Carrots and Sticks:
The Making of an American Foreign Policy toward North Korea

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Abstract: The United States' involvement with the Korean peninsula and especially with the D.P.R.K. has always oscillated between extremes and as such, Washington has been using a variety of policies ranging from engagement to threats in order to try to steer North Korea out of a roguish path. The common stereotype regarding such foreign policy is that the Bush Administration has had a tendency to sanction North Korea while the previous Administration led by President Clinton had a softer, dovish and carrot-driven approach. As North Korea is now a nuclear power, it seems important to investigate whether sanctions and rewards have ever triggered any change in North Korean behavior, or whether incentives and disincentives have largely been ignored by Pyongyang. The literature on how to deal with North Korea clearly shows that there is a need to be involved with Pyongyang, but pessimism often prevail as some, argue that American sanctions have been rather ineffective as both China and South Korea have been helping North Korea financially and thus offset the sanctions' effects. However, others state that it is "unrealistic to assume that an agreement with the D.P.R.K. leadership could be reached without giving the country any assurances that it could continue to exist" As such, conducting a review of American foreign policy actions toward North Korea has serious implications for learning how to deal with a nuclear North Korea, especially in light of the upcoming American Presidential election.

Keywords: North Korea, United States, Foreign Policy, Sanctions, Rewards

Introduction

As George Bush's last few months in office can almost be counted with the digit of a single hand, it is the President's foreign policy, and especially how he articulated the 'War on Terror' doctrine as well as implemented regime change that will most likely stay as remembrance of his time in office. The Bush Administration has thus attempted to alleviate insecurities created by dangerous, or 'rogue' states such as Iraq. The 2002 Axis of Evil also singled out Iran as well as North Korea, as nations whose designs were contrary to American and the free world's ideals. But even though harsh rhetoric has been used by the Administration in order to deal with Pyongyang, many overtures have also been made, and a multilateral forum, the Six-Party Talks, has almost constantly been working on the issue of denuclearization of the Korean peninsula since its first round in 2003. It is not the first time, however, that North Korea has been engaged by the United States, and at the same time sanctioned because of its development of weapons, or testing, for example. Indeed, the Clinton Administration, though it favored Kim Dae Jung's Sunshine Policy of engagement, also juggled between sanctions and rewards when it came to North Korea. As the presidential election is just around the corner, candidates have been presenting different visions of how a foreign policy toward North Korea should be conducted. While Barack Obama has been 'endorsed' by the Chosen Shinbo[1] and has hinted that talks with dangerous actors were often necessary, John McCain's approach is more skeptical of president-to-president meeting.

What foreign policy has the United States conducted toward North Korea during the Clinton and the Bush Administrations? Where sanctions and rewards effective in swaying Pyongyang's resolve to develop nuclear weapons, and what type of policies should not be enacted, as North Korea has detonated a nuclear weapon while still participating in the process of denuclearization of the Korean peninsula?

In order to answer those questions, it is necessary to examine how North Korea has been framed and engaged by the United States. As such, the United States has been crafting a foreign policy toward North Korea that must acknowledge the existence of very specific variables: first, North Korea has been framed as a rogue state in an extensive fashion, and Washington has been oscillating between engagement and containment, as well as sometimes regime change and rollback strategies. Moreover, Washington has had to consider North Korea's immediate surroundings, and therefore its geopolitical importance, which is also directly influencing the relevance of the United States military in the region. Finally, the United States has had to compose with North Korea development of its nuclear program and as such, negotiations regarding Pyongyang's armament have constituted an important part of the relationship between the two countries.

This paper will therefore first look at how North Korea has been understood in an American context, and it will investigate the notion that Pyongyang is a rogue state. Second, the paper will consider whether and how a rogue state such as North Korea can and has been engaged by the United States. Finally, an analysis of negotiation rounds since Kim Jong Il's accession to power in 1994, as well as the United States' foreign policy outside of those rounds of negotiation will be presented.

[1] World Tribune, "Obama Offers Change Kim Jong-Il Can Believe In," Friday, June 20, 2008.

I. Framing North Korea into a Contemporary American Context

The Concept of 'Rogue State'

Over the past two decades, North Korea has often been referred to as being a "rogue state". Interestingly, however, the literature does not have a fixed definition for what a rogue state is. The term was created and used mainly by the United States. One can trace the appearance of the concept of "rogue state" back to the Clinton years, when it was first used to talk about the clear danger that Iran and Libya presented to Europe. The first commonly accepted definition of the term is often attributed to Anthony Lake, then Assistant Secretary for National Security Affairs under President Clinton, and who defined rogue states as "nations that exhibit a chronic inability to engage constructively with the outside world" (1994). This definition was then modified to fit various other situations, such as when Secretary of Defense William Cohen attempted to justify the United States' steps toward creating and deploying a limited missile defense system. Later on, Madeleine Albright also talked about rogues, but using the somewhat milder "states of concern" label (Becker 2005). The term "rogue" became once more fashionable when President G. W. Bush came to power. Michael Klare also traces the rise of the modern "American rogue doctrine" to the late 1980's, when the United States started linking together the notion of rogue states, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, and problems of instability usually occurring in third world countries (1995). This linkage is also found in Jasper Becker's definition of rogue states as being not only unstable and aggressive, but typically failed states (2005).

How do rogue states fit within the United States understanding of its own foreign policy? At first, rogue states were seen as isolationists and Lake initially understood them as states that were also consciously isolated from the international community. Over the past fifteen years, however, the definition has shifted to encompass many different aspects of a state's behavior, while still being largely focused on weapons of mass destruction and terrorism. In his book *Rogue Regime*, Jasper Becker ties the notion of the rogue label to a pursuit of weapons such as nuclear bombs and to a "dangerous insanity in the diplomatic world" that would also mean the lack of understanding of the concept of deterrence (2005) while Lake's definition of a rogue state only amounted to that of a marginalized state, or a state that does not function within the open limits of the international system. But this definition is too simplistic to fit the case of North Korea, as Pyongyang has been a member of the United Nations since 1991 and has been interacting with other states on a fairly regular basis, especially with the former Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China.

Robert Litwak's work on rogue regime presents another definition that stresses the fact that contemporary concerns are now very different from when a Nazi Germany or a Soviet Union were threatening to upset the balance of power within the system (2000). Litwak contends that the focus is now on relatively marginalized states that could threaten the stability of their immediate region, but that do not pose a risk to the larger international system. This definition does not fit the case of North Korea either, however. Instability within the region would most likely spill over and upset the international system, since North Korea's neighbors are amongst some of the most powerful nations in the world, as well as major United States' trading partners.

Litwak's definition can, however, be complemented by that of Alexander George. George suggests that rogue states fall into a specific political category that is used by great powers who have a stake at maintaining a specific organization and order within the international system (1993). George argues that the concept of rogue states did not arise from any international legal tradition, but rather that it was constructed by American politics. George's position is supported by the fact that the United States started as early as 1979 to develop a list of terrorist and outlaw states. Importantly, this list is not recognized by the United Nations nor is it recognized by any body of international law.

Following George's logic, the United States is partly responsible for singling out North Korea and characterizing it as a rogue. It is also interesting to note George's argument-building process: he mentions that during the 1970's, the United States had developed a list of diplomatically isolated states that had interest in developing nuclear weapons. South Korea was then part of this list! This reflected the tense relationship between Seoul and Washington and Jimmy Carter's displeasure with South Korea president Park Chung-Hee's policies which were raising concerns about human rights in South Korean, and how Seoul becoming a democracy was not necessarily a given, despite the United States' effort to support the country since the partition of the Koreas in the 1950s.

One of the important aspects of the North Korean - American relationship is the link that Pyongyang has had with terrorism. North Korea's slot on the United States State Department's list of nations that provide a safe haven for terrorists or that are engaged in terrorist activities themselves has been a constant haggle between Washington and Pyongyang and regularly resurfaces as a contentious topic between the two. North Korea earned its slot on the list as it is responsible for the 1983 Rangoon bombing (during which South Korean President Chun Doo Hwan narrowly escaped death while on an official state visit to Burma) and the 1987 bombing of Korean Airline flight 858 (Oberdorfer 2002). However, it is problematic to label a state "rogue", "terrorist" or "pariah" since, as Robert Litwak contends, such labeling will "push the United States' Administration toward a default strategy of containment and isolation" (2000).

Whether to engage North Korea or to try to contain it without interacting much with Pyongyang has been a dilemma for the United States. This problem was very salient during the Clinton Administration, as it was the first American Administration to attempt to engage North Korea at a different level. The Clinton Administration tried to use confidence-building measures (understood here as actions taken by various parties involved in a conflict and which are geared toward reducing tension and providing a sense of security), such as the 1994 Agreed Framework to promote stability on the Korean peninsula. Litwak contends that although the Clinton Administration adopted a one-size-fits-all approach to so-called "rogue states," North Korea was excluded from this strategy. Washington kept on trying to engage North Korea despite the fact that many thought North Korea was not respecting the rules it has agreed on in Geneva in 1994. North Korea has also been treated differently than other "rogue states" by the G. W. Bush Administration. The Bush Administration has not tried to pursue regime change in North Korea the way it did in Iraq even though it has been clearly established that North Korea possessed weapons of mass destruction (2000).

Finally, an important refinement has been added to the concept of rogue states, especially in the post-9/11 world order: the United States has shifted its focus almost exclusively toward terrorists, state-sponsored terrorism and states engaged in trading weapons of mass destruction to non-state actors, such as isolated insurgency groups. Henriksen argues that this change started to happen at the end of the Cold War. He discusses the link rogue states such as Iraq, North Korea, Iran and Libya have with terrorism (1999). Advocating the fact that the United States must take the lead in confronting rogue governments, he supports the use of sanctions and the pursuit of isolationist policies to contain rogue states. Moreover, he argues for the use of international courts and domestic prosecution, as well as for the use of armed interventions to bring rogues down.

To summarize, the literature tells us that the definition of rogue states has evolved over time. At first, rogues were defined as states that did not fit into a traditional pattern of regular interactions with other states. Rogues have also been associated with weapons of mass destruction and especially with the pursuit of nuclear power. The concept of rogue has also been extended in order to incorporate marginalized states, as well as those states that can threaten the stability of a given region. However, the rogue definition also depends on who is doing the defining: great powers have had a stake in deciding which states fit the rogue definition, based on how such states would influence the balance of power. North Korea therefore falls into the categories of isolationist and unstable states desiring non-conventional weapons. However, Washington is now in a difficult position, as it appears it has created its own monster, just as Dr. Frankenstein had: the United States has labeled North Korea a rogue state, but has not treated it as such. Instead, the United States has been engaged in negotiations with the North even though Washington does not recognize the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's official existence. The United States is therefore stuck in a conundrum: even though it does not want to interact with North Korea, isolating Pyongyang is no longer possible now that Kim Jong Il has testing its own nuclear weapon. Invading the North, on the other hand, does not seem possible especially in light of the United States' current engagement in Iraq as well as for obvious tactical and practical military reasons such as those underlined by Michael O'Hanlon's who notices the lack of any open or easy access to Pyongyang thus pointing at a major geographical contrast between North Korea and the open desert that surrounds Baghdad (2005).

Assessing the Threat

Has North Korea been engaged despite being a rogue because is it, in fact, not a real threat to the United States but more of a "looming threat" as Becker contends (2005)? Is the fact that Pyongyang insists on developing its own viable nuclear weapons a factor in Washington's war on terrorism? Or is North Korea an embarrassing problem for the Bush Administration, as the United States is having a difficult time negotiating a secure deal with Pyongyang, and is also militarily overextended in several regions because of the recent Iraq military intervention?

There are thus three broad lines of thought to consider when analyzing the current level of threat that North Korea projects: the possibility of military confrontation, instability in the East Asian region, and a political threat to Washington.

The most obvious form of threat from North Korea is the possibility of an armed conflict over the Korean peninsula. Also possible is the ignition of a conflict that would sweep across Northeast Asia. Because the Pyongyang regime's hold over the country has not weakened despite the change in leadership in 1994, its problems associated with the failed Agreed Framework, and its pursuit of nuclear weapons, Pyongyang is not a harmless state. However, it should be noted that a Manichean approach to international relations often does not provide accurate and unbiased views. If North Korea is in possession of atomic bombs as its 2006 testing seem to imply, the purpose may not be to use these weapons to destroy South Korea or Japan. The North Korean regime, although it sometimes shows erratic behavior when taking decisions, exhibits an inner rationality. Pyongyang's main objective is state survival. This explains its desire to have deterrent nuclear weapons, or weapons powerful enough to defend itself in case of aggression (Kang 2005). Kim Jong-Il probably knows that any North Korean attack on South Korea would trigger an American response, which would most likely be lethal for North Korea, and its regime. The strong American presence in the Demilitarized Zone may also be interpreted by Pyongyang as a threat from Washington.

There is also the possibility, however unlikely, that a conflict could be triggered by the United States. George W. Bush trapped in his own preemptive doctrine, and the War on Terrorism motto, and striving to be coherent could strike first if North Korea somehow convinced Washington it was a real and immediate danger to the United States' national security. Washington's willingness to prevent terrorism from spreading and to monitor regimes responsible for building and trading weapons of mass destruction is pushing the American government to act on many fronts. It is then legitimate to wonder whether North Korea might be the next target after Iraq. Should the United States intervene in North Korea, Northeast Asia's stability would be greatly affected, partly because of Seoul's un-readiness to accommodate North Korean refugees, but also because of the new role the United States would have to play in winning the peace over the peninsula. Post-war reconstruction and state-building would also prove to be very complex and costly for regional powers as well as for Washington.

Because of the nature of the North Korean regime as well as the historical events that led to the division of the country, Pyongyang has been seen as an aggressive nation that tests missiles over Japan, bombs commercial aircrafts, purchases military arsenal from Middle Eastern countries and often refuses to participate in international forums with other nations. Is North Korea an aggressive state because of the nature of its leadership, or does acquiring nuclear weapons as a nuclear deterrent make sense for Kim Jong-Il? Experts sharply differ in their views of Pyongyang's militarism and aggressiveness.

Victor Cha, in Lee's vein, supports the idea that North Korea's goal has changed from achieving hegemonic unification to avoiding collapse and domination by the South (2003). Cha argues, however, that the change of strategy regarding long-term goals is exactly what might lead Pyongyang to try a preemptive-type of action toward the South: "each provocation is too minor to prompt all-out war, but serious enough to raise the incentive for Seoul and Washington to give ground and negotiate a peaceful resolution to the crisis." The assessment that North Korea cannot be completely trusted to be deterred is especially important in light of North Korean military development, and many also argue about the real orientation that Pyongyang has been taking since Kim Jong-Il came to power, and following the devastating floods and droughts of

the mid-1990's. Paul French argues that since 2003 there seems to have been a change in Pyongyang's priority regarding potential economic reforms and diplomatic engagement; North Korea has started to reassert its military first-line policy (2005). Other experts contend that North Korea's behavior stems from its economic needs; North Korea, nearing the state of economic collapse, has become more aggressive. They suggest that creating economic incentives for North Korea to accept a denuclearization bargain with Washington could be a potential solution to the uncertain situation (O'Hanlon 2003) and Paul French claims that North Korea's food shortage situation could be resolved by simply reducing its defense budget by five percent (2005).

Others hold a more liberal view than the more realist perspective of Victor Cha. David Kang, for example, asserts that the concept of deterrence is understood and respected by North Korea (2003). Kang argues that North Korea also understands that nuclear weapons are political weapons and should not be used as offensive arms, and that Kim Jong-Il is essentially a rational thinker. One could, however, make a logical argument based on historical events on the peninsula that North Korea militarized and isolated itself in order to survive, and does not have many options in light of the united States' military presence in the region, and its role bolstering South Korea's security while being one of its most important trading partners. The United States and the international community are divided in their thinking about how to best deal with North Korea. Cha presents an approach that he dubs as "hawk and dove" engagement (2003). Stating in a convincing manner that North Korea does not belong to the Axis of Evil, Cha moves on to state that Kim Jong-Il operates under a rational and calculating framework, he rejects criticisms about Kim's supposedly crazy and impossible-to-deter nature. For him, Pyongyang has the capability to launch an attack on the South, and to smuggle weapons in Japan but has not done so, thus proving that North Korea has been deterred. However, he is also cautious in assessing Pyongyang's regime as he notes that North Korea has often defected from international agreements. Framing the current debates in American foreign policy in terms of Hawks and Dove, Cha supports the claim that the Clinton Administration managed to delay North Korean atomic development, even though it did not manage to stop it.

But perhaps one of the most direct threats to the United States is the relative position of its military within East Asia. The important number of U.S. soldiers dispatched over South Korea, and largely in Asia as well as their security is of prime importance to the United States. Removing troops is not an option, as the possibility of an attack from North Korea to South Korea, and possibly Japan is still a reality, though not a strong possibility as such attack would most likely be swept away by an American retaliatory strike over North Korea. However, damages the United States army could suffer if there was a military confrontation would probably be smaller in comparison to the whirlpool, which would sweep Asia, and by repercussion the rest of the world. Because of the strong economic ties the United States has with Japan, as well as the economic importance of Asia, the world's stability depends in large part on a peaceful situation in East Asia. It is therefore possible that the United States' interest is to prolong its presence within East Asia, by maintaining a status-quo. Of course, such a situation does not resolve the threat posed by North Korea's military capabilities, but at the same time, limiting the risks of a confrontation and still continuing a distant engagement policy towards North Korea is the only known option that has worked before, and that did not lead to a major crisis.

Finally, a direct attack from North Korea to any facilities in the South, in Japan, or in the sea bordering the Korean peninsula could trigger a military response from the United States, but as seen before, a deliberate attack from Pyongyang seems less than probable, providing that the North Korean regime understand the logic of nuclear deterrence as well as legitimate retaliation, similar to that of the United Nations upon Pyongyang's invasion of the South in 1951. However, the United States' military forces could be put at risk in the event of a mishandling of nuclear weapons, or weapons of mass destruction in North Korea. The risk associated with building arms stocks is that some weapons might end up in the wrong hands, or the mere fabrication process could lead to serious consequences if an accident happened. Because of North Korea's poor economy, it seems hardly conceivable that its weapon-building facilities would include state-of-the-art machineries and security devices. The risk of a nuclear accident in Northeast Asia exists, and is also somewhat of a concern, if not a threat to American troops in the region, and to the world's stability as well.

North Korea has thus managed to create a brinkmanship system with many countries around the world, but especially with the United States. One of George W. Bush's campaign messages was his willingness to restore America's pride abroad. However, as his presidency nears its end, the Middle East, Europe, as well as Asia hold many anti-American views. This also applies to South Korea, where frequent protests are being organized in order to denounce Bush's erratic foreign policy towards North Korea. Cha's analysis of what he refers to as the Hawk policy is quite compelling, and demonstrates the rational behind what seemed to be a series of unbalanced political maneuvers (2002). George Bush's Axis of Evil discourse showed a departure from the Clinton Administration's engagement policy, despite Bush's claims that he would follows most of Clinton's line towards Pyongyang. The new policy also seems strangely opposed to the recommendations given in the 1999 Perry report, which was commended by the U.S. Administration, and resulted in a yearlong investigation of North Korea and its relationship with the United States. The Perry report warned about the terrible consequences a military conflict over the peninsula would create, despite America's most likely victory. It stressed the importance of dialogue with Pyongyang as well as the importance of completing the Agreed Framework. It also delineated cooperation with South Korea and Japan as being of uttermost importance in dealing with the North Korean situation (Perry 1999).

George W. Bush has faced tough challenges when trying to apply a consistent approach to North Korea and so will his successor. According to Cha's analysis, Washington's attempt to transform carrots into sticks is a compelling approach and could not have been attempted before the Clinton Administration, as no relationship had previously been initiated between the United States and North Korea. Pyongyang's nuclear brinkmanship is a political threat or a security to the Bush Administration and thus the Administration seemed to have tried to counter this threat, no matter its real nature.

Moreover, North Korea as a weapons provider poses an integral threat to the United States as well. The interception of weapons shipments from Pyongyang to Yemen suggests that North Korea's economy is extremely reliant on its military exports. Selling weapons of mass destruction to other rogue states could make North Korea an accomplice of terrorism, therefore giving reasons for the United States to eliminate such practices.

II. Is it possible to engage a roguish North Korea?

To Engage or Not to Engage

The United States has over time been involved into two types of interactions with North Korea: negotiations through bilateral and multilateral forum, and ongoing meeting / rhetorical exchanges. But directly negotiating or even communicating with North Korea is controversial for the United States as Washington does not consider North Korea as a legitimate actor in the international system. What is the danger for the United States to talk to such a 'villain'? Bertram Spector argues that the inherent risk in negotiating with terrorists and with rogue states is smaller than pursuing a no-negotiation policy (1998). He also focuses on the need to address terrorists and rogues' interests and intentions in order to find out whether there might be reasonable grounds to enter into negotiations. His approach thus departs from a zero-sum approach and leans towards a more cooperative, enlarging-the-pie approach. This proposition is also sponsored by Abba Eban, who argues that leaders have a duty to negotiate with villains, no matter how detestable they are, as leaders might be saving lives by doing so (1998). Roger Fisher, William Ury and Bruce Patton also advocate talking and negotiating with villains not for ethical reasons, but because this is the only peaceful available solution to change a status quo (1991).

But what kind of actor has North Korea been when engaged by the international community? Some advocate that it is almost impossible to deal with North Korea as an isolated player, because of its relationship with the People's Republic of China. Triplett, for example, considers North Korea a subordinate of China and which is part, to some extent, of the Chinese Communist empire (2004). Bordering along the lines of conspiracy theory, Triplett talks about China using a "borrowed knife," as it bolsters the North Korean regime by giving it support and money, and in turns receives benefits from North Korea's defiant actions toward the United States and the international community, while appearing as a broker and reliant actor in the international system. Others such as You Ji look closely at the relationship between China and North Korea over the past fifty years and conclude that Beijing and China have had less and less to agree upon overtime, and have had rather contentious points of view when it came to their historical ties as well as their economic and diplomatic relations (2001). Finally, some have argued that China has played a constructive role in the current stalemate, as it has behaved as a honest broker between the United States and North Korea and that Beijing is to be credited for Pyongyang's return to the negotiation table in 2003 even after the failure of the Agreed Framework (Wu 2005). At the same time, there is a divide in the literature regarding who deserves the blame for this failure and the current stalling of more recent rounds of talks. Some of the most influential and knowledgeable researchers on North Korea such as Leon Sigal, Selig Harrison, and Bruce Cumings blame Washington for the failure of the Agreed Framework, while others, such as Richard Perle, former chairman of the Defense Policy Board for the Bush Administration, thinks that North Korea blackmailed the United States before, during, and after the Agreed Framework negotiations (2003). The answer to the question of who is to blame, however, remains often tied to political affiliations, especially in the United States as many are still polarized by different approaches taken by the Clinton and Bush Administrations on the North Korean issue.

Thus, there is a division within the literature as to whether or not rogues such as North Korea should be engaged. Ignoring North Korea, however, is a risky solution that the United States is no longer willing to consider. From 2000 to 2003, the United States has refused to be involved in talks with North Korea mainly because Washington was preoccupied by the September 2001 terrorist attacks, the war in Afghanistan as well as the war in Iraq. China has acted as a middleman, effectively bringing back both Washington and Pyongyang to the negotiation table in April 2003. During those talks, North Korea stated it had developed nuclear weapons, and this revelation turned out to be a wake-up call for the United States. Washington realized that it could not longer ignore North Korea for large period of times, as Pyongyang's actions would go unchecked, and could possibly upset the balance of power in Northeast Asia as well as around the world. Engagement with North Korea is thus needed, as Michael Klare had prescribed back in 1995: containing and confronting rogue states only heighten their resolves, whereas engaging them could be more successful (1995).

Engagement in Practice

Since Kim Jong-Il came to power in 1994, North Korea and the United States have been involved in a number of high-profile negotiation episodes as well as dialogues despite Washington's policy of non-recognition towards Pyongyang. It is possible to divide this time period into three eras that each exhibit specific characteristics.

1. Teenage Diplomacy

The first phase can be labeled "Teenage Diplomacy." It took place as soon as Kim Jong-Il came to power and is illustrated by the first and only crisis negotiation case in the time-period. First, the "Pilot Negotiations" case took place in late 1994. A U.S. Army helicopter crossed the D.M.Z and entered into North Korea's air space. The helicopter was shot down by the North Korean Army. The United States government had to negotiate with North Korea in order to recover the remains of one pilot who died, and to obtain the release of the second pilot. The case is noteworthy since it was important that it did not intensify so as to not impede the implementation of the Agreed Framework that had just been signed a few months before this incident. This case opened the way for the world to see whether or not Kim Jong-Il had managed to succeed his father. The two countries also held negotiations and dialogue during the "Nodong Launch" crisis. Talks took place in 1996 when the United States detected North Korean preparations for a test of its medium-range Nodong missile. Washington tried to assert its power by sending reconnaissance ships and aircrafts to Japan. Several meetings were held in New York between the United States and North Korea, in order to reach a compromise on the missile testing.

2. Tentative Diplomacy

The second phase that can be labeled "Tentative Diplomacy" started in 1996 and ended in 2000. This phase was characterized by tense relationships over the Korean peninsula because of

the 1996 incursion of a North Korean submarine into South Korean waters, North Korea's difficulties overcoming its food crisis, and numerous floods and droughts. The Four-Party Talks that also took place during this period showed the importance of monetary compensations: North Korea used early rounds of negotiation to receive money for its participation in the talks. Washington and Pyongyang held bilateral missile talks eight times from 1996 to 2000. The United States and North Korea also held bilateral talks in Berlin in April 1996 in order to discuss Pyongyang's missile proliferation. North Korea was asked to agree to the Missile Technology Control Regime and responded by asking for compensation from the United States for lost missile-related revenues. Subsequent talks took place in Berlin in June 1997 (Round 2), in New York in October 1998 (Round 3), in Pyongyang in March 1999 (Round 4), in Berlin in September 1999 (Round 5), in Rome in May 2000 (Round 6), and in Kuala Lumpur both in July and in November 2000 (Round 7 and 8). Additional talks also took place in 1998 and 1999 for the "Kumchang-ri Compromise", and involved a potentially hazardous construction on a North Korean site. American Ambassador to South Korea Charles Kartman visited the D.P.R.K. and exposed his concerns regarding underground construction in the Yongbyon area. If North Korea was indeed building a nuclear plant at Kumchang-ri, the 1994 Agreed Framework could be voided. Pyongyang had to decide, in order to receive food and aid, whether it would allow American inspectors to visit the site. At the same time, the Four-Part Talks started to signal a tentative shift toward multilateral diplomacy: the United States, China, South Korea and North Korea met in Geneva in December 1997 in an unprecedented move, in order to discuss security issues and a nuclear-free peninsula. Subsequent rounds took place in March 1998 (Round 2), October 1998 (Round 3), January 1999 (Round 4), April 1999 (Round 5) and August 1999 (Round 6).

1998 and 1999 showed an increase in the amount of contacts with North Korea, and reflected the interest that North Korea had for the Clinton Administration. Madeleine Albright's 2000 visit to North Korea was meant to pave the way for a potential Clinton visit before the end of his term.[2] Albright's visit was also part of a succession of events that were tied to the failure of the Bilateral Missile Talks. According to Donald Gregg who was then working for the Council on Foreign Relations, it was concluded that the missile crisis was risking the United States' relationship with North Korea, and the C.F.R. asked that a high diplomat be selected to be sent to North Korea in order to help the issue move forward.[3] As a result, William Perry was sent to Pyongyang and though he did not meet with Kim Jong-Il, he managed to develop a relationship with his North Korean counterpart that was strong enough to incite that General Politburo Director Cho Myong-Nok be sent to Washington to carry an invitation for President Clinton to visit North Korea.[4]

3. Multilateral Diplomacy

The 2000 Inter-Korea summit meeting was the most important reconciliation event that the two Koreas had taken part in since the division of the peninsula, but also coincided with a change of leadership in Washington D.C., as President Bush entered the White House. For many,

[2] Interview with Donald Gregg, Former U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Korea (2006). Washington D.C.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Green, M., Council on Foreign Relations (2006). Washington D.C.

the Clinton-Kim Dae-Jung years were the most successful in terms of diplomacy. The first democratic government in South Korea did not constrain Washington as much as earlier regimes had[5] since previous regimes could be considered as being more authoritarian (such as the Park regime that had many diverging views from the Carter Administration, especially regarding human rights). That window of opportunity, however, ended with September 11, 2001. In comparison with 2000, 2001 and 2002 showed a dearth in the relationship between the United States and North Korea, mostly because of the terrorist attacks and President G. W. Bush's Axis of Evil speech in early 2002. President Bush's change in policy towards North Korea, illustrated by its decision not to pick up where President Clinton had left off, angered many South Korean conservatives, especially as it contradicted Colin Powell's statements that the Bush policy would be no different than that of Clinton. Slowly, the Bush Administration started to show more flexibility and when President Bush came to Seoul in 2003, he was eager to arrange talks with North Korea.[6]

Thus, the 2003-2008 period can be labeled a period of "Multilateral Diplomacy." It was characterized by two frameworks that relied heavily on China bringing North Korea to the negotiation table. The monetary bait that was used in the 1990s' ceased to be a requisite for bringing North Korea to negotiate. Because of the war in Iraq and the United States' 2002 preemptive strike doctrine, China decided to step to the plate in order to replace the absence of American diplomacy towards North Korea.[7] Thus, China, North Korea and the United States' met for negotiations in Beijing in April 2003. No significant negotiations had taken place between the United States and North Korea since the summer of 1999 when the last round of Four-Party Talks was held. Following the change of Administration in the United States as well as the September 11 attacks, the Beijing Trilateral Talks were an effort to jumpstart a multilateral talk process that had died several years earlier. Thus, because China saw North Korea as a potential threat if it collapsed or if it had nuclear weapons, Beijing decided to assume the lead in the recent rounds of negotiation, and was largely responsible for bringing North Korea into the Six-party framework after the 2003 Trilateral Talks even though North Korea did not want anything else than bilateral talks with Washington.[8] Another factor also weighed in on North Korea's decision to come back to the Six-Party Talks for a second round without using the tactic of negotiating its participation for money: Hu Jintao had to go to the A.P.E.C. meeting in Pusan in November 2003, but had never been to North Korea before. Protocol between the two communist allies would dictate that Hu would have to go to Pyongyang first before going to Pusan. Hu appears to have used this opportunity to negotiate with North Korea. He first visited North Korea before going to South Korea in exchange for North Korea's promise to come back to the Six-Party Talks.[9] The United States, for its part, was happy to have a multilateral framework, especially after having been accused of unilateralism against Iraq.[10]

Finally, China's role should be highlighted as Beijing was a driving force behind the September 19, 2005 agreement, by presenting multiple drafts for parties to sign. After North

[5] Hubbard, T., Former U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Korea (2005). Washington D.C.
[6] Choi, K., Institute for Foreign Affairs and National Security, Republic of Korea (2006). Seoul.
[7] Bruce Cumings, University of Chicago, 3/18 2006..
[8] Flake, G., Mansfield Center for Pacific Affairs (2006). Washington D.C.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Bruce Cumings, University of Chicago, 3/18 2006.

Korea tested its nuclear weapons in early October 2006, President Bush rejected once again calls for bilateral negotiations with Pyongyang while Condoleezza Rice tried to build support for Asian leaders to help the United States get back on the diplomatic field. The diplomatic process seemed to be revitalized when North Korea, following a meeting Beijing with the United States appeared ready to join the Six Party Talks again The third phase of the fifth round of the Six-Party Talks started on February 8, 2007 in Beijing. Bilateral meetings were held ahead of the talks by China as well as other by other parties. After the release of North Korean funds from the Banco Delta Asia in Macao, North Korea announced on July 14, 2007 that is had closed its Yongbyon facility, which was later confirmed by I.A.E.A. inspectors. Subsequent evolution during the end of 2007 and the first half of 2008 with new Six-Party Talks discussion in Beijing during the summer as well as North Korea destroying part of its Yongbyon reactors in exchange for American concessions has not yet led to a comprehensive and clear outcome regarding North Korea's rogue status.

III. Sanctions, Rewards, and North Korean Reactions

In order to assess the United States' foreign policy choices and its usage of sanctions and rewards toward North Korea, it is useful to look at news transcripts as well as official documents released by the United States as well as by the United Nations. As such, a content analysis method was used to analyze the various negotiation episodes that the United States and North Korea have been involved in, and present how North Korea has been responding to such change. The study period was from 1994, date at which the leadership changed in North Korea, until 2007 and the later rounds of Six-Party Talks. A subsequent part also investigates the effects of American foreign policy options outside of the realm of negotiation episodes but rather through ongoing interactions between Washington and Pyongyang.

Foreign Policy within Negotiation Rounds

First, North Korea has been using "give and take" approaches, here labeled as "Conditional Concessions". North Korea has been using Conditional Concessions numerous times, and in all negotiation rounds except for the Pilot Negotiation and the Nodong Launch. It is interesting to notice that North Korea has used a significantly larger number of Conditional Concessions that any other party involved in the different negotiation rounds, and considerably more than the United States, who appears to be using Stances more.

	Rounds	US	NK
Bilateral	R1		Ask U.S. to ease eco. sanctions in return for suspension of missile development and export
	Inter		Ask for repatriation of defectors in order to come back to negotiation

	R3		Requests U.S. grant 1 billion a year in return for regulation of missile export
	R4	Will ease eco. sanctions if missile program stopped	Demands $3 billion over three years in compensation for stopping missile program
	Inter		Would abandon missile program if could be provided satellite launchers
	R8		Will give-up 1,000kms-range missile development if U.S. launches satellites in China or Russia
Kumchang-ri	R1		Asks for $300 million for visit of site – not Kumchang-ri
	R2		Offers 2 chances to visit Kumchang-ri in exchange for 400,00 tons of food aid
Four-Party Talks			Ask for food aid and lifting of trade and investment sanctions as pre-conditions to the talks
			Ask for food aid, American diplomatic recognition and easing of trade sanctions
	R2	Wants a permanent peace treaty prior to lifting economic embargo	Will not join new round if US does not remove troops from S.K.
	R6		Will not come back to talks if 2 key issues are not included in talks
Trilateral Talks			Will abandon nuclear weapons programs and will stop exporting missiles in exchange of pledge of non-aggression from U.S.
			Package includes security guarantees, lifting of econ sanctions, provision of food, aid from South Korea and Japan, and compensation for Japanese occupation of Korea
Six-Party Talks	R1		Will give up nukes in exchange for fuel supplies and reactor promised by AF (nonaggression, econ aid from SK and J as well)
	R2		Will not agree to N.K.'s request unless C.V.I.D.
	R3		Might allow C.V.I.D. if given compensation
		Offer energy reward for N.K. to freeze installation in 3 months	Wants 2 million tons of energy a year, removal from terrorist list, and lifting of sanctions
	Inter		Will come back if respected by the U.S. as a regime

Second, both the United States and North Korea have been using a "take it or leave it" approach, here called "Stances," by which parties request something without asking for anything in return. Stances are less conciliatory than Conditional Concessions. Stances have been used in every negotiation episode.

	Rounds	US	NK
Pilot Negotiation		Ask for safe return of pilots	Wants to complete its own investigation and then will release pilot
		Wants prompt access to alive pilot and pilot's remains	Not finished with investigation and not ready to discuss return of Hall
		Wants immediate release of surviving pilot and pilot's remains	Asks for apology
		Questioning delay in releasing pilot	Says was spying, wants U.S. to send higher-ranked diplomat
			Asks for U.S. to sign apology statement
Missile Talks	R1		Asks U.S. not to publicize talks because of internal problem
		Asks N.K. to hold joint neg. about peace treaty	
		Wants N.K. to stop exporting missiles to Middle East	
	R2	Urges restriction of missile production	
		Asks N.K. to join the Missile Technological Control Regime	
	R3		Will continue to launch missiles as a sovereign right
Nodong Launch		Asks N.K. not to carry out ballistic missile test	
Kumchang-ri		Asks for access to Kumchang-ri site	Responds it is a civilian site so no need for access
			Asks Perry not to sanction North Korea for something that might not be being built
Four-Party Talks		Creates 4 party talks	Asks for information about 4-way talks
	R1		Asks U.S. to end economic blockage and have bilateral talks
	Inter		Calls for a delay in four-way talks
			Calls for talks to occur in Switzerland instead of in China
	R2		Wants to raise issue of U.S. troops withdrawal
	Inter		Wants peace agreement with U.S.
	Inter		Asks for 2-week pushback because of Kim Il-Sung's birthday
			Wants to discuss status of US troops during talks

	R5		Wants to discuss status of US troops during talks
Trilateral Talks		Will not reward bad behavior	
Six-Party Talks	R1	No intention of invading	Wants U.S. to sign legally binding treaty of nonaggression
		Wants N.K. to dismantle first	Wants U.S. to stop intervening in N.K. trade
	Inter		Wants to exclude Japan from talks if it raises abduction issue
			Wants peaceful nuclear program
			Asks for right to retain nuclear energy, and also wants resources

Third, parties have been using "Threats", which are unequivocal statements used to compel or prevent a party from taking a certain action. The United States has used Threats significantly more than North Korea during the negotiation episodes.

	Rounds	**US**	**NK**
Pilot Negotiation		Failure of N.K. to provide prompt information will be detrimental to Pyongyang	Will release pilot only if proven that it was a navigational mistake
		$4 billion A.F. could be in jeopardy if crisis continues like this	
		Senators: N.K. should cooperate otherwise no A.F.	
		Not releasing pilot will lead to serious consequences	
Missile Talks	R3	U.S. warns of very serious consequences if N.K. tests or exports its missiles	
	R4	Will suspend heavy-oil shipment and food aid if does not suspend missile-firing	
Nodong Launch		K.E.D.O. says tensions on the peninsula could have an effect on schedule of A.F.	
Kumchang-ri		A.F. might be nullified if situation too tense	Launches ballistic missile in the Sea of Japan
			To the U.S., war could be waged at any moment
Four-Party Talks	R4		U.S. and S.K. should not try to undermine peace talks, as could have serious consequences for peninsula
Trilateral Talks		U.S. and Japan warns N.K. against escalation	
Six-Party Talks		Might freeze assets if no breakthrough	

Fourth, "Actions" are perpetrated by parties, at the negotiations or aside from negotiations, and they can also influence the negotiations, either intentionally or unintentionally.

	Rounds	US	NK
Pilot Negotiation		Restriction of military flights over S.K.	Calls off scheduled meeting in Panmunjon
		Asks China and so forth to negotiate on behalf of U.S.	Releases Hilemon's body
		Acknowledges plane unintentionally strayed	Refuses meeting at Panmunjon
		Refuses to apologize	Releases a picture of Hall
		Restriction of military flights over S.K.	Releases Hall's "confession"
		White House sends letter of apology to N.K.	Releases Hall
		Deputy Assistant Secretary Thomas Hubbard sent to Seoul	
		Members of Congress discuss sanctions and delaying oil shipments	
		A week later, U.S. sends more than 50,000 tons of oil to North Korea	
Missile Talks	R1		Cancels second round for technical reasons
			Accepts proposal to get back to neg. table in June in N.Y.
	Inter	Takes in 2 N.K. diplomat defectors	
		U.S. refuses to give diplomats back	
	R3	Bill Clinton authorizes the use of $15 million for the purchase of heavy fuel for delivery to North Korea under the 1994 Agreed Framework	
	R4		N.K. deploys ballistic missiles that have range to hit Japan
	Inter	Will provide additional 50,000 tons of wheat to N.K.	Extends ban on missile flight-testing after easing of sanctions
		U.S. eases sanctions on N.K. imports and exports	
Nodong		Mobilizes a reconnaissance aircraft to monitor Sea of Japan	Missile activity: potential testing about to be done
		Starts joint military drills with Japan	Informs U.S. of its plan to launch missiles during talks in N.Y. (but this will stay secret until the end)
			N.K. appears to stop missile-launch plans
Kumchang-ri		Sends delegation headed by Charles Kartman to visit the site	
Four-Party Talks			Stages a mock reaction to a chemical weapons attack
		U.S. and Japan start military exercise	

	Inter	Refuses invitation from Perry
Trilateral Talks		Broadcasts statement that it has nuclear weapons
Six-Party Talks	Inter	Will not talk to John Bolton
	R2	Backs out of project because of S.K. nuclear double-standard

1. Conditional Concessions

Conditional Concessions have been predominantly used by North Korea during rounds of negotiations, but also in-between rounds. In general, those Conditional Concessions reflect extortion. North Korea requests money and favors through this mechanism. One could infer that because North Korea did not use Conditional Concessions during the Pilot negotiations, Pyongyang was genuinely concerned about getting an apology from the United States. In five other negotiation episodes, Conditional Concessions have been related to food aid and money, as well as some higher-level politics issues such as Pyongyang abandoning its missiles in exchange for substitutes such as Russian satellites. North Korea's request during the 1994-2000 period could be directly linked to its economic situation, and Pyongyang's need for money and food in order to sustain itself.

It appears that Conditional Concessions are not used when North Korea is seeking high-level outcomes, such as an apology. However, the use of Conditional Concessions changed after the year 2000, with North Korea being more concerned with the issue of energy, as well as high-politics issues, such as having respect for the fact that Kim Jong-Il's regime is a sovereign regime. North Korea also diversified its sources of support via the usage of Conditional Concessions towards Japan. One example of such Conditional Concessions involved the requests for money in exchange for abductees' release. As a general rule, Conditional Concessions are met with no similar proposals by the United States, which appears more gregarious when it comes to Stances.

2. Stances

North Korea used stances especially in negotiation rounds where it was pushed towards a difficult situation by the United States' usage of threats. North Korea used stances in the Pilot negotiation mainly to obtain an apology from Washington, but it used it more in multilateral negotiations, especially to delay the negotiation process. For North Korea, stances seem to be a defense mechanism whereas stances are more of an attack mechanism for the United States. For example, North Korea used stances during the Missile talks to keep the United States from publicizing talks, to avoid sanctions for something it did not do in the Kumchang-ri case, to get the U.S. to end sanctions and for technical reasons such as getting a delay in the start of the Four-Party Talks for a few days or a few weeks.

It thus seems that North Korea uses stances when it is either not ready to have talks, or has internal problems related to talks, and when it wants the United States to not take a specific course of action. Finally, Stances have been used heavily during the Six-Party Talks, especially regarding issues that have been hurting North Korea's pride, such as the Japanese occupation or topics related to its energy problem, therefore reinforcing the patterns of using stances as a defense mechanism, and not as a demand, as opposed to the United States.

3. Threats

Despite its label as an aggressive and rogue state, North Korea has used threats remarkably less than the United States. Most of the threats that the United States hinted at were linked to the Agreed Framework that was formulated before the Bush Administration cam to office. North Korea, however, used threats during the Kumchang-ri negotiations as well as during the Four-Party Talks, showing that it was not very comfortable with this forum.

4. Actions

Actions have been used before, during, and after negotiation rounds. Most of North Korea's actions involve a military structure of some sort, such as putting in place missiles for testing, or staging a mock reaction to a chemical weapons' attack. Most of North Korea's military actions, however, seem related to threats that were proffered by the United States, especially in the case of the bilateral missile negotiations.

Ongoing foreign policy initiatives

The United States, be it under the Clinton Administration of the Bush Administration, has always managed to keep on interacting with North Korea, even though the Axis of Evil comment as well as Pyongyang's development of nuclear weapons have hampered their relationship numerous times. The United States has thus maintained a dual foreign policy, one focused on multilateral diplomacy and commitment to the Six-Party process, and the other focused on semi-direct relations with North Korea, with the American Congress cutting or reapproving aid to Pyongyang, as well as the United States bringing sanction calls to the United Nations Security Council.

A content analysis of the United States foreign policy toward North Korea allows us to build a list of sanctions and rewards during both the Clinton and the Bush Administrations.

1. Sanctions

	US
1-Sep-98	Congress cuts funding for implementation of 1994 agreement because of missile test and discovery of underground facility not covered by the 1994 agreement.
14-Apr-00	US imposes new but largely symbolic sanctions on North Korean companies and the government for “knowingly engaging in export of military technology transfers” in violation of the MTCR
Dec-01	President Bush warns Iraq and North Korea that they will be "held accountable if they develop WMDs "that will be used to terrorize nations"
29-Jan-02	Bush characterizes North Korea as part of the "axis of evil"
23-Aug-02	Bush Administration again imposes symbolic sanctions on North Korean companies and government for violating the MTCR and selling missile components to Yemen
16-Oct-02	US calls on North Korea to comply with all its commitments under the NPT and suspends bilateral talks on improving economic and political ties.
14-Nov-02	KEDO suspends heavy oil supplies to DPRK unless it abandons nuclear weapons program
Dec-02	President Bush identifies North Korea as a key threat to the U.S. and its ally in a National Security Directive on missile defense.
Apr-03	U.S. rejects North Korea's proposal to end its nuclear weapons program only after receiving U.S. concessions
Apr-03	President Bush and South Korean President Roh Moo-Hyun vow not to "tolerate nuclear weapons in North Korea," and threaten "further steps" if North Korea continues its program
Dec-03	All work on the nuclear power project in North Korea, promised under the 1994 Agreed Framework, is suspended for one year.
19-Jan-05	Condoleezza Rice calls North Korea one of the "outposts of tyranny"
Mar-05	Condoleezza Rice says efforts to persuade North Korea to give up nuclear program failed and Washington and the Int'l community will pursue "other ways"
28-May-05	The United States suspends program to recover the remains of US soldiers killed in the Korean War. Move is perceived as a symbolic sanction in that it deprives the North Korean military of foreign exchange. The United States also cuts funding for personnel working on the light water nuclear reactor project
13-Oct-05	The US Justice Department formally accuses North Korea of forging US currency.
21-Oct-05	The US Treasury Department adds 8 North Korean entities to its list of sanctions against proliferators of weapons of mass destruction.
Nov-05	U.S. employs financial restrictions against banks and

	North Korean companies for their alleged involvement in currency counterfeiting and other illicit activities.
15-Jul-06	UN Security Council unanimously adopts Resolution 1695 which condemns North Korea's missile launches earlier in the month and demands it cease its ballistic missile activities.
6-Oct-06	UN Security Council adopts a presidential statement expressing "deep concern" over North Korea's declaration that it will conduct a nuclear test.
14-Oct-06	UN Security Council votes unanimously to impose sanctions on North Korea declaring its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction are a "threat to international peace and security"

2. Rewards

	US
20-Jan-95	Clinton Administration relaxes travel, communications, and some trade restrictions but leaves in place "about 99 percent" of the sanctions under the Trading With the Enemy Act.
1-Mar-99	US supplies 500,000 tons of food through the UN's World Food Programme.
17-Sep-99	President Clinton eases economic sanctions
15-Dec-99	U.S.-led consortium signs a $4.6 billion contract for two Western-developed light-water nuclear reactors in DPRK.
Mar-02	For first time, White House does not certify that North Korea is complying with its commitments under 1994 agreement, but waives the certification for national security reasons and releases $95 million for KEDO
25-Feb-03	Stating that recent suspension of food aid was not related to nuclear crisis, Powell announces that US will renew aid at reduced levels.
18-Oct-04	Bush Administration decides to continue funding for KEDO but demands that construction of the LWRs be suspended. US provides only $3.72 million to KEDO for FY 2003 to cover administrative costs
22-Jun-05	The United States announces donation of agricultural commodities to North Korea through the World Food Program.
16-May-08	U.S. will restart food aid to North Korea

It is quite obvious that the use of sanctions and rewards by both the Clinton and the Bush Administration has been accomplished to different extents, and in order to face very different situations. During the Clinton Administration, rewards consisted of food as well as economic aid which North Korea in fact sometimes acknowledged through its mouthpiece, the Korean Central News Agency. As far as the Bush Administration is concerned, rewards consisted essentially of food given in exchange of relaxation over the nuclear crisis.

As far as sanctions, there are not as many under the Clinton Administration, as part of the goal of the approach taken then was to embrace North Korea and coax it into slowly opening up, or at least prevent a hard-landing, shall the country collapse, by instead providing economic aid and development to the state. It is quite understandable, under this light that the Clinton Administration did not wish to sanction North Korea too harshly when it came to its nuclear program, as well as its lack of compliancy regarding the testing of missiles, for example. Sanctioning North Korea in the early years of the Agreed Framework could have thus sent the 'wrong message' to Kim Jong Il. When looking at the Bush Administration, however, it is quite clear that Washington did not really intend to let North Korea get away with just about everything. Sanctions have been largely based on denuclearization and failure by North Korea to do so, and the United States has also called onto multilateral means by pressuring the international community, and especially the United Nations, to vote for an official sanctioning of some of Pyongyang's illicit behaviors. This move is interesting, as it provides not only an insight into the way the United States has really embraced multilateral diplomacy, but also makes us wonder whether the United States would consider a potential strike against North Korea while it has garnered an international consensus on sanctioning North Korea, which thus differs from how the United States went about the war in Iraq.

North Korea's reactions, however, have been mild at best. Sanctions have often been acknowledged and lengthily debated in the KCNA's articles, and two themes have erupted over the years. First, the idea that the United States does not have the only prerogative on using force preemptively has been a major response of North Korea to Washington's sanctions, especially when those followed sticks linked to denuclearization. Second, North Korea has stressed its right to develop nuclear weapons for security, and has often referred to the United Nations charter to strengthen its position. It has also maintained its right to leave the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and to create its own nuclear deterrent in light of the United States' foreign policy.

Conclusion

The United States foreign policy toward North Korea has largely been composed of sanctions and rewards, as well as, especially during the Bush years, a propensity to use multilateral diplomacy. It should not be understood, however, that the policy had become more flexible or more accommodating. What seems to have appeared is that the United States has had a hard time crafting a policy that would encompass North Korea's rogue state status.

During the Clinton Administration, the concept of rogue state was already relevant but effort to create the Agreed Framework and stick to its terms probably hampered the United States from becoming too vehement against Pyongyang. At the same time, North Korea was also suffering from devastating floods and was on the brink of collapse because of famine and very poor economic conditions. During the Bush Administration, however, North Korea has managed to continue developing nuclear weapons, has tested them while withdrawing from the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and has also kept on being an integral actor in the Six-Party talks while having been singled out by Washington as a rogue state, an axis of evil, or an outpost of tyranny, for example.

Given the fact that sanctions and rewards have been utilized both in the past, and that North Korea still appears to have maintained a relative freedom regarding the building and testing of nuclear weapons, one can truly wonder about the effectiveness of sanctions to impede the regime economically, as well as the impact of rewards that are supposedly changing the regime and helping it to become more trusting of the world, and more integrated into the international community.

As such, one can wonder if North Korea's rogue status is not setting a precedent in the relationship between Washington and Pyongyang, as every overture that the United States would do is still tainted by the pre-existing fact that Washington does not consider Pyongyang as a 'normal' state but as a suspicious and dangerous one to begin with.

The same can be said about the relationship governing both countries, historically-speaking. Perhaps a smart move for Washington would be to stop labeling North Korea a rogue state, and accept a truce by signing a non-aggression treaty with North Korea. Of course, this could be seen as a failure and a dangerous move for the United States, but it is what North Korea has been vehemently asking for over many years. At the same time, giving this security guarantee would undermine North Korea's only reason for developing weapons of mass destruction and for being verbally aggressive toward the United States. As such, North Korea's very demand, the signature of a non-aggression treaty with Washington, could very-well be its own undoing: Pyongyang would no longer be able to polarize its citizens because there would not be the great threat of war with the United States anymore, hence weakening the regime from within.

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