



If you have discovered material in AURA which is unlawful e.g. breaches copyright, (either yours or that of a third party) or any other law, including but not limited to those relating to patent, trademark, confidentiality, data protection, obscenity, defamation, libel, then please read our [Takedown Policy](#) and [contact the service](#) immediately

**Comparing German and British Political Culture Through Values: an
Analysis of the Values of Health Care Reform**

Volume I

David Pritchard

Doctor of Philosophy

Aston University

April 2002

This copy of the thesis has been supplied on condition that anyone who consults it is understood to recognise that its copyright rests with its author and that no quotation from the thesis and no information derived from it may be published without proper acknowledgement.

Abstract

Aston University

Comparing German and British Political Culture Through Values: an Analysis of the Values of Health Care Reform

David Pritchard

Doctor of Philosophy • April 2002

This research sets out to compare the values in British and German political discourse, especially the discourse of social policy, and to analyse their relationship to political culture through an analysis of the values of health care reform. The work proceeds from the hypothesis that the known differences in political culture between the two countries will be reflected in the values of political discourse, and takes a comparison of two major recent legislative debates on health care reform as a case study.

The starting point in the first chapter is a brief comparative survey of the post-war political cultures of the two countries, including a brief account of the historical background to their development and an overview of explanatory theoretical models. From this are developed the expected contrasts in values in accordance with the hypothesis.

The second chapter explains the basis for selecting the corpus texts and the contextual information which needs to be recorded to make a comparative analysis, including the context and content of the reform proposals which comprise the case study. It examines any contextual factors which may need to be taken into account in the analysis.

The third and fourth chapters explain the analytical method, which is centred on the use of definition-based taxonomies of value items and value appeal methods to identify, on a sentence-by-sentence basis, the value items in the corpus texts and the methods used to make appeals to those value items. The third chapter is concerned with the classification and analysis of values, the fourth with the classification and analysis of value appeal methods.

The fifth chapter will present and explain the results of the analysis, and the sixth will summarize the conclusions and make suggestions for further research.

Keywords: Language and Politics; Values; NHS; Health Care; Parliamentary Debates

To my parents, who made this possible

Acknowledgements

I gratefully acknowledge the guidance of both Professor Nigel Reeves and Dieter Haselbach and their forbearance along the rather tortuous path to the completion of this thesis, and the help of all those others who made encouraging or critical suggestions.

My sincere thanks go out to all family and friends for their support, tolerance and understanding. I would like, in particular, to thank my parents for their unfailing encouragement for what I was doing, even when it did not seem to make a great deal of sense, and for a great deal of material assistance.

I also thank Anne McCabe for her empathy and suggestions, as a fellow doctoral student, and for her general support and kindness as a friend.

Table of Contents, Volume I

Abstract.....	2
Acknowledgements.....	4
Table of Contents, Volume I.....	5
Table of Contents, Volume II.....	9
List of Figures.....	11
List of Tables, Volume I & II.....	12
Note on Examples.....	14
0. Introduction.....	15
0.1. The Origins of the Research.....	15
0.2. Objectives of the Research.....	17
0.3. Hypothesis.....	18
0.4. Structure of the thesis.....	19
1. Political Culture and Value Research.....	20
1.1. The Relationship between Political Culture and Value Research.....	20
1.2. Defining Political Culture.....	20
1.3. The Historical Background to Social Policy Before 1945.....	23
1.3.1. <i>The German State and the Quest for National Unity after 1871</i>	23
1.3.2. <i>From Classical Liberalism to Collectivism: The British State in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries</i>	27
1.4. Comparing German and British Political Cultures After 1945.....	30
1.4.1. <i>A Summary of Post-War Developments</i>	30
1.4.1.1. Constitutional Consensus and Dissent.....	30
1.4.1.2. System Performance and System Legitimacy.....	33
1.4.1.3. Political Participation.....	36
1.4.1.4. Cross-Party Consensus and Co-operation.....	39
1.4.2. <i>A Theoretical Model</i>	48
1.4.2.1. Conventionalistic versus Legalistic Cultures.....	48
1.4.2.2. Deference versus Subject Cultures.....	51
1.5. Developing the Hypothesis: Expected Value Contrasts.....	53
1.5.1. <i>Expectations for the German Data</i>	54
1.5.2. <i>Expectations for the British Data</i>	55
1.5.3. <i>Conclusion</i>	55
2. Choosing the Corpus and Analysing Context.....	56
2.1. Introduction.....	56
2.2. Choosing Health Policy as a Case Study.....	56
2.3. Ensuring Representativeness.....	57
2.3.1. <i>“Narrow” Genre Membership</i>	58
2.3.2. <i>“Wide” Genre Membership</i>	61
2.3.3. <i>Genre Representativeness</i>	62

2.3.4.	<i>Text Representativeness</i>	63
2.3.5.	<i>Rules Limiting the Selection of Text for Analysis</i>	64
2.4.	<i>Ensuring Comparability</i>	65
2.4.1.	<i>Comparability in Parliamentary Discourse</i>	65
2.4.2.	<i>Comparability in the Parliamentary Reports</i>	69
2.4.3.	<i>Comparability in the Reforms</i>	71
2.4.3.1.	<i>State Health Insurance in the Federal Republic</i>	72
2.4.3.2.	<i>The British National Health Service</i>	77
2.4.3.3.	<i>The German Gesundheits-Strukturgesetz 1993</i>	79
2.4.3.4.	<i>The British National Health Service and Community Care Bill 1990</i>	80
2.4.3.5.	<i>Implications for the Value Analysis</i>	82
2.4.3.6.	<i>Summary</i>	85
2.5.	<i>Recording Contextual Information</i>	85
3.	<i>Analysing Value Appeal Content</i>	87
3.1.	<i>Introduction</i>	87
3.2.	<i>Finding Values in Modern Political Discourse</i>	87
3.2.1.	<i>Where Values Are To Be Found</i>	87
3.2.2.	<i>Separating Values From Context</i>	88
3.3.	<i>The Analysis of Value Appeals by Method and Content</i>	91
3.4.	<i>Defining “Value” as the Basis of a Taxonomy</i>	92
3.4.1.	<i>Rokeach’s Value Definition</i>	92
3.4.2.	<i>The Distinction Between Values and Norms</i>	93
3.4.3.	<i>Levy and Guttman’s Mapping-sentence Value Definition</i>	94
3.4.4.	<i>A Synthesis</i>	96
3.5.	<i>Value Taxonomies & Content Analysis: A Literature Survey</i>	97
3.5.1.	<i>R.K. White’s Value Analysis</i>	98
3.5.2.	<i>Rescher’s Survey of Value Classifications</i>	100
3.5.3.	<i>Rokeach’s Value Survey and Content Analysis</i>	102
3.5.4.	<i>Inglehart’s Value Ranking Survey</i>	106
3.5.5.	<i>The Basisresearch Value Survey</i>	107
3.5.6.	<i>Klages’ Two-dimensional Classification</i>	110
3.5.7.	<i>Conclusions from the Literature Review</i>	112
3.6.	<i>Classifying Value Appeals: Data-Related Issues in Developing the Taxonomy</i>	112
3.6.1.	<i>Arguments for Developing a New Taxonomy</i>	113
3.6.2.	<i>The Relationship Between the Taxonomy and the Data</i>	114
3.6.3.	<i>Deciding What To Encode</i>	114
3.6.4.	<i>The Relationship Between Values and Addressees</i>	115
3.6.5.	<i>Restricting Polarity in Value Items: A Revised Value Definition</i>	117
3.7.	<i>Classifying Value Appeals: Theoretical Issues in Developing the Taxonomy</i>	118
3.8.	<i>Classifying Value Appeals: Selecting Value Items for the Taxonomy</i>	120
3.8.1.	<i>A Procedure for Value Item Selection</i>	121
3.8.2.	<i>Problems in Item Selection</i>	123
3.8.2.1.	<i>Managing Reductionism using Combination Values</i>	123
3.8.2.2.	<i>Handling Ambiguity</i>	124
3.9.	<i>Classifying Value Items: Data-Related and Theoretical Issues</i>	125
3.10.	<i>Classifying Value Items: Expectation and Entitlement</i>	126

3.10.1.	<i>The First Classificatory Level: Instrumental versus Terminal Values</i>	126
3.10.2.	<i>The Second Classificatory Level: Interaction-Dependency</i>	128
3.10.2.1.	Conclusions from the Literature	128
3.10.2.2.	Linking Interaction to Expectation and Entitlement	129
3.10.2.3.	A Test for Interaction-Dependency	129
3.10.2.4.	The Significance of Interaction-Dependency	131
3.10.2.5.	Addressees and Beneficiaries	132
3.10.3.	<i>The Third Classificatory Level: Value Purity</i>	135
3.10.3.1.	The Need To Classify Values By Purity	135
3.10.3.2.	The Position of Value Purity in the Classification	136
3.10.4.	<i>The Final Value Classification</i>	139
3.11.	The Value Taxonomy	141
3.12.	Values as Views of Human Nature	143
3.12.1.	<i>Optimism and Pessimism in Values</i>	143
3.12.2.	<i>Ranking Values by Optimism</i>	145
3.12.3.	<i>Representing Rankings by Scores</i>	147
3.12.4.	<i>The Value Map</i>	148
3.13.	Addressee Roles in Value Appeals	151
3.13.1.	<i>Comparing Roles with the Basisresearch Value Systems</i>	152
3.13.2.	<i>Revising the Basisresearch Scheme</i>	152
3.13.3.	<i>The Classification of Addressee Roles</i>	154
3.13.4.	<i>Values Which Are Not Role-Specific</i>	155
3.14.	Appeal Polarity and Polarity Modifiers	156
3.14.1.	<i>Polarity Qualification</i>	157
3.14.1.1.	Polarity Qualification in Negative Appeals	157
3.14.1.2.	Polarity Qualification in Positive Value Appeals	159
3.14.2.	<i>Polarity Hypothecation</i>	160
4.	Analysing Value Appeal Methods	161
4.1.	Defining the Appeal Method	161
4.2.	Data-Related Issues In Constructing the Appeal Method Taxonomy	162
4.2.1.	<i>Reviewing the Literature on Methods</i>	162
4.2.2.	<i>Separating Appeal Methods from Arguments</i>	162
4.3.	Theoretical Issues In Constructing the Appeal Method Taxonomy	164
4.4.	Constructing a Hierarchical Classification for Appeal Method Constituents	165
4.4.1.	<i>The Basis of the Method Classification</i>	165
4.4.2.	<i>The Four Classificatory Levels</i>	166
4.5.	Characteristics of Appeal Methods	171
4.5.1.	<i>Classifying Methods by Strength</i>	172
4.5.2.	<i>Subordinate (Auxiliary) Methods</i>	174
4.6.	The Final Appeal Method Classification	175
4.7.	Overview of the Appeal Method Taxonomy	177
4.8.	Definition and Identification of Appeal Method Constituents	179
4.8.1.	<i>Value Presupposition (PRS)</i>	179
4.8.1.1.	Defining Value Presupposition	179
4.8.1.2.	Interpreting Value Presupposition	180
4.8.1.3.	Identifying Value Presupposition	181
4.8.1.4.	Practical Limits in Coding Value Presupposition	182

4.8.2.	<i>Conversational Implicature (CIMP)</i>	183
4.8.2.1.	The Theory of Conversational Implicature.....	183
4.8.2.2.	Applying Conversational Implicature to the Analysis.....	183
4.8.2.3.	Issues in Identifying and Coding Conversational Implicature.....	185
4.8.3.	<i>Categorical Assertion (CAT)</i>	186
4.8.4.	<i>Modality (SEM/SIM/OIM/OEM-x)</i>	187
4.8.4.1.	Defining Modality.....	187
4.8.4.2.	Finding a Model for Modality.....	189
4.8.4.3.	Orientation in Modal Expressions.....	191
4.8.4.4.	Adjusting the Modality Model.....	193
4.8.4.5.	The Modal Types and their Impact on Value Appeals.....	198
4.8.4.6.	The Impact of Modal Orientation on Value Appeals.....	209
4.8.4.7.	General Issues in Coding Modality.....	213
4.8.4.8.	Indicators for the Modality Types.....	215
4.8.5.	<i>Imperative (IMPR)</i>	220
4.8.6.	<i>Metaphor (MET)</i>	220
4.8.6.1.	Defining and Containing Metaphor.....	220
4.8.6.2.	Metaphors as “Stories”.....	223
4.8.6.3.	Generative Metaphors and Filtering.....	225
4.8.6.4.	Identifying Significant Metaphorical Usage by Controversiality.....	226
4.8.6.5.	Identifying Significant Metaphorical Usage by the Transfer of Positive or Negative Meanings.....	228
4.8.6.6.	Classifying Metaphor.....	229
4.8.7.	<i>Connotation (CON)</i>	229
4.8.8.	<i>Entailment (ENT)</i>	232
4.8.9.	<i>Subjective Entailment (SNT)</i>	233
4.8.10.	<i>Irony (IRO)</i>	233
4.8.11.	<i>Association (A-x)</i>	235
4.8.11.1.	Association by Causality (A-CAU).....	236
4.8.11.2.	Association by Conditionality (A-CND).....	236
4.8.11.3.	Association by Instrumentality (A-INS).....	237
4.8.11.4.	Association by Equivalence (A-EQV).....	238
4.8.11.5.	Association by Co-occurrence (A-COO).....	238
4.8.11.6.	Classifying Associative Method Types.....	239
5.	Coding Texts and Analysing the Results.....	241
5.1.	Coding texts for analysis.....	241
5.1.1.	<i>The Limits of Objectivity in Coding</i>	241
5.1.2.	<i>The Unit of Analysis</i>	241
5.1.3.	<i>Specific Problems in Coding Value Appeals</i>	245
5.2.	Analysis of the Appeal Content Data.....	246
5.2.1.	<i>Establishing a Basis for the Comparison of Coded Data</i>	246
5.2.2.	<i>Analysing the Raw Data: An Overview of the Results</i>	247
5.2.3.	<i>Analysing the Raw Data: Value Distribution By Individual Value</i>	249
5.2.4.	<i>Controlling for Variables in the Analysis of Value Distribution</i>	252
5.2.4.1.	Likely Realisations of Systemic Distortions.....	252
5.2.4.2.	Correcting the Distortions.....	254
5.2.5.	<i>Value Distribution by Value Class</i>	254
5.2.6.	<i>Value Distribution by Expectation and Entitlement</i>	256

5.2.7.	<i>Value Distribution By Individual Value Count</i>	258
5.2.7.1.	Overview of the Corrected Individual Counts	258
5.2.7.2.	Re-interpreting the Value Class Findings	260
5.2.8.	<i>Summary of the Individual Value Results</i>	263
5.2.9.	<i>Value Distribution by Addressee Role</i>	265
5.2.9.1.	Overview of the results	266
5.2.9.2.	Institutional Expectees	266
5.2.9.3.	State Expectees	267
5.2.9.4.	Global Entitlees	269
5.2.10.	<i>Value Distribution by Party Status</i>	272
5.2.10.1.	Direct Comparison of Value Distribution Across Parties: Overview	273
5.2.10.2.	Direct Comparison of Value Distribution Across Parties: Governments	275
5.2.10.3.	Direct Comparison of Value Distribution Across Parties: Main Opposition	279
5.2.10.4.	Analysis of Value Consensus Through Indirect Comparison of Party Values	283
5.2.11.	<i>Value Distribution by Speaker Status</i>	291
5.2.12.	<i>Conclusions from the Value Content Data</i>	297
5.3.	Analysis of the Appeal Method Data	298
5.3.1.	<i>Remarks about the Appeal Method Analysis</i>	298
5.3.2.	<i>Overview of the Appeal Method Results</i>	299
5.3.3.	<i>Measuring the Accuracy of the Method Analysis</i>	300
5.3.4.	<i>Weak Method Distribution by Value</i>	303
5.3.5.	<i>Strong Method Distribution by Value</i>	306
5.3.6.	<i>Method Distribution By Party</i>	309
5.3.7.	<i>Value Combinations and Associations</i>	312
5.3.8.	<i>Conclusions from the Analysis of the Appeal Method Data</i>	315
6.	Conclusions	317
6.1.	Political Culture Through Values	317
6.2.	The New Analytical Framework	317
6.2.1.	<i>Effectiveness of the Analysis</i>	317
6.2.2.	<i>Weaknesses and Possible Improvements</i>	319
6.2.3.	<i>Further Applications</i>	321
6.3.	Wider Conclusions	325
	References	329

Table of Contents, Volume II

Table of Contents, Volume II	2
List of Tables, Volume II	2
Appendix I: Value Definitions and Coding Conventions	3
Appendix II: Identity and Status of Speakers from the Corpus in Speaking Order*	41

Appendix III: Debate on the Second Reading of the NHS and Community Care Bill 1990 (HC Deb, cc 489-548)	45
Appendix IV: Verhandlungen zur Ersten Beratung des Gesundheits-Strukturgesetzes 1993 (Sten. Ber., 12/105, d. 11. September 1992, S. 8987-9028)	62
Appendix V: The Coded Data.....	85

List of Figures

Figure 3.1: The Value Classification as a Value Continuum.....	138
Figure 3.2: Value Item Classification	140
Figure 3.3: Value Map	150
Figure 3.4: Optimism, Purity, Interaction & Terminality	151
Figure 3.5: Addressee Roles	154
Figure 3.6: Appeal Polarity and Polarity Qualification.....	158
Figure 4.1: Value-Desirability Relationships as a Continuum.....	174
Figure 4.2: Appeal Methods Classified by Value-Desirability Relationship	176
Figure 5.1: GStrG Terminal and Instrumental Value Appeals.....	248
Figure 5.2: NHSCCB Terminal and Instrumental Value Appeals	248
Figure 5.3: Value Map for GStrG	261
Figure 5.4: Value Map for NHSCCB.....	262
Figure 5.5: Most Frequent State Expectee Appeals in NHSCCB	268
Figure 5.6: Most Frequent State Expectee Appeals in GStrG	269
Figure 5.7: Most Frequent Global Entitlee Appeals in NHSCCB.....	270
Figure 5.8: Most Frequent Global Entitlee Appeals in GStrG	271
Figure 5.9: Value Map for Governing Parties in GStrG.....	275
Figure 5.10: Value Map for Governing Parties in NHSCCB.....	276
Figure 5.11: Top Values for Governing Parties in GStrG	277
Figure 5.12: Top Values for Governing Party in NHSCCB	278
Figure 5.13: Top Values for Main Opposition in GStrG.....	280
Figure 5.14: Top Values for Main Opposition in NHSCCB	281
Figure 5.15: Positive Polarity Levels for Top Ranked Values in GStrG	289
Figure 5.16: Positive Polarity Levels for Top-Ranked Values in NHSCCB	290
Figure 5.17: Positive Polarity by Speaker Status	291
Figure 5.18: Positive Polarity Levels for Top-Ranked Frontbencher Values in GStrG.....	295
Figure 5.19: Positive Polarity Levels for Top-Ranked Frontbencher Values in NHSCCB.....	296
Figure 5.20: Overall Controversiality Rankings for GStrG	308
Figure 5.21: Overall Controversiality Rankings for NHSCCB.....	309

List of Tables, Volume I & II

Table 3.1: Rokeach's Value Classification	104
Table 3.2: The <i>Basisresearch</i> Value Orientations and Value Systems	108
Table 3.3: Klages' Two-dimensional Value Classification	111
Table 3.4: Expectee and Entitlee Addressee and Beneficiary Status Types	133
Table 3.5: Identities of Addressees and Beneficiaries	135
Table 3.6: Value Items	141
Table 3.7: Scoring System for Optimism Ranking	148
Table 3.8: Optimism Scores by Value Class and Beneficiary Status.....	148
Table 4.1: Appeal Method Constituents	177
Table 4.2: Modality Types	199
Table 5.1: General Statistics from the Analysis.....	247
Table 5.2: Appeal Frequency by Value Class	249
Table 5.3: Value Counts for Entire Taxonomy.....	250
Table 5.4: Possible Distortions in the British Data.....	253
Table 5.5: Possible Distortions in the German Data.....	254
Table 5.6: Appeal Frequency by Value Class with Systemic Variables Equalised	255
Table 5.7: Appeal Frequency by Value Class with Systemic Variables Removed.....	255
Table 5.8: Expectees and Entitlees and Addressee and Beneficiary Status Types	256
Table 5.9: Optimism/Pessimism Scores	257
Table 5.10: Value Breakdown with Systemic Variables Removed	258
Table 5.11: Twenty Top-Ranking Values.....	259
Table 5.12: Counts for Selected Value Classes without "Personal" Values	260
Table 5.13: Values with Significant Differences in Ranking and Count.....	263
Table 5.14: Expectee and Entitlee Roles	266
Table 5.15: Institutional Expectees by Value Class.....	267
Table 5.16: State Expectees by Value Class	268
Table 5.17: Global Entitlees by Value Class	269
Table 5.18: Value Class Overview by Party	273
Table 5.19: Optimism/Pessimism Scores for Main Party Groupings	274
Table 5.20: Top Ten Ranking Values for Main Two Party Groupings in GStrG	284
Table 5.21: Top Ten Ranking Values for Main Two Party Groupings in NHSCCB.....	285
Table 5.22: Qualified Appeals by Party Groups	293
Table 5.23: Hypothecated Appeals by Party Groups	293

Table 5.24: Distribution of Method Types.....	300
Table 5.25: Controversiality Rankings and Appeal Patterns for Main Party Groupings ...	302
Table 5.26: Value Ranking for Weak Appeal Methods.....	304
Table 5.27: Value Ranking for Strong Appeal Methods.....	307
Table 5.28: Value Ranking for Weak Appeal Methods of Governing Parties.....	310
Table 5.29: Value Ranking for Strong Appeal Methods of Governing Parties	310
Table 5.30: Value Ranking for Weak Appeal Methods of Main Opposition Parties	311
Table 5.31: Value Ranking for Strong Appeal Methods of Main Opposition Parties	311
Table 5.32: Most Frequently Recorded High-Level Combination Values	312
Table I.6.1: Heading Abbreviations in Coded Data	36
Table I.6.2: Actor and Modaliser Pronouns and Combination Types.....	38
Table I.6.3: Addressee Roles and Polarity Modifiers	38
Table I.6.4: Contribution Types	38
Table I.6.5: Parties	39
Table I.6.6: Party Status Types and Personal Status Types	39

Note on Examples

The corpus consists of sections from parliamentary reports on two legislative debates, the NHS and Community Care Bill 1990 (HC Deb, 6th Ser., 7 December 1989, Vol. 163, cc 489-548) and the *Gesundheits-Strukturgesetz* 1993 (Sten. Ber., 12. Wahlperiode, 105. Sitzung, den 11. September 1992, S. 8987-9028). Rather than give these references in full for each example, a shortened reference will be given, together with another form of reference which refers to the numbering of sentences for the purposes of analysis. The first reference, for the British examples, will therefore consist of the abbreviated report name and column number(s), in the following form:

HC Deb, cc 489

and, for the German examples, will consist of the abbreviated report and page number(s), as follows:

Sten. Ber., S. 8987

The second reference given is an internal one, consisting of the abbreviation for the debate (NHSCCB or GStrG) and the sentence number, matching the sentence numbers in the appendices.

0. Introduction

0.1. *The Origins of the Research*

This research has its origins in the need to explain differences in social policy across countries and cultures. It focuses on Germany and Britain, because those two countries constitute a particularly interesting comparison. Taking a broad view, although they share some common cultural and linguistic heritage, they have historically followed divergent paths of political and social development. Britain has enjoyed political stability, whilst Germany has seen frequent political upheaval; by the same token, Germany's state machinery and constitutional arrangements have, as in many European countries, been subject to frequent change, and so been adapted to what were perceived as the demands of the age, whilst changes to Britain's have been slow and organic in nature.

Differences are also notable in specific policy areas. In Europe, one has played the role of enthusiastic promoter of unity, whilst the other has stayed on the sidelines as a reluctant participant. In social policy, especially since 1979, the two countries have come to represent two distinct approaches on the old continent. As market-oriented thinking, with its emphasis on incentives and self-reliance, transformed political economy in the United States, its adoption was swifter and more enthusiastic in Britain, and its effects more keenly felt. Britain, although beginning in some areas from a significantly higher level of spending and intervention, has gone much further than Germany in reducing the state's responsibilities. Whilst the advent of Mrs. Thatcher rendered the expansion of the British welfare state almost impossible, Germany has continued until very recently with the expansion of the *Sozialstaat*, the introduction of nursing care insurance being one of the most significant recent examples.

So how real and significant are the differences? Plenty of work exists in comparative political culture that backs the assertion that this divergent political practice can be traced to significant differences in political culture. This work will be examined in Chapter one. However, it is not the purpose here to reiterate that the two political cultures are different, but rather to try to answer a deeper question: what, if anything, lies behind such differences? To phrase the problem in another way, is political culture really the simplest concept available to us to explain why German and British people and politicians behave so differently in similar situations, or can we dig deeper?

In the search for an answer, initial research spanned reviews of the policy-making process, history and political philosophy. The policy-making process was rapidly eliminated from the inquiry, since it is a much more high-level concept with roots in institutions, whose origins themselves require explanation. History tells us about the events that constitute the divergence in development, but it is only explanatory when some sort of framework is used to analyse the events and their consequences. This framework would be political culture, forcing us to ask, for example, how historical events contributed to making Britain's culture more deferential, or Germany's more bureaucratic. This is interesting, but it is ground that has already been covered. The objective here is to establish a framework at a lower level. Finally, political philosophy presents a chicken-and-egg problem, namely: how much is political philosophy itself a product of the differences one is trying to explain? Even if one can plausibly explain differences in political practice with reference to strands of political thought, it hardly seems reasonable to regard the philosophers as a point of origin, influenced only by previous generations of philosophers. Philosophy does not arise in a vacuum.

So what enduring factors underpin history and shape policy, and do so on a less conscious level than political philosophy? *Values* appeared very early on in the development of the research to be a key concept in understanding these issues; they have come to form the primary object of inquiry. Values, as fundamental and deep-rooted ideas about good and bad, right and wrong, normal and abnormal, desirable and undesirable, are perhaps the least-examined but perhaps most significant forces shaping policy. They are the axioms that are taken so much for granted that few ever think to question them. They are the frequently unexposed central guiding principles for thought and action, wrongly supposed to be universal and thus of little significance. Seeping into every institution and law, closing off potential avenues of thought and opening others, values are powerful ideas whose influence deserves more attention.

It was therefore decided to focus on values in policy-making, and, in particular, in the presentation and debating of policy. The presentation of policy can provide a unique window on the values of the target audience, in a way that no opinion polls or interviews could hope to do. It offers the chance to analyse the relationship between politicians and their target audiences, and the communication of values in this relationship. The proposal

of the research is to discover whether and how differences in values are related to differences in the making of social policy.

0.2. Objectives of the Research

Firstly, it should be stated what this study is not intended to do. It is not proposed to make any new contribution to research into social policy; nor is it proposed to add to the existing body of work comparing the political cultures of the two countries. Both of these paths have been well trodden before, and this study will only concern itself with reviewing the literature on these areas, in order to support the premise behind the hypothesis and to establish the background to the data which is being analysed.

What the study is intended to do is to discover, firstly, whether the value patterns in the data reflect systematic differences in the countries' political cultures; secondly, whether, as the hypothesis will propose, these differences match the consensus view in political culture research; and, thus, thirdly, whether underlying value difference might explain the different directions of policy. The main emphasis of the methodological discussion and of the data analysis will therefore be on an examination of such values, and on the development of the tools necessary to make such an examination possible. The development of the analytical framework is intended to pull in strands of both content analysis and linguistic analysis to assist in this effort.

Furthermore, although the detailed discussion of the method should not be pre-empted at this stage, it should be understood that the methodology is a critical part of the work. The data for the study will be existing texts of debates on health reform. Although there is certainly a substantial body of value research literature available, there is a very limited volume of work which attempts to analyse values in independently produced texts. Moreover, even those few existing studies concentrate on a limited range of analytical tools and exclude some other promising approaches. In particular, little attempt seems to have been made in previous studies to combine linguistic analysis and value research, and it is proposed here to broaden the scope of the analysis to include such methods. This has considerable implications for the structure of the thesis, because establishing the methodological framework for that aspect of the work will require considerable effort. This research will therefore not simply review existing analytical approaches and conduct an analysis of new data, but rather first establish a new analytical framework. Given the limitations imposed on length and scope, this implies shifting the balance somewhat

towards methodological considerations and away from the analysis of large quantities of data.

This methodological emphasis is strengthened by the complementary nature of the two analytical frameworks; each offers a different view of values and a different path to testing the hypothesis. The description of the method will therefore be concerned with outlining and justifying, firstly, an extended traditional approach to analysis and, secondly, a new linguistics-based approach. Such methodological considerations have thus become a major focus of the work, and so the results of the study will serve as much to highlight the comparative effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the new approaches as to support or invalidate the hypothesis.

0.3. Hypothesis

The hypothesis proposes that the language used to discuss and describe social policy reform in Great Britain and the Federal Republic of Germany, in selected debates from the post-war period, can serve as a window on the different values which underlie the formation of policy in each country in this period, values which have a significance not just in health policy, but in welfare policy as a whole and beyond. It will be seen that selected legislative debates on policy — one debate from each country on a significant recent reform proposal — have an underlying value appeal structure which goes beyond what is immediately obvious to the audience. Moreover, it will be demonstrated that the values in these debates differ across the countries in terms of both importance and controversiality, and that such patterns of differences reflect the differences known to exist between the two political cultures.

This hypothesis, if supported by further research, would have wider implications for political culture. Paradoxically, the existence of a dichotomous political culture in Great Britain, where there are frequent superficial shifts in policy, would be shown to be indicative of much more stable, permanent values which define attitudes towards politicians, politics and policy, just as in Germany the more consensus-oriented political culture is supported by its own foundation of values, similar in form but quite different in content. It has been argued that it is the absence or presence of a defining national ideology or myth, focusing on the delivery of political or economic objectives to legitimise the political system, which gives rise to the dichotomous and consensus models of political culture in Britain and Germany. The hypothesis is that an analysis of political discourse will not only

support this conclusion, but demonstrate the significant extent to which values act to shape these features of the political landscape.

0.4. Structure of the thesis

The first chapter will look at political culture research with two main objectives: to verify the premise of the hypothesis by showing that Britain and the Federal Republic have two contrasting political cultures; and to thereby establish the framework for interpreting the final results. It will do this by reviewing the relevant literature in the field and providing a brief view of some of the historical background.

The second chapter details the basis for selecting the texts for the corpus, explains the reasons for selecting health reform as a case study, lays out the justification for making the comparison, and explains some of the contextual differences which need to be controlled for as variables in the analysis, including the key systemic differences in the health care systems and the background to the reforms.

The third and fourth chapters set out the two distinct methods applied in the analysis, dealing, respectively, with the analysis of value appeals and the analysis of value appeal methods. They will review existing literature and outline the modifications and innovations in value analysis that will be applied in the work.

The fifth chapter will make some general remarks about coding and present and explain the results. This will be followed in chapter six by the conclusions of the thesis, covering the findings and methodology. Finally, the appendices will contain value definitions, coding conventions, details of the participants in the debates, copies of the relevant parts of the debates and the coding itself.

1. Political Culture and Value Research which specifically incorporates the

1.1. *The Relationship between Political Culture and Value Research*

There is a natural relationship between research into values and research into political culture, since the former can be, and frequently is, regarded as constituting an important part of the foundation for the latter. It is precisely this relationship that this research has set out to investigate, in seeking to establish whether the differences between the German and British political cultures, which are fairly broadly accepted, are reflected in values that underlie policy-making. Examining the concept of political culture and summarising the broadly shared views about the contrast between the two cultures therefore has two functions: firstly, to establish that the premise of the research is a valid one, and secondly, to sketch out the details of this contrast and thus the differences which one might expect to find when carrying out a value analysis.

1.2. *Defining Political Culture*

Political Culture is a concept whose definition has a troubled history. From relatively modest beginnings, when Almond et al. defined it as “patterns of orientation to political action” (Sontheimer 1990: 9), its popularisation led to an expansion of its frame of reference and application, famously prompting Kaase to compare defining political culture with an attempt to “nail a pudding to the wall” (Sontheimer 1990: 10 & Topf 1989: 52). In German political discourse in particular, the notion of political culture has become value-laden, such that it is possible to talk about “the lack of a political culture” (Greiffenhagen/Greiffenhagen 1993: 26).

Although political culture research attempts to avoid such value-laden definitions, there is still some disagreement about how the term should be defined. Culture is, by common consensus, a social artefact, and political culture must therefore be defined socially. Rohe questions the focus of the traditional view of political culture on attitudes to the political system, and on subjective orientations towards political phenomena and, drawing on the work of the Elkins and Simeon, advocates a definition centred on basic assumptions (*Grundannahmen*) about the political world:

[es soll] unter politische Kultur die für eine soziale Gruppe maßgebenden Grundannahmen über die politische Welt und damit verknüpfte operative Ideen verstanden werden, soweit sie sich mental und/oder habituell auskristallisiert haben. (Rohe 1994b: 1, cf. also Dörner/Rohe 1991: 40)

Shell also gives a definition from McClosky and Zaller which specifically incorporates the notion of value. It defines political culture as:

einen Komplex von breit akzeptierten Glaubenssätzen, Werten und Normen betreffend die Beziehungen der Bürger zu ihrem politischen System; und zueinander, insoweit diese öffentliche Angelegenheiten betreffen. (McClosky/Zaller in Shell 1989: 11).

This latter definition is interesting, because it includes the notions of values and norms, but by adding beliefs to the lists of defining features of political culture, it risks being somewhat too broad, if one accepts the general definition of “belief” given in psychology as being something specific and often trivial (Reich/Adcock 1976). Rohe’s definition is more powerful because it prevents the contours of political culture from being confused with the rapidly shifting landscape of attitudes to a political system, to political parties, or to particular governments (Rohe 1994b: 2), and therefore describes something less fluid and less prone to variation between the individuals in a political community. Rohe uses the notion of categories to flesh out his distinction between attitudes and assumptions: political culture research is less concerned with, for example, attitudes to a national community than with the question of whether people primarily think in “national categories”. Political culture is concerned with the categories which shape people’s thought about the political system, governments, parties, and so forth; it consists of something akin to a “kollektive Theorie des Politischen” (Rohe 1987: 40), which defines how problems are approached, how particular solutions are viewed, views which in turn reflect the past collective experience, especially that of crisis.

Political culture research is therefore not primarily concerned with the state of political opinion, but with the categories of thought which give rise to that opinion, and indeed, more broadly, those that define the “tramlines” within which the political system develops and thus, ultimately, the limits within which opinion can be formed and expressed. If one wishes to compare political cultures, therefore, one needs to examine something more durable than attitudes. The fact that citizens of one country, for example, vote more frequently at national elections for parties which describe themselves as “social democratic” than do citizens of another country would not alone suffice as empirical evidence of a difference in political culture. However, if such voting patterns reflected a difference in the view that citizens in the countries took about the proper role of a government, or about the appropriate way to approach the resolution of social or economic problems, then they might indeed be indicators of a difference in political culture. This distinction between

attitudes and assumptions reflects the distinction made in psychology and sociology between attitudes and values. To the extent that assumptions about the political world reflect a view either of how things should be, or how things must be, it is then reasonable to assume that there is a relationship between such fundamental assumptions of this kind and values, and that an analysis of the expression of values might therefore reveal something about those assumptions (Huppertz 1987: 68). Indeed, McClosky and Zaller's definition suggests that such values are an important component of political culture.

Nevertheless, the practical application of these distinctions to research is not entirely unproblematic; they are clear enough in theory, but when exposed to real data they can become rather blurred. One can in fact maintain that, however texts are analysed or questionnaires designed, real-world data can only ever provide direct information about attitudes, and that underlying assumptions and values can only be inferred from patterns in the expression, or non-expression of certain attitudes in certain configurations and contexts. This highlights a broader issue: although Rohe's definition of political culture locates it in the minds of the members of a political community, political systems, as Almond showed, are not made up of linear processes but rather of interdependent elements in a partially closed system (Berg-Schlosser 1972: 40). Thus, traditions inform the underlying assumptions of the community's members as well as the construction of the system's institutions; and those institutions, in part through the actions of governments and political parties, influence the actions, attitudes and ultimately, basic political assumptions of the electorate, while at the same time being constrained by them. It is therefore not only difficult to obtain reliable data about assumptions; it is also clear that there are other places to look when trying to map out the contours of political culture. Rohe points this out when he explains the limitations of the political culture concept; far from it being a "concept of concepts", it is merely one of many tools for explaining political phenomena.

Before mapping out an approach to analysing data in a way which might enable some safe inferences about values and assumptions to be made, some more preparatory work is therefore necessary. In the following sections, the two political cultures will be discussed against the background of historical and philosophical developments, and compared on the basis not just of work which has tried to measure attitudes and assumptions directly, but also of studies which have tried to identify the contrasts using more indirect evidence on political action. Three brief surveys will therefore be conducted. The first looks at the

historical background to the development of divergent political cultures in both countries before 1945, in the context of the formation of health and welfare policies; the second looks at the development of political culture in both countries since 1945, both through the measured assumptions and attitudes of the electorates and the behaviour of the political parties, and the third at an explanatory theoretical model.

1.3. The Historical Background to Social Policy Before 1945

The political cultures of Germany and Britain before 1945, as mirrored in the development of social policy, were distinguished by a different attitude towards the role of the state and thus the role of policy. In Britain, policy development tended to be increasingly characterised by moral rather than technical ideology, which mirrored the rise of Classical Liberalism, Radical Liberalism and then Socialism. Although Germany in part shared this intellectual climate, ideology played a different political role, and social policy remained governed primarily by pragmatic and technical considerations and thus less intimately connected with ideological conflict. The reasons for this lie in the quite different historical circumstances of the two states.

1.3.1. The German State and the Quest for National Unity after 1871

In Germany, not a unified state at all until 1871, a state possessing a turbulent past, a questionable identity and understandably fearing external threats to her territorial integrity, where in short the national question loomed large in politics throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, politicians had every reason to assume a more pragmatic approach to domestic issues. Following the establishment of the *Reich* the establishment of what Max Weber called the *innere[n] Einigung der Nation* assumed priority (Gall 1981: 643). Bismarck's politics in particular bore this imprint: his desire to foster unity – a concern which extended far beyond his hostility to democracy and his penchant for *staatssozialistische* experiments – led him to embrace ideas and pursue policies which one would not otherwise have expected from a conservative Junker. In his view, ideologies and doctrinaire politics were a luxury the *Reich* could not afford; the preservation of stability, primarily through appeasing or quelling dangerous opposition, took priority. Gall sums this up thus:

[Politik nach Bismarck] gehe um die Bewahrung des Bestehenden im Inneren wie nach außen und um die Macht und Integrität der deutschen Nation - das seien für ihn und seiner Politik die entscheidenden Bezugspunkte und Werte. Von dieser Basis aus sei er zu jeder Verhandlung und mancher Konzession bereit. (Gall 1981: 660)

Bismarck's ambitious social insurance schemes were just one element in this strategy (Hertz 1975: 360f., Ritter 1991: 65f. & Light 1986a: 4). Frerich confirms this when he quotes Pilz and Bull in viewing conflict reduction as one of the central defining features of the German view of the welfare state (Frerich 1996: 22).

The *Reichstag* contained a number of political groupings who might have wished to oppose this legislation. Indeed, a substantial element did vote against it, but it was composed largely of Socialists who feared a loss of electoral support and Liberals who, mostly, suspected Bismarck's motives (Hertz 1975: 361). A majority, including Conservatives, was however ready to support Bismarck because they accepted that the state should be an instrument for achieving its own objectives, a view which was not counterbalanced by a strong belief in personal liberty. The Prussian-dominated *Reich* represented the very antithesis of the state as a civil association, as a loose framework for allowing individuals to exercise their liberty – the Greek model which many classical Liberals held up as an ideal. Established on short wars of aggression, and enjoying only a fragile unity, the united Germany was fertile ground for those who wanted the state to take an active, interventionist role to shape society and minimise dissent (Ritter 1991: 66-67).

Liberalism was in particular diluted as an economic, social and moral ideology by nationalism and this concern over Germany's fragility. The National Liberals, Bismarck's allies in the 1870s, reflected both in their name and their parliamentary behaviour their ambiguity of purpose.¹ Popper and Carr both point out that nationalism for some (but by no means all) became tangled with the cause of freedom, and therefore with Liberalism, as a result of the French occupation of German territories (Popper 1966: 51f. & Carr 1991: 6-9, cf. also Hamerow 1969:144f.). Krieger expands on this hypothesis by showing how the authoritarian German state periodically acted to strengthen its links with semi-Liberal, semi-Nationalist sentiment, particularly through the three short wars under Bismarck, thus driving "constant wedges between the moderate, dualistic and radical tendencies in liberal politics" (Krieger 1957: 275ff.). Unquestionably, it also needs to be stressed that Germany's relative economic backwardness in the nineteenth century hurt the Liberal cause. Its middle class was smaller and the emerging industry of the *Reich* saw itself threatened by competition from other more developed economies. The development of economic policy

¹ Gall 1981: 664-669. The attitude of the parties to the Polish question in 1886 and their anxiety to court votes on a strong nationalist ticket in the forthcoming election illustrates this point.

during Germany's rapid phase of economic growth demonstrates for how little abstract economic theories counted against these interests. Agrarian and industrial concerns successfully lobbied the government to protect them from foreign competition and the government actively encouraged the formation of cartels and monopolies.² Liberals were occupied with putting together a national legal framework and other common standards which the economy demanded, a battle that British Liberals had begun many generations earlier (Hamerow 1969: 153 & Bullock/Shock 1956: xxii). Thus "Manchester School" Liberalism, with all its implications for social policy and the state's role in general, was handicapped from the beginning (Hamerow 1969: 54-59).

Any visionary energies which politicians did possess were typically absorbed, particularly after Bismarck's departure, by the national question, reinforcing the weakness of ideological thinking on domestic issues. This question was increasingly dominated by plans to expand and strengthen the Empire rather than merely consolidate it, a desire fuelled by the persistent fears of external threats to Germany's borders. William II's reign, encompassing the rise of the Pan-Germanic movement, international disputes and controversies over naval policy, illustrates perfectly the power of this unresolved national question to disrupt Germany's politics and shape her destiny. These tensions, having taken on new forms following the Versailles settlement, were to combine fatally with the by now well-established faith in state power to bring down the Weimar Republic. Following Hitler's accession to power, internal dissent, international isolation and the eventual conflict into which Germany's aggressive foreign policy plunged it ensured that the state resumed its role as an instrument for preserving and building national unity.

The development of social policy in the latter years of the Wilhelmine era and the Weimar period was again guided less by ideology than by a concern to hold the country together by alleviating potentially explosive social problems. The First World War saw a transition to a recognisably modern welfare state model, a development consciously driven "zum gesellschaftlichen Krisenmanagement" (Ritter 1991: 104). The development of the system continued after 1918, although handicapped by economic crisis and especially badly shaken after the crash of 1929, when drastic cuts were made to keep the system solvent (*ibid.*). After 1933, although social policy, like everything else, was used to promote and

² Krieger 1957, *loc. cit.* The National Liberals were also seduced by Bismarck's protectionist policies as the 1880s progressed, further illustrating how the national question directly acted to weaken an ideology; see also

implement National Socialist ideology, especially racial ideology, the role of ideology played a more limited role in shaping the system's development than the nature of National Socialism might suggest (*ibid.*: 135ff.). Markedly absent from National Socialist thinking was a coherent, rigid economic theory to match its racial and national ideology; instead corporatism, planning and controls were used together with free market elements to achieve the regime's objectives. Moreover, although National Socialism might superficially have seemed to represent a new social policy based on the *Volksgemeinschaft*, in fact that too was characterised less by a coherent ideology than by the need to integrate different social groups into the Nazi state, dampen down opposition and further the state's economic aims. The "ideal" of *Gemeinnutz vor Eigennutz* was in practice readily abandoned for pragmatic reasons, and National Socialism appeared in the end to be rather agnostic or, perhaps, contradictory in its approach to social questions.³ Hence, welfare policy was characterised by a large degree of continuity even under the Third Reich. This unprincipled approach was, of course, in part a survival strategy employed by a totalitarian state; it was however also in accordance with the pattern of German politics since Bismarck. The approach to welfare taken under the Bonn Republic has not diverged very far from this pattern. Just as the Ordo-Liberals acquired a strong dislike for economic planning and controls during the National Socialist period, they reflected and reinforced the historical tendency to recognise the promotion of social cohesion through a framework of state regulation as not merely morally desirable, but as a political necessity. Whether as a promoter of competition or a regulator of social conditions, the state was afforded a central role. The Bonn Republic's politicians were even less inclined than the ordo-liberals to consider either radical free market policies or heavy-handed state intervention in a country which had known so much instability.

This is not to imply that political ideology did not played a central role in German politics in this period: quite the reverse. It is rather to suggest that ideology was not primarily a means of lending philosophical coherence to reform programmes, but was used instead as a means of justifying political power (Rohe 1982b: 593). From Hegel's philosophy of the state in Prussia, to National Socialist ideology and the Social Market Economy, politicians

ibid.: 459-460.

³ The literature on this subject is too extensive to be mentioned here. Mason, however, looks in particular at the subject of "privatisation" (Mason 1978: 97ff.)

have employed ideology to describe and justify the role of the technical-bureaucratic state whilst pursuing largely agnostic social and economic policies.

1.3.2. From Classical Liberalism to Collectivism: The British State in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries

The origins of Liberal thought in Britain differ crucially from Germany in that the movement which gave birth to it, the struggle against arbitrary monarchical authority, was not diluted by nationalism. Instead, the revolutionary force stirring as the eighteenth century closed was economic growth. The Liberalism of Smith, Bentham and others was the reaction to this development and the problems it posed for contemporary government, and Britain's external stability allowed this new ideological force to grow unhindered. Moreover, Britain's advanced economic development fostered the growth of a larger middle class, which in turn favoured the development of Liberalism. Its adherents demanded freedom from government interference in their commercial affairs, and, at the same time, more political liberalisation to allow the middle classes a greater voice in government.

As the century progressed these forces mutually reinforced each other. Britain, the cradle of the industrial revolution, already dominated world manufacturing as Germany's own industrial development was getting underway. It is therefore unsurprising that she was ready to embrace liberal ideals of free trade and competition, since they manifestly worked in her interest. And the same voices making these demands insisted that the state's role should be strictly limited in every other sphere of activity, including social policy, since social ills could, it was thought, only be cured by economic means. Furthermore, Britain's very modernity as the leading industrial nation, and her unique geopolitical position, allowed the tendencies towards less bureaucratic and more limited government which had developed following the destruction of the royal bureaucracy and its replacement by "amateur" nobles to continue unchecked (Döring 1993: 61f.). state intervention was never needed to help industrial development, and a large bureaucracy was not required to administer a large land army, or to run the Empire, which had largely been founded on the activities of entrepreneurs and private companies (Rohe 1982a in Döring 1993: 62 & Huntington in Rohe 1982b: 590). The geographical and economic imperatives which forged a strong state tradition on the European continent were therefore absent, an accident of history which gave economic interests no reason to ask for state intervention, and every reason to demand that the state should stay out of their business (Rohe 1982b: 590f.). The strength of this movement resulted in a new Liberal Party being formed from the ranks of

the increasingly conservative Whigs, and with the Gladstone administrations the new Liberalism reached its zenith: nothing could illustrate more clearly the divergent paths of Liberalism in Germany and Britain than the accession to power of this individual, determined to set a high moral tone in both domestic and international affairs, while at all times remaining true to *laissez-faire* principles.

Towards the end of the nineteenth century the very factors that helped Liberalism to develop were, ironically, nurturing the beginnings of collectivism. Britain's pioneering role in industrialisation and the reluctance of the state to intervene to improve working conditions and alleviate distress meant that she suffered earlier and to a greater extent from the social ills of industrial society; it is no coincidence that Marx drew his inspiration from the condition of Britain's working poor. As the ranks of the working class grew and the agitation for electoral reform resulted in considerable extensions of the franchise, a radical post-Cobdenite wing of the Liberal party developed with a social agenda based on interventionism. Here, again, a high moral tone was set: from Joseph Chamberlain to Churchill and Lloyd George, the case was argued in terms of alleviating misery for its own sake. This theme was to recur constantly in British collectivism, right through until Wilson and his "moral crusade". Advocates of collectivism therefore tended, like their Old Liberal counterparts, to exhibit considerable ideological consistency: Liberal reformers frequently came to support all manner of government interventions, including economic *dirigisme*, Lloyd George and Beveridge being particularly clear examples (cf. in particular Greenleaf 1983: 142ff. and Ritter 1991: 149ff.). At the same time, the morality of state intervention tended to outweigh technical considerations; the technical-bureaucratic Socialism of the Fabians, although influential on Labour thinking, was an imported philosophy that struggled to take hold in the British political climate (cf. esp. Drucker 1974).

The state did not absorb the growing demands for social intervention by taking early action. Disraeli's "annus mirabilis" of largely permissive reform measures did not mark the beginning of a wave of reform; instead, the pace remained slow and the measures unsystematic and limited in scope. The absence of a "national" dimension — Britain was not a newly established nation, and there was no perceived threat from a nascent social democratic movement — meant that the moves lacked urgency and were tempered by the traditions of limited state intervention. The pressure for reform thus built up outside the Government, amongst reformers in the Liberal Party, a party that increasingly needed to sup-

plement its traditional support base with a greater share of the large working class vote, and in the emerging Labour movement; the debate remained politically polarised.

When the Liberals won the 1906 election, there followed a program of social reform that was more wide-ranging and comprehensive than anything attempted previously, and which included the establishment of a National Insurance scheme providing limited pensions and health care (cf. Ritter 1991: 91ff.). The centrepiece of the reforms, the 1909 Finance Bill, which provided the necessary funds through national insurance contributions and substantial increases in general taxation, illustrated the degree to which social reform, or more specifically, the extension of state intervention, remained a partisan issue. After the wrecking of a number of Bills by the Lords, Lloyd George placed a large number of radical measures into the 1909 Finance Bill, which was then rejected by the Lords, breaking 250 years of constitutional precedents. It was symbolic that this, Britain's most significant constitutional crisis of recent times, should not be triggered by economic problems or social unrest, but by the refusal of the nobility to accept the "thin end of a socialist wedge" of higher confiscatory taxation — notably on land, lessors and mining royalties — and Government intervention in social affairs.

Although the almost unbroken period of Conservative and Conservative-dominated Government in the twenties and thirties, punctuated only by short-lived and inexperienced Labour administrations, did not see a reversal of, or an end to, social reform, the Conservative creed of cautious change and "safety first" contrasted strongly with the burgeoning working class demands for radical change, demands which the interregnum of a second World War only served to strengthen (Levitt/Wall/Appelby 1995). The Labour victory of 1945 was thus not exceptional; instead it followed a pattern of radical change in Britain's political system. It reflected the Liberal victories in 1868 and 1906, and, much later, the Conservative victory of 1979, which all entailed almost paradigmatic shifts in the mood of the electorate and Government policy; it marked the high water mark of a collectivist ride which had begun to rise in the nineteenth century, and which retreated rapidly in the latter half of the twentieth. Each phase of these changes was marked by sharp political polarisation, followed by a gradual adjustment to the ascendant ideology; each shift was moreover characterised by the language of principle and morality, since at no point was this radical change tempered by a perceived threat to national unity or democracy.

1.4. Comparing German and British Political Cultures After 1945

1.4.1. A Summary of Post-War Developments

A complete analysis of the development of German — which will be taken to mean, until 1990, West German — post-war political culture is clearly inseparable from the question of how the experience of authoritarian and totalitarian government and the defeat of 1945 affected German views about the proper role of government and shaped attitudes towards the legitimacy of the post-war regime. However, a detailed analysis of the historical background would be beyond the scope of this work; this section will restrict itself to a brief survey of work on post-war German political culture, looking at four main distinguishing features that are held to characterise it.

A survey of British post-war political culture may seem to have fewer signposts to guide it than a survey of the German position, since the end of the war did not mark the collapse of one regime and its replacement by another, with a new constitution and political order. However, the landmark Labour victory of 1945 certainly marked an apparent break with the past; some even described it as a revolution (Harrington/Young 1978). This important political shift and the subsequent developments of the post-war period have offered analysts of political culture the chance to examine the nature of political change in Britain; whether that change has meant conforming to secular, increasingly global trends in policy and political philosophy, and thus changing underlying assumptions about, for example, the role of the state, or merely continuing patterns of political action consistent with the traditional features of British political culture.

1.4.1.1. Constitutional Consensus and Dissent

1.4.1.1.i. The Federal Republic

A major focus of political culture research, particularly on post-war Germany, is the existence and extent of constitutional consensus. This concerns both the commitment to the respective constitutions, and specifically to democratic government, and the existence of violent and non-violent forms of constitutional dissent, or “opposition of principle”.

The existence of a constitution is, in and of itself, indicative of a belief in a set of principles which are above current political trends or sectional conflicts, and which therefore place some limits on freedom of action. However, the German constitution has an especially strong emphasis, firstly, on the defence of the political order as a guarantee of rights and freedoms, rather than the defence of notions of absolute liberty, and, secondly, on the

enduring interests of the state as opposed to those of group or other interests; this is expressed through the superior position of the Constitutional Court in the constitution, and was underlined by its banning of two extreme left- and right-wing parties in the 1950s (Erdinger 1986: 173, Kirchheimer 1966: 243 & Döring 1993: 84). From early on in the Republic's history, other radical groupings which were, or might potentially have been, opposed to the democratic order remained marginalised, and, at least in the first half of the post-war period, posed little threat to it; in particular, the real but largely impotent right-wing rump has consistently failed to make much of an impression during most of the post-war years (Rudder/Sahner 1988: 57-58, Sontheimer 1990: 27, 31 & Minkenberg 1995: 257). This is reflected in wider assumptions about what constituted legitimate political activity: Kirchheimer, writing before 1967, speaks of a disdain for those who moved "outside recognised channels" in their political opposition (Kirchheimer 1966: 259).

This picture did change in the late sixties and early seventies, with the emergence of the *neue soziale Bewegungen*, who challenged the purely representative definition of democracy on which the political order had been built, and challenged the right of the state to take extraordinary measures to protect itself under the *Notstandsgesetze*. The extreme elements of the *Sozialistische Deutsche Studentenbund* (SDS) rejected parliamentarism, had a revolutionary Marxist agenda and were prepared to justify violence (Parness 1991: 88). That, in addition to the later terrorist activities of the *Rote-Armee-Fraktion* (RAF), posed the first serious threat to the democratic order, demonstrating not only a lack of faith by some in the post-war settlement, but also a willingness amongst a minority to see violence as a legitimate means of political opposition (Sontheimer 1990: 46). However, the rebellion was short-lived. The extremist elements of the *Außerparlamentarische Opposition* (APO) rapidly alienated the majority of the movement, and the focus of radical opposition quickly shifted from extra-parliamentary opposition to a "march through the institutions" (Parness 1991: 88). The RAF also proved to be without any substantial support base and quickly faded as a threat. Just as the long-term impact of these events on the level of political participation appears to have been limited, so they do not appear to have significantly weakened the constitutional consensus in the long term (cf. Conradt 1980: 223). After a period when nonconformist elements did strain the consensus, by the mid-eighties stability had returned and the non-violent elements of anti-establishment opposition had been

largely integrated into the parliamentary system (Sontheimer 1990: 31 & Kolinsky 1987b: 333ff.), making radical change unlikely (Erdinger 1986: 179).

1.4.1.1.ii. Great Britain

In Britain, although there is no single, formal, written constitution analogous to the German constitution, Britain does possess something referred to as a constitution. The British constitution is actually a series of individual statutes which govern various elements of the political structures, combined with constitutional precedent and tradition (Birch 1993). Although this, collectively, forms no less of a constitution than the FRG's Basic Law, it is clearly different in character and objectives. Its objectives are rather diffuse; they do not form any single, coherent strategy for shaping the political landscape, but are rather the expression of many generations of gradual change and development. Thus, any consensus around the constitution is a consensus around a system without a single set of governing principles.

There has been little violent or radical opposition to the British regime in the post-war period which would come under any definition of constitutional dissent. Violent opposition to the regime has been almost exclusively associated with the Northern Ireland problem, a quite special case and a focus of previous actual and threatened violent opposition to the constitution in the earlier part of the century. Since the focus of terrorist activity is the status of Northern Ireland within the Union, rather than the constitution of the Union itself, the Irish Republican Army and Sinn Fein cannot be said to have been engaged in constitutional dissent.

There has also been a broad constitutional consensus within the parliamentary system. Extremist elements on both sides of the political divide appear to have been almost totally excluded from electoral success, or accommodated within the extreme wings of the main two parties. No Members of Parliament (MPs) have been elected for extreme right-wing parties since the war, and the two Communist MPs elected in 1945 remain the only victories by the extreme left (Potter 1966: 11, 15).

Furthermore, although the sixties saw social and political change, Britain did not witness the student unrest, coupled with an organised anti-establishment movement, which West Germany experienced. Political change was largely accommodated by the political establishment, and no significant new political party was formed from a primarily anti-

establishment constituency. The only major changes in the party landscape — the creation of the Social Democratic Party and its eventual merger with the Liberals — took place firmly within existing party structures and largely involved existing members of those parties. Support for constitutional innovations has also been weak. Scottish and, to a lesser extent, Welsh devolution may be regarded as exceptions; although they have been on the political agenda since the late sixties and were turned down in referenda in 1979, their progress has partly held up by the Conservative majority in England (cf. Miller/Timpson/Lessnoff 1996: 420 & Kavanagh 1980: 157). Although devolution proposals for both countries have now passed into law, it is debatable to what extent this reflects widespread enthusiasm for constitutional change. Other attempts, mainly by smaller parties, to put constitutional change on the political agenda have generated scant interest amongst the electorate, even at times when the government was suffering from record unpopularity. The lukewarm reception to proposals for English devolution and the widespread apathy towards devolution in Wales suggest that constitutional dissent is largely restricted to Scotland.

Both countries thus show a similarly strong consensus around their constitutions, measured by the existence of and support for radical or violent opposition, whereby, however, the levels of unrest and dissent in Germany were higher in the mid post-war period, indicating the existence, at least for a time, of a lingering potential in the political culture for constitutional dissent. However, the nature of the British constitution makes the British consensus somewhat different in character to that in Germany. The British appear to have accepted a system which works through gradual adjustment to circumstances, whereas the Germans have accepted one which is founded on what is seen as an enduring set of guiding principles.

1.4.1.2. System Performance and System Legitimacy

1.4.1.2.i. The Federal Republic

This evidence on constitutional consensus is supported by other findings on the question of the source and endurance of system legitimacy. This concerns, firstly, the extent to which expressed satisfaction with the regime indicates a strong and durable commitment to the political order or merely temporary satisfaction with system outputs and, secondly, therefore, the extent to which expressed dissatisfaction indicates merely temporary

dissatisfaction with the government's performance or more deeply-seated hostility to the system.

One of the most common themes in the analysis of the post-war German view of the state is the idea that system performance has played a key role in maintaining legitimacy. The fact that a new, untried political regime was set up after the war, and that it had been preceded by great political instability, in particular during the Weimar period, naturally created doubts about the source and endurance of the system's legitimacy. The post-war German state became associated with the successful management of the economy even before the official creation of the second Republic, and the Social Market Economy concept — part economic theory, part political myth — was intimately connected with the Republic's birth. The legendary status of the currency reform of 1948, with its supposedly miraculous role in creating the German "economic miracle", was packaged as an achievement of this "Social Market Economy", which in turn became part of the founding mythology of the Federal Republic (FRG) (Haselbach 1994: 1-2). The legitimacy of the new regime — which at first was viewed with ambivalence (Sontheimer 1990: 25) — was built on its apparent competence in fulfilling the functions of rebuilding Germany's shattered infrastructure and creating a new prosperity (Haselbach 1994: 9). This orientation of the electorate towards the "outputs" of the political system (Müller 1991: 7), whereby politics is defined as "die Produktion, Distribution und Allokation von (materiellen und immateriellen) öffentlichen Gütern", is what Rohe refers to as a "policy culture" (Dörner/Rohe 1991: 55), and elements of it still form part of German political culture. It dovetails neatly with a broader conceptualisation of the state as an institution with a primarily technical function (Opp de Hipt 1987: 408 & Dörner/Rohe 1991: 57).

There is, however, some dispute as to how far the ongoing satisfaction with the democratic system expressed in surveys since the war is, and has been, solely dependent on the fulfilment of its output functions. Almond and Verba's Civic Culture survey of 1959, although proceeding from an attitude-based theory of political culture, supported the idea that the legitimacy of the German regime was dependent on system, primarily economic, performance, at least to a greater extent than in the other countries surveyed (Conradt 1980: 217-218, cf. also Ritter 1991: 160), although Rohe rightly distinguishes, within Almond and Verba's "system affect" variable, between a richness of symbolic and emotional attachment to the political system, and a store of "trust capital" which can carry a system

through troubled times (Rohe 1982b: 586). Almond and Verba's interpretation does, however, receive some support from Sontheimer (Sontheimer 1990: 25) and Fuchs' analysis of other data suggests that there is some evidence that, even in the later post-war period, expressions of satisfaction with the system in Germany are very likely to be dependent to some degree on its performance (Fuchs 1987: 367). It is a moot point whether the system has yet faced any crisis that has called on an accumulated store of "trust capital", and which would suggest a weakening of this link. The first two recessions experienced by the Republic — in the mid-sixties and mid-seventies — were mild, especially in comparison to the experience of some other countries (Sontheimer 1990: 42). Nevertheless, Conradt looks at data which shows something of an increase in unconditional support for the system, in particular survey evidence that an increasing number of those judging the performance of parliament negatively still believed it to be a necessary institution (Conradt 1980: 224-225, also Kolinsky 1991: 36); he concludes that "the influence of performance as a predictor of support for the civic culture has probably decreased since the late 1950s" (*ibid.*: 263). Furthermore, the system has apparently absorbed a recent, sharper economic downturn, and relatively high rates of unemployment, without any strong manifestations of dissent, although it is clearly too early to pass any final judgement on the effect of these events on levels of system support.

1.4.1.2.ii. Great Britain

The very fact that Britain's political regime has survived for so long without even attempted coups or revolutions, and coped with the dislocations and trauma of two major wars in this century, suggests that system legitimacy in Britain is likely to have at least some deeper foundations than short-term assessments of system performance. Kavanagh, analysing post-war survey data, does note significant correlations between system performance and expressed satisfaction levels with the parties and the authorities. However, he concludes that this measurement reflects, using Easton's terminology, "specific" political support — i.e. support for the governing party — rather than "diffuse" political support, and that there is no evidence of a decrease in one leading to a decrease in the other (Kavanagh 1980: 152-153). He also reports findings from a Royal Commission survey in 1970 which discovered a difficulty amongst respondents in differentiating between support for the authorities and support for the regime (*ibid.*: 153). This finding could, of course, be interpreted both ways: either as indicating that assumptions about the nature of British

government are so deeply rooted that few are capable of reflecting on them, or that identification between the authorities and the system is total. Topf's analysis of other, more recent, survey data, though, tends to support the conclusion that the two variables are not correlated: despite widespread evidence of political cynicism, little support was expressed for specific proposals for constitutional change, even by some of the most cynical (Topf 1989: 60).

The findings do therefore broadly support the evidence on constitutional consensus. There is a greater probable dependence between system legitimacy and performance in the FRG than in Britain, but, just as the constitutional dissent experienced by West Germany in the late sixties and seventies has faded, the data also suggests a decline in this dependence and thus a convergence between the two countries. Nevertheless, the FRG may not yet have experienced conditions that genuinely test system legitimacy.

1.4.1.3. *Political Participation*

1.4.1.3.i. The Federal Republic

Another common theme in the discussion of Germany's post-war political culture is the relatively low level of individual involvement with the political process, or engagement in political activity. Sontheimer describes the German population in the early years as being largely indifferent to politics and withdrawing into their own private spheres (Sontheimer 1990: 25). This is again reinforced by the findings of Almond and Verba's Civic Culture survey in 1959. The survey's discovery of low levels of active membership in voluntary associations with political concerns, and a detached, practical and "probably overpragmatic" view of politics and politicians offers strong evidence for such an orientation (Conradt 1980: 217-219), at least in the first half of the post-war period. Gluchowski, Plasser and Ulram call on a wide range of research to confirm this view of a largely politically withdrawn citizenry and a comparatively low level of party-political organisation in the early post-war period (Gluchowski/Plasser/Ulram 1991: 159 & Berg-Schlosser/Schissler 1987: 23).

After the mid-sixties, the student protests and the *Basisdemokratie* movement seemed to mark a shift towards a more participatory model of democracy. Although APO was short-lived, it helped give rise to a number of more permanent changes: firstly, the wave of *Bürgerinitiativen*, which was strengthened by disappointment with the reforms of the SDP-FDP coalition, and secondly, the emergence of the Green Party, which was strongly associ-

ated with the *Bürgerinitiativen* and the anti-atomic power campaign in particular (Parness 1991: 97-103). The Greens have enjoyed considerable electoral success, entering the *Bundstag* in 1983, sharing power at local and *Land* level and joining the new coalition government in 1998 (*ibid.*: 112-115), whilst *Bürgerinitiativen* and street protests on environmental and other issues have become common manifestations of grass-roots political activity (Sontheimer 1990: 37-38).

However, the long-term effects on the political system are unclear: the emergence of direct political activism and the entry of the Greens into the political establishment certainly do not seem to have increased levels of conventional participation, in view of a dramatic decline in party membership in all established parties in the late 1980s (Gluchowski/Plasser/Ulram 1991: 177). Furthermore, these same parties continue to dominate the political system; no coherent alternative concentration of political support has emerged. Indeed, a significant motivating factor for the Greens' greater engagement with parliamentary politics was the realisation that most of their members were not active and that *Basisdemokratie* was therefore not working (Parness 1991: 115).

At the beginning of this chapter, Rohe's definition of political culture was given, which suggests that it comprises a set of "basic assumptions" about the political world and ideas related to it. The extent to which the continuity in political participation reflects a continuity of such "basic assumptions" about the relationship between citizen and state is open to question. For the purposes of an analysis of policy-making as an output of political culture, it must be assumed that this continuity does exist, since policy-making takes place within the conventional political structures; any dissonance between the political establishment and a developing "alternative" political culture would be a subject for further research. Furthermore, despite the existence of significant alternative groupings, there is evidence for this continuity, and evidence that the *neue soziale Bewegungen* have not caused a dramatic shift in this variable of German political culture. Movements which at first challenged the establishment have now been themselves largely integrated into it, either through the new political parties, such as the Greens, or through the selective absorption of their rhetoric and programmes into that of the mainstream parties (Sontheimer 1990: 30 & Parness 1991). At the same time, those who remain outside the political establishment and within the alternative milieus show an unwillingness to become involved in the structures of mainstream politics, and therefore demonstrate a form of political with-

drawal that is consistent with the post-war pattern. Sontheimer, in particular, criticises Greiffenhagen for drawing unwarranted conclusions from the existence of the *Basisdemokratie* movement and its successors. Greiffenhagen supposes that such developments indicate that:

das demokratische Bewußtsein des Volkes sei ungleich höher entwickelt, als es im politischen Handeln der Institutionen zum Ausdruck kommt. (Sontheimer 1990: 45)

This begs the question, namely, of where political culture is “located”. One must be consistent in deciding what significance to assign to different indicators of political culture; it is not unreasonable to assume that the minority support for the Greens reflects the limited support for the more participatory model which they advocate, a model which, as noted above, does not always find practical application amongst the party’s own members. Dörner and Rohe’s comparative analysis of political lexis also provides peripheral supporting evidence of an ongoing detachment between the concept of the state and the notion of personal political participation (Dörner/Rohe 1991: 48). The changes wrought by APO, the rise of the Greens and the *Bürgerinitiativen* are real and certainly make Almond and Verba’s original findings outdated, but their effects have been less of a radical democratisation of politics than a movement towards the normalisation of political participation in line with other western democracies (cf. also Berg-Schlosser/Schissler 1987: 23 & Rohe 1982b: 586).

1.4.1.3.ii. Great Britain

Whilst there is only weak evidence for a significant shift in the Federal Republic towards a more participatory political culture since the 1960s, the evidence for significantly higher levels of political participation or engagement in Britain is also lacking. Although the sixties saw a wave of protests and other forms of “direct” political action, especially in universities, Britain has not seen anything comparable to Germany’s *Basisdemokratie* movement or the growth of citizens’ initiatives to achieve local political objectives (cf. Birch 1993). Furthermore, the decline in party membership amongst the young as experienced in Germany is a trend mirrored in many western democracies. In Britain, party membership has shown a long-term downward trend, and while there has been recent strong growth in membership of one party (Labour), it has been accompanied by a dramatic decline in the membership and local organisation of the other main party, the Conservatives. Levels of party membership have been relatively high, at least until very

recently, but the evidence shows that the majority of members remain inactive (Birch 1993: 63-66).

In the wider electorate, British data also reflects a similar pattern to that in the Federal Republic, namely a combination of political disengagement, in the form of a large numbers of respondents in surveys who expressed low interest in political affairs (Topf 1989: 59 & Kavanagh 1980: 154), and a preparedness to participate more directly in political action, whether through demonstrations, signing petitions or simply writing letters to the local MP (Topf 1989: 59-61).

In both countries, therefore, there is a relatively low level of conventional political participation, measured by interest in following the activities of the major parties or being active members in them, accompanied by a greater willingness to become involved in more direct action. The differences that exist — somewhat higher levels of conventional participation in Britain and significantly higher levels of “direct” participation in Germany — do not support the notion of a much less developed sense of the individual’s role in German political culture.

1.4.1.4. *Cross-Party Consensus and Co-operation*

1.4.1.4.i. The Federal Republic

A further important variable concerns the nature and extent of opposition or consensus within the party system. The behaviour of political parties cannot provide direct evidence about the assumptions underlying the political attitudes of an electorate, but where that behaviour demonstrates consistent patterns and contrasts with that of parties in other political cultures, it can offer some reliable indicators about a country’s political culture.

It is frequently observed that Germany’s broad constitutional consensus has been mirrored by a greater degree of consensus amongst political parties than seen in many other western democracies. That is not to assert that Germany’s political parties have not engaged in vigorous political competition; some have described the behaviour of the German parties as exceptionally partisan, reflecting a greater degree of conflict orientation than seen in the broader population (Loewenberg 1961: 102 & Gluchowski/Plasser/Ulram 1991: 159). However, political competition is not necessarily synonymous with opposition. Kirchheimer — writing before the events of 1967 and in the context of the *Große Koalition* — distinguished between three concepts: “opposition of principle”, which consists of

radical opposition to the existing political order, “loyal opposition”, which he defines as an opposition to the government based on a substantial difference in ends or means, and “political competition”, which is defined as a largely unprincipled struggle between parties to fill the available posts and do essentially the same job. He views the latter as setting the tone for much of the party political activity during the first two decades of the second Republic, and suggests that the climate in Germany since Bismarck has favoured the two extremes of either opposition of principle or political competition. Kirchheimer is no doubt strongly influenced by contemporary events when he speaks of Germany’s “vanishing opposition” and describes the tendency to look for consensus on major questions of policy as the outcome of political competition (Kirchheimer 1966: 256). His scathing assessment of the SPD strategy in opposition, in particular, seems to stretch the theory of political competition by extrapolating too far from the political atmosphere of the mid-sixties:

SPD energies are all bent to enhancing the chances for a permanent cut-in on the governmental organisation. (Kirchheimer 1966: 256)

Nevertheless, the contention that the behaviour of the parties is characterised by a large degree of consensus on the major issues, and a tendency towards compromise, is widely supported. Gluchowski, Plasser and Ulram speak of a “basic consensus” which encompasses an increasingly large part of economic policy as well as the fundamentals of the constitution and the democratic order (Gluchowski/Plasser/Ulram 1991: 159, also Kolinsky 1991: 50-51).

There is plenty of evidence that supports this view. The behaviour of both governments and opposition has indicated a broad consensus around the free market as the basis of the economic order. The Christlich-Demokratische Union (CDU), after a brief flirtation with nationalisation in the late forties (cf. Pütz 1978: 74-75), and the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD), after the abandonment of the remnants of their Marxist programme in the *Godesberger Programm*, and in particular their vastly scaled-down ambitions for public ownership and Lassalian acceptance of working within the *Grundgesetz*, offered no fundamental challenge to the economic order established by the currency reform, either by offering a coherent alternative economic theory or through attempts at large-scale government intervention (Parness 1991: 66-71 & Kirchheimer 1966: 241-242). Both parties, in government, have pursued conservative fiscal and monetary policies (Erdinger 1986: 180). The Freie Demokratische Partei (FDP), the junior coalition partner in most of the FRG’s

post-war Governments, has always had a particular affinity with the Liberal principles of the free market and competition (cf. Lösche/Walter 1996). Erdinger also notes a lack of ideological orientation and a strong streak of pragmatism in the main parties, especially the CDU/CSU, and notes the strong pressures on the SPD to compete with the CDU/CSU on the basis of managerial competence rather than by offering a doctrinaire alternative programme, despite the party's Marxist traditions and their sometime commitment to revolutionary change (Erdinger 1986: 177-179).

Although the SPD was returned to power in 1969 on a programme of reform, its radicalism was a great deal more modest than its slogans suggested. Its promises to increase growth and exports, prompted largely by the modest recession of the 1966-67, were essentially bland and largely free of the language of planning or intervention; genuine reforms were restricted mainly to educational and foreign policy (Parness 1991: 97-100). And in foreign policy, too, there has also been a broad-based, if shifting, consensus between successive governments: Erdinger notes that both parties pursued greater trade links with communist countries in the cold war era and that the *Ostpolitik* of the SPD-FDP coalition, although opposed by the CDU/CSU in opposition, was continued by the governing coalition after 1982 (*ibid.* & Conradt 1980: 223, 236).

This consensus was expressed as much in the willingness of both parties to intervene in social affairs through the expansion of welfare provision as it was through economic conservatism, as Alber demonstrates by studying social welfare policy during the post-war period. Whilst increases in the level of welfare spending and the volume of social legislation passed do reflect a disproportionate role for the Social Democratic-Liberal coalition in expanding the welfare state, an analysis of voting patterns in parliament reveals that only five out of thirty-eight major pieces of legislation which increased social spending were opposed by the leading opposition party. In two of those five cases, the opposition wanted a higher level of spending, and only in one case was there any principled opposition to the increase in benefits; most opposition to welfare legislation was directed against cuts in existing benefits (Alber 1989: 256-263). This is not to suggest that the social policies of the two main parties were not based on quite different views about the appropriateness and function of welfare benefits and other social spending — Alber emphasises that the SPD and CDU/CSU had somewhat different objectives in this area — but that the ideological

differences made relatively little difference to policy-making, in particular when compared with the situation in Britain (*ibid.*: 264-266 & Döring 1989b: 67).

These conclusions are supported by the work of Opp de Hipt, who has analysed images of the state in the party programmes of the SPD and CDU from 1959 to 1980. He finds significantly different patterns which, superficially, indicate a traditional left-right divide: the main themes of the CDU relate to a fear and distrust of state power, and to restraint by the state in its social intervention, whereas the SPD's most frequently used images are of a state which guides, plans and monitors. However, he concludes that the language of planning used by the SPD does not correspond to any concrete demands for state intervention in the Socialist sense (Opp de Hipt 1987: 404-405). Similarly, although the SPD's concerns about state "efficiency" had their origins in a desire to maintain the state's active social role, an objective which the CDU ostensibly did not share, anxieties about the possible limits of the state's capacity to meet democratic demands were shared by both parties. Another shared image is that of the state as a caring institution which protects its citizens, either through social welfare (SPD), or by shielding them from (unnamed) dangers (CDU) (*ibid.*: 407). What is striking is not that there are substantial differences in the expressed objectives, but that in terms of concrete policies, and in terms of the central role afforded to the state, the parties are so close — much closer than the two main British political parties during the same period. This is true even in the 1970s, when German politics is generally held to have become much more polarised. Opp de Hipt concludes that his findings reflect:

[den] allgemeinen Trend weg von der philosophischen und hin zur sozialwissenschaftlichen Betrachtung des Staates (*ibid.*: 408)

The *Wende* of 1983, although marking a swing back to the right, did not mark the end of this broad consensual approach or anything resembling Thatcherism. Although the CDU/CSU-FDP coalition did reduce social spending as a proportion of GDP (Alber 1989), the *Volkspartei* traditions of the senior coalition partner, perhaps embodied in the policies of Kohl's long-serving Minister Norbert Blüm, did not provide the ideological basis, the inclination, or the support for a "slash and burn" attack on the welfare state (cf. Ritter 1991: 212), and the role of the free market's *Tempelhüter* has largely been assigned to the FDP, who have been alone in abandoning, at least in theory, a moderate social-liberal position for out-and-out neo-liberalism (Lösche/Walter 1996: 115-120). It is significant that the FDP, who suffered something of an exodus of Bundestag deputies and members after

their shift to the right, have also suffered a long-term decline in local organisation and electoral support, disguised for a time by the popularity of Genscher. Especially in the east of the newly unified Germany, but not only there, the FDP's increasingly hard-line neo-liberalism has found little echo in the electorate, despite rising unemployment and considerable unease, especially in the business community, about the viability of the welfare state (*ibid.* & Søe 1995). Added to that has been a marked contrast between the liberal rhetoric and the FDP's identification with sectional interests and half-hearted compromise; its failure to defend its own — not especially popular — principles has cost it credibility and thus more support (Lösche/Walter 1996: 122).

This leaning towards consensus, and sometimes even inter-party co-operation, is clearly strengthened by the Federal system and the electoral system (Scheuner 1974: 427-428). The Federal system, in particular through the strength of the second, revising chamber, the *Bundesrat*, militates against an all-powerful executive and forces the government to seek more broadly-based support for its proposals. This is then accentuated by an electoral system based partly on proportional representation, which usually prevents single parties from obtaining overall majorities and makes it necessary to form coalitions. Oppositions tend to be regarded as “co-governments” rather than “alternative governments”, exercising “control through co-operation”, a role which may be strengthened by the low status of parliament and parliamentary opposition in Germany's pre-war history (Kolinsky 1987b: 320). However, Busch lends support to Kirchheimer's suggestion that the opposition is also motivated by electoral considerations in seeking to work with the government; he refers to a:

grundsätzlich auf Kooperation und Kompromiß angelegten Strategie der Opposition, die sich — nicht zuletzt im Blick auf den Wähler — einer konstruktiven Mitarbeit an der staatsleitenden Aufgabe der Gesetzgebung nicht versagen will. (Busch 1991: 50, cf. also Heinzerling 1989: 124)

The German electorate generally dislikes opposition for its own sake and are suspicious of the theatre and grand oratory of ideology and ideological opposition, which is clearly not unrelated to the bitter experience of the National Socialist era. This is inevitably reflected in the behaviour of politicians. Erdinger notes the sobriety of the CDU/CSU in particular (Erdinger 1986: 177) and Loewenberg comments on the unimportance in German politics, in comparison to British politics, of oratorical skills, reflected in the requirements placed on potential candidates and in the behaviour of parliamentarians (Loewenberg 1969: 455).

The popularity of centrist politics also forces parties onto the same ground. Great importance is attached by the two main parties to their image as *Volksparteien* — parties with very broad appeal, reflecting the concerns of the majority, and not embracing radicalism at either end of the political spectrum — which in turn reflects a strong preference among the electorate for the middle ground. The welfare state is decidedly part of this middle ground in German politics. Döring notes research which demonstrates a somewhat higher expectation in Germany than Britain that the state should take responsibility for the minimisation of income differences (Döring 1993: 66-67), and Collier, wryly noting that the SPD slogan at the 1994 German elections might have been “It’s the entitlements, stupid!”, comments:

Cutting social benefits or subsidies is at least as dangerous to a person’s political health in the Federal Republic as is raising taxes or cutting social security pensions in the United States. (Collier 1995: 274; cf. also Ritter 1991: 217)

This reflects what Erdinger notes is the German view of the state as something “akin to a corporation”, where the parties are different sets of “governing managers” (Erdinger 1986: 173). There is broad agreement about what products and services this corporation should offer, and competition is therefore generally limited to disagreements about means, rather than ends.

1.4.1.4.ii. Great Britain

The picture in Britain appears to be very different. The first election after the war, which returned a huge Labour majority with a programme of welfare reform and nationalisation, set a radical tone for post-war politics. The scope of nationalisation measures, including the Bank of England, the coal, gas, steel and electricity industries and, of course, as part of the establishment of the NHS, the entire hospital service, were far-reaching and, apparently, totally at odds with traditional Conservative thinking. The ambitious public spending programmes, including not merely the NHS but also other aspects of the welfare state, largely as envisaged in the Beveridge Report, and the housing programme, represented considerable qualitative and quantitative extensions of the state’s responsibilities, as did a commitment to Keynesian demand management as a means of maintaining full employment (Eckstein 1958: x, Honigsbaum 1989: 35-37 & Beer 1956: 17).

There was, however, even during this period, evidence for consensus. The Conservative-led wartime coalition had broadly accepted the principles of the Beveridge Report and committed itself to a National Health Service in some form (Pelling 1984: 97, Honigsbaum

1989: 86-93, Beer 1956: 12 & Beer cited in Crewe/Searing 1988: 378). Furthermore, many of Labour's nationalisation measures were, ironically, responses to reports from Conservative-led committees and based on the public corporation model used in the creation of the BBC by Baldwin's government in the 1920s (Eckstein 1958: x-xi). The demands of the war and of post-war reconstruction had inevitably created something of an interventionist role for the state in many areas (*ibid.*: x), and there were elements of Conservative opinion which accepted that (*ibid.* & cf. Crewe/Searing 1988). The Conservative administrations that followed the 1945-1951 Labour governments did reverse some of Labour's measures, but there was no dramatic reversal of the main planks of social policy, as some had feared (Birch 1993: 69 & Webster 1994: 65). Although Webster does emphasise the different emphasis by the Conservative administrations on retrenchment, and their contemplation of radical changes to the NHS, including MacMillan's flirtation with insurance-based financing, his claim that there was no consensus in the early post-war period is based on an assessment of inclinations, intentions and preferences rather than on concrete policy outputs (*ibid.*: 56-72). In terms of actual policy, a combination of public opinion and political consensus, although playing different roles for the two main parties, acted to produce a *de facto* policy consensus on most issues (cf. Beer 1956: 20-21). The Conservatives did not, as Webster suggests, have a monopoly on violating the NHS's founding principles, principally through the introduction of various forms of charges. Labour was forced to introduce prescription charges soon after the creation of the NHS, and their abolition by Wilson's first administration had to be reversed following the sterling crisis in the second. Many of Labour's policies were tempered by pragmatism, and did not reflect earlier, much more radical pre-war proposals, which had included much more nationalisation, including the nationalisation of land (cf. Beer 1956: 12ff.). At the same time, the welfare state was maintained, most of the nationalised industries remained nationalised until the eighties, and Keynesianism became the new treasury orthodoxy and remained so until the early seventies (Döring 1993: 87; Birch 1993: 70 & Beer 1956: 17-18).

The Wilson administrations did, however, mark something of a change. There was a new emphasis on peacetime economic planning in the new Labour programme, with the objective of "modernising" Britain, of which Brown's National Plan was an infamous part. There were attempts to establish prices and incomes policies and ambitious plans for the further expansion of social services (Kavanagh 1980: 155). The failure of economic plan-

ning and the problems which the state's new interventionist role was creating began to create a shift in the Opposition's thinking which was first expressed in the early seventies. The first stirrings of this more radical movement emerged in the Heath administration, when Heath promised to move away from interventionist prices and incomes policies and adopt a more market-oriented approach. His betrayal of these promises and the new interventionist heights reached by his prices and incomes policies, in particular, together with huge industrial relations problems and the economic shock of the first oil crisis, marked less the high point of the consensus than the point of its collapse (Kavanagh 1980: 157; Birch 1993: 70 & Döring 1993: 87).

Mrs. Thatcher's election as leader of the Conservatives in 1975 marked a decisive shift (Birch 1993: 70). Her election did not mark a wave of enthusiasm for a Thatcherite programme — there is a widely held view that she was elected “not because she held [Thatcherite] views, but largely despite the fact that she held them” (King 1983 in: Crewe/Searing 1988: 371) — but it prepared the ground for the demolition of the already crumbling post-war settlement. Keynesianism had already run into problems due to high unemployment and high inflation, and the Labour administration of the late seventies was forced to experiment with monetarism and impose large public spending cuts. When the Thatcher government took office, it had a programme that, at the very least, was highly controversial (cf. Crewe/Searing 1988: 375 & Döring 1993: 87-88). The ensuing emasculation of the trade unions, large scale privatisations, deflationary budgets, the full-blooded, if short-lived, implementation of monetarist theory (including the abandonment of full employment as a policy objective), an aggressive foreign policy, shifts from direct to indirect taxation, cuts in the welfare state and the sale of council houses amounted to a programme which was arguably more radical and ambitious than the programme of the 1945 Labour administration, and which was not based on any measure of consensus (Crewe/Searing 1988: 376-377). Indeed, the first years of the Thatcher administration saw Labour move further to the left, before Kinnock's election of leader began a process of adjusting to the new Conservative climate created by Thatcherism (*ibid.*: 379).

It could be claimed that Labour's process of adjustment to Thatcherism has created a new consensus, especially on economic policy, but also on the broad principles of many aspects of social policy. It is also interesting to note that the NHS has survived even Thatcherism as an object of broad consensus, despite the reforms of 1989 and plans, even-

tually abandoned, for more radical changes which reflected some of MacMillan's earlier ideas (Birch 1993: 71 & Döring 1993: 64). However, the picture that emerges, when compared to post-war Germany, is not of a continuous conflict between two diametrically opposed ideologies, but of gradual movement by government and opposition from financial and economic orthodoxy and limited social intervention, which started in the early years of the century, to collectivist and interventionist policies, followed by a fairly sharp move back to financial and economic orthodoxy and a substantial trimming of the state's responsibilities (cf. Döring 1993: 86⁴). In each case, one or more parties have led the change (in the early 1900s, primarily the Liberals) and the other has followed some way behind (cf. Potter 1966: 28-29 & Crewe/Searing 1988: 378).

At each stage in the process, the role played by the Opposition has been quite different from that of the Opposition in Germany. The Opposition has a distinct role in the political system, which has its origins in the eighteenth century, and which first began to resemble the modern system of "loyal opposition" in the 1860s (Potter 1966: 4-15). Confrontations between the two main parties are adversarial, a point underlined by the design of the House of Commons, where the two main leaders are separated by a distance equivalent to two sword-lengths. The system favours the settlement of political questions through a dialectical struggle between Government and Opposition, an approach which, notably, is mirrored in the legal system (Döring 1993: 84-85). Döring, drawing on the work of Low, Loewenstein and others, compares the continental view of political disputes regulated by principles with the British view of political disputes as a kind of game, in which two opposing sides continually fight it out (*ibid.*, 84-86).

The title and salary that the Leader of the Opposition has acquired reflects the perception that opposing the government of the day is a duty and a necessary counterweight against the unlimited constitutional power of a Government with an overall majority (*ibid.*). This constitutional position is, of course, reinforced by precisely that power, which is afforded Governments by the electoral system. The absence of strong local or federal government structures, and of an elected revising second chamber, which could provide alternative centres of power to the Government, as in the Federal Republic, and the regular

⁴ Döring notes that the number of laws passed with the votes of the opposition in Britain, at least before the Thatcher administration, matches that in Germany, lending weight to the notion of radical shifts in consensus rather than radicalism replacing consensus (Döring 1993: 86).

acquisition of overall majorities, avoiding the necessity of forming coalitions, shuts the opposition out of government and encourages the development of its role as an “alternative Government”. The endorsement, through an election victory, of radical alternatives developed in opposition, a victory whose extent is almost always massively exaggerated by the voting system, then allows their largely unhindered implementation in Government. The Opposition thus ebbs and flows between adjusting itself to the programme established by one party with a strong majority, and developing and implementing its own radical alternative. This system has remained largely intact during the post-war period, despite the short-lived resurgence of a third force in the form of the Alliance in the mid-eighties (Denver 1991). In this sense, Webster is right to question the post-war consensus, because it was founded on the expedient adjustment to a temporary consensus rather than on a long-term cross-party consensus on the basic principles of policy. This situation contrasts strongly with post-war politics in the FRG, where the shifts to the left and right have been much less pronounced, the parties staying clustered around a middle-ground consensus, rather than following each other from collectivism to economic liberalism.

1.4.2. A Theoretical Model

Although it is not the primary purpose of this study to explain the differences in political culture briefly surveyed in the last section, a consideration of some relevant theoretical work will help in drawing these disparate strands together and arriving at broader conclusions about what divides German and British political cultures.

1.4.2.1. Conventionalistic versus Legalistic Cultures

While some of the observed developments in both countries can be attributed to the effects of the Second World War, and, in Germany’s case, to the experience and aftermath of National Socialism, there is reason to doubt the adequacy of explanations that stop in 1933 or 1945. Instead, it seems highly probable from an examination of the divergent historical and philosophical backgrounds that the two countries’ political cultures continue to be shaped by deeper-seated assumptions about the political system that are largely independent of the political turmoil of the twentieth century (Rohe 1982b: 582-583).

Huntington and Rohe suggest that, measured according to the usual criteria for modernity, Britain’s political society can be seen as less modern than the Federal Republic’s (Huntington in Rohe 1982b: 590). Rohe expands on this by differentiating between political cultures with an orientation towards a “way-of-life” paradigm (which are typically

“conventionalistic”) and those with an orientation towards a “technical” paradigm (which are typically “legalistic”) (*ibid.*: 585, 587). The former paradigm sees the democratic system as an institutionalised expression of a way of life, and thus brings with it the symbolic and emotional elements that constitute Almond and Verba’s “system affect”. The latter does not attach emotional or symbolic significance to the political system, but rather sees it as the most rational and efficient political form for meeting the demands of conflict resolution and problem-solving which modern society places on the state.

Britain’s political culture is oriented strongly towards the former paradigm. It still contains elements inherited from the Middle Ages; these include not merely the Monarchy, but also the symbolism and colour of Parliamentary and state occasions, and the particular view of the state which the culture embodies, in which the state “holds the ring” and ensures fair play between competing interests, a view which is expressed in the adversarial confrontations between Government and Opposition as well outside the political sphere, for example in the adversarial trial-by-jury system (*ibid.*: 1982b: 586 & Döring 1993: 84; also cf. Rohe 1994b: 6). It is therefore “conventionalistic”, because many of its laws and procedures are inherited and continue to be used because they are perceived to work, rather than because they express any overarching set of rational principles. The most obvious outward symbol of the British preference for convention is the absence of a written constitution — Britain remains the only member of the United Nations that does not possess one (Birch 1993: 23) — but it is also expressed in the Burkean philosophy of pre-Thatcherite conservatism, which is distrustful of abstract theory and therefore reliant on the accumulation of practical wisdom through the ages (*ibid.*: 68; O’Gorman 1973 & Freeman 1980).

Germany’s political culture, on the other hand, has a much stronger “technical” orientation; it is largely bereft of symbols and the state has a primarily functional image and role (Rohe 1982b: 586). The culture is “legalistic” in the sense that it is characterised by the strong influence of legal norms and standards. Hence the central role afforded to the Constitutional Court, as the defender of the legal principles of the *Grundgesetz*, which stand above and define the limits of government action and political debate (Döring 1993: 84). Sontheimer notes that this is also expressed in a “legal formalism” which pervades political debate. He bemoans:

die Tendenz, politische Probleme in formale Rechtsprobleme zu kleiden und unter juristischen Gesichtspunkten zu diskutieren...Der juristische Formalismus wird von den Nichtjuristen oft kopiert und noch übertrumpft, z.B. in Geschäftsordnungsdebatten. (Sontheimer 1990: 40)

As Kirchheimer observes, this has also often been matched by a tendency to resort more readily to regulation and legislation, or as he puts it, to allow "prevalent legitimacy notions" to "narrow down the radius" of legality (Kirchheimer 1966: 259).

This legal formalism also embodies the notions which form the core of the *Staatsidee*, namely that there are overarching principles which stand above the struggle between interest groups and which regulate society (Döring 1993: 60-61), and to which one can therefore appeal to resolve disputes. The centrality of this idea in German political culture goes some way towards explaining the desire to define many aspects of the state's role, including its social role and responsibilities, as basic governing principles and place them in the *Grundgesetz* or codify them in the form of basic rights in the *Sozialgesetzbuch* (cf. Ritter 1991: 162). This codification of political principles has in turn strengthened the reluctance on the part of Germany's main political parties to consider policies which either substantially expand or reduce the role of the state; such policies are not just potentially unpopular, but might also be seen to violate these principles and would contradict the regulative notion of the state which, in many ways, defines the limits of thought and debate in Germany (Rohe 1982b: 584). It is this notion of the state which is only weakly developed in Britain (Döring 1993: 60-61). Dörner and Rohe's analysis of political lexis in German and British encyclopaedias confirms these quite different conceptualisations: in the British encyclopaedias, government is portrayed as the "crystallisation" of an interactional "game" between different interests ("the ruling power in political society" and "public affairs of the community"), whereas the German encyclopaedias gloss *Regierung* as "Leitung des Staats" and "leitende politische Tätigkeit, in der der Staat sich und sein Wesen bestimmt und durchsetzt" (Dörner/Rohe 1991: 49-50). A comparison of the articles on "anarchy" humorously underlines the point: whereas the German entries negatively describe *Anarchie* as a "Staatsform" lacking legal authority and the rule of law, the British entries make no reference to the state and instead emphasise free forms of association and individualism (*ibid.*).

1.4.2.2. *Deference versus Subject Cultures*

Rohe introduces a further distinction which stands parallel to the “conventionalistic”-“legalistic” contrast, that of “deference cultures” versus “subject cultures” (Rohe 1982b: 587ff); whereas the former distinction primarily describes different ways in which the actors in a political system can legitimise their actions, the latter describes different relationships of authority which exist between Government and governed. Whilst both deference and subject cultures involve a subordinate relationship to authority, the conceptualisation of authority is quite different in the two cases. The deference-orientation views the political system as a kind of “immensely extended kinship system”, in that social elites possess authority, and authority takes on the tangible form of particular persons and personalities. Subject-orientation defines a much more abstract, formalised and depersonalised relationship to authority, where state bureaucracy typically plays a central role (*ibid.*: 588). The concept of state bureaucracy here is crucial: Britain’s mainly deference-oriented political culture has a strong tendency towards what Döring calls “government by amateurs” (Döring 1993: 60; also Rohe 1982b: 589), because authority is linked to personalities and not to an efficient state bureaucracy. The colourful symbolism of Parliament and the Monarchy is in many ways consciously anti-bureaucratic, a point that Döring explains with reference to the destruction of the royal bureaucracy in the revolutions of the 16th century (Döring 1993: 61). Britain’s lateness in developing a professional civil service and her enduring tendency towards amateur government — as evidenced by the preference for broadly educated all-rounders over specialists in the Cabinet and the extremely short tenure of Ministers (*ibid.*: 62-63) — prompts Rohe to describe Britain as a *verspätete Bürokratie* (Rohe in Döring 1993: 61). In contrast, German politics has always tended towards a greater degree of professionalisation and specialisation (Rohe 1982b: 589): Cabinet ministers have much longer average tenures, and the educational profile of parliamentarians indicates the higher value that is placed on the possession of high academic qualifications and specialist knowledge. Rohe also points to a further consequence of the personalisation of politics, namely the more prominent role given to morality in political discourse (*ibid.*: 589). In “moralising” political cultures, political speeches tend to reflect more closely the characteristics of sermons, and the relationship between political speakers and audience tends to reflect more closely that between the priest and his congregation than is the case in those oriented towards a primarily technical paradigm. This can be seen not just in the strong emphasis by Labour on the moral content of its programme, a theme recently re-

vived in the form of “Christian Socialism”, but also in the recurring concern of the Conservative Party with moral themes.

The emphasis in deference-oriented and “conventionalistic” political cultures on personalities and symbolism can be discerned in many aspects of British political life, including the preference for conflating the roles of party chairman, parliamentary party leader and Prime Minister or leader of the Opposition into one “presidential role”, and the ceremony and tradition surrounding Budget day. Both examples contrast sharply with practices in the Federal Republic, where *Parteivorsitzende*, *Fraktionsvorsitzende*, and *Kanzler* or *Kanzlerkandidat* are posts frequently occupied by different people, and where the presentation of the Finance Bill is a comparatively low-key affair, without budget boxes or glasses of whiskey. The controversy surrounding attempts to modify or break with even the most archaic political traditions in Britain, such as that of the strict dress code at the Chancellor’s annual Mansion House speech, rather confirms the point.

An important consequence of the amateur and non-bureaucratic tradition in politics is a leaning towards “small” government. As Schumpeter points out, amateur government supported by a small bureaucracy functions best when the role of the state is limited (Schumpeter 1950 in Döring 1993: 62). In the “conventionalistic” model the state apparatus suffers from latent inefficiency and a difficulty in adapting to the administrative demands of the modern era, a problem which becomes most acute when the state attempts to expand its activities into the provision of a wide range of services and into economic management and planning (Rohe 1982b: 592). It is for this reason that the tradition of a strong state, with a large interventionist role in resolving social and economic problems, never developed in Britain; the country has instead adapted to working around lingering structural problems and deficiencies — what Döring calls the art of “Muddling through” (Döring 1993: 63 & Rohe 1982b: 589). The development of collectivist politics in Britain took place against this background, and it is therefore unsurprising to find a moral rather than a technical emphasis in British Socialist ideology (cf. Döring 1993: 64), with the Fabians being the main exceptions to this (cf. Drucker 1974).

The tendency in Britain to perceive politics less as a technical enterprise than an extension of ordinary social relations helps to explain a contrast that has been noted between political thought in Britain and Europe. Rohe suggests that political cultures oriented more towards a technical-bureaucratic view of the state require ideology to “bridge the gap” be-

tween the state machine and the “lifeworld” (Rohe 1982b: 592-593). That ideology, mainly based on the Hegelian *Staatsidee*, links the impersonal state bureaucracy to the objectives of common welfare and national unity and so justifies the state’s role. The abstract ideology of the state thus acquires a central role in the political discourse of such cultures. In contrast, political systems in political cultures oriented towards the “way-of-life” paradigm are constructed around an analogy to the “lifeworld” and so less dependent on ideological abstractions to justify political power. In other words, the contrast between “personal” and “technical” orientations is extended into political thought itself. This is reflected in the very different attitudes towards political doctrines noted by Döring. He quotes Low in observing that the political parties are based largely on trust in individuals rather than a belief in political abstractions (Low in Döring 1993: 76). This is supported by survey evidence which discovered that the British had an understanding of the terms “Left” and “Right” based much more on personalities than on abstract conceptualisations, and which showed that out of seven countries surveyed, the abstract “conceptual” grasp of political terminology was strongest in Germany and weakest in Britain (Drucker 1974 & Döring 1993: 77).

Sontheimer takes this abstract idealisation of the state and links it with what he regards as the German desire to avoid conflict and seek consensus. The German *Staatsidee*, which has at its core a superordinate role for the state above sectional interests, effectively stigmatises conflict as a symbol of imperfection and incompleteness. Adversarial competition, not just in the political system, but also in the legal system and the economy, therefore tends to be weakened. The pronounced consensual orientation of German political parties therefore expresses a broader longing for harmony and unity which is largely lacking in British political culture (Sontheimer 1990: 39 & Erdinger 1986: 180).

1.5. Developing the Hypothesis: Expected Value Contrasts

Following this analysis, some conclusions can be drawn about the type of value contrasts that, if the hypothesis is correct, are likely to emerge from a comparative value analysis. Some reference will be made here, sparingly, to terms related to the value system, which are only introduced and explained in the methodology chapter, so their meaning should be briefly outlined. *Terminal* values, also referred to as *entitlement* values, are values that define desirable goals; *instrumental* values, also referred to as *expectation* values, are values that define desirable modes of behaviour. *Interaction-dependent* values are those

values of either of the above types that are only meaningful in the context of social relations. There is a maximum of two possible addressees of a value appeal: someone of whom something is expected (*expectee*), and someone who has an entitlement (*entitlee*); appeals to interaction-dependent values have both of these addressees, non-interaction-dependent values only have one. Each addressee can take one of the following roles, depending on the value: *global*, *institutional* or *state*.

1.5.1. Expectations for the German Data

A clear feature which emerges from the analysis of German political culture is the leaning towards consensus. It seems therefore reasonable to expect a desire for that consensus to be expressed quite strongly in the values expressed in political debate, through appeals to the right of others to be included in the political process and a willingness to compromise. Appeals to harmony or unity will tend to be made in the context of this consensual approach. Moreover, the values should reflect not only a desire for consensus, but also a factual consensus on aspects of health policy and on the role of the state, involving reference to some of the founding myths and constitutional principles of the Federal Republic. This should be reflected in values that reflect those myths and principles, and in a relatively low variance in the appeal frequency across the parties.

In view of the rational, technical and depersonalised view of the state which is central to German political culture, one can expect a stronger orientation to rational argument, less recourse to emotional appeals, and a central role for the state, specifically expressing an enduring, if weakening, emphasis on the state's output functions. The state's importance is likely to be reflected through more references to it as an addressee, and specifically as an expectee, reflecting its assigned role in producing, allocating and distributing public goods. The findings should also show a less moral tone in German political debate, with personalities less central to the argument than technical matters. This will be expressed primarily through a lower number of appeals reflecting personal attacks on opponents, primarily appeals to *honesty* or *honourableness*. Where behaviour is questioned, the focus is more often likely to be on an alleged lack of rationality rather than morality. The preoccupation with legal principles should also give rise to a larger number of appeals to abstract notions such as *justice* and *lawfulness*.

1.5.2. Expectations for the British Data *Analysing Context*

The British debate should present a quite different picture. Especially since the debate took place in a period of adjustment in Britain's shifting political consensus, when the Opposition had moved only some way towards the government position, the values should reflect less of a desire for consensus than in the Federal Republic. Compromise and unity are unlikely to feature heavily. Any factual consensus that emerges from the analysis is likely to focus on the NHS itself and its founding principles, since Britain has few broader principles or "founding myths" which might be the object of such a consensus. Whatever consensus does emerge is likely to focus on those values that are related to the functions of the NHS.

The comparatively weak image of the state and its role is likely to be mirrored in a lower number of positive appeals with the state as the expectee, except where appeals are directly concerned with the NHS. The state is likely to be put less often in a regulative role, and the actions and decisions of the other parties are likely to receive greater stress. The state's output function will probably receive less emphasis, and input functions, i.e. democratic rights, may well be stressed in their place. There will be fewer appeals to theoretical principles and to legality, reflected in lower numbers of appeals to values such as *lawfulness* and *justice*. British political debate is likely to have a more personalised dimension, reflected mainly in a more moral tone and personalised attacks on opponents that cast doubt on their integrity. There may well also be more reference to feelings and emotions and a general tendency to stress the human qualities of the main political actors rather than the rationality of arguments, and propriety will tend to be defined more in personal than rational terms. In the British data, the lower level of consensus is also likely to produce a greater overall differentiation of Opposition and Government value appeals.

1.5.3. Conclusion

Although these expectations will need to be modified by looking at the distortions which are likely to be introduced into the data by the structural differences between the two health care systems, they provide the basis of a reliable guide to the sorts of results which would help to support the hypothesis.

2. Choosing the Corpus and Analysing Context

2.1. Introduction

The choice of criteria for selecting texts for a corpus is one of the issues requiring the most careful consideration when embarking on any analysis; if the texts for the corpus are ill-chosen, it may naturally cast doubt on the usefulness of the entire analysis. The first problem is to identify the broad area from which the texts will be chosen.

2.2. Choosing Health Policy as a Case Study

Although in any area of social policy could potentially yield interesting value data, there are some special reasons for choosing health care reform. Firstly, the health systems in both Britain and Germany mark points of stability in the post-war period, and so, if values are to be regarded as more enduring than shifts in political preferences, health reform offers a potentially more illuminating comparison of value differences. This is especially so in the case of Britain, where the NHS survived the shift to the right after 1979 virtually unscathed, at least until the 1990 reforms, and arguably since then too. Although social spending has increased in real terms over this period, the Conservative administrations and the 1997 Labour administration have seen substantial reductions in welfare entitlements, including the decoupling of benefits from earnings, the virtual abandonment of the state pension, the replacement of unemployment benefit with the Jobseeker's Allowance, deep cuts in legal aid and the phasing out of student grants. The very concept of an "entitlement", realised through state intervention, to anything other than the minimum needed to survive appears now to have become politically taboo; even state education is almost always discussed in terms of economic efficiency and employment. The NHS seems therefore to be one of the last vestiges of a culture of entitlement and state intervention. Döring, looking at data from the mid-seventies and mid-eighties, notes a strong and strengthening desire for state intervention in the provision of good health care, consistently standing at a higher level than that in Germany over the same period (Döring 1993: 66-67). At the same time, the expectation for state involvement in the minimisation of income inequality is somewhat weaker and weakening (*ibid.*).

The NHS thus marks a constant factor in a shifting landscape of alternating opposition and consensus and often partisan policy-making in Britain. Given the continuity in the German health care system during the post-war period, health reform provides an especially interesting subject for study. A second reason for selecting health care reform is

the passion which it arouses; it is not a subject likely to leave either the public or politicians feeling bored or indifferent, and so promises to yield either more heartfelt or carefully calculated value appeals than, say, the reform of unemployment insurance.

A logical source for texts on health care reform appears to be the official reports of parliamentary debates on some comparable reform proposals in the two countries. Before diving into an analysis, however, it is necessary to consider the representativeness and the comparability both of these types of texts and of the specific texts one is proposing to analyse. Texts must be in some sense representative of the particular political, social or linguistic phenomenon about which the hypothesis makes a claim, and, in comparative analysis, the texts must also be shown to be sufficiently similar in content and context to be comparable.

2.3. *Ensuring Representativeness*

These twin problems of comparability and representativeness are difficult to resolve without reference to the notion of genre. Before texts can be chosen, a decision must be made about whether the texts should be selected from a particular genre or even from a particular strand (discourse) within a genre. In a comparative study in particular, the complexities of defining genre can itself become a major methodological stumbling block. One has to make the assumption that different cultures share the same genre or genres, and especially that the boundaries of genre in each country are coterminous. If one is not comparing like with like, the significance of differences and similarities is hard to interpret.

The functional definition of genre offered by Swales helps to establish representativeness by focusing on communicative purpose as the main criterion for deciding genre membership. Swales' definition of genre is worth quoting in full:

A genre comprises a set of communicative events, the members of which share some set of communicative purposes. These purposes are recognised by the expert members of the parent discourse community, and thereby constitute the rationale for the genre. This rationale shapes the schematic structure of the discourse and influences and constrains the choice of content and style. Communicative purpose is both a privileged criterion and one that operates to keep the scope of a genre as here conceived narrowly focused on comparable rhetorical action. In addition to purpose, exemplars of a genre exhibit various patterns of similarity in terms of structure, style, content and intended audience. If all high probability expectations are realised, the exemplar will be viewed as prototypical by the parent discourse community. The genre names inherited and produced by discourse communities and imported by others constitute valuable ethnographic communication, but typically need further validation. (Swales 1990: 58)

Before the genre issue is examined in more detail, however, a clear explanation of the representative function of the chosen texts is needed as an obvious prerequisite for addressing the representativeness problem. The hypothesis places a comparative investigation of values in selected parliamentary health policy debates within the wider contexts of, firstly, values in parliamentary discourse and, secondly, political discourse in general across political cultures. Of course, on the strength of analysing such a limited selection of texts, one cannot conclusively demonstrate that the two political cultures are shaped by their differing values, or even fully substantiate claims about values in parliamentary discourse. Instead, the aim is to contribute to the investigation of such questions by testing the hypothesis in a case study.

For this purpose, then, the texts do not have to be “representative” of particular genres, in the sense that their value content could be viewed as a microcosm of the value contents of the genres as a whole. Attempting to establish representativeness of that kind would stretch the function of the “genre” concept far beyond its intended use. Instead, three conditions must be fulfilled: the texts must be members of a genre, the analysis of some or all of whose constituent texts would be sufficient to falsify or support the narrow hypothesis; this genre must be one of the set of genres, the analysis of whose constituent texts a falsification of the wider hypothesis would necessitate; and this genre, of all those genres, must provide a particularly good test-bed for the wider hypothesis.

To these conditions must be added a further, fourth, condition, which concerns the specific legislative function of the debates. This question cannot be resolved with the genre concept; it will be covered after the first three conditions have been discussed.

2.3.1. “Narrow” Genre Membership

The fulfilment of the first condition requires one firstly to identify a genre (and, as a pre-condition, a parent discourse community) which would offer evidence that could be usefully compared with the claims of the narrow hypothesis. Locating the parent discourse community is very easy: national Parliaments possess Swales’ six defining characteristics for discourse communities, including a range of publicly stated goals, communicative purposes which serve the furtherance of these goals, and a variety of different genres matching such purposes (Swales 1990). The members of this community are professional national parliamentary politicians. Debates held prior to a vote on a legislative proposal before Parliament clearly possess a common set of communicative purposes, and at the same time

differ from other communicative events, such as Prime Minister's Questions, or the German *Fragestunde* or *aktuelle Stunde* (Loewenberg 1969). These purposes can be divided into two "levels", which can be described as the objective and subjective levels. The "objective" purposes, in other words, those purposes which can be attributed to the debate as an institution, independently of its participants, are to communicate the government's intentions in proposing a piece of legislation, to enable the opposition to respond, to elicit reactions to the proposals from the media and the public, to obtain suggestions for improvements or alterations and to discover whether the legislation is publicly acceptable. The "subjective" purposes of debates, the purposes which the debates serve for their participants, may differ substantially from those mentioned above: governments use them to justify legislative proposals by presenting them in the most favourable possible light, whilst opposition parties typically attack the proposals and present them in the least favourable light, which in each case is intended to communicate a positive message about the respective party to the audience. This dialectical process may, however, be seen as a practical realisation of the abstract "objective" purposes and thus need not be seen as a deviation from them. Such legislative debates can thus be regarded as a genre, and the texts within this genre would meet the first condition.

However, the texts which are the subject of analysis here are *reports* of legislative debates. There is a problem with establishing the membership of these texts in the above genre, since they are not "primary" texts. Official records of parliamentary debates are just representations of actual discourse in parliaments, and they inevitably reflect the choices made by those who carry out the transcription and publishing work. The suspicion must be that the very act of reporting may introduce distortions into the text which reflect the values of those who carry out the work.

This problem is, however, not a serious one. Firstly, any distortions which are introduced by the reporting process are fairly unimportant for the purposes either of the analysis or determining genre membership. In the case of the *Bundestag*, as Buri notes, the accuracy of the initial report is high, since all speeches are recorded simultaneously by two reporters. The revisions which can then be made are governed by rules which allow only alterations which prevent "distortion of meaning", and there are further rules which forbid even these modifications in various contexts - for example, where a speaker refers back to a grammatical error made by another speaker. The application of these rules does mean that, in prac-

tice, the reporting process produces a “standard language” version of the spoken text through the correction of grammatical errors, the completion of incomplete sentences, etc. (Buri 1992: 87-92). However, although this method does leave some room for interpretation on the part of reporters, the speakers themselves have a right to correct the reports and thus ensure that the report is in keeping with their original purpose (while not necessarily being an “accurate” representation of their original speech). Indeed, Heinze’s work demonstrates that, despite what can be in some cases substantial revisions of spoken texts, there is usually no substantial loss or change in meaning which affects the communicative purpose of the texts (Heinze 1979).

The rules governing the reporting procedure in the House of Commons are very similar to those in the *Bundestag*. The reporters are required to produce what is described in Erskine May (the British Parliament’s standard reference for parliamentary rules and procedures) as:

a full report, in the first person, of all speakers alike, a full report being defined as one ‘which, though not strictly verbatim, is substantially the verbatim report, with repetitions and redundancies omitted and with obvious mistakes corrected, but which on the other hand leaves out nothing that adds to the meaning of the speech or illustrates the argument’. (Boulton 1989: 211)

The reporting procedure itself also shows important similarities with that of the *Bundestag* which help to maintain a comparable level of accuracy. Two reporters are present in the lower press gallery at any one time, one compiling the report and the other checking it. Furthermore, Members of Parliament may also read the reports and suggest amendments before printing, although they do not automatically receive copies.

Secondly, the vast majority of speeches in the *Bundestag*, and this certainly includes major speeches by ministers on legislative proposals, are — in contravention of the standing orders of the chamber — prepared in detail in written form, and even distributed before the speech to members and the media (Heinze 1979: 31, Simmler 1978: 36-37 and Loewenberg 1969: 455). Heinze shows that such prepared speeches appear in almost unaltered form in the reports, and that they cannot therefore be regarded as spoken language at all⁵.

⁵ The absence of a script for major speeches can even provoke surprised comment in the *Bundestag*, as shown by interventions at the start of Dr. Martin Pfaff’s speech in the GStrG first reading debate (Sten. Ber., S. 9025, 9028; GStrG 1407-1409), comments which prompted the presiding officer to subsequently remind members of the chamber’s standing orders.

In the case of the House of Commons, written manuscripts are also very frequently used, again despite a rule, seldom enforced, that forbids the reading aloud of written speeches. Moreover, this rule is explicitly relaxed for opening speeches, such as those in second reading debates by Ministers, and so such speeches are almost without exception carefully prepared in advance (Boulton 1989: 365-6). The fact that the language of such major speeches is primarily written language reduces the scope for discrepancies between what is spoken in debate and what is considered acceptable by reporters, and therefore, as in the German case, minimises the alterations which are made. In both countries, there is natural pressure on frontbenchers or prominent figures in the *Fraktionen* to express a carefully prepared party line on an issue, which makes the use of written manuscripts essential (Loewenberg 1969: 455).

2.3.2. "Wide" Genre Membership

The second condition, that this genre must be one of the set of genres whose constituent texts must be analysed to falsify the wider hypothesis, is also fairly easily met. The wider hypothesis relates to value appeals across the spectrum of political discourse, and their role in defining political culture. The set of genres to which parliamentary debates must belong, defined according to communicative purpose, must include those political texts which contribute towards the development and reproduction of the system of values in discourse which ultimately affect policy-making. Amongst those are the texts to which the majority are most commonly exposed, such as the representations and edited transmissions of speeches, interviews, press conferences, etc., by the media. Such accounts are far more interpretative than the texts in the corpus, since much more serious distortions of the "primary" material are introduced in the process of editing, interpreting and selecting. However, they nevertheless serve the communicative purposes of the producers of the "primary" texts, since such texts are generated in full knowledge and expectation of the nature of their mediation by newspapers, television and radio. Indeed, the process by which values are communicated is characterised almost entirely by interpretative accounts of actual events, meta-interpretations, speculation based on meta-interpretations, etc. Seen from the perspective of communicative purpose, the representations may even be regarded as the "primary" texts; they are the intended end product. The wider hypothesis would, however, also need to be tested with those texts which, besides having some direct media

exposure, make a large contribution to shaping and reproducing the value system within the narrower community of the political class. The genre of parliamentary legislative debate would certainly be counted amongst those.

2.3.3. Genre Representativeness

The third condition raises an interesting question. The condition is that the chosen genre must be demonstrated to be not merely an example, but a particularly good example of a genre which is involved in these processes. There might seem to be a good reason to object to the choice of parliamentary reports, in preference to, say, television interviews with politicians, television or newspaper reports on press conferences or other similar media accounts of political “events”, not on the basis that the texts are too interpretative, but insufficiently so. In contrast to heavily mediated reports of parliamentary affairs in newspapers and television, they are less directly involved in the communication of values to the public. Parliamentary debates, although televised — in the British case, only since 1989, and then not around the clock (Mayntz 1992: 208, 456-458) — are for the most part less immediately accessible to the majority of the two electorates than other mediated political texts. They may seem therefore less suited to exemplifying appeals by politicians to the values of voters. However, choosing other, more “mediated” texts would be problematic, and of arguably limited value, for a number of reasons.

Firstly, the range and depth of content, and the intellectual sophistication of most press releases, television interviews and conference speeches are considerably lower than that of parliamentary debates on the reading of bills, certainly in the British case. The hypothesis of this study focuses on policy-making, and a collection of media material largely containing slogans and “sound-bites”, while certainly being rich in value appeals, would not map out the policy-making process in sufficient detail to give a clear picture of the relationship between values and policy development. Too wide a spread of different policy proposals would risk making the value appeals too diffuse, and bring in possible random elements, such as the distorting effect of one particular issue which had an especially strong focus on certain values; at the same time, it would be very difficult to accumulate enough material on one specific policy proposal to make an analysis worthwhile.

These difficulties are magnified when one considers, secondly, how much more difficult it would be to establish comparability between such diffuse media material. Even if, say, a specific radio discussion program were chosen in each case, there would be many extra

variables to eliminate, including the length of the program, the intended audience, the length of the interviews, the presence or absence of others during the interview, the approach taken to a particular issue and the nature and length of the questions.

The choice of parliamentary reports avoids many of these problems, because parliamentary speakers have to combine a *relatively* high level of debate with a consideration of the values to which they must appeal inside and outside the chamber. The complex subject matter of legislative debates, combined with peer pressure from other members in all the parliamentary parties, encourages members to engage in more detailed discussion of policy and to bring a higher level of competence to the debates than is the case elsewhere (cf. Schubert 1989: 8-9). This is however balanced by an awareness that their utterances may reach the ears of the public, both directly (via television) and indirectly (via the media), which compels them to appeal to those audiences, often by drawing clear "lines in the sand" between themselves and their opponents; immediate pressure from within their own party political ranks reinforces this.

2.3.4. Text Representativeness

The fourth condition which must be met to demonstrate representativeness concerns the relationship between the texts chosen and the total body of texts which might be chosen to test the narrow hypothesis. It must be plausibly argued that the selected debates are not extreme or exceptional examples of debates in this field; and that they have been chosen in a way which ensures, as far as it is possible to do so, that valid statements about them are most likely to have some wider explanatory power for political discourse about health as a whole.

The debates which were selected were first of all intended to mark, as far as possible, a significant moment in the development of health policy. However, for the purposes of comparability, an issue which will be discussed later, the debates also needed to originate from approximately the same part of the post-war period. The debates in the corpus concern two of the most significant recent items of proposed legislation in the health care field, which can be claimed to provide an especially suitable focus for the expression of values: they constituted relatively radical attempts at reform and hence attracted a great deal of attention, often negative. The parliamentary debates enjoyed a high level of participation and interest. On this basis alone, it can be claimed that the corpus does not contain extreme or exceptional texts.

The decision to focus on a debate from each bill's first legislative stage was in part based on practical considerations, principally the sheer volume of text involved; nevertheless, this choice of texts fits the purposes of the research quite adequately. The second reading debate, which is the first opportunity for debate on a Bill brought to the Commons (the first reading being a purely formal event), and the *Erste Beratung* in the *Bundestag*, are the points in the legislative procedure where all parties involved state their basic case for or against the proposal, and thus tend to contain more arguments from principle than the later legislative stages. This makes such texts especially well suited to value analysis, although their content is not likely to deviate very substantially from that of the later stages. The exclusion of debates on specific amendments to the bills can be justified on similar grounds, to which can be added that in amendment debates the level of technical detail is very high, and the focus on precise wordings can cause the wider principles debated during the reading of bills to receive less attention.

2.3.5. Rules Limiting the Selection of Text for Analysis

In seeking to make the texts one has chosen and the analysis one carries out as representative as possible, one must eliminate bias from the process of selection and analysis as far as it is possible to do so. The reasons for selecting the first reading stages of the bills have already been outlined. In addition, there are some minor rules which limit the selection of text for analysis within these debates, and these must also be shown to be consistently applicable to any texts of this type.

Firstly, entirely formal opening remarks (e.g. "I beg to move, That the Bill be now read a Second time") are not included in the analysis and thus not in the numbering of textual units (there is a discussion of what constitutes a textual unit in chapter five).

Secondly, remarks by the presiding officer are not analysed, since he or she plays no direct part in the debate.

Thirdly, all linguistic or non-linguistic events external to the current speech (shouted verbal interventions, applause, laughter, etc.), including all interventions that are not made as formal interventions in the current speech, are excluded.

Fourthly, quotations made by speakers from motions, bills, acts or amendments are excluded from the analysis, since such texts have a primarily legal character and do not belong to the legislative debate genre.

All other utterances within the boundaries of the debates are included in the analysis. These boundaries are quite clearly defined: adjournments to debates are marked as such in the reports, and the end of a debate is marked by an announcement from the presiding officer or by a division (vote). The inclusion of all other material means that quotations by speakers from texts other than motions, bills, acts or amendments will also be analysed; this is justified, since such quotations are always made with a specific purpose which suits the tenor of the speaker's speech, and can thus be analysed in the same way as the speaker's other utterances. That is not to say that the quotations always directly express the opinions of the speaker; they may be reports of statements made by others, to which the speaker is hostile, but with which he or she wishes to make a point. However, exactly the same analytical procedure applies in such cases as to reported speech, and so there is no need to treat such quotations differently⁶.

All of these rules are easily applicable to all legislative debates: formal opening utterances always have the same content and are easily identified; the presiding officer's comments are clearly marked in the reports; events external to the current speech are likewise clearly demarcated in the text; and finally, quotations are also clearly marked, by quotation marks if not by a separate paragraph and typeface (as in Hansard), and will only be interpreted as quotations where such clear marking exists. Also, since all the above applies equally to both reports, these rules are also consistent with comparability, a matter which will now be discussed in full.

2.4. Ensuring Comparability

2.4.1. Comparability in Parliamentary Discourse

In addressing the problem of comparability between texts, Swales' notion of communicative purpose in defining genres is again of value. It would be logical to start by looking at the parliamentary discourses which are recorded in the reports before comparing the reports themselves, in order to determine whether the discourses can reasonably be said to belong to the same genre.

In both countries, the forum for the debates in question is a nationally elected lower house of parliament, the communicative purpose of whose discourse is the process of leg-

⁶ Although all utterances which come within the boundaries defined by this rule are numbered and examined for analysable content, some sentences may not contain value appeals as defined in the study and may therefore be coded as having no value content.

isolating and monitoring the activities of the executive. On this level, their comparability seems clear. Membership of a common genre is also strongly suggested when the discourses are measured against other elements in Swales' definition of genre, the existence of "patterns of similarity" in structure, style, content and intended audience. The debates follow a recognised pattern in each case: they are characterised by turn-taking, and chaired by a presiding officer elected by the members of the chamber, the *Speaker* or *Deputy Speaker* in the House of Commons and the *Präsident* or *Vizepräsident* in the *Bundestag*. The presiding officer gives permission to speak and may control interventions, which are ultimately dependent on the permission of the speaker. The roles of both presiding officers also encompass a number of similar formalities involving the agenda, voting, and so on (Boulton 1989). The presiding officer's position in the *Bundestag* is distinguished by the fact that he or she remains a member of a parliamentary party and a member of Parliament, whereas in the House of Commons the Speaker leaves his party and is no longer able to carry out the normal functions of an MP; however, the presiding officer in the *Bundestag* must give up his position if he or she wishes to take part in debates, and this right is seldom exercised (Lohmann 1967: 68). In practice, therefore, the two roles and their part in the discourses are very similar. The debates themselves follow comparable formal patterns: the reading or *Beratung* of a piece of legislation; a debate or *Große Anfrage* on a particular aspect of the executive's activities or on specific legislation; an amendment or *Änderung* to a piece of legislation; all of these can be occasions for a debate in each chamber. In both country's lower houses, debates are led off by a member of the chamber who represents those members who have initiated the event: a member of the government will begin a debate on legislation brought forward by the government; a prominent opposition spokesman will begin a debate on an opposition amendment; and so forth.

There are, of course, differences in behavioural rules during debates, including different conventions for addressing other members and expressing approval and disapproval. Most affect only the margins of procedure, however, and are unlikely to have much impact on the content of what is said or on the structure of debates. They do not constitute significant differences in structure or content and only amount to peripheral stylistic variations. There are, however, three significant differences which must be taken into account in the analysis of the data.

The first concerns the right to speak. Whereas, generally speaking, only Members of the House of Commons have permission to speak in that chamber, the right to speak in the *Bundestag* can be extended to members of the *Bundesrat*, the second chamber which contains representatives of the Federal *Länder* (Lohmann 1967: 59). This potentially amounts to a serious divergence of content, as well as of communicative purpose, since members of the second chamber can be said to belong to a different discourse community. The intentions behind a speech made by a member of the CDU from the *Bundesrat* will, in all likelihood, be quite different from those of a fellow CDU member who sits in the *Bundestag*. It is therefore necessary to modify the rules for the selection of analysable text in order to exclude speeches by those who are not members of the lower chamber or of the Government.

The second is connected with the nature and frequency of interventions. It is much less common in the *Bundestag* for speakers to formally intervene in a speech by putting a *Zwischenfrage* than is the case in the House of Commons, where such interventions occur frequently. In the *Bundestag*, in contrast, comments shouted by Members are often recorded in full in the reports, and occur much more frequently than formal interventions in the British chamber. This is reflected very strongly in the corpus texts, and has important implications for the content and, to some extent, the style, of speeches. Interventions are of a different character to long monologues, as are the responses to those interventions given by speakers. One can reasonably expect the value content of such interventions to be quite different, relating often to the validity or falsity of what someone has just said rather than to broader policy questions. It is therefore necessary to control for this variable in the analysis by recording the occurrence of interventions and responses. Since shouted interventions, in contrast to formal interventions, are rarely responded to by speakers, an intervention shall be defined as a short speech bounded by two sections of a longer speech from another speaker, and a response shall include the first three sentences following any intervention. These events will be recorded in the data so that they can be excluded for control purposes.

The third difference is in the organisation of the parties, in particular that of the opposition. In comparing the values appealed to by different members of the two parliaments, it is essential to be aware of the different status which they possess within their own parties. It clearly makes a difference whether a speaker is, say, a leading figure in the SPD, or merely one of the many "foot-soldiers" who troop from one party meeting and committee to the

next, just as the British leader of the Opposition, who is simultaneously parliamentary party leader, national party leader and “shadow Prime Minister”, has a different role from that of an Opposition MP who does not hold office. It is therefore instructive to distinguish in the analysis between what, in the British terminology, would be called “frontbenchers” and “backbenchers”. In the British case, the distinction is fairly clear: frontbenchers literally do sit on the front bench on their party’s side of the Commons and consist of, on the government side, the Prime Minister, Cabinet ministers and some other senior members of the Government outside the Cabinet (where members of the Government are almost always, but not necessarily Members of the Commons). On the Opposition side, they consist of the Leader of the Opposition and the “Shadow ministers”, that is, senior Opposition figures who are assigned a portfolio which “shadows” that of the equivalent government Minister. Although the term “backbencher” is often used to indicate Members on both sides who lie completely outside the government or shadow ministerial machine, whose role is limited to select committee work and, in theory, loyal support of their party, for definitional purposes here it will be taken to mean all those who do not fall under the “front bench” category as defined above, including holders of low office such as Parliamentary Private Secretaries. Smaller parties in the Commons may also have their own divisions between front- and backbenchers, depending largely on the number of MPs that they have. However, since their role is quite different to that of the main Opposition, and since the role differences between their front- and backbenchers are comparatively small (frequently, small parties may need almost all of their MPs to act as spokespersons for some issue or other), all members of parties which are outside the government, and which are not the official Opposition, will be placed in the “back bench” category.

However, placing the members of the German *Bundestag* in the same categories is not completely straightforward. Firstly, there is no equivalent concept of a “shadow minister” in the German opposition, which (secondly) reflects in part a sharper division between the parliamentary party (*Fraktion*) and the national party structure (cf. Schwarz 1989: 115 & Heinzerling 1989: 120-121). The chair of the Opposition parliamentary party (*Fraktionsvorsitzende*) is not necessarily the leader of the national party, and the national party leader (*Parteivorsitzende*), in turn, may not necessarily be the party’s choice as candidate for the Chancellorship (*Kanzlerkandidat*) before an election. There may also be a distinction between the *Fraktionsvorsitzende* and the opposition leader on the floor of the

Bundestag. The parliamentary parties have a complex organisation, including several vice-chairs, an executive committee and a series of “working groups” (cf. esp. Loewenberg 1961: 93). There is, however, usually some overlap in the different leadership functions, and the leaders of the main parliamentary parties are, in any case, important national figures in the party. Leading figures in the “working groups”, which “shadow” *Bundestag* committees (*Fach-* and *Sonderausschüsse*), are frequently the main source of party spokespersons on specific issues (*ibid.*; also cf. Schwarz 1989: 117); this reflects in part the broader base of specialists among *Bundestag* members.

In the light of these considerations, the definition of “frontbencher” within the ranks of *Bundestag* members and of the German Government (which may include persons who are not members of the *Bundestag*), will be taken to include the following: firstly, all senior members of the Government, including ministers in the Cabinet and the Chancellor; secondly, senior members of the governing coalition parties and of the largest Opposition party, including in each case the chair and vice-chairs of the parliamentary party, parliamentary floor leaders, members of the executive committee and designated speakers and deputy speakers on main policy areas (those reflecting cabinet positions); and, thirdly, the leader and deputy leader of the working group on health policy and the chair and vice-chair of the *Bundestag* committee on health policy (cf. Loewenberg 1969: 460-461). Although these latter cases are entirely specific to this analysis, they constitute justifiable exceptions. As previously stated, leaders of working groups are frequently important party spokespersons, who shape and reflect their party’s position on their specific area of expertise; however, the inclusion of all chairs and vice-chairs of all working groups and *Bundestag* committees under the “frontbencher” tag would be misleading, since they do not typically toe the party line on every issue.

It should also be noted that the chairs of House of Commons Select Committees should not be regarded as having a comparable status to those of *Bundestag* committees, because Select Committees are intended to be independent of party and Government authority, and MPs from the governing party on those Committees frequently unsettle the Government with highly critical reports and searching cross-examinations of Ministers.

2.4.2. Comparability in the Parliamentary Reports

The next important application of Swales’ definition of genre is to the parliamentary reports themselves. Again, the first question concerns the extent of common communicative

purpose. In the case of each country, the official reports make a verbatim written account of utterances in parliamentary discourse available to a limited wider audience including interested academics and future parliamentarians and their researchers who, one suspects, make the most frequent call upon such resources. They have official status within the parliaments as records of what was said, and as such have precedence in any dispute over other sources, even video recordings.

The second question to be answered regarding the comparability of the reports concerns the “patterns of similarity” in structure, style and content which Swales incorporates into his definition. As stated above, the variable of interpretative reporting must be constant over the two corpora to allow for an unproblematic comparison, and this requires an examination of the way in which spoken discourse is transcribed in each case. Reporters must first decide what information is to be recorded from a debate, and then that information has to be presented in a certain way on the printed page, which may have the effect of backgrounding one set of events and foregrounding others. Parliamentary reporting in both countries largely avoids recording paralinguistic features of a speaker’s utterances, such as intonation, aside from the customary inclusion of exclamation marks and question marks; however, linguistic and non-linguistic events external to the current speech and speaker in the chamber are represented in some detail in the reports.

Apart from a few minor rationalisations in the German case, the system for recording such events has remained unchanged in each country during the post-war period. The most noticeable difference between Hansard and the *Bundestag* reports is that the latter uses a much wider range of conventions to describe the “mood” in the chamber, or the type of intervention. This often reflects the different rules governing behaviour in the German chamber and includes such terms as *Heiterkeit*, *Lachen*, *Zustimmung*, *Unruhe*, *Widersprüche* and *Beifall*. There also does appear to be a pronounced bias in Hansard towards the current speaker and away from the chamber as a whole; most of the events external to the speaker which are recorded appear to be important in understanding what the speaker then says, which frequently constitutes a reaction to an intervention. Other events that might be recorded (such as the waving of order papers) are omitted. The detailed recording in the *Bundestag* reports, on the other hand, appears designed to give the reader a flavour of the atmosphere in the chamber, since the events recorded do not always have a direct impact on the content of speeches. These differences do not constitute any violation of Swales’

genre definition, however, and do not really affect the recording of the meanings expressed by speakers.

2.4.3. Comparability in the Reforms

There are also clear similarities in the content of the specific reports which have been chosen for the corpus. Initially, a comparative analysis of all the main legislative proposals in the entire post-war period was considered, but all earlier legislation proved unsuitable, because of the time lag involved between debates in the two countries (for example, around fifteen years between the debate on the first NHS Bill and the debate on the first attempt to reform the German *Krankenversicherung*), because of large differences in scope and objectives, or because of problems of representativeness, i.e. the relative insignificance of the proposed changes.

The NHSCCB and the GStrG, brought forward within a few years of one another, address some similar problems in health care and suggest some similar solutions. There is a concern in both cases with controlling costs and using resources efficiently, and both governments propose the introduction of some market-based solutions to these problems. Both reforms were seen as radical, and were applied to systems which were old and well established, whose problems were not new, but merely a continuation of a history of similar problems, occasionally culminating in what were described or regarded as "crises". The outcomes of the proposals differed, in that the GStrG was not passed in the end, but rejected in favour of a compromise Bill supported by all the main parties. It was considered that, although this latter Bill was a text-book case of inter-party compromise and co-operation in the German system, it was nevertheless a bad comparison to make with the British Bill. This could also be said, in some ways, to be an issue of representativeness. Choosing a Bill which had emerged after the presentation of a Government-sponsored Bill, and which had no significant opposition, would not be representative of those aspects of the policy-making process which are of interest here, and would not be comparable to the British process. In choosing a Bill which most closely matched the British configuration of Government support and generally unanimous opposition from the other parties, it was felt that value contrasts which emerged from the analysis were most likely to be the product of underlying differences in political culture rather than the product of a quite different legislative context.

The remaining contextual problems which the comparison presents are related to the background to the reforms and their content, both of which will now be surveyed briefly.

2.4.3.1. *State Health Insurance in the Federal Republic*

2.4.3.1.i. Finance

The health care system in the Federal Republic is based on contributory state health insurance, and its system of finance possesses four defining features. Firstly, it is financed through contributions which are calculated as a percentage of employees' gross income, a percentage which is set by the sickness fund (*Krankenkasse*) to which the insured persons belong, and which can therefore vary considerably from one part of the country to another (Frerich 1996). This method of finance embodies the *solidarity* principle, in which in the health care system redistributes the burdens of financing health care from the sick to the healthy, and the *individuality* principle, which provides for a further redistribution of financial burdens from the poorest to the wealthiest by calculating contributions according to income.

Secondly, for the majority of Germans, the taking out of some form of health insurance under the scheme is compulsory. The obligation to insure covers all wage earners and all salaried employees with salaries at or below the income limit used to calculate contributions (*Beitragsbemessungsgrenze*), as well as pensioners and the unemployed, although the payment of their contributions is covered through pensions insurance, and by the state, respectively. Higher earners can choose to take out private insurance, rather than join a sickness fund within the *Gesetzliche Krankenversicherung* (GKV).

Thirdly, until 1996, many insured persons had very little choice in selecting the sickness fund which they joined. If they were not able or willing to join a private sickness fund, they had to join the relevant occupational fund, if one existed. Thus miners joined the miners' fund, farmers joined the farmers' fund, and so forth (Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Sozialordnung 1993: 42).

Fourthly, contributions are split into two, half being taken directly from employees' pay, and half being borne by employers as an additional tax, in effect, on the payroll (Haselbach 1996: 124). This has considerable political implications, because increases in contribution rates do not simply reduce employees' take-home pay, putting indirect pressure on wages

and salaries, but also directly increase employers' non-wage costs and thus overall labour costs.

Although the public and private sickness funds finance the greatest part of direct spending on medical treatment (in 1991, DM200bn. out of a total of DM266bn. or 75 per cent), pensions and accident insurance funds, the public purse and individual patients also make considerable contributions (Müller 1993: 849). The state's overall direct share of spending on medical treatment in 1991 was 16.9%. Additionally, although this is sometimes hidden in the figures by the deduction of hospital charges paid into the public purse, the state has until recently financed all hospital capital investment through payments into investment funds set up under the dual finance system in 1972 (*ibid.*). Under this system, hospital charges only meet the prime costs of patient care, i.e. the cost of medical supplies, equipment with a depreciation time of less than 3 years and personnel costs (*Selbstkostendeckungsprinzip*), whereas capital investment is paid for by the Federal Government (which contributes one-third) and the *Länder* (two-thirds) in order to hold down the level of these charges (Jung 1986: 303-304 & Flamm 1974: 131). Private individuals also contribute directly to financing the system through charges on prescriptions, on dental and eye care and on hospital treatment ("hotel charges"), carrying DM28.3bn. or 10.6% of total direct spending on medical treatment in 1991 (Müller 1993: 849).

The system of reimbursement is different across the health care system. GPs and dentists have until recently been paid on a fee-for-service basis, whereas the public hospitals based their charges on the cost per patient, per day in accordance with the per diem ordinance and the *Selbstkostendeckungsprinzip* mentioned above (Haselbach 1996: 127f.). Although in each case, the providers first provide and pay for the relevant treatment and then receive reimbursement, that reimbursement is paid to them from funds obtained in advance by their representatives in negotiation with the sickness funds (Frerich 1996).

2.4.3.1.ii. Organisation

The state health care system in the Federal Republic is not a single organisation or series of organisations directly managed or owned by the state, but primarily a series of agencies who pay out benefits, such as sick pay, and finance the out- and inpatient care provided by semi-independent contractors. These agencies, the sickness funds, are in turn legally self-administering public bodies which are financed by employees' compulsory insurance

contributions (Flamm 1974: 56). The devolvement of immediate administrative control to the sickness funds is part of the *corporatist* structure of the German health care system. By making membership compulsory for the insured, and giving the funds some control over the behaviour of the providers registered with them, the state has attempted to create a balance of power between the interest groups (Stone cited in Light 1986a: 5 and Fulop 1995: 2), whereby the funds have the legal power to negotiate global budgets with the powerful provider organisations. The state has therefore traditionally not been a powerful player in the system (Fulop 1995: 2), although the recent reforms, driven by the urgent need to control costs, have begun to change that. One reason for the state's increasing intervention in the sector is the relative weakness of the sickness funds, whose diversity and autonomy make them a poor match for the negotiating power of the Doctors' Associations (Zöllner 1987).

The conflicting interests of GPs and hospital specialists have historically ensured a strict division between in- and outpatient care in the Federal Republic, although the most recent reforms have begun to lift this division. Thus by law, ambulatory care was not offered by hospitals, except in emergencies, and GPs did not have access to hospital practice except through complex referral procedures, leading to substantial duplication of effort and equipment (Haselbach 1996: 127; Fulop 1995: 2 & Light 1986b: 576, 583).

Outpatient care is therefore provided almost exclusively by formally independent GPs, who perform treatments and are then reimbursed by the fund. GPs must be licensed fund doctors (*Kassenärzte*) to give treatment under the insurance scheme (Flamm 1974: 130). Rather than take out contracts with individual doctors, the funds instead contract the services of GPs through the local or regional Association of Sick Fund Doctors (*Kassenärztliche Vereinigung*) (Herder-Dorneich 1966: 66ff.), and GPs therefore have to be members of the relevant association in order to be licensed by the fund (Flamm 1974: 130). Inpatient care is provided by a mixture of for-profit and not-for-profit private hospitals, and public hospitals, many under local authority ownership and some owned by the sickness funds (Jung 1986: 293-294 & Hurst cited in Fulop 1995: 3).

2.4.3.1.iii. Spending Levels, Costs and Demand

The financial and organisational features of the German system combine with some universal features of health care markets to create some quite specific problems. The health care market is fundamentally different from, say, the consumer goods market, in that the

high degree of specialist knowledge required to make diagnoses and determine treatments makes market transactions extremely one-sided. Consumers, in the form of patients, are relatively powerless, in that they do not make precise demands; they know or suspect that they are ill, but the providers determine which medicines or other treatments are required, and thus determine most of the market demand. Furthermore, demand for health care is on the whole inelastic, since patients generally want treatment urgently and cannot therefore "shop around" to compare price levels or quality of treatment (Herder-Dorneich 1966: 256ff. & Haselbach 1996: 128). To this one might add the additional point that demand driven by the knowledge or suspicion of illness is hardly comparable to the demand for toasters or video recorders. It is usually motivated by some degree of discomfort, pain or fear or a combination of these, and these factors help to skew the operation of the market by preventing the patients from behaving as completely rational economic agents. The emotional and physical imperatives which accompany the search for treatment preclude a totally dispassionate assessment of the likely need for treatment, or of the probable value of any particular medicine or surgical procedure, even if the providers give patients all of the relevant information and are not persuaded by their own economic interests to advocate inappropriate treatments.

The two most important consequences of the structure of the German system have therefore been the lack of downward pressure on demand and the relatively weak control over consequent levels of spending. Since individual GPs until recently derived their income solely from fees charged on a per-service basis, and since there were few pressures on their prescription behaviour, there was an inevitable tendency to over-provide, driven not merely by the interests of the professions, but also by the demands of the patients. There is strong evidence that, in times when demographic changes or other factors have threatened doctors' income, there has been over-prescription to compensate (Zöllner 1987). This tendency is strengthened yet further by the ever-swelling ranks of the profession (*ibid.*; Perina 1993). The huge increase in the number of practices over recent years has meant a potential squeeze on doctors' fees, which again has been alleviated through more prescribing (Zöllner 1987). Until the reforms, the hospitals also had every motivation to do more than was strictly medically necessary, since they only needed to prove that a treatment had been carried out in order to receive reimbursement, subject to broad restrictions on overall spending and salary levels (Haselbach 1996: 127). Hospitals thus

tended towards operating at full capacity and up to their spending ceilings. This has also led to a huge excess of beds and hospital stays that were, by common consensus, far longer than clinically required (Fulop 1995: 6 & Haselbach 1996: 127).

These structural problems have combined with other factors, well documented elsewhere, which are driving up health care costs and spending levels in most industrialised countries. Demographic changes, producing an older population more prone to illness and more in need of long-term care, rapid advances in medical technology, producing ever more sophisticated but also more costly treatment, and rising expectations on the part of patients, in part fed by technological advances, are forcing spending on health to rise much faster than the economy is growing (Cromm 1988; Statistisches Bundesamt 1985 & Niemeyer 1987: 24). The above average inflation rate in the medical sector is further accentuating this trend (Müller 1993: 851f.). The number of people insured under the public health insurance scheme has also grown continually during the post-war period (Haselbach 1996: 126). Moreover, the demographic trend has not merely increased demand for services, but has also hit the take from contributions as the working population has shrunk relative to the non-working population; increasing unemployment has dealt a further blow to a system which is especially sensitive to employment levels.

The consequence of these factors has been a worrying rise in the average contribution rate across the sickness funds, punctuated only by brief reductions immediately following the recent reform measures. In 1990, two years before the debate on the *Gesundheitsstrukturgesetz*, the average contribution rate stood at 12.5 per cent. Three years later, it had reached 13.4 per cent and in 1995 almost 14 per cent (Süddeutsche Zeitung 1/6/1993 & Haselbach 1996). This problem has also been accentuated by the rigid rules governing membership of the sickness funds, which have prevented the insured from choosing between sickness funds and thus exerting some competitive pressure on them, pressure which could have fed through into downwards pressure on contribution rates, and ultimately, on health spending. The implications of these contribution rises are not immediately connected with the quantity or quality of health care, but with the economic consequences of deducting ever-larger sums from employees' incomes and adding ever more to employers' non-wage costs. Sharp increases in social contributions can stifle consumer demand when it is most needed, during economic downturns, and threaten competitiveness, effectively wiping out large productivity gains. Ultimately, of course, such a trend threatens to re-

bound on the health care system itself, because it is unsustainable and must lead to drastic cuts in services if not stopped or reversed. Addressing these problems was the main objective of the proposed *Gesundheits-Strukturgesetz*, which will be discussed in section 2.4.3.3.

2.4.3.2. *The British National Health Service*

2.4.3.2.i. Finance

The financing of the British National Health Service provides a marked contrast to that of the German system. The basic principle is simple. The total NHS budget, excluding revenue from charges, is funded from general taxation revenue from the Exchequer, and is thus set by the Government in the annual spending round. NHS spending is therefore not determined by any consistent or objective assessment of need, or by demand, but negotiated by the Department of Health in competition with other departments (Fulop 1995). The funds are then distributed down the management tiers, which meant that, until the 1990 reform, they passed through the Regional Health Authorities (RHAs) to the District Health Authorities (DHAs) and finally to the hospitals and general practitioners.

The other main source of funds has traditionally been patients, who have, almost since the beginning of the NHS, contributed to its costs through charges on prescriptions. Over time charges have been increased and extended, and dental and eye care now also carry charges for most of the population.

The centralised nature of NHS finance means that GPs and hospitals have traditionally not been reimbursed for services, but instead pre-paid, either through a mixture of salary and per-capita fees, for GPs, or, in the case of hospitals, simply through their slice of the DHA budget.

2.4.3.2.ii. Organisation

Before the 1990 reforms, all of the hospitals in the NHS were nationalised institutions which were directly owned and managed by, and accountable to, the NHS via its various tiers of management, although senior hospital doctors, whilst they are paid a salary, are not officially salaried employees of the Service (Brown 1979: 16f.). General Practice is somewhat different. GPs have never officially been salaried employees of the NHS but merely independent contractors, although they are, for the most part, entirely dependent on the NHS and in many cases work in health centres which are the property of the Service.

Because of the central control exerted by the Government over the NHS, administrative organisation has been much more of a political issue than it has in the Federal Republic. Whereas health reform in Germany has primarily been about cost control by introducing incentives through changed financial arrangements and the introduction of charges, British Governments tend to be preoccupied with improving efficiency through better management.

2.4.3.2.iii. Spending Levels, Costs and Demand

Overall spending levels in the NHS are not an issue in the same way that they are in the Federal Republic, because the funding is centrally determined and entirely discretionary. The financial problems of the health care system are therefore not those of controlling spending levels, but rather principally funding problems, arising from the gap between ever-increasing demand and the spending allocated by the Government. The political debate on health care finance tends therefore to centre on what the desirable or required level of funding is and whether the Government is spending enough. Such problems are, however, a matter for the annual spending rounds and not (at least directly) for health care reform. The effect of health care spending on the public finances and therefore on non-wage costs is significant, but, again, the latter are regarded as matters for the government to resolve when determining overall public spending and taxation levels, rather than issues arising from the structure of the health care system.

However, costs within the system are a matter of concern, as they are in health care systems around the world. The NHS is, like the German Health system, also concerned with demand levels, not because they lead directly to higher spending, but because they create political pressure for more spending and threaten to widen the gap between what is desirable and what is affordable in the NHS, bringing forward difficult and painful decisions about rationing and rationalisation. Many of the general causes of rising demand and costs, such as demographic changes, advancing medical technology and the high level of inflation in the health sector, outlined in section 2.4.3.1.iii, are shared between the two systems. These pressures have acted in broadly the same way in Britain, but the effects have not been quite as severe for several reasons: firstly, Britain's demographic structure is somewhat more favourable than Germany's; secondly, the use of new, expensive medical technologies remains at a much lower level, a level which is arguably much too low, but which is not driven beyond medical need by competition between GPs and between GPs and hos-

pitals; and thirdly, the prices of drugs is lower than that in Germany, which pays some of the highest drug prices in the world (Müller 1993: 852 & Der Spiegel 10/1989).

There are relatively few structural factors putting pressure on demand and costs. One problem has been what some have felt to be the overuse use of services and drugs caused by zero or near-zero pricing, a problem which the increases in charges, and the imposition of new charges, for example for eye tests in 1988, besides their obvious role in raising additional revenue, have been designed to reduce. Beyond this there have been few other structural problems other than the absence of direct, genuine competition between providers, a problem present in most health care systems due to the peculiar structure of the health care market. Reform efforts have therefore generally focused on applying a variety of approaches to improve general efficiency in administration, management and care.

2.4.3.3. *The German Gesundheits-Strukturgesetz 1993*

The proposal for a reform of the public health care system, the *Gesundheits-Strukturgesetz* (henceforth GStrG), which was presented to the German Parliament, the *Bundestag*, in the first reading stage on 11 September 1992, contained a whole range of proposals mixing short-term cost control measures with long-term structural reform. The proposal was abandoned shortly afterwards in favour of new legislation agreed between the CDU/CSU-FDP coalition and the SPD, which retained many of the elements of the original proposal.

In the hospital sector, the GStrG proposed to abandon the so-called prime costs coverage principle (*Selbstkostendeckungsprinzip*) and the dual finance system, whereby hospital charges only covered the immediate costs of treatment, and not those of capital investment, which was paid for by the state. There was to be a gradual shift to monistic finance, a system in which the hospitals would cover the costs of investment and care through charges, while also being able to seek funds for investment from sources other than the Federal and *Land* Governments. The per diem charging system was also to be replaced by a fee-per-service system, so that charges would more accurately reflect the treatments provided, introducing greater transparency and downwards pressure on costs. In addition to these measures, the Government proposed a general ceiling on hospital expenditure, above which no reimbursements would be made from the sickness funds.

A number of measures were proposed in the ambulant sector. Two measures were intended to restrict the numbers of new doctors joining the system. An upper age limit was to be introduced, above which GPs would not be allowed to register with sickness funds,

along with a two-year compulsory training period for new GPs, during which they would not be able to set up a practice. In addition to this, a general ceiling on GPs fees was created, to be administered through the existing "points" system: the points awarded for each treatment would be totalled for each doctor at the end of the year and each doctor would receive a slice of the fees "cake" corresponding to his share of the overall points total. A similar ceiling was proposed for dentists' fees.

The reform put forward what were in some cases radically interventionist measures to control drugs expenditure. "Administered prices" (*Festpreise*) were to be introduced for a list of drugs; these prices would not be upper limits on the prices charged for drugs, but rather upper limits on the level of reimbursement which would be made from the sickness funds, to encourage the use of cheaper generic substitutes. Prescription charges were also to be increased and staggered according to package size. Furthermore, a five per cent price cut on non-price-administered drugs was agreed with the pharmaceutical industry. The proposal also suggested that a "positive list" of drugs, that is, a finite list of drugs whose costs are reimbursable, should be created. The final, and most *dirigiste*, proposal in the pharmaceutical sector was that there should be an overall ceiling on drug expenditure, with any excess being deducted from GPs' fees.

The GStrG also proposed some tentative moves toward the integration of primary and hospital care, principally through co-operation between the sectors to regulate the procurement of expensive equipment, avoiding duplication, and through a loosening of GPs' monopoly on ambulant care (Haselbach 1996 & Dreßler 1992).

2.4.3.4. *The British National Health Service and Community Care Bill 1990*

The NHS and Community Care Bill 1990, whose second reading was debated in the House of Commons on 7 December 1989, was introduced following a number of purely administrative measures in 1974 and 1982 which had created and removed various layers of authority in the NHS. As the culmination of a radical review of NHS structures by the Thatcher Government, it represented a break with that tradition and attempted to introduce market forces into a state-run and state-owned monopoly, whilst attempting to exert some direct influence on standards of care and efficiency. The Government's very large majority ensured its easy passage through Parliament and the Bill became law in the following year.

The centrepiece of the reform was the "internal market", a device intended to create competition within the NHS between providers, while retaining a unified structure, a com-

mon “interface” with patients, and preserving the twin principles of financing the service mainly from general taxation and providing services free at the point of use. The internal market hinged on the split which the reform proposed between “purchasers” and “providers”. Henceforth, DHAs were to become purchasers, which would “shop around” for the best quality and the best value hospital care, whether from their own hospitals, from NHS Trusts (see below), or from the private sector. The Government also proposed to allow GPs to become “fund holders”, who would receive their hospital care budget, prescribing budget and other funds directly from the Ministry of Health rather than from their DHA, and who would then also be able to act as independent purchasers of care from the hospital sector. Finally, the proposal allowed hospitals to become NHS “Trusts” (NHSTs), public corporations accountable to the Secretary of State but with almost total operational and financial independence. NHSTs would receive funding from the Ministry of Health and be able to borrow limited amounts, either from the Government or private sources. These hospitals would mainly act as providers, but could also be purchasers, buying care from other providers in the NHS or outside it. A system of extra-contractual referrals and cross-border payments between DHAs would allow for cases where a patient might be treated by a provider which did not have a contract with his or her DHA.

The reform also proposed substantial administrative changes. RHAs, DHAs and the re-named FHSAs (formerly Family Practitioner Committees) were to be cut in size and remodelled along business lines, with executive and non-executive directors, but without the automatic presence of local authority or trade union representatives. This marked the final break from the notion of a “democratised service”, a concept which had always been controversial in view of the potential conflict between accountability to Whitehall and more direct democratic accountability (cf. Brown 1979: 26). An NHS Management Executive was also to be created, amongst whose tasks would be the brief of implementing national policy objectives, and which would have direct authority over the RHAs, and thus also over the DHAs and FHSAs. The combination of NHSTs and reconstituted authorities was intended to introduce a much more business-oriented approach and atmosphere, especially to the hospital sector, a point underlined by the introduction of charges to hospitals for their use of NHS capital, which would bring the notion of depreciation into NHS financial planning for the first time and thus bring it closer to standard business practice.

A number of measures were put forward to control expenditure on drugs. Rather than setting a rigid overall ceiling, as in the German reform, the Government would formulate "indicative" drug budgets, which would provide firm guidelines for prescribing behaviour. GPs would be allowed to overshoot the budget, but would be accountable for their actions to the FHSAs and may have to explain their prescribing behaviour before a special committee. Fund holding GPs would have their own drug budgets and thus have a particular incentive to control costs. A computer system was also to be set up in pharmacies for monitoring GPs' prescribing behaviour.

Parallel to measures for monitoring GPs' efficiency was the proposed introduction of medical audit in hospitals, which was to produce an accurate measure of clinical competence through peer evaluation, and the extension of the Resource Management Initiative to more units. The Audit Commission was also to audit the NHS accounts.

The Bill also allowed for the creation of an additional 100 consultant's posts over three years to meet existing demand and the additional requirements of the reforms. This was the sole concession to those insisting that more resources were needed for the Service.

One final measure, not immediately connected with the NHS, was the proposed introduction of tax relief on private medical insurance for old age pensioners. This was based on the Government's argument that paying small incentives to those who wished to provide for their own care would take pressure off the NHS, and which thus implicitly placed absolute levels of resources and services above notional equality of access (Dept. of Health 1989 & Levitt/Wall/Appelby 1995: 24ff.)

2.4.3.5. *Implications for the Value Analysis*

Since the analysis is one of content, any contextual differences which directly impact upon content must be treated with additional care. Thus, in the same way that a comparison of political culture in Britain and the Federal Republic suggests the sort of value differences which might be expected from the hypothesis, this comparison of the immediate context of the debates also has a predictive function. It helps to identify those value differences which are independent of political culture, or which are, at the very least, inseparable from other variables, and which must therefore be controlled for in the analysis. Both the context and content of the reforms shape the nature of the debates, including their value content, by setting different problems and suggesting different solu-

tions. The starting point is therefore to identify the main contrasts between the problems of the systems and the solutions suggested by the reforms.

The financing of the two systems is one of the central differences between them, and gives rise to both their best and their worst features. The central financing structure of the NHS renders control of overall spending a much less important issue, while at the same time putting great strain on resources and divorcing supply from demand. The results are long waiting lists, arguably inadequate levels of investment in high-technology medicine and the rationing of certain treatments. The insurance-financed German system struggles to control overall spending, but does not suffer from a shortage of resources. It has more than enough high-technology equipment, sophisticated drugs and good hospitals, but waste and excess are endemic, and the cost to contribution payers and employers is not merely causing concern about their personal finances, but also about the effects on the economy at large.

One can therefore expect the British debate to focus on the problem of inadequate resources, and to interpret reforms in terms of what they might do to alleviate this problem. A large number of value appeals are likely to be concerned with health and resources, and on the negative effects of comparatively low system outputs on the population. The “problem focus” of the German debate, on the other hand, will typically be the personal and economic effects of increasing levels of health spending, specifically the effects of higher contributions. The high quality of health care in the German system, and, more importantly, the good match between supply and demand, make it unlikely that the concerns about the quality of care would be very prominent, except perhaps in connection with the possible consequences of the reform measures.

The solutions offered by the two reforms show some core similarities, but also very significant differences. There is a common emphasis in both on efficiency and on the market as the means of resolving the different problems the systems face. Increasing efficiency features strongly as a means of obtaining more “value for money” from the system, and as a means of increasing total system outputs. This confirms its attractiveness to policy-makers as a relatively cost-free and thus (at least for tax- and contribution payers) pain-free option for achieving political objectives, and significant differences in the appeal frequency of efficiency-related values are therefore unlikely to be predominantly system-dependent, i.e. they are more likely to vary according to speaker or party, and, if there is still a significant

variance when these variables are controlled, due to differences in underlying values. Incentives play a role in both cases as the perceived driving mechanisms behind market forces, expressing something of a shared view about human motives. However, the realisations of this idea differ sharply between the NHS Bill and the GStrG. The GStrG is characterised by the largely “negative” promotion of market forces by the removal of factors which are perceived to be distorting incentives, such as the existing structures of hospital finance or methods of reimbursement for doctors. The NHS reform Bill is, in contrast, concerned to force competition upon the NHS by the creation of wholly new bodies and arrangements which exist solely for that purpose; that is, it is concerned with the “positive” promotion of market forces, by finding ways of introducing them into the system where there was previously no potential for them to work. The Bill therefore has a more “positive”, interventionist approach to the promotion of market forces than the GStrG. Paradoxically, although the underlying Smithian philosophy of the Conservative administration posits the equivalence of the operation of market forces with a state of nature, the NHS reform actively creates artificial structures in an attempt to make those forces work. The level of cynicism about human nature would therefore seem to be that much stronger.

Although incentives and market forces feature in both proposals, the GStrG places comparatively less emphasis on market-oriented solutions and more on the use of short-term bureaucratic *dirigiste* measures to hold down spending until more permanent solutions can be found in the planned “third stage” of the health reform programme. The NHS Bill is much more comprehensive and designed as a complete, long-term structural solution to the NHS’s problems. Criticism of the GStrG is therefore more likely to focus on the short-term and patchwork nature of many of its solutions. Criticism of the NHS Bill will tend to focus on its expected negative consequences, for example lower levels of care or lower quality care as a consequence of the new incentive structure.

Finally, although the section of the British debate included in the analysis is devoted to the parts of the NHS and Community Care Bill concerned with the health service, some speakers do spend some time on the community care elements of the proposals. One can therefore expect a somewhat more frequent occurrence of values — such as *compassion* — which are related to the community care proposals.

2.4.3.6. *Summary*

In summary, the nature and content of the texts provide no serious obstacles to a comparative analysis, or to a potential falsification of the hypothesis. Providing that the contextual differences of the reforms are taken into consideration in the final analysis, the resulting distortions should not invalidate the findings.

2.5. ***Recording Contextual Information***

Krippendorff identifies the explicit delineation of the context as one of the elements of a conceptual framework for defining the role of the content analyst (Krippendorff 1980: 25-27). To conclude the discussion of context, therefore, a brief summary is needed of the contextual information which is to be recorded for each value appeal, drawing on what was discussed in the previous section. Five pieces of information will be needed for each appeal.

Firstly, sentences will be distinguished according to the type of contribution they represent from the speaker. A distinction will be made principally between standard speeches, interventions and responses to interventions, where standard speeches are merely defined as any sentence which does not fall into the latter two categories. Interventions will then be further subdivided into interventions from a member of the same party and interventions from a member of a different party, and responses into responses to each of the intervention types. As stated, interventions can simply be defined as short contributions within another speaker's contribution, and responses will be defined as the first three sentences following an intervention.

Secondly, the party to which the speaker belongs will be recorded. Thirdly, the status of that party will be recorded. A party may have one of three possible status types: a governing party, a category which includes all the parties in a governing coalition, where one exists; a main opposition party, which is the largest party outside the government (in Britain, this party also has official opposition status); or a minor opposition party, a category which includes all opposition parties except the main opposition.

Fourthly, the speaker's personal status will be recorded. Personal status will have only two values, frontbencher or backbencher, and these will be defined as outlined in section 2.4.1.

Finally, and most fundamentally, the debate within which a value appeal is made will be recorded, where there are obviously only two possible options to choose from, the NHS and Community Care Bill and the *Gesundheits-Strukturgesetz*.

3. Analysing Value Appeal Content

3.1. Introduction

A study such as this is necessarily interdisciplinary in nature. It encompasses a comparative study of political cultures while at the same time relying on a study of both values and language to identify differences in the values underlying those cultures. This is an issue relevant to many areas of the social sciences, since many social scientists rely implicitly on an interpretation of language to reveal the intentions and motives behind the behaviour of individuals and groups. In the past, such scholars have not necessarily regarded the study of values, discourse analysis or linguistics as an essential element in their work. It would now seem clear, however, that the insights of the language-based disciplines can offer additional tools to assist in this type of work and to try to make explicit what is often implicit in qualitative research.

3.2. Finding Values in Modern Political Discourse

3.2.1. Where Values Are To Be Found

Before entering into a more formal discussion of what constitutes a value, the general approach to analysis needs to be sketched out. The modern political speech has the central communicative purpose of leaving one or more audiences more favourably disposed to the speaker, and, additionally or by extension, to his or her party or government and its policies, than they were before the speech or speech took place. In order to achieve this, speakers must usually create a positive image of their own "side" and implicitly or explicitly contrast it to a correspondingly negative image of their opponents. On occasions this may still involve direct persuasion and argument, but in modern political discourse such mechanisms have been increasingly supplanted by devices more suited to the new audiences which political speeches must address, including the mass media and their consumers, including the international financial markets and others (Corcoran 1979). Those who compose speeches must consider the needs of the media who communicate what they say before the needs of the end-consumers, in order to achieve the highest possible prominence for the speech in television news slots or on front pages, or to be reported at all; and in a news environment where a two-hour speech may at best receive five minutes of prime-time coverage seen by audiences of millions, simplicity, brevity and succinctness are virtues. Indeed, Atkinson (1984, cited in Swales 1990: 47) has shown that speeches are often designed primarily to generate the maximum amount of applause. Parliaments, although

somewhat more closed and exclusive environments than conferences and other venues, do not completely shield politicians from this development, especially since the advent of television.

If one wishes to discover which values a speaker is communicating or — to use the term that will be adopted here — the values to which he is *appealing*, a search for explicit value references is therefore unlikely to prove sufficient. A speaker in a plenary speech in Parliament will not typically spend a great deal of time presenting a detailed case for a specific policy objective, rooted explicitly in a set of specific value orientations. Values are instead often to be found hidden as presuppositions and connotations in what appear to be bald statements of fact, or concealed amongst the minutiae of a speech. This rhetorical slight-of-hand is, of course, not a new invention of the mass media age, but its use is now even more extensive, and the necessity of using subtle analytical tools that much greater.

It would not be going too far to claim that value appeals are the *raison d'être* of almost every utterance in a political speech; in other words, almost every utterance is on one or more levels a value appeal, whether or not the value is explicitly thematised, and that value appeal usually serves the primary persuasive purpose of the speech. Even where a speech has a genuinely informative function, this function is often reliant on value appeals, since the information given is always selectively chosen and applied, and in most cases is ultimately used to support one or more claims. A hearer's willingness to accept what is presented as a fact, especially in view of its possible later role in supporting a claim, can be itself subject to persuasive influences. Here, too, value appeals play an essential role.

3.2.2. Separating Values From Context

However, there is a quite legitimate concern that may be raised when it is proposed to study general and abstract concepts such as values by looking at texts that were not created to make generalisable value statements. Since most appeals to "values" are going to be made in the context of some specific problem or issue, it could be contested that those appeals tell the analyst nothing general about the values that the speaker is trying to communicate, only something about the desirability of realising a particular value in a given context.

This criticism can be answered in several ways. Firstly, this study is comparative, and so the significance of the results will be assumed to primarily arise from the difference or lack of difference between them; systemic differences and contextual differences which could

give rise to systematic variations between the two sets of texts will be taken into account in the analysis of those results. This does not obviate the need to establish that the chosen method is an appropriate means of analysing values, but it does mean that, even if the expression of values imperfectly reflects the "underlying" values, the analysis can still be productive.

The second point is that any abstract system of values about which one may hypothesise must be realised in some concrete form. The problems on which people in different cultures focus and the institutions which they create are in part a reflection of the values of those cultures (Huppertz 1987: 68f.). Furthermore, any attempt to completely separate abstract value systems from their realisations would be misguided, because values cannot be studied in complete abstraction. Although studies which try to investigate values through questionnaires and interviews might give the impression that they are studying values in abstraction from their realisations, this can only be an illusion. People who respond to value questionnaires are unlikely to have constructed entirely abstract value systems which inform their responses, and most questions contain clues as to what a particular concrete representation of a value might be. Each respondent is likely to give an answer in the context of some specific issue that happens to be in his or her mind at the time the question is put, or in the context created by the phrasing of the question. All such responses thus inevitably reflect the particular context in which they are given. Indeed, as Krippendorff points out, questionnaires and interviews are in some ways less reliable than text-based content analysis, since they are obtrusive techniques in which the data is likely to be influenced by the questioner or interviewer (Krippendorff 180: 29). However, no form of data is immune to the basic problem of context. Even texts which contain apparently generalised statements about what is right and wrong are not written in a vacuum; they are written in a particular context, and their authors have particular concerns in mind when they formulate their generalised value statements. There can be no sense, in any study, in which one can claim to be directly obtaining raw information about the values behind people's words. The words are all one has to work with. Furthermore, all studies rely on some form of comparison to establish what is significant: comparison between the frequency of one value and another; comparison between the frequency of values from one year to the next; or comparison across cultures.

A third point to make is that most values, by their nature, tend to be desirable in the abstract. If one asks a person whether they are in favour of, for example, “health”, “decisiveness”, “employment”, “plenitude” and “competence”, they are likely to answer “yes” to each one. In the abstract, people would tend to want all of them to be realised. It is only the relative desirability of values which is generally of interest, and that can only be measured when there is some form of explicit or implicit ranking. Explicit ranking — for example as performed in questionnaires — will generally require knowledge of a context, where the realisation of one value may help or hinder the realisation of another, or where one knows one can only prioritise, and thus hope to realise, a limited number. Parliamentary debates provide a different sort of context, where politicians choose the values they believe are most important to their audience — and perhaps also to themselves — in the knowledge that the audience is aware of the necessity of making choices. Clearly, there must be a limit to which such contextual factors can be allowed to diverge between the texts, if a comparison is not to be invalidated. One would not, for example, attempt to compare a finance bill with an advertisement for breakfast cereal. To this end, it is useful to distinguish between “broad”, enduring contextual factors such as a country’s constitution, and “narrow”, transient contextual factors such as the fact that current health insurance contributions are not covering health spending, or that waiting lists are growing. It is to limit the influence of narrow contextual factors that the occurrence of the “systemic distortions” predicted in chapter two will be investigated and, if necessary, corrected for in the analysis.

The final, obvious, point is that single value appeals, in and of themselves, tell one nothing useful from an analytical point of view. Only much larger amounts of data can be subjected to analysis, and it can only ever be hoped that the distorting effects of specific issues — those that are not analysable at the systemic or broad contextual level — will be lessened and the underlying value patterns strengthened as individual appeals are grouped together.

This chapter and the following chapter describe a method which aims to group together these individual value appeals for analysis and to examine the linguistic mechanisms used in making them.

3.3. *The Analysis of Value Appeals by Method and Content*

A method which aims to examine value appeals in speeches must not only find a way to identify those appeals and attempt to group them together, but also distinguish between these groups according to their relative importance. The political significance of values cannot be divined by examining their nature or content, and so two fundamental variables will be examined in order to establish the relative significance of different values. Firstly, on the simplest level, the frequency with which speakers appeal to a value (including a complete absence of appeals to the value), will be taken to suggest something about the weight given to the value by those speakers. Secondly, the linguistic mechanism, or appeal method, which speakers use to make their appeals will be used as an indication of how the speakers expect the values to be received — or, in other words, as a measure of how controversial they judge the values to be.

The approach employed here therefore attempts to incorporate both the value content (which value is appealed to) and the value appeal method (how a value is appealed to) into the analysis. To group value appeals for analysis, each value appeal will be viewed as addressing one of a limited set of *value items*. This will be used as a convenient term for an entry in a specific, limited taxonomy of values which will be used to categorise the value appeals. A taxonomy of appeal methods will also be needed, and this will be discussed in the next chapter. This chapter will thus be exclusively concerned with the analysis of value content, and the next will cover the analysis of the value appeal method.

Although these two approaches complement each other, the analysis of value content is a more tried procedure than the analysis of appeal methods, which does not appear to have received much attention in the literature. It is therefore the intention to conduct these analyses separately, in order to reveal the advantages and drawbacks of each. However, such distinctions are always somewhat artificial, and in practice there is some blurring at the edges. Much of the work in this chapter, including the definition of the value concept and the categorisation of values, forms an essential foundation for the appeal method analysis; the latter would not be possible or meaningful without the former. Furthermore, one might also (rightly) point out that the appeal method analysis is indispensable for the successful analysis of content, since one cannot identify that a value is present in the text without being able to demonstrate that the speaker is trying to appeal to it. This latter stage appears to be left implicit in content-based value analysis work; making it explicit requires the sort

of investigation of pragmatic and other linguistic features which will be undertaken in chapter four. Readers who are aware of these difficulties in separating “content” from “method”, and who might wonder why such matters are not given any attention in this chapter, are therefore asked to understand that the exclusion of such linguistic features at this stage is deliberate.

Although some content analysts use software tools in their work, it is not the intention here to try to investigate values using such tools, since there appears to be no likelihood that computer software would be able to do the essentially qualitative task of identifying values. Values, as will become clear later on, are not identifiable merely by the occurrence of one particular word or word collocation, but rather only by the occurrence of particular ideas in particular contexts. Since computer software cannot currently handle complex contextual factors in interpreting the semantics of text, automating the analysis would be impossible, or would render it crude and involve unacceptable data loss. One of the tasks in devising the method will therefore be to give some structure to the application of judgements to the value analysis and to spell out, as far as is possible, what the basis is for making those judgements, in order to make the analytical process more open to scrutiny.

3.4. Defining “Value” as the Basis of a Taxonomy

3.4.1. Rokeach’s Value Definition

At this stage a clear definition of the term “value” is needed to prepare the ground for a value item taxonomy. The distinction between the concept of “value”, and that of related concepts such as “belief” and “attitude” has been widely discussed in psychology and value research literature. Rokeach proposes to distinguish between attitude and value by defining values as abstract, and not related to any specific object or situation in the way that attitudes are:

I consider a value to be a type of belief, centrally located within one’s total belief system, about how one ought or ought not to behave, or about some end-state of existence worth or not worth attaining. Values are thus abstract ideals, positive or negative, not tied to any specific attitude object or situation, representing a person’s beliefs about ideal modes of conduct and ideal terminal goals... (Rokeach 1968a: 124)

He goes on to surmise that values number in the dozens, whilst attitudes probably number in thousands, and beliefs in the tens or hundreds of thousands. In the sociological values research literature, there is a wide range of definitions of “value” which differ in detail but almost all of which retain the “core” definition offered by Kluckhohn, who suggests that

values are “ideas about what is socially desirable” (cf. Maag 1991, Foss 1977: 112, Kilby 1993: 32 & Kluckhohn 1951). Kluckhohn’s definition, like Rokeach’s, has moral content, because he carefully distinguishes between what is “desired” (which may conflict with what is felt to be “right”), and what is “desirable”, which is felt to be “right”, even if it conflicts with short-term interests or desires (Rokeach 1973, Kilby, *loc. cit.*). The desirable is, to quote Kluckhohn, “what is felt or thought proper to want” (Kluckhohn 1951 in Kilby, *loc. cit.*).

Other authors question, however, whether these “moral” values can be neatly separated from personal valuations of what is “desired”, or even from judgements about monetary or economic value. However, although this is a difficult theoretical problem for those attempting to delimit the value concept in sociological research, it is less of a problem here. Adopting a purely “moral” definition of value is unlikely to create problems for an analysis of political texts, because morality, in the broad sense of “oughtness”, is central to all political discourse. Politicians are ultimately in the business of offering competing notions of “rightness”, and so almost every political utterance acquires moral force, even if the same utterance would not have any moral content in other discourses. This applies to appeals to “material” values, such as *employment*, just as much as it does to traditional “moral” values like *honesty*. Once a material value enters political discourse, it can scarcely retain the character of something merely “desired”; it must acquire political significance by being characterised as “desirable” by those who advocate it. Politicians cannot afford to appear as advocates for the petty personal preferences of individuals, and so even the material is compelled to become moral.

3.4.2. The Distinction between Values and Norms

One further point to mention the separation of values, which are defined as what is socially desirable, from norms, which are defined as generally accepted social rules. Providing that one can feasibly differentiate between the two in an analysis, this distinction seems perfectly reasonable, since what is “desirable” is, in contrast to “mandatory” norms, theoretically a matter of social choice (Maag 1991). However, such a distinction, whilst it may be workable for questionnaire-based value studies, is too theoretically fine-grained for the type of analysis being attempted. Appeals made in policy debates will, by their nature, mainly be concerned with “optional” orientations, but norms are not always the same in different cultures, and attempting to distinguish cleanly between them in a comparative

study might well involve unnecessary complications. Furthermore, debates may also, from time to time, touch on items which might fall under the term “norm”, but which are nevertheless emphasised for political purposes. One may well expect to see what are ordinarily regarded as norms feature strongly in parliamentary debates on crime Bills, for example, and the extent to which they are appealed to and the method of the appeal used may well differ from one country to another, and from one speaker to another. There are many norms, and when politicians choose to appeal to a particular one, their choice should always be regarded as significant. Therefore, a value definition that takes account of this would be preferable.

3.4.3. Levy and Guttman’s Mapping-sentence Value Definition

A definition of the value concept which is broader than that of Maag, whilst being more exacting than the Rokeach definition, is offered by Levy and Guttman’s mapping-sentence formulation (Levy 1992). Although it is not as lucid as it might be⁷, it is still worth quoting:

An item belongs to the universe of value items if and only if its domain asks for a
(cognitive) assessment of the importance of a (situational) goal in a(n) (cognitive)
(behavioural) (affective)
modality in life area (y) for (itself as a) purpose in life area (z), and the range (instrumental)
(a more primary)
is ordered from (very important that it should) to (very important that it should not) exist for
that purpose.

(Levy & Guttman, 1974 in Levy 1992)

This definition can be crudely paraphrased as follows: an item is a value item if it can be assigned a range of degrees of importance as a situational or behavioural goal in itself, or with respect to the pursuit of another, more important situational or behavioural goal. For example, “efficiency”, may be considered very important for improving the effectiveness of the NHS, improving the performance of the economy, or more generally, for deriving the maximum utility from available resources; “altruism”, on the other hand, may be con-

⁷ as suggested by the frequent misquoting of it in the literature, in which the crucial last four words are often omitted

sidered much less important with respect to these goals. In contrast, "health" may be considered a goal in itself. The key word here is "important": in stressing importance, rather than desirability, the tone of this definition is somewhat different from that of Kluckhohn's.

However, this definition may be of limited usefulness in helping to create a value taxonomy, since it contains a critical ambiguity which, depending on one's interpretation, either restricts the concept of a value item to those items which are highly controversial, or allows it to apply to almost anything. In the definition, the value item is an item whose assessed importance for the pursuit of a goal is ordered from "very important that it should" to "very important that it should not exist for that purpose". The interpretation of this hangs on one's understanding of how importance is expressed and measured, which the phrase "is ordered" does little to elucidate. One way of measuring the range of importance would be to look at the *range* of views on the importance of a value item, whereby it would not be clear whether the definition demanded that the actual range of expressed views covers the specified spectrum (which would appear to be the most likely intended meaning), or merely that such a range of views is theoretically conceivable. In a comparative study, a second available method of measuring importance would be to look at how the frequency with which a value item is appealed to varies across the two sets of data.

The two interpretations of the phrase "is ordered" allowed by the former method are both equally unsuitable here. The first of these, which demands the existence of a full spectrum of views on a value's importance, is far too restrictive, since it does not allow for value items which, on a superficial level, may not be controversial, such as *compassion*, but whose appeal frequency reveals something significant about the role and importance of that value item in political discourse. That is, the range of actually expressed views would not necessarily provide an indication of the item's significance. The second interpretation, in contrast, would allow for a degree of freedom in defining the value item which could be useful in some contexts but would be excessive here. It would be exceedingly difficult to say which value items could never be "potentially" controversial, and thus almost every conceivable desideratum could find its way into the taxonomy. Finally, the second, comparative, approach to measuring importance, appears to render Levy & Guttman's

definition useless from a taxonomical point of view, because it requires the results of the comparative analysis to be produced before the value taxonomy can be defined.

3.4.4. A Synthesis

It is useful at this point to return to Rokeach's definition of value, which focuses on the degree of abstractness in a belief, because it helps to clarify what precisely might be meant by "importance" and "social" desirability. By separating values from specific situations or objects, Rokeach enables preferences related to favourite football teams, different supermarkets or colours of carpet to be removed from the sphere of inquiry. Levy and Guttman's notion of "importance" appears to suggest this need for eliminating the trivial and specific, but since items can be goals in themselves, it appears not to achieve this. Kluckhohn effectively does this by using the phrase "socially desirable", since this rules out potential value items that are of importance only to a limited number of individuals. Rokeach's focus on abstractness is, however, the most efficient and clear way to identify what items might be described as values, without prejudging their range of application or type of usefulness. Rokeach's definition of value will therefore be the one employed as the basis for this study, but with a few minor modifications. Where Rokeach refers to "ideal" modes of conduct and states of existence, the term "desirable" — used in Kluckhohn's sense to mean what "is felt or thought proper to want" — will be substituted, because it expresses rather more clearly the relationship between values and human inclinations. Thus, a value will now be defined as:

a type of belief, centrally located within one's total belief system, about how one ought to behave, or about some end-state of existence worth attaining, and thus an abstract ideal, positive or negative, not tied to any specific attitude object or situation, representing a person's belief about a desirable mode of conduct or a desirable terminal goal.

(adapted from Rokeach 1968a: 124)

It should be underlined that this definition maintains the clear distinction between "desirable" and "desired" which was outlined earlier in this section.

Even Rokeach's definition, however, is still not unproblematic from the point of view of constructing a taxonomy and analysing a corpus, especially in a comparative study. No definition, however tightly worded, can obviate the need to judge the significance of value items and thus the case for their inclusion in the taxonomy. In theory, almost any utterance in a political speech can have some sort of value content; even such a simple act as an expression of gratitude could hold significance in a comparative study of, for example, Ger-

man and Chinese political speeches. Almost any number of abstract values could potentially be defined, and so, as useful as Rokeach's definition is, much that is insignificant to this analysis must still be screened out if the analysis is to be useful and manageable. This definition also appears less clear-cut when one comes to analyse texts. Values are rarely appealed to in isolation from objects or situations, and so, in practice, a belief that, say, people ought to be rational, will be inseparable from a belief that particular people ought to be rational in a particular situation. However, as suggested at the beginning of this chapter, this is merely an example of a wider conflict between abstract definitions of value and concrete attempts to discover which values people hold. This problem cannot be entirely resolved, but nor should it hinder an investigation into values, whether through the medium of questionnaires or through textual analysis.

3.5. Value Taxonomies & Content Analysis: A Literature Survey

Having chosen a definition of "value", therefore, the next step is to consider how this definition may be applied. Given that the intention is to analyse texts to identify occurrences of values, this work consists primarily in performing *content analysis*. One of the key elements in content analysis is the building of systems of categories — taxonomies — to classify content. In fact, as Berelson states, the quality of classification is *the* crucial factor determining the success of any form of content analysis (Berelson 1952 in Stone/Dunphy/Smith/Ogilvie 1966: 9).

Thus, a taxonomy of values needs to be constructed and a method found for applying it to text. An investigation of how to go about constructing it should ideally begin with literature on value-based content analysis. However, there is relatively little work in that specific area, and so the review of literature in this section must also be concerned with work in the broader field of value research. It should be noted at this point that the issues of which items to include in the taxonomy and how to classify those items once chosen are very difficult to keep separate. The reasons for this will become obvious later; for now it will suffice to say that the literature tends to discuss both of these issues together, and so a separation will not be attempted here.

Although there is a substantial literature on value research, there is comparatively little literature available on the kind of value analysis proposed here. For example, much of F. Kluckhohn's work focuses on a number of primarily sociological questions in value research, such as the means by which values are transmitted through generations, the degree

to which values are consciously held and the existence of universal values. These questions, although important, are not directly relevant to this study.

F. Kluckhohn's notion of "value orientation" has received considerable coverage in the literature, and certainly requires a brief discussion. Essentially, value orientations combine notions of what *is* with notions of what *ought to be*; they consist primarily of beliefs about something, such as the character of human nature, but also constitute, or form the basis for, a conception of how people should live (Kluckhohn 1961: 4ff.). Conceptually at least, this is clearly of relevance to political discourse, and indeed to the study of all human valuation, since ideas about what should be, at least as far as behavioural values are concerned, often spring forth from perceptions of what is possible. One important point to note is that most of the values to which politicians appeal are, taken out of context, rather uncontroversial. Whether it is being suggested that public health care services ought to have more money, or that people ought to be honest, thorough or efficient, or that there ought to be something called justice, few people, including other politicians, would disagree that these things are desirable, in principle. What Kluckhohn describes as the "cognitive" elements of value orientations — essentially, perceptions about what is possible — are therefore arguably more important than the "affective" elements in determining the choice of values which politicians make. However, the work of Kluckhohn, Pappi and others cannot be directly applied here, because the research is of a quite different character, relying on the use of questionnaires and interviews to identify and connect these separate strands (cf. Kluckhohn 1961: 5ff. & Laumann/Pappi 1974: 157-188). This question of how values reflect views of the world will surface again later.

What is therefore needed is a survey of those parts of the value research literature which have some direct relevance to the construction of a value item and appeal method taxonomy, and to the development of the research method.

3.5.1. R.K. White's Value Analysis

Relatively little work has been done in content analysis on the analysis of values, and of the studies which do exist, not all use original value taxonomies. One of the earliest to do so is a study by White (1951), described by Merten (1983). White used a fairly large value taxonomy, containing 100 "general values" and 25 "political values". He identified values on the basis of the occurrence of particular words or word collocations, and analysed their relationship with other parts of a clause or sentence, including other value references, using

a complex system of operators to express personal relations, negation, causality, equality, etc. Results were then generated based on the frequency of occurrence of particular value references (Merten 1983: 190-191).

White's analysis appears flawed in a number of respects, including but not limited to those problems referred to by Merten. Firstly, the method used to identify value references is in part qualitative, since it requires the analyst to understand and interpret the text; but, in relying too closely on links between particular words and value references, White limited the usefulness of this qualitative input. Secondly, and probably in part as a consequence of the method used for identifying value references, White's value taxonomy is very large and not systematically constructed. Merten's recommendations for the construction and classification of category systems will be discussed later, but the central problems with White's taxonomy can be summarised as:

- 1) an inadequate theoretical basis for the category system;
- 2) the lack of a single classificatory principle;
- 3) a failure to make the categories mutually exclusive.

Firstly, White's notion of value, which must be the theoretical basis underlying such a classification, was at best unclearly defined, since such abstract concepts as "Justice" are not systematically distinguished from "High Prices" or "Warmth", whilst the group "political values" contains such diverse notions as "Communism", "victory" and "decision". Furthermore, "positive" values such as "health" seem to be liberally mixed with "negative" values such as "fear". Secondly, there appears to be no single classificatory principle which is applied in grouping the values: it is unclear why "general" values are the opposite of "political" values, and why, for example, the categories of "security" and "order", which are included under general values, might not also sometimes be political value categories. Thirdly, the categories are not, in any abstract sense, mutually exclusive, because a reference to a high-level concept such as "Nationalism" might well be interpreted as implying some of the lower-level values which White places under the "general" heading, such as "leadership", or "similarity".

The confusion inherent in White's taxonomy is a consequence of a value identification method that has an excessively strong quantitative basis. Relying on the occurrence of particular words or word collocations is always likely to create a need for a large number of

value items which have no proper theoretical basis and which are not systematically defined or classified, since the analyst is not basing the analysis on an interpretation of the underlying meaning of what is being said. It would seem that meaningful processing of the data generated by such an analysis is very difficult, since without any clear idea of the content of the value items, and thus how they are similar or dissimilar, the analyst cannot reliably group the value references, or even say what it means when a certain value is referred to a certain number of times. At best, without a means of grouping value references according to the shared characteristics of groups of values, an extremely large corpus must be analysed to produce statistically meaningful results.

3.5.2. Rescher's Survey of Value Classifications

Later, mainly theoretical, work suggested somewhat more systematic approaches to classifying values than those underlying White's study. In the late 1960s, Rescher, in a survey of value research and theory, outlined six such classificatory principles (Rescher 1969: 13ff). These six principles will first be briefly summarised and then discussed together. The first principle is *subscribership*, or classification according to the holder of the value, which might include categories such as *personal*, *professional*, *national*, etc. The second approach is classification by *domain of applicability*, which classifies values according to the objects of which they are attributes. Rescher makes distinctions here between, for example, desirable attributes of individual people, of groups, of societies, of "things" (inanimate objects) and of the environment. A third approach groups values according to the *nature of the benefit* which they offer, such as *material & physical*, *economic*, *moral*, *social*, etc. Rescher's fourth classificatory principle distinguishes between value items according to what he calls "the purposes at issue", i.e. whether they have "monetary value", "historical value", etc. The fifth classificatory principle classifies values according to what Rescher describes as the *relationship between subscriber and beneficiary*, which is really just an unnecessarily complex way of describing classification by beneficiary. Typically, beneficiaries are broadly divided into *self* and *other*, and *other* may be further subdivided into values relating to the *in-group* and *out-group* or some similar configuration. The last approach to classification distinguishes between values on the basis of their *relationship to other values*, or, in other words, on the extent to which they can be said to be "self-sufficient" or subordinate to others. Values whose primary benefit is to contribute to the realisation of some other value or combination of values are subordinate to those other values; these Rescher calls *instrumental* or *means* values. Values whose benefit primarily

lies in their own realisation are self-sufficient and described by Rescher as *intrinsic* or *end* values.

What is notable about a number of these approaches is that they require further complex classifications to underpin the classification of values. Rescher acknowledges this for the third principle (classification by nature of benefit), but it is true of all but the last two approaches; one must classify subscribers, domains, benefits or purposes before any work can begin on the values themselves. This is certainly not a simple task, and it would seem to be a problem that one should seek to avoid if the classification of values is not to be made impossibly complex.

However, despite these misgivings, both of the first two classificatory approaches — by subscriber and by objects at issue — may be suitable for studies which use very diverse corpora or which have ambitions to provide a comprehensive value taxonomy. Studies which encompass texts from many different genres and which employ a fine-grained value taxonomy containing many values specific to particular genres could benefit in particular from the subscriber-based approach, and classification by domains of applicability may work well for studies with very broad classifications of values which attempt to encompass the entire range of human desiderata, all the way from human behavioural values to desirable qualities of precious stones. Neither approach translates well to this study, due to its narrow genre base and focus on particular types of values. A more general reservation concerns the suggested underlying classifications, which suffer from a lack of clear classificatory principles themselves: it is not clear, for example, why the inanimate “thing” domain might not cover the “environmental” domain.

The third and fourth approaches — classification by benefits and by “purposes” — seem not to be logically distinguishable. The notion of “purpose” in Rescher’s description appears to arise primarily from a particular pattern of usage of the word “value”, and is nothing more than a specific type of benefit. Classifying values by benefits is an approach which is especially interesting from a political point of view, since it enables one to distinguish at an abstract level between what one might regard as “basal” value appeals which are concerned with largely “material” benefits, and those that are concerned with other benefits, say “moral” or “social”. However, here the underlying classification, Rescher’s list of ten benefits, also presents a problem. It is open to the same sort of criticisms as White’s classification: it is not, for example, clear why “economic” could not be a subset of

“material and physical”, or whether the “political” category might not at times encompass elements of most of the others, especially “moral” and “material”.

The last two approaches are much more promising from the point of view of this study. Classification by beneficiary makes it possible to evaluate a statement about a value according to the person or persons most likely to benefit if that value is realised. For a study of political values, this has instant appeal, because the motivation of politicians in appealing to values, and the judgement of politicians about the probable motivations of their audience in accepting them, are very much at issue. There is still a need with this method to provide an underlying classification of beneficiaries, but it does not need to be a complex one. In Rescher’s survey, as outlined above, he only distinguishes between “self-oriented (egocentric)” and “other-oriented (disinterested)” values, and then subclassifies “other-oriented” by “in-group orientation” and “mankind-orientation”. This dichotomous approach is much more systematic, because it is not necessary to identify more than one attribute of a value at any level of the classification.

Classification by inter-value dependency is also very attractive for a study of political values, although the reason for this is perhaps not immediately obvious. Rescher (following Rokeach, whose work will be discussed below) again suggests a simple dichotomous classification of inter-value relationships, by distinguishing only between “means” or “instrumental” values, and “intrinsic” or “end” values. The interesting distinction between these two types of values, when they are appealed to in a political context, is that “means” values tend to be concerned with how people should behave, as a means to some stated or unstated end, whereas “terminal” values are concerned directly with the ends themselves, and therefore with the desirability of obtaining something in isolation from the behaviour which might be required to obtain it. There are some obvious correspondences between this value dichotomy and the tension between “rights” and “responsibilities” in political discourse.

3.5.3. Rokeach’s Value Survey and Content Analysis

Work by Rokeach, beginning in the late 1960s before Rescher’s survey, took a quite different approach to White and uses some of the classificatory principles to which Rescher refers. In an analysis of the Federalist Papers (Rokeach/Homant/Penner 1970), whose authorship was disputed, Rokeach and others sought to use value-based content analysis to establish whether the papers had been written by Hamilton or Madison. To this end they

used a very limited value taxonomy, divided into “terminal” and “instrumental” values (following Rokeach 1968a). As has already been suggested, the distinction between these two value types, which Rokeach derived partly from existing work in philosophy, anthropology and psychology, is a useful one (Rokeach 1973: 7). It is worthwhile spelling out in detail what Rokeach understood by these terms. Rokeach describes the belief on which an instrumental value is based as taking the following form:

“I believe that such-and-such a mode of conduct (for example, honesty, courage) is personally and socially preferable in all situations with respect to all objects.” (Rokeach 1968a: 160)

and the belief underlying a terminal value as follows:

“I believe that such-and-such an end-state of existence (for example, salvation, a world at peace) is personally and socially worth striving for.” (*ibid.*: 160)

He further subdivides each category into two: terminal values into *personal* and *social*, and instrumental values into *moral* and *competence* values. These distinctions are fairly simple. End-goals such as “peace of mind” are defined as personally desirable objectives, whereas “equality” and “justice” have a “social” orientation. Equally, Rokeach defines “moral” values, such as “honesty” and “altruism”, as instrumental values which govern personal interaction, and “competence” values such as “behaving logically” or “being critical” as instrumental values which govern one’s own behaviour. He views the violation of moral values as being primarily subject to social sanction and that of competence values as being largely regulated by personal feelings of inadequacy (Rokeach 1973: 8). Thus, both distinctions can be seen as representing a dichotomy between intrapersonal and interpersonal orientations. The classification is shown in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1: Rokeach's Value Classification

Instrumental Values		Terminal Values	
Ambitious	Independent	A comfortable life	Inner harmony
Broadminded	Intellectual	A sense of accomplishment	Mature love
Capable	Logical	A world at peace	National security
Cheerful	Loving	A world of beauty	Pleasure
Clean	Obedient	An exciting life	Salvation
Courageous	Polite	Equality	Self-respect
Forgiving	Responsible	Family security	Social recognition
Helpful	Self-controlled	Freedom	True friendship
Honest		Happiness	Wisdom
Imaginative			

Source: Rokeach/Homant/Penner 1970: 247 & Reich/Adcock 1976: 23-24)

Rokeach identifies a further feature of instrumental and terminal values, namely that instrumental values, and in particular moral values, have what he calls a higher degree of "oughtness", that is, they are accompanied by greater social pressure. Rokeach claims that instrumental values generally carry greater social pressure than terminal values because there is greater social concern with regulating behaviour than with insisting on the attainment of specific end-goals, and that interpersonal interaction is naturally subject to greater social sanction than other forms of behaviour.

Rokeach also points out the existence of a fairly obvious relationship between terminal and instrumental values, namely that instrumental values may represent modes of behaviour needed to attain specific end-goals. However, he also quotes Gorsuch in pointing out the potentially blurred distinction between the two value types: any terminal value might also be considered an instrumental value if it is concerned with a goal which is itself a means to another — probably "greater" — end (Rokeach 1973: 12).

Rokeach himself states that his method for estimating the total number of values and identifying individual terminal and instrumental value items draws on intuitive, theoretical and empirical evidence. The question of the overall number of values is of less concern here, but his procedure for the identification of items merits a closer look. The eighteen terminal values which Rokeach uses in his value survey were developed from an original survey containing a list of twelve, and drawn from a much larger list compiled from numerous sources, including a review of literature where values are mentioned, introspection on the writer's part, a survey of graduate psychology students and an interview with 100 adults asking them about their own terminal values. This list was narrowed down by eliminating those which were felt to be synonymous, those which overlapped and those which

were too specific, as well as those which did not seem to fit into the terminal category (*ibid.*: 29).

The identification of instrumental values began with a list of 555 personality-trait words from Anderson, itself drawn from a much larger list and narrowed down on the basis of at least partially subjective criteria, such as picking out those “likely to be useful”. Rokeach eliminated all negative items in the list and reduced it further by a method similar to that used for terminal values: the elimination of synonyms and overlapping values, and the selection of items “judged to represent the most important values in American society” and those “deemed to be maximally discriminating across social status, sex, race, age, religion, politics, etc.” (*ibid.*).

Rokeach’s value taxonomy is much more sophisticated than White’s and accords well with criteria laid down by Merten (discussed below). The theoretical basis — his conception of value — is sound, and the distinction between terminal and instrumental values is a highly instructive one and a good basis for value classification. In particular, his classification has much greater analytical power, in allowing any content-based analysis to identify patterns in the data, such as a terminal or instrumental orientation, or an interpersonal or intrapersonal orientation, whilst avoiding excessive numbers of high-level categories which require huge data sets if useful results are to be obtained.

There are a number of points to make on his analysis. Firstly, the potential blurring of the distinction between terminal and instrumental values applies both ways, since achieving a particular mode of behaviour (for example, honesty) might be regarded as a goal in itself, rather than a means to an end; it rather depends on the moral framework within which such value judgements are made. Rokeach is right to say that a classification system which posits idealised end-states and modes of behaviour is a useful abstraction, but it is also helpful to consider the implications of this blurred dividing line, especially in the light of the greater social significance of certain values. Values which directly concern human interaction can be regarded as having more than one component, since their regulation involves two “parties”, those who want, or *expect* something, and those *of whom* something is expected. This will be discussed at greater length in a later section.

Rokeach’s method of selecting value items is certainly supported by some empirical work, but only indirectly. It would not be going too far to suggest that it involves a large degree of subjectivity. That is not intended as a criticism, since it is hard to see how the

selection of items could be given a much firmer empirical basis, although some of the procedures used to eliminate values from the list do appear rather questionable (Meyer 1981: 44). However, it does indicate that Rokeach's list need not necessarily be regarded as a definitive list for all content-based value analysis. Indeed, parts of his selection method, especially for instrumental values, explicitly take account of the purposes of the research by focusing on American social values, and racial and religious distinctions which are in part context-dependent. As Meyer has pointed out, the value taxonomy tries to be global in scope, but cannot really hope to adequately cover any specialised area, such as religion or politics (*ibid.*, p. 46). It would therefore be inappropriate to try to apply his taxonomy to the current research, and rather than attempting to adopt a modified version of it, it seems most advisable to build the taxonomy from the ground up, using similar methods if appropriate.

The work done by Rokeach is of fundamental important in value research and many of his insights are taken up in this study. The distinction between terminal and instrumental values, and between interpersonal and intrapersonal values, as well as the analysis of values according to social expectation, will — with some modifications — form the basis of the value analysis.

3.5.4. Inglehart's Value Ranking Survey

There is an area of value research which has a rather different emphasis from that of Rokeach, in that it is entirely survey-based and concerned primarily with changes in the values held by certain groups over time. Ronald Inglehart's work is regarded as the forerunner of much of this modern survey-based value research, and he is one of the major proponents of the idea of a "silent revolution" — a major shift from "materialist" to "postmaterialist" values in the industrialised world (Inglehart 1977). His research has attracted much criticism, but is worth briefly summarising, in particular because his list of values has a political emphasis.

The value taxonomy used by Inglehart is very small — it contains only twelve items — and the items are classified as either "materialist" (concerned with material acquisition, physical security and the satisfaction of basic human needs) or "postmaterialist" (concerned with self-realisation, self-fulfilment and aesthetics). The items are, moreover, very specific; they include "Seeing that people have more to say about how things are done at their jobs and their communities" and "Making sure this country has strong defense forces" (Meyer 1981: 50ff.). Even allowing for the fact that the wording is tailored to the public who will

participate in the survey, the items are perhaps more akin to what Rokeach refers to as “attitudes” than generalisable values.

It would not be appropriate to get involved in a discussion of Inglehart’s survey methodology or the criticisms that have been made of it (but see Klages 1992, Flanagan 1987 et al.), but it will suffice to say that his value taxonomy is of limited application, due to its high specificity and limited scope. The distinction between “materialist” and “postmaterialist” values is undoubtedly the most interesting aspect of his work, but even in the light of later research, their definitions remain a little nebulous (cf. Klages 1985: 24), and they are more suited to measuring broad changes in values than analysing values across cultures in a specific context such as health policy.

3.5.5. The *Basisresearch* Value Survey

The German organisation *Basisresearch* uses a rather different value taxonomy for its regular surveys, the results of which have been analysed by Jung (Jung 1994). The research is interesting because of its political nature, and because the value analysis is structured in a quite different way from the Rokeach work.

The taxonomy is tailored exclusively to surveys. The objectives of survey-based value research are typically the measurement of changes in values over time amongst specific groups, such as non-voters or young people, and the methods for applying it include questionnaires or interviews which extract data from a fixed number of correspondents, using pre-defined sets of questions to ensure that the data is complete and comparable. Most importantly, such studies look at values from the perspective of those who possess them; their first objective is to get a clear picture of which items their target group genuinely view as important or unimportant.

The taxonomy contains 21 “value orientations”, as Jung calls them (although this term does not appear to be used in the sense of Kluckhohn; the term is sometimes used interchangeably with “value” in the literature (cf. Klages 1985: 9)); these are shown in Table 3.2. In contrast to Rokeach’s taxonomy, the items are not classified, but, significantly, interpreted as part of two separate “value systems” — one a set of personal values defining the respondents’ own behavioural maxims and priorities, and the other a set of values defining their expectations of others, specifically “State and Society”.

Table 3.2: The Basisresearch Value Orientations and Value Systems

Value Orientations	Global Value Orientations	"State & Society" as Value System
		Living in a country...
1. Religiousness	To find meaning and fulfilment in a belief in God and in religion.	where belief in God and religion are taken seriously and valued in politics.
2. Contemplation	To find meaning and satisfaction in my life by contemplation & reflection.	N/A
3. Self-realisation	To be able to realise/fulfil as many of my thoughts, ideas and dreams as possible.	where one is respected for trying to fulfil one's own political thoughts, ideas and dreams.
4. Acquisition of Knowledge	To be able to constantly expand and improve my knowledge.	which offers all citizens a full range of educational options.
5. Fun/Happiness	To lead a carefree life, where I have lots of fun and am happy.	where the state tries to create a political and social climate in which one can live a care-free life.
6. Employment/ Prosperity	To add to my prosperity and property.	where one has opportunities to increase one's wealth.
7. Harmony/ Aesthetics	To create an environment for myself which is not merely functional, but also pleasant, attractive and harmonious.	where art, beauty and harmony are promoted in public life.
8. Independence	To plan my life and make and carry through decisions with as much independence from others as possible.	which solves its own problems, independent of other countries.
9. Security	To arrange my life so that I feel safe and don't need to worry.	which protects its citizens from internal and external threats and offers as much security as possible.
10. Respect	To be respected, accepted and valued by others.	whose citizens count for something and are respected in the world.
11. Power	To be a person that others listen to and whose instructions they follow.	which is strong enough to be respected by its citizens and by other countries.
12. Fulfilling Duty/ Obligations	To carry out the duties which are placed on one† by others conscientiously and satisfactorily.	in which citizens who fulfil their duties and obligations and bow to majority decisions are respected.
13. Altruism	To be personally concerned about and promote the welfare of others.	which does not only use its wealth for its own citizens, but also for people in underdeveloped countries.
14. Tolerance	To accept behaviour and attitudes which differ from my own.	which allows everyone to live as he or she wishes, as long as he or she obeys the law.
15. Trust/Human Contact	To have people who will stand by me and whom I can trust.	where people can quickly and easily form relationships and gain trust in each other.
16. Co-operation	To think about things and make decisions with others, rather than just relying on myself.	which does not try to solve problems and conflicts with other countries alone, but in co-operation with other states.
17. Morality	To not do anything which one† could describe as immoral or dubious and of which one would one day be ashamed.	where human interaction and the behaviour of institutions are regulated by decency and morality.
18. Responsibility	To be ready to accept responsibility for what I have done and accept the consequences.	whose citizens do not just feel responsible for themselves, but are prepared to accept responsibility in politics and society.

19. Activity	To lead a life which is eventful and active.	where one as a citizen always has something to do and can participate actively in public life.
20. Adventure	To always be interested in experiencing something new and unknown.	where life doesn't always just follow its predictable course, but one always faces new challenges.
21. Achievement	To achieve something in life and have success.	which offers its citizens good opportunities to achieve something and be successful.

Source: translated by the author from Jung (1994): 31-34

† This switch to an impersonal pronoun occurs in the original text.

One difficulty with this table is that its value formulations are somewhat inconsistent and vague across the two value systems. The “State and Society” system uses a mapping sentence formulation that contributes considerably to clarifying the meaning of the value items, but the “global” system does not use such a formulation, even though both systems are using different interpretations of what are apparently the same value items. Whether they are, in fact, the same value items, or quite different items which share the same name, is not explained. Similarly, there does not appear to be a systematic method of “translating” from a global value item to the equivalent value in the “State and Society” system. For example, if one reformulates the definitions to be consistent, so that each global value definition can be prefixed with “It is important for me ...”, and each “State and Society” definition with “The State and society should...”, no set of formulations can be found which produce a consistent mapping from one value system to the next. In particular, no clear distinction can be made between “the State” and “Society” when performing this translation: whereas “co-operation” on the “State and Society” level would seem to primarily involve the state as a co-operating agent, the definition of “morality” on the same level implies that “society” collectively, or individuals, are agents behaving “morally”, whereas the state has a possible dual role, both as a moral agent (as suggested by the vague reference to “institutions”) and a regulator of the behaviour of others. In the case of “responsibility”, the state appears completely absent, and “Society”, defined as a collection of “citizens”, becomes the agent which must behave responsibly.

These problems appear to arise from a failure to distinguish between different forms of expectation, and are exacerbated by the lack of any value item classification. A further problem, which is not necessarily a criticism of the *Basisresearch* work in its context, but a problem in adapting it to content analysis, is that the value systems and value definitions are not adequate for capturing the complexity of the unstructured textual data in the parliamentary corpus. They are based solely on the notion of expectations — “global” expecta-

tions that respondents have for themselves and for others, and expectations that people have of the state. No distinction is made between those global expectations which require something from people (such as “morality” or “fulfilling obligations”), and those which are essentially “entitlement” expectations, which require, whether implicitly or explicitly, some sort of role to be played by a third party before they can be fulfilled, or before they can even have any meaning (like “power”, “respect” and “trust”). Examining the relationship between particular groups of values and the expectations which the state has of people, and which people have of each other and of the state, is one of the central purposes of the analysis being undertaken here. It is therefore critical to distinguish between different types of values that have different implications for these expectations.

3.5.6. Klages’ Two-dimensional Classification

The research done by Helmut Klages is, like that of Inglehart, concerned primarily with value change, and it uses data gathered by organisations like *Basisresearch* and Emnid. His work is interesting in this context because he uses a two-dimensional value classification which improves considerably on Inglehart’s one-dimensional scale.

The first dimension he uses is that of “self-control” (or “duty and conformity”) versus “self-development” or “self-realisation”. This is not to be understood as implying a “social” versus an “individual” orientation, since the “individual” versus “social” dichotomy constitutes the second dimension. Both self-control and self-development values can therefore be divided into values with a “social” orientation and values with an “individual” orientation.

Of the “self-control” values, values such as “discipline”, “obedience” and “achievement” are regarded as “social” self-control values, because they are primarily necessitated by the existence of social relationships and the pressures which emerge from them. In contrast, values like “abstinence” and “obedience to God” are regarded as “individual” self-control values because they are typically self-imposed, for personal reasons. The “self-development” values are subdivided into three categories: the first, “idealistic social criticism”, encompasses “social” self-development values such as “emancipation”, “equality” and “democracy”, and the second two categories, “hedonism” and “individualism”, encompass “individual” self-development values such as “fun”,

Table 3.3: Klages’ Two-dimensional Value Classification

	Self-control		Self-development
Social Orientation	Discipline Obedience Achievement ...	Idealistic Social Criticism	Emancipation Equality ...
Individual Orientation	Punctuality Adaptability ... Obedience to God Abstinence ...	Hedonism Individualism	Fun Adventure Excitement ... Creativity Spontaneity ...

Source: translated by the author from Klages (1985): 17ff.

“adventure” and “excitement” in the former case and “creativity” and “spontaneity” in the latter (Klages 1985: 17ff.). The whole classification is shown in Table 3.3.

What is interesting about this scheme is how closely the groups of values match those in Rokeach’s classification, despite the quite different conceptual basis for the two schemes. The self-development values are, on the whole, goal-oriented values, whereas the self-control values tend to be instrumental in character. The subdivision of each of these categories into “social” and “individual” mirrors in part Rokeach’s own subdivisions of terminal and

instrumental values. The apparent relationship between what Klages describes as “self-control” and “self-development” values and what Rokeach calls “instrumental” and “terminal” values is an observation that will be developed later in the construction of the taxonomy.

3.5.7. Conclusions from the Literature Review

Whilst the work of Rokeach, aspects of the *Basisresearch* work and other previous studies are invaluable in providing a basis for the construction of a value item taxonomy, a survey of the literature reveals little work that is completely analogous to this research in its *application* of such a taxonomy. The analysis of the Federalist Papers by Rokeach, Homant & Penner probably comes closest in scope, ambition and approach to the present work, although it is not a cross-cultural comparative study (Rokeach/Homant/Penner 1970: 245-250). Other work by Cochrane, Billig and Hogg on a simple two-value model of ideology in British politics, which uses Rokeach’s value survey, shows interesting results, but it is of limited applicability to cross-cultural comparative research (Cochrane/Billig/Hogg 1979 & Rokeach 1979b). Besides being survey-based, it is also concerned with broad ideological divisions between opposing parties. In cross-cultural research, one is more interested in comparing the superficially similar rather than the obviously different across the cultures, and so the differences one expects to find may be rather subtle. The application of the value taxonomy method will thus be developed by pulling together a number of strands, including Rokeach’s work, to meet the requirements of a comparative analysis. The details will be discussed in the following sections.

3.6. Classifying Value Appeals: Data-Related Issues in Developing the Taxonomy

The first and most important consideration in applying some of the ideas discussed above to this analysis must be the nature of the data to be analysed. Naturally, the data used in this research is quite different in a number of respects from that used by the other studies. This immediately suggests that using an existing taxonomy “off the shelf” is not an option, a suggestion which is lent weight by some criticisms of existing taxonomies made during the preceding discussion. Nevertheless, new taxonomies should not be generated unnecessarily, so the creation of another requires more careful justification. The related issue of how the taxonomy is to be constructed, and specifically how far one should attempt to abstract away from the data, also requires some discussion. At the end of this section, a number of other matters arising from the literature review will also be addressed.

3.6.1. Arguments for Developing a New Taxonomy

The general argument against standard taxonomies is that they are almost never properly suited to any particular research task, and that their claim to be general is, in any case, spurious, because they are always designed with a specific purpose in mind, albeit perhaps unconsciously. Although some authors, notably Rokeach, have claimed that the total number of values is quite small, and have — nominally, at least — made an attempt to produce comprehensive value taxonomies, in every case it is possible to identify significant omissions. As Meyer has observed, the “one fits all” model is simply not tenable (Meyer 1981: 46-47), and so any value taxonomy must be tailored to the data. In practice, all taxonomies of value items in value research inevitably reflect the type of data from which they are derived or for which they are designed. This alone renders most of the taxonomies looked at in previous sections unusable in their present form, because they were developed for research with quite different objectives, and the categorised data was analysed using different methods.

There are a number of specific points to make about the ways in which the data for this study differs from the data typically analysed in value research. The most important feature of Parliamentary debates as data is that they take place in an uncontrolled environment, and are therefore not designed to fit any research model, unlike survey data. It follows from this that the study cannot start from the assumption that the data will fit a particular value framework. The taxonomy is not a framework to be “filled” with matching data generated during the research, but an imposition on data which has already been created. It seems plausible to assume that a study of the data to be analysed would at least be helpful in trimming irrelevant values from the list, and ensuring that it remains rich enough to capture the subtleties of the data and (in this case) offer an adequate contrast between the texts being compared.

The argument for developing a new value taxonomy is strengthened when one considers the difference in breadth and context between the present study and most survey-based work. The value items which are appealed to in the discourse may be fairly wide-ranging in content, but they are addressed in the context of specific legislative debates on health policy. In the broadest interpretation, the debates have as their object, indirectly, the relationship between citizen, state and society. In contrast, value change research by Klages

and others examines values in many different areas of life, such as work, the family and religion, but on a less detailed level than that which is proposed here.

3.6.2. The Relationship Between the Taxonomy and the Data

If one accepts the need to produce a new taxonomy, one then needs to consider how far the data should influence the choice of value items. Although Rokeach created his taxonomy of values independently of his study of the Federalist papers (Rokeach/Homant/Penner 1970: 246), two crucial differences between this research and Rokeach's content analysis work suggest that his approach may not be appropriate. First of all, Rokeach was only interested in identifying the authorship of the Federalist Papers and, providing that the value taxonomy was capable of distinguishing between the different writing styles of Hamilton and Madison, it did not matter that important elements of the value data in the documents might be ignored. It was therefore sufficient to use a standard list of value items which Rokeach had previously proposed. Although this study also seeks to compare two sets of data, the conclusions are intended to be more than a simple binary choice between "different" and "not different", and it therefore *does* matter if parts of the value data are lost. This makes a close match between the taxonomy and the data very important. The second major difference is that the comparison here is a cross-cultural one. Although that does not change the value taxonomy in principle, it does require that any value framework must fit both sets of texts. Again, an exclusive reliance on value taxonomies from other sources would be dangerous. Cross-cultural differences have implications not only for value item selection, but also for value classification, especially when one is considering, for example, what might be meant by the phrase "State and Society", used in the *Basisre-search* study. The culture-specific meanings of such apparently innocuous words become a problem if one is seeking to distil, for example, a single, unified concept of "the state" from two different concepts in two different languages and use this as a basis for part of the classification. The choice of value items must take these issues into account.

3.6.3. Deciding What To Encode

Given that a method is found for choosing value items, a decision must be made about which other information ought to be captured and recorded in the analysis, and how this might affect the value framework. One element of Levy & Guttman's definition of "value", discussed in section 3.4, is a measure of importance given to a particular goal, and it might seem reasonable to try to include this in the analysis. There are, however, a number of rea-

sons why this would be impractical. Making distinctions between relative priority or importance levels for a given value, or between values, makes sense when conceived against the background of questionnaire-based research: it is a measurement made possible through the tight control which the questionnaire method gives over the data format and content. As far as content analysis is concerned, whilst it might be possible to make such distinctions in an analysis of a piece of writing authored by one person on a fairly narrow topic, it would be an unrealistic goal when working with less structured data. Since the individual speakers whose utterances constitute the data may reflect many different values, and since they cannot be relied upon to give a consistent and comprehensive picture of these values, it would be illogical to analyse a single speaker's entire output as one unit, as something analogous to a set of answers on a questionnaire. Instead, the analysis must take place at the appeal level, which means that one value appeal cannot be weighed relative to another, or be taken as a refinement or modification of a previous appeal for the purposes of assigning such priority levels. Ranking, priority levels or degrees of importance will not therefore be incorporated into the analysis. There is, however, one specific way in which appeal strength *will* be measured, and that is in identifying utterances in which speakers qualify their appeal to a value by advocating its non-realisation. This will be explained in section 3.14.

3.6.4. The Relationship Between Values and Addressees

A further issue concerns the definition of value items and the method of interpreting an individual value appeal. Precise definitions are especially important in the analysis of unstructured data, where considerable variability must be allowed for in the way in which value appeals are used. It is therefore of great importance when applying a taxonomy that the value items are not so abstracted from the text that their meaning becomes ambiguous: simple labels do not provide a sufficiently clear definition. For example, if one were to include a value item simply named "rationality", and then to claim to have identified several appeals to this value in the text, no-one studying these results would know how to interpret them. It would not be clear whether the appeals signified demands directed from speakers to the audience (stressing the general importance of rational behaviour, and demanding rationality from the audience or a subset of it), or signified a claim on the part of speakers about the rationality of their actions or of the government's actions, thus framing the audience as the (perhaps future) recipients of the fruits of the government's good policy-making. The meaning of each value item must be made clear and explicit.

Two main conclusions arise from this. Firstly, it is essential, to formulate both a mapping sentence for the entire taxonomy and a detailed definition for each value item. The mapping sentence should be similar to, but more complete than that used in the “State and Society” value system in the *Basisresearch* table, so that a complete sentence can be generated for each value item, making its meaning explicit. These mapping sentences must be applied consistently to each value system or category, not just to one as in the *Basisresearch* work. The value item definitions should give more detail on the meanings of the items and possibly include other information for identifying them in text. Secondly, a means is needed of distinguishing between the different relationships between speaker and audience and building them into the taxonomy. The distinction between different value systems used in the *Basisresearch* work is a useful starting point for this, but it raises an important question. In Rescher’s discussion of value classification, he suggested that classification by beneficiary might be one useful way to impose some structure on a value taxonomy. If one takes up this suggestion, one begins to define precisely the type of relationship between speaker and addressees which the *Basisresearch* value systems are designed to do. However, the *Basisresearch* value systems are not a means of *classifying* different value items, so much as a way of *redefining* a set of value items for each value system (for example, “rationality” as a value for individuals versus “rationality” as a value for the state). This begs the question, therefore, of whether the properties of a value change with the speaker-audience relationship — or, in other words, of whether speaker-audience relationships may vary between appeals to a given value item (necessitating the inclusion of some extra information about each appeal), or whether such variations simply occur between value items (allowing extra information about speaker-audience relationships to be encoded in the classification rather than at the individual appeal level).

It seems clear from the *Basisresearch* design that an item such as, for example, “caution”, could be interpreted differently, depending on who is the real or hypothetical agent involved (the general public, the state, doctors, etc.). Equally, however, if one thinks in terms of the beneficiaries of realising a given value, some value items appear to be more clearly to do with the delivery of specified benefits than others. “Caution” is one value which might have rather vague or unspecified beneficiaries, since the main emphasis of an appeal for caution would probably be on the behaviour of those who might potentially behave incautiously, and not on those who might benefit from their avoidance of this behaviour. In contrast, an appeal to a value such as “employment” would tend to emphasise the

beneficiaries, since it is primarily concerned with the delivery of an objective. It should be clear from this that there is a close relationship between Rokeach's instrumental/terminal classification and the kinds of speaker-addressee relationship which an appeal to a given value can define. The expectation must be that such relationships will show some variance both within and between value items, and that such information will need to be encoded at the individual appeal level and at the value classification level. However, the types of variance will probably differ at each level. At the value level, the *number and type* of addressee will vary, whereas, at the appeal level, it is the types of *addressee role* which will vary. Thus, the position of a value in the classification will tend to determine whether it defines a benefit being offered from one addressee to another, or a demand being made from one to another. The analysis of an individual appeal will then reveal precisely who the addressees are, and who is offering what to whom, or demanding what of whom. The omission of *Basisresearch's* second item, "Contemplation", from the "State and Society" value system also indicates, however, that the value item being appealed to may place some constraint on the permissible addressees, since some items simply do not have any meaning for some addressees. A good example is the value *health*, which could have an individual or the general public as a beneficiary, but not, perhaps, the state. This depends, of course, on how exactly the different addressees are defined. This will be considered later.

3.6.5. Restricting Polarity in Value Items: A Revised Value Definition

A further issue is whether or not the value items in the taxonomy should be a mixture of "negative" and "positive" items, as Rokeach's definition suggests, or all positive items. Certainly, in real texts, values are expressed both negatively and positively, that is, speakers express what they see as desirable and what they see as undesirable, for example, by appealing to the desirability of *health* (positive) and the undesirability of *illness* (negative). However, as in the example just given, negative appeals tend to express the inverse of a potential positive appeal. There is thus an argument for maintaining a taxonomy of solely positive value items, and encoding the polarity of speakers' appeals (whether they appeal to a positive item, or against the inverse of a positive item) separately. That is what is proposed here. It is therefore necessary to modify Rokeach's original value definition to accommodate this change. A value, for the purposes of this study, will therefore now be defined as:

a type of belief, centrally located within one's total belief system, about how one ought to behave, or about some end-state of existence worth attaining, and thus a positive abstract ideal, not tied to any specific attitude object or situation, representing a person's belief about a desirable mode of conduct or a desirable terminal goal.

(adapted from Rokeach 1968a: 124)

More details about appeal polarity will be given later in this chapter.

3.7. *Classifying Value Appeals: Theoretical Issues in Developing the Taxonomy*

There are important theoretical as well as data-related issues in constructing a value item taxonomy, and the discussion of these has a firmer basis in existing research. They are primarily concerned with the method of classifying value items once a taxonomy has been defined, but also impact indirectly on the way items are chosen. Some work on general (non-value-research-specific) content analysis offers very useful guidelines for the classification of data which can help prevent some of the errors which can arise when a taxonomy is based purely on data analysis. Merten, in particular, gives six requirements for a classificatory system based on the work of Holsti (Merten 1983):

- a) the category system should have a theoretical basis so that it corresponds to the objectives of the research
- b) the category system should be complete, so that it can classify all possible content
- c) the categories should be mutually exclusive
- d) the categories should be independent from each other
- e) the categories should satisfy a unified classificatory principle
- f) the categories should be unambiguously defined

The first of these requires, quite simply, that the taxonomy should be based on a theoretical concept derived from the research being carried out, so that it is guided by the research objectives and not solely derived from data. Merten expands on this:

Jede gewählte Kategorie sollte daher möglichst exakt operationalisiert sein, so daß sie **gültig** (valid) in bezug auf das theoretische Konzept und **zuverlässig** (reliable) in bezug auf die Eintragung des Codierers ist. (Merten 1983: 95, highlights and translations by Merten).

Central to meeting this requirement is the value concept, already described in detail in a previous section, which is the theoretical basis for the taxonomy proposed here; further-

more, and jumping ahead somewhat, it is proposed to give a formal definition for each value item. These definitions, given later in Appendix I of Volume II, will ensure that each category is a valid value item and that each item can be reliably coded in the analysis.

The second requirement is a critical prerequisite for reliable data coding, because it is directed against category systems which attempt to artificially force the potentially infinite diversity of data into a finite number of categories. This requirement is satisfied either by closed category systems, which used dichotomised categories (for instance, Natural or Un-natural; Employed or Unemployed) which logically cover all the data, or by open category systems which use a residual category (for example, Politics, Economics, Culture, Other). Since the value item taxonomy used here has open categories, a residual category will be used. The residual category effectively constitutes an acknowledgement by the analyst that it is not realistic to try to devise a finite number of categories which can be used to consistently code all data. This certainly applies to value analysis: no matter how many discrete value items are identified, new items are always liable to emerge in data not yet analysed, and for every research project, a line must be drawn at some point under the development of the analysis framework. Throwing problematic appeals into a container marked "other" may be expedient, but it also increases the reliability of the analysis, since the analyst will be less inclined to force appeals into categories where they do not belong, a temptation which is increased when developing new categories involves considerable effort.

The third requirement, that categories should be mutually exclusive, is often problematic when applied to taxonomies which describe real-world data. It is particularly difficult to draw precise boundaries between different value categories, and so, although each value appeal will be coded under one and only one value category, the potential overlap between the definitions of some items threatens to violate this requirement. A systematic approach to dealing with these ambiguities will be outlined in the following section.

The fourth requirement, that categories should be independent from each other, is closely tied to the issue of mutual exclusivity. Insofar as each unit of data can be coded under one heading only, the categories are formally independent, since the applicability of a category cannot be dependent on that of others. Whether this independence is genuine depends on the level of duplication or ambiguity in the system. Again, this will be covered in the next section.

The fifth requirement concerns the principle used to organise and distinguish between categories, and is especially important for open category systems. Meeting this demand often provides a solution to the problems of the third and fourth requirements, since it tends to minimise or eliminate duplication and ambiguity. Merten gives an example of a classificatory system for youth literature which uses at least several different classificatory principles and thus violates the third, fourth and fifth requirements. Among the 15 categories which it uses are the two categories "Nature" and "Supernatural", which, logically, should alone suffice to cover all the data (Merten 1983: 97). Besides failing to use one classificatory principle, the system's categories are not mutually exclusive or independent. The solution to this problem proposed in the next section includes a hierarchical classificatory system for the value items, which is dichotomous and is thus based on one unified classificatory principle.

The last requirement, that categories should be defined unambiguously, is important for the reliability of an analysis, but is much more easily stated than applied in practice. Real-world data seldom lends itself to a tidy division into categories, and in this research, ambiguous appeals on the borderline between value items present just as much of a problem for the definition of value items as they do for maintaining their mutual exclusivity; the two requirements are really two sides of the same coin. Value item definitions will be based on a range of possible features of the data which act as indicators for appeals to those values, and the ranges of different items will in some cases overlap; these ambiguity problems are dealt with in the next section.

3.8. *Classifying Value Appeals: Selecting Value Items for the Taxonomy*

Having identified the need for a new value item taxonomy, discussed some of the data which will need to be recorded for value appeals, and looked at the issues involved in classifying value items, the items themselves have to be selected. Despite the great value to be gained from studying other research, this selection process remains an inexact science. It inevitably involves the laying down of somewhat arbitrary boundaries, since there is no objective method of deciding how many items there should be, how fine the distinctions should be between items, or where one item ends and another, related item begins. It has already been shown that the most commonly used formal definitions of the value concept are of limited assistance in making these decisions. To avoid such decisions being made in isolation, as much use as possible was made of existing research; however, the selection

procedure remains fundamentally heuristic and data-centred. As has already been stated, the resulting value taxonomy is not intended to be comprehensive or generic; its value items do not define the total range of possible desirable items in any text. Furthermore, the emphasis on deriving the item selection from the data means that the taxonomy does not reflect any complete, abstract world view, and may mirror some of the overlaps and apparent inconsistencies encountered in the data. This does not imply that the value items do not have to be as accurately and unambiguously defined as possible, but it helps to avoid the temptation to force the data to fit an artificially clean and tidy value scheme.

3.8.1. A Procedure for Value Item Selection

The heuristics of the value item selection procedure that was employed can be summarised as follows. Firstly, a sentence-by-sentence preliminary analysis was performed on a section of text from each debate. For each sentence, the utterances of speakers were scrutinised to identify any positive or negative content, that is, anything that might indicate that a speaker considers something desirable or undesirable. These content items were then analysed to find how the speaker's utterances mapped onto views about particular forms of behaviour or particular demands, or in other words, whether and how the speaker's remarks, which might be very specific and might relate to a particular person or a certain aspect of a piece of legislation, could indicate an appeal to a more generally defined value. Where such a mapping was possible, the utterance was assigned a value item. At this stage, the decision about which value item best represented the speaker's appeal, and to what extent that value item might be suitable for inclusion in the taxonomy, was made with reference to both knowledge of the subject of the debates and to some of the other taxonomies examined in previous sections (this will be expanded on below), and on the basis of the analyst's own understanding of the text. Through this process, an initial taxonomy of value items was compiled which appeared to offer a satisfactory means of categorising the appeals in the text. Once the taxonomy was examined for inconsistencies and overlaps, it was used to try to re-categorise appeals in the same parts of the texts, and in new parts. In this way, gaps in the taxonomy were filled and the system tested for further inconsistencies and ambiguities. This process was repeated a number of times. As each phase threw up fresh problems in identifying which values were being appealed to in a particular utterance, it became possible (and necessary) to begin turning vaguely defined value items into much tighter concepts with formal definitions. These definitions then became, in the final phases

of the analysis, the primary means of deciding which value item most accurately represented a speaker's appeal.

As has already been stated, the choice and description of some items during this process were informed by the existing research surveyed in section 3.5. The taxonomies from Rokeach, *Basisresearch*, Klages and others provided a good starting point for dividing up the total value "space" in the texts and, in many cases, prompted the inclusion of new items late into the development of the taxonomy. Some value items are shared across most of the taxonomies, but a comparison of some apparently similar items also revealed interesting ambiguities. For example, the value item "achievement" appears in the taxonomies of both *Basisresearch* and Klages, as well as being approximated by "a sense of accomplishment" in Rokeach's list of terminal values. However, in each case it appears to mean something slightly different. Klages classifies "achievement" as a "social self-control" value, whereas Rokeach lists "a sense of accomplishment" as a terminal value. Presumably, in the former case, the demand to "achieve" comes from society and is placed on the individual, whereas, in the latter case, the rewards flowing from achievement are classed as something desirable which an individual might want for him or herself. Deciding what is meant by "achievement" in the *Basisresearch* taxonomy is more difficult, because of the lack of both a classification and complete mapping sentences. "To achieve something in life and have success" could be prefaced with either "I think it is important that one/I should..." or by "It is important for me to...". These problems underline the need to clearly define and classify value items.

Despite these ambiguities, each taxonomy was found to contain some interesting candidate items. The values "respect/recognition", "achievement" and "responsibility/fulfilling duties" appear in one form or another in each of the three taxonomies mentioned above, and "discipline/self-control" appears in two of them; all seemed intuitively appropriate in a political context. There are a number of items that were not considered relevant to the research ("religiousness", "activity", "adventure", "contemplation", "punctuality", "giving expression to emotional needs"), and some which were found to be too broad or imprecise ("morality", "power", "trust/human contact"). Klages' taxonomy is unique in adding a series of more overtly "political" values, such as "democracy", "equality" and "participation", and the *Basisresearch* table includes "co-operation" and "employment/prosperity". All of these appeared to be promising candidate values.

3.8.2. Problems in Item Selection

There are a number of issues concerning the “intuitive” selection of value items which need to be raised, however. As one might expect, mapping from value appeals onto value items can be very problematic, particularly in borderline cases. During the course of the preliminary analysis, these problems resolved themselves into two main areas of concern which needed to be addressed systematically for the research to proceed: reductionism and ambiguity.

3.8.2.1. *Managing Reductionism using Combination Values*

The problem of reductionism is one that has implications at the level of both value item selection and item classification. The value definition given earlier in this chapter makes it clear that values are abstract — that is, their definitions are independent of specific attitude-objects — and the number of values can therefore be expected to be manageably low. However, since the analysis is concerned not with abstract definitions of values, but with the realisations of values — which certainly include specific attitude-objects — one can expect, and indeed one finds, that values which can be separately defined in the abstract are sometimes merged in specific realisations in text. The problem is how to deal with such cases.

Fundamentally, therefore, the problem of reductionism concerns the very process of taxonomy-building itself — the way in which the part of the value continuum into which the corpus falls is divided up into separate value items. It also concerns the reduction of the corpus data itself into component parts through analysis. The application of a value taxonomy-based value analysis to a text is inevitably reductionist, in that it aims to break down a whole — whether one views that whole as being the clause, the sentence, the paragraph or the entire text — into discrete value appeals, but one needs to define exactly how much reduction this will involve, what might be lost in the process, and how some of that data loss might be prevented.

These two types of reductionism are obviously closely related. In practice, a speaker’s utterance may contain two or more inextricably linked appeals to different values, and attempting to split them into two atomic appeals risks distorting the analysis. This points to a need for structures in the analysis which can encode this complexity. Encoding this information in the taxonomy itself is, however, undesirable, for a number of reasons. Introducing less abstract, higher-level values into an abstract taxonomy would violate the theo-

retical basis of the taxonomy, something disallowed by Merten's principles for classification. It would also mean having an unmanageably large number of items; in fact, attempting to build a taxonomy of complex value items is clearly quite futile — given any taxonomy of values, no matter how coarsely grained, there will be cases where what appears to be a single appeal draws together more than one value item in the taxonomy — say *plenitude* and *freedom* — to create a higher-level value concept, for example, the importance of being free from economic burdens imposed by others. Having a large number of high-level values with shared component values would also make analysis more difficult, because to discover, for example, all the occasions on which *plenitude* was appealed to, one would have to find all of the high-level values of which *plenitude* was a component part.

It is therefore desirable to employ a fine-grained taxonomy which simply contains the “building blocks” of all possible high-level values, whilst, at the same time, allowing the joining together of these basic items to be recorded so that higher-level appeals are not lost. A solution is the use of *combination values*. Combination values consist of two or more value items explicitly linked in the coded data to form one appeal. Each item is separately recorded, which means that information about, for example, polarity, addressees, and a number of other appeal characteristics is available for each element of the combined value. This is particularly important, since it does not necessarily follow that the different value items in a combined appeal will occupy the same classificatory slots.

There are two types of combination that will be encoded: *high-level* and *associative*. High-level combinations are values combined to form higher-level concepts, such as the example given above of “the imposition of economic burdens”, encoded as *plenitude* and *freedom*. Associative values are values which, without being formed into a higher-level concept, are brought together in the text and appealed to as one unit, such as *health* and *ambition*.⁸

3.8.2.2. *Handling Ambiguity*

The second problem is one of ambiguity in the definition of value items. Given an unstructured list of items without formal definitions, attempts to analyse text are frequently frustrated when quite different value appeals appear, intuitively, to belong under the same value heading. The different possible ways of viewing “achievement” outlined above pro-

⁸ Associative combinations do not represent the only type of association between values; chapter five will detail forms of “asymmetrical” association which can serve as appeal methods.

vide a good example of the problem. Mapping sentences and formal definitions are part of the solution: the latter should, in particular, either eliminate ambiguity, or, where it cannot be completely removed, make explicit any areas where an item may overlap with another, so that the level of ambiguity is known and controllable for. However, these formal definitions are difficult to arrive at without an overview of how the value system is structured, in other words, without a system for placing the items which are being selected into distinct classes or categories according to their general properties.

The conclusion must therefore be that classifying value items is not only necessary in order to facilitate and enrich the final data analysis, but also a necessary part of constructing the value taxonomy in the first place; it becomes part of the iterative process of selecting and testing items. Classifying items can expose both the type of addressees which they allow, and their relationship to other items, and this information used to increase the accuracy with which further items are selected and applied. Furthermore, because the classification framework is, to some extent, independent of the individual items themselves, it can help to identify and eliminate weaknesses in the taxonomy itself, in particular values which might be missing or incorrectly placed.

3.9. *Classifying Value Items: Data-Related and Theoretical Issues*

An abstract outline of the value item classification is therefore needed before the taxonomy can be finalised. The work by Klages and Rokeach emerged from the literature review as the most important building blocks for value classification. Rokeach's scheme is a two-level hierarchy containing instrumental and terminal values, subdivided into "moral" and "competence" values, and "personal" and "social" values respectively. Klages proposes a division into self-control and self-development values, with a further sub-division into "individual" and "social" values. In the light of the *Basisresearch* work, it was shown that, in a political context, instrumental values are primarily concerned with making demands of others (having expectations), whereas terminal values are about claiming entitlements. Furthermore, there was considerable similarity between Rokeach's and Klages' value classifications, suggesting that their different levels of classification might reflect different views of the same value features.

A value classification system is needed which exploits the strengths of the different approaches used in this work and adapts them to the needs of this study. Rokeach's distinction between instrumental and terminal values is an excellent starting point, but it omits the

classification of beneficiaries, as suggested by Rescher, and does not analyse the corollary of a value's beneficiary — the object of the expectations or demands which flow from a value. Values ought therefore to be grouped according to the type of relationships which they define between speaker, addressee and a possible third party, and these groups should be treated differently in the analysis. Furthermore, the notions of “entitlement” as well as “expectation” should be captured where applicable.

The design of the classification system which emerged from these considerations has, again, been informed by Merten's requirements. First of all, the category system has a sound theoretical basis, namely the notions of *entitlement* and *expectation*, which will be described below. Secondly, the classificatory system has been designed with a hierarchical and a completely closed, dichotomous structure. That is, at each level in the hierarchy, only two classificatory “branches” exist, and those two branches form, in every case, a closed, dichotomous system which encompasses every logical possibility at that level. That ensures that the system can classify all possible content without the need for a residual category, and (thirdly) ensures that the categories remain mutually exclusive. This structure also assists in ensuring mutual exclusivity in the definition of the value items themselves. Fourthly, the categories, though related, are entirely independent of each other. Fifthly, a single classificatory principle has been applied in the three-level classificatory hierarchy; that principle again concerns the two notions *expectation* and *entitlement*, which will be discussed shortly. Merten's final requirement for non-ambiguity in value category definitions is, as with value item definitions, the most difficult to satisfy. There are certain problem cases in the classification of value items, which are covered below. Although an additional level has been added to the classificatory hierarchy to deal with these cases, the system does not, and cannot, eliminate ambiguity, but rather attempts to manage and localise it by placing the value categories, like the value items themselves, in a value continuum.

3.10. Classifying Value Items: Expectation and Entitlement

3.10.1. The First Classificatory Level: Instrumental versus Terminal Values

The three levels of the classificatory hierarchy will now be described. Following Rokeach, the most fundamental, top-level classificatory distinction is between “instrumental” values, which are concerned with forms of behaviour, including attitudes and approaches to the carrying out of tasks, as means to specified or unspecified ends, and

“terminal” values, which are focused on end-goals which have value in themselves and which are not necessarily a means to achieving anything else. *Discipline* and *realism* would be examples of instrumental values, and *equality* and *contentment* examples of terminal values.

In practice, it is not possible to draw a solid black line between these two value types, since certain forms of behaviour and attitudes may be regarded as ends in themselves, and since it is difficult to define precisely what constitutes an “end-goal”; arguably, most goals are simply intermediate goals which serve as the means to achieve some other objective. At this point it is useful to introduce the notions of “entitlement” and “expectation” into the classification. It has already been observed that Klages’ notions of “self control” and “self development” values appeared to map onto Rokeach’s “instrumental” and “terminal” values. The concepts can be paired together, at least in a political context, for the following reason. To appeal to a value which is concerned with means rather than with ends is to concentrate on the means of achieving a (perhaps unspecified) objective rather than on the objective itself. Since instrumental values are concerned with forms of behaviour as the means to achieve objectives, an appeal to means is an appeal to certain types of conduct, and can therefore be described as representing an “expectation” placed on addressees. Equally, to make an appeal to an end goal is to emphasise the goal and not the means, to emphasise the merits of possessing something without considering how difficult it may be to obtain, and how it might affect the fulfilment of other goals. The focus of appeals to terminal values is therefore on the “entitlements” of the addressees. To summarise the distinction crudely, instrumental values are about “doing” and terminal values are about “having”.

To further expand on this distinction, expectations necessarily involve a person, group or organisation of whom something is expected, and entitlements likewise involve somebody who possesses the entitlement. In other words, each value appeal must have one or more notional addressees; henceforth, the terms “expectee” and “entitlee” will be used to describe these different types of addressee. What distinguishes an expectee and an entitlee is that an expectee plays an *active* role in realising a value, whereas an entitlee is a *passive* recipient of something. A characteristic of expectations is therefore that their realisation is seen as being within the control of the expectee, whereas a characteristic of entitlements is that their realisation may not be within the control of the entitlee. This introduces an ele-

ment of asymmetry into the classification, the significance of which will become more evident later.

3.10.2. The Second Classificatory Level: Interaction-Dependency

3.10.2.1. Conclusions from the Literature

This instrumental/expectation versus terminal/entitlement dichotomy tightens the classificatory system, but it does not entirely eliminate ambiguity. It became clear from the preliminary analyses that certain values, which appear to be primarily characterised by expectation, have an entitlement element, and vice versa. For example, the value *honesty* certainly concerns an expectation for behaviour, and yet, intuitively, one feels it could also be represented as a goal, because a speaker might say “we want more honesty in public life”. At this point, it is helpful to look back at some of the literature. As reiterated at the beginning of this section, Rokeach and Klages both suggest further levels of classification. Rokeach divides instrumental values into “moral” expectations and “competence” expectations, and terminal values into “personal” and “social”, whereas Klages subclassifies both instrumental and terminal values as either “individual” or “social”. The notable feature of each of these subclassifications is that, in different ways, they distinguish between values with a “social” component, and values without a “social” component. In the case of “personal” or “individual” versus “social” this is made explicit, but the “moral” versus “competence” dichotomy can also be shown to fit this pattern. “Morality” can arguably never be meaningful for an isolated individual, because it regulates behaviour with respect to some other entity. The entity may be another person, or an object of belief, such as a god, or even non-sentient beings such as pets — but a moral value cannot be purely defined by self-interest. “Competence” values, on the other hand, do not require a social context to acquire meaning. The need for competence can be explained purely by reference to the self-interest of an individual.

The subclassifications of Klages and Rokeach thus seem to identify a potentially important distinction between different types of instrumental and terminal value. This needs to be woven together with the observation that expectations and entitlements can sometimes both form part of the same value. It is therefore proposed, on the second level of the hierarchy, to create a dichotomy between what will be called “interaction-dependent” and “interaction-independent” values. This dichotomy is related to that of “individual/personal” versus “social”, but differs in a number of respects. The defining characteristic of

interaction-dependent values is that they can only acquire relevance or meaning in a social context, which for the purposes of this work may safely be defined as the context of interaction with other human beings, although, as in the case of “moral” values above, deities or even animals could also perform the regulative role. In other words, all such values can only be defined with reference to others, and can only be appealed to with some explicit or implicit reference to others. *Altruism* is an example of an interaction-dependent value, since it cannot have meaning outside a social context. On the other side of the dichotomy, interaction-independent values are defined, simply, as those values which do not fall into the “interaction-dependent” category. This means that interaction-independent values may or may have a social context, but do not require one. *Determination* is an example of a value in this class.

3.10.2.2. *Linking Interaction to Expectation and Entitlement*

It is now possible to link this dichotomy to notions of entitlement and expectation, because all interaction-dependent values will contain elements of both. Since each interaction-dependent value belongs to the top-level category of either instrumental or terminal values, each one will contain either a *primary* component of either entitlement or expectation. In the case of interaction-dependent instrumental values, the primary component will be expectation. However, these values will also contain a secondary component of entitlement, because interaction-dependent values define some form of social exchange: each expectation placed on the addressee of a value appeal also postulates an entitlement for some third party. *Altruism* can again be used as an illustration. Its primary component is expectation, because it is demanding a certain form of behaviour, but that behaviour, if delivered, will also have beneficiaries. Similarly, interaction-dependent terminal values have a primary component of entitlement, and a secondary component of expectation. *Equality* is such a value, since it defines a goal, and thus a set of entitlements, but the fulfilment of that goal necessarily involves an expectation for the behaviour of others.

3.10.2.3. *A Test for Interaction-Dependency*

The distinction between interaction-dependent and interaction-independent values can often seem less than clear when applied to real values, not least to the analyst. *Discipline* and *realism* are two that might cause confusion: can they have meaning outside a social context, or are they both purely social expectations? *Responsibility* is another case; although it at first appears obvious that it must be an interaction-dependent value, a little re-

flection can muddy the waters somewhat. An individual can certainly be said to be “responsible”, without the speaker making explicit reference to others, but does the value only acquire meaning because of the *implied potential* for others to take responsibility in the individual’s place? In other words, if an individual were not in a position to pass responsibility to someone else, would *responsibility* cease to be a meaningful value?⁹

To make the resolution of these questions easier, a test was devised to determine when a value could be classed as interaction-dependent. The test might be described as the “desert island test”, because it takes the form of a thought experiment which begins with a person alone on a desert island, without any means of communicating with the outside world, or any immediate expectation of returning to it. To make the scenario simpler, the castaway can also be assumed to be an atheist (and thus not to be involved in notional relationships with a deity) and the island can be assumed to have no other sentient life (thus excluding the possibility that interaction-dependent values may acquire relevance with respect to other life-forms). The purpose of imagining this rather odd scenario is to enable the analyst to envisage what, if any, relevance a particular value would have to that person’s existence on the island. If this is done, it rapidly becomes evident that some values, such as *compassion, trustfulness, altruism* or *justice and fairness* have no applicability in such an environment; they require the existence of other parties and must therefore be classed as interaction-dependent. In contrast, values such as *assiduousness* or *rationality* do have some potential relevance, for example in helping the stranded person find food, build a raft to travel to nearby islands or retain sanity until the day when help arrives. Such values would therefore belong to the interaction-independent category.

The problem cases mentioned above are also easily resolved with this test. *Discipline* and *realism* are both clearly meaningful in this scenario; *discipline* is important to the castaway, since a failure to control his immediate whims might prevent him from doing what is necessary for his health or survival. Thus, *discipline* is not, as one might be tempted to think, a purely social construct. Similarly, the castaway also needs *realism*, because he must not allow daydreams about being rescued to distract him from the immediate task of survival. Both are therefore interaction-independent, because in each case, the desirability

⁹ It should be made clear that the concept of “responsibility” referred here is that laid down in the relevant value definition in the appendices. For all value items, the definition is intended to remove the doubts about which particular meaning is intended, and any reference to a value item should be taken as a reference to the

of the value arises purely from the objective requirements placed on him by his situation, and so the absence of social pressure does not affect their relevance. In the case of *responsibility*, on the other hand, reflecting on the desert island scenario reveals that, although the stranded person could, in theory, be said to be “taking responsibility” for survival and raft-building, such a concept has no practical meaning when no others are present to take responsibility in his place. However he behaves, whatever his attitude, the castaway is unavoidably “responsible” for every aspect of his life, and appeals to *responsibility* would therefore have no meaning. The thought experiment thus confirms that this value is little more than an abstraction unless there is an *implied potential* for others to take responsibility, and it must therefore be classed as interaction-dependent.

3.10.2.4. *The Significance of Interaction-Dependency*

In reality, of course, values exist in more complex environments than the one in this thought experiment. In parliamentary debates, there are always at least two notional parties when a value is appealed to: the individual making the appeal and the addressee or addressees. There is therefore always a social component in political value appeals. The reason for making the distinction between interaction-dependent and interaction-independent values is that appeals to interaction-dependent values require the participation of a second *and* a third party (the first party being the speaker making the appeal) in a more direct form of social exchange sanctioned or demanded by the speaker. These two parties may not always be named explicitly, but their existence is, at the very least, presupposed by the speaker and required by the value item involved in the appeal.

It should be conceded here that values classed as interaction-independent may also, sometimes, be used to define an explicit social exchange between two named parties. This is not a property of the values, however, but of appeals to those values, and so to encode this would involve recording considerable extra information at the individual appeal level, and therefore considerable additional analysis. It would also mean that information about social exchanges would be stored at different levels for different categories of value. The simplifying assumption has therefore been made that interaction-independent values define indirect forms of social exchange (or, in extreme cases, no social exchange at all), and so they will not be analysed as social exchanges.

concept described in its definition, not to the concept or concepts generally associated with the word or phrase.

3.10.2.5. *Addressees and Beneficiaries*

Interaction-dependent values bring to light two additional value properties which are not strictly part of the classificatory hierarchy, but which it is nevertheless appropriate to mention here. Since interaction-dependent values involve relatively direct forms of social exchange, it is useful to identify which party, in each case, is the *primary addressee* of an appeal to the value, and which party is the *primary beneficiary* of the exchange.

The primary addressee can be regarded as the party by whose mode of conduct or state of existence the extent of the realisation of a value can be measured. In other words, it is the party which is the focus of a value appeal. In the case of interaction-independent values, there can only be one addressee, namely the expectee or the entitlee, because there is no explicit social exchange. Appeals for people to "work harder" or "be rational" only have as addressees those upon whom the expectations are being placed. For interaction-dependent values, there is both an expectee and an entitlee; demands for "honesty" or "compassion" at least imply that someone is to be recipient of the honest or compassionate behaviour. Identifying the primary addressee is a simple matter, because it reflects the position of the interaction-dependent value in the instrumental-terminal hierarchy. In the case of interaction-dependent instrumental values, the primary addressee is always the expectee, because instrumental values are focused on expectation; for interaction-dependent terminal values, the primary addressee is always the entitlee.

The concept of the primary beneficiary concerns the derivation of benefits. Typically, any social exchange will result in many different parties deriving some sort of benefit; often, the party that may, initially, appear to lose out, gains something over the long term. However, the primary beneficiary is defined here as the party which receives the most direct benefits from the exchange (the primary beneficiary will therefore most often also be the initial beneficiary). Unsurprisingly, the unmarked case is that the *entitlee* is the primary beneficiary, since that party receives the fruits of the expectee's efforts. One illustration of this is the value *honesty*. An appeal to honesty implies that it is desirable that others should "tell the truth", that is, the truth as they see it, or behave in a way which does not mislead or deceive. The entitlee is the one being told this "truth", and is therefore the primary beneficiary. It may be that others may later benefit from someone's honest behaviour, including the expectee, but the entitlee is the most direct, and thus the primary beneficiary. There are, however, cases where the entitlee is not the primary beneficiary. *Assertiveness* is

one such case, because it is a value which prioritises the interests of the expectee (the party of whom assertive behaviour is expected). The entitlee does not receive any direct benefit, but rather loses out in the social exchange. *Cynicism* is another value of this type. Both of these values belong to the interaction-dependent instrumental class; no values have emerged from the analysis on the interaction-dependent terminal side which have the expectee as the primary beneficiary. However, such values are theoretically conceivable. *Punishment* might be an example, because it would clearly be a terminal value whose primary beneficiary is not the entitlee. The expectee (the party carrying out the punishment) would presumably be viewed as the primary beneficiary, although the entitlee is the primary addressee.

It may seem that the terms “entitlee” and “entitlement” are somewhat inappropriate for values where entitlements do not coincide with benefits. The terminology can be preserved by arguing that these values postulate a “negative” entitlement, because the entitlee receives no direct benefit, and indeed loses out in the immediate term, and a “negative” expectation, because the expectee gains in the exchange; the main justification, however, is simply consistency: it is felt to be preferable to use the same terminology throughout, and assume that the reader can appreciate that the character of the entitlement varies according to the primary beneficiary.

Table 3.4: Expectee and Entitlee Addressee and Beneficiary Status Types

	Interaction-independent Instrumental	Interaction-dependent Instrumental	Interaction-dependent Terminal	Interaction-independent Terminal
Expectee Addressee Status	Primary	Primary	Secondary	[N/A]
Entitlee Addressee Status	[N/A]	Secondary	Primary	Primary
Expectee Beneficiary Status	[Unspecified]	Non-Primary or Primary	Non-Primary or Primary	[N/A]
Entitlee Beneficiary Status	[N/A]	Primary or Non-Primary	Primary or Non-Primary	Primary

The concepts of addressee and beneficiary can also be applied, with some exceptions, to interaction-independent values. The primary addressee of an interaction-independent value is easy to identify, since there is only one addressee; there is therefore, obviously, no secondary addressee. Determining the parties’ beneficiary status is somewhat more difficult. Certainly, for all the interaction-independent terminal values in the taxonomy, the beneficiary status of the entitlee can always be identified — the entitlee is always the primary

beneficiary, since he or she is the receiver of plenitude, security, or whatever it might be. It is perhaps conceivable that, in a value not included in the taxonomy, the entitlee could be the non-primary beneficiary of an interaction-independent terminal value; that is to say, that realising some terminal value for the entitlee might primarily benefit the person realising the value, even though the social exchange is not made explicit. However, it is almost certainly not possible for the beneficiary status of the entitlee to be unspecified. In other words, it is hard to conceive of any value where the entitlee might potentially have either type of beneficiary status — that is, be either the primary or the non-primary beneficiary of a given entitlement. Once an entitlement is defined, it is, in all probability, possible to know whether a given party is its primary beneficiary.

In contrast, interaction-independent *instrumental* values do not specify which party is the primary beneficiary, because it is possible, even when there is no explicit entitlee, for an expectee to be a non-primary beneficiary. Indeed, this is quite normal for such values. Appeals to *assiduousness*, *decisiveness* or *patience* frequently imply that those making the demands will derive the initial benefit from compliance, even if it is not made clear exactly who is the source of the demands. This asymmetry between instrumental and terminal values arises because a given mode of behaviour can be directed towards achieving different goals, which may benefit different parties in different contexts. For terminal values, the goal is known and this ambiguity does not arise. The different possible addressee and beneficiary relationships for each class of value described so far are shown in Table 3.4. To provide a different view of these properties, the different possible identities of the addressees and beneficiaries are shown in Table 3.5; where two possible identities exist, the unmarked case is italicised.

Table 3.5: Identities of Addressees and Beneficiaries

	Interaction-independent Instrumental	Interaction-dependent Instrumental	Interaction-dependent Terminal	Interaction-independent Terminal
Primary Addressee	Expectee	Expectee	Entitlee	Entitlee
Secondary Addressee	[None]	Entitlee	Expectee	[None]
Primary Beneficiary	[Unspecified]	Entitlee or Expectee	Entitlee or Expectee	Entitlee or [Unspecified]
Non-Primary Beneficiary	[Unspecified]	Expectee or Entitlee	Expectee or Entitlee	[Unspecified] or Entitlee

3.10.3. The Third Classificatory Level: Value Purity

3.10.3.1. The Need To Classify Values By Purity

There is a final, third level of classification below the interaction-dependent versus interaction-independent level. This became necessary due to a curious feature of certain value appeals which emerged from the preliminary analysis. No matter how rigorous and comprehensive a classificatory structure the analyst creates, when that structure is required to accommodate the sometimes ambiguous and irrational content of real text, compromises have to be made. Real value appeals do not follow any classificatory principles; speakers are not mindful of the need for their appeals to slot tidily into instrumental, terminal or any other slots. The cases which prompted the addition of a third level of classification are appeals which appear to have the essential character of one class of values (terminal), but are appealed to in a fashion which suggests they belong to the other class (instrumental).

An example of this is the case of *competence*. *Competence* would seem, at first glance, to be a terminal value, because it has the characteristics of a goal: it is something which it is important to *have* rather than something which it is important to *do*. However, intuitively but paradoxically, it seems more appropriate to describe it as an expectation than an entitlement. The appeals to *competence* made in the corpus confirm this paradox; they are typically characterised by criticism directed at a person or organisation because of their lack of competence, rather than, say, criticism of the government for not creating sufficient quantities of it. This seems inconsistent with the notion of an entitlement, since people do not tend to willingly deprive themselves of entitlements. Other terminal values, in contrast, are never appealed to in this way: one never finds a speaker criticising someone for their lack of health or criticising an institution for having insufficient government funding. Example of other values which behave in the same way as *competence* are *insight* and *success*.

There are two ways in which to deal with cases such as these. The values can be forced to fit the existing classification, by inferring whether they logically constitute expectations or entitlements, or the tightness of the classificatory system can be compromised by allowing it to accommodate the ambiguity of the data. The first option is rarely practical and never desirable: it is usually impractical because it requires one to know what speakers may have “really” meant, and undesirable because it distorts the content of the texts in order to make them fit an inflexible classificatory system. In the case of *competence*, the analyst would have to infer that the speaker was not really appealing to *competence* at all, since it cannot logically be an instrumental value. Instead, the speaker’s appeals might have to be coded as appeals to one or more values whose absence is either the cause or the consequence of incompetence, such as *assiduousness*, *thoroughness* or *inefficiency*; or perhaps the analyst would have to infer that a speaker was implying a value such as *honesty*, since holding a public position which one is allegedly not competent to hold might be presented as a form of dishonesty. It would be extremely difficult to know which of these values was “actually” being appealed to, and such an inference would go far beyond the analysis of implicature. The analyst is thus compelled to accommodate these strange values in the classificatory system.

3.10.3.2. *The Position of Value Purity in the Classification*

Since these values combine elements of the two principal value classes, whilst being interaction-independent, they can be described as *impure*. The third level of classification which is proposed to address this problem therefore classes values according to *purity*. Purity is only a property of interaction-independent values, and, in practice, only of *instrumental* interaction-independent values. The reason for this will be explained shortly. At this level, therefore, a distinction is made between two types of interaction-independent instrumental values, pure instrumental and impure instrumental, and (in theory) between two types of interaction-independent terminal values, pure terminal and impure terminal. Values such as *competence* and *insight* are classified as impure instrumental, because they are appealed to as expectations (and are thus closer to pure instrumental values than to pure terminal values), while possessing some of the logical properties of terminal values.


Impure terminal values exist, at least in this value taxonomy, as a purely theoretical possibility. A value which fell into this category would have to behave in discourse like a terminal value, while logically resembling an instrumental value. Speakers would, in other

words, have to appeal to what was logically an expectation, but treat it as an entitlement. There are good intuitive and theoretical reasons to suppose that such values are rare or non-existent. One intuitive reason is that appeals directed towards the behaviour of individuals or organisations tend to be directed at those individuals or organisations themselves, because they are usually viewed as being directly responsible for their behaviour; achieving a certain behaviour by one group would therefore never become an “entitlement” for another. Where one group has some control over the behaviour of another, for example prison officers in a prison, appeals would tend to address the behaviour of each group separately. Officers might be criticised for not maintaining control, and inmates for rioting; if someone suggested that officers had not “provided enough discipline” for the prisoners, it would be taken as a fairly clear criticism of the officers’ failure to maintain control. Equally, an announcement by a prisons minister that she intended to “achieve more discipline in prisons” would be treated as an intention to tighten control by the government and an expectation for the behaviour of inmates. It is difficult to conceive of an expectation genuinely being treated as an entitlement.

A good theoretical reason for supposing that there are few, if any, impure terminal values, is that there is an asymmetry in the relationship between instrumental and terminal values. As stated previously, instrumental values are often the means to realise terminal values, and so one might reasonably expect criticism of the non-achievement of goals to replace criticism of the non-application of means in discourse. This shorthand only works in one direction, however. In value appeals, goals may come to symbolise behaviour, but behaviour does not generally symbolise goals, since, although the achievement of a goal may help encourage a particular behaviour, this relationship is less obvious and less direct than that between a goal and the behaviour which contributes to achieving it.

Nevertheless, the emphasis found in the corpus on personal responsibility for one’s own behaviour, as well as the conceptualisation of means and ends employed here, may themselves be discourse- or culture-specific. The impure terminal category therefore retains its theoretical position, although it does not contain any values from the taxonomy used here.

Figure 3.1: The Value Classification as a Value Continuum




The final point which remains to be explained is the reason for applying the third level of classification only to interaction-independent values. To understand this, it is perhaps helpful to view the emerging classification as representing a value continuum which flows from expectations to entitlements and (theoretically) from entitlements back to expectations. This is illustrated in Figure 3.1. Since interaction-dependent values contain elements of both expectation and entitlement, they form one of the points where terminal and instrumental values meet in the continuum. Impure values form the other meeting point for the two basic value classes. In the interaction-dependent part of the continuum, a form of social exchange is postulated; here, expectation meets entitlement because those two elements of value appeals are addressed to different parties. In the interaction-independent part of the continuum, only one party is involved; expectation meets entitlement because a goal becomes a symbol for certain forms of behaviour, and goals and behaviour then merge in the same person or organisation. Impure values cannot be interaction-dependent because, in the interaction-dependent part of the continuum, there is no symbolisation of behaviour by goals, or of goals by behaviour; behaviour and goals are provinces of separate parties to a social exchange.

3.10.4. The Final Value Classification

The complete value item classification is shown in Figure 3.2 on page 140 in the form of a hierarchy, together with the codes for the value items in each class. What these codes mean will become clear in the next section, where the final value taxonomy is given in table form. To make a general point about the classification: this classification is not being presented as complete, in the sense that it contains all the meaningful groupings of values in the taxonomy. Far from it; further sub-classifications are no doubt possible, and valid, as are quite different classificatory schemes. This classification is intended to be sufficient to enable a fruitful value analysis to be performed, and no more than that. It naturally contains many simplifying assumptions to which some may object. It might be contested, for example, that *justice and fairness* is an abstract value, whereas *equality* is a far more concrete one, and that they deserve separate treatment. Such matters must remain outside the scope of this particular study. Furthermore, the classification cannot entirely eliminate all ambiguity. Some doubt may always remain about whether a particular borderline value ought to be placed in one category or another. However, the classification serves to illustrate *relationships* between categories of value items, with the whole classificatory structure forming a value continuum. This should localise the errors which the analyst makes in categorising values, since a value's broad characteristics should lead the analyst to place it in the correct region of the continuum, even if the precise choice of category is debatable.

Figure 3.2: Value Item Classification



3.11. The Value Taxonomy

With the value classification in place, it is now possible to finalise the value taxonomy. As has already been stated, for the taxonomy to be complete, a definition is required for each value. Since these definitions are rather long and involved, and since they include additional information which is best given following the discussions in the next few sections, the value definitions will be given in Appendix I in Volume II. However, the values chosen for the taxonomy are given here in tabular form. The table contains, for each value, its name, a three-letter code which will be used to refer to the value in diagrams, in coding and elsewhere, and a short definition constructed from a mapping sentence. There is a separate mapping sentence for each value class. The short definition of a value is in no way intended to summarise or be equivalent to its full definition.

Table 3.6: Value Items

Short Item Description	Code	Short Value Definition
Pure Interaction-independent Terminal Values (Entitlement)		
		People deserve...
Contentment	CTM	to be happy and content.
Continuity	CTN	to experience continuity in their lives.
Convenience	CNV	to have as few obstacles placed in their path as possible.
Employment	EMP	to have good and regular employment.
Health	HTH	to be healthy.
Plenitude	PLN	to have sufficient resources to ease or remove financial or other pressures.
Pride	PRD	to have pride in themselves and their achievements.
Security	SCR	to be and feel secure from risk.
Sense of Identity	SDN	to have a strong sense of identity in a community.
Stability	STB	to experience stability in their lives.
Interaction-dependent Terminal Values (Entitlement)		
		People deserve...
Compassion	CMP	concern for and help with their problems
Consultation	CNS	involvement in making or vetting decisions which affect their lives
Co-operation & Agreement	COO	co-operation and agreement
Dignity	DGN	to be treated as human beings with pride and dignity
Equality	EQL	to be treated according to certain basic standards and to have the same basic entitlements irrespective of income, race, sex or any other characteristic
Freedom	FRD	the freedom to act as they wish and to make their own choices
Justice and Fairness	JSF	fair and reasonable treatment
Respect	RPC	respect
		...when dealing with other people.

Interaction-dependent Instrumental Values (Expectation)		
		People should show...
Altruism	ALT	a willingness to sacrifice personal interests for the benefit of others
Assertiveness	AST	a willingness to robustly defend their interests, and to do what is necessary in the face of opposition
Clarity	CLR	clarity in their presentation of arguments and information
Consistency	CST	consistency in their behaviour and pronouncements
Cynicism	CYN	a scepticism about human nature and motivation
Honesty	HST	truthfulness and candour
Honourableness	HNR	an avoidance of the deceptive exploitation of circumstance for personal gain
Humility	HML	an avoidance of self-aggrandisement and a recognition of personal limitations
Lawfulness	LWF	an adherence to the law
Responsibility	RSP	a preparedness to accept the responsibility which accompanies their position
Sense of Duty	SDT	a sense of their duty to attend to the needs of others
Trustfulness	TRU	trust in human nature and motivation
		...when dealing with other people.
Pure Interaction-independent Instrumental Values (Expectation)		
		People should show...
Accuracy	ACR	accuracy in their pronouncements and other activities.
Ambition	ABT	ambition to improve quality and increase output.
Assiduousness	ASD	preparedness to work hard.
Caution	CAU	a cautious attitude towards new ideas or change of any kind.
Conviction	CVC	confidence in their beliefs and the ideas which flow from them.
Decisiveness	DCV	decisiveness in their activities.
Dedication	DDC	a dedication to their tasks which goes beyond the ordinary expectations of others.
Determination	DTR	a determination to carry overcome obstacles and resistance.
Discipline	DSP	discipline in resisting urges and impulses.
Efficiency	EFF	the ability and willingness to extract maximum utility from available resources.
Flexibility	FLX	an ability and willingness to accept and adapt to change.
Patience	PAT	an ability and willingness to delay satisfaction — to accept that worthwhile changes and gains may come slowly.
Rationality	RAT	a rational, calculating approach to their activities.
Realism	RLM	a willingness to accept what is unpleasant but necessary.
Sobriety	SOB	a sober attitude towards problems and other matters of importance and avoid self-indulgence.
Thoroughness	THO	a thoroughness in their activities.
Impure Instrumental Interaction-independent Values (Expectation)		
		People should show...
Competence	CPT	an ability to carry out the tasks with which they are charged.
Control	CTR	an ability to exercise control over events and an appearance of being in control.
Insight	INS	an ability to gain insight into problems.

Success	SCS	an ability to achieve the goals they have set for themselves, or which have been set for them.
Residual Category		
Other/Ambiguous	O/A	People deserve an entitlement or should conform to an expectation not included in the value taxonomy.

In the final choice of values, there was a tendency to err on the side of controlling the size of the taxonomy, rather than maximising its applicability. One can obviously think of other values which might occur frequently in other contexts, for example *courage*, *unity* and *life/existence*. However, given that the goal of an all-purpose value taxonomy is probably impossible to achieve, adding values which did not occur in the data, or only occurred infrequently, would add unnecessarily to the burden of coding and analysis, without contributing anything to the results. Despite this, the taxonomy is still fairly substantial. It contains fifty values, which is considerably more than Rokeach proposed. It is also interesting that there is a pronounced bias towards instrumental values: they account for thirty-two of the fifty values.

Reference was made earlier to combination values. Since, in principle, any value may combine with any other value, the number of possible combination values is huge, and it would be fruitless to try to define all of them. Definitions will therefore not be given for every instance of a value combination. Where it is felt that the significance of a particular combination value needs further explanation, notes will be included with the definition of one of the component values¹⁰, and cross-referenced from the other values involved.

3.12. Values as Views of Human Nature

Having classified value appeals as value items, and having in turn classified those value items into a series of value categories, it is interesting to consider whether any of the properties of value classes or individual values might have direct political significance, and how those properties might map onto established categories of political thought. This is a valuable analytical exercise which will not only help in the later analysis of the results, but also helps in probing the value system for inconsistencies.

3.12.1. Optimism and Pessimism in Values

One important way of distinguishing certain systems of political thought is by the degree to which they embody a pessimistic or an optimistic view of the human condition. The human condition consists of many facets, and different strands of political thought are con-

¹⁰ The value definitions are found in Appendix I in Volume II.

cerned with different facets. For example, one may be optimistic about the human capacity to adapt, learn and achieve, whilst retaining a pessimistic view of human morality. It is not proposed here to review the literature on political thought to identify these different strands. Instead, a definition of optimism and pessimism will be proposed which focuses on particular aspects of the human character and which suits the present purposes.

Before any definition is proposed, it is useful to consider at which level values are to be analysed. Although it would be possible to examine each value in the taxonomy individually to discover what sort of assumptions it implied about human nature, such an analysis would, in effect, amount to a further *de facto* classification of values to a deeper level than that attempted so far. Such additional analysis is beyond the scope of this work. The conclusions here will therefore be derived solely from analysing the properties of the value classes and the addressee-beneficiary relationship outlined in the previous section.

The basic proposition is essentially very simple. The elements of values which define expectations are concerned with placing pressure on expectees to deliver something that they would, or might, otherwise not deliver. Those elements which define entitlements are concerned with ensuring that entitlees receive some benefit which they might otherwise not receive, and which they are presumed to deserve. Value appeals primarily addressed to active expectees can therefore be said, in a political context, to express a relatively pessimistic view of human nature, and those addressed primarily to passive entitlees a relatively optimistic view.

This needs some further explanation. The political implication of appealing for a particular form of behaviour is that it represents an ideal of which, in the absence of sufficiently tight scrutiny and control, many people will fall short. Politicians making such appeals have some degree of power and influence and are therefore not just expressing a private view, but rather expressing an expectation which they have for others, and thereby placing pressure on them to meet their expectations. Similarly, politicians who appeal to the value of achieving a particular goal are not merely expressing a personal preference, but rather claiming that this goal has importance for a great number of others; at the same time, they are also implying that the goal is not always receiving the weight it deserves. They are therefore postulating a certain level of entitlement. A single value appeal cannot, in and of itself, be taken to indicate very much about the attitude of a politician, but, when a sufficiently large number of value appeals are analysed together, a tendency to emphasise one or

the other type of value will show whether speakers tend to use values as a means of promoting control of their addressees (by exerting pressure through expectations) or as a means of promoting the procurement of benefits for those addressees (by demanding entitlements).

The particular view of human pessimism and human optimism which is being employed here can now be more precisely defined. Human pessimism is to be defined as the following set of beliefs:

People are essentially bad, and, if left to themselves, will tend to behave in undesirable ways. The principal task of society and the state is therefore to create and enforce a moral framework which minimises this undesirable behaviour and promotes desirable behaviour. This requires constant vigilance and moral control. Society and the state must not become overgenerous, because generosity will be taken advantage of and induce laziness and dependence. Broadly speaking, it is for each family or individual to take care of its/his/her own needs.

Human optimism is essentially the mirror image of this outlook. It is therefore to be defined as follows:

People are essentially good, and, if left to themselves, will tend towards desirable behaviour. It is not the principal task of society to act as a moral watchdog, but rather to create institutions which enable people to mutually benefit one another. In particular, society and the state should be concerned with those who are, relatively speaking, less fortunate, and find ways of assisting them.

In the context of value appeals, these definitions can be interpreted as the possible views taken by speakers about the characteristics of their audiences, before they have spoken and, perhaps, influenced those audiences. A value will be judged to be relatively pessimistic or optimistic by what it implies about the state of the audiences *before* an appeal to that value is made, not by what it implies about some future desired state which may come about if the appeal is made and heeded.

3.12.2. Ranking Values by Optimism

It is therefore proposed to rank values according to the extent to which they imply either the pessimistic or the optimistic view of human nature; this will be done by distinguishing between them according to the weight attached to the basic elements of expectation and

entitlement. The method by which this will be done needs some detailed explanation and justification.

The degree and type of expectation or entitlement embodied in a value will be deduced, for each addressee, from two properties of the value discussed earlier: the primary addressee and the primary beneficiary. Where an addressee is the primary addressee, the addressee's role in contributing to the value ranking will be viewed as being "amplified" by its importance as the primary focus of the value. Thus, for example, an expectee who is also the primary addressee will push a value further towards the pessimism end of the ranking than an expectee who is the secondary addressee.

The primary beneficiary of a value influences its ranking in a more subtle way, because entitlees are treated differently from expectees. As one might expect, if an entitlee is the primary beneficiary, a value's ranking is increased (more optimistic values have higher rankings), because the entitlee is being cast as the legitimate recipient of some form of benefit. Such values reflect the optimistic view of the role of society and/or the state. Equally, if an entitlee is a non-primary beneficiary, a value's ranking is decreased, because the value postulates that the entitlee has a passive role in a social exchange from which another party primarily benefits — in other words, in the immediate term, the entitlee has a "negative" entitlement in the exchange. In the case that an entitlee was neither the primary nor the non-primary beneficiary, because the value did not define who received which benefits, the entitlee's role would not affect the value ranking one way or the other.

However, expectees are treated somewhat differently. Whereas the effect which an entitlee has on a value's ranking differs according to the benefits which the entitlee derives or does not derive, the existence of an expectee *always* reduces a value's ranking, because it implies that someone needs to be placed under pressure to deliver some form of (supposedly desirable) behaviour. In other words, expectation is viewed here as being fundamentally pessimistic. Thus, what might be called "negative" expectation (expectation for behaviour which benefits the expectee) is not treated as a sign of optimism in the value. However, the identity of the primary beneficiary does influence the degree to which an expectee negatively influences a value's ranking. If the expectee is the primary beneficiary, this decreases the value's optimism level to a lesser degree than if the expectee is a non-primary beneficiary. This may seem paradoxical, because if an expectee, the active party, is the primary beneficiary of a value, the value is advocating selfish behaviour — behaviour

which benefits the party which performs it. Given that this appears to contradict the optimistic view of social exchange, it would seem reasonable to view such values as being relatively pessimistic. What needs to be kept in mind, however, is that a value's optimism or pessimism level is being judged according to what it implies about its addressees' pre-appeal state. An appeal for selfish behaviour from a speaker implies that he or she believes that there is a tendency for behaviour to be too unselfish, and so implies a relatively optimistic view of his or her addressees. In contrast, if the expectee of a value is a non-primary beneficiary — that is, if a party is being asked to behave in a particular way for the benefit of another party, the entitlee — the value implies a more pessimistic view of current behavioural trends. In the case that an expectee's beneficiary status is not specified by a value, the implied level of pessimism will be assumed to be midway between the primary beneficiary and non-primary beneficiary levels.

The assessment of optimism in impure values is the final issue which needs to be addressed before the details of scoring can be discussed. The assessment of these values will follow from their classification, so that impure instrumentals will be treated as being some way between pure instrumentals and pure terminals, but closer to the former than the latter, and impure terminals treated in a comparable fashion (although no impure terminal values exist in the taxonomy). Thus, impure instrumentals will be ranked as primarily pessimistic, but rather less so than pure instrumentals, and impure terminals as primarily optimistic, but again less so than pure terminals.

3.12.3. Representing Rankings by Scores

These value optimism rankings will be represented by numerical scores. The numerical score for each value will be derived from the value's class and properties, and each of the value's addressees will contribute a value to that overall score. The score for interaction-independent values will therefore have one basic component, for interaction-dependent values two. The choice of numerical values for the scores is not important, providing that the values are chosen to reflect the possible degrees of variation. A scheme has been chosen which awards negative scores for the properties of a value which reflect a primarily pessimistic view, and positive scores for the properties which reflect a primarily optimistic view. The scoring of the different properties reflects the analysis of addressee and beneficiary status, differentiated according to addressee type, which was discussed above.

Table 3.7: Scoring System for Optimism Ranking

Basic Score			Multipliers			
	Primary Benefcry.	Unspec. Benefcry. Status	Non-Primary Benefcry.	⇒ Primary Addressee	⇒ Value Is Impure	⇒ (All)
Expectee	-5	-7.5	-10	x 2	x 0.75	÷ No. of Addressees
Entitlee	10	0	-10	x 2	x 0.75	÷ No. of Addressees

Table 3.7 gives an overview of the scoring system, which involves four stages for each addressee of a value. Firstly, a basic score is awarded on the basis of the beneficiary status of the expectee or entitlee. Secondly, the score is multiplied by two if the addressee is the primary addressee. Thirdly, the score is multiplied by three-quarters if the value is impure. There is then one final but important adjustment before the total is calculated. Since interaction-dependent values have more addressees than interaction-independent values, the final scores for the former could potentially be twice as high or twice as low as those for the latter. This is undesirable, because a speaker's level of pessimism or optimism is not affected by the number of addressees involved in his or her value appeal. This distortion is therefore corrected by dividing the score for each addressee by the total number of addressees.

Table 3.8: Optimism Scores by Value Class and Beneficiary Status

	Score for Unmarked Beneficiary Status Types	Score Where Expectee is Primary Beneficiary
Impure Instrumental	-11.25	N/A
Interaction-Independent (Pure) Instrumental	-15.00	N/A
Interaction-dependent Instrumental	-5.00	-10.00
Interaction-dependent terminal	5.00	-12.50
Interaction-Independent (Pure) Terminal	20.00	N/A
Impure Terminal	15.00	N/A

Table 3.8 shows the scores given by this system for the different value classes according to beneficiary status.

3.12.4. The Value Map

Whilst showing the scores in tabular form goes some way towards illustrating the results of this optimism/pessimism analysis, it is not an ideal form in which to present the results. A diagrammatic representation was thus devised which shows the optimism scores for each

value, and also serves an additional purpose, that of mapping out the relationships between value items. It is useful, at this stage, to recall that, in order to help address the problem of ambiguity in identifying which value item represented an appeal, two principal requirements needed to be met: firstly, that there should be a sound classificatory system to minimise and localise ambiguity, and secondly, that there should be complete definitions for each value item, which explicitly state where ambiguities might arise and what form they might take. Both of these requirements have been met: the classification has already been described, and short value definitions have been given, to be supplemented by more detailed definitions in Appendix I of Volume II. It is appropriate here to anticipate the ambiguities described in those value definitions, in order to illustrate them in graphical form. Illustrating the various ambiguities described throughout the value definitions provides an immediate overview and a more systematic description.


The representation chosen to achieve this is called a *value map*. The value map is simply a diagrammatic representation of the values item taxonomy which displays each item as a circle. Each circle may have neighbouring items whose boundaries may overlap, and whose proximity indicates their degree of relatedness with the item. An overlap between two value items indicates the degree to which those two items occupy the same area of the value continuum, and thus shows those areas where ambiguity may arise in coding value appeals. The size of an item's circle is only significant in so far as it shows how many other items it overlaps. It is important to state that the map is not claimed to correctly show the relatedness of every pair of values; the structure of the map is derived from two principal sources: firstly, the value classification, which suggests which values are likely to be closest together, and secondly, the inter-value relationships noted in the value definitions¹¹. Only the parts of the structure determined from those sources should be regarded as reliable indicators of value-relatedness.

The mapping out of value item ambiguity offers one of the most practical means of controlling that ambiguity in coding. The value map shows the value continuum in more detail than the classificatory diagrams, and suggests to the analyst where questionable value appeals might be located in the taxonomy. In addition to controlling ambiguity, the value map also provides another way of visualising the value continuum, thus helping to either

¹¹ The value definitions are found in Appendix I in Volume II.


confirm the relationships between the existing value classes or to show weaknesses in the system. It also shows gaps where values not included in the taxonomy might be added in the future.

Figure 3.3: Value Map



The value map is shown in Figure 3.3. The codes in the circles refer to the codes given in Table 3.6. The map has been shaded to illustrate the optimism rankings derived from the scores in Table 3.8; the shading covers a range of scores from twenty to minus fifteen, as shown by the legend. It should be noted that the flat representation afforded by the map has an obvious limitation: relationships between values at opposite edges of the map cannot be shown, even though they may exist. For example, the ambiguous status of impure instrumental values suggests that they have a relationship with certain terminal values, but that cannot be shown through the proximity of the items.

Figure 3.4: Optimism, Purity, Interaction & Terminality



The position of values on the map largely reflects their classificatory positions. The general, perhaps rather unsurprising, pattern is that optimism increases with the degree of positive entitlement. In the current taxonomy, positive entitlement mirrors terminality, although *punishment* has previously been mentioned as a possible terminal value that would express negative entitlement. If the map could be drawn in three dimensions to represent the value continuum, the impure values would be seen to be closer to the pure terminals. Following the low point of the pure instrumental values, the optimism level increases again as the purity level decreases and the values move back towards the terminal end of the spectrum. Figure 3.4 summarises the relationship between optimism, purity, interaction and terminality.

3.13. Addressee Roles in Value Appeals

So far, the discussion of addressees in value appeals has been limited to distinguishing between the function that they have in the appeal, that of expectee or entitlee. There is a further important piece of information needed in order to understand the significance of an appeal, namely the real-world *role* of the appeal's addressees.

A speaker may address a value appeal at one or more of what are usually thought of as separate groups of people: the public, the government, the opposition, etc. The difficulty

with this view is that individuals can belong to more than one “group” at different times and in different contexts. For example, every public figure is also, at times, a private individual, and it is reasonable to assume that a person might emphasise different values depending on which of these roles he or she is playing. At the same time, the importance of some values may not be differentiable between different roles.

3.13.1. Comparing Roles with the *Basisresearch* Value Systems

Whilst there are a huge number of roles which could potentially be defined, the intention here is to define a very limited set which can distinguish sufficiently between addressees to allow for useful analysis. The concept of roles is related to the notion of different “value systems” made in the *Basisresearch* work. The value systems used in that study were based on a set of values which was interpreted differently for each system, and each system was based on a notional set of addressees playing different roles. Thus, values such as *tolerance* had different definitions, depending on whether the respondents to the questionnaire were advocating that the state should be tolerant, or that everybody should be tolerant. That is a crucial difference between value systems and roles, because here each value item has the same definition, irrespective of which role an addressee is playing. Nevertheless, the value systems defined by *Basisresearch* form a good basis for defining a set of roles.

Basisresearch defined two value systems, “Global” and “State and Society”. The intention was to distinguish between questionnaire responses that defined what was desirable for everyone, including the respondents themselves, and those that defined what was desirable for everyone else, including the state. This distinction between the systems was made explicit in the questions. This is not quite what is needed here, because it would be very difficult to identify those value appeals in which speakers included themselves as notional addressees, and those in which they did not.

3.13.2. Revising the *Basisresearch* Scheme


In deciding how to revise this scheme, a good starting point is the distinction between government and governed, i.e. between those who are executive and (in the sense of being the initiators and motivators behind most legislation) legislative actors, and those who are subject to this executive and legal power. The reasoning behind this is unremarkable: value appeals in parliamentary debates can usually be sensibly categorised according to whether they make demands of the state or of the state’s citizens. Appeals are rarely individualised: even when speakers appeal to a value which they themselves claim to possess and act on,

their utterances can typically be regarded as representative of the government to which they belong, or of the body of people which they claim to represent.

Clearly, the category of the “governed” could be subdivided into many other categories, and it might make sense to distinguish between them. When an appeal is made to the preferred values of the “public”, some audiences or audience members may feel they are the addressees, while others will identify more closely with the speaker. There are, however, reasons for largely rejecting such subcategorisation. One is simplicity: the complexity of the analysis needs to be kept under control to produce meaningful and comprehensible results; another is practicality: it would be very difficult to consistently make finer distinctions with any degree of reliability.

There is, however, one exception which is made to this rule in the analysis. Appeals addressed to the audiences within the health care institutions, which are the objects of the legislative proposals which are being debated in the corpus texts, should have a privileged status. In almost any parliamentary debate, there will be certain parts of the audience who are explicitly cited as distinct addressees, and thus appealed to differently, from the rest. In this case, the people who constitute institutions belonging to the health care systems in each country are systematically addressed as separate from the “general public”, since the former are, to use controversial terminology, in a producer-consumer relationship with the latter. Identifying appeals directed at this group is both practical and very important for the analysis.

Figure 3.5: Addressee Roles



3.13.3. The Classification of Addressee Roles

It is therefore proposed to define three addressee roles. A simple two-level distinction will furthermore be made between the generality of the different roles. This is illustrated in Figure 3.5. The first, and most general, role is the *global* role. This will be used to code appeals which are not, implicitly or explicitly, directed at addressees playing either of the other roles. *Global* appeals will thus tend to present a value as being desirable for all members of a community. They will also code appeals to values that are not role-specific (non-role-specificity will be discussed below). The second role is the *institutional* role; this applies where the speaker appeals to a value which is held to be desirable for the people who work within the institutions of the respective health care systems, or of other relevant public institutions such as schools, when a speaker refers to them to make a comparison with issues in health care. An important distinguishing property of these institutions is their position between the "public" and the "state": they are primarily subservient to the state, but also serve the public. The final role is that of the *state*. The state concept being applied here must be distinguished from the abstract concept of the state which is typically encountered in the literature. The state is defined here narrowly as the people and institutions which hold executive power. Values are addressed to people, and so the state, as an ad-

dressee, is regarded as a collection of people playing the role of members of the state machinery. This definition needs to be slightly qualified, however. The people and institutions under the direct control of the state can also be included within this addressee definition to the extent that they are mentioned in connection with actions or intentions of the executive which forcibly change their behaviour. In such cases, the required value judgement relates to such actions and intentions, and not to the behaviour of the subordinate people or institutions.

There are some further points to make. Members of the legislature who are not part of the executive are included under the *global* heading. Local authorities in Britain, where they are mentioned in connection with health matters for which they have responsibility, such as community care, are included in the *institutional* addressee definition, because they are largely implementing the legislation and policy objectives defined by the executive. Other references to local authorities are defined as *global*. In line with the general approach to categorisation, a residual category of addressee, *ambiguous*, will be used to code value appeals whose addressees are ambiguous.

A few examples will perhaps help to clarify these points. A typical example which illustrates two of these roles is in Rudolf Dreßler's reply to Seehofer's speech, in which he criticises an alleged bias in favour of doctors in Seehofer's proposed reforms through an appeal to *consistency*:

(3.1) Bei Ärzten gehen Sie anders vor. Sie kürzen nicht, sondern Sie begrenzen die Einkommenszuwächse. (Sten. Ber., S. 8998; GStrG 437-438)

The expectee of *consistency* clearly has the state role here, because Seehofer and the government to which he belongs are the object of the criticism. The entitlee, on the other hand, must have the global role, since neither the state nor health care employees are cited as the necessary recipients of greater consistency, and since neither could logically be the entitlees — the state is being criticised for inconsistency, and doctors are being cast as the beneficiaries of this inconsistent behaviour. If there is an entitlement to greater consistency which needs to be realised, therefore, it lies outside the scope of the state and institutional roles.

3.13.4. Values Which Are Not Role-Specific

One issue remains to be discussed, that of values which are not role-specific. Such values are distinct in that it is not logically possible for their importance to a person to vary according to the role which that person is adopting. They tend to be realised by physical

states, rather than mental states, which are invariant across roles. One example is *health*. It would be highly unusual for personal health to be presented as a matter of importance for, say, individuals who work in the health service, but not for the public in general. The view of a group of individuals on the importance of their own health will not tend to alter according to whether they are at home, working in a hospital, or working in government. It is therefore reasonable to regard such values as non-role-specific, and thus to code the addressees of all appeals to them as *global*.

3.14. *Appeal Polarity and Polarity Modifiers*

Polarity was cited earlier in the context of deciding how to classify value appeals, and it was stated that all value items were to be defined as positive, that is, defining something desirable as opposed to something undesirable. However, speakers may appeal to values in a negative way, that is, they may appeal to the inverse of a positive item (for example, against indiscipline, where indiscipline is the inverse of the positive item *discipline*). The distinction between a negative and a positive appeal to the same value can be quite an important one, because it can say a great deal about how speakers approach a problem, what they are willing to commit themselves to and what they would rather avoid. Opposing cuts in spending is quite different from positively advocating more spending; criticising a lack of scepticism about human nature might be considered acceptable, whilst demanding cynicism would not. Recording the polarity of an appeal as a separate variable makes it possible to capture such data, whilst retaining a positive taxonomy. As in all parts of value analysis, there are ambiguous cases which may be interpreted either as positive or negative, or which may contain elements of both negative and positive appeals; these may occur, for example, when speakers wish to discuss a problem which previously existed but which has now been resolved. Sir George Young provides an example when comparing the health reforms to the education reforms and applauding the eventual acceptance of the latter:

(3.2) Concepts that were derided three years ago are now quite popular. (HC Deb, cc 518; NHSCCB 728)

His appeal to *flexibility* is both negative, because it criticises the haste with which people allegedly rejected unfamiliar concepts, and positive, because it celebrates their eventual adjustment to what he regards as sensible innovations. Although a distinction could be drawn between examples such as this and cases where the polarity cannot be firmly identified, it suffices to subsume them all under the heading of "ambiguous".

3.14.1. Polarity Qualification


Polarity cannot always be straightforwardly classed as positive or negative, or even ambiguous, however. Speakers often try to be both positive *and* negative about the same topic, typically in order to bridge a gap between a position they are obliged to take or wish to take, and the view which they think may be most popular. This is *qualification* of polarity, and can affect both negative and positive appeals. Qualification can occur in both strong or weak forms: the weaker the qualification, the more speakers can be regarded as being in sympathy with the appeals they are making; the stronger the qualification, the more appeals can be seen as concessions to opinions which the speakers do not share. The relationship between appeal polarity and appeal strength is illustrated in Figure 3.6.

3.14.1.1. Polarity Qualification in Negative Appeals

Qualified polarity occurs most often in negative value appeals. Weakly qualified negative appeals are thinly veiled criticism, embellished with a concession to an opposing view to make speakers appear more objective or less harsh in their judgement. Sir George Young, discussing the introduction of the health reforms, criticises those who opposed the education reforms several years earlier by using weakly qualified negative appeals to *flexibility*:

(3.3) They were not popular on the doorstep. At that time we were told that it was wrong to apply the sort of concepts that I have described to state education. (HC Deb, cc 517; NHSCCB 719-720)

Figure 3.6: Appeal Polarity and Polarity Qualification



The audience is simply left to infer from this that those who expressed opposition were wrong to do so (although this is later made explicit), and this implicit criticism is qualified by his reference to popularity, an indicator which politicians must ultimately treat with some degree of respect. The appeal to *flexibility* is, however, only slightly weakened by this, and so it should be regarded as weak qualification.

Strongly qualified negative appeals are less openly critical, because speakers tend to use them to mitigate their support for an opposing position. The purpose is usually to demonstrate that the speakers are proposing or supporting something unpopular but necessary, whilst wishing that it were not necessary and expressing some degree of distaste for it — the staple political metaphor of asking people to “take the medicine”. The negative appeal is therefore made to a value representing the opposite of that which the speaker is actually proposing. Seehofer provides an example, when justifying the proposed controls on doctors’ fees and hospital charges:

(3.4) Es geht um die Begrenzung der Zuwächse - zeitlich befristet. (Sten. Ber., S. 8991; GStrG 137)

Seehofer mitigates twice here: firstly — after making a detailed argument in favour of limiting growth in fees and charges — by saying that the controls are solely about achieving this objective (“es geht um”), and secondly by repeating that the controls are just temporary measures. By doing this he is implicitly recognising and sympathising with the concern of the doctors about losing their freedom. However, because his criticism is heavily mitigated, the appeal cannot simply be labelled as a negative appeal to *freedom*; it is qualified by his actual support for the measures which will cause the doctors to lose some of this freedom.

3.14.1.2. *Polarity Qualification in Positive Value Appeals*

Positive appeals can also be qualified. Strongly qualified positive appeals are employed when speakers wish to suggest that something, whilst being in principle good and desirable, is in reality unattainable, perhaps utopian. The Conservative MP Sir Michael McNair-Wilson, responding to criticism of the NHS Bill by Michael Foot, supplies a good illustration:

(3.5) He...knows that it is the Government's responsibility to manage the affairs of this country as they think best at any given moment, and to accept the economic circumstances in which such services can be provided. (HC Deb, cc 524; NHSCCB 901)

He acknowledges the importance of providing good health care services, whilst also stressing the practical limitations on that provision and thus what he regards as the utopian nature of some of the preceding remarks. His appeal to the terminal value *health* is therefore positive, but strongly qualified by his references to responsibility and (implicitly) to efficiency.

Weakly qualified positive appeals are usually used by speakers to strongly express support for something whilst acknowledging certain worries, concerns or practical problems. For example, the CDU deputy Wolfgang Lohmann argues that hospitals should become more efficient:

(3.6) Das Krankenhaus muß endlich zu einem richtigen Unternehmen werden. Natürlich zu einem Unternehmen eigener Art; denn es hat ja schließlich einen Versorgungsauftrag zu erfüllen. (Sten. Ber., S. 9006; GStrG 762-763)

He qualifies his appeal to *efficiency* by acknowledging the difference between a hospital and a conventional business, but not in a way which alters the tenor of his argument or suggests any concrete policy modifications.

3.14.2. Polarity Hypothecation

There is a further type of polarity modification which occurs when a speaker makes a negative or positive appeal to a value based on a hypothetical event or circumstance: *hypothecation*. Hypothecation does not affect the strength of the appeal to the value, but rather the judgement about its realisation. Generally, value appeals tend not to be completely abstract (for example, “efficiency is desirable”), but rather refer critically or positively to some actual event or circumstance which illustrates the value, and its realisation or non-realisation. Positive appeals tend to be founded on a claim that a value has been realised, negative appeals on the claim that it has not.

If a speaker refers only to a hypothetical circumstance, however, the value appeal takes on a quite different nature. Frequently, when the polarity of an appeal is *hypothecated*, speakers who would normally be critical of an addressee make positive appeals, and speakers who would normally be positive make negative appeals, because they are referring to events or circumstances that will probably never come about (for example, criticisms that might be made, positive states of existence which are possible but non-existent), or claims with which they disagree (for example, refuted criticisms). Gudrun Schaich-Walch uses positive hypothecated polarity when referring to increased charges for patients:

(3.7) Fast alle Ärzteverbände fordern Zuzahlungen der Patienten. Sie bezeichnen dies als Stärkung der Selbstverantwortung der Patienten. (Sten. Ber., S. 9016; GStrG 1046-1047)

Although she makes a positive appeal to *responsibility*, the polarity is hypothecated by presenting it as the opinion of supporters of the reform, an opinion with which she implicitly disagrees. It is important to record such instances of hypothecation, because it allows the polarity of value appeals to be more accurately interpreted.

4. Analysing Value Appeal Methods

4.1. Defining the Appeal Method

Having covered the territory of values, which are concerned with the content of value appeals, a further strand will be introduced into the study: the analysis of appeal methods. Appeal methods are concerned with *how* speakers make value appeals, rather than *which* value appeals they make. The transmission of values and ideologies through texts and, specifically, the mechanisms by which it is achieved, have long been the concern of many researchers, from discourse analysts to historians. However, not all of the textual features which would interest researchers in those fields necessarily belong under the appeal methods heading.

The value appeal method is defined as the collection of tools which speakers use to make a value appeal. In contrast to the *content* of an appeal, which is the value or values being communicated, the *method* is the approach which speakers take to enhancing a value's desirability in the minds of their audiences. Speakers might express obligation, inclination, use a metaphor, exploit a word's negative connotation or employ a whole variety of other means to make a value appear desirable. Two examples should serve to illustrate the point. In both cases, the speaker is appealing to *efficiency* (amongst other values); in the first, the speaker makes no effort to convince the audience that this value is something desirable; in the second, the speaker employs a whole armoury of linguistic weapons to persuade his audience that *efficiency* is a value which should be assigned some degree of priority:

(4.1) Audit can be clinical or managerial: it can be assessment of medical practice, or a check on how resources are being used. (HC Deb, cc 525; NHSCCB 914)

(4.2) The crying need for resource management is obvious. (HC Deb, cc 496; NHSCCB 154)

Clearly, it is desirable to be able to distinguish between these different kinds of appeal, and so some analysis of the types of mechanisms used in example (4.2) is needed. The mechanisms used in a given appeal to help make a value appear desirable are referred to collectively as the *method* for that appeal; each of these distinct mechanisms in the appeal method can be identified and analysed separately, and is referred to as a *constituent* of the method.

Furthermore, appeal method constituents can be categorised according to the potential they have to influence the appeal's reception by an audience. Given that a value appeal is a claim made to an audience about the desirability of a particular mode of conduct or state of existence — a claim which may be controversial, but which speakers wish to have accepted — the appeal method offers speakers a chance to vary the appeal's persuasiveness according to the content of their speeches and the constitution of their audiences. Each constituent of a given appeal's method is a mechanism for increasing the audience's receptiveness to the appeal — with one exception, which will be explained later. Appeal method constituents will therefore be described in terms of mechanisms used by speakers, and classified in terms of their persuasive character. It should be noted that, although the terminology here may suggest otherwise, it is not the intention to claim that speakers always use these mechanisms consciously, or that they are aware of their effects, but merely that their usage and effects do follow a significant pattern.

As in the case of value items, the first step is to create a taxonomy. This will be discussed in the next section. There is one point to be made about terminology. The method is viewed as the whole collection of tools which a speaker uses in a given appeal; since, however, a method may only have one constituent — a speaker may just, for example, use an expression of necessity, or a metaphor to support an appeal — it is convenient, for the sake of brevity, to slip into referring to each of the possible method constituents as “methods” or “appeal methods”, rather than the more verbose “appeal method constituents”. This will be avoided in cases where it might cause serious confusion.

4.2. *Data-Related Issues In Constructing the Appeal Method Taxonomy*

4.2.1. *Reviewing the Literature on Methods*

Although there is a rich source of literature on the various linguistic mechanisms which might be considered for inclusion in the method taxonomy, there appears to be no literature which contains a general discussion of such mechanisms in the context of values. There will be therefore no general literature review in this chapter; discussion of the literature relevant to each method will be left for the section which deals with that method.

4.2.2. *Separating Appeal Methods from Arguments*

Since this analysis is exclusively concerned with a cross-national comparison of value appeals, the content of the speeches which constitute the data is only of interest insofar as it reveals something about specific and identifiable values. It is not concerned *per se* with the

detail of the arguments which the speakers make or the evidence which they marshal to support claims about, for example, the state of the economy, the financial state of the health care system or the allegedly dishonest behaviour of government ministers. In short, to claim that something is true is not to claim that something is good. The point of making this distinction is that much linguistic analysis of texts is concerned with what speakers are claiming, without relating these claims to values. Areas of linguistic investigation such as *modality* can reveal a great deal about how speakers argue a point, but such insights may not always be relevant to this work. Thus, although the textual features identified as appeal methods may also constitute methods of argument, or at least occupy the same linguistic “space” as methods of argument, their categorisation depends on the way they communicate a value between speaker and audience, and not on the way that they assist in arguing a point.

This distinction is critical for the analysis, so it will be explained in a little more detail. When an argument is employed to justify a claim, it is most often the claim itself which constitutes the value appeal, and not the argument. For example, making a case that someone has behaved dishonourably only constitutes an appeal to *honourableness* because the audience accepts, on the whole, that the described behaviour is wrong. Even if the argument is made in a clearly critical tone, the success of the appeal still relies on the presumption of a sympathetic reception from the audience. If a speaker were unwise enough to make an appeal of this sort which clashed with the prevailing value consensus — for example, arguing critically that a previous administration had done nothing to raise inefficiency — the appeal would fail disastrously. An example from the corpus will help further illustrate this point. In Seehofer’s speech on the GStrG, he expresses bafflement at the opposition to limiting doctor’s fees.

(4.3) Meine Damen und Herren, ich kann gar nicht verstehen, daß dies als Sozialismus oder Planwirtschaft eingestuft wird. (Sten. Ber., S. 8991; GStrG 138)

The use of *potentiality* (kann) is intended to support his argument that his reforms are not Socialism or economic planning; it does not, however, contribute towards arguing that Socialism and economic planning are undesirable. His appeal to *freedom* relies on his audience taking their undesirability for granted or deducing his dislike for them from the general tenor of his utterance. The use of modality does not therefore necessarily indicate that modality is the appeal method.

The implication for the construction of the appeal method taxonomy is simply that the selection of items for the taxonomy cannot simply be based on traditional linguistic categories, although the two may sometimes overlap. It must be based primarily on the capacity of a pragmatic, syntactic or other mechanism to assist in appealing to values.

4.3. *Theoretical Issues In Constructing the Appeal Method Taxonomy*

The theoretical requirements for taxonomy building — Merten's six requirements for a category system — have already been discussed in the context of constructing the value item taxonomy. There are a number of points to be addressed in meeting those requirements.

As indicated above, there is already a rich source of literature, especially in linguistics and discourse analysis, which can be drawn upon in identifying the most important appeal methods. This forms the starting point for putting together a method taxonomy. The question which needs to be asked when looking at possible candidate mechanisms is not whether a given mechanism fulfils an important or interesting role in political texts, but rather whether that mechanism helps political speakers to signal a particular state of affairs or form of behaviour as desirable or undesirable. This criterion forms the theoretical basis for the categorisation of methods in accordance with Merten's first requirement. The process of identifying suitable appeal methods on the basis of this criterion followed a pattern of heuristic analysis similar to that used for the categorisation of value appeals, although existing research provides many more useful leads for the former than for the latter. The study of the use of modality, metaphor, irony and other similar discourse features forms an important part of much discourse analysis research (cf. Uhlig 1972, Lakoff/Johnson 1980, Fowler 1985, Chilton 1985, Chilton 1996, Fairclough 1992a, Schäffner 1996, et al.), and much work has been done on defining them, classifying their usage and studying their significance. However, although the categories of the taxonomy have been heavily influenced by this work, traditional linguistic or discourse analysis-related systems of categorisation are not directly applicable, because the theoretical basis of the categorisations and the classificatory principles underlying them are different.

To meet Merten's second requirement of completeness, the appeal method taxonomy has a residual category which covers both ambiguous cases and appeals whose method constituents do not come under any of the other categories, whether because of some difficulty in identifying the precise mechanism used, or because the method constituent, though iden-

tifiable, was simply not included in the taxonomy. Since this is the first attempt at producing this type of taxonomy, and because there are limitations to the scope of this work, it is very likely that some suitable candidate methods will be overlooked, and this makes the residual category all the more important.

The mutual exclusivity and independence of the method constituent categories will be ensured by classifying them in a dichotomous hierarchy, which will be discussed in the next section. This hierarchical classification of categories will also be used to guarantee that a unified classificatory principle is being applied; given that the choice of method constituent categories is informed by a number of fields, it is not easy to demonstrate this without grouping the categories together according to shared properties.

As in the case of value appeals, the unambiguous definition of the categories is in practice very difficult to achieve. Again, the classification should help to localise ambiguity, and detailed definitions will be given for each method constituent, including indicators to help identify them in the analysis.

4.4. *Constructing a Hierarchical Classification for Appeal Method Constituents*

As in the case of value items, the classification of appeal methods is not a linear process. As before, the choice of individual method constituent for the appeal method taxonomy is informed by, in turn, classifying those method constituents and teasing out the relationships between them. This process helps to identify weaknesses, inconsistencies and gaps in the lower-level classification.

4.4.1. *The Basis of the Method Classification*

As with value items, appeal methods are classified in a hierarchy with simple binary choices at each level. The central principle guiding the classification is the need to distinguish between different ways of successfully communicating an appeal to an audience. The distinctions will primarily be made on the basis of the cognitive processes on which the choice of method relies to communicate the intended message. To simplify the process of making these distinctions, no assumptions are made about the values held by the audience. The audience is assumed to be neutral, and each method is judged on the basis of how it might influence such a neutral audience.

Communicating values is about communicating the desirability of modes of conduct or states of existence. Therefore, appeal methods must ordinarily communicate desirability or

undesirability in some way, in order to assist in persuading an audience to accept appeals. However, if the audience utterly rejects what speakers say, their appeals can have no effect, and so one can assert that the success of appeals depends on at least the superficial acceptance of what speakers are saying. One can therefore make a further statement about utterances containing value appeals: that, if an audience accepts what is asserted by a speaker's value-laden utterance x , there exists a relationship between x and the attachment in the minds of the audience of notions of desirability or undesirability to the value v implicitly or explicitly indicated by that utterance x . The type of relationship which is created is determined by the appeal method, and it is therefore the different types of relationship which are being classified in the appeal method hierarchy.

In defining these relationships, the semantic properties of certain methods will be examined to discover how what is literally meant by the speaker might encourage the audience to accept a value. Inevitably, in examining how the use of certain methods is realised in texts, certain classes of words or phrases will be identified as typical realisations. Certain methods — such as modal methods — will be seen to have more predictable realisations in texts than others, with the identification of some methods being much less dependent on the pragmatic context than others. At no point, however, should this be taken to imply that any particular classes of word or phrase possess a fixed relationship of reference with particular meanings. The definitions and classification of the appeal methods cannot be more than broad sketches; the analyst is always compelled to apply judgement in order to decide whether a particular example of a textual feature constitutes the use of a given method.

4.4.2. The Four Classificatory Levels

Although most appeal methods actively create a value-desirability relationship (which may be referred to as $d(v)$ for short), there is one exception to this. There are cases in which speakers simply assume that an audience will accept a particular value, and therefore make no attempt to increase the palatability of their appeals. By presupposing the acceptance of the value to which they are appealing, speakers use what might be regarded as a “non-method”. Since the desirability of the value cannot in any way be derived from their utterance, they do not actively create a relationship between the value and notions of desirability, and so the relationship must already exist in the minds of the audience for the appeal to be successful. An example would be an utterance such as “the Government has

increased the resources available to the health service by 20% since 1995”, which contains no clue as to whether or not the provision of more resources is viewed as a desirable thing. The speaker could be making a criticism of the Government, or praising it; only the audience can conclude that the resource increase is desirable.

This “non-method” must obviously be coded in some way in the analysis and it is preferable to include it in the taxonomy. Therefore, the most fundamental distinction that is proposed in the classificatory hierarchy is that between methods which, when used, enable a value-desirability relationship to be derived from a speaker’s utterance, and those methods (or, more accurately, non-methods) which do not. The former, when successful, create *derivable* relationships, and the latter *non-derivable* relationships. Since there is only one “non-method” (*value presupposition*) to be placed in the latter category, this creates some asymmetry in the classification. However, as will be shown later, its function is consistent with its position in the classification.

Given that there is only one method which does not create an utterance-derived $d(v)$, all further levels of classification apply to those methods which do allow the audience to derive $d(v)$. Such methods are firstly distinguished, at the second level of classification, according to whether the relationships they create are derivable *pragmatically* or *non-pragmatically*. Pragmatics is concerned with the meaning which utterances derive from their context, rather than from their semantic properties (Levinson 1983). This is of interest in the context of value appeals, because it provides a framework for explaining how a value judgement can be implicit in an utterance, even though nothing in the semantics appears to entail it. The field of pragmatics covers a range of topics, many of which are either of no direct concern here, or too complex to be treated in any depth within the scope of this work, but one aspect of pragmatics, the theory of conversational implicature, deals with what is probably the most common form of pragmatically implied value judgement in political debate. When a speaker makes a pragmatic implicature, the meanings, and therefore the value judgements, inferred by the audience depend on the assumptions which the audience makes from the context. As will be explained in more detail in the section on conversational implicature (section 4.8.2), those assumptions about what the speaker is trying to mean are usually derived from a set of standard assumptions about the speaker’s “co-operativeness”, assumptions which have no direct bearing on values, but which lead the audience to conclude that the speaker is making a particular value judgement. This contrasts

both with *value presupposition*, where the $d(v)$ is derived solely from the audience's own assumptions about values, and with other methods, where the speaker is more active in creating the relationship in the minds of the audience. It is the relative passivity of the speaker, in relying *exclusively* or *primarily* on such broad contextual information to communicate the value to the audience, which distinguishes pragmatically derivable relationships from other types of derivable relationship. It is important to note that only methods which rely exclusively or primarily on pragmatic implicatures belong in the pragmatically derivable category; some other methods can and do involve pragmatic implicatures, but rely primarily on semantic mechanisms such as entailment or conventional implicature to create $d(v)$.

The third classificatory level classifies those methods falling outside the pragmatically derivable category. Although this introduces some further asymmetry into the classification, this asymmetry is again justified, because the distinction made at this level cannot apply to pragmatically-derivable relationships, as will be explained shortly. This level identifies two types of non-pragmatically derivable value-desirability relationships: those that are *explicitly* derivable, and those that are *implicitly* derivable. Value-desirability relationships are explicitly derivable from speakers' utterances when they explicitly predicate the desirability of a value. They may do this objectively, for example by making the claim "It is desirable to increase resources for health care", or subjectively, for example by stating "We wish to see resources for health care increase". In each case, the objective or subjective desirability of the value is made explicit.

Utterances which create implicitly derivable relationships do not make this link between a value and desirability explicit. Implication¹² can encompass a whole range of mechanisms, but in its broadest sense, it is about the linking of one meaning to another in a way which goes beyond the literal content of those meanings (Hansen 1989: 145 & Levinson 1983: 97ff). Implication may or may not involve contextual factors: implied meanings may be conventionally attached to words (separate from their literal meaning but always implied), or be implied by words given certain contexts. The implication may arise logically from contextual knowledge (for example, a "problem" is an obstacle to some undertaking, and therefore considered undesirable if the undertaking is considered desirable) or

¹² "Implication" is used here to refer to non-Gricean implicatures, since "implicature" is usually understood to refer to Gricean conversational implicatures.

may have no logical relationship at all with the literal meaning of the words uttered. Desirability can thus be implied by a whole variety of mechanisms — for example, the use of metaphor, connotation or certain forms of modality. The concern here is with forms of implication that do not rely exclusively on the pragmatic context, and so such contextual factors will only be a contributory factor to creating implications in this category. What all these implications have in common is that their use avoids explicitly *saying* that a value is desirable; that is not to say that audiences cannot immediately infer the desirability of a value when an implicitly derivable relationship is created — the types of meanings communicated by, for example, metaphor or connotation are usually strongly positive or negative; it is merely to distinguish between explicitly stating desirability and communicating other meanings which imply it, however strongly.

The reason for not applying this level of classification to pragmatically derivable relationships is that they cannot be explicit — all involve pragmatic implicature. Although implicit versus explicit distinction could therefore be placed at a higher level in the classification, with the pragmatic versus non-pragmatic level merely subclassifying implicit relationships, the degree of dependence on pragmatic implicature is a more fundamental property of an appeal method than its implicitness, and so the latter is subordinated to the former in the hierarchy.

The fourth and final level of classification identifies a further property of methods which create explicitly or implicitly, and non-pragmatically, derivable relationships. Again, it does not apply to pragmatically derivable relationships, for reasons which will be made clear. As stated, explicit methods can make an appeal either objective or subjective. This distinction can be developed into a more general distinction between types of both implicit and explicit relationships: *logically derivable* and *non-logically derivable*. Logically derivable relationships are those which arise when the speaker makes a literal statement or a primarily non-pragmatic implication, the acceptance of whose truth logically requires an acceptance of the desirability of the value to which the speaker has appealed. In other words, they arise when what a speaker says about a value or its realisation makes explicit or literally implies its objective desirability. For example, a speaker might say “it is desirable to increase spending on health”, or “the problem is that the government has not increased spending on health” or “we must spend more on health”. Each of these creates a logically derivable $d(v)$: the first is derivable explicitly, because the speaker is predicating

that it is objectively desirable to increase spending; and the second and third implicitly, because the speaker is predicating that the absence of spending is a “problem” (in the second example), and that there exists an objective necessity to spend more (in the third example); in neither of these cases is desirability explicitly mentioned, but it is deducible from what is said. The concept of “logic” applied here is a fairly broad one, and is not intended to imply that the relationship follows exclusively from the semantics of what is said, completely excluding contextual knowledge or pragmatic implicatures of any sort. Quite the opposite: pragmatic implicatures will almost always be involved at some level in the appeal, and the audience will always need to apply contextual knowledge to interpret the appeal. However, the completion of the $d(v)$ in these cases will rely on the semantics of what is said, and, in the case of implicit derivable relationships, on inferences which are primarily drawn on those semantics. Thus, whereas an audience hearing pragmatic implicature might primarily look for $d(v)$ because it assumes the co-operativeness of the speaker, an audience hearing a logical implication would look for $d(v)$ because something in the speaker’s literal utterance prompts them to do so — perhaps the speaker’s claim that a second desirable value x cannot be realised without realising v , or that the realisation of v is necessary, or impossible to avoid.

Any appeal method that does not fall into this category is classified as creating *non-logically derivable* relationships. Methods of this type fall into two principal groups (this is mentioned for the purposes of clarification only - no distinction is made between these two groups in the classification): those which create $d(v)$ through the explicit or implicit expression of personally held views, either of the speaker or of another individual or group; and those which do so by attaching to values positive meanings which are not “native” to desirable values — meanings which cast the values in a positive light, but do not explicitly state their objective desirability or logically imply it.

Into the first group fall methods such as the expression of inclination (for example, “I want the government to spend more on health”) and the expression of personally held views about desirability or necessity (for example, “I believe it is necessary to spend more on health”). Because these utterances constitute subjective views, the audience cannot logically infer the objective desirability of the indicated values; it can only infer the value’s desirability non-logically, for example by deciding to trust the speaker’s judgement and

honesty¹³. Methods in the second group include metaphor (for example, “the government’s Dickensian spending cuts are leading to the dismemberment of the NHS”), expressions using words with strong positive or negative connotations (for example, “the government has boosted spending significantly”) and expressions of expectedness or usuality (for example, “It is astonishing that the government has cut spending”). The audience cannot logically derive the desirability of health spending in any of these cases: in the first example, the government’s spending cuts are not literally Dickensian, and are not (in all likelihood) literally going to lead to the NHS’s physical dismemberment; in the second example, the literal meaning of “boosted” in this context is merely “increased”; in the third example, the speaker’s astonishment does not literally imply anything about desirability or undesirability. These methods imply desirability non-logically, by importing literal meanings from foreign discourses, or using words or concepts which have attached to them meanings which are unrelated to their literal senses.

The reason why this final level of classification does not apply to methods which create pragmatically derivable relationships is that it is impossible to imply the objective desirability of a value both pragmatically and logically; the very nature of pragmatic implicature is that a speaker’s utterance does not contain anything which logically implies objective desirability, but rather only implies, given knowledge of the context, that the speaker views the value as desirable. Whether the speaker might express that desirability as a personally held view or objective fact is precisely what is not made clear when pragmatic implicature is used.

4.5. *Characteristics of Appeal Methods*

Having grouped together different appeal methods in a classification, one can go further, as with the classification of value items, by identifying some of the general properties of the different categories. This process is important if the classification is to be very useful for analytical purposes; it would not be very informative simply to place certain methods together under certain headings, without any clear view of the significance of those groupings.

¹³ Even claiming that everyone is inclined towards the realisation of a value is not the same as claiming the objective desirability of its realisation.

4.5.1. Classifying Methods by Strength

One reasonable assumption is that appeals made using the different method classes have different strengths. If one assumes a situation in which a value to which a speaker is appealing is controversial — in other words, where the audience is generally unsympathetic to the appeal — certain approaches to making the appeal might be expected to have more success than others. If the speaker simply assumed that the audience would accept his or her appeal, the appeal would be ineffective; likewise, if the speaker simply explicitly stated the desirability of the value, the hostile audience would reject the assertion of the value's desirability and the appeal would fail; if the speaker just pragmatically implied the value's desirability, again the appeal would be unlikely to meet with success, because the uncooperative audience would decline to fill in the necessary inference to make sense of what he or she was saying. If the speaker logically implied the value's desirability, however — for example, by casting its non-realisation as a “problem” — he or she might begin to convince some of the audience. Even more success might be expected if the speaker both actively created a relationship between the value and desirability, and did so subtly, for example by employing connoted meanings or metaphor.


More generally, therefore, the following is proposed: an appeal whose acceptance is presupposed is very weak, because it relies on the audience being in sympathy with the speaker; appeals from which desirability is only derivable pragmatically are weaker than those from which it is derivable non-pragmatically, because the former rely on the audience “filling in” the necessary value inferences, without actively encouraging them to do so; appeals which express desirability explicitly are weaker than those which express it implicitly, because when a speaker creates an explicit link between a value and desirability, that link can be scrutinised and challenged; and, all other things being equal, appeals which make this link logically are weaker than those which make it non-logically, because they expose the speaker's reasoning in appealing to a value and give others the opportunity to find counter-arguments.

Thus, methods from which a value-desirability relationship is non-logically, implicitly and non-pragmatically derivable stand at the opposite end of the appeal strength spectrum from methods from which relationships are non-derivable. Using methods in the former class strengthens an appeal considerably and thus substantially increases its chances of success. One can therefore claim that the method which a speaker uses suggests something

about the *controversiality* of the value to which he or she is appealing. The least controversial values need only relatively weak appeals — and indeed, it might sound odd to use strong appeal methods when a value is already widely accepted — and the more controversial values need stronger appeals. The different classes of relationship can be shown as a continuum, as illustrated in Figure 4.1.

It is helpful to define more precisely the distinction between controversiality, which is at issue here, and importance, which is the focus of the value analysis in chapter three. Essentially, the former is concerned with whether or not the value is desirable, and the latter with the priority that should be assigned to a value relative to others. Since most values are usually desirable in the abstract, arguments about them might seem to boil down merely to arguments about priorities. However, this is not quite so. Firstly, some values may be felt to be undesirable when they are seen to involve a trade-off with other values, and they can thus become controversial. For example, it may be felt that realising *plenitude* (an abundance of resources for a particular institution) prevents the realisation of *efficiency* by encouraging waste, and that *plenitude* is therefore undesirable. This is distinct from suggesting that *efficiency* is more important than *plenitude*. Conversely, there may be disagreement over the relative importance of the value *honesty*, for example, without the desirability of the value being controversial. Secondly, it should be remembered where the dispute over a value's controversiality lies: if a speaker's appeal indicates that a value is controversial, he is not himself casting doubt on its desirability — otherwise he would not be making the appeal — but implying that others harbour such doubts. Thus, there is no contradiction between a speaker implying that a value is controversial, and putting that same value at the top of his list of priorities. The two are quite independent variables.

Figure 4.1: Value-Desirability Relationships as a Continuum



Applying this type of analysis should offer interesting evidence about how deeply embedded particular values are in the political culture. The values that are least controversial in political discourse could be viewed as being close to norms, whereas the values which are most controversial would be at the centre of the political debate about trade-offs in policy. The description of the appeal methods in the taxonomy will help to flesh out this model, and some supportive empirical evidence for the link between appeal method class and controversiality will be offered in chapter five, prior to the discussion of the method analysis results.

4.5.2. Subordinate (Auxiliary) Methods

In most cases, where more than one appeal method constituent is present, each constituent plays an equal and independent role in appealing to the value. However, in some cases, one constituent is used to support another. It will be seen later that some appeal methods usually function in this way.

An auxiliary method constituent contributes towards creating a value-desirability relationship, but cannot do so independently. Its success is dependent on the success of the constituent on which it is dependent - the superordinate constituent. An example of this dependence is provided by Rudolf Dreßler, when, after accusing the government of dishonourable behaviour in discussing their legislative proposals with special interest groups, he makes the co-operation of the SPD (an appeal to *co-operation & agreement*) dependent on an end to such behaviour (an appeal to *honourableness*):

(4.4) ...wenn Sie ernsthaft an einer tragfähigen Gesetzeslösung mit der SPD interessiert sind, wird dieses Verfahren nicht möglich sein. (Sten. Ber., S. 8999; GStrG 487)


The superordinate method used in appealing to *honourableness* is thus a conditional association with *co-operation & agreement*. However, in addition, Dreßler uses an expression of potentiality (“wird...nicht möglich sein”) to further support his appeal; it does not give the audience any additional reason to suppose that *honourableness* might be desirable, but instead strengthens the association by making it clear that the realisation of one value will be impossible without the realisation of the other. The potentiality is subordinate to the association, because its success and relevance depend on the success of the association Dreßler has created.

There may be up to two dependencies of this kind in an appeal method: one constituent may be dependent on another, which may in turn be dependent on a third. Subordinate appeal methods make a much weaker contribution to enhancing an appeal than superordinate methods, and will therefore be disregarded in the results.

4.6. The Final Appeal Method Classification

The final hierarchical appeal method classification is shown in Figure 4.2 on the next page. As with value items, the method constituents are represented by codes which are explained in the definitions section. The complete listing of method constituents, together with the codes that represent them, is contained in Table 4.2 in section 4.7, which summarises the method taxonomy.

Figure 4.2: Appeal Methods Classified by Value-Desirability Relationship



4.7. Overview of the Appeal Method Taxonomy

A brief overview of the method constituents in the appeal method taxonomy is given in Table 4.1. The methods are listed by class, and, as with value items, a mapping sentence has been defined, although here it is the same for each of the classes. The sentence is completed differently for each method constituent, and each complete sentence briefly describes the type of value-desirability relationship created by the method constituent and the means by which that relationship is created (i.e., what constitutes the method constituent). Again, as with value items, the descriptions are not intended to replace the full definitions provided in section 4.8. Each method also has a code, which matches the code used in the classificatory diagram and, later, in the coding itself. Different modal types with the same orientations which fall into the same class are grouped together.

Table 4.1: Appeal Method Constituents

Constituent	Code	Constituent Description
Methods creating Non-Derivable Value-Desirability Relationships		
		Value-desirability relationships are created by...
Value Presupposition	PRS	...assuming audience's acceptance of a value's desirability or importance.
Methods creating Pragmatically Derivable Value-Desirability Relationships		
		Value-desirability relationships are created by...
Conversational Implicature	CIMP	...pragmatically implying desirability or importance by making an utterance which requires a particular value judgement to obey Grice's maxims.
Subjective-Explicit and -Implicit and Objective-Implicit and -Explicit Modality: Probability and Validity	SEM/SIM/OIM/OEM- {PB,VL}	...pragmatically implying desirability or importance by expressing an explicitly or implicitly subjective or objectivised view about the probability of a form of behaviour or a state occurring, or about the validity of an assertion relating to a form of behaviour or a state.
Methods creating Explicitly and Logically Derivable Value-Desirability Relationships		
		Value-desirability relationships are created by...
Categorical Assertion (inc. Objective-Explicit Modality: Desirability)	CAT (inc. OEM-DS)	...explicitly asserting desirability or importance.
Methods creating Explicitly and Non-Logically Derivable Value-Desirability Relationships		
		Value-desirability relationships are created by...
Subjective-Explicit Modality: Desirability	SEM-DS	...expressing an explicitly subjective view about desirability or importance.
Subjective-Explicit and -Implicit and Objective-Implicit and -Explicit Modality: Inclination	SEM/SIM/OIM/OEM-IC	...expressing an explicitly or implicitly subjective or objectivised view about people's inclinations.

Methods creating Non-Pragmatically, Implicitly and Non-Logically Derivable Value-Desirability Relationships

		Value-desirability relationships are created by...
Association by Co-occurrence	A-COO	...asserting the existence of an association of co-occurrence with another value item or items.
Connotation	CON	...using a word or phrase which connotes meanings which imply desirability or importance.
Irony	IRO	...expressing the opposite of one's true views to imply desirability or importance.
Metaphor	MET	...transferring meaning from one object or state to another to imply desirability or importance.
Imperative	IMPR	...implying a desire or inclination through an order or unqualified request.
Subjective-Explicit Modality: Obligation and Potentiality	SEM- {OB,PT}	...implying desirability or importance by expressing an explicitly subjective view about people's obligations or the potential to behave or not behave in some way if a value is realised or not realised.
Subjective-Explicit and -Implicit Modality: Admission and Sensibleness	SEM/SIM- AD	...implying desirability or importance by expressing an explicitly or implicitly subjective view about people's admissions.
Subjective-Explicit and -Implicit and Objective-Implicit and -Explicit Modality: Expectedness, Presumption and Usuality	SEM/SIM/ OIM/OEM- {EX,PR,SN, US}	...implying desirability or importance by expressing an explicitly or implicitly subjective or objectivised view about the expectedness, obviousness, sensibleness or usuality of a form of behaviour or state.
Subjective-Implicit Modality: Desirability	SIM-DS	...implying desirability or importance by expressing an implicitly subjective view about the desirability or importance of a form of behaviour or state.
Subjective Entailment	SNT	...expressing something which logically implies an inclination.

Methods creating Non-Pragmatically, Implicitly and Logically Derivable Value-Desirability Relationships

		Value-desirability relationships are created by...
Association by Causality	A-CAU	...asserting the existence of a causal association with another value item or items.
Association by Conditionality	A-CND	...asserting the existence of an association of conditionality with another value item or items.
Association by Instrumentality	A-INS	...asserting the existence of an association of instrumentality with another value item or items.
Association by Equivalence	A-EQV	...asserting the existence of an association of equivalence with another value item or items.
Entailment	ENT	...making an utterance which logically implies desirability or importance of a form of behaviour or a state.
Objective-Implicit Modality: Desirability	OIM -DS	...implying desirability or importance by expressing an implicitly objectivised view about the desirability or importance of a form of behaviour or a state.
Objective-Implicit and -Explicit Modality: Admission and Sensibleness	OIM/OEM- AD	...implying desirability or importance by expressing an implicitly or explicitly objectivised view about people's admissions.

Subjective-Implicit and Objective-Implicit and -Explicit Modality, Obligation and Potentiality	SIM/OIM/ OEM-{OB, PT}	...implying desirability or importance by expressing an implicitly subjective or implicitly or explicitly objectivised view about people's obligations or potential to behave or not behave in some way if a value is realised or not realised.
Residual Category		
		Value-desirability relationships are created by...
Other/Ambiguous	O/A	...a method not included in the taxonomy, or by a method which cannot be unambiguously identified.

4.8. Definition and Identification of Appeal Method Constituents

This section contains the definitions of each method constituent, and, where appropriate, some indicators which help to identify them in the analysis. However, the definitions differ from the value item definitions in two principal ways. Firstly, most are considerably longer, because the concepts behind each one require further explanation, and, because, in many cases, some reference needs to be made to the relevant literature. Secondly, it is less straightforward to define separate sets of indicators for each method, since, in many cases, the possible realisations are too diverse, and no generalisations can be made beyond the abstract definition given in each section.

4.8.1. Value Presupposition (PRS)

4.8.1.1. Defining Value Presupposition

Many appeals are made without the use of any explicit mechanism to support them. Their success therefore relies on the belief of speakers that the value appeal will be readily accepted by the audience — that the audience will interpret the content as positive or negative without prompting or persuasion. This effective absence of appeal method is described in the analysis as *value presupposition*.

Presupposition is a term used in pragmatics, and is related to, but not identical to, the concept of *value presupposition*. Givón gives a broad definition of pragmatic presupposition, stating that it is:

defined in terms of assumptions the speaker makes about what the hearer is likely to accept without challenge (Givón 1979a in Brown/Yule 1983: 29.)

Brown and Yule also give the following definition from Stalnaker:

presuppositions are what is taken by the speaker to be the common ground of the participants in the conversation. (Stalnaker 1978 in Brown/Yule 1983: 29)

There are a number of differing views about pragmatic presupposition, and these two quotations cannot be said to be representative of the entire literature; other authors would offer

different definitions. Nevertheless, these quotations represent the common ground between pragmatic presupposition and value presupposition: assumptions by the speaker concerning the beliefs of the hearer.

The two concepts are not, however, identical: they differ in two principal ways. Firstly, and most obviously, value presupposition is focused entirely on assumptions about value judgements, whereas pragmatic presupposition is a more generic concept. Secondly, in pragmatic presupposition, everything which is presupposed by the speaker can be deduced from the speaker's utterance — for example, the use of a noun presupposes the existence of the referent of the noun; in value presupposition, the most crucial presupposition, the value judgement, is not deducible. Both types of presupposition involve implicature — if nothing is implied, nothing can be deduced — but appeals which presuppose a value judgement only imply that a judgement *of some kind* must be made, not *which* judgement. It is left to the audience to “fill in” that judgement, and the speaker naturally hopes and expects that it will accord with his or her own. For example, a speaker might state that “the opposition has made every attempt to have those spending increases included in the Bill”. Careful examination will show that this utterance does *not* imply the desirability or undesirability of the increases in question, only that they are in some sense significant. No doubt the speaker would have a view on whether or not the increases are desirable, but he or she does not state or imply that view. The use of value presupposition withholds the speaker's negative or positive judgement about a particular event or state of affairs, where that judgement is felt to be an area of common ground between the speaker and the majority of his or her audience.

4.8.1.2. *Interpreting Value Presupposition*

Since appeals which use value presupposition make no attempt at convincing the audience, the values they appeal to are unlikely to be controversial. The typical form of such appeals is that of a statement of fact, or a bald claim, as in this quotation from Seehofer's speech on the *Gesundheits-Strukturgesetz*:

(4.5) Meine Damen und Herren, die Ausgaben der gesetzlichen Krankenversicherung steigen seit zwei Jahren doppelt so schnell wie die Einnahmen. (Sten. Ber., S. 8988; GStrG 21)

Here, there is nothing, beyond the most general contextual information about Seehofer's views and the debate, to tell the audience that these rapid rises are a bad thing; he employs no subtle means of persuading the audience to accept the values to which his utterance po-

tentially appeals. Seehofer's preferred judgement cannot be deduced from his utterance alone, and thus, whilst additional contextual information may allow the audience to guess what that judgement might be, the speaker clearly expects his audience to either arrive independently at the same judgement, or to accept the judgement without prompting, persuasion or any other form of active value appeal. Since it is not possible for an audience to derive $d(v)$ from an appeal which uses value presupposition, this method occupies the non-derivable category in the classification.

4.8.1.3. *Identifying Value Presupposition*

The characteristic which makes *value presupposition* easiest to identify is that explicit textual methods such as modality or metaphor, which would ordinarily shoulder the burden of making it clear what is being praised or criticised, are not present or make no contribution to appealing to the values in the utterance. However, identification is complicated by the fact that value presupposition can easily become confused with conversational implicature. Aspects of this problem will also be discussed in the section on conversational implicature (section 4.8.2), but a number of points can be made here.

When attempting to identify instances of value presupposition, one must first resolve two problems. Firstly, one must determine how the central characteristic of this method type is realised in the text; in other words, how it is possible for a speaker who uses value presupposition to imply the need for a value judgement without implying the judgement itself. The answer is simply that the audience tries to interpret any utterance as being in accordance with the Gricean maxims (discussed in more detail in connection with conversational implicature), which lead it to assume that a speaker does not discuss events or situations which are irrelevant or superfluous. If a statement of some sort is made by a speaker, and no motivation is found for it outside the value realm (that is, if it is not a purely formal utterance opening a speech, a factual reply to a question, or something similar), the audience will be compelled to assume that a value judgement is required to make sense of what is being said, even when the nature of the value judgement is not stated or implied by the speaker.

The second problem concerns the source of the audience's knowledge about which judgement to make: if the speaker does not indicate what he or she considers desirable or undesirable, how is the audience to decide which value is being appealed to? This problem is not as serious as it might seem on a theoretical level; a glance at example (4.5) above

shows that speakers provide plenty of clues about the kind of values which might lie behind their utterance. The referents in the speaker's utterance — in the above example, rising spending levels in the health insurance system — form a set of “neutral” indicators which point to a very limited number of possible values. In order to arrive at a value judgement, the audience must only decide whether they and the speaker view these indicators as being positive or negative.

In order to identify value presupposition, therefore, the analyst must go through these stages explicitly: firstly, by always asking what the motivation of the speaker is in making an utterance, under the assumption of adherence to the Gricean maxims, and secondly, by looking for instances in which this motivation is not explained by implicit or explicit positive or negative judgements. The presence of exclusively “neutral” indicators is the important characteristic which identifies value presupposition.

Whilst assisting in the identification of the method, however, the absence of positive or negative indicators is also a problem for the analyst; for he or she must, like the audience, “fill in” in the missing value judgement in order to decide which value is being appealed to. The neutral indicators will point to at least two possible values, and only the analyst's wider contextual knowledge can make it possible to determine what the probable intended value is. For example, a neutral reference to an increase in resources might potentially be either an appeal to *plenitude* (because the speaker welcomes the increase), or an appeal to *discipline* or *control* (because the speaker considers the increase to be overburdening the public finances). Typically, it will not be too difficult to resolve this using the wider context of the utterance.

The significance of value presupposition is not that it completely obscures the speaker's values, but that each instance of its use is an occasion on which the speaker chooses not to drive those values home using a stronger method of appeal.

4.8.1.4. *Practical Limits in Coding Value Presupposition*

There is one final point to make about value presupposition. It is only recorded as the appeal method in cases where no explicit method is identifiable in the appeal. However, one can assume that most values which a speaker may appeal to are, to a greater or lesser extent, already “rooted” in the minds of at least some of the audience, and there is therefore almost always a degree of value presupposition involved. Quantifying the role which this factor makes in an appeal is, however, very difficult, since one is dealing not with a textual

feature, but with the absence of a textual feature. The only way to judge the extent of a speaker's reliance on value presupposition is to judge the strength of a method by the position of its constituents in the method classification. Logically, one may assume that, as the strength of appeals decreases, the degree of general value presupposition increases.

4.8.2. Conversational Implicature (CIMP)

4.8.2.1. *The Theory of Conversational Implicature*

Another field of linguistic inquiry which offers valuable insights into value appeal methodology is pragmatics. An important theory in pragmatics is that of *conversational implicature*, which was developed by Grice as part of a wider theory of implicature (Levinson 1983: 97-118 & Brown/Yule 1983: 31-33). At its heart is the co-operative principle, expressed through the four maxims of conversation: the maxims of quality, quantity, relevance and manner. Grice claimed that certain types of implicature can be understood by a hearer because the hearer assumes that the speaker is being co-operative; specifically, Grice proposed that hearers would assume speakers would be largely truthful (quality), be no more or less informative than was required by the situation (quantity), be relevant (relevance), be brief, be orderly, and so forth (manner) (*ibid.*). Probably the most interesting maxims here are those of relevance and quantity, although this is not the place for a detailed discussion of the maxims. An example quoted from Levinson will illustrate his point:

(4.6) A: Can you tell me the time?

B: Well, the milkman has come. (Levinson 1983: 97)

Although B's response to A appears, on a semantic level, to be completely irrelevant, Grice proposes that A will attempt to interpret it as being relevant to what was asked, i.e. in a way that will allow it to comply with the maxim of relevance. Thus, the fact of the milkman having visited is interpreted as giving some indication of the time, because the milkman generally comes at a predictable time of day (*ibid.*).

4.8.2.2. *Applying Conversational Implicature to the Analysis*

This theory is of interest in analysing value appeal methods because there are frequently cases where speakers, when implicitly appealing to a value, appear neither to use an easily identifiable method such as modality or metaphor, nor to make a statement which allows the audience to logically deduce desirability. Conversational implicature is one method which permits speakers to use considerable subtlety in implying desirability, because it

relies on the audience “filling in” the inferences which are required to make an utterance obey the maxims.

A value appeal uses conversational implicature when the speaker makes an utterance with value content, which can only be interpreted by the audience as obeying the maxims of conversation if a particular value judgement is made. The value appeal can thus be understood using very general information from the pragmatic context of the utterance. Note that a careful distinction here is made between this general pragmatic information (the assumption of co-operative behaviour of the speaker) and much more general contextual information. Clearly, given sufficient contextual information, it is almost always possible to derive the relationship which the speaker wishes to exist between the value and its desirability — otherwise the analyst would not be in a position to deduce it. Stating that the relationship is derivable given all possible contextual information is really not very interesting; the point here is to identify appeals where that relationship is derivable from much more general and limited contextual information, appeals which do not presuppose that the audience has any knowledge of the speaker’s value preferences.

Although this is classed as a method which creates derivable value-desirability relationships, the reliance on general pragmatic principles makes the speaker’s active involvement in creating the relationship very weak; there is therefore only very weak pressure on the audience to accept the value judgement implied by the utterance. Its effectiveness as an appeal method, although greater than that of *value presupposition*, is thus quite restricted.

An example of conversational implicature from the corpus can be taken from the speech by Christina Schenk, who criticises the reliance on market forces in the German government’s reforms:

(4.7) An der Bereitschaft, Steuergelder auch für Zuschüsse zur Kostendeckung im Gesundheitswesen zu verwenden und vor allem einen grundlegenden Strukturwandel vorzunehmen, wird sich messen lassen, was einer Regierung die Gesundheit der Bürger und Bürgerinnen wert ist. (Sten. Ber., S. 9008; GStrG 817)

Schenk spells out what she believes be the test of how much the government cares about the health of its citizens, and lays it down as an implicit challenge to the government. She thus implies that caring about the health of their citizens is something that governments should be concerned with; to a hypothetical member of the audience who did not consider this matter to be of any importance, this utterance would appear to flout the maxim of relevance, and could only be made to conform if the importance of caring about the health of

citizens were accepted. Thus, she conversationally implies the desirability of both *compassion* and *health*.

4.8.2.3. *Issues in Identifying and Coding Conversational Implicature*

The problems in identifying the conversation implicature of desirability mirror those in identifying value presupposition, since the two are quite easily confused. An invented example of value presupposition should serve to illustrate: if a speaker made a critical statement such as “the government did not increase resources for the NHS last year”, it might seem at first glance as though that statement could not obey the maxims — especially the maxims of quantity and relevance — without the assumption of a value judgement, in this case the desirability of an increase in resources. One might therefore conclude that this is an example of conversational implicature. However, this is not the case.

There is a relatively simple test which distinguishes the two methods. Value presupposition *does* involve implicature, but only insofar as the conversational maxims demand that the speaker says something which the audience would not consider superfluous or irrelevant; for example, a statement such as “the Government has not stated its position on the sunny weather we had yesterday” would almost certainly flout the maxims, because it would involve a scarcely credible implicature, namely that spells of pleasant weather could be a matter for government statements. The implicature that value presupposition *does not* involve is that which is at the heart of the conversational implicature method, namely the implicature of a positive or negative stance towards the situation or event being described by the speaker. Utterances using value presuppositions obey the maxims, irrespective of whether the judgement passed on their value content is assumed to be positive or negative — in other words, even in a context where traditional value assumptions are turned on their heads. The invented example above (“the government did not increase resources for the NHS last year”) would still obey the maxims even if one presupposed that it was important *not* to increase resources for the NHS — the statement might constitute praise for the government’s achievements. In contrast, utterances in which values are appealed to using conversational implicature (such as example (4.7) above) can only obey the maxims if a particular positive or negative value judgement is assumed.

The main consequence of this distinction for the analyst is that the burden of identifying which value is being appealed to in cases of value presupposition falls on his or her shoul-

ders, whereas conversational implicatures contain all the information necessary to deduce the value from the utterance. When speakers make value presuppositions, they depend entirely on the wider contextual knowledge, preferences and orientations of their audience to ensure that the desired value judgement is made; conversational implicatures do not depend exclusively on such factors, because speakers who use it prod their audience in the direction in which they wish them to go.

As a final footnote, it should be noted that certain specific types of conversational implicature, namely those that arise through the use of the modal types like *probability* and *validity*, will be coded separately under those modal headings, in order to avoid spreading the analysis of modality over too many different categories. *Conversational implicature* is a method type which is intended to enable all other instances of conversational implicature to be captured in the analysis.

4.8.3. Categorical Assertion (CAT)

Categorical assertion is defined as the explicit objectivising of the desirability or importance of a value. To categorically assert a value judgement is therefore to do three things: to produce an utterance which communicates the desirability of an object or state which represents a value, to make the desirability of that object or state explicit, and to make it appear to be objectively true that the object or state is desirable, rather than a matter of opinion. This method therefore encompasses, but is not limited to, the objective explicit form of the modal type *desirability* (details of modal forms and their objectivity and explicitness are discussed in section 4.8.4).

The indicators for categorical assertion go beyond objective explicit statements which use the word “desirable” and related forms. Desirability can be indicated by all those adjectives, nouns and verbs which denote or describe objects or states which belong to what is regarded as the world of the desirable and undesirable. Examples are adjectives such as “bad”, “good”, “marvellous”, “awful”, “important” and “vital”; some further examples are given for the modal type *desirability* on page 216. Since the categorical assertion of desirability must be objective and explicit, it must be expressed through the explicit predication of desirability in an utterance, typically by attribution using a projected clause.

Since categorical assertion creates both an explicit and a logical relationship between the value being appealed to and notions of desirability, a simple qualitative test for its occurrence in text can be formulated: if accepting the truthfulness or appropriateness of the

literal content of the speaker's utterance (as opposed to that of any inferences which one might make from what the speaker says) is incompatible with rejecting the speaker's value appeal, then the speaker has categorically asserted the desirability of the value.

An example is provided by the Conservative MP James Couchman, who expresses his concern about the economic implications of introducing the indicative drug budget:

(4.8) The Henley centre has recently suggested that imprudent implementation of the White Paper proposals could be highly detrimental and cost far more than will be saved by the indicative drugs budget. That would be a poor outcome. (HC Deb, cc 532; NHSCCB 1091-1092)

His assertion that introducing proposals that "cost more" than is saved would be a "poor outcome" constitutes a categorical assertion of the undesirability of such proposals, and thus a (hypothecated) negative appeal to *plenitude*.

One can assume that this method is used relatively rarely in political discourse to make value appeals. Typically, its use is restricted to cases where the speaker wishes to give extra emphasis to a proposition which is, at least for a significant part of the audience, uncontroversial. Appeals which use categorical assertion create value-desirability relationships which are explicitly and logically derivable from the speaker's utterance. It is therefore, in terms of the activeness of the speaker's role in creating the relationship, and the explicitness of the relationship, at the opposite end of the spectrum from value presupposition. Nevertheless, as explained in section 4.5, it is very close to value presupposition in terms of its strength as an appeal method.

4.8.4. Modality (SEM/SIM/OIM/OEM-x)

4.8.4.1. Defining Modality

Most appeals are made using somewhat more subtle means than categorical assertion, and more explicit means than value presupposition. Linguistics offers some important insights into these methods, and one grammatical feature which is of great interest is modality. Uhlig notes the importance of certain modal forms in political speeches:

...den Modalverben [kommt] eine gewisse kommunikative Relevanz [zu]..., weil sie die Aufgabe der Steuerung und Lenkung der Modalität der Aussage erfüllen in einer Weise, die die politische Bewußtseinssteuerung sprachlich vorbereitet und die die gewünschten Absichten der regierenden Minderheit als dispositive Elite signalisiert. (Uhlig 1972: 69)

Here, the focus will go beyond the modal auxiliaries, since the effects that Uhlig notes when modal verbs are used are, in fact, achievable with a much wider range of modal

forms. Before the significance of modality as an appeal method — or, more accurately, a whole group of diverse appeal methods — can be assessed, a discussion of the concept is needed, with some reference to the extensive literature on the subject. Modality is a complex area of linguistic investigation, and there appears to be no completely coherent definition of the concept that can describe all of the linguistic phenomena which come under this heading and exclude those which do not. In the consensus view, modality is the category that allows:

...speakers to express varying degrees of commitment to, or belief in, a proposition.
(Saeed 1997: 125)

Thus, the expression “insurance contribution rates must be rising” is a modulated version of the proposition “insurance contribution rates are rising”, through which a speaker may express a high degree of certainty about the proposition without stating it as a bald fact. Traditionally, modality is divided into *epistemic* and *deontic* forms, the former indicating degrees of knowledge, as in the last example, and the latter degrees of obligation or permission, as in “we must reduce contribution rates”. However, systemic linguists, in particular, also integrate modal adjuncts into the system of modality, and these can express a much wider range of meanings, allowing speakers to judge the extent to which something is sensible, expected, presumed, valid, etc.

It is at this point that the question arises as to whether modality is syntactically or semantically defined, since, if the definition is purely a semantic one as indicated by Saeed’s definition, modality might be extended even further. For example, the statement “contribution rates are too high” includes a judgement on the part of the speaker about the level of the contribution rates: they are excessive, or undesirably high. This, in turn, implies a judgement about contribution rates themselves, namely that at a certain level they become undesirable, and that they must therefore have undesirable qualities. However, descriptions of modality do not generally include “too”, or other words which define excessiveness or sufficiency. One reason appears to be that the expression of excessiveness is part of the proposition rather than a judgement on it, although one could claim that the congruent form of the proposition is “contribution rates are high”, and that the “too” constitutes a judgement on the level of the rates in the same way as an utterance such as “nobody wants contribution rates to remain at their current level”. A further reason might be that “too” only *implies* an orientation of the speaker towards the proposition (i.e. that the speaker, or oth-

ers, feel that something is undesirable), rather than making it explicit in the way that modal adjuncts do. However, deontic modality also allows speakers to make judgements about necessity or obligation without making any such orientation explicit. The explanation for this apparent confusion may be partly syntactic: descriptions of modality have tended to begin with modal auxiliaries and modal adjuncts, both of which can be syntactically defined; the concept has then subsequently been extended to cover semantically related words, such as “probable”, “expected” and “understandable”. This mixture of the syntactic and semantic has made modality very hard to tie down.

It is therefore clear that the consensus view about the definition of modality is not unproblematic, especially when categorising appeal methods. Added to this is the difficulty of establishing correspondence or equivalence between modal forms in the two languages. It is certainly not the intention here to try to resolve these definitional problems, but nor will the category of modality be entirely abandoned. Instead, the focus here will be on those features of modality which are of greatest significance for the study of value appeals and which are most readily comparable, and use will be made of the existing work on modality which seem to offer the best way of codifying the occurrences of modality which assist in appealing to values in the corpus texts. Some modifications will be made to the traditional models, but, generally speaking, where categories of expression (such as those of sufficiency) fall outside the traditional boundaries of modality, they will be codified under separate headings.

It should, however, be noted that modality is being viewed from a different angle here than is usual in linguistics. Modality is defined in linguistics with respect to propositions, but here the focus is on values. A judgement made about a value may not always be coterminous with a judgement about a proposition. Existing models of modality will need to be judged with this in mind.

4.8.4.2. *Finding a Model for Modality*

The broad definition of modality which will be adopted here matches the consensus view which has already been stated: that modality is the category by which speakers express attitudes towards a proposition or proposal (Downing & Locke 1992). Looking at the encoding of such attitudes is of great importance in understanding how values are appealed to. Through a wide range of methods, it allows a proposition to be presented as likely, or surprising, or a proposal to be represented as necessary or desirable. It is necessary to use a

model which can reflect the complexity and diversity of the relevant modal meanings in a systematic fashion.

Halliday offers a good description of at least some aspects of modality in English, and the functional basis of this description makes it possible, with some qualifications, to apply many of the categories to the coding of German texts. Halliday's emphasis on function makes it unnecessary to enter into a debate about the comparability of specific modal forms — say, of *must* and *müssen* (although Heine and others have shown that German modal verbs, in particular, have many similarities with their English “equivalents” (Heine 1995 et al.)). Instead, the concern is exclusively with establishing which grammatical function a given instance of a given form is performing. However, the most useful elements of Halliday's modality model are restricted to his discussion of the “exchange” function of the clause, where he deals with probability, usuality, obligation, inclination and potentiality, whereas the model used here will be somewhat broader, including modal adjuncts and other items which Halliday deals with separately. Nevertheless, the interesting parts of his model can, with some adjustments, be extended to cover the whole range of modal expressions which are of interest, and Halliday's model will therefore first be outlined as a basis for later discussion.

Halliday begins by defining modality as a means of referring to “the area of meaning that lies between yes and no” (Halliday 1985: 335, see also Eggins 1994: 179). What precisely “no” and “yes” mean depends on the speech function of the clause in which modality is being used. Two basic forms of modality are identified, according to the speech function of the clause which they affect. *Modalisation* (i.e., “epistemic” modality) applies to “information” clauses, which consist of propositions, and *modulation* (i.e., “deontic” modality) applies to “goods-&-services” clauses, which consist of proposals. The essential distinction between these two functions can be best understood by looking at their non-modal (or *congruent*) forms. An information clause containing a proposition can be realised in congruent form as indicative, e.g.:

(4.9) There are also wide variations in the performance of the hospital services. (HC Deb, cc 491; NHSCCB 38)

whereas the congruent form of a “goods-&-services” (proposal) clause can be regarded as the imperative¹⁴, e.g.:

(4.10) Kehren Sie mit uns zu einem System der wirklich geschlossenen Solidarität zurück! (Sten. Ber., S. 9016; GStrG 1052)

Halliday explains that, when these clause types are modalised or modulated, a choice can be made from two types of modality in each case: modalised information clauses either convey “probability” or “usuality”, and modulated goods-&-services clauses either convey “obligation” or “inclination”. Two modalised versions of the first example and two modulated versions of the second demonstrate this:

There are probably wide variations in the performance of the hospital services. (Probability)

There are usually wide variations in the performance of the hospital services. (Usuality)

Sie müssen mit uns zu einem System der wirklich geschlossenen Solidarität zurückkehren. (Obligation)

Sie wollen mit uns zu einem System der wirklich geschlossenen Solidarität zurückkehren. (Inclination)

Modalisation and modulation express a degree of probability, usuality, obligation or inclination which lies between the absolute “poles” of “yes” and “no” in each case. The “poles” of probability and usuality would be “is” and “is not”; those of obligation and inclination “do” and “do not”. Halliday also mentions a further semantic category which he includes alongside these four main types of modality, even though it is not strictly “polar”. This is *potentiality*, which is concerned with the possibility for someone to do something, and is usually expressed with “can”, “is able to”, etc., as in “no one can really be committed to high-quality services without wanting to increase efficiency”.

4.8.4.3. *Orientation in Modal Expressions*

There are a number of different ways in which these modal meanings can be expressed, which can act to show or conceal the extent to which the propositions or proposals are subjective judgements by the speaker. Halliday identifies two main “orientations” in the expression of modality: *subjective* and *objective*, each of which can be expressed *explicitly* or *implicitly*. *Subjective modality* in a clause allows speakers to express some personal affinity with a proposition or proposal; in its *explicit* form it involves the use of such ex-

¹⁴ Halliday uses the imperative as the congruent form for ease, but points out that “goods-&-services” clauses in fact have “no real congruent form in the grammar” (Halliday 1985: 335).

pressions as “I believe”, “ich glaube”, “we suspect”, “Ich denke”, “wir wollen”, etc. in a “projecting” clause, with the proposition or proposal in a subordinate clause (cf. also Hansen 1989: 82-83, 88)¹⁵. The *implicit* form of subjective modality is typically expressed with modal auxiliaries (e.g. I must, we need, etc.), which indicates that the determination of necessity or obligation has an interpersonal dimension, without it being specified who is “obligating” or “necessitating”.

The use of *objective* modality removes all traces of personal affinity with a proposition, and instead enables the speaker to “universalise” a particular perspective. When using the *implicit* form, speakers make this universalisation less obvious by integrating it into the clause containing the proposition or proposal; this is most frequently achieved by using modal adjuncts, especially mood adjuncts like “probably”, “possibly”, “obviously”, “wahrscheinlich” and “offenbar”, and comment adjuncts such as “hopefully”, “wirklich” and “erstaunlicherweise” (see example (4.3)). Modal adjuncts such as these can, however, express more than probability, usuality, obligation, inclination and potentiality. Mood adjuncts can express presumption (“evidently”, “presumably”, “obviously”) and comment adjuncts can express, among other things, admission, assertion, desirability, constancy, validity, or how sensible or expected something is (Egins 1994: 166-169). The adjectival counterparts of these adjuncts (e.g. probable, obvious, certain, möglich) can also express similar meanings when used within the same clause as an assertion or proposal (e.g. “they contemplate years of discussion before implementing such *obvious* improvements as better financial management”). The modal meanings, such as expectedness and admission, which these adjuncts and adjectives express lie, strictly speaking, outside Halliday’s model, as will be discussed below.

The *explicit* form of objective modality is expressed, as in the case of explicit subjective modality, by using a hypotactic clause complex (clause plus subordinate clause), which subordinates the proposition or proposal to an objectively stated judgement about its probability, obligatoriness, etc., as in the following example:

(4.11) Es ist ein ethisches Gebot, Mittel von der Verschwendung wegzunehmen und zugunsten der Pflegebedürftigen in unserer Gesellschaft einzusetzen. (Sten. Ber., S. 8990; GStrG 100)

¹⁵ There is some disagreement about which verbs carry modal meanings. Downing and Locke (1992) include lexical verbs such as “beg” and “promise”, in addition to the verbs “wonder” and “wish”, but do not include “want”. Halliday includes “want” in his account of modality and it certainly belongs in any account of the relationship between modality and value appeals, and will therefore be included.

The judgement about the degree of obligation is expressed in a projecting clause (es ist ein...Gebot) which makes the “objective” judgement explicit. The adjectival counterparts of the modal adjuncts mentioned above can also be used to express objective-explicit modality (e.g. it is probable, obvious, etc).

4.8.4.4. *Adjusting the Modality Model*

This model provides many useful insights into modality, but is problematic in a number of ways from the point of view of value analysis. The first problem arises with Halliday’s definition of subjective and objective orientation. The role of the speaker appears to be defined differently between the different types of orientation, or at least to be ambiguous, especially in the case of subjective explicit orientation.

In the case of judgements on propositions, such as probability, the meaning of subjective explicit orientation is quite clear: it indicates the explicit presentation of a judgement about the probability of something, given as the subjective judgement of the speaker (e.g. “I think John will come”), rather than its implicit presentation as subjective (“John’ll come”), or its presentation as objective fact (“It’s likely that John will come”). The speaker is, for the purposes of this abstract description, kept separate from that which is being judged.

However, in the case of what Halliday calls proposals, such as those made through obligation, the role of the speaker becomes involved with the object of the judgement: whereas the subjective implicit form (“John must come”), the objective implicit form (“John is supposed to come”) and objective explicit form (“It is necessary for John to come”) might seem able to express the judgement of the speaker about an obligation which can exist separately from him or her, the subjective explicit form is shown by Halliday as indicating that the speaker is the *source* of the obligation (“I want John to come”). Equally, his account of inclination seems to define all forms but the subjective explicit in a way that makes them potential judgements by the speaker about someone’s inclination (“It will be a pleasure for John to come”, “John will come”, etc.), whilst the subjective explicit form expresses the speaker’s involvement in somehow guaranteeing or ensuring the inclination (“I undertake for John to come”¹⁶).

¹⁶ Halliday does not present this archaic form as current English usage, but merely as an example of what the subjective explicit orientation would look like if it were used.

This model seems inconsistent, but the fact that Halliday is describing clauses in terms of exchanges, and specifically in terms of propositions and proposals, goes some way to explaining its quirks. When Halliday discusses expressions of obligation, he discusses them purely as proposals, not propositions, even though one may make propositions about obligations which arise from circumstance rather than from the wishes of individuals — in short, which express necessity (for example, “I think that we need to...”), — and even though some proposals that may appear to place obligations on others (“I want John to go”) can also be regarded as propositions about inclination, and can only obligate someone when backed up by sufficient power over the person or persons concerned. Halliday’s description of expressions of inclination as proposals seems less controversial, but the examples which he gives make even this problematic, because they seem to relate not to the expression by someone of their *own* inclinations (e.g. “I want to go”), but the expression by someone of their view about *someone else’s* inclinations (e.g. “John will go”). Whatever the merits of this approach for a description of systemic functional grammar, this view is difficult to apply to the analysis of value appeal methods, because the effect of postulating necessity is quite different from the expression of personal inclinations or preferences.

A further problem arises from the fact that Halliday does not integrate the modal adjuncts (e.g. probably, frankly, understandably) into this system, even though the modal orientations can also be applied to these modal meanings. Finally, he does not include in his model some other forms regarded by other authors as capable of expressing modal meanings, such as lexical verbs which act as performatives (allow, beg, command, forbid, etc.) (Downing/Locke 1992: 383).

The model therefore needs some adjustment. Firstly, Halliday’s categories are a little too limited. Halliday’s notions of proposition and proposal correspond to the two fundamental ways in which speakers can express their views: they can claim that something is, or claim that something should be. However, Halliday’s four or five core types (inclination, obligation, probability, usuality and, arguably, potentiality) do not express the full range of modal meanings which are included in other accounts of modality. In the scheme that will be adopted here, modality will be extended to include certain other modal meanings, such as presumption, admission, desirability, validity, sensibleness and expectedness, which are the most interesting from the perspective of a value analysis. In addition, some additional modal forms will be included in the scope of modality, such as the performatives *guess*,

guarantee, command, require, allow, suggest, promise and *warn* (Downing/Locke 1992: 383). Some of these complement the modal adjuncts and allow distinctions to be made between different modal orientations for each modal type.

Secondly, Halliday's apparent restriction of the notion of obligation to obligations originating from speakers is somewhat too limited, since it does not deal with the existence of absolutely necessities. Whereas Halliday treats expressions of obligation or inclination as proposals, with the preferences of the speaker defining the degree of subjectivity or objectivity in the utterance, expressions of obligation here will be treated as propositions about the *existence of obligations* — expressions of necessity — rather than of the speaker's *desire to obligate* someone. Only explicit expressions of desire to obligate will be treated as expressing the preferences of the speaker, and coded as *inclination* rather than *obligation*. More generally, all modal types will be treated as propositions — expressions of obligation as propositions about the degree to which something is necessary, expressions of inclination as propositions about the degree to which something is wanted, expressions of admission as propositions about the degree to which something is admitted, etc. This not only largely solves the problem of distinguishing between expressions of personal inclination and propositions about reality, it is more suited to analysing political speeches, where speakers rarely express genuine personal preferences, and more suited to an analysis which is concerned with what speakers want people to think they are saying, rather than what an analyst might believe to be the "truth" underlying their utterances.

This change of perspective will have an impact on the way that modal orientation is assessed and recorded. Its scope will be restricted solely to the assessment of *probability* given by speakers (their view of what *is*): modal expressions using subjective explicit orientation will be interpreted as expressing a subjective view on the part of the speaker about the existence of obligations, inclinations, admissions, expectedness, etc.; and those using objective explicit orientation as stating the existence of those conditions as objective fact. However, the problem that Halliday proposed to solve by defining certain types of modality as proposals remains to complicate the assessment of modal orientation. Most modal types can be said to be concerned with concepts which can be defined without the intrusion of individual preferences or actions: necessity can be said to exist independently of individual desires, validity and usuality likewise. Expectedness, interpreted as expressing people's view of normality, can also be viewed as having a potential life outside individual

perspectives, if normality is regarded as being derived from an objective reality. Even desirability (the potential to be desirable), can, paradoxically, be argued to have an objective existence of sorts, because desirability can sometimes be seen as arising from the potential to meet absolute needs. However, there are two modal types, inclination and admission, which semantically demand the involvement of particular speakers, namely in either wanting or admitting. Something cannot be wanted or admitted in the abstract. Thus, if one regards the use of these modal types as expressing propositions about admission or inclination, there arises the problem of whether a personal expression of these meanings (for example, "I want more spending on health", or "I admit that little has been spent on health") should be regarded as a subjective view of inclinations or admissions, or an objective statement of one's own. Clearly, an individual expression of preference or admission is subjective on one level, but it is a nonsense to suggest that the speaker is expressing a subjective view about what he or she wants or admits; speakers know what they want or are admitting, and it can reasonably be argued that the whole notion of modal orientation is inapplicable if one treats such expressions as propositions.

Nevertheless, for the sake of consistency, modal orientations *will* be applied to such individual expressions of inclination or admission. Those which use the first person will be treated as subjective implicit orientations of the respective modal types, since they limit the scope of the alleged inclination or admission, and since it is convenient to keep them distinct from more generalised expressions, such as "spending increases are widely welcomed" or "it is widely admitted that little has been spent on health". This solution is somewhat untidy, because it means that modal expressions with the same syntactic form, but different subjects, will be viewed as having different orientations; "We want more spending" will be subjective implicit, but "everyone wants more spending" will be objective implicit. It is, nevertheless, acceptable from an analytical point of view.

A few examples should serve to further clarify precisely what is found to be problematic in Halliday's model, and what is to be changed. Under Halliday's scheme, example (4.12), where Kenneth Clarke is making explicit his placing of an obligation on the workers in the health service, would be treated as an instance of subjective explicit obligation:

(4.12) We want staff to be well motivated (HC Deb, cc 489; NHSCCB 9)

Instead, this example will be coded as subjective implicit inclination, that is, a subjective expression of the government's inclinations, irrespective of what power the government may or may not have to realise their inclinations.

The place of the next example in Halliday's scheme is unclear:

(4.13) Deshalb meine ich, daß wir...gerade in diesem Bereich noch Öffnungen durchführen müssen, damit ambulante Operationen stärker gefördert werden. (Sten. Ber., S. 9001-9002; GStrG 579)

The speaker is making explicit the subjectivity (*ich meine*) of his belief that an obligation exists (*wir...müssen*) to carry out the specified measures. Since, however, Halliday views subjective explicit obligation as the explicit placing of an obligation on someone, by an expression of personal preference, as in example (4.12), this example cannot be treated as subjective explicit in his scheme. However, handling expressions of preference differently removes this obstacle; here, Seehofer's utterance will be treated as an expression of a view about the existence of an obligation, and thus classed as subjective explicit obligation.

Equally unclear is the position of the final example in Halliday's model:

(4.14) I believe that the vast majority of good clinicians will welcome the opportunity to have their dedicated efforts measured against sensible benchmarks. (HC Deb, cc 532; NHSCCB 1086)

Since Halliday regards subjective explicit inclination as expressing the intrusion of the speaker's own inclinations on those of the subject in the proposition, there appears to be no place for the explicitly subjective expression of a *view* about someone's inclinations. However, in the modified scheme that will be used here, examples such as (4.14) will be placed into the subjective explicit inclination category.

This approach implies privileging the concept of probability somewhat; for each modal type, the speaker will be regarded as making explicit or implicit his or her view about the probability of something. The assessment of probability encoded in modal orientation should not be confused with the expression of probability as a modal type. Every modal expression in the modified model has a "layer" of probability which is subject to the different orientations described above. Speakers can, for example, explicitly assert that they believe something is desirable, state its desirability as an objective fact or use one of the implicit objective or subjective forms in between. In so doing, they are expressing the *probability* of its desirability. When speakers use the modal type *probability*, they are in fact expressing metaprobability, by making a judgement about the *probability of a*

probability. For example, a speaker may assert as an objective fact that something will happen (“It is likely that health spending will rise indefinitely”), or express that probability as an explicitly subjective judgement (“I think that health spending will rise indefinitely”). The modal type is given by the “will” in each case; each statement concerns whether something will happen in the future, and so expresses *probability*. The orientation lies in the projected clauses (“I think”, “It is likely”); they express the speaker’s judgement about the probability of this statement being correct. The two frequently become blurred when interpreting statements, since metaprobability is a concept most would rather avoid. However, here it is important to keep the two forms of probability strictly separate.

4.8.4.5. *The Modal Types and their Impact on Value Appeals*

Table 4.2 lists all the different types of modality which will be encoded in the analysis, with the code which will represent each one in the coding, and a mapping sentence which should help to clarify the semantics of each type. Concrete examples of all the types are given later in section 4.8.4.8. In this section, the significance and usage of each type will be discussed and the means by which the modal meaning implies or explicitly states desirability will be explained. The handling of the different orientations of modal types is subject to general rules, and so it will not be explained for each modal type, except in cases which require special treatment. The discussion of the implication of desirability by each type can generally be taken to refer to the objective orientation of that type; for example, discussion of the implication of desirability by statements of necessity will assume statements of necessity which are not explicitly subjective. Subjective orientations can change the classification of a modal type, and details of this will be given in section 4.8.4.6.

Table 4.2: Modality Types

Type	Code	Short Definition
		Explicitly or implicitly expressing a subjectivised or objectivised judgement about the extent to which something is...
Admission	AD	...confessed or (reluctantly) acknowledged to be true.
Desirability	DS	...desirable.
Expectedness	EX	...expected.
Inclination	IC	...wanted.
Obligation	OB	...obligatory or necessary.
Potentiality	PT	...possible — able to be done or able to happen.
Presumption	PR	...self-evident, not requiring further justification or explanation.
Probability	PB	...likely to be done, occur or come about.
Sensibleness	SN	...sensible or rational.
Usuality	US	...usual or normal.
Validity	VL	...true or logically derived from premises.

Sources: adapted from Halliday (1985): 82-83, 86-87, 334-337, Eggins (1994): 166-171, Downing/Locke 1992: 383, Heine (1995): 17-53 and Hansen (1989): 68-69.

4.8.4.5.i. Obligation (x-OB)

Obligation is, for perhaps obvious reasons, a key type of modal meaning in a political context. Speakers may assert that someone is obligated to do something by some unspecified force (for example, by some abstract necessity which is claimed to exist) or that an abstract necessity exists which, by implication, indirectly obligates someone to do something (where those allegedly obligated are not specified, but they often know who they are). The assertion that some force is necessitating something is an extremely powerful aid in making an argument and in appealing to values (Kilby 1993: 6). It derives its power from the fact that audiences are familiar with and will largely accept the principle that circumstances may often compel them to do something which is perhaps unpleasant or difficult but nevertheless necessary and beneficial in the long run. Therefore, presenting a measure as a necessity increases the possibility that audiences may agree to suppress any immediate dislike they may have for it; equally, a value appeal which makes use of obligation can help to avoid a value being judged solely on its immediate appeal or its perceived impact on individual interests. Thus, obligation and necessity remove the element of choice from determining desirability; unless the obligation or necessity is explicitly qualified (for example, “we must do *x* if we want *y*”, associating one value with another), acknowledging and acting on it becomes a prerequisite for avoiding some implied catastrophe, or for achieving some vague, implied and universally shared goal — in short, for achieving desirable states or forms of behaviour. Its use therefore creates an implicitly, but logically derivable value-desirability relationship.

4.8.4.5.ii. Inclination (x-IC)

Modal expressions which encode *inclination* have a different effect on an audience: they introduce a much stronger interpersonal element into a proposal. Speakers, by suggesting that they personally, the government, or some other group, are inclined towards taking a particular course of action, make a proposal less of a rational argument and more of an appeal for personal trust. The use of explicit subjective modality further strengthens this effect (subjective modality will be covered in more detail in section 4.8.4.6). Thus, through expressions of inclination, values are made to seem desirable because certain people desire them. Given that a value which is desired (even if it is desired by everyone) may still not be regarded by everyone as *desirable*, the relationship between inclination and desirability is a non-logical one. This modal type will therefore be classified as creating implicitly and non-logically derivable value-desirability relationships.

There is a possible problem with inclination as an appeal method. Since it expresses subjective views, it may be used not only to lend credibility to somewhat controversial values, but also to convince an audience that the speaker wishes to see a quite uncontroversial value realised, in cases where there may be doubt about the speaker's commitment to it. In such cases, the expression of inclination towards the value effectively becomes a way of reassuring the audience about one's intentions, rather like the use of *probability* in some circumstances (see later section on *probability*). Since it is not possible to identify which instances of inclination are being used for which purposes — without first knowing the controversiality of the value — it is hard to interpret appeals methods of this type. In fact, this is a more general problem with methods in the middle of the classification, and it may be necessary to exclude them from the final results.

4.8.4.5.iii. Potentiality (x-PT)

Potentiality is a measure of the degree to which something is possible, a consideration which is at the heart of most political debate and which therefore shapes values. Although many apparent expressions of potentiality are actually thinly disguised expressions of obligation, politicians may genuinely make claims about what lies within the realm of the possible. Asserting that something is impossible is the policy equivalent of shrugging one's shoulders, and is therefore not a well-favoured approach by political speakers, since it can cause a government to appear as if it is not in control of events. However, it can have advantages over the assertion of necessity in situations where a speaker wishes to de-empha-

side the imposition of a policy solution and to emphasise the circumstances which circumscribe a government's policy options, in the hope that the government may gain more sympathy and acceptance for its position. Horst Seehofer does this after admitting that his proposal to limit the number of new doctors has serious constitutional implications:

(4.15) Aber wir sind überzeugt, daß wir dieses Problem nicht anders lösen können. (Sten. Ber., S. 8993; GStrG 240)

In appeal method terms, *potentiality* and *obligation* form two sides of the same coin: *potentiality* describes the extent to which the scope for action is restricted, and *obligation* describes the compulsions which arise from those restrictions. Thus, the two form similar relationships between values and desirability. However, it should be noted that there is an asymmetry in the ability of *potentiality* to support value appeals: whereas an assertion of impossibility postulates a restriction of the scope of the possible and thus one or more potential necessities arising from that restriction, an assertion of possibility is generally only inclusive, not exclusive — it describes a part of the possible but does not exclude anything from its scope. An exception to this occurs where an assertion of possibility implies impossibility at other times, or under other circumstances. In the following example, Kenneth Clarke appeals to *patience* by asserting that consultations which others have requested will be possible at a later date, thus implying that they are not possible now:

(4.16) Propositions will not even be worked out until next summer... We can have proper consultations then. (HC Deb, cc 500; NHSCCB 253)

Although this use of potentiality can be considered to involve a particular type of conversational implicature (see also section 4.8.2), the implication is still of a restriction of the scope of the possible.

There is, however, an application of potentiality which does rely entirely upon conversational implicature. This is also illustrated by the above example, where Clarke also implies the desirability of consultations by entering into a discussion about the possibility of having them. This implication of desirability by potentiality relies exclusively on the pragmatic context. Since coding these cases as standalone cases of *potentiality* would require different instances of *potentiality* to be classified differently — under both pragmatic and non-pragmatic headings — such cases will be coded as *potentiality*, but made subordinate to conversational implicature (see section 4.5.2 for details on subordinate methods).

Potentiality, under this restricted definition, can therefore be classed together with obligation as making $d(v)$ non-pragmatically, implicitly and logically derivable.

4.8.4.5.iv. Usuality (x-US)

Usuality is concerned with the normality or frequency of events or situations. It is generally a subordinate method constituent, in that it is often used only as an auxiliary method to shore up the use of other modal types or other methods. However, it can be used independently in certain circumstances. Asserting a particular degree of *usuality* can directly support a value appeal by exploiting the fact that normality tends to have mildly positive connotations. Those connotations presumably arise because normality is, by definition, at least tolerable and survivable, and is a condition to which most people are adjusted, in contrast to the potentially less favourable conditions which could arise from implementing certain changes. One example of the exploitation of this is provided, again, by Kenneth Clarke. Politicians, in particular, would wish to present their “normal” or “usual” behaviour as being not merely tolerable, but positively pleasant and beneficial. Thus, what is regarded as unpleasant but necessary can be mitigated by framing it as a temporary deviation from normality. In doing this, politicians actually make an appeal to the desirability of the opposite of their proposed behaviour. Clarke does this when justifying his proposed powers of intervention:

(4.17) These powers will allow me and my successors to direct all trusts on matters of safety or ethics...and, in exceptional circumstances, to direct an individual trust where there is justified cause for concern. (HC Deb, cc 500; NHSCCB 265)

By framing intervention as allowable only in “exceptional circumstances”, he makes a strongly qualified appeal to *freedom*.

Since the power of usuality to imply desirability is dependent on a particular view of normality or usuality, it cannot be regarded as logically implying desirability. Nor is it classifiable as pragmatically implying desirability, because, although *usuality* can be regarded as involving some degree of conversational implicature (see section 4.8.2), it is not solely dependent on pragmatic inferences; its use carries strong connotations of desirability¹⁷, and

¹⁷ Although usuality, expectedness, presumption and sensibleness can strongly connote desirability, the implicature of desirability is generally “defeasible” or “cancellable”. For example, although “I fully expect that the government will increase spending” can be taken to imply the desirability of spending increases — in an appropriate context — this implicature can be cancelled, thus: “I fully expect that the government will increase spending, even though this can only be harmful”. See section 4.8.4.5.vi for more details on this.

thus represents the active creation of a value-desirability relationship by the speaker. It is therefore classified as creating non-pragmatically, implicitly and non-logically derivable value-desirability relationships.

4.8.4.5.v.Expectedness (x-EX)

Expectedness is related to *usuality* in placing emphasis on some degree of normality, but it introduces the additional element of human expectation, which strengthens the notion that what is normal — in the sense of conforming to expectations — is positive, because the existence of expectations tends to involve some degree of pressure, implicit or explicit, on expectees to conform to desired forms of behaviour. Like *usuality*, its comprehension may involve some pragmatic inferences, but it strongly connotes desirability and thus must be regarded as making $d(v)$ non-pragmatically, implicitly and non-logically derivable.

4.8.4.5.vi.Presumption (x-PR)

Expressions of *presumption* concern the extent to which something is, or should be, already known at the time an assertion is made. Expressions of presumption with subjective orientation (e.g. “I assume that the government will increase spending”) and objective orientation (“obviously, the government will increase spending”) tend, like *expectedness*, to imply some degree of expectation that the behaviour of others will conform to what is desired. In addition, by claiming that something should be already clear to their audience, such as the necessity of increasing spending, speakers can effectively claim that a value to which they are appealing is uncontroversial and will be accepted as positive by the majority. Those with doubts are thus encouraged to believe that their doubts are not widely shared.

As in the case of *expectedness* and *usuality*, although deriving $d(v)$ from an expression of *presumption* might be considered to involve some pragmatic inference, presumption carries strong connoted meanings, and so the audience is not merely left to fill in the value inference by itself. Thus, *presumption* can be classed as creating non-pragmatically, implicitly and non-logically derivable value-desirability relationships.

4.8.4.5.vii.Sensibleness (x-SN)

Expressions of *sensibleness* can be effective in appealing to values by framing indicators for a value as conforming to, or deviating from, what is regarded as rational, or what is regarded as being capable of being understood and explained rationally. The question

arises, therefore, of what relationship, if any, rationality may have with desirability. Intuitively, rationality appears to strongly imply desirability; indeed, one may suspect that the two notions are so closely linked that the latter is in some way semantically entailed by the former, or at least that expressions of sensibleness, without literally *meaning* desirability, always imply it, independently of the pragmatic context.

A test for the latter case would be to examine the expressions of sensibleness to discover whether the implication of desirability is both *non-defeasible*, or (*non-cancellable*) and *non-detachable*. An implicature is defeasible or cancellable if one can “cancel” the implied meanings by adding additional premises to a statement, and it is non-detachable if the implicature does not depend on the particular linguistic item chosen to express the concept (Levinson 1983: 115, 127). By testing a few examples for these properties, it becomes clear that the implication of desirability by sensibleness is weaker than it might intuitively seem.

(4.18) “It is sensible to increase spending, *although not desirable*”.

(4.19) “The government has wisely maintained spending, *because it knows that it must take care of its re-election before turning its attention to what is desirable for the health service*”.

(4.20) “Understandably, the government has increased spending.”

Although the implicature of desirability cannot be suspended in the first example by adding premises in another clause (the added clause is italicised), it can be at least partially suspended in the second example. Moreover, in the third example, there does not appear to be any implication of desirability at all; the speaker is stating that the spending increases do not appear irrational, but the implication, if any, appears to be that they may have done so for the wrong reasons, and that the increases may not be desirable in a broader sense. These examples show that desirability is not always implied by sensibleness, and so it remains to explain the apparently close connection between the two concepts. The key to the implication of desirability is the context: given a particular context (a goal or set of goals, whether specified or unspecified), rationality can be regarded as positive, because it provides a logical connection between people’s behaviour and the achievement of those goals. Indeed, it would be reasonable to assume that sensibleness is almost always cited in the context of some stated or unstated goals — it would be unusual to regard sensibleness as an end in itself, and indeed difficult to define it without reference to some objective. However, the logical relationship between sensibleness and desirability *relies* on both the existence of

such a context, in which such specified or unspecified goals are being pursued, and, crucially, on the desirability of those goals. As example (4.20) shows, speakers may wish to express their understanding for a particular action, in the context of goals which others wish to pursue or are compelled to pursue, whilst distancing themselves from those goals and thus casting doubt on the ultimate desirability of realising the value in question. The implication of desirability by sensibleness seems to involve a significant contextual (pragmatic) component.

This may appear to make classification of this modal type extremely difficult, since sensibleness can sometimes be used to refer to values whose realisation the speaker considers *undesirable* (but which others wish to realise), or be dependent for its effect on another explicitly stated objective (for example, “if we want to improve the health of our people, it would be wise to increase health spending”). The first of these cases is not, however, problematic from an analytical point of view: the use of the modal adjunct *understandably* in example (4.20) does still imply some degree of desirability, and the speaker’s distance from the value can be encoded with strongly qualified positive polarity. The second case is a little more awkward, because when, by the use of association, sensibleness is defined in relation to a specific objective, it logically supports that association and no longer relies on pragmatic implicature. Thus, such cases will be coded as *entailment* (see section 4.8.8) and subordinated to *association* (see section 4.8.11 on value associations).

Having screened out cases in which sensibleness forms a logical link with an explicit objective, it remains to explain how the other cases of sensibleness imply desirability. The conclusion from the above examples has to be that they possess strong connotations of desirability, whilst relying — in the absence of explicitly stated objectives — on pragmatic implicature to complete the value-desirability relationship. It therefore functions exactly like expectedness, presumption and usuality and will be classified in the same way, as making $d(v)$ non-pragmatically, implicitly and non-logically derivable.

4.8.4.5.viii. Admission (x-AD)

Expressions of *admission* constitute some form of confession, and are therefore rarely used by politicians, perhaps for obvious reasons. By saying that they are admitting something, speakers imply several things: that what they are disclosing is true, that there is some reason that they or others may not wish to disclose it, and that they are therefore saying it

with some reluctance. This form of modality tends therefore to be used, unsurprisingly, in connection with values to which speakers do not assign an especially high priority, or which conflict with other values which they consider more important. The expression of reluctance is rather important, because it enables speakers to appeal to values to which they might otherwise have difficulty appealing — perhaps because those values conflict with others which their supporters cherish.

The principal type of confession which speakers make using *admission* is about some action or state for which someone is responsible. In a political context, one can identify two main forms of this: an admission by a speaker that something has happened or been done, for which his or her opponents are responsible, and an admission that something has happened or been done, for which the speaker or those whom the speaker represents are responsible. In the former case, the reluctant admission of truth implies that what is being admitted is desirable, since it can be generally assumed that a speaker would rather not credit his or her opponents with anything positive. Equally, in the latter case, the reluctance implies what is being admitted is undesirable, since speakers generally want to avoid associating themselves with anything negative. Clearly, in each case, some pragmatic inferences need to be made by the audience, in particular about the sorts of things politicians are likely to admit about themselves and others. However, once those inferences have been made, the value-desirability flows logically from the semantics of admission and confession; these two principal types of admission can therefore both be regarded as implying desirability non-pragmatically and logically.

There is another variant on admission, which involves speakers admitting that a claim, whether real or hypothetical, is true, whilst being outside the context of any responsibility on their part, or on their opponent's part, for the state or event to which the claim pertains. In such cases, admission is reduced to the reluctant admission of truth, and no longer carries any identifiable implicature of desirability or undesirability, because the reason for the reluctance cannot be deduced without further information. This form is therefore always coded as an auxiliary method (see section 4.5.2). Horst Seehofer illustrates its use:

(4.21) Höhere Beiträge sind auch sozial ungerecht. Ich gebe zu, daß dies in der Öffentlichkeit in der Konkurrenzsituation zur Selbstbeteiligung und Zuzahlung nicht einfach darzustellen ist. (Sten. Ber., S. 8989; GStrG 75-76)

His admission in the second sentence pertains to the (probably quite hypothetical) claim that it is difficult to persuade the public of the injustice of high contributions, in contrast to

the charges being imposed on patients by the reforms. He thus implies the truth of this claim, and therefore logically implies that the public are not keen on having money taken away from them in any form — an appeal to the combination value *plenitude* and *freedom*. In this way, admission acts as an auxiliary method for *subjective entailment* (see section 4.8.9), since he is only confessing that *others* consider higher charges undesirable. It should be noted that his appeal is qualified, since he is, of course, proposing to impose charges on patients; he is simply claiming that the burdens thus imposed will be less onerous than the alternatives.

Admission has a further useful side effect which is worth noting. The implication of truth and reluctant honesty in one appeal tends to make the audience less inclined to suspect that speakers are telling untruths for personal or party advantage, and encourages those who wish to disagree with later utterances to challenge the logic of what is being said rather than the speaker's integrity. However, this effect on later appeals is rather hard to quantify and will not be represented in the analysis.

4.8.4.5.ix.Desirability (x-DS)

Desirability is an unusual case. Desirability is obviously a privileged concept in a study of values, since claims about the desirability or importance of value items are at the centre of the investigation. It is therefore unsurprising that modal expressions which encode desirability require treatment which differs from that of other modal types. The general rules for dealing with the different orientations of modal types will be given in the next section, but the orientations of desirability will be handled differently, and so it is appropriate to give the details of this special handling here.

Firstly, expressions of desirability with objective explicit orientation (“it is desirable to increase health spending”) are viewed as constituting categorical assertions of a value item's desirability, and thus handled quite separately from other instances of modal usage by being encoded as *categorical assertion*. Secondly, expressions with subjective explicit orientation (“I believe that it is desirable to increase health spending”) are handled differently from those with implicit orientations, because they constitute an appeal method which functions explicitly and non-logically (i.e., which implies desirability by asking the audience to identify with their subjective view that something is desirable). Thirdly, in a similar way, expressions of desirability with a subjective implicit orientation (“I regret that spending has been reduced”) are placed in the implicit-non-logical category, and those with

an objective implicit orientation (“Regrettably, spending has been cut”) in the implicit-logical category.

One last point to note is that the scope of *desirability* will be extended somewhat to encompass the notion of importance (thus incorporating modal adjuncts such as *crucially*, *vitality*, etc.), so that appeals which are made on the basis either of a value’s importance or its desirability can be handled in the same way.

4.8.4.5.x. Probability (x-PB)

Expressions of *probability* are most often used as auxiliary method constituents, that is, as a way of supporting another method such as association or obligation (see section 4.5.2). Speakers often use them to express a high degree of certainty that, for example, certain causal associations or obligations exist. However, it can be used to directly appeal to values; in certain contexts, asserting the likelihood that an event will happen, or that a particular state of affairs will exist, is tantamount to expressing an intention to bring about that event or state, and thus a personal preference for it. Such expressions of probability can then, providing the appropriate pragmatic inferences are made, make a value appear desirable to an audience. This can be illustrated by an example from Bruno Menzel’s speech, where he uses probability (together with obligation) to reassure the audience about the direction of health reform, appealing to *health*, *compassion* and *equality*:

(4.22) Solche Begrenzungen bei medizinisch unbedingt notwendigen Leistungen darf und wird es in einer solidarischen Krankenversicherung in unserem Lande nicht geben. (Sten. Ber., S. 9013; GStrG 956)

Such usage is, in fact, a special case of conversational implicature (see also section 4.8.2), because it relies entirely on the pragmatic context to imply desirability; thus, *probability* will be classified with *conversational implicature* as creating pragmatically derivable value-desirability relationships.

4.8.4.5.xi. Validity (x-VL)

The final modal type is *validity*, which is concerned with truth and falsity. Like *probability* and *usuality*, it is almost always subordinate to other method constituents, since the mere demonstration of the truth or falsity of an assertion does not usually, in and of itself, constitute an assertion of desirability. However, it can imply desirability by functioning, like *probability*, as a special type of conversational implicature (see also section 4.8.2); an

example of this is when politicians make a denial, as Kenneth Clarke does in the following example:

(4.23) It is not true that the White Paper reforms will lead to people having to go miles down the road to have cheaper services. (HC Deb, cc 494; NHSCCB 108)

His denial of the validity of the charges levelled against the government conversationally implies some sensitivity to those charges, and thus that the dignity and convenience of patients matters.

Since the implication of desirability is entirely dependent on the pragmatic context, *validity* will be classified in the same way as *probability* and *conversational implicature*.

4.8.4.6. *The Impact of Modal Orientation on Value Appeals*

The choice made between the different orientations in modality can have a dramatic impact on the reception of a value appeal, because the orientation can change the relationship between a value and desirability which is created by the speaker; this is reflected in the differential classification of certain modal types according to their orientation. In the case of several modal types, notably *desirability*, the effects of modal orientations on classification have already been discussed. Here, the general effects of modal orientations will be outlined and the general rules for their classification outlined.

Subjective explicit modality, which makes the role of speakers' subjective opinions explicit, can paradoxically be used to lend additional force to their claims (Kress/Hodge 1988, Fairclough 1992a). Although expressions of belief or opinion make an utterance less categorical and thus may seem to weaken speakers' affinity with a claim, they can have the effect, in political speeches in particular, of strengthening both controversial and uncontroversial assertions. They do this by enhancing or replacing the rational content of a proposition with an essentially emotional plea from speakers for the audience to trust their integrity. In the case of controversial assertions or proposals, the personalisation of a proposition distances speakers' "views" from those of others, and therefore causes assertions to seem like views which they have arrived at independently from their party, the government, political dogma, interest groups or anyone else whose influence may put the motives behind the views in doubt; modal expressions of inclination can make especially good use of this effect. Such utterances are therefore often characterised by the use of the first person singular pronoun, as in the following example from a speech by Robin Cook, Shadow Health Secretary in 1989:

(4.24) I believe that, without a partnership between public and private provision, we have no hope of meeting the explosion of need of the very elderly in the next 10 years. (HC Deb, cc 514; NHSCCB 622)

Cook is treading on somewhat controversial ground, especially where his own party is concerned, by advocating a role of some sort for the private sector in health care, and so he claims to hold this view through personal conviction, and then strengthens it by making an appeal to the very values — health and inter-generational solidarity — which many in his party and in the wider public may feel are threatened by the encroachment of private provision. Politeness theory also supports the suggestion that the subjective modalisation of controversial utterances can make them more palatable. Brown and Levinson's theory of "face wants" interprets demands made of hearers as "threats" to their "negative face", which are normally mitigated in order to elicit a more positive response (Brown & Levinson 1987. Fairclough 1992a). The use of explicit subjective modality is one method of mitigating controversial assertions which may directly or indirectly make demands of hearers, such as claims that more discipline is needed in the use of emergency services for trivial injuries, or in the prescription of drugs by doctors: presenting the assertion as a personal opinion implicitly admits of possible opposing views and suggests fallibility on the speaker's part. This is reflected in the classification: the subject explicit orientations of all modal types are classified as non-logical, and most as implicit; this reflects the observation that an increase in non-logicality and implicitness tends to strengthen an appeal.

However, in exceptional cases, speakers may use explicit subjective modality to make *uncontroversial* propositions seem like subjective views. In these cases, the distance which they strive to create is not between their personal views and those of, say, their party, but between the view of those they represent and an often unspecified opposing position. The objective is to underline their party's or administration's support for the expressed view and to make the holding of that view seem more "significant" than it would if there were a universal consensus on the issue. An extreme case of this is often seen in the "straw man" tactic, in which a speaker goes to great lengths to construct a non-existent opposing position. The creation of a sense of unity of purpose or view on the speaker's side of the political divide is then often achieved through the use of the first person plural. The following example from a speech by Kenneth Clarke, Secretary of State for Health, in the debate on the National Health Service and Community Care Bill from December 1989 illustrates this.

(4.25) Such a service [the NHS] *should, in our view*, be based on the fundamental principle - adhered to by all parties in the House - that free medical treatment should be provided regardless of means and financed largely by general taxation [author's emphasis]. (HC Deb, cc 489; NHSCCB 4)

Clarke makes here a curious combination of a mild distancing of his view, presented as being shared by his party or government, from some unclear opposing position (“in our view”), and an attempt to emphasise his government’s desire to preserve consensus (“adhered to by all parties”). This makes his use of subjective modality less effective, demonstrating the point that some political distance needs to be maintained if the subjective modalisation of an assertion is to be successful, and providing more support for the idea that subjective modality is most often used to appeal to more controversial values.

Implicit subjective modality allows for a very effective compromise between subjectivity and objectivity. It is most often expressed through the modal auxiliaries, and these, when combined with verbs in the passive voice, can have the effect of concealing an actor or actors while expressing interpersonal meanings such as obligation, necessity and so on, as in the second clause of the Clarke example above (“free medical treatment *should be provided* regardless of means”). Alternatively, the use of personal pronouns with implicit subjective modality can specify a scope for obligation, necessity, etc.; the use of the first person plural in particular — probably the most frequently used pronoun in such contexts — can include both the speaker and the audience in the subject of a proposition and thus encourage the audience to identify with the speaker as an equal partner in the pursuit of a goal. This is shown by a quotation from Dieter Thomae’s speech on the *Gesundheits-Strukturgesetz*:

(4.26) Wir müssen aufpassen, daß der breite soziale Konsens nicht unter die Mühlen von Gruppenansprüchen gerät. (Sten. Ber., S. 9002; GStrG 548)

Objective implicit modality, by removing the subjective, interpersonal element from an appeal and universalising the perspective which lies behind it, while stopping short of making an objective judgement explicit, allows a speaker to make an appeal with much greater subtlety. Claims about inevitability, probability, usuality and the like can be slipped into an utterance in a matter-of-fact way which belies their significance. Kenneth Clarke provides an example:

(4.27) The crying need for resource management is obvious. (HC Deb, cc 496; NHSCCB 154)

Clarke manages to use objective implicit modality twice here, firstly to presuppose that there exists a “need” for resource management (obligation) and secondly to assert that this need is clear to everyone and requires no further debate (presumption).

Objective explicit modality, although it takes the “objectivisation” and “universalisation” of a perspective to its limits, is not the clear choice for political speakers which it may appear to be. By placing an “objective” assertion or proposal in a clause of its own, it can actually highlight controversial assertions and increase the chances that appeals based on them will not be accepted. A rare example comes from Kenneth Clarke’s speech:

(4.28) *It has been the common experience for years* that most people in the Health Service have, until I proposed the reforms, suffered from the feeling that there are far too many layers of authority above them and far too many constraints on running units better. (HC Deb, cc 496; NHSCCB 163, my emphasis)

By expressing his view on the usuality of this feeling in a projecting clause (highlighted), he makes this judgement stand out more than it would have done had he used implicit objective modality, and makes his assertion more open to challenge. Objective explicit orientation is therefore more suited to appealing to less controversial values.

These different modal orientations can affect the classification of a modal method. The general rules governing this classification, which apply to all modal types except *desirability*, are as follows. Firstly, the subjective orientations of a modal type are classified differently from the objective orientations if the latter are classified as making $d(v)$ logically derivable, because a subjective orientation removes the logic from the relationship. A subjective utterance is no longer about objective facts, but about speaker’s opinions, and these must always be classified as creating non-logically derivable relationships. Clearly, if, because of the general semantic properties of the modal type, the objective orientations are classified under the non-logical heading, the classification of the subjective orientations will also be classified under this heading; whatever additional degree of subjectivity is added by the subjective orientation is overshadowed by the more important semantic properties of the type. Secondly, the classificatory position of the subjective orientations may vary within the lowest level of the classification (in other words, the above subjective orientations would be placed in the non-logical category in the same branch of the hierarchy). This latter rule exists because, generally speaking, the orientation of the modal type should not influence the classificatory position of a modal type to a greater

extent than the semantic or pragmatic relationship between the modal meaning and desirability.

Although it has been stated that modal orientations are usually divided into subjective and objective, there is a further complication. This arises because, following Halliday, it has been decided to define the use of modal auxiliaries as constituting the subjective implicit orientation of certain modal types, such as obligation and potentiality (it is, in fact, difficult to find other forms that might constitute a subjective implicit orientation in these cases), even though their subjectivity is debatable. The use of modal auxiliaries (e.g., we must, I need, they can) certainly involves a subject, and it might therefore be argued that it is capable of restricting the scope of assertions of obligation, potentiality, etc., to that subject. However, especially in a political context, one could also regard expressions of this type as asserting the existence of obligations or potentialities which are absolute, but whose *discussion* is limited to the subject. In other words, one can maintain that speakers, by using these modal auxiliaries, are not subjectivising the obligations or potentialities, but are rather only concerning themselves with their impact on the subjects of their utterances. The author takes the latter view, and so, where these modal types (those whose subjective implicit orientations are constituted by modal auxiliaries) need to be divided, for classificatory purposes, into subjective and objective orientations, only the subjective-explicit form will be placed in the non-logical category, and the remaining orientations, including the subjective-implicit, will retain their classification as creators of logically derivable relationships.

4.8.4.7. *General Issues in Coding Modality*

The most general point to make about coding modality is the same point which needs to be made about all appeal methods. As important as modality is for the analysis of appeal methods, the use of modality may not always contribute directly, or even at all, to value appeals. As was made clear at the beginning of this chapter, identifying a particular textual feature does not amount to identifying an appeal method, and this applies particularly to modality. The exercise of judgement is essential in deciding what, if any, relationship the modality creates between a value appeal and a value's desirability.

A number of different pieces of information will need to be recorded in order to code instances of modality. Relevant instances of modality in the corpus will be analysed to establish their *type* (probability, usuality, obligation, inclination, potentiality, presumption, etc.)

and their *orientation* (subjective explicit, objective implicit, etc.). Moreover, it should be clear from some of the examples given in this section, and in the discussion of certain modal types, that the use of personal pronouns in modalised utterances — both the subject pronouns in a modalised statement which make it clear who is obligated, inclined, etc., and also, in the case of subjective explicit modality, pronouns in projected clauses which express whose subjective view is being expressed— may be an important variable in their employment in texts, especially from the perspective of value appeal analysis. This information will therefore also be recorded, where applicable, in the coding process; the subject pronoun will be recorded as the *actor* in the proposition, and the pronoun in the projected clause of subjective explicit utterances as the *modaliser*. In both cases, only pronouns referring to persons or groups of persons will be recorded.

One final point concerns those forms of expression which might seem to belong to the category of modality, but which are not traditionally held to do so; expressions of sufficiency or insufficiency have already been cited as an example. These cases will be divided into two groups. Where the speaker's judgement is backgrounded, as in the case of expressions of sufficiency, the appeal method will be coded as either *entailment* or *subjective entailment*, reflecting an objective and a subjective $d(v)$, respectively. Examples of such cases will be given under those headings. The other cases, in which the speaker's judgement is made more explicit, will be included in the relevant modal category. This means, in effect, that some categories of modality will be extended somewhat, to avoid creating further categories simply for the purpose of holding the overspill from the traditional modal model. The need to absorb additional data into the modality categories is in part accounted for by the problem noted at the beginning of this section, namely that making a judgement about a value does not always equate to making a judgement about a proposition. The category most affected by this is *inclination*. Speakers find an almost infinite variety of ways to express their inclinations. A couple of examples will serve to illustrate:

(4.29) Ich pfeife auf Briefchen, die klammheimlich im Briefkasten des Ministers landen.
(Sten. Ber., S. 9017; GStrG 1092)

(4.30) I view with profound distaste the allocation of health care discussed in the patter of a salesman. (HC Deb, cc 512; NHSCCB 563)

In both cases, the speaker chooses a way to express disinclination which would be unlikely to appear in any account of modality (*ich pfeife auf*, *I view with profound distaste*). In both instances, this is partly explained by the fact that the speakers' expressions do not modalise

propositions. However, in both cases, the speakers *are* making value judgements. The first is decrying the dishonourable behaviour of certain doctors and doctors' representatives (a negative appeal to *honourableness*), and the second deploring the treatment of patients in the debate as commodities (a negative appeal to *dignity*).

4.8.4.8. *Indicators for the Modality Types*

Since there are so many different forms that may realise modal meanings, it is impossible to give a comprehensive list of indicators for modality. However, for each type, a typical example of the use of modality will be given for each orientation, and these examples will be followed by a list of modal adjuncts, adjectives, modal auxiliaries, nouns and verbs that typically realise each modality type in English and German. It should be stressed that the mere occurrence of one of the words in the list does not necessarily indicate the use of modality, and the occurrence of modality does not necessarily indicate the use of modality as an appeal method. The lists are simply for general guidance. The classificatory position of each orientation will also be given for each modal type.

Admission

- Examples*
- subjective explicit:* "I think everyone would admit that the government has not really increased spending."
 - subjective implicit:* "I speak as a former minister in saying that most of the government would admit that spending has not increased."
 - objective implicit:* "Admittedly, the government has not increased spending."
 - objective explicit:* "It is admitted that the government has not increased spending."

Typical Realisations

modal adjuncts: frankly, admittedly, honestly, really, to be honest, one has to say, to tell the truth; zugegeben, zugegebenermaßen, ehrlich, ehrlich gesagt

verbs: admit, confess; zugeben, eingestehen

nouns: admission, confession; Eingeständnis

- Classification*
- subj. expl. & subj. impl.:*
non-pragmatically, implicitly & non-logically derivable
 - obj. impl. & obj. expl.:*
non-pragmatically, implicitly & logically derivable

Desirability

Examples

subjective explicit: "I think that it is regrettable that the government has cut spending."

subjective implicit: "I regret that spending has been cut."

objective implicit: "Regrettably, the government has cut spending."

objective explicit: "It is regrettable that the government has cut spending."

Typical

Realisations

modal adjuncts: luckily, unfortunately, hopefully, regrettably, worryingly, to my delight, importantly, vitally, crucially; glücklicherweise, leider, hoffentlich, dummerweise, noch wichtiger

adjectives: desirable, fortunate, unfortunate, hopeful, regrettable, serious, worried, concerned, sorry, important, vital, crucial; wünschenswert, zuversichtlich, besorgt, bedauerlich, wichtig, entscheidend

verbs: hope, fear, worry, regret; hoffen, fürchten, sorgen, bedauern, Leid tun

nouns: hope, fear, worry, regret; Glück, Hoffnung, Furcht, Angst, Sorge, Bedauern

Classification

subj. expl.: non-pragmatically, explicitly & non-logically derivable

subj. impl.: non-pragmatically, implicitly & non-logically derivable

obj. impl.: non-pragmatically, implicitly & logically derivable

obj. expl.: non-pragmatically, explicitly & logically derivable (categorical assertion)

Expectedness

Examples

subjective explicit: "I find it quite amazing that the government has chosen to cut spending."

subjective implicit: "I am amazed that spending has been cut."

objective implicit: "Amazingly, the government has cut spending."

objective explicit: "It is amazing that the government has cut spending."

Typical

Realisations

modal adjuncts: of course, surely, as expected, to my surprise, remarkably, amazingly, incredibly, astonishingly, believe it or not, naturally, by chance; voraussichtlich, wie erwartet, bemerkenswert, erstaunlicherweise, unglaublich, verblüffenderweise, auf frappierende Weise, natürlich, selbstverständlich, sage und schreibe

adjectives: remarkable, amazing, incredible, extraordinary, natural, amazed, staggered; bemerkenswert, erstaunlich, verblüffend, frappierend, unglaublich, natürlich, selbstverständlich, erstaunt, verwundert

verbs: wonder, ask oneself

Classification

all orientations: non-pragmatically, implicitly & non-logically derivable

Inclination

Examples

subjective explicit: "I think that everyone welcomes the government's increase in spending."

subjective implicit: "I speak as a former doctor in saying that everyone welcomes the government's increase in spending."

objective implicit: "Everyone welcomes the government's increase in spending."

objective explicit: "It is widely welcomed that the government has increased spending."

Typical

Realisations

modal adjuncts: gladly, keenly, willingly, readily; bereitwillig, gern(e)

adjectives: happy, unhappy, glad, keen, enthusiastic, ready, willing, unwilling, hostile, determined; froh, begeistert, bereit, entschlossen

modal auxiliaries: will, would; möchten

verbs: wish, want, insist, welcome, suggest, promise, beg, warn, ask, plead, recommend, reject; wünschen, wollen, bestehen auf, begrüßen, vorschlagen, versprechen, warnen, bitten, auffordern, appellieren, empfehlen, sich freuen, ablehnen

nouns: happiness, unhappiness, hostility, determination, inclination, willingness, wish, suggestion, promise, warning; Wunsch, Vorschlag, Versprechen, Aufforderung, Warnung

Classification

all orientations: non-pragmatically, explicitly & non-logically derivable

Obligation

Examples

subjective explicit: "I think we need to increase spending."

subjective implicit: "We need to increase spending."

objective implicit: "The government is ignoring the need to increase spending."

objective explicit: "It is necessary to increase spending."

Typical

Realisations

adjectives: supposed, necessary; notwendig, nötig, erforderlich

modal auxiliaries: must, have to, ought to, is to, should, need, may; müssen, haben zu, sollen, brauchen, dürfen, sein zu, haben zu

verbs: expect, want, command, require, demand, allow, forbid; erwarten, wollen, verlangen, erlauben, verbieten

nouns: necessity, need, obligation, permission, requirement, demand; Notwendigkeit, Erwartung, Erlaubnis

Classification

subj. expl.: non-pragmatically, implicitly & non-logically derivable

subj. impl., obj. impl. & obj. expl.:

non-pragmatically, implicitly & logically derivable

Potentiality

Examples

subjective explicit: “I don’t believe that we can continue without increasing spending.”

subjective implicit: “We cannot continue without increasing spending.”

objective implicit: “The government is failing to see the impossibility of continuing without increasing spending.”

objective explicit: “It is impossible to continue without increasing spending.”

Typical

modal auxiliaries: can; können

Realisations

adjectives: able, unable

Classification

subj. expl.: non-pragmatically, implicitly & non-logically derivable

subj. impl., obj. impl. & obj. expl.:

non-pragmatically, implicitly & logically derivable

Presumption

Examples

subjective explicit: “I think it is assumed that spending is being increased.”

subjective implicit: “I assume that spending is being increased.”

objective implicit: “Presumably, spending is being increased.”

objective explicit: “It is assumed that spending is being increased.”

Typical

modal adjuncts: evidently, obviously, apparently, presumably, clearly, no doubt, of course; offensichtlich, offenbar, vermutlich, zweifellos

Realisations

adjectives: obvious, evident, apparent, clear; offensichtlich, deutlich, klar

verbs: assume, presume; annehmen

nouns: assumption, presumption; Annahme

Classification

all orientations: non-pragmatically, implicitly & non-logically derivable

Probability

Examples

subjective explicit: “I firmly believe that my government will increase spending.”

subjective implicit: “I assure everyone that spending will be increased.”

objective implicit: “My government will certainly increase spending.”

objective explicit: “It is certain that my government will increase spending.”

*Typical
Realisations*

modal adjuncts: certainly, surely, probably, possibly, perhaps, maybe, definitely, positively; bestimmt, möglicherweise, womöglich, vermutlich, wahrscheinlich, wohl, doch

adjectives: certain, sure, probable, possible, definite; sicher, wahrscheinlich, möglich, klar, eindeutig

modal auxiliaries: must, could, may, might, will; müssen, können, mögen, werden

verbs: think, believe, expect, guess, guarantee, assure; denken, glauben, erwarten, garantieren, versichern

nouns: certainty, probability, possibility, belief, expectation; Wahrscheinlichkeit, Möglichkeit, Glaube, Erwartung

Classification

all orientations: pragmatically derivable

Sensibleness

Examples

subjective explicit: "I think it is wise that spending is being increased."

subjective implicit: "I cannot blame the government for increasing spending."

objective implicit: "Wisely, the government has increased spending."

objective explicit: "It is wise of the government to increase spending."

*Typical
Realisations*

modal adjuncts: understandably, wisely, sensibly, foolishly, by mistake; verständlicherweise, klugerweise, dummerweise

adjectives: understandable, wise, sensible; verständlich, klug

verbs: understand, not blame; verstehen

nouns: Verständnis

Classification

all orientations: non-pragmatically, implicitly & non-logically derivable

Usuality

Examples

subjective explicit: "I think it is perfectly normal for the government to consider further spending increases."

subjective implicit: "This government will tend not to cut spending."

objective implicit: "Unusually, the government has cut spending."

objective explicit: "It is unusual that the government has cut spending."

*Typical
Realisations*

modal adjuncts: always, often, usually, regularly, typically, occasionally, seldom, rarely, ever, never, once; immer, oft, normalerweise, regelmäßig, typischerweise, ab und zu, selten, kaum, nie

adjectives: usual, regular, typical, occasional, exceptional, rare; üblich, normal, regelmäßig, gelegentlich, außergewöhnlich

modal auxiliaries: will

nouns: rarity, regularity; Seltenheit, Regelmäßigkeit

verbs: tend; neigen zu

Classification

all orientations: non-pragmatically, implicitly & non-logically derivable

Validity

Examples

subjective explicit: "I think it is quite wrong to suggest that the government wishes to cut spending."

subjective implicit: "I refute the suggestion that spending will be cut."

objective implicit: "Generally, the government has not cut spending."

objective explicit: "It is untrue that the government has cut spending."

Typical

Realisations

modal adjuncts: broadly speaking, generally, in general, on the whole, strictly speaking; im allgemeinen, strenggenommen, im großen und ganzen

adjectives: true, false, right, wrong, correct, incorrect; wahr, richtig, falsch, unwahr, korrekt, inkorrekt

nouns: truth, falsity, correctness, incorrectness; Wahrheit, Unwahrheit, Korrektheit, Richtigkeit, Falschheit

verbs: stimmen

Classification all orientations: pragmatically derivable

Sources: adapted from Halliday (1985): 50-51, 82-83, 86-87, 334-337, Eggins (1994): 166-171, Downing/Locke 1992: 383, Heine (1995): 17-53, Hansen (1989): 68-69 and Langner 1994: 87.

4.8.5. Imperative (IMPR)

The imperative is a mood of a verb used for making unqualified requests or issuing orders (Eggins 1994: 184). Halliday regards the imperative as being close to the congruent form of a proposal (see section 4.8.4.2), since it expresses, in a sense, unqualified inclination and obligation (Halliday 1985: 335). However, since it does not predicate the existence of either obligations or inclinations (or indeed anything else), its use does not create any explicit relationship between the value to which it is used to appeal and notions of desirability. Its relationship to values is therefore different from that of the modal expression of inclination; it creates only an implicit relationship with desirability by implying that the expressed demand represents an inclination on the part of the speaker. Like the expression of inclination, the use of the imperative creates a non-pragmatically, implicitly and non-logically derivable $d(v)$, since the speakers' demands only imply a subjectively held value.

4.8.6. Metaphor (MET)

4.8.6.1. Defining and Containing Metaphor

Another textual feature which can say much about how a speaker views the task of appealing to a value is *metaphor*. There is an extensive body of existing work on the study of metaphor, and it is not the intention, within this brief definition and discussion, to add to it,

or to give a comprehensive overview of the many interesting questions which that work addresses. This section will focus on the role of metaphor in enhancing the desirability of values.

Before its role as an appeal method can be discussed, however, metaphor needs to be defined. There are a number of different views about metaphor, at two principal levels. Most fundamentally, the traditional view of metaphor, now almost universally rejected, considers it to be a superficial phenomenon, in which "literal" expressions are replaced by alternative expressions from other areas of meaning to achieve a pleasing effect. This view assumes that metaphor represents an often unnecessary and entirely avoidable embellishment of language, for which can be substituted wholly 'literal' expressions which refer to objects in the world. In contrast, most linguists now view metaphor as all-pervasive and fundamental in natural language, challenging the notion that language can ever be "de-metaphorised" (cf. Black 1962, Chilton 1996). On another, related level, there is disagreement about the source for the "alternative expressions" that characterise metaphor — that is, how meanings from one conceptual domain come to be applied in another. One view, exemplified by Halliday, proceeds from the existence of inherent "similarities" or relationships between areas of meaning, and views metaphors as arising from those similarities or relationships (Halliday 1985: 319-333). The cognitivist view, exemplified by Lakoff and Johnson, views metaphors as arising from the "creation" of similarity between conceptual domains, largely rejecting the idea of inherent similarities. Lakoff considers many metaphors which, at first glance, might appear quite self-evident (such as the "mind is a container" metaphor) to be constructs based on other metaphors, and therefore at least potentially culture-specific, since different cultures may choose to construct relationships between different conceptual domains. The cognitivist view, to a greater extent than the Hallidayan, therefore regards metaphor primarily as a way of thinking about the world, a way of "understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another" (Lakoff/Johnson 1980, also Chilton 1996: 49-50).

To deal with the most fundamental disagreement first, it is hard to dispute that metaphor is both fundamental and pervasive. Halliday offers convincing evidence that forms of metaphor, in particular "grammatical metaphors", pervade even those expressions which might at first appear literal (Halliday 1985: 319-435). Supportive examples can easily be found in both the English and German corpus texts, two of which are given here:

(4.31) Bis Ende 1994 sind dann insgesamt sechs Jahre seit der erstmaligen Auftragserteilung vergangen. (Sten. Ber., S. 8990; GStrG 118)

(4.32) There is a variation in performance when one considers theatre sessions cancelled in different district health authorities. (HC Deb, cc 491; NHSCCB 44)

The placing of *sechs Jahre* in the role of Actor, and the dense wording of the second example, which, taken literally, indicates that variations only occur when one thinks about the cancellation of theatre sessions (but which might be decoded as: “when one considers theatre sessions cancelled in different district health authorities, one sees a variation in performance”), are both common examples of metaphorical usage requiring some form of transference (Halliday 1985). Halliday rightly observes that metaphor is such a common tool for expressing ideas that it is often barely noticeable; indeed, one could go further in saying that metaphor is not only deeply embedded in common usage, but that, as Paivio suggests — following the cognitivist view — its characteristics are shared with the very process of comprehension itself (Paivio 1979).

However, this presents the analyst with a problem. If metaphor is so pervasive, which metaphors are to be treated as “significant” for the purposes of analysis? Halliday remarks that, for the purposes of discourse analysis, it is only necessary to:

Unscramble as far as is needed (Halliday 1985: 332).

However, a way of deciding where to draw the line is still needed. The examples of grammatical metaphor given above might seem, intuitively, to be of less significance than others kinds of metaphor, but why? One approach might be to consider which metaphors represent a conscious choice. Many grammatical and lexical metaphors seem so much part of ordinary usage that they no longer signify a marked choice on the part of the text producer or any corresponding conscious or subconscious effect on the consumer. Over time, a word or phrase which formerly represented the “transference” of meaning from one domain to another might seem to become incorporated into the latter domain, and become a “dead” metaphor, enabling the consumer to understand the metaphor without referring back to the source domain. However, Lakoff argues that even such apparently dead metaphors may remain productive, suggesting that the connection between the conceptual domains is not severed over time, but remains intact.

This leads into the second area of disagreement: do metaphors create similarity? If metaphors are to be seen as artificial constructs, that would appear to increase the significance

of all metaphors as indicators of the models of the world which underlie political debate. As Lakoff and Johnson suggest, there are physiological and other constants — human constants, at least — which might be regarded as giving rise to “natural” metaphors. For example, the erect posture of the modern human and the need to resist gravitational force might be regarded as the sources of the “up is good” metaphor (Lakoff/Johnson: 1980). However, it is hard to argue that even metaphors such as these are necessary and inevitable choices. It is at least theoretically possible that another culture may view the world differently. In the case of many other metaphors, there is even less reason to regard them as “natural” views of the world, and so the view of metaphors as artificial and potentially culture-specific constructs seems justified.

So, if all metaphors are productive and all represent choices — albeit not necessarily conscious choices — are all metaphors significant? On one level, they are, because they reveal something of the underlying world view of the speaker. If one were to compare metaphors directly across cultures, even “natural” or apparently “dead” metaphors might reveal a great deal about how their views of the world differed, by showing the different connections they choose to make between conceptual domains. However, this work has a different focus: the concern here is with how metaphors might help to make unpalatable values palatable. It is useful to consider an example of this in order to understand how this differs from a direct comparison of metaphor, and how a restrictive set of criteria might be developed for the analysis.

4.8.6.2. *Metaphors as “Stories”*

If, as Lakoff and Johnson suggest, the “essence of metaphor” is “understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another” (Lakoff/Johnson 1980: 5), one can, following Schön, regard many metaphors in political usage as “stories”. These “stories” often involve understanding an abstract thing in terms of a concrete thing (Schön 1979). One such “story” is used in a value appeal by Nicholas Winterton, when he makes an intervention in Kenneth Clarke’s speech:

(4.33) ...why was he [my right hon. and learned Friend] not prepared to analyse...the resource management initiative in six hospitals...before rushing forward into the dark with unproven proposals which could do so much damage to the Health Service? (HC Deb, cc 496; NHSCCB 144)

Winterton likens a somewhat abstract concept, the implementation of untested proposals, to the more tangible notion of “rushing forward into the dark”. This transference of mean-

ing from one area of experience to another is one of the most significant means of assisting a value appeal. Schön observes, when discussing the link between the use of metaphor and political argument, that the role of “story” metaphors is to frame a problem by diagnosing it and suggesting a remedy, frequently by transferring a concrete meaning to an abstract context. It is a means of “problem setting”, in that it explains what is wrong with a situation and what should be done about it (Schön 1979; cf. also Opp de Hipt 1987: 51 & Lakoff/Johnson 1980). The above example and the surrounding exchange provide a good illustration of this point. By likening the implementation of untried proposals to “rushing forward into the dark”, Winterton’s negative appeal to *caution* becomes an appeal against doing something impetuous, risky and unwise. Clarke then replies with some metaphors of his own to make an appeal to *decisiveness*, picking up on the “path” metaphor used by Winterton. He claims that further delay would be unnecessary, even damaging, because:

(4.34) The crying need for resource management is obvious. The pace at which we proceed must, with respect, be somewhat more purposeful. (HC Deb, cc 496; NHSCCB 154-155)

Besides presuming that there is a “need” for resource management (expressing obligation with modality), Clarke characterises that need as a “crying” need, which suggests both lament and desperation on the part of consultants and doctors who are waiting for the government’s reforms; this need is then further described as being obvious (using a modal expression of presumption). This metaphor competes directly with Winterton’s, telling, in essence, a different “story” about the reforms. Clarke then follows this with another instance of modality (must) and a series of expressions — “pace”, “proceed” and “purposeful” — which reformulate Winterton’s “path” metaphor to liken continuing with the reforms to walking purposefully to some known destination (see Chilton/Ilyin 1993: 11-12 on reformulation). Given that one knows where one is going, and that walking is the method of getting there, it is hard to argue with the idea of moving purposefully forward, and thus to argue with Clarke’s value appeal. That is quite different from suggesting that moving forward will lead you into the dark and thus into unknown dangers. Much of this difference in outlook, however, is obscured by the metaphors which the two speakers use. They are telling different “stories” about the reforms and also reformulating the same “story”, based on the “policy is a journey” metaphor. These stories are familiar to the audience and their implications known, and so they avoid the need for more lengthy and detailed arguments which might expose the politicians’ reasoning to greater scrutiny. Thus

what Schön — with no apparent irony — calls “the spell of metaphor” often fulfils a dual function, in acting to save speakers from having to bore their audiences with very long-winded arguments from principle and detail, but also helping them to win over members of the audience who are potentially hostile or sceptical to certain value appeals by making the appeal through a “story” to which they will be sympathetic.

4.8.6.3. *Generative Metaphors and Filtering*

The problem is therefore how to recognise when metaphors are being used in this way. Schön, Sternberg and others, looking at metaphor from a psychological perspective, make a distinction between “generative” and “non-generative” metaphors. Generative metaphors are defined as metaphors which transfer perspectives between domains which have not previously been connected conceptually and thus create “new perceptions, explanations and inventions” (Schön 1979; Sternberg/Tourangeau/Nigro 1979), and it is these metaphors which are regarded as having a “story-telling” capability. As attractive as this distinction is, however, it is deeply flawed as a tool for examining the significance of metaphorical usage. The central problem is that it is not possible to know what constitutes a “new” transference, and it seems clear that old, well-established metaphors (those which “capitalise on existing ways of seeing things”) can be just as potent for story-telling as new metaphors. The “path” metaphors used by Clarke and Winterton are very established ways of viewing policy, and yet they are used to great effect by both politicians.

The cognitivist view of metaphor taken by Black and Lakoff and Johnson, which regards it as a means of “filtering”, or “highlighting and hiding”, is also an apparently attractive framework (Lakoff/Johnson 1980 & Opp de Hipt 1987: 56-57). Lakoff and Johnson, in particular, see metaphor as being primarily a matter of thought and action, and thus as an expression of the way that we “package” reality, at once underlining certain aspects of a thing and concealing others (Lakoff/Johnson 1980: 153). Black sees the use of metaphor as not only a means of filtering, but also of transforming and ultimately shaping attitudes (Black 1962: 37-42 & Opp de Hipt 1987: 56). However, this still presents the same problem as before: how does one contain the metaphor concept and make it manageable? As Opp de Hipt has demonstrated, producing a sufficiently restrictive definition of metaphor based on the notions of “highlighting and hiding” or “filtering” alone is almost impossible, precisely because the process of “highlighting and hiding” is omnipresent in language usage (Opp de Hipt 1987: 57-58).

4.8.6.4. *Identifying Significant Metaphorical Usage by Controversiality*

The key to constructing a framework for the analysis would seem to lie not in trying to define metaphor itself in a more restrictive way, but in selecting those metaphors which represent a choice by the speaker which is significant in the context of the research. One can generally state that, wherever different choices are made or are likely to be made in the selection of source domains — wherever the same kind of thing is understood in terms of more than one other kind of thing — the resultant metaphors can be regarded as significant. However, such differences can arise at different levels, both between cultures and between individuals or groups, and not all such contrasts are relevant here. Perhaps paradoxically, the intercultural differences — those between metaphors used in German and British culture — are of less interest here than the intracultural ones — those which might arise between political parties or individuals in the same country.

The reason for focusing on intracultural differences is that, if metaphors are to be regarded as appeal methods, they must provide a way for speakers to make a value which might ordinarily be controversial seem less controversial to audiences which share the same culture as the speaker. If a particular metaphor represents a conventionalised way of viewing the world *within a culture*, it is unlikely to enable a speaker to reinterpret the controversial value as something more palatable. To be relevant to this analysis, therefore, the metaphor must therefore represent one of two or more possible choices within the political discourse of the culture in question, and represent a *controversial* choice — that is, there must be some possibility that a metaphor may be (implicitly or explicitly) challenged by an alternative metaphor.

This assertion is based on the assumption that the obscuring power of metaphor makes it most suitable to appealing to controversial values. Not all metaphorical usage in value appeals is controversial. An example from Jerry Hayes' intervention illustrates the point:

(4.35) It is clearly time that he came clean and told the House whether he is committing his party to reject money travelling with the patients (HC Deb, cc 507-508; NHSCCB 447)

Hayes describes *honesty* (the disclosure of all relevant facts) with the metaphorical phrase "to come clean", thus framing *honesty* as "cleanliness". However, this use of metaphor as a method of appealing to uncontroversial values is relatively rare; appeals to controversial values — such as those by Clarke and Winterton — are much more typical. Chilton and llyin show how the use of metaphor can help avoid face-threatening acts (FTAs) by allow-

ing the metaphor to imply the FTA, or by describing the FTA in innocuous or uncontroversial terms (Chilton/Ilyin 1993: 9; 21). Controversial value appeals would certainly often count as FTAs, because they may involve not only asking the audience to do something, but also asking them to do something undesirable.

If metaphors usually appeal to controversial values, the use of the metaphors themselves will tend to be open to challenge, and so conventionalised metaphors are unlikely to be effective in the context of value appeals. Thus, the notion of *controversiality* provides a useful element of the framework for judging whether a given instance of metaphor assists in making a value appeal more palatable. Deciding what is controversial necessarily involves using intuitive judgement to decide whether a metaphorical usage represents only one of several possible “frames” or “stories” which a speaker may use to define a problem or describe an action — in other words, a choice on the part of the speaker between several possible representations — or whether it represents an unmarked “frame” — an uncontroversial, less significant perspective. The example of *rushing forward into the dark* can be analysed in this way. The first speaker frames the intentions of the government — that is, the absence of a more prolonged assessment of potential risks and problems — as impetuosity. This negative appraisal decides how the value indicators are interpreted — in this case, as negative indicators for *caution*. The speaker who replies frames the negative indicators for *caution* as rapid forward progress, and therefore reinterprets them as positive indicators for *decisiveness*. It is the *controversiality* of the “lack of caution as impetuosity” metaphor which makes it significant in appealing to the *caution* value. To give another example, the following metaphor: “the *bold* reforms of the National Health Service on which the Government have *embarked*”, could also be challenged by an alternative metaphor, for example “the changes being *bulldozed through* by the Government”, where positive indicators for *assertiveness* might become negative indicators for *consultation*. A more general principle can be derived from this: the significance of metaphor in appealing to controversial values lies in its potential ability to reinterpret indicators for one value item as indicators for another, or vice versa.

None of this is to deny that contrasting metaphors directly across cultures can be useful and revealing — although, in this study, the two cultures in question are likely to share much more of their view of the world than, say, the British and Chinese cultures. Metaphors which are shared within cultures but not between them are, however, subjects for a

different study. In particular, the study of the impact of conventionalised metaphors on thought and behaviour (for example, “argument is war”), represents an entirely separate area of debate and study which lies outside the remit of this work.

4.8.6.5. *Identifying Significant Metaphorical Usage by the Transfer of Positive or Negative Meanings*

A further criterion needs to be introduced for the selection of metaphors for analysis. Since the metaphorical usage which is of interest is that which helps to make a value item seem positive or its inverse negative, it is important to consider whether a source domain “imports” strong positive or negative meanings into the conceptual domain of the object in question. By choosing a source domain of meaning which has associations in the minds of the audience which are either strongly positive (for example, “the *bold* reforms of the National Health Service on which the Government have *embarked*”) or negative (e.g. “*rushing forward into the dark* with unproven proposals”), speakers can set the “polarity” of the indicators — and thus indicate to the audience whether they are praising the realisation of a value or criticising its non-realisation — and ensure that the polarity is sufficiently pronounced to encourage the acceptance of the value. In these examples, the positive associations of both courage and making a (possibly hazardous) journey, and the negative associations of impetuosity are meanings which are not “native” to the values *assertiveness* and *caution*, but imported by the metaphors the speakers use.

Metaphors employed in this way will therefore meet two principal criteria: they will “transfer” or “import” clearly identifiable positive or negative meanings from another conceptual domain and they will attribute that meaning to the indicators for a value. The last point is important, because it means that the metaphor must be independent of the indicators; the positive or negative meanings must not inhere in them. Thus, “rushing forward into the dark” is both a negative indicator for *caution* and a metaphor, but it only helps make *caution* seem more desirable if “rushing forward into the dark” is not part of the negative definition of *caution* itself. Only if a lack of caution can also be described in a more neutral way (for example, “prioritising speed of implementation over certainty”), or even positively (for example, “being bold/decisive/courageous”, “not hesitating”), can “rushing forward into the dark” can be regarded as a means of making *caution* seem more desirable.

An example which does not meet these criteria is the metaphor “build on”, which is often used in connection with appeals to *ambition*. The positive meaning which it transfers from the world of construction derives from the fact it represents the underlying metaphor “more is better”. Since reference to quantitative improvement is one of the key indicators for the *ambition* value, it would require circular reasoning to code the use of the “build on” metaphor as an appeal method. *Honourableness* and *honesty* are examples of values whose negative indicators are often reflected in the use of metaphors. When James Couchman refers to instances of “shroud-waving” (HC Deb, cc 531; NHSCCB 1064), he is arguing that people have behaved dishonourably in using stories of the ill, dying and dead to further political ends. His appeal to *honourableness* is therefore not enhanced by his use of metaphor; rather, the metaphor is merely the indicator for the appeal — it merely tells the analyst that the speaker thinks someone has behaved dishonourably.

4.8.6.6. *Classifying Metaphor*

Although, arguably, the comprehension of metaphor cannot be explained without reference to pragmatic principles, once a metaphor has been decoded, its effectiveness as a value appeal is reliant on a connection being made between conceptual domains — domains of meaning — rather than on pragmatic implicature (Bachem 1979: 51); it must therefore be classed with methods which function non-pragmatically. Furthermore, the use of metaphor does not constitute an explicit statement of desirability, and so it falls into the implicit category. Finally, since metaphor makes a value appear desirable by attaching literal meanings to it which do not logically belong to the literal discussion of the value or its realisation, it is classed as creating non-logically derivable value-desirability relationships.

4.8.7. **Connotation (CON)**

A further method of supporting value appeals is the use of *connotation*. Connotation is a specific type of implication which, like metaphor, uses words or phrases loaded with additional meaning to make an appeal more acceptable. However, unlike metaphor, it does not transfer the literal meaning of words from other areas of discourse and apply them to the value in question, but rather employs words whose literal meanings are unremarkable in the context, but which possess connoted meanings which carry the desired implication of desirability. A word’s connoted meaning is a meaning — sometimes just a strongly negative or positive “sense” — which it has acquired beyond its fundamental or literal meaning. Natu-

rally, the only concern here is with connotations which relate to the notions of desirability or undesirability, and help attach them to value indicators.

The use of words or phrases with strong connotations is a time-honoured practice in political speeches. Edmund Burke, writing in the late eighteenth century, criticised a new form of political writing which contained much abstract political terminology — words such as “liberty”, “virtue” and “honour” — the use of which allowed only one of two judgements: “hurrah” and “boo” (Drucker 1974), since the words had acquired connotations which made the concepts thus described difficult to oppose or support. Bachem also points out how the use of such words amounts to pre-judging the matter in question, and how it encourages the addressees of the utterance to accept this pre-judgement (Bachem 1979: 15). This is the key property of connotation: speakers who use it can appear only to literally *mean* something uncontroversial, but their judgement on the matter is concealed in the connoted meanings of the words they have chosen.

Connotation encompasses, but is not limited to, Grice’s concept of “conventional implicature”. It would not be appropriate here to discuss this theory at length, but Grice proposed that conventional implicatures possessed a number of properties which distinguished them from conversational, and indeed, all types of pragmatic implicatures. The most significant of these are *non-defeasibility*, or *non-cancellability*, and *detachability*. As discussed in section 4.8.4.5.vii, an implicature is non-cancellable if one cannot “cancel” the implied meanings by adding additional premises to a statement, and an implicature is detachable if it is dependent on the use of particular linguistic item (Levinson 1983: 115, 127). The latter property applies generally to all connotations as defined here, but the former is true of only a subset of connoted meanings. Whereas conventional implicatures are not dependent on the context in which they are made (hence their non-cancellability), certain words may only acquire particular connotations in a given context.

As implied by the detachability of this form of implicature, the existence of choice is crucial for identifying the use of connotation. When using connotation, speakers choose, from a range of possible words, those words which carry the (usually fairly strong) connotations they need. The chosen words reflect a gloss which the speaker has *chosen*, consciously or unconsciously, to put on a concept, and which reflects a quite different choice to that which another speaker might make. In this sense, the test to determine whether strong connoted meanings are being employed to assist in value appeals mirrors that used

to test metaphorical usage: an assessment of the degree to which the speaker's representation of the importance of certain behaviour or goals is open to challenge by alternative representations using other connoted meanings.

There are some points to bear in mind when trying to identify examples of this method. Firstly, connotation-carrying words can only be said to assist in value appeals insofar as their connoted meanings are not conventionally attached to the very value items which they are claimed to support. Many words which directly denote values, such as "freedom", acquire strong positive or negative connotations which go beyond their literal meaning; however, it would require circular reasoning to claim that an audience is encouraged to respond positively to the concept of "freedom" because the concept of "freedom" has a positive connotation. As stated above, the crucial test is whether the speaker has a choice — in other words, whether the positive or negative connotation is merely attached to certain linguistic realisations of a concept (say, to "steadfast", but not to "determined"), or whether it appears, in a given context, to attach to the very concept itself (say, to "liberty", "freedom", "autonomy", "independence", etc.). This may mean that some values can never be supported by connotation, since the very concepts which underlie them carry non-defeasible implicatures of desirability.

An example of connotation is provided by Kenneth Clarke when he exploits the acquired negative connotations of the word "academic" to justify going ahead with the reforms before the completion of pilot studies.

(4.36) Change cannot be made conditional on a protracted academic appraisal of six particular experiments. (HC Deb, cc 496; NHSCCB 148)

The word "academic" is not a transferred meaning; the studies are indeed "academic". However, this word is not the only one that Clarke could have chosen, and its choice in this context, especially together with the word "protracted" is unlikely to be coincidental. Its use in an argument against further delay in implementing reforms accentuates its negative connotations — those of impracticality and esoteric discussion. By portraying the studies in this way, he implies that failing to act quickly and decisively amounts to wasting time.

Connotation is classified in the same way as metaphor, since it involves the attachment to a value of meanings which the speaker chooses to import from elsewhere — in this case, connoted meanings rather than transferred meanings.

4.8.8. Entailment (ENT)

Entailment involves the logical implication of a value's desirability by a speaker's utterance, in particular through meanings which can be regarded as logically derivable from the literal meanings in the utterance. *Entailment*, in linguistics, is concerned with truth relations between sentences, and thus with a very narrow definition of logic which does not allow for the consideration of any contextual factors, or indeed any world knowledge beyond the literal meanings of the words in question (Levinson 1983: 103f.). The usage of the term here is somewhat looser, because, again, it is not proposed to exclude contextual knowledge or pragmatic inferences entirely from the picture. Instead, the logical connection made between a speaker's utterance and the desirability of a value will usually depend on common and uncontroversial assumptions about the world. The test will be that, where *entailment* is used, and where the audience accepts what is predicated or directly implied by the speaker's utterance, the audience must also accept the objective desirability of the value to which the speaker is appealing. A careful distinction again must be made between desirability being logically derivable from concepts which are attached to the value by the speaker, and desirability being logically derivable from the value concept itself. As with connotation, if positive meanings are conventionally attached to or derivable from the value itself, they cannot be regarded as appeal methods.

A few examples of the concepts which are referred by speakers who use *entailment* are "problem", "improvement", "basic principle", "blame", "vulnerability", "Gefahr", "gewinnen" and "Notstand"; none of these denotes desirability or undesirability, but the literal meaning of each one implies one or the other. To expand on a few of these examples: a problem is an obstacle of some kind which stands in the way of achieving an objective; problems are, therefore, generally undesirable (given the general assumption that people do not enjoy making the achievement of desirable objectives more difficult); an "improvement" raises the quality of some object or state of affairs, and one would therefore not wish to carry it out on something inherently undesirable (if one assumes that people want to minimise the realisation of undesirable values); to attach blame is to assign responsibility for something which is wrong, and therefore undesirable; and so on.

A further concrete example can be given from the corpus. The MP Nicholas Winterton, commenting on the proposed indicative drug budget, says:

(4.37) If we proceed with some of proposals in the White Paper that seek, unjustifiably, to contain prescribing, we shall drive investment out of this country to the detriment of employment and the economy of our nation. (HC Deb, cc 539; NHSCCB 1268)

His assertion that the government are seeking “unjustifiably” to restrict resources for prescribing states nothing explicitly about the desirability of *plenitude*, but implies it logically by claiming that there is no way to demonstrate that the proposal is permissible, morally or in any other sense (besides which, of course, he employs association with *employment* and global *plenitude* to underline the undesirability of restricting the NHS’s resources).

4.8.9. Subjective Entailment (SNT)

Subjective entailment differs only from *entailment* in making the logically derived value judgement subjective. In an appeal using this method, the speaker’s utterance does not logically imply objective desirability, but instead that the speakers or others named in the speaker’s utterance consider the value to be desirable.

An example will be given to illustrate. Bruno Menzel, speaking in favour of the government’s proposed reforms, says:

(4.38) Ich hoffe, daß die heutige Beratung allen Beteiligten bzw. Betroffenen zeigen wird, daß...die Koalition bemüht ist, ein sozial ausgewogenes und für alle akzeptables und tragbares Gesetzeswerk auf den Weg zu bringen. (Sten. Ber., S. 9012; GStrG 925)

His interpretation of what the coalition is trying to do does not state anything explicitly about the desirability of those objectives, but it does suggest that those objectives have some priority for the coalition, and therefore that the coalition considers them desirable, or at least that they wish to be seen saying that they are desirable.

Since, as with modal expressions of inclination, objective desirability cannot be inferred from subjectively expressed value judgements, and since subjective entailment only *implies* subjective desirability, it will be classified as making d(v) non-pragmatically, implicitly and non-logically derivable.

4.8.10. Irony (IRO)

Irony is a particular type of paraphrase belonging to a wider family of imagery types encountered in texts (Hansen 1989: 112-114). It is a tool which is used sparingly in political speeches, but when it is used, it is often to great effect.

Irony in a speech is the implicit or explicit expression of a meaning which is the direct opposite of a speaker’s true meaning. Irony is most often critical; there is almost always a

party (whether or not this party is part of the audience) which is the target of this criticism (Levinson 1983: 161). Irony is, however, generally for the benefit of the audience, and is therefore usually directed towards encouraging others to accept this critical interpretation. From the point of view of the others in the audience, the use of irony introduces a humorous or strong emotional dimension to the assessment of what the speaker is saying. Speakers can achieve this in a number of ways. They may choose a description or proposition which causes a particularly crass conflict with the more widely accepted interpretation of a situation; in this case, what the speakers say is so outrageous or improbable that the audience can be certain that what was literally said was not what was meant. Alternatively, speakers may choose words which contain more subtle hints that their intended meaning lies elsewhere (Hansen 1989: 113-114).

The literal meaning which ironic utterances contain, and which speakers want the audience to reject, almost always constitutes a crude representation of the object of their criticism which encourages the audience to accept the intended (often diametrically opposite) meaning. This can often trigger humour, which can cause the audience to become more positive and receptive towards the speaker's preferred assessment. When a value appeal is made using irony, this preferred assessment indicates the value which the speaker wishes to communicate.

There are thus several components to the implication of desirability by irony: certainly, there is a pragmatic component, because it would not be possible for the audience to "decode" the irony without making pragmatic inferences — the Gricean maxims may frequently be involved here. Once the decoding has been done, however, the audience is left with two meanings, the literal and the intended, and it is when the intended meaning implies desirability — whether logically or non-logically — that irony can function as an independent appeal method. Since the latter stage is not a pragmatic process, the method is not entirely reliant on pragmatic implicatures, and must therefore be regarded as creating non-pragmatically derivable relationships with desirability. Furthermore, even if the speaker's intended meaning logically implies desirability, his or her exploitation of pragmatic implicature means that the relationships created by the method as a whole are only non-logically derivable.

As in the case of the modal type *potentiality*, there are cases where irony relies exclusively on pragmatic implicature to imply desirability. Quite often, irony may be used to un-

derline the non-realisation of a value — for example, that doctors do not support the government's proposals, that proposed measures will lead to significantly higher charges on patients, that another party does not care about patients, etc. — rather than the desirability of the value itself. This is done by using irony to apparently claim that the value *has* been realised, but in a way that clearly signals that that is not the intended meaning — often using exaggeration in some form or other. The absurdity of both the nature of the claim and the speaker's apparent support for it — in a context where the audience is well aware that is not the speaker's real view — creates humour, and this humour can then come to make the very non-realisation of the value itself appear both strange and undesirable. Rudolf Dreßler exploits this when attacking the FDP's lack of concern for the hardships caused by charges for dental and other work:

(4.39) Die Damen und Herren von der Freien Demokratischen Partei beweisen dabei besondere Einfühlsamkeit. (Sten. Ber., S. 8997; GStrG 394)

His exaggerated politeness and exaggerated claims for the FDP's sensitivity, together with other contextual information, make it clear that he believes the opposite. However, only pragmatic inference allows the audience to conclude that there is anything remarkable about this lack of sensitivity.

As with *potentiality*, it would be undesirable to place different forms of *irony* in different classificatory positions according to usage; rather, it is preferable to regard the solely pragmatic usage of irony as acting as an auxiliary method for *conversational implicature*.

4.8.11. Association (A-x)

Another method which speakers use to appeal to values is the *association* of two or more values. Value associations come in two forms: one-way and two-way. Values in one-way associations have an unequal relationship, in that the association involves one value in the relationship playing a positive role in realising the other value, but not vice versa; values in two-way associations, in contrast, have an equal relationship, because the values are merely linked in the speaker's utterance, without one being presented as having a role in realising another. Only the former function as appeal methods, because they create a dependency between values. Two-way associations were outlined in chapter three, and will not be dealt with further here.

One-way associations are typically used by speakers in order to appeal to values which may encounter some resistance in parts of the audience, by simultaneously appealing to one

or more other, less controversial values and linking the two together in a way which makes an acceptance of the latter more likely to lead to an acceptance of the former.

This analysis distinguishes between five types of value appeal association.

4.8.11.1. *Association by Causality (A-CAU)*

The first type is *association by causality*. The proposition of a causal relationship between items in a text is usually achieved by the use of causal conjunctions such as “because”, “therefore”, “it follows from this”, “that is why”, “that is the cause of”, “deshalb”, “aus diesem Grund” etc. (Brown/Yule 1983). Another quotation from Kenneth Clarke illustrates this:

(4.40) Much of the low morale of recent years has arisen because many staff are frustrated by the muddle that often features in NHS decision-making and objectives. (HC Deb, cc 490; NHSCCB 10)

Clarke makes an uncontroversial appeal to *contentment* here and then uses it to support an appeal to *clarity* by claiming that the demoralisation of the workforce occurred largely as a consequence of “muddle”. On a value level, therefore, Clarke is suggesting that those who accept his appeal to the former value should also accept his appeal to the latter, since the adherence to one (a desirable form of behaviour) leads to a greater likelihood of achieving the other (a desirable goal). The use of causal conjunctions tend to suppress any sense of agency in the relationship; one condition or event is portrayed as leading inevitably to another, and thus an audience is asked to accept that the desirability of two separate value items is connected in a similar fashion. The inevitability inherent in a causal expression gives the impression that the speaker is presenting the audience with some universally valid and eternally relevant “facts” about the nature of reality.

4.8.11.2. *Association by Conditionality (A-CND)*

The second type of appeal association is *association by conditionality*. A conditional relationship between items is formed by the use of conditional constructions such as “if x then y”, “when x, y”, “wenn nicht x, dann y”, etc. This is shown with an excerpt from Dr. Bruno Menzel’s response to Seehofer’s speech:

(4.41) Wenn nichts geschieht, meine Damen und Herren, dann steigen die Krankenkassenbeiträge von Jahr zu Jahr unaufhaltsam weiter, um rund einen halben Beitragspunkt pro Jahr. (Sten. Ber., S. 9013; GStrG 929)

Menzel appeals for reform on the grounds that not acting would lead to a further economic burden on contribution payers. Although the effect of using conditional associations may in

practice often seem similar to that of causal associations (here, Menzel proposes that inaction will lead directly to higher contributions), conditionality has a somewhat different emphasis. It creates a conceptual relationship of dependency between value items which, in contrast to causality, generates a sense of “opportunity”, that is, presents a view of reality as consisting of options. Speakers therefore often use conditional expressions to make positive appeals (unlike the above example), which, say, emphasise the benefits that could result *if* a reform is carried out. As is the case with all of these appeal methods, it must be emphasised that although there may often be a close relationship between particular appeal types and particular grammatical structures, one does not follow from the other. Thus, association by conditionality can also be achieved without the usual *if...then* structures, as Kenneth Clarke demonstrates:

(4.42) No one can really be committed to a caring service without being committed also to raising efficiency levels wherever possible. (HC Deb, cc 489; NHSCCB 7)

Clarke makes here a commitment to *compassion* conditional on a commitment to “raising efficiency levels” by suggesting that no one can “really” have the first commitment without the second.

4.8.11.3. Association by Instrumentality (A-INS)

The third association type is *association by instrumentality*. Instrumental relations between values show the realisation of some values as being the necessary “tools” for realising other values, and are most often expressed grammatically by the use of the propositions “by”, “with” or “through”. Again, the line between an instrumental and a causal relationship can be a fine one, but instrumentality tends to put more emphasis on the actor (with the actor as “tool-user”). An example is provided by Kenneth Clarke:

(4.43) By providing a friendly personal service they will be more likely to attract referrals and contracts from their district health authority and surrounding authorities and thereby increase their resources. (HC Deb, cc 499; NHSCCB 225)

Clarke appeals to *ambition* by talking about the provision of better service and suggests, through the use of “by”, that such improvements are the key to greater success for the institution as an enterprise, and to acquiring more resources. Thus, *ambition* is associated instrumentally with *success* and *plenitude*.

4.8.11.4. Association by Equivalence (A-EQV)

The fourth method of explicitly relating values is *association by equivalence*. This can be seen when a speaker portrays one action or state of affairs as being “tantamount to” another. Seehofer’s speech provides one of the best illustrations:

(4.44) Wenn wir 11,4 Milliarden DM einsparen und einen Teil davon dazu verwenden, die Pflegefachberufe, z.B. die Schwestern, zu unterstützen, dann ist das ein Umbau des Sozialstaats. (Sten. Ber., S. 8991; GStrG 163)

Seehofer refers here to his earlier use of the metaphorical expression “Umbau des Sozialstaats”, specifically the criticism within the coalition that the cuts in health spending are being made without reference to an overall reform concept for the health care system or the *Sozialstaat*. He tries to rebuff this by suggesting that making savings and using some of the saved money for “supporting” nursing staff does in fact constitute just such a reorganisation. Thus an appeal to *efficiency*, mitigated by an appeal to *compassion*, is supported by association with an appeal to *thoroughness*.

4.8.11.5. Association by Co-occurrence (A-COO)

The final association type is *association by co-occurrence*. This is the most general type of association, and can be regarded as a residual category for the classification of value associations. It encodes the bringing together of one value with one or more others, but in an unequal relationship. This association may be made explicit or implicit. It may be made explicit by stating that two or more values tend to be realised together — either always or in a particular cited case — and are thus inseparable, in order to persuade the audience to accept appeals to both, or left implicit by simply placing the values together in an utterance. Seehofer’s speech provides the example of an explicit association:

(4.45) Jeder Patient, meine Damen und Herren — dies wird oft vergessen —, ist auch Beitragszahler. (Sten. Ber., S. 8989; GStrG 89)

From the juxtaposition of “Patient” with “Beitragszahler”, Seehofer intends his audience to grasp the point that an interest in health care (*health*) cannot be separated from an interest in the level of social insurance contributions (*plenitude* and *freedom*), that is, that the realisations of these values co-occur. Kenneth Clarke illustrates an implicit association when attacking the critics of his health reforms:

(4.46) The critics of the reforms are trying to scare the life out of patients by suggesting that basic services will be lost. (HC Deb, cc 505; NHSCCB 390)

By stating that people who are opposed to his reforms are deliberately engaged in an effort to mislead and manipulate the public — that, in other words, opposition co-occurs with dishonest and dishonourable behaviour — he is implicitly associating his negative appeal to *flexibility* with negative appeals to *honesty* and *honourableness*. Another way to create an implicit association of this type is by contrast; when speakers contrast the hoped for or claimed existence of *x* (for example, the challenging of vested interests in health care) with the reality of *y* (increasing charges on patients), they frequently imply that *not-y* co-occurs with *x* — that, in other words, *y* is a bad substitute for *x*, which would not be necessary if *x* were carried out.

4.8.11.6. *Classifying Associative Method Types*

Associative methods are somewhat awkward to classify, because value appeals which use them are not entirely self-contained; they are linked to other value appeals which determine the character of the appeal method. However, although it is obviously not possible to say precisely which values will be used in value associations, one can make some general simplifying assumptions about the way speakers employ them.

The first assumption is that speakers, irrespective of whether they are appealing to controversial or uncontroversial values, will, if they choose to use value association, tend to associate their appeals with appeals to other values which are generally uncontroversial. For example, if a speaker wished to appeal to a value which had become controversial in a debate (for example, *efficiency* in the context of resource deployment in health care), it would be unwise to try to appeal to that value by linking it with another controversial value (for example, *discipline* in the context of the prescription and use of drugs) in a value association. To pursue the example, a speaker could probably not hope to convince many of the doubters in the audience by arguing that increasing efficiency in the deployment of health care resources by the government would encourage doctors to be more careful in prescribing, and thus ultimately lead to patients being more disciplined in making demands on the health care system. On the other hand, arguing that increases in efficiency would lead to more patients being treated and to shorter waiting lists would be more likely to produce the desired result.

One can, however, make a more general case for the utility of association. The last example utilised a fairly unappealing value — *discipline* — and contextualised it in a way that would be especially unattractive to the audience. Usually, speakers are wise enough to

avoid this type of approach; association typically exploits the fact that most values are always desirable unless they are considered to involve a costly trade-off with another value. By associating value x (the subject of the appeal) with value y (the associated value), a speaker can portray value y as a largely cost-free benefit to be gained by realising value x , obscuring any further trade-offs that may be necessary to realise y . In the above example, even *discipline* might be made to seem an attractive benefit of realising *efficiency* if it were not specified who would become more disciplined (for example, “increasing efficiency will introduce more discipline into health care system/the use of resources”). Thus, making such associations will always tend to increase the appeal of the target value.

So, if one assumes that associated values are generally held to be desirable, associative methods are quite easy to classify: they create non-pragmatically derivable value-desirability relationships, since those relationships inhere primarily in the meanings uttered by the speaker; those relationships are implicitly derivable, since they involve no explicit statement of desirability; and, for all associative types except association by co-occurrence, a logical link is posited between the realisation of the target value and the realisation of one or more other, desirable, values, and so those relationships can be derived logically. In the case of association by co-occurrence, the posited relationship is simply too vague and weak for one to logically conclude that the realisation of one value does indeed lead to the realisation of another, and so the value-desirability relationship must be viewed as non-logically derivable.

5. Coding Texts and Analysing the Results

This final chapter is divided into three main parts. The first deals with some general issues in coding the texts in preparation for analysis, and the second and third present the results of that analysis for the appeal content and appeal method data, respectively. A shorter fourth section will draw together the conclusions from parts three and four.

5.1. Coding texts for analysis

5.1.1. The Limits of Objectivity in Coding

An issue which is of great concern to content analysts is the extent to which their background and contextual knowledge influence their conclusions about a text, and how far such bias may hinder the intersubjective validation of the results. Texts have no inherent meaning; they only have the meaning which a given producer or consumer gives to them. It is therefore pointless to ask whether background or contextual knowledge should be used in interpreting a text; without it, interpretation is impossible. The problem is therefore to try to make the use of that knowledge as explicit as possible, both by making use of existing theories, such as the Gricean theory of conversational implicature, and by trying to transform one's vague intuitions about the text into workable principles which guide the analysis. The detailed taxonomies, classifications and definitions which have been formulated thus far are all part of this process, and the next section will outline some principles governing the unit of analysis in coding and the use of knowledge from the textual context. However, the analyst cannot detail every judgement which is made in the analysis; additional background knowledge will inevitably be called upon to make final judgements in certain cases, thus risking bias.

5.1.2. The Unit of Analysis

In any kind of text analysis with a quantitative element, a way must be found to break down the text into pieces which can be analysed separately, or which at least enable a given part of the analysis to be located unambiguously in the text. A textual unit must be found which best suits the analysis of values.

The unit clearly needs to be capable of carrying a complete message, and so the smallest conceivable candidate is the clause. Since the clause is, however, very frequently only part of a message, as in conditional statements for example, the sentence seems likely to enable much more of the sense of what a speaker is saying to be captured. A "message", though,

depending on how broad is one's definition, can clearly be spread over more than one sentence. Paragraphs (of written texts) or even entire texts can be seen as single, indivisible messages. In addition, the definition of certain units, such as the sentence, is open to dispute, especially with regard to spoken discourse (Heinze 1979: 167-173).

The final choice will therefore be a reductionist compromise, but, providing a framework is chosen which can be applied consistently across both texts, this should not affect the comparison. There are a number of good reasons for choosing the sentence. Firstly, the written reports from both Parliaments already divide the text into two units: the sentence and the paragraph. The process by which this division is done may not be subject to a set of criteria which linguists would recognise as defining a sentence, but it provides a convenient means of breaking down the texts which is fairly consistent between both reports. Secondly, if one views the contribution of each speaker as a separate "text" in itself, or at least a separate entity which requires separate analysis, the size of a unit is limited by the size of the smallest contributions, which are interventions consisting of single sentences. It is essential to analyse such interventions separately, since they reflect the views of separate individuals in a debate. Since, as explained above, the clause is not an adequately sized unit, the sentence is left as the only plausible candidate.

However, this does not mean that each sentence-sized unit is to be analysed as an indivisible whole. On the contrary, the basic unit of analysis is the value appeal itself, and the numbered sentences will merely serve as a framework within which appeals can be identified, as labelled "chunks" of text to which they can be attached, and as boundaries beyond which they cannot go. A sentence may contain many value appeals, or none at all, but each value appeal will "belong" to a given sentence.

This does, however, raise the question of context. Contextual knowledge plays an inevitable part in the analysis, but a distinction needs to be made between general contextual knowledge and the knowledge of the *textual* context. If a text is to be broken down into units which are analysed separately, how far can knowledge of the immediate textual context of an utterance influence its analysis? More specifically, how far can the reading of the text cross the boundaries of a textual unit in looking for the textual indicators which signal an appeal (the textual indicators given in the value definitions¹⁸)? The answer to this question has to involve reference to the speaker's audiences — those to whom the appeals are

being made. Although this study does not intend to discover or surmise how value appeals might actually have been received by those audiences, the analyst must attempt a reading of them based on a consideration of how they *might* be received. The speaker and the analyst both know the content of entire speeches, and can interpret what is said in one sentence in the light of what comes later. Such readings are not, however, legitimate for an analysis, because the audiences would not have the benefit of such knowledge. Analysis must therefore not be based on forwards-contextual readings.

Furthermore, the extent to which readings can be backwards-contextual must be severely limited, because appeals must be pegged to identifiable indicators in a sentence and not simply be identified from a vague reading of several paragraphs. It is difficult to define such limits numerically, but a general rule is that an appeal may not be interpreted in the light of text belonging to a previous section of a speech — that is, text which came before the last change of topic or shift of focus. Such changes or shifts are marked in a number of different ways, including addressing of the audience (e.g. “meine Damen und Herren”), the use of certain particles (e.g. “nun”, “also”), temporal expressions (“earlier this week”), expressions summarising the previous parts of the speech and shifts from the specific to the general.

The use of knowledge of the textual context is thus restricted to backwards-contextual readings which allow an expression or word to be interpreted in the light of what has just been said. So, for example, where Brian Sedgemore makes the comment:

(5.1) Cheek. (HC Deb, cc 499; NHSCCB 231)

it is legitimate to interpret this as a response to what Kenneth Clarke has just said about the motivations of doctors. In contrast, Clarke’s comments about doctors should not be interpreted in the light of remarks he made about them ten paragraphs previously, or indeed in the light of what the analyst might know about Clarke’s previously expressed views on doctors. To repeat the point made earlier, however, the use of general contextual knowledge is unavoidable: this example clearly could not be analysed without knowing what a doctor is, or why motivation may come to be connected with respect.

The final problem concerns the way in which the repetition of points, the marshalling of different items of evidence, or the employment of different arguments over several sen-

¹⁸ The definitions are given in Appendix I in Volume II.

tences is resolved by sentence-based analysis. It seems fairly clear that, where a point which constitutes a value appeal is repeated over two or more sentences, analysis by sentence demands a separate appeal to be coded for each sentence. However, where evidence or argument is marshalled over several sentences to support an appeal, the matter is not so straightforward. To give an example: those in favour of a Bill might argue that those affected, who may be opposed to it or uneasy about it, should be flexible and accept change. They argue this by first mentioning the fears that exist and then offering what they regard as evidence that the Bill, when passed, will yield much-needed benefits and will not have the damaging effects that some fear. A speaker may, for example, argue in one sentence that greater efficiency is required in the management of resources. The question is then whether such a sentence should be coded as two value appeals: one to *efficiency*, and one (implied) to *flexibility*, since each point in favour of the reform is also an attempt to persuade doubters to support the change. This approach appears, intuitively, to be undesirable, because it would distort the analysis by generating multiple appeals from what is, in purely qualitative terms, a single appeal. If, in the example just given, a speaker raised twice as many points in support of the reform as another speaker, but both concluded with a single appeal for doubters to support the bill, it would seem odd to record that the first speaker had made twice as many appeals to *flexibility* as the latter. This problem therefore needs to be resolved with a refinement of the rules for coding.

This problem is, in fact, an extension of the problem of backwards-contextual reading. A limit has already been placed on the practicability of non-contextual readings by demonstrating the necessity of backwards-contextual readings in some circumstances. Forwards-contextual readings have already been ruled out, and so there can be no question of interpreting an argument as implying a broader value appeal on the basis of evidence later in the text. Some limitations have also been placed on the degree to which readings can be backwards-contextual by introducing the rule that, broadly speaking, an interpretation cannot go beyond the last change of topic or shift of focus. This new problem requires a further limitation of backwards-contextual reading, namely that going beyond the boundaries of the sentence to look for textual evidence is only legitimate, insofar as that evidence is needed to help interpret an utterance in value terms. Where an utterance can be interpreted without the help of textual evidence external to the sentence, for instance where there is an appeal to *efficiency* as in the example given above, it is not legitimate to use a backwards-contextual reading to support coding an implied appeal to another value.

5.1.3. Specific Problems in Coding Value Appeals

Alongside this general definition of values and guide to their identification, there are a number of specific problems in coding which require discussion. The first arises in part from a point made in the discussion on appeal methods, namely that arguments about specific proposals or other details do not by themselves constitute value appeals, although they may contain value appeals in many cases. Certain arguments, rather than being concerned with easily definable objects, which tend either to have very clear values attached to them or none at all, address rather less tangible concepts such as “socialism”, “competition” or “privatisation”. Each of these can be realised in some concrete, tangible form, and indeed one may argue that the last example is not at all intangible. However, speakers often refer to such concepts without any reference to their concrete implementations, and thus one cannot deduce from that what concrete measures speakers are advocating or opposing when they support or criticise the concept. Moreover, such concepts, in their intangible form, do not have clear value implications, but instead may potentially be linked with a whole collection of values. For example, criticisms of privatisation might potentially represent appeals to *equality*, *altruism*, *plenitude* or even *honourableness*. It would, however, be quite wrong to bundle all such values together in a combination value and claim that they were being appealed to each time a negative reference was made to privatisation; nor is it possible, when speakers are so vague, to know which subset of these values is being appealed to.

When politicians refer to concepts such as these, they are usually making what one might call “fuzzy” value appeals. The negative or positive connotations from the values which underlie the concepts have become directly associated with the concepts themselves, and so words like “privatisation” come to acquire their own negative or positive connotations without any explicit value appeals being necessary. When an audience hears such references being made, it must comprehend them on the value level if the references are to successfully connote anything, but the value interpretation will differ widely from one member or section of the audience to another. Indeed, this is exploited in political speeches by politicians who wish to appeal to diverse audiences: vague political concepts such as “socialism” or “conservatism” can help speakers to make “fuzzy” values appeals which are effective for appealing to different audiences with diametrically opposed views. The ambiguity of such appeals make it impossible to analyse them, and so they will be recorded as ambiguous and excluded from the results.

A further issue, which is touched on in some of the value definitions, is that of “node” values – values, such as *contentment* or *discipline*, which are related in a very general sense to many other values and might thus conflict with the latter in coding. This is resolved in coding by looking at the primary focus of a value appeal. Although an appeal to value *a* (say, *assiduousness*) might be regarded in some cases as implying an appeal to value *b* (say, *discipline*), the appeal will be coded solely under value *a* unless an appeal to *b* is also specifically indicated. The mere fact that the realisation of the value *a* may involve the realisation of the value *b* will not be regarded as sufficient justification for coding for *b*. The perhaps unremarkable conclusion drawn from this merely confirms the general approach to coding values, namely that “node” values such as *discipline* will only be coded for when they are specifically indicated.

5.2. Analysis of the Appeal Content Data

The second part of this chapter details the results from the analysis of the “content” data — the analysis of value appeal frequency. The coding of the corpus texts on which the results are based can be found in Appendix V in Volume II.

5.2.1. Establishing a Basis for the Comparison of Coded Data

To compare two sets of coded data, one must normalise both to some common standard, so that factors which might distort the analysis can be removed from the calculations. All of the numerical results which are compared will therefore be calculated either as percentages of the total number of appeals in the relevant text or some part of that total — for example, total appeals by members of the government — or as absolute figures, corrected with a multiplier based on the appeal total to enable comparison. In each case, the appeal total will exclude “null” appeals recorded for sentences with no analysable value content, and appeals in the other/ambiguous (residual) category. The multiplier for correcting absolute counts will be based on the fraction of the total number of relevant appeals (both British and German) which they constitute. So, if, for example, there are fewer appeals overall in the British text than in the German text, the British appeal counts will be multiplied by a number greater than one, and the German counts by a number less than one, in order to achieve parity in the overall counts and make a direct comparison of the counts legitimate.

5.2.2. Analysing the Raw Data: An Overview of the Results

To begin with, a few statistics are shown in Table 5.1 to illustrate the volume of data involved in the analysis, followed by a brief, crude summary of the data which shows the distribution of values across the values classes¹⁹.

Table 5.1: General Statistics from the Analysis²⁰

Statistics	GStrG	NHSCCB
Total Sentences	1517	1519
Total Sentences without Analysable Value Content	116	173
Total Value Appeals (Categorised or Uncategorised)	2843	2869
Total Ambiguous or Uncategorised Appeals	183	224
Total Non-Ambiguous Categorised Value Appeals	2660	2645
Appeals per Sentence	1.75	1.74
Total Records (Appeals plus Sentences w/o Analysable Values)	2959	3042
Total Non-Ambiguous Categorised Value Appeals for all Data	5305	
Total Records for all Data	6001	

Before considering possible systemic distortions in the data — those predicted in the second chapter — it is interesting to get an overall view of the raw data, in part to assess the accuracy of those predictions. Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2 on page 248 show the distribution of values across the value classes in each country. The distribution between the two principal classes — terminal and instrumental — is broadly similar, with both countries emphasising terminal values over instrumental values, despite the fact that the taxonomy contains more items of the latter class than the former. This seems to confirm the suspicion that politicians are generally keener to talk about what they have achieved and what advantages their policies offer to the audience — or, alternatively, what their opponents have not achieved and what disadvantages their policies involve — than about any pressures and obligations which might be imposed on their audience.

¹⁹ These figures will be corrected, as always, for comparison — this will always be the case for absolute counts unless otherwise stated, and so the author will not bore the reader by repeating this each time.

²⁰ “GStrG” will henceforth be used to signify data from the analysis of the debate on the *Gesundheits-Strukturgesetz*, and “NHSCCB” data from the analysis of the debate on the NHS and Community Care Bill.

Figure 5.1: GStrG Terminal and Instrumental Value Appeals





Figure 5.2: NHSCCB Terminal and Instrumental Value Appeals



This terminal bias is especially strong in the German data, with an 18% gap separating terminal and instrumental values, and a little weaker in the British data, as shown in both the diagrams and Table 5.2 on page 249. Comparing across the two countries, therefore, this raw data seems to show something of a German bias towards terminal values, and a corresponding British bias towards instrumental values, although the difference is not very marked.

Table 5.2 gives these results in figures and also breaks down the totals according to interaction-dependency. In both countries, interaction-independent values such as *assiduousness*, *control* or *plenitude* seem to get significantly more attention than interaction-dependent values like *honesty* and *justice & fairness*. However, this bias is especially pronounced in Britain, suggesting a German leaning towards interaction-dependent values and an opposite British leaning towards interaction-independent values. This gap between the figures for interaction-dependency widens still further when terminal interaction-dependent values

such as *compassion* or *equality* are considered — the German figure is a full 7% higher than the British. In the same way, most of the British lead in the interaction-independent figures seems to be accounted for by terminal values such as *plenitude* and *health*. The overall bias towards terminal values in the German data can therefore be seen to reflect an even stronger apparent bias towards terminal values concerned with social exchanges, which is partly obscured in the overall results by the fact that the British figures for interaction-independent terminals are much higher than the German figures.

Table 5.2: Appeal Frequency by Value Class

Value Class	GStrG		NHSCCB	
	Count (Corrected)		As % of total appeals	
Terminal	1570	1480	59.2%	55.8%
Instrumental	1083	1172	40.8%	44.2%
Interaction-dependent	1239	1106	46.7%	41.7%
Interaction-independent	1413	1546	53.3%	58.3%
Terminal Interaction-Dependent	855	652	32.2%	24.6%
Terminal Interaction-Independent	715	828	27.0%	31.2%
Instrumental Interaction-Dependent	385	454	14.5%	17.1%
Instrumental Interaction-Independent	698	718	26.3%	27.1%
Impure Instrumental	235	164	8.9%	6.2%

The higher British figures for instrumental values are reflected in a slightly higher frequency of both interaction-dependent and -independent instrumentals, with the single exception of impure instrumental values (*control, insight, success* and *competence*) which occur more frequently in the German data. Except for this last result, none of these differences can be regarded as highly significant, and so, from these raw figures, one must conclude that there is a broadly similar level of preoccupation with appealing to ideal forms of behaviour through instrumental values.

5.2.3. Analysing the Raw Data: Value Distribution By Individual Value

It is interesting to ask which individual value contrasts underlie the overall results from the raw data. Table 5.3 shows the number of appeals per value per text, with any significant differences between the counts marked by boldening and shading.

Although only a crude view of the results, the values which show significant differences appear to reflect some of the expected values contrasts noted in the first two chapters. Firstly, the data reflects some of the expected contrasts which are less interesting — those that were predicted to arise from the systemic differences between the health care systems and from differences in the contexts of the debates. In the British data, there is a strong ten-

dency to emphasise values such as *health*, *ambition* and *convenience*, as was suggested might be the case because of the focus in the British reforms on low system outputs, primarily inadequate levels of care. The difference between the appeal frequency of each one of these values is very significant, and notably, in the case of *convenience*, the value is barely appealed to at all in the German data. This is probably due largely to the effect of one aspect of the British reforms, namely the introduction of a contract system, which many feared would lead to patients having to travel further to hospitals. One interesting point to note, however, is that *compassion* occurs significantly more frequently in the German debate, despite the fact that the — relatively small — community care element of the British debate would have led one to expect the opposite, all things being equal.

Table 5.3: Value Counts for Entire Taxonomy

Value	GStrG	NHSCCB	Value	GStrG	NHSCCB
Accuracy	12	12	Equality	178	54
Altruism	57	27	Flexibility	42	84
Ambition	28	167	Freedom	371	215
Assertiveness	20	12	Health	221	392
Assiduousness	2	10	Honesty	47	73
Caution	0	10	Honourableness	100	167
Clarity	24	31	Humility	6	1
Compassion	151	125	Insight	27	39
Competence	18	15	Justice & Fairness	33	31
Consistency	36	63	Lawfulness	9	9
Consultation	49	93	Patience	0	3
Contentment	9	18	Plenitude	416	265
Continuity	8	17	Pride	21	23
Control	167	84	Rationality	31	20
Convenience	3	54	Realism	47	32
Conviction	2	10	Respect	4	7
Co-operation & Agreement	41	50	Responsibility	55	33
Cynicism	19	18	Security	3	5
Decisiveness	19	16	Sense of Duty	5	5
Dedication	4	6	Sense of Identity	20	37
Determination	12	11	Sobriety	1	1
Dignity	28	76	Stability	3	8
Discipline	29	7	Success	24	26
Efficiency	147	136	Thoroughness	88	27
Employment	11	9	Trustfulness	8	14

On the German side, this raw data is inconclusive in some respects, although it is very likely that the large bias towards *freedom* and *plenitude* can be explained by the strong emphasis in the German debate on high contribution levels and their effects on contribution

payers, which was usually encoded as the high-level value *freedom-plenitude*. The large number of appeals to *thoroughness* in the German data is also almost certainly a consequence of the different nature of the German reform, which contained many short-term measures aimed at containing cost inflation, and which therefore attracted criticism on the basis of its allegedly insufficient emphasis on long-term structural reform. Equally, the emphasis on *control* in the German data reflects the concern with spiralling costs and contribution rates in the health care system.

One expectation that is apparently not fulfilled is that the NHS data would show higher levels of *cynicism*, as a consequence of its emphasis on creating artificial structures to make market forces work, in contrast to the focus in the German reforms on removing perceived barriers to the operation of such forces. This may be because the German politicians view the perceived tendency to exploit such "artificial" barriers as grounds for pessimism, just as British politicians view the perceived natural tendency of people to be inefficient, lazy or feckless as grounds for their cynicism.

In addition to this broad confirmation of the predicted systemic differences, there is, however, also support for the expectations which arose from the examination of the two political cultures. Most strikingly, values which are most closely connected with an assessment of personal qualities occur with much greater frequency in the British data. *Honesty*, *honourableness*, *consistency* and, arguably, *insight* all fall into this category, suggesting the sort of "personalised" relationship between the electorate and actors in the political system described by Rohe and Döring. The higher frequency of appeals to *trustfulness* in the British debate is also in line with this view, although their numbers are too small to be strictly regarded as significant. The emphasis on local and national identity, reflected in appeals to the value *sense of identity*, and, to a lesser extent, the higher appeal frequency for *contentment*, also support the view that the British debate reveals an attachment to tradition and a concern with emotional and personal values, and focuses less on the rational-technical merits of policy proposals. On the German side, the supporting evidence is less strong, but the assumption that German values will reflect a more formal and technocratic view of politics and the policy-making process seems to be supported by the greater emphasis by German politicians on *rationality*, *realism* and *discipline*.

However, some of the data appears to contradict expectations. Despite the apparently more consensual character of the German political system, *consultation* is appealed to

much more frequently in the British data than in the German data, and there is no significant difference in the frequency of appeals to *co-operation and agreement, justice & fairness* or *lawfulness*. This pattern is broken by the higher incidence of *flexibility* in the British data, which may suggest less of an emphasis on consultation and consensus, and more criticism of those unwilling to accept change.

Two further results that were not predicted are the markedly higher frequency of appeals to *equality* and *altruism* in the German debate. This needs to be fleshed out by determining, in a more general sense, whether that reflects a greater focus on interaction-dependent values, and whether these tendencies apply equally to the different parties. The final notable result is the higher frequency of British appeals to *dignity*. It may be that this reflects particular concerns over the perceived poor performance of the NHS, expressed in terms of the indignities suffered by patients in various contexts; equally, it may reflect concern over the impact of the reforms and their more commercial approach to management, although these factors are, to some extent, common to both reform proposals.

All of these results require closer examination, by comparing the addressees of the appeals and taking into account polarity and other factors, and it is only by looking more closely at the data that compliance with some of the other expectations — most notably, the differing emphasis on the state — can be tested. However, as noted above, there is good reason to assume that some of these results are due to the influence of known systemic and contextual factors, which must be removed from the data for further analysis. It would be desirable to take a closer look at some aspects of the data which seem likely to be attributable to these factors.

5.2.4. Controlling for Variables in the Analysis of Value Distribution

5.2.4.1. Likely Realisations of Systemic Distortions

The first step is to detail the likely realisations of the systemic factors which have been identified. It is not sufficient to simply identify values which might reflect the distortions, because that would involve the wholesale removal of many value items. Instead, the appeals which most probably reflect the distortions should be identified on the basis of a combination of features: value item, addressees and combinations or associations with other value items.

On the British side, it is likely that a greater focus on low outputs in the British health care system will be reflected by considerable variations in appeals to the following values:

ambition with institutional expectees, and *ambition* combined or associated with *health* with non-global (i.e., state or institutional) expectees, reflecting a desire to see actors within the health care system or the state achieve improvements in the health care system; appeals to *convenience* combined or associated with *health* and with global entitlees, reflecting a concern with the present or possible future inconvenience to patients; appeals to *plenitude* combined or associated with *health* and with institutional entitlees, reflecting a concern with the level of resources in the health care system; and appeals to *health*, whether alone or combined or associated with any of the above, reflecting a concern with inadequate levels or quality of care.

Table 5.4: Possible Distortions in the British Data

Value Configurations	GStrG	NHSCCB
	Count (Corrected)	
<i>Ambition</i> with institutional expectees, not combined or associated	4	31
<i>Ambition</i> with non-global expectees, comb'd or assoc'd with <i>health</i>	13	84
<i>Plenitude</i> with institutional entitlees comb'd or assoc'd with <i>health</i>	15	77
<i>Convenience</i> with global entitlees, comb'd or assoc'd with <i>health</i>	2	45
<i>Health</i>	221	392
<i>Compassion</i> with global entitlees	147	113

Table 5.4 shows these value configurations in both sets of data. The figures match the assumptions almost perfectly, with the single exception of *compassion*, which, as suggested by the overall figures for that value, goes against expectations. It is worth noting that, when *compassion* is taken out, all the values in question are interaction-independent, and most of them are terminal, matching the British bias towards such values in the raw data.

Secondly, the distortions in the German data are likely to be reflected by variations in the following values: high-level combination appeals to *plenitude* and *freedom*, with global entitlees for *plenitude*, and with state or ambiguous expectees and global entitlees for *freedom*, reflecting concern with the effect of high contribution rates on contribution payers; appeals to *control* with non-global expectees, reflecting concern over the state's ability to control health costs, contribution rates and non-wage costs due to contribution rates; and appeals to *thoroughness* with state expectees, arising from criticism in the German debate of the short-termism of reform measures.

Table 5.5: Possible Distortions in the German Data

Value Configurations	GStrG	NHSCCB
	Count (Corrected)	
<i>Plenitude</i> , with global expectees, high-level comb'd with <i>freedom</i> , with state or ambiguous expectees, or <i>freedom</i> combined with <i>plenitude</i> in the same way.	419	42
<i>Control</i> with non-global expectees	167	84
<i>Thoroughness</i> with state expectees	82	18

Again, the figures shown in Table 5.5 match the assumptions perfectly. Both of these sets of data strongly support the theory that the contextual factors cited are introducing distortions into the value distributions of the two debates. Whilst it is, of course, possible that some of these differences are attributable to other factors, if there are non-systemic differences to be found in the pattern of value appeals, they should be found elsewhere. For example, if the much higher frequency of appeals to *freedom* and *plenitude* is not solely caused by the different focus of the German debate, but by a greater general preference for terminal values, that general preference should emerge elsewhere in the data.

5.2.4.2. Correcting the Distortions

These distortions therefore need to be corrected, and there are different possible ways to approach the adjustment of the figures to achieve this. One can simply remove all of the cited value configurations, or, alternatively, equalise the levels of the distorting configurations to the level in the country with the lowest count. So, to remove, for example, *health* as a distorting factor in the data, one would either remove the 392 appeals from the British data and the 221 appeals from the German data, or, to equalise them, assume a new British count of 221. For inter-country comparisons (which are, after all, the main objective here), it is better to simply remove all of the cited value configurations, since, if equalised, they obviously cannot show any differences, and can only serve to mask differences in other values by increasing the overall count and thus raising the required significance level. For intra-country comparisons — that is, for calculating the relative counts for different value classes within each country, as illustrated in Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2 — the latter approach is better, because the proportions of the different value classes are retained.

5.2.5. Value Distribution by Value Class

The value class distribution data will therefore be corrected in the two different ways outlined above to observe whether the differences in value distribution across the value classes seen earlier are still visible. Firstly, equalising the systemic variables makes it pos-

sible to judge the new relative proportions of terminal and instrumental values within each country.

Table 5.6: Appeal Frequency by Value Class with Systemic Variables Equalised

Value Class	GStrG	NHSCCB	GStrG	NHSCCB
	Count (Corrected)		As % of basis appeals	
Terminal	1421	1321	57.8%	53.7%
Instrumental	1039	1140	42.2%	46.3%
Interaction-dependent	1082	1076	44.0%	43.7%
Interaction-independent	1379	1385	56.0%	56.3%

Table 5.6 shows the figures with the systemic variables equalised. The preference *within* each country for terminal values over instrumental values is considerably reduced, but it is still marked. The tendency towards interaction-independent appeals in preference to interaction-dependent appeals is also still marked, although slightly reduced in the British case.

Table 5.7: Appeal Frequency by Value Class with Systemic Variables Removed

Value Class	GStrG	NHSCCB	GStrG	NHSCCB
	Count (Corrected)		As % of basis appeals	
Terminal	934	843	51.6%	46.5%
Instrumental	877	969	48.4%	53.5%
Interaction-dependent	1071	1045	59.1%	57.7%
Interaction-independent	740	767	40.9%	42.3%
Terminal Interaction-Dependent	671	607	37.0%	33.5%
Terminal Interaction-Independent	263	236	14.5%	13.0%
Instrumental Interaction-Dependent	400	437	22.1%	24.1%
Instrumental Interaction-Independent	477	531	26.3%	29.3%
Impure Instrumental	88	90	5%	5%

Table 5.7 shows the values by class again, but with the systemic variables removed this time. It is now possible to make inter-country comparisons and compare the results to those from Table 5.2. The new figures show quite dramatic changes. The overall differences between the two countries in terms of terminality and instrumentality have been narrowed somewhat, although the German figures are still higher on terminality, and the British on instrumentality. However, overall differences in interaction-dependent and interaction-independent values have almost completely vanished, with nothing of significance remaining of the previously marked leaning in the German data towards the former and, in the British data, towards the latter. When interaction-dependency and terminality/instrumentality are considered together, the higher British figures for behavioural values seem, as before, to be split equally between the interaction-dependent and interaction-independent instrumental classes, and thus reduced below the significance

level for each of those classes. It is therefore not possible to say with any certainty that British politicians appeal more often to either type of instrumental value, even though the overall preference for instrumental values appears clearer.

The previously large British lead in interaction-independent terminal values has also completely disappeared from the figures, no doubt due to the partial or complete removal of values such as *health*, *plenitude* and *convenience*. Only the German preference for interaction-dependent terminals is preserved, although at a much reduced level; the removal of many appeals to *freedom* is almost certainly the cause of that reduction. These revised figures therefore do still suggest that there is a leaning in German discourse towards goal-oriented values with an explicit social component, likely to be largely accounted for by the higher counts for *compassion* and *equality* noted earlier. The final footnote is that the marked German preference for impure instrumental values like *success* and *control*, noted earlier, is also now absent from the figures, due to the removal of the distorting effect of the value *control* from the data.

5.2.6. Value Distribution by Expectation and Entitlement

Another overall view one can take of the data is that of expectations and entitlements. By reducing the value classes down to their component elements of expectation and entitlement, one can look for some overall patterns in the data which may not be visible when one has to consider larger numbers of categories. Table 5.8 shows the figures for values with expectees (that is, all except interaction-independent terminal values) and values with entitlees (all except interaction-independent instrumental values).

Table 5.8: Expectees and Entitlees and Addressee and Beneficiary Status Types

Values with...	GStrG	NHSCCB	GStrG	NHSCCB
Expectees	1548	1576	85.5%	87.0%
Entitlees	1333	1279	73.6%	70.6%
Expectees as Primary Addressees	877	969	48.4%	53.5%
Expectees as Secondary Addressees	671	607	37.0%	33.5%
Entitlees as Primary Addressees	934	843	51.6%	46.6%
Entitlees as Secondary Addressees	400	437	22.0%	24.1%
Entitlees as Primary Beneficiaries	1294	1250	71.4%	69.0%
Expectees as Primary Beneficiaries	40	29	2.2%	1.6%

The results are also broken down by addressee and beneficiary status type, to illustrate the distribution of expectation and entitlement in more detail. It should be noted that the addressee distribution adds nothing to the data already shown, since each of the categories

coincides precisely with one of the value classes (for example, values with expectees as primary addressees are instrumental values, and values with expectees as secondary addressees are interaction-dependent terminals).

These results are, in fact, surprisingly similar. The only significant differences occur in the addressee categories, and are therefore the same differences noted in Table 5.7. The overall numbers of expectees and entitlees, rather than magnifying the German leaning towards terminality and the British preference for instrumentality, merely suggest it at a level which cannot be regarded as statistically significant. It would therefore seem that the contrasts in the data are visible only at a relatively low level, and are not consistent enough across the value classes to produce an observable pattern of differences at the expectation/entitlement level. These figures simply confirm the British leaning towards instrumental values and the German preference for terminals.

Table 5.9: Optimism/Pessimism Scores

Total Score for...	(score per value appeal)	GStrG	NHSCCB
Pure Interaction-independent Instrumentals	(-15)	-5833	-6619
Impure Interaction-independent Instrumentals	(-11.25)	-992	-1010
Interaction-dependent Instrumentals with Expectees as Primary Beneficiaries	(-10)	-404	-290
Interaction-dependent Instrumentals with Entitlees as Primary Beneficiaries	(-5)	-1799	-2042
Interaction-dependent Terminals	(+5)	3354	3037
Interaction-independent Terminals	(+20)	5268	4712
Positive Scores		8622	7749
Negative Scores		-9028	-9962
Total Points (Absolute negative & positive figures added)		17650	17711
Overall Score (Excess of negative over positive)		-406	-2212
Average Deviation per Value from Neutral Score (0)		-0.224	-1.221

However, some additional evidence for these terminal and instrumental preferences can be found when one applies the figures in Table 5.8 to calculating an overall optimism/pessimism score for each set of data, using the scores suggested in section 3.12.3 of chapter three. As shown in Table 5.9, the instrumental tendency in the British data produces a markedly higher negative score of minus 2212 on an overall points score of over twenty thousand. This does suggest that there is something of a tendency in German political discourse to emphasise entitlements, and an opposite tendency to stress demands and expectations in British political discourse. This, in turn suggests — but only suggests — confirmation of the suspected emphasis in German discourse on the outputs of the political system, due to a possible lingering reliance on system performance.

5.2.7. Value Distribution By Individual Value Count

5.2.7.1. Overview of the Corrected Individual Counts

As before, light can be shed on the overall results for value class distribution by looking more closely at the individual value counts which underlie them. For this comparison, the systemic variables have again been removed completely; this will not have changed all the counts seen in Table 5.3, but it is still worth viewing the entire table again²¹.

Table 5.10: Value Breakdown with Systemic Variables Removed

Value	GStrG	NHSCCB	Value	GStrG	NHSCCB
Accuracy	12	12	Equality	186	52
Altruism	59	26	Flexibility	44	81
Ambition	23	86	Freedom	168	186
Assertiveness	21	12	Honesty	49	70
Assiduousness	2	10	Honourableness	104	161
Caution	0	10	Humility	6	1
Clarity	25	30	Insight	28	38
Compassion	157	121	Justice & Fairness	34	30
Competence	19	14	Lawfulness	9	9
Consistency	37	61	Patience	0	3
Consultation	51	90	Plenitude	185	115
Contentment	9	17	Pride	22	22
Continuity	8	16	Rationality	32	19
Control	17	13	Realism	49	31
Convenience	1	8	Respect	4	7
Conviction	2	10	Responsibility	57	32
Co-operation & Agreement	43	48	Security	3	5
Cynicism	20	17	Sense of Duty	5	5
Decisiveness	20	15	Sense of Identity	21	36
Dedication	4	6	Sobriety	1	1
Determination	12	11	Stability	3	8
Dignity	29	73	Success	25	25
Discipline	30	7	Thoroughness	8	10
Efficiency	152	131	Trustfulness	8	14
Employment	11	9			

Of those values whose counts have been altered, three stand out: *ambition*, *plenitude* and *freedom*. The counts for *ambition* and *plenitude* have both been reduced very considerably, but a comparison shows the same pattern as before: German politicians appeal to *plenitude* more often than their British peers, and British politicians appeal to *ambition* more often than their German counterparts. The position of *freedom*, in contrast, has been

²¹ Since *health* was completely removed from the data, it will not be included.

reversed: whereas, previously, the German figures were higher, the removal of the combination value *plenitude* and *freedom* has made the British count higher, thus showing the previous German figures to be an artefact of the focus in the German debate on compulsory contributions.

These and other interesting patterns in the data can be observed more clearly by taking the highest figures from this table and producing overall value rankings for the two countries. Ranking the values also has the advantage of showing the relative importance of the values as well as their absolute counts. Table 5.11 shows the twenty top-ranking values from each country in ascending order.

Table 5.11: Twenty Top-Ranking Values

GStrG		NHSCCB	
Equality	186	Freedom	186
Plenitude	185	Honourableness	161
Freedom	168	Efficiency	131
Compassion	157	Compassion	121
Efficiency	152	Plenitude	115
Honourableness	104	Consultation	90
Altruism	59	Ambition	86
Responsibility	57	Flexibility	81
Consultation	51	Dignity	73
Honesty	49	Honesty	70
Realism	49	Consistency	61
Flexibility	44	Equality	52
Co-operation & Agreement	43	Co-operation & Agreement	48
Consistency	37	Insight	38
Justice & Fairness	34	Sense of Identity	36
Rationality	32	Responsibility	32
Discipline	30	Realism	31
Dignity	29	Clarity	30
Insight	28	Justice & Fairness	30
Clarity	25	Altruism	26

The ranking shows more vividly than the figures the difference in prominence given to values such as *equality*, *altruism* and *ambition*. *Equality* is the top-ranking German value, yet merits only a mid-ranking position in the British data; *altruism* appears near the top of the German figures but is the lowest-ranking value in the British top twenty. Conversely, *ambition* appears in seventh position in the British data but only in twenty-second position in the German results (not shown).

It was noted earlier that some values connected with "personal" or moral qualities such as *honesty* and *honourableness* occur much more frequently in the British data, and this

pattern is preserved despite the re-correction of the figures to the new basis counts. Although the rankings of *honesty* are equal despite the significantly higher British count, both *honourableness* and *consistency* have much higher rankings in the British figures. In particular, the fact that *honourableness* is appealed to more often in the British debate than any other value except *freedom* demonstrates that personal references — usually criticisms — play a greater role in the data than many of the values more directly related to issues of policy, issues which one might expect to be the centre of attention in such a debate. One might attempt to explain this marked difference by reference to the much higher frequency of interventions in the British debate, where personal exchanges, and thus accusations of dishonesty and dishonourableness, may be more common. This is, however, not supported by the data. If one removes those parts of the data recorded as interventions and responses to interventions, the difference in counts and rankings remains.

5.2.7.2. *Re-interpreting the Value Class Findings*

Given that the stronger British focus on personal values seems so clear, the question arises of whether some of the patterns seen at the value class level might be explained by these results. In particular, “personal” values such as *honourableness*, *honesty* and *consistency* may account for a large part of the British leaning towards instrumental values, since all of such values are primarily directed at expectees. This can be tested by removing those values most closely connected with “personal” qualities — *honesty*, *honourableness*, *humility*, *consistency*, *insight* and *trustfulness* — from the data and looking again at some of the overall figures.


Table 5.12: Counts for Selected Value Classes without "Personal" Values

Value Classes	GStrG	NHSCCB
Instrumental Values	621	647
Interaction-independent Instrumental Values	432	512
Interaction-dependent Instrumental Values	189	135

Looking at these results in Table 5.12, it would indeed appear that removing these values removes a large proportion of the difference between the figures in the instrumental class. Moreover, looking specifically at interaction-dependent instrumentals (which include *honesty*, *honourableness* and *consistency*, but also *altruism* and *responsibility*), removing these figures turns a small British lead into significantly higher German figures. On the basis of the individual value breakdown in Table 5.10, these higher German figures must be explained by the two values *responsibility* and *altruism*, since the German figures for all

other values are either lower or equal. These figures thus seem to lend strong support to the notion that British political discourse is characterised by the language and values of personal relations and moral qualities, reflecting Mackenzie's notion that the British type of political system is regarded as an "immensely extended kinship system" (Mackenzie in Rohe 1982b: 588). At the same time, when taken together with the German preference for terminal interaction-dependent values, the figures also seem to reveal a focus in the German discourse on certain forms of social exchange.

Figure 5.3: Value Map for GStrG



There are also other patterns hidden in these dry figures, which can be seen more clearly in the values maps for each debate shown in Figure 5.3 and Figure 5.4. The figures for the interaction-independent class, which show a higher but not substantially higher British count, conceal a more chequered pattern of differences, with higher British figures for *flexibility* and *ambition*, and, to a lesser extent, for *caution*, *assiduousness* and *conviction*, and higher German counts for *realism*, *discipline*, *efficiency* and *rationality*.

In almost every case, therefore, a relatively small overall lead in a particular value class has concealed a much larger lead in just one or two values. This must lead to the conclusion that, if there is a greater overall pattern in the differences between value counts, it does not lie primarily in the distinction between terminal and instrumental values, or between interaction-dependent and interaction-independent values. Although analysis by these value classes does show up reasonably clear differences in the tendency to appeal to terminal or instrumental values, it would seem that still greater differences exist when the values are grouped differently.

It is interesting to see how some of these differences are reflected in the rankings of values within each debate. All of the values in Table 5.10 were ranked by count for each country, and the ranks compared for those showing the largest differences in count *and* in rank. The results, shown in Table 5.13, largely confirm what has already been noted, with the different rankings of *equality* being perhaps the most striking outcome.

Table 5.13: Values with Significant Differences in Ranking and Count

Value	GStrG		NHSCCB		Difference
	Ranking				
Discipline	17	42	25	17	25
Ambition	22	7	15	7	15
Altruism	7	20	13	7	13
Equality	1	12	11	1	11
Sense of Identity	25	15	10	25	10
Dignity	18	9	9	18	9
Responsibility	8	16	8	8	8
Rationality	16	23	7	16	7
Realism	11	17	6	11	6
Honourableness	6	2	4	6	4
Flexibility	12	8	4	12	4

5.2.8. Summary of the Individual Value Results

When the values preferred by German politicians — *responsibility, altruism, realism, discipline, efficiency, rationality, equality, compassion and plenitude* — are placed alongside those preferred by their British counterparts — *honesty, honourableness, consistency, trustfulness, flexibility, ambition, caution, assiduousness, conviction, consultation, dignity, freedom, co-operation & agreement, sense of identity, convenience, continuity and contentment* — differences emerge which cut across some of the value classes. Many of the British values seem either to be concerned with behavioural expectations which do not demand any explicit social exchange, or with social behavioural values which are concerned

with the morality or character of their expectees, rather than the delivery of any concrete benefits to the entitlees. Some of the top German values, in contrast, appear more positive in their expectations. For example, *altruism*, despite being interaction-dependent like *honesty*, *honourableness* and *consistency*, demands a more active and positive exchange than the latter three, which are mainly defined negatively.

Responsibility fits this pattern too, and also seems to reflect another pattern observable in the highest ranking German values: *responsibility*, *realism*, *discipline*, *efficiency* and *rationality* have a formal character which contrasts strongly with the personal, moral and emotional characteristics of many of the British values. Each seems to place more emphasis on the demands which flow from a rational analysis of necessity, values which one might expect to encounter frequently in a political culture which takes a bureaucratic and technocratic view of the state.

The British tendency to appeal to values such as *contentment*, *sense of identity*, *dignity* and *conviction* can be seen as further support for the assumption that values which emphasise feelings will receive greater stress in “conventionalistic” and “deference-oriented” political cultures, and that the values of British politics are closer to the “lifeworld” than those of German politics. The rational overtones of *flexibility*, a value more common in the British debate, perhaps make it an exception, but one might suspect that appeals to it tend to carry more of an emphasis on the character and emotional disposition of the flexible and the inflexible, rather than on the rational demands which necessitate *flexibility*. An examination of the corpus both confirms this and reveals, furthermore, that this tendency is much more pronounced in the British data. A few examples will illustrate: Kenneth Clarke speaks of the “attitude” of opponents and their “reaction” to his reforms (HC Deb, cc 493; NHSCCB 88), of how certain of his proposals will “create a fuss” (HC Deb, cc 497; NHSCCB 175), and about detecting “mounting enthusiasm” for change (HC Deb, cc 501; NHSCCB 289); George Young damns the opposition for being “full of their usual doom and gloom” (HC Deb, cc 520; NHSCCB 787) and Bill Walker speaks of the reforms being “appreciated and understood” (HC Deb, cc 544; NHSCCB 1392); and so on. Examples of this personalised approach are, in contrast, rather sparsely distributed through the German data: Seehofer talks of the “gehörige Portion Mut” shown by the chairman of the *Kassenärztliche Bundesvereinigung* in moving towards discussion with the government (Sten. Ber., S. 8995; GStrG 284), and Bruno Menzel talks of there being “Verständnis” for the

government's measures (Sten. Ber., S. 9014; GStrG 965), but most appeals are depersonalised, with the use of the passive and expressions of necessity being common. The higher frequency of appeals to this value in the British data does, therefore, appear to fit the broader pattern.

Compassion is one of the preferred German values which does not seem to fit into the bureaucratic-technical model of the state's role, although it does, together with the emphasis on *equality* and *plenitude*, seem to fit the observation that terminal values are more important in the German debate. An explanation for this apparent exception may lie in its frequent role as part of the combination value *equality-compassion*; this will be discussed in the section on appeal method results.

Some may object to finding significance in these results, claiming that many of the preferred German values can be located in the details of the arguments over the health reforms. It seems likely that the German emphasis on *altruism*, *compassion* and *equality* reflects the concerns of opponents of the reforms about their likely consequences; *altruism* may well be appealed to most often by those in the debate who criticise the motivations of health care professionals and the pressure in the reforms for professionals to behave less altruistically towards their patients; *compassion* may reflect attacks on the government for not considering the effects of its reforms on the weak and vulnerable; and *equality* is most likely to be appealed to by those who believe that both the financing and the outcomes of the health care system will become less equal following the changes. However, none of these concerns is unique to the German context; each finds its equivalent in the debate about the British reforms, and so it would appear that higher appeal frequencies for these values cannot be explained simply by reference to differences in the content of the Bills.

These deliberations do, however, raise two central questions: to whom are these value appeals addressed, and who is making the appeals? Finding the answers may help to determine the extent to which the results for these values may be artefacts of certain context-specific factors. These questions will be addressed in the next three sections.

5.2.9. Value Distribution by Addressee Role

It is interesting to look at the addressees of value appeals in order to determine on whom speakers are placing expectations, or for whom they are postulating entitlements. Again, the data used to analyse these features will be the results with the systemic variables removed.

5.2.9.1. Overview of the results

Firstly, an overview of the data is given in Table 5.14. It shows broadly similar, in places surprisingly similar distributions of expectee and entitlee roles. The number of appeals to global expectees is almost exactly the same, suggesting there is no greater or lesser tendency in either country towards making demands on the public. There is, however, a marked difference in the appeals to institutional expectees, with British politicians making heavier demands on addressees within health care services institutions; this is partly mirrored by a somewhat milder contrast in the number of appeals to state expectees, of whom German speakers are more likely to make demands. This gives limited support to the notion that the state is afforded a more central role in German political discourse; the figures seem to suggest that, where action is required to resolve problems, the British speakers are inclined to turn more often to actors outside the state, and German speakers more likely to involve the state itself in providing the solution.

Table 5.14: Expectee and Entitlee Roles

Appeals with...	GStrG	NHSCCB	GStrG	NHSCCB
Global Expectees	278	263	15%	15%
Institutional Expectees	408	498	23%	27%
State Expectees	799	750	44%	41%
Global Entitlees	942	880	52%	49%
Institutional Entitlees	341	371	19%	20%
State Entitlees	41	45	2%	2%

The other significant difference is in the number of global entitlees, with German politicians appearing to postulate global entitlements more often than their British counterparts. This is partly counterbalanced by a mild tendency towards more institutional entitlements in the British data. It is hard to interpret this, since closer analysis shows there is no greater tendency for global entitlements to be linked with state expectations in the German data. Nevertheless, the fact that a value does not postulate an explicit exchange (between the state and the public) does not mean that no exchange takes place; it is reasonable to assume that at least some of the global entitlements appealed to involve outputs of the political system.

5.2.9.2. Institutional Expectees

As before, some of these overall figures can be seen to hide more complex patterns when more closely analysed. The higher numbers of institutional expectees in the British figures turn out to be concentrated mainly in appeals to interaction-dependent terminal

values, such as *compassion, dignity, freedom, equality* and *co-operation & agreement*, as shown in Table 5.15. In contrast, institutional expectees are the targets of a markedly higher number of appeals in the German data to interaction-dependent instrumental values such as *responsibility, honesty, honourableness, assertiveness* and *altruism*, with *altruism* accounting for a great deal of the difference.

Since the overwhelming majority of these appeals are negative (in the British as well as the German data) it may suggest a greater tendency in the German debate to frame the problems in the health care system as being the consequence of unmet expectations on the part of the health care institutions. It seems possible that this may be a consequence of a further systemic distortion which affects the distribution of addressee roles — namely the greater independence of the German health care institutions from state control. If this is so, the overall tendency of the British data to favour institutional expectees could only be strengthened if that distortion were removed. The high appeal frequency for *altruism* might well be regarded as a consequence of this distortion, since, as suggested by the high number of institutional expectees, it reflects a concern with the motivations and values of health care professionals.

Table 5.15: Institutional Expectees by Value Class

Classes of Value Appeal with Institutional Expectees	GStrG	NHSCCB
Interaction-Independent Instrumental	194	239
Interaction-Dependent Instrumental	130	74
Interaction-Dependent Terminal	84	185

5.2.9.3. State Expectees

In an exact mirror image of the pattern of institutional expectation, state expectees are the objects of value appeals more often in Germany in all affected classes except interaction-dependent instrumentals. The leaning towards state expectees is especially pronounced for interaction-dependent terminals. However, when one analyses this class of values in detail, it emerges that this difference is explained by only two values: *compassion* and *equality*. There are actually more British appeals to *dignity, consultation* and *freedom* with state expectees, but there are so many more German appeals to *equality* and *compassion* that this fact is hidden.

Table 5.16: State Expectees by Value Class

Classes of Value Appeal with State Expectees	GStrG	NHSCCB
Interaction-Independent Instrumental	149	135
Interaction-Dependent Instrumental	181	236
Interaction-Dependent Terminal	469	379

Table 5.16 shows value appeals with state expectees by value class, and Figure 5.5 and Figure 5.6 show, for each debate, roughly the upper two-thirds of the frequency range for appeals with state expectees — that is, the values with the highest frequency which constitute the upper 68% of the appeal total for the group, the values with the lowest frequencies having been excluded to avoid cluttering the diagrams.

Figure 5.5: Most Frequent State Expectee Appeals in NHSCCB





Table 5.16 shows that the differences in state expectation, as with those in institutional expectation, are not consistent across the value classes, and so this would seem to weaken the argument that there is a clear overall tendency to demand more of the state in German discourse.

Figure 5.6: Most Frequent State Expectee Appeals in GStrG



Nevertheless, the diagrams show an interesting difference in state expectations. The most favoured value in the British state expectee results — *freedom* — can be regarded as being of a different character than other values in its class, such as *equality* and *compassion*, in the sense that it is defined negatively, as the absence of state interference rather than as positive state action. This view is not entirely unproblematic, given that the “creation” of freedom may, paradoxically, require state action to remove or suppress factors which are viewed as inhibiting free choice or action. However, if one accepts that *freedom* does imply a less active state and fewer required outputs from the political system than other terminal values, it does make the German data appear much more strongly inclined towards regarding the state as the object of positive expectations, especially for the realisation of terminal values such as *equality*.

5.2.9.4. Global Entitlees

Table 5.17: Global Entitlees by Value Class

Classes of Value Appeal with Global Entitlees	GStrG	NHSCCB
Interaction-Dependent Instrumental	311	327
Interaction-Dependent Terminal	489	437
Interaction-Independent Terminal	141	115

The observed difference between the British and German debates in terms of the distribution of global entitlees seems more clear-cut when the data is broken down by value class as in Table 5.17. The higher German figures are split fairly evenly between the two

terminal classes, with the overall picture being confused slightly by mildly higher British figures for interaction-dependent instrumentals. The latter are explained by the results already observed: higher German figures for *altruism* and *responsibility*, obscured by even higher British figures for *honesty*, *honourableness* and *consistency*. The higher frequency of appeals to terminal values with global entitlees in the German data appears to lend further support to the theory that there exists a noticeably greater orientation towards outputs in German political discourse. However, the higher number of interaction-independent terminals can be attributed almost solely to the value *plenitude*, and the results for interaction-independent terminals are an exact reflection of those for state expectees: a very large number of German appeals to *equality* and *compassion* produces an overall lead in the category, even though the British figures are higher for *freedom*, *dignity* and *consultation*. Thus, again, the differences cut across the value classes.

Figure 5.7: Most Frequent Global Entitlee Appeals in NHSCCB





Figure 5.7 shows the upper two-thirds of the frequency range for appeals to global entitlees in the British data, and Figure 5.8 shows the same portion of the range for the German data. They illustrate clearly what the figures have already shown: the interaction-dependent terminal value *equality* heads the global entitlements most often cited in German discourse, but does not appear at all in the British diagram (it is actually ranked eighth, just below *consistency*), and that, together with the prominence of *plenitude* (ranked eleventh in the

British data) appears to confirm that the German debate on health is much more centred on what concrete benefits the general populace can obtain from political action. This is despite the ample opportunities in the British context to take up the cause of *equality* in particular: one of the main concerns about the British reforms was the possible emergence of a “two-tier” health service, with the poor being denied access to the best quality care because of accidents of geographical location, all NHS patients possibly losing services, and the more wealthy enjoying state subsidies for private health care. Yet the biggest concentration of appeals to *equality* comes at the beginning of Robin Cook’s speech when he discusses the only vaguely related issue of charges for eye tests.

Again, this German focus on outputs calls to mind Rohe’s description of subject cultures as being characterised by an understanding of politics as the “creation, distribution and allocation of public goods” (Rohe 1982b: 589). Equally, the highest-ranking British value, *honourableness*, appears to constitute a perfect fit for the deference culture model, in which “moralising” plays a central role in discourse. The prominent position of both *consistency* and *honesty* reinforces this conclusion.

Figure 5.8: Most Frequent Global Entitlee Appeals in GStrG



It is also notable that there is a concentration of British appeals to *freedom* with global entitlees — the figures are twice as high as the German figures — whereas the number of

appeals with institutional entitlees is virtually the same in the two debates. If one returns to the figures on state expectation, therefore, and matches state expectees with global entitlees, the greatest preoccupation in the German debate seems to be with the delivery by the state of *equality* and *compassion* to its citizens, whereas the most important values which the British state is required to realise for its subjects appear to be *freedom* and *honourableness*. This is underlined when one notes that, of the appeals to *freedom* with global entitlees — which are already higher in Britain — a higher proportion have the state as the expectee in the British debate than in the German debate, where institutional expectees are more common.

Since freedom from the state seems to be so much of a preoccupation in the British debate, it is perhaps possible to suggest a reason why *consultation* is so emphasised in the British data, in contrast to earlier expectations: if a desire for consultation is an expression of the desire not to have solutions imposed by the state, it may mask any greater preference in the German data for consultation as a part of the normal process of policy-making. If this is true, one would expect the British data to be much more one-sided in terms of who is making the appeals, with far fewer appeals to *consultation* by the government than by the opposition. This will be examined in the next section.

5.2.10. Value Distribution by Party Status

The next step is to compare the figures by party status, in order to examine how the pattern of appeals differs across the parties, and what this might suggest about the origin of those appeals. There are two principal ways to approach this comparison. One can undertake a direct comparison — for instance, ask whether the German opposition appeals more to terminal values than the British opposition — or compare the relative distributions of values across the parties in the two countries — for example, ask whether the German opposition appeals more to terminal values than the German government, and whether comparable differences exist between the British opposition and British government. The latter approach is more suited to testing whether there exists a value consensus, and has the added advantage that, since there is no direct comparison of differences — rather, in effect, a comparison of differences between differences — it is possible to use all the data, including those containing the systemic distortions.

5.2.10.1. Direct Comparison of Value Distribution Across Parties: Overview

Taking the more direct comparison first, Table 5.18 shows appeals in each principal value class by the three categories of party. There are two striking points. The first is the major difference in the figures for government appeals, which show to a greatly magnified degree the previously observed tendency to appeal to terminal values in the German debate, and the opposite leaning towards instrumental values in the British debate. They also show a pronounced preference for interaction-dependent values in the German text as compared to the British. It is therefore no surprise that, on closer examination, the main differences between the two governments arise in terminal interaction-dependent values (such as *equality*, *freedom* and *compassion*), where the German figures are higher, and in interaction-independent instrumental values (such as *discipline*, *realism* and *ambition*), where the British figures are higher. For the other two sub-classes, the figures are largely equal.

Table 5.18: Value Class Overview by Party

Appeals by → To ↓	Government		Main Opposition		Non-Main Opposition	
	GStrG	NHSCCB	GStrG	NHSCCB	GStrG	NHSCCB
Terminal	520	385	342	342	80	115
(% of basis)	52.24%	38.67%	54.50%	54.48%	42.44%	61.01%
Instrumental	476	611	285	286	109	73
(% of basis)	47.82%	61.38%	45.42%	45.52%	57.82%	38.73%
Interaction- dependent	516	415	420	477	137	142
(% of basis)	51.83%	41.69%	66.93%	76.09%	72.68%	75.33%
Interaction- independent	480	581	208	150	51	46
(% of basis)	48.22%	58.36%	33.15%	23.91%	27.06%	24.40%

The second striking result is the similarity of the main opposition figures for terminal and instrumental values. On the interactional axis, the figures are less similar, but the differences all seem to be directly opposite to the differences noted in the government appeals. This pattern is reflected, although less strongly, in the appeals from the other opposition parties.

Further confirmation of these patterns comes from calculating the optimism and pessimism scores for the two main party groupings. Table 5.19 shows two interesting results. Firstly, there is a marked difference within the countries between the levels of optimism in the value appeals of the governing and main opposition parties. In both countries, the governing parties have negative scores, indicating that their value appeals are, on balance,

more pessimistic than optimistic; in contrast, both main opposition groupings show positive scores. On closer examination, this is explained by the fact that interaction-dependent instrumentals and both classes of terminal value — that is, all the classes of value which have entitlements as addressees — account for a greater proportion of appeals in the main opposition data than in the government data. This demonstrates that the main opposition parties focus much more on entitlements than the governing parties, which is unsurprising, given their greater freedom to avoid unpopular causes and policies.

Table 5.19: Optimism/Pessimism Scores for Main Party Groupings


Totals	(Scores per value)	Government		Main Opposition	
		GStrG	NHSCCB	GStrG	NHSCCB
Pure Interaction-independent Instrumentals		-4103	-5385	-1215	-921
	(-15)				
Impure Interaction-independent Instrumentals		-373	-571	-490	-336
	(-11.25)				
Interaction-dependent Instrumentals with Expectees as Primary Beneficiaries		-221	-239	-60	-51
	(-10)				
Interaction-dependent Instrumentals with Entitlees as Primary Beneficiaries		-714	-825	-774	-946
	(-5)				
Interaction-dependent Terminals		1750	1114	1300	1415
	(+5)				
Interaction-independent Terminals		3359	3182	1644	1211
	(+20)				
Positive Scores		5108	4296	2944	2626
Negative Scores		-5411	-7020	-2539	-2254
Total Points (Absolute negative & positive figures added)		10519	11316	5483	4880
Overall Score (Excess of negative over positive)		-303	-2724	405	372
Average Deviation per Value from Neutral Score (0)		-0.167	-1.504	0.224	0.205

The second interesting point is the dramatic confirmation of earlier findings pointing to a greater concentration on expectations in the British government figures. The British governing party's score is nearly two and a half thousand lower than that of the German governing parties, on an overall points total of just over eleven thousand, showing a very strong bias towards more pessimistic values. The figures show that this is concentrated in appeals to interaction-independent instrumental values such as *ambition*, *flexibility* and *assiduousness*. In the overall optimism/pessimism figures, this strong bias was masked by the more entitlement-centred appeal pattern of the main British opposition.

In the next two sections, these results will be investigated more closely.


5.2.10.2. *Direct Comparison of Value Distribution Across Parties: Governments*

Figure 5.9: Value Map for Governing Parties in GStrG



The two value maps in Figure 5.9 and Figure 5.10 show the value distribution for the governing parties in each debate, and make it clearer which values are responsible for these overall numbers. They demonstrate some similarities and some differences in emphasis from the overall value maps shown earlier.


Figure 5.11: Top Values for Governing Parties in GStrG



Nevertheless, a closer look at the government figures also reveals that many, but not all, of the overall trends are still visible. Figure 5.11 and Figure 5.12 show values in the upper two-thirds of the frequency range for appeals from the governing parties in both debates. The British government's emphasis on behavioural values is seen in higher figures for *ambition*, *accuracy*, *assiduousness*, *clarity*, *flexibility*, *insight* and *success*, as well as *honourableness* and *honesty*, although the difference on those last two is much less marked than in the overall figures. On the terminal side, the preferences noted earlier for *sense of identity*, *pride*, *contentment* and *co-operation & agreement* are still visible, but the numbers for *dignity* are no longer significantly higher. On the German side, in contrast to the overall results, the terminal values *consultation* and *freedom* both occur more frequently than in the British appeals. As before, the German figures also show higher numbers for the terminal values *compassion*, *plenitude* and *equality*, and a significantly greater appeal frequency for *justice & fairness*, which has previously not appeared to differ between the two sets of data. A number of the instrumental values yielded more often by the overall German data — such as *altruism*, *control*, *discipline*, *realism* and *responsibility* — are also

preferred by the German government, but *rationality* appears to be equally favoured in this subset of the data.

Figure 5.12: Top Values for Governing Party in NHSCCB



Perhaps the most interesting result from the government side is the contrast between *co-operation & agreement* and *consultation*, of which the former appears to be far preferred by the British government over the latter. It is particularly enlightening to note that the expectees in British government appeals to *co-operation & agreement* are virtually all either global or institutional — very rarely is the government seen as being in need of co-operating or agreeing with anyone else. Equally, only half of the expectees in the British government's appeals to *consultation* are state expectees. In contrast, every appeal by the German government to *consultation* bar two has the state as the expectee. Thus, the addressee results show not only that the German government appears to value consultation more in this debate, but also that it views it as part of the policy-making process in a way which the British government does not.

A further curious result is that for *freedom*, where the German figures now appear higher. However, there are some interesting differences hidden here, too. Whilst only a quarter of the British appeals have negative polarity, almost three-quarters of the German appeals are negative, and almost all of the latter have state expectees. In other words, the German government appears to be criticising the non-realisation of this value by the state.


This is partially explained when the polarity modifiers are taken into account. Almost all of these negative appeals by the government are strongly or weakly qualified or hypothecated; in most cases, the former. In effect, therefore, the government parties are qualifying their criticism of the value's non-realisation, because its non-realisation arises from their own proposals. This reflects a common feature of the German debate, and of Seehofer's speech in particular: qualified apologies for the limitation of *freedom* by some aspect of the reforms. The largely positive British appeals, on the other hand, seem to be split fairly evenly between a celebration of increases in freedom provided by the state, and those which are provided, or which the state wishes to be provided, by the institutions. Thus, results which, on the surface, would appear to suggest that the German government is even less keen on intervention than the British government in fact demonstrate the opposite: the figures document a catalogue of apologies for the restriction of freedoms.

A similar pattern is seen for the value *plenitude*. Whereas two-thirds of the British government's appeals to this value are positive — and mostly concerned with resources for institutional entitlements — almost three-quarters of the German appeals are negative, and have greater spread of institutional and global entitlements, although the majority are also institutional. In addition, half of these negative appeals are qualified in some way. Thus, despite the resource implications of both reforms, the German governing parties seem to focus much more on the possible negative consequences, whilst those in Britain concentrate more on promoting the likely benefits. Both show a concern with resources — when the German qualified appeals are taken out, almost the same level of concern — but this concern is manifested in notably different ways.

5.2.10.3. *Direct Comparison of Value Distribution Across Parties: Main Opposition*

The top-ranking main opposition values, shown in Figure 5.13 and Figure 5.14 on the following two pages, also reflect some of the general patterns in the data and confirm some of the tentative explanations offered for some of the more curious overall results.


Figure 5.13: Top Values for Main Opposition in GStrG



They confirm that the Labour Party is indeed responsible for a large part of the appeals to *honourableness* in the British figures; it is a value which receives more attention than any other when the distortions are removed from the figures. In line with the overall results, *honesty* also has considerable prominence in the British data, but fails to appear in the top German values. *Honourableness* is prominent in the German results too, but questioning the motives and integrity of one's political opponents seems to be a much more important ritual in British debating.

The graphs also confirm the higher German figures for both *equality* and *plenitude*, with *equality* being the most favoured value for the German opposition, whilst the British opposition's interest in the value stands at almost as low a level as that of the British government. Reflecting the overall results, but contrasting with the governing party figures, the graphs also show that the values *consultation* and *freedom* occur much more often in the British data than in the German data. In the light of these figures, explanations can be suggested for the contrast between the parties.

Figure 5.14: Top Values for Main Opposition in NHSCCB



Firstly, the higher numbers for *freedom* confirm in many ways what has been concluded before. Almost all appeals in the British data are negative and almost all have the state as expectees — in other words, they constitute criticism of a supposed absence or diminution of freedom, even though the governing party results show that the British government is trying hard to claim that their proposals involve increasing freedom, principally freedom of choice. In contrast, although most references to *freedom* by the German governing parties are of a negative apologetic nature — justifying the diminution of freedom by the proposals — the main German opposition do not seem to view that as a particularly important matter on which to criticise the government. This reflects the hostility of the SPD and others towards the government’s conciliatory attitude to those who would be affected by the interventionist measures in the reforms. The German opposition place values such as *equality* and *compassion* before *freedom* and are willing to see further intervention if it will help to realise these values; they show none of the FDP’s reverence for the independent status of health care professionals. It is interesting that the other opposition parties, the PDS/Linke Liste and Bündnis 90/Die Grünen place even less emphasis on *freedom*: it appears only ninth in their top value ranking, with *altruism* in first place, *equality* in second place and *compassion* in fourth.

However, although the German government's qualified apologies and the opposition's relatively low level of interest in *freedom* seem to suggest a more interventionist view of the state, this might merely reflect the difference in the power of the two states with respect to the health care institutions. Prior to the reforms, the British state's central control of financing and ownership of hospitals gave it more power over the NHS than the German state had over the German health care system. This power difference should not be exaggerated; GPs enjoyed and continue to enjoy considerable independence within the NHS — indeed, a deal very favourable to GPs was an essential precondition to the establishment of the NHS itself — and prior to the reforms, especially, much of the regulation of the performance and competence of health care professionals was entirely carried out within the professions. Nevertheless, the difference is real and must be taken into account.

A clue that it may not be a wholly adequate explanation lies in the uniformity of the attitudes of the parties. In Britain, the thrust of the government's reforms was to shift responsibility for the day-to-day management of the NHS and for improving its performance to local managers and doctors; however, despite this, the British opposition did not argue that central control should be maintained, but instead seized on the government's failure to consult on proposals for self-governing hospitals as an opportunity to appeal to *consultation* and *freedom*. In Germany, the reforms proposed more intervention, and yet the opposition parties responded by demanding more intervention, not less. In each case, the parties appear to be pulling in the same direction in terms of the state's involvement in the health care system. Furthermore, there is a sharp difference between the styles of the appeals in both countries. The British opposition's attack on state power is far more personalised, typically by reference to the Secretary of State. This is most vividly illustrated when Robin Cook points out how many times the Secretary of State is mentioned in the Bill (HC Deb, cc 515; NHSCCB 641-652, 659-670). This points to a difference in conceptualisation of the state and its power, not just a difference in its relationship to the health care institutions.

Secondly, the main opposition figures give an insight into the overall results for *consultation*. They seem to indicate that, although it is not a value taken seriously by the British governing party, it is a value which the opposition believes will form the basis of an effective attack on the government, and which they must therefore believe is held by a substantial number of people. Figures for the other British opposition parties show that

they take *consultation* even more seriously than the main opposition, placing it second in their value rankings. This, and the results for the governing parties, back the tentative hypothesis offered at the end of section 5.2.9, namely that the British preoccupation with this value is caused largely by opposition criticism of the government's failure to consult, whereas the German data is dominated by government appeals, reflecting the German view that consultation is a normal and accepted part of the normal business of legislating.

Finally, an interesting result in the party data, particularly in the light of some earlier remarks, is that for *altruism*. It was previously suggested that its prominence in the German results may be a result of the criticism of health-care professionals, and thus perhaps partly due to context-specific factors in Germany. The data here supports this conclusion. The high rank of *altruism* in the overall German data conceals the interesting fact that, although the value ranks more highly right across the German data — for the government, the main opposition and the minor opposition parties — it is not an especially prominent value for either of the two main party groupings, appearing in neither of the diagrams shown above (Figure 5.11 and Figure 5.13). The reason for *altruism*'s high ranking overall therefore lies in its prominence in the appeals of the minor opposition parties, which was noted above. Despite having a comparatively small part in the debate, the minor opposition parties make almost as many appeals to this value as all the other parties put together. This suggests why its high frequency may be anomalous, the result of a further systemic distortion. This result seems likely to reflect the peculiar hostility to large scale commercial enterprise in the ideologies of those parties, which, of course, also dovetails with the much greater commercial independence of the German health care system and consequent power of the health service institutions, in comparison to the NHS.

5.2.10.4. *Analysis of Value Consensus Through Indirect Comparison of Party Values*

The next step in this part of the analysis is to perform an indirect comparison of the party results to examine the degree of value consensus within each country. "Value consensus" will here be taken to refer to a consensus about the *importance* of particular values, rather than about their *realisation*, and it should be noted that the two do not always coincide. The behaviour of the parties in the two debates with respect to the value *freedom*, seen in the results from the direct comparison, shows that both the government and opposition can place emphasis on a value, whilst still arguing over the extent of its realisation. One might regard a consensus on value importance as a "deeper" consensus than one about

value realisation, and thus as better evidence for consensual politics. Later in this section, the evidence for a “shallow” consensus on value realisation will also be examined by looking at polarity.

Table 5.20: Top Ten Ranking Values for Main Two Party Groupings in GStrG

Governing Parties	Main Opposition
Plenitude	Plenitude
Freedom	Freedom
Control	Health
Efficiency	Equality
Health	Compassion
Equality	Honourableness
Compassion	Control
Thoroughness	Thoroughness
Responsibility	Efficiency
Consultation	Co-operation & Agreement

Since this is an indirect comparison, all of the data, including the systemic distortions, can be included in the analysis. The results for each country should therefore not be taken in isolation; only the comparison of the differences in ranking is significant. A brief comparison of the value rankings for the two main party groups (government and main opposition) provides some superficial evidence of a difference in the level of value consensus. Table 5.20 and Table 5.21 show the top ten ranking values for both groups in each country. In the German case, eight of the ten values are shared between the government and the main opposition — *plenitude, freedom, control, efficiency, health, equality, compassion and thoroughness* — whilst, in the British debate, only six are shared — *health, plenitude, freedom, control, compassion and honourableness* — indicating that the German parties may be somewhat closer in their view of what is politically important. It should be remembered that, although the difference appears small, the fact that the parties in each country are all taking part in the same debate on the same legislative proposals makes it very likely that a significant number of values will be shared in both cases. The significance of marginal differences in the number of shared values is thus greater than it may at first seem; after all, the achievement of a 100% value consensus amongst the German parties could only add two to their shared value total.

Table 5.21: Top Ten Ranking Values for Main Two Party Groupings in NHSCCB

Governing Parties	Main Opposition
Health	Honourableness
Plenitude	Health
Ambition	Freedom
Efficiency	Plenitude
Freedom	Compassion
Flexibility	Consultation
Control	Dignity
Compassion	Honesty
Honourableness	Consistency
Convenience	Control

To confirm this finding, more detailed evidence is needed. This can be garnered by producing a Spearman rank correlation coefficient for each pair of rankings to demonstrate, in each case, how likely it is that a value ranked high or low by the government will be ranked high or low by the main opposition²². Using this closer analysis, there emerges a quite dramatic difference. Both countries show a correlation between the value rankings of the main party groupings, but it is relatively modest in the British data (0.43) and very strong — an almost perfect correlation — in the German data (0.89). This is a much greater difference than the simple rankings above suggest. These results thus provide, firstly, confirmation that many values are shared by the main parties in both countries, an unsurprising outcome given the fact that the same subject matter is being debated, and secondly, a strong indication that there is a greater “deep” consensus on what is important and desirable amongst the most prominent German parties.

Examining differences in value rankings does not provide the only view of consensus in a country’s political discourse. Whilst the above comparison examines whether the parties focus on the same values, an examination of the polarity of appeals can reveal how far the parties differ on their assessment of the realisation of those values, and help determine

²²

The formula for the coefficient is as follows:
$$rs = 1 - \frac{6 \sum d^2}{N^3 - N}$$

where *rs* stands for the correlation coefficient, *d* signifies the difference between the rank of each value in the first and second rankings, and *N* represents the number of values.

The ranking of the items was done as follows: for each data set, values were ranked both for government and main opposition appeal frequency. Each of these ranks was then divided into a number of equal ranges, and each value item assigned the number of the range to which its frequency value was closest. Thus, more than one value item could have the same rank number, reflecting the fact that several items in a range might have similar or identical frequency values, and that others may be very widely spaced. These new ranks were then used to calculate the correlation coefficient.

whether there is a “shallow” consensus in either country. For this part of the analysis, the percentage of positive appeals will be calculated for each value and each party grouping in each country, and from that will be calculated, for each value in each country, the difference between the percentages for the main opposition and the government. In effect, this indicates how likely it is that a positive attitude on the part of one party group towards the realisation of a value is likely to be matched by a positive attitude on the part of the other, or — more realistically — how much more negative one party group is than another, and if this “polarity gap” is different in the two countries.

Figure 5.15 and Figure 5.16 on pages 289 and 290 show the polarity levels for top-ranking values in each country, excluding hypothecated and qualified appeals, and reveal some interesting points. Not only is the main opposition *generally* more negative than the government, it is *always* more negative when appealing to the most prominent values in the debate — with the one exception of *honesty* in the British figures. It would appear that *honesty* is appealed to very negatively by all the main British parties, suggesting again that the British debate is characterised by frequent negative personal attacks. Also noteworthy is the extent to which the two curves on each graph follow each other, suggesting that, in many cases, the position of the opposition is deliberately “offset” from that of the government, or vice versa. This pattern is especially pronounced in the German appeals. These similarities indicate that the opposition cannot afford to be too negative, or the government too positive, perhaps because they feel that too great a contrast between their positions might turn off the audience, or because both are seeking to match the audience’s current perceived mood. The more erratic pattern of the British graph perhaps suggests that the British parties — or at least elements of them — are more willing to engage in adversarial debate and less concerned to moderate their contributions.

Before an overview is taken, a few individual results can be picked out. It is interesting to compare the findings for *consultation* in the two graphs, which complement what was observed about *consultation* in previous sections. Not only is *consultation* a prime concern of the German government, but the main parties in Germany are also almost equally positive about both *consultation* and *co-operation and agreement*. In contrast, the British parties stand at opposite poles, with the government seldom making reference to *consultation*, yet being extremely positive when it does, and the opposition making great play of the government’s failure to consult and thus being almost exclusively negative. This interpre-

tation is strengthened by a significant number of hypothecated positive appeals to *consultation* by opposition backbenchers in the British data, suggesting further frustration at the government's attitude.

At this point it seems appropriate to shed further light on the difference in attitudes to this important value in the two countries by an examination of addressee patterns and by looking back at the original appeals in the texts. They show that the British opposition appeals are almost all concerned with the supposedly inadequate interface between an all-powerful state and a people allegedly opposed to its actions. In contrast, the German appeals are almost all concerned with consultation between one party and another, and between parties and special interest groups with the health care system. A further characteristic of the British appeals, and of opposition comments on the government's behaviour generally, is the greater degree of personalisation: in addition to the personalisation of state power mentioned earlier, the opposition frequently frame the "people" and the "users of the service" (not the institutions) as the proper beneficiaries of consultation by the state (HC Deb, cc 499-500, 508, 518; NHSCCB 237-240, 248, 465-475, 733-737). German politicians, in contrast, do not apparently feel the need to be seen consulting "the people" or complaining when others do not consult them; in fact, opposition criticism is levelled at the government for discussing the reforms with special interest groups rather than with the other parties formally involved in the legislative process (Sten. Ber., S. 8999-9000; GStrG 485-491). Finally, a very telling point made by the veteran Labour MP Michael Foot makes an interesting contrast with the British opposition's professed enthusiasm for consultation. Foot, after criticising the government for failing to consult over their reform proposals or listen to the crescendo of criticism, makes the perhaps unintentional admission that the Labour government of 1945 did not found the NHS "on a democratic basis", confessing that "the co-operation of doctors and other staff would never have been secured if that had been the case" (HC Deb, cc 523-524; NHSCCB 889).

The picture that emerges is therefore of a merely perfunctory commitment to *consultation* in Britain, and a conceptualisation of it not as a part of the machinery of government, but as a weapon with which to attack the allegedly misguided policies of opponents, to be dispensed with once the commanding heights of government are reached and the "correct" policies can be put into place. Appeals to "ask the people" seem, in fact, to be a way of resolving some of the tensions caused by the reform process and the power of the state, ten-

sions which the formal constitutional arrangements do not address. In Germany, in contrast, the state's power seems to be less disputed, despite, or perhaps because of, the greater distance between electorate and representatives, and consultation appears to be a much more institutionalised process.

As an aside to the consensus debate, the figures for *health* are noteworthy. Since all of the data is analysed here, this is the first opportunity to observe some of the results for *health*, which is otherwise excluded to remove systemic distortions. The numbers show that the SPD judge its realisation extremely negatively, even more so than the Labour Party. This is, perhaps, a surprising result considering that one would expect a lower level of concern with the outputs of the health care system in the FRG. It may support the assertion that there is a greater German focus on all system outputs, including outputs from the health care system, which is strong enough to mask the effects of a health care system which delivers better care.

To bring these individual results together, and to establish whether the parties in one country tend to be further apart in their assessments than those in another, the average polarity gap between the two main party groups was calculated for the most commonly appealed-to values in each country (a concentration on top-ranking values eliminated values with very low counts which would distort the findings). The results are fairly clear: the average difference in positive polarity is 52.4% in the German data, but only 38.36% in the British data, a significant difference of 14.05% and the opposite of what might have been expected. This suggests that there may be a greater "shallow" consensus on value realisation in Britain, which seems slightly curious in the light of other evidence which seems to point to a more consensual approach in the Federal Republic. These figures will be analysed further in the next section, when the results are analysed according to speaker status.

Figure 5.15: Positive Polarity Levels for Top Ranked Values in GStrG





Figure 5.16: Positive Polarity Levels for Top-Ranked Values in NHSCCB




5.2.11. Value Distribution by Speaker Status

A further angle from which to view the data is that of speaker status. Speaker status has been reduced down to a simple “frontbencher”/“backbencher” classification in the analysis, to distinguish between those who have positions in either the government or the party leadership and those who are less closely tied to the party line on issues. Since analysing the available data on this level reduces many of the individual value counts below the level where they can be regarded as reliable, this section will largely concentrate on aggregate counts for positive polarity in the different party groupings.

The first objective is to look at the overall pattern of polarity for frontbenchers and backbenchers and to determine whether those patterns confirm the data from the previous section, which suggested a larger polarity gap in the German debate, and thereby appeared to contradict the expectation that a more consensual political culture would be reflected in less polarised value appeals. To obtain figures for polarity without examining individual values, the total number of appeals with positive and negative polarity was calculated for both frontbenchers and backbenchers in each party grouping, and the percentage of positive polarity derived from that. The percentages are illustrated in Figure 5.17.

Figure 5.17: Positive Polarity by Speaker Status



The results clearly confirm the earlier, unsurprising finding that the government is a great deal more positive than the main opposition. Furthermore, they demonstrate unequivocally that frontbenchers are more extreme than backbenchers in their assessments of

value realisation: the main opposition leadership is very negative and the government spokespeople are extremely positive, with backbenchers falling somewhere in between the two. Furthermore, none of the results are significantly different in the two debates: the government frontbenchers are equally positive in each country, the main opposition frontbenchers equally negative, and both groups of backbenchers show similar, more moderate levels of polarity in the middle. Crucially, it shows no great difference in the gap between the government and the main opposition in the two countries, in contrast to what the overall figures suggested. The question therefore arises as to what is causing the discrepancy between these new results and the previous ones.

A clue lies in the clear difference between polarity levels for frontbenchers and backbenchers. Examination of the figures reveals that the distribution of backbenchers and frontbenchers in the debates is not equal: the British debate features many more backbenchers but fewer frontbenchers than the German debate, and so, since frontbenchers are more extreme in their assessments, the overall results appear to show more polarisation in the arguments between the German parties. The 14% difference between the overall German and British polarity gaps is therefore to be accounted for by the fact that more speakers in this *Bundestag* debate tend to have positions of importance in their parties and are thus classified with the party leadership and main spokespeople, a pattern which probably reflects the more diffuse distribution of power in the German constitution. Whether this is systemic, or just a peculiar feature of this data, the overall results can safely be discounted as misleading. Taking the more reliable percentages from Figure 5.17, therefore, one cannot find any clear evidence in the pattern of positive and negative value appeals which clearly speaks for or against a less confrontational political culture in Germany.

There are, however, some other polarity results at this level which support the consensual model. German politicians make many more appeals with modified polarity in the health debate than their British opposite numbers. Firstly, polarity qualification, already mentioned in the context of the German government's apologies for restricting the freedoms of doctors and others, is used five times more often by German government frontbenchers than British government frontbenchers and almost seven times more often by CDU and FDP backbenchers than by their British Conservative counterparts. In contrast, as shown in Table 5.22, it is barely used at all by the main opposition in either country, a fact

which confirms its role as a means for governments to qualify their advocacy of unpopular policies. The greater willingness of the German governing parties to make such tacit apologies suggests that they feel less able or willing to shrug off criticism directed at their policies and feel more inclined, or compelled, to compromise.

Table 5.22: Qualified Appeals by Party Groups

	GStrG	NHSCCB
Government Frontbenchers	105	21
Government Backbenchers	108	16
Main Opposition Frontbenchers	6	1
Main Opposition Backbenchers	2	2

The second aspect of polarity modification is hypothecation. Here, too, a very clear pattern emerges. As Table 5.23 shows, the use of hypothecation does not vary much between the different parties or sections of parties, but is typically twice as frequent in the German value appeals as in British value appeals. Moreover, almost all government hypothecation is negative, and almost all opposition hypothecation positive. This confirms that hypothecation is a means for governments to talk in negative terms about what they do not wish to see happen, as an alternative to positively promoting their policies, and for oppositions to talk about what they would like to see the government do, as an alternative to criticising their actual policies. Each of these approaches is clearly less appropriate in a political culture which favours confrontation and does not reward moderation or compromise, and so the consistently higher frequency of this type of appeal in the German data is a clear sign that German politicians are prepared to adopt a less confrontational stance in debate.

Table 5.23: Hypothecated Appeals by Party Groups

	GStrG	NHSCCB
Government Frontbenchers	86	40
Government Backbenchers	85	23
Main Opposition Frontbenchers	86	40
Main Opposition Backbenchers	90	47

Finally in this section, the polarity of a few individual value results will be analysed. Although the counts for many individual values are too small to be reliably analysed at the frontbencher/backbencher level, some of the top-ranking values appealed to by frontbenchers have high enough counts to enable a comparison with the overall polarity results. The results for the *Gesundheits-Strukturgesetz* are shown in Figure 5.18 on page 295 and those for the NHS and Community Care Bill in Figure 5.19 on page 296. They largely confirm

the overall finding that the parties appear to “shadow” each other on the different values, with the British graph again appearing somewhat more erratic than the German one. In the British data, *honesty* is again the exception to the rule that the main opposition are more negative than the government, with the government front bench being more negative than their opposition counterparts. Notably, as in the overall results, *honesty* and *honourableness* are two of the three values on which the two British front benches are closest, again reflecting the negative personalised attacks characterising British political discourse.

The third value showing a small polarity gap between the British front benches is *efficiency*; this value also features in the German graph, and the German front benches are even closer together in their appeals to it. Taken together with the overall polarity results, it shows both the importance of this value to the main parties in both countries, and their concern to be seen taking a moderate position on it. The governments do not wish to be too upbeat about efficiency, because that would deprive them of one of the principal sticks with which they can beat special interest groups; and the opposition want to be seen welcoming measures which increase efficiency, to enhance their image as responsible governments-in-waiting. The latter is especially true in these debates, since both of the principal opposition parties (The Labour Party and the SPD) were at this point in the process of trying to shed an image of profligacy in borrowing and spending and to substitute one of responsible, restrained management. For all parties, realising greater efficiency is attractive as a convenient method of obtaining more output — and a reputation for managerial competence — without committing additional resources, and this appears to be reflected in the polarity figures.

Figure 5.18: Positive Polarity Levels for Top-Ranked Frontbencher Values in GStrG





Figure 5.19: Positive Polarity Levels for Top-Ranked Frontbencher Values in NHSCCB



5.2.12. Conclusions from the Value Content Data

The analysis of the content data has produced some clear and consistent conclusions. Although most of the observed difference cut across the value classes, there is a pattern of more frequent German appeals to terminal values, concentrated on *equality*, *compassion* and *plenitude*, which is especially pronounced if one treats the preferred British value *freedom* as something of an exceptional case. This pattern is observable in both the expectations placed on the state and the entitlements postulated for the public, lending support to the notion that there is an enduring output orientation in German political culture.

There is an opposite British leaning towards the instrumental end of the value spectrum, which the figures clearly show to be due to higher numbers of appeals to values which relate to personal or moral qualities, or feelings, such as *honourableness* and *honesty*. The German data, in contrast, shows a preference for values of a more formal character, such as *discipline* and *responsibility*. In the case of some values, such as *flexibility*, this contrasting approach is even observable in the style with which appeals are made. Analysis of the figures by political party also shows a pattern of personalised attacks by the British opposition on the government which is not found in the German data to the same degree. These findings reflect the models which Döring, Rohe and others have proposed to explain the different political cultures in the two countries: Britain's more personalised and sentiment-laden values are symptomatic of the conventionalistic and deference-oriented nature of its political culture, where the relationship between electors and elected is a quasi-personal one based on trust, morality and a largely false sense of familiarity; the preferred values of German politicians reflect a rational-technical, bureaucratic model of the state which is more distant from the "lifeworld", and in which politicians have less of a personal relationship to their electors and more specialist knowledge and expertise. The greater number of value appeals directed at state expectees in the German data also appears to confirm the importance of the state in Germany and the different view of its role which the bureaucratic-technical model implies, although it may also reflect the German state's comparatively weak position in the context of health care reform.

The expectation that German political culture would show a greater degree of consensus is fulfilled by the exceptionally high correlation between the value rankings of the main parties and by the much more frequent use in Germany of hypothecation and qualification. This is supported by the quite different attitudes of the governments towards the value

consultation. In the light of the distribution of negative and positive polarity, which shows no significant differences between the countries' debates, these results seem to suggest that the consensus is "deep" rather than "shallow" — that is, centred on the importance of values, rather than on an assessment of their realisation — but also that German political debate is less adversarial than British political debate.

There are also some results which do not meet with expectations. Some features of the overall data — for example, the greater frequency of appeals to values such as *rationality* or *realism* in the German results — do not hold consistently when the data is analysed more closely. Other expected features, such as a greater German emphasis on legal or abstract principles, do not appear at all in these results — although the number of appeals to the related values is probably too small to draw firm conclusions on those points — and values such as *consultation* present a sharply differentiated picture across the political parties, suggesting that appeal frequency may not always be sufficient to judge the extent to which a value is genuinely held.

5.3. Analysis of the Appeal Method Data

The final part of this chapter presents the results from the analysis of appeal method data. Again, the coding of the corpus texts on which the results are based can be found in Appendix V in Volume II. The method analysis extends the inquiry beyond value categories, polarity and addressees to the controversiality of value appeals. It is hoped that this will both shed light on some of the issues raised by the content analysis and reveal new patterns in the data.

5.3.1. Remarks about the Appeal Method Analysis

There are some restrictions on this part of the analysis which require explanation. Firstly, since the results across the terminal, instrumental and interaction-dependent/independent value classes have proved so inconsistent, and since other patterns in the data appeared to be more significant, the appeal method data will not be viewed by value class. Secondly, the results will be compared differently in this section. Since there may be a tendency to use certain forms — metaphors or modality, for example — in one language more or less often than in another, it would not be wise to try to directly compare the raw results for any particular method. To hold the influence of this variable to a minimum, values will be ranked for each method or method class according to the frequency with which the method is used, and the rankings compared. This means that it will not matter if,

for example, German politicians use more metaphors in appealing to *consistency* than British politicians, unless the frequency of their use of metaphors places *consistency* higher in the German rankings for that method than in the British rankings. Thirdly, there is a restriction on which results can be generated due to the volume of data available. Rankings can only be calculated for values with a sufficient number of appeals to make an examination of their appeal methods worthwhile, which both reduces the number of values which can be analysed and limits the extent to which the data can be broken down to reveal more detailed patterns. For example, although analysis by speaker status yielded some very interesting results for the value counts, breaking down the results by value, party, speaker status *and* appeal method would, in most cases, yield numbers too small to be regarded as significant. The analysis of pronoun usage is impractical for the same reasons. Finally, as noted in chapter four, subordinate method constituents will not be included in the results, and, as before, systemic variables will be excluded from the data.

5.3.2. Overview of the Appeal Method Results

Table 5.24 shows the overall percentages²³ for the principal method types.

The distribution is broadly similar in the two countries: *value presupposition*, *conversational implicature* and logical association are the three most frequently used methods in both rankings. Non-logical association (*association by co-occurrence*), *connotation*, *entailment*, and modal expressions of inclination and obligation make up the majority of the rest of the methods used by speakers in both debates.

The first task in examining the overall results is to check some of the assumptions which underlie the classification of appeal methods, in order to ensure that the analysis is reliable. One assumption, at least, appears to be supported by this breakdown: *categorical assertion* — the explicit statement of desirability or importance — is confirmed as being of very little importance in political discourse. Speakers evidently prefer the extremes of presupposing or pragmatically implying a value's desirability, or implying its desirability more subtly. However, that should be qualified by pointing out that expressions of inclination make up a significant percentage of appeal methods; this indicates that speakers are quite willing to make explicitly *subjective* statements of desirability. As noted in chapter four,

²³ For readability, the percentages are derived from the total number of occurrences of each method type (including multiple occurrences in single appeal) expressed as a fraction of the value appeals. To calculate rankings later on, the total count is measured as a percentage of all potential occurrences.

when speakers explicitly say that they want something, it may be interpreted in different ways: it can either make an appeal to a controversial value more credible, or reassure the audience about the speaker's commitment to an uncontroversial value. This ambiguity requires further investigation before the analysis can progress any further. Finally, the most important claim of the analysis, that methods from opposite ends of the classificatory spectrum play opposing roles in appealing to values, has yet to be validated.

Table 5.24: Distribution of Method Types

GStrG		NHSCCB	
Value Presupposition	30.46%	Value Presupposition	30.77%
Conversational Implicature	16.67%	Conversational Implicature	16.14%
Logical Association	10.86%	Logical Association	11.67%
Entailment	10.11%	Association by Co-occurrence	8.45%
Modality - Objective Obligation	9.48%	Entailment	8.23%
Association by Co-occurrence	6.15%	Connotation	5.38%
Modality - Inclination	5.92%	Modality - Objective Obligation	5.16%
Connotation	3.79%	Modality - Inclination	5.16%
Metaphor	3.45%	Modality - Probability	5.16%
Subjective Entailment	2.93%	Metaphor	3.82%
Modality - Probability	2.76%	Subjective Entailment	2.15%
Modality - Objective Potentiality	1.21%	Modality - Subjective Implicit Desirability	1.78%
Modality - Subjective Implicit Desirability	0.92%	Categorical Assertion	1.18%
Categorical Assertion	0.63%	Irony	1.08%
Imperative	0.52%	Modality - Subjective Obligation	0.54%
Irony	0.46%	Modality - Objective Potentiality	0.16%
Modality - Subjective Obligation	0.40%	Imperative	0%
Other Modal Types	2.82%	Other Modal Types	2.69%

5.3.3. Measuring the Accuracy of the Method Analysis

Without much larger amounts of data, it is not possible to find supportive evidence for the inverse relationship between strong and weak methods purely by analysing patterns within the method data itself. Although there are exceptionally strong negative correlations between the occurrence of weak and strong method types in both halves of the data²⁴, this

²⁴ The Spearman rank correlation coefficient for the German data is 0.91, and for the British data 0.88. In each set of data, only value items were considered which occurred at least thirty times in the data; sixteen value items were ranked in the German data, nineteen in the British. The ranking was done as follows: the value items were ordered twice for each data set, according to the frequency of occurrence of both weak methods (value presupposition, conversational implicature, probability, validity and categorical assertion) and strong methods (implicit logical and non-logical). The two ranks were then correlated for each data set using the method described in footnote 22.

does not provide reliable evidence in itself, because those types make up a substantial proportion of the data, and the correlated variables are thus not entirely independent²⁵.

An alternative approach to testing the significance of opposing methods is to consider whether the difference in value controversiality which this part of the analysis tries to measure might be reflected within parts of the appeal frequency data. One place one might expect a related pattern to occur is in a comparison of appeal frequencies across the main parties. Opposition parties differ from governing parties in that they have the luxury of avoiding real policy-making or decision-taking, and so they have more freedom to concentrate on appealing to popular values than their government counterparts. Whilst governing parties will no doubt also be keen to appeal to popular values whenever possible, it seems reasonable to assume that the pressures of having to introduce sometimes unpopular measures will sometimes compel them to appeal to more controversial values. This seems very appropriate in the context of both of these health debates, where a government is endeavouring to justify unpopular health reforms in the face of what is, in part, populist criticism from the opposition. It would therefore be supportive of this analytical approach if it could be shown that those values that the method analysis suggests are uncontroversial tend either to be favoured by the main opposition, or favoured equally by both party groupings, and that those values that the analysis suggests are controversial tend to be favoured by the government.

Table 5.25 shows an overall controversiality ranking for the most frequently appealed-to values in both countries, along with an indication of which party grouping favours which value²⁶: G signifies that governing parties appeal to it more frequently, M that main opposi-

²⁵ The occurrence of *value presupposition* automatically precludes the occurrence of another method type for an appeal, and each occurrence of another method type reduces the likelihood of another occurring. Simply put, if ninety percent of appeals to *honesty* use strong methods, only ten percent can use weak methods. Thus, a positive correlation between weak and strong methods is to be expected, although perhaps not such a strong one. An alternative approach would be to measure whether methods at opposite ends of the classification occur for the same value less often than values closer together in the classification. However, this is difficult to do reliably without more data.

²⁶ To calculate the controversiality for each value, the occurrence of weak and strong methods (see footnote 24) was calculated as a percentage of the total potential occurrence of each type of method, and then the strong percentage was subtracted from the weak. The "total potential occurrence" is the total number of times that the method could have appeared as a constituent in a value appeal, which, for all appeal methods except *value presupposition*, is three times per appeal (a maximum of three constituents are recorded per appeal). Thus, 10 occurrences of metaphor in ten value appeals would constitute 33.3% of the potential total. Since *value presupposition* precludes any other method, it can only occur once per appeal. Thus, a balance was struck between overemphasising it (regarding it as three occurrences) and under-emphasising it (regarding it as only one occurrence out of a potential three); this was achieved by counting each occurrence of

tion parties appeal more frequently, and E that the appeal frequency from these two groupings is equal or near equal. The values are ranked in descending order, with the most controversial values first. With a few exceptions, the party groupings favour values in the expected pattern. Seven out of the eight values in the bottom half of the German data, and nine of the ten values in the bottom half of the British data are either appealed to more frequently by the main opposition, or appealed to equally by both main party groupings; and six out of the eight top values in the German data, and five out of the nine top values in the British data are appealed to more frequently by the governing parties. Whilst this does not provide conclusive proof, it strongly supports the theoretical arguments which underpin the method classification. The exceptions which occur in the data are not unexpected, since even opposition parties must, at times, embrace more controversial values to please a particular minority audience, including groups amongst its own supporters.

Table 5.25: Controversiality Rankings and Appeal Patterns for Main Party Groupings

GStrG			NHSCCB		
Flexibility	-17.85%	G	Flexibility	-18.45%	G
Responsibility	-10.92%	G	Efficiency	-9.67%	G
Co-operation & Agreement	-6.09%	M	Freedom	-5.29%	M
Consultation	-5.27%	G	Plenitude	-4.82%	G
Freedom	-5.08%	G	Clarity	-4.30%	G
Equality	-0.75%	M	Justice & Fairness	-2.69%	M
Efficiency	1.13%	G	Equality	-1.86%	E
Plenitude	1.98%	G	Consultation	-1.80%	M
Compassion	7.62%	M	Insight	2.13%	G
Altruism	10.52%	M	Responsibility	5.05%	E
Honourableness	16%	M	Compassion	6.02%	M
Rationality	18.28%	E	Co-operation & Agreement	8%	E
Justice & Fairness	20.71%	E	Ambition	13.21%	G
Consistency	22.69%	M	Sense of Identity	16.21%	E
Realism	25.89%	G	Dignity	17.32%	M
Honesty	39.36%	E	Honesty	23.51%	M
			Realism	24.47%	E
			Honourableness	35.04%	M
			Consistency	37.58%	M

The next question concerns the role of methods in the middle of the hierarchy — that is, explicit non-logical methods, or, more specifically, modal expressions of inclination (subjective explicit desirability is included in the same class, but the numbers of appeals using this method are too small to be analysed reliably). The central position of inclination

presupposition as equivalent to 1.5 occurrences of any other method type, which is roughly equivalent to the average number of constituents per appeal.

in the hierarchy means that it falls between the strong and weak methods, and this gives rise to the suspicion that its usage will not be clearly interpretable. If one ranks values by the frequency with which this appeal method is used, one would expect those rankings to present an unclear contrast with the rankings for strong and weak²⁷ methods.

In order to determine whether this is the case, the value rankings for inclination can be compared with those of its neighbours in the classification²⁸. The results illustrate the point perfectly: rankings by inclination in the British data show a 0.28 correlation with rankings by implicit non-logical methods, and a 0.51 correlation with rankings by weak methods, and so present a clear contrast with neither. Expressions of inclination certainly appear to be closer to weak methods in terms of their pattern of usage, but the evidence is not clear enough to place any interpretation on their occurrence. Therefore, the analysis will concentrate on the methods at the extremes of the classification.

5.3.4. Weak Method Distribution by Value

Before examining the overview of controversiality previewed in Table 5.25, the results at each end of the controversiality spectrum will be looked at in turn, starting with the weak appeal methods. Table 5.26 shows the values in both debates ranked by frequency of occurrence of weak appeal methods²⁹.

The first striking point is that *flexibility* tops both lists with the lowest amount of value presupposition, and thus appears to be the most controversial of all the values. This is perhaps rather unsurprising, since appeals for flexibility tend to be made in a context where it is felt to be absent, in an attempt to alter people's behaviour or attitudes, and therefore represent a significant face-threatening act. Politicians will always have to tread carefully when trying to persuade their audience to accept such unpopular changes. There are further similarities between the rankings: other values central to the health debate — including *efficiency*, *plenitude*, *freedom* and *equality* — appear high in both lists; in contrast, *honesty*, *honourableness*, *consistency* and *realism* all appear at or near the bottom, suggesting, again unsurprisingly, that none of them are especially controversial.

²⁷ *Value presupposition*, “pragmatic” methods and *categorical assertion* are considered “weak” methods.

²⁸ In other words, values with a sufficient appeal frequency are ranked three times: once for the occurrence of modal expressions of inclination, once for the occurrence of implicit non-logical methods, and once for the occurrence of weak methods. These rankings are then correlated with one another.

²⁹ The percentages here again represent, as for all method results, the fraction of the total number of potential occurrences (see footnote 26). It should be noted that, in practice, this method of calculation precludes

Intuitively, these results appear to support the general controversiality hypothesis, which holds that the bottom third of each list would represent the undisputed values in each country (those closest to norms), the middle third those values which typically concern matters of policy but which are relatively uncontroversial, and the top third those values which are most at dispute, typically those at the heart of the political debate. The position of the values appears to closely fit this pattern. Also, it is worth noting the potential distinction which this highlights between the importance of values and their controversiality: for example, whereas the values *honesty* and *honourableness* appeared to be more important in the British debate, as measured by frequency of occurrence, *honesty* appears to be equally uncontroversial, and *honourableness* comes somewhat lower in the British ranking.

Table 5.26: Value Ranking for Weak Appeal Methods

GStrG		NHSCCB	
Flexibility	9.92%	Flexibility	10.12%
Consultation	12.24%	Justice & Fairness	14.52%
Co-operation & Agreement	12.61%	Efficiency	15.82%
Responsibility	14.54%	Clarity	16.13%
Freedom	15.42%	Plenitude	16.39%
Equality	18.25%	Freedom	16.76%
Plenitude	19.68%	Equality	17.90%
Efficiency	20.41%	Consultation	19.71%
Compassion	24.39%	Insight	20.08%
Altruism	25.14%	Responsibility	21.21%
Honourableness	29%	Compassion	21.98%
Rationality	30.11%	Co-operation & Agreement	22%
Justice & Fairness	31.82%	Ambition	24.89%
Consistency	31.95%	Dignity	28.29%
Realism	35.82%	Sense of Identity	28.82%
Honesty	42.91%	Honesty	33.10%
		Realism	35.93%
		Honourableness	40.42%
		Consistency	41.81%

Some of the overall similarities are highly significant. It might seem odd that an apparently attractive value such as *freedom* should appear controversial in both countries, but it should be remembered that all values are desirable unless they involve a trade-off against other values. The figures reflect the dispute in both countries about the trade-offs which realising *freedom* involves, and about the likely beneficiaries. The high position of *equality* also suggests that speakers encounter some resistance to this value. In contrast, *compassion*

percentages of over 50% for any method type; a value which had 100% value presupposition would only show a figure of 50% in this table, and so figure of over 30% should be regarded as very high.

appears somewhat less contentious, falling somewhere in the middle in both cases. *Efficiency* and, to a greater degree, *plenitude*, also appear relatively controversial in both countries, reflecting the central role they play in the arguments over health reform. However, both are more highly placed in the British ranking, *efficiency* especially, suggesting that British politicians need to work harder to justify increases in resources — in most cases, increases in resources from the state — but also to justify tighter controls on the use of those resources. This perhaps illustrates a conflict between Gladstonian parsimony and a progressivist view of the state in British politics — that there is both a deep suspicion of increases in resources from the state for whatever purpose — a view, in fact, as one speaker in the debate remarked, that the institutions in question might be better off with fewer resources rather than more — and, on the other side, a belief that an attempt to do anything other than increase resources constitutes an attack on those institutions.

Although *dignity* and *sense of identity* only appear in the British ranking (because of their low frequency in the German data), their low position is interesting, because it accords with the more central role played by emotion and personalisation in Britain's political culture and suggests they almost have the status of norms in that country. It is, of course, not possible to say what the German figures might be if the appeal frequency in Germany were higher.

Perhaps the strangest feature of these results is the high German ranking for *consultation* and *co-operation & agreement*, and the much lower British ranking. The apparent tendency towards consensus in German discourse and the greater willingness to embrace genuine consultation and co-operation between parties and interest groups seem to be at odds with figures which suggest that such values are highly controversial in the Federal Republic. There are two possible explanations for this.

The first is that there is a distorting factor in the data, namely the very frequent use of expressions of inclination in the German appeals, which occur in 38.78% of all *consultation* appeals and 14.63% of all *co-operation & agreement* appeals, more often than for any other values. This reflects the fact that many appeals for cross-party consultation are made as personal pleas from the speaker. Although expressions of inclination lie outside the weakest method categories, the correlations given earlier did suggest that expressions of inclination tend to be associated with the use of weak appeal methods. If this is the case, there might be a tendency in the German data to use inclination rather than conversational

implicature or presupposition, thus producing a much higher ranking in the results here. If the appeals using inclination were to be included in the weak method rankings, the present position of *consultation* would be entirely reversed, and the ranking of *co-operation & agreement* reduced significantly.

The second possible explanation for these results arises from the fact that the nature of the consultation and co-operation proposed in many of the German appeals — consultation between different political parties — contrasts sharply with that proposed in the British appeals, namely consultation of the electorate or patients by the government. Consultation which involves discussion, agreement and compromise with opponents is probably inherently more controversial, and requires a greater degree of “hedging” or persuasion by the speaker. It may be that both of these explanations are partially correct, in which case the extreme contrast shown in the data between the positions of these values can be regarded as a reflection of a somewhat milder underlying contrast.

A further notable difference is the almost exactly opposite placement of the value *justice & fairness* in the rankings, which might seem to reflect the greater acceptance of abstractions in German discourse. However, inclination may again be a distorting factor here, with 22% of British appeals involving modal expressions of inclination, in contrast to the German appeals, where there are no personal pleas at all. The same possible distortion may affect the position of *clarity* in the British data, although to a lesser extent, suggesting that its true position may be in the mid-range. These findings will need to be considered in the light of the strong method rankings.

5.3.5. Strong Method Distribution by Value

Table 5.27 on page 307 shows the ranking of values in the two debates again, but this time by the frequency with which strong appeal methods — those from which value-desirability relationships are derived implicitly — are used. Its percentages are calculated by adding the percentages for implicit logical methods, such as *association* and *entailment*, and implicit non-logical methods, such as *metaphor* and *connotation*. The ranking is in descending order, so that the most disputed values appear at the top.

Table 5.27: Value Ranking for Strong Appeal Methods

GStrG		NHSCCB	
Flexibility	27.77%	Flexibility	28.57%
Responsibility	25.46%	Efficiency	25.49%
Freedom	20.50%	Freedom	22.05%
Efficiency	19.28%	Consultation	21.51%
Equality	19.00%	Plenitude	21.21%
Co-operation & Agreement	18.70%	Clarity	20.43%
Plenitude	17.70%	Equality	19.76%
Consultation	17.51%	Insight	17.95%
Compassion	16.77%	Justice & Fairness	17.21%
Altruism	14.62%	Responsibility	16.16%
Honourableness	12.67%	Compassion	15.96%
Rationality	11.83%	Co-operation & Agreement	14.00%
Justice & Fairness	11.11%	Sense of Identity	12.61%
Realism	9.93%	Ambition	11.68%
Consistency	9.26%	Realism	11.46%
Honesty	3.55%	Dignity	10.97%
		Honesty	9.59%
		Honourableness	5.38%
		Consistency	4.23%


Since these rankings are not entirely independent of the weak method rankings, many similarities should be expected, and indeed there are many: *honesty*, *honourableness*, *realism*, *consistency*, *sense of identity* and *dignity* appear in the same part of the ranking as before, in both cases, as do *flexibility* and, broadly speaking, *compassion*, *freedom* and *equality*. *Efficiency* and *plenitude* also remain more controversial in the British data, although the gap is a little narrower in this part of the data.

It is noteworthy that *consultation*'s ranking in the strong method data contradicts its weak method ranking: previously more controversial in the German data, it is now significantly more controversial in the British data. This lends support to the theory that the strong occurrence of inclination in the German data may be distorting the weak method rankings. In the light of these results, *consultation* may be more controversial in the British context than those rankings suggest.

The results for *justice & fairness* are also significant. This value was ranked at nearly opposite ends of the spectrum for weak methods, but here the gap is reduced considerably. However, the fact that the value appears high in both the British rankings indicates that the high frequency of inclination in the British data may not wholly explain the results. Even if expressions of inclination are taken into account, *justice & fairness* still appears to be significantly more disputed in the British data.

Finally, *clarity*'s high position in the British weak method data is mildly contradicted by these results, suggesting that the use of inclination may be pushing it too far up the weak rankings, and that it belongs in the mid-range of controversiality. No comparative conclusions can be drawn on this due to the low frequency of this value's occurrence in the German data. Figure 5.20 and Figure 5.21 summarise all of the above findings by showing the overall controversiality rankings from Table 5.25 in graphical form³⁰.

Figure 5.20: Overall Controversiality Rankings for GStrG




³⁰ These overall rankings are calculated by combining the weak method rankings and the implicit non-logical (strongest method) rankings into a single score out of 10, using the following formula:

$$10 - \left(\frac{w + s}{t * r / 10} \right)$$

where w is the weak rank position, s the strong rank position, t the total number of rank positions in each rank, and r the number of ranks merged (here: two). No correction is made for the possible distorting effects of inclination in these figures, so the rankings of *co-operation & agreement* and *consultation* in the German graph, and *justice & fairness* and *clarity* in the British graph should be treated with caution.

Figure 5.21: Overall Controversiality Rankings for NHSCCB



5.3.6. Method Distribution By Party

Although the volume of data available limits the number of values for which the method results can be usefully analysed, and although the tables for the two main party groupings will not therefore contain all the same values, it is still worthwhile to see which values are considered most and least controversial by the parties. For both the governing parties and the main opposition, the rankings for both weak and strong methods will be shown.

Taking the governing parties first, both sets of figures for the governing parties confirm both the highly controversial nature of *flexibility* in both countries and, on the British side, the uncontroversial nature of the “personal” values, *honesty* and *honourableness*. They also reflect the higher ranking of *efficiency* and *plenitude* in the British data. The strong method figures for *efficiency*, in particular, are kept high by a greater use of both connotations and various types of association by the British government, whereas the German government tend towards the use of expressions of obligation and entailment. It seems that the British government feels a greater need to justify appeals to *efficiency* by making its realisation

appear to be a precondition for the realisation of other values, such as *plenitude* and *compassion*.

Table 5.28: Value Ranking for Weak Appeal Methods of Governing Parties

GStrG		NHSCCB	
Flexibility	12.25%	Flexibility	9.78%
Consultation	13.06%	Freedom	11.71%
Responsibility	13.49%	Plenitude	14.34%
Freedom	16.23%	Efficiency	15.76%
Plenitude	18.02%	Compassion	20.49%
Efficiency	19.50%	Ambition	24.99%
Equality	22.01%	Honesty	32.38%
Compassion	22.14%	Honourableness	34.05%
Realism	35.86%		

The higher British ranking of *freedom* is a little more pronounced here than in the overall results, with association featuring very strongly in the government's choice of methods — it is used in almost half of all British appeals, but only appears in 14% of the German appeals. This perhaps suggests that the British government's notion of *freedom* is felt to be more controversial than the German government's and thus more in need of defence, again by linking its realisation to that of other values. This pattern matches the largely apologetic nature of the German appeals described earlier, since maintaining existing freedoms — which the German government apologises for not doing — is likely to be less controversial than proposing new ones, such as greater freedom for GPs to manage budgets or to choose healthcare providers.

Table 5.29: Value Ranking for Strong Appeal Methods of Governing Parties

GStrG		NHSCCB	
Flexibility	26.47%	Flexibility	28.89%
Responsibility	24.61%	Efficiency	25.53%
Efficiency	20.33%	Freedom	25.40%
Compassion	20.00%	Plenitude	21.76%
Freedom	18.11%	Compassion	16.67%
Consultation	18.02%	Honesty	11.43%
Plenitude	17.72%	Ambition	10.78%
Equality	13.25%	Honourableness	9.93%
Realism	10.10%		

The final noteworthy result is the low ranking of *equality* in the German figures compared to its middle ranking in the overall results. Looking below to the main opposition results reveals a correspondingly high ranking for the SPD's appeals. It thus appears that the German opposition consider *equality* much more controversial than the government. However, since the British figures for this value are not sufficiently high to allow them to

be analysed in this way, it is not possible to suggest what significance this might have for the cross-cultural comparison.

Table 5.30: Value Ranking for Weak Appeal Methods of Main Opposition Parties

GStrG		NHSCCB	
Equality	14%	Consultation	19.83%
Freedom	15.60%	Plenitude	20.24%
Efficiency	19.90%	Freedom	20.77%
Plenitude	20.92%	Compassion	22.14%
Compassion	25.26%	Dignity	32.36%
Honourableness	29.80%	Honesty	33.34%
		Consistency	36.87%
		Honourableness	42.45%

Moving on to the main opposition data, it is interesting to note the similar ranking given by the opposition parties to *freedom*, which confirms that it is the government results which give rise to the overall difference for this value, and that the difference in controversiality between the two sets of government appeals arises because the German government is apologising for restricting existing freedoms and the British government is, more controversially, proposing new ones.

Table 5.31: Value Ranking for Strong Appeal Methods of Main Opposition Parties

GStrG		NHSCCB	
Freedom	26.88%	Consultation	21.27%
Equality	22.23%	Freedom	19.48%
Plenitude	18.96%	Plenitude	18.25%
Efficiency	17.20%	Compassion	16.94%
Compassion	14.58%	Dignity	9.15%
Honourableness	12.82%	Honesty	8.34%
		Consistency	7.07%
		Honourableness	4.01%

Finally, the two British rankings for *consultation* provide some support for the earlier theory that the value is more controversial in the British context. Although it is not possible to compare the British main opposition figures with those for the German main opposition, they can be compared with those for the German government, the main source of appeals to *consultation* in the German debate. The strong method results show much higher controversiality in the British main opposition appeals than in the German government appeals, caused largely by the heavy use in the British debate of non-logical association, which is not used at all by the German government. However, it should be noted that this result again depends on the interpretation of the use of modal expressions of inclination, which occur very frequently in the German data.

5.3.7. Value Combinations and Associations

A study of combinations of values and patterns of association between values can give further clues about how particular values are viewed by revealing conceptual relationships between values and showing how one value is used to support appeals to another. However, it is difficult to provide any overview of value associations because of the extremely high number of possible permutations and the fragmentation of the data at that level. Instead, the discussion will be restricted to looking at high-level combination values and specific association patterns which are of interest and relevance to the wider hypothesis.

Although high-level combinations occur frequently in the data, the most commonly occurring example — *plenitude* and *freedom* — was removed, because it largely reflected the discussion in the German data about contribution rates, a factor not present in the British context. The remaining high-level combination values which occur with any significant frequency are shown in Table 5.32. It should be noted that each recorded instance of a combination value signifies one occurrence of each of the two values in the combination, and therefore two individual value appeals.

Table 5.32: Most Frequently Recorded High-Level Combination Values

GStrG		NHSCCB	
Equality-Compassion	56	Consultation-Freedom	23
Employment-Plenitude	7	Control-Equality	9
Control-Equality	4	Efficiency-Freedom	7
		Employment-Plenitude	4

Before the figures are analysed, a brief explanation of these combination values is needed. *Equality-compassion* embodies the ideal that different persons, groups or bodies should provide mutual assistance and support to achieve some degree of equality, whether it be in access to health care, income levels at times of great need, or in other areas. This value, which is entirely absent from the British data, most frequently encodes appeals to “solidarity” in the German debate; “solidarity”, like many political concepts, is notoriously flexible in its meaning, but wherever it is used in the context of a social security system which is regarded as being based on the “solidarity principle”, its meaning can be adequately approximated by these two values.

The combination *employment-plenitude* is used to encode references to general — as opposed to personal — economic prosperity or threats to such prosperity. Typical realisations will refer to economic growth, competitiveness and investment. *Control* and *equal-*

ity are recorded wherever speakers make references to planning and organisation as a means of achieving and guaranteeing equal levels of service or production across different social groups or geographical areas. *Consultation* and *freedom* are combined to represent appeals which refer to democracy and democratic decision-making and accountability, or to any situation in which choice and consultation are brought together to allow people to shape or directly take important decisions which affect them. Finally, *efficiency* and *freedom* are in many respects the inverse of *control* and *equality*, in that they express the link often made by supporters of market economics between the freedom to choose or act and the efficient allocation of resources. This is frequently expressed in criticism of “bureaucracy”, that is, heavy regulation or large, complex monopoly organisations which restrict freedom of choice or action.

The figures show clear differences in priorities and also help to interpret some of the overall findings for values such as *equality*, *compassion* and *freedom*. The two most interesting results are those for *equality and compassion* and *consultation and freedom*: the former is by far the most common value in the German data, and the latter heads the British list. Neither value appears at all in the other country’s data.

The large number of appeals to *equality* and *compassion* places the high frequency for both of the component values in a somewhat new light. The importance of this combination value is underlined by the fairly even distribution of the appeals amongst the CSU, CDU, FDP, SPD and the minor opposition parties. The best means of understanding its significance is to return to the corpus and examine the individual appeals. A glance at the text reveals that a substantial part contains references to *Solidarität* and derived terms such as *Solidarbeitrag*, *Entsolidarisierung*, *Solidargemeinschaft* and *solidarisch*, which are used at least fifty-one times by speakers in the debate. Many other appeals to *equality* and *compassion* employ the word *sozial*, very often in adjectival or verbal constructions such as *sozial ausgewogen*, *sozial ungerecht*, *sozial verträglich* and *sozial abfedern*.

The appeals to this combination value are therefore dominated by references to abstract principles, such as solidarity, justice, community and fairness, and the parties appear to believe that, in order to convince the audience of the rightness of their policy proposals, they must demonstrate their conformity with these principles. The fusing of concepts such as *sozial* and *gerecht* appears to be an attempt to link what might be regarded as the more controversial values of social equality and solidarity with universally accepted principles

such as justice, and thus make their appeals all the more difficult to reject. This finding is supported by the way in which the value *justice & fairness* is employed: of all the appeals which are associated with this value, *equality* alone accounts for exactly half.

The contrast with the British data could not be clearer: not only is there not a single appeal to *equality* and *compassion*, and not only are there many fewer appeals to *equality*, the appeals made to *equality* by British politicians are generally not characterised by any references to abstract principle. When Kenneth Clarke talks about equality in access to care he talks about “chance factors” which determine different qualities of treatment, or “variations in the times for which [patients] must wait for treatment” (HC Deb, cc 490; NHSCCB 18, 20). When Robin Cook attacks the inequalities that he believes the proposals will cause, he chooses to return to the example of an earlier Bill brought forward by the government which abolished free eye tests, in order to measure intentions against past behaviour. He refers not to violated principles, but rather cites statistics on the numbers of eye tests and argues with a government backbencher about the behaviour of a company offering free tests (HC Deb, cc 506; NHSCCB 400-430, 552-561). A Conservative backbencher who believes the reforms will prevent gross inequalities arising within the NHS speaks not in terms of defending its basic principles, but of avoiding a “two-tier service” and making the NHS so good that no-one will wish to “go private” (HC Deb, cc 537; NHSCCB 1215, 1217). Other Labour Party MPs such as Michael Foot and Jack Ashley barely mention equality at all. The one principle which does seem to be mentioned on a few occasions is less of a general maxim of social policy than an NHS-specific mantra: “financed from general taxation, free at the point of use” (HC Deb, cc 495, 518; NHSCCB 132, 730).

None of these examples demonstrate anything on their own, but together form a pattern which is repeated throughout the British debate. Where the German appeals are abstract and general, the British appeals are concrete and specific; not only do British politicians seldom employ concepts such as “solidarity”, such terms seem to be almost entirely absent from ordinary political vocabulary. The similar overall counts for *justice & fairness* might seem to run counter to this view, but, again, a comparing the text of the appeals to this value reveals further differences which fit the same pattern. Whereas most German appeals to this value are made with references to abstractions such as “soziale Gerechtigkeit”, the majority of British appeals refer to specific instances of unfairness (“a rigged market”, “unfair competition”, “a free and fair choice” (HC Deb, cc 514; NHSCCB 623, 626, 628))

and to the “rights” of particular interest groups (“patients’ rights”, “the ordinary right to appeal against decisions” (HC Deb, cc 528, 542; NHSCCB 1004, 1327)). In short, “justice” seems to be the predominant theme in the German appeals, and “fairness” in the British. Together, these findings support the view of Birch and others that there remains a distrust of abstract theories in Britain’s political culture and, therefore, a preference for arguing from example and practical experience (Birch 1993).

The results for *equality* and *compassion* also go some way towards explaining an apparent anomaly from the content analysis. The fact that many appeals to *compassion* in the German data are combined with *equality* explains the high frequency of the former, which had previously appeared to deviate from the broader pattern for German values; *compassion*, it would seem, far from reflecting emotion and sentiment in the German debate, reflects a tendency to abstract away from the personal experiences and anecdotes which form the staple of so much British political discourse.

The high British figures for *consultation-freedom* are a further confirmation of what has previously been observed about *consultation* in the context of the opposition data, in particular. In the light of the frequent use of this combination value, the British emphasis on *consultation* becomes all the more explicable as a plea for the relaxation of central control over decision-making. This both emphasises the importance of *freedom* in the British data and the greater unease at the state’s role.

5.3.8. Conclusions from the Analysis of the Appeal Method Data

Despite the problematic distortions introduced by expressions of inclination, some of the method data does support the conclusions from the content analysis. In particular, the British leaning towards “personal” and “moral” values is again underlined, and the weak method rankings appear to support the conclusion that *plenitude* is less controversial in German political discourse, even though that is not entirely upheld by the data for strong methods. In addition, the high frequency of the combination value *equality* and *compassion* in the German results points to a higher level of abstraction in German discourse, which is also reflected in the context of appeals to *justice & fairness*, its association with other values and its higher controversiality in the British data. Finally, the method results, including those for the different party groupings, point to a higher level of controversiality for *consultation* in British discourse, and thus reinforce the connection between *consultation* in the British data and unresolved tensions created by the role of the state.

A more general finding that emerges from the method rankings is that there may be no direct relationship between the controversiality of a value and its importance; many values which have similar appeal count rank very differently in the method data, and many with wildly differing counts — such as *equality* — show no notable difference in the choice of method.

6. Conclusions

6.1. *The Analytical Framework*

6.1.1. Effectiveness of the Framework

The new analytical framework has attempted to pull together various disparate strands from previous value research and combine the best elements with some innovative work, creating new, coherent method suited to the research task. The results of the analysis indicate that this was achieved with some success.

Rokeach's broad terminal-instrumental dichotomy has proved sound, but did not produce as many contrasts as might have been expected. The expectee/entitlee classification, and the related classification of addressees, derived in part from Rescher's work, has proved considerably more interesting. It has permitted the development of what one might call a rudimentary value grammar, by defining clearly the relationship between speaker and addressee in a value appeal and by classifying some high-level components of the value's meaning. Some of the best results have emerged when combining these complimentary classifications: for example, focusing solely on government appeals to global addressees can illustrate much more clearly the relative weight of instrumental and terminal values in appeals from government to electorate by screening out much of the noise which would otherwise distort the results.

The addition of "rich" information about speakers has been a particularly important innovation in the analysis. It is evident that some minimal information about speakers is needed to supplement a basic count of value frequencies in an analysis of this type; it would be quite useless if one were not able to distinguish between government and opposition, for example. However, the inclusion of this information has only been an implicit requirement in previous studies – for example, in the study of the Federalist Papers – and no attempt has been made to formalise it. The systematic categorisation of speaker roles, speaker status and parties attempted here has made it possible both to observe interesting patterns and to exert greater control over the analysis of the data. In addition to the obvious comparison of government and opposition, the analysis of the data according to speaker status ("frontbenchers" and "backbenchers") has also proved fruitful. The results for *consultation* illustrate clearly how simple value counts in a couple of basic speaker categories would be misleading, since they would disguise a very uneven distribution of appeals amongst different types of speaker. In addition, the categorisation of contribution

types has been very useful in permitting the differing frequency of interventions in the two data sets to be controlled for.

A further, even more important innovation that has revealed new information about value appeals is the expansion of the appeal content analysis to include addressees. Since values tend to be trivially desirable in the abstract, it is important to know not merely what is desired, but also what the practical implications of the desiring are, specifically whether it implies a demand and/or an entitlement, and at whom these different aspects of the appeal are aimed. In this study, an attempt has been made to categorise addressees and to distinguish between addressee types according to the expectation/entitlement dichotomy. As indicated above, this dichotomy has been linked with the traditional terminal/instrumental value classification to allow value items to be interpreted differently, according to what they imply about their addressees. The results have demonstrated the value of this new approach, by allowing, for example, the interpretation of groups of value appeals as demands on the state or as the granting of global entitlements.

Also new to this study is the recording of value appeal “polarity”, which permits the analyst to know whether speakers are being positive or negative about a value – whether they are focusing on realisation or non-realisation. This has made it possible to identify important differences between what would otherwise be identical appeals, and the addition of modifiers has allowed qualification and hypothecation to be filtered out of the results and studied separately. All of these properties have produced interesting and relevant patterns in the data, such as the “polarity shadowing” of government and opposition.

Perhaps the aspect of the value classification that is most open to question is the pure/impure distinction. The limited data in this study makes it difficult to draw definitive conclusions on its usefulness, but it should certainly be reconsidered.

The individual value categories in the taxonomy have, on the whole, proved their worth in the analysis. Although the method of selection still involves considerable subjectivity, the use of clear value definitions has helped to eliminate duplicate or inconsistent values and proved of enormous assistance in correctly assigning values to value appeals. Curing the analysis, once the definitions had been sufficiently refined, the conflicts between values (and the accompanying difficulties in identifying the correct value for an appeal) were kept to a minimum.

The analysis of appeal methods has been the most original component of the analytical framework, making it possible to look at value appeals from a quite different angle. The study has set out to examine the linguistic context of value appeals in order to obtain information about the attitude of speakers to values, or more specifically, about the *controversiality* of those values. It has identified appeal methods, connected them with the traditional value concept, classified them and interpreted their significance for the analysis of political values. The appeal method analysis results have unfortunately been more limited in scope than those for value appeal analysis, since adding another variable in the analysis inevitably requires more data before significant patterns can be seen at the individual value level. Nevertheless, they offer some support to the conclusions from the rest of the analysis and demonstrate that the approach has potential. Furthermore, the study of appeal methods has provided broad confirmation of the subtlety with which values shape political discourse. The results show quite clearly that value appeals are usually made on a level below categorical assertion, with speakers frequently exploiting notions of necessity or obligation to communicate them to audiences. This is the confirmation of an important insight: that values work by altering the model of reality communicated in discourse. This finding alone makes the consideration of appeal methods worthwhile.

6.1.2. Weaknesses and Possible Improvements

The results suggest a number of areas in which the analysis could be improved. As mentioned above, the overall terminal/instrumental distinction, although sound, has been shown to be less revealing than other distinctions, and so there may be a case for considering a completely new value classification, or developing alternative classifications which can be applied alongside the traditional one. There is an obvious danger in reworking classificatory schemes after obtaining disappointing results, since the new scheme could be too closely focused on the desired outcomes of future research. Nevertheless, one could at least consider schemes that try to encompass the distinctions between, for example, formalism and personalisation, or between abstractions and arguments from experience. Alongside this, a further improvement might address the problem of those values that are sometimes interaction-dependent and sometimes interaction-independent, enabling them to be handled differently from those that consistently fall into one or the other of these categories. The possession of an expectee and an entitlee might be made into an appeal-specific property, thus also opening up the possibility of a completely new classificatory system higher up the hierarchy.

As far as the taxonomy itself is concerned, consideration should be given to slimming down the list of values, to cull values that were not appealed to at all in the text or that appeared too infrequently to be considered. In the light of the results, it may also be opportune to reflect on whether any significant values are missing. For example, differences in attitudes towards the state remain to be explained in pure value terms. It can be speculated that there may be values such as *harmony* or *order* that are missing from the taxonomy and whose distribution may reflect differences in conceptions of the state as well as the distribution along the personal-anecdotal/abstract-theoretical spectrum.

In the appeal analysis itself, a way might be found of dealing systematically with repetitions of value appeals that consist merely of an implicit reference to a previous appeal or set of appeals, so that they can be identified as repetitions and screened out in the data processing stage if necessary.

To enhance the reliability and reproducibility of the appeal method analysis, it might be possible, if rather daunting, to attempt an overall formalisation of the means by which value indicators are implied and desirability is implied by the use of appeal methods. The starting point for this would be some of the work done in pragmatics on formalising implicature (Levinson 1983: 122). In addition, the value definitions could be further refined, to ensure that they are, as far as possible, abstracted away from specific appeal methods. This would mean that the definitions might have to be made more neutral than they are at present, through the removal of pre-judgmental elements (for example, positive and negative connotations) in the indicators, which would in turn imply a much clearer distinction in the definitions between value items and appeal methods. This might involve the listing of typical appeal methods in the definitions. The classification of methods could also be completely revised to incorporate concepts other than controversiality, and more data would allow a much-more fine-grained analysis that could look at, for example, individual modality types. Finally, the flexibility of the data framework should be improved, allowing an unlimited number of constituents, multi-level combination appeals, a greater number of associated and combined values, and more than one association type as an appeal method.

There may be opportunities to improve the process of analysis itself by applying computer-assisted techniques. Although the work of identifying value appeals could not be carried out through software, it could help in identifying some patterns and taking some of

the repetitive work out of the process. Advanced parsers might now be able to identify many cases of modality or other grammatical features in the text, thus reducing the possibility of missing them. Also, a package capable of applying the results of existing analyses to corpora, by "tagging" phrases or words, might be able to add an additional quantitative element to value definitions by identifying any strong correlations between the occurrence of certain phrases or words in particular contexts and appeals to certain values. Such software might also then be used to search new corpora for such patterns and make suggestions about their appeal content. After the analyst has completed a manual coding of the corpus, such suggestions could then be followed up as a precaution against omissions or errors.

At the opposite end of the analytical spectrum, the brief qualitative analysis of appeals to several values, including *consultation*, *freedom* and *equality*, has shown the usefulness of going beyond quantitative methods, and indeed beyond value analysis itself. Some of the examples analysed in the appeal method definitions indicate that they are especially suited to qualitative work. Further work should expand the role of qualitative analysis and go further in integrating the study of values with the wider study of political culture and the language of politics.

6.1.3. Further Applications

This line of research has a considerable potential for further development. Alongside work to improve the method, the priority for further research would be the application of the method to other political texts, covering a wider range of material, and to much larger corpora, enabling the resolution of the analysis, in particular the appeal method analysis, to be increased. In addition to the more generic improvements outlined above, the wider application of the method would almost certainly necessitate either a broadening of the value taxonomy or the development of new, field-specific taxonomies to allow for an adequate analysis of texts focused on other issues.

Such a broadened and improved method could, when applied to other texts, provide interesting insights into values in other areas of policy-making, in political campaigning, and in the policies of political parties. One area of particular interest might be the changes that occur in the values of political parties over time, as reflected in speeches, party election broadcasts or other material. Such research could test assumptions about the constancy or variability of values in certain countries or parties, or about differences in values between

countries. Further comparative work might continue to focus on aspects of the differences and similarities between the "British" and "German" models of policy-making, or might compare the policy-making process in Britain with that in the United States to examine the extent to which the two oft-compared systems really do share similar values. Value changes within parties, such as the British Labour Party and the British Conservatives, would provide a rich source of material for further work, as would an analysis of supposed value changes during particular parts of the post-war period, within and between countries.

6.2. Political Culture through Values

One clear outcome from the research is that it clearly vindicates the decision to use political culture not just as a means to validate the premises of the hypothesis, but also as a framework for interpreting the results of the value analysis. The large body of existing political culture research already shows us, on a high analytical level, how politics in the two countries runs along different "tramlines", producing observable patterns of contrasting political behaviour. The results have successfully shown that an analysis of values can be related to these patterns and thereby considerably enriched.

The results have certainly furnished some strong evidence to back the original hypothesis, by showing that the values in the texts match very closely in places with the features of the political cultures described in chapter one. Perhaps the clearest result to emerge is the strong emphasis in British appeals on "personal" and "moral" values such as *honesty*, *honourableness* and *consistency*, values that feature strongly across the parties and are almost uniformly negative. If we compare this to the much lower frequency of such values in the German debate and the greater emphasis on more formal values such as *discipline*, *realism* and *responsibility*, it becomes clear that these values reflect some important features of British political culture: the confrontational nature of debate, the personalisation and moralisation of criticism and the personalised view of authority. Accompanying the personal attacks is a strong British tendency to use anecdotes and other personal references to make points, and this implies a correspondingly weak role for the informed, technical arguments that feature more strongly in the remarks of the German parliamentarians. This is very suggestive of the divide that Döring describes between British "government by amateurs" and German government by professional bureaucrats (Döring 1993: 60). Supporting these findings is evidence for a greater level of abstraction in the German discourse, expressed through the tendency to justify policies as the

realisation of abstract principles such as "solidarity" and "justice". Even the style of appeals to values such as *justice and fairness* and *equality* differs, with the British appeals relying much more on personalisation and anecdotes. Here the results appear to highlight the British distrust of abstract theory and reliance on practical experience described by Birch (Birch 1993), a conclusion tentatively backed by the controversiality results.

Consultation and *freedom* seem to form one of the most complex and interesting patterns in the results, but one that both forms a coherent overall picture and reinforces the other conclusions of the work. *Freedom's* importance as a controversial value and an expectation placed on the state in both debates masks important differences in the identity of those making the appeals. In Germany, an apologetic government proposes to limit various freedoms within the health care system and is criticised by the opposition for not going further; in Britain, the government proposes measures which it says will provide for more local autonomy within the NHS and an angry opposition attacks it for imposing those policies without consultation. Thus, in the German case, appeals to *freedom* appear to reflect a consolidation and expansion of state influence, and in the British case an attempt to minimise it, with even the minor opposition parties in each country all pulling in the same direction. The "solutions" to the problems the opposition identifies in each case are significant: the British opposition, considering the reforms flawed, advises consulting "the patients" and "the people" as a necessary corrective to the unwise application of state power; the German opposition, also critical of the government's reforms, advises the state to become more assertive vis-à-vis the institutions and special interest groups. This, together with the personalisation of state power in the British appeals, suggests that systemic factors do not entirely explain the greater German emphasis on the state, and that it reflects something more fundamental about the different views of the state in the two countries.

The results for *consultation*, *co-operation & agreement* and *flexibility* fit this picture. In Britain, the data shows a shallow, one-sided commitment to consultation by the opposition which is not reflected by the attitude of the party holding power, and which appears primarily as a means of compensating for the inadequacies of the constitution through "personal" appeals to the electorate. The dismissal of *consultation* by the government is further emphasised by their appeals to others for *co-operation and agreement* and *flexibility*. The evidence linking appeals to *consultation* with appeals to *freedom*, and the

equally one-sided and negative nature of those appeals — the opposition being far more prominent than the government — strengthens the view that appeals to *consultation* in Britain primarily express unease at the power of the state, and reflect both the personalised view of the relationship between government and governed and the battle for state power between competing parties in a confrontational system. They may also be evidence for a greater focus on the state's input functions. In Germany, in contrast, consultation appears to be more institutionalised, more widely accepted across the parties and less personalised, and thus a part of the exercise of state power. This conclusion is backed up by the polarity results, which show much more qualification and hypothecation in the German data, indicating a less combative style of debate, a greater willingness to both admit mistakes and to suggest alternatives rather than criticise opponents. In addition, the close correlation between value rankings for Germany's main parties furnishes evidence of a greater low-level or "deep" consensus on values.

All of these pieces fit well into the larger picture painted by Kirchheimer, Rohe, Döring and others: on the one hand, a German political culture favouring abstraction and formalism, but also adapting more successfully to the role of the modern state and encouraging a less confrontational style of politics; on the other hand, a British political culture which personalises authority and power, is characterised by adversarial political debate and copes less well in resolving the tensions caused by the state's responsibilities (Kirchheimer 1966, Döring 1993, Rohe 1982b). The evidence also reflects the differing positions of the state in both cultures, showing a British state whose status is more controversial and whose power is less trusted.

More broadly, there is also evidence for a German leaning towards terminal values such as *plenitude*, *compassion* and *equality*, particularly as global entitlements, and for a British emphasis on instrumental values such as *ambition*, *assiduousness*, *flexibility*, and *insight*, reflecting a seemingly more pessimistic value orientation on the British side. This pattern comes out particularly strongly in the government optimism/pessimism results, and in the preferred addressees of the main opposition parties, although the lower overall controversy of *plenitude* in Germany, and the fact that the German main opposition have a much more negative attitude towards the realisation of *health*, despite the higher outputs of the German health care system, also point to the same conclusion: that in Germany the politics

of entitlements dominate discourse about the state to a greater degree than in Britain, where expectations of the state are lower, and demands made by the state on its citizens higher.

The analysis also produced some results that were unexpected and which do not relate directly to the political culture question, such as the apparent tendency of the government and opposition polarity levels to "shadow" each other. Less surprising, but still interesting, was the finding that the opposition parties in each country are almost uniformly more negative about values, and that frontbenchers in each country make more extreme value judgements than backbenchers, with opposition frontbenchers being more negative and government frontbenchers more positive.

There are also areas in which the data does not show the expected contrasts. Values which one might expect to be favoured by German politicians, such as *rationality*, reflecting a less personalised approach to debate, and *justice and fairness*, reflecting a greater willingness to resort to abstractions, show no significant differences in their value counts, despite the fact that the expected contrasts appear to be reflected in other parts of the data. One feature that does not emerge at all from the analysis is a greater preoccupation with legal principles in the German case, although the data is not sufficient to draw any clear conclusions, given that the number of appeals to this value is so small in each case.

Despite all the difficulties in pinning down the concept of political culture, it has proved an indispensable tool in the analysis of values. It places value findings in the context of something known and well established, and thereby shows that the value analysis can be an extension of existing lines of research, and a valuable additional tool for shedding new light on old ideas.

6.3. Wider Conclusions

Given that many of the results appear to reflect the consensus view on political culture differences between Germany and Britain, can we conclude that value differences explain differences in health policy?

Values clearly do not explain everything. Historical circumstances have a powerful influence on institutions, and the inertia of institutional development in turn shapes policy. It is, of course, probably true that values have played a powerful role in historical and institutional change, but this is not the place to raise such questions, and indeed, it has not proved necessary to do so. These limited results have shown that, given similar political

circumstances and the same universal human need for health care, policy can be pushed in quite different directions by the values that determine the contours of debate.

Consider the personal-abstract axis in the value spectrum. To suggest that British politicians focus to a greater degree on personal criticisms and anecdotal examples is not to say that they devote no energies to the technocratic aspects of reform, nor does it imply that German politicians are uninterested in making personal criticisms. However, their need to articulate the perceived values of their audiences involves an opportunity cost; time in debate is limited, the energies of ministers are finite, and the public eventually lose their appetite for debating the issues. If time and energy are spent on appealing to some values, others are inevitably sidelined. The obsession of British parliamentarians with personal attacks and aggressive confrontation weakens the corrective function of parliamentary debates and helps to concentrate power in the hands of the executive, which in turn heightens the possibility that policy will be more amateurish and more extremist. By the same token, it encourages experimentation and radical change and allows governments to fulfil a clear mandate. In contrast, the more consensus-oriented and technocratic German debates strongly favour systemic stability and help to minimise amateurism. In both cases, the influence of current values is magnified by the institutional and constitutional arrangements that each country has inherited.

The entitlement-expectation dichotomy provides another example. The entitlement-orientation of German political values and the stronger role assigned to the German state seem likely to be factors which help to maintain a larger, more generous, better quality and more costly welfare state, whereas the British focus on expectation values and discomfort with state power assists in perpetuating a political culture which favours minimal, low-cost welfare provision. These tendencies are self-reinforcing in each case: the greater enthusiasm for state intervention in Germany produces a culture of more professional bureaucrats and technocrats, whilst Britain's anti-state prejudices are constantly reaffirmed by the lower quality outputs which results from the less effective bureaucratic control exercised over the public sector. British politicians devote more energy to preaching but regulate less and concede fewer entitlements; German politicians regulate more, preach less and assign more responsibilities to the state.

Some of this can be seen reflected in the actual health legislation. The British bill was radical in conception and was passed in virtually unmodified form. Its central technical and

organisational concepts were never really properly debated in parliament, but were instead the product of consultation with a limited number of "gurus" by the government and ministers' own political instincts and calculations. Its ambitions to reduce state involvement in the administration of health care were, ironically, seriously curtailed by the unwillingness or inability of the government to wield state power to fully implement its provisions. The adoption of NHS Trusts and GP fund-holding was thus slow and patchy, dependent on a series of much-delayed "waves" organised by the government and on the interest of the GPs and hospitals. The German Bill, in contrast, was the product of far wider consultation and its technical aspects received far more debating time in parliament than those of the British Bill. Furthermore, it was eventually replaced by a modified Bill devised in consultation with the opposition. The results demonstrate the strengths and weaknesses of German political values; whilst the government did not hesitate to enact its provisions, including some rather draconian cost controls, it was not sufficiently radical to produce long-lasting downward pressure on costs.

If these results are representative of value patterns in discourse on health policy or in political discourse as a whole, they indicate that, underlying the two contrasting political cultures, there is a closely matching system of values exerting a powerful influence on the outputs of the political system. Most significant of all, these values are, as the appeal method results clearly show, rarely stated clearly and openly. It is not known to what extent value appeals are the subject of conscious deliberation by speakers, and to what extent they are made unconsciously, but it is surely of very great importance to note that one of the central influences shaping the discourse of policy-making is rarely, if ever, itself the subject of debate. This means that most political utterances must be deconstructed in order to discover how they are communicating their most important ideas to the audience.

Inter-country systemic comparisons, when they are made at all, tend to focus on the historical background to the institutions and structures, on the material questions of policy – advantages and disadvantages of each system – or on the political context, and thereby create the misleading impression that change is purely contingent on institutional inertia, differences of opinion or short-term political interests. What these results show is not just that Britain is like Britain because of British values, and Germany like Germany because of German values – statements that would not, by themselves, surprise anyone – but that those

values permeate the very words from which each country's political fabric is constructed and reconstructed every day.

This work suggests many further questions that could be asked about values. How quickly and easily can values change? What forces help or hinder value change? Are values wholly social constructs? How conscious is the process of value transmission? Some of these questions have been addressed in other research, others not at all, and this work has only made a beginning at investigating values in political discourse. More research is needed before it can be known whether the patterns found here are observable throughout the discourse of policy presentation. Nevertheless, it seems clear from these results alone that the final policy outputs of the two political systems are related to the values to which politicians appeal, and that those values can be found in almost every phrase that they utter. Values form part of the very fabric of political discourse – indeed, the author would argue, of all discourse – and shape thought and behaviour in ways of which a speaker himself may not be aware. It is precisely because values are so pervasive and awareness of their importance and influence so low that makes them powerful; they provide a culture with its identity and strength, but also limit change by narrowing each culture's perception of the possible. Values are therefore both a blessing and a curse: they unite us in our sense of who we are, but may blind us to what we could be.

References

- Abelshausen, Werner (1976), "Freiheitlicher Sozialismus oder soziale Marktwirtschaft? Die Gutachtertagung über Grundfragen der Wirtschaftsplanung und Wirtschaftslenkung am 21. und 22. Juni 1946", in: *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, Vol. 24, Issue 1, pp. 415-449.
- Alber, Jens (1989), *Der Sozialstaat in der Bundesrepublik 1950-1983*, Frankfurt: Campus Verlag.
- Allhoff, Dieter-W. (1975), *Rhetorische Analyse der Reden und Debatten des ersten deutschen Parlamentes von 1848/49: insbesondere auf syntaktischer und semantischer Ebene*, München: Tuduv.
- Almond, Gabriel A. & Verba, Sidney (eds.) (1980), *The Civic Culture Revisited*, Boston: Little, Brown.
- Altenstetter, Christa & Haywood, Stuart C. (1991), *Comparative Health Policy and the New Right*, London: MacMillan.
- Appleby, J. (1992), *Financing Healthcare in the 1990s*, Milton Keynes: Open University Press.
- Bach, Kent, "The Semantics-Pragmatics Distinction: What It Is and Why It Matters", <<http://userwww.sfsu.edu/~kbach/semprag.html>> (Accessed 3 February 1999)
- Bachem, Rolf (1979), *Einführung in die Analyse politischer Texte*, München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag.
- Bargel, T. (1984), "Überlegungen und Materialien zu Wertdisparitäten und Wertwandel in der BRD", in Klages, Helmut & Kmiecik, P. (eds.) (1981), pp. 147-184.
- Barnard, Keith & Lee, Kenneth (1977), *Conflicts in the National Health Service*, Helm Publishers.
- Beer, Samuel H. (1956), "Pressure Groups and Parties in Britain", in *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 50, Issue 1, Jan, pp. 1-23.
- Bentham, Jeremy (1843), *A Manual of Political Economy*, in Bullock, Alan & Shock, Maurice (eds.) (1956).
- Berg-Schlosser, Dirk (1972), *Politische Kultur: eine neue Dimension politisch-wissenschaftlicher Analyse*.
- Berg-Schlosser, Dirk (ed.) (1987), *Politische Kultur in Deutschland: Bilanz und Perspektiven der Forschung*, Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.
- Berg-Schlosser, Dirk & Schissler, Jakob (1987), "Politische Kultur in Deutschland. Forschungsstand, Methoden und Rahmenbedingungen", in Berg-Schlosser, Dirk (ed.) (1987), pp. 11-26.
- Bergsdorf, Wolfgang (1976), *Politik und Sprache*, Günther Olzog: München.
- Beveridge, Sir William (1944), "Full Employment in a Free Society", in Bullock, Alan & Shock, Maurice (eds.) (1956), pp. 263-267.
- Birch, Anthony H. (1993), *The British System of Government*, London: Routledge.
- Black, Max (1962), *Models and Metaphors: Studies in Language and Philosophy*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

- Bloor, Thomas & Bloor, Muriel (1995), *The Functional Analysis of English: a Hallidayan Approach*, London: Arnold.
- Boulton, C.J. (ed.) (1989), *Parliamentary Practice: Erskine May's Treatise on the Law, Privileges and Usage of Parliament*, London: Butterworths.
- Braunthal, Gerard (1972), *The West German Legislative Process. A Case Study of Two Transportation Bills*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Brown, Gillian & Yule, George (1983), *Discourse Analysis*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Brown, R.G.S. (1979), *Reorganising the National Health Service. A Case Study of Administrative Change*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell and Martin Robertson.
- Bullock, Alan & Shock, Maurice (eds.) (1956), *The Liberal Tradition From Fox To Keynes*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Buri, Heinz (1992), *Argument und Parlament: Versuch der Entwicklung einer Methodologie zur Analyse dialogischer Sequenzen am Beispiel der 'Nachrüstungsdebatte'*, München: Tuduv-Verlagsgesellschaft.
- Bürklin, Wilhelm, Klein, Markus & Ruß, Achim (1994), "Dimensionen des Wertewandels. Eine empirische Längsschnittanalyse zur Dimensionalität und der Wandlungsdynamik gesellschaftlicher Wertorientierungen", in *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*, Vol. 35, Issue 2, 1994, pp. 576-606.
- Busch, Eckart (1991), *Parlamentarische Kontrolle. Ausgestaltung und Wirkung*, Heidelberg: Decker & Müller.
- Busch, Eckart & Berger, Frithjof (eds.) (1989), *Die Parlamentarische Kontrolle: Institutionen und Funktionen des Deutschen Bundestages*, Berglen: Württemberg Verlag.
- Büser, Wolfgang (1996) "Die Leistungen reichen nur noch für einen hohlen Zahn", in *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, December 28-29 1996, p. 20.
- Bybee, Joan & Fleischmann, Suzanne (eds.) (1995a), *Modality in grammar and discourse*, Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
- Calbert, Joseph P. & Vater, Heinz (1975), *Aspekte der Modalität*, Tübingen.
- Carr, William (1991), *A History of Germany 1815-1990*, Edward Arnold.
- Chilton, Paul (1985), *Language and the Nuclear Arms Debate*, London: Pinter.
- Chilton, Paul (1996), *Security Metaphors: Cold War Discourse from Containment to Common House*, Berne and New York: Peter Lang.
- Chilton, Paul & Ilyin, Mikhail (1993), "Metaphor in Political Discourse: the Case of the 'Common European House'", in *Discourse and Society*, Vol. 4, Issue 1, 1993.
- Clayman, Steven E. (1993), "Reformulating the Question: A device for answering/not answering questions in news interviews and press conferences", in *Text Special Issue: New Directions In Conversation Analysis*, Vol. 13, Issue 2, 1993, pp. 159-188.
- Coates, Jennifer (1995), "The Expression of Root and Epistemic Possibility in English", in: Bybee, Joan & Fleischmann, Suzanne (1995a), pp. 55-66.
- Cochrane, Raymond, Billig, Michael & Hogg, Michael (1979), "British Politics and the Two-Value Model", in Rokeach, Milton (ed.) (1979a), pp. 179-191.

- Collier, Irwin L., Jr. (1995), "Rebuilding the German Welfare State", in Conradt, David P., Kleinfeld, Gerald R. & Romoser, George K. (eds.) (1995), pp. 273-285.
- Conradt, David P. (1980), "Changing German Political Culture", in Almond, Gabriel A. & Verba, Sidney (eds.) (1980), pp. 217-236.
- Conradt, David P., Kleinfeld, Gerald R. & Romoser, George K. (eds.) (1995), *Germany's New Politics: Parties & Issues in the 1990s*, Providence: Berghahn Books.
- Corcoran, Paul E. (1979), *Political Language and Rhetoric*, Queensland: University of Queensland Press.
- Crewe, Ivor & Searing, Donald D. (1988), "Ideological Change in the British Conservative Party", in *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 82, Issue 2, June 1988, pp. 370-378.
- Cromm, Jürgen (1988), "Bevölkerungsentwicklung in Deutschland", in *Informationen zur politischen Bildung*, Vol. 220, pp. 14-22.
- Culyer, A.J. (1976), *Need and the National Health Service: Economics and Social Choice*, York: University of York.
- Dahl, Robert A. (ed.) (1966), *Political Oppositions in Western Democracies*, New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Denver, David (1991), "Great Britain: From "Opposition with a Capital 'O'" to Fragmented Opposition", in Kolinsky, Eva (ed.) (1987a).
- Department of Health (1989), *Working for Patients - The Health Service: Caring for the 1990s*, London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office.
- Deth, Rüdiger (1986), *Die Teilmodalität Possibilität im Russischen und Deutschen, ein Beitrag zur funktional-semantischen Kategorie der Modalität*, Berlin: Humboldt-Universität.
- Dod's Parliamentary Companion* (1989), Sussex: Dod's Parliamentary Companion.
- Dollinger, Heinz, Gründer, Horst & Hanschmidt, Alwin (eds.) (1982), *Weltpolitik, Europagedanke, Regionalismus*, Münster: Aschendorff.
- Döring, Diether (ed.) (1989a), *Politische Kultur und Sozialpolitik: ein Vergleich der Vereinigten Staaten und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des Armutproblems*, Frankfurt: Campus Verlag.
- Döring, Herbert (1993), *Grossbritannien: Regierung, Gesellschaft und politische Kultur*, Opladen: Leske & Budrich.
- Dörner, Andreas & Rohe, Karl (1991), "Politische Sprache und Politische Kultur. Diachron-kulturvergleichende Sprachanalysen am Beispiel von Großbritannien und Deutschland", in Latniak, Erich (1989).
- Downing, Angela & Locke, Philip (1992), *A University Course in English Grammar*, Prentice Hall.
- Dreßler, Rudolf (1992), "Eckwerte des Gesundheitsstrukturgesetzes", in Forschungsinstitut der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (1993), pp. 7-19.
- Drucker, H. M. (1974), *The Political Uses of Ideology*, MacMillan.
- Eckstein, Harry (1958), *The English Health Service. Its Origins, Structure and Achievements*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

- Eggs, Suzanne (1994), *An Introduction to Systemic Functional Linguistics*, London: Pinter.
- Erdinger, Lewis J. (1986), *West German Politics*, New York: Columbia University Press.
- Fairclough, Norman (1992a), *Discourse and Social Change*, Oxford: Polity Press.
- Fairclough, Norman (1995), *Critical Discourse Analysis: the Critical Study of Language*, New York: Longman.
- Feather, N.T. & Peay, E.R. (1975), "The Structure of Terminal and Instrumental Values: Dimensions and Clusters", in *Australian Journal of Psychology*, Vol. 27, Issue 2, 1975, pp. 151-164.
- Flamm, Franz (1974), *The Social System and Welfare Work in the Federal Republic of Germany*, Frankfurt: Eigenverlag des Deutschen Vereins für öffentliche und private Fürsorge.
- Flanagan, S.C. (1987), "Value Change in Industrial Societies", in *American Political Science Review*, Issue 81 1987, pp. 1303-1319.
- Foot, Michael (1975), *Aneurin Bevan 1945-1960*, Vol. 2, Paladin.
- Forschungsinstitut der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (1993), *Gesundheitsstrukturgesetz - Geeignet zur Lösung der Probleme im Gesundheitswesen?*, Bonn.
- Foss, Dennis C. (1977), *The Value Controversy in Sociology*, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers.
- Fowler, Roger (1985), "Power", in van Dijk, Teun A. (ed.) (1989), Vol. 4, pp. 61-81.
- Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, "Vereinte Besorgt über steigende Ausgaben im Gesundheitswesen", June 26, 1990.
- Franz, Gerhard (1987), "Projektion persönlicher Wahrnehmungen auf die Beurteilung von Regierung und Parteien", in Klages, Helmut, Franz, Gerhard & Herbert, Willi (1987), pp. 105-129.
- Freeman, Michael (1980), *Edmund Burke and the Critique of Political Radicalism*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Frerich, Dr. Johannes (1996), *Sozialpolitik: das Sozialleistungssystem der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag.
- Fuchs, Dieter (1987), "Einstellungen zum politischen System der Bundesrepublik. Trends politischer Unterstützung in der Bundesrepublik", in Berg-Schlosser, Dirk (ed.) (1987), pp. 357-377.
- Fulop, Naomi (ed.) (1995), *Choice in the Allocation of Health Care Resources in Britain and Germany*, London: Anglo-German Foundation.
- Gaffney, John & Kolinsky, Eva (eds.) (1991), *Political Culture in France and Germany. A Contemporary Perspective*, London & New York: Routledge.
- Gall, Lothar (1981), *Bismarck: der weisse Revolutionär*, Ludwigsburg: Propyläen.
- Gibbins, John (ed.) (1989), *Contemporary Political Culture. Politics in a Postmodern Age*, London: Sage Publications.
- Gilbert, Bentley B. (1970), *British Social Policy 1914-1939*, London: B.T. Batsford.

- Gluchowski, Peter, Plasser, Fritz & Ulram, Peter A. (1991), "Politisch-kultureller Wandel in Deutschland. Eine Übersicht über Veränderungen und Wandlungslinien", in Plasser, Fritz & Ulram, Peter A. (eds.) (1991), pp. 159-177.
- Greenleaf, W.H. (1983), *The British Political Tradition Volume Two: The Ideological Heritage*, London: Methuen.
- Greiffenhagen, Martin & Greiffenhagen, Sylvia (1993), *Ein schwieriges Vaterland. Zur politischen Kultur im vereinigten Deutschland*, München: List-Verlag.
- Guttman, Louis (1992), "The Mapping Sentence for Assessing Values", in Klages, Helmut, Herbert, Willi & Hippler, Hans-Jürgen (eds.) (1992), pp. 595-601.
- Halliday, Michael Alexander Kirkwood (1985), *An introduction to functional grammar*, London: Edward Arnold.
- Hamerow, Theodore S. (1969), *The Social Foundations of German Unification 1858-1871: Ideas and Institutions*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Hansen, Gyde (1989), *Textlinguistische Analyse von Gebrauchstexten*, Copenhagen: Nyt Nordisk Forlag Arnold Busck.
- Harrington, William & Young, Peter (1978), *The 1945 Revolution*, Davis-Poynter.
- Harrison, Wilfried (1965), *Sources in British Political Thought 1593-1900*, New York: The Free Press.
- Hartmann, Klaus D. (1981), "Werthaltungen als Handlungsregulative. Ergebnisse eines Pretests", in Klages, Helmut & Kmiecik, P. (eds.) (1981), pp. 210-215.
- Haselbach, Dieter (1994), "'Soziale Marktwirtschaft' als Gründungsmythos. Zur Identitätsbildung im Nachkriegsdeutschland", in Mayer-Iswandy, Claudia (ed.) (1994), pp.255-266.
- Haselbach, Dieter (1996), "On the Difficulties of Cutting Public Health Expenditure: Health Reform in Germany" in Stingl, Michael & Wilson, Donna (1996), pp. 124-129.
- Hayek, Friedrich August von (1944), *The Road To Serfdom*, Chicago: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Hegel, G.W.F. (1961), *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam.
- Heine, Bernd (1995), "Agent-Oriented vs. Epistemic Modality. Some observations on German modals", in Bybee, Joan & Fleischmann, Suzanne (eds.) (1995a), pp. 18-53.
- Heinze, Helmut (1979), *Gesprochenes und geschriebenes Deutsch. Vergleichende Untersuchungen von Bundestagesreden und deren schriftlich aufgezeichneter Version*, Düsseldorf: Pädagogischer Verlag Schwann.
- Heinzerling, Stefan (1989), "Funktionen der Fraktionen als Träger der parlamentarischen Kontrolle", in Busch, Eckart & Berger, Frithjof (eds.) (1989), pp. 120-127.
- Herder-Dorneich, Philipp (1966), *Sozialökonomischer Grundriß der Gesetzlichen Krankenversicherung*, Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer.
- Hertz, Frederick (1975), *The German Public Mind in the Nineteenth Century: A Social History of German Political Sentiments, Aspirations and Ideas*, George Allen & Unwin Ltd..

- Herz, Thomas A. (1981), "Die Einstellungen zur Verwirklichung der Werte 'Gleichheit' und 'Gerechtigkeit'", in Klages, Helmut & Kmieciak, P. (eds.) (1981), pp. 193-207.
- Holly, Werner (1990), *Politikersprache. Inszenierungen und Rollenkonflikte im informellen Sprachhandeln eines Bundestagsabgeordneten*, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
- Hondrich, Karl Otto (1979), "Bedürfnisse, Werte und soziale Steuerung", in Klages, Helmut & Kmieciak, P. (eds.) (1981), pp. 67-83.
- Honigsbaum, Frank (1989), *Health, Happiness and Security: the Creation of the NHS*, London: Routledge.
- Huppertz, Beate (1987), *Werte und Normen in ihrem konstituierenden Einfluss auf die politisch-soziale Wirklichkeit*, Bonn: University of Bonn.
- Ickler, Theodor (1990), "Zur Semantik des politischen Schlagwortes (und anderer Wörter)", in: *Sprache und Literatur in Wissenschaft und Unterricht*, Vol. 21, Issue 65, 1990, pp. 11-26.
- Inglehart, Ronald (1977), *The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles Among Western Publics*, New Jersey.
- Jung, Helmut (1986), "Political Values and the Regulation of Hospital Care", in Light, Donald W. & Schuller, Alexander (eds.) (1986), pp. 293-304.
- Jung, Helmut (1994), "Wertorientierungen von Nicht- und Protestwählern", in *Politische Studien*, Vol. 45, Issue 336, Jul pp. 5-34.
- Kalivoda, Gregor (1986), *Parlamentarische Rhetorik und Argumentation*, Frankfurt: Peter Lang.
- Kavanagh, Dennis (1980), "Political Culture in Great Britain: The Decline of the Civic Culture", in Almond, Gabriel A. & Verba, Sidney (eds.) (1980), pp. 152-158.
- Keynes, John Maynard (1925), "Am I a Liberal? An Address to the Liberal Summer School at Cambridge", in Bullock, Alan & Shock, Maurice (eds.) (1956), pp. 283-285.
- Kilby, Richard W. (1993), *The Study of Human Values*, San Jose: University Press of America.
- Kirchheimer, Otto (1966), "Germany: The Vanishing Opposition", in Dahl, Robert A. (ed.) (1966), pp. 241-259.
- Klages, Helmut (1985), *Wertorientierungen im Wandel. Rückblick, Gegenwartsanalyse, Prognosen.*, Frankfurt: Campus Verlag.
- Klages, Helmut (1992), "Die gegenwärtige Situation der Wert- und Wertwandelforschung - Probleme und Perspektiven", in Klages, Helmut, Herbert, Willi & Hippler, Hans-Jürgen (eds.) (1992), pp. 5-39.
- Klages, Helmut, Franz, Gerhard & Herbert, Willi (1987), *Sozialpsychologie der Wohlfahrtsgesellschaft: zur Dynamik von Wertorientierungen, Einstellungen und Ansprüchen*, Frankfurt: Campus Verlag.
- Klages, Helmut, Herbert, Willi & Hippler, Hans-Jürgen (eds.) (1992), *Werte und Wandel: Ergebnisse und Methoden einer Forschungstradition*, Frankfurt: Campus Verlag.
- Klages, Helmut & Kmieciak, P. (eds.) (1981), *Wertwandel und gesellschaftlicher Wandel*, Frankfurt: Campus Verlag.

- Klein, Josef & Diekmannschenke, Hajo (eds.) (1996), *Sprachstrategien und Dialogblockaden. Linguistische und politikwissenschaftliche Studien zur politischen Kommunikation*, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
- Kluckhohn, C (1951), "Values and Value Orientations In the Theory of Action" in Parsons, T., & Shils, E.S., *Toward a General Theory of Action*, Cambridge/Massachusetts, pp. 411ff.
- Kluckhohn, Florence Rockwood & Strodtbeck, Fred L. (1961), *Variations in Value Orientations*, Westport: Greenwood Press.
- Kolinsky, Eva (1987a) (ed.), *Opposition in Western Europe*, London: Croom Helm.
- Kolinsky, Eva (1987b), "The Transformation of Extra-Parliamentary Opposition in West Germany and the Peace Movement", in Kolinsky, Eva (ed.) (1987a), pp. 319-333.
- Kolinsky, Eva (1991), "Socio-Economic Change and Political Culture in West Germany", in Gaffney, John & Kolinsky, Eva (eds.) (1991), pp. 36-51.
- Kress, Gunther & Hodge, Bob (1988), *Social Semiotics*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Krieger, Leonard (1957), *The German Idea of Freedom: History of a Political Tradition*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Krippendorf (1980), *Content Analysis: An Introduction to Its Methodology*, London: SAGE Publications.
- Lakoff, George & Johnson, Mark (1980), *Metaphors We Live By*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Lal, Deepak (1995), "Adam Smith - Altruist", in *The Times Higher Education Supplement*, Jan 27, p. 23.
- Langner, Michael (1994), *Zur kommunikativen Funktion von Abschwächungen: pragma- und soziolinguistische Untersuchungen*, Münster: Nodus-Publishers.
- Latniak, Erich (1989), "Sprache statt Politik? - Politikwissenschaftliche Semantik- und Rhetorikforschung: Fachtagung an der Freien Universität Berlin 3.-5. April 1989", in: *Sprache und Literatur in Wissenschaft und Unterricht*, Vol. 20, Issue 64, July, pp. 110-112.
- Laumann, E.O. & Pappi, Franz Urban (1974), "Gesellschaftliche Wertorientierungen und politisches Verhalten", in *Zeitschrift für Soziologie*, Vol. 3, No. 2, April 1974, pp. 157-188.
- Leaman, Jeremy (1988), *The Political Economy of West Germany 1945-1985*, London: MacMillan.
- Lenel, Hans Otto (1989b), *Evolution of the Social Market Economy: Social Policy Aims*, in Peacock, Alan & Wilgerodt, Hans (eds.) (1989b).
- Levinson, Stephen C. (1983), *Pragmatics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Levitt, Ruth, Wall, Andrew & Appelby, J. (1995), *The Reorganised National Health Service*, London: Chapman & Hall.
- Levy, Shlomit (1992), "Use of Facet Theory in Developing Value Theory for Communal Wellbeing: A Cross-Cultural Example", in Klages, Helmut, Herbert, Willi & Hippler, Hans-Jürgen (eds.) (1992), pp. 602-621.

- Light, Donald W. (1986b), "Values and Health in the Two Germanies", in Light, Donald W. & Schuller, Alexander (eds.) (1986), pp. 576-583.
- Light, Donald W. & Schuller, Alexander (eds.) (1986), *Political Values and Health Care: The German Experience*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
- Loewenberg, Gerhard (1961), "Parliamentarism in West Germany: The Functioning of the Bundestag", in *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 55, Issue 1, Jan pp. 87-102.
- Lohmann, Karl (1967), *Der Deutsche Bundestag*, Bonn: Athenäum Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag.
- Lösche, Peter, & Walter, Franz (1996), *Die FDP: Richtungsstreit und Zukunftszweifel*, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.
- Ludwig, Klaus-Dieter (1976), *Zum Verhältnis von Sprache und Wertung: Untersuchungen an einigen Adjektiven, die negative ästhetische und moralische Wertungen fixieren*, Berlin: Akademie der Wissenschaften der DDR.
- Luthe, H.-O. & Meulemann, H. (eds.) (1988), *Wertwandel - Faktum oder Fiktion?*, Frankfurt.
- Maag, Gisela (1991), *Gesellschaftliche Werte: Strukturen, Stabilität und Funktion*, Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.
- Mason, Timothy W. (1978), *Sozialpolitik im Dritten Reich. Arbeiterklasse und Volksgemeinschaft*, Opladen.
- Matthews, Richard (1996), "'Oblique' Modals in English and German", in *Language Sciences*, Vol. 18, Issue 1, 1996, pp. 363-379.
- Mayer-Iswanday, Claudia (ed.) (1994), *Zwischen Traum und Trauma - Die Nation. Transatlantische Perspektiven zur Geschichte eines Problems*, Tübingen: Stauffenburg.
- Mayntz, Gregor (1992), *Zwischen Volk und Volksvertretung. Entwicklung, Probleme und Perspektiven der Parlamentsberichterstattung unter besonderer Berücksichtigung von Fernsehen und Deutschem Bundestag*, Bonn: University of Bonn.
- Meinecke, Friedrich (1957), *Die Idee der Staatsräson*, München.
- Merten, Klaus (1983), *Inhaltsanalyse. Einführung in Theorie, Methode und Praxis*, Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.
- Meulemann, H. (1985), "Wertwandel in der Bundesrepublik zwischen 1950 und 1980: Versuch einer zusammenfassenden Deutung vorliegender Zeitreihen", in Oberndörfer, Dieter, Rattinger, Hans & Schmitt, Karl (eds.) (1985), pp. 391-401.
- Meyer, Ruth (1981), "Wertforschung im systematischen internationalen Vergleich", in Klages, Helmut & Kmieciak, P. (eds.) (1981), pp. 40-50.
- Miller, Susanne & Potthoff, Heinrich (1983), *Kleine Geschichte der SPD: Darstellung und Dokumentation*, Bonn: Verlag Neue Gesellschaft.
- Miller, William Lockley, Timpson, Annis May & Lessnoff, Michael (1996), *Political culture in contemporary Britain: people and politicians, principles and practice*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Minkenbergh, Michael (1995), "What's Left of the Right?" in Conradt, David P., Kleinfeld, Gerald R. & Romoser, George K. (eds.) (1995), pp. 255-259.

- Mohler, Peter Ph. (1992), "Wertewandel in der Bundesrepublik in den 60er Jahren. Ein 'Top Down'- oder ein 'Bottom Up'-Prozeß?", in Klages, Helmut, Herbert, Willi & Hippler, Hans-Jürgen (eds.) (1992), pp. 40-68.
- Morris, Charles W. (1956), *Varieties of Human Value*, Chicago.
- Müller, Wolfgang (1993), "Ausgaben für Gesundheit 1991" in *Wirtschaft und Statistik*, Vol. 11/1993, pp. 849-852.
- Müller, Wolfgang C. (1991), "Politische Kultur: Konzept - Forschungsmethoden - Effekte" in Plasser, Fritz & Ulram, Peter A. (eds.) (1991), pp. 3-15.
- Müller-Armack, Alfred (1956), "The Meaning of the Social Market Economy", in *Germany's Social Market Economy: Origins & Evolution*, pp. 82-86.
- Nicholls, A. J. (1994), *Freedom with Responsibility: The Social Market in Germany 1918-1963*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Niedermayer, Oskar & Beyme, Klaus von (eds.) (1994), *Politische Kultur in Ost- und Westdeutschland*, Berlin: Akademie-Verlag.
- Niemeyer, Werner (1987), "Strukturreform der gesetzlichen Rentenversicherung", in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte: Beilage zur Wochenzeitung Das Parlament*, 29 August 1987, pp. 17-27.
- O'Gorman, Frank (1973), *Edmund Burke: His Political Philosophy*, Unwin University Books.
- Oakley, Ann & Williams, Susan A. (eds.) (1994), *The Politics of the Welfare State*, London: UCL Press.
- Oberndörfer, Dieter, Rattinger, Hans & Schmitt, Karl (eds.) (1985), *Wirtschaftlicher Wandel, religiöser Wandel und Wertewandel. Folgen für das politische Verhalten in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot.
- Opp de Hipt, Manfred (1987a), "Denkbilder vom Staat in bundesrepublikanischen Parteiprogrammen" in Berg-Schlosser, Dirk (ed.) (1987).
- Opp de Hipt, Manfred (1987b), *Denkbilder in der Politik. Der Staat in der Sprache von CDU und SPD*, Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.
- Ortony, A. (ed.) (1979), *Metaphor and Thought*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Paivio, Allan (1979), "Psychological Processes in the Comprehension of Metaphor", in Ortony, A. (ed.) (1979), pp. 150-171.
- Parliamentary Debates (Hansard). Official Report (House of Commons) (1989-1990), Vol. 6, Issue 163, Dec cols 488-569, 681-764, 773-780.
- Parness, Diane L. (1991), *The SPD and the Challenges of Mass Politics: The Dilemma of the German Volkspartei*, Boulder: Westview Press.
- Peacock, Alan & Wilgerodt, Hans (eds.) (1989a), *Germany's Social Market Economy: Origins & Evolution*, London: MacMillan.
- Peacock, Alan & Wilgerodt, Hans (eds.) (1989b), *German Neo-Liberals and the Social Market Economy*, London: MacMillan.
- Pelling, Henry Mathison (1984), *The Labour Governments 1945-51*, London: MacMillan.

- Perina, Udo (1993a), "Steuern statt Beiträge", in *Die Zeit*, June 18 1993, p. 21.
- Perina, Udo (1993b), "Keiner wird gewinnen", in *Die Zeit*, October 22 1993.
- Plasser, Fritz & Ulram, Peter A. (eds.) (1991), *Staatsbürger oder Untertanen?: Politische Kultur Deutschlands, Österreichs und der Schweiz im Vergleich*, Frankfurt: Lang.
- Popper, Karl (1966), *The Open Society and Its Enemies, Volume 2: The High Tide of Prophecy: Hegel, Marx and the Aftermath*, Routledge.
- Potter, Allen (1966), "Great Britain: Opposition with a Capital 'O'", in Dahl, Robert A. (ed.) (1966), pp. 4-29.
- Pütz, Dr. Helmut (1978), *Die CDU*, Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag.
- Reich, Ben & Adcock, Christine (1976), *Values, Attitudes and Behaviour*, London: Methuen.
- Rescher, Nicholas (1969), *Introduction to Value Theory*, New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
- Ritter, Gerhard Albert (1974), *Gesellschaft, Parlament und Regierung. Zur Geschichte des Parlamentarismus in Deutschland*, Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag.
- Ritter, Gerhard Albert (1991), *Der Sozialstaat. Entstehung und Entwicklung im internationalen Vergleich*, München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag.
- Rohe, Karl (1982b), "Zur Typologie politischer Kulturen in westlichen Demokratien. Überlegungen am Beispiel Großbritanniens und Deutschlands", in Dollinger, Heinz, Gründer, Horst & Hanschmidt, Alwin (eds.) (1982), pp. 582-593.
- Rohe, Karl (1987), "Politische Kultur und der kulturelle Aspekt von politischer Wirklichkeit", in Berg-Schlosser, Dirk (ed.) (1987), pp. 39-48.
- Rohe, Karl (1994b), "Politische Kultur: Zum Verständnis eines theoretischen Konzepts", in Niedermayer, Oskar & Beyme, Klaus von (eds.) (1994), pp. 1-6.
- Rokeach, Milton (1968a), *Beliefs, Attitudes and Values*, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers.
- Rokeach, Milton (1973), *The Nature of Human Values*, New York: The Free Press.
- Rokeach, Milton (ed.) (1979a), *Understanding Human Values: Individual and Societal*, New York: The Free Press.
- Rokeach, Milton (1979b), "The Two-Value Model of Political Ideology and British Politics", in Rokeach, Milton (ed.) (1979a), pp. 192-196.
- Rokeach, Milton, Homant, Robert & Penner, Louis (1970), "A Value Analysis of the Disputed Federalist Papers", in *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, Vol. 16, Issue 2, pp. 245-250.
- Rudder, Helmut de & Sahner, Heinz (1988), *Herrschaft der Verbände? Interessenverbände - Gegenregierung oder Partner?*, Berlin.
- Saeed, John (1997), *Semantics*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Schäffner, Christina (1996), "Europapolitische Metaphorik in England und Deutschland", in Klein, Josef & Diekmannschenke, Hajo (eds.) (1996), pp. 151-163.
- Scheuner, Ulrich (1974), "Zur Entwicklung des Parlaments unter der Ordnung des Grundgesetzes", in Ritter, Gerhard Albert (1974), pp. 421-441.

- Schissler, Jakob (1981), "Der Werteaspekt in der Forschung zur politischen Kultur. Ansätze und Ergebnisse", in Klages, Helmut & Kmieciak, P. (eds.) (1981), pp. 351-364.
- Schön, Donald A. (1979), "Generative Metaphor: A Perspective on Problem-Setting in Social Policy", in Ortony, A. (ed.) (1979), pp. 254-283.
- Schubert, Susanne (1989), "Das Plenum des Bundestages", in Busch, Eckart & Berger, Frithjof (eds.) (1989), pp. 5-9.
- Schwarz, Werner (1989), "Die Fraktionen als Träger der parlamentarischen Kontrolle", in Busch, Eckart & Berger, Frithjof (eds.) (1989), pp. 108-119.
- Searing, Donald D. (1979), "A Study of Values in the British House of Commons", in Rokeach, Milton (1979a), pp. 155-178.
- Shell, Kurt L. (1989), "Amerikanische Einstellungen zur Armut und sozialen Ungleichheit", in Döring, Diether (ed.) (1989a), pp. 11-24.
- Simmler, Franz (1978), *Die politische Rede im Deutschen Bundestag: Bestimmung ihrer Textsorten und Redesorten*, Göppingen: Verlag Alfred Kummerle.
- Smith, Adam (1910a), *The Wealth of Nations*, London.
- Smith, Adam (1970), *The Wealth of Nations*, Pelican.
- Søe, Christian (1995), "The Free Democratic Party: A Struggle for Survival, Influence and Identity", in Conradt, David P., Kleinfeld, Gerald R. & Romoser, George K. (eds.) (1995), pp. 171-181.
- Sontheimer, Kurt (1990), *Deutschlands politische Kultur*, München: Piper.
- Statistisches Bundesamt (1985), *Bevölkerung gestern, heute und morgen*, Wiesbaden: Statistisches Bundesamt.
- Sternberg, Robert J., Tourangeau, Roger & Nigro, Georgia (1979), "Metaphor, Induction and Social Policy: The Convergence of Macroscopic and Microscopic Views", in Ortony, A. (ed.) (1979), pp. 325-353.
- Stingl, Michael & Wilson, Donna (1996), *Efficiency versus Equality: Health Reform in Canada*, Alberta: Fernwood Publishing.
- Stone, Philip J., Dunphy, Dexter C. & Smith, Marshall S. (1966), *The General Inquirer: A Computer Approach to Content Analysis*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
- Süddeutsche Zeitung (1993), "Der Zugriff der Sozialversicherung", in *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, June 1 1993.
- Swales, John (1990), *Genre analysis, English in academic and research settings*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Taylor, Charles (1979), *Hegel and Modern Society*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Topf, Richard G. (1989), "Political Change and Political Culture in Britain, 1959-87", in Gibbins, John (ed.) (1989), pp. 52-61.
- Uhlig, Eckart (1972), *Studien zur Grammatik und Syntax der gesprochenen politischen Sprache des deutschen Bundestages. Ein Beitrag zur deutschen Sprache der Gegenwart*, Marburg: N.G. Elwert Verlag.

- van Dijk, Teun A. (ed.) (1989), *Handbook of Discourse Analysis*, London: Academic Press.
- Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages (1992): Vol. 12, Issue 105, Sep pp. 8987-9029.
- Vossekuhl, Wilhelm (1981), "Werte und Handlungen", in Klages, Helmut & Kmiecik, P. (eds.) (1981), pp. 136-144.
- Webster, Charles (1994), "Conservatives and Consensus: The Politics of the National Health Service 1951-64", in Oakley, Ann & Williams, Susan A. (eds.) (1994), pp. 54-73.
- Weise, Peter (1981), "Ziele, Normen, Werte und quantitative und qualitative Systemvergleiche", in Klages, Helmut & Kmiecik, P. (eds.) (1981), pp. 122-135.
- Winch, Donald (1978), *Adam Smith's Politics: An Essay in Historiographic Revision*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Wiseman, Jack (1989), "Social Policy and the Social Market Economy", in Peacock, Alan & Wilgerodt, Hans (eds.) (1989b).
- Zöllner, Detlev (1987), "Ausgaben für die Gesundheit – Steuerungsprobleme und Reformmöglichkeiten", in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte: Beilage zur Wochenzeitung Das Parlament*, Jun 13, pp. 3-12.