Tacit collusion, firm asymmetries and numbers:evidence from EC merger cases

Davies, Stephen, Olczak, Matthew and Coles, Heather (2007). Tacit collusion, firm asymmetries and numbers:evidence from EC merger cases. Working Paper. University of East Anglia, Norwich (UK).

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to identify empirically the implicit structural model, especially the roles of size asymmetries and concentration, used by the European Commission to identify mergers with coordinated effects (i.e. collective dominance). Apart from its obvious policy-relevance, the paper is designed to shed empirical light on the conditions under which tacit collusion is most likely. We construct a database relating to 62 candidate mergers and find that, in the eyes of the Commission, tacit collusion in this context virtually never involves more than two firms and requires close symmetry in the market shares of the two firms.

Publication DOI: https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.982531
Divisions: Aston Business School > Economics finance & entrepreneurship
Aston Business School > Economics finance & entrepreneurship research group
Uncontrolled Keywords: tacit collusion,collective dominance,coordinated effects,European mergers,asymmetries
Full Text Link: http://competitionpolicy.ac.uk/documents/107435/107583/pb07-7.pdf Full Text Link: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=982531
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Published Date: 2007-04
Authors: Davies, Stephen
Olczak, Matthew
Coles, Heather

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