

CHAPTER 5

European Integration, Global Governance and International Relations*Jens-Uwe Wunderlich***Introduction**

The European integration process has inspired a rich and still growing body of scholarship that is unique in many aspects. Since the 1950s, analysts have been fascinated by the developments in Western Europe where the evolving institutional framework of the European Communities successfully challenged more traditional views of world politics, themselves based on an explicit distinction between domestic affairs (what is going on *within states*) and international relations (what is going on *between states*). European integration seemed to provide an entirely new paradigm for the organisation of international affairs, based on multilateralism and cooperation rather than emphasising self-help and balance-of-power. European integration scholarship emerged to provide a refreshing contrast to the dominance of realist thinking in the academic field of International Relations. Indeed, for some time integration theory in the form of neofunctionalism offered the most convincing challenge to the stranglehold of neorealism on international affairs. At the empirical level, European integration questioned the central concept upon which traditional thinking of world politics in general, and the realist tradition in particular, was based – the Westphalian state, with its explicit connection between sovereignty and territory. European integration was fuelled by a desire to overcome the flaws of the

Westphalian system. The anarchical structure created by the Westphalian system only led to a perpetual security dilemma. The two world wars had amply demonstrated the consequent lack of trust and an emphasis on self-help, leading to armament, balance-of-power behaviour and warfare. Thus, one of the main motivating factors kick-starting the European project was the over-riding concern with finding a solution to the security dilemma arising out of the absence of a central authority above state level (i.e. anarchy). Concerted efforts focused on reigning in sovereignty and the power of the state and on transcending nationalism. And hence the supranational institutions, the very antithesis of the Westphalian state, which are unique to European integration.

It has often been argued that European integration has evolved beyond Westphalia, creating post-Westphalian modes of governance in Europe in the process. Decision- and policy-making has become increasingly decentralised across several levels of authority (the sub-national, the national and the European Union levels). However, even in such a multilevel governance structure, the state survives. After all, the contemporary European Union (EU) rests on compromise, combining supranational and intergovernmental features in an idiosyncratic manner. The pooling of sovereignty in some carefully negotiated areas has enhanced the effectiveness of the states allowing them to better respond to the challenges of, first, the Cold War and, second, the globalisation process. Yet the state is no longer the only actor of consequence in European policy-making. Depending on the policy area, decision-making is being shared between various sub-national groups, government departments and European institutions. Private actors are also gaining in influence. Thus, European

integration is a unique response to the challenges, empirical and conceptual, arising out of the inadequacies of the Westphalian system, exacerbated by globalisation.

For over fifty years now an impressive body of literature on European integration has evolved, dealing with first-order normative, conceptual and empirical issues around international affairs. EU studies scholarship, therefore, should offer a rich repository for those studying International Relations and Global Governance.¹ However, for a variety of reasons, the outline of which is beyond the scope of this chapter, this is unfortunately not the case. As Alex Warleigh-Lack outlines in his contribution to this volume, this state of affairs is no longer tenable. As he states, it is time to review the potential contributions of EU studies to those interested in international affairs and global governance. This chapter aims to do just that. It will focus on two particular strengths of the EU studies literature. First, for more than twenty years, there has been work on the intra-European dynamics of integration and Europeanisation. Multilevel governance and network approaches are well-developed within EU studies. This should be of interest to global governance scholars who regard multilevel governance as a unique way of analysing post-Westphalian international affairs. And, second, EU studies goes beyond Westphalian perspectives of world politics. Yet the Westphalian model and sovereignty still dominate the theoretical and normative lenses of International Relations. This is particularly true when it comes to questions of actorness in contemporary world politics. Indeed, to date International Relations lacks any systematic discussion on actorness beyond the state. Hence, globalisation poses

¹ For the purposes of this chapter, the term EU studies refers to the study of the EU, its institutions, EU policy-making processes, European integration theory and history. See also Alex Warleigh-Lack's chapter in this volume.

severe conceptual challenges to the discipline. EU studies, on the other hand, has a long tradition in dealing with conceptual change and overcoming the state-centric straight jacket that restricts International Relations.

Multilevel Governance

The introduction to this volume has outlined that current world politics is in a state of flux. The traditional analytical and conceptual tools of International Relations are a bit rusty for the analysis of contemporary world politics. In an international environment dominated by the forces of globalisation, states find their autonomy to set independent national objectives measurably reduced. The result has been an increase in decentralisation and the emergence of more informal modes of governance.

Devolutionary processes in many countries are empowering sub-national actors while an increase in and expansion of international regulative regimes and multilateral organisations enhances the institutional global governance framework. Globalisation is breaking with the formal framework of the Westphalian state based on exclusive territorial sovereignty and replacing it with a more fluid multilevel global governance structure. Governance is increasingly shared among various actors such as municipal authorities, government agencies and international organisations. Private actors such as civil society organisations, industrial organisations and multinational companies have also increasing access to the governance complex. Scholars such as Scholte speak in this context of post-sovereign governance characterised by increasing levels of sub-state and supra-state governance alongside national governance (1997, 2005). Additionally, globalisation has led to an increase in direct transborder links between

subnational authorities, political elites, government officials and business and civil society actors.

In this interdependent world an understanding of world politics that primarily emphasises interstate relations and concentrates on interstate conflict and cooperation is insufficient. The scope of analysis has to be broadened to include a variety of new issues and actors such as the multiple roles of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), multinational corporations (MNCs), transnational advocacy networks, civil society actors, citizens groups, domestic and transnational lobbies. The separation between high politics (security and diplomacy) and so-called low politics (issues of political economy, human rights, intellectual property, labour rights, migration, the environment, information technology etc.) that has characterised state-centric IR is no longer tenable. Thus, the Global Governance literature is increasingly turning toward multilevel governance approaches to better understand the empirical realities of contemporary world politics.²

This is not an entirely new analytical framework. Within the last twenty years, multilevel governance approaches have attained a certain prominence within the study of European integration. The European project has created a unique framework for European policy-making where decision-making power is dispersed across several levels and, thereby, facilitated the creation of a much more diverse political space.

Multilevel governance approaches within EU studies emphasise the fluidity between

² Examples of this global governance literature include: Rosenau and E.-O. Czempiel (1992), Young (1999), Behrens (2002), Cooper et al. (2002), Held and McGrew (2002), Ba and Hoffmann (2005), Wilkinson (2005).

several tiers of authority and the interconnectedness between institutions and actors within political and regulatory decision-making process that are typical for the EU.³ They explicitly acknowledge the variety of public and private actors involved in EU decision-making and transcend state-centrism, analysing public and private aspects of governance as well as formal and informal, institutionalised and non-institutionalised structures (Wunderlich 2007: 12). EU studies and Global Governance scholars are interested in similar phenomena. Both study the regulatory and institutional implications of globalisation and the resulting increasing interdependencies. Both sets of scholars are investigating the transformation of world politics and the role of the state. And both are interested in the expansion of the role of sub-state and regional/international actors alike. A multilevel governance perspective overcomes the inadequacies of the Westphalian model in an increasingly interconnected world, a fact increasingly recognised by Global Governance scholars but already well-entrenched within EU studies.⁴

Two leading EU multilevel governance scholars, Marks and Hooghe, distinguish between two approaches to multilevel governance: Type I and Type II (2004). Type I is concerned with power sharing between governments and is closely related to contemporary federalism. In Type II:

[J]urisdictions are aligned not just at a few levels, but operate on numerous territorial scales; in which jurisdictions are task-specific rather than general

³ For EU multilevel governance scholarship see: Marks et al. (1996), Hooghe and Marks (2001), Bache and Flinder (2004), Jessop (2004), Marks and Hooghe (2004), Rosenau (2004).

⁴ On this topic please see also Lee Miles' chapter in this volume.

purpose; and where jurisdictions are intended to be flexible rather than durable. This conception is predominant among neoclassical political economists and public choice theorists, but also summarize the ideas of several scholars of federalism, local government, international relations, and European studies (Marks and Hooghe 2004: 21).

EU multilevel governance scholarship, therefore, sits very well with students of globalisation and global governance. Both are asking similar questions and are interested in very similar problems. The EU multilevel governance literature has been developed to make sense of EU policy-making processes. A similar mode of analysis is being applied by Global Governance scholars and helps to focus on the variety of actors, public and private, at different levels, in various parts of the world. To summarise, multilevel governance overcomes state-centric views of world politics. It can also be regarded as a strategy to organise governance in an increasingly complex and interdependent world where international and subnational actors have acquired relative autonomy and have joined states and their agencies at the international level. To sum up, multilevel governance approaches offer an analytical viewpoint and a strategy for not only the EU policy-making system but also for the contemporary global governance complex.

International Actorness

European integration is an interesting case study for the effective management of globalisation through a multilevel governance structure. Far from being a marginalized idiosyncratic regional organisation, the EU has fundamentally changed our conception of international actorness. International Relations as an academic subject has been dominated by state-centric conceptions of world politics. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the neorealist school of thought. In a nutshell, neorealism assumes that the basic condition of world politics is anarchy, i.e. the absence of any legitimate level of authority above state level. This condition follows from the existence of sovereign, territorial-based Westphalian states. Neorealist theory suggests that the anarchical structure of world politics generates a perpetual security dilemma (very similar to a Hobbesian state of nature scenario) where individual states have no choice but to rely on power and self-help mechanisms to ensure their very survival in an ultimately dangerous international environment. The state then becomes the principal focus of analysis for realists because it represents the only location for security, justice and morality. It also represents a primary concentration of power. Thus, traditional International Relations theory in general, and the neorealist school of thought in particular, has tied the concept of international actorness to the state, a sovereign Westphalian state to be more precise. Actors in international affairs are, therefore, assessed against the state and sovereignty. This inherent state-centrism is very visible in the vocabulary used - states are fully-fledged international actors, while other actors are lower down the hierarchy and are usually described as 'non-state' or 'non-governmental' actors.

In contrast to realist/ neorealist accounts, the neoliberal tradition expressively allows for the impact of such non-state actors (i.e. multinational enterprises, regional and international organizations, non-governmental organizations etc). However, even neoliberalism underlines the centrality of the sovereign state as an international actor. Nor does neoliberalism offer an alternative concept of actorness other than in relation to the Westphalian state. And while the stranglehold on the discipline that neorealism and neoliberalism have exerted in the past has been decisively broken, there has been little attempt to address the consequences for the concept of actorness in a systematic manner in the general International Relations literature. Even within the current debates in International Relations theory, the spectre of the sovereign state continues to loom large in any descriptions of international actorness.

Within EU studies, however, the conceptualisation of actorness can look back at a long tradition, dating back to the 1970s when in Western Europe realist conceptions of international actorness were increasingly challenged by the evolution of the European Communities. Since then a steady stream of scholars has been engaged in assessing the actorness of the emerging European Community (EC). This literature can be divided into two broad streams. One thematic area studies the policy processes and internal dynamics that provide the EC/ EU with actorness. A second looks at the involvement of the EC/ EU in international relations and the wider implications of the EC/ EU's external engagement for its own agency and actorness.

During the early days, the aim was to develop a general, more comprehensive framework of actorness. Focusing on the particularities of the EC and European

integration, it was hoped, would lead to possible generalisations regarding the concept of actorness. And, indeed, any serious discussion on actorness and European studies has to start with Gunnar Sjöstedt's pioneering work (1977). Sjöstedt focused on actor capacity, allowing for a differentiation between strong and weak actors in the international system. He also stressed the importance of purposive action of an actor with regard to other actors. More recently, Allen and Smith (1991, 1998) added to the debate by introducing 'presence', where presence is defined as legitimacy and capacity to act and to mobilize resources, and the perception an actor generates about itself. Christopher Hill (1993) pays particular attention to the formation of actor capacity in the EC/ EU, coming to the conclusion that there is a 'capability-expectations gap', i.e. a divergence between what the EC/ EU can actually do and what it is increasingly expected to do. Antje Herrberg (1997) identifies the EU as a complex system which at different times and across different issue areas will prioritise different factors. She concludes that EU actorness depends to a significant degree on the level of integration. Thus, EU actorness depends on the policy area under consideration. Cohesion, therefore, is important for our understanding of actorness, especially with regard to effective actorness. Subsequently, the actor capacity of the EU is more developed in the area of Common Commercial Policy (CCP), where the Community method of policy-making dominates, than in Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which remains subject to intergovernmental cooperation.

Richard Whitman (1998) highlights that the EU has an identifiable and coherent international identity, thereby focusing on the external dimension of the concept of regional identity. Of particular significance for discussion on actorness with regard to

the EU's external policies are the elaborations of Jupille and Caporaso (1998) and Bretherton and Vogler (1999). Both works put forward criteria-based approaches to the analysis of the actorness of the EU. Jupille and Caporaso emphasize four factors: *recognition*, *authority* (decision-making structures, legal competence), *autonomy* (institutional independence) and *cohesion* (the ability to reach a common position). Bretherton and Vogler's construction of the actorness of the EU is determined by three factors: *presence* (the relationship between international developments and external expectations), *opportunity* (external dynamics that might foster or hinder the construction of EU actorness) and *capacity* (the capabilities necessary to respond to opportunities and external expectations).

These contributions have not gone entirely unnoticed outside the field. New Regionalism scholars in particular have followed the scholarship on EU actorness with great interest. An important contribution to our understanding of regional actorness has been Björn Hettne's new regionalism approach and his concept of *regioness* (Hettne 1996, 2004). Emerging in the 1990s, Hettne's new regionalism approach located regional phenomena within the context of globalization and systemic (extra-regional) forces rather than concentrating on intra-regional factors, which remains a feature of a significant proportion of scholarship on European integration. Most importantly, Hettne emphasized the possibility for regional agency and the construction of regional space. Hettne outlines that regions are 'subjects in the making', i.e. on the way to becoming international actors in their own right (Hettne 2007).⁵ Focusing on Western Europe and borrowing from Bretherton and Vogler,

⁵ See also Hettne's chapter in this volume.

Hettne argues convincingly that the actorness of regions emerges through the interplay of *regioness* (relative cohesion), *presence* (impact on the international environment) and *purposive actorness* (the ability to influence international order).

While Hettne's work is another good indicator for the synergies between European studies and International Relations it is possible to go even a step further. Rather than restricting ourselves to regions as emerging international actors alone it is possible to draw up a set of criteria that make for an international actor (state and non-state actor alike), to compare such actors and to assess the capacity of such actors. The discussed EU studies literatures have demonstrated that it is possible to divorce actorness from sovereignty. The remainder of the chapter will outline such a set of criteria and briefly map ways of operationalising them. These criteria include institutional identity (internal identity and recognition), presence, institutionalisation and capability.

Internal self-understanding/ identity

The concept of self-perception relates to issues such as identity, self-image, as well as perception and recognition by others. Collective identities have played a significant role in the emergence of the Westphalian state system. Nation-states, very much like international or regional organisations, non-governmental organisations or even private enterprises, are collective actors. Collective identities contain an external and an internal dimension. The internal side, which provides a sense of community and inclusion, leads us to the external side of identity, related to a sense of difference and

exclusion. Questions of belonging such as ‘Who are we?’/ ‘Who belongs?’ inevitably lead to questions such as ‘Who are we not?’ and ‘Who does not belong?’ The construction of such a community of belonging automatically leads to the creation of the ‘other’. It is pertinent to note that identities, like international actorness, are context related and issue-specific. Thus, international actors, like states, are ideational constructs, masking group action, and questions of identity run through every single aspect of international actorness. Furthermore, actorness and actor-identity are not total but are always context-specific.

External recognition

At first glance, *de jure* recognition in the international system appears to be reserved to state-actors endowed with sovereignty. To date it is impossible for non-state actors to have a seat in the United Nations or to enter official diplomatic relations. The international system is biased in favour of state actors. However, that does not imply that non-state actors cannot gain recognition as international actors. We need to move away from sovereignty and diplomatic recognition. Instead, one could focus on processes of mutual interaction between different actors. Dealing with an entity as a collective international actor presupposes and grants some form of recognition, bestows actorness and enhances actor-identity.

International presence

International presence refers here to the capacity to actively influence the external environment. International presence is influenced by the identity of an actor and contributes directly to recognition. For example, agenda setting and participation in international organisations and international dialogues can serve as good indicators here. This emphasis on presence and capacity also highlights that actorness in context specific. Powerful transnational companies might have the capacity to influence economic policy-making at a transnational scale. This provides them with a presence in financial or economic matters. At the same time, their presence in geo-strategic or security matters may remain marginal. Actorness is not absolute.

Institutionalisation

Institutionalisation is an important feature for the concept of actorness, constraining and shaping actorness. Institutions can be described as formal and informal rules as well as behavioural norms and codes of conduct constituting prescriptions and ordering repeated and interdependent relations. Institutions come as highly formalized, written, well-codified documents, treaties or legal arrangements. They also come in more informal forms denoting norms about what is deemed to be appropriate behaviour. Institutionalisation, therefore, contextualises international actorness. To put it differently, the institutional set-up determines actor qualities. With regard to actorness it is useful to imagine a continuum of institutionalisation ranging from very informal arrangements to highly formalised and legalised institutionalism. It is important where an actor is located along this continuum. The degree of institutionalisation has consequences for the level of actorness inasmuch as it

determines the presence of an international actor and policy instruments and, to a lesser degree, its recognition and self-understanding. Low-level institutionalisation, characterised by a preference for informal arrangements, sets clear limits for potential actorness. Decision-making under such circumstances is inevitably subject to inefficiencies, drawn out and limited, depending on the lowest common denominator. High-level institutionalisation, on the other hand enhances actorness somewhat by increasing the efficiency of decision-making by clearly demarcating levels of authority and competence. Participants are joined via strong formal and legal ties, making it much more difficult to withdraw. The international actorness potential of, for example, civil society actors such as charities, social movements, advocacy groups, depends on institutionalisation and formality. The same can be said for regional organisations such as the EU, ASEAN or Mercosur.

Capabilities (to provide capacity and to achieve outcomes)

Policy instruments of public and private actors alike provide capacity that helps to project interests, achieve outcomes and enhances actor identity. Actor capacity is ultimately dependent on the available instruments.

This set of criteria has been directly devolved from the various contributions on EU actorness in the EU studies literature. If applied to contemporary world politics it takes a much wider variety of actors (such as, for instance, states, global and regional organisations, civil society actors, economic actors) into consideration and escapes the

straight-jacket imposed by the explicit and implicit state-centrism that still dominates International Relations. It offers a description of international actorness that fits much better with the realities of contemporary world politics.

Conclusion

There is significant potential for intellectual bridge-building between EU studies and International Relations. First, although developed with the idiosyncrasies of EU policy-making environment in mind, multilevel governance, if carefully applied, offers a valuable analytical tool for understanding global governance. It deals with issues of governance, legitimacy and accountability beyond the state.

And second, EU studies literature has enhanced our conceptual understanding of actorness beyond the Westphalian model. States may be distinctive international actors, endowed with sovereignty, but sovereignty is not a pre-requisite for actorness. Traditional International Relations-based approaches tend to confuse actorness with statehood and this ultimately limits any analysis of an increasingly complex and multilayered global arena. Globalisation and new modes of global governance emerging in the aftermath of the Cold War force ‘an expansion of actorness beyond the traditional state-centric model’ (Cooper et al, 2008: 1). The state no longer has a monopoly of economic, military and social power. Policy-making at the national and the international level is becoming more complex and diversified. The Westphalian model, therefore, is past its sell-by-date. What we need is a much more flexible

understanding of actorness that includes the state but also a variety of other kinds of actors. Take, for instance, countries lacking diplomatic recognition but which may possess some form of actorness (such as Taiwan). We need a concept that sees actorness as fluid and dynamic. Actorness can be attained and it can be lost (consider, for instance, failing states). And, finally, we need a concept that is versatile enough to consider actors that are strong players in any one dimension (economic, political, social or cultural), rather than all capabilities being bundled together as in traditional conceptions of the state. Thus, we would be able to take into account international organisations such as the EU, NATO or the UN as well as NGOs, MNEs and investment banks, all of whom play critical roles alongside, and sometimes above, the state-level, with all the capabilities and capacities of an actor.