DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

EU-ASEAN relations in the post-Cold War era

an analysis of the impact of normative factors on interregionalism

Xuan Loc Doan

2013

Aston University
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EU-ASEAN relations in the post-Cold War era –
An analysis of the impact of normative factors on interregionalism

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Doctor of Philosophy in International Relations

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ASTON UNIVERSITY
April 2013
Thesis summary

Aston University

EU-ASEAN relations in the post-Cold War era – An analysis of the impact of normative factors on interregionalism

Xuan Loc DOAN
Doctor of Philosophy in International Relations
2013

This thesis examines the relationship between the European Union (EU) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) with a focus on why their normative elements, e.g. values and norms, affect their ties in the post-Cold War era. Since the end of the Cold War, policy-makers and academics have become interested in region-to-region interaction, termed interregionalism. Though interregionalism is considered to have become an indelible feature of post-Cold War international politics, there are question marks over its importance. It is often argued that interregionalism reinforces the collective identity of the regional organisations involved. It is also maintained that its overall relevance to the international system depends on the level of actorness, which is primarily measured in institutional and material terms, of the participant regional organisations.

This thesis contends that the normative components of the EU and ASEAN are also fundamental constituents of their actorness and, consequently, define significantly their interregionalism. This is based on a crucial observation that normative factors are of importance to the regional and international relations of the EU and ASEAN. Yet, while they strongly espouse norms and values to guide their internal and external activities, their normative premises radically differ from each other. Furthermore, these normative differences jeopardise their cooperation. Building on this observation the inquiry takes the normative components of the EU and ASEAN as the criterion as well as the focus for investigating their interregionalism. In doing so, it hypothesises that the EU and ASEAN are two different regional actors that adopt two dissimilar sets of norms to conduct their regional and international affairs and that such normative differences hinder their relations. Within this hypothesis, it seeks to address three central questions. First, what are the normative features that constitute the EU and ASEAN as actors in world politics and that make them different from each other? Second, what are the main sources of their normative differences? Finally, why do their normative differences become an obstructive factor in their relationship?

To address these issues, the inquiry adopts a constructivist interpretation (of International Relations) and opts for a narrative and empirical inquiry, which is based on information and data acquired from official documents, scholarly works and interviews and questionnaires. In doing so, it finds that as they were born and evolved in two dissimilar temporal and spatial settings, the EU and ASEAN are two different norm entrepreneurs and normative powers. The former advocates a set of liberal cosmopolitan norms whereas the latter champions a set of traditional communitarian principles. Their normative differences become a major obstacle to their cooperation, especially when one regional organisation’s norms are refused or violated by the other. Thus, a key lesson drawn from these findings is that in order to explain more fully EU-ASEAN interregionalism, it is essential to consider their norms, the reasons behind their normative differences and the implication of those differences to their relations.
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I own an immense gratitude to my parents in Vietnam, who always support and encourage me, especially during the years of this research.

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<tr>
<td>AASM</td>
<td>Associated African States and Madagascar</td>
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<td>ABC</td>
<td>ASEAN Brussels Committee</td>
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<td>ACP</td>
<td>African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States</td>
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<td>ADB</td>
<td>Asian Development Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACFTA</td>
<td>ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement</td>
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<td>AEFTA</td>
<td>ASEAN-EU Free Trade Agreement</td>
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<td>AEM</td>
<td>ASEAN Economic Ministers</td>
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<td>AEMM</td>
<td>ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meeting</td>
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<td>AFC</td>
<td>Asian Financial Crisis</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMM</td>
<td>ASEAN Ministerial Meeting</td>
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<td>AMU</td>
<td>Arab Maghreb Union</td>
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<td>ANCOM</td>
<td>Andean Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARF</td>
<td>ASEAN Regional Forum</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACFTA</td>
<td>ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>AEFTA</td>
<td>ASEAN-EU Free Trade Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>APRIS</td>
<td>ASEAN-EU Programme for Regional Integration Support</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>APT</td>
<td>ASEAN Plus Three (ASEAN + China, Japan and South Korea)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEM</td>
<td>Asia-Europe Meeting</td>
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<tr>
<td>AC</td>
<td>Cooperation Agreement</td>
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<td>CARICOM</td>
<td>Caribbean Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAS</td>
<td>East Asian Summit</td>
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<tr>
<td>CER</td>
<td>Closer Economic Relations</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECO</td>
<td>Economic Cooperation Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<td>ECSC</td>
<td>European Coal and Steel Community</td>
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<td>EFTA</td>
<td>European Free Trade Agreement</td>
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<td>ESS</td>
<td>European Security Strategy</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>FDI</td>
<td>Foreign Direct Investment</td>
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<td>FTA</td>
<td>Free Trade Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>G-7/8</td>
<td>Group of Seven/Eight (leading countries of the world)</td>
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<tr>
<td>G-20</td>
<td>Group of Twenty</td>
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<tr>
<td>GCC</td>
<td>Gulf Cooperation Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<tr>
<td>GES</td>
<td>Global Europe Strategy</td>
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<td>HRB</td>
<td>Human Rights Body</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISEAS</td>
<td>Institute of Southeast Asian Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCC</td>
<td>Joint Cooperation Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>JSG</td>
<td>Joint Study Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>MERCOSUR</td>
<td>Mercado Común del Sur (Southern Common Market)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAFTA</td>
<td>North American Free Trade Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAS</td>
<td>New Asia Strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>NLD</td>
<td>National League for Democracy</td>
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<td>PMC</td>
<td>Post Ministerial Conference</td>
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SAARC  South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SADCC  Southern African Development Cooperation Conference
SADC  Southern African Development Community
SCCAN  Special Coordinating Committee of ASEAN Nations
SCS  South China Sea
SICA  Central American Integration System
SLORC  State Law and Order Restoration Council
TAC  Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia
TREATI  Trans-Regional EU-ASEAN Trade Initiative
UDHR  Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UK  United Kingdom
UN  United Nations
US  United States of America
WTO  World Trade Organisation

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1. EU-ASEAN cooperation and interregionalism

1.1. Background and aim of the study

A major trend of post-Cold War world politics is the re-emergence of regional organisations, which is related to new regionalism or second wave of regionalism (Hettne 2005; Söderbaum and Langenhove 2005).¹ This phenomenon has occurred across the globe and become a prominent force in contemporary world politics (Farrell 2005; Katzenstein 2005; Hurrell 2007; Joffé 2007). As regional arrangements have proliferated, a third wave has emerged with its defining feature being that regional organisations have had a stronger external orientation (Söderbaum and Langenhove 2005). They have sought to revive and/or establish relations with major powers and in doing so, they became world political actors in their own right (Wunderlich 2012a: 127). For instance, even though both the EU (see Appendixes 1 and 3) and ASEAN (see Appendixes 2 and 4) are organisations whose main purpose has been to cultivate regional integration and cooperation they have, to some extent unwillingly and to some extent by design, became actors on the international scene (Mahncke 1999). The EU has widely been pictured as an international/global actor/player (Cremona 1998; Ginsberg 1999; Helly and Petiteville 2005; Hettne 2011). ASEAN’s international influence is not at the same level as that of the EU and it still lacks an EU-like supranational agency (Weatherbee and Emmers 2005). Nevertheless, it still has the ability to act as a bloc vis-à-vis other major powers, e.g. (People’s Republic of) China and the United States (US).²

Besides their efforts to establish links with major powers, regional organisations have actively sought to set up relations with each other. Consequently, unlike pre-1990,³ in the post-Cold War era, interregional arrangements have become more influential in world politics because more regional organisations being involved in the interregional network (see Appendix 6). Even though the EU remains the chief

¹ Unlike the ‘old’ regionalism, i.e. the first wave, a Cold War phenomenon with specific objectives (security-motivated or economically oriented), ‘new’ regionalism is a post-Cold War/globalisation process with multidimensional orientations.
² ASEAN is also regarded as a central actor in wider regional institutions, e.g. ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), East Asia Summit (EAS) and ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus 8 (ADMM + 8).
³ In the 1970s and 1980s, the European Community (EC) had established interregional relations (see Appendix 5 and Edwards and Regelsberger 1990). They, though, were not very visible and influential because in those years, regional organisations were often inward looking and the interregional network only centred on the EC.
advocator of interregionalism, it is no longer the sole organisation to do so. Others have also sought to establish interregionalism. This has resulted in producing a new component in world politics, namely interregionalism, defined as the process whereby one region interacts with another (Gilson 2005: 309; Söderbaum and Langenhove 2005: 257). It is regarded as an indelible aspect of the international system (Hänggi et al. 2006a: xiii; Doidge 2007: 230) and will remain an important dynamic in international relations (Smith 2005: 68). This is very true in the case of the EU, which is regarded as the patron saint of interregionalism (Aggarwal and Fogarty 2005: 327), because interregionalism has become a highly visible feature of its foreign policy (Hettne and Söderbaum 2005: 535; Hettne 2008a: 15; Wunderlich and Bailey 2011b: 5).

The re-emergence of interregionalism has interested scholars, who have seen it as a new subject and a new field of research in political sciences (Rüland et al. 2008). A number of works have been undertaken to investigate it (Gilson 2002b; 2005; Doidge 2004b; 2007; Robles 2004b; Hänggi et al. 2006a; Söderbaum and Langenhove 2006; Yeo 2007a; 2007b and Rüland et al. 2008). Yet, despite such an increasingly scholarly interest, interregionalism is underrepresented in the research community (Söderbaum and Langenhove 2005: 377) and remains an under-researched phenomenon (Doidge 2007: 230). For instance, the most insightful and completed book on it so far is arguably Interregionalism and International Relations, edited by Hänggi et al. (2006a). For the first time a volume systematically investigated the key issues of interregionalism, e.g. its forms, functions and related theoretical approaches to it, and examined concrete interregional relationships. However, even with its solid empirical and theoretical foundations, as Rüland (2006a: 295-313), one of the book’s editors, comments in the last chapter, entitled Interregionalism – An Unfinished Agenda, this volume does not provide the indefinite answer, but rather opens up valuable avenues for further investigations on interregionalism. A particular area, which is still understudied and the one to which this thesis aims to contribute, is the impact of the ideational and normative factors, or what Lucarelli (2006a: 1) refers to as the ‘software’ dimensions, e.g. norms, values and principles, of regional organisations on their interregional relations. A look

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4 In literature, ‘ideational’ and ‘normative’ factors refer to a wide range of non-material elements, e.g. norms, values, principles, worldviews and ideas. In this thesis, they are used to include these terms, which can be defined as cognitive and normative beliefs held by political actors, be they states or regional organisations, e.g. the EU and ASEAN. Yet, it focuses on values, principles and particularly norms. Later, this chapter and Chapter 2 will define values, principles and norms and explain their relationship to other related concepts.
at two main bodies of literature on regional organisations and their interregional relations will reveal such paucity.

A key aspect of interregionalism, which greatly attracts scholarly interest, is the impact of interregional relationships on the formation of the collective identities of regions or regional organisations involved (Gilson 1999; 2001; 2002a; 2002b; 2005; 2011; Higgott 2000; Hänggi 2003; Gilson and Yeo 2004; Holland 2006; Manea 2008). In fact, identity formation is one of the so-called five functions of interregionalism, which was first theorised by Rüland (2001a; 2001b; 2001c) and used by many latter works to investigate the relevance of interregionalism to the international system. This function, which is theoretically deduced from constructivism, means that the interaction between two regions/regional organisations may distinguish ‘self’ from ‘other’ and thus help to galvanise regional identity. While there is a significant body of literature arguing that interregional relationships shape and consolidate the collective identities of the participant regions, there are no major investigations of the reverse. In other words, there still exists a scarcity of analysis of whether, and if so why, regional organisations’ identities – or more exactly, the norms, values and principles that constitute them as actors in world politics – determine their interregionalism.

The relevance of the ideational factors of regional organisations to their external relations and interregionalism in particular is also under-explored in the works on the concept of regional actorness. This term, which signifies the ability of a (regional) actor “to behave actively and deliberately in relations with other actors in the international system” (Sjöstedt 1977: 16), is employed to explain the influence of a regional organisation in its external activity. Though referring to norms and identity, most scholars on this concept, e.g. Sjöstedt (1977), Allen and Smith (1991), Hill (1993; 1998), Jupille and Caporaso (1998), focus mainly on the institutional and material elements of regional organisations and consider these as the key requirements of their actorness. As a result, they pay little attention to their ideational and normative elements and the implication of these factors to their external relations. In their work on the EU’s actorness, Bretherton and Vogler (2006) regard its shared values and principles as one

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5 Rüland (2001c: 4) maintains that how much interregional relations contribute to the international system or what he calls “an emergent structure of global governance” depends on how well they perform these functions. Using EU-ASEAN cooperation as an empirical case, he finds that despite being the most advanced relationship, it only partly fulfils them because only limited balancing and identity formation are visible in this relationship.

6 Rüland (2006: 311) defines the actorness of a regional organisation as its ability “to become identifiable, to aggregate interests, formulate goals and policies, and make and implement decisions”. For a more updated understanding of this concept, see Wunderlich (2011; 2012a; 2012b).
of the four components that constitute its actorness and regard its identity as a key element of its actorness. Nevertheless, they do not explore how the EU’s shared values and principles affect its relationship with another regional actor, e.g. ASEAN, which prefers a different normative framework. In fact, all the scholars mentioned as well as most of those who work on the concept of actorness, e.g. Larsen (2002), Toje (2008), Kaunert (2010) and Thomas (2011), use this concept mainly to measure the EU’s external influence. A researcher, who links regional actorness to interregionalism, is Doidge (2004a; 2004b; 2007; 2008; 2011). However, like Sjöstedt (1977) and others, on whom he draws to develop his framework, he focuses primarily on the institutional and material aspects of regional actors. Consequently, he downplays the importance of the ideational and normative aspects determining their nature (Wunderlich 2012b: 657) and does not explore how these shape their interregional relations. 7 After all, his aim in developing and using the concept of regional actorness is to further Rüland’s work by investigating why interregional relationships fail to perform the five functions mentioned. By hypothesising that the extent, to which interregional relations perform those functions, depends on the level of the actorness of the regions involved, he uses EU-ASEAN relations as an empirical case to test his hypothesis. In doing so, he finds that this relationship fails to perform them because the EU and ASEAN do not have enough actorness. In other words, the level of actorness of the participant regions is the criterion he uses to measure the performance of their interregionalism. This means he neither considers whether their actorness, especially the ideational and normative components of their actorness, is convergent or not nor explores how such a convergence or divergence affects the overall performance of their interaction.

From what has been discovered, it can be concluded that the existing literature on interregionalism and regional actorness rarely considers the relevance of the ideational and normative factors of regional organisations to their external activities and their interregional relations in particular. This can be a significant omission because for regional organisations, e.g. the EU and ASEAN, their software elements are of central importance to not only their regional cooperation but also their international affairs. Indeed, taking the relationship between these two regional organisations as an empirical case, this thesis shows that the ideational and normative factors of regional

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7 According to him, actorness consists of three fundamental components, namely the ability (1) to set goals, (2) to make decisions in relation to these goals and (3) to pursue the policy decided in relation to the said goals. He argues that the extent to which regional organisations possess these requisites depends on where they are on a continuum running from intergovernmental to supranational.
organisations play a key role in shaping their regional actoriness and their interregionalism. The question arises is why is the case.

1.2. Assumptions, reasons and questions of the study

To begin with, this thesis agrees with the argument that interregional relationships, e.g. EU-ASEAN relations and Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), form and reinforce the collective identities of the participant regional organisations or groupings. As will shown in Chapter 7, by interacting with the EU, the Asian side of ASEM, forms and reinforces what can be referred to as ‘Asianness’ or ‘we-ness’, which not only makes it distinct from the EU but also enables it to act as a distinct regional actor vis-à-vis the EU (Higgott 2000a; Gilson 2002b; 2005; 2011). It also acknowledges that the institutional and material dimensions of regional organisations play an important part in determining their actoriness and, consequently, their influence on the external world. For instance, Chapter 8 will show that the lack of material capabilities, notably military ones, of the EU considerably prevents it from being regarded as a relevant security actor in Southeast Asia and the wider Asia-Pacific region in general, which still faces major ‘realist’ security issues. Furthermore, it shares Doidge’s view that the level of actorness of the regional organisations involved influences the performance (or lack of one) of their interregional relations.

Yet, adopting a constructivist interpretation (of International Relations), this inquiry contends that the ideational and normative components of regional organisations are also fundamental constituents of their actorness. Consequently, they play a fundamental role in defining the nature, shape and outcome of their interregionalism. Manners (2002: 252) is arguably apt to hold that the EU “is built on the crucial, but usually overlooked observation that, the most important factor shaping the international role of the EU is not what it does or what it says, but what it is”. This view can be applied to ASEAN, which is able to play an influential role in the wider Asia-Pacific region not because of its economic or military weights but because of its norms. Indeed, as will be illustrated in the subsequent chapters of this thesis what the EU and ASEAN are greatly defines their internal and external relations. For this reason, this inquiry postulates that interregional relations and EU-ASEAN interregionalism in particular will not be fully explained if the ideational and normative factors of the organisations involved are ignored. Such a belief is based on the three following observations of the EU’s foreign policy, ASEAN’s external relations and the EU-ASEAN interaction in
particular since the end of the Cold War. These are also the starting positions that this study takes to examine the EU, ASEAN and their interregionalism.

Firstly, it is commonplace that the protection and promotion of a set of democratic values, e.g. human rights and democracy, has become an integral aspect of the EU’s external relations (European Commission 1995a; 1995b; 2007). The promotion of human rights and the promotion of democracy and good governance are regarded as two of the five particular foreign policy of the EU (Smith 2008a). The spread of this liberal internationalism is also one of three roles of its interregionalism (Söderbaum et al. 2005: 368-77). The EU has increasingly been described as a normative power (Manners 2002; 2008a; Whitman 2011) because it is founded on those principles and seeks to advance them in Europe and globally (European Council 1991a; Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, Articles 2 and 3-1). One may agree with this argument by looking at the ‘Copenhagen criteria’ or the ‘membership criteria’ and the ‘human right clause’ that it applies to those, which want to establish cooperation agreements with it (Elgström and Strömvik 2005: 123).

Secondly, like the EU, ASEAN has developed its own normative framework, known as the ASEAN way, to conduct its regional and international relations. This set of Westphalian norms, e.g. national sovereignty and non-interference, has not only defined ASEAN’s raison d’être but also been accepted as the modus operandi of other ASEAN-led institutions, e.g. the ARF and the EAS (Busse 1999; Khong and Nesadurai 2007; Stubbs 2008; Teo 2010). In other words, like the EU, ASEAN can be regarded as a normative power. The defining difference is that while the EU is seen as a post-Westphalian entity based on a set of democratic values (Manners 2002; Laïdi 2008a; Whitman 2011), ASEAN is premised on a set of Westphalian principles (Haacke 2005; Rumelili 2007; Acharya 2009; Wunderlich 2012a).

Finally, such normative differences have become a prominent issue and indeed an inhibiting factor in their interaction since the end of the Cold War. Given its focus on the promotion of its liberal and democratic norms, the EU has introduced measures, e.g. the human rights clause, into its agreements with third parties (European Commission 1995a; Miller 2004). In fact, since 1995, the EU has established more than 120 such agreements (Balme 2008: 144; Doan 2010a: 45). Yet, while the EU has successfully

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8 The other two are building the EU as a global actor and the promotion of its power and competitiveness.
included that clause in its cooperation agreements with other regional groupings,\(^9\) it has so far failed to do so with ASEAN. Furthermore, the EU’s insistence on that clause and ASEAN’s resistance to it was a key reason for their disagreements over a number of political matters, e.g. the East Timor issue and the Myanmar problem.\(^10\) These not only became an obstacle in their cooperation (Balaoing 1997) in the 1990s but also negatively affected their interaction during the 2000s. The Myanmar issue even averted the ASEM process (Goh 2004: 324). Thus, in the case of EU-ASEAN cooperation, it seems that not only the lack of actorness of each regional organisation but also the conflicting norms of the two organisations significantly hamper their interaction.

These three positions lead this inquiry to consider the EU-ASEAN relationship and take their normative dimensions, i.e. the norms and values that constitute them as regional actors, as the criterion and the focus to examine their interaction. In doing so, it puts forward a central assumption: that is the EU and ASEAN are two different regional actors that espouse two dissimilar sets of norms to conduct their regional and international affairs and that such normative differences hinder their relations. Within this overarching hypothesis, the thesis explores the following three questions:\(^11\)

- First, what are the normative features that constitute the EU and ASEAN as actors in world politics and that make them different from each other?
- Second, what are the main sources of their normative differences? In other words, why do they promote two opposing sets of norms?
- Third, why do their normative differences become a conflictual and obstructive factor in their relationship?

This also means that the first aim of the thesis is to examine the impact of the normative dimensions of the EU and ASEAN on their interregionalism. Simply put, it essentially investigates EU-ASEAN interregionalism as an *intrinsic* or *theory-guided idiographic case*.\(^12\) This relationship merits such an investigation because, for the EU

\(^9\) These include MERCOSUR (Santander 2005), the group of 12 Mediterranean countries (Panebianco 2006; Martinez 2008) and the ACP, i.e. the group of 78 countries in Africa, the Caribbean and Pacific (Balme 2008).

\(^10\) The country was originally called Burma, which is still used by the US and the United Kingdom (UK) continue to call it ‘Burma’. The United Nations (UN) and ASEAN use Myanmar. Some scholars and the EU often use both names, i.e. ‘Burma/Myanmar’. This thesis refers to it as Myanmar. Yet, it keeps ‘Burma/Myanmar’ and ‘Burma’ when these names are used in/by official documents, officials and others.

\(^11\) Beyond the principal questions that guide the research, in each chapter of the thesis, additional subordinate questions will be introduced to specify and support the analysis.

\(^12\) Stake (1995) identifies three types of case studies, namely *intrinsic*, *instrumental* and *collective*. Regarding the intrinsic case, it is not undertaken primarily because the case represents other cases but because in all its particularity, the case itself is of interest. For Levy (2008), an *idiographic case* is used to
and ASEAN, their respective normative aspects play an integral part in their internal and external relations. Among the existing regional organisations, they are probably the only ones that develop two prominent – and indeed divergent – normative frameworks to conduct their regional and international affairs. Furthermore, their normative factors prominently feed into and negatively affect their interaction. In addition, as noted below, they are arguably the most successful regional organisations in the developed world and the developing world respectively and the two most active organisations in developing interregionalism.

By tackling the three questions, the thesis also attempts to advance an analytical framework that can be used to elucidate the application of the normative factors of the regional organisations to their external relations and their interregionalism. Precisely, by taking EU-ASEAN interregionalism as an instrumental case, it aims to generate some explanatory variables that help to explain why different regional organisations may adopt different sets of norms to conduct their internal and external affairs and to explore whether – if so, why – such normative differences restrain their interaction. The EU, ASEAN and their interregionalism offer a relevant area for investigating those issues because of the reasons mentioned. Furthermore, in addressing its key questions, the thesis also attempts to counter a number of commonly upheld positions. One of these is the argument that in world politics, Western/developed countries in general and the EU in particular are norm producers/exporters and weak/developing countries are norm takers/receivers. Another is related to the normative power Europe (NPE) thesis, which often sees the EU as a force-for-good in world politics. The thesis seeks to illustrate that weak actors, e.g., ASEAN, can be norm entrepreneurs and that normative power can become a source of contention and conflict.

Moreover, by examining a number of key issues of EU-ASEAN relations, the thesis wishes to contribute to the literature on this relationship. As noted, the EU and ASEAN are involved in most of the interregional mechanisms (Hänggi 2006: 34; see also Appendix 6). In addition, this long-standing relationship is viewed as the model of interregionalism (Hänggi 2006: 34; Villacorta 2009: 7), the most advanced interregional

explain a single case as an end in itself rather than as a vehicle for developing broader theoretical generalisations. It has two subtypes. The first is inductive case study, which is highly descriptive and often lacks an explicit theoretical framework to guide the empirical analysis. The second is theory-guided case, which is explicitly structured by a well-developed conceptual framework that pays attention to some theoretically specified aspects of reality and neglects others.

Stake (1995) defines a single instrumental case study as the one that is designed to provide insight into or illustrate a particular issue.
relationship (Rüland 2001: 4) and the best example available for empirical analysis of interregionalism (Doidge 2004b: 39). Yet, unlike ASEM, which has given rise to a very large literature though being only established in 1996, EU-ASEAN interregionalism has not been extensively written about (Doidge 2004a: 10). In a survey of academic literature on EU-ASEAN relations in 2004, Robles (2004a: 6) found 99 works done by European and Asian scholars, published in English, French, German, Italian and Spanish. According to him, 80% of publications on this relationship were published over the last two decades. However, among these titles identified by him there are only four books. The most recent and major work on it is *The Political Economy of Interregional Relations – ASEAN and the EU* of Robles (2004b). Moreover, as Robles (2004b: 1) points out, the majority of the literature on this relationship is in the form of descriptive and historical accounts. For these reasons, while the thesis examines, to some extent, ASEM and other ASEAN-led interregional mechanisms, e.g. the ARF and the EAS, it mainly focuses on EU-ASEAN interregionalism.

A final note that should be made here is that the thesis focuses on the post-Cold War interaction between the EU and ASEAN. More precisely, it primarily looks at their interaction from 1991, i.e. when political matters, e.g. human rights, became a divisive issue in their interaction, to 2009, when they failed to negotiate and conclude a region-to-region free trade agreement (FTA), partly due to their disagreement over the participation of Myanmar in this FTA. There are three reasons for this focus. First, as already mentioned, regional organisations began to emerge as actors on the international stage in the post-Cold War era. Second, and because of the first, interregional relations just become a relevant trend in both the practice and study of world politics after the end of the Cold War. Third, ideational and normative elements also became prominent in both the policy and scholarship of world politics, the EU’s foreign policy, ASEAN’s external relations and the EU-ASEAN interaction following the collapse of the Soviet bloc. Yet, this does not mean that it ignores completely their pre-1991 contact. Indeed, it also looks at their link before 1991 because their post-Cold War relationship and the

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15 As its title reveals, in this book Robles approaches EU-ASEAN relations from a view of political economy.
impact of their normative factors on their relations during this period are only fully explained if their pre-1991 links are considered.

1.3. Some conceptual clarifications

The thesis has so far referred to a number of key terms, which are often contested. Thus, it is worth defining them in order to make clear what they mean and how they are used in this thesis.

Interregionalism: Definitions and forms

Hänggi et al. (2006b: 18) regard interregionalism as a process of widening and deepening interaction between regions. For Rössler (2009: 317), it refers to different forms of bi- or multilateral relations between one or more regional organisations, or between regional organisations and states, under the conditions that regional grouping is acting as an entity in the international system. These definitions illustrate that there is no consensus on the conceptualisation of interregionalism (Söderbaum 2011: 224). Yet, even though they describe it differently, they all imply that in order to establish a formal interregional relationship the regions involved, or at least one of them, must achieve some kind of what Hettne (1993; 2005; 2011) calls ‘regionness’. This concept refers to a five-level process of regional integration that transforms a region as a geographical area, i.e. an object, to an active subject, i.e. an actor. In other words, they must be either a regional complex, or a regional society, or a regional community or an institutionalised entity. As the concept of regionness illustrates, the regions involved in interregionalism can be at different levels of development. Given this, their interregional arrangements differ from one another. Hänggi (2000; 2006) identifies five types of ‘interregionalism’. They are the relations between (1) two regional organisations, (2) a regional organisation and a regional group, (3) two regional groups, (4) groups of states from more than the two core regions and (5) a regional organisation and a third country in another region. In his view, the fourth type, which he sees as ‘megaregional relations’ and the last type considered as ‘quasi-interregional relations’, are only understood as interregional relations in the wider sense, whereas the first three are viewed as interregional relations in the narrower sense. This thesis defines interregionalism in the wider sense. Thus, even though it mainly focuses on EU-ASEAN relations, i.e. the first type, it examines ASEM, i.e. the second type, in which the EU and ASEAN are members. It also looks at two ASEAN-led institutions, namely,
ARF and EAS, which can be seen as the fourth type because such an examination provides a comprehensive understanding of EU-ASEAN interregionalism as well as additional valuable information for exploring the questions that are central to this thesis.

**Regional actors: Actorness, actorship and actorhood**

As already explained, the concept of regional actorness is used to evaluate the relevance of regional organisations and the EU in particular in the global system. However, it is not the sole concept employed to explain the ability to influence of a regional organisation in its external activity. To explore its capability to exert influence on the external world, Hettne (2008a; 2008b; 2011) uses the term of *actorship*, which consists of three interacting components. The first is *regionness*, which has been explained earlier. The second is *actorness*, which he defines as a region’s “capacity to act purposively to shape the outcomes in the external world” (2008a: 2). The last is the region’s international *presence*, which is mainly measured in terms of its size, economic strength and military capability. In his study to examine the international identity and role of the EU, or more exactly whether the EU should transcend its civilian power model, pioneered by Duchêne (1973), in order to cope with the globalised and uncertain world of the 21st century, Tèlo (2007c) uses the concept of *actorhood*. By doing so, he proposes three scenarios (see also Tèlo 2001b: 247-274; 2006: 198-251). The first is to continue with the existing low profile civilian power. The second is to build a ‘Fortress Europe’ as part of global new-mercantilist competition. The third is to foster a new kind of civilian power Europe as a pillar of a new democratic and multilateral world order. Chapter 4 will refer to these three characteristics of the EU. What is meant here is that Tèlo’s concept of actorhood focuses prominently on the nature of the EU as an actor in the international system. In this sense, actorhood of a regional organisation is related to the area that this thesis investigates, namely the nature of the EU and ASEAN. A regional actorhood can also be seen as an integral part of its actorness or its actorship. Yet, the point being made is not that the former is an intrinsic component of the two latter. Rather, it is to state that the central concern of the inquiry is not to analyse all the components (including the institutional and material dimensions) of the actorness or actorship of the EU and ASEAN. As underlined, the thesis only focuses on their

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16 Jepperson et al. (1996: 58) also use actorhood to describe to the identity of states and maintain that ideational and cultural, institutional and normative elements of states, most often norms, constitute their basic identities. Meyer and Jepperson (2000) argue that modern actors, be they individuals, nation-states or organisations derived from them, are a historical and ongoing cultural construction, and that the particulars of this construction should help to account for a number of specific features of their actorhood.
normative aspects – the factors that constitute their respective identity, or what is referred to as ‘the nature of the beast’ (Risse-Kappen 1996; Bretherton and Vogler 2006) – and examines why these influence their interregional relations.

**Norms, values and principles**

As mentioned earlier, though in this thesis ideational and normative factors refer to a wide range of non-material elements, which include norms, values, beliefs, worldviews, ideas, political and strategic culture (Alagappa 1998a; Noble 2004; Reus-Smit 2005; Béland and Cox 2011; Bode et al. 2011), it focuses on values, principles and particularly norms. For this reason, it is worth briefly defining these three terms. Lucarelli (2006a: 10) defines values as “notions laden with an absolute positive significance for the overall order and meaning we try to give our world”. Examples of values, which can be understood as moral and/or political concepts, include liberty, freedom, equality, democracy and respect for human rights. As highlighted, these are also the values, on which the EU is founded. Principles are understood as “normative positions that translate values into constitutional standards for policy action” (Lucarelli 2006a: 10). An example of values turning into principle of action is that the EU’s values are not simply the values on which it is founded. They are also legalised and guide its relations with the wider world, in which it upholds and promotes those values. That is why Manners (2006a: 32) use both ‘values’ and ‘principles’ to refer to the normative framework that the EU is based on and promoted by it. However, as Lucarelli (2006a: 10) notes, the mode of translation (from values into principles) depends on how values are interpreted according to a particular worldview. For instance, liberty has a very different meaning according an individual/cosmopolitan or communitarian view of the social world. This point is worth underlining because it enables the thesis to explain why the EU and ASEAN have divergent and even opposing views of human rights, which will be looked at in Chapter 6. Regarding norms, they are defined as standards of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 891; Barnett 2005: 265). In this sense, norms are related to values, principles and another key concept, namely identities. As it is central to the thesis, Chapter 2 will

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17 While Ruggie (1998) consider normative factors as a component of ideational dimensions, in most cases, the terms ‘normative’ and ‘ideational’ are used together without being distinguished. Stubbs (2008) uses the term ‘ideas’ to refer to (1) cognitive beliefs, (2) normative beliefs (about what is considered to be good and bad in terms of ideals, values and norms) and (3) tastes and desires that shape people’s preferences.

18 Worldviews, also known as images of the world (Lucarelli 2006a: 10), are a way of organising, interpreting and making sense of a complex reality so as to provide guidepost for knowing and acting. Actors conduct their identity and reality with reference to a worldview (Jachtenfuchs 1997: 48).
theorise norms and explain their relations to other key terms, notably values, principles and identities.

1.4. Theoretical considerations

This thesis draws from social constructivism because the insights it offers are very useful in explaining many key issues, e.g. the pivotal roles of norms and values in the EU and ASEAN and their impact on EU-ASEAN relations, which are central to the inquiry. Chapter 2 will explain more detail why many areas of constructivist thought enable it to address adequately its key research questions. A core argument of constructivists, which should be mentioned here, is their argument that ideational and normative factors, e.g. principles, norms and beliefs, are just as important as material ones, e.g. wealth and power (Reus-Smit 2005: 196). A key reason for their emphasis on these software elements is their conviction that these non-material factors condition actors’ identities and inform their interests. For instance, in their views, norms not only regulate actors’ behaviour but also define and redefine their interests and constitute their identities, including the development of collective identities (Acharya 2009: 4). Another reason why they emphasise the relevance of the ideational and normative factors in world politics is their belief that a convergence of these features between political actors foster their cooperation whereas a divergence hinders their interaction. For instance, Kowert and Legro (1996: 454) maintain that norms play a key role in international politics, shaping both cooperation and conflict. The reasons why ideational and normative factors can be both cooperative and conflictual are explained by two different perspectives of social constructivism (Rumelili 2007: 32-7).

The first view, which is upheld by those who work on security communities, e.g. Deutsch (1961), Adler and Barnett (1998), Acharya (2009), or liberal constructivists, e.g. Wendt (1994; 1999) maintains that the formation of collective identity always involves a ‘we-feeling’. Furthermore, for them, this ‘we-feeling’, which includes shared norms and values, is the condition for cooperation among political actors. The second view, which is maintained by critical constructivists or post-structuralists, e.g. Connolly (1991; 1995), Campbell (1992; 1998) and Rumelili (2004; 2007), assumes that the

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19 This also shows that there is not a single constructivism, but different forms of constructivism (Rosamond 2000: 171; Adler 2002: 96; Devine 2008: 464) because while some constructivists prioritise agents, others structures. Some focus on interstate politics, others domestic politics whereas others seek to bridge these two domains (Adler 1997; 2002; 2005, Barnett 2005). Yet, despite those differences, constructivists share core arguments, e.g. the social construction of reality, the importance of ideational and normative factors in world politics (Price and Reus-Smit 1998; Reus-Smit 2005).
formation of collective identity also entails the production of a sense of difference with outsiders. Moreover, in their views, this sense of difference can bring about conditions for confrontation and conflict with the outsiders. This thesis takes both these perspectives. This is because while the former is valuable for exploring why the members of the EU and ASEAN could come together and builds their respective collective identity and community/regional organisation, the latter is very beneficial for explaining the normative differences of the EU and ASEAN and the impact of those normative divergences on their interaction.

In addition, the thesis anchors its argument in normative theory because it is very helpful in defining the EU and ASEAN as well as distinguishing them from each other. A normative theory approach often outlines two main normative positions, namely *cosmopolitanism* and *communitarianism*, with the former arguing that the central focus of any normative theory of world politics should concentrate either on individual human beings or humanity as a whole (Jackson and Sorensen 2003: 260; Smith and Owens 2005: 279). In contrast, the latter argues that the appropriate focus is the political community, usually the state (Brown 1992: 55; Smith and Owen 2005: 279; Wiessala 2006: 37). These two positions reflect quite well the EU, ASEAN and their respective normative premises because the EU’s values, e.g. human rights and democracy, are predominantly individual-centred whereas ASEAN’s principles, e.g. sovereignty and non-interference, are state-centric. Yet, it is imperative to underscore here that the thesis does not aim to make a judgment on which set of norms is better. Rather, it draws on a normative theory approach to explain what the EU and ASEAN are in terms of their normative dimensions, why their norms differ from each other and explores why their normative foundation and differentiation affect their interaction.

Finally, it is important to state that the thesis’s adoption of a combination of social constructivism and normative theory to develop its theoretical framework to explicate the EU, ASEAN and their interregionalism does not mean that other IR perspectives, notably realism and liberalism, are completely irrelevant in explaining these two organisations and their interaction. Indeed, taking into account the moral of the story of *Five Blind Men and the Elephant* (Puchala 1972) and the views of scholars such Walt (1998) and Snyder (2004), this thesis recognises that these perspectives can be used to explain some aspects of the EU, ASEAN and their relations. For instance, as will be seen in Chapter 5, realism remains a key theoretical approach to international politics in Southeast Asia. The main reason that it chooses constructivism and normative theory is
that their key insights are more suitable to the investigation of the normative features of the EU and ASEAN, the sources of their normative differentiation and the significance of their normative differentiation to their interregionalism.

1.5. Methodological issues

As it has already been made clear, this research explores the normative features of the EU and ASEAN, the reasons behind their norms and the implications of their norms to their interregionalism. To that end, it follows a qualitative research methodology, which is guided by narrative and empirical inquiry. Narrative as a qualitative research methodology is commonly acknowledged (Clandinin and Connelly 2000; Czarniawska 2004), with some even maintaining that all research is narrative (Hendry 2010). It is popular in various disciplines of social sciences, including political science (Shenhav 2006; Spector-Mersel 2011) and its subfields, e.g. international relations (Suganami 1997; 1999; 2008; Roberts 2006) and European studies (Agius 2007; Ciuta 2007; Martin 2011). The thesis adopts a narrative approach because whatever the EU and ASEAN are defined, such an act always involves a narrative. As narrative is seen as central for constructing collective identity and it always focuses on experience (Roberts 2006; Henry 2007; Birchfield 2011: 151; Martin 2011: 191), it is very appropriate for the thesis to address its key questions, notably the two first ones. Manners and Whitman (2003: 383) identify three key elements that define the EU’s international identity, namely how it is constituted, constructed and represented. By constitution, they refer to the constitutive history and principles of the EU. By construction, they mean the way in which it is understood. By representation, they mean the ways, in which it represents itself and is represented in the minds of those who experience it. Such a way of defining the EU can also be applied to ASEAN. For instance, Southeast Asia’s history plays an important role in shaping ASEAN’s raison d’être and its constitutive norms. By adopting a narrative approach, the thesis can explain why and how the time-space setting, in which the EU and ASEAN have developed, significantly defines their respective normative premises (Postel-Vinay 2008; Stubbs 2008; Forchtner and Kølvraa 2012).

Besides facilitating to construct identity, narratives also help to frame and structure action (Roberts 2006: 710). For instance, in regarding themselves as a force

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20 Narrative research resembles intrinsic case study research because both focus on the issue/case itself (Creswell et al. 2007: 247).
21 For Henry (2007: 493), the primary concern of narrative is to develop modes of analysis that provide explanatory power for understanding experience.
for good in world politics, EU actors engage in a discourse, in which they construct themselves as model citizens (Diez and Pace 2011: 211) and such a construction empowers the EU in projecting its values abroad (Cebeci 2012: 573). Thus, a narrative approach enables the thesis not only to explain the norms of the EU and ASEAN, the reasons behind their norms, but also to explicate, to some extent, why, when and how their norms affect their interaction. In this sense, narratives fit very well the thesis’s theoretical perspective, which is primarily based on constructivism, whose main theme is the impact of ideas on social action (Roberts 2006: 705). Yet, a major challenge arises is how to recognise the dominant narrative about the EU and ASEAN because as will be shown in Chapters 4 and 5, the EU and ASEAN are often narrated differently by different people. As has been explained in this chapter and will be explored in-depth in the subsequent chapters, this thesis chooses to narrate the EU as a cosmopolitan normative power and ASEAN as a communitarian normative power.

To illustrate the normative nature of the EU and ASEAN, the sources of their normative foundation and differentiation and especially the reasons why their normative foundation and differentiation affect their interregional relations, the inquiry examines three empirical cases. The main evidence that supports the central arguments of the thesis lies in these three case studies. It is worth noting that case studies are widely used in qualitative research and very popular in international relations (Bennett and Elman 2007) because they offer several advantages (Vaus 2001; Yin 2003; 2009; Hartley 2004; Denscombe 2007;). As already mentioned, there are different typologies of case studies. Levy (2008) classifies three types: idiographic, hypothesis generating and hypothesis testing. Yin (2003) differentiates between single, holistic case studies and multiple-case studies. This thesis opts for multiple-case studies and the selected cases, which will be examined in Chapters 6, 7 and 8 respectively, are the East Timor issue, the Myanmar problem and the Aceh matter. Chapter 2 will establish the factors to explain the normative differences of the EU and ASEAN and identify the conditions under what their normative differences can lead to disruptions in their relations. Chapter 3 will provide a historical background of these case studies. What should be underlined is that the cases chosen are not purely intrinsic or idiographic case studies. They are instrumental case studies, which serve as vehicles for demonstrating what the EU and ASEAN in terms of their normative constituents, why they develop and promote two different sets of norms and above all, why their normative differences can become a major obstacle in their interaction. The thesis also opts for a collective/multiple-case
study method because the findings it replicates across the selected cases enable it to explain better these issues.

Regarding the three selected cases, the thesis chooses them because they are suitable for investigating the central issues it attempts to address. The East Timor issue and the Myanmar problem, which can be regarded as two extreme cases, are two appropriate for illustrating the normative differences of the EU and ASEAN and the negative impact of such differences on their cooperation. The East Timor issue became a disruptive issue in their relations in the 1990s mainly because the EU and ASEAN upheld and promoted two opposing sets of norms. Similarly, given their normative divergences, the Myanmar problem not only negatively affected their relations in the 1990s and their cooperation in the last decade, i.e. 2000s, but also hindered the progress of the ASEM process. These two issues also involved both political and economic matters. For instance, while the former was seen as a key reason for their failure to negotiate and conclude a new and far-reaching cooperation agreement in the early 1990s, the latter was a dominant factor leading to the collapse of the negotiations towards a region-to-region free trade agreement (FTA) in 2009. Unlike the two first cases, the Aceh matter is much less talked about in the literature on EU-ASEAN relations. Yet, it is a relevant and indeed typical case for a number of reasons. The EU’s participation of the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) was the first-ever mission that it pursued under its European Security and Defence in Asia. The AMM was also the unprecedented mission that the EU and ASEAN undertook together. Yet, until their participation in the AMM, ASEAN states were never concerned about the Aceh conflict even though it was a deadly and long-standing conflict in their region. Furthermore, while the AMM was repeatedly hailed by the EU, they were rarely talked about in ASEAN. These raise a number of questions whose answers will provide valuable insights into the issues that the thesis seeks to address. One of these is why unlike the issues of East Timor and Myanmar, over which the EU and ASEAN greatly differed and hardly found a common ground to solve them, the EU and ASEAN could work

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22 EU-ASEAN relations are multifaceted, involving a wide range of activities in different areas, e.g. economics, politics and security. These three fields can be selected as three case studies. However, the links between the two regional organisations in these areas overlap. Consequently, it is not easy to separate them from each other. For this reason, they are not selected. Other issues, e.g. the 1997/98 financial crisis, might also be selected. However, they are rejected because they are either insignificant or unrepresentative in EU-ASEAN relations.

23 An extreme case is selected because of its extreme values on the independent or dependent variable of interest whereas a typical case is used to provide a broader phenomenon (Seawright and Gerring 2008: 299, 301).
together to monitor the AMM. Another important question is why the EU was so interested and actively engaged in solving the Aceh conflict, ASEAN and its members were largely indifferent to it. Overall, while the two first cases focus on economic and political matters of EU-ASEAN relations, the Aceh matter deals with their security cooperation. Thanks to this, besides offering the thesis valuable evidence to illustrate its key arguments, the three cases also enable it explain more comprehensively the EU-ASEAN relationship.

In terms of information and data used for its narrative and empirical inquiry, the thesis draws on three types of sources. The first and most important one is the official documents issued by the EU and ASEAN and those jointly released by the two organisations. These documents, which exist in different forms, e.g. treaties, declarations, communications and speeches, not only enable the thesis to narrate amply what the EU and ASEAN are in terms of their normative features. They also allow it to explain adequately why the normative foundation and differentiation of the two regional organisations defines their relations in general and their posture vis-à-vis the three case studies in particular. This is because throughout their existence and development, the EU and ASEAN have published a variety of treaties and declarations, which not only underline their nature and orientation but also guide their actions and policies. For instance, on the European side, there are a huge number of lengthy and legally binding documents on the EU’s values as well as its wider objectives in the world. On the ASEAN side, even though compared to the EU, ASEAN’s internal and external relations are less documented and particularly much less legally binding, it has a number of influential documents, e.g. the Bangkok Declaration (AMM 1967), or the TAC (ASEAN Summit 1976b), which clearly outline its key principles and its goals in both its internal and external relations. There are also numerous and valuable documents on EU-ASEAN relations issued by the EU, ASEAN and/or jointly released by the two organisations. For instance, their Joint Communiqués, which are published at the end of the ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meetings (AEMM, see Appendix 7), provide a lot of information on their official relationship. Most of the official documents, on which the thesis is based to acquire information for its analysis, are publicly available on the internet sites of – or in the printed form by – the various institutions of the EU and ASEAN. Yet, some important statements, especially those made by the officials of the EU and ASEAN at their joint meetings, regarding sensitive issues, e.g. human rights, in their relations, are not published. The author feels fortunate to get access to these, which
are made available by the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union and the Historical Archives of the European Commission.

The second type of information, which the thesis uses for its analysis, includes a wide range of genres, e.g. accounts on constructivism, scholarly literature on interregionalism, EU-ASEAN relations and on the EU and ASEAN. This second type of information is available in different forms, e.g. newspapers, journals, books and the so-called Track Two works. These secondary sources not only enable the thesis to explain the key concepts that are central to the inquiry as well as to establish what the EU and ASEAN are. They also allow it to examine EU-ASEAN interaction, especially their stance vis-à-vis the issues of East Timor, Myanmar and Aceh. In brief, the scholarly literature and other forms of written material, which this author has extensively collected (as found in the bibliography) and thoroughly and critically examined, are also of great importance because they provide valuable information for the inquiry to develop and illustrate its key arguments.

The third source of information derives from interviews and questionnaires. Though the data gained from the interviews and questionnaires is aimed at supporting the first two sources, they are also of importance because it permits the thesis to enrich the development, clarification and support of its key hypotheses. The author conducted nine high-quality interviews with officials of the EU, ASEAN and experts on EU-ASEAN relations (see Appendix 19). This involved two visits to Brussels and a three-week stay in Singapore. With regard to the interviews with officials, the candidates chosen were those who either ran or knew very well the daily activities of the EU-ASEAN cooperation, e.g. those working in the Southeast Asia Unit of the European Commission and ASEAN’s former General-Secretaries. Given their first-hand knowledge and experience, they provide an official and insightful perspective of each side vis-à-vis the other and the overall cooperation between the two regional organisations. Interviews with academics as well as with those who worked as both officials and academics were also conducted to give a more balanced and comprehensive assessment of EU-ASEAN cooperation. All interviews, but one, were face-to-face. The interviews conducted were semi-structured. That is to say even though a guided set of questions had been prepared for a particular interview, each interview was flexible, allowing new questions to surface during the interview as a result of what the interviewee said. For reasons of confidentiality, all the names of interviewees whose
information is used or quoted in this thesis are withheld. The thesis only refers to them generally, e.g. an EU official, and mentions the year when the interview took place.

The author also conducted a survey on the EU, ASEAN and their relations. Like interviews, questionnaires are a means to collect new information and data to test and support the key assumptions of the thesis. Targeted respondents were scholars in EU-ASEAN relations, who have had works published on this relationship, and experts in the EU’s relations with ASEAN and East Asian countries, who work in different think tanks and institutions. Based on these two criteria, respondents were identified and sent the questionnaire.\textsuperscript{24} The structure of the questionnaire was divided into three parts, which included 10 multiple-choice questions, 19 statements and one open question (see Appendix 20). The questions are aimed at asking the respondents to give their views on specific issues that the thesis is investigating. As the informants are scholars and experts in EU-ASEAN relations, their responses provide very meaningful information for analysis. Overall, the combination of documentary analysis (both primary and secondary sources), elite interviews and expert survey, is suitable for the narrative and empirical investigation into the norms of the EU and ASEAN, the reason behind their normative underpinnings and the impact of their norms on their relations. In other words, the information and data acquired from those sources will allow the thesis to address satisfactorily its three core questions.

1.6. Structure of the thesis

The thesis is divided into nine chapters. The present chapter, i.e. Chapter 1, has presented the context, aim, assumptions and research questions of the study. It has also briefly covered its theoretical considerations and explained its methodological issues. Chapter 2 develops in detail the theoretical framework for the thesis. Chapter 3 offers an overview of EU-ASEAN relations. Chapters 4 and 5 examine what the EU and ASEAN are in terms of their normative dimensions. As explained, to address this issue, with a narrative approach and based on a normative theory perspective, Chapter 4 depicts the EU as a cosmopolitan normative power and Chapter 5 portrays ASEAN as a communitarian normative power. Chapters 6, 7 and 8 focus on the three cases studies, i.e. the East Timor issue, Myanmar problem and the Aceh matter respectively. Based on the findings provided by the previous chapters, Chapter 9 reaches a number of

\textsuperscript{24} Nearly a half (i.e. about 46\%) of them completed and returned the questionnaires.
conclusions regarding the EU, ASEAN, their interregionalism as well as the relevance of the normative factors of the regional organisations involved to their interregionalism.

2. Theorising EU-ASEAN Interregionalism

The main purpose of this chapter is to develop a theoretical framework for the thesis. To that end, it begins by highlighting the core arguments of constructivism and normative theory, on which the thesis is premised to explore the EU, ASEAN and their interregionalism. As they are central to the thesis, the chapter then defines norms and explains their relationship to other concepts, notably values, principles and identities. Two other principal concepts that are examined in this section are norm entrepreneur and normative power. In defining these two terms and relating them to the EU and ASEAN, the chapter aims to define what the EU and ASEAN are and how different they are in terms of their normative dimensions. It holds that both the EU can be aptly seen as norm entrepreneurs and normative powers. The difference is that the two respective normative frameworks that constitute them as actors in world politics and are promoted by them diverge from each other. While the EU heralds liberal norms, ASEAN opts for traditional/Westphalian ones. Basing on a normative theory perspective, it differentiates the EU from ASEAN by depicting the former as a cosmopolitan normative power and the latter a communitarian normative power. Yet, this raises another relevant question that is why different actors, e.g. the EU and ASEAN, promote different normative frameworks. Consequently, the chapter identifies the processes or factors that lead them to generate and promote their own norms. In the current literature on norms, much has been written to examine whether norms matter in international relations and how they matter. However, less attention has been paid to why a given actor seeks to promote a particular norm or a set of norms. If the third section is aimed at clarifying why different actors promote different norms, the fourth one examines why their normative differences affect their relations. Such an investigation facilitates the thesis to explain meaningfully why the EU and ASEAN find it difficult to interact with each other in the post-Cold War period. Again, this is also relatively under-developed in literature on norms, which mainly focuses on why shared norms foster cooperation between actors in world politics. To explain why normative divergences can be conductive to hindering EU-ASEAN interregionalism, this section draws on critical constructivist or post-structural accounts, e.g. Diez (2004; 2005),
Rumelili (2004; 2007). In brief, an examination of these four issues will enable the thesis to tackle adequately its three principal questions raised in Chapter 1.

2.1. Constructivism and normative theory: Core insights

As noted in Chapter 1, in the post-Cold War period, when regional organisations and interregionalism (re-)emerged on the global system, constructivism also became prominent in both the study and practice of international politics. This constructivist turn has challenged two major and long-standing beliefs often maintained by mainstream IR theories, notably rationalist perspectives.

First, actors in world politics are not pre-social as traditionally assumed. Like other social agents, they are defined by the environment, in which they find themselves (Risse 2005: 161). In other words, like other social agents, they do not exist dependently from their setting (Barnett 2005: 259). In this sense, as social actors, the EU, ASEAN and their respective normative underpinnings are influenced by their own context-specific conditions, e.g. their respective historical, cultural and geopolitical factors (Christiansen et al. 1999; 2001; Postel-Vinay 2008; Stubbs 2008). That is why, though coming into existence almost at the same period, the EU, ASEAN and their respective ways of perceiving and conducting their own regional and international affairs significantly differ from each other.

Second, unlike rationalists and particularly (neo-)realists,25 constructivists hold that ideational and normative dimensions play a determining, rather than secondary, role in foreign policy interactions (Reus-Smit 2005: 196; Acharya 2009: 4; see also Wendt 1992; 1994; 1995; 1996a; 1996b; Katzenstein 1996a; Adler 1997; 2005; Checkel 1998; Ruggie 1999; Acharya 2009). For these constructivists, ideational forces matter for at least two reasons. First, they condition actors’ identities and inform their interests. As will be shown, norms not only regulate actors’ behaviour as rationalists suppose; they also constitute their identities and define their behaviour in the sense of influencing their actions and the way they act. For instance, the EU’s values not only shape its international identity, role and goals, e.g. the promotion of those values as one of the core objectives of its foreign policy. They also define the ways it follows, e.g. the Copenhagen criteria or the conditionality, to achieve those goals. This point is of central importance because it enables the thesis to explain that ideational and normative

25 Rationalists regard cost-benefit calculations as the logic underlying actors’ behaviour and neorealists, who maintain that only material factors and forces, e.g. wealth and power, matter in international relations.
elements define not only the interests/goals of the external relations of the EU and ASEAN and their interregionalism, but also the approaches/ways they use/follow to achieve those interests/goals. Second, ideational features matter in world politics because they foster cooperation when they are compatible whereas they hinder interaction when they are incompatible.

A third key argument held by constructivists is that formation of collective identity and the construction of security communities or regional organisations, e.g. the EU and ASEAN, like other social communities, is only made possible through the presence of some pre-existing conditions, e.g. historical similarities of its members, and the process of interaction between its members. Thanks to these pre-existing conditions and their socialisation, the members within a community or the states within a region can consider themselves as part of a ‘we-group’. This sense of belonging to a group is also the basis for the cooperation within the community. However, that process of collective identity formation and community building also involves a ‘they-group’ because “the production of a sense of collective identity within a community inevitably entails the production of a sense of difference with states outside of the community” (Rumelili 2007: 6). In other words, identity information “entails developing a collective sense not only of ‘who we are’, but also ‘how we differ from others’” (Acharya 2009: 28). Furthermore, if a sense of belonging to a group enhances cooperation among states within the community, the production of difference generates conditions for conflict in the external relations of the community (Rumelili 2007: 7).

The subsequent sections of this chapter will develop in more detail these three core arguments. Yet, two examples can be given now to illustrate them. The first, which will be studied in more detail in Chapter 4, is about the process of European enlargement vis-à-vis the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and Turkey. Just fifteen years after the collapse of the Soviet/communist bloc, 10 CEE countries were admitted into the EU in 2004. By contrast, despite Turkey’s interest in joining the European Community in 1959 (Rumelili 2007: 64), 50 years later, its request has still not been accepted. One may ask why the CEE countries were quickly allowed to join the EU whereas Turkey’s request has not yet been granted. While recognising that there are many factors involved, ideational factors play a significant role in the EU’s posture vis-à-vis the CEE countries and Turkey (Diez 2007; Dixon 2008). It is believed that the CEE countries’ membership to the EU was accelerated and accepted because they belong to Europe, i.e. sharing the same ‘we-group’ (Rumelili 2004; 2007; Diez 2007;
By contrast, Turkey has not yet been allowed to join because it does not share a common history, culture and civilisation – or a European-ness or a ‘we-group’ – with Europe (Phillips 2009; Kuebler 2011). This example also shows that the spatial and cultural environment, in which actors, e.g. the EU and its members, embed define their identities and their ways of perceiving and conducting their internal and external affairs.

The second example of is related to the EU and ASEAN. Conditioned by their own contexts, e.g. Europe’s war-torn past for the EU and Southeast Asia’s colonialism for ASEAN, these two organisations strive to organise and pursue their internal and external relations around their own set of shared norms. ASEAN has evolved a brand of diplomatic and security culture,26 i.e. the ‘ASEAN way’, to guide its regional and international policies (Acharya 1999: 56; Haacke 2005: 5; Nishikawa 2007: 45). Given this, while recognising that realist considerations, e.g. power politics, are strong among Southeast Asia’s political leaders (Emmers 2003: 6), nobody can deny the predominance of norms in ASEAN’s internal and external relations (Ciorciara 2008). Some even believe that they are “more insightful than ‘balance-of-power’ realism” (Peou 2002: 120). On the EU side, it has developed a set of liberal and democratic norms to inform its internal and external policies (Marsch and Mackenstein 2005; Laidi 2008). This set of values has now become an integral part of its foreign policy and its strategic culture, which is defined as a set of beliefs, attitudes, norms, worldviews and patterns of behaviour held by the EU vis-à-vis security and defence issues.27

These two examples illustrate that ideational and normative factors are pertinent to international relations. Yet, while they matter, they do not necessarily influence in a constructive manner; they can affect negatively (Acharya 2005: 103). For instance, as will be illustrated, norms shape both cooperation and conflict (Kowert and Legro 1996: 454). Their positive influence is widely examined by constructivist accounts on security communities, which maintain that shared norms and identities, or the ‘we-group’ elements, are imperative for the creation and maintenance of security communities

26 Acharya (1999: 56-7) refers to the ASEAN way as security culture and differs it from strategic culture (see next footnote) in three respects. First, strategic security revolves around issues of threat perceptions and military doctrine. Second, it is largely associated with state security. Third, it concentrates on great powers’ behaviour. However, according to Wah (2000), Biava et al. (2011) and Haglund (2011), there is not much of a distinction worth making between these two concepts because they are interrelated.

27 The ‘strategic culture’ concept, first developed by Snyder (1977), became prominent in the literature on international relations after the end of the Cold War (Ball 1993; Lantis 2003). It began figuring in the scholarship on the EU after its publication of European Security Strategy in 2003 (Rynning 2003; Cornis and Edwards 2005; Meyer 2005; 2006; Biava et al. 2011).
(Deutsch 1957; Acharya 2009). They become obstructive when they are incompatible as EU-Turkey relations demonstrate. Rentzow-Vasu (2006) points out that the EU and ASEAN disputed over a number of issues, notably human rights and democracy, because they have opposing socio-cultural norms. Later, based on critical constructivist/post-structural accounts, the chapter will examine more in detail why become an obstacle in the relationship between international actors, e.g. the EU and ASEAN. A crucial point made here is that the realm of international relations can be interpreted as a place where international actors compete not only for material powers but also for ideational ones with actors seeking to promote their own normative frameworks. This also means that different actors may have different and even competing ideas of how world politics should be constructed or conducted. A normative theory perspective is useful for explaining these differences.

Like social constructivism, a normative theory approach to international relations prominently centres on norms. The distinction is that it focuses more on the ethical aspects of norms (Hurrell 2005). More precisely, it often outlines two main normative positions, namely cosmopolitanism and communitarianism. Cosmopolitanism argues that the central focus of any normative theory of world politics should concentrate on either individual human beings or the humanity as a whole (Smith and Owens 2005: 279). In other words, for a cosmopolitan perspective, which has become increasingly popular in the West, individuals should be seen as agents and units of consideration in the realm of interregional politics (Dunn et al. 2010). In contrast, the latter argues that the appropriate focus is the political community or the state (Brown 1992: 55; Smith and Owen 2005: 279; Dunn et al. 2010: 298). These two normative positions are very useful in identifying the norms of the EU and ASEAN as well as distinguishing them from each other. In the current literature, the EU has already been depicted as a proactive cosmopolitan community (Smith 2006) or a normative power (Manners 2002; Whitman 2011), because it has espoused a set of liberal or individual-centred values (Taylor 1999; Rynning 2003). In contrast, ASEAN’s norms, e.g. sovereignty and non-interference, are predominantly state-centric. Furthermore, as will be shown in Chapter 5, whether there exist values that are typically ‘Asian’ is a point of contention. Yet, it is

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28 The divergent views between the EU and the US, and even between EU members, vis-à-vis the Iraq war are another example of why normative difference can impede cooperation between actors in world politics (Rynning 2003; Puetter and Wiener 2007). This example also shows that normative divergence can occur between members within a wider community (e.g. NATO) or a narrower organisation, e.g. the EU.
clear that some of ASEAN states’ leaders, e.g. Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew and Malaysia’s Mahathir Mohamad as well as those who advocate the Asian values maintain that (the economic development and stability of) the community, i.e. the state, is much more important than (the political rights and freedoms of) the individual (Zakaria 1994; Mahathir 1997). Another noteworthy difference between cosmopolitanism and communitarianism is that the former “rejects the idea that states have a right to autonomy if it allows them to undertake actions that conflict with the rights of individuals”, whereas the latter “opposes any restrictions on autonomy that do not arise out of the community itself” (Smith and Owens 2005: 279-80). In other words, they differ over whether and when it is right for states to intervene into others’ internal affairs. These insights are also very valuable for explaining the normative differences of the EU and ASEAN and the implication of those divergences to their relations. Given their emphasis on the individual’s rights and freedoms, the EU and its members are willing to interfere into other states’ domestic politics in order to promote democratic norms (Poos 1991; Moeller 2007: 474). In contrast, ASEAN members reject such interference because it violates the norms of national sovereign and non-interference that are central to their regional and international relations. As will be explained further later, based on these two contrasting normative positions, the thesis depicts the former as a cosmopolitan normative power and the latter as a communitarian normative power because their respective norms fit very well the characteristics of these two positions.

Briefly, this chapter proposes three central positions that the inquiry takes in its exploration of the EU, ASEAN and their interregionalism. First, actors in world politics, e.g. EU and ASEAN, their identities and norms are socially constructed. Consequently, they are the products of their own temporal and spatial conditions. Second, like material factors, ideational ones are influential in global politics (Jepperson et al. 1995: 65) because the building blocks of international reality are both material and ideational (Christiansen et al. 1999: 530; Ruggie 1999: 239; Huntington 2007: 53). Precisely, they are of importance because they define international actors’ identities, interests and ways of operating in the international system and shape both positive and negative outcomes of world politics (Acharya 2009: 28). Third, the construction of a community, e.g. the EU and ASEAN, not only requires a sense of collective identity, i.e. a ‘we-group’, within the community but also entails the production of a sense of difference with outsiders, i.e. a ‘they-group’. Moreover, while the former enhance cooperation between members within a community, the latter can lead to tensions between the ‘we-group’
and the ‘they-group’. The next section, which focuses on the three core concepts, namely norms, norm entrepreneur and normative power, will further explain these.

2.2. Norms, norm entrepreneur and normative power

2.2.1. Norms

Norms are a core notion in social sciences (Horne 2001: 3). With the constructivist turn, they became prominent in the study of international relations (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 889; Elgström 2000: 459; García 2006: 15-6; Capie 2008: 637; Beyer and Hofman 2011: 290). Yet, though being widely mentioned, norms are understood differently by different people (Hechter and Opp 2001: xii; Horne 2001: 3; Cancian 1975: 1). For some, they are standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations, i.e. they specify what people ought to do (Williams 1960: 24; Krasner 1982: 186; Kratochwill 1989: 59), while others regard them as frames of reference or standardised ways of regulating activities and perceiving the world (Sherif 1965: 24-5). Ingrebritsen (2002: 12) defines norms as established practices, codes of conduct and standards of acceptable behaviour. According to Klotz (1995a: 14) and Legro (1997: 33) norms are broadly defined as collective understandings of standards for behaviour. For Finnemore (1996: 22), Jepperson et al. (1996: 54), Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 891) and Barnett (2005: 265), norms are standards of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity or shared expectations about appropriate behaviour held by a community of actors. Sjursen (2003: 43) conceptualises norms “as inter-subjective beliefs about the worlds. They define actors and constitute their preferences and worldviews”. Based on these definitions, this chapter highlights four key elements of norms that the thesis takes to explain the EU, ASEAN, their respective normative basis and their interregionalism.

Norms are generally defined as standardised ways of regulating activities or standards that govern people’s behaviour (bold for emphasis). In this sense, broadly speaking, norms refer to or convey what is ‘normal’. As conceptualised by Williams (1960), Krasner (1982), Kratochwill (1989), norms also imply what is ‘normative’ (bold for emphasis) or “a moral imperative – that is a sense of oughtness” (Hechter and Opp 2001: xiii) or “a principle of right action that can be approached from various ethical perspectives” (Forsberg 2011: 1190). They assume this moral/ethical role “when they express values that create new rights and responsibilities” (Bernstein 2000: 467). In this light, they are perceived as moral/ethical values (Womack 2008: 267; Stoeva 2010: 13). This is true in the case of the EU’s set of liberal norms, e.g. peace, liberty,
democracy and human rights, which are often referred to (in the EU’s key documents as well as in the literature on the EU) as values.

It is commonly held that norms regulate behaviour (Horne 2001: 4; Garcia 2006: 16). Yet, norms also define actors’ interests and identities (Kloz 1995b; Finnemore 1996) and constitute preferences and worldviews (Sjursen 2003: 43). Indeed, they shape not only the interests or the policies of actors but also their basic identities, i.e. the features of their actorhood (Jepperson et al. 1996: 58; Katzenstein 1996b: 5; Kowert and Legro 1996: 462; Barnett 2005: 265). According to Makarychev (2008), not only are norms and interests mutually constitutive, but so are norms and identities. Furthermore, norms affect the ways actors connect their preferences to policy choices (Kowert and Legro 1996: 463).

While norms are regarded as normal practices, different actors in different temporal and spatial contexts often adopt different norms. They even interpret norms differently (Tocci and Manners 2008: 306-7). In other words, the meaning and significance of – the preference for – norms are not independent of time and space. They are all the product of a specific history (Ruggie 1999: 239; Laïdi 2008: 4; Postel-Vinay 2008: 40). For Jepperson et al. (1996: 54), “norms establish expectations about who the actors will be in a particular environment and about how these particular actors will behave”. For this reason, as highlighted by Finnemore (1996a: 22), Sjursen (2003: 43) Barnett (2005: 265), norms always involve collective expectations of proper behaviour of actors with a given identity (bold for emphasis).

Finally, whatever norms are defined they always involves a discursive asymmetry. Practices are regarded as ‘normal’ because they are differentiated from others, which are seen as ‘abnormal’. As Acharya (2009: 26) puts it, norms help actors to distinguish between ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’. That is why normative discourse is “marked by a frontier separating the inside from the outside, a frontier between those who succeed in remaining within normative boundaries and those excluded from them” (Makarychev 2008: 157). Indeed, like identities, which are only distinguished when they are seen as relative to the identities of others (Hopf 1998: 175), certain practices are regarded as democratic because they are defined against those, which are perceived as non-democratic. Furthermore, the production of that difference can generate conflict. The

29 This role is strongly maintained by the works on international regimes, e.g. Krasner (1982), Keohane (1984), Young (1989) and Parker (2001).
30 In this sense, norms are closely interrelated to other notions, which are referred to in this thesis, e.g. worldviews, principles, values, approaches, preferences and identities.
last section will examine why normative differences can be a source for conflict between different actors with different or opposing norms.

2.2.2. Norm entrepreneur

It makes no sense to talk about norms without examining how they come about because they do not appear out of thin air. In fact, as identified by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 894), international norm come into existence via a three-stage cycle and the first stage is known as *norm emergence*. The agents that play the central role during this stage are *norm entrepreneurs*, who first “call attention to issues or even “create” issues by using language that names, interprets, and dramatizes them” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 897). In other words, norm entrepreneurs are those who are dissatisfied with the existing normative context and promote a particular norm or a set of norms that they think to be the appropriate behaviour (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 896-90; Ingebritsen 2002: 12; Hamilton 2008: 80) or those who set out to change the behaviour of other (Florini 1996: 375). For example, as will be examined in Chapters 4, 6 and 7, the EU strongly insisted on the protection of human rights in its post-Cold War foreign policy and its relations with ASEAN because it was concerned about the human rights situation in other parts of the world. The second stage is *norm acceptance* or *norm cascade*, during which the norm leaders, i.e. those have already accepted the new norm, try to socialise and convince others to accept the new norm and become norm followers. The EU is also very active in this second stage. However, the EU has also faced difficulties in persuading others, e.g. Mediterranean countries (Pace 2007b: 665) and notably ASEAN, to accept its set of liberal norms. If the norms pass the first two stages, they reach the third one, i.e. *norm internalisation*, during which “norms may become so widely accepted that they are internalized by actors and achieve a ‘taken-for-granted’ quality that makes conformance with them almost automatic” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 904). The former communist CEE countries’ compliance with the Copenhagen criteria before their admission to the EU is an example of this internalisation.

Various actors, e.g. individuals, non-governmental organisations and states, could embody the role of a norm entrepreneur in world politics (Finnemore 1996a; Ingebritsen; 2006). Nevertheless, states are the most prominent norm entrepreneurs.

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31 The term has its root in the French word, *entrepreneur*, which refers to someone who takes initiatives, introduces new ideas or undertakes a project. While it is mainly used in economics (Nandan 2009: 5), it is also used in political science and international relations. According to Florini (1996: 375), the term *norm entrepreneur* was used by John Mueller at a conference on ‘The Emergence of New Norms in Personal and International Behavior’ held at University of California in May 1993.
(Katzenstein 1996a; Wendt 1999). It is also often maintained that powerful states are better positioned to take on norm entrepreneurial role (Axelrod 1986: 1108; Florini 1996: 375; Job 2007: 61). According to Womack (2004), the more powerful an actor in the international system is, the more likely it tends to advocate its preferred norms. The West’s strong focus on the promotion of liberal values to the non-Western world after the end of the Cold War is an example of this (Fukuyama 1992). Indeed, as will be shown in the subsequent chapters, this is somehow true in the EU’s foreign policy and its relations vis-à-vis ASEAN in the post-Cold War period (Lim 2012: 56). The triumphant mood in West following the collapse of the communist bloc prompted the EU and its members to advocate a new international system, which is based on liberal and democratic norms. It is also commonly held that international norms are mainly produced in and by the West (Postel-Vinay 2008: 40). However, this does not mean that major powers and Western countries always hold a monopoly on norm entrepreneurship. Small and non-Western one also play the role of norm entrepreneurs by seeking to advance norms that challenge the established order or influence world politics in a particular way (Arter 2002; Ingebritsen 2002; 2006; Jacob 2007; Stubbs 2008; Brommesson 2010; Nasra 2011). In his study, Acharya (2011: 97) maintains that the post-colonial period, Third World states and regions in Asia and Africa engage in what he calls norm subsidiarity, which signifies a process whereby local or weaker actors “create rules with a view to preserve their autonomy from dominance, neglect, violation or abuse by more powerful central actors”. As will be shown in Chapters 5 and 6, the fact that some leaders of ASEAN countries, such as Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew and Malaysia’s Mahathir Mohamad, championed the concept of ‘Asian values’ to challenge Western/European values, is an example of the engagement of small non-Western actors in norm entrepreneurship. Moreover, norm entrepreneurs in world politics are not always states. They can be regional organisations. The EU is a very active norm entrepreneur (Björkdahl 2005; Pace 2007b; Zwolski and Kaunert 2010) and this is demonstrated by its efforts to cultivate democratic norms (Rynning 2003: 484; Elgström and Strömvik 2005: 123). Given this, there is a tendency to regard it as a norm producer/exporter and other countries and organisations as norm takers/receivers (Argomaniz 2009: 112). In fact, like the EU, ASEAN is a notable norm entrepreneur because it has proactively engaged in norm generation and diffusion (Katsumata 2006; Rüland 2011).
While actors in world politics have an interest in spreading their preferred norms (Björkdahl 2008: 136), the intensity of their interest in norm entrepreneurship differs. The selection of norms and the degree, to which norms are prioritised, also depend on their generators and advocates (Powel 2009). There are those who feel they have a moral obligation to promote certain norms and they are known as moral entrepreneurs, who have strong notions about appropriate behaviour and, consequently, invest time and resources to convince other actors to engage in this sort of desirable behaviour (Nadelmann 1990; Kingdon 1995; Florini 1996; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Elgström 2000). The EU can be seen as one of these because promoting its democratic values has become a central issue in its post-Cold War foreign policy and it has used different positive and negative incentives to spread its values globally. In contrast, though seeking to disseminate its norms in the Asia-Pacific region, ASEAN does not regard the promotion of its norms worldwide as a key objective of its external relations.

It is also important to note that norms “never enter a normative vacuum, but instead access a highly contested space in which they need to compete with other norms” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 897). Thus, a key condition for entrepreneurs to create and promote norms at the international level is the presence of some kind of organisational platform (Zwolski and Kaunert 2010: 15). These platforms can be multilateral, e.g. the UN, interregional, e.g. EU-ASEAN relations, and regional, e.g. the EU and ASEAN. As will be shown in Chapters 6, 7 and 8, their interregional interaction is the place where the EU and ASEAN seek to promote their respective norms. For the EU, three major platforms, from which its norms emerge, are the Council, the Parliament and the Commission because, as will be illustrated in Chapter 4, its key documents on issues such human rights and democracy come from these institutions. For instance, the European Parliament is regarded as an important norm entrepreneur in the EU (Smith 2004; O’Brennan 2006: 98-9). With regard to ASEAN, its ministerial meetings and summits are the place where its principles are formed.32 In this sense, the primary norm entrepreneurs in ASEAN are its member states. Thus, it is worth noting a major difference between the EU and ASEAN in institutional terms (Doidge 2007: 234). The EU has supranational institutions, e.g. its Commission and Parliament, which have the power to generate and spread norms. In contrast, ASEAN is a purely

32 As will be seen in Chapters 5 and 8, other ASEAN-led institutions, e.g. the ARF, are important channels for ASEAN to disseminate its norms (Gilson 2007a: 30).
intergovernmental organisation, which has no supranational bodies that have the power
to determine and embed norms.33

In short, norm entrepreneurs are the agents or policy innovators that generate and
promote a particular norm, which they think to be the appropriate behaviour. This norm
entrepreneurial role is not limited to states and powerful actors in world politics as
commonly held. Weak states and regional organisations, e.g. ASEAN and its members
also attempt to create and disseminate norms. This thesis maintains that the EU and
ASEAN are two norm entrepreneurs. In the EU, various actors engage in norm
generation and diffusion and these include its Council, Commission and Parliament. In
contrast, ASEAN’s norms are mainly formed by its member states. The leaders and
officials of state members of the two organisations also play a major role their
respective organisation’s norm entrepreneurship. The question is whether ASEAN, like
the EU, can be regarded as a normative power. This leads to another concept that is
important and related concept, which is central to the thesis, namely normative power.

2.2.3. Normative power

While the concept of normative power (NP) is hardly novel and unique to the EU,
it has been largely developed in relations to the EU (Diez 2005: 620), especially since
Manners (2002) coined the term of Normative Power Europe (NPE). In fact, since then,
a huge number of works has been undertaken to examine and refine not only the NPE
thesis but also the concept of NP. Thus, Manners’ definition of NPE can serve as a good
starting point to describe a NP. According to Manners (2002: 239), the notion of a NPE
“is located in a discussion of the ‘power of over opinion’, idée force, or ‘ideological
power’”. With such an understanding, he defines NP is a power that is able “to shape
conceptions of normal in international relations” (Manners 2002: 239; Diez and
Manners 2007: 175; bold for emphasis). In this respect, the word of ‘normative’ in the
concept of NP conveys what is ‘normal’ in world politics. In other words, the NP can be
defined as the power that has the power to shape what is considered to be ‘normal’ or to
contribute to determining the ‘norm’ in international affairs (Tocci 2008b: 4). If defined
as such, the EU is not the only NP in world politics. Many other international actors,

33 For more information on the two different models of regionalism followed by the EU and ASEAN and
especially the institutional differences between the two organisations, see for instance Henry (2007) and
Wunderlich (2007; 2012a). Chapter 3 (section 3.1.2) will explain in more detail why European integration
tends towards supranationalism whereas regionalism in ASEAN strongly focuses on
 intergovernmentalism.
e.g. the US (Hamilton 2008), China (Kavalski 2007; Womack 2008; Reilly 2012), India (Kumar 2008) and Russia (Makarychev 2008; Sakwa 2011) and ASEAN are also qualified as NPs because they also promote what are commonly practiced in international relations. The difference is, as the findings of Hamilton (2008), Kumar (2008), Makarychev (2008) and Womack (2008), who examine the US, India, Russia and China respectively demonstrate, different actors often emphasise different norms and use different means to project their own norms, with the EU being often depicted as a benign power or a force-for-good in world politics (Manners 2002). This can be a reason why in the current literature, the EU has been described as a NP whereas the US, China, India, Russia and ASEAN have not been portrayed so. In fact, the EU is given that depiction because there is another interpretation of the concept of NP.

According to the second, a NP is not only a power that shapes what is ‘normal’ in international relations but also a power that advocates what is ‘normative’ (bold for emphasis) or what is ‘good’ or ‘ethical’ as previously explained. If the first interpretation focuses on the ‘normal’, this concentrates on the ‘normative’. Forsberg (2011: 1190) argues that the idea that NP “is the ability to define what passes for normal is not necessarily at all normative”. Such an analysis has its roots in normative theory, which focuses on the moral dimension of international relations (Smith and Owens 2005: 278-80). Under this understanding, which is most commonly found in the literature on the EU (Tocci 2008: 4) as well as often adapted by the EU’s policy papers and officials, a NP would be a force-for-good for the world.34 Given this, to be qualified as a NP, a power’s goals, means and impacts need to be normative (Tocci 2008: 5) and the EU is often regarded as “one of the most, if not the most important, normative powers in the world” because the EU’s principles, its actions and its impact are normative (Manners 2002: 252). However, if judging by these criteria, no power on earth could pass this test with any consistency because political actors employ a variety of means to advance a range of foreign policy goals and both instruments and goals change over time (Hamilton (2008: 81).

An overview of the two major understandings of NP shows that both of them have their own limitations; and they are contested. The second is very controversial not only because no power can meet all the three requirements identified by Tocci et al (2008)

34 For instance, in its European Security Strategy (ESS), published in 2003, the EU states that it wants to become a force-for-good in the world (European Council 2003. Because of such an understanding, the EU’s norms are often seen as ‘values’.
but also because it involves the ethical issue, which is deeply contentious in international politics (Aggestam 2008: 5). In other words, while it is already difficult to agree on what is ‘normal’, it is even more challenging to concur what is ‘normative’ or ethical in international relations. For this reason, the thesis does not adopt the second interpretation. Another main reason for its rejection is that its primary objective is not to assess whether the EU and ASEAN are the normative powers that attempt to do what is good in international relations. Regarding the first definition, it is too simple. If a NP is understood as a power that possesses the ability to shape what is ‘normal’ in international relations, all states can be qualified as NPs (Tocci 2008b: 4). So, what is the plausible definition of normative power?

In her study, though adopting the first understanding of NP, De Zutter (2010: 1122) expands it by defining a NP “as the identity of a power in the international system that shapes the normal in world politics through its norm-driven practices and the adaption of its norms by others”. While this definition is somehow similar to the first interpretation, it singles out four important elements, and for this reason, with a minor justification, the thesis adopts it to explain the EU and ASEAN. First, a NP is an identity in the international system. In other words, it refers to what constitutes an entity, e.g. the EU and ASEAN, as an actor in world politics. In fact, the argument that NP is the identity of a power in the international system is widely underlined. For instance, according to Sjursen (2006a), the NPE thesis is about the nature of the EU and its international identity. Powel (2009: 195) points out that NPE “is conceived of as a particular type of international actor, predisposed to promote its values through its interaction with other actors”. For Diez (2005: 614) the discourse of the EU as a NP constructs a particular self of the EU. Second, a NP is also a power that has the ability to shape the normal in world politics. Third, a NP shapes the normal through its norm-driven practices. As will be demonstrated in the subsequent chapters of this thesis, the internal and external activities of the EU and ASEAN are largely norm-driven. Fourth, a NP is a power, whose norms are adopted by others. This thesis slightly modifies the final point by adding the word ‘some’ before ‘others’ because there is no power that is able “to produce and put in place a global framework of norms that applies to all, including the most powerful” (Hamilton 2008: 81). The norms of a normative power, e.g. the EU and ASEAN, are only accepted by some others, not by all.

Based on De Zutter’s definition of normative power, it is clear that a normative power is also a norm entrepreneur because it engages in the three-stage cycle of norms.
identified by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998). A difference between a NP and a norm entrepreneur is that the former refers to not only the ability to shape the normal in world politics of a power or its ability to generate and diffuse norms but also its identity. Moreover, judged by the four elements of a normative power that her definition implies, both the EU and ASEAN are qualified as normative powers because they meet those criteria. These four characteristics also fit well a key argument by Manners (2002: 252) in his first work on NPE, in which he maintained that the EU “is built on the crucial, but usually overlooked observation that, the most important factor shaping the international role of the EU is not what it does or what it says, but what it is”. Such a view can be applied to ASEAN because, as will be illustrated in the subsequent chapters, ASEAN’s raison d’être greatly defines its influence in the Asia-Pacific region. This raises another question, that is: if they are both normative powers, what makes them different from each other.

For Börzel and Risse (2009: 5), it makes little sense to attribute a normative quality to a power’s “identity as long as we do not specify which norms are being promoted”. While recognising that China, Russia, India, the EU and the US all promote norms, Tocci and Manners (2008: 307) point out a crucial difference between these powers, which “lies in the degree to which normative value is bestowed upon individual political, social and economic rights and freedoms on the hand, or collective rights, self-determination and state sovereignty on the other”. Using this differentiation as a measure, they find that these actors position themselves respectively along a continuum, with China standing on one extreme end and the US positions on the other. While China’s normative framework focuses on state sovereignty, the US’s normative preference is individual-centred. Standing fourth and next to the US on this spectrum is the EU, “which like the US bestows prime normative value to individual rights and freedoms” (Tocci and Manners 2008: 308). If ASEAN is put on this continuum, it will stand in the same place as or next to China because ASEAN’s norms are strongly bestowed upon state sovereignty. Thus, this method is very helpful for describing and differentiating the normative nature of the EU and ASEAN. Indeed, based on a key argument made earlier that norms not only regulate actors’ behaviour but also define their identities and premised on the two major normative positions outlined by normative theory, this inquiry depicts the EU as a cosmopolitan normative power’ and ASEAN as ‘communitarian normative power’ because the EU gives prime normative value to individual rights. In contrast, ASEAN focuses on collective rights and state
sovereignty. Another question raised is why there exist such normative differences. In other words, why do different actors, e.g. the EU and ASEAN, often advocate ideas about desirable goals and appropriate behaviour that diverge from each other (Stubbs 2008: 453)?

2.3. The sources of normative differences

2.3.1. Ecological, social and internal processes

In their studies, Kowert and Legro (1996: 470-82) identify three processes that lead political actors to generate, maintain and change their norms, namely ecological, social and internal. With regard the first process, norms derive from the pattern of relations between actors and their environment. These patterned interactions may occur in two major forms. The first form takes place when actors confront a rapidly (or dramatically) changing environment (Kowert and Legro 1996: 470-4). For example, historic events in the international system can lead to a search for new ideas and norms (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 910). This form is evident in the EU because as will be shown in Chapters 4 and 6 the end of the bipolar system led it to transform from the EC to the EU and this transformation brought with it a new identity and mission that strongly focused on the promotion and protection of human rights and democracy. The second form, which addresses the problem of norm and identity maintenance rather than their emergence, stresses that the continuity in the environment strengthens norms (Kowert and Legro 1996: 472). This is the true in the case of ASEAN’s norms because even though the end of the Cold War somehow affected international relations in Southeast Asia and the economic situation of the region’s countries may have changed, the overall regional context, especially at the security level, has not changed much (Katsumata 2003). Consequently, the core norms, e.g. national sovereignty and non-interference, which ASEAN adopted when it was established in 1967, remain unchanged. They were all reiterated in the ASEAN Charter, which was signed in 2007.

Concerning the second, norms stem from the relations between actors themselves, i.e. through social processes, and these take place in two forms. Norms are spread through a process of interaction between members within a community, i.e. the in-group interaction (Kowert and Legro 1996: 474). This form of norm building and spreading is underlined in many works on security communities (Deutsch 1957; 1961; Barnett 1995; Wendt 1995; Risse-Kappen 1995; Adler 1997; Ericson 2000). Norms also emerge from a process of in-group/out-group interaction (Kowert and Legro 1996: 475). This in-group/out-group interaction in the formation of collective identity is underlined by a
number of scholars, such as Diez (2004; 2005), Neumann (1996; 1998; 1999) and Campbell (1992; 2998). Indeed, as mentioned in Chapter 1 and will be shown in Chapter 7, interregional relations, e.g. Asia-Europe Meeting, enable the participant regional organisations to form and reinforce their norms and identities (Gilson 1999; 2001; 2002a; 2002b; 2005; Higgott 2000; Gilson and Yeo 2004). However, as will be shown in the last section of this chapter, the norms that emerge from these two forms of the social processes are the two facets of the same process.

Finally, norms spring from the internal characteristics of actors, i.e. through the internal processes. Kowert and Legro (1996: 478-82) identify three different arguments relating to how norms emerge within political actors. The first regards the construction of norms as a psychological process. This argument, which is closely related to one of the social process examined, pretends that norms emerge because of people’s need for identity in social relations, i.e. their need to invent an in-group identity to differentiate with an out-group identity. The second argument maintains that norms and identities emerge from cognitive miserliness, which mainly focuses on ‘Who am I?’ or ‘Who are we?’. As will be shown later, these two internal processes play a key role in the norm-building/spreading of both the EU and ASEAN. However, as the two forms of the social processes mentioned earlier, they are in fact two facets of a single process because we cannot define ‘who we are’ unless we differentiate ourselves from other(s) as Diez (2004: 321-2) rightly maintains. The third argument of the internal process focuses on the linguistic role, i.e. the use and interpretation of langue, in norm construction. As already mentioned in the methodological issues in Chapter 1, the processes and multiple levels of speech, e.g. speech events, phrases, sentences and texts of (the officials and institutions) of the EU and ASEAN also form an important source of their respective norms.

2.3.2. Other causal factors and forces

The three processes are very useful in explaining why political actors, e.g. the EU and ASEAN, promote their preferred norms and/or why their normative premises differ from each other. Nevertheless, there are other important factors that define their normative foundation and differentiation, which are either ignored or under-developed by Kowert and Legro (1996). One of these is their own historical backgrounds. According to Tocci and Manners (2008: 311-2), historical conditions and philosophical traditions are a defining reason behind the normative dissimilarities of the US, the EU,
China, India and Russia. For Manners (2002: 240), the historical context of Europe is a key factor that shapes the EU’s normative distinction. The role of history in ASEAN’s construction of its ASEAN way is also very influential (Katsumata 2003). The striking difference is that European integration in general and the EU’s norms are aimed at overcoming Europe’s past disastrous wars (Checkel and Katzenstein 2009b: 1) caused by ultranationalism (Yeo 2009b: 195) whereas ASEAN and its norms are shaped by Southeast Asia’s colonial legacy. This historical difference is the defining reason why the EU and ASEAN espouse two differing normative frameworks as well as follows two models of regionalism with one being inclined to supranationalism and the other tends towards intergovernmentalism mentioned earlier. Regarding the philosophical or cultural traditions, Tocci and Manners (2008: 311) maintain that the emphasis of the EU – and by extension the US – on individual rights and freedoms is also unmistakably linked to the legacy of Enlightenment. Chapter 5 will consider whether there exist some cultural elements in the so-called Asian values advocated by some ASEAN leaders.

Tocci and Manners (2008: 312-4) also identify two other factors that define political actors’ normative preferences and differences. One is related to their background, location and perspective of powers in question. A case in point is that the EU upholds and promotes liberal cosmopolitan norms partly because its members are established democracies. In contrast, for decades ASEAN ignored those norms because its members were not democratic countries. Currently, despite their agreement to include human rights and democracy in their Charter and their decision establish a regional human rights body, ASEAN states still prioritise national sovereign and non-interference over human rights and democracy because some ASEAN members’ regimes remain authoritarian. In responding to the EU’s insistence on the inclusion of the human rights clause in a new cooperation framework the EU and ASEAN intended to negotiate in the early 1990s, ASEAN argued that in developing countries, there were other rights and concerns, which were far more important than civil and political rights (Tay and Goh 1999: 43). The second is related to “the power political configuration in which an actor finds itself in the international system” (Tocci and Manners 2008: 312-3). According to this, the stronger an international actor it within the international system the more likely it seeks to promote and protect its desired norms. For instance, as they regarded the collapse of the communist bloc as their victory over their Eastern adversaries, in the 1990s, the West in general and the EU sought to impose their preferred values on the non-Western world. Similarly, given their countries’ impressive
economic growth before the 1997/1998 Asian financial crisis, Southeast Asian leaders became confident in their economic model. Consequently, as will be shown in Chapter 6, they were more assertive and willing to oppose the EU’s assertion on the protection and promotion of human rights.

In his own study, Manners (2002: 240) highlights two particular factors that make the EU’s norms different, namely the EU’s hybrid polity and its political-legal constitution. Regard to the first, he maintains that the EU has developed into a hybrid of international form of governance that transcends Westphalian norms. Indeed, this makes the EU radically differ from ASEAN, whose existence is intended to strengthen Westphalian norms. Concerning the EU’s political-legal constitution, Manners (2002: 241) maintains that the EU is a political entity that “has largely occurred as an elite-driven, treaty based order. For this reason its constitutional norms represent crucial constitutive factors determining its international identity”. This can be applied to ASEAN because even though being less legally based, it is an elite-driven organisation, whose current key norms have been adopted and maintained since its foundation and enshrined in its key documents.

Briefly, the processes and factors examined affect, to a greater or lesser degree, the normative preferences and differences of the EU and ASEAN and, consequently, the thesis takes them to explain their normative foundation and differentiation. Yet, though they are identified separately by different scholars, they are related to each other and some of them even overlap. For instance, Kowert and Legro (1996) argue that norms are formed through a process of social interaction and they name the common heritage of actors (within a community, e.g. the EU and ASEAN) as the facilitating factor for norm building. This common heritage can include historical backgrounds and philosophical traditions, which are the elements identified by Tocci and Manners (2008: 311-2). For this reason, while using these factors and processes, the inquiry regroups them into two major ones and takes them as the key typologies to explain the normative foundation and differentiation of the EU and ASEAN. The first is related to the ‘we-group’ elements, e.g. the international, regional and domestic/national factors shared by the members of each regional organisation, and the interaction within the ‘we-group’. The second is about the ‘they-group’ factors and the interaction between the ‘we-group’, i.e. the EU and ASEAN, and their respective constitutive ‘they-group’ or

35 A reason for the inclusion of the ecological or international factor in this group is that while the end of the Cold War, which was regarded as a defining event, it affected the EU and ASEAN differently.
‘they-groups’. Their relations with each other are a form of this ‘we-group’/‘they-group’ interaction. Another major reason for its rearrangement is that it can explain more adequately the reasons why the normative factors can be both cooperative and conflictual. This leads to the last and most important section of the chapter.

2.4. Why norms become cooperative or conflictual

As underlined, a major argument held by the thesis is that normative factors can become a force for cooperation as well as a source of conflict between actors in world politics and to explain why they can be cooperative or conflictual, it has adopted two major – and indeed, divergent – perspectives of constructivism. The first, which is strongly underlined in the constructivist accounts on security communities, e.g. Deutsch (1961) Kahl (1998/99), Adler (1997), Adler and Barnett (1998) and Acharya (2009), maintains that the community building always involves a ‘we-feeling’, i.e. the feelings belonging to a group. Furthermore, according this liberal constructivist perspective, this ‘we-group’ is the foundation for the creation and maintenance of a security community (Acharya 2009: 29; Fligstein 2009: 134). Deutsch (1961: 100-1) identifies four ‘we-group’ factors or pre-existing conditions for building a security community. They are (1) geographical proximity and assimilation of culture, (2) economic interdependence, (3) mutual responsiveness and (4) the development of a ‘we-feeling’ among regional countries. Based on Deutsch, Adler (1997), Kahl (1999) and Adler and Barnett (1998) argue that a sense of a collective identity helps foster cooperation between countries and enable them to build security communities. However, unlike Deutsch, Adler (1997: 250) and Adler and Barnett (1998: 40) strongly emphasise liberal and democratic values as the basis of a security community. Risse-Kappen (1995), Wendt (1995) and Ericson (2000) also highlight that shared liberal and democratic norms make war impossible among democracies.

Looking back at the foundation and evolution of the EU and ASEAN, one can easily recognise that shared historical experiences and normative factors play an essential part in the process of their establishment and development. For instance, sharing the same concern about nation building in the post-colonial period and facing similar regional challenges, e.g. territorial disputes, ASEAN’s five founding states sought to subscribe to a set of principles, i.e. the ‘ASEAN way’, to help mediate

36 The process of the community building is somehow similar to that of the construction of a region identified by Hettne (1993; 2002; 2005) in his concept of regionness because both the processes involve intraregional factors and result in the formation of a particular community identity.
disputes and guide the interaction between its members. This has eventually become the basis for their regional and international relations since ASEAN’s foundation to present. Similarly, conditioned by Europe’s war-torn past and inspired by its own philosophical traditions, e.g. the Enlightenment, the EU has also developed its own set of liberal norms to foster its internal cooperation and inform its external policies. As will be shown in Chapter 3, the anti-communist posture that the EC and ASEAN shared during the Cold War also facilitated their interaction. Thus, while recognising that a common commitment to shared community norms is not always sufficient for cooperation between members within a community or organisation (Puetter and Wiener 2007), there is little doubt that the ‘we-group’ is the basis condition for cooperation between political actors. Without it, it would be difficult, if not impossible, for the countries of Southeast Asia and Western Europe to come together and build their respective regional organisations.

The second perspective has different understandings of the formation of collective identities and norms and the implications of such a construction to contemporary international politics. Unlike the first perspective, which considers the formation of collective identities and norms as a self-generated and self-sustained process, it maintains that such an formation is a ‘double-sided process’, by which “the production of a sense of collective identity within the community inevitably entails the production of a sense of difference with states outside of the community” Rumelili (2007: 6). The presence of the ‘other’ in collective identity formation – and this is also applied to norms because the definition of one’s norms is a defining feature in the articulation of a political actor’s identity (Manners and Tocci 2008: 307) – has been widely studied by scholars in the field of national and international politics.37 The reason for such a strong focus is that “collective identity is also by definition about the construction of an ‘other’” (Fligstein 2009: 135). In other words, there is no identity without difference because identity is incomprehensible and unthinkable without such a difference (Connolly 1995: xx; Diez 2004: 321; Gilson 2005: 310).38 Our perception of who we are is usually constructed as a response to some ‘other’ groups (Diez 2004: 321-2;


38 The division within the EU vis-à-vis the US-led Iraq in 2003, which led to the emergence of ‘Old Europe versus New Europe’ discourse (Haseler 2004; Lansford and Tashev 2005; Lévy et al. 2005), can be an example of this because if there is a ‘we-group’ or a ‘New Europe’ it is because there is a ‘they-group’ or an ‘Old Europe’.
Indeed, as underlined by Gilson (2002b: 20), an interregional dialogue, e.g. Asia-Europe relations or EU-ASEAN interaction, “can only take place if the self can identify an other with whom to communicate”.\footnote{For more understanding on self and other and their relationship, see Gilson (2002b: 20-25; 2005: 309-10).}

Furthermore, if the liberal constructivist accounts make a convincing case of how a sense of collective identity generate the condition for peace among states within a community, these critical constructivist/post-structural scholars maintains that “by virtue of the same logic, production of difference may perpetuate conditions for conflict in the external relations of the community” (Rumelili 2007: 6). The relations between the self and its constitutive other can be conflictual because order to assert itself, i.e. to protect or maintain its identity and its norms, the self sometimes has to belittle the other (Campbell 1992; 1998; Connolly 1996; Rumelili 2004; 2007; Morozov and Rumelili 2012). That is why it is often argued that the self/other relationship may engender a situation known as ‘othering’, which can be defined as a way of defining and securing the self’s own positive identity through the deprecation of an other (Rumelili 2007: 8).

A crucial question arises is whether othering is always conflictual.

According to Campbell (1992: 69) in securing their identities, states engage in “boundary-producing political performances”, which consider the external realm as different, inferior and threatening. In his study, Diez (2004; 2005) identifies three forms of othering that are important in the discourse on European identity. The first is temporal othering, which means that the self of the present is also the other of the past as examined above (Waever 1998). The second is spatial othering, expressed in the interaction between the self and an external other, e.g. the EU vis-à-vis Turkey and Russia (Neumann 1998; Christiansen et al. 2000) or Asia (Loewen 2010; Murray 2010). The third is cultural/normative othering, which became more salient in world politics. Unlike the first form, the last two tend to be more exclusive, antagonistic and conflictual because they always involve one or many out-group(s). However, these three forms are often related to each other (Rumelili 2004; Diez 2004; Prozorov 2011). For instance, Europe’s war-torn past and Southeast Asia’s colonialism, i.e. the respective temporal othering of the EU and ASEAN, led them to espouse two different normative premises, which eventually became of source of tensions between the two organisations.

Diez (2005: 628) also argues that the self/other relationship can create four different levels of othering. The first and the strongest level is the representation of the
other as the self’s existential threat, which can lead to extraordinary security measures, e.g. war between the self and the other. The US’s war-on-terror discourse and policy following 9/11 terrorist events can be seen as an example of this level of othering. The second level occurs when the self considers the other as inferior. In this version of othering that sees the other as weaker, the self is constructed as superior to the other. Consequently, the other is perceived as feted, but at the same time looked down upon. In the third level, the other is perceived as violating universal principles. At this level, the self’s norms are not simply seen as superior, but of universal validity, with a consequence that the other should accept the principles of the self. According to Manners and Tocci (2008: 316) when one international actor interprets a normative difference as another actor’s violation of a universal norm rather than as a legitimate challenge to its own norms, it can generates mistrust among them. Finally, the self sees the other as different. Unlike the previous three, at this fourth level, the self does not place obvious value-judgements on the other, which is represented neither as inferior nor as a threat, but merely as different. While it does not create conflict or tension, it does not help foster cooperation either because if the self perceives other as different, it tends to be indifferent to the latter.

Looking at the EU’s foreign policy and its relations with ASEAN since the end of the Cold War, one can see that the first level of othering does not occur. However, the second and third levels are widely employed. For instance, by requiring the candidate countries or any other partners to respect democracy and human rights, which it sees as universal values, in order to be allowed to become a member or enter into agreements with it, the EU directly or indirectly practises the second and third levels of othering. As will be shown shortly below and in Chapter 4, the EU and the countries or organisations with whom it interact will not clash if the latter are willing to accept its norms and wish to become like it. However, as will be demonstrated in Chapters 6 and 7, they will clash if the latter refuses the former’s norms. Regarding the last level, it somehow exists in the EU’s posture vis-à-vis ASEAN, especially in the security area. Chapter 8 will display that the EU does not substantially engage with ASEAN in this field in partly because the EU’s way of security differs from ASEAN’s. Consequently, the two organisations tend to be indifferent to the other’s perceptions and approaches to security, which deters, to a degree, their cooperation in the security area.

As the last level of othering identified by Diez demonstrates, othering or normative difference is not always conflictual. According to Rumelili (36-38; 2007: 38-
othering is conflictual or not depends on three conditions (Rumelili 2004: 36-38; 2007: 38-43). The first condition is about the nature of identity and norms, which can be inclusive, e.g. democracy, or exclusive, e.g. Islamic. She also regards ASEAN’s core norms, e.g. sovereignty and non-interference, are predominantly exclusive (Rumelili 2007: 128, 130). While the inclusive identity can be acquired if a state fulfils certain criteria, e.g. the Copenhagen criteria, the exclusive identity is based on some inherent characteristics and, as a result, it is more difficult to acquire or leave. A good example of the nature of identity and its implication is the EU’s policy vis-à-vis the CEE countries and Turkey previously examined. Tocci and Manners (2008: 315) maintain that the differences in normative nature are a major source for conflict between great powers. They point out that the US and the EU push for the rights of individuals, to the point of discursively justifying military intervention in breach of third states’ sovereignty to secure such goals. In contrast, China and Russia are far more inclined to defend the non-interference principle at the cost of tolerating gross violations of human rights. As will be shown in Chapters 6 and 7, EU-ASEAN relations are prone to tensions firstly because of the difference of their normative nature. The EU is premised on a set of liberal cosmopolitan norms and, consequently, willing to interfere into others’ domestic politics to promote them. In contrast, ASEAN is based on a set of traditional communitarian principles, which deject any external interference in any form or manifestation. This means EU-ASEAN relations are potentially conflictual not because of what either organisations does or does not do but because of what they are.

Second, whether that potential occurs or not depends on the response of the other, which can be either acceptance or resistance. In the first case, i.e. acceptance, the self and its identity discourses are recognised by the other. As a result, the other is not treated as a threat to the self. Furthermore, if the other recognises the self as superior and wishes to become like the self, the latter is even more secure. For instance, if a non-democratic actor recognises its shortcomings, seeks to promote democracy and considers the democratic one as a model, then such a response is seen as securing the latter’s identity. However, if the self’s identity is resisted or violated by the other, its identity becomes more insecure and the self regards the other as a threat to its identity. This second condition is useful in explaining why when the EU seeks to intervene in ASEAN’s domestic affairs to promote human rights, the latter reacts angrily because that intervention violates the core of its normative culture. Equally, the EU feels irritated when the values that make up its normative identity are resisted or violated by
ASEAN. Indeed, as will be shown in Chapters 6 and 7, their normative differences led to tensions in their relations in the 1990s because the core norms of one regional organisation were refused or infringed by the other. In contrast, as will be seen in Chapter 8, when their norms are accepted, or at least not defied, by the other, they do not face any major disagreements and even are able to cooperate with each other.

Finally, whether the othering is conflictual or not depends on the social distance, i.e. the social connection or disconnection, between the self and other. According to this, states perform and secure their identities in international relations through associating with other states. In other words, they engage in acts that symbolise their co-belonging within the same community or dissociate themselves from other states that they see as different, by refusing such an engagement. The interaction between the EU and the CEE countries is an example of social connection. The EU’s relations with Turkey and Morocco can be seen as an instance of social disconnection. This point illustrates well why during the Cold War when the EC and ASEAN were in the same boat, i.e. the anti-communist bloc, they found it easy to interact, especially at the political level. In contrast, when this bond broke, coupled with many changes at both the regional and international levels, they dissociated themselves from each other in terms of their normative dimensions. The EU represented itself as a community that is based on liberal and democratic values. In contrast, ASEAN fervently reaffirmed its core state-centric principles and some of its leaders, e.g. Malaysia’s Mahathir Mohamad or Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew, even promoted the Asian values. That disconnection caused frictions in their relations.

Overall, the liberal constructivist/critical accounts offer valuable insights on the implications of the normative differences of political actors, e.g. the EU and ASEAN, to their relations. Precisely, the levels of othering identified by Diez (2005) and notably the three conditions under what othering may take place theorised by Rumelili (2004; 2007) are very useful in explaining whether – and if so, why and when – the norms of the EU and ASEAN clash. This is why while recognising that there may be other approaches that can be adopted to explain why and when international norms clash, 40

40 For instance, in their study, entitled “When norms clash: international norms, domestic practices, and Japan’s internalisation of the GATT/WTO”, Cortell and Davis (2005) choose Japan’s domestic salience as the variable to examine when a state embraces an international norm. In doing so, they identify three criteria to measure domestic salience, i.e. high, moderate and limited and argue that an international norm is internalised or not depends on the level of the domestic salience of the state in question. This author thinks we can use this framework to examine why and when the normative differences of the EU and ASEAN determine their interaction. Indeed, the domestic condition of their respective members is a
the thesis follows Diez (2005) and Rumelili (2004; 2007) to explore the reasons why the normative differences of the EU and ASEAN became an obstructive factor in their post-Cold War interaction.

2.5. Conclusion: Key propositions

To sum up, this thesis adopts social constructivism and normative theory (of IR) to examine the EU, ASEAN and their interregionalism. In doing so, it proposes the three following fundamental hypotheses.

• First, actors in world politics, e.g. the EU, ASEAN and their respective norms, are always shaped by their own temporal and spatial (or historical, cultural and geopolitical) conditions.

• Second, normative factors, e.g. norms, values and principles, are influential in world politics and their relevance is manifested in two particular manners: (1) they constitute actors’ identities, inform their interests and define their ways of perceiving and conducting their internal and external affairs; and (2) they influence both cooperation and conflict in world politics.

• Third, the creation and building of a community or a regional organisation, e.g. the EU and ASEAN, is a dual process, which always entails a ‘we-group’, i.e. a sense of collective identity within a community, and a sense of difference with outsiders, i.e. a ‘they-group’ or many ‘they-groups’. If a sense of collective identity generates conditions for cooperation within the community, a sense of difference engenders conditions for tension or conflict in the external relations of the community.

Anchoring its arguments on these three primary premises, the thesis puts forward the following key and related propositions:

(1) Normative factors are crucial to the EU and ASEAN. These two organisations generate norms not only to guide their regional and international relations but also to seek to persuade others to adopt their preferred norms. In other words, norm entrepreneurship is a defining and influential component of their regional actorness. Yet, while they are both norm entrepreneurs and normative powers, the norms, on which they are founded and which they advocate, radically differ from
each other. The EU upholds a set of predominantly individual-oriented values whereas ASEAN promotes a set of primarily state-centred principles.

(2) The EU, ASEAN and their normative premises are different from each other because the ‘we-group’ factors, e.g. historical experience and cultural traditions, as well as the ‘they-group’ actors, e.g. external powers and forces, that shape their respective collective identity and normative underpinnings, diverge from each other.

(3) Their normative differences are the reason behind their disagreements over a number of important issues and these tensions significantly hinder their economic, political and security cooperation in the post-Cold War period. These are manifested in the following forms and ways.

a. Their normative differences tend to be conflictual firstly because the natures of their norms or their normative identity differ. As it upholds a set of liberal cosmopolitan norms, the EU has the tendency to push for the rights of individuals to the point of being willing to interfere into others’ internal affairs to make sure that its cherished norms are respected. In contrast, as ASEAN is premised on a set of traditional communitarian principles, it explicitly discourages any external interference into its internal affairs in any form or manifestation. This means EU-ASEAN relations are inclined to be conflictual not because of what either organisation does or not does but because of what the EU and ASEAN are.

b. Their normative differences become a major obstruction in their cooperation when one regional organisation firmly upholds and keenly promotes its core norms and the other defies or violates them. More precisely, when the EU ardently defends and spreads the liberal and democratic values that make up its normative identity and ASEAN refuses to accept those values, it is certain that their relations become conflictual. Similarly, when ASEAN insists on the respect of its cherished norms and the EU ignores or violates them, their interaction probably faces tensions and standstills.

c. Their normative differences are also likely to lead to disruptions in their cooperation when one regional organisation disconnects or disassociates with the other and its preferred norms.

d. In contrast, whenever they try to limit, avoid or accommodate their normative differences their tensions are significantly decreased and this paves the way for
some cooperation. Yet, as long as their normative differences exist, while they may not clash, they still find it difficult to meaningfully to cooperate with each other.

e. Not only the lack of actorness, notably the institutional and materials dimensions, of the EU and ASEAN, but also their normative differences considerably impede their post-Cold War cooperation. This thesis mainly examines why and when their normative differences are conducive to preventing cooperation.

f. Finally, not only does the EU-ASEAN relationship form and reinforce the collective identity and normative features of the EU and ASEAN as most of literature on interregionalism maintains. Their normative constituents also play determine (the shape, content and outcomes) of their interregional interaction. Again, the thesis mainly focuses on the latter aspect of this proposition.

The above propositions are the main ones that this thesis takes to address its three principal questions that were raised in Chapter 1. The (1) supposition is aimed at tackling the first question, which looks at the normative features that constitute the EU and ASEAN as actors in world politics and that make them differ from each other. The (2) is formulated to address the second question, which examines the sources of their normative differences. Chapters 4 and 5 will explore in-depth these two first issues, which are also further illustrated by the three chapters on the case studies. The hypotheses proposed in the (3) are primarily aimed at addressing the third question, i.e. why their normative differences become a conflictual and obstructive factor in their relations. The two first case studies, i.e. the East Timor issue and the Myanmar problem, are examined to demonstrate the (3a), (3b), (3c), (3e) and (3f) propositions whereas the Aceh matter is aimed at illustrating the (3d), (3e) and (3f) ones. These three case studies are intended to offer further evidence to the (1) and (2) hypotheses.

To provide a historical background of EU-ASEAN relations and of the three case studies and especially to facilitate the thesis to explain and illustrate these key propositions, the next chapter gives an overview of this interregional relationship.
3. EU-ASEAN relations: An overview

This chapter gives an overview of the EU-ASEAN relationship. It is aimed at providing a historical background of their interaction and the three case studies in particular. As noted, the thesis mainly looks at their post-Cold War relations, i.e. since 1991. Yet, the two regions have a long-standing interaction, dated back to the 16th century (Gilson 2002b: 32), which still has impacts on their current relations. As highlighted in the two previous chapters, history is vital to understanding contemporary events. Indeed, as Tilly (2006: 433) aptly points out, “[e]very significant political phenomenon lives in history and requires historically grounded analyses for its explanation. Political scientists ignore historical context at their peril” (see also McDonald 1996; Wah 2000; Rodrigo 2002). For this reason, it is difficult to understand the EU, ASEAN, their respective norms and their interregional relations, if their respective history is ignored. Consequently, the chapter also briefly looks at the two major and distinct periods of their interaction prior to 1991. The first and longest period is from the arrival of Europeans in Southeast Asia to 1972, when the EC-ASEAN institutional link was initiated. The second period is from 1972 to 1991. Besides providing a historical background, which permits the thesis to explain more fully their

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41 The role of history in international relations has been increasingly highlighted, especially since the historical and constructivist turn (Elman and Elman 2008). For instance, it is argued that constructivism “is inherently an argument about how the past shapes the way actors understand their present situation” (Copeland 2000: 210).

42 Archer (2008: 19) points out that European integration “was not just an idea dreamed up by a few politicians and academics – it had and has a particular historical background”. Wunderlich (2007: 5) also maintains that only by locating the experiences of regionalisms in the EU and ASEAN “within their specific historical contexts can we begin to grasp the factors driving regionalism”.

43 Doidge (2004a: 1-2) divides the long-standing relations between the two regions into four periods: (1) from 16th to the end of the World War II (WWII), (2) from the end of the WWII to 1967, (3) from the early 1970s to the end of the 1980s, and (4) the current one, since the end of the Cold War. Yeo (2005; 2007b; 2009a) divides EC/EU relations into four different periods: (1) courtship, from 1972 to 1980, (2) consolidation, from 1980 to 1991, (3) turbulence, from 1991 to 2001, with ties becoming frosty between 1991 and 1993, a new dynamism between 1993 to 1996 and stagnation from 1997 to 2001, and (4) re-discovery from 2001.
post-Cold War interaction, this section demonstrates that until the end of the Cold War, in terms of their way of perceiving and conducting international affairs, the two regional organisations were similar and this facilitated their cooperation. In fact, thanks to this similarity, unlike their post-Cold War relations, which will be looked at in the third section of the chapter and examined in-depth in Chapters 6 and 7, their ties during the Cold War period did not experience any major political disagreements.

3.1. Prior to 1972: From colonial to institutional relationship

3.1.1. Colonisation and decolonisation

Europeans arrived in Southeast Asia in the 16th century and by the 1800, five European countries, namely Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands, Great Britain and France, had colonies in Southeast Asia. During the first period, European colonialism was mainly pushed by commercial imperatives (Bridges 1999: 8; Elson 2004: 16). It reached to a new level by the end of the 19th century, when the Europeans sought to acquire territories in order to exploit their resources. This in turn gave the Europeans’ greater control over local populations and kingdoms (Bridges 1999: 10). By the early 1940s, Europe’s long-standing and largely unchecked colonialism gradually disintegrated (Berger 2004: 30). Japan, who avoided European colonisation, sought to secure its own colonial empire (Bridges 1999: 12). However, it control was short lived as it was defeated in 1945. With Japan’s defeat Japan and the end of WWII, independence became a top priority in Southeast Asia (Farrell 2010: 117). By that time, some European countries tried to come back, however, their return was greatly resisted by their respective colonies partly because when they returned, the situation in Southeast Asia had changed significantly. Nationalism and anti-Europeanism were now strong (Bridges 1999: 13); some territories declared independence in mid-1940s; decolonisation had expanded widely in the region. Yet, their process of decolonisation was not easy because some countries had to fight bitter wars with their colonial powers in the post-independent years. Colonialism also left the newly independent Southeast Asian nations with major challenges, e.g. territorial disputes. These significantly led to mistrust and conflicts between regional countries (Henderson 1999: 15). Chapter 5 will look more in detail these challenges. The point made here is that Europe’s four-century colonialism in the region, Southeast Asian territories’ hard-fought battles for their independence and the multiple problems they faced in their process of nation building are the key reasons behind ASEAN’s preference for its ASEAN way and especially the
non-interference principle. Such preference, as will be shown in this thesis, is the cause of their disagreements with the EU over political issues in the post-Cold War era. To sum up, it is apt to refer to Camroux (2008: 15), who argues that in dealing with ASEAN countries, the EU “has had to deal with an ambiguous colonial heritage. While the independence of the nations of Southeast Asia is over fifty years old, in terms of the millennial history of these countries in a sense this is only yesterday”.

3.1.2. The creation of the EC and ASEAN

After the end of the World War II, “which had wreaked such devastation on the European continent” (Leustean and Madeley 2009: 4), the primary objective of European countries was to reconstruct their own war-torn continent and reconcile great rivalries, notably between Germany and France, which were seen as the reason behind disastrous wars. A fundamental step that European leaders took to achieve that objective was to establish the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) on 18 April 1951. The ECSC, which was also known as the Treaty of Paris and signed by five democratic European countries, namely France, (West) Germany, Italy Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, began European integration and eventually resulted in creating the EC and then the EU. As nationalism or ultranationalism was regarded as a root cause of wars, European integration was seen as a restraining force against ultranationalism and a building block towards a new level of governance through the pooling of sovereignty and various socioeconomic means (Jones 2001: 10; Henry 2007: 858; Yeo 2009b: 195 Wunderlich and Warrier 2010: 131). Given this, in terms of the market liberalisation and especially the level of institutionalisation, the EU has been much more advanced and far-reaching than any attempt made by ASEAN and other regional organisations. Another element that is worth noting is that from the outset, peace and democracy were among the core norms, on which the EU was founded. In fact, peace, which was emphasised in the Declaration of Robert Schuman, who was viewed as the architect of European integration, on 9 May 1950 and then was reiterated in the preamble of the ECSC, was the raison d’être of European integration; and democracy was the membership norm from the inception of the ECSC (Manners 2006d: 70-71).

44 “World peace cannot be safeguarded without the making of creative efforts proportionate to the dangers which threaten it [...] Europe will not be made all at once, or according a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements, which first create a de facto solidarity. The coming together of the nations of Europe requires the elimination of the age-old opposition of France and Germany” (Schuman 1950).
In contrast, for the post-colonial leaders of the newly independent Southeast Asian countries, the primary concern was nation building, not region building (Yeo 2009b: 195). To deal with the enormous task of consolidating their hard-earned independence, strengthening their newly acquired statehood and promoting their national development, what they really needed was not the help from other regional countries but a stable external environment (Rodrigo 2002: 337). This is because in their view, regional resilience could only be built on the foundations of national resilience (Yeo 2009b: 195).

Against this backdrop, ASEAN was established when its five founding members, namely Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, signed the Bangkok Declaration, on 8 August 1967. Given their preoccupation with nation building and domestic developments, it was not surprising that the institutional design of their institution was deeply wedded to state sovereignty. In fact, the core principles enshrined in the Bangkok Declaration, e.g. non-interference into internal affairs of other member countries, were aimed at protecting national sovereignty. 45 Furthermore, due to such a focus, unlike the EC, ASEAN had minimal economic cooperation during the first decade of its existence. Actually, until the late 1980s, ASEAN had very little interest in any regional economic cooperation, and as a result, it did not achieve a great deal in this area (Akrasanee 2001: 37; Narine 2002: 24).

ASEAN’s adoption of a set of norms to guide its internal relations from its inception shows that like the EC, ASEAN was also primarily based on norms. The difference was that they were founded on two different sets of norms. While the former was established on (liberal) peace and democracy, the latter was premised on a set of traditional or state-centric norms, e.g. national sovereignty and non-interference. Another element that is worth mentioning is that they were both established in the Cold War and during the Cold War years, their outlook was similar. In fact, they were anti-communist, Westernised and capitalist organisations. As will be shown later in the chapter, this convergence of views in the political and strategic area not only diminished their other fundamental differences, e.g. their foundational norms, but also facilitated their cooperation, especially their political relations, until the early 1990s. Finally, from the very beginning both of them specified cooperation with other international and regional organisations as an aim of their respective establishment. In reality, as Lukas (1989: 102-3) and Redmond (1992b: 138) note, among regional institutions, only the

45 It is for this reason, as noted in footnote 33, unlike European integration, which tends towards supranationalism, regionalism in ASEAN was and continues to be primarily intergovernmental.
EC and ASEAN specified the cooperation with other regional organisations as a declared objective when they were established. For instance, the Bangkok Declaration states that “To maintain close and beneficial co-operation with existing international and regional organisations with similar aims and purposes, and explores all avenues for ever closer co-operation among them” (AMM 1967, point 7). That paved the way for them to forge a new form of interaction in the international system, namely interregional relations.

3.2. EC-ASEAN relations from 1972 to 1991: A smooth relationship

“The political dialogue between ASEAN and the EC during the Cold War was very good. This is because if you were anti-communist and capitalist, you were pro-Western and you were supported by the West. Therefore, there was not a great deal of discussion about human rights and democracy at that time. The dialogue was pragmatic. If you were my enemies’ enemies, you were my friends” (Asian scholar, Interview, 2009).

3.2.1. From informal to formal relationship

The idea of cooperation between the EC and ASEAN was an endeavour initiated at the fourth meeting of ASEAN Foreign Ministers, also known as ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM), in 1971. ASEAN states made the first move because with the British accession to the EC imminent in the early 1970s, two former British colonies and ASEAN members, i.e. Malaysia and Singapore, were concerned about the loss of Commonwealth preference in the British market (European Commission, DG for Information 1976: 2; 1981: 3). Consequently, in June 1972, a Special Coordinating Committee of ASEAN Nations (SCCAN) was set up, consisting of the ASEAN ministers of Trade and the ASEAN Brussels Committee (ABC), which was composed of the ASEAN ambassadors to the EC, with the responsibility to develop ASEAN’s relations with the EC (European Commission, DG for Information 1985: 4). Two years later, both sides agreed to set up a Joint Study Group (JSG), which met regularly from June 1975, to explore all possible areas of future cooperation (European Commission, DG for Information 1976: 3).

As it wished to intensify relations with the EC, ASEAN pressed for a regular dialogue between the ABC and the EC’s Permanent Representatives Committee. The purpose of this dialogue, which was first held in November 1977 and then in July 1978,

46 Until the end of 1972, Malaysia and Singapore (along with other Asian members of the Commonwealth, e.g. India and Pakistan) had enjoyed tariff preferences on the British market under the Commonwealth system (European Commission, DG for Information 1976: 2).
was to supplement the activities carried out by the JSG. At these two meetings, ASEAN also pushed for a ministerial conference, which it had already conducted with Japan, Australia and New Zealand in 1977, and there was a favourable response from the EC (European Commission, DG for Information 1979a: 5; 1981: 4). Subsequently, the first conference of the foreign ministers of the EC and ASEAN, known as the ASEAN-EC Ministerial Meeting (AEMM), was held in November 1978 in Brussels. This meeting, often considered to be the real birth of interregionalism because it was the first time a ministerial meeting between two regional organisations was held (European Commission 1979b: 2), 47 gave EC-ASEAN relations greater political significance. 48

Notably, at this meeting, the ministers decided to launch negotiations for a formal cooperation agreement (Drury 1979: 19). These negotiations were opened in November 1979 and rapidly led to the conclusion of a Cooperation Agreement (CA), formally signed at the second AEMM in Kuala Lumpur in March 1980 (European Commission, DG for Information 1985: 5). The signing of the CA marked the beginning of a new stage in the EC-ASEAN linkage because not only did it form the basis for their cooperation but also formally institutionalised their relations (Yeo 2009a: 47).

As explained, ASEAN initiated links with the EC because it wished to gain greater access to European markets for its primary and manufactured products. It also wanted to receive more investment and development aid from Europe (Harris and Bridges 1983: 28). Equally, economic interests, e.g. better access to Southeast Asia’s natural resources and markets, were also an impetus for the EC’s institutionalisation of relations with ASEAN (European Commission, Information Memo 1978: 1; Nuttall 1990: 149-50). However, as acknowledged by the European Commission’s President Roy Jenkins (1978: 5) at the first AEMM, their cooperation “goes wider than trade”. From ASEAN’s perspective, a formal partnership with the EC conferred tremendous prestige on ASEAN (Wannamethee 1989: 21). For the EC, it was also of great interest to promote ASEAN and to assist the development of links between the two organisations (Genscher 1978: 113-4). ASEAN countries actively sought an increased European interest in their region because they wanted to limit economic presence of the

47 In 1974, when the EC sounded out ASEAN countries as to whether they wished to establish agreements similar to those that the EC had concluded with India in 1973, ASEAN governments indicated that they all preferred to establish their relations with the Community on a regional basis, i.e. a region-to-region relationship (European Commission 1979b: 1).

48 The EC’s first ministerial conference with ASEAN had been held before the agreement was signed. In contrast, the first ministerial meeting between the EC and EFTA (European Free Trade Agreement) took place 12 years after the EC-EFTA Free Trade Agreement was signed (Lukas 1989: 108).
US and Japan’ (European Commission, Information Memo 1978: 1; Rüland 2001c: 9). For European countries, their presence in Southeast Asia offered them the chance to reassert their position in a geo-strategically relevant region (European Commission, Information Memo 1978). The political-strategic dimension was even of incomparably greater relevance than economic one (Mols 1990: 72). For this reason, the EC-ASEAN relationship was regarded as economic in form but political in intent (Indorf 1983: 119; Harris and Bridges 1983: 73; Mols 1990: 69; Nuttall 1990: 150).

A defining security factor that accelerated their cooperation was communism. In the years when it deliberately courted the EC, ASEAN was very concerned about communism, especially after North Vietnam’s victory over US-backed South Vietnam in 1975 (Tasker 1987: 106). To respond to this threat, in 1976 ASEAN’s leaders held an unprecedented summit, during which they signed the ASEAN Concord I and the TAC. As will be shown in Chapter 5, these documents highlighted ASEAN’s commitment to the principles of non-national sovereignty and interference. They also highlighted ASEAN’s commitment to preserve the stability of the region and its member states, particularly against the threat of subversion. This posture was strongly supported by the EC (European Commission, DG for Information 1979b: 1; 1981: 1). After the Bali summit, they also sought to forge special links with major powers (Mols 1990: 66). It was in this context that the EC became a vital partner for ASEAN, even though the EC was basically an inward-looking player without much actor capacity in foreign and security areas (Rüland 2001c: 12).

Vietnam’s intervention in Cambodia (then Kampuchea) and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1978 and 1979 respectively brought the EC and ASEAN even closer together in late 1970s and during the 1980s (Rüland 2001c: 12). As both of them were anti-communist blocs, they feared that those expansionist postures could destabilise their respective region (Regelsberger 1989: 82-83; Soon 1989: 61). That is why their relationship was seen as “a bulwark against communism” (de Flers 2010: 4). The first AEMM placed a strong focus on the Cambodian matter. The 1980 Cooperation Agreement, also the first formal agreement that the EC concluded with another regional group, was signed at the second AEMM, during which the Afghanistan issue became prominent (European Commission, DG for Information 1981: 8). At this conference, they also issued a Joint Statement on Political Issues (AEMM 1980b), which was the first time that the two groups publicly adopted a joint stance on major political issues (Harris and Bridge 1983: 53; Hull 1984: 22; McMahon 1998: 235). At the ninth AEMM
in 1991, Luxembourg’s Foreign Minister Jacques Poos recalled this statement and stressed its importance because it was the first time the EC and ASEAN spoke with one voice to condemn the invasions of Cambodia and Afghanistan (Poos 1991). The issues of Cambodia and Afghanistan continued to dominate the AEMMs throughout the 1980s (AEMM 1981; 1983; 1984; 1986; 1987).

3.2.2. Political success and desire to enhance economic cooperation

The united posture of the EC and ASEAN vis-à-vis communism considerably enhanced their interaction in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s, especially at the political level, which was regarded as remarkably successful (Hull 1984: 22; Mols 1990: 1966; Luhulima 1992: 317; Yeo 2009a: 47). They worked closely in coordinating and supporting each other’s position on a number of international matters – notably the issues of Cambodia and Afghanistan – in international fora such as the UN (AEMM 1985; Rüland 2001c: 12; Yeo 2009a: 47). A study of the votes of the UN General Assembly Resolution from 1979 to 1984 indicated that the EC and ASEAN voted as a bloc in support of the calls for the Soviet Union from Afghanistan and Vietnam from Cambodia (Robles 2004b: 34). The argument that invasions of Cambodia and Afghanistan played a significant part in enhancing their cooperation is also supported by the responses to the survey undertaken by the author. When asked to express their views on the statement ‘the Soviet-backed Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia in 1978 and the Soviet Union invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 strengthened EC-ASEAN relations’, of the 21 responses, two indicated ‘completely agree’, 10 ‘agree’, five ‘neutral’ and four ‘disagree’. The significance of the political element of EC-ASEAN relations was also reflected in their dense network of dialogue. For instance, until the early 1990s, the high-ranking officials of the EC and its members were always present in the AEMMs as well as other meetings that ASEAN held with its major partners.

49 In terms of institutional links, ASEAN had the most extensive contacts with the EC of any regional grouping of developing countries (European Commission, DG for Information 1991: 14). The AEMM, held every 18 months, was the most important mechanism in their cooperation. The second type of high-level political exchange took place in the form of the ASEAN Post-ministerial Conference (PMC), which ASEAN organised annually with its international partners. The third significant link established by the CA was the JCC, made up of senior officials, met annually to discuss economic issues.

50 One of the ASEAN ambassadors to the EC in Brussels said, “[t]here is no other ASEAN relationship to match this in intensity” (quoted in Mols 1990: 67). However, as will be shown in Chapters 6, 7 and 8, in the post-Cold War period, compared to China, India, Japan and other major partners of ASEAN, the EU was much less involved in its region-to-region dialogue with ASEAN as well as other meetings that ASEAN held with its major partners.
The achievement of their political relations laid a strong foundation for a closer cooperation in the economic area (Wannamethee 1989: 23). By the mid 1980s, both the EC and ASEAN realised that they needed to expand the scope of cooperation, especially in the economic-related areas.51 This is why at the fifth AEMM in January 1984, they agreed to organise a ministerial meeting to discuss economic matters (AEMM 1984), which was held nine months later in Bangkok (AEMM 1985).52 The desire for an enhanced partnership was reiterated at the eighth AEMM, during which the ministers agreed that “greater efforts should be made to enhance cooperation between the two regions” (AEMM 1990, point 2). Chief among these efforts was to review the CA (AEMM 1990, point 18). At the ninth AEMM in May 1991 they made clear that “the revision of the [1980] Agreement was now necessary and they decided that the new Agreement be broadened in scope to cover all domains of cooperation between the two regions so as to better reflect the new conditions and priorities in both regions” (AEMM 1991, point 37).53 This illustrates that by the late 1980s and the early 1990s, given the fact that “economic motivations feature strongly in the development” of their cooperation (Luhulima 1992: 313), the EC and ASEAN realised it was time to revise their cooperation framework.

By providing a summary of EC-ASEAN relations since 1972 to 1991, this section wants to underline three important points because they enable the thesis to explicate better their post-Cold War interaction – or more exactly, why and how their divergent normative factors affected their relationship since 1991.

From a modest beginning in the early 1970s, EC-ASEAN relations grew stronger in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s. Both regional organisations regarded each other as an important partner. While the EC’s link with ASEAN became a solid and, on the whole, a reliable element in its foreign relations, ASEAN considered its cooperation with the EC a successful enterprise that became an indispensible part of its international engagement (Mols 1990: 66). Coupled with other factors, e.g. ASEAN’s impressive

51 Another key factor that prompted the EC to seek to strengthen its economic cooperation was the high economic growth of ASEAN countries in the 1970s and 1980. While during that period, ASEAN did not achieve a great deal in terms of its economic integration, individually five ASEAN economies enjoyed impressive growth, which was much bigger than the EC’s (see Appendix 11).

52 This first ever meeting of ASEAN-EC Economic Ministers, which was also the first the EC held with any other regional groupings, “signifies the growing convergence of views and interests between the EC and ASEAN” (Wannamethee 1989: 23).

53 In his opening statement at the ASEAN PMC in July 1991, the European Commissioner for North-South Relations Abel Matutes reiterated the need to modify the agreement taking into account the significant changes in both regions since 1980 (Manutes 1991). The statement was made available to the author by courtesy of Ms. Jocelyne Collonval, Historical Archives of the European Commission.
economic growth, their political successful cooperation prompted them to enhance their economic cooperation by agreeing to revise the 1980 Cooperation Agreement in the late 1980s.

They managed to forge a strong political partnership because they had similar international outlooks. In his speech at the first AEMM, Genscher (1978: 112) said that both the EC and ASEAN “have many basic convictions and many interests in common”. A central and shared element, as the comment of Yeo quoted at the beginning of this section illustrates, is that both of them were fundamentally capitalist and anti-communist regional groups. While other factors, e.g. economic interests, brought them together, their shared Western capitalist and especially anti-communist character was the main reason for the success of their political cooperation. Their shared views were also clearly expressed in the 1980 Joint Statement on Political Issues, in which they both emphasised the need for all states to observe strictly the principles of national sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference others’ internal affairs (AEMM 1980b, point 1). As will be shown in Chapter 5, these principles are the core of the ASEAN way, strongly upheld by ASEAN and its members.

Finally, until the late 1980s, the EC did not strong focus on the protection and promotion of democratic values, e.g. human rights and democracy, in its external activities in general and its relations with ASEAN. As will be shown in Chapters 6 and 7, until the early 1990s, East Timor and Myanmar were not a concern in its dialogue with ASEAN even though gross human rights violations took place in East Timor since 1970s and Myanmar’s military regime widely abused human rights in the 1970s and the 1980s. Like ASEAN, in those years of the bipolar confrontation, the EC’s external relations and its security policy were mainly viewed and approached in a realist sense. In other words, it adopted a traditional security policy, which was based on defence of borders and the containment of threats. Consequently, it lent its support for authoritarian regimes in Southeast Asian countries as elsewhere, regardless of the consequences for

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54 This was confirmed by the responses to the author’s survey. The respondents were asked to give their views on the statement ‘the capitalist and anti-communist stance of the EC and ASEAN bonded the two regional organisations together and prompted them together and work closely in supporting each other position on the Afghanistan and Cambodian issues in the international fora, e.g. the UN, in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s’. Of the 21 responses received, two indicated ‘completely agree’, 11 ‘agree’, six ‘neutral’ and only two ‘disagree’.

55 The EC’s recognition and emphasis of the core principles upheld by ASEAN as the fundamental principles of international relations strengthened ASEAN and its norms. In other words, as explained in Chapter 2, when ASEAN (i.e. the self) and its identity discourses were recognised and supported by the EC (i.e. the other), ASEAN felt more secure and confident in its dealing with external challenges, such as the Cambodia issue. This, in turn, enhanced their cooperation.
people living in those countries. Overall, until the late 1980s, in terms of their way of viewing and conducting their external relations, the EC and ASEAN were largely similar and this why did have any major disagreements. The questions arise now are whether they can maintain a good partnership and whether they can successfully agree a new cooperation agreement in the 1990s as they planned and wished in the late 1980s. More importantly, what are the reasons for this success or failure? The next section as well as Chapters 6, 7 and 8 will look at these two questions.

3.3. EU-ASEAN relations after 1991: An uneasy partnership

“I should like to express our concern to incorporate respect for human rights and the promotion of democracy into our relations with third States and into our development aid policy [...] It is not a matter of our interfering in the internal affairs of a given country, but of implementing the moral obligation on the international community to act on the issues, which affect both the dignity of human beings and the maintenance of peace” (Luxembourg’s Foreign Minister Jacques Poos 1991). 56

3.3.1. A new and mixed era

The collapse of the Soviet Union radically changed world politics because not only was it a watershed in the structure of international politics and in multilateral international organisations, it was a turning point in the relationship between states and regional organisations (Crockatt 2005: 112). The EC, ASEAN and their relationship were no exception. In fact, it led to a new and mixed era in their internal and external relations as well as their interaction. On the positive side, the end of the bipolar rivalry gave them more freedom to revitalise themselves and develop their external relations.

With respect to the European side, the signing of Maastricht Treaty or the Treaty on European Union (TEU) in 1992, which transformed the EC into the EU, enabled the EU to deepen and broaden its regional integration as well as expand and strengthen its external relations. In fact, this transformation, considered one of the greatest milestones in the history of European integration (Baun 1995: 605), introduced a number of far-reaching changes to the EU’s internal and external relations, which in turn enhanced its actoriness and signalled that the EU aspired to an enhanced global role (European Commission 1991; Forster 1999: 474; Guay 1999: 63). One of these was the establishment a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), whose aim was to give the Community a strong and coherent voice in its international affairs (European

56 Speech was given at the ninth AEMM in May 1991. Both the speech (in French) and its draft (in English) were made available to the author by the courtesy of Historical Archives of the European Commission.
Council 1991e; 1991f). In addition, following the end of the Cold War, the EU also expanded its membership, with Austria, Finland and Sweden, who remained neutral in the Cold War, joining the EU in 1995. Furthermore, as underlined in Chapter 1, the EU had a strong desire to foster interregionalism, making it a major feature of its foreign policy. All these developments significantly increased the EU’s influence in the world. It was even regarded as a powerful economic competitor of the US in a new emerging world order (Baun 1995: 605).

Regarding ASEAN, the Paris Peace Agreement on Cambodia, signed on 23 October 1991, in which ASEAN had played a major role (Poos 1991; Funston 1998: 25), marked the end of the Cold War in Southeast Asia. Freed from the threat from the communist Indochinese countries, ASEAN also sought to extend its membership (AMM 1992, points 14, 15 and 16).57 In addition, after a particularly slow period of internal cooperation, especially on an economic level, ASEAN decided to “move towards a higher plane of political and economic cooperation to secure regional peace and prosperity” (ASEAN Summit 1992, point 2). A significant development and by far the most important regional economic endeavour of ASEAN was its decision to establish an ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA, Chng 1993). Compared with the European integration, ASEAN’s integration remained far behind. Yet, this move by ASEAN demonstrated that it sought to increase its economic integration (ASEAN Summit 1992, point 5; Haudeville 2000: 106). At the external level, ASEAN sought to develop and reinforce its links with major partners (ASEAN Summit 1992, point 6). Furthermore, with the aim to shape its strategic environment as well as to play a greater role in the region, ASEAN created the ARF in 1994, which includes many global and regional powers to deal with the Asian security in the post-Cold War era. With these developments, ASEAN became an economic and political force to be reckoned with and it could become the focal point of Europe’s political presence in Asia (McMahon 1998: 238).

In the context of the deepening and widening of their respective regional integration as well as their efforts to increase their external relations, the EU and ASEAN had strong reasons and solid foundations for strengthening their cooperation. In other words, their respective actor capability was significantly enhanced; the

57 Vietnam, which was once a major threat to ASEAN, joined the Association in 1995. Two other communist countries, i.e. Laos and Cambodia, were admitted in 1997 and 1999 respectively. Myanmar was also allowed to join ASEAN in 1997.
international environment was more favourable; and both regional organisations found new confidence and willingness to play a greater role in the international scene. These factors, together with their success of their political dialogue during the Cold War period, could pave the way for them to significantly enhance their cooperation by establishing a new and far-reaching cooperation framework – a move that had already been considered and desired by the EC and ASEAN in the late 1980s and the early 1990s (AEMM 1988; 1990; 1991).

3.3.2. The emergence of contentious issues

However, a desire for a stronger interregional partnership was not realised because besides the positive factors mentioned, there were other major issues, which fed into – and, consequently, averted – their interaction. Chapter 6 will explore in more detail these factors. Yet, it is worth briefly mentioning two of them here. First, with the collapse of the bipolar rivalry, the common threat, i.e. communism, which had bonded them together during the Cold War years, no longer existed. Consequently, the basic convergences in views and approaches in the politico-strategic sphere they had forged and enjoyed during the Cold War period began to waive (Bridges 1999: 150) and their inherent normative differences and other related problems emerged (Forster 1999: 750). This also means the initial success of their relations in the political arena was confined to the context of the Cold War and the earlier convergence of their strategic interests over the Cambodian and Afghanistan issues did not lay the foundation for a greater politico-cultural alignment in the post-Cold War era. Second, with the end of the Cold War, in both regional organisations, new questions of ‘who are we’ were raised and this debate even compounded their normative divergences. On the European side, the EU’s transformation from the EC gave it a new identity and a new agenda, whose one of the cornerstones was to defend and spread its ‘European values’, e.g. human rights and democracy (European Council 1991a; 1991b; Europa Press Releases 1993). With this new mission, it introduced and applied a human rights clause into its cooperation agreements with third parties, be they states or regional organisations. On the ASEAN side, thanks to their economic growth in the 1970s and 1980s, ASEAN and its member states were more confident in their way of conducting their regional affairs, and even more willing to oppose European value-based policies. As will be shown in Chapter 5, against this background, the so-called ‘Asian values’ emerged. Given these factors, the EU and ASEAN clashed with each other and their disputes even posed the greatest threat to their relationship (Tay and Goh 1999: 39). Overall, if the political dialogue
between the two regional organisations was the strongest part of their Cold War ties, it became the weakest element in their link in the post-Cold War period. In fact, due to their normative differences, a number of contentious issues emerged in their interaction, and because of them, the EU and ASEAN entered what was termed a ‘value-system friction’ (Dent 1999: 51), which was seen as the ‘dark side’ of their relationship (Dosch 2001: 64).

The first signs of their disagreements appeared at the eighth AEMM in February 1990 in Kuching, Malaysia. The main reason for their disputes was not anything related to their cooperation, but the Tiananmen Square massacre in June 1989, when the Chinese military attacked the students’ pro-democracy movement. As this event came at a time when it paid attention to the human rights issue in general and was already critical of China’s human rights record, the EC strongly condemned the attacks and called for a tough stance against Beijing (European Council 1989; Bridges 1999: 106-7; Tay and Goh 1999: 45; Kreutz 2005: 26). However, at this meeting as well as during its ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference (PMC) in July 1990 in Jakarta, ASEAN rejected the EC’s proposal to impose economic sanctions on Beijing (Palmujoki 1997: 273; Forster 1999: 751; Pattugalan 1999: 55). ASEAN countries rejected this move because, besides their effort to (re-)normalise and engage with China in those years (Lee 2001: 62), they opposed external interference into other countries’ domestic politics.

Following the tense exchange at the eighth AEMM, it was hoped that the next meeting in Luxembourg in May 1991 would be more cordial. Officials on both sides realised that their relationship was “entering an important new phase and efforts must now be made to ensure that it will be positive” (Merritt 1991: 31). However, the political climate at the ninth AEMM was not as friendly as expected. Actually, it was even worse because the disagreements between the two organisations over human rights became even more evident. In his opening speech, Jacques Poos said that the EC was saddened by the oppression in China (Poos 1991). Moreover, as the quotation the beginning of this session illustrates, he stated that the EC sought to include respect for human rights and democracy in the EC’s relations with third countries. In response, Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas argued that since developing countries, e.g. ASEAN ones, “are still struggling to overcome the blights imposed by past colonialism and new exploitation”, they were more concerned about basic needs (quoted in Cerna 1995: 203). Consequently, ASEAN countries disliked the way European officials insisted on human rights, accusing them of “a tendentious application of Western norms
and values in inter-state relations” and of “creating standards and criteria by which to judge people and condemn countries” (quoted in Vatikiotis 1991: 35). Overall, by the early 1990s, the EU and ASEAN emerged as two different normative powers. While the former focused on the promotion of its liberal norms, the latter emphasised its core principles of non-interference. These normative differences were the main reason behind their disputes over the two major issues, namely East Timor and Myanmar.

3.3.3. The issues of East Timor and Myanmar

East Timor only became a major issue the EU’s relations with ASEAN in 1991 though Indonesia’s invasion of this territory took place in 1975 and from then there were reports about widespread human rights violations by Indonesian army forces. The Dili killing, which took place on 12 November 1991, when several hundred East Timorese pro-independence demonstrators in the Santa Cruz cemetery in the capital, Dili were shot by Indonesian troop (Defert 1992: 120; Amnesty International 1994: 50-54; Singh 1999: 498), became a focal point of European criticism (Bridges 1999: 171). It brought East Timor in EU-ASEAN relations and compounded their already existing disagreements over the EU’s human rights clause. In fact, these divergences, coupled with Portugal’s veto in July 1992 were the reason behind their failure to negotiate a more advanced cooperation framework, even though they had desired and planned this in the late 1980s and the early 1990s. Chapter 6 will examine in-depth why, from a non-issue in the 1970s and 1980s, East Timor became a major – and indeed obstructive – factor in EU-ASEAN relations in the 1990s.

In an attempt to boost its relations with Asia as a whole, the EU – and especially its four major powers, namely France, Germany, Italy and the UK – decided to put aside sensitive political issues and return to a pragmatic course of focusing on economics (Yeo 2005). That consensus decision was also the result of the EU’s general shift in policy towards Asia in the early 1990s. In fact, in July 1994 the European Commission issued *Towards a New Strategy in Asia*, which also emphasised the EU’s relations with ASEAN as the cornerstone of its engagement with Asia (European Commission 1994). This strategy, which also set the stage for the creation of ASEM, which will be examined in Chapter 7, was the EU’s response to the growing economic and political importance of Asia. Thanks to the optimism created by the Commission’s *New Asia

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58 According to a report of Amnesty International in 1994, about 200,000 people, one third of East Timor’s population, were killed or died of starvation or disease after Indonesia invaded in 1975 (Amnesty International 1994: 5). Others believe that the 1970s and 1980s between 100,000 to 250,000 East Timorese lost their lives out of a population of 650,000 (Smith 2001: 29).
Strategy, the foreign ministers of both sides came to the 11th AEMM, held in Karlsruhe, Germany on 22-23 September 1994, with a determination to leave behind the disputes about human rights and find new ways to enhance their cooperation. More precisely, they adopted a pragmatic approach by sidestepping the issue on a new agreement that was blocked by Portugal. Given this, unlike the past few AEMMs, the Karlsruhe meeting was congenial. The East Timor issue was not raised and human rights were only briefly mentioned in this meeting. According Rüland (1996: 31), this revealed that ASEAN has gained the upper hand in determining the topics, style and procedure of the meeting. At this meeting, they agreed to establish an ad hoc Eminent Persons Group (EPG), also known as an ASEAN-EU Senior Officials Meeting (1995), with members drawn from both regions, whose task was to develop a comprehensive approach to EU-ASEAN political, security, economic and cultural relations towards the year 2000 and beyond (AEMM 1995; Villacorta 2009: 8). Nearly two years later, in June 1996, the EPG produced a report entitled A Strategy for a New Partnership, which called for an increase in mutual trust and a better understanding between the two regions. The strategy also suggested other measures to foster economic and political cooperation. The EPG’s proposals were complemented and supported by a communication of the European Commission, called Creating a New Dynamic in EU-ASEAN Relations, which was aimed at revitalising the EU’s relations with ASEAN (European Commission 1996; Mierlo 1997). The Commission also proposed that this ‘new dynamic’ should be endorsed by the next AEMM, due to take place in Singapore in 1997.

However, this new and optimistic spirit or a new dynamism did not last long. In fact, the recommendations in both the EPG’s report the European Communication’s Creating a New Dynamic in EU-ASEAN Relations did not produce any concrete results and, consequently, failed to revive EU-ASEAN relations (Yeo 2008b: 87; 2009a: 45). While both sides thought they had found a new way to move their relationship forward after being held hostage by the human rights issue and the East Timor problem, they faced new and even bigger challenges. One of these was the 1997/1998 Asian financial crisis, which did not weakened many Asian economies but also negatively impacted upon ASEAN’s relations with the EU. Another significant – if not the defining – factor that hindered their interaction in the late 1990s was the Myanmar issue. While it had already a major point of disagreement between the two organisations in the early 1990s, Myanmar became an obstacle to the EU-ASEAN dialogue when it was allowed to join ASEAN in 1997 despite the EU’s objection. The disputes over Myanmar led the EU and
ASEAN to postpone their AEMM and JCC for several years in the late 1990s. The Myanmar issue also overshadowed some summits and ministerial meetings of ASEM, which was established partly because of the desire of the EU and ASEAN to overcome the deadlock they faced in the 1990s. Chapter 7 will examine in-depth why the Myanmar jeopardised not only EU-ASEAN relations but also the ASEM process.

3.3.4. New efforts to strengthen relations and ASEAN-EU FTA

By the early 2000s, both the EU and ASEAN realised that they needed to revive their relations and their economic cooperation in particular.\(^{59}\) This was motivated by a number of important changes at different levels during the first years the 21\(^{st}\) century. Globally, as underlined by the EU’s *Global Europe Strategy*, the world witnessed developments that “are as significant for the world economy and international relations as the end of the Cold War” (European Commission 2003a: 3). One of these was the rise of Asian countries, notably that of China (Fukuyama 2008; Zakaria 2009; Moore 2011). Another is the intensification of the process of regionalisation (Hurrell 2007: 130), which resulted in the proliferation of FTAs (Sen 2008b; Senti 2010). A major cause of this shift was the failure of the Doha Development Agenda (Woolcock 2007: 2). Another reason is that in this post-American world, each country, and maybe each regional organisation, planned to shape its own future in its own way (Gardels 2007; 2008; Grugel et al. 2008; Khanna 2008).

Coupled with those global transformations, the EU and ASEAN also experienced major changes. For the EU, a significant move it made was to alter its trade policy. Instead of focusing on the establishment of political and security-oriented agreements as it did in the 1990s,\(^{60}\) it now paid attention to the negotiation and conclusion of primarily commerce-oriented ones (Aggarwall and Fogarty 2004; Woolcock 2008). This shift was aimed at taking advantages of huge opportunities, e.g. new markets, and meeting challenges, e.g. increasing competition for access to markets and raw materials for its members that the major transformations in the world economy brought about (European Commission 2006a: 3). Consequently, the EU sought to establish FTAs with major emerging economies and regions (European Commission 2006a: 7). In this context, it

\(^{59}\) Yeo (2009b: 45) regards as the fourth and current phase, which was one of re-discovery because both sides have been seeking to rebuild their relations.

\(^{60}\) These included cooperation agreement with CEE countries (European Commission 1995c; Inotai 1995), and with countries surrounding its borders, e.g. the Euro-Med Association Agreement (Attinà 2004; European Commission 2006a: 10-1; Woolcock 2007: 3; Boening 2009).
wanted to enhance economic cooperation with ASEAN by seeking to establish an FTA with it (Camroux 2010: 67; Cremona 2010: 247; see also Gavin and Sindzingre 2009).

ASEAN also witnessed significant changes (Neves 2004: 4-10), which helped to transform itself into a coherent grouping (Prado 2010: 362). After being heavily affected by the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis and other issues, e.g. the ecological crisis caused by the haze in 1999, the humanitarian crisis in East Timor (Yeo 2007b: 180), ASEAN as a whole and its members sought to recover their economies and to rebuild their organisation.61 One of the moves it took was the agreement to create an ASEAN Community, based on three pillars, namely political and security, economic and socio-cultural, during its ninth summit in Bali in October 2003 (ASEAN Summit 2003). Moreover, with the aim of competing with countries like China and India, ASEAN countries realised that they needed to transform their organisation, making it formal, legalistic and rule-based (ASEAN official, interview, 2009). For this reason, from 2005 ASEAN began to discuss forming an ASEAN Charter, which was eventually signed in 2007. They also agreed to create a Human Rights Body (HRB) to deal with this sensitive issue, and two years later, at their 42nd AMM, ASEAN Foreign Ministers adopted the Terms of Reference for this HRB (AMM 2009; ASEAN Secretariat 2009d). The creation of the HRB is a significant step in the ASEAN’s evolution because “five years ago, we could not even talk about anything called ‘human rights’” (ASEAN official, interview, 2009). According to an EU official, the process of democratisation began to take place in some ASEAN countries, e.g. Indonesia and Malaysia, and ASEAN’s efforts to accelerate its integration, for example through the creation of the ASEAN Charter, which was welcomed by the EU, contributed to the improvement of the EU-ASEAN relationship. Moreover, with the aim of maintaining its relevance, ASEAN sought to advance its relations with its major Asian neighbours, especially China, Japan and South Korea, as well as India, Australia and New Zealand (Smith 2004: 416-33). This resulted not only in creating the EAS in December 2005 (Malik 2006: 207), but also in leading ASEAN to enter into negotiations FTAs with these regional powers (Sen and Srivanstava 2009; Kawai and Wignaraja 2008; 2010; Wignaraja 2010; Senti 2010; see also Appendix 8).

Together with, and thanks to, the global changes and the developments within the EU and ASEAN, their relationship also experienced positive changes. Unlike in the

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61 During and after the AFC, ASEAN as an institution was widely criticised because it was unable to help its members manage the crisis (Narine 2008: 420).
1990s, it was now less confrontational. Instead of expressing their disagreements bluntly, as they used to, they now tried to avoid or accommodate their differences. Indeed, as explained by the officials of the EU and ASEAN that the author interviewed in 2009, EU-ASEAN relations were much better than in the 1990s. Major changes in ASEAN mentioned contributed to this improvement. In addition, there was a better understanding on the part of ASEAN about what the EU wanted to achieve in its integration and its relations with ASEAN (EU official, Interview 2009). There was also the change of attitude on the EU side because after a very tense period in the EU-ASEAN relationship because of what happened in East Timor and Myanmar, the Europeans realised that the EU others may operate different from the (ASEAN official, Interview, 2009). These changes in perceptions helped improve the relationship. Consequently, after being disrupted by the disputes over human rights and the Myanmar problem, the AEMM was resumed in Vientiane, Laos in December 2000 (Kazmin and Williamson 2000). Even though the EU sent only low-ranking officials to the meeting, the fact that it was held again was a significant development for their relations.

In 2001, the EU also published *Europe and Asia: A Strategic Framework for Enhanced Partnerships*, in which it emphasised that strengthening of its partnership with ASEAN “will be a key priority in the coming years” (European Commission 2001: 22). In 2003, in an attempt to revise its partnership with ASEAN, the EU issued *A New Partnership with South East Asia*, covering a wide number of areas. The 14th AEMM in 2003 also injected a new momentum into EU-ASEAN relations since at this meeting the ministers extensively discussed how to reinvigorate their relationship, notably commercial cooperation. Concretely, with the aim to revive their relationship, with the objective of revitalising their relations and their economic cooperation in particular, they initiated a number of mechanisms. One of these was the establishment of the *Regional EC-ASEAN Dialogue Instrument (READI)* in 2005, which covers a wide variety of non-trade issues, ranging from transport, home affairs and justice concerns (e.g. human trafficking, transnational crimes, and money laundering), and the environment. Another initiative was the creation of the *ASEAN-EC Project on Regional Integration Support (APRIS)*, which was set the process of regional integration in ASEAN. Along with the EU’s participation in the Initiatives for ASEAN Integration, APRIS was expected to contribute to narrowing the huge development gap among

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62 It identified six areas as strategic priorities in its relation with ASEAN, which also included promoting human rights, democratic principles and good governance (European Commission 2003: 3-4).
ASEAN members, which consequently would promote further regional economic integration (Yeo 2009a: 54). Since APRIS’s establishment, which was also aimed at strengthening the institutional capacity of the ASEAN Secretariat, the EU made significant assistance towards ASEAN to support its regional integration efforts. Around €1.3 billion was committed for development cooperation to support the creation of the ASEAN Economic Community (Yeo 2009b: 16).

The third initiative was the Trans-Regional EU-ASEAN Trade Initiative (TREATI). This programme, which was launched during the third ASEAN Economic Ministers and EU Trade Commissioner Consultation (AEM-EU Consultation) in 2003, was aimed at enhancing trade relations between the two regions (AEM-EU Consultation 2003). Since its creation, several workshops and meetings were held in Brussels and ASEAN countries (Abbate et al. 2008: 10). These activities were aimed at preparing the foundation for a potential ASEAN-EU FTA. Besides these schemes, at their 16th AEMM in 2007 in Nuremberg, Germany the EU and ASEAN adopted the Nuremberg Declaration on an EU-ASEAN Enhanced Partnership. In this Declaration, both sides pledged to enhance EU-ASEAN dialogue and agreed to step up cooperation in the fields of political, security, economic, social and development cooperation (AEMM 2007a; 2007b). In addition, to implement the Nuremberg Declaration in the medium term (2007-2012), they also agreed to develop a Plan of Action (AEMM 2007b, point 28). This plan was endorsed by the Heads of State/Government of the EU and ASEAN at their Commemorative Summit in Singapore in November 2007, which was held to mark the 30th anniversary of the formal relationship between the two organisations.

These developments and initiatives, notably the TREATI, paved the way for the two regions to launch negotiations towards a region-to-region FTA in 2007. Yet, despite significant perceived strategic and economic benefits such an FTA would bring to the two organisations, as well as great enthusiasm of both sides before the FTA negotiations (Geest 2004; Andreosso-O’Callaghan et al. 2006; Andreosso-O’Callaghan 2008; 2009; Andreosso-O’Callaghan and Nicolas 2007; 2008; 2009), they decided to halt the FTA talks in 2009. The third section of Chapter 7 will explore in more detail the factors that led them to open talks and the reasons behind the collapse of the talks. Since then, the EU decided to negotiate FTAs with individual ASEAN countries. In fact, it already opened negotiations with Singapore and Malaysia in 2010, Vietnam in 2011, and is planning the similar move with other ASEAN countries (Doan 2012a). One of the causes of the failure of the FTA negotiations was their differences over Myanmar with
the EU refusing the participation of this country in the FTA whereas ASEAN insisted on its inclusion. This means Myanmar still negatively affected their relations in the 2000s. More precisely, it shows that while their relationship in the period 2001-2009 was less conflictual than in the 1990s, in terms of their ways of conducting regional and international affairs, the EU and ASEAN were still divergent and this prevented them from moving their economic and political relationship to a more substantial level.

**3.3.5. Security cooperation and the Aceh Monitoring Mission**

At the security level, the EU was a full member of the ARF when it was established. However, compared to ASEAN’s other major partners, e.g. the US, China, Japan, India or Russia, the EU was much less involved in the ARF and its overall contribution was lacklustre (Yeo 2009c: 16-7). The EU has still been excluded from the East Asia Summit (EAS). The EU’s exclusion is notable because it is one of the oldest dialogue partners of ASEAN, who is the lead organisation of the EAS, which is regarded as the prime multilateral security arrangement in the Asia-Pacific region. Chapter 8 will explain why the EU and ASEAN did not have substantial cooperation in the security area, especially regarding traditional security issues.

There were only two areas or issues, in which the two organisations had some notable cooperation and these took place in the 2000s. The first was about their cooperation to fight against terrorism following the terrorist attacks in the US on 11 September 2001 and subsequent terrorist bombings in some ASEAN and EU countries. At the 14th AEMM in January 2003, they adopted a *Joint Declaration on Cooperation to Combat Terrorism* affirming their “commitment to work together and contribute to global efforts to stamp out terrorism” (AEMM 2003). Through its *Rapid Reaction Mechanism*, the EU provided assistance to a number of ASEAN countries in their fights against terrorism. For instance, the EU assisted the Philippines in the fields of border and money laundering and Indonesia in the field of juridical capacity building and fight against the financing of terrorism (European Commission 2003: 14). Until summer 2003, the EU supported counterterrorist measures in Southeast Asia with a total of 21 million Euros (Umbach 2004). Even though, this amount was much less significant than the aid the US offered to ASEAN countries in the aftermath of the 9/11

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63 These include the bombings in Bali (October 2002), Jakarta (August 2003 and September 2004), the Philippines (October 2002; February 2003; February 2004) in the ASEAN region and the bombings in Madrid (March 2004) and London (July 2005).
events (Lim 2003: 6), it showed that the EU considered the ASEAN region as one of the important fronts in its fight against terrorism. According to Moeller (2007: 474), the EU had some considerable cooperation with ASEAN in this area because after the 9/11 events, for the EU, “it was an eye opener that Southeast Asia was of strategic importance outside the realm of economics and trade”. In fact, the EU identified cooperating in the fight against terrorism as one of the priorities of its relations with ASEAN and its members (European Commission 2003: 13). For ASEAN and its members, the EU’s interest in their regional security “signifies that the EU was finally coming to realize the importance of Southeast Asia in the context of global security” (Moeller 2007: 474).

The second area, in which the two organisations had tangible cooperation, was their joint operation to monitor the implementation of the peace agreement between the Free Aceh Movement, or Geraka Aceh Merkeda (GAM), and the Indonesian Government, signed in 2005. Though this EU-led venture, known as the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM), also involved two non-EU countries, namely Norway and Switzerland, and only five ASEAN members, it was largely a joint EU-ASEAN effort (Solana 2005b). It is arguably the most important contribution of the EU to Southeast Asia security and the most concrete and successful collaboration between the EU and ASEAN in the security area so far. At their meeting in 2007, the ministers of the EU and ASEAN also commended it “as a success in a unique political environment and noted with appreciation that for the first time, EU and ASEAN member countries worked together closely in the field of crisis management” (AEMM 2007a, point 9). This raises a key question regarding the reasons behind their successful collaboration in the AMM. In other words, why did the EU and ASEAN could successfully work together in the AMM whereas not only did they fail to solve the issues of East Timor and Myanmar but also let these two problems jeopardise their cooperation? Chapter 8 will address in more detail this question. Yet, while the Aceh peace agreement and the AMM were commonly hailed in and by the EU, they were rarely mentioned in and by ASEAN. In fact, until the involvement of five ASEAN countries in the AMM, the Aceh conflict was never an issue in ASEAN. Thus, the Aceh issue raises two other important questions. First, why did the EU proactively get involved in the Aceh peace whereas it

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64 After the 9/11 events the US offered a $660 million aid package to Indonesia (Chow 2005: 312) and the Philippines a $100 million military aid package and direct military assistance to fight against terrorism (Asia Times 2001).
was absent from the other regional security mechanisms led by ASEAN, such as the ARF and the EAS? Second, why was ASEAN much less concerned about the Aceh conflict than the EU even though this deadly conflict occurred – and lasted for several years – in its region? Again, these are the key questions that Chapter 8 will address because such an examination will enable the thesis to explain and illustrate the normative differences of the EU and ASEAN, the reasons behind their normative dissimilarities and the negative impact of those divergences on their relations in general and their cooperation in the strategic and security area in particular.

Overall, despite their realisation that they needed to enhance their cooperation, especially in economic-related areas, e.g. trade in order to meet the new realities of the two regions since the late 1980s, their relations were not improved significantly. In fact, while the scope of their post-Cold War cooperation was much broader than their Cold War interaction, their overall relations were not substantially strengthened. For instance, commercial relations, which were the strongest aspect and the centrepiece of their ties, were largely unchanged. The share of ASEAN’s three major trading countries, i.e. Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia, in the EU’s total trade increased very slightly from 3.1 % in 1992 to about 3.4 % in 2009 (EUROSTAT 2010). In 1983, the EC was ASEAN’s third biggest trading partner, accounting for 11.1 % of its total trade, in 2011, while remaining its third largest trader, the EU represented only 10.5 % of ASEAN’s overall trade (European Commission, DG for Trade 1985; 2012) even though the two organisations have enlarged considerably since then. In other words, while the EU had a wide range of initiatives, e.g. READI and APRIS, to help ASEAN’s integration and foster EU-ASEAN relations, it failed to establish grand projects or far-reaching cooperation agreements with ASEAN. Its failure to agree a more advanced cooperation framework with ASEAN in the early 1990s and to negotiate an FTA with the later in 2009 was an example. Given this, the 1980 Cooperation Agreement remains their legal binding cooperation framework, even though it is regarded as outdated. The latest and most significant document on their relations was the 2007 Nuremberg Declaration, in which both sides promised to enhance their cooperation. Yet, as its

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65 In contrast, the share of China’s trade in the EU’s trade rose dramatically, from 2.5 % to 12.7 % in the same period.

66 In addition, with the aim of providing information to European and Southeast Asian firms on trade, infrastructure, costs, regulation and standards, the first European Business Information Centre was established in Manila in 1993, followed by others in other ASEAN countries, e.g. Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore.

67 According to Lim (2012: 57), ASEAN wanted the EU to invest in concrete projects and not just funding workshops, seminars, the talking sessions.
name implies, it was merely a declaration, which expressed the intent of the two organisations. It was not a legal document or a cooperation agreement. At the political and security levels, though it had some notable collaboration with ASEAN, e.g. their cooperation to fight against terrorism and to monitor the Aceh peace process, their cooperation in this area was relatively insignificant as illustrated by the EU’s feeble participation in the ARF and its exclusion from the EAS. A key reason for this underdeveloped relationship between the EU and ASEAN was their conflicting norms.

In summary, this chapter has given a broad overview of not only the ties between the EU and ASEAN since 1991 but also the long linkage between the two regions prior to that date. In doing so, besides offering a historical background as well as an assessment of their relations, it has drawn attention to a number of important points, which this thesis aims to illustrate. As they are central to the study, this chapter concludes by pointing out some of these main points. First, right from the beginning, the core norms on, which the two organisations were respectively based, were significantly different from each other. Yet, given both of them were established in the Cold War and shared an anti-communist and capitalist posture, not only their foundational norms were diminished but also that overriding similarity facilitated their Cold War interaction. Second, because the two organisations and their relationship were considerably defined by Cold War politics, the end of the Cold War significantly shaped the EU, ASEAN and their interaction. Third, their normative dimensions were always determined by their own temporal and spatial context. For instance, the EU and its norms were significantly shaped by Europe’s war-torn past whereas Southeast Asia’s colonial legacy characterised ASEAN and its norms. Fourth, their ideational and normative dimensions were the fundamental components that constitute them as actors in world politics and, consequently, they significantly defined their international relations. As it is founded on a set of liberal and democratic norms, e.g. democracy and human rights, the EU’s foreign policy and its relations with ASEAN are influenced by those norms. In contrast, the set of traditional/Westphalian principles, e.g. national sovereignty and non-interference, on which ASEAN is premised, define ASEAN’s raison d’être, its regional and international relations. Fifth, both the EU and ASEAN are norm entrepreneurs and normative powers as they strongly uphold and promote their norms. Sixth, ideational and normative factors are not always a force for cooperation; they can be a source of conflict in world politics. International actors are better to cooperate with each other when their norms and worldviews converge and their relations are conflictual when
their ideational and normative diverge. EC-ASEAN relations during the Cold War were relatively friendly because their overall worldviews converged whereas their post-Cold War link, especially in the 1990s, was rather strained because their norms diverged from each other. Finally, since the end of the Cold War, the EU and ASEAN became two different norm entrepreneurs and normative powers and their normative differences significantly hindered their post-Cold War interaction. The next five chapters will illustrate in more detail these seven points.

4. The EU: A cosmopolitan normative power

“[W]e must ask ever anew what holds Europe together also in this century, what the essence of its identity is. For me the answer is clear. The source of Europe’s identity are our shared, fundamental values. They are what holds Europe together (Angela Merkel, Germany’s Chancellor 2007).

This chapter examines the nature of the EU as an international actor with a strong focus on its normative basis and role in world politics. From the outset, it has to admit that it is not an easy task because the EU and its international identity in particular are contested. They are perceived differently by different people (Caporaso and Kim 2009: 19). A key reason for this controversy is that the EU does have not a single identity, but many identities, which remain “open to multiple interpretations” (Katzenstein and Checkel 2009: 226). Another important reason for this puzzlement lies in the fact that the EU itself remains largely an “unidentified international object” (Elgström and Smith 2006b: 1-2). In fact, as will be shown shortly, in the current literature, there exist many descriptions of the EU as an international actor. Yet, among these portrayals of the EU, normative power is the most popular one and despite its limitations, it captures quite well the essence of the EU (Forsberg 2011: 1184). It is for this reason that the thesis adopts it as a typology to examine the EU. Furthermore, with the aim of distinguishing it from other normative powers, notably ASEAN, it depicts the EU as a cosmopolitan normative power. More precisely, by using this portrayal as a framework for the analysis, this chapter aims to (1) identify the EU’s normative foundation, (2) the sources of its normative premises and differences and (3) why the EU’s normative preferences affect its relations with other political actors, especially those who do not share or highly regard its normative premises. The current chapter mainly focuses on the two

68 The EU’s international role generally refers to its international behaviour and influence. It is often treated as interchangeable with references to its identity. This thesis maintains that the EU’s international identity and role are interrelated because its identity defines its role in world politics.
first of these three issues. Yet, it also briefly looks at the EU’s links with some actors in world politics because such an examination will enable the thesis to explain more adequately the EU’s relationship with ASEAN, which will be investigated in more detail in Chapters 6, 7 and 8.

4.1. The EU’s identity and normative foundation

4.1.1. The EU: A multifaceted identity

In recent years, scholarship on the EU has abundantly focused on the exploration of “the nature of the beast” (Risse-Kappen 1996) or the characteristics of its international identity and role (Sjursen 2006a). Yet, this kind of research can be traced back to the early 1970s, when Duchêne (1972; 1973) depicted the EU as a particular actor that used economic and political rather than military means to deal with international affairs (Larsen 2002: 289; Sjursen 2006a: 169). Consequently, even though Duchêne did not directly use the term ‘civilian power’ in his works (Orbie 2006: 123), the concept of civilian power Europe is used to describe the EU and he is often seen as the precursor of this concept. However, a civilian power Europe advocated by Duchêne was criticised by Bull (1982), who pleaded for a military power Europe, i.e. militarily self-sufficient Europe. Nonetheless, the question of the EU assuming a military dimension had remained unthinkable until the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, when the EU wished to move beyond a civilian power and to develop a military dimension to its international identity (Whitman 1998: 135-6). Again, the expectation that the EU could develop a common compelling foreign and defence policy, which could help it make a fundamental shift from civilian to military power, was not fulfilled because there existed what Hill (1998; 1993) called a ‘capabilities-expectation gap’.70

Besides these two concepts, the EU is given other images, e.g. an ethical power (Aggestam 2008), a realist power (Zimmerman 2007; Seeberg 2009), a pragmatic power (Wood 2011). The next section on normative power Europe will explain in more detail these depictions because they are conceptualised to challenge the portrayal of the EU as

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69 The depiction of civilian power Europe remains one of the main portrayals used by scholars to describe the EU because the key components of that interpretation of the EU are still relevant to the EU (Telò 2001b; 2006; Whitman 1998; Manners and Whitman 2003; Whitman 2006; Börzel and Risse 2009).

70 This lack of military capabilities prompted Kagan (2002; 2003) to depict the EU as coming from ‘Venus’, which focuses on civilian means to international affairs. Yet, some scholars, e.g. Sangiovanni (2003) and Treacher (2004) still regard the EU as an emerging military power.
a normative power. By referring to them, a point made here is that there are different
typologies of the EU and while each of these depictions captures a particular aspect of
the EU’s identity, with the exception of the concept of ethical power Europe, they all
have a major limitation. That is they do not considerably take into account the
normative quality of the EU and its foreign policy, which is probably the most defining
feature of the EU and its international identity. The typology that considers this most
prominent character of the EU is normative power Europe (NPE).

4.1.2. Normative power Europe

NPE or the EU as a normative power is a concept, which was first coined by
Manners (2002).71 His key objective in introducing this concept was to tackle what is
crucial but missing or underdeveloped in the concepts of civilian and military power
Europe depicted by Duchêne and Bull respectively – that is the EU’s normative
character. Since then, NPE has become a well-known concept in both policy debates
and academic studies on the EU and its foreign policy in recent years (Forsberg 2011:
1184). A huge number of works have been undertaken to expand, refine or criticise the
concept. These include Diez (2004), Youngs (2004), Sjursen (2006a; 2006b), Hyde-
Manners himself has published many to revise and further his thesis (2006a; 2006b;
2006c; 2008a; 2008b; 2009a; 2009b). Yet, while it is popular, NPE is a contested
notion. Its controversy is related to the letter ‘N’ in NPE. In his original work, Manners
(2002: 239) defines NP as the “ability to shape conceptions of ‘normal’” (emphasis
added). In a later article, entitled “The Normative Ethics of the European Union”,
Manners (2008a) furthers his thesis by focusing more on the ethical/moral meaning of
the ‘N’. By doing so, he assumes that the EU is a NP not simply because it is
constituted by, and seeks to promote, normative values. It is also because the practices
through, which it promotes them and the impact they have are normative, i.e. morally
good. In this article, the EU is not directly affirmed as such an ethical power. Rather, it
is advised to become and live as a virtuous power, which should “live by example”, “be
reasonable” and “do least harm” (Manners 2008a: 60). The ethical aspects of the EU’s

71 Manners’ work also marked to a shift in the scholarship on the EU’s international influence since his
inception of the concept of normative power Europe, scholarly debate has largely shifted to its ‘software’
constituents, e.g. norms and values. For decades, debates about its external relations more or less focused
on “the question of whether or not there was such a thing as a European foreign policy” (Sjursen 2006a:
169). That is why the ‘hardware’ dimensions of its foreign policy, e.g. institutional infrastructure and
military equipment, were emphasised and the ‘software’ dimensions of its foreign policy were often
ignored (Lucarelli 2006a: 1).
action in world politics are advanced by Aggestam (2008), who introduces the concept of ethical power Europe. Her aim is to provide “a conceptual shift in the EU’s role and inspiration from what it ‘is’ to what it ‘does’: from simply representing a ‘power of interaction’ and a positive role model to proactively working to change the world in the direction of its vision of the ‘global common good’” (Aggestam 2008: 1). Thus, unlike the concept of NPE, the ethical power Europe thesis predominantly focuses on the EU’s proactive role in the world and its action should be a force for good for the world.

However, the argument that the EU is an ethical power is contentious because “what is usually projected is not the EU as is, but an EUtopia” (Nicolaïdis and Howse 2002: 767). In other words, such a picture of the EU in the international arena does not really represent what the EU actually is, but represents an ideal Europe. For that reason, it is often argued that instead of exporting what it is, the EU tries to export what it would like to be to the world (Scheipers and Sicurelli: 2007: 438). That means there is a gap between the EU’s rhetoric and its action (Smith 2001). Some scholars even argue that the EU sometimes put economic and security interests over values (Youngs 2004). This seems very true in the case of the EU’s relations with China, in which its stance vis-à-vis the latter is not always consistent with its ideals (Eriksen 2006; Balducci 2010). That is why Zimmerman (2007) regards the EU as a ‘realist power’ whilst for Wood (2011: 256), it is a ‘pragmatic power’ because “while EUrope displays normative, ethical and realistic instincts and features, the self-interested pragmatism of its members states, pressured by domestic imperatives, is the crucial characteristic of its external relations”.

Söderbaum et al. (2005: 373-7) argue that along with the promotion of its values in its foreign policy, the EU seeks to strengthen its economic power and its strategic interests, which are not fully compatible with the high ideals and normative agenda so often emphasised in its official language. According to Bretherton and Vogler (1999; 2006), besides being depicted as a NP, the EU is also seen as a ‘fortress Europe’; they believe that there are contradictions in the EU’s collective identity. On the one hand, the EU is portrayed as a principled actor, who promotes universal principles and high ideals to others; on the other hand, it is seen as a selfish actor, who seeks to strengthen its interest and power. Hettne and Söderbaum (2005: 535-52) also underline that on the one hand, the EU seeks to pursue a norm-driven foreign policy, which stems from the values promoted within the Union, e.g. the rule of law and democracy. On the

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other, it practices ‘soft imperialism’, which is “an asymmetric form of dialogue or even the imposition or strategic use of norms and conditionalities enforced for reasons of self-interest rather than for the creation of a genuine dialogue” (Hettne and Söderbaum 2005: 539). Balfour (2006: 115) underlines that this dichotomy, i.e. principles vs. interests or idealism vs. realism, appears tenuous and suggests that it should be challenged on a continuum’, which implies that the EU’s promotion of its values is not totally derived either from its genuineness or from its selfishness.

These arguments show that if a NP is defined as a virtuous power that always behaves in an ethical manner in world politics, the EU – and, perhaps, no power in world politics – is universally regarded as a NP. This is because ethics in international politics are deeply contested because “it tends to be closely associated with particular worldviews and each with its own assessment of the feasibility of change in the international system” (Aggestam 2008: 5). What the EU regards as an ethical way to conduct international affairs, e.g. the respect of human rights, may not be perceived in the same manner by other actors, e.g. China and ASEAN, and vice versa. Another contested point relating the NPE thesis is the contention that an ideal-type of normative power should have a normative identity, normative interests/goals, normative means and normative impacts and behave according to norms (Forsberg 2011). However, if a NP is defined as a power that possesses all these characteristics, there exists no such a type of power on earth. Tocci et al (2008: 25-6) use only three criteria: normative goals, normative means and normative impacts, to examine the EU’s relations with eight different countries to see whether the EU is a normative actor. By doing so, they discover that its foreign policy has at times been normative while at other times has been realist, imperialistic and status quo-oriented.

Thus, like other images of the EU, the depiction of it as a NP is also contested, especially when that description is used to illustrate it as an ethical power or a power that has the five characteristics identified by Forsberg (2011). However, under the interpretation of De Zutter (2010: 1122), the EU is aptly qualified as a normative power. While one may question the motives, the consistence and the ethical aspects of its norm-motivated practices, the EU is probably the most noticeable normative power if judging by its efforts to shape the normal in world politics through its norm-driven practices. Its norms are also adopted by some others, e.g. those who seek its membership. The next part, which examine in-depth the EU’s norms, will illustrate the integral role of the norm-driven practices in the EU’s internal and external relations. There is another
reason why the EU’s norms are examined in more detail is that it makes little sense to attribute a normative quality to the EU and its international identity if one does not identify the norms that constitute it. Manners (2002: 240), Diez (2005: 614) and Diez and Manners (2007: 180) acknowledge that although the concept of NP in IR is largely developed in relation to the EU, it is not novel and unique because throughout history different actors seek to advocate their own normative preferences.

4.1.3. The EU’s norms and their importance in its foreign policy

According to Manners, over the past five decades, through a great number of declarations, treaties, policies, criteria and conditions (2002: 242), the EU has developed a series of founding values and wider objectives that contribute to its constituting the normative elements of its international identity (2006a: 32). Within this vast body of EU laws and policies, he identifies nine norms, which comprise the EU’s *acquis communautaire* and *acquis politique* (2002: 42). They are: (sustainable) *peace*, (social) *liberty*, (consensual) *democracy*, (associative) *human rights*, (supranational) *rule of law*, (social) *solidarity*, (inclusive) *equality*, i.e. anti-discrimination, (sustainable) *development* and *good governance*. In one description, Manners (2002: 242) regards the first five norms as ‘core’ norms and the last four as ‘minor’ norms. In the other account, he does not distinguish the core norms from the minor ones; and while the order of the first five norms remains the same, the order of the last four changes slightly (2006a: 32-8). In a collaborative work, Lucarelli and Manners (2006b: 202), classify *peace* as the EU’s prime value and categorise *human dignity/rights, freedom/liberty, democracy, equality, justice/rule of law* and *solidarity* as its core values. In addition, they identify a number of derived or more recent values of the EU, e.g. *regulated liberalism* and *ecological modernisation*. However, they regard these as complex interpretations of *good governance* and *sustainable development*. Thus, though naming and classifying them differently, Manners and Lucarelli refer to the same nine norms. For Manners (2002; 2006a; 2008a; 2008b), those substantive normative principles “are constitutive of the EU as a hybrid polity and as part of its international identity in world politics” as well as those that are promoted by the EU in world politics.

The EU’s value of *peace* is found in key symbolic declarations such as that of Schuman in 1950, the preambles to the *European Coal and Steel Treaty* in 1951, and the *Treaty of European Communities* in 1957, the Treaty on European Union (Manners 2002: 242; 2006a: 33; 2006d: 70). Article 3-1 of the *Consolidated Version of the Treaty*
on European Union states that the EU’s “aim is to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its people”. The focus on sustainable peace, which is central to the European project, is aimed at addressing the causes of conflicts to ensure that war “becomes not merely unthinkable but materially impossible” (Manners 2006b: 185; 2008a: 48). It is worth noting here in its European Security Strategy the EU identifies failure states, e.g. bad governance and civil conflict within a country, one of the key dangers to its peace or security and the world’s. It also argues that the best way to create and protect peace is to build a world of well-governed democratic states and to achieve that it needs to spread good governance, the rule of law and human rights (European Council 2003: 6, 16). For this reason, as examined in Chapter 8, the EU’s way of security differs from ASEAN’s. The EU’s values of liberty, democracy, the rule of law and human rights, as well as its values of social solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable development and good governance also are strongly expressed in the key document of the EU. In short, as explicitly stated by the Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union (Articles 2 and 3-5), these norms are the values, on which the EU is founded and which it upholds and promotes in its relations with the wider world.

While those norms constitute the EU as well as are championed by it, democracy and especially human rights are the EU’s most visible and promoted values in the post-Cold War era (Manners 2006a: 34; see also Smith 2003: 97-120). They are also the norms that the EU faces challenges and opposition when it insists on them in its relations with the countries e.g. China, which do not highly regard these democratic norms (Panebianco 2006). As will be illustrated in Chapters 6 and 7, the EU’s insistence on the respect of those norms and ASEAN’s resistance to them was the reason behind their disagreements over the issues of East Timor and Myanmar. Thus, they should be explored in more detail. Compared to the EU’s other norms, human rights were less focused in the EC’s internal and external relations during its first period. In fact, until the 1980s, they were not strongly included in the EC’s key documents. However, in the 1990s, they became an essential part of the EC/EU’s relations with third countries and 1991 marked an important turning point in this shift because in June that year, it issued a Declaration on Human Rights. This document unequivocally stated that “respecting, promoting and safeguarding human rights is an essential part of international relations, and one of the cornerstones of European cooperation as well as of relations between the Community and its member States and other countries” (European Council 1991a). It
also underlined that expressing concerns about human rights violations and requesting to secure those rights “cannot be considered as interference in the internal affairs of a state” (European Council 1991a). In November 1991, it issued a Resolution on Human Rights, Democracy and Development, which introduced for the first time the principle of conditionality, whereby it reserved the rights to adopt negative measures “in the event of grave and persistent human rights violations or the serious interruption of the democratic process” (European Council 1991b).

Other documents issued by the EU’s different institutions also underline the fundamental importance of human rights and democracy in the EU’s external relations. These include Communication on the Inclusion of Respect for Democratic Principles and Human Rights in Agreement between the Community and Third Countries” (European Commission 1995a) and the Charter of Fundamental Rights (European Council 2000). Furthering Human Rights and Democracy across the Globe, which is another significant document, clearly stated that the EU “has made human rights and democracy a central aspect of its external relations: in the political dialogue it holds with third countries; through its development cooperation and assistance; or through its action in multilateral fora” (European Commission 2007). In its relations with Asia in general and with ASEAN, the EU regards the promotion of human rights and other democratic values as a priority. Europe-Asia: A Strategic Framework for Enhanced Partnerships states that one of the core objectives of the EU’s relations with Asia is to “work to contribute to the protection of human rights and the spreading of democracy, good governance and the rule of law” (European Commission 2001). A New Partnership with Southeast Asia also identifies “human rights, democratic principles and good governance” as one of the six strategic priorities of the EU’s relations with Southeast Asian countries (European Commission 2003).

A reference to some of the EU’s key documents shows that the pursuit of democracy and human rights has become a transversal objective of the EU’s external activities. This is reflected by its use of a wide variety of measures, which include both positive and negative incentives, to achieve this objective. The two most famous legal means that it uses to them are the ‘Copenhagen criteria’, i.e. the membership criteria,

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73 The role of human rights and other democratic norms in the EU’s internal and external policies was strongly enshrined in the Treaty on European Union (European Union 1992) and were reaffirmed, clarified and extended in the other treaties of the EU, e.g. the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) and the Treaty of Nice (2001).
and the ‘human rights clause’, i.e. the conditionality.74 Concerning the second, which is also the reason for the disagreements between the EU and ASEAN, it is applied when the EU negotiates or includes economic and political cooperation agreements with its partners (European Council 1991b). It has been strengthened and widely practised by the EU since the publication of the Inclusion of Respect for Democratic Principles and Human Rights in Agreement between the Community and Third Countries in 1995 (European Commission 1995a). In fact, by 2008, there were more than 120 agreements between the EU and third parties, i.e. countries or groupings, which contain such a clause (Balme 2008: 144). This clause implies that in the event that democratic principles are breached, the EU may take a wide number of measures. These include modification of the contents of cooperation programmes, postponement of joint committee meetings, refusal to grant visas to senior government members, suspension of high-level bilateral contacts, postponement of new projects and suspension of cooperation agreements (European Council 2003a). In addition, since 1994, the EU has a large budget, i.e. about 100 million euro, each year, for the promotion of human rights (European Commission 2004: 2; Diez 2005b: 618). No country or regional organisation in the world spends such efforts and resources to promote human rights.

An overview of the EU’s norms shows that while the EU does not always behave as an ethical power as pictured by Manners (2008a) and Aggestam (2008), because in some cases, it acts as a realist power or a pragmatic power, it is clear that “there are always constitutive elements of the EU political identity at work” (Lucarelli 2006b: 56).75 These constitutive elements are the nine norms that the EU has developed to guide its internal and external relations. They are peace, liberty, democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights, social solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable development and good governance.76 This set of normative premises greatly differs from ASEAN’s norms, as will be shown in the next chapter. These norms, notably human rights and democracy, are also those that the EU attempts to promote abroad.

74 With regard to the first, it stated that in order to be allowed to join the EU, the candidate country must have met three criteria. The first among these is to have achieved stability of institutions that guarantee democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities (European Council 1993).

75 Lucarelli (2006b: 48) distinguishes political identity from cultural identity, with the former being a construct that is not, and should not be, derived from a common culture. This thesis maintains that the EU’s identity and the norms that constitute its identity are a political construct. Yet, as will be shown later, they are also influenced by Europe’s historical and cultural background.

76 To those founding norms, others, e.g. harmony with nature or multilateralism, have been added (Lucarelli 2006b: 56).
Indeed, the defence and spread of those values plays an integral role in its external relations. The following statements made by the European Commission’s Vice President Manuel Marin during a meeting with ASEAN in 1993 and an official at the European Commission in an interview with the author summarise that argument.

“As you know one of the prime objectives of European foreign policy is precisely to strengthen democracy, the rule of law and the respect for human rights and individual freedoms. This objective is not intended to apply to any one group of countries, but to all countries, both in Europe and outside it” (Marin 1993).

“As human rights are one of the corners of the EU and its foreign policy we have not only the obligation but also the task to pursue the protection of human rights in all our cooperation agreements and other external relations, including with ASEAN” (Interview, 2009).

The argument that the EU possesses an official political culture that strongly supports and promotes human rights and democratic governance is widely acknowledged by scholars. For instance, according to Wunderlich (2012a: 138), the EU’s norms and its self-understanding is constructed on broad liberal values, e.g. “adherence to political and individual human rights, democracy as the only acceptable form of government and the rule of law as the organising principle. The EU strongly identifies with these principles and promotes them in its external relations”. A survey of analysts in Europe undertaken in 2006 found that 85.2 % of its respondents said that the EU was trying to export its norms (Murray 2008: 204). Therefore, despite the fact that in some cases, e.g. its relations with China and Russia, the EU can be either realist or pragmatic as some assume, it is clear that overall the EU cherishes its democratic norms and seeks to promote them. Even in its interaction with China, which has considerable advantage – and because this, the EU’s ability to extend its values is very limited – the EU is not always silent about China’s human rights record. For example, at the seventh ASEM summit in Beijing in 2008 José Manuel Barroso stated clearly “[w]e should underline our commitment to cooperate in the promotion and protection of Human Rights globally”. According to him, “Human Rights are universal by nature and we all have a responsibility to uphold them” (Barroso 2008).

77 Keohane (2002: 746) contends that while proposals for military action tend to divide the EU, the issues with high symbolic value e.g. the protection of human rights, provide it with common ground for reinforcing its cohesion and emphasising its role in international relations.

78 These two words were capitalised in the original text. It is possible that they were capitalised to underline the importance of human rights in the EU’s foreign policy. For that reason, in this quotation, they are kept as originally put.
The overview also illustrates that, from a European perspective, a key factor that prompts the EU to highly value as well as to advocate its normative principles both within the Union and externally, is its belief that it is the best way to promote peace and well-being in the world. In an article published in the *Jakarta Post* in 2005, the Commissioner for External Relations Benita Ferrero-Waldner stated clearly that “[t]he EU believes that respecting democracy, human rights and the rule of law is crucial for attaining any lasting security and prosperity”. For that reason, she added: “[w]e cannot condone those countries where these values are not respected, not only as a matter of principle, but also because we consider such countries to be serious security threats” Ferrero-Waldner (2005). According to a former ambassador of an EU member to an ASEAN country, European countries seek to advance those values because they “are convinced that their core values are the best ones” (Interview, 2009). For a former ASEAN General-Secretary, “Europeans strongly focus on the democratic values because they are convinced that those values are good for human kind. Some European officials even believe that these values are so good that others have to follow” (Interview, 2009). Furthermore, due to its strong belief in and, consequently its focus on the promotion of, liberal and democratic norms, the EU uses both positive measures, e.g. socialisation, persuasion and emulation, and negative means, e.g. the human rights clause, to promote its norms. Given its widespread usage of the conditionality, the EU’s norm-driven practices are questioned and it is depicted as a ‘soft imperialist’ (Hettne and Söderbaum 2005). As underlined, the thesis does not aim to assess whether the EU’s exercise of this tool is morally justified or in line with the image of a virtuous power as advocated by Aggestam (2008) and Manners (2008a). The point made here is that, from the EU’s perspective, it has a responsibility – for some a moral obligation – to promote those norms. Furthermore, the EU’s strong belief in its normative values and its zealous promotion of them are a key reason behind its difficulty to interact with other actors in world politics, e.g. ASEAN, who have divergent normative preferences and (consequently) resist the EU’s norms.

Judging by its huge efforts to create and promote norms, the EU as a whole is undoubtedly a norm entrepreneur. Indeed, norm generation and diffusion is an integral part of its actorness. As seen above, its different institutions, e.g. the Council, the Parliament and notably the Commission, and the officials from those institutions are strongly committed to norm entrepreneurship. Furthermore, judging by the role of its norms in its internal and external relations and by the norms that define its international
role/identity, the EU can be depicted as a cosmopolitan normative power. Under a normative theory interpretation, cosmopolitanism is a view that the world politics should focus either on humanity as a whole or on individuals (Jackson and Sorensen 2003: 260; Smith and Owens 2005: 279). Moreover, a cosmopolitan perspective is also inclined to favour every extensive account of universal human rights. In addition, given their strong emphasis on human rights, cosmopolitans are willing to interfere into others’ domestic politics to promote those democratic norms. Again, whether and when it is right for the EU to interfere into the internal affairs of others, e.g. ASEAN and its members, to promote human rights goes beyond the purpose of this thesis. Yet, it chooses to describe the EU as a cosmopolitan normative power because such a portrayal enables it to identify three key characteristics of the EU and its norms. First, the EU’s key norms, e.g. liberty are human rights, are predominantly individual-focused. Second, the protection and promotion of human rights play an integral role in the EU’s internal and external relations. Maybe with the exception of the US, no actor in world politics can match the EU’s enthusiasm and efforts in human rights promotion. Third, the EU’s zeal to advocate human rights leads it to use negative means, e.g. the conditionality, which is regarded as some kind of interference into others’ internal affairs. As will be shown in Chapter 5, non-interference is the central principle of ASEAN’s regional and international relations.

In short, this section has identified the nine norms that constitute the EU as well as are promoted by it. While the EU’s motives behind the promotion of these norms may be questioned, it is clear that from its perspective, those norms are very important to its internal and external relations. They inform “EU institutions, its policies, its approach to global governance and its actorness” (Wunderlich 2012a: 138). This point not only illustrates that the EU’s norms are integral parts of its actorness but also explains very well that the EU is a notable norm entrepreneur and normative power. As the set of norms it espouses predominantly focuses on the rights of the individuals, it is aptly seen as a cosmopolitan normative power. The last section of this chapter and especially Chapters 6, 7 and 8 will illustrate in more detail the argument that not only is the EU founded on a set of cosmopolitan normative values but it is also predisposed to act as a cosmopolitan polity and its critics, see for instance Eriksen (2006), Baban and Keyman (2008).

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79 Cosmopolitanism is also understood as a proactive attempt to create an international or ‘cosmopolitan’ community of diverse communities, which is based on ‘universal’ values, e.g. human rights. This is often found in literature on EU, e.g. Taylor (1999) Beck (2006), Habermas (2006), Smith (2006) because it is often argued that the EU is an institution, in which human rights policies are deliberately identity-based and which strongly promotes universal values. For an understanding of the EU as a cosmopolitan polity and its critics, see for instance Eriksen (2006), Baban and Keyman (2008).
cosmopolitan normative power in world politics in general and its relations with ASEAN. The question is why the EU has developed that particular set of norms and strongly focused on them in its internal and external relations. In other words, what makes the EU’s norms differ from those of other powers in world politics? The next section of the chapter will focus on this question.

4.2. The sources of the EU’s normative premises

Chapter 2 has identified a number of factors that define the normative premises of a power and make it differ from other powers in world politics. They are very helpful in explaining the normative foundation and differentiation of the EU.

4.2.1. Europe’s historical and cultural background

The first among those factors is a power or an entity’s historical background. This is very true in the EU’s case because Europe’s past or more exactly Europe’s tragic-war legacy has determined not only the process of European integration but also the raison d’être of the EU. Europe’s experience with war caused by nationalism, which was regarded as “insular, wasteful and ultimately destructive” (O’Neil 1996: 21) as an overriding reason behind the project of European integration is strongly highlighted by accounts on European integration, such as Nicoll and Salmon (2001: 9), McCormick (2002: 63), and Bache and George (2006: 84). According to these authors, the aim of European integration was to restrain or at least pool sovereignty in order avoid wars that shattered Europe. Duchêne (1972: 43) advocated a civilian power Europe because he wanted Europe to overcome “the age-old processes of war and indirect violence”. Other scholars, such as Manners (2002), Gillingham (2003) and Lucarelli (2006a), also argue that European integration was aimed at surmounting the disastrous wars that Europe suffered in the past. For instance, Manners (2002: 240) points out that “the EU was created in a post-war context which reviled the nationalisms that had led to barbarous war and genocide”. Because of it, the rationale of Europeans behind the creation of the Community institutions and policies was to pool “their resources to preserve and strengthen peace and liberty” (Manners 2002: 240). The Europe of the past as the other

80 This point is very noteworthy because it highlights the contrasting difference between European integration and regionalism in ASEAN, which will be examined in-depth in the next chapter.
of the Europe’s of today is underlined by Waever (1998: 90), who points out that Europe’s ‘other’ of today is not ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ or ‘the Russians’, or anything similar but rather Europe’s own war-torn past, which should not be allowed to become its future. According to him, it is against this past – or the threat of a relapse of the EU into antagonistic fragmentation that defined the Westphalian Europe of sovereign nation-states – that European integration was able to identify itself as a peace project (Waever 1998: 90). This peace project is to construct “an identity of the ‘new’, i.e. post-World War II, Europe as one in which peace and the respect for human rights prevail over the use of force and pure power politics” (Diez 2005: 634). Europe’s bitter past has also been repeatedly highlighted and narrated by EU officials to justify not only the process of European integration.81 Lucarelli (2006b: 56) also maintains that their dramatic experiences, notably dictatorship and the Holocaust, had reinforced Europeans’ faith in the values of democratic systems, human dignity and solidarity. According to an EU official, “the fundamental reason for the EU’s strong focus on these values is that the EC/EU was founded in the aftermath of the WWII. The foundation on which it based, and continues to base itself, is peace, justice, democracy and human rights” (Interview, 2009). Therefore, there is no doubt that Europe’s (pre-EU) war-torn past has radically defined European integration as well as the modus vivendi and modus operandi of the EU’s internal and external relations.

Another factor that has somehow led the EU to regard highly democratic norms is Europe’s cultural or philosophical heritage. While not sharing the view of complete dependence of political values on cultural/religious values, Lucarelli (2006b: 56-7) acknowledges that culture provides one of the most important frameworks in which values are interpreted. In other words, how norms and values are perceived depends on the cultural background of their viewers. The influence of Europe’s cultural background on the EU’s adoption of its values is maintained by a number of scholars, such as Tocci and Manners (2008: 311), who argue that the emphasis of the EU on individual rights and freedoms is linked to the legacy of Enlightenment. For Pettman (2010: 294-5), the Enlightenment has radically defined how Europe and its offshoots think and behave. He also points out that one of the results of this rationalist revolution is that Europe has a

81 These include the former President of the European Commission Romano Prodi (2004) and German Chancellor Angela Merkel (2007). In referring to the speeches made by key European politicians, such as German’s (former) Foreign Minister Joschka Fisher in 2000 and Great Britain’s (former) Prime Minister Tony Blair in 2003, Diez (2004: 325; 2005: 634) maintains that “[t]his ‘past as other’ logic is still part of many Sunday speeches on European integration, and continues to legitimise the integration project”.

particular way of organising its affairs, which is based on and emphasises individualism. Bretherton and Vogler (1999: 34) maintain that the values and beliefs, which the EU seeks to maintain within – and to extend beyond – the Western countries, are the products of an essentially European culture or more exactly of European Enlightenment. These values and beliefs include the respect for the dignity of the human individual and liberal-democratic political arrangements (Wiessala 2006: 30). While it is difficult to assess the extent, to which Europe’s cultural and philosophical elements have defined the EU and its normative values, especially its individual-centred norms, they are undoubtedly one of the sources, on which the project of European integration/construction and the EU’s norms have been based and built. According to Checkel and Katzenstein (2009b: 1), for many Europe elites, especially those who are deeply committed to the EU as a political project, the EU as an institutional machinery for the solution of problems that had shattered Europe’s peace and destroyed its prosperity “is a project that rooted in the European Enlightenment”. Fligstein (2009: 138) also points out that there are key European scholars, such as Habermas (1992), who regard a European identity as part of the idea of completing the Enlightenment project and maintain that a European state would be democratic. Therefore, it can be said that not only does this common heritage, or the ‘we-ness’, that European countries share, favour their rapprochement and cooperation. It also leads them to build a regional organisation, i.e. the EU, which radically differs from other regional organisations, notably ASEAN, which strongly focuses on a communitarian understanding of politics.

4.2.2. Other factors and actors

Besides Europe’s war-torn past and the philosophical/cultural legacy – or the ‘we-group’ – that European countries experienced and inherited respectively, other external factors and actors defined and continue to shape the collective identity of the EC/EU. While peace and liberty were the defining features of Western European politics in the immediate post-war period, the norms of democracy, rule of law and human rights were reinforced because Western Europe (i.e. EC and its members) wanted to distinguish itself from the Soviet Union and communist Eastern Europe, which lacked these values (Risse-Kappen 1995; Manners 2002: 243). In this sense, an illiberal and non-democratic Soviet Union/Eastern Europe was an external other, or a ‘they-group’, against which a liberal and democratic Europe was defined and constructed. With the end of the Cold War, the Soviet Union, which used to be a good or powerful candidate for Europe’s
‘other’, no longer has a similar impact on the EU (Caporaso 2005: 71; Katzenstein and Checkel 2009: 224). Yet, in the existing literature on the EU and its identity, Turkey and contemporary Russia are often seen as key external/spatial others that define the EU’s identity (Morozov and Rumelili 2012: 32).\footnote{The representation of Russia and Turkey as the others of Europe (‘s Latin Christendom) can be traced back to centuries (Neumann 1996; 1999). The presence of the Ottoman and Muscovite empires to the East gave Western (Christian) Europe a degree of coherence that would otherwise have been lacking (Katzenstein and Checkel 2009: 224).} For instance, Turkey is differentiated from Europe/EU in terms of its geography and religion (Hülsse 1999; Erkem 2009). The views that Turkey is a non-European and Muslim country are also maintained by EU officials, e.g. Herman van Rompuy and France’s (former) President Nicola Sarkozy (Morozov and Rumelili 2012: 38). Others see Turkey’s divergence as stemming from deficiencies in liberal-democratic values, which are the core values of the EU (Diez 2007: 416; Morozov and Rumelili 2012: 38).

There are other spatial, i.e. geographical and/or geopolitical others, against which the EU can be defined. One of these is the US, which “European identities crystallize in relation to” (Katzenstein and Checkel 2009: 225). Under the George W. Bush Administration, the US was pictured as a realist or semi-realist power whereas the EU was portrayed as a promoter of internationally accepted norms (Manners 2002: 236; Adler and Crawford 2004; Lightfood and Burchell 2005; Scheipers and Sicurelli 2007; Smith 2009; 2011). Europe’s social model, which is more concerned about the environment, is also differentiated from the US’s model of ‘laissez-faire’ or ‘jungle’ capitalism (Diez 2004: 330; Caporaso 2005: 71-2). With the exception of Robison (2011), in the current literature, there is no major work that refers to ASEAN as an other, against which the EU is defined, it is no doubt that ASEAN can be seen as a notable other of the EU. This is because, when building a community, which is predominantly based on cosmopolitan norms, e.g. human rights and fundamental freedoms, the EU, directly or indirectly, differentiates from ASEAN, which relies on communitarian norms, e.g. sovereignty and non-interference. Thus, like any identity in world politics, the EU and its norms are always constructed in relation to (multiple) others and their norms. Furthermore, the presence of, and its relations with, these spatial/external others also reinforce its identity and its norms. As maintained by some scholars on interregionalism, the EU’s relations with other regional organisations, such as ASEAN, reinforce its collective identity. In other words, the sources of the EU’s...
normative differences come not only from within, i.e. Europe’s (pre-EU) war-torn past, and its cultural/philosophical tradition, but also from outside, i.e. external/spatial others.

There are other important factors reinforcing the EU’s normative foundation and, consequently, led it to focus more on the promotion of its set of normative values. Chapter 2 has already underlined that the rapidly changing environment often leads political actors to generate, reinforce, change their norms (Kowert and Legro 1996: 470). This is very true in the EU’s case because following the collapse of the Soviet bloc, like other Western countries, the EU strongly focused on a value-based foreign policy, which sought to export its preferred norms to the other parts of the world. This is reflected in the fact that human rights became treaty-based and policy-centred in the early 1990s as previously illustrated. The EU’s concentration on the spread of its liberal and democratic values following the end of the Cold War was also because the West and the EU considered the collapse of the communist bloc as their victory over the latter. In other words, the power political configuration, in which the EU found itself in the post-Cold War international system (Tocci and Manners 2008: 312), was also another important factor that prompted the EU to fortify its normative foundation as well as to seek to import them to the non-European/Western world. Furthermore, the EU’s desire to advocate its norms coincided with the prominent emergence and influence of normative and cultural elements in world politics (Huntington 1993; 1996).

Coupled with, or because of, the factors and actors mentioned, the normative differences of the EU are also found in its own supranational and international forms of governance, which transcends Westphalian norms (Manners 2002: 24). As noted by Diez (2005: 614), the argument “[t]hat the EU is such a different type of international actor, and represents a new kid of power in international politics is not much disputed”. Its normative differences are expressed in its political-legal constitution, which has largely occurred as an elite-driven, treaty-based and legal order (Manners 2002: 241). The combination of these factors has led its to espouse a set of liberal and democratic norms to guide its regional and international relations in the post-Cold War period as identified above.

Briefly, it is clear that like other actors in world politics, the EU and its norms are shaped by its own temporal and spatial factor backgrounds. Precisely, the EU and its norms are different from other political actors and their norms because it has experienced its own ‘we-group’ factors, e.g. Europe’s war-torn past and cultural traditions, as well as ‘they-group’ actors, e.g. Turkey and Russia, that are different from
other actors in world politics, e.g. ASEAN. The question is whether its relations with other actors in world politics is always cooperative or peaceful when it conducts its external relations based on those norms – and particularly when it seeks to project them to the latter. In other words, does the interaction between the EU, i.e. the self, and other political actors, i.e. the others, generate the othering? If so, why does this happen?83

4.3. The EU’s relations with spatial/external and cultural others

In their respective study, (Manners 2002: 244) and Forsberg (2011: 1185) maintain that a key mechanism used by EU to spread its norms to others is contagion – that is the EU leads by virtuous example and others, including regional organisations, e.g. MERCOSUR and ASEAN, replicate it and adopts its norms. Yet, a look at the EU’s relations with different countries and organisations shows that while some recognise and adopt the EU’s norms some others do not always accept and follow the EU’s normative system. They even resist to the EU’s norms and its use of conditionality, which is another notable tool employed by the EU to diffuse its normative preference. The question is why the EU’s normative values are accepted by some whereas they are refused by others. This section will briefly address this question. Another important issue, which is often ignored by the works on the NPE concept, is that they focus mainly on the EU’s norms and its promotion of its norms, without considerably examining how other political actors, especially those whose normative basis differs from the EU, reacts to the EU’s norms and its insistence on the promotion of those norms. For those who advocate a NPE, the EU’s norms are universal and ideal and they should or even must be exported to other states and groups. However, by building a regional community based on those values, and more importantly, by seeking to export such a model to other countries and regional organisations, the EU and its members somewhat engage in discursive practices of naming, marking, and articulating of others as different or even inferior (Rumelili 2007: 7; De Zutter 2010: 1112). Such discursive practices also make it hard for the EU to interact with those political actors, whose normative preferences diverge from the EU’s. By examining the EU’s relations with a varying numbers of countries and regional groupings, this section illustrates these two important issues.

83 As noted at the beginning of the chapter, an examination of these questions enables the thesis to explain adequately why the EU and ASEAN disagreed with each other over political issues, e.g. human rights, East Timor and Myanmar.
Central and Eastern Europe

As noted earlier, during the Cold War, the communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) were represented and constructed as a key other of democratic Western Europe. During that period, the CEE was often regarded as either inferior or as an existential threat to Western Europe. The collapse of the communist rule not only ended that threat but also paved the way for the EEC countries to transform from the ‘they-group’ of Western Europe to the ‘we-group’ with the latter through the EU’s membership process. According to Diez (2004: 326), a key factor that facilitated that transformation was the EU’s concern about the post-communist CEE could become an incardination of Europe’s pre-EC/EU past, i.e. a zone of war and nationalism,84 which threatened not only the CEE’s peace but also the EU’s. In this context, the EU regarded its enlargement to CEE countries as a necessity to maintain peace in Europe. However, as Rumelili (2004: 41) argues, a defining factor that made the EU’s enlargement to the CEE possible was the shared identity, i.e. culture, history and even geography, between Eastern and Western Europe. In other words, these inherent characteristics of the CEE countries favoured their entry to the EU. What the CEE countries lacked and they had to acquire in order to become the EU’s members was stable institutions that guaranteed democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities – the first requirement of the Copenhagen criteria. In this sense, the EU-CEE interaction was regarded as a superior/inferior one, in which the former regarded itself as having stable and mature democratic institutions and the latter as lacking these. Nevertheless, while their relationship was unbalanced, it was not conflictual because the CEE countries recognised their insufficiency and were willing to acquire those requirements. Furthermore, by doing so, they also acknowledged the superior identity of the EU and its members, and consequently, enhanced the EU’s norms. Such an acceptance even makes the self even more secure. In short, the EU’s relations with the CEE countries were not conflictual because they shared the same identity. Furthermore, thanks to this, the CEE countries were willing to accept the EU’s norms. The efforts of the EU and the

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84 This is because in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, territorial disputes and nationalism became prominent in former communist and newly independent Central and Eastern countries.
CEE to associate with each other in the post-Cold War years also facilitated their interaction.85

**Turkey**

While the CEE countries were quickly allowed to join the EU, Turkey has not yet given that permission even though it expressed its interest in becoming a member of the EC in 1959. Turkey is often considered as to be different from Europe/EU, in terms of its geography, culture and religion (Morozov and Rumelili 2012: 38). Such a difference is a reason for its exclusion from the EU. The arguments that Turkey is a non-European and Muslim country, and because of this, it should not be allowed to join the EU, are also maintained by EU officials. For instance, in 2004, Herman van Rompuy, who is the current EU President, maintained that “the universal values which are in force in Europe, and which are also the fundamental values of Christianity, will lose vigour with the entry of a large Islamic country such as Turkey” (Phillips 2009). France’s (former) President Nicola Sarkozy also repeatedly said that his preference for a geographically fixed Europe was the one that did not include Turkey (Morozov and Rumelili 2012: 38). Another key EU figure, who referred to geography, history and culture to question Turkey’s Europeanness, and consequently, objected Turkey’s membership, is France’s former President Valery Discard D’Estaing (Baban and Keyman 2008: 116-7). Thus, it is clear that from the view of these European figures, Turkey is inherently different from Europe/EU (Rumelili 2004: 44) and given this, it is not allowed to join the EU. Furthermore, as the remark of Herman van Rompuy illustrates, besides its inherently different characteristics, which preclude its admission to the EU, Turkey is also perceived as lacking ‘universal’ values or norms, e.g. human rights and the rule of law, which the EU embraces. European Commission’s Regular Reports on Turkey’s Progress towards Accession often highlight Turkey’s significant differences from the EU, such as economic underdevelopment, the instability of political system and poor human rights record, and consider these shortcomings as a reason for Turkey’s omission (Diez 2005: 632; Rumelili 2004: 44). In this sense, the EU regards Turkey as not only

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85 Based on Rumelili (2004; 2007), Chapter 2 has identified three conditions, under which the self/other relations can be cooperative or conflictual, namely (1) nature of normative difference or identity, (2) the response of the other to the self and its norms, i.e. acceptance or refusal, and (3) the social distance between the self and the other.
inherently different from but also inferior to it. 86 Overall, from the EU perspective – or more exactly, in the view of some key European leaders – Turkey’s differences from European countries in terms of its geography and culture and its lack of liberal and democratic values are the two main explanations for its exclusion from the EU. In other words, these cultural and normative divergences are a major reason why until now Turkey has not been permitted to join the EU. With the same rationale, Morocco was given an absolute no when it applied for membership in 1987 (Rumelili 2004: 42-4).

Other countries and regional organisations

While the EU has rather successfully promoted its norms to the CEE countries and in its enlargement policy in general, it has not achieved a great deal in its efforts to export its normative values to other countries or regional organisations (Le Gloannec and Rupnik 2008: 51). For instance, the EU’s promotion of its democratic norms to Mediterranean countries through the so-called Barcelona Process established in 1995 has not made any major normative impact on the latter (Panebianco 2006; Martinez 2008). Among these Arab and Mediterranean countries, only Turkey has made some changes towards a democratic regime due to its desire to join the EU. Other countries, while formally adhering to the principles of democracy and human rights because the EU attaches so much importance to them, do not implement them at the domestic level (Panebianco 2006: 151). A key reason for this is that the Barcelona Process is very different from the enlargement process, which requires candidate countries to adopt the EU’s *acquis communautaire* or the Copenhagen criteria in order to be allowed to join the EU. This difference reveals another fundamental divergence between the EEC countries and Mediterranean ones. While the former is culturally closer to the EU, the latter radically differs from it in terms of culture, history and, consequently political culture. In fact, in terms of political rights and civil liberties, like some ASEAN countries, many Mediterranean countries in the Barcelona Process, such as Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Syria and Tunisia, were not free (Freedom House 2010). Despite this, unlike its relations with ASEAN, the EU’s interaction with the Mediterranean countries was much less conflictual because while these countries voluntarily accepted the EU’s human rights clause in their cooperation agreement with the EU, ASEAN strongly resisted such conditionality. A key factor for this is that the grouping of Mediterranean

86 Whether the two above reasons are justified or whether Turkey should (or should not) be allowed to join the EU is debatable. On this issue, see for instance, Diez (2007) and Baban and Keyman (2008).
countries did not have a set of collective norms, such as the principle of non-interference, strictly maintained and fervently upheld by ASEAN. The subsequent chapters of the thesis will examine in-depth the reasons behind ASEAN’s resistance to the EU’s normative values. The point made here is that not all countries and regional organisations wholeheartedly accept to import the model of political development based on democratic norms and practices, and human rights protection in particular championed by the EU. Some of these, such as ASEAN, even opposed the EU’s insistence on the protection and promotion of human rights and democracy.

To sum up, describing the EU as a ‘normative power’, or more precisely a ‘cosmopolitan normative power’, can be problematic because the EU is a multifaceted entity, which acts rather differently in its relations with different actors, at different points in time. Yet, such a depiction captures quite well the EU’s international identity and role. More specifically, this chapter uses this concept because it enables it to explain three fundamental arguments maintained by the thesis.

It allows it to identify the key norms of the EU. In fact, drawing on different key documents of the EU and scholar works, notably Manners (2002), it has identified nine norms, which constitute the EU as a particular actor in world politics. They are also the normative values that the EU upholds and promotes in its external relations. For instance, the European Commission (2004) clearly states that not only “[l]iberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law are founding principles of the European Union” but also “[h]uman rights and democratic values factor in all areas of the EU’s activities, and have become a cornerstone of its external policy”. This set of norms, as will be shown in the next chapter, greatly differs from ASEAN’s. This point illustrates well the (1) proposition made by the thesis.

There are many internal and external factors and actors, e.g. Europe’s war-torn past, its cultural heritage, illiberal and non-democratic Eastern European countries during the Cold War and the collapse of the communist bloc, that have prompted the EU to espouse those norms. In other words, the EU’s normative underpinnings are rooted in European history and culture (Wunderlich 2012a: 138). This second point demonstrates that shared historical, cultural and geopolitical settings are of significant importance because they can lead a regional organisation to develop a particular way of conducting its internal and external relations, which diverges from others, which live in

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87 For a more understanding why other countries and regional groupings refused to embrace democratic norms advocated by the EU, see Smith (2006), Balme (2008), Martínez (2008), Parmentier (2008).
different settings. Indeed, the next chapter will illustrate that since it was established and evolved in a different temporal and spatial context, ASEAN has developed a different way of organising its regional and international affairs. Again, this is another important argument, i.e. the (2) position, maintained by the thesis.

Finally, which is also the central point made in the (3) hypothesis, given its strong focus on the promotion of human rights the EU “felt that it had an obligation – for some a moral obligation – to promote human rights, including the obligation to interfere in the domestic politics of other countries” (Moeller 2007: 474). Yet, the EU’s promotion of those norms was not always accepted by actors in world politics. Some countries or regional organisations, e.g. ASEAN, strongly resisted the EU’s insistence on the respect and promotion of its norms because by interfering into others’ internal affairs to promote its norms, intentionally or unintentionally the EU goes in the opposite direction to the principles upheld by the latter. The next chapter will explore these norms and principles in great depth.

5. ASEAN: A communitarian normative power

As underlined in Chapter 2, this thesis depicts ASEAN as a communitarian normative power. A key reason for this is that such a portrayal summarises fairly well what ASEAN is in terms of its normative underpinnings. Furthermore, it enables the thesis to differentiate ASEAN from the EU, which is a cosmopolitan normative power. In other words, like the EU, ASEAN can be seen as a normative power. The difference is that while the former is based on a set of liberal and democratic or cosmopolitan norms as illustrated in detail in Chapter 4, the latter relies on a set of communitarian or Westphalian norms. The chapter examines in-depth ASEAN’s norms, i.e. what they are, and the reasons behind its norms, i.e. why it has developed and adopted them. These two issues will allow the subsequent chapters of the inquiry to explain why its identity as a communitarian normative power negatively affects its relations with a cosmopolitan normative power Europe/EU.

5.1. ASEAN’s identity and its normative foundation

5.1.1. Multiple perspectives on ASEAN

Compared to the EU, ASEAN is institutionally less complex. Yet, this does not mean that ASEAN is easily defined and consensually agreed. In effect, “ASEAN has
been, will remain, an essentially contested institution” Acharya (2009: 493) because its analysts “still disagree about what it is” (Emmerson 2005b: 165). Indeed, a scan of the literature on it reveals that there is no consensus among scholars on the questions of ASEAN’s nature (Eaton and Stubbs 2006; He 2006; Kivimaki 2008a; Acharya 2009; Kuhunta 2009; Beeson 2009). A major point of contention is related to the question of whether ASEAN is a ‘security community’ (Emmerson 2005b: 155-6; Rüland and Jetschke 2008: 399; Acharya 2009: 497). It is widely acknowledged that security has always been ASEAN’s main raison d’être (Snitwongse 1995; Busse 1999; Feddema 2000; Wanandi 2001; Narine 2002; Dosch 2003; 2009; Sharpe 2003; Kivimaki 2008a). It was at the heart of ASEAN’s Bangkok Declaration (1967) Declaration of ASEAN Concord and Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (1976) and the ASEAN Charter (2007). Yet, scholars disagree over whether it has a security identity (Sharpe 2003) or a security community that acts on the basis of a collective identity (Nischalke 2002; Emmerson 2005b). The disagreement over ASEAN is also reflected by – or more precisely, due to – the fact that different scholars interpret it through different theoretical lenses, ranging from a realist perspective, through an English School viewpoint, to a constructivist view (Emmerson 2005a; 2005b; Acharya and Stubbs 2006; Rüland and Jetschke 2008). Consequently, they give different, and even competing, understandings of ASEAN. Of these perspectives, realist and constructive accounts are the dominant ones (Emmerson 2005b: 166; Nesadurai 2009: 91). These two perspective, which “have now been established as the key intellectual competitors in Southeast Asian security studies” (Peou 2002: 119), offer two opposite views of ASEAN.

With regard to realism, which is the oldest perspective on Southeast Asian security (Peou 2002: 120), dominated works on Southeast Asian politics during the Cold War and remains a major trend in the current international politics in Southeast Asia. Chief among those who maintain a realist perspective on ASEAN is Leifer (1989; 1992; 1993; 1995; 1996a; 1996b; 1999; 2000; 2001), who was also regarded as the dean

88 One may argue that concern about security in Western Europe, e.g. confrontation between France and Germany, was also behind European regionalism (Rodrigo 2002: 335-6). Yet, its nature and notably approach to it by the EU radically differs from ASEAN’s. Later, the chapter will explain in more detail what security is in the context of Southeast Asia.

89 (Pluralistic) security communities were introduced by Deutsch et al. (1957) and a number of great works has been undertaken to refine it. Broadly speaking, a security community is defined as the one, in which states become integrated to the point that they have a sense of community, or a ‘we-feeling’. This we-feeling, whose components include common historical experience and shared norms, creates the assurance that they will settle their differences without resort to war (see also Deutsch 1961; Adler and Barnett 1998; Acharya 2009).
of Southeast Asian security studies (Peou 2002: 121). In his eyes, Southeast Asia faced ‘real-world’ problems, e.g. territorial disputes, external interventions, which threatened not only the survival of the region’s newly independent states but also the regional stability as a whole. Another important reason for his pessimistic view of ASEAN was the Association’s lack of a genuine corporate interest, a sense of community, or the ‘we-group’, which is an essential part of Deutschian security communities. For him, ASEAN’s key norms, e.g. mutual respect for national sovereignty and non-interference, did not provide the basis for enduring cooperation in ASEAN or the achievement of a robust regional identity. ASEAN was simply an instrument for its members to pursue their own interests. Furthermore, while being aware of norms, identity and socialisation in ASEAN and the ARF, he did not regard them as important to regional cooperation and security. In his view, the primacy of the US military presence was the main source of the stability in Southeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific region. Given these factors, he argued that ASEAN did not qualify as a security community. Instead, he described it as a ‘diplomatic community’ (Leifer 1989: 139; 1995: 132; 1999: 30). According to Acharya (2005: 107), Leifer’s view of ASEAN as a diplomatic is not very far from a minimalist notion of a pluralistic security community, namely a ‘nascent security community’ identified by Adler and Barnett (1998) mentioned above. However, for Leifer, ASEAN achieved that status not thanks to ASEAN’s shared norms. Rather, it was the product of informal intergovernmental dialogue (Leifer 1999: 26). In other words, according to him, ASEAN’s normative contribution to cooperation in ASEAN and the wider region’s security was unimportant.


90 For a more comprehensive understanding of Leifer’s works on – and his views of – ASEAN and its role in the wider region, see The Pacific Review, vol. 18, no. 1 (2005), which includes the articles of Acharya (2005), Emmerson (2005a), Khong (2005) and Tan (2005).
ASEAN’s irresoluble paradox is that while it is intended to establish the notion of Southeast Asia, it calls its members to recognize that there is no such an entity”. That is why Khoo (2004: 35) does not regard ASEAN as a ‘nascent security community’, let alone a ‘security community’.

By contrast, the constructivist point of view, which takes into account non-material factors, e.g. identity and norms, to explain ASEAN, contends that ASEAN states have “evolved some useful tools of diplomacy” (Vatikiotis 1999: 80) or “diplomatic security culture” (Haacke 2005: 7) to promote common security (Ciorciara 2008). If realist works maintain that Southeast Asia’s real-world problems work against meaningful cooperation in ASEAN, constructivist ones highlight the role of ASEAN’s norms in managing these conflicts and fostering stability in the region (Jetly 2003). Chief among these is Acharya (1991; 1997; 1998a; 1998b; 2000; 2005; 2006; 2009). While acknowledging the ‘realist’ challenges faced and facing Southeast Asian countries and the practice of balance of power politics in Southeast Asia, Acharya differs from realists by arguing that even though ideational forces, e.g. norms and identity, are not the only factor, they are a central determinant of regionalism in Southeast Asia. More precisely, he maintains that in dealing with those problems, ASEAN chose to develop and promote a number of key norms, which have gradually become the mode of conduct for its members in their dealings with one another. In his view, thanks to this, not only did ASEAN succeed in moderating intraregional conflicts and significantly reducing the likelihood of war. It was also successful in forging a degree of common identity among its members. For him, given ASEAN’s capability to manage intra-regional conflicts without resort to war and its ability to foster a collective identity despite the cultural diversity of its members, it can be regarded as ‘a nascent security community’ or as moving toward an ‘ascendant security community’ (Acharya 2001: 208; 2005: 108). Overall, Acharya (2005: 112-3) argues that norms are central to ASEAN because ASEAN’s material resources and organisational make-up are very thin.

Adler and Barnett (1998) identify three stages of the development of a security community, namely nascent, ascendant and mature. At the first stage, which is marked by common threat perceptions, expectations of mutual trade benefits and some degree of shared identity, a group of states coordinate their relations in order to increase their mutual security. The ascendant stage is marked by tighter military cooperation and a deepening of mutual trust. At the mature level, the security community has greater institutionalisation, a high degree of trust and low or no probability of military conflicts (see also Acharya 1998; 2001; 2009; Collins 2007; Tusicisny 2007).
Other scholars, who adopt a constructivist perspective to explain ASEAN, include Higgott (1994), Alagappa (1998a), Busse (1999), Kivimaki (2001), Peou (2002), Ba (2005), Haacke (2005), Tan (2006) and Rumelili (2007). These scholars, like Acharya, emphasise the importance of norms in ASEAN. For example, Kivimaki (2001) and Ba (2005) maintain that through their socialisation, ASEAN states see themselves as belonging to a regional grouping, i.e. a ‘we-group’, which shares a common life-world and fate. According to them, ASEAN’s norms, which its ruling elite have consciously constructed since its foundation, become the focal point for ASEAN regional identity. This, in turn, fosters stronger regional cooperation and a more secure regional order. Rumelili (2007: 126) maintains that despite their great political, economic and cultural diversities, ASEAN members have “fostered a collective Southeast Asian identity around the norms of non-interference, mutual respect for sovereignty and consensus-building”. For Busse (1999: 55), “ASEAN states see military pact as providing less rather than more security”, and from a realist viewpoint, “this makes no sense. But seen through the lens of the ASEAN norms, we are able to understand this attitude”. Furthermore, for those who opt for a constructivist view of ASEAN, e.g. Eaton and Stubbs (2006) and Stubbs (2008), not only do ASEAN norms guide and enhance its intra-regional interaction. They also inform ASEAN’s external relations and enable it to shape the wider regional order.

As noted, besides realism and constructivism, scholars also use other theoretical perspectives to explain ASEAN. One of these is the English School which has great appeal to ASEAN’s observers (Rüland and Jetschke 2008: 400) and which also shares some elements of a constructivist interpretation of ASEAN (Acharya and Stubbs 2006: 129). Like constructivists, those who adopt this approach, e.g. Khong (2005), Narine (1997; 2006; 2008; 2009) and Collins (2007), recognise the importance of ASEAN and its norms, including its ability to get other states to adopt its rules of acceptable regional behaviour. However, unlike constructivists, they contend that ASEAN’s core norms often work against the development of a cohesive regional organisation. For instance, Narine (2006; 2008) maintains that ASEAN members’ preoccupation with preserving their security is at odds with the building of an ASEAN identity. They also point out that though ASEAN elites may enjoy a sense of belonging to a larger community, the people of the ASEAN states do not exhibit much of the ‘we-feeling’, which is a crucial part of Deutschian security communities (Collins 2007: 217; Narine 2008: 412). That is
why, for them ASEAN is best described as a ‘security regime’, not a ‘security community’ (Collins 2007: 215; Narine 2008: 412).

Looking back at ASEAN’s foundation, evolution and its regional and international relations, this author believes that not a single theoretical perspective captures all the important elements of ASEAN. As Nesadurai (2009: 91) underlines, ASEAN’s nature, its role, behaviour and achievements or failures “cannot be fitted into any neat theoretical categories that emphasize either material or ideational variables in explanation”. Each of the three perspectives examined can be used to highlight some key features of ASEAN. For example, realist accounts rightly single out the real-world problems that ASEAN member states faced and continue to face. The insights offered by the English School approach are also very useful for explaining the fact that the ‘we-feeling’ that exists in ASEAN is primarily elite-centred as will be shown later. Yet, of these three perspectives, the author thinks that a constructivist approach has more advantages in explaining – if not, is the most suitable for analysing – ASEAN’s raison d’être and its way of functioning.92 Consequently, the thesis adopts this perspective.

5.1.2. ASEAN: A normative power

In fact, there are a number of reasons this thesis adopts a constructivist view of ASEAN. One of these is that this perspective takes into account the vital role of ASEAN’s norms in its internal and external relations. In other words, it adopts a constructivist perspective because its claim that ASEAN has, for the better or the worse, developed its own set of norms to guide its internal and external affairs. Indeed, it agrees with Acharya (2005: 113) that “ASEAN regionalism has been primarily a normative regionalism” and Kivimaki (2001: 7) that ASEAN as “a normative community”, which is somehow similar to the community, constructed by liberal democracies.93 Put differently, like the EU, ASEAN is a community building institution, which has developed its own norms to “mediate disputes and guide interaction between its members, and to underpin a process of identity construction” (Haacke 2005: 4) as well as to respond to external challenges and forces (Acharya 2006: 157).

92 While proposing an English School perspective to explain ASEAN, Narine (2008: 412) also acknowledges that constructivism offers the most useful, though limited, analysis of ASEAN.
93 Yet, he distinguishes ASEAN’s ‘normative community’ from a ‘normative community’, which is constructed by liberal democracies that is premised on liberal and democratic norms. Later, the chapter will develop in more detail this difference.
The second reason the thesis opts for a constructivist approach to ASEAN is that it recognises the contribution of ASEAN and its norms to security in Southeast Asia. While it debatable to argue that ASEAN is a security community, it is plausible to maintain that ASEAN and its norms have significantly contributed to regional security. This position is upheld by many scholars on ASEAN. Kivimaki (2001) maintains that ASEAN’s founding nations were able to cope with their intra-regional conflicts and achieved a long peace, because they respected the principle of non-interference into each other’s domestic politics. In a later work, he also shows that ASEAN has pacified its members as well as intra-ASEAN interstate relations (Kivimaki 2007). Another important point he makes is that to assess the success or failure of ASEAN and its norms, one should not do so from the viewpoint of European mechanisms and objectives of integration. ASEAN is an instrument for Southeast Asian, not European, integration, and consequently, it needs to be explained against the backdrop of Southeast Asian objectives, not European ones (Kivimaki 2007: 432). Premised on ASEAN’s 1967 Bangkok Declaration, he points out that one of ASEAN’s two major goals is regional stability (Kivimaki 2007: 434). Judging by this objective, ASEAN has achieved its goal because Southeast Asia is more peaceful – or more exactly, less conflictual – than its pre-ASEAN period. Kivimaki (2001; 2007) also argues that ASEAN’s normative agenda contributed to this stability. This view is also held by other scholars, e.g. Dosch and Mols (1998), Acharya (2001; 2005a; 2005b) Tan and Cossa (2001), Jetly (2003) and Caballero-Anthony (2005). For instance, Caballero-Anthony (2005: 22) underlines ASEAN’s success in terms of its conflict management and avoidance and maintains that its norms contribute its achievements. Similarly, Dosch and Mols (1998: 172) highlight the success of the ASEAN’s norms and its model.

Moreover, ASEAN has played a lead role in the creation and maintenance of wider regional institutions, e.g. ARF, APT and EAS, which involve major powers, e.g. China, Japan, Russia and the US, even though economically and militarily ASEAN is weaker than these powers. ASEAN is the central axis of the regional collaboration (Park 2012: 270) and it has this ‘disproportionate regional influence’ because it

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94 ASEAN’s other declared goal is economic development. However, security is more important because security was the rationale behind ASEAN’s foundation and remains the defining feature that determines ASEAN and its role in the region.

95 For him, the absence of a war between ASEAN’s founding members was a significant success because prior to its establishment the outlook for regional security was particularly grim.

96 No other regional organisations in the developing world, not even MERCOSUR, have managed such high-level engagements with major external powers (Dosch and Mols 1998: 171).
possesses a set of principles that are accepted by other regional powers (De Castro 2000; Higgott 2000b; Dieter and Higgott 2002; Stubbs 2002; Eaton and Stubbs 2006; Desker 2008; Stubbs 2008). Thus, not only do ASEAN’s norms guide its internal and external relations. They are also accepted by other regional countries and chosen as the mode of function for ASEAN-plus institutions. The ARF adopted the norms of the TAC and the ASEAN way as its basic legal framework (ARF 1994; Busse 1999: 53; Khong and Nesadurai 2007: 34). The ADMM-Plus too accepted the ASEAN way as its modus operandi (ADMM 2007; 2009; Teo 2010). The accession to TAC is a precursor to membership of the EAS.\textsuperscript{97} Indeed, based on its efforts to develop norms to guide its internal and external relations as well as its attempts to encourage – and, to some extent, its success in persuading – other wider regional organisations to adopt its preferred norms, ASEAN is a notable norm entrepreneur (Katsumata 2003; Acharya 2004; Rüland 2011). Moreover, it can be seen as a normative power because it fits very well the conceptualisation of normative power made by Manners (2002) and De Zutter (2011).\textsuperscript{98} For Manners (2002: 252), the concept of NPE is built on the crucial observation that the most important factor shaping the EU’s international role is what it is. Similarly, it can safely be argued that the most crucial factor defining ASEAN’s role in the wider Pacific-Asia region and its actorness in general is its raison d’être. Loder et al. (2011: 83) convincingly argue that ASEAN has played a central role in the development of East Asian regionalism because has been able to develop widely accepted regional norms. Robinson (2011: 49) even goes further contending “that ASEAN may in fact be much closer to the EU’s own aspiration for normative power than the EU is itself”. For this reason, he concludes that “ASEAN’s [normative] framework has importance in terms of the very edifice on which the normative power Europe thesis has been constructed” (Robinson 2011: 50). While it is debateable to maintain that the EU should learn from ASEAN as Robinson suggests, it is clear that, like the EU, ASEAN is an active norm entrepreneur and an influential normative power. It illustrates well a key argument maintained by the thesis – that is norm entrepreneurs in world politics are not always Western and powerful actors as much of the literature

\textsuperscript{97} ASEAN’s preference for informality and non-binding mechanisms even prevailed American and Australian preferences in the institutional design of APEC (Khong and Nesadurai 2007: 32).

\textsuperscript{98} For Manners (2002: 239) normative power is defined as its ability to shape conceptions of normal while De Zutter (2010: 1122) regards it “as the identity of a power in the international system that shapes the normal in world politics through its norm-driven practices and the adaption of its norms by others”.

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on norms assumes. Non-Western and weak countries or regional organisations also actively engage in norm entrepreneurship.

It is very important to note that not only do constructivist-minded scholars highlight the central part of ASEAN’s norms in its regional and international relations and its active role in norm generation and diffusion. They also underline that the set of norms advocated by ASEAN differ from and even compete with those promoted by other Western powers and the EU in particular. For instance, Stubbs (2008) maintains that by fostering a distinct way of conducting its internal and external relations, which is accepted by regional countries, ASEAN offers an alternative normative model to global governance, which is often dominated by the liberal paradigm advocated by the West. More precisely, ASEAN’s normative paradigm, which centres around the principle of non-interference, diverges from and even opposes the Western model, which focuses on the norm of intervention (Kuhonta 2006: 344; Dunn et al 2010). In other words, the codes of conduct or standards of acceptable behaviour in international relations that ASEAN and its members uphold and promote are not intervention but non-intervention. This point should be underlined because it enables the thesis to explain why the EU and ASEAN disagreed with each other over human rights, East Timor and Myanmar. It also shows that normative power is not always a force for good as it is often maintained by scholars on NPE, e.g. Manners (2002), who regard the EU as something positive in world politics; it can be a source of rivalry and conflict (Steinkohl 2010).

Another important issue underlined by constructivists, e.g. Stubbs (2008), for which a constructivist perspective is adopted, is that the historical context of Southeast Asia significantly shapes ASEAN’s norms. According to this, while norms might have a universal significance, they are often locally interpreted and practised. In one of his works, Leifer (1999: 28-9) argues that ASEAN’s norms are “part and parcel of the standard working practice of international society writ large and not in any way particular and exclusive to the Association or its regional locale”. This is somehow true because ASEAN’s core norms are widely recognised by the international system and strongly upheld by many regional organisations, notably those in the developing world (Kuhonta 2006: 344-5). Yet, his argument is unable to explain why those norms are not fervently advocated by the EU. This point is also very important because it allows the thesis to explain adequately the reason behind ASEAN’s set of norms, which is radically different from the EU’s and why the EU and ASEAN find it difficult to interact with each other.
In short, a constructivist approach is very useful in describing ASEAN and its norms. Indeed, anchoring its argument in this theoretical perspective and judging by the way ASEAN has espoused norms to inform its internal and external relations and by the fact that its norms have been adopted as the mode of function for other broader regional institutions, the thesis holds that ASEAN is a ‘norm entrepreneur’. As noted, that view is already maintained by some scholars, e.g. Katsumata (2006) and Rüland (2011). Stubbs (2008: 455) labels ASEAN as a ‘norm guardian’ because according to him ASEAN took on boards the norms that had been widely discussed in Asia from the late 1940s through to the 1960s. For Acharya (2011), ASEAN engages in norm subsidiarity. In the current literature, with the exception of Robinson (2011: 51), who maintains that ASEAN embodies the characteristics, e.g. the presence and influence through form and being, of normative power, no work goes further arguing that ASEAN is a normative power. Adopting Manners (2002: 239, 252), who regards a normative power as a power that has the ability to shape the normal in world politics or the power whose influence lies in its being, i.e. what it is, and notably De Zutter (2010: 1122), this thesis contends that, like the EU, ASEAN is a normative power. Yet, such a depiction of ASEAN raises a number of important issues. One of these is, if it is a normative power, what type of normative power it is. In other words, how different is it from a normative power Europe, or more exactly, a cosmopolitan normative power Europe examined in Chapter 4. To answer this, it is vital to examine its norms.

5.1.3. ASEAN’s normative foundation

As it has been examined so far, the principles that have become ASEAN’s modus vivendi and modus operandi as well as the mode of function for other wider regional institutions predominantly lie in the ASEAN way. Like the concept of European values in European studies, the ‘ASEAN way’ is probably one of the most discussed issues in the literature on ASEAN. Yet, while there are a great number of accounts on it, e.g. Acharya (1997; 2001), Ravenhill (1998), Askandar et al. (2002), Sharpe (2003), Katsumata (2003), Haacke (2005), Nishikawa (2007), it is often interpreted differently because there is no official definition of the term. Acharya (2001: 47) makes a distinction between the ‘ASEAN norms’ and the ‘ASEAN way’, by arguing that the ASEAN norms derive from international documents whereas the ‘ASEAN way’ comes from the local social, cultural and political milieu. Among the ASEAN norms, Acharya (2001: 47-62) identifies four core categories to which the ASEAN norms and principles belong: (1) the non-use of force and pacific settlement of disputes, (2) regional
autonomy and collective self-reliance, (3) non-interference in other states’ internal affairs and (4) the rejection of an ASEAN military pact in favour of a bilateral defence cooperation. These norms, also known as the legal-political norms, are the fundamental principles enshrined in the UN Charter. With regard to the ASEAN’s social-cultural norms, Acharya (2001: 63-70) identifies a number of attributes. Among these, there are three, which are of particular importance for ASEAN, namely: a preference for informality, a related aversion to institutionalisation and consensus building, which focuses on consultation based on equality and tolerance.

However, Haacke (2005: 5) argues that Acharya’s distinction between the ASEAN norms and the ASEAN way is unnecessary. According to him, Acharya attempted to distinguish the latter from the former because he thought it made little sense to consider the universal norms, e.g. non-use of force or non-interference, as typical to ASEAN, because “the leaders and officials of most, if not, all countries subscribe to them” (Haacke 2005: 5). Nevertheless, he points out that while it may be true that politicians around the world tend to endorse those norms, “the relevance and significance of these principles to individual states is likely to depend on the context of interaction in which leaders operate. The legal principles thus have varied political meanings” (Haacke 2005: 5). To demonstrate the contextual condition in the understanding and application of these norms, Haacke refers to Acharya’s own explanation of the obligations imposed by ASEAN’s doctrine of non-interference on its members. One of these is refraining from criticising the actions of a member government towards its own people, including violations of human rights and from making the domestic political system of states and the political styles of governments a basis for deciding on their membership in ASEAN (Acharya 2001: 58; Haakke 2005: 5). Undoubtedly, the EU does not have such an interpretation and application of the principle of non-interference. In other words, this principle has been ASEANised. That is why instead of distinguishing the ASEAN norms, i.e. the legal-political norms, from the ASEAN way, i.e. social-cultural norms, Haacke (2005: 214) combines and calls them the ‘ASEAN way’. In doing so, he identifies six norms as making up the core of the ASEAN way: (1) sovereign equality, (2) non-use of force and the peaceful settlement of conflict, (3) non-interference and non-intervention, (4) the non-involvement of ASEAN to address unsolved bilateral conflict between members, (5) quiet diplomacy and (6) mutual respect and tolerance.
This author thinks that Haacke’s argument is more plausible because, as Katsumata (2003: 111) comments, while many of ASEAN’s core principles are not peculiar to Asia, ASEAN states adopted these principles in their particular regional politics. Yet, the argument here is not whether or not the ASEAN norms, i.e. the legal-political norms, such as non-intervention and non-interference, can be seen as part of the ‘ASEAN way’. Rather, by referring to Acharya and Haacke, this section aims to identify the key norms that ASEAN states have developed to guide its regional and external relations. In this light, it is clear that even though Acharya and Haacke categorise ASEAN’s norms differently, they identify almost the same six core norms of ASEAN. That means the six norms, which constitutes the ASEAN way, radically differs from the EU’s nine constitutive norms. There is not a single norm, which is advocated by both organisations. This is the key reason why this thesis maintains that in terms of their normative premises, the EU and ASEAN are fundamentally different from each other. An in-depth examination of ASEAN’s principle of non-interference demonstrates more clearly the normative differences of the EU and ASEAN.

If respect for human rights is the most promoted principle in the EU’s the internal and external relations, non-interference is “the single most important principle undermining ASEAN regionalism” (Acharya 2001: 3). It has been elevated into “a central pillar of Southeast Asian regionalism” Jones (2010: 479) and remains “central to regional governance” (Nesadurai 2009: 91). Dosch (2008: 525) regards it as “the sine qua non of regional cooperation”. This principle is always present in ASEAN’s main key documents. The 1967 Bangkok Declaration stated that ASEAN members “are determined to ensure their stability and security from external interference in any form or manifestation” (AMM, para. 5). The emphasis on non-interference was also obvious in the TAC because the first three clauses of Article 2 of this treaty are related to it

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99 According to an ASEAN official, “the non-interference is the foundation of the entire inter-state system. Thus, this principle is not special for ASEAN states. Every regional and international organisation has it as a principle” (Interview, 2009).

100 Having said that, it is important to underline that a particular feature, which makes the ‘ASEAN way’ typically Asian and special, is its socio-cultural norms, also known as the procedural norms.

101 Stubbs (2006: 456-7), identifies five ideas that lie at the heart of ASEAN’s approach to its regional and international relations. They are: (1) neutrality in the Cold War context, (2) sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference, (3) peaceful settlement to disputes, (4) informality, consultation and compromise and (5) the promotion of domestic stability and harmony.

102 According to Kuhonta (2006: 343), there is such emphasis on non-interference because “[i]n theory and in practice, ASEAN has relentlessly underscored the belief that stability and progress in the region can only be built upon the legitimacy of state boundaries”.

113
According to Acharya (2001: 58), this non-interference obliges ASEAN members to do (or not to do) a number of things. First, they have to refrain “from criticising the actions of a member government towards its own people, including violations of human rights, and from making the domestic political systems of states and the political styles of governments a basis for deciding on their membership in ASEAN”. As will be shown in Chapter 7, this is reflected by ASEAN’s admission of Myanmar despite the latter’s poor human rights record in 1997. This example also shows radical differences between ASEAN and the EU, which sets political criteria, i.e. respect for human rights, for countries seeking membership. Second, they must criticise “the actions of states which were deemed to have breached the non-interference principle”. Third, they are obliged to deny “recognition, sanctuary, or other forms of support to any rebel group seeking to destabilise or overthrow the government of a neighbouring state”. Finally, they have an obligation to provide “political support and material assistance to member states in their campaign against subversive and destabilising activities”. Again, these four elements are totally absent in – and at odds with – the EU’s set of norms.

5.1.4. ASEAN: A communitarian normative power

The examination of ASEAN’s normative preferences and its core principle of non-interference show that norms are predominantly state-centric. For this reason, it is more suitable to describe it as a communitarian normative power. To illustrate why such a typology summarises well ASEAN and its core norms, it is worth examining the concept of security in Southeast Asia context. Security is a critical and often contested concept (Bellamy 2004: 175) because it has many facets, which vary depending on “whose security is threatened, the nature and gravity of the threat, the source of the threat, and the authority responsible for identifying and describing the entity, the threat and the source” (Emmerson 2009b: 5). This remark is very apt in the context of Southeast Asia. Bellamy (2004) identifies three forms of security in Southeast Asia (Bellamy 2004). The first and broadest level is regional security. The second level is the

103 They are (1) mutual respect for independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial and national identity of all nations, (2) the right of every state to lead its national existence free from external interference, subversion or coercion and (3) non-interference in each other’s internal affairs. They are also the first three of the six core principles of the TAC (1976, Article 2). The other three are: (1) settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful means, (2) renunciation of the threat or use of force and (3) effective cooperation among regime.
territorial integrity and sovereignty of its member states. The third level of security is that of the regimes or the ruling elites in the region (Bellamy 2004: 166; Kivimaki 2007: 434; Stubbs: 2008: 459). Furthermore, in Southeast Asia, as Bellamy (2004: 158) notes, three sources of threats to security can be identified. The first form threats emanates from other regional states. The second form comes from outside the region. For instance, in the 1950s and 1960s, China actively supported communist insurgents in many Southeast Asian countries (Yahuda 1983: 219; Narine 2002: 76-7; Storey 2002: 205; Katsumata 2003: 112). Another external force, perceived as posing challenge to the security of the regional states or, more specifically, to the security of particular regimes/governments, is liberalism, which mainly emanates from the West, especially years just after the Cold War. The third form of threat stems from within individual states. In the early period, the destabilising forces were almost exclusively related to communist insurgences, supported by China. In recent years, a major internal threat, which some regional regimes and governments consider to be destabilising, is the activists and movements for human rights and democracy (Bellamy 2004: 168).

A brief overview of the forms and sources of security in Southeast Asia shows that security in this region is primarily state-centred. It is also very regime-focused. For Bellamy (2004: 165-6), “it is not the state per se that is considered to be the primary referent of security by political leaders, but particular ruling regimes and elites”. This is because, in his view, “throughout much of the Cold War and still today for many of the region’s states (...), the paramount concern has been the consolidation, legitimisation and security of particular regimes and ruling elites”. Bellamy’s argument is reasonable because it is widely acknowledged that “ASEAN’s primary concern has been with regime survival” (Acharya 1999: 428) and “[m]ost ASEAN states remain dominated by narrow elites” (Narine 2008: 425). Kivimaki (2007: 434) also maintains that security was interpreted in an elitist manner, almost identical to security of the regimes. Such a
prioritisation of regime security over individual security plays an important part in ASEAN states’ marginalisation of human rights and democracy. For instance, the obligations that ASEAN states have to follow with regard to the principle of non-interference, e.g. refraining from criticising the actions of a member government towards its own people, including violation of human rights, are aimed at protecting regimes/governments (Acharya 2001: 58; Haacke 2005a). Because of this, Katsumata (2009: 620) believes that ASEAN diplomacy has been state-centred and designed to address the interests of governments. Arguments like those of Bellamy and Katsumata are justified if one looks at the region’s political systems and situations. According Freedom House, in 2010 most of the ASEAN countries were either ‘not free’ or only ‘partly free’ (see Table 5.1).

Furthermore, as Table 5.1 illustrates, the level of freedom in Southeast Asian countries has not improved during the last eight years. While the average score of the political rights of the ten ASEAN countries slightly increased, from 4.8 in 2002 to 5.3 in 2010, the average score of the civil liberties decreased from 4.8 in 2002 to 4.6 in 2010. The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Index of Democracy 2010 also shows that most of the ASEAN countries have either ‘hybrid regime’ or ‘authoritarian regime’ (see Appendix 9; Case 2004; 2009). In fact, compared to the EU members, the ASEAN members are far behind in terms of freedom and democracy. According to this Index, in 2010 the highest ranked ASEAN country was Thailand, which ranked 57th of 167 countries surveyed, whereas Bulgaria, which had the lowest core among the EU members, ranked 51st (see Appendix 10). It is also worth noting that, according to this index, the average score of nine ASEAN countries surveyed is 4.77. In contrast, the average score of the 27 members of the EU is 8.02. Thus, if based on this score, nine ASEAN countries were classified as ‘hybrid regimes’ whereas the 27 EU members were full democracies.
Given that reality, from a liberal perspective, ASEAN hardly qualifies as a security community because it is not underpinned by a liberal collective identity. Adler (1992: 293) argues that, in a security community its members “hold dependable expectation of peaceful change not merely because they share just any kind of values, but because they share liberal democratic values”.

According to Kuhonta (2006: 339-40), by emphasising sovereignty and non-interference in order to protect regime security and political stability in the region, ASEAN neglects democratic norms. However, he maintains that given the relative peace in the region since ASEAN’s foundation, ASEAN can be defined as “a nascent security community” (Kuhonta 2006: 341). Nevertheless, as liberalism is obviously absent in the building of an ASEAN security community, the peace that ASEAN as a security community has brought about was built on an ‘illiberal’ foundation (Kuhonta 2006: 340). Kuhonta’s argument is also supported by Kivimaki (2001: 5). Whether ASEAN should be seen as an illiberal security community is debatable. Nevertheless, it is clear that the normative foundation on which ASEAN is primarily based is not the liberal and democratic norms that constitute the EU. Instead, it is premised on a set of state-centred norms. In this sense, ASEAN can be probably best described as a ‘communitarian normative power’ because ASEAN and its normative underpinnings fit

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**Table 5.1: The level of freedom in ASEAN countries**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Political Rights</th>
<th>Civil Liberties</th>
<th>Overall Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Country A</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>Free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country B</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>Partly Free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country C</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>Not Free</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Freedom House (2002; 2010)

According to Freedom House’s method, each country is assigned on a scale of 1 to 7 for political rights (PR) and a similar rating for civil liberties (CL), with a rating of 1 indicating the highest degree of freedom and 7 the lowest level of freedom. Each pair of political rights and civil liberties ratings is averaged to determine an overall status of “Free”, “Partly Free”, or “Not Free” Those whose ratings average 1.0 to 2.5 are considered “Free”, 3.0 to 5.0 “Partly Free” and 5.5 to 7.0 “Not Free”.

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108 Adler (1992: 293) argues that, in a security community its members “hold dependable expectation of peaceful change not merely because they share just any kind of values, but because they share liberal democratic values”.

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very well the characteristics of a communitarian normative powers, e.g. its strong focus on state sovereignty, underlined in Chapter 2.

To illustrate why ASEAN is best viewed as a ‘communitarian normative power’, it is worth briefly examining the concept of Asian values. This is because even though the Asian values discourse is neither confined to ASEAN nor officially present in its main documents, it is strongly advocated by the former leaders of two of ASEAN members, Malaysia’s Mahathir Mohamad and Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew (Lee 2000). As maintained by Nesadurai (2009: 108; see also Kraft 2001: 33-55), not a single ASEAN country, not even the democratic Philippines, challenged the notion. This means ASEAN states tacitly supported it. In fact, a number of ASEAN countries, notably Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia, asserted the Asian values to resist the human rights and democracy discourse promoted by the West in the 1990s (Mauzy 1997: 211-2). The Asian values discourse was even regarded as “a prominent and distinctive part of Southeast Asia’s identity during the boom years” (Beeson 2002: 561). Therefore, it is of significant importance to note some key points of this concept.109

To begin with, it must be acknowledged that the discourse on Asian values is controversial (Levine 2007a: 1). One of the reasons for its controversy is the difficulty to determine whether such a set of values, which is distinctively Asian in character, exists (Levine 2007b: 106). Yet, the fact that there is a debate about it implies that there must be ‘something’ in it. This ‘something’ is another major reason for the controversy. On the one hand, its advocates, like Malaysia’s Mahathir Mohamad or Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew, maintain that Asian people put the ‘rights’ of the community (i.e. family, society or state) ahead of their individual rights (Lee 1993). According to an ASEAN official, unlike Europeans, who are more relaxed about authority, “Asians are still very much family/society-oriented and respectful toward authority” (Interview, 2009). For a former ambassador of an EU country to an ASEAN country, Asian values exist in many ways. “For examples, in Asia, you have the rule of man more than rule of law while in Europe there is the rule of law more than rule of man. That is basically an Asian value”.110 In contrast, others argue that Asian values are simply the instruments that

110 According to this official, now working as visiting professor in Singapore, “the fundamental reason behind this is that in Confucianism, Hinduism, and maybe in Islam, people are educated to believe that they have emperors or the sons of heaven, who are capable of making good decisions for them. Consequently, they should trust them” (2009, author’s interview).
Asian governments use to justify their human rights abuses and undemocratic practices (Barr 2000: 309). Whether “Asian traditions typically entail respect for authority and hierarchy” (Pettman 2010: 301) or that Asian values are just self-serving arguments of Asia’s paternalistic and illiberal governments (Barr 2000: 312) is a question of debate. Yet, whatever the ulterior motives behind Asian values are, Asian and ASEAN states tend to put the state – and in some case, the ruling elite – before the individual. In this sense, Asian values sharply contrast with, if not are at odds with, Western/European values, which emphasise the rights of the individual. This divergence is illustrated by the fact that regionalism in Southeast Asia does not seek to “generate the kind of ‘we-feeling’ and concerns for values such as human rights, democratization and social justice that help support the building of a people-centred ASEAN community” (Nesadurai 2009: 105). In other words, the advocate for the Asian values by some ASEAN’s leaders makes ASEAN approximate a ‘communitarian normative power’, which radically diverges from a predominantly individual-focused or cosmopolitan normative power Europe. Furthermore, as will be shown in Chapters 6 and 7, these normative divergences are the main reasons for the clashes between the two organisations over human rights and the issues of East Timor and Myanmar in the 1990s.

Finally, it is worth noting that the ‘Asian values’, the ‘ASEAN way’ and its core principle of non-interference have been greatly challenged, especially after the 1997/8 Asian financial crisis. It is believed that these principles, notably non-interference, prevented ASEAN from taking important actions over economic crises and problematic members like Myanmar (Jones 2010: 479). Whether it is because of those criticisms or because of their awareness that they needed to change in order to facilitate economic and political integration, in 2007, at ASEAN’s 40th anniversary, its members signed the ASEAN Charter and established a regional Human Rights Body (HRB). The agreement to sign the Charter and create the HRB is a landmark for ASEAN because marked its “liberal turn”, which now “explicitly identifies the rule of law, good governance, democratic principles and constitutional governments as essential elements of political order” (Dosch 2008: 527). However, that turn was a hesitant one as “it is a long way from the cautious acceptance of general democratic values to the active promotion and regional enforcement of rules based on these norms” (Dosch 2008: 527). Despite including these ‘liberal norms’ in its Charter, ASEAN reiterated its traditional norms as its core principles. In fact, the “fundamental importance” of “sovereignty” and “non-
interference” still comes before any talk of ensuring democracy in the Charter. Given ASEAN’s refusal to modify or abandon its cardinal principle, it is difficult, if not impossible, for ASEAN’s HRB to produce anything of substance (Jones 2008: 737; Nesadurai 2009: 05; see also Chalermpalanupap 2008; Caballero-Anthony 2008; 2009). This is reflected by the fact that, despite approving the terms of reference for its HRB in 2009, due to this body’s weak mandate and ASEAN’s strong insistence on the principle of non-interference, ASEAN has not made any concrete results in the human rights area (International Federation of Human Rights 2010; Doan 2012b).

Briefly, from what it has examined, it is clear that maintaining security was and remains a preoccupation of ASEAN countries. To achieve this goal they have evolved and promoted the ASEAN way, which they regard as the ‘normal’ way of conducting their regional and international affairs. That means although the goal that ASEAN states have sought to achieve is very ‘realist’, i.e. state-centred and sovereignty-focused, the instruments they have employed to attain this objective are primarily ‘soft’ means, i.e. norms. In other words, like the EU, ASEAN upholds and promotes norms in its internal and external relations. Indeed, like the EU, ASEAN is a norm entrepreneur and normative power. The difference is the standards of acceptable behaviour developed and promoted by ASEAN radically differ from the EU’s. This section also noted that some ASEAN countries have advocated Asian values. Whether some cultural elements exist in the concept remains an open question. Yet, whatever the reason behind the concept, most of the region’s governments did not cherish democratic norms. For this reason, despite its recent attempt to create a HRB, ASEAN remains a state-centric organisation, which hesitantly moves towards a community based on a liberal and democratic foundation. For this reason, it is apt to describe ASEAN as a communitarian normative power. The question arises is why ASEAN states have been concerned about security and advocated the ASEAN way to conduct their internal and external affairs. This leads to the second section of the chapter.

5.2. The sources of ASEAN’s state-centric norms

Chapter 2 identified a number of factors and actors that define the normative underpinnings of a political entity, e.g. its historical legacy, its economic and political situation, the external/geopolitical actors and factors it has to deal with. Chapter 4 has illustrated how these have defined the EU’s normative premises and differences. Similarly, this section uses these to explain ASEAN’s normative foundation and differentiation (from the EU’s).
5.2.1. Southeast Asia’s historical background

Chief among those factors is its historical context. In fact, like European integration, the EU’s identity and its norms, ASEAN regionalism, its identity and normative underpinnings have been influentially shaped by Southeast Asia’s historical background. The primary difference is that for the former, it is Europe’s war-torn past whereas for the latter, it is its colonial experience. Such difference is also a defining factor that makes the EU and its norms radically differ from ASEAN and its normative foundation. It also makes regionalism in (Western) Europe and Southeast Asia diverges from each other. As noted by Yeo (2009b: 195), for the former, “regionalism is seen as a restraining force against ultranationalism and a building block towards a new level of governance through the pooling of sovereignty”. In contrast, for the latter, “regionalism will be tailed to complement and strengthen nationalism not replace it”.

Southeast Asia’s colonialism as a defining factor leading to ASEAN’s formation and its ‘ASEAN way’ is widely recognised (Beeson 2002: 550; Katsumata 2003: 112; Nishikawa 2007: 44; Yeo 2009b: 194). In Southeast Asia, all countries, except Thailand, had been colonised and had recently gained their independence. As they had never experienced sovereign statehood (Wunderlich 2007: 73), and even for them, “the concept of a frontier was uncommon, if not unknown” (Tarling 1998: 47), sovereignty has been obviously cherished (Gilson 2011: 236). Furthermore, as they had to fight very hard – in some cases, bloody and deadly wars – against their colonial masters to gain their independence (Yeo 2009b: 194), it is unsurprising that “the region’s first and foremost principle is protection of sovereignty” (Nishikawa 2007: 44). In other words, perhaps like other countries in the Third World, ASEAN states’ particular commitment to the norm of sovereignty was first developed out of a drawn-out struggle for independence and sovereign equality in international society (Busse 1999: 46; Haacke 2003: 31). Indeed, the genesis of the ASEAN way “is best conceived as both a nationalist struggle and the outcome of a longstanding struggle for recognition and security” (Haacke 2005: 51). It is for this reason that ASEAN states placed a particular emphasis on the principle of non-interference (Katsumata 2003: 112), which has become a guiding principle for ASEAN (Henderson 1999: 16-17), and that “institutional design in ASEAN remains wedded to state sovereignty” (Khong and Nesadurai 2007: 33). Briefly, given their preoccupation with sovereignty, ASEAN
states were and are still unwilling to allow other member states or external powers to interfere into their internal affairs.

Coupled with their particular emphasis on sovereignty, Southeast Asian countries were also concerned about their domestic stability. This factor defined their interaction and their adoption of the ASEAN way as the mode of function for their relations (Katsumata 2003: 113). The fundamental reason behind their preoccupation is that colonialism left these newly independent nations with great challenges (Elson 2004: 15-29). One of these was the weakness of their internal infrastructures and institutions. During the colonial period, institutional structures and economic developments had depended on colonial powers and when they left, the newly-independent states faced huge problems of nation-building (Beeson 2002: 550). In addition, each country faced deeply ethnic and cultural divisions (Nesadurai 2008: 225). Another major issue was related to long-standing territorial disputes between regional countries (Dixon 1991: 9; Henderson 1999: 15). Given these challenges, the ultimate objective of the post-colonial leaders was to consolidate their fragile and newly acquired statehood (Tilman 1989: 12). For them, nation building and domestic developments were far more important than region building (Yeo 2009b: 194-5). As they were too weak physically to defend their statehood against other regional states or domestic problems, ASEAN states knew that they could only survive if others would respect their sovereignty (Jackson 1993). Consequently, “the normative ideal of sovereignty became the standard prescription for almost every political disease in the region and the cornerstone of ASEAN’s attempt at creating a regional order” (Busse (1999: 47). As summed up by Ghazali Shafie,111 ASEAN states “were recommending a special kind of relationship conscious of the fact that the modern state entities in the region were the product of colonial designs, which had left a number of thorny residual problems, particularly in relations to national border” (quoted by Leifer 1996: 12).

It is also imperative to underline that despite major changes in the international system during the last decades, the challenges that ASEAN states faced 40 or 50 years ago have not been completely resolved.112 As put by Katsumata (2003: 104), “the political factors which affected the development of the “ASEAN Way” have not changed much”. For this reason, the ASEAN way has remained a constant feature of

111 He was Malaysia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and present at ASEAN’s Bangkok conference in 1967.
112 For instance, intra-regional territorial disputes, which were unsettled but largely dormant (Dixon 1991: 9), have become salient recently.
ASEAN as well as its ASEAN-plus institutions (Khong and Nesadurai 2007: 33-4; Yeo 2009: 195). During the interviews with the author, when asked why ASEAN states still strongly uphold the ASEAN way and especially its principle of sovereignty and non-interference, an ASEAN official and a former ambassador of an EU member, referred to Southeast Asia’s colonial past and the reality that whatever they are, ASEAN states remain very young nations (Interview, 2009). These comments also illustrate well the argument that the background, location and perspective of a political entity influence its normative foundation and differentiation. Unlike Western countries, which acquired their statehood for centuries and had solid and established economic and political institutions, ASEAN states did not have those luxuries. Most ASEAN members remain fragile entities because they are still locked in a struggle to become – and, consequently, very preoccupied with creating – stable nation-states (Narine 2004; 2008: 425; Weatherbee 2005). Therefore, it is unsurprising that they are still strongly committed to the sovereignty norm (Rüland and Jetschke 2008: 406). Furthermore, unlike post-War World II European leaders, ASEAN elites were revolutionary leaders, i.e. they came to power not through free and democratic elections and stayed in power for decades (Tan 2005: 9). Accordingly, they did not hold the liberal democratic ideals that (Western) European countries had long embraced.\footnote{Western Europe countries have more or less the same political system, i.e. liberal democracy (Zhu 2007: 157). According to Wallace (2000: 50), “[t]he EC and later the EU were in part devised to contribute to democratic stabilization as the club of European liberal democracies”.} Chapter 4 has maintained that the emphasis of the EU on individual rights and freedoms is also linked to the legacy of Enlightenment. Asia did not have such a philosophical heritage. Instead, some ASEAN leaders promoted the Asian values, which preferred collective rights to individual rights. Whether there are some cultural elements behind the Asian values is open to debate. Yet, the point made is that Asia’s non-experience of a Europe-like Enlightenment is a reason for ASEAN’s scant attention to the individual’s rights and its absence of liberal-democratic political arrangements.

Another important factor, which is identified by Henderson (1999: 16) as one of the three reasons behind ASEAN’s adoption of the non-interference principle as its guiding tenet, is its members’ sheer diversities. Compared with Western Europe, Southeast Asia is a much more heterogeneous region in terms of politics, economy and culture (Zhu 2007: 156). Politically, unlike the EU, which is a club of liberal democracy, ASEAN includes a wide spectrum of political systems, ranging from an
authoritarian military regime in Myanmar and authoritarian communist governments in Vietnam and Laos through a hybrid regime in Cambodia to flawed democracy in other countries (see Appendix 9). Economically, the disparity between ASEAN members is huge. For example, in 2009, Singapore’s GDP per capital was US$ 36,379 whereas the Myanmar’s was only US$ 571 (see Appendix 4). Culturally, unlike Christian Europe, Southeast Asia is a polyglot region of many different religions: Confucianism, Buddhism, Islam and Christianity (Chopparapu 2005: 135; Fong 2005: 8). Given these immense diversities, ASEAN states need to respect their diversity and create some unity among them. The ASEAN way is a feasible means of attaining that unity and promoting cooperation. In other words, the ASEAN way may be not desirable but it is a workable way of promoting regional cooperation (Zhu 2007: 156) because it allows its members to participate in a cooperative endeavour (Jetschke 2009: 413).

5.2.2. External factors and actors

In addition to their internal factors or weaknesses, Southeast Asian countries are always vulnerable to external challenges and threats. This vulnerability significantly influences them in their approach to, and compliance with, the ‘ASEAN way’. In fact, a key and declared goal of non-Communist Southeast countries when establishing ASEAN in 1967 was to foster and strengthen their collective position against a threatening external environment: the rise of communism in their region and communist insurgencies in their own countries (Jorgensen-Dahl 1982: 73; Jetschke 2009: 411). This communist threat also defined ASEAN’s evolution in the 1970s and 1980s (Tasker 1987: 106; Stubbs 2008: 456). For instance, their concern about a victorious Vietnam after the end of the Vietnam War in 1975 was the main reason behind unprecedented summit in Bali in 1976, during which they signed two major documents, i.e. the ASEAN Concord I and the TAC (Ganesan 1995: 214; Tenorio 1997; McDougall 2008: 46; Narine 2008: 415). In these two texts, which remain ASEAN’s important documents, notably the latter, ASEAN leaders were strongly determined to ensure their region and their respective countries from external interference in any form or manner. Vietnam’s intervention in Cambodia in 1978 made ASEAN more committed to its key norms, notably non-interference (Busse 1999: 48-50). In fact, these norms enabled

\footnote{Even though it is increasingly becoming a multi-religious space, Europe remains a Christian continent. In fact, Christianity has significantly shaped European integration, identity and politics (Leustean and Madeley 2009; 2010; Leustean 2013).}
ASEAN to sustain the Cambodian conflict on the international agenda despite its limited material capabilities and the marginal international interest in its region at that time (Khong and Nesadurai 2007: 35). For example, as noted in Chapter 3, in the *Joint Statement on Political Issues* with the EC in 1980, ASEAN states emphasised the need for all states to observe strictly the principles of national sovereignty and non-interference, which they regarded as vital importance to inter-state relations (AEMM 1980b, point 1). In this sense, ASEAN’s principle of non-interference is aimed at restraining interference not only from a member state but also from major powers outside the region. That is why Yeo (2009b: 195) argues that ASEAN was also built on the need to restrain any interference from external powers.

With the end of the Cold War and the resolution of the Cambodian conflict, ASEAN states no longer faced communist threats. Yet, other challenges have emerged. China’s rise and the recent tensions between China and some ASEAN members over the territorial disputes in the South China Sea are among the major security issues that ASEAN and its members have to face (Busse 1999: 51; Baviera 2004). To deal with the region’s volatility and its members’ vulnerability, ASEAN has attempted to shape the wider regional environment by engaging with China and other major powers to discuss and address shared regional problems, but based on its principles and practices (Nesadurai 2008: 227). In reality, as noted early, since the end of the Cold War, ASEAN has become more active in its dealing with the outside world (Busse 1999: 54). For instance, ASEAN’s TAC has become one of the strongest symbols of ASEAN’s influence in the Asia Pacific region (Narine 2008: 415). Chapter 2 underlines that the ecological process, i.e. the pattern of relations between actors and their environment, leads political actors to generate or maintain their norms (Kowert and Legro 1996: 470-82). This is very true in ASEAN’s case because the regional and international setting during and after the Cold War has played a key role in prompting ASEAN to maintain and advocate its core norms.

ASEAN’s strong focus on its ASEAN way and some ASEAN leaders’ promotion of Asian values in the first years of the 1990s were also due to the West’s insistence on the promotion of human rights following the collapse of the communist bloc. These principles and values became a useful means for them to deflect calls by the western powers to fully democratise, respect individual human rights (Nesadurai 2008: 228). As will be shown in the next chapter, ASEAN states often referred to these two sets of norms and values to resist the respect and promotion of democratic norms insisted by
the West and the EU in particular in the early 1990s. ASEAN states opposed the EU’s insistence on the promotion of human rights in the early 1990s, i.e. prior to the 1997/1998 Asian financial crisis, partly because by the early 1990s, they were no longer the junior partners vis-à-vis the European countries. According to Manners (2002: 240), the EU’s hybrid polity and its political-legal constitution also make the EU’s normative premises differ from those of political actors. These two elements also exist in ASEAN. While ASEAN is much less institutionalised and legalised than the EU, it is an elite-driven polity or entity, whose normative constitution is defined by its key documents. If the EU’s core norms, e.g. democracy and human rights, are enshrined in its main treaties and declarations, in the same vein ASEAN’s fundamental norms are preserved in its main documents.

In short, a number of ‘we-group’ factors define ASEAN’s normative foundation and make it differ from the EU’s. Chief among these is Southeast Asian countries’ common colonial past. Though they are culturally, politically and economically heterogeneous, all Southeast Asian countries, but Thailand, shared colonial experiences and consequences. Another notable reason behind the ASEAN way is that before and ASEAN’s foundation and even now, ASEAN members always have to deal with different external powerful forces or ‘they-groups’ actors and factors. The promotion and prolongation of their ASEAN way are a feasible way for them to cope with those external challenges. Due to these ‘we-group’ and ‘they-group’ factors, ASEAN and its members had – and continue to embrace – shared objectives, namely protecting their respective national sovereignty and the region as a whole (from any external interference and intervention) and enhancing the stability of their respective countries and the region as a whole. In other words, like the EU and its normative underpinning, ASEAN its and ASEAN way are defined by both their ‘we-group’ factors, e.g. their shared colonial experience, and their ‘they-group’ ones, e.g. the communist threats during the Cold War, China’s rise and the West’s promotion of liberal values.

As a way of concluding, this chapter compare ASEAN’s normative foundation with the EU’s one examined in the last chapter. Such a comparison enables the thesis to illustrate the differences between ASEAN’s norms and the EU’s, the reasons behind their normative differences, and most importantly, the impact of their normative divergences on their interaction, which will be the focus of its subsequent chapters. By doing so, three important points can be drawn here.
First, while norms play an integral part in the internal and external relations of the EU and ASEAN, the key normative premises that constitute them as actors in world politics fundamentally differ from each other. The EU espouses a set of liberal and cosmopolitan values, e.g. human rights and democracy. These values, which lie at the heart of the EU, define its international identity and role. In fact, promoting those values has been a key objective of its foreign policy, its interregionalism and its relations with ASEAN since the end of the Cold War. Furthermore, given its strong focus on the promotion of its normative framework, the EU is even willing to interfere, to varying degrees, in others’ domestic politics (bold for emphasis). In contrast, ASEAN is premised on a set of communitarian/Westphalian norms, e.g. national sovereign and non-interference. Indeed, in its regional and international relations, ASEAN has fervently maintained and promoted its ASEAN way and notably its core principle of non-interference, which strongly discourages any external interference in its internal affairs, in any form or manifestation (bold for emphasis). This means their respective standardised ways of regulating activities and perceiving the world are radically different from each other.

Second, the defining factor that led the EU and ASEAN differ to develop and promote two contradictory sets of norms is that they were born and evolved in two contrasting historical, cultural and geopolitical contexts.115 In other words, the ‘we-group’ and ‘they-group’ factors and actors that define their respective collective identity and their normative underpinnings differ. In fact, with the exception that they were born and developed in the context of the Cold War and that they both faced communist threats until the end of the collapse of the Soviet bloc, the contexts, in which the two organisations were established and developed, were essentially different. The officials and experts the author interviewed all strongly highlighted that fundamental difference. For instance, according to an EU official, the EU and ASEAN have different ways of perceiving a number of issues

“because their ideological starting point is very different. As ASEAN countries acquired sovereignty only 50 years ago, they emphasise the traditional attributes of national sovereignty and independence. In contrast, as European countries have sovereignty for centuries, it is much easier to pool and delegate sovereignty” (Interview, 2009).

115 It is for this reason that the EU and ASEAN followed “two different and contradictory models” of regionalism (Neves 2004: 16-7).
This second point illustrates well that, like other actors in world politics, the EU, ASEAN and their respective norms are always shaped by their own context-specific conditions. It is also for this reason that, as underlined in the previous chapters, this study strongly focuses on the temporal and spatial backgrounds of the EU and ASEAN to explain and illustrate their normative foundation and differentiation.

Finally, as illustrated in the preceding chapters and this one, both the EU and ASEAN are norm entrepreneurs and normative powers in world politics. As seen in Chapter 4 different actors in the EU, e.g. its Commission and Parliament, engage in norm entrepreneurship. In contrast, as shown in this chapter, the key norm entrepreneurs in ASEAN are its member states because the Bangkok Declaration, the TAC and the ASEAN Charter were agreed at ASEAN’s ministerial meetings and summits. Chapter 4 has also shown that the EU promoted its norms to former communist CEE countries, which willingly accepted the EU’s norms. Thanks to this, the EU’s relations with these CEE countries did not experience any normative clash or division. This chapter has highlighted that ASEAN also sought to disseminate its norms in the Asia-Pacific region and many regional powers, e.g. China and India, embraced ASEAN’s normative preferences because ASEAN’s core norms are similar to those of these regional powers. That recognition is reflected by the fact that they admitted to ASEAN’s TAC and accepted the ASEAN way as the mode of function for the wider regional mechanisms, e.g. the ADMM-Plus and the EAS, of which they are also members. Given this, there was no major normative conflict between ASEAN and its regional partners. However, as illustrated by the EU’s relations with Turkey, when their norms differ with other countries or regional organisations, they will find it difficult to interact with the latter. Indeed, such normative differences can become a source of conflict. The next chapter, which examines the East Timor issue, will further illustrate the normative dissimilarities of the EU and ASEAN, the sources of their normative divergences, and especially the reasons why such divergences become a disruptive factor in their interaction.

6. The East Timor issue in EU-ASEAN relations

Chapter 3 has already mentioned that in the 1990s, the EU and ASEAN neither sustained the same harmonious political dialogue they had enjoyed in the 1970s and 1980s nor reached a new far-reaching cooperation framework they had desired and planned since the late 1980s. It has also explained that a major reason for these failures was the emergence of contentious issues in their relationship. One of these was the issue
of East Timor. This chapter will elaborate extensively the involvement of the East Timor question in EU-ASEAN relations to explain why it became a divisive and disruptive factor in EU-ASEAN cooperation in the 1990s. By doing so, it will test and illustrate the (3a), (3b), (3c), (3e) and (3f) hypotheses, which have been formulated at the end of Chapter 2. It also illustrates the (1) and (2) propositions, which are two of the central arguments maintained by the thesis and which have already been examined in-depth in the two preceding chapters.

To do so, the chapter begins by providing a description of why the East Timor question turned from a non-issue in their relationship in the 1970s and 1980s into a key issue – and indeed a major obstacle – in EU-ASEAN links in the 1990s. This section is quite descriptive. Yet, it is very important because it enables the second section of the chapter to explain adequately why many changes at the global and regional levels brought about by the end of the Cold War led to the emergence of the norm-based policy in EU-ASEAN relations, which was totally absent in their interaction in the 1970s and the 1980s. Moreover, it allows the chapter to illustrate why the involvement of their respective norms into their relations hindered their cooperation in the 1990s. In other words, based on the first, the second section of the chapter gives an-depth elucidation of the reasons for what their normative differences became a major hindrance in their cooperation in the 1990s.

6.1. From a non-issue to a major obstacle


East Timor, also known as Timor-Leste, was a colonial outpost for the Portuguese, who arrived in the early 16th century and kept the territory until 1974, when Portugal acknowledged the territory’s right to self-determination (Dunn 1995; 59; 2003 13; Jardine 2000: 49). However, a civil war broke out between those favouring

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116 There were a great number of accounts on the East Timor issue, e.g. East Timor’s invasion and occupation by Indonesia, the international reactions to Indonesia’s actions and the role of the UN in East Timor. These include Jolliffe (1978), Ramos-Horta (1987), Taylor (1990; 1991), Roff (1992), Turner (1992), Defert (1992), Carey and Bentley (1995), Dunn (1995; 2003), Inbaraj (1995), Jardine (1995; 1998; 2000), Gunn (1997; 2011), Hainsworth (1997), Fox and Soares (2000), Hainsworth and McCloskey (2000), Ward and Carey (2000); Chawla (2001), Smith (1999; 2001), Martin (2001), Smith and Dee (2003), Nevins (2005). Yet, the involvement of East Timor in EU-ASEAN relations was only referred to, or examined to some extent, in some works on EU-ASEAN cooperation, e.g. Robles (2004b). In other words, there is not a major work on why the issue fed into and impacted upon EU-ASEAN cooperation in the 1990s.

117 Japanese briefly occupied the territory from 1942 to 1945. After the WWII, Portuguese control was reinstated.
independence and those wishing integration with Indonesia. The Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (Fretilin), a left wing and pro-independent movement, managed to control the territory and on 28 November, it declared the independence of the territory (Singh 1999: 499; Smith 2001: 28). Nevertheless, East Timor’s independence did not last long as Indonesia invaded it on 7 December 1975 and formally annexed the territory as its 27th province on 2 June 1976 (Taylor 1990; Singh 1999: 499; McCloskey 2000: 5). Indonesia occupied it until 30 November 1999 when an UN-supported referendum was held and East Timorese voted for independence (Gilson 2002b: 126).

Indonesia’s invasion of East Timor was perceived differently by the international community. The UN never recognised East Timor as a part of Indonesia (Chawla 2001: 2292) and continued to regard Portugal as the administering power in East Timor after Indonesia’s annexation (The Economist, 1994). The UN General Assembly and Security Council passed ten resolutions between 1975 and 1982, deploring Indonesia’s invasion, calling it to withdraw its troops and supporting East Timor’s right to self-determination (Singh 1999: 499; Jardine 2000: 48). Among those that strongly supported East Timor were newly independent former Portuguese colonies in Africa. Most Latin American countries and all communist states but Yugoslavia also sided with it (Dunn 2003: 317). By contrast, Western countries either voted ‘no’ on the annual resolutions condemning Indonesia or abstained from the voting (Jardine 2000: 51; Nevins 2005: 72). The reason behind Western countries’ posture was that the event took place at the height of the Cold War, especially in the wake of the April 1975 Communist victory in Vietnam. The fear that an independent East Timor under the Fretilin could become another haven for communist subversion in Southeast Asia prompted Western countries to lend tacit support to Indonesia (McCloskey 2000: 4; Dunn 2003: 306; Nevins 2005: 51).

Like other Western countries, the EC and its members did not condemn Indonesia’s assault. In fact, until 1986, all of its members, with the exception of Ireland, abstained from votes on East Timor within the UN General Assembly. There were a number of reasons for their abstention. One of these was that Indonesia’s invasion took place in the Cold War context. The EC feared that East Timor would fall victim to forces of the far left following the fall of South Vietnam in 1975. Furthermore, until Portugal’s 1986 accession, no country within the EU championed for East Timor’s

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118 Ireland changed its vote to support East Timor in the November 1982 UN General Assembly resolution.
cause. Indonesia was also a major economic partner of many European countries. Consequently, they allowed economic interests to override concerns about human rights abuses in East Timor. Finally, until the end of the Cold War, human rights were a low-key issue in the EC’s external relations. In fact, while human rights promotion was an issue of the EC’s foreign policy cooperation almost right from the start, during the first two decades of its European Political Cooperation (EPC), human rights were promoted primarily through declaratory diplomacy with minimal impact (Simma et al. 1999: 575; Smith 2003: 101). Moreover, in its relations with Third World countries, the EC and its members maintained a neutral posture vis-à-vis the human rights records of these countries (Smith 2003: 103). Because of these factors, the EC ignored the human rights issue in Southeast Asia and human rights violations in East Timor (Harris and Bridges 1983: 47). Its position changed slightly following its admission of Portugal in 1986 because once this country became a member, it raised the East Timor issue within the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers, and pressed the EC to reconsider its posture. By mid-1980s, the European Parliament began to raise the human rights issue in the world and pressed the European Commission to link EC aid with conditions of human rights protection. Given this criticism from the European Parliament, the EC’s human rights policy began to change slightly in the second half of the 1980s (Smith 2003: 105). For instance, in the European Parliament, Portuguese members of the various parties joined all the main party groups and called them for supporting their position on East Timor (Ward and Carey 2001: 54). Nevertheless, the concerns about human rights abuses in Southeast Asia and East Timor raised by the European Parliament never featured in the agenda of EC-ASEAN meetings (Snitwongse 1989: 256). In other words, until the early 1990s, East Timor remained a non-issue in the EC’s relations with ASEAN.

Concerning ASEAN, it ignored completely Indonesia’s invasion and occupation of East Timor even though the conflict took place in its region and there were reports about worst human rights violations (Inbaraj 1995: 7; Singh 1999: 500; Dupont 2000: 163; Dunn 2003: 305). For instance, at their ninth meeting on 24-26 June 1976 in Manila, ASEAN Foreign Ministers only “heard with appreciation the explanation given by the Foreign Minister of Indonesia on the question of East Timor” (AMM 1976, point 23), without commenting on, let alone condemning, Indonesia’s actions. The Joint Communiqué of the first ASEAN Heads of Government/State on 23-24 February 1976 in Bali did not mention Aceh at all (ASEAN Summit 1976). ASEAN members even
supported Indonesia’s posture and this was reflected by their voting against the UN resolutions criticising this country’s invasion of East Timor (Villegas 1996b; Henderson 1999: 21). Only Singapore abstained in the UN resolutions condemning Indonesia’s occupation in 1975 and 1976. Its abstention was consistent with its voting record at the UN General Assembly because as a newly independent country, Singapore always voted against intervention by bigger powers. However, though abstaining from the votes in those two years, it did not publicly criticise Indonesia’s invasion and annexation of East Timor. By 1977, it chose to vote against UN resolutions condemning Indonesia (Ortuoste 2011: 9). After that, Indonesia was never again troubled by any ASEAN member over its actions in East Timor (Inbaraj 1995: 51) because all ASEAN members consistently voted against the UN resolutions condemning Indonesia’s occupation (Dunn 2003: 318). One of the key reasons for their staunch support of Indonesia’s actions (Inbaraj 1995: 10; Dunn 2003: 305; Ortuoste 2011: 8) was that they considered East Timor as Indonesia’s internal matter. Consequently, ASEAN as a whole and its members restrained from interfering into Indonesia’s domestic politics. As will be shown, given their commitment to this principle, ASEAN continued to be silent over the issue until the late 1990s despite the international outcry. Besides their commitment to their core principle of non-interference into a member state’s internal affair, they also wanted to show their solidarity with Indonesia, which was ASEAN’s most powerful member. Moreover, given their strong anti-communist character, they feared that East Timor could become a communist country, which could destabilise Indonesia and the region as a whole. Because of these reasons, at their first summit in 1976, when they issued two key documents, namely the TAC and the ASEAN Concord I that have already mentioned, they completely ignored Indonesia’s invasion of East Timor.

The overview of the posture of the EC and ASEAN vis-à-vis Indonesia’s invasion of East Timor shows that until the early 1990s, East Timor was absent in the EC’s external relations and its interaction with ASEAN. With the exception of Portugal’s refusal to participate in the EC-ASEAN meetings during its first year of its membership in 1986,119 the question was never raised in the meetings between the two organisations, e.g. the AEMMs. The matter was excluded from the EC-ASEAN relationship because Indonesia’s invasion and occupation of East Timor took place in a period when international affairs were predominantly defined by Cold War politics, divisions and

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119 Portugal regarded this boycott as a way to force the East Timor issue into the EU’s internal and external affairs (Taylor 1999: 173; Ward and Carey 2011: 52).
loyalties. As explained in Chapter 3, the anti-communist character of the EC and ASEAN and their concerns about communist threats bound them together in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s. Seen in this context, the idea that East Timor could become a communist country compounded their apprehension, prompting them to be on Indonesia’s side. This point illustrates well the argument that sharing the same identity, e.g. the anti-communist character, can enhance the interaction between actors, e.g. the EC and ASEAN. Indeed, until the late 1980s the EC and ASEAN were on the same ‘we-group’, i.e. the anti-communist and Western capitalist bloc. Thanks to this overriding common posture, their differences were diminished, resulting in preventing any major disagreement in their interaction. It is also a good example to demonstrate that the external environment, e.g. the Cold War setting, plays a key role in defining political actors’ identities and their relations. Due to the geopolitical overplay of the Cold War confrontation, the EC and its members put political interests and security concerns over moral principles and human rights in its dealings with ASEAN and the East Timor issue. In other words, the valued-based policy was not a prominent part of the EC’s external relations. It is for this reason that until the late 1980s, issues such as human rights and democracy, remained totally absent in the EC’s ties with ASEAN. For ASEAN members, their commitment to the principles of national sovereignty and non-interference was another important reason behind their staunch support of Indonesia’s actions. While the EC members abstained from the UN resolutions condemning Indonesia’s invasion of East Timor, ASEAN members voted against them because they regarded East Timor as a purely internal matter of Indonesia.


From what has been examined, due to different reasons, until the late 1980s, despite being discussed at the UN and raised by rights groups over common and huge abuses of human rights by Indonesia since 1975,\(^{120}\) East Timor aroused very little attention from Western countries, including the EC and its members (Martin 2001: 7). However, by the early 1990s, Western perceptions of the Indonesian rule in East Timor began to change. As noted in Chapter 3, a key event that contributed to this shift was the Dili massacre in 1991. This dramatic occurrence raised the international awareness of

\(^{120}\) According to a report of Amnesty International in 1994, about 200,000 people were killed or died of starvation or disease after Indonesia’s invasion (Amnesty International 1994: 5).
human rights abuses in this territory and led many Western countries to criticise and condemn Indonesia’s actions (Defert 1993: 120; Ishizuka 2004: 271). Following the incident, several Western countries, e.g. Canada and the US, decided to suspend aid to Indonesia (Inbaraj 1995: 103; Robles 2004b: 155). There were two major factors behind the West’s radical change of attitude vis-à-vis the East Timor issue after the Dili massacre. First, unlike previous atrocities, which had been relatively unknown to the outside world, the Dili massacre was captured on film by a British journalist Max Stahl and then shown by many television stations in many countries (Gunn 2011: 74). This film helped expose human rights abuses in East Timor and transformed East Timor from a relatively ignored issue to a major international news story (Inbaraj 1995: 88; O'Shaughnessy 2000: 36). Second, as they were no longer constrained by the strategic imperatives of the Cold War, democratic Western countries now felt free to advance the global agenda for human rights. Consequently, they began paying attention to human rights violations in countries and territories, such as East Timor (Amnesty International 1994: 8). In fact, having overlooked human rights violations by Indonesia during the Cold War, they now took human rights seriously because these issues became important in their foreign policies (Suryadinata 2000b: 56-7). Among those who were critical of Jakarta were the EU and its members. In fact, as will be illustrated in more detail in this chapter and the next one, the winding down of the Cold War was the defining reason behind the disagreements between the EU and ASEAN over human rights issue and East Timor. It played a key role in bringing the issue of East Timor into EU-ASEAN relations, which eventually hindered their cooperation because by the early 1990s, the posture of the EU and ASEAN vis-à-vis the issue became radically different from each other.

The EU and ASEAN: Two opposing normative postures

While the EC had already taken notice of the East Timor issue and discussed it in the late 1980s, it was the Dili massacre that led it to issue its first statement of outright condemnation of Indonesia (Ward 2000: 155). At their informal meeting on 13 November 1991, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the EC issued a declaration on East Timor. In this declaration, they stated that the EC and its member states “are greatly concerned at reports that members of the Indonesian armed forces in Dili opened fire on a group of demonstrators on 12 November, killing and wounding a considerable number”. They also “vehemently condemn such violence, which is in clear contravention of the most fundamental human rights” (European Council 1991c). Later,
at their meeting on 3 December 1991, they reiterated “their condemnation of these unjustifiable actions by the armed forces of Indonesia” (European Council 1991d). Furthermore, they stressed once again the paramount importance they attached to the full respect of human rights as expressed in particular in the two key documents of the European Council issued earlier in 1991 and referred to in Chapter 4, namely Declaration on Human Rights (European Council 1991a) and Resolution on Human Rights, Democracy and Development. As referred to in Chapter 4, the latter clearly stated that “respecting, promoting and safeguarding human rights is an essential part of international relations and one of the cornerstones of European cooperation as well as of relations between the Community and its Member States and other countries” (European Council 1991b). On 13 February 1992, the EU issued another statement on East Timor. In this, while viewing favourably the Indonesian government’s positive responses to the massacre and expressing the hope that these developments “will be followed by concrete and effective steps to improve significantly the human rights situation in East Timor, the Community and its member states remain concerned about other aspects” in this territory (European Council 1992). This point demonstrates that by the early 1990s, human rights became prominent in the EU’s foreign policy. It also illustrates that, as explained in Chapter 2, international norms, e.g. the respect and protection of human rights, only come into existence if, first and foremost, there are agents who call attention to issues, e.g. the violation of human rights in East Timor, by using language that names, interprets, and dramatises them (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 897). In this case, the European Council played a key role in calling for the protection of human rights in East Timor. In fact, as noted in Chapter 3 and will be further developed in this chapter, by the early 1990s, the EU, its key institutions and member states, acted as key human right norm entrepreneurs.

To raise its concern about human rights abuses in East Timor, in January 1992, under the presidency of Portugal, the EU submitted a resolution to the UN Human Rights Commission criticising Indonesia for its conducts in East Timor. This resolution was not passed that year. However, a new one was presented and adopted in March 1993. In this resolution, the 12 EU members expressed their preoccupation about severe and continuing human rights violations in East Timor (Inbaraj 1995: 116). In this case, Portugal and other member states of the EU played a key role in calling for the protection of human rights in East Timor. The European Parliament, which had already been critical of Indonesia’s actions, even urged the 12 EU members and the UN to
impose an arm embargo on Indonesia and to consider limiting or suspending aid and cooperation agreements with it (Wise 1991). Later, the chapter will examine in-depth why East Timor and human rights now became a major issue for the EU and its member states. The point made here is that having largely ignored the matter in the 1970s and the 1980s, in the early 1990s, the EU and its members seriously took the East Timor issue and strongly linked this matter to its human rights agenda. Put differently, unlike in the 1970s and 1980s, when its relations with ASEAN were dominated by commercial interests and security concerns, the EU now genuinely focused on the normative principles, e.g. human rights and democracy, that defined its identity and its role in the world. The European Parliament and particularly Portugal, as will be shown, played a salient role in the EU’s policy change vis-à-vis East Timor.

While the EU as a whole and its different institutions and member states condemned the Dili Massacre and sought to raise this issue at multilateral fora, e.g. UN Human Rights Commission, ASEAN and its individual members remained virtually silent over it (Inbaraj 1995: 179; Rocher 2006: 235). ASEAN’s dialogue partners criticised the Association for condoning Indonesia’s actions and pressed it to act. Yet, again, it was unmoved by these criticisms and demands, choosing to follow its core principle of non-interference (Ortuoste 2011: 11). For instance, the Joint Communiqué of the 25th meeting of the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) in July 1992 in Manila, which took place after the Dili massacre, did not mention the incident. At the individual level, ASEAN members also avoided the issue. This is explained by the muted posture of official media reactions in ASEAN countries to the massacre (Inbaraj 1995: 90). ASEAN members even curbed dissent in their countries to Indonesia’s advantage (Singh 1999: 500; Ortuoste 2011: 12). For instance, in the early 1990s, some opposition parties and NGOs, notably the Asia-Pacific Conference on East Timor (APCET), took advantage of the relatively political openness in three ASEAN countries, namely Philippines, Thailand and Malaysia, to criticise Indonesia’s actions in East Timor. Yet, their governments tried to stop those criticisms. In the aftermath of the Dili massacre, Malaysia’s opposition attempted to raise the East Timor issue in the Malaysian parliament, however, they were told that the country did not want to interfere into other members’ internal affairs (Inbaraj 1995: 92). In September 1992, Malaysia’s Information Minister had to go to Indonesia to apologise after Malaysia’s state-run radio and TV had aired an unedited footage of the Dili massacre. He explained that it was a mistake and assured Indonesia that the mistake would not happen again (Inbaraj
Philippine President Ramos banned foreigners, including France’s former first lady Danielle Mitterrand, from participating in an APCET meeting in Manila in 1994. At the occasion of the 27th AMM in Bangkok in 1994, a human rights conference was held. However, the Thai government blacklisted 11 Timorese seeking to attend it and deported three foreigners associated with a Timorese leader (Singh 1999: 500).

The EU and ASEAN not only viewed and approached the Dili massacre differently. Their postures vis-à-vis the East Timor issue as a whole continued to diverge in the years afterwards. In Europe, the Dili massacre and East Timor in general were widely reported and had a profound impact on public opinion. In 1996, the Nobel Peace Prize was given to the Archbishop of Timor, Carlos Félipê Belo and José Ramos-Horta, East Timor’s then overseas representative and its current President. Three years later, the European Parliament awarded the Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought to Xamana Gussamao, East Timor’s independence leader. These prizes made the East Timor issue highly prominent on the European political agenda (Camroux 2010: 19). Of these two, the latter was of great significance because it was an esteemed prize given by the European Parliament to an independence leader of East Timor. Furthermore, the European Parliament repeatedly called on Indonesia to end its oppression (Piening 1997: 148). Therefore, even though they recognised that they needed to establish closer economic relations with ASEAN as noted in Chapter 3, the EU and its institutions did not ignore the human rights situation in Southeast Asia because the promotion of those liberal values now became an integral part in its foreign policy (European Commission 1994). That is why the EU insisted on the human rights issue in its relations with ASEAN (European Report, 1996a; 1996c). Within this context, the East Timor issue was always present in the EU’s affairs and this was reflected by the publication of its Common Position on East Timor on 25 June 1996. By adopting this position, which was aimed at improving “the situation in East Timor regarding respect for human rights in the territory” (European Council 1996), the EU asserted that East Timor was no longer a national (i.e. Indonesia) and regional (i.e. ASEAN) issue; it was a matter of international concern (Ward and Carrey 2001: 59). It also expressed support for the talks, which were taking place under the aegis of the UN and urged Indonesia to take effective measures to improve the human rights situation in East Timor (European Council 1996). Yet, though what the EU suggested in its Common Position was regarded as relatively muted criticisms because it did not raise East Timor’s self-
determination nor regarded Indonesia’s occupation as illegal, the EU’s Common Position drew a sharp reaction from Indonesia and ASEAN. Indonesia denounced it as tantamount to a declaration to war whereas ASEAN considered whether the EU should continue to participate in the ARF (King 1999: 333; Robles 2004b: 157).\textsuperscript{121}

Such reactions of Indonesia and ASEAN towards the EU’s Common Position clearly illustrate that ASEAN perceived and approached the East Timor issue divergently from the EU. Indeed, as they were strongly committed to their principle of non-interference, ASEAN as a whole and its individual members completely closed their eyes to the issue until the late 1990s (Hayes 2000; Sebastian and Smith 2000; McDougall 2001; Narine 2005; Rocher 2006). As a former ASEAN’s General-Secretary comments, for ASEAN states, until the end of the Suharto era,\textsuperscript{122} East Timor was an internal matter (Interview, 2009). They even determinedly backed Indonesia’s rule in East Timor to the very end despite the international outcry in the 1990s (Weatherbee and Emmers 2005: 235). It was also believed that some ASEAN members, e.g. Malaysia, tried to block Western efforts to launch a humanitarian intervention in East Timor (Dupont 2000: 165; McDougall 2001: 176; Eldon 2004: 554).

For Jones (2010: 492), by the late 1990s, some ASEAN members, e.g. Malaysia, voiced their concern about the East Timor situation and stated that the referendum outcome must be respected, not overturned. Judging by this, he maintains that ASEAN states did not unanimously respect the principle of non-interference as it was commonly assumed. As underlined in Chapter 2 and will be shown below, this thesis acknowledges that, like in the case of the EU, e.g. the relatively different postures of Portugal and other EU members vis-à-vis the East Timor issue, there are inherent tensions in the processes of norm creation and maintenance within ASEAN. Yet, it is clear that in its official and common posture vis-à-vis the East Timor issue, ASEAN as a whole was silent. With the exception of the call for a cessation of violence by a few ASEAN countries, e.g. Thailand, Singapore and Malaysia, when the situation in this territory had

\textsuperscript{121} ASEAN Foreign Ministers also made clear that the first Asia-Europe summit, which will be examined in the next chapter, that ‘sensitive, controversial and irrelevant issues’ should be avoided and Indonesia’s Foreign Minister sought to extract a guarantee that the East Timor issue would not be raised (King 1999: 333).

\textsuperscript{122} The fall of President Suharto in May 1998 opened the way for significant progress on the diplomatic front because unlike his successor, President Habibie was more willing to find a solution to the conflict. He first agreed offer East Timor a wide-ranging autonomy, however, under the demand of pro-independence movement and pressure of the international community, he eventually agreed to hold a referendum to allow East Timorese to self-determine. This paved the way for the referendum on 30 August 1999 (Martin and Mayer-Rieckh 2005).
become worse by 1999, ASEAN states were virtually unresponsive. Collectively, the East Timor crisis “was never part of ASEAN’s discourse” (Weatherbee and Emmer 2005: 235). For instance, despite the dire situation, caused by several weeks of widespread killing and destructions organised by Indonesian army and pro-Indonesian militias after the referendum in August 1999 (Martin 2001: 94-7; Martin and Mayer-Rieckh 2005: 125), ASEAN did not mention the issue in its summit or the ASEAN Plus Three summit held three months later (ASEAN Summit 1999). It also resisted Canada’s attempt to convene a special meeting on East Timor during the APEC meeting in September 1999, insisting that APEC should focus on its trade agenda (Ortuoste 2011: 12). This clearly shows that unlike the EU, ASEAN and its members were unresponsive to the East Timor crisis, regarding it as a purely internal affair of Indonesia.

In short, it is evident that the EU and ASEAN had opposing postures vis-à-vis Dili massacre and the East Timor issue as a whole. While the EU was concerned about the problem, criticising Indonesia’s actions and calling for the respect of human rights as well as the peaceful solution to the conflict, ASEAN ignored the matter, with some of its members even lending their strong support to Indonesia’s actions. As will be developed later, the reason behind their contrasting positions towards East Timor was that by the early 1990s, the EU and ASEAN became radically different in terms of their normative underpinnings. The EU insisted on the protection and promotion of human rights to the point of being willing to interfere into others’ internal affairs to make sure that its cherished values were respected. In contrast, ASEAN was inclined to safeguard and promote the principle of non-interference at the cost of ignoring human rights and even the gross violations of these norms by Indonesia in East Timor.

**The impact of their normative differences on their cooperation**

The normative differences between the EU and ASEAN led to a period of uneasy relations between the two organisations, especially at the political level. For instance, the East Timor matter almost led to the failure of the 10th AEMM in Manila in 1992 because at the insistence of Portugal, the EU expressed its desire that the issue be explicitly referred to in the Joint Declaration. However, ASEAN strongly objected to it as it maintained that East Timor was an Indonesia-Portugal matter and should not be mentioned (Balaoing 1997: 24; Ortuoste 2011: 11). Though, due to ASEAN’s instance, the official Joint Declaration did not mention the East Timor issue (AEMM 1992), it revealed the tensions in EU-ASEAN relations. The East Timor issue was even seen as the origin of a crisis in the EU-ASEAN relationship because it eventually impeded the
attempts of the two organisations to enhance their ties and their economic cooperation in particular in the early 1990s (Inbaraj 1995: 106; Gupwell 2003: 64; Smith 2003: 78). On the ASEAN side, despite Indonesia’s human rights violations in East Timor, its members continued to support Indonesia and maintain their core principle of non-interference even though they knew that such a stance would delay or block any joint projects with the EU (Ortuoste 2011: 11). In contrast, following the Dili event, Portugal tried to raise the issue. More critically, it sought to stop the EU’s plan to negotiate a new cooperation agreement with ASEAN because of what its Foreign Minister Joao de Deus Pinheiro condemned as Indonesia’s “unacceptable violation of human rights” in East Timor (quoted by Islam 1992: 9). Because of this, at a meeting of the EU’s General Affairs Council in July 1992, Portugal vetoed an agreement to authorise the European Commission to begin negotiations with ASEAN on the new agreement (Desker 2002; Gupwell 2003: 65). That veto effectively killed a new cooperation pact between the two organisations when they just began to negotiate it (Tay and Goh 1999: 46).

The disagreements between the EU and ASEAN over human rights and the East Timor issue continued to damage their cooperation throughout the 1990s. This is despite the fact that privately Portugal’s veto was not always supported by some EU members and the European Commission,123 who really wanted to establish a wide-ranging cooperation agreement with ASEAN (Islam 1992: 9) and to strengthen their relations with Asia in general from the early to the mid-1990s. For instance, in early 1993 Germany’s Chancellor Helmut Kohl made his first visit to Asia and following this trip, Germany issued its Concept of Asia, which urged the political and business community to take into account Asia’s excellent prospects in the 21st century (Gaens 2008c: 15). Based on this paper, the European Commission issued Towards a New Asia Strategy (NAS), in July 1994, which called the EU to enhance its relations with Asia. French President Jacques Chirac also visited Singapore in February 1996 during which he also stressed the need for the EU to strengthen relations with Asia (Chirac 1996).124 Nevertheless, despite the significant efforts by both sides to enhance their economic cooperation and the fact that some EU members, e.g. the UK, continued their business with Indonesia as usual (Robles 2004a: 156), until the late 1990s, East Timor remained

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123 As noted earlier, this point also illustrates that there were tensions in the processes of norm creation and diffusion within the EU. However, in this case, Portugal’s stance prevailed because other EU members did not want to have open confrontation within the EU (Bridges 1999: 172).

124 These efforts and desires eventually paved the way for the establishment of ASEM, which will be further examined in Chapter 7.
a divisive and destructive matter in EU-ASEAN relations. It significantly reduced their appetite for cooperation. For example, in the 11 years following their failure to negotiate a new cooperation framework in 1992, only four AEMMs were convened whereas in the eleven years from 1981 to 1992, eight meetings were held (see Appendix 7). While, as will be shown in the next chapter, the Myanmar problem also contributed to this lack of interaction and cooperation between the two organisations, it was undoubted that the East Timor matter played a key role in holding back their relations. Furthermore, the question of whether it should be raised in their meetings, e.g. the AEMMs, or should be mentioned in the final declarations of those meetings, was a point of disagreement. For instance, at the 12th AEMM in Singapore in February 1997, Indonesia threatened not to attend the meeting if East Timor was on the agenda (Lim 1999: 16). As a compromise, it was not formally raised at this meeting but only briefly referred to in the opening speech by the head of the European delegation. However, both sides were aware of its shadow (Bridges 1999: 172). Its continued presence in the EU-ASEAN interaction was the main reason why the 11th and the 12th AEMMs, held in Karlsruhe (Germany) and Singapore in 1994 and 1997 respectively, they were unable to make any progress regarding the negotiations of the new cooperation agreement (Piening 1997: 148; Bridges 1999: 172; Hill and Smith 2000: 437). At a conference on EU-ASEAN relations in 2004, Pierre Amilhat, then Head of Unit, Directorate Asia and South East Asia, European Commission, spoke of the need to renew the 1980 Cooperation Agreement in the 1990s. However, according to him, talks on the agreement had stalled because of East Timor (European Policy Centre, 2004). Balaoing (1997: 24) also maintains that the issue was a persistent thorn in their relations and “the principal, if not the only, obstacle to the negotiation of a new Cooperation Agreement” between the two organisations. Thus, though the East Timor issue did not completely stall EU-ASEAN cooperation in the 1990s as both sides tried to cultivate other channels to maintain their relationship in a period when they desired to enhance their economic cooperation, it was definitely an obstructive factor in their ties. In other words, their divergent views and approaches vis-à-vis the East Timor issue negatively affected their

125 For instance, with the aim of providing information to European and Southeast Asian firms on trade, infrastructure, costs, regulation and standards, the first European Business Information Centre was established in Manila in 1993, followed by others in other ASEAN countries, e.g. Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore. More significantly, the establishment of ASEM was seen as an effort to enhance not only EU-ASEAN relations but also the EU’s interaction with Asia as a whole.
links because it hampered their enthusiasm and efforts to strengthen their relationship in those years.

Yet, it is worth noting that while East Timor was a defining factor, it was not the only reason that hindered EU-ASEAN relations in the 1990s. As already highlighted in Chapter 3, it can be said that the fundamental cause of their conflict-laden interaction and their failure to agree a new cooperation framework was the radical shift in the EU’s foreign policy, which now strongly focused on human rights and democracy in its relations with third countries (Balfour 2006: 15). In fact, Portugal’s veto coincided with the EU’s efforts to establish a political dialogue with ASEAN that covered human rights (Robles 2004b: 156). In other words, when the Union and Association realised that they needed to enhance their cooperation, the former also began to insist on the respect of human rights and sought to link it to aid assistance and economic cooperation (Europa Press Releases 1992). More precisely, having already successfully incorporated the ‘human rights clause’ in its economic cooperation agreements with African and Latin American countries in 1989 and 1990, the EU now wanted to include the respect for human rights and democratic values as the basis for its new cooperation agreement with ASEAN (Manea 2008: 376). For instance, during his intervention in the European Parliament’s debate on economic and trade relations between the EU and ASEAN on 10 April 1992, European Commissioner Abel Matutes acknowledged that “preparations are under way to re-negotiate the 1980 cooperation agreement taking into account both changes in Europe and in the ASEAN region” (Europa Press Releases 1992). However, he also stated that the Commission “is in agreement with the Parliament’s view point that greater emphasis should be put on the protection of the environment and on the respect of human rights” (Europa Press Releases 1992). Such an insistence on the respect of human rights and on the inclusion of the human rights clause in the new agreement the EU intended to negotiate with ASEAN irritated ASEAN’s officials because they considered it as “Western attempts to impose foreign values on Asia” (Islam 1991: 9). At their meeting in July 1992 in Manila, Philippines, ASEAN Foreign Ministers made clear that they did not accept the conditionalities included in economic and development cooperation (AMM 1992, point 18). These disagreements over human rights between the EU and ASEAN created an unfriendly mood in their interregional
interaction in the 1990s. Against this background, the East Timor problem simply compounded the already existing tensions between the two organisations.

In short, having been absent from the EC-ASEAN linkage in the 1970s and much throughout the 1980s, the East Timor issue heavily got involved into and negatively impacted upon their interaction in the 1990s. Indeed, it contributed to an acrimonious atmosphere in their relations and was the fundamental factor that led to their failure to negotiate a new and far-reaching cooperation agreement. A deep-rooted reason behind its unconstructive involvement in EU-ASEAN cooperation during that period was the emergence of the value-based policy, which had been absent, in their correlations. Specifically, the East Timor issue became a divisive and obstructive factor in their relationship because the EU began strongly to focus on its core values of human rights and democracy, considering the respect of those democratic values as a condition of cooperation. In contrast, ASEAN emphasised its prime principles of non-interference and national sovereignty and resisted to the EU’s position on the human rights issue and the East Timor matter. In other words, in the 1990s, the EU and ASEAN emerged as two different regional organisations whose normative nature differed. Given this normative difference, not only did they disconnect from each other but also opposed each other in terms of their normative dimensions. Consequently, their relations, which had been largely conflict-free in the 1970s and the 1980s, now became conflict-ridden. Thus, it is not their lack of actorness but rather their conflicting norms hindered their post-Cold War cooperation. As they are central to this inquiry, the next section will illustrate in-depth why their normative elements became prominent and indeed different from each other and why such normative differences led to disruptions in their interaction in the 1990s.

6.2. Reasons behind their disagreements

Chapter 2 has established a number of factors to explain the normative differences of the EU and ASEAN. These include – but are not limited to – the ecological (i.e. between actors and their environment), social (i.e. between actors) and internal (i.e. within actors) processes, their historical and cultural conditions, their perspective and the power political configuration in which they find themselves in the international system. It has also theorised three conditions to explain why the normative differences of the EU and ASEAN led them to dispute with each other over issues, such as East

126 As will be shown in the next chapter, the Myanmar problem also contributed to the tensions between the two regional organisations in the 1990s.
Timor, which consequently hindered their cooperation. Using these factors and conditions, this section will explain and demonstrate why the East Timor matter and the human rights issue in general got involved into the EU-ASEAN relationship and, eventually, hold back their cooperation in the 1990s.

6.2.1. The emergence of inherent normative differences

As explained in Chapter 3 as well as underlined in the first section of this chapter, until the early 1990s, i.e. the end of the bipolar system, the EC and ASEAN were two Western-oriented and anti-communist organisations. That prevailing shared outlook not only diminished the salience of multifaceted differences between the two organisations (Forster 1999: 750; 2000: 790). It was also an enabling factor because it facilitated their interaction. However, with the end of the Cold War, that shared bond – or the ‘we-group’ that the two organisations and their respective members felt they belonged to throughout the Cold War period – no longer existed. Consequently, their inherent normative differences began to surface. In this sense, the collapse of the communist bloc played a defining role in bringing the value-based policy in the external relations of the EU and ASEAN as well as their interregional interaction.

During the Cold War period, as earlier noted, the EC and its members did not strongly focus on the promotion of liberal cosmopolitan values, e.g. human rights and democracy, in its external relations and especially in its dialogue with ASEAN. Yet, this does not mean that the EC did not value those values. Indeed, they have always been important elements of European politics and European integration. As Pattugalan (1999: 55) highlights, human rights have been at the core of European development. An EU official also underlines that values such human rights, fundamental freedoms, democracy “became a central element in the European integration” from the beginning (Interview, 2009). Palmujoki (1997: 270) noted that besides functionalist economic model, the EC pursued its own politico-ideological model in regional cooperation, which was based on shared liberal values. In other words, for the EU those values are essential in national and international politics because not only do they give them legitimacy to govern but also because they establish the conditions for social stability and economic progress (Tay and Goh 1999: 43).

On the other hand, for Southeast Asian countries and the regionalism in ASEAN, human rights, democracy and fundamental freedoms were not essential. As explained in Chapter 5, these liberal values would be even seen as a direct threat to many regimes in
Southeast Asia because none of these countries was a liberal democracy. In fact, as an EU official aptly observes, “human rights only appeared in the ASEAN Charter in 2007” (Interview, 2009). Looking at the main documents of ASEAN, e.g. the Bangkok Declaration and the TAC, one can easily see that such liberal ideals were almost ignored. Instead, ASEAN’s organising principle since its establishment was and continues to be its ASEAN way, which includes non-interference and national sovereignty. The absence of liberal cosmopolitan norms in ASEAN and the Association’s strong attachment to its state-centric or communitarian ones was reflected by the fact that only at their 26th ministerial meeting in 1993, did ASEAN Foreign Ministers officially discuss human rights. Yet, their discussion about this issue was seen as their reaction to the World Conference on Human Rights, which took place a few months before. On this occasion, they stressed that national and regional particularities should be considered when addressing human rights. They also emphasised that the use of human rights as a conditionality for economic cooperation was detrimental to international cooperation and that the protection and promotion of human rights in the international community should take into account the principles of respect for national sovereignty and non-interference in other states’ domestic politics (AMM 1993, point 17).

The posture of ASEAN not only highlights the fundamental differences of the EU and ASEAN regarding the importance (or non-importance) of democratic principles in their internal and external relations as well as in their interaction, in which the former strongly regarded them to be essential while the latter considered them to be of little value, if not at all. It also reveals that there were other aspects relating to human rights issues that prompted a clash between the two organisations over the East Timor matter. These concern their understandings of the nature, character and role of human rights. It can be said that these differences between the EU and ASEAN were the primary reason why the former was so concerned about human rights whereas the latter was not. Actually, the debate or the clash between the two sides over the so-called Western/European values and the Asian values was related to these differences in understanding of and approach to the issue of human rights. Thus, it is worth briefly mentioning these.

Based on a communication of the European Commission (1995c: 5-6), a declaration of ASEAN members and other Asian countries on human rights, known as the Bangkok Declaration (1993), at least five points of disagreement between the EU
and ASEAN on the human rights issue could be identified (see also Hernandez 1995: 3-7). First, they had different understanding of the nature of human rights, with one believing that human rights were universal, while the other argued that each country had its own culture. The EU and its members strongly believed in the universality of human rights because individual rights and democratic principles were so deeply rooted in European political culture that they were seen as natural and universal. In contrast, the ASEAN states, like other Asian countries, stressed the cultural relativity of human rights because they argued that human rights were defined by each country’s specific set of cultural experiences. Second, they differed over the character of human rights. For the West human rights had an international character not only because they were universal but also because they were inscribed in international treaties, e.g. the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). ASEAN states, like many other Asian countries, maintained that those documents were produced by the West and, consequently, they did not reflect the reality of the newly independent countries, whose primary concern is state sovereignty. Third, they diverged over the dichotomy between individual and communitarian rights with European countries firmly emphasising the former, whereas ASEAN countries put their stress on the latter. Fourth, they disagreed over the indivisibility of human rights. The EU maintained that aspects of human rights, e.g. political and civil rights, should not be treated separately from each other. ASEAN leaders, e.g. Malaysia’s Mahathir Mohamad, argued that their people could not meaningfully enjoy those rights without a certain level of economic prosperity. Finally, they disputed over the human rights clause. While the EU argued that respect of democratic values was a condition of aid assistance and economic cooperation, ASEAN contended that such an approach, e.g. the withdrawal and withholding of aid, did not hurt the ruling elites but the ordinary people.

From what has been seen, it is also clear that though the disagreements between the EU and ASEAN over the issues of human rights were a post-Cold War artefact, some major sources of their normative divergences could be traced back to the pre-establishment of the two organisations. For the EU’s strong focus on liberal values, notably human rights, has been deeply rooted in Europe’s pre-EU cultural traditions and notably its history. Chapter 4 has examined in-depth how Europe’s war-torn and bitter past shaped European integration in general and the EU as a normative power, which is
based on and seeks to promote a set of liberal and democratic values. In this sense, the demise of the Cold War simply made the EU focus more genuinely on the defence and spread of those norms. In other words, the EU’s strong adherence to them was not something new that the EU only embraced after the end of the Cold War. They did not get involved in the EC’s external relations and its dialogue with ASEAN simply due to the predominance of Cold War politics. Similarly, as shown in Chapter 5, ASEAN’s normative principles have predominantly embedded in pre-ASEAN Southeast Asian historical background, notably the region’s colonialism, as well as other regional factors, e.g. communist threats from Vietnam and China. This also implies that ASEAN’s norms were formed right from the Association’s inception and/or reinforced during the first decades of existence. Nevertheless, as the bipolar confrontation prevailed during the Cold War, the EC and its members did not have any problems in interacting with a regional organisation that strongly upheld those state-centric principles and ignored individual-centred norms. Now, with the removal of the bipolar confrontation, the inherent normative differences of the EU and ASEAN began to appear. These made them two very divergent actors with dissimilar and even incompatible ways of perceiving their regional and international affairs in general, human rights and the East Timor matter in particular. In other words, they were now two different normative powers, with divergent norms and values. Those intrinsic normative differences were augmented by other developments within the EU and ASEAN after the end of the Cold War as will be shown in the next point.

6.2.2. The EU’s new identity and ASEAN’s newfound confidence

The perspective and the power political configuration in which the EU and ASEAN found themselves in the international system (Tocci and Manners 2008: 312-4) following the end of the Cold War was another important factor that significantly contributed to their normative differences. For the EU, the triumphant mood in the West after the fall of Berlin Wall and the wave of democratisation movements in former communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe played a key role in pushing it to

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127 For example, to justify why they greatly attach to those liberal values in its post-Cold War foreign policy, the EU and its officials often refer to Europe’s war-torn and bitter past (Forchtner and Kølvraa 2012: 387-8).

128 As noted in Chapter 3, ASEAN strongly emphasised those norms in its dealing with the Cambodia issue and to support ASEAN, the EC even stressed the need to respect those fundamental principles of international relations.
press developing countries towards democratisation (Tay and Goh 1999: 44; Rüland 2001c: 17; Yeo 2009a: 48). In other words, the strong self-belief and, to some extent, the sense of superiority that the European countries had after the collapse of communism made them more confident in seeking to export its liberal norms in Europe and globally. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the transformation of the EC into the EU also significantly enhanced the EU’s actor-ness, which inspired it to play a greater role as a political actor on the international scene. Furthermore, that transformation brought with it a new identity based on a set of liberal and democratic norms and prompted it to anchor the promotion of those values as a central objective of its foreign policy. During a meeting with ASEAN members in 1993, the European Commission’s Vice President, Manuel Marin, clearly stated that strengthening democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights and individual freedoms was one of the primary objectives of the EU’s foreign policy (Marin 1993). As shown in Chapter 4, most of the EU’s key documents on human rights and democracy were issued in the 1990s. Coupled with an enhanced actor-ness, a new mission and a triumphant mood, the collapse of the Soviet Union and its allies also meant that the EU no longer needed to court authoritarian governments in developing countries in general and authoritarian and pro-Western regimes in Southeast Asia (Smith 2003: 105). Subsequently, it sought to push for democratisation in this region by introducing a policy of conditionality (Tay and Goh 1999: 44; Yeo 2009a: 48). Because of this, the human rights issue and the East Timor matter fed into its relations with ASEAN in the 1990s. Overall, it is apt to say that the construction or self-presentation of the EU as a normative power in world politics as examined in Chapter 4 began due to the transformation within the EU and the change at the internal level following the end of the Cold War.

On the ASEAN side, it became more confident of its normative underpinnings and thereby strongly relied on them in its dealing with the EU because it also experienced internal dynamics in the 1990s. In fact, as an Asian scholar aptly points out, thanks to the impressive economic development of its members and its recognition as a successful diplomatic community after the Cambodian conflict, by the early 1990s, ASEAN and its individual members had become more assertive (Interview, 2009). Economically, in the 1980s and the 1990s, the average annual GDP growth of the ASEAN countries was much bigger than that of the EU members. With the exception of Ireland, which enjoyed high economic growth (i.e. 7.5), the average annual GDP growth of the EU members was below 2.8 % in the years 1990-1998. In contrast, with the
exception of the Philippines, the average annual GDP growth of ASEAN members was above 5.5% (see Appendix 11). Given this impressive growth, until the 1997/8 Asian financial crisis, the ASEAN region was one of the world’s fastest-growing economic regions; and such economic dynamism gave ASEAN states more confidence in dealing with regional and international affairs (European Commission 1994; Brunn and Jacobsen 2000).

At the political and diplomatic level, the self-belief and dynamism of ASEAN was also reflected in a number of proactive measures that it took to respond to the new challenges that arose in the post-Cold War era. These included the establishment of the ARF, a mechanism, which includes all major global and regional powers and deals with security and political issues in the Asia-Pacific region, and which adopted the ASEAN way as its mode of function. If the EU began to emerge as a global actor and strongly advance its liberal values of human rights and democracy in Europe and globally following the end of the Cold War, ASEAN also became an active actor in fostering cooperation as well as promoting its core Westphalian principles of sovereign and non-inference in the wider Asia-Pacific region. In fact, given such economic successes and political achievements, ASEAN and its members believed that they could manage their domestic and regional affairs in their own way. More precisely, they felt that their development model, which emphasised stability and economic growth and which favoured the community or state’s rights over the individual’s rights, was vindicated. It is for this reason that some ASEAN leaders championed the Asian values. Their development and endorsement of the Asian values, which were such a prominent and distinctive part of Southeast Asia’s identity during those boom years, not only showed that ASEAN’s normative nature became divergent from the EU’s. It also illustrated that ASEAN members sought to disconnect from the EU in terms of values and were willing to oppose what they regarded as the Western imposition of foreign values (Tay and Goh 1999: 46). Such a resistance led to tensions in its relations with the EU.

6.2.3. The EU’s insistence and ASEAN’s resistance

Indeed, the EU and ASEAN disputed over human rights and the East Timor issue not only because their normative natures became divergent from each other after the end of the Cold War. They clashed also because one group’s core norms were refused or violated by the other. From what has been examined so far, it is evident that the more the EU insisted the promotion of human rights, the firmer ASEAN was in its response to the EU’s posture. ASEAN was firmly resisted to the EU’s demand partly because, as
noted by an Asian scholar, it “had leaders such as Mahathir Mohamad, who did not want the West to impose their values on them and were not afraid to stand up against the EU” (Interview, 2009). It questioned why the EU had become so preoccupied with democracy and human rights because “these same European countries had paid scant attention to democracy or human rights to their Asian subjects during the colonial period. Much the same could have been said about the Cold War period, when Western countries supported authoritarian regimes as long as they were opposed to communism” (Gupwell 2003: 67).

As noted, ASEAN even went further and challenged the whole notion of human rights by disapproving of the UDHR as a Western document because it was formulated when many Asian/ASEAN nations did not even exist (Tay and Goh 1999: 46). This is reflected by the fact that prior to the *World Conference on Human Rights* in June 1993, ASEAN members sought to bring other Asian countries, notably China, for an intergovernmental meeting in March 1993 in Bangkok (Freeman 1996; 1999). At that meeting, they formulated a *Declaration on Human Rights*, known as the Bangkok Declaration (1993). In this declaration, while reaffirming their commitment to principles contained in the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, they emphasised their particular understanding of, and approach to, human rights (Freeman 1999: 104-5). For instance, though recognising that the universality of human rights, they stressed that human rights “must be considered in the context of a dynamic and evolving process of international norm-setting, bearing in mind the significance of national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds” (Bangkok Declaration 1993; point 8). More importantly, they emphasised the principles of respect for national sovereignty, non-interference in other states’ internal affairs, as well as the non-use of human rights as an instrument of political pressure (Bangkok Declaration 1993, points 4 and 5).

ASEAN’s effort to socialise with other Asian countries as well as its reliance to its core norms of national sovereignty and non-interference to defy the EU on the human rights issue not only showed ASEAN’s confidence in its norms to guide its external relations and its relations with the EU. It also illustrated that it succeeded in creating a broader Asian ‘we-group’ based on its preferred normative framework, which was state-focused, e.g. national sovereignty and non-interference, to distinguish it from as well as to resist a ‘they-group’, i.e. the West and the EU, which was individual-centred, e.g. human rights and fundamental freedoms. More significantly, this example clearly
demonstrated that the EU and ASEAN were now in a ‘we-group’ versus ‘they-group’ relationship, in which the EU considered, either intentionally or unintentionally, ASEAN as a violator of universal principles or inferior to it and, consequently, sought to export its liberal norms to ASEAN. In contrast, ASEAN vigorously opposed the EU, regarding its assertion on human rights as a new moralism or a neo-colonialism (Yeo 2009a: 48). That insistence versus resistance dichotomy was the fundamental reason behind their disputes over human rights and the East Timor matter, which resulted in creating a stalemate in their cooperation.

Overall, there were three related reasons why the EU and ASEAN clashed over human rights and the East Timor issue in the 1990s. The first concerns the differences of their normative natures, which became salient in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War. The EU was fundamentally premised on a set of liberal cosmopolitan or individual-centred values, e.g. human rights whereas ASEAN was founded on a set of communitarian or state-centric principles, e.g. non-interference. Second, given their own normative nature, the EU was willing to promote its norms to the point of interfering into others’ domestic politics to make sure that its preferred norms were respected. ASEAN was opposed to the EU because that posture of the EU violated the core of its normative cultural. Such opposing postures compounded the disagreements between the two organisations and led them to clash. A third reason for their disputes was the fact that the end of the Cold War not only made their inherent normative differences surface. It also broke the anti-communist bond they shared during the Cold War. Consequently, the two organisations were, to a certain degree, politically disconnected from each other. In fact, as seen, not only did some leaders of ASEAN members, e.g. Malaysia’s Mahathir Mohamad and Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew reject the liberal values promoted by West and the EU. They also promoted their own values, namely the ‘Asian values’, to challenge the Western/European values.

In brief, the examination of the East Timor issue has highlighted a number of important points. Some of these are worth mentioning here. First, by the early 1990s, the EU and ASEAN emerged as two remarkable norm entrepreneurs and normative powers, whose regional and international policies were predominantly norm-based and guided. The defining difference was that the value-systems, which they were founded on as well as sought to advocate were divergent from each other. While the former espoused a set of individual-oriented values, the latter preferred a set of state-centred principles. Second, their normative differences became salient in the 1990s because the
end of the Cold War not only made their inherent differences, which were rooted in their own historical and cultural background, surface. Many changes within the EU and ASEAN as well as at the international level after the winding down of the Cold War also compounded their normative differences. This means that their regional and international factors defined their respective normative underpinnings and made them divergent from each other. Third, such differences were the reason behind their disagreement over the human rights issue and the East Timor matter in particular and these disputes eventually hindered their interaction. In other words, they disputed partly because of the differences of their normative natures. The EU primarily emphasised individual rights and freedoms whereas ASEAN stressed the importance of collective rights and state sovereignty. Coupled with – or more precisely because of – the differences of their normative premises, they did not accept each other’s preferred norms and this intensified their tensions. While the EU fervently insisted on the respect of its liberal and democratic norms, ASEAN firmly opposed that insertion because it regarded such an act violated its core norm of non-interference. Because of this, they could not find a common solution to the East Timor issue, which resulted in jeopardising their relations in the 1990s. Fourth, the negative consequences that their normative differences brought to their relations illustrate that their conflicting norms were conducive to preventing their cooperation. In addition, it demonstrates that not only EU-ASEAN relations reinforced the identities or norms of the EU and ASEAN. The normative dimensions of the two organisations also shaped the nature, form and outcome of their interregional interaction. In short, the East Timor case supports very well the key hypotheses of the thesis, notably the (1), (2), (3a), (3b), (3c), (3e) and (3f) propositions, which were formulated at the end of Chapter 2. The next chapter, which focuses on the Myanmar problem, will further illustrate these points.

7. The Myanmar problem in EU-ASEAN relations

This chapter examines the Myanmar issue in the interaction between the EU and ASEAN. It is probably the most reported aspect of the EU’s relations with ASEAN and Asia in general as it is referred to, or examined to varying degrees, in almost all academic works on the EU-ASEAN relationship and on Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM). These include those of Tay and Goh (1999), Robles (2004b), Smith (2006) and Petersson (2006). Yet, the thesis studies the Myanmar matter in-depth in this chapter not
only because it was a dominant problem in their correlation for several years. The inquiry investigates it also because, like the East Timor issue, it is a concrete case to illustrate the normative differences of the EU and ASEAN, the sources of their normative dissimilarities and the impact of their normative differences on their relations. In other words, like the East Timor case, it is a very suitable case to demonstrate that the EU and ASEAN are two unalike norm entrepreneurs and normative powers, which uphold and promote two opposing ways of building their own community and conducting their respective regional and international relations. Furthermore, because of these normative differences, they find it difficult to cooperate with each other, especially in the economic and political areas.

It is worth noting that, like the East Timor issue, the Myanmar problem became involved into and negatively affected upon EU-ASEAN relations since the early 1990s. However, while the East Timor issue was removed from their ties by the late 1990s, the latter continued to affect their links, such as their negotiations towards a region-to-region FTA, in the 2000s. The Myanmar issue also fed into and consequently jeopardised progress of the ASEM process. Given these factors, the Myanmar matter provides greater evidence for the thesis to demonstrate comprehensively and convincingly its principal arguments, notably the (1), (3a), (3b), (3c), (3e) and (3f) propositions that have been formulated and put forwards in Chapter 2.

In terms of structure, the chapter looks at the involvement of the Myanmar issue in EU-ASEAN relations in four key periods and areas. They are (1) prior to Myanmar’s admission to ASEAN in 1997, (2) after its entry to ASEAN, (3) in the negotiations towards an interregional FTA between the EU and ASEAN and (4) in the ASEM process.

7.1. Prior to Myanmar’s admission to ASEAN

Myanmar gained its independence from the British in 1948, under the name of the Union of Burma.¹²⁹ In the early 1950s, a parliament was formed and multi-party elections were held in the 1960s. However, democracy in Burma was short-lived because in 1962, a military coup d’état took place. From then to the dramatic changes that began in 2010, the country was ruled by the military and almost cut off from the outside world. The military regime’s political repression and economic mismanagement

¹²⁹ For more information on Myanmar, see Silverstein (1992), Fink (2001), Taylor (2001) and Dittmer (2010).
led to widespread discontent frustration. On 8 August 1988, mass demonstrations (mostly students) for democracy took place and they were violently suppressed by the security forces. The State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) was established and in 1989, it declared martial law and changed the country’s official English name from the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma, which had existed from 1974, to the Union of Myanmar. It also set out plans for the People’s Assembly elections, which were freely held for the first time in almost 30 years on 27 May 1990. The National League for Democracy (NLD) won by a landslide even though its leader Aung San Suu Kyi was under the house arrest. The Western countries and the EC welcomed the election results. However, they were annulled by SLORC, which refused to step down (Petersson 2006: 569; du Rocher 2012: 168).

Until 1988, when the regime violently curbed pro-democracy protesters, Myanmar was not a major concern for European countries though from 1962 it was under the military rule, which had one the worst human rights records (Petersson 2006: 568). Even during that period, they were among the most generous donors to Myanmar’s military regime (Egreteau 2010: 16). The 1988 suppression brought Myanmar into the international spotlight and dramatically changed the EC’s relations with the regime. Like other Western countries, it strongly condemned the SLORC’s killing of pro-democracy demonstrators (Bridges 1999: 88). The EC also applied a wide range of sanctions against the regime (Egreteau 2010: 19). In July 1990, the European Parliament awarded Ms Aung San its Sakharov human rights prize (Bridges 1999: 88; Gupwell 2003: 66).

The EC’s reaction towards Myanmar in the late 1980s and the early 1990s highlights that if the Dili massacre led the EC to change its posture vis-à-vis the East Timor issue, the military regime’s 1988 suppression and its refusal to accept the 1990 election results were the reason behind its change of attitudes towards Myanmar. In other words, these events played a key role in prompting it to act as an entrepreneur of human rights norm, calling for the respect of those democratic norms in Myanmar. It also demonstrates that, like in the case of East Timor, the EC was concerned about human rights violations in Myanmar because by the early 1990s, the promotion and

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130 This illustrates well that, as underlined in the previous chapter, until the late 1980s, the EC and its members did not pay attention to human rights violations in Southeast Asia. For this reason, unlike “Vietnam and Cambodia, which had been regular topics of political discussion between the EC and ASEAN in the 1980s, Burma rarely figured in European deliberations on Southeast Asia” (Bridges 1999: 87).
protection of human rights and democracy became a priority of its foreign policy. In this context, the EC and its members raised the issue its meetings with ASEAN even though at that time this country was not a member of ASEAN (Bridges 1999: 87; Petersson 2006: 569). In his opening speech at the eight AEMM in May 1991, Jacques Poos recalled “the distressing events in Burma”, which he regarded as “no longer acceptable today to the international community” (Poos 1991). At the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference (PMC) in Manila in July 1992, the EC also bluntly attacked Myanmar’s regime because for the EC and its members, not only did human rights now become a major aspect in its foreign policy. They should also become a matter of international concern that interregional and regional forums, e.g. EC-ASEAN dialogue and the PMC, should discuss. In contrast, ASEAN and its members were completely indifferent to the political situation and human rights abuses in Myanmar. This illustrates that the EC and ASEAN adopted opposing postures towards Myanmar.

Divergences were increased – and reflected in the fact that – when the EU sought to punish Myanmar’s military leaders, ASEAN attempted to welcome them. For instance, in a concerted effort to condemn and sanction its military regime, on 28 October 1996, the EU produced a Common Position on Burma/Myanmar (European Council 1996b). This Common Position, which was renewed and revised several times, applied a wide range of sanctions on Myanmar’s military regime. These include visa bans for Myanmar’s high-level officials, the marginalisation of its representatives in international gatherings. In contrast, ASEAN did not regard other countries’ political systems or styles of their governments as a basis for cooperation – let alone apply any political conditionality in its relations with them. This is why while the EU tried to isolate Myanmar’s military officials from international forums, ASEAN sought to bring them into its regional mechanisms. At its 29th AMM in 1996, ASEAN officially granted it observer status and allowed its foreign minister to deliver a speech at the opening session of the meeting. ASEAN also implied that it would grant membership to Myanmar, together with Laos and Cambodia (AMM 1996).

From now on, Myanmar became a disruptive subject in EU-ASEAN relations not only because of the different nature of their normative premises but also because while one regional organisation fervently defended and promoted its desired norms, the other

\[131\] Other measures are banning defence cooperation with Myanmar and its military personnel from EU territory, suspending bilateral/multilateral partnerships and non-humanitarian programmes, restricting import/exports of Burmese-made product and freezing its leaders’ financial assets within the EU.
resisted them. For the EU, given its poor human rights record, Myanmar’s participation as an observer at the AMM and its potential admission to ASEAN were unacceptable. In his statement at the PMC, which was held at the same time with the 29th AMM, Dick Spring, Ireland’s Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, who held the EU’s presidency, said that the EU was deeply concerned about the human rights situation in Myanmar (Spring 1996). He also warned that EU-ASEAN cooperation could diminish and even suffer if ASEAN moved to reinforce ties with the military junta (Asiaweek, 1996; Kynge 1996b; Othman 1996b). ASEAN responded to the EU by arguing that integrating Myanmar into its regional framework and constructively engaging with it was a more appropriate way of resolving the problem. It believed that once Myanmar had joined its rank, it could be influenced by ASEAN in the way that “in Asia, we marry first and expect the bride to adapt her behaviour after marriage” (Philippines Foreign Minister, Domingo Siazon, quoted by Business Times, 1997b). ASEAN also made it clear that it would not accept any external pressure, especially from the EU, because they had no business airing opinions on its internal affairs (Kynge 1996a; Othman 1996a). Domingo Siazon bluntly put it this way: how ASEAN dealt with Myanmar was “our business” and the EU and any other external powers had no right to interfere (Business Times, 1997b). Such reactions clearly demonstrated that not only did ASEAN strictly maintain its ASEAN way but also used it as a means to resist the EU’s criticism and demand. Furthermore, they showed that the more the EU pushed for the protection of human rights and the more ASEAN was opposed to it.

Such an assertion/opposition dichotomy was also evident at the 12th AEMM in February 1997 in Singapore, which also marked the 20th anniversary of EU-ASEAN relations. At this meeting, Netherlands’ Foreign Minister Hans van Mierlo wanted to discuss frankly, openly and in the spirit of searching for a compromise about “things which we disagree” (Mierlo 1997). With a frank openness, he expressed that “what’s happening in Burma is unacceptable” (quoted in Lee 1997) and made it clear that the EU was counting on ASEAN to do more to push for the democratisation of this country (Lee 1997; Bridges 1999: 173; Loewen 2008: 16). Furthermore, on this occasion, Gwynn Morgan, head of the EU department for relations with South East Asia, said that Myanmar was “the issue that presents the greatest challenge in our relations in the foreseeable future” and “a thorn in the foot that has got to be clinically removed” (quoted in Satthiah 1997). Indeed, it was expected that the Singapore meeting would discuss and endorse the ‘new dynamic’, which had been proposed during the last
AEMM in Karlsruhe in 1994. However, the Myanmar matter dominated this meeting, during which “the senior officials and their ministers discussed nothing else but human rights down to the last comma, while topics on economic cooperation were left almost untouched” (Pastor 1997). That means the Myanmar problem greatly jeopardised EU-ASEAN cooperation (Business Times, 1997a; du Rocher 2012: 165).

Disagreements between the EU and ASEAN over Myanmar since the early 1990s illustrate three important points. First, by the early 1990s, the EU and ASEAN became two different regional organisations, with conflicting cooperation cultures (Lee 1997). As it was premised on a set of liberal cosmopolitan values, the EU considered human rights as an important issue in its relations with ASEAN. For this reason, it strongly urged ASEAN to put pressure on Myanmar and even wanted it to adopt the same posture vis-à-vis Myanmar. In contrast, ASEAN was a regional entity that was based on a set of traditional communitarian norms, notably the principle of non-interference. This means that while both of them were norm-based organisations, their norms were divergent from each other. Second, given such normative differences, it was inevitable that their interaction was prone to tensions. Indeed, their relationship was primarily a ‘we-group’ versus ‘they-group’ one, in which one group not only disconnected from the other and its core norms but also challenged and infringed the other’s norms. That normative dissociation and especially normative opposition was the key reason behind their disagreements over human rights and the Myanmar issue. Finally, these disputes jeopardised their cooperation, especially in the economic area because, due to the overwhelming presence of the Myanmar issue, the AEMM did not have time to discuss other important matters of their relations, such as economic cooperation (Pastor 1997). These three points are also among the key propositions of the thesis, which have already been illustrated in the previous chapter. The next section will illustrate them in more detail.

7.2. After Myanmar’s admission to ASEAN

One year after Myanmar was invited to its ministerial meeting as an observer, at the 30th AMM in Malaysia, which also marked its 30th anniversary, ASEAN formally admitted Laos and Myanmar (AMM 1997). Within ASEAN, there were some reservations over Myanmar’s membership. The member that was most concerned about Myanmar was Thailand, who proposed that ASEAN should put more pressure on its government for political reform. However, as noted by Petersson (2006: 572), going against the ASEAN way was never a popular approach in ASEAN and the proposal was
not backed by its other members. Yet, the main opposition to Myanmar’s admission to ASEAN was not from the Association but from the EU, which strongly criticised ASEAN’s decision. In fact, while Myanmar had already posed a problem to EU-ASEAN relations, ASEAN’s admission of Myanmar was a turning point in their relationship. The Europeans were furious at its accession to ASEAN and following its admission, they decided to take a firm stance on Myanmar (Bardacke and Kynge 1997; *European Report*, 1997a). In his speech at a meeting with ASEAN members in July 1997 in Kuala Lumpur, Jacques Poos recalled that “[t]he EU has, on various occasions over the last year, expressed its serious concerns regarding the political and human rights situation in Burma/Myanmar” (Poos 1997). Notably, he reminded ASEAN that the EU had maintained its *Common Position on Burma/Myanmar* in April 1997, which prevented the EU from opening negotiations with Myanmar for an accession protocol to the 1980 Cooperation Agreement. This also implied that Myanmar could not sit at the table with the rest of ASEAN in negotiations with the EU on an equal footing in the framework of the CA. For that reason, Myanmar was not given a seat at the Joint Cooperation Committee (JCC). Later, the section will illustrate why the EU’s opposition to Myanmar’s participation in the JCC led to a stalemate in their relations. What is worth looking at here is why the EU opposed ASEAN’s admission of Myanmar and why despite the EU’s opposition, ASEAN allowed it to join because it allows the thesis to explain more fully why their normative differences of the EU and ASEAN negatively affected their relations.

From the EU’s viewpoint, Myanmar was not of any significant strategic interest (Petersson 2006: 571) and this could be a reason behind its tough position on Myanmar. Yet, there was another more important reason for such a posture – that is in the 1990s, the promotion of human rights and democracy became an important element of the EU’s international identity and role (Smith 2003: 121). As examined in Chapter 4 and illustrated in the previous chapter, it was strongly attached to those values and sought to defend and spread them due to its historical and cultural backgrounds as well as other changes and conditions that it experienced after the end of the Cold War. For ASEAN, Myanmar was strategically important. In fact, its admission of Myanmar was driven by a security concern that isolating it could force this country towards China whose regional hegemonic ambitions were increasing and about which ASEAN states were more and more concerned. That is why, as noted by Rüland (2001d: 143-4), though ASEAN states’ “differences over how to deal with Burma were simmering under the
surface, suspicions of China forged an early consensus that the grouping should not give in to Western pressure to isolate the junta or impose any sanctions on the SLORC”.

Another reason behind ASEAN states’ friendly posture towards Myanmar’s regime was that Myanmar provided them with raw materials (du Rocher 2012: 166). Yet, the defining reason behind its support for Myanmar was that as liberal cosmopolitan values were not really established in most ASEAN countries, ASEAN did not make the respect for those principles as its key objective or organising principle. Instead, as examined in Chapter 5 and illustrated in the last chapter, due to Southeast Asia’s past and other related domestic and regional factors, the fundamental principles that guided its regional and international relations were its ASEAN way, notably that of non-interference. These prevented domestic concerns, e.g. Myanmar’s human rights and political situations, from being an issue in ASEAN’s internal and external cooperation (Smith 2003: 165). This illustrates ASEAN’s stark normative divergences from the EU. In fact, these normative discrepancies were the cause of their disagreements over Myanmar’s participation in the JCC, whose next meeting was due to take place in Bangkok on 17-19 November 1997.

In a letter sent to the European Commission, ASEAN had insisted that Myanmar should be given full observer status in the Bangkok meeting, which meant that the Myanmar’s officials would sit with other ASEAN participants at the negotiating table and actively take part in the talks (European Report, 1997b). However, the Commission did not accept this demand of ASEAN and would only accept a ‘passive presence’ of Myanmar (Islam 1997b). More specifically, Myanmar could be allowed to come to the meeting but without a flag, nameplate, or any authority to participate in the discussions; it even refused mention of its presence in any press release. In other words, it could come but only to sit at the back of the room (The Economist, 1997). ASEAN did not accept such a treatment by the EU vis-à-vis one of its member because its “stance is non-discriminating and ASEAN won’t drop one of its members from the meeting” (Thai official quoted by the European Report, 1997b). Because of this deadlock, the Bangkok meeting was cancelled, putting EU-ASEAN cooperation in even greater jeopardy (Bardacke 1997; European Report, 1997a; 1997b). It is worth mentioning that this meeting was also expected to discuss and endorse the ‘new dynamic’, which was designed to facilitate cooperation between the two organisations and approved in

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132 For some scholars, e.g. du Rocher (2012: 166), ASEAN’s policy towards Myanmar was fundamentally a challenge to European values and their pretended universality.
principle at the 11th AEMM in 1994. Their disagreements over whether Myanmar should or should not join the JCC reveal that not only did they opt for opposing postures vis-à-vis the Myanmar issue but also their differences became now an inhibiting element in their cooperation. This illustrates well a central point of the thesis – that is not only the EU and ASEAN differ from each other in terms of their normative preferences but also such divergences undermine their cooperation.

Indeed, the postponement of the JCC’s Bangkok meeting marked a major deadlock in – and, to some extent, paralysed – EU-ASEAN relations because the JCC was one of their main channels of dialogue. As both sides failed to agree on whether and how Myanmar should join the JCC, another JCC meeting, due to take place in January 1999 to prepare the agenda for the up-coming AEMM, scheduled to take place in Berlin in March, was also postponed (Lim 1999: 24). The postponement of the JCC meeting led to the cancellation of the AEMM because the Union and the Association could not agree on the participation of Myanmar’s Foreign Minister. As previously explained, given its Common Position, which applied visa bans on Myanmar’s high-level officials, the EU did not grant visas to Myanmar’s high-ranking officials. Some EU officials, such as Robin Cook, clearly stated that they did not want to sit down with a minister from Myanmar (Abram 1999). Thus, the EU only allowed Myanmar’s low-ranking officials to attend the conference. The EU’s pre-condition about Myanmar’s involvement was not accepted by ASEAN countries because, for them, Myanmar was now an ASEAN member and should receive equal treatment from ASEAN’s dialogue partners. Because of these disagreements over the manner of Myanmar’s participation, the meeting was cancelled.

Following the cancellation of the 1999 AEMM, ASEAN blamed the EU for causing the abandonment, citing the EU’s tough position on Myanmar as the main obstacle in their relationship. For ASEAN countries, as Malaysia’s Foreign Minister, Syed Hamid Albar clearly stated, the meeting was between two organisations and not between two countries, and the EU could not dictate which country should be in ASEAN and which should not (Harun 1999). That is why ASEAN’s diplomats regarded the EU’s refusal to grant a visa to Myanmar’s Foreign Minister as “absurd” and “unacceptable” and even “humiliating” (Harun 1999). Furthermore, in the eyes of ASEAN, given the EU’s tough posture vis-à-vis Myanmar and its refusal to accept it as part of ASEAN, the EU-ASEAN dialogue would eventually come to a standstill. The AEMM was postponed until 2000, when the EU hesitantly agreed that Myanmar could
participate in the AEMM in December 2000 in Vientiane, Laos. Yet, this gathering after a three-year interruption was overshadowed by the total absence of the EU’s foreign ministers. While all 10 ASEAN foreign ministers attended the meeting, not a single foreign minister from the EU was present. The EU sent only low-ranking representatives to the meeting. It is unclear whether they could not come because the Vientiane meeting coincided with the EU summit in Nice or whether the Europeans intentionally chose to do so because they did not want to sit at the same table with Myanmar’s officials.

Whatever the reason behind the EU’s low attendance, it is evident that the Myanmar issue damaged EU-ASEAN relations. According to a former ambassador of an EU member, it “was a stumbling block in the EU-ASEAN cooperation in the 1990s, and it remains a contentious issue” (Interview, 2009). This was confirmed by the responses to the author’s survey. When asked to give their views on the statement ‘the Myanmar issue became a stumbling-block in the EU-ASEAN cooperation’, of the 21 responses, 12 indicated ‘completely agree’, six ‘agree’, two ‘neutral’, and only one ‘disagree’. In fact, together with the East Timor issue examined in the previous chapter, the Myanmar problem jeopardised their relations in the 1990s. It can be said that if the Cambodian and Afghanistan issues bonded them together and facilitated their interaction in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s, the problems of East Timor and Myanmar set them apart in the 1990s. This was confirmed by the responses to the author’s survey.133

In brief, what has been explored in this section further supports the three conclusions drawn at the end of the previous section, namely 7.1. Besides illustrating those three points, the fact that the Myanmar issue significantly deterred EU-ASEAN cooperation after Myanmar’s accession to ASEAN demonstrates well other key propositions maintained by the thesis.

First, it is evident that the norms of the EU and ASEAN play an influential role in defining their intraregional and interregional relationship. Put differently, the factors that really shape their regional and international affairs are not purely the institutional or

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133 The respondents were asked to express their opinions on the statement ‘if the Cambodian and Afghanistan issues united the EC and ASEAN and strengthened their relations during the Cold War, the East Timor issue and the Myanmar problem divided them and undermined their cooperation in the post-Cold War era’. Of the 21 responses, four indicated ‘completely agree’, 15 ‘agree’ and only two ‘neutral’. Furthermore, when asked to give their views on the statement ‘compared to their interaction in the 1990s, the relationship between the EC and ASEAN in the 1980s was quite smooth, especially on a political level’, of the 21 responses, one indicated ‘completely agree’, 13 ‘agree’, five ‘neutral’ and only two ‘disagree’.
material dimensions of their actorness. Rather, it is the normative components of their actorness – or simply their raison d’être or their actorhood – that influence their way of perceiving and conducting their intraregional and interregional activities. Their own norms – or their respective codes of conduct or established practices – defined their posture vis-à-vis the Myanmar issue.

Second, while the normative constituents of the EU and ASEAN matter, they do not necessarily matter in a positive and progressive manner. In fact, as demonstrated so far in this chapter as well as in the previous one, they became an obstacle in EU-ASEAN relations. Their normative dimensions became a divisive and disruptive source because they competed or conflicted with each other. Thus, like the East Timor issue, the Myanmar problem demonstrates that norms are not always a force for cooperation. They can be a source of rivalry and conflict. This point counters the argument often maintained by the normative power Europe (NPE) thesis that regards NPE as a force-for-good or something positive in world politics that contributes to defence of human rights or the spread of democracy.

Finally, while it is probable that the exchanges or disagreements between the EU and ASEAN over the Myanmar issue shaped and consolidated the norms and values of the Union and the Association, it is clear that their respective norms also played a key role in determining (the nature, shape and outcome of) their interregional relationship. This point illustrates well another key argument held by the thesis: that is not only do interregional relations define the collective identities of the regional organisations involved. The collective identities or the norms and values of the participant organisations also significantly shape their interregional relations. The next section will further illustrate these arguments.

7.3. The Myanmar issue in the ASEAN-EU FTA negotiations

As have been seen so far, both the East Timor issue and the Myanmar problem hindered EU-ASEAN cooperation in the 1990s. However, unlike the former, the Myanmar problem continued to be an obstructive factor in the EU-ASEAN interaction in the 2000s. In fact, it was one of the main reasons behind the collapse of their negotiations towards a region-to-region FTA. This section looks at why it remained a divisive issue in their relations. The overall aim of the section is to provide more evidence to the arguments made earlier in the previous sections.

7.3.1. The reasons behind the FTA

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Chapter 3 has pointed out that by the early 2000s, many transformations, at the global, interregional and regional levels encouraged and/or forced the EU and ASEAN to revive their relations, especially their commercial cooperation. Trade was, “is and will continue to be the centrepiece of ASEAN-EU relations” (Balaoing 1997: 65) and “it is perhaps this area more than any other that binds the two regional groupings together” (Crozier 2008: 69). It brought them together in the 1970s and prompted them to upgrade their cooperation framework in the early 1990s. However, given their disputes over human rights and East Timor, the plan failed. Now, they realised the need to enhance their cooperation in this area and to achieve this, they initiated a number of mechanisms. One of these was TREAT I, which was established in 2003. After its creation, several workshops and meetings were held (Abbate et al. 2008: 10) with the aim to prepare the foundation for a potential ASEAN-EU FTA. In 2005, both sides agreed to establish an ASEAN-EU Vision Group (AEVG) to explore the feasibility of that FTA (AEM-EU Consultation 2005).

Following its formation, the AEVG commissioned two studies to examine the viability of the AEFTA, with one being led by Bou Mellassa et al. (2006) and the other by Andreosso-O’Callaghan et al. (2006). According to the first, if such an FTA were concluded it would increase EU export of goods to ASEAN by 24.2% and of services by 29.0% (Bou Mellassa et al. 2006: 24; European Commission, DG for Trade 2007a). It would also increase ASEAN’s exports to the EU by 18.5% and add up to more than 2% of its GDP in 2020 (Bou Mellassa et al. 2006: 24-5). The other suggests that the FTA could help the EU to “consolidate the commercial presence of its firms in one of the most dynamic markets in the world” (Andreosso-O’Callaghan et al. 2006: 120, 187). Equally, the FTA would facilitate ASEAN’s access to a major export market (AEVG 2006: 8-9). The agreement would also bring other political and strategic advantages for each side. For the EU, as its firms had lost ground to other competitors, especially after ASEAN’s proactive FTA strategy in East Asia and beyond, the cost of not creating an FTA with ASEAN would be high (Andreosso-O’Callaghan et al. 2006: 187-8). Thus, to avoid potential discrimination, it needed to start negotiations with ASEAN (AEVG 2006: 9). The major benefits that ASEAN was expected to gain from the FTA included an increase in its credibility vis-à-vis its partners (Andreosso-O’Callaghan et al. 2006: 52).

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134 As noted in Chapter 3, until 2006, while ASEAN was actively involved in the negotiations and conclusion of the FTAs with its major partners, the EU remained absent from this network of FTAs (see Appendix 8).
188). For instance, it could be a significant element in ASEAN’s strategy to compete with China (AEVG 2006: 9). For ASEAN states establishing FTAs with major powers was also seen as a way of cementing stronger political links with them that could open the doors to other strategic and security-related agreements (Sally 2006: 5; Dosch 2009: 67; Sen and Srivastava 2009: 207). Interpreted in this way, an FTA with the EU could enable ASEAN to enhance its political and strategic links with the latter.

In short, an FTA between the two organisations was justified economically and strategically as concluded by the Vision Group (2006: 7). In the interview with the author, an EU official was also convinced that that FTA would bring significant benefits to both the EU and ASEAN.

“If an FTA is signed it will increase trade between the two regions. From the EU’s point of view, a comprehensive FTA with ASEAN can help balance the imbalance of its trade with ASEAN as the EU has a trade deficit with ASEAN. It will also help the EU compete with ASEAN’s other major partners, e.g. China, India. For ASEAN, an FTA can increase its import to the EU. In a number of sectors, ASEAN’s exports to the EU remain below their potential. An FTA with the EU will enable ASEAN to further integration and to become a more important economic power to counter-balance the growing importance of China and India, for example, and diversify its economic relations” (Interview, 2009).

Given the perceived benefits, in May 2007, the EU and ASEAN confirmed “their shared desire to enhance economic relations by establishing a FTA providing for comprehensive trade and investment liberalisation” (AEM-EU Consultations 2007) and FTA negotiations were officially launched afterwards. Yet, the question is whether they could surmount their normative divergences and their differences over the Myanmar issue to reach an FTA.

**7.3.2. Negotiations, their collapse and reasons for the failure**

Following the launch of FTA negotiations, an ASEAN-EU Joint Committee (JC) was established. The JC planned nine rounds of negotiations and hoped that negotiations on a comprehensive agreement could be reached within two years (Pratruangkrai 2007; Astuto 2012). The two first rounds, held in Vietnam in July 2007 and in Singapore in October 2007, did not produce any concrete results. Only until the third one, held in Brussels from 30 January to 1 February 2008, that saw an open frank and constructive exchange of views by the parties on the various issues that the EU wanted to be included in the final agreement (European Commission, DG for Trade 2008). Though
during the fourth round, held in Thailand in April 2008, both sides had some substantive discussions in a number of areas, progress was less than the EU expected (Aquino and Domingo 2008; Berenguer 2008; Ganjanakhundee 2008). This fourth round also coincided with the adoption by the Committee on International Trade of the European Parliament (2008) of a report on trade and economic relations with ASEAN. The report, while believing that a high quality agreement was more important than a rapid timetable, expressed concerns about the slow pace of negotiations. In recalling that “human rights and democracy are core EU values and demands that they form an integral part of the negotiations with ASEAN”, it also underlined that the protection of human rights in general and the regime change in Myanmar as well as other issues, e.g. sustainable development, were necessary conditions for negotiating an FTA with ASEAN. More precisely, it believed “that the current situation in Burma makes it impossible for that country to be included in the agreement” (European Parliament 2008). This stance was also repeated in the remarks on the adoption of the report made to the European Parliament by Peter Mandelson, the EU’s then Trade Commissioner (Mandelson 2008). Given the involvement of the Myanmar issue and other matters, the fifth and sixth rounds of negotiations were unable to make any significant progress. The seventh meeting in March 2009 in Kuala Lumpur faced a similar situation and because of this at that meeting both sides agreed to halt the negotiations (Adamrah 2009; Kurczy 2009). Since then, the EU opened negotiations with Singapore and Malaysia in 2010, Vietnam in 2011, and is planning the similar move with other ASEAN countries (Doan 2012a. The question raised is why, despite significant potential benefits, the EU and ASEAN decided to halt negotiations towards an interregional FTA. There were a number of factors for the collapse of the talks.

**Discrepancies and incoherencies in ASEAN**

During an interview with the author in May 2009, when asked to explain why the EU and ASEAN decided to halt the negotiations even though it was perceived that the FTA would bring great benefits to the two regions, an EU official gave two fundamental reasons for the collapse of the negotiations towards an FTA between the EU and ASEAN. One is political and one is economic-related. According to this official, in economic terms, there existed big differences in ASEAN. Some ASEAN countries were very advanced and more reform-oriented whereas others were inward looking. For this reason, he believed that ASEAN countries were not in the position to negotiate a
number of issues where their economies were not yet prepared. Furthermore, given such huge diversities, there were different ways, options and philosophies within ASEAN to address the opening of trade. Most ASEAN were not ready to discuss issues, e.g. intellectual property rights, which were the priorities for the EU. These affected the ASEAN position during the negotiations. Consequently, “the EU concluded that there was a gap in the degree of ambition and willingness to conclude a deep and comprehensive agreement” (Interview, 2009). Indeed, a glance at the 10 ASEAN members will show huge disparities among ASEAN countries, in terms of the GDP per capital (see Appendix 4), the share of Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) of its members (see Appendix 12). Their great differences in terms of their level of economic development also made it difficult for the negotiations and the possibility of concluding an FTA. During his visit to Thailand, in June 2008, Karel De Gucht, Belgium’s then Foreign Minister and currently the European Trade Commissioner, underlined that because there was not a homogenous bloc of ASEAN countries, “you need many rules and provisions adapted to meet various national conditions” (quoted in Ganjanakhundee, 2008). The responses to the survey also show that the divergences of ASEAN members were one of the reasons for the collapse of the talks. Six of the 21 responses ranked this cause first and six second (see Table 7.1).

Given these disparities, ASEAN countries had different priorities in trade, investment and economic development (Burton 2007). As a result, their motivations and interests in FTAs and the FTA with the EU in particular also differed from one another. While the EU wanted to establish an FTA-plus, i.e. a broader and comprehensive agreement, some ASEAN countries were not ready or willing to do so. In an interview with the author in May 2009, another EU official maintained that the differences between the EU and ASEAN over the level of ambitions or the scope of the agreement were another major inhibiting factor. Unlike ASEAN, the EU did not want a purely goods-FTA; it wanted to include other issues, e.g. labour standard, intellectual property rights, and climate change (Interview, 2009). Two of the 21 responses to the author’s survey also identified these differences as the main cause of the collapse of the talks (see Table 7.1). This also illustrates the differences of the EU and ASEAN in terms of their perceptions and approaches vis-à-vis economic policies.
There were also other factors, which hampered the progress of negotiations and eventually led to their collapse. One of these was the lack of cohesion in ASEAN, which made it hard for the negotiation process itself and any future implementation of an FTA. At the negotiating level, while the European Commission was mandated to negotiate with ASEAN on behalf of the 27 EU members, the latter did not have such an institution because neither the ASEAN Secretariat nor the ASEAN rotating president was given the mandate to negotiate for all ASEAN members. ASEAN’s incoherence as a reason for the collapse of the talks is confirmed by the author’s survey (see Table 7.1). Another issue that was somewhat seen as a setback to the progress of ASEAN’s negotiations with the EU was that, at the time of the ASEAN-EU FTA being negotiated, ASEAN was also in the process of negotiating and concluding FTAs with other partners. This was backed up by Peter Mandelson in remarks to the European Parliament. According to him, given this stretch on ASEAN’s capabilities, “it is hard to see the timeframe for a full region-to-region agreement as less than three to four years, and it is difficult to see us achieving a consistent high level of ambition” (Mandelson 2008).

**Differences over the Myanmar issue**

Concerning the political reason, the EU official interviewed mentioned earlier explained that ASEAN wanted to include every country, including Myanmar and other two less developed countries, namely Cambodia and Laos, in the FTA with the EU. In other words, as a matter of regional solidarity, ASEAN preferred a family approach, i.e. a region-to-region agreement, which included all of its ten members. In contrast, the EU

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<th>Reasons for the collapse*</th>
<th>Rankings of reasons</th>
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<tr>
<td>ASEAN’s preoccupation with FTA talks with others</td>
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<td>Discrepancies of ASEAN members</td>
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<td>Lack of cohesion in ASEAN</td>
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<tr>
<td>Disagreement over the inclusion of Myanmar in FTA</td>
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<td>Other: (Disagreements over the scope of FTA)**</td>
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**Source**: Taken from the survey undertaken by the author  
**Note**: * Some respondents did not rank some of the reasons named. This also applies to some other questions of the questionnaire, which are referred to later.  
** One respondent specified that ASEAN wanted only-goods FTA, e.g. ASEAN-China FTA whereas the EU wanted a comprehensive one, including service. The other respondent noted that the EU wanted to include labour issues and environment.
maintained that due to the political situation in Myanmar, this country was not allowed; and given their respective level of economic development, Cambodia and Laos did not justify their participation in the region-to-region FTA. This is why the European Commission was authorised by the 27 members to negotiate formally a trade agreement with only the ASEAN 7, i.e. without Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar (Interview, 2009). Another EU official also maintained that the difference between the EU and ASEAN over the exclusion of Myanmar in the FTA was a key reason for the failure of the negotiations (Interview, 2009). Indeed, it is widely recognised that the issue of human rights violations in Myanmar loomed large over these rounds of negotiations and became a persistent stumbling-block to the talks (Adamrah 2009).

As seen in 7.1 and 7.2, Myanmar had been a thorny issue in EU-ASEAN relations before their decisions to open FTA talks. Despite the improvement of the EU-ASEAN relations in the early years of the 2000s, the issue was not completely removed. In 2006, when the EU planned to start FTA negotiations with ASEAN, it already raised concerns that it could hold up talks. An EU Trade counsellor, Jean-Jacques Bouflet, said in 2006 that they felt the political situation in Myanmar “is the main issue that we have to consider as we decide whether to proceed on free-trade association negotiations with” ASEAN (quoted by Pratruangkrai 2006). Eventually, it came up during the negotiations. Just a month after the first round of negotiations, the disagreements over whether the negotiation process should include all of ASEAN’s members emerged when Javier Solana played down the prospect of Myanmar joining the talks (Oxford Analytica Daily Brief Service, 2007). During a meeting with ASEAN Foreign Ministers at the 14th ARF in Manila, Philippines on 2 August 2007, he said that the FTA “would not be an agreement with ASEAN as such. It would be with member states of ASEAN” (quoted in Landingin 2007). From the EU’s viewpoint, its relations with ASEAN and its negotiations towards an FTA were significantly defined by the human rights situation in Myanmar. It also wanted ASEAN to pressure its member to improve the situation. Such an assertion hindered the progress of the negotiations.

ASEAN’s insistence on Myanmar’s inclusion made it even more difficult to overcome the impasse brought about by the Myanmar issue. From the beginning, ASEAN stressed a preference for a region-to-region FTA with the EU (Cuyvers et al. 2010: 281). Alberto Romulo, Philippines’ Foreign Secretary, said that Myanmar should participate in any trade deal with the EU (Landingin 2007). Gloria Arroyo, Philippines’ President, who at the time held ASEAN presidency, also insisted that Myanmar would
be included in the talks despite the EU’s opposition to dealing with the military autocracy. According to her, it was agreed in ASEAN “that there would be negotiations between the EU and ASEAN as a bloc” (quoted by Beattie 2007). Some days before the seventh and last round of negotiations in March 2009, Mari Pangestu, Indonesia’s Trade Minister, also maintained that ASEAN wanted to negotiate as a group with the EU. According to her, “if there’s going to be an ASEAN-EU FTA then it has to be region to region. ASEAN has not changed on that position” (quoted by Channel News Asia, 2009). ASEAN’s persistence on a region-to-region FTA meant that it wanted Myanmar to participate in the negotiations and to be included in an eventual interregional FTA. For the EU, given Myanmar’s human rights record, such an inclusion was unacceptable. As both sides did not give up their own positions vis-à-vis the exclusion/inclusion of Myanmar, the collapse of the talks was inevitable. The Myanmar problem as an obstacle for the FTA negotiations between the EU and ASEAN was confirmed by Karel de Gucht at the conference of the ‘EU in International Affairs’, in Brussels in April 2010.135 When asked to explain the reasons behind the halt of the talks, he said the disagreement over Myanmar was the main reason. The responses to the author’s survey also confirmed that the disagreement between the EU and ASEAN over the inclusion of Myanmar in the FTA was a major cause of the collapse of the talks. Of the 21 responses, seven ranked such a disagreement the first reason for the failure of the negotiations (see Table 7.1).

To sum up, despite their strong desire and efforts to enhance their economic relations and the great benefits that an FTA would bring to them, the EU and ASEAN failed to negotiate and conclude an FTA. While there were a number of factors contributing to the collapse of the negotiations, the differences between the EU and ASEAN over the participation of Myanmar in the FTA was a defining one.136 The fact that the EU’s insistence on the exclusion of Myanmar due to Myanmar’s poor human rights record and ASEAN’s opposition to the EU’s demand contributed to the collapse of the FTA negotiations illustrate very well many key arguments of the thesis. Three of them are worth highlighting here. First, it shows that though the developments in ASEAN, e.g. the progress towards democratisation in some of its members and ASEAN’s adoption of a regional human rights body, and a better understanding

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135 The author attended this conference and presented a paper on the EU-ASEAN relationship.
136 Other differences that are worth noting are their disagreements over the scope of the FTA mentioned by two EU officials interviewed and two respondents of the author’s survey.
between the two organisations, brought the EU and ASEAN closer in the early 2000s, they did not have a major and positive impact on their relationship. In other words, even though the EU and ASEAN no longer clashed with each other as they had done in the 1990s because the EU no longer bluntly insisted on the promotion of its values, their normative differences still existed and remained a problematic factor in their relations. This is because their relationship remained primarily a ‘we-group’ vs. ‘they-group’ dichotomy, in which one group’s norms were still challenged and opposed by the other. This lack of response to each other’s norms made it difficult for them to interact. Second, it demonstrates that the EU and ASEAN remained two divergent normative powers with dissimilar ways of viewing and conducting their regional and external relations. The fact that human rights and the Myanmar matter became issues in EU-ASEAN relations and their FTA negotiations, whereas they were absent from ASEAN’s relations and FTA negotiations with its other major partners, e.g. China and Japan, was another example of this. Third, it clearly shows that their conflicting norms significantly hindered their efforts to strengthen their relations and their economic cooperation in particular. In other words, this point illustrates that not only the lack of their actorness but also the divergences of their norms prevent them from establishing an influential partnership. In maintaining this position, the thesis also acknowledges that sharing similar normative premises is not sufficient for the two organisations to negotiate successfully an FTA. Nevertheless, in the EU-ASEAN negotiations, while recognising that other major factors prevented them from effectively negotiating an FTA it is evident that their disagreements over the political issues, e.g. the Myanmar problem, were a defining one. The next section, which looks at the Myanmar issue within the broader Asia-Europe relations, will illustrate in more detail these three points as well as other key assumption of the thesis.

7.4. The Myanmar issue in the ASEM process

This section begins by briefly looking at what ASEM is and why it was established. It then examines whether, and if so, why ASEM failed to achieve its objectives. The overall aim of the section’s examination of the ASEM process is to offer more evidence to the core assumptions of thesis, especially those that have been illustrated in Chapter 6 as well as the three previous sections of this chapter.

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137 The failure of the EU and MERCOSUR – two regional organisations, which share common liberal and democratic values (Santander 2005: 291) – to negotiate an interregional FTA is an example of this. A key reason for the failure of the FTA negotiations was the disagreement over agricultural policies (Doctor 2007: 29; Robles 2008b: 336).
7.4.1. Characteristics and rationales of ASEM

Officially established in 1996, in Bangkok, Thailand, ASEM is an interregional dialogue between ‘Europe’, represented at that time by the 15 EU members plus the European Commission and ‘Asia’, represented by a group of ten Asian countries. It has been enlarged three times and it now consists of 48 members (see Appendix 13). Given the diverse membership of the ‘Asian’ side of ASEM, the question of whether ASEM is an interregional dialogue or an intergovernmental forum is often raised (Gaens 2008f: 173; Tiilikainen 2008: 135-48; Loewen 2010: 25; Yeo 2010a: 9). Nevertheless, despite this lack of a coherent and compelling agency on the Asian side, there are significant interregional elements in the ASEM process. Between 1996 and 2008, ASEM involved the EU on one side and the ATP, i.e. ASEAN plus China, Japan and South Korea, on the other side. Moreover, as will be shown later, during that period both sides took distinctive collective stances vis-à-vis a number of issues, notably human rights, democracy and the Myanmar issue in particular. Furthermore, as the EU insisted that no non-EU countries could join ASEM on the EU side, Australia, New Zealand and Russia had to join ASEM via the ‘Asian door’, i.e. joining ASEM as ‘Asian states’ (Loewen 2010: 33; Murray 2010a: 66; Appendix 13). Thus, overall ASEM is an interregional process whereby the ‘self’, i.e. the EU, interacts with the ‘other’, i.e. the grouping of ‘Asian’ countries. Because of this, it is argued that interregional relations shape or reinforce the formation of the collective identity of the regions involved (Gilson 1999; 2002b; 2005; Higgott 2000a). Indeed, by interacting with the EU, ASEAN and other countries on the Asian side of ASEM, either by an intended or unintended way, form what can be referred to as ‘Asianness’ or ‘we-ness’, or ‘we-group’ that not only makes it distinct from the EU but also enables it to act as a distinct regional actor vis-à-vis the EU.

Another noteworthy characteristic of ASEM is that though it involves a wide range of institutions, including the biannual summits of Heads of State/Government, and covers a broad spectrum of issues, e.g. economic, security, political, social and cultural matters (Shin and Segal 1997: 138; Fort 2004: 357), it is an informal and non-binding arrangement (Fort 2004: 356). In other words, ASEM adopted ASEAN’s social-

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138 Given the diversity of ASEM’s Asian side, some also raise the question of whether ASEM is an interregional dialogue or an intergovernmental forum (Tiilikainen 2008: 135-48; Gaens 2008f: 173).

139 This means ASEM differs from the APEC and the ARF, which focus on economic and security issues respectively.
cultural norms, which prefer informality, non-confrontation, consultation and consensus based on equality and tolerance and which averse institutionalisation and other legalistic decision-making procedures (Busse 1999: 47; Acharya 2001: 63-70; Kivimaki 2007: 435). The fact that European countries accepted – or perhaps, were forced – to work almost like the Asian (Gilson 2002b: 60) not only illustrated that in the ASEM process there existed an exclusively ASEAN or Asian way of doing things in international relations that differed from the EU’s (Gilson 2001: 117). It also showed that the norm promoter in this case was not the EU but ASEAN. In other words, in ASEM, or at least when it was established, the EU was a norm follower or taker. As will be shown later, these different ways of perceiving and conducting international affairs between the EU and the Asian side of ASEM, notably ASEAN members, eventually emerged in the ASEM process and averted its progress. The question arises was why the EU and ASEAN/Asian countries wanted to establish such a broad (i.e. not purely limited to the EU and ASEAN) interregional forum, which was based on informality and focused a wide range of issues, in the mid-1990s.

A great number of reasons led to the creation of ASEM. Chief among these was Europe’s rediscovery of Asia and its change of view vis-à-vis Asia in the early 1990s (Godement 2008: 28). By the early 1990s, Europe, which had largely ignored Asia for several decades, realised that East Asia was fast becoming a major force in the world economy (European Commission 1994: 1; Cammack and Richards 1999: 1; Godement 2008: 28). Consequently, it “needs as a matter of urgency to strengthen its economic presence in Asia in order to maintain its leading role in the world economy” (European Commission 1994: 1). The need to create its own links with Asia was even compounded given the US’s a proactive economic policy towards the region and that fact that the US was much faster than Europe in realising Asia’s economic importance (Pelkmans 1997: 23-25; Forster 1999: 748; Dent 2003: 227-229; Yeo 2003: 14; Gaens 2008c: 14; Gaens et al. 2012: 92). Coupled with Europe’s rediscovery of Asia, there was a consensus in both regions that, compared to transpacific and transatlantic relations, the link between Europe and East Asia was weak and that it should be strengthened (Hänngi 1999: 56).

140 Other factors include ASEAN’s desire to foster wider regional mechanisms to meet post-Cold War challenges and ASEAN’s concern about the EU becoming a fortress. The EU also underwent major changes that favoured its closer relations with Asia, e.g. its desire to play a greater global role and its focus on interregionalism. For more information on ASEM’s rationale, see Shin and Segal (1997), Forster (1999), Gilson (2002), Dent (2003), Yeo (3003), Gaens (2008a), Godement (2008), Park and Kim (2008).
141 From the end of the WWII to the late 1980s, European countries were not very interested in Asia (Bridges 1999: 18; Richards and Kirkpatrick 1999: 688).
For instance, Goh Chok Tong (1995a; 1995b), regarded as ASEM’s spiritual father, and Jacques Chirac (1996), who considered ASEM as part of his Asian policy (Gilson 1999: 737), underlined this weakness and called for a strong partnership between Asia and Europe. They believed that a closer cooperation would reduce their dependency on the US and prevent it from pursuing a unilateral policy (Higgott 2000a: 29; Dent 2006: 117) as well as enhance their international influence (Shin and Segal 1997: 140).

Finding a way out of the stalemate that the EU and ASEAN faced in the early 1990s was another important factor that pushed them to establish ASEM. As seen in the previous chapter, at a time when the EU needed a gateway to access Asia’s emerging markets and ASEAN sought to engage with a newly transformed EU to diversify its economic relations as well as intensify its political weight, they disputed over human rights and East Timor (Villegas 1996a). Consequently, EU-ASEAN cooperation was brought to a standstill and the 1980 CA was not upgraded even though many had been calling for this for a long time. The great hope was that ASEM could offer a way to revitalise EU-ASEAN relations and be a way of renegotiating the agreement (Forster 1999: 753; 2000: 795; Wiessala 2002: 75; Gaens 2008c: 24). As Loewen (2008: 24) puts it, the desire to intensify cooperation between the two regions “was based not only on the potential welfare gains to be realized but also on the grounds that the informal ASEM dialogue might help soften value clashes and ideological confrontations that had previously obstructed the interregional cooperation between the EU and ASEAN”.

From the EU’s perspective, such an informal approach could allow it to discuss with ASEAN and other Asian countries about human rights and other democratic values as they now became a cornerstone of its foreign policy. In its Position Paper on ASEM, the European Council (1995) clearly states that

“[h]uman rights, the rule of law and good governance play a key role in furthering harmonious social development. In this respect, the ASEM participants should reflect on the close links between the political and economic aspects involved in building a secure, stable and democratic society”.

7.4.2. Reasons behind ASEM’s underachievement

Given their desires to strengthen Europe-East Asia cooperation and to find a way out of the deadlocked situation that the EU and ASEAN faced in the early 1990s, the EU and its ASEAN/Asian partners came to their first summit with huge expectations and enthusiasm. President of the Commission Jacques Santer regarded this unprecedented meeting as a “historical turning point” in the relations between Asia and
Europe (quoted in Richards and Kirkpatrick 1999: 684). Yet, all these high hopes and optimism turned out to be short-lived because the ASEM process did not produce tangible results as originally expected (Gaens 2008b: 2; Yeo 2008a: 115). The report of the two research teams commissioned by the ASEM ministers to evaluate the ASEM process on its 10th anniversary concluded that ASEM’s achievements were modest. According this report, the ASEM summit remained at the information sharing level and has not moved into substantial cooperation (Joint Report 2006: 6). The failure of ASEM is also confirmed by the results of the author’s survey. When asked to give their view on the statement ‘the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) process has stayed at the information-sharing level had not moved into a substantive cooperation’, of the 21 respondents, three answered ‘completely agree’, 16 ‘agree’, one ‘neutral’ and only one ‘disagree’. The activities and the issues it deals under its three pillars also yielded modest concrete outcomes. Among its three pillars, only the social and cultural pillar achieved some significant and tangible results. Its political and economic cooperation agenda failed to generate any substantial performance despite having a number of initiatives (Joint Report 2006: 8). Overall, two major failures of ASEM should be underlined here. First, even though it bridged the Asia-Europe link, ASEM could not strengthen that link. That link remained the weakest one in the triangle of North America, Europe and East Asia. From the US’s viewpoint, “ASEM does not exist” (May 2005: 38). Second, not only did ASEM fail to help the EU and ASEAN come out of the deadlocked situation that they faced in the early 1990s due to their disagreements over the value-based issues. These controversial matters were injected into the ASEM framework and eventually jeopardised its progress. The question is why despite great interest and expectation at the beginning, ASEM failed to achieve its objectives.

A number of factors contributed to ASEM’s under-achievement. One of these was the fact that ASEM was created at a time when the economies of Southeast and East Asia enjoyed impressive growth. However, the 1997/98 AFC not only destroyed that economic dynamics but also made the European countries doubt the miracle of the Asian economies and, consequently, became less interested in Asia (Cammack and Richards 1999; Gilson 2011: 240). The existence of numerous asymmetries between the EU, Asia and the US, as well as between the EU and Asia also prevented Asia and

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142 This biennial summit of Heads of State and Government is the most important because it is not only “the centre piece of ASEM” but also “the most obvious manifestation of ASEM to the outside world” (Yeo 2010a: 7).
143 ASEM’s activities are grouped into three pillars: political/security, economic and socio-cultural.
Europe from strengthening their weak link. ASEM was established partly to limit US dominance (Higgott 2000). However, given their weak military capabilities, both the EU and East Asia primarily depended on the US (Hänggi 2004). That is why from the outset the US paid little attention to ASEM (Bobrow 1998; May 2005). Furthermore, though pledging to strengthen its relations with Asia (European Commission 1994; 2001), the EU did not look beyond Europe and its immediate neighbourhood to engage East Asia seriously (Yeo 2004; Park and Kim 2008). This means geographical distance was also a reason behind the EU’s low political activity towards Asia was (Smith 2008).

The informality of ASEM, which was preferred by ASEAN and other Asian countries, was also a drawback (Rüland 2000; Yeo 2004; Loewen 2007). Though it enabled the two regions to dialogue on a wide range of issues, it prevented them from making tangible decisions. For instance, while European leaders wanted to formulate precise and concrete proposals to deal with 2007/2008 global financial crisis, Asian countries opposed it and preferred informal measures, e.g. information sharing and policy exchange (EUROPE Magazine, 2008). This also reflects very different approaches to international relations of the EU and its Asian partners with the former wanting deep institutionalisation and legalistic cooperation whereas the latter preferred an informal and non-binding approach. This was one of many differences between the two sides. For instance, to foster their economic cooperation, both sides decided to establish a number of mechanisms and one of these was Asia-Europe Business Forum. However, this forum could not produce concrete results because both sides viewed it differently. The Asians regarded it as a networking one whereas their European counterparts saw it as a forum to facilitate the working environment and achieve a more binding code (Gaens 2008d: 37).

In fact, the EU and its ASEAN/Asian partners had different perspectives and approaches when establishing the ASEM and these divergences played a key role in hindering their cooperation within the ASEM framework. According to Petersson (2006: 576), it was not the informality of ASEM but rather the differences of the fundamental values (between the EU and its Asian partners) that was the main obstacle in ASEM. Indeed, in its relations with Asia, the EU wanted to focus on political issues, notably human rights and democracy, which was of great importance to it (European Council 1995). In contrast, its Asian partners wanted to avoid them. Their disagreement over the Myanmar issue was a symbol of their divergences. A look at some ASEM summits reveals these disputes. Despite the efforts of both sides to focus on economic
matters, human rights still loomed at the first summit. This meeting involved what McMahon (1998: 250) refers to as “a confusion of the two sets of objectives. Europe was primarily interested in the human rights issues whereas the Asian participants wanted to talk about trading conditions. The result was an agreement to exchange students”. Before the second summit, held in London in 1998, the UK’s Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, made it clear that Myanmar’s officials would not be granted visas to attend the summit (Kynge 1997). In response, Mahathir Mohamad, Malaysia’s Prime Minister warned that Malaysia and other ASEAN members would not attend the meeting because he maintained that the discrimination against Myanmar was also discrimination against ASEAN (European Report, 1997b; Gabriel 1997; Kynge 1997; Camroux 2006: 13; Petersson 2006: 574). Despite that warning, the host did not grant any visas to Myanmar’s senior officials because for the UK and its European partners, ASEM was not just about economics; political issues also had to be discussed. Eventually, ASEAN’s leaders attended the meeting without their Myanmar counterpart after Thailand suggested that joining ASEAN did not automatically imply ASEM membership (Loewen 2008: 20; Manea 2008: 379). Yet, the Myanmar issue was not completely solved, as it would return – and to some extent overshadow – subsequent summits (Ashayagachat 2000; Donnan and Mallet 2004; Petersson 2006; Loewen 2008; Manea 2008; Doan 2010b). For instance, before the Hanoi summit in 2004, the division on Myanmar’s admission to ASEM led to the postponement of ASEM’s finance and economy ministerial meetings scheduled for July and September 2004 respectively. The disputes over Myanmar’s membership were only resolved after both sides reached a compromise, which allowed Myanmar to participate in the Hanoi summit, only with low-level representation. This shows how the EU and its Asian partners viewed human rights differently and how such disagreements could damage ASEM. In fact, given the heavy and negative involvement of human rights and the Myanmar issue, ASEM did not have enough time or energy to concentrate on other important matters, e.g. economic-related issues. According to Gaens (2008c: 41), “the human rights discussion has seriously impeded progress in the dialogue on trade and economy” and the Myanmar issue “remains problematic and is likely to continue influencing ASEM’s course in the near future”. The Joint Report on ASEM (2006: 8) also acknowledged that Myanmar issue turned into a problem that jeopardised the ASEM process.

While recognising that different views existed within the EU and ASEM’s Asian side vis-à-vis the Myanmar matter, it is evident that the EU and its Asian partners,
notably ASEAN members and China, held two contrasting positions towards the Myanmar issue as well as the ASEM process in general. Due to its insistence on the protection and promotion of democratic values, the EU maintained a tough position on Myanmar and wanted the ASEM process to focus on issues, such as human rights and democracy (AFP 2008). In contrast, given their principle of non-interference, the ASEAN members and other Asia countries, notably China, were reluctant to put pressure on Myanmar. Moreover, they were much less interested than the EU – if not at all – in discussing human rights and other related political issues. According to Goh Chok Tong, who was regarded as ASEM’s spiritual father (Gaens 2008c: 19), “because the EU is obliged to profess a common position, Myanmar has become an obstacle to seeking common ground on other more strategic issue” (Goh 2004: 324). In his view, like the EU-ASEAN framework, the ASEM process was held hostage by this single issue, which paralysed and overshadowed other more important issues of the Asian-European relationship (Goh 2004: 324). Most of the responses to the author’s survey also agree the negative effects of these issues on ASEM. When asked to give their views on the statement that ‘the controversial and sensitive issues, e.g. human rights and the Burma/Myanmar problem, overshadowed some of ASEM summits’, of the 21 respondents, six said ‘completely agree’, eight ‘agree’, five ‘neutral’, and only one ‘disagree’. As an Asian official at the AEF confirmed, the controversial issues always came up either before or during the ASEM summits, and sometimes distracted the meetings and even overshadowed them (Interview, 2009). Cultural differences existed not only at the official level but also in the business circle (Gaens 2008d: 37).

The different postures of the EU and its Asian partners vis-à-vis Myanmar, the ASEM process as well as regional and international affairs in general explain very well why the collective identity, i.e. shared norms and values, of the regional groupings involved defines the interregional relations they form. As previously mentioned, the ASEM process is a ‘we-group’/‘they-group’ interaction, in which the EU interacts with a group of ASEAN/Asian countries. This author agrees with the argument made by some major scholars on interregionalism that ASEM shapes the collective identity of the participant regions, i.e. the EU on one side and an Asian ‘we-group’ on the other side. However, from what has been examined, it is clear that the collective identity of the two sides involved also defined the shape and outcome of ASEM. The EU entered the relations with Asia as a regional actor, which, besides its economic interest, wanted to promote liberal and democratic norms, e.g. democracy and human rights. In contrast,
in entering a partnership with the EU, ASEAN and other members of the Asian side of ASEM were not interested in human rights and democracy because these did not feature prominently, if not at all, in their normative discourse and practice. For instance, even though it is seen as a Westernised country, Japan tried to keep human rights off the agenda at the first ASEM summit and “was pursuing an Asian line on human rights, one which eschewed direct discussion of the subject at summit meetings” (Gilson 1999: 742-3). For other Asian members, e.g. India and Pakistan, human rights and democracy did not rank as high on their respective agendas as they did for the EU. Instead, the principle of non-interference was central to their internal and external relations. Another difference was that ASEAN and Asian states opted for loose and non-binding institutionalisation of international affairs, which not only distinguished from but also opposed to deep institutionalisation and legalistic cooperation preferred by the EU. Thus, like the EU-ASEAN framework, the ASEM process is a ‘we-group’ vs. a ‘they-group’ interaction, in which each group promoted its own normative premises, which were not only divergent from those of the other but also resisted by the other. Indeed, as explained in Chapter 2 and illustrated in Chapters 6 as well as in this chapter, such an insistence/resistance pattern was the reason why the EU and ASEAN/Asian countries found it difficult to interact with each other. An assessment of ASEM made in 2001 concluded that “[u]ntil the two regions can arrive at a joint solution to divided interests, ideas, and identity on issues such as human rights, democracy, and environmental protection, the long-term prospect of ASEM cooperation may be seriously limited” (Lee and Park 2001: 31). The view that Asia and Europe were hardly able to find common ground to advance their cooperation was maintained by Goh Chok Tong, who said that “[t]oo often Asia and Europe are talking at and not with each other” (Goh 2004: 324, emphasis added). Yeo Lay Hwee, a key scholar on Asia-Europe relations, also noted that, “[t]here is a perception in Asia that there is more of a monologue, rather than a dialogue” between the EU and its Asian partners (Friends of Europe 2011: 8).

In summary, it is clear that since 1988 when Myanmar became an issue in EU-ASEAN relations to recent notable changes in this country, which began in 2010, the EU and ASEAN could not find a common position vis-à-vis the issue. In fact, like in the East Timor case, the two organisations failed to work together to reach a common policy that could produce positive and significant impacts on Myanmar and their relations. In other words, EU-ASEAN cooperation did not contribute anything to the changes in both East Timor and Myanmar. Instead, as illustrated in this chapter, they
had opposing views of and approaches to the Myanmar issue and such divergences jeopardised their political and economic cooperation, not only within their interregional relations but also within the broader ASEM framework. Thus, the Myanmar problem is a convincing example to illustrate a number of important propositions assumed by the thesis. One of these is the argument that the EU and ASEAN are different norm entrepreneurs and normative powers with one being founded on and seeking to individual-centred values whereas the other champions state-centric principles in their regional and international relations. Another is the view that their focus on two different sets of norms was the main reason for their disagreements over human rights and Myanmar, which resulted in hindering their relations. Their normative divergences became a major hindrance in their cooperation when one organisation strongly promoted its preferred norms and the other opposed them. Indeed, they disputed over human rights and Myanmar because the EU insisted on the promotion and protection of its liberal cosmopolitan values whereas ASEAN resented the EU’s insistence. This also means their conflicting norms jeopardised their cooperation, especially at the political and economic levels.

Yet, while holding that the EU and ASEAN are radically different from each other in terms of their normative premises and such differences significantly deter their cooperation, this thesis does not maintain that they differ from each other all the time and in every aspect. Neither does it argue that that their normative differences always lead them to clash. The next chapter, which examines the Aceh matter, will show that they sometimes manage to accommodate their differences,144 or even find some common ground, to work together and whenever they achieve this they are better to cooperate with each other.

8. The Aceh issue and EU-ASEAN security cooperation

Chapters 6 and 7 have shown that the EU’s strong insistence on the protection and promotion of its normative values and ASEAN’s firm resistance to that assertion (because it violated its core norms) and the normative disconnection between the EU and ASEAN was the fundamental reason behind their disputes over East Timor and Myanmar, which consequently jeopardised their overall relations. This chapter looks at

144 As shown above, in the early 2000s, they managed to compromise their differences and that paved the way for them to take a number of initiatives to revive their relationship and economic cooperation during the first half of the last decade.
the Aceh matter, which, unlike the two first, did not witness any disagreements between the EU and ASEAN even though it was a long-lasting and deadly conflict in the ASEAN region. Instead, they were able and successful to work together and complete a joint operation, namely the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM). A key factor contributing to their successful collaboration was that they found some common ground to deal with human rights, which were a controversial issue in their relations. Thus, by examining the Aceh issue the chapter aims to illustrate a key argument, that is whenever their views and norms converge – or whenever they limit or compromise their normative differences – they have a better chance to cooperate with each other. Yet, this chapter also notes that while they were successful to work together in the AMM, the EU and ASEAN had different attitudes towards the AMM and its achievements. The EU repeatedly hailed the AMM and its success whereas ASEAN rarely mentioned it. This can be explained by their different ways of perceiving and dealing with security issues. Given these difference, coupled with the EU’s lack of military capabilities, though it made a major contribution to the Aceh peace process, the EU’s role in Southeast Asian security is relatively irrelevant. Therefore, by examining the Aceh issue, the chapter aims to support the central argument of the thesis – that overall the EU and ASEAN are two different normative powers. While their normative differences did not lead them to clash with each other over the Aceh issue as they did it in the cases of East Timor and Myanmar, they were the main reason behind the EU’s lacklustre contribution to the ARF, its exclusion from the EAS\(^\text{145}\) and, consequently, its insignificant role in Southeast Asian security. Overall, the aim of this chapter is to illustrate the (1), (2) and (3d), (3e) and (3f) propositions of the thesis.

8.1. The conflict and peace process

The conflict in Aceh, Indonesia’s westernmost province, with a population of about 4.2 million,\(^\text{146}\) between the rebel fighters of the Free Aceh Movement or Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) and the Government of Indonesia (GoI) was regarded as one of Asia’s longest-running internal conflicts (Feith 2007: 1). It could be traced back to 1976, when Indonesian rule over the territory was contested by the GAM. The conflict

\(^{145}\) Together with the ADMM-Plus, the ARF and the EAS are the key ASEAN-led institutions, which deal with political and security issues in Southeast Asia the Asia-Pacific region. These two institutions will be briefly examined in this chapter.

intensified in 1989, when a larger rebellion was met by a massive military counterinsurgency operation of the GoI. Since then to 1998 Aceh was known as a military operations area and during this period Indonesian security forces in their pursuit of the GAM fighters perpetrated human rights abuses against the Acehnese population (Schulze 2007b: 3). Compared to the East Timor conflict, the Aceh one was less severe. Nevertheless, it claimed an estimated 12,000 lives as of 2003 (Burke 2008: 50). Following the fall of the authoritarian regime of President Suharto in May 1998, the situation in Aceh changed. Faced with potential conflict in other parts of Indonesia and pressured by a public outcry at human rights violations in Aceh, the new government of President Abdurrahman Wahid, elected in October 1999, was willing to consider political rather than military means to resolve the issue. This paved the way for the dialogue between the GoI and GAM (Aspinall and Crouch 2003: 2). Facilitated by Henry Dunant Centre (HDC), a Geneva-based advocacy group, the GoI and the GAM signed a *Joint Understanding on Humanitarian Pause for Aceh* on 12 May 2000 in Switzerland. However, this *Humanitarian Pause*, which was hailed by the UN, the US and the EU, generated only a temporary halt to the violence (Aspinall 2005: vii). Two years later, on 9 December 2002, the two parties signed a *Cessation of Hostilities Agreement* (COHA) in Geneva (Reid 2004: 312). Again, the COHA collapsed when the Government of President Megawati Sukarnoputri imposed martial law in Aceh in May 2003 and allowed the Indonesian armed forces to launch a major military offensive in this province (Aspinall 2005: vii). There were several reasons for the collapse of these two peace initiatives and chief among these was the huge gap between the goals of both parties (Aspinall and Crouch 2003: 46; Reid 2004: 313; Strategic Comments 2005).\(^{147}\)

With the failure of the COHA, Aceh seemed destined to endure many more years of armed conflict (Aspinall 2005: vii). Yet, the tsunami at the end of 2004, which killed 150,000 people, left half a million homeless and destroyed livelihoods and infrastructure in Aceh (Solana 2005b), brought Aceh into the international spotlight and offered ways of linking the reconstruction effort and peace process (Wiryono 2008: 26; Törnquist 2011: 832).\(^{148}\) In fact, under great pressure from international donors, who maintained that their promised reconstruction aid for Aceh could only be effectively delivered if security was restored, the two parties decided to commence new peace talks

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\(^{147}\) The GAM repeatedly insisted it would settle for nothing less than independence whereas the GoI insisted that negotiations had to occur within the framework of the unitary state.

\(^{148}\) Yet, other factors, e.g. political changes in Indonesia, which had preceded it, also played a key role in facilitating the negotiations (Schulze (2007b: 3)).
Among those key international donors was the EU, who saw this as an opportunity to engage the GoI and the GAM in talks towards a peace agreement (Solana 2005b). Funded and facilitated by the EU, this time, the peace talks were mediated by the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI), chaired by Finland’s former President Martti Ahtisaari. Unlike the peace talks negotiated under the aegis of the HDC, the intention of the CMI was to achieve a final agreement that would cover a wide range of issues. These included Aceh’s long-term development and reconstruction, Indonesia’s security arrangements for Aceh, human rights and monitoring of both sides’ undertakings after the agreement (Strategic Comments 2005; Ahtisaari 2008: 11). After five rounds of talks in Helsinki, on 15 August 2005, the GoI and the GAM signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in Helsinki, also known as the Helsinki Accord, ending the three-decade continuous armed conflict in Aceh (Kingsbury 2006; Schulze 2007a; Ahtisaari 2008). This peace agreement, under which the GAM agreed to give up its armed struggle for independence and demobilise and in exchange, the GoI offered far-reaching autonomy for Aceh and an amnesty for the GAM fighters (Solana 2005b), was clearly more advanced and concrete than the two failed attempts mediated by the HDC. More precisely, as noted earlier, besides providing the broad outlines of a political and security settlement, it agreed the establishment of an international team, known as the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM), composed of the EU and five ASEAN members, to oversee the implementation of the peace agreement (Ahtisaari 2008: 13).

By giving an overview of the conflict and peace process in Aceh, this section highlights three important points that will be examined in more detail in the subsequent sections of the chapter. The first is about the Aceh Monitoring Mission. It was the first time that the EU and ASEAN closely and successfully worked together to undertake an operation. The question raised is why they were able to cooperate in Aceh whereas they failed to do so in the case of East Timor and Myanmar as examined in the two previous chapters. The next section will look at the AMM, its achievement and the reasons behind its success. The second is related to the postures of the EU and ASEAN towards the Aceh issue as a whole. Though the conflict took place its region, ASEAN was not

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149 The European Commission had committed $720 million to Aceh’s reconstruction (Strategic Comments 2005).

150 The MoU (2005) consisted of six sections, namely (1) the governing of Aceh, (2) human rights, (3) amnesty and reintegration into society, (4) security arrangements, (5) the establishment of an AMM to oversee the implementation of the peace agreement and (6) dispute settlement.
concerned about it. In fact, with some minor exceptions, until their participation in the AMM, ASEAN as a whole and its members largely ignored the conflict. In contrast, together with UN, the US and Japan, the EU encouraged the peace initiatives brokered by the HDC (Aspinall and Crouch 2003) as well as expressed its concern about the Aceh situation after the failure of COHA (Joint Statement on Aceh 2003). Furthermore, as shown, it played a crucial role in facilitating the Helsinki peace talks. In other words, while the EU acted as a peace promoter by seeking to end the conflict and bring a sustainable peace to Aceh, ASEAN was largely indifferent to the Aceh conflict. Their differing attitudes were clearly manifested by the fact that while the EU proudly and repeatedly mentioned the Aceh peace process, the AMM and its achievement, ASEAN rarely talked about these. The fundamental reason behind their different postures was the EU acted as a cosmopolitan normative power, which strongly focused on the promotion of liberal peace and other individual-centred norms, whereas ASEAN behaved as communitarian normative power, which stressed the importance of national security. The third section will demonstrate in more detail their different stances vis-à-vis the Aceh issue and the reason behind their divergences. To illustrate why their dissimilar ways of viewing and dealing with the Aceh issue and other regional and international affairs hinder their relations and their security cooperation, the last section of the chapter will look at the ARF and the EAS, which are two of the key ASEAN-led security institutions.

8.2 The AMM and EU-ASEAN cooperation

One of the reasons for the collapse of the two earlier peace Aceh initiatives mediated by the HDC was the lack of strong diplomatic support for their implementation. Thus, the key lesson learnt from the previous failures made it crucial to identify a credible international partner to oversee the implementation of the eventual agreement (Braud and Grevi 2005: 21; Solana 2005b). In fact, the belief that the success of any peace agreement required a stronger political backing was raised and discussed during the first talks in Helsinki. The GAM representatives wanted international peacekeeping forces, while the delegates of the GoI did not accept any traditional UN

151 Thailand’s former Minister Surin Pitsuan was among a few mediators that participated in the renewed peace talks mediated by the HDC in 2001. Thailand and the Philippines participated in the Joint Security Committee to monitor the COHA (Aspinall and Crouch 2003: 27).
peacekeeping operations in Aceh,\textsuperscript{152} preferring a monitoring team consisting of only ASEAN members (Schulze 2007b: 3; Burke 2008: 56). In the end, they agreed to set up the AMM, which comprised of the EU and ASEAN members (MoU 2005, point 5.3; European Council 2005; Solana 2005b; Feith 2007: 2). The five ASEAN members, which participated in this EU-led mission,\textsuperscript{153} were Brunei, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Besides the EU and the five mentioned ASEAN members, it also included Norway and Switzerland (Schulze 2007b: 3; Burke 2008: 56; Ashton 2010; Anderson 2012: 2). The AMM’s mandate, which lasted from 15 September 2005 until 15 December 2006, was to monitor the implementation of both parties’ commitments. Among AMM’s eight tasks are the monitoring human rights situation and providing assistance in this fields and the investigation and ruling on complaints and alleged violations of the peace agreement (MoU, point 5.2; European Council 2005, article 5; Solana 2005b).

As the composition of its participants illustrates, the AMM was not purely an interregional cooperation between the EU and ASEAN because, in addition to the EU and the five ASEAN countries, there was also the contribution of two other non-EU European countries, namely Norway and Switzerland. Nevertheless, the EU’s cooperation with ASEAN states to monitor the execution of the Aceh peace agreement was unique and very noteworthy in many aspects (Solana 2006d). For ASEAN and its members, whether they sought to ignore it or not, they could not forget that the Aceh conflict was an enduring and deadly one that took place in their member state, namely Indonesia. Moreover, half of ASEAN members participated in the AMM.\textsuperscript{154} For the EU, the AMM was the first-ever mission that it pursued under its European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in Asia (Solana 2006d; Feith 2007: 3) and its involvement was appreciated in the region (Cameron 2010: 280). Even though there were other factors and actors, which played their part in resolving the conflict, the EU’s role was of significant importance, especially its leading role in the AMM (Solana 2005b; 2006d; Ashton 2010). According to Gunaryadi (2006: 88-9), the EU’s support for the CMI,

\textsuperscript{152} For the GoI as the negative experience of the international intervention in East Timor was still fresh, the presence of international forces in its territory was a sensitive issue. Similarly, for ASEAN states, due to their principle of non-interference, they were not always comfortable to participate in a peace process in one member state was a sensitive matter (Braud and Grevi 2005: 21).

\textsuperscript{153} The mission was headed by Pieter Feith, who reported to the European Council and directly to Javier Solana, the EU’s then High Representative for CFSP (European Council 2005, article 5; Schulze 2007b: 3; Burke 2008: 56).

\textsuperscript{154} That means only four new and less developed members of ASEAN, namely Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar and Cambodia did not engage in this process.
which enjoyed the its exclusive and full support legally and financially, was indispensable in initiating and nurturing the Helsinki Accord. Most importantly, EU-ASEAN cooperation was remarkable because, as underlined by an EU official, the AMM was the unprecedented mission that EU and ASEAN members joined together with forces on the ground to monitor a peace process (Interview, 2009; see also Solana 2006d; 2009). It was also the first time, the EU and ASEAN members “worked together closely in the field of crisis” (AEMM 2007, point 9). In every part of its work, the AMM fully integrated teams of EU and ASEAN monitors (Feith 2006; 2007). Indeed, from the top level to that of field inspections, the AMM was “really a joint EU-ASEAN effort” (Solana 2005b; 2006d).

With regard to the MoU, it was widely seen as a notable achievement not only because it was reached in a relatively short time but also because of its successful implementation. According to Feith (2006; 2007), a number of factors contributed to this success and one of these was the credibility and role of the AMM. Unlike the two previous agreements which failed due to the lack of a strong and credible monitoring team, the implementation of the Helsinki Accord was supervised by a team of states from the EU and ASEAN that both the rebel fighters and the GoI accepted (Braud and Grevi 2005: 36; Solana 2005b). Thanks to this, the AMM had significant influence on the two parties (Feith 2007: 3). For Schulze (2007a: 49; 2007b: 13), who considers the AMM and the transition from conflict to peace in Aceh as ‘mission not so impossible’, the AMM was a clear achievement because without its monitors and expertise the implementation of the MoU would have been much more difficult and the Aceh peace process may have collapsed early on. In his view, there were five key reasons behind the accomplishment of the AMM. They were: (1) the full commitment of both the GAM and the GoI to the peace process, (2) the leadership and impartiality of the mission, (3) the support of EU member states during the set-up phase, (4) the quick amnesty and the committee on security arrangements and (5) the AMM’s lack of focus on implementing the human rights elements at the beginning of the process (Schulze 2007a: 49; 2007b: 14). This author agrees with such an assessment of the AMM, especially the last point, which is examined in more detail below because it is very useful in explaining EU-ASEAN relations in general and their cooperation in the AMM in particular as well as illustrating some key arguments maintained by the thesis.

155 The other factors included the clarity of the agreement’s provisions and timelines, the strong political of both parties to make the process work and the timing of the peace process (Feith 2007: 3).
The MoU had a number of specific clauses relating to human rights and one of the eight tasks of the AMM was “to monitor the human rights situation and provide assistance in this field” (MoU, point 5.2). However, the AMM did not focus on this task, especially at the beginning. In fact, in the implementation of the peace agreement the human rights issue was generally overlooked because the in the end the human rights court and the commission for truth and reconciliation were not established even though in the MoU both sides agreed their establishment and the AMM had to monitor that establishment. The lack of the AMM’s focus on human rights and its success in this area resulted in criticism by human rights organisations. Some European circles were also disappointed about this lack of progress on human rights and even GAM was critical of this deficit (Schulze 2007b: 9). Yet, the AMM’s relative ignorance of the human rights issue was essential because such an approach “made it possible for the AMM to ultimately complete its mission in the highly sensitive context of Indonesian domestic politics” (Schulze 2007b: 1; 14). As seen in Chapters 6 and 7, human rights had become a highly politicised and disruptive issue in the EU’s relations with ASEAN and Indonesia. For this reason, if the AMM had focussed on the respect of human rights, which was one of six points of the peace agreement, too early and too obsessively, the GoI could have become very uncomfortable and decided to withdraw from the peace concord. As acknowledged by Justin Davis, the AMM’s Chief-of-Staff, “[i]f we had gone in 2005 and had said that we will focus on human rights we would have been finished’ (quoted in Schulze 2007a: 22; 2007b: 9). That view also shared by an Indonesian diplomat, who made it clear that “[i]t was a simple choice of facilitating the end of armed conflict in Aceh or losing this opportunity by talking about human rights, which would not have brought about results anyway” (quoted in Schulze 2007b: 9). These two comments illustrate that not only the AMM’s strong focus on human rights would have led to the collapse of the peace agreement but also that such an approach would not created any concrete results in the human rights area. Thus, it is possible that the monitors involved in the EU-led mission had learnt the lesson from the issues of East Timor Myanmar that the EU’s emphasis on the promotion of human rights not only jeopardised EU-ASEAN relations but prevented it from achieving any results at all in that area.

Another crucial factor that encouraged the GoI’s peace negotiations and settlements with the GAM to solve the Aceh conflict in the early 2000s, notably the Helsinki talks and the MoU, and led it to allow the EU to participate in monitoring the
implementation of the MoU was Indonesia’s transition from autocratic rule to a vigorous multiparty system. It is probable that the Aceh conflict would not have been peacefully solved if Indonesia had not started its democratisation process in the late 1990s and gradually strengthened it in the early 2000s. This democratic evolution not only encouraged Jakarta to find a peaceful solution to the Aceh conflict but also enabled it to be more receptive to the fundamental values, e.g. democracy, human rights, rule of law, good governance – the values that the EU strongly promoted. Indeed, as noted by the European Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy Benita Ferrero-Waldner, “[i]t is surely no coincidence that the dramatic breakthrough in the Aceh conflict has come as Indonesia’s democracy has grown stronger” (Ferrero-Waldner 2006). This point also shows that, as highlighted by a constructivist perspective, the change of identity of a political actor also prompts it to modify its domestic and foreign policy. Furthermore, the fact that the EU did not criticise Indonesia’s handling of Aceh as it had done in the East Timor case was also of importance because it paved the way for the GoI to accept the EU’s involvement in the Helsinki talks and eventually invite the EU to lead the AMM. In reality, the EU did not issue any statement criticising human rights violations in Aceh despite the long-standing and violent conflict in this province.

From what has been examined, some major points should be drawn. It is clear that through its strong support for the Helsinki talks and especially its leading role in the AMM, there is no doubt that the EU played a key part in bringing a lasting peace to Aceh after 30 years of armed conflict (Solana 2005b; 2006d). As identified by Gunaryadi (2006: 93-7), there were a number of economic, political and strategic reasons behind the EU’s support for the Helsinki talks and its participation in the AMM. Chief among these was that its involvement in Aceh fit into very well its commitment to promoting peace, security and justice in the world through its ‘soft power’ means, e.g. its political and economic weight, resources and especially its shared values (European Council 2003; Solana 2005b; 2006c; 2006d; Feith 2007: 3). As will be further developed in the third section, the EU was willing to conduct a complicated

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156 These included the EU’s desire to play a greater global role. Economic interest was another factor. The EU perceived that the rebuilding of a post-tsunami Aceh, with the cost of construction being forecast to be €4,169 billion, would generate huge economic opportunities for its firms (Gunaryadi 2006: 94-5).

157 After the US-led military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq following the 9/11 terrorist events, by supporting the two parties to reach a peace agreement and helping them to implement it, the EU wanted to voice a moral message that conflicts could be solved by peaceful means (Gunaryadi 2006: 94; Ashton 2010).
mission, which was far from its traditional geographical sphere of interest (Wong 2012: 41, because that engagement suited its international identity and role as a normative power that sought to promote its prime norm of peace and other core norms to other regions in the world (Rynning 2003; Kaldor et al. 2007; Biava et al. 2011). Indeed, as noted by Gunaryadi (2006: 94), the EU’s involvement in the Aceh peace process because supporting good governance, local democracy and sustainable development was an important part of the mainstream agenda of its foreign policy.

The EU’s cooperation with ASEAN regarding the Aceh issue was remarkable because for the first time the two organisations could work together and make a significant contribution to the security in Aceh and Southeast Asia in general. Though they had successfully forged a united posture vis-à-vis political and security matters, e.g. the issues of Afghanistan and Cambodia and their cooperation to fight against terrorism in the aftermath of the 9/11 events, it is probably safe to say that never before did the EU and ASEAN have such a close, tangible and successful cooperation in any field. Moreover, it is evident that they could do so because they found some common ground in terms of their approaches vis-à-vis the Aceh peace process and its implementation. Indonesia’s mere willingness to invite the EU and five ASEAN members to participate in the AMM was already an achievement. As noted earlier, for the GoI, in the aftermath of the international intervention in East Timor in the late 1990s, the involvement of international forces on its soil was always seen as a risky and susceptible matter. For ASEAN countries, given their core and long-standing principle of non-interference, getting involved to solve a member state’s internal problem was not something they were willing or happy to undertake. Thus, their overcoming this sensitivity in order to work together to monitor the peace process was by itself a noteworthy success. The common and plausible approach to the controversial issue of human rights of the EU and ASEAN monitors also facilitated their cooperation. Without delicately dealing with this contentious matter, the AMM would had have failed and, consequently, the peace agreement would have collapsed. One of the key hypotheses of the thesis is the premise that whenever the EU and ASEAN try to avoid, limit or accommodate their normative differences their tensions are significantly decreased and this paves the way for some substantial cooperation. This point illustrates very well that proposition.

Indeed, the EU wanted to engage in the Aceh peace process because such a commitment was an integral part of its international role as a normative power that was
keen to transfer its core norms to other countries and regions in the world. By mid-
2000s, thanks to its democratic transition, the GoI was also more willing to embrace
those norms, making it no longer regard the EU’s involvement as interfering into its
internal affairs. Furthermore, unlike the cases of East Timor and Myanmar, in which the
EU strongly, if not bluntly, insisted ASEAN and its members to respect the democratic
norms it cherished, in its dealing with the Aceh issue, the EU did not take that tough
posture. This not only diminished their differences but also enabled them to cooperate.
Thus, the Aceh issue is an example to illustrate that whenever their views and
approaches vis-à-vis international affairs converge, the EU and ASEAN are better able
to cooperate with each other. In contrast, as seen in the two previous chapters, whenever
their normative elements diverge from or compete with each other, they find it difficult
to interact.

Yet, though finding some common ground to oversee successfully the AMM, the
EU and ASEAN still view the EU-led mission and its achievement rather differently.
The EU repeatedly and proudly talks about the success of the mission and its
significance to the EU’s foreign policy and its relations with ASEAN whereas the
AMM and its achievement were much less mentioned in and by ASEAN. The next
sections will develop in more detail these differences, the reason behind them as well as
their implication to the relations between the EU and ASEAN and their cooperation in
the security in particular. An examination of these issues will show that overall the EU
and ASEAN remain two different regional actors or normative powers with divergent
ways of perceiving and conducting regional and international affairs. This prevents
them from substantially cooperate with each other, especially the strategic/security area.

8.3. Two different attitudes towards the AMM

As singled out earlier, though the violent and long-standing conflict took place in
their region, ASEAN and its members were not concerned about it. In fact, until the
participation of the five ASEAN members in the AMM, the Aceh conflict was never a
relevant issue in ASEAN as the Association and its members saw it as solely an internal
affair of Indonesia and did not interfere. This was reflected in the fact that it was barely
mentioned in the ASEAN summits and ASEAN Ministerial Meetings (AMM) and
rarely referred to in the communiqués of these meetings. If ASEAN states referred to it
in the final statements of their meetings, they did so in order to show their support for
Indonesia’s unity. For instance, in their AMM in 2000, ASEAN Foreign Ministers
expressed their support for Indonesia’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and national unity and commended the efforts and measures taken by the Indonesian Government to restore peace and order (AMM 2000, point 22). In their meeting in 2003, which took place after the collapse of the COHA and Indonesia’s subsequent military campaign in Aceh, they reaffirmed their continuing support for Indonesia’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and national unity and recognised its efforts to restore peace and order in Aceh. They also “pledged our support to deny the separatist movement access to means of violence through, among all, preventing arms smuggling into the Aceh province” (AMM 2003, point 17). Notably, despite their significance, the MoU and the Aceh Monitoring Mission barely appeared in ASEAN’s official discourse. In fact, to the author’s knowledge, the MoU and the AMM were mentioned twice by ASEAN. The first was during the 11th ASEAN summit in December 2005, held after the signing of MoU, when ASEAN leaders welcomed the conclusion of the MoU (ASEAN Summit 2005, point 33). The second reference to it was made by Ong Keng Yong, ASEAN’s then Secretary-General, during a lecture at the Polish Institute of International Affairs during his visit to Poland, in 2007, which was also the year that marked 30th anniversary of EU-ASEAN relations (Ong 2007). There was not a single separate statement issued by ASEAN or its officials on the MoU or the AMM.

In contrast, the Aceh issue was present in the EU’s policy. As noted earlier, while ASEAN as a whole was silent over the two agreements between the GAM and the GoI brokered by the HDC in the early 2000s, the EU voiced their support for these initiatives (Aspinall and Crouch 2003). Though it did not criticise Indonesia and human rights in Aceh as it had done in the case of East Timor, together with the US and Japan, the EU issued a Joint Statement on Aceh on 6 November 2003, expressing its concern for the extension of state of military emergency in this territory. In that statement, while reiterating their commitment to Indonesia’s territorial integrity, the EU, Japan and the US believed that “the conflict in Aceh can only be ended with a political solution” and that “good governance reforms, autonomy and development plans are critical to resolve the conflict” (Joint Statement on Aceh, 2003). Surely, ASEAN would not issue such a statement. In fact, Indonesia regarded that joint statement as a foreign ‘meddling’ in its affairs and worked diligently within ASEAN to obtain declarations of support for its national unity as mentioned earlier (Weatherbee and Emmers 2005: 142). More remarkably, while the Aceh peace agreement, the AMM and its achievement were scarcely brought up in and by ASEAN, they were repeatedly mentioned by the EU. The
EU had official and unofficial statements that referred to or exclusively focused on the Helsinki Accord, the AMM and its success. These include – but are not limited to – those of the European Council (2005; 2006a; 2006b), the European Commissioner for External Relations, Benita Ferrero-Waldner (2006), the Head of the AMM, Pieter Feith (2006; 2007), the EU’s High Representative for the CFSP, Xavier Solana (2005a; 2005b; 2006a; 2006b, 2006c; 2006d; 2006e; 2007; 2009). In 2010, the EU even marked the fifth anniversary of the signature of the MoU (Ashton 2010).

In those statements, the EU often hailed the Aceh’s peaceful evolution and its contribution to that progress (Solana 2005b; 2006b; Ferrero-Waldner 2006; Ashton 2010). It also commended its collaboration with ASEAN in the AMM, regarding the joint mission as a comprehensive political and security cooperation between the two organisations (Solana 2005b; 2006b; 2007). In addition, its officials believed that the “outstanding way” the EU and ASEAN worked together in Aceh was the most significant boost for their relations and opened the ground for possible further EU-ASEAN cooperation (Solana 2005b; 2006b; 2006d; 2007; Feith 2007). Later the chapter will see whether the AMM could pave the way for the EU and ASEAN to advance their strategic and security cooperation as the EU envisaged and hoped. The point being made here is that the EU repeatedly and proudly spoke about the AMM and its achievement and highlighted its significance to the EU’s foreign policy and its cooperation with ASEAN, especially in the strategic and security area. This view of the EU is very different from ASEAN’s because the Aceh issue in general and its cooperation with the EU in the AMM did not figure prominently in its internal and external policies as well as its relations with the EU.

The differing postures of the EU and ASEAN vis-à-vis the MoU, the AMM and its achievement were manifested not only at the official level but also at other unofficial ones. In fact, the Aceh conflict, the Helsinki Accord as well as the AMM were mostly covered and studied in Europe and to some extent in the US. They were much less talked about in Southeast Asia. For instance, in her study, based on World News Connection dataset, Anderson (2012: 7) discovers that among the worldwide coverage of the Aceh Monitoring Mission, 37.7% of articles from EU countries and only 1.0% from ASEAN countries. She also finds it astonishing that the Lexis/Nexis and World News Connection uncovered next to no articles published in English in ASEAN

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158 51.0 % were from Indonesia and this was not surprising because the Aceh issue was an Indonesia one.
countries about the AMM. More precisely, according to her research, the Bangkok Post (Thailand), the Manila Times and the Daily Inquirer (Philippines) and the New Light of Myanmar had no coverage whatsoever. Malaysia’s New Straits Times had eight articles, but three were written by Javier Solana and the rest were on the peace process in general with little mention of mission. Singapore’s Straits Times had nine articles. However, as in Malaysia, three were written by Javier Solana, one by the Commissioner for External Relations, one from the UK High Commissioner and the rest were on the peace process without referring to the AMM (Anderson 2012: 7-8). The question is why the EU and ASEAN had contrasting postures vis-à-vis the AMM and its achievement.

In explaining why the press in ASEAN countries rarely mentioned the AMM, Anderson (2012: 8) aptly points out that the ASEAN way, notably the principle of non-interference, was the reason behind the absence of the AMM in ASEAN media. Indeed, due to their core principle of non-interference in other states’ internal affairs and given the sensitive nature of the peace agreement, it was inevitable that ASEAN countries’ governments chose to ignore the mission. For them, as she noted, “even praise of the mission might sound like an endorsement of EU interference in the region and a tacit criticism of Jakarta” (Anderson 2012: 8). Yet, it was only the tip of the iceberg. The root of their dissimilar postures vis-à-vis the Aceh issue is that the security environment in Europe and Southeast Asia and the way the two organisations perceive and deal with security are fundamentally divergent from each other.

Thanks to its members’ commitment to dealing peacefully with disputes and cooperating through common institutions and the progressive spread of the rule of law and democracy that transformed authoritarian regimes into secure and stable democracy, the EU is now a united and peaceful region in which large-scale aggression among its member states is improbable (European Council 2003: 3, 6). In contrast, as underlined in Chapter 5, due to existing territorial disputes and other factors, tensions between ASEAN members remain. Furthermore, while the EU’s external environment, e.g. its neighbourhood, is relatively stable, the security situation in Southeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific region is still volatile. Indeed, despite important changes in the international system during the last decades, the security context that ASEAN states experienced 40 or 50 years ago has not changed significantly.

Given the differences of their security context – and this illustrates well how their respective environment determine their norms, which is the (2) assumption – security is also understood differently in the EU and ASEAN. In the EU, security is no longer
perceived within the realist state-centric view of national security, e.g. territorial
defence against threats from another state. It is interpreted in a much broader sense
(Ellner 2008: 10; Yeo 2009: 11). In its ESS, which is the key document of the EU on
security, the EU identified terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
regional conflicts, state failure and organised crimes as the key threats to its security
(European Council 2003: 5-9). With regard to the state failure, which the EU sees as an
alarming phenomenon that undermines global governance and adds to regional stability,
the ESS identifies bad governance, e.g. corruption, abuse of power, weak institutions
and lack of accountability, and civil conflict corrode states from within as two major
causes (European Council 2003: 8-9). Thus, it is clear that from the EU’s perspective,
non-traditional problems are the major sources of threats to its security and global
security. That is why the intra-state problems, e.g. the Aceh conflict, the East Timor
issue and the Myanmar problem, featured in its foreign policy and its relations with
ASEAN. A crucial element of the ESS is that though it does not explicitly mention the
concept of ‘human security’, it strongly focuses on this form of security. In fact, nine
months after the publication of the ESS, a team led by Mary Kaldor and other members
of the Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, which was convened by Javier
Solana issued A Human Security Doctrine for Europe with the aim of proposing a new
doctrine for implementing the ESS (Kaldor et al. 2004: 8). According to this report,
which emphasises that the main sources of insecurity are either authoritarian states that
repress their own citizens or a combination of state and non-state armed groups in
conditions of state failure, human security means individual freedom from basic
insecurities, caused by gross human rights violations (Kaldor et al. 2004: 8-9).

In contrast, in ASEAN, security is mainly understood in the most traditional
concept of national security. Chapter 5 has underlined that in Southeast Asia, three
sources of challenges/threat to security are identified. They are those that emanate from
(1) other regional states, (2) from states outside the region and (3) from within
individual states. It also noted that the security that Southeast Asian countries aim to

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159 This emphasis on non-traditional security threats is also strongly stressed in the 2008 Report on the
160 The concept of human security is generally associated to Human Development Report: New
Dimensions of Human Security by UN Development Programme (UNDP) in 1994, which defined that
“human security is people-centred” (UNDP 1994: 23). For more on this concept and the EU’s human
security doctrine, see also Kaldor et al. (2004, 2007), Glasius and Kaldor (2006a), MacFarlane and Khong
maintain is that of (1) the region as a whole, (2) the regional countries, i.e. territorial integrity and sovereignty, and (3) the regimes/ruling elites in the region (Bellamy 2004: 166; Kivimaki 2007: 434; Stubbs: 2008: 459). As illustrated by the two first sources and forms of security, in ASEAN security is predominantly state-centred and related to inter-state conflicts, not the internal conflicts, e.g. the Aceh issue, were and continue to be the primary concerns of ASEAN members. ASEAN’s state-centric view of security is also obvious in the concept of ‘comprehensive security’ used by policy makers in ASEAN, which emphasises a holistic view of security that includes both military and non-military threats, does not pay attention to the aspects of human security, e.g. human rights (Yeo 2009c: 15). Furthermore, though expanding the scope of security to include non-traditional types of security threats, e.g. ethnic, religious, racial, and inter-group conflicts, this concept still regards those threats as the threats to the states (Nishikawa 2009: 225).

Finally, due the two first, the EU and ASEAN approaches to security divergently; and this is another important reason why they had different postures towards the Aceh peace process, the AMM and its achievement. The EU’s security strategy states that “the best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic states” and stresses that the best means of fostering and strengthening that world are “spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights” (European Council 2003: 16). More precisely, as Biscop (2007a: 4; 2007b: 5) highlights, the EU opts for a ‘soft’ approach to security, which emphasises the access to four core ‘global public goods’. They are: (1) physical security or freedom from fear, (2) economic prosperity or freedom from want, (3) political participation, i.e. democracy, respect for human rights, and (4) social well-being, i.e. access to health care and education. The EU’s adoption of such a normative approach to security, which is strongly rooted in the concept of human security (Ellner 2008: 9), was the key reason behind its support for the Helsinki talks and its engagement in the AMM. As noted by the EU’s doctrine of human security, a human security approach for the EU “means that it should contribute to the protection of every individual human being and not focus only on the defence of the

161 These include territorial disputes in the South China Sea, bilateral territorial disputes among ASEAN members, and the possible rivalry among major powers (Sukma 2009: 112).
162 In his speech at the Special Winston Churchill Lecture 2011, President of the European Council also argued that the key security threats to European and global security could not be solved by military means alone”. For this reason, he maintained that the EU champions a “soft power” approach that links “security, development aid and human rights” (Rompuy 2011).
Union’s borders” (Kaldor et al. 2004: 9). There are a number of reasons behind the EU’s particular way of dealing with security, which is an essential part of the EU’s strategic culture. One of these is its reasoning that it would be safer if other regions in the world looked more like itself (Rynning 2003: 483). In other words, the logic behind this analysis, known as the EU’s ‘enlightened self-interest’, is that Europeans cannot be secure while others in the world live in severe insecurity (Kaldor et al. 2004: 9).

While the EU’s road to security focuses on the well-being of individuals, in ASEAN, where sovereignty is jealously guarded (Yeo 2009c: 14), approach to security is primarily state-focused (Umbach 2008: 128). Such a posture, which is clearly manifest in the ASEAN way and through the establishment and the mode of functions of the ASEAN-led institutions, e.g. the ARF and the EAS, has a number of implications. First, intra-state and/or non-traditional security problems, e.g. East Timor or Aceh, are primarily left to individual member states to resolve, especially through their own nation-building measures (Sukma 2009: 111). This is the reason why, as has been so far, ASEAN states refrain from involving in the issues of East Timor, Myanmar and Aceh. Second, cooperation within ASEAN and other ASEAN-led multilateral institutions, e.g. the ARF, the EAS and the ADMM-Plus, primarily focuses on inter-state and/or traditional security challenges and aims to reinforce national sovereignty and security. Given such a realist reasoning and approach, ASEAN states also rely on realpolitik, balancing and military powers, in dealing with security. This is another reason why a normative power Europe with its soft power approach to security is hardly attractive to ASEAN. As maintained by a major Asian scholar at a recent debate on Europe and the Asian Century, organised by Friends of Europe (2011), when Asian countries look at who can be a real player in the region, they still look for hard power. Finally, given its state-centred approach, ASEAN largely overlooks human security despite its recent inclusion of liberal and democratic values, e.g. human rights, in its discourse. The lack of focus on human security in ASEAN is reflected in the fact that one of the three key forms of security that are protected in Southeast Asia is that of some regional regimes or ruling elites, whose legitimacy is challenged. Indeed, as Nishikawa (2009: 232) points out, ASEAN governments’ mistrust of the liberal interventionist connotations of the

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163 There are two other reasons why the EU is concerned about human security. One of these is based on morality, i.e. a concomitant obligation to help each other when that security is threatened. The other is legal. The protection of human rights, the core component of human security, is enshrined in international treaties and the EU’s key documents (Kaldor et al. 2004: 9-10; Glasius and Kaldor 2006b: 8-9).
concept of human security is a key reason for the limited acceptance of this concept in ASEAN.

Thus, it is obvious that the EU and ASEAN are two different normative powers, with different ways of viewing and dealing with security. One of their major divergences is that while the former focuses on human security the latter pays attention to national security. The responses to the author’s survey confirm these divergences. When asked to express their views on the statement that ‘with respect to security, the EU focuses on ‘human security’, which emphasises the well-being of peoples, i.e. a people-centred approach, whereas ASEAN stresses the well-being of states, i.e. a state-centred approach’, of the 21 responses, two answered ‘completely agree’, 12 ‘agree’, six ‘neutral’ and only one ‘disagree’. Their differences in terms of their perceptions and approaches vis-à-vis security are the reason why they reacted differently towards the Aceh peace process, the AMM and its achievement. The EU regarded the Aceh’s peaceful evolution and its contribution to this process as a significant success of its foreign policy and its relations with ASEAN. In contrast, for ASEAN, the Aceh matter and its peace process was a purely an Indonesian matter and did not have any major impact on regional security. More significantly, those divergences are one of the major causes why despite its significant contribution to the Aceh peace process, the EU’s overall role in the security in Southeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific region is relatively insignificant. To illustrate ASEAN’s dissimilar way of perceiving and conducting security (from the EU’s) and how such a divergence is a central reason for the EU’s lack of cooperation with ASEAN in the strategic and security area, the next section briefly looks at two key ASEAN-led security institutions, namely the ARF and the EAS.

8.4. The EU’s modest contribution to ASEAN security

8.4.1. The ASEAN Regional Forum

Though its original idea did not come from ASEAN, the ARF is an ASEAN-led mechanism for a number of reasons. One of these is that it is based on ASEAN norms

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164 Australia and Canada proposed a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Asia, modelled on the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, to deal with post-Cold War Asian security issues. However, ASEAN did not want to duplicate the European model, preferring a more informal framework based on its existing PMC (Antolik 1994; Narine 1997; Katsumata 2006; Weber 2009).

165 Several works have examined the ARF (Antolik 1994; Narine 1997; Acharya 1998b; 1999; Garofano 2002; Weber 2009) and its different aspects, e.g. its mode of function (Katsumata 2006) and major
Precisely, it adopted ASEAN’s TAC and the ASEAN way as its mode of function (ARF 1994; 1995). ASEAN adopted that approach partly because it wanted to engage China, who did not want to copy the European style of security cooperation, which is very formal, law-abiding and problem-solving (Deng 1998; Yong 1998). China’s appreciation of the ARF’s approach was very significant because ASEAN’s rationale behind the ARF’s creation was to engage the major powers in a constructive dialogue regarding regional political security issues (Caballero-Anthony 2005). China was the first among these powers because, due historical mistrust, territorial disputes in the South China Sea and China’s rapid economic and military rise, ASEAN states believed that it was critical to create a regional forum that involved China (Antolik 1994; Leifer 1996; 1997; Whiting 1997; Cunha 1998; Foot 1998; Yong 1998; Gilson 2007b). Another important power that ASEAN sought to bring in to maintain a balance of power in the region was the US (Emmers 2001; Goh 2004). Besides China and the US, ASEAN also sought to engage other powers and one of these was the EU, who was a member when the forum was created. Before looking at the EU’s contribution to the ARF, three important points should be underlined here. First, ASEAN’s concern about traditional security issues was a key factor behind the ARF’s creation. Second, like the EU, ASEAN mainly relies on norms to deal with its internal and external affairs. The difference is that its preferred norms are primarily state-centred. Third, in addition to its reliance on its preferred normative framework, ASEAN also uses some kind of balancing of influence and/or power in the region, which was regarded as vital for regional stability. The question asked is whether the EU shared such a view of and approach to security and was capable and willing to play a key role in the ARF.

Since its establishment in 1994, the officials from its Troika, i.e. the Commission, the current presidency and the incoming presidency, attend the ARF’s ministerial meetings (Lim 2003: 5). Nevertheless, the EU’s contribution to the ARF was very different from that of other participants. While the ARF’s non-ASEAN members, including China, India, Japan, and South Korea, Russia and even the US took the forum seriously, the EU did not give it the same consideration. This is reflected in its lack of commitment to ARF activities, e.g. the ARF’s Inter-Sessional Meetings (ISM), Inter-Sessional Groups (ISG), seminars and workshops. These activities are the third formal

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powers’ participation in the forum (Simon 1998; Emmers 2001; 2003; Garofano 2002), notably the US (Goh 2004), China (Foot 1998; Evans 2003) and Japan (Kawasaki 1997; Yuzawa 2005; 2007).

166 It is now composed of 27 members (see Appendix 14)
activities of importance (after the Foreign Ministers’ Meetings) of the ARF. In his remark at the 11th ARF in 2004 in Jakarta, Javier Solana said that the EU “continues to attach high value to our participation in the ARF, a unique forum for dialogue on security policy issues in the Asia-Pacific region” (Solana 2004). However, until 2002 the EU did not co-chair any ISG or ISM and hosted only a few workshops (see Appendix 15). In contrast, Australia, the US, China, India, Japan, Russia and Canada co-chaired several ISGs and ISMs and hosted a great number of workshops. Only in 2004 did the EU co-chair, for the first time, an ISG.

The EU’s lack of engagement with the ARF and security in Southeast Asia was manifested in other ways. One of these was its delay in signing the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC). ASEAN’s main partners, China, India, Japan and Russia acceded to this treaty in 2003 and 2004 (see Appendix 16). In contrast, the EU, despite being the oldest partner of ASEAN, the EU only formally signed a Declaration on Accession to the TAC in May 2009. From ASEAN’s viewpoint, the accession to the TAC by non-ASEAN member states is seen as a symbol of their commitment to the region’s security and their support for its way of dealing with regional security issues. Given such a symbolic significance, China, India, Japan and even Russia were quick to seek to accede to it. It is also worth noting that the accession to this treaty is also a precursor to membership of the EAS and, as will shown later, the EU’s reluctance to adhere to the TAC was a key reason for its exclusion from the EAS. Another example of the EU’s lack of interest towards ASEAN and the ARF was the absence of its high-ranking officials in the ARF meetings as well as to other important meetings of the EU-ASEAN cooperation framework. This makes ASEAN officials question whether the EU takes ASEAN and its relations with the latter seriously (Moeller 2008; Camroux 2010; Islam 2010a; 2010b). The EU’s modest involvement was also reflected in the fact that in the existing literature on the ARF and regional security, the EU’s role is rarely mentioned whereas that of China, the US and even Japan is widely examined (see footnote 214). In contrast, there is only one significant work on the EU, namely that of Robles (2003). Overall, as concluded by Yeo (2009c: 16-7), “the rather lacklustre participation of the EU in ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) only served to reaffirm the limits of the EU’s security role, and also the limits of its influence” in Southeast Asia

167 For instance, the primary motivation of the US’s application for the accession to the treaty was to send a signal to ASEAN and its partners that the US wanted to upgrade its presence in Southeast Asia (Manyin et al. 2009: 1).

168 The other paper on the role of the EU in the ARF is a policy brief of Berkofsky (2003).
and the Asia-Pacific region as a whole.\textsuperscript{169} The question asked is why the EU did not actively engage in the ARF, and (consequently) in the region’s security.

There are several reasons for this. One of these is that from the early 1990s to 2004, the EU was in the middle of enlargement to East Europe. Consequently, it was largely internally focused. The EU’s lack of cohesion, authority and autonomy, which are three of the key institutional elements that make up the actorness of an entity and enable it to act effectively, was another inhibiting factor. For instance, originally only sovereign states were allowed to accede to TAC. Therefore, in order to admit the EU, ASEAN countries and other signatories of the treaty had to amend it. This prompted France to go it alone and sign in 2007. Another crucial factor that hindered the EU from playing a more active role in the ARF was the EU’s divergences from ASEAN in terms of its perspectives and approaches vis-à-vis security issues.\textsuperscript{170} While the EU championed a normative power approach to security, which is strongly rooted in human security, ASEAN countries predominantly view and deal with international relations and security in particular in realist terms. ASEAN’s state-centred posture was clearly reflected by the rationale behind the ARF and its use of the ASEAN way as its mode of function. Because of such divergences, the EU and ASEAN found it difficult to establish a meaningful partnership. These two factors are also the key reasons behind the EU’s absence in the EAS.

\textbf{8.4.2. The East Asia Summit}

The East Asia Summit (EAS) began in 2005 when it convened the meeting of the leaders of the 10 ASEAN members plus those of China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, India and New Zealand (Tanaka 2006).\textsuperscript{171} Since 2011, the leaders of the US and Russia attend the summit. Like the ARF, the rationale behind the establishment of the EAS was to deal with the region’s traditional security challenges. For instance, it is argued that ASEAN decided to expand the EAS to the US and Russia because it wanted to limit the

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\textsuperscript{169} Despite its limited efficiency in solving important regional security issues, the ARF remains a major security mechanism not only in Southeast Asia but also in the Asia-Pacific region. For ASEAN, apart from the ADMM-Plus and the EAS, the ARF is the forum that it uses to foster dialogue on regional security issues with its main partners. Thus, from its viewpoint, the level of engagement of the non-ASEAN members, notably the influential ones, in the forum, is a variable to judge their level of interest in regional security issues.

\textsuperscript{170} The EU was reluctant to accede to the TAC partly because the treaty is “replete with language on non-interference and sovereignty”, and it “not quite a mirror image of the EU’s values” (Parello-Plesner 2010). Given this, the accession to it would prevent it from being free to criticise those who did not respect human rights, e.g. Myanmar.

\textsuperscript{171} For more information on East Asia Summit, see for instance, Malik (2006; 2009), Richardson (2006), Camroux (2012).
dominance of a single power in regional affairs, notably China. As a Southeast Asian diplomat said, “[t]here must be a counterbalance, otherwise one country will dominate” (quoted by AFP 2010), and this ‘one country’ referred to is “an increasingly assertive China” (Islam 2011: 2). The EAS also adopted ASEAN’s core norms as its mode of function. However, in terms of official involvement, the EAS is the highest ASEAN-led forum because it is the summit of Heads of State/Government. Furthermore, with the participation of the US and Russia since 2011, it now consists of 18 members, with eight of them being members of the G-20 and three of the four BRIC countries (Doan 2011). Given this, it is now regarded as the prime security forum in East Asia the Asia-Pacific region (Islam 2011: 2). While the other major partners of ASEAN have been enthusiastically involved in this new and important arrangement, the EU is absent from it despite being ASEAN’s longest partner (Doan 2011). According to Parello-Plesner (2010; 2012), a senior advisor to the Danish government on Asian affairs, the EU’s absence was not good for the EU because its non-appearance prevented it from contributing to regional affairs and security. Due that absence, unlike other regional and global powers, especially China, Japan and India, and now Russia and the US, the EU does not have regular contact with ASEAN at the highest level in the security area. Indeed, though the EU was a strong economic player in East Asia, in political and security terms, it was largely absent in the region (Gaens 2012: 93; Wong 2012: 33). Given this conspicuous absence, in a speech to European foreign policy experts in Berlin, former Australian former Prime Minister Kevin Rudd asked “if the world is moving to become an Asia Pacific world, where does Europe fit in” (Quoted in Parello-Plesner 2012). The EU’s exclusion in the EAS also illustrates that its successful cooperation with ASEAN in the AMM did not help enhance EU-ASEAN relations and their cooperation in the security area in particular as the EU predicted and hoped. As noted earlier, in the aftermath of the accomplishment of the AMM, the EU believed that the AMM could boost EU-ASEAN relations and that it should be the model for their future cooperation (Solana 2006b; 2006c; 2006d; 2007; Feith 2007: 1). The question is why the EU is still absent from the EAS and, consequently, unable or unwilling to play a key role in Southeast Asian security and East Asia in general.

Parello-Plesner (2010) identified three reasons for the EU’s non-involvement. The first was the EU’s delayed accession to the TAC, which technically prevented it from being allowed to participate. The second was the EU’s lack of a single, coherent and powerful voice that would be listened to by the rest of the summit. In other words, as he
put it, if finally ASEAN states decide to invite the EU to take part, they would not be sure who would be this Mr. or Mrs. Europe that should be invited. The third cause of the EU’s non-involvement in the EAS was the EU’s lack of clear priorities and concerns vis-à-vis its relations with ASEAN. He pointed out that during her presence in Hanoi at the 17th ARF meeting and the fifth EAS in July and October 2010 respectively, Hillary Clinton brought up the SCS issue and by doing so, she rightly addressed worries of ASEAN countries. In his view, if the EU had been present at the EAS in Hanoi, its strong priorities would be free trade (Parello-Plesner 2010). However, as illustrate in-depth in Chapter 7, given a number of factors, notably its difference with ASEAN over the inclusion of Myanmar in the FTA, the EU failed to materialise that FTA with ASEAN. Besides these three factors, the EU’s lack of capabilities, especially military ones, also makes it less attractive to ASEAN countries that still view international relations in realist terms and face many realist security issues as mentioned. By highlighting this, this author agrees with Doidge and others that the institutional and material elements are important components of the regional actorness and that the EU’s lack of these elements significantly prevents it from acting effectively in world politics and Asian affairs in particular.

Yet, another important reason for the EU’s exclusion from the EAS, as already underlined, was its differences from the EU in terms of its perceptions of and approaches to security. Given such divergences, the EU is not strongly receptive to ASEAN, its security concerns and its efforts to deal with them. In fact, ASEAN and its members do not feature among the EU’s top security partners identified by the ESS (European Council 2003). Furthermore, while the EU has already established a great number of strategic partnerships with several countries and regional groupings, it remains reluctant to move its relationship with ASEAN into this category (Moeller 2007: 469). Meanwhile, the US, Japan, China, India and Australia have all become strategic partners of ASEAN, each carefully eyeing the other’s moves. For this reason, it is believed the EU “should also be a strategic partner, but its politics seem to have lagged behind the economics” (Yeo 2005). Given the EU’s indifference to ASEAN, it was also overlooked by the latter. According to Singapore’s Foreign Minister Yeo, when ASEAN Foreign Ministers discussed plans for an East Asia summit, they all took into account the views of China, Japan, India, Australia and the US. However, the EU “did not figure at all because it had not shown any interest in such a summit” (Yeo 2005). The EU’s posture changed following ASEAN’s decision to invite the US and
Russia to participate in the EAS and it was craving for a similar invitation to this prime security forum of the region (Islam 2011: 2). According to an EU official, the EU’s decision to accede the TAC could enhance its chance of being given a place at this summit because such a decision was a very big initiative on the EU side, showing that it wanted to be associated with the EAS as closely as possible (Interview, 2009). Nevertheless, as it was made clear by ASEAN officials, this would not happen soon (Islam 2010b). In fact, the EU was excluded from the last EAS, which was held in Cambodia in 2012.

The argument that the normative divergences of the EU and ASEAN were an obstacle to their relations and security cooperation was also confirmed by the author’s survey. When asked to rank a number of factors that make the EU less attractive to ASEAN, seven of the 21 responses to the author’s survey ranked first the divergence of norms and beliefs between the two organisations (see Appendix 17). Furthermore, as the responses to the survey illustrate, it is not the EU’s lack of military capabilities but rather its continuing insistence on human rights that makes ASEAN less interested in the EU. Similarly, when asked to rank the six reasons for the absence of a strategic partnership between the EU and ASEAN, five of the 21 respondents named their divergence of worldviews and values as the first factor that prevented the EU and ASEAN from forging a strategic partnership (see Appendix 18). In contrast, only one respondent identified the EU’s lack of military capabilities and two respondents regarded the EU’s lack of interest in ASEAN as the first cause. This means the ideational and normative divergences of the EU and ASEAN vis-à-vis regional and international affairs and security in particular were a defining reason behind the EU’s lacklustre contribution to the ARF, its exclusion from the EAS and, consequently, its irrelevance in Southeast Asian security and East Asia in general.

To sum up, the examination of the Aceh issue illustrates that when their ways of viewing and conducting regional and international affairs converge, the EU and ASEAN are better able to work together. They would not have cooperated with each other in the AMM if the EU had criticised Indonesia’s human rights violations in Aceh and insisted ASEAN to intervene as it did in the case of East Timor and Myanmar. Yet, while the two organisations found some common ground to work together in the AMM, their perceptions, priorities and approaches vis-à-vis international relations and security in particular remain significantly different. Their postures vis-à-vis the AMM and its achievement illustrates that they are two different normative powers with two divergent
ways of dealing their regional and international affairs. As illustrated by its ESS and its *Human Security Doctrine*, the EU is – and acts as – a cosmopolitan normative power that upholds and promotes a set of fundamentally liberal or individual-centered values in its relations with the world. The ESS is not simply a security strategy of the EU. It also expresses its identity, values and political philosophy (Major and Riecke 2006: 45; Biscop 2007a: 5). Indeed, as noted by Biava et al. (2011: 1236), the ESS is “an expression of what the EU itself is and thereby creates standards and benchmarks for the normative model the EU wants to embody. It also represents the philosophy underlying the EU’s external actions”. The EU views and acts as such because of its historical experience and especially its reasoning that it is safer if the world is more like itself. The comment of Kaldor et al. (2007: 287) resumes well the EU’s normative identity and role as well as the reason behind its commitment to the Aceh peace process.

“Many Europeans crave a role for the EU on the world stage as a peace promoter in order to banish the demons of Europe’s own conflict-ridden experience; they seek to extend beyond Europe’s borders the zone of peace and stability which the integration project has helped to achieve; and they believe that the EU can use its transformative power to persuade others to move from war to peace and to universalize its own norms and ethics”.

In contrast, though relying on norms and seeking to promote them in its internal and external relations, ASEAN’s norms are predominantly state-centred. As reflected by the establishment and the mode of function of the ARF and the EAS, ASEAN is – and acts as – a communitarian normative power. Though these normative divergences do not lead the EU and ASEAN to dispute with each other over security issues, they prevent them from establishing a strong partnership in the security area. In other words, as seen shown in this chapter as well as the two previous ones, they significantly hinder their cooperation. With this point, the thesis comes to its concluding chapter.

9. Conclusion: EU-ASEAN relations and interregionalism

– Looking back and looking ahead

9.1. A summary of the research

This thesis has begun with an observation that after the end of the Cold War, regional organisations have become prominent in the global system; they have actively developed and strengthened their relations with major powers and with each other. By doing so, not only have they become actors in their own right on the international stage but also created a new and indelible feature in post-Cold War world politics, known as
interregionalism. Chief among those who have proactively fostered this form of relations are the EU and ASEAN. Interregionalism has also greatly interested scholarship and a number of works has been undertaken to investigate the different aspects, such as its forms, rationales, impacts, of this phenomenon. Yet, despite such an increasing scholarly interest, interregionalism in general and EU-ASEAN relations in particular have been underdeveloped. A particular area, which was still understudied, was the significance of the normative factors of regional organisations to their interregionalism. Such paucity was reflected in and by the two main and related bodies of existing literature. First, most of scholarship on interregionalism focused on why and how interregional relations define the collective identities of regional organisations involved whereas it paid a little attention to why and how the participant regional organisations’ identities – or more exactly, the norms, values and principles that constitute them as actors in world politics – determine their interregionalism. Second, the relevance of the normative factors of regional organisations to their interregionalism was also under-explored in – if not, ignored by – the works on the concept of regional actorness, which was conceptualised to explain the influence of a regional organisation in its external activity. In other words, the existing literature on interregionalism and regional actorness rarely considered the significance of regional organisations’ normative features to their interregional relations.

That ignorance was a significant omission because for regional organisations, e.g. the EU and ASEAN, their normative elements were of central importance to not only their intra-regional cooperation but also their extra-regional relations in the post-Cold War period. This argument was based on the three key observations of the EU, ASEAN and their interaction. First, in its foreign policy, its interregionalism and its relations with ASEAN, the EU espouses and advocates a set of liberal and democratic values. Second, like the EU, norms also play a central role in ASEAN’s regional and international relations. The difference is that the set of norms on which it is based and seeks to advocate is predominantly state-centric, e.g. the principles of non-interference and national sovereignty. Third, given those normative differences, they have found it difficult to interact with each other since the end of the Cold War. It is for these reasons that the thesis chose to study EU-ASEAN relations with a strong focus on why and how their normative dimensions impact on their interaction. More precisely, by taking their normative premises as the criterion and the focal point to examine their post-Cold War relationship, the thesis assumed that the EU and ASEAN are two different regional...
actors that espouse dissimilar norms to guide their regional and international affairs and those normative differences hinder their relations. Within this hypothesis, the thesis sought to explore the three central questions:

- First, what are the normative features that constitute the EU and ASEAN as actors in world politics and that make them different from each other?
- Second, what are the main sources of their normative differences? In other words, why do they promote two different sets of norms?
- Third, why do their normative differences become a conflictual and obstructive factor in their relationship?

To address these issues, the thesis chose to draw on the insights offered by social constructivism and normative theory because these two IR perspectives are very useful in answering those questions. Methodologically, it opted for a narrative and empirical inquiry. A narrative methodology was very helpful in describing what the EU, ASEAN and their normative premises are and explaining why they promote two different sets of norms, whereas the three case studies provided it with valuable evidence to further support the two first issues and to illustrate why their normative differences lead to disruptions in their relationship. For both narrative and empirical inquiry, this thesis drew on a wide range of important information and data that are acquired from the three major sources: (1) official documents, (2) scholarly works and (3) interview and questionnaires. With the mentioned hypothesis, research questions, theoretical methodological approaches, the investigation has critically examined the normative foundation/differentiation of the EU and ASEAN, the sources of their normative foundation/differentiation and the impact of their normative premises/differences on their interregional relations. In doing so, it has reached the following conclusions.

9.2. The major findings

9.2.1. The EU and ASEAN: Two different normative powers

As stated from its beginning, the thesis has recognised that by forging relations with major powers and with each other, the EU and ASEAN have become actors on their own right in world politics. The first question it has sought to address is what characterises these two regional organisations as international actors and what distinguishes them from other actors and from each other. This inquiry has only looked at the normative dimensions that constitute them as actors in world politics and that make them different from each other. By doing so, it has found that since their foundation in 1951 and 1967 respectively, the EC/EU and ASEAN have developed their
own sets of norms, which are enshrined in their respective key documents, e.g. treaties, declarations, communications, speeches, issued by their own institutions and officials. In fact, based on these documents as well as scholarly works, Chapter 4 and 5 have identified the sets of norms of the EU and ASEAN.

**The normative constitution of the EU and ASEAN**

For the EU, its normative basis consists of nine norms. They are *peace*, *liberty*, *democracy*, *human rights*, *the rule of law*, *solidarity*, *equality*, *development* and *good governance*. For Manners (2002: 242), the first five norms are the EU’s ‘core’ norms and the last four as its ‘minor’ norms. Lucarelli and Manners (2006b: 202) classify *peace* as the EU’s prime value and categorise *human dignity/rights*, *freedom/liberty*, *democracy*, *equality*, *justice/rule of law* and *solidarity* as its core values. While these norms define the EU’s foreign policy, its interregionalism and its relations with ASEAN, human rights are the EU’s most mentioned norm in the post-Cold War era. They are present in the EU’s important documents, discourses, policies and agreements, especially those that are related to its external relations. ASEAN’s norms are included in the well-known term, the *ASEAN way*, which consists of six key norms. They are *sovereign equality*, *non-use of force* and the *peaceful settlement of conflict*, *non-interference* and *non-intervention*, the *non-involvement of ASEAN* to address unsolved *bilateral conflict between members*, *quiet diplomacy* and *mutual respect and tolerance*.

If human rights are the most cited norm in the internal and external policies of the EU, non-interference is the most important norm in ASEAN. In fact, it is the *sine qua non* of cooperation in ASEAN. This principle, which has jealously been kept and ardently promoted since its establishment, was emphasised in the ASEAN’s founding declaration. It was reiterated in ASEAN’s later important documents, e.g. the TAC (1976) and the ASEAN Charter (2007). Even though it was criticised after the Asian financial crisis and there were calls from outside and even within ASEAN for altering, non-interference remains the core norm of ASEAN’s internal and external relations.

The EU and ASEAN have generated their own norms first to guide their internal relations. However, as norms not only regulate or guide the behaviour of actors within a given community but also define their interests, worldviews and preferences and constitute their identity, the norms of the EU and ASEAN fundamentally constitute

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172 As noted in Chapter 2, norms and values are closely interrelated and often used as synonyms.
them as actors in world politics. Indeed, as illustrated at in different chapters of this thesis, the set of liberal and democratic norms the EU has espoused is not only the basis on which it is founded. Those norms have also defined its international identity and role. Similarly, the ASEAN way is not only the *modus operandi* of ASEAN’s regional and international relations. It has also shaped ASEAN’s overall *raison d’être*. Because of this, while acknowledging that the institutional and material elements of the EU and ASEAN are the important components that make up their actorness or actorship, this thesis has maintained that their normative constituents are also of vital importance. They are the essential elements that constitute them as actors in world politics and that define their external relations as well as their influence on the external world. Their respective norms also determine their institutional structure to some extent. The EU is founded on a set of liberal and democratic values and vows to uphold and promote them in its relations with the wider world since the end of the Cold War. Given this, it sought to include the human rights clause in a cooperation framework, which it had planed to negotiate with ASEAN in the early 1990s. Its focus on human rights was also the reason behind its refusal to accept the participation of Myanmar in the FTA, which it decided to negotiate with ASEAN in the 2000s. Similarly, ASEAN’s norms have defined its regional and international relations as well as its relationship with the EU. For instance, due to its commitment to the principle of non-interference, it was silent over the East Timor issue and allowed Myanmar to become a member despite the EU’s opposition. Yet, the involve ment of their normative dimensions in their relations does not always bring about positive results. It can produce negative consequences. This point will be further explained later. The point made here is that their normative elements are of importance to their regional and international relations.

**Like the EU, ASEAN is a norm entrepreneur**

The argument that the EU is a norm entrepreneur is widely acknowledged. Indeed, the EU has created its preferred set of norms not only to guide its internal and external relations but also actively promoted or exported those norms in Europe and worldwide. Its *Copenhagen criteria* or membership criteria and its *conditionality* or human rights clause are the two well-known means it uses to defend and spread its norms. The three case studies have shown that the EU is a very active norm generator and promoter. Chapters 6 and 7 have illustrated that the EU strongly insisted the protection and promotion of the norm of human rights, which is also its most mentioned norm in its post-Cold War foreign policy, in its relations with ASEAN and its members. Chapter 8
has shown that the defining reason behind its support for the Aceh peace process and its engagement in the Aceh Monitoring Mission was its desire to bring peace, human rights, the rule of law and good governance, which are its key norms, to this province.

Equally, in its relations with the EU and its external relations, ASEAN has also fervently championed its favourite normative framework. ASEAN’s insistence on the access to its TAC as the condition for the membership in the EAS was a proof to ASEAN’s efforts to advocate its norms. ASEAN plays a central role in regionalism in East Asia and the security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region not because of its economic or military capabilities but rather because it has a code of conduct for international relations, i.e. its norms, that has been widely acknowledged by the region’s countries (Loder et al. 2011: 83). Economically and militarily, ASEAN as a whole and its members are much weaker than regional powers, e.g. China and India. Yet, as underlined in Chapters 5 and 8, the ASEAN way has now been accepted as the *modus operandi* of the three important institutions in the region, namely the ARF, the EAS and the ADMM-Plus. ASEAN’s approach to regional governance is regarded as a real alternative to the Western liberal model of global governance that tends to focus on the norm of interventionism (Stubbs 2007; Stubbs et al 2010). This point illustrates convincingly that, like the EU, ASEAN is a prominent norm entrepreneur. It also supports very well another important argument made by the thesis that is powerful actors in world politics do not always hold a monopoly on norm entrepreneurship as most of literature on norms assumes. Weaker actors, e.g. ASEAN and its members, also play the role of norm entrepreneurs by seeking to advance norms that influence world politics in a particular way. Indeed, norm entrepreneurship is an essential aspect of ASEAN’s actorness.

**Like the EU, ASEAN is a normative power**

In the existing literature on normative power (NP) in general and normative power Europe (NPE), there are different interpretations of the concept of NP and different, even opposing, narratives of the EU as an international actor as noted in Chapter 4.173 Followed and adapted a definition by De Zutter (2010: 1122), this thesis defines a NP “as the identity of a power in the international system that shapes the normal in world politics through its norm-driven practices and the adaption of its norms by [some]
Based on this definition, the thesis has described the EU as a NP because such a conceptualisation singles out four major elements that reflect very well the international identity and role of the EU. First, a NP is an identity in the international system. Second, a NP is also a power that has the ability to shape the normal in world politics. Third, a NP shapes the normal through its norm-driven practices. Fourth, a NP is a power, whose norms are adopted by some others. As illustrated in Chapter 4, whatever the EU is depicted, that depiction always refers to the EU’s particular type of actor or specific identity (Diez 2005: 614; Sjursen 2006a; Powel 2009: 195; Manners 2011: 233). The EU’s liberal and democratic norms, e.g. human rights and democracy, are the ‘normal’ practices that are enshrined in the UN Human Rights Declaration and the UN Charter. The EU’s ability to shape the normal in world politics through its norm-driven practices and the adoption of its norms by other has been illustrated by the acceptance of countries, e.g. former communist countries in Eastern and Central Europe, who were willing to conform to the EU’s membership criteria. The fact its preferred norms of peace, good governance, the rule of law and human rights were embraced in Aceh as demonstrated in Chapter 8 is another example. The reason why this thesis has slightly modified De Zutter’s definition adding the word ‘some’ before ‘others’ is that no power in world politics is able to produce and put in place a normative framework that is fully accepted by all and every time (Hamilton 2008: 81). ASEAN’s resistance to the EU’s values of human rights and democracy in the 1990s was a proof to this. Overall, this inquiry maintains that the EU is a power that is predominantly based on, and predisposed to promote, a set of liberal cosmopolitan values in its relations with the world in general and ASEAN in particular.

In the literature on ASEAN, there are few accounts that regard ASEAN as a norm entrepreneur (Katsumata 2003; Rüland 2011). Nevertheless, with the exception of Robinson (2011: 49), who argues that ASEAN may “be much closer to the EU’s own aspirations for normative power than the EU itself”, there is not a single work, which explicitly classifies ASEAN as a NP. From what has been illustrated in this thesis, ASEAN is a normative power. Indeed, it fits very well the definition of NP by De Zutter (2010: 1122) that the thesis adopts and slightly modifies mentioned previously because its core norms, e.g. national sovereignty and non-interference, are internationally held principles. The fact that ASEAN way and its TAC are accepted and adhered by rising powers, e.g. China and India, and other major powers, e.g. Russia, Japan and the US, is a proof of ASEAN’s normative influence. It is also worth noting that a central
hypothesis of the NPE thesis advocated by Manners (2002: 252) is the argument that “the most important factor shaping the international role of the EU is not what it does or what it says, but what it is”. This too can be applied to ASEAN because as shown in this thesis, notably in Chapters 5 and 8, the most crucial factor defining ASEAN’s role in the wider Pacific-Asia region and its actorness in general is its raison d’être. Thus, the argument that ASEAN is a normative power is also one of the inquiry’s major contributions to the existing literature on ASEAN and regional organisations in general.

**Cosmopolitan normative power vs. communitarian normative power**

While both the EU and ASEAN are norm entrepreneurs and normative powers, the norms they have espoused are different from each other. The two narrative chapters on the EU and ASEAN respectively as well as three empirical chapters on their relations have demonstrated that the EU is founded on, and promotes, a set of primarily individual-focused or liberal cosmopolitan norms, whereas ASEAN is premised on and champions a normative framework, which is predominantly state-centric or communitarian. Such differences of their normative nature are manifested not only in their regional and international relations but also in their security policy and cooperation. Chapter 8 has shown that while the EU’s view and way of security largely focuses on human security, i.e. the well-being of individuals, ASEAN’s principally stresses national security, i.e. the well-being of states. Based on the two normative positions highlighted by normative theory, namely *cosmopolitanism* and *communitarianism*, this study describes the EU as a cosmopolitan normative power and ASEAN as a communitarian normative power.

**9.2.2. The sources of their normative differences**

The question that the thesis has sought to address is the EU and ASEAN promote two different sets of norms. Chapter 2 has underlined that while norms are defined as standards of appropriate or normal behaviour, those standards are regarded as appropriate or normal for *actors with a given identity* (bold for emphasis). That means different actors in different contexts are likely to adopt different norms (Tocci and Manners 2008: 307). For this reason, the preference for international norms is at the same time the product of a specific history (Ruggie 1999: 239; Laïdi 2008: 4; Postel-Vinay 2008: 40). It has also argued that as they are not pre-social, actors in world politics are defined by the environment in which they find themselves (Barnett 2005: 259; Risse 2005: 161). These two positions have led the thesis to maintain that, like
other actors in world politics, the EU, ASEAN and their respective normative underpinnings are shaped by their own context-specific conditions. Based on this, it has identified a wide range of factors that are the reasons behind the normative differences of the EU and ASEAN. Some of these can be recalled here.

**Europe’s war-torn past and Southeast Asia’s colonial legacy**

For the EU, a defining factor that has determined European integration as a whole, the EU’s and normative foundation and differentiation was Europe’s pre-EC/EU war-torn past. As underlined in Chapter 4, different scholars on the EU, e.g. Duchêne (1972), Waever (1998) Manners (2002), Gillingham (2003) and Lucarelli (2006), all agreed that the rationale behind European integration was to surmount the age-old processes of war and their root causes, e.g. nationalism or ultranationalism that had shattered Europe. Given this, right from the beginning, European integration was seen as a peace project, which was built on liberty, democracy and human rights. It is worth noting that the EU was granted the 2012 Nobel Peace Prize mainly because of its achievement in transforming most of Europe from a continent of war to a continent of peace (Jagland 2012). As noted in Chapter 8 the EU strongly focuses on human security partly because “many Europeans crave a role for the EU on the world stage as a peace promoter to banish the demons of Europe’s own conflict-ridden experience” (Kaldor et al. 2007: 287). In fact, Europe’s bitter past has been repeatedly highlighted and narrated by EU officials to justify not only the process of European integration but also the EU’s protection and promotion of peace and other liberal cosmopolitan values in its relations with the world (Forchtner and Kølvraa 2012).

In contrast, for ASEAN, an overriding factor that has defined its *raison d’être* and its normative premises was Southeast Asia’s colonisation and its consequences. Unlike European countries, which, despite conflicts and wars between European countries, had been independent and sovereign entities for centuries,\(^{174}\) when ASEAN was established, none of the Southeast Asian nations, except Thailand, had long-term experience of sovereign statehood having only recently gained – and indeed hard fought to earn – their independence from their former colonial powers. Subsequently, the nation-state was so cherished and nation building was an overriding concern for these newly

\(^{174}\) Furthermore, in the aftermath of the WWII, nationalism was regarded as the cause of wars. Consequently, restraining it was considered essential for the rebuilding of post-war Europe. In this context, national sovereignty was not of such high importance.
independent countries. Furthermore, in their nation building process, they faced multiple and huge internal challenges, which could be only dealt with if they had a stable external environment. It is for these reasons that from the outset ASEAN states placed a particular emphasis on the principles of national sovereignty and non-interference and that the institutional design in ASEAN as well as ASEAN-led multilateral mechanisms, e.g. the ARF and the EAS, remains deeply wedded to state sovereignty (Beeson 2002; Katsumata 2003; Khong and Nesadurai 2007; Nishikawa 2007; Yeo 2009b).

Other important factors

In addition to their historical dissimilarities, there are other differences, which also play a significant role in making the EU and ASEAN follow two unalike sets of normative premises. Cultural difference is one of these. In Europe, thanks to its rich cultural heritage and long-lasting tradition, offered by the Enlightenment and other major movements, individual rights and democratic principles are greatly valued in social, economic and political life. However, these ideals were not so highly valued – and remain secondary – in ASEAN and in Asia in general. While recognising that the debate about the ‘Western/European values’ and the ‘Asian values’ is controversial, especially in the case of the ‘Asian values’, the thesis stressed the fact that the EU members are mature liberal democracies whereas most ASEAN countries are not. Indeed, as illustrated in Chapter 3, if based on their respective average overall score (of the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Index 2010), the ASEAN countries were classified as ‘hybrid regimes’ whereas the EU members were full democracies.

Their historical and cultural dissimilarities were also amplified by other regional and global developments in the post-Cold War era. For the EU, its transformation from the EC into the EU and the triumphant sentiment of the West following the collapse of the communist bloc also inspired and prompted it to export its values to other regional organisations and countries. Thanks to the impressive economic growth that they enjoyed throughout the 1970s and 1980s until the late 1990s, ASEAN states became more confident in their own model of (economic) development and were even willing to oppose European value-based policies in the 1990s. As underlined, following the Asian financial crisis, Asian values and the ASEAN way were challenged. There were calls from outside, even within ASEAN, for modifying its cherished principle of non-interference. Yet, despite those calls, the key principles of ASEAN were not modified.
Instead, they continue to be reiterated in ASEAN’s key documents such as the Bali Concord II (2003) and the ASEAN Charter (2007). The ASEAN way was even chosen to be the modus operandi of ASEAN-led regional institutions, e.g. the EAS and ADMM-Plus. Another difference between the two regional organisations, which is worth highlighting, is their geopolitical context. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and other communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe, the EU members no longer face major intraregional conflicts or prominent external aggression. In contrast, ASEAN members were, and remain, concerned about intraregional conflicts and external challenges and threats.

Overall, except the fact that the two organisations were established in the Cold War and their development until the late 1980s was significantly defined by Cold War politics, the EU and ASEAN were established and evolved in two historical, cultural and geopolitical backgrounds, which are radically different. In other words, the ‘we-group’ and ‘they-group’ factors that have influenced the EU, ASEAN and their respective norms differ significantly from each other. It is for this reason that despite some changes in ASEAN, e.g. the process of democratisation in some members of ASEAN and its establishment of a regional human rights body, which have someway shortened the normative gaps between the two regional organisations, their normative premises are overall different from each other. This is why they disputed over a number of issues, e.g. human rights, East Timor and Myanmar in the 1990s.

9.2.4. Why their normative differences are unconstructive

Chapter 2 has theorised a number of hypotheses to explain why their normative differences become a source of disagreements in their relations, which in return negatively affect their post-Cold War cooperation. Three empirical chapters have tested and illustrated those propositions. Some of these can be drawn and reiterated now.

The differences of their normative natures

The relationship between the EU and ASEAN, i.e. a self/other interaction, is contentious primarily because the natures of their collective identity and norms differ. The EU is based on a set of liberal and cosmopolitan values, e.g. human rights and democracy, which are inclusive and can be acquired if a state or a regional organisation

175 As noted in Chapter 3, during the Cold War, the two organisations shared an overriding anti-communist and westernised posture and, thanks to this, not only did their other inherent and foundational normative divergences diminish but also they could establish and maintain a friendly relationship with each other.
fulfils certain criteria, e.g. the Copenhagen criteria. In contrast, ASEAN is premised on a set of communitarian norms, e.g. non-interference and national sovereignty, which are inherent and exclusive, and as a result, more difficult to leave. Even though it has recently paid attention to and somehow included liberal and democratic norms in their internal policies, ASEAN still strongly upholds the core principles of non-interference. Thus, given their own normative nature, while the EU tends to push for the rights of individuals to the point of being willing to interfere into others’ internal affairs to make sure that its cherished norms are respected, ASEAN explicitly discourages any external interference into others’ internal affairs in any form or manifestation. This means EU-ASEAN relations are inclined to be conflictual first of all not because of what either organisation does or not does but because of what the EU and ASEAN are. As seen in Chapter 7, Myanmar became a contentious issue in EU-ASEAN relations in the early 1990s even though in those years this country was not a member of ASEAN. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre even became a point of contention between the two organisations in their 1990 ministerial meeting. Indeed, as illustrated several times in Chapters 6 and 7, the EU and ASEAN disputed with each other over human rights and the issues of East Timor and Myanmar because of the differences of their normative natures. For instance, due to its normative identity, the EU sought to insert its human rights clause into the cooperation agreement it intended to negotiate with ASEAN in the early 1990s. Similarly, because of its normative nature, ASEAN had no choice but to oppose that assertion because it violated the core of its normative culture. This leads to the next point.

**The assertion of one and the opposition of the other**

The interaction between the EU and ASEAN is certain to be conflictual when one regional organisation’s core norms are opposed by the other. The thesis has demonstrated that the EU and ASEAN clashed with each other over human rights, the East Timor issue and the Myanmar problem because one organisation’s norms were rejected or violated by the other. As discovered in Chapter 6 the EU and ASEAN disputed over human rights and the East Timor issue in the early 1990s, because they now entered a ‘we-group’ versus ‘they-group’ relationship. In this interaction, the EU, who regarded its values of democracy and human rights as universal, considered, either intentionally or unintentionally, ASEAN as a violator of universal principles or inferior to it. Consequently, it urged and demanded ASEAN and its members to respect those
liberal and cosmopolitan norms. In contrast, ASEAN vigorously opposed the EU’s posture and regarded that assertion on the respect of human rights as a *new moralism* or a *neo-colonialism*. Such an insistence of the EU and ASEAN’s resistance heated their exchanges. The EU’s insistence on the inclusion of a human right clause in the new and more advanced cooperation agreement that EU wanted to conclude with ASEAN and ASEAN’s opposition to it in the early 1990s was an example of this insistence/resistance pattern.

Similarly, Chapter 7 has shown that the two regional organisations disputed over human rights and the Myanmar issue because the EU’s emphasis on the protection and promotion of its core norms was opposed by ASEAN. That opposition made the EU unhappy and annoyed not only because those norms are its constitutive component of its identity but also its belief that the respect of those norms is essential for building a stable and peaceful society. The comment of Luxembourg’s Foreign Minister Jacques Poos at the ninth AEMM in the 1991 quoted at the beginning of the section 3.3 of Chapter 3 summarises well the EU’s particular emphasis on human rights and its irritation if those norms were not respected. ASEAN also felt irritated because by the EU’s criticisms and usage of different negative measures violated its core principle of non-interference. For example, as noted, an ASEAN official bluntly said that how ASEAN dealt with Myanmar was its business and the EU had no right to interfere (*Business Times*, 1997b). In brief, the EU and ASEAN disputed over human rights and the Myanmar issue because the EU’s posture challenged and infringed the core of ASEAN’s normative culture whereas ASEAN’s refusal to accept the EU’s norms defied the EU’s normative identity.

**The normative disconnection between the two organisations**

A third important and related reason why their normative differences became a disruptive issue in their post-Cold War interaction was that due to the different natures of their norms, they found it difficult to associate with each other. If during the Cold War period they shared an overriding outlook, i.e. the anti-communist and westernised posture, they now no longer shared a prevailing worldview that could connect them or facilitate their interaction. Instead, they disassociated from each other and each regional organisation sought to develop and promote its own preferred norms, which were radically different from each other. Chapters 6 and 7 have cited a number of examples to illustrate the normative disconnection between the EU and ASEAN in their post-Cold War interaction. The development and endorsement of the ‘Asian values’ by some
ASEAN leaders to oppose the Western/European values was one of these examples. While it is controversial to argue that there exists values that are typically and culturally Asian, it is clear that those ‘Asian values’ were formulated to defy the so-called Western/European values. Another instance was ASEAN states’ decision to ally with China and other Asian countries to discuss and issue a declaration on human rights before the World Conference on Human Rights in 1993. In this declaration, they emphasised their particular understanding of, and approach to, human rights, which were different from Western/European countries’ one. This normative disassociation was also manifested in the ASEM process where non-ASEAN members of the Asian side of ASEM, e.g. China and Japan, sided with ASEAN on issues such as human rights, East Timor and Myanmar.

Overall, the two organisations disputed with each other over human rights and the issues of East Timor and Myanmar in the 1990s because their normative natures became different from each other. Moreover, the identity or normative discourses and performances of one regional organisation were rejected by the other and this rejection led them to clash. The disconnection of one regional entity to the other and its core norms also contributed to their tensions in those years. Because of these three factors, the EU and ASEAN experienced what was termed as a ‘value-system friction’ (Dent 1999: 51; Wiessala 2002: 64), which was also the ‘dark side’ of their relationship in the 1990s (Dosch 2001: 64). Furthermore, they contributed to their disagreements over the exclusion/inclusion of Myanmar in their negotiations in the late 2000s as well as other disputes between the two sides in the ASEM process.

**Less confrontational when normative divergences were limited**

This thesis has also shown that when they try to avoid, limit or accommodate their normative differences or when their normative premises converge, their tensions are decreased or removed and this paves the way for some cooperation. For instance, their decision to put aside the sensitive issues and to focus on economic matters enabled them to create a new dynamism in their relations between 1993 and 1996, which also resulted in the creation of ASEM. Similarly, coupled with many international changes and regional developments, notably in ASEAN, e.g. the democratisation process in some ASEAN members, which somehow limited the normative divergences between the EU and ASEAN, the two organisations also tried to reduce and accommodate their divergences in the 2000s. Consequently, their interaction was much less confrontational.
than in the 1990s. After several years of being disrupted by the disputes over human rights and the Myanmar problem, the AEMM was resumed in 2000 and they took a number of initiatives to revitalise their relations and economic cooperation in particular. One of these was the establishment of the TREATI, which eventually paved the way for them to open negotiations towards an FTA in 2007.

The most significant example of how the limitation of normative divergences or the convergence of normative premises between the two organisations fostered their relations was their cooperation in the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM). The Aceh peace process and the EU-led AMM were successful firstly because the EU’s efforts to bring peace, democracy, human rights and the rule of law – which are its core values – were accepted by Indonesia, which was by that time in the process of democratisation. The fact that EU did not criticise Indonesia and its dealing with and involvement in the Aceh conflict also made it easier for the Government of Indonesia to accept the EU as the leading organisation of the AMM. Another reason for the success of the AMM, which significantly contributed to the successful implementation of the Aceh peace process, was that it delicately dealt with the human rights issue, which was very sensitive in Indonesia politics and Southeast Asian context. In brief, unlike the issues of East Timor and Myanmar, which the EU and ASEAN not only failed to find any common ground to solve but also let them jeopardise their relations, the EU had some significant cooperation with ASEAN and its members in the Aceh matter. This is because they did not strongly insisted their preferred norms and opposed the other’s ones.

Yet, the collapse of their negotiations towards an interregional FTA has demonstrated that even though the normative differences of the EU and ASEAN were significantly diminished in the 2000s, they were not completely removed. Their normative discrepancies were even manifest in the AMM. While the EU repeatedly mentioned and even hailed the achievement and significance of the Aceh peace process and the AMM in particular, ASEAN rarely talked about it. This is because views and approaches of the EU and ASEAN vis-à-vis international relations and security issues in particular were considerably different. As illustrated in Chapter 8, the EU’s way of security was predominantly individual-oriented whereas ASEAN’s one was primarily state-centred. While such differences did not always lead to tensions between the two regional organisations, they were the reason for their indifferences to each other and their initiatives. The EU’s lack of contribution to and participation in the ASEAN-led
institutions, e.g. the ARF and the EAS, partly because the issues discussed in these wider regional mechanisms and the ways they were dealt with did not fit very well the EU’s way of security. That lack of response from the EU also made ASEAN less receptive to the EU and its role in the region. In short, while their different ways of viewing and conducting regional and international affairs, including security issues do not lead them to clash (if one does not oppose the other and its norms) they significantly hinders their cooperation. This will lead to the next important argument made by the thesis.

The negative impacts of their normative differences on their relations

A chief argument maintained by the thesis that their normative differences made it difficult for them to cooperate meaningfully with each other. Throughout its chapters, notably Chapters 6, 7 and 8, the inquiry has demonstrated why the conflicting norms of the EU and ASEAN impeded their post-Cold War operation. Coupled with the involvement of the East Timor, their disagreements over the exclusion/inclusion of the human right clause in a more advanced cooperation framework they had desired and planned in the late 1980s and the early 1990s was the reason behind their failure to negotiate such an agreement. Their differences over Myanmar led to the suspension of the AEMM for several years in the late 1990s and the two ministerial meetings of ASEM in the mid-2000s. The Myanmar issue was one of the key factor that led them suspend the FTA negotiations despite the hugely perceived economic and political benefits that a region-to-region FTA could bring to the two regions. Their different ways of cooperation and their disputes over the Myanmar issue hindered the overall progress of the ASEM process. Their differences of perceptions and approaches vis-à-vis security also limited their cooperation in the strategic and security area.

The negative consequences that their normative divergences brought to their economic, political and security relations illustrate well a number of important arguments made by the thesis. One of these is the contention that the normative dimensions of the EU and ASEAN played a key role in determining their interregionalism. As noted in Chapter 8, this inquiry recognised that the lack of institutional and material factors, notably military powers, prevented the EU from becoming – or being perceived as – a major strategic/security actor in Southeast Asia and the wider Asia-Pacific region. Yet, it is clear that conflicting worldviews and approaches between the EU and ASEAN was also an inhibitory factor. In other words,
while acknowledging that the lack of actorness, notably the institutional and materials dimensions, of the EU and ASEAN deterred their cooperation, the thesis has illustrated that their divergent normative features also considerably held back their cooperation in the post-Cold War era. Thus, a major contribution of the thesis is to add to the established literature on actorness, which focuses heavily on institutional and material pre-requisites.

Another is related to impact of the normative constituents of the EU and ASEAN on their interregional relations. As noted in Chapter 1 and illustrated in the section on ASEM of Chapter 7, this thesis agrees with key scholars on interregionalism that interregional relations, e.g. the EU-ASEAN relationship and the ASEM process defined the collective identity and normative features of the regional organisations/groupings involved. However, this thesis goes beyond that argument maintaining that the normative dimensions of the participant regional organisations/groupings also shaped their interregional interaction. Indeed, as illustrated in this thesis, the normative components of the EU and ASEAN determined the content, shape and outcome of their interregional relationship.

Finally, the negative impacts of the normative divergences of the EU and ASEAN on their relations illustrate that norms and normative powers are not always a force for cooperation or a force for good as some scholars, notably those who work on normative power Europe, e.g. Manners (2002) assume. They can be a source of tension and conflict if they are opposed to each other.

9.3. Some final remarks and recommendations

From what it has discovered, this research wishes to make some remarks and offer some suggestions relating to (1) the research of regional organisations and their interregionalism, (2) the future of the EU-ASEAN relationship and (3) the impact of interregionalism on world politics.

9.3.1. The research of regional actorness and interregionalism

This thesis began by noting that the current literature on the concept of regional actorness mainly focuses on the institutional and material factors of regional organisations when examining their influence on the external world. Consequently, they often overlook or ignore their normative constituents, which also play a vital role in determining not only the form and the content but also the outcome their external
relations and interregionalism. This thesis has demonstrated that ideational and normative factors, e.g. norms, values and worldviews, matter in world politics, the EU’s foreign policy, ASEAN’s external relations and their interregional relationship. Indeed, it has discovered that the ideational and normative dimensions, notably norms, of the EU and ASEAN are among the fundamental constituents that make up their actorness and, consequently, define their interregionalism. For this reason, in order to understand fully the EU and ASEAN as actors in world politics and the way they act, it is essential to take into account their ideational and normative dimensions. Furthermore, in order to explain comprehensively why they behave in a particular way, it is vital to look at their historical, cultural, geopolitical backgrounds. For instance, their own history is a constitutive part of their identities and norms. Thus, it is important to consider the ideational and normative features of regional organisations, e.g. the EU and ASEAN, when examining their actorness. The influential role of the ideational and normative dimensions of organisations, e.g. the EU and ASEAN, in their interregionalism also implies that when exploring the phenomenon of interregionalism and its implications to world politics, it is not only worth considering why interregional relations form and reinforce the collective identities or norms of the participant organisations. It is also of great importance to look at why their collective identities or normative premises affect their interregionalism. As underlined at the beginning of the thesis, this area remains under-developed in the current scholarship on interregionalism.

Indeed, in order to understand the nature of interregional relationships and their impact (or lack thereof), it is indispensable to take into account the *raison d’être* of the regional organisations involved or the way they view and conduct their regional and international affairs. Yet, it is important to underline here that by focusing on the ideational and normative factors of the EU and ASEAN to examine their actorness and their interregionalism, this thesis does not aim to nullify the arguments maintained by a number of scholars on actorness that regional organisations’ institutional and material elements are important components of their actorness. Nor does it intend to invalidate the argument held by Doidge (2004b; 2007; 2008) that the actorness of the participant organisations decides the performance of their interregional relations. Nor does it aim to nullify the argument that interregional relations shape and/or reinforce the collective identities or the normative natures of the regions involved. Rather, it intends to complement these arguments. In other words, an analytical framework that ignores the
ideational and normative factors of the regional organisations involved or their institutional and material ones will not adequately explain their actorness and interregionalism. Equally, an analysis that focuses either only on the level of actorness of the regional organisations involved or only on their normative convergences or divergences to explore the performance or non-performance of their interregional relations will not give a full picture of the relevance of interregional relations in world politics.¹⁷⁶

9.3.2. The EU-ASEAN relationship: Looking ahead

The aim of this thesis is to investigate the EU-ASEAN relationship to see why their normative and ideational premises define their interaction rather than to assess it and, accordingly, suggest what should be done to improve it. Yet, from what it has studied and discovered, it can make some remarks and offer some suggestions for its future. First, despite the setbacks it faced since the end of the Cold War, this relationship continues to be maintained. For the EU, whatever ASEAN is, it is the most advanced regional organisation, which has become more structured and dynamic, after the EU and plays a major role in the wider Asia-Pacific region. For ASEAN, the EU is its second biggest trading partner. However, from what the thesis has discovered, whether their cooperation will move to an advanced level – for instance, establishing a more substantial partnership in which the EU and ASEAN consider each other as a strategic partner or concluding an interregional FTA – depends on many regional and external international factors. These include the desire, willingness and ability of the EU and ASEAN to enhance their respective actorness, making them strong, coherent and effective actors at the economic, political and strategic/security levels. For instance, the thesis has noted that the EU has not been invited to the EAS partly because it was not seen as a genuinely strategic and security actor in Asia. Yet, the central argument made by this thesis is that the normative divergences significantly hindered their economic, political and security cooperation. Therefore, to enhance their relations, the two regional organisations need to limit their normative differences because they are better able to cooperate with each other when they do so. Chapter 7 has shown that their relationship during the last ten years was much less conflictual than in the 1990s because tried to

¹⁷⁶ Besides these two variables, there are probably other factors, which affect, to varying degrees, the rationale and the performance of interregionalism. For instance, the thesis has pointed out that the rise of China on the global stage had an impact on the EU, ASEAN and their relations. These can provide avenues for future investigation.
compromise, avoid or accommodate their normative differences. They were able to work together closely and successfully in the Aceh Monitoring Mission because they shared some common ground to undertake this unprecedented mission.

It is also worth noting that the political opening in Myanmar that began in 2010 (Doan 2011) led many high-ranking EU officials to visit this country. In April 2012, Catherine Ashton, High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, attended the 19th AEMM in Brunei. It was the first time that she went to the ASEAN region to participate such a ministerial meeting. According to the EU, that meeting was set to take the EU’s “relations with Southeast Asia to a new level” and “the progress in Myanmar will ultimately help EU interaction with ASEAN as a whole” (European Commission, Press Release 2012). This means that the political reforms in Myanmar, which used to a major obstacle in EU-ASEAN relations, contributed to the recently enhanced relations between the two organisations. It also shows that if ASEAN and its members continue to open up politically and embrace the liberal and democratic values that the EU holds their ideational and normative underpinnings will become more converged with the EU. Such convergences will also make the EU feel more comfortable as well as interested in interacting with ASEAN. Consequently, their cooperation will be improved.

Nevertheless, whether – and if so when – the EU and ASEAN can or will reach to a higher level of the convergence of perceptions, priorities and approaches to forge a substantial cooperation, especially in the political, security/strategic area remains an open issue. For the moment, there still exist major differences between the EU and ASEAN. One of these is, despite the major changes in ASEAN and its members, especially the latest developments in Myanmar, in terms of their normative and ideational premises, the EU and ASEAN are considerably different and will be the case for many years to come. For instance, as illustrated in Chapter 8, the EU and ASEAN’s ways of security cooperation remains significantly divergent from each other with the former focusing on human security whereas the latter is still preoccupied with state security. Given the current discrepancies of their historical, cultural and geopolitical factors, those divergences will not appear soon. In other words, while their ideational and normative factors have become increasingly similar, and (consequently) their interaction is no longer conflictual as it was 15 or 20 years ago, there are still notable differences between the two organisations in terms of their raison d’être and ways of
functioning in the global system. For the moment, these divergences are still greater than their convergences.

9.3.3. Interregionalism and global governance

As noted in Chapter 1, a key issue that a number of scholars on interregionalism are interested in is whether interregional relations contribute anything to global governance. It has been repeatedly argued that interregionalism can only contribute to global governance if it performs the five deduced functions of interregionalism, and the fulfilment of these five functions depends on the level of actorness of the regional organisations involved (Rüland 2001c; 2006; Doidge 2004b; 2007; 2008; 2011). While acknowledging that generalisations are not always helpful, some remarks can be made based on what has been discovered from the examination of the EU and ASEAN and their relationship.

First, embedded in its own specific backgrounds, each regional organisation was originally established to deal with specific challenges faced by the countries in that region and, consequently, adopted its own way of organising its affairs and functioning in the global system. This thesis illustrates that because of their respective historical, cultural and geopolitical environments, the EU and ASEAN have divergent perspectives, priorities and approaches vis-à-vis their internal and external affairs. Second, their differences are a major obstacle for them to establish meaningful interregional partnerships that can influence the global system. This thesis has acknowledged that the lack of actorness (notably institutional and material component, e.g. military capabilities, of regional organisations considerably limits the performance of their interregional relationships. A case in point is the lack of a united and concerted response by the EU and other regional organisations vis-à-vis the US-led Iraq war and the unilateralism of the George W. Bush administration in general. Besides the lack of military capabilities, the divisions within the EU vis-à-vis the Iraq war prevented it from making any substantial challenge to the US. However, if the EU had managed to form a united and strong position, and then sought to ally with other regional organisations,

Global governance is problematic is generally understood as governance without the existence of an overarching sovereign authority (see also Finkelstein 1995; Fischer 2008). In that sense, with the emergence of interregional arrangements, it is argued that a multi-layered global governance system has emerged. This includes: (1) the global and multilateral level, e.g. UN, WTO; (2) inter- and transregional dialogues, e.g. EU-ASEAN relationship, ASEM; (3) regional organisations/groupings, e.g. EU, ASEAN; (4) sub-regional arrangements, e.g. Greater Mekong cooperation and (5) bilateral, i.e. state-to-state, relations.
such as ASEAN, to oppose that war, it is still unlikely that it would have been successful. This is because not only ASEAN lacks actorness, which enables it to challenge US’s policy, but also because major international issues, like the Iraq war, do not rank very highly on its agenda. While the EU may be inspired to become a global actor and play a major role in shaping global affairs, at the moment, and in the near future, this will not happen in the case of ASEAN. ASEAN’s activity and influence has been, and remains, largely confined to East Asia or the wider Asia-Pacific region. This is because ASEAN and its members have other issues, which are more important and urgent than global matters, e.g. the Iraq War or the current conflict in Syria. Their major concerns continue to be how to deal with territorial disputes, e.g. in the South China Sea and other traditional security challenges. In this context, regional organisations can only establish strong interregional partnerships that can make a significant contribution to global governance if their perceptions, priorities and approaches vis-à-vis regional and international affairs converge.

The question about the impact of regional organisations and their interactions on the global system also interest other scholars of regionalism and interregionalism. Padoan (2007: 53) believes that two main features are likely to characterise the evolution of the international system in the foreseeable future. One is the emergence of new world leaders, e.g. China and India, which strengthens the trend towards a multipolar system. The other is the emergence of regional blocs, i.e. ‘a club of clubs’, which are expected to exist alongside major powers and pursue independent and, possibly conflicting, policies vis-à-vis the latter. Hettne (2005; 2007) predicts that regionalism pursued by the EU and other regional organisations could lead to a future global pattern, that he terms ‘post-Westphalian’. According to him, in this post-Westphalian scenario for global governance, which is preferred by the EU, “[t]he state system would be replaced or complemented by a regionalised world order and a strengthened global civil society, supported by a ‘normative architect’ of world order values such as multiculturalism and multilateralism” (Hettne 2005: 563; 2007: 113). Furthermore, he argues that in the long-term, the EU could play an important role in shaping that post-Westphalian global governance, which he refers to as Pax Europaea, for two reasons. First, its emphasis on interregionalism would lead to the rebuilding of that multilateral world order in a regionalised form. Second, there is a clear pattern in the EU’s external policy to shape the world order in accordance with its experience of
solving conflicts through dialogue, multilateralism, based on international laws and institutionalised relations.

From what has been examined in this thesis, whether regional organisations will pursue independent and conflicting policies vis-à-vis major powers as assumed by Padoan is yet unclear. Yet, what is sure is that their presence and relevance will be maintained. The fact is that ASEAN is able to engage a number of major powers into its multilateral mechanisms, such as the ADMM-Plus and the EAS. However, the Pax Europaea preferred and advocated by the EU and predicted by Hettne does not seem so feasible outside Europe. A key reason for this is that the Pax Europaea, as acknowledged by Hettne (2005: 563), “can be called ‘soft imperialism’, based on ‘soft power’, since despite fine diplomacy, it is often felt as an imposition in other parts of the world”, and is not always well received by other regional organisations. ASEAN’s resistance to the core values promoted by the EU and its members was a proof of this. Furthermore, ASEAN has sought to link with regional powers, notably China, to promote an alternative paradigm, which is predominantly premised on its core principle of non-interference, to the dominant Western/European approach to global governance, which emphasises the norm of interventionism. These two paradigms are increasingly at odds with each other (Stubbs 2007; Dunn et al. 2010). Because of these divergences, as the EU-ASEAN case illustrates, building influential interregional relationships, as the Pax Europaea preferred, will not be an easy task.

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List of Appendixes

Appendix 1: Map of the EU member states

Source: http://www.eu2008.si/fr/About_the_EU/index.html

Appendix 2: Map of the ASEAN member states

Source: http://www.aseansec.org/69.htm
Appendix 3: Selected indicators of the EU member states

Sources: IMF 2009; *World Bank 2009

Appendix 4: Selected indicators of the ASEAN member states

Sources: IMF 2009; *World Bank 2009
Appendix 5: Pre-1990 network of interregional dialogues

AASM: Associated African States and Madagascar
ANCOM: Andean Community
ACP: African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States
ASEAN: Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CARICOM: Caribbean Community
EC: European Community
ECOWAS: Economic Community of West African States
GCC: Gulf Cooperation Council
Rio Group: Group of Latin American and Caribbean States
SAARC: South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SADCC: Southern African Development Cooperation Conference

Source: Modified and updated based on Doidge (2011: 10)
Appendix 6: Post-1990 network of interregional dialogues

Source: Modified and updated based on Doidge (2011: 77)
Appendix 7: ASEAN-EC/EU Ministerial Meetings (AEMMs)

Source: ASEAN’s website, as of April 2012

Appendix 8: ASEAN’s FTAs with its main partners

Appendix 9: The Index of Democracy 2010 of the ASEAN countries

Source: The Economist (2010)

Note: This index of democracy, which is measured on a 0 to 10 scale, is based on the ratings for 60 indicators grouped in five categories: electoral process and pluralism; civil liberties; the functioning of government; political participation and political culture. Each category has a rating on a 0 to 10 scale, and the overall index of democracy is the simple average of the five category indexes. The index values are used to place countries within one of four types of regimes: (1) Full democracies: scores of 8-10, (2) Flawed democracies: scores of 6 to 7.9, (3) Hybrid regimes: cores of 4 to 5.9 and (4) Authoritarian regimes: scores below 4
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank (167)</th>
<th>Overall Score</th>
<th>Category Scores</th>
<th>Classifications</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8.49</td>
<td>9.58 7.86 7.78 8.13 9.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>8.05</td>
<td>9.58 8.21 5.56 7.50 9.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>6.84</td>
<td>9.17 6.11 6.11 5.63 9.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>7.29</td>
<td>9.17 6.43 6.11 5.63 9.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Rep</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8.19</td>
<td>9.58 7.14 6.67 8.13 9.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9.52</td>
<td>10.00 9.64 8.89 9.38 9.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>7.68</td>
<td>9.58 7.50 7.50 7.50 8.82</td>
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<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
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<td>9.19</td>
<td>10.00 9.64 7.22 9.38 9.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>7.77</td>
<td>9.58 7.14 6.11 7.50 8.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
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<td>8.38</td>
<td>9.58 7.86 7.22 8.13 9.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>7.92</td>
<td>9.58 6.43 6.67 7.50 9.41</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>7.21</td>
<td>9.58 6.07 5.00 6.88 8.24</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8.79</td>
<td>9.58 7.86 7.78 8.75 10.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
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<td>7.83</td>
<td>9.58 6.79 6.11 8.13 8.53</td>
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<td>Latvia</td>
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<td>7.05</td>
<td>9.58 5.36 5.56 5.63 9.12</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
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<td>7.24</td>
<td>9.58 5.71 5.56 6.25 9.12</td>
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<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8.88</td>
<td>10.00 9.29 6.67 8.75 9.71</td>
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<td>Malta</td>
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<td>9.17 8.21 5.56 8.75 9.71</td>
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<td>Netherlands</td>
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<td>8.99</td>
<td>9.58 8.93 8.89 8.13 9.41</td>
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<td>Poland</td>
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<td>7.05</td>
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<td>Portugal</td>
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<td>Romania</td>
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<td>6.60</td>
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<td>Slovakia</td>
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<td>7.35</td>
<td>9.58 7.50 5.56 5.00 9.12</td>
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<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
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<td>7.69</td>
<td>9.58 7.14 6.67 6.25 8.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>8.16</td>
<td>9.58 8.21 6.11 7.50 9.41</td>
</tr>
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<td>Sweden</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9.50</td>
<td>9.58 9.64 8.89 9.38 10.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>8.16</td>
<td>9.58 7.86 6.11 8.13 9.12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 11: Annual growth in GDP of the EC/EU and ASEAN


Appendix 12: FDI in ASEAN by host countries, 1995-2004

Source: ASEAN Secretariat 2005.
Appendix 13: Members of ASEM

Source: ASEM Infoboard, as of 4 October 2010

Appendix 14: Members of the ARF

Sources: The official websites of ASEAN and the ARF, as of March 2011.
* Pakistan is a sectoral dialogue partner of ASEAN

Appendix 15: Participation of ASEAN’s major partners in the ARF’s activities (1995-2002)

Source: Modified based on Heller (2005: 132)
Appendix 16: List of countries that have already acceded to the TAC

Source: ASEAN’s website, as of 30 March 2010

Appendix 17: The factors that make the EU less attractive to ASEAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The factors/Rankings</th>
<th>1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>3&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>4&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>5&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The geographical distance</td>
<td>5x</td>
<td>3x</td>
<td>7x</td>
<td>4x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU’s lack of military capabilities</td>
<td>3x</td>
<td>3x</td>
<td>7x</td>
<td>4x</td>
<td>1x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The divergences of worldviews and norms between the two</td>
<td>7x</td>
<td>5x</td>
<td>1x</td>
<td>4x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU’s continuing consistence on the human rights issue</td>
<td>5x</td>
<td>8x</td>
<td>6x</td>
<td>2x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU’s lack of strategic vision and inward-lookingness</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disaccord in the EU</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: From the survey undertaken by the author

Appendix 18: The reasons for the absence of an EU-ASEAN strategic partnership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors/Rankings</th>
<th>1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>3&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>4&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>5&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>6&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>7&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU’s lack of military capabilities</td>
<td>1x</td>
<td>2x</td>
<td>2x</td>
<td>4x</td>
<td>4x</td>
<td>5x</td>
<td>1x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU’s lack of interest in ASEAN</td>
<td>2x</td>
<td>4x</td>
<td>3x</td>
<td>3x</td>
<td>4x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The rise of China, India and other Asian powers</td>
<td>8x</td>
<td>5x</td>
<td>3x</td>
<td>1x</td>
<td>2x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of integration in ASEAN</td>
<td>6x</td>
<td>5x</td>
<td>1x</td>
<td>1x</td>
<td>4x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divergences of worldviews and values between the two</td>
<td>5x</td>
<td>4x</td>
<td>4x</td>
<td>5x</td>
<td>1x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographical distance</td>
<td>1x</td>
<td>5x</td>
<td>1x</td>
<td>2x</td>
<td>6x</td>
<td>1x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU is less attractive compared with the US</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of consensus within the EU members</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: From the survey undertaken by the author
Appendix 19: List of interviewees

Information on this page has been removed for data protection purposes
Xuan Loc DOAN, PhD candidate, Aston University, UK
Research topic: “EU-ASEAN Relations”
Supervisor: Dr. Uwe Wunderlich; Email: j.u.wunderlich@aston.ac.uk

I am working on the interregional relationship between the EU and ASEAN with a focus on how their normative and ideational dimensions, e.g. worldviews, principles, norms and beliefs, affect their external relations and their interaction with each other in particular.

This survey is part of my doctoral research. It is aimed at enabling me to extend my knowledge of EU-ASEAN relations as well as to fulfil my PhD. Thus, your contribution is of vital importance. For that reason, I would be grateful if you could answer this questionnaire and return the completed one to me by email to doanx@aston.ac.uk by 10 September 2011.

The questionnaire is divided into three sections and consists of 30 questions.

Respondent’s details
Name:
Institution:
Contact:

Survey Questionnaire

A. For the following ten multiple choice questions please select all that apply and put them in rank order 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 ... with 1 being the most important by putting an appropriate number in [ ].

1. The objectives of ASEAN’s external relations (have been):
   a. To enable the economic development of its members ....................... [ ]
   b. To preserve the national integrity and sovereignty of its members ....... [ ]
   c. To enhance ASEAN’s relevance in the region .................................. [ ]
   d. To maintain regional stability ....................................................... [ ]
   e. Other (please specify and rank) .................................................... [ ]

2. The objectives of the EU’s foreign policy since the end of the Cold War (are):
   a. To build the EU’s identity as a global actor.................................... [ ]
   b. To compete with other major powers, e.g. the US, China ............... [ ]
   c. To promote its values, e.g. human rights, democracy .................... [ ]
   d. To protect the EU’s interests and increase its influence ................. [ ]
   e. Other (please specify and rank)..................................................... [ ]

3. The main (economic, political and security) partners of ASEAN (are):
   a. Australia and New Zealand ......................................................... [ ]
   b. China ......................................................................................... [ ]
   c. India ......................................................................................... [ ]
   d. Japan .......................................................................................... [ ]
   e. South Korea .............................................................................. [ ]
   f. The EU ....................................................................................... [ ]
   g. The US ....................................................................................... [ ]

4. The factors that make the EU an attractive partner for ASEAN (are):
a. The EU’s economic weight (e.g. trade and investment).................................
b. The EU’s political influence (e.g. EU as a global actor) .............................
c. The EU as a regional organisation ............................................................
d. The EU as a counter-balance in the region .............................................
e. Other (please specify and rank) ................................................................

5. The factors that make the EU less attractive for ASEAN (are):
   a. The geographical distance .................................................................
   b. The EU’s lack of military capabilities ................................................
   c. The divergence of worldviews, principles, norms and beliefs
      between the two regional organisations ..............................................
   d. The EU’s continuing insistence on the human rights issue ...................
   e. Other (please specify and rank) .........................................................

6. The regions/regional groupings in the EU’s priorities (are):
   a. ACP (i.e. countries under the Lome Convention) ...............................
   b. ASEAN and Southeast Asia...............................................................
   c. EU candidates (e.g. Croatia, Turkey ....) ............................................
   d. Mediterranean countries ..................................................................
   e. Latin America (e.g. MERCOSUR, Andean Community) ....................
   f. South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).............

7. The partners (in Asia-Pacific region) in the EU’s priorities (are):
   a. ASEAN ..............................................................................................
   b. Australia/New Zealand ......................................................................
   c. China .................................................................................................
   d. India ...................................................................................................
   e. Japan ...................................................................................................
   f. South Korea ....................................................................................... 

8. The EU’s main priorities in its relations with Southeast Asia and ASEAN (are):
   a. Supporting stability in Southeast Asia .................................................
   b. Strengthening its economic interest ....................................................
   c. Promoting human rights, democracy and good governance..............
   d. Promoting regional integration in ASEAN ....................................... 
   e. Other (please specify and rank) ......................................................... 

9. In 2007, the EU and ASEAN decided to open negotiations towards an interregional free
   trade agreement (FTA). However, two years later, they decided to halt the FTA talks. The
   causes of the failure of the ASEAN-EU FTA negotiations (are):
   a. ASEAN’s preoccupation with FTA negotiations with others ............
   b. Discrepancies of ASEAN members (e.g. level of development)...........
   c. Lack of cohesion in ASEAN (e.g. lack of supranational body) ...........
   d. Disagreement over whether Burma/Myanmar should or should not be
      included in the FTA ...........................................................................
   e. Other (please specify and rank) .........................................................

10. Despite three decades of formal relations, the EU and ASEAN do not yet consider each other
    as strategic partners. The factors that prevent the EU and ASEAN from forging a
    strategic partnership with each other (are):
a. EU’s lack of military capabilities ................................................. [ ]
b. EU’s lack of interest and an overall strategy towards ASEAN.......... [ ]
c. The rise of China, India and other Asian powers .......................... [ ]
d. Lack of integration in ASEAN ...................................................... [ ]
e. Divergence of worldviews and values between the EU and ASEAN... [ ]
f. Geographical distance............................................................... [ ]
g. Other (please specify and rank).................................................... [ ]

B. Please give your view on each of the following 19 statements by putting the number that the best reflects your view in [ ]:

1 = Strongly Disagree; 2 = Disagree; 3 = Neutral; 4 = Agree; and 5 = Strongly Agree

11. Compared to their interaction in the 1990s, when the EU and ASEAN disagreed over human rights, the relationship between the European community (EC) and ASEAN in the 1980s was quite smooth (e.g. no major disagreements), especially on a political level. [ ]

12. The Soviet-backed Vietnamese intervention in Kampuchea (Cambodia) in 1978 and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 strengthened the EC-ASEAN relationship. [ ]

13. The capitalist and anti-communist stance of the EC and ASEAN bonded the two regional organisations together and prompted them to work closely in supporting each other’s position on the Afghanistan and Cambodian issues in international fora, e.g. the UN, in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s. [ ]

14. The political differences (e.g. over human rights) between the EU and ASEAN became prominent following the end of the Cold War. [ ]

15. In terms of values and principles, the EU and ASEAN are considerably different from, and even somewhat opposed to, each other. [ ]

16. Promoting its values, e.g. human rights and democracy, is an integral part in the EU’s relations with Asia and ASEAN. [ ]

17. ASEAN also seeks to promote its norms, i.e. the ‘ASEAN way’ and its core principle of non-interference in its internal and external relations. [ ]

18. The EU and ASEAN disagree over the Burma/Myanmar issue because the EU and ASEAN promote two different sets of values and norms (with the former promoting its values, e.g. human rights and democracy, and the latter advocating its ASEAN way, notably its core principle of non-interference. [ ]

19. If the Cambodian and Afghanistan issues united the EC and ASEAN and strengthened their relations during the Cold War, the East Timor issue and the Burma/Myanmar problem divided them and undermined their cooperation in the post-Cold War era. [ ]

20. The Burma/Myanmar issue became a stumbling-block in the EU-ASEAN cooperation. [ ]

21. With respect to security, the EU focuses on ‘human security’, which emphasises the well-being of peoples, i.e. a people-centred approach, whereas ASEAN focuses on ‘comprehensive security’, which stresses the well-being of states, i.e. a state-centred approach. [ ]
22. The disagreement over human rights is one of the main factors that prevented the EU and ASEAN from renewing their 1980 Cooperation Agreement in the 1990s and concluding the FTA in 2009. [ ]

23. Despite more than thirty years of formal dialogue between the EC/EU and ASEAN, their cooperation remains relatively weak. [ ]

24. The lack of ‘actorness’, i.e. capacity to act actively and deliberately in the international system, of the EU and ASEAN hinders their cooperation. [ ]

25. Divergence of worldviews, principles, norms and beliefs between the EU and ASEAN also prevents them from establishing a robust interregional partnership. [ ]

26. The relationship between the EU and ASEAN “has not moved from a consultative to a more substantive one”. The main reason for this is that “the EU and ASEAN have never really fully understood each other, what their respective objectives are and how they work” (Moeller – Denmark’s former Ambassador to Singapore). [ ]

27. The Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) process has stayed “at the information-sharing level and has not moved into a substantive cooperation” (Report on ASEM in its Tenth Year). [ ]

28. The controversial and sensitive issues, e.g. human rights and the Burma/Myanmar problem, overshadowed some ASEM summits. [ ]

29. “Both the ASEAN-EU and ASEM processes have come to be held hostage by a single issue [i.e. Burma/Myanmar]. The result is an impoverishment of dialogue and the overshadowing of more important strategic issues by ritualistic exchange” (Goh Chok Tong – Singapore’s former Prime Minister). [ ]

C. Additional question:

30. It is maintained that “both the EU and ASEAN are very different multi-dimensional regional entities with quite different histories, objectives, structures and capacities. It is this asymmetry that is at the heart of the difficulties in their attempts at inter-regional cooperation” (Camroux – Senior Research Associate, CERI, Sciences Po Paris). What do you think about this argument? (Please comment below).

............

Thank you very much for your contribution!