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BRITISH RACIAL DISCOURSE

A study of political discourse about race and race-related matters at parliamentary and borough council levels.

IN TWO VOLUMES: VOLUME ONE

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Francis William Reeves Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

SUMMARY

'British Racial Discourse' is a study of political discourse about race and race-related matters. The explanatory theory is adapted from current sociological studies of ideology with a heavy emphasis on the tradition developed from Marx and Engels's Feuerbach. The empirical data is drawn from the parliamentary debates on immigration and the Race Relations Bills, Conservative and Labour Party Conference Reports, and a set of interviews with Wolverhampton Borough councillors. Although the thesis has broader significance for British political discourse about race, it is particularly concerned with the responses of members of the two main political parties, rather than with the more overt and sensational racism of certain extreme Right-wing groups. Indeed, as the study progresses, it focuses more and more narrowly on the phenomenon of 'deracialised' discourse, and the details of the predominantly class-based justificatory systems of the Conservative and Labour Parties. Of particular interest are the argument forms (used in the debates on immigration and race relations) which manage to obscure the white electorate's responsibility for prejudice and discrimination. Such discoursive forms are of major significance for understanding British race relations, and their detailed examination provides an insight into the way in which 'ideological facades' are created and maintained.

KEY WORDS FOR INDEXING

RACIAL DISCOURSE, RACISM, DERACIALISATION

BRITISH RACIAL DISCOURSE

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OBJECTIVITY

A neighbour came to Nasrudin for an interpretation on a point of law.

'My cow was gored by your bull. Do I get any compensation?'

'Certainly not. How can a man be held responsible for what an animal does?'

'Just a moment,' said the crafty villager. 'I am afraid I got the question back to front. What actually happened was that my bull gored your cow.'

'Ah,' said the Mulla, 'this is more involved. I shall have to look up the book of precedents, for there may be other factors involved which are relevant and which could alter the case.'

Idries Shah, The Pleasantries of the Incredible Mulla Nasrudin, Picador.

INTRODUCTION

The overall aim of this project is to provide some explanation for the kinds of discourse used in dealing with racial issues. The central task throughout is to combine the insights offered by a theory of ideology with an analysis of examples of actual discourse about race and kindred matters. Because of the immensity of the task of trying to account for all kinds of racial expression, the study is confined, in the main, to an examination of political discourse, and further, to the political discourse of a limited number of local and national politicians, (councillors, and members of parliament) belonging either to the Conservative or to the Labour Party.

There are a number of reasons for selecting political discourse about race and race-related issues as a subject for study. Such discourse is related to decision-making or to the absence of decision-making, which gives it a little more significance than that of a casual conversation in a public bar. Also, it is the language of persons who are accustomed to making public utterances and are aware, to some degree, of the likely consequences of their speech acts. And, because of the ideological setting in which it occurs, political discourse may reveal more consistency and regularity of feature than other kinds of speech. Force of circumstance probably encourages politicians to develop, enlarge upon, and systematise their views on various topics. There is also likely to be variation between different schools of political thought, enabling useful comparisons to be made. For reasons, then, of its association with significant decision-making, its regularity of feature, and the availability of comparative and contrasting data, political discourse was chosen as the focus for the project.

The study is further limited to an examination of what Conservative

and Labour politicians have to say about race - thus omitting the more sensational racial declarations of Right-wing groups such as the National Front. For similar reasons (though without implying, in the manner of psychologists such as Eysenck, that Right and Left-wing attitudes should be classified in tandem), the strong anti-racist stances of Communist and Trotskyist groups are neglected. This does not mean that the menace posed to the black community* by the National Front's vicious, Right-wing propaganda and other action is unrecognised. Rather, the central purpose of the study is to concentrate on the mainstream of British politics in the shape of the Conservative and Labour parties that, at national and local level, must be held responsible, inasmuch as responsibility can be attributed in this sphere, for making (by inclusion or omission) most of the political decisions that have affected race relations and racial minority groups. This state of affairs is likely to continue to be the case for the forseeable future. And yet, while there is much literature on fascist ideology, including a recently published Social Psychological View of the National Front (Billig, 1978) surprisingly little has been written by social scientists generally, and sociologists in particular, about British Conservative or Labour Party ideology, and even less about that ideology in relation to racial matters.

One common view is that party political consensus has removed race as an electoral issue, yet within their parties and to their electorate, politicians are forced to justify their action or inaction to pressure groups and individuals that challenge them. The aim of the study is to examine the regular features of the justificatory systems adopted by mainstream politicians. Such a study has political relevance: it should provide insights into the relationship between racial and other party values, into the stability of the ideological

* For a discussion of the terminology used in this study to refer to racial minorities, see note 1.

structure as a whole, and into whether there is much potential or room for further policy initiative in the field of race relations within the present political context.

Despite the decision to limit the study to an examination of political discourse, the task was still sufficiently grandiose to require further focus. This was accomplished by the choice of theory and by the selection of particular cases for analysis.

The explanatory theory adopted was drawn extensively from current sociological studies of ideology with a heavy emphasis on the tradition developed from Marx and Engels's Feuerbach (1845-6), the first part of The German Ideology. In particular, there is an attempt to relate racial discourse to the general process of capitalist state legitimation highlighted by Habermas (1975). But ideas are also drawn eclectically from the works of Pareto, Gramsci and Schils, to provide a theory of ideological levels in which the specialist discourse of politicians can be distinguished from the discourse of the general population. It is recognised that the discourse of politicians has an important justificatory function which, in the examination of empirical data, best serves to exemplify its ideological nature.

A number of important logical and philosophical distinctions are also employed. The sentences that go to make up an ideological complex are classed as descriptive, evaluative, or prescriptive, while the process of explanation is carefully distinguished from justification. Many arguments in the area of race relations are enthymematic, meaning that they are not stated in full. Premises or conclusion are suppressed because they are already accepted as common knowledge by the population and because enthymemes are often rhetorically more persuasive than full argument.

The empirical data selected for analysis was drawn from three main sources: the debates on the Immigration and Race Relations Bills, as recorded in Hansard, the debates on immigration, race relations and other kindred issues recorded in Conservative and Labour Party Conference Reports, and a set of tape-recorded and transcribed interviews with over fifty Borough Councillors.

Details of the interviews with councillors and the schedule of the questions are supplied in Appendix One. Although the survey material was specifically gathered with project hypotheses firmly in mind, as with all such exercises, only a small amount of the available data could properly be utilised. Nevertheless, where appropriate, case study material has been incorporated in the main body of the text to illustrate relevant themes. It has been thought best, however, always to indicate the precise point at which the case studies of Borough Councillors' discourse are included in the main text, so that, if required they can be read and judged separately. Some continuity might have been sacrificed to achieve this organisation of material, but the richness of the responses deserves some independence of treatment, and acts as a helpful reminder that however adequate the theory employed, it can never fully account for the complexity of reality. Indeed attempts in this field to achieve a perfect fit between theory and data are likely to result in the omission of awkward material and an oversimplification, or caricaturing, of what is actually said. It was, after all, in order to avoid the simplistic classification of discourse as 'prejudiced' 'racist' 'Conservative', 'fascist' or 'socialist' that this study was undertaken in the first place.

The study itself is organised into eleven chapters.

Chapters One and Two examine in detail the meanings of terms such as 'racism' and 'prejudice' and whether these concepts are adequate for describing the complexities of discourse dealing with race. In Chapter One, the meaning of the term 'racism' is explained and three different usages - a 'weak', 'medium' and 'strong' - are distinguished. There is some discussion of the means by which racist discourse might be identified, and Professor Banton's arguments on this point are subjected to criticism. Chapter Two challenges the common assumptions that racial prejudice is necessarily a form of attitude, or that it is negative, or that it can be identified either by its non-verifiable empirical characteristics or psychological functions. An alternative definition of racial prejudice as an unjustified expression making an evaluative reference to a racial group, is advocated. The critique of the concepts of racism and prejudice aims to show that they are generally inadequate as means for analysing discourse about racial matters.

Chapters Three to Six attempt to locate discourse dealing with race in the framework of the social structure, and for this purpose draw extensively upon various theories of ideology, making use in particular of themes drawn from the work of Marx and Engels. Initially, the meaning of ideology and its relationship with discourse are set out in detail. Then, an economic structural explanation of racial division, postulating a "square of alienation", is offered for consideration. It is argued that while economic explanations of race relations might throw light on the reasons for racial responses generally, they are unable to account for the many complexities of political discourse dealing with race. Specialised political discourse is best understood

within the context of the political legitimation process in which the representatives of particular social classes or class alliances seek to persuade the population that they are acting for the public good and in the general interest. Although this might seem a very obvious point to make, it differs from the widely accepted view that 'racism' can be simply explained in terms of action in pursuit of economic interest. While the underlying dynamic of capitalism has to be recognised, the contending class pursue their interests at different institutional and discoursive levels. The actual content of any example of racial or racist discourse is likely to reflect the true complexity of the decision-making process in which politicians seek to maximise a whole range of benefits and to minimise losses.

In Chapter Six a typology of Conservative and Labour values is devised to describe the specialised political discourse of the two major political parties. The aim is to show that what is said about race issues is tempered by the predominant class values of British ideology as a whole, values that arise from the antagonism between the classes and class alliances of a capitalist society. Racial expression, then, is subject to the constraints of class values, and must avail itself of the forms and categories that Right and Left-wing class ideologies provide.

Chapters Seven and Eight constitute an attempt to show how the analysis provided in the previous chapters can be applied. The values of Conservative and Labour are paired, and their contrasting ideological and policy implications described. Examples are drawn from the historical legacy of Conservative and Labour classics, from the Party Conference reports, and from the interviews with borough councillors. Conservative traditionalism and organicism is contrasted with Labour rationalisation and commitment to structural change. Nationalism.

is contrasted with internationalism, imperialism with anti-imperialism, the maintenance of class stability with the pursuit of egalitarianism, social order with social justice, laissez faire and the rejection of state interference with social ownership and the advocacy of government intervention, the emphasis on self-reliant individualism with welfare collectivism, and the limitations of human nature with the possibilities offered by nurture and education for human improvement. And finally, Right and Left-wing 'bogies', Communism and extremism of any kind for the Conservative camp, and Fascism for Labour, are mentioned in respect of their consequences for racial views and policies. Throughout this section, attention is devoted to the ways the values mentioned have affected opinions and positions adopted towards black people.

Chapter Nine is concerned with how discourse, which, at face value, makes no use of racial or racial categories, can be used with racial effect or to disguise racial intent. There is the straightforward situation where practices resulting in inegalitarian racial consequences are justified, consciously or unconsciously, by recourse to arguments of a non-racial or racist kind. Alternatively, there is a form of deracialisation, described here as 'sanitary coding', in which the speaker speaks purposely to his audience about racial matters while avoiding the overt deployment of racial descriptions, evaluations, and prescriptions. The first kind of ideological deracialisation is analysed in detail with the help of a case study. The arguments used by Members of Parliament for justifying Commonwealth immigration control (which had clear racial consequences) are grouped into seven categories: personalised dispositional and agential, abstracted social process, populist, economic, pro bono publico, reciprocity, and means-orientated, together with accompanying rhetorical modes. In general, deracialised discourse

is defensible against the accusation that it is racist, but is capable, nevertheless, of justifying racial discrimination by providing other non-racist criteria for the differential treatment of a group distinguished by its racial characteristics. "Sanitary coding" is another rhetorical device which provides absolution from responsibility for racial evaluation and prescription, but here the politician self-consciously shares in a conspiracy with an audience. In order to conceal his racial message he uses the techniques of equivocation and stress as well as attempting to project mental images for others to interpret. As a whole, Chapter Ten is meant to illustrate in detail, and by using a specific issue i.e. black immigration control, how the ideological facade (the claim that various actions are morally justifiable and are not merely undertaken in pursuit of self-interest) is constructed and efficaciously maintained.

The final Chapter, Eleven, takes this kind of analysis one stage further by showing how, without ever admitting openly to the true moral turpitude of a situation, politicians may take limited steps to remedy a vicious underlying reality of which they may be uneasily aware. To extend the architectonic metaphor, the ideological facade may be maintained more or less intact while structural renovation is attempted - albeit unsuccessfully. As an example, explanations offered by Members of Parliament and Borough Councillors for white race prejudice and discrimination are described and shown as a means by which white responsibility might be assuaged. The explanations also act as justifications. And yet the parliamentary debates making use of these explanations are used to justify the passage of the Race Relations Acts aimed at reducing discriminatory behaviour, recognised as a social evil. In this case, deracialised discourse is employed both to explain away

hostile white reaction to blacks and to justify taking action to stop that same activity. Again a typology of argument is used for a detailed analysis of the elaborate ideological facade erected.

Together, the eleven chapters aim to provide a partial account of a few aspects of British racial ideology as it is practically experienced in the form of political discourse, as well as to offer some theoretical understanding of its relationship to the social structure as a whole and in particular its relationship to inter - and intra-class divisions. Such a massive undertaking is likely to be inadequate in many respects, and the project, when read as a whole, may appear on occasion to be either repetitive or unsatisfactorily synthesised. Nevertheless, it is hoped that it does attempt to provide an overview of the nature of British racial discourse, and to bring one or two original concepts to bear on the task. There is undoubtedly a need, however, for further extensive academic work to be conducted in this area.

CHAPTER ONE

THE MEANING OF 'RACISM' AND ITS LIMITATIONS IN THE STUDY OF DISCOURSE DEALING WITH RACIAL ISSUES

Terminological difficulties beset the whole field of race relations and particularly, the study of racial discourse. Before setting out to describe the characteristics of British political discourse about race, I shall try to explain the meaning of 'race', 'racism', 'racialism', 'racist', and 'racialist'. I shall examine in detail the use of the word 'racism' as this description has been widely applied to the kind of things people say about race. Because of a general vagueness and ambiguity in the meaning of all these terms, the exercise requires a great deal of arbitrary legislation, influenced in part by the needs of the subsequent study. In the course of analysis, various confusions, lurking in everyday and previous social scientific usage, are revealed. It should be stressed, however, that the whole area is a semantic 'battlefield', in which Wittgenstein's analogy of word tools does not come amiss. But the social and political ramifications of 'category legislation' is more akin to the deployment of tanks and barbed wire, than to the use of the hammer, pliers and saw of Wittgenstein's homely tool-box. The use of words has political significance: their application in social context reveals something of a person's scheme for ordering, understanding and acting in his world.

The reality of race consists in the first instance of perceivable characteristics of groups of people. 'Perceivable' in this context means 'capable of being perceived' ('perceived'= 'made available to the senses'). Pigmentation, physique, descent, historical or geographical origin, dress, language, and cultural norms and expressions are perceivable at what philosophers have called the level of the material field. But although perception by itself would appear

to require the capacity to differentiate, the recognition of racial difference requires some form of classification, comparison, and judgment of categorial significance. A recognition of racial difference involves a comparison of different pigmentations, physiques, etc., and their acceptance as indicators of a general racial category that acquires significance in conjunction with a broader system of thinking about the world. Perception of itself does not reveal the existence of race. Perceived differences become imbued with significance inasmuch as they act as an anchorage for a set of beliefs, and individuals have cause to consider their position in the light of that set. This idea is superficially similar to the Kantian idea of an object being conceptually determined or grasped by means of a concept, the concept acting as the condition of experience, although it is not clear whether Kant is referring to the conditions of perception or of understanding. It is the overall framework of ideas into which 'race' is inserted, therefore, which provides it with significance for social existence and understanding.

In its everyday usage the term 'race' is both vague and ambiguous. The limitations to the word's usage are rarely clear, and even if they are, it is not always apparent which of the word's recognised usages is being used in a particular context.

Is a race 'a group of people of common origin or descent', 'a division of mankind based on certain physical differences', 'one of the divisions of living creatures', e.g. 'the race of man', or something else again? In zoological literature, stipulative definitions of race have been offered which derive from and may also affect everyday usage if they become popularised. There is obviously a connection between race defined as 'a group regarded as

of common stock' and as 'a population within an animal species possessing a distinct gene frequency'. The sociologist's approach has been to study the definition of 'race' in popular usage in a given society. 'Race', then, is seen to be a social classification based primarily on perception of physical differences, although these physical differences need not be demonstrably genetically based.

Lachenmeyer (1971, p10) points out that:

> linguistic symbols must at certain points represent observable attributes, properties, and relations. A term's referential meaning consists of the points of contiguity between it as linguistic symbol and the observable attributes, properties and relations that it represents. Thus,referential meaning is the most relevant "meaning concept" for a consideration of scientific terminology.

The sociologist, then, identifies 'race' not merely by the use of the linguistic symbol but by its referential meaning. I may recognise others' discourse to be about race, when it employs a category which I am able to identify as having a referent corresponding to that designated by my own understanding of the term 'race'. It is not to be recognised solely by the occurrence of one particular linguistic symbol.

This also means that the boundaries that are placed around a given usage must be made absolutely clear if it is to be the arbiter of whether others are 'really' discussing race. Banton (1977) provides an example of the difficulties involved in boundary-drawing by distinguishing racial minorities ("created when opposition to the social incorporation of a minority is justified on the grounds of the minority members' hereditary characteristics, particularly those associated with skin colour and nineteenth century doctrines of


racial typology....."), national minorities ("people who are either citizens of another state or regard themselves as such and want the political map revised....."), and ethnic minorities (dependent "upon a belief among the minority members that the nature of their common descent requires or justifies their coming together....."). The classification, he says, "makes allowance for a minority's being both ethnic and racial and for changes in the relationship of the inclusive and exclusive boundaries." It serves to distinguish a variety of groupings all of which might previously have been referred to as races: e.g. the black race, the Welsh race, the Sikh race, etc.

Definition must always involve questions of where to draw the line: when the line is drawn too tightly, much that others think about as 'racial' will be excluded, giving rise to a 'reductionism', and when drawn too extensively, it will take in far too much substance, resulting in 'expansionism'. When Cox (1948) distinguishes race prejudice against blacks from intolerance of the Jews, it could be argued that the line has been drawn too tightly. From the point of view of explaining the structural mechanisms of race relations, however, it is undoubtedly a most thoughtful distinction to make. The possibility of sub-dividing large general categories of diverse phenomena is probably of great importance in developing an understanding of, and providing explanations for, the race relations complex (which seems to suffer more from expansionism than reductionism). However, it involves lexicographical legislation with political repercussions. For example, are the speeches of Enoch Powell to be thought of as concerned primarily with nationhood rather than with race?

One rough and ready method of tackling demarcation disputes is

to connect definitions to frequencies of usage in particular historical and geographical contexts. Thus, when British political discourse in the 1960s and 1970s is examined, it becomes clear that the categories that correspond most closely with Banton's definition of a racial minority (in terms of skin colour) - a definition which might usefully be adopted - are 'West Indians', 'Asians', 'coloured immigrants', 'immigrants', 'spades', 'wogs', and 'racial' or 'ethnic minorities'. In this context, it seems that skin colour is the decisive racial feature, despite the fact that the Jewish 'race' is also identified. In another era, however, the linguistic symbol, 'race', might have a somewhat different denotation. It is the referent, not the presence of the linguistic symbol, that is crucial, although there is in fact likely to be substantial correspondence in referential meaning between the sociologist's, and the 'man in the street's' linguistic symbols. The race category adopted here, then, consists of the class of phenomena designated racial by social scientists and referred to in common parlance under this and other designations:

Figure 1. Racial symbol and referent



Racial discourse consists of spoken and written material (e.g. speeches, books, articles, debates, conversation) that makes use of a racial category. Quite how central the race category must be to the discourse, and how frequently it must occur, are matters to be decided by the researcher.

Racial discourse may constitute part of a recognised political ideology. ('Ideology' is defined in Chapter Three.) In attempting to provide a comprehensive map of political affairs, ideologies are likely to find a place for matters of race.

A political ideology such as the national socialism outlined in Mein Kampf is centrally concerned with racial explanations of social processes, evaluations, and political prescriptions, and is frequently described as 'racial' or 'racist ideology.' Furthermore, the ideology's adherents might proudly accept the accuracy of a 'racist' label. (But even national socialism deals with issues other than race.) The social observer must not allow the political ideologists' assertions or denials of 'racist' content to play much part in deciding whether the ideology makes extensive use of the racial category: he must decide by reference to content, although the assertions of adherents, particularly those in principal positions in political parties, will qualify as part of that content.

Political ideologies such as British Conservatism, Liberalism, and Labour beliefs, however, are not appropriately described as 'racial' or 'racist'. Very little of the discourse that goes to make up the totality of these ideologies deals in any direct way with racial issues. This is not to deny that the social scientist may be able to recognise the adverse effects of the fulfilment of these ideologies' prescriptions on racial groups. But the ideologies are not accurately described as racial in the sense of making wide use of racial categories, explanations, evaluations, and prescriptions. It is still possible, however, to identify those parts of ideologies which are dealing with relations between racial groups and where terms do have an acknowledged racial referent. Ideologies with little overall emphasis on race may

make use of racial categories when a sequence of events about which decisions must be made is regarded as racial, or when there is a need to counter a racial interpretation offered by another ideology: e.g. "immigrants ought not to be repatriated". They are best described as ideologies in which racial categories, evaluations, or prescriptions appear. This study will be mainly concerned with ideologies such as these.

It is also important to consider the possibility that ideologies from which racial categories are absent from the adherents' point of view, or which remain unrecognised by many of the adherents, may justify practices recognised by the social observer as racially discriminatory. In other words, the effect of the fulfilment of prescriptions contained in the ideology is racialist although the ideology itself is non-racial in that its descriptive, evaluative, and prescriptive content does not make any use of racial categories. What better way to turn a blind eye to racialist practice than to justify it without reference to race itself? I wish to argue that there is a strong tendency in British political ideology to 'deracialise' situations which would appear racial to the social observer, and which may be judged by him to be racially discriminatory in their consequence.

In summary, I distinguish three kinds of ideology that have significance for race relations:

(1) racial ideology with an integral racial element;

(2) ideology judged non-racial overall, which nevertheless contains racial elements; and

(3) non-racial ideology with minimal or no racial content.

Although it is likely that, as a matter of fact, racial ideology will lead to racial practice, it is at least conceivable that

racial ideology need not result in racial practice. Also, of great interest is the possibility of the existence of non-racial ideologies that exist side by side with racial discrimination - an idea explored at length in later chapters.

In discussion of ideology and discourse dealing with racial matters, the terms 'racism' and 'racialism' are frequently used. As these terms occur again and again in most of the literature in this area, the rest of the chapter is devoted to a detailed examination of their meaning. Although the previous discussion, in mentioning racialism and racial discrimination, understandably hinted at the negatively evaluated consequences of much racial discourse, it is important to recognise that there is no necessary connection between the three kinds of ideology outlined above (racial ideologies, ideologies containing racial elements, and ideologies making use of few or no racial categories) and racism or racialism.

I shall use 'racism' to refer to particular kinds of language configuration and 'racialism' to refer to kinds of act, process, or material effect. This distinction is by no means clear cut: racial abuse, or incitement to racial hatred, might be considered racist from the point of view of its verbal form or content, or racialist from the point of view of the act committed, the process involved, and the consequences. Nevertheless, it is conceptually most useful to preserve a distinction between 'racist' word and 'racialist' action. I shall deal first and in close detail with the term 'racism', as it is this that is most aptly applied to ideology or discourse.

Racism

There are at least three meanings of 'racism': the 'weak', the

'medium', and the 'strong'. Many a trick lies in the failure to recognise the differences between them. An even more specialised use of 'racism', offered by Banton, is discussed afterwards. The term 'racism' is generally applied to a body of beliefs containing the following assumptions:

(a) that races of human beings exist,

(b) that these races differ from one another,

(c) that the differences are deeply rooted and enduring,

(d) that the differences are significant, possibly because they appear in themselves to be explanatory, or because explanations of other social features may be inferred from them, and

(e) that the differences have social consequences, for example, for social policy.

This meaning is 'weak' in the sense that it only emphasises the importance of a system of classification, and also, possibly, its explanatory value and social consequences. It does not require the body of belief to include a moral evaluation of racial differences, or prescription of how a person ought to act towards members of a different race. The weak meaning of racism may be given a more specific connotation by providing

(b-descriptive) precise details of how and in what way the races differ,

(c-explanatory) an explanation for the continuing existence of races and racial differences. This might be couched in psycho-cultural terms, but in the last analysis, it is the persistent nature of the differences and not the explanation for their persistence that is important, and

(d-explanatory) reasons for the assumptions being thought significant (e.g. (e) in terms of the social consequences that result or have resulted from racial differences or past belief in their significance).

Weak racism becomes medium racism when the assumptions (a) to (e) are extended to include the evaluation:

(f) that the differences between races are of superior to inferior, that they occur in some sort of rank order.

Medium racism, therefore, is descriptive and evaluative.

The strong sense of racism goes one step further. It includes all the characteristics (a) to (f) but holds in addition:

(g) that the superior race(s) ought to be entitled to more favourable treatment and the inferior to less.

In extreme cases, the inferior races will scarcely be recognised as human, and be places so far down the ladder of development that the policies adopted by the 'superior' towards them will amount to genocide - a reflection of their evaluation as 'worthless'.

An example of the weak use of 'racism' is provided by Van der Berghe (1967, p11) when he states that "the existence of races in a given society presupposes the presence of racism, for without racism,

physical characteristics are devoid of 'social significance'." Abbott (1970) comments critically that on Van den Berghe's definition, "it would still be racism, if races were perceived or recognised in a neutral way, or in a favourable or positive way (e.g. one group might think that another group had characteristics considered desirable by the first group or that they themselves possessed desirable characteristics)."

The weak sense of 'racism' leaves open the possibility of a different evaluation:

(f - contra) that differences exist but that they are of equal importance,

and of a different prescription:

(g - 1 contra) that the races ought to be treated equally.

The medium sense of 'racism' accepts the evaluation that differences between races are of superior to inferior, but, nevertheless, still allows the possibility of an alternative prescription:

(g - 2 contra) that the inferior races ought not to be treated as such by the superior.

We might consider as an example, the ideas of a ruling race that while accepting its genetic superiority and entitlement to rule, exercises a benevolent paternalism, or even a positive discrimination, in favour of 'lesser mortals'. Lord Acton (1834-1902), for instance, wrote of "inferior races" being "raised by living in political union with races intellectually superior..... Nations in which the elements of organisation and the capacity for government have been lost, either through the demoralising influence of despotism, or the disintegrating action of democracy, are restored and educated anew

under the discipline of a stronger and less corrupted race" (1922, pp 290-300).

Strong racism does not allow of any of these exceptions. Hitler's theory of an Aryan race destined to conquer and subjugate other races for its own needs includes the social Darwinist imperative that only the needs of the more advanced race are to be taken into account in the inevitable struggle for survival. Strong racism contains a racist prescription, such as:

> No boy and no girl must leave school without having been led to an ultimate realisation of the necessity and essence of blood purity .... By mating again and again with other races, we may raise these races from their previous cultural level to a higher stage, but we will descend forever from our own high level.
>
> (Hitler, 1930, p389)

One advantage for persons subscribing to weak racism, i.e. a classification based on the descriptive and explanatory significance of racial difference, is that they may deny that their views entail either (f) the evaluation of one race as superior in comparison with an inferior, or (g) commitment to favourable treatment for the superior. This may be a distinct advantage in a situation where there are political disadvantages in being accused of being racist. Eysenck (1971) is quite conscious of the distinction between weak and medium/strong racism when, in a book discussing the difference of I.Q. between whites and 'negroes', he points out that:

> ... facts, of course, are one thing; deducing social policies from these facts is quite another...it could just as well be argued that negroes required and should be provided with a better system of education to remedy these defects insofar as that was possible. (p10.)

He goes on to claim that the difference of I.Q. between 'negroes' and whites is partly attributable to genetic differences, and he even

hypothesises about how selection (of slaves) might have come to favour the less intelligent.

> If for instance the brighter members of the West African tribes which suffered the depredation of the slaves had managed to use their higher intelligence to escape, so that it was mostly the duller ones who got caught, then the gene pool of the slaves brought to America would have been depleted of many high I.Q. genes. (p46.)

All the characteristics of weak racism are demonstrated by this work which treats racial differences as significant but claims not to evaluate them. A great deal of attention is paid to the differences, and yet such emphasis is excused on the basis of the hypothetical nature of science. Unfortunately, the persuasiveness and strength of hypotheses do not always coincide and, while the scientist might attempt to limit himself to description, his methodologically less-astute audience might supply the missing evaluation and prescription.

Weak racism tends to be a feature of scientific rather than political discourse, and arises from the much-vaunted, objective nature of science, which underscores its concern with description and explanation and rigorously eschews moral evaluations and prescriptions. It is likely that a greater inclination towards strong racism would be found in a survey of racist political discourse. After all, there is a propensity, demonstrated in ideology for the facts to be brought into line with the political task in hand.

Hodge (1975, p11) mentions the need to concentrate on the element of racism which stresses "the belief that the superior races should rule over the inferior and the attempt to put this belief into practice". It is not 'prejudice' - "the belief that some races are superior to others" - that has "harmful consequences". "The harm occurs when a group not only believes in its superiority, but also believes this superiority entitles it to rule and control." He goes on to define 'racism' as "the predication of decisions and

policies on considerations of race for the purpose of subordinating a racial group and maintaining control over that group". It should be of no surprise that in explaining the meaning of racism in the political realm, Hodge lays stress on a prescription of control and domination.

In the context of this study, 'racism' is primarily used in a medium or strong sense. Weak racism amounts to the acceptance that racial differences exist and that they help to explain the social world, but it omits any overt suggestion of a moral ranking of those differences. An expression of weak racism is best treated as a descriptive element of racial discourse and is not what is meant in the context of this study (or in most political usage) by 'racism'. This does not mean that under certain circumstances it cannot be used as an effective basis for a medium or strong racism.

Racial discourse is best assessed as (strongly) racist by considering its component racial prescriptions. The prescription must also be of a particular kind: advocacy of positive discrimination in favour of an oppressed group in order that it might achieve equality would not qualify as racist. A racist prescription is one whose fulfilment would be likely to result in deviation from a moral standard of racial equality. The prescription must advocate the inferior treatment of a race, or races, on the grounds of racial difference, by another race considered to be superior. The social scientist recognises (medium or strong) racist discourse because: it uses racial categories (categories that are seen to equate with the social scientist's concept of race), it contains a moral evaluation of the races in terms of superior to inferior, and it contains a moral prescription advocating different and (as a final goal) unequal treatment of the races. The prescription does not always have to be stated, but it does have to be understood. It is

often derivable enthymematically from an evaluative premise that indicates a relationship of racial superiority to inferiority and is sometimes justified by reference to such a premise.

The moral prescription. The question arises as to whether racism can be assessed on the basis of racial evaluation alone. Of course, this is a possibility as I have indicated in discussion of 'medium racism', but it also raises the problem of how to classify expressions such as "the Germans are militarily superior to other races" and "negroes are superior at sport". The ranking of such differences in order of merit would not appear in itself to entail strong racism. It might become so, however, if the evaluation is seen to be moral (as opposed to non-moral), rather than technical or aesthetic.

A moral value is related to human conduct and takes 'precedence' over other forms of value. It is not always clear from evaluative expressions whether terms such as 'good', 'bad', 'superior' and 'inferior' are being used morally, and, even if it were clear, the evaluation is usually insufficiently precise to give an immediate indication of a person's behavioural orientation to the issue pronounced upon. A claim that a practice is good or bad is not as definite as a claim that it is right or wrong (and methodologically, it is probably best to select material that is most clearly and explicitly formulated). The moral nature of discourse is likely to be most apparent to the observer in the examination of prescriptions. Of course, not every prescription is moral: the rules of games, of etiquette, and technical and aesthetic prescriptions are non-moral.

There is disagreement between philosophers over the criteria for identifying the moral. Many moralists have held the 'right' to be self-evident. From the paucity of comment on the subject in race

relations literature, it seems that the moral characteristic of a racist prescription (advocating inferior treatment for members of a race) has also been treated as self-evident.

Ladd (1957) argues that moral prescriptions have special authority in that they have superiority and legitimacy. By superiority, he has in mind the categorical nature of the moral 'ought': e.g. "(You ought) never (under any circumstances) (to) trust a Jew". It is not a hypothetical as in the case of "if you want a nigger for your neighbour, (you ought to) vote Labour". (In fact the main racist punch of this slogan seems to derive from the enthymematic categorical "You ought never to want a nigger for a neighbour".) The moral prescription does not depend on the end in view. No further justification is needed once it has been accepted as 'right', and to justify it non-morally is always logically redundant. The moral prescription also takes precedence over other methods of conduct, that is, over non-moral prescriptions, and ought not to be neglected. It is always sufficient to justify overruling other behaviour, though it does not insist that this must occur.

By legitimacy, Ladd has in mind the grounding of a moral prescription. First, possibilities must exist of justifying the prescription. Second, on 'inter-subjective' element - that the moral prescription is intended to be accepted by not only those it is directed at, but by its asserter - is required. And third, the moral prescription must be "founded on the nature of things":

> This requires that they (i.e. the moral prescriptions) be in some way derived from man's conception of human nature or of the world, or reality in general (including supernatural reality)... I suggest that every ethical system must have such a foundation, although of course, moral prescriptions cannot strictly be deduced from it without committing the so-called "naturalistic fallacy" (the fallacy of deducing a prescriptive from a non-prescriptive statement).
>
> (Ladd, 1957, p106)

With this last requirement, Ladd secures the moral prescription to the matrix of an ideology consisting of a mass of descriptive, explanatory, evaluative, and prescriptive statements providing a group-centred 'picture' of the world. Although the racist nature of discourse is to be formally identified by reference to prescriptive statements, the other components of discourse are racist inasmuch as they provide a persuasive framework for the acceptance of racist prescriptions, and fail to raise questions about, or to suggest other options to replace, current racialist practice. This is one reason why Van den Berghe's definition is not unconvincing, why 'weak racism'is felt to exist, and why non-racial discourse has been accused of racism. But not least for analytical and methodological reasons, a formal way of identifying racist discourse - in terms of moral prescription - is needed.

Even so, the moral prescription will not always be easy to identify and may have to be ascertained by, for example, logical inference (see below). A general characteristic of ideological justification remarked upon by other writers (e.g. Seliger, 1976) is the tendency for moral values, as ends, to be displaced by technical values, as means. In other words, racial discourse is likely to contain a preponderance of technical prescriptions that divert attention from the superior moral considerations on which they must depend for justification. This may be even more marked as a result of the phenomenon of deracialisation described in greater detail in Chapter Nine.

Is it impossible, therefore, for discourse to be formally and strongly racist if a racial prescription is absent? This question is of crucial importance in the identification of racism. There are two commonly held views that lead to difficulties. First,

there is the position that despite the fact that a prescription does not employ racial categories, it nevertheless remains the speaker's intention to be racist. He may be disguising the fact with pious words, but, given our knowledge of his 'real' intentions, his words have another more sinister meaning. This argument is particularly convincing if the blandly non-racial prescription can be shown to have racialist effects. Second, there is the position that a prescription that prima facie does not employ racial categories may be judged racist by an observer on the basis of its effect. These views may be referred to respectively as the intentional and effective considerations.

Intention. The suggested need to take into account the ideologist's intention in order to decide on the racist nature of discourse may be better understood by making a distinction between the mental and verbal aspects of intention on the one hand, and the separation of the private and public spheres of discourse, on the other.

Although a person may have racist thoughts, it is only through the use of words, signs, and symbols that he is able to make his thoughts available to others. Racist thoughts (prejudices) undoubtedly exist, but they are only identifiable and attributable through words, signs, and symbols.

It is often difficult to separate strictly the private and public spheres of life, but knowledge of a person's private views (as an example, Chairman Dobson's comments about 'wogs') may offer a yardstick against which to judge the sincerity of more formal public utterances. As politicians specialise in trying to satisfy different audiences with diverse views, it is likely that there will be inconsistency between remarks made to one group and remarks

made to another. A judgment of whether a discourse is racist or not will depend on where the boundary is drawn around the discourse, and on an estimate of the relative importance of the different statements made within it. The publicly known, 'off-stage' remarks are ambiguous or unclear.

Intentions, then, are only likely to be known, if expressed and publicised. They may constitute part of political discourse if they fall within what has come to be defined as its boundaries. I am not now dealing with intentions versus public statements, but with intentions that (admittedly) sometimes by accident, and at great cost) become part of a total political discourse and a legitimate means of judging whether it is racist. It is a matter of debate as to how much weight should be placed on public revelations of private asides, particularly as much is now made of the 'right to a private life', but undoubtedly, many people feel that what is said between friends is a better indicator of the truth than what is said to achieve political goals.

This view appears most convincing when a political leader decides that his goals can only be achieved by conspiratorial action, and his conspiracy is made public. The Granada Television World in Action programme (3.7.78) revealed that the National Front Chairman, John Tyndall, just before his 33rd birthday, had written a private letter in March 1967 to an American Nazi, which said:

> I do not believe that a movement with an open Nazi label has a hope of winning national power in Britain or the U.S. I have therefore sought to modify our propaganda, though not, of course, the essence of our ideology.

Nevertheless, it is the political goal expressed in a public prescription that is most likely to affect people's lives, and not the bedroom whisper of an indiscreet politician. Intention, then is

relevant in the assessment of the racist nature of discourse inasmuch as its expression is treated as part of that discourse. Methodologically, however, the 'private secrets' of politicians are rarely available and although they may occasionally - in later autobiographies, for example, - reveal the way in which a political potentate generated an idea, or was forced to follow a political strategy, they cannot easily be used in a large scale, general and representative analysis of ideology. If the main political ideologies are to effectively influence social practice, they must, after all, either be publicly subscribed to and widely shared, or held by a dictatorial elite.

Tyndall's letter reveals how National Front ideology is to be developed where it is planned that it shall go, not what it publicly says. If the National Front had already gained power, there might be no need for the subterfuge, but in their attempt to gain power, it is as interesting to study their public ideology as it is their private, because it is their public ideology that must be convincing to large numbers of people. In the example given above, a National Fronter's private discourse, in the hands of counter-ideologists, has become a weapon with which to discredit his organisation.

Effect. It is frequently suggested that the practical effect of discourse might be used to decide whether the discourse were racist. This raises the problem of the relationship between discourse and action. There are(at least logically) the possibilities that: discourse containing overtly racist prescriptions may not result in racialist action, discourse without racial categories may have racialist consequences, and racist discourse may lead to racialist practice.

If we were to rely on effects alone to judge the racism of discourse, then discourse advocating racially inferior treatment

but having no effect would have to be excluded. Furthermore, it would be impossible to distinguish between non-racial and racial discourse that both had racialist effects. It is the interesting cases of non-racial statements justifying and resulting in racial discrimination that make it so important to create this distinction and to limit the category of 'racism' to the overtly stated. In other words, I wish to limit the use of the term 'racist' to "the study of ideas" and to admit to the criticism that "the problem of racism disappears as soon as politicians and other change their style of theorising" (Rex, 1970, p38). This does not mean that the "race relations structure or problems" - or racialism - will disappear, however. In seeking to affirm the causal link between any discourse, racial or otherwise, and racialist practice, the expression "racialist - effective discourse" might be appropriate. This idea is developed at greater length in the chapter on discrimination.

Some bizarre consequences arise from the attempt to identify racist discourse by its effects. There is a tendency to look for 'deep' or secret references to the effects within a discourse that at face value fails to deal with them. Attempts are made to find the hidden unstated racism in ambiguous expression, metaphor, and 'deep structures'. There is a turning away from the discourse itself to the psychology of those voicing it, and investigation into their secret intentions, dispositions, false consciousness, and childhood repressions. (See Chapter Two.)

Imputing. However, all this does not rule out the possibility of imputing expressions of belief from action. For example, the Granada World in Action programme in providing a list of racialist attacks by National Fronters on blacks and left-wingers sought to establish the National Socialist and racist nature of the Party's ideology. If there

is evidence that in other circumstances a mode of practice has been justified by a particular form of ideology, and there are sufficient similarities between present practices and these other circumstances, then the presence of a correspondingly similar ideology may be inferred. The study of ideology, however, should make the researcher extremely wary of using this method alone to establish the presence of racial categories. (Granada television, for example, provided a great deal of other spoken and written evidence.) Apart from the considerations of intention and effect, the question remains of whether discourse can be racial if racial categories are absent.

Besides the technique of imputing belief from action with the help of circumstantial evidence, beliefs may be discovered by asking questions. Interrogatively acquired beliefs come into being when symbolised for the first time in the process of discussion with the interviewer. Verbal expression utilising racial categories may emerge as a result of questioning about race. Alternative formulations might be suggested until the respondent agrees on the appropriate one. In fact, this is a special example of the eristical method by which ideologies develop. (See note 3.) The danger lies, to use an appropriate expression, of the interviewer "putting words into people's mouths", and of constructing an ideology that bears little resemblance to the salience of the interviewee's already symbolised beliefs. Yet for the social scientist, this is a useful way of gaining information and standardising responses to particular issues.

Another method of proceeding is by logically inferring further statements from the discourse as it stands. It is quite possible that statements may be logically dependent on presuppositions that are not openly stated in the discourse, or that are even denied. The politician may not recognise or be prepared to admit to himself that his statements

have these logical implications. It behoves the social scientist to be wary of attributing statements, particularly to those who expressly deny their existence. There is, after all, no empirical reason why people must be consistent in their pronouncements of belief. Nevertheless, within a given framework such a method is logically justified. If no racial prescription is actually present in a discourse, the context may permit it to be reconstructed (enthymematically). A moral evaluation of a particularly pronounced kind might strongly incline the researcher to classify a discourse as racist.

Sometimes there may be insufficient evidence available to decide whether a racial prescription is directed to achieving a group's disadvantage or not. Unless there were strong circumstantial evidence, it would be impossible to judge whether the discourse was racist or not. Similarly, where apparently contrary prescriptive statements coexist, some of them conducive to inequality, some to equality, all the researcher is entitled to do is to describe the equivocal nature of the discourse, or to try to assess the overall position from what is stated. Logical inference within a body of discourse is not only a matter of interest to the social scientist, but may be a source of great insecurity to the politicians who sense the dangers of inconsistency.

Banton's view of racism. The definition of racism outlined in the previous passage does not accord with that outlined by Banton in "The Concept of Racism" (1970). Banton draws on Ruth Benedict's definition that "racism is the dogma that one ethnic group is condemned by nature to congenital superiority". "The kernel of this doctrine", he says, "is found in the assertions: (a) that people's culture and psychological characteristics are genetically determined and (b) that the genetic determinants are grouped in patterns that can be identified with human races in the old morphological sense that envisaged the existence of pure races" (p17). He goes on to define racism as:

> the doctrine that a man's behaviour is determined by stable inherited characters deriving from separate racial stocks having distinctive attributes and usually considered to stand to one another in relations of superiority and inferiority. (p18)

Banton's definition suffers from two related inadequacies and his semi-recognition of their existence. First, according to my account, he has only managed to describe weak racism, or at a pinch, medium racism, and then only if the expression "usually considered to stand to one another in relations of superiority and inferiority" (my emphasis) is interpreted as a necessary moral evaluation. There is no sign, however, that the need for the evaluation to be morally based, (in addition to being technically or factually supported) is recognised.

As a consequence of failing to fully recognise the evaluative and prescriptive content of racism, Banton is unable to deal with Harris's distinction between scientific racism and folk racism (as mentioned by Banton). Banton gives as his reason that he is "not persuaded that it is proper to speak of race consciousness or racism in times or places where people do not employ a concept of race". On this last point, I agree - racial discourse can only be identified by the presence of a racial category. But the racial category need only be secured to the perceivable characteristics - frequently, but not always biologically based - of a group of people. It need not be "determined by stable inherited characteristics deriving from separate racial stocks". There is a difference between deploying a racial category (the anti-racist uses racial categories, too) and accepting a biological theory as an explanation for racial variation. A category may be anchored to a biological difference - skin colour - but the difference marked by colour can also be explained in terms of geographical, cultural, class or other factors. Categorising and explaining are two separate processes.

In terms of the previous discussion, Banton has recognised assumption (c), that the differences between races must be treated as deeply rooted and enduring, but limited it to (c - explanatory), and further, to (c - explanatory) of a solely genetic kind. Such an approach is gravely reductionist in effect. It fails to recognise the cultural forms of racism common to the twentieth century. There is no need to claim that racist explanations must be biologically based. Indeed as Fanon (1964) so wisely points out, "vulgar, primitive, over-simple racism" justified on a biological basis has long since given way to "more refined argument": "This racism that aspires to be rational, individual, genotypically and phenotypically determined becomes transformed into cultural racism" (p42).

The second inadequacy of Banton's definition, then, lies in its reduction of 'racism' to a nineteenth-century-based, bio-scientific racism. I demonstrate in later chapters that explanations in terms of what is 'natural to man' are just as adequate for justifying racist belief. And rarely do people stop and consider the minutiae of whether 'natural' means biologically inherent, culturally expected or acceptable, or according to divine ordinance. In other words, biological, cultural, and divine necessity (nature, nurture and providence) are for most purposes not distinguished from one another in common parlance and are used interchangeably as justifications.

If folk racism contains racial categories, explanations (whether in terms of nature or nurture), and evaluations, can it be distinguished in logical structure from scientific racism? One difference might lie in the stress placed in scientific discourse on 'facts' and empirical procedures (however ill-founded) as a means of justification and persuasion. A second

difference, already indicated, is that because of the formal exclusion of moral evaluation and policy recommendation from scientific discourse, scientific racism shows a marked tendency to be 'weak', whereas folk racism, not subjected to these requirements, will occur fully-fledged and 'strong'.

Rex (1973) has commented on the political repercussion of the biological reductionism of'racism' which results in Peter Griffiths's and Enoch Powell's speeches being denied racist status. But Banton has reaffirmed his view in The Idea of Race (1977), where he points out that "Powell has attempted to present race relations in Britain as primarily a problem of immigration" (p161) and that his central concern is with what constitutes English nationality. I would argue that if the referent of the term "coloured immigrant", or just "immigrant", is seen to correspond with the sociologist's race category, and Powell's discourse is seen to contain prescriptions justifying the unequal treatment of coloured immigrants on the grounds that they are inferior on grounds of culture, etc., then there is a strong case for claiming that the discourse is racist. More difficult to decide is whether evaluations and prescriptions are moral (as opposed to non-moral). But in Powell's speeches racial categories and prescriptions both appear to be present. Another of Banton's mistakes appears to lie in thinking that meaning rests in a particular linguistic symbol, and not in the symbol's relationship with the attributes, properties and relations that it represents (see Lachenmeyer, 1971).

The discussion of Banton's use of the term 'racism' reveals many of the difficulties involved in applying it in any comprehensive way to an analysis of British discourse about race. If the term is to be limited to describing discourse containing

assumptions that the differences between races are of superior to inferior, and that the superior should be entitled to more favourable treatment, then much of what is said about race in specialised political and general discourse cannot be labelled 'racist'. Of equal importance are non-racist expressions such as those based on belief in class inequality, which can be used to justify racialist practice, and, of course, anti-racist views. An even greater amount of discourse will be excluded, if racism is defined as "the doctrine that a man's behaviour is determined by stable inherited characters deriving from separate racial stocks" (Banton). 'Racism', then, is an inappropriate term for describing much, if not most, of British discourse about race, but it can still be accurately used to describe the specific kinds of evaluations and prescriptions mentioned above.

The use of the term 'racist' in social science has also been criticised for its 'emotive' connotations that are felt inappropriate to such a context. I feel this criticism to be misguided and probably based on a failure to distinguish between an actor's evaluation and prescription in favour of racial inequality, and the observer's descriptive account of the actor's views. The observer is able to identify a particular discourse as 'racist', by recognising the use of moral evaluations and prescriptions by the actor. In itself, the identification is descriptive: it entails the application of the various criteria of racism to a situation. If the discourse meets the various criteria discussed above, it is prima facie 'racist'. Of course, in using the term 'racist' to describe the discourse, the observer may simultaneously be making a moral judgment: e.g. that the discourse is racist, and that this is morally reprehensible. This is often implied by those who describe a text as 'racist',

although, analytically, the descriptive and morally evaluative uses may be separated. The social scientist, however, must attempt to confine himself to the descriptive usage, inasmuch as he has pretensions to be producing social science.

Racialism

Although Webster admits that 'racism' and 'racialism' may be used interchangeably, I have sought to precise the term 'racism' and to apply it to a particular form of the spoken and written word. I reserve the term 'racialism' for effects or outcomes, intentional or unintentional, where one racial group is in an unequal economic, political, or social position vis à vis another, and is kept there, advertently or inadvertently, by personal acts or institutional procedures. Racialism, then, is a phenomenon closely identifiable with Rex's race relations structure or problem:

> We shall speak of a race-relations structure or problem, insofar as the inequalities and differentiation inherent in a social structure are related to physical and cultural criteria of an ascriptive kind and are rationalized in terms of deterministic belief systems, of which the most usual in recent years has made reference to biological science. (Rex, 1970, in Zubaida p39)

The identification of racialist practice is in this instance made by the observer who traces out the social mechanisms whereby racially identifiable group(s) are systematically discriminated against by others. The actors in the situation, whether oppressors or victims, are not necessarily conscious of the effects of their actions, although often the unequal treatment is justified by recourse to racial discourse. But in the case of institutionalised racialism, various laws, rules, and mores, often unbeknown to, or ignored by, the practitioners (e.g. the effects of the 11+ on black children's chances of obtaining grammar school places) effectively

prevent equality of opportunity. For this to qualify as racialism, first the mechanism and outcome must be analysed by the observer in racial categories, and racial categories must be shown to be significant for understanding the resultant state of affairs. Second, in order to make the situation 'racialist' and not simply 'racial', the discriminating effects must be shown to militate against racial equality, resulting in the disadvantaging of one racial group and (usually) the advantaging of another. In this sense, racialism is to be judged as such against a standard of equality.

This does not mean, of course, that the observer must be morally committed to racial equality. All he need do is to apply the criteria for deciding on whether a situation is racialist e,g, decide whether it maintains, or results in racial inequality. As with racism, it is possible for the observer to judge a situation racialist and at the same time to commit himself to a moral judgment that racialism is wrong. Social science, however, is concerned only with the descriptive usage.

A number of conceptual difficulties are raised by the usage of the word 'racialist' and its application to human actors (rather than to effects and practices). Where 'racism' is concerned, it is legitimate to attribute the characteristic 'racist' to a meaningful moral prescription advocating racialist practice. 'Racist' could also, without complication, be used of a human actor who knowingly accepted the racist moral prescription. He might demur at the label 'racist', but the social observer's decision that the actor subscribed to the prescription would decide the matter once and for all. What then is the connection between the racist (in word) and the racialist (in action)?

There are three logically possible relations between prescription and action. (The following distinction is obviously similar to that between prejudice and discrimination.)

First, the accepted racist prescription may be fulfilled when the racialism conforms to it. (A housing officer may advocate that blacks ought to be placed in older property and proceed to rehouse them in this way.)

Second, the accepted racist prescription may be violated when the actor pursues a different policy. (A housing officer may advocate that blacks ought to be placed in older property but then rehouse them in standard or new property despite the fact that older property is available.)

Third, no racist prescription might be accepted at all, but an action judged racialist by the observer might take place. (A housing officer may have no conscious views about how blacks ought to be placed in property, but a later examination of his work might show that the blacks he had dealt with had been rehoused in older property.)

For a racialist to be judged morally, the first or second conditions must obtain, in other words, an individual must be racist as well. But a person can also be judged 'racialist' in the third sense, and confusion and indignation might arise from the implication that he consciously discriminated or set out to achieve a racialist result. It is important, therefore, to remember that a usage of 'racialist' exists which does not imply moral awareness or blame. If a moral term is needed for the actor, 'racist' is more satisfactory, as it covers both those who subscribe to inegalitarian discriminatory principles but do not discriminate, and those who subscribe and discriminate.

One lesson to be learnt is that observation of a single racialist action is never in itself sufficient to enable a decision to be made about whether a person has accepted a racist prescription. In fact, neither the performance or non-performance of an act can be taken as conclusive evidence of the acceptance or non-acceptance of a moral prescription. Nevertheless, as indicated in a previous section, it is often plausible to 'impute' racism.

In summary, I have attempted to demonstrate the following points. Linguistic symbols are anchored to observable attributes to give referential meaning. In this way racial categories in discourse may be identified. Racial discourse is discourse containing racial categories. The terms 'racial' and 'racist' differ in their meaning. There is a distinction between 'weak', 'medium', and 'strong' usages of the term 'racism', and the moral prescription is the criterion by which 'strong racism' can be identified. Whether moral prescriptions must always be present in racist discourse is a matter for discussion and there may be exceptions. Racist intention and racialist effect are often offered as other ways of identifying racist discourse, but although it is worth examining the possibilities offered by employing these criteria, they are, by themselves, unsatisfactory. Banton's definition of 'racism' probably deals only with weak racism. It is correct in insisting that racial categories must be present in racist discourse, but wrong in confusing category identification with explanation. As a result, the definition of 'racism' is artifically narrowed to the genetically determined. A distinction between scientific and folk racism can still be made,

but on the basis of different criteria. As a conclusion to the section on racism, moral and descriptive usages of the term 'racism' are distinguished. Next, 'racialism' is defined. The attribution of 'racism' and 'racialism' to human actors raises questions of the racialist's moral responsibility. One lesson to be drawn is that racialist action cannot by itself be used as evidence of racist prescription. The main conclusion from the discussion on the meaning of 'racism' is that although the term might be used to advantage in describing elements of British discourse about race, it cannot provide anything like a comprehensive view of the subject matter dealt with in this study. A description of British racism (as defined above, and by most of the experts in this area) would exclude many of the important features of ideological complexes dealing with race relations.

CHAPTER TWO

THE INADEQUACY OF THE SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL CONCEPT OF PREJUDICE

There has been a tendency for the study of race relations to bifurcate into the sociology of discriminatory behaviour on the one hand and the psychology of prejudiced attitude on the other. The "prejudice/discrimination axis" described by Blumer (1966) as dominating American race relations in the post-war period until 1958, has been widely adopted by British policy-orientated researchers and by the more informed sections of the population. Richmond's The Colour Problem and Rose's Colour and Citizenship, two influential books on British race relations, both make use of the distinction between prejudice and discrimination.

Adoption of the prejudice/discrimination axis has had a number of important consequences for the study of race relations. It has meant that investigation of discourse dealing with race has either been monopolised by social psychology and converted into research into the study of attitudes, and moreover, of attitudes of a particular kind called prejudices, or neglected in favour of research into racial action and behavioural consequences. Furthermore, the stipulative and constructional nature of the social theory in this area has 'regulated' and 'limited' the available approaches and determined the content of empirical studies (Israel 1972). The neglect of an adequate sociology of knowledge as part of the systematic study of the sociology of race relations is recognised by Rex (1973, p.219) who calls for a start to be made to the development of a classification of "the kinds of belief systems, knowledge, and theories which are to be found in a culture, and one which shows how the more systematic theories are connected through social mechanisms

with less sophisticated ones."

I wish to argue that the widespread acceptance and use of the social psychological concept of prejudice in the field of race relations has had a number of undesirable consequences, and that an effort must be made to avoid these in a study of discourse dealing with race. In particular, race prejudice has been mistaken for, or reduced to a mentalistic phenomenon, instead of being treated as a verbal expression that is considered unjust to a racial group. Furthermore, prejudice has been incorrectly associated with accompanying emotional states and behavioural outcomes. Inadequate, individualised explanations, frequently in terms of psycho- and socio- pathology, have been offered for the occurrence of prejudice. Prejudice has been treated as self-evidently dysfunctional within the context of a tacitly-assumed, functionalist and teleological view of social structure. Because of the process of isolating prejudices as particular forms of attitude, the important relationships between race prejudice and other beliefs manifested in public discourse (rather than in 'subterranean' private associations) have been underplayed. The ethical/political problem of prejudice as unfair description, evaluation, and prescription has been wrongly transformed into a question of scientific validity. The already complex relationship between racial ideology and racial practice has been obfuscated by a failure to deal with actors and organisations in the context of the political system. Also, there has been an insufficient examination of the nature of ideological elements, the structures into which they are built, and the part they play within the political process.

In the course of this chapter, I outline the historical development of the concept of prejudice, argue against accepting the

prevailing social psychological meaning and provide an alternative stipulative definition which more closely accords with the original usage. I go on to acknowledge, however, that in social science, the term's social psychological accretions are so well-established that they cannot be easily discarded. In addition, a study that purports to deal with discourse about race cannot limit itself to those elements that have hitherto been regarded as prejudices. As a consequence, the term 'prejudice' is unsuited to the task in hand, and accept for occasional passing mention, is omitted from subsequent discussion. In order to lay the framework for a broader approach, this chapter serves as a critique of previous attempts at studying the things people say about racial groups.

The term 'prejudice' has a lengthy history. The Latin verb 'praeiudicare' meant 'to decide beforehand' or 'to give a preliminary judgment', and the noun 'praeiudicium' a 'previous judgment' which, by a process of transference, came also to imply a premature decision or precedent. In the Roman courts, a pre-judicial action (praeiudicialis) determined whether a defendant had the status of a freedman (libertus), for if he were a freedman rather than freeborn, he was bound to treat his previous master with respect, and could never take him to court without a magistrate's consent. Thus, by appealing to his status as a manumissor, a previous master could take steps at a pre-judicial hearing to protect himself from attempts at litigation by a freedman (Pritchard, 1964).

Although it is frequently pointed out that looking at the origins of words for their current meanings is often a mistake (Berry and Tischler, 1978, criticise this approach to the definition of prejudice), the exercise is a useful reminder that prejudice consisted then of a public judgment about what was just or unjust in the context of a

fabric of rights and privileges. Enforcement of a patron's rights by a pre-judicial action would probably displease an aggrieved freedman, and in our democratic age, the notion of different legal rights for different social classes would epitomise injustice. To examine 'prejudice' within the historical context then, draws attention to its public nature, to its relationship with conflicting concepts of justice, and to the way such a judgment might disadvantage one individual while acting to another's advantage.

The English 'prejudice' has a number of meanings including the idea of pre-judgment of an issue - making the mind up prematurely without due regard to the evidence at hand. This element seems also to have become associated with its possible causes: the self-interest or motives of the person responsible for failing to judge a case on its merits. The fact that a person is not open to objective persuasion makes him prejudiced, or biased, and therefore likely to affect in an adverse way - or to prejudice - the interests of those he judges. Prejudice then, is closely associated with injustice or unfairness of treatment and with a failure to judge a case in the light of available evidence. The connection with the older meaning is clear.

But prejudice may not only be against, but in favour of any person or issue. In a court of law, a decision that injures a plaintiff may benefit the defendant, or vice versa. The complementarity of the two effects may be neglected if emphasis is placed only on negative prejudice.

The fact that prejudice is shown in the making of a decision has led to the word's association with 'preference' - the act of favouring or setting one thing above another, something that all human beings must do if they are to make a choice. A common defence against the accusation of prejudice is to ignore the term's connotation of injustice and to equate it solely with choice. Thus, the claim 'everyone is

prejudiced' is meant to imply that everyone has preferences, but not that everyone is prone to making unfair judgments without regard to available evidence.

In recent years, the term's association with injustice in the decision-making process has tended to decline, and to be replaced by a meaning based on usage in social psychology (or in literature drawing on social psychology). 'Prejudice' has accreted a number of additional connotations. It is most commonly used in the field of race or ethnic relations, in the negative sense of 'prejudice against', and applies to unreasonable, unwarranted and hostile attitudes (that are not open to revision in the light of new evidence) towards racial or ethnic groups. Indeed, it has become so inextricably enmeshed in the theoretical framework of attitude psychology, particularly in its application to studies of 'the authoritatian personality', anti-semitism, and racial anomosity, that much of its sense now derives from the stipulative definitions that were originally formulated for the analyses of these areas.

The definitions below gives an indication of the common usage in the social sciences of the concept of prejudice:

> .....a pattern of hostility in interpersonal relations which is directed against an entire group, or against its individual members; it fulfils a specific irrational function for its bearer.
>
> (Ackerman and Jahoda, 1950, pp 3-4)

> .....thinking ill of others without sufficient warrant.... a feeling favourable or unfavourable, towards a person or thing prior to, or not based on, actual experience. (from the New English Dictionary, p6)

> .....an avertive or hostile attitude towards a person who belongs to a group, simply because he belongs to that group, and is therefore presumed to have the objectionable qualities ascribed to the group. (Allport, 1954, p7)

> .....is an antipathy based upon a faulty and inflexible generalization. (Allport, 1954, p9)
>
> .....is a term applied to categorical generalizations based on inadequate data and without significant regard for individual differences.
>
> (Allport, 1954)
>
> ..... an unfavourable attitude towards an object which tends to be highly stereotyped, emotionally charged, and not easily changed by contrary information.
>
> (Krech, Crutchfield and Ballachey, 1962)
>
> .....an attitude that considers selected categories of people in terms of stereotypes, usually for some purpose (conscious or unconscious)believed to be of advantage to the person who has the prejudice. (Rose, 1965)
>
> .....an emotional, rigid attitude.....toward a group of people....prejudiced attitudes have an affective or emotional quality that not all attitudes possess.
>
> (Simpson and Yinger, 1965, pp 14-15)

The se definitions share four contentious stipulations: (1) that prejudice is an attitude, (2)that generally it is negative, (3) that prejudice is belief which is not based on empirical evidence, or is based on insufficient evidence, and (4) that prejudice has a particular psychological function or functions. In addition, the concept of prejudice is almost exclusively applied to the field of race relations; and the normative connotation of injustice is ignored. This has an important restrictive effect on attempts to understand the political ideology of race relations, as I argue below.

(1) Must prejudices be attitudes? Originally, prejudice was publicly demonstrated when the observer judged a social actor's decision to be biased and unfair, but when prejudice was defined as an attitude, it became an entity in a mentalistic underworld and lost it externality as an expressed, self-interested, and unfair justification for an action or view of the world. Ryle's account (1949) of the nature of dispositions and the tendency for them to become reified and located as part of 'the

ghost in the machine' helps to explain why attitudes have become psychologised, despite the strongly contrary behaviouristic inclinations of psychologists.

DeFluer and Westie (1963) distinguish between two concepts of attitude. In the first, they stress attitude's behavioural basis:

> The attitude, then, is an inferred property of the responses, namely their consistency .....attitude is equated with the possibility of recurrence of behaviour forms of a given type or direction.

But "by far the most popular" is the second type of attitude conception which

> begins with the fact of response consistency, but goes a step beyond this and postulates the operation of some hidden or hypothetical variable, functioning within the behaving individual, which shapes, acts upon, or 'mediates' the observable behaviour. That is, the observable organisation of behaviour is said to be 'due to' or can be 'explained by' the action of some mediating latent variable. The attitude, then is not the manifest responses themselves or their probability, but an intervening variable operating between stimulus and response and inferred from the overt behaviour. (p21)

As an example of the latter conception, we might quote Rokeach's definition of attitude as "a relatively enduring organisation of beliefs around an object or situation predisposing one to respond in some preferential manner" (1968, p450). The 'enduring beliefs' and 'the one responding' are clearly separated.

From the multifarious contributions to definition and research in the area, it becomes clear that an attitude is to be regarded as an individual's psychological predisposition, as a hypothetical construct posited as existing within the mind. When Rokeach goes on to explain that "A belief is any simple proposition, conscious or unconscious,inferred from what a person says or does, capable of being preceded by the phrase "I believe that...."", the suspicion

arises that an attitude is to be understood rather as a cartoon speech bubble that has been swallowed by the individual to whom it has been attributed. This approach is reflected in past research which has almost exclusively approached the study of attitudes through respondents' discourse (McNemar, 1946).

An alternative view is for a belief to be treated as a 'proposition' or 'interrelated set of propositions' that may be studied in its own right, without reference to attitudes and independently of the mind that 'possesses' it or the individual who expresses it. After all, propositions in the form of sentences are inscribed on monuments, or kept in books, on tape and computer. They do not always have to be understood or kept in mind, but need only to be capable of being brought to mind should the need arise.

An examination of the characteristics said to be possessed by attitudes shows them to have much in common with sentences. They have a subject 'I believe that' and an object. They describe things or situations, they evaluate in terms of good or bad, and advocate courses of action as desirable or undesirable, right or wrong. They have a structure, or are said to be interrelated in the same way as language flow in speech, as contiguous sentences, or the premises or conclusion of an argument. The structure or ordering is recognised through the 'cognitive dimension' of the attitude - or meaning of the sentences.

Rokeach claims, quite mistakenly, that all beliefs are "predispositions to action", in order to argue that "an attitude is.....a set of interrelated predispositions to action.....", but it is difficult to see how beliefs that the sun consists of hydrogen, that it rained yesterday, or that it is the presence of melanin that makes skin black, in themselves, necessarily

predispose a person to act, although certainly (actual or inferred) prescriptions to act might do so. Similarly, we must challenge the claim that "all beliefs have a truth value" (Ehrlich, 1973, p5), as it is generally accepted that evaluative and prescriptive beliefs are neither true nor false.

Attitudes are said to have three dimensions: cognitive, affective, and behavioural. While a plausible case might be presented for equating the cognitive element of attitudes with a straightforward study of publicly manifest linguistic phenomena what of the affective and behavioural dimensions? Certainly an individual may have feelings when an external stimulus calls to mind beliefs or imposes itself on the senses. Also his verbally expressed beliefs frequently appear to be related to his behaviour. Attitudes are sometimes credited as being 'well-developed' when verbal articulation, the feelings experienced, and behavioural manifestations occur together. But there is no necessary correspondence between the three: they seem capable of existing quite separately.

Concentration on the cognitive and affective unity of attitudes has led to the supposition that cognitive assertion of prejudice must always be accompanied by a feeling of hostility towards the victim. In fact, persons without strong feelings towards a group (non-prejudiced on the affective dimension) may discriminate and cognitively justify their discrimination by, for example, asserting the inferiority of their victims if they see it to be in their interests to do so. There is, of course, a major difference, frequently overlooked, between experiencing and expressing a feeling. It is possible to verbally express feelings, to profess to have feelings, that one does not personally experience - a stock-in-trade of the political orator. Attitudes can be

emphatically asserted and also believed by a speaker without his simultaneously experiencing strong emotions. A person can utter any calumny against a group if he stands to gain from its being discredited; he need not believe it himself.

Where behaviour is concerned, psychologists and moralists alike accept that cognitive assertion of belief in a particular action is no guarantee that the action itself will be performed. Wicker (1969) concludes from his studies that "it is considerably more likely that attitudes will be unrelated or only slightly related to overt behaviours, than that attitudes will be closely related to actions". La Piere's classic study of hotels which accommodated a Chinese couple 'in the flesh' but responded negatively when sent a questionnaire asking them whether they accepted members of the Chinese race as guests (1934), appears to make the same point. Wicker lists what he calls personal factors ("other attitudes held by the individual; competing motives; verbal, intellectual, and social skills; and activity levels" (p181) and situational factors ("the actual or considered presence of certain people, normative prescriptions of behaviour, alternative behaviours available, specificity of attitude objects responded to, extraneous, unforseen events and expected and/or actual consequences of various acts" (p183), as possible reasons for the discrepancy between word and action. A major problem for moral philosophers has always been to explain how it is that a person can fail to do what he genuinely believes he ought to do.

In the study of race relations, prejudice has indeed proved to be a poor predictor of discrimination. But this has not stopped prejudice being defined as a propensity to act - despite the fact that the act - even with circumstances permitting - rarely takes place. In recognising this problem, attitude theorists have included 'speech acts' within their definition. The definition of a prejudiced person as one who is

disposed in suitable circumstances to utter prejudiced remarks is, of course, trite, but acceptable, as long as there is suitable evidence of such expressions having been previously made. Difficulties arise, however, when individuals are apparently inconsistent in their remarks, asserting belief in racial equality or equality of treatment in discussion of one topic and judging a racial group to be morally inferior on another occasion.

Attribution of the three dimensions to a hypothetical mental construct called an attitude appears to arise from a desire to explain the relationship between thought (as manifest in language), feeling, and action. Undoubtedly, there are vital relationships between all three dimensions, but apart from making this rather obvious claim, attitude theory has achieved conspicuously little in categorising, let alone explaining, the relationships' vast complexities. Such relationships must be established empirically and not by definition. And in introverting the public cognitive field of language and social intercourse, attitude theory seems to have increased the methodological difficulties appertaining to its already limited individualistic focus. As a further consequence, too little attention has been paid to the study of racial language with, or without, accompanying cognitive and affective mental states and behavioural outcomes. The social psychological tendency to treat publicly expressed beliefs as part of individual attitudes, has led to the neglect of political and sociological studies of public discourse, and a preoccupation with personality traits, family pathologies and early socialisation as explanations for antilocution. It is seldom recognised that beliefs might be professed by organisations as well as by the individuals of which they are constituted.

Earlier literature on prejudice often revealed a recognition

of the theoretical difficulties of reconciling the insights of the different social scientific disciplines, but generally, it too, suffered from "attitude reductionism". One of the seminal and best known works on racial ideologies is The Authoritarian Personality by T W Adorno and others, published in New York in 1950, edited by Max Horkheimer, and sponsored by the American Jewish Committee. Adorno (1903-1969), of course, was a long-standing member, and Horkheimer, the Director of the Frankfurt Institute of Social Research, which after the Nazi success of 1933 had been transferred in 1934 to the United States and affiliated to Columbia University in New York. In 1942 to further its research into anti-semitism, the Institute received a large grant from the American Jewish Committee which did not wish to see a repetition in the USA of what had occurred in Europe.

The American intellectual and political context in which The Authoritarian Personality was written made it an eclectic study, tending to draw on Freudianism, ego psychology, and personality theory, as well as to illustrate an American commitment to quantitative method. At the same time Marxist Critical theory and social structural aspects of authoritarianism were neglected. Hyman and Sheatsley (1954) have argued that the authors of The Authoritarian Personality "take the irrationality out of the social order and impute is to the respondents and by means of this substitution it is decided that prejudiced respondents derive their judgments in an irrational way". Jay (1973) mentions the "unwonted stress on psychological rather than sociological explanations of prejudice, a choice deliberately made in connection with the pedagogical goals of the project". What in practice occurs is a psychologising of the concept of ideology and a failure to develop an alternative, or preferably, parallel, sociological approach.

Despite this deficiency, passages in the introduction show an awareness of the sociological dimension of ideology and provide valuable indications of the direction in which sociological studies of racial ideologies might take. For example, the authors stressed the importance of distinguishing "the conception of ideology and the conception of underlying needs in the person". The two "may be thought of as forming an organised whole within the individual" but may nonetheless "be studied separately". "The same ideological trends may in different individuals have different sources and the same personal needs may express themselves in different ideological trends" (p2).

But although it was acknowledged that personal needs and ideology may be studied separately, ideology was defined as an "organisation of opinions, attitudes, and values" and there was a strong suggestion that its ontological status is mentalistic. And yet "ideologies have an existence independent of any single individual; and those which exist at a particular time are results both of historical process, and of contemporary social events. These ideologies have for different individuals, different degrees of appeal, a matter that depends upon the individual's needs and the degree to which these needs are being satisfied or frustrated".

Since personality was defined as an organisation of needs, it was considered to be a determinant of ideological preferences, but not a sufficient determinant. Adorno and his co-authors readily admitted that personality evolves "under the impact of the social environment and can never be isolated from the social totality which it occurs", but despite this caveat, early family socialisation was selected from the totality, as the major determinant of personality development. The authoritarian adult is one whose sexual and aggressive urges were so repressed in childhood by his parents,

that he has come in later life to redirect them towards other weaker externalities, such as Jews, Negroes, or Communists. Thus although a cultural determinant was admitted to the theory, it was interpreted as deriving from the small-scale structure of the family, and also, as conveniently situated in distant biographical history.

However, in any attempt to summarise The Authoritarian Personality, there is a grave risk of misrepresenting its complex message. Group membership was also recognised as an important factor in ideological receptivity and individuals "out of their needs to conform and to belong and to believe, and through such devices as imitation and conditioning, often take over more or less ready-made the opinion, attitudes and values that are characteristic of the groups in which they have membership."

The upshot of the uneasy eclecticism of personality and socialisation theories was to assert that both a personality and situational factor play a part in the 'determination of ideology'. The Authoritarian Personality helps to focus attention on the social needs that generate ideology, rather than on the ontological status on the one hand, of feelings, needs and wants, and on the other, of ideology.

(2) Should prejudice be treated as a primarily negative phenomenon?

It appears that the perceived negative quality of a prejudice is usually closely associated with the affective dimension of an attitude. But if there is no necessary correspondence between cognitive, affective, and behavioural dimensions, the possibility exists of being able to feel hostile towards a racial group without describing, evaluating, or prescribing for, that group in a disparaging manner, and without behaving unjustly towards it. Similarly, others may judge an utterance to be negative while its speaker claims not to feel hostile, and shows no other behavioural

signs of overt hostility.

If instead, prejudice is regarded not as an attitude but as a cognitive public expression, then this negative attribute probably has to be understood to consist of either a simple logical negation within a descriptive proposition or an evaluation/prescription judged by those who hear it as negative in its implications for, for example, black people. If the former possibility is discounted as an unlikely implication (a negative proposition e.g. "blacks are not taking as much from the social services" may be aimed at inducing a positive or non-negative response to their presence), it can be seen that a prejudice's negative nature is decided upon by the social observer in the light of his concept of social justice and his assessment of the speaker's intent. In a study of racial ideology, it would seem unsatisfactory for attention to be confined simply to racial views that did not conform to a particular concept of justice. Instead there is a need to show how different concepts of justice contribute to different views of what is good or bad, right or wrong, just or unjust.

The cognitive element of prejudice may be descriptive, evaluative, or prescriptive in form. Where descriptive expressions are concerned, their categorisation as prejudices, rather than as false statements, seems to derive from the observer's assessment that they imply a negative evaluation on the part of the speaker, as assessment often warranted by the frequency with which they accompany and are used to justify the speaker's overt negative evaluation and hostile behaviour, e.g. Qu. Why don't you like your Indian neighbours? R. They are always eating curry; we hate the smell.

If prejudice is narrowly defined as a belief about a racial

group that is not based on sufficient evidence, then again it seems obvious that many such stereotypical beliefs are often flattering to the group in question, if worrying to others. Europeans have credited themselves with high intelligence, the British with a sense of fair play, Indians and Jews are said to be good at business, while Negroes are good at sport and have big penises. Usually, of course, prejudices of this kind occur as comparisons, but if this is the case, one belief must be better, or less worse, than the others. To treat prejudices singly rather than in pairs, and as invariably negative, restricts their comprehensive study.

How are we to classify a Labour councillor's assertion that West Indians, being 'happy-go-lucky by nature', compared favourably in his estimation with the English who were far too inhibited to enjoy a party? We might judge there to be an underlying negative evaluation, or a psychological over-compensation, but at face value it is not easy to classify the West Indian stereotype as necessarily hostile, although there are good grounds for thinking it false and damaging in its consequences.

In summary then, the negative understanding of prejudice arises from an assessment of the part it plays in supporting racial injustice, and also, no doubt, in its frequent identification with falsehood. If prejudice is treated not as an attitude, but as a descriptive, evaluative, or prescriptive sentence, then it need not be accompanied by a negative affective mental state - or feeling. And there are a number of false beliefs that might flatter a group, or possibly even hinder the development of negative racial evaluation.

(3) Is prejudice belief that is empirically unfounded? Allport gives the example of an anthropologist living on an Indian reservation who insists that his own family live in a community of white people several miles away. On occasion, when his children

visit him, he refuses to allow them to play with the friendly Indian children. Allport argues that although it might appear from the orders that he gave to his children that he was racially prejudiced, this was not the case because the scientist knew that TB was rife in the tribal village and that four of the children in the household where he lived had already died of the disease. This, therefore, was rational behaviour, in contrast to Allport's other example, in which hoteliers who, when sent letters asking for accommodation by a researcher under the aliases of Mr Greenberg and Mr Lockwood, failed either to reply at all, or to reply positively, to Mr Greenberg's enquiries, while in contrast, Mr Lockwood received a 95 per cent positive response. Allport regards as prejudice the fact that Mr Greenberg is rejected on the basis of his presumed Jewish group membership alone.

To the objection that the cases of the anthropologist and the hotelier both show reasoning on the basis of probability - exposure to infection from the Indians and to undesirable traits from Jews - and there is no basic difference between them, Allport argues: (1) the hoteliers may have had no unpleasant experience of Jewish guests (particularly as they are never admitted to the hotels in question) and (2) even if they have had unpleasant experiences "they have not kept a record of their frequency in comparison with objectionable non-Jewish guests. Certainly, they have not consulted scientific studies concerning the relative frequency of desirable and undesirable traits in Jews and non-Jews".

It is difficult to believe that Allport wishes to distinguish prejudice from reasonable belief on the grounds of (1), the distinction between hearsay and first-hand experience. Much hearsay may be factually accurate, while limited 'first-hand' experience can lead to what Allport subsequently calls 'overgeneralisation'.

Allport's main criterion appears to be contained in (2), and his claims that prejudice is thinking ill without sufficient warrant. It is quite clear that it is the failure to make use of empirical evidence that is to decide whether or to what degree a person is prejudiced.

Although Allport recognises the difficulty in operating this test: "it is not easy to say how much fact is required in order to justify a judgment", and "a prejudiced person will almost certainly claim that he has sufficient warrant for his views", he stresses that "in most cases" it will be evident that his facts are scanty and strained." To remedy the view that the prejudiced person bases his prejudice solely on non-empirical fantasies, Allport goes on to stress the "overgeneralised" nature of prejudice, where the experience gained of certain individuals in a group is used to make a negative judgment about all its members. Thus, prejudice includes cases where a person expresses hostility towards a group of which he has no knowledge (as in the case of some of the fictional categories with which psychologists have experimented) or towards a group of which, in the observer's opinion, the person has insufficient direct or indirect knowledge.

The consequences of an approach in terms of insufficient knowledge is that it makes the definition of prejudice a matter of deciding on the strengths or weaknesses of an inductive argument. Such a criterion is open to a number of serious objections.

First, the conslusion of an inductive argument might be considered strong and therefore unprejudiced until contrary evidence is discovered. What had previously been considered an empirically warranted belief might in hindsight become prejudice, or vice versa. It is quite obvious that a large number - some would argue an

overwhelming number - of beliefs about the factual nature of things are not based on any formal scientific findings and vary considerably in the weight of evidence available in support of them. Metaphysical beliefs, by definition, are empirically unverifiable, but are they to be classed as prejudices? More importantly, many beliefs that some politically conscious people might seek to call prejudices, e.g. nineteenth century scientific racism, or family pathology explanations for comparative performance of blacks in education and in the social system, exist as scientific attempts to order the 'factual facades' of social reality. What differences there are, if any between the races, and the explanations for them are treated in science as hypotheses, but these hypotheses, such as Jensen's and Eysenck's views on the differences in American 'negro' and white intelligence, act as a ready platform for prejudice and discriminatory political programmes. Apart from their sophistication, it is difficult to see how these beliefs differ in kind from the explanation for crime that the proverbial white old lady might offer after having been mugged by black youths.

In an endeavour to overcome these objections, Allport claims that "if a person is capable of rectifying his erroneous judgments in the light of new evidence, he is not prejudiced. Prejudgments become prejudices only if they are not reversible when exposed to new knowledge. A prejudice, unlike a simple misconception, is actively resistant to all evidence that would unseat it". (p9). But as Kuhn, or any philosopher of science would point out, new contrary 'facts' by themselves do not displace established hypotheses, and in the social sciences in particular, there is frequently a discontinuity between simplified explanatory theory, and available data. Disentangling questions of the validity of a statement from the socio-psychological reasons for its acceptance is a complex business, but

it seems clear that Allport is left to rely upon socio-psychological factors to explain prejudice's imperviousness to change in the light of new evidence: "....the difference between ordinary pre-judgments and prejudice is that one can discuss and rectify a pre-judgment without emotional resistance " (p9).

But supposing the emotional resistance is overcome - was the belief a prejudice in the first place? Prejudice would seem to depend on the degree of resistance, and the development of a scale with which to measure it. The reasons for the resistance - emotional or not - of the prejudiced person to the 'facts' or to the acceptance of the better informed statements of others is undoubtedly of importance in explaining prejudice, as it also is to the understanding of ideology, but it would appear to be more closely related to the functions of prejudice than to its cognitive content.

Second, it seems unnecessarily restrictive to claim that prejudice is always directed against all Jews or all black people; that a prejudice is universal in categorial application. With many expressions, it is unclear whether all or only some members of a class are being referred to, and it is quite obvious that a prejudiced person can claim with equal effect that laziness is a property not of 'all blacks', but of 'most blacks' the 'average black', 'a large proportion of blacks,' or 'many thousands of blacks'. Thus, although the generalisation applies to all of 'a large proportion', it does not need to apply to all blacks. Expressions most people would regard as prejudiced do not have to be generalised or applied universally to a racial group (although they frequently are). Truth need not be paired with restricted application, or falsity with generalisation.

It is probable that this view has arisen from the awareness of the dangers of making inductive generalisations on the basis of a limited number of confirming instances. The term 'overgeneralisation' certainly implies that a claim goes beyond the available evidence to support it, and is therefore false, but equally, there are many false and prejudiced sentences that are not generalised. It is, of course, true that a racial prejudice must be directed at one or more members of a racial group, but it need not necessarily be directed at all of them, e.g. "Of course there are some nice black people: our next door neighbours are marvellous, but the majority of them are still savages." 'Overgeneralisation' although it may serve as a rough and ready indicator, is a further inadequate criterion for identifying prejudice. We might not only agree with Allport that "not every generalisation is a prejudice" but add that not every racial prejudice is a generalisation about a racial group as a whole.

Third, Allport's insistence that the hoteliers' evaluation of, and behaviour towards Jews is unjustified because they have had no unpleasant experiences of Jewish guests is based on the assumption, common among psychologists, that values may be explained in terms of positive or negative stimuli, pleasure or pain. Psychological hedonism, of this kind, constitutes a naive attempt to bridge the stubborn fact/value gap - a gap which prevents the development of any'objective theory' of value. Like Hare (1963), I cannot accept the naturalistic stance that there is "some logical link holding in virtue of the meanings of words, between factual premises and moral conclusions" although, of course, this is not to deny that "facts are relevant to moral arguments because they make a difference between cases that would otherwise be similar" (Hare, 1963, p215).

Morally, we may believe that it is wrong to dislike or to disadvantage those who have done us no harm, but the ethical standpoint cannot be grounded on a factual description of another's behaviour. It requires a commitment on our part to behave morally, a moral premise to the effect that we ought not to dislike or disadvantage those who do us no harm, and further, in the case of the Christian ethic, that we ought to love our enemies. In Allport's example, the hoteliers are seen not only as having false beliefs about Jews, but as having wrong values and behaving badly. Their factual beliefs, as he indicates, may be falsified by the use of scientific method, but their values and behaviour can never be. Evaluative and prescriptive expressions, whether moral or not, are not susceptible to tests of truth or falsehood. Yet it is important to recognise that evaluations and prescriptions may be, and frequently are, classed as prejudices.

The person who avows his hatred of black people and when asked why, claims that he "just can't stand them" or the person who thinks there would be less evil in the world if black and white did not mix, are committed to values and policies that are frequently termed prejudices. These prejudiced persons may be immoral, amoral, lacking in imagination, insensitive, and basing their views on unscientific categorisation, but prejudices of this kind cannot be shown to be false by scientific method. Allport recognises their existence in his distinction between the attitudinal and belief ingredients of prejudice: "I can't abide Negroes" and "Negroes are smelly" (p13), and by spending some time in showing that, as a matter of fact, attitude and belief are frequently found together, but overall, he manages to obscure the difference between the two. He chooses to define prejudice as thinking ill of others "without sufficient warrant", a phrase that conveniently suggests inadequate

moral, as well as inadequate factual, justification.

Is prejudice definable in terms of psychological function? Ultimately, Allport is forced to distinguish prejudice from prejudgment or misconception by claiming that the former is "actively resistant to all evidence that would unseat it". Why, it must be asked, should a person not wish to alter his views in the light of new evidence? In attempting to explain this characteristic of prejudice, psychologists have turned to the function of attitudes. For good reasons, Allport is reluctant to define a prejudice in terms of its functions, but his failure to distinguish between a prejudice and a prejudgment except in terms of the former's resistance to evidence leaves him in need of an adequate explanation:

> It will become abundantly clear in later chapters that much prejudice is indeed fashioned and sustained by self-gratifying considerations. In some cases prejudice seems to have some "functional significance" for the bearer. Yet this is not always the case. Much prejudice is a matter of blind conformity with prevailing folkways... For this reason it seems unwise to insist that the "irrational function" of prejudice be included in our basic definition. (p12)

Allport's recognition that much prejudice is a result of conformity to folkways requires us to examine more closely the psychological and social context in which people express prejudice. A complex and much discussed topic in social psychology is the function of attitudes. Various functions have been identified, but the lists that theorists put forward often overlap. For example, Smith, Bruner, and White (1956) identify object appraisal (attitudes dealing with material reality), social adjustment (dealing with social reality), and externalisation (dealing with inner psychological reality). Katz (1960) distinguishes adjustive, ego-defensive, value-expressive, and knowledge functions. Lane (1969) sets himself the task of developing a more differentiated set of functions and offers

the following list: instrumental guide to reality, cognitive needs, autonomy and freedom, and self-actualisation. The suspicion occurs that an attitude could be found for most of the more common areas of human endeavour.

It is clear that attitudes are generally seen as functioning for the individual by serving his needs, but what of the possible conflict between attitudes that serve the individual and attitudes that serve the group, e.g. between commitment to the principle of dying a noble death in the service of one's country and self-preservation? The presumed compatibility of the two kinds of attitude and the depoliticised character of these schemes is illustrated by the proposed 'social adjustment' function. But what of attitudes, particularly the kind called prejudices, which appear to be socially dysfunctional?

There has been a tendency to associate prejudice with Smith, Bruner and White's externalisation and Katz's ego-defensive function of attitudes, which are seen as the less 'rational' psychological functions serving the 'inner man'. However, the possibility that prejudice might be associated with other attitude functions such as social adjustment (Allport's 'blind conformity') is not ruled out. But with the wholesale neglect of the political dimension, it is difficult to explain why an attitude serving a social adjustment function should be thought 'irrational'. Unremittingly, we are led to believe that a prejudiced attitude functions more happily serving a pathological mind.

The emphasis placed upon these particular kinds of individual personality functions, needs, or values is likely to have arisen from prejudice's definition as an attitude. But it is also related to the need to dismiss as irrational the unacceptable views of political opponents. It is asserted, for example, that prejudiced attitudes

have affective and emotional qualities that other attitudes do not possess (Simpson and Yinger, 1965). This,by implication, appears to rule out rational discussion and to place those who are prone to such strong emotions beyond the pale of democratic decision-making. The arguments of political opponents are not accepted as meaningful descriptions of, and orientations towards, the world, but as indicators of a pathological state of mind, of maladjustment to their fellow men, explainable in terms of deep psychological traits, the foundations of which were laid down in early childhood. Undoubtedly, archetypal individuals with volcanic temperaments, who seeth at the mention of members of another race, do exist, and assertions and explanations of the kind offered above may well possess a considerable element of truth. But such approaches to prejudice should not exhaust other possibilities.

Apart from the personality functions of prejudice, Simpson and Yinger (1958) do, in fact, recognise that explanations for prejudice may lie in "the structure of society," are related to "power arrangements" (p70), and can act as weapons in group conflict (p111). In addition they recognise that "in almost every society, if not in all, each new generation is taught appropriate beliefs and practices regarding other groups. Prejudices are, in part, simply a portion of the cultural heritage" (p71).

There are likely, then, to be large numbers of beliefs regarded by many as prejudices that do not serve particular ego-defensive functions and are not any more resistant to change than non-prejudices. They may be acquired as part of a continuous 'cultural stream' and put to use, as other beliefs are, in the process of everyday living. This is not to deny that there may be attitude complexes of the kind described in The Authoritarian Personality, but by confining studies of prejudice to what are regarded as absurdly unempirical, descriptive

beliefs, or to the actual or imagined psycho-pathological, there is a distinct danger of neglecting other popular and widespread beliefs about race and racial issues. Furthermore, it is important to trace the relationships and parallels between racial beliefs and other political issues, for it is only in this way that it is possible to see how race prejudice is maintained in the total matrix of an established ideology.

Race prejudice in its entirety cannot be comprehended on the basis of the individual psyche separated from the group and institutional context. And the view must be challenged that a prejudice can be defined in terms of a generalised psychological function. A single publicly recognisable expression may serve a variety of purposes, individual or collective, in different contexts. A prejudice identified by its cognitive form can be put to a variety of uses - and is independent of any specific function. Once identified, however, psychological and sociological questions may be asked about the part it plays in sustaining the existence of the individual and society.

If prejudice is not necessarily an attitude, is not invariably negative, and is not to be distinguished by its non-verifiable characteristics or psychological functions, what is it? The following tentative definition restores much of its original meaning, places the term in a social context, and enables us to recognise its limitations when used in the study of political ideologies that deal with racial issues.

A racial prejudice is an expression usually *consisting of a descriptive, evaluative, or prescriptive sentence or combination of sentences which is regarded as making an evaluative reference to, or having evaluative import for, a member or members of a racial group or for the group as a whole, the evaluation being regarded by

* The possibility of non-verbal expression must also be allowed.

some audience A[+] as morally, legally, or factually unjustified in the light of ethical or legal precepts, descriptive (scientific) theories, or, more simply, evaluative or factual beliefs to which it (A) adheres.

In addition, though not necessarily (and deriving from the requirements of moral and legal responsibility), the audience might also require these precepts, theories, and beliefs, to be known to, or available to, the human source of the expression, so that the expression is felt to imply either moral or legal culpability or non-moral delinquency. In the former case, it might be inspired by, for example, self-interest while in the latter it might involve personal inadequacy, incompetence, or abnormality.

However, the precise explanation for the expression is not central to the identification of prejudice, though for the purpose of the distinguishing prejudice from ignorance by providing some explanation for the human source's idiosyncratic assertion and apparent unwillingness to accept what an audience regards as self-evident, it might be considered important. But the distinction between prejudice and ignorance remains problematic because of the recognition in legal circles that injustice can be committed unwittingly. If we are morally judging an individual, his culpability will depend greatly on his intention: if he acted in ignorance we might not wish to imply blame by accusing him of prejudice. But if we are judging him legally, his ignorance will be no defence: the injustice perpetrated, whether in full knowledge or ignorance, remains and prejudice and ignorance must coincide in that their effects are identical. Probably, because of the legal derivation of the concept of prejudice, the distinction between prejudice and ignorance is rarely made in everyday usage, and it is best to emphasise, as central to the definition, the phenomenon of unjustified evaluation, whatever might be the explanation offered for its occurrence.

+ The audience, A, may or may not include (1) the social scientific observer who identifies the prejudice or (2) the human source of the expression.

I might add that in traditional social psychological definitions, the categorisation of prejudice as irrational, is a pseudo-scientific device aimed at fortifying a moral/political/legal opinion with the status of science - a not infrequent occurrence in the history of psychology.

The critique of the social psychological concept of prejudice is indicative of the dangers to be avoided and the criteria to be met in a study of discourse about racial issues. The psychologised, negatively and narrowly circumscribed, scientised, and functionalistically - modified concept of prejudice has to be rejected for the purpose in hand.

Whilst the importance of the psychological dimension of discourse and ideology must be acknowledged, a number of difficulties arise from the treatment of public expressions as mentalistic phenomena. Attitude psychology has tended to conjoin, simply by definition, verbal articulation, feelings, and behavioural manifestations. The study of racial discourse must accept that there is no necessary correspondence between the three, that words may be uttered without accompanying feelings or actions. Indeed some of the most interesting examples of discourse are those in which politicians express feelings that they do not experience, or justify racially discriminatory actions with racially bland expressions. Furthermore, the necessity of anchoring each expression to a sentient, fully-conscious human being leads to the neglect of the mass of public discourse existing in memory and in the printed word, which is frequently and unwittingly drawn upon in the routine of everyday existence. A justificatory system can be profitably studied as a shared linguistic phenomenon, the characteristics and effects of which may remain unsuspected and unintended by the human actors concerned.

The mentalistic approach in the study of prejudice has also resulted in the mistaken identification of the structure of mind with the structure of discourse. The difficulties of examining the profundities and peculiarities of the individual psyche and of drawing generalisations from it may be avoided by dealing instead with the cognitive structure - patterns of argument, substantive and logical - to be found in passages of publicly expressed discourse, and of attributing observed characteristics to the discourse rather than to some "hidden or hypothetical variable, functioning within the behaving individual" (DeFleur and Westie, 1963). In contrast to earlier approaches, I shall endesvour to avoid 'psychologising' the study of discourse about race and to develop, instead, an alternative 'sociologised' account.

Concentration on the negative attributes of prejudice has resulted in neglect of the totality of utterances about racial matters. 'Prejudice', delineated is an extremely narrow way, has been studied at the expense of other expressions. For example, positive evaluations of a racial group uttered with malevolent intent, or in the full knowledge of likely injurious consequences, have been omitted. Just as seriously, the binary aspect of racial categorisation has been neglected, as has the relationship between racial and other elements in discourse, which might equally serve the purpose of justifying inegalitarian treatment of racial groups. The study of discourse used in connection with racial issues has become the study of racial stereotyping - narrowly focusing on the general psychological characteristics of racial groups. Discourse about race involves far more than this.

It is most unsatisfactory that attention be confined simply to racial expressions that do not meet a particular criterion of justice: sentences judged against other criteria, whether just or unjust, need also to be included. And on closer examination of

common texts on racial prejudice, it appears that the actual topic of examination is a very limited range of sentences dealing mostly with the description and evaluation of the physical and mental characteristics of racial groups. The omission of contextual and political considerations, and of recognition that individual prejudices exist and are supported within ideological structures is most noticeable. I shall try, therefore, to broaden the range of expression dealt with here and to show how individual elements are built into larger, highly stable, and relatively enduring justificatory structures.

For the best of intentions, social psychologists have sought to show that prejudice is empirically unfounded. In the course of this exercise, however, they have failed to distinguish between descriptive, evaluative and prescriptive aspects of expressions dealing with race relations. Whilst it can readily be accepted that many of the claims of a factual nature made about other racial groups are totally without empirical foundation, or are not warranted on the basis of the available evidence, this criterion is inadequate for distinguishing prejudices from other forms of expression. In addition, values and prescriptions which might also be classed as prejudices, cannot be shown to be true or false in the same way as descriptive statements. Yet, the search for an 'objective theory of prejudice' (which must ultimately be based on 'objective values', which do not exist in the same sense as 'objective facts') has misled social psychologists into adopting a scientistic approach to race relations. The necessity of racial justice and equality, and the importance of ridding the world of racial prejudice, are matters for moral and political commitment and not for scientific proof. While

facts have some bearing on the values people subscribe to, logically they cannot bridge the gap between factual premises and moral conclusions. I readily acknowledge the dangers of scientism in the study of discourse about race, and try to compensate for it by stressing in subsequent chapters the autonomy of the moral realm.

As a consequence of adopting this position, I render myself open to the accusation of 'relativism'. Lest I be misunderstood, may I affirm my belief that a descriptive statement may be tested for truth by empirical means or by its consistency with other true statements belonging to the same set. Thus false beliefs are (sometimes) identifiable. I also acknowledge that there are evaluative and prescriptive beliefs that I find incompatible with the values of justice, etc., to which I subscribe. While accepting that universal values can only result from universal agreement, I nevertheless seek to 'universalise' my own belief in racial justice. In this respect I possess standards of right and wrong, and cannot be accused of relativism. In the study of discourse, however, I see no reason to select only those elements which accord with my judgment of what is racially unjust. It is possible and necessary to study the whole range of descriptions and evaluations of, and prescriptions about, race relations. To confine attention to expressions which I personally find offensive would be quite unnecessarily limiting.

The discussion of prejudice in terms of its functions raises further significant issues for the study of discourse about race. Some of the functions mentioned seem to dwell on the needs of the individual, others on the needs of the group. The political question of whether particular elements of discourse serve the needs of individual, ethnic group, social class or society as a whole, has often been ignored in favour of a tacit assumption that there is no

prejudice are better handled as part of a broader justificatory system, some examination of this limited aspect of ideology must be included to provide a comprehensive picture of racial discourse. I introduce the relatively neutral term 'stereotype' to refer to a statement or set of statements describing the characteristics of a racial or ethnic group, and provide a case-study of the racial and ethnic group characteristics mentioned by local councillors when they were interviewed. The classification of racial and ethnic group characteristics mentioned was compiled from answers to four questions, which are not strictly comparable in form:

> If you were asked to describe the main features of the national character, what would you say?
>
> Do you think there is much difference between the English and Irish in temperament?
>
> Apart from colour, do you think West Indians differ from us in any way?
>
> Do you think Indians differ from us?

It seems likely, for example, that questions (a) and (b) encourage answers in terms of personality factors, while (c) and (d) produce a more general list of differences. In addition, the last three questions are more self-evidently comparative in their approach. Nevertheless, it is possible to tabulate the items isolated in councillors' often quite lengthy replies to the four questions. Responses were first classified into two kinds: those which asserted there was little or no difference between the groups and those which asserted there was a difference. With regard to the latter, most of the differences noted by councillors were classified under six heads:

(a) general but unspecified differences (little is claimed except that there are differences),

(b) perceived behavioural or attitudinal differences (including the perceived differences in dress, language, and other social norms).

(c) differences in temperament (divided under three subheads, labelled 'sanguine', 'choleric' and 'phlegmatic').

(d) differences in drive (high and low).

(e) differences of cognitive skill (high and low), and

(f) differences in relational attributes (connective and disconnective).

(For details in form of table, see note 2).

Roughly similar numbers of items were received for three of the groups (English/British 72, Irish 67, and West Indian, 77) but substantially more were given for the Indians (109 in all). As a result of the discrepancy between the question asked, it is difficult to tell whether the substantially higher number of items about Indians, generally and, specifically, the larger number of behavioural and attitudinal items used to describe West Indians and Indians (30 per cent and 50 per cent respectively of the subhead), resulted from the question form or from an inclination by councillors to concentrate on the externalities of ethnic minority life styles. Common sense, however, indicates that British councillors are likely to treat the British way of life as the norm from which other groups deviate and to focus on the noticeable differences of dress, religion, family life, and leisure activity of the Indians and to a lesser extent, the West Indians.

One unforeseen problem was raised by the interviewer's realisation that at least three councillors were confused by the term 'West Indian' and 'Indian', and appeared to be unable to tell the difference between the two groups - even after prompting. When asked about West Indians, for example, Councillor C3 talked about them wanting their own separate temples, while Councillor L2 mentioned the "fantastic turbans" of the "Ravidarians" * (sic) who were involved in"mugging affairs". Throughout the interview, the same councillor seemed to be distinguishing West Indians from coloured youths. The following extract from Councillor C8's answer clearly illustrates that he could not tell the difference between the two main groups of 'coloured' people:

> (....do you think West Indians differ from us in any way?)
> They tend to upset the people by having their religious ceremonies in their own homes. With the turbans, you get one who wears a turban and one who doesn't. I really haven't studied the religious angle, but I know there's a tremendous problem.
> (You're talking about Indians, here?)
> Frankly, I can't tell the difference. I can't tell the difference between the Indians and the Asians.
> (What about the Negroes?)
> Well of course, they dress differently, don't they? It's a thing you won't break because it's their custom. Another thing that I probably shouldn't mention: they go in for curries a lot, which are rather obnoxious to people living next door.

Because of the inability of these councillors to distinguish West Indians from Indians, their response items have been omitted from the table. Rather than seeing West Indians and Indians dichotomously, the councillors possessed a single, vague and amorphous category for coloured people generally. Such a phenomenon also illustrates the logical requirement that the characteristics mentioned by a respondent

* Ravidas + Rastafarian?

must be unambiguously attributable by the social observer to the racial or ethnic group under consideration. In other words, the observer must have a good idea of the characteristics which in any given culture or context are to be appropriately applied to a given racial or ethnic group because otherwise he would not be able to recognise the inconsistency of the examples given above.

In turning to the classifiable response items, a relatively large and diverse number of characteristics - some of them quite contrary - are attributed to the racial and ethnic groups under consideration. Furthermore, attributed characteristics may be quite differently evaluated, indicating the importance of making a distinction between the descriptive quality of an attribute and its evaluation. It is not always easy to discern the evaluation of the attribute, except by paying careful attention to prevailing cultural beliefs, to the context of the item within the response and interview as a whole, and to other cues such as tone of voice. A 'neutral' classification serves the double purpose of containing items towards which councillors appear relatively indifferent, as well as items for which the researcher is unable to decide on the speaker's intended evaluation. Very often the argument form is enthymematic - the evaluative premise remains unstated although the audience is expected to understand and provide it. It is conceivable,for example,that in certain contexts, the description 'lazy' may be favourably interpreted, but within the general cultural milieu it is invariably pejorative and, therefore, there is no need to add "and that is a bad thing". But the assessment of other attributes is far less predictable. 'Easy-going', 'stoical', or 'emotional' may be seen in both favourable and unfavourable lights, and their evaluative import cannot always be straightforwardly decided upon. It is also a mistake to assume

that apparently undifferentiated, inaccurate, or false descriptive attributes are invariably unfavourable to an ethnic group. This is clearly not so in the case of the list of English/British characteristics, and perhaps surprisingly, the view of the West Indians as being 'happy people', who are good at music and sport, is very positively evaluated. It is a truism to point out that ethnic groups are described in terms not just of how they appear, but of how people would like them to be - and of course, of what people fear about them.

The term 'stereotype' is widely used in the study of ethnic attributes and I see no reason to avoid using it, provided it is first explained and precised for my purpose. Lippmann (1922) introduced the term to indicate the difference between an individual's assessment of a group's characteristics and the reality of the situation. He pointed out that the individual frequently had no direct experience of the group in question and acquired his beliefs from other sources. A stereotype was a belief that was naive, insufficiently differentiated, inaccurate or erroneous, and acquired second-hand. Tajfel (1973) defines a stereotype as "the attribution of general psychological characteristics to large human groups" and goes on to discuss how stereotypes arise from a process of categorisation. The use of categories helps the human being to order the complexities of reality by simplifying them:

> ... in each relevant situation we shall achieve as much stereotyped simplification as we can without doing too much violence to the facts. But there is good evidence that even when facts do turn against us and destroy the useful and comfortable distinctions, we still find ways to preserve the general content of our categories. (1973, p80)

I use the term 'stereotype' to refer simply to a statement or set of statements describing the characteristics of a racial or ethnic

group, in this instance, the English, Irish, West Indian and Indian. The 'stereotype' is the descriptive element to which evaluative import may be added. It may or may not, and in differing degrees, correspond to an empirically tested or testable group mean, median, or mode. Furthermore, it is used here to apply to normative aspects of a group's behaviour in addition to general psychological characteristics. (In practice, it is difficult to distinguish between, for example, close observation of a group's religious norms and the attributes of religiosity or devoutness to members of the group.) Furthermore, the stereotype is not to be distinguished by the means by which it is acquired, by its historical origin, or by its psychological functions. It merely involves the categorisation of a racial or ethnic group by a description of its (supposed) characteristics. As these characteristics are used to distinguish one group from another, stereotypes are often set out comparatively and found in tandem, although the characteristics of the 'reference group' are just as likely to be taken for granted and to remain unmentioned. In the case of the stereotypes held by English/British people, the unstated comparison of another racial or ethnic group's characteristics is likely to be with the English/British way of life.

A stereotype may be idiosyncratic or a recurring and widely-distributed typification of a racial or ethnic group. If a stereotype is expressed often enough and by a sufficiently large number of people, it may be treated as one constituent of the descriptive content of a given ideology, while the common evaluation of the stereotype may be regarded as part of an ideology's evaluative content. In other words, shared stereotypes form one small segment of ideologies dealing with race and race-related matters. As with ideology, the fact that a stereotype is positively or negatively evaluated by the group attributing it, is not directly related to any

beneficial or harmful effect it may have on the group it purports to describe.

The following paragraphs describe the stereotypes held by Wolverhampton councillors of English/British, Irish, West Indian, and Indian groups. Afterwards, there is some discussion of the way in which particular characteristics come to be ascribed to the groups mentioned.

(a) A number of responses drew attention to the differences between racial and ethnic groups without specifying in any detail the nature of the differences. West Indian and Indians were thought to be more different from the English/British, than were the Irish.

(b) Councillors drew upon the various features of racial and ethnic groups' life-style such as diet, dress, language, family organisation, religion, politics, health and hygiene, etiquette, morals, legality, and leisure, to illustrate the differences between them. Indians received by far the largest number of attributes in this set (50 per cent), followed by West Indians (30 per cent), Irish (16 per cent), and English/British (8 per cent). Councillors stressed the differences of diet (eating of curry) (5), dress (5), language (2), religion (9), caste system (2) and, most importantly, the family organisation of Indians (29). Indians were seen as having strong family ties, and a caring attitude to the elderly. Both were traits that incurred councillors' respect. Arranged marriages and the perceived unequal treatment of women were looked upon less favourably, however.

The selected features of West Indian behaviour which councillors focused upon were their diet, disciplinarian family regime (which was seen as leading to the expulsion of teenage children from the family home and a consequent problem for the Borough Council of homeless young people), their religiosity, inclination towards sport, and love

for music. In addition the following generally negative features were attributed by councillors to West Indians: inconsiderateness and bad manners (2), criminal inclinations (2), sexual laxity (2), noisiness (8), overcrowding (1) and urination in the streets (1). The comparative behavioural stereotype of West Indians was clearly an unfavourable one, Irish differences were confined to the areas of religion and politics, both being viewed very negatively. The Irish were patriotic (2), they caused industrial trouble (1) and participated in violence and terrorism (6). In their behaviour, like the West Indians, they were not seen in a favourable light. In contrast, and to be expected, the English/British group was positively evaluated on its behaviour: the English/British lived in a civilised way (3), were committed to freedom and democracy (5), and were polite and good mannered (1).

(c) The personality traits of the racial and ethnic groups are classed under three archaic but suitable subheads: 'sanguine', 'choleric', and 'phlegmatic'.

The sanguine personality is extrovert, happy, jolly, fun-loving, sunny, easy-going and happy-go-lucky or a combination of some or all of these qualities. West Indians received approximately two-thirds, and the Irish one-third of the attributes classified as 'sanguine'. The English/British were only mentioned once under this head, while the Indians did not feature at all. Generally the 'sanguine' character was positively evaluated, particularly by Labour councillors who claimed to enjoy West Indian company for this very reason.

The choleric personality is moody, volatile, emotionally charged, quick tempered, agressive bigotted, and intolerant - a combination of some or all of these qualities. The Irish received 86 per cent and the West Indians the remaining 14 per cent of choleric attributes. Neither the English/British or Indians were mentioned at all in this

The phlegmatic personality is introverted, reserved, passive, stoical, unemotional, apathetic and complacent. Three quarters of the attributes classed as 'phlegmatic' were used to describe the English/British, and the other quarter the Indian, temperament. Irish and West Indians were unrepresented.

For the researcher who is already steeped in British culture, the results contain nothing new: they only confirm the existence of popularly shared racial stereotypes that most Britons know about and take for granted. The English and the Indians are phlegmatic introverts, the West Indians are sanguine extroverts, and the Irish possess a volatile, sanguine and choleric mix.

(d) Racial and ethnic groups are also thought to differ in drive, in their attitude to work, education, and generally 'getting on' in the world. Councillors saw the Indians (with nearly two-thirds of the items in the category) and the English/British(one-third) as having high drive while the West Indians and Irish were thought to possess low drive. In particular the Indians and the English/British were seen as hard-working, conscientious, industrious and thrifty, the West Indians lazy and with no commitment to education and with no sense of time. For the Irish and West Indians the attributes were somewhat contradictory: one councillor believed them to be hard workers while others believed them lazy. On the whole, high drive was positively, and low drive, negatively evaluated, with the exception of three categories mainly affecting the Indians. Drive manifested in Indians in the form of persistance and refusal to 'take no for an answer' (2), was not approved of, and neither was their ambition, push and competitiveness. Their attitude to business ('shopkeeper attitude', 'business-minded', acquisitive', 'greedy') was noted by 6 councillors, 3 neutrally and 3 negatively. Councillors clearly possessed a stereotype of Indians as hard-working, ambitious,

acquisitive little businessmen. The Indians' approach to education, however, met with strong approval.

(e) The labelling of a group as 'lazy' or 'of low intelligence' was recognised by councillors to be insulting and politically contentious. As a result the comparative paucity of this type of negatively evaluated attribute may be explained in terms of fewer opinions of this kind being held by councillors or alternatively, as a reluctance to express politically provocative views. Nevertheless, 3 Conservative councillors were willing to assert that West Indians were lazy and 4 (3 Conservative and 1 Labour) that they were of low intelligence. With regard to the few items (11 in all) classed under difference of cognitive skill, the English/British and Indians received those emphasising high intelligence and the West Indians and Irish those emphasising low.

(f) Differences of relational attributes were grouped under two subheads: 'connective' and 'disconnective'. 'Connective' refers to those qualities possessed by good friends or by those with whom a person would normally want or find it easy to make friends. 'Disconnective' is used to describe qualities which would make it difficult to relate to the person or group possessing them. Examples of connective attributes are generosity, warmth, kindness, understanding, tolerance, fairness, honesty, loyalty, etc., and of disconnective attributes, pride, superiority, exclusivity, narrow-mindedness, parochialism, clannishness, etc. The English/British were regarded as having the largest share of both, 19 connective and 12 disconnective items. They were generous, considerate, tolerant, fairminded, and dependable, and, at the same time, proud, a cut-above the others, parochial, and inclined to reject strangers. The Indians (9), and to a much lesser extent the West Indians (2), were seen as clannish and refusing to mix or integrate. The Irish (5),

alone, were thought of as generous, warm-hearted, and good-natured.

If the evaluation of the items of difference is totalled for the four groups across the six categories described above and percentaged, a rank order of positive, neutral, and negative evaluation can be established. The English/British received the highest number of positively evaluated attributes (70 per cent) followed by the Indians (34 per cent) West Indians (32 per cent) and Irish (24 per cent). The West Indians received the largest percentage of negative attributes (47 per cent) followed by the Irish (30 per cent), Indian (25 per cent) and English/British (19 per cent). Whereas the figures for the rank leaders in positive and negative qualities probably possess some significance, the size of the neutral categories (containing unclassifiable responses) in the case of the Irish and Indians (46 and 41 per cent respectively) makes any more detailed statistical assumptions impossible.

Very few reasons were spontaneously given for the differences in racial and ethnic attributes. The reasons that were offered were of two kinds: 'natural evolutionary' and 'climatic'. 'Natural evolutionary' responses portrayed the differences as 'natural' - they had evolved over time as a result of bio-racial origins or environmental factors (although the distinction between the two was never clearly made). Reasoning of this kind stressed the deep-seated, historic, and long-lasting nature of racial and ethnic differences. 'Climatic' responses were content to explain West Indian and, to a lesser extent, Indian traits as a product of a hot climate, and English/British traits of a cold climate. (The Irish inconsistency was neglected entirely.) Thus, the happy easy-going nature, and laziness attributed to the West Indians was put down to the effect of the sun, and the phlegmatic personality

of the English to the temperate climate.

This limited survey quite naturally raises questions and offers some clues about the formation of racial and ethnic stereotypes, although the issue can only be treated superficially, here. In examining the explanations offered for stereotype formation, a distinction may be made between stereotype formation generally, and the formation of specific ethnic stereotypes. Closely related, is the further distinction between explanations that focus on the needs of the group producing the stereotype and those that concern themselves with the characteristics of the group described by the stereotype. Explanations in terms of group needs are probably best treated in the context of explanations offered for the wider ideological matrix, but they are nevertheless mentioned briefly below.

Tajfel (1959) points out that the problem of stereotypes is that of the relation between on the one hand, a set of attributes which vary on continuous dimensions and, on the other, classifications which are discontinuous. Groups may possess differing distributions of various qualities held in common, but there will be a tendency to convert the categories used to describe the group into exclusive realms with exclusive qualities. When categorisation is correlated with a continuous dimension, the differences on the dimension between items falling into distinct categories are likely to be maximised and the differences within each of the categories minimised (Tajfel, 1973, p81). Thus, although there must be extroverts within all groups under consideration, extroversion is seen as a property of the Irish and West Indians. An increase in contrast is achieved which exaggerates the intensity of all group qualities.

To the social observer, some stereotypes are so bizarre and apparently so unrelated to empirical reality that it has been

suggested they are entirely 'free-floating'. A product of deep psychological needs or a 'collective id', they emerge from the group to adhere to any convenient victim. Whether or not psychoanalysis provides an adequate explanation for the production of the stereotype, it is worth considering the potential for random allocation of qualities to a group. If the qualities were to be entirely randomly attributed, there is, in any large population, likely to be some manifestation - however infrequent - of those qualities. And in many circumstances, where behaviour is ambiguous to interpret, supporting evidence will be found for the preconception, with contradictory evidence remaining unrecognised.

Apart from a totally random allocation supported by selective perception, there is the possibility then an individual may acquire an extremely idiosyncratic impression from the one or two eccentric representatives of a group he happens to meet. It is quite possible that he may then be encouraged to generalise from his limited experience by the psychological or social needs of the moment, and by the unavailability of alternative sources of information with which to correct his initial reaction. Once formed, the stereotype will be supported by selective perception. If a person is in a position to spread his convictions, then a shared stereotype may come into being which has little or no connection with the group focus. Certainly, a few of the local councillors produced some unconventional group associations, although this is to pass no judgment about their truth. For example, one councillor thought that West Indians were more kind and loving to their children than the English or Indians. Such a claim is unusual, whether or not it happens to be true.

Of course, a stereotype may possess a lengthy historical

pedigree, that of the negro's physical prowess but low intellectual ability serving as an example. This idea, which can be found with slight variation among councillors' responses, has been explained as the survival of a justificatory form from the days of slavery. But why then should it persist for so long after the demise of that system? It is usually suggested that although the stereotype has an historical foundation, it is maintained once it has been established by the psychological process of selective perception, but other explanations in terms of current psychological and social needs are explored below. Persons look for characteristics they have been led to expect from the enduring culture and ideological flow available to them.

Much evidence points to limited observation of a few obtrusive features, followed by over-generalisation, as the means by which persons come to attribute particular qualities to an ethnic minority group. This is not to deny that fairly random ascription does not take place, but to point out that once an hypothesis has been arrived at for whatever reason, it is likely to be supported by some available evidence - often very selectively perceived. Three examples serve to illustrate the likely manner in which councillors came to attribute qualities to West Indians and Indians. As was apparent from the interviews, the preoccupation with West Indian noisiness was related, at least in certain instances, to that of West Indians holding late-night parties. Initially brought to councillors' attention by neighbours' complaints - often in the early hours of the morning - the noisiness of individual households was later confirmed by information gained from investigations by the Council's environmental health committee, which followed up persistent offences with prosecution. Whether complaints of noise were made

with the same frequency against English people was irrelevant - members of one readily identifiable group were seen to be different and stood out as noise-makers. Their behaviour was then generalised and attributed to the group as a whole.

A similar phenomenon occurred in councillors' considerations of West Indian family life. Black homeless youth were defined as a problem by police, community relations workers, and the social services department. A relatively higher frequency of homeless among the population of young blacks led councillors to talk as if black youngsters were invariably expelled from the family home and to generalise accordingly about West Indian family life.

Similarly, in observing the handful of Indian shopkeepers (who were conspicuous because at first it was so unusual to see Indians running shops), councillors began to generalise and to arrive at the view that Indians as a group were business-minded and acquisitive. It is clear that many people have great difficulty in understanding the subtleties of quantification when applied to a population, and are likely to confuse the properties of individuals with the properties of the groups to which they belong, or vice versa.

The psychological and social needs of the group using the stereotype can also be used to account for its form. Some interesting suggestions are afforded by the psychoanalytic theory of 'ego-defence' and by Marxist-derived theories of economic and symbolic group interest.

The ego might be bolstered by exaggerating the values which please it. Ego inflation on technical, intellectual, moral, power, and other dimensions is apparent when comparison is made between positive and negative estimations of ego and positive and negative estimations of alter. Compensation may occur as the ego

concentrates on those areas in which it is inadequate or insecure. Areas of concern may provide the subject matter for particular stereotype formation. Projection may occur as the unpleasant attributes of ego are displaced onto alter e.g. "I am criminally inclined" or "sexually promiscuous" becoming "you are criminally inclined" or "sexually promiscuous".

Ego inflation and compensation may be reflected in the connective relational attributes of the English/British where in the context of questions on race-relations, respondents lay claim to being understanding, compassionate, tolerant, fair-minded, loyal, etc. Projection may be occurring in the areas of behaviour drive, and relational attributes, where traditional vices such as criminality, immorality, laziness, failure to live up to the work ethic, clannishness and failure to integrate, which are often levelled at sections of the British population, are attributed instead to other ethnic and racial groups.

If stereotyping is seen as part of an ideological system for justifying group behaviour and interest, then there are obvious advantages in casting one's own group in a favourable light while denigrating the behaviour of others. In this way the position of racial minorities and their treatment at the hands of the majority group can be accounted for in terms of their own failings. If West Indians are seen as unintelligent and lacking in drive at work and in education, then their inferior treatment in competition with whites becomes self-inflicted, and whites' reluctance to remedy the situation or relate to them as equals is excused. Any lingering doubt is alleviated by the assurance that the British are tolerant and fair-minded. Similarly, the competitive drive of the Indians can be condemned as ruthless and unfairly exploitative and contrasted with the diligence and thrift of the British shopkeeper.

Even the qualities that on the whole are positively evaluated when attributed to another racial or ethnic group may alleviate the anxiety and threat posed by that group. The positively evaluated physical prowess of black people may be set against the view that they are less intelligent, with the effect of reducing the overall threat they are thought to pose to whites.

It is important to recognise that while stereotypes are descriptive in character, the prevailing social milieu in most cases provides a very certain evaluation of the descriptive characteristics. Explanations for stereotypes in terms of psychological and social needs draws attention to the fact that the description of the ethnic group is only one element of an integrated justificatory system. The description is better understood as being predicated on the prescriptive and evaluative discourse of an individual or social group pursuing an interest: the view that the description is the primary material on which evaluation and prescription are based has to be rejected.

Finally, it is worth considering how stereotypes of ethnic groups are related to prejudice and racism. If as I have argued, 'prejudice' entails a concept of injustice, and 'racism' a belief in the (moral) inferiority of another race, then the descriptive stereotype in itself - even if it claims that a racial group is more criminally inclined, more lazy or less intelligent than others - does not automatically constitute prejudice or racism, until it is assessed as unjust by a particular audience. The assessment that a given stereotype is unjust may be based on the fact that it is unfounded, inaccurate, exaggerated, or damaging in its effect. When it fulfils all or some of these conditions, it may be judged to be a prejudice. Nevertheless, the assessment of stereotypical descriptions is likely to cause considerable controversy as when,

for example, the 'golliwog' trade mark on James Robertson and Son's jam jars is variously judged "an innocent image of childhood affection" or "a contemptuous and damaging caricature". In the writer's estimation, some of the views expressed here by councillors are profoundly insulting, totally inaccurate, and unjust to many members of the ethnic groups they purport to describe. This is an assessment of councillors' expressions but not of their intention or purpose.

CHAPTER THREE

THE MEANING OF IDEOLOGY AND ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH DISCOURSE

If, as I have suggested, the concepts of 'prejudice' and 'racism' have been poorly defined and their implications vaguely understood, how then is it best to approach the study of ideas that affect or result from the relationship between the races (or, more specifically in this context, between people allocated to different colour categories)? I claim first, that the study of discourse is the best way of treating ideas about race, second, that 'racial discourse' is a narrower category than 'discourse dealing with race' and third, that discourse is most usefully studied in social context.

First, it is best to accept for methodological reasons that only ideas as expressed in language must constitute the subject matter of the study. This is not to assert that ideas cannot exist independently of a public language, nor is it to deny that communication with others is possible without use of the spoken or written word - natural and conventional signs are frequently available. For the sake of simplicity, however, I intend to confine my attention to ideas as expressed in language, and moreover, to publicly expressed language capable of being used in communication between two or more persons: what is referred to here as 'discourse'.

Although it is useful to recognise that there are likely to be correlations between linguistic expressions, affective states of mind, and social behaviour, and these are of utmost significance in the field of race relations, discourse - unlike prejudice - is not defined in terms of propensities to feel or act in particular ways. Of equal interest is discourse unaccompanied by strong emotion or ineffective in behavioural motivation.

Second, it is worth pointing out that the discourse which affects

or results from the relationship between the races is not conterminous with the category of racial discourse. To treat it as such would be to fall foul of the serious limitations arbitrarily imposed on the study of the discourse significant to race relations, by the concepts of 'prejudice' and 'racism' and their theoretical derivatives. The sociological observer is able to distinguish between the speaker's intention, a particular set of expressions and its effect, if any, on a particular racial group.

An expression is described as racial only if it makes use of racial (or ethnic) categories: it is usually described as racist if it is felt by an audience to imply hostility towards or to attribute negative traits to a particular racial group. Such expressions are obviously of great interest to the sociologist of race relations, but so also are non-racial or non-racist expressions, (a) that result in or justify behaviour which the observer believes has an adverse effect on a racial group, or (b) that, judging from the context in which they are uttered and the consequences they are likely to engender, show evidence of a racial intention, irrespective of the apparent absence at face of racial meaning. The following table gives an indication of the possible combinations of speaker intention, content of expression, and racial effect.

Table 1. Types of discourse

	SOCIAL OBSERVER'S ASSESSMENT OF			DESCRIPTION OF TYPE OF DISCOURSE
	ACTOR'S RACIAL INTENTION	THE RACIAL CONTENT OF EXPRESSION	RESULTANT RACIAL EFFECT OR ACT	
1	Present	Present	Present	Intended racialisation - effective
2	Present	Present	Absent	Intended racialisation - ineffective
3	Present	Absent	Present	Strategic deracialisation - effective
4	Present	Absent	Absent	Strategic deracialisation - ineffective
5	Absent	Present	Present	Unintended (institutionalised?) racialisation - effective
6	Absent	Present	Absent	Unintended (institutionalised?) racialisation - ineffective
7	Absent	Absent	Present	Unintended (institutionalised?) deracialisation - effective
8	Absent	Absent	Absent	Non-racialised discourse - ineffective

If a thorough account is to be given of the role of discourse in race relations, all these circumstances, except the converse (8), must be examined. In small passages of discourse the categories listed can often be separated, but in larger passages they may occur together. Previous studies have tended to concentrate almost exclusively on small overtly racist passages as in categories (1) and (2). But the "deracialised" expression of categories (3) (4) and (7) in which racist and even racial meaning is absent, yet where racial intent or racial effect can be detected, are of considerable importance, and these are explored in detail in Chapter Nine. So also are categories (5) and (7) in which politicians with little or no racial intent, and with or without the use of racial expressions, manage to justify actions which adversely or otherwise affect racial groups. These possibilities are dealt with in Chapters Seven and Eight. The primary concern then, is with racial expressions, non-racial expressions used with racial intent, and expressions, racial or non-racial, with racial consequences.

Despite a tendency in practice to concentrate here on intentions and expressions that are regarded by the observer as hostile to particular racial foci and damaging in consequence, there is no reason, in theory, why 'positive' intentions, expressions, and consequences should not warrant equal attention.

Third, if the sociologist is profitably to study discourse affecting race, he must place it within a social context in which the reasons for its occurrence can be explained, its meaning explored, and its consequences recorded. It is probably tautologous to say that the social significance of the discourse under discussion will vary in accordance with the social position of the speakers, the things they say, and the circumstances with which they are dealing. In most examination of discourse, whether in the literary or political field,

speakers are identified, the circumstances in which an utterance takes place are specified, the full meaning of what is said is spelt out, and its effects, if any, are noted. The who, where, what, why and wherefore of discourse are perennial questions.

Although it is possible to study discourse in social context in a number of different ways, a traditional social scientific approach has been to centre discussion on the concept of ideology and the rich theoretical insights that may be derived from it. The next four chapters are devoted to a discussion of the issues raised in the study of ideology, and the application of the theory thus outlined to a study of British discourse affecting race relations.

Ways of studying ideology

Studies of ideology demonstrate preoccupation with seven separate but closely related issues which I shall mention in turn in the light of my overriding purpose of examining discourse as it affects race relations. The issues are (1) problems of definition and of operationalised definition, (2) the historical genesis of ideology, (3) its ontological status, (4) its function, (5) its truth, (6) its relation to 'interest', and (7) its content.

1. Definition. First, there are questions related to definition: what is an ideology, and more particularly, for the purposes of this study, what is a racial ideology and how can it be identified or operationalised for research purposes? My prime concern, of course, is not racial ideology, as such, but ideology, racial or otherwise, affecting race relations. Racial ideology is ideology which (a) accounts for events in the social world by making extensive use of racial descriptions and explanations, and assigning major causal significance to racial categories and (b) utilises racial evaluations and prescriptions in a substantial way. A connotative definition of ideology will isolate certain qualities that are thought to typify

ideology, while the denotative definition will attempt to indicate the phenomenon which I intend to call 'ideology'. I make use of both approaches in this chapter.

An ideology is best treated as a set of linguistic symbols or sentences. The category does not include everyday practical activity or skills, such as farming or engineering, and is usually confined to discourse 'corresponding' or 'referring' to the material or spiritual world, to the exclusion of discourse dealing with the consistency of a symbolic system, such as logic or mathematics (see Plamenatz, 1970). The sentences of ideology are selected from the general flow of discourse by the social observer on the basis of certain necessary criteria, the definitional sufficiency or theoretical adequacy of which is much disputed in academic circles. For my purposes here, I identify ideology in terms of (a) its internal logical relations, (b) the kind of substantive cognitive elements that go to make it up, (c) the shared nature of its constituent beliefs, (d) its justificatory purpose, (e) its public availability, (f) its relatively enduring life-span, (g) the social agents that develop, profess, and make use of it, and (h) the social areas in which it is most commonly manifest.

(a) The social observer perceives logical and analogical relationships between the various elements of discourse. The discourse describes real or imagined spatial, temporal, relational, causal, and other relationships in the social and physical universe. Generally, ideology consists of arguments from premises to conclusion, rarely valid in any formal sense, but aimed at persuading and convincing an audience that a past, present, or future, state of being or course of action is, or is not, legitimate. Recurring argument forms may be seen as a sign of ideological formation.

Seliger (1976, p106) distinguishes six "interacting components" of ideology: description, analysis, moral prescriptions, technical prescriptions, implements (an account of the means of implementing the prescription), and rejections. I would prefer to classify the formal components of ideology in terms of descriptions, evaluations, general and operationalised prescriptions, their quality (whether they are affirmative or negative), and the argument forms into which they are built; together with the rhetorical techniques of association (bringing separate elements together) or of dissociation (disuniting elements which were originally regarded as forming a unity, and foci (headings under which arguments can be classified in this case, according to their substantive content, or, in terms of logic, their "most frequently occurring substitution instances").

(b) What is to constitute an ideology is also decided upon by the cognitive substance of the discourse. Arguments dealing with certain subject matter usually involving disputed values in, for example, the moral, political, and religious realms are frequently considered ideological. In Britain, the subject matter of national politics is regarded as ideological, while mathematics and, in the main, scientific findings will be excluded. Common sense views of what is ideological, however, are unsatisfactory because political debate may suddenly develop over issues that have hitherto remained undisputed. Nevertheless, political/moral/religious issues are frequently referred to in this kind of discourse.

(c) A distinction can be made between an individual's idiosyncratic ideas and the ideas he shares with others. Although it may be developed by the innovation of any one individual, an ideology consists of a set of publicly expressed beliefs held in common by a group of people. It is made up of descriptions, evaluations, and prescriptions, which are subscribed to collectively. Ideologies may

spread 'spontaneously' among a given population but frequently possess organisational carriers - groups of people organised with the express purpose of convincing others of the worth of a given set of beliefs. The organisational setting of many ideologies is likely to give them greater coherence, and strengthen them in their resistance to countervailing views. Ideology, particularly when supported by an effective organisation, has a juggernaut effect in that deviant views of a minority are unlikely to prevail in the face of mass adherence.

(d) The reason why moral, political, and religious debate serves largely as the content of ideology is related to what is perceived to be its main purpose. Ideology is a discoursive system seeking to justify a particular state of affairs or course of action. Ideology emerges only when human beings have to account for their actions to others. Descriptions, evaluations, and prescriptions are combined together to convince the audience that the means and ends of certain social behaviour and, in particular, political behaviour are right (or wrong). The purpose of ideology may be revealed in the implicit or explicit affirmation of that purpose in the discourse itself, or may be inferred by the observer from the known interests of the speaker, or from the effect of the discourse on his audience.

(e) In order to be effective, a justificatory system must be made public. It is possible, as in the case of the Manson hippy commune, for a unique justificatory system to develop privately in a small isolated circle, but generally, as a consequence of its purpose, an ideology competes for public attention. Nevertheless, the agents of a particular ideology might do their best to silence or suppress a competitor. In twentieth century Britain, conflicting ideologies compete for popular adherence.

(f) An ideology is a relatively enduring set of publicly expressed beliefs. Although the precise periodisation of ideological types is open to much debate, in many cases it is possible to identify ideological

traditions that have lasted for hundreds of years - as in the case of British Conservatism.

(g) The frequency with which ideology is used by certain recognisable social agents - politicians or social theorists, or is accepted as the official or agreed doctrine of a political party or social group, offers a further, if secondary, means of identifying it. In one sense, ideology has come to mean the language of politicians: the commitment to certain analyses of social events, values, and policies, expressed, for example in speeches or conference resolutions. One of the chief roles of the politician is to convince his audience of the righteousness of the decisions he supports and for which he holds responsibility. Although conceivably, justificatory systems may be non-political, as in the case of certain kinds of religious, technical, or aesthetic beliefs, in the final analysis these must be subordinated to moral justification, of which political advocacy is an important, though frequently disguised, form. For the purposes of this discussion, ideology will nearly always refer to the justification of action or inaction in a recognisably political context.

(h) Decisions binding on numbers of people are usually taken in formal, institutional, or organisation settings such as the local council chamber and parliament, the party conference or local branch meeting, where at the time of decision, they often require justification along formal lines. Ideology, then, may be looked upon as the kind of discourse arising from the controversy engendered in the decision-making process. It is the language of the political forum, and may be identified, in a secondary manner, by its location. But, of course, justification takes place not merely in the formally-designated decision-making arenas, but in almost every social setting. The formal setting, however, may reveal ideology's most formal expressions and their link with prior or subsequent social activity, thus providing for sociological

analysis the most readily identifiable specimens of ideology's kind.

2. Genesis. The second issue in the study of ideology relates to the reasons for the emergence of ideology either generally or in a specific historical context. Discussion may dwell on the causal relationship between social conditions and the development of ideology in all societies, or alternatively between social conditions at a specific juncture and the development of a particular ideological configuration. Usually accounts of ideological genesis tend to locate a set of beliefs spatio-temporally, and to suggest that people devised new ideologies when circumstances changed so substantially that the old ideologies were implausible in justifying events, were out of harmony with the values implicit in practice, and gave no prescriptive guidance on action to satisfy the wants and aspirations of sections of the population. Shils (1968, p69) affirms that "ideologies arise in conditions of crisis and in sections of society to whom the hitherto prevailing outlook has become unacceptable."

The difficulty here is that ideologies are constantly undergoing change and questions arise over how to periodise the ideological stream while it is being continually modified by the requirements of social existence operating on the continuity of patterns of thought. The actual time of an ideology's 'birth' is difficult to pinpoint because an ideology itself has the qualities of a chameleon and because there will nearly always be precursors. The debate about Christianity before Christ is a case in point.

It seems that both validity (in terms of the success with which an ideology explains the nature of the political world and can be technically applied to achieve stability or change) and persuasibility (the ease with which an ideology can be spread to wide sections of the population) are necessary if a new ideology is to establish itself against existing ones. Neither do ideologies compete on equal terms

on the descriptive level, for old ideologies have been shaped by, and in turn, shape, institutions and culture (by affective behaviour) and superficially, at least, describe the reality they have helped to create. They serve those who are already powerfully and advantageously placed, and those who are content with the status quo, and who have no need to change their views. In a stable, homogeneous, social setting in which economic life remains relatively undisrupted and class relations show little sign of radical alteration, ideologies exist relatively monomorphously for long periods of time.

It is true that twentieth century Britain has seen the growth of the Labour Party and decline of the Liberals. Change in organisational structure, however, cannot automatically be taken as a sign of major ideological rupture. It has been argued that with the growing power of organised labour on the one hand and the convergence of finance, industrial, and landed capital on the other, the welfarism and trade and economic policies of the Liberals were divided respectively between the Labour party and Conservatives, who were able to find ways of reconciling them with their previous stances. In other respects Labour party beliefs and Conservatism are marked by their historical continuity. As long as cataclysmic situations do not occur there is no need for 'holistic' change. New political situations are dealt with in a 'piecemeal' way, by applying the old, successful interpretations, evaluations, and answers. This can be referred to as 'the historical flow' of ideology. In the following chapters, I hope to show how long-term ideological flow has governed political interpretations of black Commonwealth immigration and settlement in the last thirty years.

3. Ontological status. The matter of ideological genesis is frequently intertwined with a third issue: that of its ontological status: in what way is an ideology related to the social factors, material or non-material,

from which it emerged; is it 'determined' by them, or once engendered, does it possess autonomy; does it 'reflect' social reality or 'misrepresent' it? There is a marked symmetry between the social structure (economic base)/ideology (ideological superstructure)debate in social science and the traditional mind/body relation problem of philosophy. I make no attempt here to elaborate on matters of ontology and am content to accept a crudely dualist approach to the problem, believing that the emergent ideological properties, though dependent on physiological and social configuration for their existence, should not be'reduced' (when attempts are made to describe them or to explain their effects) to accounts of the consequences of practical economic/ class relations.

Ideology as a non-material symbolic entity mediates - at least in many circumstances - between the structures of the physical and social world and the non-verbal behavioural response. Ideology is neither a mere 'reflection' in the mind of the human actor, of the real world, nor does it exist apart from the real world. The capacity to think and modes of thought are to be distinguished from the content of thought, both of which are combined to produce ideology as discourse. It follows that a study of ideology cannot amount simply to a description of the material circumstances with which it seems to match up, for once in being, it possesses characteristics and an autonomy of its own.

This may all seem very obvious, but theories of race relations often simply mention an economic relationship of racial subordination and domination and the social consequences which emerge from it, without dealing with the account the actors give of the circumstances in which they find themselves. Such theories lack conviction inasmuch as they do not explain why the actors' accounts of their actions frequently

differ from those offered by the observer. Without a knowledge of the actors' accounts, a persuasive explanation of the relationship between the objectively assessed (economic) circumstances of the actors and the actions they take in furtherance of their collective interests cannot be easily provided.

Worse, although a 'structural' explanation of human behaviour that omits an ideological dimension may appear to have validity on a grand and long-term scale, it deals most inadequately with the details of the shorter term and fails to provide scope for a 'political dimension' of human behaviour. A theory of ideology would help to clarify the relationships between first, the social structure as perceived by the social observer, second, the experiences, knowledge, assessments, and behavioural imperatives collectively generated within that structure by the social actors, and third, consequences of their resultant behaviour.

One effect of ignoring the intervening ideological variable in race relations is to produce rather crude theories that explain racial discrimination, racialist policies, or racist discourse, simply in terms of British capital's need to maintain a dual labour market in which black labour is forced to fill the most undesirable jobs. Reality is more complex than this. Another effect is to rule out the possibility that people, who are seen as merely instruments of overwhelming social forces, may be persuaded at a political level to pursue policies more equitable to black and white alike.

4. Function. Fourth, there is the question of the 'function of ideology'. This is an ambiguous expression because the term 'function' carries a number of meanings. It may refer to the process or operation which is present in the manifestation of ideology. Just as an axe is a tool for cutting wood, ideology is discourse which serves to justify political action. As used below, 'ideology' is defined in

terms of its justificatory function, and in this sense of the term, it makes no sense to ask whether it succeeds in performing its function. But 'function' may refer not merely to a process or operation but to the effect of that process or operation on something else. In this limited sense, it is possible to consider what function ideology plays in the social system without raising questions about whether the effects were intended by any human agent, or beneficial or harmful to the system in any way.

Next, there is the meaning of the term which contrasts 'functioning' with 'malfunctioning' and implies that ideology 'functions' in the sense of fulfilling part of an overall social design. This teleological concept of society which attributes goals, and therefore values, to the abstractions of society, race or class is frequently criticised,although no doubt it is possible in a Machiavellian way, for an individual or group to consciously use an ideology to achieve certain goals and to assess such means as functional. But there is no systemic imperative that forces an individual to accept without recourse to his own value system, any particular ideology as 'functional'. In this respect, 'prejudice' or 'racism' can only be dysfunctional from the point of view of a given integrationist value system.

For my purposes, the function of an ideology refers either to the process of justification manifested in ideology (by definition) or to the effect of that justification on, for example, a given audience, who, by accepting a given justification, 'legitimates' a course of behaviour. In this sense, a capitalist ideology is traditionally seen as legitimating the capitalist relations of production, without requiring the assumption that the legitimation was intended. Or in the race field, beliefs about black people's inferior intellectual capacity may help to sanction the way in which they are treated. The effects which

an ideology has on policy and ultimately on a social structure, should not be confused with the effect of the social structure on ideology, although it is clear that each has a reactive relationship with the other.

The function of ideology as justification may be discussed at a less general level. Ideology is part of language and its function must be seen as having effect through the communication process. It has a source and an intended audience at which it is directed. It may also have an unintended audience that 'overhears' the message.

The message may be sent or accepted for many different reasons. Where ideological discourse is concerned, the source outlines argument which he intends the audience to accept. These arguments consist of descriptive, evaluative, and prescriptive sentences occurring in complex sets. Gouldner (1976, p55) explains that ideologies require the""what is to be done?" side of the language" to be grounded" in the "report" side, the side that makes reference to "what is" in the world". But the presentation of any set of sentences may involve different emphases of the descriptive, evaluative, and prescriptive elements according to the purpose of the source and the receptivity of the audience. An audience's existing familiarity, partial or thorough, with an ideological complex (particularly one that corresponds sympathetically with the prevailing ideological milieu) will enable it to draw for interpretation on more than the partial presentation made available by the source at any one time. Ideological presentation can serve a variety of specific purposes separately, or simultaneously.

Arguments may concentrate on descriptive and explanatory accounts which help the audience to orientate itself to its natural and social world. MacIver (1947, p4) refers to this function as "man's way of apprehending things, his way of coming to terms with his world",

Christenson (1971, p15) points out that "The cognitive orientations of political ideology help men to avoid ambiguity in their lives, and provide a sense of certainty and security". In practice, description and explanation are often difficult to separate from evaluation.

Evaluations about the worth of certain people, actions, and events, offer the audience the opportunity to learn how others think and feel to order their values hierarchically within the context of a reasonably consistent scheme, and thereby to share common attitudes and goals. An evaluation is a guide to individual and collective judgment by which the individual may sort out internal conflicts between his passions, as well as joining with other human beings in the pursuit of common wants. Parsons (1951, p349) describes ideology as "a system of ideas which is orientated to the evaluative integration of the community".

Prescriptions are presented to audiences as suitable directives for action on their part or on the part of others. A prescription's acceptance involves its adoption as a directive for action. It does not necessarily entail the performance, or non-performance, of the action itself. The fulfilment of the prescription must entail the prior acceptance of the prescription, but the acceptance does not entail fulfilment. People do not always do what they believe ought to be done. Obviously, however, an ideological prescription presented to an audience is frequently aimed at persuading it not only to accept the prescription, but also to act upon it. Indeed this is often regarded as ideology's primary function and test of success. Parsons (1951, p350) asserts "there must be an obligation to accept its (ideology's) tenets as the basis for action". Ideology, Gouldner (1976, p26) claims, "seeks to gather, assemble, husband, defer, and control the discharge of political energies". Stereotypical studies

of ideology have frequently emphasised its effectiveness in persuading large numbers of people to engage in mass political action, e.g. Hitler addressing a Nuremburg rally, but, of course, ideology may be equally successful in persuading people to be inactive and to accept the legitimacy of the behaviour of politicians acting on their behalf.

Obviously, this aspect of ideology brings it into close relationship with rhetoric, the study of the techniques of persuading audiences by means of argument. Perelman and Olbrechts - Tyteca (1969, p4) regard rhetoric as "the study of the discursive techniques allowing us to induce or increase the mind's adherence to the theses presented for its assent". Rhetorical techniques are discussed elsewhere, but its mention here stresses the importance of considering ideology actively within a discursive context aimed at persuasion, whether that persuasion turns out to be successful or not.

5. Truth. Once ideology has been discussed in terms of its function, the further question of its truth is raised. If it is accepted that power, wealth and privelege are unevenly distributed in a given society, then it follows that certain political decisions are likely to benefit one group more than, and perhaps at the expense of, another. Justification of action or inaction, therefore can be seen as a means by which one group of people persuades another to accept a certain version of how things are and ought to be, in a manner which happens to benefit the former at the expense of the latter. At this point, questions are raised about the truth of an ideology and the interests that it serves. These are two separate questions, for interests may be served by truth as well as falsehood. Sorel (1906) recognised that it was not the truth or falsehood of social and political beliefs that mattered, but the way they accorded with and expressed the needs, feelings,and aspirations of a group.

One of the first didficulties in dealing with the relationship between ideology and truth is to decide on the criterion by which truth is to be established. Is truth, as a property of statements, to be established by the statements' correspondence with a state of affairs in the world, or is it a matter of group agreement over the relationship between terms? Even if agreement is reached over the criteria of truth, it should be obvious that only statements have the property of being true or false: evaluations and prescriptions, as the other important components of ideology, cannot be established as true or false by empirical means. It probably only makes sense to talk about 'false ideology' in respect of doubtful assertions of fact, statistical inaccuracy, false cause, unsupported hypotheses, selective presentation of evidence, etc.

Of course, many apparently factual propositions are unlikely ever to be operationalised and subjected to rigorous scientific scrutiny. And science, itself, does not lay claim to absolute truth: propositions are true only in relation to available supporting evidence. The truth of falsehood of statements about the world is not always immediately apparent. The discovery of the truth frequently requires an intense intellectual effort which many people are not in a position to attempt or to sustain. They do not consciously choose falsehood: they themselves simply do not know what is the case, and remain ignorant, rather than wrong, until pursuit of certain values leads them to assume that a particular set of statements is true.*

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* As an example, Curtin (1964) describes the influence of Edward Long's History of Jamaica 1774 in which he tried "to assess the place of the Negro in nature" (p43). Long thought Africans had "a covering of wool like the bestial fleece, instead of hair", were inferior in "faculties of mind", had a "bestial and fetid smell", were parasitized by black lice instead of the lighter colored lice of the Europeans, that Negro women bore children after brief labour and with practically no pain, and that mixed-race children were infertile (p43-44). Long's credentials were that he was a resident of Jamaica and, unlike his readers in England, was thought to be in possession of the evidence for his assertions. His views also fitted into earlier prevailing modes of thought such as the idea of 'the Great Chain of being'. Curtin writes that "Long's greatest importance was in giving an 'empirical and 'scientific' base that would lead on to pseudo-

Systematically directed 'distortion of truth', or belief in falsehood when truth is readily available, is undoubtedly of great interest, but it cannot be regarded as the sole indicator of ideology. The distinction in logic between disagreement of belief and disagreement of attitude, or Russell's conjugations (e.g. I am firm, you are obstinate, he is a pig-headed fool), reveal the possibility that propositions with identical descriptive content might be acknowledged in different systems of justification. Nevertheless, comparison of ideological assumptions of fact with social scientific measurements of the same phenomenon, particularly at a simple descriptive level (e.g. the number of new Commonwealth immigrants and their descendents in Britain), may, in the examination of their discrepancies, help to lay bare important characteristics of a justificatory system. However the same example shows that while two people might agree on immigrant numbers, they may variously interpret the numbers as 'too large' or 'of no significance'. Evaluation and prescription play a crucial part in the composition of ideology. The preoccupation of liberal-minded social scientists and anti-racist politicians with race relations' empirical truths is understandable. What is surprising is the way they have been content to dismiss as 'prejudice', the population's lack of concern for the truth. Instead, they could have provided more convincing reasons for its inclination towards 'systematic distortion'.

6. Relation to interest. Whether an ideology is true or false in its descriptive aspects, it is put to use in the service of particular social groups, who use it to justify the world as they

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scientific racism.... Long was more of a pro-slavery publicist than a scientist, but his views influenced even those scientists who believed in a more liberal social policy"(p45).

would like it to be, at the expense of possibilities proposed by other groups. The need to justify a desired state of affairs, reflects a situation in which different groups have diverse and conflicting aims.

In Marxist sociology, the conflict between particular social groupings has been attributed to their underlying difference of economic interest, as observed objectively by the social observer, and also subjectively, by the social groupings in question who come to realise their 'class interests'. Marxists believe there is a fundamental difference of interest under the capitalist mode of production between capitalists who own the means of production and proletarians who must sell their labour power. Careful observation of class relationships, then, should show, at some stage, a social class manifesting an expression, behaviourally or discoursively, of its class interest. While this might provide the basis for an ideology's emergence, such a manifestation does not in itself constitute an ideology. To understand how an ideology emerges, a distinction must be made between the structural economic, and the responsive political, level.

Under the capitalist mode of production, the interests of the dominant capitalist class are served at the expense of the subordinate proletariat, a state of affairs that can only continue for any length of time, if the dominant class has the means of coercion, or preferably, the persuasive ability, to insist that arrangements favourable to it are generally accepted by society as a whole. In other words, the capitalist class must manage to convince the proletariat that it speaks not just for itself, but for the whole of society, or, as Marx and Engels put it: "to represent its interests as the common interest of all the members of society.... to give its ideas the form of universality, and represent them as the only rational universally valid ones" (1973, pp 52-53).

This presupposes not only a social universe of interests, economic, or otherwise, but a world in which interests are represented by members of a given social class to one another, and to other social classes. The political level constitutes the world of the systematic representation of interest to others, a level that must make extensive use of the means of communication: discourse. This 'representation' does not take the form of only descriptive representation, but involves evaluation, interpretation of circumstances, and recommendations for action. Neither is it necessary to assume that the representation of interest is confined to social classes: other social units, both larger in the form of nations or alliances, and smaller in the form of substrata, occupational or ethnic groupings, or local communities, might represent their interests at a discoursive level. While this is undoubtedly true, the representation of class interests in contemporary Britain is probably of paramount importance.

But the representation of interest does not by itself constitute ideology. For this to occur, Marx and Engels thought, the interest must be represented as universal - as valid for all social groups. Groups might express their interests directly without any pretension that the pursuit of those interests served the social entity as a whole, or alternatively, they might claim that they acted in everyone's interest, for the public good. They might talk in terms of 'we want, we need, we shall have', or alternatively, in terms of 'this is right, everyone wants this, everyone will benefit, everyone ought to follow this course of action'. Ideology, in this latter sense, constitutes the justification of political action for the common good. Sometimes, of course, action may be for the common good, but Marx and Engels were stressing the point that in a class-antagonistic society, exemplified by capitalist socio-economic formations, political action invariably benefits one class more than, or at the expense of, another, and that therefore, the

acceptance by a subordinate group of a dominant group's justification for action, hinders the subordinate from directly realising its own interest.

None of this implies that the groups themselves are conscious of the deceptive nature of the justification: this might only be discovered by directly studying the economic, or more generally, the material relations of a society. As Marx and Engels point out, "whilst in ordinary life every shopkeeper is very well able to distinguish between what somebody professes to be and what he really is",.... historians have not yet won even this trivial insight. They take every epoch at its word and believe that everything it says and imagines about itself is true" (1973, p55).

One further point that should be mentioned here is Marx and Engels's recognition that effort has to be invested in the production of ideas, and that it is the ruling class that performs this task. They "rule also as thinkers, as producers of ideas, and regulate the production and distribution of the ideas of their age...." (1973, p51). Not only does the subordinate class not have the time to devote to thought, but because it rarely finds itself in a position to take decisions affecting other people's lives, it does not possess the immediate need or the opportunity to develop sophisticated justificatory systems. This point will be developed further in the section on ideological levels.

Although I am anxious to argue that class politics and, therefore, class ideology are crucial for understanding the form of British racial discourse and its consequences, it is obvious that what has been said in the class context about ideology and interest may also be applied to situations of racial domination and subordination. In Britain, the interests of ethnic minorities are seldom expressed through the mass media, and black people are rarely in a position to speak with effect on behalf of the common interest of a social whole which includes themselves. 'Black ideology' may be produced but it has little opportunity for establishing itself as a dominant mode of justification. In the meantime,

justificatory forms serving the interests of certain sections of the white population remain firmly ensconsed. Rarely will it be admitted, for example, that the white population and British social institutions bear any responsibility for the lowly position of black people: rather their comparative privation is seen to be of their own making.

7. Content. Finally, the content of ideology may be studied in its own right. Predominantly, this must involve an interpretation of the meaning of discourse as intended and understood. Attention must be drawn to recurrent themes that perhaps have remained unnoticed by the source or audience. The techniques of argument and persuasion have to be noted and the intricate connotation of terms and sentences spelled out in detail. Above all, the internal consistency or inconsistency of discrete passages or series of passages has to be emphasised. The relevance of certain expressions in the ideological discourse for the political purpose in hand must be judged against the social observer's knowledge of the social context. The precise hermeneutic involved - that is, the principles by which the meaning of the discourse is to be laid bare - is seldom clearly defined, but seems to be related to the observer's concept of the actor's intent, further explication of the actual meaning, or connotation of the passage, the techniques of expression, and the effects of the meaning on the audience.

The study of the content of ideology cannot be reduced to a formalistic rendering of passage length, sentence form, or techniques of presentation or alliteration. In the final analysis, it is concerned with meaning, and must, if it is not merely to repeat the substance of the discourse under examination, order that material and relate it to a context through the use of significant external categories. Yet the superimposition of categories must clarify existing plausible meanings and avoid distorting the original intension of the expression.

The content of ideology must be studied by giving an interpretation of meaning: it does not consist of studies of the genesis or behavioural effects of ideology or of the motivation of social actors. For example, it is not possible to derive adequate categories for the description of ideology dealing with race from an examination of the economic structure of society or more particularly, of race relations. I am not asserting that discourse cannot be about economic structure: I point out only that the description of an economic structure is not to be identified with the structure itself. Inasmuch as categories derived in this way correspond at all to the content of political discourse, it is because they themselves are part of that discourse. Although it would seem to be an obvious point, it still needs to be reiterated that categories of meaning (word or symbolic categories) are not the same as, and cannot be reduced to, categories of externalised objects (real categories).

Less obviously, and returning solely to the world of word categories, it is mistaken merely to employ categories used to describe the economy in attempting to understand ideological forms, in the same way as it would be absurd to analyse an economic formation using only classificatory forms derived from linguistics. For the purpose of analysing ideology, I consider it apposite and necessary to utilise classifications derived from logic and rhetoric, and developed with the nature of discourse especially in mind, as well as substantive categories arising from the subject matter of the discourse itself. In the following account of Conservative and Labour ideology and of the discourse of the parliamentary debates on immigration and race relations, I attempt to develop those kinds of classification that are necessary to reveal the key structures of the justificatory system underpinning race relations. This is not to deny the importance of economic factors in

providing the context for the genesis of ideology or for its maintenance, but only to reassert the duality of economic structure on the one hand, and the ideological 'reflection' (or as I would prefer to say, 'account') of it, on the other.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF RACIAL DIVISION

Having briefly hinted at the issues raised by the study of ideology (definition, genesis, ontology, function, truth, interest, and content), I shall now try to sketch out a simple theoretical framework which best accommodates what I have to say about British discourse affecting race relations. What follows is neither profound nor original but is an attempt to make explicit my underlying assumptions so that they may be more readily criticised.


I start by distinguishing the social observer, ego, from the observable universe. That universe includes both material or physical entities and the relations between them, and also symbolic entities and their relations. This distinction does not correspond either to that made between the physical and social world or to that between the physical and mental world. Social beings are physical entities and the social world consists of much that is physical in addition to the symbolic. And leaving aside the process of introspection, the social observer is unable to study the mental world directly. However, the social observer uses his mind to study aspects of the material and symbolic universe. Here, the observer focuses on those aspects of the universe in which social actors are confronted with the presence of black migrants in Britain and respond to that presence in different ways.

Conceptually, the social universe may be divided into two parts: the social structure and the population's perception and response to that structure. Although undoubtedly inspired by the Marxian economic basis/ideological superstructure dichotomy, the structure/response distinction does not correspond closely with it because a primarily

unidirectional causal relationship between base and superstructure is not automatically assumed, because there is a danger of too narrowly defining the economic dimension of the basis, and because the superstructure, as the name implies, contains 'structure' - particularly the political structure of the state. The distinction at the real level between structure, and the responses to it, is relative to the social context of an individual or group: one person's response is another person's structure. Structure constitutes those forces seen to circumscribe any social actor's experience. As Parsons (1966,p8) puts it, "each member is both actor (having goals, ideas, attitudes, etc.) and object of orientation for both other actors and himself. The interaction system, then, is an analytical aspect abstractable from the total action processes of its participants".

From the point of view of the social observer, certain structures may be picked out as significant for understanding and explaining the responses of social actors. Their perception and knowledge of the structures with which they are faced may be entirely different from the social observer's. Thus, the social observer is able to compare his account of how he thinks structural mechanisms operate with the account offered by the social actors. Although a correspondence between them need not be assumed, prima facie, the reason why these two accounts of the same phenomenon should differ stands in need of explanation.

Figure 2 Observer's and actor's accounts of social structure



What then is this social observer's conception of the social structure? I accept that the economic aspect of the social structure plays a dominant part in the lives of all social groups and individuals, although they themselves need not use economic categories in the description and explanation of that structure. In describing and explaining the economic structure of British society, I make use of the categories and theory of Marxist and Marxist-derived political economy. The prevailing economic structure, in my opinion, is best represented as a capitalist mode of production. The British economy constitutes the basis of a capitalist social formation. The capitalist dynamic imperative resides in an overall capitalist system of production which, irrespective of the response of individual social actors and groups, creates a relationship that sustains two main social categories: a bourgeoisie and a proletariat. As a class, the bourgeoisie, which owns the means of production, extracts surplus from the proletariat, which must sell its labour power. The proletariat becomes internally differentiated because it possesses different qualities of labour power for which there is a varying demand, and which is sold at different rates.

A major difficulty in analysing the British social formation arises in deciding whether to focus on class composition at a national level, in the belief that class relations of this kind provide the economic underpinning for race relations structures, or to look at the wider international field, in the belief that metropolitan class relations are better understood in the context of empire and colonies and the continuing exploitation of overseas territories. It is clear that for some purposes, the national metropolitan economic structure might be adequate in accounting for

class responses to certain categories of labour power, but in explaining the process of Commonwealth migration, and the responses of metropolitan classes to black migrants, it is more appropriate to adopt a broader economic framework.

The economic structure to which we are referring creates, at certain periods, a localised demand for labour power and the opportunities for people in areas of labour surplus to satisfy that labour requirement by moving in search of work. Capital then, seeks labour in times of labour shortage, but, of course, labour shortage varies according to the competitiveness of wages. Workers already established in the metropolis will tend to gravitate towards the more desirable jobs, while newcomers must fill the remaining, less desirable vacancies. Because of the capitalist trade cycle, the demand for labour is subject to considerable fluctuation. In times of recession, industries shed labour and the competition for work intensifies. The capitalist will seek to minimise costs including that of labour power, while the proletariat will want to ensure its economic security by preserving work and level of income.

The economic structure presents itself to social actors as both a system of production and a system of consumption, for most people, the connection between the two being surprisingly difficult to grasp. For the proletarian, class relations are most readily experienced and understood at the place of work, where the struggle for higher wages and security of income is conducted. With his wage, the worker must purchase the goods and services - food, clothes, shelter, fuel and transport, health treatment, support in times of difficulty, education and cultural artefacts, etc. - that are provided for his consumption.

These will not be equally available to all consumers, because

of differences in wage levels. In addition, the consumer will experience a world divided in its public provision of services, and its private provision of goods. Over a period of time, a population emerges which is highly differentiated on objective dimensions of wealth, income, power, education, skills, and possession of consumer durables. The social actors' perception and evaluation of these differences has provided a society subjectively stratified in terms of social status. Social status is both a description classification of the worth people attribute to various social categories and a normative classification of the worth people think ought to attach to those categories.

The economic structure circumscribes the life of the proletariat both as producer and consumer: the price at which he can sell his labour power and what he can afford to buy with the proceeds will set limits on the way he lives and the decisions open to him. Under these circumstances, he might seek individually to compete with others for jobs, higher wages, and the consumption patterns that go with them, or join with others in order to put an end to the exploitative and competitive structure of capitalism and to equalise the distribution of resources. Capitalism survives because the proletariat, in the face of the immediate structural imperatives, continues, on the whole, to adopt the former strategy. The social relations of workplace, housing, education and of the market for goods and services, encourage individualistic competition, although the social units of competition which emerge within the economic structure may vary considerably, depending on the proletariat's historical and immediate consciousness of how best to realise its interests. All this has important consequences for race relations.

In brief, capitalism provides the context in which the bourgeoisie and proletariat exist together in an unequal and exploitative relationship, and where the proletariat is stratified internationally by the contrasting patterns of investment, production, and trade between metropolis and colonies, and nationally by the demand for and supply of particular kinds of labour.

British race relations must initially be set in this context. In relation to the structure of the British economy, black people originally existed in the relatively poorly developed colonies which were used advantageously by British capital as a source of raw material and as a captive market. British capitalists, if not the British proletariat, benefited from the colonial resources, and created in the process elaborate justificatory ideologies for the political and economic control they exercised over the countries of the West Indies, Africa, and Asia. After the war, a labour hungry British economy discovered that the colonies might also provide labour power. A migratory process started in which black labour moved from the colonies to a white metropolitan society in order to take jobs which sections of the white proletariat were unable or unwilling to occupy. Industry treated the black colonial migrants only as a factor of production, and held no responsibility for the provision of the goods and services they were bound to need. The migrants themselves, or alternatively, agencies of national and local government, were held to be responsible for the 'servicing' of the migrant labour force.

The economic ramifications of the migrant colonial labour force on both metropolis and colonies have been explored at length elsewhere (Castles and Kosack (1973), Jones and Smith (1970), Nikolinakos (1975)), and it is not my purpose to deal with them further. Suffice it to say that black migrants helped fill a labour

shortage, took jobs unacceptable to white workers and, because of their geographical mobility, settled in areas of greatest labour demand. Proportionately to the indigenous white population, they were highly economically active. In addition, black labour was relatively cheap, and at first, the cost of its reproduction (in terms of education and welfare provision for the family unit) was minimal. Industry benefited in numerous ways. Labour was made available to labour-intensive industries in public and private sectors, thus ensuring their continued existence. Workers willing to undertake unpopular night shifts made continuous working possible, thus rendering economic the installation of expensive new machinery. The state also benefited because, for various reasons, migrants were less reliant on social provision.

Although we might expect the beneficial economic effects of a migrant labour force to affect the way people act towards and speak about black Commonwealth labour - and Sivanandan's account (1976) of the gradual transformation of British immigration laws in the direction of the European model is of relevance here - convincing explanations of ideological configurations are more complex.

It can be accepted with little difficulty that in a capitalist system, the fluctuating demand for labour creates conditions that call for the reduction of labour costs, the regulation of labour supply, and the maintenance of particular patterns in the division of labour. These requirements may be widely recognised, especially at a less generally stated level, by employers and government officials who are attempting to ensure the smooth running of the economy and a satisfactory return on investment. If their rational and purposeful management of capital were all that had to be reckoned with, and indeed constituted all that was ever said or implemented with regard to migrant labour, there would be little need for a study of ideology

affecting race. But, of course, this is not the case. Even the justification for control of the labour supply is seldom couched in the simple logic of capitalist economics. But more importantly, economic regulators alone cannot account for the actual decisions taken or their effects, or the singling out of a particular type of labour - black labour - for differential treatment.

Perhaps capitalist economic laws set broad limits to the sphere of possible action and it can be shown that the effects of, for example, migration policies seem always to benefit capitalism, but this is not to assert that capitalists are always purposeful in their actions and sure of their likely outcome. Neither is it to say that the policies that are followed stem only from a crude analysis of profit and loss; certain policies, while damaging to individuals, may have little effect on industry. And capitalism involves more than the successful management of the forces of production. The relations of production develop irrespectively of the wishes of the capitalist and must be met and managed as the need arises and to the best of its ability by the ruling fraction of the bourgeoisie. The maintenance of a particular capitalist economic formation involves the weighting of other goals, such as the securing of the power to make decisions, against the pursuit of private profit, although, in the long run, the latter must always be paramount. Thus, even a so-called economistic Marxism is likely to accept that policies drawing, for example, on the demand for labour, are unlikely to be decided solely by reference to the job market.

I shall go further and argue that contradictions within actual class-divided societies produce responses which are only accommodated with difficulty by the governments of these societies, and the decisions that are taken are not invariably optimal for

capitalism. Furthermore, these decisions result from various perceptions and convictions about the nature of a situation, and are justified in multifarious ways - few of them simply economic. It is these decisions and their justificatory forms that I seek to outline.


My primary concern here is to place the study of ideology affecting race in a structural context, without asserting that these decisions and their justifications are accounted for, in toto, by the underlying economic imperative of capitalism. The intervening processes need to be more fully described and explained. Myrdal (1962, p12) is right in warning of the dangers of reducing the ideological forces "solely to secondary expressions of economic interests". This would be 'economism', defined by Poulantzas (1968, p46) as the belief that "socio-economic relations are the specific objective of the class struggle".

The square of alienation A Marxist structural analysis of society allows for a number of different theories explaining race relations. The status of such theories is rarely made absolutely clear. Certainly, if they aim to explain only a partial aspect of the total reality, they need not be considered universal or complete, and may be reconcilable with one another. With this in mind, I shall explore each theory as an account of the white response to a particular class relationship.

The theories may be reconciled to some extent by considering them as part of a 'square of alienation' in which human beings fail to co-operate with one another as a result of the structural imperatives mentioned in the previous section. 'Alienation' may be understood to refer to the responses, social and psychological, that are likely to emerge in a class-antagonistic economic structure.

Clearly, the concept, as used here, is derived from that part of Marxist theory which deals with alienation from other human beings (rather than from the product), and is based on the underlying assumption that social actors desire, or would, in the opinion of the social observer, benefit from the resolution of their antagonism by transforming the economic structure of society.


Figure 3. The square of alienation



The square deals with four relations: (1) the antagonism between members of the bourgeoisie, and in this case, between different national bourgeoisies, (2) the bourgeoisie's efforts to maintain its exploitative relationship with the proletariat, (3) the proletariat's tactics in resisting the bourgeoisie's exploitation and political domination and (4) the competition between members of the proletariat, in this case white and black proletarians, for scarce resources. If the scheme is to accord more closely with race relations in a country with a colonial legacy and ties, it must be elaborated by the recognition of the importance of metropolitan/colonial relations. The relations between metropolitan and colonial bourgeoisies, and between colonial bourgeoisie and colonial proletariat, are of obvious importance in understanding the economic and political developments of the former indepence movements, but the relation (4a) between colonial and metropolitan proletarians is of particular interest

in the light of post-war colonial migration to the metropolis.

Figure 4. The metropolitan/colonial square of alienation



The consideration of race relations in the colonial context has led to the realisation that the treatment meted out by the metropolitan bourgeoisie to either certain distinguishable sections of the metropolitan proletariat (e.g. US blacks) or to colonial migrants to the metropolis, might bear a close resemblance to that perpetrated by the colonial authorities on the native population: the relation (2a) in the diagram, Rex and Tomlinson (1979) also raise the possibility that the response of the colonial proletariat in the metropolis to the metropolitan bourgeoisie derives its ideological inspiration from the struggle of the national proletariat and national bourgeoisie of the colonies against the metropolitan bourgeoisie. The "ultimate structural source" of black political movements in Britain, they suggest, "is to be found in the social structure of Empire and Third World liberation movements" (p.293). Black identity groups believe "that the revolution of the Third World, and particularly the African part of it, is (the black immigrant's) revolution and one with which he should be identified in every way" (p292).

Despite the schema outlined here in an attempt to show how various theories of race relations might be reconciled, the

theories themselves are generally offered individually and in more detail and applied to specific societies. Below, I give a thumb-nail sketch of a number of common theories. My aim is to show how they might clarify the reasons for the development of British ideological configurations affecting race relations.

(1) Competition between national bourgeoisies Deriving from the work of Hobson, Hilferding, and more importantly, Lenin, theories of imperialism as a late stage of capitalism can be used to explain how race relations are affected by rivalry between national bourgeoisies. In the nineteenth century, the political interest of the bourgeoisie was expressed in the institution of the nation state, which sought to represent national interests and to define the economic sphere through laws, the control of the monetary system, and restrictions on the movement of the factors of production. Yet in order for capitalists to maintain their high levels of return on investment, it became necessary to expand abroad, and to control politically the territories in which the investment was made. Because other national bourgeoisies were engaged in the same process, rivalry developed between the capitalist states which eventually led to war. "The war of 1914-18", Lenin wrote, "was on both sides an imperialist (i.e. annexationist, predatory, and plunderous) war for the partition of the world and for the distribution and redistribution of colonies, of 'spheres of influence', of finance, capital, etc."

National commitment to overseas expansion and the need to mobilise the British population to fight for the interests of the national bourgeoisie might explain both the jingoism of the British population towards foreigners and their feeling of

superiority towards colonial peoples.*

(2i) Relationship of bourgeoisie to proletariat-economic. Oliver Cromwell Cox expounded the theory that "race prejudice..... is a social attitude propagated among the public by an exploiting class for the purpose of stigmatizing some group as inferior so that the exploitation of either the group itself, or its resources or both may be justified." (1948,p393). In other words, Cox saw racial beliefs, together with their manifestations in discrimination as functioning to preserve the super-exploitation of black people and consequently, the economic interests of the bourgeoisie.

Cox's theory is often deliberately interpreted as implying a purposeful racial conspiracy on behalf of the bourgeoisie to spread racist propaganda and to maintain racialist practice. Just as easily, it can be seen to refer either to a general desire to perpetuate economic practices that are profitable, or to the actual measurable consequences of racial prejudice. My view is that the differential exploitation of groups of workers on racial lines can be profitable in itself, while at the same time generating the need for a justificatory system which is most likely to be provided by bourgeois ideologists.

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* On a much more mundane level, the dislike of foreign competition is revealed in the attitudes to imported goods and their makers. For example, before the First World War, many German goods carried the letters D R G M (Deutsches Reichsgebrauchs - Muster) which means 'German registered patent'. In Britain the letters were said to stand for 'dirty rotten German make'. More recently, similar attitudes have been shown to all things Japanese: the products, workers' skills, and the people themselves being regarded as inferior.

In the Autumn of 1980, British apple growers waged a very successful, nationalist 'Save British apples' campaign in the face of competition from Continental 'Golden Delicious'.

But this is not to say that differential exploitation on racial lines is profitable under all circumstances or that behavioural manifestations arising from an established racist justificatory system cannot severely disrupt production at the expense of the bourgeoisie. Nor is it to say that under certain conditions, the bourgeoisie are incapable of using racial issues in a thoroughly conscious and Machiavellian way. Indeed, it is quite obvious that in Britain, politicans representing the interests (on other issues) of the bourgeoisie have done precisely this; but not necessarily for directly economic reasons. It may be felt that discriminatory practices existing for whatever reason, may help to maintain and provide a predominantly black labour force at lower rates of pay and in substantially worse conditions than white workers would be prepared to accept, in recognition of which fact those employers most immediately involved are unlikely to go out of their way to campaign for less discrimination and higher rates of pay and better conditions for their black workers.

(2ii) Political relationship. Of course, Cox goes further here in suggesting that the bourgeoisie maintain antagonistic attitudes between white and black workers in order to facilitate the exploitation of both parties, and to prevent the proletariat organising itself to capture the state and to overthrow capitalism (p473). Now in certain historical and geographical contexts, the idea that a regime may deliberately foment dissension between sections of the population fractured on lines of language, tribe, race, religion, colour, or their relationship to the means of production, is by no means far-fetched. Far more likely, however, is the possibility that existing divisions might be astutely used and exacerbated to the disadvantage of the minority groups who possess little power over their own destiny. Obviously, this

theory relates closely to the popular ideas of scapegoating and the deflection of responsibility for government failure on to the weak and visible sections of the population.

But Cox's suggestion might appear more plausible when seen in terms of the ideologies that appear to support existing capitalist relations of production. No central dynamic of antagonism towards black people need be postulated, but only a justification for commitment to those beliefs and practices that maintain the various forms of capitalism. Thus, with regard to the colonies, it may be necessary to hold a belief in the civilising mission of the white man and of his general benevolence towards the child-like black man, with the accompanying implication that white people, whether proletarian or bourgeois, are superior to those within their charge. This belief is likely to strengthen the bourgeoisie at the expense of the metropolitan white and colonial black proletariat.

The internal stability of the metropolitan society will also depend on acceptance of justification for the existence of social inequality, a belief that must be actively generated if the bourgeoisie is going to legitimately maintain its privileges. If the inequality in that society partly accords with racial categories, that very same justification will also serve to support racial differentiation. It is not then that the bourgeoisie always actively conspires to produce racially divisive ideology but that the practice of capitalism generates widespread inequality which must be justified. If class and social stratification is accompanied by racial stratification, the justificatory system may utilise class categories, or racial categories, or both. The maintenance, without undue force, of racially exploitative relations will require justification and legitimation.

(3) Relationship of proletariat to bourgeoisie. If a bourgeoisie,

or a fraction of the bourgeoisie, differs in racial composition from a proletariat, proletarian struggle against that bourgeoisie may come to be justified in racial terms. Although such racial classification may have at least some empirical base in the actual racial composition of the class in question, by a process of generalisation all members of a particular race, whether they be capitalist or proletarian, may come to be attributed with the supposed qualities of the class. Thus a petit-bourgeois, or managerial, class fraction with whom workers are in close contact may engender racial animosity, by virtue of its class function. Class struggle against capitalism in general may assume racial forms at a real and symbolic level. Such a highly generalised theory could perhaps be modified to partially explain some kinds of anti-semitism, the Rastafarian vision of white babylon, or the ideology of some black anti-colonial movements.

In a slightly different vein, British workers may be inclined to fight the machinations of management anxious to reduce the cost of labour or commodities by importing foreign workers or goods. Management's attempts to improve relations between workers in order to avoid the disruption of production, may be interpreted as a way of undermining the solidarity achieved by the indigenous workers in their struggle for improved wages and conditions. Indeed, the race relations pietism of those in authority may become closely associated with their class or managerial interests, and be resisted through various anti-authoritarian acts, interpreted by the social observer as racist. Such defiance need not be confined to industry. It has been suggested that various youth cultures may be best explained as anti-authoritarian responses:

joining the National Front, 'Paki-bashing', or wearing swastikas possess an anti-authoritarian symbolic value far outweighing the dislike of other races.

(4) Relationships between proletarians. The limited strategies developed by the proletariat for defending itself against capital may stress general worker solidarity or attempt to defend only a section of the work force at the expense of other labour. The dispute in Marxist circles over whether there is such a thing as 'working class racism' must surely depend on whether a distant or proximate causal explanation is adopted for the specific examples of conflict that on occasion quite manifestly does occur between sections of the working class. A protectionist strategy on the part of white employees aimed at maintaining the price of labour in a particular plant by refusing to accept black workers who are quite able to fill the shortage can be seen either as a struggle against bourgeois attempts to reduce the cost of labour, or as proletarian competition for scarce resources. The effect may be white racism, but a causal explanation may still be offered in terms of the structural imperatives of capitalism, the need to extract surplus from the worker, and the worker's consequent defensive response against his vulnerability in the market situation.

There remains a possibility that sections of the proletariat might combine along racial lines to safeguard their market position, both as producers or consumers. A typical scenario is outlined by Peach (1968):

> It seems to have been almost universally the case that West Indians were taken on as second best. This was not necessarily due to colour prejudice on the part of the employer but possibly to fear of it among employees. The situation from the point of view of the employers must have appeared delicate. In their view, they were obliged to take on coloured labour because of the shortage of white labour: they did not want to exacerbate

> the shortage by its remedy. Laying aside any overt feelings of colour prejudice, the employees must have felt that any addition to the work force from whatever source, must weaken their bargaining power. Shortage of labour is, after all, one of the main bargaining tools in attempts to achieve higher wages. Because of the shortage of labour, there was a grudging acceptance of the necessity for coloured labour, but generally on the basis of 'thus far and no further', that is, in colour quotas, in the reservation of certain skills and supervisory categories for white workers and so on.(p95.)

In dealing with attitudes to post-war foreign labour from the continent, Senior and Manley (1955) point out that the British trade unions took the view that there would be no need to recruit foreign labour if working conditions in the mines and in rural areas were improved to attract natives. The unions also feared a future slump. The interests of the British workers were safeguarded by union agreements which usually kept the volunteer workers in unskilled jobs and prevented them from competing with skilled or even semi-skilled natives (1955, p16).

An explanation of race relations in terms of competition between black and white workers in the job market is useful because in focusing on the productive process, it reveals the more obvious linkages with the overall capitalist mode of production. But capitalist competition is neither limited to nor experienced only in employment. The proletarian finds himself in competition as both producer and consumer, and develops strategies for safeguarding his interests in many different spheres, such as housing, leisure, health and education, where goods and services will also be in short supply. Although a person may not have the same competitors in every sphere, nor deal with them in the same way, nor recognise any link between one incident and another, there is likely to be an overall tendency to make sense of a totality of experience, resulting in similar responses to recurring

stimuli, and eventually perhaps an habituated response in the absence of stimulus. Thus, groups of proletarians may defend an entire way of life which they see as intendant on maintaining a social position relative to other groups. In such circumstances, the smallest change, e.g. in dress or folkway may take on a symbolic importance far in excess of any actual material advantage it has for the group.

Apart from inter-ethnic group competition, alternative, unifying strategies can be adopted by fractions of the proletariat wishing to maintain their economic and social status. But the forging of unity will prove difficult if the respective groups do not have or perceive a common interest and have little in common with one another. The differences between groups might be actual or imagined and the evaluation of their importance might vary considerably. Colour, language, religion, historical traditions, previous colonial experiences, social practices, and kinship ties may all contribute to the reasons for treating other groups differently and for finding it difficult to make common cause with them.

(4a) Relationship of metropolitan proletariat with colonial proletariat.

A legacy of beliefs arising from colonial class relations is also likely to be of significance in understanding white workers' attitudes to black colonial migrants. These beliefs, though generated in the relationship between metropolitan bourgeoisie and colonial peoples (2a) might have been communicated - particularly in times of jingoistic fervour - to the metropolitan proletariat who, no doubt, would derive some comfort from their perception of their elevated position in relation to the colonial people. Though the metropolitan proletariat were in many ways economically more favoured than the colonial people, the actual material differences were probably of less importance than the symbolic ones: the metropolitan white proletariat actually saw itself as an 'aristocracy of labour' in relation to the inferior black

people of the colonies. All this would have been of little consequence for British race relations, had it not been for colonial migration to the metropolis.

The symbolic level. So far, the account of the relationships within the square of alienation has concentrated, without much elaboration, on unspecifically described feelings of dissatisfaction and behavioural strategies. Yet, even in themselves, these responses demand the presence of some level of consciousness, of verbalisation. Nevertheless, it is important to emphasise still further that human beings exist in a symbolic world of words and representations. Their linguistic tools may be developed initially, and continue to enable them, to represent and manipulate the environment in furtherance of their interests, but their language has a facility for detaching itself from objective stabilisers in the real world, and developing relatively independent symbolic associations or even fantastic, idealist universes. This is not the place to attempt a theory of linguistic representation, but to point out only that the symbolic dimension of human existence does not allow a satisfactory analysis of a racial complex to be provided solely in terms of economic alienation. It is not only what blacks are, or do, in relation to whites that matters, but what they come to mean or to represent. Yet the principles of representation are less easy to discover.

Langer's study of symbolism (1942) is frequently cited as providing an insight into the extensive world of myth, ritual and the arts, which is to be found in every society and not least, it might be added, when examining race relations. Metaphor, she stresses, is the "law of growth of every semantic. It is not a development, but a principle" (p147). It should perhaps be added that metaphorical development, itself, must follow principles.

With the underlying skeleton of the square of alienation revealed, it is important at least to hint at how the flesh of the symbolic interpretation of race relations is attached to the economic bone. Only in this way, can the complexities of racial discourse be explained. At this stage then, but still against a backcloth of social class analysis, it is appropriate to turn briefly to more speculative explanations of the symbolic interpretation of black proletarian migration to a white class society. Sennett and Cobb's The Hidden Injuries of Class (1972) might help to provide some understanding of the symbolic significance for white proletarians of the new proximity of black people.

If members of the white proletariat derive some estimate of their own worth by comparing themselves with those they have traditionally held to be their inferiors, then a situation in which colonial migrants - identified by their colour - come to work and live side by side with them and appear to enjoy all the same advantages, must challenge that estimate and undermine the white proletarians' conviction that the sacrifices they made to achieve and maintain their standard of living were worthwhile.

Sennett and Cobb develop a general theory of sacrifice as "the last resource for individualism, the last demonstration of competence":

> It is always available to you, because your desires are always part of you. It is the most fundamental action you can perform that proves your ability to be in control; it is the final demonstration of virtue when all else fails.... it permits you in practice, that most insidious and devastating form of self-righteousness where you, oppressed, in your anger turn on others who are also oppressed rather than on those intangible, invisible, impersonal forces, that have made you all vulnerable. (p140-141.)

In accepting the historically determined belief in the colonial proletariat's worthlessness, the metropolitan proletarian must make

sense of the spectacle of black men working in his factory, living in his street, and drinking in his club. If black men have the same privileges as he, surely he, too, must be worthless, and his many years of sacrifice to keep family and home together, to achieve adequate educational and health facilities amount to nothing. His anger, then, becomes directed at those who are the symbol of the worthlessness of the sacrifices he has made. He has deprived himself only to find his inferiors flaunting the same symbols of success and security on which he has set so much score. If this is the case, then it must follow that the colonial migrants must have cheated in some way, and are guilty of abusing the system as he has experienced it, by, for example, living on social security, making use of facilities to which they as immigrants have never contributed, being allowed unfair access to an undue proportion of council properties, or having a special race relations act passed in their favour.

Sennett and Cobb claim that it was not the blacks so much, as the idea of people "getting away with something I never got away with", that disturbed the workers they interviewed: "if there are people who have refused to make sacrifices, yet are subsidised by the State, their very existence calls into question the meanings of acts of self-abnegation" (p137). Although these suggestions must be treated speculatively, they seem to accord closely not only with some of the actual responses of the white population to the presence of black colonial migrants, but to a theory of proletarian alienation deriving from an economic configuration which produces inter - and intra-class conflict and insecurity.

In brief, I have suggested that hostile white proletarian responses to black colonial immigrants may be explained in terms of (a) white people's perception of the real threat that increased numbers pose to the limited resources of work, housing, social

services, etc., (b) the way the presence of black people partipating in British social institutions affects whites' self-attributed status, (if status or social position is clearly defined with the help of well-established social symbols, then the acquisition of those symbols by a group previously regarded as inferior may be seen as undermining that status), and (c), the meaning invested in individual effort and the apparent ease with which black people achieve comparability without appearing to make the necessary effort. Thus, black people are felt to devalue the proletarian's investment of self-sacrifice - so necessary in helping him to believe he has some control over his own destiny. (This mechanism may explain the source of anger directed against such widely different targets as black people, welfare or social security recipients, council house tenants, students, and other dependants.)

With the postulation of a symbolic level, attention is drawn to the fact that human beings are never simply economically 'determined'. An expression of alienation is not a mere economic reflex but involves a response that is always arrived at with some degree of consciousness. The mention of a symbolic level exemplified in this case by the work of Sennett and Cobb, is one way of indicating, though fairly unspecifically, that consciousness mediates between economic circumstance and human response. Sennett and Cobb's theory of sacrifice involves the social actor adopting a consciously formulated general cultural and ideological approach to a perceived social reality. Even the apparently basic economic responses mentioned in describing the square of alienation must involve some conscious, if self-interested, pursuit of economic goals.

The point about the conscious pursuit and balancing of values is elaborated in subsequent chapters. Nevertheless, there are certain

responses that appear to be more obviously related to the ideally-conceived, pure-economic reflex than others. While it must always be acknowledged that human beings operate with some degree of mediating consciousness, it is possible to examine instances that could be described as 'economically basic', in the sense that they approximate to verbal accounts of the self-interested economic strategies that are to be inferred from the square of alienation. In other words, the social actor's account of his motivation closely accords with what is regarded by the social observer as a crudely reflexive expression of economic interest. Examples of this kind are offered below.

Local case study: councillors' accounts of racial animosity that accord with the theories outlined so far.

In parallel to the difficulties posed above, any attempt to offer a simple structural account for the content of remarks made at the discoursive level is always plagued by the dilemma posed by the concept of ideology. If people try constantly to disguise their economic interests behind a facade of ideology, how can any connection be drawn between the 'facades of social structures' and the social structures themselves?

If a connection is to be made between the content of an ideology and underlying economic arrangements, then it undoubtedly lies in some theory of 'relative autonomy', in the sense that an ideology neither accurately reflects the underlying pattern of economic interest, nor exists entirely independently from it in a 'free-floating' capacity. A great deal of ink has been expended on attempts to theorise the precise nature of the relationship between practical relations and ideology and to more accurately quantify the degree of autonomy that ideology commands. In subsequent chapters, it is argued that racial discourse is best understood in the context of a totality of massive, long-lasting class ideological configurations and not in terms of

separate racial ideological accretions. A distinction is also made between the crude economic response and differing levels of ideological elaboration that might be developed upon it. This quasi-empirical approach which aims, by a series of small-scale plausible connections, to build up a convincing account of how and why certain discoursive forms have been adopted as appropriate in a given social formation is espoused here in preference to an approach which concentrates on more general and abstractly formulated relations between economic base and superstructure, whether couched in terms of dominant or determinant instances, or whatever.

It is sensible to ask whether any of the theories of alienation and general explanations for racial animosity are, or can be, supported by the presentation of data from the councillors' responses. If the councillors' discourse is part of an ideological facade, how can any part of it serve to confirm theories aimed at exposing the underlying reality of interest? One simple answer is to point out that the political actor must operate in a real political world and, in his immediate perceptions and descriptions, cannot afford the luxury of total subjectivity. It is also worth mentioning that there are different conceptions of the degree to which the ideas that people hold, are ideologised. The political actor does not always need to present his own actions in the best possible light and as operating for the common good, and it may serve his purposes to reveal what he knows about the self-interested motivations of his political enemies. Under certain favourable conditions, some of his remarks, at least, are likely to trace out, often in an accurate and sensitive manner, reasons for racialanimosity that accord with those of the social observer.

At this stage, the cynic is likely to argue that the social observer is either himself immersed in the dominant ideological

milieu, or merely selecting those elements of another's discourse that are in agreement with his own. The only answer to this criticism is to show, in as convincing manner as possible, the nature of the social actor's interest, as assessed by the social observer, and the meaning of the social actor's discourse - whether it confirms the social observer's assessment or shows a wide discrepancy with it that is clearly advantageous in masking the actor's motives. As ideology in this context refers to shared beliefs, the 'masking' phenomenon must be widely found within a social grouping and systematic in its effects. Obviously, it is possible to compare the different renderings of social events with the social observer's observations of the same issue.

In this context, the only kind of discoursive evidence that might support the square of alienation would be that which confirmed that black people (a) were perceived as a threat to white people's livelihood, or (b) to their self-attributed status, or (c) were seen as devaluing their "investment of self-sacrifice". Occasionally, a frank admission in these terms of the perceived role of black people can be found, although more often that not, hostility towards blacks will be justified in other ways. Whether the response confirms or obfuscates the analysis offered by the square of alienation, it can still be regarded as an element of ideology. Class or other interest may be served occasionally by laying bare the economic foundations of human action. I deal at length elsewhere with whites' attempts to explain and justify prejudice and discrimination. Here, I selectively present only those occasional accounts that appear to support the views outlined above.

Acknowledgement of the perceived threat to economic well-being is exemplified by one Labour councillor's description of the reactions of her fellow workers:

> They think they (the blacks) are taking our heritage and our jobs and without them there would be more homes, more jobs, more of everything for everybody. One lady at work says that her children are held back at school because of the black children. (L46.)

Other councillors also mentioned that their white electorate saw black people as an actual or potential danger to their jobs and economic security.

> Most of the race relations problems emanate from people's fear for their jobs and security. (C53)

> It's a reflection of people's insecurity about jobs, homes, etc., translated into attitudes about a different coloured skin, religion, etc. (L21)

> Because of economic decline, there will be a feeling by white unskilled people that blacks take their jobs. (L43)

> It's fear of the deprived, who've never had anything, of toiling people who see the bit that they've got, and then others are able to present to them that the blacks are taking that away from them, too. (L20)

These remarks show how white workers distinguish between categories of 'us' and 'them' - 'them' being identified by racial and cultural characteristics, and then being held responsible for shortage and privation.

The belief that black people are somehow inferior to white is best illustrated when they are seen individually or collectively to have achieved economic parity or superiority. A recognition that black people may be doing well in comparison with certain whites is capable of triggering paroxysms of jealousy. Attention is focused on the possible means by which black people have achieved so much at the expense of whites' self-attributed standing. It is assumed that black people must have been given unfair advantage over whites by government agencies, the courts, the employers, etc. in order to have bettered themselves so effectively. This phenomenon may be explained in terms of the traditional symbolic value attributed to the difference of colour (possibly as the means of distinguishing between the aristocrats and

plebians of labour). It is also possible that Sennett and Cobb are right in assuming that white workers become disillusioned and annoys when they see that their 'self-sacrifice' has been in vain and that, despite all their efforts, they remain on a par with, or even less successful than, those whom they have long considered as the lowest specimens of mankind. Councillor L19 was perhaps trying to describe this syndrome, when he mentioned that:

> People are suspicious of the rapid development of some immigrants by their own work. They can't understand how they came to own their own houses and shops, when they've been living here all their lives and have got nothing. They think that at this rate they'll soon take over.

A Conservative councillor described the way in which he was approached by some people in his ward. If he was unable to accomplish very much on their behalf, they would claim that this was because they happened to be of the wrong colour:

> If I were coloured you could find me a place. (C53)

Councillor C36 in agreeing with this sentiment, presented a similar picture of white grievances.

> When they're in trouble with social security, or in trouble financially they say it is because they're the wrong colour. "If I was the other colour, you'd help me...." And I do think we bend over backwards to help the coloureds at the expense of our own people.

Another idea that clearly emerges, particularly in Conservative explanations for racial animosity, is that of the threat posed by black people to the traditional neighbourhood routine. It is not only the perceived threat to economic livelihood that is important but the danger posed to the British way of life, conceived of as a totality. Forced change to the merest of folkways takes on a symbolic significance as an attack upon the national heritage as a whole. Minor alteration made to the visible environment might, in itself, annoy elderly white residents who for years have been used to their locality remaining undisturbed. Alternatively, small changes (such as the Indian sweet shop replacing

the fish and chip shop, the painting of houses in bright colours) may act as a constant reminder that foreigners are nearby, that inferior colonial peoples have presumed to intrude on the sacred environment of a superior British people. The proximity of black people may be seen as a form of neighbourhood pollution and self-degradation. The obvious decline of a previously respectable inner area and perhaps, even the general malaise of old age felt by the elderly residents who cannot move out, may be blamed on the highly visible new factor in the situation - black colonial immigrants. Thus, even the smallest changes to the neighbourhood symbolise an attack upon white status and self-esteem relative to other groups. In summary, long-term economic rivalry in the field of production and consumption gives rise to status differentials which are strictly delineated by numerous, accreted, cultural symbols bearing an importance far beyond their actual value.

When asked whether the British way of life had been affected by the presence of coloured people, one councillor explained the situation in this way:

> I think in areas with particularly older residents who perhaps have lived there all their lives, they see changes all around them. When we talk about a different way of life, you see, I know, even at my age, you get into a little groove or routine. (Even when my own daughter and her baby visit me it disturbs things - you sort of think, it's noisier - you know what I mean?) Now, when an old couple have lived in a peaceful street all their lives, and they see coloured people having christening parties or other events with all those relatives, it creates a different atmosphere from the one they've been accustomed to, and they find it extremely irritating that their routine is being disturbed by foreigners. They want to know why they've got to put up with it as it's their country. (C47)

Remarks by other councillors illustrate similar kinds of reaction:

> You can't blame them for feeling frightened and annoyed when suddenly they find people of a totally different culture living on either side of them, where they'd had old and-respected

> neighbours before. All the smell of garlic and the rest of it. (C9)
>
> These Rastafarians who go around with woolly hats - they are just annoying people. They're forcing their image on people and the local native population object. (C59)

Obviously the various theories of race relations outlined above could be elaborated and amplified. By looking at the processes over time, additional theories of institutionalised or cultural racism, and 'business-as-usual' or vicious circle arguments might easily be accommodated within the framework offered. The overriding aim, however, must be to develop explanations of how the forms of racial alienation help to shed light on the treatment of race relations matters in British political discourse. To do this requires more elaboration of the nature of social structure and particularly of the notions of political response and ideology.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE STATE, AND LEVELS OF POLITICAL ARTICULATION

The inherently unstable capitalist economic system affects the livelihood of the bourgeoisie and proletariat in different ways. Though both classes are in harness to it, the bourgeois is unlikely to see its constraints as irksome: indeed he stands most to gain from maintaining the overall framework and from attempting to control and stabilise its oscillations. With the system of production weighted against him, the proletariat, too, wants economic security but is rarely satisfied with or secure in achieving it. Inasmuch as he feels himself likely to benefit from existing economic relations, or is likely to avoid increased discomfort by conformity, he will accept the status quo. But this support cannot be guaranteed: if conditions worsen or fail to fill expectations, alternative economic relations may promise much more. As the effects of capitalism are uneven, subversive responses to it may be differentially distributed throughout the population.

Responses may be individual or collective, supportive or disruptive of the status quo, involve different levels of organisation and degrees of development of institutions, or take coercive or persuasive forms. The threat to social stability of primary responses to the economic structure has resulted in a secondary response of control, institutionalised in the form of the state.

The state then, is a secondary, organisational reflex evolving in part from the fear of insecurity generated by primary responses to economic opportunities unevenly distributed among the population. Crudely generalised, the state will be supported most strongly and unquestioningly by those who are likely to benefit from the economic structure it helps to maintain, while its practices will be least

attractive to those who are most conscious of the inadequacies of existing arrangements. The harsh realities arising from any form of social disruption result in most groups lending support to arrangements that can guarantee stability, whether or not that stability is at the expense of justice and economic equality. With the state seeking to stabilise existing social relations by coercion and persuasion, the social actor is presented with the stark choice of whether to accept his allocated position in an inegalitarian social order or to risk rejecting it in the face of social coercion and the likely social instability that might result from any action taken. The choice that he makes in the light of his primary economic interests, and the secondary political restraints placed upon him, can be described as the tertiary response or reflex - that of political practice.

This very simplistic and generalised account of the nature of the political state and the economically motivated tensions it seeks to resolve by coercion and persuasion is inadequate in explaining the complexities of an actual socio-political formation. It does, however, give some indication of the way the important political institution of the state arises as a means of controlling class conflict to the greater advantage of those who benefit most from capitalism. In addition, it can be seen that the social responses summarised by the square of alienation will be articulated within the political framework set out by the state.

The generalised notion of 'response' must, of course, be developed. Initially, behavioural manifestations in the form of individual or collective actions and institutional and organisational processes may be distinguished from their linguistic or verbal accompaniment. In dealing with discourse affecting race relations,

our concern must be with the latter, but this can only be properly understood within the context of the former.

If we turn from theoretical generalisation to an examination of empirical reality, twentieth century Britain reflects structurally, and in its political responses, the characteristics of an advanced and overwhelmingly capitalist social formation. Class interest is expressed in many ways, but in relation to the state, a number of institutions (such as the trade unions, the CBI, and political parties at national and local level) are acknowledged as the means of articulating and integrating the interests of the various social groupings. Inasmuch as a class 'in itself' can be said, through organising in furtherance of its interests, to have become 'for itself', it is clear that the two major political parties, Conservative and Labour, while both accepting and operating within the structure of the existing state, are at the same time class-based, and frequently reflect the differences of interest between the two major classes of bourgeoisie and proletariat. Obviously, other class fractions and localised groupings caused by structural variations complicate the situation, but the generalisation is nevertheless worth adhering to.

An acceptance of the essentially class-based nature of British political articulation (which should not be confused with the stronger assertion that the parties always act in the best interests of particular classes or fractions) is crucial for understanding race relations issues. The politics of race relations, even if appearing to possess autonomy, is always circumscribed by class considerations, and indeed must be treated within the context of the long-standing organisational and ideological forms that arise from the divisions of social class. Put crudely, racial responses in

Britain originate from the alienation created by inter - and intra-class divisions, and are then generally justified in terms of class ideology by party organisations representing those class divisions, I develop this theme more fully below.

To understand the complexities of racial discourse, however, it is necessary to recognise the varying need of and purpose for verbal response of different groups in the social structure. Alienated proletarians, in no position to make and enforce decisions on their political environment, may merely express their deep-felt animosities, whereas ruling fractions of the bourgeoisie need to persuade the rest of the population of the importance of adopting policies dealing with race that have the effect of maintaining order and avoiding, at all costs, disruption of production. At the same time they will want to satisfy the electorate that they are attending to its problems.

The 'speech acts' of the ruling fraction, when viewed in toto, of necessity, will reveal greater complexity than those uttered by groups deprived of power and in no position to achieve it. Persuasion, of course, is not merely a function of what is said, but of the opportunities available for making what is said widely known. Not only is the power to coerce differentially distributed among the population but so also is the power to persuade. The necessary skills - often developed to a fine art - and the organisational and technical facilities to spread information and to influence its composition will be closely supervised by the more powerful groups in society and, in particular, by the state.

Persuasion, however, does not depend solely on the power of the ruling classes to 'brain-wash' the population by selecting, manipulating, and evaluating information, and controlling channels

of communication. Deutsch (1953) stresses, that to be:

> susceptible to persuasion, men must already be inwardly divided in their thought. There must be some incompatibilities in the facts they remember, or in the facts that they can be induced to accept. There must be some contradictions actual or implied among their habits or values. In short, there must be something for persuasion to get started on, and something substantial for persuasion to maintain its hold for longer periods. What matters, therefore, is the distribution of individuals and groups that can be persuaded - and kept persuaded - within any given time. (p52.)

From a Marxist perspective, individuals' experiences of alienation (including dissatisfaction, indecision, and inter-personal anomosity) arising from the objective class structures in which they find themselves may be dealt with in different ways. Policies may be pursued which maintain existing class divisions and contain and repress alienation. Alternatively, class structures may be undermined and abolished and, in the course of that process, alienation utilised or sublimated in the struggle to remove its structural sources. The containment and repression of alienation is made possible by the maintenance of the contradiction between capital and labour which comes to be internalised within the individual. The individual is placed in a position where he must choose either the improvement of his condition and the securing of justice by opposing the oppressive and coercive organisation of capitalism, with all the sacrifices that entails, or the acceptance of a compromised existence and an agreement to accept things as they are. The ruling fraction, as an agent of the bourgeoisie, seeks to maximise its interests by maintaining, as far as possible by persuasion, the existing state of affairs. Inasmuch as it is successful, the framework which generates alienation remains intact. But because of the inherent contradiction within the system, the state of 'ideological hegemony' is only very

precariously maintained through persuasion.

As Habermas (1975) explains, the modern capitalist state faces a 'legitimation crisis', legitimation being the successful culmination of attempts to persuade the population to accept the existing political order. In more traditional political parlance, legitimation is the conversion of power into authority. The modern state has not only increasingly intervened in the market economy, but has extended its tentacles into every aspect of civil life, with the consequence that its actions require additional powers of legitimation. According to Habermas, these have been found in a justificatory system of technical rationality, whereby it is believed that experts such as scientists and technicians know, by virtue of their skills, what is best. Thus politics becomes a matter of manipulation in order to achieve ends that are so far taken-for-granted that moral and ethical questions are excluded from debate. In a system that is inherently unstable, however, the state - particularly where it has assumed wider areas of responsibility - may not always be able to satisfy its clients, who in the event of serious disruption, are likely to seek new solutions to their problems. At this stage, the state will have to devote greater effort to persuasion, but owing to its internal contradictions, its increased scope of responsibility, the population's level of expectations and its failure to meet them, it is liable to suffer a 'legitimation crisis'.

With regard to race, Habermas's work helps to locate the state's justification for its race relations policies in the general context of capitalist legitimation. The state must maintain its overall control over the population through coercion and persuasion. It is seen to have responsibility for race relations and is expected to take action to deal with the consequences of the alienation of white

from black, when it occurs. The kinds of racial policies and justificatory forms that emerge are likely to be compatible with, and indeed part of those major ideological configurations that provide legitimation for the capitalist social structure as a whole.

But black and white sections of the population experience the effects of capitalism in different and unequal ways. The justificatory forms that satisfy and placate the white electorate may fail to persuade the black population, for whom the legitimation crisis of the state may be far more imminent: this will be particularly so where blacks are affected directly and unequally by racially discriminatory policies or legislation. Of course, the state may make no attempt to appeal to certain minorities who will be seen as "beyond the pale". It is quite apparent from a study of British political ideology of the last thirty years, for example, that black people have only recently come to be accepted as part of the political audience and as potential voters. Previously, and with a clearly dehumanising effect on the discourse used to refer to them, they were treated as political 'objects' rather than as agents in the political process, although it is true that, more recently, politicians responsible for the justification of government policies have sought to appeal to both the white and black electorate.

In the course of their development, political blocs opposed to the economic system that is supported by the state, draw on the experience of the classes on which they are based and produce counter-justificatory systems for those needing to interpret and organise their experiences. In most social formations, therefore, although the ruling ideology will be in the ascendancy for all to draw upon, alternative justificatory systems will be available and

strenuous efforts will be made by ideologists loyal to the existing social order to bridge the differences or to incorporate counter-justifications into the prevailing system. This is necessary, if persuasion is to succeed, for it must be presumed that for a counter-justificatory system to come into being, despite the hegemony of ruling ideas, it must accord strongly with the experiences and desired responses of some sections of the population - particularly those who seek to utilise and sublimate their alienation. Thus, there will be a tendency for ideologists who support the status quo and seek to ensure its appeal to wide sections of the population to draw off some element of counter-thought for incorporation into a modified and ubiquitous ruling ideology. This might explain the frequent complaints of opportunism and revisionism made by revolutionaries against ideologies and organisations which at least initially were seen as rejecting capitalist thought.

Because sections of a population respond differently according to their position in the socio-political structure and are involved to a greater or lesser extent with state and political institutions, the justificatory and persuasive content of their discourse is likely to vary considerably. In studying racial discourse, it becomes clear that there are levels of expression and justification ranging from a straightforward expression of a feeling of alienation, to a politically sophisticated, carefully weighted, and plausibly justified statement of racial import. Recognition of these differences has led various writers, in pursuit of diverse objectives, to develop what can loosely be called a concept of ideological levels. If we are to understand the many kinds of discourse dealing with racial issues, it is important to look carefully at what has been said about the

existence of various ideological levels. The ideas of three writers: Pareto, Gramsci and Shils are of particular relevance.

Pareto (1916, 1923) makes an important distinction between action that is performed as a means to an end and action that is not so related. When social actor and observer both recognise the means/end conjunction of an action, it is to be termed 'logical'. When either agent or observer do not recognise end or purpose, it is 'non-logical'. Non-logical actions are actions that are performed prior to conscious purpose: a baby sucking the breast, or having a temper-tantrum, as well as the instinctive behaviour of animals, might serve as examples. Although the baby's sucking may be end-orientated from the point of view of the observer ('the baby is seeking milk'), it is not sucking in order to get milk, or with the purpose of getting milk (an end-orientated action), but because of some psycho-physiological state of hunger. It is only with conscious thought that an anthropomorphic, teleological patterning is added to an existential world of cause and effect.

Pareto believes that there are many human actions that are non-logical, both from the actor's and observer's point of view. But "human beings have a very conspicuous tendency to paint a varnish of logic over their conduct" (p79). "The human being has such a weakness for adding logical developments to non-logical behaviour that anything can serve as an excuse for him to turn to that favourite occupation" (p104). By non-logical behaviour, I understand Pareto to mean behaviour for which the actor has not thought of an explanation or justification, while, in contrast, logical behaviour is behaviour for which he possesses an explanation or justification. Just as science undermined the teleogical view of the inanimate universe and later, with Darwinism, of the animal world too, Pareto takes a further step of arguing the case for a category of non-purposive human action,

which is, however, very difficult to identify because of the propensity of human beings to explain (usually post hoc) their own behaviour in terms of purpose. Such a view tends to be socially unpopular because it undermines the strongly-held moral view that human beings ought to act purposively.

Pareto argues that often all we are entitled to say of an action is that we do D and believe C,but that we invariably go further and claim that we do D because we believe C. It is, he thinks, more likely that we believe C because we do D.

The distinction between the non-conscious response to a stimulus, and the conscious formulation of a reason for that response is of obvious significance for a discussion of ideological levels. We might have, for example, on the one hand, (1) a near instinctive response on the part of the individual to what is perceived as a threat, while on the other (2) a mediated response affected by a conscious consideration of elements of a justificatory system. From the point of view of the actor, (1) can not (theoretically at least) be considered to constitute part of a justificatory system, although the actor, no doubt, will sooner or later be expected to explain himself. Perhaps the expression "I don't know what came over me" may be understood in this context. And from the point of view of the observer, it is likely that an explanation of some sort will be found, such as, "You behaved like a wild beast". Where (2) is concerned,the actor, in most cases, will be making use of a justificatory system that is publicly available, widely accepted, and understood by the observer, although with some eccentric groups (e.g. Charles Manson's hippy commune) the ideological framework against which actions must be judged will not be immediately obvious.

The first kind of response (1) might be viewed as the ideal-typical response untainted by purposive consideration, whereas (2), however superficially, has been thought about in the light of a conscious end.

In terms of the account of racial alienation given above, we might seek to distinguish some sort of basic economic reflex, from a response to economic conditions that foresightedly seeks to protect and explain the interest of a given group. Although, in reality, it is doubtful that a pure form of (1) exists, we might recognise that (2) could range from a rudimentary 'gut-feeling', closely approximating to (1), to a carefully worked-out statement of purpose which takes into account the likely effect of the expression or action on the community as a whole. A party political ideology might be placed near the end of a continuum as an example of a highly systematised public justificatory system on which actors draw when they are required to give reason for their action. Between the 'non-logical' and fully-fledged political there will be many forms and levels of justification. The pejorative term 'economism' might be used to describe an account of ideology offered in terms of economic stimulus and response at or near level (1).

There is no suggestion by Pareto that a reason for action need be given, although when questioned, the actor will be encouraged to construct one. In this context, it is worth bearing in mind Gouldner's comment (1976, p54) that:

> Men are, but are not only, speaking subjects, They are also sensuous actors engaged in a practice which may be spoken but is not identical with that speech. Words mediate between deeds and experiences, but there are deeds that overwhelm the capacity for speech, thus imposing silences and dissatisfaction with our ability to communicate or understand our experience.

The experience of racial alienation, then, may not be understood by the actors caught up in the alienating economic system.

Pareto warns us clearly of the pitfalls of assuming any causal link between action and ideology or ideology and action. There is no reason why the "psychic motivator" must always be exposed in a public

justification for action, and furthermore, there are actions for which a purpose may not be provided by, or known to, the actor. Nevertheless, the pressing effects of actions are prone to encourage the observer to interpret and explain every actor's actions in terms of purpose. As Pareto says, it is much easier to formulate a theory about logical rather than non-logical behaviour (p178). And "nobody, in practice, acts on the assumption that the physical and moral constitution of an individual does not have at least some small share in determining his behaviour."

Pareto's observations pose a number of questions for the study of racial discourse. First, it is implied that there need be no necessary connection between the structural determinants singled out by the sociologist to account for practice deemed by the observer to have a racialist effect, and the discourse offered as the explanation or justification by the actor for his behaviour. If the explanations do, in fact, tally, then the problem may be hidden: the actor may still not be aware, or may not be able to explain his 'real' reason - should he have a reason - and under such circumstances he may have merely accepted the 'logical' explanation made available to him by the observer. If the explanations do not tally, then the question arises of whether to believe the observer or the actor, particularly if the actor strenuously denies the observer's story.

A second implication that can be drawn is that there may be one explanation for an actor's racial practice and quite another for his racial discourse. It has often been assumed in the theory of race relations that racialist practice and racist belief have the same causal mechanism, or, at least, that they are closely connected, whichever is assumed to be causally prior. But Pareto's observations make it at least possible that they might develop separately. Indeed, in the discussion of ideological levels, it becomes obvious that the

reasons given for the development of rudimentary responses approximating to Pareto's level (1) (offered, for example, by the theory of alienation) are insufficient to account for more sophisticated forms of racial discourse which can probably only be explained in terms of other considerations such as the weighing of values and policies by decision - makers anxious to achieve a number of different, and sometimes apparently incompatible goals. Put in crude fashion, although racial alienation might explain immediate responses, both behavioural and verbal, and might provide the basis for explaining subsequent political manoeuvres to capitalise in some way on the manifestation of that alienation, the form of the discourse dealing with race will be subject to political considerations, and can only be properly understood by taking into account the 'logical' conduct of politicians.

To extend Pareto's point, although an individual X may believe C because he does D (because he acts out a particular role in a social structure), a second individual Y may do D because he believes B (which might include a judgment about X's belief C). The second individual Y's behaviour and discourse cannot be adequately explained, therefore, in terms of the reasons for X's behaviour, although it might originally have been necessitated by it. The situation is further complicated if Y has to take into account the behaviours and beliefs of any additional persons, particularly if theirs differ from X's.

In summary, an explanation for racial alienation (whether conceived of by the actor or observer as primitively non-purposive, or as purposive) and any rudimentary ideology that might emanate from that circumstance is unlikely to be adequate in explaining racial discourse considered as part of a fully-fledged political ideology aimed at legitimation. Racial discourse must be thoroughly described and allocated to a correct ideological level in order for it to be properly accounted for.

Gramsci offers a further clue to the existence of ideological levels,

by distinguishing between three kinds of thought: philosophy as an intellectual order, the common sense of the masses, and religion which is an "element of fragmented common sense". Common sense is defined negatively as lacking in unity and coherence - in respect of both the individual and collective consciousness. For the mass of humanity, the "conception of the world is not critical and coherent but disjointed and episodic". Human beings gain elements of consciousness from the multiplicity of groups to which they belong:

> The personality is strangely composite: it contains Stone Age elements and principles of more advanced science, prejudices from all past phases of history at the local level and intuitions of a future philosophy which will be that of a human race united the world over. To criticise one's own conception of the world means therefore to make it a coherent unity and to raise it to the level reached by the most advanced thought in the world. It therefore also means criticism of all previous philosophy, insofar as this has left stratified deposits in popular philosophy. (p324.)

In its unity and coherence, public ideology differs from incoherent, disjointed, and episodic common sense. With regard to racial discourse, we might wish to distinguish an individual's 'gut' response to a given situation (which may be inconsistent with the expression of his opinion at another time and place) from a group's public statement which is likely to have been carefully weighed against other tenets, as well as the likely effect of the 'speech act'. Gramsci's concept of the historical accretion of ideas is also extremely useful in showing both how ideologies come into being and how racial beliefs persist, e.g. as a result of the experience of empire.

Gramsci is aware, too, that philosophy and common sense can only be analytically distinguished and are never found in a 'pure' state. He writes of "the healthy nucleus that exists in 'common sense', the

part of it which can be called 'good sense' and which deserves to be made more unitary and coherent". The different levels affect one another and the more complex ideas of philosophy are likely to 'react back' on their base in 'common sense'. If the philosophy of the intellectuals and the common sense of the masses should become increasingly differentiated then the unity of an "entire social block" (p328) might be threatened.

Indeed the strength of religion of the Catholic church has stemmed from the recognition of the need for "doctrinal unity of the whole mass of the faithful", and from the church's attempts to ensure that the intellectual stratum does not become detached from the lower.

> The Roman church has always been the most vigorous in the struggle to prevent the official formation of two religions, one for the "intellectuals" and the other for the "simple souls"..... One of the greatest weaknesses of immanentist philosophies in general consists precisely in the fact that they have not been able to create an ideological unity between the bottom and the top, between the "simple" and the intellectuals. (p328-329.)

Education and cultural activity guarantee some continuity between beliefs of the intellectuals and the masses, but it is in the sphere of politics, according to Gramsci, that the relation between philosophy and common sense is assured (p331). The masses can only assert their interests by organising themselves with the help of organisers and leaders constituting the elite of political intellectuals who must always justify the party's behaviour to the masses.

In applying these ideas to British politics, we must recognise the continuity between the common-sense culture of social classes expressed in a variety of dissociated discoursive responses to the activities of the moment, and the consciously formulated and coherent ideology of the political party, many of whose fundamental premises change very little over the generations. The complexity of an ideological justificatory system arises, paradoxically, from the need to show how a wide variety

of political decisions can be founded on a minimal set of consistent, or hierarchically ordered premises. But the continuity between the mass, democratic response to a population's conditions, and a ruling party's policies is always tendentious, as I have already tried to show. Gramsci is wrong in thinking that in politics the relationship between philosophy and common sense is always assured. A bourgeois party may make concessions to the common sense beliefs of the masses, or alternatively, over a number of years, work to superimpose its beliefs upon them, while a party serving the proletarian class interest must work to develop the ideological level of the masses, or risk being isolated and misunderstood.

The implications of these ideas for British race relations are clear. Governments must seek to reconcile the differences between their view of the world and that of the electorate whom they rely on to legitimate their democratic pretensions. On the whole, in Britain, the working class has not been convinced by the reasons given by socialists for the existence of social alienation, and the means by which they say it must be dealt with and resolved. Instead, bourgeois parties have successfully persuaded the electorate to maintain the status quo despite the alienation to which it gives rise. Much of the time, alienation is suppressed in its behavioural and verbal manifestations, but occasionally it bursts through the coercive and ideological constraints in ways which threaten existing orthodoxies. In order to maintain its hold on the population, the bourgeois ideology developed by intellectuals must be used to try to suppress altogether, to ignore, to make concessions to, or to incorporate expressions of alienation within its explanatory and justificatory system, without threatening the stability of the existing economic order.

Occasionally, when deviant ideologists have access to the media

and manage to put into words the feelings of certain sections of the population, the grip of bourgeois ideas may look dangerously tenuous. Attempts must then be made to repair the persuasive network, by showing that popular ideas are unfounded and illegitimate, or by modifying or isolating them in such a way that adherence to them does not unduly undermine other beliefs necessary for maintaining the status quo. In other words, the population as a whole and its political leaders must never be allowed to become ideologically separated on important issues, Indeed, it is quite obvious from the Wolverhampton case studies that politicians of both parties, like missionaries, are continually working hard to establish their ideological outlook among an heretical and anarchic electorate.

In Britain, the fear of differences arising between certain sections of the population and the government over racial issues and the possibility that elemental racial reactions might undermine social stability have encouraged power holders to take various forms of conciliatory action. The formation of the Community Relations Commission whose aim was "to break down prejudice and intolerance through public education and information" may be seen as one attempt to develop a partial ideology of race relations compatible with prevailing party political viewpoints and in answer to primitive populist responses to racial alienation.

In 1968, Powell's speeches, expressing as they did the level of alienation of sections of the white population, and causing a rash of demonstrations, threatened to upset the consensual line established by the two main political parties. The Conservative leader Edward Heath, pointed out that his difference with Powell was that Powell discussed racial issues in a manner "likely to exacerbate relations between the races, rather than lead to their peaceful solution".

Such issues needed to be discussed by the leadership in a calm and rational manner, i.e. within the existing framework of debate.

Powell's immense support was said to spring from the fact that he had dared to express what many people really felt and, by expressing those feelings publicly and from a political position of some importance, had made them acceptable.* He had succeeded in legitimating an alternative and relatively consistent ideological matrix that was able to accommodate the previously dispersed and fragmented elements of common sense about black people. When he was expelled from the Shadow Cabinet this led not only to greater publicity for his ideas, but to a recognition by his supporters of just how difficult it was to make inroads into the prevailing ideological consensus. Powell's view came to symbolise an anti-authoritarian response to state ideological incursion on the individual, who felt his capacity to express through the words of a public figure his own experience of alienation, was threatened.+

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* A typical letter to the local newspaper The Express and Star (23.4.1968) read: "Enoch Powell has the guts to voice the opinion of the vast majority of English people of all political parties and creeds....."

\+ The following are examples of letters on the Powell issue to The Express and Star which express an anti-authoritarian response:

- "This is supposed to be a free country, yet a man is 'sacked' because he says what he believes and knows to be true. It's about time someone brought to light the feelings of the majority. I'm with Mr Powell every inch of the way."
- "Instead of a democracy, our country is now becoming a dictatorship ruled by a set of people who cannot understand the feelings of the man in the street since they have never bothered to find out."
- "We fought two world wars in the cause of freedom. Now it is being taken from us." And many more of such ilk.

Of course, ideologies of the Right as well as of the Left are likely to be subject to the hegemonic control of the ruling class, and expressions of alienation repressed, Powell must be regarded as an 'organic intellectual' ** of the Right whose success was achieved by developing a Right-wing nationalist ideology which could incorporate the primitive responses of alienated sections of a proletariat lacking in socialist consciousness.

The third writer on ideological levels whom I should like to mention is Shils (1968). Shils, like Gramsci, recognises the need for intellectual endeavour in the formation of ideologies when he claims they are "the creations of charismatic persons who possess powerful, expansive and simplified visions of the world, as well as high intellectual and imaginative powers". While not necessarily agreeing with his personalised conception of ideological genesis, we may accept that intellectual input is necessary in order to achieve greater "explicitness", "internal integration or systematisation", "comprehensiveness", "urgency of its application" and "concentration" of "certain central propositions and evaluations". In this, ideology differs from what Shils calls a "prevailing outlook"which is vague, diffuse, unsystematic, and lacking "authoritative and explicit promulgation".

Apart from these two levels of expression, Shils adds two other possible categories, the programme - as an example of quasi-ideology, and proto-ideology.

The programme is a "specification of a particular limited objective (e.g. civil rights or electoral reform movements)". It narrows "the

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** Gramsci defines "organic intellectuals" as the thinking and organising element of a particular fundamental social class. They are distinguished "less by their profession which may be any job characteristic of their class, than by their function in directing the ideas and aspiration of the class to which they organically belong."

focus of interest that is implicit in an outlook", but in having only a limited range of objectives, unlike an ideology, does not require a fully comprehensive justificatory system. If political ideology is associated with the political party, the programme may perhaps be identified by its association with the pressure group. The justificatory system of the Anti-Nazi League, or of a Council for Community Relations might serve as examples.

Shils sees the beliefs (expressed in discourse) of adolescent gangs or of military and paramilitary gangs as examples of proto-ideology. Although the closely-knit groups assert particular forms of loyalty, discipline, criteria of membership, and reasons for enmity towards outsiders, they do not "develop or espouse a coherent moral and intellectual doctrine". Shils attributes this failure to the insufficient intellectual endowment of the groups' members. They lack a fully-fledged belief system because of the absence of a "charismatic ideological personality", "a founder who is sufficiently educated or sufficiently creative to provide them with a more complex system of beliefs".

We might wonder how Shils would deal with Charles Manson's hippy group with its elaborate racist cosmology of "helter-skelter". Perhaps this point is covered by his assertion that "such groups lack sufficient contact with both the central value system and the tradition of ideological orientation". This seems to imply that an ideology is to be identified in the main by its longstanding continuity and setting in mainstream political institutions. As Gramsci (Hoare and Nowell Smith, 1971, p341.) puts it:

> ....mass adhesion or non adhesion to an ideology is the real critical test of the rationality and historicity of thinking. Any arbitrary constructions are pretty rapidly eliminated by historical competition....constructions which respond to the demands of a complex organic period of history always impose themselves and prevail in the end.

Aided by the ideas of Pareto, Gramsci, and Shils on ideological levels, we might now seek to distinguish the discourse of politicians in the process of political deliberation from the casual conversation - admittedly sometimes involving ideas of political import - of the common man. The view that it is useful to make such a distinction is shared by Lane (1962) who writes:

> Of course, there are differences between the articulated, differentiated, well-developed political arguments put forward by informed and conscious Marxists or Fascists or liberal democrats on the one hand, and the loosely structured, unreflective statements of the common man.....I distinguish between the forensic ideologies of the conscious ideologist and the latent ideologies of the common man. (p15-16.)

On the basis of the preceding discussion, I shall attempt to draw up a dyadic typology of discourse, two ideal types, termed respectively (1) specialised political discourse and (2) general discourse. It is important to remember that the typology is a sociological construct for which there are only approximations and real life. The extent of its generalisability is unclear, but it is conceived with the British political system in mind.

Specialised political discourse is engaged in by social actors, who in the main, have undergone a lengthy political apprenticeship. For example, a large proportion of members of parliament of both major political parties have been to public school (three-quarters of Conservatives and one-fifth of Labour) and to university (well over half in both parties). In October 1974, 44% of Conservative and 49% of Labour MPs had professional occupations. 33% of Conservatives and 8% of Labour MPs were businessmen. (See Guttsmann, W. L. (1963) The British Political Elite.) Others have been long active in the constituency parties or in the trade union movement.

Specialised political discourse is always verbalised and can be found in oral and written forms. It is communicated through the media and can be closely and repeatedly examined when in print. Words, then, are likely to be carefully chosen in a self-conscious manner and for an instrumental purpose. In making a speech, a politician often reads from notes, and generally his discourse is closely linked with written or printed material. General 'discourse' on the other hand, is sometimes scarcely verbalised. (Rex, in one of his seminars, referred to the "primitive grunt" of the racist, emotionally overwhelmed, but lacking in words.) It is infrequently written down, and although often supported by television news, newspaper reports, and the like, is not closely linked with reading. Rather, it is an expression of personal experience, of how the individual is immediately affected by an event.

Because political discourse aims at achieving the legitimation of particular policies, it will tend to present them as serving the interests of the whole community. What is done must be seen to be done for the good of the whole, and not for sectional interest. Political discourse, therefore, will have a strong moralistic demeanour in which attempts will be made to reconcile differences of interest by the use of word formulae that emphasise consequences for the public good. General discourse may make use of moral evaluation and prescription but, in making no pretensions to speak publicly in favour of the social whole, can afford to voice individual and sectional interests.

Though both general and political discourse may refer to economic matters, general discourse is often associated with the crudely economic clamour of those who seek to satisfy their needs without taking into account the needs of others. This is not to say that politics is actually concerned with justice in the balancing of

sect ional interests, but only that politicians must always seek to justify their deeds as serving the general interest. In this way, immediate economic satisfaction is contrasted with politically mediated moral decision-making, the language of the politician laying claim, however falsely, to the latter.

The primary aim of specialised political discourse is persuasion, of getting others to accept the justification of past or future deeds. It is closely linked to action/inaction for a specialised political function and its prescriptive content is usually part of a carefully thought-out strategy. General discourse is part of an ongoing stream of conversation, serving the individual's practical and emotional needs of the moment. It is expressive and indexical (revealing much about the speaker's personality). It need not be linked to political action, or action generally, and when lacking in a specialised task, merges with other functions and subject areas, e.g. practical jokes, chants at football matches. Whereas specialised political discourse is preplanned and instrumental and performed by agents conscious of what and why they are involved in particular discourse, general discourse is frequently spontaneous, expressive and unselfconsciously engaged in.

The setting for the kinds of discourse differs, too. Specialised political discourse is to be found in formal debating arenas such as parliament and party conferences, while general discourse is engaged in everywhere, but particularly in the informal groups of family, workmates, and friends.

Where the characteristics of the discoursive form itself are concerned, specialised political discourse is structured, integrated, and systematised, showing a recognised degree of consistency, in contrast to general discourse which is weakly structured, less integrated, and unsystematised, with consistency being much less of a priority. Specialised political discourse is conceived of as an

overarching system combining descriptive, evaluative, and prescriptive sentences in a totality: not so general discourse, which possesses no overarching or consciously created coherent system, and which does not present descriptive, evaluative, and prescriptive sentences as if they were related, and part of a whole. Specialised political discourse offers a general theory or set of theories for explaining a number of significant events and situations, while general discourse allows of many different and apparently unrelated explanations. Specialised political discourse concentrates on one major theme at a time, while general discourse is syncretic, showing little attempt to divide a 'flowing stream of consciousness' into discrete parts.

Specialised political discourse is based on the premise that political aims are interrelated and that the pursuit of one can affect others adversely. There is a clear and marked means/end distinction. The distinction between meands and ends is less obvious in general discourse and the existence of 'intrinsic means' receives more notice.

Both specialised political and general discourse develop eristically - a process in which agents compete for an audience's allegiance by creating new discourse in response to the scepticism, disbelief, and alternative views expressed by others (This concept is developed extensively in Note 3). In political discourse, however, eristic is formalised with a claim being matched against a counter-claim, sometimes in a very regular manner. The formal balancing of dialogue and argument in this way is advantageous to the comparative study of ideologies as it allows the respective weighting given to arguments and counter-arguments in discourse to be quantitatively analysed. Such a technique is not so easily applicable to general discourse unless the researcher employs interrogative methods and matches blocks of discourse for himself, in which case he himself

becomes a participant in eristical development.

The policy orientation of those in power is manifested in political discourse in the clear means/end distinction, the concentration on technical means, the preponderance of prescription over evaluation, and prescription's detailed specification and operationalised nature. Argumentation takes on a balance-sheet format, quantification and qualification are present, and, where it suits the policy maker, social scientific material is made use of. In contrast, general discourse does not mark the means/end distinction so clearly and places less emphasis on prescription. Evaluation is often sufficient, but where prescription is present, it may be vaguely specified, difficult to operationalise, and indeed, appear as sheer fantasy. Quantification and qualification are frequently rudimentary and because agents are not involved in implementing their own suggestions, there is no need for economic or political accounting. 'Folk knowledge' takes precedence over social science, but the folk knowledge of the present is often derived from the social science of the past (Keynes, 1936).

The following table summarises the characteristics of the two levels of discourse.

Table 2 Differences between specialised political and general discourse

	SPECIALISED POLITICAL DISCOURSE	GENERAL DISCOURSE
AGENTS	highly specialised group, long experience of politics.	highly differentiated groups drawn from all occupational categories.
	always verbalised: found in oral and written forms. closely linked with writing and print. often recorded and closely examined. self-conscious choice of words. used instrumentally.	not always verbalised: mostly in oral form. not closely linked with written form. rapidly fading. spontaneous. used expressively.
AIM	to convince audience that action is taken for the public good - moral justification. primary aim of persuasion. justification of past and future action. linked to action/inaction. often carefully thought-out strategy. specialised political function.	actual reasons - moral or otherwise - frequently stated. primary aim conversational. serving individuals' practical and emotional needs of the moment - expressive. not always linked to action. often response to immediate stimuli. merging with other functions.
SETTING	formal debating arenas (parliament, party conference). opposition and audience.	no formal arena (informal group: family, work, leisure). no necessary opposition or specific audience.

	SPECIALISED POLITICAL DISCOURSE	GENERAL DISCOURSE
CHARACTERISTICS OF DISCOURSE	a structured, integrated, systematised. high degree of consistency. conceived as overarching system, combining descriptive, evaluative and prescriptive sentences in a totality. general theory or set of theories offered to explain events. b recognition of relationship between aims and how pursuit of one can affect others adversely. clear means/end distinction. c eristical development, strongly formalised, producing balance of argument against counter-argument. d emphasis on policy with the following characteristics: clear means/end distinction. concentration on technical means. prescription rather than evaluation. detailed specification of prescription. prescription operationalised. balance sheet format of argumentation. measurability. use of social science.	a weakly structured, less integrated, unsystematised. consistency less of a priority. no overarching or consciously coherent system; descriptive, evaluative and prescriptive sentences not necessarily related. many different and unrelated explanations. b less recognition of the consequences of particular aims. distinction between means/end less clear - more emphasis on 'intrinsic means'? c eristical development, but not always obvious, and no necessary balance. d policy emphasis not necessary. not always clear means/end distinction. often fantasy prescription. often content with evaluation. prescription often vague. prescription often vague. no need for economic or political accounting. qualification and quantification rudimentary. reliance on folk knowledge (often derived from social science of the past).

The discourse with which I am primarily concerned in this study is of ths specialised political kind. It emerges from the broad matrix of general discourse, or from what Gramsci would call 'the common sense of the masses' and Shils 'the prevailing outlook', and is never totally separable from it. A full study of discourse would have to take such general discourse more fully into account. Here, rather cursorily, I have suggested two possibilities.

The first is that the general discourse dealing with race is an expression of the alienation experienced in the relationship between social classes, where class divisions correspond with racial categorisation. In Lane's terms, the common man's ideology is latent in that his alienation, though experienced, is not always expressed, or when expressed, uttered in words of his own choosing. The second possibility arrived at by extrapolation from the previous section is that general discourse contains the justificatory forms of the common man who in his non-specialised political behaviour, must spontaneously develop some political sentiments or alternatively adopt those offered to him by the organic intellectuals of his own or another class. Further, I have suggested that there may be a tension between the spontaneous expression of his own discourse and the discourse that he is encouraged to adopt by and from others.

The admittedly very general nature and descriptive inadequacy of the account must be excused in the knowledge that my primary purpose is to examine in greater detail what I have described above as specialised political discourse, one of the aims of which is to convince an audience that action has been or is being taken for the public good. The reasons for concentrating my attention at this level are threefold: theoretical, political and practical.

First, specialised political discourse usually forms part of a major ideological matrix supported by a political organisation. As

such, it is not a transient discoursive phenomenon, but a longstanding feature of considerable significance in the consciousness of the population and in supporting or undermining the stability of a social formation. Political decisions affecting race relations and, for that matter, the racial complex generally, including the reaction of racial minorities, can be more fully understood and explained by the study of political discourse as ideology.

Furthermore, description of the specific forms dealing with race have invariably been neglected in previous studies where discourse about racial matters has been treated as an immediate reaction to alienated circumstances. As has been repeatedly pointed out, the formulation of specialised political discourse dealing with race often involves the conscious weighing of many factors in the context of already existing ideological formations. Thus, while it might be possible to explain much of general discourse about race in terms of the economic tensions operating on groups of individuals, political discourse must surely be accounted for in terms of the complexities of wielding and maintaining power. Put crudely, explanations for racialist practice are unlikely to satisfy the need for explanations of racist discoursive forms.

Second, the idiosyncracy of the discourse I choose to select will be minimised if it also has significance for both the political actor and the groups his decision affects. Political discourse accompanies the political decisions that affect the lives of millions of people and can clearly be seen to be related to action. Almost by definition, it is speech preceding or consequential on action (or inaction) and, as such, acquires an higher status than speech that is not so related. It must be of importance, therefore, to those who seek, directly or indirectly, to maintain or abolish racial injustice.

Third, specialised political discourse is likely to be more formally presented than general discourse, thus facilitating the researcher in his efforts to identify it, to separate it from general discourse, and to develop techniques for its analysis. The circumscription of a topic for study is an important consideration in any research and will depend to some extent on how well the phenomenon, in this case, political discourse, can be separated from its surroundings - from discourse as a whole. To make this task more simple, I have, in subsequent chapters, concentrated on the discourse of the two major British political parties, first, by outlining very briefly their general ideological stance, second, by concentrating on national parliamentary debates on the immigration and Race Relations Bills, and third, by looking closely at what politicians at a local borough level have to say about race-related issues. The scope, of course, is enormous but unavoidable if the study is to say anything useful about British discourse dealing with race.

CHAPTER SIX

IDEOLOGY AND THE DISCOURSE OF THE CONSERVATIVE AND LABOUR PARTIES

The previous chapters sought to locate the study of discourse by drawing on ideas from various theories of ideology. It is always difficult, however, to convincingly relate the general statements of theory to the uncomfortably complex empirical world, but, even at the risk of gross ingenuousness, it is important to make clear the assumed connection between theory of ideology, on the one hand, and the actual language of current British politicians, on the other. It is not possible in my view to 'operationalise' the concept of ideology,simply by identifying it with political discourse. The identification of a concept with measured data results in reductionism of the concept. 'Ideology' derives its force of meaning not only from some object in the real world that it denotes, but from the complex connotations it has accreted from its use in the many different social theories explaining the relationship between social behaviour and beliefs. The term 'political discourse' carries few of the connotations of ideology and yet can be used to describe much of the same data.

Only by careful selection of elements from a given political discourse, in which those elements, and the context in which they are uttered, are noted, and conclusions are drawn by the social observer, can the existence of ideology be established. Ideology is a concept that is used to draw attention to various relational characteristics of the raw datum, but, cannot, in any strict sense, be constituted by the datum itself, though, for simplicity of expression, an author may not always bother to draw the distinction. This study aims to search for some of the characteristics of ideology in the discourse of the political parties and, in particular, of the British Conservative and Labour parties viewed against the background of class relations and

the black migration to Britain. Inasmuch as a number of those characteristics can be located, aspects of the discourse of the parties may be described as constituting 'justificatory systems' or 'ideologies'. But it should always be remembered that not everything that is said is necessarily ideological, and that party discourse is only ideological inasmuch as it is judged in context to possess ideological attributes.

The discourse under examination here is recognised as belonging typically to the political parties by virtue of the long-term continuity of political theme. Combinations of recognisable 'themes' have endured, with some modification, and with the need for creative application to new events and crises, from the nineteenth century at least. The objective class relations of the time stimulated the growth of political parties representing the interests of classes and class alliances. The actual pursuit of class interest would be obscured by a party justifying its policies as the only possible or plausible course of action for the general benefit of society.

Party 'themes' were developed from, and supported by, a general class discoursive milieu which, once systematised by the organic intellectuals of the class, could be spread or superimposed upon a much wider class spectrum. There was competition between party beliefs in the sense that each party strove to persuade the mass of the population of the merits of its policies. In the course of this competition, party beliefs became increasingly systematised into argument and counter-argument, in time, producing opposed justificatory systems. It is in the context of the broad justificatory systems embraced by the Conservative and Labour parties that political discourse dealing with race has to be examined.

The task remains that of how best to describe the ideological

content of the discourse of the two political parties I have chosen to examine. So far, I have loosely referred to political 'themes'. But at this stage, if I am to deal adequately with the contents of Conservative and Labour ideologies, I must develop a descriptive typology of what, in fact, they say and mean. Because ideologies must be successful in accounting for a spectrum of nearly all conceivable events and circumstances, and may be developed originally and unexpectedly to meet most eventualities, the categories employed to describe them must be general in nature.

There is also the danger that the social observer's view of what is thematically significant will differ markedly from that of the political actor. Further, and even more problematically, different political actors within the same party may not agree over what are to be regarded as the most important party themes: politics, as I have argued (note 3) develops eristically, and differences of emphasis are a characteristic of this kind of group discourse. The categories selected are always likely to be 'essentially contested'. Nevertheless, it may be possible to reach some sort of agreement over what themes have, in the past, been, and still are, significant.

One persistent methodological difficulty in attempting to delineate the characteristics of a party ideology is to decide which of the many available discoursive elements is to be regarded as typical or representative of its justificatory system. One solution might be to investigate statistically what is said by party voters, and another to concentrate exclusively on the speeches of the party leader. But either course of action poses the questions of who is to be regarded as party spokesman and in what capacity he is to assume that function.

First, because parties are made up atomically of individuals who may make their opinions known on various occasions, and also are composed organically of groups that may speak or pass resolutions

collectively, there may be a difference between individual and group expression.

Second, because parties are multifunctional and are organised at local branch, district, constituency, national, party conferences, parliamentary and government levels, it is not easy to decide which organ represents the party's voice and in what capacity.

Third, because both the social observer and social actor expect to see a structure and pattern within party discourse - and indeed recognise what is typical of a party by the recurrence of a number of themes that supposedly indicate a fairly consistent structure - certain expressions may be held to be representative of the 'real soul' of the party, despite the fact that they are found relatively infrequently when assessed in strict numerical terms. In other words, there is a tendency to select what is typical of party ideology on the basis of preconceived stereotypes, and to neglect evidence that appears to contradict those assumptions, on the grounds that is not really Conservative or Labour.

Fourth, both Conservative and Labour acknowledge the haphazard eclectic manner in which their respective justificatory systems have come into being, and with somewhat anti-intellectual posturing, unashamedly admit the poverty of theory in the formulation of their principles.

R J White (1950), for example, points out that: "The shape and pattern of Conservative politics have rarely been imposed upon the phenomena of nature, and of human nature, by clever men taking thought. Insofar as Conservatism is a formulated doctrine it is the by-product of real-living, not the fabrication of unimpeded intellect. It has arisen out of nature, out of human nature, like the great spare necessary lines of a landscape seen in the perspective of history". Similarly, C A R Crosland (1956), to the question of whether there are

socialist first principles, asserts that the British Labour Party was "not founded on any body of doctrine at all, and has always preserved a marked anti-doctrinal and anti-theoretical bias".

In summary, then, the presentation of what constitutes the essence of a party political ideology is likely to vary because of intra-party eristic (conflict within a party over values, their interpretation, importance, and application), the difficulty of deciding which party official or organ is to be credited with possessing the mainstream party line, preconceived views in the general population of what can be classed as Conservative or Labour, and the haphazard historical development and accretion of discoursive elements. As there is no widely accepted method of solving the problem of which discourse is to be selected as representative, most writers are content to make the selection more or less intuitively. In subsequent chapters, I make use of a range of sources, including manifestos, official policy documents, major political speeches, and, in particular, party conference resolutions and debates concerned with race and immigration. It would, I think, be quite possible to make an entirely different selection, although I am inclined to think that there is some measure of agreement over what sources are of significance and of recurring value for representing party ideology.

The selection of various themes from party political discourse poses further problems. The themes or 'foci' need to be sufficiently numerous to represent accurately all important aspects of the ideological form, yet limited enough to avoid undue complexity. As many of the themes in an ideological complex are, almost by definition, interconnected or hierarchically ordered, the number arrived at must always be a matter of judgment, depending to a large extent on the purpose of the exercise.

As my emphasis throughout has been on the justificatory function

served by ideology rather than, for example, on ideology's effect on policy implementation, the themes or 'foci' chosen are probably best described as 'values' because they concentrate on the evaluation, as opposed to the descriptive or prescriptive, content of ideology. A 'value' refers here to the broad heading under which particular evaluative sentences from the selected discourse can be summarised. It is against the background of these values that particular policies towards black people in British society have to be justified to members of the party and to the electorate. Descriptive accounts of events and prescriptions for action may develop independently of the evaluation or, alternatively, may be adopted because of it, but evaluation must take place in the process of justification.

One solution to the difficulties outlined above is to draw up a typology of party values. Ideally, such a typology would have to offer a thorough overview of most of the readily identifiable values that could be abstracted from Conservative and Labour discourse in a variety of contexts, particularly where those values relate to issues of race. In addition, the typology would have to provide a framework against which the respective values of the two main parties could be compared and contrasted.

A fairly high degree of abstraction is required in order to arrive at any simple, comparative typology of this kind. The reality of party discourse is far too complex to be easily reduced to a small number of value headings and, were the values to be formulated, considerable attention would still have to be devoted to explaining the relationship between the value abstractions and the discoursive reality they represented. The criticism of the typology must always be that it oversimplifies the reality of discourse. It is for this reason that I have avoided incorporating the local case studies into the main text and have tried to preserve the subtle intricacies of

the individual responses. In describing the overall pattern of political discourse, caricature is never easily avoided. A typology, nevertheless, remains a most useful way of classifying the data. I try to support the choice of values with quotations from recognised party classics, but invariably, the precise formulation of the values and their implications will be open to dispute.

Indeed, the difficulties of developing a typology of values to describe party discourse can never be entirely resolved. Closer inspection reveals that the parties consist of contending fractions, each with its separate system of values. There are internal contradictions in the Conservative Party between monetarist, laissez-faire liberalism and corporatist views, and in the Labour Party between social democratic labourism and socialism. If the proposed typology were elaborated to reflect this complexity, it would begin to lose its heuristic purpose.

Seliger, too, makes an important distinction between the fundamental and operative dimensions of ideology. Political argumentation, he claims, is bifurcated by the need, on the one hand, to maintain "the centrality of prescriptions based on the commitment to essentially moral principles", and by the need, on the other, "to devise and justify specific practical measures, and to pronounce on the topical issues of day-to-day politics". Ideology, therefore, acquires a fundamental dimension "determining final goals and grand vistas", and an operative dimension consisting of"the principles which actually underlie policies" (pp 108-109). The distinction raises questions of how the two dimensions are linked, and of whether it is possible to incorporate both within the typology.

The relationship might be explained in the following way. Party

ideologists are able to systematise and refine the values and value hierarchy of a party, by various means, to produce a recognisably 'fundamental' set of first principles. But in the light of existing realities, such as an empty exchequer or hostile electorate, pursuit of first principles tends to be displaced. Nevertheless, the fundamental values are the raison-d'être of the party and its primary claim to moral consideration.

But when its actions do not appear to accord with its fundamental values, a secondary and supplementary justificatory system is forced into being by the necessity of accounting for the actual, as opposed to the ideal, outcome. In other words, there is a primary justificatory system that deals with ultimate goals, with how the world ideally ought to be, were everything to go as planned, and a secondary justificatory system to account for what the party actually manages to do under less than ideal circumstances. The former can be seen as justification in terms of ends, the latter in terms of means. Put in everyday parlance, it amounts to the difference between aspiration and excuse, between how the social actor thinks the world ought to be, and how he rationalises his behaviour in a world that constrains him. The secondary system invariably attempts to reconcile the actual outcome with the ideal future, by claiming it to be a step in the right direction, as the only way forward in the present limiting circumstances.

Two predictions may be made from this analysis. First, that the more a party is committed to major structural change as the answer to social problems, and the less it achieves in implementing the scale of change considered necessary, the greater will be its need for a two-dimensional justificatory system. Second, the more a party seeks to maintain the status quo, and succeeds in this task, the less will be its need for a dual system of justification. Until recently therefore,

the expectation might be that the Conservatives' essential pragmatism within a fairly static economic environment would allay the need for dualism, while Labour's commitment to a socialism that it never seemed able to achieve, would render it more susceptible to a two-fold value system. (This theme is developed at greater length in note 4.)

Both Conservative and Labour parties, therefore, have at their disposal two kinds of justificatory discourse. They must first set out their fundamental principles and programmes, and second provide apologetics for the ambiguous actions of their party in attempting to achieve, or in wielding, power, by showing how principles and actions are compatible. The typology offered below, cannot easily reflect the complexities introduced by Seliger's distinction, although the difference between word and action and the consequential, secondary justificatory system, can be dealt with to some extent in subsequent detailed accounts of the application of party values to matters of race.

Nevertheless, the question may be raised of whether the values offered in the typology are fundamental or operative. The answer must be that they mostly describe the motivating, fundamental dimension of an ideology, which maintains its identity irrespective of the constraining influences of social class and economic and state institutions. Party ideology primarily reflects class aspiration and only secondarily, class achievement (or lack of it). A justificatory system is concerned first, with optimistically convincing others that an action is right and only, as a last resort, with the defensive business of claiming 'we could do no other'. Although, in practice, the operative dimension might conceivably displace the fundamental, under most circumstances the operative is secondary and arises as a result of trying to uphold the fundamental.

While the claims to fundamental values might be scoffed at by those who are witness to the actual deeds of politicians, the aim of this study is to describe the justificatory forms of political discourse. To persuade another that he is right, a politician always presents his views and deeds in the best possible light. I, in turn, must describe his justificatory system, however great the discrepancy between his word and deed. The operative dimension is required only as a last resort by the embarrassed politician and, although issues of immigration and race relations have once or twice proved mightily embarrassing, the fundamental dimension can still serve to explain the parties' approach to most matters of race.

In abstracting from Conservative and Labour party discourse, it is probably best to relinquish the position that the resultant values, individually or even collectively, remain party values. The range of values within the two parties, the varying degree of salience with which they are held, and their juxtaposition in contrasting pairs, support the view that they should be construed as a Right-wing/Left-wing frame against which actual examples of party discourse can be compared. Thus, while Conservatism would, on the whole, be congruent with Right-wing values, and Labour views with Left-wing values, an element of overlap might occur. There is no reason to deny that Conservatives, on occasion, favour rationalisation or some form of welfare collectivism, or that Labour embrace an element of nationalism or imperialism, though, in long-term perspective, these values might be deemed out of character. The following table sets out the typology of Right and Left-wing values abstracted from Conservative and Labour discourse.

Table 3 Party Values

	RIGHT WING	LEFT WING
	Commitment to:	Commitment to:
1	Traditionalism and organicism	Rationalisation and structural change (tempered by gradualism)
2	Nationalism	Internationalism - the brotherhood of man
3	Imperialism	Responsible self-government and eventual independence for the colonies
4	Recognition of rank, acceptance of hierarchical arrangements, maintenance of standards	Egalitarianism, implying equality or equality of opportunity
5	Maintenance of the social order and the rule of law	Social justice
6	Rejection of state interference in economic and social life, laissez-faire politics, private ownership	Government intervention in economic and social relations, the mixed economy, social ownership
7	Self-reliant individualism	Welfare collectivism
8	The belief that man is essentially imperfect and that human nature is not easily changed	The belief that man is corrupted by his environment but that he may be moulded and improved by education
9	Opposing 'extremism' of Left and Right, and, in particular, of the traditional enemy, communism	Opposing the traditional enemy, fascism

In drawing up the typology and illustrating the effect that party values have on discourse dealing with a racially-defined object, I seek to argue that evaluations of, and facts (including explanations) and prescriptions about, the black presence in Britain are formulated in the light of the long-standing ideological traditions of the two parties, and that their action or inaction on race is justified by recourse to their primary class-based values and derivative secondary values. The justificatory forms affecting race relations are best understood as constituting a minor part of two major class-derived ideologies, the Right-wing orientated of these providing the greatest scope for justification inimicable to black people.


The application of the general value headings provided in the typology to the social phenomenon of black Commonwealth immigration and settlement in Britain helps to explain many aspects of British discourse about race. Responses previously classified as 'racist' or 'anti-racist' can be understood from a political, rather than a social psychological perspective, and be seen as a rational extension of a Conservative or Labour world view. They need not be treated as a product of a particular personality type, or sick mind, but as a manifestation of a socially-situated ideology that makes sense of the world and guides the behaviour of large numbers of people.

In the chapters that follow, I provide a more detailed outline of Conservative and Labour ideologies and try to show how they have affected specialised discourse dealing with racial issues. For the remainder of this chapter, I shall continue to expound the arguments that the two main British political ideologies remain predominantly class orientated, that they cannot aptly be described as 'racial' or 'racist', and that when they do focus on a racial subject, they adopt existing justificatory forms deriving from a traditional class scenario. The chapter is finally concluded with a local case study dealing with

the question of whether borough councillors can be said to possess racial or racist ideologies.

The theory of ideological levels developed in the preceding chapter enables a distinction to be drawn, in Pareto's terminology, between a 'non-logical' reflex, and a 'logical' overlay. These categories allow that, at an ideally conceived, non-logical level, social actors simply experience the social and physical environment, and react spontaneously with it. In transferring to a logical level, the same social actors are able to reflect on their experience and reactions and consciously evaluate them. From a publicly-aired evaluation of a common experience and set of reactions, the actors re-examine the context in which they find themselves, and describe it in a way which psychologically supports their evaluation. Non-confirmatory evidence is omitted, and the world is reconstituted in a manner consistent with the evaluation. Thus, the evaluation influences the description which, in turn, fortifies the belief that the evaluation is reasonable. Evaluation of the reaction in terms of its potential for improving a state of affairs judged unacceptable, or maintaining a tolerable status quo, results in the formulation of plans for action: prescriptions about what ought to be done. All this can be represented simply in diagrammatic form.

Figure 5 Logical and non-logical levels




The important point to note is the - admittedly vaguely formulated - relationship between evaluation and descriptive and prescriptive elements at the logical level.

The model of ideological structure can be elaborated by recognising that, in the construction of an ideological complex able to explain the majority of circumstances in which social actors find themselves, it is necessary to make a series of evaluations of different social contexts. At the same time, for ease of comprehension, memorisation, and application, the social actors are likely to employ the two psychological principles of consistency and simplicity, reflected in the tendency to repeat features of description, evaluation, and prescription in the network produced. The isomorphism of its different parts is one of ideology's most notable characteristics. Ideologies seem strongly inclined to develop mono-causal explanations at a descriptive level, common features of evaluation in widely diverse contexts, and universal panaceas as prescription.

On the explanatory dimension, there is also a movement towards self-containment and eventual circularity. Examples can frequently be found of two factors, directly or indirectly related, serving alternatively, or sometimes simultaneously, as both cause and effect of one another.

Figure 6 Ideological integration



The degree of interconnectedness varies between ideologies. Some ideologies are poorly integrated and inconsistent, others are very tightly knit, and so consistent that, in application to new circumstances, their development is largely predictable. Although

there are no satisfactory scales by which to measure what might be termed 'the degree of ideological integration', Conservative and Labour ideologies might intuitively be placed near the middle of a continuum ranging from low levels of integration, exemplified best by general discourse, to high levels, usually caricatured by official Soviet tracts. In order to qualify in the first place as an example of ideology, a particular discourse must demonstrate a certain degree of integration.

One method of classifying ideologies is provided by the recognition that certain kinds of explanation recur more frequently than others. A racial or racist ideology is likely to employ racial characteristics as explanation for a wide range of social phenomena, and to feature race in accompanying evaluation and prescription. Class ideologies are likely to concentrate approvingly or disapprovingly on the hierarchical arrangements in society, in terms of distribution of wealth, ownership, just reward for skills, status, power, and leadership, and the means by which those arrangements might be perpetuated (e.g. law enforcement) or altered (e.g. democratic participation in class struggle).

As an example, a racial ideology might explain a country's economic crisis in terms of the conspiratorial action of some racial group loyal to its own devious ends, rather than to the good of the nation as a whole. Alternatively, it might stress a particular racial group's excessive consumption of resources in comparison with, and at the expense of, others. A Right-wing class ideology, on the other hand, might point instead to the disloyalty and subversive behaviour of employees or trade unionists who demand wage increases from hard-pressed employers seeking to restore the economy and the welfare of the nation. The obvious claim made below is that Conservative and Labour are predominantly class-derived ideologies,

and usually account for racial phenomena by utilising existing formulae developed over many years in response to class demands.

In its simplest conception, an ideology provides a verbal association of two categories of phenomena. Leaving aside the precise nature of the association, e.g. whether it be causal, compositional, relational, etc., it is clear that, over time, customary associations or 'constant formulae' come to be established which serve to identify that ideology to a political audience. Thus, the opinions that "the level of wage settlement is undermining the profitability of British industry" and "workers are not receiving the level of remuneration they deserve for their productivity agreements" will be recognised, respectively, as constituting, in all probability, examples of Right-wing and Left-wing association. The fact that in any example of ideology a range of associations has long been established is illustrated by the excitement of the political commentators when a politician of significance is felt to have unexpectedly deviated from custom in his utterance.

An established verbal association, or linkage, within an ideological complex is referred to here as a formula. Formulae can be thought of as consisting of three parts: the subject, the copula (the linking element) and the predicate. (The choice of terminology from logic is convenient but incidental.) In some ideological formulae, the constituent elements are maintained in traditional form over many years. Where subject, copula, and predicate remain unaltered, the formula may be referred to as a 'constant'. Conversely, a variable formula is one in which a traditional element is maintained, while one or two other elements are subject to replacement or change. It is also useful to distinguish between two kinds of variable formulae: the free, in

rather they enter into discourse only when the need to deal with actual racial issues presents itself. At other times, they are scarcely utilised. Nevertheless, Conservative discourse shows a stronger inclination than Labour, to use race in certain formulae, and further, to employ race as one of a handful of restricted variables. Labour, on the other hand deals with racial issues far more pragmatically and, while it has established favoured responses to questions on race, appears more random in the choice it allows.

For each of the value headings mentioned in the typology, I try in subsequent chapters to show how descriptive, evaluative, and prescriptive expressions, recurring in Conservative and Labour party circles, are used as formulae for dealing with the selected topics of race relations and immigration. The formulae, derived from a well tried and trusted ideological matrix, developed to meet a wide range of eventualities, provide the patterns against which racial issues have to be described, interpreted, evaluated and acted upon. While elements of the formulae have long become fixed by habit and expectation, in most instances the racial substitution instances are far less firmly established. However, there are exceptions.

Some likely examples in Conservative discourse of traditional, constant formulae dealing with race may be found under the value heading of imperialism - although Conservative interest in the imperialist ideal is now very much a thing of the past. But scientific racism, white paternalism, and the importance of white patriality, traces of which still linger in Conservative thought, have, historically, constituted well-established racist formulae in which black people were evaluated

as inferior. Most Conservative and Labour discourse about race, however, combines traditional class formulae with racial elements in free, or limited, association.

Before turning to the local case study on councillors' ideology, I shall briefly mention what, in the following chapters, I have taken to be the main class-related formulae that have served to orientate Conservative and Labour discussion of race-related issues.

The force of tradition and desire for organic integration expressed in Conservative formulae has had a number of consequences. Initially, there was defense of the Commonwealth right of free entry to Britain, but as the migration continued, Conservatives began to see the newcomers as a potential threat to British institutions and customs, and to the homogeneity of the body politic. Existing immigration policy could be defended or attacked in the name of tradition. The policy of integration was advocated to safeguard the British way of life and to prevent social division and strife. With similar ambivalence, Labour formulae, focusing on rationalisation and structural change, and suitably applied in the debate over the need for expansion and control of the economy, could be used to justify the migration in times of labour shortage, or to advocate its limitation in times of surplus.

Formulae relying on nationalistic sentiment are very much a hallmark of Conservative ideology. At one time, Enoch Powell clearly voiced the Conservative concern over the danger to nationhood posed by Commonwealth immigration. Blacks were seen as an alien horde threatening to overrun British territory and institutions. As an alternative, Labour's commitment to internationalism, represented by the slogan 'brotherhood of man',

might mitigate jingoistic attitudes, and be used as a reason for rejecting racial discrimination justified on the grounds of "Britons first".

Both Conservative and Labour, when in power, were faced with having to justify imperial policy. In this context, Conservative imperialism was frequently supported by formulae incorporating theories of racial superiority, paternalism, and commitment to the rule of order established by white settler regimes. But support for the Empire also entailed upholding the rights of Empire citizenship and of free entry of Commonwealth citizens to the 'Mother country'. Whereas the Labour Party had always been committed to self-government for the colonies, to the peaceful transition to independence, and to the end of economic exploitation, it tended to bask in a self-satisfied complacency with regard to colonial conditions, economic independence, and the pace of advancement. For Labour, the colonial experience seemed to leave an ideological legacy of stifling moralistic paternalism which, some have claimed, lived on in the procedures and organisational forms created by the party's race relations legislation. The paternalistic formulae resulting from Empire may heve contributed to many of the policies adopted by the parties towards black people in Britain.

Conservative and Labour demonstrate very different approaches towards social inequality. On the whole, Conservatives believe in the inevitability of social differences and hierarchical arrangements, and are not, therefore, likely to be particularly concerned at the differences in opportunity and living standards between black and white groups. Nevertheless, the maintenance of middle class values is seen to be threatened by the

reproductive potential of the lower social orders - now extended to include black people. Labour justification of immigration and race relations, on the other hand, is explained by various formulae supporting egalitarianism. Labour stresses the need to treat black and white equally and to ensure equality of opportunity in the process of migration and settlement. But in the context of the initial class position forced on black migrants, the pursuit of equality of opportunity by itself is likely to be inadequate. Reluctant to adopt large-scale redistributive policies, the Labour party opted in traditional fashion for a further extension of a welfare net to meet the needs of the black urban poor.

Conservatives have long been concerned to uphold the rule of law in the face of anarchic tendencies threatening the freedom and security of the individual. Formulae emphasising the law and order theme have concentrated the Conservative mind on the issues of the criminal element in the immigrant population, illegal entry, ghetto violence, National Front versus Left-wing confrontation, and mugging. Labour formulae on social justice are applied in demands for fair shares and equal treatment for the black population. The value of social justice tends to ensure Labour support for race relations legislation, to create sympathy for those who fall foul of 'class laws', and to permit a libertarian approach to laws which interfere with migrant cultures. Labour formulae mentioning respect for the rule of law result, however, in the Party relying extensively on legal means of redressing social injustice, and in its adopting a somewhat uncritical attitude towards the agents of law enforcement.

Conservatives have always been committed to the principle of private ownership and wary of state interference. Formulae derived from this stance have affected Conservative policy towards black

people in a number of ways. At first, Conservatives welcomed industry's right to recruit black labour on the international market without government interference. Later, they condemned the Race Relations Bills for undermining employers' freedom to hire and fire whomsoever they chose. Race relations legislation was an improper extension of state power. In contrast, Labour formulae committing the state to intervene in economic relations and to support 'planning', help to explain why immigration controls come to be seen as part of the planning process, and the Race Relations Acts as the means by which industrialists can be forced to act for the public good. Economic intervention is extended by Labour to the social field of housing and public services, where 'racial problems' exist.

Conservatives are very much committed to a concept of individual self-reliance and the need to restore to the individual a new sense of moral responsibility and initiative. State welfare provision is seen as damaging to individual initiative and the work ethic, and great vigilance must be exercised if undeserving persons are not to become a drain on the public purse. One typical Conservative formula casts the British welfare state as a gigantic magnet attracting the poor and profligate of the Commonwealth. There is a Conservative predisposition to treat black people as a drain on the social services and as a burden on the economy.

In contrast to the Conservative position, the key to understanding Labour policy on race relations is to recognise the value the Party attaches to formulae advocating welfare aid as an answer to social problems of all kinds. The provision of welfare may be seen as an alternative to any serious attempt at socialising the means of production, and improving the comparative position of the working class. In general, welfare formulae are based on Beveridge's principles of compulsion and universality, but older Liberal contractual concepts of

welfare survive, raising questions of the criteria of entitlement to welfare benefit, and migrants' place in those schemes. Paradoxically, emphasis on the need to provide welfare for black people is likely to confirm the view that they are socially inadequate and economically dependent.

The Conservative concept of man is preserved in three formulae: that man is essentially imperfect, that he is naturally conservative, and that, without reward and punishment, he is unlikely to behave sociably. In the field of race relations, therefore, the Conservative is unlikely to be surprised by racial intolerance or to believe that it can be eradicated merely by passing laws. On the contrary, man's love of the familiar will make him deeply suspicious of the strange habits of newcomers. In addition, if immigrants are exempt from market forces or laws - from social reward and punishment - they will, it is believed, take advantage of the indigenous population, and, therefore, no special allowances should be made. The Labour concept of man, on the other hand, stresses that man is fashioned by his environment and debilitated by poverty, disease, ignorance, and squalor. The importance attached to proper nurture produces the well-tried Labour formula that education can play a major part in eradicating racial hostility. Unfortunately, such approaches have been accompanied by a tendency to view racialism as a superficial ideological phenomenon divorced from the pursuit of economic interest.

The political embodiment of the values most antithetical to a party might be termed the 'party bogy'. To the Conservative, the arch-bogy is communism, to the Labour supporter, fascism. Conservatives have shown anxiety at the prospects of black people embracing the foreign ideas of Communism, and of social unrest nurtured by subversive ideas taking root in the predominantly black

urban areas. The Labour party has focused on the spectre of fascism, the Nazi-style versions of which contain central racist tenets. Anti-racists have been able to capitalise on this generalised anti-fascist formula in their campaigns for racial justice, although some have felt a danger exists in the displacement of campaigns against prejudice and discrimination by the more diffuse goals of anti-fascism.

In summary, the parties have at their disposal a wide variety of formulae which can be used to the advantage or disadvantage of black people. From the point of view of black people's interests, the most objectionable and possibly most damaging values are those that derive from the legacy of empire. On the whole, Conservative values may result in stances and policies more inimicable to black people, who may be cast in the role of offenders against tradition, foreigners endangering the security of the nation, members of the profligate and undeserving poor, or political subversives.

Nevertheless, it is also possible for Labour formulae governing equality of opportunity, social justice, and the necessity of social welfare to produce associations that may earn the label 'prejudice'. Black people may be seen as undermining the opportunities available to white people, as receiving unfair advantages, and as making unjust demands on the welfare kitty. From a Labour position, while there should be nothing wrong in black people being cast in the role of welfare recipients, such casting is likely, nevertheless, to encourage paternalistic manifestations towards black people. On the whole, however, the Labour party's ideological matrix probably favours benevolent treatment of black people - on the fundamental dimension at least. But danger lies in a separation of Labour values into fundamental and operative dimensions, with operative values dominating totally, to become little more than pleas

of political expediency in the face of the perceived hostility of the white electorate.

In the following two chapters, the application of party values and more detailed party formulae to British race relations is examined in greater detail. The argument remains that the two parties' racial policies are nearly always justified along traditional class lines and, whatever the social pressures producing the policies, the policies themselves are invariably presented as conforming in some way with the parties' established ideological values. In the meantime, I provide a case study of the responses to a series of questions that illustrate the interconnectedness of ideology, selectivity in the choice of causal factors, and the relative infrequency with which racial explanations are provided.

Local case study: borough councillors and racial or racist ideology

The questionnaire fell into two sections that made no direct mention of race, and those questions that directly referred to matters of race, race relations, and ethnic minorities, or that appeared like immigration, and right-wing politics, to be closely associated in the media and in popular culture with racial issues. The questions in the first section on the economy, education, population, housing, health, crime etc were conceived of as being open-ended and were deliberately inserted to allow respondents to express any opinion they so chose under these broad headings. As a set, they were purposely positioned before the direct questions on race, to lead respondents gently into the questionnaire and to avoid the charge that the questionnaire form itself focused a respondent's mind on racial issues.

Although the questions were phrased in neutral language, they were deliberately constructed to allow of certain answers - if those answers were likely to be forthcoming. In this sense alone, they could be regarded as 'leading' questions. e.g. "Sir Keith Joseph made a speech in

1974 in which he said that the balance of the British population, its 'human stock' was threatened. The nation was moving towards degeneration because mothers of low ability and intelligence were giving birth to an undue proportion of the nation's children. Do you think there is any truth in this?" and "What do you think about today's standards of sexual morality? How do you account for the change in sexual morality?"

The purpose of this exercise was to discover the frequency with which individual respondents were likely to draw upon a particular descriptive category or explanatory framework. For example, answers might continually refer to or make use of an analysis in terms either of social class, or of the importance of laissez faire, or of racial categories, as respondents chose to deal with problems relating to the economy, education, demographic composition of the population, etc. In this way, it might be possible to establish whether respondents possessed an overall racial ideology, which would involve making use of race and colour categories in description, explanation, and evaluation of the world, and in prescriptions for political action. A racial ideology would be suspected if, on a significant number of items, a comparatively heavy emphasis was placed on the efficacy, or possibly, moral agency, of racial groupings in the working out of the social process.

Even if no overall structure of racial ideology was revealed among the councillors interviewed, the numbers of questions to receive answers containing racial referents might give some measure of the level of racial consciousness, the spheres in which race was already established as a crucial factor in the understanding of a situation, and the connection between the spontaneous emergence of racial items and other ideological strands. To measure the importance

of the interviewer's actual need to 'queue in' on race, in order to produce a response making use of a racial category, a number of the questions were repeated in specific racial form in the second section of the questionnaire.

The series of questions on different topics of social concern revealed a general consistency in, or pattern to, individual responses. Usually a councillor adopted a coherent approach to a number of the questions and selected a general cause, suitably adapted in application, to serve as his answer to a whole series of social problems. Not only was consistency demonstrated within any one individual's interview but, given fairly wide parameters, councillors also showed adherence to a common party line, although - depending on the scale of conformity adopted - this did not preclude considerable variation of response within each party grouping.

The sets of answers of three councillors to thirty-six general questions are reproduced in the columns below. Of all those interviewed in the two major parties, Conservative Councillor No. 58 produced the responses which showed most sign of spontaneous racial referents and expressions hostile to black people. The other two councillors, Conservative No 10 and Labour No 22 were selected, from among a number of colleagues with very similar views, to illustrate what might be classed respectively as the traditional Right - inclined Conservative and Left - inclined Labour positions. Some of the more lengthy, repetitive or laboured replies have been summarised or truncated, but every endeavour has been made to preserve the full sense of the original interviews.

Table 4 Comparison of councillor responses

	CONSERVATIVE (58)	CONSERVATIVE (10)	LABOUR (22)
VIEW ON THE ECONOMY	It's very good. The balance of trade is good, the £ sterling is rising - we're having a job to keep it down. Who can complain about a situation like that?	There is very little wrong with the commercial and industrial state of the nation. If industry and commerce were freed from government interference in all its forms including excessively heavy taxation, the country would become prosperous again. The sooner we get back to traditional reliance on individual initiative and enterprise, the sooner the country will reassert itself.	The crisis is induced by advanced capitalism in decay. Wealth is unevenly distributed and there is no planning of the productive process. The aim is to get the maximum profit in the shortest possible time. Apart from this, there are no forward-looking arrangements. This affects everybody's lives: the increase in crime, vandalism, etc. results from the capitalist environment we live in. If people lived in a fairer society in which they could see the fruits of their toil shared equitably among the people, they would respond positively to that new environment.
CAUSES OF UNEMPLOYMENT	The new technology causes some. The failure to be ahead in the new technology causes more. The Security of Employment Act causes a lot of unemployment. Also heavy taxation on enterprising people who would	Unemployment is partly due to the state of World Trade over which the government has little control. It is also due to the attitude towards industry by government. The profit motive is all important. There has	The cause of unemployment is the capitalist system - we have it in all the Western capitalist systems. Our unemployment is lower than some of our European counterparts because we do have a government - though not a socialist government -

	(58)	(10)	(22)
CAUSES OF UNEMPLOYMENT (Cont'd)	like to expand to push their businesses bigger and faster but are deterred from doing so. A lot of the money has gone out of Europe and America, to the Far East where labour is cheap and if you're setting up a production line that's the way to do it.	been a tendency to treat the profit motive as something dishonourable ( ). We've got to get back to profitability without which there can be no proper returns on dividends, in wages, in investment, and without profit individual firms cannot continue to employ labour. There has got to be a recognition of the profit motive, the value of savings, the importance of the skills of management and workers, and belief in rewards for responsibility.	committed to reformist measures - perhaps eventually even to socialism. We do apply, to some degree, socialist measures to balance the economy.
COULD UNEMPLOYED GET WORK?	Some of them could get work but some couldn't get the kind of work they would like. I consider quite a lot of them - a considerable percentage of them - are totally unemployable, will be permanently unemployed no matter what the market is like.	There are, in fact, more vacancies in certain trades and professions than skilled workers willing to fill them ( ). There is a problem of mobility. There would be less severe unemployment if people were freer to move around. A large percentage of the population is restricted in its movement by council house tenancies.	There are areas where there is a shortage of skilled labour. If we directed labour - I'm not saying we should - this could be taken up. There is a minority who don't ever intend to work - a small minority - but basically the majority do want to work.
MEMBER OF TRADE UNION	No	I'm not a member of a Trade Union.	Yes, I'm a member of the AUEW.

	(58)	(10)	(22)
WHAT DO YOU THINK OF TRADE UNIONS?	The trade unions should stick to their objective of seeking higher wages for their members. But now they find they are a powerful political organisation and they are using their muscle. They're using the best methods they can, I suppose.	The Trade Union movement has been given credit for more than it can do. The trade unions don't cause inflation or unemployment. Providing governments control the money supply, then the trade unions haven't got the power to influence wage negotiations. Trade union leaders are not stupid men who go into a negotiation to break employers. The members are interested in long-term employment as well as wages.( ). Unions should confine themselves to specifically industrial matters and not try to influence governments because they haven't got the power and it isn't in their interests to do so.	The trade unions have played a major part, particularly since the war, in enhancing the living standards of the whole of the people and evidently trade union members. People even tend to follow the trade union pattern when they are not organised in trade unions. Their settlements and conditions, the shorter working week and higher wages tend to be reflected even in industries where there isn't a trade union organisation. The trade unions have done a very good job.
ARE EDUCATIONAL STANDARDS RISING OR FALLING?	I would say they're rising - the standard of today's A level exams probably would have walked them straight into University without any problems at all. The standards are mugh higher today. I've looked at the papers you have on the Open University and I consider	I'm concerned. I don't think we're getting an adequate return for the amount of money we expend. I'm not so sure whether the average school leaver is any better equipped today than he was twenty years ago. Some of the Secondary Modern Schools I have known in the past were very fine schools. A school is not a matter of a label or of crude	Educational standards are rising, in my opinion, due to the fact that we have now almost got a fully comprehensive system in this country. Not fully comprehensive, of course, while the private sector is still creating an elitist society. I think ultimately the private schools will have to be taken into the state system.

	(58)	(10)	(22)
ARE EDUCATIONAL STANDARDS RISING OR FALLING? (Cont'd)	the courses very tough. Anyone who succeeds in doing that has got to work jolly hard.	resources - I don't think the building is of very great consequence for determining the quality of the product. I don't think the fact that you teach 20 as opposed to 35 is of any great consequence in determining the quality of the lessons. These things are a matter of attitude and objective on the part of the teacher concerned. There has been a great deal of attention paid to academic standards and not sufficient to moral standards and a training for life. There has been a marked decline in moral values and in the matter of general behaviour and courtesy. ( ) A lot of schools have largely dispensed with religious education - despite the fact of the law - and this is a tragedy.	

	(58)	(10)	(22)
IS THERE A POPULATION PROBLEM?	Yes, what they want is a policy of depopulation in this country. This could be done by a policy of encouraging immigrants to return home - the same type of policy as they use in France where immigrants are openly encouraged by government to return back - though their immigrants are mainly from North Africa. They're not encouraged to return, here.	No. In any case what we think, is likely to have no effect on the population. Let's stabilise it.	Britain has always had a population problem. It's a small island with a higher density per acre than France or Germany. I think the present level should be maintained.
THE EFFECT OF A FALLING BIRTHRATE.	Less labour would be needed with the new technology in the factories, so I can't see it would have a lot of effect.	I couldn't say what effect the falling birthrate is likely to have. Governments keep statistics but government statistics are usually wrong. With society in its present mood, the tendency for the falling birthrate to continue for some time is there. The effect will leave us with an increasingly elderly population to be supported by a younger population.	I don't think it will have a great effect. A high birth-rate meant we were producing the work force for our factories but with automation and the silicon chip, the falling birthrate won't have any effect because we'll be able to increase production without the need for a larger labour force.

	(58)	(10)	(22)
SIR KEITH JOSEPH's SPEECH: IS THE NATION MOVING TOWARDS DEGENERATION AS MOTHERS OF LOW ABILITY AND INTELLIGENCE GIVE BIRTH TO AN UNDUE PROPORTION OF CHILDREN?	I suppose it's always been true, hasn't it? It's always been true in the days of birth control, anyway.	He's making a point, isn't he? We come across large families, where family circumstances suggest to us a degree of inadequacy which we find a little alarming. There isn't anything we can do - these are matters for people themselves to decide upon. In council work one comes across families which continue to grow in inadequate accommocation. We shouldn't want this. There are families that are incapable of ordering their lives in accordance with what seems to be most desirable and rational way at the time. I'm afraid I paid little attention to Sir Keith Joseph's semantics.	Absolute nonsense, putting people into different categories of intelligence. He was attacking, in his way, the growing birthrate of the immigrant minorities whom he classed as having the lowest intelligence - absolute nonsense.
IS THERE A SHORTAGE OF HOUSING?	I wouldn't say there was a great shortage in Wolverhampton, from the number of houses that there are for sale and the length of time they remain for sale. I wouldn't say it was the major problem the socialists make it out to be. Large numbers of those who are on the	There is, in fact, a surplus of housing - but it isn't evenly distributed. In Wolverhampton, the waiting list is misleading. We are rapidly moving into a balance and we shall soon be in surplus. There is a distortion in the number of council houses in Wolverhampton some 40-45% which is a higher figure than in some countries in Eastern Europe. I happen to	There is not an acute shortage in the country as a whole but local shortages. But it would be idealistic to imagine we could all move to areas of surplus. But in areas like this there is a shortage of houses. There are 3,500 on our council house waiting list. We do have a shortage of dwelling places.

	(58)	(10)	(22)
IS THERE A SHORTAGE OF HOUSING? (Cont'd)	housing list are not on the housing list for accommodation but for a modern, post-war, semi- detached council house.	believe that owning one's own house is a great stabilising factor in life. The present balance should be disturbed in favour of owner occupation.	
HOUSING QUALITY	I suppose continuing development with government grants must improve the quality. The government's advertising on home improvements - how to retain the heat, etc. - is all jolly useful because people who own their own houses take up these offers. There is an enormous do-it-yourself business today so they must all be busy improving their houses.	- has undoubtedly risen.	The quality has certainly risen. The socialist administration has raised standards. We have stuck to the Parker-Morris standards which the private sector doesn't build to. We build better houses than the private sector. The standard of the older stock has has also risen with our big modernisation programme. We are enhancing the living standards of the population of the borough.
HOUSING POLICY	The best policy would be the sale of council housing because people who own their own houses tend to look after them and improve them.	The sale of council housing.	We should be building more houses for rent. The local authority can do this fastest. We certainly need a progressive housing programme whereby we can eventually make sure everybody in the country has a house. One of the main obstacles is the shortage of land. We shall have to look for overspill arrangements.

	(58)	(10)	(22)
IS WOLVERHAMPTON A HEALTHY PLACE TO LIVE IN?	Relative to any other similar industrial town, do you mean, or relative to somewhere like Ludlow? (similar industrial town). Yes, I should say so, but it's better to live on the West side than the East because of the prevailing wind.	Yes, I should think so, although there have been some statistics relating to newly-born babies which suggest some problems there. On the whole, it is a very pleasant town to live in particularly if you can get out of the town centre.	Yes, considering the fact that we live in an industrial area. By and large, with our programme of smokeless zones and our system of control of pollution factors, I think Wolverhampton is a healthy place.
GUESS AS TO WHY HIGH INFANT MORTALITY RATE IN WOLVERHAMPTON	I don't know. I have no idea.	I really have no idea.	I'll be quite candid. I couldn't give you a reason.
CRISIS IN THE NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE	There seems to be more and more problems in the National Health Service. There has been a pattern of continuous strikes - this could be called a crisis.	I think we're moving towards it. When you read of people with kidney complaints dying through lack of access to kidney machines, then there's something wrong with the system. And there are hospital waiting lists containing people in pain. The amount of money available for NHS purposes has not been wisely spent. There is far too much spent on administrative functions instead of on doctor/patient care.	The crisis is due to a lack of cash injection. We spend far less than some of our European counterparts, even though we were the envy of the world just after the war.

	(58)	(10)	(22)
OUTBREAK OF CONTAGIOUS DISEASES	Who said it was an inefficient health service? With vast industrial conurbations and half-educated immigrants and that sort of thing, it's likely to occur anywhere. I don't think it's anything to become alarmed about.	This is caused by a mobile world population. I would have thought infectious diseases are not a problem. Anxiety over the side-effects of vaccination may prevent parents from taking full advantage of the services for their children.	It may be that we don't pay enough attention to preventive medicine.
WHY HAS RATE OF VENEREAL DISEASE INCREASED?	If I could hazard a guess I would probably say it was due to immigration - brought in by immigrants. I would say that immigration was probably the cause of it.	The increase in venereal disease is directly related to greater sexual freedom.	We've entered the era of the permissive society. Sexual experiment is more widespread than a few years ago. I'm not talking about morals because in my opinion sexual relations isn't immoral. It's a natural thing for people to do. We've now been liberated sexually and women have been liberated too, and this does tend to give rise to venereal disease, bearing in mind contraceptives in the past were mainly for men.

	(58)	(10)	(22)
OPINIONS ABOUT TODAY's STANDARDS OF SEXUAL MORALITY	Not as strict as when I was young but I've got to live with changing times and this is the way people want to live today. You mean with the youngsters having sexual intercourse willy-nilly and sleeping around? Well, I've got to live with changing times. If this is the way the world wants to live, then it's up to them.	Today's standards are far too low. I have a daughter and I would hate to feel she was viewed as an easy touch. The relationship between a man and a woman ought to contain a high degree of respect, admiration, and self-discipline. Women should not be cheapened into becoming mere sexual objects in the sight of men.	Sexual morality is an invention in the mind of the bigotted, and it's always been so. People are always attracted to members of the opposite sex, and there's nothing unusual in that.
VIEWS ON THE SOCIAL SERVICES	Expensive. They use an awful lot of the ratepayer's money and some of it quite wastefully,	The level of social provision is inadequate. Unless the amount of money is increased it will remain inadequate. The contribution by the voluntary sector is absolutely crucial. Where the old and infirm are concerned they should be kept in their homes for as long as possible.( ). There is a need to expand the domiciliary services. There are only two ways that this can be done: by expanding the full-time workers and the voluntary sector.	We don't have enough injection of public money. We have an excellent social services department in Wolverhampton. We've increased our expenditure year by year, but the reason we can't expand it to the extent we would like is lack of funds.

	(58)	(10)	(22)
ABUSE OF SOCIAL SECURITY	I continually get complaints of this and the complaints are so numerous that there must be abuse of them. I continually get complaints of immigrants appearing in the courts where they are questioned about how much they get - say £65 a week. They have never contributed anything from the time they arrived in the country, and they get their rent paid, money for food, clothing allowance for the children's school uniform, free milk delivered on the doorstep in the morning. Many of them have got six, seven or eight kids, some of them by other women than their wives. They get allowances for all these and can probably wind up with nothing less than £65 a week, which is more or less equivalent to a man going to work earning £100 a week. I think it's absolutely disgraceful but they're paid this. I would prefer to see a system, I'll tell you, where when they arrive in - if I were in the Home Office - they put £2000 down here (and this is being done in another country). Any attempt to fall on social security until you've got three years'or five years' stamps on your card and out you go on your own money. And this is the system used in Rhodesia	There is abuse, but the degree of abuse is small. Most people are very honest - the minority who cheat is small, and not sufficiently large to make us revise the type of social security we offer.	I don't think there's a great deal of abuse, although there always will be some abuse, but basically - it was estimated at £2½ million last year - it's a derisory amount.

	(58)	(10)	(22)
ABUSE OF SOCIAL SECURITY (Cont'd)	and it would be an efficient system to bring in here. It's absolutely disgraceful that I should pay taxes to keep these people or that anyone else should.		
PEOPLE BETTER OFF ON SOCIAL SECURITY THAN AT WORK	It's possible. I wouldn't say they all are. But obviously, if they've got a large family they are.	It's true. We must do something about a tax system that penalises work but not benefits.	There probably could be cases where people are better off, though I've known cases where people have come to me and said: 'I want to get back to work - I can't live on this'. This doesn't mean we should cut the benefit. The fault lies with industry which doesn't pay adequate wages.
VIEWS ON CRIME	A large part of the crime in Wolverhampton is caused by immigrants. They are not caught, dealt with severely enough. They live in gangs. At the time I knew of a gambling saloon in the town where at one o'clock every day they used to assemble in their pads across the Midland area in gangs and set forth with their bags, thieving in the shops. They look for any likely assistant where they can crowd in and thieve. When you ring the police, they	The crime rate is too high and there are too many young people involved. There are certain aspects of crime that bother me greatly, and I'm thinking about physical assaults - there is a degree of fear in the minds of people when they walk in certain parts of this town. The answer is more police and better policing - more community policing. The increase in crime is partly due to the indiscipline in society that arises from an insistence on rights as opposed to responsibilities.	Nobody can be happy with the crime rate. This, particularly among the juvenile population, I think is due to the fact that they can't get jobs and they're bored and they probably turn to little petty crime. Of course the rise in crime as a whole does cause a great deal of anxiety, but it stems from the environment we live in.

	(58)	(10)	(22)
VIEWS ON CRIME (Cont'd)	always arrive ten minutes after the crime has been committed. These are Jamaicans; I'm not accusing the Asians of this. I would quite honestly like to see the police armed and these people dealt with severely. Because in my opinion - these people, you can't even class them as human beings - Alsatian dogs are better trained. They live by crime, straight across the West Midlands wherever you find these Jamaicans and it's the Jamaican teenagers, not the first generation of immigrants. The fact that they're Jamaicans is concealed by the press when they publish. Obstructive methods are used in the courts by particular solicitors to ensure they get off the hook. The Community Relations Board rush around as soon as they are arrested. You want one typical example? When three were arrested two years ago at the Wolverhampton Fiesta and taken to Red Lion Street, the police station was beseiged by two hundred, and Maurice Buck, the Deputy Chief Constable, comes over from Birmingham and says 'let them out'. If I had him on the spot, he wouldn't last two minutes. This		

	(58)	(10)	(22)
VIEWS ON CRIME (Cont'd)	is the sort of thing that goes on: they are thus encouraging crime. Had they been white they'd have been in gaol for the next five years. So crime is just encouraged because a determined push is not made against them.		
WHICH CRIMES ARE ON THE INCREASE?	Generally, robbery round the shops in gangs. They drift in, they crowd in, and thieve, and of course there are continual reports of mugging. Another instance of these people, a couple of years ago they over-ran Aldersley Stadium - over 100 of them. When the police arrived and arrested some of them, what was the consequence? The next morning a lot of these people were carpeted for having arrested all these Jamaicans who were armed with bricks, sticks and everything else. (more said but characters identifiable). A football match was going on at Ettingshall. When the Jamaicans were losing they overran the pitch and stopped that. I can remember round about two years ago, they caused a battle outside the French Duck (public house) in the town.	See above - physical assaults.	Robberies, muggings, these are the two main areas. If we had a socialist system of society, crimes where monetary gain was the prime objective would diminish.

	(58)	(10)	(22)
WHICH CRIMES ARE ON THE INCREASE? (Cont'd)	On the Dudley Road, the traders have been terrorised from one end to the other by these Jamaicans. And the reason is that the police are hamstrung by the left-wing legislation coming out of Westminster, and when I say Left-wing, immigrant-worshipping legislation preventing them dealing with the situation as it should be dealt with.		
VIEWS ON COMPLAINTS ABOUT POLICE ABUSING POWERS	They haven't got enough powers to deal with them.	I am a great admirer of the British police force. They're pretty representative of society as a whole. Occasionally, there are individuals who overstep the mark or don't follow the procedures as carefully as they should, but the police have their own standards and methods of investigation ( ). Today, the balance is more in favour of the criminal than the police. I would say, let's leave the police alone and listen to what the senior police officers tell us about the kinds of problems they are encountering today. We need more police and more bobbies on the beat.	Basically, they're an honest lot. They're doing a job under very serious disadvantages. They're undermanned. Possibly there may be an element who are over-aggressive - there is evidence of that - but basically they do the job properly and thoroughly in a fair-minded way, but there are excesses ( ). We don't have bobbies on the beat as we did previously.

	(58)	(10)	(22)
NATIONAL CHARACTER	Considerate!	The English are good natured, tolerant, slow to anger, difficult to rouse, but, once aroused, very determined and not easily deterred.	The English - they're very fair, they're compassionate: they have a sense of justice.
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ENGLISH AND IRISH	The Irish are possibly a little quicker tempered - that's the only difference I notice.	A great deal of difference. There is a basic difference in attitude between the English, Irish, Scots, and Welsh. The Irish are aggressive but beyond that I'm not prepared to go.	The Irish as it appears are probably more temperamental than the English. Mind you, I've met temperamental Englishmen and docile Irishmen. I don't think you can equate one nationality against another. You get the variation within the two different races.
IS NATIONAL CHARACTER INBORN OR ACQUIRED THROUGH LEARNING?	It could be acquired through learning.	I think it's inborn.	Certain things we're born with - a certain trait - but I think the others we develop as we go along. People can change character, can't they?
IMPORTANT INGREDIENTS OF BRITISH WAY OF LIFE	The preservation of the family is one of the most essential parts, and the improvement of the democratic way of life. It could do with considerable improvement.	Freedom of the individual and the tolerance we show to one another in our day-to-day lives.	The capacity for ingenuity. There's no doubt about it, the British people are second to none when it comes to ingenuity.

	(58)	(10)	(22)
RELEVANCE OF BRITISH COMMONWEALTH TO MODERN WORLD	The Exchange Control Act, stopping free exchange of money throughout the sterling area, demolished the Commonwealth ( ). I would rather have remained in the white Commonwealth than I would have gone into Europe. In the white Commonwealth we could have had a global strategy with world-wide bases and the black Commonwealth would, to some extent have followed along. ( ). South Africa has been made an outcast - the country that supplied more troops per head of the white population than any other Commonwealth country when it came to fighting the War.	Very little.	It is unfortunate, it isn't the same Commonwealth we knew years ago. We were a loose federation and unfortunately that has been weakened by our disastrous entry into the E.E.C.
WAS THE BRITISH EMPIRE A GOOD OR BAD THING?	It did pretty well for the countries that formed part of it. It established in them good local and national government. Whether the black countries have still got it now is a different matter. All the white countries have done jolly well. They've got a	(Historical outline) In the sense that Kipling understood it, it only lasted thirty years. It was a creation more of accident than of design. The British people were surprised to discover they controlled large sections of the world.	In retrospect, there may have been some good points about the British Empire in the fact that we did bring new development to the countries. But the British Empire with its intolerances, its exploitation of Africa and the Indies is something we can't look back upon with pride. I'm critical of it.

	(58)	(10)	(22)
WAS THE BRITISH EMPIRE A GOOD OR BAD THING? (Cont'd)	higher standard of living than we have.	They gloried in it for a short period of time, but the Empire in that sense, quickly faded. ( ). I see it as having no value except an inhibiting one. I would like to see Britain on its own going its own way unhampered by any traditions of the Imperial days. Looking at it now, it was a bad thing.	
AID TO COUNTRIES OVERSEAS	Stop it at once. The Communist-led countries in Africa simply use the aid to buy arms off the Russians in order to murder our relatives in Africa and this is the sort of usefulness of the aid. And having lived in Africa for five years, I should say very little gets to the people it's actually intended for. ( )..	It should be stopped. I don't think you can buy friends.	It's a good thing. People tend to think that we give a lump sum of money and that's it. But,of course,it brings untold benefits to the British people in increased trade, etc. I'm in favour of aid to the under-developed countries.

	(58)	(10)	(22)
POLICIES FOR RHODESIA	I should support Ian Smith and his policies there up to the hilt. I think he's done remarkably well. Smith has buried Wilson and he's buried Heath and he'll see Callaghan out. Smith has been a very efficient politician. The standard of living for blacks in Rhodesia and South Africa is far higher than in any of the black-un countries. When we refer to the black we're referring to the negroes in Africa. (more, repetitive). David Owen who supports these murderers with finance and with daily propaganda on the television should be charged with subversive activities. He's encouraging the murder of all the European settlers out there. (more on Kenya).	This country has no power to influence the way Rhodesia will develop. I would like to see the British government adopt the policy of regarding Rhodesia as it would regard any other country - not to intervene.	I think the present situation is wrong. We shall be hearing I suppose in the next few days that there is now a black majority government in Rhodesia. But I don't think the black Rhodesian people will have any strong representation: the white majority will be as firmly entrenched as ever. On the face of it, it will look as as though the blacks do have a majority in parliament. I would have liked it to have gone along so we would have had Mr Nkomo and Mr Mugabe from the outset. They should have been brought into the talks from the outset. I think that Ian Smith and his government should have been totally ignored and we should have merely talked with the black Rhodesian people.
WHAT DO YOU THINK OF APARTHEID IN SOUTH AFRICA?	I think it's quite good, quite a feasible system, separate living, really, I see nothing wrong with it. Even Nkrumah said it was a good system. After all, if I went to live in Cairo tomorrow, I should ask where the English community lived and go and live	Apartheid is a matter for the South Africans. It ill becomes a people five thousand miles away to sit in judgment over people who have problems to meet and difficulties to encounter. I would	It's abhorrent to me. It's an abhorrent form of separating people, because of race. It's based upon the hypothesis that the white man is a higher intellectual than anyone else.

	(58)	(10)	(22)
WHAT DO YOU THINK OF APARTHEID IN SOUTH AFRICA (Cont'd)	there. You wouldn't go and live among the Egyptians and Greeks - you'd go and live among your own kind.	take the insular view that it is no concern of ours and we will only get into difficulties if we become seriously involved.	
VIEWS ON RECORD OF AFRICAN STATES	Well, most of them have switched to military government because democracy hasn't caught on very well (chuckle) and they've had to pull up from the ground. I suppose they're succeeding as well under military government as they would under democracy because under democracy they were having terrible tribal troubles.	Tragic and continuing at that level. There is nothing we can do about it. Leave them to sort out their own affairs.	Of course, one has to admit that it hasn't been roses all the way - there's been some internal troubles - this was inevitable. You've got different factions in all countries. But basically I was pleased that they did gain independence whether peacefully or violently. It did give the people a say in their own countries. I was always glad when independence was given to the black African nations.

	(58)	(10)	(22)
A REPRESENTATIVE BLACK AFRICAN POLITICIAN	A smart politician? Dr Banda in Malawi. He's a smart African politician. He's playing on both sides, South Africa for its money and the surrounding blacks, which I suppose he's forced to do from the position he's in.	(not asked)	President Nyerere would be an outstanding one. And of course Jomo Kenyatta when he was alive.

The thirty-six questions varied considerably in form and in the responses they elicited. Nevertheless, it appears significant that Councillor 58 managed to refer to immigrants or to use racial categories in his responses to at least eleven questions, with a possibility that a further two of his answers also contain racial innuendo. Roughly one third of his replies may be classed as racial and most of these focus on black people as having agential responsibility for Britain's social problems. The other Conservative councillor (10) avoided all mention of immigration or race, and even on the question of Rhodesia and South Africa went only so far as to argue for non-intervention. The Labour councillor (22), in response to three questions, noted that racial issues were raised, but used them as opportunities to defend the black population and to attack racism and apartheid. He was, therefore, conscious of the public connection between, for example, Sir Keith Joseph's view of the degenerative effect of the reproductive level of mothers of low ability and the ethnic minority birthrate, but sought to dissociate rather than to associate the two categories.

Would it be correct to claim that Councillor 58's discourse embodied racist ideology? Certainly, racial categories helped the councillor to explain many facets of the social world. Britain had a population problem which might be solved by "encouraging immigrants to return home". The outbreak of contagious disease was partially attributable to half-educated immigrants, while blame for the increase in venereal disease was laid entirely at their door. The answers to questions on abuse of social security and crime not only concentrated almost entirely on immigration as the cause, but were lengthy, detailed, anecdotal, and intense. Councillor 58 believed "these people cannot even be classed as human beings:

Alsatian dogs are better trained." Answers to questions on the Commonwealth, British Empire, overseas aid, Rhodesia and South Africa were couched in racial terms and strong support was expressed for Ian Smith and the policy of apartheid. And in reference to negroes, the authoritarian personality described by Adorno finds expression: they were never dealt with severely enough; they constituted a threat to a law-abiding society; they were aided and abetted by Left-wing subversives who passed "Communist... immigrant-worshipping legislation" at Westminster, or supported "African murderers" with finance and propaganda. Yet it is probably significant that it was a plot by Left-wingers and Communists, and not by the Elders of Zion, that threatened the stability of Wolverhampton and the world.

Most liberal thinkers would by now be satisfied that Councillor 58 was a racist but, when it was suggested to him that many people would call him a racist for these views, he claimed that he might be 'a realist' but 'not a racist': "I've had Asian friends for many years, so you could scarcely call me a racist." He clearly understood the pejorative sense of 'racist' and sought to avoid the label. The matter was pursued still further: had he suggested that there were ulterior motives for bringing coloured people into the country? As far as he was concerned, it was a matter of simple economics: coloured people had "jumped on the gravy train" to come to the British welfare state and "who wouldn't in their circumstances?" The English had not had sufficient foresight to recognise the likely consequences. Had there been a Zionist conspiracy to admit coloured people? No, this was "a futile bit of propaganda..cooked up" by the National Front.

In contrast to his responses which attributed efficacy in social matters to 'immigrants', Councillor 58 also showed commitment

to laissez faire economics, the small businessman, and a traditional Right-wing approach to class politics. Taxes penalised the enterprising, council housing should be sold because owner-occupiers looked after their property better than council tenants, strikes were the cause of a crisis in the National Health Service, the rate-payers' money was often wastefully consumed by the social services, and there should be more law and order. A certain non-commital, liberal disposition was expressed in attitudes towards sexual behaviour. To the question of whether national character is inborn or acquired through learning, Councillor 58 inclined towards the latter position, believing that one acquired the characteristics of those amongst whom one lived.

In these respects, Councillor 58's discourse shared much in common with the petit-bourgeois conservatism of Councillor 10. Here the dominant categories which united his responses - inasmuch as they possess unity and coherence - were laissez-faire conomic policies, nationalism, individualism and an opposition to socialist class politics. His intellectual, specialised political discourse was Conservative, while his immediate and often emotional responses to less clearly ideologically secured areas: population, health, social security and crime, where the relevance of economics is not always obvious, arose from a popular general discourse which makes use of racial explanations but possesses the capacity, when appropriate, for combining them with Conservative responses. Thus, because Conservatives have always concerned themselves with the effect of poor relief on the will to work, and stressed the likely abuse of any arrangement involving 'something for nothing', Councillor 58 was easily able to insert into the formula the 'immigrant' as arch-example of the social security scrounger. Similarly, with regard to crime, the immigrant was seen as the major

transgressor in the general break-down of law-and-order and progress towards anarchy, deplored by Conservatives since the time of Burke.

The underlying ideological matrix is still recognisably Conservative in form. Insertions are clearly racial, but are not yet linked sufficiently by an explanatory framework to produce the kind of ideology to be found in Mein Kampf or, in the British context, in National Party and National Front propaganda. While accepting the strong racial inclination of Councillor 58's responses - many of his individual answers are clearly prejudiced and racist by my definition and in my estimation, - I am reluctant to treat his discourse as an example of racial ideology. It probably constitutes a borderline case where causal significance is assigned to racial categories, and racial evaluations and prescriptions are clearly present but not in sufficient degree or combination to warrant such confident classification. For Councillor 58, race was not the prime causal factor: market forces still took precedence in accounting for most social processes, including migration and race relations.

The discourse of the other two councillors was typical of Wolverhampton councillors generally in that, without solicitation in the form of questions bearing a forthright reference to migration, race or colour, few responses showed any consciousness of race as an issue in spheres other than those directly associated with race, or more correctly, they did not express views on race when other topics were mentioned. In other words, racial responses required racial triggering. It is possible, however, that certain questions and responses were racial in intent, and in the understanding they elicited in the audience. For example, Councillor 22 had no hesitation in interpreting Sir Keith Joseph's remarks as referring to the ethnic minority birthrate . Deracialised discourse is dealt with in more detail elsewhere, but it is worth considering whether

Councillor 10 had carefully studied his totally 'race-free' responses: what kind of family did he or his audience have in mind when he referred to families who were incapable of ordering their lives and who continued to grow in inadequate accommodation? Whose anxieties was he representing when he mentioned "a degree of fear in the minds of people when they walk in certain parts of this town?" If he believed that the Irish were aggressive and that national character was inborn, surely there is some underlying, if unstated, racial categorisation in his conceptualisation? Does the refusal to condemn apartheid on the grounds that South Africa is five thousand miles away ring true, even though the principle of non-interference was extended to the black African states? It is likely that if Labour Councillor 22 clearly recognised the racial innuendo of these particular questions, then so also did Councillor 10. Irrespective of these caveats, councillors rarely produced racial responses, unless directly questioned on issues of race. Yet most areas covered were capable of stimulating an occasional vilification of ethnic minorities: unemployment, educational standards, the quality of housing, and the National Health Service proving no exception. Rarely, however, did these flurries account for more than three responses from the total of thirty-six.

Councillor 10 and Councillor 22, typical of councillors generally, demonstrated clearly the presence of ideologies based on traditional British class politics. Councillor 10 wanted industry freed from government interference and a return to reliance on individual initiative. Government had to recognise the importance of the profit motive. Market forces should be allowed to control production: the mobility of labour could be encouraged by the sale of council houses. Trade Unions should confine themselves to industrial matters and keep

out of politics. Maladministration and bureaucracy accounted for failures in state-run concerns. The contribution of the voluntary sector was seen as vital to the social services. In true Conservative style, Councillor 10 deplored the decline in traditional moral values exemplified by the failure to teach religion in schools and the lax standards of sexual morality. The police had to be supported in the important work of maintaining law and order. On foreign affairs, Councillor 10 advocated a little England policy of non-interference.

Councillor 22 believed that economic and social problems are a product of capitalism in a stage of decay. Britain was suffering from an uneven distribution of wealth and from the shortsighted pursuit of profit at the expense of long-term planning and the movement towards true socialism. Trade Unions had played a vital part in improving the quality of life of the general population, but there was still much to do, particularly in the field of housing, where there was a need to build more houses to rent. Lack of adequate financing had hindered the extension and development of health and social services, though there had been considerable improvement in recent years. The introduction of comprehensive schools was raising educational standards. Crime was a product of greed, encouraged by capitalism and by capitalist crisis in many forms, including unemployment. The police were basically "an honest lot". Although by no means always present in Labour opinion, a markedly liberal attitude was expressed on sexual matters: sex was natural and sexual morality was an invention of the bigotted. Councillor 22 was a strong believer in democratic self-determination and independence for the people of Africa.

In many ways Councillors 10 and 22 represent respectively the class-orientated ideologies of the Conservative and Labour parties.

In subsequent chapters, I explore the way these ideologies affect racial beliefs, but it is clear that, in the sense I have chosen to define the expression, the discourse of Wolverhampton councillors does not serve to exemplify racial ideology. Little credence is given to race as an explanatory category in accounting for processes within British social institutions.

The one area in which racial explanation was perceptibly beginning to intrude, albeit at a relatively low level, was in the area dealt with in great detail in Hall et al's Policing the Crisis - that of street crime, but even here, for the majority of councillors, it was black youth unemployment, rather than black youth per se, that was held to be responsible.

CHAPTER SEVEN

BRITISH POLITICAL VALUES AND RACE RELATIONS (I)

From the mid 1950s, British politicians were confronted with a new and increasingly contentious public issue: the presence in Britain of a conspicuous minority of black people from the Caribbean and the Indian subcontinent. As early as 1949, whites had attacked a black hostel in Deptford, and Reginald Sorenson's vain attempt to introduce a private member's bill in 1950 outlawing discrimination in public places showed early recognition of the conditions that many black people experienced from the moment they arrived. In August 1958, there were racial brawls in Nottingham public houses, and in September, white youths in Notting Hill assaulted black people and damaged their houses. These were only the more sensational and overt manifestations of white hostility, the actual dimensions and scale of which are always difficult to decide upon and measure.

Whatever the 'real circumstances', politicians, relying on public support, were forced to take notice of the social issues presented to them through popular means of communication such as the national and local press, radio, and television, and through party organisation. Even so, from the arrival in the late 1940s of the first black people outside of the ports and in any numbers, it took approximately ten years for party officials to recognise the potential political importance of the migration and the white electorate's reactions to it. But, over the next twenty years, their speeches, campaigns, party resolutions, ministerial decisions, and laws, made relations between black and white a party political issue in its own right.

Frequently, members of parliament were reacting to a series of popularly - defined crises, such as the 1961-62 increase in immigration, the Conservative, Peter Griffith's victory over Patrick Gordon Walker

in the 1964 General Election, Enoch Powell's articles and speeches, the possibility in 1968 of a Kenyan Asian immigration, and the arrival in 1972 of 27,000 Ugandan Asians. Sometimes, despite apparent popular and press opposition, ministers actively worked out long-term strategies for implementing the policies which they regarded as necessary - such as the 1968 and 1976 Race Relations Acts.

Black people had come from widely different parts of the Commonwealth to find work in the industrial towns and cities of Britain. The immigrants' skin colour enabled the relatively biologically and culturally homogeneous white British to identify the newcomers and to remain conscious of their presence. Affected by long-standing cultural expectations, some of which derived from the history of empire, and by their interpretation of the effect that numbers of black immigrants would have on their immediate circumstances, the white population behaved in complex - but predominantly defensive and hostile ways. The two main white political parties were slowly forced to come to terms with their white electorate.

The novel circumstance of black migration was dealt with by both Conservative and Labour parties in accordance with their respective long-standing ideological traditions, tempered by the needs of foreign policy and, more importantly, by their recognition and fear of the electorate's apparent hostility towards black people. The Conservatives found it easier to come to terms with the electorate's mood because on the issue of race, their ideology closely paralleled popular culture and made use of similar justificatory forms. (Indeed, the persistently large Conservative vote, and surveys of beliefs among the working class indicate that the culture of the mass of the population has never been thoroughly penetrated by socialist thought.) The Labour Party, on the other hand, relied on abstract human notions, such as the brotherhood of man, rather than on a convincing economic

class analysis, to justify its early open-door and later cultural pluralist position. At best, this might have appealed to middle-class sentiment, but not to the hard-headed 'economic man' of the working class.

The prospect of widespread racial hostility among their traditional supporters frightened the leadership of the major parties, which both recognised the danger of an Ultra-Right party or pressure group filling the dark political void between the hostile emotional response of the electorate and the initially disinterested policies of the government. The visible black group, and the manner in which it was presented in the media, was beginning to lend greater plausibility to racial explanations for social problems. In order to re-establish electoral support and confidence, to keep a potentially explosive situation under control and to reduce the threat from the Far-Right, both parties moved in a Rightward direction, agreeing to strict control of black immigration and to an informal bipartisan approach to race questions. The move seems to have been undertaken reluctantly: the British political intelligentia rejected beliefs of racial superiority, and continued to justify their policies in traditional class-political, rather than classical racist terms. In addition, a continuing labour shortage in the early 1960s, together with Commonwealth pressure, played some part in slowing down the Rightward tendency.

The concern in this and the following chapter is to show how mainstream party political values were brought to bear on the issues raised by black migration to Britain. Existing, well-established, ideological formulae were employed to provide justification for immigration and race relations policies, partly chosen by, and partly forced upon, the parties in their assessment of the situation. This chapter deals in turn with Conservative and Labour values in the

following three areas:

(1) The process of change. A comparison is made between Conservative traditionalism and organicism and Labour rationalisation and commitment to structural change,

(2) The nature and significance of nationhood. Conservative nationalism is compared with Labour internationalism, summed up in the slogan 'brotherhood of man'.

(3) The effect of empire. The rise and fall of Conservative commitment to the British Empire is set against the somewhat ambivalent Labour resolve to guide the colonies to independence.

The general values are described and some evidence offered of their relatively enduring nature. Following this, an attempt is made to show how formulae drawing on those values have been used as justification for and, possibly, as an aid to, decision-making in the field of immigration and race relations. Many of the examples are taken from party annual conference reports. Where case studies of borough councillors' responses are thought to illustrate or support the argument being advanced, these, too, are included. As a result of the need to severely curtail the original length of this section, the reader is asked to excuse what, on occasion, may appear to be a somewhat cryptic presentation of the argument. The sections that follow offer an impression of the historically enduring nature of two prevailing justificatory systems, and an indication of how they bear on racial matters. They are intended neither as a detailed, all-inclusive history of party policies, nor as a critical comparison of party beliefs with performance in office, nor as a class analysis of party ideologies. In general, thematic takes precedence over chronological ordering, but some indication is offered of ideological development and new application.

The Conservative Party and traditionalism and organicism

The Conservative Party has always seen itself as a party of tradition, believing in the worth of existing social institutions and seeking only to modify them slowly and pragmatically in response to changing circumstances. Lord Hugh Cecil (1912), in restating Burke's contribution to Conservative thought, pointed out that Burke regarded society more as an organism than a mechanism, "and an organism about which there is much that is mysterious". In accordance with the organic, living nature of society, it behoved politicians to proceed with caution lest they damage the body politic. Change had to be made gradually "and with as slight a dislocation as possible". Disraeli (1872) saw, as one of Conservatism's great objects, the necessity of maintaining the institutions of the country. L S Amery (1945) explained that the Conservative "is not prepared to place undue reliance on attempts to create a new world order on paper in wishful disregard of the profound differences in national character and ambitions which must impair the efficiency of such a mechanical structure".

The implications for government action and legislation are clear: maintain existing practice and procedure intact as long as they function satisfactorily, make necessary changes by building on past traditions, and interfere with administrative machinery as little as possible, or only to restore the historical status quo disturbed by others. Nowhere is this precept more important than in the economic sphere, where there is strong commitment to the private ownership of the means of production. The Conservative approach to social and political institutions, says Philip Buck, is to view them "as the result of a slow and gradual growth of custom, tradition, practice and formal enactment. The stability of state and society is based upon this accumulation of rules and precedents, built up through

centuries of experience" (1975, p.26).

What then should be the role of the Conservative in social legislation such as that aimed at countering racial discrimination? According to Oakeshott (1962), "modification of the rules should always reflect and never impose a change in the activities and beliefs of those who are subject to them, and should never on any occasion be so great as to destroy the ensemble". In other words, legislation should never precede public opinion, nor interfere unduly with existing practices.

Values of traditionalism and organicism have considerable effect on Conservative positions on immigration and race relations. On immigration, we should expect commitment - at least initially - to Commonwealth citizens' 'traditional right' of entry to the mother country, and to the honouring of past promises and passports. This would eventually be counterbalanced and undermined by fear of possible changes in white British society caused by the presence of black people and, moreover, of black people with different customs and habits.

The Conservative perception of the scope of the changes would seem to be related to the size of the groups wishing to enter and the degree to which they were seen to differ in their behaviour from the 'British way of life'. If, for example, they were non-Christian, or had different domestic or sexual practices, they might be seen as posing a threat to Christian religion and family life. (Churchill, in 1946, had defined one of Conservatism's main objectives as "To uphold the Christian religion and resist all attacks upon it" (5.10. 1946).) Respect for existing social institutions such as the monarchy, parliament, church, police, and family life, lies at the emotional heart of much Conservatism.

A sudden influx of immigrants would be seen as posing a threat

to existing social relations and would have to be countered by immigration acts to 'control immigration', to slow down the rate of change, and to give the host community time to 'assimilate', 'absorb', and perhaps, 'adjust' to the newcomers. There would be strong opposition to 'superior' British institutions being modified to meet the needs of immigrants: if these people were not to be integrated on British terms then, as long as social stability and 'harmony' could be maintained, they would have to live separately, or be encouraged to return "from whence they came".

With regard to anti-discrimination legislation, the traditionalist Conservative might seek to oppose it on a number of counts: it would be an attack on British freedom of speech and association, it would be strongly opposed by the electorate, it would be ineffective and unlikely to make an impression on racial injustice, and it would be an attempt to import American practices which have no basis in British legal traditions. Oakeshott (1962) puts the general Conservative point of view on legislation succinctly, and it helps to provide the kind of justification Conservatives would be likely to offer for the various stances on the Race Relations Acts:

> The Conservative will have nothing to do with innovation designed to meet merely hypothetical situations; he will prefer to enforce a rule he has got rather than to invent a new one; he will think it appropriate to delay a modification of the rules until it is clear that the change of circumstances it is designed to reflect has come to stay for a while ...

The influence of the values of traditionalism and organicism is very apparent in Conservative discourse on race and related issues. The section on the effect of empire, will deal more fully with beliefs about people of the Empire, but the interrelated nature of traditional ideas of the superiority of British institutions and the ability of colonial peoples to decide on their own destiny is illustrated by Sir Conrad Corfield's suggestion that "The Westminster

model of Parliamentary democracy is the finest form of Government in the world. It is based on an education and homogeneous electorate. Emergent countries have not yet got this. So long a period of training is necessary" (CACR*, 1960, p.12). Importance is attached not only to British institutions and the homogeneity of the British electorate, but to the claim that colonial people are not yet sufficiently educated to make political decisions for themselves. Beliefs such as these have repercussions for British domestic race relations.

Specific applications to immigration control and the philosophy of 'integration'

At first, Conservatives were wedded to the principle of the Commonwealth citizen's right of access to the mother country. When challenged by Norman Pannell at the 1958 Party Conference, R A Butler mentioned "our time-honoured tradition of hospitality", claiming that Conservatives must be worthy of their old traditions, while, at the same time, dealing with "the practical difficulties of the present moment" (CACR, 1958, p.151). At the 1961 Conference, the open-door policy was again criticised. While acknowledging the importance of the tradition, one delegate wanted to know how much longer the country would be able to absorb "the ever-increasing numbers of unskilled workers arriving in our cities" (Maddin, CACR, 1961, p.27). Another, while admitting "we hear a great deal about the traditional rights of the people who come into this country from the Commonwealth" did not think it was a particularly long-standing tradition. It dated, he said, "mainly from the 1870s and 1880s, when people went out to chance their arm in the old colonies and, of course, they had to have the right to return" (Jessel, CACR, 1961, p.28). Still

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* CACR = Conservative Annual Conference Report.

others could see absolutely no reason why the tradition should not continue (Buck, CACR, 1961, p.31). And, even though the Conservative Government was already planning to legislate, R A Butler felt it necessary to remind the Conference that "if the Government decide to take your advice, we are departing from one of our most cherished traditions and making a new step in history" (CACR, 1961, p.31).

The principle of the traditional right of Commonwealth citizens to come to the mother country was irreversibly weakened by the passing of the Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1962, and with the strength of the Conservative commitment to severely reducing Commonwealth immigration, it became impossible to use it for justification of subsequent immigration. But, if the need arose to justify the admission of further Commonwealth immigration, as in the case of the Kenyan Asians with British passports, or the Ugandan Asians expelled by President Amin, other powerful traditions existed to which the Conservatives might appeal. Not only was there a belief in the value of promises and of the British passport, but it was accepted that Britain had always acted as a haven for refugees, and that it was a Christian country whose leaders were guided by the precepts of compassion and humanity.

Quintin Hogg pointed out that "at a Conservative Conference in Britain one does not need to overemphasise that we believe in the dignity of man because our country has been founded upon the natural law as expressed in the Christian and Jewish scriptures" (CACR, 1968, p.71). "... Let us never forget", he continued, "that there is room for compassion and humanity ..." And "when I think of the Jews fleeing from Hitler, I am proud that our nation took them into our midst" (CACR, 1968, p.72). In referring to the Ugandan Asians at the 1972 Party Conference, Clr Mrs M Hogarth attempted to transfer the delegates from one tradition to another. "Let us be quite

clear", she said, that "they are refugees and not immigrants" (CACR, 1972, p.74). In these ways, the Conservative belief in tradition slowed down or modified action aimed at reducing black immigration.

By the late 1950s, however, Conservatives were becoming increasingly preoccupied with the number of black residents in Britain whom it was felt might threaten the traditional British way of life. "If the present tendency continues", Norman Pannell said, "there will be about half-a-million of them in five years' time - to say nothing of their children, many of whom will be of mixed blood" (Pannell, CACR, 1958, p.149). In addition to taking for granted the desirability of white endogamy, he suggested that British standards were being undermined by the immigrants' squalid living conditions. The threat to British standards posed by immigrants is a frequently repeated Conservative theme. Clr D Clarke claimed that the reasons that had led to his motion for the restriction of immigration were the conditions prevailing in the country: the serious overcrowding and housing problems in the towns exacerbated by immigrants "with the result that in places like Birmingham we have new slums being created before old ones can be demolished" (CACR, 1961, p.26). T F H Jessel wanted to make sure that "the interests are protected of people who have always lived in these districts where the immigrants go and that standards of public health are preserved" (CACR, 1961, p.27). But it was not only their impoverished physical conditions that worried the traditionalists. Immigrants appeared to undermine the biological and cultural homogeneity of the British way of life.

"These immigrants are not necessarily inferior to us", Pannell conceded, "but they are different - different not only in colour, but in background, tradition, and habits" (CACR, 1961, p.30). He could conceive of only two possible solutions, both of them

undesirable: "they must either be fully integrated into our society by intermarriage, by the intermingling of their blood with ours throughout the population, or they must form minority groups set apart from the general population - a sort of second-class citizenry". Although Pannell offered no reason for these limited possibilities, both of them might be seen as reflections of an organicist response to a black minority - conceived of as distinct and possibly threatening. The first offers biological organicism - a merging of races - as an unwelcome solution, while the second suggests that social organicism - a beneficial mixing on equal terms - will fail to occur. Pannell went on to point out that no country in the world had been able to solve the racial problem and asked whether it was fair that "we should allow this problem to develop in this country for our children to face".

John Boyd Carpenter called for the strictest control of immigration on the grounds that "The one danger ... among our own people who are the kindliest in the world, is that fear may arise, fear of their standards, habits, being swamped by an unchecked flow of people, people with many merits and many qualities, but who have different ideas, different attitudes, and different habits" (CACR, 1968, p.68). "We are an old people" claimed Jim Hall, in the context of the Ugandan Asian immigration, and "we have been in this island for some 2,000 years and none of us own this country. Certainly no Government owns it". The people of Britain, he said, had a right to be consulted about their inheritance before it was "unduly diluted and altered completely", and he urged Conservative delegates to vote for the British people and for a country which "boasts a history of enlightenment that has spread to the four corners of the earth". "We have something worth preserving and please God we will preserve it" (CACR, 1972, p.77). Clr P R Wood

claimed that the people did not "welcome the changes they see taking place in the hearts of those towns of Britain" (CACR, 1973, p.37).

The widespread belief in the superiority of British ways and standards and the threat posed to British traditions through contact with people having 'many merits' but who were 'different', recurred frequently as a justification for immigration control. But immigration control does not provide a solution to the challenge to the British way of life posed by immigrants already settled in Britain. Belief in organicism would seem to dictate that they must be incorporated into the British way of life, in some way or other, ideally, of course, by behaving in exactly the same way as the indigenous British. The 1965 Conservative Conference called not only for firm restrictions on immigration, but for positive and wide-ranging measures for "the integration of existing immigrants in the field of housing, education, employment, and the social services, backed up by the generous resources of the central Government".

To the Conservative traditionalist, 'integration' would seem to imply the abandonment by immigrants of all distinctive ethnic languages, institutions, organisations, and cultural practices, and the adoption of the lifestyle of the British middle stratum. It is only in this way that the traditionalists can be reassured that any challenge immigrants pose to the British life has been removed. This interpretation of 'integration' is the thesis to Roy Jenkins's antithesis that it must not be a "flattening process of assimilation" but "equal opportunity accompanied by cultural diversity". The "atmosphere of mutual tolerance" proposed by Jenkins (1967, p.267) is scarcely possible if, in Conservative eyes, an immigrant is unable to qualify as a good citizen until he follows British tradition to the letter and conducts himself as an integral part of the body politic. If British institutions are best, then any attempt to

modify them constitutes a lowering of standards which must be resisted at all costs.

Chris Barr, for example, thought that the Ugandan Asians had to be told that "we expect them to take on British ways, to speak our language, and to live their lives in Britain in the ways we have established over the centuries and the ways we believe that life should best be lived ..." (CACR, 1972, p.75). Dr Raja Chandran argued that to be accepted by the British, the immigrant "should change his attitude and become part of the British scene" (CACR, 1976, p.42). However, it is interesting to note that mainstream Conservatives rarely developed the idea of integration in the direction of advocating the desirability of intermarriage - on this theme, they preserved a significant silence. It was left to Pannell to provide an example, rare at a national political level, of a Right-wing expression of open disapproval of micegenation.

But is a total integration or assimilation on Conservative lines a realistic demand or probable outcome? In 1968, Clr K G Reeves proposed the resolution that the Party, when returned to power, would "take effective and urgent steps to promote social harmony and stability by severely restricting further immigration ..." (CACR, 1968, p.65). It was his opinion that the vast majority of people in the country did not want a multi-racial society and that the fact needed to be recognised. Besides, "the very backgrounds and cultures of our new residents almost defy its realisation and we know only too well that in areas where immigrants are concentrated, integration is a very slow and difficult process". In the meantime, a programme had to be designed to promote stability and harmony.

The theme was developed by Peter Davis, who expressed his pleasure at the fact that the resolution contained the words 'social harmony' and not 'integration' because there was a subtle difference

between them. "We are not asking either that we must be forced to live together or that we must be forced to accept them in our communities" (CACR, 1968, p.66). In other words, the indigenous British might still be able to maintain their biological and cultural identity by keeping apart.

Thus, two visions - apart from repatriation - are available to the traditionalist and organicist, afraid of the effect of black Commonwealth immigrants on the British way of life and body politic. Immigrants must become culturally indistinguishable from the indigenous British and participate on equal terms within British institutions. Alternatively, they must conduct themselves unobtrusively, and be prevented from influencing British ways, until they decide to 'integrate' on British terms. In this way, the survival of British institutions is guaranteed without concessions being made to foreign influence.

Any concessions to non-Christian religions, clothing, and diet is seen as a betrayal of British tradition and 'standards', and attempts to change seemingly minor regulations act as symbolic rallying points for defenders of tradition. The Conservative imperative that British institutions must be maintained and protected from all unnecessary change - leads inevitably to a rejection of suggestions that simple modifications might be made for the newcomers. In defense of tradition, even peripheral rules take on symbolic importance. Requests, in defiance of rules on uniform, that Sikhs be allowed to wear turbans to school, or when working on the buses, are seen as undermining standards, as an attack on the British way of life. The mores of a foreign religion take second place to the regulations on uniform of a municipal organisation. Exemption of turbanned Sikhs from the law requiring all motor cyclists to wear crash helmets is regarded as an attack on the law in its entirety and, furthermore, on

the principle of equality before it. The Commonwealth immigrant is cast in the role of an iconoclast, of a violator of rules. In common with socialists and criminals, he is credited with having no respect for institutions. Conservative sensitivity becomes even more noticeable when encroachment occurs upon particularly cherished institutions and symbols, such as the family, the police, or the established church.

The Labour Party and rationalisation and structural change

Attempts within the Labour Party to reconcile socialism's commitment to radical structural change and social democracy's belief in gradual progress towards a fair and rational society, lead inevitably to a diffuse and disparate set of arguments characterised by increasing levels of abstraction and flights of radical rhetoric describing mundane modification of the status quo. Perhaps one reason for the failure of socialism to penetrate popular culture has been the inconsistent message of the Labour Party which fluctuates between fundamental rejection of capitalist first premises and tentative acceptance of suitably modified, highly idealised versions of them.

What has come to be called socialism, in contradistinction to social democracy, advocates an end of the capitalist system and its class divisions between capitalist and worker, in order to eliminate the economic exploitation of man by man, and to achieve a rationally and humanely-run society in which each will contribute according to his ability and receive according to work or need. The socialist recognises that this end is to be achieved by taking into common ownership the means of production, distribution, and exchange, and by ensuring that the State machinery is no longer run for the benefit of the capitalist class. The socialist believes in some kind of discontinuity between capitalism and socialism: the capitalist system of ownership with its entrenched economic interests must end before

socialism can be achieved, and this is unlikely to occur without an all-out struggle, with or without violence.

Intellectually formulated by Eduard Bernstein in the late nineteenth century, social democracy criticises what it takes to be the cataclysmic nature of Marxian-derived socialism and rejects the idea of irreconcilable class antagonism. A socialist future is still envisaged, but the means by which it is to be attained is through an extension of democratic choice to an electorate whose representatives will gradually shift the balance of the economy in favour of socialism. Capitalism will be modified little by little, until, one day, it will be seen to have metamorphosed into socialism. The social democrat believes in the possibility of a slow, steady socialist advance and continuity between the two economic systems.

Whether or not these two strands of thought are logically reconcilable, they are both to be found in uneasy condition in party resolutions and documents, and in the discourse of Labour politicians. The Labour Party can be said to be committed - if that is not too strong a term - to the principle of structural change if not, as yet, to a programme for its achievement. For example, the definitive Labour Party document, Let us Face the Future (April 1945), which mapped out the post-war reconstruction programme, stated that the Labour Party was a socialist party whose "ultimate purpose at home is a socialist Commonwealth - free, democratic, efficient, progressive, public spirited - its material resources organised in the service of the people ..." But, significantly, it then added: "socialism cannot come overnight".

Because of the strong social democratic leanings of many party members, the basic 'economism' of the trade unions, the apparent unpopularity of social policies with the electorate, the opposition of the capitalist press, and many other factors, socialist policies

calling for the abolition of the capitalist mode of production have long been omitted from Labour's actual programme when in power.

The alternative policy of maintaining, modifying, and humanising capitalism, results in the socialist agenda of common ownership and democratic control being replaced by one of economic rationalisation of existing industrial structures. In addition, the failure to accept the importance of social class analysis and class struggle converts the pursuit of egalitarian social relations into welfarism. The demand for equality is relinquished in favour of the principle of equality of opportunity and a safety net consisting of a national minimum wage and social security payments. Revolutionary activism and urgency of purpose are replaced by quietist gradualism and an acceptance that, far from campaigning to change hearts and minds, the Party should be guided in the name of democracy by existing public opinion.

The overall position was aptly typified by Attlee's personal economic adviser, E F M Durbin in his book The Politics of Democratic Socialism (1940). "It would be difficult to conceive", he wrote, of

> ... a more respectable, a more responsible mass movement, than the British Labour Movement today. Extremists of all classes, and particularly intellectuals of the middle class, hate to recognise this historical fact. They struggle to avoid its political implications. But the generalisation remains obstinately true, and any Labour Government that was foolish enough to commit itself to revolutionary action would lose the electoral support upon which it had been formed, would have to fight without an army to lead and would become a sorry company of deluded Jacobins ...

The consequences for immigration and race relations are predictable. The Labour socialist ideal is invariably belied by social democratic practice, aimed at maintaining a mixed economy and placating the electorate in order to stay in power. Immigration is controlled in accordance with the demand for labour and/or the racist sentiments expressed by the electorate. Control is justified

as an aspect of economic planning. The demand for racial equality is not met by a change in the relations of production and a fundamental redistribution of wealth, but by attempts to increase racial equality of opportunity and to control the 'irrational' workings of the market. In the meantime, the party continues to voice a confusing and ineffectual rhetoric of racial equality and its commitment to radical measures for alleviating racial oppression. The Labour Right concerns itself with strategies for improving race relations without unduly provoking the electorate. The Labour Left may run the danger of regarding racialist practice as so endemic to capitalism that its remedy must await the coming of the revolution. Nevertheless, the Party is likely to recognise the need for experiment, intervention, and initiative in the area of race relations.

Specific application to immigration control and race relations legislation

After the war, British industry, hungry for labour power, tried to satisfy demand by recruiting between 1946 and 1951 half-a-million aliens from Europe. As this supply began to peter out, a colonial pool of labour was discovered and Commonwealth citizens were encouraged to enter Britain to satisfy the general labour shortage and more specifically, to take the jobs which employers found the indigenous population reluctant to fill. From the point of view of capitalist economic rationalisation, unhampered by other social considerations, the solution to the demand for labour was simple and cheap. Any overheads would be borne by the migrants themselves or local government.

Gaitskell and other Labour MPs opposed the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act, basically on the grounds that it offended against economic rationalisation. Gordon Walker pointed out that the expanding economy created new jobs, 60,000 of which were created between 1955 and 1960. Without importing labour, the service industries (transport

and health), so important in the construction of the welfare state, would suffer from shortages. There was, he went on, "a direct relation between labour demand and immigration" (Hansard, 16.11.1961, p.710). Gaitskell also believed in the direct relationship between migration and the laws of supply and demand: he argued that "..the movement of immigration is closely related to the movement of unfilled vacancies. If we were to run into a recession we should find the immigration drying up extremely quickly" (Hansard, 16.11.1961, p.795). It is quite clear that Gaitskell was justifying immigration primarily in terms of the migrants' contribution to economic expansion, i.e. rationalisation, even though the Labour opposition motion was formally worded in terms of the right of free entry, the unity of the Commonwealth, and opposition to racial discrimination. If we accept that social democratic economic rationalisation was likely to remain dominant in this sphere, as it had in others, then it would not be difficult to predict that the Labour Party would be unlikely to oppose control of immigration in a period of economic recession, particularly if other factors such as popular opinion, made it expedient not to do so.

The cheap labour demanded by the economy in the 1950s was no longer considered as indispensable in the less certain economic climate of the 1960s. The solution was now thought to lie, not in making available an adequate supply of labour, but in the mobilisation of scientific research to produce a new technological breakthrough. "We are redefining and we are restating our socialism", Harold Wilson said, "in terms of the scientific revolution." Technical rationalisation was no longer seen simply in terms of steadily expanding the economy by ensuring the necessary ingredients of capital and labour were present. Instead, industry, privately or publicly owned, required the abolition of outdated traditions of

production, elitist management and restrictive practices, and merger into efficient units (Harold Wilson, LPACR, 1963).

Commentators who argue that the White Paper (Cmnd.2739, 1965), which drastically restricted to 8,500 the number of work vouchers available, represented an about-turn in Labour Party policy have failed to identify the underlying theme of rationalisation in the field of labour supply that was already present and manifest in 1961. Nevertheless, Crossman felt that the Party would be shocked by the White Paper which would confirm that the Government had surrendered to public pressure and was no longer socialist. In the same way as it had been forced to make "economic concessions to reality", the Cabinet had had the limit on the immigrant quota "squeezed out" of it (1975, Vol 1, p.299). It is clear from his concern that, along with other Party members, he felt that a betrayal of principle had taken place.

Labour's abstract liberal humanitarian critique of immigration control as a betrayal of Commonwealth obligations and a blow to racial harmony and justice, provided a most inadequate defense against the pressure for control, acknowledged by Crossman to be "the hottest potato in politics" (1975, Vol.1, p.149). No class-based analysis of immigration and race, appealing to the economic interests of the working class, was ever suggested or popularised by the Labour Party as this time. Recognising that theirs was a minority cause opposed by the working class in whose interests they claimed to speak, and having no socialist analysis, the Labour Left became demoralised and acquiesced to the crushing operative logic of their leaders. (See note 5.)

The 1961 Labour opposition amendment to the Commonwealth Immigrants Bill also indicated the Party's solutions to racial discontent were never conceived from a class position but, in addition

to immigration control, in terms of reallocation of welfare provision. Gordon Walker thought that the Conservative government was to blame for not relating the increase in the number of jobs to housing and for failing to disperse industry. A Labour government would tackle the problem by planning for these eventualities and providing for the needs of both the indigenous and immigrant populations. Ten years later, Joan Lestor reaffirmed that "as socialists we believe in planning and we must have a planned programme to fight discrimination in the same way as we plan for full employment, adequate housing and other things" (LPACR, 1972, p.158). The size and scope of subsequent Labour exercises in planning services within the cities and for the allocation of industry have shown that the Party allowed itself to be constrained by the condition of the capitalist economy, and was reluctant to radically interfere with the ownership and distribution of wealth.

The failure to engage in activist politics generally, and in the politics of race relations in particular, led to the Party's simple acceptance of the electorate's racial animosity. The Party always feared that by pursuing a course that was initially unpopular with the electorate, it would become, in Durbin's words, "a sorry company of deluded Jacobins". Its acquiescence, in the face of white hostility, to the need to control coloured immigration was well illustrated by both the 1965 White Paper and the passing of the 1968 Immigration Act which subjected to immigration control, citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies with United Kingdom passports who had 'no substantial connection' with Britain.

In order to reconcile the racially discriminatory policy of excluding Commonwealth immigrants from Britain with the fundamental socialist principle of equality of treatment for members of all races, a number of rhetorical strategems were developed, among them the

notorious 'balance format'. In February 1965, Crossman noted that "we have to combine tight immigration controls ... with a constructive policy for integrating into the community the immigrants who are there already" (1975, Vol 1, p.149). The 1965 White Paper spelt out the new dual policy of, on the one hand, controlling the entry of immigrants "so that it does not outrun Britain's capacity to absorb them" and, on the other, of introducing positive measures designed to "secure for the immigrants and their children their rightful place in our society". The racially discriminatory nature of the immigration controls was to be counterbalanced by the Race Relations Acts. By 1968, the government was able to report to the Labour Party conference that it had maintained "a balanced policy by taking a number of steps in the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1968 to reduce the number of Commonwealth citizens entering the United Kingdom but also introducing increased powers to ensure that immigrants already here are treated in the same way as the indigenous population" (LPACR, 1968, p.86).

The dishonourable expediency necessary to placate a hostile electorate was set against an attempt to maintain the Party's fundamental values. The Race Relations Acts could be seen as an ameliorative tactic for excusing the racially discriminatory effect of the immigration controls. The policy was balanced because it combined, in a formula apparently acceptable to the membership as a whole, concessions to Right-wing racial animosity with reaffirmation of socialist commitment to equality of treatment.

The Race Relations Act might also be understood and explained within the context of rationalisation and structural change. In law, racial discrimination consists of treating another less favourably after having made due allowance for his market position. A person discriminates against another if

> ... he applies to that other a requirement or condition which he applies or would apply to persons not of the same racial group as that other but ... which he cannot show to be justifiable irrespective of colour, race, nationality or ethnic or national origins of the persons to whom it is applied ... (Race Relations Act, 1976).

The Act did not question the already existing economic position of black people, and sought only to remove or lessen the interference of the colour factor in the market mechanism. The Act was not aimed at achieving equality, but of guaranteeing equality of opportunity in the fields of employment, education, and the provision of goods, facilities, services, and premises. This was to be achieved not by mass organisation of the ethnic minorities or Labour movement exercising pressure from below, but by the due process of law within the courts.

The Act was frequently justified by pointing to the instability that might result if precautions were not taken to ensure work and housing were allocated homogeneously according to colour-blind market forces. It was rarely advocated on grounds of its contribution to the rights of black people. A much more serious problem of maintaining law and order would be presented to the state, it was argued, if preemptory measures were not taken.

After 1975, there was a marked resurgence and reaffirmation of socialist values in the Party and an accompanying growth of concern for racial equality. New attempts were made to couple theories of the phenomenon of racialism with those of the structure of capitalism and to develop an awareness that racial animosity could only be finally eradicated in the campaign for socialism. Gerry Lerner moved the composite resolution: "Conference recognises that to end the threat of racialism once and for all requires an end to the system that creates and nurtures it and that the system will use immigrant workers as scapegoats for its inadequacies" (LPACR, 1976, p.213). Ivan Taylor pointed out that "minority groups are used as scapegoats for capitalism's failure", the solution to which

lay, according to Paul Moore, in "taking over the economy and running it in the interests of all workers, black and white" (LPACR, 1976, p.216). At the conference, socialist fundamentals in the form of a critique of inevitability of alienation under capitalism were clearly being voiced. The social democratic and socialist strands of Labour thought continued to coexist.

THE NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF NATIONHOOD

The Conservative Party and nationalism

Political scientists experience great difficulty in defining the multiplexity of ideas contained under the heading 'nationalism'. British nationalism is inclusive of beliefs in the importance of tradition, historical culture, and institutions, but is something far more extensive than these. It is a belief in the entity of the British nation identified through a combination of geographical, racial, linguistic, and cultural criteria. Those who consider themselves members of this entity place considerable importance on its existence and their freedom to decide upon their own nation's affairs without reference to outsiders. Emphasis on nationalism is often accompanied by a fear or dislike of foreigners - those who do not belong to the nation and have no commitment to sustaining it. Loyalty or commitment to the nation is expected of its members, while disloyalty is attributed almost automatically to foreigners, who are regarded as belonging to other nations and, ipso facto, as having other loyalties.

If racial characteristics, membership of kinship lines, or meticulous performance of some cultural activity (the acquisition of which is difficult) are imposed as criteria for membership of the nation, it may be impossible for outsiders to become incorporated in a manner which satisfies the self-appointed guardians of a nation's integrity. The criteria, and enforcement of criteria,

for defining nationhood vary according to law, but the law is formulated, interpreted, in the context of the prevalent historical and cultural concepts of how the nation is to be identified.

British, or rather, English nationalism*, matured comparatively early in European history. At this stage, lineage, geographical situation, and loyalty to the crown are all distinguishable as criteria for membership of the nation. English nationalism's nature and strong emotional appeal to the populace are probably well illustrated by Shakespeare's Henry V in his speech to the English troops invading France: "Once more unto the breach, dear friends, once more ..." (Shakespeare, Henry V, Act III, Scene 1) and also by Richard II's praise of "this blessed plot" in which territorial affection looms large:

> "This royal throne of kings, this sceptred isle,
> This earth of majesty, this seat of Mars,
> This other Eden, demi-paradise,
> This fortress built by Nature for herself ..."
> (Shakespeare, Richard II, Act II, Scene I.)

The growth of nationalism was also accompanied by the invention of national myths of racial origin. Poliakov (1971) claims that the English had four great mythologies with which to construct their own myth of origin - the Greco-Roman, the Celtic, the Germanic, and the Hebrew - the last two assuming great importance. He argues that after the Glorious Revolution of 1688, English writers came to regard the constitutional system in Great Britain as the embodiment of liberties derived from Germanic or Gothic sources.

Henry Bolingbroke (1678-1751), statesman and leader of the Tory party in the reign of Queen Anne, is credited with helping to write:

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* See L P Curtis (1968) Anglo Saxons and Celts, p.9.

Rule, Britannia, rule the waves;
Britons never will be slaves.

And his The Idea of a Patriot King was used to teach George III the principles of kingship. Bolingbroke stressed the traditions of British and Saxon freedom, and admitted "I feel a secret pride in thinking that I was born a Briton; when I consider that the Romans, those masters of the world, maintained their liberty little more than seven centuries and that Britain which was a free nation above seventeen hundred years ago, is so at this hour". (See Snyder, 1964.)

Edmund Burke, Tory and traditional nationalist par excellence, asserted that, next to the love of parents for their children, "the strongest instinct, both natural and moral, that exists in man, is the love of his country: - an instinct indeed, which extends even to the brute creation ..." "We all know" he continued "that the natal soil has a sweetness in it beyond the harmony of verse. This instinct, I say, that binds all creatures to their country, never becomes inert in us, nor ever suffers us to want in memory of it" (1790).

As a creed that reviles theories of internal class division, Conservatism has always placed great value on a unifying nationalism. Arthur Balfour felt that "no more abominable creed" had ever been preached than that of class war, claiming that Britain's future depended ultimately on "cooperation, friendliness, mutual good will and service, and all classes working together for one great object" (1925).

Because English nationalism matured early, was long taken for granted and latterly assumed an imperialist - a 'Greater Britain' - aura, the cultural criteria for deciding on who belonged to the nation were never clearly specified: indeed the criteria changed in accordance with the country's changing relationship with other parts of the world. For example, Charles Wentworth Dilke, writer

traveller, and Liberal MP, gave expression to a highly influential and distinctly racial nationalism in his book Greater Britain published in 1866-67. He conceived of the Anglo-Saxon race conquering the world and eventually displacing the backward coloured peoples*. Britain's noble destiny, sustained by an "instinct of inherited continuity", was also portrayed in the immensely popular work of the imperialist novelist and poet, Rudyard Kipling. By the turn of the century, a concept of British nationalism based on distinctly racial criteria was well established and popularised in the newsprint of, for example, the boys' comics. This was also the golden age of self-congratulatory racial history+.

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* Dilke wrote:

> If I remarked that climate, soil, manners of life, that mixture with other peoples had modified the blood, I saw, too, that in essentials the race was always one... the dearer are on the whole likely to destroy the cheaper peoples, and that Saxondom will rise triumphant from the doubtful struggle ...
> The power of English laws and English principles of government is not merely an English question - its continuance is essential to the freedom of mankind. (1868.)

\+ For example, William Stubbs, in his Lectures on Early British History (1906) wrote:

> We will proceed to England of which I have ventured to affirm that it is the country in which the teutonic genius has most freely developed notwithstanding the intermixture of the blood and the disturbances of foreign influences.

That these ideas were available for use among members of the Conservative Party in the 1920s is well illustrated by Foot (1965) who quotes tellingly from the parliamentary speeches of two Conservative MPs. Mr Charles Crook, in moving a Private Member's Bill for stricter immigration control in 1923, remarked that: "these four limbs of the race - Saxon, Norman, Dane, and Celt - have given the nation the power that it is today by the mingling of their strength. I am content to maintain our stock as nearly as possible from these four races". And Mr W P C Greene asserted that "it is absolutely essential to preserve the purity of our race and to prevent contamination with the riff-raff of Eastern Europe, the stiffs of the Mediterranean, and the dead beats of the world" (11.2.1925, quoted in Paul Foot, 1965, pp 109-110).

But, despite such earlier trends, the precise nature of British nationhood and the conditions of membership remain ambiguously defined in today's popular culture. It is likely that the requirement of continuity of lineage is reflected in Conservative commitment to their Rhodesian 'kith and kin'. But the actual practice of conferring British citizenship on all those born in Britain - the 'ius soli' - seems to indicate a general acceptance of geographical criteria. The demand that immigrants and others identify with the 'British way of life' draws attention to the importance of cultural tradition in deciding on who is British. Declarations that an applicant is of good character and loyal are required of the referees of those applying for citizenship of the United Kingdom and colonies. Most debatable is whether a biological racial criterion is, or ever has been, implicit in the Conservative concept of British nationality. If any generalisation can be made, it would seem that Conservatives place greatest weight on the criterion of loyalty to Crown and Parliament and to other traditional British institutions. A British

citizen is thought of as someone who obeys the law of the land, identifies with his country, and serves it faithfully in times of need - although this is not to say that reference to the British race and to the importance of preserving racial purity cannot occasionally be found.

The effect of Conservative nationalism on questions of race is illustrated by the conception of black people, as an 'alien wedge', which threatens the British way of life. Blacks have come from overseas to a place where they do not properly belong. Geographical, and cultural, and possibly racial, criteria prevent their being identified as British. They are compared with an army of invasion: they may 'swamp' Britain and irrevocably alter the British way of life. Illegal immigrants are cast in the role of Germans against whom our beaches must be defended. In time "the black man will have the whip hand over the white" (Powell, 20.4.1968), particularly if his rate of reproduction continues to exceed that of the native British. The British are seen as superior to all foreigners - particularly black foreigners - who have strange habits and customs and lower standards. With an effective Conservative government, the Immigration Acts can keep out the alien horde, dependants can be restricted, and voluntary repatriation encouraged. The Race Relations Acts, however, are seen as aiding the enemy's takeover, as breaking down native defenses, and as giving the foreigners privileges over the indigenous white population.

A terrible question is posed by the knowledge that many black children were born in Britain and have no other home: no longer can geographical criteria of exclusion be applied to the new generation, and suggestions that there are cultural and linguistic barriers to nationhood become increasingly less convincing. However, at the present moment, the Conservative is rarely prepared to go further and

to countenance an overtly racial concept of nationality.

Specific application to black migration and settlement

Conservative nationalism in the field of race is best exemplified in the influential speeches of Enoch Powell before he left the Party to join the UUUC, although he continued to reassert his position, referring, for example, in 1977 to "enclaves of foreign lands in British cities" (21.1.1977). Powell was concerned to defend his belief in nationalism against an unspecified group of people who "tell us we must be prepared to contemplate, in fact to welcome, the alteration and alienation of our towns and cities":

> They tell us there is no such thing as our own people and our own country. Indeed there is, and I say it in no mean or arrogant or exclusive spirit. What I know is that we have an identity of our own and that the instinct to preserve that identity, as to defend that territory is one of the deepest and strongest implanted in mankind. I happen also to believe that the instinct is good and that its beneficent effects are not exhausted.
> (The Times, 10.6.1969.)

The new and menacing threat to the country's identity arose from the "foreseeable consequences of a massive but unpremeditated and fortunately in substantial measure, reversible immigration". Powell presented himself as a latter-day Winston Churchill issuing a clarion call for Britain's defense before the nation completed the work of "heaping up its own funeral pyre" (Sunday Times, 21.4.1968). He claimed that the future of Britain was as much at risk "as in the years when Imperial Germany was building dreadnoughts and Nazism rearming" (Observer, 14.6.1970). Indeed, the danger was greater because the activity of the invisible fifth column passed unnoticed:

> Race is billed to play a major, perhaps a decisive part, in the battle of Britain whose enemies must have been unable to believe their good fortune as they watched the numbers of West Indians, Africans and Asians concentrated in her major cities mount towards the two million mark, and no diminution of the increase yet in sight.
> (Observer, 14.6.1970.)

The nationalist polarisation of freedom versus thraldom is unmistakably present. At the Conservative Party Conference in 1968, Powell warned that the character of the country's towns and cities would be changed beyond recognition. This change was not taking place at the periphery, but in the heart of the country. The change brought about would alter the character of England in a way which the people "neither chose nor desired, nor even expected" (CACR, 1968, p.68). At the Conference in 1972, Powell again reiterated the same theme, and drew attention to the number of electors who were gravely anxious about the future consequences of Commonwealth Immigration. As a solution to the threat to nationhood from within, he suggested repatriation, conceived, at this time, as an offer of help to all who wished to return home (CACR, 1972, p.73).

After he left the Conservative Party, Powell continued to stress the danger to British nationhood from Commonwealth immigration. When asked by Spiegel how 3.6 per cent of the population were supposed to plunge the other 96.4 per cent into a fearful catastrophe, he replied with the question "Do you know how many Normans crossed the Channel in 1066?" He admitted that the British, because of their insularity, might well be more sensitive to aliens than other nations: "It is very much our nature to differentiate between what is British and what is not" (New Statesman, 13.10.1978, p.461).

As Winston Churchill recognised, a continuum exists between the lofty defense of the abstraction of nation and the mundane defense of the neighbourhood street. Powell utilised this knowledge in his references to an old lady intimidated by black neighbours and followed by "wide-grinning piccaninnies". Indeed, Conservative Party discourse as a whole, made great play of the alien threat to homely circumstances. For example, Frank Taylor, at the 1961 Conservative Party Conference, posed the rhetorical question of whether black immigrants could be

blamed "for clubbing to buy houses, very often over the heads of English residents and thereby, because of overcrowding, driving out the English people and eventually becoming owners of residences in whole streets" (CACR, 1961, p.29). Quite apparent are the nationalist themes of the necessity of territorial defense and the threat to the Englishman's freedom of choice.

But there may be some hope of a peaceful naturalisation of the black population. Powell's successor in Wolverhampton SW, Conservative MP Nick Budgen, thought the black community would only find peace and security in Britain if it pledged "primary loyalty to the British state" (Express and Star, 6.1.1979), thus indicating the possibility that black people might become British by abandoning any independent identity they might have and committing themselves wholeheartedly to leading a British way of life. The questions of nationhood, of national solidarity, and of the national identity of black Britons, are revealed as unresolved Conservative preoccupations.

Local case study: the criterion of nationality

The importance Conservatives attach to loyalty to Britain and conformity to the British way of life as criteria of national identity is exemplified by the following passage from an interview with a Conservative borough councillor. He expressed the view that:

> ... We must define exactly what we mean by a citizen of these islands. We should say, "If you want to live here and be regarded as a full citizen of these islands, then you not only have rights, but you have duties, and prime among those duties must be the defense of law and order and of the state. I don't necessarily mean going off and fighting a war, but you've got to regard this land as your land, and no other, and looking backwards over your shoulder is not likely to help you live among the other citizens of this land".
>
> These people have got to stop being Indian and West Indian. I'm not saying they've got to give up any of their ideas. All I'm really saying is that they've got to try somehow to encourage the belief among their own families that they are English.

The Labour Party and internationalism (the brotherhood of man)

In his book The Future of Socialism (1956) C A R Crosland managed to list twelve traditional themes in a summary of socialist doctrines. One source was Christian socialism, which Crosland saw as having a close affinity with Owenism, although the inspiration for Owenism lay in a Benthamite belief in universal happiness, while that of Christian socialism derived from Christian ethics. Both schools, however, held that "the essential evil was the competitive pursuit of private gain, and the objective (was) a cooperative society of communal ownership in which mutual love and brotherhood would replace the selfish antagonisms inevitably bred by competitive capitalism".

Crosland also isolated the Independent Labour Party tradition, defined by Professor Cole as "a socialism almost without doctrines ... a broad movement on behalf of the bottom dog". According to Crosland, the unique ILP element was not doctrinal or intellectual, but consisted of a "particularly strong insistence, largely Nonconformist in origin, on the brotherhood of man, on fellowship, service and altruism" that was not only to be found in the domestic context but in relation to the people of other countries. Crosland asserted that the "internationalist tradition of the Labour Party stems far more from the 'international brotherhood of man' appeal of the ILP than from the 'workers of the world, unite!' slogan of the Marxists". "It is this generous, idealistic, deeply religious emphasis on brotherhood and altruism", he continued, "which justifies us in identifying the ILP as a separate influence - and one very different in spirit from the Fabian, as may be seen from the contrasted reactions of the two bodies to the Boer war".

A number of Labour Party traditions, therefore, unite in establishing the 'brotherhood of man' as a commonly recurring value

of Labour ideology. 'The brotherhood of man' suggests that the warm friendships and loyalties of close kinship ties should be extended to the universe of human kind.

The slogan may be criticised from a Marxist point of view as 'idealist' in the sense that, at the abstracted level, it can make no reference to the differences of interest that, as a matter of fact, occur between human groups. Other political theorists might question the assumption that there are no important qualitative differences, particularly in industrial societies, between small kinship and larger social groupings. Both criticisms, however, are directed at neglect of the actual political obstacles which are likely to prevent the value being achieved, rather than at the value itself. The Marxist believes that however high-sounding the value, its practical implementation must take into account the material interests of the respective parties. This is why 'workers of the world unite' differs from 'men must all be brothers', in that the former is related to a theory of common interest in the face of an exploitative enemy. This is only to state the difference of implication of the two prescriptions, but not, of course, to pronounce upon their respective past or future effectiveness, even supposing it were possible for such a thing to be measured.

If the value of 'the brotherhood of man' is intended to affect relations between human beings, however, it must be practically translated and applied. With reference to the Labour Party's incursions into the field of race relations, one criticism has been that the value has kept the Party's conscience intact but has had little effect on policies for the extension of brotherly love to the black neighbour. But, values deriving from, or closely related to, the Christian precept of 'loving one's neighbour' may, like much current Christian ethics, have bearing on personal, rather than

group behaviour. The Labour Party member may or may not recognise a connection between his decisions in parliament or council chamber and his personal behaviour towards friends, acquaintances, and neighbours. This, of course, is true of politicians of all political persuasions. But the 'brotherhood of man' may become increasingly operative as relationships become more personalised, and, vice versa, 'brotherhood' may be less easily recognised as the relational metaphor is extended to the anonymous multitude, perhaps represented only by statistical data. A local councillor, for example, might express dismay at the idea of black youth congregating in large numbers and vote against the setting up of a Caribbean centre. Yet, at the same time, he might do all in his power to make sure a West Indian family of his acquaintance is adequately rehoused. (There have been similar reports of Enoch Powell's helpfulness to black constituents.)

Nevertheless, the brotherhood of man is a recurrent theme in Labour Party literature. The famous 1945 document, Let us Face the Future, states clearly that because it is a "socialist party" the Labour Party "believes in the brotherhood of man". The statement of 16.3.1960, from the National Executive Committee, reaffirming, amplifying, and clarifying party objects, describes the British Labour Party as "a democratic socialist party", whose "central ideal is the brotherhood of man", and whose purpose is "to make this ideal a reality everywhere". Accordingly, it rejects "discrimination on grounds of race, colour, or creed and holds that men should accord to one another equal consideration and status in recognition of the fundamental dignity of Man" (LPACR, 1960, NEC statement).

But what exactly is meant by the brotherhood and fundamental dignity of man and what political measures have to be taken in furtherance of this value? This question is of particular importance

in the light of the Conservative counter-emphasis on nationalism, and of the very logic of national government which is expected to put national interest first. It could also be claimed, for example, that far from contrasting with nationalism, the principle of the 'brotherhood of man' might be extended to encourage cooperation between members of different social classes and consequently undermine the class-based nature of socialist ideology*. Most socialists, however, would understand the brotherhood as extending only to members of the international working class, and as excluding the rich, the capitalists, the exploiters, the militarists, and the anti-democratic elements of the world. Nevertheless, Panitch (1971) has argued that aspects of Labour Party ideology stressing the fundamental unity of society help it to play a nationally integrative role under capitalism. Such a role might detract from the ability to engage in class struggle on behalf of either the British or international working class.

The Labour Party has come under attack both from Left-wing critics who have condemned its class collaborationism and lack of 'international solidarity', and from Right-wingers who have criticised its lack of loyalty to the national interest. But the implications of 'brotherhood of man', though vague, have a significant bearing on Labour justification of policy. This is not to say that commitment to the value is manifest in any obvious way in practice.

At a general level, the Party has sought to suffuse much of its propaganda with the warm glow of compassion to contrast with the

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* Herbert Morrison, Minister of Transport in the 1929 Labour Government, gave an indication of this tendency when he said "I want every business manager to realise that the Labour Government is not their enemy, but that every Minister in this Government wants to take him by the hand, treat him as a man and brother, and help to make his commercial or industrial enterprise more successful than it has been in the past". (Daily Herald, 30.6.1929.)

Conservatives' ruthless dog-eat-dog philosophy. "Our appeal is to those who have faith in the capacity and humanity of their fellow men", the 1970 General Election Manifesto asserted, "and to those who are not solely moved by the search for profit or the hope of personal gain". More specifically, the internationalist principle is supported by expressions of anti-militarism and of sympathy for developing countries, the poor of the 'third world' and black people from the ex-colonies living in Britain. The politician's commitment to international brotherhood might perhaps be illustrated in his advocacy of policies for increasing overseas aid and improving the treatment of black minorities in Britain.

Specific applications to overseas aid and to racial prejudice and discrimination

White (1968) described how when the Labour Party came to power in 1964 it had a very strong political commitment to expand and improve the British aid programme, and set about rationalising the machinery with which to undertake the task by establishing the Ministry of Overseas Development. The Ministry published a white paper in 1965 which "though conspicuously deficient in firm commitments on the volume of aid, and not noticeably profuse in specific new proposals, was essentially expansionist in character". Thereafter, the British commitment to aid foundered in the slough of the various economic crises that beset the Government. Britain excused its failure to increase the general level of aid by pleading its special balance of payments problem "thus encouraging other countries to plead their special problems". The Ministry of Overseas Development "was allowed to make its moral proclamation into specific commitments" (p.59).

The Labour Party's failure to translate principle into practice was defended first by the assumption that in the gloomy economic

climate, aid had become a luxury only to be indulged in when other priorities had been met. Second, it was held that the developing countries were wasting the aid that was being given. Third, and significantly in the context of this study, it was believed that there was public hostility towards the giving of aid, and fourth, it could be argued that other Western countries had embarked upon policies of reducing the amount they were giving. White challenged all four assumptions.

What emerges in the examination of the literature on the Labour party and overseas aid is the impression of a real tension between fundamental and operative dimensions, particularly in time of economic crisis. The Party manifesto of 1970 pledged Labour to devoting 1 per cent of the Gross National Product to aid the developing world by 1975 and, in line with the Pearson Commission target, to achieve an official flow of aid of 0.7 per cent of GNP during the Second Development Decade. The October 1974 Manifesto claimed that the Government had accepted the United Nations target of 0.7 per cent of GNP and promised to "seek to move towards it as fast as possible". The 1979 Manifesto claimed only that the United Nations target of 0.7 per cent would be implemented "as soon as economic circumstances permit". Although in its years in office, the Labour Party did not succeed in implementing the percentage promised, it never wavered in the reaffirmation of its principles.

It is interesting to note that the commitment to aid, in the face of the nationalist argument that the British poor and old should come first, was often justified by Labour politicians, not by an appeal to altruism, but to a countervailing nationalism. It was in the national interest to give aid because most of it was in loan form anyway and had to be repaid, because the receiving countries might then be able to buy British goods with consequent employment for British workers, and because if Britain did not give aid, then

other countries hostile to British interests would do so instead. In terms of justifying the practice to the electorate, overseas aid might not, after all, constitute a paradigm case of commitment to human brotherhood, although between themselves, party members undoubtedly chose to regard it in that light.

It is not possible in the context of this study to deal, except in a very superficial manner, with the subject of overseas aid. Suffice it to say that, in Labour circles, support for overseas aid was frequently regarded as a paradigm test of commitment to international brotherhood, and further, as many of the recipient countries had black populations, as an example of good race relations.

In dealing with the term 'brotherhood', it is apparent from the previous discussion that it is almost impossible to specify all the kinds of relationships which might be included in the set of brotherly behaviour, or even to be clear about what is to be excluded. The term is vague because the range of behaviour constituting the term's referential meaning is not specified, and turns on disputed evaluations.

For example, although the giving of overseas aid has been advanced as a paradigm case of brotherly behaviour in the political sphere, it is quite possible to dispute that interpretation by claiming that all aid is given on the basis of selfish national interests, whereas a practical demonstration of brotherhood must always entail altruism. Nevertheless, there is likely to be some agreement that acts, for example, of miserliness, or public expressions of racial hatred cannot be reconciled with brotherhood. Absence of meanness and hatred does not mean that brotherhood is present, but the manifestations of what is seen as meanness and hatred are by definition excluded from the set of brotherly actions.

Unfortunately, the rules for exclusion from the set scarcely help in determining which political words or actions are unacceptable to those dedicated to brotherhood. It is possible, for example, that Robert Mellish might claim that his remark "Enough is enough" (made in reference to Goan refugees from Malawi) was perfectly reconcilable with the principle of international brotherhood. Although it might be agreed that gynaecological tests on immigrant Asian women (performed under a Labour administration) were an offence against the fundamental dignity of human kind, the exercise of the laws themselves to control immigration and the other vetting techniques applied to suspected illegal immigrants might well be defended. The whole policy of immigration control, even on racial grounds, was frequently justified on the basis of its advantages for immigrants already in Britain who did not wish their conditions to be worsened by a further migrant influx. If other values do not intervene, commitment to the brotherhood of man might exclude some of the grosser barbarities inflicted by one group of human beings on another, but political values and attempts to implement them are contested to such a degree that the practical policy implications of the slogan 'brotherhood' are rarely explicit.

One area in which Labour supporters often appeal for justificatory purposes to the value of brotherhood is in their expression of opposition to racial prejudice and discrimination. The Party has campaigned for many years against racial injustice and has proved its strength of purpose to its supporters by passing the 1965, 1968, and 1976 Race Relations Acts in the face of vociferous attack from the Right. The value of brotherhood would seem to be avowed in commitment to racial equality, and the themes of brotherhood and racial equality are frequently to be found in close association in Labour discourse.

The apparent suitability of application of a formula mentioning 'brotherhood' (with its associated internationalist connotations), no doubt, stems from the fact that the black worker came from overseas, and was not yet fully accepted as British. In addition, he probably was seen as a standard example of an 'underdog'. Despite Labour worries about the danger to British workers' conditions created by importing foreign labour, both the TUC and the Labour Party, at oratorical level, constantly reiterated the theme of the need for solidarity among workers from different countries.

As early as 1948, E C Smith, speaking on behalf of Tottenham North at the Annual Party Conference, gave the lead on internal race relations by declaring "My Party feels that the colour bar is a disgrace. We have seen negroes banned from taking part in sports and we have seen them barred from certain restaurants in London" (LPACR, 1948, p.181). In the 1960s and 70s the Party went on to strongly reaffirm its dislike of discrimination, the appeal to brotherhood continuing to play an important rhetorical role. Tom Driberg, for example, proclaimed that people "realise that any manifestation of racial prejudice is an affront to the brotherhood of man" (LPACR, 1967, p.317).

Reaffirmation of the principle of brotherhood played an important part in the response to the 1968 Powell speeches. R Burns claimed that "All we have to do to be a multi-racialist is to believe in the brotherhood of man, the very soul of the socialist movement" (LPACR, 1968, p.284). S Gill thought that "we can easily face Powellism with our honesty of outlook and belief in the brotherhood of man" (LPACR, 1968, p.285), while Frank Cousins asked the people to unite to stop the exploitation of coloured workers: "Let us mean it. Let them be our brothers" (LPACR, 1968, p.286).

Most Labour Party discussions on race relations are replete with

testimonies of belief in the brotherhood of man, and it would be tedious to offer many more examples. Making more explicit the association between familial and race relations, the formula took on a slightly different complexion, however, when 7,000 people on the 1976 Southall anti-National Front demonstration shouted the slogan "One human race, one human family".

Local case study: nationality

Table 5 Councillors' descriptions of their nationality

	CONSERVATIVE	LABOUR	TOTAL
British and English	2	1	3
British	13	15	28
English	10	4	14
Welsh	1	1	2
Unclassifiable	0	1	1
TOTAL RESPONSES	26	22	48

The answers to the question 'What nationality would you describe yourself as?' demonstrated a customary historical ambivalence among the population of the United Kingdom in knowing whether to describe themselves generally, as British (two thirds), or specifically, as citizens of the constituent countries of England, Wales, Scotland, and (Northern) Ireland (one third). Also, and from the questioner's point of view, unintentionally, it gave respondents an opportunity to hint at their opinions on issues of national identity. In a few cases, the interviewer was treated to a resume of a councillor's family tree and historical origins, a response that sometimes revealed common but quite telling national stereotyping.

> My mother was and my maternal grandparents were native-speaking Welsh, my father's parents were English sons of the soil, and I think that between the two I've benefited. I've inherited a degree of the Welsh quick-wittedness and the stolid approach of the English (C41).

The question also enabled councillors from both parties, but particularly from the Conservatives, to demonstrate their nationalism with remarks such as "very proud indeed to be British", "British through and through", and "I'm a Welshman, and Welshmen are the salt of the earth".

But, quite another phenomenon was illustrated by 9 of the 22 Labour respondents, though never by Conservatives. This was a strong reluctance to make any use whatsoever of national categories, summarised by one councillor's single sentence reply: "I was born in England, but I consider myself to be a member of the human race". More commonly, declaration of nationality by Labour would be followed by the qualifications "I suppose" or "but I've never considered nationality myself". One councillor jokingly sidestepped by claiming to be 'Black Country', another with a grandfather from Scotland and Wales, to be a 'bloody mongrel'. The possible significance of the question was not lost and the moral drawn in at least one reply: "British now, but my original stock was Huguenot and were hated when they came to this country just as much as the Polish, Irish, West Indian and Jewish have all been hated". Another response indicated the impression that the class factor should take precedence: "English working class with a parental Welsh background". The reluctance to make use of national categories may be interpreted as a Labour commitment to the value of internationalism.

Local case study: foreign aid

As might have been expected from the parties' respective commitments to nationalism and internationalism, Conservative and Labour councillors illustrated major differences in their responses to the question about British aid to countries overseas. Of 22 Conservatives, only 2 were in favour of giving overseas aid unconditionally, in comparison to 18 of 23 Labour, 7 of whom also

felt inclined to increase what they saw as an inadequate level of help. A further 5 Conservatives and 2 Labour approved of aid-giving but advocated certain limitations on its distribution. Nevertheless, 14, or well over half of the Conservatives, as opposed to only 2 of Labour, either reserved judgment under a form of words, or believed that aid should be reduced or cut off altogether.

Table 6 Views on the giving of aid

	CONS	LAB	TOTAL
More aid should be given	0	7	7
Aid should be given (no conditions stated)	2	11	13
Aid should be given (conditions stated)	5	2	7
Aid should be reduced	6	0	6
Aid should be cut off	4	1	5
Reservation of judgment (e.g. 'should be looked at')	4	1	5
General comments, but answer avoided	1	1	2
TOTAL RESPONSES	22	23	45

One Conservative summed up the conditional position by pointing out that the giving of aid should be dependent on "why it's given, what it is used for, and where it's spent" (C4). He felt that, if he were in a position to allocate resources, it would be for "primary things like water supply, water storage, flood control, and reasonable roads". There was no sense in building a factory and filling it full of fork-lift trucks if there were no fork-lift truck batteries available. Specific answers of this kind were exceptional. Usually Conservatives were worried about the corrupt use of aid, the dangers of it getting into the wrong hands, and the proportion of it consumed by bureaucrats, the same issues, indeed, as were raised in discussion of the merits of social security payments at home in Britain. There was a strong feeling that the long-term aim of the exercise was to make 'deserving' recipients -

(e.g. 'genuine refugees', children) self-supporting. The level of aid should also be related to the wealth of the nation: it needed to be earned first (C9), to be related to the state of the British economy (C27), and to be spent on British goods (C24).

Some similar reasons were given for reducing or for cutting off aid altogether: it never got into the hands of the people it was intended for. Giving aid was like "keeping some idle layabout on National Assistance" (C25). The donors were never thanked (C41): more likely they would be "stabbed in the back" (C59) by recipients who showed no signs of appreciating British efforts on their behalf (C39). Countries such as Malta might try to blackmail Britain into giving money (C26), which, once given, could be used to build up rival industries (C37, C59), or in the case of some African states, to buy arms to murder white people (C58). Aid was a waste, because friends could not be bought (C10) and little was obtained in the way of return (C39). But the most common reason offered for reluctance to give aid was contained in the expression "charity begins at home" (5 responses). One councillor expanded on this sentiment and revealed another interesting association when he remarked:

> I think they should begin to reduce some of the aid to overseas countries and pump a bit more into this country. After all a third of the overseas people (sic) are now living in this country and need a lot of help both with education, housing, and everything. They need it here (C28).

The Conservatives could be said to see aid as a form of overseas social security often paid out to undeserving and ungrateful clients who used it unwisely. It is easy to understand how a connection was drawn between overseas aid and social security paid out in Britain to people identified as coming from abroad. Interesting, too, is the underlying assumption that the archetypal recipients of aid or social security were dark-skinned. The nationalist implication of

'charity begins at home' must also be apparent: the national interest came first.

The Councillors who escaped from a direct answer to the question on aid did so behind a facade of elder statesmen's cliches e.g. "it should be looked at", "it should be considered carefully", and "it should be examined very closely indeed" - but the general impression given was of a reluctance to openly express any underlying hostility for fear of not being considered magnanimous.

As a whole, Labour responses contrasted markedly with Conservatives. The majority of Labour councillors automatically assumed that if aid were given it would, de facto, be properly allocated and achieve worthwhile results. The two who specified conditions, wanted either to be assured that aid would be going "to people who need it" and would not be "bolstering up some rotten regime"(L1) or that the aid should be of the right kind, i.e. "no arms or munitions" (L19). The giving of foreign aid was indeed seen as the operationalisation of the values of international brotherhood, showing that Britain was a caring nation:

> We ought to do it, because we're living in palaces here, and they're living in mud huts there, and that's wrong. That's not Christianity, that's not socialism, that's not the brotherhood of man (L32).

The importance of world-wide equality was also stressed: poverty could be eradicated if the riches of the whole world were more equitably distributed (L16), and furthermore, the countries of the third world had in the past been exploited for British benefit, and the debt needed to be repaid (L29). The very fact that education, health, and agriculture might be improved was seen as an end in itself (L31).

But councillors also showed an awareness of the operative as well as of the fundamental dimension. The presumed public hostility to foreign aid was frequently acknowledged, and arguments in terms

of self-interest advanced to meet it. Foreign aid would bring trade, it was always given on condition it was used to buy British goods, and when the economic circumstances of the poor nations improved, they would buy from us - thus keeping British workers in employment. The idea that aid might be used to build up rival foreign economies was strongly denied. Foreign aid would not make British workers redundant. It provided them, rather, with foreign contracts. One further revealing justification for giving aid was in terms of its effect on immigration: it would help "to keep people in their own countries" (L15).

Two councillors were so convinced that aid was given self-interestedly that they were sceptical as to whether it should be known as 'aid': "it isn't aid - that's a misnomer - it's political bribery" (L14), and "aid, in fact, consists mainly of loans and they have to be repaid at a price" (L56).

Interestingly, the one Labour councillor opposed to giving aid justified his view by describing the poverty that remained in Britain and then remarking that "charity begins at home" (L7). But overall the Labour Party undoubtedly sought to appeal 'to those who have faith in the capacity and faith of their fellow men'. The giving of foreign aid was seen as a symbol of commitment to internationalism and the brotherhood of man, in stark contrast to the simple nationalism of "charity begins at home".

THE EFFECT OF THE EMPIRE

The Conservative Party and imperialism

Lord Hugh Cecil considered imperialism to be one of the three elements out of which modern Conservatism was formed. He saw it as a way of thinking by which men turned their eyes away from domestic conflict to the part the country as a whole might play in world affairs. He suggested that sometimes this interest originated

in fear of foreign aggression and the need for national defense. At other times "the strong sense of corporate personality which patriotism evokes or expresses ... seeks to assert itself, to enlarge the sphere of its activity, to guide and control the fate of others" (1912, p.37).

A plethora of values and policy prescriptions arises out of the close Conservative involvement with empire, the commitment to which has frequently pulled the party in different directions over questions of race and immigration. Belief in racial superiority or scientific racism arising from empire relations of domination and subordination, paternalism towards the child-like native entrusted to the call of the white man, a view that empire links could best be maintained and fortified by encouraging emigration of white stock, the concept of empire citizenship, the realisation and acceptance of the inevitability of nationalism and independence, and the difficulties of coming to terms with African nationalism in areas of white settlement, are important and closely interrelated themes emerging from Conservative commitment to empire.

As a result of the division within the Empire between the rulers and ruled, between colonial settlers and 'natives', impetus was given to the development of ideologies of white racial supremacy. The black natives, specifically identified by their racial characteristics, were often regarded as mentally inferior in the fields of technology, science, art, religion, and morals. In the course of the second half of the nineteenth century and early twentieth century, the condition of the native, in relation to the position of the European ruler, was not only rationalised at the level of common sense, but refined by white scholars into a biologically-based scientific racism. (See Kiernan, 1969; Bolt, 1971; Huttenback, 1976.) Groups of men were classified into racial types

on the grounds of their physical appearance. Cultural variation and existing power and social relations were then explained in terms of the differential distribution between the racial types of intellectual ability, temperament, moral worth, and aesthetic attraction, etc.

Scientific racism became a central feature of Nazism, and as a result, was discredited in British intellectual and political circles by 1945. In the 1930s, a number of Conservative politicians openly professed belief in scientific racism, and expressed fascist sympathies (Haxey, 1939), but these views have never been a marked feature of post-war Conservatism at national level, although a faint echo of scientific racism can still be found on the Far-Right of the party. (For examples see Foot, 1965.) Nevertheless, a strong suspicion lingers that a belief in the differential endowment of the races remains as a folk memory in the breasts of some rank-and-file Conservatives.

It should be pointed out that the distinction between hereditary and environmental factors affecting racial performance is neither made nor understood by large sections of the population. Claims of racial difference and of the inferiority of black standards or ability are frequently presented as a descriptive reflection of reality and no attempt is made to offer explanations for these traits. Nevertheless, with or without a theory of biological racism, whether derived from the work of Count Gobineau (1854) or some other source, a deepseated, unrefined belief in racial difference in performance, and in standards, probably owes its origin to the colonial relationship between white master and black subordinate. This relationship is not confined to the distant past. Much of post-war British colonial history has been concerned with resolving the political difficulties created by the reluctance of white settler minorities to relinquish their power and privileges in the face of black African majorities seeking national independence. The struggle

to maintain white domination in Kenya, the Central African Federation (and afterwards in Rhodesia), and South Africa, was frequently supported by elements in the Conservative ranks, who identified with their white kinsfolk and British economic interests which they thought would be threatened by 'irresponsible' black nationalism. Anti-democratic stances of this kind would require traditional ideological fortification in the form of belief in the inability, or unreadiness of the 'native African' to control his own affairs. Racial superiority might be deemed either a genetic or a particularly enduring, cultural affair. But whether or not the African might eventually be raised to acceptable British standards, he would continue to need a 'guiding hand' or, in the euphemistic language of the Central African Federation, a 'partnership'.

Opinion varied greatly over the possibilities of civilising the 'primitive peoples' of the Empire, some writers holding to the view that the whole exercise was a waste of time. Others thought, however, that, given time and patience, advancement of the native was possible and desirable. The noble mission of the British was to spread the enlightenment of British civilisation, particularly the advantages of democratic government, to the most humble savage, a duty aptly expressed in Kipling's call to "take up the White Man's burden". "Our vocation in the world", Lord Hugh Cecil thought, was "to undertake the government of vast, uncivilised populations and to raise them gradually to a higher level of life" (1912, p.214), a task that had been partly accomplished in India.

The white man's civilising presence, the need to develop backward nations, the missionaries' vocation to convert the heathen, acted as powerful justifications for continued imperial domination. Such ideas deeply penetrated the culture of the British population and survive to the present day (see note 6).

It was scarcely surprising that many white British manifest a distinctly paternalistic approach to blacks who were seen as needing the generous, but firm, guidance of wiser white counsel. Rejection of such guidance was likely to be interpreted as the thoughtless action of a wayward child. Concern at emergent Commonwealth people's susceptibility to communism and 'irresponsibility' was another symptom of this syndrome.

Two quotes from the debate on the Colonies at the 1960 Conservative Party Conference might be used to illustrate the surviving Conservative pride in empire and paternalism. Mrs H M V Barrington declared she was sick and tired of the attitude that the colonial record was something of which to be ashamed. On the contrary, "we can be proud of the part our own people have played in the transformation of our colonies" (CACR, 1960, p.13). Patrick Wall, MP, claimed that the colonial problem arose not from differences in colour, but from differences in standards. "What we have to do", he suggested, "is to work as hard as we can by raising the standards of the black Africans to ensure that we level up and do not take the easy way out by levelling down ... Progress in Central Africa ... depends on the maintenance of standards and I believe we owe it, not only to our kith and kin, but to the vast mass of as yet uneducated black Africans for whom we are trustees, to see that the existing standards in Central Africa are not debased" (CACR, 1960, p.17). Similar remarks may be found in Conservative discourse on the future of Southern Rhodesia, now Zimbabwe.

The decline of the Conservative Party's commitment to imperialism

In his speech at Blackpool in October 1946, Winston Churchill declared that one of the main objectives of Conservatism was "to defend and develop our Empire trade without which Great Britain would perish". The Conservative Party's document Imperial Policy

stated that the Empire was the supreme achievement of the British people which, if it were to break up, would result in Britain becoming a third-class power unable to feed or defend herself. "The same fate would quite certainly befall every other country of this family of nations, one by one, and thus would crumble to ruin the world's greatest bulwark of liberty and democracy". These remarks were particularly apposite in the light of the acknowledgement of the indispensible role that Commonwealth troops and resources had played during both the First and Second World Wars (We believe in the Empire, July 1949).

In the late 1940s, the Conservative Party pledged itself to restore the Empire and Commonwealth to its position as the leader of "free peoples against the encroachments of world Communism" by setting up a Commonwealth defense council, by maintaining imperial preference, and by jointly working out a plan for investment, migration, trade, and research. The Conservatives expressed their intention of developing the Empire's resources to the full, of raising living standards, and of guiding its people along the road to self-government. The powerful jingoistic advocacy within the Conservative Party of imperial union had resulted in the popularity of the concepts of a 'Greater Britain' and of an imperially enlarged British citizenship. The acceptance of the concept of 'Civis Britannicus Sum' in what was then still a white-dominated Empire, led the Conservatives to declare "We accept the position established by the Nationality Act 1948, but hold ourselves free to return to the old conception of common citizenship if this should be the wish of the other Dominions and member states" (Imperial Policy, 1949).

By the early 1950s, however, the Party had been forced to recognise the growth of nationalism in the colonies and its attendant problems. In his Empire Day address of 1951, Anthony Eden asserted

that "a tide of nationalism has swept over some of the colonies and the demand for constitutional progress will not be appeased with economic food in the shape of national betterment and prosperity". With good will and mutual understanding between races and creeds, and with education and training in the art of government, the colonies could be prepared for independence and Britain would have nothing to fear. Danger lay in the rapidity of growth and strength of nationalist feeling in the "shadow of Communism", which might threaten the gradual preparation and planning needed before the achievement of independence (The British Empire, July 1951).

Colonial peoples, not surprisingly, had no experience of running a country and, in the eyes of the Conservatives, an inexperienced and insufficiently educated populace could not be relied upon to make decisions acceptable to the British Government - rather the danger lay in it becoming a gullible pawn in the Cold War. The war in Malaya, the 1952 Mau Mau rebellion in Kenya, and the suspension in October 1953 of the constitution of British Guiana, were symptomatic of the difficulties of colonial policy facing the new Conservative government of the early 1950s.

While the principle of trusteeship was widely accepted in Conservative circles, it was in practice, vulnerable to pressure from white colonialist interests. In setting up the Central African Federation in 1953, the Conservative Government chose to disregard the almost unanimous opposition of the black Africans and to listen to the Southern Rhodesian settler regime under the leadership of Sir Godfrey Huggins. All this was justified under the slogan of 'partnership'. The Federation was, in the words of Oliver Lyttelton, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, an "enlightened vision of how the races should work together" (24.3.1953), and, indeed, "the

British solution to the racial problem" (6.5.1953). In practice, it led to white settler economic and political domination of three territories, and the weakening of safeguards for the African majority.

The prevailing Conservative idea of 'responsibility' in colonial government seemed to involve maintaining British traditions and the existing economic arrangements and, in addition, denouncing communism. 'Irresponsibility' was explained in terms of lack of maturity, illiteracy, and inexperience of government among the colonial peoples, whom it was agreed had been somewhat neglected by the ministerial backwater of the Colonial office. (The Colonies - Conservative Record 1951-54, 12.4.1954.) Their peoples were "backward some, indeed, living a life little different from that of our primitive ancestors":

> Now, thanks to the aeroplane, radio and the newspapers, they are brought into close and constant contact with civilisation and no longer can they stand aloof from the menace of Communism, trade recessions, the dollar gap and all the problems which beset the world today. They are groping to find expression for their hopes and ambitions. They are exposed to the full force of nationalism. (The Colonies - Conservative Record 1951-54, 12.4.1954.)

Oliver Lyttelton, in a speech to the House of Commons (16.12.1953), described changing conditions in Africa in the following way:

> The saucepan radios in many African villages catch up new voices. All these have a message, one of hope or despair to the Africans who hear them. Africans as a whole cannot always chart these cross-currents. Often we cannot chart them ourselves. The Africans cannot make a common theme out of the discordant voices, nor can they unravel the tangled skein of our Western civilisation. All they know is that they are: '... moving about in worlds unrealised', as the poet had it.

The unmistakable picture is of colonial peoples being somewhat unwillingly forced by world events into the twentieth century and not of their actively demanding independence from the colonial power. Like children, their 'groping' and bewilderment, in the face of the complexities of civilisation are protrayed as needing firm and careful

handling if they are not to be led astray. If this was the official government view of the state of African society, it was small wonder that the British people would have low expectations of the readily identifiable black students and workers that they were beginning to find in their midst.

But traditional Commonwealth relations were changing rapidly, as Harold Macmillan publicly acknowledged in his speech to the South African parliament on 3 February 1960 when he talked of the nationalist 'wind of change' blowing throughout Africa. The South African government had no wish to come to terms with black nationalism and was insulted by Macmillan's suggestion that Afrikaner nationalism was simply the first of the African nationalisms to develop. The Sharpeville massacre on 21 March 1960 was followed on 31 May 1961 by the white South African regime declaring itself a republic, and leaving the Commonwealth to maintain its racial policies. Following the example of Ghana in 1957, a spate of African and Caribbean countries prepared for independence.

With the Conservative Party 'bowing' to the 'wind of change', racial discrimination within the Commonwealth, whether in Kenya, the Federation of Rhodesia, and Nyasaland, or Britain became a politically sensitive issue. The 1959 Conservative Election Manifesto declared:

> Our central aim in multi-racial countries is to build communities which will protect minority rights and are free from all discrimination on grounds of race and colour.

The 1960 Conservative Party Conference chose to debate, not the problems of immigration, but the difficulties of guiding the colonies to self-government. Concern was expressed at the tribulations besetting Conservative kith and kin (who were seen as the representatives of European Christian civilisation in heathen lands) and the unhealthy speed at which the colonies were approaching

independence. Ian Macleod, Secretary of State for the Colonies, managed to reconcile differences of opinion in his statement of the Party's four dities: there was a duty to build a society in which men had full rights, a special duty to those "of our own blood" who had made their home in those territories, a duty to her Majesty's Overseas Civil Service, and a responsibility to the native minorities. How these differences were to be reconciled was not clarified, but the speed of political decolonisation did not slacken. The Conference pledged its support to the Prime Minister and his colleagues "in their responsible task of guiding the Colonies towards self-government so that legitimate rights are protected and legitimate aspirations fulfilled" (CACR, 1960, p.12).

Specific application to policies on immigration control

At first, the Conservative Party continued to hold sacred its belief in the traditional freedom of British Commonwealth subjects to come to Britain, although not without some private, if ineffectual, discussion in the Cabinet, as early as 1955, on the possibility of immigration control. Macmillan (1973) claims that

> Early in 1955, after some rather desultory discussions in the Cabinet, it was agreed that a Bill should be tentatively drafted. I remember that Churchill, rather maliciously observed that perhaps the cry of 'keep Britain white' might be a good slogan for the Election which we should soon have to fight without the benefit of his leadership. (pp.73-74.)

Yet no particular action was taken on the suggested Bill for another six years. (See Deakin (1975) for discussion of the delay, intentions, and eventual passage of the Act.)

When in April 1958, Mr H Hynd, Labour MP for Accrington, spoke to a motion that the time had arrived for reconsideration of the arrangements whereby British subjects from other parts of the Commonwealth were allowed to enter the country without restriction,

and listed the numbers involved, their health, difficulties of employment, the size of school classes, and immigrants' immediate eligibility for National Assistance as reasons for concern, Miss P Hornsby Smith, Joint Undersecretary for the Home Office, agreed that the rising 'potential' could not be ignored and might in future constitute a very grave burden on the country. After pointing out the important contribution of immigrants to the labour force, she concentrated her remarks on 'coloured workers' and on the quality of their labour: "A number of (Indians and Pakistanis) are handicapped by their initial inability to speak English, by illiteracy and by poor physique which makes it impossible for them to take the normal labouring jobs which would otherwise be available" (Hansard, 3.4. 1958, p.1427). The Government she said, was not complacent about the 'problem' but remained reluctant to contemplate any departure from the traditional readiness to receive all citizens who had the status of a British subject (p.1430). 'Civis Britannicus Sum' still held sway but the commitment to unrestricted Commonwealth immigration was coming increasingly under attack.

On 11 October 1958, Norman Pannell moved a resolution of the Conservative Party Conference calling for the revision of the immigration laws in the light of the grave social problems arising from unrestricted immigration and for the deportation of immigrants who committed serious crimes. R A Butler, Secretary of State for the Home Office once more reiterated the Conservative government's belief in maintaining "the long and respected tradition of allowing citizens of the Commonwealth countries to come here". But, referring to racial incidents in Nottingham and Notting Hill (which he believed had arisen as a result of housing shortages and competition for jobs), he promised to try to persuade the Commonwealth countries concerned to limit voluntarily the rate of immigration to Britain.

Nevertheless, Norman Pannell's resolution was carried with a substantial majority.

Conservative Notes on Current Politics (9.2.1959) not only reaffirmed the traditional right of the British subject to come to the Mother Country, but asserted that the great majority of coloured immigrants were doing useful work in Britain, were not drawing National Assistance, and were not engaging in criminal behaviour.

The Government's awareness of the political sensitivity of the race question among Commonwealth nations and of the pressure placed on South Africa to leave the Commonwealth may be offered as one reason for its reluctance to accept proposals for immigration control. Paul Foot (1965) also mentions an alliance in opposing Commonwealth immigration control between Conservative radicals who recognised the beneficial effect on the economy of immigrant labour, and Conservative traditionalists committed to the greatness and majesty of the British Empire. Not until the 1961 Party Conference, at which a resolution - one of forty - calling on the Government to take action on immigration was passed by a large majority, did R A Butler admit that the Government might follow Conference advice. But a number of prominent Conservatives urged the Government and the Party to think again. Nigel Fisher asked whether the problems of immigration were really enough to change "our whole concept, so important to the Commonwealth, of the principle of free entry of British citizens" (CACR, 1961, p.28), while Christopher Barr opposed the motion saying "there are binding Commonwealth agreements: the United Kingdom's word should be its deed" (CACR, 1961, p.30).

Control in the form of the Commonwealth Immigrants Bill was announced in the Queen's speech in October and the Bill received its

second reading in November. As Butler had foreseen and to the disquiet of what Foot (1965) called 'the traditional right' of the Conservative Party, a number of Commonwealth governments objected not only to the Bill but to the Government's failure to consult them. Norman Manley, the Prime Minister of Jamaica, tellingly pointed out that England had failed the first time it had had to cope with assimilating persons of different races and colour, and the exclusion of the Irish from the Bill only reinforced the belief that Britain had introduced racially discriminatory immigration control.

Paradoxically, the pragmatic acceptance of nationalism in the Empire which resulted in the Colonies achieving political independence from their white colonial masters, and the commitment to the creation of a multi-racial Commonwealth, freed the Conservative Party, not only from its imperial mission, but from its duty of safeguarding the status of the British subject. Sans noblesse pas d'obligation. As 'Empire' began to lose its firm reference to a political reality, so also did the ideological baggage of 'Civis Britannicus Sum'. The justificatory props of Empire were no longer necessary.

However, vestiges of the beliefs outlined in this section survived into the late 1960s and 1970s and required refutation or reassertion as political circumstances demanded. Quintin Hogg felt himself obliged to justify the 1968 Immigration Act by arguing that there was no unqualified right of entry for permanent settlement in other Commonwealth countries. "Whatever else the Commonwealth bond means", he said, "there is no evidence that it can be made to mean that". At the 1969 Conference, Robert Apps remarked that "The habits of Empire and civis romanus sum die very hard". Even so, "we should not shrink from bringing together the laws relating to Commonwealth immigrants and aliens" (1969, p.93).

Despite the increasingly stringent restrictions on immigration,

a reluctant Conservative Party in 1972 was forced to admit the Ugandan Asians. In the face of a Right-wing onslaught, the older imperial justificatory forms were put to work once more. Enoch Powell denied that when the East African countries became independent there had been an undertaking that those inhabitants who remained citizens of the United Kingdom and colonies would have the right of entry to Britain (CACR, 1972, p.72). But David Hunt found it "completely and utterly morally indefensible to grant a person a British passport and then, when that person is in trouble, to try to pretend that it is a worthless document" (CACR, 1972, p.73). Anthony Baldry believed that we had a moral and legal duty to care for those British subjects expelled from Uganda: "I believe that those sentiments, expressed at the height of our Empire, are as worthy now as they were then and to betray them would be to betray whatever was noble in our Empire" (CACR, 1972, p.75). Robert Carr, the Home Secretary, reaffirmed commitment, not to the Ugandan Asians, generally, but to those of them who were United Kingdom passport holders: "We sought to make sure", he said, "that no one who had been one of our citizens or protected persons before independence, in the days of the British Empire, should have to suffer the fate of becoming stateless. This was part of our Imperial heritage and our Imperial responsibility. We did do it deliberately and we knew quite well what it was we were doing" (CACR, 1972, p.78). Later he took up the imperial refrain again: "We put a great deal into our Empire and we also took a lot out. We have our imperial heritage and our obligations, and to those we will stick. I know that our party would never forgive a Conservative Government which broke that faith".

But the forced Ugandan Asian immigration was likely to be the last occasion on which there was a need to express Conservative

commitment to the responsibilities of empire. In reference to the Ugandan immigration, Roy Galley in 1976 said "We cannot afford grandiose gestures and cries of 'Civis Britannicus Sum'. We have no debt to our imperial past, a past of which, on balance, we should be proud" (CACR, 1976, p.41), a faithful reiteration of the now famous remark made in the context of the immigration debate by William Whitelaw: "The British Empire has now paid its debts" (Leicester, 21.7.1976).

Specific application to white emigration to the Commonwealth and black immigration - belief in the merits of white stock

Concern for the stability, unity, and security of the Empire was reflected in the attitudes of successive British governments to the process of white migration. Reporting in 1949, the Royal Commission on Population expressed anxiety over the consequences of sub-replacement family size in Britain because:

> "(a) the sources of supply of suitable immigrants are meagre and the capacity of a fully established society like ours to absorb immigrants of alien race and religion is limited, and (b) a diminishing flow of British emigrants to other parts of the Commonwealth may have serious consequences for the economic and political future of Great Britain and the Commonwealth as a whole". (1949, p.225.)

The Commission recommended that the problem be studied jointly by the governments of Great Britain and the Empire countries.

To the criticism that emigration to the Empire might be harmful to the 'Mother country', The Conservative Approach (July 1951) informed the voter that "the distribution of population, especially of British stock, is one of the most serious problems affecting the Empire today. Five sevenths of the white population of the British Commonwealth live in Great Britain and a wider dispersal of British stock would be welcomed by Empire countries, and would be a source of strength to the Empire as a whole". It was believed that there

might be some truth in the idea that skilled and youthful manpower could ill be spared, but Anthony Eden reasserted the prevailing belief that "If we strengthen the resources and manpower of the Commonwealth as a whole, we strengthen ourselves" (London, 24.5.1951).

The Conservative Government maintained the position that migration was a valuable means of strengthening the bonds between members of the Commonwealth, provided that it comprised "a fair cross-section of the population". It was recognised that a disproportionate number of skilled and professional people might decide to emigrate - a 'brain drain' - to the detriment of a mother country that could ill afford to lose skilled manpower. But this consideration was overruled by the belief in the importance to the Commonwealth of white British stock who could be relied upon to ensure the continuity of British political and cultural traditions (and, as the Royal Commission put it, "to purchase British goods" (1949, p.125)).

It is interesting to note that the continued advocacy of emigration by white British stock was not justified in terms of its superiority in genes, or of civilisation, but for purposes of defense or trade. Yet the perpetuation of British culture and the hereditary features of race appeared to be closely associated - indeed were treated as complementary properties.

The number emigrating from Britain was closely related to domestic economic conditions. 1948 and 1952 were peak years, while in 1955, a year of full employment, emigration fell dramatically only to rise again in 1956. Queues at Commonwealth countries' immigration offices invariably caused comments in the press about the undesirable effects of emigration on the supply of manpower and on the British economy. It was perhaps unavoidable that with continuing Commonwealth immigration, emigration and immigration

would be discussed in tandem - as they had been in the Royal Commission's Report - and the debate on the quality of labour be perpetuated in a racial form.

The third report of the Overseas Migration Board (Cmnd.336), published in December 1957, pointed out, for example, that immigration into Britain offset to a considerable extent the effect of emigration. Under 25% of immigration was thought to be made up of coloured workers. The Board agreed that Britain lost more skilled and professional workers than she gained and gained more unskilled workers than she lost, but offered the reassurance that the inflow of skilled and professional workers was higher than was generally supposed. Nevertheless, it is difficult to see how a reader of the report, concerned with the state of the British economy, could interpret the exchange of white workers for black as anything other than a debit. The key features of the debate were the stress on the importance of white stock and the belief that whites were skilled and blacks unskilled. The view of black immigration as an exchange of a superior skilled white for an inferior unskilled black population has clearly survived the days of Empire, while the justification of emigration in terms of defense and trade has collapsed with Conservative commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the European Economic Community. There are many signs in grass-roots Conservative discourse that the supposed decline in the calibre of the nation's work force is blamed at least partly, on the arrival of black labour. At a less clearly formulated level, an uneasy association of black people with inferior work status and lack of skill and, ipso facto, long-term personal and moral inadequacy, is discernible.

The Labour Party and responsible self-government for the colonies

In a letter to Kautsky dated 12 September 1882, Engels wrote "You ask me what the English workers think of colonial policy? Exactly the same as they think of politics in general: the same as what the bourgeois think. There is no workers' party here, there are only Conservative and Liberal-radicals: the workers merrily share the feast of England's monopoly of the world market and the colonies". After quoting Engels approvingly, Lenin (1916) went on to explain how the English colonial monopoly enabled the capitalists to make super-profits out of which they could afford to bribe their own workers in order to create a national alliance between workers and capitalists against other countries: a strategy which reached its logical conclusion in the First World War.

Two main tendencies within the Labour movement were revealed by the war between the imperialist nations for economic advantage. Hyndman's group sided with the other chauvinistic political forces, whereas the Independent Labour Party, headed by MacDonald and Keir Hardy, steadfastly opposed the war. As a result of early ideological inclinations, and the lessons drawn from the war, the Labour Party eventually came to place great emphasis on international peace and goodwill, the end of the exploitation of one nation by another, the policy of granting full autonomy to the white dominions[+], and the need to guide colonial peoples[X], in time, towards self-government and independence within a 'commonwealth of nations'.

[+] The designation 'dominion' was adopted in 1907 to denote a status different from that of a colony. Full self-government was not achieved until 1919 when Britain relinquished control of foreign policy. The Balfour Formula drawn up as a result of Dominion demands at the 1926 Imperial Conference finally defined the Dominions as "autonomous communities within the Empire, equal in status, etc.".

[X] 'Colonies' is employed loosely to cover all dependencies including colonies, protectorates, and trust territories.

But, despite this apparent clarity of principle, reflecting belief in the brotherhood and equality of man, the actual ideological configurations produced by Labour have been extremely complex. Once again, the Labour Party has been faced with an operative dimension on which an actual colonial policy had to be implemented in the face of strong commercial interests, of nationalism and jingoism at home, and of political rivalry and white settler interest abroad. Furthermore, the Empire, being a most heterogeneous grouping, consisting of autonomous white dominions as well as dependencies (including colonies, protectorates and trust territories) generated, over more than half a century, a vast number of disparate political responses.

For the purposes of this study, it is only necessary to draw attention to a limited number of the many strands of thought in the Labour ideology of empire. I shall mention only the desire for peace and for peaceful transition to responsible government, the commitment to the 'bottom dog' and the ending of exploitation, and the atmosphere of self-satisfied complacency with regard to Empire advancement, with accompanying moralistic paternalism. Afterwards, I try to show how orientations developed towards the Empire have application to domestic immigration and race relations.

Labour's heartfelt desire for world peace and equality between nations was illustrated by its dream of world government. Arthur Henderson (1918) recommended a League of Nations for the purpose of preventing war and in order "to create a common mind in the world, to make the nations conscious of the solidarity of their interests, and to enable them to perceive the world as one ..." A number of Labour writers glowingly set out the advantages to world peace and prosperity of a world government.

J H Thomas (1920), for example, claimed that the League would be the right medium for "keeping the industrial balance as well as

the political peace of the world" (p.194). But to do so it would have to become a world parliament with representatives of "all free peoples" upon it. As long as it was composed only of the victorious nations of the First World War, it would be little better than an alliance. Thomas envisaged his "League of Peoples' Parliament" as something more than a debating club or advisory committee. It would have power to legislate, and in strong Liberal vein, he offers it as the means by which free trade is to be achieved. There is a noteworthy and far from accidental parallel between Labour ideas for cooperation between the different peoples of the world and plans for the development of a 'British Commonwealth of nations'. Both can be seen as a means of restoring the nineteenth century stability shattered by the Boer and 1914-18 wars.

Labour literature always presented an ideal of world peace and economic cooperation, but invariably neglected to offer a realistic appraisal of the obstacles in the form of national, imperial, and class interests to its achievement. The charge of operative naivety in the formulation of socialist international policy gives an indication of the Labour government's likely performance in power. When no practical means have been devised for reaching a goal, conservative inertia and class collaboration are likely to establish themselves with accompanying secondary systems of justification (see note 7). (Nevertheless, the 1924 Labour Government did make moves towards establishing the League of Nations.) With regard to Empire, the Labour Party reaffirmed its opposition to economic exploitation and argued the need to develop economic, educational, and democratic infrastructure for the social advancement of the colonial peoples. Ramsey MacDonald (1907) declared that "the native should be protected from the blighting exploitation of white man's capitalism". J H Thomas (1920) wrote that "both in

regard to Africa and other dependencies, Labour has its principles, and the first one is that there should be no economic exploitation of the native by the white man". The Labour Party would aim at the establishment of native representation upon governing councils with a gradual "deepening of the responsibilities of government". Eventually, the interests of the dependencies would be supervised by the League of Nations. Labour rule would aim at conditions in which the native took "his place as a free man in the economic system, utilising for himself the riches of his own country".

The Trade Union Congress of 1925 stated its complete opposition to imperialism and resolved to support the workers in all parts of the British Empire to organise trade unions and political parties to further this interest.

It could be argued that the Labour Party's short spells in power before the Second World War did not provide it with the opportunity of accelerating the exceedingly slow economic development of the colonies, let alone of using the wealth of imperialist entrepreneurs for the advancement of the native. The two general rules that each colony should balance its own revenue and expenditure, and that economic development should be left to private investors remained unchallenged.

The Colonial Development and Welfare Acts, first passed in 1929, provided for the annual expenditure of £1 million on the whole Colonial Empire - but even this was only half implemented (only £5 million had been spent by 1939), and it was conveniently justified as a means of improving employment prospects at home. In practice, the economic relations of Empire were not substantially altered before the 1940s. After 1945, the Labour Party began to take colonial development more seriously, declaring in Let us Face the Future that it would seek to promote mutual understanding and cordial

cooperation between the Dominions of the British Commonwealth, "responsible self-government in India and the planned progress of our Colonial Dependencies". Consideration was given to the questions of how the "imperial domination and the economic exploitation that remain" were to be ended and how economic resources were to be organised for the social good (Creech Jones, 1945, p.13). The answer in terms of aid to improve education and health services in the colonies was predictable from the inclination of the Labour Party to welfarism.

H N Brailsford affirmed that "Emphatically it is our duty to make handsome grants in aid to foster the educational and health services of the colonies" (1945, p.29). A Creech Jones (1945, p.67), Labour Colonial Secretary, believed that "the corollary of the liquidation of imperialism is a sound policy of economic construction and social welfare". Williams (1949) described in glowing terms "the great advances in political self-government, in economic expansion, in the development of trade unions, in education, and in the union of territories whose political and economic advance can be made more rapid by membership in a larger unit" which were taking place under a Labour Government, and proudly listed the sums of money being used to raise the living standards of the native peoples. Again, in line with the trade unions' influence on the Labour Party, it was accepted that trade union officials should go out to the colonies to help in developing local trade union movements.

After the experience of the First World War, the Marxist Left laid great emphasis on the immense profits British capitalists could draw from the super-exploitation of the Empire and described the appalling conditions of the colonial populations suffering from disease, starvation, low wages, or forced labour. Strong indignation was expressed over the suppression of trade union

organisation and activity in many of the colonies. The rivalry between the imperialist powers for wider colonial markets, sources of raw materials, and opportunities for investment was seen as a constant danger to world peace. As the aims of imperialists were to force down the wages of British workers and to pacify the colonial people's independence movements, the Labour movement had to work for solidarity between British and colonial workers to end all forms of exploitation and to free the colonies from the imperialist yoke. But in the general jingoistic climate of the 1920s, the view of the Left did not prevail.

In contrast, the Labour Right, breaking with Cobden traditions, acknowledged the Empire's economic and political potential. Following the 1923 Election, a Labour Commonwealth group was set up with W S Royce as chairman, succeeded in June 1924 by George Lansbury. The group decided to hold an Empire - in reality, an inter-dominion Conference in London on 17 September 1924, at which Lansbury advocated more bulk buying from the Empire, and increased emigration. The Right accepted the need for greater democratic participation in the running of Empire, but recognised the ambiguity of expressions such as 'self-determination' which could describe a wide range of relations with the metropolis.

One popular idea of the process of colonial development was that of 'the ladder of ascent' by which each colony passed through a series of stages, each giving the native leaders slightly more responsibility, until dominion status, i.e. complete self-government, was reached. With a belief that it would take the colonial peoples a long time to achieve the sophistication needed for dominion status - for, after all, the dominions had had the advantage of British culture to begin with - the question of Empire became

translated into the question of Dominion*. Influenced by 'greater British nationalism', many Labour thinkers sought to reaffirm the bonds of Empire. Development of the Empire would be to the economic benefit of the metropolis and of the colonies and, as with the dominions, would eventually lead to their closer voluntary incorporation in a world-wide Imperial Union, thus providing an economic justification for the continuation of Empire. Even in 1948, Ernest Bevin was arguing that it was essential that Commonwealth resources should be jointly developed and made available in this way (Hansard, Foreign Affairs debate, 22.1.1948).

The British public and many members of the Labour Party tended to look upon the Empire in a favourable and uncritical light. Whatever the reasons for the existence of Empire, it was argued that the British Government had acquired a moral responsibility towards the colonies that had to be exercised by the provision of good government

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* In reading through a number of Labour speeches on Empire affairs in the 1920s, I was struck by their emphasis on dominion, in preference to colonial, conditions. Of course, this was related in part to the dominions' relatively greater economic importance, yet in all discussion on the merits of Empire, there was a strong tendency to generalise about origins, conditions, processes, and policies, and to neglect the important differences between the white dominions, the areas of white settlement, the Indian subcontinent, and the black colonies. Convincing statements purporting to represent the universal conditions of imperial rule, yet listing only the freedoms enjoyed by a country with dominion status, might obscure the oppressive policies experienced in the black colonies and perform a useful justificatory function. So prevalent was this tendency that Leonard Barnes (1939) felt it necessary to preface his remarks on imperialism by pointing out that he spoke not of the self-government of the dominions, but of the forcible subjection to British rule of India, Ceylon, tropical Africa, the West Indies, and the rest of the so-called dependencies and mandated territories.

and the maintenance of law and order. Abdication of the powers of government to people incapable of exercising them properly might result in the destruction of property and loss of life. The estimated 400,000 deaths in India and Pakistan after partition could later be used as a reason for condoning prolonged British rule elsewhere.

The most commonly expressed opinion was that although occasional excesses might have besmirched the British record on Empire, it was, on the whole, something of which the country could be proud. If the age of colonisation was bound to come, its British form had been the most humane, and the colonial peoples had benefited greatly from the experience. British imperialism was not oppressive because it sought to raise the standards of subject peoples and prepare them gradually for the independence that was rightfully theirs.

A manifestation of Labour participation in the long-standing tradition of pride in Empire is to be found in J H Thomas's speech on 26 July 1929 at a luncheon given by the Directors of the Olympia. The then Labour Secretary of State for the Colonies was reported thus:

> Today there was a Labour Government in power but he was not speaking in a partisan spirit when he said that he too often found that foreigners were inclined to mis-interpret the real significance of British character and did not understand the British Empire. The Labour Government was as anxious and as zealous and would maintain the integrity, improvement and development, and were as proud of the British Commonwealth of Nations as any Government that either preceded it or that would follow it. The Union Jack was neither the property nor the prerogative of any particular party.

Similar sentiments were reiterated in J R Clynes's essay "Why a Labour Party" and George Gibson's "Labour and the British Commonwealth" both published in Herbert Tracey's The British Labour Party (1948).

Clynes felt that the Labour Party had had to spend considerable

time and effort disproving the most absurd mis-statements circulated against its imperial policies. "The free and inappropriate use of the term 'imperialism'" had done much "to discredit the name of Britain and mislead unthinking people as to the motives of different political Parties in retaining attachment to Colonies and Dependencies of mixed peoples having little in common with the English population." However, "the outlook of the Labour mind to these remote outposts of Empire was human and considerate, with a firm resolve for fair dealing. It dwelt upon the economic conditions, employment, liberty and life of the people" (1948, p.24).

Gibson developed the theme:

> The favourite expression was that it was an Empire built by fire and sword, and the rape and destruction of the native races. That notion, inherited from the early free traders was until quite recently the stock-in-trade of some of the more extreme elements in the Labour Party ... What I would like to examine is - Is the charge true?

Naturally, he leaves the reader with the strong impression that the charge was false, and went on to express the opinion that:

> The one irrefutable fact is that the Empire is here - a living entity - the best parts of it colonised and brought from the rough to happy fruition by the bone of our bone and the flesh of our flesh, men who speak the same language, have the same standards of human freedom, morals and justice.

There is a certain ambiguity in knowing whether Gibson was referring to dominions or colonies in his peroration, although it would seem clear that a racial element is present in his assessment. Proudly, he declared that "every dominion of British stock was at our side on the day war was declared".* The task facing the third Labour Government was to find a way of deepening and strengthening the "existing blood ties" which "bind free kinsmen" - a policy of which the Conservatives, conscious of their kith and kin overseas, must have heartily approved.

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* He was mistaken in the case of the Dominion of Eire.

With regard to the Labour concept of colonial imperialism, Creech Jones (1945) probably summed up the more common assessment of the British role when he claimed that "British control is generally tolerant and easy going and the majority of the people are consequently acquiescent and embarrassingly loyal to Britain". This generally entrenched complacency towards colonial conditions and policy was only to be shaken (if it has as yet been shaken) by the spread of nationalism in the colonies.

But there were British socialists who held a more sceptical view. Bernard Shaw (1928) had pointed out, many years earlier, that the British had always pretended that they were in foreign countries for the good of the inhabitants and not for their own sake. In the long run, however, these pretensions could never be made good because however noble the aspirations of imperialist idealists, capitalist traders were there to make as much profit out of the inhabitants as they could, and for no other purpose. Shaw described the capitalist traders posing as

> ... weary Titans shouldering the public work of other nations as a duty imposed on them by Providence; but when the natives, having been duly civilized, declared that they were now quite ready to govern themselves, the capitalists held on to their markets as an eagle holds on to its prey, and, throwing off their apostolic mask, declared their annexations with fire and sword.(p.158.)

Leonard Barnes (1939), in a Left Book Club Edition, wrote that it was essential to understand the Empire as "fundamentally a class interest", strengthening and consolidating the power and privileges of the groups which were already dominant in the economic and political life of the country. The structure of the Empire, he claimed, constituted "an immense obstacle to British progress in the only valid meaning of the term - namely the reorganisation of British society in the interests of the unprivileged" (p.100).

On the fundamental dimension of principle, it was quite obvious

that the Labour Party was bifurcated. The Left minority saw the negative effects on Empire and wished to see its exploitative structure demolished as rapidly as possible. A Right majority sought to maintain the ideal of an evolutionary process of colonies advancing towards dominion status, with their eventual voluntary participation in some Commonwealth parliament.

In two minds over Empire, the Labour Party never adopted a Leninist economic analysis, nor ever favoured imperial union. It combined commitment to the eventual independence for the colonies with belief in the Englishman's duty to enlighten the uncivilised. It opposed exploitation of colonial people, yet sought to further British economic development of the colonies. And it favoured independence, but independence only under 'responsible' leadership. Labour's confused ideology on colonial peoples evolved against the background of an existing empire, the absence of a class-based economic analysis of imperial relations, and the acceptance of the moral duty of 'humanely developing' and 'responsibly preparing' the colonies for independence ('trusteeship').

As quotations above from Ramsay MacDonald and J H Thomas illustrate, colonial people had to be protected from the worst excesses of capitalist exploitation. This meant, of course, not an end to capitalism in the colonies, but only an amelioration of its harsher effects on vulnerable sections of the population. Furthermore, it was believed that the colonial people needed to be raised from a condition of savagery, albeit noble savagery, to a position in which at some future date they might be permitted to govern themselves wisely. They were frequently seen as innocent and gullible children to be protected from capitalist exploiters and, in what appeared to be the best tradition of libertarian free-school philosophy, they were to be given a degree of latitude in their

waywardness.

Ramsey MacDonald (1907) thought that the native's "catalogue of crimes should not be made the same as ours because he cannot understand our notions of right and wrong", while J H Thomas (1920) asserted that Labour's aim would be "to civilise not to exploit the African" (p.135). In 1945, Leonard Woolf, writing on "The Political Advance of Backward Peoples", described primitive and tribal societies in which people who were uneducated and illiterate, terribly poor, and ravaged by the major tropical diseases, were incapable of dealing "intelligently and efficiently with the political and economic problems which the impact of European civilisation and particularly the economic system of Europe (was) imposing upon them" (p.85).

Whether the last statement is true or false, and it remains too vaguely formulated to be decided, it might, with others like it, imply that the existing way of life of colonial peoples contained little of worth to aid their survival in the modern world and would have to be replaced almost totally by the 'civilising' culture of the imperial power. It was never made clear what exactly was to be included under the heading of 'culture' but the possibility that other cultures might be perfectly viable when supplemented with a number of Western technical skills (such as double-entry book keeping) was never considered. Instead, colonial peoples were thought of as having an inferior primitive culture which had to be slowly replaced by Western civilisation.

There was an accompanying danger that when colonial peoples showed reluctance to relinquish their old ways, or idiosyncratically adapted the new ways to their needs, this would be interpreted by Western 'cultural missionaries' as evidence of 'the natives' natural inferiority'. The Westerner was so convinced of the superiority of

his way of doing things, that failure to act on his advice was seen by him as stupidity. The thwarted ambition of the paternalist that fell short of producing the results required, could quickly generate the need to explain away the perceived deficiency of others in terms of their inherent lack of ability.

Woolf illustrated this point well by going to the trouble of considering whether the African was capable of learning Western ways: "I have not the space in this essay", he said, "to discuss the question whether the African is so inferior psychologically that he cannot learn the technique of Western civilisation and form a self-governing community or the further question whether democratic freedom is desirable - to do so would require a book or two books" (1945, p.93). What is of significance is that a Fabian socialist should ask these questions in the first place, let alone deem them worthy of such lengthy answers.

Labour's view seemed to be one of a benevolent paternalism that accepted that the colonial peoples needed some protection from the rigours of capitalism, that they had to be excused for their ignorance of the modern world, and that the British politician's duty, like that of the Christian missionary, was to initiate policies that would enlighten the innocent and bewildered.

The Labour Party also accepted the need for all peoples to acquire independence and freedom, but acknowledged that this could not be achieved overnight. "Political and economic domination by one people over another", Creech Jones (1945) believed, was "preposterous today and contrary to all our professions". The primary duty of the Colonial Office and of British administrations in Africa was "to train the native inhabitants in each colony in democratic self-government" so that they could "take over the administration of

their own countries":

> Universal elementary education is a sine qua non of modern democracy ... If Africans are to manage their own affairs they must be given the knowledge of Western civilisation without which management is impossible.

One way of equipping the colonial peoples for government would be to give some practice to the suitably gifted by allowing them to participate on various committees and councils. J H Thomas (1920) envisaged their acquiring training in the local government supervision of sanitation, roads, and education in small areas. Rita Hinden (1945) advocated more political representation for Africans and encouragement from the British Labour Movement in the development of trade unions. Reform would be needed, Woolf argued, in the nature and extent of education and in the structure of the administration and government (1945, p.95). If progress was to be made towards self-government, the Africans had to be given the maximum amount "of which they (were) capable".

Probably, J R Clynes (1948) summed up the mood admirably when he claimed that the Labour Party did not frown upon tendencies towards independence when others claimed it, and it preferred to let peoples have some practice in the art of self-government to fit themselves for it" (pp 24-25). Labour politicians were always "delighted to know of any advance in colonial peoples' education, social and economic affairs, and greater knowledge in the art of how to govern themselves wisely". But stress on the need for practice in government might have fortified belief among the British that black colonial peoples were scarcely fitted for the task, that the imperial power had to have the final say in deciding on their readiness for independence, and that external intervention was justified if things went wrong.

In fact, although the Labour Party believed in granting

independence to the colonies, it showed by its policies in power that it was in no great hurry to do so, and that it was determined that any transfer of power would only be to governments which it regarded as 'responsible' (see note 8). It was, of course, firmly opposed to nationalist and communist liberation movements which were seen as 'extremist' and a danger to British interests, as was illustrated by the policies it adopted towards Malaya, Kenya, British Guiana, and South Rhodesia. Prominent Labour politicians, no doubt, believed themselves to be acting for the natives' own good, and tended, like hurt parents, to feel particularly aggrieved if the natives rejected their magnanimous dealings. In general, it would be true to say that unless it were severely challenged by a powerful independence movement, the Labour Party, like the Conservative, never for one moment questioned the right of the British Government to make decisions on behalf of the colonial peoples.

All this simply amounted to a rather stifling moralistic paternalism, which as colonial independence became increasingly inevitable, fitted in well with the prevailing belief that British rule had accomplished its great civilising mission and justice was being done. There was, of course, the countervailing Marxist analysis laying stress on the exploitative nature of imperialism and the continuity of economic dependence long after the granting of political sovereignty, but this was never a dominant theme in Labour thought. In general, the overall position was aptly served by the formula of 'trusteeship'.

Specific application to recent foreign policy and black immigration

Labour's approach to black immigration and race relations in Britain was greatly influenced by its policies towards Empire. The assumption of responsibility towards colonial peoples abroad was replicated in Labour attitudes towards black workers in Britain.

In the early 1950s, the Labour Party Conference pledged its support for "the maintenance and development of co-operation in the Commonwealth and its progressive enlargement as a free association of peoples of different race on a footing of complete equality". Recognising the danger to unity of the doctrine of racial superiority in East and Southern Africa, the Labour Party endorsed the view that the essential basis of the Commonwealth had to be equal respect for people of all races, and committed itself towards the progressive elimination of racial discrimination.

In all the dependent territories there had to be rapid progress towards 'responsible' self-government, to be achieved by promoting economic development, expanding education and social services, and by fostering the growth of democratic institutions. As soon as the development of each territory made it practicable, arrangements were to be made between the Government and the 'responsible' leaders of each territory for the transfer of power (LPACR, 1953, p.150). The Labour Party wished to see the colonial peoples 'coming of age' as soon as possible and fulfilling their responsibilities in a manner worthy of their British educators.

In 1958, Hugh Gaitskell (1958), the Party leader, outlined four Commonwealth ideals: the first, belief in democracy and self-government, the second, racial equality, the third, economic cooperation (involving aid from the richer to the poorer countries), and the fourth, non-aggression. In a group of multi-racial states, any idea that one race was superior to another was bound to be unacceptable, and where the principle of racial equality was openly flouted, it caused strain upon the Commonwealth.

Labour's support for the concept of a world-wide multiracial family was illustrated by its frequent condemnation of apartheid in South Africa as a "dangerous and immoral doctrine which sets certain races apart as inferior human beings and restricts them to "a life

of servility""(LPACR, 1955, p.186). Apartheid was incompatible with the British Commonwealth of Nations and a violation of human rights. When parliament debated the withdrawal of South Africa from the Commonwealth in 1961, the Party expressed its total 'abhorrence' of South African policies (Hansard, 22.3.1961).

With regard to British Central Africa, although the idea of Federation might first have been explored at the tail-end of the Labour administration, the Party voted against the proposals in the White Paper on the grounds that it failed to contain adequate safeguards for African interests, and was against the will of the African people (James Griffiths, Hansard, 24.3.1953). At the second reading of the Rhodesia and Nyasaland Federation Bill (Hansard, 6.5.1953), Clement Attlee, Leader of the Opposition,reiterated the Party's view that the measure should be delayed until the colour bar was broken down.

The strength of commitment to the future development of a multi-racial Commonwealth was demonstrated in the 1958 parliamentary debate on Commonwealth economic problems. Labour speakers claimed that the Conservative Covernment had gravely damaged the Commonwealth economy. The steep decline in inter-Commonwealth trade was loosening "the ties which bound our free and equal nations together" and the failure to stabilise commodity prices had impoverished millions of Commonwealth citizens and deprived them of the ability to buy British goods. The Labour Party:

> had always maintained that the development of this new, multi-racial, free and equal community bestriding the five continents of the world, was vital to the cause of peace (Hansard, 2.12.1958; LPACR, 1959).

Against the background of this previous, passionate commitment to the multi-racialism of empire as a foreign policy, it is much easier to understand Labour's moral indignation at the "bare-faced,

open racial discrimination" (Gordon Walker, Hansard, 16.11.1961, p.706) of the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act. In effect, Labour's idealist search for world peace, the brotherhood of man, and its feelings of responsibility for the welfare of colonial peoples had made it the party of empire when empire was on the wane. It remained strongly committed to the propaganda of 'the great multi-racial family of nations'.

Specific application to the Race Relations Acts

It might also be argued that the Labour colonial traditions of benevolent paternalism and of seeking to end the excesses of racial oppression within the framework of capitalist exploitation were perpetuated in subsequent race relations legislation.

Members of the Labour Party sought to outlaw the colour bar not only in Africa, but in Britain. Fenner Brockway, in 1953, attempted to abolish the colour bar by moving a motion opposing "all discriminatory practices based upon colour throughout the British colonies, protectorates and trusteeship territories" (Hansard, 1.5.1953, p.2505). After Fenner Brockway had spent ten years campaigning unsuccessfully for a bill outlawing the colour bar to be put on the statute book, Harold Wilson eventually promised him that should a Labour Government come to power, it would adopt his bill (The Times, 17.2.1964), a promise repeated in the October 1964 Labour Manifesto.

The first Race Relations Act of 1965 was followed by two more pieces of Labour Party legislation introduced in 1968 and 1976. Significantly, one long-standing criticism of the acts and their resultant institutions of education and enforcement has been their paternalistic philosophy and function. The 1968 Act was justified on the grounds that unless some placatory action was taken the

blacks in Britain might become as restless as they were in the cities of the United States.

Downing (1972) claimed that people at the centre of British politics, liberal Tories, Fabians, and Liberals, agreed on the policy that had to be followed: "But it had to be done to the oppressed and not by them, and without denting the granite structures which originate poverty and racism in the first place". Other writers drew attention to the paternalistic provisions of the 1968 Act itself. If the Race Relations Board formed the opinion that a coloured worker had not suffered unlawful discrimination, he was not allowed access to the courts himself.

Sivanandan (1976), under the heading "... to domestic neo-colonialism", took the analysis still further. The purpose of the 1968 Act was to educate "the lesser capitalists in the ways of enlightened capital". With the availability of a new reserve army of labour in the form of European migrant workers, and bearing in mind the social costs of possible racial violence, the state deemed that the exploitation of colonial immigrants through racial discrimination was no longer acceptable. The purpose of the Race Relations Board was to carry that lesson to employers and local officials, a function reflected in the structure and personnel of the Board and conciliation committees, which were marked "by the presence of local firms and interests (and token blacks) and the absence of black workers from the factory floor ..." The Board succeeded in justifying the ways of the state to local and sectional interests and in creating in the process "a class of coloured collaborators who would in time justify the ways of the state to the blacks".

Without interfering unduly with the existing status quo, yet with an eye on the likelihood of future racial unrest, the Labour

Party sought to organise, control, and make decisions on behalf of the black community, to encourage limited reform and the end of overt discrimination, to develop a 'responsible' black middle class and to incorporate a rising and indignant black intelligentsia in various government-sponsored welfare schemes. Thus domestic race relations legislation duplicated many of the effects of colonial policy. It would appear that, in dealings with colonial immigrants, well-worn ideological paths, established in transactions with those same colonies, have been tried yet again, either because they were available and were thought suitable and/or because the economic configurations at home and abroad were sufficiently similar to elicit an identical response.

Local case study: councillors on Empire, Commonwealth and Africa

The survey of Wolverhampton councillors' views contained a number of questions on foreign policy and its bearing on African affairs, together with two questions specifically related to the Empire and Commonwealth. In hindsight, the questions may not have been sufficiently well formulated to have elicited a full range of representative responses but they provided councillors with an opportunity to voice opinions on a subject that not a few of them still found of great interest. Overall, Conservative and Labour responses differed significantly, although members of both parties did share views in common.

To the question of whether the British Empire had been a good or bad thing, Conservative councillors were overwhelmingly of the opinion that it had been a good thing (18 of 26 answers), with 7 out of 26 believing it to have had both good and bad aspects. Only one councillor felt it to have been wholly bad. Of the Labour councillors, 5 of 22 thought it had been good, as many as 9 thought it bad, and the remaining 8 thought it both good and bad. The

Conservatives undoubtedly had greater nostalgia for empire while Labour divided between those who were distinctly hostile to the evils of imperialism and those who recognised the undesirable side effects of the British presence, yet felt they were outweighed by the benefits of the pax Britannica. The raw statistics, however, give little indication of the complexity of councillors' ideas on empire and commonwealth and their consciousness of their significance for contemporary race relations.

Table 7. Was the British Empire a good or bad thing?

	CONSERVATIVE	LABOUR	TOTAL
Good	18	5	23
Good and bad	7	8	15
Bad	1	9	10
TOTAL RESPONSES	26	22	48

Most apparent was the continuing eristic between the noble theory of empire as a civilising mission and the economic theory of imperialist exploitation. This was not simply a somewhat stale debate between Conservative and Labour members. Faced with a Left-wing alternative ideology and confronted with evidence in the media of poverty and low wages in the colonies, the traditionalists were forced to hold a defensive position. Paradoxically, the attack on traditional certainties may have been aggravated by a recognition of the economic motivation of Commonwealth migrants coming to Britain and also by the frequently expressed opinions hostile to empire of the ethnic minority councillors. In short, even when satisfied with empire, councillors felt it necessary to defend their views against possible criticism. For example, councillor C4 remarked:

> You will get people saying that we exploited the Empire but you've got to remember how they were being exploited when we got there. You have to remember the times when the Empire was built up and the attitudes of men and women of the time. In fact, I did make a point to a group of West Indians some time ago when they were saying that their ancestors were slaves, that at the time the conditions for ordinary men and women in Europe were probably a damn sight worse in many instances than the conditions of their ancestors, because they were worth money. Somebody had actually paid for them so they were not to be wasted. I must admit this rather shook the chap concerned but there's an element of truth in it (C4).

The survey question of course was effective in provoking moralistic responses, yet this councillor even felt the need to justify the age of slavery in his support of imperial conditions.

The annoying discrepancy between vindication of British empire-building and Conservative condemnation of Soviet expansionism was also recognised. Councillor C9 observed that:

> Russia's doing it now in a different way but the influences we had on our Empire and on the world as a whole was preferable to what the Russians are doing now with their colonisation (C9).

Councillor C59 argued simply that the British had engaged in "the most productive, open empire-building that was ever done": "It was the most benevolent empire that ever existed. It improved the lot of the people and took maximum advantage of each country's natural resources and developed them". A Labour councillor L10 also found consolation in making comparison with other empires: "In those days it was a good thing when compared with other ruling nations like the French and Portuguese". The defense of empire invariably merged with the cataloguing of its long-term beneficial effects, best illustrated perhaps below in the paragraphs on the views of the British contribution to civilising backward nations, but summarised by councillor C25 in the following way:

> We hear today a great deal of criticism of the British Empire, usually from people who are complaining about what we've taken out of India, and very rarely do we hear of what's been put into Empire. The advances over the last 25 or 50 years of some of the countries that

> were formerly part of the Empire and are now part of the Commonwealth have been absolutely tremendous. None of this would have been achieved without our presence. You can compare it with the Roman Empire. Would Britain have been what it is today if it hadn't been for the Romans?

But not all councillors were so sure of their ground. Defensive justification signified unease and, in some cases, quite obvious symptoms of cognitive dissonance and of attitude change in the face of a growing awareness of the evil conditions that had been present in the former colonies. The following touching testament shows that even the conceit of a deeply felt political commitment is capable of melting in the uncertain but sincere confrontation with harsh reality.

> I suppose the aristocracy of those days greatly benefited from the Empire at the expense of the ... I don't like to think this way, but I've got to realise it was a fact. I like the thought of empire, I'm a royalist, I love the Royal Family, and I love this sort of thing. But when I think what I read, I must have been pretty naive all my life. But don't forget people like yourself (addressing the interviewer) get your education a lot quicker than we did in our time: we got our education very slowly you know. As you grow older you've got to think and think. These people are being exploited. What can I do about it in my little way? I think nothing, I'm nothing. But consensus of opinion would say we should do something about it (C57).

But this was an exception. More frequently, both Conservative and Labour councillors defended the Empire in terms of the civilising effects of the British presence though Labour responses of this kind were fewer and softer in tone. "Without the British people" one Conservative councillor, C13, unselfconsciously remarked, "a lot of the people of the Empire would still be in the trees." The Empire was good, another thought, "because we took out Christianity and, to put it bluntly, brought them down from the trees and started to educate them" (C12). Apart from such crude expression, which perhaps represented the last lingering trace of nineteenth century scientific racism, other respondents produced an impressive list of British contributions:

> We gave them government and judicial procedures (C9).
>
> The British civil service did a very good job in introducing a sense of justice where there was no justice, in saying and thinking what was right no matter who was right or wrong ... The district officer was incorruptible (C24).
>
> We gave them law and order and a sense of democracy (C53).
>
> The people learnt a lot from our expertise and from the Christian knowledge that was taken there (C47).

Members of the Labour Party tended to concentrate on British educational achievements:

> We played a wonderful part in different parts of the world (L15).
>
> They had education from us; the Indians learnt steel-making and other techniques from us (L35).
>
> We laid the foundations in a lot of countries for a better life. We provided education (L51).

Strong paternalism and an underlying conceptual framework of the "ladder of ascent" were frequently demonstrated:

> (The British Empire) was a good thing because we took ideas out there and started things. But it was right that as the countries matured they should run their own affairs and we shouldn't try to impose ourselves, just as parents shouldn't try to impose themselves on their children once they've grown up and become people in their own right (L42).

When children have learnt the right behaviour they are entitled to their freedom. But councillors' highly critical views on the performance of present African states, caused continuing unease among Conservatives about the colonial territories' preparedness for independence.

> I'm only sorry to say that we gave our Empire away without ensuring that the countries had the same sort of political system which we have always been used to. We can still boast the best political system in the world. But we haven't given our colonies that system. In many cases we have allowed them to take independence and a lot of them have one-party systems, like Amin, and we've seen blood baths in other colonies, too (C26).

Apart from the justification of empire in terms of its civilising effects, a number of councillors saw it as a possible alternative

power block and world-wide defense system. They referred to the way the Empire - and they seemed to be thinking here mainly of the Dominions - had come to Britain's aid in the world wars and might still be capable of acting as a bulwark against communism. As one Conservative simply put it, "It's nice to think we've got colleagues in other countries who are prepared to help us if the need arises" (C23). More explicitly, another pointed out that "we wouldn't be so worried about the Common Market if the British Empire was as strong as it used to be. We would have enough: a global empire - and strength" (C39). A number of Labour members found similar satisfaction in the idea of a "family of nations" consisting of different nationalities, races, creeds, and colours. More practically, empire was seen as a kind of economic partnership in which "we were able to manufacture things and sell to our second or third cousins in various parts of the world, and they in their turn, were able to sell to us" (L7).

Councillors from both parties mentioned the immense gratification they experienced from nationalist and imperialist sentiments. A Labour councillor described it in the following way:

> I used to love to stand up and sing on St George's day, all the songs of the British Empire and wave the flag, but that's certainly a thing of the past now. I think good traditions arose from the Empire. What more stirring sight than to see the processions in London with the Sikhs and Canadian Mounties and all the rest coming in procession! That's the most wonderful sight (L2).

The alternative critical approach to empire was centred, on the whole, around the idea of imperialist exploitation and the principle of self-determination for all peoples of the world. It was found mainly among councillors who would be classified, and would classify themselves, as on the Left of the Labour Party (9 in all). Their views can be summarised bluntly and clearly as follows:

> I think all empires are bad. I think all conquests are undesirable and I can't honestly see that the Romans did us much of a favour when they came here and conquered us, no more than we did the Indians when we went there and subjected then to our rule. It's inevitable to me that the subjection of one people to the will of another has only one purpose in empires and that's economic exploitation (L43).

Other councillors pointed out that "we systematically robbed and pillaged the countries we went into" (L19), that "we never ploughed anything back in" (L29), and that if technology was established in the countries of Empire, such as the railways in East Africa, "it was only for the capitalists' convenience - to get their goods out" (L14).

If the Empire was exploitative, it also followed that its so-called civilising influence consisted of nothing short of cultural genocide, although only one Labour councillor attempted to spell out this consequence:

> We told them that they had no history and created bloody second class citizenship in their minds so that they had no past. Look at the Afro-Asian today, why he's like he is. He's like he is because he was told by us the rulers - not by my class, but by the same people who rule me - that he had no past at all, and neither we, nor the Afro-Asians have been allowed to entertain all the very good things, the culture, the tribal set ups in Africa, etc., and they're very important (L20).

What really concerned a small number of councillors was the political effect of empire on the British people. Lenin's theory of "the aristocracy of Labour" helped one or two of the Labourites to explain why the British working class had not yet turned to socialism, while councillors of both parties pointed out that the common man had in fact benefited very little from empire:

> I don't think the English working man did very well out of it. It might have kept him in a job which was pathetically paid, but it was the better off who profited from Empire (L35).

> When I was a boy at school, the teachers used to point to the map of the world, and one fifth of it was coloured red, and they used to say we were the richest country in the world, but the kids used to run outside with the backsides out of their trousers. I would say it was probably a good thing inasmuch as we gave them law and

> order, but they were totally exploited to the benefit of certain families and finance houses in this country. It didn't do the individual in this country much good (C53).

During the analysis of the question on empire, it became obvious that a number of councillors had established a relationship between the idea of empire and British race relations. On the one hand, it was assumed that the multiracial Empire and Commonwealth in which Britain had served as the civilising 'mother country' might now act as an example for the new multi-racial Britain. On the other hand, poor race relations could be explained as a reaction to the cruelties perpetrated during the days of slavery and empire:

> I have to go back to my history books and look at the way British people made money out of the slaves in the British Empire. I think that if it hadn't been so bad in those days, black people wouldn't hate us so much now. They're afraid, and they sort of want to fight back, not for the way they've been treated, but for their ancestors (L46).

A further point needs to be mentioned in relation to the question on empire. A number of councillors described their personal experiences of life in Africa or India, having lived there or served in the armed forces abroad. They usually treated the interviewer to vivid accounts of life in the colonies and of the behaviour of 'natives' and 'colonials'. No generalisation could be made about the effect of the experience on their values, but they were all agreed on how poor the living standards for the majority of the population had been, whether they chose to blame this on native ineptitude or colonial exploitation.

As councillors made little distinction between 'Commonwealth' and 'Empire', the two questions tended to produce a repetitive element in their respective answers. The summary of the responses to "What part do you think the British Commonwealth has to play in the modern world?" will be correspondingly brief. Together with the item on empire, the question sought to contribute to an understanding of the

way ideology had been affected by waning British political influence abroad and the growth of the independence movements. Out of a total of 48 respondents, over half (26) felt the Commonwealth had little or no part to play in the modern world, whereas 14 felt it had some or an important part. The remaining 8 gave other replies or said they did not know. Generally, it was the Conservatives who felt the era of Commonwealth had most certainly passed, but paradoxically they showed greatest regret at its decline (11 Conservative to 2 Labour). Conservatives also emphasised the importance of the historical contribution of the British Empire (15 Conservatives as against 3 Labour). Inevitably, the Commonwealth was compared by 12 councillors - 6 from either party - with what was seen as the alternative political strategy - membership of the European Economic Community. In all cases, the comparison was favourable to the Commonwealth. A number of councillors (11) from both parties stressed either the symbolic or actual role of the Commonwealth in creating world unity. For most responses, however, it was difficult to distinguish what councillors thought was the case from what they would have liked to be the case.

Table 8 What part do you think the Commonwealth has to play in the modern world?

DIRECT ANSWERS	CONS	LAB	TOTAL
Little or no part	16	10	26
Some or important part	8	6	14
Don't know, response unclassified	2	6	8
TOTAL RESPONSES	26	22	48
OTHER CHARACTERISTICS (MORE THAN ONE RESPONSE POSSIBLE)			
Regret at passing of Commonwealth	11	2	13
Favourable comparison with EEC	6	6	12
Mention of historical contribution	15	3	18
Unifying role of Commonwealth	5	6	11

As with the question on empire, it was possible to separate distinctly positive from distinctly negative opinions of Commonwealth. Conservatives felt that the Commonwealth had brought trade and prosperity. It had also created stability as volatile political situations had been brought under control by British institutions and through the example set by parliamentary democracy, while security had been won by the construction of a world-wide network of military bases. The Commonwealth still looked to Britain as the motherland with the queen at the helm, for example, and guidance. Throughout the world the idea of Commonwealth engendered respect and had the potential of encouraging greater world unity. British technical skill and education was still being passed on through Commonwealth connections. The Commonwealth nations had played an important part in helping Britain to win the war and colonials, meaning, in general, Australians, New Zealanders, Canadians, and white South Africans and Rhodesians, had helped to strengthen "the British character". It is apparent that councillors illustrated nostalgia in their search for positive attributes.

Negatively, the Conservatives saw the Commonwealth as consisting at present of third-world nations which were "a bit underdeveloped" and in need of aid. These Commonwealth countries were no longer under British control and, in selling their allegiance to the highest bidder, showed an annoying lack of loyalty. In addition, one councillor mentioned the cost and problems caused to Britain by Commonwealth immigration.

Labour councillors tended to see the Commonwealth as a kind of social service agency operating at home and abroad. Engels, no doubt, would have found it ironic that the party of labour could be so completely imbued with the propaganda of empire that its members believed in the beneficial effects of its memory more thoroughly

than those in the party of capital, but the idea of "the great family of nations" died hard among Labour supporters. At home, the Commonwealth was thought to act as a useful example to the people to Wolverhampton of a successful multi-racial experiment. It had a part to play in the development of culture and international understanding, and could help everyone to function together as one community. Apart from its lessons for multi-racial living, it increased the degree of unity in a divided world, and contributed to the advancement of poor nations. It was certainly a more pleasing prospect than the European Economic Community and could be expected to act as a defense against communism. Even those sceptical of the Commonwealth's actual achievements thought that in the future it might contribute more to the ideal of the international brotherhood of man. The doubts arose from acknowledgement of the lasting memory of the depradations of colonialism, and from the stress placed on the importance of self-determination without interference, Commonwealth or otherwise.

The questions on apartheid in South Africa, Rhodesia, and the record of African states since independence sought to make councillors racialise their discourse about foreign affairs. Again there were marked differences between Conservatives and Labour on these issues. Of the Conservatives, 10 of the 25 respondents (2/5) said they disapproved of apartheid whereas 21 out of 23 Labour councillors declared themselves - sometimes very emphatically - to be against it. Only one Conservative said he actually approved of apartheid: "quite good, quite a feasible system, separate living, really" (C58). The others gave a variety of non-commital or apologetic answers: 5 thought that allowances should be made for it, while 9 felt it was difficult to pass an opinion, particularly as they weren't living there, that it should be left to the South Africans to decide and that it wasn't

their business, or that they simply didn't know enough about the situation. Approximately 9 tried to provide some apologia for the South African regime. Of the 2 respondents in the Labour Party who didn't declare against apartheid, one said she did not know much about foreign affairs, while the other speculated from the behaviour of the whites and blacks he represented in Wolverhampton who seemed to prefer to live apart, that it might be "natural" for the races to be separate.

Table 9. Thoughts on apartheid or separate development in South Africa

	CONS	LAB	TOTAL
Approve of apartheid	1	0	1
Need to make some allowances for it	5	1	6
Disapproval of apartheid	10	21	31
Difficult to pass an opinion/don't know enough/no first-hand experience/not a British affair/leave it to the South Africans to decide	9	1	10
TOTAL RESPONSES	25	23	48

Conservatives who opposed apartheid fell into two groups: the moralistic, who felt it wrong for people to be treated differently, and the pragmatic who felt it was politically expedient to change the system as soon as possible. Councillor C8's response provides an example of the former:

> Apartheid is shocking. I couldn't bear to think that in Wolverhampton you would have separate buses for whites and blacks. I consider some black people are idiots the same way as I consider some white people but I don't think of them as any different.

Another Councillor described with disapproval how a South African cousin's Bantu servant was not allowed to live with her husband in her quarters. The pragmatic response was reflected in references to the likelihood of future violence, the possibility of communism, and to the need to come into line with the rest of the world.

Labour disapproval was often expressed vehemently and moralistically:

> The worst possible type of slavery (L10).
>
> I'm totally against it, it's utterly immoral, it's socially unjust (L19).
>
> Abominable. It's the philosophy of divide and rule in another guise. Instead of using people's class and so forth, it uses people's natural attributes which I think is abominable. The fact that a man's white or black or whatever and is segregated is infinitely more abominable than class segregation, which I accept exists here because I've been fighting that all my life (L20).

One or two councillors tried to extend a socialist economic analysis of capitalism to South Africa: "I think it's a way of exploiting one section to the benefit of the other ..." (L43), while others criticised apartheid from a humanitarian or Christian perspective. It was an offense against dignity and how on earth was it possible for those people to continue claiming they were Christians. Also voiced was fear of the bloodbath to come as the whites: "defend their interests for all they are worth" (L56).

Conservative defense of South Africa took traditional forms. The evolutionist theme was present: "It's taken us 2,000 years to get to this stage of civilisation. In many cases we are trying to do this with the African in 100 years" (C26), as was the idea that the whites had arrived in the country at the same time as, or prior to, the blacks, and were entitled to do what they wished with their land. The whites had built the country up with farming, mining, industry, and commerce from what had previously been a barren land. Their enterprise should be rewarded and not jeopardised by socialist wealth-sharing schemes. The idea that blacks in South Africa were better off than elsewhere in Africa was also a common-place theme:

> It seems to me that the coloured people have done better through the apartheid system than in other areas, because although they have been kept separate, their standard of living has developed, not as well as it should have done,

> but they have had opportunities under apartheid, for example, education, that they wouldn't have had elsewhere. While I wouldn't condone apartheid, I think the coloured population have done a little better than some people have given the South Africans credit for (C9).

Two other slightly abberant but clearly 'Conservative' answers are also worth mentioning. One councillor was willing to admit apartheid was wrong but as he felt that any change would be for the worse, thought it best to leave it as it was. Another thought that as it was 'natural' for 'communities' to live apart, there was clearly no need for apartheid laws, and the situation should be allowed "to find its own level" without state interference.

Apart from straightforward defense of apartheid there were the claims that British people were not in a position to judge the situation:

> I don't think we're in a position to understand apartheid here. It's a different society, a different way of life. Good God, there are some who can't understand each other even in Wolverhampton (C4).

> I've never been to South Africa, I've never met anyone from there, I have no first hand knowledge of what really happens so I don't think I'm really qualified to judge. I think you'd have to live there a while before you could give a true statement (C13).

> I honestly think that unless someone has lived in South Africa one is not really competent to talk about South Africa's problems (C24).

> Apartheid is a matter for the South Africans. It ill-becomes a people five thousand miles away to sit in judgement over people who have no problems to meet and difficulties to encounter (C10).

Most of these answers and others like them (9 in all) might acceptably have been classed as "careful answers" or "don't knows". But councillors' stringent requirement of first-hand knowledge for assessing the truth or for passing an opinion on an issue contrasted vividly with their unqualified answers to the question on the record of African states since independence, on which subject one would expect them to have possessed a similar lack of competence. For

example, C4 thought that the record of African States was "not really very good - not a happy sight", C13 that "they haven't got an excellent track record",C24 that "the record is absolutely pathetic ... independence was granted too early and the responsible colonial powers didn't do anything like enough to educate them", and C10 that the record was "tragic and continuing at that level".

One might be forgiven for feeling that the 'ostrich' response to apartheid was an extension of a white supremacist justificatory system, particularly as this syndrome was not found among Labour councillors. Such studied lack of competence in replying to a question perhaps provides a further instance of the phenomenon of deracialisation (see Chapter Nine).

The question on Rhodesia produced similar results to that on apartheid. Again there were major differences in the policies recommended by members of the two parties. In the spring of 1979, a number of alternative policies were possible: to continue to support white rule under Ian Smith, to recognise the 'Internal Settlement' and Bishop Muzorewa's government, or to support the Patriotic Front under Mugabe and Nkomo. One problem of analysis was to decide how to treat those responses in favour of black majority rule which failed to distinguish clearly between Bishop Muzorewa's party and government and the Patriotic Front. There was a clear tendency among Conservatives to support Ian Smith or the 'Internal Settlement' and to recommend an end to sanctions, while among Labour, to advocate black majority rule, or one man one vote, and to dismiss Muzorewa as a 'puppet'. Some small backing for the Patriotic Front was also apparent. Labour responses undoubtedly bore the mark of successive years of Labour foreign policy attempts to achieve an 'honourable settlement', beginning with Harold Wilson's and terminating with David Owen's.

Table 10. Rhodesian policies advocated			
	CONS	LAB	TOTAL
Support Ian Smith / recognise Smith regime	3	0	3
Support Internal Settlement, Muzorewa government	9	0	9
Support Patriotic Front	0	3	3
Support black majority rule, one man one vote (whether Muzorewa government, Patriotic Front or other possibility, unspecified)	8	15	23
Should not get involved in any way	3	2	5
Don't know enough to comment	2	2	4
Other, vague, etc.	0	1	1
TOTAL RESPONSES	25	23	48

Once more the Conservative 'ostrich' response was noticeable in at least seven of their replies: it wasn't possible to judge what was going on far away in Rhodesia. There was also some spirited defense of the European settlers in Rhodesia.

> You see when Rhodes went into Rhodesia it was almost a barren country. As soon as the settlers came and started industry the natives came along in countless thousands, creating problems (C41).

> Without the white man, the natives - if there had been any there to begin with - would have still been up trees (C39).

> ... they probably aren't yet ready for majority rule (C13).

The principle of non-interference in another country's affairs, and recognition of Britain's total impotence were given as reasons for not getting involved in the Rhodesian situation. Yet a number of Conservatives were extremely worried at the possibility of a major outbreak of violence in Rhodesia, and thought that, for the sake of real politik, Mr Smith should grant majority rule forthwith: "eventually black majority rule will come by virtue of their number and I think if we don't accept that fact communism is inevitable" (C8).

One councillor recounted how disgusted he had been when, as a soldier stationed in Africa, he had seen the treatment meted out to the blacks: "It opened my eyes, I didn't approve and I knew that

they were all basically afraid that one day the blacks would take over" (C37).

On the whole, the Labour party were thoroughly committed to black majority rule. Where they differed was over the means to achieve it. While a very small number supported the Patriotic Front and the guerrilla war, the majority, in line with official policy, sought a peaceful solution. While accepting that sanctions and negotiations had not achieved the desired results, they were reluctant to advocate military solutions: "confrontation and force achieve nothing (L33). One councillor admitted his ambivalence, pointing out that he hated violence but, that if history showed anything, it was that real civil liberties had to be fought for and were never freely given (L43). Many expressed the wish for peaceful transition to a free and democratic multi-racial society. In one or two instances, exhortations for black and white to come together in love and peace and lacking in any reference to the political reality of Rhodesia, inclined towards wholly philanthropic escapism.

At least five councillors made reference to Bishop Muzorewa's government as a puppet regime, e.g. "I have great mistrust of Ian Smith and believe his elections to have been concocted to suit the interests not of the black Rhodesians but of the minority white population. Bishop Muzorewa is a very appropriate tool" (L56).

A clear distinction between Conservative and Labour was also to be found in answer to the question on the record of African states since independence. Eighteen of the twenty-four Conservatives (three quarters) felt that the African states had not done well, or had done very badly: "deplorable", "tragic", "very poor", etc., whereas only 3 of 20 Labour replied that they had not done well. More than half of the Labour councillors (11 in all), in comparison with 3 Conservatives, showed strong sympathy for the emergent African

states and were prone to make allowances for them.

Table 11. The record of African states since independence			
	CONS	LAB	TOTAL
Have done well	0	2	2
Have done as well as can be expected under the circumstances - sympathetic to their problems	3	9	12
Have not done well	12	3	15
Have done very badly	6	0	6
Other unclassified views	2	1	3
No opinion/don't know	1	5	6
TOTAL RESPONSES	24	20	44

In general, the Conservatives saw the problems of African states as arising from their too rapid transition from colonial rule to independence.

> They got independence too quickly (C8).
>
> With such a vast change, you should do it very slowly - it's wrong to go like a mad bull at a gate in that sort of situation (C27).
>
> They weren't really educated enough to cope with independence (C28).

This position was often combined with 'ladder of ascent' and cultural and institutional evolutionist concepts, falling squarely into the Burkian tradition:

> If you force this type of thing onto people it's bound to cause anarchy - all these things have got to evolve naturally. As time goes on everyone will have a vote and we will see a majority government even in South Africa. We must always remember that the women in this country haven't had the vote for all that long (C25).
>
> I would see the thing sort itself out if I lived for another sixty years. It's evolution. They're going to fight one another for a long time yet (C39).
>
> They are still a very primitive people (C53).

The predominant image was one of a violent, bloody, lawless, and anarchic continent, in which corrupt leaders exploited their own people and showed utter disregard for the democratic principles in which they had been schooled while under British rule. The majority of African countries, one councillor said "have proved to be far worse dictatorships than we've seen anywhere else in the white world" (C59). Of course, there were exceptions to these generalisations: Kaunda, Kenyatta, and Hastings Banda were mentioned as reliable and stable politicians. The poor record of African states was also blamed on lack of adequate leadership, one councillor suggesting that they needed "a few really brilliant statesmen" (C57).

In summary, it was clear that Conservatives had a very poor impression of Africans' ability to run their own affairs. It was difficult to decide whether this attitude was based on deeper biological or cultural concepts of racial differences or merely a fairly superficial reflection of the information they had received through the media. Little or no attempt was made to look at the economic problems of emergent countries.

Various reasons were given by Labour respondents for viewing sympathetically the record of African states, the most widespread being that they needed more time to develop. Superficially, this resembled the Conservative evolutionist approach, but it was less centred on the individual or institution, and more obviously derived from a socialist model of the economic stages of development:

> People who expect these countries to have parliamentary democracies are living in cloud cuckoo land. You can't go from a feudal state to industrial democracy. They're following their own ways to development. The only trouble is I think that Africa is becoming Balkanised through the intervention of the world powers and the Africans will be unable to decide their own future (L21).

> By and large they are making the same kinds of mistakes in their development as we made ... Our job is to tell them in a comradely way that these corrupt regimes are stages of development (L20).

Other reasons for the difficulties that African states were experiencing were: the legacy of colonial exploitation, the poor role models and behaviour they had been presented with by the colonial powers, the public school education of their leaders, foreign intervention, and the fact that one was likely to find political factions in every country. As with the Conservative responses, there was little or no mention of the general economic and trading difficulties experienced by 'third world' countries. Instead the impression was given of an interest in the welfare of the bottom dog, of a paternalistic concern for the Africans, and a firm commitment to their right to self-determination and independence. Nevertheless, the somewhat defensive responses revealed an underlying anxiety at the prospect of more violence and instability in African quarters.

In conclusion, it is apparent that there was a marked difference in the approach of the Conservative and the Labour group to questions on Empire, Commonwealth, apartheid in South Africa, Rhodesia, and the record of African states since independence, and that their responses showed clear signs of following along their respective parties' traditional ideological paths. While overall, the ideologies remain relatively constant and stable, they are modified little by little by the pressure of events and the reality of decision-making. Nevertheless it is instructive to recognise the very real historical continuity and homogeneity of party responses at national and local level.

CHAPTER EIGHT

BRITISH POLITICAL VALUES AND RACE RELATIONS II

This chapter deals at slightly shorter length than the preceding one with Conservative and Labour values. Specific ideological formulae and the manner in which they have come to be applied to British race relations are described with the help of examples drawn mainly from the parties' annual conference reports. The chapter is divided into six sections.

(1) Class and class mobility. The Conservative Party's satisfaction with existing class relations is compared with the Labour Party's quest for egalitarianism, and the significance for race relations is indicated.

(2) Social justice and social order. The Conservative Party lays great stress on issues of law and order, while the Labour Party shows more concern for social justice. Each produces a distinct pattern of responses in dealing with racial matters.

(3) Laissez-faire versus social ownership. The Conservative Party's rejection of state interference in economic and social life, commitment to laissez faire politics and private ownership is in marked contrast to the Labour Party's belief in the necessity of government intervention in the economic sphere and the long-term ideal of social ownership of the means of production, distribution, and exchange. Both policy sets have a bearing on approaches to race relations.

(4) Individualism, collectivism and welfare provision. The Conservative doctrine of self-reliant individualism is compared with Labour Party commitment to collectivism, in regard to the justification of welfare provision for black people.

(5) Concepts of man. The parties' respective approaches to the fundamental nature of mankind affect the way they handle race relations.

(6) Party bogies. Various political figures and organisations come to represent the antitheses of party values. Conservative and Labour Parties seek to distance themselves from their arch enemies and the various policies with which they are associated, a fact which has significance for race relations.

CLASS AND CLASS MOBILITY

The Conservative Party and recognition of rank, acceptance of hierarchical arrangements, maintenance of standards.

As Conservatives are concerned with maintaining tradition and preserving the economic institutions of capitalism, they are also prone to believe in the inevitability of existing class distinctions and in the futility of pursuing the socialist goal of equality. Lord Coleraine (1970) remarked that "the Conservative no more believes in the possibility of equality than he believes the moon is made of green cheese". But the explanations and justifications offered for the existence of inequality and its universal inevitability vary considerably as also does Conservative opinion on the desirability of alleviating poverty. This we might expect of a party unsure of whether to turn from its nineteenth century paternalist protectionism, either to the laissez-faire Liberal Conservatism of Hayek, or to a form of welfare corporatism.

A man's wealth, Lord Hugh Cecil wrote, is acquired by lending his exertions or his possessions, i.e. by selling labour power or risking capital. Where free market forces are allowed to operate, "Ethics are beside the point; desert is irrelevant; the pecuniary value of exertions is determined by wholly non-ethical economic causes. What economists call "the law of supply and demand" regulates

earnings ..." (1912, p.124). Similarly, the gains of those who lend their possessions are altogether unrelated to merit. Because in the eyes of the law, justice does not require that a man be charitable to another, but only that he keep faith with him, there is no commitment on the part of the state to grant relief to the poor. "Where there is no convention, where there is, that is to say, no implied promise, neglect to help the deserving or the suffering, however cruel or however ungrateful, is not unjust" (p.175). In other words, the laws of supply and demand decide on the distribution of wealth, and the state should interfere as little as possible in their operation.

An older Conservative view, exemplified by the oft-quoted hymn "All things bright and beautiful", is that the hierarchical relations between human beings are a reflection of divine ordering. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, this view was supplemented by various popular theories of elites: some classes were best fitted to rule by virtue of inherited characteristics or superior upbringing. Sir Geoffrey Butler (1914) claimed that the "vital energy" and "efficiency of a governing class" consisted in the fact that "the vast majority of its members have passed through a specialised preparatory training". To a large extent, the class into which one was born provided the social context in which that training took place. The class system constituted "a moral and a real necessity" and represented "the effect of selection by the capacity to govern". Public school and Oxbridge were mere glosses on a well-laid, social-class foundation.

The genetic endowment of social classes and their ability to reproduce themselves effectively were issues raised in the new, nineteenth-century study of eugenics founded in the 1860s by Darwin's cousin, Francis Galton. The word 'eugenics', coined by Galton, in

his book, Inquiries into Human Faculty and Its Development, meant "the study of agencies under social control which may improve or impair the racial qualities of future generations either physically or mentally". Before Darwin's Origin of Species, it had been generally held that the inherited qualities of a species were fixed, but the new eugenics accepted that the human species was not only changeable, but that there was a moral duty to improve the human stock. "What Nature does blindly, slowly, and ruthlessly, man may do providently, quickly, and kindly ... The improvement of our stock seems to me one of the highest objects that we can reasonably attempt" (Galton, 1904, p.50).

To the objection that the qualities which should be selected for breeding purposes were a matter for conjecture, Galton stressed that he sought all-round efficiency in physical, intellectual (including moral), and hereditary qualifications, all of which he believed were closely connected. All sensible people would accept "Health, energy, ability, manliness, and courteous disposition" (1904, p.46) as qualities to be encouraged, while the breeding of habitual criminals and the feeble minded would quite evidently have to be restricted. Galton had little patience for the view that the harsh social conditions of the time were much more pertinent in creating differences of performance and that all that could be recognised in human behaviour was achievement rather than ability. He objected to what he called 'the pretensions of natural equality' (1869, p.56) and rejected the view that the social structure of Victorian England prevented the highly able from the lower classes from achieving success.

The practice of eugenics would raise "the average quality" of the nation and "the race as a whole would be less foolish, less frivolous, less excitable, and politically more provident than now ..."

(1904, p.47), and better fitted to fulfil its "vast imperial opportunities". In his paper to the Sociological Society of 1904, Galton suggested that the society concern itself with an historical inquiry: into the rates with which the various classes of society (classified according to civic usefulness) had contributed to the population at various times, in ancient and modern nations. "There is strong reason for believing that national rise and decline is closely connected with this influence. It seems to be the tendency of high civilisation to check fertility in the upper classes." The races of men and the social classes within a nation were ranked by Galton on a scale of social worth derived from the fact of their existing ascendancy in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century world order. He speculated inconclusively on why the higher social classes often failed to reproduce themselves and why though "most barbarous races disappear, some, like the negro, do not" (1904, p.48). It was important, he thought, that the policies of the state and public institutions be closely examined for their eugenic significance. There could be a danger that institutions for the feeble-minded might result in the procreation of feeble-minded offspring. Neither should costly higher education be wasted on those intellectually unable to profit by it. Indiscriminate charity might also be non-eugenic.

Eugenic arguments became increasingly popular in the early twentieth century and were taken up by many groups, including the campaigners for birth control.* The assumptions that various 'higher'

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* Havelock Ellis (1917) argued:
"We possess in birth control an invaluable instrument not merely for immediate social betterment but for the elevation of the race"..."as carried on at present, neo-malthusian methods may even be dysgenic rather than eugenic, for they tend to be adopted by the superior stocks, while the inferior stocks, ignorant and reckless, are left to propagate freely. This unfortunate result

human qualities, such as intelligence, were found in greater abundance in the upper social classes, that there was a danger of their being diluted through intermarriage or through the more rapid rates of reproduction among less worthy representatives of human stock, were of obvious concern to politicians anxious to preserve the quality of the British way of life, its standards, genetic endowment, and class structure.

Keith Joseph, in 1974, showed that the Galtonian theme, suitably modified by the use of modern sociological categories, was still present in Conservative thinking on social class. Joseph claimed that "The balance of our population, our human stock is threatened". The nation was moving "towards degeneration" for a number of reasons, one of which was that young mothers from unskilled and semi-skilled social backgrounds were giving birth to an undue proportion of the nation's children.

> Many of these girls are unmarried, many are deserted or divorced or soon will be. Some are of low intelligence, most of low educational attainment. They are unlikely to be able to give children the stable emotional back-

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* (footnote continued)

> is encouraged by the notorious failure - still so conspicuous amongst us -to spread the knowledge of contraceptives among the classes which from the eugenic standpoint most urgently need them." Marie Stopes (1923), another ardent campaigner for contraception, claimed that "For want of contraceptive measures the low-grade stocks are breeding in ever-increasing ratio in comparison to the higher-grade stocks, to the continuous detriment of the race" (p.9). Scarcely needing to be drawn is the only-too-obvious parallel with the present-day preoccupation with the comparatively higher fertility rates of the black population and its apparent ignorance of, or reluctance to use, contraceptive measures.

> ground, the consistent combination of love and firmness which are more important than riches. They are producing problem children, the future unmarried mothers, delinquents, denizens of our borstals, sub-normal educational establishments, prisons, hostels for drifters. (Observer, 20.10.1974.)

The Sunday Times (27.10.1974) examined in detail the inadequacy of Keith Joseph's factual information and pointed out that just under one third of the population of Britain came from families where the husband was engaged in unskilled or semi-skilled work.

Conservatives would never crudely claim that there were no able working-class children, but only that fewer able children were to be found within the working class. For this reason, Conservatives would probably support provision for the screening out of working-class children, so that their talent would not be lost to the nation. For example, the provision of a limited number of scholarship places or of similar means of access to a number of the professions would satisfy Conservatives not only that the class system did not waste the nation's human resources, but that the excellence of the middle class was being preserved by its continual recruitment of 'new blood'.

Conservatives are in favour of equality of opportunity in the limited sense of approving of the channels of access to middle and upper strata, providing that the recruitment process does not unduly interfere with the existing social order, that market forces continue to operate, and that no egalitarian measures aimed at standardising environmental influences are undertaken. The Conservative is more than convinced that economic adversity is unlikely to prevent realisation of potential, and that, in the final analysis, "brains will out". He feels that the opportunities given to the individual and the freedom of the British way of life guarantee that the truly able will excel. For him, the danger lies in the

introduction of regulations furthering egalitarianism by closing down existing avenues of social mobility.

The Conservative's belief in the existence in Britain of a fair degree of equality of opportunity, makes him appear unsympathetic towards the complaints of those who claim they have unfairly been denied the facilities to better themselves. He feels that, with the necessary persistence and single-mindedness, immigrants could succeed within the present opportunity structure. The fact that they have failed is a sign to him that they are insufficiently prepared or simply unfit to enter the ranks of higher social strata. It is not the class system that is at fault, but the calibre of the lower orders. To defend standards, class barriers and exclusive practices need to be defended at all costs against pressure from the swelling numbers of the 'lumpen' and from socialist iconoclasts.

Specific application to immigration control and race relations legislation

Conservative approaches to inequality and social class manifest themselves in a number of ways in the field of race relations. Where black immigration is concerned, it is sometimes felt that the social hierarchy will be undermined by the number of black people entering the country. They are thought of as adding substantially, through immigration and their higher rates of reproduction, to the lower social classes, with the overall effect of lowering standards of health, hygiene, morals, education, and accommodation. Poor standards of attainment in schools with a high proportion of black pupils are blamed on their lower ability or IQ. Also blacks alter what is deemed the just order of priorities in the allocation of scarce resources.

At the Conservative Party Conference in 1961, T.F.H. Jessel,

citing evidence from the Camberwell Medical Officer of Health, talked of the lower standards of hygiene and overcrowded conditions found among many of the immigrant communities. They did not dispose of food waste properly, and they carried contagious diseases (CACR, 1961, p.27). Frank Taylor claimed that, as a result of migration, the rate of leprosy has risen 150 per cent in ten years (1961, p.29), while Norman Pannell complained of "the housing difficulties, the danger to health and morals, the unwanted children" (1961, p.30). John Greaves Holt thought that education was being "dragged back" and health standards threatened by the large percentage of immigrants (CACR, 1969, p.96). McKenzie and Silver (1968, p.61) indicate the long-standing nature of these kinds of fear in their account of a 1906 Conservative leaflet called The Aliens Act Made Useless, in which European immigrants are described as diseased and criminal "scum".

T.F.H. Jessel argued that the search by young married couples for accommodation was made worse by the 100,000 immigrants occupying housing space in the county of London (CACR, 1961, p.28). He wanted the interests protected of the people who had always lived in these districts. Charles Simeons believed that when eventually immigrants qualified for the council housing list "the order of the natives, the British, and the immigrants may well be reversed and those who have been on the housing list for years and have now got near the top may suddenly go to the bottom" (CACR, 1969, p.96).

Justification in terms of the preservation of the social hierarchy, as with other Conservative values, may operate in the opposite direction. The status quo can be threatened not only by the numerical extension of the lower orders but by a shortage of their particular kind of labour power. The fear of numbers is counterbalanced by the need for menial workers, aptly expressed by Christopher Barr's claim that "we need someone to sweep the factory floors" (CACR, 1961, p.29).

Alternatively, continued immigration may be justified by pointing out that particular immigrants do not belong to the lower social strata. "We are told", Mrs. M. Hogarth said, "that these Asian people are educated and are skilled" (CACR, 1972, p.74), while Councillor Robert Atkins asserted that "These people from Uganda are independent, educated and, for the most part, professional - the very stuff of which Tory votes are made" (CACR, 1972, p.79). Much more frequently, however, black immigrants are associated with the lowest and least socially useful (if not wholly parasitical) stratum of society, and the rate at which they 'breed' in comparison with white stock is a cause for grave concern. (See Enoch Powell, 1972.)

With regard to anti-discrimination legislation, Conservatives are often inclined to reinterpret the systematic deprivation of the human rights of black people in terms of a justified inequality of treatment arising from blacks' alleged lower standards of education, hygiene, or moral behaviour. For example, it is sometimes thought right that blacks be excluded from certain kinds of housing in much the same way as it would be right to exclude tramps, alcoholics, pimps, or prostitutes. This is not seen as race prejudice, but as a correct assessment of blacks' social status and likely behaviour.

Arising from this interpretation, the Race Relations Acts are regarded as a socialist measure aimed at reducing what, in Conservative eyes, are legitimate or inevitable differences of treatment, in an effort to achieve an unwarranted equality. The Race Relations Bill "is concerned solely and exclusively with the intention to achieve social equality" (Hansard, 23.4.1968, p.102), claimed Ronald Bell. In a society deemed legitimately inegalitarian, such measures give black people more than their just deserts. "The 1968 Race Relations Bill", K.G. Reeves asserted, "will create a

privileged and protected minority" (CACR, 1968, p.65). Peter Davies thought the Bill, "in aiming to give equality to people of all races, in fact could create a privileged minority" (CACR, 1968, p.66). The most notorious exponent of the position was Enoch Powell who, while agreeing with Edward Heath that there had to be equality before the law, pointed out that this "does not mean that the immigrant and his descendants should be elevated into a privileged or special class ..." (Birmingham, 20.4.1968).

A more fundamental belief in the fairness of market mechanisms in allocating rewards probably lies behind much of Conservative scepticism about state interference in economic relations between the races. It is believed that blacks are discriminated against, not so much because they are black, but because, for whatever reason, they are inadequate in their market behaviour. If they had ability, opportunities would be there for them to make use of. Their alleged inability to make use of the opportunities extended to them is taken as confirmation of their poor mental calibre.

The Labour Party and egalitarianism (implying equality or equality of opportunity).

"The central socialist ideal is equality" argued Hugh Gaitskell, leader of the Labour Party. He explained that he did not mean by this identical incomes or uniform habits and tastes, but a classless society in which the relations between all people were similar to those existing within one social class: a society "in which though there are differences between individuals, there are no feelings or attitudes of superiority and inferiority between groups ... one in which though people develop differently, there is equal opportunity for all to develop".

The continuous tension between the socialist and social democratic forces within the Party is reflected in its ambiguous

position on the principle of equality. Gaitskell, for example, in explaining what he had in mind by equality, mentioned on the one hand a future of objective egalitarianism in a classless society, and on the other, the possibility of a subjective assumption of egalitarianism in a society that operated on the principle of equality of opportunity: and at the same time, his audience was reassured of his commitment to individualism.

Tawney (1931) described how the inequalities of the old regime in Europe had been unacceptable because they resulted not from differences of personal capacity, but from social and political favouritism. In contrast, the inequalities of industrial society were seen as the expression of individual achievement or failure to achieve, and were also economically beneficial for they acted as an incentive to work. It was widely believed that ability could be fully realised in the unbounded field of economic opportunity providing the individual set his mind to the task. If, in the process, inequality arose, it was attributed not to the arbitrary nature of a divinely ordained class system, but to the great differences in personal quality that existed within the population. Thus, economic inequality was explained as the necessary consequence of legal equality and economic liberty. But such bourgeois reasoning could not readily satisfy those sections of the population who experienced the narrow circumscription of their lives and the brunt of capitalist economic exploitation. "Most social systems", Tawney claimed, "need a lightning conductor. The formula which supplies it to our own is equality of opportunity."

The doctrine of equality of opportunity has both a descriptive and prescriptive form. It may be used to claim in a self-satisfied, Conservative fashion that individuals all have an equal chance of

making use of their abilities to achieve the most desired values of a given society, or alternatively, in a discontented Labour mode, that individuals must have such chances made available to them. The Labour Party has embraced the view that the general life-style of the working class in the areas of employment, education, housing, and health, must be substantially improved to guarantee to it the same opportunities as other classes.

But, as Tawney pointed out, equality of opportunity obtained "only insofar as each member of a community, whatever his birth, or occupation, or social position, possesses in fact, and not merely in form, equal chances of using to the full his natural endowments of physique, of character, and of intelligence" (p.104). As long as differences in social environment have a telling effect on personal development, equality of opportunity is unrealisable. Shaw (1928) put it more graphically:

> .... many people who call themselves socialists will tell you ... that they want "equality of opportunity, by which I suppose they mean that capitalism will not matter if everyone has an equal opportunity of becoming a capitalist, though how that equality of opportunity can be established without equality of income they cannot explain.

While accepting the value of equality of opportunity, the socialist critique focuses upon the impossibility of achieving greater self-realisation without greater actual social equality. The insistance on the necessity of developing human potentiality to the full can be used to justify the provision of a limited number of opportunities to the few at the expense of the many who may, as a result, be deprived of the elementary requirements of civilisation and remain incapable of scaling the ladder of success. The socialist believes not simply in an equality of opportunity that enables a few competitive individuals to excel over others and to

be rewarded by riches or fame, but in a greater measure of collective equality that increases the social well-being of the whole community. Where socialists are likely to disagree is over how this is to be achieved.

The social democratic wing of the Labour Party acts as if institutions under capitalism can be modified in a piece-meal way to achieve a much fairer society. If equality of opportunity is ensured, it is argued, members of the working class may rise into positions previously monopolised by the bourgeoisie, thus helping to erase class privilege and the social disadvantage and conflict that accompany it. The comprehensive provision of housing, education, and health facilities will reduce the differences in life chances between social classes to such an extent that equality of opportunity will prevail. People will then be able to move easily from social class to social class in a manner that makes obsolete traditional theories of class conflict.

"British socialists", C.R. Attlee (1937) claimed, "have always recognised the conflict between classes but have not generally adopted the class war as a theory of society." Instead, they have concentrated on providing a safety net of welfare provision in an endeavour to abolish debilitating poverty and to guarantee equality of opportunity. The socialist principle of equality, it was implied, would come about gradually as institutional reforms ensured increasingly equal access to jobs, political positions, and social resources. In the words of the 1970 General Election Manifesto, the Labour Party believed:

> that all people are entitled to be treated as equals: that women should have the same opportunities and rewards as men. We insist, too, that society should not discriminate against minorities on grounds of religion or race or colour: that all should have equal protection under the law and equal opportunity for advancement in and service to the community.

In contradistinction to the social democratic wing of the Party, the socialist might argue that in a capitalist market economy, the pursuit of equality of opportunity, as an alternative to a commitment to equality per se, would have the effect of intensifying individual competition and legitimating class differences by ensuring that the particularly able members of the lower placed strata were upwardly socially mobile. Far from destroying the bastions of privilege built on the basis of the private ownership of the means of production, the quest for equality of opportunity could lead to the acceptance of class exploitation and class differences (by presenting the possibility of individual, rather than collective, advancement).

Specific application to immigration control and race relations legislation

With the social democratic tendency to the fore, the two approaches to the value of equality help to explain some aspects of Labour Party justification of immigration and race relations policies. Great play is made of the necessity of treating black and white equally and of ensuring equality of opportunity in the process of migration and in accommodation, employment, and education. A Labour objection to the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act was that, with the Irish exempted from control, it was directed unfairly at black immigrants. Subsequently, when Labour introduced controls, strenuous attempts were made to counter the idea that they were unfairly directed against black people.

In commenting on the 1965 White Paper (Cmnd. 2739), the Labour NEC Report (LPACR, 1965, p.80) emphatically asserted that it was "a cardinal principle of Government policy that Commonwealth immigrants should have exactly the same rights and responsibilities

as any other citizen". John Fairhead's emergency resolution, defeated on the vote, had accused the same White Paper (which limited the number of Commonwealth immigrants to 8,500) of a double discrimination against both the coloured citizens of the Commonwealth and the non-professional classes (LPACR, 1965, p.213). Although, when in power, the Labour Party made little attempt to grasp the nettle, and adopted what Alex Lyon euphemistically called 'a low profile', it is now widely believed among informed Labour circles that, while there is a need for immigration controls, immigration laws which discriminate against members of another race in provision or effect must be replaced. The 1976 Conference called for the repeal of the 1968 and 1971 Immigration Acts on the grounds that they discriminated against black immigrants.

At face, discrimination on grounds of colour offends against the principle of equality of opportunity, and the Race Relations Acts can be seen as attempts to ensure that equality of opportunity is extended to black people. In his speech to the voluntary liaison committees of the National Committee for Commonwealth Immigrants, Roy Jenkins (1967) highlighted equal opportunity in his definition of 'integration' and went on to stress the importance of satisfying the second generation of 'coloured Britons' who were looking for the same opportunities as the rest of the population. "The more talented ones", he said, would have "full, normal expectations for professional, for white collar, for scientific and technological jobs" and vast trouble would accrue if these expectations were disappointed (23.5.1966).

The 1967 Conference resolution on racial discrimination, moved by A. Lester, mentioned concern "at the extent of racial discrimination in employment, housing, and insurance, and other services revealed in the recent report by Political and Economic Planning". Conference

believed that legislation could play an important role "in promoting equal opportunity without regard to race, colour or ethnic or national origins" (LPACR, 1967, p.312). The issue was fundamental to socialism for, Lester asked, "if we are not for equality and for equal opportunity ... what are we for?" (LPACR, 1967, p.313). The theme was frequently reiterated. David Pitt, in 1970, said that "what we want in this country is a united community in which all people have equal opportunities" (LPACR, 1970, p.207). Tom Driberg explained that "Integration - that rather academic word - means being accepted and fitting in. It means equal opportunity ..." (LPACR, 1970, p.208).

The Race Relations Acts' immediate object was not the achievement of equality between black and white, but the extension of equal opportunity to black people to whom it had previously been denied. The more naive social democrats thought that, by legislating in favour of equal opportunity, obstacles to black advancement might be removed and that, in time, black people might become evenly distributed among the social classes. But, in a labour market in which black people had been introduced to fill jobs that the white labour force was unable or unwilling to take, legal equality could not guarantee economic equality. There were, Alex Lyons acknowledged, "two parts to solving the problem of ensuring satisfactory race relations in Britain". One was to "eliminate racial discrimination", the other to "eliminate racial disadvantage" (Hansard, 4.3.1976, p.1667). Recognising the already existing de facto inequality of black people in Britain, the Labour Party responded in the manner in which it had been accustomed to dealing with inequality among the urban poor. It tried to find ways of directing welfare benefits towards the newly discovered class of black "socially deprived".

The scene had already been set by a series of well-publicised

reports produced by Government Commissions of Enquiry into housing, education, and the social services. For example, the 1965 Milner Holland Report had called for a comprehensive attack on areas of bad housing, the 1966 Plowden Report, for extra resources to be channelled to schools in deprived areas, and the 1968 Seebohm Report, for the designation of special need. The idea that comparatively minor geographical areas of social deprivation could be identified and treated amelioratively was common to them all. The terms 'social deprivation' or 'social disadvantage' adequately reflected the underlying assumption of a minimum living standard, below which a welfare safety net had to be extended and only at and above which equality of opportunity was possible.

In 1968, the Labour Government embarked on an Urban Aid Programme of expenditure on housing, education, health, and welfare in areas of special social need. These areas were identified by the stigma of "multiple deprivation", revealed collectively by poor and overcrowded housing, above average family size, unemployment, a high proportion of children in trouble or in care and, significantly, "a substantial degree of immigrant settlement" (Urban Programme Circular, Number 1, October 1968). Two other area-based schemes were also set up, both including "immigrant problems" within their terms of reference: the national programme of Educational Priority Areas, and the National Community Development Project. The special difficulties of the amorphous black population were conveniently subsumed into the general programme of welfare provision in housing, education, health, and other facilities. The planners reduced poverty to manageable proportions by agreeing to confine measures to deal with it to small geographically-defined areas.

In seeking to extend welfare facilities, the Labour Left and

Right were united in the pursuit of equality and equality of opportunity, but the Left was still able to criticise the Right's failure to recognise the endemic nature of inequality under capitalism. The explanation of inequality in terms of "social deprivation", and the attempts to eradicate that deprivation by compensatory programmes, ignored the wider structural imperatives and probably encouraged the belief that personal deficiencies were responsible for poverty. (The fact that the very number and concentration of black people living in an area was seen as a factor which qualified that area for welfare provision only perpetuated the view that it was black people themselves who constituted the problem.) As Tawney recognised, equality of opportunity depended not only upon "an open road, but upon an equal start", which, as a result of competition between unequals in the Labour market, did not exist. Black people had never had an equal start in Britain.

SOCIAL JUSTICE AND THE SOCIAL ORDER

The Conservative Party and the maintenance of social order and the rule of law.

Conservatives have always emphasised that the successful working of society depends, above all, on each individual performing his duties in accordance with the law of the land. As Burke (1790, p.58) put it, "Society requires not only that the passions of individuals should be subjected, but that even in the mass and body, as well as in the individuals, the inclinations of men should frequently be thwarted, their will controlled, and their passions brought into subjection. This can only be done by a power out of themselves..."

The rule of law is treated as a fundamental basis of British society stretching back at least as far as Magna Carta. Within the limits of the law the basic British freedoms are made secure. Those

who offend against the law are seen as undermining the social fabric and contributing to the state of anarchy, best exemplified, in Burke's opinion, by the French revolution. In Conservative thought, law is nearly always coupled with order, indicating the perceived relationship between a stable set of social relations and the legal bonds that guarantee their continuity. The existing just social order is maintained by the rule of law, the socialist antithesis of which is the conception of an unjust class society supported by 'class laws'.

It would not be difficult to show, with numerous examples, how important the ideas of the rule of law, and respect for law and order, have been to generations of Conservative thinkers, and how, at different periods, they have responded to what they have perceived to be attacks on the social fabric. One of Churchill's main objectives for Conservatism was "to uphold law and order and impartial justice administered by courts free from interference or pressure on the part of the Executive", thus combining the tradition of respect for the law with the principle of a minimum of state interference. If maintenance of the present law assures the continuity of the status quo, and there is a strong desire for things to be left as they are, then it is clearly best that the executive arm of government does not interfere with the law. According to L S Amery, "the main foundation of British freedom is what is known as the "reign of law", that is, of the equal submission of all, executive or ordinary citizens, to the same laws".

In recent years, Conservatives have been much concerned with upholding the rule of law against the various elements they felt were working - consciously or otherwise - for its destruction. In 1970, the Conservative election programme stated that a "prime duty of government" was the protection of the individual citizen from "the

serious rise in crime and violence". Fanned by constant press reports of crime to property and persons, the fears of many voters for their safety were harnessed to the traditional value of respect for law. In 1974, during the miners' strike, the Party manifesto was very much preoccupied by the threat posed to a law-abiding society by "a small number of militant extremists" who "abuse the power of their unions and cause incalculable damage to the country and to the fabric of our society itself". Again, in 1979, the Conservative manifesto stated that "the most disturbing threat to our freedom and security is the growing disrespect for the rule of law ... respect for the rule of law is the basis of a free and civilised life. We will restore it, re-establishing the supremacy of Parliament and giving the right priority to the fight against crime".

To ensure the effectivenes of "the fight against crime", the police were to receive better pay and conditions, greater attention would be paid to crime detection and prevention, and violent criminals and thugs were to be given "really tough sentences". As the bulwark of law enforcement, the institution of the police force is particularly sacred to Conservatives and any criticism of the police is looked upon, not only with disbelief, but as a dangerous attack upon the stability of the country itself. He who fails to give his unconditional support to the police is thought to be against them, and on the side of the criminal element.

Respect for law and order, then, is a central and long-standing tenet of Conservative thought, and the Conservative makes it his business to be on the look out for those subversive forces engaging in crime, industrial action, political sabotage, or other unacceptable behaviour, and intent on undermining the existing social order.

Application: black people as law breakers

As with the other Conservative values, the preoccupation with

law and order has had a marked effect upon the justificatory forms and policies pursued by the Party in the field of race relations. There is a heavy emphasis on the illegal aspects of black behaviour, which from being a subsidiary or side issue is elevated into the main political concern.

Prohibition on the entry of immigrants who have a criminal record and deportation of those who commit crimes is placed high on the political agenda. Norman Pannell's resolution, carried by a substantial majority of Conference delegates in 1958, contained the suggestion that "those immigrants who are convicted of serious criminal offences should be subject to deportation" (CACR, 1958, p.149). Pannell went into considerable detail about the "undesirable elements" among Commonwealth immigrants, illustrating his point by reference to convictions for living on immoral earnings. He believed "they should all be deported". Councillor D Clarke asserted that immigrants should all have absolutely clear records where criminal proceedings are concerned: "Personally, I want to tackle this problem from both ends. We ought to say that no one with a criminal record should come in and secondly, any person who commits a criminal offence when they have come in ought to be deported". Indeed, so great was Conservative disquiet over the criminality of immigrants that Miss Pat Hornsby-Smith, the Conservative Joint Parliamentary Under-Secretary at the Home Office, in a parliamentary statement, considered it necessary to deny that colonial or coloured people engaged in crime to any greater extent than did natives of the United Kingdom (Hansard, 27.3.1958).

By 1968, Conservatives had begun to recognise a new threat posed by blacks to law and order: the 'problem of illegal immigration'. A statement issued by the Shadow Cabinet (21.2.1968) demanded a

mandatory entry certificate procedure for non-voucher holders so that credentials could be checked in the country of origin, and the establishment of proper machinery for tracing the identity and locality of immigrants during the whole period before they could acquire United Kingdom citizenship. At the 1968 Party Conference, Quintin Hogg, in referring to immigrants' dependants, mentions evidence "of significant evasion and abuse, either by direct impersonation or by the importation of children without mothers, to exploit their labour" (CACR, 1968, p.73).

But by 1973, anxiety over illegal immigration had reached new peaks. Councillor P R Wood argued that the prevention of illegal immigration must be "a priority". "Certainly, the extension from six months to three years of the period during which proceedings may be taken is to be welcomed. I would like to see all immigrants who break our laws deported. Those who abuse our hospitality should not continue to enjoy it one moment longer than absolutely necessary" (CACR, 1973, p.37). And so concerned was William Deedes about the matter of illegal entry that he argued in favour of the use of identity cards. "If we want effective immigration control we shall have to think more seriously of internal control. That means what much of Europe already accepts, namely identity cards for all, unpalatable though that may be to some" (CACR, 1973, p.39). William Whitelaw in 1976 still felt that "stronger action must be taken to break the illegal immigration rackets which continue to flourish. This offensive trade in human hopes and lives damages public confidence in the whole immigration policy" (CACR, 1976, p.46).

Another significant law and order issue related to the black presence was that of urban violence, seen as a massive threat to a traditional law-abiding public. In August 1958, there were fights of a racial nature in Nottingham public houses and in September,

white youths attacked black people and their property in Notting Hill. Although the perpetrators of these incidents were white, the distinctive causal factor, isolated by the media, was race. As the new addition to the situation, the recent black immigration might easily be blamed for the violence.

Ten years later, in 1968, by a curious stroke of fate, the announcement of plans for a new Race Relations Bill coincided with Martin Luther King's funeral which was marked by looting, arson, and stone throwing in Baltimore, Pittsburgh, Cincinatti, and other American towns. Inevitably, the press and politicians presented the Bill as a means of ensuring that the "black versus white agony now shaking America doesn't happen here". It was, of course, against this Bill that Powell's speech on the 20th April was directed. Powell saw the Bill as "throwing a match into gunpowder", a result many thought he himself had come near to achieving at the time of his dismissal by Edward Heath from the shadow cabinet. Quintin Hogg reported that the Conservative shadow cabinet was split three ways over the Bill. As parliamentary spokesman, he himself was concerned to reestablish party unity and to avoid conflict between the government and opposition, which might lead to bitterness and "a threat to public order on a scale quite incommensurate with the value or demerits of the legislation as such" (Hailsham, 1975, p.231).

The association between urban violence and the black presence soon came to be well established. The news presentation focused in the main on two issues: on the crimes of 'mugging' and on the danger of race riot conceived as occurring on the lines of the American experience, although the civil disturbances of the last ten years in Britain have had little in common with the U.S. situation. Among politicians of the Right who offered any political analysis or policy recommendation, the inner-city deprivation thesis, coupled with

a tautologous breakdown of law-and-order account was popular in the late 1960s and early 1970s, to be replaced in the late 1970s, among Conservative circles, by explanations in terms of extremist exploitation of the race issue.

The build-up of mugging as an exemplar of the breakdown of law and order is well documented in Stuart Hall et al's Policing the Crisis (1978), a book which grew from the campaign on behalf of three youths, of whom one, Paul Storey, a fifteen-year-old Handsworth youth, was given two concurrent sentences of twenty years for assault and robbery. (See Paul, Jimmy and Mustafa Support Committee, 20 Years, 1973.) The growing concept of mugging as a black crime is well illustrated by Enoch Powell's reference to it as 'racial' (in a speech at Cambridge, April 1976) and by his suggestion in an interview about the black population, that British people no longer dared "to step out of their front doors after dark because thugs will steal their wallets" (New Statesman, 13.10.1978). John Pritchard, commenting on crime at the 1977 Conservative Conference,drew attention to the prevailing belief by trying to refute it: "Many idle hands are turned to crime. Blacks who become criminals are more in evidence for obvious reasons, creating yet more prejudice among their white neighbours. However, it is significant that the greatest amount of mugging is in Glasgow where the number of blacks is low" (CACR, 1977, p.43).

Violent street clashes at the 1976 Notting Hill Carnival once more drew attention to the dangers and possibilities of race riot and the deteriorating relationship of the black community with the police. At the 1976 Party Conference, John Alden, referring to the well-worn theme of immigration, commented that "Unless we

can see an end to this never-ending influx, we will see a great increase in the violence that we saw recently in Notting Hill" (CACR, 1976, p.43). On the 8th August 1977, a provocative National Front march in Lewisham, an area of heavy black settlement, was met by a Socialist Working Party organised counter-demonstration with predictably violent scenes. In the 1977 Birmingham Ladywood by-election, clashes occurred between the National Front and anti-fascist groups outside a National Front meeting. On 27th January 1978, there was a confrontation between police and black youths in Wolverhampton, while in February, after widespread protests against the Conservative Council's decision to allow the National Front to use Digbeth Civic Hall in Birmingham, angry stone-throwing crowds bombarded the heavily-policed building in which the meeting took place. In June (2.6.1978) a mob of white youths intimidated the Bengalis of Brick Lane in Tower Hamlets. When the National Front held a rally in Southall in April 1979 (23.4.1979) street battles between police and demonstrators resulted in the death of the anti-racist Blair Peach.

Despite the fact that violence was never widespread and the incidents arose mainly from reaction to National Front provocation, Conservative reaction was to reassert the importance of the principle of the rule of law. John Pritchard claimed that "Great Britain has a proud heritage of reason and tolerance. But the public has been shocked in recent weeks by street violence in three major cities brought about by those who seek to stir up political enmity to achieve their spurious ends at a time when unity and reconciliation are needed" (CACR, 1977, p.42). Michael Alison pointed out there were three essential factors where race relations were concerned, the first being "the odious exhibition by extremists of both Left and Right parading their organised cohorts and debasing our traditional freedoms of speech and association" (CACR, 1977, p.46).

Mrs Thatcher condemned the Southall disturbances as a "disgrace to democracy" and stressed that the only way to beat the National Front was by "the ballot box, not by bricks and bombs" (24.4.1979). She asserted that a Conservative government would pursue with "unremitting hostility" disruptive and destructive elements (25.4.1979). When asked by reporters if the Southall riot was the beginning of the fulfilment of his 1968 'rivers of blood' prophecy, Enoch Powell replied that, unless there was a reduction in the proportion of the population of New Commonwealth origin, civil war was inevitable. He felt troops would probably be needed to quell violence in immigrant areas (24.4. 1979).

In response to the fear of social unrest and to the importance of maintaining social unity, Conservatives have been inclined to reassert their old dream that black people should behave in the same way as law-abiding whites and accept superior British practices. K G Reeves stated that "We cannot have two types of citizens, nor can we have two standards of living. Immigrants must accept our laws ... Where standards are concerned we cannot put the clock back"(CACR, 1968, p.66). Dr Raja Chandran thought that to win the confidence and trust of British people the immigrant must above all "abide by the laws and regulations of this country" (CACR, 1976, p.42).

But, once Conservatives have expressed this value, two policies are discernable. One position represented by Peter Walker, the once minister and former member of the shadow cabinet, is to argue for equal opportunities and the improvement of housing and employment prospects (17.6.1976). At the 1976 Conference, a similar line was put by Roy Galley: "... if we do not seek to make our immigrant communities fully part of our society, with opportunities equal to the indigenous population, there will again be violence, spread of frustration and fear" (CACR, 1976, p.41). In a further

speech in March 1978, Walker called for racial problems to be tackled "economically" in order to avoid the inevitability of the vicious crime cycles of American cities (Guardian, 3.3.1978).

The other Conservative position at present (1979) in the ascendancy, was to argue for better detection of crime, stricter enforcement of the law, and heavier punishment. In a phone-in programme in November 1978, Mrs Thatcher called for greater emphasis to be placed on the punishment of young criminals. She was tired of being told that it was not the youngsters' fault that they were in trouble and that society was to blame. "Instead of handing the problem over to social workers, we have got to provide the proper detention centres." The police force would have to be strengthened and tougher detention sentences introduced (27.11.1978). For William Whitelaw, Conservative Opposition Spokesman on Home Affairs, 'punishment' would be a Conservative government watchword. Speaking in Solihull, Whitelaw said that, unless due regard was paid to the principle of maintaining the sanction of discipline, "the very boundaries which separate order from disorder, discipline from indiscipline, and lawful from unlawful behaviour, would inevitably be eroded" (23.3.1979, Express and Star, 24.3.1979).

These policies are to be directed against all who are guilty of undermining the law, but if black people are thought of as law breakers, or are forced to assume the role of law breakers, a role which in the case of illegal immigration, mugging, and various civil disturbances, the press has indeed cast them in, then the Conservative pressure to preserve law and order may fall disproportionately upon them. A Conservative concerned with law and order and its converse, crime, may regard blacks as undesirable - not solely because they are black, but because he assumes, albeit falsely, that they are more prone to criminal activity. In addition,

however, the Conservative may be anxious to uphold the law as it stands and to oppose any violence or illegal behaviour directed against black people, individually or collectively. Even though he may be unenthusiastic about the presence of blacks in Britain and be committed to strict control of immigration and voluntary repatriation, he is likely to believe that, irrespective of colour, all people should receive equal treatment before the law. And, despite evidence to the contrary, as a fervent believer in British justice, he is likely to maintain that they always receive it.

The Labour Party and social justice

Rawls (1971) in attempting to establish a close association between equality and social justice, expresses his general conception of justice in the following simple way before going on to elaborate his principles:

> All social values - liberty and opportunity, income and wealth and the bases of self-respect - are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of any, or all, of these values is to everyone's advantage. Injustice, then, is simply inequalities that are not to the benefit of all. Of course, this conception is extremely vague and requires interpretation (p.62).

This may describe the underlying moral value or justificatory principle of justice, but leaves unanswered the way it is to be practically implemented. A great deal must turn on beliefs about what is to everyone's advantage or disadvantage and about what degree of equality or inequality is necessary to achieve what is advantageous. The Conservative might, of course, reject out of hand Rawls's principle of justice as fairness, as well as asserting that existing social arrangements, inequalities included, actually produce -to put it in utilitarian terms - the greatest happiness of the greatest number. The socialist, however, is likely to be both sympathetic towards Rawls's principle, and to accept that the inequalities and injustice that exist under capitalism must be eradicated.

It appears that, in its pursuit of egalitarian measures, the Labour Party also reveals its commitment to the value of social justice. The close relationship in Labour thought between equality and justice is illustrated by R H S Crossman's declaration that

> ...fair shares is one of the vital concepts of British socialism ... Fair shares means feeling as a community that things are fairly distributed ... Fair shares means that people are feeling, roughly speaking, that they are getting what they deserve (1952).

In similar vein, the statement approved by the NEC to reaffirm, amplify, and clarify party objects (16.4.1960), declared that Labour stood for

> ...social justice, for a society in which the claims of those in hardship or distress come first ... Where difference in rewards depends not upon birth or inheritance but on the effort, skill, and creative energy contributed to the common good, and where equal opportunities exist for all to live a full and varied life.

Socialism, in questioning the existing social order, challenges the justice of its rules, both legal and non-legal, and the way they are enforced. It is frequently argued in socialist circles that the laws are made by the rich for the poor, and serve the interests of their makers. The laws protect property at the expense of humanity. And before the law, the rich are able to afford justice by being in a position to hire the best lawyers and to pay fines and damages. Jurors are likely to be prejudiced in favour of those with high social status and against those with low. In addition, the law is seen to operate in a social context in which certain people, brought up under unfavourable conditions, are more prone to become offenders. Their culpability, it is felt, must be judged, not in relation to an objective standard of the law, but to a relative standard formulated in the light of the life opportunities that have been granted to them. Historically, the existence of unjust, oppressive laws that have borne down onerously upon particular social groups and classes, has

made socialists wary of automatically assuming that existing laws and the order of society they support, are just.

The spontaneous anger arising from overwhelming frustration in the face of legal injustice can be resolved politically by adopting the naive anarchist view that all laws are unjust and that human beings will only be able to coexist in a fair and happy state in which there are no legal codes. Although there has been a strong anarchist tendency in the development of socialism, some highly modified theory of 'class law' has generally taken precedence in British socialist thought. Yet the Left has preserved marked libertarian inclinations, believing in the values of individual freedom of choice, and the spontaneous enjoyment of 'natural' human energies. The Labour Party has traditionally opposed restrictive and puritanical pressures on the life of the individual, and has sought to liberalise, for example, laws on divorce, abortion, homosexuality, and liquor licensing, and to implement penal reform. R H S Crossman (1952) claimed that "the test of socialism is the extent to which it shapes a people's institutions to the moral standards of freedom - even at the cost of a lower standard of living or the surrender of an empire".

Despite the element of libertarianism, the Labour Party has always been anxious to reaffirm its respect for the rule of law. In the absence of Labour ability or willingness to mobilise the working class, the law has been seen as the chief means of bringing about social reform. In power, the Labour Party has upheld the principle of obeying even unjust laws until they are repealed. The Marxist conception of the courts and police as forming part of a repressive capitalist state apparatus has never obtained much credibility in Labour quarters. On the contrary, the theory of the class nature of the state has been rejected in favour of a belief that it may act as an impartial arbiter of a Labour Government's

will, and be used as an agent for social transformation.

Application: social justice and black people

The disparate tendencies outlined above: the principle of justice as 'fair shares', the idea of 'class law' (one law for the rich and another for the poor), the questioning of injustice, libertarian leanings, countervailing respect for the civilising rule of law, and the belief in state impartiality, have affected the Labour stance on immigration and race relations in different ways.

The principle of justice as fair shares is most obviously manifested in the Labour demand for equal treatment of black and white. This may be summed up simply in the words of Joan Lestor (LPACR, 1972, p.158): "For our socialist philosophy, our commitment to social justice includes the black worker just as surely as it includes the white worker". The rather obvious demand for racial justice through equality of treatment would need no further illustration, but for the fact that it is open to different practical interpretations. Equal treatment of black and white can be simply understood if black and white are alike in the respects that justify their equal treatment. But, if Labour supporters think black and white are different in certain crucial respects, social justice may require inequality of treatment. It might be held that if whites are considered to be in a less favourable position than blacks and justice is to obtain, they should be preferentially treated. Or alternatively, black people should be preferentially treated, if they are in a less favourable position than whites. From time to time, both assumptions have been found in Labour circles.

In the debate on the 1965 White Paper, Bob Mellish (LPACR, 1965, p.217) showed indignation at what he believed was a social injustice being perpetrated on the citizens of Lambeth by continued immigration. He asked rhetorically whether the Conference was telling him, as

Parliamentary Secretary of Housing, to go to Lambeth, "who have a waiting list of about 10,000 of their own people" to instruct them to give a housing preference "to these coloureds who have come in without any measure of assistance before". "If you ask me to do that and you say this is a socialist approach, I say to you frankly and firmly that I shall be asking Lambeth to create the most grievous racial disturbances we have ever seen in London and this is a fact" (LPACR, 1965, p.217). Mellish obviously believed that a necessary criterion for equal treatment, was not only need, but length of residence and long-term contribution to the welfare state.

Similar views were shared by William Carron, president of the Amalgamated Engineering Union, who stated his interest in obtaining "detailed statistics applying to the grand total that is consumed by educational grants, National Health expenses, and subsistence payments, that become immediately obtainable by the ever-growing number of individuals who were not born in this country and who have in no way contributed towards the setting up of a fund into which they so willingly dip their fingers" (AEU Proceedings, 1967, quoted in Rex, 1968). It is particularly noticeable that a class position in which welfare payments are seen as an aid to the reproduction of labour in a capitalist market economy is absent from Mellish's and Carron's reasoning. Instead, they see the white working class as contributing their "effort, skill and creative energy" disproportionately to the welfare of parasitical newcomers who benefit unfairly. A belief in the injustice perpetrated on the white population by black newcomers' entitlement to equality of welfare treatment with whites is in total contrast to one premised on the injustice of the existing structural inequality of the black population in Britain.

One solution that has been proposed in Left-wing political circles to remedy the existing injustice arising from the inferior position of

the black population is that of 'positive discrimination'. At the 1976 Labour Party Conference, Sardul Singh Gill suggested that "we should positively discriminate, for the time being at least, in favour of special dispensation towards the underprivileged in this society" (LPACR, 1976, p.219). Formulated originally in the United States, 'positive discrimination' is an ambiguous expression, drawing much of its power from the juxtaposition of the term 'positive' with the generally negatively conceived '(racial) discrimination'. In this way, it hints that the reversed 'discrimination' may be at the expense of white people. Positive discrimination in the field of race relations is a proposed policy for achieving a more even distribution of black people through the social structure, but the means by which this is to be achieved are rarely spelt out in terms of practical policies.

They may amount to little more than a compensatory welfare programme aimed at achieving equality of opportunity for black people; they may involve measures to give blacks more opportunities than whites of a similar social status, or they may require wholesale reconstruction on an egalitarian basis of existing class society. If black people, distributively, were all worse off than whites, then a distinction could be made between the first two possibilities: as it is, the direction of resources to black people per se, rather than to poor black people and, furthermore, to black people who are poorer than whites, could lead to some blacks benefiting more than some whites, unless it is accepted that the black lifestyle (measured in more than crude economic terms) in a racist society is always qualitatively inferior to that of whites.

In Britain, as this last suggestion is usually denied, politicians seem acutely conscious that the direction of resources to black people per se could create invidious comparisons with the treatment meted out

to poor whites of similar social status: vide supra, the remarks of Mellish and Carron - when blacks are thought to be receiving similar treatment. Consequently, politicians are not prepared to interfere directly in the job market in such a way as to give preference to black workers, although they might wish to ensure equality of opportunity.

As an alternative, stress is placed on blanket welfare provision aimed at, for example, all people living in a particular geographical area, with some concession being made to the apparent objective differences, which are generally attributed to migrant status, between white and black groups. For example, language difficulties, educational disadvantages, unfamiliarity with British ways, lack of facilities for worship or leisure, are frequently selected as criteria for justifying supplementary funding, but then the resources are always allocated collectively to groups and not distributively to individuals.

'Positive discrimination', insofar as the expression is used in Britain, usually refers to attempts through welfare provision to create equality of opportunity for black people. Yet the expression 'positive discrimination' is shunned in political circles because it carries the connotation of preference for blacks and discrimination against whites. "I was asked about positive discrimination", Alex Lyon remarked in the debate on the 1976 Race Relations Act. "I dislike the term intensely. When I refer to this problem, I refer to correcting the disadvantages of our black citizens. Clauses 35, 37 and 38 relate to training and welfare provision for particular racial groups" (Hansard, 4.3.1976, p.1666). Positive discrimination is acceptable only insofar as it entails social justice through equality of treatment for both whites and blacks, and not social injustice against whites.

With regard to class law, there is a strong tendency within the Labour Party to treat black people as a whole as social underdogs along with other sectors such as working people, labourers, the poor, and women, and with social pariahs such as homosexuals, unmarried mothers, and gypsies. Given the level of discrimination against black people, there may be good reasons for agreeing with this, but it should be remembered that there are a number of black professional workers and businessmen who would object quite strongly to this classification.

Nevertheless, the belief is widespread in the Labour Movement that black people are oppressed by injustice in the enforcement, if not the enactment, of laws that favour the rich at the expense of the poor. Tom Driberg claimed that:

> A century ago the working class of this country was discriminated against, treated like animals by the employers. In the twentieth century, it is the coloured citizens of the various communities who are the victims of discrimination ... (Legislation) can redress the balance of social justice which is at present heavily loaded against our coloured fellow-citizens ...

A measure of sympathy is generated by the identification of black people as the unfortunate victims of the capitalist state. Labour supporters, unlike those who hold British institutions sacred, are prone to believe stories about officious or callous immigration officers, police brutality, and legal bias, and to support pressure groups which seek to redress injustice towards the black community. The more active local cadres have associated themselves, for instance, with campaigns against particularly blatant examples of racial discrimination or violence, the use of the SUS law* against black

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* 'SUS' refers to Section 4 of the 1824 Vagrancy Act under which the police can arrest anybody as 'a suspected person loitering with intent to commit a felonious offence'. A campaign for the repeal of SUS was launched on 1.2.1978 by BPOCAS - Black People's Organisations Campaign against SUS.

youth, or the more heartless decisions to deport persons of Asian descent. But there is a danger that the very categorisation of the black community as underdogs and scapegoats encourages white socialists and liberals to enter these struggles paternalistically, believing always that their frequently reconciliatory methods of approaching the issue are preferable to those of ethnic minority organisations also engaged in the struggle for justice.

Labour's libertarian approach to laws and traditional practices is illustrated by Roy Jenkins's definition of integration "not as a flattening process of assimilation, but as equal opportunity accompanied by cultural diversity in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance" (1967, p.267). It is generally accepted that laws and regulations which bear heavily on the family life, religion, and culture of ethnic minority groups, may have to be modified. The new multi-racialism demands that rules, which are not indispensible or whose purpose is not always obvious, or has faded with time, should be changed. Thus, a turbanned Sikh is exempted from the law requiring motor cyclists to wear crash helmets, or allowed to wear a turban in regulation blue as part of his uniform. In practice, very few alterations to laws and regulations have been made to ease the existence of ethnic minority groups, and Labour tolerance is likely to extend only insofar as cultural demands are in sympathy with Labour traditions and/or are unlikely to upset to any degree the white electorate. For example, Muslim demands for Koranic schools in which boys and girls are educated separately will almost certainly be opposed because they undermine Labour plans for a comprehensive state education system in which boys and girls are taught a common syllabus together. Yet a climate of libertarianism probably enables some small changes to be made as gestures to multi-racialism, for example, in school

syllabuses, in the dietary practices of institutions, and in administrative procedures.

Labour's faith in the use of the law as a means of social reform is well exemplified by the succession of Race Relations Acts aimed at achieving equality of opportunity and at stamping out discrimination. Advocacy of the use of law against racist propaganda and racial discrimination has a long history in labour thought. Bernard Finlay, at the 1948 Labour Party Conference argued that just as the law forbade defamation, sedition, and blasphemy, it could be used to prevent fascists poisoning men's minds with pernicious ideas (LPACR, 1948, p.180). The vigorous campaigning of Brockway, Sorenson, and others, led to the NEC Statement of 1962 calling for legislation to make illegal the practice of racial discrimination in public places (LPACR, 1962, p.197).

Left-wingers have criticised the idea that the law can be left to correct the racial problems of society (although it is not clear that anyone in the Party actually holds such a naive belief) on the grounds that legislation is often seen as an alternative to vigorous political campaigning, whereas, in fact, the two must be complementary. In addition, they remain suspicious of the mainstream Labour Party tradition of regarding state institutions, such as the civil service and the police as impartial forces that can be used to achieve socialist objectives as easily as capitalist ones.

Nevertheless, Labour Governments and the majority of their supporters have continued to regard the police as a necessary and beneficial British institution characterised by its impartiality. And, if on occasion, the police have been heavy-handed in the treatment of black people, this is thought most exceptional, and must be set against their sincere endeavour to come to terms with

the emergent multi-racial society. After all, it is argued, in the face of extremist violence and provocation, understaffing, and overwork, the police have made moves to recruit from among the ethnic minorities and to familiarise themselves through special educational programmes and schemes of social policing with the black community. The answer to the difficulties between the police and the black community, it is felt, must lie in developing greater confidence, friendship, and cooperation between the two parties which have, after all, a commonality of interest. In the 1970s such views were sorely tested by police involvement in protecting the National Front's provocative marches and meetings in the face of widespread opposition from the Labour movement and ethnic minorities. A massive demonstration of anti-racists against an NF meeting in Southall town hall (23.4. 1979) resulted in 340 arrests, 40 people injured, and the death of Blaire Peach, and when followed by severe legal reprisals, it did little to improve relationships between police and racial minorities.

Of course, the duality in Labour policy observed by the racial minority organisations has always detracted from its pretensions to be a party of racial justice. Whilst generally accepting the good intent of race relations legislation, these organisations point to its incompatibility with Labour immigration policy - the White Paper of 1965, the 1968 Commonwealth Immigrants Act, and the failure of the Labour administration from 1974 to 1979 to repeal the Conservative 1971 Immigration Act, all of which, in their opinion, discriminated against black immigrants.

Local case study: borough councillors' opinions on black people's involvement in crime

Table 12. Opinions on black people's involvement in crime			
	CONS	LAB	TOTAL
Involved in more crime than whites	14	2	16
Involved in the same amount of crime as whites	7	12	19
Involved in less crime than whites	0	1	1
Don't know, no figures	4	6	10
TOTAL RESPONSE	25	21	46

Conservatives were more prone than Labour to suspect black people of criminal activity and for many Conservatives, young blacks were readily identified as constituting the criminal element in society (14 items), with 'mugging' being mentioned as the main criminal offence (5 items). Labour, on the other hand, singled out young blacks only twice (2), and mugging only once (1). In only one instance were Indians mentioned and then in connection with a stabbing that had occurred in the Borough. It was clear that mugging, unemployment, and black youth were closely associated in a number of councillors' minds, though it is important to examine carefully the accompanying location of responsibility or blame.

Councillors were often careful to avoid accusations of racism in their assertion of black criminal tendencies. They pointedly referred to their statistical sources or corrected any dubious causal implications that might be drawn from their statements, e.g.

> The statistics that were produced by the Metropolitan Police ... suggested that, in percentage terms, young West Indians were proportionately more involved in crime than the indigenous population (C10).

> In percentage terms, they commit more crime, but I don't think they are inherently more criminally inclined (C24).

Where Conservatives bothered to explain the causes of black crime, they attributed it to cultural or social factors, rather than to

genetic traits. A common reason offered was the lack of employment, with "the devil finding work for idle hands" (C24). Councillor C25 thought that black youths went around "with a chip on their shoulders and think they're being downtrodden, and because they want to get their own back, tend to get involved in petty crime more than white youths".

But, for most Conservatives who believed that blacks were proportionately more involved in crime than whites, the preoccupations were with the security of the townspeople, particularly at night, and with the apprehension and punishment of offenders. Much indignation was expressed in support of the belief that streets, which had formerly been safe and respectable, were now the haunt of thieves, prostitutes, and gangs of marauding youths. Both racial and non-racial questions on crime triggered councillors to indignantly recount long catalogues of local criminal practice - which with a very few exceptions - was directed not only at black youths (though their contribution was certainly acknowledged) but at the lawless elements of society generally. It was felt that the police had to do something more to stem the tide of lawlessness and to make the streets of the town safe to walk again at any time of the day and night.

Most Labour councillors were inclined to assert that blacks were involved in the same amount of crime as whites. Nevertheless, they felt it necessary to explain why others associated black people with criminal activity. Foremost among the reasons offered were media diffusion arguments: "The Express and Star, always picks out the worst news" (L2), "the Press exploits coloureds more than whites" (L10), and "coloured crimes are highlighted more by the Press" (L46).

Environmentalist and class-orientated causal explanations for crime featured largely in Labour responses: "it's environment that causes the person to be a criminal, not the race he belongs to" (L15).

In an attempt to dismiss entirely the racial implications of the question, one councillor entered into a sophisticated comparison of crime figures for 'mugging' in London and Glasgow. 'Mugging', he pointed out, was not a preserve of coloured youths, "but a characteristic of all socially and economically deprived groups" (L43). Even the two Labour councillors who claimed there were higher levels of black crime, dismissed the possibility that they could be explained in terms of a black criminal propensity. Instead, it was attributed to "the higher levels of unemployment among black youth" (L56).

Few councillors had any actual knowledge of criminal statistics for the Borough, for the West Midlands, or for England and Wales as a whole. It is likely that fewer still would have been able to interpret them effectively or to decide on their relevance for making generalisations about black crime. A minority of councillors freely acknowledged that it was impossible to answer the question properly without having access to the figures: "without statistics, how could one answer that?" (C30). But the majority chose to answer the question, 16 claiming more, 19 the same, and 1 less black involvement.

Responses indicated the Conservative concern to assert higher black involvement in crime, and the Labour desire to establish that black and white were entirely similar in relation to the law. Black street crime was seen by many Conservatives as a serious and comparatively new threat to law and order, a view confirmed by selective perception of incidents mentioned in the press or by the electorate. The Conservatives, however, distinguished, on the whole, between West Indians and Asians, the former appearing as far more threatening to the peace of the neighbourhood than the latter. Labour councillors recognised the political sensitivity of the question and the danger of encouraging racism by associating blacks and crimes. Dissociation could be achieved by claiming the same rate of crime

for both whites and blacks. At the same time, the relationship between crime and social injustice could be established by dwelling on the environmental and class causation of criminal activity.

LAISSEZ FAIRE VERSUS SOCIAL OWNERSHIP

The Conservative Party, its rejection of state interference in economic and social life, and its commitment to laissez-faire politics, and private ownership

Conservatives have always been committed to the principle of private ownership of the means of production and have been wary of state interference in the economic life of the nation. Liberty had been endangered, W E H Lecky thought, by the inevitable tendency of democracy to extend government authority into the fields of social and economic regulation, impairing freedom of contract and freedom of enterprise (1896, p.258). One of the main tenets of Churchill's Conservatism was to "support, as a general rule, free enterprise and initiative against state trading and nationalisation of industries" (Blackpool, 5.10.1946). But, though Conservatives remain deeply suspicious of government interference in industry and social life, they have not elevated laissez-faire to an unassailable article of faith. Macmillan, in The Middle Way (1938), wrote that Conservatism admits the truth of the powerful arguments of orthodox economists of the laissez-faire school, but then went on to claim that the arguments in favour of private enterprise, and the free play of competitive forces, "no longer apply to the whole range of economic effort".

Enoch Powell (1960) believed the Conservative to be committed "practically and theoretically" "to the interplay of individual choice" because he rejected "the effects upon society and upon individuals of transferring all economic decision and initiative from them to the government". As it is far more likely that, by allowing

the free play of market forces, society will realise growing economic opportunities and adapt itself automatically to changing circumstances, government competence in discerning and defining economic ends is to be distrusted. "If then the Conservative embraces, as embrace he must, laissez faire in the economic field, he must repudiate in principle and minimize in practice, government intervention on economic grounds." But, in response to the value of nationalism, in common with most Conservatives, Powell tempered his belief in laissez faire by making clear that the national interest must come first. "Laissez faire does not logically necessitate free trade any more than it excludes armaments or a health service or the Factory Acts." The principle of restriction on government intervention in the economic field is paralleled by a belief that government should be reluctant to involve itself any more than is absolutely necessary in the 'non-economic' areas of life. According to Lord Hugh Cecil (1912) "... character is strengthened by the effort to find a way out of difficulties and hardships" and will be weakened "by the habit of looking to state help" (p.189).

These longstanding commitments to the values of privately owned industry and the non-interference of government are reflected in the recent manifestos of the Party. The 1970 programme, A Better Tomorrow, stated that "under Labour, there has been too much government interference in the day-to-day workings of industry and local government. There has been too much government: there will be less" (p.10). In the 1979 Conservative manifesto, the Labour Party are accused of crippling enterprise and effort by enlarging the role of the state and diminishing the role of the individual (p.6).

Specific application to immigration control and race relations legislation

The Conservative position on race relations is affected in a

number of ways by these stances towards government and industry. Before other values such as traditionalism and nationalism took precedence, Conservatives were likely to welcome industry's right to recruit labour on the international market and at the cheapest rates, a situation that obtained in the 1950s. But, at the same time, in accordance with Powell's thesis that laissez faire did not necessitate free trade (either in commodities or labour), allowances could always be made for supra-national laissez faire to be overridden by the Conservative concept of the national interest, the passing of the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Bill serving as an example of this.

Conservative stances towards the Race Relations Bills are also more easily understood in the light of the principle of minimum government interference in civic life. From the point of view of a Conservative, government interference in business and industrial relations in the matter of who was to be hired, fired, or promoted, or in housing in deciding on the letting of property, was an unwarranted attack on the employers' or landlords' traditional freedoms of choice and action and, what was even more upsetting, a denial of the effectiveness of the free market mechanism. Any attempt to legislate on social mixing in clubs and public houses was an abnegation of the right of free association: people should be able to decide for themselves on the company they kept and the friends they made. Nobody, not even the government, could - or should - make a man like his neighbours.

The Conservative criticism was not only that the government should not meddle in affairs that did not concern it, but that such meddling would, as a matter of course, be abortive. Voluntary, non-governmental measures, or peaceful persuasion, could be relied on to solve any problem that arose. Yet, in true Macmillan style, a loop-hole for government intervention was left. If the market mechanism

was seen not to be working, with a resultant social disruption that offended against other Conservative values, then government intervention, though regrettable, could, after all, be justified. A growing awareness of the "problem of the inner city", originally conceived of in the American context, provided the opportunity needed. In Britain, social problems, in the form of decaying terraced houses, Victorian buildings, inadequate social services, etc., testified to the breakdown of the economic system. Economic incentives were needed to 'breathe life' back into the inner areas of the cities where it so happened that most of the black immigrants had decided to live.

Civic pride in the Joseph Chamberlain tradition led many Conservative councillors, normally reticent to spend local rate-payers' money, into pressurising national government to put more resources at the disposal of the councils. Councillor P R Wood, for example, asserted that "The social problems of the old, central areas of the towns in which the coloured population is concentrated, must be dealt with urgently. To hold the immigrants responsible for poor education, housing, and social service facilities in these areas would be wrong - social services tend to be poor in the old central areas of many towns" (CACR,1973, p.37). But, of course, the Conservatives continued to argue that the only long-term answer was not a redistribution of wealth to the inner cities, but the creation of more wealth.

The early laissez faire approach to black labour is well illustrated by the remarks of R A Butler at the Party Conference in 1961. To the rhetorical question of whether the country needed immigrants, he replied:

> I must say definitely, after consultation with the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the President of the Board of Trade and others responsible for our economy, that these immigrants do provide a valuable contribution to our labour force, especially in certain fields [buses, trains, hospitals] which it would be otherwise difficult to secure (CACR, 1961, p.32).

Christopher Barr took the same position:

> Do we need the labour force that is coming in in the presence of these immigrants? Of course we do. Britain is becoming highly industrialised. At the present time we are getting a tremendous lot of people coming into Britain who are filling vacancies that cannot otherwise be filled (CACR, 1961, p.29).

Butler was aware, however, of the problems that might arise if there were to be a trade recession: "What we have got to look to is the 'rainy day' if there is difficulty in our economy and if unemployment returns. Then the situation would become very much more intense and difficult than it is at the present time" (CACR, 1961, p.32). The laws of capitalism that served to attract the immigrant to the factories of Britain might not be so effective in encouraging him to return to his country of origin in times of slump, and labour competition could create social difficulties.

Recognition of the irksome nature of immigration controls in times of labour shortage is provided by Councillor J Price who claimed that:

> At the present day in the time of expansion we are faced with an acute shortage of labour, particularly in the service industries... And yet at this time when our economy is starved of labour we impose artificial restrictions on the size of our potential labour force. (CACR, 1973, p.41.)

But, as Robert Carr recognised, there were ways of recruiting labour without incurring the social costs of permanent settlement:

> Commonwealth citizens will now be subject to the same work permit controls which we have always applied to aliens. In other words, we shall only allow them to come here to fill particular jobs for a temporary period ... We cannot afford permanent settlement in order to meet temporary labour shortages which is what we have done hitherto. (CACR, 1973, p.41.)

With Britain's entry into the Common Market, the gastarbeiter solution would be of great interest to the Conservative entrepreneur anxious to make use of labour power while minimising labour costs.

The acceptance of the capitalist economy and its natural and

almost life-like expansion and contraction, independent of government action, provides an insight into Conservative stances on racial discrimination and differential opportunity for black people in Britain. Conservatives are invariably ambivalent towards government intervention in economic matters: on the one hand, they accept the principle of laissez-faire and, on the other, they recognise that there are circumstances in which it does not achieve the results they desire. This ambivalence was portrayed in Quintin Hogg's speech at the second reading of the 1968 Race Relations Bill in which the Bill's scope in dealing with insurance, housing, and employment was discussed. Hogg did not believe that there was any case for including insurance and credit in the Bill, because economic laws operated in that area against discrimination, but, in the fields of housing and employment, "there were circumstances in which the economic laws would operate in favour of discrimination and against human rights" (Hansard, 23.4. 1968, p.78).

The scenarios Hogg had in mind were employees forming up against employers and saying, "if you employ this man or this type of man, we will go on strike", or tenants forming up against a landlord and saying "if you admit this tenant we will not pay our rent", or residents of a district approaching a house agent and saying "if you do not discriminate we will not use your services" (Hansard, 23.4.1968, p.78). Of course, it is no accident that in Conservative eyes, the failure of the economic laws to operate in favour of human rights is explained solely in terms of employee and tenant combination against employer and landlord, and not in a more fundamental analysis of the inadequacies of the so-called laws of supply and demand in satisfying human need.

Another popular Conservative position is to blame socialism for the country's economic backwardness. In a competitive world,

resultant underdevelopment will inevitably affect the least well-equipped sections of the population. Michael Alison claimed that "It is Socialism which has inhibited capital investment, driven small businesses into ruin, or out of the big cities at any rate". As a result "poor immigrants of whatever colour and of whatever race, bringing rural skills, which they usually do, and no language capacity to an urban industrial environment, are inevitably going to be locked up in the worst housing, the poorest, and lowest skilled jobs". "This", he thought, "is the result of the failure of the economy to expand", and "a rational and humane basis upon which Conservatives from Mrs Thatcher downwards, advocate firmly that there must be a limit on immigration ..." (CACR, 1977, p.46). Black people are disadvantaged, not because of discrimination, but because of the low demand for their inferior labour power, a position which will only be improved by a much greater general demand for labour.

An expanding capitalism, therefore, offers the rags to riches promise of success to the enterprising black person:

> ... upward progression is open to immigrants of all nationalities and countries and colour in Britain provided only that they believe with us in a free Britain, a fair Britain, above all in a Britain with those essential creative economic freedoms ... those economic freedoms which Conservatives cherish, which we believe in the end are going to be the instrument and means by which the immigrant communities of any colour or ethnic origin in these islands can in the end share in the prosperity and the potential of Britain. (CACR, 1977, p.47.)

Much of the hostility expressed towards the Race Relations Bills is explained by Conservative wariness of government interference in the private affairs of the individual, particularly his right to conduct his business as he sees fit. The Conservative reasoned amendment to the 1965 Race Relations Bill declined to give it a second reading on the grounds that it introduced "criminal sanctions into a field more appropriate to conciliation and the encouragement of fair

employment practices, while also importing a new principle into the law affecting freedom of speech". Enoch Powell criticised the 1968 Bill for denying the citizen "his right to discriminate in the management of his own affairs between one fellow-citizen and another", for subjecting him "to inquisition as to his reasons and motives for behaving in one lawful manner rather than another", and for pillorying him for his "private actions" (Birmingham, 20.4.1968). Ronald Bell thought the Bill made "very deep and damaging encroachments into the proper sphere of personal decision" (Hansard, 23.3.1968, p.102).

Granted that the government should not intervene in affairs that lie outside of its sphere of competence, is the Conservative able to offer any suggestions for the improvement of race relations? In common with Conservative belief in the efficacy of non-governmental agencies, William Deedes made the suggestion that the help of voluntary organisations, including the Trade Union Congress and Confederation of British Industry, might be enlisted (Hansard, 23.4. 1968, p.89). For all but the most Leftward-inclining Conservatives, race relations legislation is an improper extension of state power.

The Labour Party and government intervention in economic and social relations: social ownership

Both wings of the Labour Party accept the necessity of government intervention in industry. For the social democrat, the ravages inflicted on workers by the too ruthless pursuit of profit must be alleviated by the imposition of government controls upon private industry: in this way, capitalism may be modified so that all groups can benefit. For the socialist, industry must be nationalised and socialised in order, first, that the workers' surplus product at present expropriated, can be returned for their use, and second, that production can be planned rationally for social need, and not for profit. The two positions are disguised and reconciled behind

loosely formulated rhetoric, for according to its aims, the Labour Party has long been committed to a programme of public ownership.

In 1928, Labour and the Nation stated that the choice before the country was "not between private enterprise and public control, but between the conduct of industry as a public service, democratically owned and responsibly administered, and the private economic sovereignty of the combine, the syndicate and the trust ... in short, between public ownership or control and one form or another of industrial feudalism". It pledged the Labour Party "without haste, but without rest, with careful preparation, with the use of the best technical knowledge and managerial skill and with due compensation to the persons affected" "to vest its ownership in the nation and its administration in authorities acting on the nation's behalf".

After the war, the Labour Party nationalised a number of the basic industries such as coal-mining, power, and the railways which were failing in their work of servicing the privately owned sectors of the economy. But, by the 1960s, it appeared that 'planning' had replaced socialist nationalisation as the panacea for the nation's failure to expand economically.

The perceived need, mentioned in the 1964 Labour Manifesto, to modernise the economy by developing new science-based industries was elaborated into The National Plan, which committed the government to action on "all aspects of the country's economic development for the next five years". However, the policies devised for encouraging industry to modernise and reequip in order to increase profitability were found to be expensive and were soon abandoned in the light of the worsening balance of payments problem.

The 1970 Election Manifesto contained hardly any hint of commitment to nationalisation, but by 1974, a new policy reconciling social

democracy's support for planning and the mixed economy, and socialism's belief in nationalisation had been evolved. A form of partnership between the public sector and the privately-owned companies was advocated in conjunction with the setting up of a National Enterprise Board to administer and extend publicly-owned share-holdings in private industry.

On an operative dimension, the Labour Party sought to develop the efficiency of the 'mixed economy' by trying to halt the falling rate of profit. The Left were placated with cautious moves to invest more public money in the economy without incurring the displeasure of the international business world. In other words, insofar as it was possible, the Labour Party pursued with a socialist intent the goal of an efficient capitalist economy. Unlike the Conservatives, therefore, the Labour Party had no scruples about interfering in the working of the capitalist economy. In addition, it enthusiastically advocated planning - including the planning of industry's labour requirements.

Specific application to immigration control and race relations legislation

Immigration controls can be seen as part of the planning process, the size of the quota varying according to the current and future needs of the economy. If it is felt the quota is too large and that a labour surplus will result, greater restrictions will be imposed. If, on the other hand, the planned expansion of the economy is endangered by a shortage of labour power, a justification exists for further immigration. For example, in 1965, Thomas Young, in questioning the White Paper quota of a mere 8,500, suggested that some 200,000 extra workers would be required for the expanding economy (LPACR, 1965, p.214). Although use may be made of the value

of economic planning in justifying immigration restrictions, the actual ability of governments to control economic expansion and contraction under capitalism is sufficiently limited to call into question the suggested economic motives for their actions. Nevertheless, the Labour member is likely to uphold the right of governments to control the factors of production, including labour, and to accept that immigration control - though not racist immigration control - could form part of this process.

Similarly, race relations legislation, like the factory acts, can be seen as an attempt by the Government to limit the power of industrialists to act autocratically against the public good and in the ruthless pursuit of profit. The requirement to treat black and white workers equally in recruitment, employment, and promotion, constrains, for the benefit of the community as a whole, the industrialists' freedom of action, and furthermore, safeguards the interests of already enlightened companies against competition from more unscrupulous operators.

The legitimacy of intervention in the economic sphere is extended quite naturally to the social. Decisions on housing, education, health, and other requirements are the responsibility of democratically elected bodies, which are forced to act decisively when capitalism fails to provide much-needed facilities. For example, Crossman (1975) in referring to urban renewal, thought that Government had to concentrate on six or seven of the largest towns where the problem of housing was so bad that the Local Authorities were unable to cope:

> A Labour Minister should impose central leadership, large-scale state intervention in these blighted areas of cities, the twilight areas, which were once genteelly respectable and are now rotting away, where Commonwealth citizens settle, and where there are racial problems. (Diaries, November 1964.)

Specific application to explaining racialism

Apart from the evident susceptibility of Labour governments to small-scale economic and social interventionism, with consequences for immigration and race relations, the Party's race relations policy is also influenced by its perception of the alienation caused by the capitalist economic system. Opinions vary over how deeply racism and racialism are embedded within the economic structure, and whether they can be alleviated or eradicated without a wholesale transformation of the relations of production. For the social democrat, racial prejudice and discrimination are not concomitant with capitalism, but only with certain primitive forms of it. It is quite possible to conceive either of a Britain with a mixed economy where there is no racialism, or a socialist Britain in which racialism continues to survive. For the socialist, the extent to which racialism is a product of class relations and therefore of capitalist society, is a moot point. A variety of different explanations have been offered, all purporting to show that racialism and its accompanying ideological configurations can be explained in terms of the economic relationships that exist under capitalism.

Cox (1948), for example, suggests that racial prejudice "is a social attitude propagated among the public by an exploiting class for the purpose of stigmatising some group as inferior so that the exploitation of either the group itself or its resources or both may be justified". Others have argued that capitalist exploitation and crisis create frustration among the workers which is deflected away from the real cause onto readily identifiable vulnerable groups (scapegoating). Racial antagonism is also explained in terms of the threat, real or imagined, posed by black workers to white workers' economic and status interests. Such theories are frequently attended by the belief that racism and racialism are part

of the very nature of the capitalist order and that their threat will only finally be eliminated with the advent of socialism. Capitalism, then, is a necessary, if not sufficient, condition for the development and survival of racism and racialism. Although not all socialists adhere to this view or think that social ownership of the means of production by itself will eliminate racialism, capitalism's alienating conditions frequently loom large in explanation and solution alike.

At the Party Conference in 1948, in opposing the resolution seeking to make illegal racially defamatory statements and organisations propagating racial or religious hatred or discrimination, H J Laski argued that fascism - and by implication anti-Semitism - could succeed only in a country where there was mass unemployment and psychological frustration (most commonly caused by defeat in war) (LPACR, 1948, p.181). In 1976, twenty-eight years later, after calling for the repeal of the 1971 Immigration Act, a massive propaganda drive against racialism, and other measures, Paul Moore pointed out that these alone would not be enough if the root causes of racialism were not dealt with. The fears of unemployment, and bad housing could only be eliminated finally "by a change of economic policy, by taking on the employers, by taking over the economy and running it in the interests of all workers, black and white" (LPACR, 1976, p.216). Reiterating this opinion, Joan Lestor claimed that "unemployment and fear and urban deprivation are the seeds on which the whole question of fascist ideas and right-wing reactionary ideas grow" (LPACR, 1976, p.223).

The hatred of many socialists for racialism gives them an added incentive to work for the elimination of capitalism. For them, racialism is a direct product of the alienated relationships of capitalism. The social democrat, however, though accepting that

racialism is kindled by economic insecurity, unemployment, and bad housing, etc, might feel that these factors can possibly be brought under control within the framework of a mixed economy. He is not so inclined to agree that the constant threat of racialism is a necessary accompaniment of a properly controlled mixed economy. Nevertheless, both socialist and social democrat will agree that government economic measures in the public and private sectors are likely to have an important effect on race relations. Manpower Service Schemes, providing jobs and training opportunities for the young black and white unemployed exemplified the Labour Government's concern to temper the least acceptable and potentially most explosive aspect of capitalism in crisis.

INDIVIDUALISM, COLLECTIVISM AND WELFARE PROVISION

The Conservative Party and the doctrine of self-reliant individualism

In the nineteenth century, laissez-faire economic policies were frequently accompanied by a philosophy of social Darwinism. The successful in business were thought to be society's fittest members whose individual or family vigour, hard work, and self-sacrifice had been rewarded by their current social standing. The poor, unable to cope in the rigorously competitive economic world, were seen as the least fitted to survive. The human species would be vitally weakened if there were any major attempt to intervene in the natural selection process exercised by the economic system. The individual had to prove his worth by self-reliance and had never to become a burden to others. A society which removed responsibility from the shoulders of its citizens and endeavoured to cushion them against the natural selection process, would undermine individual self-reliance and, eventually, contribute to its own destruction.

This classical, nineteenth-century Liberal thinking is still present in the brand of Liberal conservatism that believes the

economy should be controlled by the free market mechanism, with a minimum of political and governmental interference. It also believes that there is a need to restore to the individual a new sense of moral responsibility and initiative. There are, of course, other countervailing strands, some of them stemming from the old paternalism of the landed gentry, who recognised a responsibility towards the local poor, and some from a more recent corporatism which sees the need to stabilise a working class, alienated by harsh economic realities. But, despite a post-war acceptance of the inevitability of the welfare state, commitment to a concept of individual self-reliance is a hallmark of Conservative views on welfare provision.

The state, Lord Hugh Cecil believed, "depends on the vigour of the character of the individuals which make it up; and that character is strengthened by the effort to find a way out of difficulties and hardships and is weakened by the habit of looking to state help" (1912, p.189). Lord Coleraine, in criticising state socialism, claimed that the Conservative position was founded on "the conviction that Government control of industry and the apparatus of social welfare, with the burden of taxation which accompanies it, tends to weaken the sense of responsibility of the individual citizen and stifle his initiative, and at the same time, by undermining his respect for the law and for himself, loosens the fabric of society" (1970, p.105).

Yet, despite this antipathy towards collective welfare provision, post-war Conservatives have, until recently, accepted Keynesian economic theory with its interventionist prescriptions forthe achievement of full employment. The Beveridge vision of a social minimum was assumed to be an indispensible adjunct of this programme, relying as it did, on the condition of full employment, a 'never-had-it-so-good' post-war fact that many Conservatives had come to take for granted. Even with the acceptance of Beveridge, Conservatives were described by

David Clarke (1947) as insisting "that the collective provision of social security must be a 'springboard and not a sofa'. It must not detract from the self-reliance of the individual. It must encourage the virtues of thrift and family responsibility".

As in the nineteenth century, Conservatives were prone to distinguish between those who were thought to deserve help from the public purse, and those who abused the privilege by making no attempt to help themselves. The 'undeserving poor' or 'welfare scroungers' were seen as seriously damaging the social fabric by offending against the work ethic in preferring public benefit to work. They were also thought to undermine the morale of those still working, who would not be prepared to make an effort if they could see others getting something for nothing. Sennett and Cobb describe the hostility felt by workers towards people "'getting away with something I never got away with'. If there are people who have refused to make sacrifices yet are subsidized by the state, their very existence calls into question the meaning of acts of self-abnegation" (1972, p.137). And, in a low-wage economy, the comparatively high level of benefit paid to the deserving or undeserving alike would make it possible for them to maintain a 'reservation wage' rather than to undertake the unattractive and poorly paid jobs that would have to be filled if the market economy was to function effectively.

Whereas previously, Conservatives had reluctantly come to accept the necessity of the welfare state, in the late 1970s, at a time of economic crisis, with falling levels of investment and low levels of profitability, a more militant brand of Conservatism came to the fore. S M Miller (1978) described the emergence of a new policy which "decouples Keynes from Beveridge and severely modifies the

macro-policies of Keynesianism". It demanded that state expenditure for social purposes be cut back in order to provide a spur to private investment through lower taxation on corporations and higher income recipients, who were in a position to save. In parallel with this, a harsher attitude towards welfare recipients was required in order to force them to work at what were previously considered unacceptably lowly paid or unpleasant jobs. Individual initiative in welfare provision was to be encouraged in order to supplement or eventually to replace the comprehensive facilities provided collectively by the welfare state. In such a climate of opinion, it was likely that an earlier social Darwinist view of poverty and social inadequacy would reassert itself, and greater moral censure would be directed against the 'featherbed' welfare state and its 'comfortable' clients. The category of 'undeserving poor' would tend to be expanded to include, not only the limited number of 'shirkers' and 'scroungers', but welfare recipients generally.

In 1970, the Conservative election programme promised "firm action to deal with abuse of the social security system". A Conservative government would "tighten up the administration" in order to prevent "the whole system being brought into disrepute by the shirkers and scroungers". But Conservatives would also tackle the problem of family poverty by ensuring that adequate family allowances went to the families that needed them. With a typical Conservative ambivalence, the value of self-reliance and the corrupting influence of collective welfare provision, is set against commitment to Beveridge's social minimum and the sacred institution of the family.

A more doctrinaire approach to welfarism began to emerge after the election of Mrs Thatcher to leadership of the Party in February 1975. Rhodes Boyson, Opposition Spokesman on Education, was credited with saying "I think the welfare state is quite evil" (28.3.1978),

while Mrs Thatcher herself, in a speech at St Lawrence Jewry, London (30.3.1978), expressed the view that:

> there are grave moral dangers and serious practical ones in letting people get away with the idea that they can delegate all their responsibilities to public officials and institutions ... Once you give people the idea that all this can be done by the state... you will begin to deprive human beings of the essential ingredients of humanity - personal moral responsibility.

The 1979 Conservative manifesto spelt out that no more money would be available to spend on the social services except in the event of the nation's prosperity being revived. The "will to work" would be restored by cutting income tax, by reinforcing "the rules about the unemployed accepting available jobs" and by acting "more vigorously against fraud and abuse". More would be done "to help people to help themselves and families to look after their own", and encouragement would be given to movements and self-help groups working in partnership with the statutory services.

Application to immigration control and race relations legislation

Conservative views on race relations and immigration were greatly affected by the long-standing commitment to self-reliance and the ambivalence towards state social welfare provision. First, the provision itself was felt to attract and create greater numbers of clients. Without stringent immigration controls it was thought that the world's poor would swarm to Britain's welfare 'honey pot', to make use of Cyril Osborne's imagery (Hansard, 16.11.1961, p. 719). If, as Conservative nationalistic propaganda would have us believe, conditions in Britain were so much more preferable to conditions elsewhere - and especially in the 'third world' - then people would migrate here in ever-increasing numbers.

Hogg thought that "because we have a system of social services which ... would provide a standard of life which would be the envy

of 19 out of 20 of the human beings who live on this planet, it is utterly impossible to suppose that, unless we erect a pretty stiff fence round our country, it will not act as a magnet which will attract all sorts of people, and present us with a situation we cannot control" (CACR, 1968, p.72). Deedes asserted that "the pressure to enter this country has not diminished, but has, if anything, increased. Our standard of living here is 30 times higher than that of the Indian subcontinent" (CACR, 1976, p.43).

The idea that black Commonwealth immigrants came to Britain to work was offset by the recognition among the whites that the work available was not particularly attractive, and the widespread, and still-surviving, colonial belief that black people were lazy, pleasure-loving, and unaccustomed to work discipline. It was felt that, given the ready availability in Britain of national assistance, unemployment benefit, or social security - in distinct contrast to the absence of such facilities in the poor Commonwealth countries - black people would become a burden on the welfare state. As a result of these anxieties, Conservatives called for an end to immigration, or for eligibility to the social services to be made conditional on the length of residence or size of contribution made. In no way were new residents to be encouraged to get something for nothing, and constant demands for closer scrutiny and control of benefits were made to ensure as little as possible of the taxpayers' money was handed out.

Referring to the 20,000 Commonwealth immigrants in Britain, Norman Pannell, at the 1958 Party Conference, claimed that "some ten per cent roughly are unemployed and many thousands of them are on National Assistance, never having been able to obtain work in this country". In 1961, he talked of "the drain on public funds" caused by their presence. At the same 1961 conference, Frank

Taylor remarked that "We are also told these immigrants are fully entitled to National Health protection because they pay for stamps and they pay income tax". But he thought some of them "do not intend to belong to the income tax class": "some, a minority, I agree, do not really want to do an awful lot of work". After recounting an anecdote about a black man who had been in Britain for eight years without work, Taylor informed the conference delegates that it was they who were "keeping him and his wife and about six delightful little piccaninnies round his knees" (CACR, 1961, p.29). "Immigrants should not get social security benefit", Nicholas Winterton, MP for Macclesfield suggested, "until they have been in Britain for a minimum of two years" because "if they have not contributed a half-penny in contributions they have no right to draw benefits" (Birmingham Edgbaston, 17.2.1978).

Commonwealth immigrants came to Britain to sell their labour power in the industrial towns and cities. In return, if they were to be treated in the same way as the indigenous population, they were entitled not only to their earnings, but to the social wage in the form of social, educational, housing, and health services paid for by their taxes and rates. As the social wage is provided on the grounds of need, rather than of work, and administered indirectly by various national and local governmental agencies, its source is not as apparent as that of the actual wage. As a form of distribution, the social wage can easily be seen as governmental largesse, unrelated to the production process.

Local authorities were required to extend the social, educational, housing, and health provision for the existing population to Commonwealth immigrants and their families. Because the social wage owing to immigrants was not immediately forthcoming, or because they saw a way of obtaining yet more resources for the population as

a whole, the various local authorities and other agencies proceeded to politically articulate their need for extra expenditure by laying great stress on the problems caused by immigrants. More school places, maternity beds, specially trained teachers, and social and health workers were thought necessary to cope with the 'immigrant influx'.

Quite understandably, a presentation of the case in terms of the extra demands made by Commonwealth immigrants on selected social services, without mention of their contribution through taxes and rates, would confirm a Conservative predisposition to treat them as a drain on the social services and a burden on the economy. K Jones (1967) showed quite the reverse - that in terms of the rates and taxes they paid and their distribution in the economically active age range, they made fewer demands and contributed more than the indigenous population if the social services as a whole were taken into account. From the manner in which the subject was politically articulated, however, the black immigrant was cast in the role of an excessive consumer of scarce social resources. The Conservative response, ambivalent as always, was to sanction additional necessary social expenditure, particularly to alleviate the possibility of social unrest, but at the same time to treat the immigrant as a somewhat greedy member of the undeserving poor and as personally responsible for his own lowly economic position.

The 1966 Conservative manifesto offered "special help where necessary to those areas where immigrants are concentrated", a proposal amplified in a statement of February 1968: "The Government must recognise the special problems arising from the number of immigrants in certain areas. Racial tension is aggravated by poverty and overcrowding. The Central Government must coordinate and be prepared to support financially special housing, welfare, and

educational programmes administered by local authorities in areas where immigrants are concentrated".

Local Conservatives generally saw black immigration as a financial burden on the community and demanded action from central government. K G Reeves claimed that "Ratepayers are forced to bear a burden which should be a national burden and are deprived of improved amenities as more and more money is spent in looking after immigrants" (CACR, 1968, p.65). Councillor Tony Prescott thought that if "a Conservative government ... instead of niggardly grants for specific projects, gave to local authorities an increase in the general grant which takes into account the proportion of immigrants in the community, then we will deal with the problem" (CACR, 1968, p.70). Quintin Hogg agreed that financial assistance should be given to local authorities because the satisfaction of "fundamental social needs" was the solution to racial problems, but he warned in true Conservative style, that such needs would not be met "except in the context of an economic policy which restores self-respect and self-reliance and ability to stand on its own feet to the people of Britain" (CACR, 1968, p.71).

But, despite unease at the greater demands on the state, for many Conservatives, as with Labour, the solution to racial difficulties lay in comprehensive welfare provision. Robert Apps stated that "Only by a massive capital injection for more schools, better health and welfare services, improved housing (etc) will we even begin to get on top of our task" (CACR, 1969, p.94). Conservatives frequently committed themselves to plans for the renewal of the towns and cities and supported urban aid and inner city programmes. John Pritchard claimed that "responsible people ... both blacks and whites, deplore violence, but demand positive

action to deal with the prevalence of poverty, decay, bad housing conditions, and poor education - a vicious circle, which, combined with despair about job prospects, inevitably sows the seeds of prejudice and ethnic friction" (CACR, 1977, p.42).

Although higher unemployment figures and poorer accommodation among black people might be explained by racial disadvantage and discrimination, blacks were still likely to be held in some way responsible for their situation. The Conservative was less likely to blame the ailing economy than an individual's lack of fitness in the struggle for survival. And, paradoxically, the very channelling of aid to the urban poor or disadvantaged black people tended to confirm the view of their being inadequate and unable to cope: why else would they be receiving aid in a society widely held to function justly and efficiently, in accordance with free market principles and with the minimum of governmental interference? The more resources that were devoted to black people, the more confirmed a Conservative might become in his belief that they were inherently unable to cope with the demands of industrial society and that they constituted a new class of 'undeserving poor'. For the average Conservative, the black was equated with the archetypal welfare recipient, a character for whom, traditionally, he spared little sympathy.

The Labour Party and the doctrine of welfare collectivism

One of the most important doctrines of the Labour Party, C A R Crosland (1956) believed, was "the rejection of the laissez faire doctrine that the state has no obligation to its citizens (save for the protection of property) and indeed a positive obligation to remain inactive". Instead, it affirmed the opposite view that "the state must accept responsibility for preventing poverty and distress and for providing at least a subsistence minimum of aid to such

citizens as need it". Crediting the Fabians with first giving overt expression to this value, Crosland claimed that in "the shape of demands for social security and a guaranteed national minimum", it had become "the most deeply-felt item in Labour policy".

My remarks under this head will be brief as discussion of welfare provision has crept into a number of previous sections. Nevertheless, I think it important to emphasise, and indeed it is difficult to avoid, the conclusion that welfare is seen as Labour's panacea for nearly all social problems, including those of hostile race relations.

The basis of the welfare state had already been laid between 1906 and 1914 by the Liberal Government of Asquith and Lloyd George, and these early foundations were slowly built on in the years that followed. But the welfare state's solid and coordinated development followed the publication of the 1942 Beveridge Report, which recommended the extension and integration of already existing schemes. The report advocated insurance against loss of earning power, resulting from sickness, unemployment and old age, and a guaranteed income at subsistence level, providing the bare necessities of life such as food, clothing, housing, etc. Apart from 'want', the report referred also to the other 'giant' social problems of disease, ignorance, squalor, and idleness. The White Paper on Employment Policy produced during the war by the coalition parties, and Beveridge's subsequent Full Employment in a Free Society, saw the necessity of viewing these policy recommendations in the context of full employment.

Whereas all major political parties recognised the importance of the Beveridge Report, the Labour Party embraced its proposals wholeheartedly and set out to implement them. Sydney Silverman, MP, claimed that Beveridge represented the basic programme of his

party, but while still working within the framework of capitalism, in the aftermath of the war, and with massive inflation, the Labour leadership's initiatives were perforce limited. The reluctance of the Labour Party to intervene in the economy resulted in an alternative, 'soft', humanistic movement for social collectivism, rather than in a 'tough' drive towards economic collectivism.

The key principles on which Beveridge's welfare proposals were based were compulsion - all would contribute, and universality - the entitlement would be for all regardless of income. It was intended that there would be no test of means, or stigma attached to receipt of benefit. But, by insisting on the necessity of personal insurance before subsistence was guaranteed, the Beveridge Report showed signs of its Liberal origin. The principle of universality, involving compulsion, could not properly be based on the contractual insurance relationship, and it was never made clear whether entitlement according to economic requirement was to be justified on the grounds of a contractual obligation, or solely on the basis of one's being a member of society. Both the Liberal predilection for the 'individualism' of the former, and the socialist dedication to the 'collectivism' of the latter, have survived in Labour approaches to a welfare policy, in which the relative values of desert or need as criteria for benefit have still not fully been resolved. This becomes particularly obvious in the field of immigration and race relations.

Application to immigration control and race relations

The question of how and when a person qualifies to receive benefit or to become a member of the welfare collective seems to have been posed starkly by the arrival of the black colonial immigrant. One answer in the Labour movement was to view welfare entitlement as conditional on an individual's (long-term) payment

in the form of taxation and rates into government funds. The new arrival - being new - was seen as not belonging, as an extra mouth to support, and as a drain on hard-earned resources.

At the Labour Conference in 1965, W H Johnson of the Transport Salaried Staff Association claimed that his organisation catered for every type of worker, but that there was a large percentage of workers from the colonies who were unsuited to any form of work. They went from one employer to another looking for work and became thoroughly disillusioned before finishing up at the National Assistance Board offices. On being interrupted by delegates, Johnson responded by telling his audience that they knew as well as he that this caused a great deal of "bad feeling among our people". Bob Mellish, likewise, was indignant at the fact that "large numbers of our coloured friends" were living in slums and would have to be rehoused in advance of the indigenous white population.

But, in general, Labour belief in welfare collectivism necessitated the treatment of the black immigrant as part of society in which universality remained unmodified, and support was made available on grounds of subsistence needs. At local level, however, the liberal, social contractual concept of welfare provision meant that councillors often denied facilities to newcomers. Yet, the local outcry over the cost of black immigrant welfare encouraged national government to consider making further provision to Local Authorities. The 1965 White Paper (Cmnd.2739) pointed out that local health, education, and housing services were assisted through the General Grant or by specific subsidies. However, in the case of some local authorities who needed to undertake "exceptional commitment by engaging extra staff in order to ease those pressures on the social services which arise from differences in language and cultural background and to deal with problems of transition and

adjustment", the Government proposed to offer special financial help. At the same time, while maintaining the principle of universality in entitlement to benefit, the Labour Government responded to popular feeling by severely restricting the number of new immigrants who threatened to inspire a Right-wing backlash against comprehensive, welfare provision.

Because from the outset, the Labour Party saw prejudice and discrimination as basically emanating from the alienation caused by economic need, ignorance, squalor, and idleness, its response to racial problems closely resembled that of the Beveridge blueprint. The alleviation of prejudice and discrimination among the white population required an improved social environment in which competition on racial lines for work or for the civic amenities of housing, health, and education was reduced. With better conditions, the psychological need for scapegoating weaker groups would also disappear. But, as the more thoughtful socialists had already recognised in the implementation of Beveridge, the Labour government's reluctance to control the economy meant that it was only capable of dealing with the superficiality of social insecurity and not with the economic insecurity fundamental to the capitalist cycle.

Where there were irregular fluctuations in the demand for labour, immigration control was the only answer to the threat perceived - however mistakenly - by white workers. The triad of immigration control, race relations legislation, and the welfare response were seen as the prime means of diffusing racial tension. Miss A Bacon, in 1965, spoke of the concentration of immigrants in those very areas where the supply of houses, schools, and teachers was already inadequate. "Of course we know that the immigrants did not create the shortage", she said. "Of course we know that the immigrants are just making more apparent a shortage which already existed, but,

until the Labour Government can make good these shortages, to put more on already overburdened services could lead to a very situation" (LPACR, 1965, p.218). Demands for increased provision and special legislation followed.

The 1966 Local Government Act (Section 11) provided for the payment of grants in respect of staff to local authorities with substantial numbers of Commonwealth immigrants. In 1967, a Conference Resolution declared that race relations legislation was only a partial remedy to difficulties caused by immigration: "there should be more positive aid for education and housing in areas with large immigrant populations" (LPACR, 1967, p.312). R Burns, in 1968, proposed the resolution requesting the Government to grant substantially greater financial aid "to towns where social conditions of low standards, including areas of a high ratio of immigrants, incur extra cost to the local ratepayers for the provision of extra houses, education facilities, and welfare services" (LPACR, 1968, p.283). In replying to the debate for the National Executive Committee, Joan Lester referred to the Urban Development Plan aimed at relieving areas of social deprivation. But she added

> do not let us fall into the trap of talking of this as a grant for immigrants. This is a grant for help to areas that have certain difficulties. Some of them will include immigrants, some of them will not include immigrants, and we have to avoid getting ourselves caught up in an atmosphere where immigrants can be used as a scapegoat for failure by any of us or the previous Government for dealing with socially inadequate services ...

In the heady, Powellite days of 1968, this was a timely reminder of Beveridge's principle of universality. The fear that blacks were benefiting more than whites had to be allayed. In 1970, Adeney reiterated what was by now the commonly accepted view that "many of the problems of our inner cities" were "common to both black and white who live in these areas, and that is why we insist that

this problem must be dealt with in a way that affects the whole community" (LPACR, 1970, p.207).

Many Labourites, of course, recognised the severe limits on the provision in the face of the magnitude of social need. "The urban aid programme and Section 11", Alex Lyon declared,

> are a pittance against the real problem. What we need is an overall programme of reallocation of resources on a much larger scale than hitherto envisaged in order that the people who are the citizens of this country - 40 per cent of them were born here - and a great many of the other 60 per cent are the citizens of this country - in exactly the same way as us - shall share equally in the future prosperity of this country. (LPACR, 1976, p.222.)

One snag, long recognised in the Beveridge principle of extending welfare benefit to all, was its tendency to dilute provision and make it difficult to pinpoint those in real need. One solution already mentioned above, was to select out for special help particular geographical areas on the basis of a catalogue of statistics of social problems, including 'immigrant' numbers. In this way, although special moneys could be directed to some degree at the black population, the target was thought sufficiently diffuse as to avoid the accusation of reversed discrimination, or black privilege, so widely believed among the white population. Unfortunately, the suspicion could not be entirely alleviated, and neither could the general stigma attached to welfare.

Parker (1970, p.41) describes British attitudes to the social services as "complex, inconsistent and often hypocritical". On the one hand, they have "elaborate ideas of social justice, of everybody's 'right' to health and well-being and the State's duty to provide these", while on the other, Britain is still "a competitive laissez-faire society which expects everybody to make his own arrangements". "Our pity for those who fail", Parker thinks, "is tinged with a great deal of contempt - we are prepared to see them assisted, but still

expect them to feel grateful and a bit guilty about accepting public help".

The Labour concern to alleviate racial prejudice and discrimination by the use of welfare provision may have had paradoxical results. In a society in which socialist ideas have failed to penetrate a working-class Liberal and Conservative ideological matrix, the constant emphasis on the need to provide welfare for immigrants can only confirm the view of them as socially inadequate and economically dependant. The association of black people with slum housing, overcrowded conditions, large ill-cared-for families, persistent unemployment, welfare scrounging, and crime, is at least, in part, a product of a Labour welfare response that explains poor race relations in terms of inadequate social facilities.

Local case study: black people and the social services

Table 13 Opinions on black people's use of the social services

	CONS	LAB	TOTAL
Take more from the social services than whites	10	1	11
Take the same from the social services as whites	7	4	11
Take less from the social services than whites	1	12	13
Don't know, no figures	7	6	13
Other	1	0	1
TOTAL RESPONSES	26	23	49

To the question of whether black people proportionately took more, the same, or less than white people from the social services, there was a tendency for the Conservatives to think they took more, and for Labour to think they took less.

Among the 10 Conservatives who claimed black people took more, there was a strong feeling that they were exploiting the white population in a variety of ways. Indignant mention was made of the much publicised case of Neimat Nafar, who had been sent to prison

for fraudulently claiming £37,000 of state benefits. Councillors were also annoyed at the thought that "people get off the boat and go straight down to the social security office and then back home with the cheque" (C26). Others suggested that it "stood to common-sense" that if coloured people had bigger families ("you get an immigrant family of seven or eight"), then they were going to draw more child benefit (C28). Councillor C39 thought that "the very fact that they've come here in such numbers makes it likely that they're taking more out than anyone else". These responses make the case for arguing that many Conservatives are prone to think of black people as undeserving welfare recipients.

Labour councillors explained their contention that black people took less from the social services in three ways. Most frequently they argued that the black community was economically more active because of its comparatively youthful age structure. But they also pointed out that (and gave examples from their own experience of how) many black people were unaware of all the benefits to which they were entitled. Finally, there was the common belief that in the care of the aged, the British community were far more likely to rely on institutional arrangements, while the Indians looked after their old people in the bosom of the family, and consequently needed correspondingly less public support. It was also claimed that the Indians were more reluctant than other groups to draw money from social security because of their pride in self-sufficiency.

Apart from engaging in argument over whether black people took more or less from the social services, a number of councillors situated themselves, albeit unknowingly, in the debate over the nature of welfare benefit. Was it a form of insurance to which a person was only entitled if he had contributed for a set number of years, or was it something for which he qualified simply by being a member of

society? On the whole, Conservatives inclined to the former view:

> They arrive with no visible assets and straight away are entitled to social security when they have contributed nothing (C58).

> There may not be so many of their old people, but our old people have contributed more over the years (C59).

The contractual point of view was by no means a Conservative prerogative. Labour councillors used similar arguments to urge their opposing claim that black people took no more than their fair share of the social services. Councillor L1 explained that, as they grew older, coloured people would take more in the way of benefits but by then they would have earned the right to benefit by making a contribution to the economy in the same way as anyone else.

The contractual position contrasted strongly with the alternative claim to general entitlement according to social need, exemplified by both Conservative and Labour councillors although the Conservative contribution is somewhat atypical of Conservatives.

> I don't see how they can take more if their need is there, and if they take what they're entitled to. If they've been unable to find work because of prejudice, then of course, they'll draw more. After all, you can't turn round and say "you're getting nothing off the state, just because you're coloured" (C53).

> The services are geared towards the needs of the community irrespective of who contributes most or least. It isn't necessary to dissect the relationship between the givers and the takers(L56).

These examples were received despite the nature of the question, whose format probably encouraged acceptance of the 'bank-account' concept of welfare provision. The ambivalence of Beveridge is still very much in evidence in current discussion of welfare provision.

CONCEPTS OF MAN

The Conservative Party's concept of man

It is not possible to deal adequately, within the scope of this study, with the many facets of the Conservative concept of man, but

the image the Conservative has of man will affect his approach to the relationships between different races of men.

First, man is conceived of as imperfect and imperfectible. He is neither corrupted by society as it exists, nor capable of being perfected by a new order of society. As society has developed organically to meet his needs, he is prior to society, and it faithfully reflects his character. He may alter it in a piecemeal manner to suit his changing circumstances, but a changed society will never offer the means to human perfection. Such a concept of man has much in common with the doctrine of original sin. Man is naturally flawed and his artifices, social or otherwise, far from enabling him to rise above his weaknesses, are made in his own image and likeness. R J White (1950) explains that, "it is not that the Conservative is more religious than other men, but that he is less confident than some other men about man's self dependence, more inclined to mistrust the finality of man-made remedies for human ills, more prone to look for the sources of these ills, rather in a defective human nature than in defective laws and institutions".

It also follows that the individual rather than any dictator or man-made institution, such as the state, is best able to decide what is to his personal advantage. Rules can never be successfully superimposed by a philosopher king who possesses the intention of improving the human condition: they can only be evolved organically in a lengthy process of human interaction. Lord Coleraine (1970) tells us that the Conservative "holds that human nature is essentially imperfect, but that men and women are most likely to make the best of it in a free society, not one which is minutely regulated from above by some agency external to themselves. He believes that his past is part of man's nature".

This last remark draws attention to the second characteristic - the 'natural conservatism' of man. Lord Hugh Cecil describes man's distrust of the unknown and his desire for the familiar rather than the unfamiliar. Human beings adapt to their social environment in such a way that they come to want those things to which they are accustomed: change of any sort is difficult and vexatious and "only very slowly and gradually made". Although natural conservatism operates with most force where personal habits are concerned, it also helps to maintain and strengthen political institutions. The Conservative concept of man notes his preference for the familiar and accepts that political change must be slow to be effective. Man has only limited malleability.

Third, the Conservative is inclined to a 'carrot and stick' concept of man in which human beings are felt to be motivated by reward or punishment. Human beings do not work without incentives, they do not behave sociably without the law to keep them in order. They have no natural love of their neighbour, and stand in need of a social policeman who administers correction through the mechanisms of the market or legal system.

Application to immigration and race relations

These three facets of the Conservative concept of man are reflected in policies on immigration and race relations. If man is imperfect, then to describe him as prejudiced is only to mention one of his natural imperfections. The Conservative is likely to think that social reform in the shape of race relations legislation will always founder on the reef of original sin. In any case, the imposition of a noble humanitarian sentiment of inter-racial love as law from above, smacks of utopianism: race relations will only be improved if human beings voluntarily choose to move in that direction. If legislation does not emerge organically from the

people, it will only ever be a misguided and inadequate anti-democratic imposition, failing to change hearts and minds, and causing resentment. Because man is imperfect, the Conservative is not surprised when an individual fails to show brotherly love towards his fellow men: surely that is a counsel of perfection rarely to be achieved.

In addition, the phenomenon of natural conservatism forearms the Conservative with a knowledge that a sudden immigration of peoples of strange appearance, customs, and habits, is likely to be unacceptable to the natives of Britain. There is little chance that change of this magnitude could ever have come about without fear and resentment. If human beings prefer the familiar, as they do, they will dislike the unfamiliar ways of the immigrants, a state of affairs that would be taken for granted by any natural conservative. In other words, the Conservative concepts of imperfection and natural conservatism provide a political context in which tolerance and acceptance, rather than intolerance and rejection, stand in need of explanation.

This is also true of the 'carrot and stick' concept of man. Without social regulation, man is unlikely to behave responsibly towards others. If immigrants are exempt from market forces or laws, they will take advantage of the indigenous population. The answer must be for the laws to be stringently enforced on all occasions, and for no well-meaning, but misguided, allowances to be made for black - or for white-people. Of course, none of these characteristics rules out assimilation, but it is likely to be a slow and painful business.

A gradual process of education offers the best possibility of change: but the extent of the change is clearly limited by the

available human material. As Robert Carr put it,

> There is prejudice and it is no good pretending there is not. There always has been prejudice in this world and in this country; between Jew and Gentile, between Catholic and Protestant, between one race and another. These prejudices have never been easy or quick to resolve ... Colour, unfortunately, adds a new, sharp, and strong dimension to this human feeling of prejudice (CACR, 1973, p.43).

In this analysis, his views were shared by Enoch Powell who claimed that "in private life, people just do distinguish between their own kind and aliens, Jews and Christians. All mankind does this". Violent and criminal impulses "are common to humanity; and there is nothing strange in this" (New Statesman, 13.10.1978, p.461). Races themselves are presented in Conservative manner as permanent and unchanging. For the Conservative, the likelihood is that the separate races and the relations they engender will continue to exist indefinitely.

The Labour Party's concept of man

For the socialist, man is ensnared in an economic and social environment over which he must come to exercise mastery if he is to liberate himself. In the right circumstances, which may be created by the exercise of reason, the young human being can be brought up in harmony with nature and his fellows. Conversely, all destruction of the physical world and antagonism between human beings is best explained in terms of existing social relations, particularly exploitative class relations, which have come into being haphazardly as a result of scarcity, hardship, and the pursuit of interest at others' expense. The vital human resources provided by nature have been squandered in the past as a result of the failure to nurture them properly. The socialist believes that the physical and social fabric of society must be changed if the potential of mankind is ever to be fully realised. In more specific terms,

an attack must be made on the economic relations of capitalism which spawn conflict between and within social classes, between nations, and between races. Once the structural obstacles to cooperation have been removed, an attempt may be made to rebuild the moral culture of the people and to produce the 'new moral man'.

The social democrat, while influenced by this Marxist-orientated account of man's future moral possibilities, may consider it somewhat utopian in tone. The socialist claim that man can be morally improved is likely to be described dismissively as 'a utopian doctrine of human perfectability'. The social democrat will assert that he is no utopian dreamer, but a hard-headed, practical politician, who promises nothing that cannot be delivered. Although it is difficult to pin down the many humanistic themes in Labourand social democratic thought, deriving from such disparate sources, as for example, the philosophy of natural law, Christian socialism, Morris's anti-commercialism, welfarism, etc. (all cited by Crosland), it is probable that, in general, the social democrat holds that man is basically neutral in character, but corrupted by social institutions. Crosland (1956) mentions an ethical source of inspiration in Labour Party thought which believes in replacing first, the competitive social relations by fellowship and social solidarity, and second, the motive of personal profit by a more altruistic and other-regarding motive. By improving the social environment, by removing the sources of social conflict, it is possible to produce 'reasonable' human beings - human beings that have not been 'twisted' by the unpleasantness of their upbringing.

The reluctance of the social democrat to interfere with the economic relations of capitalism, however, and his belief in gradualism, lead to the channelling of his reformist zeal into the field of social welfare, and into education in particular. The

importance of education is recognised by all who hold that the human stuff is essentially plastic and capable of many forms, but the social democrat sees it as a means of achieving equality of opportunity, social justice, and greater democratic participation in society, without his having to interfere unduly with the more formidable capitalist economic mechanisms. Education becomes the peaceful and gradual means of social engineering for socialism.

The British Labour Movement has a long tradition of faith in the powers of education. Robert Owen, in 1816, wrote that:

> No human nature save the minute differences which are ever found in all the compounds of the creation is one and the same in all; it is without exception universally plastic, and by judicious training, the infants of any one class in the world may be readily formed into men of any other class. (p.146.)

Leaving aside considerations of wealth, a common education could act as the great leveller, reducing differences of culture and opportunity between classes, and offering the possibility of equality of opportunity. One hundred and forty years later, the role of education in creating inequality, and the part it might play in abolishing it, were still being debated. "A major cause of inequality in British Society", the Labour Party pamphlet Towards Equality (1956) informs us "is our educational system ... our schools not only reflect the existing class structure, but also help to perpetuate it".

Application to race relations

The Labour concept of man and the corresponding emphasis on education have considerable significance for approaches to race relations. If human nature can be changed for the better, it is quite clearly the Labour Party's duty to undertake such changes in the shape of race relations legislation and educational programmes. In the parliamentary debate of 7 December 1959, the Labour Party moved that the House declare its strong disapproval of racial

intolerance. The Conservative Government was criticised for not doing enough to deal with intolerance in Britain. An educational campaign was necessary and there had to be legislation to prohibit, and make illegal, discrimination in any public place.

The importance of education in the Labour Party approach to race relations is reflected in a constant stream of suggestions for public education, eventually incorporated in the 1968 Race Relations Act setting up the Community Relations Commission. The Commission aimed "to break down prejudice and intolerance through public education and information". Arising from the heavy emphasis on the importance of education as a means of enlightenment, the racial hostility of the white population was attributed to its ignorance and lack of understanding, rather than to its economic interests. The composite resolution moved by R Burns at the 1968 Labour Conference called for "a massive programme of education to counteract racial prejudice in all its aspects". In particular, it urged "the Department of Education and Science to undertake a campaign to guide teachers in counteracting racial prejudice" (LPACR, 1968, p.283). The 1968 Conference was acutely conscious of the need to combat the effects of Enoch Powell's speeches on Labour supporters. S S Gill suggested Powellism signified "lack of education in the working class movement in this country" (LPACR, 1968, p.285), while Frank Cousins thought that "we have to do more educating amongst our people ..." (LPACR, 1968, p.286).

Of course, the answer to inequality of opportunity experienced by black people might also be thought to lie in education. If blacks were not as well qualified as whites, then their inequality could not be attributed solely to racial discrimination. Instead, their lack of education, or ignorance of British culture, was held responsible, but once again, these could be remedied by the provision

of the proper facilities. David Pitt asked the Party to "start first with education" "to make sure the proper educational facilities" were available so that black people might play their full part in society (LPACR, 1970, p.207). Black people, as well as white people, might be moulded through education to achieve racial harmony and racial equality of opportunity.

The importance of the Labour concept of man stems essentially from the firm belief that there is nothing innate or natural in the existing strained relations between the races. Rather, through carefully controlling nurture, these relations may be changed in favour of brotherhood and understanding. A danger, however, arises from the social democratic tendency to view racialism as a superficial ideological phenomenon divorced from perceptions of economic interest. Racialism is reduced to ignorance, and measures to combat it to a well-intentioned, but somewhat idealistic, appeal to love and understanding (reflected in some of the early activities of Councils for Racial Harmony). Both these points are clearly exemplified in a speech to the 1976 Party Conference by Joan Lestor. She did not believe, she said, that

> ... the people in this country are basically racist or basically fascist, or anything like that. But I believe they are confused, they do not understand, and until this moment of speaking, very few who know have taken the trouble to explain to all the people of this country what the situation is. (LPACR, 1976, p.222.)

Local case study: is national character inborn or learnt?

Table 14 Views on whether national character is inborn or learnt

	CONSERVATIVE	LABOUR	TOTAL
Inborn	8	2	10
Learnt	7	12	19
Combination of both	8	5	13
Other/unclassifiable	3	3	6
	26	22	48

The question "Is national character inborn or can it be acquired through learning?" produced some interesting insights into the debate about folk and scientific racism. The question raised a problem of saliency in that a nmmber of councillors seemed never before to have thought about human behaviour in terms of 'nature' versus 'nurture'. To make the distinction in the way it is understood by social scientists or biologists requires a fairly sophisticated understanding of the principles of genetics, of Darwinian and Lamarckian ideas of inheritance, of sociological and psychological concepts of social-isation and of the long-running debates in education of the relative importance of learnt and inherited behaviour. It is a mistake to think this dual categorisation of behaviour is utilised at all, or to the same degree or level of sophistication, by the man in the street.

Although the point should not be unduly exaggerated, it was clear from some councillors' responses that instinctual and learnt characteristics were not always distinguished at a theoretical level, and even if they were, this did not rule out for the councillors the possibility that learnt behaviour, indulged in over many centuries, might not, in the end, be passed on genetically. The central idea signified by 'inborn', 'inherent', 'instinctive', etc., was simply of long-lasting, or permanent, population traits, passed on from generation to generation. Little or no attention was paid to whether the means of transmission were biological or cultural. The obvious consequences of this realisation is that attempts to separate biological from cultural racism among, at least, certain sections of the population, constitute nothing less than an artificial imposition of the researcher's categories upon a world picture untrammelled by such theoretical sophistication. In other words, the question of whether a respondent thinks a black person is inferior because of

genetic or cultural reasons is pointless: for whatever reason, he believes him to be inferior.

The following quotes are evidence of some councillors' failure to make use of the distinction:

> I think it's inborn, you're brought up to it, and brought up to respect it (C30).

> I think there are traits that come to us over the years, For instance, my own people came over here with the Conqueror and I think the culture that has been ours over the centuries is bound to have an effect on our lives. There's always something that singles us out because of those inborn and inherent traits (L1).

> It was inborn, the national character, years ago, but things are changing. We've got a more mixed race now with more foreigners coming over, so we have to learn it (C37).

> Some are born with it and some acquire it (C13).

Of course, many councillors did make a clear distinction between inborn and learnt behaviour and understood very well the point of the question. In accordance with what has been said about the differing concepts of man, it is probably significant that Conservatives showed a greater inclination towards the 'inborn' and Labour towards the 'learnt' explanation of national character. The concept, or existence of national character, itself, went unchallenged.

PARTY BOGIES

Conservative Party bogies

Party bogies are made up of the antitheses of the values that party members hold dear. Individuals or groups come to be identified, often without good cause, with the contrary values that offend good party members to the core. The party bogy may threaten in a real sense the party's actual existence or its ideological coherence. To the Conservative, the arch-bogy is communism, represented by individual communists, the Communist Party and its 'card-carrying' members, Reds in the trade unions, Trotskyite agitators, Marxists, or the founding fathers themselves: Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, or Mao.

These are seen as offending almost every value the Conservative possesses, as the very essence of political iconoclasm.

Application to race relations

Because communism is regarded as having been invented by a German Jew and has become the political creed of the Soviet Union, it is treated as a foreign import and its adherents as somehow alien. There is always a danger that this foreign ideology may infect the nations of the Commonwealth or accidentally enter into Britain like the 'plague bacillus' mentioned in Churchill's notorious reference to Lenin. Immigrants, in particular, might be susceptible to communist beliefs because they are, after all, foreign.

In the Party debate on the colonies in 1960, Anthony Grant claimed that if Britain did not help the people of the colonies "someone else - namely the communists - will" (CACR, 1960, p.18). A majority of the people were "far more interested in full employment and full stomachs than in the niceties of constitutional democracy and parliamentary government", a fact "that the communists are very quick to perceive".

If black people become involved in Left-wing politics, there is a likelihood that they will be closely identified with the "communist menace". During the debate on the 1968 Commonwealth Immigrants Bill, Quintin Hogg made the curious remark: "We may want some immigrants to go away. If I were allowed to select some of the demonstrators in Grosvenor Square recently, I should not be sorry to see their departure" (Hansard, 23.4.1968, p.71). Powell, in referring to Indian immigrants, also raises the spectre of "subversive elements, who have had their training" in England (New Statesman, 13.10.1978).

Conservative fears are frequently extended to all who disturb the consensual ballot-box and committee-room politics of the main parties. Takingpolitics on to the streets, or belonging to non-

parliamentary parties of both Left and Right, are classed as 'extremism' and vociferously denounced. The 1977 Party Conference deplored "the threat to good race and social relations posed by the extreme parties from both the 'Left' and the 'Right'". In moving the motion, John Pritchard talked of Britain's proud heritage of reason and tolerance, and condemned the street violence in three major cities brought about by people who sought to stir up political enmity. The fascist right whose "philosophy is totally alien to the British tradition of fairness" is singled out for abusing the national flag. "Neither fascist nor Marxist cares one jot for the liberty of the individual" he asserted (CACR, 1977, p.42). Michael Alison enlarged on "the odious exhibition by extremists of both Left and Right parading their organised cohorts and debasing our traditional freedoms of speech and association". He reminded the Conference that "extremists on the Left are just as likely to be fascists as extremists on the Right. It is no accident that Nazi is a shorthand word for National Socialism" (CACR, 1977, p.46).

Because of the Conservative's felt need for political quietude, little or no distinction is made between campaigners of Right and Left, racists and anti-racists. Those anxious to change the institutionalised discrimination and disadvantage of the status quo have little hope of avoiding the ire of Conservatives content with God's handiwork in the form of the existing British constitution. It is also interesting to note that the Conservatives rarely denounce the fascist Right without balancing their attack with a reference to the Left, in keeping with the idea of fairness and impartiality - alleged characteristics of the British character.

The Conservatives have acquired one further bogy in the shape of Enoch Powell, who is seen as a traitor seeking to undermine the unity of the Party by challenging party discipline and questioning

party values with his overemphasis on one strand of Conservative thinking: nationalism.

Labour Party bogies

For the last fifty years, the hatred of the Left and working-class has been directed against fascism. This has arisen both as a result of the antithesis between socialist and fascist social theories, and as a consequence of the bitter rivalry between socialist and fascist organisations in the political arena, in the streets, and on the battle fields of Europe. Socialists lay stress on the ending of capitalism and the triumph of the working class, on peace and brotherhood, internationalism, democracy, and equality. Fascists express anti-capitalist sentiments, while at the same time, strengthen private ownership, by destroying the organised working class and encouraging corporatism. Rational persuasion is despised in favour of appeals to the emotion. The fascist values of militarism, racial domination, strident nationalism, the cult of leadership, and authoritarianism, are in fundamental contradiction to those of socialism. Millions of socialists have been killed by fascists: the democratic fabric has been threatened and at times demolished by victorious fascist forces. The socialist movement possesses a deep and passionate loathing for all fascist persons, ideas, institutions, and symbols. The strength of this feeling has, in the late 1970s, been tapped for renewed campaigning against the revival of British fascist parties such as the National Front and the National Party, and against racism which has been, and still is, an integral element of fascist ideology in Britain.

Yet, although the Labour Party has accepted fascism as its arch-enemy, the bogy has never been pursued with much vigour by the Labour leadership. On a fundamental dimension, fascism has certainly been denounced dismissively, but on the operativedimension, the

Labour Party policy-makers have been cautious in committing themselves wholeheartedly to popular campaigns against British fascist organisations. Fascism has been abhorred for its unconstitutional means, its provocative tactics, and its political extremism, rather than for its central ideological tenets and their effects on the working class and racial minorities. Committed to a constitutional road to the exclusion of street politics, and determined to maintain at all costs its image of law-abiding and placatory respectability, the Labour Party leadership has tended to condemn equally the extremism of both Right and Left, and to guide the Party away from mobilising the people against the fascists at home or abroad.

It has been argued that fascist organisations are best handled by denying them publicity and turning a blind eye to the provocative acts of their very small membership. Street demonstrations and protests at meetings against fascists at which there is a chance that violence might break out, have been condemned for mimicking the tactics of the enemy. Instead, the Party has preferred to use its influence over the state machinery, or to pass legislation in defense of any group suffering from fascist harassment.

But, in the face of fascist activity and its destructive effects, the Party leadership has found its placatory line most difficult to maintain. Mention of the British Union of Fascists, Olympia, the Battle of Cable Street, the defeat of Republican Spain, and most importantly, the war against Hitler's Germany, rouses fierce sentiments in the breasts of the socialist rank and file, that cannot easily be diffused by stressing the importance of maintaining free speech and the right to organise - even for fascists. Note 9 briefly sketches the historical development of Labour formulae on fascism and indicates their remarkably enduring nature.

Application to race relations

The fact that the traditional bogy of fascism - Nazi style - placed great emphasis on a racial conspiracy theory, strengthened the hostility towards racism among socialists. The connection between anti-semitism and colour prejudice and discrimination was clearly perceived by Labour Conference delegates in the 1940s when they called for legislation against fascist activities. In the 1970s, the power of traditional anti-fascist feeling was still capable of mobilising large numbers of people against the National Front and, therefore, indirectly against the racial policies central to the Front's political programme. The Anti-Nazi League seems to have successfully tested the tactic of approaching anti-racist campaigning by making use of the traditional fifty-year-old anti-fascist bogy, although it is likely that other motivating factors are present, such as a readily identifiable, self-professed, fascist group. Racists and racialist practice are rarely as easily identifiable.

Nevertheless, the Labour Party conferences of the 1970s revealed the developing association in Labour thinking between capitalist crisis, the growth of fascism, and the possibility of using black people as scapegoats as an alternative, or in addition, to the traditional Jewish victim. The National Front's attack on black people was treated by Labour delegates as the first step in a sustained attack on working class organisations and on socialism. In this way, socialists might be encouraged to recognise their own interests in the struggle for black people's rights.

The National Front had been formed in 1967 from the British National Party, the League of Empire Loyalists and part of the Racial Preservation Society, with the Great Britain Movement of Tyndall and Webster joining later. The National Front was able to capitalise on the Conservative decision in 1972 to admit the Ugandan

Asians, and, in the West Bromwich by-election, managed to save its deposit with 16 per cent of the vote. In the February 1974 election, the Front put up 54 candidates and polled an average of 3.2 per cent of the vote, while in October with 94 candidates it polled 3.1 per cent. In 1976 and 1977, it gained patchy, but significant support in local elections, especially in Leicester, Hackney South, Bethnal Green, and Stepney.

In response to what was seen as a rising fascist tide, the subject began to appear once more on the Conference agenda. In 1970, Tom Driberg referred to a fascist counterdemonstration in Trafalgar Square in which the slogan "We want black blood" had been shouted. He repeated the cry of 'shame' that arose from the hall: "It is terrible, shaming indeed" (LPACR, 1970, p.208). In 1972, Tom Torney drew Conference's attention to the fact that people with the same thoughts that brought Hitler to power were still in evidence: "Analyse the people who are writing in your local papers. Analyse the words of these vicious characters and you will find that they are very much akin to the Hitlers and Mussolinis" (LPACR, 1972, p.157).

In 1976, a Conference resolution reaffirmed opposition to racialism in any form and recognised "that the National Front and other Right-wing groups are playing a key role in the propagation of racialist ideas". It called upon Labour councils to ban the National Front and National Party from using Council property (LPACR, 1976, p.213). In arguing for the resolution, Gerry Lerner expressed his pleasure at the NEC's broadcast attacking racialism. He thought it had done a great deal of good in linking the National Front and Fascist organisations with Oswald Mosley's movement in the 1930s. To applause, he suggested that it might have been even more desirable to have linked the Front with Hitler, Mussolini, and Franco, for there should be no mistaking the fact that the National Front was a

Nazi Front. He went on to explain that the Front used blacks and Irish as scapegoats for economic ills brought about by capitalism.

> They use them as scapegoats to do the job of work that Hitler, Mussolini, and Franco did - to destroy the organised Labour and trade union movement, and to destroy with them all democratic rights. (LPACR, 1976, p.214.)

Paul Moore warned that growing racialism was a threat not only to the blacks and the Asian community but to the unity of the whole Labour movement (LPACR, 1976, p.215). The composite resolution asserted that Conference believed that there were "serious parallels with the racism in pre-war Europe whereby minority groups (were) used as scapegoats for capitalism's failure" (LPACR, 1976, p.216). The following year, in a resolution reminiscent of Communist demands of October 1936, the Conference carried a resolution stating that marches by the National Front and other racist parties through multi-ethnic neighbourhoods should not be allowed. The emergence of neo-Nazi racist parties posed a threat to both the Labour movement and the whole basis of the hard-won democratic system. However, the Labour Government found no time to act on the suggestions put to it by Conference with the result that the continued National Front presence provoked violence in a number of multi-racial areas, in Ladywood, and at Digbeth, Birmingham, and in Southall, London.

The bogy of fascism, therefore, has had the effect of concentrating the Labour mind on a conglomeration of values antithetical to socialism. Racism is seen as an important part of fascism's ideological snare, and as a potential threat not only to the Jewish or black population, but to socialists, trade unionists, and radicals, and to everything they hold dear. Opinions differ over how the fascist threat is to be met - the rank and file favouring more direct action, the leadership always seeking, almost to the point of acquiescence, to exercise restraint. The fact that, in its opposition

to fascism, the Labour Party is forced to mobilise against racism and to understand racial propaganda's potential for political damage in a much broader economic and class context, has not been lost on those campaigning on behalf of the black community in Britain, although the danger might arise of displacing the pursuit of specific anti-racialist goals with more diffuse anti-fascist activity, for which popular, traditional support has appeared to be more readily available.

Local case study: policies towards the National Front

Councillors' responses revealed marked differences between and within the two parties in opinion and proposed course of action to be adopted towards the National Front and its activities. Conservative opinion ranged from hostility and anxiety, scorn and ridicule, to tolerance and sympathy for the Front's patriotic and essentially nationalistic policies. With regard to policy, Conservative councillors thought the National Front should be ignored, that people should allow it to pass into anonymity by failing to respond to its provocation, and that no action should be taken to ban it or limit its existing democratic rights. Unrepentently hostile to the National Front, Labour members sought to stop it from using public buildings, to prevent its marches through multi-racial areas, and even to proscribe it completely.

A number of Conservatives were clearly ambivalent towards a party with whose policies they shared a great deal of sympathy. They felt that, were the National Front to discard its Nazi and fascist leanings, and its more vicious and outspoken racist policies - if, in a word, it renounced 'extremism', then it might usefully become aligned with the Conservative party. "The problem", one Conservative explained, "is that everybody seems to start from the assumption that if you're a member of the National Front, you are, ergo, a jack-booted

fascist, which I hope to God isn't so. There are things that they say - they want to see law and order, they would like to see England great again, they'd like to see the power of the unions restricted - which I find eminently reasonable. What I don't like about their public statement is their fixation on colour" (C4). Alternatively, their advocacy of traditional Conservative values was seen as a snare to catch the unsuspecting:

> If I read some of their leaflets, they often list ten points of policy and I find myself agreeing with seven of them. But it seems to me they're hoodwinking the people. If the NF were ever to gain power we would see a completely different set of policies. It's what they're hiding I'm afraid of. We would possibly see policies similar to those we saw in the 1930s. They would treat the immigrant population in the same way as the Jews. I disagree with compulsory repatriation. And I've seen members of the NF on TV criticising the Jewish people. That again seems to harken back to the days of the Nazis. I'm not a racialist. One becomes a racialist when one talks about compulsory repatriation. I don't think an Indian or Jamaican is inferior in his bodily or mental make-up to an English or Frenchman (C26).

While acknowledging the National Front's patriotism as a point in its favour, Conservatives, on the whole, saw it as 'extremist', and lost no time in pointing out that:

> I'm against extremes, both Left or Right (C57).

> They're as extreme as the Left-wing and would constrain us in the same way (C8).

> They're an extreme minority like the Marxist, Maoist, and Socialist Worker groups, and shouldn't be given any credence (C10).

These examples also illustrate that, in condemning extremism, Conservatives showed a strong tendency to associate the behaviour of Right and Left. There were occasions, however, when attempts were made to salvage the difference:

> I prefer to ignore extremism, but the National Front is, at least, a patriotic organisation, unlike the Socialist Workers who are positively subversive (C58).

It is always necessary to point out that a number of Conservatives went out of their way to condemn outright the Front's racism and policies of hatred towards black people.

But, whilst dismissing the National Front as extremist, Conservatives were most reluctant to advocate taking any positive political action against it. The best one could do was to ignore it, and encourage others to have no truck with it, either. There was strong feeling that the Front's democratic rights to organise, hold meetings, to march, and to enjoy the same facilities as other parties at election time, should in no way be interfered with. Provided members of the Front did not break the law, it was important that their right, and that of others, to free speech remain inviolate.

> We disagree with their policies, but don't believe they should be banned from taking part in the democratic process. They should be free to express their opinions in the same way as the Communists (C25).

While Conservatives on the whole dismissed the National Front and its policies as much ado about very little, most Labour councillors were unbridled in condemning it and seemingly vied with one another to denounce it in yet more strident terms.

> We bitterly oppose everything they stand for (L1).
>
> We hate the sight of them - they're evil (L2).
>
> An abomination (L20).
>
> We find them abhorrent (L5).

"The National Front", one councillor claimed, "was what the last war was about" (L15). Parallels were frequently drawn with the anti-fascist campaigns of the thirties, the Spanish civil war, and the horrors of the Nazi holocaust. But it was the Front's fascism, rather than its racism, which was more frequently mentioned in the Labour denunciations. 'Fascism' featured as Labour's archetypal political adversary and, while its racial traits undoubtedly met with

unmitigated censure, it was most starkly projected, in repressive and authoritarian manifestation, as the traditional foe of the working class.

There were one or two Labour councillors, however, whose casual utterances were in marked contrast to the general vehemence of response. The mildness of the reproach they levelled at the Front and the policy of turning a blind eye which they advocated, set them apart from the rest of the Party, and allied them to the more lackadaisical Conservatives. But these were a tiny minority. The Labour Group as a whole maintained a policy of prohibiting the National Front from hiring Local Authority property for meetings, A significant number of individual Labour councillors were also in favour of taking much stronger action such as banning the Front from marching through areas with a large black population, "running the fascists off" the streets, forbidding the Front from holding public meetings or distributing propaganda, or proscribing the organisation in its entirety. The Labour Party was quite clearly agitated by the presence in the locality of an organisation it took to be fascist, while the Conservative Party concerned itself only inasmuch as extremism of Right or Left might disturb the peace or lead to curtailment of traditional freedoms.