Lead arranger reputation and the structure of loan syndicates

Chaudhry, Sajid M. and Kleimeier, Stefanie (2015). Lead arranger reputation and the structure of loan syndicates. Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, 38 , pp. 116-126.

Abstract

This study explores the effects of information asymmetry and arranger reputations on syndicated loan structures. The moral hazard problem arising from information asymmetries between borrower and syndicate can be overcome only by the most reputable arrangers. Both moral hazard and adverse selection problems appear when arrangers have an information advantage over other syndicate participants. However, the adverse selection problem arises only when low-reputation arrangers lend to opaque borrowers.

Publication DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.intfin.2015.05.021
Divisions: Aston Business School
Additional Information: © 2015, Elsevier. Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
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Related URLs: https://linking ... 042443115000748 (Publisher URL)
Published Date: 2015-09-01
Authors: Chaudhry, Sajid M. ( 0000-0001-8769-8920)
Kleimeier, Stefanie

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