a dilemma. On the one hand he feels a commitment to help the disadvantaged in rural areas, while on the other he faces a situation apparently impossible for him to redress. However, a long term commitment to helping the disadvantaged in rural Cumbria following a similar pattern to "success through development" policies, will undoubtedly result in poor policy making, as policy will not be shaped to fit irreversible trends; compromise the planning system; create additional local and national expenditure; and the prolongation of what could be essentially short term problems into the long term.

Rural areas are responding to structural changes within the national and local economy and in so doing, are playing a new role in national life. This trend within Cumbria is already well developed especially in the National Park. It has been shown that the spread of retirement, commuter and second homes is not something to be regarded as necessarily undesirable. However, commentators such as Newby (1979), indicate that certain short term problems do exist, if only at the level of conflict between local culture and the new values of the "incomers". Yet in this battle the losers are already marked. To seek to bolster their position is not only destined to long term defeat, but also to an unnecessarily long continuance of existing problems and the commitment of more public money.

This is not to say that some short term measures to help those in real need are undesirable, particularly if they are inexpensive and do not compromise the

planning system. In this respect community action, such as car-sharing schemes are inexpensive and help rural communities to overcome what are essentially short term transitional problems by flexible short term measures.

Recommendations

1. The official bodies which have taken an interest in rural community affairs, should recognise that the trends recorded in past years are largely irreversible. The conditions which created this situation appear beyond solution in the market economy. Clearly it would be misguided to expect any significant success from ventures to improve the rural economy, and consequently local governmental bodies should be cautious before involving themselves with them.
2. Local authorities should accept that there is little merit in maintaining rural communities in their current condition. They should continue their run-down of local services such as primary schools and public transport on a cost basis, without being dissuaded by vociferous pressure groups. It is also recommended that a re-examination should take place of all rural service costs within the county, with a view to the future removal of the most heavily subsidised. However, if rural communities do wish to retain services under threat of closure, the opportunity should be given for them to pay the additional cost. This could be through the individual user, or a parish rate. Greater encouragement should be given by local authorities to community initiatives to replace or complement existing services. Funds should be made available to help those enterprises where it can be proved they significantly benefit the local community, and reduce overall local authority expenditure.
- 4* . Local authorities should not alter their present policy of only limited construction of public housing in rural areas. Local authorities should only pursue public housing where it is necessary to do so in order to fulfil their statutory duties. The development of Housing Associations should not be encouraged except to aid the local authority in its statutory duties. Within the National Park, Section 52 Agreements are of only very limited effect. However, they do create an unfortunate illusion that something can be done to reverse the housing problems in rural areas, and do interfere with the natural adjustment process. It is recommended that they are now abandoned.
5. All developments in rural areas should meet strict environmental standards, and should not increase service costs significantly. If they do the latter, the developer should be required to pay all the extra costs.

8.3:1. Rural Problems in Britain

The research has indicated that there is scope for a major redirection of Britain's rural policy. This section considers the major conclusions found during the research period, and how they can be used to formulate a new rural policy. The

*NB. The Section 52 Agreement was deleted from the Cumbria and Lake District Joint Structure Plan by the Secretary of State for the Environment, Patrick Jenkin in December 1983, after concluding that it was not desirable to seek restrictions to control the disposal of private houses.

recommendations for the application of rural policy within Cumbria under present policy constraints, largely indicate a continuation of present trends. Yet it is these trends which many observers find unsatisfactory. The research has shown that there is little scope for the state to improve economic conditions in those rural communities most seriously affected by rural deprivation, and that to even consider that solutions do exist means that rural policy may be seriously misguided, and lose its effectiveness. It is strongly recommended that rural policy should attempt to encapsulate this change and direct itself to at once harnessing its effects and ameliorating the worst problems that accrue as a result of it.

There is clearly, within the rest of rural Britain a tremendous scope for the reform of rural policy, and the recommendations suggested provide a possible redirection of government action. The recommendations made here reflect as much a line of thought, or attitude towards the highly complex problem of rural policy, as a series of firm recommendations. The policy maker however, must always keep in mind the fact that rural areas can differ considerably from one another, even in the space of a few miles, and that flexibility is the key to good rural policy formulation.

8.3:2. Policy Recommendations: Rural Industrialisation

The research has indicated that there are significant problems associated with the development of industry in rural areas. Those factors which are of primary importance include the fact that those rural areas which require state industrial assistance are usually structurally weak, with little attraction for relocating industry. The industries that are attracted are often unsatisfactory in the type of employment they offer, vulnerable to closure, and usually bring few benefits to the local community. These industries can also create conservation problems and are often virulently opposed by the local community. Taking these and other factors into account, the following recommendations are made:-

1. Before sponsoring a rural industrial development scheme the public funding body should be required to produce an impact analysis indicating:-

- a) The effect of the scheme upon the environment.
 - b) The effect of the scheme upon local service costs and the availability of housing.
 - c) The likelihood of uptake of factory units.
 - d) The type of industry that is likely to be attracted.
 - e) The type and level of employment to be created, and how this relates to local need.
 - f) The social effect on nearby rural areas, i.e. does it compound migration problems in other rural settlements.
 - g) The effect upon other employment creation ventures in the area, whether rural or urban.
2. The sponsoring body should only finance the larger industrialisation scheme, employing a high ratio of local people. While it is important to allow a certain amount of flexibility in rural policy implementation, a benchmark could be a minimum of ten employees with nine of these residing in the local area for five or more years. Further research should be aimed at discovering the optimum local employment level in each firm for the social well being of communities. The sponsoring body should not aim to subsidise "incomers" to the rural area, except in the special circumstances described in Section 8.3:6. part 3.
 3. The sponsoring body should seek to receive a commercial return upon investment; the state has already taken a financial risk in providing premises without being assured of them being occupied. The state should not, except in special circumstances, invest in fundamentally unprofitable areas.
 4. Local authorities should continue to encourage private capital to develop sites where they see fit. However, planning requirements should not be relaxed simply to encourage industrial development.

8.3:3. Policy Recommendations: The Development of Tourism in Rural Areas

The research has indicated that the scope for tourism to alleviate rural problems is extremely limited, indeed in some circumstances the encouragement of tourism can compound existing problems. Tourism is a structurally weak industry, vulnerable to economic recession and providing increasingly limited employment opportunities. At present, given the information recorded in the research, there is a strong disincentive for investment in the industry. Added to this, tourism can create serious environmental problems, especially in areas of high scenic value. Taking these, and other factors illuminated in the research into account, the following recommendations are made:-

1. Before any grant for a tourist venture is made, the local Tourist Board should carry out an impact study considering:-

- a) The effect of the scheme upon the environment.
 - b) The effect of new developments upon the existing tourist industry, especially in relation to present accommodation supply.
 - c) The type and level of employment likely to be created, and the degree of benefit to the local community in terms of employment creation.
2. The Tourist Boards should only concentrate upon subsidising development where a proven undersupply of accommodation exists, or where local authorities feel they wish to encourage tourist development in order to relieve congestion in other areas. The Tourist Boards should concentrate upon providing advice and improving costs, quality, profit and turnover in existing establishments, and should only subsidise self-catering schemes in very special circumstances. The Tourist Boards should move away from the grant system, to supplying loans at a commercial rate.
 3. Consideration should be made of fully integrating local authorities and the local Tourist Boards, with the former being given control over the latter, thus ensuring Tourist Board activities adequately complement structure plan requirements.
 4. The Town and Country Planning system should continue to resist the demands of mass tourism where they conflict with conservation objectives. Planning authorities should not be encouraged to relax control procedures for the smaller scheme as these can be just as harmful to the environment as the larger operation, even though they may be of some limited value to the local community.

8.3:4. Policy Recommendations: Forestry

The research has indicated that forestry has only a limited role to play in ameliorating the socio-economic problems of rural areas. Employment levels are both low and falling, and serious environmental problems are often created by it in many scenic areas. More important than this, a number of studies have indicated that the state subsidisation of forestry represents a misallocation of national economic resources. On the basis of these and other factors, the following recommendations are made:-

1. The government should keep under constant review the economic benefits of state forestry, and if necessary, have the political will to carry out radical changes within the support system, even to the extent of dismantling both the Forestry Commission, and grant and tax incentives to private investors.
2. Finance should not be available for the integration of upland farming and forestry, as this represents an expensive dual subsidisation, without serious long term viability.
3. Funds for the promulgation of conservation orientated schemes, especially those regarding hardwoods should continue to be made available to local authorities and individuals. These funds should be under the control of the Department of the Environment, and should be given to encourage regeneration in areas where the worst effects of resource exploitation exist.

8.3:5. Policy Recommendations: Agriculture

Agriculture is undoubtedly the major economic land use in rural areas, and changes within its structure have significant effects upon most aspects of rural policy. The research has illuminated the severe pressures upon the agricultural industry, which will result in a continuing emphasis upon productivity, and the need to contain the cost of national financial support. The long term trend will be towards fewer and larger farms, and less employment in the industry. There will also be pressures to reduce state expenditure on agriculture, and a subsequent reduction in the social welfare aspect of policy, with efforts to reduce the number of farmers through economic pressure, or renewed structural policies.

As these are the general long term trends, rural policy should be tailored to take account of them. The following policy recommendations indicate how agricultural policy can be made more compatible with changes that are likely to take place in the economic structure of agriculture itself. The recommendations are as follows:-

1. The CAP will over the next decade, be subject to considerable reform. The government should press for increased national responsibility for agriculture within an EEC framework to enable costs to be kept to a minimum, and agricultural policy to fit more in line with national rural policy.
2. Increased agricultural productivity will further reduce customer costs and the amount of land used for agriculture; because of this it is strongly recommended that increased productivity remains the primary objective of agricultural policy.
3. There should be no long term commitment to supporting agriculture on social grounds. This includes farmers in Less Favoured Areas.
4. Capital grants should only be provided where it is certain that that which is produced as a result, will be in line with market prices and not in its turn create an extra financial burden on the nation.
5. A vigorous structural policy should be implemented to remove uneconomic farmers humanely, and increase productivity, rather than solely rely upon the pressures of the market. Targets on the number of farmers to be removed should be set, and the MAFF required to meet them. An example of how this can be done in Less Favoured Areas, is set out below.

There are some 44,000 farmers receiving Less Favoured Area support in Britain, at a cost of £127.3 million (1982). If the government say, wished the removal of 5 per cent of farmers per annum, with the inducement of a £30,000

"golden handshake", this would require £66 million per annum. £32.1 million of this could be obtained from halting capital grants in these areas, £2.1 million from halting agricultural rural development programmes, and a 5 per cent reduction in production grants (headage payments), to take account of those farmers leaving production. This makes a total of £39 million. An additional £25 million could then be taken from the £88 million headage subsidies, resulting in a 28 per cent fall in total paid out. This would act as a "squeeze factor" in inducing farmers to leave farming. Changes in this system could be made to make extra funds available if thought necessary. At the end of say a 20 year period, then all agricultural support would be ended. This theoretical exercise shows how the removal of upland farmers could take place humanely and relatively expensively. No doubt variation on this technique can be applied in other areas of the agricultural economy. For as Stabler (1975) says:

"Farmers and workers may be too old, insufficiently educated or trained, and be unwilling to rehabilitate themselves in urban areas... However, the question of which sector can make better use of capital resources when they are reallocated is of more importance. The answer from the evidence referred to above emphatically rules against their use in agriculture".

A general move towards a more market orientated agricultural economy will undoubtedly have its critics. There will be arguments against such a policy on moral, social and economic grounds. To counter these, it can be argued that farmers have received substantial benefits from the state and cannot expect to receive them in perpetuity. Farmers do not have a major long term role to play in rural community life, and continued large scale support for agriculture represents a poor investment of national resources. However, in implementing this policy, the state funded structural reform of landholdings should be of significant importance. For this to work effectively three elements are necessary; first the commitment of MAFF in implementing policy, which can be achieved by setting a quota on the number of farmers to be removed over set periods. Second, is the need for "pull", in the policy, that is to provide positive incentives for farmers to leave the industry either through some form of redundancy payment, or through tax

incentives to sell property; and third a degree of "push" to ensure there is no long term incentive for the fundamentally uneconomic farmer to continue his business.

6. There should be no attempt made to restrict farm holding size, or ownership whether institutional or foreign. However, government should remain vigilant in preventing monopoly and oligopoly in the production of agricultural inputs and the food processing and retailing industries creating disadvantages for the consumer.
7. The state should review agricultural marketing schemes, ensuring that they do not encourage inefficient and expensive production.

8.3:6. Policy Recommendations: Rural Communities

The research undertaken basically points the way for a change in attitude towards rural communities, but not necessarily for change in policy. In a sense policies towards rural communities have taken two paths. On the first there is a recognition of the economic problems facing rural areas, and the corresponding social difficulties that result; attempts have been made to resolve these by economic development and social subsidy. On the second path, local authorities, government supported agencies such as the National Bus Company and central government itself, has recognised the increasing cost of maintaining rural populations in an era of transition and have been seeking to reduce them. These two approaches are contradictory, although the stronger one is the second, if only because of the lack of success of the first.

In attempting to resolve dual purposes, not only are public funds badly invested, but by accepting that there might be some future for the rural community as it exists today, policy does not become adequately tailored towards long term trends. It also engenders an atmosphere in which authorities are obliged to take overdue account of the demands of interested groups such as the Womens' Institute and the CLA.

Once it is accepted that the problems of rural communities are transitional, and that the state is limited in the degree to which it can solve them, then policies can be adjusted to not only maintaining the status quo, but rather to attempting to deal effectively with problems as they occur. Necessarily because of the immense

differences between different rural areas, it would not be correct to lay down strict policies without some degree of flexibility. However, general guidelines can be evolved for those involved in providing support for rural areas to follow. It is on this basis that the following policy recommendations are made:-

1. It should not be taken for granted that rural areas should receive the same level of service provision as urban areas. Policies should not be directed towards achieving comparability, but greater cost effectiveness.
2. A number of studies have shown that rural services can be more expensive to provide than urban ones, and that there are considerable financial benefits to be achieved from settlement concentration (Walford 1969; Norfolk County Council 1976). Walford found that all services including water, telephones and mail could only be provided in dispersed settlements at high costs. Indeed he went on to say: "If relocation really shows a net social benefit, people could possibly be encouraged to move by being offered a compensation equal to the market value of their homes, plus a removal grant". While this appears a little excessive, it should not be assumed that rural areas should receive services subsidised by the rest of the community, except in special circumstances or where the rural community is prepared to make a substantial contribution itself. This includes local authority funded services such as primary schools and public transport, and centrally funded services such as telephones public and private, electricity, water and gas provision. With regard to centrally funded services the major costs will be maintenance. Maintenance of existing facilities should be ensured unless costs are exorbitantly high. Where new development takes place in rural areas which will create service costs above the national average, the developer should be required to pay the additional sum over the national average.
3. Special circumstances where the state should be required to maintain or improve service levels, will include where it may be more expensive to move inhabitants to other areas than provide reasonable services; where communities fulfil an important national role, for example in relation to defence; or where they provide the base for a major form of economic activity such as fishing or mining; or where the community fulfils an important cultural or conservation purpose. These areas should be indicated by local authorities and confirmed by the Department of the Environment as areas requiring special attention.
4. Local authorities should encourage low cost community initiatives to replace or complement existing services. Voluntary action has been noted as being very successful in Cumbria; a trend which should be encouraged, nationwide by the provision of special funds from central government.
5. Evidence indicates that although some degree of deprivation exists in rural communities, it has in the past resolved itself by outmigration. For the worse cases of deprivation local authorities and the social services have a considerable amount of power to alleviate difficulty. While it is not recommended that local authorities significantly increase the supply of public housing beyond that level necessary for them to carry out their statutory duties, it is strongly recommended that a close watch be kept upon groups within communities who may escape the social security net. Vigorous attempts should be made to ensure members of rural communities are fully informed as to their rights as regards state financial support.

8.3:7. Policy Recommendations: Conservation in Rural Areas

The conservation of rural areas is of great importance for a number of reasons, not least of these is that their amenity value is an important economic resource in its own right and represents a recreation resource of unparalleled importance in a predominantly urban nation. The conservation value of rural areas is directly linked to economic pressures exerted upon them by national and international forces, and general government policy, which in itself is often a reflection of these forces at work. It is essential that conservation policy should keep apace with economic developments inside the rural community and the economy in general in order to remain effective in the long term, and it is towards the long term that policy should direct itself. It is in relation to this that the following policy recommendations are made:-

1. With regard to the conflict between agriculture and conservation it should be recognised that agricultural landscapes reflect the economic condition of agriculture at any particular moment. Conservation policy should attempt to accept some change in historic landscapes as inevitable, and evolve long term policies to suit them.
2. With regard to the conflict between agriculture and conservation, it should be recognised that agricultural landscapes reflect an economic activity which in itself is dictated by large impersonal forces beyond its control. Therefore a landscape to a great extent reflects the economic situation at a particular moment in time. Conservation policy should, therefore, accept changes in historic landscapes as inevitable, in order to evolve viable long term policies.
3. The long term trend will inevitably lead to much of Britain becoming agriculturally marginal, while there is likely to be a concentration of activity in agriculturally superior areas. This will mean accepting new forms of landscape different from those erroneously considered "traditionally" British. In the uplands for example, less emphasis should be placed upon a farmed landscape, but rather one in which nature dictates vegetation forms. In some areas, as a result of centuries of exploitation by man, nature may need some assistance if it is to create the optimum landscape and ecological environment. This assistance should be administered by local authorities, allocated funds from the Department of the Environment to carry out their functions. The measures required should preferably take the form of management agreements with landowners, and should include those areas so exploited by man that natural regeneration of trees is impossible; scenic spots where vegetation regeneration is restricted to certain unsightly types due to continued selective grazing, whether by domestic or wild animals; and some areas of high historic scenic value. This form of funding will differ from the recommendations of Sinclair and MacEwen (1983) in that it will be an essentially short term solution to the problems of agricultural deintensification; that it shall only apply to areas where local authorities show a very good case for funding; that it is likely to be much cheaper as grants are not made to farmers for conservation simply because "they are there"; and because real conservation problems are likely to be few because of the ecological and landscape benefits accruing as a result of agricultural

deintensification. Any funding should be seen as attempting to iron out the problems of transition, rather than a new direction of conservation policy itself, and funds should be geared to reflect the limited scope of the policy.

4. In some areas where agricultural intensification takes place, there will continue to be adverse ecological and landscape implications. If agriculture is to become more market orientated, and if many areas therefore achieve significant conservation benefits, then the application of planning controls over such activities as hedgerow removal will increasingly appear unnecessary and anachronistic. Yet this being said, ecological pools such as SSSI's should be strongly protected through the normal planning process, with the extension of management agreements with compensation or through tightening of planning control without compensation, if the cost of management agreements becomes prohibitive.

Farm buildings are one form of farm development that does have a very significant effect upon the landscape, and needs to be brought under some degree of planning control. Yet if the MAFF, as with the housing of farm workers, finds a need for buildings, then this should be accepted by the local authority who will still retain control of siting and design. This should remove a major anomaly in planning law, and should be applied throughout all rural areas.

5. One major problem that will undoubtedly face Britain is the diminishing importance of agricultural land. This will mean that whereas land has been of major importance in restricting development this one barrier will be removed. To meet this challenge the planning system will have to be maintained with a stronger emphasis upon the conservation value of rural areas. This is of special importance in areas of high demand for development in National Parks, AONB's and suburban areas.

The balance between conservation and economic development, as argued in Chapter Six can be best achieved by ensuring democratic participation in the system. One means of achieving this is to make the system more accountable, which requires a great understanding of the planning system by the general public, which itself is an educational problem having its basis in the schools. Second, there needs to be an increased amount of information released upon planning decisions indicating how they have been arrived at. Many have argued for a Freedom of Information Act which will allow the observer to examine material upon which governmental decisions are made, which it is often thought is hidden by certain self-interested groups. Whether this is true or not, if the planning system is to remain credible, then all decisions must be open to more critical inspection. Such legislation would allow the extension of democratic participation in the planning process. Third, there needs to be more research and information made available on the loss of land to development; the level of agriculture activity desirable within Britain, and its relationship to general land use; and the perceived and real social

and economic demands of the nation. This is essentially a call for more information to be available on those policy issues encountered in the planning process, so as to make the system itself not only more aware, but decision making more effective, and subject to closer informed scrutiny

8.3:8. Policy Recommendations: Road Developments and Agriculture

It is normal for major road developments to create significant problems for the agricultural community. However, the research has indicated that many of the difficulties that occur can be prevented. From the examination of two estates, a number of factors were established as being of considerable importance in determining the success, from the agricultural viewpoint, of a road development. These factors included the size and layout of the estate; the level of commitment of the estate owner to protecting his interests; the commitment and expertise of the estate surveyors; the economic nature of the estate; the degree to which the estate is taken into the planning process; and the relationships held with both planners and contractors.

Once these factors have been isolated, there exists the scope for increasing state intervention to ease the plight of the majority of landowners who suffer adversely during road developments. At present the state only takes a minor ameliorative role, as seen at the Whitbarrow Conference, the MAFF holds the view it is not their role, to carry out essentially private work on reducing the worst effects of road developments. The MAFF is prepared to consider such matters as accommodation bridges and their setting, but not to enter into the greater detail of more intricate and personal problems, which as we have seen, usually create the greatest difficulties. In a sense the MAFF is correct in taking this stance, as they would not like to get involved in controversial argument with another government department. It may also seem wrong for them to engage in work which land agents have considered as their own.

However, strong arguments against this stand do exist. First, the government has often made it clear, that it is the duty of governmental agencies to protect British agriculture whenever possible. Second, the agricultural community is usually forced to accept public development schemes against its will, often with great psychological stress to themselves and physical damage to their business. In respect of this, there is a duty on the part of public bodies to ensure that those developments that do take place, are carried out with as little disruption as possible to the lives of those affected. Third, an efficient road development can be financially lucrative for all those involved, planners, contractors, farmers, and the nation, with less compensation to pay.

Therefore, on sound moral, administrative and financial grounds there is a good case for greater governmental involvement in ameliorating the worst effects of public developments. Yet the question has to be asked, what form should the governmental involvement take. First, it is quite clear from past experience that road planners and contractors are not as amenable to the agriculture interest as is necessary. Added to this, for many farmers, there are tremendous cultural and educational barriers between them and the road development teams, which severely restricts communication and therefore the opportunity for mutual understanding and respect between the various parties. Both gas and road development contractors have hired "trouble-shooters" to ease the passage of developments, through agricultural land, but verbal evidence appears to suggest that there is a tendency for these people to act as a public relations front, not acting specifically in the interests of the agricultural community. Second, the ability of individual land agents to successfully negotiate a road development through the various stages must be suspect. At Lowther, an already highly experienced team carried out a great deal of preliminary research, before the final road planning stage started. Then, during the planning and construction period, the estate's team were engaged for a substantial period of their time in planning negotiations and observing; indeed, the total correspondence for the Penrith By-Pass, weighs some $2\frac{1}{2}$ stones. It cannot be assumed that the ordinary land agent will have the time, technical ability or commitment, to enter into such a

comprehensive approach as did Lowther. The problems of relying on an ordinary land agent have been seen at Whitbarrow; a great many of the problems that accrue during a road development scheme, can be laid not only at the feet of the planners and contractors, but also the land agents involved.

Seeing that neither road development teams or ordinary land agents can effectively take into consideration the agricultural interest, there appears a very major role for the MAFF to play. The first major advantage the MAFF has over other bodies in this respect, is that it is in regular contact with the farming community, understands them, and is trusted by them more than any other governmental organisation. Second, within the Lands Division, the MAFF has a number of highly qualified and experienced staff who both understand the problems of farmers and the dynamics of a road development. Third, they have a good knowledge, not only of the land over which a road would pass, but also the social fabric of that area. To fulfil a valuable service for the agricultural community need not be expensive. One man in an advisory role can easily cover a particular stretch of road development as roads are usually only constructed in stages of 10-20 miles in length.

The task can form part of an extended socio-economic advisory service. The one-man operation must be flexible, with the socio-economic adviser being free from local control, accountable only to headquarters. It is preferable however, to recruit people from within a region, who have a good understanding of its physical and social fabric. Once chosen for a specific scheme, the detailed remit of the adviser should be as follows:-

1. To ensure that the voice and interest of the farming community is taken into effective consideration during the planning, construction and operation of a major highway development.
2. To make contact with, and develop a working relationship with all farmers and the planning and construction teams involved in a highway development.
3. To actively participate in the planning of the highway, attempting to ameliorate problems that might occur for the farming community.
4. To make in-depth reports, on the nature and problems of individual holdings, recording the concerns of the landholder, and noting the social background of the farmers involved, indicating potential sources of concern, especially with regard to the capacity of individuals to respond effectively to the problems and opportunities that emerge during a highway development.

5. The socio-economic adviser, with the aid of other MAFF divisions, shall draw up a schedule of improvements that can be made on each individual holding, both to ameliorate the effects of the highway development, and to take advantage of the presence of surplus men and equipment on site. This will involve the drawing up of detailed accommodation works for each individual holding.
6. The socio-economic adviser shall encourage those farmers who have badly severed holdings, fragmented holdings and those on the verge of retirement to abandon agriculture as a profession. Special funds should be made available to encourage farmers to leave their holding and for the state to purchase it. This land can then be sold to the remaining farmers, in order to improve their farm structure.
7. The socio-economic adviser shall inform the road planners and contractors of the socio-economic problems of the farming community in the vicinity of their operations.
8. The socio-economic adviser shall be situated on the construction site, and shall supervise all construction; he will have the authority to halt all operations, which are not being carried out with due concern for the interests of the landowner or tenant.
9. The adviser shall maintain continuous contact with the landowners and farmers, keeping them informed of the operations being carried out, and taking account of, and expressing their worries to the planners and contractors.
10. The adviser shall note the opportunity the farming community has in providing the contractors with goods and services. He shall encourage the contractor to take advantage of these wherever possible, in order to engender a spirit of co-operation.
11. It will be the role of the socio-economic adviser to arrange sites for tips, drainage outlets, temporary leases etc. In doing this he will ensure that the appropriate accommodation and restoration works are carried out, and that the landowner and tenant receives a fair price.
12. The socio-economic adviser shall liaise directly with the landowner and tenants, over matters of compensation. Using his own discretion, and taking into account the feelings of the landowners and tenants, he shall draw up fair compensation figures which shall be then handed to the District Valuer as a base from which to work. Given the appropriate permission from the individuals concerned, he may negotiate directly with the District Valuer. This will not remove the right for individuals to enter into private negotiations with the District Valuer, nor their representatives; nor will it prejudice their right of appeal.
13. The landowner and tenant shall not be obliged to take advantage of the service of the socio-economic adviser, and may restrict his access to their land, if they so wish.

The suggested advisory service will not only remove many of the problems that face agricultural communities during road developments, but will make the development process more efficient and democratic. It will also strengthen the hand of those farmers isolated and alone, who do not have the umbrella of an estate such as

Lowther to rely upon. It will ensure that the long term rights of the farming community are maintained against the short term demands of planners and contractors.

The example given here refers to road developments. However, there is no reason why a similar approach could not be taken with regard to other major developments such as gas pipelines, power stations, airport extensions and the like. While the policy recommendation indicated above would undoubtedly resolve most of the problems experienced during any public development on agricultural land, there may be some difficulties peculiar to various types of development apart from road developments, which need researching before a more general detailed role can be ascribed for the MAFF.

8.4. General Conclusions

The recommendations made in this chapter do not represent a radical new alternative to the seemingly intractable problems of rural areas, but the logical extension of present policy. While there is a need for government intervention and concern in most aspects of rural life, the government should only become involved in any aspect of society, where it can make a meaningful contribution. In the case of road developments, the net benefits of increased government involvement are clearly apparent, yet the benefits of government involvement, and inevitably expenditure, in attempting to rejuvenate rural economics are more opaque. Where even within their own criteria government policies are found to be inadequate or fundamentally unsound, then logic must determine they are radically altered.

The scope of the research was essentially derived from the demands of MAFF to consider a wide range of rural problems, and how they affected one fairly small agricultural estate. The results, however, are not totally applicable to them, as although they are one of the prime movers in rural affairs, and they do share to a considerable extent the role of policy formulation and implementation with many other government bodies. The research indicates that there is little scope for a

diversification of MAFF's activities into taking a wider social perspective in policy making, indeed, a gradual withdrawal from this aspect of agricultural policy would be beneficial to the national interest. Yet there is significant scope for the MAFF to protect the individual landowner from injustice, and the unnecessary problems usually experienced during road and other public developments.

The Whitbarrow Exercise itself has indicated that there is a need for a greater interchange of information between the various groups interested in rural affairs, and similar exercises should be encouraged on a regular basis. Yet this being said, the requirement for a specific umbrella body to co-ordinate all movers in rural affairs, must appear unwarranted. The term "rural area" is simply a rather cumbersome geographical expression; to imagine that it implies the need for a single department to administer it is to be fundamentally misguided. Most governmental bodies roles specifically suit their functions, and although the present framework has its faults, the divisions of interests appears to reflect adequately the diversity of rural affairs, and the interplay between them, even if it often appears to be conflict orientated, is an integral part of the democratic system. Indeed, it can be argued that many of the contradictions apparent in rural affairs, appear to stem directly from unnecessary governmental intervention.

How significant the withdrawal of governmental interests from those activities where its actions are no longer effective, is essentially a political decision. The scope for a more radical re-appraisal of governmental initiatives than indicated in this chapter is clearly significant. Yet, the application of radical rural policies, cannot be carried out without censure from the numerous interests involved in rural life, clearly a difficult, but not an impossible problem for the rural policy maker to overcome.

APPENDIX 1

LONGSLEDDALE: A CASE STUDY

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1A. Introduction

The valley of Longsleddale lies six miles north of Kendal off the A6, as seen in Map 1A. The single track road follows the River Sprint for part of its way through the valley, winding along the valley floor with few passing places where drivers can pull in. The road passes farm buildings, holiday homes, derelict barns, broadleaved woodlands, poorly planned forest plantations, and an increasingly untidy landscape of unrepaired stone walls and spreading scrub.

The first description of Longsleddale occurs in May 1717, which mentions the fact that the road through the valley was popular with cattle drovers (Kendal Library 1717). Increased interest in the Lake District as a tourist area, and a focus for the new romanticism came in the nineteenth century, when one writer described Longsleddale:

"Verdant fields rise from each side of the rivulet in irregular swells till the rocky structure of the mountain precludes all cultivation except brushwood and coppices, which climb up steep banks and in some places find support even in the crags, which present their lofty and rugged fruits with much grandeur".
(Parson and White 1829).

Another description comes in 1867 with the parish being described as having:

"No village of its own name, but there are two hamlets Stockdale and Sadgill, the former containing two and the latter three houses". (Murray 1867).

In 1930 John Somervell published a book entitled "Water Power Mills of South Westmorland" in which he said:

"The wonderful and as yet unspoiled beauty of Longsleddale is attractive enough, but when there is the added interest of three mills, of which all trace is lost, to me the search was delightful". (Somervell 1930).



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2A Agricultural and Population Change in Longsleddale

For many centuries the main economic activity in Longsleddale had been agriculture and quarrying, yet, as throughout Cumbria there has been a substantial reduction in the numbers employed in these industries. Table 1A. shows that the population of the valley has fallen quite substantially since 1831.

Table 1A.

Population Change in Longsleddale

<u>Year</u>	<u>Population</u>
1801	187
1811	172
1821	185
1831	199
1841	173
1851	170
1901	144
1931	101
1951	89
1961	85
1971	76

Source: Parish Records.

The population decline has been largely the result of farm amalgamations. In 1829 there were 27 farms, each supporting a farming family; in 1982 there were just eight. As can be seen from Table 2A. this has not only resulted in a decline in the economically active population, but has also led to a substantial increase in the size of remaining farms. As a result of this, the number of farmers and farm workers has fallen from 19 in 1947, to 8 in 1982. A side effect of this has been an increase in the number of holiday homes to 6 in 1982, as compared to 1 in 1947.

The farming population has also become increasingly reliant upon farming as its sole occupation. At present three farmers in Longsleddale let holiday accommodation, but this in no way can replace the importance of the local quarry which closed 50 years ago, in employing "off-peak" farm labour.

Table 2A. Farm Amalgamations in Longsleddale Since 1960

MAIN FARM	AMALGAMATED FARMS	ACREAGE	TOTAL ACREAGE
NETHERHOUSE	TENTER HOWE	513	685
	BRIDGE END	n /a	
	DALE END (Part)	n /a 54	
MUIRTHWAITE		63	113
	DALE END (Part)	50	
LOW HOUSE		128	228
	HIGH HOUSE	100	
DOCKERNOOK		543	761
	KILNSTONES	218	
WADS HOWE		141	651
	MIDDLE	107	
	BEECH HILL	253	
	MIDDLE SWINKLEBANK (Part)	150	
WELL FOOT		528	1050
	SWINKLE HOUSE	112	
	YEWBARROW HALL	295	
	LOW SWINKLE BANK	115	
TOMS HOWE		192	734
	HIGH SWINKLEBANK	395	
	STOCKDALE	147	
HIGH SADGILL		87	561
	MIDDLE SWINKLEBANK	187	
	LOW SADGILL	180	
	TILLSHOWE	107	

n/a = Not Available

Source: Parish Records.

In association with the decline in the total number of holdings, changes have taken place in the agricultural system employed in the valley. From about 1940 to 1960, most of the farms were small dairy farms, keeping dairy shorthorn cattle. But a number of forces acted to alter this situation; new health and hygiene regulations necessitated the expensive provision of equipment, which proved too costly for farmers who only produced twenty to thirty gallons of milk a day; added to this economic pressures from holdings, with more productive land and animals, made it difficult for local farmers to retain an economically viable agricultural system. As dairy farming tended to be more labour intensive, the switch from dairy farming meant a rapid decline in the number of workers employed. As well as the demise of dairy farming, the farmers have also lost another source of income in the form of chick production. Longsledale farmers used to sell chicks to egg producers, and as the many wooden chicken houses next to the farms show, the practice was very widespread. Yet with improved technology, economies of scale and vertical integration, the farmers were forced out of this market.

Once the dairy shorthorn cattle started to disappear, they were replaced by larger sheep flocks and the reviving of Galloway cattle for beef. But now even this agricultural system is being altered. Suckler cows are going out of fashion, they require a great deal of hard work and attention, and with higher feed prices some feel they are not economically worthwhile.

As there are fewer farmers working the land, there is less spare labour to deal at slack times with the maintenance of farm buildings, walls and fences. The result is an increasing state of disrepair of these vital parts of the landscape. A skilled man can only build a few yards of dry stone wall in a day, and therefore, when the walls start to fall down due to age, erosion and vandalism, farmers tend either to leave them as they are or else fill them with such things as metal sheeting and oil cans. Added to this as farms become more and more extensive, there is less need for walls to keep in stock, and so their importance in the agricultural system declines, and thus further encourages dereliction of the

countryside.

Another factor of losing labour and of farms becoming increasingly extensive, is the decline in the general quality of farming in the valley. Gorse bushes, although resplendent in springtime, are spreading through the valley and serve only to show the lack of consideration to efficient farming. Animals wandering on the road are a common sight, one farmer in Longsleddale recently was taken to court by the RSPCA for neglect of his animals.

Although the changes have been great within the valley, the level of amalgamation will probably continue at the same pace. According to well informed local opinion another four farms are likely to be amalgamated in the next fifteen years. The decline of the number of holdings, cannot be attributed to any one cause. The long hours, unpredictable returns and better opportunities elsewhere, have perhaps been the most obvious reasons for people leaving farming. Added to this, tenancies may have been ended by the owner on the death of a farmer, or his children may simply not wish to carry on the farm. Once a farm does come on the market, one of two things usually happens. First, other farmers can take the farm over completely, this seems most common in Longsleddale or second, property speculators, usually farmers, buy up farm holdings, and then sell them off in lots to the highest bidders. In the absence of any controls over the breaking up of individual holdings, this is a difficult, if not impossible process to stop.

3A. Longsleddale and its Relationship with the LDSPB

As in most parts of the Lake District, permission to develop land can be highly profitable, and therefore, there is considerable pressure to gain planning permission in the valley. Over a period of one year, 1980, the LDSPB reviewed twenty-four applications for planning permission. Of these, seventeen were directly related to improvement to agricultural enterprises, and the provision of caravans to supplement the incomes of the farmers from agriculture. All of these applications were accepted. Seven applications were placed which meant some

substantial development within the valley, these included the building of a bungalow, the conversion of a barn into a house, and the building of a holiday centre. Of these none was accepted. The indication from this, is that the LDSPB seriously tries to help farmers in the day to day running of their businesses, and is prepared to allow small scale developments in order to increase the amount of income available to them. Yet the LDSPB is not prepared to accept any larger scale developments, whether proposed by farmers or not. This creates a certain amount of resentment on the part of locals, especially farmers. With changes in the running of the farm, and with the increase in size of farms, a large number of redundant farm buildings exist in the valley. One farmer actually owns twelve redundant barns, and was approached by a number of people on the possibility of developing them, but consultations with the LDSPB convinced the farmer that he would not get planning permission for any of them, because of the fact that they were set away from the main farm house. As a result, the barns are now deteriorating rapidly.

One problem with the Planning Board, came with a development that took place at a house in the valley without any planning permission. A small extension was built, and none knew that it had been done, until a local person who had noticed it reported it to the LDSPB. They ordered that the extension should be pulled down; this went to appeal. The Inspector was sympathetic to the family as the extension was done well and fitted in with the surroundings. He felt that planning permission would have been given anyway, and so he reversed the decision of the LDSPB.

4A. Tourist Pressures in the Valley

Another problem that does afflict the valley at certain times of the year, arises out of pressures from tourism. At peak times, the narrow road becomes clogged with traffic, cars park in awkward positions blocking the accesses to local farms and houses. Although this worries some people, most farmers tend to take it as a natural consequence of living within the National Park. Yet Longsleddale has

given a home to one of the most vigorous opponents of tourism and development within the Lake District. This gentleman, a retired lecturer from Liverpool, is regarded with considerable suspicion by many farmers.

Placed at the head of the valley in a particularly beautiful setting, he continually speaks out at public meetings and in the press against the onslaught of tourism destroying the peace and quiet of the valley. He opposes any significant development within the valley, and is thus seen by many as an obstacle to them earning a fortune. He was during one period, the Chairman of the Parish Meeting, a position he was elected to in the face of widespread apathy from the rest of the valley's population. After inviting members of the LDSPB to come and talk about the objectives of the National Park, the local peoples' suspicions about him were aroused. Yet his final downfall came when he had persuaded farmers to sign away certain rights regarding the River Sprint to the local Water Board; this proved to be disastrous, as the Water Board produced plans to canalise the river and develop it. The local farmers decided enough was enough and he was removed.

Although to a certain extent he was discredited by local farmers, it did not stop him complaining to the LDSPB about tourists. A portion of one letter sent in 1980, sets out his feelings:

"The chief focus of attention in rural areas is the "preservation of amenity". Regrettably the viewpoint seems always to be that of the "visitor" to the area, not the residents. The latter often voluntarily incur trouble and expense to maintain "the environment", only to have their own amenities destroyed by an overwhelming influx of visitors. Parked cars destroy the view from this address for most of the summer and much of the winter. The AA guide book, Tourist Board publications, and even the Michelin Guide describe the spot as 'quiet and unspoiled'. Hence the daily influx of from 20 to 90 cars? I suggest that the interests of residents now deserve some attention". (Walshaw 1980).

5A. Conservation in Longsleddale

In terms of conservation, only one farmer can be described as an active supporter. The rest tend to look upon such issues as being unimportant, or else are directly hostile to conservation interests. The increased dereliction of the

countryside has probably helped wildlife by providing a greater diversity of vegetation. Although one farmer has planted some broadleaved woodland, the rest tend to ignore their own substantial woods. One farmer has actually planted some conifers in a single square block of about ten acres, this is one of the most unsightly areas of the valley. Landscape conservation, if one values a "tidy" countryside, has worsened, although the "new look" to the valley has a certain charm. Perhaps the most unfortunate development though has been the spread of bracken down the hillsides; eradication measures do not appear popular with farmers.

6A. Rural Deprivation in Longsleddale

In many ways the valley seems prosperous. Every family has at least one car, and most have two. This is partly a reaction to the valley's relative isolation and the lack of any public transport facilities. In 1946, the Chairman of the Parish Meeting was instructed to make enquiries to the County Council regarding the provision of a bus service, seeing the regular one was to be stopped in 1950. The proprietor of the local bus company responded to an initiative on the part of the council, but although he considered the scheme, he felt that it would not be worth his while to run a bus in Longsleddale; as well as this the road itself was not satisfactory. An attempt to run an early form of voluntary car service was abandoned because of the high cost that would be incurred, and thus all public transport was halted in 1951.

But as some services declined, others improved. Electricity was provided for the valley in 1961; although the local school was closed after the war. A telephone kiosk does exist in the valley, and there is a regular collection of post. When farmers become old, they often stay in the area, with neighbours "keeping an eye on them", and helping them as much as possible.

Competition for housing is important in the valley, with a gradual process of "gentrification" taking place. At least seven families can be described as middle class to upper middle class, varying from retired professional people, teachers and

the landed gentry. As well as this there are six holiday homes in the area. In general terms, the people of the valley do not feel themselves to be deprived, in fact rather the opposite. They value the landscape and privacy of the valley, and have learned to make do without many of the services some regard as a right. Even if there was a public transport system, it is unlikely that anyone would use it, especially as the ubiquitous freezer means that less shopping trips have to be made. Unemployment in the valley tends to solve itself by emigration. This, many argue is not forced but rather voluntary, as children tend to be well educated and seek jobs elsewhere. Added to this the general level of fertility appears very low, with only two children per married couple as the norm, and a number of "only ones"; there is also an elderly bachelor farmer in the valley.

7A. A Part-Time Farmer

On the whole, farmers in Longsleddale have tended to cope with the vigorous crisis in agriculture, by either giving up farming, or extending their farms and reducing their labour force. One farmer tends to concentrate on cattle and land dealing more than on his farming, but most tend to run their businesses on a predominantly agricultural basis. Only one truly part-time farmer exists in Longsleddale.

His farm holding consists of 113 acres carrying around 150 sheep and 16 head of cattle, with the land lying between 500 and 1,000 feet above sea level. About 15 per cent of Lake District farms have a labour requirement in the 250-449 Standard Man Day category, and this particular farm is about 440 SMD's. Hence the holding lies in the lower of the very low income enterprises, with limited opportunities for capital investment.

The farm holding has inbye land for grass conversion, grazing and sheep at lambing time; and allotment and fell land. The layout enables sheep and cattle to be left to make best use of higher grazing at other times. Cattle are major users of allotment land, grazing from April to November, depending on rainfall. For the rest of the year they are housed inside to save land from poaching, which would

otherwise occur. The winter fodder consists of straw (bought in autumn), hay and a urea based supplement. In some years, silage is used when a second crop of grass can be cut. The cattle, a mixture of Aberdeen Angus and Galloways, are a suckler herd used to produce store cattle for fattening between the ages of 12-18 months, born from spring onwards, the time most favoured by the seasonal pattern of grass growth, and sold in autumn the following year.

The relationship between the supply and demand for fodder in any one year is crucial. This stems from the fact that the number of livestock carried through the winter, is largely dependent on the quantity of hay which can be conserved from inbye land. A good stock gives flexibility of action if prices for livestock in autumn are depressed, and with high hay prices, the productivity of inbye land is assuming even greater importance. However, the unit is not self sufficient in winter feed and in a normal year about 30 tons of hay/straw has to be purchased to supplement reserves.

A certain amount of fertilising has taken place on the holding; in 1972, some 30 acres were treated with basic slag, limestone and asulam to kill bracken. Although a grant could be obtained for the capital cost of new buildings, because of the costs of construction on the holding, and increased veterinary costs, livestock cannot be profitably intensified over present levels.

Some farms do not engage in providing farmhouse accommodation because of restricted space, and as it is an unwanted extra burden on the farmers wife. Added to this there maybe no scope for the conversion of farm buildings. Therefore, the only alternative is a caravan venture, though the chief barrier to this has been the stiff development policy of the LDSPB.

The attractions for tourists on this particular farm are accessibility and location, space, scenery, wildlife, the settlement pattern and the farming culture. At present the holding has two caravans, and the charges are as follows per week:

April	£40
May	£45
June	£50
July	£55
August	£45
September	£45
October	£40

The following table shows the relationship of the caravan enterprise to the agricultural income of the farm, for the period 1979-80.

Table 3:A. The Part-Time Farmer's Farm Accounts 1979-1980

<u>Expenditure</u>	<u>£</u>	<u>Income</u>	<u>£</u>
Adjustment costs	495	Milk, cows & heifers	810
Fertilizer	176	Calves	2,482
Hay, straw & feeding stuff	3,475	Ewes	246
Vet fees & medicine	210	Lambs	2,900
Haulage	62	Wool	212
Commission	<u>161</u>	Subsidies & grants	1,346
		Caravans (net)	<u>756</u>
	<u>4,579</u>		
 <u>Fixed Inputs</u>			
Machinery (depreciation)			
fuel & repairs	500		
Repairs/maintenance	323		
Rates	<u>125</u>		
	948		
Caravan sinking fund	140		
<u>Labour</u>			
Hired casual labour	<u>520</u>		
Total input	£6,187	Gross output	£8,752

Total net farm income = £2565

Of this figure 52 per cent comes from government grants and 24 per cent from caravans.

The holding does suffer from some visitor damage, and has therefore, taken advantage of the Upland Management Scheme. The holding has fenced off 400 yards of bridleway and diverted it to keep a bull in. Added to this, UMAS has been responsible for work on footpath management, providing gates and signs, and helping with two shelter beds.

The establishment costs of the caravans included site clearance and preparation, the cost of providing toilet facilities and the capital cost of the caravans. One caravan was purchased new in 1978 for £1,620 and the other second hand, for £650 in 1977.

At 1978 prices establishment costs were as follows for the new caravan:-

Clearing site and preparation	£ 16
Toilet	£ 28
Capital cost of caravan	£1,620
Other expenditure	£ 20
Total capital expenditure	<u>£1,684</u>

Assuming the caravan will have an estimated life of twelve years, the annual sinking fund to replace capital will be £79, at ten per cent interest. The same figure for the second caravan will be £61. In 1980 the profitability of the caravans was as follows:

<u>Expenditure</u>	£	<u>Income</u>	£
Gas	53	Letting Fees	1,045
Rates	25		
Insurance	40		
Repairs	148		
Advertising	<u>23</u>		
	<u>289</u>		<u>1,045</u>

Net Income = £756

Net Income - sinking fund = £616

As can be seen the total amount received from the caravans is small, but in relation to the total farm income, it is probably significant enough to determine whether one will continue farming or not. Added to the caravans, the farmer works as a travelling salesman for a local firm of chemists. This work usually takes up about three mornings a week, and brings in around twenty pounds on average. As already noted, a considerable amount of importance is attributed to the part-time farmer, but a number of disadvantages can be noted. In general, the part-time farmers working day amounts to about twelve hours, as an attempt is made to mix two jobs, and at certain times of the year three. As this farmer put it, "you have to run to stand still".

Added to this, with any tourist venture there is the problem of planning permission. In issuing a site licence for caravans on the holding, the LDSPB imposed certain conditions. These restrict the period when the caravans may be let from the 1st March to the 3rd October. Steps have also been taken to screen the caravans, paint them in the permitted colours, and provide adequate sanitary facilities. In giving planning permission, the chief considerations on the holding were over access and the impact on the landscape, and indeed outline permission was at first refused for the second caravan on these grounds. Due to the fact that the Longsleddale valley is a single track road culminating in a dead end, the Board were concerned over the impact of the additional traffic from the site. However, this argument was defeated since the site would only generate one extra car on the road system, which could hardly be considered excessive. The other consideration over impact on the landscape was defeated after a Planning Board site visit, and the realisation that the caravan would be so well screened, as to be hardly visible from the road.

*NB. The agricultural and economic information kindly provided by the owner's son.

8A. Conclusions

The valley of Longsleddale has undergone considerable social and economic change over a period of many years. Farm amalgamations have and will continue

to occur and a change coupled with a move towards extensive sheep and cattle rearing away from the more labour intensive dairy and poultry farming. Added to this, employment opportunities in the valley have declined with the closure of a major quarry.

While the economic importance of the valley has been reduced, its conservation and recreation role has increased, with it now being an integral part of the Lake District National Park. The LDSPB has stalled attempts by farmers to develop farm buildings; an action which due to the isolated nature of these buildings undoubtedly protects the environment. Although tourism is environmentally harmful, it is generally accepted as a feature of living in Longseddale, and this represents an adjustment to an on-going phenomenon. However, a major planning anomaly is the fact that the LDSPB has no restrictive control over unsightly forestry developments.

The problems of rural deprivation have been adjusted to well by the local community, and the "in-comers" to the community have a valuable role to play in the valley's life, although there can be conflict as the in-comers attempt to protect their own amenity, and in so doing the national purpose of the park.

One farmer has become truly part-time. However even with a number of occupations, with a hard working wife, and with very hard work, he finds it difficult to make an acceptable income. Clearly part-time farming is not a panacea to agricultural income problems, and is an activity unlikely to hold widespread attraction.

APPENDIX 2

ACCOUNTING CONVENTIONS

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ACCOUNTING CONVENTIONS

1. Net assets = working capital
2. Return on equity = $\frac{\text{Profit after loan interest and tax}}{\text{Ordinary share capital and reserves}} \times 100$
3. Return on net assets = $\frac{\text{Profit before tax and interest on long term loans}}{\text{Net assets}} \times 100$
4. Profit margin = $\frac{\text{Profit (before interest and tax)}}{\text{Sales}} \times 100$
5. Asset turnover = $\frac{\text{Sales}}{\text{Net assets}}$
6. Debt ratio 1 = $\frac{\text{Long term debt including bank overdraft}}{\text{Net assets}} \times 100$
7. Debt ratio 2 = $\frac{\text{Only specified long term debt}}{\text{Net assets}} \times 100$

Source: Reid and Myddleton 1971.

APPENDIX 3

THE WHITBARROW QUESTIONNAIRE

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THE WHITBARROW QUESTIONNAIRE

A590 (T) STUDY-MARCH 1980

SECTION A: PERSONAL AND FARM DETAILS

1. NAME _____
2. Name, address & telephone number of farm

- 3a Is your farm all in one holding?
Yes No If not, how many _____
- b How many acres do you farm in total? _____
- c What is your farm system - predominantly milk?
predominantly arable?
milk and arable?
cattle?
sheep?
other?
Please specify _____
4. Acres held as owner/occupier ____ Years held ____
5. Acres held as annual tenant ____ Years held ____
6. Acres held as long-term tenant ____ Years held ____
7. Acres held on any other tenancy, cropping right, or so forth - please give details:

8. Number of acres lost to and severed by the road in each category:
Owner/occupier lost ____ Annual tenancy lost ____
" " severed ____ " " severed ____
Long-term tenancy lost ____ Other (cropping etc) lost ____
" " " severed ____ " " severed ____

- 9a. Was your farm ring-fenced before the road ? _____
Can you give me details of your farming pattern, including daily and seasonal trends? _____

- 9b. How many hours do you work? ____ How often do you work after dark? ____
What is your daily routine in the different seasons?

10. How do you think the road has, or will change this farming pattern (in detail) ?

11. What contacts have you had before the construction of the road with:
M.A.F.F. _____
R.C.U. _____
N.F.U. _____
What were the results of the meeting (discussions and suggestions)?

12. Were any boreholes made on your land? _____
13. If yes, was prior permission obtained? _____
14. Were you told what they were for? _____
15. How many were there? _____
16. What dimensions were they? _____
17. Were they filled immediately after use? _____

18. Was compensation offered? _____
19. What was the effect of the boreholes? _____

20. Did you meet any of the contractors or consulting engineers representatives before construction began? Yes No
 If yes, were you alone? Yes No
 With other farmers? Yes No
21. Can you name the people you met and/or their position?

22. Were such meetings concerned with:
 Specific worries of yours? _____
 Specific worries of the contractor? _____
 General matters of liaison? _____
 Broad generalities? _____
23. What actions, if any, have been taken to protect the farm from undue disturbance?

24. Are they: Very useful? _____
 Useful? _____
 Fairly useful? _____
 Useless? _____
25. Was any plan of the work to be done on the farm drawn up before construction began?

26. Was any such idea suggested? _____
27. Was any statement of the condition of the farm before the road considered?
 No
 Considered and rejected
 Seriously considered and rejected
 Drawn up
28. Have you made any agreements with the contractor?
 Yes Approached but did not accept No

29. If an agreement was made, how has it worked in practice?

30. How would you describe your working relations with the contractors?

Good Workable Unworkable

31. What factors have been instrumental in producing this state of affairs?

32. How would you describe your working relations with the consulting engineers?

Good Workable Unworkable

33. Why was this? _____

34. How would you describe your working relations with the resident engineer (or liaison officer)?

Good Workable Unworkable

35. Why was this? _____

36. Have you had any problems during construction, and what are they?

37. Whom did you consult about this? _____

38. Do they understand your agricultural problems? _____

39. Was any attempt made to find out your farm's drainage characteristics before construction commenced? _____

40. If yes, by whom? _____

41. Were you given the opportunity to offer suggestions on how the road drains and farm drains might be married? _____

42. What were they? _____

43. What future problems do you see arising in the matter of drainage?

44. Do you think more could be done? _____

45. If yes what? _____

46. Have you negotiated a permanent access across the road?

No Bridge Underpass

If no, will you have to go off the farm to reach severed land? ____

47. What problems will occur through such an arrangement? _____

48. Whose responsibility will the cost of fencing and its upkeep be?

49. Do you know what type of fencing will be used?

50. Will it be adequate (or what would be adequate)?

51. Can you tell me how the compensation negotiations are going?

Refer to agents (their competence)

Are costs a restriction?

Have you received any money?

52. What do you plan to do with money received from compensation?

53. What do you think will be the likely effects of the road?

54. What problems could have been better solved?

TO THE FARMER

1. When were you born? _____ 2. Where were you born? _____

3. How long have you lived in this area? _____

4. Was your father a farmer here? _____

5. How many generations does this farm go back? _____

6. When did you leave school? _____

7. Did you obtain any academic qualifications? _____

8. When did you take over the running of the farm? _____

9. The family at home:

Age _____

Sex _____

Rel to head _____

10. The family away from home:

Age _____

Sex _____

Rel to head _____

11. What are the various tasks of the family members on the farm?

12. Are there any farm workers employed by you? _____

13. Concerning your wife:

Where was she born? _____

Where were you married? _____

What jobs has she had? _____

What education has she had? _____

What help does she give in running the farm? _____

14. Regarding your children, what are your aspirations for each one of them?

15. What are their own aspirations (do they conflict)?

16. What education have they had, or are receiving?

17. What plans have you made regarding retirement?

18. What factors are you taking into consideration?

19. Do you think that the presence of the road will have any effect on these plans? _____

20. There are a number of problems regarding the transference of tenancy, have you any ideas how these might affect you? _____

21. There are also problems accruing due to Capital Transfer Tax, do you know about these? _____

22. There are various schemes for pensions after retirement, have you subscribed to any? _____

23. Have you ever received or looked for advice on the above problems?

24. If not, in retrospect, do you think such advice could have been useful to you if explained clearly? _____

25. Many people find difficulty with working with major institutions such as N.F.U. M.A.F.F. and R.C.U's. What do you think about them and the advice they give?

26. How do you find your present job?
Interesting all the time
Mostly dull and monotonous
27. Why is this? _____

28. What do you like most about your job? _____

29. What do you like least about it? _____

30. Have you ever had other jobs? _____
What were they? _____

31. Why did you leave them? _____

32. Do you think your farm is as good a place to work as there is, or do you think there are better jobs available? _____

33. Have you ever thought about leaving your job ? _____
Have you ever done anything about it? _____
Why have you thought of leaving? _____
If you have thought of leaving, what keeps you in your present job? _____

34. If, say, you were (forced) to choose another occupation, which do you think it would be? _____

35. How many hours a day do you work? _____
36. If you were to get a job outside which offered, say, £20 greater income than you get at present, would you take it? _____
37. Do you think that the more money you earn, the better chance you have of a fulfilled life? _____
38. If you were asked what other values modern society should look for in terms of work and its rewards, what would you say? _____

39. Do you think there are any other kinds of people within the north of England who are doing noticeably better than you and your family? _____
40. Do you think they are happier? _____
41. Do you think that in comparison with other industries, your position is deteriorating? _____
42. In terms of satisfaction, do you think things are better for the average family in, say, Manchester? _____
43. Do you think small communities such as this have leaders who effectively express their views? _____
44. Do you think the changes that have occurred in the past 50 years have brought a lot of benefit to this farming community? _____

45. Do you think the changes that may occur in the next 50 years will (also) bring a lot of benefits? _____

46. Do you think that any change should allow for the retention of certain values, and if so, what are these? _____

47. What values do you see the prospect of losing in this area? _____

48. (Probe on older generation, and what happens to them after they effectively retire) _____

49. Say you were to move away from the area, how pleased or sorry would you be? _____

50. How often do you make trips away from the farm? _____
Where do you go? _____
What do you do there? _____
51. Thinking of your friends and relatives, what proportion of them live in the area? _____
52. What kinds of jobs do they have? _____

53. How often do you:
Go out and visit friends? _____
Go out and visit friends and receive visits from them? _____
Go out to a pub? _____
54. Do you go to church? _____
55. Are you a member of any clubs or associations, and where are they based? _____

56. Out of a scale of 1 to 10, how do you rate your life style, if we say that 10 is the Royal Family, and 1 a down-and-out tramp in Liverpool? _____
57. A number of farmers have started ancillary enterprises. As I mention them, can you give me your opinion on them?
Farmhouse and/or self-catering accommodation on the farm

Equestrian enterprises on the farm _____
Direct farm produce sales to the public _____
Fish farming _____

58. Considering the road what are and were your main worries?

59. Have these been alleviated at all by any institution?

60. Do you think that the road will bring any advantages to you?

61. What amenities do you think there are in the area (cinema, theatre etc?). Do you think young people are interested in them? _____

62. What types of dwelling do they live in?

Farmhouse: Large Medium Old (pre-1850)(middle-age)

Modern (post-1940) Home off farm

63. State of dwelling: Good Fair Poor

64. Access: Easy Difficult Very difficult

65. Amenities: Water in house Hot water on tap

Lighting Cooking Refrigerator

Deep freeze Central heating T.V.

Telephone Fixed bath Flush toilet.

66. Has the presence of the National Parks Planning Board had any effect on the development of the farm? _____

67. Where do most young people go when they leave the area?

68. What factors make them leave?

69. Do you think they would prefer to stay in the area?

70. Do you think that they are happy where they go?

71. What types of jobs do they get elsewhere?

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