

AN ANALYSIS OF THE SEMANTIC FIELD OF THE GERMAN
PARTICLES „ÜBERHAUPT“ AND „EIGENTLICH“

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An analysis of the semantic field of the German particles 'Überhaupt' and 'Eigentlich'.

SUMMARY

KEY WORDS : Modal Particles

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Distinctive Features

Lexical and Syntactic Meaning

The main objective of this thesis is to show that the methods of structural semantics, that is forming oppositions and thereby eliciting distinctive features, are applicable to lexemes without any proper lexical meaning, such as German modal particles. German modal particles have, as is shown, played a very unimportant role in grammar. This was due to various reasons: firstly, there always was (and still is to a certain extent) the problem of homonymy; in other words particles, more than other words, have homonyms with different functions, a fact which complicated a proper classification. Secondly, particles were supposed to be negligible entities because of their lack of any proper syntactic function. Thirdly, particles were regarded stylistically 'bad' precisely because they were devoid both of lexical meaning and of syntactic functions. Despite that fact, they occur frequently both in written and spoken language, a phenomenon which in recent years has attracted the attention of a number of scholars.

The most important results of their investigations were that particles express the speaker's attitude towards the propositional contents of an utterance and towards the participants likewise. In written texts they serve to bring out nuances in the meaning which cannot be expressed by intonation. Thus particles have a very important function in both written and spoken language. They have however no proper lexical meaning; on the other hand they have a meaning which in this thesis is called 'instrumental meaning', following COSERIU's distinction.

To elicit this instrumental meaning the techniques of field theory and structural semantics were employed. Field theory, however, has been a much-questioned approach so much so that a short discussion of its essentials as well as criticisms of it is indispensable. The development of field theory by COSERIU and the theoretical and terminological background are discussed and a largely successful attempt is made to construct a field for 'überhaupt' and 'eigentlich' by employing structural methods.

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1.0 PRELIMINARIES

1.1 INTRODUCTION

Modal particles have traditionally been one of the crucial points in any grammar of German. This has been so for various reasons. Firstly, they have resisted any proper classification, and secondly, traditional grammarians have usually regarded them - and still do - as unnecessary and because their proper function has never been determined or even asserted to be detrimental to good style. What, therefore, emerges from traditional grammars with respect to modal particles is usually not much more than a marginal notion, often accompanied by a warning to writers not to use them as they allegedly indicate that their potential user has not mastered his language properly and would therefore incorporate them in his text in order to make his utterances vague instead of keeping them clear and straightforward. The origin of this view is of course in the adaptation to German of a Latin-based grammar system which again was based on Greek grammar. There is no point in reproaching past periods for their linguistic attitudes but a look into cultural history might well explain certain present-day phenomena.

As a matter of fact, it is only since 1963 that particles have become of wider interest to linguists,

starting with KRIVONOSOV's work on modal particles in German and WEYDT's research on particles. [Cf. KRIVONOSOV 1963/WEYDT 1969.] KRIVONOSOV's book especially shows the vast problems that arise with respect to particles. Most of these words, as he clearly shows, function differently in different positions in the sentence and in different types of sentences, i.e. apart from functioning as modal particles they can be adverbs, conjunctions and so on. In this thesis, however, I limit myself to the analysis of only two of these modal particles: 'überhaupt' and 'eigentlich' and I intend to investigate only their functions as modal particles.

Before I give an account of the methods I have employed to conduct the analysis I wish to give a brief summary of what the various chapters treat.

Chapter 1.2 is designed to epitomise the problems and the analysis of modal particles to be elaborated. In this chapter I try to show these problems by reference to traditional grammars. The main concern of this chapter is why traditional grammars were bound to fail in their attempts to classify particles. A critical look into various inconsistencies accompanying almost every such attempt may help to explain why a satisfactory classification was never accomplished. This leads to Chapter 1.3 in which I try to answer the question whether particles are really necessary, that is whether they can be omitted or not.

This foreshadows Chapter 1.4 which is designed to give a short survey of modern approaches.

As has been mentioned, KRIVONOSOV was the first to look deeper into the problem of German modal particles, but his 1963 thesis was not available, however, until 1977; the first German research, which was carried out without any awareness of KRIVONOSOV's work, was done by WEYDT in 1969. During the TG 'craze' in Germany there were no further attempts to pursue the matter for various reasons, one of which was the inability of transformational grammar to generate such items as particles. It was not until 1975 that the younger generation of linguists - probably in need of topics that were not too 'worn out' - became interested in particles again. By then, such fields as pragmatics, discourse analysis and suchlike had developed a number of techniques which showed promise of yielding interesting results in the investigation of particles.

Up to now a couple of 'Readers' as well as a number of monographs have been published in this field. There are, nevertheless, many problems which have not been solved yet; one of these is: do particles have a proper meaning? This is actually the problem with which this thesis is concerned.

Chapter 1.4.1 deals with the close and often stressed relationship between particles and intonation. As a matter of fact, any alteration in intonation in a given sentence may alter the meaning of the particle in this sentence. In some languages, for instance English, the expressive function of German particles is almost entirely conveyed by intonation. This leads to the next Chapter 1.4.2 in which I analyse the interrelation between the use of particles and the emotive attitude of the speaker towards the proposition made by the sentences incorporating them.

In Chapter 1.6 I summarise the results of the preceding chapters and point out what direction further research ought to take. Adaptation of the field concept, for instance, may be one method of investigating further the meaning of modal particles.

The concept of field is closely connected with names such as PORZIG, TRIER, and WEISGERBER. There have, however, been earlier formulations of such ideas. I give a brief account of these in Chapter 2.1.

The chapter is designed to present and discuss the field established by PORZIG, TRIER and WEISGERBER respectively. There has been considerable discussion between these three scholars about which of the concepts would be the most appropriate one. As a matter of fact, it turned out that these three concepts were complementary rather than in opposition.

In the third chapter I give detailed descriptions of the methods I employ in this thesis.

Chapter 2.2 is a survey of how the lexical field can be structured by means of the different levels COSERIU suggested. A very good example was given by GECKELER, a pupil of COSERIU.

Chapter 3 is entirely designed to apply the previous methods to our specific problems, that is to define the meaning of 'überhaupt' and 'eigentlich' by means of structuring their lexical fields, and Chapter 4 is concerned with the conclusions, suggestions and prospects of this analysis.

A thesis such as this is bound to have shortcomings, but it is designed mainly as a pilot study to encourage further research in these fields.

1.2 PARTICLES AND TRADITIONAL GRAMMAR

The classification of words has been a problem for grammarians as long as grammatical formulations have existed. Dating back to classical times the classification of words was usually achieved by formal, grammatical categories such as the absence or presence of case or tense. Entities which are not conveyed by these categories are usually not properly defined individually, but treated rather as a whole, regardless of the different functions the individual entities may have. Only POMPEIUS in a comment on DONATUS states that these entities are not vacant but have a proper function, and with regard to what might be called the Latin equivalent of German modal particles describes this function as bringing out underlying, not explicitly expressed features [cf. POMPEIUS 1868: 96 f].

X Since German grammar (and not only German grammar) is largely based on Classical Greek and Latin grammars, as for instance indicated by the adaptation of terminology, we can trace the attitude mentioned above in almost any grammar up to the present day. Der Duden, for example, gives the following classification of words: Verb, noun, adjective, pronoun and particles. The latter are characterized by the lack of inflexion and are defined as a group:

'die weder über eine gleich
grosse Aussagekraft verfügen wie
die Verben, Substantive und
Adjektive noch über eine
Formenwelt wie alle bisher
betrachteten Wörter. Sie
sind gleichsam der Rest-
bestand des gesamten Wortschatzes
. . . den man unter dem Namen
Partikeln zusammenfasst . . .'
[DER GROSSE DUDEN, 1966: Vol 4 66 f].

The members of this group have in common:

'daß sie - von geringen
Ausnahmen abgesehen - keiner
Formveränderung unterliegen.
Dies lässt bereits darauf
schliessen, daß ihre Verwendung
im Satz eng begrenzt ist. Eine
dieser Wortart zukommende Grund-
leistung ist kaum zu erkennen'.
[DER GROSSE DUDEN, 1966: Vol 4: Ziffer 3170]

This definition based on morphological criteria is far too narrow and slightly inadequate, and it is not surprising that DER DUDEN has quite a poor opinion of the functional value of these words. In more recent grammar this attitude has changed slightly. Notably ERBEN and BRINKMANN include modal particles in their respective classifications. ERBEN, strongly influenced by Russian research, draws a distinction between 'Modalwörter' and 'Modale oder emotionale expressive Partikeln' [cf ERBEN 1972: 178]. The latter are characterized as the emphatic parts of speech in spoken language. Their function is to add an emotional component to the contents of an utterance. [cf ERBEN 1972: 178]. Though ERBEN still finds it difficult to give a more detailed specification his interest in these entities indicates remarkable progress.

BRINKMANN's conception of modal particles goes slightly further. For him modal particles are closely connected with communicative intentions and expectations. [cf BRINKMANN 1971: 499]. Against this background he classifies them as follows:

„Für die zeitliche Gliederung hat die modale Partikel eine doppelte Bedeutung:

1. Sie ist Bestandteil der Satzintention und folgt darum in der Regel unmittelbar auf die Personalform. Zwischen Personalform und Modalpartikel können Pronomina stehen, die schwach betont sind und formulieren, was den Sprechern bekannt ist, oder andere sprachliche Elemente, die nicht betont werden und eng mit dem Prädikant verbunden sind . . .
2. Nach der Modalpartikel steht was kommunikative Bedeutung hat. So grenzt sie ab, was zum Gegebenen [Thema] gehört und was in der Kommunikation neu ist".
[BRINKMANN 1971: 499]

As we can see quite clearly, these attempts all go in the direction of classifying modal particles as entities which transmit certain emotional properties of utterances. The definition of these words can only be achieved against the background of verbal interaction, i.e., they are conceived - though this is not made explicit in the above definition - as entities which function on a level higher than the syntactic chain. In the following chapter, we see that research dealing exclusively with modal articles provides quite similar solutions.

Yet before we proceed some remarks about 'language purists' have to be made. Those linguists who regarded purity of language as their main objective were, and usually still are, strongly opposed to the use of particles. I will only give one example.

REINERS writes:

„Beiwörter, die nur verziern,
verstärken oder entbehrliche
Schilderungen bringen, müssen
wir streichen“.
(REINERS 1959: 131).

The idea behind this is that modal particles are redundant but, as WEYDT points out, even when they are redundant, they play a very important part in communication, because as information theory has shown, a certain degree of redundancy is indispensable for the successful transmission of any information. (cf. WEYDT 1969: 83).

As a matter of fact, even well-established German novelists use particles quite frequently (cf. WEYDT 1969: 84 f). It seems that German without particles exists only as an ideal which is based on the conception of Latin-based grammar⁽¹⁾ whether such a grammar is the appropriate instrument to structure a language like German is an interesting question, which I will not attempt to answer here. However, the consequences that we have to draw from a point of view such as the one quoted above are to omit all signs of personal emotional involvement in spoken as

well as in written language. Yet as early as 1935

RICHARDS stated:

'They (sense and feeling) are, as a rule, interlinked and combined very closely, and the exact dissection of the one from the other is sometimes an impossible, and always an extremely delicate and perilous, operation'.

[RICHARDS 1935: 209].

This quotation brings us now to the question of how 'necessary' German particles are. The next chapter shows some empirical evidence of the fact that the absence of German particles, especially in spoken language, might indeed lead to serious disruption of interaction.

1.3 HOW NECESSARY ARE PARTICLES?

How necessary are particles? The following chapter is mainly based on a survey carried out by HARDEN/RÜSLER in 1979. [The whole article is to be published in WEYDT, 1980].

The question which we took as our starting point was precisely as given in the title, i.e. we were concerned with the effect the absence or presence of German modal particles in spoken German would have on various groups of listeners. To obtain an answer to these questions we designed the following test: we recorded a dialogue spoken by three different sets of speakers. The first set of speakers differed in their accent, i.e. the degree of foreign accent was different within that set. The second set of speakers differed in their degree of accent as well, but here one of the speakers was a native speaker of German. The third set did not differ in accent at all because both speakers were native speakers of German. In each dialogue one of the speakers spoke with particles (hereafter Speaker A) and one of the speakers spoke without particles (hereafter Speaker B).

The particle-containing sequences were allocated to the speakers with the 'better' accents. These dialogues were played back to different groups of people; native speakers of German, people who had learned German at school but who had lived in Germany

for the previous year, people who had learned German at school but who had not lived in Germany and people who did not know any German at all. The participants' task was firstly to guess the speaker's respective proficiency, i.e. to state which of the speakers spoke better German and secondly, which of the speakers they personally would prefer to conduct a conversation with.

TABLE 1) TEST

DIALOGUE I	SPEAKER A (heavy accent and particles)
	SPEAKER B (slight accent, no particles)
	Number of participants: 138
DIALOGUE II	SPEAKER A (slight accent and particles)
	SPEAKER B (no accent - native speaker, no particles)
	Number of participants: 141
DIALOGUE III	SPEAKER A (native speaker and particles)
	SPEAKER B (native speaker no particles)
GROUPS:	TOTAL: 414
	without any knowledge of German = [0] : 667
	with fair knowledge of German = [1] : 119
	with good knowledge of German = [2] : 115
	native speakers = [3] : 73

- QUESTIONS:
1. 'Which speaker does, in your opinion, speak better German?'
 2. 'Which speaker would you personally prefer to converse with?'

TABLE 2) RESULTS

Speaker A was judged better [Question 1]
 by 36.9% in Dialogue I
 by 51.9% in Dialogue II
 by 65.1% in Dialogue III
 [Figures apply to total population]

Speaker A was preferred for conversation [Question 2]
 by 52.9% in Dialogue I
 by 59.6% in Dialogue II
 by 67.4% in Dialogue III

TABLE 3) ORDERED BY GROUPS

GROUP 0: Question 1 Speaker A: 80.5%
 GROUP 0: Question 2 Speaker A: 89.5%

GROUP 1: Question 1 Speaker A: 42.0%
 GROUP 1: Question 2 Speaker A: 46.2%

GROUP 2: Question 1 Speaker A: 31.6%
 GROUP 2: Question 2 Speaker A: 41.3%

GROUP 3: Question 1 Speaker A: 69.8%
 GROUP 3: Question 2 Speaker A: 78.0%

TABLE 4) RESULTS FOR SPEAKER A
 Ordered according to ability in the respective dialogues:

	QUESTION 1	QUESTION 2
O I	72.6%	86.3%
O II	66.6%	85.7%
O III	95.8%	95.8%

TABLE 4)
[continued]

	QUESTION 1	QUESTION 2
1 I	25.0%	27.2%
1 II	45.9%	54.1%
1 III	57.9%	57.9%
2 I	30.4%	60.8%
2 II	36.7%	41.7%
2 III	46.5%	53.5%
3 I	34.6%	50.0%
3 II	82.6%	82.6%
3 III	95.8%	95.8%

The results we obtained were, as a matter of fact, quite surprising. Especially those participants without any knowledge of German reacted in a way which gave room for a lot of speculation. They showed two general tendencies: firstly, there was a tendency in all groups and all dialogues to prefer speaker A [that is the speaker who speaks with particles] for conversation. Secondly, there was a remarkable discrepancy in the reaction of the different groups. As a matter of fact, there is a major subgrouping within the full group. On one hand we find those participants who had learned German at school, on the other hand we find the native speakers and those who did not know any German at all.

I do not find it too far-fetched to draw the conclusion that 'proper school-teaching' has a certain impact on how a language is viewed. The standard established by this teaching even survives a longer stay in the respective country (in this case Germany). But this is only one point. The reaction of the participants without a knowledge of German is quite similar to the reaction of the native speaker. As the former has no other means except for his naive intuition on which to base a judgement, we can assume that the absence of particles in spoken German has the effect of making it unnatural. Further support for this hypothesis is the fact that, although speaker B is judged better by Groups 1 and 2, there is an overall tendency to prefer speaker A for conversation. This brings us back to the point made above: quite obviously, all the participants sense that speaking a foreign language is hinged on a complex set of accents, but they also, though not consciously, sensed that speaking a language properly, (i.e. as close to a given standard as possible), and conversing effectively are different things. In actual fact I think the results of Groups 1 and 2 show quite clearly that proper school teaching corrupts naive intuition in a way - there seems to be no other way to explain Table 4.

The figures in this table show that Groups 1 and 2 have a notion of what is to be regarded as good German.

Even in the third dialogue the figures for speaker A are surprisingly low. On the other hand they are always higher in question 2 than in question 1. (On one occasion they even doubled). This may indicate that all participants have a vague notion that conversation has something to do with certain emotional factors, in other words that a conversation in which these are missing is not the most desirable one. (cf. Chapter 1.4.2). The group of participants without any knowledge showed a remarkable stability even to such factors as accents, which can probably be explained by the fact that these persons did not really notice that there were decisive differences in this respect, but paid more attention to the rhythm which to them probably seemed more natural since particles were used.

The native speakers, however, reacted quite strongly to the heavy accent in the first dialogue, but changed their attitude completely once the accent was not the dominating feature. We can summarise the results as follows:

1. The proficiency of the listener has a decisive impact on the judgement of the use of particles.
2. There seems to be evidence that the interdependence

between emotions and the use of particles is noticed by all groups.

3. The accent of the speaker has a greater impact on the judgement than the particles used.
4. Participants who learned German at school do not seem to place too high an estimation on the communicative value of German particles.

All this, of course, does not prove that particles are absolutely necessary but it suggests quite strongly that they play a very important part in spoken German. This is, as a matter of fact, maintained by most of the linguists with whose work we shall be dealing in the next chapter. These authors, however, base their hypotheses mainly on intuitions which seem to point in the same direction as the empirical evidence given above.

1.4 A SHORT SURVEY ON MODERN APPROACHES

The first monograph dealing exclusively with German modal particles was KRIVONOSOV's thesis of 1963 which was not published in Germany until 1977. It is a very detailed account of the distribution of particles in different types of sentences. KRIVONOSOV meticulously investigates in which sentence types modal particles function as modal particles because - and this is another major source of problems - most of the particles have other functions such as Modalwort, subordinierende Konjunktion, and so on. Only in certain types of sentence which are different for different particles do they function as modal particles.

KRIVONOSOV denies that particles have a proper lexical meaning [cf. KRIVONOSOV 1977: 15 ff], asserting that their meaning is constituted by the whole syntagm [cf. 17]. Thus particles have to be classified syntactically and in this classification two factors have to be taken into account. Firstly the syntactic context, as already mentioned, and secondly the situational context because the meaning of particles is determined by these factors and because the meaning of particles can differ within these contextual limits [cf. 39]. But what is the meaning [or the function, KRIVONOSOV uses these terms more or less as synonyms] of modal particles?

KRIVONOSOV draws a distinction between subjective modality and objective modality. The latter is indicated in a given sentence by the absence or presence of modal adverbs [cf. 57], whereas the former is indicated by modal particles. Subjective modality can in short be characterised as the emotional or expressive attitude of the speaker towards the propositional contents of the utterance.

„Kurz gesagt, in den Sätzen mit den modalen Partikeln bringt der Sprecher seine subjektive Stellungnahme zur Aussage, [subjektive Modalität] zum Ausdruck".
[KRIVONOSOV 1977: 242]

In this function modal particles form, together with the predicate, a new, analytical predicate. This analytical predicate has a different meaning to the original predicate, a meaning which applies to the whole sentence [cf. 84]. Together with the objective modality which is, as KRIVONOSOV puts it, a fundamental entity in any sentence, it enables the speaker to express his specific attitude towards the contents of an utterance [cf. 84 f].

Because particles have no proper lexical meaning and are structural elements of the predicate they have no effect on the quantity but bear rather on the quality of a sentence.

„Diese neue Qualität besteht darin, daß der Satz einen bestimmten Gedanken und die emotionale

Stellungnahme des Sprechers zu diesem Gedanken unzerlegbar auszudrücken beginnt, dh das Objektive und das Subjektive, das Rationale und das Emotionale." [KRIVONOSOV: 243].

KRIVONOSOV warns on several occasions against attempting to separate the rational and the emotional, and describes the two kinds of modality which are connected with the rational and the emotional as complex and interwoven phenomena. [cf. 248 and 306]. This is expostulated quite frequently throughout the book. It is therefore slightly surprising to find KRIVONOSOV maintaining that objective modality is obligatory whereas subjective modality is optional. These contradictory postulates recur in most of KRIVONOSOV's publications [cf. KRIVONOSOV 1977: 59 and 306/KRIVONOSOV 1965a: 575]. It becomes even more contradictory when KRIVONOSOV attempts a comparison between modal particles and such entities as phonemes and morphemes; this does in fact reveal striking similarities between the former and the latter and leads to the following conclusion:

„Darum gibt es keinen prinzipiellen Unterschied zwischen den modalen Partikeln und den Morphemen: sowohl die ersten als auch die zweiten haben keine ständige und selbständige Bedeutung und werden nur in der Umgebung erkannt". [KRIVONOSOV 1977: 252].⁶

But morphemes are not optional features in a language structure. The contradiction outlined above actually reveals a crucial point in linguistic research: what aspect of language is to be investigated?

According to HOFSTADTER, language can be viewed in two ways:

' . . . as a calculus, i.e. as a set of rules governing the operations of construction and transformation permitted within the language . . . or as a complicated empirical phenomenon, as an institutional and more or less shifting set of modes of behaviour of individuals within a sociological group . . . '

[HOFSTADTER 1938: 230 f].

The only explanation for the contradiction we thus find in KRIVONOSOV's work is that these two aspects are intermingled without making it clear at what point. If particles which express subjective modality belong to the structure, i.e. the calculus, they cannot be optional, if they belong to the extra-structural phenomena of language behaviour they can be optional with respect to the structure, but they are nevertheless obligatory with respect to the conventionally fixed rules of language behaviour. As KRIVONOSOV explicitly states that modal particles belong to the system, i.e. the structure of language, [cf. KRIVONOSOV 1977: 266] they cannot be optional.

The major part of the book actually deals with the definition of the sentence types in which modal particles function as modal particles proper. It is a very thoroughly conducted piece of research and invaluable to anybody interested in this particular field. I do not wish to go into further details because they are of no special interest here. I will come back to KRIVONOSOV in Chapters 1.4.1 and 1.4.2 which deal with the interdependence of particles and intonation and particles and emotion, respectively.

As far as method is concerned, the work done by WEYDT in 1969 is quite similar to the one carried out by KRIVONOSOV; both authors employ the traditional structural approach of opposition and classification. But there are nevertheless certain important differences in their results.

WEYDT, for a start, does not employ the term 'modal particles', but coins a new one „Abtönungspartikel". Starting with a comparison between French and German in the frequency of difference of particles in these respective languages, he arrives at a first hypothesis: that particles are indispensable in spoken German.

„Der deutsche Hörer erwartet
nämlich eine Partikel".

But, in opposition to KRIVONOSOV, he denies that particles are part of the language system as such because:

„die Partikeln bringen in den Satz erstens ihre eigene spezielle Bedeutung mit, zweitens wirken sie verbindlich, rein durch ihr Vorhandensein und ganz abgesehen von ihrer Bedeutung". [WEYDT 1969: 21].

This all means that sentences with and without particles do not form oppositions on the same level. It is quite obvious even at this point that WEYDT regards language as a set of rules, a calculus, independent of usage. So he postulates two levels of expression: firstly the level of description and secondly the level of intention. The level of description is the level on which we find pure proposition; the level of intentions covers what might be called the speaker's attitude towards these propositions. It is quite interesting to note that WEYDT labels the level of description as 'normal' without giving any further explanation of why, for instance, the level of intention is less normal than the level of description. [cf. WEYDT 1969: 60 f].

Parallel to KRIVONOSOV whose book, in fact, was not available at that time, WEYDT distinguished between two different kinds of modality: „Adverbmodalität" and „Abtönungsmodalität", which are identical with KRIVONOSOV's objective and subjective modality.

„Adverbmodalität und Abtönungsmodalität unterscheiden sich also so, daß das Adverb zum Urteil gehört, die Abtönung das Urteil über das Urteil enthält". [WEYDT 1969: 64].

By distinguishing between the two levels above WEYDT however avoids the contradiction apparent in KRIVONOSOV's book, though it is questionable whether such a distinction can be applied to the reality of languages; it does save methodological confusion.

Because of this now it is quite easy to attack language purism by stating that language purists, who, as already mentioned, have always despised the use of particles, do not take into account the fact that the language does not only exist as a system, a level on which modal particles do not operate at all, but also in connection with human interaction, a level on which they play an important role and are therefore indispensable [cf. WEYDT 1969: 80 ff].

Their function is, and this result again is parallel with KRIVONOSOV's findings, to transmit emotions [cf. WEYDT 1969: 21, 44, 61]. I will discuss this function in greater detail in Chapter 1.4.2.

Although not as detailed as KRIVONOSOV's, WEYDT's research gives certain information which cannot be found in KRIVONOSOV. For instance, the attempt to define which emotions the respective particles express is, though still quite tentative, very enlightening. Another asset is that WEYDT's book is easily accessible to the non-linguist because it does not employ any specialised and complicated terminology.

LÜTTEN's research in this field is set in an entirely different framework, namely speech-act theory. The reason for this is that morphological and syntactical analysis do not provide any insight into the communicative role particles have in certain texts. The texts to which LÜTTEN restricts her analysis are 'discussions'. In discussions all participants present a certain opinion and they all try to make the other participants accept their opinions (cf. LÜTTEN 1977: 202). This means that each participant is under pressure to present his opinion as convincingly as possible: LÜTTEN thus postulates the hypothesis that in order to achieve their goal the participants use certain particles which have a definite communicative value, consciously or sub-consciously to furnish the propositional contents of an utterance with situational clarity, or to refer to a shared communicative background, in order to establish the framework for a successful defence of a position or an attack on somebody else's position (cf. LÜTTEN 1977: 203).

With the phrase: „Wie Sie ja wissen . . .“ for example, the listener is hurried into admitting something he probably does not know, because it is more difficult to defy a flattering assumption than a blunt statement like: „Wie Sie wissen“. Thus by using „ja“ the speaker refers to a shared background. But once the other participant accepts that

assumption, that is, if he does not protest immediately, the speaker is free to draw all sorts of conclusions from this admission, that is, he gains a positional advantage over the listener. [1].

Or in more general terms:

„S 1 produziert p, um S 2 auf einen bestimmten Sachverhalt [oder Vorgang] aufmerksam zu machen, d.h. um zu erreichen, daß S 2 sieht [oder denkt, vorstellt], was S 1 sieht [oder denkt, vorstellt]".
[LÜTTEN 1977: 211].

Thus, as LÜTTEN points out, the reference to a common experience can be made without the existence of such a shared background; it can be purely fictional and can be invented just for discursive purposes [2]. LÜTTEN now analyses her potential particles in their different functions, because she assumes a 'primary meaning' and a 'derived meaning'. The conjunction „aber" for example has - according to LÜTTEN - the 'primary meaning' of contradiction.

„Er ist klein, aber stark".

Two facts, seemingly contradictory, are linked by „aber". Thus, 'primary meaning' is still conceivable in phrases like:

„Du bist aber groß geworden".

Though there is no immediate opposition, one could create one by extending the sentence to:

„Du bist aber groß geworden,
das hätte ich nicht gedacht“.

In this case the contradiction does not appear on the surface of the phrase as in the phrase above, but it is one between the subjective expectations and the factual word [cf. LÜTTEN 1977: 226]. The 'primary meaning' of 'contradiction' is thus maintained when „aber“ is used as a particle, though in a broader sense, of course.

It would probably not advance the argument to repeat LÜTTEN's findings in detail; as a matter of fact, though the whole research is very thoroughly conducted and provides many important insights, it lacks the kind of general conclusion one would expect in a work of this scope. The essential results of her research are given in an article published in 1979. Particles on the whole and „doch“, „eben“ and „ja“ in particular are seen as „Konsensus-Konstitution“ (see above). Three types of „Konsensus“ can be distinguished:

„doch : appelliert an das Vorhandensein einer
gemeinsamen Kommunikationsbasis . . . :
appellativer Rekurs.

eben : konstatiert die Faktizität einer gemeinsamen
Kommunikationsbasis: konstitutiver Rekurs.

ja : assertiert die Gewißheit einer gemeinsamen
Kommunikationsbasis: assertiver Rekurs“.
[LÜTTEN 1979: 36].

This establishing of a „Konsensus“ by referring to a shared basis is, as LÜTTEN puts it, one of the universal characteristics of human communication.

The theoretical framework for BUBLITZ's analysis is 'pragmatics' in the broadest sense of the word. His actual basis however is mainly the work of GRICE, KEMPSON, and DUCROT. The adoption of conversational analysis, which is more thorough than LÜTTEN's adoption of speech-act theory, furnishes him with quite a subtle instrument to investigate what he chooses to call „Sprechereinstellung“ or „emotive Modalität“ (cf. BUBLITZ 1978: 7 ff). There are in fact three types of modality between which BUBLITZ distinguishes:

kognitive Modalität

volitive Modalität

emotive Modalität

The first type, the cognitive modality, can be described as:

„ . . . die Haltung gegenüber dem Inhalt einer Äußerung . . . , wenn der Sprecher den Wahrheitsgehalt der Proposition kommentiert und kundgibt, ob er die Beziehung zwischen dem Subjekt und Prädikat . . . als zutreffend, nicht zutreffend, wahrscheinlich zutreffend usw. einschätzt“.
[BUBLITZ 1978: 7].

„Volitive Modalität“ on the other hand is characterized by the speaker's wish to cause a change of the situation, whereas the third, the „emotive Modalität“ is used to neglect the speaker's attitudes and assumptions,

„die sich auf das gemeinsam unterstellte Wissen der Kommunikationspartner, ihre Erwartungen, Emotionen und sozialen Beziehungen zueinander beziehen“.
[BUBLITZ 1978: 8].

The investigation of such phenomena is, as BUBLITZ puts it, very important and has, as he criticizes, been neglected far too long. It would probably be going too far to summarise his summary of the various theories, and I think I can assume a certain familiarity with GRICE'S maxims and implicatures, so I will restrict myself to discussing BUBLITZ'S analysis of „eigentlich“ and to add my own analysis of „jedenfalls“ which should give a fairly lucid picture of how far conversational analysis can be of any use in dealing with particles.

As a modal particle - according to BUBLITZ - „eigentlich“ only occurs in questions and assertions, and here it actualizes an objection, the origin of which is to be found in the speaker himself [cf. BUBLITZ 1978: 115]. In other words, „eigentlich“ actualizes an objection, of which the speaker believes that it was hitherto unknown to the

listener, or that he did not pay any attention to it. Thus, „eigentlich“ introduces new information. We thus get the following logical structure of „eigentlich“ sentences. (X denotes the information introduced by „eigentlich“).

„Ich habe bisher nicht davon geredet
(oder: daran gedacht), daß X

und wenn man von etwas nicht redet,
dann gilt im allgemeinen, daß man
es nicht für bemerkenswert hält

also gilt auch für diesen Fall, daß ich
X wahrscheinlich nicht für bemerkens-
wert halte aber ich halte X doch für
bemerkenswert und erwähne es“.
[BUBLITZ 1978: 115].

The conversational implicature can thus be described as the marking of a new topic or a new aspect (cf. BUBLITZ 116 f). Before continuing with the discussion of BUBLITZ's analysis which is as far as I know the only one so far which deals with means of attitude expression in two languages - German and English - I will give an example of my own, of the way in which conversational analysis can be used in the investigation of modal particles. The example is „jedenfalls“ in assertions. WEYDT (1979: 408) describes the function of jedenfalls as follows:

„. . . ein weitgehendes Urteil
wird in Betracht gezogen, das
der Sprecher nicht voll unter-
stützen kann. . . . Der Sprecher
reduziert es auf einen harten
Kern von Aussage, den er vertreten
kann . . . Die reduzierte Aussage
erhält dadurch eine besondere
Glaubwürdigkeit“.
[WEYDT 1979: 4/8].

True though this certainly is, it nevertheless falls short of explaining the specific logical structure of sentences containing „jedenfalls“.

B : „ . . . jedenfalls hat er ein großes Haus“.

Let us assume the sequence preceding this example was the question:

A : „Sag mal, ist Müller eigentlich Millionär?“

For such a case, the description given above is perfectly adequate. A considers the possibility of Müller being a millionaire. [weitgehendes Urteil]. B cannot fully support this assessment but stresses the deduced assertion [großes Haus].


The problem is now why should A ask such a question? Obviously he must have met with some evidence that would justify an assumption about Müller's wealth. Let us again assume that the only evidence he has had so far is the house (a comfortable mansion, for example). From this now he infers that Müller is a millionaire (or at least could be one). The implication on which his inference is based and which is commonly held to be true is:

Being a millionaire implies having a big house
or formally $p \longrightarrow q$

The process of the deduction applied by A is known as

'modus ponens'. This rule has the following interpretation: given the truth of p and q and given that p is true as well we can infer the truth of q.

Or in the formal notation:



There is no simple inversion of this rule, that is, truth of q does not allow any conclusions about the truth of p. But this is exactly what happened in our example. A infers from the truth of q [big house] the truth of p, or at least suggests, that he is inclined to infer it. B, in our example, now senses that there is something wrong, he does not want to follow A's conclusion and stresses that only the truth of q is known, or, in other words, warns A against applying the 'modus ponens' wrongly.

The conversational implicature of „jedenfalls" would thus be the warning not to draw false conclusion from given facts or, that such conclusions based on the information given are not necessarily true but that there is only a certain probability of the truth of the conclusion in question. In other words: certain observed phenomena can be regarded as necessary conditions, but not as sufficient ones.

It seems that conversational analysis can contribute a great deal to the explanation of the function of

modal particles, it does however not solve certain semantic problems attached to modal particles and other elements of 'emotive modality'.

After this short digression I will now return to BUBLITZ, and discuss in short his findings in the contrastive analysis in German and English by means of attitude-expression.

The fact that the English language does not have modal particles does not imply that native speakers of English do not have any means to convey their „Sprechereinstellung“. On the contrary there exists a variety of ways to express attitudes: tag questions, certain particles like 'well', 'just', etc., intonation, etc. (cf. BUBLITZ 138 ff).

In spite of this BUBLITZ maintains:

„Es hat sich gezeigt . . . , daß es funktional dehnungsgleiche Ausdrucksweisen der Sprechereinstellung im Deutschen und Englischen nicht gibt. Zwar finden sich durchaus einander entsprechende sprachliche Erscheinungen, mit deren Gebrauch die gleichen Annahmen, Erwartungen und gelegentlich auch Implikaturen verbunden sind; doch die deutschen MPn lösen immer noch zusätzliche Implikaturen aus, die im Englischen die Folge weiterer prosodischer und syntaktischer Mittel sind“.
[BUBLITZ 1978: 210].

In addition most of the English means of expressing a certain attitude, like intonation, stress, type of sentence, negation, exist in German too; modal

particles are thus just one of the means to express a certain attitude or emotion in German. [cf. BUBLITZ 1978: 226].

To illustrate this, I will give a short sketch of the contrastive analysis of the means of expressing expectations in German and English.

There is a formal equivalence between positive and negative yes-no questions: Don't you like it?

Gefällt es dir nicht?

rhetorical questions : Do you want to catch a cold?

Willst du dir eine

Erkältung holen?

suggestive questions like: Du hast doch nicht etwa den Schlüssel verloren?

have no formal equivalent in English. The expectation with regard to the answer would probably be expressed by a tag question:

You haven't lost your keys, have you? etc . . .

[cf. BUBLITZ 1978: 218 ff].

This is to show how different, on the whole, the ways and means of expressing one's attitude are, even in quite closely related languages like German and English. The conclusion BUBLITZ draws, and which I fully support, is that these elements have to be taught in schools, because of their eminent importance for any 'natural' conversation.

In the preceding pages I have tried to give a short and concise summary of the major works on modal particles. Though hardly comparable they have provided the following aspects of modal particles:

1. modal particles express the speaker's attitudes and emotions towards the propositional contents of an utterance and towards the listener. This point is shared by all four authors.
2. modal particles form a new predicate together with the verb [KRIVONOSOV].
3. modal particles indicate „ein Urteil über ein Urteil" [WEYDT].
4. modal particles can be viewed as conversational implicatures [BUBLITZ].
5. modal particles have the quality of „Konsensus-Konstitutive" [LÜTTEN].
6. except for Greek, no other language has these means of expressing all the phenomena listed under 1 - 5. Again all authors agree on that.

1.4.1 PARTICLES AND INTONATION

It is a commonplace amongst linguists dealing with German modal particles that these are closely related to intonation. There are however two levels which have to be distinguished. Firstly, there is the notion of the fact that particles functions are in some languages [e.g. English] conveyed by intonation, and that in German too, certain intonation patterns can replace particles. Secondly, there is the question, how the insertion of particles influences the intonation pattern of an utterance and how particles themselves change this meaning under stress.

The first problem, i.e. how intonation and modal particles are related in general, was tackled by SCHUBIGER in a paper dating from 1965. Her objective was to establish 'a certain parallelism between German modal particles and English intonation' [SCHUBIGER 1972: 175] [3].

Thus from the very beginning she connects intonation and emotion, a relation which has provided the grounds for a very vivid discussion [4]. But in general one can say that the majority of linguists in some way or other connect intonation with emotion and the speaker's attitude [5].

SCHUBIGER also stresses a point which is very important in our present discussion, the point that

German modal particles are lexicalised whereas intonation is not.

'The great number of German particles . . . makes it possible for the speaker to put into words practically every shade of feeling he wants to express. The elocutional means on which the English speaker heavily relies when urged to express his feelings, though just as expressive and differentiated, are much more elusive'.
[SCHUBIGER 1972: 176].

This is probably a misinterpretation, induced by the fact that German modal particles are lexemes, but they are nevertheless almost as elusive as intonation. But this elusiveness too could be an indicator for a close relationship between particles and intonation, or as WEYDT puts it:

„Die Abtönung scheint uns ein sprachliches Mittel zu sein, das den Mitteln des . . . außersprachlichen Kontextes und der Intonation parallel läuft".
[WEYDT 1969: 61].

These remarks and the fact that both particles and intonation are regarded as what DELATTRE called 'the salt of an utterance', without which it would be tasteless, seem to give ample evidence for the notion that particles and intonation are closely related.

But the above remarks are more or less based on the illusion that utterances exist without intonation

[I am quite convinced that even written language is subject to a certain intonation pattern superimposed by the reader], that both particles and intonation are added to an otherwise homogeneous and stable system. If such a point of view is to be maintained, there has to be a strict distinction between level of use and level of analysis.

In the case of German modal particles however, intonation has always to be taken into account, or as OPALKA demands:

„Analysen von MPn sind prinzipiell unter Zuhilfenahme von Satzintonationen vorzunehmen . . . " [OPALKA 1977: 265].

Despite the growing awareness that particles can only be analysed when intonation is taken into account, so far only KRIVONOSOV has extensively dealt with this factor.

KRIVONOSOV notices a very close connection between modal particles and intonation which for him is almost identical to the communicative intentions of the speaker. Thus, particles can be seen as either signals or accompanying elements of intonation [cf. KRIVONOSOV 1977: 78 ff].

In an article dated 1965 [6] KRIVONOSOV deals exclusively with the interrelation between particles and intonation. Based on the notion that so-called

'subjective modality' is closely connected with the speaker's emotions and on the assumed fact that emotions are in general expressed by intonation-patterns he postulates:

„Die subjektiv-modale Bedeutung wird in der Sprache in erster Linie durch die Intonation lautlich zum Ausdruck gebracht".
 [KRIVONOSOV 1965b: 576].


As modal particles are in their function closely related to intonation-patterns, both together express the emotional component or subjective modality [cf. KRIVONOSOV 1965b: 577]. The example he discusses, and which needs some further discussion here are the questions:

„Was ist das?"


and

„Was ist denn das?"

The former has, according to KRIVONOSOV, the intonation pattern



and the latter has the intonation pattern



The patterns seem to be quite comprehensible, less so the interpretation. The first question is described as being 'neutral' and 'calm' normally, with the option of being turned into an emotional question by employing the proper emotional intonation pattern [cf. KRIVONOSOV 1965b: 577 ff]. The second question however can always be regarded as purporting a certain emotional charge. The criticism I would like to put forward at this stage is that there is no proper definition of what 'neutral' is or even could be; hence 'emotional' has to be a somewhat impressionistic term for a notion which has undoubtedly a certain justification. There is yet another problem. The whole analysis is based on a somewhat questionable distinction, that is: subjective and objective modality. Objective modality is, as a matter of fact, a construction, and not only KRIVONOSOV's. The idea behind it is, that there is such a thing in reality like an objective, systematic language. A useful construction for scientific purposes, but one must not make the mistake of mixing those constructions with reality. KRIVONOSOV obviously does this and by this devalues his otherwise interesting and important findings. Thus a neutral intonation pattern may be established and defined for certain reasons, but there is no such thing in the reality of human communication. We can thus infer that the two intonation patterns are

different and convey different attitudes which are both not void of emotion. The difference, in this KRIVONOSOV is certainly right, is partly created by the fact that one question contains „denn“ whereas the other does not. The fact that the verb and the modal particle have the same level of intonation leads KRIVONOSOV to the conclusion that verb and modal particles form a new, a 'synthetic predicate' because:

„Das Verb und die Partikel „denn“ sind so eng mit einander verbunden, daß sie beide als etwas Einheitliches empfunden werden“.
[KRIVONOSOV 1965b: 582].

This is quite an interesting concept, though I do not believe that support can always be as easily obtained as in the examples given above. When, for example, the modal particle is positioned at the very end of the sentence it seems to be slightly forced to attach it to the verb unless one assumes an infinitive like „dennsein“ or „dennmachen“, etc.

There is, nevertheless, no doubt about the close relationship between particles and intonation though some aspects might have been overstressed by KRIVONOSOV. The statement, for instance, that particles might replace intonation (cf. KRIVONOSOV 1965: 589) certainly holds no truth at all.

What is true, on the other hand, is that particles change the intonation pattern, and that both are closely connected with what so far has been called the emotional attitude of the speaker or his subjective modality.

Another problem, closely related to the one discussed so far, is the fact that certain particles change their meaning when stressed.

„Denn“ is such a case. The question

„Was ist das denn?“

presupposes that an alternative has to be mentioned:

A : „Das ist ein UFO“.

B : „Das ist kein UFO“.

A : „Was ist es denn?“

The difference between stressed and unstressed forms according to WEYDT is the fact,

„ . . . daß die betonte Form auf eine vorhergehende Negation oder eine vorhergehende Falschangabe hinweist. Der Satz bestreitet das Vorhergehende“.
[WEYDT 1969: 56].

Particles which have stressed forms are, apart from the above mentioned, „denn“: „eigentlich“, „wohl“ and „doch“.

In general however, only the unstressed forms are subject to investigation.

We can thus conclude that an intimate relationship exists between modal particles and intonation patterns. At this stage, however, there is not much more than speculative theory based on anecdotal evidence available, and the remark made by KRIVONOSOV, that the complex interrelationship between modal particles and intonation-patterns is awaiting its solution, still hold true [cf. KRIVONOSOV 1965b: 589].

1.4.2 PARTICLES AND EMOTION

The notion that particles and emotions are very closely associated was, as far as I know, put forward for the first time by GABELENTZ. Though not specifically concerned with this topic, he made several enlightening remarks which still hold true today. He tries to explain as follows the fact, for instance, that in spoken language we very often find entities which do not belong to the topic of conversation in the proper sense:

„ . . . kurz, wenn ich dem, was ich sage, allerhand Redensarten beimenge, die nicht zur Sache gehören; so wird der Grund hiervon nicht unmittelbar in der Sache, im Gegenstand der Rede, sondern in einem seelischen Bedürfnis meiner, des Redenden zu suchen sein".
[v.d. GABELENTZ 1969: 472].

The speaker, GABELENTZ continues, wants to establish an emotional contact with his counterpart, wants to persuade or dissuade him or just to communicate his feelings (cf. v.d. GABELENTZ 1969: 472). There is another quite interesting statement he makes: German is, apart from Greek, the only language he knows which gives so much room to these emotions, conveying them by lexical entries.

„Wir haben es hier mit einer echt nationalen Eigenheit der Sprache . . . zu tun, mit einer der bezeichnendsten, die ich kenne".
[v.d. GABELENTZ 1969: 473].

Both these points are maintained by modern scholars too. KRIVONOSOV stressed the emotive functions of modal particles. Their meaning lies in the expression of the emotional relationships of the speaker and the utterance (cf. KRIVONOSOV 1977: 84 f). The qualitative change particles cause in a sentence is therefore due to the fact,

„ . . . daß der Satz einen bestimmten Gedanken und die emotionale Stellungnahme des Sprechers zu diesem Gedanken unzerlegbar auszudrücken beginnt . . . ”
[KRIVONOSOV 1977: 243].

WEYDT too postulates two levels of discourse, the so-called „Intentionsebene” and the „Darstellungsebene”. Particles now belong to the former level, because „Intentionsebene” indicates the attitude of the speaker towards the utterance. (cf. WEYDT 1969: 60). These are just a few indications of how particles and their function are viewed in general. There is, nevertheless, the problem of emotion in language, which has at times, caused quite fierce debates amongst those concerned.

Although over the past two decades or so there have been quite a number of investigations and speculations about what in BÜHLER's terminology can be called 'expression' notably by scholars of general semantics, by OSGOOD and various other schools, which were heavily influenced by psychologic research, HÖRMANN's criticism still holds true:

'Traditional theories of language (from ARISTOTLE to WUNDT) have tended to place in the foreground the rational or functional aspect of language. The expressive and emotional aspect was considered merely in connection with the evolution of speech from the prelinguistic state'. (HÖRMANN 1971: 182).

Thus, most of the research done in this field has its origins in psychology; in 1925 ERDMANN for instance, was already taking a close look at the affective side of language and stated:

„Sie [die Wörter T.H.] beinhalten Werte, auf denen gerade die feinsten Wirkungen der Sprache beruhen". (ERDMANN 1925: 103).

These are attached to a level which he calls „Gefühlswert" and which is different from „begrifflicher Inhalt" and „Nebensinn". Thus the consequence is that no utterance is just the mere transmission of information. ERDMANN also accounts for the difficulties in separating the three levels and thus get hold of what actually makes the „Gefühlswert".

It seems to be this difficulty which prevented linguists from investigating the subject deeper. A certain awareness of such phenomena has been in linguists' minds for quite a long time. Though as OGDEN/RICHARDS criticize, only half-hearted attempts have been made to incorporate the affective components into a grammar (cf. OGDEN/RICHARDS 1972).

The case of VENDRYES is quite a good example to illustrate the attitude grammarians have had, and to a very large extent still have, towards the impact of emotions on language.

To be fair, it should be noted that VENDRYES deals fairly extensively with the problem and he states:

"Mais on ne parle pas seulement pour formuler des idées. On parle aussi pour agir sur ses semblables et pour exprimer sa propre sensibilité".
[VENDRYES 1922: 157].

Thus one utterance for example can have different meanings corresponding to the emotional nuances. But as long as these nuances have no impact on the grammatical structure of any given utterance, the linguist is quite justified in dismissing them as of too little importance to interfere with his proper task. And this is, according to VENDRYES, the fact in the majority of cases, because emotions are:

". . . comme une vapeur légère qui flotte au-dessus de l'expression de la pensée sans altérer la forme grammaticale".
[VENDRYES 1922: 166].

His ideal - as far as language description is concerned - an algebraic model of language which, once the elements and the combination rules are fixed, remains stable under all sorts of circumstances, and

he deeply regrets that natural languages can only be described in this fashion to a certain extent - a regret that is certainly shared by the majority of linguists up to the present day.

There is, however, the danger that once emotions are accounted for, the description of a given language becomes vague and probably quite emotional itself, that different levels of description are intermingled, and any such analysis will lack a certain generality. This can be shown quite clearly by a statement MALINOWSKI made with regard to what he called phatic communion [7].

'Are words in Phatic Communion used primarily to convey meaning, the meaning which is symbolically theirs? Certainly not! They fulfil a social function and that is their principal aim, but they are neither the result of intellectual reflection, nor do they necessarily assure reflection in the listener. Once again we may say that language does not function here as a means of transmission of thought'.
[MALINOWSKI 1972: 315].

If we look at the implications of this statement it becomes quite obvious where the difficulties lie. Firstly, a level of communication, in this case phatic communion, is established and hypostasised, i.e. MALINOWSKI refers to phatic communion as if there were such a thing existing on its own. There is, as a matter of fact, no such thing and conversely

there is no communication that is entirely void of phatic elements. Thus - if words in phatic communion do not convey their symbolic meaning, how can they be recognised as words - or, and that would be the consequence - can phatic communion be reduced to the mere interchanging of emotions and thereby become hardly controllable for any outside investigation? Certainly not. There is a lot of truth in MALINOWSKI's findings. But two things have to be kept apart: firstly, emotions, which can be viewed as a 'conditio humana', that is, expressions for pain, anger, shock, etc., which are closely related to primitive animal 'languages' and in my opinion are not the subject of a linguistic analysis; and secondly, those emotions which have made their way into the structure of language, that is, for which we find proper elements of expression within the system. In other words all sorts of grammatical devices can have or indeed have to express the emotive component of speech (tense, aspect etc.). Assuming that this is true, the emotive component is not a

'shapeless, subterranean stream,
buried under the structure of
language'
[STANKIEWICZ 1972: 247]

but it is in the structure of language itself. Seen in this light German modal particles have the important function of conveying certain information,

which - for methodological reasons - can be separated from other types of information. Thus they cannot be called optional because from both points - the speaker's intention and the listener's expectation - they are necessary. The argument that they can easily be left out without any major consequences does not hold true because one could argue that the use of the infinitive instead of a proper tense does not result in major consequences either, that is to say, even a very badly-formed utterance will be perfectly understandable in the majority of situations. But this is not the point. The speaker's intentions and the listener's expectations will certainly grossly be affected by such language use and will probably lead to the breakdown of the conversation. What I want to do shows that the distinction between necessary and optional features can only be justified by a very restricted concept of language which might be useful from a methodological point of view but which should and must be - as has happened very often - identified with 'the language'.

There is one more point I would like to make with regard to emotive, affective components. It is certainly true that emotions are communicated, and that these means of communication have a proper place in the structure of language. Yet by isolating them from so-called rational or logical elements one might

fall short of describing another important feature of language: the possibility of communicating experience. Experience here is not only taken as the individual's experience which certainly finds its way into the speech-habits of any individual. The fact that language in itself is the result and also the precondition of common experience seems to be far more important. From this point of view language cannot be taken as a self-sufficient system designed to transmit information but as a reflection and a constituent factor of the society in which the language is used; in other words, any analysis which does not relate its results to this basis must naturally be deficient. How does this now relate to particles and emotions, respectively? Firstly, it provides a standpoint from which all aspects of language can be taken as integrated and complementary functions, that means the emotive or affective component of language will not be regarded as something interfering with the 'real' languages i.e. the system, but as a necessary and essential feature in which the individual finds his means of relating any subjective experience to the experience of society by which language is constituted and shaped. Secondly, particles can then be regarded as systematic devices to verbalise the subjective experience in particular.

The methodological partition that certainly is necessary can be made by adopting COSERIU's tripartite distinction of 'system', 'norm' and 'speech'. [See also 2.2].

Thus, any means of expressing subjective experience have to be observed on the level of 'speech'. But speech naturally is affected by all sorts of singular phenomena. The next step, then, is to relate the observed data to the more abstract level of 'norm'. On this level we find all the features of language which are regular but not necessarily functional. One could for instance imagine that a certain particle loses its power to form a functional opposition by changes on the level of 'norm'. This would then require a change or rather a shift in the 'system' too, that is, another element will take over the function and so fill the gap [8].

This tripartite distinction will enable the investigator not to mix up data and thus help to clarify the very intricate and complex interrelation of subjective and objective, emotive and rational components in language.

One last remark must be made about the importance of such elements as particles and their close relationship with subjective or emotive functions of language. If we follow LYONS who maintains that

' . . . much, if not most of the semantic information contained in every day language-utterance is social and expressive, rather than descriptive'.
[LYONS 1977: 93].

and if we assume that German modal particles account for these social or expressive elements they are indeed extremely important for any communication in German. What happens when these elements are left out is described by LYONS with reference to ARGYLE [1967] as follows:

'If the appropriate paralinguistic elements are omitted, the participants in a conversation get confused, nervous or angry; they may lose the drift of what they are saying and become more or less incoherent, and they may stop talking altogether; in short conversation is inhibited, if not rendered impossible, by the absence of the appropriate paralinguistic cues'.
[LYONS 1977: 64 f].

This quotation now shows the relevance of modal particles and intonation (other 'paralinguistic elements' will be left out).

We can thus conclude that when either element is omitted in language teaching this might lead to serious consequences for the users at a later stage.

There is only one European language which has a particle system like German: Classical Greek. As my own competence in Greek is virtually non-existent, I will restrict myself to a short survey on the matter.

1.5 SOME REMARKS ON PARTICLES IN CLASSICAL GREEK

The similarities between the particle-system in the two languages - Classical Greek and Modern Standard German have notably been pointed out by WEYDT [cf. WEYDT 1969: 104 ff] [9]. The findings of authors like DENNISTON, SCHWYZER and others indeed strongly suggest that the system of Greek particles is very similar to the German particle system, as a definition by SCHWYZER may show:

„Mit dem . . . Namen Partikeln . . . im engeren Sinne bezeichnet man recht äußerlich Wörter meist geringen und geringsten Umfangs, von allgemeiner, oft schwerfaßbarer Bedeutung, die ein Wort [Satzglied] oder einen Satz irgendwie gedanklich, in älterer Zeit besonders affektisch, modifizieren".
[SCHWYZER 1950: 553].

The parallels are obvious: the size, the vagueness of their meaning, their function as modifiers. Another similarity lies in the fact that it is difficult to classify and categorize them.

„Teilweise erscheinen also die gleichen Wörter in verschiedenen Anwendungen, und es fehlt nicht an Übergängen zwischen den vom logischen Standpunkt aufgestellten Kategorien".
[SCHWYZER 1950: 555].

DENNISTON too defines particles as expressive elements:

'I will define it as a word expressing a mode of thought, considered either in isolation or in relation to another thought or a mood of emotion'.
[DENNISTON 1934: XXXVII].

And he states at another place:

'Besides expressing modes of thought, these particles . . . indicate moods of emotion, nuances. Thus pathos . . ., irony, sarcasm, interest, surprise, sympathy, encouragement, threatening, hostility, sudden perception or apprehension'.
[DENNISTON 1934: XXXVIII F].(10)

Everything said so far could, without alterations, be applied to German modal particles too. I will not give any examples of the use of Greek particles because I do not think it is necessary at this point. The arguments presented so far however support the results that have been achieved in the field of German modal particles [11].

There is, however, another point I would like to make. There exist two contradictory theses about the use and function of Greek particles [12]. DENNISTON and SCHWYZER maintain that Greek particles were mainly used in spoken language.

'It cannot be doubted that Greek conversation was full of particles'.
[DENNISTON 1939: LXXII].

And SCHWYZER:

„ . . . rein sachliche Ausdrucks-
weise war den Partikeln, die
charakteristisch sind für die
Umgangssprache, besonders für
das Gespräch, nicht günstig . . .“
[SCHWYZER 1950: 554].

The other hypothesis put forward by LABEY and
MEILLET-VENDRYES maintains that particles were used
mainly in written language to express what is
expressed by intonation etc. in spoken language.

"Comme on l'a déjà fait remarquer,
les particules appartiennent à
la langue écrite. Elles expriment
des intonations de la voix.
Indispensables dans les écrits où
leur absence produirait le désordre,
elles disparaissent dans la langue
parlée".
[LABEY 1950: 4].

It is worth remembering that the above opinion is
partly shared by KRIVONOSOV; it seems however quite
unlikely that a complicated system like the one of
Greek particles should have the sole function of
replacing or substituting punctuation.

I will not go deeper into the matter because my
competence in Greek is very limited. It is however
very interesting that there should exist such
similarities between languages which are very distant
from each other in time and space. We can thus
conclude that particles in Greek are associated with
emotion, subjective modality, affection etc. in the
same fashion as German modal particles are.

1.6 SUMMARY

As has been shown so far, all the investigations we have discussed have brought forward valuable evidence. They all lack however a consistent approach, that is, too many categories of traditional grammar still interfere with, for instance, speech-act-theory. It is of little help to hypostasize the speech-act-level instead of the system level. I will argue that on the basis of a field-theoretical approach which provides the necessary data a grammar of usage has to be established - at least as far as German modal particles are concerned. In the following chapter I demonstrate how such an approach could work and what results it could possibly yield.

-
- [1] Although Classical Greek has quite a number of particles it has - surprisingly enough - never had any consequences for German grammars.
- [2] FRANCK comes to a similar conclusion by relating the use of particles to interaction-management. Certain particles for instance inserted in questions indicate a preference as far as the consumer is concerned. The conversation is structured by the speaker by limiting the range of acceptable answers, indicating that an unacceptable answer might result in certain consequences with regard to the interactional relationship of the participants involved. A question with an inserted „etwa“ for example strongly suggests the preference for a negative answer. „Hast du etwa das Fenster offen gelassen?“ Preference: „Nein“ [cf. FRANCK 1979: 3 ff].

- [3] BUBLITZ 1978 comes to quite the same conclusions though in more detail.
- [4] LIEBERMANN for instance maintains that intonation or breath-groups are phonological features and that 'the emotion of the speaker can modify the intonation of an utterance just as it can modify other aspects of the speech signal . . . '
[LIEBERMAN 1968: 121].
- [5] Cf for example LYONS [1977 : 59 ff]
BOLINGER [1968: 48 f].
- [6] This article is quite obviously a revised part of his thesis, which, as already mentioned, was only published in 1977.
- [7] The term 'phatic' has become widely known by JAKOBSON's adaptation in 'linguistics and poetics'.
- [8] COSERIU gives an example on the phonetic level of Rio de la Plata Spanish, when the loss of θ caused quite remarkable changes in the lexicon to avoid ambiguities and misunderstandings [cf. COSERIU 1971: 71].
- [9] WEYDT shows a couple of other structural similarities between the two languages such as the relative frequency of compounds, verbs with separable prefixes, the frequency of derived verbs, the meaning of which is quite deviant from the original meaning [cf. WEYDT 1969: 111 ff].
- [10] cf. also KAEGI 1964: 166-171
- [11] For further similarities cf. WEYDT 1969: 105 ff.
- [12] cf. also WEYDT 1969: 108 f.

2.0 FIELD THEORY

2.1 THE CONCEPT OF 'SEMANTIC FIELD'

Probably the earliest example of a field analysis is HEYSE's investigation into the semantic field of 'Schall'. Though, as COSERIU remarks, HEYSE did not intend to produce a field analysis and thus does not employ the term 'field', it seems that he intuitively used the concept and the means of a field-analysis [cf. COSERIU 1971: 179 f]. But, however, this example from 1856 has not had any impact at all. It is commonly accepted [1] that the first explicit definition of 'semantic field' was given by IPSEN in 1924. According to IPSEN the interrelation between lexical entities must be regarded as a close bond:

„Diese Verknüpfung ist aber nicht als Auseinanderreihung an einem Assoziationsfaden gemeint, sondern so, daß die ganze Gruppe ein „Bedeutungsfeld“ absteckt, das in sich gegliedert ist“.
[IPSEN 1924: 225].

The most influential developments in this direction were however made by TRIER, PORZIG and WEISGERBER [2]. Though it seems quite an obsolete attempt to give a concise description of their ideas, mainly because it has been done by a number of scholars of very high reputation (ÜHMANN 1951; ULLMANN 1957; GECKELER 1971) I will nevertheless give a brief account of the slightly different conceptions and try to relate

them to the problem of this thesis. For TRIER 'field' is a structural unit between the language as a whole and its elements [cf. TRIER 1931: 4]. Thus the lexeme only becomes meaningful in relation to its neighbours; it has a meaning in this context and by this context [cf. TRIER 1931: 5 f].

TRIER's concept, however influential it might have been, is quite intuitive though. This shows up even in the somewhat heterogeneous terminology „Begriffsbezirk“, „Begriffsfeld“, „Sinnbezirk“, „sprachliches Zeichenfeld“ are used as synonyms because they all refer to the same phenomenon viz.:

„. . . eine Gruppe von Wörtern,
die inhaltlich eng benachbart
sind, und die sich vermöge
ihrer Interdependenz ihre
Leistungen gegenseitig zuweisen“.
[TRIER 1973: 455].

The field is structured hierarchically, that is there are different sub-groupings in a lexical field, and TRIER thus concludes:

„Es kommt in der Feldebetrachtung
an auf die Binnengrenzen, die
ein vorhandener Wortschatz in
einem gegebenen Augenblick durch
einen Sinnbezirk zieht . . . “ [3]
[TRIER 1932: 419].

WEISGERBER, whose concept of field is quite similar to that of TRIER now tried to integrate the idea of field into his „inhaltsbezogene Grammatik“. It would certainly lead too far astray to discuss this branch

of linguistics in full detail. It seems however to be necessary to give some ideas of what the objective of this [almost exclusively German] branch in linguistics was.

The most fundamental concept in WEISGERBER's theory is the 'energetic', the active power in language and of language. This concept actually dates back to HUMBOLDT, who, in a very often quoted passage postulated:

„Die Sprache, in ihrem wirklichen Wesen aufgefasst ist beständig und in jedem Augenblick Vorübergehendes. Selbst ihre Erhaltung durch die Schrift ist nur eine unvollständige . . . Sie selbst ist kein Werk [Ergon] sondern eine Tätigkeit [Energiea]. Ihre wahre Definition kann daher nur eine genetische seyn ".
[HUMBOLDT 1963: 418].

This active power now creates what WEISGERBER called „geistige Zwischenwelt". This now is between reality and the human mind. Because reality is always filtered by this „Zwischenwelt", that is, the human mind does not perceive reality as it is but by means and categories of the „Zwischenwelt", the latter is or is at least taken by WEISGERBER to be the 'real world' (cf. WEISGERBER 1953: 14 ff). This concept has been subjected to much criticism which we examine later. The question which is still open is: how does the concept of field now fit into this theoretical framework? For WEISGERBER more than for TRIER and



others 'field' is not a methodological dissection of certain areas in the lexicon, but an existing entity. It is:

" . . . ein Ausschnitt aus der sprachlichen Zwischenwelt, der durch die Ganzheit einer in organischer Gliederung zusammenwirkenden Gruppe von Sprachzeichen aufgebaut wird."
[WEISGERBER 1953: 91 f].

PORZIG introduces another kind of field. It is determined by the so-called „wesenhafte Bedeutungsbeziehungen“ as they for instance exist between „bellen“ and „Hund“ and he stresses:

" . . . daß hier eine notwendige Beziehung zwischen Wörtern hergestellt wird, die ausschließlich durch die Bedeutungen hergestellt wird".
[PORZIG 1973: 79].

Interrelations of that kind are also called „elementare Bedeutungsfelder“. PORZIG has necessarily elaborated his terminology with the effect that it became clear that his „wesenhafte Bedeutungsbeziehungen“ turned out to be implications. Thus COSERIU criticizes:

„PORZIG hat aber die Solidaritäten von den durch die Sachkenntnis gegebenen Implikationen nicht klar unterschieden“.
[COSERIU 1967: 296].

These are in short the most discussed and most influential field concepts.

The definition of field COSERIU gives is very similar or seems at least to be based on the concept postulated by TRIER and WEISGERBER:

'Un champ lexical est un ensemble de lexèmes unis par une valeur lexicale commune (valeur du champ) qu'ils subdivisent en des valeurs plus déterminées en supposant entre eux des différences de contenu lexical minimales (traits distinctifs lexématiques, ...)'.
(COSERIU 1966: 212).

To elicit these minimal features COSERIU provides a very elaborate and sophisticated terminology which I will discuss below. It should however be noted that COSERIU's main interest is not the field itself but the lexical structure of a language as a whole. In this framework the field maintains a certain position which can only be understood within a concept of structural lexicology and structural semantics in general (cf. GECKELER 1971: 178).

Though WEISGERBER's understanding of field includes both syntactic and paradigmatic fields more emphasis has always been put on the paradigmatic field which he structured as follows:

„Einschichtige Felder“:

„Reihengliederung“ : z.B. Stufen der
Leistungsbewertung.

- „Flächengliederung“ : z.B. Feld der nhd.
Verwandtschaftswörter.
- „Tiefengliederung“ : z.B. der Farbkegel.
- „Mehrschichtige Felder“ : z.B. die sprachliche
Fassung des Sterbens.
[WEISGERBER 1962: 185].

Though all this seems to be quite a reasonable approach field-theory - at least as far as WEISGERBER is concerned - has never developed a proper methodology to bring out the rational and fruitful idea on which field-theory is based. Especially WEISGERBER very often withdraws to vague metaphorical terminology like „Volk“, „Muttersprache“ etc. The most concise criticism is probably levelled by HELBIG who argues from a materialistic position against WEISGERBER's undoubtedly idealistic point of view. The criticism thus is not very much concerned with the technical difficulties of a field-theory [4] but - which is certainly more interesting - with the philosophical implications of an idealistic concept of field. HELBIG thus offers the criticism that once the history of languages is seen as a history of „Weltbild“ linguistics is bound to lose its proper object.

Because of the priority of the active power in language - as it is seen by WEISGERBER and his school - linguistics became more interpretative rather than descriptive.

On the other hand this leads - as already mentioned - to a vague and metaphorical terminology which lacks the exactness essential to any theory set up to describe language.

Yet again the fact that the so-called „Zwischenwelt“ is hypostasized and almost identified with thinking leads to an extension of the range of linguistics which is not only not practicable but even dangerous. Every problem can thus be reduced or traced back to language problems. There is, HELBIG maintains, no such thing as „sprachliche Zwischenwelt“ which has an existence in its own right. Language has to be regarded as a means of organizing society and maintaining its values and the common experience. That is „Weltbild“ is not created by language but reflected and transmitted by it (cf. HELBIG 1974: 138 ff).

He thus states:

„Die Sprache - als materielles Korrelat des Denkens - ist an der Widerspiegelung der Wirklichkeit beteiligt; aber aus dieser Hilfsfunktion macht Weisgerber fälschlicherweise eine emotionale primäre Kraft. Es ist in Wahrheit der Mensch mit seinem Denkvermögen, der die Wirklichkeit erkennen und verarbeiten muß“.
(HELBIG 1974: 141 f).

Apart from such fundamental disagreement which is more on a philosophical level than on a technical level

there has been quite heavy criticism in this latter respect too which I deal with at the end of this chapter. The question then will be: is it necessary or even useful - from a methodological point of view - to assume some entity like field?

The concept of field was challenged as soon as it was postulated. DORNSEIFF, for example, refuted the field-theoretical analysis with the argument that field as such was a „logische Verabsolutierung von Sachgruppen" [DORNSEIFF 1938: 126]. And BETZ maintained that the vocabulary is not structured in itself but always with regard to the object world [cf. BETZ 1954: 191 f]. And LYONS remarks referring especially to TRIER's concept of field that the notion of field requires the assumption of an 'a priori unstructured substance of meaning' underlying the vocabularies of all languages [cf. LYONS 1977: 259]. This assumption entails certain difficulties such as the difficulty of a clear interpretation of conceptual substance as well as it neglects the fact that the object world is structured in itself. Though LYONS does not advocate a crude materialistic position and concedes that language or its structure is not to be taken as a mere reflection of the object world he warns:

'The notion of a denotational continuum must not be pushed too far'.
[LYONS 1977: 260].

A very thorough and detailed discussion of criticism to field-theory is given by GECKELER. Though it would probably lead too far astray to give a detailed account of it here I adduce the most important points; the discussion is quite interesting for two reasons: firstly, because it gives an overall view of two positions, and secondly, because GECKELER tries to defend certain aspects of field-theory and preserve them for his own analysis.

GECKELER takes KANDLER's systematic account of essential features as a basis for his discussions. The first of these essential features is the „Ganzheitsprinzip" (principle of totality) by which is meant that a single lexical entry can only be understood with reference to its neighbouring entries. Once this principle is abandoned the whole concept becomes useless. GECKELER now maintains that though there is virtually no proof that the vocabulary is structured with regard to meaning this does not mean that this possibility does not even exist (cf. GECKELER 1971: 116 ff). The second principle is the 'principle of order' (Prinzip der Geordnetheit). This requires that the contents of words fit into a prestructured system without any overlappings. This criticism now is - according to GECKELER - directed towards a no longer existing concept and therefore unjustified (cf. GECKELER 1971: 118 ff).

The „Prinzip der Wechselbestimmtheit“ (principle of interdependence) of which critics say that it leads to a logical circular argument is refuted by the claim that it is not only the interdependence that constitutes the meaning but

„ . . . daß die Glieder eines Wortfeldes eine gemeinsame inhaltliche Grundlage, sozusagen eine Art gemeinsamen Nenner besitzen, daß aber für jedes Glied eine oder mehrere zusätzliche Bestimmungen zu dieser gemeinsamen Basis dazukommen, die es im Rahmen der Gesamtkonstellation inhaltlich differenzieren . . .“
[GECKELER 1971: 121].

The principle of completeness (Prinzip der Vollständigkeit) which - according to some critics cannot be maintained, because no individual is in possession of the entire vocabulary at a given time. Thus for different individuals the meaning of a word must differ grossly because the absence or presence of only one single entry changes the whole field and thereby the meanings of its members. However, as GECKELER points out, this argument is based on the confusion of language as a system and as individual competence. He also maintains - probably subconsciously - that there is an awareness of field structure in every native speaker (cf. GECKELER 1971: 121 ff).

The 'principle of proper distinction' (Prinzip der Wohlgeschiedenheit) deals with the phenomenon of

homonymy; because each entry belongs to only one field, homonyms thus - though they have probably etymological relations - belong to two different fields.

This, says GECKELER, is indeed the fact. Justified by his synchronic approach he postulates that homonyms are identical as far as their material aspect is concerned but are different with regard to their contents because they function in different lexical fields. This argument may sound circular but it is indeed not because GECKELER sees the problem in the light of COSERIU's approach and thus maintains the strict methodological distinction between the synchronic and the diachronic axes. (cf. GECKELER 1971: 124 ff).

The 'principle of consistency' (Prinzip der Lückenlosigkeit), that is the notion of consistency of lexical fields and the consequent notion of consistency in the „Weltbild" of the respective user, is not the problem the critics want it to be. There are, says GECKELER, certainly gaps within a lexical field, but:

„Das Problem der Lücke im Wortfeld muß . . . immer in Bezug auf die jeweilige Stufe der Gestaltung gesehen werden. Auf einer bestimmten Stufe der lexikalischen Gestaltung lassen sich zuweilen Lücken feststellen . . . Diese eventuellen Lücken werden aber auf einer höheren Stufe der Gestaltung geschlossen, und zwar dadurch, daß das betreffende Wortfeld durch ein Wortfeld allgemeineren Inhalts überbaut wird". (GECKELER 1971: 141).

Thus the criticism misses its target and, furthermore, most of the scholars working on field-theory have rejected the comparison of lexical field and a mosaic - a comparison which formed the basis for the above criticism (cf. GECKELER 1971: 134 ff).

The last problem GECKELER deals with is the problem of well-defined boundaries; this is a problem on two levels. The first is concerned with the boundaries between the individual entries in a given field, the second is more concerned with the boundaries of the field itself. GECKELER himself advocates for the solution of the latter problem the assumption of the 'Archilexeme', a term postulated by COSERIU. However, it seems nevertheless to be virtually impossible even by employing 'Archilexeme' to arrive at proper boundaries, a view which is shared even by most of the supporters of field-theory. With regard to the possible overlapping of certain words in a lexical field GECKELER remarks that the notion of such an overlapping might be due to the widespread confusion of „Bedeutung" and „Bezeichnung" (cf. GECKELER 1971: 144 ff).

„Es muß ein Unterschied gemacht werden, zwischen der Möglichkeit von Unterscheidungen im sprachlichen Inhalt und der Möglichkeit der Trennung bei den objektiven Gegenständen. So sind z.B. die Inhalte „Tag" und „Nacht" klar geschieden, dasselbe kann aber nicht ohne weiteres von den damit bezeichneten Phänomenen der Wirklichkeit gesagt werden". (GECKELER 1971: 148).

It seems as though GECKELER had managed to refute some unjustified criticism of field-theory, but it should be noted that his approach too has provoked some criticism. ŠCUR, for example, doubts the usefulness of terms like „Archilexeme" and „Klassem"; at least the way they are defined, he maintains, is slightly circular and some of the examples are not comprehensible: why for instance the „Archilexeme", „Kind" represents a field, whereas the „Klassem" „menschliches Wesen" represents a class though the integrating features are in both cases of extra-linguistic origin is certainly not conceivable (cf. ŠCUR 1977: 36 f). Another point in SCUR's criticism is the refusal to see opposition as the functional element in language structure. Though it never becomes quite clear what SCUR himself favours (except on some remarks about the priority the investigation of interrelationship should have) he states:

„Jedenfalls bleibt unbegreiflich warum andere Forscher ohne Oppositionen auskommen und worin der Beweis dafür besteht, daß die Beschreibung des Materials unter Benutzung des Oppositionsbegriffs vom ontologischen und erkenntnistheoretischen Standpunkt aus begründet ist".
(ŠCUR 1977: 18).

And at another place he asserts that the integration of oppositions into the field is totally unjustified, because:

„Die Oppositionen sind vorwissen-
schaftliche Modellierungsmethoden
linguistischer Objekte“.
[SCUR 1977: 82].

There might be some truth in this blunt statement,
but the successful application of this method in
phonetics for example provokes certain doubts even
with regard to the concession I have just made. I
conclude this chapter by adding one more quotation
with respect to the debate as to whether field-theory
is a useful device or not and with respect to the
discussions about the correct procedure or method
in science in general:

„Wenn wir die Natur verstehen
und unsere materielle Umgebung
beherrschen wollen, dann müssen
wir alle Ideen, alle Methoden
verwenden, nicht nur einen kleinen
Ausschnitt aus ihnen“
[FEYERABEND 1977: 407].

2.2 COSERIU'S APPROACH

OBJECT AND LANGUAGE

This previously discussed distinction is of great importance, especially in respect of particles as we do not find „eigentlich" and „überhaupt" in the extra-linguistic world, the world of objects. That might sound trivial but it shows quite clearly the difficulties that arise in attempting to describe the meaning of these words. The distinction between objects and language is aimed at the separation of the lexical function and the extra-linguistic reality lexemes refer to. As already mentioned, particles do not have a lexical, i.e. referential, meaning. Their meaning is different and can be found on the level which COSERIU chose to call „Sinnebene" [cf. COSERIU 1973a: 8], but this implies the existence of meaning, a kind of primary meaning.

OBJECT-LANGUAGE AND META-LANGUAGE

Object-language, as the name already suggests, is language which deals with the extra-linguistic world. With regard to modal particles this means that their meaning expresses simply what can be expressed only by means of language without being language itself. Meta-language on the other hand is a language the object of which is language. Particles belong to the object-language but can only be described by means of meta-language; we can for instance say, a dog is . . . and carry on with an explanation. But

we cannot say: „eigentlich“ is . . . and give the same kind of explanation. We always have to use a phrase like: '„eigentlich“ is a word, and so on', which is the meta-language explanation. Thus, when only lexical meaning, that is the meaning which can be explained by using the proper language, is conceived as meaning, any investigation into the meaning of particles is nonsensical. On the other hand, if meaning is conceived as a form of certain contents we can assume that particles do indeed have a certain meaning.

TECHNIK DER REDE UND WIEDERHOLTE REDE (CREATIVE SPEECH AND STEREOTYPES)

Creative speech covers all lexical and grammatical entities, and their modification and combination rules. Particles belong to this category, thus it should be possible to analyse them as entities of speech technique [cf. COSERIU 1973d: 27].

Stereotype, on the other hand, contains:

„was in der Tradition in
„Ausdrücken“, „Phrasen“, oder
Redewendungen erstarrt ist,
und dessen konstitutive Elemente
gemäß den geltenden Regeln der
Sprache weder ersetzbar noch
wieder kombinierbar sind“.
[COSERIU 1973d: 27].

In this thesis I do not investigate particles which are elements of stereotype.

SYNCHRONY AND DIACHRONY

This distinction, though not new, is, according to COSERIU of importance because languages:

„konstituieren (entwickeln oder „verändern“) sich historisch („diachronisch“) und funktionieren „synchronisch“, d.h. in gleichzeitigen Beziehungen innerhalb ihrer Strukturen; folglich können sie entweder in ihrer Entwicklung oder in ihrem Funktionieren untersucht werden“.
[COSERIU 1973d: 23].

This analysis however is dealing only with the synchronic aspect of the language, in particular with the functioning of „eigentlich“ and „überhaupt“. A diachronic study, on the other hand, would deal for instance in the change in meaning of these words.

ARCHITECTURE AND STRUCTURE OF LANGUAGE

The synchronic creative speech within a given language is never homogeneous. [cf. COSERIU 1973d: 32]. The three basic types of internal differences are:

1. geographical differences, i.e. diatopic differences;
2. social and cultural differences, i.e. diastratal differences;
3. differences in style, i.e. diaphasic differences.

These three types of differences are equivalent to three more or less homogeneous techniques or speech:

- 1a. syntopic techniques such as dialects or regional variations;
- 2a. synstratal techniques such as standard variation or colloquial variation;
- 3a. synphasic techniques such as literary styles, etc.
[cf. COSERIU 1973d: 32].

All these techniques are more or less present at the same time in anybody's speech:

„In diesem Sinn ist eine historische Sprache niemals ein einziges „Sprachsystem“, sondern ein „Diasystem“: eine Summe von „Sprachsystemen“, zwischen denen jederzeit Koexistenz und Interferenz herrscht“.
[COSERIU 1973d: 32 f].

Such a diasystem is called by COSERIU, with reference to FLYDAL, the architecture of language. On the other hand we find the structure of language which deals exclusively with the relation between certain entities within a given creative speech - the so-called 'functional language' [cf. COSERIU 1973d: 34].

In the architecture of language we have the principle of diversity; within the structure we have the principle of functional oppositions. A structural

approach therefore finds its object in a language which is homogeneous with respect to points 1, 2 and 3, because any functional opposition can only be described within the system to which it actually belongs [cf. COSERIU 1973d: 36 f]. For any actual research this means:

„Für die Praxis der Untersuchung wird es also darauf ankommen, eine mittlere Ebene als funktionelle Sprache auszuwählen und zu analysieren und Abweichungen davon stets in Bezug auf diese Grundlage anzugeben".
[GECKELER 1971: 188].

For the analysis of modal particles the synphasic aspect seems to be the most important one.

SYSTEM AND NORM

Within a given creative speech COSERIU distinguishes four different structural levels: speech, norm, system and type. Speech is the concrete realization of a given technique of speech. Type, on the other hand, is the way or the means by which different languages structure the extra-linguistic world [cf. COSERIU 1973d: 38 f].

The more important distinction, however, is the one between norm and system:

„Die Norm umfaßt alles, was in der „Technik der Rede" nicht unbedingt funktionell [distinktiv] fixiert, was allgemeiner Gebrauch ist. Zum „System" dagegen gehört alles, was objektiv funktionell [distinktiv] ist".
[COSERIU 1973: 40].

„System“ is thus the whole of the distinctive features, even those not yet realised, whereas „Norm“ is the whole of the traditionally-realised features [cf. COSERIU 1973d: 40].

With regard to particles in general and to „eigentlich“ and „überhaupt“ in particular, we can state that these words are elements of the „System“ because they are, as we see later, objective-functional, i.e. distinctive.

„BEDEUTUNGSBEZIEHUNGEN“ AND „BEZEICHNUNGSBEZIEHUNGEN“

It is a commonplace that there is a lot of terminological confusion within semantics. I therefore do not attempt to translate the two terms given above, but to make clear in this chapter what they signify. A language sign is composed of its material form (signifiant) and its contents or concept (signifier). Thus there are a number of possible relations: for one thing it refers to the rule of objects, and secondly there is a relation between the respective concepts:

„zwischen den signifiés der sprachlichen Zeichen. „Bezeichnungsbeziehungen“ sind Beziehungen zwischen den sprachlichen Zeichen und den „Objektiven“ (der „Wirklichkeit“) auf die sie sich beziehen, und die sie in der Rede darstellen“. [COSERIU 1973d: 44].

This distinction actually goes back to FREGE who, as a matter of fact, used different terminology [cf. FREGE 1975: 42-65]. The distinction is, however, - in particular an attempt to apply field-structural methods to the analysis of German modal particles of eminent importance because, as COERIU puts it, only „Bedeutungsbeziehungen“ can be structured, not „Bezeichnungsbeziehungen“ [COSERIU 1973: 44], but, as GECKELER pointed out, up to now there is no procedure for locating the point of transition from Bezeichnung to Bedeutung:

„was wir in Texten unmittelbar feststellen (ist) „Bezeichnung“ nicht „Bedeutung“, denn wir können dasselbe „Objekt“ durch verschiedene Zeichen, [also auch durch verschiedene „Bedeutungen“] bezeichnen“. [GECKELER 1971: 82].

Taking this into consideration, it is not clear at all how to discover to what particles such as „eigentlich“ and „überhaupt“ refer in the world of objects. In the following, however, I will attempt to apply one of the distinct concepts of meaning COSERIU developed to particles.

LEXICAL MEANING

Lexical meaning conveys what is structured by language, in other words what parts and objects of the extra-linguistic world are regarded as being significant or insignificant. This means that

different languages according to the circumstances in which the users live cover certain aspects in the extra-linguistic world quite detailed, whereas other parts are not taken into account at all.

CATEGORIAL MEANING

This type of meaning is related to the way in which the extra-linguistic world is structured; its main objectives are the word categories given in a language: noun, verb, etc. Within this framework 'to ask' and 'question' have the same lexical meaning, but different categorial meanings. Under the assumption that there exists a category for particles we should be able to discover the categorial meaning. Thus elements can be conceived as elements of a group which COSERIU called „Kategorienwörter" [cf. COSERIU 1973c: 80].

INSTRUMENTAL MEANING

Instrumental meaning is the meaning of morphemes whether these are proper words or not. The article 'the', for instance, has in a given syntagma the instrumental meaning of topicalisation. Instrumental meaning can only be discovered within the syntagma. This fact actually distinguishes this type of meaning from lexical meaning.

We can thus conclude that particles have instrumental meaning which in a special case has to be discovered.

SYNTACTIC MEANING

This type of meaning is a combination of properties of lexemes with morphemes within a sentence; singular, plural, active, passive, etc. [cf. COSERIU 1973a: 10]. As particles are not grammatical entities in this sense, they seem to be void of any syntactic meaning.

ONTIC MEANING

This type of meaning is related to the existential value of a given sentence: questions, demands, etc. [cf. COSERIU 1973a: 10]. This type of meaning can certainly be found in particles because their presence or absence has a considerable impact on the illocutive value of a preposition.

LEXEME

„Jede in der Sprache als
einfaches Wort gegebene
Einheit ist inhaltlich ein
Lexem“.
[COSERIU 1967: 296].

Under the assumption that there exists some sort of contents in particles they must be regarded as lexemes. In a more recent contribution the term 'Lexeme' is revised. COSERIU thus now distinguishes between 'lexeme', 'kategorie' and 'morpheme' - words and stresses that only the 'lexemes' really belong to the lexicon. This actually does not mean

that particles are exempt from structural analysis but only that particles have no lexical meaning and that it is therefore necessary to adapt the analysis to this fact [cf. COSERIU 1976: 16].

ARCHILEXEME

„Eine Einheit, die dem ganzen Inhalt eines Wortfeldes entspricht, ist ein Archilexeme".
[COSERIU 1967: 276].

It seems quite doubtful if an entity such as „Archilexeme" can be postulated for particles [cf. GECKELER 1971: 23]. Certainly more investigations in this field are needed to answer the question of 'archilexeme' properly.

SEME

'Seme' is a minimal distinctive feature with regard to the contents. As particles do not have any lexical contents the term seems to be inapplicable. In this analysis therefore I will only speak of distinctive features.

CLASSEME

„Der Inhaltzug, durch den eine Klasse definiert wird, ist ein Klassenem".
[COSERIU 1967: 297].

GECKELER showed quite clearly that a „Klassenem" can always be found with proper lexemes but

„Die Entscheidung, ob es sich
im Einzelfall bei einem
Inhaltsunterscheidenden Zug
um den Status eines Sems oder
eines Klassems handelt, kann
nicht a priori, sondern nur a
posteriori getroffen werden,
d.h. erst durch den Vergleich
umfangreicher semantischer Analysen“.
[GECKELER 1973: 23].

KLASSE

„Eine Klasse ist die Gesamtheit
der Lexeme, die unabhängig von der
Wortfeldstruktur durch einen
gemeinsamen inhaltsunterscheidenden
Zug zusammenhängen. Klassen
manifestieren sich durch ihre
grammatische und lexikalische
Distribution, d.h. die Lexeme,
die zu derselben Klasse gehören,
verhalten sich grammatisch bzw.
lexikalisch analog; sie können
grammatisch gleiche Funktion
übernehmen und erscheinen in
grammatisch bzw. lexikalisch
analogen Kombinationen“.
[COSERIU 1967: 298].

It seems that „Klasse“ is not applicable to particles
because they have neither any grammatical function
in the proper sense, nor can they form lexical
combinations. On the other hand there has been
quite heavy criticism, challenging the usefulness
of the term.

Notably SCUR doubts whether the distinction between
'field' and 'class' is useful or even logical.

Thus his question:

„Wie können die Felder zugleich
eine paradigmatische und eine
syntagmatische Erscheinung sein?“
[SCUR 1977: 36].

When, according to SCUR, by „Klasse" is meant what others called „Valenz etc." the term is unnecessary because it only creates wider confusion where clarity is needed (cf. SCUR 1977: 36 f). It seems that „Klasse" is a somewhat clumsy term for phenomena which can be described more precisely by other means, but I do not wish to go into this problem any further because it is only of very little relevance for the present analysis.

SUMMARY

The investigation of lexical structures means the investigation of meaning. The meaning in question is located in the object language and has to be analysed synchronically. Furthermore, it is the technique of speech and the system which has to be investigated with respect to the concept developed above. As far as particles are concerned we can tentatively state that they have no lexical meaning, but a categorial, an instrumental and an ontic meaning.

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- [1] CF. GECKELER 1971: 88f and ULLMANN 1972: 144 f.
- [2] JOLLES too has had a certain influence on the discussion but as his concept can be regarded as being contained in TRIER's, I will not discuss it any further (cf. JOLLES 1934).
- [3] TRIER actually never published anything concerning field-theory after 1938.

- [4] Such a very thorough and detailed account is given by GECKELER 1971: 116-144. GECKELER however seems to have no difficulties with the epistemological implications of the concept as such.

3.0 ANALYSIS

3.1 „ÜBERHAUPT" AND „EIGENTLICH"

The status of „überhaupt" and „eigentlich" as modal particles is a matter of discussion in various grammars. HELBIG/BUSCHA for instance rank „überhaupt" under particles and „eigentlich" under „Modalwörter". The difference between the former and the latter is that „Modalwörter" can answer to yes-no questions, whereas particles cannot be an answer to any question at all. [cf. also WEYDT 1969]. Applied to „eigentlich", however, the criterion fails. „Eigentlich" cannot be an answer to any yes-no question [cf. HELBIG/BUSCHA 1979: 429 f].

*„Gehst du mit ins Kino? Eigentlich".

One can thus conclude that „eigentlich" too is a particle. This view seems to be shared by SCHULZ/GRIESBACH, who list both words under „Modalglieder", which by their definition express the subjective attitude of the speaker. Such attitudes are:

„Überraschung, Skepsis, Desinteresse,
Bewunderung, Ironie, persönliche
Anteilnahme . . ."
[SCHULZ/GRIESBACH 1972: 349].

HINZE's grammar does not account for either word but gives just a rough account of what function modal particles have in a sentence which is almost identical with the one given by SCHULZ/GRIESBACH.

Quite surprisingly HELBIG/BUSCHA qualify particles as referring to only one word in the sentence [1]. In this respect again particles are different from „Modalwörter“ because the latter do - according to HELBIG/BUSCHA refer to the whole sentence.

HELBIG/BUSCHA give quite a detailed account of the semantic value of particles but none for „Modalwörter“, thus, only „überhaupt“ is analysed in this grammar.

Two kinds of semantic features are assumed: subjective and objective features. The objective features for „überhaupt“ are:

„Verstärkung und Steigerung“.

„Verallgemeinerung“.

„Zusatz und Hinzufügung“.

[cf. HELBIG/BUSCHA 1979: 433].

I now discuss how „eigentlich“ and „überhaupt“ are analysed in some research papers dealing exclusively with particles.

WEYDT points out that „eigentlich“ always indicates an opposition between ideas, thoughts or concepts, that is a superficial, actual thought and a more important but not so obvious one. „Eigentlich“ thus indicates a change or rather a shift of the topic. It is, however, not necessary that the more obvious idea or thought is verbalized, because it usually can be inferred from the situational context.

Because of this quality of „eigentlich“ i.e. the indication of a shift or change, it does not occur in imperatives and exclamations [cf. WEYDT 1969: 41].

„Der Wechsel zwischen zwei Gedanken entspricht dem Imperativ und dem Ausruf sehr viel weniger als der Aussage und der Frage, da Imperativ und Ausruf vor allem geeignet sind, einem einzigen Gedanken Ausdruck zu verleihen“.
[WEYDT 1969: 41].

„Überhaupt“ is not analysed by WEYDT but he ranks it under the „abtönungsfähigen“ particles. It is quite interesting to notice the disagreement in classification between HELBIG/BUSCHA and WEYDT, because the former, as we have seen above, rank only „überhaupt“ under particles and „eigentlich“ under „Modalwörter“, whereas WEYDT comes to quite the opposite classification [cf. WEYDT 1969: 68 f].

THIEL, in his rather anecdotal survey on „Würzwörter“ - a term that labels the same group of lexical entries as does „Abtönungspartikel“ - distinguishes two levels meaning in particles. The original and the derived meaning. For „eigentlich“ the original meaning would be „ursprünglich“, as a particle in a question it indicates that the speaker believes that he has ample reason to ask the question [cf. THIEL 1962: 72]. „Überhaupt“, according to THIEL, has the original meaning of „gänzlich“ but as a particle it indicates an important idea being brought forward

or doubt about the propositional contents of an utterance, especially in questions. BECKER sees the main function of „überhaupt“ in the fact that „überhaupt“ rejects a claim, or in other words, that the speaker refuses to continue the communication on the present basis. There is a grain of truth in that - especially for „überhaupt“ in yes-no questions - but it does not justify this kind of generalisation [cf. BECKER 1976: 11]. A quite detailed paper, especially on „eigentlich“, was published by ALBRECHT with the intention of establishing a framework of the meaning of „eigentlich“ in order to facilitate translation. One interesting result of his analysis is that „eigentlich“ can be combined with its 'synonyms' (wirklich etc.) without resulting in unacceptable utterances. Thus „eigentlich“ can be regarded as a „Proform“ for a number of lexical entities, which denote the restricted truth-value of utterances. In this function - according to ALBRECHT - the scope of „eigentlich“ does not depend on its position in the sentence. This is not quite true because, as I show later, there are certain positional restrictions depending on the elements following immediately after „eigentlich“.

ALBRECHT assumes that there is no fundamental difference in meaning for „eigentlich“ in questions and assertions. He does however draw a distinction between the 'speaker-related' and the 'hearer-related'

use of „eigentlich“. The former is more restrictive [with regard to the proposition], the latter more aggressive [with regard to the listener]. Examples are such rhetorical questions as

„Bist du eigentlich bescheuert?“.

This sort of question cannot be regarded as a question but - on speech-act level - as a reproach or even as an insult [cf. ALBRECHT 1977: 19-37]. LÜTTEN stresses the fact that most of the original meaning of „eigentlich“ is still maintained in the modal particle [cf. LÜTTEN 1977: 253]

In accordance with the majority of scholars she points out that „eigentlich“ indicates the non-verbalized intentions of the speaker as far as the direction of the conversation is concerned [cf. LÜTTEN 1977:353].

BARTSCH too comes to similar conclusions for both „überhaupt“ and „eigentlich“, which refer to the shared background or a common experience, which she describes as follows:

„überhaupt p: „p“ auch in Bezug
auf andere Fälle und Berichtspunkte“.

„eigentlich p: „p“, wenn man es
recht betrachtet“.
[BARTSCH 1979: 372].

SANDIG, who regards particles as „Gliederungssignale“, mentions the important fact that the use of „überhaupt“ presupposes that a certain aspect of the conversational

topic has already been verbalized, and that „überhaupt“ can only introduce new topics when some kind of relationship between the new and the old theme exists [cf. SANDIG 1979: 86 f].

It is not too easy to summarise and systematise all these bits and pieces. The methods as well as the interests of the respective scholars differ to quite a degree. There are nevertheless certain notions which seem to be shared - disregarding what method has been employed. For „eigentlich“ the following points are more or less generally accepted:

„Eigentlich“ as a modal particle retains much of its so-called original meaning i.e. „im Grunde“ or „wirklich“. It thus structures two levels of thought. The first level is the one of obvious or manifest phenomena, the second is the one of underlying truth. This too accounts for the fact that „eigentlich“ constructions show certain similarities to „zwar-aber“ constructions [cf. ALBRECHT 1977: 21]. „Eigentlich“ can be used in two ways: 'speaker-related', then it functions in a restrictive sense, and 'listener-related' in which case it indicates a certain aggression. In either case it refers to a certain shared background, that is to say, it directs the listener's attention to this said background. In questions „eigentlich“ indicates a certain casualness and informality.

„Überhaupt“ on the other hand indicates an extension or generalisation. It too refers to a shared background but employing „Überhaupt“ requires the preceding topicalisation of a subject. By „Überhaupt“ certain aspects or better the aspect of totality can be stressed or emphasised (in assertions) or doubt and uncertainty can be expressed (in questions). In my opinion however, it is not „Überhaupt“ that expresses the doubt because questions as such express a doubt or an uncertainty, otherwise they would not be asked.

Taking all this into account, it might seem to be quite a senseless endeavour to establish a semantic field containing both „Überhaupt“ and „eigentlich“. There is however a certain indication that this is not a too far-fetched idea: the fact that both grammars use both words to demonstrate their respective use, that is „Überhaupt“ is partly explained by „eigentlich“ and vice versa. This intuitive notion is supported by my own intuition as a native speaker of German. I think that this is enough reason to attempt the construction of a semantic field for „Überhaupt“ and „eigentlich“.

3.2 REMARKS ON METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS

An investigation of the meaning of particles by means of field methods is, as already mentioned, slightly problematic, because so far there exists no proper definition not only of meaning of particles, but of meaning in general [GECKELER 1971: 82]. A tentative approach, which was postulated by BREKLE and which I will adopt here, is to conceive of meaning as a multitude of conceptual features [cf. BREKLE 1972: 55]. Furthermore we can assume without violating any grammatical concept that particles have a so-called 'instrumental meaning' [cf. 2.2]. Based on these reflections the definition of 'field' given by COSERIU seems to be perfectly applicable.

„Das Wortfeld ist in struktureller Hinsicht ein lexikalisches Paradigma, das durch Aufteilung eines lexikalischen Inhaltskontinuums unter verschiedene in der Sprache als Wörter gegebene Einheiten entsteht, die durch einfache inhaltsunterscheidende Züge in unmittelbarer Opposition zueinander stehen".
[COSERIU 1967: 76].

Though such a field is constituted by a 'lexical continuum' which cannot be found in particles there is no reason why this definition should not be applied to lexemes without lexical meaning. It seems to be perfectly legitimate to reformulate the definition given above with regard to the meaning in question, i.e. the instrumental meaning. Thus the

fundamental principle of structuralist investigation
- the forming of oppositions - is applicable
because, as COSERIU pointed out:

„Funktionelle Einheiten existieren
(bzw. funktionieren) primär durch
„Oppositionen“, d.h., durch
Merkmale, die sie partiell
voneinander unterscheiden“.
[COSERIU 1976: 8].

The main task of this analysis is therefore the
discovery and the designation of such features.

The basic operation is the comparison of identical
sentences one containing a particle, and one not
containing the particle. (In this case „überhaupt“
and „eigentlich“ respectively). The next step will
be the contrastive analysis of sentences containing
one of the particles in question respectively (cf.
WEYDT 1969: 21 ff).

3.3 DISCOVERY PROCEDURES: EIGENTLICH

3.3.1 ASSERTIVE SENTENCES [positive]

- 1 Er ist ein guter Kerl.
- 1a Er ist eigentlich ein guter Kerl.
- 1b Eigentlich ist er ein guter Kerl.
- 1c Er ist ein eigentlich guter Kerl.

The first utterance differs from a, b and c with respect to the attitude of the imaginary speaker towards the propositional contents. In the first case, the attitude could be described as thorough conviction, a firm belief, which the speaker holds to be beyond doubt or even questioning. One could imagine that such an utterance is inferred from obvious facts or that the speaker has formed his opinion about the person in question and wants to indicate that he is going to maintain his position, however incompatible the facts might be with this position.

The difference in 1a and 1b is that these sentences lack the strong assertive quality of sentence 1. On the other hand they express a mild surprise of the kind of:

„Eigenartigerweise ist mir bisher noch nie in diesem Ausmaße aufgefallen, daß er ein guter Kerl ist“.

As one feature of „eigentlich“ I will therefore

tentatively postulate the feature [+ slight surprise]
[cf. BUBLITZ 1978: 115 f].

Such a feature might be connected with the fact that „eigentlich” always refers to an underlying 'real' or 'true' reality. By using „eigentlich” the speaker expresses his ability to make a distinction between deceptive appearances and the real truth. Furthermore he invites the listener to follow his distinction [cf. LÜTTEN 1977: 253]. A situational context for sentences 1a and 1b could be as follows:

A: „Peter hat gestern schon
wieder seine Frau verprügelt”.

B: „Ich verstehe das nicht. Er ist
eigentlich ein guter Kerl”.

B in this example tries to distract A's attention from the surface-phenomena, in other words he tries to prevent A from drawing the wrong conclusions from what he has heard of experienced, that is, he tries to indicate that there is no conclusion possible from the action [beating up his wife] to some basic fault in Peter's character. He even indicates that there might be an explanation in the wife's behaviour rather than in Peter's character. [This may sound like mere speculation and I have indeed no proof for such an assumption, only my communicative competence as a native speaker].

„Eigentlich“ in this case (and in the majority of cases) has the function of indicating something which is regarded as being more true or at least more important than the phenomenon experienced on the surface, that is, the process is one of restriction from a multitude of phenomena to one feature which is regarded most important and to emphasise this feature. In other words, „eigentlich“ is used to focus the attention. I will thus postulate the feature [+ focus].

This feature can also be discovered in sentence 1c. There is however a slight difference in meaning between sentences 1a and 1b; on the one hand and 1c. In c the focus is restricted to „gut“. The speaker who uses this expression (which is admittedly slightly old fashioned) tries to indicate that the person in question is not only seemingly a nice person but genuinely one. In this example „eigentlich“ does not have the function of a particle but of a qualifying adverb; „eigentlich“ in this function is not part of the present analysis and can therefore be disregarded.

3.3.1.1 ASSERTIVE SENTENCES (negative)

- 2 Er ist kein guter Kerl.
- 2a Er ist eigentlich kein guter Kerl.
- 2b Eigentlich ist er kein guter Kerl.
- 2c Er ist kein eigentlich guter Kerl.

For the negative assertions the same holds true as for those with positive contents. Thus for these sentences we can also assume the features

$$\left[\begin{array}{l} + \text{ focus} \\ + \text{ slight surprise} \end{array} \right] (3)$$

The feature and slight surprise does not cover the entire complex of functions apart from focussing, i.e. in our examples it can indicate a slight surprise but it does not necessarily have to. It seems to be more convenient to postulate a feature [actual], because by using „eigentlich" the speaker refers to something that has not been mentioned so far, or at least has not been accounted for properly; this is, the speaker brings forward or stresses a new aspect or 'actualises' it. Such a feature would also account for a slight surprise but one would nevertheless maintain [+ slight surprise] a feature - an optional one. We thus get:

[+ focus]

[+ actual]

[/+ slight surprise/]

[cf. also SANDIB 1979: 84 ff and BUBLITZ 1978: 112 ff].

3.3.2 QUESTIONS

- 3 Was macht der Herr dort drüben?
- 3a Was macht eigentlich der Herr dort drüben?
- 3b Was macht der Herr eigentlich dort drüben?
- 3c Was macht der Herr dort drüben eigentlich?

3 is just a simple demand for information. One can easily imagine for instance that such a question might be asked by a child in the 'question-age'. A possible answer [among many others] might be:

„Der Herr prügelt gerade seine Frau“.

In this case - and we will assume for the sake of argument that a child asked question 3 and got the answer given above - the child has actually never seen somebody beating up somebody else and thus, although it can probably see quite clearly what is going on, it has no proper means of evaluating and denoting what is going on. In other words, the child in this example simply wants information and the only attitude we can assume is curiosity.

3a and 3c can also be interpreted in the same situational context but the difference is that the person asking question 3a or 3c has got an idea of what is going on but is not quite sure if what he sees or hears is truly compatible with his interpretation. The interpretation, or rather paraphrase, of 3a and 3c could be:

'I see [or hear] that there is something going on and it seems to me that somebody is battering a woman, but I might be mistaken'.

So in this case we can discover the attempt to establish a distinction between the surface phenomena and an assumed underlying truth, which means that the assumption of the feature

[+ focus]

is justified, for „eigentlich" in questions. Furthermore, questions with „eigentlich" sound more casual than questions without. This fact would be accounted for by introducing the feature [+ casual] for „eigentlich" in questions, though one could argue the feature [+ actual] already covers this fact. For a close description, however, the assumption of the feature

[+ casual]

seems to be useful (cf. also SCHULZ - GRIESBACH 1972: 351; BUBLITZ 1978: 112 ff; SANDIG 1979: 84 ff).

In 3a and 3c „eigentlich" modifies the entire sentence unless a special intonation puts the stress on one of its constituents (machen, der Herr, etc.). Not so in sentence 3b. In this example „eigentlich" only indicates the speaker's attitude (e.g. surprise) towards the adverb of place (dort drüben). A possible paraphrase could be:

„Was macht der Herr eigentlich
dort drüben, wo es doch hier
viel schöner ist?“

The same phenomenon was discovered in 3.4.1 and 3.4.1.1 [assertive sentences]. Although it might seem to be premature at this stage, I tentatively postulate the rule: When „eigentlich“ precedes an adjective or adverb, its focus is limited to the word immediately following, it therefore does not function as a particle because particles by definition modify the whole syntagma. In the following I will refer to this rule whenever this problem occurs.

Questions like

Wer sind Sie eigentlich?

Wie heißen Sie eigentlich?

Was wollen Sie eigentlich?

can bear an undertone of aggression or irritation. Especially in final position „eigentlich“ seems to express these kinds of emotions although with adequate intonation the other questions can sound aggressive too. To account for this feature

[+ aggressive]

could be introduced. This would naturally exclude the feature [+ casual] because casualness and aggression are naturally incompatible. The features for „eigentlich“ in questions thus are:

+ focus
+ actual
+ casual/ + aggressive
/+ slight surprise/

3.3.3 YES-NO QUESTIONS

- 4 Haben Sie Goethe gelesen?
- 4a Haben Sie eigentlich Goethe gelesen?
- 4b Haben Sie Goethe eigentlich gelesen?
- 4c Haben eigentlich Sie Goethe gelesen?

In fact we find - in opposition to 4 - the prevailing aspect of casualness and actualisation. Whereas 4 is a simple request for information - this type of question can often be found in questionnaires - 4a is a typical conversational move. Questions of this type very rarely demand just a simple answer [yes/no]. I would even assume that a person asking a question of that type is not at all interested whether his counterpart has read Goethe or not. It is much more an invitation to take the turn, and by this to ensure the continuation of the conversation. An answer yes/no, without a proper continuation, would be regarded as being extremely impolite because it would certainly be an explicit violation of the cooperation-maxim. „Eigentlich" in a question of this type indicates the speaker's offer to the listener. This justifies the introduction of the feature

[+ offer.]

Obviously together with this feature the features

[+ actual and
+ casual]

in 4a play a far more important role than

[+ focus.]

As a matter of fact this feature seems to have no importance at all in this type of question. The other two features which have been elicited for

[+ aggressive
+ slight surprise]

are again optional.

Strangely enough, in 4b and 4c we find the same problem we have met before. The focus of „eigentlich“ is limited to the following word. Only in this case we are not dealing with adjectives and adverbs but with a personal pronoun and a past participle.

This leaves the alternative of either changing the rule, that is, extending it or modifying the definition of modal particles. I postpone the discussion and continue the analysis of „eigentlich“ in requests.

3.3.4 REQUESTS WITH MODAL VERBS (WOLLEN, KÖNNEN, MÜSSEN etc)

„Eigentlich“ does not occur in sentences with a proper imperative structure, only in requests like the following:

- 5 Du solltest mal die Oma besuchen.
5a Eigentlich solltest du mal die Oma besuchen.
5b Du solltest eigentlich mal die Oma besuchen.
5c Du solltest die Oma eigentlich mal besuchen.

A very evident feature of 5a and 5b is [+ actual], in opposition to 5, which lacks such an aspect. The situational contexts which would suit phrases like 5a and 5b and in which the topic [Oma besuchen] is put forward or actualised can be very different. They must have nevertheless one aspect in common: the topic must be 'latently' present, i.e. either visits in general or the grandmother must have been mentioned before. In this respect „eigentlich“ does not, as in some yes-no questions, introduce an entirely new topic it only specifies something already mentioned (either „Oma“ or „Besuch“). There is also a certain casualness about such a phrase, so that we can assume the following features:

+ actual
+ focus
+ casual

Before I now discuss the problem sentences of which 5a is one it seems to be necessary to summarise and list the features which have been elicited so far.

3.3.5 SUMMARY

Assertions POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE :

<u>Positive</u>	:	[+ focus]
			+ actual	
			/+ slight surprise/	
<u>Negative</u>	:	[+ focus]
			+ actual	
			/+ slight surprise/	
<u>Questions</u>	:	[+ focus]
			+ actual	
			+ casual/+ aggressive	
			/+ slight surprise/	
<u>Yes-no questions</u>	:	[+ actual]
			+ casual	
			+ offer/aggressive	
			/+ slight surprise/	

As already mentioned the feature [+ focus] seems to be quite unimportant in this type of question. There is, after all, a trace of this feature because by actualising a certain topic there is naturally the aspect of focus involved (because a certain stress is put on the topic in question). It thus seems to be justified to postulate a feature [+ focus] for yes-no questions as well. So in yes-no questions „eigentlich“ has the features:

+ focus
+ actual
+ casual
+ offer/aggressive
/+ slight surprise/

Requests:

+ actual
+ focus
+ casual

The features maintained in all phrases thus are:

+ focus
+ actual.

I will discuss at a later stage if the other features can be found in the respective phrases or if these features are a function of the particular sentence structure.

3.3.5.1 SOME PROBLEMS: DISCUSSION

I will now investigate what makes the problem sentences so problematic.

- 1c Er ist ein eigentlich guter Kerl.
- 2c Er ist kein eigentlich guter Kerl.
- 3b Was macht der Herr eigentlich dort drüben?
- 4b Haben Sie Goethe eigentlich gelesen?
- 4c Haben eigentlich Sie Goethe gelesen?
- 5c Du solltest die Oma eigentlich mal besuchen.

We have seen that, in the examples above, „eigentlich“ only refers to the parts of the sentence that follow immediately. Therefore they do not fulfil the requirements of the definition of modal particles, which by definition have to indicate the speaker's attitude towards the whole propositional contents of the sentence.

Sentences 1c and 2c can definitely be excluded from any further analysis because „eigentlich“ here is an adverb of manner. By replacing „eigentlich“ with „sehr“ we get:

Er ist ein sehr guter Kerl.

Er ist kein sehr guter Kerl.

Nevertheless even in this function „eigentlich“ seems to retain the feature

[+ focus.]

In 3b „eigentlich“ can only be replaced by other modal particles, such as „denn“ etc. Although it does not refer to the whole sentence, it strongly expresses the speaker's attitude and in this case it functions in a quite different way than in 1c and 2c. It thus bears the most obvious and most strongly emphasised characteristic of modal particles, which, in my opinion, justifies regarding it as a proper modal particle. Another interesting phenomenon is that sentences 3b to 5c seem to entail

an alternative, which the speaker would not express verbally.

3b Was macht der Herr eigentlich dort drüben.
 . . . wo es doch hier viel schöner ist.

4b Haben Sie Goethe eigentlich gelesen.
 . . . oder haben Sie nie davon gehört?

4c Haben eigentlich Sie Goethe gelesen.
 . . . oder war das jemand anders?

5c Du solltest die Oma eigentlich mal besuchen.
 . . . und nicht immer nur anrufen.

In all these cases we find that - as indicated by the alternative - the speaker expresses his attitude towards parts of the sentences and does not qualify them themselves internally, i.e. within the sentence structure. In these examples, too, the feature [+ focus] is the dominant one.

The definition of modal particles, however, has now to be extended. Based on the fact that the speaker's attitude is the prevailing function of modal particles the definition can be altered with regard to the scope of modal particles which has no longer to be the whole phrase.

3.3.6 SYNTACTIC DIFFERENCES

The next step now will be to investigate the interdependence of type of utterance, position of „eigentlich“ in this utterance, and the respective clusters of features. In the due course of this procedure, I will try to determine the neighbouring entries in the semantic field of „eigentlich“. The entire list of features we have established so far is:

+ focus
+ actual
+ casual/aggressive
+ offer/aggressive
/+ slight surprise/

But these cannot be found in all sentence types.

Entities which bear the features that can be found in all types [+ focus/+ actual] are: „in Wahrheit“, „im Grunde genommen“, „in Wirklichkeit“ and „wirklich“.

Thus the sentences:

Er ist eigentlich ein guter Kerl.

in Wahrheit

im Grunde genommen

in Wirklichkeit

wirklich

should have quite a similar meaning, which they indeed have. The same applies to:

Er ist eigentlich kein guter Kerl.

in Wahrheit

im Grunde genommen

in Wirklichkeit

wirklich

But it does only to a certain extent hold true for:

Was macht eigentlich der Herr dort drüben?

in Wahrheit

im Grunde genommen

in Wirklichkeit

*wirklich

Apart from the fact that the *marked sentence is totally unacceptable, the other variations contain only part of the information of the original. Add to the fact that „in Wahrheit“ etc. do not have or even cannot have features like [+ casual] or [+ aggressive.]

In phrases like

Wer sind Sie eigentlich?

in Wahrheit?

im Grunde genommen?

in Wirklichkeit?

wirklich?

the same holds true.

The fact that the features [+ aggressive] and [+ casual] do not occur in assertive sentences might be explained in terms of the different functions of the respective types in conversational contexts. Questions are, more than assertions, directed to the listener, they require his involvement. Therefore this type of utterance leaves more room for nuances like casual, aggressive, frank, etc. Especially in questions which explicitly deal with the listener himself: „Wer sind Sie eigentlich?“ can easily carry a high emotional charge because they attack the personality of the listener directly. We thus can conclude that features like [+ aggressive] are only a latent property of „eigentlich“ and need for the manifestation a syntactical environment which potentially has the same properties.

On the other hand, in questions of the type with which we are dealing, „eigentlich“ can be replaced without too much loss of information by „denn“. In

„Was macht eigentlich der Herr dort drüben denn?“

„denn“ has no feature like [+ focus] but potentially all the others. „Denn“ therefore can be regarded as a neighbouring entry of „eigentlich“.

In yes-no questions like:

Haben Sie eigentlich Goethe gelesen?

*in Wahrheit

*in Wirklichkeit

*im Grunde genommen

wirklich

none of the alternative entries can be inserted without loss of information. This accounts for the fact that + actual plays quite an important part in this type of question. „Denn“ would stress the surprise to an extent not intended in the original question. It is the unique combination of features in this case that makes „eigentlich“ irreplaceable by other entities.

Du solltest eigentlich die Oma mal besuchen.

in Wahrheit

im Grunde genommen

in Wirklichkeit

wirklich

In this example only two entries fit into the sentence and only one of these maintains the information of the original (im Grunde genommen). This entry however carries only one feature of „eigentlich“, that is [+ focus]. „Wirklich“ on the other hand too has the feature [+ focus] but, especially in this context it bears a strong, almost moral undertone. The request becomes much more an appeal to a certain moral obligation than it does with „eigentlich“.

The other features [+ actual] and [+ casual] which are shared by „denn“ as well, though „denn“ cannot be inserted at all, seem to be genuine properties of „eigentlich“.

Before I give a tentative field description of „eigentlich“ I will try to depict in short the influence the syntactical position has on certain features.

3.3.7 POSITIONAL INFLUENCES

Assertions: [positive]

Initial position:

Eigentlich ist er ein guter Kerl.

The inversion that is caused by the initial position of „eigentlich“ has no effect on the semantic contents of the sentence and „eigentlich“ has the features

$$\left[\begin{array}{l} + \text{ focus} \\ + \text{ actual} \\ /+ \text{ slight surprise}/ \end{array} \right]$$

Inner-syntactic positions:

1. Er ist eigentlich ein guter Kerl.

features: $\left[\begin{array}{l} + \text{ focus} \\ + \text{ actual} \\ /+ \text{ slight surprise}/ \end{array} \right]$

2. Er ist ein eigentlich guter Kerl.

„Eigentlich“ in this position loses its function of being a modal particle but maintains nevertheless the feature

$$[+ \text{ focus}]$$

Final position: very unusual.

Assertions:[negative]

See Assertions [positive].

Questions:

Initial position: incorrect.

Inner-syntactic positions:

1. Was eigentlich macht der Herr dort drüben?

This case has not been analysed so far because it is a very rare usage used in speeches or poetic language only: it is in actual fact a rhetorical question. In this example it functions more like an emphatic interjection than a modal particle. It nevertheless has the features

$$\left[\begin{array}{l} + \text{ focus} \\ + \text{ actual} \end{array} \right]$$

Thus, preceding the predicate „eigentlich“ loses the features

$$\left[\begin{array}{l} + \text{ casual} \\ /+ \text{ slight surprise}/ \\ + \text{ aggressive.} \end{array} \right]$$

2. Was macht eigentlich der Herr dort drüben?

features:

$$\left[\begin{array}{l} + \text{ focus} \\ + \text{ actual} \end{array} \right]$$

[+ casual
/+ slight surprise/]

In this position „eigentlich“ could also bear the feature

[+ aggressive]

depending on the intonation. But one normally would assume [+ casual.]

3. Was macht der Herr eigentlich dort drüben?

Features:

[+ focus
+ actual
+ casual/+ aggressive
/+ slight surprise/]

In this case there is an equal chance of „eigentlich“ having the features [+ casual] or [+ aggressive], the scope of „eigentlich“ however is restricted to the parts of the sentence immediately following.

Final position:

Was macht der Herr dort drüben eigentlich?

Features:

[+ focus
+ actual
+ aggressive]

[+ aggressive] in this position of „eigentlich“ is such a dominant feature that it even causes the loss of the optional feature [+/ slight surprise/]. In questions in which the addressee is personally mentioned this dominance of [+ aggressive] makes such questions sound impolite or even insulting.

Yes-no questions

Initial position: unacceptable.

Inner-syntactic positions:

1. Haben eigentlich Sie Goethe gelesen?

features:

[+ focus]

The feature [+ focus] is absolutely dominant in this case, it suppresses any other feature and again the focus is directed only towards the element following immediately after „eigentlich“.

2. Haben Sie eigentlich Goethe gelesen?

features:

[+ focus
+ actual
+ casual
+ offer]

Though [+ offer] could be replaced by [+ aggressive]

„eigentlich“ in this position does normally bear this feature, whereas in

3. Haben Sie Goethe eigentlich gelesen?

with features:

+ focus
+ actual
+ aggressive

both [+ casual] and [+ offer] are replaced by [+ aggressive]. Again this question sounds very impolite because it indicates that the speaker thinks he has reason to believe that the hearer has only pretended to know about certain things, in this case about Goethe. As already mentioned, the scope of „eigentlich“ in this position is restricted to the element immediately following.

Requests:

Initial position:

Eigentlich solltest du mal die Oma besuchen

Features:

+ focus
+ actual
+ casual

Inner-syntactic positions:

1. Du solltest eigentlich mal die Oma besuchen

features:

+ focus
+ actual
+ casual

2. Du solltest die Oma eigentlich mal besuchen

features:

+ focus
+ actual
+casual

restricted scope.

Final position: incorrect.

We can now postulate some sentence-structure plans and allocate the respective clusters of features to „eigentlich“ according to the position. The following symbols will be used:

- Kernel, i.e. subject; finite verb if split. ⊗
- U Object and predicative complement.
- D Pronoun in object position.
- ^ Adverb.
- B Particle.
- ⊖ Interrogative Pronoun.

Assertions:

Type 1

B	O	U
---	---	---

[+ focus]

+ actual
/+ slight surprise/

Type 2

O B U

+ focus
+ actual
/+ slight surprise/

Questions:

Type 1

ə ⊖ B ⊖ ^

+ focus
+ actual
+ casual
/+ slight surprise/

Type 2

ə O B ^

+ actual
+ casual/+ aggressive
+ focus
/ + slight surprise

[restricted scope]

Type 3

ə O ^ B

+ actual
+ aggressive/+ casual
+ focus

Yes-no questions:

Type 1 \ominus B \ominus U

[+ focus]

Type 2 O B U

[+ casual
+ actual
+ offer
+ focus]

Type 3 \ominus U B \ominus

[+ actual
+ aggressive/+ casual
+ offer
+ focus]

[restricted scope]

An interesting result is that „eigentlich“ expresses aggression mainly in final positions.

Requests:

Type 1 B \ominus U \ominus

[+ actual
+ casual
+ focus]

Type 2 \ominus B U \ominus

[+ actual]

[+ casual
+ focus]

[restricted scope]

Part of the field of „eigentlich“ can now be described as follows:

in Wahrheit

im Grunde genommen

in Wirklichkeit

wirklich

eigentlich

denn

[+ focus]

[+ actual
- casual
- aggressive
- offer
/+ slight surprise/]

[+ focus]

[+ actual
+ casual
+ aggressive
+ offer
/+ slight surprise/]

[- focus]

[+ actual
+ casual
+ aggressive
+ offer
/+ slight surprise/]

3.4 DISCOVERY PROCEDURES: „ÜBERHAUPT“

3.4.1 ASSERTIVE SENTENCES [POSITIVE]:

- A Er ist ein guter Kerl.
A1 Überhaupt ist er ein guter Kerl.
A2 Er ist überhaupt ein guter Kerl.
A3 Er ist ein überhaupt guter Kerl. [4]

In contrast to A, A1 and A2 express a certain extension of the topic in question. Not only singular facts are taken into account, from these facts certain general conclusions are drawn or in other words the thought value of the statement is extended. We can thus postulate a feature

[+ extension.]

Though not very obvious one could as well assume the feature [/+ slight surprise/] The sequence that could possibly follow an utterance containing „überhaupt“ could be something like

. . . daß ihr das bisher noch
nicht bemerkt habt.

„Überhaupt“ thus can bear such a feature and parallel to „eigentlich“ it will have the status of an optional feature.

One feature which is definitely present is [+ actual] because the extension necessarily causes an actualisation of new aspects of a given topic. We

thus get the features:

+ extension
+ actual
/+ slight surprise/

3.4.1.1 ASSERTIVE SENTENCES [NEGATIVE]:

- B Er ist kein guter Kerl.
B1 Überhaupt ist er kein guter Kerl.
B2 Er ist überhaupt kein guter Kerl.
B3 Er ist kein überhaupt guter Kerl.

In B1 we find the same features as in A1 and A2. B2 however is different. In this case again „überhaupt“ does not function as a modal particle but as a grading particle [5]. It only qualifies the negation. In this case one could quite easily imagine a scale like

wenig nicht überhaupt nicht

Example

„Ich habe wenig Lust, ins Kino zu gehen“.

keine

überhaupt keine

In this position „überhaupt“ can be replaced by „ganz“ and „gar“ without any loss of information. We nevertheless find even in this case the aspect of extension.

The attitude expressed by „überhaupt“ is by SCHULZ -
GRIESBACH characterised as:

„beiläufige Aussage oder Feststellung“

and illustrated by examples like

„Du kannst jetzt noch nicht gehen,
überhaupt muß ich mit dir nach
einiges besprechen“.

and „Ungewißheit, Zweifel“ in examples like:

„Ich komme morgen, soweit ich
das jetzt überhaupt schon sagen kann“.

Can these features like:

+ extension
+ actual
/+ slight surprise/

be found in any of these sentences? There is at
least not the slightest hint of surprise in any of
these examples, but there is the aspect of introducing
a new topic or better extension of a familiar one.
In the second example

„ . . . soweit ich das jetzt
überhaupt schon sagen kann“

„überhaupt“ does not express doubt, the doubt
expressed is a necessary element of a prognostic
utterance like the one given above.

„ . . . soweit ich das jetzt
schon sagen kann“.

But the whole content of uncertainty is actualised.
In other words the utterance

„Ich komme morgen“

is placed in general context of uncertainty that applies to all utterances of this type. That is, the speaker indicates that not only he in this special case has to cope with uncertainty, but that the hearer should bear in mind that all prognostic sentences have a certain degree of uncertainty. This interpretation justifies both the features

+ actual
+ extension

We can in quite similar fashion maintain these features in the first example:

„ . . . überhaupt muß ich mit
dir noch einiges besprechen“.
[cf. SCHULZ- GRIESBACH 361 f].

Apart from the reasons the speaker assumedly shares with the listener and which by themselves might justify the request not to allow the speaker to extend the range of reasons with „überhaupt“, that is, he indicates that there are more reasons which support the justification for his requests.

So in this case too we have:

+ extension
+ actual

3.4.2 QUESTIONS

- C Was macht der Herr dort drüben?
C1 Was macht überhaupt der Herr dort drüben?
C2 Was macht der Herr überhaupt dort drüben?
C3 Was macht der Herr dort drüben überhaupt?

Quite obviously the feature [+ actual] plays an important part in sentences C1 - C3, though at first sight there seems to be no evidence for the existence of a feature [+ extension]. On the other hand phrases C1 - C3 have, compared to C, a certain casual quality, so that the assumption of a feature

[+ casual]

seems to be justified. Still there is the unsolved question if the feature [+ extension] can be detected, though in any case it would not play an important part.

When we replace „überhaupt" by „ganz und gar" or „ganz im allgemeinen" in the sentence above, this does not make much sense:

* „Was macht der Herr dort drüben ganz und gar?"

* „Was macht der Herr dort drüben ganz im allgemeinen?"

Nevertheless there are paraphrases like

„Ich möchte ganz allgemein mal wissen,
was der Herr dort drüben macht".

possible.

In this case we find the aspect of extension, not with regard to any part of the sentence, but to the speaker's casual request for information.

In C2 we also find the restricted scope of „überhaupt“, i.e. restricted to the element immediately following, whereas - which again shows some similarity with questions with „eigentlich“ - in C3 we find a very strong undertone of aggression. Especially in questions involving the listener directly:

A: „Lassen Sie das bitte“.

B: „Wieso?“

A: „Weil ich es sage“.

B: „Wer sind Sie überhaupt?“

B in this case does not only doubt A's justification to give orders in the given situation but in general, so again this seems to indicate that the feature [+ extension] is a property of „überhaupt“.

As questions like this sound extremely aggressive, almost insulting, it is quite likely that there is a feature [+ aggressive] present. Thus the cluster that has been elicited so far is

+ extension
+ actual
+casual/+ aggressive
/+ slight surprise/

For questions it also seems to be true that „überhaupt“ carries the feature + surprise, which again will have the status of an optional feature, very much depending on intonation.

3.4.3 YES-NO QUESTIONS

- D Haben Sie Goethe gelesen?
D1 Haben überhaupt Sie Goethe gelesen?
D2 Haben Sie überhaupt Goethe gelesen?
D3 Haben Sie Goethe überhaupt gelesen?

There is a striking sense of aggression in D2 and D3. Questions like these are definitely insulting because by expressing one's doubt about another person's competence in this way, one overtly denies his right to take part in a conversation at a given stage. It is a quite frank indication of conceit and arrogance on the speaker's side towards the potential listener, whereas D for instance can only be taken as a simple request for information (in examinations for example). There is only a slight difference between D2 and D3: the scope of „überhaupt“ in D3 is again restricted to the following part. This however does not take a grain out of the aggressive attitude.

Thus, the feature [+ aggressive] seems to be so dominant that there is hardly any room left for other features.

There certainly is no feature [+ casual], but the totality with which the potential addressee is attacked indicates that there might be reasons for the postulation of the feature [+ extension] for yes-no questions as well. In other words, the person asking such a question does not seek any specific information, but questions the competence of his or her counterpart in general.

As this is a heavy attack and a violation of the maxim of cooperation or even a refusal to continue the conversation we may in addition establish the feature [+ refusal]

We thus get:

+ aggressive
+ extension
+ refusal

And, as a completely new aspect, even a dramatic change in the conversation is actualised by „überhaupt“, there too is the feature [+ actual]

So the complete cluster is:

+ aggressive
+ extension
+ refusal
+ actual

3.4.4 REQUESTS

E Du solltest die Oma mal besuchen.

E1 Überhaupt solltest du die Oma mal besuchen.

E2 Du solltest überhaupt mal die Oma besuchen.

E3 Du solltest die Oma überhaupt mal besuchen.

In contrast to E, E1 - E3 have a strong actualising character, and - at least in E3 - a taste of reproach, though probably not strong enough to justify a proper feature

[+ reproach]

Apart from the feature + actual again there is a strong sense of extension, which can be clearly shown by a paraphrase like this:

„Nicht nur hier und jetzt und aus den bekannten Gründen, sondern ganz allgemein kann ich dir nur empfehlen, die Oma mal zu besuchen“.

E3 too shows once more that the syntactic position entails certain restriction of scope, indicated by a non-verbalised alternative like

„Du solltest die Oma überhaupt mal besuchen . . . und nicht immer nur anrufen“.

The features thus are:

+ actual
+ extension

3.4.5 SUMMARY

Assertions (positive):

[+ extension
+ actual
/+ slight surprise/]

Assertions (negative): void.

Questions:

[+ extension
+ actual
+ casual/+ aggressive]

Yes-no questions:

[+ aggressive
+ extension
+ refusal
+ actual]

Requests:

[+ actual
+ extension]

The features which can be found in all sentences thus are:

[+ extension
+ actual]

3.4.6 SYNTACTIC DIFFERENCES

As field neighbours, which bear at least the feature + extension, we can assume „im allgemeinen“, „alles in allem“, and „ganz und gar“. The procedure of substituting these for „überhaupt“ will be the same as for „eigentlich“.

Assertions:

Er ist überhaupt ein guter Kerl.

im allgemeinen

alles in allem

ganz und gar

These sentences carry part of the information of the original, due to the shared feature [+ extension], but they lack the emphasis that is expressed by „überhaupt“. So far no feature [+ emphasis] has been introduced, but it seems quite useful to postulate it as a means of distinction. One might argue that the feature [+ actual] already includes a certain emphasis, but actualisation can be casual too, so the revised cluster for assertion is:

+ extension
+ actual
+ emphasis

Questions:

Was macht überhaupt der Herr dort drüben?

*im allgemeinen

*alles in allem

*ganz und gar

None of these sentences is acceptable. This is certainly due to the absence of features like [+casual] and [-aggressive], which, as has been shown, maintain quite a dominating position in questions. Again there is only „denn“ which might serve as an appropriate substitute. Thus „denn“, though lacking a feature [+extension], can be regarded as a neighbouring entry of „überhaupt“.

Yes-no questions:

Haben Sie überhaupt Goethe gelesen?

*im allgemeinen

*alles in allem

*ganz und gar

Again, none of the substitutes is acceptable, and again due to the fact that „im allgemeinen“ etc. do not and cannot have features like [+aggressive], which we have said is the dominant feature. It is possible to substitute „denn“ for „überhaupt“, but the meaning of the sentence would be quite different. „Denn“ indicates an attitude of surprise which cannot be found in this example but which is however present

in questions like C1. This may account for the fact that „denn“ can be inserted, that is, substituted for „überhaupt“ without too much loss of information.

Requests:

Du solltest überhaupt mal die Oma besuchen.

*im allgemeinen

*alles in allem

*ganz und gar

Again, substitution results in unacceptability, which can be explained by the fact that the feature [+ actual] is the dominating one.

The result so far is that the neighbouring entries we have assumed only in the minority of cases can replace „überhaupt“ and only when the feature [+ extension] is the only or the dominant feature. There are also cases when „überhaupt“ shares a number of features with „denn“ and there are certainly cases when „überhaupt“ and „eigentlich“ can be replaced by each other without loss of information. But before we go deeper into the relationship between „überhaupt“ and „eigentlich“, it seems to be necessary to give a detailed account of the interdependence between syntactic position and the presence or absence of certain features.

3.4.7 POSITIONAL INFLUENCES

Assertions (positive):

Initial position:

Überhaupt ist er ein guter Kerl.

The initial position in assertions similar to „eigentlich“ not only causes inversion (a fact that can be neglected for the time being), but it gives the sentence a very strong aspect of actualisation, and quite an emphatic character. Assuming the feature [+ actual] is the prevailing one the cluster thus is:

+ actual
+ emphasis
+ extension
/+ slight surprise/

Inner-syntactic position:

1. Er ist überhaupt ein guter Kerl.

This position causes a shift in the hierarchy of features because the stress is put on the extension.

We thus get:

+ extension
+ actual
+ emphasis
/+ slight surprise/

2. Er ist ein überhaupt guter Kerl.

„Überhaupt“ loses the function of a modal particle and can be regarded as an adverbial of manner. Again there is a striking similarity in the positional behaviour of „eigentlich“ and „überhaupt“.

Final position: unacceptable.

Questions:

Initial position: possible

„ . . . überhaupt, was mache
der Herr dort drüben?“

It is nevertheless doubtful if „überhaupt“ in this case can be regarded as part of the sentence. To me, it seems to be the elliptic form of a preceding sentence.

Inner-syntactic position:

1. Was überhaupt macht der Herr dort drüben?

poetic version of the other forms and sounds more emphatic than these, but there is, as will be shown, no considerable impact on the order of features.

2. Was macht überhaupt der Herr dort drüben?

As already mentioned, the prevailing aspect in such a question is one of casualness, combined with actualisation. Even the feature [✓+ slight surprise]

is - if present - more eminent than [+ extension].

So the cluster is:

+ casual
+ actual
/+ slight surprise/
+ extension

3. Was macht der Herr überhaupt dort drüben?

The aspect of actualisation in this sentence is quite limited. It is probably connected with the fact that the scope of „überhaupt“ in this position is limited to „dort drüben“. So it seems to be not too far-fetched that the question of the specific location „dort drüben“ is actualised in contrast to some other location. The order of feature then is:

+ actual
+ casual
+ extension
/+ slight surprise/

[restricted scope]

Final position:

Was macht der Herr dort drüben überhaupt?

The features [+ extension] and [+ aggressive] are equally strong and, judging from my competence as a native speaker, there is reason to assume, that in the majority of cases the feature [+ aggressive] is the

dominant one, whereas the features [+ actual] and [+ extension] are subordinate to it. We thus get:

+ aggressive
+ actual
+ extension

Yes-no questions:

Initial position: possible (see Questions)

Inner-syntactic position:

1. Haben Sie überhaupt Goethe gelesen?

As already discussed in this type of question, the aggressive component is very strong, and so is the aspect of refusal. We can thus assume this hierarchy in the cluster:

+ aggressive
+ refusal
+ actual
+ extension

The same applies to:

2. Haben Sie Goethe überhaupt gelesen?

With the only distinction that, again, the scope of „überhaupt“ is restricted.

Final position: unacceptable.

Requests:

Initial position:

Überhaupt solltest du die Oma mal besuchen.

As only two features have been elicited for „Überhaupt" in requests, i. e. [+ actual] and [+ extension] there is not much choice in their ranking. Nevertheless in the initial position „Überhaupt" carries more emphasis than in the other position. The feature [+ emphasis] has already been introduced. We then have:

+ actual
+ emphasis
+ extension

Inner-syntactic position:

1. Du solltest überhaupt die Oma besuchen.

Compared to the sentence above this one carries less emphasis, which should justify the following order:

+ actual
+ extension
+ emphasis

2. Du solltest die Oma überhaupt mal besuchen.

Again there is a certain emphatic aspect detectable, although the stress is only put on the part immediately

Following „besuchen“ or „mal besuchen“. The features then again would take the following order:

+ actual
+ emphasis
+ extension

I will now - in the same way as for „eigentlich“-construct abstract sentence - structure plans with regard to their impact on the absence or presence or order of the features. The symbols will be the same, so I do not repeat them here.

Assertions:

Type 1

B	O	U
---	---	---

+ actual
+ emphasis
+ extension
/+ slight surprise/

Type 2

O	B	U
---	---	---

+ extension
+ actual
+ emphasis
/+ slight surprise/

Questions:

Type 1

ə	⊖	B	⊖	^
---	---	---	---	---

+ casual

+ actual
/+ slight surprise/
+ extension

Type 2

ə O B ^

+ actual
+ casual/+ aggressive
+ extension
/+ slight surprise/

[restricted scope]

Type 3

ə O ^ B

+ aggressive
+ actual
+ extension

Yes-no questions:

Type 1

O B U

+ aggressive
+ refusal
+ actual
+ extension

Type 2

⊖ U B ⊖

+ aggressive
+ refusal
+ actual
+ extension

[restricted scope]

Requests:

Type 1 B ⊖ U ⊖

+ actual
+ emphasis
+ extension

Type 2 ⊖ B U ⊖

+ actual
+ extension
+ emphasis

Type 3 ⊖ U B ⊖

+ actual
+ emphasis
+ extension

Before I now contrast „überhaupt“ and „eigentlich“
I sketch the field, that is part of the field of
„überhaupt“.

On one side we find entries like:

im allgemeinen
alles in allem
ganz und gar

which all have the feature + extension and possibly
the feature + actual as well. On the other hand
again we find „denn“ with the features + actual/

+ casual, / + aggressive, / + offer and / + slight surprise/ and in the middle there is „überhaupt“ with the features

+ extension
+ actual
+ casual
+ aggressive
+ emphasis
/+ slight surprise/
+ refusal

We thus get:

im allgemeinen	überhaupt	denn
alles in allem		
ganz und gar		

<table border="1"> <tr><td>+ extension</td></tr> <tr><td>+ actual</td></tr> <tr><td>- casual</td></tr> <tr><td>- aggressive</td></tr> <tr><td>- emphasis</td></tr> <tr><td>- refusal</td></tr> <tr><td>/- slight surprise/</td></tr> </table>	+ extension	+ actual	- casual	- aggressive	- emphasis	- refusal	/- slight surprise/	<table border="1"> <tr><td>+ extension</td></tr> <tr><td>+ actual</td></tr> <tr><td>+ casual</td></tr> <tr><td>+ aggressive</td></tr> <tr><td>+ emphasis</td></tr> <tr><td>+ refusal</td></tr> <tr><td>/+ slight surprise/</td></tr> </table>	+ extension	+ actual	+ casual	+ aggressive	+ emphasis	+ refusal	/+ slight surprise/	<table border="1"> <tr><td>- extension</td></tr> <tr><td>+ actual</td></tr> <tr><td>+ casual</td></tr> <tr><td>+ aggressive</td></tr> <tr><td>+ offer</td></tr> <tr><td>/+slight surprise/</td></tr> </table>	- extension	+ actual	+ casual	+ aggressive	+ offer	/+slight surprise/
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- extension																						
+ actual																						
+ casual																						
+ aggressive																						
+ offer																						
/+slight surprise/																						

3.5 „ÜBERHAUPT" VERSUS „EIGENTLICH"

The procedure of contrasting „überhaupt" and „eigentlich" will contain the following steps. Firstly, I compare the feature clusters in general, that is, all the features so far elicited. Secondly, I give an answer to the question why „überhaupt" and „eigentlich" can be substituted by each other in certain contexts and not in others. The third step then will be the construction of a feature-matrix with regard to the syntactic position for both words. The fourth and last step then has to be an attempt at constructing the field for both „überhaupt" and „eigentlich".

„überhaupt"		„eigentlich"
+ extension - focus + actual + casual + aggressive + emphasis + refusal - offer /+ slight surprise/	f	+ focus - extension + actual + casual + aggressive + offer - refusal /+ slight surprise/

The clusters differ considerably and despite the fact that a couple of features are shared, two vital characteristics are in total opposition i.e. [+ focus] versus [- extension] and [+ refusal] versus [- offer].

That leaves the question as to how it can be that the two words can be substituted in some contexts without loss of information, when they disagree in the features + extension and + refusal which are, as we have seen, almost always present, even if they have no strong impact. The answer I give in the following is certainly speculative but I think it is nevertheless worth discussing.

Since the time of classical rhetoric there have existed techniques for producing certain effects in the mind of the listener by restricting or extending certain conceptions, i.e. to refer to a dagger, for instance, as 'weapon'. (Macbeth, for example, could in his famous soliloquy have said: 'Is this a weapon I see before me'), or vice versa, to refer to a human being as 'hands', 'foot' etc. (helping hands etc.) This figure of speech is called synecdoche. Though at a superficial glance the two operations (denoting to a whole by referring to a part and denoting a part by referring to a whole) seem to be in opposition, they are summarised under the same term. Also DUBOIS et al. (1974) view them as one operation though they make a distinction between 'generalising synecdoche' and 'particularising synecdoche'. Though the two operations look quite different, they nevertheless have in common that attention is drawn to certain characteristics of the object or idea in question which the speaker thinks to be of eminent

importance. Using 'weapon' instead of 'dagger' might stress the idea of something deadly or dangerous and neglect the actual material form of this idea (sharp, made of metal etc.), whereas 'helping hands' stresses the importance of the hand as the most useful limb as far as helping is concerned and neglects the fact that it is always the human being as a whole that gives that help. These remarks have the sole purpose of illustrating the internal structure of the operation called synecdoche.

Now my cautious suggestion is that one would probably detect certain similarities between the two kinds of synecdoche and the way „überhaupt" and „eigentlich" function. DUBOIS et al. for example argue that, when the process of generalisation exceeds certain limits, the propositional contents of a phrase become very vague:

„Wenn man den Prozeß der
Generalisierung zu weit
treibt, kommt man schließlich
dahin, jedes Wort durch „Dings"
oder „Dingsda" zu ersetzen . . ."
[DUBOIS et al. 1975: 171 f].

The same is true for the excessive use of „überhaupt". It leaves the listener with the task to find out for himself what is referred to the same way as it does when „Dings" is used too frequently. On the other hand, „eigentlich" would have a remote resemblance with what is called 'particularising synecdoche',


that is, a stress on certain unobtrusive but essential characteristics of the concept etc. in question.

As already mentioned, this is only a brief and very speculative sketch of some ideas which might be helpful in explaining certain problems arising by the substitutability of „überhaupt“ and „eigentlich“ in certain contexts. I do not go into this any further, but proceed with the comparison of „überhaupt“ and „eigentlich“ in certain contexts. The method will be to start from the abstract sentence-structure plans - to discuss the distinct and the shared features of the respective words, to draw conclusions with respect to the substitutability and then to demonstrate by some examples whether these conclusions hold true or not - and if not, to try to find out why not.

3.5.1 POSITIONAL BEHAVIOUR OF „ÜBERHAUPT“ AND „EIGENTLICH“

Assertions:

The first structure plan for assertion was



and the features for „überhaupt“ and „eigentlich“ respectively in these positions are:

„eigentlich“

+ focus
+ actual
/+ slight surprise/

„überhaupt“

+ actual
+ emphasis
+ extension
/+ slight surprise/

There are two features shared by both words, and if our above speculation holds true, there should not be too much difficulty in making the features [+ focus] and [+ extension] compatible by introducing a feature like [+ syn] the only problem left is the feature [+ emphasis] which, in my opinion, cannot be found with „eigentlich“. A revised and more redundant cluster then would be:

+ syn
+ actual
- emphasis
/+ slight surprise/

+ actual
+ emphasis
+ syn
/+ slight surprise/

The absence of the feature [+ emphasis] plus the different order of the features now suggests that no substitution is possible at least not without a - though moderate - change in the meaning of the utterance:

. . . überhaupt können wir da nicht so einfach eingreifen.

. . . eigentlich können wir da nicht so einfach eingreifen.

The two examples could certainly be uttered in the same situational context, but the speaker's intention would be quite different: the first one would probably be used to override any possible counter-arguments, whereas the second invites some meditation on the part of the potential listener to arrive at the same results as the speaker has arrived at. The result of the whole operation is probably the same for both utterances: the listener gives in but the way this is achieved is different. In these examples or in this type of sentence, there seems too to be a feature like [+ offer] (cf. yes-no questions) at work, that is in the case of „eigentlich“. It seems to be unnecessary to assume a feature [+ refusal] for „überhaupt“ or, in my opinion, there is no real refusal involved. So the once more revised matrix is:

„eigentlich“

+ syn
+ actual
- emphasis
+ offer
/+ slight surprise/

„überhaupt“

+ actual
+ emphasis
+ syn
- offer
/+ slight surprise/

The second structure-plan was:

O	B	U
---	---	---

with the features:

„eigentlich“

+ focus
+ actual
/+ slight surprise/

„überhaupt“

+ extension
+ actual
+ emphasis
/+ slight surprise/

or:

+ syn
- emphasis
/+ slight surprise
+ actual

+ syn
+ actual
+ emphasis
/+ slight surprise/

Though in this case the order of features is compatible the absence of emphasis in „eigentlich“ will give the respective phrases different nuances; and again it might be argued that this is not only due to the absence of emphasis in „eigentlich“ which could be accounted for by the appropriate intonation, but also that there might be a feature [+ offer] in „eigentlich“ here too.

Er lebt eigentlich über seine Verhältnisse.

Er lebt überhaupt über seine Verhältnisse.

The first example again invites the listener to consider the true facts after which as the speaker seems to assume there is no other way but to agree with his opinion. The second example again seems to forbid any counterargument. These offensive qualities could be marked by a feature

[+ offensive]

So, the new clusters are:

„eigentlich“

+ syn
+ actual
- emphasis
+ offer
- offensive
/+ slight surprise/

„überhaupt“

+ syn
+ actual
+ emphasis
- offer
+ offensive
/+ slight surprise/

The feature [+ offensive] certainly applies to the initial positions too. Thus the matrix above can be viewed as the final version for assertions.

Although „überhaupt“ and „eigentlich“ as adverbials are excluded from the analysis I take account of these cases here again because they show quite clearly that there is at least some truth and validity in the speculation about the synecdochical character of „überhaupt“ and „eigentlich“.

Our examples were:

Er ist eigentlich ein guter Kerl.

and


Er ist ein überhaupt guter Kerl.

These sentences are virtually identical in their meaning and here we see that the operation of referring to a totality or to an essential characteristic produce quite the same result. In other words, in this position and function „überhaupt“ only has the feature [F extension] and „eigentlich“ has only the feature [+ focus] and these can, as it seems, be summarised under [+ syn.]


Comparing the two matrices given above it seems that the feature [+ offer] seems to be a genuine property of „eigentlich“ and in addition one that cannot be conveyed by intonation, whereas [+ emphasis] and + offensive can be, as will be shown in the following analysis of questions.

Questions:


The sentence-structure for this type of question in general is:



in our examples it was the adverbial of place, thus we have:



The first position „überhaupt“ and „eigentlich“ could take was right before the finite verb, so that the structure was:




and the features were:

„eigentlich“	„überhaupt“
+ casual + actual /+ slight surprise/ + focus + syn	+ casual + actual /+ slight surprise/ + extension + syn

The structures of the matrix are identical. One would expect that in case of substitution there should be no change in meaning which indeed, judged from the native speaker's competence, is normally true. The factor 'casualness' is so prevailing that only intonation could bring about a change in meaning [cf. also SCHULZ -GRIESBACH 1972: 351].

The second position possible was described by this structure-plan:



with the features:

„überhaupt“	„eigentlich“
+ actual	+ actual
+ casual/ aggressive	+ casual/ aggressive
+ extension [+ syn]	+ focus [+ syn]
/+ slight surprise/	/+ slight surprise/

There is another shared property: the restriction in scope to the immediately following part of the sentence. Again we have identical configurations of features, so again the two words should be interchangeable without loss of information.

Though both words can have the feature [+ aggressive] in this context it seems to me that „überhaupt“, because of its offensive character and the potentially reconciliatory character of „eigentlich“, attracts this feature more easily.

Given a sentence with the structure:

Warum wäscht Klaus sein Auto?

for example, the insertion of „eigentlich“ would not result in the amount of disapproval as the insertion of „überhaupt“ would. In this case too the notion

of any restriction of scope is only very faint. This suggests that adverbials cause a closer attachment of modal-particles than for instance accusative-objects. There is at the moment no proper explanation available and I do not feel competent to speculate on one.

There is yet one more position left, the final one:

[2 0 B]

with features:

„eigentlich“
[+ actual
+ aggressive
+ focus [+ syn]]

„überhaupt“
[+ aggressive
+ actual
+ extension [+ syn]]

In this position we find that, as already mentioned, „überhaupt“ more easily expresses a certain aggression, it becomes more obvious when we choose questions like:

Wer sind Sie eigentlich?

and

Wer sind Sie überhaupt?

The difference for „überhaupt“ and „eigentlich“ in this position lies in the fact that for „eigentlich“ certain combinations of features are possible, which are impossible for „überhaupt“. This is due to the

existence of a latent feature [+ offer] for „eigentlich“.

So a possible combination would be:

+ actual
+ aggressive
+ syn
+ offer


for „eigentlich“, whereas „überhaupt“ would only have a combination like:

+ aggressive
+ actual
+ yn
- offer

Thus the already dominant role of the feature [+ aggressive] is reinforced by the feature [+ offer] whereas in the case of „eigentlich“ the feature [+ offer] lessens the impact of [+ aggressive]. One now could argue that a feature [+ aggressive] must necessarily block features like [+ offer]. I do not share this point of view. Aggression is not naturally a lack of cooperation, on the contrary aggression can to a certain extent be a constructive element in a conversation: so I would like to maintain that [+ aggression] and [+ offer] do not block each other, and that on the other hand features like [- offer] or [+ refusal], are not a sufficient condition for a feature [+ aggressive].

Yes-no questions:

For the yes-no questions only the sentence plans which are shown by both words will be taken into account:



with the features:

„eigentlich“

+ casual
+ actual
+ offer
+ focus [+ syn]

„überhaupt“

+ aggressive
+ refusal
+ actual
+ extension [+ syn]

There is a considerable disagreement in the respective matrices and it should be impossible to substitute „überhaupt“ and „eigentlich“ by each other in otherwise identical contexts. There is not only the absence of the feature [+ offer] in the matrix of „überhaupt“, but the presence of the feature + refusal, which makes the clusters and by this the junction of the respective words entirely incompatible. Although, at first sight, it might seem that not too much change in meaning is caused by a substitution the speaker's intention and also the effect caused in the mind of the listener differ considerably. For example:

Haben Sie eigentlich Kinder?

is meant to be and is taken to be a conversational request to relate something either about children or about the reasons for not having children, etc. Whereas

Haben Sie überhaupt Kinder?

insinuates that the person addressed lacks the competence to talk about such a matter, which is indeed a grave insult or at least very impolite.

The second sentence-pattern was:

⊖ U B ⊖

with the features:

„eigentlich“

+ actual
 + aggressive
 + offer
 + focus [+ syn]

„überhaupt“

+ aggressive
 + refusal
 + actual
 + extension [+ syn]

We find quite the similar situation as above. Though

Haben Sie Goethe eigentlich gelesen?

sounds already quite aggressive, it is still tolerable and can mean a shift in the conversation.

Haben Sie überhaupt Goethe gelesen?

must be taken as a clear refusal. The two lexemes

thus cannot be substituted by each other without creating a different meaning of the sentence. Yet again for both words the scope is restricted to the parts immediately following.

Requests:

The first sentence pattern was:

B O U O

with the features:

„eigentlich“

[+ actual
+ casual
+ focus (+ syn)]

„überhaupt“

[+ actual
+ emphasis
+ extension (+ syn)]

Especially in the initial position the two features [+ casual] and [+ emphasis] seem to play quite an important role, so that a substitution would change the meaning of the sentences quite decisively. As there is not much change in the order of the features for the other two positions, we can assume that this holds true for all requests.

One of the problems which I wish to discuss here in short is whether the casualness of our request is not due to „mal“, which certainly has the property of making requests more casual. However, requests like these usually contain „mal“ because they are

meant to be casual requests and not strict orders. I will nevertheless give a short demonstration of what happens if „mal" is omitted. I discuss „eigentlich" and „überhaupt" in initial position only.

Eigentlich solltest du die Oma besuchen.

Überhaupt solltest du die Oma besuchen.

The examples show that both [+ casual] in the case of „eigentlich" and [+ emphasis] in the case of „überhaupt" are still present. Both sentences in the appropriate situational context can be interpreted as follows:

Eigentlich solltest du die Oma besuchen, aber du scheinst ja nie Zeit zu haben.

A casual, quite defensive comment with an undertone of resignation. Whereas:

Überhaupt solltest du die Oma besuchen

must be followed by a more offensive sequence like:

. . . aber du hast ja ständig was anderes zu tun.

We have now reached the point when we have to establish or try to establish the actual field. The first step now will be to set up a redundant matrix.

Table 5

Features entities	focus	extension	actual	casual	aggressive	emphasis	offer	refusal	slight surprise
im allgemeinen	-	+	0	0	-	0+	-	-	-
alles in allem	-	+	0	0	-	0+	-	-	-
ganz und gar	-	+	0	0	-	+	-	-	-
überhaupt	-	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	+
eigentlich	+	-	+	+	+	0+	+	-	+
in Wahrheit	+	-	0	0	-	0+	-	-	-
im Grunde	+	-	0	0	-	0+	-	-	-
in Wirklichkeit	+	-	0	0	-	0+	-	-	-
wirklich	+	-	0	0	-	0+	-	-	-
denn	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	-	+

0 = insignificant feature

Thus we can construct this graphic representation of the field of „Überhaupt" and „eigentlich" as shown in Figure 3.

The structure of „eigentlich" itself could probably be represented by Figure 4.

It directs the attention from the superficial phenomena to the 'real' truth.

Whereas the structure of „Überhaupt" would be as in Figure 5.

It directs the attention from a singular phenomenon to a totality.

The 'archilexemes' which then could be postulated for both lexemes could be 'casual direction' or 'casual actualisation', though, in my opinion, it is not absolutely necessary to find or construct an 'archilexeme' by all means, at least not on the grounds of a limited analysis like this.

Figure 3




Figure 4





Figure 5



3.6 PRAGMATIC CONSIDERATIONS

Before I come to the end of this thesis I would like to put forward some considerations which are concerned with what is called 'pragmatics' in the broadest sense. Let us for example take the utterances:

Eigentlich gehe ich gerne spazieren.

and

Überhaupt gehe ich gerne spazieren.

Can these two sentences be uttered in identical or almost identical situations?

One could for instance imagine the following setting: two people are walking in silence. Suddenly one of them says: „Eigentlich gehe ich gerne spazieren“. The phrase presupposes [6] that the speaker actually had been thinking about the problem for quite some time and eventually found out that although he likes walking he does not do it very often. He would not even have to explain this to his companion because the latter would quite easily infer exactly that from the phrase he had just heard. Had he, on the other hand, heard the second example: „Überhaupt gehe ich gerne spazieren“ he would have been quite surprised, because „Überhaupt“ requires the topicalisation of some detail to be fully understood. If the two people in our example had

not walked in silence, but discussed some related topic, the beautiful scenery for instance, „überhaupt“ would be perfectly all right, as „eigentlich“ would be. There are, as was just shown, certain constraints on a pragmatic level as far as the use of „überhaupt“ and „eigentlich“ is concerned, or in other words the presuppositions are different. This is at least true for assertions. It is not true for most of the questions:

Wo wart ihr eigentlich gestern abend?

or:

Wo wart ihr überhaupt gestern abend?

can certainly be uttered in identical situations. Parents, for example, might ask their adolescent children this question at the breakfast-table. It seems that because the speech-act, that is 'question' in this case is already strongly determined by the syntactic form of the utterance of both, „überhaupt“ and „eigentlich“ only transform it into the speech-act of 'casual question', whereas in the first example „eigentlich“ indicates the speech-act of 'introducing new topics' (new to the listener that is) and „überhaupt“ indicates one of 'directing the listener's attention'. In this case one could say that „eigentlich“ includes the functions of „überhaupt“.

With yes-no questions the presuppositions are entirely different from one another:

Können Sie eigentlich Englisch?

or

Können Sie überhaupt Englisch?

are by no means interchangeable. The former could be asked in a conversation about languages or general knowledge, whereas the latter is not a question, but - in terms of speech-acts - the speech-act of 'insult'. That is, the presupposition for the latter is one of overt aggression and hostility, the one of the former more one of conversational routine. The requests do not present any problems because on the whole everything said about assertions applies to these too.

3.7 APPLICATION TO EMPIRICAL MATERIAL

I will now try to show that the results so far achieved can be applied to 'normal' sentences, that is to sentences which have not been constructed by the researcher and for the sole purpose of research. The samples for „eigentlich", which I discuss first, are taken from LÜTTEN's extensive corpus (7). The samples for „überhaupt" are taken from conversations in which I myself participated.

Assertions:

„. . . das Hauptfanggebiet
liegt eigentlich . . ." [405]

The example is an assertion of Type 2. „Eigentlich" in this case should have the features:

+ focus
+ actual
/+ slight surprise/

The feature [+/+ slight surprise/] does certainly have no importance at all in this case but [+ focus] has. The speaker is directing the hearer's attention to the 'truth' underlying the perceptible phenomena.

„Obwohl unsere Schiffe jetzt da
und da sind . . . das Hauptfang-
gebiet liegt eigentlich . . ."

By drawing the hearer's attention to this 'truth' the speaker also actualises this aspect: hence the assumption of the feature [+ actual] is justified in this case.

The same applies to the second example, which is an assertion of Type 2 as well.

" . . . die Diabolita kommt
eigentlich aus . . . " [405]

A paraphrase which shows the justification of the feature [+ focus] could be:

„Obwohl wir die Diabolita jetzt
hier sehen . . . sie kommt
eigentlich aus . . . " .

Thus the feature [+ actual] is justified too.

And again this is no sign of a feature [+ slight surprise/].

Questions:

" . . . wie sind Sie eigentlich
interessiert?" [418]

The example is a Type 1 question: „eigentlich" in this case should have the features:

+ casual
+ actual
+ focus
/+ slight surprise/

The features [+ casual] and [+ actual] work very closely together in this case. The speaker directs the conversation casually into another direction by actualising a new topic. The feature [+ slight

surprise/ can be detected, because one could imagine a paraphrase like:

Das wollte ich doch schon
immer mal fragen . . . daß
mir das jetzt erst einfällt . .

The feature [+ focus] plays only a marginal role. The speaker's intention is not (normally at least) to investigate the listener's true or real interests as opposed to those pretended.

„. . . wie machen Sie das eigentlich?“

This example is a Type 3 question and „eigentlich“ should have the features:

+ actual
+ aggressive/+ casual
+ focus

The feature [+ actual] is certainly present as a paraphrase like:

Was ich schon immer wissen
wollte . . . wie machen Sie
das eigentlich?

shows. The speaker actualises some hitherto unmentioned topic or aspect. Both features [+ aggressive] and [+ casual] could be present, though not simultaneously.

In a normal conversation [+ casual] will certainly prevail, though even in a so-called normal conversation, conducted under the assumption of mutual

politeness, the feature [+ aggressive] might replace [+ casual] as the following paraphrase shows:

Denkt: Ich schaffe sowas nie
so sehr ich mich auch anstrenge.
Wieso schafft der das?

Fragt: Wie machen Sie das eigentlich?

Again the feature [+ focus] is almost negligible because the speaker does not want to know the true or real proceeding that led to the results achieved by the other person but wants merely to express either his envy or his admiration. The latter case would be accounted for by [+ casual]. Thus the admiration would be presented unobtrusively, casually.

Yes-no questions:

„Wart ihr damals eigentlich auch in Malaga?“

The example is a Type 2 question. „Eigentlich“ should thus have the features:

+ casual
+ actual
+ offer
+ focus

Again we find that both features [+ casual] and [+ actual] work very closely together. The question casually brings in a new aspect. One even could imagine such a question being asked to prevent the conversation

from dying out. The fact that in such a context the counterpart is requested to say something about having been or not having been in Malaga is accounted for by [+ offer.] This feature has quite a strong position in yes-no questions of this type, whereas [+ focus] again seems to be negligible. Whether the persons in question have been to Malaga or not is of very little interest. What matters is to maintain the conversation to prevent awkward silence.

„Hast du die Bücher eigentlich schon zurückgebracht?“

The above example is a Type 3 question, which means that „eigentlich“ has the features:

+ actual + aggressive/+ casual + offer + focus

[restricted scope]

The scope of „eigentlich“ is certainly restricted to „zurückbringen“. What is actualised thus is the question if the books are still there nor not. It depends on the situational context whether the question is aggressive or casual. If there had been discussion about that topic before it is quite likely that the question is aggressive:

Du sitzt hierum und tuest nichts.
 Hast du die Bücher eigentlich schon zurückgebracht, wie ich dir heute morgen aufgetragen habe?

In both cases, however, that is if the question is either casual or aggressive, there is still the possibility of explanation. In other words an explanation is more or less invited, a fact which is accounted for by [+ offer] which again is a very influential feature in this type of question. Once more [+ focus] is not important at all.

Requests:

„Du sollst eigentlich den Rasen mähen . . .“

This example is a Type 2 request. In these cases „eigentlich“ should have the features:

+ actual
+ casual
+ focus

All these features are present in our example. The speaker actualises a topic (Rasen mähen); he does this casually:

Du liegst hier in der Sonne,
du sollst eigentlich den Rasen
mähen (wenn ich mich nicht irre)
aber nun gut . . .

The paraphrase shows too that the feature + focus cannot be neglected this time. The speaker draws the listener's attention to what he should be doing, as opposed to what he is doing at the moment in question: a speaker who utters such a request is

obviously prepared to get a negative response with regard to compliance with his request. This is accounted for by the feature [+ casual].

"Ihr könntet eigentlich nachher die Fenster putzen".

Again, this is a Type 2 request with the same set of features as in the first example:

+ actual
+ casual
+ focus

The request is very informal, more like a suggestion which indicates quite a strong influence of the feature [+ casual]. The feature [+ actual], however, is very strong too because a new topic is introduced into the conversation. Again, the feature [+ focus] plays an important role because the proposition [Fenster putzen] is contrasted with some unmentioned alternative which the listeners would probably prefer. The speaker tries to draw their attention to the necessary tasks. This is accounted for by [+ focus].

Assertions:

For „überhaupt“ the first example is:

„Das war überhaupt die beste Fete seit langem“.

As it is a Type 1 sentence, „überhaupt“ is supposed to have the features:

+ extension + actual + emphasis /+ slight surprise/
--

The feature [/+ slight surprise/] can certainly be neglected in this case. Not so [+ extension]. The speaker points out that the party in question was not only for certain reasons very good, but in general:

Nicht nur, daß es genug zu trinken gab. Das war überhaupt die beste Fete seit langem.

By this extension he actualises of course aspects which so far have not been mentioned. That is where the feature [+ actual] comes in. Furthermore, the speaker does not simply express his opinion in a matter of fact way but puts a certain weight into his statement. This is accounted for by the feature [+ emphasis]:

Ich bin der Meinung, daß es die beste Fete seit langem war, und ich sehe keinen Grund, warum du oder ihr meine Meinung nicht teilen könntet. Es spricht nichts dagegen zu sagen, daß die Fete überhaupt gut war.

„Wir haben zum Schluß überhaupt nur noch Blödsinn gemacht“.

Again the example is a Type 2 assertion in which „überhaupt“ should have the features:

+ extension + actual + emphasis /+ slight surprise/
--

In this case, the feature [/+ slight surprise/] could be present:

Stimmt ja, (ich hatte es schon fast vergessen) wir haben zum Schluß überhaupt nur noch Blödsinn gemacht.

The features [+ extension] and [+ actual] are very powerful in this example:

Wir haben nicht nur dies und jenes gemacht, . . . wir haben überhaupt . . .

The feature [+ emphasis] in this case is certainly less influential than in the first example. This could result from the fact that the speaker reflects certain events more for himself or communicates these reflections to a person who is familiar with the events: emphasis thus becomes more or less obsolete. The feature can nevertheless be detected and its influence depends on the situational context.

Questions:

„Wie ist der überhaupt an die Frau gekommen?“

The example presents a Type 2 question and should

therefore assign the following features to „überhaupt“:

+ actual
+ casual/+ aggressive
+ extension
/+ slight surprise/

[restricted scope]

The scope, however, is not restricted in this example due to the fact probably that the part of the sentence following „überhaupt“ is not an adverbial. The feature [+ aggression], too, can be neglected here because the question actualises a demand for information in a casual way:

Jetzt wo ich ihn zusammen mit seiner Frau sehe, fällt mir ein, daß mir noch immer ein Rätsel ist, wie der an die Frau gekommen ist.

As both [+ actual] and [+ casual] are very influential in this example [+ extension] only plays a marginal role but it is present. The speaker does not ask for any details and giving a detailed answer would not be appropriate. [/+ slight surprise/] is quite a strong element too, because the speaker is surprised - maybe for the tenth time. The marriage in question could even be regarded as a constant source of surprise.

„Was weißt du überhaupt?“

This example is a Type 3 question and „überhaupt“ should have the features:

+ aggression
+ actual
+ extension

The feature [+ aggression] is undoubtedly the dominant one. The question thus is only formally a question: on speech-act level it must be regarded as an insult:

Ich habe den Eindruck, als wenn
du gar nichts weißt.

By this aggressive question the deficiency (or the assumed deficiency) of the listener is actualised which is accounted for by the feature [+ actual]; [+ extension] too plays an important role.

Dies weißt du nicht, das weißt
du nicht, was weißt du überhaupt?

The speaker does not only actualise the listener's ignorance with regard to certain details, but in general.

Yes-no questions:

„Hast du überhaupt einen Führerschein?“

As the example is a Type 1 question „überhaupt“ should have the features:

+ aggression
+ refusal

[+ actual
+ extension]

The question is definitely aggressive but the aggression differs in degree according to the situational context:

Du redest hier übers Autofahren,
hast du überhaupt einen Führerschein?

In this case both [+ refusal] and [+ actual] have a very strong position too. The speaker actualises his doubts and at the same time indicates that he is disinclined to pursue the conversation with the person in question. The feature [+ extension] on the other hand accounts for the attitude with which the refusal is put forward:

Ich habe zwar bisher nur
Details deines Unwissens
gehört . . . hast du überhaupt
einen Führerschein?

Yet another situation would be as follows:

Du willst mich nach Hause fahren,
ich sitze auch schon in deinem
Auto mir dir. Aber hast du
überhaupt einen Führerschein?

In this case, neither aggression nor refusal is involved. It is only the actualisation of some general doubts.

„War das überhaupt richtig, was der
da erzählt hat?“

Again, this is a Type 1 question in which „überhaupt“ has the features:

+ aggressive
+ refusal
+ actual
+ extension

As the question is not directly concerned with the hearer, the feature [+ aggression] is not as dominant as in the first example, it is however present. Not so [+ refusal], again for the reason that the person in question is not personally involved. The whole phrase expresses a general doubt stirred up by some unmentioned details: thus [+ extension] and [+ actual] are the only features which have a strong impact in the sentence:

Irgendwie kommt mir das komisch vor . . . war das überhaupt richtig, was der erzählt hat?

Requests:

„Du solltest überhaupt mit dem Rauchen aufhören“.

This is a Type 2 request, „überhaupt“ thus has the features:

+ actual
+ extension
+ emphasis

The extension, which is actualised, could be described as follows:

Nicht nur, daß dein Husten dann besser würde, . . . du solltest überhaupt mit dem Rauchen aufhören, weil es ganz allgemein gesundheits-schädlich ist.

The actualisation, although probably caused by some detail, [continuous coughing for example], is applied to the general and commonly known and accepted fact that smoking can damage health. The person in question is requested to stop smoking [it is at least strongly suggested]. This implies a certain emphasis on the side of the speaker which is accounted for by the feature [+ emphasis].

„Ihr solltet euch die neue Staatsbibliothek überhaupt mal ansehen“.

The interpretation of this example is identical with the one of the first example.

We have seen that the features, i.e. the sets of features are applicable to ordinary sentences. A matrix of features could therefore be of immediate advantage to the translator.

A sentence like „Was wollen Sie überhaupt?“, in which „überhaupt“ bears the dominant feature [+ aggressive], would then not be translated into English, as 'What do you want in general?' or 'What do you really

want?' The dominance of the feature [+ aggressive] would only leave the version 'What the hell do you want?' or a similar version: the other versions would - certainly be excluded.

Naturally, this requires a similar matrix in English, i.e. those elements which in English have the function German modal particles have, must be discovered, classified and allocated to their proper position in a structured field.

Yet there is not only an immediate advantage involved. On the grounds of a revised theory of grammar and a new approach to language learning, the investigation of modal particles and their equivalents might bring about a new and better understanding of language as a whole and might thus bring forward an easier and more appropriate way of teaching and learning a language. I discuss some of these aspects in the following chapter.

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- [1] cf. for example SAIDOW [1967: 204] who clearly states that „überhaupt“ modifies the whole sentence.
- [2] SCHULZ - GRIESBACH list „überhaupt“ also as „Rangattribut“ which is quite a questionable classification with regard to the example they give; it has the same structure as the one which illustrates the use of „überhaupt“ as a „Modalglied“ [cf. SCHULZ-GRIESBACH 1972: 368].

- [3] In sentence 2c we find again the feature + focus, but this time the qualifying character seems to be even more obvious than in 1c.
- [4] For this sentence the same is true for sentence 1c: „Überhaupt“ in this position does not function as a modal particle.
- [5] SCHULZ-GRIESBACH have labelled „Überhaupt“ in this function as „Rangattribut“, which indicates the subjective attitude of the speaker towards one part of the sentence. [cf. SCHULZ-GRIESBACH 1972: 367 ff.].
- [6] I will use the terms 'presuppose' and 'presupposition' in what LYONS called 'pretheoretical sense'. I am well aware of the fact that both terms are highly fashionable at the moment, but I do not intend to go any deeper into this quite complicated matter. [cf. LYONS 1977: 603].
- [7] The numbers following the examples refer to LÜTTEN 1977.

4.0 CONCLUSIONS, SUGGESTIONS, PROSPECTS

4.1 CONCLUSIONS

This analysis of „überhaupt" and „eigentlich" shows that it is not too far-fetched to construct a semantic field for lexical entries without any extralinguistic references. The restrictions inflicted on field-theory to deal solely with 'meaningful' words seems thus to be quite pointless. Yet as a matter of fact, as this analysis has only dealt with two modal particles, the above conclusion might appear slightly precipitate. When particles can be viewed as a lexical class it should be possible to construct a field which contains more than only two particles, probably even all particles. There is, however, a certain danger involved in such an approach. The field could become a very vague notion. It could for instance be described by 'attitude' or 'emotion', a description which, as has been shown, has very narrow boundaries and does not lead very far. On the other hand the matrix could become over-redundant, which means that too many idiosyncratic features have to be introduced, so that certain entries are defined by clusters which could be incorporated only by force into the system of features or would at least be totally insignificant for the definition of other entries.

Another danger already manifest in this analysis is that for the sake of consistency certain properties and functions are overstressed at the expense of a true and honest insight into the proper functions of language.

But what is the function of language? I take this point and argue: The function of language is the reflection of common experience. It is thus based on the society it is used in, in other words, language can neither be understood nor produced without reflecting certain features of the society in which it is rooted. This now does not mean that I want to argue in favour of some crude, naive materialism, although in the end it is a materialist point of view that I do want to take. On the other hand, nothing is gained by denying that language again has a constitutive power. This means in simple words that once an expression is found it structures reality to a certain extent. These ideas are neither new nor very original, some people might even call them trivial. They have, however, not had a great influence on contemporary linguistics [1].

To illustrate the meaning and the consequences of the ideas sketched above I not give two examples. The first one is my own, an example from the 'lexical' level, the second one was given by MAAS and deals with the more complex problem of tense-systems.

In Germany, two or three years ago, the term „Sponti“ was coined. „Sponti“ denotes a person who is a member of a certain left-wing, alternative political movement. The word itself is derived from 'spontaneous': thus describing a certain new and different quality within the political scene. As one can easily see, it is not the human 'creative spirit' which is responsible for the coining, but the need to reflect a certain new or changed reality in language. Such was the need for those who coined the term. A child learning German now will probably encounter the word much earlier than the phenomenon it denotes. The word „Sponti“ thus becomes part of its means to structure reality rather than to reflect it: „Sponti“ has become a part of what WEISGERBER would call „sprachliche Zwischenwelt“ or what others in more general terms would simply call grammar. In other words, an empirical experience becomes part of the grammar of a language.

The line of argument, as can clearly be seen, is heavily influenced by WITTGENSTEIN's notion of a 'grammatical sentence'. MAAS's analysis of tense systems in Indo-European languages is influenced by the same philosopher.

The organisation of experience is, according to MAAS, a function of the means of production. Pre-industrial societies thus do not organise time as an impersonal

and decentralised entity: on the contrary, it is closely attached to and directly dependent on perception.

„Unabhängig von einer bestimmten aufstehenden Aufgabe, der in ihr noch gegenwärtigen Vorgeschichte und der bevorstehenden Nachgeschichte gibt es keine Zeit".
[MAAS 1976: 402].

Any action therefore is not measured by means of time but time is measured by the action. (This still can be found in everyday usage: time for a cup of tea, time for a beer etc.). [cf. MAAS 1976: 402].

This 'non-homogeneous' time now is based on a contemplative attitude towards reality, an attitude which cannot be maintained as soon as work has cooperatively to be organised.

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„Die Organisation von kooperativen Arbeitsprozessen bedeutet ja auch ein Heraustreten aus der kontemplativen Haltung und damit eine Praxis, die nicht mehr mit dem anschauenden Zeitbegriff organisiert werden kann".
[MAAS 1976: 403].

Even less can a highly complex society as the early theocratic states be organised in this fashion. MAAS now shows quite conclusively how economic development is reflected by a more and more complex tense-system in ancient Greek.

Before the Greek states and colonies had become thriving communities by exporting their surplus production a complex morphological tense-system did not exist.

When export, however, became an important factor in the economy, when the investments could only be covered by loans, which involved an elaborate legal system to account for the terms of repayment and rates of interest, such a system was gradually developed (2)(cf. MAAS 1976: 408 ff). Without going any further into this development it should be clear by now which line I am trying to argue. To make it more precise, the question I wish to ask is: What historical realities do modal particles reflect and what are the motives for organising a certain common experience in this fashion? I am not going to attempt to answer this question for reasons too obvious to undertake the trouble of even mentioning them. In my opinion however, this is - or better, should be - the central question behind any linguistic research (not only with regard to particles of course).

On the other hand MAAS in his analysis could refer to a field in which much research has been done. This is certainly not true for particles. One conclusion therefore might be that before we actually start to answer the fundamental questions, we need an inventory of some kind. This thesis therefore can be viewed as an attempt to contribute to such an inventory.

I have tried to show that describing the function of particles by features can be a viable way; the question, however, how an integrated system of modal particles can be constructed is still open. Despite the above-mentioned imponderables, I make some suggestions - highly speculative in parts - as to which line such an endeavour would follow.

4.2 SUGGESTIONS

Any such research should - in my opinion - start with the question: What can the speaker do with particles? Or, probably: What does the speaker do with particles? Some of the tentative answers have already been mentioned and, if necessary, criticised. They express emotion, attitude, subjective modality, etc. I myself have advocated that they structure, and thereby express [or better shape] experience. But, as we have just seen, all [or almost all] grammatical categories express experience. We must thus infer that particles either express a peculiar experience - or express experience in a peculiar way [3].

The peculiar experience can, I think, be ruled out as an explanation. What is left then, is the way the experience is structured. But what experience is it? One could probably argue that particles in general reflect a vagueness, an insecurity, about the facts of reality, a fundamental doubt about the possibility of objectivity. If these speculations have any validity, they can also account for the emotional, the attitude, the subjective modality because, if particles reflect the doubtfulness of objectivity, they must necessarily be personal or subjective. As a matter of fact, the empirical evidence that is available now seems to support this

point [cf. HENTSCHEL 1980]. Particles thus could be viewed as structural elements, structuring the relationship between the individual experience and the pseudo-objective perception of reality, or, in other words, particles are part of the grammar of opinion [cf. also STETTER 1974: 88 ff.] [4].

Opinion obviously differs from one individual to the other. There are, nevertheless, some basic categories by which opinion can be defined or at least structured.

The first two are based on the notion that, when comparing my personal experience with the momentarily perceived reality, there is only the alternative of 'agreement' or 'disagreement'. Two more entirely different categories could be set up with regard to the speaker's intention, that is, does the speaker attempt to make the hearer share his opinion, or does he merely state them? These factors could be accounted for by the terms 'active' and 'passive'. We would thus get four basic combinations: 'active agreement', 'passive agreement', 'active disagreement' and 'passive disagreement'. As all four basic categories can form subcategories independently, the number of combinations should allow the construction of a sufficiently redundant matrix. The ideas developed so far have, that should be noted, only the status of speculation, but even speculation should have some relation to the facts. It is therefore necessary to apply them to the facts to see how valid they are.

Because I have mainly been dealing with „Überhaupt“ and „eigentlich“, I will start with these two lexemes. The features that have so far been elicited seem to indicate that both words have to be ranked under 'disagreement'. Both main features [+ extension] and [+ focus] convey a sense of incongruence and so does the feature [+ actual], which both words have in common. The following example might illustrate the justification of this assumption:

- A: „Gehst du mit ins Kino?“
B: „Eigentlich muß ich arbeiten“.

The disagreement here is that the suggestion of going to the movies is perceived as an attractive one. B's opinion, however, is that he should work. But, as „eigentlich“ in this position does not bear the feature [+ aggressive], we can assume that it is 'passive disagreement'. In other words, B does not invite A to share his opinion. As a consequence A could continue:

- A: „Das kannst du doch morgen machen“.
B: „Da hast du eigentlich recht“.

A's reply contains the modal particle „doch“. I deal with it at a later stage. Interestingly enough the problem of B's comment is that, though formally a consent, it contains the category of 'disagreement'. [In this example it becomes quite obvious that

'disagreement' in this sense has nothing to do with a formal disagreement]. The disagreement here lies in the fact that B, on the one hand, accepts the truth of A's proposition, it does not really change his opinion. Even when B in the end surrenders and joins A, this does not mean that he has changed his opinion. Such behaviour could be paraphrased as follows:

Obwohl viele Fakten dagegen sprechen behalte ich meine Meinung bei, und wenn ich gegenteilig handle, heißt das noch nicht, daß sich auch meine Meinung geändert hat.

The case of „Überhaupt“ is slightly more difficult. It is difficult to see 'disagreement' in a phrase like:

„Ich muß dich überhaupt mal sprechen“.

But it becomes clearer when the phrase is put in an appropriate situational context:

A: „Wann können wir denn das Manuskript durchgehen?“

B: „Komm doch morgen abend vorbei, ich muß dich überhaupt mal sprechen“.

The disagreement now can be interpreted as follows: B wants to talk to A (for some reason). We can perceive that as B's 'opinion', but obviously he has not had the opportunity so far. But A takes the initiative and wants to talk to B, but on a very specific topic; the disagreement thus is twofold:

firstly A has taken the initiative, secondly A actualises a topic or a reason for a discussion which is not the reason B had in mind.

Again in a sentence like:

Er ist überhaupt ein netter Junge.

the 'disagreement' lies in the fact that in the speaker's opinion the person in question is nice in general, and that it needs some random incident for others to realise it. But „überhaupt“ has furthermore an active quality, that is the speaker's intention is to convince the other participants of his 'opinion'.

An example for 'agreement' is „doch“ as in the sentence:

Das kannst du doch morgen machen.

The speaker's opinion is in accordance with reality, or with what is perceived as reality. Or, as one could put it:

Obwohl andere es nicht so
sehen, bin ich der Meinung,
daß es sich so und so verhält.

Another particle indicating agreement is „ja“. „Ja“ in this function probably contains a vague element of its assertive function as an answer to yes-no questions. Phrases like:

Das ist ja gar nicht schön

though formally expressing disagreement, indicate on the level I am discussing a strong agreement, that is the speaker's opinion is in accordance with what is perceived. This might become clear when a phrase like the one given above is contrasted with a phrase containing „eigentlich“:

Das ist ja gar nicht schön.

Das ist eigentlich gar nicht schön.

The second sentence expresses a strong disagreement with the reality which is supposed to be „schön“.

I am not sure, however, if it is possible to decide at the moment whether „ja“ and „doch“ are 'active' or 'passive'.

Another suggestion I would like to make is concerned with a method of discovery whether a given particle belongs to the category 'agreement' or 'disagreement'. When a particle can be used in a formal imperative sentence, it is very likely to belong to the category 'agreement'. Giving an order strongly presupposes that the person giving that order means it.

*Geh eigentlich nach Hause.

*Geh überhaupt nach Hause.

Geh doch nach Hause.

Geh ja nach Hause. [5]

The suggested method of discovery would at least hold true for our examples.

There could, however, arise the problem of the combination of particles. „Doch" and „eigentlich", which in our terminology belong to different categories, can for instance be combined:

Das ist doch eigentlich egal.

As the combination „doch eigentlich" cannot be used in an imperative sentence, one should expect that the combination belongs to the category of disagreement. The interpretation of the above phrase could be as follows:

1. Something has happened.
2. It does not match somebody's expectations.
3. He communicates this fact to somebody.
4. This person appreciates the disagreement.
5. The agreement in disagreeing is expressed by „doch".
6. The person in question disagrees as far as the relevance of the disagreement is concerned.
7. This is expressed by „eigentlich".

This tentative and certainly questionable interpretation shows that combinations of particles have to be treated as entries in their own right. In other words, an entry which belongs to one category may, combined with another entry, belong to the other category.

It would probably lead too far astray to discuss all this in detail. Further research and more empirical evidence is required to achieve more substantial results. I will therefore restrict myself to summarise the suggestions put forward so far.

I started from the assumption that language (or grammar) is based on common experience of its users. It reflects and transmits this experience. Particles in German thus could be regarded as a reflection of the experience, that the opinion of the individual does have a certain relation to the reality perceived. One could for instance imagine a society in which a category like particles or any equivalent would be obsolete because entities like 'individual' and 'opinion' are not part of the social practice of this society, but in a Western society these entities are certainly important.

By introducing the term 'opinion', difficulties arising with the terms 'subjective-modality', 'emotion' etc. are avoided because it is more neutral than the other terms and comprises them. It is certainly true that probably no utterance is made which is entirely void of the speaker's opinion. Particles thus must be seen only as part of the grammar of opinion.

Thus 'opinion' is not an optional ingredient of an utterance, but a 'conditio sine qua non'. There are, however, different ways to express or structure the relationship between opinion and the reality perceived, and one of them is the use of modal particles. Hence, modal particles have a similar status as tense-morphemes for instance because, if I want to describe a certain relationship of events with regard to the time in which they happen, I have to use certain tenses; very similar to modal particles which structure the relationship between events and the opinion about these events.

But postulating four basic categories we are enabled to make a first grouping. Within these groups now subcategorisations are necessary. These subcategorisations could be achieved by means of field-technique, as was shown in this thesis. The result would eventually be a structured field of opinionating or rather relating the opinion to the reality perceived. It should be noted, however, that particles do not denote or describe an opinion. This is actually done by saying: 'In my opinion . . .', just as tense morphemes do not denote or describe time, this is done by stating the time: 'In the year 2525 . . . '.

As this relation is a very important one for successful verbal interaction it is highly desirable to incorporate

it into language teaching. But even the most modern language-teaching practice is in no position to account for it. In the final chapter I therefore discuss some suggestions made by MAAS which seem to be more apt to that purpose.

4.3 PROSPECTS

The assumption on which more appropriate ways of language-teaching should be based is - according to MAAS - the assumption that grammar is not a product of scientific research. Grammar is at the disposal of any native speaker [cf. MAAS 1974: 331 f]. Thus, the second language learner should not be confronted with grammar as a device of production of social situations but as one of acquisition.

„Es gilt, die thematische Bindung der Sprachreflexion als Unterrichtsprinzip zu nehmen: Sprachreflexion als Aneignung einer sozialen Situation - nicht in bildungsidealistischer Tradition als fiktive Form der Produktion von sozialen Situationen".
[MAAS 1974: 382].

Thus a grammatical rule cannot have the form: 'In this situation one says this and this', but must be necessarily negative. That is they have the form: 'If you want to converse under such and such circumstances you cannot say so and so' [cf. MAAS 1974: 382].

Under these assumptions, the learner then has to ask: 'How do I say if this and this?' To structure this strategy of heuristic questions MAAS distinguishes between „Ereignis", „Vorgang" and „Handlung". „Ereignis" in this sense is an even which took place in my presence, „Vorgang" is an event of which I know

that it has happened, though not necessarily in my presence, „Handlung“ is an event for which someone can be held responsible [cf. MAAS 1974: 334]. These categories naturally imply different types of questions. In the first category [Ereignis] the question: 'Who . . .?' would not make sense, but it would in the third category. But in the first category the questions 'When . . .?', 'Where . . .?' would ask for specification, which should be available. The questions are correlated with certain grammatical categories [adjective, adverb, etc.] In other words, certain grammatical categories provide the answer to certain types of questions; this means that some categories do not occur in „Ereignis“, for example, because certain questions cannot be asked.

The question the learner is forced to ask then is: 'How do I say if I want to answer this and this question?' There is, as a matter of fact, no question available to which particles could be an answer. Nevertheless, the problem for the learner will arise, that in a given situation, his opinion is such and such. He will therefore be forced to ask: 'How do I say, when the situation is such and such and my opinion such and such'.

The average participant is probably very often not in the position to answer these questions but, when science is conceived as the systematic reconstruction

of experience [cf. MAAS 1974: 331] science should be able to provide the answers. To achieve all this, more detailed investigation is necessary: with regard to modal particles this means that field analysis can probably provide such a reconstruction of experience.

There remains however the question of how to apply the results to the actual classroom-situation. A number of language teachers, although they probably agree with the basic ideas, would object on the grounds that the entire issue is sheer utopia.

There is certainly some truth in that. But there exist nevertheless models which could account for the above demands and put them into practice. The best known one was developed by CURRAN [cf. CURRAN 1972]. The following short description of his model is based on HARDEN-RÜSLER 1980.

A student - in CURRAN's terminology of counselling learning - client who takes a course in a foreign language with CURRAN, starts in a small group of 6 to 12 people. The students sit in a circle. Outside the circle sits the teacher - in CURRAN's terminology - the counsellor. The basic activity with regard to learning the language is the free conversation between the clients. In the very first lesson the clients usually have a conversation - mainly small talk - in their native language, but

experience has shown that very soon the communicational situation becomes problematic, a fact which is verbalised by the clients. The counsellor's task then is to repeat the utterances in the foreign language - in the simplest possible way. The clients are requested to repeat this and thus, step by step, a basic conversation is established. The counsellor only intervenes when the clients' utterances are absolutely unintelligible. The most important factor in this phase is the constant encouragement. Whatever the clients say is accepted, except for the above-mentioned cases. Another important factor is that the conversation is not about some boring topics, but involves the participants personally. Thus, an atmosphere of security is created, in which the clients will lose or at least reduce their inhibitions. In an advanced phase, the students will try to express themselves in the new language. The counsellor will still be very cautious with his corrections. Only when the clients feel confident enough he will correct, offer alternatives, give idiomatic expressions and comment on stylistic variations.

A number of questions are still unanswered in this model but it shows, in my opinion, a way to a more interesting, enjoyable and profitable way of language-learning. The argument that the normal class-room situation does not provide the necessary conditions

For a similar process of second language acquisition must certainly be taken into consideration: it does certainly not relieve the linguist or the language teacher to strive for improvements.

It might seem now that it is a bit far-fetched to proceed from particles, via language philosophy, to pedagogics. It is not.

As I have tried to show, German modal particles have always been a crucial point in grammar. There should, however, not be any crucial and therefore often peripheral fields in a grammar. The steps taken in this thesis might be one move in the direction of clarification. An analysis of German modal particles based on field-theory can only be the first step. The second step has, as I have tried to show, to be towards the integration of the grammar of opinion into a grammar which should be based on the notion that language is not an object in its own right, but dependent on the social practice of its users. With such a grammar established, second-language learning could be facilitated by releasing it from its isolation and setting it in the social practice of the learners.

This thesis is only a minor contribution to research in this direction. Further investigations are necessary and highly desirable.

- [1] HUMBOLDT for example accounts for part of the above-mentioned process by the term „Energia“. CHOMSKY - who for some time was synonymous with linguistics, claims that the idea of a grammar generating infinite numbers of acceptable sentences partly goes back to HUMBOLDT. Obviously a slight misunderstanding, as HUMBOLDT's idea of infinity is certainly different from CHOMSKY's and is noted in the notion that language can cope with an infinity of circumstances, i.e. is embedded in social practice, a factor explicitly excluded from TG.
- [2] It should be noted that once categories like this are established or have become - as WITTGENSTEIN would call it - 'grammatical', the individual or the society are not aware of the nature of these categories, in other words, we think or believe that our time is structured by phenomena like future or past, which to some extent is certainly true.
- [3] 'Peculiar' here is meant to account for the difficulties German grammarians have had so far, when dealing with modal particles.
- [4] STETTER discusses the apparent contradiction between 'sentences' and 'opinion'. 'Opinion' is only applicable to historical, intentional subject, whereas 'sentence' is part of the „Lebensform“ and hence part of the „Tiefgrammatik“ in WITTGENSTEIN's understanding of the term [cf. STETTER 1974: 57 ff].
- [5] There is yet another unsolved problem. In this example „ja“ can be substituted by „bloß“. But it cannot in: Das ist gar nicht schön. Furthermore, „ja“ is stressed in the imperative sentence. There is, however, no room for a proper analysis of this problem in this thesis.

APPENDIX

BIBLIOGRAPHY

There are of course more contributions to the problem of modal particles than those I have mentioned. To discuss them all in detail would certainly extend the framework of this thesis. For the sake of completeness however, I list them all below in the form of a commented bibliography. These articles do not provide any fundamental new insights, as they usually relate to one of the monographs so far discussed or at least to one of the theories employed in these. Furthermore, they very often deal with single particles and thus are of very limited interest even for linguists. The methods too vary to a certain extent. Some are very heuristic and somewhat anecdotal, whereas others present the topic on a very abstract, i.e. formalised level.

The order of this commented bibliography is alphabetical, although I try to make the interdependence clear by means of cross-reference. The titles are numbered and the cross-references always refer to these numbers.

1. ABRAHAM, W. [1979]
 In: WEYDT [ed.] (1979): 239 - 256.
 Contrastive analysis of *außer* and *wenn nicht*. -
 Certain restriction rules are elicited and a
 diachronic method of the development is given
 and contrasted with *unless*.

2. ADLER, H.G. [1964]
 „Füllwörter“. *Muttersprache* 74 [1964]: 52 - 55.
 More anecdotic than systematic account of the
 function of modal particles. Though
 obviously influenced by language-purism,
 ADLER maintains that modal particles cannot
 be regarded as omissible entities, especially
 not in spoken language.

3. ALBRECHT, I. [1977]
 „Wie übersetzt man eigentlich eigentlich?“
 In: WEYDT [hg.] (1977): 19 - 37.
 Brief account of the different functions of
 „eigentlich“, the most eminent of which as a
 modal particle is 'restriction'. Some
 equivalents in English and French are
 discussed. Authorities as far as particles
 are concerned are WEYDT and KRIVONOSOV and
 also ARNDT.

4. ARNDT, W. [1960]
 'Modal particles in Russian and German'.
Word 16. Some general characteristics of

modal particles. Stresses heavily the emotional drive of particles.

5. ASBACH-SCHNITTKER, B. [1975]
„Zur Wiedergabe der deutschen Satzpartikel im Englischen". In: DRACHMANN, G. (hg) 1975. Salzburger Beiträge zur Linguistik, 303 - 318. Contrastive analysis. See also BUBLITZ 1978.
6. ASBACH-SCHNITTKER, B. [1977]
„Die Satzpartikel wohl". In: WEYDT (hg) [1977] 38 - 62. Very thorough and detailed contrastive analysis of wohl and its restrictive impact on certain speech-acts. Compared to English equivalents. Refers to WEYDT 1969; HARTMANN 1975 and KÖNIG 1977.
7. ASBACH-SCHNITTKER, B. [1979]
„Die adversativen Konnektoren aber, „sondern" und 'but' nach negierten Sätzen". In: WEYDT (hg) [1979] 457 - 469. Detailed contrastive analysis. 'But' is only partly equivalent to „sondern" und „aber". Stressing the different communicative implications of the respective words.
8. BARTSCH, R. [1979]
„Die Unterscheidung zwischen Wahrheitsbedingungen und anderen Gebrauchsbedingungen in einer Bedeutungstheorie für Partikeln".

In: WEYDT [hg] [1979]: 365 - 378. Modal particles, the paper maintains, do not contribute to the truth conditions of sentences, but have other conditions of use i.e. directing the listener, etc. . . . As the information provided by modal particles is different from that provided by other parts of the sentence, they do not play a role in the direct truth-conditional interpretation.

9. BECKER, N. [1976]
„Die Verknüpfungspartikeln „denn“, „mal“, „doch“ und andere“. Zielsprache Deutsch 7 Heft 3: 6 - 12. Quite an amateurish attempt to classify modal particles, describe their meaning or function and to make use of the results in German as a second language. Refers only to KRIVONOSOV 1965a.
10. BUBLITZ, W./ RONCADOR, M.V. [1975]
„Über die deutsche Partikel „ja“. In: BATORI, I. et al. [1975]. Syntaktische und semantische Studien zur Koordination Mannheim. Investigation of „ja“ on various levels, combined with the attempt to find a primary meaning [ja . . . der Bekanntheit] and derive other uses from it. The theoretical framework is an eclectic adoption of both speech-act theory and transformational grammar.

11. BUBLITZ, W. [1977]
 „Deutsch „aber“ als Konjunktion und als Modalpartikel“. In: SPRENGEL/BALD/VIETHEN [hgs]. [1977]. Semantik und Pragmatik 199 - 209.
 „Aber“ as a modal particle can be viewed as a special case of the conjunction „aber“. It has nevertheless certain interactional properties the conjunction does not have. The paper is generally based on conversational analysis.
12. BUBLITZ, W./RONGADOR, M.V. [1977]
 „Abschweifungen“. In: WEYDT [hg] [1979] 285 - 299. „Übrigens“ and „nun“ as indicators of digression in a conversation. Syntactic restriction as well as pragmatic conditions of use are analysed. Based on conversational analysis.
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 Purely syntactical approach, aimed at the construction of context-free base rules to describe the deep structure of sentences containing the respective words. It remains

doubtful whether TG can describe these sentences properly, but the attempt is nevertheless worthwhile.

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WEYDT [hg] [1977] 10 - 16
Very interesting account of the emotive functions of modal particles.
15. GERSTENKORN, A. [1979]
„Partikeln in einem pragmatischen Sprachmodell".
In: WEYDT [hg] [1979] 444 - 457.
Very formal. approach, based on speech-act theory, aimed at describing the basic pragmatic functions of particles, which should then be integrated into German as a second language. Stresses the emotive function of modal particles, as well as their modal functions.
16. HARTMANN, D. [1977]
„Aussagesätze, Behauptungshandlungen und die kommunikativen Funktionen der Satzpartikeln „ja", „nämlich" und „einfach". In: WEYDT [hg] [1977] 101 - 114.
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„Syntaktische Funktionen der Partikeln „eben“, „eigentlich“, „einfach“, „nämlich“, „Ruhig“, „vielleicht“ und „wohl“. Zur Grundlegung einer diachronischen Untersuchung von Satzpartikeln im Deutschen". In: WEYDT (hg) [1979] 121 - 139.

Attempts to outline a diachronic approach to words modal particles. HARTMANN studies the syntactic properties of sentences in which particles can occur and compares them with the whole system of particles in their respective functions, which he tries to distinguish by their formal properties and the appropriate intonation patterns.

18. HELBIG, G. [1970]

„Sind Negationswörter, Modalwörter und Partikeln im Deutschen besondere Wortklassen?" Deutsch als Fremdsprache 7 [1970] 393 - 401. Attempt to give a classification on syntactic grounds. The answer to the title question thus is that „Negationswörter" do not form a class of their own, whereas „Modalwörter" and „Partikeln" do. The latter can be regarded as less than „Satzglieder", whereas the former are more, that is: „Sätze über Sätze". [400].

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„Partikelgebrauch und Identität am Beispiel
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