Post-democracy and institutionalized austerity in France:budgetary politics during François Hollande’s presidency

Abstract

This paper applies the concept of post-democracy coined by Crouch to shed light on the emerging political dynamics of macro-economic policy coordination in the Eurozone as they applied to France during Hollande’s presidency. Firstly, the paper explains the nature of EMU reform, characterized here as post-democratic by institutional design, before analysing its impact on France’s budgetary politics. Finally, the French case involving Hollande’s balancing act between supranational rules and domestic spending preferences is used as a way to reflect on the stability of this post-democratic arrangement for rescuing the Euro. The 2017 presidential election pitting Macron against Le Pen showed that post-democracy by design is sustainable only if the supply side of politics remains supportive of EMU – a condition undermined by the institutionalization of austerity, at least in France.