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STRATEGIES AGAINST RACISM

VOL 2

A comparison of a social movement and case studies of anti-racist
policy and practice in the local state

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CHAPTER 6

Education Case Studies - Brent

6.1 Introduction

The American Marxist Harry Braverman, in 'Labour and Monopoly Capital' described schools as 'caretakers of children and young people [which] are indispensable for family functioning, community stability, and social order in general (although they fulfill even these functions badly).' One of the effects of the migration of black workers to Britain in the 1950s and 1960s was to increase the non-white pupil population from an uncounted handful to over 275,000 in 1972.² As Mullard, writing on the black presence in British schools, has noted, in that period, the state and 'the multiracial education movement in Britain has tended to view black pupils as a *problem*.'³ Mullard locates three phases in state philosophy on multiracial education:

- (1) Assimilationist - Early 1950s to 1965
- (2) Integrationist - 1965 to early 1970s
- (3) Cultural Pluralist - Early 1970s to present day

These educational models were 'all stemming from a common social imperative - to maintain as far as possible the dominant structure of institutions, values and beliefs.'⁴

Increasingly a more radical challenge has come in terms of not only the advocacy of a pluralist ethos which seeks to respect all

'cultures' but also the emergence of anti-racism as an educational force and a more pro-active approach by some local authorities (and ILEA in Central London) to the question of lessening the effects of racism within the education system. Much effort was made to remove racist books,⁵ to urge rethinks in the obvious Eurocentrism in subjects such as history and geography⁶ and to go on to question the reasons for black underachievement.⁷

For some black parents, especially those seeking to retain a strong cultural/religious link, the imbalance of expectations and results in the state system is such that demands have come for additional, supplementary, and in some cases segregated, education for their children. These demands stem from failings, both perceived and real, in the state education system to ensure black educational attainment and religious observance. A factor which tends to be overlooked or underplayed by official studies especially in the *integrationist* and *assimilationist* periods, is that of racist ideology individualised and institutionalised.⁸ In some respects the calls for separate schooling by parents and pressure groups has grown in concert with attempts to challenge racist and sexist stereotypes and move away from the constraints of a more traditional curriculum. Concern over racism can therefore be compounded by conservatism and hostility to some of the professed aims of the local education authorities.

The case of *Islamia School* is one of a private Muslim school seeking *voluntary aided* status, namely local authority and DES support with the running costs of a denominational school. If successful, it will set a precedent as the first Muslim school to use the voluntary aided procedure for gaining state funding and thus set in

train moves for greater Muslim educational separatism. The case study investigates the attempts of the governors of Islamia to gain voluntary aided status for their school, the issues raised in terms of separatism, parental and religious influence and the wider national implications should the Islamia bid be accepted by the Department of Education and Science (DES).

The response of Brent Council in terms of attempts to defuse Muslim grievances within the state system whilst trying to block the Islamia application is illuminating. This case study provides an example of a local authority following a strategy against racism, namely keeping Muslim pupils within the local education authority, which conflicts directly with that of a pressure group, namely the Islamia School and its supporters. This brings out a contradiction between the wishes of the local authority and the very 'ethnic minority community groups' which it claims to consult and represent.

The other case study, that of *Maureen McGoldrick*, explores the actions of Brent Council over the case of Maureen McGoldrick, an infant school headmistress in Brent and allegations made against her of racism, by a Council Education Officer. Suspended by a council intent on establishing its anti-racist credentials and supported by a right-wing dominated NUT branch, her case rapidly became a *leitmotif* for what the tabloid newspapers termed 'loony leftism' in local authorities and a point of principle for Brent Council. The matter was finally settled through the High Court, Appeal Court and by the Education Secretary, Kenneth Baker, in the full glare of national publicity.

Education and anti-racism have for years been contentious issues in Brent and the McGoldrick situation rapidly developed from a

small disciplinary offence to encompass the whole debate about the best way to fight racism in education. The case study shows the influence of strands of black nationalism, though not always black separatism, on key influentials in the local authority in the dispute and the use by Left Labour Councillors of the Right-wing leadership of the local NUT branch as an example of what they saw as the inability of white, male-dominated trade unions to fight racism as professionally as the political leadership of the local state. The Council's dogmatism towards its policies and practices was handed down from the Councillors most notably during the course of this dispute and more than once their attitude was referred to as 'anti-racism by diktat'.

Probably more than any other borough, Brent has been set up as the example of municipal socialism run rife. It has provided much copy for newspapers and not a little embarrassment for the Labour Party leadership. In the course of these case studies it will be repeated that the appraisal of Brent Council is not of the Council's intent in seeking to lessen the effects of racism but of the strategies pursued and the Council leadership's eventual isolationism and reification of policy. Secondly, the two case studies are of two different areas of anti-racism in education. One reflects the growing demands of many black parents for state support for separate schooling whilst the other centres on a small dispute blown out of all proportion by fundamental differences about educational policy and practice, and their implementation. In that respect they both stand as separate entities.

Both case studies do have a common theme, however, the degree of qualification which should be given to one of the key strands of the New Left approach to anti-racism, that of 'consultation' and

external involvement in the decision-making process. This may have been exacerbated by the recent electoral shifts in the local political system which favoured a policy of absolutism, as will be seen below. Before exploring each case study, therefore, it is important to sketch out the political scene in Brent and more specifically the policies and structures developed to fight racism in the Borough.

6.2 Brent Council - The immediate political history

Education has frequently occupied centre stage in the local politics of Brent. The Council has been under Labour leadership since it was formed in 1964,⁹ from the coalition of Wembley and Willesden, apart from a period of Conservative rule in 1968-71, until May 1983. After the council elections of that month, the result enabled the Labour group to maintain control only through use of the Mayor's casting vote. In December 1983, Ambrozine Neil, a Labour Councillor, defected to the Conservatives over the issue of local independent schools and her support for them. This removed the Labour majority on the Council until the 1986 elections, the Liberal group held the balance of power with Conservatives taking the positions of the Committee Chairs although was no formal coalition. One Liberal Councillor, John Hammond, described the situation thus:

When they had a one vote majority, the Labour Party had so many problems they took to making decisions in 'urgency sub-committees' consisting of Labour Councillors from which the press and public were excluded. When the defection of Mrs. Neil happened, they felt unfairly treated and the atmosphere of plot and counter-plot grew worse.¹⁰

The promotion of Ambrozone Neil to the position of Deputy Chair of Education was in part due to her promotion by Labour colleagues as a black woman, moving into a position of political strength within the local authority which was adopting a high anti-racist and anti-sexist profile. However, her political decisions veered too far towards the promotion of private education, strict discipline and a narrow core curriculum for many of her fellow Labour Councillors. Reaching an impasse within the Labour administration she left the Labour Group in a well-prepared public resignation. Twenty four hours after her defection the Daily Mail gave her a full page interview and Labour Councillors have claimed she had visited the House of Commons for discussions with Conservative Ministers, though this is unsubstantiated. The Conservative and Liberal Groups then took over control of the Council. In the May 1986 local elections the Labour group won a clear majority on the Council. winning 43 wards with 20 going to the Conservatives and only 3 to the Liberals.

6.3 'Race Relations' policies in Brent

Under the hung Council the following plans on improving 'race relations' were approved :

- (i) Application to central government for funding for 180 schools officers to investigate the effectiveness of multicultural teaching¹ (See Appendix 5),
- (ii) The establishment of the Race Relations Unit,
- (iii) The Code of Practice on Race Relations and Employment,
- (iv) Regular funding for black projects and,

- (v) The issuing of directions to council officers on the combating of racism.

The Race Relations Unit came into being in 1982, based in the Executives Division with Race Relations Advisers in each council department. Russell Profitt, the Principal Race Relations Adviser, was appointed with overall responsibility for 'race relations' matters and became a member of the Directors' Team, the most senior management team on the council. The Council developed a policy on equal opportunities and anti-racism in line with the 1976 Race Relations Act (s71). One of the touchstones of Brent's Equal Opportunities Policy making has been ethnic monitoring. Monitoring was first started in 1983 and it was assessed that although 50% of the borough's population were black, they made up only 17% of the workforce. As Russell Profitt has argued, 'Ethnic monitoring is absolutely basic. Without it you cannot isolate pockets of discrimination.'¹² The workforce is now nearer 30% black with the greatest concentration of black workers in lower clerical grades. It is, however, the number of black managers that is frequently taken as one of the measures of how racism is being combated within a local authority.

Further key objectives included:

- (i) The creation of greater employment opportunities for ethnic minorities through access routes and other forms of positive action,
- (ii) The need for greater involvement of ethnic minorities in the decision making process at all levels and,
- (iii) The need for fairness when dealing with grievances and disciplinary complaints.

The implementation of the Council's Code of Practice on Race Relations was strengthened by the demands of Nalgo Black Workers' Group, a body dominated by white collar management and supervisory grades. At the same time, the Council had appointed black Race Relations Advisers who were to make no secret of their dislike for 'white dominated' unions, as will be seen below. The administration of anti-racist policies with at times apparently little procedural flexibility and a climate of witch-hunting was apparent before the case of Maureen McGoldrick. In one instance a senior porter was sacked for allegedly making racist remarks. Nalgo contested the sacking and both black and white porters signed a petition for his dismissal to be revoked. The Black Workers' Group urged workers not to support a strike planned by Nalgo to demand the reinstatement of the porter and the Labour Council blamed the threatened strike on racist and Conservative workers.

In another case an industrial tribunal looked into the qualities of two councillors involved in an appointment of a head teacher in which an unsuccessful candidate complained of racism. The tribunal claimed the Conservative Councillor was 'of limited experience in everything except local politics ... and unable to express a sensible view', whilst the Labour Councillor 'was determined ... to ensure that a non-white be appointed ... the relative merits of the candidates was bordering on the irrelevant.'¹³ When asked if he thought that Brent Council's policies might cause a white backlash, Russell Profitt replied, 'It's a problem for white people.'¹⁴ The above examples are only briefly mentioned, without arguing the particular pros and cons of each, to help define the climate in which the Maureen

McGoldrick case came about. It was one in which the Black Workers' Group in the white collar union Nalgo found support from both councillors and officers for tough disciplinary measures to be taken against alleged racists. The obverse of this strategy was that it helped to engender within the Council a confidence to suspend or sack on the strength of rumour or one person's word against another and the belief that anti-racism should be imposed from above by using disciplinary structures.

6.4 'Race Relations' and education policy in Brent.

In November 1980, the Education Committee appointed an Adviser for multicultural education. There were seen to be four factors barring successful multicultural education in the Borough:

- (i) An absence of a policy statement on racism and education,
- (ii) A lack of understanding amongst heads, teachers and the 'community' of the concept of multicultural education,
- (iii) A lack of adequate teaching materials to help in educational support,
- (iv) The absence of explicit guidelines to help schools and colleges.

A policy statement was issued in October 1981 to remedy point (i) above, which noted that 'the council is committed to a fundamental and significant change to a multicultural education system based on a concept of cultural pluralism. The recognition that all people and their cultures are inherently equal must be a constant from

which all educational practice will develop'. In 1983, when Brent published wider plans on the concept of multicultural education in their 'Education for a Multicultural Democracy',¹⁵ the consultative procedures which brought these booklets about were not made clear. As Troyna and Williams observe, 'the Brent documents offer no details about the origins of the policy other than suggesting that the appointment of a black adviser for multicultural education in 1980 constituted the catalyst for change.'¹⁶

The policies were based on assumptions that the prior assimilationist models of integration were ineffectual in practice. As racism was seen as being 'endemic'¹⁷ to the British education system, so teachers were operating within a closed system of racist education, educating children, some of whom would go on to be teachers who themselves would be teaching racist education. The Council noted, 'It is obviously true that the majority of teachers are not racist in the extreme pathological sense. However, it is probably true that those teachers are supporting and defending a system which is inherently racist.'¹⁸ There was a fatalism in the report about teachers themselves taking on racism rather than the more correct attitude of anti-racist councillors.

The strategic implications for the Council's multicultural education policy were twofold. One was for the local authority to attack racist educational structures, by improving facilities to promote multicultural and anti-racist education whilst introducing policy elements within each area of educational procedure and practice. At the same time the Council sought to confront the 'individual' racism of teachers by the introduction of Racism Awareness Training (RAT)

courses. In August 1983 the Education Committee decided that teachers applying for posts in Brent should be asked at their job interviews if they were prepared to attend a RAT course. Any person refusing would not be appointed. Ambrozone Neil, the Deputy Chair of Education at that time, argued that 'I would not be prepared to appoint people who refused to go on the course. The council has a responsibility to and we won't employ somebody who says they don't have to interact with all races properly'.¹⁹

The Council set the ideology of racism in terms of mainly colonial throwbacks lingering in the educational system which can gradually be updated and reformed away by the employment of more black teachers and the introduction of more appropriate books. At the same time it invokes a high degree of internalisation of anti-racism amongst those involved in teaching. The invoking of RAT seeks to challenge each white individual's element of racism within themselves - for RAT the unit of oppression is the abstract individual. The strategy is not a collectivist one but rather throws the onus upon white individuals to remove from themselves the 'guilt' of racism. Ahmed Gurnah, a critic of RAT, has argued 'What is profoundly mistaken about the slogan *racism is a white problem* is that it fails to recognise that racism is a relationship. In a relationship one cannot fruitfully focus on the *nature* of the individual in the hope of solving structural inequalities.'²⁰ It is not only the theoretical basis that radicals such as Gurnah and Sivanandan²¹ see as flawed, but also the implications for anti-racists. The latter suggests that:

It is the sort of psychospiritual mumbo-jumbo which ... by reducing social problems to individual solutions, passes off

personal satisfaction for political liberation ... [and has] claimed the attention not just of Middle America but of a grateful state. For what better way could the state find to smooth out its social discordances while it carried on, untrammelled, with its capitalist works. 22

In October 1983 plans were put before Brent Council for the drafting in of more black governors and teachers into those schools with a high intake of black pupils. Ron Anderson, then Chair of the Education Committee, explained that the new approach would initially be recommended for 3 schools in the Borough. However, he dismissed rumours that there were plans afoot to call for all black schools from within the council on the grounds that, 'this or any type of segregation would be a retro-grade step'. One of the key pressure groups involved in the separate schools debate at the time was the Parents Association for Educational Advance (PAEA). As a registered charity it had received a combined GLC/Brent grant in 1984 of £29,000. The PAEA is a conservative parents' association which seeks to set up schools with narrower core curricula, stricter discipline and greater governor influence. It is primarily a black pressure group which aims to improve the results of black pupils by a return to 'traditional' teaching values away from much of the 'permissiveness' promoted by sections of Brent Council.

What made the position of the PAEA more prominent was the fact that its founder, Ambrozine Neil, had occupied a top influential position within Brent Education Committee. There are suggestions that the Labour Group promoted her not only as a way of getting a black woman into a key position but further because their hold on the Council was so tenuous (a majority of one) that they were happy to indulge someone with an educational viewpoint at odds to that of council policy

in order to remain in power. Despite her position, she was not sufficiently able to influence the Committee to the demands of the PAEA and her resignation from the Labour group (and defection to the Conservatives) deprived the Labour group of their overall majority.

The PAEA plan for separate education was re-presented to the Council in September 1984 at which time the sub-committee of the then Conservative-controlled Education Committee agreed to let it go ahead with its plans to take over or set up a separate school. The Conservative Chair, Arthur Steel, said, 'My party believes in the fullest involvement of parents and governors but we would not wish to impose anything upon anybody.'²³ The complaints of the PAEA were also influential in provoking the Labour group to commission the 'Two Kingdoms' report. This investigated why black pupils underachieved in Brent.

In 1983-84 Brent CRC surveyed the 1983 'O' Level results in the Borough and in September 1984 produced a report which was critical of the way black children were being failed by the local schools. Janet Hope-Bogle, its Education Officer, claimed the situation was such that:

Black children are failing badly, there is too much emphasis on social development and not enough on academic achievement. Schools are not receptive or responsive enough to the needs of the parents or of the community - the whole multicultural policy in the borough is now more or less defunct. It is virtually in the bin.²⁴

Teachers were seen as being prime forces in the process of ensuring black under-achievement. Much of the report was written in the black

nationalist rhetoric which part of the Labour group on Brent Council courted. It concluded:

The black community is being more than generous by continuing to send its children to Brent schools to allow them to be taught in racist institutions by teachers who refuse to use their collective power to bring about any change. We will, however, see them use this power to fight for salary improvements next term.²⁵

The key factors which were influences in the whole scenario at the beginning of the Maureen McGoldrick dispute were a powerful influence in the council of black activists who separated issues of 'race' and class and supported the hostility of Labour Group management to independent trade union activity and a thorough enforcement of the disciplinary code for alleged racist incidents. Incorporation of black activists into the semi-managerial infrastructure of the Council helped build a coalition of councillors, officers and pressure groups. Opposition to these forces ran the risk of being branded racist and appearing to be allies of, for example, the right-wing leadership of the Brent Teachers Association. It is useful to presage the case studies with a quote which summarises the generalised problems of the education system in Brent:

The report reflects a resultant amount of disaffected parents, a substantial section of alienated young people, critical ratepayers, a divided, isolated and defensive teaching force and a well-intentioned authority that in the past has neither understood the real nature of the problem nor invested resources wisely to deal with it. (Fred Flowers, a member of the 'Two Kingdoms' team)²⁶

The ISLAMIA SCHOOL Case Study.

6.5 Introduction

The case for the independent Islamia Primary School in Brent gaining local authority financial support and the case against can on one level be presented in the light of the age-old debate of who knows best for a child's education - the parents or the state - but it is more properly viewed as a religious group's quest for state support for private education. It is part of the claim of the proponents of the local state thesis that one of the strengths of Labour control of local authorities is their ability to be receptive to the needs of minority groups.²⁷ What to some extent makes Islamia a variation on this general theme is that the parents are not attempting to circumlocute a national education policy which they dislike but rather a local one, on primarily religious grounds. The governors and teachers of Islamia, in attempting to change its status from *independent* to *voluntary aided*, are for the first time using a procedure for a Muslim school which brings 'separate' schools within the maintained system (See Appendix 6).

Although any group can in theory seek to establish a voluntary aided school, a Muslim school would have obvious parallels with the other prime users of the voluntary aided procedure, namely Church of England, Roman Catholic, and Jewish church schools. The Swann Report into multicultural education summarises the status of a voluntary aided school as thus:

Voluntary aided schools are established by voluntary bodies, usually a Church or charitable foundation. The voluntary

body has to provide the premises for the school and thereafter is responsible for external maintenance, repairs and any major capital expenditure on which it is eligible for grant aid of up to 85% from the DES. The voluntary body holds a majority on the governing body which enables it to exercise control of admissions and the curriculum.²⁸

The components which set Islamia apart are the perception of it being an 'Asian' school, the question of black religious separatism and by extension the serious consequences for the proponents of multicultural and anti-racist policies in education. The anti-racist influence a local authority can make in its key services (See Chapter 4) is varied but education has been one of the sites of the greatest effort. The implications of widespread Muslim separatism from state education policies questions the appropriate learning conditions for children in advanced industrial societies and raises the prospect of what has been termed 'educational apartheid'. In addition, questions have to be asked as to the role of the state in funding black separatism, which in some cases is what voluntary aided funding will amount to.

It is important to separate some of the strands of the arguments here to avoid confusion later. Opposition to Islamia receiving voluntary aided status has come both from the Right, who argue against government funding for non-white schools, and from the Left who wish to promote multiculturalism and contend that the battle for anti-racism must be conducted within the state sector. Conversely, support for schools like Islamia has come from two Brent MPS of very differing political persuasions. Rhodes Boyson (Cons.) supports the school because it is 'independent' and opposing the Labour-led local Council whereas

Ken Livingstone (Lab.) has claimed that Islamia should have the same rights as any other religious school and that to oppose its getting voluntary aided status amounts to racism.

At the same time the Swann Report recognised the dilemmas as not only resting in the sphere of academic theory:

As far as the physical security of ethnic minority youngsters is concerned, whilst they may be safer from racial attacks in a "separate" school, the very existence of a visibly identifiable "Asian" school may serve to polarise the attitudes of other communities in the area.²⁹

Because at the school the religion in question is Islam at Islamia School, and brings forth the possibility of a 'blacks-only' voluntary aided school in Brent, the position of Brent Education Authority, a high profile anti-racist one, is bound to be paramount. In the light of the case of the actions of white separatist parents in Dewsbury in 1987 the implications of calls for segregated education policies on the grounds of religion or parental choice may easily be a smokescreen for what are in reality calls for divisions on the basis of 'race'.³⁰

Islamia is by no means the only independent religious school seeking local authority support.³¹ But compared with Church of England and Roman Catholic faiths it can be seen as being about 'more than religion' and in that respect sets a precedent for other religions which may lead to not only single religion schools but also single 'race' schools. As will be seen below, there exists in legislation at present before Parliament an opting-out plan which may well lead to a semi-independent Muslim educational network fuelled both by the failings of

the state system to counter racism and the demands for stricter religious education.³² The background to the Islamia case is one which is rooted in the pressures from Muslim groups in the past for greater emphasis in education on Muslim principles, despite all the best efforts of the multiculturalists.

6.6 The History of Muslim Education in Britain

There are over 4000 Islamic organisations in Britain and not surprisingly it is those which are most closely controlled by the mosques which have the greatest influence.³³ Demands made upon local authorities for Islamic rights and influence have generally taken the form of requests for a degree of parity for Islam with other religions in the school curriculum and due respect for Islamic religious observances. Whatever the problems with multiculturalism the interests of formal equality and religious freedom as enshrined in the 1944 Education Act have been ill-served in relation to the teaching of Islam. Islamic groups have thus made an general appeal to educationalists to take seriously Islamic perceptions of the direction for education. As Sally Tomlinson explains:

In particular Muslim parents question the materialistic and competitive basis of English education, the individualistic nature of learning, the way girls are educated, the predominance of Christian influences and the separation of education from all other aspects of life.³⁴

A co-ordinating body for increasing the influence of Islam has been the Muslim Educational Trust, a registered charity since 1964,

which organises religious advisers to visit schools to teach Islamic religious education and to explain Islamic tenets. The intention of the Trust is not only to promote what are seen as the positive aspects of the faith but also to act as a buffer against the encroachments of Westernisation. In terms of practical requirements made of schools, these range from aspects of sex segregation, food and dress standards to the more obviously theological considerations. The lack of reception of many local authorities has led to a shift in emphasis away from what are seen as the fruitless attempts to convert local education authorities towards the creation of a wholly separate Muslim educational network. Both separatist and integrationist streams of thought have co-existed but with the apparent relentlessness of both racism and lack of interest shown towards Islamic representation in schools the separatist tendency has assumed the dominant position - reinforced by the Conservative Government's emphasis both on private education and parental choice.

Religious instruction at home and in the mosques does not, for some parents, provide redress for the lack of Muslim teaching and practices in state schools. Following a conference on Islamic education in 1974, notice was drawn towards the possible use of the voluntary aided system in which an independent religious school could apply to the local education authority for partial funding and support whilst retaining primacy of the faith. As the conference report noted, not only did parents see state schools as failing to adequately represent Islam, they were also viewed as a positive threat. The post-conference report argued that, 'A major worry for Muslim parents is that their children soon adapt to the English standards and ideas. They start to question, not only traditional customs but religious ideas'.³⁵

Disquiet continued and in 1978 the Muslim Educational Council was formed, publishing a series of papers³⁶ which in their appraisal of the situation and recommendations for the future of Muslim education, including the founding of a Muslim University in London, echoed the 1975 report. Following continued pressure, there has been some uptake of the demands of Muslim parents by local authorities, however sporadic. In the TES (12/3/82) P.S. Dosanjh, the Head of Careers at Highgate School in Birmingham, claimed that 'Denominational Muslim or Sikh schools are counter-productive. But the fact that they are established is a serious indictment of the country's education system'. These views were confirmed by in the same article by R. Singh, senior Lecturer at Bradford College. 'There's nothing wrong with a few denominational schools but this will not solve the needs of the mainstream education system. Integration cannot work and assimilation does not work because they have been seen as one-way processes. The white community has to give and not only take.'

Doubts have also been raised by more prominent commentators on 'race relations'. Lord Scarman (along with Lord Swann a 1980s holder of the multicultural faith), speaking at the Annual Conference of C. of E. Secondary School Heads in 1985 expressed the view that 'There are fears that there would be a sudden flood of them [voluntary aided schools]. We are also uneasy about how much of the teaching would be similar to that already offered in the mosque after school hours and ... [Muslim views] are not compatible with the idea of girls in contemporary society.'³⁷ This was echoed by Peter Newsam, the Head of the Commission for Racial Equality (1982-87). He put the general point that 'The evidence is that if you separate people out they become a focus for

hostility.¹³⁸ It is a moot point that by heading a body espousing the need for 'racial equality' Peter Newsam accepted the separating out of people into 'races' and the underlying assumption that 'races' qualitatively exist.

The liberal concensus in integrationist terms was thus for any moves for Muslim or black separatism to be dissuaded. This reflected the primacy of cultural pluralism which many on the Left had fought for in the 1960s and 1970s and which was reinforced in the 1980s by commentators such as Swann, Scarman and Newsam. The Swann Report (1985), investigating ethnic minority education in Britain was the touchstone for multiculturalists attempting to defend the importance of such an approach. More importantly, Swann Committee also came down against separate schools for 'ethnic minorities'.

6.7 'Education For All'; The Swann Report and its critics

The Swann Committee, whilst recognising the right in law of 'ethnic minorities' to seek voluntary aided status for their schools, claimed that integration and assimilation would be harmed by concessions to Muslim separatism. Recommendations were made to ameliorate separatist pressure, for example the proposals that local authorities should retain the option of single-sex schools and be more responsive to the needs of Muslim parent to keep the Muslims within the net of the state education sector. What Swann noted, but failed to fully appreciate, was the fact that it was racism as well as religious needs that was driving Muslim parents to the separatist frame of mind, however ill-founded. To further probe the roots and underlying causes of that racism would require not

only a broader remit but also a whole different mode of analysis to that which Swann adopted, for despite bouts of optimism his report primarily an exercise in damage limitation for the multiculturalist ethos.

Swann concluded that 'The establishment of separate schools would fail to combat many of the underlying concerns of the communities and might exacerbate the feelings of rejection which they are seeking to overcome'³⁹. It was actual rejection, not only 'feelings', that Muslim parents were attempting to avoid and by trying to mollify them with policies aimed at integration, Swann failed both to target racism as a prime cause of disaffection. After publication of the report, a statement issued by a combination of Muslim organisations condemned the implicit racism of Swann's conclusions. It noted that when the Swann report argued that voluntary aided schools were a bad thing, 'The suggestion by the committee has only been made when it is Muslims wanting to set up voluntary aided schools.'⁴⁰ Furthermore, the statement claimed that Swann saw as acceptable only those cultures which are not in conflict with 'rationally justified shared values'. This then had to be squared with the contention that many basic Islamic values are already opposed to the lifestyles of the majority community.

Halstead,⁴¹ who taught in Bradford for 12 years, raises important practical questions for those schools wishing voluntary aided status. He suggests that many may rush into requesting the semi-autonomous status without properly formulating how the schools will be run. There are such everyday problems as the difficulty in obtaining adequate teachers and suitable premises. The former, often untrained, he claims, tend to employ rote learning and corporal punishment with little

degree of sophistication and the local authority has no binding powers in a voluntary aided school over forms of punishment. In general terms his arguments are really those which can be directed against any small independent school such as the lack of suitably broad ranges of text books and wide curricula. He also somewhat naively takes the Muslim schools to task for failing to present an acceptable non-Muslim world view.

The very real problems of Muslim independent schools are shown in two fairly recent cases in Dewsbury, where white parents sought to disassociate themselves and their children from a school which they considered had too high a proportion of black pupils. According to a HMI report in 1986, the Islamic Institute of Education had made rapid progress, since being set up in 1982.⁴² It had 171 pupils, a high quality of pastoral support and a broad-based curriculum which gained a HMI thumbs-up. In the same year the HMI ordered Dewsbury's Muslim Girls High School to close having failed to satisfy the required standards. The school had not remedied faults noted two years previously and was said to have a drab environment, lack of practical facilities and a library consisting of two shelves of books discarded by the local public library.⁴³ The Assistant Masters and Mistresses Association report on multicultural and anti-racist education came to the general conclusion that:

So deep are the feelings in some minority communities that they have established independent schools working in highly adverse circumstances dictated by severe financial handicaps. We are concerned that as a result some of these schools provide an education that is woefully inadequate in almost every respect.⁴⁴

The conflict of the public and private educational sectors in the field of education is still not resolved with the state allowing those with sufficient finances to secure a private education. At the same time, independent or quasi-independent denominational schools have a position enshrined in law. The present situation suggests that some Muslim parents are reasonably satisfied with the state system if it can be altered to take more account of their religious and cultural values. For others a way out of the state education system is the requirement. In the case of Brent, it appears that the Council's multicultural policies within schools were not enough for some parents (by contrast their non-sexist and pro-lesbian and gay policies may have been too sacreligious for some Muslims).

The present situation for many Muslim parents, but not all, with the split between the mosque and the state school, the religious and the secular, is too great. As Afzal Agha, a member of *Candeel*, a project set up in the West Midlands to reappraise Muslim education, has noted that:

Some parents can spend four hours a night after a full school day in one of these (mosque) schools. They put immense pressure on the kids and their work at school the next day suffers dramatically. Children simply don't get time to do their homework.⁴⁵

It was this situation that has led to the setting up of Muslim independent schools, mainly primary, and under the terms of the 1944 Education Act the governors of the Islamia School in Brent have attempted to make it the first voluntary aided Muslim school in Britain. Brent Council has tried to include a greater Muslim emphasis in the

local education system but the persistence of racial attacks, of endemic racism and the depth of religious feeling has forced some Muslim parents to look to Islamia as a better alternative. The response of the Council has been to argue that Islamia is divisive and does nothing for the vast majority of school students in Brent who together must try to combat racism. At the same time it has applied delaying tactics to slow down the process on Islamia's application, which must eventually be decided upon by the Education Minister. As may be becoming clear, Tomlinson was not understating the case when she surmised that:

All in all, Muslim community and parental desires, even for educational change incorporating minimum Islamic principles in state schools pose problems, and the notion of voluntary-aided schools is fraught with great contradictions'.⁴⁶

6.8 Schooling and Muslims in Brent

Founded in 1983, the Islamia Primary School, a former three-storey family home in Brondesbury Park, Willesden Green was originally a nursery school which metamorphosed into a primary school. The intention of the governors is for the school to take children up to the age of 11 and to prepare them for the Common Entrance Examination. Education for children beyond that age would require single-sex separation according to Islamic principles. Muslims in Brent are estimated as numbering between 15-20,000 with 4000 children of school age⁴⁷. The cosmopolitan nature of the school, despite its small size, is such that the 85 pupils were born in 20 different countries. Brent has 3 mosques and 90% of the pupils who attend the school live in the borough. There are already 19

voluntary aided schools in Brent - 12 of these are Catholic, 5 Church of England and 2 Jewish. The last two schools to get voluntary aided schools were the Jewish ones, in 1960 and in 1981. In this respect voluntary aided status was for many years a dead issue following the initial uptake after the 1944 Education Act, until the migrant groups from the New Commonwealth began to demand a greater say in their children's education.

The school's independent status has been maintained and financed by Islamic Trusts and parental fees but the impact of Yusuf Islam, chair of the board of governors, has been critical. Previously known as the pop singer Cat Stevens, his influence, money and energy have pushed Islamia to the fore in the group of Muslim schools seeking voluntary aided status. This should not be seen solely as a one-man crusade, for Yusuf Islam himself views his school as part of a national movement for improvement in Muslim education. Although fighting shy of the 'Great Men of History' thesis, it is clear that in certain conditions and circumstances the influence of such an individual can be decisive.

6.9 The Muslim Argument for Islamia

The people involved in running the school essentially want to see a synthesis between the sacred tenets of Islam and the demand of the British educational system. They argue that in modern state schools Islam is being relegated to the sidelines or totally ignored. How this will be resolved by the withdrawal of Muslim children into private or semi-private schools is problematic. Yusuf Islam, in arguing against

remaining in the state system, pointed out that his opposition was not only to under-representation of Islamic theology but also the whole ambience of local authority schools. He claimed, 'The children are not getting the study of Islamic matters which we consider are critical. Nor are they taught the kind of behaviour we want ... the school here has an Islamic atmosphere ... it is not something that ordinary schools can provide.'⁴⁸

This notion of the imperative of Islamic atmosphere or, it may be argued, isolationism was echoed by the headmaster, Dr. Baig, who proposed that 'We want to educate the children with a thorough understanding of the Islamic faith ... but we are also concerned with creating a situation which is in line with the discipline, the respect for elders, the obedience, which is something Muslims believe to be very important.'⁴⁹ Yusuf Islam went on further to explain the *raison d'etre* of Islamia School in terms of the failings of a general perceived malaise in British comprehensive education beyond that of what secular or non-Muslim parents might see as the immediate problems. 'There is no provision whatsoever for Muslim children in this country. The pattern of education given is usually Christian-based and there is a general slant which can be very offensive to Muslims. We call ourselves orthodox and we want to make this an exemplary Islamic school. In Islam, things are either black or white.'⁵⁰ This case was similarly argued in 'Islam in Britain', published in 1981, in which the author wrote,

Secularism, being introduced in this society gradually, has allowed for the traditional beliefs to make certain adjustments and to undertake certain accommodations ; it has allowed for the survival of certain aspects within its

secular outlook. In other words it is in a sense a secular Christianity.⁵¹

Each day, 20% of the school's time is devoted to religious education. There is an Islamic priest, an Imam, to provide special information and guidance. The Koran is read for memorisation. Other areas are less formal in that the children are taught and encouraged to ask questions which 'will help them reach God, to understand what we believe' (Dr. Baig - The Headmaster). The only foreign language that is taught is Arabic. Religious education and Arabic apart, the curriculum is much as would be found in most primary schools. It is estimated that the school would have no problems covering a secular curriculum as required by the Department of Education although history and geography have a Muslim bias. Friday afternoons are given over to visits to the mosque. Boys and girls are allowed to mix freely except for swimming lessons. There are no music lessons and singing is restricted to Islamic nursery rhymes, 'nasheeds'. What the implications of the proposed core curriculum will be on the proliferation of Islamic education in the state sector remains to be seen.

6.10 Running costs of the Islamia (if given voluntary aided status)

This was estimated in late 1985 by the Brent Director of Finance for a full year to be £371,000 for 210 children and £280,000 for 100 children⁵². The Chair of the Board of Governors of the school has suggested that if the local education committee approved the school, the school may initially admit only 85 pupils, until a new teaching block

was erected. (Permission for this was given by the council in Feb. 1986 but is now under review). In such a case the estimated running costs would be approximately £220,000. For the full costing by the Borough Finance Department (in February 1986) see Appendix 7.

6.11 The School's Governing Body

The current governing body includes the Imam, the Headmaster and a representative from the Parent Teachers' Association. All but one of the teachers at the school has 'Qualified Teacher Status' i.e. a teaching qualification recognised by the Dept. of Education⁵³. For voluntary aided status the school needs a management team of at least: 7 foundation governors, 2 governors supported by the local education authority, 1 teacher governor, 1 parent governor and the Head Teacher. Admissions would be the responsibility of the governors but they must publish their admission requirements. The secular curriculum would be controlled by the Local Education Authority (LEA). Religious education would remain the realm of the governors. The LEA would determine the staffing establishment and also be able to query the qualifications of the teachers and prohibit the appointment of secular teachers whose qualifications were deemed not to be up to standard. The responsibility for dismissing staff would lie with the board of governors primarily. The local authority has less power to influence discipline. Although most teachers would be of the required religion this is not a prerequisite.

Until a decision is made regarding voluntary aided status, the parents of the children continue to contribute what they can to the

running of the school. Says Yusuf Islam, 'There are no fees as such and we never refuse a child for financial reasons. The entrance procedure is simple - whoever comes first gets in.'⁵⁴ This somewhat idyllic picture of private education is perhaps possible to maintain with a school of only 85 pupils but should the school expand it is possible that overriding financial considerations may begin to impose a selectivity upon those children who can be allowed into the school according to ability to pay.

6.12 The response of Brent Council

For the first three years of existence of Islamia School, Brent Council was hung with the Committees having a Conservative Chair. Due in part to the pressure being exerted by the Islamia governors for voluntary aided status, the Council publicly stated its support for Muslim children in its schools whilst also offering tacit support to the plans of Islamia for voluntary aided status. The Schools Committee announced on 3rd September 1985 that, having been addressed by Mr. Sheikh Nadir of the Mosque and Islamic Centre of Brent, it was to allow in principle a 'Charter for Muslims'⁵⁵.

The Charter for Muslims allowed:

- (a) Rights under the 1944 Education act to withdraw children from assembly,
- (b) Muslim religious instruction in schools with a high proportion of Muslim children
- (c) The right to eat halal meat in school meals,

- (d) Schoolgirls to wear traditional dress and trousers,
- (e) Swimming in girl only groups,
- (f) The introduction of Urdu as an optional subject in secondary schools,
- (g) A review of other ways of providing mother tongue teaching in primary schools.

By the announcement of the measures as listed below, and using delaying tactics over Islamia School's application, certain councillors and officers hoped that the Muslim separatists would be less of a pole of attraction for disaffected Muslim parents. The Islamia parents were still adamant as to the need for private education for their children. As part of the process of considering the application of Islamia two advisers to the Education Committee were sent to the school in February 1986 to report their impressions back to the Education Sub-Committee. Both reports were broadly favourable although they both noted the religious aspects of the school militated against the Council's anti-sexism policy.

The Equal Opportunities Officer wrote:

Pupils experience the same curriculum and they are all in mixed groups except for swimming. Pupils experience a wide range of practical activities as well as academic studies. Girls and boys are involved in science work and I was told of Muslim parents who had high aspirations for their daughter's academic achievements. Within the classroom boys and girls interacted freely and sat in mixed groups. The little interaction I saw between pupils and teachers was even-handed. ⁵⁵

The Multicultural Education Officer submitted a report to the Committee at the same time and was more critical, noting that:

The school presented positive black models. With the pupils a critical approach towards society and its norms was developed which helped to propagate an anti-racist approach. There was the usual sexism. The positive values from Islam gave value [sic] to the beliefs and attitudes of that religion. The Headteacher was careful to explain that this was in no way intended to devalue other cultures or religions.⁵⁷

In the summer of 1986 the DES sent in inspectors to consider the applicability of Islamia for voluntary aided status. In December 1986 it was alleged by those mounting the pro-Islamia bid that the planning application proposal to Brent Council for a building extension to allow more pupils was effectively being 'sat on'. The Council blamed staff shortages and the necessity for care and attention to the application for the delay, an explanation greeted with scepticism by the Islamia supporters.⁵⁸

The Planning Committee responded in January 1987 and refused the application on various grounds (see below). The DES had made it clear in discussion with the Islamia's governors that the school had little chance of attaining voluntary aided status without 175 or more pupils (the present capacity being 85). Since that decision was made the School's plans for voluntary aided status have effectively been in limbo with the processes of appeal and re-application hinging on the vagaries and lengthy delays of planning considerations. For the moment Kenneth Baker, as Minister for Education, has been spared a difficult decision over Islamia, given the number of potential applications which

may follow one successful one. As discussed in Appendix 6 (Voluntary Aided Status and Opting Out), his recent proposals for opting out offer even further incentives for state schools with a high Muslim intake to 'go it alone' and independent Muslim schools to try for state cash via the voluntary aided system.

That is the position of Islamia at the time of writing and gives enough of the flavour of the debate to allow both for analysis of the specifics of the situation and the possibilities for generalisation from the the positions both of the school governors and the council. Whilst the nature of religion, separate schooling and the black schools debate are all parts of the whole, the main elements are the strategy of the Council, both the key and top influentials involved and forums for change in policy and practice. The position of the Council remains one of delay and filibuster, despite Governmental education proposals which make the likelihood of black separatist schools more common (and indeed white separatist schools given the decision over the Dewsbury parents campaign and the cave-in by the local council).

6.13 Summary of findings

Much of this thesis is concerned with the limits of local authority autonomy especially in the light of arguments for the state as a contested terrain for class and 'other' struggles, relatively autonomous from the direct capitalist influence prevalent in the national state. Troyna and Williams, looking at multicultural education, argue along this line, when they note that:

while we recognise the overall primacy of the state it is the arena (or 'space') opened up by this relative independence of the local education system that the competing ideologies of different groups arise and are resolved, either partially or wholly.⁵⁹

Leaving aside the many problems of such an analysis, e.g. whether the term 'relative autonomy' is a contradiction in terms and if ideologies 'compete' within 'groups' in a quasi-pluralist way (as Troyna and Williams infer), it is worth considering this position in the case of Islamia. To borrow Engels' notion, it is the national state which is responsible for over-determination *in the last instance*. The ultimate decision in voluntary aided status cases rests with the Minister but, as shown above, Brent Council has had two approaches of stopping, however temporarily, the Islamia proposition.

Firstly the Council could merely not offer its support. As the Director of Education in 1985, Mr. Parsons, concluded, 'it is highly unlikely that the Secretary of State will establish Islamia as a voluntary aided school without Brent's backing, given the financial implications which the LEA has to undertake.'⁶⁰ At that time the Conservative-dominated council gave backing to the school and it was only with the arrival of the Labour administration in May 1986 that the school began to experience lack of support in addition to the expected delays. These have been aggravated by the second approach of the Council to blocking the bid, namely that of delay through planning application considerations. The DES Inspectors had advised Islamia that there would have to be at least 175 pupils at the school to be viable. To accommodate that number involved doubling the capacity of the school by the construction of a new teaching block. At the beginning of

January 1987 permission was refused by the Planning Committee on the grounds that development of the site would be obtrusive, that it would create a noise nuisance, lower the architectural tone of the area and that parking problems would arise from doubling the pupil intake. Several Islamia parents remain sceptical as to the real motives behind the turning down of planning permission and do not believe that the decision was taken on pure planning considerations.⁶¹

In this respect, the limits of the relative autonomy of Brent Council and its strategies for fighting the racism suffered by Muslims are realistically the much-vaunted *Charter for Muslims* and the blocking tactics against the attempt of Islamia to gain what Ibrahim Hewitt of the Islamic Circle - a dominant pressure group - claimed is only an assertion of their legal rights. 'We are not seeking to change the law or ask for special treatment...All we want is to be able to exercise our right to choose the kind of education we give our children.'⁶² The success of Islamia making has its roots to some extent in the co-ordination of pressure group activity but also in the activities of a key influential, Yusuf Islam. He has been instrumental in pushing Islamia to the fore of the Muslim education movement. Conversely it is the influence of the political leadership in the Brent Education Department, in particular the two most recent Chairs of Education, Nitin Parshotam and Ron Anderson that has been telling.

6.14 Key and Top Influentials

The position of Yusuf Islam falls neatly within that of the *key influential*. As the founder and chair of the board of governors he

has the structural position within the school to use as a springboard to win local support. There is little doubt amongst the parents or council officials that I encountered that he engenders much respect as an activist. Dinah Tuck, for example, ex-Acting Director of Education in Brent described him thus. 'He's a very engaging personality and he sells the project well. He has charm and he's very committed.'⁶³

His financial support has enabled the school to open its doors to all-comers though there may be a time when paying parents will receive preferential treatment given the school's needs for expansion. His position as a figurehead has projected Islamia and acted as a magnet for Islamic organisations in the borough. As a spokesman for the movement for separate Islamic education he addressed a conference in 1987 of Muslim educationalists stating the need for, 'a legal strategy department which could be called upon to fight the case for Muslim education on the political front',⁶⁴ in part to circumvent intransigent local authorities. His general assertion was for Muslims to stop building mosques and turn their attention to schooling.

The arguments put forward by Yusuf Islam and the Islamia Schools Trust are clear. He sees no separation between the religious ethos of the school and the religious ethos of the home, he sees no education contradiction between scientific judgements and articles of faith and he sees in the multiculturalism of the state system a daily seed of doubt being sown in the minds of young Muslims. 'You don't want this conflict between the church and the home ... Your child has to choose whether or not to believe his parents or his schoolteacher.'⁶⁵ Whilst Yusuf Islam has championed the cause of Islam, the opposition to it has largely remained within the Council, in effect on a point of

principle. The local NUT and other unions have not pressed the issue and it is the political leadership in the Education Department which has had the top influential role in the council.

The two most recent chairs of the Education Committees were the top influentials in local policy and decision-making in this case. Both are against black separatist schools. This is in no small way due to the circumstances under which the 1983 Labour Administration in Brent lost office. Following the May elections of that year the Labour group held power by the mayor's casting vote. At the same time the Brent Labour Party was heavily influenced by the Bennite Left and the fight for adequate representation of blacks and women within the council was seen as central. One councillor, Ambrozone Neil, was not slow to take advantage of this although her own politics were far from Left. She was rapidly pushed to the position of Deputy Chair of Education, despite having long been an advocate of black separatism. When the PAEA plans were refused she left the Labour group and defected to the Conservatives, thereby shifting the Council to 30 months of Liberal/Conservative rule. There is more, therefore, than the present-day politics of the Islamia bid in the minds of some Labour Councillors.

In reference to the Islamia case, Ron Anderson, when Brent Education Chair, argued that 'We regard the campaign for the school as a gigantic red herring to the real needs of the thousands of Muslims in Brent. With 170 on the roll you can say that 90% of Brent's Muslims are not going to the school'. Similarly, Nitin Parshotam, on being appointed to Anderson's position in 1987 restated the centrality of

anti-racism to Brent's Education Policy.⁶⁶ In his previous incarnation as Deputy Education Chair he claimed:

With Islamia there's two main factors. One is the whole question of voluntary status for schools. the amount of expenditure that will be put upon the council is enormous ... Now we have to decide, given our responsibilities, how much we want to spend on education over which we don't have full control ... Their slice of the cake could be spent better elsewhere.⁶⁷

On the more general political effects of Islamia's bid, he argued:

We have to look at the relationship a Muslim school will have with the rest of the community. That involves the whole of Brent's anti-racist education policy and multiculturalism, although it has a lot of faults and we recognise the Eurocentrism within the system. We cannot rectify the faults as easily if Muslim children are taught in daily isolation. The Islamia venture is counter-productive and I think it will only heighten racial barriers.⁶⁸

The importance of key and top influentials is, of course in part due to the position they occupy and the forces they can marshal. In the case of Islamia school, the pressure group activity has really failed to gain a toe-hold and hence influence in the present political leadership of the Council which to all intents and purposes appears unreceptive. The claims by the Council to take into account the consultation of 'community leaders' do not imply that the advice will be acted on, indeed it may be argued that 'community consultation' is another method of co-opting and defusing possible pressure from below, however un-coordinated

6.15 External Influences

The lack of co-option/consultation of Muslim views and hence influence in the relevant Education or Planning sub-committees has put Islamia in the position of outsiders and enabled hostile councillors to relegate them to the back burner, limiting the pro-Islamia lobby to public displays at council meetings. The Islamic Circle Organisation (ICO) has rallied Muslim support in the area and has brought together 15 separate Muslim groups in Brent as a nascent social movement to aid the Islamia campaign. Ibrahim Hewitt of the ICO has argued that rather than opting out of the local state system, they are seeking to opt into Brent's education authority 'because we value its input'. This view is tempered somewhat by the differences in fundamental attitudes to sexual politics, for example, which have been voiced in the current debate over Gay and Lesbian images in schools. The same Muslim umbrella organisation has called on the Council to scrap positive images of gay men and lesbians in Brent's schools (drawing up a 20,000 name petition).

Following the decision not to allow planning application to Islamia, Coleman Mahoney, Chair of the Planning Committee, made the somewhat obvious point to the protesters that 'No-one is going to railroad anything through here.'⁶⁹ This has to be severe qualification for the effectiveness of pressure group activity. It is partly because of the lack of co-ordination of pressure groups and leverage within the council that Islamia has enlisted Ken Livingstone as a local MP to lend his weight behind the campaign. His support stems from the view that :

There is no prospect of ending the state funding of denominational schools under any government. Once you accept that fact you have to say 'Well if one religion can have its denominational schools it is clearly racist to deny another ... I can very easily sympathise with the Orthodox Jewish and Muslim schools who say we want to preserve our culture. It's as valid as the predominant Anglo-Saxon one.'⁷⁰

So it was that the one of the more prominent of the ex-top influentials of the local Labour Left had thrown his local weight behind Islamic private education in Brent because of his perception of 'ethnic need' and fair play for religious minorities in being denied access to a scheme which was readily used by other religions. His focus was upon what he determined to be the need to preserve a 'cultural identity'.

6.16 Case study summary

Since 1983 and the founding of Islamia School, the teachers and governors have pressurised the Council to accede to supporting a bid for voluntary aided status. As stated before, although the role of the local authority is to give its opinion on the bid to the DES and help the school the Council has an effective veto if it does not support the school's application. Prior to the Labour election victory in Brent in 1986, the Education Committee had met Yusuf Islam and other leading Muslims, one response being the 'Charter for Muslims'. Although this was no doubt intended to defuse the growing demand for Muslim separatism, when the full Council met in April 1986 it agreed to support Islamia's bid. One month later Labour having won the local elections, they put a brake on Islamia's plans. The prevailing emphasis on anti-racism and multiculturalism are seen by key and top individuals

within the Education Department and the Council as a whole as not being best served by Islamia and thus their bureaucratic measures have succeeded in delaying Islamia's application.

As Troyna and Williams have pointed out, local authorities will discriminate between what are held to be legitimate and illegitimate parental demands in respect of education policy. Policies arrived at 'contain the selective legitimisation of the local communities' demands. Nor does this differential incorporation and legitimisation of community views bear any relationship to the level of support for certain issues.'²¹ In this respect a call for greater Muslim emphasis in maintained schools is legitimised whereas the equally prominent demands of Islamia are deemed to be illegitimate. Troyna and Williams further describe a 'heterogeneity' of views that the local council has to choose from. The reality of this is somewhat different - one can cite the differential access of pro- and anti-Islamia opinions to the policy implementation centre of the Education Department. More crucially, as will be elaborated below, the wider focus of the external influence of national issues raised by Islamia has forced Brent Council into a corner in its non-support for the scheme.

There is little evidence that there is much inside influence upon the Labour councillors to support Islamia or political kudos in doing so. Key figures in the Education Department have opposed the school's application on the grounds that it does not serve the best interests of the majority of Muslims in Brent and that with limited co-optation of Muslim organisations within the consultation process, the result has been a sense of political alienation by the supporters of

Islamia and if anything a greater entrenchment and hostility both to Brent Council and the state education system.

The point has been made by Ron Anderson that the whole issue of Islamia was one which the present administration had inherited from the pro-private education Conservatives. In that respect the Council has made a *volte face* based on the political considerations of how best to serve multiculturalism in the borough. Although questions raised by the Council about the management of resources and the elitism of Islamia are valid, this case study clearly shows that 'community consultation' is in the decision-making sector of council activity, to use Ron Anderson's own phrase 'a gigantic red herring'. The presentation of statements and policy documents which stress the need for community consultation and representation do not stand up when the Council is confronted with a community group which it sees as reactionary and hostile to the aims of the council.

The case of Islamia exposes the central problematic of 'community consultation', a supposed distinguishing feature of the New Left in local government. Flexibility and funding are strictly limited in terms of groups which do not override political considerations within the Town Hall. Similarly the case study shows that the whilst the degree of autonomy to block a measure that the council considers to be 'reactionary' may still rest in the hands of the key and top officials in the local state, their views and political positions are shaped by wider national factors. To draw wider conclusions about Islamia it has to be placed within a wider context than just the locale.

To paraphrase Marx, Brent makes its own history but not in conditions of its own choosing. To support the voluntary aided funding of Islamia School would in the eyes of Brent Council have involved setting in train the beginnings of a major Muslim separatist education movement throughout Britain. With the Conservative Government's plans to enable parents to make schools 'opt out' of the local education authority there could soon be a twin-pronged assault on multicultural education by Muslims groups either increasing the size of independent schools to gain voluntary aided status and then opting out, or for predominantly Muslim state schools directly opting out of the local system and thus attempting to unofficially become a denominational school 'through the back door'.

There has been much written on the successes and failures of multicultural education⁷³. Many criticisms from the left, whilst noting the problematical premises on which it is founded and the uneven uptake of its teaching, are all too aware that the anti-racist aims of multiculturalism are under attack from the political Right.⁷⁴ Brent's education chiefs, in recognising the weaknesses of multiculturalism and the need for greater anti-racist work in schools, defend it against the separatism and as some would say 'ghettoisation' of schools such as Islamia. It is noteworthy and ironical therefore that the parents of Islamia have found themselves on the same side of the national debate on multiculturalism as the racist Dewsbury parents. (There may be further parallels to be drawn in the interests of lower petit-bourgeois parents and their involvement in pressure groups for 'privileged' education for their children.)

Brent Council has therefore attempted to block the Islamia

bid both by not offering formal support in the application to the DES and by dragging its heels over a planning application which the school sees as imperative in its quest for voluntary aided status. The normal channels of pressure group activity are fairly closed to Muslim groups in the area, in part through their previous disunity. With no other method of circumventing the necessity of local authority support for a voluntary aided bid, they have attempted to keep the pressure on Brent by demonstrations at council meetings, petitioning and seeking national publicity.

This case study shows much of the subjective nature of pressure group and community consultation and the limits of local autonomy in tackling racism. Reports submitted by key and top influentials on the officer side of the Councillor/Officer divide have found no reason not to support the Islamia bid on educational terms but still Brent Council have effectively chosen to slow down the Islamia application and kept the decision away from the Minister Kenneth Baker. At the same time the possibilities exist for a mass exodus of Muslim pupils from the state sector and the 'progressive' policies of Left Labour Authorities, indeed the *threat* of an exodus may be effectively used as a bargaining tool in levering further concessions out of councils.

The case has therefore come full circle, from looking at the importance of key and top influentials within the clash between school and Council and the limits of local autonomy, it ends with the strongest ally of the Muslim independent schools against the anti-racist policies of local authorities being the present Conservative Government. The Councillors in Brent have no effective power

base within even their own section of the local state to halt the Central Government proposals on opting-out and are thus reduced to using delaying tactics over planning application, like many a local authority before it.

As Rosenberg noted above, it is important to reiterate the reproductive function for capital that education fulfils. Yusuf Islam argued that Islamia could wholly prepare Muslim children for 1980s Britain. Ken Livingstone, as a local MP, similarly couched the import of Islamia in national interest as well as equal opportunity terms claiming that 'Many of these (Islamia) children will contribute to Britain's economic prospects.' In that respect it is as likely to serve the reproduction of the labour force for capital as well as many other schools. But in the political and ideological battles over the strategies to be employed in fighting racism, and as a part of that, the best educative programmes offered by local authorities, the embattled parents of Islamia became up aligned both with the Conservative Government and the Dewsbury Parents.

The Maureen McGoldrick Case Study

6.17 Introduction - The Offence

The dispute at Sudbury Infants School first arose when the school's headmistress Maureen McGoldrick telephoned Brent's Education

Department on July 17 1986 (at the end of the summer term) to discuss staffing arrangements for the autumn term. The school was four teachers short of its complement and Shelagh Szulc, a Brent Education Officer, discussed with Maureen McGoldrick one available teacher, Shamin Khan. Ms. Szulc noted that 'she [Ms. Khan] would need a lot of support in an infant school because she was trained to teach older children'. Bea Campbell, in an article in *City Limits* (5/2/87) claims that 'Szulc reported that McGoldrick was reluctant to hire Khan, and had said that she was getting pressure from some of the governors about black teachers on the staff. Szulc said she was "astonished" and reassured McGoldrick about Khan's ability to speak English. Another more senior officer talked to McGoldrick a little later and drew similar conclusions to Szulc.'⁷⁴

The central allegation which became the repeated phrase in the dispute was whether or not Maureen McGoldrick had said she did not want 'any more black teachers', as Shelagh Szulc alleged.⁷⁵ Such a statement would have contravened Brent's Code of Practice on Race Relations. Pat Thomas, the Deputy Head of Sudbury Infants, claims to have been in the school office at the time the phone call was made and has stated, 'I'm sure I would have noted that sort of remark as it is totally out of character with what I know of Maureen McGoldrick. You can be sure that had it occurred I would have immediately objected'. Richard Sachse, the Head of Sudbury Juniors, claimed in a statement made to the Council in September that Maureen McGoldrick had asked him to come to see her after talking to Szulc, had been very upset and he had concluded that whatever she had said 'placed her in a vulnerable position.'

The senior officer who spoke to Maureen McGoldrick was Mr. Twining, Shelagh Szulc's superior, who informed her that he was investigating a complaint about the alleged racist remark and asked her to report to his office on the following day, the last day of the school year. Maureen McGoldrick has asserted that 'At that stage I still believed that it was a silly mistake that could be cleared up quickly. I knew I was wholly innocent and whilst the allegation was a serious one, because I'm not a racist, I thought it would be dealt with there and then.' Present at the meeting were Maureen McGoldrick, the Head of Brent Teachers' Association (BTA), John Poole, and Gordon Mott, a tertiary level officer with the Education Department. At the meeting Mott put the charge formally and Maureen McGoldrick was suspended pending a full investigation. She is reported in the Council minutes of that meeting as saying her remarks were taken out of context and when asked if she had made the alleged statement but had spoken of English and non-English language staff, 'Miss McGoldrick agreed with this.'⁷⁶

6.18 The role of the Governors and Parents

Following the suspension of McGoldrick by Brent Council, it invited the Board of Governors of Sudbury Infants School to investigate the allegation. A meeting was convened on August 26th and lasted for 6½ hours. Evidence was heard from McGoldrick, Szulc and other interested parties including character witnesses who supported McGoldrick's anti-racist past. The meeting was chaired by Karwal Singh, Chair of the Board of Governors, and following admission of all the evidence, the Board unanimously recommended that there was no case to answer. As the

allegation was unsubstantiated by documentary proof, the Board further went on to recommend the immediate re-instatement of McGoldrick. The Governors issued a statement saying that the local authority had 'trivialised the whole concept of racism'. They were also 'astounded that Brent had taken no account of McGoldrick's record on anti-racism and suggest that the Council has made a grave error of judgement.' Following this meeting the Board offered full support to Ms. McGoldrick.

On the surface it may appear that the case was on an anti-racist teacher, with a good anti-racist record, being exonerated by her governors who included several black parents. At this stage the Council may well have resolved the issue by asking McGoldrick what was going on, in view of her record. Had they done so, they might have discovered that McGoldrick felt she was being pressured from her Board not to employ more black teachers. As it was, the story of Governor influence did not emerge until 20 September after confidential documents were leaked to the *Guardian*. What the *Guardian* had received was a copy of the statement made by Richard Sachse, Head of Sudbury Junior School, claiming that he and McGoldrick shared pressures from the Parent Teachers Association and the Board of Governors. He noted, 'We agreed there was a problem with the white, middle-class parents. the school is 85 per cent black, but the PTA is 85 per cent white.'²⁷ The focus of complaints and allegations of racism were, however, directed upon the personage of Maureen McGoldrick.

The beginning of McGoldrick's problems with the Governors began in mid-1983 when a white chairperson of Sudbury Governors was replaced by a black chairperson, Halim Hassani. According to Bea

Campbell, 'McGoldrick herself spent many anxious hours with black colleagues trying to defend the school's record against some white parents and one black governor - Halim Hassani who consistently criticised her support of the anti-racism stance.'⁷⁶ In 1985 Hassani was replaced as Chair of the Board of Governors by Karwal Singh. It has then been submitted that further pressure was put upon McGoldrick to maintain 'standards' by keeping down the quota of black teachers. Karwal Singh denied any such policy arguing:

There has been pressure from one particular governor in the past. Miss McGoldrick fought this governor for a long time because she did not agree with his views. He had no support from the governors. We have always been in favour of black teachers and have never put any pressure on Miss McGoldrick not to recruit any more. You could say that a very small minority of parents have had their concerns about the issue, but we have always convinced them that they need have no worries.'⁷⁷

Accusations of partiality on the part of the parents and governors do have some basis. It may be too much to expect a critical hearing from a Board of Governors which had at least applied some prior pressure on McGoldrick in the past not to push anti-racism and multiculturalism (as they contend, at the expense of 'standards'). McGoldrick herself admitted in her affidavit to the High Court that whenever Governors expressed concern about the appointment of black teachers, 'I have always sought to persuade them away from such racist ideas'. The Governors' inquiry did not see the evidence of Richard Sachse (evidence which would have accused the Governors themselves of acting in a racist manner) and Karwal Singh failed to declare a possible conflict of interest, in that before the inquiry took place

she had already accompanied McGoldrick to the Education Department as a 'friend'. At the same time Mrs. Singh was also the president of Brent Teachers Association (BTA).

Thus seemingly contradictory forces within the school coalesced in support of the head teacher by those hostile to the anti-racist policies of Brent Council and those who could not fault her on prior instances of defending black teachers. What is apparent from the available information is that there was some pressure from Governors on McGoldrick to be cautious about taking on more black teachers, a pressure which she resisted. Halim Hassani, the senior governor gave a coded response saying, 'It has always been the desire of English people that their children should be educated in the English way of life'. Asked if McGoldrick had been pressurised, he noted, 'There might have been some concern from the Governors in that way.' The inquiry was thought by Brent Council to be effectively a whitewash. That is not to be taken as an inference that McGoldrick was guilty of the charge but it is most likely that the full weight of the Council campaign was officially aimed at a Head who, from the available information, sullied her anti-racist record by bowing before racist Governors.

On August 29th, three days after the Governors met and exonerated McGoldrick, a Sub-Committee was convened at the council to consider their report. At this meeting it was decided that the matter should be aired at a full council disciplinary hearing. A resolution was passed that the Education Sub-Committee should hold a full meeting to discuss the matter. However, the intervention of the courts was at hand. Before returning to the story of how the case developed through

the courts there were the forces operating for and against the Council both within the Council itself and in the teachers' organisations.

6.19 Political forces and top influentials within Brent Council

On the election of the Labour Council in May 1986, the 'new broom' approach was much in evidence and the Council was quick to seek to establish its anti-racist credentials in Education. The Council's Chief Executive, Director of Education (Adrian Parsons) and two Assistant Directors of Education had all resigned within four months. The two most prominent characters in the McGoldrick case on the Council side were both Councillors, Ron Anderson (Chair of the Education Committee) and Nitin Parshotam (Deputy Chair of the Education Committee). Some of the key figures involved in the suspension of McGoldrick had left the Council by October 1986, including Dinah Tuck, the acting Director of Education, and Gordon Mott, the Education Officer who had suspended McGoldrick. The latter is seen by members of the BTA as having been under pressure from the Labour Group to continue with the suspension. As the issue became rapidly politicised so Anderson and Parshotam, both on the Left of the Labour group, took greater control.

They both took a high media profile in order to defend the decision to suspend McGoldrick, to argue the right of Brent Council to hold an enquiry and generally shore up the anti-racist disciplinary framework which was under attack from all sides. They also used the opportunity to attack the BTA for taking a soft line on anti-racism.

When questioned Anderson did not see that the Council had made any tactical errors at all, claiming,

A very serious allegation was made against Ms. McGoldrick, which was supported by evidence from two other people [Sachse and Mott - MC]. Our officers, acting independently of councillors or any other influences, took the quite proper decision to suspend her until a full enquiry could be held. They were right to do so because if these allegations were true, we would have to ask ourselves whether we wanted such a teacher to continue to work with black children.⁸⁰

He added that if McGoldrick had committed one racist act 'how do we know she won't do it again, or hasn't done it before' and made the incredible assertion that 'I don't see any difference between a Labour supporter with racist views and a member of the National Front.'⁸¹ A comment such as that shows what may be termed the ultra-leftism exhibited throughout by Anderson and his lack of conception of the different ways in which a socialist treats those who are generally in agreement with socialist policies but are not fully convinced of them and those who are totally at odds with all that socialists stand for. Anderson was also typifying much of the siege mentality which developed as criticism grew about the Council's 'sensible, radical policies'. The McGoldrick row was 'blown up by an unholy alliance of the NUT in Brent - whose hatred of our race relations policies is well known - the media and the government, which has used the issue to further its attack on local government.'⁸² He argues that the Council had to establish its right to hold a disciplinary hearing,

not just because of this case, but more importantly because if we hadn't it would have set a very dangerous precedent for the future. Is anyone seriously arguing that an employer

should not be able to consider allegations of misconduct against one of its employees.³³

Nitin Parshotam, who became Chair of the Education Committee in late 1987 argued much the same line during the dispute. At a public meeting held in late September 1986, he supported Brent's disciplinary procedures and accused those critical of the Council's tactics of being akin to racists themselves, claiming,

The Brent Teachers Association has a poor record on race relations. It opposed the 'Two Kingdoms' investigation and when we attempted to introduce ethnic record keeping, the BTA leaders organised a ceremonial burning of the forms. It looks to me like there are some hardened racists inside the BTA. They should put their own house in order before attacking the Council.³⁴

Other *top influentials* in the Council were less notable. Brent's leader, Merle Amory, stayed in the background of the dispute, seeking to play it down. After Ms. McGoldrick returned to her school, Merle Amory did contend that the Council was still right to take the action it did, although tactically it may have erred. 'The main thing was the way it was all personalised. We were in a difficult position, the media made it about a woman who nobody could dispute is a nice person. But we had a responsibility which the media and the NUT didn't accept.'³⁵ According to the Labour Group's Chief Whip, Christine Winter, that:

was the hardest thing to accept. We couldn't go to the press with our case because this was a confidential disciplinary matter. This Labour group may be unique - most of the councillors either have been through, or have children who are going through, our schools. Because of the number of new

black and women councillors we reflect the community more than any other group. We have total commitment because of our own *knowledge* of our services.⁶⁶

What Ms. Winter proposed is that the Council alone knows best how to fight racism and that there is no need for building a campaign against racists to isolate them, rather they should be subject to managerial discipline, that policies can be made to stick even if the arguments about it have not been won and that disciplinary procedures and trial by innuendo are legitimate in the fight against racism. Brent has, through various initiatives and schemes created a few well paid, often semi-managerial, posts for black people. Thus not only do the tokenist policies of the Council fit with the notion of black nationalism, if not separatism, but they begin to have a growing shared material base for their support.

One such activist is Russell Profitt, Brent's Principal Race Relations Adviser, a Labour Party black sections campaigner and Labour candidate for Lewisham East in the 1987 General Election. It was he who drew up the code of practice on recruitment and selection, and the procedural guidelines for dealing with allegations of racism and racial harrassment. He has stressed the position of Brent Council that the only way to take on racism is by having the structures within the council policy framework to adequately deal with any allegations made, and structures to dissuade racist activity. He notes that,

One can't dismiss attitudes, particularly when people are dealing with the public. But we take the view that attitude change is very difficult to achieve, which is why our emphasis is on behaviour and structures, and making people aware of what our expectations are.⁶⁷

A criticism of this viewpoint was provided by Frances Braithwaite, local teacher and NUT executive member, who argued, 'Surely the whole idea of policies is to help people move along. People don't change overnight just because you've got a policy. As a teacher I know the best way to change people is to bring them along with you.'^{②③}

The Labour Party in Brent was not united at this time. Brent North Labour Party (the weakest of the borough's three constituency Labour Parties) passed a number of resolutions opposing the Council's handling of the McGoldrick case, though they were not made public in order to avoid further adverse publicity. Jim Moher, the Secretary of Sudbury Ward, drafted a resolution which accused the Council of bungling the affair and playing into the hands of their political opponents. He added, 'Our children's education is being damaged. In the hope that further damage can be prevented ... the local party calls on Brent Council to end this act of grave injustice.' The Sudbury Branch resolution was passed by Brent North Labour Party on September 11, effectively making the re-instatement of Ms. McGoldrick the policy of the constituency party for the past six weeks. The resolution continued,

Brent education spokesmen's failure to familiarise themselves with the facts of the matter from the minutes of the governors' meeting and the records of the education office is to be deplored. Our children's education is being damaged.

As stated above, the Brent North Labour Party was the weakest link in the Labour group and in the interests of party unity made little effect on the position taken by the Council over Ms.

McGoldrick. Reg Freeson, the ex-MP, having been deselected by his local party in Brent East in favour of Ken Livingstone, was no friend of the Council. He has accused the Labour leadership in Brent of attempting to use anti-racism opportunistically. 'They are playing with fire; dabbling in communalistic politics of which they understand nothing. Authoritarianism rules in Brent now. People give way because they dare not argue. I am frightened at what they are doing to the community.'

As stated above, there are two important points to be remembered about the power structure within Brent Council in the McGoldrick dispute. Firstly, the whole McGoldrick dispute was kept within the remit of the Education Department with other Councillors and officers playing a supportive role. The public face presented by Brent Council was effectively that of the two Councillors who actively argued for the enforcement of the disciplinary procedure. The senior officers within the council as key/top influentials who may have argued a different line were on the point of leaving, or had left, the Council. The dispute thus appeared to be run from the Council by Ron Anderson and Nitin Parshotam with the backing of other councillors. The key emphasis was on political will.

Secondly, the coalition of elements of New Leftism, black nationalism and anti-labourism was exhibited by the Councillors and officers in the local authority. The position developed by these people within the Council was one of hostility to the trade unions, suspicion of the ability of white employees to be anti-racist and involved a reification of policy structures and disciplinary codes. Racism therefore became too important to be left to anyone but the Councillors and moves towards collective action to combat racism were disparaged.

Through the implementation of RAT schemes at the same time as the collapse of the fight against ratecapping, the fight against the ideology of racism shifted away from attempting to undermine its material base and more into the realm of idealist and individualist solutions.

6.20 The Local NUT branch - The Brent Teachers Association (BTA)

The All London Teachers Against Racism and Fascism group in a 1979 report 'Racism In Schools', criticised the role of the NUT in fighting racism in education in Britain. The group noted that 'Much of the union's defensiveness arises from a sectoral interest - the professional reputation of its members.'³⁰ The BTA leadership claims it has both a good record on 'race relations' and its commitment to the borough's policies. Cllr. Anderson and John Poole, Head of the BTA, had some acrimonious disputes, the BTA defending Maureen McGoldrick to the hilt and the Council accusing it of seeking to undermine the Council's strategy against racism. Apart from the (generally) right-wing leadership of the BTA two other groups operated within the local NUT. One, the Brent Black Teachers Collective (BBTC), sided with the Council in calling for the fullest investigation of the McGoldrick case. The other group, the Socialist Teachers Alliance (STA), vacillated in its line throughout the dispute, in part supporting the Council's right to investigate the allegation whilst criticising its draconian actions. The front presented by the BTA was thus not a united one facing the Council and this is important in the analysis of the McGoldrick dispute.

In the late 1960s in Brent, a Joint Education Sub-Committee between the BTA and the Council was set up, and the first-ever booklet on the problems facing black children in British schools was published under its auspices. Evidence was given by BTA teachers to the Parliamentary Select Committee on the Education of Black Children. The BTA established its own working party on multicultural education and produced a discussion document, again in collaboration with Brent Council, which in June 1980 resulted in the publication of 'Multicultural Education in Brent Schools'. The president of the BTA at that time was none other than Ron Anderson, not then a Brent Councillor. As Monica Davies, Public Relations Officer for BTA (in Brent such things are necessary) put it, 'Cllr. Anderson knows our record. He knows our commitment. He knows our pledge of support to Brent's policies on anti-racist education. Why does he repeatedly disparage the leadership of the BTA ?'²¹ She also denied the allegations made by Cllr. Parshotam about the burning of ethnic record forms, going so far as calling them 'spurious'.

BTA secretary John Poole rejects accusations that the union has been dilatory, or even discriminatory - insisting that the union took the first initiatives on multicultural education a full three years before the Council. But it had not endorsed the Council's anti-racist code of practice (the 'Little Red Book') or the new Race Relations Unit fielding advisers into schools (dubbed 'race spies' by the right wing press). Poole contends that 'To accuse the BTA of pussyfooting is nonsense. Things started going really sour because we were accused of not doing enough.'²²

He describes the influence that the BTA has on the local

authority as minimal and that 'Ron Anderson ... wants to say "This is the policy and if you don't like it get out" but you can't run an education service like that. The policy of Brent is to consult the community, not the teachers. We are excluded from all consultation but are not teachers, heads and governors members of the community ?'⁹³

Many of those involved in developing Brent's anti-racist strategy since 1983 have accused the BTA of being 'soft' on anti-racism, failing to defend anti-racist teachers and acting in their own interests contrary to the policy of the local authority. These allegations came from Brent Community Relations Council and teachers in both the BBTC and STA. Before moving on to the role of these two groups it is important to clarify the position of the BTA through the dispute. There were socialists acting within the BTA but had to distance themselves both from the right-wing leadership of their own union and the actions of the Council.

6.21 The BTA and the Maureen McGoldrick case

Following the suspension of Maureen McGoldrick, the teachers at Subdury Infants School voted to go on strike until she was reinstated, the strike starting on September 5th 1986. The BTA called the strike, promising full strike pay, at a time when it could have negotiated with the Council. It then blocked an inquiry which could have settled the affair by going to the High and Appeal Courts and possibly extended the length of the dispute. The assertions about the BTA leadership's poor line on defending anti-racists are too frequent to be ignored and generally stem from the unco-operative stance taken

by the BTA to the policies pursued by the Council. At a press conference on September 15th, Ron Anderson (Brent Council) claimed:

Brent Teachers Association used Maureen McGoldrick and Sudbury Infants School for their own campaign against compulsory RAT courses, the independent investigation into secondary schools and ethnic monitoring. I believe their misinformation and the statements they have put into the press have been designed to stir up racial hatred.⁹⁴

John Poole (BTA) responded:

I wish Councillor Anderson would wake up. If they go on calling teachers racists, they will leave the borough. That's a fact. The BTA was not embarking on a campaign to embarrass the borough. It can do that well enough itself. BTA's record on fighting racism is second to none - in 1980 the BTA had formulated a multi-racial policy on education three years before Brent. Anderson blurting out this way can do nothing but harm.⁹⁵

Before the disciplinary meeting arranged by the Council could be held, the BTA went to the High Court to stop Brent Council holding the meeting. During the delay before the court hearing, John Poole, also a deputy head at Claremont High in Brent, undertook action against Louella Fernandez, a black teacher in his own school, for allegedly demanding to know why the union was supporting someone held to have made a racist remark. The charge against her was 'professional misconduct' and if upheld it could have meant her suspension from the union. It was this sort of action which led groups within the BTA to openly criticise the stance of the union in the McGoldrick case, especially its appeals to the courts and to the Conservative Education

Minister Kenneth Baker, with the BBTC threatening to split from the union.

6.22 Brent Black Teachers' Collective (BBTC)

Brent's stated policy of increasing the number of black head teachers in the area is one way in which upwardly mobile black teachers are drawn closer to the council. Their identification with the Council had become so close that some members of the BBTC, a group with a tradition of trade union militancy, were freely talking of crossing NUT picket lines and even of splitting from the union over its action in support of McGoldrick. Following the Governors' report on Maureen McGoldrick the BBTC argued for her continued suspension and defended the Council position throughout. The collective was in part motivated by its desire for justice to be done through a full Council investigation but also because it was in a position of consolidating support amongst the Labour Councillors. The Councillors in turn were not averse to undermining much of the influence of the BTA leadership in opposition to the Council's anti-racist policies. In that respect a weakened or divided BTA was as beneficial to the Council as a BTA with an ascendent BBTC.

The BBTC welcomed the row over the McGoldrick case. 'It polarises the community between racists and anti-racists,' noted a spokesman, 'Fighting racism is a messy business.'⁹⁶ BBTC has further accused the BTA leadership of 'perpetuating the status quo and obstructing radical measures to combat racial discrimination.' The Collective further accused the BTA of 'papering over important facts'.

This included the evidence of Richard Sachse about Ms. McGoldrick being under pressure from her governors not to recruit any more black teachers. The guilt or innocence of McGoldrick was to a certain extent irrelevant compared with the principle of anti-racism which was under threat. In other words, the re-instatement of McGoldrick would be seen as a victory for the reactionary leadership of the BTA, Conservative Councillors and opponents of anti-racism everywhere. As the spokesman put it, 'The loss of Maureen McGoldrick would be regrettable but it is a small price to pay for winning the support of the black electorate. The priority of the ruling Labour group was to do just that. To do this it had to be seen to be taking a firm stand on racism.'

The BBTC filled a role in acting as the voice of the council opinion within the teaching union and in the staff rooms. Its arguments that BTA had done little to highlight the plight of black teachers in Brent had a resonance both with black teachers and teachers on the left. When the BBTC found a better hearing for its case in the Town Hall than in its own union, so hostility to the union's support for McGoldrick was more likely. Once again this tied in with the hostility of many councillors to trade unions they regarded as racist. As a member of the STA noted, 'the outcome has been a Left in the borough which is split, weakened and demoralised.'

6.23 The Socialist Teachers Alliance (STA)

The McGoldrick case brought about many trials of conscience for the Left in teaching, especially for the STA. The STA had fought for anti-racist policies in schools in the late 1970s in the face of a

hostile campaign by the National Front aimed at recruiting amongst schoolchildren. It was the STA which mobilised the biggest unofficial strike of teachers ever in support of members in Daneford School who had been campaigning against racist attacks on Bagladeshi students. The STA had a history of union activity in fighting racism and had consistently argued for black teachers to work within the unions, whilst defending their right to organise independently. Shaun Doherty, a BRent teacher and member of the STA noted that 'The role of the union is central because it is the vehicle of collective action, it organises across the boundaries of race and gender and facilitates the necessary unity for a successful fight.'⁹⁷

In the case of Maureen McGoldrick the STA sided with the BBTC in supporting the council, a situation which Doherty regrets:

We were wrong for all the right reasons but wrong nevertheless. In our understandable desire to identify with militant black teachers we ended up capitulating to their mistaken analysis. Our initial instincts were to dissociate ourselves from the discredited NUT leadership and support their opponents.⁹⁸

When the situation reached the High Court, the STA argued that teachers should vote no in a ballot for strike action in support of McGoldrick. This was the first time that the STA had opposed a strike call and sided with the employer. Shaun Doherty argues that the STA should have supported the strike and made any criticisms of Brent NUT obvious at the same time. 'To argue for breaking the strike, as some of the black teachers did, has disastrous consequences. It undermines the whole basis of union organisation and makes future collective action more

difficult'. His appraisal of the general situation was one of scepticism about the gains to be made by black workers building alliances with employers as a way to combating racism. As he argued,

The dangers of separatist solutions were there for all to see in Brent. A senior advisor to the council described white anti-racists as 'parasites' on black struggle. This is the antithesis of the position we should be fighting for and plays right into the hands of the Tories, of racists and union bureaucrats seeking to avoid a commitment to anti-racist policies.⁹⁹

6.24 The Legal Battles and the resolution of the dispute.

On September 12th 1986 the NUT (on behalf of the BTA) submitted an application to the High Court that Maureen McGoldrick should be re-instated following her exoneration by her governors on August 26th. The NUT also wished to stop a disciplinary meeting scheduled by the Council for the evening of September 12th. The NUT won its injunction against disciplinary action and the striking teachers at Sudbury Infant School called off their action as a result. McGoldrick remained suspended however. The NUT argued that Brent acted wholly unlawfully in pursuing a hearing after the governors had asked for her re-instatement. The Council was granted leave for a full hearing.

From 21-22 October the McGoldrick case was heard at the High Court, before Mr. Justice Roch. Mr. James Goudie QC, for the NUT, sought a further injunction on behalf of McGoldrick restraining Brent Council from proceeding with a further disciplinary hearing. Mr. Justice Roch ruled that the findings of the Governors, as upheld by an earlier hearing, were binding upon the Council. The Judge decided that

under both the Council's disciplinary code and the School's articles of government, Brent could only take one of two courses - they could ask the Governors to hold an inquiry or the Disciplinary Sub-Committee could hold one.

Once the Governors had decided on the rights of the issue, the Judge concluded, the Sub-Committee could agree or disagree with the recommendations for re-instatement but could not hold what was in effect a second trial. The Judge refrained from granting McGoldrick an injunction to prevent the Council from holding another inquiry after it had given an undertaking not to do so. Costs, estimated by the NUT at £40,000 were given against the Council. In the evening of October 23rd, an ad hoc Education Sub-Committee comprising of 4 Labour and 1 Conservative Councillors met for half an hour after the judgement and indicated that the Education Committee would take on the battle for a disciplinary hearing to the Appeal Court. A statement issued by the Council claimed,

It was not the race relations policies of Brent Council or Miss McGoldrick who were on trial today. It was an argument on the interpretation of the disciplinary procedures for teachers. In the event a point of law has been established which will prove to be neither in the interests of the unions nor of education authorities. The council therefore has no alternative but to challenge this decision on appeal.¹⁰⁰

By this time the McGoldrick dispute was attracting national news headlines - with a press hostile to Brent Council homing in on a case of alleged victimisation. The Labour Party nationally was aware of the damage being done to the reputation of the party and noted the way

Conservatives were arguing that the actions of Brent Council would be writ large if a Labour Government were elected, the so-called 'loony' factor. The national Labour Party Education spokesman, Giles Radice, demanded the immediate re-instatement of Maureen McGoldrick. With the backing of Neil Kinnock, he wrote to Ron Anderson, accusing the Council of acting out of 'vindictiveness'. At the same time the national leadership of the NUT wrote to the Education Secretary, Kenneth Baker, asking him to intervene in the dispute.

The BTS called for a strike of all Brent's Junior School staff in support of McGoldrick. A ballot was held on November 3rd and despite the opposition of the BBTC and some members of the STA, 150 teachers in 14 schools voted to strike on November 5th and 6th. A BTA statement warned that, 'there is to be a selective action in schools. If this does not get Brent to change its mind we will be balloting more teachers in more schools'. Faced with an ever-worsening situation, a special ad hoc disciplinary sub-committee met and re-instated McGoldrick to clear the way for an appeal. Ron Anderson was quick to assure interested parties that the Council had not responded to the BTA strike threat but that the decision was made because 'Counsel said we had a very good chance of winning an appeal, but that we would be wise to re-instate her in the interim period'. The proposed teachers strike was immediately called off.

On November 19th the Court of Appeal ruled that Brent Council could indeed go ahead with their investigation. Brent Council immediately announced another sub-committee to hear the case in full although the Council had already given an undertaking to the Court not to take any further disciplinary action. Sir John Donaldson, Master of

the Rolls, argued the case of Ray Honeyford in Bradford had determined that 'the local education authority had retained a residual power of dismissal, divorced from any recommendation by the governors and despite any recommendation to the contrary' vindicating much of the legal weight of Brent Council's argument.

The Council set December 17th as the date for the disciplinary hearing but on the 15th Maureen McGoldrick gained a further High Court injunction. On the 18th the Education Secretary Kenneth Baker intervened and took rarely used powers under section 68 of the 1944 Education Act to order Brent Council to drop any further disciplinary proceedings against her because it was held by Baker to be acting 'unreasonably'. Maureen McGoldrick was finally allowed to work with no further action outstanding. The teacher who it was alleged she had not wanted, Ms. Khan, was also working at Sudbury Infant School and indeed had come out on strike in support of McGoldrick. In September of 1987 it was confirmed that Maureen McGoldrick would be taking up a post in neighbouring Conservative-controlled Barnet. The situation of Maureen McGoldrick was thus resolved by the woman herself leaving the Borough. The question of what this battle had done to inspire the Council or its workforce to fight racism within the Borough is not one which can be answered enthusiastically by any of the key and top influentials involved.

6.25 Case Study Summary

It is tempting in summing up this case study, with a nod to the media attention it created, to headline the conclusions 'Brent

Asunder'. The public perception of Brent Council at war with a lone head teacher was a common one. As Bea Campbell wrote of the McGoldrick affair,

Brent [Council] lost the argument. And the effect was to give a new respectability to racism and a new notoriety to anti-racism ... The fatal factor was that an individual rather than a structure was the target ... the council was trapped in what used to be known in the communist movement as using an administrative method to deal with a political problem.¹⁰¹

It is noteworthy that Campbell sees the failings of Brent as symptomatic of municipal socialism as such in that whilst Labour groups on local authorities understand the machinery of power, their weakness is their inflexibility to the pressures put upon them by external social and political 'movements'

The infrastructure of the local state in Brent was such that Councillors supportive of elements of black nationalism and hostile to trade union activity (as employers sometimes are) were confronted in the McGoldrick case by the BTA leadership, a model of conservative trade union consciousness. The Labour Councillors, notably top influentials such as Anderson and Parshotam, sought to follow through the policy on the grounds of the importance of 'the policy' over the actual pros and cons of the case, an example, which recurs through this thesis, despite claims of New Left flexibility, of policy fetishism. As John Poole of the BTA claimed, 'An extreme sectional group seems ready to see Maureen McGoldrick as a sacrificial lamb. It would be catastrophic if such people ever had influence within the education structure.'¹⁰²

Because of the very nature of the disciplinary procedure, the local authority could not open up the case or build a campaign around the issue because that would have laid the claims of the Council open to fuller public scrutiny. As it was the Council did not have to say that it thought that McGoldrick was guilty, only that it defended the right to hold a hearing. The actions of the BTA in deliberately trying to obfuscate that meeting were not conducive to a speedy resolution of the dispute but it was still up to Brent to change its emphasis and line of approach to use Campbell's term 'sensitive' to find a way out of the impasse that developed.

Ron Anderson still argued to the end that only racists had anything to gain from the demise of Brent's anti-racist stance against McGoldrick:

I don't believe that there is fear among teachers at all. What is happening is that the leadership of the BTA is like a group of dinosaurs finding themselves in the twentieth century and whipping up a campaign against the council. Also to blame is the overwhelmingly white press which do not understand the needs of Brent's black community.¹⁰³

It may appear that there has been much comment above by the key influentials in the dispute at Sudbury Infants but precious little by the woman herself. Much of the time she kept wise counsel (restrained by the sub judice rules perhaps) and was reticent to discuss the case save for pointing to her past record and repeating her desire to return to school as soon as possible. By not entering into the political disputes she was presented, as Campbell notes, as a 'nice lady who nobody thought was a racist'. Certainly Maureen McGoldrick is

no hardened racist as are present in the Islington Case study (see Chapter 7 below) nor is she in the same mould as Ray Honeyford. During the strike at Sudbury Infants School a demonstration of teachers and parents marched to Brent Town Hall to protest against the suspension. The fact that half the demonstration was black should have been a clear indication to the Council that McGoldrick was not an out and out racist. But the Council refused to look at the feelings of the parents and teachers who knew and worked with McGoldrick. Instead they continued to make their disciplinary procedure the keynote of the whole anti-racist policy.

The degree of officer involvement in the McGoldrick case is tempered by the haemorrhaging of much senior staff after Labour gained control in May 1986. The Race Relations Unit, which had produced the disciplinary procedure was anxious to see the case followed through as were officers in the Education Department. The access to officers is more difficult than to Councillors and relies upon rumour and innuendo tended to multiply. There were allegations, for example, about officers 'leaning on' Richard Sachse to ensure his evidence in the case against McGoldrick was not dropped.

The role of the BTA bureaucracy is not simply one of a trade union defending its member against a hostile employer. Much of the local NUT leadership's motivation was directed against the policies of the council in general. The BTA had boycotted the 'Two Kingdoms' enquiry, had refused to sign the local authority's equal opportunities policy and had actively opposed the self-organisation of black teachers (the BBTC) in the Borough. As a result, the BBTC sought methods to bypass their own union in pursuit of the struggle against

discrimination. Instead they turned to their employers, the Councillors. The influence of the BBTC was to give a voice to the Council in the teachers' main union but it did not wrest control of the dispute away from the twin bureaucracies of the local union and the town hall. As Shaun Doherty of the STA has argued, the importance of the McGoldrick case for the BBTC and other black pressure groups operating in the trade unions has been that:

The idea that it is acceptable to scab on a strike has gained currency. The notion has grown that if you don't like something your union has done you leave it. The central importance of the only weapon with which the working class has to fight - its own organisation in the unions - is forgotten.¹⁰⁴

Perhaps the best summation is one given by the authors of the 'Two Kingdoms' report over which there was so much prior animosity between the Council and the BTA, in which, after discussion with black youths the report commented:

Head teachers are very powerful figures in a school. It was thought that the head teacher is the key to the whole problem; if (s)he was trusted by pupils, if (s)he didn't opt for suspension when problems cropped up but tried to listen, things would be alright. A black head would not guarantee that automatically - all that was needed was an understanding person.¹⁰⁵

It was the Maureen McGoldrick case which above any other, drew national attention to what was termed by its detractor, 'loony leftism'. The case worried the Labour Party nationally such that it sought to dissociate itself from the Brent Labour party. At the same

time a policy agreed under a previous Brent Council over 'race relations' inspectors in schools was used as a further example of the zealotry with which anti-racism was followed in education in Brent. Similarly, despite the vicarious pleasure given to the Brent Conservatives by the McGoldrick case and the opprobrium heaped upon the Council, it was necessary for the Education Secretary to take it upon himself to end the dispute and reinstate Maureen McGoldrick.

A central issue in the McGoldrick case was the way the Council by digging itself into a procedural hole could claim any criticism, from whatever quarter, was directed at the ethos of anti-racism and not at the specific actions of the Council. By setting themselves up as prime agenda setters and keepers of the faith of anti-racism in education the Council excluded the possibility of the involvement of teachers in the McGoldrick case because of the hostility of the nature of the BTA leadership. Had the Council attempted to build for support amongst all its workers, including white anti-racists, it may have been able to isolate the BTA bureaucracy and bring about notable changes in the system of education in Brent. The failure of the Council to do so is not merely an aberration on the part of Brent but cuts at the heart of the contradiction of municipal socialism. In May 1986 the Council was elected with expectations much greater than its base of either support or power warranted. The individualisation of anti-racism within the education department was shown through the adoption of RAT and the co-option of black activists to semi-managerial roles. The pro-activeness of fighting racism by seeking it out became not a common cause but a reason for attacking workers and trade unions within the Council and atomising the workforce.

The case of Maureen McGoldrick brings out, therefore, certain key general points. Local autonomy is not only relative, it is very conditional. When the national state saw the McGoldrick case getting out of hand it was quick to step in. The economic and political fight in the 1980s over ratecapping and the defeat of the Left Labour Councils has had a clear effect on the degree and quality of service provision. This has meant that in the fight against racism in education the laudable policy aims which seek to affect material changes are not as readily achievable as the promotion of idealist solutions, such as RAT and the attempts to change people's ideas without altering the conditions of their social reproduction. The picking of Maureen McGoldrick as the peg on which to hang all the disputes over anti-racism in the borough provoked a backlash against the Council and played into the hands of right-wingers who could support an 'innocent' teacher whilst the Left was isolated in the fight between the intransigent bureaucracies. The perspective adopted by Brent Council acted as a barrier to building a unity in action against racism and will make the isolation of racist teachers that much more difficult in the future.

6.26 Chapter Summary

The recent debate over the Burnage Report¹⁰⁶ has been used by some on the Left as an example of how the imposition of anti-racism within a school environment can wholly fail to defuse racist tensions between pupils in the school. The argument made by Gus John, one of the contributors to the Report, has been that there is a basic problem in

the municipal socialist venture of attempting to remove racism by changing ideas and by threatening sanctions against the mark oversteppers. He claims that,

it is all well and good to tell white children not to be racist but without confronting the wider social situation which working class children find themselves in, then you are doing nothing. In fact you're being moralistic, cosmetic and highly self-indulgent.¹⁰⁷

And as Gus John notes, Burnage could have happened anywhere.

It may be a conclusion to be drawn after reading this Chapter that one of the places where Burnage could have happened is Brent. For what the Burnage case shows, as clearly as the examples do here, is that the aims of the municipal socialist venture is one which cannot fully address issues of racism within education, precisely because issues of racism within education do not start and finish within some falsely enclosed sphere called 'the education system'. With the Maureen McGoldrick case not only were the questions of how to fight racism within schools seen by the local authority as its sovereign right but also the target of its attack was one individual with at worst an ambivalent record on fighting racism. Sivanandan¹⁰⁸ has commented on the Maureen McGoldrick case,

however much the issues might have been muddled by the yellow press or muddled by a reactionary teachers' union, the fact remains that the council, in its anxiety to do right by black children, did wrong by Ms McGoldrick ... [and] It is also a fact - and a sad one - that black councillors and officers who know how the "sus law" has been used against their young should themselves administer "sus" by another name.¹⁰⁹

Whatever the complaints about the way the anti-racist policies were followed by Brent Council, clumsily and dogmatically, they were aimed at bringing overall improvements by raising sanctions against individuals. That process of the individualisation of anti-racism within the realm of education (as within other sectors of the local state) has the effect not only of absolving the central and local state of being implicated in the reproduction of the ideology of racism but furthermore of denying the possibilities of a collective response against racism. The right way to combat racism in education for the municipal Left has become one of having 'the right books' and putting in 'the right individuals' to teach them, a strategy which wholly underestimates both the way ideologies are reproduced within class society and an underestimation of the role of the state, even in its local form, of securing consent.

In the other case study, that of Islamia School, one can see the patterns of individualism and the 'ethnic need' arguments being repeated and linked. In the early 1980s (post-Scarman), aiming their limited provisions at ethnic need, councils such as Brent saw a sudden flowering of ethnic groups. As Sivanandan, notes, 'Everybody was ethnic now ... and they all vied with each other for "ethnic handouts" and "ethnic positions" and set themselves against each other, politicking for "ethnic power."' ¹¹⁰ So when a private Muslim school comes along to request voluntary aided status the Council is put in a contradictory position of support for "ethnic need" and simultaneously espousing a belief in multiculturalism as the way ahead for education. What that case study showed clearly was not only the problems faced by the Council in bringing up any form of principled opposition to the plans

for Islamia, sheltering behind the smokescreen of planning requirements etc, but that the actions of the Islamia parents were in part an admission of the failure of the multicultural, multi-ethnic enterprise in Brent.

The aims of the Islamia parents and governors should not be understated. They are pro-private education, they are clearly pro-religious and they accept the tenets of their religion which are discriminatory towards women and homosexuals, though it would be shortsighted to ignore the debates and internal pressures for change within Islam. It is still a safe assumption that within the British context, Islam is not a liberation theology. But as recently as June 1988 a plan to use state school premises, due for closure by the Council, by Islamia was rejected by Brent's ruling Labour Group. At the Council meeting, Nitin Parshotam claimed that the Council 'saw itself as the enabling mechanism through which all the aspirations of the different groups of the community were realised'.¹¹¹ Unless it may be added you are a Muslim private school. The question then remains as to how racism can actually be combated within schools without recourse to black separatism or to the individualism of RAT.

It may thus be argued that Marxists seeking to fight racism within the education system have to come to terms both with the function schools fulfill under capitalism and the role that teachers trade unions or different key and top influentials can undertake as a counterforce to the prevailing ideas in society. Indeed much of the struggle over the introduction of multicultural education in Britain by teachers in the 1970s was an example of the confidence of teachers, as a collective, to challenge the educational orthodoxy. Since then the

inability of teaching unions to resist Government changes in their own conditions has put them in a weaker position to promote anti-racism at the local state level. At the same time they are faced with Left Labour Councils, such as Brent, which are forced to implement education cuts and inflict job losses on the teachers from whom they expect support for their anti-racist programmes.

In such a situation it is clear that those seeking to fight racism within education, as children,¹¹² teachers and parents cannot do so without addressing themselves, at the same time both to the political implications of specific incidents such as the McGoldrick and Burnage cases and to the national educational scenario unfolding into the 1990s. The municipal socialist venture, as shown in Brent, has failed to address the problems because it cannot adequately provide the solutions. The ambivalent position of the Councillors was evident in both Case Studies. The incompatibility between supporting 'ethnic choice' as represented by Islamia School and the council's own policy of supporting multicultural education brought about a contradiction which may in time only be adequately resolved by national state involvement.

In the Maureen McGoldrick Case, the 'Two Kingdoms' report has instilled in the leadership of the Education Committee (particularly Ron Anderson), the need to do 'something' about the embeddedness of racism within the local education system and particularly on the removal of racist attitudes from teachers. One of the first targets and the one which became the *cause celebre* of municipal anti-racism above all, Maureen McGoldrick, showed the problems in an individualised anti-racism policy. The contradictory

position of the Councillors was one in which they continually sought to hold the disciplinary hearing but were unable to take autonomous action without the intervention of the local NUT branch, the High Court and the Education Secretary. What was a policy aimed at improving the education of local children by sanctioning racist teachers seriously undermined the potential support for the Council by the attitude it adopted towards McGoldrick. In such a case the unity of the various groups who might be assumed to be opposed to racism in education is apparently further away because of the actions of the Councillors. But the individualism and managerialism which is at the centre of the practicee of municipal socialism may have been strengthened by the circumstances described above.

CHAPTER - 7

Employment Case studies - Liverpool and Islington

7.1 Introduction

Studies of racism, its effects and what produces and reproduces it as an ideology in Britain inevitably return to the question of employment. With the advent of the New Left in local authorities in the early 1980s, so black workers began to organise caucuses or pressure groups within sections of the local state and within trade unions to highlight and oppose racism in the trade unions and to use the trade union movement to oppose racism within wider society. In Nalgo, for example, black workers groups have been set up which specifically press for black workers' demands separately from those of workers as a whole. This has led to a situation in the London Borough of Camden where the Left Labour Councillors conceded a higher wage demand to Nalgo Black Workers Group causing a degree of resentment and division in the Council workforce. Most Left Labour Councils adopted some form of equal opportunity employment policy though not without their problems as will be seen below.¹ A key issue was the way in which Councillors in the Left-led Councils would react when they came into conflict with the trade unions in their own local authorities. Both case studies point to a political strategy of municipal socialism which is shifted rather ingloriously into managerialism in dealing with local authority workers.²

The first case study in this chapter addresses a different political current on the Left of the Labour Party from much of what is presented in the rest of this thesis under the catch-all term of the Labour Left. In Liverpool City Council it was Militant, espousing a brand of Trotskyism allied to local statism, which sought a strategy centred around making improvements for workers in Liverpool without distinctions being made on 'race', sex, disability etc which had become key points of reference in other local authorities. This was made most obvious in the case of the employment of Sam Bond as a Principal Race Relations Adviser in the city's new Race Relations Unit. His employment raised questions of representation and consultation; of an appointment which had virtually no local support apart from the Militant councillors responsible; of the rights of pressure groups to have effective control over appointments in race relations posts and, most notably in the role of municipal socialists, how the issue becomes one of management's right to manage.

In the other case study, based in Islington, the issue is one of how racism is to be combated within the local authority's own workplace. Following several incidences of racial harassment of black workers in the Housing Department, three workers were disciplined but not effectively so, according to Nalگو which went on strike over the cases. For five weeks 400 housing workers stayed out demanding stiffer punishment of racists at work whilst the Council appeared to be compromising its own disciplinary procedures. The Labour Councillors involved chose to ignore the mandates of their own wards to settle the dispute roughly in line with Nalگو's claims, a factor which was militated by the high degree of dual membership of Nalگو and local

Labour Parties in such areas as Islington.

For both Councils, the disputes were not the only issues occupying them, as both were heavily involved in the ratecapping campaign which was eventually to collapse. A link between the case studies is the way in which the Left Labour Councils involved seek wide support against ratecapping yet on internal issues were unwilling to take too much notice of 'consultation' procedures and stress their claim to be 'real socialists' in the face of strike action by their own workers. Perhaps more clearly than in the other case studies featuring a service provision, these throw up the fundamental contradictions in the position of municipal socialists and the irreconcilability of these despite political control of key influentials in what is a wholly ambivalent situation.

The Liverpool Case Study

7.2 Local politics in Liverpool

It is ironic that a study of race relations policy in the employment field should be set in a city which was historically built not upon the employment of black people but their enslavement. Fryer, who has thoroughly investigated the history of the black presence in Britain, does not overstate the case when he claims that it is beyond doubt that 'it was the slave trade which raised Liverpool from a struggling port to be one of the richest and most prosperous trading centres in the world'.³ Many Irish workers with little empathy for

their English landlords had a similar dislike for their new employers but the casual nature of dock work in the city, added to the new competition for jobs, made trade union organisation difficult. As Taaffe and Mulhearn, both Militant members, claim, 'The slums, according to one commentator, had a "congenital urge to fight" which usually took the form of a battle between "green and orange" rather than against the capitalists.'⁴

Towards the end of the 1930s Trotskyism began to get a small base in Liverpool, not from disillusioned members of the Communist Party as much as sections of the ILP and Labour Party. At the time the few local Trotskyists worked with Ted Grant, one of the founders of Militant. The left stronghold in Liverpool was in the Walton constituency where the *Rally!* editors - including Pat Wall and Keith Dickinson⁵ in the 1950s - resided. Ted Grant was initially selected as Prospective Parliamentary Candidate for Walton in 1955 (though removed at a later selection meeting) and in 1959 George McCartney, a supporter of *Socialist Fight*, the other parent of *Militant* was also selected as PPC - ahead of the then Tribunite Woodrow Wyatt. All were members of the Revolutionary Socialist League (RSL), who were to recruit Terry Harrison (in 1958), Peter Taaffe (in 1960) and Tony Mulhearn (in 1963)⁶ before this and two aforementioned newspapers were wound up and launched a new group via a new newspaper, *Militant*.

The early days of the Wilson Government in 1964 saw changes in Liverpool's political leadership. Eric Heffer, leader of the Trades Council, left to take up his parliamentary seat and was replaced by Bill Sefton, also Jack Braddock's successor, was running one of Britain's more overt examples of Tammany Hall-type politics. During

the 1960s Labour and Conservatives alternated in office until the 'community politics' followed by the Liberal group, under Trevor Jones, drove a wedge into dual control of the city, making them the largest single party in 1973. One year previously saw the demise of the right's stronghold on the Council when the left took on Sefton and won although it was another 5 years before Militant became a serious political force in power in the Council. In that period Militant built not only on the industrial struggles of the period but also by utilising a Militant version of 'community politics' on problems which were within the remit of the local authority but which they could put a marxist, anti-capitalist stamp on.

In 1979 the Labour group became the largest party on Liverpool City Council, though without the desired clear majority. Following attempts at a 50% rate rise in March 1980, the Labour Party not surprisingly lost 6 seats in elections in May 1980 and a Liberal/Conservative coalition under Trevor Jones took over. It was in this period that the City Council finally began to take account of the pressure being put upon it by the city's black organisations, a move which was to provide initial optimism, tempered by infighting in the Race Relations Liaison Committee of the Council and finally breakdown amid polarisation over the appointment of the Council's first Principal Race Relations Adviser, Sam Bond. But what is commonly termed 'race relations' in the city had been formed over hundreds of years and for much of that time, the local authority and trade unions had actively collaborated in racist treatment of black people (and Chinese and Jewish people) in the city. In that respect it is of a different

tradition to the black migrants in some of the other case studies considered in this thesis. 7

7.3 The history of the Black presence in Liverpool

Unlike the other areas under scrutiny in this thesis, Liverpool has seen the ideology of racism permeating the locale for over 300 years. The initial formative experiences were those of slavery, the first slave ship sailing from Liverpool in 1700, and links with the municipal fathers were rapidly established (in 1748 carvings of African's heads and elephants were incorporated in the decorations of Liverpool Town Hall as a celebration of slavery). As Law⁸ notes, the Victorian period was characterised by racism in popular jokes and minstrel shows to hostility by local politicians, police and labour movement.

Around the turn of the 20th Century, albeit on a smaller scale compared with the pogroms sweeping Europe, the Liverpool Commission on Unemployment blamed Jews for the lack of jobs and the Conservative MP for West Derby warned his constituents against the 'alien flood' of Jewish emigres.⁹ Racism did not weigh so heavily as to stop the British empire using black men as cannon fodder in World War 1. The patterns of seafaring changed immediately after the war and black people were allowed to take work on ships other than in the galley. Racism and economic rivalry led to outbreaks of violence in Liverpool in 1919 in which gangs of whites between 2000 and 10,000 strong roamed around the streets attacking any black people they could find - operating little more than as a lynch mob.¹⁰

There were smaller disturbances following demobilisation after World War 2 by which time some 8000 black people were settled in the city. The right-wing dominated National Union of Seamen was organising a drive to keep black seafarers off British ships and in August 1948 a 300 strong mob attacked an Indian restaurant. The following day 2000 whites laid siege to hostels primarily populated by black seafarers. In both sets of disturbances named above, black people had little or no protection from the police who clearly regarded the black presence as a problem. The political solution to these racist attacks was drawn up by the Liverpool Advisory Committee, comprising MPs and local councillors, which recommended the repatriation of unemployed blacks in the city. As the Liverpool Black Caucus in 'The Racial politics of Militant in Liverpool'¹¹ stresses, despite the seriousness of these specific incidents (which again flared up in a dispute in 1972 over housing allocation Liverpool 8), it has to be remembered that Liverpool's black population has found continual incidence of racial violence, harassment and abuse, punctuated by collective outbursts.

Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, despite the historical, research and political evidence¹² to confirm the embeddedness of racism in Liverpool, there was little movement against the way the city's black population was confined to the Liverpool 8 area and out of the big city stores and council workforce. The attitude of dominant groups in the city was steadfastly colour-blind, the Black Caucus summing up the period as being one which:

although there were occasional unsustained gestures by individual councillors resulting mainly from pressure by

local race relations organisations, the majority of the key political actors maintained the position that an equal opportunity policy was not necessary, because the Council did not discriminate...¹³

The City Council's eventual moves towards 'race relations' policies have thus to be viewed in the light of a black presence in Liverpool for hundreds of years, of a process of gradual settlement in the Liverpool 8 area (unlike other parts of Britain where post-war immigration accounted for most of the black presence) with a good degree of popular racism highlighted by acts of organised racial attacks.

The build up of tensions between police and black people in Liverpool 8 in the early 1980s, primarily due to the racism of the police force (which had a long 'pedigree' - see Humphrey¹⁴), led to the Liverpool 8 (Toxteth) riots of July 1981. Black organisations in the city had to direct all their energies from work with the City Council to the Liverpool 8 Defence Committee, defence campaigns and attempts to force the resignation of the Chief Constable, Kenneth Oxford. During the riots, CS gas was used for the first time on the British mainland. In the conflict between police and rioters a young disabled man, David Moore, was killed by a police vehicle. The Chief Constable was not averse either to linking what he saw as black people's 'criminality' with his impression of the Liverpoolian's 'natural aggressiveness'.¹⁵

In terms of financial aid, the broad brush of Urban Regeneration was applied. Funding for the city via its Enterprise Zone status tended to benefit out of town contractors rather than local

businesses and workers and showed little effect on the Liverpool 8 economy. As Shelter, the housing charity, commented acerbically:

there has been something ludicrous in Mr Heseltine's professions of concern about the problems he has seen on Merseyside, when it was he who savaged the Housing Investment Programme and recalculated the Rate Support Grant to favour the shire counties at the expense of inner cities.¹⁶

Plans for a Liverpool 8 economic development programme were shelved and in its place the City's Garden Festival and Albert Dock schemes were given the go-ahead. Neither of these offered any serious long-term improvements in the city's decrepit infrastructure or even a suggestion of the likelihood of the re-investment of capital in the region. The City Council, under Liberal/Conservative domination, made cuts which pre-empted even those expected by Heseltine (See Sunday Times 27/7/80) and Trevor Jones, the Liberal leader announced 'We are proud of the fact that we have reduced jobs in the city council... We think we can reduce still more.'¹⁷ It is central to stress that in many respects the Liberal/Conservative coalition was, if not acting in concert, then at least in tandem with the declared aims of the Conservative Government to curb local authority expenditure. At the same time the influence of Militant was beginning to become more dominant in the local Labour Party and the pressure grew for some form of confrontation with the Conservative Government should the Labour Group assume power. At the same time so the Council began to finally develop its own policies for improving the conditions of its own black population and incorporate some of the 'race relations' policy-making

structures which had begun to proliferate in other parts of the country.

7.4 The development of anti-racist policies by Liverpool City Council

The Policy and Finance Committee of Liverpool City Council, following considerable local pressure, passed a resolution on 9th December 1980 which agreed to adopt an equal opportunities policy, an equal opportunities statement and the establishment of a Liaison Committee which would bring together black community groups and local authority officers and councillors. The Liverpool Black Caucus notes that the 'issue of race was, at last, officially on the City Council's agenda and at least in formal terms, a structure for black participation was created'.¹³ These moves reflected the period 1978-80 when a coalition of black organisations was able to put more concentrated pressure on the Council (via Liverpool Black Organisations and Merseyside Anti-Racist Alliance). In October 1980 a Parliamentary Select Committee visited Liverpool and noted the extent of discrimination in the city.¹⁴ By the time the Policy and Finance Committee made its recommendations, the city's Chief Executive had personally sought to put equal opportunities high on the Council's agenda.

The Race Relations Liaison Committee was to consist of 12 Councillors (4 from each party); 12 representatives from black organisations; Directors of all the major Council Departments and four non-voting representatives of the Joint Shop Stewards Committee for the trade unions. The Labour group was the only Council political group

which involved its senior members in the Committee and was openly hostile to the Liberals and the Conservatives, who both sent their junior and less experienced members. The political composition of the Committee therefore tended to militate against translation into support at the higher levels of the hung council. The lack of involvement of key and top influentials pushing for the development of anti-racist policies in the City Council's political leadership ensured that there was, as the Black Caucus notes, convenient room for 'significant policy subversion, dilution or delay at officer level'.²⁰ The lack of a comprehensive corporate management structure in the authority²¹ gave individual Department Directors considerable latitude such that the Education and Housing heads rarely attended Race Relations Liaison Committee meetings with council officers unable to provide anything proactive in terms of policies or initiatives, commonly responding to badgering by the black representatives.

These black community group representatives were elected by the various organisations who had put the original submission on race relations policy to the City Council and it was agreed amongst the black representatives that they would develop a united strategy for the Liaison Committee meetings, caucusing before and thus becoming known as the 'Black Caucus'. As the councillors and officers offered little in the way of detailed changes or proposals regarding policy matters for the Council, the Black Caucus, having finally gained a toehold in the local state bureaucracy was anxious to actually get something on the Council statute book. Community participation and consultation - problematic concepts at the best of time and ideal types which bear no relation to the *realpolitik* of local authority practice - went by the

wayside. As the Black Caucus readily admits, 'the extension of the democratic process beyond Committee members that was envisaged at the outset did not take place to any significant degree.'²²

The position of black workers in the City Council, in overwhelmingly manual grades few in number, hardly altered from October 1980 to September 1982. The Black Caucus stressed the importance of getting black people into the higher levels of the local state bureaucracy (except when that black person's politics differed to theirs e.g. Sam Bond) at the same time as increasing the black composition of the workforce as a whole. In the above-mentioned period straightforward head counts showed an increase of black workers from 225 to 250 in a total Council workforce of 30,000.²³

The minimal consensus between the councillors on the Liaison Committee broke down when the Labour group opposed a motion seeking to increase the black composition of the workforce the Labour group on the Liaison Committee opposed a motion seeking to increase the black composition to more accurately reflect the approximately 8% black population of the city (from the above figures it is clear that there were less than 1% of the City Council's workers were black). In essence this amounted to a proposal for affirmative action which the Labour group opposed, which sought the removal of the moratorium on the filling of employment vacancies on the Council - with the promise that there would be no discrimination in recruitment policy. The Militant grouping opposed a 'race-specific' mechanism on the grounds that 'reverse discrimination' might provoke a right-wing backlash.²⁴ The Black Caucus sums up the period as one in which:

despite having apparently pierced the former colour-blind ideology...the black groups still found massive obstacles both at councillor and officer level...So the Caucus felt that, in the absence of drastic party political conversions, real progress would only come through the appointment of a very capable team of race relations officers.²⁵

In essence the demands made by the Black Caucus on the Councillors were ones which may have found a more favourable hearing amongst the conventional 'New Left' councils under scrutiny in other case studies here. As it was the unwillingness of the Militant-led group to give any special concessions to affirmative action-type policies in the city was to bring it into more profound conflict with the City's black organisations when it had control of the full City Council in 1983. Before going on to the case of Sam Bond, it would be remiss, as is done to a certain degree in the Black Caucus report, to ignore the fact that the drama of the Militant-led Liverpool City Council was being played out on the national stage with the spending battles with the Secretary of State for the Environment, Patrick Jenkin. The following brief synopsis cannot hope to explore the intricacies of the time²⁵ but is crucial to at least summarise the events if the Sam Bond case is not to be taken as simply a 'race relations' problem.

7.5 The post-1983 Militant-led Council

The local elections of May 1983 resulted in the first decisive overall majority on the City Council for ten years. As such, it presented the opportunity for the Council to implement an equal

opportunities programme without being hamstrung by opposition obfuscation. Leading Militant member Peter Taaffe and Top Influential Liverpool Councillor Tony Mulhearn describe the election as one in which:

The approach of Marxists [Militant - MC] represented a complete break with the pedestrian, low-key approach of the right...The opponents of Labour were taken aback by the sweep, the verve and the élan that was generated...²⁷

Labour gained 12 seats and lost none with the party's vote increasing by 40%. When in office the Labour group immediately cancelled the 1000 projected job losses planned by the previous administration and announced 400 new jobs. The City Council planned to move a deficit budget in 1984/5 and not to raise the rates more than 9% in direct opposition to the Government and Patrick Jenkin in particular. In August 1983 Derek Hatton was elected Deputy Leader of the City Council with John Hamilton, of the old Left, an ineffectual figurehead as Council leader.

Of the 51 Labour members in the new ruling group, no more than 16 were actual Militant members but they made the most effective interventions (partly by out-caucusing their opponents).²⁸ As Peter Taaffe noted in a Militant Internal Document,²⁹ the District Labour Party had eroded the autonomy of the Labour group on the Council which had atrophied in the Braddock era of the 1940s-early 60s - with the effect that the Councillors were more accountable to the DLP and Militant was able to exert more of an influence. By stretching the previous administration's budget the Labour Council survived its first

year in office unscathed. It successfully mobilised 15,000 workers for a demonstration in November 1983 and 20,000 in March 1984. The city was, however, left without a budget in Spring 1984 as the Council faced-off with the government. The local elections of May were fought as a referendum on the budget issue and the result was an endorsement of the Council's stance.

After the election the Labour Councillors were prepared to meet the Environment Secretary Patrick Jenkin to visit Liverpool. Despite the triumphalism, a characteristic of Militant,³⁰ both the Council and Jenkin compromised. He offered £2.5m to the city's Inner City Partnership Scheme and extended urban aid projects whereas the Council reduced its budget through 'creative accounting' and a rate rise of 17%. The *Financial Times* (17/7/84) assessed the position as one in which:

The fact is that Liverpool's muscle won, but less than it might have done, and the Government lost but not as much as it might have done...For its part, Liverpool made substantial concessions too and any claims to the contrary are simply disingenuous.

One year later Liverpool City Council and 16 other ratecapped councils agreed to a joint policy of not setting a rate at all in opposition to ratecapping. Militant argued that this 'no-rate' line would dodge the issue of direct confrontation with the Government but agreed to the strategy for the sake of a united campaign. In June 1985, the campaign having all but collapsed, Liverpool set a 9% rate with an illegal deficit budget. From that point on the financial crisis developed. By the end of August council officers warned the councillors

that the authority would run out of money by December and was therefore obliged to give its employees 90 day redundancy notices. Nalگو and the teaching unions both refused to distribute the redundancy notices despite claims by the Council that the move was another bargaining ploy with the Government. The result was that GMBATU shop stewards had to deliver the notices in a fleet of 30 hired taxis.³¹ Whatever the motivation the result was a divided workforce despite large but powerless popular support.³²

On 8th September 1985, at the same time as Neil Kinnock and Labour Party National Executive Committee were launching an investigation, or as the Left termed it a 'witch-hunt', into the running of the DLP in Liverpool, the District Auditor imposed a fine of £106,000 against 46 labour Councillors and dismissed them from office for refusing to set a legal rate. By the end of 1985 cuts were imposed in weakly unionised parts of the council in a package totalling £3m and £30m in loans were secured from Swiss Banks. The whole of 1986 was taken up with a battle by the Labour Councillors through the courts to have the surcharges quashed.

In January 1987 the Council took its appeal to the Law Lords which was rejected on 12th March. The Liberal/Conservative coalition was resurrected to fill the void left by the dismissal of 46 Labour Councillors and took immediate control of the Council. On March 13th Sam Bond was sacked with the minimum notice available. In the local elections of May that year Labour regained control of the Council though the new Council was much more right-wing in composition. Militant on Merseyside had been isolated following the breakdown of the campaign over ratecapping in 1985 and the Labour Party investigation

which led to the likes of Tony Mulhearn going through tortuous forms of argument to avoid expulsion from the Labour Party and desperate legal wranglings to hold on to the reins of power in the City Council. Yet at the same time as Liverpool was involved externally in its war of attrition with the government it was also in conflict internally with trade unions, churches, Labour wards and a whole gamut of black organisations in Liverpool over the appointment of the city's first Principal Race Relations Adviser - Sam Bond in 1984.

7.6 The development of race relations policy under Labour after 1983 and the Sam Bond dispute

At the formation of the new Race Relations Liaison Committee in 1983 Derek Hatton, a leading Militant member and probably *the* top influential in the council was appointed as Chair - a double-edged sword for the Black Caucus given his political clout in the Council and DLP and his lack of sympathy with the position adopted by the Black Caucus on the Committee. The Caucus itself was re-elected in a new representative group in July 1983 at a meeting to which over 70 black groups and anti-racist organisations had been invited (though throughout the Sam Bond dispute the Black Caucus reiterated this figure to back its claims of being representative it did not give details as to how many groups attended the meeting, what their membership was and how much the memberships overlapped). The Black Caucus, whether or not it was representative, faced no queries from the Council at the time of its formation as to its claims to speak for the black people of Liverpool - that was to come later.

The first few meetings of the Race Relations Liaison Committee were centred around the establishment of a Race Relations Unit in the Council in line with those set up in other local authorities. Although the Black Caucus saw some slow progress taking place it did not take long for problems to be thrown up between the various groups on the Liaison Committee over the unwillingness of the Council to provide funding (or to apply for Government funding) for projects and posts which the Council argued were 'race specific'. The caucus countered by claiming that the planned posts and schemes only marginally began to redress some of the racism which had been all too evident in the city over many years.

Ethnic record-keeping and monitoring in the Housing Department was opposed by the Councillors on the grounds of its potential abuse and possible alienating factors.³³ A major forerunner of the Sam Bond dispute which soured relations on the Race Relations Liaison Committee was over the River Avon Street Project. This was a scheme for sheltered accommodation facilities for elderly people from ethnic minorities who had been specifically excluded from similar Council-run accommodation in the past. Despite a 75% Department of Environment grant and the fact that the scheme was at a high stage of development, the Council cancelled it for budgetary reasons. The Black Caucus described the Councillors attitudes at the time as, 'a form of persistent racism - a determined opposition to the taking of action on proven racial inequalities.'³⁴

In contrast with the previous administration, delays in policy implementation were rarely found in all areas of the Council and the key influentials in the Liverpool local state at the time, the

Militant-led Labour Left, were the prime force behind the weak uptake of the Black Caucus's demands. The reason for this was in part the insistence of the Councillors on policies which were seen as benefitting the working class as a whole and thus black workers by definition. They sought to avoid what they saw as the tokenism followed by other councils. The personnel changes in the Race Relations Liaison Committee in 1984 brought the departure of Derek Hatton and his replacement by Cllr. Paul Lafferty who professed no particular knowledge or experience of anti-racism policies. More cheering news for the Black Caucus (after they had threatened to quit en masse) was the commitment given by the Council to the immediate setting up of a Race Relations Unit in the Chief Executive's Office consisting of:

Principal Race Relations Adviser (PRRA),
Social Services and Personnel Race Relations Advisers,
Race Training Officer,
Research Officer,
Complaints Officer and
Clerical Officer.

This general personnel composition was agreed by all parties and the posts were advertised on July 25th 1984. On October 1st shortlisting was completed with interviews set for October 9th for the post of PRRA. Sam Bond was not on the shortlist of any of the Black Caucus representatives and it was only on Derek Hatton's insistence, as Chair of the Interview Panel, that Bond's name went forward.

Six candidates were drawn up for interviewing for the post of PRRA. They were:

- A. Bennett - Senior Community Relations Officer (Merseyside Community Relations Council)
- S. Chatterjee - Community Relations Officer (Housing) Liverpool City Council
- I. Lynn - Postgraduate Researcher and Lecturer in Race Relations (Liverpool University)
- R. Quarless - Special Projects Officer (Ethnic Minorities) Liverpool Housing Trust
- S. Zaida - Principal Race Relations Officer (Sandwell)
- S. Bond - Assistant Building Surveyor (London Borough of Brent)

The Interview Panel consisted of : Councillors Hatton, Lucock, Dillon and Ord (Labour) and Bradley (Liberal); Race Relations Liaison Committee members Councillors Lafferty (Chair) and Hood (Vice-Chair) (both Labour), Gideon Ben-Tovim, Liz Drysdale and Steve French (all Black Caucus); and Chris Ducla (Nalگو). The Labour Councillors and the Black Caucus have their differing accounts of the conduct of the interviews and these are therefore presented separately below.

7.7 The Black Caucus account

The basis of the information on the interviews for the PRRA job presented by the Black Caucus has been, notably, the evidence

submitted to the Labour party NEC investigation into Liverpool DLP. The submission notes:

Councillor Hatton...stated that...'we are looking for someone supporting the policies of the Labour Party' - they have to show 'commitment to the policies we have been arguing for'.³⁵

The submission continues, suggesting that Sam Bond's answers in interview were out of step with the other interviewees on the issues of ethnic monitoring, affirmative action and the basic causes of racism. Following initial questioning, the Black Caucus representatives noted that following his silence on questions about his management skills,

It was clear he had no relevant experience or qualifications for the post, in terms of his own practical training, his work experience or his voluntary record of recent work.³⁶

The other candidates all had the advantage of having some experience in 'race relations' work through local authorities, voluntary or research work. Following the lunch break, Derek Hatton announced that he considered the most important characteristic for the post to be the ability of the candidate to follow council policy. On this basis he ruled out the two candidates with Black Caucus links because of their prior conflicts with the Labour Councillors. Two further candidates were ruled out without explanation and the remaining local candidate was considered to be more suited to the Social Services Adviser post, leaving Sam Bond as the only choice. When the other Labour Councillors were polled for their opinions, they all unwaveringly recommended Sam

Bond for the job. The Liberal Councillor, Nalgo representative and Black caucus representatives all expressed astonishment at the choice of Bond for the post, claiming that he was possibly the worst suited of all the candidates. The Black Caucus submission concluded:

We stressed that Bond's appointment would be totally unacceptable and we urged the Councillors not to go down a road that would inevitably bring the Council into conflict with the black community ... The motion to appoint Bond was then put: 6 in favour (the Labour Cllrs) 4 against (Cllr Bradley and the three of us). At this point the three of us spontaneously stood up, said the appointment was totally unacceptable and walked out of the meeting as did the Nalgo observer.³⁶

The Black Caucus report goes on to claim that irrefutable evidence from two sources (anonymous) that Cllr Hatton had lined up a 'comrade' from London for the PRRA post in mid-September, a fact supposedly echoed by Cllr Tony Byrne.³⁸ The irrefutability is somewhat increased by the fact that both testimonies are based upon unsubstantiated hearsay and that both testimonies are by persons unknown. Not only had the Black Caucus seen their own candidates passed over for the first ever major race relations post in the City Council, but that they also believed it to be a 'stitch-up' to get a Militant supporter in the Top (and Key) Influential position in the new Race Relation Unit. The criteria for Bond's ineligibility were presented variously as his age, lack of experience in the black community, lack of management experience, lack of knowledge of the Liverpool area and lack of fit between his views as expressed at the interview and the policy of the DLP on 'race relations' (as opposed to the pervading Militant line). The conclusion reached by the Black Caucus was that the

appointment of Sam Bond was purely as a Militant plant in the top post and they announced plans for strenuous opposition. Not surprisingly, the view of the Labour Councillors involved differed somewhat.

7.8 The Labour Councillors' Account

The Labour Councillors defence of their decision rested upon two main planks:

- (i) that the procedure for choosing Sam Bond had been properly administered with all candidates getting a fair hearing and,
- (ii) that for such a key appointment with its clear political overtones it was important that the appointee was a person who could work with the Council leadership and was on the same political wavelength.

As Taaffe and Mulhearn explain, 'No amount of professional qualifications, without a serious grounding in the socialist policies of the labour movement, is capable of mobilising the black working class, together with the labour movement, to combat racism.'³⁹ There were other factors at play, which the Black Caucus neglected to bring out in their testimony. The point, for example, that one of the leading members of the Black Caucus was a candidate, who could expect some favouratism from the Black Caucus panel members. Moreover, two caucus members on the interview panel were also referees for those they were interviewing. The majority of the Labour Councillors on the interview panel were not Militant members or supporters and Taaffe and Mulhearn rightly point to the unanimity of the Labour Councillors in choosing Bond to reinforce their claims that he was the best candidate.

The question of the Bond appointment is not so much a battle over one person but a reflection of the two political currents at work in the race relations structure in the local state. In contrast to the municipal managerialism of Steve French of the Black Caucus who noted 'Mr Bond ... hasn't any great experience in management as in all the other areas such as education, housing and employment', the activist, anti-national statist stance of the Councillors was expressed by Taaffe and Mulhearn who responded 'What academic qualifications did Martin Luther King, Malcolm X, Huey Newton, Bobby Seale and George Jackson possess ?'⁴⁰ The question has to be asked as to what strategy these black activists would have supported.

On the question of non-localism it was noted that the Black Caucus had been slow in coming forward to oppose the appointment of black Liverpoolians in race relations jobs in Manchester and London. Fathema Prince wrote in *Black Linx* (Issue 6 - June 1986), a magazine published by Merseyside Community Relations Council, that the Black Caucus must be wary of attacking outsiders on the assumption that they would be incapable of understanding the problems of Liverpool 8. She noted, 'It just so happens that Rashid Mufti [a prominent black activist in MCRC] got a position in London, but I did not hear any of the London people shouting that they had the same qualifications that Rashid had.'

7.9 On the interview and appointment of Sam Bond

Firstly, the assumption that it is only Militant that makes political appointments is an obviously untenable one. Especially in the

re-politicised area of local government in the 1980s, councils have sought to employ top influentials in their own image in key areas of social policy, although patronage is hardly a modern phenomenon. Take for example the case of Alan McFarlane and Dan Thea in the Hackney Case Study (see Chapter 5 above), both of whom were ciphers for the dominant political ideology in the Council (from 'old right' to 'new left'). It also hardly needs noting that many more people have been victimised in employment because of their left politics than have secured positions because of them.

The stance of the Black Caucus was not one which comfortably occupied too high a moral ground. The chagrin at failing to get one of their own candidates into the PRRA post was presented as a legitimate anger at being steamrollered over the post by a Council which had little or no time for Liverpool's black community. The Black Caucus had seen its one real chance to establish a power-base within the Council's Race Relations Unit taken away by the appointment of Sam Bond.

The immediate conclusion on the appointment of Sam Bond has to be that the inbuilt majority of Labour councillors allowed them to choose a candidate who on the available evidence would not have been chosen because of his credentials. Believers in natural justice may view the decision as manifestly unfair. More importantly, the appointment made sense for the strategy followed by Militant in Liverpool that the struggle for black liberation could not be won without the greater liberation of the working class as a whole. The problem for Militant came about when the positions it acquired on an electoral basis led to a subordination of local black demands to those of the local state. Once again the debate can be broadened to questions

of where real power for change lies in society but these broader issues were not too much in the minds of the Black Caucus, however, which immediately began to co-ordinate a campaign to remove Sam Bond from his post and have the job re-advertised.

7.10 The occupation of the Deputy Leader's office

The response of the Black Caucus was not slow. On October 10th, the day after the appointment of Sam Bond, an official Nalگو picket in co-operation with the Black Caucus was organised. The picket, held outside the Municipal Annexe in Dale St., stopped Councillors attending the interviews for the other posts in the Race Relations Unit and instead they took up brief residence in Derek Hatton's office. A delegation from the picket then visited his office to attempt to get the Councillors to rethink their decision and was rebuffed. The pickets then decided to occupy Derek Hatton's office to 'negotiate' - the pickets numbering over 30. After 5 hours of discussion, Derek Hatton agreed to have the post of PRRA job readvertised and signed a statement to that effect.

Derek Hatton claimed, after the occupation was over, that:

It was not a case of giving in to the mob. I was not threatened. There were a lot of people there and we had to take notice of their strong feelings. We said before that the decision was right but we had to defuse the situation and come to a reasonable conclusion. We refused to involve the police preferring to continue our discussions.⁴¹

A spokeswoman of the Black Caucus, speaking on behalf of the 'black community' denied that the Councillors were being held against their will but had stayed because they were involved in a 'big negotiation'.⁴²

Taaffe and Mulhearn relate the incident somewhat differently claiming that 'Derek Hatton, Tony Mulhearn and other councillors were taken hostage, threatened with physical violence and had no option but to sign the "agreement" put to them by people, a number of whom were 'well-known for their criminal record'.⁴³ This 'criminality' was perhaps due to the major 'racial animosity' of the Liverpool Police Force, which Taaffe and Mulhearn also note.⁴⁴ The Liverpool Nalگو leadership dismissed any claims that violence was threatened by the pickets but Nalگو members in the City Solicitors Department issued a statement which commented 'They [the Councillors - MC] were told in no uncertain terms that if they attempted to leave the office they would be subjected to physical violence'.⁴⁵ The Black Caucus responded in a leaflet issued to the public over the Sam Bond campaign by noting, 'Councillor Hatton's own security guards were present throughout the occupation. The police arrived, yet even they took no action. No Labour Councillors [sic] present have filed charges against anyone involved in the occupation.'

The U-turn over the Sam Bond appointment was short lived for at a meeting of the DLP the following evening he was re-affirmed as the new PRRA. Officers at the door of the meeting refused entry to anyone not delegated by their own ward branches thereby stopping two Black Caucus Labour Party members from attending even as observers. A proposal from the floor of the meeting that Black Caucus members be

allowed to address it was rejected by the delegates. Councillors present alleged that they had been 'intimidated' by 'gangsters' at the occupation and the decision to readvertise the PRRA post was overturned the motion was carried by 71 to 34. The DLP issued a resolution from the meeting which the Black Caucus described as an official declaration of war on Liverpool's Black community. The resolution noted:

The DLP condemns the use of intimidation and threats by those who occupied the office of the Council leader and Deputy Leader. The councillors were held as hostages, completely against their will - a method alien to the Labour movement. The DLP recognises that the councillors not only signed a statement under duress ... This Party refuses to allow any councillors, who were democratically elected by the people of Liverpool, to be held by ANY unrepresentative group whether black or white, who seek to impose their will on elected councillors.

The council has a duty to represent the interests of the whole community, including all ethnic minorities, and cannot succumb to a small, unrepresentative group who only seek to have one of their own nominees appointed to the job.⁴⁶

The DLP resolution confirmed to the Black Caucus that it needed to fight the Bond appointment on two fronts, one of marshalling the forces of black organisations and individuals in and around Liverpool 8 and at the same time building support in the local labour movement where more generalised political hostility to Militant existed.

7.11 The campaign in the Liverpool labour movement

Taaffe and Mulhearn have little doubt that the Bond affair was used by right-wingers and the soft left in the Labour Party wards and trade union bureaucracies to undermine the broader political fight

of the Militant-led council against the government. The Council leadership denounced the Liverpool Nalgo leadership as being 'under control of how the members and supporters of the Communist Party and petit bourgeois ex-lefts' who lied to their members about the circumstances of the Bond appointment. Certainly Nalgo, the union which would be responsible for the posts in the Race Relations Unit, was quick to act in campaigning against the post.

On October 11th, the day the DLP met to endorse the decision to appoint Bond, the local Nalgo Finance and General Purposes Committee endorsed the stance of the Nalgo observer during the interviews in walking out and opposing the Bond selection. The Nalgo Black Workers Group on the Council prepared a report for Nalgo Branch Committee on the whole selection procedure and on October 23rd the local Nalgo Branch Service Conditions Committee voted to boycott all Race Relations Unit posts after hearing both sides of the argument. The Branch Executive backed the decision the following day. In a reply to an Open Letter sent by the Labour councillors to their workforce, explaining their reasons for appointing Sam Bond, Peter Cresswell and Graham Burgess of Nalgo argued crucially that:

The Labour Group say that the City Council is not 'just another employer'. Many of us would love to believe that, but recent actions of the Council are leading us to draw the conclusion that they are 'just another employer', prepared to attempt to bypass and villify their employees, the unions.⁴⁷

By the end of October Nalgo's National Executive Committee officially backed the boycott of the Race Relations Unit posts (this may be a

record for official recognition of a Nalgo dipute) and on November 6th Brent Nalgo, Sam Bond's own branch, accepted the NEC decision.

The Joint Shop Stewards Committee (JSSC), a key body in the co-ordination of city council trade unions decided on October 20th to support the demands for the readvertisement of the PRRA post after being addressed by Steve French (Black Caucus) and Derek Hatton. Individual unions and key influentials such as the NUT, NATFHE, NUPE and ASTMS all supported the JSSC position to boycott the PRRA post. The power bases of Militant in the Council trade unions were in the TGWU and GMBATU - both of whose Regional Executives called on the Council to readvertise the appointment. The Black Caucus could not, however, claim the support of the Liverpool branches of either union for on November 17th the JSSC, led by GMBATU stewards, withdrew support for the boycott amid claims of unconstitutionality and walk-outs by other unions.

Even *Youth action*, the North West area Bulletin of the LPYS was critical of the Bond appointment as were the City Solicitors Stewards, who as mentioned above had alleged intimidation of the Councillors during the occupation of Derek Hatton's office. Further support came from Keva Coombes, non-Militant Left Labour Leader of Merseyside County Council and Margaret Simey and Jim Clarke, both Councillors in Liverpool 8. The situation had therefore come about where the Labour Councillors and DLP, claiming to be the sole representatives of the working class on Merseyside were lined up against the Black Caucus, supported by: Liverpool Trades Council, Merseyside Trade Union Community and Unemployed Resources Support Centre, Mossley Hill and Riverside Constituency Labour Parties, Picton, Bootle, Granby, Arundel, Pirrie and Vauxhall Ward Labour Parties, TGWU,

Nalgo, ASTMS, NATFHE, GMBATU, NUPE & NUT branches, Somali, Chinese, Caribbean and Sikh Groups, Merseyside Community Relations Council, Labour Party Black Sections and a mass of smaller community and religious groups in the city.

7.12 Grass roots organised opposition in and around Liverpool 8

The Black Caucus was quick to seek wider grass roots support in Liverpool 8 for its initiatives, expressly in the face of claims made by the Council of its 'unrepresentativeness'. To this end an organising meeting was held at the Caribbean Centre on 17th October 1984 which was attended by at least 200 people. The meeting gave its fullest support to the acts undertaken by the Black Caucus. A march and rally were held on 17th November with the organisers estimating an attendance of over 1000. Eight days later a full quarterly meeting of Merseyside Community Relations Council endorsed the boycotting of the post of PRRA and pledged total support for the Black Caucus. Despite regular lobbies and pickets, combined with the boycotting of Sam Bond and the Race Relations Unit, the Black Caucus were still unable to budge him or the Labour Councillors with increasing signs of disquiet against the Council's intransigence.

The Race Relations Liaison Committee met only once after Sam Bond was offered the job and given the disarray in the formal consultative arrangements, the Council decided to abolish the Liaison Committee and replace it with an Equal Opportunities Committee which would develop the policies to combat discrimination against black people, disabled people and women. The Black Caucus saw this not only

as a tactic for undermining their strength in the Council but also as a way of setting them against women's groups and disabled organisations in the city by making them compete for positions on the new Committee.

The full City Council met on 21st May 1985 to ratify the decision and the meeting was lobbied by over 200 people with 30 allowed into the Council meeting. When it was obvious the abolition of the Liaison Committee would be passed, as the Black Caucus relates, 'the public gallery erupted in *spontaneous* displays of shouting and continuous protest' (my emphasis). The Council Chairman, Hugh Dalton, then called in the police to remove the demonstrators. Eggs were thrown at the Labour Councillors, somewhat belying the spontaneity of the protest and the *Liverpool Echo* (22/5/85) described the demonstration as a 'riot'.

At the same time, Militant, realising it was beginning to look distanced from the debate which was being carried on through the Council chamber began to go more on the ideological offensive in the heartland of the Black Caucus, Liverpool 8. A 'Merseyside Action Group' was set up to rally people round Sam Bond and establish a base for him in Liverpool 8. Black Militant members came into the city to organise a series of meetings and leaflettings in the area. Accusations were made that the Labour Party was sending 'salt and pepper' groups round Liverpool 8 - consisting of one white and one black party member to argue the case door-to-door in a hope that they would get a better reception. Their partial success made them, in the eyes of the Black Caucus, a destructive force in Liverpool 8 and the Caucus alleged that they were using violent and intimidatory tactics.

Tension in Liverpool 8 rose during a series of meetings

which were arranged by supporters and opposers of Sam Bond. At a Labour Party meeting on 30th July in St. Margarets Junior School, Hampton St., Toxteth, at which there were violent arguments, reporters were threatened and left-wing newspapers and leaflets were scattered. As the *Times* (31/7/85) reported, 'Councillors were spat on as they were ushered out of the building and one member found his car had been damaged.' On August 15th Tony Mulhearn claimed that Derek Hatton had been attacked at a public meeting at Toxteth Law Centre. First he was refused admission to the meeting and then would only speak after guarantees that there would be no violence. The *Times*, again, reported 'The blow from his attackers sent him staggering against a wall and blood flowing from a cut' (*Times* 16/5/85). This caused the City Council to break off any further contact with the Black Caucus on the grounds that 'any group of people in Liverpool has a right to listen to and debate the Council's case without undemocratic interference from a group of thugs who were prepared to break meetings up'.^{4:13}

After a meeting at the Toxteth Sports Centre on 16th September 1985, there were well publicised claims reiterated by the Black Caucus, that local black people had been bribed into bussing Bond into the meeting and protecting him - although why he should need protecting is not clear from the Black Caucus's account. October saw street disturbances in the Liverpool 8 area, due primarily to heavy policing in the area (at the same time as riots were occurring in Brixton and Handsworth). The police having arrested four local men, whose court appearance triggered more trouble, riot squads were deployed in Liverpool 8. Merseyside Action Group claimed that black community leaders were to blame for part of the violence in the area

and that they had manipulated it for their own ends, a claim firmly repudiated by the Black Caucus.

On November 1st 1985 Sam Bond marked the anniversary of his appointment as the city's first PRRA, one month after Neil Kinnock had made his famous speech denouncing the Liverpool City Councillors at the Labour Party Conference. Through 1986/7 a number of press reports appeared attacking the racism of the City Council and further demonstrations and meetings were arranged with little tangible effect. In Granby Ward, an area with a large black population, a Black Caucus candidate stood in the May 1986 local elections securing 477 votes against the Labour candidate's 2287 (Labour's highest ever vote in the Ward). The fiscal crisis in the city in Autumn 1986 was to occupy most of the attention of Councillors and black organisations in Liverpool - for most of the latter still relied for major funding from the former to keep them in existence. Neil Kinnock, not surprisingly, met the Black Caucus and offered them his support.

The attacks made by the national Labour Party on Derek Hatton and Militant in Liverpool were supported by the Black Caucus on the grounds that it was vindication for the Council's 'race' policies and they offered no support for the Left when facing expulsions from the Labour Party.⁴⁹ As the Black Caucus confirmed, 'Militant's formal demise has largely come about through external pressure and intervention from the Labour Party leadership and from court cases by the Labour Party.' Following the Labour Party expulsions and the surcharging of the 47 Labour Councillors, Sam Bond was removed as quickly as possible by the Liberal/Conservative caretaker administration, only to be re-instated by the new non-Militant

dominated Labour Council in May 1987. By that time the positions were firmly set within the various groups in the city such that important contradictions in their strategies around lessening racism in the city can be drawn out.

7.13 Case Study Summary

The apotheosis of consultation and community involvement which is commonplace amongst other New Left Councils is noticeable by its absence in Liverpool. What was more evident was a belief that Militant offered a vanguard of political activity which did not base itself upon the centrality of the working class in leading a politicised local authority against the national state. In essence, the language of Liverpool City Council from 1983 was that of class struggle. As Tony Mulhearn noted, 'Merseyside politics is not life-style politics'.⁵⁰ That is to be expected, given the different political tradition of Militant to that of the New Left in the local authorities in the 1980s. And yet at the end of this study, the similarities between Labour groups in the councils outweigh their apparent differences.

The elements of contradiction of municipal socialists acting as employers are no clearer than in this case study for not only did Liverpool City Council act as a 'tough' management in keeping an unpopular employee on despite all the union activity and hostility of the local labour movement, it also set itself up as the leader of the workers' movement in the fight against the Thatcher Government. As early as 1981 Derek Hatton clearly stated the principle of building a

coterie of like-minded council officers around the ruling Labour group, as with other councils, in key influential positions. In the case of Liverpool, John Hamilton was the top influential, the Council leader, yet the popular myth of his ineffectiveness in the running of the Council has a sound basis. Clearly recognising the 'organised inertia' that council officers can bring about, Hatton proposed that, 'we'd want to make sure that ... those who are employed to manage and carry out the policies which we decide are those who are in great sympathy with those policies'.⁵¹

Hatton et al at Liverpool City Council asserted that claims to political neutrality of local authority professionals can often be unmasked as fundamental conservatism. From the Ken Livingstone days of the GLC onwards there were attempts made to break down the divisions between councillors and officers. The degree of 'threat' which this was to the top influentials in the local state bureaucracy is rendered somewhat ambiguous by, for example, the ability of the central government appointed District Auditor to confound Liverpool City Council's plans to use the local authority as an anti-government springboard. The powers of District Auditors to promote 'good housekeeping' by local authorities went back many years, to the last century, with their powers of disqualification of councillors dating from 1927.⁵²

The Sam Bond affair effectively alienated many potential supporters of the local authority in its fight not only against ratecapping but also against racism although there is little or no evidence that the support of community and voluntary groups made any difference to the campaigns waged by the likes of Sheffield, Manchester

and the London Labour councils. Pauline Dunlop, Deputy Chair of the Council's Personnel Committee (Derek Hatton being the Chair) expressed the view of the Militant Councillors when she argued, 'the realm of unemployment in Liverpool ... is that we all share a common misery. Positive discrimination ... would split the community right down the middle.'⁵³ The choice of Sam Bond was a climax of a policy of the establishment of the Labour Councillors as the sole arbiters of what constituted good 'race relations' in Liverpool.

By freezing out community groups from any effective position within the race relations structures in the Council - keeping the Black Caucus in a minority on the Race Relations Liaison Committee, ensuring a Labour Councillor majority on the PRRA selection panel - the Militant Councillors were doing little more than other local authorities have done by more subtle means. In all the Left Labour councils under scrutiny in this thesis the consultative frameworks may exist but are either circumvented by councillors and officers as top or key influentials or, more importantly, the decisions made are of allocation of strictly limited resources and even more limited job creation.

Those at the helm of Liverpool City Council saw the way to change council policy not through greater involvement of pressure groups or exhortations to professionals within the local authority but by working through the Wards of the DLP. As Tony Byrne explained,

If there is a contribution through the party we will meet with anybody to explain and defend our policies - but we are not consensus people. We believe that the party - democratically elected - makes the policy and the Labour group carries it out.⁵⁴

This policy, in terms of anti-racism, meant ironically the negation of the demands of the Black Caucus by the policies which the Labour group saw as being beneficial to the Liverpool working class as a whole. Delroy Burris of the Black Caucus claimed that the Council had no policy for improving the lot of black people in the city:

Every proposal the Black Caucus put through was nearly always rejected by Derek Hatton or Tony Byrne. We applied for a housing grant for the Avondale site. The Government were to give £1m and Hatton and his cronies only had to put in 25% but once they knew the government was involved they sent the money elsewhere. For work they bring in outside contractors if the council holds the pursestrings. They don't want to absorb black people.⁵⁵

Questions of representation remain problematic. Militant sought to represent the most class conscious workers and hoped to give a lead to workers through their actions in the Council. The Black Caucus claimed it acted on behalf of all black people in Liverpool from the many unemployed to the few aspiring black middle class individuals who saw the local authority race relations structure as providing material benefits through influential posts. For the majority period of the Labour rule of the Council, the Councillors were looking to Whitehall and their battles with Patrick Jenkin whereas the Black Caucus saw their objective enemy as the political leadership of the Council.

This led to wholly different strategies as to how to fight racism within the city. For the Black Caucus the primary task was to correct some of the effects of 200 years of racism in the city by taking steps to ensure the removal of racism in employment and essential services such as housing and education. Militant, conversely,

prioritised the fight against the government which they argued would secure more resources without which a race relations policy would only be an exercise in spreading the poverty, unemployment and homelessness more equally. The difference between the Labour Councillors and the Black Caucus was not so much about the most qualified person to do the job of PRRA, it was the political job to be done.

As Alex May, shop steward with Nalgo in Liverpool, has argued:

The Black Caucus were wrong to say the term 'racist' about people who are clearly not. But the strength of their case on the appointment is overwhelming. This was a blatantly political appointment of someone who would support council policy on race relations when all the black organisations in the city made it clear that they oppose it. It stems from the arrogant attitude of Labour Councillors that they knew best for the workers of the city.⁵⁶

Whilst much of this case study has been a catalogue of the (sometimes physical) battles between black organisations and the council (and DLP) the basic premise remains the same. As Alex May notes above, the fundamental contradiction of the position of the Labour Councillors is one of claiming that they are acting in the interests of the working class when their policies as employers bring them into conflict with their own workers. There have been strikes in local authorities since their inception but the current wave of New Leftism was hailed by some of its proponents as a new form of Left organisation in which the capitalist state could be undermined by a coalition of oppressed groups. As the case studies here show, the municipal socialists, because of the role they play within the local authority,

are put in the place of making decisions as municipal employers. This then forces them into a position of seeing the trade unions are the enemies of 'socialism' inasmuch as they are not wholly supportive of the employment policies pursued by the particular council.

Claims by the Council about the unrepresentativeness of the Black Caucus have some roots in reality but the Caucus was in one respect so because it contained petty bourgeois elements as it did wholly unrepresentative organisations. The Militant members on the Council, after all sought really to represent the objective interests of Liverpool's workers and not the reactionary elements within the working class. The Black Caucus was, however, the only black voice in Liverpool which commanded any degree of influence and respect - a Black Caucus which was not acquiescent, which had campaigned against police harassment, fought for the Council to take racism in the city seriously and had been responsible for pointing out the way black people had been excluded in the city for decades. To respond to that form of concerted pressure on the local state by appointing an assistant building manager with a Militant membership card into the top race relations job in Liverpool reflected some degree of political naivety, or cynicism or both.

And what of the man Sam Bond himself. He denied actual membership of Militant, but then so had other key Militant members. For much of the time Bond appears to have been only a lightweight compared with the major factions fighting out the race relations policy for the Council. In a speech to the Labour Group (17/12/84) he declared:

I was attracted to apply for my present post by the principled stand taken by the city council in jobs and

services. Since I have been appointed I have had to face a barrage of personal attacks...Even though I have never broken a single rule of Nalgo it appears that even officials of the union are prepared to condone the threats of violence against me.

He repeated his call for broader working class action to defeat the government as a way of undermining the social conditions which reproduce racism but continued to argue that 'self-appointed' community leaders could not mobilise the black workers of Liverpool 8 to form a united movement. The surcharging of the Councillors, allied to the inquiry into Militant in Liverpool ensured that the powerful group which backed Bond and which was prepared to take on the Black Caucus was significantly weaker in the Council following the 1987 elections and this brought to an end much of the conflict. It remains to be seen whether the next experiment with municipal anti-racism will come from a more usual Left Labour-type council and whether it makes a difference to the material conditions of black people in Liverpool 8.

The Islington Case Study

7.14 Introduction

Islington Council, under the leadership of Margaret Hodge⁵⁷, has acquired in the 1980s a reputation of being one of the hardest of

the left Labour councils. This was not always the case. In 1979 the Labour Group on the Council had been dominated by the right-wingers of the party (much as in Hackney noted in Chapter 5) and although the Left began to take greater control in the wards of the borough, Islington council became the first to have a SDP leadership in 1981 following the mass defections from the Labour Party in the wake of the 'Gang of Four'. SDP control was short-lived and the New Left swept to power in May 1982 with Labour Councillors being returned in 51 out of the 52 seats contested. In June 1982 *London Labour Briefing* saw the borough as being one of the local authorities at the forefront of the Labour-controlled local authority fight against the Conservative Government's ratecapping legislation and applied the label of 'Fortress Islington'.⁵²

The new Council was held by parts of the London municipal Left to be the jewel in Labour's local government crown and Labour Councillor Keith Venness stressed the need for a new political broom claiming that 'Labour will lose ground if it is led by a tired, aged, right-wing leadership unable to combat the superficially attractive community policies led by the Liberals.' The spirit of community consultation and GLC-style populism seems to have infused the Councillors with over-reaching optimism. Bob Crossman, later to become Mayor, claimed when Labour Deputy Chief Whip that:

We hope that there will be plans to run Departments of the Council in a less hierarchical manner and we have already been approached about the possibility of one unit becoming a Workers Co-Op. This kind of arrangement would make 'working for the Council' much less alienating than in most local authorities.⁵³

As one Islington Councillor noted, in criticising the Labour Group from a left position, described the way the Left-led Committee's apportioned money to a variety of groups as being 'a reformists dream', where Councillors had unreal discussions about their power and influence - with plans for saving factories, for example.⁶⁰

One of the major strategies applied by the Council to bring about its aims was the move towards a decentralisation of services, particularly in social services and housing provision. The setting up of Neighbourhood Offices to administer these functions was seen as a further step in personalising the work of the local authority and giving the people of the borough both more control over, and interest in, what the Council could offer them. Margaret Hodge summed up the Council's optimism when she claimed 'I think decentralisation will mean better services, more extensive services and greater control by the people of the services the council provides.'⁶¹

Within the Labour Group, there were competing factions to the Left and to the Right of the Leadership, something which was to anger Margaret Hodge, despite her optimism for the policies of Islington Council under her leadership. She commented in the March 1984 edition of *London Labour Briefing* that:

there is a form of political strategy being exercised ... which may be damaging to Islington Labour Party's objectives in local government. It is the strategy of raising demands that cannot be met; the strategy of trying to prove that even a left-led Labour Party cannot deliver the goods. a strategy based upon internal manoeuvre that is totally archaic in a left-led electoral and campaigning party.⁶²

In August 1984 the Council was involved in a long and bitter dispute with its Nursery workers⁶³ who went on strike for extra pay and greater staffing. The dispute broke the 'honeymoon period' which the new Council had enjoyed with its own unions and as a forerunner of the Housing Strike was evidence of the contradiction faced by Councillors whose concept of socialism did not involve workers' independent action within the Council. Furthermore, Labour Councillors mandated by their local wards to settle the dispute in approximation with the demands of the Nursery workers broke with their ward's decisions and voted to support the leadership line. One Councillor resigned from the Council complaining at the handling of the strike. Joint meetings of Islington Labour Group and the Joint Local Government Committee of the two Islington Constituency Labour Parties failed as a mechanism of accountability.

In common with some other Left Labour Councils, Islington became embroiled with the Government over the issue of ratecapping. In both 1984 and 1985 the Council promised to campaign vigorously against rate-capping legislation by not setting a rate, although in both years a rate was eventually set.⁶⁴ In 1984 the Council set its rate within the required time limit and in 1985 the rate was delayed until May 31, with the possibility that the Councillors will face surcharging in the same way as the 46 Liverpool Councillors did. The similarity with the Sam Bond case is that a Left Labour Council, as will be seen below, was embroiled with its own workforce over how best to fight racism at the very same time as it sought the support of its workers and electorate to defy the Government's limits on Council expenditure. Before going on to the particulars of the Housing Strike, it is important both to recap

on the development of Race Relations structures within Islington Council and centrally the Equal Opportunities Employment Policy (EOEP).

7.15 The Race Relations Structure in Islington Council

Islington Council first set up a Race Relations Working Party in the autumn of 1979. This was transformed into the Race Relations Sub-Committee of the Policy Committee in 1981 and black and other ethnic minority groups were invited onto this by the Council. In 1983 the Sub-Committee was made a full Committee of the Council and it now consists of councillors, heads of services and six black and other ethnic minority co-optees. To attempt to solve the thorny problem of who is 'representative', Islington wrote to all the black and ethnic minority organisations in the borough setting their own guidelines for potential co-optees. The criteria were thus laid down to the nominating bodies and out of the nominees co-optees were elected.

In September 1984 the co-optees were elected. The co-opted members have voting rights and 'community representatives' have the right to speak at Race Relations Committee meetings provided they have first notified the chair of their intentions. The Committee is serviced by the Race Relations Adviser who consults with groups should they wish to raise issues before the meeting. Items suggested by community groups are normally included upon the agenda. In tandem with this Committee, the Race Relations Consultative Panel was set up at the beginning of 1983 offering a more informal forum for discussion with a Race Relations Adviser and development workers liaising with groups and encouraging them to attend. These development workers have quite large

consultative and communicative roles because Islington has no Community Relations Council structure to liaise between Council and voluntary sector.

In 1983 the Council also set up a Race Equality Unit with the intention of monitoring the progress made by other committees and departments. Grant aid has been increased to black and ethnic minority groups and the number of black workers in the Council has been greatly increased⁶⁵ with positive action programmes and targeting have been introduced throughout. Monitoring of race/ethnic records has been introduced and a number of Section 11 posts have been set up such as the Race Equality Unit's Race Equality Advisers. The Council (partly carrying through old GLC initiatives) has supported black businesses, issued an anti-apartheid declaration and started a translation and interpretation unit. As the Council's publicity booklet *Time for Positive Action* claims, 'Numerous anti-racist schemes have been set up and supported, in a bid to combat racism and challenge racist attitudes and behaviour'⁶⁶.

In 1984 Islington launched its 'One Islington' campaign which had three main objectives:

- (i) To change institutional and organisational structures which have racist and discriminatory effects.
- (ii) To refute all racist publications and media output which perpetuate biased and prejudiced attitudes and opinions.
- (iii) To secure the involvement of as many Islington residents as possible in an effective anti-racist programme.

As is evident from the description above, Islington Council had embarked upon schemes and programmes aimed at fighting racism

within all its spheres of influence and was as highly developed in its race relations structures as most other local authorities. Yet in 1985 it was accused by the local government union, Nalgo, a key influential group, of not being able to follow through its own policies when active racists were involved in concerted campaigns of harassment and intimidation in the Council's Housing Department. Nalgo claimed that the case showed up insensitive management and half-heartedness amongst Councillors to fight actual instances of racism. This was despite the fact that the Council had established a Race Relations Section in the Housing Department and a clear anti-harassment employment policy.

7.16 The development of Race Relations structures in the Housing Department

Two investigations were carried out into the allocation implications of Housing Department policy for ethnic minorities in the late 1970s. The first was carried out by the Islington Housing Rights Project and the second was undertaken by the Council itself, the results being published under the title 'The Allocation of Islington Housing and Ethnic Minorities'.⁶⁷ As a result of the latter report ethnic record keeping was introduced and in addition two specialist posts were funded (under Section 11) of a Housing Liaison Officer for Ethnic minorities and Housing Advisory Officer.

The new Council in 1982 created a Race Relations Section in the Housing Department on 4th July of that year. At that time it consisted of only one officer, Raj Mungar, who was appointed Race Relations Adviser, although the Section was expanded to include five

other officers. The vast majority of the work of the Race Relations Section was in the development of policies around racial harassment in the Council's housing estates (as in Newham noted in Chapter 6 above) and in the allocation policies and procedures to ensure that discriminatory practices were lessened (as in Hackney). In this respect the Council had some successes including eviction of Council tenants for persistent racial harassment.⁶⁸

The question of internal racial harassment by workers against other workers was the domain not of the Race Relations Section of the Housing Department but of the Personnel Committee and covered by the EOEP. In the dispute discussed below, it was a central demand made by the central trade union involved, Nalگو, that those found guilty of racist behaviour and harassment should not be allowed to work directly with the public, especially in such a sensitive area such as housing where the influence of racism had frequently been pointed out in other local authorities (see Chapter 5 above). It must be remembered that the previously referred to CRE investigation of Hackney pointed to the degree of influence which individual officers had in keeping black people in the worst housing in the borough and there is no evidence that the situation was qualitatively different in Islington. Despite this consideration, the whole Housing side of management, from the Race Relations Section to the full Housing Committee, whatever their personal opinions,⁶⁹ felt the actions of racists towards black workers within their own Department was somehow outside their remit and matters which were the responsibility of Personnel, given the weight of the Equal Opportunities Employment Policy.

7.17 The Provisions under Islington's Equal Opportunities Employment Policy (EOEP)

The Equal Opportunities Employment Policy (EOEP) was brought into effect by the Council in September 1983 and became one of the major planks of the Council's 'One Islington' input into the GLC's Anti-Racism Year (1984). As the Race Relations Adviser noted in a report to the Race Relations Committee (31/1/84), relating a factor which became clear in the Housing Department dispute, 'the quality of service delivery is affected by the composition of the workforce and its sensitivity to and understanding of race issues'⁷⁰. Areas such as recruitment and selection training were to have a 'race' dimension accompanied by the promotion of positive action training. The Director of Personnel, reporting to the Equal Opportunities Joint Committee (3/11/83) had pointed out the need to allay staff anxieties at the implementation of anti-racist measures by having trade union involvement at all levels.⁷¹

The Equal Opportunity Employment Policy (EOEP) noted that 'the Council recognises that discrimination and prejudice will not cease merely as a result of policy decisions by the Council and as part of our strategies will assist in the changes of attitude by whatever means deemed necessary by Members and employees alike' (s5.6), Section 6 which deals with harassment, clearly sets out the antipathy of the Council to such behaviour and the commitment to dealing with it severely. Section 6 read, at the time of the dispute,:

6.1 Harassment is defined as repeated, unreciprocated and unwelcome comments, looks, actions, suggestions, or physical contact that is found objectionable and offensive and that might threaten an employee's job security, or create an intimidating working environment.

6.2 This Council will not condone any harassment of any employee within the Council, whether these acts are committed by members of the public or by colleagues. Nor will the Council condone any acts of harassment by employees against members of the public. The Council is committed to grievance, disciplinary and other Staff Code procedures which will provide proper redress.

The Council had also implemented an Equal Opportunities Employment Policy - Complaints and Disciplinary Procedure which was supposed to deal with cases such as the one related below in which black workers alleged racial harassment by their workmates. Discriminatory acts were defined by the Policy as 'acts which have the effect of treating applicants/employees less favourably on the grounds of sex or marital status, racial or ethnic origin, disability or sexuality.' The Policy targeted the Chief Officer as the person responsible for ensuring that the workplace is free from discrimination although members of staff or Trade Union representatives are able to invoke the grievance procedure and have the matter referred to the Personnel (Disciplinary & Grievances Sub-Committee). The Committee can recommend whether disciplinary action should take place and can allow the use of documents or information not previously supplied. It also

allows the accusers and accused some form of representation. The Council has the full range of sanctions against its employees from warnings and suspensions to transfer or dismissal.

At the same time as the Council provided the disciplinary stick is also offered the carrot of Racism Awareness Training (RAT) for key and top influentials in the local authority to run their sections and Departments in an anti-racist way. The need for awareness training programmes such as RAT was held to be unproblematic, if only because of the professed aims of the courses overcoming attitudinal, prejudicial and institutional forms of discrimination. The assumption held by the Personnel Committee was that racism could be reduced by 'increasing awareness of the forms and effects of discrimination', in other words racism stemmed from 'wrong ideas'.²² Underlying this mode of reasoning is that racism is irrational and that appeals to people's rationality can be used to rid them of racism for it is the result of bad ideas and unheightened awareness. Because of the availability of RAT courses and of the evidence of endemic racism in the employment sphere, the Director of Personnel for Islington married the two to recommend that RAT should be organised for senior Council officers involved in making employment-related decisions and advising supplementing policy.

The degree of officer involvement in RAT courses held by the Council in the period June 1984 - January 1985 was not too impressive. A report by the Director of Personnel, *Take up of places on race and racism training courses* (28/1/85) noted that of nine courses run with 135 places offered, only 77 people had attended (57%). The poor attendance was seen as surprising given the initial interest by various Departments, the Director concluding that despite the 43% stay-away

rate, 'it is not felt that the right spirit of the training would be achieved by making attendance compulsory, and it would be more appropriate to tighten up the administration processes involved.' Moreover the thrust of RAT was clearly aimed by the Council at key and top influentials within the officer structure to help to provide better anti-racist managers. As the Race Relations Committee report on 14/1/85 on RAT recommended, 'Since it is not particularly feasible to promote RAT to all employees, priority be given to senior and middle management, as well as those who work directly with the public' (s 10.2).

The position adopted by the Council leading into the anti-racism strike was one in which it had clearly laid out policy objectives and disciplinary procedures designed at the removal of racism from the Council structure, providing equality of opportunity and limiting the effects of racist behaviour amongst staff. The Nursery workers dispute had reflected part of the contradictory practice of local state socialism - the way socialist municipal management handles its own trade unions despite the high development of 'race relations structures' as identified by Robinson.

The emphasis was put on a managerialist approach - through disciplining of workers by senior officers who had been sent on RAT courses to make them aware of the RAT-proscribed way racism can be confronted in the workplace. Trade unions were ascribed a role of legitimate raisers of workers' grievances but little more. External groups had little or no say in what was for the Council a sector of internal employment policy. The Council had thus developed a framework by which racial harassment at work would be dealt with as with any

other disciplinary matter, by senior management.

When Council officers in the Housing Department were found guilty of racial harassment in the case below, the apparent disinterest of the Disciplinary Sub-Committee in pushing for the fullest disciplinary measures caused Nalgo, who had brought the case to the Council's attention, to call for a strike in the Housing Department. The lines became drawn between key influentials in the local authority, the Councillors and Nalgo, the former being influential enough to ignore the mandates of their own Labour Party wards and the representatives of their workforce in the implementation of their interpretation of municipal anti-racism.

7.18 The Nalgo Strike

The local Nalgo branch first became aware that black workers in the Essex St. office of the Housing Department were being harassed in January 1984. David Burn, Nalgo's Branch Secretary recalls,

It became clear that this situation had been going on for the previous two years ... while the section's black workers have been excluded from social events and have endured outrageous racist comments, suffered accusations of incompetence and disturbing incidents like ashtrays being emptied out over their desks.⁷³

It was Linda Braithwaite, a Clerk in the Rent Accounts section, who reported that she faced racial harassment and cited four individuals, including housing officers Vi Howells, Irene Pledger and Steve Henney. She claimed that at the time the incidents were not merely occasional

outbursts but amounted to a systematic campaign of harassment noting that,

Every day Pledger would come out with racist statements but Vi Howells just ignored it. She even told one black worker that she had a problem because she didn't speak to anyone else on the section. The office manager told me to ignore the comments made. [Contravening Section 3.1 of the Quality Complaints and Grievance Procedure]⁷⁴

When Nalgo first took a previous complainant's case up with management in the Housing Department, it was the black worker who was redeployed and despite negotiations taking several months, no disciplinary action was initiated against any of the alleged racists. A few months after Linda Braithwaite started work she claimed that she also had been racially abused and like all previous black employees in the section sought to be redeployed as soon as possible. In her case Nalgo insisted that the four alleged racists be formally disciplined [in line with Section 2.2 of the Complaints and disciplinary procedure] and that the charges should be brought before Councillors on the Personnel Committee. This was in January 1985 and a problem immediately arose because one of the four accused was a Nalgo member.

On 18th April Islington Nalgo's Administration and Finance Committee decided that a panel hearing would have to be convened to choose whether or not she should be represented by the union as was her right. The hearing was held before Nalgo representatives with no inside knowledge of the dispute and they came to the decision that Nalgo should not put itself in the position of defending both those accused of racism and those subject to it. The panel formally agreed that only

procedural representation would be given to the defendant and that she would in any case be disciplined by her local Nalgo branch, even before the full disciplinary hearing took place, a decision which was to lead to later accusations of 'double jeopardy'. ~~and Henney were both~~

The Council's Personnel (Disciplinary and Grievances) Sub-Committee met on 22nd April and the Nalgo member was found not guilty although Howell, Pledger and Henney were found guilty of breaking the EOEP. Pledger was subject to a reprimand and a written warning after being found guilty of not inviting Braithwaite to the staff Christmas party in November 1984. Henney was found guilty of racial harrasment because he had allegedly ignored black members of staff and frequently found fault with Braithwaite's work. Howells was found guilty of unfairly challenging a black administrative assistant who had been legitimately absent from work. In each of the above cases it was accepted by the Councillors that the motivation for the defendants' actions was racial and for no other reason. In fact the defendants were only found guilty of half the actions they were accused of because the hearing dismissed any accusation where the evidence was only the word of one black officer against one white one and the Committee also refused to allow witnesses who wished to explain the background to the dispute and offer support to the black workers' complaints.

Top influential Councillor Marjorie Ogilvy, chairing the Committee, regretted that none of the defendants had been on Islington's RAT courses and recommended that each of them attend a one day RAT course. The accused, the accusers and the council's opposition were all dissatisfied by the outcome of the hearing albeit for differing reasons. Pledger and Henney both sought leave to appeal

although Howells, who was moved to a job which effectively meant promotion, accepted the judgement but refused to sign an undertaking that she would obey the rules of the Council's Equal Opportunity Employment Policy. The appeals of Pledger and Henney were both dismissed in early June by a committee consisting of Margaret Hodge, Val Veness (Deputy Leader) and Councillor Alan Clayton.

Nalgo and Nalgo Black Workers Group were both angered by the disciplinary measures meted out which they considered insubstantial. Sharon Robinson, another black worker in their section claimed, 'they had been found to be guilty and yet the Council seemed to think that by sending them on a one day course that would be enough'. David Burn of Nalgo, as a key influential, felt similarly aggrieved, noting that:

the council is giving a lifeline to all racists in the workforce to harass people and know they can get away with it. Our demand of management that workers found guilty of racial harassment should not be allowed to work with the public has been rejected.⁷⁵

He pointed to the 1982 Manifesto Commitment of the Labour Group which affirmed that 'Labour would treat very seriously any grievance against a council employee connected with racial discrimination. Racism will be considered a "gross misdemeanour" which could lead to dismissal.'

Labour Councillor and Chair of the Personnel Committee Sally Gilbert (ex-Leader of the Islington Trades Council) wrote to Dave Burn who was already being pressed by groups of his members for industrial action. Her letter contained the argument that:

The council does not see any particular danger in allowing members of staff who have been penalised for racial

harassment cases to pursue duties involving contact with the public. Surely the action proposed against Henney and Howells constitutes a harassment albeit of a different sort.⁷⁶

At the same time both local and national press were beginning to take an interest although the *Islington Gazette's* reporting of the dispute was hampered somewhat by the boycott of it both by Nalgo and Islington Council (for what was seen as its anti-Labour line).⁷⁷ The press tended to concentrate, not surprisingly, on the 'loony' angle and portrayed the racists as victims of autocratic socialism. The *Islington Gazette* (21/6/85) headlined Pledger as 'The Outcast' and the following week gave Henney a full chance to state his side of the case - balance not being given because of the aforementioned dispute. The *Daily Mail* (11/6/85) termed the Council's disciplinary proceedings 'akin to the kind you expect from Nazi Germany or Stalin's Russia'. Pledger herself was portrayed as a 'bewildered council clerk' and 'white grandmother'. With characteristic diffidence *The Times* of May 11th reported that 'A woman employed by the London Borough of Islington has been found guilty of racial harassment because she failed to ask a colleague whether she was going to the office Xmas party.'

The Press was aided in its coverage of the dispute by the Leader of the Opposition, SDP Councillor Peter Hyams. He was responsible for forwarding details of the disciplinary hearings to the *Mail on Sunday* and to the *Islington Gazette*. The leaking of the names of the black workers complaining of racial harassment was perhaps the most serious aspect. The *Mail on Sunday* was castigated by Islington's

Chief Executive, Eric Dear, for a breach of confidentiality by naming Linda Braithwaite as the primary complainant. He noted that since the publication of the item, 'that person has been a victim of a sinister campaign of threats and intimidation from a person or persons unknown'.^{7a} Hyams went on to accuse Nalgo and the Council of operating a 'kangaroo court' in their proceedings against the 3 racists.^{7b}

On May 1985 Islington Council gave expression to supporting the struggle of black workers in other parts of the world when it flew the flags of the African National Congress (ANC) and South West African Peoples' Organisation (SWAPO) over the Town Hall and declared Islington an apartheid-free zone. At the same time, Irene Pledger, one of the three accused racists, who had been suspended since the offence had been reported and was not a Nalgo member, and Henney, were reported as having sought out the assistance of Lady Jane Birdwood, a lifelong racist campaigner. Birdwood was a veteran of the far-right in Britain having been active in founding the Anti-Immigrant standing Committee and providing a bridgehead between crypto-fascist groups and the Conservative Right. It is alleged that it was she who provided the legal representation for Henney and Pledger at the Appeals Hearing. Following the presentation of new information at the Appeals hearing [under Section 4.2 of the Complaints and Grievance Procedure] the suspension of Pledger was extended.

The Socialist Workers Party (SWP), with a base of a few members in Nalgo, was organising for the dismissal of the racists as was the Nalgo Black Workers Group. On 18th July Islington Race and Housing Group held a picket at the Town Hall to renew the call for the sackings of the racists, a spokeswoman for the Group claiming that the

atmosphere had worsened towards black workers in some Council Offices and that what she viewed as the Councillor's equivocal solutions added to the problem. She noted, 'Anti-racist posters in offices have been slashed and one woman who decided to fight the racists has been receiving threatening phone calls. Its time to stop talking and start acting.'⁸⁰ As mentioned earlier, Vi Howells had been transferred to a Neighbourhood Office, the Quadrant Office and she was due to start work there on August 5th. It was therefore to that office that the attention of Nalgo and other groups was switched.

Nalgo locally, but more importantly key activists within different sections of the Housing Department, organised housing workers to go on strike until all three workers disciplined had given a written assurance that they would abide by Islington's EOEP and that the Council would ensure that they were not dealing with members of the public. The Council intended for Vi Howells to return to work on August 5th at the Quadrant Neighbourhood Office where she would not only deal with the public but also would not have to sign any declaration on her support for the EOEP before resuming her duties. Nalgo workers at her new office and at other Neighbourhood Offices and other sections in the Housing Department came out on strike on that day and mounted a picket at the Quadrant office. On being greeted by a picket Howells reported to the Council's Personnel Department where she was given alternative work.

The industrial action taken put the Labour councillors leading the Labour Group in the position of defending racist workers and attacking the actions of their own union members. The letter from Sally Gilbert, quoted above, shows the way in which the councillors set

the agenda for anti-racism within the Council. The position was not helped by the strike occurring in the holiday period for many councillors and council workers which delayed the whole administrative process. Acting Council Leader Alan Clinton defended Howells by claiming, 'this woman has been punished already. There is nothing to be gained by punishing her twice' and accused the strikers of 'anti-social posturing'¹. Keith Venness, leading Labour Councillor and Councillor for the ward in which Vi Howells would now work, blamed the unions for the continuation of racism in the Council but opposed their attempts to remove the three racists. He argued, 'They [Nalگو] should have rooted out racism long ago. They can't call on the councillors to solve their problems. The workers' demands are ludicrous.'²

The strike was having its effect on the running of the decentralised scheme, where the closure of any Neighbourhood Office had an immediate local effect and the number of strikers grew from 300 to nearly 400 in a few days with ten out of the Council's thirteen Neighbourhood Offices were closed. The Nalگو workers spread the industrial action to housing advisory sections, social services area teams, night duty teams special services and emergency duty teams. Messages of support came from Hackney, Camden, Haringey and GLC Nalگو branches. Although on the surface adopting a hard line, the Council was involved with negotiations with Nalگو and conceded (within four hours of the strike) that Henney and Pledger would have no contact with the public but the Council held firm over Howells taking up her appointment. Jacqui Brown, of Islington Nalگو, criticised the council for not following its own anti racist policies to their logical conclusions and argued:

The Council's position is that the strike is about Nalgo's objections to an individual and their own 'right to manage'. The union feels that if Islington Council is to offer a fair and equal service, it must protect the communities it serves by ensuring its workforce is both able and willing to implement its policy on anti-racism, whilst black workers have a right to protection from abuse and discrimination from other workers.⁸³

The midsummer delays were also having their effect on the local Labour party, many of whose members were concerned over the actions of the Councillors. Both Islington North and South Constituency Parties supported the demands of the strikers, the latter issuing a resolution noting 'the Council seems more interested in taking a tough line with the Councillors than with dealing with the racists'. Twelve wards also passed resolutions in line with Nalgo's position. The ruling Labour Group, which finally met to discuss the strike in September appeared to support the Nalgo position against the Councillors. Out of 49 Labour Councillors, 29 had been mandated by their ward meetings to support the strike. However at the Labour Group 11 of these councillors were absent and 5 broke their mandate, including top influential Sally Gilbert, Chair of Personnel, who argued at the meeting 'The Councillors run Islington, not the Labour Party.'⁸⁴ The Labour Group broke with the mandate and passed motions supporting the Council Leadership stance and called on Nalgo to return to work. One of the motions was proposed by the Chair of Housing who had reversed his earlier position of backing the strikers.

The Council did attempt some damage limitation two weeks into the strike when they brought forward proposals to issue guidelines on racial harassment, provide RAT training for managers, and reconsider

the procedure for dealing with complaints and disciplinary matters in relation to the EOEP. At the same time these recommendations did not resolve the immediate crisis over the Nalgo strike. Unlike the Sam Bond case in Liverpool, Nalgo nationally did not rush to make the dispute official until a full ballot had been taken of the members and the pressures on the strikers were considerably greater, because the central issue was not one of wages or conditions. The Council was able to run some Neighbourhood Offices through the support of the managerial section of the GMBATU, MATSA, whose Frank Foley accused Nalgo of using Howell as a political pawn.

A one day strike across the Council was called for August 15th and received partial, if sectional, support. At a rally of strikers Islington North MP Jeremy Corbyn called for an independent inquiry into racism in the Council and for the removal of 'the very senior people at the Council who had allowed racism to flourish'. Linda Bellos also offered her backing to the campaign, as a member of the Labour Party Black Sections Steering Committee. As the strike entered into its third week there were inevitable pressures for a return to work and three Neighbourhood Offices re-opened. At the beginning of September 1985, with apparent stalemate having been reached, Islington Nalgo balloted all its members to extend the strike to an all-out dispute in the borough. Although the SWP and other activists argued with their members in the Nalgo branches and through outside leafletting etc. for more effective picketing, the local Nalgo bureaucracy kept tight control of the dispute and focused on the ballot as the key issue around which offered hope of building strike action. Out of the 2000 members balloted, 36% voted in favour of an all-out

strike. Whilst this was a sizeable minority, the ballot result effectively knocked the wind out of the strikers and at a meeting attended by over 250 strikers the following week, there was an overwhelming acceptance of the strike committee's recommendation for an orderly return to work.

The Council and Nalgo agreed a back-to-work package in which the union underscored its position that the dispute - over disciplinary procedures aimed at fighting racism and guarantees for a non-discriminatory policy for all - continued. David Burn of Nalgo argued that the union would continue the dispute and endeavour to ensure that Council services were delivered in a non-racist way. On their part the Council were pleased that the strike was over with their position practically unaltered. Noting the proposed changes in the procedures for disciplining Council workers found guilty of racist acts, Sally Gilbert sought to re-affirm the centrality of individualist schemes such as RAT. She commented 'The council and its trade unions will now sit down and work out the procedures and training that are needed to combat racism.'

7.19 The Procedural response of Islington Council

The immediate recommendations made following the strike came from the Director of Personnel, L.J. Bartlett (a key influential), with input from Sally Gilbert. The Equal Opportunities Joint Committee considered Bartlett's recommendations which included the following:

1. That the EOEP's definition of harassment be amended to remove the need for the harassment to be repeated - therefore lessening the burden

of proof on the complainant.

2. That the Equal Opportunities Unit should have its role increased to offer confidential advice and assistance to any potential complainants.
3. That 'it has been recognised that staff pursuing such complaints may need more support than that under existing (grievance and disciplinary) procedures.'
4. That greater emphasis should be given to combating racist ideas by the promotion of 'Dealing with racism at work' courses which are primarily aimed at countering racist attitudes and practices particularly as they affect services. Those sent on the courses 'must include the most senior management and managers most involved in service delivery'.

Guidelines were also issued by the Race Relations Adviser (RRA) in the Housing Department on dealing with racial harassment at work²⁷. The question arises as to whether the RRA in Housing would be the best or the worst qualified person to deal with the issue of racial harassment given the handling of the above dispute. The Guidelines claimed that the Council and Unions 'had negotiated procedures which will provide proper redress for individuals claiming racial harassment' and reminded managers that non-pursuance of harassment cases may constitute a disciplinary offence.

A distinction was made between harassment and victimisation, the latter occurring after a person has made a complaint of discrimination or been a witness in such a matter. The intention of this differentiation was to give confidence to people to come forward when they had witnessed or been subject to, acts of racial discrimination and harassment. This clearly refers to the continuing

racial abuse and harassment that Linda Braithwaite suffered after making her complaints about Howells, Pledger and Henney. The problem of course is that much racial harassment can be anonymous in terms of threats etc and can easily happen outside the workplace, so that the burden of proof is once again thrown upon the complainants to prove links between any anonymous harassment and the workplace offences.

The criteria which constitute racial harassment were also to be broadened to include physical assault and intimidation; derogatory references including racist jokes; the wearing of racist insignia/badges; the writing of racist graffiti and defacing of anti-racist notices; attempts to stir up racial hatred and the encouragement of others to ostracise member of staff on the basis of colour, ethnicity and race. Once again the particular definitions of what is termed as racial harassment have been shaped by the strike. Reference is made to the defacing of anti-racist notices which had happened in the Essex St Office, the ostracism of staff, which was the main complaint against Henney. The other criteria, including derogatory remarks, were often raised by black workers in the course of the dispute but those are particularly the kind of occurrence which the Council dismissed as 'hearsay' and inadmissible at the disciplinary hearings.

Most important were the Guidelines for handling cases of alleged racial harassment. These offered suggestions meant to compliment the EOEP Complaints and Grievance Procedure and once again centred upon the council's view of having close officer control over the whole procedure. Whilst 'any member of staff or trade union representative may draw the attention of section heads or immediate

supervisors' to instances of racial harassment, it is the liaison between Chief Officers and Section Heads which is clearly promoted as the appropriate forum for deciding on how to act on such cases. Supervisors/Section Heads were to record (if not report) incidents and regularly inform the Chief Officer even if the victim does not wish to pursue the matter. Where complaints have been made to the Chief Officers it would still be the responsibility of the immediate supervisor of the workplace to record all such acts. In effect, the onus for dealing with cases is to be kept with the local manager, in Neighbourhood Offices for example.

The effects of these improvements upon the racial harassment policies are twofold. On one level the experience of the dispute has caused the Council both to widen and clarify the criteria under which disciplinary action can be taken against harassers, although whether these amount to qualitative changes is debatable. In what is a notable parallel to the Newham racial harassment case study above (see Chapter 5), where groups such as the Newham Monitoring Project stressed that there was no need for new legal measures as the existing law was perfectly adequate but poorly applied, several of Islington's recommendations were already covered under their prevailing disciplinary procedures. The Council could deal with defacing of its notices as it could with assault and threatening behaviour without further policy changes. What the above alterations to the particulars of the racial harassment procedure do not really address is the situation which had developed in Islington's Housing Department where workers lacked the confidence both in management and in the

disciplinary procedures to adequately deal with acts of racial harassment.

The onus remained upon particular managers in particular offices to deal with racial harassment and although it was recommended that Chief Officers would see reports of all incidents, it is difficult to see how they would act without the recommendations of the Supervisors and others 'on the ground' - Vi Howell was, of course a section supervisor. The role of trade unions was played down so that they were treated as an afterward almost, in which they could bring up a members grievances. Having aired the complaint it would then be removed from their sphere of influence and taken into the managerial structure and as Sally Gilbert, notes below, the 'quasi-judicial' atmosphere of the Personnel Disciplinary Sub-Committee would come into play. The 'independent' bodies which employees were recommended to go to were the Equal Opportunities and Race Relations Units of the Council rather than their trade unions. Whilst the above measures were introduced as a response to the Nalگو strike the Council did not seek out a greater role for the union but rather attempted to circumvent its influence by offering other options to workers to get their complaints heard.

By late 1986 the format of race relations training for Islington Council Housing officers was again under review. The training was being specifically targeted at dealing with racial harassment and related matters with training programmes for Estate Managers, Caretakers and all front line staff. The Council also set targets for the recruitment of black and other 'disadvantaged groups' within the Council's services with particular attention being paid to staff in

Neighbourhood Offices, other sections of the Department and key groups such as Advisory, Lettings, Housing Benefits and Estate Management⁸⁹. The Personnel Committee organised a series of seminars in late 1986 for senior management for dealing with racism at work, led by an external consultant psychologist. The report of the course was generally favourable and the report noted that 'staff had already given much thought to the service implication of racist practices or prejudices.'⁹⁰ This may not be too surprising given that fourteen months previously 400 Nalgo staff had been on strike over racial harassment in the Housing Department.

In 1988 the Council promoted a newly published booklet *Time for Positive Action* which promoted the moves made by the Council in the pursuance of racial equality. The booklet made no mention of the Housing Department dispute and indeed no mention at all of the role of the trade unions in the Council in fighting racism. The official history of the first six years of race relations policy in Islington therefore ignores, as an earlier letter to the *Islington Gazette* (13/9/85) noted, a dispute in which 'the most significant and revealing thing is that 500 people feel strongly enough about racial harassment of black workers to do without pay for a month'. It would be a little difficult for the Council to explain why its own workers chose to go on strike because it was not doing enough about fighting racism.

7.20 Case Study Summary

Jeremy Weinstein wrote in *Critical Social Policy* (Autumn 1986) arguing that Left Labour Councillors were better placed to lead a

struggle for socialism than a group of workers steeped in 'trade union consciousness'. He claimed:

An alliance of socialist councillors, community and constituency activists and radicalised elements of local government professions such as social workers and planners, is seen as being able to go beyond purely defensive struggles and redefine the possibilities for building socialism within the local state.²¹

What Weinstein and the Islington Labour leadership failed to grasp was the contradictory and ambivalent position *inherently* reached by those who define themselves as socialists but because of their position within the local state act as management, indeed are the management and employers. The contradiction can be shown no more clearly than in this dispute where the Councillors had offered support to black workers on strike in South Africa and striking miners in Britain but not when they were faced with one of their own unions in dispute. Since the emergence of the left on Islington Council in the 1982 local elections, the Council leadership has striven to introduce policies which would combat racism and promote equality of opportunity both in the Council's unique position through its service provision and employment procedures and practices.

In February 1984, in line with the GLC's anti-racist year, the Council launched its 'One Islington' campaign aimed at tackling racist ideas at their roots. The assumption was that by a combination of a high anti-racist profile and positive programmes for action, racism and its effects could be seriously undermined in Islington. Margaret Hodge, Leader of the Council, argued at the time, 'Racism is

one of the most difficult problems facing our society. One year's activity will not bring it to an end but it will be a year in which policies and practices aimed at tackling racism can get off the ground.⁹² In other words the Council had apparently set up a solid framework for building the municipal anti-racist policy network around equal opportunities in employment, service provision, publicity and PR, contract compliance etc.

In terms of employment, the cornerstone was the EOEP which was in part focusing on interviewing and new employee requirements, also stressed that the Council would follow through its policy commitment keenly against racism in the workforce. When that policy was finally put to the test, the councillors kept resolutely to the disciplinary mechanism. The councillors felt that this did not require 'consultation' and certainly not influence on what was viewed as merely an internal disciplinary matter. Sally Gilbert, Personnel Committee Chair, summarised the position thus:

The council recognises that this is an emotive issue but remains firmly of the view that where the disciplinary machinery - a quasi-judicial process - has been used to discipline an individual then that sentence is final and cannot be added to by outside pressures. We are not prepared to put our employees in a double jeopardy situation.⁹³

The question of top and key influentials and their control over the agenda of the dispute is more straightforward than in some of the earlier case studies discussed above. The Personnel Committee which decided in the appropriate disciplinary measures against Pledger, Howells and Henney supported and valued the 'objective' semi-legalistic

structure of the disciplinary meetings above the 'subjective' experiences of the black workers themselves. The Labour Councillors were able to ignore the mandate of their wards, the criticism of external pressure groups and the opposition of a large group of their own workers. The Councillors themselves, albeit implicitly, recognised the value of key and top influentials in the local state. By their wholehearted acceptance of RAT³⁴ the Councillors committed themselves to an anti-racist policy which recognised collective organisation for management of the 'black community' but sought individualist solutions which could be applied to and by senior management. Hence it was they who were to attend RAT courses (later amended to include staff dealing with the public) where they could then run their services in an anti-racist way. In fact discussions about RAT only revolved around whether or not the courses should be made compulsory.

In what was possibly the first political strike over racism in the workplace in Britain, the leading militants of the strikers returned to work feeling confident that they had brought more of the arguments about racial harassment into the open and developed greater solidarity in the workforce against racism than all the race relations policies developed by the Council. As Reana Gordon, a typist in the Calshot Area Office and Nalگو striker, claimed:

Management have an equal opportunities policy but it's propaganda. It attracts attention and gets praised from outsiders but inside the offices where you try to implement it, it falls down. Black people, particularly the older generation, have always felt isolated by racism. You can feel that it's something you have to live with and cope for yourself. We won't get rid of racism overnight but at least we're making a stand. The strike will mean that next time it will be easier to do something about it.³⁵

The optimism of that scenario may be misplaced but further proffers an alternative strategy against racism to the managerialist one of the councillors.

7.21 Chapter Summary

The commitment of the New Left in local authorities to providing equality of opportunity in employment has been shown in job advertisements, the use of ethnic monitoring to establish the composition of council workforces, improving interviewing techniques to lessen the likelihood of candidates failing because of racism and the use of contract compliance by which outside contractors are only given Council contracts on the basis that they operate some form of equal opportunities policy.

The expansionist period of the Labour-Left in local government (1980-83), followed by ratecapping and slogans around 'defence of jobs and services' (1984-85) have now been followed by an intense desire for survival at the helm of Labour-controlled councils. At the Labour Co-ordinating Committee Conference in July 1987, Margaret Hodge, leader of Islington, argued that 'where there is a conflict of interests, the services must take precedence over trade union interests arises, or even jobs'. Any of the above-mentioned policies aimed at lessening discrimination are therefore based on a non-expanding and quiescent workforce. By January 1987 Peter Crowney, a Hackney Councillor, was writing in *London Labour Briefing*, 'There is no such thing as a socialist local authority in the country - only socialists attempting to run a piece of capitalist state machinery.'

Two of the facets of employment considerations in anti-racism have been brought out by the case studies discussed here. One shows how the appointment of a top influential to manage the race relations strategy of a local authority drew the fire of community groups in Liverpool. The other showed up not a problem in the employment of a race relations manager but rather the failings of an employment policy in effectively dealing with racial harassment in the workplace. In Herman Ouseley's story of the setting up of race relations policies in Lambeth he came down in favour of 'enlightened management' pointing out the powerlessness of those outside the managerial team. The point of congruence of both these case studies in employment is the degree to which the key councillors involved maintained tight control of the managerial position within the relevant disputes.

In some of the case studies above, the role of community groups and organisations has been stressed in the municipal socialist venture and the degree to which their incorporation within the local state terms of reference over race relations initiatives enables the Councils to control the agenda. What has been shown up in the employment case studies is that when the Council is brought into sharp conflict with their own workforces, the conceptualisation of a collectivist/socialist/pluralist decision-making process is a basically flawed one.

Liverpool City Council eschewed the line taken by other local authorities considered above in its promotion of measures with an explicit class dimension rather than promoting 'race'. The language of Derek Hatton and Tony Mulhearn was one of class politics which saw

black organisations as 'unrepresentative' and self-serving. To that end it was closely aligned with the manual trade unions - TGWU & GMBATU - in the Council, especially for support in its anti-ratecapping campaign. When it came to the dominant white collar union, Nalgo, relations were less close and further strained by the Sam Bond dispute. The questions of whether Sam Bond was the appropriate appointee; of his links with Militant; of the way that the Black Caucus used the manifest inappropriateness of Sam Bond to push their own claims for dominance in the race relations bodies; are all only part of the issue. The fundamental factor is the way in which the Councillors were able to circumvent the protests, campaigns and concentrated efforts of all concerned to unseat Bond. Having decided on the appointment of their key race relations influential, the Councillors, as employers, were not to be blown off course.

It is against that background that the claims of worker participation and community involvement in race relations policy-making must be measured. The case of Sam Bond stood out more so because of his lack of credentials for the post but for all the Councillors' talk of workers' control, the issue remained one of management's right to manage. In the housing case studies considered above it was the degree of incorporation within the policy framework which ameliorated the Council's actions. In Liverpool the Council was able to override the objections raised from all quarters in the defence of an unwanted race relations adviser. It was thus the Council and not other groups, even the trade union which would represent the Race Relation Unit's staff which set the agenda for race relations policy in the city. The top influential employed was to represent the Council leadership, not the

black population of the city. That is the assumption of a managerial responsibility which sits uncomfortably with the participatory models of municipal socialism and consultation in anti-racist policy looked at in Chapter 4 above.

It may be suggested that the Liverpool case study, coming as it does from a different Left Labour standpoint to the other case studies. The Islington case study, however, throws up similarities to that of Liverpool. Here it was not the employment of a council's first key influential in race relations, for Islington had already established a race relations framework but rather the application of the Equal Opportunities Employment Policy which was challenged by Nalgo. The key influentials once again were the Councillors who, facing less of a citywide campaign than the Liverpool Councillors, still had to cope with a borough wide strike by Nalgo members. As in the Liverpool case study the Councillors chose to ignore the mandates of their Labour Party Wards in defence of their own policy.

In what was in some ways similar to the attitude of Brent council during the Maureen McGoldrick dispute, the Councillors stuck firmly to their policy of using individualist solutions to instances of workplace racism. As the dispute grew it became the defence of the policy rather than the most appropriate method to combat racism which became the issue. The actions of Nalgo, who argued that a one day or one week RAT course would not remove racism from hardened racists brought them into direct conflict with their employers. What became more obvious through the dispute was the isolationism which the Councillors sought refuge in when in conflict over their race relations disciplinary procedures.

Both also illustrate the sociological ambivalences of what Merton termed the attempt 'to blend incompatible or potentially incompatible norms into a functionally consistent whole'. The description offered by Merton is of a 'status-set' conflict but one might also proffer the notion of an ambivalent or contradictory class location occupied by socialist managers of the local state. In summation, the case studies showed the limited power of local councillors within the local state in either defending a person or a procedure against the actions of their own trade unions. In Islington the bloc of top and key influentials were able to ignore the mandates of their Labour Party wards and sit out the Nalgo strike. In Liverpool the isolation of Sam Bond was not enough to unseat him, given the DLP support for the Militant line. Both cases show the importance placed by Labour Councillors on their ability to ignore external organisations, their own workers and at times their own local Labour Party. For these municipal socialists the section of the working class which they employ are expected only to play a supportive role to the duly elected councillors - effectively a subordination of workers' organisations and anti-racist pressure groups to the managers of the local state.

CHAPTER 8

Conclusions

8.1 The contribution of the thesis

In the Introduction to this thesis the differentiation was raised between explanatory and analytical theory, with the suggestion that the latter could be used to analyse and typologise certain social situations without necessary reference to what explanatory powers the work incorporates. There are serious theoretical and practical difficulties with the assumption that analyses can present abstract sociological data within a codified form which does not seek to explain wider social conditions or need a wider explanatory basis. But inasmuch as this thesis has been focused on the ideology of racism it did not attempt to provide the grand definition of racism or the grand critique of reformism, rather to show, and clarify sociologically by the examples and case studies available, what some of the obstacles faced by local authority anti-racists have been in the 1980s.

The contrast with the ANL was a marked one, for it did not seek to compare anti-racist strategies in another country, as could have been done with America since the 1960s, nor did it compare the success of those policies with others in a similar vein, e.g. anti-sexism and womens' rights work within the Left Labour Councils. The study of the ANL was taken on because of its *modus operandi*, the extra-state, movementist, activist self-organisational form, mainly led by

Marxists, who in their approach to anti-racist/anti-fascist strategy an implicit (and sometimes explicit) assumption about the fundamental and unreformable class nature of the capitalist state.

The demise of the ANL and the movementism it epitomised brought anti-racism off the streets and into the Town Halls and the implication that although movements could combat other movements, real political power lay in the local authority for a more generalised fight against racism. The present period, alternately titled either 'municipal socialism' or 'local statism', was at the inception of the research only beginning in terms of local authority anti-racist policy and practice. Since then a greater degree of sophistication might have been expected from local authorities but this was not always apparent from the Case Studies explored above.

The method of studying the six local state Case Studies. of approaching key and top influentials within each area, was intended to help appraise the municipal socialist claim that control of the local state machine was the key to promoting anti-racism in the locale. In some cases the most important respondents were not forthcoming and that is to be expected, when the subject matter is in such a sensitive area and in a contemporary vein. The thesis is that much poorer because of it. Similarly other areas for study such as planning, social services and local health would have provided useful sectors for similar examinations. In both the ANL and the local state case studies, the restrictions of space were limits on the descriptions of two anti-racist strategies which could easily fill a book each. Much of the content of the Case Studies above had to be spent on both relating the salient incidents, listing the relevant 'race relations' policies and

generalising the particular subject areas of housing, education and employment. The difficulty was in providing both enough of the situation to explain its specificity whilst giving enough of the analysis to reach broader conclusions about the anti-racist strategy in general.

On reflection the thesis may not have suffered too much had there been only one case study in each of the three areas examined but the plan of having two case studies per area did have the advantage if not always in straight comparative terms, of adding breadth to the discussion. In reality the delineations drawn are not as clear as suggested in the case studies. The McGoldrick case, for example, could be presented as an employment issue and the strike at Islington was over racism in the Housing Department, which also provided the impetus for the CRE investigation in Hackney. The fact that some of these case studies may have been interchangeable had different factors does not invalidate their importance, rather it simply shows the interrelation of the subjects and the way in which the conflicts explored have been brought in various aspects of policy and practice.

The advantage to the methodology adopted, that of locating key informants within and around each local authority case study, and indeed in the ANL study, was that it fitted best with the areas under consideration. The contemporary nature of all the studies above was such that taking full cognisance of the recollections and opinions of agents who had some degree of power, responsibility or influence in policy implementation and formation seemed most appropriate. Some case studies, such as Brent, provided more respondents whereas others, in Hackney for example, were completed more from secondary data. In a

situation where the researcher is much of the time shadowing the actions of those being studied, some form of ethnographic approach appears most profitable, at least in these instances.

The first half of the thesis, an analysis of the ANL as an anti-racist social movement, suggested some of the limits of the strategy. The Anti Nazi League as a United Front, or form of United Front, was partially successful in its opposition to a fascist party attempting to exploit popular racism in building a fascist mass movement. Other factors such as the demographic and psephological ones suggested by Stan Taylor in this study of the NF, combined with the 'swamping' speech of Margaret Thatcher add to the complexity of the case. Certainly the ANL contributed substantially to the demise of the NF by opposing it through a variety of extraparliamentary forms which could not be equally matched by those seeking to work within the environs of the local state.

The ANL was able to combine those anti-racist and anti-fascist forces which were clearly anti the NF but could not necessarily provide wider strategies for combating the power and influence of the ideology of racism within contemporary Britain. As an anti-racist strategy it could not be transferred to other less clearly definable targets such as what is collectively termed 'institutional racism'. Indeed for the SWP, the prime party organisationally immersed within the ANL, institutional racism could only be surmounted by the 'smashing' the institution above all, the state. But that required a broader political agreement than existed within those making up the ANL. The Anti Nazi League was a successful movement in its declared aim

of campaigning against and opposing the National Front. Without the NF the reason for the ANL subsided and many of the activists moved into the Labour Party and contributed to the resurgent Labour Left, following the 1979 General Election and the rise of Bennism, which was to infuse much of the anti-racist elements of the reborn tendency of termed municipal socialism.

The nature of electoral politics is such that it took the Labour Left a period of four years (1979-83) to register successes in a number of inner city councils, particularly in London. Its academic mirror was a resurgence of interest in the theory of the local state, by which local government was viewed as an area for socialist/radical advance through its potential for embracing the 'new social movements'. As part of this current the black population of Britain was to be separated into communities and ethnic groups and Race Relations Units and Committees set up to administer what was determined to be 'ethnic need'. The aim of the municipal socialists was to use power backed by 'community involvement' and being 'accountable' to local residents, though in reality both those terms have been shown to be little more than vague assertions. The theory of the local state, however much cognisance was taken of the class character of the capitalist state and however qualified the degree of local autonomy was held to be, saw local government as the place to be in the 1980s. The theoretical explanandum of why this should be, when the administrative powers of local government had been gradually reduced since the Second World War, were never concretely clarified except for a more politicised version of 'small is beautiful'.

In the development of anti-racist strategies the Labour Left

sought to educate and inform people about the wrongness of racism, its extent and ways to reduce it. Hand in hand with this was the inclusion of disciplinary procedures to stamp out racist behaviour by employees and in service provision, moves to encourage black people to work for the local authority and use its services. In general, the creation of an anti-racist ethos was gradually sought to work through all areas of local government activity. For many observers, success was measured by the number of policy initiatives instigated and the number of advisers employed and committees formed.

What the case studies have shown is the severely compromised position of those seeking to combat racism within the confines of local government. Councillors and senior officers have some power and influence within the local authority, in terms of policy development, hiring and firing etc but there appears to be confusion between what internal changes can be wrought by Labour administrations and the reproductive functions of the capitalist state as a whole. If the aim is to eliminate racism through the actions of the local state then the Councillors and their theoreticians have to show that they can have some effect on social conditions in the areas they are responsible for. Housing policy, education policy and employment policy have all been subject to central state intervention, as the Case Studies have shown.

In housing both Hackney and Newham simply do not have enough houses or adequate funds enough to even begin to undermine the poor housing conditions from which racism can appear 'common-sense'. The actions of Brent Council have not suggested that they are seeking unity with the local teachers for the improvement of multicultural or anti-racist education, rather that they simply wish to discipline such

teachers as Maureen McGoldrick, avoid the issues of such schools as Islamia and threaten teaching redundancies because of the Council's cash crisis. In Islington and Liverpool, despite all the defiant rhetoric which came from the Councils about the need to disobey the Government's ratecapping laws, both Councils acceded to Government spending limits, reduced their employment options and in the case of Islington moved towards the reification of policy as the only expression of the Councillors' power. The Liverpool Case Study similarly showed the ability of the Council to defend its employment decision against a range of local groups and people but how this could be equated with local socialism remains most unclear.

As to the nature of the ideology of racism, the local state strategy was one which regularly adopted the definition of racism = power + prejudice. The strategy involved the positioning of anti-racists within positions of power and the advocacy of educative and informative schemes as well as RAT to remove prejudice, which is a very individualised context in which to place racism. The combination to combat racism is thus the presentation of anti-racist arguments and the imposition of administrative changes from the senior managerial levels of the local state. This argument removes racism from its material and social base and can in cases such as Maureen McGoldrick take on the dimension of a personalised fight against an individual. Power became, not class or state power so much as the power of interpersonal relationships. Material conditions, however, have a way of re-asserting themselves. The basis for the ideology of racism is in the social conditions which allow for its reproduction and which have been shown in the Case Studies above to be simply beyond the control of those

working within the local sector of the state.

The availability of housing, the nature of education, the conditions of employment cannot be mediated or controlled by Left Labour Councils in a non-capitalist way. The competition central for capitalism which encourages competition over jobs and houses, as well as competition within the educational system promotes divisions within the working class to which the ideology of racism can provide 'common-sense' answers. The arrival of black migrants in the context of material decline and the actual competition over scarce resources has played an important part in the processes of racial categorisation which were an integral part of the production and reproduction of the ideology of racism. In each of the areas explored in the case studies above, working class racism is to a large extent related to the very material conditions which the local statist are not in a position to alter - in main because of both the fiscal constraints made upon local authorities by central government and the weak position of local government in relation to the central state. Rather the election of Councillors to fight racism implicitly denies the centrality of working class struggle as an anti-racist force and, as shown in some of case studies this brings them specifically into conflict with their own workers, not as municipal socialists but as managers of the localised sector of the capitalist state.

8.2 Summary - On strategies against racism

Despite the breadth of scope offered by an investigation of this length, the specificity of the subject under investigation

necessarily involves eschewing some broader considerations as to the nature of the society and state in which racism flourishes, some of which have been alluded to above. Given that the broad framework is established initially this thesis attempted to compare two strategies against racism, one influenced by the ideas of reformism, the other by revolution. The local state theorists, whatever the qualifications offered in support of their arguments, both viewed the local government as an appropriate forum for socialist advance and for the forces opposed to racism within society. By contrast the Anti Nazi League avoided co-operation with any part of the state (save for the odd supportive Labour council) in building a movement which could oppose a growing fascist movement and which at least attempted to relate to the working class advertising the threat nascent fascism posed to white workers as well as to black. Whilst this does not mean that the outcomes of the local state Case Studies prove the bankruptcy of reformism or that the limited success of the ANL therefore proves the correctness of the revolutionary road.

The material factors which produce and reproduce racism do not come about as a result of the peculiar social relations according to 'race' or 'nation' per se but out of the production relations of capitalist society. For Marxists the working class is the subject rather than the object of change and that white workers have an interest in combating racism. If the state is mistakenly viewed as a neutral or autonomous body which can alternatively be captured and used for socialist ends then it can be argued that local government can provide the structures by which racism can be gradually undermined and removed. However, as the state is an instrument of class rule and in

the few sectors where socialists have found a home have found their options severely limited, it cannot be viewed uncritically, even in its localised forms. The Left Labour Councils, which at the beginning of the 1980s were elected to carry out their own expansive packages, by the end of the 1980s were carrying out financial cuts thrust upon them from the national level. The material conditions of black and white people which they were elected to represent have not fundamentally changed and neither have the production relations which they are born into. In the struggle against racism, the strategy cannot be confined to racism alone, nor to the confines of the central and local state.

NOTES

CHAPTER 1

1. Discussions as to the nature of ideology are legion. Almost any attempt to formulate an analysis and explanation of the nature of ideology, is liable to attack for its anti-traditionalism or lack of modernism. An equal problem of is that of equivocation and relativism. Having stated that, it is concurrent with the works of Marx, Engels and Lenin that ideology should be seen as a system of representations that mystify the relations between people and the conditions of their existence. The important point is that ideology must be studied in relation to to the social relations and class society, in which it is embedded. And as Giddens notes, in A. Giddens (1971) *Capitalism and modern social theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), in a statement which could well be applied to the study of racism as an ideology, that 'while ideologies obviously show continuity over time, neither this continuity, nor any changes which occur, can be explained purely in terms of their own internal content.' (pp41-2)
Marx, in K Marx (1965) *The German Ideology* (London: Lawrence and Wishart) and (1973) *Grundrisse* (Harmondsworth: Penguin) provides insights into his own conception of ideology but the term is used at times imprecisely, which in part accounts for the degree of debate which has followed. For general overviews of the Marxist debate see J Larrain (1980) 'On the Character of Ideology', *Theory Culture and Society* 2 pp5-22 and E Laclau (1977) *Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory* (London: NLB). For a summation of Althusser's thoughts and influence on the matter P Q Hirst (1977) 'Althusser's Theory of Ideology', *Economy and Society* Vol 5 No 4 p385 is useful as is Chantal Mouffe's reading of Gramsci in C Mouffe (ed) (1979) *Gramsci and Marxist Theory* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul).
2. The 'bottom-up' tradition runs throughout E P Thompson (1968) *The Making of the English Working Class* (Pelican: Harmondsworth) and accounts of Trotskyism in Britain, albeit partial, are provided by J Callaghan (1984) *British Trotskyism* (Oxford: Blackwell) and S Bornstein and A Richardson (1986) *Against the Stream* (London: Socialist Platform).
3. For some of the most graphic accounts of that period see P Piratin (1978) *Our Flag Stays Red* 2nd Edition (London: Lawrence and Wishart), R Benewick (1972) *The Fascist Movement in Britain* (London: Allen Lane) and J Fyrth (ed) (1985) *Britain, Fascism and the Popular Front* (London: Lawrence and Wishart).
4. Ralph Miliband in R Miliband (1983) 'State Power and Class Interests', *New Left Review* 130 pp37-68 argues that:

The dynamic of social action is explained by Marxism in terms of the imperative requirements of capital or the imperative requirements of labour... what is the relationship of state power to class interests. The answer is that, throughout the

history of capitalism that relationship has been very good.

(pp 42-44)

5. Through a process of rather selective reading C Cockburn's (1977) *The Local State* (London: Pluto) has become a key influence for those arguing for that socialist control of local authorities was a gradualist step for a new way of achieving socialism, not through the working class but through a broad democratic alliance of the dispossessed (See also T Flynn (1981) 'Local Politics and Local Government', *Capital and Class* 13). An entertaining critique is provided by N Harris (1986) 'What to do with London: The strategies of the GLC 1981-86', *International Socialism* 2:31 pp113-134 in which he surmises that for 'Local Statists':

The opposition to the state is not a united class, but the local, the community. Here is a revival of Burke's native land of little platoons, of happy hobbit valleys, peaceful in the sunlight with peasants singing in the fields ... The underlying vision is not merely utopian, it is reactionary.

(p 133)

6. As in Poplar Council in London in the early 1920s. See N Branson (1979) *Poplarism 1919-25* (London: Lawrence and Wishart).
7. A Callinicos (1982) *Is there a future for Marxism* (London: Macmillan) is one amongst many who denies the validity of the split.
8. John Palmer of the GLC argues, in J Palmer (1986) 'Reply to Nigel Harris', *International Socialism* 2:33 pp134-5, that

programmes strategies and when (fleeting) there is the opportunity, interventions around "prefigurative" demands for production for need, industrial democracy, human-centred technologies, social ownership are important precisely in helping to recreate the political awareness and self-confidence which is an essential component of the reemergence of militancy and a willingness to struggle.'

(p135)

9. One definition of 'Thatcherism' might be a new form of class rule involving direct ideological appeal to the masses - backed up by a strengthened repressive state apparatus. There are problems in this analysis in its ability to explain the real qualitative difference that Thatcherism is supposed to present. In economic terms, the Government has failed to drive down real wages to the benefit of capital; politically, they have often benefitted from a divided and weak opposition; and the ideological sphere is shot through with contradictions - the enterprise culture or popular support for the NHS? See S Hall and M Jacques (eds) (1983) *The Politics of Thatcherism* (London: Lawrence and Wishart).
10. Gilroy (1987) p 115.
11. Miles is none too happy with a rigid correlation of the emergence of capitalism and the dissemination of the ideology of racism and the implication that there is a prehistory to racism which was invented for capitalist and mercantilist purposes. For a discussion of the possibility of racism existing in a recognisable form in ancient society see N Carlin (1987) 'Was there racism in ancient society?', *International Socialism* 2:36 pp90-104 and A

- Callinicos (1988) 'A note on racism in the ancient world', *International Socialism* 2:37 pp131-8.
12. C L R James (1973) *Modern politics* (Trinidad: PNM) p88.
 13. See Lord Scarman (1981) *Report on the Brixton Disorders 10-12 April 1981* and J Benyon and J Solomos (eds) (1987) *The Roots of Urban Unrest* (Oxford: Pergamon). Also Gilroy (1987) and R Ramdin (1987) *The Making of the Black Working Class in Britain* (Aldershot: Gower).
 14. See M Banton (1977) *The Idea of Race* (London: Tavistock) and J Rex (1970) *Race Relations in Sociological Theory* (London: Weidenfield and Nicolson).
 15. R Miles and A Phizacklea (1987) pp13-14.
 16. See R Miles (1982) *Racism and Migrant Labour* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul), D Lecourt (1980) 'On Marxism as a critique of sociological theories' (pp267-286) in UNESCO (1980) *Sociological Theories: Race and Colonialism* (Paris: UNESCO) and P Alexander (1987) *Racism, Resistance and Revolution* (London: Bookmarks).
 17. Larrain (1980) p6.
 18. J Larrain (1979) *The Concept of Ideology* (London: Hutchinson) provides one of the best summaries of the debate.
 19. *ibid* p 16.
 20. See O C Cox (1970) *Caste, Class and Racism* (New York: Monthly Review Press). S Castles and G Kosack (1973) *Immigrant workers and Class Struggle in Western Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press) and M Nikolinakos (1973) 'Notes on an economic theory of racism', *Race* Vol 14 No 4 pp365-81 adopt a similar economist theme.
 21. J Gabriel and G Ben-Tovim (1976) 'Marxism and the concept of racism' *Economy and Society* Vol 7 No 2 pp118-54 and P Fryer (1984) *Staying Power* (London: Pluto).
 22. Lecourt (1980) p237.
 23. See R Miles (1982) and (1982a) 'Racism and Nationalism in Britain' in C Husbands (ed) (1982) *'Race' in Britain: Continuity and Change* pp279-300.
 24. Miles (1982a) p 283.
 25. Miles (1982) p 78.
 26. See P Corrigan (1979) 'The local state: the struggle for democracy' *Marxism Today* July pp203-9.
 27. See S Hall (1980) 'Race, articulation and societies structured in dominance' in UNESCO (1980) pp305-46.
 28. J Gabriel and G Ben-Tovim (1982) 'The politics of race in Britain: 1962-79' in Husbands (1982) pp145-171. Quote pp 159-60.
 29. See Miles (1982).
 30. Castles and Kosack (1973) and CCCS (1982) *The Empire Strikes Back* (London: Hutchinson).
 31. The role of the state in introducing immigration laws and administering the police, the courts, the Home Office etc should obviously not be underestimated in the depth of institutional racism in Britain. At the same time writers such as Sivanandan and the CCCS authors can focus upon the state to the exclusion of the capitalist relations which the state reproduces.
 32. See L Althusser (1969) *For Marx* (Harmondsworth: Penguin) and A Gramsci (1971) *Selections from Prison Notebooks* (London: Lawrence and Wishart).
 33. Callinicos (1982) p 191.

34. H Draper (1977) *Karl Marx's Theory of Revolution - State and Bureaucracy* (New York: Monthly Review Press) p 260.
35. V I Lenin (1949) *State and Revolution* (Moscow: Progress) p 12.
36. H Fallding (1968) *The Sociological Task* (New York: Prentice Hall).
37. A W Gouldner (1980) *The Two Marxisms* (London: Macmillan).
38. Fallding (1968) p24.
39. *ibid* p 25.
40. Giddens (1971) p 141.
41. See E Cashmore and B Troyna (1983) *Black Youth in Crisis* (London: Allen and Unwin)
42. Marxism is frequently borrowed from to give a critical edge to some non-Marxist works
43. Gouldner (1980) p 32.
44. *ibid* p 44.
45. G Ben-Tovim, J Gabriel, I Law & K Stredder (1986) *The Local Politics of Race* (London: Macmillan) p 8.
46. Bill Daniel, basing his book on the 1967 PEP report 'Racism in Britain', selected two main areas for study, housing and employment (allied with services). I have taken these two sectors and added the most important service in terms of anti-racist provision, namely education. For the original see W W Daniel (1968) *Racial Discrimination in England* (Harmondsworth: Penguin).
47. See A Sivanandan (1976) 'Race, Class and the State', *Race and Class* Vol 17 No 4 pp383-91, Hall (1980) and Gabriel & Ben-Tovim (1978).
48. See K Young and N Connelly (1981) *Policy and Practice in the Multi-Racial City* (London: PSI), C Robinson (1981) *The origins of corporate structures for race relations policy in Inner London boroughs* (London: CRE), CRE (1982) *Local Government and Racial Equality* (London: CRE) and Joint Government/Local Authority Association Working Group (JG/LAAWG) (1983) *Local Authorities and Racial Disadvantage* (London: Department of the Environment).
49. Ben-Tovim et al (1986) p 10.
50. *ibid* p 5.
51. See S Taylor (1982) *The National Front in English Politics* (London: Macmillan).
52. P Ashworth (1979) *Social Interaction and Consciousness* (London: John Wiley) gives a full account of the theory and what he sees as its relevance for analysis of the interaction that social actors undertake in everyday life through symbolic acts, gestures etc.
53. Selected reading includes: Malcolm X (1965) *The Autobiography of Malcolm X* (Harmondsworth: Penguin), E U Essien-Udom (1966) *Black Nationalism* (Harmondsworth: Penguin) and M Marable (1985) *Black American Politics* (London: Verso).
54. N Smelser (1962) *Theory of Collective Behaviour* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul).
55. See Touraine (1981), Roberts and Kloss (1979) and the latter's introduction by Rudolf Heberle.
56. See Laclau (1977) for a full discussion of the debate.
57. See J-P Sartre (1958) *Being and Nothingness* (London: Methuen) and E P Thompson (1978) *The Poverty of Theory* (London: Merlin Press).
58. For pointers towards the 'race relations' politics of Birmingham City Council see the row over Birmingham's Equal Opportunities Unit (*Birmingham Daily News* 17/10/86 and *Birmingham Evening Mail* 20/10/86). Dick Knowles, Birmingham Council Labour Leader and

veteran Right-winger, proudly boasted 'No loony left turns for Birmingham (*Evening Mail* 10/11/86) in which he defended the Council's removal of black left-winger and black sections campaigner Phil Murphy from the Race Relations and Equal Opportunities Committee.

59. M Hammersley and P Atkinson (1983) *Ethnography: Principles in Practice* (London: Tavistock) p 32.
60. A division drawn by Delbert Miller, a structural-functionalist writer, who terms *top influentials* as the most influential people filling the major positions in any structure under scrutiny. Out of those come the *key influentials* who take the key roles and decisions in particular instances affecting the structure. the adoption of Miller's terms may seem inappropriate but they are used in the case studies below to delineate between those occupying the formal positions of influence within the local state such as senior officers and councillors and those embodying potential influence such as pressure groups and trade unions which is realised in key events such as those catalogued below. For Miller's own use of his concepts see D C Miller (1958) 'Decision-making cliques in community power structures' *American Journal of Sociology* Vol 64 pp299-310.
61. R K Merton (1976) *Sociological Ambivalence and Other Essays* (New York: Free Press).
62. C Offe (1984) *Contradictions of the Welfare State* (London: Hutchinson).

CHAPTER 2

1. Stanley Aronovitz, in the Introduction to D A Foss and R Larkin (1986) *Beyond Revolution - A New Theory of Social Movements* (Massachusetts: Bergin & Garvey) pxi.
2. H Blumer (1951) 'Collective Behaviour' in A M Lee (ed) (1951) *Principles of Sociology* (New York: Barnes and Noble) pp165-222. Quote from p199.
3. R Heberle (1951) *Social Movements: An introduction to political sociology* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts) p459.
4. H Toch (1965) *The Sociology of Social Movements* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill) p5. See also B McLaughlin (1969) *Studies in Social Movements* (New York: Free Press) and J A Banks (1972) *The Sociology of Social Movements* (London: Macmillan).
5. C W King (1956) *Social Movements in the United States* (New York: Random House) p23.
6. Heberle (1951) p6.
7. Though what of millenarian and radical religious movements ? Eric Hobsbawm (1959) *Primitive Rebels* (Manchester: Manchester University Press) for example argues, 'between the two extremes of the pure "millenarian" and the "pure" political revolutionary all manner if intermediate positions are possible.' (p59)
8. Roberts and Kloss (1975) p15.
9. See Lofland (1981 & 1985) and Smelser (1963).
10. Lofland (1985) p201.
11. Heberle (1979) pviii.
12. Lofland (1981) p446.
13. See Preface to *The Condition of the Working Class in England* [Marx

- & Engels (1975) p3021.
14. Smelser's analytical framework is adopted as recently as 1984 in Blumberg's analysis of the civil rights movement in the U.S. See especially her references to 'structural strain' and the relation between collective behaviour and social movements - R L Blumberg (1984) *Civil Rights: The 1960s Freedom Struggle* (Boston: Twayne) pp167-77.
 15. As McLaughlin (1969) argues, 'Although a necessary temporal sequence is explicitly denied by Smelser, the fact that "strain" is the second element is a belief and the fact that belief is a contributory cause of mobilisation introduces the sequential logic of the life history. (p64).
 16. Heberle in Roberts and Kloss (1979) pvii.
 17. See Lofland (1981).
 18. See Lofland (1985).
 19. Lofland (1981) p415.
 20. See Ashworth (1979).
 21. *ibid* pp104-30.
 22. Zurcher and Snow (1981) p447.
 23. *ibid* p449.
 24. L Trotsky (1959) *The History of the Russian Revolution* (New York: Doubleday) p249.
 25. *ibid* p455.
 26. The diffuse examples include the Moonies, Peasants' Movements in Chile and the Gay Liberation movement - such is the lack of ability to distinguish between the political causes and effects of these various movements.
 27. Zurcher and Snow *op cit* p456.
 28. *ibid* p464.
 29. Heberle (1951) p110.
 30. Lofland (1985) p201.
 31. As Lofland (1985) admits he (and his co-contributor) wanted 'to stress that we are not attached to any of the labels we have employed. We even dislike a number of terms but have been forced to their use by the even lesser aptness of alternatives. It is the *empirical patterns* instead, to which we want to draw attention and *not* the specific words' (p216-7).
 32. Examples include such groups as WISE, Choice and Self-Help (see editions of *Searchlight* *passim*).
 33. Paramilitary groups of the far-right include Column 88 and Survivalist groups backed by Michael McLaughlin (ex-leader of the British Movement), indeed the remaining cadre of th BM tend to operate around TA groups and Gun clubs (see *Searchlight* January 1988).
 34. Touraine (1981) p114.
 35. *ibid* pp31-2.
 36. *ibid* p29.
 37. As Lindsey German (1988) notes in her dissection of 'The Rise and Fall of the Women's Movement' *International Socialism* 2:37 pp3-47, 'For although there have been undoubtedly major advances for women in the past decades, these have been nearly all advances for bourgeois women.' (p39)
 38. Lofland (1985) p415.
 39. Touraine (1985) pp772-3.

40. See E Laclau and C Mouffe (1985) *Hegemony and Class Structure* (London: Verso).
41. Touraine (1981) p57.
42. *ibid* pp57-8.
43. *ibid* p2. Perhaps the writers have been reading Marx after all. Their stressing of the importance of force in social movements is echoed by Marx (1976) *Capital* (Harmondsworth: Penguin) where he wrote, 'Force is the midwife of every society pregnant with a new one' (1976) p912. Perhaps not, given their autonomisation of other forces within society.
44. Foss & Larkin (1986) p3.
45. *ibid* p3.
46. *ibid* p7.
47. *ibid* p138.
48. The separation of the 'economic' and 'political' debate has a long lineage, or course, in Marxist circles. See Ellen Meiksins Wood's summary of the arguments, 'The Separation of economic and Politics', *New Left Review* 127 (1981) pp66-95
49. From *The Holy Family* in McLellan (ed) *Karl Marx: Selected Writings* (1977) (Oxford: OUP) p134.
50. Laclau is part of the 'new revisionist' current which denies the primacy of class politics in Marxism and seeks to assert the over-riding importance of the autonomous movement, such as the 'black' movement. See E M Wood (1986) *The Retreat from Class* (London: Verso) for a critique.
51. Marx (1976) p92.
52. M Castells (1977) *The Urban Question* (London: Edward Arnold) pp271-2.
53. Trotsky (1959) p73.
54. *ibid* pp115-6.
55. Quoted in J Desan (1974) *The Marxism of Jean-Paul Sartre* (Gloucester, Mass.: Anchor) p196.
56. Sartre (1978) p196.
57. *ibid* p355.
58. Desan (1974) p127.
59. S Lukes (1973) *Individualism* (Oxford: Blackwell) p13.
60. Thompson (1978) p280.
61. Benton (1984) p212.
62. See *Marxism Today* June 1987 in which Hobsbawm supported an electoral alliance with groups to the right of the Labour Party, with the expressed intention of preventing a Conservative majority.
63. Hobsbawm (1959) p11.
64. *ibid* p11.
65. Trotsky (1975) p134.
66. *ibid* p107.
67. *ibid* p144.
68. R Williams (1983) p172 *Towards 2000* (London: Chatto and Windus).
69. *ibid* pp172-3.
70. *ibid* (1983) p255.
71. Wood (1986) p185-6.

CHAPTER 3

1. Given that movements are usually aimed at gaining concessions from some sector of the state and thus have tendency towards reformism.
2. The ANL was able to publicise the early Nazi-inspired pasts of Tyndall and Webster. The former had been photographed in full Nazi regalia and the latter had written an article entitled 'Why I am a Nazi' in 1962.
3. Gilroy (1987) suggests that the ANL attempted to out-patriot the NF and having succeeded in this aim, 'The League's single issue orientation became harder to sustain and looked out of place when the Prime Minister elect made remarks about British people "feeling rather swamped". (p135)
4. See *Searchlight* January 1988 for a summary of the rise of the 'revisionist' historians.
5. See L Trotsky (1975) *The Struggle Against Fascism in Germany* (Harmondsworth: Penguin), D Guerin (1973) *Fascism and Big Business* (New York: Monad) & C Sparks (1980) *Fascism: What it is and how to fight it* (London: Bookmarks).
6. Miles's definition of 'Fascism' in E E Cashmore (1984) *Dictionary of Race and Ethnic Relations* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul) p97.
7. Trotsky (1975) pp410-11.
8. Via the infamous 'Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion' - a supposed setting out of Jewish plans for world domination. See Edgar (1977) for a discussion of what was most probably a forgery by Tsarist secret police.
9. Taylor (1982) p77.
10. D Edgar (1977) 'Racism, Fascism and the Politics of the National Front', *Race and Class* Vol XXIX No 2 pp111-31. Quote p129.
11. Taylor (1982) p72.
12. Miles and Phizacklea (1987) pp133-4.
13. Mosley became Conservative MP for Harrow after the First World War and crossed the floor of the House of Commons over the Irish Question. Although he briefly followed Liberal ideals he joined the Labour party in 1924, earning the nickname 'Sir Oscillating Mosley'.
14. Including such small groupings as Rotha Linton-Orman's British Fascists and Arnold Leese's Imperial Fascist League.
15. In 1934 4000 blackshirts attended a meeting in Bristol's Colson Hall. In Sheffield in the same years 300 marshalled an audience of 3000. On January 21st 1934, Mosley had spoken, flanked by two thousand blackshirts spoke to an audience of several thousand.
16. See I Ravendale (1953) *In many rhythms* (London).
17. R Skidelsky (1975) *Oswald Mosley* (London: Macmillan).
18. *ibid* p317.
19. C Rosenberg (1988) 'Labour and the fight against racism', *International Socialism* 2:39 pp55-93. Quote p58.
20. See J Brewer (1984) *Mosley's Men* (Aldershot: Gower).
21. Skidelsky (1975) p369.
22. P Hayes (1973) *Fascism* (London: Allen and Unwin) quotes Nye Bevan who argued 'Where is the money coming from? Who is going to pay? Who is going to call the tune? I tell you where it will end up

- ... as a fascist party.' (p75)
23. Brewer (1984) p12.
 24. Piratin (1978) p26.
 25. D Rosenberg (1985) *Facing up to anti-semitism - How Jews in Britain countered the threats of the 1930s* (London: JCARP) shows many of the debates between the Jewish working class and petty bourgeoisie at the time over how to fight anti-semitism, by ignoring it, by playing the numbers game, or by actually opposing the fascists themselves.
 26. C Rosenberg (1988) p66.
 27. R Miles and A Phizachlea (1987) *White Man's Country* 2nd Impression (London: Pluto) pp20-44.
 28. Though the eternally triangular relationship between Tyndall, Jordan and Francoise Dior, the perfume heiress, had put the friendship under considerable strain. See M Walker (1977) *The National Front* (London: Fontana).
 29. Jordan and Tyndall were never to actually renounce their National Socialism but rather left the PR work to more apparently respectable or presentable sorts such as Webster and Andrew Brons.
 30. See P Foot (1965) *Immigration and Race in British Politics* (Harmondsworth: Penguin) for full account of this notable by-election.
 31. See Taylor (1982) pp18-23 and Walker (1977) pp68-108.
 32. This took much of the first years of the Front's existence to reconcile.
 33. See B Smithies & P Fiddick (1969) *Enoch Powell on Immigration* (London: Sphere) for verbatim copies of the speeches and P Foot (1969) *The Rise of Enoch Powell* (Harmondsworth: Penguin) for an analysis of the opportunism of the man.
 34. Taylor (1978) p57.
 35. Walker (1977) p135.
 36. N Nugent (1976) *The Anti-Immigration Groups*, New Community No 5 Autumn pp302-10.
 37. Walker (1977) p137.
 38. *ibid.*
 39. Though by December 1984 even Webster was taking the NF to court with the intent of bankrupting the faction who had expelled him and who were in turn expelled by the 'political soldier factions'. To get the full flavour of the splits and differing political tendencies it is, at the moment, necessary to follow through each monthly edition of *Searchlight*, where it reads like a pocket thriller.
 40. Taylor (1978) p57.
 41. R Rosewall (1973) *The Struggle for Workers Power* (London: International Socialists).
 42. See Bethnal Green and Stepney Trades Council (1978) *Blood on the streets* (London).
 43. T Gilbert (1975) *Only one died* (London: Kay Beauchamp) p1x.
 44. *ibid.*
 45. A Callinicos & A Hatchett (1977) 'In defence of violence', *International Socialism* 1:101 September pp24-28.
 46. Taylor (1982) p43.
 47. Walker (1977) p180.
 48. *Searchlight* July 1977.

49. Taylor (1982) p47.
50. Walker (1977) p197. Relf did not 'get away with it' completely. Not only did black groups and the left come together in the campaign against him but great ceremony was made by the International Socialists of stealing the offending sign from outside Relf's house and publicly burning it at a rally.
51. Interview conducted July 1986.
52. Read was prosecuted under the 1976 Race Relations Act but was found innocent of incitement to racial hatred in November 1977 at the Old Bailey by Judge McKinnon. The Judge wished him well from the dock and added 'Read is obviously a man who has the guts to stand up in public for the things he believes.' (See Widgery 1986 p52).
53. Taylor (1982) p111.
54. Quoted in *The Times* 19 May 1976.
55. Miles and Phizacklea (1987) p103.
56. The NF had itself attempted to build a presence in some unions and played a key role in the Mansfield Hosiery and Imperial Typewriters disputes in the Midlands in the early 1970s.
57. Taylor (1982) p115.
58. C Sparks (1977) 'Fighting the Beast' *International Socialism* 94 p12.
59. Interview conducted June 1986.
60. Widgery (1986) p44.
61. Taylor (1982) writes 'If the general interpretation is correct, it would seem that both the succour drawn by the NF from the 1977 GLC results and the alarm that was created among other groups, was largely misplaced ...' (p130).
62. See *Spearhead* June 1977.
63. Interview conducted February 1986.
64. Interview conducted July 1986.
65. The CPGB's decline from its strength post-war was reflected in the internal wranglings brought about by Stalinism, the invasions of Hungary and Czechoslovakia, and in the 1970s the debate over the drift to Eurocommunism. As Taylor (1982) writes, 'Apart from national denunciations of the NF, the CPGB nationally had done little to oppose the party, although its local activists had played a prominent role as individuals in the local oppositions to the NF.' (p133)
66. Widgery (1986) p45.
67. Labour Party Annual Report (1977) pp314.
68. *Socialist Worker* 14/1/78.
69. See Widgery (1986) p50. The original idea was thus Nichol's. Taylor (1982) wrongly attributes the germ of the notion to Peter Hain. This may be due to Hain's reluctance to deny this assertion.
70. Indeed some members of the party hierarchy were less than keen in the launch of a United Front and some spoiling tactics were indulged in.
71. Interview conducted July 1986.
72. Widgery (1986) p51.
73. Hain ran into considerable trouble with BOSS, the South African secret police, for his troubles. For an early explanation of his convictions see P Hain (1971) *Don't Play with Apartheid* (London: George, Allen and Unwin).
74. Roberts was deselected for the 1987 General Election in favour of a

- black candidate, Diane Abbott.
75. *Socialist Worker* 19/11/77.
 76. Neil Kinnock's abhorrence of violence is well known, as was evident in his criticism of picketing miners and this may have had some effect upon his support for the ANL, beyond his undoubted anti-fascist credentials. On 31st July 1976 20-30 NF supporters haddisrupted a meeting of Harrow Trades Council at which Kinnock was speaking on unemployment.
 77. Edgar was not, of course, only a playwright. He had written *Edgar* (1977) on the politics of the National Front.
 78. There was a notable lack of black members on the steering committee. Trevor Carter (1986) *Shattering Illusions* (London: Lawrence and Wishart) relates, 'I was invited along to be the black activist. I declined, saying this was obviously white people's business.' (p118)
 79. Widgery (1986) provides the fullest account of Rock Against Racism though his judgement is sometimes clouded by hyper-optimism and by the thrill of the activist in relating his/her own exploits.
 80. Taylor (1982) p137.
 81. Interview conducted December 1985.
 82. Taylor (1982) p177.
 83. Interview conducted June 1986.
 84. Quoted by C Barker (1981) *The New Racism* (London: Junction) p59.
 85. *ibid.*
 86. *Sunday Times* 19/2/1978.
 87. See Taylor (1982) pp144-50.
 88. The SWP argued against bans on the NF imposed by the state precisely because they believed that the law would be used against the Left, as the 1936 Public Order Act, supposedly brought in to stop the BUF marches, has been.
 89. See *Spearhead* May 1978.
 90. Taylor (1982) p151.
 91. Alongside the first London Carnival (attendance 100,000) other RAR events were held in Manchester (35,000), Cardiff (5,000), Edinburgh (8,000), Harwich (2,000), Southampton (5,000), Bradford (2,000) and the second London Carnival (100,000) again. An ex-member of Harwich ANL, Savvas Eleftheriades, recounted to me his astonishment at the ability of the ANL to organise in a town which to all intents and purposes had been 'dead' in anti-racist terms for many years.
 92. *Searchlight* June 1977 gives a precis of the relevant election results.
 93. Trotsky (1975) p106.
 94. Interview conducted July 1987.
 95. Widgery (1986) p27.
 96. The quote elicited during police questioning and related by Widgery (1986) p16.
 97. Quoted *ibid* pp29-30.
 98. Taylor (1982) p156.
 99. Joint statement issued by Sibghat Kadri, President, The Standing Conference of Pakistani Organisations in U.K.; Vishnu Sharma, President, Indian Workers Association (Souhall); and the President of the Federation of Bangladeshi Organisations. Printed in full in Bethnal Green and Stepney Trades Council (1977) p95.

100. Taylor (1982) p157.
101. The argument about the centrality of taking the ANL into trade unions and where people worked was carried through in the pages of *Socialist Worker* which had by this time become 'ANL News' to all intents and purposes. Tony Cliff, *de facto* leader of the SWP argued in *Socialist Worker* 13/5/78 'the more the ANL is rooted in the workplace, the more the interconnection between all aspects of the struggle will be clear for everyone to see.' as 'the holy war'
102. Quoted in *Socialist Worker* 15/7/78.
103. David Rosenberg (1985) p11.
104. Which by this time was not far off the mark, although *influence* is a rather a loaded word. The Board of Deputies have not been averse to asserting their political influence, given their standing. It is not a wild allegation to note that the political opponents of the SWP within the ANL tended to see the SWP'S influence when it suited them.
105. Interview conducted May 1986.
106. Jewish Cultural and Anti-Racist Project (JCARP) (1986) *From awareness to action* (London: JCARP) p45.
107. Interview conducted May 1986.
108. Alexander (1987) p155.
109. Especially critics from inside the Left of the Labour party such as Socialist Challenge and Workers Power.
110. Interview conducted July 1986.
111. As well as Tyndall, his wife, mother-in-law and father-in-law stood as candidates.
112. The ANL attempted to harass NF candidates wherever they stood and this may have tempted NF Candidates to avoid individual canvassing.
113. *Socialist Worker* 28/4/79.
114. According to the 1976 sample census, some 18% of Ealing's state population were born of parents from the New Commonwealth or Pakistan. An average of 46% of the population of the five wards which make up Southall were of such origin.
115. NCCL (1980) *Southall 23 April 1979: The Report of the Unofficial Committee of Enquiry* (London: NCCL) p6. It was after the death of Gurdip Singh Chaggar in Southall that John Kingsley Read made the comment 'One down - a million to go' (See n62 above).
116. Quoted *ibid* p22.
117. Quoted in NCCL (1980) p145.
118. Or more properly the SWP argued this (*Socialist Worker* 28/4/79).
119. *Socialist Worker* 5/5/79.
120. See Searchlight January 1985 and January 1986 for summaries.
121. The campaign in 1987-8 where white parents in this Yorkshire town refused to allow their children to go to a school which they believed had too high a content of black children attending.
122. Interview conducted December 1985.
123. Widgery (1986) p112.
124. Interview conducted July 1987.
125. Widgery (1986) p112.
126. Interview conducted January 1985.
127. Interview conducted July 1986.
128. Widgery (1986) p111.

CHAPTER 4 - NOTES

1. CRE (1983) *Annual Report* (London: CRE) p30.
2. Race Relations Act (1976) s71.
3. See B Campbell (1987) 'Charge of the Light Brigade' *Marxism Today* February pp10-13. In it she argues that Left Local government has been particularly susceptible to what she terms as 'the holy war' on the 'loony left'. Stories abounded and were gleefully repeated in the popular press of 'Baa Baa Black Sheep' being banned, black bin-liners being banned and even Tufty the Squirrel being banned, all in the name of good 'race relations'. All the stories were false. For a wider consideration of the role of the press in the counter-offensive against municipal anti-racism see N Murray (1986) 'Anti-racists and other demons: the press and ideology in Thatcher's Britain', *Race and Class* XXVII No3 pp1-19.
4. Nor is this an exercise in policy analysis. Should the reader be interested a useful work is B W Hogwood & L A Gunn (1984) *Policy Analysis for the Real World* (Oxford: OUP).
5. Corrigan (1979) p204.
6. Cockburn (1977).
7. See Castells (1977) and (1975) 'Immigrant workers and class struggles in advanced capitalism: the West European experience', *Politics and Society* Vol 5 No 1 pp33-66.
8. See P Dunleavy (1979) *Urban Political Analysis* (London: Macmillan), P Saunders (1979) *Urban Politics* (London: Hutchinson), M Boddy & C Fudge (eds) (1981) *The Local State: Theory and Practice - Papers from a conference held on 6 December 1980* University of Bristol SUAS Working Papers No 20 and J Gyford (1985) *The Politics of Local Socialism* (London: George Allen and Unwin).
9. Corrigan suggests that Lenin warned his followers that the state takes many forms and that people must be aware of this in the struggle for socialism. All well and good although in the same lecture which Corrigan quotes, Lenin also notes 'The state is a machine for the oppression of one class by another, a machine for holding in obedience to one class other, subordinated classes.' ["The State" in Lenin (1964) p267]
10. Harris (1986) p130.
11. See R Miliband (1969) *The State in Capitalist Society* (London: Weidenfield and Nicolson), N Poulantzas (1978) *State, Power, Socialism* (London: NLB) and E O Wright (1978) *Class, Crisis and the State* (London: NLB).
12. Cockburn (1977) p47.
13. *ibid* p168.
14. S Villandsen (1986) 'Local Corporatism' *Policy and Politics* Vol 14 No 2 pp247-266 explores what he terms the growth of 'local public corporatism', referring generally to Scandanavian examples.
15. Cockburn (1977) p171.
16. A Cochrane (1985) 'The attack on local government: what it is and what it isn't', *Critical Social Policy* 12 Spring pp44-61. Quote p47.
17. See P Saunders (1979 & 1981), (1980) 'Local Government and the State', *New Society* Vol 51 pp550-1 and (1984) 'Rethinking Local Politics', in M Boddy & C Fudge (1984) *Local Socialism?* (London:

- Macmillan) pp22-48.
18. See T N Clark (1972) 'Community Power and Decision-Making' *Current Sociology* Vol XX pp6-54 and E O Laumann & F U Pappi (1973) 'New directions in community power elites' *American Sociological Review* pp212-230.
 19. See Boddy (1981) 'The Local State : Theory and Practice' in Boddy and Fudge (1981) pp1-23 and Dunleavy 'The limits to local government' in Boddy and Fudge (1984) pp49-81.
 20. M Gottdiener (1987) *The Decline of Urban Politics* (Newbury Park: Sage) p110.
 21. Saunders (1984) p45.
 22. *ibid* p41.
 23. Cochrane (1985) p58.
 24. K Bassett (1981) 'Political Responses to the restructuring of the Local State' in Boddy and Fudge (1981) pp38-60. Quote p60.
 25. See Gyford (1985) and (1984) *Local Politics in Britain* (London: Croom Helm).
 26. Boddy and Fudge (1984) p10.
 27. Harris (1986) p112.
 28. See Gyford (1985) pp1-7.
 29. See Noreen Branson's Communist Party inspired histories, Branson (1979) and (1975) *Britain in the 1920s* (London: Weidenfield and Nicolson), the former being the fuller history of Poplar.
 30. As D Blunkett & K Jackson (1987) *Democracy in Crisis* (London: Hogarth) note, 'Labour's victory under Herbert Morrison in the 1934 elections for the London County Council was important in the revival of the fortunes of the Labour Party nationally ... Morrison was a moderate, the darling of the Fabians, and an opponent of Poplar ... Above all, Morrison was dominated by the idea of proving that Labour was fit to govern.' (pp61 & 63)
 31. See E Dell (1960) 'Labour and local government', *Political Quarterly* Vol 31 who suggested that currents within the Labour Party actively feared the prospects of local deviation and that the Labour Party supported local democracy in theory but saw the central state as the agent of reform in practice.
 32. Gyford (1985) (p11) lists some of the more prominent dignitaries who were caught.
 33. Bassett (1981) p49
 34. Quoted in C Harman (1979) *Why Labour Fails Socialist Worker* Pamphlet p23.
 35. S Cockerill (1985) 'The Municipal road to Socialism', *International Socialism* 2:26 pp95-112. Quote p97.
 36. Quoted in Gyford (1985) p29.
 37. Kinnock argued in a meeting at Westminster Hall in November 1979, 'Local labour groups are autonomous. We [the NEC] can appeal, we can advise, we can point out the political consequences. In public speeches we can make great appeals ... but Labour groups must take their cases one by one'. Quoted in Gyford (1985) p30.
 38. Quoted in Blunkett (1987) p161.
 39. *ibid* p158.
 40. Authorities ratecapped for the financial year 1985/6 were Brent, Southwark, Lambeth, Lewisham, Greenwich, Islington, Camden and Hackney; the ILEA and GLC; Merseyside and South Yorkshire county council; Sheffield Metropolitan District Council; Basildon,

- Leicester, Portsmouth and Thamesdown non-metropolitan district councils. All were Labour-controlled except for Portsmouth.
41. In November 1984 100,000 workers came out on strike in boroughs threatened by ratecapping. Liverpool held a mass meeting of trade unionists of 2500 in January 1985. there was an undercurrent of support for the Council's stance amongst their workers which effectively only tapped when the workers were required as stage armies for one-day demonstrations.
 42. Blunkett & Jackson (1987) p173.
 43. P Taffe and T Mulhearn (1988) *Liverpool - A city that dared to fight* (London: Fortress) p198.
 44. Blunkett & Jackson (1987) pp191 & 196.
 45. Interview with Ken Livingstone and David Blunkett 'Local Socialism: The Way Ahead' in Boddy and Fudge (1984) pp242-284. Quote p266.
 46. H Ouseley (1984) 'Local Authority Race Initiatives' in Boddy and Fudge (1984) pp133-59. Quote p134.
 47. See Gilroy (1987) pp136-48. As a good disciple of the importance Eurocommunist emphasis on the importance of having the appropriate 'culture' in changing the world, Gilroy focuses almost entirely on the GLC's publicity campaign, although by a convoluted route he does arrive at some substantial criticisms of municipal anti-racism in general.
 48. *ibid* p144.
 49. *ibid* p144.
 50. H Ouseley (1981) *The System* (London: Runnymede Trust) p173.
 51. Cockburn (1977) n24 pp198-9.
 52. T Flynn (1981) 'Local Politics and Local Government' *Capital and Class* 13 Spring pp114-29. Quote p121.
 53. *ibid* p122.
 54. See Robinson (1981).
 55. *ibid* pp12-13.
 56. Ouseley (1981) p174.
 57. Flynn (1981) p121.
 58. A Rogers (1983) 'When the boss is a Labour left' *Socialist Review* No 57 October pp11-14. Quote p14.
 59. Robinson (1981) p7.
 60. Letter from Ron Hayward, General Secretary of the Labour Party to Secretaries of CLPs June 1980.
 61. Labour Party Advice Note (1980) 'Labour and the Black Electorate', Labour Party NEC.
 62. See JG/LAAWG (1983).
 63. Flynn (1981) p120.
 64. Young and Connelly (1981) pp77-83.
 65. Boddy and Fudge (1984) pp14-15.
 66. See 'The Corporate Gospel of Management and Planning' in H. Elcock (1982) *Local Government* (London: Methuen) pp228-259.
 67. See J Dearlove (1979) *The Reorganisation of British Local Government: Old Orthodoxies and a Political Perspective* (Cambridge: CUP)
 68. Robinson (1981) p15.
 69. JG/LAAWG (1983) p15.
 70. Young and Connelly (1981) p54.
 71. Connelly (1981) p59.
 72. Ouseley (1981) p167.

73. *ibid* p178.
74. *ibid* p179.
75. CRE Annual Report (1983) p30.
76. CRE (1984) *Race and Council Housing in Hackney: Report of Formal Investigation* (London: CRE).
77. The CRE's own fears about its limited powers are discussed in the 1985 CRE Annual Report (pp5-10).
78. Young and Connelly (1981) p149.
79. Robinson (1981) p13.
80. In 1980 Hackney Council undertook an investigation to review Hackney CRE's running, responsibilities etc after several criticisms of its activities.
81. Ben-Tovim, Gabriel et al (1986) p86.
82. J Gabriel and G Ben-Tovim (1982) 'The politics of race in Britain' in *Husbands* (1980) pp 145-71. Quote p168.
83. See I Katznelson (1973) *Black Men, White Cities* (Oxford: OUP) and M M Dummett & A Dummett (1969) 'The role of government in Britain's racial crisis' in L Donnelly (ed) *Justice First* (London: Sheed and Ward) pp25-78
84. See T Rees (1982) 'Immigration policies in the United Kingdom' in *Husbands* (1982) pp75-96
85. *ibid* p94.
86. See J R Short (1984) *The Urban Arena* (London: Macmillan)
87. Sivanandan (1983) pp4-5.
88. *ibid* p7.
89. S James (1973) *The Power of Women and the Subversion of Community* (London: Falling Wall Press)
90. Cockburn (1977) p160.
91. See N Deakin (1970) *Colour, Citizenship and British Society* (London: Panther), D Lawrence (1974) *Black migrants: white natives* (Cambridge: CUP) and for a general collection see P Braham, E Rhodes and M Pearn (eds) (1981) *Discrimination and Disadvantage in Employment* (London: Open University/Harper and Row)
92. Ouseley (1981) p180.
93. C Brown (*Black and White Britain - the third PSI survey* (London: PSI/Heinemann).

CHAPTER 5

1. The ideology of racism, with its material base, has been reproduced in part through the scarcity of council housing and the requirements upon all authorities to house homeless people in their boroughs (within certain criteria).
2. See G Pearson "'Paki-bashing" in a North-East Lancashire cotton town: a case study and its history' in G Mungham and G Pearson (eds) (1976) *Working Class Youth Culture* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul).
3. J Rex and R Moore (1967) *Race, Community and Conflict* (Oxford: OUP).
4. See CRE (1984) *Race and Council Housing in Hackney: Report of a formal investigation* (London: CRE).
5. In 1933, Jews were excluded from flats built in Glasgow with government aid and from housing in Walthamstow because 'gentiles objected' (See Rosenberg (1985) p17).

6. Engels F, 'The Housing Question' in Marx and Engels (1969) *selected Works II* (Moscow: Progress) p350.
7. Marx (1976) pp811-2.
8. See Castells (1977), Saunders (1981) and M Harloe (1977) *Captive City* (London: John Wiley).
9. J Lojkine (1970) 'Urban Politics and Urban Social Movements' in Harloe (1977).
10. See P N Balchin (1981) *Housing policy and housing needs* (London: Macmillan) pp104-138 although A E Holmans (1987) *Housing policy in Britain* (London: Croom Helm) claims that the origins of permissive powers for local authorities to build and retain houses for letting were first under the Housing Act (1885) then consolidated as Part III of the Housing of the Working Classes Act 1890.
11. Balchin (1981) p106 and as Holmans (1987) p294 notes, housing was considered to be second only to rising prices as a cause of unrest, according to the Commission of Enquiry into Working Class Unrest, which reported in 1917.
12. See Micheal Foot's eulogy, M Foot (1973) *Aneurin Bevan* (London: Davis-Poynton).
13. A Bevan (1944) *Why not trust the Tories* (London: Gollancz) p75.
14. Foot (1973) p83.
15. Since October 1987 Hackney Council has been carrying out its 'Homelessness Action Plan'. Part of the plan to bring more council properties into use has involved evictions of squatters from derelict council housing. On the Stamford Hill Estate in early March the Council brought in hundreds of bailiffs and police equipped with riot gear to get the squatters out. Cockburn (1977) pp76-87 provides a short study of the squatting movement in action in Lambeth in the 1970s. For a more general, though now dated, appraisal see R Bailey (1973) *The Squatters* (Harmondsworth: Penguin).
16. Balchin (1981) p111.
17. Miles (1982) p172.
18. See R Ward (1984) 'Race and Housing: Issues and Policies', *New Community* XI No 3 Spring pp201-5.
19. See Foot (1965) and S Patterson (1965) *Dark strangers: A study of West Indians in London* (Harmondsworth: Penguin).
20. See M Banton (1955) *The Coloured Quarter* (London: Cape).
21. Foot (1965) p163.
22. S Jacobs (1985) 'Race, empire and the welfare state: council housing and racism' *Critical Social Policy* 13 pp6-28. Quote p19.
23. D Smith and A Whalley (1975) *Racial Minorities and Public Housing* (London: PEP).
24. Rex and Moore (1967) p27.
25. Unlike other writers in the 'race relations' field, John Rex has written about the subject in class terms albeit 'housing class' (See Rex & Moore 1967). For Rex, class does not relate to the social relations of production but rather to differential access to markets in a Weberian type analysis. By virtue of their exclusion from these markets, black migrants to Britain form an 'underclass', according to Rex, in the three key areas which are reflected in this thesis, namely education, employment and housing. J Rex and S Tomlinson (1979) *Colonial Immigrants in a British City* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul) cover the debate

over the use of the term and its failings.

The term is not without its critics, however, such as Bourne (1980) who suggests that the lack of a holistic analysis by Rex holds him back from confronting the real issues as to how a black underclass comes about and is reproduced. She argues that 'Rex's political sociology ... entrusts the task of changing society to political parties (whereas Marxist) political economy puts it in the hands of the oppressed and the exploited' (pp350-1). Thus because Rex locates various 'classes' as competing over various 'markets', he is drawn towards a policy-oriented model and as Bourne contends, is 'frozen' in the welfare state model at the very time it is under severe financial pressures.

Similarly Miles (1982a) finds difficulty with the housing class/underclass terminology in that it 'mistakenly assumes that discrimination is the sole factor determining the position of migrants within what are defined as the three different markets which come to constitute the determinants of class position' (p153). Fundamentally, by defining class in subjectivist terms at the level of distribution of resources via markets Rex is dismissing the centrality of the relations of production. As Miles summarises 'Rex and Tomlinson and Parkin [a critic of Marxist class theory - MCI] share an absolute silence on the question of the origin of the resources and opportunities that are distributed and, thereby, determine, the class structure' (p155). There are, therefore, serious problems in use of the housing class/underclass model for analytical purposes although it has had some uptake in the policy-making sector.

26. See Political and Economic Planning (PEP) (1967) *Racial Discrimination in Britain*.
27. See Dummett and Dummett (1969) and Foot (1969).
28. Daniel (1967) p178.
29. J Henderson and V Karn (1984) 'Race, Class and the Allocation of Public Housing in Britain', *Urban Studies* 21 pp115-28. Quote p119.
30. Jacobs (1985) p21.
31. Van den Berghe in Cashmore (1984) p75.
32. See Smith and Whalley (1975).
33. Balchin (1981) p123.
34. *ibid* p146.
35. See D Clark (1977) *Immigrant responses to the British housing market: A case study in the West Midlands Conurbation* SSRC Working Party on Ethnic Relations 7 (London: SSRC), A Power (1977) *Racial Minorities and Council Housing in Islington* (London: North London Housing Rights Project) and H Flett (1979) *Black council Tenants in Birmingham* SSRC Working Paper on Ethnic Relations 12 (London: SSRC).
36. A Sivanandan (1983) p4.
37. *Race and Immigration: The Runnymede Trust Bulletin* December 1984.
38. R Miles and A Phizacklea (eds) (1979) *Racism and Political Action in Britain* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul) p98.
39. London Borough of Newham (1984a) *Newham Digest of Census Statistics - Second Supplement - Newham's Ethnic Minority Communities* p29.
40. Interview conducted January 1986.
41. London Borough of Newham (1982) *Central Race Relations Unit - Background Information*.

42. *London Borough of Newham (1984b) Report of Chief Executive to Policy and Resources Committee 'Race Relations Unite in the Chief Executive's Department Section 2.5.*
43. The CRE's working definition of racial harassment, as used in CRE (1987) *Living in Terror* (London: CRE), the most recent publication on the subject, is as follows:

Racial harassment is violence which may be verbal or physical and which includes attacks on property as well as on the person, suffered by individuals or groups because of their colour, race, nationality or ethnic origins, when the victim believes that the perpetrator was acting on racial grounds and/or there is evidence of racism. (p8)

One problem in using such a term is its catch-all nature. Racial harassment can be verbal and physical and can lead to any number of responses from the harassed (the term 'victim' tends to emphasise the attitude towards the harassed as powerless and unable to defend themselves). The previous CRE Report on racial harassment, CRE (1981) *Racial Harassment on Local Authority Housing Estates* (London: CRE) focused on racist ideologies in action and recommended substantial improvement bureaucratic procedures for responding to 'harassment' and the mass recruitment of Section 11 workers.

GLC (1984) *Racial Harassment in London* (London: GLC), coming was crucial in the bureaucratisation of the whole response to racial violence. Although both reports are at pains to stress the serious nature of racial harassment, the CRE and others are tending to minimise the seriousness of the subject by defining racial violence as harassment. Furthermore, by emphasising the bureaucracy oriented strategies, the perspective shifts away from collective struggle and into individualised professional/client relationships, racial harassment becomes a housing management problem. It is the 'victimist' approach in action which effectively pays little more than lip service to black self-activity. See London Borough of Waltham Forest (1987) *Racial Attacks and Harassment*, Redbridge CRC (1986) *Silence Gives Consent*, Leeds CRC (1987) *Racial harassment in Leeds* and Manchester CRC (1986) *racial Harassment in Manchester and the response of the police 1980-85*, each published by the authors, for local accounts of racial harassment and the role of the local councils and the police. As C Bhatt (1987) 'Racial Violence and the Local State' *Foundation* No 2 July has noted, 'the identikit nature of the policies would suggest that the instigators do not actually know what to do about such violence' (p9).

One unforeseen circumstance of the uptake of 'identikit' strategies by local authorities against racial harassment has been the incorporation of parts of the black pressure group and voluntary sector. The effects of actively getting the councils to monitor and take note of their responsibility can be that 'monitoring converts black struggles around housing into an administrative process to be exercised by trained professionals. A logic of bureaucratic rationalism has taken over is developing its own momentum' [Bhatt (1987) p9]

44. GLC (1984) p45.
45. JG/LAAWG (1984) p44.
46. *ibid* p47.
47. *New Statesman* 25/2/85.
48. See CCS (981) *Football and the Fascists* (Birmingham: CCS).
49. See *New Society* 23/4/82.
50. See Bethnal Green and Stepney Trades Council (1978).
51. *New Statesman* 19/5/78.
52. *New Statesman* 25/2/83.
53. Affray has frequently been used in the last thirty years after gang fights - mods and rockers etc. - and its use against black people has been novel in that nearly each case the rival 'gang' has been the police, who have not been charged. No specific assault has to be proven, all that must be shown is that the accused has been involved in a fight which has frightened reasonable onlookers. The conspiracy charge has a more controversial history, has most recently been used against the 'Angry Brigade' and Irish Republicans. It can carry a heavier sentence than the offence and needs less proof than the related actual offence. It has in the past been used against such characters as blasphemers, outragers of public decency and purveyors of subversive language.
54. A Wilson 'Conspiracies to assault' *New Statesman* 25/2/83 p8.
55. *Searchlight* Feb 1984 p19.
56. *Searchlight* July 1982.
57. *Searchlight* November 1982.
58. *ibid*.
59. *ibid*.
60. Interview conducted March 1986.
61. *ibid*.
62. *ibid*.
63. *ibid*.
64. See P Gordon (1986) *Racial violence and harassment* (London: Runnymede Trust) pp17-23 for an examination of the issues.
65. As the 'Commissioner for Metropolis' Report (June 1983) notes on the figures for racial harassment 'Whatever one's views on the accuracy of these figures it is clear that the problem is horrifyingly large' (p27).
66. U Desai (1987) 'Racial Harassment, Housing and Community Action', *Race and Class* XXIX Autumn p71.
67. *ibid*.
68. Interview conducted January 1986.
69. Gordon (1986) p23.
70. *Guardian* 8/9/84.
71. See *Guardian* 8/9/84.
72. *Summary of Court Proceedings: London Borough of Newham vs. McDonnell, Bow County Court, Friday November 23rd 1984.*
73. *ibid*.
74. *ibid*.
75. *Newham Recorder* 29/11/84.
76. *ibid*.
77. See *Searchlight* Special (1985) 'The murderers are amongst us'. This report notes:

The facts show not only the very real correlation between membership of fascist groups and racial crimes... No other political movement in contemporary British history has had the same proportion of criminals in its ranks.

78. *Newham Recorder* 13/12/84. *Searchlight* January 1985 which has a full report of the NF and League of St. George campaign to keep her in Clements Ave. Just before the eviction Ian Anderson, the Front's deputy chairman, told the NF's AGM that 'if white families are evicted their flats should be made uninhabitable'.
79. The *Newham Recorder* of January 17 1985 described the McDonnells as 'banished by the law', portraying them as 'tearful' and 'out in the cold'. The report was accompanied by a picture of the family setting off down Clements Avenue with a bundle of clothes and an emaciated dog in tow. There were no photographs of the victims of racial harassment and violence.
80. *Searchlight* August 1982 gave evidence of the work being undertaken by Steve Brady in developing links between European nazi terrorist groups and the Loyalist UDA.
81. Interview conducted January 1986.
82. Interview conducted Feb 1985.
83. Interview conducted Feb 1986.
84. Desai (1987) p74.
85. London Borough of Newham (1985) Section 19.1.
86. *ibid* Section 9.15 (iii).
87. *ibid* Section 9.15 (v).
88. Report of the Chief Executive to the Race Relations Sub-Committee 10/3/87.
89. Desai (1987) p74.
90. *Guardian* 18/9/87.
91. Interview conducted January 1986.
92. Desai (1987) p69.
93. *ibid*.
94. *ibid* p75.
95. Interview conducted March 1986.
96. Brown (1984) p258.
97. David Keys (Secretary of the Joint Campaign Against Racism), in *Police Review* 30/10/81, advocated specialist squads which would have the sole responsibility for investigating racial offences and building up information on black people. The Panel's ethos may well be one of information gathering and surveillance.
98. Home Office (1981) *Racial Attacks - report of a Home Office Study* (London: HMSO).
99. PSI (1983) *Police and People in Britain* (London: PSI).
100. 'Police in the Dock' *New Society* 6/11/87.
101. The Islington Crime Survey (1986) found that black people were twice as likely as whites to be stopped and searched in the Borough. In 1985, 53% of black youth in the survey had been stopped by the police.
102. Kenneth Newman, when Commissioner for the Metropolitan Police, claimed that 'where ideology rules local government policy, it is likely to be less responsive to local needs than the police are' (see 'Police-bashers risk to Labour reputation' *Police Review* 11/10/85).

103. The Miners' Strike 1984/5 brought the question of the police accountability to the fore. For example see 'Can Police Authorities Give Orders to Chief Constables' *New Law Journal* 12/10/84 pp880-2, 'Joint Authorities for the Police' *Local Government Studies* July/Aug 1985 pp13-20 and 'Police Complaints Procedure' *Social Policy and Administration* Vol 19 No.2 1985 pp134-44. The general conclusion of the articles is that undue political influence is likely either to be thwarted by the powers vested in the Chief Constable or by the Home Office. The foundation of the legal requirement of the police to be formally independent is *Fisher v. Oldham* (1930) which established that there was no 'master and servant' relationship between police officer and police authority.
104. See C Leys 'Watching the state' *New Socialist* No. 18 July/August 1984 & P Hain (1984) *Political Trials in Britain* (London:) Chapter 2.90. Stuart Hall has argued a radical anti-statist line in S Hall et al (1978) *Policing the Crisis* (London: Macmillan) (when the crisis was a Labour-controlled one) and many articles since.
105. Following the Handsworth riots in 1985, the West Midlands Police Authority failed in their attempt to prevent Chief Constable Geoffrey Dear taking stock of plastic bullets and tear gas. In 1984 the South Yorkshire Police Authority resolved not to pay the funds for policing picket lines during the Miners' strike. An appeal by the Chief Constable to the Attorney General was enough to ensure the Authority's grumbling compliance.
106. Alexander (1987) p120
107. Indeed John Fernandez, a lecturer at Hendon Police College, was sacked in 1982 for producing essays which showed the breadth and depth of racism amongst police cadets. See Gordon (1986).
108. Consultation in multi-agency panels rests upon the agreed agenda of 'moderate' black leaders, councillors and the police. Should any that concensus break down, as mentioned above, and the role of the police within the state again asserts itself.
109. See L Bridges (1986) 'Beyond Accountability', *Race and Class* XXVII 4 pp78-87.
110. Interview conducted March 1986.
111. Figs from London Research Centre Housing Group (1986) *Housing In London* (London: LRC).
112. P Harrison (1983) *Inside the Inner City* (Harmondworth: Penguin).
113. *ibid* pp370-1.
114. *ibid* p374.
115. GLC (1976) *Colour and the allocation of GLC housing* Research Report 21.
116. Interview conducted February 1986.
117. *Hackney Gazette* 12/5/78.
118. Report of Principal Race Relations Adviser to Race Relations Subcommittee 15/3/84.
119. *Hackney Gazette* 16/6/78.
120. London Borough of Hackney (1981) p87.
121. *ibid*.
122. U Prashar and S Nicholas (1986) *Routes or roadblocks* (London: Runnymede Trust/GLC) p202.
123. See London Borough of Hackney (1981).

124. CRE (1984a) p5.
125. *ibid.*
126. Interview conducted February 1987.
127. Letter sent 17/12/82.
128. Statement delivered to full Council 23/12/82
129. Housing Services Committee 5/1/83 Para 3.
130. See D J Walker and M J Redman (1977) *Racial Discrimination: a simple guide to the Race Relations Act 1976* (London: Shaw).
131. Details from 'Report of Conference to discuss racism in Hackney Council Housing' given by PRRA to Race Relations Sub-Committee 15/3/84.
132. *Housing* May 1984 p15.
133. Ben-Tovim et al (1986) p146.
134. See *Housing* May 1984 for a full report of the conference.
135. *ibid.*
136. Interview conducted February 1986.
137. *Hackney Gazette* 13/1/84.
138. *Housing* April 1984 p32.
139. London Borough of Hackney (1984a) p6.
140. Report from Race Relations Sub-Committee 13/6/83 to Housing Services Committee.
141. P. Harrison (1984) 'How racism affects council housing' *New Society* 12/1/84 *ibid* p43.
142. *ibid* p45.
143. See C Hann (1984) 'Public Housing in Hackney', *New Community* XI No 3 Spring pp249-55 and Letters *New Society* 19/1/84. Discussion of some of the issues raised on the politics of the New Left within the local authority is raised in P Hoggett, S Lawrence & C Fudge 'The Politics of Decentralisation In Hackney' in R Hambleton & P Hoggett (eds) (1984) *The politics of decentralisation: Theory and practice of a radical local government initiative* University of Bristol SAUS Working Paper 46 pp62-79.
144. Jacobs (1985) p24.
145. Offe (1984) p144.
146. *ibid* Offe also argues that 'The state does not so much, as liberal reformers believe, become a force of social change and progress but rather it increasingly becomes the area of struggle.' (p143)

CHAPTER 6

1. H Braverman (1974) *Labour and Monopoly Capital* (New York: Monthly Review Press) p440.
2. Figures from D Kirp (1985) 'Racial Explicitness and Education Policy', in M Arnot (1985) *Race and Gender: equal opportunities policies in education* (Oxford: Pergamon) p25.
3. Mullard (1985) 'Multi-racial education in Britain: from assimilation to cultural pluralism' in Arnot (1985) p39.
4. *ibid* p40.
5. See B Dixon (1977) *Catching them young: sex, race and class in children's fiction* (London: Pluto) and J Stinton (ed) (1979) *Racism and Sexism in Children's Books* (London: Writers and Readers).

6. See C Mullard (1980) *Racism in society and schools* (London: Centre for Multicultural Education).
7. See Afro-Caribbean Resource Report (1982) *Racism and the black child* (London: ACRR) and F Dhondy, B Beese & L Hassan *The Black Explosion in British Schools* (London: Race Today).
8. See Kirp (1985) and Mullard (1985).
9. The first Labour leader being Reg Freeson, later to be MP for Brent East.
10. *Independent* 25/10/86. A situation which reappeared following the court cases involving McGoldrick and Brent.
11. This was later used as an example of Brent's 'loony left' policies - the inspectors became 'race spies' and 'classroom commissars'. See the leader of the *Daily Mail* 4/10/86 for an example.
12. 'What are Councils really doing on race' *New Society* 6/11/87.
13. *Independent* op cit.
14. 'This isn't the way to deal with racism' *New Statesman* 31/10/86 p10.
15. See London Borough of Brent (1983a) *Education for a multicultural democracy: Book 1 - The need for a change from a white ethnocentric approach* and (1983b) *Education for a multicultural democracy: Book 2 - Analysing implicit assumptions on which current school practices are based*.
16. B Troyna and J Williams (1986) *Racism, Education and the State* (London: Croom Helm) p77.
17. Brent (1983a) p20.
18. *ibid* p36.
19. TES 19/8/83.
20. Gurnah (1984) p13.
21. A Sivanandan (198) 'RAT and the degradation of black struggle', *Race and Class* XXVI No 4 Spring pp1-33.
22. *ibid* p20.
23. TES 28/10/83.
24. TES 5/10/84.
25. *ibid*.
26. TES 11/7/86.
27. Although a feature of 'Municipal Socialism' has been its claims for greater accountability to the people it serves, Ben-Tovim et al (1986) note 'even when political demands are conceded, the fragility of alliances, the lack of community resources and the skilful manoeuvring and delaying on the part of politicians and officials alike all combine to weaken the prospects for policy implementation through sustained community pressure.' (pp120-1).
28. Swann (1985) n37 p449.
29. Lord Swann (Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Education of Children from Ethnic Minority Groups) (1985) *Education for all* (London: HMSO Cmnd 9453) p510.
30. In 1987 a group of white parents objected to their children going to the predominantly Asian Headfield School. Arguments about 'language' and Christian culture' provided a thin cover for what was essentially racism on the part of the parents. As the dispute became more bitter, with parents withdrawing their children and delivering them to a predominantly white school so their racism became more apparent. The local authority, Kirklees Council, was notably weak in its defence of its anti-racist

- stance. See 'Dewsbury triumph glosses over bigotry' *Sunday Times* 17/7/88 for a summary of the dispute.
31. A Caudrey (1987) 'The Prophet Motive' *New Society* 3/4/87 gives the example of Yesodey Hatorah Scool in Hackney, an orthodox Jewish school which is appealing for voluntary aided status against the background of ILEA's policy on discouraging such schools. As in Brent, the school governors have found backing from the Conservative opposition on the Council. 'Joe Lobenstein, the Tory group leader ... also a member of the strict orthodox community, has been vociferous in his support of the school's campaign, and his daughter teaches there'.
 32. The Metropolitan Borough of Bradford provided an interesting precursor to the debate in Brent. In 1982, the city introduced an Educational Statement *Education for a multicultural society : provision for pupils of ethnic minority communities.* with four main aims: to prepare all children for life in a multiracial society, to counter the effects of racism, to build on and develop the strengths of linguistic and cultural diversity and to respond sensitively to the special needs of minority groups. This covered various provisions for Muslim children including the serving of Halal meat, a greater emphasis on Islamic principles in schools and various proposals relating to single-sex education.

This was partly aimed at heading off the call by Bradford Muslim Parents' Association (BMPA) for 5 city schools to be made into voluntary aided schools and for Muslim heads and governors to be appointed. Norman Roper, Assistant Education Officer, defended the decision against giving support to the BMPA scheme by envisaging a scenario where 'Muslim voluntary aided schools would be totally Asian. Employment prospects would not have been helped at all if it had been felt that the standard of English was not as high as it could be' (TES 30/8/85). Other voices against the separatist moves included the Bradford Asian Youth Association who argued that it was more important for all state schools to take more account of all their children's cultures. Similarly teachers claimed that it would 'imperil race relations, expose pupils to a reactionary pedagogy and authoritarian discipline, and restrict the educational opportunities of the girls' (Jeffcoate 1984 p106).

Finally, Jeffcoate claims that in the publication of Bradford's Education Statement, 'the only ground for criticism might be timing. Bradford has had a "multicultural and multiracial" population for at least 20 years' (1984 p126). I would advocate the obverse, that Bradford's timing was immaculate.
 33. See M Anwar (1985) *Pakistanis in Britain* (London: New Century), S M Darsh (1980) *Muslims in Europe* (London: Ta Ha) and Z Budawi (1981) *Islam in Britain* (London: Ta Ha).
 34. S Tomlinson (1985) 'The Black Education Movement' in Arnot (1985) pp 65-80. Quote p71.
 35. Union of Muslim Organisations of England and Eire (UMO) (1975) *Islamic Education and Single-Sex Schools* (London: UMO) p10.
 36. Union of Muslim Organisations of England and Eire (UMO) (1976) *National Muslim Educational Council - Background Papers* (London: UMO).
 37. TES 30/8/85.
 38. *ibid.*

39. Swann (1985)
40. This statement was issued by leaders of Britain's Muslim organisations including The Islamic Academy, The Islamic Cultural Centre, The Islamic Circle organisation, The Muslim World League and the Muslim Educational Trust. See also TES 9/5/86.
41. J M Halsted (1986) *The case for Muslim voluntary aided schools* (Oxford: Islamic Academy).
42. TES 18/7/86.
43. TES 31/10/86.
44. AMMA (1987) p79.
45. Sunday Times 10/10/86.
46. Tomlinson (1985) p74.
47. TES 28/2/86.
48. Interview conducted August 1986.
49. Interview conducted September 1986.
50. Interview conducted August 1986.
51. See Badawi (1981).
52. London Borough of Brent : Report from Director of Education 25/11/85 to Education Policy and Estimates Sub-Committee.
53. London Borough of Brent : Report of Schools Sub-Committee 3/9/85.
54. Interview conducted August 1986.
55. There was a similarity with the plans for Muslims in Bradford, outlined above.
56. London Borough of Brent : Report from Director of Education 17/2/86 to Education Policy and Estimates Sub-Committee (section 7.33).
57. *ibid* (section 7.35/6).
58. TES 12/12/86.
59. Troyna & Williams (1986) p7.
60. London Borough of Brent : Report from Director of Education 25/11/85 to Education and Policy Resources Sub-Committee (section 10.8).
61. A similar recent case has been related to me by Pam Helmers-Olsen, section 11 teacher in High Wycombe. There, the Conservative-controlled local authority has refused permission for a 'change of use' for a house to be used as a Muslim supplementary school. The reasons given by the council are similar to those in Brent - noise and nuisance. The underlying motive may well be more discriminatory.
62. Interview conducted August 1986.
63. Dinah Tuck left the Council soon after the Labour Group took control.
64. TES 3/7/87.
65. Interview conducted August 1986.
66. He warned against black parents being seduced into setting up their own schools. 'It must be part of the campaign to reassure the community that the education authority can provide for ethnic minorities in the best possible manner' TES 7/8/87.
67. Interview conducted December 1986.
68. *ibid*.
69. TES 12/12/86.
70. Interview conducted March 1987.
71. Troyna and Williams (1986) p78.
72. For an up to date account of multiculturalism by the teaching establishment see AMMA (1987). Also J Twitchin & C Demuth (1981)

- Multicultural Education: views from the classroom* (London: BBC), A Little & R Willey (1981) *Multi-ethnic education: The way forward* (London: Schools council) and CNNA (1984) *Discussion Paper on multicultural and anti-racist education* (London: CNNA). Left-wing critics include All-London Teachers Against Racism and Fascism (ALTARF) (1984) *Challenging Racism* (London: ALTARF), A Wilson (1984) 'Educating Patrick' *New Statesman* 25/5/84 and R Hatcher (1985) 'On "Education for racial equality"' *Multiracial Education* 12:1.
73. The attack on multiculturalism came to public attention through the writings of Honeyford (TES 19/11/82 and Salisbury Review Summer 1983). Also Flew (1984) and Jeffcoate (1984) offer criticisms. For critiques of these authors see Gordon & Klug (1986) and Troyna & Williams (1986).
 74. 'How Brent went black and blue' *City limits* 5/12/87.
 75. McGoldrick claimed at a later date that she had said she didn't want any more 'bad' teachers.
 76. 'How Brent went black and blue' op cit.
 77. *Guardian* 20/9/86.
 78. *City limits* op cit.
 79. Interview conducted October 1986.
 80. Interview conducted December 1986.
 81. *ibid.*
 82. *ibid.*
 83. *ibid.*
 84. Interview conducted December 1986.
 85. Interview conducted November 1986.
 86. *City limits* op cit.
 87. *New Statesman* op cit.
 88. *ibid.*
 89. Interview conducted November 1987.
 90. ALTARF (1979) p7.
 91. Interview conducted October 1986.
 92. Interview conducted November 1986.
 93. *ibid.*
 94. *Wembley Observer* 25/9/86.
 95. *ibid.*
 96. Interview conducted September 1986.
 97. Interview conducted July 1987.
 98. *ibid.*
 99. *ibid.*
 100. Quoted in the *Guardian* 23/10/86.
 101. . Campbell (1987).
 102. *TES* 3/10/86.
 103. *Wembley Observer* 9/10/86.
 104. Interview conducted July 1987.
 105. 'Two Kingdoms' March 1986 Para 10.2.
 106. A report on the stabbing of a Manchester schoolboy in 1986 by a committee chaired by Andrew Macdonald, a left-wing barrister, one third of which was published by Manchester City Council in May 1988. The Committee found that there had been a racist motive to the murder and that the anti-racist policies followed by the Council had failed in Burnage School. At the same time the report began to re-introduce the issue of class into the debate on

- education.
107. Quoted from his contribution to the debate on racism and education at *Marxism 88* Organised by the Socialist Workers Party 10/6/88.
 108. A Sivanandan (1988) 'No such thing as anti-racist ideology' *New Statesman* pp16-18.
 109. Quote p15.
 110. *ibid.*
 111. *TES* 17/6/88.
 112. It must be remembered that in the late 1970s there was an organisation, the National Union of School Students, which attempted to promote militancy among schoolchildren. During the time of the Anti-Nazi League, one of its biggest sub-groups was Schoolkids Against the Nazis (SKAN).

CHAPTER 7

1. But as Young and Connelly (1981) note:

Many authorities have, after careful consideration, advocated some form of equal opportunities statement ... The increasing number of such locally adopted statements is sometimes seen by observers as indicating a steady incremental progress towards equal opportunities. Our fieldwork suggests that the adoption of such a statement per se is evidence of very little and may be intended to do no more than provide a modicum of legal protection to the authority. (pp48-9)

2. And indeed the steady advance of privatisation will offer even less protection for Council equal opportunity policies with the tendering out of key services.
3. Fryer (1984) p194.
4. Taaffe and Mulhearn (1988) p15.
5. Pat Wall at 16 was the youngest party secretary in the country. In 1982 he became the centre of controversy when Michael Foot attempted to stop him becoming the Labour Candidate for Bradford North because of his Militant past. Keith Dickinson, on Militant's Executive Committee, was one of the five Militant leaders expelled in 1983.
6. Terry Harrison was Militant's first full-timer in Liverpool. He had also been a Chair of Militant's national Conference and was described by M Crick (1986) *The March of Militant* (London: Faber and Faber) as 'Militant's leader on Merseyside and its father-figure' (p218). Peter Taaffe, with Ted Grant and Keith Dickinson, have been at the centre of Militant since 1964 and is a key figure in Militant having edited *Militant* for many years. Tony Mulhearn was for more than a decade Liverpool's only other representative (with Dickinson) on Militant's Central Committee.
7. The most frequently cited estimation of Liverpool's non-white population is that made by the Merseyside Community Relations Council (see Liverpool Black Caucus (1986) *The Racial Politics of Militant* (London: Runnymede Trust) p17)

Liverpool-born Blacks	20,000
Chinese	8,000
South Asian	4,000
African	3,000
Caribbean	3,000
Somali & Arab	2,000
TOTAL	40,000

8. See I G Law and J Humphrey (1981) *A history of race and racism in Liverpool 1660-1950* Merseyside CRC.
9. Taaffe and Mulhearn (1988) p14.
10. See Chapter 10 in Fryer (1984).
11. See Liverpool Black Caucus (1986).
12. See Liverpool Youth Organising Committee (1968) *Special but not separate* (Liverpool: Liverpool CVS), Law & Humphrey (1972), Race Relations Board (1976) *The leaving of Liverpool* (North West conciliation Committee) & Merseyside Anti-Racist Alliance (1978) *Merseyside Against Racism* (Liverpool: MARA).
13. Liverpool Black Caucus (1986) p23.
14. See Law and Humphrey (1972).
15. D Cowell, T Jones and J Young (eds) (1982) *Policing the riots* (London: Junction).
16. Quoted by Taaffe and Mulhearn (1988) p53.
17. *ibid* p54.
18. Liverpool Black Caucus (1986) p27.
19. The result being House of Commons Home Affairs Committee Race Relations and Immigration Sub-Committee Session 1979-80 (1980) *Racial Discrimination: Minutes of Evidence* (London: HMSO).
20. Liverpool Black Caucus (1986) p53.
21. The relevance of corporate management in race relations policy-making is gone into more deeply in Robinson (1981) and in Chapter 4 above.
22. Liverpool Black Caucus (1986) p41.
23. See G Ben-Tovim (1983) *Equal opportunities and the employment of black people and ethnic minorities on Merseyside* (Liverpool: Merseyside Area Profile Group). As Liverpool Black Caucus (1986) notes this gives a Merseyside black population of 8% in the city, having less than 1% of the jobs in the City Council and similar representation in the City Centre stores and offices.
24. Reverse and positive discrimination are of course illegal under the Race Relations Act (1976).
25. Liverpool Black Caucus (1986) pp48-50.
26. For greater analysis see Crick (1986), Taaffe and Mulhearn (1988) and S McGregor (1986) 'The History and Politics of Militant', *International Socialism* 2:33 Autumn pp59-88.
27. Taaffe and Mulhearn (1988) p65.
28. See Crick (1986) Chapters 12 & 13.
29. *ibid* p232.
30. See Taaffe and Mulhearn (1988) pp146-57.
31. In October 1985 Neil Kinnock launched his attack on Militant at the Labour Party conference and Liverpool in particular with the words:

I'll tell you what happens with impossible promises. You start with far-fetched resolutions. They are then pickled into a rigid dogma, a code, and you go through the years sticking to that, out-dated, misplaced, irrelevant to the real needs, and you end up in the grotesque chaos of a Labour Council - a Labour council - hiring taxis to scuttle around the city handing out redundancy notices to its own workers. [from Crick (1986) p277]

32. In late September Channel 4 News commissioned a Harris Poll which found that 47% of the Liverpool electors asked blamed the Government for the city's crisis and only 33% blamed Liverpool City Council.
33. Most the argument around ethnic monitoring was dealt with by JG/LAAWG (1983).
34. Liverpool Black Caucus (1986) p63.
35. *ibid* p72.
36. *ibid* p73.
37. *ibid* p76.
38. *ibid* pp78-9.
39. Taaffe and Mulhearn (1988) p259.
40. *ibid* p258.
41. *Guardian* 11/10/84.
42. *ibid*.
43. Taaffe and Mulhearn (1988) p259.
44. *ibid* pp51-2.
45. *ibid* p259.
46. Liverpool District Labour Party Resolution 11/10/84.
47. *Black Linx* December 1984.
48. Liverpool City Council statement quoted by Taaffe and Mulhearn (1988) p273.
49. Liverpool Black Caucus (1986) p126.
50. Interview conducted May 1986.
51. *Liverpool Echo* 10/12/81.
52. District Auditors have never been pure auditors in terms of simply checking the books of local authorities. Poplar Councillors in the 1920s were constantly harassed by the district auditors as were the Clay Cross Councillors in the 1970s. The 1982 Local Government Finance Act gave the District Auditors new and draconian powers under the control of the National Audit Commission. In Liverpool the District Auditor did not even have to give a hearing to the Councillors before surcharging and banning them from office.
53. In *Militant* (1984) p9.
54. *Guardian* 7/8/84.
55. Interview conducted June 1986.
56. Interview conducted June 1986.
57. She was also the Leader of the Association of London Authorities and her husband represented Alan McFarlane in his employment hearings with Hackney Council.
58. See *London Labour Briefing* June 1982.
59. *London Labour Briefing* July 1982 on decentralisation.
60. Quoted by Cockerill (1985) pp98-9.
61. *London Labour Briefing* November 1982.
62. Note the similarity with Neil Kinnock's anti-Militant speech.

63. The Council's refusal to settle the Nursery workers' claim directly contravened its manifesto commitment as well as it compared badly with the the aims to help low-paid women workers and support childcare provision. Councillors openly stated that if they could beat the Nursery workers, they would be able to set up the neighbourhood offices under their terms and conditions rather than Nalgo's.
64. As *Islington Gazette* 5/4/85 noted, for all the confrontational talk made by Labour Councillors, Margaret Hodge 'has continually sidestepped questions as to whether she was prepared to act outside the law'.
65. Between 1985 and 1986, the number of black and ethnic minority officers working for the Council has risen from 499 to 820. Percentage-wise 23% of the Council's workforce by then came from black and other ethnic minorities compared with 14.4% in 1985.
66. London Borough of Islington (1988) p5.
67. See London Borough of Islington (1979).
68. Indeed Islington was the first Labour local authority to successfully and 'cleanly' evict a family for racial harassment.
69. Indeed the Chair of Housing had written to the Personnel Committee noting his concern about the dispute but claimed it was not a Housing matter.
70. 'Equal Opportunity Employment Training - The Race Dimension' Report of Race Relations Officer (January 1984).
71. 'Equal Opportunity Training' Report of Director of Personnel 3/11/83.
72. *ibid* Section 6.1.
73. Interview conducted April 1986
74. Interview conducted April 1986
75. Interview conducted April 1986
76. Letter shown to me by Dave Burn, April 1986.
77. In 1983 Islington denied information, advice and assistance to the *Islington Gazette* during a dispute between its publishers and the NUJ. The Council were censured by the Press Council, but survived the ordeal, who saw this as a 'despicable example of Councillors disregarding their responsibility not to impede the free flow of information'. The attempts by the Council to do the job itself flowered with the *Islington News* which collapsed with substantial losses (See Gyford [1985] p19).
78. See *Islington Gazette* 28/7/85.
79. *Islington Gazette* 10/5/85 and *Islington Focus* August 1985.
80. *Socialist Worker* 10/5/85.
81. *Islington Gazette* 9/8/85.
89. Quoted in *Socialist Worker* 10/8/85.
83. *London Labour Briefing* October 1985.
84. Interview conducted May 1986
85. *Islington Gazette* 16/8/85.
86. *Islington Focus* September 1985.
87. 'Racial Harassment at Work' Report by Director of Personnel. (amending a report by the Race Relations Adviser [Housing]) to Equal Opportunities Joint Committee 10/8/85.
88. *ibid* section 4.2.
89. See 'Review of the current work of the Race Relations Section in Housing' Report by Director of Housing 11/12/86

90. 'Anti-racist strategy for the Housing Department' Report by the Director of Housing 1/12/86.
91. J Weinstein (1986) 'Angry arguments across the picket lines: Left Labour councils and white-collar trade unionism', *Critical Social Policy* 17 pp40-59. Quote p42.
92. *Islington Gazette* 17/2/84.
93. Interview conducted May 1986.
94. See Gurnah and Sivanandan above.
95. Interview conducted April 1986.
96. Merton (1976) p8.

Key Primary Informants

The key informants listed below, whilst not a full list of those interviewed, are those who are directly quoted in the text of the thesis or who provided a valuable contribution which substantially added to the body of the work.

- Tariq Ali - Ex-leading member of the IMG
Dave Cook - Communist Party writer on anti-fascism
Savvas Eleftheriades - Harwich ANL member
Paul Holborow - Founder Member of the ANL
Sheila McGregor - Ex-Birmingham SWP organiser/SWP Central Committee Member
Steve Marsh - Ex-joint organiser National Union of School Students
Elaine Mein - Sheffield ANL Secretary
Simon Ogden - Sheffield ANL Organiser
Dr Sokolic - Board of Deputies of British Jews
Andy Strouthous - SWP Central Committee
Simon Read - Bristol ANL member
Vernica Crooks - Race Relations Adviser Newham Council
Unmesh Desai - Founder member Newham Monitoring Project
Ayuz Khan - Resident Keir Hardie Estate
Elton Lewis - Outreach Worker Newham Monitoring Project
Rosina McDonnell - Woman evicted for racial harassment
John Carr - Ex-Equal Opportunities Officer Personnel Directorate
Hackney Council
Sally Grubb - Housing Officer Commission for Racial Equality
Alan McFarlane - Ex-Senior Housing Adviser (Race Relations) Hackney Council
Tony Shoults - Ex-Director of Housing Hackney Council

Ron Anderson - Ex- Chair Education Committee Brent Council
Dr Baig - Headmaster Islamia School Brent
Brent Black Teachers Collective
Shaun Docherty - Brent Socialist Teachers Alliance
Reg Freeson - Ex-Brent East MP
Ibrahim Hewitt - Islamic Circle Organisation
Yusuf Islam - Founder Islamia School Brent
Ken Livingstone - Brent East MP
Maureen McGoldrick - Ex-Headmistress Sudbury Infants School
Nitin Parshotam - Chair Education Committee Brent Council
John Poole - Chair Brent Teachers Association
Russell Proffit - Principal Race Relations Adviser Brent Council
Karwal Singh - Governor Sudbury Infants School

Derek Hatton - Ex-Deputy Leader Liverpool City Council
Liverpool Black Caucus
Alex May - Nalگو Shop Steward Liverpool City Council
Tony Mulhearn - Ex-Liverpool City Councillor
Charles Williams - Liverpool 8 Community Worker

Linda Braithwaite - Clerk (Rent Accounts) Islington Council
Jacqui Brown - Islington Council
Dave Burn - Nalگو Branch Secretary Islington Council
Sally Gilbert - Chair Islington Personnel Committee
Reana Gordon - Typist Calshot Area Office Islington Council

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APPENDIX 1

FOUNDING STATEMENT OF THE ANTI NAZI LEAGUE

The National Front are emerging as a growing force in British politics. In the local elections in London they received over 119,000 votes. In some recent by-elections they have pushed the Liberal Party into fourth place. They intend to stand over 350 candidates in the next General Election.

For the first time since Mosley in the thirties, there is the worrying prospect of a Nazi party gaining significant support in Britain. The leaders, philosophy and origins of the National Front and similar organisations follow on directly from the Nazis in Germany. Like Hitler with the Jews, the British Nazis seek to make scapegoats of black people. They exploit the real problems of unemployment, bad housing, cuts in education and in social and welfare services. Physical assaults on black people are increasing at a disturbing rate. If their evil propaganda takes root we will be facing an alarming development in Britain, which affects every one of us.

In these months before the General Election the Nazis will seize every opportunity to spread the propaganda. During the Election itself, National Front candidates might receive equal TV and radio time to the two major parties. The British electorate will be exposed to Nazi propaganda on an unprecedented scale.

This must not go unopposed. Ordinary voters must be aware of the threat that lies behind the National Front. In every town, in every factory, in every school, on every housing estate, wherever the Nazis attempt to organise, they must be countered. Millions of leaflets and posters will have to be distributed. To have the necessary impact, this demands a campaign on a national and massive scale.

That is why we, the undersigned, believe that an Anti-Nazi league has to be built urgently to unite all those who oppose the growth of the Nazis in Britain, irrespective of other political differences.

The League's objectives will be to organise on the widest possible scale against the propaganda and activities of the Nazis in Britain

today.

We believe that many people - in the professions and in trade unions - are already aware of the danger. The experience of Hitler's Germany shows that the Nazis will not go away of their own accord.

We, the undersigned, appeal for the widest possible support for our efforts to alert the people of this country to the growing menace of the new Nazis.

APPENDIX

The constitution of Germany... which relates... resolution in the... sales of... rent rate... is made up... The... the rest is... police... signature... (some 45%)

to directly... the local authorities...

and local... spending... the Treasury... Planning and Land Act... expenditure which was... although in practice... by the capital... of the total... the savings as a sign to... (13-9) after... the major reason... concern for the... expenditure... This... if not... could...

APPENDIX 2

The cuts and controls on local government finance since 1979

Local government finance is distinguished primarily between *capital* expenditure, which is used in the acquisition of assets such as buildings, land and machinery and *revenue* expenditure which relates mainly to the current costs of providing goods and services to the locality. The former is funded largely by borrowing, whilst sales of assets, revenue contributions and grants from central government make up much of the rest. The cost of funding revenue expenditure is made up by a mixture of government grant, locally levied rates and rents. The government grant is composed of over 80% Block Grant and the rest is made up of specific grants relating to housing, transport, the police and urban renewal. In terms of total local government expenditure revenue accounts for a much greater proportion than capital (some 90%) of which education accounts for approximately half. There is, of course, a degree of variance between local authorities depending upon their spending priorities.

After Tony Crosland had warned local authorities in 1975 that 'the party was over' for high public spending, as the IMF pressured the Labour Government into cutting the PSBR, the Treasury imposed a system of cash limits which was reinforced by the Conservative Government's 1980 Local Government, Planning and Land Act. The latter introduced ceilings on total capital expenditure which were to be set annually for individual authorities, although in practice few local councils have been effectively constrained by the capital expenditure controls. Not only has spending fallen short of the total allocation but the government has increased the ceilings as a spur to capital expenditure. As Boddy (1984 pp218-9) notes, 'the major reason for the massive underspending appeared to be councils' concern for the *revenue implications* of capital expenditure ... at a time when current expenditure was increasingly subject to cuts and controls ... This reinforced the longer-term decline of capital spending from 32 per cent of total expenditure in 1975/6 to 10 per cent in 1982/3.'

The controls on revenue expenditure have been more extensive and successful. Firstly, the proportion of total local spending which the Government considered relevant in calculating its grant was reduced from 61% in 1979/80 to 53% in 1983/4. A cut in the total grant was seen as a straightforward way of attempting to cut local expenditure. The effect was, however, to push up the local rates levied. A further measure was brought in when the Block Grant system was introduced in 1980. The Department of the Environment set for each local authority a Grant Related Expenditure Assessment (GREA), a calculation as to the amount a local authority would need to spend in order to provide a 'standard' level of services. Beyond this a target level, the threshold on expenditure was set at GREA plus 10%. An authority could spend more than its GREA but in doing so would attract less and less money from central government. Spending beyond the target level incurred a loss of grant and a system of penalties. The controls were clearly aimed at high spending Labour local authorities and caught many within the net especially after the tightening of the penalties in 1983/4. Boddy (1984 p221) suggests, 'The severe penalties introduced in 1983/4 were such that many authorities were in the position of receiving less grant in absolute terms, at higher spending levels.'

After the Conservative's General Election victory in 1983 the Government went ahead with its plans for rate-capping and the abolition of the GLC and the metropolitan counties. Under the terms of the Rate Act 1984, councils overspending the limits set by the Government would have the level of their rates 'capped' so that they could not spend excessively by raising extra revenue through the rates. Under the 1980 Local Government Act local authorities were forbidden to levy a supplementary rate to make up any shortfall in income but under the 1984 Rates Act the Secretary of State has the power to withdraw grants and effectively freeze rate income which cannot be made up in any other way.

APPENDIX 3

Details from : London Borough of Newham (1987) Report of a Survey of
Crime and Racial Harassment in Newham

The report was prepared by the Harris Research Centre from a local crime survey completed in June/August 1986 and published in March 1987. A total of 1063 residents of the borough were questioned.

The survey found that:

1. 1 in 4 blacks had been harassed in the twelve months leading up to the survey.
2. 2 in 3 victims had been harassed more than once.
3. 116 victims reported 15509 separate incidents.
4. Only 1 in 20 victims had reported the incidents to the police.
4. 80% of victims were dissatisfied with the police handling of their complaints.
5. Less than 1 in 4 victims were generally pleased with policing in their area.

Disappointment was seen by the respondents as stemming largely from police apathy and indifference rather than a lack of resources on behalf of the police force. The report concluded:

Crime and racial harassment play a significant part in the lives of Newham's residents. To be more specific not only do crime and racial harassment directly affect Newham residents, the fear of being a victim affects the majority of people living in the borough.

APPENDIX 4

NON-DISCRIMINATION NOTICE
(RACE RELATIONS ACT 1976, S.38)

1. Whereas, in the course of a formal investigation into the London Borough of Hackney ('the Council'), the Commission for Racial Equality ('the Commission') have become satisfied that the Council have committed acts to which Section 58(2) of the Race Relations Act ('the Act') applies, namely:

that between 13 June 1977 and 31 January 1981 the Council, by its servants in the borough housing department, for whose acts the Council is liable under Section 32(1) of the Act, discriminated against various persons of West Indian, Asian or African origin who were rehoused from the Council's waiting list, rehoused as homeless cases or rehoused as a result of being decanted from their existing accommodation:

- in contravention of Section 20(1)(b) read together with Section 1(1)(a) of the Act by refusing or deliberately omitting to provide them with housing accommodation (provision of such accommodation being a service of the local authority) of the like quality to that afforded to white persons in need of housing accommodation, and/or
- in contravention of Section 21 (1)(c) read together with Section 1(1)(a) of the act in its treatment of them in relation to lists of persons in need of Council accommodation.

2. And the Commission are of the opinion that further such acts are likely to be committed unless changes are made in the Council's practices or other arrangements as respects:

(a) the need for arrangements to record the ethnic origin of all persons applying for housing and being rehoused by the Council and analyse these records at quarterly intervals in relation to:

- the quality of accommodation offered (measured in terms of the type of property, age of property and its floor level or some other measure of quality to be agreed with the Commission);
- the quality of accommodation allocated if different from that offered above;
- allocations to those estates, or parts of estates which the Council knows are 'difficult-to-let';
- and report the results to a Council Committee

(b) the need for arrangements for a review of the procedures and practices operated and the criteria in assessing which applicants/tenants will be offered which available property to ensure that they are clearly defined, reliable, relevant to housing needs and applied equally to all housing applicants/tenants;

(c) the need for arrangements to provide guidance and training to all staff concerned with visiting housing applicants/tenants and making allocation to them about Section 20 and 21 and how this affects their work with particular respect to:

- completing the record of information which will be used by the allocations officers;
- ensuring that applicants/tenants are equally informed of the options available to them and consulted about their preferences and other special needs;

- ensuring that only those criteria which have been defined as relevant to allocation decisions as a result of (b) above are recorded;

(d) the need for allocation to a senior official in the housing department of responsibility for ensuring the Council's compliance with the 1976 Race Relations Act generally and the non-discrimination notice and for ensuring that appropriate arrangements are made by the Council within the meaning of Section 71 of the Act, for the monitoring as appropriate in (a) above, the review in (b) above and the guidance and training in (c) above.

3. Now, therefore, without prejudice to the Council's other duties under the Act, the Council are hereby required, in pursuance of Section 58(2)1 not to commit any such unlawful acts.

4. In so far as compliance with the aforesaid requirements involves changes in any of the Council's practices or other arrangements, the Council are further required in pursuance of the said Section 58(2) to inform the Commission as hereinafter provided that they have effected those changes and what those changes are and to take the following steps for the purpose of affording that information to other persons namely:

A. to inform the Commission within two months of the non-discrimination notice becoming final that the Council will make these changes within one year or such other period as may be agreed with the Commission;

B. to take the following steps within the period specified below, or such other period as may be agreed with the Commission, for the purpose of affording information about the changes to other persons concerned:

(i) issue to all housing department staff involved in visiting applicants/tenants and allocating accommodation, within one year of the non-discrimination notice becoming final, written

notifications warning them of the changes made and arrangements in accordance with 2(a) 2 (b), and 2(c) above;

- (ii) prepare written guidance to be given to all those applying for housing, within one year of the non-discrimination notice becoming final, on the arrangements to be made in accordance with 2(a) above and the factors defined as a result of the review at 2(b) above.

5. The Notice also requires the Council, pursuant to section 58(3) of the Act, to furnish the Commission, on dates specified below during the period of five years after the Notice has become final, with the following information to verify that the notice has been complied with, namely:

- (1) to supply within 28 days of its issue, copies of written notifications referred to in 4B(i) above, and the names and positions in the housing department of the employees to whom it was issued, and the dates on which they received it;

- (2) to supply within 28 days of the review referred to in 2(b) above being completed details of the procedures and practices to be operated and the criteria to be used in assessing which applicants/tenants will be offered which available property and the arrangements to be made to ensure they are applied equally;

- (3) to supply a copy of each report on the recording and monitoring of ethnic origins referred to in 2(a) above as and when it is put to the appropriate Council Committee for a period of five years after the non-discrimination notice becomes final;

- (4) to supply within 28 days of its issue a copy of the guidance to applicants/tenants referred to in 4B(ii) above.

The information to be furnished by the Council to the Commission in pursuance of the notice shall be furnished in writing by ordinary letter post.

Dated the ninth day of May 1983

This Notice was issued by the Commission, with provisions of Section 58(5) of the Act having been complied with.

APPENDIX 5

'Race Spies' and section 11 funding

In the last week in October 1986, headlines such as 'Race Spies in the classroom' and 'Brent's thought police' littered the popular press as the backlash grew against Brent Council's plan to employ over 170 extra teachers to implement education policy. The atmosphere over the McGoldrick affair became an excuse for the Conservatives to attack Brent on the issue of the 170 section 11 teachers. Although the scheme had received Home Office approval, not forgetting that the proposal was one which had been made under the previous local Liberal/Conservative leadership. The Home Office wrote to Brent council at the height of the McGoldrick saga demanding more information about the planned role of the race equality advisers in the schools. It said that the money for section 11 'could only be used for tackling the under-achievement of black children in schools and this does not extend to promoting the council's anti-racist policies'.

Brent prepared the relevant information for the Home Office whilst denying that there had been any impropriety over the application, which had been worked out step-by-step with Home Office and DES officers who gave agreement in principle. Ron Anderson argued:

Councils throughout the country now run the risk of committing themselves to significant expenditure after being given the green light from Government civil servants only to be told months, or even years later, that ministers have changed their minds and reneged on agreements on a whim based on inaccurate and misleading Press reports.

The Home Office stated that the project would receive a grant of between £2 million and £3 million. The scheme was devised because Brent stood to lose the money it was already receiving from the Home Office after an investigation had found that Brent was simply using the money to employ more black teachers, outside the section 11 guidelines which stipulate that the money provided must be used to improve the provision

of education for people of Commonwealth origin. The Home Office Minister, David Waddington, was also involved - as he has been with the tightening of immigration rules.

In the same month as the allocation of the section 11 funding was under review, Kenneth Baker sent in 50 school inspectors to carry out the most thorough investigation of a local authority's schools since the war. The report, released in April 1987, found little at fault which could be put down to the supposed 'loony leftism' of the council. The inspectors found deep-rooted and long-standing problems which added up to a an underfunded, mismanaged and under-achieving education system. The report noted that the anti-racist policy was not a factor in reducing standards and was not distorting the curriculum. In fact, it was contributing to racial harmony, and was supported by most local people. Some black parents, in fact, felt that it was not going far enough.

New Society (1/5/87) concluded that:

Baker is quite right to insist that Brent put its house in order, but he seems unaware that the kinds of criticisms made by the inspectors were already familiar to education watchers...The truth is that the left-wing authorities have taken on the quality of an *idée fixe* in the mind of the Education Secretary...In Brent's travails with a racist popular press backing him up, Baker scents an election winner...Such cynical opportunism offers little hope to the teachers, parents and children grappling with the real problems of life in Britain's inner cities.

APPENDIX 6

Voluntary Aided Status and Opting Out

At present there are nearly 4,500 voluntary aided schools in Britain - almost all of which are Roman Catholic or Church of England. Only 19 are Jewish. Voluntary aided status in effect takes a school from an independent to a semi-independent position. Parents pay for the building and external upkeep of the premises whilst the local authority is liable for the running costs. In percentage terms this puts a responsibility on the council to foot approximately 85% of capital costs in the day to day maintenance as well as salaries. The particular religious group, if it is a denominational school, appoints two-thirds of the governors, who decide what is taught and who makes up the staff. Nationally it is estimated that 15% of pupils are taught in denominational schools - though in West London the figure is nearer 40%.

When a school wishes to be considered for voluntary aided status, there are two main provisions. These are the 1944 Education Act and S.13(1) of the 1980 Education Act. The application is made by the school to the Department of Education without strictly needing approval from the relevant local authority. The Secretary of State is the final arbiter in cases such as this but is most often heavily influenced by the reports submitted by the council's education committee. There is usually little chance for a school unaided by the local authority.

Following the primary application to the local authority, the school then formally submits its plans to the Department of Education. There is then a two month period for objections to be raised to the application. These can be made by 10 or more electors within the borough, the governors of any other school (voluntary aided) or local authority likely to be affected by the decision. After this two month period the school is then invited to forward comments on the objections within 1 month and it is then up to the Secretary of State to decide.

The decision, binding on the local authority takes the following relevant criteria into consideration :

- (a) The demand for places,
- (b) The willingness of the local authority to maintain the school,
- (c) Evidence that the school's promoters can meet their financial costs
- (d) Whether the premises come up to HMI standards,
- (e) The provision for a secular curriculum,
- (f) The adequacy of the teaching staff's qualifications,
- (g) The publication of formal admissions arrangements,
- (h) Whether the school has taken account of the objections raised

The religious character of a school does not release it from satisfying either DES criteria on its curriculum or from the demands of the 1944 Education Act. It may therefore appear that the procedures for gaining voluntary aided status are straightforward but as discussed above, the hostility of a local authority can severely delay, if not wholly block the attempts of school to change its status. The changes for schools planned in Kenneth Baker's Education Bill (1988) are likely to significantly increase the number of applicants from independent schools for voluntary aided status as a way of opting in to the system so that they can then opt out. Stuart Sexton, at the Institute for Economic Affairs estimates that between 50 or 60 schools might attempt this process before the next general election (Quoted in *Sunday Telegraph* 22/11/87).

There are several independent schools who would dearly love to be part of the state system whilst not wishing to be beholden to the local state. Now, with the Baker proposals, independent schools which obtain voluntary aided status, involving local authority influence and in certain areas control, will then be able to opt out and move to direct funding by the Department of Education. For those schools at loggerheads with their LEAs this will provide a useful escape route to state funding and avoidance of a local authority of an unfavoured ideology. As the *Sunday Telegraph* (22/11/87) noted, 'Kenneth Baker, for all his ministerial background in such whizzo subjects as Information Technology, may end up as the saviour of religion'.

The Islamia School in Brent applied for voluntary aided status long before Baker's proposals but is a test case for non-Christian schools in Britain. The success of Islamia school, against a

hostile council could well bring forth many more applications from similar denominational schools. The effect on the educational make up of many areas, those with a high Muslim population for example, could be far-reaching. In Brent itself where 1 in 5 children who live in the borough are educated outside it at secondary school age the growth of a school taking in Muslim children into a semi-independent sector is a problem for a council which attempts to provide equality of opportunity within the local state education system.

APPENDIX 6

Costing by Brent Borough Finance Department (in Feb 1986) of Islamia
Primary School if given voluntary aided status

<u>FULL YEAR</u>	<u>FIRST YEAR</u>	
126,900	74,000	Staffing: Teachers
10,000	5,800	Others
15,000	8,800	Wage Covers
-----	-----	
151,900	88,600	Total staffing costs
4,000	2,100	Capitation
29,000	6,900	Running costs (premises)
5,000	2,900	Other running costs
34,000	20,100	School meals
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£224,700	£131,100	

(Source: Report of Dir. of Education to Education Policy and Resources
Sub-Committee Feb. 1986)