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TRANSLATION AND PEACE: ARABIC, ENGLISH AND HEBREW VERSIONS OF ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN PEACE INITIATIVES

AHMAD YOUSEF MOHAMMAD AYYAD

Doctor of Philosophy

ASTON UNIVERSITY

November 2011

This copy of the thesis has been supplied on condition that anyone who consults it is understood to recognise that its copyright rests with its author and that no quotation from the thesis and no information derived from it may be published without proper acknowledgement.
Thesis Summary:
The present thesis examines Palestinian-Israeli peace initiatives as politically negotiated texts and their different Arabic, English and Hebrew language versions. Its aim is to make a contribution to a deeper understanding of the role of translation and recontextualization of politically negotiated texts in situations of ongoing contemporary conflict.

In modern Translation Studies, although research exists on the translation of political texts following functional (e.g. Schäffner 2002) or systemic-linguistic (e.g. Calzada-Pérez 2001) approaches or applying narrative theory (Baker 2006), peace initiatives and politically negotiated texts are still a largely under-researched genre of political texts.

The thesis – which takes 31 Arabic, English and Hebrew language versions of 5 different Palestinian-Israeli peace initiatives as its corpus – operates within the framework of product-oriented Descriptive Translation Studies (Lambert and Van Gorp 1985) and Critical Discourse Analysis (Fairclough 1992). For all of the peace initiatives analysed, there exist several language versions which were made available in different contexts by different institutions and for different readerships and purposes. The thesis pursues a top-down approach. It begins with presenting the socio-cultural and political contexts of the production of the original versions of the respective peace initiatives (the source texts) and their different language versions (target texts), focusing on their underlying functions and principles of audience design. It then moves to examine how the textual profiles of the language versions of peace initiatives reflect aspects of ideology, political affiliation and power relations at both the macro- and micro-structural levels. The final step is to account for these aspects in terms of socio-political and institutional conditions of the production of the translations.

The overall textual analysis demonstrates that when translated, peace initiatives can be interpreted differently by different institutions in their attempt to promote their respective political interests and narratives. Also, it is very frequently that translations produced in one specific institutional context are recontextualised for use in another one. Such recontextualisation goes hand in hand with further textual amendments.

To summarize, the thesis demonstrates how these translations – as products – are (re)framed and (re)contextualized in different institutional settings in order to serve different purposes. These texts, thus, play different roles in situations of ongoing contemporary conflict depending on the institutional context in which they are presented and the purposes they set to serve. These main findings make an original contribution to the discipline of Translation Studies in respect of emphasizing the need to study translations in their socio-political, historical and institutional contexts.

Keywords: Peace initiatives, translation studies, ideology, power relations, translation institutions, Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
بسـم الله الرّحـمـن الرّحـمـي

"سَيَعْفِنَكَ لَا عَلِمَ لَنَا إِلاَّ مَا عَلِمَنَا إِنَّكَ أَلَّهُ الْعَلِيمُ الْحَكِيمُ"

إِهْدِاء

إلى روح والدي، رحمه الله،
إلى روح جدتي أم يوسف، رحمها الله،
إلى عمي الغالي عز عباد،
إلى خالي الغالي عبد الحليم عباد،
إلى ست الحبايـب، إلى نور العيون,
إلى من سكنت القلب وبين الجفون,
إلى من ضحكت و مازالت تضحي,
إلى أغلى إنسان على قلبي,
إلى صاحبة القلب الطيب، إلى أمي.

إلى وطني فلسطين، أنا باقون مابقي الزعتر والزيتون,
Acknowledgements

This work would not have seen the light without the support and encouragement of my colleagues, family and friends. First and foremost, I would like to thank Professor Christina Schäffner for her supervision and invaluable advice and feedback throughout the years of the research. She has read draft chapters with patience until the thesis saw the light. A special word of thanks is also due to Aston University for funding my studies.

I would also like to deeply and sincerely thank my external examiners, Professor Myriam Salama-Carr and Dr. Jordan Finkin for taking the time to examine my thesis and for their invaluable feedback and constructive comments which have improved its focus and helped in revealing its original contribution to knowledge.

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Finally yet importantly, I would like to thank my family, particularly my brothers Mohammad and Amer, sisters and uncles as well as my close friends for their unlimited love and support at every step of the way; I am very fortunate to have you all in my life.
Table of Contents

Thesis Summary 1
Dedication 2
Acknowledgments 3
Table of Contents 4
List of Tables 7
List of Figures 8
Arabic Transliteration System 9
Hebrew Transliteration System 10

Chapter One: Introduction 11
1.1 The Narratives of the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict 14
   1.1.1 The Competing Palestinian and Israeli Narratives 16
   1.1.2 The Narrative of the Middle East Peace Process 24
   1.1.3 The Narrative of the Palestinian-Israeli Peace Initiatives 29
1.1 Objectives and Analytical Progression of the Study 35
1.2 Structure of the Study 38

Chapter Two: Translation, Ideology and Conflict 41
2.1 Introduction 41
2.2 Translation, Peace Initiatives and Politics 41
2.3 Peace Initiatives in Other Disciplines 47
   2.3.1 Political Science and Conflict Resolution Studies 47
   2.3.2 Negotiations Theory and Diplomatic Studies 48
   2.3.3 Genre Studies 51
2.4 Conclusion 53

Chapter Three: Corpus and Methodology of the Study 54
3.1 Introduction 54
3.2 Corpus of the Study 54
   3.2.1 Track-One Peace Initiatives 54
   3.2.2 Track-Two Peace Initiatives 60
   3.2.3 Translations and Institutions 67
3.3 Methodology of the Study 83
   3.3.1 Lambert and Van Gorp’s Descriptive Model 84
   3.3.2 Causal Model as Developed by Chesterman 84
   3.3.3 Fairclough Three-Dimensional Discourse Analytical Model 86
3.4 Conclusion 95

Chapter Four: Textual Organization 97
4.1 Introduction 97
4.2 Layouts and Covers 98
4.3 Labels of Translations of Peace Initiatives 101
4.4 Introductions of Translations of Peace Initiatives 105
Chapter Five: Textual Analysis

5.1 Introduction

5.2 Creative Ambiguity
   5.2.1 Israeli Withdrawal
   5.2.2 Jewish Settlement Outposts
   5.2.3 Closed Palestinian Institutions in Occupied East Jerusalem

5.3 Naming Practices
   5.3.1 The Protagonists of the Conflict
   5.3.2 Names of Holy Places

5.4 Intertextuality
   5.4.1 National Home
   5.4.2 To Incline to Peace

5.5 Modality

5.6 Politically Sensitive Concepts and Terms
   5.6.1 Land
   5.6.2 Jewish Settlement Activity
   5.6.3 Jewish Settlement Outposts
   5.6.4 Terms Related to the Question of the Palestinian Refugees
   5.6.5 Terms Related to the Israeli Occupation Policies and Practices
   5.6.6 Future Relations between Arab States and Israel

5.7 Addition of Information

5.8 Omission of Information
   5.8.1 Omissions in Translations Published by Ha’aretz Newspaper
   5.8.2 Omissions in Translations Published by Yediot Aharonot Newspaper
   5.8.3 Omissions in Translations Published by Al-Quds Newspaper
   5.8.4 Omissions in Translations Published by CNN

5.9 Conclusion
### Chapter Six: Institutional Settings and Textual Profiles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6.1 Introduction</td>
<td>235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2 Institutions</td>
<td>235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2.1 International Institutions</td>
<td>237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2.2 Governmental Institutions</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2.3 Non-Governmental Organizations</td>
<td>248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2.4 Mass Media</td>
<td>256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.3 Political Debate</td>
<td>258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.4 Conclusion</td>
<td>261</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Chapter Seven: Conclusion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7.1 Major Conclusions of the Study</td>
<td>264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.2 Original Contribution of the Study</td>
<td>275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.2.1 Translation Studies</td>
<td>275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.2.2 Critical Discourse Analysis</td>
<td>278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.3 Future research</td>
<td>279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.3.1 Translation Studies</td>
<td>279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.3.2 Other Disciplines</td>
<td>281</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### List of References

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>283</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## List of Tables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>Corpus of the Study</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>Translations Published by International Institutions</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>Translations Published by Governmental Institutions</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>Translations Published by Non-Governmental Organizations</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>Translations Published by Newspapers</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>Translations Published by News Agencies</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>Translations Published by Online Networks</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>Labels of Translations Published by International Organizations</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>Labels of translations Published by Governmental Institutions</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>Labels of Translations Published by Non-Governmental Organizations</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>Labels of Translations Published by Mass Media</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>Introductions of Translations Published by International Institutions</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>Introductions of Translations Published by Governmental Organizations</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>Introductions of Translations Published by Non-Governmental Organizations</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>Introductions of Translations Published by Mass Media</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>Word Count for Arabic and English Translations of the Gush-Shalom Declaration of Principles</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.10</td>
<td>Word Count for Arabic Translations of the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.11</td>
<td>Word Count for Hebrew Translations of the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.12</td>
<td>Word Count for English translations of the Arab Peace Initiative</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.13</td>
<td>Word Count for Hebrew Translations of the Arab Peace Initiative</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.14</td>
<td>Word Count for Arabic and Hebrew translations of the Geneva Accord</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.15</td>
<td>Word Count for Arabic Translations of the Roadmap Plan</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.16</td>
<td>Word Count for Hebrew Translations of the Roadmap Plan</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.17</td>
<td>Summary of Israeli and Palestinian Maps of the Old City of Jerusalem</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.18</td>
<td>Summary of Israeli and Palestinian Maps of Land Swap</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>Language Versions of Peace Initiatives based on Originals and Target Texts</td>
<td>236</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## List of Figures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>Chesterman’s Causal Model</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>Fairclough’s Three-dimensional Concept of Discourse</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>Cover of the Hebrew Translation of the Geneva Accord</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>Layout of the Hebrew Translation of the Arab Peace Initiative</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>Map of the Old City of Jerusalem Published by <em>Ha’aretz</em> Newspaper</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>Map of the Old City of Jerusalem Published by <em>Al-Ayyam</em> Newspaper</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>Map of Land Swap Published by <em>Al-Ayyam</em> Newspaper</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>Map of Land Swap Published by <em>Ha’aretz</em> Newspaper</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>News Headline from <em>Al-Ayyam</em> Newspaper</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>News Headline from <em>Al-Quds</em> Newspaper</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>News Headline from <em>Al-Quds</em> Newspaper</td>
<td>208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>News Headline from <em>Al-Quds</em> Newspaper</td>
<td>213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>News Headline from <em>Al-Quds</em> Newspaper</td>
<td>213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>News Headline from <em>Al-Ayyam</em> Newspaper</td>
<td>213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>News Headline from <em>Al-Ayyam</em> Newspaper</td>
<td>213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>News Headline from <em>Al-Quds</em> Newspaper</td>
<td>257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>News Headline from <em>Al-Ayyam</em> Newspaper</td>
<td>257</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Consonants

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<thead>
<tr>
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This transliteration system was not applied to names, words in titles or quoted passages. In such cases, these are reproduced without modification.
# Hebrew Transliteration System

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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In specific cases where a conventional spelling different from this transliteration system, the standard version is followed, for example, Eretz Israel, Kotel as well as particular place names.
Chapter One
Introduction

Those who formulated the Geneva initiative were, quite naturally, eager to please the Israeli public (Amir 2004).

The initiators of the Geneva document are, of course, entitled to express their views and publicize them in any manner they see fit. But do they have the right to brazenly lie to the public as to what the document does or does not contain? (Avineri 2003).

What was published in Arabic does not truly reflect the agreement and this is an insult to the Palestinian citizen. This is a clear fraud (Harisha 2003).

These comments respectively made by Shmuel Amir and Shlomo Avineri – two Israeli academics – and Hassan Harisha – a Palestinian politician – clearly carry sharp criticism for one peace initiative, i.e. the Geneva Accord. These writers accuse the drafters of this particular initiative of misleading and manipulating the Israeli and the Palestinian publics in order to achieve their political aims. The Geneva Accord was drafted originally in English (cf. Chapter 3.2.2). In international politics, it is common for negotiated texts to be made available in other languages, i.e. translations. The above comments on the Geneva Accord were not based on its original English source text but on its Hebrew and Arabic translations respectively. That is to say, these political reactions were based on translation. Some of these reactions and debate – specifically with regard to the issue of the “Jewishness” of the state of Israel – will be discussed in Chapter 6.3.

The Geneva Accord is one of the five Palestinian-Israeli peace initiatives in the corpus. A peace initiative is a genre of political texts which can be defined as a text negotiated – officially or unofficially – by key international, regional or local political players in

---

3 Shmuel Amir is a political activist and a lecturer at the Hebrew University in Israel.
4 Shlomo Avineri is a professor of history and political science at the Hebrew University in Israel, and a former director-general of Israel's Foreign Ministry. This excerpt is taken from an article that was published in the Israeli newspaper Yediot Aharonot in Hebrew on 1 December 2003. It was then translated into English by Moshe Kohn and published on the website of Independent Media Review and Analysis available at www.imra.org.il/story.php3?id=19061 [last accessed: 24 November 2011].
5 Hassan Harisha was elected in January 1996 as member of the Palestinian Parliament and served as the chairperson of the Parliament's Oversight Agency at that time. Harisha was the re-elected as a member of the Palestinian Parliament in the January 2006 elections.
situations of ongoing contemporary conflict as an attempt to outline a specific political solution to that conflict. The Palestinian-Israeli conflict, an intractable conflict – i.e. “protracted, irreconcilable, violent, of zero-sum nature, total, and central” (Bar-Tal and Salomon 2006: 20) – is regarded in the thesis as extremely asymmetric: a conflict between an occupying power, i.e. Israel\(^6\) and people under occupation, i.e. the Palestinian people. These two unequal rivals have fundamentally incompatible goals and interests as well as competing narratives\(^7\) – understood as “public and personal ‘stories’ that we subscribe to and that guide our behaviour” (Baker 2006: 19) – that have been influencing the conflict throughout.

The Palestinian-Israeli Peace initiatives were put forward by key international, regional and local political players after the collapse of the peace process following the failure of the negotiations between the Palestinians and Israelis in Camp David II and outbreak of the second Palestinian intifada, Al-Aqsa, on 28 September 2000\(^8\) (cf. Chapter 1.1.3). Since the players are international, regional and local, the texts have operated in international and local languages: three of these documents were produced in English, one in Arabic and one in Hebrew and they have then been translated into Arabic, English and Hebrew (cf. Chapter 3.2.3). The decision to translate these initiatives in particular languages is in itself political. For example, the League of Arab States translated its initiative – the Arab Peace Initiative – into English but not Hebrew. This could be explained with regard to the fact that only two member states of the League, i.e. Egypt and Jordan, have official peace treaties and full diplomatic relations with Israel.

For all of the peace initiatives analysed there exist several translations. For example, there exist six Arabic and four Hebrew language versions of the Roadmap Plan which was originally drafted in English. Language versions of peace initiatives were made available in different contexts by different institutions – e.g. international, governmental, non-

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\(^7\) The concept of ‘narrative’ is used in this thesis because of its “ability to serve as a tool for describing events and developments without presuming to voice a historical truth” (Shenhav 2006: 246).

\(^8\) The second Palestinian intifada – which was named after the Al-Aqsa Mosque in the Old City of Jerusalem – broke out “following Ariel Sharon’s provocative visit to affirm Israeli sovereignty over the third holiest site in Islam and the killing of seven unarmed Palestinian protestors the following day” (Khalidi 2001: 83).
governmental and mass media and for different readerships and purposes – e.g. to instruct, inform, persuade, etc. This initially provided the motivation to investigate in detail five peace initiatives drafted between 2000 and 2003 and their different language versions into Arabic, English and Hebrew.

This thesis presents original research; it examines the Palestinian-Israeli conflict from a language and translation standpoint focusing entirely on a largely under-researched genre of political texts, i.e. peace initiatives – specifically those initiatives which were negotiated between September 2000 and April 2003 – and their Arabic, English and Hebrew language version as its corpus of study.

The thesis presents a product-oriented textual analysis of 13 Arabic, 5 English and 13 Hebrew language versions of five different Palestinian-Israeli peace initiatives (See Table 1.1 below). It aims to examine how aspects of ideology, political affiliation and power relations at play in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict manifest themselves on the translations of the most recent of these initiatives which were drafted after the collapse of the peace process following the failure of the Camp David negotiations in 2000. In doing this, the thesis aims to make a contribution to a deeper understanding of the role of translation and recontextualization of politically negotiated texts in situations of ongoing contemporary conflict, namely, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. It also demonstrates the complexity of analysing political discourse in translation and hopes to raise awareness among negotiators, politicians and translators of the ideological, political and ethical implications of linguistic choices in both, original texts and translations (cf. Chapter 7).

The thesis first presents the socio-cultural and political contexts of production of the original versions of the respective peace initiatives (the source texts) and their different language versions (target texts), focusing on their underlying functions and principles of audience design. It then moves to examine how the textual profiles of the language versions of peace initiatives reflect aspects of ideology, political affiliation and power relations at the macro- and micro-structural levels. The final step is to account for these aspects in terms of the socio-political and institutional conditions of the production of the translations.

The methodology applied in this thesis is based on Descriptive Translation Studies (DTS), namely, the analytical model suggested by Lambert and Van Gorp (1985) and Critical
Discourse Analysis, namely, Fairclough’s (1992) three-dimensional model (cf. Chapter 3.3). In linking textual profiles to conditions of text production, the analysis is an example of causal models as described by Chesterman (1997).

1.1 The Narratives of the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict

The Middle East⁹ – known as the “Cradle of Civilization” (Wilcox 2004: 2) and the birthplace of the three monotheistic world religions, Judaism, Christianity and Islam (Bunzl 2004: 2) – has always been of significant importance to the key political players in the world (Sørli et al 2005: 146). This significance has been evident for a number of reasons, notably, the region’s strategic geographic location and natural resources.

Firstly, the Middle East is located between “Africa and Eurasia and between the Mediterranean world and between Asia and India and between the Far East Nations of China and Japan” (Chaurasia 2005: 1) and at “the major crossroads of global cultures” (Anderson 2000: 11). In the past, the Middle East was home to significant trade routes such as the ‘silk road’ that linked China with Europe and acted as the “breadbasket”¹⁰ of the region (Lowrance 2007: 192).

Secondly, most of the world’s oil is located in the Middle East. This region has 65% of the world’s proven reserves of oil and just one-third of global production (Salameh 2009: 199). Many Western governments are dependent on this oil. For example, 17% of the United States’, 45% of Europe’s and 90% of Japan’s import of oil, respectively, come from the Middle East (Lowrance 2007: 194). Other than oil, the Middle East has 40% of the world’s proven gas reserves (Cordesman and Al-Rodhan 2006: 2). Based on these facts, there is no other alternative to an increasing global dependence on the Middle East region energy for at least the coming twenty-five years (Cordesman and Al-Rodhan 2006: 2).

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¹⁰ The Middle East was of particular interest to European powers during the era of colonialism (Lowrance 2007: 192). For instance, the French colonisation of Egypt, from 1798 to 1801, was due to “Egypt’s perceived ability to supply France with grain and its location at the intersection of the African and Asian continents and the Mediterranean and Red Seas would give France the ability to control military and commercial traffic and threaten the British in India” (Lowrance 2007: 192-193).
Although privileged by its strategic location and natural resources, the Middle East region has not been immune from political and economic instability\(^{11}\) (Lowrance 2007: 194). One of the major sources of such regional instability – and also “for the world at large” (Uzer 2009: 123) has been the Arab-Israeli conflict in general and Palestinian-Israeli conflict in particular (Kim and Morey 2005: 785; Milton-Edwards 2009: 173). This conflict continues to be a potential “flashpoint of a war” (Lieber 1995: 69) that could break out “on short notice” (Kim and Morey 2005: 785). This state of instability threatens the vital interests of key international players, i.e. “the energy reserves of the region”, most notably the United States of America (Chomsky 1999: 17). These key political players are aware that stability\(^{12}\) in the Middle East cannot be achieved unless the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is resolved (Behrendt 2007: 2).

The Palestinian-Israeli\(^{13}\) conflict has been extensively researched within a number of disciplines, most notably Political Science, History and Conflict Resolution. Detailed accounts of this conflict can be found in Bassiouni and Ben-Ami (2009); Ben-Ami 2(006); Chomsky (1999, 2003); Finkelstein (2003); Masalha (1992); Morris (2009); Pappé, (1999, 2006a); Rabinovich (2008); Said (1980); Shlaim (1995a, 2009) and Tessler (1994).\(^{14}\)

As this thesis makes its contribution specifically to the discipline of Translation Studies, the following overview of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is not intended to provide a detailed historical chronology of all events of the conflict nor intends to contribute to the political and ideological debate of the more complex issue of validity of claims of each side of the conflict. It aims rather to provide a brief overview of the conflict by focusing on the issues of competing narratives of the two sides of the conflict, the peace process and the Palestinian-Israeli peace initiatives. The aim of this overview is thus twofold: firstly, to situate the Palestinian-Israeli peace initiatives in their wider geopolitical context and secondly, to provide the reader with necessary background knowledge which is needed to

\(^{11}\) Other recent sources of instability include what is now termed as ‘the Arab Spring’, namely, the revolutions which have swept throughout the Arab world in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya and still ongoing in Yemen and Syria.

\(^{12}\) On the long-term economic benefits of stability and peace in the Middle East, see Winckler (2002).

\(^{13}\) This term – i.e. ‘Palestinian-Israeli conflict’ is used throughout this thesis – except in cases of direct quotations – in accordance with the Palestinian discourse on the conflict.

\(^{14}\) The common factor between all of these political and historical accounts of the conflict is that “no scholar on either side has ever presented an account of the two peoples’ history which has satisfied both Arabs and Jews” (Bassiouni and Ben Ami 2009: xii). The historical overview of the conflict provided in this thesis is not an exception.
help explain the political and ideological implications of the translation shifts between the different language versions of peace initiatives (cf. Chapter 5).

This overview proceeds as follows. The first section presents a summary of the competing Palestinian and Israeli narratives vis-à-vis the main final-status issues of the conflict, namely, land (including the issue of Jewish settlements)\textsuperscript{15}, Jerusalem and the Right of Return for the Palestinian refugees. The next section presents an overview of the narrative of the Middle East Process which was launched at the Madrid Conference in Spain in 1991. The last section outlines the narrative of Palestinian-Israeli peace initiatives, focusing particularly on those initiatives drafted after the collapse of the Camp David II negotiations and the outbreak of the second Palestinian intifada, \textit{Al-Aqsa}, both in 2000.

1.1.1 The Competing Palestinian and Israeli Narratives

Conflicts, it is argued, “depend on narratives, and in some senses cannot exist without a detailed explanation of how, why the battles began, and why one side, and only one side, is in the right” (Rotberg 2006: vii). The Palestinian-Israeli conflict is a case in point. The Palestinians and Israelis have contradictory and intertwined narratives about the conflict, generally and in every single detail. These narratives are “more often than not, mutually exclusive” (Chiller-Glaus 2007: 67). In this sense, the conflict between the Palestinians and Israelis is one of “mutual denial and mutual rejection” (Shlaim 1994: 25). The Palestinian and Israeli narratives examine the same events of the conflict from extremely different – and more than often conflicting – standpoints (Rotberg 2006: 4).

The Palestinian-Israeli conflict revolves broadly around three major symbols: land, Jerusalem and the Right of Return.\textsuperscript{16} The Palestinians and Israelis maintain fundamentally conflicting narratives of each of these symbols. More importantly, within-group narratives are not fully homogenous but rather exist at “different levels of generality, and as having elements that can be added, discarded, rearranged, emphasized, and deemphasized” (Ross 2007: 32). With time, some of these narratives – including the within-group narratives – achieve resonance through many “processes of reinforcement and contestation” (Baker 2006: 20). The Palestinians and Israelis have invested heavily over the years in their own narratives to the extent that they have become a fundamental part of their national

\textsuperscript{15} The term ‘Jewish’ will be used in this thesis rather than ‘Israeli’ to describe settlements and settlement outposts because they are entirely established and inhabited by ‘Jewish’ settlers.

\textsuperscript{16} Of course, there are other important symbols in the conflict such as water, sovereignty, security, etc.
identities. This is why giving up or even adjusting these narratives “could result in major personal trauma for them” (Baker 2006: 21) and usually met with strong resistance.

Political discourse relies extensively on “narrative patterns” (Shenhav 2006: 246). Examining these narrative patterns and the way they compete to achieve currency is of significant importance to understanding the political discourse of peace initiatives and translation shifts found between their different language versions. Many of these narratives, whether deliberately or not and to some extent, find their way to these language versions (cf. Chapter 5).

The Narratives of Land
The struggle to control land has been, and continues to this day to be, the core of the conflict between Zionism and the Palestinian national movement (Abu Hussein and McKay 2003: 1; Amro 2002: 183; Khalidi 1991: 5-6). The origins of this conflict go back to more than a century ago when the Zionist leaders in their first congress in Basel, Switzerland on 29 August 1897 – which was arranged by Zionism’s founder, Theodor Herzl – decided to create “a home for the Jewish people in Palestine to be secured by public law” (Khalidi 1991: 6-7; Neff 1995: 156) (cf. Chapter 5.4.1). At that time, Palestine was – and since the fifteenth century – part of the Ottoman Empire (Abu Hussein and McKay 2003: 4).

Following the First World War and the consequent defeat of the Ottomans, Palestine was placed under the British Mandate which came into effect on 26 September 1923. Almost five years earlier, the British government had already committed itself for facilitating the establishment of a “national home” for the Jews in Palestine in the infamous Balfour Declaration of 2 November 1917 (Abu Hussein and McKay 2003: 4).

The Zionist narrative of claim of ownership to Palestine (Arabic: فلسطين) as “Eretz Israel” – a land portrayed by the Zionist leaders as “empty” (Doumani 1999: 13; Shobat 1995: 225) or “a land without a people for a people without a land” (Finkelstein 2003: 95; Masalha 2007: 95; Pappé 1992: 2) – is based on biblical narratives, namely that God

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17 Zionism is “a political ideology which holds that the Jewish people constitute a nation and have a right to a sovereign nation-state in their ancestral homeland” (Eisenberg and Caplan 2010: 3).
promised this land to the Jewish people\(^\text{18}\) (Eisenberg and Caplan 2010: 3; Karmi 1999: 107; Masalha 2007: 1). According to the Zionist-Israeli narrative, the Jews were “a nation in exile for 2,000 years who, beyond all reason, returned to their ancestral country and re-established sovereignty there” (Sharan 2003: 38). By contrast, the Palestinians – who have always rejected Zionism and considered it as “a form of settler colonialism which employs a religious/cultural narrative to justify its aims” (Karmi 1999: 109) – base their narrative of ownership to Palestine on uninterrupted living as the majority population on – and cultivation of (Yiftachel 2005: 66) – the land for thousands of years (Dajani 1994: 8).

According to the Palestinian narrative “greater powers imposed a European migration, a national home for the Jews, and finally a Jewish state, in cynical disregard of the wishes of the overwhelming majority of the population, innocent of any charge” (Chomsky 2003: 46).

At the time of the Basel Congress, the Jewish community made up less than 7% of the total population of historic Palestine (Khalidi 1991: 6). The rest of the population were Arab Palestinians who owned 99% of the land (Neff 1995: 156). By 1948, the Jewish community owned only some 6% of historic Palestine (Abu Hussein and McKay 2003: 4).

However, the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181 of 29 November 1947 – which proposed the partition of historic Palestine against the will of its indigenous people into two states, one Arab and one Jewish – assigned the Jewish community 5,893 square miles or 56.47% of the total territory of Palestine (the Palestinians were assigned 4,476 square miles or 42.88% of the total territory and Jerusalem, comprising 68 square miles or 0.65% was accorded the status of internationally administered Corpus Separatum) (Hadawi 1991: 67). Based on this resolution, the leaders of the World Zionist Organization proclaimed on the eve of 15 May 1948 the establishment of the state of Israel (Jiryis 1988: 83). By this date, the Zionists had already seized territory beyond that allocated to the Jewish state, i.e. 77% of total territory of historic Palestine (Hadawi 1991: 79; Masalha 2000: 8). This historical event, i.e. the division of historic Palestine, marked the first phrase of struggle between the Palestinians and Zionists to control land.

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\(^{18}\) This promise is recorded in Genesis (17: 1, 7, 8): “I will establish My covenant between Me and thee and they seed after thee throughout the generations for an everlasting covenant to be a God unto three and they seed after thee. And I will give unto thee and to thy seed after thee, the land of their sojournings, all the lands of Canaan for an everlasting holding and I will be their God” (Lassner and Troen 2007: 292).
The second phrase of struggle to control land occurred in 1967 when Israel occupied the remaining 22% of historic Palestine, i.e. the West Bank, including East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip (Falah 2004: 956) (Israel also occupied other Arab territories, i.e. the Syrian Golan Heights and the Egyptian Sinai Desert). The Israeli occupation gave rise in 1974 to “an extremist religious-nationalist settlement movement, Gush Emunim, bent on rebuilding the Temple and populating the whole of the Promised Land in perpetuity with Jews in fulfillment of the covenant with Jehovah” (Khalidi 2003: 59). This settlement movement – which endorsed the narrative of “Greater Land of Israel” – opposed the withdrawal from any territories occupied in 1967 (Zertal 2005: 218). The settlers “saw themselves as fulfilling a national mission of historical magnitude and as following in the footsteps of the Zionist founders of Israel” (Shamir 2007: 12) and the state of Israel encouraged them to move to settlements built on land occupied in 1967 (Klein 2008: 90) (cf. Chapter 5.6.2 and 5.6.3).

The third phrase of struggle to control land has started – and continues to this day – with the Oslo process in the mid-1990s which has been marked with intensive Palestinian land expropriation, rapid Jewish settlements expansion and the building of Israel’s Wall since 2002 (ruled as illegal by the International Court of Justice in 2004) in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. These three accelerating processes threaten the very fundamental principles of the peace process, i.e. ‘the land for peace’ (cf. Chapter 5.6.1) and the ‘two-state’ solution and warn of more coming rounds of confrontations in the near future, particularly when the construction of Israel’s illegal Wall is completed (cf. Chapter 1.1.3).

19 The ‘Gush Emunim’ was formally replaced by ‘Yesha Council’ (Hebrew: י”ש י”ע), the political umbrella organization of the Settlements (Zertal 2005: 218). For more on ‘Gush Emunim’, see for example, Newman (1985).

20 Names and labels used to refer to this Wall are controversial. In the Israeli official discourse, this wall is referred to as “the Security Fence”. By contrast, the Palestinians refer to it as ‘the Separation Wall’ or more polemically as ‘the Apartheid Wall’ (Warren 2011: 81). The Palestinians see this wall as “part of a continued ethnic-cleansing campaign” whereas Israel claims that it is “necessary to ensure the safety of Israeli citizens” (Thomas et al 2010: 304). The erection of this wall (built on confiscated Palestinian land and in contravention of the international law) started on 16 June 2002, stretching over a total area of 723 kilometers in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, including in and around Occupied East Jerusalem and ranging from 6-8 meters in height (Norman 2010: 100). For comparison purposes, the ‘Berlin Wall’, for example, was 155 kilometers long and 3.6 meters in height.

21 The International Court of Justice – which used the term “the Wall” – ruled on 9 July 2004 that “the construction of the wall being built by Israel, the occupying power, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, and its associated régime, are contrary to international law”. This ruling is available at www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/131/1671.pdf [last accessed: 24 November 2011].
The Narratives of Jerusalem

The question of Jerusalem – often described as “controversial, emotional and intricate” (Abu Odeh 1992: 184) – is at the heart of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict (Khalidi 2001: 83; Dumper 1997: 11-12) (see for example, Klein 2001; Ma’oz and Nusseibeh 2000; Molinaro 2009).

The Old City of Jerusalem, approximately one square kilometre in size, is the only place on earth that has always been sacred to the three Abrahamic faiths – Judaism, Christianity and Islam – and civilizations (Ma’oz 2009: 99). The Palestinians and Israelis – who both consider Jerusalem as part of their national identities – have two completely exclusive and conflicting narratives of claim of ownership to the same city (Sha’ban 2007: 43). These conflicting narratives revolve around the political status of the city, its territory, future, institutions and inhabitants.

The conflict over Jerusalem starts with the very names given to this holy city as ‘القدس’ (Al-Quds) in Arabic and as ‘ירושלים’ (Yerushalayim) in Hebrew as well as the names of its holy places, notably, what is called in Arabic ‘الحرم الشريف’ (al-Ḥaram al-Sharīf, lit. ‘the Noble Sanctuary’) and in Hebrew as ‘הר הבית’ (Har ha-Bayt, lit. ‘the Temple Mount’) (cf. Chapter 5.3.2).

The Palestinian narrative of ownership of Jerusalem derives from the city’s sanctity in Islam. Jerusalem had been the first Qibla (direction of prayers) which Muslims around the world faced when they carried out their prayers five times a day; it was also the destination of the Prophet Mohammad’s night journey and the site from which he ascended to heaven (both events being recorded in the holy Qur’an) (Dumper 1997: 13). Jerusalem is also the home of the al-Ḥaram al-Sharīf which is the third holiest place for Muslims after Mecca and Medina (Dumper 1997: 14). The Palestinians’ claim to Jerusalem – other than due to its Islamic significance – is part of the more general claim to Palestine based on centuries-long occupation (Quigley 2005: 225).

By contrast, according to the Jewish-Israeli narrative of ownership, Jerusalem “has been for more than 3,000 years the only unique center of Judaism and the Jewish people” (Ma’oz 2009: 102) and though “the Jewish Temple in Jerusalem was destroyed twice (in 586 BC and AD 70) and Jews were exiled, they have never disengaged from Jerusalem or forgotten it. Jews continued to reside in Jerusalem for centuries, albeit in small numbers
and, along with their brethren in the Diaspora, they pray toward Jerusalem three times a day” (Ma’oz 2009: 102). Jerusalem is also home to *Har ha-Bayt* (the Temple Mount) which is Judaism’s most holy site (Klein 2007: 29-30). Accordingly, many Israelis are “convinced that the city is theirs by divine right” (Dumper 1997: 2).

To the Israelis, Jerusalem (both Eastern and Western parts) is their “unified” (Peteet 2005: 163-164) and “eternal capital” (Sha’ban 2007: 43). By contrast, the Palestinians – backed up by the international community and international legitimacy which is manifested in numerous United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) and Security Council (UNSC) resolutions (e.g. UNGAR 2253, 2245; UNSCR 242, 252) – consider East Jerusalem an occupied territory (Peteet 2005: 163-164) and thus “subject to the applicability of the law of belligerent occupation” (Sha’ban 2007: 49).

The struggle between the Palestinians and Israelis to control Jerusalem has been radically intensified since Israel’s occupation of East Jerusalem – including the Old City – along with the rest of the West Bank following the June 1967 war (Jabareen 2010: 28). Immediately after the conclusion of the war, Israel has employed a range of tactical measures in order to legitimize its claim of ownership over the city. These measures include annexing East Jerusalem to its territory, evicting the Palestinians from the Jewish Quarter and settling Jews there (Ma’oz 2009: 103), demolishing the historic Muslim *al-Maghāriba Quarter* (Arabic: ‘حارة المغاربة’, Hārat al-Maghāriba) adjoining the Western Wall in order to enlarge the ‘Wailing Wall’ plaza and make room for Jewish worshipers to pray (Dakkak 1981: 139; Ma’oz 2009: 103) (cf. Chapter 5.3) and initiating large-scale excavations along the southern and western walls of the *al-Ḥaram al-Sharīf* in order to expose large areas of important archaeological remains (Silberman 2001: 498) (cf. Chapter 5.7.2).

Other Israeli measures and practices in the occupied city – which are still ongoing – include, erasing Arab names in the city and replacing them with Hebrew ones (cf. Chapter 5.3), cancelling “residency of East Jerusalem Palestinians” (cf. Chapter 5.3.1), building

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22 Khalidi (1992: 136) explains that “much of what today is commonly thought of as ‘Israeli West Jerusalem’ in fact consisted of Arab neighborhoods before the fighting of the spring of 1948, when over 30,000 of their inhabitants were driven out or fled from their quarters like [Upper and Lower] Baqa’, Qatamon and Talbiyya, several months before some 2,000 Jews were forced out of the Jewish Quarter of the Old City”.

23 On the specific issue of the Israeli reconstruction of the Jewish Quarter after the 1967 war, see Ricca (2007).
illegal Jewish settlements (cf. Chapter 5.6.2), closing Palestinian institutions (cf. Chapter 5.3.2) and building Israel’s illegal Wall. The Palestinians – who have aspirations of having East Jerusalem as a capital for their future state – perceive these measures and practices as attempts by Israel to change the geography and demography of Occupied East Jerusalem (cf. Chapter 5.3.1) and ultimately consolidate its exclusive claim of sovereignty and control of the city.

Resolving the question of Jerusalem is of significant importance to the success of any future peace agreement between the Palestinians and Israelis. As Khalidi (2001: 83) explains, “[C]ertainly, there will be no end to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, no Arab-Israeli reconciliation, and no normalization of the situation of Israel in the region without a lasting solution for Jerusalem”.

The Narratives of the Right of Return

The 1948 war – a “war of liberation” for the Israelis and a “war of conquest” for the Palestinians (Chomsky 2003: 47) and its major catastrophic consequence, namely, the creation of the Palestinian refugees tragedy – constitutes a key chapter in the history of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict (see for example, Pappé 2006b, Masalha 1992, 2003; Morris 1987, 2004). This historical event – termed al-Nakba (Arabic: ‘النكبة’, lit. ‘The Catastrophe’ or ‘The Disaster’) by the Palestinians – turned at least 80% of the indigenous Palestinian people (estimated as 750,000-800,000) into refugees (Abu Lughod and Sa’di 2007: 3) and led to the destruction of some 420 Palestinian towns and villages (Sa’di 2007: 297). Other than this, the Zionist gangs of the Hagana, Irgun and Ster committed massacres against unarmed innocent Palestinian civilians, including in Dayr Yassin on 9 April 1948 (Khalidi 2003: 53) resulting in the “massacre of several thousands” (Pappé 2003: 229). Simultaneous with this systematic process of destruction there was an organized process of erasure of the Arab Palestinian names and replacing them with Hebrew-Zionist ones (cf. Chapter 5.3)

The circumstances surrounding the creation of the Palestinian refugees tragedy and its causes have always been a point of a heated debate between the Palestinians and Israelis. The two sides approach the question of the Palestinian refugees and their Right of Return from fundamentally conflicting standpoints (Chiller-Glaus 2007: 67). The Palestinian narrative of 1948 – which considers what happened in 1948 as “a form of ethnic cleansing, a colonial enterprise which covets the land without the people” (Aruri 2011: 3) –
accuses the “Zionists of deliberately and forcefully expelling the Palestinian Arabs who lived in what has become the state of Israel in 1948” (Shamir and Shikaki 2005: 315). The Palestinians – while insisting on Israel’s sole responsibility in the creation of the Palestinian refugees tragedy – demand the Right of Return of the Palestinian refugees to their homes and properties, a demand anchored in the UN resolution 194 which provides that “the Palestinian refugees have a choice: either to return to their homes or to resettle elsewhere” (Abu Hussein and McKay 2003: 5).

For the Palestinians, their forced displacement from their homes and properties in 1948 “cuts to the core of the Palestinian identity and more than one hundred years of struggle against Zionism and its project in Palestine” (Chiller-Glaus 2007: 67). To them, it is a matter of principle that Israel acknowledges their Right of Return and the wrongs and suffering it caused them.

The Israeli official narrative in turn rejects the Palestinian refugees’ Right of Return altogether (Shamir and Shikaki 2005: 315). According to the Israeli official narrative, the Palestinian refugees in 1948 “fled ‘voluntarily’ (meaning not as a result of Jewish compulsion) or that they were asked or ordered to do so by their leaders and by the leaders of the Arab states” (Morris 2004: 2) despite “Jewish pleas for the local Arab population to stay and demonstrate that peaceful coexistence was possible” (Chiller-Glaus 2007: 67). Accordingly, Israel officially denies its responsibility for the creation of the Palestinian refugees problem (Ghanem 2001: 195) and upholds the position that “any Palestinian rights over land must be dealt with by payment of compensation” (Abu Hussein and McKay 2003: 5) in the context of “a return to a future Palestinian state” (Peters 2011: 24).

Israel’s denial of any responsibility of the creation of the Palestinian refugees tragedy stems from ethical considerations:

For the Israeli Jews recognizing the Palestinians as victims of their own evil is deeply traumatic, for it not only questions the very foundational myths of the state of Israel and its motto of “A state without a people for a people without a state,” but it also raises a whole panoply of ethical questions with significant implications for the future of the state...Thus, having been the just party at that time, in the formative period of the conflict, justifies the existence of Zionism and the whole Jewish project in Palestine; in the same way it doubts the wisdom and morality of Palestinian actions in that period. It obliterates out of any discussion the ethnic cleansing carried out by the Jews in 1948 (Pappe 2003: 228-229).

The official Israeli narrative of 1948 was contested by a group of Israeli historians who published research since the mid-1980s and became known later as the ‘new historians’, most notably Morris (1987; 2004), Pappe (1992) and Shlaim (1995b). The most influential
research on this issue is the one by Benny Morris (1987) who – after examining declassified documents in the Israel State Archive – concluded that:

“[T]he Palestinian refugee problem was born of war, not design, Jewish or Arab. It was largely a by-product of Arab and Jewish fears and of the protracted, bitter fighting that characterized the first Israeli-Arab war; in smaller part it was the deliberate creation of Jewish and Arab military commanders and politicians” (Morris 1987: 286 quoted in Finkelstein 2003: 52).

That is to say, the Zionists did not expel the Palestinians with pre-meditation, as in the Palestinian narrative and the “invading” Arab states did not encourage the Palestinians to leave, as in the Israeli narrative but the truth, according to Morris, lies somewhere in the middle ground of these two extremes (Finkelstein 2003: 52) (for more on the critique of Morris’s argument, see for example, Finkelstein 1991; Masalha 1991, 1995).

Although it has been 63 years since its creation, the Palestinian refugees problem has not been resolved yet and millions of Palestinian refugees are still living in refugee camps under harsh living conditions. According to the official statistics of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), as of 30 December 2010, there are 4,966,664 registered Palestinian refugees worldwide.24 One-third of those registered refugees – more than 1.4 million – live in 58 recognised refugee camps in Jordan, Lebanon, the Syrian Arab Republic, the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem.25 The Palestinian refugees in Lebanon suffer the worst living conditions. According to the UNRWA those refugees “do not enjoy several basic human rights”, for example, they do not have the right to work in as many as 20 professions, lack social and civil rights, have no access to public services and very limited access to public health or educational facilities.26

1.1.2 The Narrative of the Middle East Peace Process

The unofficial start of the Middle East peace process can be traced back to the Palestine Liberation Organization’s (PLO thereafter) acceptance of the American preconditions27 for


27 These preconditions are based on a U.S. commitment to Israel in 1975 that it would not “recognize or negotiate with the PLO unless it 1) recognized Israel’s right to exist; 2) accepted UN Resolutions 242 and 338; and 3) renounced terrorism” (Hunter 1991: 159). These are the very same current American preconditions to talk to the Palestinian faction, Hamas.
establishing diplomatic relations: the acceptance of Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 242 as the basis of peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, recognition of “Israel’s right to exist” and the formal renunciation of “terrorism” in all its forms (Goldberg 1990: 98; Vatikiotis 1997: 46). These preconditions were met by the PLO in the text of the Palestine Declaration of Independence and a political communiqué, both adopted during the 19th session of the Palestine National Council (PNC) – the Palestinian parliament in exile – in Algeria on 15 November 1988 (Goldberg 1990: 98).

The Palestinian acceptance of these preconditions meant that the PLO officially endorses the principle of partitioning historic Palestine and a ‘two-state’ solution to the conflict (Shlaim 1994: 26). Israel, led by a Likud government at the time, rejected the Palestinian declaration setting claim to the whole of the “Land of Israel” including the Occupied West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Shlaim 1994: 26).

The Palestinian diplomatic move represented “the most significant expression of the PLO’s change in its attitude vis-à-vis Israel and regional peace” (Ghanem 2002: 17). Following this move, the Americans significantly modified their attitude towards the PLO and the Palestinians (Ghanem 2002: 18) and decided on 14 December 1988 to start unprecedented talks with the PLO (Hunter 1991: 160). These developments paved the way for the convening of the international peace conference in Madrid on 18 October 1991 (Ghanem 2002: 18) which was based on the UNSCR 242 (cf. Chapter 5.2) and the principle of ‘land for peace’ (Shlaim 1994: 27). The Palestinians participated in the conference as part of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation which crucially provided them with “the opportunity to have their voice heard by the international community” (Cebeci 2011: 141). The Madrid Peace Conference launched bilateral and multilateral, i.e. negotiations between Israel, Syria, Jordan and the Palestinians. The bilateral talks between Israel and the Palestinians were held in Washington; however, these talks (six rounds) did not produce any important progress (Ghanem 2002: 18).

28 The PLO had refused to accept the UNSCR 242 before because it denied the national rights of the Palestinian people and refer to them solely in the context of a refugee problem (Chomsky 1999: 41).

29 The principle of partitioning historic Palestine or ‘the two-state’ solution was first proposed by the Peel Commission in 1937 and then in UN resolution 181 of 1947. The ‘two-state’ solution was then emphasized in other UN General Assembly (UNGA) and Security Council (UNSC) resolutions including, UNGAR 3236 (1974), 65/16 (2010) and UNSCR 338 (1973) and 1397 (2002), 1515 (2003) and 1850 (2008).
At the same time, secret negotiations between the PLO and Israel were carried out in Oslo, Norway which led later to the conclusion of a set of interim agreements which became known as the Oslo Accords (Shlaim 1994: 24) (see for example, Abbas 1995; Freedman 1998; Qurie 2006; Said 2000; Watson 2000). The Oslo Accord I – also known as the Declaration of Principles (DOP) – was signed on 13 September 1993 on the White House lawn by the Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Chairman Yasir Arafat under the auspice of then American president Bill Clinton (Bennis 2003: 63; Shlaim 1994: 24). The Oslo Accord II – also known as Gaza-Jericho Agreement – was signed at a ceremony in Cairo, Egypt on 4 May 1994.

In the Oslo Accords, the PLO recognized “Israel’s right to live in peace and security” and in return, Israel recognized the PLO as “the representative of the Palestinian people” (Shlaim 1994: 25). This declaration led to the establishment of Palestinian Authority (PA) and Israel’s withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and from “unspecified areas in the West bank, leaving Jewish settlements and military security areas under Israeli control” (Thorpe 2006: 172). One of the key features of the Oslo process is that it divided the Occupied West Bank into three areas of jurisdiction (Rubenberg 2003: 67) in a “Swiss cheese-like design” (Bennis 2003: 63) (cf. Chapter 5.2.1). The PA had enormously limited control over only 17.2% of the total area of the Occupied West Bank (Khalidi 2004: 134). Another key feature of Oslo is that the Palestinians were allowed to negotiate a 5-year interim agreement for self-government; However, they were seriously “forced to accept” the indefinite deferment of the negotiations on all of the most significant final-status issues including sovereignty, statehood, final borders, Jewish settlements, Jerusalem, refugees and water (Khalidi 2004: 134)

The Palestinians and Israelis had different interpretations of the Oslo process and its expected outcome. The Palestinians hoped and imagined that – after recognizing “Israel’s existence on the 78% of their homeland” (Falah 2005: 1361) – the implementation of the Oslo Accords would lead eventually to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Thomas 2009: 125). Israel, on the other hand, considered the Oslo Accords as a guarantee of ‘autonomy’, but not for an independent state

(Thorpe 2006: 171). Bennis (2003: 64) argues that the Oslo process was not designed to end the Israeli occupation and lead to the establishment of such a state. As a matter of fact, the texts of the Oslo Accords (I and II) do not mention any of the words ‘occupation’, ‘occupied’ (Bennis 2003: 64; Rubenberg 2003: 59) or ‘Palestinian state’ (Armajani 2011: 106). Thorpe (2006: 267) argues that Israel inserted language in the texts of the Oslo Accords – which the “creative ambiguity” played a major role in their drafting – “suggesting a Palestinian State, but with loopholes that enabled Israel to deny statehood”.

The Oslo Accords were fundamentally a reflection of the power imbalance between the Palestinians and Israelis which was inevitably weighted in favour of the latter at the expense of the former (Zreik 2003: 40-41).

Conditions on the ground have worsened for the Palestinians during the Oslo process through a sharp rise in unemployment, reduction of GDP, erection of military checkpoints, restrictions on movement of people and goods and expropriation of land to build and expand Jewish settlements (Yasmeen 2010: 202). Most importantly, due to the fact that there was nothing in the Oslo Accords to prevent the creation of Jewish settlements or their continued expansion (Tessitore and Woolfson 1997: 54; Zreik 2003: 40), the number of Jewish settlers in the Occupied Palestinian Territories had doubled from two hundred thousand in 1991 to four hundred thousand by the end of the interim period in 2000 (Aruri 2011: 4; Khalidi 2004: 136). Thus, rather than ending the Israeli occupation, Oslo “released Israel from the occupier’s obligations” (Aruri 2011: 4) and more significantly became a tool that “has prolonged and consolidated the Israeli occupation of Palestine by pseudo-diplomatic means” (Aruri 2011: 6).

The final-status issues of the conflict were discussed for the first time in detail at the Camp David II Summit on 11 July 2000. This summit brought together the Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and the Palestinian President Yasser Arafat under the auspices of the American President Bill Clinton (Aruri 2011: 7). The summit collapsed on 25 July 2000 with no agreement. The reason for this has been a point of a heated debate between the two sides with each side blaming the other for its failure (for the Palestinian narrative of the summit, see for example, Qurie 2008; whereas for the Israeli-American narrative, see for example, Ben-Ami 2006; Ross 2005; Sher 2006).
According to Khalidi (2003: 57), the widely circulated Israeli-American narrative of what happened at Camp David – which was promoted by the Prime Minister Ehud Barak, Shlomo Ben-Ami and Dennis Ross and subscribed to by President Bill Clinton – claims that “Barak offered Arafat the most generous peace settlement conceivable but Arafat walked away from it. Why? Because Arafat’s commitment to a negotiated settlement in Oslo in 1993 had been a subterfuge”. Consequently, the Palestinians – who were perceived as “rejectionists” – were blamed for the failure of the negotiations.

However, such a “generous” offer simply did not exist (Bisharah 2003: 23). Pappé (2003: 227) offers an interpretation of what happened at Camp David: for the Israelis – led by the Israeli left since 1999 – the summit was “a stage for dictating to the Palestinians their concept of fairness: maximizing the divisibility of the visible (evicting 90 per cent of the occupied areas, 20 per cent of the settlements, 50 per cent of Jerusalem) while demanding the end of Palestinian reference to the invisible layers of the conflict: no right of return, no full sovereign Palestinian state, and no solution for the Palestinian minority in Israel”. By contrast, for the Palestinians the summit was meant “to produce the final stages in the Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (according to resolution 242 and 338 of the UN security council) and prepare the ground for new negotiations over a fair settlement on the basis of UN resolution 194 – the return of the refugees, the internationalization of Jerusalem, and a full sovereign Palestinian state” (Pappé 2003: 227).

Following the Camp David negotiations, a new narrative emerged to explain what was perceived by some as the total collapse of the peace process (Ghazi-Bouillon 2009: 119-120). This narrative – which focused on the alleged Palestinian rejection of Barak’s “generous offer” and the Israeli claim that there was ‘no partner’ for peace – gained currency and became part of the mainstream discourse in Israel (Ghazi-Bouillon 2009: 119-120). The American President then, Bill Clinton, presented on 23 December 2000 the two sides with a proposal to bridge the gap between their positions (Ben-Ami 2005: 82). Although no agreement was reached during the summit, Clinton’s bridging proposal formed more or less a reference to any future negotiations between the two sides.

The collapse of peace process following the failure of the Camp David II negotiations and the outbreak of the second Palestinian intifada, Al-Aqsa, on 28 September 2000, have resulted in an atmosphere of tremendous political despair and frustration among the Palestinians and have consequently given rise to new set of peace initiatives or plans aimed
at reviving the dead peace process and restoring hope in the ‘two-state’ solution to the conflict.

1.1.3 The Narrative of the Palestinian-Israeli Peace Initiatives

The diplomatic efforts to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict are as old as the conflict itself. Since the start of this conflict more than a hundred years ago, numerous plans or initiatives have been drawn up by key international, regional and local political players in attempts to outline a possible settlement to this conflict. Many of these initiatives – specifically since the mid-1970s – have been drafted within the political framework of the ‘two-state’ solution, i.e. a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip on the 1967 borders living side by side with Israel (Chomsky 1999: 41).

The framework of the ‘two-state’ solution was officially accepted by the PLO in June 1988 in Algiers (Deeb 2003: 5). This kind of solution, other than being supported by the international community since the mid-1970s (Chomsky 1999: 41), is also supported by the Palestinian and Israeli publics and the entire Arab world (Thomas 2009: 176). The framework of the ‘two-state’ solution was the basis of Middle East process that was launched in Madrid in 1991 and consequently the Oslo Accords which were signed between Israel and the PLO in the mid-1990s (cf. section 1.1.2). Examples of peace initiatives within this framework – particularly during the last three decades – include the Fahd Plan (1981)\textsuperscript{31}, Reagan Plan (1982)\textsuperscript{32}, Clinton’s Parameters (2000)\textsuperscript{33} and Moratinos Non-Paper (2001).\textsuperscript{34} What characterizes these specific peace initiatives is that they all belong to what is called ‘track-one’ diplomacy, i.e. negotiations carried out by “diplomats, high-ranking government officials, and heads of states” (Mapendere 2006: 67) (cf. Chapter 2.3.2).

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item The Saudi King Fahd’s Plan of 1981 was adopted during the Arab Summit in Fas on 25 November 1982, available at \url{http://www.arableagueonline.org/las/arabic/details_ar.jsp?art_id=416&level_id=202} [last accessed: 24 November 2011].
\item ‘Reagan Plan’ is a script drafted by George Shultz in close consultation with Henry Kissinger on 1 September 1982. The main elements of this plan are opposition to Jewish settlements in the Palestinian Occupied Territories and that a negotiated settlement should be based on ‘an exchange of territories for peace’ (Stork 1993: 141).
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
The most recent diplomatic efforts – within the same framework and as mentioned before – came immediately after the collapse of the peace process following the failure of the Camp David II summit in August 2000 and the outbreak of the second Palestinian intifada, Al-Aqsa on 28 September 2000. Those two major events resulted in an overwhelming atmosphere of political despair and frustration and consequently gave rise to a new set of peace initiatives. These peace initiatives can be seen as part of the rigorous diplomatic efforts by key international, regional and local political players – e.g. the Quartet, the League of Arab States, politicians, etc. – to reach a ‘two-state’ solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

However, this solution is “rapidly becoming less likely to occur” (Winnick 2009: 47). This is fundamentally due to what has actually been happening on the ground in the Occupied Palestinian Territories since the signing of the Oslo Accords in the mid-1990s, namely the division of the Palestinian territories into Areas ‘A’, ‘B’ and ‘C’ (cf. chapter 5.2.1), the continued expansion of Jewish settlements and what has been further worsened since the outbreak of the second Palestinian intifada in 2000, namely the construction of Israel’s illegal Wall. This situation has been described as the ‘Ghettoization’ (e.g. Said 1995; Pappé and Chomsky 2010b: 145), the ‘Enclavisation’ (Falah 2005: 1342), the ‘Cantonisation’ (e.g. Emerson and Tocci 2003: 29) and even the ‘Bantustanization’ (e.g. Alissa 2007: 130; De Cesari 2009: 46; Farsakh 2002: 14-15) of the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Today, these territories stand as:

- a canonised set of physically separated Palestinian localities, with local Palestinian government for municipal services, but subject to overarching Israeli military occupation and rule over all else of importance. The construction of the fences, the expansion of Israeli settlements and the progressive destruction of the Palestinian Authority fit with this model. This means that the longer the continuation of the status quo, the less likely becomes a peace settlement based on a viable, sovereign and territorially contiguous Palestinian state (Emerson and Tocci 2003: 29).

The option of a ‘one-state’ solution – also known as the ‘bi-national state’ – cannot be ruled out in light of these facts. Indeed, it is warned that the current situation of ‘cantonisation’ of the Palestinian lands will soon become the default scenario of the ‘one-state’ solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict (Emerson and Tocci 2003: 29). This kind of solution – which has never been endorsed by any government but rather proposed by academics and political activists (e.g. Abunimah 2007; Makdisi 2010; Tilley 2005) and

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35 The second Palestinian intifada, unlike the first one (1987-1993), was armed.

36 Ghanem (2009: 120) argues that “[I]n recent years, following the evident impasse of other solutions, the Bi-National State (BNS) alternative has once again become part of the political discourse among Israelis and Palestinians.”
regarded by majority of Israeli Jews as “a strategic threat to the Jewish State” (Ghanem 2009: 126) – envisions a one ‘bi-national’ state in which citizens, Palestinians and Israelis “live democratically side by side, with equal rights and equal obligations” – i.e. ‘one man, one vote’ (Klein 2008: 89).

The failure of the ‘two-state’ solution and the rejection of the ‘one-state’ solution – and taking into account the geographic and demographic changes on the ground 37 – would lead eventually to a third option – i.e. “apartheid” (Bishara 2007: 72). In such a situation, a Jewish minority will rule a Palestinian majority. The Palestinians – who “have suffered a severe historical injustice in that they have been deprived of a substantial part of their traditional home” (Chomsky 2003: 77) – 78% of historic Palestine – and faced with the impossibility of establishing a viable state on the remaining 22% – will have no other alternative but to dismantle the Palestinian Authority and start a South African-like-style struggle for equal political, social and economic rights within a single democratic state for all of its citizens (Emerson and Tocci 2003: 33).

In order to avoid these two scenarios – i.e. the ‘one-state’ and the ‘apartheid’– key international, regional and local political players decided to intervene and intensified their efforts following the collapse of the negotiations at Camp David II (cf. Section 1.1.2). These intensified efforts resulted in the drafting of five Palestinian-Israeli peace initiatives in less than two years (cf. Chapter 3.2). The ‘two-state’ solution – which the international community endorses and promotes – would allow Israel to keep a Jewish majority on 78% of historic Palestine. In this sense, the creation of a Palestinian state on the lands occupied in 1967 – is not only a Palestinian interest but also an Israeli one.

The texts in the corpus and equally their different translations play a crucial role in not only keeping the ‘two-state’ solution on the table but also making sure it is the only solution under discussion. 38 These peace initiatives largely build on the outcome of previous negotiations and agreements between Israel and the PLO – e.g. Clinton’s Proposal (2000) and Taba Talks (2001). For example, the Clinton’s Proposal formed the basis of the

37 According to Klein (2008: 93), there are “5,658 million Jews as compared to 5,057 million Palestinians in what was once Mandatory Palestine. In a few years’ time, given the current demographic trends, if no alternative solution is found, a Jewish minority will be ruling over a Palestinian majority”.

38 For example, the Roadmap Plan, which envisions a ‘two-state’ solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, is officially endorsed in the United Nations General Assembly resolution 1515 of 2003 as the only way to move forward.
Geneva Accord and the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles and the Roadmap Plan was based largely on the report of Sharm al-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee – better known as ‘the Mitchell Report’– (2001). Moreover, these peace initiatives address – in more or less detail – the final-status of the conflict which have been impeding resolving the conflict for a long time and offer political solutions to them.

Furthermore, peace initiatives range from one page (e.g. the Arab Peace Initiative) to forty-nine pages (e.g. the Geneva Accord). Some of these initiatives were the outcome of direct unofficial bilateral negotiations (e.g. the Geneva Accord), others were the outcome of indirect official negotiations (e.g. the Roadmap Plan) (cf. Chapter 2.4.2), whereas a third group were unilateral attempts by one side (e.g. the Arab Peace Initiative) to outline a political solution to the conflict. As the outcome of direct or indirect negotiations (cf. Chapter 3.2), peace initiatives reflect political compromises and power relations which find their way in the textual profiles of the different language versions (cf. Chapter 5).

These peace initiatives – following a chronological order – are the Gush-Shalom Declaration of Principles for Peace Agreement, the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles, the Arab Peace Initiative, the Geneva Accord and the Roadmap Plan. The following table (1.1) lists the authors, dates of publications and language versions of each initiative.

Table 1.1 Corpus of the Study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Initiative</th>
<th>Authors</th>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Date of Publication</th>
<th>Translations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Gush-Shalom Declaration of Principles for Peace Agreement</td>
<td>The Gush-Shalom Organization</td>
<td>Hebrew</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Arabic (1) English (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Arab Peace Initiative</td>
<td>The League of Arab States (LAS)</td>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>English (4) Hebrew (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles</td>
<td>Ami Ayalon and Sari Nusseibeh</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Arabic (5) Hebrew (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Geneva Accord</td>
<td>Yossi Beilin and Yasser Abed-Rabbo</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Arabic (1) Hebrew (1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What distinguishes peace initiatives in the corpus from previous peace initiatives drafted throughout the history of the conflict is the increasing role of civil society — both in the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Israel — in the efforts to resolve the conflict, particularly since the outbreak of the second Palestinian intifada, *Al-Aqsa*, on 28 September 2000.

Conflict situations, unlike peaceful societies, may produce “more intense mobilization of civil society” (Marchettia and Tocci 2009: 201). The fact that three out of the five Palestinian-Israeli peace initiatives in the corpus belong to what is called ‘track-two’ diplomacy or ‘unofficial diplomacy’ (e.g. Chataway 1998; Fisher 2006) (cf. Chapter 2.3.2) is indicative of such increasing mobilization of civil society. ‘Track-two’ diplomacy — a term coined by Joseph Montville (1987) — is defined as “unofficial, informal interaction between members of adversary groups or nations that aim to develop strategies, to influence public opinion, organize human and material resources in ways that might help resolve their conflict” (Montville 1991: 162 quoted in Mapendere 2006: 68).

The term ‘civil society’ includes a multiplicity of actors “ranging from local to international, independent and quasi-governmental players” (Marchettia and Tocci 2006: 201). Examples of groups and members of civil society in the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Israel include the Palestinian Peace Coalition (PPC), Gush-Shalom organization, Peace Now, National Consensus, B’Tselem, etc. in addition to individual citizens such as Sari Nusseibe, Ami Ayalon, Yossi Beilin and Yasser Abd-Rabbo (cf. chapter 3.2.2) who have been involved in unofficial negotiations or ‘track-one’ diplomacy.

In order to keep the ‘two-state’ solution on the table and to challenge the narrative of there being no Palestinian ‘partner for peace’ (cf. Section 1.1.2), these civil society groups decided to intervene after they lost faith in the ability of their political leaderships to bring any change to the impasse in the peace process. These groups believed that power lies in

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40 There is also an emerging international civil society movement which promotes boycotts, divestment and sanctions ‘BDS’ against Israel that is similar to the Palestinian movement for ‘BDS’ (Bisharat 2011: 316).
the hands of people and thus decided to resort to civil society in order to secure the backing of public opinion to the political solutions they propose. They tried to avoid mistakes made in the Oslo Accords, namely, deferring the discussion of the final-status of the conflict until the end of the process (cf. Section 1.1.2) by tackling them from the outset.

Given this situation, peace initiatives present a genuine case of interaction and engagement between different political and social agents: mainly those who belong to ‘track-one’ and ‘track-two’ diplomacy. These agents compete over power, political supremacy and legitimacy. Such a competition can be summarized as who has the power to negotiate a peace agreement: governments or people (cf. Chapter 2.3.2).

The drafters of peace initiatives decided to put the texts which they negotiated in front of their respective publics. Translation played a central role in this context. Peace initiatives drafted for example, originally in English, were made available in Arabic and Hebrew. These peace initiatives and their translations are presented in different frames in order to serve different purposes or functions and fulfil different roles in different institutional contexts. As these initiatives are featured on the public agenda, they play a decisive role in determining which course the conflict takes in the future. It is precisely here that translation plays a key role by being an important source of information and part of a political propaganda to achieve certain political aims.

What is interesting here is that some of the negotiators themselves acted as translators of these texts, such as Sari Nusseibeh and Ami Ayalon. Other translators were peace activists, such as Hagit Ofran, or academics, such as Ilai Alon. This shows the increasing role of non-professional translators in translation. The aim of these particular translations, other than dissemination of information (i.e. fulfilling an informative function), is to influence Palestinian and Israeli public opinions (i.e. fulfilling a persuasive function). It can be argued then that these peace initiatives have a major social and political role to play in this conflict, namely, preparing and shaping public opinion in Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories with regard to any future political settlement to the conflict.

Public opinion is of the utmost importance in situations of ongoing contemporary conflict and its resolution. In this regard, Shamir (2007: 6) emphasizes that “the premise that public opinion affects foreign policy is now widely accepted among political scientists, scholars of international relations, and public opinion experts”. That is why some of these
initiatives, such as ‘track-two’ peace initiatives (cf. Chapter 3.2.2) directly target public opinion in both Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories and strive to elicit their support. Drafters of these initiatives try to pressure their respective governments to negotiate a peace agreement by gaining support from people at grassroots level.

Some of these peace initiatives, such as the Geneva Accord, generated heated debates in Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories. This was mainly due to their political content as well as the political credibility of their drafters. Consequently, some of these initiatives were well received as potential proposals to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, whereas others were severely criticized for giving up so much to the other side of the conflict. Some of these criticisms were based on the original source texts of these initiatives; other cases were based on translations, e.g. the Arabic and Hebrew translations of the Geneva Accord (cf. Chapter 6.3).

1.2 Objectives and Analytical Progression of the Study

The Palestinian-Israeli conflict has been playing a major role in shaping the political landscape of the Middle East for more than a hundred years. This conflict has been attracting considerable interest from political scientists, historians and sociologists for many years (e.g. Finkelstein 2003; Hajjar 2005; Kimmerling 2008; Nakhleh and Zureik 1980; Pappé 2011; Said 1995; Schulze 2008; Shlaim 2000) but the role of language and translation in this context has not yet received as much attention as the study of other political contexts. As Schäffner (1997: 119) notes, the term ‘political text’ is vague as it covers a variety of genres such as treaties, speeches, editorials, etc. This thesis examines peace initiatives – which have been playing a significant role in the context of this conflict for many years – as a largely under-researched genre of political texts.

Power relations and other ideological considerations have a significant impact on discourse practices (Chilton and Schäffner 2002) and all levels of linguistic organisation in political texts, including the authors’ lexical choices and their deliberate use of ambiguity or vagueness. But the sensitivity of political texts (Schäffner 2002) is multiplied and refracted in international politics, understood in this thesis as “a struggle for power, between those who seek to assert and maintain their power and those who seek to resist it” (Chilton 2004: 3). Governments, political parties as well as ordinary citizens rely on translation as a source of information which constitutes acts of mediation and, potentially, may add to the complexity of the ideological clashes underpinning peace initiatives. Amid the growing
internationalisation of politics and the increasing social visibility of its consequences, whether in the form of conflict-induced displacement or clashes between competing approaches to the resolution of diplomatic tensions, the translation of political texts has gained significant attention within Translation Studies in recent years (e.g. Baker 2006, 2009; Salama-Carr 2007; Schäffner 1997, 2004).

Existing research on the translation of political texts includes a number of scholarly strands, ranging from functional analyses (Schäffner 1997, 2002) and systemic-linguistic approaches (Mason 1994, Calzada-Pérez 2001), to research on political discourse analysis (Chilton and Schäffner 2002) and narrative theory (Baker 2006). In this thesis, translation is understood as a social practice in the hands of a variety of social agents within specific socio-cultural and institutional context. As Wolf (2002: 33) explains:

[a] sociological approach to the study of translation would follow the insight that translation is a socially-regulated activity and consequently analyze the social agents responsible for the creation of translation. The analysis of the social implications of translation helps us to identify the translator as constructing and constructed subject in society, and to view translation as a social practice.

The main focus of investigation in this thesis is on texts, i.e. peace initiatives and their translations. Nevertheless, aspects of agency and institutions involved in the translation and publication of these texts are partly accounted for as detailed information about these two is not available.

The study of peace initiatives, as sensitive political texts, and their translations, in their respective socio-political, historical and institutional contexts, can shed more light on the major role that these texts play in society in situations of ongoing contemporary conflict, the institutional practices and the way in which the different social agents – including translators, publishers, political institutions, etc. – involved in their production and publication interact and “take up positions and build alliances” to accomplish their “aims and ambitions” (Hermans 1996: 10).

The positions of the social agents involved in the production of the texts under scrutiny in this thesis, both the original and translated versions, are influenced by ideological and political considerations. In other words, their positions emanate from their ideologies, understood as “representations of aspects of the world which can be shown to contribute to

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41 The concept of ideology in this thesis is used following Fairclough (1995) in a critical rather than a neutral way.
establishing, maintaining and changing social relations of power, domination and exploitation” (Fairclough 2003: 9). Against this backdrop, translators emerge as active social agents – “within complex structures of power” (Hermans 1995: 6) – who are politically aware of the choices they make and play “a crucial role in both disseminating and contesting public narratives [i.e. collective stances or dispositions that circulate and operate in structural units and institutions of society or a nation as a whole] within and across national boundaries” (Baker 2006: 4).

This thesis presents a product-oriented textual analysis of 31 Arabic, English and Hebrew language versions of five different Palestinian-Israeli peace initiatives. Methodologically, the thesis pursues a top-down approach in analysing data. After outlining the socio-political conditions of text production of the drafting of the Palestinian-Israeli peace initiatives (original source texts), the thesis examines the textual profiles of the different Arabic, English and Hebrew language versions of these initiatives, focusing on their functions and underlying principles of audience design. The thesis then moves on to establish how these textual profiles reflect aspects of ideology, political affiliation and power relations at the macro- and micro-structural levels level. The final step in the analysis attempts to account for these aspects in terms of the socio-political and institutional conditions of the production of the translations.

The main body of the analysis draws on concepts and methods of Descriptive Translation Studies (DTS) (Lambert and Van Gorp 1985) and Critical Discourse Analysis (Fairclough 1992). This thesis is informed by previous applications of Critical Discourse Analysis to Translation Studies as it works from the assumption that “discourse is both socially conditioned and shapes social relationships, and that it is necessary to adopt a critical stance towards the relationship between analysis and the practices analysed” (Saldanha 2008: 151). Political discourse analysts examine texts in one language and cultural context whereas a translation approach to the investigation of political discourse can shed new light on the various processes involving the production of political discourses in more than one language (Arabic, English and Hebrew in the case of this thesis).

This thesis goes beyond description of actual translation profiles to explanations of these profiles with reference to their institutional contexts of production. For this purpose, Fairclough’s (1992) three-dimensional model of Critical Discourse Analysis (cf. Chapter 3.3.3) will be applied to answer the main research questions of this thesis.
1) **What are the key characteristic features of peace initiatives as politically negotiated texts?**

2) **What happen to these texts in translation?**

3) **How do the translations of peace initiatives reflect aspects of ideology, political affiliation and power relations?**

4) **How can these aspects of ideology, political affiliation and power relations be accounted for in terms of the socio-political and institutional conditions of the production of the translations?**

The framework of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) – a politically engaged form of discourse analysis – is a useful framework for the study of peace initiatives and their translations because, among other reasons, it accounts for three levels of analysis: text production, text interpretation and institutional contexts and emphasizes that texts have a role in social and political change (for more in depth justification of CDA as the methodological framework in this thesis, see Chapter 3.3.3).

By attempting to answer these research questions, this thesis makes an original contribution to the discipline of Translation Studies by contributing to a deeper understanding of the translation and recontextualization of politically negotiated texts in their socio-political, historical and institutional contexts during situations of ongoing contemporary conflict.

### 1.3 Structure of the Study

The thesis is structured as follows:

**Chapter Two** consists of two main sections, reviewing the main studies on political and negotiated texts. The first section reviews the major studies on negotiated and political texts in the discipline of Translation Studies. It provides the justification for conducting this study and its relevance to the discipline of Translation Studies. The second section reviews the main studies on peace initiatives and politically negotiated texts in the neighbouring disciplines of Political Science, Conflict Resolution, Negotiation Theory, Diplomatic Studies and Genre Studies. This review helps in identifying the nature of peace initiatives and their characteristic features (e.g. use of deliberately ambiguous or vague drafting, naming practices, choice use of politically sensitive concepts and terms, etc.). These features would then guide data analysis at the macro-structural level (cf. Chapter 5). This section shows that peace initiatives are still largely under-researched genre of political texts and that more research is still needed in this direction. On the other hand, it shows similarities between peace initiatives and peace treaties.
Chapter Three consists of four main sections introducing the corpus and methodology of the study. The first section introduces the aims of the chapter. The second section presents the corpus of the study. It starts with presenting the socio-cultural and political contexts of the production of the original versions of the respective peace initiatives (the source texts). It then presents the different language versions of these initiatives (the target texts) in their different institutional contexts. The third section presents the methodology of the study. The thesis operates within the framework of product-oriented Descriptive Translation Studies and Critical Discourse Analysis. It applies the analytical model suggested by Lambert and Van Gorp (1985) and Fairclough’s three-dimensional model of Critical Discourse Analysis (Fairclough 1992). In linking the textual profiles of peace initiatives to conditions of text production, the analysis is an example of causal models as described by Chesterman (1997).

Chapter Four examines the textual organization of the individual translation profiles of the various language versions of peace initiatives. It aims to show how the various components of textual organization of translation profiles of the different language versions of peace initiatives (the target texts) at the macro-structural level – e.g. layouts, paratexts, chapter heading, etc. – reflect ideological and political interests. For this purpose, the Descriptive Translation Studies model of Lambert and Van Gorp (1985) is applied. This descriptive account of textual profiles answers the following questions: Are these texts complete? How were they introduced? What labels were given to them? Were there any translator’s notes, footnotes? etc.

Chapter Five moves on to examine the textual profiles of the different language versions of peace initiatives at the micro-structural level as the second level of analysis. This product-oriented textual analysis starts by justifying the selection of data examples and it then moves on to the discussion of relevant examples. This chapter aims to examine how aspects of ideology, political affiliation and power relations impinge on the different language versions of peace initiatives. Identified translation strategies are classified according to Chesterman’s categories (1997).

Chapter Six consists of two main sections aiming to turn to explaining textual profiles of the language versions in terms of their institutional contexts. The first section presents the aim of the chapter as linking aspects of ideology, political affiliation and power relations in
the different textual profiles of peace initiatives (i.e. target texts) – at both macro- and micro-structural levels – to their socio-political and institutional conditions of the production of the translations. It will show that in many cases translations produced in one specific institutional context are recontextualised for use in another one. Such recontextualisation goes hand in hand with further textual amendments. The second section presents a case of a political debate initiated based on the Yes to an Agreement Hebrew translation of the Geneva Accord. The last section presents a conclusion to the chapter.

Chapter Seven consists of three main sections presenting the major conclusions of the thesis. The first section presents the major conclusions and findings for the translation of peace initiatives. The second section presents the original contribution of the study to the discipline of Translation Studies and Critical Discourse Analysis. The final section points the reader to further research on political texts and peace initiatives in the discipline of Translation Studies and other neighbouring disciplines.
Chapter Two
Translation, Ideology and Politics

2.1 Introduction
This chapter presents the theoretical premises of the thesis. It consists of three main sections. Section 2.2 reviews the main research on negotiated and political texts in the discipline of Translation Studies. Section 2.3 investigates the main studies on negotiated texts, including peace initiatives, within neighbouring disciplines such as Political Science, Conflict Resolution, Genre Studies and Negotiation Theory. These studies inform the research on the key features of peace initiatives and later on their analysis. Section 2.4 provides a conclusion to this chapter.

2.2 Translation, Peace Initiatives and Politics
In an edited volume, entitled A Companion to Translation Studies (2007) covering main areas of research in Translation Studies, such as culture, literature, gender and media, Schäffner’s contribution on ‘Politics and Translation’ provided a detailed overview of what has been ongoing in the area of translation of political texts. Schäffner (2007) reviews the issue of ‘Translation and Politics’ from three main points of views: the politics of translation, the translation of political texts and the politicisation of translation. Reflecting on research in the area of political texts, Schäffner (2007: 138) points out that – although aspects of politics have been paid attention to within Translation Studies – still there is no ‘major monograph’ on the translation of political discourse. Moreover, keywords such as ‘politics’ and ‘political texts’ do not appear in reference works such as Cowie and Shuttleworth (1997), etc. (Schäffner 2007: 138). Surprisingly, ten years later, these keywords still do not appear in major reference works, e.g. Baker and Saldanha (2008).

Schäffner (1997: 119) points out that the term ‘political text’ itself is a vague one. It is an umbrella term which covers a range of genres. Genres are defined following Chilton and Schäffner (2002: 19) as “global linguistic patterns which have historically developed for fulfilling specific communicative tasks in specific situations”. Political discourse includes various genres such as treaties, speeches, parliamentary debates, editorials, etc. This list, of course, is not exhaustive. It would also include peace initiatives or plans, petitions, manifestos and press releases.
Political texts can be identified and characterized according to their functions and themes (Schäffner 1997: 119). These texts normally serve a particular political function which varies from one genre to another, e.g. political speeches usually have a persuasive function, while treaties have a regulatory one. Any significant change in this function or ‘communicative purpose’ is likely to result in a different genre (Bhatia 1993: 13). However, minor changes in the communicative purpose(s) help in distinguishing subgenres.

Despite the existence of research on the translation of political texts, following functional (e.g. Schäffner 1997; 2002) or systemic-linguistic approaches (e.g. Calzada-Pérez 2001, Mason 1994) and research on Political Discourse Analysis (e.g. Chilton and Schäffner 2002), peace initiatives are still a largely under-researched genre of political texts. In the Arab world, research on the translation of political texts includes very few studies on translation of political speeches from Arabic into English (e.g. Al-Harrasi 2001, Shunnaq 2000) and on peace treaties from English into Arabic (e.g. Masa’deh 2003). Moreover, there are no studies on the translation of political texts between Arabic, English and Hebrew languages.

Translation Studies scholars interested in political texts have examined specific genres of political texts – e.g. negotiated texts, political speeches and/or effects of translation solutions. Masa’deh’s PhD thesis *The Application of the theory of Norms to the Translation of International Treaties: A Case Study of the Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty* (2003) is the only major study found on the translation of negotiated texts between English and Arabic. Masa’deh’s thesis fundamentally addresses the complexity of legal translation from English into Arabic and attempts to find a method by which legal terms in English and Arabic can be standardized, hoping that this would reduce political conflicts arising from misinterpretations. Applying norms theory to the Arabic translation of the text of the treaty, Masa’deh’s research aimed “to explain whether or not translators are governed by norms during the act of translation, and how this affects the resulting product” (Masa’deh’s 2003: 4).

A team of professional translators working for the Jordanian government officially translated the treaty into Arabic. For the purpose of his research, Masa’deh did not use the Arabic official translation, but data gained from a survey of four groups of informants:
professional translators, lecturers in translation, MA students of translation and undergraduate students of translation, who produced one hundred different translations. These translations comprised the corpus of study.

The author focuses merely on linguistic aspects of legal terminology in peace treaties. He argues that the mistranslation of legal terms – e.g. boundary, territory, territorial waters, airspace, etc. – might lead to the outbreak of political conflicts but does not provide any evidence based on his data analysis about how this might happen. In his opinion, to reduce the chances of political conflicts arising because of misinterpretations, Arabic legal terminology in peace treaties – such as the Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty – needs to be standardized. One might wonder how the standardization of Arabic legal terminology in the Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty would help in preventing a political conflict between Jordan and Israel, taking into account that the English source text is the only authoritative one and that there is an official translation in Arabic.

Finally, as mentioned before, Masa’deh’s findings are based on data collected from four groups of informants. Using such unauthentic translations, i.e. translations produced by informants rather than institutions, comments on the possibility of the outbreak of a political conflict can only be hypothetical. This highlights the need to examine genuine data in their socio-political, historical and institutional contexts.

Some other research on the translation of political texts focused on particular linguistic problems in such texts and solutions to them. This can be seen, for example, in the work of Newmark (1991). Newmark, following a prescriptive approach, wrote a chapter on the ‘Translation of Political Language’ with focus on lexical aspects, e.g. acronyms, metaphors, pronouns, etc. Although recognizing culture-boundedness and historical-ideological conditioning of political discourse, Newmark largely overlooks that the production of texts relies on different functions and personal attitudes. Furthermore, Newmark’s discussion is generally de-contextualized and he views meaning as something that can be derived from words and within texts. For example, in his discussion of political terms, he argues that they are either positive or negative (1991: 151). He gives the example of one value-laden term, ‘normalisation’, and how it acquired a negative currency when it was employed by Soviet leaders in order to justify the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Newmark here overlooks the fact that political concepts and terms, other than being positive or negative, can also be neutral depending on the context in which they are used.
For example, ‘normalisation’ in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict is perceived as negative in Arabic, neutral in English and positive in Hebrew. This term has different connotations in these three languages as will be shown later (cf. Chapter 5.6.6).

Similarly, some research focused on linguistic features in particular genres of political texts, for example, political speeches. Tilford (1991) examined the adaptation of political texts in translation to meet the expectations of the target audience. He examined an English translation of a speech by the former German Chancellor, Kohl, given in English to an audience of British historians. This speech was translated by public service translators in Germany. Tilford (1991: 226) points out that readership or audience design was a crucial factor in adapting the message of the source text in translation. Tilford (1991: 226) speculates that the decision of such adaptation and responsibility is either the source text’s author or the translator’s. Such uncertainty reflects the complexity of translating political texts, particularly in governmental institutional contexts. Information on the actual translation process and motivation for certain translation solutions – as it is in the case of peace initiatives – is not available and in many cases cannot be accessed.

Al-Harrasi (2001) examined the translation of ideological metaphors in Omani political speeches from Arabic into English. He remarks that “translation choices for particular metaphors helped create an image of the speaker of the source text” (Schäffner 2007: 143).

Shunnaq (2000) examines the issues of repetitive and emotive expressions in the political speeches of the former Egyptian president Gamal Abdul Nasser. Shunnaq (2000: 207) argues that ‘repetition’ and ‘emotiveness’ are of significant importance in translating Arabic political discourse into English. In addition, he stresses the importance of the translator’s familiarity with the text author’s idiolect, here Nasser’s Egyptian dialect, for better translation. In these two studies, the authors emphasize distinctive features of Arab political language, namely, use of ideological metaphors, repetitive and emotive expressions to achieve certain political functions.

These different analyses were conducted using different methodologies and within different frameworks. Schäffner (e.g. 1997, 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2007) has written extensively on translation of political texts and political discourse analysis (cf. Chapters 5.4 and 7.2.1). In her research, Schäffner covers different genres including political speeches, contracts and policy papers. She borrows concepts of Critical Discourse Analysis and text linguistics and applies them to translation.
Schäffner (2004) takes translation as a “cross-cultural activity”. This emphasis on ‘culture’ reflects the social aspects of translation. In her writings, Schäffner emphasizes that the determining factor in the translation of any text, and thus a political text as well, is the function it is supposed to fulfil in the target culture. Therefore, the function of the target text will determine what translation strategies are to be followed (Schäffner 1997: 120). All translations are ideological since “the choice of a source text and the use to which the subsequent target text is put are determined by the interests, aims, and objectives of social agents” (Schäffner 2003: 23). Schäffner (2004: 131) rightly remarks that “textual features need to be linked to the social and ideological contexts of text production and reception”. However, she does not explain how feasible such a goal would be, particularly in the case of negotiated texts such as treaties and peace initiatives, taking into account that general information on conditions of target text production, let alone ideological motivation for the choice of certain structures and concepts, is not normally available to researchers or the public.

Finally, Schäffner (2007: 146) argues that translations – as products – are used “as tools for political action”. However, she does not provide sufficient examples to illustrate this point. In fact, there are still no major studies which fundamentally address the question of how translations are used as tools for political action particularly in times of conflict. Research on peace initiatives could provide some answers in this direction.

Baumgarten (2007) analysed eleven different English translations of Hitler’s political book Mein Kampf in their sociocultural and situational environments. Following a descriptive and partly discourse-analytical approach, Baumgarten aimed to contribute to a better understanding of the translation of politically sensitive texts by investigating the numerous ways in which ideology and power relations influence the different English translations of Mein Kampf (2007: 13). One of the key findings of his thesis is that “translation of politically sensitive texts is heavily dependent on ideological interests” (Baumgarten 2007: 173). Moreover, Baumgarten (2007: 176) argues that “the recontextualization of political discourse in translation needs to be seen as motivated by contrastive goals and interests”.

perceiving “social actors, including translators and interpreters, as real-life individuals rather than theoretical abstractions”. Moreover, Baker (2006: 4) emphasizes the active role that translators and interpreters play in situations of violent conflict, namely, disseminating and contesting public narratives “within and across national boundaries”. In her major work, *Translation and Conflict* (2006), Baker investigates the role played by translators and interpreters in situations of violent conflict, namely, disseminating, and contesting public narratives “within and across national boundaries” (2006: 4). Baker (2006) considers translation an active promotion of narratives rather than the traditional view of ‘building bridges’ or ‘facilitating communications’. One of Baker’s (2008: 10) fundamental arguments is that “translations (and translators) can never be absolutely neutral, objective, since every act of translation involves an interpretation – just as no observation of any scientific data is ever entirely theory free”.

Trosborg (1997) investigated hybrid political texts. Following Schäffner (1997), Trosborg classifies political discourse into ‘inner-state discourse’ and ‘inter-state discourse’. Inner-state discourse includes texts that are considered as culture-bound, e.g. speeches and statements, whereas inter-state discourse or the diplomatic discourse includes political texts which are “interactively negotiated in a supranational setting, for the overall purpose of achieving and reflecting consensus”, such as treaties, documents of NATO and the European Union (Trosborg 1997: 145). According to Trosborg, hybrid texts are the result of cultures and languages in contact which are produced in “a supranational multicultural discourse community where there is no linguistically neutral ground” (1997: 145-146). Such a text results from “a translation process and shows features that somehow seem ‘out of place’/‘strange’/‘unusual’ for the receiving culture” (Ibid.: 146). Here Trosborg’s definition overlooks the fact that a source text in such a case is a hybrid text as the result of interaction between more than one culture. In international negotiations, political texts – as the result of such negotiations – are drafted in a way that shows consensus over points of conflict. Here political concepts and terms, as well as other features, need to be negotiated and compromises need to be reached. This results in politically, and in some cases, culturally hybrid political texts. Therefore, hybridity starts in the source text and is not only a result of a translation process.

Koskinen (2000, 2008) examined the translation policy practices in institutions with special reference to the European Commission. She remarks that translations are produced
in different institutions: international and supranational organizations (e.g. the United Nations and the European Union), governmental institutions and public services (Koskinen 2008: 2). Koskinen (2008: 2) notes that translations produced in all of these institutional contexts are “constrained and controlled by the translating institution and the official nature of the institutions endows the documents with authority and performative power”. This is true if translations of documents drafted in these institutions are produced in these institutions and not outside them. Some of these institutions, such as the United Nations, also translate documents drafted in other institutions and then recontextualize them in translation. Other types of institutions, e.g. non-governmental ones, although frequently producing translations, often label them as ‘unofficial translation’ for political purposes (see chapter 6.2.3)

2.3 Peace Initiatives in Other Disciplines

Peace initiatives are the subject of study for a number of disciplines, including Political Science, Conflict Resolution Studies, Negotiation Theory and Diplomatic Studies. In the following section, the main studies on peace initiatives in these disciplines will be examined for their relevance to this thesis.

2.3.1 Political Science and Conflict Resolution

The Arab-Israeli conflict in general and the Palestinian-Israeli in particular have been the focus of extensive research in the discipline of political science since the start of the conflict (e.g. Khalidi 2007; Masalha 2000; Morris 1999; Rabinovich 2004; Said 2004; Shlaim 2000).

There has been an increasing interest in the study and analysis of the Palestinian-Israeli peace initiatives from a Political Science point of view. Peace initiatives are of interest to political scientists due to their political content and significance. Golan (2007) provides a comprehensive overview and analysis of the Palestinian-Israeli “peace process” and its peace plans from the Oslo Accords to the Israeli disengagement plan. A detailed account of the Geneva Accord is to be found in Beilin (2004), Kardahji (2004), Klein (2007) and Lerner (2004). In these four major studies, the political content, the processes of negotiations, the drafting and the public reactions to this initiative are examined and commented on in detail from a political science point of view.
Peace initiatives are also the subject of study for Conflict Resolution Studies. Articles about the role of public opinion in conflict resolution, the impact of framing on decision making and the impact of constructive ambiguity on negotiations, with regard to some of these peace initiatives – e.g. the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles and the Geneva Accord – are to be found in Astorino-Courtois (2000), Shamir (2007) and Shamir and Shikaki (2002, 2005).

Public opinion has a significant effect on the way conflicts unfold. It is of the utmost importance at times of conflict as it directly affects both domestic and foreign policies and consequently, the resolution or aggregation of conflicts. To measure public opinion, authors of these studies have conducted surveys and opinion polls.

The role of language and translation is largely overlooked in all of these studies. For example, the fact that the drafters of the Geneva Accord distributed Arabic and Hebrew translations to the Israeli and Palestinian public in order to win their support was not mentioned at all in books in Political Science. Furthermore, the authors of these studies do not recognize that the reactions of the Israeli and Palestinian public, whether for or against the Geneva Accord, are in many cases reactions to the Arabic and Hebrew translations. They would thus not be aware of any potential differences between them and the original English text. This means that in Conflict Resolution Studies, opinion polls and surveys are actually based on translations, which in many cases differ from the original source text. In this sense, public reactions to a specific peace initiative could in fact be reactions to a translation.

2.3.2 Negotiation Theory and Diplomatic Studies
In negotiations, the role of language as a means of communication is of high significance, especially if it is different from the language(s) of the parties of a conflict. In the case of the Palestinians and Israelis, who do not speak the same language, negotiations usually take place in English as a third neutral language. Language is thus a means of communication and a way of bridging the gap between the positions of the parties of the conflict. But language is also a means for expressing ideology and asymmetrical power relations. Compromises reached in negotiations are reflected in specific textual features (syntax, vocabulary, style, etc.).
Scholars in Diplomatic Studies and Negotiation Theory pay attention to the use of what in diplomacy is called “creative ambiguity” in peace treaties (e.g. Isaacson 1992; Klieman 1999, Pehar 2001). Ambiguity is a trademark of peace agreements. Diplomats, negotiators and politicians advocate the use of ambiguous formulations in order to reach an agreement between the parties of a conflict.

Pehar (2001), a Diplomatic Studies scholar, investigates the reasons why politicians and negotiators resort to ambiguity in drafting peace agreements and whether or not this use is justifiable. Pehar (2001: 164), following Munson (1976), defines ambiguity as an expression which has “more than one meaning and it is used in a situation or context in which it can be understood in at least two different ways”. This expression needs not only to create “at least two different meanings” but also “two incompatible and unrelated” ones (Pehar 2001: 164). Pehar lists some of the famous examples of political texts negotiated at different times and in various institutional contexts in which ambiguity was used both effectively and ineffectively. For example, the Athenian Constitution (drafted in the 16th Century), W.Wilson’s 14 points (USA principles to end World War I, 1918), the UNSC Resolution 242, the 6-Point Agreement (truce between Egypt and Israel in 1973), and the Oslo Peace Accords (peace agreement between Israel and the PLO in 1993). Pehar advocates the use of “creative ambiguity” in agreements and argues that negative attitudes towards this use “may have its source in particular historical experiences” (2001: 189). So, for example, if Palestinian diplomats focus on the UNSCR 242, they would probably have a negative view, whereas if they focus on the Good Friday Agreement, then they would have a positive one. Pehar here overlooks the impact of using ambiguity on texts when they are translated. He focuses on the ‘source text’ culture and overlooks what would happen in the ‘target text’ culture and the effect of this on the reception of these agreements and consequently their success or failure.

Cohen (2001), another Diplomatic Studies scholar, reflects on the role of cultures and languages in negotiations in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict. He presents the Middle East Negotiating Lexicon (2001: 67) which is an “interpretive dictionary” of essential negotiating words in four languages: Arabic, Farsi, Hebrew and Turkish. This lexicon is intended to help English-speaking negotiators interested in clearing up any linguistic discrepancies regarding controversial terms such as ‘normalisation’ (cf. Chapter 5.6.6). Furthermore, the lexicon draws attention to the specific use of terms, describes their
possible religious and historical connotations and analyses the social and cultural associations evoked by a word for the native speaker (Cohen 2001: 68).

Peace initiatives can be broadly classified as either belonging to ‘track-one’ or ‘track-two’ diplomacy. ‘Track-one’ peace initiatives are the outcome of official negotiations or talks between ‘first-level’ players, i.e. governments or government representatives authorized to negotiate a peace deal (Shamir and Shikaki 2005). ‘Track-one’ diplomacy includes political players such as “the European Union, the Arab League, the African Union (AU), the Organization of American States (OAS), and many others” (Mapendere 2006: 67).

Examples of ‘track-one’ peace initiatives in the corpus are the Arab Peace Initiative and the Roadmap Plan. ‘Track-two’ peace initiatives are the outcome of “unofficial talks between elements in the elite of two societies, acting as citizens and not as government representatives” (Klein 2007: 158). Examples of this kind of initiatives in the corpus are the Gush-Shalom Declaration of Principles for Peace Agreement, the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles and the Geneva Accord. ‘Track-two’ peace initiatives address people at the grass-roots level and seek their support whereas ‘track-one’ peace initiatives target first level political players, i.e. governments. In this way, it can be said that ‘track-one’ peace initiatives adopt a top-down approach, whereas ‘track-two’ peace initiatives adopt a bottom-up one.

The interaction between first- and second-level players reflects power relations and the struggle over political legitimacy. Klein notes that “[t]rack two is one of the areas in which civil society can enter the vacuum that governments have created, deliberately or by lack of initiative” (2007: 159). Governments perceive initiatives negotiated by second-level players as a threat to their power and as interference in the political decision-making that is reserved exclusively to them. The Geneva Accord is one case in point. Shamir and Shikaki (2005: 316) explain that:

In two-level game terms, these initiatives can be seen as bold attempts of second-level players to interfere with the first-level game in an attempt to expand both sides’ win-sets through public opinion. Nevertheless, they have been perceived as a threat to the game played by the Palestinian and Israeli leaderships. The Geneva initiative, in particular, has been viewed as a challenge to the leadership capacity of both sides, given its ambition to offer a full-blown alternative game with different assumptions, rules and perhaps even different players.

42 On the weaknesses of ‘track-two’ diplomacy, see Mapendere (2006: 68-69).
Peace initiatives have focused largely on final-status issues that address the concerns and aspirations of both Palestinians and Israelis. These initiatives accommodate, to a certain extent, the conflicting political positions of the two sides of the conflict. Moreover, peace initiatives have a significant role to play in the context of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Although not legally binding, political compromises made in these initiatives can be used to extract further concessions in any future negotiations. These initiatives could therefore constitute the starting point of any future negotiations. Moreover, more than sketching out possible formulas for the resolution of a particular conflict, these initiatives can influence and shape the outcome of any future final agreement.

2.3.3 Genre Studies

In the field of Genre Studies, there are no specific studies on peace initiatives as a genre in its own right or as a sub-genre of political texts. This gap in knowledge made the identification of the characteristic features of peace initiatives at the beginning of this research a challenging task. Peace initiatives comprising the corpus of the study are not homogeneous with regard to the way they are referred to and the labels given to them (e.g. initiative, accord, framework, plan, proposal or document). This raised the question: what kind of texts are peace initiatives? More importantly, do they all fulfil the same criteria? Regardless of labels given to these texts, they are politically negotiated texts during situations of ongoing contemporary conflict. In addition, they belong to the general framework of the “peace process”.

A “peace process” is defined as “a value judgment attached to efforts to resolve a conflict at a particular time” (Bell 2000: 16). Bell (2000: 20) makes the point that peace agreements emanate at different stages of a peace process and they can be “loosely” classified into three types: pre-negotiation agreements, framework-substantive agreements, and implementation agreements. The relevant stage for the study of peace initiatives is the first one, i.e. pre-negotiation agreements.

In explaining the peace process in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bell (2000: 107) classifies the unsuccessful peace plan blueprints, which were agreed by some parties of the conflict, as pre-negotiation agreements. She points out that although these agreements were unsuccessful, they started to “sketch out possible formulas for resolution” which later on affected the conclusion of the final agreement (Bell 2000: 107). The Palestinian-Israeli peace initiatives in the corpus too could be considered as unofficial “pre-negotiation
agreements,” as they might form the basis for future negotiations between the Israeli and Palestinian sides. In addition, either side in future negotiations cannot ignore the concessions made in these initiatives.

Contrasting already established sub-genres of political texts such as peace treaties to peace initiatives helps in identifying the key characteristic features of peace initiatives. Sarcevic (1997: 131) points out that the term ‘treaty’ is a generic one comprising all kinds of international agreements among which are peace treaties. All treaties have common generic features. These include ‘titles’, ‘preambles’, ‘main parts’ and ‘final clauses’ (Sarcevic 1997: 131). The title functions as means of identification (Sarcevic 1997: 131). The preamble states the reason behind drafting the treaty and it is introduced by a standard formula such as “considering, recognizing, desiring, etc.” (Sarcevic 1997: 131-132). One distinguishing feature of a preamble is that it is “formulated as a single sentence and usually ends with an agreement clause (…have agreed as follows)” (Sarcevic 1997: 131-132). This feature is only found in the case of the Geneva Accord, the Arab Peace Initiative and the Gush-Shalom Declaration of Principles for Peace Agreement. For example, the preamble of the Geneva Accord stipulates that “[T]he State of Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization, reaffirming their determination to put an end to decades of confrontation and conflict…recognizing that peace requires the transition from the logic of war and confrontation to the logic of peace… have agreed on the following”.

A treaty would also include legal statements of obligations, authorizations, permissions, requirements and prohibitions which are set in the provisions constituting the main body of the treaty and which are “enforceable by law” (Sarcevic 1997: 133). These legal statements are expressed by the using modal verbs, e.g. ‘shall’, ‘may’, ‘must’, etc. Modal verbs are found in all peace initiatives in the corpus. However, some modal verbs are only found in some peace initiatives but not others. For example, ‘shall’ is only found in the text of the Geneva Accord. This modal verb is used to express obligations. In other peace initiatives, for instance, the Roadmap Plan, obligations are expressed by using the simple present tense.

Peace treaties are officially negotiated and signed by governments and later ratified and endorsed in their national parliaments. Moreover, they are legally binding to all parties of a particular conflict. It thus implies that “the signatory powers accept the settlement of disputes present in the treaty as being final” (Lesaffer 2004: 37). Unlike peace treaties,
peace initiatives are, in majority of the cases, unofficially negotiated by key international, regional, or local political players in a given conflict. Thus, these texts are not legally binding to any party of the conflict unless officially accepted by governments. In such cases, a peace initiative seizes to function as an ‘initiative’ and becomes an ‘agreement’ or ‘treaty’.

2.4 Conclusion
This chapter has reviewed the main studies on political and negotiated texts in the discipline of Translation Studies and other neighbouring disciplines. This chapter justified the need to study politically negotiated texts in translation. It showed that despite the existence of some studies on aspects of politics using different methodologies and within different frameworks (e.g. functional, systemic-linguistics, descriptive, etc.), the study of peace initiatives and of politically negotiated texts is still a largely under-researched genre of political texts. Thus, this thesis contributes to filling this gap in knowledge by presenting authentic data of negotiated texts – drafted during situations of ongoing contemporary conflict – and their different language versions.

The review of the major studies on peace initiatives in neighbouring disciplines (e.g. Political Science, Conflict Resolution, Diplomatic Studies, etc.) showed that these texts are studied for their political content and functions in society rather than their linguistic features. In addition, the role of translation in the production of these texts is largely overlooked.

This review also helped in identifying some of the main generic features of peace initiatives, such as ambiguity, use of political concepts, intertextuality, etc. It showed that peace initiatives are still a largely under-researched genre of political texts which share some generic features with similar genres such as peace treaties. These characteristic features would guide the data analysis at the micro-structural level (cf. Chapter 5).

The next chapter introduces the corpus and methodology of the study. It begins by presenting the socio-cultural and political contexts of the production of the original versions of the respective peace initiatives (the source texts). It then presents the different language versions of these initiatives (the target texts). Finally, it presents the methodology of the study.
Chapter Three
Corpus and Methodology of the Study

3.1 Introduction
Chapter Two presented the theoretical framework of the study and the need for conducting this study. Chapter Three introduces the corpus and methodology of the study. The discussion in this chapter moves from the source text to the target text context. Section 3.2.1 presents the original source texts of the respective peace initiatives in their socio-cultural and political contexts of production, focusing on their functions and underlying principles of audience design. Section 3.2.2 presents the textual profiles of the different language versions of peace initiatives focusing on their functions and underlying principles of audience design.

Section 3.3 presents the methodology of the study. The thesis operates within the framework of product-oriented Descriptive Translation Studies and Critical Discourse Analysis. It applies the analytical model suggested by Lambert and Van Gorp (1985) and methods of Critical Discourse Analysis (Fairclough 1992). In linking the textual profiles of peace initiatives to conditions of text production, the analysis is an example of causal models as described by Chesterman (1997). For categorizing functions of the different language versions of peace initiatives, audience design classifications will be used (Mason 2000). Section 3.4 provides a conclusion to the chapter.

3.2 Corpus of the Study
This sub-section outlines the political and socio-cultural background leading to the production of the original source texts of the Palestinian-Israeli peace initiatives. These initiatives are classified in this thesis as either ‘track-one’ or ‘track-two’ and will be introduced in the following sub-sections.

3.2.1 Track-One Peace Initiatives
There are two ‘track-one’ peace initiatives in the corpus: the Arab Peace Initiative and the Roadmap Plan. The drafters – first-level political players – of these two initiatives are the League of Arab States (LAS) and the Quartet respectively.
The Arab Peace Initiative

The Arab Peace Initiative (Arabic: ‘مبادئة السلام العربية’) – also known as the Beirut Declaration – is a one-page peace proposal negotiated in Arabic among the 22 members of the Arab League on 28 March 2002 during its 14th summit in Beirut. The Arab Peace Initiative is based on the principle of “land for peace”. It offers Israel full normal relations with all Arab and Islamic states in return for a complete withdrawal from all occupied Arab territories of 1967, the establishment of an independent Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital and a just solution for the Palestinian refugees question (Golan 2004: 40). The initiative does not offer a detailed agreement but instead outlines a general framework for a permanent agreement. Historically speaking, this initiative constitutes a major turning point in the history of the Middle East conflict as it offers Israel, and for the first time since the Khartoum Arab League’s Summit in 1967 and its three famous ‘noes’ (no peace, no recognition, no negotiation with Israel)43, full recognition and “the right to exist”.

The initiative was proposed by then-Crown Prince (now King) Abdullah Ibn Abdul-Aziz of Saudi Arabia to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Prince revealed his proposal in an interview with the columnist Thomas Friedman of The New York Times. This interview was published on the pages of the same newspaper in English on 17 February 2002. In that interview, the Prince told Friedman that he had drafted a speech to deliver at the coming summit of the League of Arab States in Beirut which offered Israel “normalizing relations” with all the Arab states in return for full Israeli withdrawal from all occupied Arab lands, including Jerusalem. The Prince added that he decided not to deliver the speech due to the policies of the Israeli Prime Minister at that time, Ariel Sharon’s, particularly the so-called Israeli military offensive, “Operation Defensive Shield” (Hebrew: מבצע חומת מגן, Arabic: العربيه المصبوب) – against the Palestinian people in the Occupied West Bank in 2002. Friedman persuaded the Prince “to go on record with the proposal” (Gambill 2002). The Saudis reviewed the text of the interview before it was published. The next day, the Prince’s office “carefully reviewed the quotations and gave the go ahead for the paper to publish his remarks on February 17” (Gambill 2002).

43 The Khartoum Arab League Summit was held in 1967 after the conclusion of the June 1967 war between Arab states and Israel. The resolution of this summit is published on the League of Arab States website: http://www.arableagueonline.org/las/arabic/details_ar.jsp?art_id=397&level_id=202 [last accessed: 24 November 2011].
During the two-day summit in the Lebanese capital of Beirut, the Arab leaders discussed the Palestinian issue, amongst others. The summit revolved on the one hand around the call of some of the Arab countries (e.g. Jordan and Egypt) to revive peace talks between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, and on the other hand, the call of some other Arab countries (e.g. Syria and Lebanon) to offer firm support to the Palestinian resistance against the Israeli occupation and aggression. These two conflicting ideologies had an effect on the final wording of the initiative (see below). On the first day of the summit, Prince Abdullah presented his vision for a comprehensive ‘land-for-peace’ deal with Israel. According to CNN, at the end of the two-day summit on 28 March 2002, the plan “was adopted in a closed session following hours of wrangling over its final wording”.

Prince Abdullah’s proposal for peace was revised and then adopted by the League of Arab States as the ‘Arab Peace Initiative’ and it was endorsed unanimously by all Arab states. The revisions to the proposal were due to the conflicting Arab positions on two main issues: normalisation of relations with Israel and the question of the Palestinian refugees.

The term ‘تطبيع العلاقات’ (tatbi’ al-ilāqāt, lit. ‘normalisation of relations’) which appeared in the first proposal (the English text of the interview with Friedman) was replaced by the term ‘علاقات طبيعية’ (ilāqāt tабي’iyah, lit. ‘normal relations’) in the final draft in Arabic, a term described at that time by the Israeli Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon, as “too vague” (Thorpe 2006: 297). This change, as Daniel Sobelman notes, was to avoid using such a term, i.e. normalisation which has negative connotations in Arabic, namely, ‘domestication’ and ‘submission’ (cf. Chapter 5.6.6).

As a result of negotiations between the member states of the Arab League, two clauses were added to the initiative vis-à-vis the Palestinian refugees question: Firstly, “the rejection of all forms of Palestinian patriation which conflict with the special circumstances of the Arab host countries” and, secondly, the call to achieve “a just solution to the Palestinian refugee problem to be agreed upon in accordance with U.N. General Assembly Resolution 194”. These clauses – which were introduced based on Syrian and


Lebanese demands—caused a heated debate and controversy in Israel. However, these two phrases were drafted ambiguously which allowed for multiple interpretations of which one could perhaps be “palatable to Israel and the U.S” (Podeh 2007).

The initiative offers Israel full recognition and normal relations with all 22 members of the League of Arab states. In return, the initiative requires full Israeli withdrawal from all occupied Arab territories since 1967, including the Syrian Golan Heights and the remaining occupied Lebanese territories in the south of Lebanon; achievement of a just solution to the Palestinian refugees problem “to be agreed upon” in accordance with the UN General Assembly Resolution 194; and the establishment of a sovereign independent Palestinian State on the Palestinian territories occupied since the 4 June 1967 with East Jerusalem as its capital.

The initiative was unanimously ratified at the meeting of the League of Arab States in Khartoum in May 2006. The League decided to re-activate the initiative during the 19th Arab summit in Riyadh in March 2007. Following this re-activation, the Arab Quartet (similar to the Roadmap Quartet, see below) consisting of Egypt and Jordan – which have diplomatic ties with Israel – Saudi Arabia and the Arab Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) was formed. The Arab Quartet was given the task of presenting the initiative directly to Israel and the Palestinian Authority. In its effort to promote the initiative to the Israeli public, the Palestinian Authority advertised full-page notices in Hebrew (Hebrew translation of the initiative) in four major Israeli newspapers (cf. Chapter 3.2.3). The authority also published the Arabic original text of the initiative in the major Palestinian newspapers of Al-Quds, Al-Ayyam and Al-Hayat Al-Jadida.

Drawing on Bell’s (1984) model of ‘audience design’, it can be argued that the original source text of the Arab Peace Initiative addresses a multi-layered audience. On the one hand, the representatives of the member states of the Arab League and the general Arab public constitute the ‘main addressees’, i.e. known, ratified and directly addressed ‘participants’. On the other hand, the American and Israeli governments as well as non-governmental political stakeholders, such as the different Palestinian factions or the Israeli opposition, qualify as potential ‘auditors’, i.e. known and ratified, but not directly addressed readers. Finally, the range of translating and publishing institutions that will be

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46 For example, the term “special circumstances” in the final draft of the initiative refers to the Lebanese constitution that prohibits the settlement of its 455,000 Palestinian refugees on its territory.
examined later in section 3.2.3 qualify as ‘overhearers’, insofar as their presence is known but they are neither ratified nor addressed by the authors of the text. The main function of this text is referential and informative. Ban It informed the Arab states’ representatives of what they were going to sign on and the Arabic public of what had been agreed on in Arabic.

Generally, the Arab Peace Initiative was well received in the United States, but not in Israel. The Israeli media, politicians and critics depicted the initiative as “a blueprint for Israel’s destruction” (Remba 2007) by requiring Israel to accept the possible return of millions of Palestinian refugees. On the other hand, some Israeli critics viewed the initiative as a positive move. In opposition to the Arab position since the 1967 Khartoum summit, some critics regarded the Beirut declaration as “a consummation of a long and painful process in the Arab world of recognizing the Israeli state” (Podeh 2007).

The Roadmap Plan

The Roadmap Plan is a three-phase blueprint (about six pages long) which was designed to reach a permanent resolution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict by 2005. The Roadmap was originally drafted in English by key players to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the ‘Quartet’ (the United Nations, the United States of America, Russia and the European Union) in consultation with Israel and the Palestinian Authority (through indirect negotiations) and released officially on 30 April 2003. This plan is the most recent diplomatic effort to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the only one accepted officially by both sides of the conflict.

The Roadmap is based on former US president George W. Bush’s “vision for peace” in the Middle East. On 10 November 2001, Bush delivered a speech47 at the United Nations in which he adopted, for the first time in the history of the American foreign policy in the region, the United States, the principle of creating a sovereign and independent Palestinian state to exist side by side with Israel. In another speech on the Arab-Israeli conflict, delivered on 24 June 200248 – which went through 28 drafts (Thorpe 2006: 280) – Bush


outlined the general political process that would lead to the end of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict by establishing a Palestinian state on the Palestinian lands occupied since 1967. This shift in the American administration’s foreign policy sought to restore the *status quo* prior to the outbreak of the second Palestinian intifada, *Al-Aqsa* on 28 September 2000 and thus bring both Palestinians and Israelis back to the negotiating table. But, more importantly, Bush’s purpose was “to secure cooperation in the war on terrorism from Arab states’ leaders, who had made it perfectly clear that there would be no cooperation unless Bush dealt forcibly with the Middle East crisis” (Thorpe 2006: 281).

Soon after the delivery of the second speech, the Quartet was formed with the aim of turning President’s Bush formula into a plan for peace in the Middle East. At the wish of then-Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, the American administration agreed to postpone the plan’s release until after the 28 January 2003 Israeli elections (Thorpe 2006: 291). This plan, known since then as the ‘Roadmap’, was to be implemented in three stages. *Phase I* (until May 2003) would bring an end to “terror and violence”, normalise Palestinian life, build Palestinian institutions following a process of institutional reform, withdraw Israeli army from areas occupied since 28 September 2000, dismantle Jewish settlement outposts⁴⁹ and freeze on all settlement activity. *Phase II* (June 2003-December 2003) would revolve around an international conference in support of Palestinian economic recovery and the subsequent establishment of an independent state with provisional borders. Finally, *Phase III* (2004-2005) would cultivate with an agreement on the final-status issues (e.g. Jerusalem, Palestinian refugees, borders and Jewish settlements) and put an end to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

The text of the Roadmap went through three drafts. The first draft, in English, was issued to both sides on 15 October 2002. Following several objections by both Palestinians and Israelis, the Quartet issued a second draft on 22 December 2002 that accommodated a number of amendments. The third and final draft, almost identical to the second one, was issued on 30 April 2003.

The Palestinian side declared its official unconditional acceptance of the plan on 2 May 2000; the Israeli government declared its acceptance on 23 May 2003, subject to fourteen

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⁴⁹ For a detailed list of the Jewish Settlement outposts in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, see Peace Now report available at their website: [http://peacenow.org.il/eng/sites/default/files/outposts_database_1.xls](http://peacenow.org.il/eng/sites/default/files/outposts_database_1.xls) [last accessed: 24 November 2011].
reservations\textsuperscript{50} or pre-requirements to be met during implementation of the plan. This raises the question of whether the two sides accepted the same text or not.

The Roadmap was produced by the Quartet to be presented to the two sides of the conflict. Therefore, the ‘main addresses’ of the English source text are the Israeli and Palestinian leaderships, i.e. politicians and policy makers who speak English. They are known, ratified and directly addressed. ‘Auditors’ of this text are political players other than the two governments, e.g. Palestinian factions, Israeli opposition, etc. Translating and publishing institutions, as in the case of those mentioned below, qualify as ‘overhearers’. Their presence is known but they are neither ratified nor addressed. The source text has an instructive function as it stipulates what is required from both sides in order to implement the plan.

The Roadmap has attracted wide international attention and firm support (Klein 2007: 180-181). However, it has been severely criticized for its ambiguous nature and lack of robust implementation mechanisms. To date, the Roadmap Plan has not yet been fully implemented.

3.2.2 Track-Two Peace Initiatives

There are three ‘track-two’ peace initiatives in the corpus: the Gush-Shalom Declaration of Principles for Peace Agreement, the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles and the Geneva Accord. The drafters – second-level political players – of these initiatives are the Gush-Shalom Organization, Ami Ayalon and Sari Nusseibeh, and Yasser Abd-Rabbo and Yossi Beilin respectively (see below). In the following, these three initiatives will be presented chronologically in their political and socio-cultural contexts.

\textit{The Gush-Shalom Declaration of Principles for Peace Agreement}


Gush-Shalom describes itself as “an extra-parliamentary organization, independent of any party or other political grouping”. Nevertheless, some of its activists belong to some Israeli political parties such as the ‘Labor’ and the ‘Meretz’ parties. This organization aims primarily “to influence Israeli public opinion and lead it towards peace and conciliation with the Palestinian people”. Although, this initiative is an Israeli one, some Palestinians were involved in its drafting. In this regard, Avnery (2003) notes that “we acted in close consultation with Palestinian colleagues”. These consultations and the implicit inclusion of those Palestinian colleagues found their way into the Arabic version of the proposal (cf. Chapter 5.7). The peace declaration or proposal tackles the final-status issues of the conflict (e.g. land, Jewish settlements, Jerusalem and the Palestinian refugees) and proposes political solutions to them. The declaration stipulates an end to the Israeli occupation in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as well as in the Arab East Jerusalem and the establishment of a Palestinian state there, the evacuation of Jewish settlers and settlements and a solution to the Palestinian refugee question based on an Israeli acknowledgment of share of responsibility for the creation of this tragedy.

The drafting of this initiative came almost a year after the outbreak of the second Palestinian intifada, Al-Aqsa on 28 September 2000 and aimed to show that an alternative to military solution to the Palestinian intifada exists. The declaration was published in Hebrew in the Israeli newspaper Ha’aretz as an advertisement by Gush-Shalom, as well as on its website on 10 August 2001. Ha’aretz has a left-of-centre position (see mass media below). The choice of Gush-Shalom to publish its proposal in this particular newspaper rather than other newspapers can be explained with regard to the political left-wing affiliation of both the Gush-Shalom and Ha’aretz newspaper.

On the one hand, the general Israeli public, particularly those who share the Gush-Shalom’s ideological and political stance on the Palestine-Israel conflict, such as its members and supporters as well as other peace groups in Israel, constitute the ‘main addressees’, i.e. known, ratified and directly addressed ‘participants’. On the other hand, the Israeli government as well as other political stakeholders, such as the different Israeli opposition factions, qualify as potential ‘auditors’ as their presence is known, ratified but

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52 Ibid.
not directly addressed readers. Finally, the range of translating and publishing institutions, such as Palestinian newspapers, are potential as ‘overhearers’ as their presence is known but they are neither ratified nor directly addressed by the authors of the text.

The Hebrew source text has a persuasive function as it attempts to persuade the Israeli public of certain political solutions to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. This persuasive function is also evident, for instance, in the introduction attached to the original text (cf. Chapter 4.4.3). Regarding the purpose of the proposal, Avnery (2003) points out that:

We wanted to light a candle in the darkness. To prove to the public that there is a solution, that there was somebody to talk to and something to talk about. And most important, to tell the people what the price of peace is, and that it was worthwhile to pay it.

After its publication (in Hebrew), the declaration did not achieve the effect that Avnery hoped it would leave on the Israeli public opinion. In this regard, Avnery (2003) points out that the initiative “did not cause much of a stir. As usual, all the Israeli media boycotted it and even abroad, it attracted only limited attention. But we had opened a path, and that others would use it in due course”.

**The Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles**

The Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles – also known as The People’s Voice – is a one-page (six-point) statement of general principles for the resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The grassroots initiative was drafted originally in English and signed on 27 July 2002 by Ami Ayalon (Hebrew: ‘עמי איילון’) and Sari Nusseibeh (Arabic: ‘سري نسيبة’). Ayalon is an Israeli military man who spent most of his life working for the security service. He was appointed as the Head of the Shin Bet after the assassination of the Israeli Prime Minister Rabin in 1995. Before Joining the Shin Bet, he served 33 years in the Israeli Navy, including service as its commander, from 1963 to 1996. Ayalon has been a member of the Israeli Parliament, the Knesset, from the Labor party since April 2006. Nusseibeh – a noted Palestinian intellectual and a long-time peace activist – is currently

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54 For more information on Sari Nusseibeh bibliography and publications, see his personal website which is available at [http://sari.alquds.edu](http://sari.alquds.edu) [last accessed: 24 November 2011].
the president of the only Arab university, Al-Quds in the Occupied East Jerusalem,\footnote{This term – i.e. ‘the Occupied East Jerusalem’– is used in this thesis (unless in direct quotations) in accordance with the numerous United Nations General Assembly and Security Council resolutions, most notably UNSCR 478, which all consider East Jerusalem to be part of the Occupied Palestinian Territories since June 1967.} where he teaches Philosophy. He served briefly as PLO representative in Occupied East Jerusalem from October 2001 to December 2002 – replacing the late Faisal Al-Husseini. Nusseibeh currently does not hold any Palestinian official position.\footnote{‘Palestinian Biographies: Sari Nusseibeh’, Lawrence of Cyberia website, published on 21 July 2004: \url{http://lawrenceofcyberia.blogs.com/palestinian_biographies/sari-nusseibeh-biography.html} [last accessed: 24 November 2011].}

The Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles is considered as a track-two initiative as it was negotiated and drafted by politicians acting as citizens rather than representatives of their governments. The reason behind the drafting of this initiative was that the two drafters lost faith in their respective governments to break the standstill in the negotiations and, thus, decided to appeal directly to the Israeli and Palestinian publics (Klein 2007: 28). The two drafters believed that people are the moving force behind any future agreement and they have an important role to play in decision-making regarding such an agreement. They also believed that “heavy grassroots pressure” is needed if any political change is to take place (Klein 2007: 172-173). The two drafters wanted to show their respective governments what “the people really want by circulating a one-page joint statement of principles”.\footnote{‘Alternative Diplomacy: Inside a Grassroots Israeli-Palestinian Peace Initiative featuring Ami Ayalon and Sari Nusseibeh’, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy website, published on 29 October 2003: \url{http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2125} [last accessed: 24 November 2011].}

The Statement of Principles outlines, very broadly, a political solution to some of the final-status issues of the conflict, particularly, borders, Jerusalem, the Palestinian refugees and the nature of the future Palestinian state. The Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principle suggests an Israeli withdrawal to the lines of 4 June 1967 with some modification, keeping Jerusalem as “an open city” with “Arab neighbourhoods in Jerusalem under Palestinian sovereignty, Jewish neighbourhoods under Israeli sovereignty with no sovereignty for any side over the holy places”. Finally, the Palestinians will concede the right of return to their homes in Israel and instead they are allowed to return only to the future Palestinian state and the future Palestinian state will be demilitarized.
In their efforts to appeal to the Israeli and Palestinian publics at grassroots level, the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles was drafted in a clear language specifying the endgame of the process rather than in ambiguous formulation. In this regard, Delyani (personal communication 2005) points out: “we are not an elite campaign. We are a grassroots campaign led by local political leaders at the villages and neighbourhoods levels”. For this reason, the drafters opposed the use of “creative ambiguity” in drafting their initiative: “we tried to get away from what was known during the Oslo years as creative ambiguity, and we are totally against such a term, because look at Oslo, look at the results. If you do not know where are you going, how could you get there?” (Delyani, personal communication 2005).

The ‘main addressees’ – i.e. known, ratified and directly addressed ‘participants’– of the original English source text of the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration Principles are politicians and policy makers who have interest in resolving the conflict. The Palestinian and Israeli governments as well as non-governmental political stakeholders, such as the different Palestinian factions or the Israeli opposition, qualify as ‘auditors’, i.e. known and ratified, but not directly addressed readers. Potential ‘overhearers’ are Palestinian and Israeli media outlets as well as other translating and publishing institutions as their presence is known but they are neither ratified nor addressed by the authors of the text. The English source text has an informative and declarative function: it presented to the international community and donors what the two politicians had agreed on. In addition, it is used for publicity and promotion purposes.

Although the authors launched a massive advertising campaign to promote their initiative in Israel and Palestine (also internationally), it was not well received by their respective publics: “the Israeli establishment ignored their initiative. In the Palestinian territories the initiative was criticized by refugee organizations and senior Fatah figures” (Klein 2007: 28).

It was possible to join the initiative on its both Israeli and Palestinian websites. In late 2007, the Palestinian website of the campaign, People’s Campaign for Peace and Democracy (Arabic: الحملة الشعبية للسلام والديمقراطية, www.hashd.org), went off-line as the campaign stopped due to political and financial reasons. Since its launch in 2002, 100,000 Israeli and 65,000 Palestinians have signed the initiative in support (Thorpe 2006: 323).
The Geneva Accord

The Draft Permanent Status Agreement, better known as the Geneva Accord, is a fifty-page blueprint: a detailed model for a final settlement of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict negotiated over the course of two years and drafted in English in 2003. This Swiss-sponsored unofficial initiative enlarges on previous compromises reached between the two sides in the Camp David II in 2000 and Taba negotiations in 2001 (Klein 2007).

Two teams – an Israeli one and a Palestinian one – negotiated the initiative in 2003. On the one hand, the Israeli negotiating team, led by Yossi Beilin (Hebrew: יוסי ביילין) (former Israeli Justice Minister), included a number of members of the Knesset, Israeli intellectuals, and some military people from the Israeli army. On the other hand, the Palestinian negotiating team, led by Yasser Abed Rabbo (Arabic: ياسر عبد ربه) (former Palestinian Information minister), included a number of members of the Palestinian Legislative Council and Palestinian intellectuals. Most of the members of the Israeli team were affiliated with the Israeli Left (the Labor Party and Meretz), whereas most of the members of the Palestinian team were high-ranking Palestinian officials closely linked to the Palestinian leadership.

Yasser Abed Rabbo is the founder of the Palestinian Democratic Union in 1991 which is one of the Palestinian factions and part of the PLO. He also served as the Palestinian Minister of Culture and Information from 1994 to 2001. He was part of the negotiating team in all major Palestinian-Israeli talks and is currently a member of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) executive committee. Yossi Beilin had held many cabinet posts in several Israeli governments of Yitzhak Rabin, Shimon Peres and Ehud Barak. Beilin is also well known as one of the architects of the Oslo Accords. The two men took part in many previous negotiations between the two sides.

The heads of two negotiating teams signed the accord on 12 October 2003 in Jordan. The accord was officially launched on 1 December 2003 at a ceremony in Geneva, Switzerland. Although known as negotiated by these two politicians, it was called the Geneva Accord, as it “is not the work of one person on each side but rather of large and heterogeneous teams” (Klein 2007: 4). More than that, the name Geneva was chosen “because the Swiss foreign ministry lent the most support to the process” (Klein 2007: 18). The actual legal

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58 The Geneva Accord is also called the ‘Geneva Plan’, ‘the Swiss Accords’ and ‘Beilin-Abed Rabbo Agreement’. 
drafting of the document in English was the work of two political advisors to Beilin and Abd-Rabbo: Daniel Levy, a graduate of Cambridge University and Ra’ith Al-Omari, who studied at Oxford (Klein 2007: 32).

The Geneva Accord offers a detailed blueprint for a permanent Palestinian-Israeli peace agreement. Compared to other peace initiatives, it is the most detailed and comprehensive draft for a permanent settlement of the conflict. The political significance of the accord is that it presents a model for a final settlement agreement. As Klein (2007: VIII) states:

Few will dispute my claim that the Geneva plan has become the principal reference framework in the discourse on the Israeli-Palestinian relations and as the principal model of a permanent agreement between the two peoples.

In fact, the initiative stands now as a reference to any future negotiations between the two sides. This is because compromises made in these negotiations cannot be ignored. In addition, the agreement represents a ceiling of negotiations. The agreement also presents an alternative to official policies in Israel with regard to the conflict. In this sense “the Geneva initiative stands against the unilateral moves that Israel is imposing on the Palestinians, and against the approach that the conflict is to be managed instead of resolved” (Klein 2007: VIII). The Geneva Accord presents political solutions to all final-status issues of the conflict. The political solution that the Geneva Accord suggests revolves around the main points of recognition of Palestine and Israel as the homelands of their respective peoples and a Palestinian sovereignty over the al-Haram al-Sharīf / ‘the Temple Mount’ and an Israeli sovereignty over ‘the Wailing Wall’. With regard to borders, the two sides agree that the 4 June 1967 lines are the basis with reciprocal 1:1 modifications. Finally, although the Geneva Accord stipulates that resolving the Palestinian refugee problem will be based on UNGAR 194, UNSC Resolution 242 and the Arab Peace Initiative, it makes it clear that the permanent place of residence options from which the refugees may choose is one of five options: 1) the state of Palestine 2) Areas in Israel being transferred to Palestine in the land swap 3) third countries 4) Israel – subject to Israeli decision – or 5) present host countries.

59 Daniel Levy “was a senior policy advisor to Yossi Beilin and a member of the Israeli negotiation team in the second Oslo negotiations and in Taba” (Schiff 2010: 100).

60 Ra’ith al-Omari was “a legal advisor for the Palestinian negotiation team since 1999. He participated in all negotiation rounds on the final status agreement, including Camp David and Taba” (Schiff 2010: 100).
The Geneva Accord was negotiated and drafted in English, as it is the common language between the Israeli and Palestinian negotiating teams. The English-speaking politicians and policymakers – including governments and organizations (e.g. the US government, the United Nations, the European Union, etc.) – who are interested in resolving the conflict qualify as the ‘main addressees’ of the English source text, i.e. known, ratified and directly addressed ‘participants’. The Palestinian and Israeli governments as well as non-governmental political stakeholders, such as the different Palestinian factions or the Israeli opposition, are the ‘auditors’, i.e. known and ratified, but not directly addressed readers. Finally, media outlets as well as other translating and publishing institutions qualify as ‘overhearers’, insofar as their presence is known but they are neither ratified nor addressed by the authors of the text.

The English source text has an informative and referential function: it presents to the international community what has been agreed on. This text is used for publicity and promotion purposes. Also, it represents the authoritative version and the main reference in the case of any future disputes vis-à-vis implementing the agreement.

The Geneva Accord was criticized by many Israeli politicians and commentators, most notably by Shlomo Avineri (2003), Moty Cristal (2004) and Susser (2003), particularly with regard to the issue of Israel as a Jewish state. Some of these criticisms were based on the Hebrew translation of the document which the Israeli team distributed to the Israeli public. These critics accused the drafters of the initiative of lying and misleading the Israeli public (cf. Chapter 6.3).

### 3.2.3 Translations and Institutions

The Palestinian-Israeli Peace initiatives were translated into Arabic, English and Hebrew by a variety of institutions and news media – inside as well as outside the Middle East – for different readerships and functions. There exist 31 language versions of these peace initiatives. Institutions responsible for the production of these versions can be classified as international organizations, governmental institutions, non-governmental organizations and mass media. Drawing on Bell’s (1984) model of ‘audience design’, it can be argued that translations of peace initiatives, the same as original source text of peace initiatives, address a multi-layered audience. In the following, the profiles of the institutions responsible for the production and publication of these translations, in addition to the audience design and functions of translations, will be explained.
**International Institutions**

The United Nations (UN) is the only international organization that produced translations of peace initiatives in the corpus. The UN translated and published on its website an Arabic translation of the Roadmap Plan in fulfilment of its language policy, whereby institutional documents must be translated into its five official languages, including Arabic (cf. Chapter 6.2.1). The ‘main addressees’ of this translation are the Arab-speaking members of the UN Security Council – as confirmed by the letter that Kofi Anan, the UN Secretary General at the time this version was produced, enclosed to the translation asking for it to be forwarded to the relevant Security Council members (cf. Chapter 4.4.1). Global media outlets, governments, non-governmental organizations, researchers and any interested Arabic-speaking individual qualify as ‘overhearers’ of the UN Arabic translation. The main function of this translation – commissioned for internal circulation – is largely informative. Table 3.1 shows the place and date of publication of this translation.

**Table 3.1 Translations published by International Institutions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Translation publisher</th>
<th>Initiative</th>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Place of Publication</th>
<th>Date of publication</th>
</tr>
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</table>

**Governmental Institutions**

Five governmental institutions were involved in the production of translations of peace initiatives. These institutions – in alphabetical order – are Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (IMFA), the Knesset, the League of Arab States (LAS), the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the US Department of State (USDS). Table 3.2 lists the places and dates of publications of these translations.

**Table 3.2 Translations published by Governmental Institutions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Translation publisher</th>
<th>Initiative</th>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Place of publication</th>
<th>Date of publication</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (IMFA)</td>
<td>The Roadmap Plan</td>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td><a href="http://www.altawasul.com">www.altawasul.com</a></td>
<td>30 April 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Knesset</td>
<td>The Roadmap Plan</td>
<td>Hebrew</td>
<td><a href="http://www.knesset.gov.il">www.knesset.gov.il</a></td>
<td>30 April 2003</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The first institution, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (IMFA) (Hebrew: ‘משרד החוץ’), published an Arabic translation of the Roadmap Plan on its Arabic-language website ‘التواصل’ (altawāsul, lit. ‘interaction’) whose content is available, beside Arabic, in Hebrew, English and Farsi. Altawāsul is “intended to expose audiences in the Arab world to information about Israel, addressing Israel’s neighbors in their own language, and to provide a platform for dialogue with the Arab world”.

The ‘main addressees’ of this translation – which has both an informative and a persuasive function – are Arab visitors to the website, particularly those based in Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories.

The second institution, the Israeli Parliament – the Knesset (Hebrew: ‘הכנסת’) – also translated the Roadmap Plan but into Hebrew and made it available on its website for internal circulation. The ‘main addressees’ of this translation were therefore members of the Israeli Parliament and other officials of different political persuasions, with the Israeli media qualifying as potential ‘auditors’. The function of this translation is to inform Israeli legislators about the provisions contained in the Roadmap Plan.

The third institution, the League of Arab States (Arabic: ‘جامعة الدول العربية’) (LAS), released an official English translation of the Arab Peace Initiative to the media at the conclusion of the Arab Summit in Beirut on 28 March 2002. The ‘main addressees’ of this translation were therefore English-speaking audiences (e.g. journalists, reporters, politicians, etc.). The function of this translation was informative, i.e. to inform journalists, reporters, etc. about the details of the Arab Peace Initiative.

The fourth institution, the Palestinian Authority (Arabic: ‘السلطة الفلسطينية’ (PA), published a Hebrew translation of the Arab Peace Initiative as a full-page advertisement in four major Israeli newspapers, Ha’aretz, Yedioth Aharonot, Yisrael Hayom and Ma’arive (cf. Chapter 4.2). The ‘main addressees’ of this translation were the Israeli public. The Arab Peace Initiative – after its release in English – received little attention in Israel and more than this, it was dismissed as danger to the state of Israel. This was the main reason behind the publication of the Hebrew translation in major Israeli newspapers, i.e. to explain the details of the initiative to the Israeli public in order to win their support.

The fifth institution, the US Department of State (USDS), published an Arabic translation of the Roadmap Plan on its official website. This translation is aimed at a global Arabic-speaking readership, i.e. its ‘main addressee’. The Palestinian Authority and international media outlets, on the other hand, are the ‘auditors’ of the translation, as their presence is known and ratified but they are not directly addressed. In that the primary aim of this translation is to make the original English text available to readers in a different language, it has an informative and referential function.

Non-Governmental Organizations

Six non-governmental organizations were involved in the production of translations of peace initiatives and they are – in alphabetical order – the Gush-Shalom organization, National Consensus (NC), People’s Campaign for Peace and Democracy (PCPD), Peace Now and Yes to an Agreement (YA). Table 3.3 shows the list of the Arabic, English and Hebrew translations and their dates of publications.

Table 3.3 Translations published by Non-Governmental Organizations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Translation publisher</th>
<th>Initiative</th>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Place of publication</th>
<th>Date of publication</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Organization and Initiative</td>
<td>Language</td>
<td>Website</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Palestinian Peace Coalition (PPC)</td>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td><a href="http://www.al-ayyam.com">www.al-ayyam.com</a></td>
<td>1 November 2003</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The People’s Campaign for Peace and Democracy (PCPD)</td>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td><a href="http://www.hashd.org">www.hashd.org</a></td>
<td>27 July 2002</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace Now</td>
<td>Hebrew</td>
<td><a href="http://www.peacenow.org.il">www.peacenow.org.il</a></td>
<td>5 October 2008</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Arab Peace Initiative</td>
<td>Hebrew</td>
<td><a href="http://www.peacenow.org.il">www.peacenow.org.il</a></td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Roadmap Plan</td>
<td>Hebrew</td>
<td><a href="http://www.peacenow.org.il">www.peacenow.org.il</a></td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes to an Agreement (YA)</td>
<td>Hebrew</td>
<td><a href="http://www.Heskem.org.il">www.Heskem.org.il</a></td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first non-governmental organization, the Gush-Shalom (Hebrew: 'גוש שלום'; lit. ‘the Peace Bloc’), made Arabic and English language versions of its peace proposal available on its website, whose content – beside Arabic and English – is available in Hebrew and Russian. On the one hand, ‘فلسطينيو 1948’ (lit. ‘the Palestinian of 1948’) or ‘عرب الداخل’ (lit. ‘Arabs of the inside’) constitute the ‘main addressees’ of the Arabic language version, i.e. known, ratified and directly addressed ‘participants’. On the other hand, the Palestinian government and public are the ‘auditors’ of this version, i.e. known and ratified, but not directly addressed readers. Finally, Arab governments and media qualify as the ‘overhearers’, insofar as their presence is known but they are neither ratified nor addressed by the authors of the text. As the analysis in chapter 5.7 shows, this translation fulfils both an informative and a persuasive function as it appeals to the Arab-Israeli public to win their support.

The ‘main addressees’ of the English version are the general English-speaking visitors to the website who are based in Israel, the Middle East and the world. This version has an

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62 This term refers to Palestinians who remained in their homes (and their descendants) in what became Israel after 1948. They constitute approximately 1.3 million (nearly 20% of Israel’s population) (Bassiouni and Ben Ami 2009: 227).

63 This term is preferred by Palestinian nationalists who live in Israel because it implies that “the State of Palestine still exists and that some Palestinians are outside of Palestine, while others are still inside” (Bassiouni and Ben Ami 2009: 227).
informative function, providing the organisation’s members and supporters with access to the content of the document originally negotiated in Hebrew.

Translators of these two language versions are anonymous. Gush-Shalom depends on volunteer translators from all over the world. This is evident, for example, in e-mails circulated by the organization and others calling for volunteer translators to help in translating documents in various languages, including Arabic (cf. Chapter 6.2.3). After July 2004, on the one hand, the first Arabic and English versions of the proposal – under the title “peace agreement, draft proposal” – were replaced by other Arabic and English versions under the title of “declaration of principles for peace agreement, draft proposal for Israeli-Palestinian discussion”. On the other hand, the Hebrew original text remained the same. These two language versions, as well as the original Hebrew text, are labelled as ‘versions’ (cf. Chapter 4.3) and presented as equals on the Arabic, English and Hebrew websites of the organization.

The second organization, the National Consensus (NC) (Hebrew: ‘המיסקן הלאומי’), published on its website two translations, one Hebrew and one Arabic of the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles. The National Consensus (NC) and the People’s Campaign for Peace and Democracy (PCPD), were established by the two drafters of the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles, Ami Ayalon and Sari Nusseibeh, exclusively for the purpose of marketing the initiative to the Israeli and Palestinian public, and ultimately, win their support for its main points. The Hebrew translation was produced by Ami Ayalon whereas the Arabic one (published on the website of the People’s Campaign for Peace and Democracy with some changes, see below) was produced by Sari Nusseibeh. On the one hand, the ‘main addressees’ of the Hebrew translation – which has a mainly referential and informative function – are the Israeli public as they are ratified and directly addressed, with Israeli government and media qualifying as potential ‘auditors’, i.e. known but not directly addressed. On the other hand, the ‘main addressees’ of the Arabic translation – which also has a mainly referential and informative function – are the Palestinian of 1948.

The third organization, the People’s Campaign for Peace and Democracy (PCPD) (Arabic: ‘الحملة الشعبية للسلام و الديمقراطية’), as mentioned above, was established in order to promote the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles to the Palestinian public. The ‘main addressees’ of Arabic translation published on the website of this organization are the
Palestinian public in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, as their presence is known, ratified and directly addressed. The Palestinian government and Palestinian media qualify as potential ‘auditors’ of this translation as their presence is known and ratified but not directly addressed. This translation has a persuasive function, which is reflected in one statement by Sari Nusseibeh: “we try to persuade people that this is in our self-interest and to join” (Nusseibeh 2003).

This Arabic translation differs from the one published on the website of the National Consensus (NC) in the sense that it contains an added introduction by Sari Nusseibeh (cf. Chapter 4.4.3). This introduction, as Delyani (2005) explains, was meant to give the Palestinian people an idea about what they were about to read and sign on. Moreover, this introduction also has ideological and political significance as it presents claims of each side of the conflict to land, whether historical or religious, as equal (see analysis on ‘historical claims to land’, cf. Chapter 5.6.1). A number of organizations, both governmental, for example, the Palestinian Negotiations Affairs Department, and non-governmental, for example, Meretz USA for Israeli Civil Rights and Peace and the Jewish Peace Lobby, added this introduction in English and treated it as part of the original initiative. This introduction is referred to on the websites of these organizations as the ‘cover letter’ of the initiative.

The two drafters, Sari Nusseibeh and Ami Ayalon, worked on getting large numbers of Israeli and Palestinian citizens to sign their one-page statement of principles (Klein 2007: 172-173). However, citizens on both sides would sign on translations and not the original English text. Ultimately, by having the majority of the two peoples signing this statement or petition, the drafters hoped to influence the political process from grassroots (Klein 2007: 28) and, consequently, drive their leaders to conclude a peace agreement based on the principles they were proposing.

The fourth organization, Peace Now (Hebrew: ‘שלום עכשיו’), published on its website two Hebrew translations of peace initiatives, one of the Arab Peace Initiative and one of the

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Roadmap Plan. *Peace Now* is the largest and oldest extra-parliamentary peace movement in Israel. This left-wing organization views “peace, compromise, and appeasement with the Palestinians and with our Arab neighbors as crucial to the future of our country and to maintain our security and the nature of the State of Israel”.67 The ‘main addressees’ of these two Hebrew translations are members and supporters of the organisation who share its ideological and political stance on the Palestine-Israel conflict. ‘Auditors’ of this translation include the wider Israeli public, the Israeli government and politicians; all other Hebrew-speaking readers, both inside and outside Israel, qualify as ‘overhearers’.

On the one hand, the Hebrew translation of the Arab Peace Initiative – that was produced by Professor Ilai Alon – has a persuasive function. This persuasive function can clearly be seen in the introduction and notes that Alon added to the text of the Arab Peace Initiative in order to appeal to the Israeli readers and win their support (cf. Chapter 4.4.3 and Chapter 4.7). Alon – who is a professor of Philosophy at Tel Aviv University and author on issues of negotiations in the Arab World and Islamic political thought – published his translation under the title of ‘הליגה הקישה על דלתנו, ואנו הודענו/from our door and we answered that we are not at home’) Alon – as the title of article suggests – is trying to convince the Israeli readers that the Arab Peace Initiative deserves serious consideration.

On the other hand, the Hebrew translation of the Roadmap Plan – that was produced by Hagit Ofran68 – has an informative function, providing the members and supporters of the organisation with access to the content of the initiative originally negotiated in English. Ofran is the director of the Peace Now watchdog on Jewish settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (cf. Chapter 6.2.3).

Finally, the Israeli organization, Yes to an Agreement (YA) (Hebrew: ‘כן להסכם’ and the Palestinian organization, the Palestinian Peace Coalition (PPC) (Arabic: ‘تحالف السلام’ and ‘الفلسطيني’ – which were launched simultaneously in order to promote the Geneva Accord to the Israeli and Palestinian public (Klein 2007: 7) – produced one Hebrew and one Arabic translation of the accord respectively. The Yes to an Agreement (YA), besides publishing

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68 For a short bio data of Hagit Ofran and a sample of her activity as a blogger, see http://www.huffingtonpost.com/hagit-ofran [last accessed: 24 November 2011].
the Hebrew translation on its website, mailed it (also in Arabic and Russian) to two million households in Israel as part of its marketing campaign. Therefore, the ‘main addressees’ of this translation are Israeli readers of all political affiliations as their presence is known, ratified and directly addressed. Israeli government and media qualify as ‘auditors’ of this translation as their presence is known and ratified but not directly addressed.

The Palestinian Peace Coalition (PPC), unlike the Israeli partner, could not mail the document to every Palestinian home in the Occupied Palestinian Territories as “the mail did not function properly because of the occupation” (Klein 2006: 14). Instead, the Palestinian organization disseminated the Arabic translation to the Palestinian public through publishing it in a special weekend supplement in the Palestinian newspaper, Al-Ayyam. The ‘main addressees’ of the Arabic translation are the Palestinian readers of all political affiliations in the Occupied Palestinian Territories as their presence is known, ratified and directly addressed. ‘Auditors’ of this translation include the Palestinian government and media as their presence is known and ratified but not directly addressed; all other Arabic-speaking readers, outside the Occupied Palestinian Territories, qualify as ‘overhearers’.

The drafters of the Geneva Accord had public opinion in their minds from the outset and thus, decided to put the agreement before their respective public (Klein 2006: 6). That is why the two marketing campaigns and packages were launched simultaneously. Arabic and Hebrew translation of the accord played a major role in these two campaigns. They fulfil both informative and persuasive functions, i.e. providing the public, on both sides, with access to the content of the document originally negotiated in English and persuading and eliciting the public to support the initiative. Ultimately, the political leaders on both sides would be persuaded to adopt the initiative after it has been “accepted by large portions of the public on each side and by the international public opinion” (Klein 2007: 16).

The persuasive function of the Arabic and Hebrew translations is reflected in shifts between the source and target texts (cf. Chapter 5.3.2, 5.5 and 5.6.4) and the carefully drafted summary of the accord which the Israeli negotiating team mailed along with the Hebrew translation. This summary focuses on what is considered as the selling points of the agreement:
In the agreement, the Palestinians recognize the right of the Jewish people to its state. They also recognize Israeli as our national home. Around 300,000 Israelis who live today across the Green Line will stay in their homes and within the agreed borders of the state of Israel. In return of annexing the bloc of settlements, the neighbourhoods in East Jerusalem, and the security zones, Israel transfers to Palestinians alternative territories on the basis of one to one. The Palestinians will recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. The Western Wall and the Jewish quarter will be under full Israeli sovereignty. The Palestinians recognize the historic link and the unique significance of the Temple Mount to the Jewish people. Guaranteed free access to Israelis to the Temple Mount. International Verification group enforces the prohibition of digging or building in the Temple Mount. There is no right of return of Palestinian refugees to Israel in this agreement.

These points are of significant political and ideological importance. For example, the claim of Israeli sovereignty over the ‘Western Wall’ in point five in the above summary explains the shift in the Hebrew translation of the Yes to an Agreement from ‘the Wailing Wall’ to ‘המערבי המערבי’ (lit. ‘the Western Wall’) (cf. Chapter 5.3.2), while the claim that the Palestinian negotiating team recognized Israel as a Jewish state in point one of the summary explains the translation shift from ‘homelands’ to ‘בית הלאום’ (lit. ‘the national home’) (cf. Chapter 5.4.1). Of particular interest is the latter translation shift which was the subject of a heated political debate in Israel (cf. Chapter 6.3).

**Mass Media**

In this thesis, mass media is classified into three main categories: newspapers, news agencies and online networks. To begin with, four newspapers, two Palestinian ones, *Al-Ayyam* and *Al-Quds* and two Israeli ones, *Ha’aretz* and *Yediot Aharonot*, were responsible for the production of Arabic and Hebrew translations of peace initiatives. Table 3.4 shows the list of these translations – in alphabetical order – and their dates and places of publications.
Table 3.4 Translations published by Israeli and Palestinian newspapers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Translation publisher</th>
<th>Initiative</th>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Place of publication</th>
<th>Date of publication</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Initiative The Roadmap Plan</td>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td><a href="http://www.alquds.com">www.alquds.com</a></td>
<td>1 May 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ha’aretz newspaper</td>
<td>The Arab Peace Initiative</td>
<td>Hebrew</td>
<td><a href="http://www.haaretz.co.il">www.haaretz.co.il</a></td>
<td>28 March 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles</td>
<td>Hebrew</td>
<td><a href="http://www.haaretz.co.il">www.haaretz.co.il</a></td>
<td>2 September 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Roadmap Plan</td>
<td>Hebrew</td>
<td><a href="http://www.haaretz.co.il">www.haaretz.co.il</a></td>
<td>1 May 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yediot Aharonot newspaper</td>
<td>The Arab Peace</td>
<td>Hebrew</td>
<td><a href="http://www.ynet.co.il">www.ynet.co.il</a></td>
<td>6 December 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Plan</td>
<td>Hebrew</td>
<td><a href="http://www.ynet.co.il">www.ynet.co.il</a></td>
<td>1 May 2003</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first newspaper, the Palestinian Al-Ayyam, published one Arabic translation of the Geneva Accord. Al-Ayyam (Arabic: ‘الأيام’, lit. ‘the days’) is an independent Palestinian daily newspaper with the second largest circulation in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. It began to appear in December 1995 and introduced “new printing and layout technology” (Jamal 2000: 48). Al-Ayyam is considered to be close to the Palestinian Authority (PA). It “hews to the PA line even while maintaining a critical distance” (Jamal 2000: 49). Al-Ayyam targets “a discerning readership of intellectuals”\(^{69}\)” in the Occupied Palestinian Territories.

The choice of publishing the Geneva Accord in the Al-Ayyam newspaper, instead of other Palestinian newspapers, e.g. Al-Quds, was politically motivated. Leaders of the Palestinian private sector own Al-Ayyam newspaper and although nominally independent, its chief editor, Akram Haniya, was a long-time advisor to the late Palestinian president Yasser

Arafat (Jamal 2000: 49). Moreover, Haniya and Yasser Abed Rabbo (one of the two drafters of the agreement) are long-time friends and share the same political views. This choice is an example of alliances formed between various political and social agents in order to achieve certain political purposes.

This translation – which was published in a special supplement distributed with the newspaper – has both an informative and a persuasive function. Firstly, it provides Palestinian readers with information on what has been agreed on in the English source text. Secondly, it attempts to elicit the support of the Palestinian public to the agreement.

The second newspaper, the Palestinian Al-Quds (Arabic: ‘القدس’, lit. ‘Jerusalem’), published one Arabic translation of the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles and one of the Roadmap Plan. Al-Quds is an independent Palestinian daily newspaper with the largest circulation in the West Bank (including Occupied East Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip (Jamal 2000: 46). The readership of Al-Quds consists of Palestinian readers of all political affiliations, although it is widely regarded as more of a left-wing newspaper which “is daily subject to Israeli censorship”, owing to its location in East Jerusalem. Moreover, although it supports the Palestinian Authority and the “peace process” between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, it has “an intentional lack of orientation to any clear political faction” (Alimi 2007: 89).

Al-Quds translation of the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles has both informative and persuasive functions. On the one hand, it informs Palestinian readers about what was negotiated in English. On the other hand, it leads them to view the initiative from a particular point of view by including in the translation an evaluative introduction that frames the initiative negatively. The Arabic translation of the Roadmap has an informative function providing Palestinian readers as it contributes to disseminating the content of the original English text among Arabic-speaking Palestinian readers.


70 For a detailed account of the Israeli censorship of the Palestinian press in the occupied West Bank, see Najjar (1995).
71 Ibid.
Israeli paper founded in 1919 and is considered as the most ‘leftist’ and influential newspaper in Israel. Its readership, i.e. its ‘main addressees’, consist predominantly of the political and social elites with a left-of-centre political affiliation (Levin 2003: 33). Although, it embraces a moderate liberal stance, the op-ed pages of the paper are open to a wide variety of political opinions. Israeli politicians, academics and researchers qualify as ‘auditors’ of this translation, while Palestinian media outlets such as Al-Quds and Al-Ayyam – that have the custom of translating articles and documents published by Israeli newspapers – are examples of potential ‘overhearers’. In fact, the Al-Quds newspaper’s Arabic translation of the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles was based on the Ha’aretz Hebrew translation of the same initiative. The three translations of Ha’aretz broadly fulfil an informative and referential function, i.e. presenting Israeli readers with negotiated peace initiatives in the Hebrew language.

Finally, the Israeli daily newspaper Yediot Aharonot published one Hebrew translation of the Arab Peace Initiative and one Hebrew translation of the Roadmap Plan. Yediot Aharonot (Hebrew: ‘ידיעות אחרונות’, lit. ‘evening news’) – founded in 1939 – is a tabloid format-paper which “dominates the market, reaching more than two-thirds of all Israelis” (Caspi and Limor 1999 quoted in Levin 2003: 31) and gives space to commentators from the political right and left. The ‘main addressees’ of the two translations consist of Israeli readers with secular centrist political affiliation. Potential ‘auditors’ and ‘overhearers’ of these two translations are the same as those of the translations of the Ha’aretz translations. The function of the Yediot Aharonot translations is informative.

**News Agencies**

Two news agencies, CNN and Reuters, were responsible for the production and publication of Arabic and English translations of peace initiatives. Table 3.5 shows a list of these translations and their dates and places of publication.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Translation publisher</th>
<th>Initiative</th>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Place of publication</th>
<th>Date of publication</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

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CNN published the Roadmap in Arabic and the Arab Peace Initiative in English, whereas Reuters published the Arab Peace Initiative in English. CNN (Cable News Network) is a major American news television network founded in 1980 that is widely considered as the main cable news source in the United States of America. It also provides news to other media outlets. Reuters is regarded as the world's largest international multimedia news agency that provides various types of news, e.g. headline news, political, business, technology, etc.

As the Arabic translation of the Roadmap was published on the Arabic website of CNN, the ‘main addressees’ of this version were Arabic-speaking audiences all over the world. ‘Auditors’ of this translation – which also has a mainly referential and informative function – include other media outlets in the Arab world as well as Arab governments and politicians. The ‘main addressees’ of the English translations of the Arab Peace Initiative that were published by CNN and Reuters are English-speaking audiences all over the world. ‘Auditors’ of this translation – which also mainly fulfils a referential and informative function – include other media outlets in the English-speaking world as well as western governments and politicians.

**Online Networks**

Finally, five online networks\(^73\) were involved in the publication of language versions of peace initiatives. These are – in alphabetical order – Al-eman (Arabic: ‘الإيمان’), Almtym (Arabic: ‘شبكة المتيم’), Baheth Center (Arabic: ‘مركز بحث’), God Bless Israel (GBI) and Haayal Hakore (Hebrew: ‘האייל הקורא’). Table 3.6 lists the Arabic and Hebrew translations and the details of their publication.

\(^73\) Names of these networks are the same as the originals.
Table 3.6 Translations published by Online Networks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Translation publisher</th>
<th>Initiative</th>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Place of publication</th>
<th>Date of publication</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nusseibeh</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>declaration of Principles</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Almtym</td>
<td>The Roadmap Plan</td>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td><a href="http://www.almtym.com">www.almtym.com</a></td>
<td>2 June 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baheth Center</td>
<td>The Ayalon-Nusseibeh</td>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td><a href="http://www.bahethcenter.net">www.bahethcenter.net</a></td>
<td>6 August 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>declaration of Principles</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haayal Hakore</td>
<td>The Arab Peace Initiative</td>
<td>Hebrew</td>
<td><a href="http://www.haayal.co.il">www.haayal.co.il</a></td>
<td>4 April 2002</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first online network, Al-eman, published an Arabic translation of the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles. This online network largely discusses Islamic topics such as interpretations of the Quran and Hadith. The ‘main addressees’ of this translation – which fulfils a persuasive function as evident in its introduction (cf. Chapter 4.4.4) – are thus Muslims who speak Arabic from all over the world.

The second online network, Almtym, published an Arabic translation of the Roadmap Plan. The ‘main addressees’ of this translation are the Arabic-speaking visitors to this website. This translation has an informative function as it provides information about the Roadmap in Arabic.

The third online network, Baheth Center, published an Arabic translation of the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles. Baheth Center is a non-profit strategic research centre which was established in 2002 “upon an initiative taken by a group interested in the issues of researching and compiling and concerned with their nation’s causes primarily the Palestinian cause”.74 The goal of this centre is as follows:

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Propagating and deepening the scientific awareness of the nature of Zionist project - Zionist entity - Zionist International Movement - Zionist lobbies - Zionist Messianic - Zionist entity’s foreign relations etc. in addition to contributing with building up the Palestinian national resistant project as a part of nation’s project of settling up its future.

The website of this centre is available in both Arabic and English. The centre published Arabic translations of the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles and the Geneva Accord only. The translation of the Geneva Accord is an Arabic translation of its first draft which was translated from Hebrew and circulated as the translation of the accord by some websites. The translation of the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles is based on the Hebrew translation published by Ha’aretz newspaper as it has the same cover letter which Ha’aretz newspaper published.

The fourth online network, God Bless Israel (GBI), is an American-based online network. The website is available in both English and Hebrew. The ‘main addressees’ of the Hebrew translation are a religious and far right Hebrew-speaking audience. This website discusses religious topics such as the Old Testament. It also discusses important political issues concerning the Jewish people and the state of Israel.

Finally, Haayal Hakore published a Hebrew translation of the Arab Peace Initiative on its website. Haayal Hakore is an Israeli online magazine for culture and current affairs. The website of this online magazine – established in 1999 – “sports a Slashdot-style response-engine with several enhancements which allow for discussions lasting for hundreds and sometimes thousands of replies, over months or even years”. This feature of the website – i.e. allowing for discussions explains the introduction added to Hebrew translation of the Arab Peace Initiative published on this website (cf. Chapter 4.4.4). The ‘main addressees’ of this translation are mainly Hebrew-speaking visitors to the website in Israel. This translation fulfils both an informative as well as a persuasive function. In that the primary aim of this translation is to make the original Arabic text available to readers in a different language, it has an informative and referential function. However, encouraging Israeli readers to consider the Arab Peace Initiative and to join the debate on its main points makes this translation fulfil a persuasive function too.

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75 Ibid.
3.3 Methodology of the Study

This thesis operates within the framework of product-oriented Descriptive Translation Studies (Lambert and Van Gorp 1985) and Critical Discourse Analysis (Fairclough 1992). In linking textual profiles to conditions of text production, the analysis is an example of causal models as described by Chesterman (1997).

Methodologically, the thesis pursues a top-down approach towards the analysis of data. It begins with presenting the socio-cultural and political contexts of the production of the original versions of the respective peace initiatives (the source texts) and their different language versions (target texts), focusing on their underlying functions and principles of audience design. It then moves to examine how language versions of peace initiatives reflect aspects of ideology, political affiliation and power relations at the macro- and micro-structural levels. The final step is to go beyond description to explanation of textual profiles by accounting for these aspects in terms of institutional conditions and constraints of text production. This methodology will be used to provide answers to the main research questions of the thesis:

1) What are the key characteristic features of peace initiatives as politically negotiated texts?
2) What happens to these texts in translation?
3) How do the translations of peace initiatives reflect aspects of ideology, political affiliation and power relations?
4) How can these aspects of ideology, political affiliation and power relations be accounted for in terms of the socio-political and institutional conditions of the production of the translations?

The first three questions concern the description of language versions of peace initiatives (target texts) as products. This research is product-oriented because the focus here is on translations (target texts) as products in their socio-cultural contexts rather than translation agency or translation process. Detailed information about the last two is not available. The fourth question concerns how translations of peace initiatives as products are (re)framed and (re)contextualized in different institutional settings for different purposes and readerships. This highlights the roles translations play during situations of ongoing contemporary conflict depending on the institutional context in which it is presented and the purposes it sets to serve. In the following three sub-sections, the three models comprising the methodology of the study will be discussed in more detail.

77 The terms ‘translation’ and ‘language version’ will be used interchangeably in this thesis.
3.3.1 Lambert and Van Gorp’s Descriptive Model

The descriptive translation scholars, José Lambert and Hendrik Van Gorp (1985), have developed an analytical model for “the comparison of the ST and TT literary systems and for the description of relations within them” (Munday 2008: 119). Although this model was developed initially for literary translation and predominantly used by scholars in literary translation, it can be applied – to some extent – to other types of texts or genres such as politically negotiated texts.

Lambert and Van Gorp (1985) propose to move from a description of preliminary data (e.g. title page, layout, paratext, completeness) towards macro- and micro-structural data (e.g. text division, titles and linguistic choices). For the purposes of this study, macro-structural analysis is discussed under the heading *textual organization*, whereas micro-structural analysis is discussed under *textual analysis*.

The analysis of textual organization of the various translation profiles of peace initiatives aims to show how components of textual organization of these texts – e.g. layouts and covers, paratexts, chapter heading, etc. (sections 4.1-4.7) – reflect ideological and political positions. Questions of particular interest in this context include: are these texts complete, i.e. are there any omissions or additions? Do the various language versions of these texts have the same chapter headings? Are there any prefaces, footnotes, or translator’s notes? These questions lie within the framework of Descriptive Translation Studies (e.g. Lambert and Van Gorp 1985) (cf. Chapter 4).

The textual analysis aims to account for how aspects of ideology, political affiliation and power relations at play in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict manifest themselves on these language versions. Selection for data examples will be based on a detailed comparison between target and source texts and identified characteristic features of peace initiatives as negotiated texts (e.g. use of ambiguous formulations, proper names, modality, politically sensitive terms, etc.) in the literature (e.g. Translation Studies, negotiation theory, etc.). For classifying translation strategies, Chesterman’s (1997) categories will be used.

3.3.2 Causal Model

The Translation Studies scholar, Andrew Chesterman (2000: 16) points out that in Translation Studies three basic models are used: comparative, process and causal. The Comparative Model is a product-oriented one that is centred on a relation of equivalence or
identity between two entities – i.e. source and target text (Chesterman 2000: 16). According to Chesterman, this relation has been found to be “an inaccurate representation of translation” and thus the relation between two texts is better described as more of similarity or difference (2000: 16). A comparative model makes it possible to formulate statements about ‘language-pair translation rules’, ‘language-system contrasts’, or ‘translation product universals’ (Chesterman 2000: 17).

The process model examines translation as a process rather than a product. This model is useful if a researcher is interested in “sequential relations between different phases of the translation process” (Chesterman 2000: 18). Such a model makes it possible to formulate statements about typical translation behavior and possible process universals (Chesterman 2000: 18).

These two models, i.e. comparative and process, though they may be open to a causal interpretation, they cannot be considered as ‘explicitly causal’ (Chesterman 2000: 18). They help in describing translation as both a product and a process but they do not answer questions of ‘why the translation looks the way it does’ or ‘what effects it causes’ (Chesterman 2000: 19). Questions asked by these two models are thus of ‘what’ and ‘when’ rather than ‘why’. The causal model as developed by Chesterman (1998, 2000) (see Figure 3.1 below) makes it possible to formulate statements and hypotheses about causes and effects of translations – i.e. questions of ‘why’. These statements, according to Chesterman (2000: 21), can be made based on answers in response to questions such as the following:

- Why is this translation the way it is?
- Why do people react like this to that translation?
- Why did this translator write that?
- Why did translators at that time in that culture translate like that?
- How do translations affect cultures?
- What causal conditions give rise to translations that people like/d (What people…?)
- Why do people think this is a translation?
- What will happen if I translate like this?

The causal model would thus link “causal conditions, translation profile features and translation effects” (Chesterman 2000: 26).
The aim of this thesis is to go beyond describing the different textual profiles of peace initiatives to explaining these profiles with reference to their socio-political, historical and institutional conditions and constraints of text production. The causal model is useful here, as product-oriented Descriptive Translation Studies (DTS) does not offer answers about causes and effects of translations. However, the causal model as developed by Chesterman does not account for (re)contextualization and (re)framing processes. In this way, this thesis contributes to causal models in translation (cf. Chapter 7).

### 3.3.3 Fairclough Three-dimensional Discourse Analytical Model

Translation in this thesis is regarded as a social practice governed and controlled by institutions (cf. Chapter 6). This thesis examines aspects of ideology, political affiliation and power relations as realised in translations of politically negotiated texts, i.e. Palestinian-Israeli peace initiatives in their socio-cultural, political and institutional contexts. For this purpose, the thesis applies Fairclough’s (1992, 1995) three-dimensional model of Critical Discourse Analysis. According to Fairclough (1995: 87), CDA “looks to establish connections between properties of texts, features of discourse practice (text production, consumption and distribution), and wider sociocultural practice”.

Fairclough’s model is designed for analysis in one language and one culture. This thesis applies this model twice, once for original text production where all the negotiations play a role and where English is the language of negotiations in the majority of cases, and then...
this model is applied to the context of translation production, i.e. Arabic, English and Hebrew. Fairclough’s model provides a useful framework for research on production and reception processes of more than one translation of one text. Furthermore, this model helps in accounting for translation as a socio-cultural activity and in identifying the social context in which text production and reception take place as well as the interaction between these elements. Finally, it makes it possible to move from text to the social context of translations.

In this model, Fairclough (1992: 2) proposes the following three dimensions for the analysis of discourse: analysis of texts, discourse practice (processes of text production, distribution and consumption) and analysis of discursive events as instances of sociocultural practice. These three analyses cover ‘text production’, ‘text interpretation’ and ‘institutional contexts’.

Figure 3.2: Fairclough’s Three-dimensional concept of Discourse (1992)

![Diagram showing Fairclough's three-dimensional concept of Discourse]

Firstly, ‘text production’ will be covered in chapter three under the heading of ‘corpus of the study’. In this section, the socio-cultural, political and institutional contexts of the production of the original versions of peace initiatives (i.e. the source texts) and their different language versions will be provided. This includes accounting for functions and principles of audience design of both source and target texts.
Secondly, ‘text interpretation’ (textual organization and textual analysis) will be covered in chapters 4 and 5. On the one hand, data analysis at the macro-structural level (cf. Chapter 4) focuses on describing the textual organization of translations of peace initiatives (target texts), e.g. layouts and covers, labels, introductions, maps, etc. On the other hand, data analysis at the micro-structural level (cf. Chapter 5) focuses on the mediation of a number of characteristic features of peace initiatives in translation, namely, naming practices (including protagonists of the conflict, holy places), instances of deliberately ambiguous or vague drafting, instances of intertextuality, modality, politically sensitive terms in addition to instances of addition and omission of information. The analysis aims to show how ideological factors inform translational choices as well as the interpretation of translated texts by readers. Full historical and political contexts of these translational choices are provided. This rigors work outside the text helps validate claims about what is in it and thus answers criticisms of bias (see below).

Finally, ‘institutional contexts’ will be covered in Chapter 6. This chapter aims at accounting for aspects of ideology, political affiliation and power relations (at macro- and micro- levels) in terms of institutional policies and practices. In other words, how translational choices reflect certain ideologies and policies of the publishing institutions. In linking aspects of ideology and power struggles to conditions of text production, the analysis is an example of causal models as described by Chesterman (1997).

There are a number of methodologies and theoretical frameworks through which analysis of translations of peace initiatives – as negotiated texts – can be conducted, including, pure Descriptive Analysis (e.g. Toury 1995), Narrative Theory (e.g. Baker 2006) and Critical Discourse Analysis (e.g. Fairclough 1992) (CDA hereafter). In the following, it will be explained why methods of CDA are the most promising for the purposes of this thesis.

To begin with, CDA is not one single or specific theory but broad and interdisciplinary in nature (Fairclough and Wodak 1997: 271) which derives from “quite different theoretical backgrounds, oriented towards different data and methodologies” (Wodak and Meyer 2009: 5). Three main approaches can be distinguished in CDA: socio-cognitive approach (e.g. Van Dijk 1988, 1991, 2001), discourse-historical approach (e.g. Reisigl and Wodak 2001; Wodak 2001) and social approach (e.g. Fairclough 1992, 1995, 2003).

78 For further overviews of CDA, see for example, Blommaert and Bulcaen (2000), Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999) and Reisigl and Wodak (2001).
This thesis applies Fairclough’s (1992, 1995) three-dimensional model of Critical Discourse Analysis. This model accounts for three levels of analysis: text production, text interpretation and institutional contexts. CDA is interested not only in what is produced (i.e. original source texts and translations of peace initiatives) but also how it is produced (i.e. institutional conditions of text production) and in the history and contexts that surround its production. In other words, CDA is interested in interpretation of data as well as processes of production. This allows peace initiatives and their translations to be situated within their wider context (i.e. the societal context).

Although the thesis applies Fairclough’s (1992) model, in providing further historical contextualization to aid interpretations of data examples, the linguistic analysis (cf. Chapter 5) is also an example of the discourse-historical approach as developed by Wodak (2001).

Methods of CDA are the most promising for the purposes of this thesis for a number of reasons. Firstly, this thesis shares with CDA its aims of revealing power relations and aspects of ideology in texts\(^79\) – considered as manifestations of social action and largely determined by social structures (Wodak and Meyer 2009: 10). Power – “the ability of people and institutions to control the behavior and material lives of others” (Fowler 1985: 61), particularly, power asymmetry – is a central concept for CDA (Wodak and Meyer 2009: 7). CDA aims at making explicit power relations that are often obscured and concealed (Wodak and Meyer 2009: 20). Power is realized in terms of “asymmetries between participants in discourse events” and in terms of “unequal capacity to control how texts are produced, distributed and consumed” (Fairclough 1995: 1). In the case of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the two sides of the conflict, i.e. the Palestinians and Israelis, are enormously unequal with opposing narratives and conflicting political and ideological positions (cf. Section 1.1.1). This affects the negotiation process between them and consequently the final product of such negotiations.

One important perspective in CDA – which is closely linked to the concept of power – is that “it is very rare that a text is the work of any one person. In texts, discursive differences are negotiated; they are governed by differences in power that is in part encoded in and

\(^{79}\) For Fairclough (1995: 4), a text can be either written or spoken language. For the purposes of this thesis, a text is regarded as written language only.
determined by discourse and by genre. Therefore, texts are often sites of struggle in that they show traces of differing discourses and ideologies contending and struggling for dominance” (Wodak and Meyer 2009: 10). This applies to Peace initiatives which are the work of many authors (e.g. local, regional, international). Political players involved in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict negotiate political solutions to the conflict. The final product of these negotiations, i.e. peace initiative, often reflects political compromises and asymmetric power relations of those players. The sensitivity of these compromises and asymmetric power relations are usually refracted in translation (cf. Chapter 5).

Ideology is another central concept for CDA. CDA aims at uncovering the “ideological loading of particular ways of using language and the relations of power which underlie them” (Fairclough and Wodak 1997: 258). As Schäffner (2004: 132) notes, in CDA, this is usually done based on discourse in one language and one culture whereas in the case of translation “textual features, ideological contexts, and underlying relations of power apply both to the source text and culture and to the target text and culture”. Aspects of ideology and power have been addressed in Translation Studies since what is termed the ‘cultural turn’ but mainly with regard to literary texts (e.g. Bassnett and Lefevere 1990; Tymoczko and Gentzler 2002; Venuti 1995). In this thesis, these aspects are examined in politically negotiated texts.

Secondly, CDA approaches and modern Translation Studies both focus on the on the social aspects of texts. CDA aims to establish “connections between properties of texts, features of discourse practice (text production, consumption and distribution), and wider sociocultural practice” (Fairclough 1995: 87). CDA views discourse—language use in speech and writing – as a social practice (Fairclough and Wodak 1997: 258) which is “both determined by social structure and contributes to stabilizing and changing that structure simultaneously” (Wodak and Meyer 2009: 7). In modern Translation Studies, translation is considered as a social practice in the hands of local agents to be studied in its socio-political and institutional contexts.

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80 Fairclough (1992: 3) points out that “[D]iscourse is a difficult concept, largely because there are so many conflicting and overlapping definitions formulated from various theoretical and disciplinary standpoints... ‘discourse’ is widely used in social theory and analysis, for example in the work of Michel Foucault, to refer to different ways of structuring areas of knowledge and social practice”.
Context is of significant importance to Critical Discourse Analysis which “deals with the study of text and talk in context” (Van Dijk 1999: 291). As Blackledge (2005: 6) notes, “[N]o text stands alone and outside its context. A text relates to features of the same text, to other texts which represent the same social event to other texts which make similar arguments, and to the broader socio-political and historical context within which the text was produced”.

Thirdly, methods of CDA provide tools and conceptual frameworks for rigorous textual analysis comprising linguistic analysis and intertextual analysis (Fairclough 1995: 185). Fairclough’s approach to discourse analysis is textually (and therefore linguistically) oriented (1992: 37). The focus on textual analysis suits one of the aims of this thesis which is on analysing the textual profiles of translations of peace initiatives.

Of particular interest to this thesis is that CDA approaches account for the intertextual nature of texts and the way they are embedded in socio-political contexts. Therefore, CDA approaches emphasize the significance of intertextual analysis as “a necessary complement to linguistic analysis within the analysis of texts” (Fairclough 1995: 8). Intertextuality – “how texts draw upon, incorporate, recontextualize and dialogue with other texts” (Fairclough 2003: 17) is key to the investigation of Peace initiatives which largely build on other peace proposals and agreements drafted throughout the history of the conflict and the language versions of these peace initiatives which show snatches of key documents of the conflict (cf. Chapter 5.).

Fourthly, CDA acknowledges that textual analysis is never exhaustive and thus more analysis is always possible. Fairclough (2003: 14) explains that “no analysis of a text can tell us all there is to be said about it – there is no such thing as a complete and definitive analysis of a text”. Textual analysis in this thesis is intended to account for the differences between language versions of peace initiatives (cf. Chapter 4) and how they reflect aspects of ideology, political affiliation and power relations (cf. Chapter 5). This analysis represents only one interpretation of these texts in open-ended interpretations. The interpretation provided in this thesis is never final, as the emergence of new information would lead to new interpretation of these texts.

Fifthly, CDA adopts a postmodern view that meanings are not fixed in texts themselves (Chilton 2004: 61) but derived from the readers’ interpretations based on “their
background knowledge and the information they already have about the subject in question” (Van Dijk 1993: 242).

This means that any text can be interpreted or understood in different ways and that these different understandings of the text stem from “different combinations of the properties of the text and the properties (social positioning, knowledge, values, etc.) of the interpreter” (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999: 67). Moreover, these processes of interpretations are continuous and not restricted to one and only one reading. Translations of peace initiatives continuously undergo processes of recontextualisation as they are published by various types of institutions, largely on the internet (cf. Chapter 6). A CDA framework gives room for this changing nature of translations of peace initiatives that may be affected by new readings and new contextual information that could become available in the future. This issue of meanings and interpretations of texts has been the subject of debate in Translation Studies between ‘essentialism’ and ‘non-essentialism’ (see for example, Olohan 2004: 6).

Sixthly, one of the tenants of CDA is that texts – as elements of social events – have ‘effect’, both social and political (Fairclough 1995: 208, 2003: 8); they play a role in social and political change. Fairclough (2003: 8) explains this effect as follows:

Most immediately, texts can bring about changes in our knowledge (we can learn things from them), our beliefs, our attitudes, values and so forth. They also have longer-term causal effects – one might for instance argue that prolonged experience of advertising and other commercial texts contributes to shaping people’s identities as ‘consumers’, or their gender identities. Texts can also start wars, or contribute to changes in education, or to changes in industrial relations, and so forth. Their effects can include changes in the material world, such as changes in urban design, or the architecture and design of particular types of buildings. In sum, texts have causal effects upon, and contribute to changes in, people (beliefs, attitudes, etc.), actions, social relations, and the material world.

Peace initiatives – as politically sensitive texts – and equally their translations play a crucial role in shaping public discourses, attitudes and ideological thinking during situations of ongoing contemporary conflict regarding and its future settlement.

Finally, CDA allows for the reflection on the analyst position without jeopardising academic ‘objectivity’ (cf. Chapter 3.3.3). As Wodak and Meyer (2009: 3) note, CDA researchers “attempt to make their own positions and interests explicit while retaining their respective scientific methodologies and while remaining self-reflective of their own research process”.

92
The discourse on translation and conflict belongs in the main to a branch of ‘committed approaches’ in Translation Studies, which while not promoting particular methods of translating, highlights the impossibility of neutrality and thus the necessity of recognizing the interventionist role of translators (Brownlie 2007: 135). CDA – a politically engaged form of discourse analysis – shares with modern Translation Studies, particularly, ‘committed approaches’ (e.g. Baker 2006, Hermans 1999), the conviction that “neutrality is an illusion” (Baker 2006: 128) and instead stresses the status of the analyst/translator as an active social agent.

The methodology of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) has received several criticisms. The main criticisms have to do with the social and political stand as well as bias of the analyst and the analysis (see for example, Billing 1999, Billing and Schegloff 1999; Schegloff 1997, 1999; Wetherell 1998; Widdowson 1996, 2004).

CDA has been criticized that it determines its research interests in advance (Meyer 2001: 15). Widdowson (1995) – one of the major critics of CDA – argues that CDA is “prejudiced on the basis of some ideological commitment, and then it selects for analysis such texts as will support the preferred interpretation” (Widdowson 1995: 169 quoted in Meyer 2001: 17). In other words, it is a biased interpretation. This opinion is shared by Schegloff who also argues that CDA analysts “project their own political biases and prejudices onto their data and analyse them accordingly” (Schegloff 1997 quoted in Blommaert and Bulcaen 2000: 455-456).

Fairclough (1996) in reply to Widdowson’s criticism points out that “CDA, unlike most other approaches, is always explicit about its own position and commitment” (quoted in Meyer 2001: 17). Moreover, CDA researchers try “to make their own positions and interests explicit while retaining their respective scientific methodologies and while remaining self-reflective of their own research process” (Wodak and Meyer 2009: 3).

CDA does not take itself as “objective” social science but as an “engaged and committed” one (Fairclough and Wodak 1997: 258). It promotes “interventionism in the social practices it critically investigates” (Blommaert and Bulcaen 2000: 449) and in fact, many CDA analysts are politically active against racism or as feminists, or within the peace movement, etc. (Fairclough and Wodak 1997: 258).
Fairclough (2003: 14), regarding accusations of bias, emphasizes the inevitable selective nature of textual analysis: “we choose to ask certain questions about social events and texts, and not other possible questions”. Therefore, “[T]here is no such thing as an ‘objective’ analysis of a text, if by that we mean an analysis which simply describes what is ‘there’ in the text without being ‘biased’ by ‘subjectivity’ of the analyst…our ability to know what is ‘there’ is inevitably limited and partial. And the questions we ask necessarily arise from particular motivations which go beyond what is ‘there’” (Fairclough 2003: 15).

Fairclough and Wodak (1997: 259) further defend CDA by arguing that by declaring its motives and interests in advance “does not imply that CDA is less scholarly than other research: standards of careful, rigorous and systematic analysis apply with equal force to CDA as to other approaches”. Thus, from CDA point of view, these prior interest or agenda are not seen as a shortcoming of CDA but as an advantage of it.

For Meyer (2001: 17) these criticisms are linked to the wider debate of whether it is possible to “perform any research free of a priori value judgment” and whether it is possible to possible to “gain insight from purely empirical data without using any performed categories of experience”.

The issue of “bias” has been of serious concern for the researcher from the outset of this research. This concern has originated from two preliminary points: first, the topic of research and second the profile of the researcher. First, the topic of this thesis – i.e. the Palestinian-Israeli conflict – is highly sensitive and complex. Translation Studies scholars, as Baker (2008: 11) points out, “by and large tend to shy away from dealing with issues relating to ongoing contemporary conflict of this type because they are inevitably controversial”. This controversy, Baker (2008: 11) explains, is because “consensus has not yet been reached on who is the victim and who is the oppressor, as it has in the case of South Africa or Nazi Germany, for instance. There is also still an element of risk – sometimes very high risk – involved in discussing these contemporary conflicts”.

The issue of “bias” becomes even more complicated taking into account the personal profile of the researcher. The researcher is a Palestinian who lived part of his life in the suburbs of Occupied East Jerusalem. He has witnessed first-hand, as other more than four million Palestinians, the oppressive practices and policies of the Israeli occupation in the Occupied Palestinian Territories on a daily basis.
He has also lived the era of Oslo Accords and its false promises to end the longest military occupation in modern history and achieve freedom for the Palestinian people. These agreements instead, led to prolonging the occupation, more land expropriation and expansion of the Jewish settlements.

The researcher is not trying to escape his national narrative location as a Palestinian who stands firmly against the illegal Israeli occupation to his land and people but tries to present potentially “unbiased” interpretation of texts under scrutiny which include both sides of the story, i.e. Palestinian and Israeli. This turns to be more than difficult in many cases and impossible in others. One example of this is regarding back translations which are provided to help readers of this thesis who have no command of either Arabic or Hebrew or both to understand what is in the texts under scrutiny. Keeping “unbias” in these back translations has proven to be a very challenging task for the researcher.

The notion of “neutrality” or “impartiality” underpins much of the current epistemology in the humanities and social sciences including the discipline of Translation Studies. The notion of “neutral” translator has dominated the discipline of Translations Studies for many years as an ethical principle of the profession. Baker (2009: 24) in this context explains that “[O]ne of the unexamined assumption that continues to underpin discussions of translation and interpreting is that translators and interpreters neutral disinterested, apolitical creatures, who take no sides and participate in no activities that might compromise their neutrality in the eyes of employers”. However, recent research in Translation Studies (e.g. Baker 2006; Salama-Carr 2007) has shown that translators take sides and play an active role in dissemination of narratives.

3.4 Conclusion

This chapter has presented the corpus and methodology of the study. It described the socio-cultural and political contexts of the production of the original versions of the respective peace initiatives (the source texts) as well as their different translations (the target texts). In doing so, this chapter focused on the contexts of text production of both peace initiatives and their translations. These contexts are different. Peace initiatives have different functions than their translations. Translations of peace initiatives were produced in different institutional contexts for different purposes and readers. These translations were produced generally for either internal or external purposes. However, translations produced for internal purposes in one institution are sometimes republished by other institution for
different purposes (e.g. the United Nations Arabic translation of the Roadmap Plan). That is to say, these translations are recontextualized for different purposes and audiences. The next chapter describes the textual profiles of peace initiatives at the macro-structural level.
4.1 Introduction

Chapter Three presented the corpus and methodology of the study. Chapter Four examines the textual organization of the individual translation profiles. This chapter focuses on the how the various components of textual organization of translation profiles of the different language versions of peace initiatives (the target texts), e.g. layouts, paratexts, chapter heading, etc., reflect ideological and political interests. For this purpose, the Descriptive Translation Studies model of Lambert and Van Gorp (1985) is applied.

Lambert and Van Gorp (1985: 52; cf. Chapter 3.3.1) developed this model for translation comparisons. They propose moving from preliminary data (e.g. title page, completeness of texts, metatexts, etc.) to the macro- and micro-structural data (e.g. division of the text, titles of chapters, linguistic features, etc.). For the present purposes, macro-structural analysis will be covered under the chapter heading textual organization, whereas micro-structural analysis will be covered under the chapter heading textual analysis. The textual organization of a text is closely connected to its dominant rhetorical function (Hatim and Mason 1997: 224). What happens on the macro-structural level could be an indication of the translation shifts on the micro-structural level and both are closely related.

Paratextual materials are significant parts of recontextualization of the language versions of peace initiatives. The concept of ‘paratext’ – as used by Genette (1997) – refers to materials which surround a text (Kovala 1996: 120). Paratexts include prefaces, titles, dedications, illustrations, etc. Of particular interest about paratexts is their “potential influence on the reader’s reading and reception of the works in question” (Kovala 1996: 120). In the case of peace initiatives, paratextual materials exert a considerable influence on the readers of peace initiatives by framing these texts in a specific way (see section 4.4 below).

Some paratextual materials (e.g. blurbs, prefaces, translation notes, translator’s footnotes, advertisements) are not expected to be found in the translation profiles of peace initiatives.
For example, the translator’s footnotes could be found in drafts of translations but not in the final text (see section 4.7 below). This is because of the nature of these texts – i.e. they are politically negotiated texts and usually do not include any references to translation. In other words, translation is kept invisible. Some other paratextual materials, for example, titles and added introduction, are contained in in the translation profiles of peace initiatives. Titles and introductions are the first thing to catch the reader’s attention. They could reveal institutional positions with regard to peace initiatives.

Based on the model developed by Lambert and Van Gorp (1985), a descriptive account of textual profiles examines the layouts and covers of texts and the way these texts were labelled. It also examines how these texts they were introduced and whether or not introductions were added to them and, if so, by what kind of institution and to serve what purpose. It examines the completeness of texts, i.e. whether there are major omissions or additions, and, finally, whether or not these texts share the same chapter headings and sub-headings and whether they have any prefaces, footnotes, translator’s notes, images, and illustrations.

4.2 Layouts and Covers

Layouts and covers are the first elements in the recontextualization process of the translations of peace initiatives. Original source texts of peace initiatives do not have any special page layout. Comparing translations of peace initiatives to their source texts revealed that all target texts share the same feature except in two cases: firstly, the Hebrew translation of the Geneva Accord published by the Israeli campaign Yes to an Agreement and, secondly, the Hebrew translation of the Arab Peace Initiative published by the Palestinian Authority in four major Israeli newspapers. In the following sections, both these cases will be discussed and commented on.

Figure 4.1 represents the cover of the booklet of the Hebrew translation of the Geneva Accord. This booklet was distributed to every household in Israel as part of promoting the initiative to the Israeli public. Covers are of high significance as they are the first thing readers see and therefore they draw their attention.
The cover of this booklet is particularly interesting. The first aspect is the choice of colour scheme. The white and blue colour scheme presents the accord in a nationalistic and patriotic frame. These are the colours of Israel’s flag and had been deliberately chosen to appeal to the general Israeli public. The second aspect is the very careful choice of text imprinted on the cover. The cover has a blue strip surrounded by white space and is divided into two parts by the title in the middle. The title says ‘Geneva Initiative: A Model for an Israeli-Palestinian Final Status Agreement’. The blue strip quotes a number of the selling points of the initiative from its summary. The most eye-catching points are the recognition of Israel as the state of the Jewish people, and Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, and the promise that most of the Israeli settlers will remain in the territory of Israel.

The selection of these specific points is of high political significance. They were intended to catch the attention of the Israeli reader and contribute to the marketing efforts of the accord to the Israeli public. The most important point here is the ‘recognition of Israel as the state of the Jewish people’ which appears on the cover but nowhere in the actual text of
the accord. This very specific point was the issue of a heated debate in Israel as will be explained in chapter 6.

The last feature of the cover is the red stamp at the lower right-hand corner. It says נשלחו לכל בית בישראל (lit. ‘sent to every home in Israel’). The fact that this translation was sent to more than two million households in Israel shows the scale of the marketing campaign of the Geneva Accord and the intention of its drafters to influence the Israeli public.

Figure 4.2 represents the layout of one Hebrew translation of the Arab Peace Initiative. This translation was published by the Palestinian Authority in four major Israeli newspapers ahead of the general Israeli elections in 2008. The publication of this Hebrew translation was designed to help promote the initiative in Israel and mobilize the Israeli public’s support.

Figure 4.2: Layout of Hebrew Translation of the Arab Peace Initiative
The layout of this translation has three main features. Firstly, the translation is presented in a frame of flags of Arab and Islamic states. This frame reflects the support of the members of the League of Arab States (22 states) and the Organization of the Islamic conference (57 states) to the main points of the initiative. Secondly, the logos of the two organizations at the bottom of the translation indicate official endorsement and support of these two organizations to this initiative. Thirdly, there is the two-line persuasive introduction added under the Israeli and Palestinian flags in Hebrew and in Arabic at the end of the translation (see section 4.4.2).

The layout and cover of the two translations were designed to achieve a positive visual impact on the Israeli readers and to persuade them to support these initiatives. The cover of the Geneva Accord – particularly the inclusion of the accord’s main points – was designed to market the agreement to the Israeli public by highlighting its main proclaimed achievements. The layout of the Arab Peace Initiative also was meant to appeal to the Israeli public and win its support.

4.3 Labels Given to Translations of Peace Initiatives

The second important element in the recontextualization and framing processes is labelling. Labels given to language versions indicate the status of translation, the visibility of the translator and the translation practices within institutions. Issues of status of translation and (in)visibility of the translator have been the focus of research and debate in the discipline of Translation Studies for a long time (cf. Chapter Six).

Language versions of peace initiatives were labelled differently, for example, as ‘translation’, ‘unofficial translation’, ‘unofficial text’, ‘official text’, ‘full document’, ‘text of the document’, etc. whereas some others had no labels whatsoever. This section closely examines what labels were given to language versions of peace initiatives published by different institutions. Institutions are classified into international, governmental, non-governmental and mass media.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Translation publisher</th>
<th>Initiative</th>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Label</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The United Nations (UN)</td>
<td>The Roadmap Plan</td>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>Letter dated 7 May 2003 from the Secretary General addressed to the President of the Security Council…The text of the Roadmap.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The label ‘translation’ (as in both ‘translation and unofficial translation’) was used seven times in language versions of peace initiatives. The label ‘unofficial translation’ was used with translations published by governmental institutions, e.g. the Knesset, and mass media, e.g. Al-Ayyam and CNN.

Table 4.2 Labels of translations published by Governmental Institutions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Translation publisher</th>
<th>Initiative</th>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Label</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (IMFA)</td>
<td>The Roadmap Plan</td>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>Text of the Roadmap</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Knesset</td>
<td>The Roadmap Plan</td>
<td>Hebrew</td>
<td>The Roadmap, unofficial translation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The League of Arab States (LAS)</td>
<td>The Arab Peace Initiative</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>Official translation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian Authority (PA)</td>
<td>The Arab Peace Initiative</td>
<td>Hebrew</td>
<td>The Arab Peace Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The US Department of State (USDS)</td>
<td>The Roadmap Plan</td>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>The full official Arabic text of the Roadmap</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The label ‘official text’ was used twice in cases of the Roadmap Plan published by the US Department of State and the Al-Quds newspaper. Some mass media and governmental institutions treated this translation as the ‘official translation’ of the plan into Arabic. For example, the Palestinian Authority reprinted and distributed it to the Palestinian people in order to engage them in the plan. The Roadmap is the only initiative accepted officially by the Israeli and Palestinian governments. Both the Roadmap Plan and the Arab Peace Initiative have ten translations, which make them the most translated initiatives. The label ‘unofficial text’, on the other hand, was used only once (with the label ‘unofficial translation’) in the case of the Roadmap Plan published by CNN.

Different labels were also used to describe language versions of peace initiatives published by non-governmental organizations (see table 4.3 below). The most interesting translations here are those published by the Israeli organization Peace Now. What is interesting about these two specific cases is the visibility of the translators: Ilai Alon (of the Arab Peace Initiative) and Hagit Ofran (of the Roadmap Plan). These are the only two cases (out of 31) where the name of the translator appears in the text of the translation itself. Translators of peace initiatives in the corpus are largely unknown and anonymous. Out of 31 language versions, four translators are known: the two mentioned above plus two politicians,
namely, Ami Ayalon and Sari Nusseibeh (the two drafters of the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles). The names of these two translators do not appear in the translations. They were known only by personal communications.

Table 4.3 Labels of translations published by Non-Governmental Organizations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Translation publisher</th>
<th>Initiative</th>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Label given</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Council for Peace and Security (CPS)</td>
<td>The Arab Peace Initiative</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>The peace initiative-translation from Arabic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gush-Shalom Organization</td>
<td>The Gush-Shalom Declaration of Principles for Peace Agreement</td>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>Declaration of Principles of Peace Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Gush-Shalom Declaration of Principles for Peace Agreement</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>Declaration of Principles of Peace Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The National Consensus (NC)</td>
<td>The Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles</td>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>Declarations of Principles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles</td>
<td>Hebrew</td>
<td>Declarations of Principles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The People’s campaign For Peace and Democracy (PCPD)</td>
<td>The Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles</td>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>The text</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace Now</td>
<td>The Arab Peace Initiative</td>
<td>Hebrew</td>
<td>Document of the Arab Peace initiative-a translation from Arabic by Ilai Alon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Roadmap Plan</td>
<td>Hebrew</td>
<td>The Roadmap, translation from English by Hagit Ofran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes to an Agreement (YA)</td>
<td>The Geneva Accord</td>
<td>Hebrew</td>
<td>The full agreement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

‘Official translation’, according to Sarcevic, is a translation, which is “prepared by a government or international organization on its own responsibility” (1997: 20). This definition needs to be modified in order to be applicable to the case of translations of peace initiatives. Thus, an ‘official translation’ is a translation prepared and approved by drafters of a peace initiative on their own responsibility. This definition applies to the English
translation of the Arab Peace Initiative published by the League of Arab States, which is the only translation in the corpus labelled as ‘official translation’. In this case, the League of Arab States, which is the drafter of the initiative, is the one responsible for the quality of the translation and, consequently, responsible for any translation ‘mistakes’. However, the label ‘official’ is sometimes used not only by governmental institutions but by mass media and for different purposes than those to which Sarcevic refers.

Table 4.4 Labels of translations published by Mass Media

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Translation publisher</th>
<th>Initiative</th>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Label given</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Almtym Online Network (Almtym)</td>
<td>The Roadmap Plan</td>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>This is an Arabic translation of the first phase of the suggested Roadmap plan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Al-Quds</em> newspaper</td>
<td>The Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles</td>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>As published by <em>Ha’aretz</em> newspaper…Text of document of principles reached by Nusseibeh and Ayalon.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Roadmap Plan</td>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>The official text of the Roadmap.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNN</td>
<td>The Arab Peace Initiative</td>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>Arab Peace Initiative, a translation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Roadmap Plan</td>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>Unofficial text of the Roadmap, unofficial translation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Arab Peace Initiative</td>
<td>Hebrew</td>
<td>The peace initiative that was accepted at the Arab summit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Roadmap Plan</td>
<td>Hebrew</td>
<td>Document of the Roadmap.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In conclusion, labels such as ‘official translation’ and ‘unofficial translation’ are more commonly used by governmental institutions (e.g. the Knesset and the League of Arab States) and rarely used by mass media (e.g. newspapers). In the mass media, labels such as ‘text of the document’ or ‘the document’ are more commonly used. Translations of peace initiatives in the mass media are not necessarily labelled. In the majority of cases they are referred to by the name of the initiative (e.g. The Arab Peace Initiative).

4.4 Introductions of Translations of Peace Initiatives

Introductions as one type of paratexts are of significant importance. They contribute largely to the framing and contextualization processes of texts. These textual materials play a significant role in the reading process of a given text and, consequently, in the reactions to it, i.e. for or against. In the case of politically negotiated texts, such as peace initiatives, introductions become interesting material to study and examine.

An ‘introduction’ is defined as any kind of information which is not part of the original source text and which is either part of the recontextualization and framing processes or presented as an integral part of translations. These introductions, based on their content and the context in which they are produced, can have informative, evaluative or persuasive functions.

An informative introduction provides specific information about a particular text. This information can be about the time of original text production, authors or the overall political aim of a text. A persuasive introduction, as the name suggests, is devised in order to influence the readers’ opinion and to persuade them to respond to a particular text in a
particular way. In the case of peace initiatives, such introductions aim to urge readers to take an action, namely, either to support or oppose a particular peace initiative. An evaluative introduction usually has a value-judgment statement(s) which places a particular text in either a positive or a negative frame.

Comparing translations of Palestinian-Israeli peace initiatives to their source texts revealed that 19 of these translations had introductions added to them (see tables below). These translations were published by international organizations (table 4.5), governmental institutions (table 4.6), non-governmental organizations (table 4.7) and mass media (table 4.8). The majority of the introductions are part of recontextualization and framing processes.

Table 4.5 Introductions of Translations published by International Organizations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Translation publisher</th>
<th>Initiative</th>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Introduction</th>
<th>Type of introduction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The United Nations (UN)</td>
<td>The Roadmap Plan</td>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Informative</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.6 Introductions of Translations published Published by Governmental Institutions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Translation publisher</th>
<th>Initiative</th>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Introduction</th>
<th>Type of introduction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (IMFA)</td>
<td>The Roadmap Plan</td>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Informative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Knesset</td>
<td>The Roadmap Plan</td>
<td>Hebrew</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Not Applicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The League of Arab States (LAS)</td>
<td>The Arab Peace Initiative</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Not Applicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Palestinian Authority (PA)</td>
<td>The Arab Peace Initiative</td>
<td>Hebrew</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Persuasive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The US Department of State (USDS)</td>
<td>The Roadmap Plan</td>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Informative</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Introductions of translations published by international organizations and governmental institutions have mainly informative functions, with the exception of the one published by the Palestinian Authority. These informative introductions appeared in some translations of the Road Map Plan and only in Arabic. The persuasive introduction of the translation
published by the Palestinian Authority corresponds to the overall translation purpose, i.e. to influence the Israeli public opinion (see 4.4.2 below).

### Table 4.7: Introductions of Translations Published by Non-Governmental Institutions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Translation publisher</th>
<th>Initiative</th>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Introduction</th>
<th>Type of Introduction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Council for Peace and Security</td>
<td>The Arab Peace Initiative</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Persuasive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gush-Shalom Organization</td>
<td>The Gush-Shalom Peace Proposal</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Not Applicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Gush-Shalom Peace Proposal</td>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Not Applicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The National Consensus</td>
<td>The Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles</td>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Not Applicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace Now</td>
<td>The Arab Peace Initiative</td>
<td>Hebrew</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Persuasive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The People’s Campaign for Peace and Democracy</td>
<td>The Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles</td>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Persuasive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes to Agreement</td>
<td>The Geneva Accord</td>
<td>Hebrew</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Persuasive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 4.8: Introductions of translations published by Mass Media

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Translation publisher</th>
<th>Initiative</th>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Introduction</th>
<th>Type of Introduction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Al-Ayyam newspaper</td>
<td>The Geneva Accord</td>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Not Applicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-eman Online Network (Al-eman)</td>
<td>The Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of principles</td>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Evaluative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Almtym Online Network (Almtym)</td>
<td>The Roadmap Plan</td>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Not Applicable</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Unlike introductions of translations published by international organizations and governmental institutions, those published by non-governmental organizations only have persuasive functions. In addition, introductions of translations with an evaluative function were only published by the mass media as in table (4.7).

In the following sub-sections (4.4.1- 4.4.4), introductions are categorized according to the place where these introductions were published. This will provide the institutional context for these introductions as part of translations and the way they were framed and presented.

4.4.1 Introductions of Translations Published by International Organizations
The United Nations (UN) is the only international organization involved in the translation and publication of translations of peace initiatives. The UN translated the Roadmap Plan into Arabic and published it in its official website. Part of this translation was an
introduction in the form of a letter sent from the former Secretary General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, to the president of the UN Security Council as in the following example:

(ST)

Letter dated 7 May 2003 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council:

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of the Roadmap to realize the vision of two states, Israel and Palestine, living side by side in peace and security, as affirmed in Security Council Resolution 1397 (2002). The text has been prepared by the Quartet-consisting of representatives of the United States of America, the European Union, the Russian Federation, and the United Nations-and was presented to the Government of Israel and the Palestinian Authority on 30 April 2003. I should be grateful if you would bring this text to the attention of the members of the Security Council. (Signed) Kofi A. Annan.

This introduction is part of the recontextualization process and institutional context in which this translation was produced. This translation was made available for circulation purposes among members of the UN Security Council. It has both informative and persuasive functions. On the one hand, it provides basic information about the Roadmap Plan and on the other hand, it urges the members of the Security Council to take an action, that is, read it and then vote. The Roadmap Plan was endorsed in the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1515 (cf. Chapter 6.2.1).

4.4.2 Introductions of Translations Published by Governmental Institutions

Three governmental institutions – the US Department of State, the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Palestinian Authority – published three translations of peace initiatives with introductions. The introductions of the translations published by the US Department of State and Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs are part of framing and contextualization processes. They present these translations in their institutional contexts. The introduction of the translation published by the Palestinian Authority was presented as an integral part of the translation. The first two introductions have informative functions whereas the third has a persuasive one. These three cases will be now discussed.

(OT)

وزارة الخارجية الأميركية تصدر خريطة الطريق لسلام الشرق الأوسط:

النص الرسمي الكامل، 30 نيسان/أبريل، 2003

والمطلوب، 30 نيسان/أبريل، 2003. أصدرت وزارة الخارجية الأمريكية يوم 30 نيسان/أبريل، 2003، النص الرسمي الكامل لخريطة الطريق لسلام الشرق الأوسط. وذلك بعد أن تم تسلم نص النص من قبل المسؤولين الإسرائيليين والفلسطينيين في وقت سابق من النهار. وترأس إن على النص خريطة الطريق مع بيان أصدره البيت الأبيض.
The above introduction was part of a press release of the Roadmap Plan by the US Department of State. It provided basic information about the plan’s date of release, drafters and main aims. This introduction is significant as it was more or less reproduced (with some reduction) by the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as some media outlets, namely, CNN, Al-Quds and Yediot Aharonot newspapers, which all published Arabic translations of the plan. The Roadmap Plan is the only initiative in the corpus, which only has informative introductions added to its translations.

The third introduction is part of a Hebrew translation of the Arab Peace Initiative published by the Palestinian Authority (see figure 4.2) in its effort to promote the initiative in Israel.

This two-line Hebrew introduction comes under the sub-title ‘Beirut Declaration’ and the Palestinian and Israeli flags (see figure 4.2). It starts with the political benefits of peace for Israel, i.e. normal diplomatic relations with all Arab and Islamic states and finishes with what is required from Israel in return of this, i.e. end of occupation. On the other hand, the two-line Arabic paragraph which comes towards the end of the translation starts with what is required from Israel, i.e. end of occupation and finishes with the political benefits of peace, i.e. diplomatic relations.

The full official text of the Roadmap for peace in the Middle East was released on 30 April 2003 by the U.S. Department of State. Two copies of the plan were handed to the Israeli and Palestinian officials earlier today. The release of the text of the Roadmap coincided with a statement by the White House in which President Bush called on both Israeli and Palestinian parties to take the chance of releasing this initiative, which was prepared by the Quartet in order to stop acts of violence and go back to negotiations. This to lead to achieving president Bush’s vision, which is, based on two states, Israel and Palestine. Moreover, the following is the full text of the Roadmap as it was released by the office of the spokesperson of the U.S. Department of State.

The Arab Peace Initiative
As adopted by the Arab fourteenth summit in Beirut, Lebanon, in March 2002. End of occupation and comprehensive peace in return of normal and diplomatic relations between the Palestinians and the two Islamic and Arab worlds and Israel.
This textual organization of themes can be explained with regard to the intended audiences of this Hebrew translation. The information in Hebrew targets Jewish Israeli citizens whereas the information in Arabic targets the Palestinian Israeli citizens.

4.4.3 Introductions of Translations Published by Non-Governmental Organizations

Five non-governmental organizations – Gush-Shalom, People’s Campaign for Peace and Democracy, Yes to an Agreement, Peace Now and Council for Peace and Security – published five language versions of peace initiatives with introductions. These introductions were drafted for influencing readers’ opinions. In the following section, these introductions will be discussed in detail.

The Gush-Shalom Organization published an English translation of its original Hebrew text peace proposal. Part of this translation is an introduction which was intended to influence the Israeli public opinion as in the following example:

(ST) Now, more than at any other time, the struggle for peace must not stop. The following declaration of principles is a proposal for joint Israeli-Palestinian discussion. It should not be considered a take-it-or-leave-it proposition. We went into details in order to express our conviction that all the issues at stake the components of the conflict can be resolved. Not by diktats, not by an overbearing master-and-servant attitude, but by negotiations between equals. The government and the army leadership are leading us into a hell of blood and fire. We call upon all peace-seekers in Israel to unite for the future of the two peoples of this country, Jewish Israelis and Palestinian Arabs. The country has given birth to us as twins.

The People’s Campaign for Peace and Democracy published an Arabic translation of the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles and added an introduction to it. This introduction was written originally in Arabic by Dr. Sari Nusseibeh himself for the needs of the Palestinian readers. Delyani (2005) argues that this introduction provides necessary information for the Palestinian reader with regard to what he or she is going to sign on. However, this introduction reaches beyond a merely informative function to a declarative and persuasive one. One interesting thing about this introduction is that it was published by many websites both in English, e.g. ‘Foundation for Middle East Peace’ (www.fmep.org), ‘Meretz USA for Israeli Civil Rights and Peace’ (www.meretzusa.org) and the ‘Palestinian Negotiations Affairs Department’ (www.nad-plo.org) and in Hebrew, e.g. Ha’aretz newspaper, (www.haaretz.co.il) as part of the original English text of the initiative and was referred to as the ‘cover letter’ of the initiative (see section 4.4.4 below).

(ST) يدرك الشعبان الفلسطيني والإسرائيلي الحقوق التاريخية لكل منهما فيما يتعلق بأرض واحدة. منذ أجيال، أراد الشعب الإسرائيلي إقامة الدولة الإسرائيلية في أراضي إسرائيل بينما أراد الشعب الفلسطيني إقامة دولة في كل أراضي فلسطين. وافق الجانبان على قبول نموذج تاريخية تقوم على مبدأ وجود دولة واحدة مستقلتين وحيويتين جنبا إلى جنب. إعلان النوايا هو تعريف على رغبة الأغلبية من الناس. بومن الضباط جاهزون من خلال هذه المبادرة يمكنهم التأثير على قادةهم ومن ثم يمكنهم البدء بتقسيم جديد في تاريخ المنطقة. هذا الفصل الجديد سوف يحقق أيضاً من خلال دعوة المجتمع الدولي لضمان الأمن في المنطقة والمساعدة في تعزيز وتطوير اقتصادها.
The Palestinian people and the Jewish people each realize the other’s historic rights with respect to one land. The Israeli people for generations wanted to establish the Israeli state in all the Land of Israel, while the Palestinian people wanted to establish a state in all lands of Palestine. The two sides agreed to accept a historic compromise based on the principle of the existence of two sovereign and viable states side by side. The statement of intentions is an expression of the will of the majority of the people. Both sides believe that through this initiative they can influence their leaders and thereby open a new chapter in the region's history. This new chapter will also be achieved by calling on the international community to guarantee security in the region and to help in rehabilitating and developing the region's economy. This declaration represents the general framework for accepted settlement. However, as we are looking to reach such a settlement, there are steps, which should be taken in order to reach this settlement, most notably, achieving freedom to the Palestinian prisoners of freedom. Their cause must not be separated from the cause of the Palestinian people for whom they fought.

In fact, this introduction touches on the very politically and ideologically sensitive issue of the claims of each side to the same land and represents an acknowledgment of the conflicting Palestinian and Israeli narratives of land as equal. This issue has always been the subject of heated debates between the Israeli and Palestinian sides (cf. Chapter 1.1.1).

Moreover, this introduction acknowledges the importance of the issue of the Palestinian political prisoners in Israeli detentions centres and jails and emphasizes the need for their release if any settlement to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is to succeed. The issue of Palestinian prisoners was and still is “a central theme in the Palestinian political struggle…The Palestinian public honoured the prisoners and their families, considering them heroes who were paying the day-to-day price of the Palestinian struggle for independence” (Sher 2006: 8). According to the Palestinian Prisoner Society, today there are around 7,000 Palestinian and Arab political prisoners in Israeli detentions centres and jails.

The inclusion of this issue – which has always featured on the Palestinian public agenda – in Nusseibeh’s introduction is designed to appeal to the Palestinian people who complain that it was neglected in all agreements between Israel and the PLO, most notably, the Oslo agreements.

The Yes to an Agreement published a Hebrew translation of the Geneva Accord along with an introduction written by the renowned Israeli novelist and writer David Grossman. This introduction was part of a well-organized and planned campaign to promote the initiative in Israel. A booklet (including the 49-page Hebrew translation and Grossman’s
introduction) was sent to every household in Israel as part of this campaign. Grossman’s known distinctive style in writing, particularly his choice of words, metaphors and structures, are evident in his introduction. Therefore, the very choice of Grossman to write this introduction rather than anyone else is not a matter of coincidence but the outcome of a very well planned campaign.

The two-page introduction has a very persuasive function. It aims first at catching the Israeli readers’ attention and then persuading them to support the initiative. In this context, Halevi and Oren (2003) make the point that:

In his introduction to the Hebrew version, renowned novelist David Grossman assured Israeli citizens, ‘who have withstood innumerable wars and horrible terrorist attacks,’ that the Accords will produce a ‘thriving and …egalitarian’ Israel, freed ‘from the fear of war and annihilation’.

In fact, the introduction appeals to the Israeli people by evoking their emotions regarding war and peace and promises a better future if they give their support to this initiative. This was criticized by Halevi and Oren (2003) who argued that:

For Israelis, exhausted after three years of terrorism, Grossman’s words are seductive. Indeed, the Geneva Accords coincides with an historic transformation in Israeli public opinion. Most Israelis are now ready to forfeit the results of the 1967 war—control over the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem—in return for Palestinian acceptance of the outcome of the 1948 war. Most Israelis also view the creation of a Palestinian state not as a mortal threat but as the only means of preserving Israel’s Jewish and democratic identity.

On the macro-structural level, this introduction and the cover of the translation (see figure 4.1 above) in addition to translation shifts on the micro-structural level (cf. Chapter 5.3.2, 5.5.1 and 5.4) are all part of the efforts to market this initiative to the Israeli people.

The most interesting case of persuasive introductions is the one added by Professor Ilai Alon. Alon translated the Arab Peace Initiative from Arabic into Hebrew. This translation was published on the website of Peace Now. He added a persuasive introduction to this translation. In his introduction, Alon explains to the Israeli readers why the Arab Peace Initiative should be given a chance and be supported. This is done with the help of a number of points based on his analysis to the initiative as in the following:

(81) הקדמה

במרץ 2002 החליטה הליגה הערבית לאמץ את יזמת السلام הסעודית משנת 1981 ופרסמה תרגום המ谮ר לשפה העברית, כפי ש hauter לFrançois, והזמין את אופיר ל chắnיו, ראה את המסמך עם הזמין, וא弢 את התפיסה של החופש הערבי, בסוגר עם המסמך מתא עם שמי להפיכת הליגה הערבית באופי שלום חדש.

לביים ישראל.

81 Hebrew spelling in this passage as well as other Hebrew passages presented in this thesis is the same as the one the original sources.
In March 2002, the League of Arab States decided to adopt the Saudi Peace Initiative of 1981 and published it. The Hebrew translation of the Document, as distributed to the public, is faulty. This may have been part of the reason that Israelis ignored it. It seems that most of the Israeli public is not aware of the true significance of the Arab Peace Initiative. The general tenor of the Document is evidence of a significant change in the attitude of the states of the Arab League with regard to peace between them and Israel: The proposals set forth in the Document are basically sincere (though there are a few remarks in it that leave room for further scrutiny). It is not a “take it or leave it” proposal. Rather it invites negotiation on its content. Note however that negotiations tend to begin after agreement has been reached. Compared with Documents issued earlier by the League, this one is, from Israel’s standpoint, the most positive of all. In my opinion, the document implies that the League will take upon itself to represent the Palestinians, and even impose an agreement upon them if that becomes necessary. Israel always took Arab declarations seriously. With due caution, why not this time?

This introduction – which is meant to guide the reading process and consequent reactions to the initiative in a certain direction – is a clear example of intervention by the writer who is also the translator of the initiative. This kind of addition of information is common in political texts but not in translations. The Alon’s text is a mix of both.

Finally, the Council for Peace and Security published on its website an English translation of the Arab Peace Initiative which had an introduction added to it. What is also interesting about this translation is that it was based on the Hebrew translation of Ilai Alon:

(ST) The Arab League knocked on our Door and We pretended not to be at Home

In March 2002, the League of the Arab States adopted a Saudi Peace Initiative, originally drafted in 1981. The Hebrew translation of the Document, as distributed to the public, is faulty. This may have been part of the reason that Israelis ignored it. It seems that most of the Israeli public is not aware of the true significance of this Arab Peace Initiative. The general tenor of the Document is evidence of a significant change in Arab attitudes towards peace with Israel:

The proposals set forth in the Document are basically sincere (though there are a few remarks in it that leave room for further scrutiny). It is not a “take it or leave it” proposal. Rather it invites negotiation on its content. Note however that negotiations tend to begin after agreement has been reached! Compared with Documents issued earlier by the League, this one is, from Israel’s standpoint, the most positive of all. In my view, the Document implies that the League will take upon itself to represent the Palestinians, and even impose an agreement upon them if that becomes necessary. In the past Israel always took Arab declarations seriously. With due caution, why not this time? The Peace Initiative – Translation from Arabic.
Alon’s Hebrew translation was picked up by the Council of Peace and Security and then translated into English. The English translation follows the Hebrew source text except in some parts where it summarizes the main points of the translation Alon provided. Surprisingly, the name of the writer and translator, Ilai Alon, still appears on the English translation.

4.4.4 Introductions of Translations Published by Mass Media

Ten mass media outlets, three newspapers, Al-Quds, Ha’arets and Yediot Aharonot, one news agency, CNN and three online networks, Baheth Center, Al-eman and Haayal Hakore, published ten translations of peace initiatives with introductions. In the following section, these introductions will be discussed in detail.

The Haayal Hakore translation of the Arab Peace Initiative had the following introduction:

(ST) זהות מ多元化 בימינו של יוזמות שלום, אך בפסגת הליגה הערבית לפני ימים ספורים נ文化传媒ה הצהרה, וה//================================================= nosotros הרשימות למפורט השונות על הקוראים. זה אגף לפרסום תרגום של המסמך הרשמי באנגליתampoo לה째ה בין קוראינו.

Back translation: It is a little strange in these days to talk about peace initiatives. However, in the summit of the League of Arab States few days ago, there was a declaration, and we (and not only we) think that it is a vision for a settlement. Therefore, Haayal brings before you an unofficial translation of the official document in English and puts it to discussion among our readers.

This introduction is obviously inviting the Israeli reader to take an action, i.e. to consider this initiative. The reason why it starts with saying ‘it is weird to talk nowadays about peace initiatives’ is due to the fact that the launch of the Arab Peace Initiative coincided with some Palestinian attack inside Israel which left many Israelis dead.

The Israeli newspaper Ha’arets published one Hebrew translation of the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles:

(ST) עם הפוסחתיותмыш completionHandler, העם היהודי והעם הערבי מחזק את זכויותיו של זולתו ביחס לאותה אדמה. בשל הדורות של אขนม מתחמש לחוק היהודי של הקיסר ההודויה, בהרי תלמי. בעידן של השבעה השלושה,aussa keinen Fluchtpunkt für eine Nation. Wie sieht man die Zukunft, die sich aus der Vertrautheit mit dem anderen entwickelt? Zwei der wichtigsten Aspekte sind, dass der Mensch seine eigene Entwicklung zur Welt führt, und dass er seine eigene Entwicklung zur Welt führt.

Back translation: The comparison between the original Arabic introduction and the Ha’arets Hebrew translation reveals some changes. To begin with, the paragraph on the Palestinian political prisoners was not translated at all into Hebrew. This major omission was accompanied by other textual amendments (cf. Chapter 5.8.1).
The Ha’aretz Hebrew translation of the introduction was then picked up by Al-Quds newspaper, Baheth Center and Al-eman online network and they translated it into Arabic (for the introductions of Al-Quds and Al-eman see Evaluative Introductions below). These Arabic translations kept the semantic changes contained in the Ha’aretz translation, such as the shift from ‘Israeli’ into ‘Jewish’, as well as the omission of the paragraph on the Palestinian political prisoners.

The introduction of Al-Quds (example 4.11 below) framed the initiative negatively by focusing on the Palestinian concessions, namely, giving up of the Palestinian right of return to their homes in Israel and the demilitarization of the future Palestinian state. This translation was based on the Hebrew translation of Ha’aretz. Al-Quds picked up this Hebrew text and translated it into Arabic which is a standard practice of the Palestinian newspapers (cf. Chapter 6.2.4).

The most interesting case here is the introduction published by the Al-eman online network (example 4.12 below) as part of its Arabic translation of the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles. This initiative was also framed negatively. This negative framing starts with the headline of the article: “Dangerous Israeli-Palestinian document, no return for Palestinian refugees”. In addition, it continues with details of the Palestinian concessions in this initiative. The label ‘dangerous document’ is designed to catch the attention of the reader and guides the reading process of the initiative in a certain way.

"وثائق إسرائيلية فلسطينية خطيرة (لا عودة لللاجئين الفلسطينيين)"

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"وثائق إسرائيلية فلسطينية خطيرة (لا عودة لللاجئين الفلسطينيين)"
The introduction of the Yediot Aharonot newspaper in example (4.13) below, starts with the requirement of the initiative of Israeli withdrawal from all the ‘territories’, including Jerusalem. The evaluative element here is that the introduction draws the reader’s attention that in this initiative there is the ‘Right of Return’. The argument that the Arab Peace Initiative calls for the implementation of the right of return, which means the possible return of millions of Palestinians to Israel, is the very reason why the initiative was attacked and rejected in Israel. In fact, the omission of the adjective ‘to be agreed on’ in some of the Hebrew translations, e.g. Ha’aretz newspaper, would encourage such argument.

Finally, the introduction of CNN (e.g. example (4.3)) below provides some background information about the initiative:

To summarize, 18 out of 31 different language versions had introductions added to them. These introductions, particularly persuasive and evaluative ones, are part of the framing and contextualization of peace initiatives. A number of points can be concluded from the review of these introductions. Firstly, the Roadmap Plan is the only peace initiative which had no persuasive introductions added to any of its language versions. This could be due to the fact that it is the only officially accepted initiative and that it targets governments rather than people at grassroots level, such as in the case of the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles. Secondly, evaluative introductions were added by the mass media (e.g. newspaper and online networks). This shows the role of the media in framing and recontextualizing peace proposals in situations of ongoing contemporary conflict. Thirdly,
no governmental institutions added any persuasive or evaluative introductions. These institutions (e.g. the UN, US Department of State, Israel MOFA) only added informative introductions. Fourthly, introductions cannot be only persuasive or informative. Persuasive introductions do have an informative function but the main function is persuasive.

4.5 Completeness of Texts
This section examines completeness of texts to establish whether there are major omissions or additions in the different language versions of peace initiatives. To begin with, a simple word count\(^ {82} \) will be provided for each peace initiative and its translations. The word counts will then be compared to establish which language versions have major omissions or additions of information.

4.5.1 The Gush-Shalom Declaration of Principles for Peace Agreement
The Gush-Shalom Declaration of Principles for Peace Agreement has two Arabic and two English versions. The first and second English versions are available whereas only the second Arabic version is available. Table 4.1 shows the word count for the Hebrew source text and the second English and Arabic texts.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source text (Hebrew)</th>
<th>Arabic version (2(^{nd}))</th>
<th>English version (2(^{nd}))</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1,067</td>
<td>1,446</td>
<td>1,867</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table shows that there are no major additions or omissions in these texts. The Hebrew source text has an introduction added to it, which is not the case for the Arabic and English language versions.

4.5.2 The Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles
The table (4.2) below shows that the Arabic translation of the National Consensus is significantly different from the other Arabic translations. Close examination of these language versions and comparing them to the English source text showed that the difference in word count is because Sari Nusseibeh added an introduction (in Arabic) to the

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\(^{82}\) Word count here includes introductions added to language versions.
People’s Campaign for Peace and Democracy (PCPD) for the needs of the Palestinian readers (see below).

Table 4.10 Word count for Arabic translations of the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source text (English)</th>
<th>People’s Campaign for Peace and Democracy (PCPD)</th>
<th>National Consensus (NC)</th>
<th>Baheth Center</th>
<th>Al-eman</th>
<th>Al-Quds</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>348</td>
<td>431</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>393</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.11 Word Count for Hebrew translations of the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source text (English)</th>
<th>National Consensus (NC)</th>
<th>Ha’aretz</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>348</td>
<td>431</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There is a difference in the word count between the two Hebrew versions above. This difference indicates that something was either added or deleted in translation. A closer examination of the two language versions revealed that the translation of the Ha’aretz newspaper had major addition of information. This is because Ha’aretz picked up the Arabic introduction added by Nusseibeh and treated it as part of the original document and translated it with the initiative into Hebrew. This Hebrew translation of Ha’aretz (including the introduction) was then translated into Arabic and published in all other Arabic translation, except the one published by the National Consensus.

4.5.3 The Arab Peace Initiative

The two language versions of the Council for Peace and Security and CNN, particularly the latter, compared to the other two language versions, show major omission of information. A close examination revealed that, in fact, the first three paragraphs in CNN translation were deleted. This translation looks like a summary of the initiative. In addition, the translation by the Council for Peace and Security has some omissions but the translation mentions that in certain parts it is a summary.
Table 4.12 Word count for English translations of the Arab Peace Initiative

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source text (Arabic)</th>
<th>The League of Arab States (LAS)</th>
<th>CNN</th>
<th>Reuters</th>
<th>Council for Peace and Security</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>398</td>
<td>509</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.13 Word count for Hebrew translations of the Arab Peace Initiative

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source text (Arabic)</th>
<th>Haayal Hakore</th>
<th>God Bless Israel (GBI)</th>
<th>Ha’aretz</th>
<th>Yediot Aharonot</th>
<th>Palestinian Authority (PA)</th>
<th>Peace Now</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>398</td>
<td>359</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>353</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table (4.5) shows that the translations of the Ha’aretz newspaper and Peace Now are significantly different from other Hebrew language versions. Close examination and comparison of these language versions to the original Arabic source text revealed that the translation of the Ha’aretz had major omissions whereas the translation of Peace Now contained some additions of information.

4.5.4 The Geneva Accord

Examination of the word count of the different language versions of the Geneva Accord showed that there are no major additions or omissions of information. Table 4.14 shows the word count for the English, Arabic and Hebrew language versions of this initiative.

Table 4.14 Word Count for Arabic and English translations of Geneva Accord

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source text (English)</th>
<th>Palestinian Peace Coalition (PPC)</th>
<th>Yes to an Agreement (YA)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9,887</td>
<td>8,591</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.5.5 The Roadmap Plan

Table 4.7 shows that the Almtym Online Network translation has the smallest word count of all Arabic language versions. Close examination of this specific translation showed that the first four paragraphs were deleted. These paragraphs outline the main aims of the plan:
the need for a new Palestinian leadership to emerge, putting an end to “violence and terrorism”, the need for each party to perform its obligations, and the role of the Quartet.

Table 4.15 Word count for Arabic translations of the Roadmap Plan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source text (English)</th>
<th>US Department of State (USDS)</th>
<th>United Nations (UN)</th>
<th>CNN Quds</th>
<th>Almtym Al-Quds</th>
<th>Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (IMFA)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2,044</td>
<td>2,216</td>
<td>1,927</td>
<td>2,101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,714</td>
<td>2,167</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This translation was based on an English source text published by the United Nations. The English text states that ‘this is the first phase of the Roadmap’. The translation published by CNN had one paragraph, regarding humanitarian situation and prospects for economic development in the West Bank, deleted.

Table 4.16 Word Count for Hebrew translations of the Roadmap Plan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source text (English)</th>
<th>The Knesset</th>
<th>Ha’aretz</th>
<th>Yediot Aharonot</th>
<th>Peace Now</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,843</td>
<td>1,774</td>
<td>1,695</td>
<td>1,771</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Examination of Hebrew language versions of the Roadmap Plan showed that the Ha’aretz translation deleted one paragraph, which discusses the draft constitution for the Palestinian state. The Arabic language versions include five cases of information change: four additions in the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles and one omission in the Almtym translation of the Roadmap Plan. The addition of information concerns the inclusion of an introduction, which was authored by Sari Nusseibeh. These four cases can be considered as ‘addition of information’ if it is assumed that these translations were based on the English source text, which does not have an introduction. However, if it is assumed that these four texts were based on the Hebrew translation of Ha’aretz, which added the introduction and treated it as part of the original text, then these cases would cease to be considered as examples of ‘addition of information’. These would, therefore, be better referred to as part of a ‘recontextualization’ process. This case shows the complexity of the study and translation of peace initiatives and, more generally, political texts.

The only case of omission of information is with regard to the Almtym translation of the Roadmap Plan. Comparing this Arabic translation to the English source text revealed that
this translation had major omissions. However, this translation was based on another English text of the Roadmap Plan published by the United Nations. In this English text, the first four paragraphs are deleted and the same happened in the Arabic translation. In light of such information, would this case still be considered as ‘omission of information”? This example shows that it is not always the case that a target text is based on an original source text.

The English language versions of peace initiatives also included two cases of information change: one addition and one omission of information, both in the Arab Peace Initiative. Whereas the addition of information was done by the Council for Peace and Security, the omission of information occurred in the text written/translated by CNN.

The Hebrew language versions of peace initiatives contained four cases of information change: two additions and two omissions which appeared in the Israeli newspaper *Ha’aretz* and in Peace Now. The former added major information to the translation of the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles and omitted major information in the translations of the Arab Peace Initiative and the Roadmap Plan. The latter, Peace Now, added information in the translation of the Arab Peace Initiative.

In conclusion, major information change (additions and omissions) occurred in the Arabic and Hebrew language versions more than in the English language versions. In addition, omissions of information in all three languages were produced by the mass media (CNN, *Ha’aretz* and Almtym Online Network).

### 4.6 Headings and Sub-Headings

Peace initiatives range from one page (e.g. the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles) to forty-nine pages (e.g. the Geneva Accord). These initiatives tackle the final-status issues of the conflict. Headings and sub-headings are more common in long texts than short ones. They are expected in long texts as they facilitate smooth reading and comprehension. The following section deals with headings and sub-headings of the language versions of peace initiatives. This section covers addition, omission, changes of headings and sub-headings besides re-arrangement of headings, sub-headings and paragraphs.
4.6.1 Addition and Omission of Headings/Sub-Headings

With regard to the headings and sub-headings of the 31 different language versions of peace initiatives, additions appear in six sub-headings while omissions appear in one heading and one sub-heading.

One addition appears in the Roadmap Plan, one in the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles and seven in the Arab Peace Initiative. The *Al-Quds* Arabic translation of the Roadmap Plan added two sub-headings: firstly, ‘انهاء العنف و الارهاب الفلسطيني’ (lit. ‘ending the Palestinian violence and terrorism’) and secondly, ‘دولة فلسطينية مستقلة قابلة للحياة’ (lit. ‘an independent viable Palestinian state’).

What might be interesting about the addition of the first sub-heading is that the Roadmap stipulates ending ‘terrorism’ (three occurrences) but does not explicitly mention “Palestinian terrorism”. The National Consensus Arabic and Hebrew translation of the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles had the sub-headings ‘نزع السلاح’ (lit. ‘disarmament’) and ‘פירוז מנשק’ (lit. ‘demilitarization’) respectively added. These two translations were published on the Israeli website of the campaign which was designed to promote the initiative in Israel. However, the same sub-heading was not added in the same Arabic translation which was published on the People’s Campaign for Peace and Democracy website.

The two Hebrew translations of the Arab Peace Initiative, published by Peace Now and the Palestinian Authority, also had some sub-heading added to them. The translation of the Palestinian Authority added the sub-heading ‘Beirut declaration 3/2002’ whereas the translation of the Peace Now added the sub-headings of ‘introduction’, ‘clarifications’ and ‘conclusion’. Also, the English translation of the Arab Peace Initiative, published by the Council for Peace and Security, added the sub-headings of ‘the initiative- translation form Arabic’, ‘comment and clarification’ and ‘to sum up’.

One omission takes place in the heading and three omissions in the sub-heading of the Roadmap Plan translated into Arabic. Firstly, the translations published by CNN and Almtym Online Network omitted the main heading of the initiative: “A performance-based Roadmap to a permanent two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict”. Secondly, CNN’s translation omitted the two sub-headings “civil Society” and “settlements”. Thirdly, the *Al-Quds* translation omitted the sub-heading “Civil society”.

123
4.6.2 Change of Headings/Sub-Headings

Change in headings and sub-headings of texts took place across the entire corpus, except in the case of the Gush-Shalom Declaration of Principles for Peace Agreement. Two Hebrew translations of the Roadmap Plan published by the two Israeli newspapers, Yediot Aharonot and Ha'aretz, included some changes or reductions. The Yediot Aharonot changed the main heading “A Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict” to “Leadership that acts against terror” and also reduced the following sub-headings:


Furthermore, the Ha'aretz translation changed the main heading from “A performance-Based roadmap to a permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict” into “the goal: final and comprehensive settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict” (my translation).

4.6.3 Rearrangement of Headings/Sub-Headings

Rearrangement in the entire corpus of study only took place with regard to the Roadmap Plan and specifically with regard to re-arrangement of paragraphs. These rearrangements took place in the Arabic translation published by the Palestinian Al-Quds newspaper and the Hebrew translation published by the Israeli Ha’aretz newspaper. The Roadmap Plan is a three-phase plan, which stipulates a set of steps required of each side in each phase. Moving from one phase to another depends heavily on the performance of each side and fulfilment of their obligations. Both translations took paragraphs from phase one and put them under phase two, thus changing the requirements and their sequence in the plan. Rearrangement of paragraphs here is of high political significance.

In the English source text of the plan, and under the sub-heading of ‘Palestinian Institution-Building’, there is one paragraph, out of nine paragraphs, about the re-opening of closed Palestinian institutions in Occupied East Jerusalem. In the Arabic translation of Al-Quds, this paragraph was put under the heading of the ‘Second Phase’. Similarly, the sub-heading ‘Humanitarian Response’ which includes three paragraphs and part of phase one, was put under the second phase.
Under this ‘Humanitarian Response’, Israel, according to the Roadmap Plan, is required to take measures to improve the humanitarian situation such as ‘lifting curfews’, and ‘easing restrictions on movement of persons and goods’ (Roadmap 2003). Moving from one phase to another, according to the Roadmap Plan, depends on the performance and fulfilling of obligations of each side. This means that unless the Palestinian Authority fulfils its obligations in the first phase, the humanitarian situation will remain the same, i.e. closures, curfews, deportations, etc. In the English source text of the plan, the following issues are part of phase one:

- Palestinian Institution-Building (e.g. GOI reopens Palestinian Chamber of Commerce and other closed institutions in East Jerusalem).
- Humanitarian Response (e.g. Israel takes measures to improve the humanitarian situation).
- Civil Society and Settlements (e.g. GOI dismantles settlement outposts and freeze all settlement activities).

In the Hebrew translation of *Ha’aretz*, these issues were introduced as part of phase two.

### 4.7 Prefaces, Footnotes, and Translators’ Notes

Prefaces, footnotes, and translators’ notes are common features in translations of literary texts. This is not the case in translations of political texts. Translations of political texts, unlike literary texts, are largely anonymous. Names of translators do not usually appear anywhere in the translation.

Although highly uncommon and unexpected, the corpus examination provided one case of translator’s footnotes and one case of translators’ notes. The translators’ footnotes appeared in an early Arabic draft translation of the Geneva Accord. This translation – which is published on the Palestinian website of the initiative, i.e. the Palestinian Peace Coalition (PPC) – looks identical to the Arabic translation published in the Palestinian *Al-Ayyam* newspaper with minor changes, most notably the omission of these footnotes. This translation has three footnotes. The first footnote concerns the terms al-Ḥaram al-Sharīf / the Temple Mount (al-Ḥaram), as in the following example:

| ST | ملاحظة من المترجمين: يفضل استخدام الأسماء العربية والعبرية معاً (في النص الإنجليزي لما لذلك من أهمية سياسية ولأن الحدود الجغرافية قد تختلف قليلا حسب التسمية وحسبما يعتبر كل طرف منطقته من هذه المواقع. |
| Back translation | A note from the translators: it is preferable to use the Arabic and Hebrew names (together) in the English text because of its political importance and because the geographical borders might slightly differ according to names given and according to what each side considers as its area in these sites. |
The second footnote concerns one of the gates of the Old City of Jerusalem, ‘باب صهيون’ (lit. ‘Gate of Zion’), as in the following example:

[ST] تسأل من المترجمين: هل هذه هي التسمية العربية؟
Back A question from the translators: is this the Arabic name?
translation:

In addition, the third footnote concerns two Jewish cemeteries in Occupied East Jerusalem, ‘مقبرة جبل صهيون ومقبرة الجيرمان كولوني’ (lit. ‘Cemetery of mountain of Zion and Cemetery of the German Colony’), as seen in the following example:

[ST] أشير في الفقرة السابقة إلى "مقبرة جبل الزينون"، فهل نتحدث هنا عن نفس المقبرة. النص غير واضح
Back In the previous paragraph, it was referred to the cemetery of the Mount of Olives so are we talking here about the same cemetery. The text is unclear.

These three footnotes concern questions and suggestions the team of translators had when translating this 49-page document. What is strange about the first footnote is that the translators are drawing the attention of politicians or perhaps revisers or editors to the use of the Arabic and Hebrew names of ‘al-Ḥaram al-Sharīf’ and ‘the Temple Mount’ together in the English text while the English text already mentions both at the same time. This shows that translation of such sensitive documents goes through many revisions before being approved. Moreover, in cases of long texts such as the Geneva Accord, usually a team of translators and revisers is involved in the translation and revision process. Thus, responsibility for translational choices cannot be solely the translator’s but rather, it is a ‘collective responsibility’.

With regard to the second footnote, in the Arabic translation published in Al-Ayyam, the Hebrew name of the gate ‘باب صهيون’ (Bāb Ṣahyūn, lit. ‘Gate of Zion’) was changed into the Arabic name ‘باب النبي داود’ (Bāb al-Nabi Dāwūd lit. ‘Gate of the Prophet David’). These footnotes were directed towards revisers or politicians rather than the potential ordinary readers. They are not meant to provide some background information or explanation of a vague term or sentence but rather were meant as questions from the team of translators.

The translators’ notes appear in the Hebrew translation of the Arab Peace Initiative published on the website of the Israeli Peace Now and translated by Professor Ilai Alon. The translator’s notes take the form of persuasive explanations. The translator attempts to

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83 The three footnotes talk about ‘translators’ rather than ‘the translator’. Thus, it is assumed that more than one translator was involved in the translation of this document.
convince his readers to give support to the initiative. He starts with a persuasive introduction (see 4.4.2 above) and finishes his translation with a number of bullet points to convince his readers of his point of view. These notes are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hebrew translation</th>
<th>Comment and Clarification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

[Translation of the Council for Peace and Security] Israel is being offered an opportunity to end the Arab-Israeli conflict and achieve a peace with normal neighbourly relations. Surely, this is what Israel has been striving for from the very beginning.

Concerning a solution of the Refugee Problem the Document is careful to use the term “agreed”, thereby giving Israel the right to veto solutions she cannot accept.

Referring to Jerusalem, in a departure from previous Arab statements, the Document uses the term “East Jerusalem” rather than “Arab Jerusalem” or just “Jerusalem”. This hints upon willingness to negotiate a rational division of the city.

The phrase “Israel is requested” rather than “Israel is required” is used throughout. This too is a major departure from previous wordings.

The Document asks Israel to “review her policies”, and not “to change her policies” as it used to be phrased.

The Document states that in the Arab view, military means will not solve the problem. It also expresses concern for the danger to human life.

The Document appeals, not only to the Government of Israel but also to the People of Israel, asking them to adopt the Initiative.

Israel is asked to “lean towards peace”. This is a Koranic expression of great significance.

To sum up
The style of the Document, signed by almost all the Heads of Arab States, is convincing in its sincerity and intent. This is a strong reason to accept the Initiative.

The purpose for these notes is clearly not to provide the Israeli reader with some background information or explanation of a vague term or sentence but rather to be persuasive. These notes are a distinctive sign of the presence or visibility of the translator in the translation. In translations of political texts, the visibility of the translator is manifested in other ways.
4.8 Maps

Maps have always played a major role in politics and conflicts. In the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, they continue to play a major role in representing that conflict (Collins-Kreiner et al 2006: 381). Moreover, maps “have advanced each community’s claims through both form and content, including or excluding boundaries and emphasizing or ignoring place names and settlements with a politicized nomenclature” (Collins-Kreiner et al 2006: 381). In short, they are powerful tools of political propaganda and “the most explicitly spatial form” (Collins-Kreiner et al 2006: 383) of such propaganda at the disposal of politicians.

Maps also reflect political positions and narratives. These positions and narratives can be derived from maps representing borders and frontiers. According to Collins-Kreiner et al (2006: 383), a number of techniques are used to reinforce such positions and narratives including “choice of map projection and scale, inclusion and omission of data, use of certain symbols and colours, and the message incorporated in the title and accompanying caption”.

Maps are not common paratextual material in translations of peace initiatives. In the entire corpus of the study, only two maps were found, both in the Geneva Accord. One shows the land swap between Israel and the future Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The other shows the division of the old city of Jerusalem. These maps were published in the Israeli Ha’aretz newspaper on 20 October 2003 as part of the English text of the initiative obtained exclusively by the newspaper. They were also published in the Palestinian Al-Ayyam newspaper as part of the Arabic translation of the initiative designed to promote the initiative for the Palestinian public. The two maps published for the Israeli public are different from those published for the Palestinian one.

As part of the political campaign to market the agreement to the Israeli and Palestinian peoples, maps published in Hebrew serve a different purpose to those published in Arabic. Moreover, each one communicates a different message. These visual images have powerful ability in presenting and advancing agendas (Collins-Kreiner et al 2006: 381). In the following, the differences between these four maps and the political messages they communicate will be discussed and commented on.
Figure 4.3: Map of the Old City of Jerusalem as published by *Ha'aretz* newspaper

Illustration removed for copyright restrictions
In figure (4.4), the only place names that appear on the Palestinian map are ‘the Dome of the Rock’ and ‘Jerusalem the old City’. In figure (4.5), the West Bank and the Gaza Strip appear empty of any Jewish settlements. It is worth noting here that the Geneva Accord does not specify which settlements will be annexed to Israel and which will be evacuated. This issue, together with other security issues were only published on 15 September 2009 in the annexes of the agreement. By contrast, figure (4.6), shows in detail all Jewish settlements, including those which will be annexed to the territory of Israel and those which will be evacuated. In figure (4.3), it is noted, for instance, that all the names used of
the Old City’s gates are the Jewish ones. It also shows what is called ‘Greater Jerusalem’ under Israeli sovereignty and the Old City (which will be divided) as a small portion of this ‘Greater Jerusalem’.

**Figure 4.5**: Map of land swap as published by *Al-Ayyam* newspaper

In figure (4.4), the map displays the area that will come under Israeli sovereignty as only a small portion of the Old City of Jerusalem and at the same time the Old City as a large territory, which will come under the Palestinian sovereignty. By contrast, in figure (4.6),
the map shows the Old City as a small portion of the ‘Greater Jerusalem’ under Israeli sovereignty. This map shows that it is only the Old City that will be divided.

**Figure 4.6:** Map of land swap as published by *Ha'aretz* newspaper

In figure (4.6), the map confirms the political message in the summary of the Accord distributed to the Israeli public, namely, ‘Greater Jerusalem under our sovereignty’. In this sense, visual images play a decisive role in advancing political agenda and propaganda of the Israeli side of the initiative.
### Table 4.17 Summary of Israeli and Palestinian Maps of the Old City of Jerusalem

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Features</th>
<th>Palestinian Map</th>
<th>Israeli Map</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Titles</td>
<td>Jerusalem-the Old City</td>
<td>The plan to divide the Old City according to Geneva Accord</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language</td>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>Hebrew</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Place of Publication</td>
<td>Occupied Palestinian Territories, Al-Ayyam newspaper</td>
<td>Israel, Ha’aretz newspaper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time of Publication</td>
<td>1 November 2003</td>
<td>20 October 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted Public</td>
<td>Palestinian</td>
<td>Israeli</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Function of the map</td>
<td>Informative and persuasive</td>
<td>Informative and persuasive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information in the Legend</td>
<td>Territories under Palestinian sovereignty</td>
<td>Territory under Israeli sovereignty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Jewish quarter under Israeli sovereignty</td>
<td>Territory under Palestinian sovereignty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Road under Palestinian sovereignty with special</td>
<td>Territory under Palestinian sovereignty with special arrangements for Israelis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>arrangements for Israelis</td>
<td>Free access for Israelis to the Mount of Olives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gate under Palestinian sovereignty</td>
<td>Gate under Palestinian sovereignty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gate under Palestinian sovereignty with joint policing</td>
<td>Gate under Palestinian sovereignty with joint policing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public territory</td>
<td>Public territory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Place Names</td>
<td>The Dome of the Rock</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 4.18 Summary of Israeli and Palestinian maps of land swap

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Features</th>
<th>Palestinian Map</th>
<th>Israeli Map</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Titles</td>
<td>No title</td>
<td>Territories Swap according to the Geneva Accord</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language</td>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>Hebrew</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Place of Publication</td>
<td>Occupied Palestinian Territories, Al-Ayyam newspaper</td>
<td>Israel: Ha’aretz newspaper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time of Publication</td>
<td>1 November 2003</td>
<td>20 October 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted Public</td>
<td>Palestinian</td>
<td>Israeli</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Function of the map</td>
<td>Informative and persuasive</td>
<td>Informative and persuasive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

84 Tables (4.17) and (4.18) are based on the classifications in Collins-Kreiner et al (2006).
4.9 Conclusion

This chapter has described the overall textual organization of the corpus on the macro-structural level. The discussion showed that different language versions of peace initiatives are framed and contextualized for different purposes, especially influencing the reader’s opinion. This is most evident with regard to persuasive and evaluative introductions added to some of these language versions. Paratexts added, such as introductions, for example, are designed to govern the reading of the text and to leave a certain effect on the reader, namely, supporting or opposing the political solutions suggested by a particular peace initiative (cf. Chapter 3.3.3, page 94). Paratexts, thus, play a crucial role in the framing of peace initiatives and, consequently, reactions to them.

This chapter also showed that translation is largely invisible in the different language versions of peace initiatives. This raises the question of whether these texts are translations based on original source texts or just recontextualized and reframed already existing texts. In many cases, translations produced in specific institutional contexts for specific readers and purposes are recontextualized for use in others. This is supported by the large similarities between these texts. The next chapter describes the textual profiles of the different language versions at the micro-structural level.
Chapter Five
Textual Analysis

5.1 Introduction
Chapter Four examined how the various components of textual organization of translation profiles of the different language versions of peace initiatives (the target texts), e.g. layouts, paratexts, chapter heading, etc., reflect ideological and political interests. Chapter Five – drawing on the premises that ideological and political positions as well as power relations largely determine the outcome of negotiations and consequently drafting of agreements and that ideology acts as a filtering mechanism during the translation process – aims to examine how aspects of ideology\textsuperscript{85}, power relations and political affiliation are reflected at the micro-structural level. In other words, this chapter sets to establish how ideological factors inform translational choices as well as the interpretation of translated texts by readers.

Although it is difficult to read ideology off texts based on the existence of certain linguistic features (e.g. ambiguous formulations, modality, choice of sensitive key political terms and toponyms, etc.), these features are likely to have ideological significance.

The motivation for selecting data examples in this chapter is based on the following criteria. First, a detailed comparison between peace initiatives (the source texts) and their target texts was conducted. This was done by comparing different translations of the same source text, i.e. comparing several language versions of the same peace initiative into one target language and into different target languages. These comparisons revealed that some translation strategies such as addition and omission of information occur dominantly in the translations published by Palestinian and Israeli newspapers (cf. Sections 5.6 and 5.7 below). The second criteria is identified key characteristic features of peace initiatives as the outcome of negotiations such as the use of deliberately ambiguous or vague drafting, use of naming practices, intertextuality, modality and use of politically sensitive terms (cf. Chapter 2.4).

\textsuperscript{85} In this thesis, features of texts are regarded as ideological “in so far they affect (sustain, undermine) power relations” (Fairclough 1995: 25).
The typology of translation strategies for the following discussion is the one proposed by Chesterman (1997) who attempts to arrive at a systematic classification of translation strategies. These strategies will be used to categorize shifts found in the language versions of peace initiatives in the corpus.

Chesterman (1997: 96) classifies translation shifts into three main categories: syntactic, semantic and pragmatic. Syntactic translation strategies are those which manipulate form. They are identified by comparing source and target texts and indicate a change in the grammatical form. ‘Literal translation’ strategy, one example of syntactic translation strategies, is found throughout the corpus where meaning is maximally close to the source language form, nevertheless grammatically correct according to the target language conventions.

Semantic translation strategies – which manipulate meaning – change or modify the meaning of the text, sentence, clause or even a word. The list of semantic translation strategies by Chesterman (1997) does not include a label for those shifts where lexical items – which have different meaning from the source text’s possible meaning and belong to a different class and register – are opted for. For the purpose of this study, these shifts will be labelled as ‘meaning shifts’.

Pragmatic translation strategies – which have to do with the selection of information in the target text – manipulate the message of the translation itself. ‘Explicitness change’ strategy refers to making information more explicit or implicit in the target text. This, for example, includes change in definiteness which occurred primarily in the Arabic and Hebrew language versions of the Roadmap Plan. ‘Information change’ strategy refers to either the addition or omission of source text information for reasons other than being perhaps (ir)relevant to the reader. Such addition and omission of information occur at both macro- (cf. Chapter 4) as well as micro-structural level (cf. Chapter 5). At the macro-structural level, ‘information change’ is related to the recontextualization of texts for different audiences and purposes.

Finally, ‘cultural filtering’ refers to the adaptation of source culture specific terms to target culture norms and expectations. This translation strategy particularly applies to naming practices (e.g. protagonists of the conflict and holy places; cf. Section 5.3) but also to the
overall strategy employed in some texts to make it conform to the expectations of a particular readership.

The discussion in this chapter focuses on the mediation of a number of textual elements in the different language versions of peace initiatives. Key characteristic features of peace initiatives – e.g. instances of deliberately ambiguous or vague drafting, use of naming practices, intertextuality, modality and instances of politically sensitive terms – will be covered in sections (5.2-5.5) whereas cases of omissions and additions of information will be examined across corpus in sections (5.6-5.7). Occasionally, some examples are referred to more than once to discuss different points. For comprehensive discussion of examples under scrutiny, full historical and political contexts are explained.

5.2 Creative Ambiguity
Ambiguity – and more specifically, the “creative ambiguity” – has been traditionally regarded as a key element in diplomacy negotiations (e.g. Isaacson 1992, Pehar 2001) (cf. Chapter 2.4.2). The issue of “creative ambiguity” is prominent in the long history of the Arab-Israeli conflict and its numerous documents, including the United Nations resolutions. The most significant case of using “creative ambiguity” in this context can be found in the drafting of UN Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) which in its English version called for “withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict” without specifying how much territory was involved. This resolution is legally binding in its English as well as French version which called for “retrait des forces armées israéliennes des territoires occupés lors du récent conflit”. The use of the form ‘des’ in the French version could be interpreted as either ‘all’ (de + les) or ‘some’ (des). Ambiguity – as is often the case in diplomacy – played a major role in the drafting of this resolution and consequently its later endorsement (Gorenberg 2006: 126).

Since the passing of this resolution, Israel has always interpreted it – based on its English version – to mean that it should give up “some” but “not necessarily all” of the occupied territories (Gorenberg 2006: 126) – or only to the extent it “deemed not to detrimentally affect Israeli security” (Uzer 2009: 123) – a possibility afforded by the fact that the term ‘territories’ is preceded by a ‘zero article’ signalling indefinite reference. The Arab states

and the Palestinians opposed this interpretation and took the resolution – based on its French version – to mean “a full retreat to the prewar lines” (Gorenberg 2006: 126). The inclusion or exclusion of the definite article in different language versions of a single source text has been, in this case, of profound political significance to both sides: it has allowed both parties to defend the interpretation of the resolution which best suited their political agenda and, in doing so, demand territorial concessions. Missing definite articles have been points of suspicion in Middle East peace proposals ever since.

This historical case of resorting to “creative ambiguity” in negotiated texts provided the motivation to examine this linguistic feature in more detail in the language versions of peace initiatives.

Peace initiatives are not homogeneous. Some characteristic features such as ambiguity are found across corpus as these texts are the outcome of direct or indirect negotiations. However, detailed analysis of corpus revealed that the particular issue of (in)definiteness, i.e. change from the indefinite to definite form, was only significant in the case of the Arabic and Hebrew language versions of the Roadmap Plan. This could perhaps be because the Roadmap is the only officially accepted plan to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

Ambiguity and, in some cases, vagueness are central to the Roadmap Plan in terms of the proposed sequencing of negotiations and the actual drafting of stipulations on particularly sensitive matters. While other peace initiatives (e.g. the Geneva Accord) were conceived as permanent status agreements to end the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and resolve substantive issues (such as sovereignty over Jerusalem, an agreement on permanent borders, or the status of Palestinian refugees), the proponents of the Roadmap Plan deliberately steered clear from such thorny issues and postponed them to the final settlement negotiations. As Klein (2007:180-181) explains, the drafters of the plan:

[s]aw no hope in bridging the huge gap between the two sides. The international effort was aimed at a staged process, which would focus on short-range goals, cognizant that the positions of the Sharon and Arafat governments were polar opposites. In this, the Road Map was a continuation of the report produced in 2001 by a commission headed by former senator George Mitchell, and another report prepared by then-CIA chief George Tenet.

87 The Roadmap Plan was drafted in line with the long-term American Middle East ‘step-by-step’ – or small steps – diplomacy, originated and promoted by former American Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. Kissinger defined diplomacy as “a series of steps, merging into a continuum. Step-by-step diplomacy, therefore, progress through a series of interim agreements” (Otte 2001: 197).
The Palestinian Authority and Israel thus set out to – willingly or unwillingly – indirectly negotiate less controversial issues that they could agree on – including a range of security matters, the Palestinian humanitarian situation as well as Israel’s withdrawal from the re-occupied territories and return to the borders of 28 September 2000 – while deferring the most sensitive trigger points for confrontation to the end of the process.

In the following sections, the pervasiveness of ambiguity in the text of the Roadmap Plan will be discussed in relation to three issues that designate sensitive aspects of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict: Israeli withdrawal, Jewish settlement outposts and the re-opening of closed Palestinian institutions in Occupied East Jerusalem.

5.2.1 Israeli Withdrawal

Negotiations between Israel and the PLO during the early 1990s led to the drafting of the Oslo Accords in 1993 (cf. Chapter 1.1.2). The Oslo Accords divided the Occupied West Bank (excluding Occupied East Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip into three types of areas: Areas ‘A’ (Palestinian-controlled), Areas ‘B’ (jointly Palestinian-Israeli-controlled) and Areas ‘C’ (Israeli-controlled) (Campbell 2002: 61).

Areas ‘A’, consisting of all main Palestinian “urban centres” (excluding Occupied East Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip (excluding the Jewish settlements that existed at that time, mostly in the south of the Strip) were transferred to full Palestinian control (Newman 1997: 5). The Palestinian Authority had full civil jurisdiction and internal security control over these areas which consists of nearly 17.2% of the Occupied West Bank (Fischbach 2005: 298).

Areas ‘B’ – which comprised almost 23.8% of the Occupied West Bank (Fischbach 2005: 298) – were placed under full Palestinian civil jurisdiction but shared Palestinian-Israeli security control was in place in these areas. The many parts of Areas ‘A’ are separated from each other and surrounded by Areas ‘B’ and more significantly, Areas ‘C’ (Masri 2002: 113).

Areas ‘C’ – which cover nearly 60% of the territory and include all Jewish settlements in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (at that time) and their bypass roads in addition to military installations, meanwhile – were kept under full Israeli control (Newman 1997: 5). Israel has been expropriating Palestinian private lands in Areas ‘C’ – after declaring them
“State Land” in order to build new settlements and expand existing ones (Thorpe 2006: 243-244).

In the aftermath of the second Palestinian intifada, Al-Aqsa – which broke out on 28 September 2000 – the Israeli army reoccupied all of the Palestinian territories (Areas ‘A’ and ‘B’) along with Areas ‘C’, which it already controlled. The Roadmap Plan requires Israel to withdraw from the reoccupied territories (mainly Areas ‘A’) and return to the lines of 28 September 2000. Nevertheless, this demand was expressed in ambiguous terms in the English source text and the subsequent range of possible interpretations are reflected in the different Arabic and Hebrew translations of the Roadmap, as shown in the set of translations below (throughout this chapter, underlining is used to identify the textual elements under scrutiny in each example):

(5.1) As comprehensive security performance moves forward, IDF withdraws progressively from areas occupied since September 28, 2000 and the two sides restore the status quo that existed prior to September 28, 2000. Palestinian security forces redeploy to areas vacated by IDF [The Roadmap Plan: 2].

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Back translation</th>
<th>Original Text</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Back translation:</td>
<td>The Israel defense forces withdraw progressively from the territories, which they occupy since 28 September 2000.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Back translation:</td>
<td>The Israel defense army withdraws progressively from territories, which were occupied since 28 September 2000.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Back translation:</td>
<td>The Israeli army withdraws progressively from the occupied territories since 28 September 2000.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Back translation:</td>
<td>The Israeli army withdraws progressively from the territories it occupied since 28 September 2000.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Back translation:</td>
<td>IDF withdraws progressively from areas occupied since 28 September 2000.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Back translation:</td>
<td>IDF withdraws progressively from areas, which were occupied since 28 September 2000.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The lexical item ‘areas’ appears three times in the English source text of the Roadmap and, in all three cases, it is rendered in the indefinite form, i.e. zero article. All Arabic translations, except the translation produced by the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (IMFA), employed an explicitness change strategy, thus translating the term ‘areas’ as المنطاقات (manāṭiq, lit. ‘the areas’ or ‘the territories’). Despite the fact that it is possible to retain the ambiguity of the original text, translators preferred to use the definite form, which resulted in a different reading of the English source. According to this reading, Israel is required to withdraw from all and not some of the Palestinian territories it reoccupied since the outbreak of the Palestinian intifada, Al-Aqsa. By contrast, the Arabic translation produced by the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (IMFA) followed a literal translation strategy and thus kept the lexical item ‘areas’ in the indefinite form. A literal translation strategy was also opted for in all the Hebrew versions: although ‘areas’ was translated as either אזורים (azurim, lit. ‘areas’) or שטחים (shtaḥim, lit. ‘territories’), the indefinite form prevailed.

The issue of the Israeli withdrawal from all or some of the reoccupied Palestinian areas becomes more sensitive and complicated in light of the facts that Israel has been creating on the ground since 28 September 2000. The bulk of these facts have to do with Israel’s continued appropriation of hundreds of thousands of dunums of Palestinian private land – a dunum is 1000 meters – under various pretexts. For example, to construct its illegal Wall88 – which cuts away nearly 9% of the Occupied West Bank (Klein 2008: 90) – expand its illegal settlements and construct bypass roads that exclusively serve them in addition to creating buffer zones, military closed areas and military bases, of which some became permanent. The proposed Israeli withdrawal is further complicated in light of statements made by many Israeli and American officials such as the Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin

88 To illustrate how this Wall fragments the Occupied Palestinian Territories, see for example, the map published by B’Tselem in 2008: [http://www.btselem.org/download/separation_barrier_map_eng.pdf](http://www.btselem.org/download/separation_barrier_map_eng.pdf) [last accessed: 24 November 2011].
Netanyahu, and the former American president, George W. Bush, in which they emphasized that any future settlement between the Palestinians and Israelis should take into account facts created on the ground since 4 June 1967. This automatically includes those facts which were created since 28 September 2000.

Against this backdrop, the existence or absence of the definite article in negotiated texts in the context of the struggle for land becomes an extremely sensitive issue and more than a mere linguistic formulation as it entails significant territorial concessions that both sides try to avoid at all cost.

5.2.2 Jewish Settlement Outposts

The phenomenon of the Jewish settlement outposts – which started in the mid-1990s and have intensified since 2000 – is an inseparable part of the long history of the Jewish settlements enterprise in the Occupied Palestinian Territories since 1967. The same as Jewish settlements, Jewish settlement outposts are also illegal under international law as they are built on what is internationally recognized to be an occupied Palestinian land. The term ‘settlement outpost’, according to the Peace Now website, refers to “small clusters of caravans or other buildings, usually on hilltops, which give settlers a foothold for expanding existing settlements”.

Jewish settlement outposts – found “often but not necessarily in the vicinity of already existing settlements” – are in fact “small temporary settlements” (Golan 2007: 80). The main aim of these settlement outposts is twofold: “on the one hand, to create a continuity

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89 After his meeting with President Obama on 20 March 2011, the Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, stated that “I think for there to be peace, the Palestinians will have to accept some basic realities. The first is that while Israel is prepared to make generous compromises for peace, it cannot go back to the 1967 lines - because these lines are indefensible; because they don't take into account certain changes that have taken place on the ground, demographic changes that have taken place over the last 44 years”, published on Israel Ministry of foreign Affairs website: [http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Speeches%20by%20Israeli%20leaders/2011/President_Obama_P M_Netanyahu_after_meeting_20-May-2011.htm][last accessed: 24 November 2011].

90 Former American president George Bush, in a letter to the former Israeli Prime Minister Areal Sharon on 14 April 2004, reiterated his commitment that “[I]n light of new realities on the ground, including already existing major Israeli populations centers, it is unrealistic to expect that the outcome of final status negotiations will be a full and complete return to the armistice lines of 1949, and all previous efforts to negotiate a two-state solution have reached the same conclusion. It is realistic to expect that any final status agreement will only be achieved on the basis of mutually agreed changes that reflect these realities”, published on Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs website: [http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Reference+Documents/Exchange+of+letters+Sharon-Bush+14-Apr-2004.htm][last accessed: 24 November 2011].
of Israeli presence by taking over as much land as possible and on the other, creating a barrier between the various Palestinian population centers. That is to say: forestalling the possibility of creating a Palestinian region that can be self-sufficient”. This strategic objective is in line with Ariel Sharon’s call, then Foreign Minister, to the Jewish settlers at the time of the Wye Memorandum in the late 1990s to “grab every hill and piece of land possible” (Golan 2007: 80). In this way, Jewish settlement outposts play a significant role in consolidating Israel’s control of the Occupied West Bank (Honig-Parnass 2007: 214) by creating facts on the ground prior to concluding any deal with the Palestinian leadership (Ghanem 2010: 32).

The phenomenon of the Jewish settlement outposts has become a separate issue from the long old history of the Jewish settlement enterprise in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. This phenomenon has generated a heated debate with regard to the dismantlement of these settlement outposts. According to Peace Now, there are 99 settlement outposts throughout the West Bank with an estimated population of over 4,000 settlers.92

The distinction between ‘settlement outposts’ and the settlement effort in general has considerable political significance. Etkes (2005), for instance, argues that this distinction “serves as a line of defense protecting” the general settlement effort: while the media attention is diverted to recently created outposts, ‘legal’ settlements have quadrupled in size. Against this backdrop, the Roadmap’s reference to the dismantlement of settlement outposts becomes the source of considerable and heated debate, as reflected in the different Arabic and Hebrew translations listed under the following example:

(5.2) GOI immediately dismantles settlement outposts erected since March 2001 [The Roadmap Plan: 3].

Back translation: The Israeli government immediately removes the settlement locations advanced deep into land, which were established since March 2001.

Back translation: The government of Israel immediately evacuates the settlement points, which were established since March 2001.

Back translation: Israel dismantles immediately the settlement locations, which were established since March 2001.

91 Ibid.
The Israeli government immediately dismantles all the settlement focal points which were established since March 2001.

The Israeli government immediately dismantles the settlement locations which were created since March 2001.

The Israeli government immediately dismantles all the settlement focal points, which were established since March 2001.

In the above example, the indefinite reference signalled by the use of zero-article before ‘settlement outposts’ is responsible for the ambiguity of the sentence at hand. All Arabic translations employed an explicitness change strategy. Although Arabic would have allowed translators to mirror the ambiguity of the original text, they chose to invest the term with a definite reference which allows for a different reading of the English source. By adding, whether intentionally or not, the determiners ‘جميع’ (jami‘, lit. ‘all’) and ‘كل’ (kul, lit. ‘all’), respectively, in their translations, CNN and Almtym disambiguate the English text even further and reinforce the interpretation that ‘all’ settlement outposts, ‘not just some’ of them, will have to be dismantled. The use of an information change strategy – involving the addition of the sequence ‘المتغلقة’ (lit. ‘advanced deep into land’) – in the United Nations version represents an extreme instance of disambiguation.

As for the Hebrew translations (see example 5.3 below), the Knesset version is the only one which followed a literal translation strategy, i.e. using the term ‘settlement outposts’ preceded by zero-article. The translations published by Peace Now and Ha’aretz, on the other hand, opt for an explicitness change strategy, which invests the term ‘settlement outposts’ with a definite reference. A meaning shift also arises during the process of translation in the Ha’aretz version, where ‘settlement outposts’ is rendered as ‘התיישנותיות’ (lit. ‘the settlements’) – thus widening the semantic scope of the term included in the stipulations of the Roadmap Plan.

(5.3) GOI immediately dismantles settlement outposts erected since March 2001 [The Roadmap Plan: 3].

Government of Israel immediately dismantles settlement outposts, which were established since March 2001.

Government of Israel immediately dismantles settlement outposts, which were established since March 2001.
5.2.3 Closed Palestinian Institutions in Occupied East Jerusalem

The political status, territorial boundaries and sovereignty of Jerusalem have always been of particular significance in the Arab-Israeli conflict because of the importance that the city has for the national identity of both Palestinians and Israelis (cf. Chapter 1.1.1). The Roadmap Plan consists of three phases in which the sensitive issue of Jerusalem is deferred until the third phase – i.e. final negotiations. However, the particular issue of closed Palestinian institutions in Occupied East Jerusalem is discussed in phase one. The re-opening of these institutions has been a priority for the Palestinian side since they were closed down by the Israeli army after the outbreak of the second Palestinian intifada, Al-Aqsa in September 2000.

In August 2001 – and in the midst of the Al-Aqsa intifada – the Israeli government headed by the Israeli Prime Minister then, Ariel Sharon, issued orders for the closure of several Palestinian institutions in the Occupied East Jerusalem. Among the closed institutions were “the Orient House, the Chamber of Commerce, the Small Projects Office, the Department of Land and Mapping and the Old City Rehabilitation Committee” (Ju'beh 2007: 21).

Unlike the other Palestinian institutions, the Orient House – a symbol of the power struggle between Israel and the Palestinians to control East Jerusalem – has been playing an important political role in the occupied city. The Orient House – since late 1992 – has effectively served as the “Palestinian Foreign Ministry” in the occupied East city where Palestinian politicians met diplomatic delegations from all over the world (Rekhess 2008: 275). It has also acted as the “political and institutional umbrella” and representative of the Palestinian People in the occupied city (Ju'beh 2007: 19). Israel saw this as eroding its sovereignty over the city and as an attempt by the Palestinians to consolidate their foothold in the city as the capital of their future Palestinian state. Against this background, Israel’s decision to close down this institution, i.e. the Orient House, effectively ended “one of the most important centers of Palestinian power in the city” (Rekhess 2008: 278). Such a
decision was meant to signal Israel increasing control of the city and to reinforce Jerusalem’s image as the “eternal unified” capital of Israel.

In early drafts of the Roadmap, the Chamber of Commerce was the only closed Palestinian institution that Israel agreed to reopen in Occupied East Jerusalem as the following excerpt shows:

GOI [government of Israel] reopens East Jerusalem Chamber of Commerce and other closed Palestinian economic institutions in East Jerusalem.

The final draft of the Roadmap confirms the re-opening of this commercial institution, but remains ambiguous with regard to the future of ‘other’ Palestinian institutions. The following example shows how Arabic and Hebrew translations have dealt with this issue:

(5.4) GOI reopens Palestinian Chamber of Commerce and other closed Palestinian institutions in East Jerusalem [The Roadmap Plan: 3].

[USDS] تعيد الحكومة الإسرائيلية فتح الغرفة التجارية الفلسطينية وغيرها من المؤسسات الفلسطينية المغلقة في القدس الشرقية.

Back translation: The government of Israel reopens the Palestinian chamber of commerce and other Palestinian closed institutions in Eastern Jerusalem.

[Al-Quds] تعيد اسرائيل فتح الغرفة التجارية و المؤسسات الأخرى المغلقة في القدس الشرقية.

Back translation: Israel reopens the chamber of commerce and the other closed institutions in Eastern Jerusalem.

[Peace Now] למחלף ישראלי פותחה מחלף חדש בתוככי המשטר הפוליטי במשטר פלסטיני徹 חדש בתוככי המשטר הפוליטי במשטר פלסטיני徹 новости.

Back translation: Government of Israel reopens the Palestinian commerce and other Palestinian institutions, which were closed in East Jerusalem.

The ambiguity in the phrase ‘other closed Palestinian institutions’ is retained in all language versions, except in the Arabic translation produced by Al-Quds newspaper. In this version, an explicitness change strategy is used to disambiguate the original text and, in doing so, emphasises that Israel is required to reopen ‘all and not only some’ Palestinian institutions in Occupied East Jerusalem. This kind of interpretation is advocated by the chief negotiator of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Saeb Erikat (2007: 34), who stresses that (relevant stretches underlined): 93

There is a Roadmap that was handed to both sides in April 2003, in the first phase there are commitment on the both sides, the Israeli side and the Israeli government, should freeze settlement activities, including natural growth, and remove all settlement outposts erected since 2001, and they should open all the Palestinian institutions in Jerusalem and restore things to the status that prevailed in 2000 and stop incursions and release the detainees, these are commitments.

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On the other hand, all Hebrew translations followed a literal translation strategy and thus preserved the ambiguity of the English text. In the three cases discussed above – i.e., Israeli withdrawal, Jewish settlement outposts and closed Palestinian institutions in Occupied East Jerusalem – ambiguous formulation plays a crucial role in deciding how much each side would give up or get.

5.3 Naming Practices

One significant site of struggle for power and competing ideologies is naming practices. In situations of ongoing contemporary conflict, these practices assume greater importance. The Palestinian-Israeli conflict is a case in point. Naming practices in the context of this conflict – which is enormously asymmetric in nature, militarily, politically and economically, with Israel as the stronger side in such an asymmetric conflict (Klein 2008: 93) – should be seen as a manifestation of the power struggle between the Palestinians and Israelis. In this context, Peteet (2005: 157) points out that:

> In the context of the Israeli – Palestinian conflict, naming can be a diagnostic of power; conflicts over naming reflect and are integral to contests over control and ownership. Each party tries to superimpose its name over territory, places, actions and interpretations of events. Whose nomenclature prevails derives from the ability to have one’s narration and lexicon accepted as the standard one.

Naming practices are employed by each side to legitimize its claims and uphold its power while delegitimizing and contesting the claims of the other side. Suleiman (2004: 183) argues that names in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict are “ideologically loaded linguistic constructs. They are used to validate or contest claims and proprietorship over landscape”.

Such ‘proprietorship over landscape’ can be seen in the renaming of Palestinian towns and streets inside Israel proper after the 1948 war (see below). Competing naming practices can also be seen in the names given to key historical events of the conflict such as the 1948 Palestine war itself – known to the Palestinians as ‘الفئكة’ (al-Nakba, lit. ‘The Disaster’ or ‘The Catastrophe’), and to the Israelis as “יום העצמאות” (yom ha-’atsma’ut, lit. ‘the Independence Day’), “מלחמת העצמאות” (milhemet ha-’atsma’ut, lit. ‘War of Independence’) or “מלחמת השחרור” (milhemet ha-shihur, lit. ‘War of Liberation’). The ideological and political difference between the Palestinian and Israeli names given to this historical event can be summarized as the following:

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94 For a comprehensive discussion of the asymmetrical nature of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, see Gee (1998).

95 For example, the Israeli army is the fourth largest army in the world and the strongest military power in the Middle East (Bronner 2007: 118). For a comprehensive account on the Israeli military power, see Cordesman (2006: 63-153).

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For the Jews in Israel, 1948 is the historical turning point in which their state was established and their sovereignty constituted. For the Palestinians, the opposite is the case: 1948 is the point at which their society was destroyed, a large part of them expelled, and they lost their country and the opportunity for statehood. Hundreds of thousands of Palestinians were uprooted and went into exile outside the boundaries of the state and turned into refugees in the surrounding states (Ram 2009: 366).

Thus, to opt for one of these names automatically reflects the ‘narrative location’ of the speaker (Baker 2006) and his/her particular ideology. It can be argued then that “the very act of naming something is indeed a political act, for a name is always given to something or someone by an external force having the legitimacy to do so” (Pinchevski and Torgovnik 2002: 366). In this way, names can be used to “uphold or contest power” (Peteet 2005: 154).

Naming practices in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict include names given to the protagonists of the conflict (e.g. ‘Palestinians’ and ‘Israelis’), holy places (e.g. ‘al-Haram al-Sharif’ or ‘Har ha-Bayt’)96, Israeli military occupation practices (e.g. ‘closure’ and ‘deportation’) and Israeli military offensives (e.g. ‘Operation Just Reward’).97

Naming practices are particularly significant in the context of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict taking into account the systematic and gradual erasure of Arabic Palestinian names and replacing them by Hebrew-Zionist ones, for example, names of streets, towns and villages.98

In Israel, the choice of place names, i.e. toponyms, “has become a powerful tool for reinforcing competing national Zionist ideologies” (Cohen and Kliot 1992: 653). The Israeli-Zionist naming practices, as Peteet (2005: 157) explains, have an overlapping two-fold purpose: firstly, they “attempt to nativise Israelis by consciously and methodically elaborating historically deep ties to place” and secondly, they achieve this “by, in part, erasing a Palestinian presence and history, and thus any claim to the land of Palestine and legitimate rights to reside there”. Moreover, Israeli place names are intended to reflect “a combination of continuity and change, which signifies the nation-building ethos and Zionist revival, as well as the redemption of an ancient land and the return to a pristine

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96 See Azaryahu and Golan (2001) and Ben-Ze'ev and Aburaiya (2004) for detailed accounts on the naming practices in the context of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

97 See Gavriely-Nuri (2010) for a detailed account of naming practices of Israeli military offensives.

98 See particularly Azaryahu (1986, 1996) and Pinchevski and Torgovnik (2002) for a detailed account on the systematic erasure of Palestinian names and replacing them with Jewish-Zionist ones.
origin” (Pinchevski and Torgovnik 2002: 374). This is utilized to consolidate Zionist claims to historic Palestine (cf. Chapter 1.1.1).

The political decision to erase Arab Palestinian place names and replace them with Hebrew-Zionist ones was justified by Ben Gurion – the first Prime Minister of the State of Israel and its chief architect in his letter to the “Israel Place-Names Committee” as follows:

We are obliged to remove Arab names for reasons of state. Just as we do not recognize their political proprietorship over the land so also do we not recognize their spiritual proprietorship and their names (Benvenisti 2000: 14, cited in Ram 2009: 379).

With the creation of the state of Israel in 1948, the “Israel Place-Names Committee” replaced the “Names Committee” which was formed in the 1930s for the task of replacing Palestinian names with either biblical or national/Zionist ones (Peteet 2005: 158). One example of this task was naming streets in the Palestinian town of Ramle (Arabic: ‘الرملة’). In July 1948, the Israeli army occupied Ramle and declared it an Israeli town. Soon after this, the Israel Ministry of the Interior at that time assigned an administrative committee to run the town’s affairs (Pinchevski and Torgovnik 2002: 370). The first thing this committee did after assuming power was the erasure of all Arab names and replacing them with new names including all the streets which did not have names before (ibid.: 370-371). The names given to old Ramle’s streets were primarily Zionist and nationalist in nature, e.g. ‘Lord Balfour’, ‘Hashomer’, ‘Exodus’ (ibid.: 371). Those chosen names have histories and reflect Zionist ideology, for example, ‘Hashomer’ was a group founded in 1909 to protect Jewish settlers, whereas ‘Exodus’ was a ship with 4500 Jewish “immigrants” attacked and deported back to Germany by the British forces (ibid.: 371).

Another example concerns the Palestinian Negev region (Arabic: ‘صحراء النقب’). In 1949, the government of Israel appointed a committee of experts with the specific task of the designating Hebrew place names in the Negev region. During the first two years, the committee “re-named 533 places, while obliterating their former Arab, or even Greek or Latin, names. In contrast to the 533 new Hebrew names, only 8 place names remained intact” (Ram 2009: 378-279).

This Israeli policy of erasure – which started in 1948 – continues today in Occupied East Jerusalem. Two cases suffice to illustrate this point. The first case concerns replacing road signs in Israel (including Occupied East Jerusalem). Suleiman (2011: 199) explains this case as follows:
In summer of 2009, Yisrael Katz, the transport minister in the newly formed Likud-led government of Benjamin Netanyahu decided to replace existing road signs in Israel with new ones, ‘so that all the names appearing on them in English and Arabic would be a direct transliteration of [their] Hebrew [names],’ instead of being directly in English and Arabic. Under this new policy initiative, the name of the city of Jerusalem would appear as Yerushalayim in English and Arabic, replacing the English and Arabic names Jerusalem and Al-Quds, respectively.

The second case occurred on 16 June 2011 when WAFA – the Palestinian News and Information Agency – reported that the Israeli municipality of Occupied Jerusalem changed the name of one street and another historical location in the Eastern part of the city from Arabic to Hebrew. The municipality changed the name of ‘the Sultan Suleiman Street’ (Arabic: ‘شارع السلطان سليمان’, ‘�� Reference Street’) – that extends between Damascus Gate and Herod’s Gate of the Old City Wall – to “Eliyahu Street” and ‘the Sultan Suleiman Cave’ (Arabic: ‘مغارة السلطان سليمان’, ‘Stone Reference Cave’) – on the same road – to “Eliyahu Cave”. Such an action aims to change the Arab-Islamic character of the occupied city and cement Israel’s claims of ownership.

This systematic process of erasure has never been limited to names but also extended to the erasure of hundreds of Palestinian towns, villages and neighbourhoods during and after the 1948 war (Masalha 2007: 66) (see for example, Abdel Jawad 2006: 90; Hussein 2002: 277). One example of this was the demolition of ‘the Moroccan Quarter’ (in Arabic: ‘حارة المغاربة’, Ḥārat al-Maghāriba) in the Old City of Jerusalem following the 1967 war in order to create “the Western Wall Plaza” (Khalidi 1992: 139-143).

This Israeli practice has been in line with the late nineteenth century Zionist slogan of “a land without people for a people without a land” and Golda Meir’s – former Israel Prime Minister – infamous 1969 statement, “the Palestinian people do not exist” (Doumani 2007: 50).

Naming practices in the context of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict are thus obvious acts of “appropriation” (Azaryahu 1996: 313) and demonstrate particular power relations (Azaryahu and Golan 2001: 181). Previous studies on naming practices (e.g. Azaryahu

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100 Masalha (2007: 66) points out that “[A]n exhaustive study by a team of Palestinian field researchers and academics under the direction of Walid Khalidi details the destruction of 418 villages falling inside the 1949 armistice lines”. The main objective of erasing Palestinian towns and villages in 1948 was twofold: firstly, “to prevent the return of refugees to their homes” and secondly, to disseminate the Zionist claim that “Palestine was virtually empty territory before the Jews entered” (ibid.: 66).

101 See Khalidi (1992: 139-140) for the history of the Muslim ownership of ‘the Moroccan Quarter’ in the Old City of Jerusalem.
1996, Peteet 2005, Ram 2009) and aspects of naming practices within the framework of broader studies in language and translation (e.g. Baker 2006, Suleiman 2004) provided the motivation to examine this issue in the language versions of peace initiatives in detail.

In fact, detailed analysis of these language versions revealed that naming practices were significant across corpus. During negotiations, conflict over the choice of one or another name or label is very common. Each party typically insists on using a name or label that reflects its narrative, best serves its political interests and advances its negotiating position. This is particularly significant with regard to names given to holy places, where the choice of one particular name would infer some sort of legitimacy to claims of ownership of one side of the conflict at the expense of the other.

In order to bridge the gap between the conflicting narratives of the two sides of the conflict, sometimes names important to both sides are included side by side as some sort of a compromise. This can be seen, for instance, with regard to the toponym ‘al-Ḥaram al-Sharīf’/ ‘the Temple Mount’ in the English original source text of the Geneva Accord. However, such compromises soon disappear in translation (see section 5.3.2 below).

Naming practices is a major part of this chapter. Other linguistic features, particularly cases of intertextuality (cf. section 5.4) and the use of political concepts (e.g. cf. section 5.6) – although discussed separately – are integral parts of the issue of naming practices. In the following sub-sections, naming practices with regard to the protagonists of the conflict and holy places will be investigated in detail in their full historical and political contexts.

5.3.1 The Protagonists of the Conflict

The Middle East conflict has been referred to in different terms over the last sixty years, mainly, ‘the Palestine Question’, ‘the Palestine-Jewish Question’, ‘the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict’, ‘the Arab-Zionist Conflict’ (Bassiouni and Ben Ami 2009: xi). In the Palestinian-Israeli peace initiatives, this conflict is referred to as either the ‘Arab-Israeli’ or the ‘Israeli-Palestinian’ conflict. Choices made by the authors of original and translated texts are indicative of their personal or institutional perspectives on the ongoing tensions and power relations. Such terminological choices can thus be interpreted as attempts to give more political weight to one of the parties at the expense of the other. Moreover, such choices “raise claims of partisanship by one side or the other” (Bassiouni and Ben Ami 2009: xi).
While the Palestinian political discourse refers to the conflict as ‘الصراع الفلسطيني-الاسرائيلي’ (lit. ‘the Palestinian-Israeli conflict’) and the general conflict between the Arab countries (Lebanon, Syria as well as the Palestine Liberation Organization, PLO) and Israel as ‘الصراع العربي-الاسرائيلي’ (lit. ‘the Arab-Israeli conflict’), the terms ‘הссכסוך הelfastי-הספרד’ (lit. ‘the Israeli-Palestinian conflict’) and ‘הסכסוך הישראלי-ערבי’ (lit. ‘the Israeli-Arab conflict’) are predominantly used in Israeli political circles.

As far as the source texts of the Palestinian-Israeli peace initiatives are concerned, the term ‘Israeli-Palestinian conflict’ is consistently used throughout, except for one occurrence of the term ‘Arab-Israeli conflict’ in the original source text of the Arab Peace Initiative (see example 5.8 below). All Arabic and Hebrew translations of peace initiatives followed a literal translation strategy in rendering the term the ‘Israeli-Palestinian conflict’, except for the Al-Quds translation of the Roadmap Plan which chose to reverse the word order in six occurrences, as in the following two examples:

(5.5) The settlement will resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and end the occupation that began in 1967 [The Roadmap Plan: 1].

[Al-Quds] هذه التسوية ستحل النزاع الفلسطيني-الإسرائيلي، وتنهي الاحتلال الذي بدأ في العام 1967... استنادا إلى اساس مؤتمر مدريد، ومبدأ الأرض مقابل السلام، وقرارات مجلس الأمن الدولي 242 و 338 و1397...

-back translation: This settlement will resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict...

(5.6) A two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will only be achieved through an end to violence and terrorism, when the Palestinian people have a leadership acting decisively against terror and willing and able to build a practicing democracy based on tolerance and liberty [The Roadmap Plan: 1].

[Al-Quds] إن حل النزاع الفلسطيني-الإسرائيلي بإنشاء دولتين يمكن تحقيقه فقط من خلال إنهاء العنف والإرهاب عندما يكون الشعب الفلسطيني قادراً على بناء ديمقراطية تطبيقية تتساهم إلى التسامح والحريات.

-back translation: The resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict by establishing two states can be achieved...

This same pattern – namely, the reversing of word-order – can be observed elsewhere in the Al-Quds translation. In phrases such as ‘GOI and PA’ (where ‘GOI’ stands for ‘Government of Israel’ and ‘PA’ stands for ‘Palestinian Authority’), ‘Israeli-Palestinian engagement’ or ‘Israeli-Palestinian negotiations’, word-order is reversed throughout, as the following examples illustrate:

(5.7) GOI and PA continue revenue clearance process and transfer of funds, including arrears, in accordance with agreed, transparent monitoring mechanism [The Roadmap Plan: 3].

[Al-Quds] تواصل السلطة الفلسطينية والحكومة الإسرائيلية في عملية توضيح الموارد ونقل الأموال وفقًا لآلية رقابة شفافة متقلاً عليها جزئياً وقواعد سيادة بالأسد إلى الدستور الجديد كمحلة إلى تسوية الوضع الدائم.
The Palestinian Authority and the Israeli government continue.

Phase III objectives are consolidation of reform and stabilization of Palestinian institutions, sustained, effective Palestinian security performance, and Israeli-Palestinian negotiations aimed at a permanent status agreement in 2005 [The Roadmap Plan: 4].


This terminological choice is consistent with the conventions of Al-Quds newspaper in referring to the conflict as the following two excerpts show:

Al-Quds - The executive committee of the PLO today (Monday) called on the international community and its institutions, particularly the UN Security Council and the General Assembly, to acknowledge the borders of the Palestinian state clearly on all occupied territories of 1967. It also called on the United States of America to reconsider its former and current policies to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli and the Arab-Israeli conflict based on the international law and legitimacy.

Al-Quds - Gaza-The aggression of 28 December 2008, which lasted until 18 January 2009, remains the most severe by all standards during four decades of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict since the 1967 war.

The only exception to this convention is when this term – namely, the ‘Israeli-Palestinian conflict’ – occurs in direct or indirect quotations. In such cases, the original word-order is preserved as in the following excerpts of news reports from this newspaper:

Al-Quds - Tel Aviv- Jerusalem, A.F.B, and Lieberman declared before the representatives of the largest American Jewish organizations “the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not a priority”.

Al-Quds - Brussels, London, Jerusalem, DBA- Tony Blair, the representative of the Quarter for the Middle East process, and the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, emphasized, separately yesterday Wednesday, the necessity of the two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

As mentioned above, the tensions and hostilities that the peace initiatives set out to resolve are also referred to in original source texts of peace initiatives asْـ'النزاع العربي-الإسرائيلي’ (lit.
‘the Arab-Israeli conflict’). This specific terminological choice – which is used only in the text of the Arab Peace Initiative and only once – is due to the fact the Arab Peace Initiative deals with the more general Arab-Israeli conflict rather than the specific Palestinian-Israeli one. All English and Hebrew translations adopted a literal translation strategy, except for the translations of God Israel Bless (GBI) and Yediot Aharonot newspaper which both opted for reversing the word order as in the following example:

(5.9) Arab state acceptance of full normal relations with Israel and security for all the states of the region in the context of a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace [The Roadmap Plan: 6].

[The Knesset] Back translation: The Arab states testify that the Israeli-Arab conflict...
[The Knesset] Back translation: The Arab states testify that the Israeli-Arab conflict...
[Ha’aretz] Back translation: The Arab states testify that the Israeli-Arab conflict...

The term ‘Arab-Israeli’ is used – other than with the word ‘conflict’ – with the word ‘peace’. This term, i.e. ‘Arab-Israeli’ is used only in the text of the Roadmap Plan and only once as in the following example:

(5.10) Arab state acceptance of full normal relations with Israel and security for all the states of the region in the context of a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace [The Roadmap Plan: 6].

[The Knesset] Back translation: The Arab states testify that the Israeli-Arab conflict...
[The Knesset] Back translation: The Arab states testify that the Israeli-Arab conflict...
[Ha’aretz] Back translation: The Arab states testify that the Israeli-Arab conflict...

All Arabic and Hebrew translations of the Roadmap adopted a literal translation strategy, except for the translations of the Knesset (the Israeli parliament) and Ha’aretz newspaper, which choose to reverse the word order.
Of particular significance is also the translation of ‘IDF’, an acronym that stands for ‘Israel Defence Forces’ (in Hebrew: צה”ל צבא ההגנה לישראל (tsahal)). Acronyms are used throughout the original source texts of peace initiatives, e.g. ‘PLO’ (Palestine Liberation Organization), ‘IPCC’ (the Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation Committee), ‘MF’ (the Multinational Force), and ‘PSF’ (the Palestinian Security Force), etc. These acronyms were rendered quite literally into Arabic and Hebrew as in the following example:

(5.11) An Implementation and Verification Group (IVG) shall hereby be established to facilitate, assist in, guarantee, monitor, and resolve disputes relating to the implementation of this Agreement [The Geneva Accord: 6].

According to this agreement, an implementation and verification group will be established…

However, other acronyms, such as ‘IDF’, were translated differently into Arabic and Hebrew as the following example shows:

(5.12) As comprehensive security performance moves forward, IDF withdraws progressively from areas occupied since September 28, 2000 and the two sides restore the status quo that existed prior to September 28, 2000. Palestinian security forces redeploy to areas vacated by IDF [The Roadmap Plan: 2].

The acronym ‘IDF’ appears only in the text of the Roadmap Plan in reference to the Israeli withdrawal from reoccupied Palestinian territories since 28 September 2000. In the Arabic
translations by the US Department of State (USDS), CNN, the Almtym network and Al-Quds, a cultural filtering strategy is used. As a result, ‘IDF’ is translated consistently as ‘الجيش الإسرائيلي’ (al-jaysh al-’Israaili, lit. ‘the Israeli army’) (three occurrences). By removing the same component of this multi-word term from the four Arabic versions, the ‘defensive’ role of these forces is minimised and implicitly questioned. As is also the case with the Arabic translations produced by the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (IMFA) and the United Nations (UN), all of the four Hebrew translations remained faithful to the source text and opted for a literal translation strategy, as the Hebrew term ‘צה”ל’ (tsahal) means ‘Israel defence forces’. The same can be said of the Arabic translation of the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (IMFA) in which the acronym ‘IDF’ was rendered as ‘جيش الدفاع’ ‘الإسرائيلي’ (Jaysh al-difā‘ al-Israaili, lit. ‘Israel Defense Forces’).

The term Jaysh al-difā‘ al-Isrāaili is predominantly used in Israeli state-owned television and radio as well as official websites in Arabic, such as the Arabic website of the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, altawāsul. When searching this website, the term ‘الجيش’ ‘الإسرائيلي’ (al-jaysh al-’Israaili, lit. ‘the Israeli army’) returned 86 hits whereas the term ‘الجيش/قوات الاحتلال الإسرائيلي’ (Jaysh/quwāt al-iḥtitāl al-Israaili) returned 8,810 hits as in the following excerpt from this website:

(Back translation: Israel defense army, which was established in 1948, is considered as one of the world’s most trained armies and it was defending the security of the state during five major wars.

Power relations are evident in the way the acronym ‘IDF’ is perceived by the Palestinians and Israelis. In Israel – a country often described as a “nation-state-in-arms” (Ben-Eliezer 2004: 49) – the Israeli army – which Israeli political and military leaders routinely describe as “the most moral army in the world” (Khalidi 2010: 6) – is regarded as a “citizen army” (Peri 2005: 53). It has always been perceived by the Israelis as their “defender and savior” against “national security threats” (Seidman 2010: 721-722) and, thus, essential for their protection and “survival” (Sheffer 2007: 709).

The same army is conventionally referred to by the Palestinians and Arabs as ‘جيش/قوات الاحتلال الإسرائيلي’ (Jaysh/quwāt al-iḥtitāl al-Israaili, lit. ‘the Israeli occupation army/forces’),

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102 altawāsul website, published on 30 December 2010: http://www.altawasul.com/MFAAR/this+is+israel/political+structure/idf.htm [last accessed: 24 November 2011].
جيش/قوات الاحتلال (jaysh/quwāt al-iḥtilāl, lit. ‘the occupation army/forces’) or ‘الجيش الإسرائيلي’ (al-jaysh/al-quwāt al-Isrā‘īliyyah, lit. ‘the Israeli army/forces’) for short. For the Palestinians and Arabs alike, this army – which they perceive as aggressive and oppressive and which its actions are often taken under the pretext of “self-defense” – is the tool by which Israel has been maintaining its occupation to Palestinian land for more than 44 years. Moreover, this army is responsible for waging many wars and offensives against some of the Arab countries throughout the history of the conflict, to name a few, the invasion of Lebanon in 1982, the war on Lebanon (2006) and the war on Gaza (2008), all resulting in the killing of many civilians and massive destruction.

Against this background, it comes as no surprise that Arab media, including Palestinian newspapers such as Al-Quds, refuses to circulate the official Israeli lexicon, i.e. ‘IDF’ when reporting on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Referring to this army as a “defense” army automatically legitimizes its actions and practices inside as well as outside the Occupied Palestinian Territories.

Another case of the protagonists of the conflict concerns the translation of the term “residents” in the context of Occupied East Jerusalem. This term – i.e. “residents” – appears twice and only in the original text of the Geneva Accord in reference to resolving the issue of Jerusalem: once as in the phrase “residents of East Jerusalem” and once as in the phrase “residents of Jerusalem”. When this term – i.e. “residents” occurred with the toponym ‘Jerusalem’, it was rendered following a literal translation strategy in both Arabic and Hebrew translations of the Geneva Accord. However, when it occurred with the toponym ‘East Jerusalem’, it was rendered differently in the Arabic translation as the following example shows:

(5.13) The Parties will apply in certain socio-economic spheres interim measures to ensure the agreed, expeditious, and orderly transfer of powers and obligations from Israel to Palestine. This shall be done in a manner that preserves the accumulated socio-economic rights of the residents of East Jerusalem [The Geneva Accord: 24].

103 For a detailed account on Israel’s matrix of control in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, see Gordon (2008b).
104 For a detailed account on the Israeli war on Lebanon in 2006, see Hovsepian (2008).
105 For a detailed account on the Israeli War on Gaza in 2008, see Pappé and Chomsky (2010a).
106 For example, the Israeli war on Gaza resulted in more than 1,400 Palestinians dead and over 5,000 wounded. More than half of the dead were civilians, with 400 of them women or children (Denes 2011: 185).
The Hebrew translation of Yes to an Agreement (YA) translated the term ‘residents’ in the example above – following a literal translation strategy – as ‘תושבים’ (toshavi). On the other hand, the translation of the Palestinian Peace Coalition (PPC) rendered the same term – following a meaning shift strategy – as ‘مواطني’ (muwāṭinī, lit. ‘citizens’).

East Jerusalem, according to the Geneva Accord, would come under Palestinian sovereignty and be declared as the capital of the independent Palestinian state. In this context, the translation shift from “residents” into ‘مواطني’ (muwāṭinī, lit. ‘citizens’) in the Arabic translation of the Palestinian Peace Coalition (PPC) is of high political significance. ‘Citizens’ are people who “have rights over their homeland”, whereas “residents” by contrast “cannot claim such rights but have limited rights enabling them to reside, work, and pursue an education in the country” (Rouhana and Sultany 2003: 17).

Israel officially considers the Palestinians of the Occupied East Jerusalem – ‘Palestinian Jerusalemites’ as they define themselves – “permanent residents” rather than national citizens, even though they “were born in Jerusalem, have lived in the city their entire lives, and have no other home” (Jabareen 2010: 35). After its occupation of East Jerusalem and its surroundings following the June 1967 war, Israel conducted a census there and granted “permanent residency status” to the Palestinian Jerusalemites who were present at the time the census was taken. Those who were not present in the city for whatever reason “forever lost their right to reside in Jerusalem”.107 This “permanent residency” status is the same as the one “granted to foreign citizens who have freely chosen to come to Israel and want to live there. Israel treats Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem as immigrants who live in their homes at the beneficence of the authorities and not by right”.108

One of the key features of this “permanent residency” is that it is always “under a serious threat of being lost” (Jabareen 2010: 35). According to what the Israeli Ministry of the Interior announced in 1995, this residency is “conditional upon the circumstances in which

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108 Ibid.
individuals live; when these circumstances change, permanent residency may expire” (Jabareen 2010: 35). For example, a Palestinian who leaves the city for “an extended period of time for legitimate reasons, such as for the purposes of study overseas, or in order to live in closer proximity to a work situation on the West Bank, may be denied the right to return” (Sheleff 2001: 302). In fact, “[I]n 1996, thousands of East Jerusalemites lost their residency rights because they moved to Jerusalem’s suburbs where they could find better housing than in the city, where Israel would not let them build” (Klein 2008: 91). Moreover, contrary to citizenship, “permanent residency” is “only passed on to the holder’s children where the holder meets certain conditions. A permanent resident with a non-resident spouse must submit, on behalf of the spouse, a request for family unification. Only citizens are granted the right to return to Israel at any time”.109

As “permanent residents” of Israel, Palestinian Jerusalemites pay full taxes and in return they are entitled to work in Israel (Klein 2008: 91) and receive “social security and health insurance benefits” (Abu Nahleh 2006: 167). However, they do not have “the right to vote in national elections but only in local municipal elections” (Jabareen 2010: 35) as in order to be able to do so, they need first to become Israeli citizens.

The Palestinian Jerusalemites have been boycotting Israeli municipal elections since the city’s occupation in 1967 fearing that participation in such elections would be equivalent to “an explicit or implicit recognition of, and acquiescence to, Israeli sovereignty over their city” (Sha'ban 2007: 49). Consequently, they have not been part of “decision making institutions that manage their daily life” (Klein 2008: 92).

Israel offered the Palestinian Jerusalemites the option to apply for Israeli citizenship on the condition that they “swear allegiance to Israel and renounce all other citizenships, which most of them refused to do” (Jabareen 2010: 31). They saw that obtaining the Israeli citizenship means giving up their right of self-determination (Kawar 2010: 576). More importantly, they did not wish to legitimize the city’s occupation (Talhami 1997: 64). These two politically motivated decisions were meant to challenge the status quo in Occupied East Jerusalem and the Israeli attempts to control the holy city.

109 Ibid.
The most recent case of cancelation or revocation of the so-called “Residency of East Jerusalem Palestinians” occurred on 30 June 2006 when Israel revoked the “residency” of four members of the Palestinian Legislative Council (the Palestinian Parliament) affiliated with Hamas. Israel declared that those four men must renounce their membership in Hamas if they want to continue to have “residency rights” in East Jerusalem.

This policy, i.e. the revocation of “Residency of East Jerusalem Palestinians”, is one of numerous illegal Israeli policies and practices in the occupied city – including home demolitions, private land expropriation, denial of family unification requests, building and expanding Jewish settlements and the construction of the illegal Wall – that turned the Palestinian Jerusalemites into a persecuted people in their own city.

To the Palestinians, these policies and practices are primarily informed by Israel’s goal to effectively ‘Judaize’ Jerusalem – i.e. “to change the demographic makeup of the city by increasing the Jewish presence and severely limiting the Palestinian presence to no more than 24 percent of the population” (Farha 2001: 161). This will enable Israel to create an overwhelmingly Jewish majority in the city and thus tightens its grip over the city. Ultimately, Israel – by implementing these policies – would have created enough facts on the ground that will make any division of Jerusalem in favour of a future independent Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital “physically impossible” (Rubenberg 2003: 198).

5.3.2 Names of Holy Places

The Palestinians and Israelis have conflicting claims vis-à-vis a number of holy places that each side considers as part of its national and religious identity (cf. Chapter 1.1.1). These holy places are mainly located in the Occupied West Bank cities of Jerusalem, Hebron and

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111 These policies and practices are illegal according to many UN Security Council Resolutions, such as 465 of 1980.

112 Demolishing Palestinian homes and property in the Occupied West Bank (including East Jerusalem) is one of the practices which Israel is required to stop according to the Roadmap Plan. On the general Palestinian housing conditions in Occupied East Jerusalem, including home demolitions, see Farha (2001: 161-164).

Bethlehem. However, the most contentious holy places are those located in the Old City of Jerusalem. Jerusalem is of significant importance to the world’s three major monotheistic religions: Judaism, Christianity and Islam. The city is not only religiously important to the two sides of the conflict, but also politically as each side claims it to be the capital of its state (Peteet 2005: 163-164).

Khalidi (1997: 14) argues that the “process of seeking validation for conflicting claims is most fittingly symbolized, however, by the unremitting struggle over the naming of Jerusalem”. Jerusalem is known in Arabic as ‘القدس’ (Al-Quds) and in Hebrew as ‘ירושלים’ (Yerushalayim) – “a word derived from Aramaic, meaning, ironically, “city of peace”” (Khalidi 1997: 14). Detailed analysis of data showed that the English name of the city, Jerusalem, appears twenty times in the original source texts of peace initiatives in the corpus, three times in the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles, fifteen times in the Geneva Accord and twice in the Roadmap Plan.

The toponym ‘Jerusalem’ was translated – following a cultural filtering strategy – as ‘القدس’ (Al-Quds) and ‘ירושלים’ (Yerushalayim) into Arabic and Hebrew languages respectively as in the following example:


The detailed analysis also showed that the Arabic and Hebrew names of the city – i.e. ‘القدس’ (Al-Quds) and ‘ירושלים’ (Yerushalayim) respectively – were never used together side by side – e.g. ‘يروشاليم/القدس’ or ‘ירושלים/القدس’ – in any of the Arabic or Hebrew translations of peace initiatives.

The toponym ‘East Jerusalem’ appears six times in the source texts of peace initiatives (twice in the Gush-Shalom Declaration of Principles for Peace Agreement, once in the Geneva Accord, twice in the Arab Peace Initiative and once in the Roadmap Plan). This
toponym was predominantly translated into Arabic as ‘القدس الشرقية’ (Al-Quds al-Sharqiyah, lit. ‘the Eastern Jerusalem’) and into Hebrew as ‘מזרח ירושלים’ (Mizraḥ Yerushalayim, lit. ‘East Jerusalem’). The following two examples from the Geneva Accord and the Arab Peace Initiative respectively illustrate this point:

(5.15) The Parties will apply in certain socio-economic spheres interim measures to ensure the agreed, expeditious, and orderly transfer of powers and obligations from Israel to Palestine. This shall be done in a manner that preserves the accumulated socio-economic rights of the residents of East Jerusalem [The Geneva Accord: 24].


Back translation: ...citizens of Eastern Jerusalem...

[YA] הבוחנים טובים את האומנות המחוקקת הזריזים יניקו, יוכלו, יתנו, יבוס יבוסו, ובהם אומות עולם, אומות פלסטין וירשנלי, יער משה, יער משה, יער משה. ישsembler את האומות המפורסמות אומות המדינה של ירושלים המזרחית.

Back translation: ...residents of East Jerusalem...

(5.16) Acceptance of the establishment of a Sovereign Independent Palestinian State on the Palestinian territories occupied since the 4th of June 1967 in the West Bank and Gaza strip, with East Jerusalem as its capital.

[The Arab Peace Initiative: 1] [cite]

Back translation: ...with Eastern Jerusalem as its capital.

[LAS] The acceptance of the establishment of a Sovereign Independent Palestinian State on the Palestinian territories occupied since the 4th of June 1967 in the West Bank and Gaza strip, with East Jerusalem as its capital.

[Reuters] Acceptance of the establishment of an independent and sovereign Palestinian state in the Palestinian territories occupied since 4 June 1967 in the West Bank and Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital.


Back translation: Acceptance of establishment of independent and sovereign Palestinian state in the Palestinian territories which were occupied since 4 June 1967, in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, with East Jerusalem as its capital.

However, this toponym – i.e. ‘East Jerusalem’ – was translated differently in the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs Arabic translation of the Roadmap Plan. Examine the following example:
GOI reopens Palestinian Chamber of Commerce and other closed Palestinian institutions in East Jerusalem [The Roadmap Plan: 3].

IMFA
Back translation: …in East Yerushalayim Al-Quds…

USDS
Back translation: …in the Eastern Jerusalem…

Peace Now
Back translation: …in East Jerusalem…

The translation of the Israel Ministry of foreign Affairs (IMFA) is the only case across corpus where the Hebrew-Arabic compound name 'شرقي أورشليم القدس' (East Yerushalayim Al-Quds) is used. This case is of particular interest as it shows an Israeli attempt to force on one language a name based on usage in another (Khalidi 1997: 14). In this sense, Israel forces the Palestinians to acknowledge the Hebrew name for the city “although speakers of Arabic had a perfectly serviceable name of their own for the city for well over a millennium” (Khalidi 1997: 14).

In its own Arabic-language broadcast, radio and TV, Israel refers to Jerusalem exclusively as 'أورشليم القدس' (Yerushalayim Al-Quds) (usually shortened as Yerushalayim) and to the eastern part of it as 'شرقي أورشليم القدس' (East Yerushalayim Al-Quds) (Khalidi 1997: 14). These specific compound names are also found in all official Israeli Arabic documents published on governmental websites such as the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs Arabic website – i.e. altawāsul. The following two examples show this point:

(ST)
بعد انتهاء حرب الأيام الستة بوقت قصير، في الـ27 من حزيران يونيو 1967، صادق البرلمان الإسرائيلي على مشروع قانون أصبحت بموجبه جميع المناطق في أورشليم القدس التي استولت عليها إسرائيل خلال الحرب تخضع لسلطة إدارية وقضائية إسرائيلية. وبعد ذلك يوم تم توسيع حدود منطقة نفوذ بلدية أورشليم القدس تشمل شرق
أورشليم القدس بالإضافة إلى غزّة وبيروت بعشرة مدن وعشرة جنوبها. 114

Back translation: Shortly after the end of the six-day war on 27 June 1967, the Israeli Parliament approved a law by which all the territories in Yerushalayim Al-Quds, which Israel captured during the war, became under Israeli administrative and legal control. One day later, the borders of the jurisdiction of the municipality of Yerushalayim Al-Quds were expanded to include East Yerushalayim Al-Quds in addition to Atarot, Nabi Ya’qob northern the city and Gilo eastern the city.

114 أورشليم القدس بعد حرب الأيلام السّلّة (1967), Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs Arabic website, altawāsul:
http://www.altawasul.com/MFAAR/israel+in+maps/jerusalem+after+the+six+day+war.htm [last accessed: 24 November 2011].
The old city in Yerushalayim Al-Quds is considered one of the oldest cities in the world...

Israel, by using Hebrew-Arabic compound names such as Yerushalayim Al-Quds – to refer to the whole of Jerusalem – or East Yerushalayim Al-Quds – to refer to part of it – disseminates “Hebrew-based state ideology through the Arabic language” (Suleiman 2004: 175). As Khalidi (1997: 14) notes, such a practice – although it may seem “petty” – is associated with the major process of “attempting to signal control by imposing place names”. The Hebrew-Arabic compound name Sharqī Yerushalayim Al-Quds implies that the city is not divided but rather “unified” under Israeli sovereignty. This reflects the “unquestioned” public position of all Israeli governments since 1967 that Jerusalem should always remain “Israel’s eternal and undivided capital” (Silberman 2001: 488). This position is clearly expressed in a number of official Israeli documents and legislations, most notably, the Knesset basic law on Jerusalem 1980.116

**Holy Places in Jerusalem**

The main site of conflict between the Palestinians and Israelis in the occupied Old City of Jerusalem vis-à-vis two holy sites: firstly, what is called by Muslims ‘الحرم الشريف’ (al-Ḥaram al-Sharīf, lit. ‘the Noble Sanctuary’) and by Jews ‘הר הבית’ (Har ha-Bayt, lit. ‘the Temple Mount’) and secondly, what is called by Muslims ‘حائط البراق’ (Ḥāaiṭ al-Burāq, lit. ‘al-Burāq Wall’) and by Jews ‘הכותל המערבי’ (ha-Kotel ha-Ma’ravi, lit. ‘the Western Wall’).

Detailed analysis of corpus showed that these two holy places appear in the source texts of the Gush-Shalom Declaration of Principles for Peace Agreement, the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles and the Geneva Accord but not in the Roadmap Plan or the Arab Peace Initiative. In the following sub-section, the way these toponyms are rendered in the Arabic, Hebrew and English translations across corpus will be examined.

115’terrorism of the city inside the walls’, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs Arabic website, altawāsul: http://www.altawasul.com/MFAAR/this+is+israel/jerusalem/within+the+walls.htm [last accessed: 24 November 2011].

The first toponym to be examined is ‘al-Ḥaram al-Sharīf’ or ‘the Temple Mount’. These two names appear together side by side only in the English source text of the Geneva Accord in the heading of the fifth clause of Article 6 on Jerusalem as the following excerpt shows:

(ST) 5. Al-Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount (Compound)

I. International Group

a. An International Group composed of the IVG and other parties to be agreed upon by the Parties, including members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), shall hereby be established to monitor, verify, and assist in the implementation of this clause.

For this purpose, the International Group shall establish a Multinational Presence on the Compound, the composition, structure, mandate and functions of which are set forth in Annex X.

This heading was rendered in the Arabic translation of Al-Ayyam newspaper following a cultural filtering strategy as ‘الحرم الشريف/ جبل الهيكل (الحرم)’ (al-Ḥaram al-Sharīf/ Jabal alHaykal (‘al-Ḥaram’), lit. ‘the Noble Sanctuary/ the Temple Mount’ (al-Ḥaram). It was also rendered following a cultural filtering strategy in the Hebrew translation of Yes to an Agreement as ‘(הTouchableOpacity ha-Ḥaram_al-Sharif/ Har haBayt (ha-Mithăm), lit. ‘Compound of the Noble Sanctuary/ the Temple Mount (the Compound’)’. Both translations kept the two names side by side but only in the heading.

The English source text of the Geneva Accord later on talks about ‘the compound’ as shorthand, instead of both names together, i.e. al-Ḥaram al-Sharīf and the Temple Mount.

The term, ‘the compound’ appears eleven times and only in the English source text of the Geneva Accord. In the Al-Ayyam translation, this term was consistently rendered as ‘الحرم’ (al-Ḥaram, lit. ‘the Sanctuary’). On the other hand, in the Hebrew translation, it was consistently rendered as ‘הTouchableOpacity (ha-Mithăm, lit. ‘the compound’)’ as in the following example:

(5.18) The International Group shall draw up rules and regulations to maintain security on and conservation of the Compound [The Geneva Accord: 19].

In Arabic, the term ‘الحرم الشريف’ (al-Ḥaram al-Sharīf) and both terms have the religious and historical package associated with the place. When
talking about *al-Ḥaram*, the Palestinian readers would know immediately that what is meant is *al-Ḥaram al-Sharīf* and nothing else. On the other hand, in Hebrew the Temple Mount is referred to as ' להת משオープン ' (mītham Har ha-Bayt, lit. ‘the compound of the Temple Mount’) and not by the shorthand ‘ להת אתオープン ‘ (ha-mītham, lit. ‘the compound’). The negotiated compromise – i.e. the inclusion of the two names side by side – in the Geneva Accord with regard to this holy place has disappeared in translation.

The toponym ‘al-Ḥaram al-Sharīf’/the ‘Temple Mount’ also appears in the Gush-Shalom Declaration of Principles for Peace Agreement. In the Hebrew and English language versions of this proposal the two names appear side by side. On the other hand, the Arabic language version contains only the Arab name of this place. The following example shows this point:

(5.19)  *

Shituf ḥaram al-ḥaram al-Sharīf (har ha-bayt) (hebrew the compound of al-Ḥaram al-Sharīf)
Back translation: the area of *Haram al-Sharif (Temple Mount)* will be part of the state of Palestine.

Gush-Shalom

The area of the al-Ḥaram al-Qudsi al-Sharīf will be part of the state of Palestine.

Gush-Shalom

The Haram Al-Sharif (the Temple Mount) will be part of the State of Palestine.

The differences between the English and Hebrew language versions, on the one hand, and the Arabic language version, on the other, can be explained with regard to the audience design of each language version (cf. Chapter 3.2.3).

In the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles, the toponym ‘al-Ḥaram al-Sharīf’ is the only name used. All the Arabic and Hebrew translations rendered this toponym following a cultural filtering strategy except in the Hebrew translation of the National Consensus, which employed an implicitness change strategy and thus avoided any direct reference to this toponym by its Arabic name. The following example illustrates this point:

(5.20)  *

Neither side will exercise sovereignty over holy places. The State of Palestine will be designated Guardian of al-Ḥaram al-Sharif for the benefit of Muslims [Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles: 1].

Back translation: the state of Palestine will be designated as guardian of the holy places of Islam for the benefit of the Muslims.

[NC]
This ambiguous rendering of such a sensitive toponym can be seen in light of the efforts to market the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles to the Israeli public by concealing political compromises made during negotiations.

The second toponym to be examined is what is called by Muslims ‘حائط البراق’ (Haaiṭ al-Burāq, lit. ‘al-Burāq Wall’) and by Jews ‘המערבי הכותל’ (Ha-Kotel ha-Ma'ravi, lit. ‘the Western Wall’). In the Muslim tradition, Haaiṭ al-Burāq is “the site where the prophet Mohammad tied his miraculous horse [called al-Burāq] that brought him from Mecca to al-Aqsa on his way to heaven” (Klein 2007: 29). This significant event in Muslim tradition is recorded in Qur’an in (17:1) (Khalidi 1997: 17). The very same site, called by Jews Ha-Kotel ha-Ma'ravi has been “the scene of public Jewish worship since the sixteenth or seventeenth century, before which time such worship took place on the Mount of Olives” (Khalidi 1997: 17).

This wall is “among the holiest of sites to two faiths, and is naturally considered by each to be its exclusive property” (Khalidi 1997: 17). In 1929, clashes between Arab Palestinians and Jews erupted due to the claim of each side of ownership of this wall. Following these events in 1930, an international committee formed by the League of Nations at that time was appointed and after investigations ruled that this wall belongs to Muslims and is an integral part of the al-Ḥaram al-Sharīf but Jews have the right to pray there (Unterman 2011: 178).

This wall is referred to as ‘the Wailing Wall’ in the English source text of the Geneva Accord, ha-Kotel ha-Ma'ravi in the Hebrew source text of the Gush-Shalom Declaration of Principles for Peace Agreement and the ‘Western Wall’ in the English source text of the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles. The name of this wall was translated differently only in the Hebrew translation of the Geneva Accord as the following example shows:

(5.21) **The Wailing Wall** shall be under Israeli sovereignty [The Geneva Accord: 19]

[PPC]: يكون حائط المبكى تحت السيادة الإسرائيلية
Back: The Wailing Wall will be under the Israeli sovereignty.

translation:

[YA]: המערבי הכותל: ייה תחת אזרחות ישראלית
Back: The Western Wall shall be under Israeli sovereignty.

translation:
The toponym, the ‘Wailing Wall’ appears twice in the English text of the Geneva Accord. This name was translated twice into Hebrew – following a meaning shift strategy – as ‘המערבי הכותל’ (ha-Kotel ha-Ma'aravi, lit. ‘the Western Wall’). The ‘Wailing Wall’ is not the same as the ‘Western Wall’. The ‘Wailing Wall’ is a “section of the outer western wall of the al-Haram” (Khalidi 2003: 61). This section of the ‘Western Wall’ is called the ‘Wailing Wall’ because Jews – who believe that it is “all that remains of the Second Temple destroyed by the Romans in AD 70” (Hart 2010: 291) – for centuries have come to this wall to mourn the destruction of their Temple (Reiter et al 2000: 116). This meaning shift can be explained in light of the persuasive function of the Hebrew translation which tries to elicit the Israeli public’s support by emphasizing that the Palestinian negotiating team conceded sovereignty over the ‘Western Wall’ or ‘al-Burāq Wall’ to the Israeli side.

In the Hebrew source text of the Gush-Shalom Declaration of Principles for Peace Agreement, the ‘Western Wall’ is referred to as ‘המערבי הכותל’ (ha-Kotel ha-Ma'aravi, lit. ‘the Western Wall’). This wall was rendered in the English language version of the declaration as the ‘Western Wall’ but changed in the Arabic language version into ‘حائط الحزن’ (Hāaiṭ al-Mabkā, lit. ‘the Wailing Wall’) as in the following example:

(5.22) [The Gush-Shalom Declaration of Principles for Peace Agreement: 2].
Back translation: the Western Wall (the part also known as ‘the tears Wall’) will be Part of the State of Israel.

[5] [Gush-Shalom] 
Back translation: The Wailing Wall (the part known as the tears wall) will be part of the State of Israel.

In this sense, the ‘Western Wall’ becomes under Israeli sovereignty in the Hebrew and English language versions whereas the ‘Wailing Wall’ is what becomes under Israeli sovereignty in the Arabic language version of the declaration. These changes correspond to the conflicting narratives of the two sides and their political positions on the issue.

In the English source text of the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles, the wall is referred to as ‘the Western Wall’. The following example shows how this toponym is rendered in the Arabic and Hebrew translations:
Neither side will exercise sovereignty over holy places... Israel will be Guardian of the Western Wall for the benefit of the Jewish people [Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles: 1].

In all Hebrew translations, the toponym ‘the Western Wall’ was rendered – following a cultural filtering strategy – as ha-Kotel ha-Ma’ravi. In the Arabic translation of the National Consensus, this toponym – i.e. ‘the Western Wall’ was translated – following a meaning shift strategy – as ‘حائط المبكى’ (Hāaiṭ al-Mabkā, lit. ‘the Wailing Wall’). This shift can be explained with regard to the intended readership of this specific translation, i.e. the Palestinians of 1948.

In the translation of al-eman network the two names, ‘the Western Wall’ and ‘al-Burāq Wall’ appear together side by side. The choice of ‘al-Burāq Wall’ in al-eman translation is particularly interesting as it reflects the Palestinian narrative that this wall is an Islamic property and brings the whole issue of claims back to the surface.

Other holy places concern those in the cities of Hebron, Bethlehem and Jerusalem. Firstly, the ‘Tomb of the Patriarchs’ in Hebron, which is known to Muslims as ‘الحرم الإبراهيمي’ (al-Ḥaram al-Ibrāhīmi al-Sharīf, lit. ‘the Noble Sanctuary of Abraham’) and to Jews as ‘معركة المكپلہ’ (Me’arat ha-Makpelah). Secondly, Rachel’s Tomb in Bethlehem, which is known to Muslims as ‘مقام النبي صموئيل’ (Maqām al-Nabī Ṣamū´īl, lit. ‘the site of the Prophet Samuel’) or ‘مسجد النبي صموئيل’ (Masjid al-Nabī Ṣamū´īl) and to Jews as ‘קבר רחל’ (Kever Raḥel, lit. ‘Rachel’s Tomb’). Finally, what is known to Muslims as ‘مسجد قبة راحيل’ (Masjid Qubbat Raḥil, lit. ‘the Mosque of the Dome of Rachel’) or ‘مسجد بلال بن رباح’ (Masjid Bilāl bin Rabāh, lit. ‘the Mosque of Bilāl bin Rabāh’) and to Jews as ‘קבר רחל’ (Kever Raḥel, lit. ‘Rachel’s Tomb’).
These three places are only mentioned in the English text of the Geneva Accord. The following example shows how these toponyms were dealt with in the Arabic and Hebrew translations:

(5.24) The Parties shall establish special arrangements to guarantee access to agreed sites of religious significance, as will be detailed in Annex X. These arrangements will apply, inter alia, to the Tomb of the Patriarchs in Hebron and Rachel’s Tomb in Bethlehem, and Nabi Samuel [The Geneva Accord: 34].

The Parties shall establish special arrangements to guarantee access to agreed sites of religious significance, as will be detailed in Annex X. These arrangements will apply, inter alia, to the Tomb of the Patriarchs in Hebron and Rachel’s Tomb in Bethlehem, and Nabi Samuel.

The Parties shall establish special arrangements to guarantee access to agreed sites of religious significance, as will be detailed in Annex X. These arrangements will apply, inter alia, to the Tomb of the Patriarchs in Hebron, Rachel’s Tomb in Bethlehem, and the site of the prophet Samuel and others.

In the above example, these holy places were rendered differently in the Arabic and Hebrew translations. Firstly, the toponym ‘Tomb of the Patriarchs’ was translated – following a cultural filtering strategy – as ‘الحرم الإبراهيمي’ (al-Haram al-Ibrāhimi) and as ‘معارة المكپلة’ (Me’arat ha-Makhpelah) into Arabic and Hebrew respectively. Secondly, ‘Rachel’s Tomb’ was translated literally as ‘قبة راحيل’ (Qubbat Rahīl) and following a cultural filtering strategy as ‘کبر رحلة’ (Kever Rahel) into Arabic and Hebrew respectively. Of particular interest is that the Arabic translation does not refer to this holy place as a mosque but simply a ‘dome’.

Finally, the toponym ‘Nabi Samuel’ (‘Nabi’ is the transliteration of the Arabic word ‘نبي’, lit. ‘prophet’) is a mosque – originally a 12th-century crusader church – that “Jewish, Christian and Muslim traditions alike regard as the resting place of the Prophet Samuel” (Kedar 2000: 110). Following the 1967 war, Israel turned the cellar of this mosque where the tomb is placed into a synagogue. The English source text, although adopting the Arabic transliterated name of the place, does not refer to it as either ‘mosque’ or ‘tomb’. The Arabic and Hebrew translations follow suit. This could be due to lack of agreement on this issue.

These three holy places have always been the site of ongoing religious conflict and power struggle over their ownership between the Palestinians and Israelis. In February 2010, the Israeli government, led by the Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, added the ‘Tomb of
the Patriarchs’ in Hebron and ‘Rachel's Tomb’ in Bethlehem to its list of national heritage sites, a step faced with strong condemnation and protest by the Palestinians. In response to the Israeli decision, the UNESCO Executive Board in its 185th session from 5-21 October 2010 ruled that these two sites, i.e. ‘الحرم الإبراهيمي’ (al-Ḥaram al-Ibrāhimi) and ‘مسجد بلال بن رباح’ (Masjid Bilāl bin Rabāh, lit. ‘the Mosque of Bilāl bin Rabāh’) are Palestinian and “an integral part of the occupied Palestinian territories and that any unilateral action by the Israeli authorities is to be considered a violation of international law, the UNESCO conventions and the United Nations and Security Council resolutions” and urged Israel to “remove the two sites from the Israeli national heritage list”.117

Rivalry between the two sides can also be seen with regard to the names given to the gates of Old City of Jerusalem. The Old City of Jerusalem has eleven gates (seven open and four sealed). The English source text of the Geneva Accord mentions two of these gates: the Jaffa Gate (Arabic: ‘باب الخليل’, Bāb al-Khalīl, Hebrew: ‘שער יפו’, Sha’ar Yafo) and Zion gate (Arabic: ‘باب النبي داود’, Bāb al-Nabi Dāwud, Hebrew: ‘שער ציון’, Sha’ar Tsiyon). The following example shows how these names are translated into Arabic and Hebrew:

(5.25) Along the way outlined in Map X (from the Jaffa Gate to the Zion Gate) there will be permanent and guaranteed arrangements for Israelis regarding access, freedom of movement, and security, as set forth in Annex X [The Geneva Accord: 21].

A cultural filtering strategy was followed in both Arabic and Hebrew translations, i.e. the names of these two gates are rendered according to how they are conventionally known in Arabic and Hebrew. These names are part of each side’s narrative of Jerusalem which is used to consolidate legitimacy and ownership of the city.

5.4 Intertextuality

Intertextuality is a key feature of peace initiatives. Intertextuality – which is defined as “the relationship between embedded quotation, or explicit reference to another text” (Chilton

and Schäffner 2002: 17) – is closely linked to the issue of naming practices (cf. Chapter 5.3).

Cases of intertextuality include references to previous peace agreements and negotiations between the Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), e.g. the Oslo Agreements 1993, the Wye River Memorandum 1998, the Camp David Negotiations 2000, and the Taba Negotiations 2001, etc. Also, references to numerous United Nations Security Council Resolutions (e.g. 242, 338, 1397, etc.) and major turning points in the long history of the conflict (e.g. the Madrid Conference of 1991) are made. The following two examples are illustrations of this point:

The settlement will resolve the Israel-Palestinian conflict, and end the occupation that began in 1967, based on the foundations of the Madrid Conference, the principle of land for peace, UNSCRs 242, 338 and 1397, agreements previously reached by the parties, and the initiative of Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah – endorsed by the Beirut Arab League Summit – calling for acceptance of Israel as a neighbour living in peace and security, in the context of a comprehensive settlement [The Roadmap Plan: 1].


These cases of intertextuality were translated following a literal translation strategy in the different language versions of peace initiatives. Other cases of intertextuality are more significant and have ideological and political implications (see below). In the following sub-sections, two cases of intertextuality, ‘national home’ and ‘to incline to peace’, will be discussed in detail. Other cases of intertextuality will be discussed under the heading of political terms (cf. Sections 5.6.4 and 5.6.5).

5.4.1 National Home

In the English source text of the Geneva Accord, the two parties of the conflict, Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), recognize their respective countries as the ‘homelands’ of their peoples. This statement touches on the sensitive issue of conflicting claims of the two sides – whether historical or religious – to land. This statement was changed in the Hebrew translation of the initiative from recognizing Israel as ‘the homeland’ to ‘בֵּית הָלֶאָמִים’ (bayt ha-le'umi, lit. ‘the national home’) of the Israeli people as the following example shows:
(5.26) The parties recognize Palestine and Israel as the homelands of their respective peoples [The Geneva Accord: 5].

The term ‘national home’ is derived from the founding document of political Zionism – that is Basel Programme – which declared that the aim of Zionism is “to create for the Jewish people a home in Palestine secured by public law” (Renton 2010: 21). The term ‘the national home’ or bayt ha-le’umi in Hebrew is intertextually linked to four key documents concerning the establishment of the state of Israel: the Balfour Declaration (1917), the British Mandate for Palestine (1922), an American Congress resolution on this issue (1922) and the “Declaration of Independence of the State of Israel” (1948). The term ‘national home’ appears in the text of the Balfour Declaration that was in the form of a letter (drafted originally in English) from the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Arthur James Balfour to Lord Lionel Walter Rothschild, on 2 November 1917 stating that:

[H]is Majesty’s Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object.

It also appears – five times – in the text of the British Mandate for Palestine on 24 April 1922 (drafted originally in English) as the following two examples show:

The Mandatory shall be responsible for placing the country under such political, administrative, and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish national home, as laid down in the preamble, and the development of self-governing institutions, and for safeguarding the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine, irrespective of race and religion.

The Zionist Organization, so long as its organization and constitution are in the opinion of the Mandatory appropriate, shall be recognized as such agency. It shall take steps in consultation with His Britannic Majesty’s Government to secure the cooperation of all Jews who are willing to assist in the establishment of the Jewish national home.

118 For more on the history of this term and Arab reactions to it, see Renton (2010: 15-38) and Thomas (1999: 9-14).

119 Ben Gad (1991: 158) explains that Balfour Declaration “endorsed the basic Zionist thesis that the Jews were a separate people, that they were entitled to a national home, and that it would be established in their ancestral homeland”.


Also, it appears in the 1922 US Congress resolution in support of the creation of a “national home” for the Jews in Mandate Palestine as in the following excerpt:

> Whereas the Jewish people have for many centuries believed in and yearned for the rebuilding of their ancient homeland; and whereas owing to the outcome of the World War and their part therein the Jewish people are to be enabled to re-create and reorganize a national home in the land of their fathers, which will give to the House of Israel its long-denied opportunity to re-establish a fruitful Jewish life and culture in the ancient Jewish land: Therefore be it Resolved, etc. That the United States of America favors the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of Christian and all other non-Jewish communities in Palestine, and that the Holy places and religious buildings and sites in Palestine shall be adequately protected.  

Finally, the term *bayt ha-le'umi* appears in the Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel (drafted originally in Hebrew) as in the following excerpt:

> זכות זו הזכרוה בבחירת בלפור, יומם ב' בנובמבר 1917 ובששパー מתפיסה ברב האומות, שאר תן תבשידות יחלקל ולאחריהロー, שבי' הגון,อำนาונא ödeme לא-רשא ל�� יהיה, ליזários-רשאם לממות עם היהודיה, ליקום.  

Back translation: this right was recognized in the Balfour Declaration of the 2 November 1917 and re-affirmed in the Mandate of the League of Nations, which, in particular, gave international sanction to the historic connection between the Jewish people and Eretz-Israel and to the right of the Jewish people to rebuild its national home.

The ideological and political implications of the use of the term *bayt ha-le'umi* are twofold. Firstly, it means that the Palestinians conceded the right of return of the Palestinian refugees to their homes in historical Palestine (now Israel). Secondly, it jeopardizes the rights of approximately 1.3 million Palestinians in Israel (cf. Chapter 6.4).

The term *bayt ha-le'umi* was chosen to help market the initiative in Israel by showing that the Palestinians recognize Israel as a Jewish state with all the implications of such recognition, a recognition that has been demanded by successive Israeli prime ministers.  

A heated political debate based on this specific translation choice was stirred in Israel. This debate and the political and ideological implications of the term ‘national home’ will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6.4.

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122 ‘Congressional Record: House joint resolution favoring the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people’, published on the website of *Emory University Institute for the Study of Modern Israel* (ISMI): [http://www.ismi.emory.edu/PrimarySource/jnh1922part1.pdf](http://www.ismi.emory.edu/PrimarySource/jnh1922part1.pdf) [last accessed: 24 November 2011].


124 For example, in his address to the United Nations’ 66 opening session on 23 September 2011, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reiterated the Israeli demand that the Palestinians must recognize Israel as a Jewish state.
5.4.2 To Incline to Peace

The second case of intertextuality is vis-à-vis the term ‘وَأَن تَجَنَّبْ لِلْسَلَّمِ’ (wa an tajnaḥa lil-silmi, lit. ‘to incline to peace’) in the Arabic source text of the Arab Peace Initiative as the following example shows:

This term an tajnaḥa lil-silmi (lit. ‘to incline to peace’) is part of the Islamic religious discourse on peace and war. It carries a reference to the Quranic verse (60-61) of Chapter 8 (al-Anfal) as shown below:

The above Quranic verse discusses the issues of peace and war in Islam and sets the conditions for Muslims on when to opt for peace with the enemy. The general context for this verse urges Muslims to be prepared for war all the time and not to discard this as an option; only if the ‘enemy’ ‘inclines’ to peace should Muslims then accept and do the same. This context of situation is important in order to understand the significance of the term an tajnaḥa lil-silmi in the Arab Peace Initiative. This term was employed by drafters of this initiative, i.e. the Arab states, in order to legitimize opting for peace with Israel as a
strategic option for the Arab states by presenting this option in an Islamic religious context. This verse is usually referred to by the peace camp in the Arab world to justify concluding peace with Israel.

The Arabic verb ‘تجنح’ (tajnah, lit. ‘to incline’) implies some sort of a forced action. The term an tajnah lil-silmi was omitted in all the English and Hebrew translations except in the Hebrew translation published by Peace Now. The omission of this phrase in the official English translation of the initiative can be explained with regard to the intended addressees and function of the source text. This term – with its religious connotations – was intended to help convince the Arab masses – who were angered by the Israeli oppressive practices in the occupied Palestinian Territories during the Palestinian Al-Aqsa intifada – of adopting peace as not only a strategic option but also a religious duty. This religious message, of course, was not needed for the intended readers of the official English translation.

The lack of background knowledge of this religious discourse could perhaps be the reason why this phrase was not translated in some of the English and Hebrew translations. The translation published by Peace Now shows exactly such knowledge (cf. Chapter 6.2.3).

5.5 Modality

The frequent use of modality, specifically, modal auxiliary verbs, is another key feature of peace initiatives. Modality is a universal aspect of all languages; however, its usage is culture-bound (Guido 2008: 174). Modality – a vague term – can be generally classified into two main categories: epistemic and deontic (Holes 2004: 223). Epistemic modality expresses notions of possibility, probability and certainty whereas deontic modality expresses notions of ability, obligation and permission (Darwish 2010: 155).

Modality can be expressed through a variety of linguistic forms such as modal verbs, adjectives, adverbs and certain nominalizations (Lillian 2008: 2). Fowler (1985) explains this:

[C]entrally, the modal auxiliary verbs may, shall, must, need, and others; sentence adverbs such as probably, certainly, regrettably; adjectives such as necessary, unfortunate, certain. Some verbs, and many nominalizations, are essentially modal: permit, predict, prove; obligation, likelihood, desirability, authority” (Fowler 1985: 73 quoted in Lillian 2008: 2).

Detailed analysis of corpus showed that modal verbs (e.g. shall, may, must, etc.) are predominantly used in the original source texts of peace initiatives rather than other forms of modality (e.g. sentence adverbs, adjectives, etc.) to express notions of obligations,
Permissions, possibility, etc. However, the use of modal auxiliary verbs is not homogeneous across corpus. For example, the modal verb ‘shall’ is only used in the Geneva Accord whereas in the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles, the only modal verb used is ‘will’. In the Roadmap Plan, obligations – for example – are not expressed by the use of ‘shall’ or ‘must’ but by the use of the simple present tense as in the following example:

GOI immediately dismantles settlement outposts erected since March 2001. Consistent with the Mitchell Report, GOI freezes all settlement activity (including natural growth of settlements).

This particular choice of the simple present tense is politically motivated. Saeb Erikat pointed out that the Palestinian government insisted on the use of the present tense in the Roadmap Plan as it believed it is much stronger than the modal verbs must or shall (personal communication 2005).

Based on a systematic comparison of individual translation profiles against each source text and amongst each other, one regularity vis-à-vis modal verbs was identified. This regularity in translation concerns the modal verb may in the original English source text of the Geneva Accord.

The English language has nine modal verbs: can, could, may, might, must, shall, should, will and would (Darwish 2010: 155). The modal verb may – although could express epistemic possibility – has so long been the recommended expression of permission and sanction in legal language (Trosborg 1997: 132). The same notion of permission which is expressed by may can also be expressed by using the form entitled to; however, the difference between the two forms is that “may recognizes potential agency and action, entitled to reflects only the possession of a right” (Trosborg 1997: 132).

The two Semitic languages, Arabic and Hebrew, have different means of expressing and realizing notions of modality, including permission. Generally, modality in Arabic is expressed by means of either modal verbs, e.g. ُيَسْتَطِيعُ (ystaṭī‘), ُيَمْكِنُ (yumkin), يَجِبُ (yajib) or by means of particles, e.g. ُقَدْ (qad), ُسُوْفَ (sawfa), ُرَبِّمَا (rubbamā), ُلَعْلَءُ (la‘ala) (Darwish 2010: 156). The notion of permission in Arabic is expressed through the modal verbs ُيَمْكِنُ (yumkin) and ُيَجِوزُ (yajūz) and the particle ُقَدْ (qad).

In Modern Hebrew, the modality system consists of both verbal and nominal constructions (Dromi 1980: 104). For example, the notion of permission is expressed by means of ُمُحِلَّ.
(yahol) or ‘efshar’ (Dromi 1980: 102; Glinert 1989: 136). One alternative way to express permission in Hebrew is by using one of two predicate adjectives, ‘msugal’ (yahol) or ‘mutar’ (yahol) which corresponds to the English expression ‘is able to’ or ‘is permitted’ (Dromi 1980: 103).

The modal verb *may* is used fifty times in the English source text of the Geneva Accord. It was translated into Arabic as ‘ymkin’, ‘yajūz’ (qad) forty-one times and changed nine times into ‘yaḥiqu’ (lit. ‘has the right to’ or ‘entitled to’). On the other hand, *may* was translated twenty-six times into Hebrew as ‘yahol’ (may), ten times as ‘rashai’ (entitled to) and fourteen times as simple present tense.

In the Arabic translation, *may* was changed into *yaḥiqu* five times vis-à-vis the issue of Jerusalem, three times vis-à-vis the issue of the Palestinian refugees and once vis-à-vis dispute settlement mechanism. The following two examples illustrate this point with regard to the question of the Palestinian refugees:

(5.28) The solution to the PPR aspect of the refugee problem shall entail an act of informed choice on the part of the refugee to be exercised in accordance with the options and modalities set forth in this agreement. PPR options from which the refugees *may* choose shall be as follows [The Geneva Accord: 25].

Back translation: ينطوي حل الشق الخاص بمكان الإقامة الدائم في مشكلة اللاجئين على قرار مدروس من قبل اللاجئ

(Refugees) The Parties *may* make submissions to the Committees as deemed necessary [The Geneva Accord: 28]

Back translation: لاجئين الاختيار بينها كما يلي:

(5.30) In passenger terminals, for thirty months, Israel *may* maintain an unseen presence in a designated on-site facility, to be staffed by members of the MF and Israelis, utilizing appropriate technology [The Geneva Accord: 17].

Back translation:ניתוני حل الشق الخاص بمكان الإقامة الدائم في مشكلة اللاجئين على قرار مدروس من قبل اللاجئ

The modal verb *may* was changed into *rashai* in the Hebrew translation six times vis-à-vis security issues (e.g. the defensive character of the future Palestinian state and international border crossings), three times vis-à-vis the issue of Jerusalem and once vis-à-vis the issue of dispute settlement mechanism. The following two examples illustrate this point:

(5.30) In passenger terminals, for thirty months, Israel *may* maintain an unseen presence in a designated on-site facility, to be staffed by members of the MF and Israelis, utilizing appropriate technology [The Geneva Accord: 17].

Back translation: لاجئين الاختيار بينها كما يلي:

(5.30) In passenger terminals, for thirty months, Israel *may* maintain an unseen presence in a designated on-site facility, to be staffed by members of the MF and Israelis, utilizing appropriate technology [The Geneva Accord: 17].

Back translation: يحق للطرفين تقديم عروض للذين حسبما يرياه ضروري
Israel will be entitled to maintain unseen presence…

No individuals or organizations in Palestine other than the PSF and the organs of the IVG, including the MF, may purchase, possess, carry or use weapons except as provided by law [The Geneva Accord: 12].

If a dispute is not settled promptly by the above, either Party may submit it to mediation and conciliation by the IVG mechanism in accordance with Article 3 [The Geneva Accord: 38].

The above analysis shows that the change of may into yahiqu in the Arabic translation and into rashai in the Hebrew translation of the Geneva Accord are in accordance with each sides’ priorities and political interests: the final-status issues of Jerusalem and refugees for the Palestinian side and the issues of security and Jerusalem for the Israeli side. The specific choice of the word ‘الحق’ (al-ḥaq, lit. ‘the right’) in the Arabic translation reflects undisputed entitlement to carry out an action contrary to yumkin, yajūz and qad which reflect only permission. On the other hand, the change of may into yahiqu and rashai with regard to similar issues could perhaps be the result of negotiations and common interest.

5.6 Politically Sensitive Concepts and Terms

Schäffner (2004: 121) points out that one of the important areas of investigation in political discourse is the consideration of the strategic use of political concepts or terms in order to achieve certain political purposes. These concepts or terms are normally rooted in particular ideologies and would have different meanings in different languages and cultures. Historical and ideological contexts are two fundamental elements in
understanding political concepts and terms. Schäffner (1997: 130) explains that “[c]oncepts have histories, they not only evolve historically, but they cannot be understood without linking them to total historical process”.

The choice or avoidance of particular political terms in negotiated texts is never random or neutral but serves strategic political interests and reflects particular ideologies and power relations. The Oslo Accords is a case in point. Aruri (2011: 4) explains this case as follows:

Israeli control of the process was carefully crafted with deliberate use and misuse of strategic terminology, nuances and manipulation of the legal nomenclature…The lawyers of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs ensured that the legal basis of what they crafted for Arafat’s signature would exclude Palestinian sovereignty on any portion of the land extending between the River Jordan and the Mediterranean. In hundreds of pages of the Oslo documents, there was no mention whatsoever of such terms as occupation, withdrawal, the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, Palestinian sovereignty or any wording that might hint that the endgame might possibly include Palestinian liberation and independent statehood.

The overall language of the Oslo Accords was carefully chosen by the Israeli side to the extent that the attitude of the late Yitzhak Rabin was termed by two Israeli journalists as “creative recalcitrance”, i.e. “examining every word with a magnifying glass and refusing any proposal from which there was no turning back” (Shlaim 1994: 32).

Another case concerns the exclusion of the term ‘Right of Return’ in the text of the Geneva Accord. During the negotiations of the Geneva Accord, the Israeli negotiators showed strong objection to the use of the term ‘right of return’ or even ‘return’ in the final draft of the Geneva Accord. David Kimche, a member of the Israeli negotiating team, in an interview with Gilead Light (2003) said: “[W]e fought like tigers over every single word”.

Kimche on the specific term of ‘return of return’ explains that:

[T]he central point of this agreement for the Israelis was this question of the right of return for Palestinian refugees. We actually spent a whole morning at Movenpick hotel on one single word, ‘return’. Towards the end of the session, the Palestinians asked to include the word ‘return’ in the subtitle of the article on refugees. We said, ‘If you include the word return, we are going to pack our bags and go home. We’re not going to accept anything that has to do with return.

Amos Oz (2003), another member of the Israeli negotiating team, argued that the term ‘return’ is “a code name for the destruction of Israel and the establishment of two Palestinian states on its ruins. If there’s return, there’s no agreement”. In the end, neither the term ‘right of return’ nor the term ‘return’ appeared anywhere in the final draft of the Geneva Accord. These two cases from actual both ‘track-one’ and track-two’ Palestinian-Israeli negotiations, Oslo Accords and the Geneva Accord respectively, show clearly the significant use of political terms in negotiated texts.
Ideological aspects of terms are usually multiplied when translation is involved, particularly in the context of the Middle East conflict where one political term could mean different things in different languages. For example, research in negotiation theory showed that certain political concepts and terms that are “value-free in one language imply value judgments in another” (Cohen 2001: 73). One example of this is the term ‘normalisation’ – which in the context of the Middle East conflict – has different connotations in Arabic, English and Hebrew (see below). This term as well as other terms are part of the lexicon of the conflict and have specific meaning in this context. The following sub-sections analyse cases of political concepts and terms in the different peace initiatives and how they were dealt with in translation.

5.6.1 Land

Chapter 1.1.1 has outlined the rationale for the narratives of land and the significance of land to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. This significance has provided the motivation to investigate this concept in the different language versions of Palestinian-Israeli peace initiatives in detail. In the following sub-sections, issues related to this concept such as the principle of ‘land for peace’, the term ‘land’ itself and its synonyms, historical claims and land swap will be discussed in detail.

The Principle of Land for Peace

The principle of ‘land for Peace’ constituted the essence of the Arab-Israeli ‘peace process’ which was launched at the Madrid Peace Conference in 1991. This principle appears only in the Arab Peace Initiative and the Roadmap Plan as in the two following examples:

[The Arab Peace Initiative: 1]

Back translation: …and the principle of the land for peace…

[LAS] Having listened to the statement made by his royal highness Prince Abdullah Bin Abdullahaz, the crown Prince of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in which his highness presented his initiative, calling for full Israeli withdrawal from all the Arab territories occupied since June 1967, in implementation of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, reaffirmed by the Madrid Conference of 1991 and the land for peace principle, and Israel's acceptance of an independent Palestinian state, with East Jerusalem as its capital, in return for the establishment of normal relations in the context of a comprehensive peace with Israel.

The settlement will resolve the Israel-Palestinian conflict, and end the occupation that began in 1967, based on the foundations of the Madrid Conference, the principle of land for peace, UNSCRs 242, 338 and 1397 [The Roadmap Plan: 1].

This principle – i.e. ‘the land for peace’ was rendered in all Arabic translations – following a literal translation strategy – as ‘الأرض مقابل السلام’ (al-arḍ muqābil al-salām, lit. ‘the land for peace’) and in all Hebrew translations – following a meaning shift strategy – as ‘שטחים תמורת שלום’ (shtaḥim tamorit shalom, lit. ‘territories for peace’). The Arabic phrase al-arḍ muqābil al-salām belongs to the Arabic political lexicon on the Arab-Israeli conflict whereas the Hebrew phrase shtaḥim tamorit shalom belongs to the Israeli political lexicon.

The Arabic phrase al-arḍ muqābil al-salām for example, appears in numerous resolutions of summits of the League of Arab States. The following two examples show this point:
There is a fundamental political difference between the Arabic and Hebrew translations of the phrase ‘land for peace’. To the Arab states, al-ard (lit. ‘the land’) constitutes one entity comprising all the territories occupied by Israel following the 1967 war. According to the principle of al-ard muqābil al-salām, Israel is required to return all of these territories in exchange for peace with the Arab states. By contrast, to Israel, the principle of shtahim tamorit shalom does not mean the return of all occupied territories for peace (Rabinovich 2004: 36). Based on this specific Israeli interpretation, withdrawing from some of these territories should suffice to achieve peace with the Arab states. These two conflicting positions originate from the Arab states’ and Israel’s own interpretations of the 242 UNSC resolution (cf. section 5.2).

**The Term Land and its Synonyms**

The use of the term ‘land’ and its synonyms ‘areas’ and ‘territories’ is not homogenous in the original source texts of the Palestinian-Israeli peace initiatives. For example, the term ‘الأرض’ (al-ard, lit. ‘the land’) is used in the Arabic source text of the Arab Peace Initiative but not ‘المناطق’ (al-manāṭiq, lit. ‘areas’ or ‘territories’). In the English source text of the Roadmap Plan, the terms ‘land’ and ‘areas’ are used but not ‘territories’. The specific choice of the term al-ard in the Arab peace initiatives reflects the high value attached to land in the Arab political discourse.

The term ‘areas’ – which appears three times in the English source text of the Roadmap – was translated differently in the Arabic and Hebrew as shown in the following example:

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As comprehensive security performance moves forward, IDF withdraws progressively from areas occupied since September 28, 2000 and the two sides restore the status quo that existed prior to September 28, 2000. Palestinian security forces redeploy to areas vacated by IDF [The Roadmap Plan: 2].

The specific use of the term ‘areas’ rather than ‘territories’ corresponds to the classification given to the Occupied Palestinian Territories according to the Oslo Agreements, i.e. ‘Areas A’, ‘Areas B’, and ‘Areas C’ (cf. Chapter 5.2). The use of this term – i.e. ‘areas’ – could perhaps be to distinguish between the Palestinian lands occupied since 4 June 1967 and those which were re-occupied after 28 September 2000. The Roadmap Plan requires Israel to withdraw only from the latter.
All Arabic translations rendered the term ‘areas’ as ‘المناطق’ (al-manāṭiq) or ‘المناطق’ (manāṭiq) (both terms mean ‘areas’ or ‘territories’). On the other hand, all Hebrew translations rendered the term ‘areas’ as either ‘אזורים’ (azorim, lit. ‘areas’) or ‘שטחים’ (shtāhim, lit. ‘territories’). In the Peace Now translation, for instance, ‘areas’ was rendered consistently as azurim whereas in all other Hebrew translations it was rendered twice as azurim and once as shtāhim.

This spread of choices has to be considered against their meaning in the target language context. In Hebrew, ha-shtaḥim is shorthand for ‘השטחים המוחזקים,’ (ha-shtaḥim ha-muḥzakim, literally means ‘held territories’ but has standardly been translated as ‘administered territories’ (Gorenberg 2006: 392) or ‘השטחים המשוחררים,’ (ha-shtaḥim ha-mishuḥhrarim, lit. ‘the liberated territories’).

The term ha-shtaḥim ha-kvushim (lit. ‘conquered territories’) was used for a short period after the 1967 war to describe the West Bank and the Gaza Strip which came under Israeli occupation during this war (HaCohen 1997: 397). This term, i.e. ha-shtaḥim ha-kvushim – which is commonly used today in Israel to refer to the Occupied Palestinian Territories – “conspicuously neglects to mention the continuing act of occupation” (Stähler 2007: 241) as describing these territories as ‘occupied’ entails that these territories belong to another people.

The term ha-shtaḥim ha-kvushim was soon replaced in Israel by the term ha-shtaḥim ha-muḥzakim (‘the administered territories’) (HaCohen 1997: 397). The term ha-shtaḥim ha-muḥzakim underscores Israel’s position that these territories are not ‘occupied’ and thus they are not “necessarily subject to legal framework of the international law of occupation” (Amichai 2005: 24). After Likud came to power in 1977, the Israeli policy towards the Occupied Palestinian Territories changed (Gazit 2003: 161). The Begin government in its advancement of Jewish settlement in the Occupied West Bank and the Gaza Strip, campaigned “fervently and forcefully” for the replacement of the term ha-shtaḥim ha-muḥzakim by the biblical names “Judea, Samaria and Gaza” (Hebrew: יהודה, שומרון וחבל עזה) (Domínguez 1989: 20). The ultimate goal of the Likud’s policy was “integrating the Territories as part of the ‘Land of Israel’, thus strengthening their Jewish character and conveying to the local Palestinian population that they had better accommodate to the continuing Israeli rule” (Gazit 2003: 161).
Against this historical background, the use of the term *ha-shtahim ha-muhzakim* in the *Ha'aretz* translation serves to present the status of the areas under discussion in a different light, i.e. as “disputed” rather than ‘occupied’ – thus supporting the legitimacy of Israel’s control over such areas to a certain extent. This kind of interpretation is consistent with the official Israeli position on this issue as the following excerpt taken from Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (IMFA) shows:

(ST) Politically, the West Bank and Gaza Strip is best regarded as territory over which there are competing claims which should be resolved in peace process negotiations. Israel has valid claims to title in this territory based not only on its historic and religious connection to the land, and its recognized security needs, but also on the fact that the territory was not under the sovereignty of any state and came under Israeli control in a war of self-defense, imposed upon Israel.¹²⁷

This kind of interpretation is in clear violation of the international law and numerous United Nations General Assembly and Security Council resolutions which unequivocally refer to these territories as *occupied*.

The term ‘occupied’ in example (5.35) above, represents a controversial aspect of the original text. Its two occurrences – one of them as part of example (5.35) – were translated differently into Arabic and Hebrew. ‘Occupied’ remained as a pre-modifying adjective in the Arabic translations of the US Department of State, CNN and the *Al-mtym* network. However, the translations produced by *Al-Quds* and the United Nations turned this element into a verb (in simple past tense and present continuous tense, respectively) which in turn brings about an explicitation of the agent of such occupation, i.e. ‘IDF’. As for the Hebrew translations, ‘occupied’ was also retained as an adjective pre-modifying ‘areas/territories’, except in the translation by *Peace Now* – where the agent responsible for the occupation, however, remains implicit.

The specific rendering of the term ‘occupied’ as ‘التي تحتلها’ (lit. ‘which it [Israel] is occupying’), i.e. a present continuous verb, can be found in Arabic translations by the United Nations of numerous Security Council (UNSC) and General Assembly (UNGA) resolutions concerning the Palestine Question. This choice reflects the official position of the United Nations which considers these territories as occupied since 1967. The following two examples illustrate this point:

Having learned with deep concern that Israel, the occupying Power, in contravention of its obligations under the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, deported to Lebanon on 17 December 1992, hundreds of Palestinian civilians from the territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem.

Expressing its grave concern at the continued deterioration of the situation on the ground in the territory occupied by Israel since 1967.

Another issue related to the narrative of land is the contentious claims of ownership of land (cf. Chapter 1.1.1). These claims are conflicting in every single detail. Acknowledgement of one side’s claims automatically de-legitimizes the other’s claims. This issue of claims of ownership of land is mentioned in two peace initiatives: the Geneva Accord and the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles. In the Geneva Accord, this issue caused a political debate as the drafters of this initiative attempted to convince the Israeli public that the Palestinian people acknowledged Israel as a “Jewish” state by changing the term ‘homeland’ into ‘national home’ (cf. Chapter 5.4.1 and Chapter 6.3).

In the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles, this issue of claims to land is mentioned in the Arabic introduction drafted by Sari Nusseibeh for the needs of the Palestinian public. This introduction was picked up by many institutions (among which is the Israeli Ha’aretz newspaper) which treated it as part of the original text of the initiative. The following example illustrates how this issue of claims of ownership of land was
treated in the Arabic and Hebrew translations:

Back translation: the Palestinian and Israeli peoples recognize the historical rights of each other with regard to one land. For generations, the Israeli people wanted to establish the Israeli state in the lands of Israel, whereas the Palestinian people wanted to establish a state in all lands of Palestine.

Back translation: The Palestinian and Jewish peoples acknowledge the historical rights of each other with regard to the same land. For generations, the Jewish people sought to establish the Jewish state in all parts of land of Israel, whereas the Palestinian people also sought to establish its state in all areas of Palestine.

The above extract from the Arabic introduction deals with the controversial issue of claims of ownership of Palestine. In this introduction, these claims are only recognized, which does not necessarily mean acknowledgment of such claims. In all Arabic language versions, this act of ‘recognition’ was changed into an unequivocal ‘acknowledgement’ of the Palestinian and Jewish claims as equal. Moreover, the conflict in the introduction is portrayed as one between the Palestinian and Israeli peoples. In the Ha’aretz and all Arabic language versions (which were based on Ha’aretz translation) – and following a meaning
shift strategy – the adjective ‘الإسرائيلي’ (al-Isrāīlī, lit. ‘the Israeli’) was replaced by the adjective ‘اليهودي’ (al-yahūdī, lit. ‘the Jewish’). This specific shift – which highlights the religious nature of the conflict – is contrary to the drafter’s intention of presenting the conflict as a secular one. Delyani argues: “we are seculars and we do not deal with the conflict from a religious point of view, although religion has influence on the conflict; but we insist that we are dealing with the Israeli people as a state, not as a Jewish people which we consider a religion. Not every Jew is an Israeli and not every Israeli is a Jew” (personal communication 2005).

The choice of the lexical item ‘أراضي فلسطين’ (arāḍī Falasṭīn, lit. lands of Palestine) and ‘أراضي إسرائيل’ (arāḍī Isrāīl, lit. ‘lands of Israel’) in the Arabic source text creates some sort of political symmetry between the claims of the two sides. This symmetry was changed in the Hebrew and Arabic language versions. The Ha’aretz translation rendered the term ‘أراضي إسرائيل’ (lit. ‘lands of Israel’) in the singular form as ‘أرض إسرائيل’ (Eretz Israel, lit. ‘Land of Israel’) which is how historic Palestine (now Israel, the Occupied West Bank and the Gaza Strip) is referred to in the Israeli-Zionist political and religious discourses.

A political and ideological competition between the two toponyms, ‘فلسطين’ (Falasṭīn, lit. ‘Palestine’) and “ארץ ישראל” (Eretz Israel, lit. ‘Land of Israel’) has always existed. During the British Mandate of Palestine (1922-1948) and before the establishment of the state of Israel, Falasṭīn was the name given to the territory west of the Jordan River and the government appointed by the British was called the Government of Palestine132 (Bernstein 1992: 19). The Zionists “insisted on Palestine being referred to officially as the (biblical) ‘Land of Israel’, but the most that the mandatory authorities were willing to concede was the use of the Hebrew for Eretz Yisrael after the name Palestine on all official documents, currency, stamps, and so on” (Rolef 1933: 101 quoted in Masalha 2007: 33).

The lexical items ‘أراضي’ or ‘أرجاء’ (anḥāi and arjāi respectively, both mean parts) in the Arabic language versions, on one hand, and ‘أراضي’ (arāḍī, lit. ‘lands’) in the source text, on the other hand, all occurring with the name Palestine, represent two within-group Palestinian narratives of land.

132 At that time, as Bernstein (1992: 19) explains, there was “Palestinian citizenship (for both Jews and Arabs living in the territory) as well as Palestinian currency. Jews used the term Palestine (Palesina) both in everyday speech and in writing, as did the British and the Arabs.”
The terms, Anhāī and arjāī falāṣṭīn (lit. ‘parts of Palestine’) imply that Palestine is one geographical unit whereas the term arāḍī falāṣṭīn (lit. ‘lands of Palestine’) corresponds to the geopolitical classifications of ‘الأراضي المحتلة’ (lit. the occupied lands of 1967) and ‘الأراضي المحتلة’ (lit. the occupied lands of 1948). The latter represents the Palestinian pragmatist political position which accepts the partition of historic Palestine, acknowledges the existence of Israel and calls for the establishment of a Palestinian state on the lands occupied in 1967 (i.e. the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, which is 22% of historic Palestine). Today, the Palestinian Authority (PA) refers to these lands as simply ‘الأراضي الفلسطينية’ (lit. the Palestinian land) without mentioning the adjective ‘المحتلة’ (lit. ‘the occupied’) in order to create an illusion of sovereignty. By contrast, the former represents the totalist position which rejects the partition of Palestine.

**Land Swap**

Demarcation of final borders between the state of Israel and the future state of Palestine is crucial for the viability of the two-state solution to the conflict. Palestinian-Israeli peace initiatives talk about land swap as part of this demarcation of borders.

The principle of land swap was first suggested by the American president Bill Clinton during Camp David II negotiations between Israel and the PLO in 2000, which the Palestinians and Israelis accepted, but the “proportionality of the swap remained under discussion” (Enderlin 2003: 352). The main purpose behind introducing this principle is to accommodate the Jewish settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (Balaban 2005: 254). Israel refuses to withdraw to the lines of the 1967 borders. Such a withdrawal would mean dismantling more than 149 Jewish settlements in the occupied West Bank, including in and around Occupied East Jerusalem. Israel claims that its “security needs” require a presence in some strategic parts of the West Bank and thus needs to annex some large settlement blocs, particularly in the areas near Occupied East Jerusalem. The idea of land swap responds to these needs.

The most important aspect of the principle of land swap is the question of equal value, i.e. size and quality of the land to be given to the Palestinians in return for annexing Jewish settlement blocs. This issue is of particular significance since “many of the Israeli settlements are constructed on the best agricultural land of the West Bank, and located in water shortage areas” (Emerson and Tocci 2003: 77). Israeli proposals for land to be
swapped to the future Palestinian state include areas adjacent to the Gaza Strip and areas southwest of the West Bank (Emerson and Tocci 2003: 77). These areas are known to be infertile. The Palestinian negotiators of the Geneva Accord “[f]rom the beginning of the official negotiations…demanded not only territory of an equivalent size to that annexed by Israel, but also of equivalent quality” (Klein 2007: 71). This demand finds its way in Arabic translation, as made clear in the following example:

(5.37) In accordance with UNSC Resolution 242 and 338, the border between the states of Palestine and Israel shall be based on the June 4th 1967 lines with reciprocal modifications on a 1:1 basis as set forth in attached Map [The Geneva Accord: 8].

The term ‘on a 1:1 basis’ in the above example is vague, i.e. it does not specify the nature of border modifications other than that they would be of the same ratio. On one hand, the Hebrew translation of Yes to an Agreement rendered this phrase following a literal translation strategy and thus kept its vagueness. The Al-Ayyam translation, on the other hand, followed an explicitness change strategy and, thus, specified that these border modifications would be of the same quality and quantity. This stipulation reflects the position of the Palestinian negotiating team of the Geneva Accord.

Critics of the Geneva Accord accused its Palestinian negotiators of accepting the Israeli annexation of fertile lands in the occupied West Bank in return for infertile or desert land next to the Occupied Gaza Strip. Spelling out the exact nature of these border modifications in the Al-Ayyam translation can be seen as part of the drafters’ efforts to market the agreement to the Palestinian people and refute any accusations.

5.6.2 Jewish Settlement Activity
The Jewish settlements\(^{133}\) in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (including in and around East Jerusalem) are the most vivid manifestation of the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian

\(^{133}\) For an illustration of the geography and size of the Jewish settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, see for example the map published by B’Tselem’s in June 2011:
land. These settlements are illegal under the international law, the Fourth Geneva Convention (e.g. Article 49(6))\textsuperscript{134}, the International Court of Justice and numerous United Nations Security Council (UNSCRS) (e.g. 452 (1979), 446 (1979), 465 (1980)) and General Assembly resolutions (GARS) (e.g. 36/226 (1981), 39/146 (1984), 51/133 (1996)). The following two excerpts from the United Nations Security Council Resolution 446 (1979) and the General Assembly Resolution 51/133 (1996) respectively are examples of this point:

Determines that the policy and practices of Israel in establishing settlements in the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since 1967 have no legal validity and constitute a serious obstruction to achieving a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East.\textsuperscript{135}

Reaffirms that Israeli settlements in the Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem, and in the occupied Syrian Golan are illegal and an obstacle to peace and economic and social development.\textsuperscript{136}

This widespread international consensus is rejected by Israel which considers these settlements to be “legal” as in the following excerpt from a text published by the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs on this issue of Jewish settlements:

Jewish settlement in West Bank and Gaza Strip territory has existed from time immemorial and was expressly recognised as legitimate in the Mandate for Palestine adopted by the League of Nations, which provided for the establishment of a Jewish state in the Jewish people's ancient homeland...Repeated charges regarding the illegality of Israeli settlements must therefore be regarded as politically motivated, without foundation in international law. Similarly, as Israeli settlements cannot be considered illegal, they cannot constitute a "grave violation" of the Geneva Convention.\textsuperscript{137}

Jewish settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territories are built on expropriated private Palestinian land. The international community considers these settlements both illegal and obstacles to peace. These settlements and the extensive road network that exclusively serve them destroy the territorial contiguity of the Palestinian land (Effarah 2007: 497). This

\textsuperscript{134} Paragraph 6 of this article states that “[T]he occupying power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into territories it occupies” (Canfield 2001: 11).


complicates the establishment of a viable Palestinian state (Thorpe 2006: 242) and consequently threatens the chances for achieving a ‘two-state solution’ to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

The number of Jewish settlers in the Occupied Palestinian Territories has doubled during Oslo from 200,000 to 400,000 (cf. Chapter 1.1.2). In 2007, there were more than 450,000 Jewish settlers living in 149 settlements in the Occupied West Bank including East Jerusalem. These settlements are in continuous expansion. In the text of the Roadmap Plan, this expansion is referred to as “settlement activity” including the “natural growth” of settlements, a vague term that has never been precisely defined and allowed Israel to continue expanding settlements (Efrat 2006: 42). Statements by consecutive Israeli governments on the Jewish settlements have always included the requirement that they would take into account the “natural growth” of the settlements (Ghanem 2010: 32). In fact, the Israeli leaders downplay expanding Jewish settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territories as “natural growth” (Dunsky 2008: 161).

The term “natural growth” of settlements would normally refer to “population growth due to births within particular settlements in the West Bank (and formerly in Gaza)” (Prainsck 2007: 243). However, all Israeli governments and since the signing of Oslo Accords in 1993, have “interpreted this phrase as including not only the natural growth of the existing population (i.e. birth rates), but also the growth of the population by migration”. Indeed, Israeli governments themselves “have strongly encouraged migration from Israel to the settlements by offering generous financial benefits and incentives”.

The Palestinians have never accepted the pretext of “natural growth” and considered it – as once put by Nabil Shaath, the former Palestinian minister of planning – to be a “lie” that is designed to “deepen occupation and to create facts on the ground to pre-empt the outcome of permanent negotiations” (Dunsky 2008: 162). Israel has always used this “natural growth” as a pretext to expropriate more Palestinian land, expand the settlements and construct bypass roads that connect them (Ghanem 2007: 32).


140 Ibid.
The term “natural growth” was added in the original text of the Roadmap Plan as a Palestinian demand (Saeb Erikat, personal communication 2005) and in response to the Israeli argument that a freeze on settlement activity should not include those due to “natural growth”. Thus, the purpose of this inclusion is to make it clear that Israel is required to freeze all settlement activities, including those it considers as due to “natural growth”.

(5.38) Consistent with the Mitchell Report, GOI freezes all settlement activity (including natural growth of settlements) [The Roadmap Plan: 1].

The term ‘settlement activity’ appears twice in the English source text of the Roadmap Plan. This term was rendered in all the Arabic translations – following a literal translation strategy – as ‘النشاطات الاستيطانية’ (al-nashāṭat al-aistīṭāniyyah). In the Hebrew translations, it was rendered as either the “positive” notion of ‘התיישבות’ (pe’ilut hityashvut) or the negative notion of ‘התיישבות והarihבות’ (pe’ilut hitnahlut), both mean ‘settlement activities’. However, these two Hebrew terms means different things to different people in Israel.

The Jewish settlement enterprise in the West Bank is generally known in Israel by the Hebrew term hitnahlut whereas the general Jewish “settlement” enterprise that has taken place throughout historic Palestine during the twentieth century prior to the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948 is termed as hityashvut (Newman 1996: 71). The Israeli society distinguishes between what it considers as the “positive” notion of hityashvut and the negative notion of hitnahlut (Newman 2005: 207). Hityashvut represents “the
formation of rural, agricultural, self-sustaining village communities” (Newman 1996: 71) whereas the use of the term *hitnaḥlut* – particularly by those opposed to the settlement in the West Bank – “has come to denote a negative form of action” (Newman 1996: 71). The Jewish settlers on the other hand view the term *hitnaḥlut* – which evokes “biblical injunctions and promises to “inherit” the land through settlement” (Lustick 1993: 359) and describes the original conquests of the Land of Israel in ancient times by the Hebrew people under the leadership of Joshua” (Newman 1996: 72) – as positive.

The distinction between the two terms is often used by “left wing and centrist political leaders” in Israel as a means of criticizing and opposing the West Bank settlement activities (Newman 2005: 208). Those leaders, as well as others in Israel such as Peace Now, use the term *hitnaḥlut* rather than *hityashvut* to describe the settlement process beyond the Green Line. 141 Such a distinction is denied by the Israeli settler community (Newman 1996: 72) who perceive both terms – i.e. *hitnaḥlut* and *hityashvut* – as positive (Newman 2005: 207). This is because they consider the Occupied Palestinian Territories to be their “heritage” (Bisharah 2003: 147), i.e. part of the “land of Israel” and thus they have the right to settle down in any part of it.

In sum, the term *hitnaḥlut* is used by those who oppose Jewish settlement in the Occupied Palestinian Territories to de-legitimize such activity, whereas the terms *hitnaḥlut* and *hityashvut* has been used interchangeably by the Jewish settlers of the ‘Yesha Council’ and its predecessor Gush Emunim142 to add legitimacy to such activity. The term *hityashvut* in particular, belongs to the narrative of ‘Greater Israel’ in which these settlements are considered not only ‘legal’ but also ‘legitimate’.

In the translation of Peace Now, the term ‘settlement activity’ was translated consistently as *pe’ilut hitnaḥlut*, whereas in the translations of *Ha'aretz* and the Knesset, it was rendered interchangeably, once as *pe’ilut hitnaḥlut* and once as *pe’ilut hityashvut*, perhaps to satisfy

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141 The Green Line refers to the “borders determined by armistice with neighboring States (1948–49), separating the State of Israel-controlled territory from the other areas of Palestine (Jerusalem, West Bank & Gaza Strip). Indigenous Palestinians remaining inside the Green Line became citizens of Israel. Palestinians living in the other areas of Palestine, including refugees originating from inside the ‘green line’ came under the administration of Jordan (in the West Bank) and Egypt (Gaza Strip) until Israel conquered those territories in the 1967 War”, extract published on the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights website: [http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cerd/docs/ngos/jointngo3.pdf](http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cerd/docs/ngos/jointngo3.pdf) [last accessed: 2 September 2011].

142 Gush Emunim (Hebrew: גוש אמונים, lit. ‘Bloc of the faithful’) is the movement behind most of the Jewish settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (Klein 2008: 94).
the different political positions of the Knesset members on the issue. In the translation of *Yediot Aharonot*, the term ‘settlement activity’ was translated consistently as *pe’ilut hityashvut*.

The particular choice of the term *hitnahlut* in the translation of Peace Now reflects the political affiliation and ideological position of both the organization and the translator of this target text, Hagit Ofran. Ofran is the director of the Peace Now watchdog on Jewish settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. In her reporting on the Jewish settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territories – published on Peace Now website – Ofran uses the term *hitnahlut* rather than *hityashvut*.

The term “natural growth” of settlements appears only once and only in the text of the Roadmap Plan. In the above example, this term was rendered in all the Arabic translations following a literal translation strategy. On the other hand, the same term was rendered differently into Hebrew. The choice of *רבייה טبيعית* (ribbuy tiv’i, lit. ‘natural birth rate’) in the *Ha’aretz* translation represents a human metaphor: Israel is required to freeze settlements activity, including those that are considered as due to demographic reasons, i.e. new births of Jewish settlers. The choice of *צמיחה טبيعית* (tsmiḥah tiv’it, lit. ‘natural growth’) in the translation of the *Yediot Aharonot*, on the other hand, is guided by the metaphor of growing plants which permits the casting of expanding Jewish settlements on expropriated Palestinian land as ‘natural’. This specific choice reflects the right-wing political affiliation of the *Yediot Aharonot* and its support of the Jewish settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territories.

### 5.6.3 Jewish Settlement Outposts

Section (5.2.2) sat the rationale for the issue of Jewish settlement outposts in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. This section looks at how the term ‘settlement outposts’ and the verb ‘dismantle’ were translated in the Arabic and Hebrew translations of the Roadmap Plan. The following example shows this:

(5.39) GOI immediately *dismantles settlement outposts* erected since March 2001 [The Roadmap Plan: 3].

| [IMFA] | The Israeli government immediately removes the settlement locations deep into land. |
| Back translation: | Government of Israel immediately evacuates the settlement points... |
The term ‘settlement outposts’ and the verb ‘dismantle’ were rendered differently in the Arabic and Hebrew language versions of the Roadmap. The choice of the term ‘المواقع الإستيطانية’ (al-mawaqiq al-istiyānīyah, lit. ‘the settlement locations’) in the translations of CNN and Almtym implies the starting point of something with the potential of spreading, whereas the choice of the term ‘البؤر’ (al-bu’ār al-istytāniyah, lit. ‘the settlement focal points’) in the translations of the US Department of State, United Nations and Al-Quds indicates something static. The Arabic lexical item ‘بوله’ (bu’rah, lit. ‘focal point’) can be related to the Arabic term ‘بؤرة فساد’ (bu’rat fasad, lit. ‘a focal point of corruption’) which has negative connotations. Corruption in the context of Jewish settlement outposts can be seen in the damage and harm which these settlement outposts cause to the Palestinian land. These bu’ār (lit. ‘focal points’) are the centre from which settlement outposts spread out like cancer to expand already existing settlements or to form new ones.
The term ‘settlement outposts’ is rendered in the Hebrew translations of the Knesset – following a literal translation strategy – as ‘מאחזים’ (ma’ahazim, lit. ‘settlement outposts’) or – following an explicitness change strategy in the translations of Peace Now and Yediot Aharonot – as ‘המאחזים’ (ha-ma’ahazim, lit. ‘the settlement outposts’). In the Hebrew translation of Ha’aretz newspaper, however, it was rendered – following a meaning shift strategy – as ‘ההתנחלויות’ (ha-hitnakhluhot, lit. ‘the settlements’).

Also, in this example, the verb ‘dismantle’ itself was translated differently into Arabic. It was translated literally as ‘تفكك’ (tufakik) in the translations by the Almtym network, Al-Quds, CNN and the US Department of State. However, a meaning shift strategy was used in the translation by the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (IMFA), where the verb ‘dismantle’ was rendered as ‘ikhlaa, lit. ‘evacuation’) and the United Nations’ version, that opted for the term ‘ازالة’ (izālat, lit. ‘removal’). Evacuating settlement outposts does not necessarily mean dismantling them. They could be evacuated now and populated later on.

On the other hand, in all Hebrew translations the verb ‘dismantle’ is translated literally into Hebrew in the future tense, e.g. ‘תפרק’ (tefarek, lit. ‘will dismantle’) in the translations of the two newspapers Ha‘aretz and Yediot Aharonot, indicating a future action, whereas it was translated in the simple present tense, e.g. ‘מפרקת’ (mefarket, lit. ‘dismantles’) in the translations of the Knesset and Peace Now.

5.6.4 Terms Related to the Question of the Palestinian Refugees

The question of the Palestinian refugees is one of the most contentious and sensitive issues of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict (cf. Chapter 1.1.1). Detailed analysis of different language versions of peace initiatives revealed that a number of terms and phrases related to this question were rendered differently into Arabic, English and Hebrew, namely, with regard to ethical responsibility for the creation of the refugee problem, experience of refugeehood and resettlement of Palestinian refugees. In the following, translation shifts with regard to these three main themes will be examined in their ideological and political contexts.

Ethical Responsibility

The question of who is responsible for the creation of the Palestinian refugees problem and how much responsibility is admitted has always been a point of heated debate and
conflict between the Palestinians and Israelis (cf. Chapter 1.1.1). This issue is drafted differently in the Arabic, English and Hebrew language versions of the Gush-Shalom Declaration of Principles for Peace Agreement as the following two examples show:

(5.40) ישראל מכירה באחריותה המרכזית להיווצרות והצמדה של הפליטיםremium 1948 ו-1967.
[The Gush-Shalom Declaration of Principles for Peace Agreement: 4].
Back translation: Israel acknowledges its main responsibility...

[T] [Gush-Shalom] Back translation: Israel acknowledges its main responsibility...

(5.41) ישראל מכירה עקרונית בזכות הозвращה כזכות אنسانية בסיסית.
[The Gush-Shalom Declaration of Principles for Peace Agreement: 4]
Back translation: Israel acknowledges in principle the right of return as a basic human right.

[T] [Gush-Shalom] Back translation: Israel acknowledges in principle the Right of Return as a basic human right.

In the Hebrew source text and the Arabic language version of the Gush-Shalom Declaration of Principles for Peace Agreement, Israel bears the full responsibility for the creation of the Palestinian refugees problem which corresponds to the Palestinian narrative, whereas in the English language version Israel bears only a share of that responsibility. Acknowledging “share” or “all” of the responsibility for the creation of this tragedy would have, other than an ethical and historical responsibility, financial implications as the one party found responsible for it would be obliged to pay financial compensation to the Palestinian refugees.

In the second example above, Israel acknowledges the principle of the right of return explicitly only in the English language version. Chiller-Glaus (2007: 316), commenting on the English language version of the declaration, explains the political implications of this choice as follows:

A crucial point of the Gush Shalom proposal is the provision that “Israel acknowledges the principle of the Right of Return, as a basic human right.” This formulation is interesting in several aspects. First, Israel would not recognize the right of return but merely acknowledge it; significantly, an acknowledgement is less binding and declaratory than an official recognition of the right. Second, although the right of return to be acknowledged by Israel as a “basic human right,” it carefully avoided adding a specification like “the State of Israel”... In other words while “acknowledging” the right of return as “a basic human right,” the proposal does not unequivocally include the return to Israeli territory to be part of this right.
Experience of Refugeehood and Dispersion

The way the experience of the Palestinian refugeehood is referred to reflects particular ideological and political position. The following examples show how this experience is described in the Geneva Accord and the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles and, consequently, how it is rendered into Arabic and Hebrew translations:

(5.42) Refugees shall be compensated for the loss of property resulting from their displacement [The Geneva Accord: 26].

[PPC] ستتم تعويض اللاجئين عن خسائرهم في الممتلكات الناتجة عن تهجيرهم.
Back The refugees will be compensated for their loss in properties resulted from their displacement.

[YA] פליטים י损伤 על אובדן הרכוש몽בם מעשייה.
Back Refugees will be compensated for loss of the properties resulted from their displacement.

(5.43) The Parties shall request the International Commission to appoint a Panel of Experts to estimate the value of Palestinians’ property at the time of displacement [The Geneva Accord: 27].

[PPC] يطلب الطرفان من المفوضية الدولية تعيين لجنة خبراء لتقدير قيمة الممتلكات الفلسطينية في وقت النزوح.
Back ...at the time of internal displacement.

[YA] הצדדים יבקש מהנציבות בין-לאומית lanzות פלטת של ממונת שיעורי את שיוו הרכוש
Back ...at the time of displacement.

In the original English source text of the Geneva Accord, the Palestinian refugeehood experience is referred to as ‘displacement’. This term was translated into Arabic as ‘التهجير’ (al-tahjīr, lit. ‘the dispersion’) and as ‘النزوح’ (al-nuzūh, lit. ‘the internal displacement’), and into Hebrew as ‘העקירה’ (ha-’akirah, lit. ‘the displacement’). Al-tahjīr in the context of the Palestinian refugeehood experience activates the scene of the Palestinian refugees being forced to leave their homes in 1948, whereas al-nuzūh – which refers to the time when the Palestinians were internally displaced during the 1967 war – activates the scene of a second tahjīr (lit. ‘dispersion’). The Palestinian refugees of 1967 are called ‘الفلاجحون’ (al-nāzihūn). This term, i.e. al-nāzihūn, is used to differentiate between those Palestinian refugees of 1948 and 1967. The use of both terms as translation equivalents of ‘displacement’ could perhaps be to include both groups in the discussions on this issue.

In the English source text of the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles, the Palestinian refugeehood experience is described as neither al-nuzūh nor al-tahjīr but as ‘plight’, which changes in translation. The following example is illustrative of this point:
Right of Return: recognizing the suffering and the plight of the Palestinian refugees the international community, Israel and the Palestinian state will initiate and contribute to an international fund to compensate them [The Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles: 1].

NC Back translation: The right of return: acknowledging the suffering and trouble of the Palestinian refugees...

PCPD Back translation: The right of return: acknowledging the suffering and dispersion of the Palestinian refugees...

Baheth Center Back translation: The right of return: emanating from the acknowledgment of the suffering and crisis of the Palestinian refugees...

NC Back translation: The right of return: emanating from the recognition of the suffering and plight of the Palestinian refugees...

The lexical item 'plight' in the above example is translated into Arabic as ‘مأزق’ (ma´ziq, lit. ‘trouble’), ‘أزمة’ (azmah, lit. ‘crisis’) and ‘تشريد’ (tashrīd, lit. ‘dispersion’). Ma´ziq and azmah represent a less serious condition and experience than tashrīd. The terms ma´ziq and azmah reduce the Palestinian cause to a humanitarian problem rather than a cause of a people being uprooted from their land by an occupation power and wish to return to their homes and properties. This is exactly the meaning which the term tashrīd activates in the mind of the Palestinian readers. The term Tashrīd represents a process that started in 1948 and still ongoing.

Tashrīd is a key political term in the lexicon of the Palestinian refugees narrative. This term – which implies a premeditated action by the use of force – appears in key Palestinian documents such as the late Palestinian President Yasser Arafat’s famous speech at the United Nations General Assembly on 13 November 1974 and his last speech to the Palestinian people on the 56th occasion of the Nakba on 15 May 2004, as well as in the Declaration of Independence of the State of Palestine on 15 November 1988. The following examples illustrate this point:

(ST) لقد تعرض شعبنا لويلات الحرب والدمار والتشريد سنين طويلة، ودفع شعبنا من دماء أبنائه وأرواحهم ما يعوض بثمن وعاني من الاحتلال والتشريد والنزوح والإرهاب ما لم يعانه شعب آخر. ولكن ذلك كله لا يجعل شعبنا حاضراً يعلم بالانتقام، كما أنه لا يجعلنا يا سيادة الرئيس تقع في سطوة عدوتنا العنصري أو نفق الوجودة المحققة في تعدد أعدانا...
Back translation: and it suffered from the occupation, dispersion, internal displacement and terrorism as no other people…

In summary, the choice of the political terms tahjīr and tashrīd in the Arabic translations of the Geneva Accord and the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles, respectively reflect the Palestinian narrative of the Right of Return which emphasizes that Israel bears the sole responsibility for the creation of the Palestinian refugees tragedy. These choices can be seen as part of the attempts to appeal to Palestinian public opinion in hope of winning its support.

**Resettlement of Palestinian Refugees**

How to resolve the Palestinian refugees problem is a particularly contentious and complex issue in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict with a particular humanitarian dimension (cf. Chapter 1.). This complexity has to do with the possible scenarios outlined to resolve this issue. These scenarios include the possible return of the Palestinian refugees to their homes in what is now Israel (according to the Palestinian narrative, i.e. totalist narrative), possible return to the future Palestinian state only (according to the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles, i.e. Palestinian pragmatist narrative), to reach a solution to this problem to be agreed on in accordance of the UN resolution 194 (according to the Arab Peace Initiative,


i.e. Arab pragmatist narrative) or resettlements in host Arab countries (according to the
Israeli narrative, i.e. totalist narrative). Although the Arab Peace Initiative shows political
flexibility with regard to this issue, it rejects resettlement as one of the possible
scenarios.

This stipulation is translated differently in the English and Hebrew translations.

In the Hebrew translation of the Palestinian Authority, the term ‘’التوطن’’ (al-tawtīn, lit.
’settlement’’) – following a meaning shift strategy – was translated as ‘’אזרחות’’ (izraḥut, lit.
’naturalization’’). In Israel, there is a difference between the two Hebrew terms ‘’אזרחות’’
(izraḥut, lit. ‘citizenship’) and ‘’לאום’’ (le’um, lit. ‘nationality’). Izraḥut “may be held by
Arabs as well as Jews while nationality (le’um), which bestows significantly greater rights

203
than citizenship, may be claimed by Jews alone” (Tekiner 1990: 20; in Baker 2006: 66).

Thus, the formulation of ‘rejecting all forms of naturalization of Palestinians’ is ambiguous as rejecting such naturalization of Palestinian refugees and granting them citizenship is not the same as rejecting their resettlement.

This specific choice of the term *izruah* could perhaps be to show Israel some sort of Arab political flexibility with regard to the Palestinian refugees issue. Ambiguous formulation can also be seen in meaning shifts from *al-tawiṭn* to *קליטת* (klitah, lit. ‘absorption’), *ריבונות* (ribbonut, lit. ‘sovereignty’) and *הגלות* (ha-galut, lit. ‘the banishment’ or ‘exile’). *Galut* is a biblical term which refers to “the exile of Jews during Babylonian times” (Ohliger and Munz 2003: 3).

5.6.5 Terms Related to Israeli Occupation Policies and Practices

According to the Roadmap Plan, Israel is required to take a number of measures in order to improve the humanitarian situation of the Palestinian people living in the Occupied Palestinian Territories as well as enhancing trust between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. These measures – which include lifting curfews, refraining from deporting Palestinian civilians and stopping the confiscation of Palestinian private land – are illegal under the international law and constitute “forms of collective punishment” (Darcy 2003: 65). The United Nations has condemned these Israeli “measures” (called policies and practices by the UN) in the Occupied Palestinian Territories in its numerous General Assembly resolutions, including resolutions 43/58 (1988)\(^\text{146}\), 45/69 (1990)\(^\text{147}\) and 46/47 (1991)\(^\text{148}\). These policies and practices were translated differently in the Arabic and Hebrew translations of the Roadmap as the following sub-sections will show.


The first policy to be examined is ‘curfews’. Particularly lengthy ones, have been regularly imposed by the Israeli army in the Occupied Palestinian Territories throughout the Palestinian-Israeli conflict (Darcy 2003: 61). The term ‘curfew’ (Arabic: ‘منع التجول’, ‘man’a al-tajawul’) – which appears only in the text of the Roadmap Plan – was translated differently into Arabic and Hebrew as the following example shows:

(5.46) Israel takes measures to improve the humanitarian situation. Israel and Palestinians implement in full all recommendations of the Bertini report to improve humanitarian conditions, lifting curfews and easing restrictions on movement of persons and goods, and allowing full, safe, and unfettered access of international and humanitarian personnel [The Roadmap Plan: 5].

Translation shifts in the above example are found in the Arabic translation of Al-Quds newspaper and the Hebrew translation of Peace Now which both employed a meaning shift strategy, thus translating ‘curfews’ as ‘الحصار’ (al-hisār, lit. ‘the siege’) and as ‘الحصار’ (sgarem, lit. ‘closures’) respectively. The translation shift from ‘curfew’ into ‘siege’ in Al-Quds’ Arabic translation is of high political significance. The term al-hisār or ‘siege’, according to B’Tselem (an Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories) refers to “fully or partially preventing residents from entering or leaving a certain area, while isolating the area from other parts of the West Bank. This is done by

149 For a detailed account of the Israeli policy of curfews in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, see Hanieh (2006: 324-337).
blocking the access roads to the area by means of physical obstructions, which forces the residents to pass through a staffed checkpoint on their way in and out of the area. The degree to which the siege is enforced varies from place to place and from one period to another.\(^{150}\)

This term *al-hisār* belongs to the Palestinian political lexicon on the discourse of occupation and resistance. It appears in a number of key Palestinian documents, for example, the Declaration of Independence of the State of Palestine on 15 November 1988 in Algeria as in the following example:

> قادت منظمة التحرير الفلسطينية معارك شعبها العظيم، المنصهر في وحدهه الوطنية المثلي، وصموده الأسطوري أمام المجازر والحصار في الوطن وخارج الوطن. وتحتَ ملحمة المقاومة الفلسطينية في الوعي العربي وفي الوعي العالمي، بصمتها واحدة من أبرز حركات التحرر الوطني في هذا العصر.\(^{151}\)

Back translation: the PLO led the fights for its great people…and its legendary steadfastness in front of the mascaras and siege inside as well as outside the homeland…

It also appears in the Palestinian National Conciliation document – also known as the Palestinian Prisoners’ Document – which was drafted on 11 May 2006 by the Palestinian political prisoners in Israeli jails and detention centres as the basis for national conciliation and unity between the Palestinian factions. The following example shows this point:

> رفض وإدانة الحصار الظالم الذي تقوده الولايات المتحدة وإسرائيل على شعبنا ودعوة الأشقاء العرب شعبياً ورسمياً لدعم ومساندة الشعب الفلسطيني و�行 وسطه الوطني ودعوة الحكومات العربية للتنفيذ قرارات القمم العربية السياسية والمالية والاقتصادية والإعلامية الداعمة لشعبنا الفلسطيني وصموده وقضيته.\(^{152}\)

Back translation: To reject and condemn the unjust siege which the United States and Israel are leading against our people…

The term *al-hisār* appears in a number of speeches of the late Palestinian President and PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat, such as his speech before the 58th Commission on Human Rights in Geneva on 26 March 2002 and his speech on the second occasion of the second Palestinian intifada, *Al-Aqsa* on 28 September 2002, as the following two examples show:

> إن الشعب الفلسطيني يعاني من نير آخر احتلال عسكري مبقي في التاريخ، يعرض للحصار والقصف والدمار والإرهاب بشتى الوسائل. إن أرضا وبيوتنا ومحاصيلنا وأشجارنا وبيانا التحتية واقتصادنا وكل نمط من أنماط حياتنا أصبح هدفا للهجمات العسكرية الإسرائيلية المتوالية.\(^{153}\)


152. ‘The Palestinian Prisoners’ Document’ can be found on many websites such as the Palestinian Return centre website, published on 5 October 2009: [http://www.prc.org.uk/newsit/index/kitab/52-10-05-10-2009-315153.html](http://www.prc.org.uk/newsit/index/kitab/52-10-05-10-2009-315153.html) [last accessed: 24 November 2011].
Back translation: the Palestinian people are suffering from the last military occupation in history; it is exposed to siege, bombardment, destruction, assassination and terrorism in all ways...

Back translation: my people…I greet you from this siege. But, we – as Palestinians– do not care about siege...

The term *al-*hisār also appears in a number of the League of Arab States’ summit resolutions describing the living conditions of the Palestinians in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. The following two examples illustrate this point:

Back translation: the leaders stressed the necessity of ending the Israeli siege imposed on the Palestinian people.

Back translation: the council stresses its support to the Palestinian people and enhance its economic capabilities in confronting the Israeli siege and isolation policy.

Finally, *al-*hisār regularly appears in headlines of major Palestinian newspapers such as Al-Quds, as the following three examples show (relevant stretches underlines):

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\[\text{Figure 5.1: News Headline from Al-Quds Newspaper}\

تشكل لجنة عليا لمواجهة الحصار الإسرائيلي المفروض على قطاع غزة

(13 شباط 2008)\

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\[\text{Figure 5.2: News Headline from Al-Quds Newspaper}\

אسرائيل توافق على خطة لتخفيض الحصار جزئيا وتدرس فكرة مشاركة دولية في المراقبة على المعايير

(18حزيران 2010)\

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The Palestinians identify with the term al-hisār which summarizes their harsh living conditions under the oppressive Israeli military occupation. They have been using this term more frequently since the outbreak of the second Palestinian intifada, Al-Aqsa on 28 September 2000, to describe their feelings of entrapment, persecution and humiliation. More recently, al-hisār has been widely used by the Palestinians, Arabs, some Israeli human rights organizations such as B’Tselem as well as some members of the international community (e.g. peace activists, politicians, etc.) to describe the daily suffering of the Palestinians living in the Occupied Gaza Strip, which has been sealed off the from the outside world since the election of the Palestinian government led by the Palestinian faction, Hamas in 2007.

The term al-hisār also reminds the Palestinians of some key historical events in their long struggle against the Israeli military occupation – both outside and inside the Occupied Palestinian Territories – for example, the Israeli siege of Beirut (Arabic: ‘حصار بيروت’) in 1982 during which Israel forced the political leadership of the PLO out of Lebanon. Also, al-hisār brings to the Palestinian mind the Israeli siege of the Jenin Palestinian refugee camp (Arabic: ‘حصار مخيم جنين’) in which the Israeli army – as part of its military offensive “Operation Defensive Shield” in 2002 – laid siege to the camp for eleven days ending with the Israeli army killing “at least 52 Palestinians” – according to some estimates of the United Nations – and the entire camp being flattened by armored Israeli bulldozers.

157 The term ‘siege’ is used in many publications of B’Tselem to describe the situation in the Occupied Gaza Strip, for example, B’Tselem report ‘Gaza Strip, the Siege on Gaza’, B’Tselem Website, published on 1 January 2011: [http://www.btselem.org/gaza_strip/siege](http://www.btselem.org/gaza_strip/siege) [last accessed: 24 November 2011].

158 The Palestinians in the Occupied Gaza Strip and since the start of the Israeli blockade formed the ‘Popular Committee Against Siege’ which reports on the situation there and the various activities against the siege: [http://www.freegaza.ps/en/](http://www.freegaza.ps/en/) [last accessed: 24 November 2011].

159 The situation in Gaza is described in the United Nations ‘Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict’ – better known as ‘Goldstone Report’ – in English as ‘the blockade’. This term was translated officially by the United Nations into Arabic as ‘الحصار’ (al-hisār, lit. ‘the siege’). Goldstone’s report and related UN resolutions are available at: [http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/specialsession/9/FactFindingMission.htm](http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/specialsession/9/FactFindingMission.htm) [last accessed: 24 November 2011].

160 ‘Illegal Israeli actions in the Occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory: Report of the Secretary-General prepared pursuant to General Assembly resolution ES-10/10, United Nations website, published on 30 July 2002:
Finally, the *al-hisār* brings to mind the Israeli siege on the late Palestinian President Yasser Arafat in his compound in Ramallah (Arabic: ‘حصار عرفات’ ) on 29 March 2002 during the same Israeli military offensive – i.e. “Operation Defensive Shield” – that ended on 11 November 2004 with the assassination of the Palestinian president.

The Hebrew term used in the Peace Now translation ‘סגר’ , (seger, lit. ‘closure’) – whose Arabic equivalent is ‘الطوق الأمني’ (al-ṭawq al-amnī, lit. ‘the security ring’) – designates another of the illegal and controversial measures that Israel imposes on the Palestinian civilians in the occupied territories of the West Bank, where closures are routine particularly during periods of religious Jewish festivities. Indeed, since the outbreak of the second Palestinian intifada, *Al-Aqsa*, on 28 September 2000, the Palestinian cities, towns and villages have been under various types of curfews, sieges and closures (Koran 2004: 210).

The Israeli policy of *seger* or *al-ṭawq al-amnī* was first established in January 1991 as a “temporary measure during the Gulf War” (Saleh 2009: 19) and later “institutionalized” with the Oslo Accords (Farsakh 2000: 23). Closures involves “physically preventing Palestinians either permanently or temporarily from leaving or entering those areas under closure. This is achieved by placing cement blocks, boulders, banks of rubble or earth, or manned checkpoints on all the roads leading to the closed town or village” (Darcy 2003: 64).

Closures can be either internal or external. On the one hand, internal closures ban movement between and within the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. On the other hand, external closures closes off ‘the Green Line’, i.e. between the Occupied Territories and Israel altogether and renders it “illegal for any Palestinian to exit the region regardless of whether he or she held an entry permit” (Gordon 2008a: 39). ‘Closures’ – taken by the


Israeli army in the name of “security” (Darcy 2003: 64) – are viewed by several nongovernmental organizations as “a form of collective punishment in violation of Article 50 of the Hague Regulations and Article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention” (Darcy 2003: 64).

The next two Israeli policies to be examined are deportation of Palestinian civilians and “confiscation” of their private property. These two policies – which the Roadmap describes as “undermining trust” between the Palestinians and Israelis – were translated differently into Arabic and Hebrew as the following examples show:

(5.47) GOI takes no actions undermining trust, including deportations, attacks on civilians; confiscation and/or demolition of Palestinian homes and property, as a punitive measure or to facilitate Israeli construction; destruction of Palestinian institutions and infrastructure; and other measures specified in the Tenet work plan [The Roadmap Plan: 2].

[UN] لا تتخذ حكومة إسرائيل أي إجراءات لزعزعة الثقة بما في ذلك عمليات الترحيل وشن الهجمات ضد المدنيين; ومصادرة أو هدم المنازل والممتلكات الفلسطينية...
Back translation: Government of Israel does not take any measures to shake the trust including operations of deportation, waging attacks against the civilians and confiscation or/and demolition of Palestinian homes and property.

[IMFA] لا تقوم حكومة إسرائيل بأي أعمال لزعزعة الثقة بما في ذلك عمليات طرد وهجمات على مدنيين مصادرة أو/أو هدم منازل وممتلكات فلسطينية...
Back translation: The government of Israel does not make any actions to shake trust including the operations of expulsion, attacks on civilians and confiscation or/and demolition of Palestinian homes and property.

[USDS] لا تتخذ الحكومة الإسرائيلية أي إجراءات تقوض الثقة، بما في ذلك الترحيل والهجمات ضد المدنيين; ومصادرة و/أو هدم منازل واملاك فلسطينية.
Back translation: The Israeli government does not take any measures that undermine the trust including the deportation, the attacks on the civilians and confiscation or/and demolition of Palestinian homes and property.

[Almtym] لا تتخذ الحكومة إجراءات تضعف الثقة بما في ذلك عمليات الإبعاد و الهجوم على المدنيين و مصادرة منازل و ممتلكات الفلسطينيين.
Back translation: The government does not take measures that weaken trust including operations of deportation, the attack on the civilians, and confiscation of the homes and properties of the Palestinians.

[Al-Quds] لا تقوم حكومة إسرائيل بأي أعمال تقوف ثقة من بينها الإبعاد و هجمات المدنيين أو مصادرة و هدم المنازل والممتلكات الفلسطينية.
Back translation: Government of Israel will not do any action which could undermine trust including the deportation, attacking the civilians and confiscation or/and demolition of Palestinian homes and property.

[CNN] لن تقوم الحكومة الإسرائيلية بأي أعمال من شانها أن تقوف الثقة بما في ذلك الإبعاد والهجمات ضد المدنيين ومصادرة و هدم المنازل والممتلكات الفلسطينية.
Back translation: The Israeli government will not do any action which could undermine the trust including the deportation, attacks against the civilians and confiscation or/and demolition of Palestinian homes and property.

[The Knesset] ממשלת ישראל איננה נוקטת בתנועות העתקת או הפרדה, או פעילות אחרות של פלسطينים.
Government of Israel does not take actions which undermine trust including expulsions, attacks on civilians, expropriation/ or demolition homes and property of Palestinians.

Government of Israel is not taking steps which reduce trust including expulsion, attack on civilians, expropriation/ or demolition homes and property of Palestinians.

Government of Israel will not take actions which harm trust including expulsion, attacks on civilians, confiscation/ or demolition Palestinian homes and property.

The example above concerns the only occurrence of the term ‘deportation’ in the original source texts of the Palestinian-Israeli peace initiatives. This term is used only once in the English source text of the Roadmap, nevertheless, it is important. In the translations of Almtym, Al-Quds and CNN, the term ‘deportation’ was rendered as ‘الإبعاد’ (al-ib‘ād, lit. ‘the deportation’), whereas in the translations of the United Nations (UN) and the US Department of State (USDS), it was rendered as ‘الترحيل’ (al-tarḥīl) (which also means ‘deportation’). In the translation of Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (IMFA) it was rendered – following a meaning shift strategy as ‘الطرد’ (al-ṭard, lit. ‘the expulsion’).

Although the terms al-ib‘ād and al-tarḥīl are translated into English as ‘deportation’, they have different political connotations in Arabic. The Israeli policy of deporting Palestinian civilians – a violation of the international law and conventions, e.g. the Fourth Geneva Convention – is defined as “the compulsory departure of an individual from the country of which he or she is a national, and implies the compulsory loss of that person’s national rights” (Hiltermann 1986: 2). Hiltermann (1986: 2) further explains that in the case of the Palestinians who have no national rights, it means “being deprived of the right of residence in their homeland”. This idea of the deporting Palestinian nationals rather than individuals who have no right to their homeland is expressed in Arabic by the use of the term ‘الإبعاد’ (al-ib‘ād, lit. ‘the deportation’) rather than tarḥīl or al-ṭard.
Israel – a few weeks after and its occupation of the West Bank in 1967 – conducted a census and issued identity cards only to the Palestinians who were physically present at that time in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (Baramki 1992: 127). Israel considered those Palestinians as “foreign residents” rather than national citizens (Shiblak 1996: 40). Moreover, Israel considers this residency a privilege rather than a right (Baramki 1992: 127). In sum, Israel treats the Palestinians in the Occupied Palestinian Territories like immigrants and not like the indigenous population of the land – i.e. historic Palestine. This perhaps explains the use of the Arabic term ‘الطرد’ (al-ṭard, lit. ‘the expulsion’) in the translation of the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (IMFA) which is equivalent to the Hebrew term of ‘גירוש’ (girush, lit. ‘expulsion’) or the plural form of it – i.e. ‘גירושים’ (girushim, lit. ‘expulsions’) used in all the Hebrew translations above.

The Israeli policy of girush (lit. ‘expulsion’) – which is “euphemistically known as ‘transfer’ in Zionist literature” (Aruri 2011: 6) – has deep resonance in the Israeli-Zionist ideology, namely that Palestine claimed as “the land of Israel” is “a Jewish birthright and belongs exclusively to the Jewish people as a whole, and, consequently Palestinians are ‘strangers’ who should either accept Jewish sovereignty over land or depart” (Masalha 2007: 5). Such policy aims at emptying the land of its indigenous Palestinian population. For example, in 1948 the Zionist movement expelled an estimated 750,000 Palestinians of the indigenous population of historic Palestine and in that way achieved an overwhelmingly Jewish state (Finkelstein 2003: xi). Moreover, five out of the eleven Palestinian cities that fell to the Israeli control in 1948 – namely, Safad, Majdal, Tiberiade, Beisa and Beer-Saba’ – “were completely depopulated, reducing their inhabitants to uprooted, homeless, and penniless refugees” (Abdel Jawad 2006: 90).

Al-ib’ād – a term that belongs to the Palestinian political lexicon – is used by Palestinian people, rather than the terms al-tarḥil or al-ṭard, to de-legitimize the Israeli policy of deportation and to emphasize its illegal status. This term – i.e. al-ib’ād regularly appears – for example, in the headlines of major Palestinian newspapers such as Al-Quds and Al-Ayyam as the following examples show (relevant lexical items underlined):

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163 The concept of ‘transfer’ refers to “the idea of expelling the Palestinian citizens of today’s Israel in order to achieve an ‘ethnically pure’ Jewish state, and/or to the idea of expelling the entire Palestinian population to the East of the Jordan River in order to secure a Jewish ‘greater Israel’” (Emerson and Tocci 2003: 32).


212
The choice of the term *al-tarḥīl* in the United Nations Arabic translation is of particular interest. Goldstein (2005: 208) points out that the Israeli policy of deportations “have prompted the adoption of more critical U.N. Security Council resolutions than any other Israeli abuse”. Indeed, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted 11 resolutions precisely on the issue of Israel’s policy of deportation of Palestinian civilians. These resolutions are 468 (1980), 469 (1980), 484 (1980), 607 (1988), 608 (1988), 636 (1989), 641 (1989), 694 (1991), 726 (1992) and 799 (1992), besides resolution 681 (1990) which contained a paragraph on Israeli deportation. When comparing the English and Arabic language versions of these UN resolutions with regard to the Israeli policy of deporting Palestinian civilians, it turns out that in the UNSC resolutions 468, 469 and 484 – the term ‘expulsion’ rather than ‘deportation’ was used to describe Israel’s policy. This term – i.e. ‘expulsion’ – is translated by the UN into Arabic – following a literal translation strategy – as the term “الطرد” (al-ṭard) as in the following example:

(ST) Calls again upon the Government of Israel, as occupying Power, to rescind the illegal measures taken by the Israeli military occupation authorities in expelling the Mayors of Hebron and Halhoul and the Sharia Judge of Hebron, and to facilitate the immediate return of the expelled Palestinian leaders, so that they can resume their functions for which they were elected and

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Goldstein (2005: 207) notes that Israel has deported more than 1,000 Palestinians between 1967 and 1987 and another sixty-six in the first five years of the first Palestinian intifada. During the second Palestinian intifada – and after a siege at Bethlehem’s Church of Nativity in April and May 2002 – Israel deported thirteen Palestinians to Europe and twenty-six to Gaza (ibid: 207).
These three UNSC resolutions (i.e. 468, 469 and 484), concern the deportation of the Mayors of the Palestinian cities of Hebron and Halhoul and of the Sharia Judge of Hebron.

In the rest of the UNSC resolutions on the issue of Israel’s policy of deporting Palestinian civilians – and after the outbreak of the Palestinian intifada on 9 December 1987 – the term ‘deportation’ replaced the term ‘expulsion’. This term – i.e. ‘deportation’ – was translated in the UNSC Resolutions 607 and 608 as al-tarḥil whereas in UNSC resolutions 636, 641, 694, 726, 799 and 681 as al-ib‘ād. The following two examples show this point:

(ST) Calls upon Israel to rescind the order to deport Palestinian civilians and to ensure the safe and immediate return to the occupied Palestinian territories of those already deported:

UN: يطلب الى اسرائيل الغاء أمر ترحيل المدنيين الفلسطينيين، و كفالة العودة الامنة و الفورية الى الأراضي الفلسطينية المحتلة لمن تم ترحيلهم بالفعل.

(ST) Having learned with deep concern that Israel, the occupying Power, in contravention of its obligations under the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, deported to Lebanon on 17 December 1992, hundreds of Palestinian civilians from the territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem;

UN: قد علم ببالغ القلق أن إسرائيل، السلطة القائمة بالاحتلال، قد أبعدت إلى لبنان، يوم ٣٧ كانون أول/ديسمبر ١٩٩٣، مندات من المدنيين الفلسطينيين من الأرض التي تحتلها منذ ١٩٧٦، بما فيها القدس، من بني يهوه، حيث يشير ذلك النزام إلى التزامات جنوب المضيق لعام ١٩٤٩،

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Deportation of Palestinians civilians “was one of the most contested weapons used by Israel against suspected political activists” (Goldstein 2005: 208). The largest single Israeli deportation of Palestinian civilians occurred on 17 December 1992 when Israel – in an unprecedented step – deported 418 Palestinian civilians allegedly for being Hamas activists from the Occupied West Bank and the Gaza Strip to Marj al-Zuhur in South Lebanon. The following day of this Israeli mass deportation, the United Nations Security Council condemned this Israeli action and unanimously adopted the UNSC Resolution 799.

The third Israeli policy to be discussed is the ‘confiscation’ of Palestinian private land. However, the more accurate term to describe such a policy is ‘expropriation’, as other than it indicates political motivation behind such a process, it also “signifies various arbitrary decisions on land seizure in Palestine by the Israeli authorities, especially in the early years of the state and specifically after the immediate termination of military hostilities” (Falah 2004: 958).

The struggle to control land is the most significant aspect of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict (Fischbach 2005: 291). Israel has been controlling land in the Occupied Palestinian Territories through the process of expropriation.

In Arabic, and in the context of land, both terms ‘confiscation’ and ‘expropriation’ are translated into Arabic as ‘مصادرة’ (muṣādarah), which is used in all Arabic translations above. On the other hand, in Hebrew, the Israeli control of private Palestinian land is usually referred to as ‘הפרה’ (hafka’ah, lit. ‘expropriation’) rather than ‘החרמה’ (hahramah, lit. ‘confiscation’).

One of the differences between hafka’ah (expropriation) and hahramah (confiscation) is that the former involves the payment of compensation (Somanath 2011: 539). According to

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the Israeli Land (Acquisition for Public Purposes) Ordinance of 1943, the person whose land has been expropriated for “public purposes” is entitled to compensation; nevertheless, no compensation has ever been paid to Palestinians (Schmidt 2001: 522).

The other difference between the *hafka‘ah* and *hahramah* is with regard to the history and politics of the term *hafka‘ah* which the term *hahramah* lacks. Expropriation is defined as “seizure of private property by the government” (Sharan 2005: 230). Since 1948, Israel has been expropriating private Palestinian land and property by a means of dozens of military orders (e.g. ‘Military Order 59’ – Order Concerning Government Properties – of 1967 and ‘Military Order 364’ of December 1969)\(^{174}\) and legislations. Ashmore (1997: 131) explains these legislations as follows:

\[\text{[A] 1948 law authorized seizure of “uncultivated” land; a 1949 law permitted expropriation of land for “security” reasons; a 1950 law transferred property from “absentees” to the state… a 1953 law legitimized all previous confiscations of land.}\]

The latest major case in this context occurred on 9 January 2011 when Israel demolished a four-story building known as the Shepherd Hotel in the Palestinian neighbourhood of Sheikh Jarrah in Occupied East Jerusalem in order to build 20 Jewish settlement units in its place. This hotel “was once the headquarters of Hajj Amin al-Husseini, mufti of Jerusalem and Arab nationalist leader during British rule of Palestine (Gorenberg 2009). Israel confiscated this hotel following its occupation of East Jerusalem in 1967 under the “Custodian of Absentee property” and then sold it in the mid-1980s to “a corporation owned by American millionaire Irving Moskowitz, the financial angel of far-right Israeli groups intent on settling Jews in Palestinian neighborhoods inside and encircling the Old City” (Gorenberg 2009).

The other two main pretexts for Israeli expropriation of Palestinian property are “security” and use for “public purposes”. The Israeli military commander has full authority to declare specific areas “closed areas”, generally on “security” grounds. This effectively means that Palestinian owners cannot enter to farm their land. After three successive years, the area can then be declared “state land” and confiscated; many Jewish settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territories have been erected on land expropriated in this way (Dajani 1994: 12).

\(^{174}\) These two specific orders provided the Israeli military administration authorization to “possess and dispose of all government property” of the former Jordanian government in the West Bank and oversee state lands in the Gaza Strip (Dajani 1994: 12).
Since the late 1950s, the Land (Acquisition for Public Purposes) Ordinance (1943) has been the main tool for expropriating Palestinian land and “turning it over to Jewish settlement and development” (Hussein and McKay 2003: 86). This legislation – introduced by the British Mandate administration – allows the expropriation of private Palestinian land in the public interest; however, Israel “has implemented this legislation in a highly discriminatory and arbitrary manner” (Hussein and McKay 2003: 86). Schmidt (2001: 522) explains that this is because the Palestinians:

Were, are and will never be considered as the “public” and the claim that expropriations are intended to serve a “public” purpose is accurate only if the “public” for whom it is justifiable to harm Palestinian property rights consists entirely of Jews.

5.6.6 Future Relations between Arab States and Israel

The nature of future relations between Arab states and Israel has traditionally been a matter of dispute and controversy. Arab states prefer the term ‘normal relations’ to ‘normalization’ as they regard the latter “an instrument of Israeli penetration and domination” (Shamir 2004) – i.e. Israel with its strong economy would swallow the weaker Arab economies and then control the region politically. For its part, Israel favours ‘normalisation’ of relations with Arab states as part of the “peace process” (Massoud 2000: 340). Israel understands ‘normalization’ as “the creation of economic, cultural, and social relationships between the two peoples. Such a relationship creates a web of a mutual economic interests built on joint projects in the fields of tourism, transportation, energy, and infrastructure, as well as by joint investments in business ventures” (Sneh 2005: 29). Israel claims that ‘normalization’ of relations is “the ultimate test of sincerity of peace overtures and readiness for stable peace” (Shamir 2004) as well as “the most solid guarantee that peace will be irreversible” (Sneh 2005: 29).

The term ‘normalisation’ has very different connotations in Hebrew, Arabic and English. While it is considered neutral by speakers of English, it is considered as positive by speakers of Hebrew and as negative by speakers of Arabic. In English, ‘normalisation’ describes relations between countries which have hostilities and wish to end these hostilities and establish normal relations. In Hebrew, there was no word for ‘normalisation’ and that is why “normalizatzia soon caught on in Israel” (Cohen 2001: 73). This Hebrew term has a familiar ring to another Hebrew foreign loan word ‘normali’ (lit. ‘normal’) (Cohen 2002: 73). Normalisation (Hebrew: ‘נורמליזציה’) refers to the kind of relations Israel has always been looking to have with the Arab states in the Middle East. The Arabic term
The term ‘normalisation’ was not opted for at all in any of the peace initiatives – i.e. the original source texts in the corpus. Instead, the term ‘full normal relations’ was used, such as in the Arab Peace Initiative and the Roadmap Plan. This specific choice can be explained with regard to the history and sensitivity of the term ‘normalisation’ in the context of the Middle East conflict as explained above. The implications of these connotational differences are illustrated in the following example:

(5.48) Arab state acceptance of full normal relations with Israel and security for all the states of the region in the context of a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace [The Roadmap Plan: 5].

[USDS] قبول الدول العربية إقامة علاقات طبيعية كاملة مع إسرائيل …

Back translation: The acceptance of the Arab states to establish full normal relations with Israel…

[CNN] تقبل الدول العربية بتطبيع كامل للعلاقات مع إسرائيل …

Back translation: The Arab states accept full normalisation of relations with Israel…

[The Knesset] הסכמה של מדינות ערב להשתתף棕色 מלחמת קשה עם ישראל …

Back translation: The acceptance of Arab states of full normalisation of relations with Israel…

[Yedioth Aharonot] מדינות ערב יקבלו את היחסים המלאים והנורמליים עם ישראל …

Back translation: Arab states will accept the full and normal relations with Israel…

All Arabic translations rendered the phrase ‘full normal relations’ literally, except for the CNN version that used a meaning shift strategy and opted for ‘تطبيع’ (lit. ‘normalisation’). Among the Hebrew translations, only the Knesset version chose not to translate this term literally, replacing it instead with the term preferred in Israel ‘normalizezit’ (lit. ‘normalisation’).

5.7 Addition of Information

In Chapter Four, addition of information was examined at the macro-structural level. In this section, it will be examined at the micro-structural level. Detailed analysis of the corpus showed that cases of addition of information occurred in translations of two non-governmental organizations and one Palestinian newspaper. These are the Arabic translations of the Gush-Shalom Declaration of Principles for Peace Agreement published by Gush-Shalom and the Hebrew translation of the Arab Peace Initiative published by
Peace Now in addition to the Arabic translation of the Roadmap Plan published by *Al-Quds* newspaper.

The Arabic translation of the Gush-Shalom Declaration of Principles for Peace Agreement includes two cases of addition of information which concern two of the final-status issues of the conflict: firstly, the Jewish settlements and secondly, the Palestinian refugees. The added information in the Arabic language version in the two examples below reflects the Palestinian negotiating positions with regard to these issues, namely that all Jewish settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territories are illegal and that any resolution of the refugees issue should be resolved according to the UN resolution 194:

(5.49) [The Gush-Shalom Declaration of Principles for Peace Agreement: 3]

Back translation: According to the fourth Geneva Convention and the UN resolutions, all settlements built in the area occupied in 1967 are considered illegal. Those settlers who reside in the settlements located in the area that will be transferred to the state of Palestine will be evacuated before the end of the Israeli occupation.

(5.50) [The Gush-Shalom Declaration of Principles for Peace Agreement: 4]

Back translation: according to this right, each refugee will be given the option to choose...

Furthermore, the Hebrew translation of the Arab Peace Initiative, authored by Professor Ilai Alon and published by Peace Now, had seventeen cases of addition of information. These additions, with other recontextualization strategies, had a double aim: on the one hand, presenting a clear non-ambiguous text to the Israeli reader and, on the other, showing the language expertise and academic competence of the translator (cf. Chapter 6.2.3). Added information concerns the adding of subjects and objects where they are implicit in sentences. The following examples illustrate this point:
The council asks Israel to reconsider its policies and to incline to peace declaring that the just peace is also its strategic option. Also demands it to do the following:

- The council asks from Israel to reconsider its policy, to incline to peace and to declare that the just peace is also its strategic option. Also asks [Peace Now] from Israel to fulfil the following [demands]:

Finally, one case of addition of information is found in the Arabic translation of the *Al-Quds* newspaper. This addition of information concerns the issue of the rebuilding the Palestinian security forces, as in the following example:
In this example, the addition of the Arabic adjective المتبقيّة (al-mutabaqiyyah, lit. ‘the remaining ones’) is particularly interesting. The Palestinian Authority (PA) – according to the Roadmap Plan – is required to resume security cooperation with their counterparts in the “IDF” (“Israel Defense Forces”) and fight “terror” organizations. In order to do so, the PA needs sufficient security forces with good infrastructure. However, during the second Palestinian intifada, Al-Aqsa which broke out on 28 September 2000 and particularly after 2001, the Israeli army steadily escalated its attacks on the infrastructure of the Palestinian Authority, particularly its security infrastructure (Cordesman 2006: 81). These attacks reached their peak when Israel waged a full-scale military offensive, “Operation Defensive Shield”, in 2002 during which its army systematically and effectively destroyed the Palestinian security forces and their infrastructure (Esposito 2005: 87; Ghanem 2007: 59). This is why the Roadmap Plan talks about the re-building of these forces. Against this backdrop, the addition of the adjective al-mutabaqiyyah is highly evaluative as it implicitly blames Israel for destroying something that has to be rebuilt.

5.8 Omission of Information

Detailed analysis of corpus showed that patterns of omission of information are only found in the translations of mass media: three newspapers, two Israeli (Ha’aretz and Yedioth Aharonot) and one Palestinian (Al-Quds) in addition to one news agency, CNN. Omission of information occurred mainly with regard to the final-status issues of the conflict at the level of word, phrase and sentence. In the following sub-sections, these cases of omission of information will be discussed focusing on their political and ideological implications.

5.8.1 Omissions in Translations Published by Ha’aretz Newspaper

The Israeli newspaper Ha’aretz published three Hebrew translations of three peace initiatives: the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles, the Arab Peace Initiative and the Roadmap Plan. These three translations had eighteen cases of omission of information, which will be examined and commented on in the following sub-sections.
Omissions in the Translation of the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles

With regard to the Hebrew translation of the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles, the two cases of omission of information found concern the phrases ‘agreed upon’ and ‘without mutual consent’ as in the two following examples:

(5.55) Border modifications will be based upon an equitable and agreed-upon territorial exchange (1:1) in accordance with the vital needs of both sides, including security, territorial continuity and demographic considerations [Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles: 1].

[Ha’aretz] תיקוני גבול יתבססו על חילופי שטחים שוויוניים (יחס של 1:1), בהתחשב לцовיםAnimal.

The omission of the term ‘agreed-upon’ in the above example perhaps does not have any serious political significance. However, it does in other contexts (see example 5.64 below).

The second case of omission in the Ha’aretz Hebrew translation of the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles concerns the issue of archaeological excavations in or underneath the holy sites in Jerusalem as in the following example:

(5.56) Neither side will exercise sovereignty over holy places. The State of Palestine will be designated Guardian of al-Haram al-Sharif for the benefit of Muslims. Israel will be Guardian of the Western Wall for the benefit of the Jewish people. The status quo on Christian holy sites will be maintained. No excavation will take place in or underneath the holy sites without mutual consent [Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles: 1].


The omission of the phrase ‘without mutual consent’ in the above translation can be explained keeping in mind that this Hebrew translation was based on the Arabic translation of the People’s Campaign for Peace and Democracy (PCPD), which also omitted this phrase. In other words, the omission of this phrase occurred originally in the Arabic translation of the People’s Campaign for Peace and Democracy (PCPD) – whose ‘main addressees’ are Palestinian readers in the Occupied Palestinian Territories – and was then preserved in the Ha’aretz Hebrew translation. This phrase was also deleted in all the Arabic and Hebrew translations of the initiative except in the Hebrew translation published by the National Consensus. The Arabic translation published by Al-Quds newspaper, which was based on the Hebrew translation of Ha’aretz newspaper, includes other cases of
omission of important information (see sub-section on Omission of Information in Translation published by Al-Quds newspaper below).

The omission of the phrase ‘without mutual consent’ is in the Palestinian political interest, namely, that no archaeological excavations be allowed in or underneath the holy sites in Jerusalem, particularly al-Ḥaram al-Sharīf. In the context of competing Palestinian and Israeli narratives and exclusive political claims in Jerusalem, archaeology and archaeological excavations – other than they tell “the story of the country” (Glock 1994: 71) – can also provide “hard evidence” to validate such claims (Ross 2007: 164).

The first Israeli excavations in Jerusalem began following the June 1967 war and for many years on the south and south western slopes of al-Ḥaram al-Sharīf in February 1968 (Abu El-Haj 1998: 168). From the standpoint of the Israelis, archaeology played an important role in Israel’s foreign image and foreign policy, presenting “the Jewish state in revival, investigating its past with the tools of science” (Hallote and Joffe 2002: 87). In other words, archaeology is closely linked to their “nation-state building” (Abu El-Haj 2001: 1) and in emphasizing and producing the “eternal link of the Jewish people with the city of Jerusalem” (Ricca 2007: 65).

The Palestinians, on the other hand, do not view Israeli excavations in Occupied East Jerusalem – particularly in or underneath al-Ḥaram al-Sharīf – in their interest due to the fact that the Israelis control Jerusalem and are “able to expropriate, excavate, label, and describe antiquities there as they please. They can thus put the stamp of authority on narratives that give extraordinary weight to selected strata, thereby successfully manipulating both the spatial and temporal aspects of identity, in pursuit of a clear nationalist political agenda” (Khalidi 1997: 18). The Palestinians believe that the Israeli archaeological excavations – while giving careful attention to the validation of a Jewish presence in Jerusalem – “distorts” and “diminishes” the notion of uninterrupted Arab presence in the city (Rajjal 2005: 42). They also believe that Israel uses excavations and diggings, particularly, in or underneath al-Ḥaram al-Sharīf, to search for “the ruins of the Second Temple or to build a prayer area” (Ross 2003: 198). Finally, they who have been protesting and opposing these excavations since they began in 1967 (Klein 2001: 274) believe that these excavations are undermining the walls of the al-Ḥaram al-Sharīf and would ultimately cause the collapse of the al-Aqsa Mosque (Gonen 2003: 161).
The Israeli archaeological excavations in Jerusalem have always been a major source of religious and political tensions between the Palestinians and Israelis. In September 1996, the newly elected Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, ordered the opening of the “Western Wall tunnel” (Silberman 2001: 500) which “ran alongside the Western Wall and the Haram Al-Sharif to the Muslim Quarter” (Ma’oz 2009: 104). Consequently, violent confrontations erupted between the Palestinians and the Israeli army in Occupied East Jerusalem which later spread to cities, towns and refugee camps throughout the Occupied Palestinian Territories (Abu El-Haj 2001: 228). These violent confrontations resulted in hundreds of Palestinian civilians killed and injured (Silberman 2001: 500).

Another example concerns the Palestinian village of Silwan in Occupied East Jerusalem. Israel claims that this village – with a population of 30,000 Palestinians – is the site “where King David founded his city” (Friedland and Hecht 2000: 436). The Israeli municipality of Jerusalem plans to demolish more than 88 Palestinian homes in the Al-Bustan neighbourhood of Silwan in order to create an “archaeological park” (Shulman 2007: 92). On 7 September 2011, Israel finished the digging of a new tunnel – 600 meters long – reaching from Silwan to al-Aqsa Mosque. What reactions such practices will yield in the future remains to be seen.

Archaeological excavations and naming practices (cf. Chapter 5.3.2) are two closely linked practices in the sense that they are both used to validate claims of exclusive ownership in the Old City of Occupied Jerusalem.

Omissions in the Translation of the Roadmap Plan

The Hebrew translation of the Roadmap Plan shows three cases of omission of information: the lexical items ‘reciprocal’ and ‘fully’ and one whole sentence as in the following examples:

(5.57) The following is a performance-based and goal-driven roadmap, with clear phases, timelines, target dates, and benchmarks aiming at progress through reciprocal steps by the two parties in the political, security, economic, humanitarian, and institution-building fields, under the auspices of the Quartet [the United States, European Union, United Nations, and Russia] [The Roadmap Plan: 1].

Back ...which aim at bringing progress with the help of steps by the two sides...
GOI fully facilitates travel of Palestinian officials for PLC and Cabinet sessions, internationally supervised security retraining, electoral and other reform activity, and other supportive measures related to the reform efforts [The Roadmap Plan: 3].

The government of Israel allows the travel of Palestinian officials...

Implementation, as previously agreed, of U.S. rebuilding, training and resumed security cooperation plan in collaboration with outside oversight board (U.S.–Egypt–Jordan). Quartet support for efforts to achieve a lasting, comprehensive cease-fire [The Roadmap Plan: 3].

The stipulations in Ha’aretz translation – as in the two examples above – correspond to what came in the first draft of the Roadmap Plan on 15 October 2002. The first draft of the Roadmap Plan – issued on 15 October 2002 – lacked any description of implementation mechanisms. The addition of the phrase “through reciprocal steps” in the final draft of the plan removed ambiguity of how to implement this plan and emphasized that both sides needed to carry out their obligations reciprocally. Also, the first draft of the Roadmap stipulated that Israel “facilitates travel of Palestinian officials for PLC sessions, internationally supervised security retraining, and other PA business without restriction”.

This requirement was further emphasized in the final draft of the Roadmap with the addition of the adverb “fully”. The omission of this adverb in the Ha’aretz translation leaves the issue of facilitating travel for Palestinian officials at the hands of the Israeli government. The third case concerns the omission of one whole sentence which points to the role of the Quartet in achieving peace between the Palestinians and Israelis as in the following example:

Implementation, as previously agreed, of U.S. rebuilding, training and resumed security cooperation plan in collaboration with outside oversight board (U.S.–Egypt–Jordan).

Omissions in the Translation of Arab Peace Initiative

The Ha’aretz translation of the Arab Peace Initiative shows thirteen cases of omission of information at the levels of both word and phrase. At the word level, two adjectives were

omitted. The omitted information removes reference to the occupied territories as ‘Arab’ or ‘Syrian’ as in the following example:

(5.60) 
الانسحاب الكامل من الأراضي العربية المحتلة بما في ذلك الجولان السوري وحتى خط الرابع من يونيو (حزيران) 1967.

[The Arab Peace Initiative: 1]

Back translation: full withdrawal from the Arab occupied territories including the Syrian Golan until the lines of the 4 June 1967 as well as the remaining occupied Lebanese territories in the south of Lebanon.

[Ha’aretz] Back translation: To agree to withdrawal from all the territories, which were occupied in 67, including the Golan and the territories in southern Lebanon, which are still under Israeli occupation.

At phrase level, nine cases were found. In some of these cases, as in the following two examples, omitted information could be argued to be not important to the Israeli reader.

(5.61) 
وانطلاقا من اقتناع الدول العربية بأن الحل العسكري للنزاع لم يحقق السلام أو الأمن لأي طرف من الأطراف.

[The Arab Peace Initiative: 1]

Back translation: emanating from the conviction of the Arab states that the military solution to the conflict achieved neither peace nor security to any party.

[Ha’aretz] Back translation: The decision taken was based on the conviction that there will not be a military solution to the conflict.

(5.62) 
مجلس جامعة الدول العربية على مستوى القمة المنعقد في دورته العادية الرابعة عشر. إذ يؤكد ما أقره مؤتمر القمة العربي غير العادي في القاهرة في يونيو 1996 من أن السلام العادل والشامل خيار استراتيجي للدول العربية يتحقق في ظل الشرعية الدولية ويستوجب التزاما مقابلا توعده إسرائيل في هذا الصدد.

[The Arab Peace Initiative: 1]

Back translation: the council of the League of Arab States at the Summit level at its 14th ordinary session reaffirms the resolution taken in June 1996 at the Cairo Extra-ordinary Arab summit that a just and comprehensive peace in the Middle East...

[Ha’aretz] Back translation: The council of the League of Arab States reaffirms the resolution taken in June 1996 at the Arab summit in Cairo that a true peace in the Middle East...

(5.63) 
وبعد أن استمع إلى كلمة صاحب السمو الملكي الأمير عبد الله بن عبد العزيز ولي عهد المملكة العربية السعودية التي أعلن من خلالها مبادرته.

[The Arab Peace Initiative: 1]

Back translation: having listened to the statement made by his royal highness Prince Abdullah Bin Abdullaziz, the crown Prince of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in which he presented his initiative...

[Ha’aretz] Back translation: Representatives of the states listened to the statement of the Prince Abdullah, regarding normal relations between Israel and the Arab states in return of full withdrawal from the Arab territories, which were occupied since June 1967.
By contrast, in some other cases, omissions have serious political implications. Examine the following three examples:

(5.64) [The Arab Peace Initiative: 1]

Back translation: to reach a just and agreed upon solution to the Palestinian refugees problem according to the UN General Assembly resolution 194.

[Ha’aretz] למסכים לאחרי צדק ושלום הפלסטינים לפי ההを持っている של האו"ם. To agree to just solution to Palestinian refugees according to resolution 194 of the UN General Assembly.

The phrasing of the proposed solution to the Palestinian refugees problem in the Arab Peace Initiative as “to be agreed upon” is of significant political importance. This phrasing represents a turning point in the long-time position of the League of Arab States vis-à-vis the right of return of the Palestinian refugees. The League of Arab States has always maintained the position that the Palestinian refugees problem must be resolved in accordance with the UN General Assembly resolution 194 of 11 December 1948 which “called on Israel to facilitate the return of the refugees and compensate those who did not wish to return” (Massoud 2000: 342). Before the drafting of the Arab Peace Initiative, this position was not open for any negotiations with Israel but to be implemented as it is – i.e. full return of Palestinian refugees to their homes in now Israel. The following three excerpts from previous Arab summit resolutions illustrate this point:

(ST) حل مشكلة اللاجئين الفلسطينيين وفقا لقرار الجمعية العامة للأمم المتحدة رقم 194 (1948). (ST) To resolve the Palestinian refugees problem According to the UN General Assembly resolution 194 (1948).

Back translation: To resolve the Palestinian refugees problem according to the UN General Assembly resolution 194 (1948).

(ST) مطالبة المجتمع الدولي بالعمل على وضع حد لهجرة اليهود إلى فلسطين والأراضي العربية المحتلة وضمان جميع الحقوق الوطنية للشعب الفلسطيني بما في ذلك حقه في العودة تنفيذا لقرار الجمعية العامة لعام 194 لعام 1948. (ST) …and guarantee of all national rights of the Palestinian people including its right of return translation: in implementation of the UN General Assembly resolution 194 (1948).


The addition of the term 'yutafaqu ‘alayhi, lit. ‘to be agreed upon’) in this initiative – and in resolutions of the League of Arab States from 2001 onwards on the issue of the Palestinian refugees (e.g. Arab Summits in Algeria 2005, Riyadh 2007, Damascus 2008) – thus marks a dramatic change in the sixty-year-old Arab political position on this issue. This term was meant to show the political pragmatism of the Arab states with regard to this issue. That is to say, any solution to this problem is something to be agreed on between all parties concerned, (e.g. the PLO, Israel and the Arab host countries of the Palestinian refugees). Therefore, for the first time in the history of the conflict, Israel would have a say or a veto in this matter.

The omission of the term  yutafaqu ‘alayhi (lit. ‘to be agreed upon’) in the Hebrew translation of Ha’aretz portrays the Arab Peace Initiative as nothing new in the traditional Arab position on the refugees issue. The omission of this term in a number of Hebrew translations of the Arab Peace Initiative led to the drafting of other alternative translations which aimed to show the true elements of the initiative (e.g. Alon’s translation published by Peace Now, cf. Chapter 4.4.3).

In the second example below, ending the conflict between Israel and the Arab states does not necessarily mean concluding peace agreements between them. It could mean perhaps just ending the hostilities between these states and going from the state of war to the state of ‘no war’ only.

The third example below concerns one of the fundamental requirements of the Arab Peace Initiative to end the Arab-Israeli conflict, i.e. the establishment of the Palestinian state with
East Jerusalem as its capital. In the *Ha’aretz* translation, the explicit reference to East Jerusalem as the capital of the future Palestinian state was deleted. The phrase ‘במזרח ירושלים’ (be Mizrah Yerushalayim, lit. ‘in East Jerusalem’) could mean anywhere in East Jerusalem. In fact, there have been some Israeli proposals in the past to have the capital of the future Palestinian state in the town of Abu Dies, which is “outside the Jerusalem boundary of the British mandate, inside the U.N partition’s Jerusalem, outside of Jordanian East Jerusalem during period 1949-67, and straddling the line separating the post-June 1967 expanded Jerusalem from the West Bank” (Klinghoffer 2006: 38).

5.8.2 Omissions in Translations Published by *Yediot Aharonot* Newspaper

The Israeli newspaper *Yediot Aharonot* published two Hebrew translations: one of the Roadmap Plan and one of the Arab Peace Initiative. The translation of the Roadmap Plan shows omission of information with regard to the issue of the Jewish settlements and settlement outposts, as shown below.

(5.67) **GOI immediately dismantles** settlement outposts erected since March 2001 [The Roadmap Plan: 4].

[**Yediot Aharonot**]

Back: **Government of Israel will dismantle** the settlement outposts, which were erected since March 2001.

The *Yediot Aharonot* translation, unlike other Hebrew translations of the Roadmap, removes any reference to the timeframe set for the dismantling of settlement outposts in the Roadmap text (i.e. ‘immediately’). This results in a new requirement, different from what is stipulated in the original source text of the Roadmap. This new requirement corresponds to what came in the first draft of the Roadmap Plan on 15 October 2002, namely that “GOI [government of Israel] dismantles settlement outposts erected since establishment of the present Israeli government and in contravention of current Israeli
government guidelines”. The adverb ‘immediately’ was added in the final draft of the Roadmap Plan based on a Palestinian demand (Saeb Erikat, personal communication 2005).

Far from being an oversight, this deletion is consistent with other omissions elsewhere in the Yediot Aharonot version. This is the case, for instance, with the deletion of a fragment under the ‘Phase II: Transition – June 2003-December 2003’ of the Roadmap, as part of a stipulation on Israel’s contribution to the agreement on permanent borders. The omitted fragment (underlined below) confirms the interest of the Yediot Aharonot translator(s) in downplaying the role of settlement outposts in the peace process:

(5.68) Creation of an independent Palestinian state with provisional borders through a process of Israeli-Palestinian engagement, launched by the international conference. As part of this process, implementation of prior agreements, to enhance maximum territorial contiguity including further action on settlements in conjunction with establishment of a Palestinian state with provisional borders, Enhanced international role in monitoring transition, with the active, sustained, and operational support of the Quartet. (Roadmap Plan, Phase II: Transition – June 2003-December 2003.

The political importance of the deleted sentence is that it touches on the main principle of the Roadmap Plan, i.e. the ‘two-state’ solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The Roadmap Plan proposes the creation of an independent Palestinian state with provisional borders. The viability of such a state depends on territorial contiguity between its parts in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. In order to achieve this territorial contiguity, ‘implementation of prior agreements’ and ‘further action on settlements’ is required. These two measures have serious implications for the size of the proposed Palestinian state and its viability. The omission of this information reduces Israel’s obligations according to the Roadmap Plan to only what is required in phase (I) of the plan, i.e. a freeze of ‘settlement activity’ and dismantlement of ‘settlement outposts’.

5.8.3 Omissions in Translations Published by Al-Quds Newspaper

The Palestinian newspaper, Al-Quds published two Arabic translations: one of the Roadmap Plan and one of the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles. Omission of

information appears only in three cases in the translation of the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles. These are related to the issues of land and Jerusalem, as shown in the following three examples:

(5.69) Border modifications will be based upon an equitable and agreed-upon territorial exchange (1:1) in accordance with the vital needs of both sides, including security, territorial continuity and demographic considerations [Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles: 1].

[Al-Quds] التغييرات الحدودية ستقوم على أساس تبادل الاراضي بشكل متساو بنسبة 1:1، وفقًا للأعراف الحيوية للطرفين، بما في ذلك الأمان وال التواصل الاقليمي و الاعتبارات الديمغرافية.

Back translation:

(5.70) Arab neighbourhoods in Jerusalem will come under Palestinian sovereignty, Jewish neighbourhoods under Israeli sovereignty [Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles: 1].

[Al-Quds] Omission

(5.71) Neither side will exercise sovereignty over holy places. The State of Palestine will be designated Guardian of al-Haram al-Sharif for the benefit of Muslims. Israel will be Guardian of the Western Wall for the benefit of the Jewish people. The status quo on Christian holy sites will be maintained. No excavation will take place in or underneath the holy sites without mutual consent [Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles: 1].

[Al-Quds] لايكون لاي طرف سيدا على الاماكن المقدسة الدولة الفلسطينية توصف كوصية على الحرم الشريف لصالح المسلمين، و اسرائيل توصف كوصية على الجدار الغربي لصالح الشعب اليهودي و يجري الحفاظ على الوضع الراهن في موضوع الاماكن المسيحية المقدسة. و لا تجري أي حفريات داخل الاماكن المقدسة أو في نطاقها.

All underlined information in the above three examples was omitted in the translation of Al-Quds newspaper. These omissions can be linked to the conditions of text production of this specific translation. This translation was based on the Hebrew translation published by the Israeli newspaper Ha’aretz. The implications of these omissions are the same as the ones explained in (5.6.1). The issue of translations based on other translations and their implications in the institutional context of newspapers will be discussed in Chapter 6.1.2.

5.8.4 Omissions in Translations Published by CNN

CNN published two Arabic translations: one of the Arab Peace Initiative and one of the Roadmap Plan. Omission of information occurred only in the translation of the Arab Peace Initiative. This translation had three paragraphs omitted at the macro-structural level (cf. Chapter 4.5.3). At the micro-structural level, one whole sentence was omitted as the following example shows:

(5.72) وانطلاقا من اقناع الدول العربية بأن الحل العسكري للنزاع لم يحقق السلام أو الأمن لأي طرف من الأطراف. يطلب المجلس من اسرائيل إعادة النظر في سياساتها وأن تتجه للسلام معلنا أن السلام العادل هو خيارها الاستراتيجي أيضا. [The Arab Peace Initiative: 1].

Back translation: emanating from the conviction of the Arab countries that the military
solution to the conflict did not achieve peace or security for any of the parties, the council request from Israel to reconsider its policies and to incline to peace while declaring that the just peace is its strategic option as well.

[CNN] The summit asks Israel to re-evaluate its policies and to work for peace. Israel should declare that a just peace is also Israel’s strategic option.

The omitted underlined sentence represents the general premise of the Arab Peace Initiative – i.e. peace rather than war is the only means to resolve the conflict between the Arab states and Israel. This omission is better explained keeping in mind that this translation looks like a summary of the Arab Peace Initiative, which is a common practice in news agencies – i.e. providing quick coverage to the latest news by focusing on the main points.

5.9 Conclusion

The main objective of this chapter was to examine how aspects of ideology, political affiliations and power struggles manifest themselves in the different language versions of the Palestinian-Israeli peace initiatives at the micro-structural level. The analysis showed that, when translated, negotiated texts, such as peace initiatives, can be interpreted differently by different institutions and news media in their attempt to promote their respective political interests and construct narratives that resonate with their constituencies.

The analysis has also showed that the main translation shifts between the different language versions of peace initiatives were predominantly with regard to the final settlement issues of the conflict, e.g. land, Jerusalem, settlements, refugees, etc. These translation shifts reflected the – in some cases – the competing narratives of the two sides of the conflict as well as those within-group narratives. For example, the competition between the narratives of the two sides over Jerusalem is evident in the names given to the city itself (e.g. ‘Al-Quds’ or ‘Yerushalayim’), labels given to its inhabitants (e.g. ‘residents’ or ‘citizens’), names of its holy places (‘al- Haram al-Sharif’ or ‘the Temple Mount’), archaeological excavations, claims of exclusive sovereignty by closing down institutions and practices which aim to change geography and demography of the city. The within-group narratives can be seen in referring to the ‘Western Wall’ as Hāāiṭ al-Mabkā or Hāāiṭ al-Burāq.

The analysis has also demonstrated that ambiguity and vagueness play a crucial role in the drafting of the Roadmap Plan. The proponents of this specific peace initiative deliberately sought to steer clear from the main negotiating obstacles (willingly or unwillingly) that had
previously hindered the peace process and postponed them to the final settlement negotiations. Instead, the Quartet’s text aims to generate consensus on less sensitive issues, at least in the early stages.

The range of examples discussed in this chapter indicates that issues like territorial claims, settlement policies, and sovereignty over Jerusalem can become even more sensitive as a result of translation. This form of mediation provides agents with an opportunity to select and circulate one of the conflicting interpretations afforded by the use of ambiguous and vague structures. As the examples have shown, most of the translating institutions tend to align themselves with ‘their’ side (i.e. government or country) and opt for translation strategies supporting their own interpretation of the issues at hand. Decisions prompted by the demands of the translation process ultimately contribute to reinforcing ideologies and political agendas. Specifically, Arabic translators have been found to favour explicitating (and, hence, disambiguating) strategies when mediating controversial matters such as Israel’s withdrawal or settlement outposts. In other words, their translations seek to promote a single interpretation and, in doing so, pin Israel down to a specific course of action.

The analysis has also brought into sharp relief the political implications of lexical choices – as shown in previous research (e.g. Schäffner and Chilton 2002) – both in the original and translated texts. Politically sensitive terms are normally value-laden and thus they cannot be separated from their socio-political and historical contexts. These terms, e.g. ‘normalisation’, are rooted in particular ideologies and have different connotations in Arabic, English and Hebrew. As was also the case with the translators’ approach to ambiguity, lexical choices tend to reinforce the political narratives of the institutions that have made them available. Peace Now’s use of ‘התנחלותית’ rather than ‘ההתיישבותית’ to refer to Israel’s settlement activity in its translation is indicative of the organisation’s ideology and political position, particularly its opposition to Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Both avoidance and choice of certain political terms, both in negotiated texts and their language versions, are ideologically motivated and they create different frames of interpretations.

More widely, it has also been found that those translations produced in Palestine or Israel, particularly by newspapers, feature a higher number of such translation shifts – in what appears to be an attempt to strengthen the narratives that their respective readerships
subscribe to. One clear example of this was Arabic and Hebrew language versions of the Roadmap Plan. This could perhaps be explained by pointing to the fact that the Roadmap Plan has the largest number of translations (the same number as the Arab Peace Initiative), and also to the fact that the Roadmap Plan is the only approved and officially accepted plan by the Israeli and Palestinian governments.

Finally, the discussion showed that certain translation strategies were dominant in texts published by certain institutions. For instance, omission of information appeared most frequently in translations published by newspapers. This confirms findings of research on media translation (e.g. Bielsa and Bassnet 2009).
Chapter Six
Institutional Settings and Textual Profiles

6.1 Introduction
Chapters Four and Five investigated how the different language versions of peace initiatives reflect aspects of ideology, political affiliation and power relations at the macro- and micro-structural levels. Chapter Six aims to account for these aspects in terms of the socio-political and institutional conditions of the production of the translations? In doing so, this chapter attempts to provide answers to the fourth research question of the thesis:

4) How can these aspects of ideology, political affiliation and power relations be accounted for in terms of the socio-political and institutional conditions of the production of the translations?

In other words, who is producing or publishing which texts? In which institutional contexts? For which purposes and addressees? In fact, there has been hardly any research on translation policies and practices in institutions in general and in political institutions in particular within the discipline of Translation Studies. The only exceptions are the studies by Bielsa and Bassnett (2009) in the context of media institutions, and Koskinen (2008) in the context of the European Union. This thesis, thus, contributes to filling part of this gap in knowledge by investigating translation practices and policies in political institutions.

6.2 Institutions
As mentioned previously in Chapter 3.2, language versions of peace initiatives were published by four main types of institutions: international, governmental, non-governmental organizations and mass media. These institutions are either located outside the Middle East (e.g. the League of Arab States, the US Department of State) or inside the Middle East (e.g. Palestinian and Israeli newspapers such as Al-Quds and Ha’aretz). These institutions published these language versions for different purposes (e.g. to inform, persuade, evaluate, etc.) and different readerships (e.g. representatives of states, members of parliament, the public, etc.).
Some of these institutions (e.g. the Council for Peace and Security) only published one language version which has been translated elsewhere, whereas others actually produced translations and published them (e.g. the United Nations). Some language versions were published only for internal purposes (e.g. circulation among members of a specific organization, such as the Hebrew translation of the Roadmap Plan of the Knesset). Other language versions were published for external purposes (e.g. external circulation as part of a press release, such as the official English translation of the Arab Peace Initiative of the League of Arab States). Information about the conditions and constraints of text production is publically available only for a few of these language versions. For instance, the names of the translators of the different language versions of peace initiatives are known in only four out of 31 cases. This reflects the complex circumstances surrounding the production of such politically sensitive texts (target texts) and the invisibility of translation. In addition, information about translation policies of institutions is unavailable in many cases.

The majority of the language versions of peace initiatives were not labelled as ‘translation’. This label, i.e. ‘translation’, was used to describe 12 out of 31 texts in the corpus (cf. Chapter 4.3). However, not every language version presented as a ‘translation’ was based on an original source text. In many cases, language versions were based on other target texts. Information about which language versions were based on original source texts and which language versions were based on other target texts is available in only six cases (see Table 6.1 below). This means that – technically speaking – ‘translation strategies’ is not the most appropriate term to describe shifts between language versions. In this case, these strategies are better described as ‘recontextualization’ strategies. In this way, it is possible to talk about both conditions of text production as well as conditions of text recontextualization. Translation shifts between the different language versions of peace initiatives are part of the textual amendments and the recontextualization process.

Table 6.1 Language versions of peace initiatives based on original source texts and target texts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of institution</th>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Initiative published</th>
<th>Target language</th>
<th>Translation based on</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>International organizations</td>
<td>The United Nations (UN)</td>
<td>The Roadmap Plan</td>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>Original English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governmental institutions</td>
<td>The Knesset</td>
<td>The Roadmap Plan</td>
<td>Hebrew</td>
<td>Original English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The League of Arab States (LAS)</td>
<td>The Arab Peace Initiative</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>Original Arabic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In order to be able to investigate the institutional conditions and constraints of text production of the language versions of peace initiatives, a number of important questions need to be answered first. These include, for example, what is the institution’s translation policy and practice? Who are the translators? What kind of texts are translated and published? Why, when and for whom?

However, answering such questions depends largely on available information about institutions involved in the translation and publication of peace initiatives and their translation practices and policies. In many cases, such information is not available to researchers. In fact, the majority of these institutions do not make their translation policies and publishing practices public, particularly with regard to documents as sensitive as peace initiatives. For example, newspapers take collective rather than individual responsibility for what is published. Furthermore, asking questions about such policies and practices in this context raises suspicions about the researcher and the real motivation for investigating such a politically sensitive topic. This was the case when attempting to obtain some information about some of the institutions of the Palestinian Authority involved in the publication of language versions of peace initiatives regarding their translation and publication policies (e.g. PLO Department of Negotiations Affairs) and newspapers (e.g. Al-Quds).

The following sub-sections will present the four types of institutions involved in the translation and publication of language versions of peace initiatives. Conditions of text production as well as conditions of text recontextualization of these language versions and translation policies of these institutions will be discussed as available.

6.2.1 International Institutions

The United Nations (UN) is the only international institution involved in the translation and publication of peace initiatives that form part of the corpus. This organization...
translated the Roadmap Plan into Arabic, Spanish, French, Chinese and Russian and published them on 7 May 2003. These languages – in addition to English – are the six official languages of the United Nations (Cao and Zhao 2008: 40). The language policy of the United Nations stipulates that documents are produced in the six official languages and “issued simultaneously when all the language versions are available” (ibid.: 40). The Department of General Assembly and Conference Management is in charge of matters related to documentation including translation of documents into the official languages of the organization (ibid.: 40). This department is responsible for producing over 200 documents a day in the six official languages of the United Nations (ibid.: 40). It also provides the services of meeting support, technical secretariat, interpretation, documents or verbatim and summary records to the organization’s bodies, such as the General Assembly and the Security Council (ibid.: 40). It is thus safe to assume that the Arabic translation of the Roadmap Plan was produced in this department in line with the official language policy of the organization.

Cao and Zhao (2008: 41) describe documentation at the UN as “the life-blood of virtually all gatherings” at the United Nations. Documentation involves nine different processes: documentation programming and monitoring, documents control, editorial control, reference and terminology, translation, text processing and typographic style, official records, copy preparation and proof-reading and publishing (ibid.: 41).

The United Nations language policy applies to documents produced inside as well as outside the United Nations. The Roadmap Plan, for instance, is a document produced outside the United Nations by the Quartet which the UN is one of its members. The Roadmap plan – drafted originally in English – was translated into the other five official languages of the United Nations. They were made available for the purposes of circulation and discussion among the members of the Security Council ahead of a meeting to vote on a resolution concerning the endorsement of the Roadmap plan as the plan to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. On 19 November 2003, during their meeting, all 15 Security Council members voted in favour of resolution 1515.180

Over the years, the United Nations has “established a set of translation norms and forms a unique translation system” (Cao and Zhao 2008: 40). Cao and Zhao (2008: 40) talk about translation at the United Nations as norm governed behaviour and activity in Toury’s terms (1995); however, they do not provide specific information about these translation norms and criteria. The focus is that documents at the United Nations are produced following an “institutional system of standards and criteria” such as compliance with quality and accuracy standards (ibid.: 44-45).

This is evident in the Arabic translation of the Roadmap plan. This translation is contextualized as a document of the United Nations. This contextualization is seen in the introduction attached to it in the form of a letter from the Secretary General to the President of the Security Council (cf. Chapter 4.4.1).

The United Nations Arabic translation of the Roadmap Plan was labelled as ‘translation’ and it mentions the text on which the translation was based, i.e. the original English text. The investigation of the macro-structural level of this Arabic translation of the Roadmap Plan shows that there were no major additions or omissions of information, no changes or additions of headings or sub-headings and no translator’s footnotes or prefaces. At the micro-structural level, translation strategies employed in this specific text can generally be described as literal translation. This can be seen, for example, where the translation of acronyms and political terminology occur, e.g. ‘IDF’, ‘settlement outposts’, ‘settlement activities’, ‘normal relations’, etc. (cf. Chapter 5.3.3 and 5.6). However, with regard to ambiguous phrases and structures (e.g. the issue of definiteness) (cf. Chapter 5.2); an explicitness change of strategy was employed. This shows that professional translators, such as those who work for international organizations (e.g. the United Nations), do not always comply with guidelines and regulations. With regard to ambiguous formulation in international instruments, the United Nations regulations states that translators “should not attempt to clarify vague or ambiguous wording when translating such instruments” in order to preserve the balance achieved in negotiations (Cao and Zhao 2008: 47).

Translation plays a crucial “political and practical role in the functioning of the Organization” (Cao and Zhao 2008: 39). However, translation policies and practices in this organization are still largely underinvestigated within Translation Studies. In this respect, Cao and Zhao (2008: 39) point out that “[d]espite the long history of translation and
multilingual practice at the UN, very little has been studied and written as to the nature and difficulties of translating documents at the UN in translation studies”.

6.2.2 Governmental Institutions

Five governmental institutions were involved in the publication of five language versions of peace initiatives in the corpus. These institutions are the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (IMFA), the Knesset (the Israeli parliament), the League of Arab States (LAS), the US Department of State and the Palestinian Authority (PA). The Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (IMFA), the Knesset and the US Department of State (USDS) published Arabic and Hebrew translations of the Roadmap Plan whereas the League of Arab States (LAS) and the Palestinian Authority (PA) published English and Hebrew translations of the Arab Peace Initiative. Both initiatives – i.e. the Arab Peace Initiative and the Roadmap Plan – are classified as track-one initiatives.

The Hebrew translation of the Roadmap Plan published by the Knesset was made available for the purpose of internal circulation. The other four translations were published for the purpose of external circulation. These translations are the English translation of the Arab Peace Initiative published by the League of Arab States, the Arabic translation of the Roadmap Plan published by the US Department of State, the Hebrew translation of the Arab Peace Initiative published by the Palestinian Authority and the Arabic translation of the Roadmap published by Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Two of these five language versions were labelled as ‘translation’. These are the translations published by the Knesset and the League of Arab States. Both translations were based on original English and Arabic texts respectively. The translation of the Knesset was labelled as ‘unofficial translation’, whereas the translation of the League of Arab States was labelled as ‘the official translation’. The translation of the League of Arab States is the only one in the corpus labelled as ‘official translation’. The difference between the use of the two labels, ‘unofficial’ and ‘official’ translation, in this context, can be established on the basis of whether the publishing institution is the one which drafted the initiative or not. The League of Arab States drafted the Arab Peace Initiative then translated it officially into English, whereas the Knesset only translated the Roadmap Plan into Hebrew.
The following sub-sections present the five governmental institutions involved in the translation and publication of language versions of peace initiatives and their translation policies.

**The Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs**

The Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (IMFA) has an in-house translation service. An in-house translation service can be defined as a translation service which is provided by a particular institution and carried out by qualified and well-trained professional translators (full-time or freelance) who follow specific translation guidelines and procedures and provide translation service on a regular basis to the institution. Examples of such translation services can be found in international institutions (e.g. the United Nations, the European Commission) and governmental institutions (e.g. Parliaments, ministries, embassies and consulates).

The in-house translation service of the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs is provided by the Language Services Department, which is one of four departments (Protocol, Official Guests, and Management and Budget) comprising the Protocol and Official Guests Bureau. The Language Services Department provides “writing, translation, and editing services for all the departments of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The department is responsible, amongst other things, for drafting official letters, translating speeches (including those of the minister of foreign affairs), drafting statements and communiqués and preparing various official documents, including note verbales”.  

The website of the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (IMFA) is available in Arabic, English, Hebrew and Farsi. On the Arabic website of this institution, the only peace initiative published – under the title ‘عملية السلام’ (lit. ‘the peace process’) – is an Arabic translation of the Roadmap Plan. This translation has an introduction similar to the one published in Arabic by the US Department of State (USDS). The IMFA translation follows a literal translation strategy with no major omissions or additions of information. For example, it preserves the ambiguity of the source text of the Roadmap Plan with regard to the use of the indefinite form and the way the conflict is referred to, i.e. the Palestinian-

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Israeli conflict. In addition, it renders acronyms, e.g. ‘IDF’ and place names, e.g. ‘East Jerusalem’ according to the conventions of the Israeli official discourse.

On the Hebrew website, no original source texts of peace initiatives or their target texts are published. On the English website – and under the title “peace process” – key documents (e.g. United Nations resolutions, peace treaties, peace initiatives) related to the “peace process” between Israel and the Arab countries (e.g. Egypt, Jordan and the PLO) are published. Peace initiatives published on this website are only the Arab Peace Initiative and the Roadmap Plan, i.e. those classified as track-one initiatives. The English translation of the Arab Peace Initiative is the official translation circulated by the League of Arab States at the conclusion of the Beirut Summit.

\textit{The Israeli Parliament, the Knesset}

Hebrew is the dominant language in Israel and it is used in all aspects of government and education (Amit–Kochavi 1998: 1). Members of the Knesset use Hebrew in their official speeches (ibid.: 1). Most Arab members of the Knesset, even though legally entitled to give their speeches in Arabic and have them interpreted into Hebrew, prefer to use Hebrew (ibid: 2). Arabic, which is spoken by “Israel’s 18% Arab minority” as well as “Oriental Jews”, is legally Israel’s second official language (ibid: 1).

The website of the Knesset is available in four languages: Arabic, English, Hebrew and Russian. On the Arabic website – and under the title ‘مستندات مهمة’ (lit. ‘important documents’) – a number of key documents are published (e.g. the Declaration of Independence of the State of Israel, the International Declaration of Human Rights, a speech of the former Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, etc.). However, no peace documents, e.g. plans, agreements, initiatives, etc. are published. Some of these published documents are translations, for example, the Declaration of Independence of the State of Israel is translated from Hebrew, whereas others, such as the former Egyptian President’s Speech, were delivered originally in Arabic. Neither the label translation nor any other label is used to describe these language versions. In other words, translation is kept invisible on the Arabic website of this institution.

On the English website, different political documents from 1947 to 2007 are published. These documents include United Nations resolutions, peace plans, initiatives and agreements. Among these documents are three peace initiatives drafted originally in

On the Hebrew website, and under the tile ‘תוכניות ויוזמות’ (lit. ‘plans and initiatives’), Hebrew language versions of the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles, the Geneva Accord and the Roadmap Plan are published. The Hebrew language version of the Roadmap Plan was translated by the Knesset and labelled as ‘unofficial translation’, whereas the Hebrew language versions of the Geneva Accord and the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles are the same as those published on the websites of the National Consensus and Yes to an Agreement. These two language versions were not labelled at all. Furthermore, the website of the Knesset does not specify the sources from which these language versions were taken. Finally, it is noted that both the Gush-Shalom Declaration of Principles for Peace Agreement and the Arab Peace Initiative are not published on the website of the Knesset in any language.

Other plans are also published on the Hebrew website. These include the Israeli disengagement plan (2004), Reagan Plan (1982), Fahd Plan (1981), Allon Plan (1967), etc.

The Hebrew website of the Knesset justifies the publication of all these texts as in the following:

(ST)

דצירה הסבר: המסמכים המופרכים ברשימת הנמצאות בתוכנוני העניין הכללי באיגרות ישראל-ערבי, בכל יהודואני-

ה플סטיינים מבוטלים. ברור כי הם אינן מסמכים רשמיים, למעט הממשלאות ומועצת הכנסת. הסדרה האוניברסית perfect לתכנית הנ輩ה, כדי להניב את המהנה הנכון. המסלולים המופצים הם הסברת מידע ומגちょうות, בין חבר הכנסת ו公社 הכלל. יוחסין ואחרים, המבואים במסמך

הקריטריונים להצגת המסמכים:

1. המסמכים דוגמיה תהליך מדיני אשר מטרתו להביא פתרון לסכסוך הישראלי-ערבי, בכל.
2. המסמכים כתובים בצורת הסכם, תוכנית , עקרונות, וכד'. (לא הובאו מאמרים העוסקים
3. המסמכים נדונו בכנסת, וזכו

ṃ כן
4. המסמכים נדונות בכנסת, והם לוחות יזים ביניהם בחוק. (לא הזכיאו את המשם אחריה), בכבד

Back translation: Points of the Explanation:
The following documents in this section deal with solutions to general Israeli-Arab conflict and the more specific Israeli-Palestinian one. These documents are not official ones in the name of the government or the Knesset. The reason for providing them is to present before the members of the Knesset and the general public various information regarding this issue. Some of the documents are causing or have caused in the past disputes and presenting them does not reflect opinion on issues.

The Criteria for Presenting the Documents:
1. In these documents, the political process was discussed whose aim was to bring a solution to the general Israeli-Arab conflict and the specific Israeli-Palestinian one.
2. The documents are drafted in the forms of agreement, plan, principles, etc. (we did not bring articles dealing with issue).
3. The documents were discussed at the Knesset and gained public treatment in the media. Behind these documents stand known individuals and public bodies (political and others), countries or international organizations.

The above introduction shows that the publication of these texts is not random but politically motivated. The decision not to publish Arabic translations of these texts on the Arabic website can also be seen in the same light. Such decisions reflect the institutional context in which these texts are presented. As the above introduction shows, the Roadmap Plan, as one of the published texts, was made available in Hebrew as part of the institutional policy, namely, for discussion in the Knesset (see below). The Hebrew translations of the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles and the Geneva Accord were originally published by their drafters to win the support of the Israeli public, i.e. they have persuasive functions. These two translations were re-published by the Knesset for the purpose of discussion among members of the Knesset. In other words, these translations were recontextualized for different audiences and different purposes from those for which they were translated for in the first place.

On 16 June 2003, the Knesset conducted its first parliamentary debate on the Roadmap Plan based on a request by opposition parties (member of the Knesset Zahava Gal’on on Meretz) who managed to obtain the 40 Knesset Member signatures necessary to hold the session. During the session, the-then Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon, and the-then Foreign Minister, Silvan Shalom, delivered their speeches. At the end of the debate a vote was conducted. The vote was 57 to 42 in favour of Sharon. The second debate and vote in the Knesset took place on 12 January 2004 when Sharon gave a speech in which he stated that:

As you know, about eight months ago, the Government of Israel accepted the political plan called the Roadmap to Peace, and added 14 reservations. The Roadmap is accepted by most of the international community and is the only way to reach a settlement, and eventually peace, between Israel and the Palestinians… I would like to remind the members of Knesset that in my speech here, on June 16, 2003, I announced that agreements signed by us and the Palestinians as a result of the Roadmap would be brought before the Knesset for approval…At the conclusion of this discussion, a vote will be taken on my announcement. I ask the members of the Knesset to support it. Mr. Chairman, in order to dispel any doubt, I again ask the members of Knesset to support this announcement.182

182 The Knesset translated Ariel Sharon’s speech from Hebrew into English.
The Hebrew translation of the Roadmap Plan published by the Knesset was produced for the purpose of governmental and parliamentary debates and later as the basis for decision-making.

The League of Arab States

The website of the League of Arab States (LAS) is available in Arabic and English. The only peace initiative published on the Arabic website is the Arab Peace Initiative. This initiative – published under the title ‘مؤتمرات القمة العربية’ (lit. ‘Arab summit conferences’) – is part of the Beirut Summit resolution in 2002. Information about what is published on the English website is not available as the website is currently under construction.

On the Arabic website, though, some of the summit resolutions of the League of Arab States are translated and published in English (e.g. Doha Summit 2009), whereas some others are translated and published in French (e.g. Khartoum Summit 2006). A copy of these translations was attached to a letter and sent from the permanent observer of the League of Arab States to the United Nations to the president of the UN Security Council as in the following example:

(ST) United Nations
S/2006/285
Security Council
Distr.: General
1 May 2006

English

Original: Arabic
Letter dated 27 April 2006 from the Permanent Observer of the League of Arab States to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council.
I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a letter addressed to you by the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States together with a compact disc (CD) containing all the decisions and documents (see annexes) adopted and issued by the eighteenth session of the Council of the League of Arab States at the summit level, held in Khartoum on 28 and 29 March 2006. I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annexes circulated as a document of the Security Council in accordance with Article 54 of the Charter of the United Nations.

(Signed) Yahya Mahmassani
Ambassador
Head of the New York Mission

Information about in which cases English or French translations are sent and based on what criteria is not available. This issue is left for future research on the translation policy of the League of Arab States.
The US Department of State

The US Department of State (USDS) has an in-house translation service that is provided by the Translating Division of the Office of Language Services. This division provides translation services to the Department of State, the White House and other U.S. Government agencies. The division’s mission is to “facilitate communication with non-English speaking governments and people by providing high-level interpreting (spoken word) and translating (written word) support to the Executive Office of the President, the Department of State and other federal agencies”.  

On the institution’s website, it is said that “much of this work is handled by permanent staff, but we also have an extensive roster of contract translators. The Office of Language Services (LS) contracts for translation and related services in virtually every language used in international diplomacy. Contractors must demonstrate a high degree of translating proficiency as well as professionalism, reliability and versatility”. In addition, freelance translators must have the necessary professional qualifications, and pass the Language Service translation test for each language combination the translator offers.

The third point above is interesting particularly with regard to the issue of ‘feedback on assignments’. What is meant by an assignment? Is it the translation or the text to be translated? What is meant by feedback? What are the criteria for deciding on feedback on assignments/translations? In addition, who chooses the translators? These questions are relevant for further investigation of translation practices of this institution.

Other than these professional requirements, translators undergo security checks, which can take a few months to complete. If the translator were not a US citizen then he/she would need to have appropriate visa status and a work permit (e.g. green card).

When a translation service is needed, a form entitled ‘Request for Translation Service’ is to be filled in. Information needed includes the ‘requesting agency’ (if other than the US

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185 The list of these professional qualifications can be found on the US Department of State website available at http://languageservices.state.gov/Content/documents/LS%20information%20for%20translators.pdf [last accessed: 24 November 2011].
Department of State), the ‘title or description of material to be translated’, ‘from (source language)’, ‘into (target language)’, ‘billing address’, ‘subject matter expert’, ‘related material previously translated?’, ‘level of security classification’, ‘level of difficulty’ (i.e. general, semi-technical or technical), and finally, whether the translation job required is in a ‘rush’ or ‘no rush’.

Other than this, information about the type of service requested is needed. The Office of Language Services provides five types of services:

1. Formal Translation (a polished, carefully researched and reviewed translation intended for official and/or wide distribution).
2. Unreviewed Translation (a full translation, unreviewed, recommended when needed for information only).
3. Comparison (certification of treaty or international agreement).
4. Summary.
5. Other.

Finally, for the Language Services use only, name of translator(s), reviewer(s) typist and proofreader are required. The type of service required would have an impact on the choice of the translator and the final translation product. The Office of the Language Services at the US Department of State translated the Roadmap Plan into Arabic. This translation belongs to the first category above (i.e. formal translation) as it was meant for wide circulation (e.g. journalists, news agencies, governments, international organizations, etc.). In fact, the Roadmap Plan was announced during a press conference. This translation is also published on the website of America.gov (www.america.gov/). This website, which is produced by the U.S. Department of State's Bureau of International Information Programs, is available in seven languages: Arabic, Chinese, English, Farsi, French, Russian, and Spanish. It provides information about the current U.S. foreign policy and about American life and culture.

The Palestinian Authority

Different ministries and departments of the Palestinian Authority employ full time translators (e.g. Ministry of Foreign Relations, the PLO Negotiations Affair Department, etc.). The Palestinian Authority commissioned the translation of the Arab Peace Initiative into Hebrew and published it in four major Israeli newspapers. The decision to publish this translation in those major Israeli newspapers is in itself politically motivated. The Palestinian Authority argued that the Israeli public had a distorted idea about this initiative. They hoped that by publishing a Hebrew translation of the initiative in those four major newspapers it would reach out to the Israeli people and win its support ahead of the Israeli
elections in February 2009. In other words, this translation had a persuasive function different from the source text. This function can be seen in a number of macro-structural as well as micro-structural strategies applied in this translation. At the macro-structural level, the layout of the translation (cf. Chapter 4.2) and the persuasive introduction added to it (cf. Chapter 4.4.2) are designed to help in marketing the initiative to the Israeli public. At the micro-structural level, the emphasis that the solution to the Palestinian refugees question is ‘to be agreed upon’ (cf. Chapter 5.8.1), the meaning shift from ‘resettlement’ to ‘naturalization’ of Palestinian refugees (Cf. Chapter 5.6.4), the omission of the intertextual Quranic reference of ‘to incline to’ (cf. Chapter 5.4.2) can also be seen as contributing to the same persuasive function of the translation. The Palestinian Authority, by publishing this Hebrew translation in four major Israeli newspapers aimed at influencing the Israeli public opinion before the general elections.

6.2.3 Non-Governmental Organizations
Seven non-governmental organizations were involved in the publication of 10 language versions of peace initiatives in the corpus. These organizations comprise four joint Palestinian-Israeli ones: National Consensus and People’s Campaign for Peace and Democracy (i.e. Palestinian-Israeli campaigns for the promotion of the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles), the Palestinian Peace Coalition and Yes to an Agreement (i.e. Palestinian-Israeli campaigns for the promotion of the Geneva Accord) and three Israeli organizations: Gush-Shalom, Peace Now and the Council for Peace and Security.

None of these organizations has an in-house translation service. The two drafters themselves, Sari Nusseibeh and Ami Ayalon, produced the Arabic and Hebrew translations of the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles. Two teams of professional translators produced the Arabic and Hebrew translations of the Geneva Accord. An Israeli political activist, Hagit Ofran, and an Israeli academic, Ilai Alon, produced the Hebrew translations of the Arab Peace Initiative and the Roadmap Plan.

Non-governmental organizations published translations of peace initiatives for different purposes and readerships. In the following sub-sections, these translations will be discussed in their institutional contexts.
The Joint Palestinian-Israeli Organizations

The four joint Palestinian-Israeli organizations: the National Consensus, the People’s Campaign for Peace and Democracy, Yes to an Agreement (YA) and the Palestinian Peace Coalition (PPC) were established for the aim of promoting the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles and the Geneva Accord respectively to the Israeli and Palestinian publics (cf. Chapter 3.2.3). These four organizations published two Hebrew and three Arabic translations of these two initiatives. The publication of these translations is politically motivated as the drafters of these initiatives wanted to persuade their respective publics of the political solutions they were proposing in their initiatives. This persuasive function can be seen at both macro- and micro-structural levels. At the macro-structural level, this can be seen in the introductions added to the Arabic translation of the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles published on the website of the People’s Campaign for Peace and Democracy and to the Hebrew translation of the Geneva Accord distributed by Yes to an Agreement (cf. Chapter 4.4.3). The careful design of the cover of the booklet of the Hebrew translation of the accord can be seen in the same light (cf. Chapter 4.2) as is also the case with the different maps attached for the Israeli and Palestinian public (cf. Chapter 4.8). At the micro-structural level, a number of textual amendments can be traced and linked to the persuasive function of these translations. Firstly, with reference to Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles, textual amendments can be seen, for example, in the explicitness change with regard to the place name al-aram al-Sharīf in the translation of the National Consensus (cf. Chapter 5.3.2) and in the meaning shift from ‘plight’ to ‘dispossession’ in the translation of the People’s Campaign for Peace and Democracy, among many others.

Secondly, with reference to the Geneva Accord, textual amendments can be seen in the change in modality (cf. Chapter 5.5), naming practices of holy places (cf. Chapter 5.3.2), and the case of intertextuality ‘national home’ (cf. Chapter 5.4.1).

There are three websites created for the promotion of the Geneva Accord, internationally, in Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories. The English joint Palestinian-Israeli website (www.geneva-accord.org) published a summary, maps, annexes and the full English original text of the Geneva Accord. The summary lists the main accord’s principles as follows:

- End of conflict. End of all claims.
- Mutual recognition of Israeli and Palestinian right to two separate states.
- A final, agreed upon border.
- A comprehensive solution to the refugee problem.
- Large settlement blocks and most of the settlers are annexed to Israel, as part of a 1:1 land swap.
- Recognition of the Jewish neighborhoods in Jerusalem as the Israeli capital and recognition of the Arab neighbourhoods of Jerusalem as the Palestinian capital.
- A demilitarized Palestinian state.
- A comprehensive and complete Palestinian commitment to fighting terrorism and incitement.
- An international verification group to oversee implementation.

The second point, ‘mutual recognition’, is later spelled out as “[A]s part of the accord, the Palestinians recognize the right of the Jewish people to their own state and recognize the State of Israel as their national home. Conversely, the Israelis recognize the Palestinian state as the national home of the Palestinian people”. This issue of ‘national home’ was the subject of heated debate in Israel (see 6.3 below).

The website also provides direct links to both Palestinian and Israeli websites of the initiative. Under the heading ‘full text’, beside the English original text, Arabic, Danish, German, French, Hebrew, Italian, Portuguese, Russian and Spanish translations of the initiative are published. The Arabic translation published is an earlier draft of the translation published on the Palestinian website. This is evident when comparing the two texts in addition to the translators’ footnotes left unintentionally in the earlier draft. The Hebrew translation, on the other hand, is the same as the one distributed to the Israeli public.

Furthermore, the Israeli website (www.heskem.org.il) is only available in Hebrew. On the website and under the heading ‘the agreement’ a number of things are published: ‘main points of the agreement’, ‘appendices’, ‘full text’, ‘briefings’, ‘maps’ and ‘the agreement in other languages’. In this section, the Geneva Accord is available in nine languages: Arabic, Danish, English, French, Hebrew, Italian, Portuguese, Russian and Spanish. The Hebrew translation is the same as the one distributed to the Israeli public whereas the Arabic one is the same as the one published by the Palestinian Peace Coalition (PPC) in the Al-Ayyam newspaper. This is one example of recontextualization of translations of peace initiatives. The Arabic translation was produced for specific readership, i.e. Palestinians living in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and then it was republished for other readers, i.e. Palestinians living in Israel. Under the heading of ‘הסכמים’ (lit. ‘agreements’) a number of agreements between Israel and the PLO are published in Hebrew, for example, the Crossings Agreement 2005, Memorandum of Sharm Al-Sheik 1999 and the Oslo Accords.

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186 The order of these languages is as in the original.
1993. Under the heading of ‘מסמכים’ (lit. ‘documents’) documents are classified into ‘official’ and ‘unofficial’. Published official documents include the Declaration of Annapolis 2007, the Roadmap Plan 2003, the Arab Peace Initiative 2002 and Tenet Plan 2001. The Hebrew translation of the Roadmap is the same as the one published by the Israeli Parliament, the Knesset whereas the Hebrew translation of the Arab Peace Initiative is the same as the one published by the Palestinian Authority in major Israeli newspapers (cf. Chapter 3). The Israeli website does not provide any information about the source of these two texts. Only close examination of these two translations and comparing them to other published translations of these two initiatives reveals their source.

Published unofficial documents include the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles 2001, Beilin-Etan Document 1997 and Abu-Mazen-Beilin Document 1995. The Hebrew translation of the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles is the same as the one published by the National Consensus (NC). Again, the website does not provide any information about the source of the translation and thus it is presented as produced by the website of Yes to an Agreement (YA).

In addition, the Palestinian website (www.ppc.org.ps) is only available in Arabic. However, the website provides direct links to the joint Palestinian-Israeli website and the Israeli website. The only peace initiative published on this website – in Arabic – is the Geneva Accord. This Arabic translation is the same as the one published in the Al-Ayyam newspaper.

**The Gush-Shalom Organization**

The Gush-Shalom organization published Arabic and English language versions of its peace initiative. These language versions are published on its website which is available in six languages: Arabic, Dutch, English, French, Hebrew and Russian.

On the Hebrew website and under the title ‘ארכיון מסמכים’ (lit. ‘archive of documents’) a number of political articles written by peace activists and politicians are published. Other than this, the Gush-Shalom Declaration of Principles for Peace Agreement and the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles are published. The Gush-Shalom Declaration of Principles for Peace Agreement Proposal is the first draft which was published by Gush-Shalom in Ha’aretz newspaper, whereas the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles is the same text published by the National Consensus. Other peace initiatives in the corpus,
e.g. the Arab Peace Initiative, the Geneva Accord and the Roadmap Plan are not published on the Hebrew website of the organization. These are all cases of recontextualization of texts.

On the Arabic website – under the title ‘الأرشيف’ (lit. ‘the archive’) – two political articles and the Gush-Shalom Declaration of Principles for Peace Agreement are published. On the English website and under the title ‘archive’ a number of news and political articles and peace initiatives are published. These initiatives are the Roadmap Plan (published under the title ‘The Roadmap a Drug for the Addict’), the Geneva Accord and the Gush-Shalom Declaration of Principles for Peace Agreement (the second draft). The choice of the title ‘The Roadmap a Drug for the Addict’, for example, is a clear case of recontextualization. Here the Roadmap Plan is reframed negatively, which would affect how readers react to it.

The Gush-Shalom does not have an in-house translation service but rather relies on volunteer translators. This can be seen in the following call for translators circulated by translation scholar Mona Baker on behalf of Gush-Shalom:

Gush Shalom is an excellent Israeli Peace Movement. They have an important document, which is now available in a range of languages, but are calling for volunteers to help with translation into Spanish, Dutch, German, and any other languages not already available.

Please respond to Gush Shalom <otherisr@actcom.co.il> direct.
Mona Baker

Relying on volunteer translators raises the issue of ethics of translators (cf. Chapter 7) and the general sociology of the translators which is still not fully addressed in the discipline of Translation Studies.

The Peace Now Organization

The Peace Now organization published Hebrew language versions of two peace initiatives. These language versions are of the Roadmap Plan and the Arab Peace Initiative. The former was translated by the political activist, Hagit Ofran, whereas the latter was translated by Professor Ilai Alon. Other than these two language versions, the organization re-published Hebrew language versions of the Geneva Accord which was distributed by Yes to an Agreement (YA) and the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles published on the website of the National Consensus (NC) and an English language version of the Arab Peace Initiative. All of these language versions are published under the title ‘peace initiatives’. The publication of these particular initiatives rather than others, for example, the Alon Plan, could be because these peace initiatives were drafted within the framework
of the two-state solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. This is in line with the long-standing political position of Peace Now which has endorsed such a two-state solution to the conflict since 1977 (Pappé 2005: 257).

The official English translation of the Arab Peace Initiative – which was circulated by the League of Arab States – is found on the English website. The other three peace initiatives published on this website (the Roadmap Plan, the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles and the Geneva Accord) were drafted originally in English. On the Hebrew website, the translation of the Arab Peace Initiative has a direct link to the one published by Ha’aretz newspaper. Such a choice of re-publishing texts taken from the Ha’aretz newspaper rather than, for example, Yediot Aharonot, can be explained with regard to the political affiliation of Peace Now and Ha’aretz, i.e. both are considered leftists. Neither Ha’aretz nor Peace Now mentions that this text is a translation. Another Hebrew translation of the Arab Peace Initiative is found under the section entitled ‘Articles and Speeches’. This translation is part of an article written by Professor Ilai Alon in which he explains the political and historical significance of the initiative. In this article, he mentions that this text is a translation from Arabic.

Next, the published translations of the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles and the Geneva Accord are the same as the ones produced and published by the National Consensus and Yes to an Agreement (YA). There is no explicit reference to where these translations are taken from, but this is evident when comparing these translations on both micro- and macro-structural levels. Finally, the published translation of the Roadmap Plan is produced by Hagit Ofran. All of the published Hebrew versions of these four peace initiatives, with the exception of the one of the Roadmap Plan and the one of the Arab Peace Initiative by Ilai Alon, neglect to mention that these texts are translations.

The two Hebrew texts published by the Israeli Peace Now are the only two in the corpus in where the names of translators appear, i.e. Hagit Ofran and Ilai Alon. Ofran translated the Roadmap Plan, whereas Alon translated the Arab Peace Initiative, both into Hebrew. Ofran is the Peace Now Settlement Watch Director and a long time peace activist. The Peace Now Settlement Watch “which monitors – and protests, the building of settlements, including housing tenders, expropriation of lands in the West Bank and East Jerusalem”.187

Alon is a professor of Philosophy at Tel Aviv University. He is the author of publications on topics such as negotiations in the Arab and Islamic world. He served from 1999-2001 as a member of the Israeli team in negotiations with the Palestinian Authority and Syria (www.tau.ac.il/humanities).

The Hebrew language version of the Arab Peace Initiative mentions that it is ‘ترجمة معرفية’ (lit. ‘translation from Arabic’). The Hebrew text was based on the original Arabic as mentioned in the introduction added to the translation. The main addressees of this translation are Hebrew-speaking members and supporters of Peace Now who share its values and ideological and political positions. This article mainly has a persuasive function as the writer explains to his readers why this initiative deserves attention.

In fact, this translation is part of an article written by Alon. The headline of the article is eye-catching. It says, “The League knocked on our door and we said that we are not at home”. The persuasive function of this article starts with the choice of the headline. The attempt to persuade the readers continues with the first part of the article, i.e. the introduction. Alon provides a nine-point introduction which is not part of the source text. The first point of the introduction puts the initiative in its historical context by stating when it was drafted and by whom. Then, the author justifies the need for his Hebrew translation by arguing that “it seems that most of the public is not aware even of the real implications of the Arab Peace Initiative” (my translation). Moreover, he argues that “the Hebrew translation of the document as published in public is flawed and this can be attributed to Israeli ignorance of the initiative” (my translation). Here Alon does not specify to which translation he is referring.

Alon could be referring here to one of the early Hebrew translations of the Arab Peace Initiative published by some of the Israeli newspapers such as the one published by Ha’aretz newspaper and had major omissions of information. In some parts, this translation looks like a summary, whereas in other parts it followed a literal translation strategy. In this translation, as well as in another one, presented by God Bless Israel, one of

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188 Alon was featured in a number of Israeli news bulletins and talk shows discussing culture and negotiations in the Arabic-Speaking world as well as the Arab Peace Initiative as in the following links: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aH03LuRc4MQ [last accessed: 24 November 2011]. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eiRFeXjEX7k&feature=related [last accessed: 24 November 2011].
the most controversial clauses of the initiative about the Palestinian refugees was changed. The phrase ‘to be agreed upon’ in the clause “achievement of a just solution to the Palestinian refugee problem to be agreed upon in accordance with U.N. General Assembly Resolution 194” was omitted in these two translations. This phrase means that “the Arab countries have accepted the principle that Israel as well must agree to the solution, in contrast to the PLO’s traditional conception” (Klein 2004: 7). This is the main selling point of the initiative which a number of Israeli politicians and political commentators have tried to stress (e.g. Klein 2004, Baskin 2007, Majdalani 2007, Remba 2007). The omission of this phrase makes the initiative look like nothing new in the long-term position of the Arab states insisting on the return of millions of Palestinian refugees to their homes in Israel.

Alon concludes his introduction with a statement urging his readers to give the initiative a chance. He makes the point that “the state of Israel has always taken the Arab declarations seriously, why not this time while taking means of caution?”. The article ends with eight points of explanations. One of the most significant points is the author’s reference to the clause on Palestinian refugees. He explains that the addition of the term ‘agreed upon’, “offers Israel the right of veto to solutions which are not comfortable to the refugees problem”.

**Council for Peace and Security**

The website of this organization is available in English and Hebrew. Peace initiatives and their translations are not published on this website except one English translation of the Arab Peace Initiative. This language version was published as part of an article written by Ilai Alon in a section entitled ‘articles’. In this section articles written by various Israeli writers, political analysts, strategists and security experts are found. Some of these articles are written by members of the organization, e.g. Joseph Alpher and Shaul Arieli, whereas others are taken from English newspapers, e.g. the Herald Tribune or Hebrew newspapers, e.g. *Yediot Aharonot* and republished on the website of the organization. Some of these articles are written originally in English whereas others are in Hebrew.

In Alon’s article, it is mentioned that the translation of the Arab Peace Initiative is from Arabic. Comparative analysis between this article and the article written by the same author and published on the website of the Peace Now organization revealed that this English translation was based on the Hebrew text published by Peace Now. Alon wrote a
number of articles on the Arab Peace Initiative (e.g. 2002, 2010). In these articles, Alon provides his expert analysis of the initiative’s provisions.

6.2.4 Mass Media
Mass media here can be classified into three main categories: newspapers, news agencies and online networks. Four newspapers were involved in the publication of language versions of peace initiatives in the corpus. These newspapers are two Israeli (Ha’aretz, Yediot Aharonot) and two Palestinian (Al-Quds and Al-Ayyam). These newspapers published five Hebrew and three Arabic language versions of peace initiatives (cf. Chapter 3.2.3). Two news agencies, CNN and Reuters, published two English and one Arabic language versions of peace initiatives (cf. Chapter 3.2.3). Five online networks published three Arabic and two Hebrew language versions of peace initiatives (cf. Chapter 3.2.3). In mass media, conditions of text production are still underinvestigated. In this section, cases for which information is available will be discussed.

Research on mass media (e.g. Bassnett 2005, Bielsa and Bassnett 2009) showed that “translation is normally invisible in media reports” (Schäffner and Bassnett 2010: 9). These outlets usually do not have in-house translation services as in the case of international organizations. Some of them depend on freelance translators for translations whereas others simply republish translations taken from other websites or sources.

The Arabic language version of the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles published by the Palestinian newspaper Al-Quds is a case in point. This text was based on the Hebrew language version of the same initiative published by the Israeli newspaper Ha’aretz. The Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles was originally drafted in English. Information on whether the Hebrew text published by Ha’aretz was based on the original English text or on another text is not available. In the following, the institutional conditions of publication of this text will be explained and accounted for. This will be done by explaining the differences between these two Arabic and Hebrew texts and accounting for political and ideological implications of such differences.

Two major Palestinian newspapers, Al-Quds and Al-Ayyam publish selected political articles taken from different local and international newspapers. These articles provide the Palestinian readers with different political views, both international as well as Israeli. The two newspapers have whole pages dedicated for this purpose. Firstly, Al-Quds newspaper
has four pages (page 14, 15, 16, and 17) entitled 'شؤون اسرائيلية' (lit. ‘Israeli affairs’) dedicated to political articles published only in Israeli newspapers such as Ha’arets, Yediot Aharonot, Maariv, etc. Secondly, Al-Ayyam newspaper has two pages (pages 19 and 20) entitled ‘الصحافة’ (lit. ‘press panorama’) dedicated to articles taken from regional Arabic newspapers, e.g. Al-Safeer, English-language newspapers, e.g. Washington Post, New York Times, and Herald Tribune and Hebrew-language newspapers, e.g. Maariv and Yediot Aharonot.

Articles published in Al-Quds and Al-Ayyam have similar features: headlines are followed by the name of the writers of these articles. In Al-Quds newspaper, the name of the Israeli newspaper from which the article was taken appears immediately after the name of the writer, whereas in the Al-Ayyam newspaper, it appears at the end of the article\(^{189}\). The following two examples illustrate this point:

**Figure 6.1:** Headline of an Article from Al-Quds newspaper

بطول اوباما دخلت اسرائيل منظمة التعاون فما هو المقابل

بقلم: ألوف بن هارتس

**Figure 6.2:** Headline of an article from Al-Ayyam newspaper

وضع خطر على اسرائيل

بقلم: بن كاسبيت

These Hebrew articles are translated and published in Arabic in these Palestinian newspapers to meet the needs of the Palestinian readers. The label ‘translation’ does not appear on any of these articles published by either newspaper, i.e. translation is kept invisible. Palestinian readers would know that they are reading translations without any clear reference from these newspapers to this fact. This is because these newspapers mention that these articles are taken from Hebrew newspapers, i.e. published in Hebrew.

These two Palestinian newspapers are similar with regard to the information they carry and according to Jamal (2000: 56), they:

[R]un the stories of the news agencies, especially WAFA, the official Palestinian news agency. They introduce scarcely any changes based on their own investigations. They also repeat news from the Israeli press. The contributions of local journalists are therefore very limited, and in-depth investigations of issues of concern to the public are unknown.

\(^{189}\) This also applies to articles taken from Arabic and English newspapers at Al-Ayyam newspaper.
This ‘repetition’ of news from Israeli press involves processes of translation and recontextualization for the needs of the Palestinian public. This can be seen in the pages of these newspapers dedicated to reporting from Israeli press. However, Israeli newspapers have no pages dedicated solely to reporting from the Palestinian press.

Israeli media is self-sufficient in filling their Arabic-Hebrew translation needs. Amit-Kochavi (1998: 3) points out that:

Middle East and Arab affairs experts do their own translations of newspaper and journal articles, written and oral speeches and interviews. They often demonstrate high-level performance thanks to their subject-matter expertise, reinforced by direct activity in the field, in the West Bank and Gaza Strip as well as such Arab countries as Egypt and Jordan that are accessible to the Israeli media.

6.3 Political Debate

In the world of politics, political debates over controversial issues are a very common practice. These debates become more interesting – from Translation Studies perspective – when they are based on cases of translation. Although reception of language versions of peace Palestinian-Israeli peace initiatives is reserved for future research, one case of a political debate based on a translation of one peace initiative, i.e. the Geneva Accord will be discussed.

This debate was based on the Hebrew translation of the Geneva Accord which was distributed to every household in Israel by the Israeli negotiating team of the initiative. This distribution was part of a well-planned marketing campaign to win the support of the Israeli public. The debate was mainly on the controversial issue of the Jewish nature of the state of Israel.

One of the selling points of the initiative to the Israeli public was the claim of the Israeli negotiators that the Palestinian side recognized Israel in the initiative as the ‘national home’ of the Jewish people. This alleged recognition means that the Palestinian side agreed to give up the right of return of the Palestinian refugees to their homes in historical Palestine (now Israel). This alleged recognition caused a heated debate between some politicians and one member of the Israeli negotiating team of the initiative. In the following, this political debate and its implications will be explained.

The issue of the Jewish nature of the state of Israel is ideologically and politically significant. To begin with, this issue brings back the more than 100 years struggle between
the Palestinian national movement and Zionism about claims to land and legitimacy. In addition, it raises the issue of the rights of more than one million Palestinians living in Israel nowadays.

This issue, i.e. the Jewish nature of Israel, has always been on the Israeli political agenda. For example, it was one of the 14 points of Israeli reservations on the Roadmap Plan: “declared reference must be made to Israel’s right to exist as a Jewish state and to the waiver of any right of return for Palestinian refugees to the state of Israel”. This issue was again raised in the Annapolis Peace Conference between Israel and the Palestinian Authority on 26 November 2007.

The Israeli Prime Minister then, Ehud Olmert, demanded that the Palestinians recognize Israel as a Jewish state, which the Palestinians had been repeatedly rejected on the basis that it would mean giving up the right of return for the Palestinian refugees and, even more than that, legitimizing discrimination against Israeli Palestinians living in Israel. More recently, at the launch of the direct Palestinian-Israeli negotiations in September 2010, the Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, reiterated his demand for the Palestinians to recognize Israel as a Jewish state.

Palestine and Israel are recognized in the English source text of the Geneva Accord as the ‘homelands’ of their respective peoples. The term ‘homeland’ was then changed into ‘בית לאומי’ (bayt ha-le'umi, lit. ‘national home’) in the Hebrew translation distributed to the Israeli public by the Israeli organization Yes to an Agreement (YA). As explained before, this term – i.e. ‘national home’ appears in key documents related to the establishment of the state of Israel (cf. Chapter 5.4.1).

A number of Israeli academics and politicians such as Shmuel Amir, Moty Cristal and Asher Susser – who compared the Hebrew translation to its original English source text – criticized the translation and the Israeli negotiating team for misleading the Israeli public. Amir (2004), for instance, expressed his doubt that the Palestinians would actually put their signature to a document which recognizes Israel as a Jewish state. He argues that:

In the booklet entitled ‘The Geneva Initiative – A Model for a Lasting Israeli-Palestinian Agreement,’ the section called ‘Essentials of the Geneva Document’ (page 7 in the Hebrew edition – my translation since English version is not yet available) opens with the following statement: “The Palestinians recognize the right of the Jewish people to a state...This is not merely Palestinian recognition of the State of Israel – that appears immediately after: “The Palestinians
recognize the State of Israel as our national home... It seems to me that the Palestinians have never yet affixed their signature to a document containing such a comprehensive demand from them.

Amir’s (2004) remarks – which are based on the Hebrew translation (booklet) distributed to the Israeli public – show that a Palestinian recognition of Israel as the “national home” for the Jewish people would imply a “Palestinian agreement to Zionism”. One of the basic tenets of Zionism is the “right” of all Jews around the world to a state and this “right” was “anathema to the Palestinian national movement from its very beginnings” (Amir 2004).

In fact, the Palestinians never agreed to Zionism as they accuse Zionists of “deliberately and forcefully expelling the Palestinian Arabs who lived in what has become the state of Israel in 1948” (Shamir and Shikaki 2005: 315). The Palestinian leadership of the PLO has always refused to acknowledge the Jewish identity of Israel and preferred, like in the case of the Oslo Accord, only to recognize Israel’s “right” “to exist as an independent state” (Shamir and Shikaki 2005: 315). A Palestinian recognition of Israel as a Jewish state clearly touches on “an exposed nerve” (Shamir and Shikaki 2005: 315) among Palestinians in Israel and this can explain why the Palestinian leadership rejects such recognition.

Susser (2003) wrote an article A Shaky Foundation which appeared in the Israeli Ha’aretz newspaper on 15 December 2003. In this article, Susser – who also refers to the Hebrew translation distributed to the Israeli public – makes the point that:

The cover of the Geneva Accords Booklet notes that the ‘recognition of the State of the Jewish people’ is one of the accomplishments of the initiative. However, this phrase does not appear in the Accords. There is phraseology that seemingly comes close to the aforementioned recognition, but, in actual fact, the Palestinians evade doing so.

Another criticism to the Hebrew translation with regard to the same issue comes from Cristal (2004). In his article The Geneva Accords: A Step Forward in the Wrong Direction? he argues that:

Article 2.4 stipulates that the parties recognize Israel and Palestine as “the homelands of their respective peoples.” The document is lacking the additional formulaic step of stating explicitly “The State of Israel is the state of the Jewish people, and Palestine is the state of the Palestinian people.” This wording appears in the “Document's Main Points” distributed to the public, and even in the Ayalon-Nusseibeh proposal, but it was omitted from the Geneva document text. At issue is more than a negligible point of semantics.

190 Professor Asher Susser, Dayan Centre Director and Senior Fellow, published this critique of the refugees chapter in Ha’aretz in Hebrew on 11 December 2003. The Hebrew article appeared in translation in the English version of Ha’aretz on 15 December (These comments are based on the published English translation which does not differ from the Hebrew original text)
Cristal here compares between the English source text and the Hebrew translation distributed to the Israeli public. The first quotation is from the English source text whereas the second is from the Hebrew translation. Cristal raises suspicion about the motivation of such difference between the two texts. Shlomo Avineri (2003), an Israeli political scientist, goes beyond that to plainly accusing the Israeli negotiators of lying to the Israeli public:

The initiators of the Geneva document are, of course, entitled to express their views and publicize them in any manner they see fit. But do they have the right to brazenly lie to the public as to what the document does or does not contain?

He claimed that the ambiguous reference to Israel as the homeland of its people without specifically referring to the Jewish people leaves the whole issue open to different interpretations:

Before the document was made public, the initiators said it contains Palestinian recognition of the State of Israel as “the state of the Jewish people.” Not so. The “Jewish people” is not mentioned in the document. What is does say that “the two sides recognize Palestine and Israel as the national homes for their nations.” Whoever wishes can certainly say that Israel as “the state of all its citizens “is the national home of” of the Israeli nation,” which includes Jews and Arabs. It is no coincidence that the word “Jew” doesn’t appear in the document. The Palestinian signators do not include anyone who believes there is a “Jewish people”.

In response to the critics, Klein, one of the Israeli negotiators of the Geneva Accord (2004), wrote an article in which he defended translating the term ‘homelands’ as 'הלאים' (literally: their national homes). He argues that:

Many critics have argued that the Geneva Accords does not explicitly recognize Israel as a Jewish state, and some have even accused its endorsers of misleading the Israel public. I start with this issue because it relates directly to Israel's fundamental identity. First, the agreement recognizes "the right of the Jewish people to statehood." Second, it recognizes Israel's status as the homeland of the Jewish people, ("The Parties recognize Palestine and Israel as the homelands of their respective peoples"). It should be noted that the Hebrew version of the agreement translates the word "homeland" as bayit le'umi (national home). However, it would have been more accurate to translate it as moledet (homeland). Use of the term homeland constitutes a far-reaching Palestinian statement recognizing that Israel is not only the state of the Jewish people but the Jewish people's homeland as well. Members of the Jewish people - who, as stated in the agreement's preamble, have a right to a state - are neither foreigners nor immigrant invaders. They were born here, in the land of Israel, and have returned to it.

This translation choice of ‘national home’ is a deliberate as it serves the aims of the Israeli drafters in marketing the agreement to the Israeli public. It is safe to assume that most of the reactions to this initiative as well as others are reactions to translations. This debate shows the key role translation plays in politics. Translation is an essential part of political communication.

6.4 Conclusion

This chapter has illustrated how different language versions of peace initiatives were produced in different institutional settings for different purposes. Firstly, in international
settings, texts were used as the basis for debate and decision-making. Secondly, in governmental settings, texts were used for parliamentary discussions and debates as well as for declarative purposes. In non-governmental settings, texts were used to support certain political solutions to the conflict and finally, in media settings, texts were used to report (positively or negatively) on peace initiatives.

This chapter also showed that, very frequently, translations produced in one institutional context are recontextualized and reframed for use in another one. These recontextualization and reframing processes are usually accompanied by further textual amendments.

Translation practices and policies differ according to institutions. These institutions translate or publish language versions of peace initiatives for different purposes and functions. Some of these institutions, for example, media outlets and online networks, do not have in-house translation services. Translations are produced by journalists rather than professional translators. These findings, particularly with regard to translations published by newspapers, confirm findings in literature in Translation Studies that translation is invisible in media (e.g. Bassnett 2009). In media institutions, translation has a low status and these institutions are not explicit about translation. This can be seen, for example, in the way journalists refer to themselves as international journalists rather than translators.

In other institutions, for example, international ones, e.g. the United Nations, and governmental ones, e.g. the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the US Department of State, translation plays a more important role.

The use of translation in the advocacy of certain political solutions is particularly interesting in the context of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. This is due to the fact that translation, framing and recontextualization play a major role not only in disseminating peace initiatives to the Palestinian and Israeli public but also to mobilizing public opinion in support of certain political solutions to the conflict. This is found in the case of the language versions of three peace initiatives: the Arab Peace Initiative, the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles and the Geneva Accord.

The case of peace initiatives has shown that translators are not only professional ones but also politicians, academics and political activists. Those translation agents have different views about the very concept of translation and translation process. For instance, Delyani
(2005), the technical manager for the Palestinian People’s Campaign for Peace and Democracy promoting the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles, considers translating this initiative from English into Arabic by Sari Nusseibeh as ‘rendering’ rather than translating. This perhaps explains why these language versions are not labelled as a ‘translation’ but as a ‘document’, ‘text’ or ‘version’.

In this thesis, there is less scope for generalization than expected about translations of peace initiatives. This could perhaps be due to the different conditions of text production of these texts: not all ‘translations’ were based on original ‘source texts’. In many cases, ‘translations’ were based on other ‘target texts’. In this light, it is hard to speak about translation strategies as in chapters four and five but it is more appropriate to talk about recontextualization strategies.

Scope for generalization is even more difficult on the more abstract level. This could be because of the nature of peace initiatives. Peace initiatives are still a largely under-researched genre of political texts. More research is still needed in this direction. Another possible reason is that peace initiatives are not negotiated and drafted very frequently but produced at certain critical times of ongoing contemporary conflicts.

The final reason for the difficulty of generalizing about peace initiatives is that there are not many language versions of one peace initiative published by the same institution. Peace initiatives are published by different institutions. Therefore, it is not possible to say that texts produced in mass media will show certain translation strategies. That is because texts published in media could have been taken from different types of institutions and then were simply recontextualized for new functions and audience. Thus, translations shifts found in the target texts could have occurred somewhere else other than mass media. These conditions highlight the complex nature of translation and particularly of political texts.
Chapter Seven
Conclusion

7.1 Major Findings of the Research
The present thesis has examined Palestinian-Israeli peace initiatives as politically negotiated texts and their different Arabic, English and Hebrew language versions in their socio-political, historical and institutional contexts. It aimed to examine how aspects of ideology, political affiliation and power relations at play in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict manifest themselves on these language versions and how these aspects could be accounted for in terms of the socio-political and institutional conditions of the production of the translations. In doing this, the thesis aimed to make a an original contribution to the discipline of Translation Studies by contributing to a deeper understanding of the role of translation and recontextualization of politically negotiated texts in situations of ongoing contemporary conflict.

In order to achieve this overall aim, the thesis applied the descriptive analytical model suggested by Lambert and Van Gorp (1985) and Fairclough’s (1992) three-dimensional discourse-analytical model. In linking textual profiles of translations of peace initiatives to conditions of text production, the analysis presented an example of causal models as described by Chesterman (1997).

In Translation Studies, there has been an increasing interest in “ideas and ways of explanation” of the translational phenomena (Chesterman 2008: 364). The present thesis presented a case of a qualitative research which could help in reaching conclusions about the translational phenomenon of Palestinian-Israeli peace initiatives. Explanation of such phenomenon would be possible if “we understand its causes or the factors that seem to influence it; or if we know how it works; or if we know what its function is” (Williams and Chesterman 2002: 61). In this thesis, conclusions would account for “what is possible, what can happen, or what can happen at least sometimes” but not about “what is probable, general, or universal” (Williams and Chesterman 2002: 64).
The following section outlines the major conclusions and findings of the thesis and then reflects on the strengths and weaknesses of the chosen framework.

To begin with, the present thesis has highlighted the significance of translation – as both product and practice – in situations of ongoing contemporary conflict, namely, the Palestinian-Israeli one. The very fact that there existed 31 translations of five Palestinian-Israeli peace initiatives into three languages – Arabic, English and Hebrew – is one indication of such significance.

The thesis has shown that translations of peace initiatives have played different roles in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict depending on the institutional context in which they were presented and the purposes they set to serve. One of these roles was disseminating information about negotiated texts. For example, it was through translation that the Palestinian and Israeli publics knew about the majority of peace initiatives, i.e. three initiatives were drafted in English and were then translated into Arabic and Hebrew. In other words, translations constituted a major source of information. This finding has further substantiated, and as other research has shown, that “political discourse relies on translation” (Schäffner 2004: 120).

Another significant role of these translations was influencing and shaping the Palestinian and Israeli public discourses, attitudes and ideological thinking regarding the conflict and the peace process in the Middle East. Peace initiatives, as explained before (cf. Chapter 1.1.3), were drafted at a very critical time of the conflict – i.e. the collapse of the peace process following the failure of the Camp David II negotiations and the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa intifada. These two major events posed a serious threat to the fundamental principles of the peace process, most importantly, the ‘two-state’ solution to the conflict.

Peace initiatives – which were designed to revive the collapsed peace process and keep the ‘two-state’ solution (as the only solution) on the table – tackled the complicated and sensitive final-status issues of the conflict which have always been deferred to future negotiations and offered political compromises on them. Some of the peace initiatives, namely, those belonging to ‘track-two’ (cf. Chapter 3.2.2), directly targeted public opinion in both Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories and strived to elicit their support. For political marketing purposes, these initiatives were translated into Arabic and Hebrew.
However, the sensitivity of these political compromises were largely multiplied and refracted in translation. The overall textual analysis has demonstrated that these political compromises were interpreted differently by different institutions in their attempts to promote their respective political interests and narratives. Such compromises disappeared in translation and instead one interpretation reflecting one ideological and political position prevailed. This was evident, for example, in instances of deliberately ambiguous or vague formulations (cf. Chapter 5.2), names of holy places important to both sides of the conflict (cf. Chapter 5.3.2) and modality (cf. Chapter 5.5). Such disappearance – particularly in translations published by local Palestinian and Israeli newspapers – could be interpreted as attempts by translators, the institutions behind them or both to “protect or at least avoid being implicated in undermining dominant public narratives” (Baker 2006: 36).

This showed that translation was “an integral part of political activity” (Schäffner and Bassnett 2010: 13) and that neither translations nor translators were neutral. In fact, as the textual analysis has shown, translations reflected aspects of ideology, power relations and political affiliations and translators (cf. Chapter 5) – who have ideologies – consciously or unconsciously played a major role in situations of ongoing contemporary conflict.

However, and as the thesis has demonstrated, it is not the case that translations rather than translators are engaged (e.g. Tymoczko 2000) because translators are not “always those who use translations for purposes of activism, nor are translators always fully aware of how their translations could be used” (Brownlie 2007: 139-140) but both translators and translations are politically engaged.

The thesis has indeed shown that it was difficult to speak of one translation shift originated in one particular context or that every target text was based on an original source text. It was very often the case that translations of peace initiatives produced in one particular institutional context were recontextualized for use in another one. Such recontextualisation went hand in hand with further textual amendments. Recontextualization involved repositioning a text for different functions, audiences and purposes. It also involved adding or deleting material, both textual and extra-textual, to achieve that purpose. Textual amendments included, mainly, addition, omission, change and re-arrangement of heading and sub-headings (cf. Chapter 4.6.1-4.6.4) as well as addition of introductions, particularly, persuasive and evaluative ones in language versions of non-governmental organizations (cf. Chapter 4.4.3) and mass media (cf. Chapter 4.4.4). These introductions play a major
role in triggering ideologically biased readings of texts. Extra-textual amendments concerned providing different maps attached to the Arabic and Hebrew translations of the Geneva Accord for the Palestinian and Israeli publics which best served the marketing purposes of its drafters.

By disseminating and contesting public narratives and consequently keeping a certain population disposed to keep supporting a certain decision-maker, either for or against a particular peace initiative, translations of peace initiatives have played a role in the management of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict – understood here as minimizing “the escalation of a conflict situation without necessarily dealing with the real source of the problem” (Scott 2007: 24). In other words, preserving the conflict “for resolution another day” (Zartman 2005: 62). This finding conforms to other findings in Translation Studies, namely, that translation and all its agents contribute to “shaping the way in which conflict unfolds” and play a major role in its management (Baker 2006: 1-2).

Drawing on the intractability of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict (cf. Chapter 1), peace initiatives (original source texts) – in their wider geopolitical context – have also been managing the conflict as part of an open-ended process governed and shaped by power relations and contradictory political interests. In this context, Pappé (2002) argues that:

Noam Chomsky was correct in his analysis that we in Palestine/Israel and the Middle East as a whole were eagerly playing the American game ever since they decided to take an active role in the peace process, beginning in 1969 with the Rogers Plan, and then with the Kissinger initiatives. Ever since then, the peace agenda has been an American game. The Americans invented the concept of the peace process, whereby the process is far more important than peace. America has contradictory interests in the Middle East, which include protecting certain regimes in the area that preserve American interests (therefore entailing paying lip service to the Palestinian cause) while also has a commitment to Israel. In order not to find itself facing these two contradictory agendas, it is best to have an ongoing process which is not war and not peace but something which you can describe as a genuine American effort to reconcile between the two sides... Such a process, which can and should go on forever, coached by the only superpower and supported by the peace camp of the stronger party in the conflict, is presented as peace. One of the best ways of safeguarding the process from being successful is to evade all the outstanding issues at the heart of the problem.

The indefinite deferment of all final-status issues of the conflict in the text of the Roadmap Plan – the only officially accepted plan to resolve the conflict since 2003 – is an example of the above argument. This plan repeats the exact same mistakes of the failed Oslo Accords by addressing “the easy issues while putting off the thorny ‘final-status’ issues” (Abrahms 2003). It also employs “creative ambiguity” in dealing with aspects of these final-status issues such as Jewish settlement outposts, opening of closed Palestinian institutions in Occupied East Jerusalem and Israeli withdrawal from areas reoccupied on 28 September 2000 (cf. Chapter 5.2). Such a technique “may give the illusion of progress, but
it will only inflate expectations and lead to disappointment. The result is often more violence and a hardening of mutually exclusive demands” (Abrahms 2003).

The textual analysis (cf. Chapter 5) showed that the two sides of the conflict are already interpreting the Roadmap differently in their attempts to improve their negotiating positions. In this way, the Roadmap simply continues the façade of a “peace process” (Honig-Parnass 2007: 231).

The validity of the argument that the Middle East “peace process” and its peace initiatives – including those drafted since 2000 – were designed to manage the conflict rather than resolving it can be verified by examining the results of more than twenty years of negotiations between the Palestinians and Israelis on the ground: continued land expropriation, rapid Jewish settlements expansion and the construction of Israel’s illegal Wall, to name a few (cf. Chapter 1.1.2).

The interpretation that Palestinian-Israeli peace initiatives and equally their different translations play a major role in managing the conflict is of course only one possible interpretation in open-ended ones. Another interpretation could be that peace initiatives and equally their different translations are helping in resolving the conflict by encouraging a wider participation in the political process and keeping these initiatives under continuous discussion by a multiplicity of political stakeholders. Here, these texts would be part of a step-by-step approach, i.e. the Palestinians and Israelis negotiate less controversial issues that they could agree on while deferring the most sensitive trigger points for confrontation to the end of the process (cf. Chapter 5.2). In this light, these texts play a positive role in the conflict by enhancing involvement and cooperation.

To subscribe to one interpretation or another depends largely on the receivers of these texts, their political ideologies, interests, motivations, narrative locations and whether they see the conflict as ‘intractable’ – i.e. cannot be resolved – or ‘resolvable’. If the conflict is perceived as ‘intractable’, then these texts are part of conflict management and if perceived as ‘resolvable’, then these texts are part of conflict resolution. The resistance of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict to more than a century of attempts to resolve it, the fundamentally incompatible goals and interests of the Palestinians and Israelis and the political facts on the ground in the Occupied Palestinian Territories – as explained in chapter one – support the ‘conflict management’ interpretation.
One direct implication of such an argument concerns the title of this thesis. The first part of this title, i.e. ‘translation and peace’ – which was chosen at the very early stages of the research – is mesmerising as it over-romanticizes the role of translation in situations of ongoing conflict, namely, helping to establish peace in the Middle East. However, based on findings of this research, a more appropriate title would be ‘translation and conflict management’.

Reflecting on these different roles, it has been brought into sharp relief that translation “is not simply a linguistic activity” (Schäffner 2009: 146) but rather a social activity (Hermans 1995: 10) which is governed and controlled by institutions. Translators then “work in social-political and historical contexts, their activity is embedded in and determined by social, institutional, ideological norms, conditions and constraints” (Schäffner 2009: 146).

Another major finding of the thesis – closely linked to the issue of recontextualization – was that both translators and translation were largely invisible. This invisibility was reflected in the anonymity of the translators of the different language versions of peace initiatives and the avoidance of the label ‘translation’ to refer to these texts. The names of translators of peace initiatives only appeared in two cases, the Hebrew translations of the Roadmap Plan and the Arab Peace Initiative translated by Hagit Ofran and Ilai Alon respectively and both published by Peace Now. The other two cases of known translators concerned the Arabic and Hebrew translations of the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles which were translated by Ami Ayalon and Sari Nusseibeh. The names of these two translators did not appear anywhere in these translations. These two names were known only through personal communications. The issue of invisibility of the translator is an indication of the “translator’s role in society, the translator’s status and power, the translator’s rights” (Chesterman 1997: 169).

The four known translators were not professional ones but two politicians (Ami Ayalon and Sari Nusseibeh), one academic (Ilai Alon) and one political activist (Hagit Ofran). This reflects the increasing involvement of non-professional translators in the translation activity, particularly in situations of ongoing conflict and raises many questions, including, why would, for example, political activists or academics, translate peace initiatives themselves when there exist translations of these texts. One possible answer is provided by Ilai Alon in his added introduction to the Hebrew translation of the Arab Peace Initiatives in which he starts by saying that “it seems that most of the Israeli public is not aware of the
true significance of the Arab Peace Initiative” and then justifies the need for his translation as “the Hebrew translation of the Document, as distributed to the public, is faulty. This may have been part of the reason that Israelis ignored it” (cf. Chapter 4.4.3).

With regard to the avoidance of using the label ‘translation’, the thesis has shown that target texts of peace initiatives were largely labelled as ‘documents’, ‘versions’ or ‘literal texts’ rather than ‘translations’ (cf. Chapter 4.3). Information about which language versions were based on original source texts and which language versions were based on other target texts was available in only six cases (cf. Chapter 6). This showed that translation “continues to be an invisible practice, everywhere around us, inescapably present, but rarely acknowledged, almost never figured into discussions of the translations we all inevitably read” (Venuti 1992: 1).

The avoidance of using the label ‘translation’ in describing the target texts of the peace initiatives gave the impression that these texts were originals rather than translations. And even if translations of peace initiatives, as it is the case of other texts, were visible and presented as translations, and readers were aware of the facts that they were reading translations, still the general assumption would be that translations are exact replicas of the original source texts (Schäffner 2009: 144).

As Schäffner (2009: 143) points out, the general public often comes across political discourse in translation without necessarily realizing it. Translation becomes visible to the public, when it is perceived as problematic, for example, “if some mistranslation had been discovered, leading to arguments about the correct or incorrect meaning of a word, a sentence, or a text” (Schäffner 2009: 143). This was the case in the Hebrew translation of the Geneva Accord published by the Israeli negotiating team (cf. Chapter 6.3). A heated debate was initiated based on this translation and then accusations of manipulating public opinion through translation were voiced against its drafters. In this way, translation was ‘visible’ but in a negative way.

In order to explain the issue of invisibility of translations, it should be linked to “the contexts in which translations are made available and the functions they fulfil for the respective communicative purpose” (Schäffner 2009: 145). For example, unlike in postcolonial contexts where the relative invisibility of the translator of literary texts – according to Venuti (1995) – is attributed “to a combination of attempts by translators to
produce fluent, transparent texts and the nature of acceptability judgements by readers of translation, who wish translations to appear as though they were originals” (Venuti 1995: 1 quoted in Olohan 2004: 4), the invisibility of translators of negotiated texts can be attributed to the nature of these texts as politically sensitive ones and the need to create an illusion of an ‘original’ text.

The choice of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) – which is located within “a version of critical social science” (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999: 3) – as a research framework in this thesis, particularly, Fairclough’s (1992) three-dimensional model, has provided a viable postmodern framework for the study of translation as a social activity in its institutional context. This framework, as explained in detail before (cf. Chapter 3.3.3), accounted for the three levels of analysis: text production (cf. Chapter 3.2), text interpretation (cf. Chapters 4 and 5) and institutional contexts (cf. Chapter 6). This kind of analysis helped in situating peace initiatives and their translations within their wider social and geopolitical contexts by emphasizing that translation “as both an enactment and a product, is necessarily embedded within social contexts” (Wolf 2007: 1), i.e. a “socially regulated activity” (Hermans 1997: 10). This activity is “in all its various stages, is undeniably carried out by individuals who belong to a social system” (Wolf 2007: 1) and that it is “inevitably implicated in social institutions, which greatly determine the selection, production and distribution of translation and, as a result, the strategies adopted in the translation itself” (Wolf 2007: 1).

Of particular significance in this context is the premise that texts (originals and translations) have effects and roles to play in social and political changes. This kind of research can be described as an emerging “critical translation studies” (Schäffner 2007: 147).

The following part of the conclusion returns to the specific research questions asked at the beginning of the thesis to establish to what extent they have been answered. This will be followed by reflecting on the original contributions of this thesis to Translation Studies and Critical Discourse Analysis.

1) What are the key characteristic features of peace initiatives as politically negotiated texts?

The first research question relates closely to what kind of text is a peace initiative. The review of literature on different political genres, such as political speeches, peace treaties,
political manifestos, etc., (cf. Chapter 2) showed that peace initiatives are still a largely under-researched genre of political texts. This research limitation – i.e. the lack of any studies on the genre of peace initiatives and their translations – made identifying the characteristic features of peace initiatives an exhausting process. This limitation was partially overcome by comparing peace initiatives to a closely related genre of political texts, namely, peace treaties. As explained in chapter two, detailed comparison between the two genres demonstrated that they share some key characteristic features, such as, the use of ambiguous formulations, modal verbs and politically sensitive concepts. Modal verbs, for example, are used to express legal statements of obligations, authorizations, permissions, requirements and prohibitions (cf. Chapter 2.3.3) whereas ambiguity is used by negotiators and politicians in order to bridge the gap between the conflicting positions of parties (cf. Chapter 5.2).

2) What happens to these texts in translation?

The detailed analysis has shown that peace initiatives were translated by various types of institutions for different purposes and readerships. Also, it was very frequently that translations produced in one institutional context were recontextualized for another one which was accompanied with further textual amendments. Recontextualization involved repositioning a text for different functions, audiences and purposes. It also involved adding or deleting material, both textual and extra-textual, to achieve that purpose. Textual amendments, as discussion has shown before (cf. Chapter 4), included addition, omission, change and rearrangement of heading and sub-headings (cf. Chapter 4.6.1-4.6.4) and the addition of introductions, particularly, persuasive and evaluative ones in translations published by non-governmental organizations (cf. Chapter 4.4.3) and mass media (cf. Chapter 4.4.4). These specific types of introduction were designed to trigger ideologically biased readings of translations of peace initiatives. Extra-textual amendments concerned providing Palestinian and Israeli publics with different maps of the Geneva Accord which served the political interests of its drafters.

3) How do the translations of peace initiatives reflect aspects of ideology, political affiliation and power relations?

One of the main objectives of the thesis was to account for how language versions of peace initiatives reflect aspects of ideology, power relations and political affiliation at both macro- and micro-structural levels. On the one hand, the macro-structural analysis
(cf. Chapter 4) examined the textual organization of the individual translation profiles of the various language versions of peace initiatives, e.g. layouts, paratexts, chapter headings, introductions, etc. It showed that some paratextual materials, namely, added persuasive and evaluative introductions, reflected the ideological and political position of their publishers (cf. Chapter 4). These introductions framed peace initiatives in a particular way and thus triggered an ideologically biased reading of translations of peace initiatives.

On the other hand, the micro-structural analysis aimed to examine how these aspects of ideology, political affiliation and power relations at play in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict manifest themselves on the translations of initiatives. The detailed textual analysis (cf. Chapter 5) has shown that when translated, negotiated texts such as peace initiatives can be interpreted differently by different institutions depending on their ideologies and political positions in their attempt to promote their respective political interests and construct narratives that resonate with their constituencies.

The range of examples discussed showed that the sensitive final-status issues of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, such as withdrawal from land, settlement policies and sovereignty over Jerusalem became even more sensitive as a result of translation. One example was the explicitating strategies applied in the majority of Arabic translations of the Roadmap Plan (cf. Chapter 5.2) with regard to the issues of withdrawal from reoccupied Palestinian territories, reopening of closed Palestinian institution in Occupied East Jerusalem and the dismantlement of Jewish settlement outposts.

Another example concerned the translations of names of holy place names important to each side of the conflict (cf. Chapter 5.3). For example, names important to both sides of the conflict – e.g. ‘al-Haram al-Sharif’ and ‘the Temple Mount’ – and which were placed side by side as a sort of a political compromise disappeared in translation (cf. Chapter 5.3.2). Other cases concerned changing some of the names of these holy places in translation in order to market a particular initiative to a particular public, e.g. the change of the place name ‘The Wailing Wall’ into ‘The Western Wall’ in the Yes to an Agreement translation of the Geneva Accord (cf. Chapter 5.3.2).

A third example concerned the change of the modal verb ‘may’ into the formulations of ‘has the right to’ and ‘entitled to’ respectively in the Arabic and Hebrew translations of
the Geneva Accord (cf. Chapter 5.5). A final example concerned the different interpretations provided by the various translations of the Arab Peace Initiative regarding the controversial issue of resettlement of Palestinian refugees (cf. Chapter 5.6.4).

The analysis has also demonstrated that different institutions selected and circulated interpretations – whether consciously or unconsciously – which best served their ideological and political interests. Most importantly, discussion of examples has shown that translations produced in Palestine or Israel, particularly by newspapers, featured a higher number of translation shifts, in what appeared to be an attempt to strengthen the public narratives to which their respective readerships subscribe.

On the one hand, the local Palestinian newspaper, *Al-Quds*, in its Arabic translation of the Roadmap Plan, reflected the Palestinian official interpretation of the plan, namely, the Israeli withdrawal from *all* of the Palestinian territories occupied since 28 September 2000 (cf. Chapter 5.2.1), the dismantlement of *all* Jewish settlement outposts (cf. chapter 5.2.2) and the reopening of *all* Palestinian institutions closed in Occupied East Jerusalem (cf. Chapter 5.2.3). It also disseminated the Palestinian public narrative and contested the Israeli one, for example, by referring to the conflict as ‘the Palestinian-Israeli’ rather than ‘Israeli-Palestinian’ (cf. Chapter 5.3.1), removing the ‘defense’ adjective in referring to ‘IDF’ (cf. Chapter 5.3.1) and opting for the term ‘the siege’ to refer to Israeli occupation practice of ‘curfew’ (cf. Chapter 5.6.5).

On the other hand, the local Israeli newspaper, *Yediot Aharonot*, in its Hebrew translation of the same initiative kept the ambiguity of the Roadmap with regard to the issues of Israeli withdrawal from reoccupied Palestinian territories, the reopening of the closed Palestinian institutions in Occupied East Jerusalem and the dismantlement of the Jewish settlement outposts. This ambiguity serves Israel’s political interests as it keeps these issues open for future negotiations.

The newspaper also deleted important information on the issue of Jewish settlement (cf. Chapter 5.8.2) and used the two terms ‘hityashvut’ and ‘hitnahlut’ interchangeably thus not distinguishing between early Jewish settlements and those built after 1967 (cf. Chapter 5.6.2). These shifts reflected its right-wing position on this issue.
4) *How can these aspects of ideology, political affiliation and power relations be accounted for in terms of the socio-political and institutional conditions of the production of the translations?*

This question concerns the second main aim of the thesis of taking a step beyond description of actual translation profiles by providing explanations of these profiles with reference to their institutional contexts of production. The thesis aimed to link aspects of ideology, political affiliation and power relations manifested in translation of peace initiatives to the socio-political and institutional conditions of production of translations. The aim of such linking was to bring close textual analysis with social analysis. An attempt was made in this direction but absence of sufficient information on institutional translation policies constituted left this research question largely unanswered.

The discussion of institutional settings (cf. Chapter 6) has demonstrated that four main types of institutions – international, governmental, non-governmental organizations and mass media – were involved in the translations of the different language versions of peace initiatives. These institutions published these language versions for different purposes (e.g. to inform, persuade, evaluate, etc.) and different readerships (e.g. representatives of states, members of parliament, the public, etc.).

Some of these language versions were published only for internal purposes (e.g. circulation among members of a specific organization. Other language versions were published for external purposes (e.g. external circulation as part of a press release, such as the official English translation of the Arab Peace Initiative of the League of Arab States) (cf. Chapter 6.2). One important finding has to do with the fact that the names of the translators of the different language versions of peace initiatives are known in only four out of 31 cases and that the label ‘translation’ was largely avoided in describing these versions.

**7.2 Original Contribution of the Study**

**7.2.1 Translation Studies**

Williams and Chesterman (2002: 2) point out that the aim of research in Translation Studies is to make “a contribution to the field which increases the sum of our knowledge” which can be made by one or more of the following ways:

1) Providing new data;
2) Suggesting an answer to a specific question;
3) Proposing a new idea, hypothesis, theory or methodology.
Guetzkow et al (2004: 191), add that originality in the humanities, history and social sciences can also be achieved by “doing research in an understudied area”. Reflecting on these points, the present thesis makes an original contribution to the discipline of Translation Studies in the following ways.

Firstly, the thesis has made an original contribution to the discipline of Translation Studies by investigating a largely under-researched genre of political texts, i.e. peace initiatives. Peace initiatives – as the outcome of political negotiations – presented a set of authentic politically sensitive contemporary texts which were produced by different institutions for different audiences and purposes. The thesis did not only present such a new corpus of texts for the discipline of Translation Studies but went further beyond this point by showing how these texts and their translations were recontextualized in different socio-political, historical and institutional contexts for different purposes and readerships. In this way, the thesis went beyond description to explanation by highlighting the socio-political significance of translation as product and process and led to a deeper understanding of the role of their translation and recontextualization in situations of ongoing contemporary conflict, particularly, the Palestinian-Israeli one.

Secondly, the thesis also contributed to the discipline of Translation Studies by analysing political discourse in translation in three languages: Arabic, English and Hebrew, which is still a largely under-researched combination of languages in the discipline of Translation Studies. One advantage of investigating these three languages in the context of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict was revealing how compromises reached during negotiations were interpreted by various institutions in the local languages of the two sides of the conflict.

Thirdly, the thesis contributed to the increasingly growing interest in sociologically oriented research of translation, particularly with regard to the recent interest in investigating the discourse on translation and conflict, in particular “committed approaches” (e.g. Baker 2006, 2010; Inghilleri and Harding 2010; Salama-Carr 2007) and the interest in social, ideological and political aspects of translations within Translation Studies (e.g. Bassnett and Lefevere 1998; Calzada-Pérez 2003; Schaeffner 2004; Tymoczko 1999; Venuti 1995). Focusing its attention on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the thesis had built on these studies by presenting insights about the complex nature of
translating politically negotiated texts such as peace initiatives in situations of ongoing conflict.

Fourthly, the thesis contributed to the recent interest within the discipline of Translation Studies in studying translations in their institutional contexts (e.g. Koskinen 2008; Milton and Bandia 2009; Schäffner and Bassnett 2010a). Schäffner and Bassnett (2010b: 13) for example, point out that “[N]o detailed research has been conducted yet into the actual translation policies and processes of national governments, or of national political parties, or embassies”. This thesis thus contributes to filling part of this gap in knowledge by investigating translation practices and policies regarding the language versions of peace initiatives in political institutions (cf. Chapter 6).

The decision of which peace initiatives and in what languages are to be published on websites of various types of institutions is in itself political. Analysis of institutional conditions of text production showed that not every peace initiative which was available in the original source text (e.g. in English) was made available in all other languages (e.g. Arabic and Hebrew). Some websites republished translations taken from other websites without any indication that they had done so.

When studying negotiated texts – such as peace initiatives – in their institutional and socio-political contexts insights “can be gained into institutional practices, into the respective roles of actual agents involved in the complex translation processes as well as into the power relations” (Schäffner and Bassnett 2010b: 12). These factors are of significant importance in investigating translations in political institutions.

Schäffner and Bassnett (2010b: 14) summarize questions – which can be described as “socially driven questions” (Wolf 2007: 20) – of interest from the point of view of Translation Studies regarding these policies as follows:

“[W]ho decides whether websites of governments, of individual government ministries, of political parties are made available in foreign languages in the first place, and more specifically, who decides which languages these should be? Who decides which texts are translated? Who translates these texts, that is, do governments and political parties have their own in-house translation departments? Or are translation needs outsourced to translation companies? In that case, on the basis of which criteria may a translation company be selected? Are some texts translated by politicians and/or political advisors and/or staff themselves? If yes, which kinds of texts and for which reasons? Who checks the translations before they are put on a website? Who decides which texts are used in translation for internal purposes only? Are different policies and procedures in place for translating relevant texts into foreign languages and for translating texts into the home language?”
These questions need to be answered before it is possible to fully account for the institutional contexts of text production of the translations of political texts in general and of negotiated texts in particular.

Finally, the thesis has made an original contribution to the Translation Studies by answering – to a large extent – the four research questions posed on the translational phenomenon of peace initiatives.

7.2.2 Critical Discourse Analysis

This thesis has built on research in Translation Studies applying Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) as a framework, for analyzing aspects of ideology and power relations in translation (Hatim and Mason 1990, 1997; Munday 2002; Schäffner 2003). Schäffner (2010: 275) explains that it is the “interest in analysing the influences of social, cultural, political, and ideological contexts on texts and discourse, which modern Translation Studies shares with Critical Discourse Analysis”.

The study of peace initiatives and their translations provided a modest step in showing that the discipline of Translation Studies and Political Discourse Analysis, as Schäffner (2004: 136) points out, can benefit from “disciplinary interaction”. Such cooperation, Schäffner (2004: 117) explains, begins with “presenting examples of authentic translations of political texts, commenting on them from the point of view of TS”.

As explained previously, CDA attempts to bring the textual analysis and social analysis together. Gagnon (2006: 205) quotes Fairclough (2003, 2-3) as saying “[M]y own approach to discourse analysis has been to try to transcend the division between work inspired by social theory which tends not to analyse texts, and work which focuses upon the language of texts but tends not to engage with social theoretical issues”. She then explains that “[O]ne cannot help but relate this statement to translation studies’ own dichotomy between postmodern or cultural studies approaches on the one hand, and descriptive or linguistic approaches on the other (see Chesterman and Arrojo 2000). The translation scholar Calzada-Pérez (2001) suggested that the solution to this “clash” could lie in translation studies research based on CDA” (Gagnon 2006: 205). The present thesis should be seen as another contribution to such theoretical framework.
Gagnon (2006: 206) also explains, “[E]xamples of textual markers studied in translated political discourses are transitivity (Calzada-Pérez 2001), cohesion (Hatim and Mason 1997, 143ff), metaphors (Al-Harrasi 2001) or lexical choices (Schäffner 2003)”. This thesis contributes to Political Discourse Analysis by adding other textual markers found in negotiated texts, namely, ambiguous formulations, naming practices and modality.

Also, investigating aspects of ideology, power relations and political affiliation in translated texts, unlike in CDA which applies this “on the basis of discourse in one language and one culture” (Schäffner 2004: 132), in the case of translation, such features “apply both to the source text and culture and to the target text and culture” (Schäffner 2004: 132).

The thesis has demonstrated that translation is significant to political discourse. One example of this significance was the case of the political reactions to the Geneva Accord which was not based on its original source text but its Hebrew translation (cf. Chapter 6.3). As Schäffner (2007: 135) points out, “political discourse analysis has not yet paid sufficient attention to aspects of translation”. Such attention can “shed new light to understanding politics” (Schäffner 2004: 138).

7.3 Future Research
The analysis of the language versions of Palestinian-Israeli peace initiatives gave raise to numerous questions of a linguistic, ethical and political nature; it can lead off in many different directions. In the following, a number of avenues for future research in the discipline of Translation Studies as well as other disciplines will be suggested.

7.3.1 The Discipline of Translation Studies
In the discipline of Translation Studies, three main avenues for future research can be suggested. The first line of inquiry concerns sociology of negotiated texts in general and peace initiatives in particular, as products, particularly, translation reception and consumption. This thesis provided a modest step in this direction by presenting one case of a political debate based on one Hebrew translation of one peace initiative, the Geneva Accord (cf. Chapter 6.3). Future research will need to expand on this case to include other cases of reactions and debates on language versions of peace initiatives (those based on original source texts as well as those based on other target texts, i.e. recontextualized
translations) in different settings (e.g. parliaments, governmental meetings, blogs on the internet, etc.) in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Israel and internationally.

Possible research questions in this direction can include which translation is picked up to comment on, by who, when and where, and what implications this translation has for decision making regarding the peace process and negotiations. Analysing social and political implications of translations will provide significant insights about reception and consumption of these translations in their socio-political and institutional contexts and ultimately further highlight the role translation plays in shaping public opinion in situations of conflict.

The second line of enquiry concerns the sociology of translation agents of negotiated texts, i.e. who the translators are and whether or not they are professionals. This builds on existing research on positioning of translators in politically sensitive contexts, such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the issue of their loyalties and neutrality. In Modern Translation Studies, the increasing amount of literature dedicated to sociological approaches to translation is indicative of the increasing interest in the sociology of translation (e.g. Heilbron 2000; Hermans 1999; Koskinen 2008; Simeoni 1998; Wolf 2007). However, the sociology of translators is still largely under-researched in Translation Studies and more research is still needed in this direction.

One closely related issue to agency is ethics of translating negotiated texts. Future research in this direction can build on existing research in this direction (e.g. Baker and Maier 2011; Chesterman 1995, 2001; Meschonnic 2011; Nord 2001; Pym 2001) by examining ethical issues of interest in this context for translation theory and translator training such as the notion of authorship (i.e. negotiated texts are not the work of one author but the result of negotiations between many parties or authors, i.e. collective authorship), ethical and political implications of translational choices in the different language versions of such texts and the translator(s) responsibility of such choices.

The third line of enquiry concerns sociology of translation process of negotiated texts. Such research would focus on how these texts are translated. In other words, who commissions these translations; whether there are any translation briefs and guidelines; whether the translators are professionals, i.e. trained as translators; the work conditions
under which these translations are produced; whether these translations are proofread and edited; and who gives the final permission to publish these translations.

This thesis provided some insights about institutional settings in which some of the texts were produced. Further research can look at the process of producing other texts in the same or different institutional contexts. One possible way of doing that is by conducting ethnographic studies about political institutions and their translation policies such as the study by Koskinen (2008). This will allow first-hand information about these policies.

In conclusion, this thesis has investigated translations of peace initiatives from and into three languages: Arabic, English and Hebrew in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Future studies can focus on other conflicts in the world and into other languages.

### 7.3.2 Other Disciplines

Peace initiatives present a rich material for further research in a number of disciplines, notably, Political Science, Conflict Resolution, Media Studies and Genre Studies. In the following, some venues for further research in these disciplines will be suggested.

Firstly, it could be argued that a disciplinary cooperation can take place between Conflict Resolution and Translation Studies that would open up new ways of thinking about violent conflict and resolving them. While conflict resolution studies tend to be constructed around discovering causes and effects of conflicts then how to resolve them, Translation Studies can help in showing the role translation and translators play in aggravating or resolving such conflicts.

One important issue to Conflict Resolution is measuring public opinion polls and surveys conducted during times of ongoing conflict in order to measure public support of certain political formulas. The history of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is full such polls. For example, Jacoby (2007: 34) points out that “[A]ccording to a joint survey of Palestinian and Israeli public opinion between March 8-13, 2005, 59% of the Palestinians and 60% of the Israelis support the Quartet’s Road Map plan compared to 35% among Palestinians and 36% among Israelis who oppose it” (Jacoby 2007: 34). This survey was conducted in Arabic and Hebrew about a text written originally in English. It is would be interesting to examine on the basis of what translations such support was measured and whether or not translations differ from their source texts.
Secondly, research on peace initiatives within the discipline of political science has largely focused on one peace initiative, i.e. the Geneva Accord (e.g. Beilin 2004; Kardahji 2004; Klein 2007; Lerner 2004). However, there is still no comprehensive study on all five peace initiatives in the corpus. The aim of such a study would be comparing these initiatives by analysing their political content, particularly with reference to the final-status issues of the conflict (e.g. land, Palestinian refugees, Jerusalem), and investigating the role of these initiatives not only in resolving but also in managing the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

Also, within the discipline of Political Science social narrative theory can be applied in order to detect the development of conflict and peace narratives over the years in the Arab world and in Israel. This could be done by comparing peace initiatives in the corpus to others drafted before 2000, particularly the early years of the conflict. This would show for example that particular political concepts belong to certain historical periods. Changes in use of such political concepts then reflect changes in political positions, agendas and power relations; how did what was not acceptable, for example, in 1948 or 1967, become acceptable in 1988.

Thirdly, media plays a particularly significant role during times of conflict. It can be argued that it promotes or demotes peace chances in one way or another. Many texts in the corpus were published by different media outlets (e.g. newspapers, news agencies, online networks, etc.). Translation played a vital role in disseminating these negotiated texts to readers inside as well outside the Middle East. Research in the discipline of media and journalism, as Bielsa and Bassnett (2009: 17) point out, “has focused on single language cases, and has paid scant attention to interlingual transactions”. That is why cooperation between Translation Studies and Media Studies can prove very useful. Such cooperation can provide useful insights about the role media plays in times of conflict in more than one language and in the case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, examine both Arabic and Hebrew. This would also allow comparative studies and capture what is happening on both sides of the conflict.

Finally, research in Genre Studies can provide a detailed account for more systematic categorizing for the characteristic features of peace initiatives as a genre of political texts. This research found that vagueness and ambiguity, use of political terms, modality, and treatment of proper names are characteristic features of peace initiatives. Future research can refine or add to these features.
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309


