Assessing the efficacy of structural merger remedies:choosing between theories of harm?

Davies, Stephen and Olczak, Matthew (2010). Assessing the efficacy of structural merger remedies:choosing between theories of harm? Review of industrial organization, 37 (2), pp. 83-99.

Abstract

This paper shows that many structural remedies in a sample of European merger cases result in market structures which would probably not be cleared by the Competition Authority (CA) if they were the result of merger (rather than remedy).This is explained by the fact that the CA’s objective through remedy is to restore premerger competition, but markets are often highly concentrated even before merger. If so, the CA must often choose between clearing an ‘uncompetitive’merger, or applying an unsatisfactory remedy. Here, the CA appears reluctant to intervene against coordinated effects, if doing so enhances a leader’s dominance.

Publication DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-010-9259-3
Divisions: Aston Business School > Economics, Finance & Entrepreneurship
Aston Business School
Additional Information: The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com
Uncontrolled Keywords: collective dominance,coordinated effects,merger remedies,single dominance,tacit collusion,Management of Technology and Innovation,Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management,Strategy and Management,Economics and Econometrics
Full Text Link: http://www.spri ... 580660725770qt/
Related URLs: http://www.scop ... tnerID=8YFLogxK (Scopus URL)
Published Date: 2010
Authors: Davies, Stephen
Olczak, Matthew ( 0000-0001-6808-3832)

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Version: Accepted Version


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