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SURVIVING IN VIOLENT CONFLICTS: CHINESE INTERPRETERS IN THE SECOND SINO-JAPANESE WAR (1931–1945)

TING GUO
Doctor of Philosophy

ASTON UNIVERSITY
JULY 2009

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Title: Surviving in violent conflicts: Chinese Interpreters in the Second Sino-Japanese War (1931-1945)
Name: Ting Guo
Degree: Doctor of Philosophy
Date: July 2009

Thesis summary:
In the past decade interpreting studies has gradually adopted a sociological perspective, taking into account social and cultural factors that affect interpreters’ actual behaviour in different settings. However, there have been few studies of interpreters’ practices as forms of social interaction, especially of the ways in which they become professionals and operate as social agents. Drawing upon Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of practice, this thesis aims to offer a contribution to the history of interpreting by examining the professional training and practices of Chinese Interpreters during the Second Sino-Japanese War (1931–1945).

On the basis of Bourdieu’s concept of “field”, this thesis reconstructs three competing fields dominated by three political and military powers: the Chinese Kuomintang (KMT) government, the Chinese Communist Party, and the Japanese forces. By investigating Interpreters’ training, employment and practices within these three fields, the thesis examines how the interpreting profession was affected by shifts in foreign policy, and how Interpreters’ professional habitus were formed through their training and interaction with other social agents and institutions. It then highlights the Interpreters’ active position-taking in pursuit of individual interests by examining particular Interpreters’ career development through case studies of two Interpreters, Xia Wenyun and Yan Jiarui, who served the Japanese forces and the Chinese KMT government, respectively.

The study shows that the practices of the Interpreters were broader than the scope of language transfer. In order to survive violent conflicts, Interpreters often intertwined their interpreting with other political and professional activities. For them, interpreting was not a mere linguistic practice, but a strategy for self-protection, a route to power, or just a chance for a better life. Frequently crossing social, political and military borders, Interpreters sometimes played a crucial cushioning role by protecting local residents from loss of life and property during the war.

It is hoped that this thesis will encourage reflection on our understanding of the interpreting profession and open up discussion on interpreters’ social agency both within and surrounding their interpreting practices.

Keywords: professional habitus, embodiment, military interpreter, interpreter socialization, Chinese interpreting history
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

BMA Beijing Municipal Archive
CCP The Chinese Communist Party
CMA Chongqing Municipal Archive
CMC Central Military Commission
CPSU The Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CUTEM The Communist University of the Toilers of the East in Moscow
FAB [the KMT’s] Foreign Affairs Bureau
FAO [the CCP’s] Foreign Affairs Office
HPA Hunan Provincial Archive
KMT The Kuomintang Party
MSYU The Moscow Sun Yatsen University
NHA No. 2 National Historical Archive of China
NHAT National Historical Archive, Taipei
NMA Nanjing Municipal Archive
QMA Qingdao Municipal Archive
SMA Shanghai Municipal Archive
USNA US National Archive
Chapter One: Introduction

You have aided the enemy, and tried to avoid punishment. This is the worst crime. Your hands are soaked with Chinese people's blood. Only executing you can dispel the masses' anger. Do you have anything to say?¹

This thesis was inspired by Devils on the Doorstep (Jiang 2000), a Chinese war film set in the Second Sino-Japanese War (1931–45). This film portrays a Chinese interpreter, Dong Hancheng², who serves the Japanese forces but is captured together with a Japanese soldier by Chinese guerrillas and left in the custody of Chinese villagers for interrogation. The interpreter, knowing that the Japanese soldier’s arrogance and his own collaboration with the Japanese forces will endanger his life, makes full use of his language abilities to mediate between the soldier and the Chinese villagers and to secretly pass a call for help to the Japanese troops stationed nearby. Despite a later clash between the Chinese villagers and the Japanese forces, the interpreter manages to survive the vicissitudes of the war. However, as the above quote from the film suggests, when the war comes to the end, the interpreter is accused as a traitor and publicly executed by Chinese Kuomintang (KMT) troops in front of both the Chinese and Japanese forces, as well as the Chinese public.

Although fictional, this movie provides a glimpse into the important but almost unresearched history of interpreting during the Second Sino-Japanese War, a period of intricate political relations. This conflict began in 1931 with a clash between China and Japan in North China but, because of internal competition between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Chinese Kuomintang (KMT) government (also called the Nationalist or Republican government), as well as their respective allegiances to foreign powers during World War Two, soon developed into an arena of political and military powers on national and international levels (see Appendix I

¹ A translated transcript of the Chinese KMT government’s sentencing of Dong Hancheng, the interpreter, to death in the film. Except where otherwise specified, all translations used in this thesis are my own.
² The interpreter’s name has specific connotations: the literal translation of Hancheng 汉诚 is “subject of the Han people [the Chinese people]”, in contrast to the label ‘hanjian’ (the one who betrays the Han people) discussed later in this thesis.
for a timeline\(^3\). The CCP’s growth threatened the KMT’s political dominance and diverted its attention away from the Japanese forces in the north. Although in 1937 the two factions did join forces temporarily in order to halt the advance of Japanese forces beyond occupied Manchuria (Ienaga 1978: 64), in terms of military operations, foreign policy, and control of geographical regions, the CCP and the KMT remained separate due to their different political and ideological values. In effect, two independent forces existed and represented China’s interest versus those of Japan.

The interpreter depicted in the movie is situated in the nexus of these national and international power relationships. Captured by Chinese communist guerillas, detained by Chinese villagers, saved by the Japanese forces, and executed by the Chinese Kuomintang troops, this fictional character becomes the focus of the complicated wartime power relationships. What he himself cares about most is simple survival. This cinematic representation of interpreting and interpreters raises several interesting questions about the actual history of the period: What kind of interpreting tasks were involved in this international war? Who were the interpreters? How did the war affect the interpreters’ practices? Why were some interpreters targeted as traitors, and how did they respond to this accusation and its potentially extreme consequences?

Before beginning the discussion, however, it is necessary to define the term ‘interpreter’ as used here, especially given the different references of individuals who conducted interpreting tasks in different contexts during the Second Sino-Japanese War as well as the complexity of interpreting events in the wartime situation. For example, the ‘Interpreters’ employed by the Chinese Kuomintang government were generally referred to as 译员 yi\(\text{yuan}\) (interpreting staff\(^4\)) or 译述员 yi\(\text{shu}yuan\) (those who render freely\(^5\)) in Chinese; in English-language correspondence with US forces...

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\(^{3}\) There may be some dispute over the starting date of this war given that the Chinese KMT government did not officially declare war with Japan until July 1937. This issue has been much discussed by Chinese historians, many of whom contend that the war began on September 18, 1931, when the Japanese forces provoked the Manchurian Incident in China. In light of my later discussion of interpreting in occupied North China, this thesis considers the war as encompassing everything from the September 18, 1931 incident to the Japanese surrender in the Chinese theatre during September 1945.

\(^{4}\) According to 简明汉英词典 (A Concise Chinese-English dictionary), 译员 yi\(\text{yuan}\) is defined as “interpreter; dragoman. 从事翻译的人,尤指口译人员 (those who do f\(\text{anyi}\) (translation) as their work, especially those interpreters)”. Therefore, the phrase 翻译 f\(\text{anyi}\) is a general term covering both translation and interpreting activities. As for ‘translator’, according to the same dictionary, a specific phrase is usually used in Chinese, i.e. 译者 y\(\text{zhe}\).

\(^{5}\) “译述” yi\(\text{shu}\) is defined as “render freely” in 简明汉英词典 (A Concise Chinese-English dictionary).
in China, they were referred to as “interpreting officers” or “interpreters”. General terms, such as 翻译官 fanyi guan (translation officers) or 翻译员 fanyi yuan (translation officers), were also frequently used by both the KMT government and some ‘Interpreters’ themselves (see Mei 2004, Su 2005). In addition, ‘Interpreters’ in areas occupied by the Japanese forces were often referred to as 通译 tongyi (those who help smooth communication between others with different languages), a word quite probably borrowed from the Japanese for interpreter, 通訳 tsū-yaku-sha, given the Japanese influence at that time, rather than a reflection of the Chinese word tongshi 通事 (‘interpreting clerk’) used during the Jin Dynasty (1142–55) (Cheung 2006: 198). Although these umbrella terms do not mean that interpreters were no different from the translators, who dealt mainly with written texts, it is important to point out that the situation of interpreting during this war might be far more complex than what the label ‘interpreter’ conveys. There might not have been a clear division between translation and interpreting tasks, and the ‘interpreters’ might not be such in an exclusive or predominant way, but rather interpreters who also translated or translators who also interpreted. As we will see in Chapter Three, a majority of the KMT’s ‘interpreters’ were actually military staff whose interpreting work was interspersed with translation work because of the army’s hybrid linguistic needs and the scarce wartime resources. And as some of this thesis’s case studies show, during the war some ‘interpreters’ played a variety of social roles apart from their interpreting work. Therefore, they often did not see themselves as interpreters but rather diplomats, officers or mediators. The complexity of interpreting and the diversity of interpreters’ roles during the war problematize the undistinguished use of the label of ‘interpreter’ and raise the issue of our understanding of the interpreting profession. To address this issue and emphasize the multiple social profiles and roles of these interpreters, this thesis uses the term ‘Interpreter’ (with an upper-case I) to

6 The KMT’s ‘译员训练班’ (yiyuan xuailianban) was also referred as ‘interpreter schools’ in its correspondences in English with the US forces.
7 Despite the similarity of the English translations of the two Chinese titles for interpreters, fanyi guan and yiyuan, they differ in terms of power and position. The word ‘guan’ in fanyi guan implies that the interpreter is an officer with a military rank, while ‘yuan’ in yiyuan is only a general reference to government or army staff, such as secretaries, typists, and other clerks.
8 According to Hanyu Da Cidian《汉语大词典》 (A Dictionary of the Chinese Language) (2005), tongyi ‘通译’ means “互译两方语言使通晓” (to translate for two parties who do not understand each other). In Kangxi Zidian 《康熙字典》 (the Kang Xi Dictionary) (2002), one definition of tong is “凡人往来交好曰通” (good communication and relationships among people).
distinguish them from both the exclusive interpreters (those who only interpret) and the wartime translators who mainly produce written texts (Zhou 1994; Yuan 2005; Cheng 2005).

One major reason for choosing Interpreters as the main research subject is that their face-to-face interpreting and their positions in various political and military institutions provide a fascinating avenue for analysis of interpreters’ actions in society. Moreover, a majority of these Interpreters were specifically trained and/or employed for certain interests during the war, whether military, political, or cultural. In addition, for individual Interpreters, interpreting was far more than a mere linguistic practice: it was rather a strategy for self-protection, a route to power, or even the simple chance for a better life. Hence, trained or untrained, many of these Interpreters crossed social, political, and military borders to pursue their individual interests, and their interpreting work was often intertwined with other political and social practices. As a result, the violent conflicts of war in some ways dramatized and crystallized Interpreters’ positioning and active agency in society. It is this sociological view of Interpreters’ actions that endows this specific historical case with present day relevance.

Recently, a growing number of researchers studying interpreting in situations of conflict like asylum hearings and international clashes have questioned the predominance of textually oriented research methods by emphasizing interpreters’ active participation in social and cultural contexts (Cronin 2003/1997, 2006; Inghilleri 2003, 2005a, 2005b; Tipton 2008; Palmer 2007; Dragovic-Drouet 2007). Hence, to theorize this active interpreter agency, scholars like Moira Inghilleri draw on Bourdieu’s sociological approach and argue for sociological and ethnographic interpreting studies. As Inghilleri (2005a: 126) notes, Bourdieu’s work “provides a set of powerful tools” for conceptualizing interpreter practices, especially their “reproductive or transformative” roles in particular historical and socio-cultural contexts. This Bourdieusian study of interpreters is part of the efforts by translation researchers to resort to sociology, particularly Bourdieu’s sociological approach, for theoretical and methodological inspiration (Wolf 2007a). However, despite the currently emerging literature on the sociology of translation, there has been little
research relevant to interpreters, especially in the form of systematic empirical studies and thorough theoretical reflections. As Inghilleri observes,

The real starting point is the empirical investigation of the relevant social practices, their location within particular fields and the \textit{relational} features of capital involved in both acts of translation or interpreting as well as the academic scholarly activity which takes place in relation to such acts, and their relationship to the field of power. (ibid.: 129)

As this thesis will show in later chapters, this sociological perspective does fit well with interpreting studies in that interpreters are social beings first and interpreting is a social interaction among social agents and institutions rather than the mere linguistic practice on the part of the interpreter. Hence, this thesis takes this assumption as a starting point and applies a Bourdieuian theoretical framework to study interpreters in a particular wartime situation. It is hoped that such an approach will both shed light on this specific interpreting history and open up a discussion on researching both the interpreting profession and interpreters’ practices in the social world, especially in conflict situations. Most especially, this combination of historical interpreting study and Bourdieu’s sociological approach broadens this thesis’s research perspective and offers a fruitful framework for observing and theorizing interpreters’ social practices from both the institutional and individual perspectives.

The thesis is organized as follows: Chapter Two reviews Bourdieu’s theory of practice, especially his concepts of field, capital, habitus, and \textit{illusio}. It clearly illustrates that this Bourdieuian framework promises many insightful theorizations of issues currently debated by translation researchers; for example, cultural identity and professional qualifications. This outline is followed by a brief review of existing applications of Bourdieu’s framework in translation scholarship and some reflections on relevant historical studies of wartime interpreters, including the emergent interpreter profession in the World War Two trials. On the basis of Bourdieu’s notion of ‘field’, the discussion then briefly sets out three fields of interpreting based on the three dominant political and military powers during the war – the Chinese KMT government, the Chinese Communist Party, and the Japanese forces. This categorization forms the framework for the empirical study presented in Chapters Three, Four, and Five.
Chapter Three investigates the KMT's training/deployment and use of Interpreters in different periods throughout the war. As the official government of China, the KMT was the main recipient of international aid and China's representative in the Allied camp. Because of its intensive interaction with foreign powers, the KMT was encouraged to invest in the Interpreter recruitment and training that constitute the basis of this chapter's discussion of interpreter capital and professional habitus. The CCP, in contrast, as discussed in Chapter Four, for political and ideological reasons, obtained little international support except from the Comintern. This situation impeded the establishment of formal Interpreter positions, on the one hand, and, on the other, encouraged Interpreters to develop their own careers.

Subsequently, Chapter Five examines the Interpreters trained and/or employed by the Japanese forces. Unlike the Interpreters employed by the KMT or the CCP, these individuals were in both physical jeopardy and reputation crisis because of their collaborative practice. Hence, their struggle for life and their strategies for straddling different (and often conflicting) power structures add an important layer to the discussion of tensions among conflicting fields and their impact on Interpreter praxis. This struggle and the corresponding strategies are particularly exemplified and elaborated in the case studies of two Interpreters presented in Chapter Six.

Despite its contribution to the history of interpreting and use of a Bourdieusian framework for interpreting studies, this thesis does not claim to offer an encyclopedic view of interpreting or translation activities during the war. Rather, to keep the scope manageable, it focuses on the interpreting activities organized by three major political and military powers. Admittedly however, this focus is in turn constrained by limited access to certain information and my own insufficient knowledge of the Japanese language, which necessitates that the analysis draws only on resources in English and Chinese. Nevertheless, as an initial investigation of little-researched resources — including archive files, memoirs, and original interviews — this thesis provides valuable information for reflection on the theoretical questions raised above. Hence, it is hoped that it will encourage interested researchers to further explore these questions and make further contributions to the field of interpreting studies.
Chapter Two:

A Bourdieusian Approach to Interpreting Studies

Over the past decade, one of the most cited sociologists in translation scholarship has been the internationally renowned French sociologist and anthropologist Pierre Bourdieu (1930–2002). Many scholars have applied Bourdieu’s sociological approach to translation studies (Simeoni 1998, 2005; Gouanvic 2002, 2005; Inghilleri 2003, 2005a, 2005b, 2008; Wolf 2002, 2007a, 2007b); and his concepts of ‘habitus’, ‘capital’, ‘illusio’, and ‘field’ are widely discussed in a variety of contexts, from asylum interpreting to literary translation to the professionalization of the translator position. These interdependent concepts constitute the basis of a theoretical system of sociology that Bourdieu constructed over almost three decades, which he describes as a theory of practice (1977/1972: 16–22) focused on analyzing agents’ social practices, particularly the dialectical relationship between social agents and social structure. The following paragraphs outline this theoretical framework and discuss its applications in this thesis.

2.1 Bourdieu’s theory of practice

Born in the village of Denquin, south-eastern France, Bourdieu studied philosophy at the Ecole Normale Supérieure and then worked as a teacher for one year following graduation (Jenkins 1992: 13–21). In 1957, he went to Algeria for his two-year mandatory military service and taught at the University of Algiers from 1959 to 1960. His experiences in Algeria (1957–1960) constituted a turning point in his life. There, he turned his interest to ethnology and sociology, producing his first book The Algerians: Work and Workers in Algeria in 1962. Although he moved back to Paris in the early 1960s, he continuously referred to and reflected on his empirical studies in Algeria. In fact, three of his most influential books are based on his ethnographic studies of the Kabylia in Algeria: Esquisse d’une théorie de la pratique (1972), its extended English translation Outline of a Theory of Practice (1977), and The Logic of Practice (1980). From the 1970s, Bourdieu extended his studies to a wide array of
topics ranging from education to publishing, media, and journalism, and from immigration to globalization.

Nevertheless, despite their diversity of topics, Bourdieu's writings remain remarkably coherent because they are based on a small set of theoretical principles and conceptual devices. Bourdieu developed this framework continually over his thirty-year academic career to challenge the "deep-seated opposition between two apparently antithetical theoretical stances": subjectivism (which reduces structure to the agent's rational decisions) and objectivism (which deduces agents' actions and interactions from structure) (Wacquant 2006: 267–8). For Bourdieu, this opposition is "artificial" and "harmful" (Bourdieu 1990: 125) and so must be overcome if the dialectical relationship between individuals and social structure is to be captured. This assumption guides his sociological research and is discussed in many of his well-known works, including Outline of A Theory of Practice, Distinction (1984/1979), In Other Words: Essays towards a Reflexive Sociology (1990), Language and Symbolic Power (1991), and Practical Reason: on the Theory of Action (1998a/1994).

To transcend this opposition, Bourdieu (1990: 9) tries on the one hand to distance himself from the structuralism represented by Claude Lévi-Strauss, Emile Durkheim, and Karl Marx, arguing that their view of the individual is too mechanical and that they tend to make individuals "simple epiphenomena of structure". They therefore fail to consider or explain the representations and conduct of "actors" or "agents" (ibid.). By referring to individuals as "agents" rather than "subjects", Bourdieu is emphasizing that the actions of social agents are not "the mere carrying out of a rule" but are the expression of the principles incorporated through their social lives (ibid.). On the other hand, Bourdieu (1977/1972: 20, 73) also criticizes the inclination to subjectivism in Alfred Schütz's argument that a social world is constructed through actors' reflexive and interpretive constructs, pointing out that rejecting mechanistic theories does not imply a need to reduce the "objective intentions and constituted significations of actions and work to the conscious and deliberate intentions of their authors".
To free himself from "the choice between a structuralism without subject and the philosophy of the subject", Bourdieu (1990: 10) developed a theory of practice, a "genetic structuralism", which synthesizes the analysis of objective structure and the mutual constitution of both mental and social structures (ibid.: 14). He describes this latter as "constructivist structuralism" or "structuralist constructivism" (ibid.: 122). By structuralism, Bourdieu means objective structure independent of the consciousness and will of agents capable of guiding and constraining their practices or representations. By using the term "constructivism", he is emphasizing "a twofold social genesis" of habitus, the "schemata of perception, thought, actions", and social structure, or fields and groups (ibid.). In other words, social agents, who are actually "the practical operators of the construction of objects" (1990: 13), are both social products and generative principles.

In this theory of practice, Bourdieu (1984/1979: 101) adapts and redefines some extant sociological concepts (e.g., habitus, field, and capital), which together constitute his formula for analyzing social agent's practice: \( [(\text{habitus}) (\text{capital})] + \text{field} = \text{practice} \). Applying this formula, he suggests that agent's practice is the result of habitus and capital and is activated and conditioned by the structured social conditions and the field to which agents belong, which is in turn modified through their practice (ibid.). For Bourdieu, agential habitus is formed based on agents' position in the field because the subjective relationships between positions are incarnated in their bodies. That is, the volume and components of agents' capital decide the positions they can take and the stakes they can obtain. This structure of capital is thus re-translated into a system of preference, or habitus, which directs agents' choices and direction in the field. Using Bourdieu's formula as a theoretical anchor, the following sections present a closer examination of Bourdieu's theory of practice, particularly the significance of the component concepts to this thesis.

2.1.1 Field and capital

The notion of field, which originated in natural science, especially physics, refers to the "distribution of energy in empty space". From the 1930s onward, the concept was
gradually taken up by such social psychology scholars as Kurt Lewin (Mey 1972: 4) and adopted by many sociologists – for example, Robert A. Dahl and Charles E. Lindblom and Friedrich Fürstenberg – as an important conceptual tool for any scientific study of society (Mey 1972: 197–114). This scientific orientation is also very clear in Bourdieu's adaptation of this term: in most of his empirical studies of field(s), he represents the positioning of agents and institutions using a map similar to the *x*-y graph in physical mathematics. For Bourdieu, the field is above all a structured system of social positions occupied by agents and institutions, one whose structure depends upon the internal power relations that differentiate positions and determine the value of certain resources. In other words, what is at stake varies from field to field, and each field has its own internal power relations. Hence, a "more technologically complex and socially differentiated" society has more fields or "relatively autonomous social microcosms" (Jenkins 1992: 85). These fields together constitute what Bourdieu calls "the social space".

In addition, the field is a place filled with competition for positions and capital. For example, in an interview with Loïc Wacquant, Bourdieu described the field as "a social arena within which struggles or manoeuvres take place over specific resources or stakes and access to them" (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1998: 41). Hence, the positions that agents take are decided by their possession of certain capital, on the one hand, and by the fact that different positions are also associated with different capital, on the other. More specifically, those in dominant positions always try to legitimate and preserve their positions and capital, while the others want to transform the extant structure so they can obtain capital or determine its relative value (Bourdieu 1977/1972: 169). Therefore, the field is never in stasis but rather changes over time because of the ongoing clash between agents. This socially structured situation and the interests related to agents’ positions form the core of Bourdieu’s notion of field.

Moreover, although Bourdieu uses the economic term “capital” in his explanation of the notion of field, he expands it to address the various power relationships and agents’ social activities in the social world. Thus, Bourdieu’s notion of capital is far broader than the Marxist economic usage of the term and covers both the material and non-material resources by which agents appropriate the specific profits of participation and contest in the field (Bourdieu 1986: 241). It is important to point out
that the term of capital is often discussed by Bourdieu in a general symbolic form, but he also distinguishes different forms of capital according to different contexts, for example, economic capital, cultural capital, social capital and political capital. Cultural capital is one type of capital that Bourdieu discusses much in his work, given his interests in education, publishing and literature fields. For Bourdieu, apart from economic capital (e.g., savings, salary, and assets), agents’ specialized cultural knowledge and competencies, including institutionalized forms like professional qualifications and educational degrees, are all forms of cultural capital that can be cashed in during social interactions (Bourdieu 1977/1972: 186–7). In other words, different forms of capital can be exchanged and converted in certain contexts. For example, social capital as exemplified by family connections and social networks can be reproduced in certain political systems as a type of political capital that enables agents’ “private appropriation of goods and public services” (Bourdieu 1998a/1994: 16). Although Bourdieu does not discuss certain specific forms of capital related to fields in wartime, such as those that this thesis aims to address - military and physical capital, for example - his abstract notion of capital is no doubt a useful conceptual tool for us to capture and analyze the power relationships within and between fields.

For Bourdieu, the relative value of the agents’ capital is determined by internal power relations. That is, their possession of capital directly affects their positioning in the field. On the one hand, capital is the resource that agents bring with them into the field; on the other, it is the stake that they strive to attain or secure by occupying positions. Hence, agents’ acquisition and exchange of capital are an essential part of the social reproduction process, and education plays an important role in the standardization and circulation of cultural capital in the social world. Like money as economic capital, academic qualifications have a “conventional and fixed” value that can be converted into other forms of capital independent of any differences between the individual agents holding the qualifications (Bourdieu 1977/1972: 187). This convertibility is based on an objectified power relationship between institutions – one of socially guaranteed qualifications and socially defined positions – rather than on biological individuals (ibid.). However, the exchange rate between different types of capital is not always fixed. On the contrary, the relative value of capital is often questioned and modified when the previous dominant power relationship becomes threatened or changes. As Bourdieu (1998a/1994: 34) notes, the struggle for stakes
among agents or institutions is actually the “conservation or transformation of the ‘exchange rate’ between different kinds of capital”.

Bourdieu often compares the social field to a game in which agents play according to certain rules. For Bourdieu (1998a/1994: 76), what motivates agents’ actions in the field is not their rationale, but what he terms the *illusio*, “the fact of being in the game, of being invested in the game, of taking the game seriously”. For him, the *illusio* is

> [t]he fact of attributing importance to a social game, the fact that what happens matters to those who are engaged in it, who are in the game [...] In other words, social games are games that are forgotten qua games, and the *illusio* is the enchanted relation to a game that is the product of a relation of ontological complicity between mental structures and the objective structures of social space. (ibid.: 76–7)

As Bourdieu describes it, *illusio* is the agents’ feel for the game – their belief in the stakes and willingness to invest their capital in the game. This game metaphor highlights the determinations or limits that the field imposes on agents who, as game players, must follow its rules. At the same time, it also emphasizes that agents can anticipate or recognize the stakes at play. For example, he notes, the decisive factor in the function of a discourse is its social acceptability rather than its grammar or pronunciation. This sense of acceptability is based on agents’ collective expectation and recognition, which constitute part of the “conditions of production” and encourage agents to follow rules and make themselves “acceptable in the social world” (Bourdieu 1991: 76–7). Nevertheless, this anticipation of the stakes in the field is not a conscious calculation but rather an aspect of agential habitus, which is “the product of a prolonged and primordial relation to the laws of a certain market” (ibid.). Hence, this anticipation often takes the form of agents’ self-censorship, which in turn helps them act in response to the objective conditions in the field and maximize the profit they can earn.

Although in his early works, Bourdieu did not use the term *illusio*, the ideas of agent sense of acceptability and self-censorship did emerge in his discussion of agents’ sense of honour in their social practices (e.g., gift exchange). According to Bourdieu (1977/1972: 15), this sense of honour is “a disposition inculcated in the earliest years
of life and constantly reinforced by calls to order from the group”. The “group” here refers to individuals endowed with the same dispositions and connected to each other through these dispositions and their shared interests. As Bourdieu emphasizes, rather than abstract rules or principles, this inscribed sense of honour is the key for agents to respond consistently to the challenges and riposte in the mechanism of exchange (ibid. 12–5). In other words, agents’ participation in the exchange game occurs because they assume that the other parties will engage in similar practice and they are concerned about the acceptability of their practices in the eyes of the group, and/or retaining their group identity.

The game metaphor can become more complicated when agents take positions or are positioned in more than one field simultaneously because they must take into account different or even conflicting rules arising from different power relationships in and among these fields. Although Bourdieu often discusses only one field at a time (e.g., the literary field, economic field, political field), he does not isolate fields or ignore the possibility of agents’ simultaneous positioning in multiple fields. Instead, he views the whole social world as a power field in which agents can be positioned in different sub-fields at the same time and act in one field with the capital obtained in another (Bourdieu 1990: 145).

However, as some of Bourdieu’s critics observes (Lane 2000; Thomson 2008), the various fields that Bourdieu has invested much time to plot, such as education field (1977/1972, 1988), television field (1998c) and science field (2004/2001), also confuse readers because of the co-existing, multiple fields and their unclear boundaries. Bourdieu uses the term “field” at different levels: the field of power, the broad field under consideration, the specific field, and for the social agents in the field as individual fields unto themselves (Thomason 2008: 79). For example, while talking about the French academic field in the 1960s, Bourdieu also discusses both the intellectual field and the field and sub-fields of the faculties of arts and social sciences. Although Bourdieu tries to help his readers understand the structure of these fields by providing a guide map, he contends that the boundaries of fields remain fuzzy and often change; in fact, many aspects of the fields are unclear, for example, where the effect of a field ends or starts, and how exactly fields overlap and cross each other. As
we will discuss in the next section, these ambiguities are reflected in some translation scholars’ applications of this concept and need to be handled carefully in this thesis.

Despite the above mentioned problems, Bourdieu’s concept of field is undoubtedly a fruitful heuristic tool for our understanding of translators’ and interpreters’ activities within the social world. More importantly, by emphasizing the social world as a “multi-dimensional space” comprising multiple fields, and having a “hierarchy within each of the fields and between the different fields”, Bourdieu also constructs a theory of social space that breaks with both the Marxist tendency to “reduce the social world to the economic field and to the relations of economic production”, and objectivist emphasis on concrete substances and proclivity to “overlook the symbolic struggles that take place in different fields” (Bourdieu 1991: 229). Seeing the social space as “a field of forces” or “a set of objective power relations imposed on all those who enter this field”, Bourdieu (1991: 230) captures the tension that social agents may have to face from different fields at the same time, for example, agents in publishing field often have to face pressure from political field, though the complexity of the inter-related fields within the social space is not sufficiently addressed in his investigation of specific fields.

For Bourdieu, agents’ positions in social space are defined by their positions in different fields or, more specifically, “in the distribution of the powers that are active in each of them” (ibid.: 231). This kind of social positioning includes social and geographic origins, as these can be translated into agents’ dispositions, thereby defining both their positions in the reproduction process and their competition with other agents and institutions in the social space. Moreover, agents’ active power is represented in the form of the volume and type of their capital. Accordingly, these two properties and their changes over time constitute the three fundamental dimensions structuring the social space (Bourdieu 1984/1979: 114), that is, agents’ increased or newly acquired capital results in the movement of capital over the entire social space. Whereas the movement of capitals within one field is vertical (e.g., from lecturer to professor), their movement across fields is transverse, horizontal, or between different levels (e.g., from teacher to business owner) (ibid.: 131). Although this two-directional linear model of capital movement may seem over-simplified and thus misleading to any understanding of the multi-dimensionality of social space,
Bourdieu’s emphasis on agents’ position-taking over time within and across fields is important.

In *Homo Academicus* (1988/1984), Bourdieu uses the example of the Ecole Normale Supérieure to illustrate how academic capital is obtained and maintained by the holding of a position that enables dominance over other positions and their holders. As he observes, because of its elevated hierarchical position in the institute, the university’s consultative committee wields power over the reproduction of the university body by monitoring students and screening potential doctoral candidates, from whom assistant lecturers are usually appointed (ibid.: 84). This “semi-institutionalized power” that the committee members can impose on new academics is based on these members’ hierarchical positions in smaller sub-sections of the institution (e.g. as dean or director of a department) (ibid.: 85). In other words, the agents’ positions in the higher education institution result from the exchange of all of the capital they obtained in different positions. Bourdieu exemplifies this exchange of capital with the case of Pierre Renouvin, recognized as France’s most senior modern historian, who had a significant influence on the academic field of French historiography from the late 1930 to the mid-1960s (Bourdieu 1988/1984: 86). As Head of the Department of History at the Sorbonne and President of the History Commission at the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Renouvin presided over all boards of examiners and was invited to many theses defences in the provinces. His personal acquaintance with influential senior lecturers and historians and his connection with the Director-General of Higher Education all enlarged his power in the academic field and reinforced his current positions. Hence, Renouvin’s success shows how individual agents can derive power and secure new positions through their different positions and symbolic exchanges in a process where “capital breeds capital” (Bourdieu 1988/1984: 85).

Bourdieu’s (1998a/1994: 102) notion of symbolic capital, particularly, is a useful tool for understanding the power that agents can potentially apply because of their positions:

[a]n ordinary property (physical strength, wealth, warlike valour, etc.) which, perceived by social agents endowed with the categories of perception and appreciation permitting them to perceive, know and
recognize it, becomes symbolically efficient, like a veritable magical power, a property which, because it responds to socially constituted “collective expectations” and beliefs, exercises a sort of action from a distance, without physical contact.

Nevertheless, this “quasi-magical” symbolic power, Bourdieu emphasizes, is only effective on the basis of certain objective structures and necessary dispositions. For example, to give an order, an individual must hold recognized authority over the recipient. Hence, the recipient’s obedience is not determined by the issuer’s linguistic competence, but is based on belief in and recognition of the individual’s position and power (Bourdieu 1991: 73). In other words, the power of linguistic acts must be backed up by a defined social order that justifies the speaker’s request. Moreover, as Bourdieu observes, when individuals—for example, kings or priests—speak as legitimate representatives of a social group, they become the “medium between the group and the social world” and appear to act in the name of the group rather than individually (ibid.: 75).

Since perceived symbolic power is a reflection of relationships between socially constructed groups and categories—for example, judge/defendant and doctor/patient—, it is often attached to particular social groups with, certain social continuity and stability (Bourdieu 1998a/1994: 103–4). Nevertheless, despite his interest in the symbolic power of language in performative linguistic discourse, Bourdieu does not specifically discuss the symbolic capital of translators or interpreters, who reproduce written or oral texts on the basis of others’ linguistic production.

2.1.2 Habitus

The notion of habitus originated in Aristotle and refers to a habitual or typical condition, state, or appearance, particularly of the body (Jenkins 1992: 74). In past decades, it has been used by many sociologists including Husserl, Durkheim, Marcel Mauss, and Max Weber, who, according to Bourdieu (1990: 12), tend to account for agents’ social conduct without falling into the philosophy of consciousness. Although Bourdieu’s interest in this term originated in his 1970’s translation of Erwin Panofsky’s *Gothic Architecture and Scholasticism*, he questions Panofsky’s belief in scholastic thought being accidental (ibid.: 12–3), a conceptualization antithetical to
his redefinition of habitus as “a system of durable, transposable dispositions which functions as the generative basis of structured, objectively unified practices” (Bourdieu 1979/1963 (1972): vii, 92). Indeed, in an April 1985 interview, when asked why he had chosen the concept of habitus, Bourdieu (1990:12) provided the following explanation:

I wanted to insist on the generative capacities of dispositions, it being understood that these are acquired, socially constituted dispositions [...] I wanted to emphasize that this ‘creative’, active, inventive capacity was not that of a transcendental subject in the idealist tradition, but that of an acting agent.

The key word in Bourdieu’s (1977/1972: 214) definition of habitus is ‘disposition’, which, he emphasizes, is (a) the result of an organizing action, with a meaning close to that of words such as ‘structure’; (b) a way of being, a habitual state (especially of the body); and (c) in particular, a predisposition, tendency, propensity, or inclination. Indeed, the above three points can all find interpretation in Bourdieu’s discussion of habitus; that is, the relationship between habitus and structure, the embodiment and unconsciousness of agents’ practice. Yet despite Bourdieu’s emphasis on (c), the term ‘disposition’ seems to some scholars somewhat confusing because it implies agents’ conscious deliberation or “subjective adjustments” to the objective structure, an idea that Bourdieu has always tried to distance from his notion of habitus (Harker, Mahar and Wilkes 1990: 10; Jenkins 1992: 76).

For Bourdieu (1977/1972: 73), “habit is the source of these series of moves which are objectively organized strategies without being the product of a genuine strategic intention”. Therefore, despite his emphasis on the unconsciousness of agents’ practice, Bourdieu acknowledges the obvious involvement of agents’ minds as they form their perceptions and produce practice. He does argue, however, that agents do not fully know what they are doing, and what they do usually has more meaning than they are aware (ibid.: 76–9). Thus, for Bourdieu, the phenomenon of agents’ decision-making is either (a) a shadow or reflection of what the habitus is doing anyway, either beforehand or simultaneously, (b) an option that, under certain circumstances, is part of the repertoire of the habitus and not in any sense an autonomous or chosen process, or (c) an illusio, insofar as the principles of its operation are constrained by and derived from the habitus (Jenkins 1992: 77).
The first time that Bourdieu applied the notion of habitus to his empirical studies was in his study of the indigenous Berber-speaking Kabyle communities of colonial Algeria. Through a careful reconstruction of the social and economic structures underlying these people's daily social and cultural practices, Bourdieu explores the coherence and equilibrium inherent in traditional Algerian society, arguing that the habitus of agents inculcated with objective conditions tends to engender practices compatible with the structure that produces the habitus. For example, Algerian peasants tend to show doubt about and hesitance to accept government offers such as free terrace construction or tree planting if they cannot see immediate tangible interest. This reluctance is largely related to their habitus, the inscribed perception of the annual production cycle of an agrarian economy (Bourdieu 1979/1963 (1972): 10). In contrast, European colonists in Algeria tend to accept such offers eagerly, a difference attributable to a habitus formed in a capitalist economy, which usually has a longer production cycle and is not necessarily based on an organic process (ibid.). In other words, a particular economic system is always "tied to" a corresponding habitus, which represents and reinforces the economic structure that produces it (ibid.: 6). However, as Bourdieu notes, the coming of the colonialists brought a different habitus to Algeria and broke the original tie between habitus and structure. The effects of this change in topographical positioning clearly shows that agents may intervene in one field when they move from a different field, which is why agents' social and geographical origins matter to their positioning and practices.

For Bourdieu, habitus is the product of a chronologically ordered series of conditioning by objective structures. Hence, because the reproduction of habitus is based on previously inculcated dispositions, agential habitus tends to engender practices "objectively compatible with the previous internalized structures" (Bourdieu 1977/1972: 77). In other words, agents apprehend the social world through their habitus (mental structures), which are also the products of internalized objective structures. They therefore tend to "make a virtue of necessity, that is, to refuse what is anyway refused and to love the inevitable" (ibid.). Therefore, Bourdieu distinguishes two types of habitus: "early class socialization", which build up a "kind of preconscious set of dispositions or matrix of potential action" through upbringing and personal trajectory (Torres and Teodoro 2007: 152); and a professional habitus that
social agents (e.g. artists and intellectuals) acquire and internalize via education and training, though Bourdieu never tries to specify or elaborate on its acquirement and functioning in the process of social agents’ professional development.

In light of this notion of the socially constituted habitus, agents’ family backgrounds and school experiences are particularly important because the former always underlie the latter and the habitus transformed by schooling in turn underlies the structuring of all subsequent experiences, and so on through the process from restructuring to restructuring (ibid.: 86–7). Bourdieu (1991) illustrates the influence of family experiences on habitus using the example of agents’ taste in art; that is, a child reared by parents who love art is more likely to form a habitus, or disposition, for art appreciation. Children that acquire such a disposition early in life will continue to appreciate and criticize art in later life, thereby actively reproducing the artistic structure. Thus, family is an “objective social category”, a place in which agents are socialized and divided according to the social space occupied and the social relationships engaged in (Bourdieu 1998a/1994: 66–8). Hence, to some extent, agents’ family origins greatly determine their social origins and affect their perception of capital and stake in the field. Moreover, as a natural social unit, the family plays an important role in the reproduction of social relationships and structure, both biologically and socially:

The structures characteristic of a determinate type of condition of existence, through the economic and social necessity which they bring to bear on the relatively autonomous universe of family relationships […] produce the structures of the habitus which become in turn the basis of perception and appreciation of all subsequent experience. (Bourdieu 1977/1972: 78)

In contrast, agents are not born into schools, yet such institutions can also exert a significant influence on the formation of agential habitus and on later practices in society. Moreover, the education system represents an orchestrated “inculcation and imposition of dominant culture” (Bourdieu 1998b/1989: 46), in which agents are instilled with knowledge and ideology compatible with the current social power structure, so that they will reproduce and reinforce the dominant social relationship. These inculcative and reproductive functions are particularly important for the dominant culture’s creation and legitimization of a national image, especially in subjects like history and culture. For example, teaching history (e.g., literary history)
in schools can help to build the “foundations of a true ‘civic religion’”, the “fundamental presuppositions of the national self-image” (ibid.). On the other hand, the knowledge and qualifications that agents receive from schools become their capital for position-taking in the field. First, the school diploma provides evidence of the agents’ competence, and therefore its issuance is usually overseen and controlled by certain institutions in the field that set up and maintain standards for academic qualifications. Accordingly, agents’ diplomas are recognized as tickets to certain social positions. Second, the selection and entry requirements of the school system separate and distinguish agents. For example, students that graduate from prestigious schools are judged better than those from normal schools because they have passed a certain threshold and received a better education. In other words, these agents are marked by their “affiliation (old boys of such-and-such an institution)” and, as members of a particular social network, hold certain social capital or symbolic capital (Bourdieu 1998b/1989: 20).

During this process of inculcation and imposition, agential habitus embodies the structures of the social world, “the appropriating by the world of a body thus enabled to appropriate the world” (Bourdieu 1977/1972: 89). On the one hand, it is through agents’ minds (a body part) that habitus internalizes structures; on the other, it is through agents’ bodily interaction with others that the habitus externalizes or manifests itself (Jenkins 1992: 75). In other words, the reproduction process occurs within and through agents’ biological bodies, and the structures only function when they are embodied in agents. Hence, agents’ bodily factors – such as physical conditions and location, gender, and age – are not only expressions of the internalized habitus but can directly influence the agent’s practices in society.

For example, in his anthropological study of gender relationships in Kabyle society, Bourdieu discusses the opposition between masculine sexuality (public and sublimated) and feminine sexuality (secret and alienated), which is associated with their different expression in agents’ internalized bodily practices like standing, speaking, feeling, and thinking in a social context. Those attributes seen specifically as feminine virtues – for example, modesty, restraint, and reserve – are reproduced and expressed in the females’ slightly bent body while walking, lowered eyes while
talking, and headscarf-covered hair; the manly man, in contrast, stands straight and walks with great strides (Bourdieu 1977/1972: 93–4). According to Bourdieu, this opposition is a “specification of the opposition between the extraversion of politics or public religion and the introversion of psychology or private magic” (ibid.). In this case, the opposition between masculinity and femininity is actually an expression of the definition and division of males’ and females’ biological and social roles in Kabyle society, which are imposed on and internalized by agents through social norms and ritual practices. More important, as Bourdieu (1977/1972: 94) emphasizes, if these objective principles are inscribed in agents’ bodies through “seemingly insignificant but practical details” like dress, physical and verbal manners, and bearing, the inculcation process is usually beyond the grasp of consciousness.

However, scholars like Jeremy Lane (2000: 130–8) express doubts about this bodily disposition being incorporated at “a pre-predicative level”, which assumes “the transtorical invariant nature of male domination”. These critics argue that Bourdieu builds his arguments mainly on his empirical studies of the Kabyle and fails to capture changing and varied gender relationships throughout history. Whereas it may be true that Bourdieu’s argument on the association between agents’ bodily practices and their gender is applicable to all societies and cultures, the connection that Bourdieu emphasizes between agents’ bodily internalized dispositions and their socially constructed identity, despite its limitations, is important to translation studies, especially to interpreting studies. Interpreting is a bodily practice requiring the interpreter’s physical presence and conveyance of both linguistic and non-linguistic information through bodily movements such as gestures, facial expressions, intonations, and postures. Although Bourdieu does not discuss habitus specifically from the perspective of an agent’s profession, it is interesting to consider whether interpreters’ bodily practice can be inscribed and reinforced in their habitus through training and professional practice, and how their subsequent interpreting practices and interaction with other agents and institutions continuously affects the development of their habitus. We will revisit this issue in the following sections as well as later chapters.
2.1.3 Identity

Not only does Bourdieu talk little about the issue of identity in his work, but in fact, identity seems to be a term from which he distances himself because it implies both an agent's conscious identification and an immutable social classification or categorization, a conceptualization that his notion of habitus challenges. For example, sociology often attributes social identity to individuals' social positions, especially their families and classes, a notion that Bourdieu (1977/1972: 30) challenges, arguing that in a genealogically defined group, each group member's social identity is "invariable", "equally distinct and permanently fixed". Rather, in his empirical study of the kinship system in Kabylia, Bourdieu proposes that the social identity represented by anthropologists' genealogical diagram is only a single and immutable "official kinship" that fails to consider the social practices preceding and embedded in the kin relationship, or in Bourdieu's words, the "practical kinship".  

For example, Bourdieu argues that marriage is the official definition of the relationship between a man and a woman in terms of their social identities in the family, but the proposals and negotiations before the wedding ceremony involve many practical factors, including two families' economic conditions, social status, and family members' interpersonal relationships. In other words, social identity such as kinship does not manifest as a prescribed and determined "object" or "intuition" but is a social practice that is "produce[d], reproduce[d], and use[d] by reference to necessarily practical functions" (Bourdieu 1977/1972: 36):

Practical groups exist only through and for the particular functions in pursuance of which they have been effectively mobilized; and they continue to exist only because they have been kept in working order by their very use and by maintenance work (including the matrimonial exchanges they make possible) and because they rest on a community of dispositions (habitus) and interests which is also the basis of undivided ownership of the material and symbolic patrimony. (ibid.: 35)

For Bourdieu, agents' identities are never stable or predetermined but are contingently defined and redefined in their socialization processes, in which institutions often play a decisive role. Bourdieu elaborates on this formation of social identity using the

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10 Bourdieu (1977/1972: 34) gives no precise definition but notes that practical kinship's boundaries and designations vary with its users and the occasions of use.
example of the state power's fostering of agents' national identity. As he notes, the
state is the culmination of a process of concentration of different species of capital
(e.g., armed forces, financial resources) that give it capital-granting power and a
decisive right over the relative value of particular capital. Through educational
structures (e.g., classes in history and geography), standardization of language,
unification of cultural markets (e.g., publishing and media), social ritual, and morality
training, the dominant language and culture are imposed on agents to forge their
vision of a legitimate national image and sense of belonging (Bourdieu 1998a/1994:
45–6). These agents then incarnate this official language, legitimized and maintained
through regulation and education, as part of their linguistic habitus and represent it as
part of their national identity. This inculcation process and the function of language in
identity formation is highly pertinent to the interpreter training carried out by different
political powers during wartime, especially when the legitimized language and
imposed language education differ from the agents’ previously defined national
identity.

As a component of the habitus, the linguistic habitus is a socially constructed and
internalized disposition that not only includes “a certain capacity to generate
grammatically correct discourse” but refers to “a social capacity to use this
competence adequately in a determinate situation” (Bourdieu 1991: 37). This
linguistic habitus also involves the principle of embodiment because it is inscribed in
and manifested through agents’ bodies through such physical manifestations as
accents, intonations, facial expressions, and the hand gestures associated with these
expressions. The key idea of Bourdieu’s argument for the action and power of agents’
speech acts is the social capacity to anticipate the value of linguistic capital in a
certain field or linguistic market, an assumption that forms the basis for later
discussions of interpreters’ recognition of such value in different fields during
warteime.

In interpreting studies, in contrast to Bourdieu’s hesitance to use it, the term ‘identity’
is frequently used in close association with restrictive ethical rules and prescriptive
interpreter roles. That is, strict adherence to original linguistic features, an impartial
position, and an unobtrusive presence all seem to take precedence in both interpreter
training and professional practice. This situation is partly related to the predominant
position of conference interpreting and court interpreting in international interpreting studies. Since the 1970s, much psychological and psycholinguistic research has focused on conference interpreting, with topics ranging from interpreter’s predictive ability (Chernov 2002/1979; Lambert 1983, 1989), to note-taking in consecutive interpreting (Seleskovitch 2002/1975), to a cognitive analysis of the interpreting process (Gile 2002/1997; Danks et al. 1997). Whereas such extensive psycholinguistic research on conference interpreting builds up the prestige of conference interpreters, it also reinforces the prevalent view of interpreters as psycholinguistic machines. As Daniel Gile notes, conference interpreting provides an ideal context for researchers because the language input and output can be strictly controlled and monitored; however, the carefully built booth for conference interpreting leaves out many complex and crucial factors that affect the actual process of interpreting, such as interaction among parties involved, noise and other environmental factors (Gile 2002/1997: 174). As Ebru Diriker (2004) notes, although in reality conference interpreters do play a more active role by intervening with corrections and explanations or slowing down the speed of interaction, conference interpreting is often idealized and de-contextualized, in which interpreters are expected to convey information fully and smoothly from one language to another. Most particularly, the glass window and audio equipment of the interpreting booths, to a large extent, protect interpreters from being influenced by such factors as background noise and the presence of third parties, but they also dilute the interpreters’ physical presence and interaction with other parties. Hence, this strictly controlled setting may lead researchers to forget the reality of diverse interpreting settings and ignore interpreters as biological and social beings.

Compared to conference interpreting, the setting for court interpreting seems more restrained, given the court’s rigid control over court interpreters and the other parties involved. Recognized only as a “language specialist”, as opposed to “an anthropologist, a linguist, or a psychologist”, court interpreters are prohibited from paraphrasing, omitting, or changing any information in their interpreting, let alone intervening or taking any action that might jeopardize their impartiality (González Vásque and Mikkelson 1991: 502). In fact, avoiding any identification with clients is an a priori principle of court interpreting, one inscribed and reinforced through
interpreter training, qualification, and court regulations. For example, Rule 2.890 of the 2008 California Rule of Court, "Professional Conduct for Interpreters", emphasizes that "an interpreter must be impartial and unbiased and must refrain from conduct that may give an appearance of bias". However, over the past decade, the myth of court interpreters' neutrality and impartiality has been gradually broken down by researchers through their empirical studies (e.g. Morris 1995; Berk-Seligson 1990; Mikkelsen 1996, 2001). These researchers argue that some court interpreters do identify – consciously or unconsciously – with witnesses who share similar cultural identities and tend to act as social workers, guarantors of defendant rights, or cultural mediators to help those witnesses whose poor literacy and limited legal knowledge prevent them from having equal linguistic rights in court (Berk-Seligson 1990; Moeketsi 1999; Mikkelsen 2002). However, identity is still a tricky and risky issue for court interpreters, given the strict control and conflicting interest in court settings.

As regards the identity or social positioning of interpreters, community interpreting – a newly emerging field that many professional interpreters consider the "least prestigious" (Mikkelsen 1996: 125) – opens up a more realistic and flexible perspective. Unlike conference interpreting, community interpreters work in diverse settings, including hospitals, police stations, prisons, social service agencies, and other public institutions. Although frequently ad-hoc interpreters without professional training, they have to deal with complicated power relationships to achieve certain practical goals in a variety of social contexts (Pöchhacker 2004: 163; Wadensjö 1998: 12). This practical aspect of community interpreting has provoked reflection on the interpreter's identity and role. As Jane Shackman (1984: 3) points out, a community interpreter's role differs from that of a conference interpreter in that he or she must enable satisfactory communication between professionals and clients from different backgrounds in an unequal relationship of power and knowledge. Hence, community interpreting studies do not regard interpreter participation, mediation, and advocacy in their interpreting practices as problematic but rather as natural and necessary for successful communication (Wadensjö 1998; Roy 2004/1993; Mikkelsen 1996; Anderson 2002/1976). Such positioning and participation of interpreters in community interpreting has also given rise to a growing discussion on the definition of interpreters' professional identity (Wadensjö, Dimitrova and Nilsson 2007).
Overall, despite the controversy over its status in interpreting studies, identity is a useful notion for capturing and analyzing the tension and pressure that interpreters must encounter in the real social world. For example, community interpreters can expect no protection or buffering by booths or court police, even though many must in fact handle disturbing or violent social, cultural, and military situations. In this sense, community interpreting represents an event closer to wartime interpreting, the focus of this thesis, and its study reveals more of the social side of both the interpreters and the interpreting process, while appreciating interpreters’ economic, cultural, and social concerns in their practice. It is this sociological trend that guides this thesis. Given the difficulty of conducting a psychological analysis in a historical project, the present discussion focuses on the interpreters’ real-world actions and adopts the sense of identity advocated by Bourdieu—agents’ socially formed perception and tacit self-representation. It therefore highlights interpreters’ self-positioning and the practical strategies that result from the conflicting national interests during wartime.

2.2 Interpreters as socialized professionals

2.2.1 Bourdieu’s framework applied by translation and interpreting scholars

Although translation studies have only recently turned to Bourdieu’s sociological approach, the notion of translators as social beings is not new to translation scholars. In the past decades, scholars in descriptive translation studies (DTS) such as Gideon Toury, Theo Hermans, André Lefevere and Susan Bassnett have shown great interest in translators’ manipulative power in various social and cultural contexts, though at that time their main focus was still the written text as the translator’s linguistic product, especially literary translations.

At the same time, this shift from a text-focused approach to a translator-focused approach was also projected in scholars’ interests in the process of translation, particularly translators’ decisions. To address this area, the important sociological concept of the “norm”, was then introduced by scholars such as Itamar Even-Zohar
(1971) and Gideon Toury (1976/8) to capture and illustrate the factors affecting translators' decisions within texts. Toury (1995: 56–7) elaborated the concept of norm in his descriptive approach, with his classification of three groups of norms applicable to translation – preliminary norms (translation policy and considerations concerning directness of translation), initial norms (translation's adequacy or acceptability) and operational norms (matricial and textual-linguistic norms). For Toury, translation and interpreting are norm-governed activities and translators are socialized bilinguals who assimilate and internalize feedbacks and thus build up their translation competency (1995: 250). As Toury points out, the emergent socialization process that translators undergo is in fact a process of perceiving and internalizing norms. Translation, he suggests (Toury 1995: 249), is an interactional act, and translators continuously receive feedback that is “normative in essence” in that it conveys messages about such factors as appropriateness/inappropriateness. Such positive/negative sanction affects the translators' later production and is gradually assimilated and internalized as part of their professional competence. Hence for Toury (1995: 250), a translator's competence represents “a characteristic blend of nature and nurture, of the humanly innate, the individually assimilated and the socially determined”. However, despite his incisive argument blending both individual and social facts on the concept of norm in the translation context as well as presentation of some general laws, Toury does not focus on the possibility of translation behaviour (Gentzler 2003: 142–4). Instead, he highlights the difficulty of accounting for norms in empirical studies, emphasizing that norms are always changing and usually not directly observable (1995: 63–5). Not only are individual translators' responses to norms different in different contexts, but if translators cannot or do not wish to follow dominant norms, the translators' status can be temporary (ibid.). Although Toury does not mention Bourdieu in his 1995 book, his argument on the translator's socialization process shares some of Bourdieu's notion of habitus, as well as that of earned currency in the discipline. Toury’s norm theory is no doubt a significant step towards the sociological direction in translation studies and encourages other scholars to further explore translators’ strategies in different cultural and political contexts in the social world.

The first significant step in translation studies towards a sociological approach with reference to Bourdieu was Daniel Simeoni and his paper “The Pivotal Status of the
Translator’s Habitus” (1998). In this paper, he discusses Norbert Elias’s two types of human constraints: those by other people and “self-constraints” internalized through learning and experiences (1998: 5), arguing that translators’ continuous acceptance and internalization of norms make them “not only dependent, but willing to assume their cultural and socio-economic dependence” and thus be “subservient” (ibid.: 11). For Simeoni, the determining factor in translator’s practice is his “translatorial habitus”, that is, “the internalized position of the translator in this field” (ibid.: 12). This “translatorial habitus” is “a complex, adaptive habitus finely tuned to the practical demands of the (special) field(s) in which it operates” (ibid.: 14). According to Simeoni, translators are all endowed with a social habitus acquired through their practices in the social world, but they refine it into a specialized professional habitus through their professional training and/or practice. Hence, for Simeoni, schooling is important but not necessary to the refining process and learning is never final in the translators’ professional praxis.

Simeoni’s argument on the “translatorial habitus” has stirred up a discussion of the application of this concept of Bourdieu’s to translation studies, although in the 1990s, the focus of such discussions was mainly the exploration of its theoretical support to the analysis of a translator’s perception of norms and their norm-governed practices. For example, in his Translation in Systems: Descriptive and System-oriented Approaches Explained, Hermans (1999) particularly credits the advantages of Bourdieu’s habitus concept for investigating the reality of translators and their practices. Hermans values Simeoni’s emphasis on the ‘bodily inscription’ in the habitus concept, noting that habitus as embodied disposition identifies a crucial gap between the formulated norms and their concrete enactment, thereby complementing the notion of norms by “adding lived experience and bodily comportment, including the degree of suspense and uncertainty which goes with the enactment of rules” (ibid.: 134–5).

In the past decade, the notion of translators' professional habitus is further elaborated in the past decade by scholars such as Moira Inghilleri (2003, 2005a, 2005b). Based on her empirical study of interpreters for asylum refugees in US courts during the mid-1980s (2003) and interpreters in the political asylum application process in the
UK (2005a), Inghilleri argues that interpreters’ self-perception and practices are related not only to factors like qualifications, educational experiences, and cultural affiliations but also to their habitus, as well as to the fields and specific norms involved in the interpreting context (Inghilleri 2003: 259). Apart from their social habitus, Inghilleri emphasizes, translator/interpreter also have their specialized “professional habitus” which “generate and are generated by forms of linguistic and cultural capital” (ibid.: 245). Although she does not specify what exactly this professional habitus may consist of, especially in the field of interpreting, Inghilleri emphasizes that the norms internalized by interpreters and manifested through their practices emerge from different sources within the culture(s) involved and can be traced back to

[1] training institutes, to participating in a particular discourse community, to a particular institutional body, and/or to a set of wider social beliefs and practices concerning cross-cultural/linguistic communication and notions of exclusion/inclusion. (ibid.: 255)

Clearly, rather than replacing Toury’s norm theory, Inghilleri reiterates the significance of the concept of norm and tends to combine it with Bourdieu’s theory by arguing that interpreters are socialized professionals who internalize norms and refine their habitus through their discursive practices in both translation and non-translation fields. But, by emphasizing interpreters' ability of realizing the “potentiality of language” and transcending the “orderliness” set by different social institutions, Inghilleri also argues that interpreters are not “forever trapped inside their socialized constituted selves” but can play a more active role as “rational, speaking subjects” (Inghilleri 2003: 261–2). According to Inghilleri, Bourdieu sees language primarily as an “epiphenomenal reflection of social structures” but dismisses language’s social nature and function in constructing social interaction and power relationships (ibid.: 246). Here, Inghilleri diverts from Bourdieu’s arguments on social agents’ unconscious practices but opens up a discussion on interpreters’ active agency in social interactions.

However, to conceptualize interpreters’ different positioning in events that involve interpreting, Inghilleri (2008: 213) also applies Bourdieu’s notion of illusio to the
issue of interpreters’ ethical dilemmas during conflicts, emphasizing that when their former ethics encounter challenges, interpreters are often propelled to reflect on themselves. Although this reflexivity may de-activate certain parts of the interpreter habitus, as Inghilleri notes, it does not develop into just and ethical actions because of the interpreters’ inferior positioning in the field (ibid.: 220). She thus suggests a new translation ethics that can

[r]esist the wish to transcend the violation of the other through codes based in transcendent ideals and is instead guided by the nature of the ethical encounter itself – where “the right thing to do” cannot be calculated or predetermined, but can only ever be decided in the event itself. (ibid.: 222)

Inghilleri’s “right thing to do”, which “cannot be calculated or predetermined”, echoes Bourdieu’s emphasis on the generative scheme of the interpreter habitus and interpreters’ practical sense of the field, but deviates from her previous argument on interpreters as a “rational, speaking agents”, and thus prevents her from further exploring the theoretical basis of interpreters’ agency. We may also ask whether ‘translation ethics’ is the right term. That is, Bourdieu’s notion of illusio refers not merely to a sense of what is occurring but also to the acknowledgement of the stakes in the field and the inclination to acquire certain capital or interest. As Bourdieu (1995: 333–4) explains, the illusio is the “adherence to the game as a game, the acceptance of the fundamental premise that the game, literary or scientific, is worth being played, being taken seriously”. Indeed, the term ‘ethics’ implies a shared perception or part of ‘a sense of acceptability’ that captures some social or symbolic capital in certain contexts. However, in conflicts involving multi-cultural backgrounds, there may be no clear line between right and wrong because agents’ perceptions of the structure vary based on their previous social experiences and current positioning in the field(s). More importantly, the term ‘ethics’ may clash with agent self-preservation, especially in the presence of violence and physical danger. Therefore, the notion of norm may be more appropriate for our analysis of interpreters’ practice in that norm not only includes the constraints that interpreters encounter but also is informed by value systems which serve as “the model of correct or appropriate behaviour” (Schäffner 1999: 5). Interpreters’ perception of the norms is thus, in Bourdieu’s words, their illusio. Understanding of the relation between norm
and agents’ *illusio* is particularly important for the thesis’ discussion of collaborating Interpreters in Chapter Five. Because a majority of these Interpreters apparently perceived the prevailing nationalistic and patriotic norms in Chinese society during the war and expected the negative consequences of their collaborative actions, and thus tended to straddle sides to avoid or reduce later punishment by Chinese government and public. Therefore, this thesis addresses the issue of ethics as part of agential *illusio*, or in Bourdieu’s words, the Interpreters’ sense of social acceptability or norms.

Despite translation scholars’ wide endorsement of Bourdieu’s concept of habitus, the application of his notion of field, however, is under debate. Simeoni (1998: 26) first questions the existence of a translation field, arguing that testing belongingness to a field means accepting that the “relevant decisions made by the stakeholders are taken with an eye on what their peers are doing, either to go along with them, or to oppose them”. This vision, he argues (ibid.), has not become mature and stable enough to form “a distinct community of translators” as homogeneous as the nineteenth-century French literary field discussed by Bourdieu. Rather, focusing on the relationship between norms and habitus, Simeoni emphasizes that the field structure is “a nexus of social norms embodied and customarily somatised in daily routines” (ibid.: 27).

Similar doubt on the possibility of re-constructing a translation field is cast by other scholars such as Michaela Wolf (2007a) and Jean-Marc Gouanvic (2005). Wolf argues that because of the complexity of translation practice in different social and cultural contexts, it is very difficult to map out all relevant factors constituting the field (2005: 21). More specifically, she argues that the translation field is not a formed field in Bourdieu’s sense because it is subject to frequent changes resulting from the temporary positioning of agents (including translators, editors, and publishers) in terms of translation production. Moreover, translators are usually less socially recognized than writers and have less symbolic capital (ibid.). Similar doubts on translators’ symbolic capital are also put forward by Jean-Marc Gouanvic (2005). Gouanvic argues that unlike writers, who enjoy an enduring and stable symbolic capital through their works, translators benefit primarily from the “symbolic capital invested in the original work, published in the source society” (ibid.: 161–2).
In contrast, scholars such as Hermans (1999) and Moira Inghilleri (2003, 2005a, 2005b) hold a different view on the application of the field concept to translation studies. Hermans questions Simeoni’s assumption of translator subservience to other agents and challenges his scepticism that, because of this subservience, a field of translation may not actually exist. In Hermans’ (1999: 134) view, Simeoni fails to see the structuring feature of the habitus; that is, translators can also shape or initiate norms through their resistant translations. He also points out that Simeoni’s comparison between the field of translation and the nineteenth-century French literary field is unjustified because the autonomy of the literary field is also relative and subject to factors outside literature. For Hermans (1999: 136), no fields are isolated and in absolute autonomy, but agents always act according to “interlocking logics”, as do translators.

Rather than seeing a field of interpreting, Inghilleri (2005a: 72–3) regards interpreting events as places in which multiple interlocking fields converge and argues that interpreters’ positions in the social space are often dependent on other more powerful agents and institutions. She compares this uncertainty of interpreters’ positions to the discordance that Bourdieu identifies between dispositions (experiences) and positions (expectations) in his notion of ‘zones of uncertainty in social space’. This discordance often triggers interpreters’ reflection on and adaptation to their current position and thus ultimately transforms or re-orient their habitus (Inghilleri 2005a: 71). She elaborates this concept of interlocking fields in her discussion of the ethical dilemmas of military interpreters in Iraq and Guantánamo who, involved either willingly or unwittingly in physical or verbal abuse during interrogation, experienced ethical struggles (Inghilleri 2008: 212–3). These interpreters responded differently to their interpreting work; for example, some chose to reject involvement in or the witnessing of human rights violations by quitting their positions, while others tried very hard to deal with the conflicts because they could not afford to leave their military posts (ibid.). For her, these different practices reflect the clash among distinctive fields and habitus drawn together by war.
Discussions by the above-mentioned scholars are provoking and raise a number of interesting questions related to this thesis's studies of the Interpreters during the Second Sino-Japanese War: is there a field of interpreting? If so, how is the field structured, and how are interpreters positioned? What is an interpreter's professional habitus? What factors can affect the formation of the interpreter's professional habitus? What type of capital do interpreters need to enter the interpreting field? How do interpreters respond to situations that endanger their lives and positioning in the social world? It is the aim of this thesis to contextualize and address these questions, and in particular, to test the application of Bourdieu's sociological approach in a complicated context wherein interpreting and translation are not isolated from each other, but rather mixed or inter-related.

2.2.2 Studies on interpreters in conflict situations

Despite a long history of linguists' use in both peace negotiations and military operations in international politics, little scholarly literature has explicitly addressed interpreters in wartime. One exception is the studies of interpreting in war tribunals like the Nuremberg Trials and the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) (Gaiba 1998; Shveitser 1999; Takeda 2007). Like court interpreting studies, however, most such research is discourse analysis of simultaneous interpreting during the trials and examination of the structure of the interpreting system, including the selecting and monitoring of interpreters. More relevant to this thesis are the historical studies on wartime interpreters by scholars like Michael Cronin (2003/1997, 2006), Anthony Pym (1998), Jean Delisle and Judith Woodsworth (1995), and especially Ruth Roland (1982, 1999) and diplomatic interpreters in post-war Japan by Kumiko Torikai (2009), although systematic studies on interpreters in a specific war have been sparse. This gap may be partly attributable to the difficulties of obtaining information on military conflicts for empirical study, and partly due to the frequent lack in such situations of a clear distinction between translators and interpreters. However, as discussed in the Introduction, interpreting in conflict situations is an important topic, offering rich evidence for analysis and great potential for research into interpreters' positioning and practices in different social settings.
The pioneer on the topic of wartime interpreters is Ruth A. Roland, who as early as 1982 addressed this issue in *Translating World Affairs*, which describes some influential translators/interpreters from across the world and their practices in diplomatic and political history, especially during wartime. Despite its initial failure to attract the attention of translation scholars, an updated version, re-published as *Interpreters as Diplomats: Diplomatic History of the Role of Interpreters in World Politics* (1990), offers a stimulating historical account of interpreters’ multiple roles in diplomatic and political history based on diplomatic anecdotes, interpreters’ diaries, memos of international, political, and military meetings and treaties, and governmental administrative records. Interpreters’ power in wartime could be significant due to their political or military affiliations. As Roland notes, during World War Two there were a number of Japanese interpreters who actively participated in torture and murder of civilians (1990: 171). More important, she also points out discrepancies between the professional ethical codes and individual interpreters’ various practices and challenges translation organizations and institutions upholding the application of the ethical standards to an examination of interpreters’ practices in all settings (1990: 164, 172). Specifically, she argues that interpreters’ own judgements of right or wrong vary with their native cultures and socio-political experiences (ibid.). Admittedly, it may be problematic that Roland attributes interpreters’ decisions to their ethical standards, but her research does shed light on a joint consideration of interpreters’ diversified socio-cultural backgrounds and their various interactions with different political powers in society. Moreover, although Roland does not theorize about the external and internal factors influencing interpreter practices, she emphasizes individual interpreters’ practical concerns and hence strategies by arguing that in such situations as war, when interpreters encounter both conflicting ideological and cultural inculcation and risk to their lives, it is quite possible for interpreters to “grossly abuse their power” rather than voluntarily abide by any professional codes (ibid.: 172).

A similar historical perspective is adopted by Margareta Bowen (1995), who focuses on certain influential, individual interpreters throughout world history. Specifically, Bowen discusses the recruitment and usage of interpreters in colonial times and during the two world wars, arguing that although interpreters are a crucial source in
military conquest and political negotiation, their use is also associated with a variety of problems (e.g., “loyalty, breaches of etiquette or ethics”); these owe themselves to the fact that interpreting is a human activity and involves a “highly personal act of mediation between individuals, often with strong personalities” (ibid.: 273). This emphasis on personal acts is interwoven with her analysis of individual interpreters’ social trajectories, thereby offering some interesting insights into the interpreting profession, as well as interpreters’ career development through their interpreting work; for example, from gifted interpreters to influential diplomats.

This emphasis on studies of individual interpreters’ social trajectories is elaborated by Kumiko Torikai in her recent publication, *Voices of the Invisible Presences: Diplomatic Interpreters in post-World War II Japan* (2009). On the basis of her life-story interviews on five Japanese diplomatic interpreters, Torikai attempts to explore the motivations of individual interpreters’ entrance to the world of interpreting and their career development in diplomatic interpreting. As Torikai notes, factors such as interpreters’ upbringing, wartime experiences, language acquisition, family and social background exerted tremendous impact on their life and work as diplomatic interpreters. Being aware of the limitations of life-story research in terms of validity, reliability and representativity, Torikai categorizes and analyzes the interpreters’ narratives following Bourdieu’s notions of habitus, field and practice, emphasizing the presence of these interpreters and their contribution to Japan’s foreign relationship and reconstruction after World War II. As she observes (2009: 150), individual interpreters’ perception of their profession and role varies to their individual backgrounds and experiences; and they made decisions from “a number of choices and options” on their own. However, despite many interesting insights that Torikai offers through her research, she does not address adequately the relevance between the interpreters’ life stories and Bourdieu’s notions of habitus and field. She argues that habitus is the decisive factor leading the interpreters to the field of interpreting and that every interpreter is related to a different field, but she never clearly defines the field(s) of interpreting, nor considers the fact that interpreters’ habitus is also the product of the field of interpreting. Her extensive usage of interpreters’ narratives as the basis of her analysis of the interpreters’ self-perception of the profession and factors underlying their decisions in the past is also not free of
problems, as what the interpreters say during the interviews is always a mixed result of their memory of the past and their current understandings affected by their subsequent social experiences.

In “The Empire Talks Back: Orality, Heteronomy and the Cultural Turn in Interpreting Studies” (1997), Michael Cronin takes an influential step towards a socio-cultural study of interpreters in colonial history by pointing out that interpreters used in clashes between colonialists and colonials frequently crossed the boundaries of gender, class, nationality, or ethnicity. Moreover, such hybrid identities turned them into loathed yet admired ‘monsters’ in the eyes of native people (ibid.: 391–4).

Inspired by R. Bruce W. Anderson’s (2002/1976) “Perspectives on the Role of the Interpreter”, Cronin began to realize the significance to interpreting studies of analyzing the “variables of interpreters’ social class, education, gender” and “situational factors, such as arena of interaction and level of tension” (ibid.: 391). He therefore suggested that the issue central to interpreting events is the problem of control, which directly affects interpreter practices in society. Accordingly, although not yet exposed to Bourdieu’s sociological approach, Cronin seemingly freed himself from the ethical issue haunting many interpreting scholars and interpreters because of the following concern:

[The role of interpreters throughout history has been crucially determined by the prevailing hierarchical constitution of power and their position in it. In this respect, if you or your people are seriously disadvantaged by the hierarchy, the most ethical position can be to be utterly “unfaithful” in interpreting in the name of another fidelity, a fidelity of resistance. This is not a “problem”. It is a strategy for survival. (ibid.: 394)]

This notion of “strategy for survival” well captures and articulates interpreters’ practical concerns in conflict situations and is further elaborated as “embodied agency” in Cronin’s (2006) Translation and Identity. In this work, he emphasizes that interpreters, unlike translators, are visible to other agents and institutions, and thus are more vulnerable to any retaliation (torture, etc.) resulting from failed communication during interpreting. Hence, for Cronin, this embodied agency not only means that interpreters can express their views through bodily actions like voice, intonation,
gesture, and facial expression, but also implies that the interpreters’ bodies affect their practices because they are usually well aware of the consequences of their interpreting activities (ibid.: 78).

Employing the example of masked interpreters in the 2002 Iraq War, Cronin explores the use of interpreters as intelligence agents in wartime and emphasizes the interpreters’ problematized identities in international conflicts. As he notes, like the native interpreters who could not “return native” in colonial times, in both the former Yugoslavia and Iraq, many local interpreters were murdered or even executed by local governments because of their interpreting service to the foreign forces (Cronin 2006: 114–5). To protect themselves and their families from this physical danger, many Iraqi interpreters chose to wear masks to hide their identities from the public.
Although he does not explicitly address the power of interpreters in conflict, Cronin incisively articulates on the issue of interpreters’ agency as well as their consequent identity crisis identity in both colonial time situations and current international geo-politics.

In fact, agency is not a new topic in the discipline of translation studies. In the past two decades, translators’ and interpreters’ power and agency has been an aspect emphasized much by translation scholars focusing on a cultural studies approach. For example, in the early 1990s Lawrence Venuti (1992, 1995) observed two main strategies of translation, domestication and foreignization, and proposes the term of “resistance” to address translators’ responsibilities of addressing the problems underlying fluent and transparent translations. For Venuti (1995: 266), domestication is the dominant form of translation in contemporary Anglo-American culture, which covers the unbalanced power relationship between cultures and erases the linguistic difference of the foreign text. To “restrain the ethnocentric violence of translation”, Venuti calls for the foreignizing strategy to visualize the presence of translators via foreign linguistic and stylistic elements, emphasizing the significance of this resistance in “pursuing cultural diversity” and “unsettling the hierarchies in the translating language” (ibid.). Although many scholars have cast doubt on the effectiveness of Venuti’s foreignizing strategy (Pym 1996, Tymoczko 2007), his idea
of resistance has stimulated a lot of discussion on translators’ intervention in the asymmetrical power relationships, particularly in the area of postcolonial studies.

Research by scholars such as Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (1993/2000), Tejaswini Niranjana (1992), Maria Tymoczko (1999, 2007) has shown that by disseminating ideologically charged images of the colonized and the colonialist translations have played an active role in the process of colonization in different contexts (e.g. Indian, Irish and Brazil) (Munday 2001: 134). Thus, translators hold a crucial position to stop this Western metaphysical representation and address the asymmetrical power relationships among different languages and cultures through their translation. For example, as Spivak notes, translations of writings by women in the third world often erase the linguistic and geopolitical features of the less powerful culture to cater to the more powerful ones’ expectations. Spivak thus argues that translators from the third world should retain source text’s “linguistic rhetoricity” and reflect on their selection of the source text to “fight the racist assumption” (1993/2000: 405). Niranjana advocates an interventionist approach, calling for translators’ resistance to the colonial discourse and efforts in revitalizing and nourishing the identity and culture of the colonized (1993: 173). Tymoczko further elaborates on the issue of translators’ agency by questioning the concept of translation and promoting the notion of “engaged translators” who take clear ideological stances and translate for their own political agendas (2008: 213). For Tymoczko, translation does not solely transfer knowledge from one language to the other, but also to “create, construct, or amass knowledge” (ibid.: 197); therefore, a translator’s agency reaches far beyond fidelity to source text and comprises many important political, social and cultural aspects in society. Unlike previous scholars, Tymoczko tends to expand the concept of translation to capture and theorize behavior of translators who actively engage in social movements and translate with clear political agendas. Her notion of engaged translators has direct relevance to this thesis in that many of the Interpreters that this thesis will discuss were prominent political figures as well as translators and interpreters. In the ensuing chapters, we will come back to this issue and test the necessity of re-conceptualization of the interpreting profession.
Tymoczko's emphasis of translators' political engagement actually projects a recently rising interest of translators' and interpreters' active agency in conflict. Two international conferences have been hosted on this theme by the University of Salford in 2004 and the University of Manchester in 2006. Scholars such as Mona Baker (2006) and Myriam Salama-Carr (2007) review and re-conceptualize the interventionist practices of translators and interpreters in conflict situations. Unlike previous descriptive studies and post-colonial studies with exclusive interests in texts, a majority of this research tend to situate their objects in a wider social context and explore the activist role of translators and interpreters in international geo-politics.

For example, Baker (2006), in Translation and Conflict, examines the roles of translators and interpreters in circulating, maintaining, or undermining international political narratives. Focusing on translation and interpretation between English and Arabic in recent, politically sensitive situations at Guantánamo Bay and in Iraq, Baker discusses how certain narratives can be re-framed by translators and interpreters through paralinguistic, visual, and linguistic devices such as intonation, tense, and word selection. These reconstructed narratives, she argues, constitute a representation of translators' and interpreters' active politico-social positioning and their resistance to dominance and violence. However, although Baker's use of corpus linguistic and discourse analysis no doubt makes for a significant contribution to current translation studies, it also prevents her from exploring factors other than linguistic evidence. Hence, her theoretical and empirical studies leave many issues untouched, especially in terms of individual interpreter's interplay with and positioning within different political camps.

The anthology Translating and Interpreting Conflict (2007), edited by Myriam Salama-Carr, is a joint effort by translation studies scholars to discuss the tension and conflict embedded in translation practice. In her introduction to the collection, Salama-Carr argues that translators and interpreters are not "detached observers" but social actors (ibid.: 7). Drawing on Oscar Nudler's (1990) pattern of conflict resolution (primitive conflict, coexistence, dialogue, restructuring), she suggests that at some stages of conflict situations, translators and interpreters can make contributions, from conflict representation to dialogue to restructuring (ibid.: 7).
first section of the book, “Interpreters and Translators on the Front Line,” is particularly important to this thesis because it explicitly addresses the issue of interpreting at the front during wartime, and especially locally recruited interpreters’ interaction with different international military and political powers.

Likewise, Jerry Palmer’s article “Interpreting and Translation for Western Media in Iraq”, based primarily on interviews with Western journalists working with local Iraqi interpreters since 2003, indicates that these journalists used local interpreters as ‘fixers’ who performed a range of duties beyond interpretation/translation. Such responsibilities included arranging interviews, selecting interviewees (within limits), security assessment, and gaining access to a network of local contacts to secure protection for the journalists (Palmer 2007: 18–23). In fact, few interpreters employed by Western journalists in Iraq are “exclusively” interpreters or translators, and their competence as fixers almost determines the success of their employment. This notion of interpreter as fixer is interesting because it implies the conflicting power relationship in interpreted events and emphasizes interpreters’ indispensable mediating role. Nevertheless, this fixer role also raises issues related to employers’ trust of interpreters. According to Palmer, because of their great dependence on local interpreters in communication and contact, many Western journalists seem also to have concerns about their interpreters’ reliability; for example, mistranslation or omission of information, conflicting interests, and influence on the journalistic view of the situation (ibid.).

This fixer model is further enriched by Mila Dragovic-Drouet’s paper “The Practice of Translation and Interpreting during the Conflicts in the Former Yugoslavia (1991–1999)” (2007), which focuses on translator and interpreter practices after the dislocation of the federal state in 1991. Specifically, Dragovic-Drouet shows that in the former Yugoslavia, a large number of liaison interpreters and assistant interpreters were hired from among local residents to work for the media, international organizations, NGOs, and peace-keeping forces. Many were not professional interpreters and played a role similar to that of Palmer’s model of fixer. Many candidates who applied for the interpreter positions did so because of the high
unemployment in the area and the associated payment, although many had insufficient linguistic abilities for interpreting. She also observes that local authorities chose a special kind of interpreter, the ‘official translator’, based on allegiance (Dragovic-Drouet 2007: 34–5). Thus, these liaison interpreters were not only linguistic mediators but also the extension of local powers in that, while interpreting, they were able to censor or amend information unfavourable to the government to maintain their positions. This discovery of potentially conflicting interests in interpreting echoes the journalists’ concerns about interpreter reliability and enriches Palmer’s fixer model. However, what is still missing from the picture is the group of wartime interpreters who actually worked with the conflicting military and political powers rather than other supporting parties.

This gap is somewhat filled by another article in the same collection, Wong Lawrence Wang-chi’s (2007) “Translators and Interpreters during the Opium War between Britain and China (1839–1842)”. Based on his historical research, Wong outlines the experiences of a few prominent translators and interpreters involved in the Opium War, in particular their backgrounds and positioning on either the Chinese or the English side. As Wong observes, compared to the interpreters employed by the Chinese government, those employed by the English played a more active role in the fields of intelligence collection and military advice, and even acted as civilian magistrates in areas occupied by British troops, thereby exerting a decisive impact on both the course and the outcome of the war. Wong also raises the issue of interpreters’ national identity through the interesting figure, Bao Peng, chief wartime interpreter for the Chinese officials and recognized by both the Chinese and the English as a “shrewd, unreliable […] thoroughy disreputable […] but very sociable figure” (ibid.: 51–4). More important, Bao Peng himself seemed well aware of his influential position and tried to manipulate both sides for his own material benefit.

Wong (2007: 52) also questions the label hanjian (traitor) that some Chinese officials and historians gave Bao Peng, arguing that despite his undignified behaviour, Bao might not have been a real spy for the English during the war. Drawing on Arthur Waley (1958)’s research on the Opium War (1839–1842), Wong discusses the
connotations of *hanjian* in Chinese culture, especially its wide application to any Chinese with connections to foreigners having conflicting interests with China. This moral condemnation of interpreters is an issue addressed in this thesis because the word *hanjian* was also used by the Chinese public and governments to refer to Chinese interpreters who collaborated with the Japanese forces during the Second Sino-Japanese War (see Chapter Five for further details on the wartime application of this term).

Finally, Wong (2007: 54) raises the issue of interpreters’ professional training, arguing that “had the Chinese been aware of the importance of training qualified interpreters/translator, the outcome of the Opium War may well have been quite different”. However, such high expectations of interpreter training raise some questions about wartime interpreters: Would training prevent the appearance of interpreters like Bao Peng? What kind of training would make interpreters more useful for military purposes in wars? What does “qualified interpreters” mean? These questions lead directly to an under-researched area in interpreting studies – interpreter training in wars. At present, available information on this topic is extremely limited and consists mainly of historical discussions.

One such historian, Professor Roger Dingman of the University of Southern California, offers a different but interesting perspective in his “Language at War: US Marine Corps Japanese Officers” (2004), which is based on his research on American military interpreters in World War II. Drawing from multiple sources, including archives, personal diaries, and the interpreters’ memoirs stored in the Japanese Language School Archival Project (University of Colorado, Boulder), Dingman reviews the selection of these ‘Caucasian American Japanese officers’ and their training in the US Navy’s Japanese Language School (JLS) between 1942 and 1946. These interpreting officers were then sent to work in the Pacific Theatre between 1941 and 1945 and, according to Dingman (2004: 867–868), made substantial contributions to the American victory through their effective cross-cultural communication. As Dingman observes, the sense of military duty and identity as part of the US forces were a crucial component in the training of these American
interpreters. In fact, all facets of their employment – from recruitment to training to employment – emphasized American national identity and absolute loyalty to the US Marine Corps as its two firm conditions. This emphasis on interpreter advocacy and political loyalty to the American military partly support Wong’s expectations of interpreters but also raises questions on the issue of trust and its relevance to interpreters’ national identity. Although Bourdieu does not specifically address agents’ practices in the military context, an interpreter’s national identity can be seen as a key component of social identity and have further implications for interpreter recruitment and training.

Research by George H. Danton (1943) and Kayoko Takeda (2007) may shed some light on the above issue. First, although primarily examining the Japanese and German use of linguists for psychological warfare, Danton also emphasizes the importance of the US Army’s training and use of language officers during the war. However, he also identifies two of the army’s concerns in recruiting qualified American military interpreters with foreign language proficiency. The first related to the US government’s distrust of second-generation Japanese Americans (nisei) because the Japanese were the wartime enemy; the second was that the English language knowledge of a first generation of immigrants speaking a foreign language as their mother tongue might be insufficient and still “too foreign to make them good media for the transmission of American ideas” (Danton 1943: 509). Why, then, would those with similar cultural backgrounds to the opposite side’s not be trusted? Why was degree of assimilation considered an important standard for choosing interpreters? On the one hand, these two concerns in candidate selection for interpreter training suggest the limits of training, but on the other, they help clarify the primordial goal of military interpreter training – political loyalty to the army.

Takeda (2007) specifically addresses the US forces’ use of nisei linguists during World War II and in the IMTFE, observing that all Japanese Americans were initially evaluated and classified as 4–F (physically, mentally, or morally unfit for military service) and later as 4–C (enemy aliens, not acceptable for military service because of nationality or ancestry) (ibid.: 94). However, because of their bilingual skills, many
nisei were forced to serve the US military during the war, taking on responsibilities such as translating captured documents, interrogating Japanese prisoners, and supporting propaganda activities. Drawing on Cronin’s distinction between “heteronomous” (locally recruited and trained) and “autonomous” interpreters (brought by the colonizers from the home country), Takeda discusses the trust issue in wartime interpreter recruitment as it relates to the complex situation of the nisei linguists who wanted to serve in the army to avoid detention in the internment camps but had to face prejudice and suspicion because of their ethnic origin (ibid.: 97–8). This political loyalty and its relevance to agents’ social origin is a key issue in the interpreter recruitment and training discussed in this thesis. (It is addressed in detail in both Chapter Three and Chapter Four).

Thomas O. Brandt (1944), however, presents a slightly different perspective on the US Army’s training of interpreters during World War II – the training of army officers with expertise in foreign languages and regional knowledge (known as the Language and Area Project). As Brandt notes, the army’s goal was to cooperate with foreign language departments in US universities to train officers to be proficient in the language, habits, geography, history, government, and culture of a foreign country. After nine months’ training, these officers were expected to “get along in enemy territory without an interpreter of language and ways of living, to deal efficiently in a foreign country when put on their own” (ibid.: 74). The trainees selected were soldiers with solid IQ scores and satisfying results on aptitude tests. The goal of this training program was to ultimately free the army from its dependency on locally recruited interpreters for military purposes. According to Brandt, the training of these future military language experts was “worthwhile, imperative, important for winning the war, collaborating with the civilian population of occupied territories, of enemy countries, and with our allies, and for the securing of a lasting peace” (ibid.: 74–5). The idea of equipping military staff with language skills for operation and cooperation in international warfare also appears in the research of Eleni Markou, who is both a translation scholar and leader of the intensive language training course for the UK Armed Forces personnel at the Defence School of Language. In a paper presented at
an annual conference (2006) at the University of Westminster, Markou proposes a general framework for the armed forces’ interpreting needs:

- Internal management and operations (if multilingual)
- Peace-time interaction with external organizations (political accountability, diplomacy, public relations)
- Duties within the theatre of deployment
  - Pre-conflict: monitoring, intelligence gathering;
  - During conflict: situation awareness, managing POWs, refugee movements;
  - Post-conflict: enforcing martial law, hand-over to civic authorities;
- Humanitarian efforts

Markou’s (2006) framework well represents the deployment of interpreters before, during, and after wars; that is, the potential positions for interpreters in the field. Clearly interpreters are not expected to be language machines but rather are needed to help interactions with other institutions, to monitor and gather intelligence information, and to manage and enforce laws. With this framework, Markou reviews the various interpreting needs in international organizations, especially NATO, and western armed forces in military theatres during the cold war and post-cold war eras and in regional conflicts since the 1990s, such as those in (the former) Yugoslavia, Somalia, Iraq, and Afghanistan. She also outlines some attributes for interpreting in a military context, including an English/native language combination, cultural appropriateness (status, gender, age), reliability, loyalty, operational awareness, security clearance, and (non-verbal) compatibility with the team. Finally, she argues for the application of predictive models for force generation and scenario deployments to language needs assessments at an alliance level.

Markou’s list of military interpreter attributes is particularly striking in that many are not linguistically relevant but rather relate to interpreters’ social competencies and personal qualities, which are seldom discussed in current interpreting studies. Although Markou does not explain how these qualities and competencies are to be assessed in interpreter recruitment and training, her model offers a refreshing perspective on interpreter training, as well as on the potential deployment of interpreters in wars, both issues investigated in this thesis in the context of the Second Sino-Japanese War.
Recent research by Chinese scholars like Yan Jiarui (2005) and Luo Tian (2008) specifically addresses this topic of interpreting during the Second Sino-Japanese War. Luo’s paper “Interpreting officers on battlefields during the days of national calamity: an introduction to the large-scale military translation and interpretation campaign by patriotic students during the Anti-Japanese War”, presented at the “Writing Chinese Translation History” conference in Hong Kong, not only provides a brief history of the KMT government’s recruitment of military Interpreters but argues for the Interpreters’ significant contribution to Sino-American military cooperation during the war. Although his paper does not address interpreter training and is based primarily on secondary sources mixed in with narratives and anecdotes, it undoubtedly makes an important contribution to the history of interpreting in the Second Sino-Japanese War. Yan, as a witness to the KMT’s military interpreting training, has published extremely valuable information on this history, including the prelude to an Interpreter training textbook, Forty English Lessons for Interpreting Officers (1945), which information is crucial to my research on the KMT’s training of Interpreters. Yan also granted a personal interview that provided valuable information on his application for the Interpreter position (discussed as part of the final case study).

However, apart from these two studies, interpreting during the Second Sino-Japanese War is an almost untouched field in translation studies; interpreting involving the Chinese communists and the Japanese forces has been studied even less. Moreover, as the above discussion suggests, little theorization or conceptualization has been done on wartime interpreter training and practice. Hence, this thesis aims to fill these two gaps by presenting a more complete picture of the wartime interpreting situation and applying the new theoretical perspectives opened up by Bourdieu’s theory to the study of interpreter practices in wartime.

2.3 Data and methodology

As it is impossible to cover all the historical facts relevant to interpreting during the Second Sino-Japanese War, this thesis aims particularly to open up a discussion on military interpreting in Chinese context and promote a sociological approach to
analyzing Interpreters’ practices in the social world. First, the study cannot employ traditional discourse analysis because the absence of relevant transcripts or recordings prevents accurate reconstruction of the interpreting situation. Likewise, it is always quite difficult to represent any individual interpreter’s inner world at a specific moment in history, especially in our case where very few of the Interpreters are still alive. There is, however, very rich information available in the form of archive files and personal memoirs that throw light on the social structure within which these Interpreters were working. Hence, this thesis adopts a sociological approach to examine the Interpreters’ actions in the social world; in particular, their position-taking and interaction with other agents and institutions rather than their linguistic production. Although this sociological approach may not offer a fully detailed picture of this period in the history of interpreting, it surely provides a useful tool for describing and analyzing interpreting activities within a certain social and institutional framework. Accordingly, by investigating Interpreter training programs and some individual Interpreters’ social trajectories, the thesis offers a tentative view of Interpreters’ socialization, their positioning and self-positioning in the social space in a specific historical period.

The information used is drawn from diverse sources, including archives, personal memoirs, biographies, interviews, and secondary resources like published historical studies. These archive files, particularly, are a crucial source of information in that they not only help to better contextualize the historical setting but provide substantial information on the training and employment of the Interpreters within different power structures. Moreover, a majority of the files referred to here – including government records, public documents, and personal collections (e.g., yearbooks from Interpreter training programs) – are unpublished\(^{11}\) and therefore under discussion for the first time. Other than the files from the Taiwan National Historical Archive and the Qingdao Municipal Archive, obtained through colleagues, all files were collected during 2007 and 2008 visits to both national and local archives in mainland China. The repositories visited included the No.2 National Historical Archive in Nanjing, the

\(^{11}\) It may be partly related to the public’s limited access to information in archives in China in the past decades, for example, in her research trips, the author also encountered difficulties in accessing China’s Central Archive in Beijing.
Beijing Municipal Archives, the Shanghai Municipal Archive, the Nanjing Municipal Archive, and the Hunan Provincial Archive (see the List of Abbreviations).

The majority of the information on the KMT's military Interpreters was retrieved from the No. 2 National Historical Archive. Situated in Nanjing, the former capital of the Chinese KMT government. This archive is home to a rich collection of KMT records on military cooperation with both Germany and the United States during the war, including those on the Interpreters trained specifically for these military encounters. These records provide much detailed information on KMT Interpreter recruitment, training, and employment, including the training syllabus, Interpreters' application letters, evaluation sheets, and salary standards.

The findings from the No. 2 National Historical Archive files are complemented by data from local archives, which not only keep records that local governments received from the central (KMT) government but also collect personal belongings relevant to KMT Interpreter training. The statistics on approximately 400 military Interpreters trained by the KMT in Chongqing in 1945 (see Chapter Three) are taken from two yearbooks of the KMT Interpreter training program (kept in the Hunan Provincial Archive), which provide concrete information on Interpreters' ages, educational backgrounds, and social backgrounds. The thesis also draws on some telegrams retrieved from the Taiwan National Historical Archive, which, although brief, were sent directly from Jiang Jieshi, the political and military leader of the KMT government, and reveal an interesting usage of Russian/Chinese Interpreters in the KMT's interaction with the USSR during the war.

Other local archives in Chinese cities such as Shanghai, Beijing, Nanjing, and Qingdao provide a different perspective because of these cities' histories of occupation by Japanese forces during the war. Most specifically, files from these archives offer insights into enforced Japanese language education, as well as the activities of collaborating Chinese Interpreters in occupied areas. The document analysis also carefully examines police records from the Beijing Municipal Archive on so-called fake Interpreters, which throw particular light on the perceived power of
Interpreters and their potential agency between the Japanese occupiers and the Chinese public.

It is important to point out, however, that for various reasons, these archive files do not provide an equal amount of information about the three political and military powers (the Chinese KMT government, the Chinese Communist Party, and the Japanese forces). Because of war damage and limited public access to certain archives, much information is still missing. For example, potentially relevant information on Chinese/German Interpreters trained in the early 1930s was destroyed by the KMT prior to its 1938 retreat from Nanjing to the Chinese interior. In addition, China’s Central Archive, in which all the CCP’s historical files are kept, is closed to the public. Therefore, the archival study could only be carried out on currently accessible resources.

In addition to the archival documents, this thesis also draws on a variety of biographical materials (memoirs, biographies, and interviews), a usage that is somewhat controversial and often marginalized in social scientific research (Watson 1976: 95). The main controversies revolve around two aspects of these personal narratives’ subjectivity: the reliability of autobiographical accounts and the intervention of other parties like ethnographers, Interpreters, and interviewers. As Kathleen Blee (1998: 334–5) notes, personal narratives like oral history can be misleading and deceptive because informants usually hold "a cosy view of the past" or even want to cover up or distort their past. This problem is particularly true for accounts of emotionally charged events like war. Hence, besides forgetfulness, informants may intentionally omit information involving their traumatic experiences and focus on non-sensitive issues. In addition, their current memories and the value they assign to the event(s) are not necessarily the same as during their early experiences because individual self-perception and viewpoints are continuously shaped and altered by subsequent experience. It is thus difficult for both the individuals and the researchers to distinguish views at an earlier period from those at present (Lummis 1998: 280). The influence of parties other than the informants – for example, historians, interviewers and interpreters – could also be significant. For
instance, historians' collection of information is always based on their own agenda and inevitably carries a "pre-existent historical ordering selection and interpretation" (Grele 1998: 43). This selection and interpretation bias may also occur in interviews and interpreting, when questions or interpretations frame or distort informant responses (Perk 1998: 70).

Nevertheless, despite these caveats, social sciences still make use of biographical materials, albeit with careful consideration of their application. In fact, subjectivity can be a precious element of biographical resources, as well as a key to this thesis's application of Bourdieu's sociological framework. As Perk (1998: 69) points out, life stories told by individuals provide "a much closer view on personal involvement" in the history, which may "compensate for the chronological distance" in most history publications. Indeed, because this thesis uses these biographic materials to disclose and analyze interpreters' actions in the social world, not to reconstruct a history of the CCP or a documentary of the war, such personal involvement is a primary focus of the analysis. That is, although what is said may be affected by the informants' subsequent experiences, their understanding of the past and their definitions of their lives offer valuable clues on agential illusio, agents' self-perception and perception of the social structure, in a certain period of history. These insights are particularly valuable given the limited availability of witnesses or other resources that would enable reconstruction of the Interpreters' inner world at this particular historical moment. Moreover, the manner in which these materials provide this information reveals a great deal about the individual informants and their conceptualization of the past. For example, the informants' over-emphasis on certain themes or their defensive stance on certain topics tends to reveal their values and indicate awareness of potential conflict (Watson 1976: 107). Such personal views and feelings are difficult to find in traditional history books or even archive files like the KMT transcripts of interrogations of collaborating Chinese/Japanese Interpreters, which are often institutionalized. Hence, the analysis of biographical materials actually promises to be a fruitful method for this thesis, one that not only complements other resources but enables a Bourdieusian investigation of Interpreters' illusio and practices.
The biographical materials used here are Interpreters’ memoirs, interviews, and witness biographies. For example, the case study of university students as the KMT’s Interpreters (see Chapter Three) examines the memoir of Mei Zuyan, who was recruited as a military Interpreter from Southeast Associated University, to explore students’ potential perceptions of the Interpreter role. Likewise, given the limited resources on CCP history during the war, Chapter Four benefited greatly from some Interpreters’ memoirs, particularly the published reminiscences of lead Interpreters Wu Xiuquan and Ling Qing, as well as a short interview of the latter by Chinese Central Television Station (CCTV) in 2008 (a transcript of which was published on the CCTV website). Specifically, Wu Xiuquan was one of two key Chinese/Russian Interpreters working on exchanges between the Comintern agent and the CCP during the 1930s, while Ling Qing was trained by and served the CCP as a chief Chinese/English Interpreter in the 1940s. Chapter Five also includes some published interviews with Chinese villagers regarding local collaborating Interpreters. These interviews are part of Chinese historians’ oral history projects. As expected, the accuracy and validity of information represented from these interviews is also subject to influences from social, political and personal factors, especially given the ideological and nationalistic context in which these interviews were conducted and published. However, these interviews do offer some important insight concerning the Chinese public’s perception of the Interpreters. This is a crucial area for our understanding of the social space that the Interpreters were embedded in at a specific historical moment, though it is important to bear in mind that these representations might be partial, sentimental, and mixed with interviewees’ current feelings.

The final case study of the two Interpreters, Xia Wenxun and Yan Jiarui, in Chapter Six is based primarily on Xia’s memoir, published in 1967, and my own 2008 interview with Yan. Although Xia’s memoir was originally written in Japanese, it was later translated into Chinese by Zhao Xiaosong for publication in China in 1999 as part of the Heihe Xuekan series; this thesis therefore uses the Chinese translation as the basis for analysis. Xia’s reminiscences are complemented by the memoirs of General Li Zongren, a primary witness for Xia’s wartime secret service for the Chinese KMT government.
The second Interpreter, Yan, came to my attention after he published a paper on his intelligence training on the Guangzhou Translation Association website. I therefore interviewed him, in Chinese, at his home in Guangzhou on January 8, 2009 (he was born in 1926) for about an hour a day over two consecutive days. The interviews were based on a total of 27 questions prepared in advance that covered such topics as Yan's family background, his reasons for and his process of applying for the Interpreter positions, the content of his training, his understanding of the military Interpreter profession, and his self-perception. In order that he remembers and relates as much as possible, the question list was sent to Yan before the interview. During the interviews, Yan also offered valuable information on his Interpreter experience, including a copy of the training textbook and post-war personal correspondence with Frank W. Price, once the American director of the Interpreter training program. This information is discussed in the case study along with the interview data.

2.4 Applying Bourdieu's theoretical framework

Overall, this thesis suggests that interpreting is not merely a linguistic transfer but a complicated social practice within a certain power hierarchy, and that interpreters are socialized professionals who acquire and refine their professional habitus in their training and subsequent professional practices. Drawing upon Bourdieu's framework as set out in Section 2.1, the thesis first reconstructs the social space in order to contextualize and analyze Interpreters' practice during the war. According to Bourdieu, social space is a "multi-dimensional space" comprising multiple fields in which agents' positions are defined according to their capital and positions in the fields (1991: 229, 231). Hence, this thesis addresses the field of interpreting as it relates to the three political and military powers that dominated different regions of China during the war: the Japanese forces, the Chinese KMT government, and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). In the ensuing chapters, this field of interpreting will be accordingly divided into three sub-fields and discussed in turn. The distinction between these three sub-fields according to the above mentioned three dominant

12 Admittedly, however, the actual interview process did not strictly follow the order or form of the questions but rather allowed Yan's thoughts to flow naturally, even though a little intervention was sometimes necessary to save time when the responses wandered too far into irrelevant topics.
powers is, to some extent, geographically designated because of their military blockades and political predominance in different regions (See Appendix II, Map A and B). However, in reality, the three sub-fields were not physically separate, and there was no clear border between their dominant geographic regions. On the contrary, they were interdependent because of their frequent military operations, political negotiations, and intelligence activities, although this overlap was uneven because of internal and external conflicts between the CCP and the KMT and between the CCP/KMT and the Japanese. Nevertheless, despite the complexity of the military and political relationships involved, these three sub-fields of interpreting are fairly distinctive and should be discussed separately. Not only were the Interpreters physically restricted to certain regions and to certain power hierarchies, but they were recruited and trained specifically to serve these political and military powers.

Bourdieu's notion of habitus thus informs my historical and archival investigation into the nature of Interpreter training, the training's influence on the Interpreters, and the ways in which the Interpreters interacted with other agents and institutions via their interpreting practices. Most particularly, Bourdieu's argument on the formation and development of agential habitus provides a theoretical platform for discussing the process by which Interpreters acquire and refine their professional habitus through training and professional practices. To contextualize this analysis, I closely examine the information retrieved from the archives, including the training textbook, syllabus, evaluations, and feedback on the Interpreters. I also identify the Interpreters' education, family background, and other social origins as major areas for discussing the impact of Interpreters' previous social experience on the formation of their professional habitus.

Following the discussion of interpreters' professional habitus, I use both the archival files and the relevant memoirs of Interpreters and witnesses to address interpreters' embodied agency during the war as reflected by individual Interpreters' struggle for survival and their border-crossing strategies. This part of analysis applies Bourdieu's notions of agents' embodied habitus and capital (e.g., political capital, social capital, and symbolic capital) to capture the relative value of the Interpreters' linguistic and
social competencies in the social world, and to conceptualize the socially constituted and recognized power that result from their social status and political positions within different power hierarchies.

To further investigate Interpreters' active positioning in the social world, I then discuss the Interpreters' movements within or beyond the field of interpreting; that is, their decisions to become interpreters and continue or leave the profession. Although the ethnological approach adopted by Bourdieu does not apply to a historical project such as this one, his sociological framework – in particular his argument regarding the relevance of the relationship between agential illusio and practice – provides a fruitful perspective that illuminates interpreter self-perception and career development in the social world. On the basis of the biographical materials like memoirs and interviews, this thesis also traces some individual Interpreters' social trajectories and speculates on the psychological activities relevant to their perception of the field and their social actions. As pointed out in Section 2.3, not only are the sources for this psychological study limited, but it is impossible to carry out systematic surveys or interviews because so few Interpreters are still alive. However, since the thesis focuses on individual Interpreters and their strategies when facing social and political constraints, Bourdieu's sociological approach and his emphasis on agential practices are highly appropriate for this study of active position-taking, and complement the discussion of these Interpreters' actions, evidence of which exists in the documents from institutional archives.
Fundamentally, Bourdieu conceives of ‘field’ as an arena in which agents and institutions struggle over capital and stakes. In this arena, the dominant always strive to conserve their positions by maintaining and imposing a system of capital evaluation beneficial to themselves, while the dominated attempt to transform the field’s structure by obtaining more capital or redefining the relative value of capital. Additionally, in the social space, fields always interrelate and interact with each other. Hence, the structure of one field can be affected by its agents’ and institutions’ connections with other fields. As a result, the field is never static but is always changing because of the struggle and competition among agents and institutions. At the same time, changes in the field impose new necessities on the agents positioned in it. This dynamic relationship between field and agents constitutes the basis for the following overview of Interpreters employed by the Chinese Kuomintang (KMT) government during the Second Sino-Japanese War.

The Chinese KMT government is one of the most important political and military powers to be examined if the field of interpreting is to be reconstructed. In 1928, sixteen years after the founding of the Republic of China in 1912 and despite the ongoing civil war with Chinese Communist Party (CCP) forces, the KMT government managed to achieve a nominal unification of China through its 1927–1928 Northern Expedition (Bedeski 1981: 25). The administrative and military systems that the KMT

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13 The last lesson, “On to Tokyo! Together to Victory, Freedom and Peace”, in Forty English Lessons for Interpreting Officers (1945), compiled by the Liaison Group of the Foreign Affairs Bureau, National Military Council. I want to thank Mr. Yan Jiarui for his generosity in letting me have a copy of this valuable source. Mr. Yan Jiarui was trained as a military interpreter in 1945.
government established and developed in the pre-war period reinforced its control over social, economic, and political affairs in Chinese society, including taxation, education, publication, police, and the army. In fact, despite Japan's encroachment into North China and the development of the CCP's Soviet bases in central China, by the end of 1936, the KMT government still controlled eleven out of a total of eighteen provinces in China (Twitchett, Fairbank et al 1993/1986: 170).

During the war, on the basis of the United Front policy, which politically legitimized the CCP and KMT's united effort to resist the Japanese, the KMT maintained command of most of the state's military and economic resources and acted as the official government in China's cooperation with the Allied forces. Throughout the war, during its interaction with other international powers, the KMT employed a large number of Interpreters; however, its Interpreter recruiting, training, and employment were independent of the CCP and framed within the power hierarchy of its political and military dominance. This dominance resulted in the formation of a specific sub-field of interpreting for agents embedded in the KMT power structure.

In analyzing this sub-field, this chapter will investigate three issues: how this sub-field of interpreting, in Bourdieu's sense of the word, formed and changed throughout the war; what type of training the Interpreters received and its significance in fostering their professional habitus; and how the Interpreters secured their positions and interacted with other agents and institutions in the social space. The examination of the first issue outlines the connections between the Interpreters and the KMT's interaction with foreign powers, particularly their influence on the relative value of Interpreter capital and struggle for interests and positions. Analysis of the second and third issues is based on examples of the KMT's training and employment of Chinese/English military Interpreters in the 1940s, as well as a case study of a special group of these military Interpreters - university students.

3.1 Interpreters and the changing field

Because the KMT government's foreign policy directly determined the need for language pairs, the positions available for Interpreters, and the capital that the KMT valued in and offered to the Interpreters (e.g., knowledge of a certain field,
interpersonal skills, and physical condition), its foreign relationships during the war were a decisive factor in the field of interpreting. That is to say, the ultimate goals of the KMT’s training and employment of these Interpreters were to gain international support and facilitate military cooperation; therefore, as the war developed during these fourteen years, the KMT continually adjusted its foreign policy to cater to the changing international geo-political situation. For example, before Germany signed a treaty with Japan in 1936, it had maintained a close relationship with the Chinese KMT government, providing it with strong support in the form of military advice and army training. However, after 1937, for its own military and political interests, Germany withdrew support from the KMT government in favour of Japan. As a result, the KMT resorted to the United States, which had insisted on neutrality at the beginning of the war but turned out to be the KMT’s strongest foreign ally during the 1940s.

According to its wartime records, at different times during these years, the KMT government trained and employed Interpreters in at least three major language pairs: Chinese/German Interpreters in the early 1930s, Chinese/Russian Interpreters in the late 1930s, and Chinese/English Interpreters in the early 1940s. Before further exploring this dynamic relationship between the KMT’s foreign policy and the sub-field of interpreting in detail, one important question must be answered: given that Japan was the nation that the KMT had to confront every day - politically and militarily - throughout the war, why were Japanese/Chinese Interpreters not included in this set?

### 3.1.1 Chinese/Japanese Interpreters

Although very little information is available on the KMT’s training and/or employment of Chinese/Japanese Interpreters, personnel with knowledge of the Japanese language were indispensable to the KMT’s intelligence, diplomatic, and military activities during the war. Hence, Chinese/Japanese was presumably an active language pair in the interpreting field. This paucity of data contrasts starkly with the situation of Japanese forces (discussed in Chapter Five), who recognized Chinese/Japanese interpreting as an accepted career, documented in a variety of resources, from government records and military diaries to personal memoirs. Yet
why were the positions for Chinese/Japanese Interpreters not established or recognized in the sub-field of interpreting under the KMT’s political, military dominance?

Because linguistic competency is a distinctive form of capital for the Interpreters’ position, answering this question requires attention to the relative value of Japanese language knowledge—a type of linguistic capital—in this interpreting field. Two factors are decisive for this relative value: the actual need for this capital and the number of agents possessing it. These two factors reflect Bourdieu’s (1977/1972: 186–7) market metaphor in his argument on cultural capital; that is, when the supply of one type of capital exceeds market need, its value decreases; when the supply cannot meet the need, its value increases. In terms of the first factor, although it is difficult to estimate the KMT’s exact need for Chinese/Japanese interpreting as compared to that of Japanese forces, the KMT government had a linguistic advantage in that the war took place primarily in Chinese territory. Hence, unlike the Japanese forces, the KMT government was fighting on its own ground and did not need to rely on Interpreters for its military operations and supply. Rather, Chinese/Japanese interpreting would have applied to intelligence gathering and political negotiations with the Japanese.

As for the supply of linguistic capital, regardless of Japanese language education in China before and during the war, one important factor to be considered is the frequent cultural communication between China and Japan in the early 20th century, and, in particular, the large number of Chinese people who had gone to Japan for higher education since the early 1900s. As a result, there were numerous possible candidates for Chinese/Japanese interpreting; in contrast to other language pairs, this type of linguistic capital was in good supply.

As Table 3.1 shows, according to statistics from the KMT’s Ministry of Education on Chinese students educated overseas between 1929 to 1937 (No. 2 National Historical Archive 1998: 394–5), the 3,483 students studying in Japan were the largest group (in spite of the increasingly tense political situation), as compared to the 565, 1835 and 590 students being educated in the UK, US, and Germany, respectively. However, when the percentages of government-funded and self-funded students in the above
countries are compared, the KMT funded on 75 students’ study in Japan, the smallest number sent to any foreign country with financial support.

Table 3.1 Chinese students educated overseas from 1929 to 1937

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>1929</th>
<th>1930</th>
<th>1931</th>
<th>1932</th>
<th>1933</th>
<th>1934</th>
<th>1935</th>
<th>1936</th>
<th>1937</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>49 (5/34)</td>
<td>16 (13/3)</td>
<td>25 (4/21)</td>
<td>56 (9/47)</td>
<td>75 (18/57)</td>
<td>121 (64/57)</td>
<td>100 (28/720)</td>
<td>86 (37/49)</td>
<td>37 (10/27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>272 (54/218)</td>
<td>158 (24/134)</td>
<td>115 (11/105)</td>
<td>99 (10/89)</td>
<td>186 (49/137)</td>
<td>254 (52/202)</td>
<td>294 (54/240)</td>
<td>255 (41/214)</td>
<td>202 (13/189)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>86 (6/80)</td>
<td>66 (5/61)</td>
<td>84 (15/69)</td>
<td>64 (6/58)</td>
<td>68 (17/51)</td>
<td>61 (11/50)</td>
<td>101 (20/81)</td>
<td>9 (6/3)</td>
<td>51 (6/45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1,025 (2/1023)</td>
<td>590 (34/556)</td>
<td>83 (4/79)</td>
<td>227 (2/225)</td>
<td>219 (8/211)</td>
<td>347 (7/340)</td>
<td>447 (3/444)</td>
<td>496 (15/481)</td>
<td>49 (0/49)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* G/S represents the number of government-funded/self-funded students.

The United States hosted the highest number government-funded Chinese students (308), followed by the UK (188) and Germany (92). Although these numbers do not specifically refer to interpreters and do not include students receiving foreign language education in China, they do reveal some important information about the distribution of the foreign language capital amongst agents in the social space. That is to say that there was a sufficient supply of agents with knowledge of the Japanese language to satisfy the demands in the field of interpreting. The fact that the KMT government tended to fund more agents to study in foreign countries other than Japan also reflects its need for and investment in training agents with knowledge of languages other than Japanese.

In reality, the number of Chinese students receiving higher education in Japan before 1937 is an official but artificial statistic kept by the KMT government; the true number was certainly much larger. For example, according to the Sino-Japanese Student Society, from 1927 to 1937, the average number of Chinese students studying in Japan was 3,344, while Japanese institutes claimed that 11,966 Chinese students graduated with Japanese university degrees from the early 1920s to 1937 (Keishu 1983/1981: 118).

More importantly, the linguistic capital of Japanese-educated students was also accessible to the KMT government because many of these students took positions in
the government or the army after finishing their studies and returning to China. These individuals included Jiang Jieshi (or Jiang Zhongzheng), the KMT's political and military leader, who was trained at the Japanese Military Academy. In fact, a 1932 survey by the Japanese intelligence department found that, although 14 of the 45 leading members of the KMT government had no foreign education, 18 (40%) had received higher education in Japan and 4 (9%) had done so in both Japan and other foreign countries; 6 (13%) had studied in the US and 3 (7%) in other nations (Keishu 1983/1981: 122). Moreover, almost every year between 1900 to 1937, the Chinese KMT government sent a number of Chinese students to the Japanese Military Academy for military training, 665 between the years 1900 and 1911, and as many as 908 between 1912 and 1927 (Guo 1977, quoted in Jiang 2007: 66). In the course of service with the KMT government and the army, these Japanese-educated students may also be involved in Chinese/Japanese interpreting − whether administrative, military, or liaison. This latter is important in that the KMT did not need to invest more of its limited wartime resources in training or employing Chinese/Japanese Interpreters. Nevertheless, the availability of these resources does not prevent the possibility that there were other reasons for the scarcity of records on Chinese/Japanese Interpreters; the lack of data may be due to the limited accessibility of original sources.

3.2 The KMT's military Interpreters during the war

3.2.1 Chinese/German Interpreters and Sino-German cooperation in the 1930s

During the 1930s - especially from 1928 to 1938 - before Germany belonged to the Axis camp and openly supported Japan, the country had been the KMT government's main source of foreign support. Hence, this decade was, as William C. Kirby (1984: 3) aptly puts it, not only "a period of intense Sino-foreign interaction" but also "a decade of German influence in China". From its completion of national unification to its development of a domestic military industry to army reorganization, many of the KMT government's political and military policies were directly affected by this Sino-German cooperation (ibid.). In addition to credit and equipment support through barter agreements and exchange programs, from 1928 to 1938 Germany also
supported the KMT with an expertly staffed military mission in China, assisting the KMT government in reorganizing and training Chinese troops (Kirby 1984; Twitchett, Fairbank et al 1993/1986).

As Kirby notes, this unusually close relationship between Germany and China came about partly because the KMT government, dealing with increasing military pressure from both the Chinese Communist Party and the Japanese forces, was not receiving the substantial support it sought from other foreign powers (Kirby 1984: 3–4). The general indifference of foreign powers to the KMT’s requests was obvious after Japan’s aggression against China in late 1931. Apart from an open statement by the United States on January 7, 1932, reasserting its non-recognition of any changes brought about by Japan’s aggression, the KMT’s appeal to the League of Nations regarding Japan’s illegal occupation of China’s Manchurian region earned no sympathy from other foreign powers, nor support from the League aside from a report by Lord Lytton’s commission in China (Hook 1982: 261–2). Other nations in the league, including Britain and France, remained neutral on any substantial action because of their focus on Europe, especially the rise of fascism in Germany and the risk of endangering their own relationships with Japan (Borg 1964: 9–10; Twitchett, Fairbank et al 1993/1986: 580–2).

Germany, however, showed a different attitude just at the right time for China. Specifically, it carried out a two-fold policy, on the one hand, allying with Japan to constrain the Soviet Union, and on the other, agreeing to support the Chinese KMT government. The latter was aimed at enlarging its political influence in Asia, where it could secure both strategic raw materials and a new market for its own industrial and military development (Twitchett, Fairbank et al 1993/1986: 582; Kirby 1984: 4). For the KMT government, cooperation with Germany was also beneficial because German support was “consciously designed to strengthen the military and economic power of the Nanking regime, in a manner that did not threaten Nanking’s control of its internal affairs” (Kirby 1984: 4–5). In addition, many Chinese Nationalists, including Jiang, the KMT’s political and military leader, found Germany’s modern military system very appealing because the nation exemplified the emergence of a global power through a non-revolutionary process, soon after its defeat in World War I (ibid.).
The November 1928 arrival of a 26-member German military mission led by Max Bauer, a German artillery expert, to Nanjing signified the beginning of this close Sino-German cooperation and gave rise to an immediate need for Chinese/German Interpreters, a need for which the KMT government had apparently made preparations. According to an interview by history professor Billie K. Walsh (University of California, Irvine) with former German adviser, Erich Stoelzner,

[1] Immediately upon arrival in Nanking in November 1928, Bauer and his subordinates initiated a training program for the proposed First Model Division. Composed of carefully selected Chinese officers and troops, this division was to be the cornerstone for the reformed Nationalist forces. It would be given a minimum of six months’ training in the classroom and in field exercises. Each morning, accompanied by their Chinese interpreters, the advisers taught two classes. In the afternoon, they observed tactical field problems. (Walsh 1974: 504)

A majority of the advisers in this first, 26-member German military mission, whose numbers increased to 61 by June 1934 (Kirby 1984: 124), were responsible for direct military training; the others were mainly for support (Ibid.: 55). These German advisers thus contributed greatly to the modernization of Chinese military forces.

When the Nationalist government officially declared war with Japan after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident in July 1937, a total of 300,000 Chinese Nationalist troops had been reorganized by German advisers and 80,000 of them were trained as the core armed forces for the government, equipped largely with German weapons (Kirby 1984: 220; Liu 1956: 102, 147). This close cooperation between Germany and the Chinese Nationalist government lasted until late 1937 when Adolf Hitler decided to withdraw his advisers from China and instead seek Japan’s support to control Britain’s influence in Asia (Twitchett, Fairbank et al 1993/1986: 128, 635).

With the development of this Sino-German cooperation, an increase could be expected in the importance of professional Chinese/German Interpreters in the field. This assumption is indeed confirmed by a 1935 proposal to Jiang Jieshi by Hans Klein, the German government representative in China at that time (Twitchett, Fairbank et al 1993/1986: 151). In this proposal, Klein gives advice on Jiang’s plan to
strengthen China’s defence economy, particularly the selection and training of Chinese/German Interpreters:

(10) The issue of fanyi (translation in general)
The issue of fanyi is key in the communication and cooperation between Chinese authorities and the German Commission.
This job shall only be taken on by those with talent.
These people shall master both the Chinese and the German language;
Have a thorough understanding of the task that they are going to accomplish;
Be able to keep information confidential, be honest and reliable.
Selection and training of these personnel shall begin right away.\(^{14}\)

Like most records kept by the KMT, the above Chinese translation of Klein’s proposal in German only refers generally to “翻译” (fanyi, translation/interpreting) rather than specifying Interpreters. However, given the German military commission’s advisory role, the “translators” referred to no doubt include interpreters. Moreover, given his status as the chief German adviser at that time, Klein’s proposal, especially his definition of qualified translators, must have influenced the field of interpreting in that he not only endorsed the value of Chinese/German interpreting but explicitly set out the essential competencies for agents taking up those positions:
knowledge of both the Chinese and German language (linguistic capital), a sense of responsibility, confidentiality, and reliability (social and political capital). In addition, for Klein, the way to find Interpreters with these qualities was through selection and training.

In fact, even before Klein’s proposal, the KMT government had begun discussing the training of Chinese/German Interpreters. In August 1932, the KMT’s Central Military Council (CMC) organized a survey for staff involved in the Sino-German cooperation

\(^{14}\) My translation.
that raised many issues actually related to Chinese/German Interpreters. The CMC’s summary of these survey results (presented below) were discussed at its next meeting a month later (No. 2 National Historical Archive of China 1994: 110–114).

译述员额与军语
（意见摘要）
一、译述员额宜增至顾问名额二倍或一倍半。
二、译述员宜择有相当军事学知者充任，并极力采用通常习用之军语。
三、顾问名额较多时宜顾虑译述人才并设法加以训练

The number of yishuyuan (translators/interpreters) and the application of military terminology
(A summary of survey results):
A. The number of yishuyuan should be increased to twice or one and a half times the number of foreign advisers.
B. These yishuyuan should be selected from those with good military knowledge, who should use common and accepted military terms in their interpreting work.
C. Given the increase of foreign advisers, more attention should be paid to these yishuyuan, who should be provided with proper training if possible.

This summary indicates that even before Klein’s proposal, the KMT government was already concerned about the number of yishuyuan (Interpreters) and their competencies, especially knowledge of the military system and standard usage of military terms. The summary also raises the issue of professional training, although it does not specify its proper content.

Besides these summarized survey results, some yishuyuan’s comments in response to this survey are also very interesting. For example, Wei Hanqiao, who worked as a Chinese/German Interpreter with the German advisers for over four years, points to both a potential conflict between Chinese/German and Chinese/Japanese yishuyuan and the possible undermining of the KMT’s goal of military modernization (No.2 National Historical Archive of China 1994: 107–9).
Chapter Three

Both the above two issues (dividing trainees into different classes according to their backgrounds and training accordingly at different times) are related to field training the army, but the editing and translation of new drilling manuals and the compilation of course books and references for the army are also important. They should complement each other within the entire military training process. If we hire German advisers and train our troops in German ways, on the one hand, and yet translate and edit out-of-date and useless military references for officers and soldiers, on the other, we will be going in two opposite directions and will be laughed at by others, thereby missing our goal of military modernization. To prevent this happening, we should reorganize the training section and dismiss all those who are still insisting on what they learned in Japan. At the same time, the consulting office in the Department of Military and Politics should be removed, and all its yishuyuan (Interpreters) should be transferred to the training section, which could then be responsible for biaoyi (translation and editing) of all needed military books.

As Hanqiao’s comments on translating military sources show, he is concerned that, being “out-of-date” and “useless”, the Japanese sources will only impede the training supervised by the Germans and will undermine the KMT’s goal of military modernization. He thus suggests internal reorganization by dismissing the pro-Japanese and moving Chinese/German yishuyuan from the consulting to the training section. These suggestions not only reflect his long in-field observation of the diminishing value of Japanese language skills and a Japanese educational background but also mirror his attempts to push out others and create opportunity for people like himself to move up the power ladder. From a Bourdieusian perspective on agential competition for positions and capital, Hanqiao’s action could be seen as an excellent example of the competition between the Chinese/German yishuyuan and the Chinese/Japanese yishuyuan in the interpreting field.
In its September meeting that year, the CMC followed up on this survey and made a few important decisions (No. 2 National Historical Archive of China 1994: 114–5). First, it confirmed the growing need for yishuyuan (Interpreters) and emphasized the significance of training and selecting qualified yishuyuan. Second, it took up the suggestion that military knowledge should be an essential quality for yishuyuan in addition to their language skills. This official confirmation of the necessity of yishuyuan’s military knowledge is important in that it signifies the position of Interpreters in the army and defines the value of this military capital. As regards Hanqiao’s report, the CMC made the following comments:

一、顾问处之隶属：
关于该处隶属译述员中颇有建议修改者，窃以欲解决该处之隶属须先就该处之主要任务加以讨论。

[...]

（四）翻译及译述人员之养成
本条前则为建议案，与各部均有关系，似宜属于军委会，后则为译述人才，系训练性质，似宜属于训练总监部。

合观以上该处属于军委会或军政部均可，然究以属于何处为最相宜，敬请公决。

A. About the affiliation of the consulting office:
As for the suggestion of relocating the consulting office’s yishuyuan, the decision should not be made before a thorough examination of the consulting office’s main responsibility.

[...]

d) The training and employment of fanyi and yishuyuan:
The responsibilities mentioned above are primarily related to counselling, and thus should be subject to the CMC; however, the content from here on mainly concerns yishuyuan, whose services are related to training. Therefore, it seems more appropriate that they should be subject to the management of the training section.

On the whole, the counselling office could be affiliated with either the CMC or the Department of Military and Politics. A final decision is requested.
In the plan of action above, the CMC does not comment on the Japanese-educated *yishuyuan* or take any immediate action to relocate the Chinese/German *yishuyuan*, it does emphasize the political and military capital associated with these *yishuyuan*’s positions; that is, the Interpreters’ usefulness to the KMT’s military training. For these Interpreters, this positive attitude of the CMC, the highest military and political power in the KMT government, constituted official recognition of their positions in the field of interpreting.

Of course, as discussed in Chapter Two, the Interpreters’ positions and the relative value of their capital were determined by the dominant power relationship in the interpreting field, in this case, the KMT government’s relationship with Germany, a sort of relationship between the employer and clients. In fact, in addition to the German military advisers brought in by the KMT, provincial governments had also hired German civilian advisers for a variety of purposes, including geological research, radio-telegraphic work, and aerial topographic surveys (Kirby 1984: 70). It is therefore probable that there were also Chinese/German Interpreters working with these German civilian advisers. In fact, in the mid-1930s, Germany’s influence had reached almost all aspects of Chinese society, from military, to economic, to educational. Nevertheless, the main focus of this Sino-German cooperation was still to strengthen the KMT’s military power (ibid.: 70–3). Nor was this military focus missed by other foreign powers; for example, a report prepared for Washington by American military intelligence in Beijing noted that although the activities of the Bauer-led German mission covered not only military but industrial and economic matters, they were “above all an effort to further Chiang’s ‘military power’” (Kirby 1984: 56). Therefore, this sub-field of interpreting is actually embedded in the military field under the KMT’s political framework. Not only were these Interpreters directly subject to changes in the military field, but also constituted part of the KMT’s political structure in the social space.

In fact, as revealed in the following excerpt from an August 1937 conversation between KMT’s financial administrator, T. V. Song, and Japanese special envoy,

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15 The original file is in the U.S. National Archive: Magruder (Peking) to Washington, 3 June, 1929, 2657–1–357, U.S. National Archive, Military Intelligence Division, Washington, D.C.
Saionji Kinkazu, these German-trained and equipped military forces were indeed the pride of the KMT government:

The Japanese military still hold to their preconceived ideas about the Chinese army. They think that if you hit us once we will surrender and do what you want. The Chinese army has studied hard since the Manchurian Incident. It has been trained by the Germans, and we have spent much to modernize. It knows that it is stronger, and is confident that it will not be beaten this time. So the Japanese army underestimates the Chinese army, and the Chinese army overestimates itself. Here is where the great danger lies. (Boyle 1972: 67)

In Song’s eyes, the German-trained army had taken on an important role in the KMT government’s resistance to the Japanese, military capital that the KMT had accumulated through a decade’s investment and cooperation with the Germans. Such an investment is what Bourdieu (1977/1972: 187) terms “capital exchange” in the field – the conversion from economic capital (money) to linguistic capital (linguistic competence embodied by Interpreters) and military capital (German-trained troops). This capital exchange is important because, as the dominant Chinese political and military power, the KMT had to consolidate its position and increase its capital by re-arming and training its troops, especially given the threats from both the Japanese and the communists. Part of the capital that it invested was in the form of Interpreter employment. Any salaries and benefits that the Interpreters received comprised the economic capital offered by the government, while their interpreting work constituted a part of the KMT’s capital exchange process, in the sense that Interpreters were indispensable to the production of military capital. On the other hand, being a pillar of the Sino-German cooperation, these Interpreters also gained political capital by serving and supporting this network. Hence, to secure economic, political, and social capital, these Interpreters needed to look for ways to retain or develop their positions, which reflects the concern in Hanqiao’s report about the competition and struggle for positions and capital.

Apparently, financial administrator Soong also saw the German-trained troops as a source of diplomatic capital, reminding the Japanese envoy of the KMT’s increased military strength, particularly in terms of the newly German-trained KMT Central
Force. In fact, because of the presence of the German Military Commission in China, Germany’s relationship with China was of special concern to the Japanese forces. Since December 1937, Japan had applied pressure on Berlin for the recall of the German Military Commission and for cessation of the provision of German weapons to China (Walsh 1974: 510). During the second Sino-Japanese War, the Japanese protest against German advisers’ assistance to the KMT government became stronger after several confrontations with German-trained Chinese troops, especially in the 1938 battles of Shanghai and Nanjing, in which Japan paid a heavy price for its victory (ibid.: 510). These remonstrations, however, only proved the success of the 1930’s Sino-German cooperation, including the Chinese/German Interpreters’ decade of contribution and engagement.

Japan’s protests began to have a real effect when Hitler took over leadership of the German armed forces in early 1938. For Hitler, Japan seemed a better Asian ally for Germany than China. Not only had Germany signed an anti-Comintern pact with Japan as early as the end of 1936 to restrain the Soviet Union (Young 1963: 18), but Japan’s overwhelming victory in the war with China reinforced Hitler’s opinion (Kirby 1984: 234–5). Hence, the new Nazi foreign minister, Joachim von Ribbentrop, promoted an alternative foreign policy to “divide the Chinese spoils with the conquering Japanese” (ibid.: 241). In April 1938, the German government stopped weapons shipments from Germany to China, and by July that year, almost all of the advisors from the German Military Commission had been recalled (Walsh 1974: 509–11; Kirby 1984: 237–9).

This recall of the German Military Commission signalled the end of the intensive Sino-German cooperation that had begun in 1928 and had an immediate impact on this sub-field of interpreting, especially on these Chinese/German Interpreters. For these individuals, the Germans had been their direct clients and the KMT their employer. Once the Germans were gone, Chinese/German Interpreting was no longer in great demand. At the same time, new power relationships were emerging in both the military and political fields under the KMT, including a Sino-Soviet cooperation, which created new Interpreter positions and capital. Admittedly, because relevant
government records are unavailable, it is unclear what happened to these Chinese/German Interpreters afterwards and which field and what positions they moved on to. However, the incident raises the question of Interpreters’ career development, which will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Four.

3.2.2 Chinese/Russian Interpreters

The Chinese/Russian Interpreters are seldom mentioned by historians or translation scholars, partly because the wartime Sino-Soviet interaction was comparatively short (from 1937 to 1941) and partly because of the complicated relationship between the KMT and the Soviet Union, these Interpreters’ employer and client. Ideologically, the Russians supported the Chinese Communist Party, which had been the KMT’s primary domestic foe since the early 1920s. However, it was clear to the Russians that, compared to the CCP, the KMT held more political and military capital because of its legitimate state power and military strength and its leading role in China’s resistance against the Japanese (Hook 1993: 656–7; Young 1963: 18–22). For the Russians, diverting Japan away from the Soviet Union was more urgent than pushing communism in China (Young 1963: 129). Moreover, not only might supporting the CCP push the KMT onto the side of the Japanese, who advocated anti-Bolshevism, but the CCP was not strong enough to effectively lead the nation in resisting the Japanese. Supporting the KMT, on the other hand, would only increase China’s strength in resisting the Japanese, especially when it had obtained support from international powers like the United States and Britain, which the CCP could not have accomplished (Qi 1996: 99–106).

Hence, the Soviet Union tried to follow a dual approach to China: supporting the Chinese communists’ revolutionary activities through Comintern but promoting its relationship with the official Chinese government through the Soviet government (Twitchett, Fairbank et al 1993/1986: 109). From 1937 to 1939, apart from three loans for a total of US $ 250 million, the Soviet government provided the KMT with 500 military advisers, 1,000 planes, and 2,000 so-called volunteer pilots to help China resist Japan (Young 1963: 57; 125–30). All of this material, personnel, and political support from the Soviet Union was crucial to Chinese/Russian Interpreters because it
not only imported new capital into the field of interpreting but also created job opportunities for them.

Another decisive factor for these Interpreters, given that the value of the capital invested by the Russians was subject to the dominant power in this sub-field of interpreting (the KMT government), was the KMT’s attitude towards Soviet support. For the KMT, the Soviet Union was of course a valuable foreign source for military and political support, especially after losing German support, while other international powers offered no substantial help until war broke out in the Pacific. On the other hand, Russia’s support of the CCP since the early 1920s had heightened the KMT’s suspicions of the underlying motives of this Sino-Soviet cooperation. For example, the KMT believed the Russian volunteer pilots to be disguised Russian Red Army pilots, meaning they were part of a policy of “qualified intervention”. They also thought that the Russian advisers had been sent to China for the purpose of “studying the capabilities of the Chinese and Japanese forces and of testing German concepts, training systems, and equipment on the Chinese battlefront” (Young 1963: 125–6).

This suspicion resulted in the KMT’s tactical deployment of its Interpreters to monitor and control the Russians’ activities in China. For example, on July 19, 1938, Jiang Jieshi, head of the KMT government, issued a telegram in which he requested that all Interpreters working with Russian advisers should join the Kuomintang Party and report weekly to the government about their work. Yet this compulsory Party membership and reporting was limited to Interpreters for the Russian advisers only, suggesting that both requests originated from the KMT’s concern about Russian insincerity and military activities in China. Hence, they seemingly reflect an attempt by the KMT to use the Interpreters as monitors and spies. Whereas the weekly reporting would relay the Russian advisers’ actions, the Interpreters’ Party membership would insure their political loyalty and the confidentiality of their special spying task. Thus, rather than facilitating communication between the two camps, these Interpreters acted as intelligence agents, spying on the other side. As a result, in

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16 Jiang Zhongzheng dianshi He Guoguang Kang Ze e guwen geyi yuan yingyou jianshi zuci meizhou ying xiangbao gongzuo 蒋中正电示贺国光泽润顾问各译员应有坚实组织每周应详报工作 (Telegram from Jiang Zhongzheng to He Guoguang and Kang Ze about organizing Interpreters for Russian advisers and submitting detailed weekly reports). 19 July, 1938, National Historical Archive, Taipei (hereafter, NHAT) 002-010300-014-049-001x.
addition to the knowledge of foreign language and culture, loyalty to the KMT, confidentiality, and the ability to collect information became essential capital for these Interpreters in securing their positions. Interestingly, the Russians soon perceived this particular usage of Interpreters. Just a month later, Jiang received a telegram\(^{17}\) from his officers reporting that the Russian representatives had requested that their Interpreters be replaced, even though the telegram gave no particular reason for this request. My research unearthed no other records of these Chinese/Russian Interpreter-spies. Rather, given that the KMT seemingly acted on the Interpreter replacement request without question or follow-up, the entire issue seems shrouded in mystery and is not mentioned by historians. Nevertheless, the Interpreters must surely have been affected by the repercussions from the KMT’s foreign policy towards the Russians. Although it is impossible to know the extent of this influence, they would at minimum have had to be removed by the KMT from their current positions to cover up the original intelligence plan.

This situation would soon change, however, when short-term Sino-Soviet cooperation ended. On April 13, 1941, the Soviet Union signed a neutrality pact with Japan and announced their mutual recognition of the puppet Manchukuo and the puppet People’s Republic of Mongolia (Hsu and Chang 1972: 37). As for the Interpreter-spies, their stake in the field disappeared when all Russian pilots and advisers left China, eliminating the need for spying or monitoring. In fact, the deteriorating relationship between the KMT and the Soviet Union had immediate repercussions for the Interpreters, even before the official break-up. For example, a telegram issued by Jiang a month before this neutrality pact raised the issue of the welfare of the Chinese/Russian Interpreters, including discrimination and poor payment.\(^{18}\) Specifically, Jiang emphasized that Chinese/Russian Interpreters should be treated as equals to other Interpreters and that needed subsidies should be given to those in financial difficulties. Although no further information is available about

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\(^{17}\) Zhu Shaoliang deng dian Jiang Zhongzheng su e zhu yan ning daibiao qinggu shu jianghang jinfie yu yanqiu chenhuan fanyi deng wende ren hao biao 朱绍良等电蒋中正苏俄驻甘宁代表请求改善机场警戒与要求撤换翻译等文电报 (Telegram from Zhu Shaoliang et al. to Jiang Zhongzheng concerning the requests from the Russian representatives in Gansu and Guangxi provinces to improve airport security and change interpreters), 13 August, 1938, NHA1 002-080200-501-135-001x.

\(^{18}\) Jiang Zhongzheng dian Zhu Shaoliang Gu Zhengjun deng e’wen fanyi yuan yu taguo yuwen fanyi yuand tongdeng daipu 蒋中正电朱绍良古正伦等俄文翻译员与俄国语文翻译员同等待遇 (Jiang’s telegram to Zhu Shaoliang, Gu Zhengjun and others about the suggestion that Chinese/Russian interpreters/translator should receive the same benefits as other language interpreters/translators), 16 March, 1941, NHA1 002-070200-009-080.
Interpreters who had been unfairly treated, the content and date of this telegram imply that the Chinese/Russian Interpreters had been adversely affected by the KMT’s relationship with the Soviet Union to the extent that the highest authority had to intervene.

Despite their short historical appearance, these Chinese/Russian Interpreter spies exemplify the complicated situation for Interpreters in conflict. Not only are the nature and content of their work subject to the objective relationships in military and political fields, but they themselves are part of political and military bodies. In fact, as the next section illustrates, the Interpreters’ political loyalty and physical conditions were the essential capital for their entrance into the interpreting field.

3.2.3 Chinese/English military Interpreters

Of all the Interpreters employed by the KMT government during the war, the Chinese/English Interpreters were a special group in terms of the KMT’s investment in training, employment, and management. Although the need for Chinese/English interpreting did not come to the fore until late 1941, the subsequent five-year period leading up to Japan’s surrender (in August of 1945) saw over 4,000 Chinese/English Interpreters trained and deployed for military purposes, a majority of them recruited directly from universities (Mei 2004: 52). This emergent need for Chinese/English Interpreters resulted primarily from the KMT’s new alliance with the United States, which began in 1941. In this case, these Interpreters constituted an indispensable capital with which the KMT could transcend the linguistic barrier and join the international resistance to the Japanese, especially in terms of military coalition with the US forces in China. The new political and military power relationships developed by the KMT in the 1940s also brought about great changes in the interpreting field, which had a significant influence on the Chinese/English Interpreters themselves.

In the 1930s, both the American public and the US government retained an isolationist view of the war (Hooks 1993: 657). Most particularly, the Neutrality

19 *Junweihui suoshu waishuju guanyu kailian waiyin xuntianban de baogao* 军委会所属外事局关于开办外语训练班的报告 (Proposal by the Military Affairs Commission to establish a foreign language (Chinese/English) interpreter training program under its Foreign Affairs Bureau), 28 December, 1941, No. 2 National Historical Archive (Nanjing) of China (hereafter, NHA) 763–456.
Acts,\textsuperscript{20} passed by the US Congress in 1935, prevented the United States from providing any loans to belligerents and placed embargoes on shipments of arms or munitions to nations at war (Hsu and Chang 1972: 35–7). However, the outbreak of World War Two significantly changed the situation. Japan’s expansion into the Pacific arena directly affected the United States’ interests, thereby pushing the US government to gradually give up its neutrality and side with China. The Americans also gradually realized that it was important to assist China because the Chinese armies’ resistance against Japan tied down the majority of Japanese forces, which could otherwise have been deployed against the United States. In March 1941, the Neutrality Acts were replaced by the Lend-Lease Act, which allowed the US government to provide monetary or material support to belligerent countries such as China. On August 26, Washington released its statement on sending a military mission to China led by Brigadier General John Magruder. This statement set out the following aims for this mission:

To study, in collaboration with Chinese and other authorities, the military situation in China, the need of the Chinese Government for material and materials; to formulate recommendations regarding types and quantities of items needed; to assist in procurement in this country and in delivery in China of such material and materials; to instruct in the use and maintenance of articles thus provided; and to give advice and suggestions of appropriate character toward making Lend-Lease assistance to China as effective as possible in the interest of the United States, of China, and of the world effort in resistance to movements of conquest by force.\textsuperscript{21}

This statement not only describes the material and non-material support that the United States would provide to China’s resistance against the Japanese but also emphasizes this American military mission’s close cooperation with the Chinese KMT government. Through phrasing such as “in collaboration with”, “recommendations”, “to assist”, “to instruct”, and “to give advice and suggestions”, it sends a message to the rest of the world that a military and political coalition is forming between the United States and the “Chinese government”, recognizing the

\textsuperscript{20} The Neutrality Acts were a “series of Acts passed at the height of isolationism, amidst fears that the desire for profits from the arms industry might fuel direct or indirect participation in war... In 1939, the Act was amended, so that arms embargoes and authorized ‘cash and carry’ were allowed to be exported to any belligerent power, but it continued to forbid US ships to carry ‘belligerent cargo’” (Palmowski 1997: 440).

KMT government’s official status in international politics. This coalition with the US would undoubtedly increase the KMT’s international and national popularity and put more pressure on the Japanese. Hence, this open statement itself constituted political capital granted by the US government to the KMT. In fact, the financial and military aid provided to the Nationalist government by the United States during the war was unprecedented. Through lend-lease, it lent the KMT government around $1,336 million US dollars\textsuperscript{22} during the five-year period from 1941 to 1945 (Young 1963: 351). If the 1930s was the “decade of German influence in China” (Kirby 1984: 3), the 1940s was clearly the decade of American influence.

However, American aid to the KMT was not unconditional. The American Lend-Lease law of 1941 clearly stipulated the type of “capital exchange” or “conversion” between agents and institutions suggested by Bourdieu (1977/1972: 187), one in which, as in any market, agents must invest their own capital to acquire or secure other capital. According to this law, countries receiving aid from the United States had to provide reciprocal aid or benefits (Hsu and Chang 1972: 256).

Accordingly, on June 2, 1942, a mutual aid agreement was signed by the KMT government and the US government in which the KMT government agreed to “provide such articles, services, facilities or information as it may be in a position to supply” (ibid.).\textsuperscript{23} Were interpreting services included in these “services” that the KMT was to provide as reciprocal capital for the US government?

According to John W. Mountcastle (2008: 10–15), after the founding of the first US base in the Chinese theatre (in Kunming, Yunnan province, on March 1942), the number of American military officers and staff in China grew substantially every year until war’s end. By the end of 1942, the number of US personnel in the American military mission was 1,255 (ibid.),\textsuperscript{24} but by October 1943, this number had increased to 4,800.\textsuperscript{25} In the newly established Sino-US military training centres in Ramgarh (India), Kunming (Yunnan, China), and Guilin (Guangxi, China), a large number of American military officers had also been recruited to train KMT troops. For example,

\textsuperscript{22} As Young notes, according to letters from the US Department of State, from 1941 to 1946, the total US aid to China was adjusted from US$ 1,546 to around US$ 1,602 because of reallocation and correction. Nevertheless, US $1,336 million was the number counted until the end of 1945 without consideration of these adjustments.

\textsuperscript{23} See also, the Executive Agreements Series No. 251 or 56 Stat. 1494.


\textsuperscript{25} See also, the Executive Agreements Series No. 251 or 56 Stat. 1494, 20.
the Guilin infantry training centre in Guangxi province was staffed by a total of 2,200 American military personnel; before the war ended in August 1945, the total number of American staff in China had reached 60,360 (Hook 1993: 672). This substantial number of American personnel, particularly their close cooperation with the KMT government, meant that Chinese/English Interpreting was an indispensable part of this Sino-US interaction. It also raises the question of whether the Americans brought their own Interpreters for this military coalition with the Chinese. As seen in the following report by the KMT Foreign Affairs Bureau’s (FAB) to the Central Secretary’s office, the Americans tended to seek this linguistic resource in China and through the KMT government rather than training and transporting their own Interpreters from the United States. This decision differs from that on the American training of Japanese/English Interpreters during World War Two (see Chapter Two), possibly because at that time China was a member of the Allied forces, whereas Japan was the enemy with which the US was at war.

因美国协助我国训练新军，美军官佐陆续来华，加以远东战场美军实力日益扩张，译员需要随之增加，本年度，美方要求选派译员计越三千五百余人…

Since the United States has been helping with training our new troops, more and more American officers have come to China. This situation, plus the expansion of the US forces into the Far East theatre, has given rise to a growing need for yiyuan (Interpreters). For this year, the number of yiyuan (Interpreters) needed is estimated by the Americans to be over 3,500...

Evidently, the contractual “service” requested by the US from the KMT government was Interpreting. Specifically, besides training Chinese troops for future united military operations (see Figure 3.1), the US forces also aimed to expand their operations in the Far East theatre through interaction with the Chinese KMT government. As the excerpt shows, to be able to communicate and cooperate with Chinese authorities, the Americans had to rely on Interpreters, who were trained and supplied by the KMT government.

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26 See also, ibid., 10, 15.
27 Zhongyang mísíchù zuòzhòng guànlì běn nián jīnyè liù rì tì zì di qí liú wù hào mǐhàn 中央秘书处案准贵处本年九月六日特字第七五六号密函 (Approval of the internal report (special) no. 765 submitted on September 6), 7 September, 1943, NHA 736-349-45.
In addition to the military training centres, Chinese/English Interpreters with different responsibilities were widely used in other places. From liaison and military logistics (supply and transportation) to combat practices, the Interpreters' roles varied with the context of their work and were subject to actual military needs. An overview of these multiple Interpreter roles is important because, besides being the goal of the KMT Interpreter training, they also had a decisive influence on the capital and position of the Interpreters in the field.

The multiple roles of Chinese/English military Interpreters

Table 3.2 lists statistics (in translation) prepared by the FAB on October 17, 1944, as well as the locations at which the FAB's Chinese/English Interpreters worked after their training. Of the 1,919 Interpreters trained, 1,335 (69.6%) were stationed in India, 117 (6%) in Guilin (China), and 467 (24.4%) in Chongqing (China). The heavy presence of Interpreters in India was related to the US forces' military strategies at that time. Except for 133 Interpreters at Ramgarh Base, which served mainly as the KMT's military training centre in the Indian theatre (Romanus and Sunderland 2002/1953: 214–21), a majority of these 1,335 Interpreters were serving in military units deployed for the Burma Campaign against the Japanese ICHIGO Operation,
which had been led since April 1944 by the US headquarters in the Chinese theatre. All these Interpreters were expected to work with the troops on the battle front. For those assigned to the Chinese theatre, 117 were working at the Southeast Officer Training Centre (Guilin), while the rest (467) were assigned to different military logistics units in Chongqing, including the Organization of Field Services (98), the Air Force Committee (187), the Department of Military Supplies (40), and the Department of Transportation (49). In other words, Chinese/English Interpreters enlisted before October 17, 1944, would have had a 63% chance of serving in field, a 24.3% chance of working in a logistics unit, and only a 13% chance of being posted at a training centre.

In terms of the number of Interpreters employed at that time, the top three assignments were with the US-led Chinese troops (Kunming) (697), at US headquarters in Ledo in the Northern Burmese theatre (296), and with the No. 14 Air Force Unit (AVG) (200). These assignments accounted for a total of 1,192 out of the 1,651 Interpreters working, meaning that 72% were working at the front, either with air force officers, pilots, and airfield technicians or side by side with American officers and Chinese soldiers in the field. Of the remaining 28%, 19% were employed in military training centres, with 121 in Kunming and 194 in India. The remaining 9% were working in military supply departments (Kunming 13, Ledo 113) or in the Chongqing area (9).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Distribution of Chinese/English Interpreters</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>Ramgarh Base 133</td>
<td>1,335 (69.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ledo Base 451</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kunming Y Force 596</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chinese Expeditionary Force 66</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other 89</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Southeast Officers Training Centre 117</td>
<td>117 (6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sino-US Cooperation Centre 93</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Organization of Field Services 98</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Air Force Committee 187</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dept. of Military Supplies 40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dept. of Transportation 49</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total 1,919 (100%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

29 Information in this table was extracted and translated from a report in Chinese: 杨文同志建议提议设立第二期毕业于美国服务学员名册录取名单有段总结表 (Translation of a letter from the U.S. headquarters in the Chinese theatre concerning the nominal role of the second group of FAB interpreters who have finished training, the number of qualified interpreters, and relevant statistics on extent interpreters), 17 October, 1944, NHA 763–18. Original files in English were not found in the archive.
However, within three months, the situation had changed: as indicated by statistics released in January 1945 by the US headquarters in China, there had been a decrease in the number of KMT military Interpreters (see Table 3.3); only 1,651 on January 19, 1945, compared to 1,919 two months earlier. This decline may have resulted from various factors, including Interpreter resignations, promotion to another position, or even death in battle (see Appendix III). The latter was likely given that many Interpreters were attached to the Y Force and Chinese Expeditionary Force, which, in late 1944, took part in the Burma Campaign.

As the Table 3.3 shows, the number of Interpreters needed (as estimated by the US forces) was expected to grow from 1,651 to 3,014 by the end of June 1945, an increase of 45%. This major increase in demand came from the Kunming area; especially the Kunming training centres where Chinese troops were headquartered, and the Kunming military supply department, which showed the greatest need, with a steady increase of 150 every month. Although the number of Interpreters at this supply department was only about one tenth of those in Ledo in January, by June of the same year, it reached around 763.

It is important, therefore, to carefully consider the capital and stakes associated with Interpreter positions: what types of qualities and skills would the KMT government look for in Interpreters and what were the goals towards which the Interpreters would strive?

This flow of Interpreter resources among different military units, outlined in Table 3.2 and 3.3, resulted mainly from adjustments in US military deployment after Japan’s Ichigo Campaign. It also underscores the fact that Interpreters were required to work in a variety of settings, from liaison offices, to logistics departments, to battlefields, to training centres, which would without doubt pose a challenge to all military Interpreters. Obviously, the war would test their language skills, knowledge of military terminology, interpersonal skills, personalities, physical conditioning, and
even survival skills in both the battlefield and nature. In addition, Interpreters working in different settings might face different risks and stakes related to their work. For example, Interpreters working with troops on the battlefield would be directly exposed to physical danger but would earn higher subsidies and enjoy better chances for promotions because of their courage and work record. Interpreters serving in training centres, in contrast, might worry less about their safety but had fewer benefits or chances for promotion. Therefore, the frequent relocation of Interpreters as needed by the military also indicates the inevitable physical danger involved in military interpreting (see Appendix III: Interpreters who died for their country).

Table 3.3 Number of FAB Interpreters serving the US Forces in China (January 19, 1945)\(^ {30} \) and the anticipated need for new Interpreters in the next six months\(^ {31} \)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Chongqing area</th>
<th>Kunming Training Centre</th>
<th>Headquarters of the Chinese forces (Kunming)</th>
<th>Military Supply Office (Kunming)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jan.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Anticipated future need</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>No. 14 Air Force (AVG.)</th>
<th>Headquarters, Ledo-North Burma Area</th>
<th>Military Supply Office (Ledo) at No.3 Military Base</th>
<th>India, training base</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jan.</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb.</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>326</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>3014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar.</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>1363</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr.</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>326</td>
<td>241</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>1363</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>326</td>
<td>241</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1651</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{30}\) Statistics presented in the table are from a letter sent by the US forces to the FAB on January 19, 1945: Sanshisi nian shang bannian suo xu fanyi guan zhi renshu 三十四年上半年所需翻译官之人数 (the number of interpreters needed for the first half of 1945), NHA 763-430.

\(^{31}\) Ibid.
Interpreter position-taking in the field

For Bourdieu, agents’ positions in the field are determined by their possession of capital, and the relative value of their capital is subject to the dominant power in the field. For the Chinese/English Interpreters, the KMT government, with its right to determine the type and value of Interpreters’ capital, was this decisive power. But, on the other hand, like Bourdieu’s example of the Ecole Normale Supérieure (see Section 2.2), the KMT’s recruitment, training, and control of Interpreters were also an inherent part of its functioning as a dominant Chinese political power in the social arena because the entire Interpreter production process it had designed was functionally related to, not isolated from, the perpetuation of its power and increased capital. Therefore, the sub-field of interpreting was not only embedded in the KMT’s military field, but also constituted part of the KMT dominated political field. By setting the selection criteria, the KMT defined and imposed the standard for “qualified Interpreters” – the relative value of capital. The training therefore offered successful applicants a standardized version of the necessary capital, legitimized by the KMT government, including military phraseology, military discipline, and loyalty to the KMT. The Interpreters, in turn, under KMT government dominance, had their own practical concerns and short-term stakes and thus had to act in a way that preserved the operation that had produced them. Therefore, Interpreters’ positions result from their interaction with other agents/institutions in the field. Specifically, the Chinese-English Interpreters aimed to pursue good jobs, as well as better salaries and benefits, while the KMT government wanted to recruit and train qualified staff to strengthen its political and military power.

Within this interaction, the key institution representing the KMT’s power was its Foreign Affairs Bureau (FAB), founded in 1941 as a subordinate department of the KMT’s Central Military Commission, the highest political and military authority in China. The FAB’s main responsibilities included military liaisons with foreign powers, dealing with matters related to wartime foreign advisers, and training and supervising military Interpreters. According to the organizational legislation (revised in 1944), the FAB was the direct supervising institution for Interpreters, especially in
terms of “Interpreter recruitment and training” (No.2 National Historical Archive of China 1998:142), and was responsible for Interpreter appointment (see Figure 3.2).

In 1943, besides one director and one deputy director, the FAB had one secretariat and two departments. Department I was composed of five offices responsible for liaisons with and reception of American or British military personnel; Department II consisted of three offices, mainly for the employment and reception of Russian advisers. During the war, local FAB branches and receptions were established in Ganzhou, Lanzhou, Guilin, Kunming, and India, respectively (ibid.: 142–3).

Who were these Interpreters? Or, to put it another way, what kind of agents would qualify for training as Interpreters under the KMT government? The FAB’s official document for public recruitment of Interpreters (see below) specifies the desirable applicant qualities, as well as the benefits offered to successful applicants, including salary, subsidy, medical care, and travel allowances. Although this information might change over time because of such factors as inflation, it still provides a useful overview of the pre-training capital needed by Interpreters and their stake in the field.

军事委员会外事局考选高级译员简章

一、考选宗旨：本局为适应同盟国间军事联络只需要特分期区分考选高级译员分派国内外担任翻译工作。
二、录取名额：视程度而定。

32 Jinshui weiyuanlui waishijia kaoxuan gaoji yiyuan jianzhang yu sanshi niandu 军事委员会外事局考选高级译员简章(民国三十四年度) (the FAB’s advertisement for interpreter recruitment, Chongqing 1945), Hunan Provincial Archive (hereafter, HPA) 60–1–227–11.
三、报考资格：凡曾在国内大学或专科学校毕业或具有同等学力英文程度优良而
有爱国热忱思想纯正体格强健无不良嗜好年龄在二十岁至四十岁男性皆可报名。
四、考选地区：视实际需随时规定
五、报名：
1. 手续：填具考保名单及缴最近二寸半身照二张。
2. 日期及地点：依各期各区情形而定
六、考试：
1. 科目 A：笔试（英文汉英对译需自备笔墨）B：口试（会话测验）C：党义测验
2. 日期及地点：依各期各区情形而定
七、揭晓：依各期各区情形定期榜示或分别书面通知。
八、报到手续：凡经录取之译员应于揭晓或接得通知后依本局规定日期内来局
办理如下报到手续。
1. 体格检查：向本局领取体检表赴指定之军医机关受检。
2. 填缴保证书：由取录者自觅殷实保证人担保其保证人以在本地文武机关之 X
或少校以上人员或经本局认可之商店为限。
九、任用待遇：办理报到手续后除遇有特别情形外一律派赴印缅或滇桂等
边远地区工作。详细待遇另见附表 [见附录 II.b]
十、备注
1. 本简章自核准之日施行如有未尽事宜得随时呈请修正之
2. 投考人员如有任何疑问事项可经由本局议员考选委员会接洽

The Foreign Affairs Bureau’s Recruitment of
Senior Yiyuan
(Chongqing, 1945)

1. Goal: to meet the need for military liaison among the Allies; the recruitment of senior yiyuan will be carried out through examinations in different areas. The selected yiyuan will be assigned to work at home or abroad for fanyi [translation in general] work.

2. Number of vacancies: dependent upon applicant level

3. Eligibility: all males having a degree from any Chinese or foreign university or with equivalent higher education experience, with excellent knowledge of the English language, patriotic passion, an uncontaminated mind, good health and no addictions to alcohol, drugs or gambling; aged from 20 to 40.

4. Areas for recruitment: subject to actual need.

5. Application:
   1) Procedure: an application form and two recent 2-inch photos of the applicant
   2) Date and venue: subject to the situation in different areas

6. Examination:
   1) Subjects:

33 Each X stands for an illegible character or word in original texts. English translation is provided based on the information available in the source text.
A: Written test (English to Chinese/Chinese to English translation; applicants should bring the stationery needed for their examination.
B. Oral test (dialogue)
C. Test of KMT Party knowledge
2) Date and venue: subject to the situation in different areas

7. Notification of results: dependent on the situation and area; examination results will either be released to the public or sent to the individual applicant via post.

8. Registration procedures: all successful applicants should come to the Foreign Affairs Bureau for registration once they receive notification of acceptance.
1) Physical examination: applicants should obtain a physical examination form for relevant examination in a designated military hospital.
2) Guarantor: applicants themselves should find a credible sponsor to act as guarantor. This sponsor should be someone currently working in the government’s administration section or military institutes, with a position above XX or major (inclusive), or in a commercial firm approved by the FAB.

9. Benefits: after registration, all accepted applicants will be dispatched to Kunming or Chongqing for six weeks of training. If there is an urgent demand of yi yu an from the Allies, applicants who performed well in the entrance examination will be employed immediately as third-rank yi yu an for work in the India-Burma theatre or in the Kunming, Guiling and Chengdu areas. During training, those who pass the English language tests will be entitled to the same benefits as third-rank yi yu an. Once they finish training, all yi yu an will be assigned positions according to their performance on the final test. Information on relevant positions and benefits is included in the attached table.34

10. Notes:
1) The above regulations are in effect since being approved but may be subject to change over time
2) Questions about the application should be directed to the FAB’s yi yu an recruitment committee.

The standard set by the FAB in the above yi yu an (hereafter referred as Interpreters, see Introduction) recruitment document can be classified into three main categories: the Interpreters’ physical condition (gender, age, and health), interpreting knowledge and skills (a university degree and knowledge of the English language), and political loyalty and reliability (“patriotic passion” and “an uncontaminated mind”). The physical requirements can be related to the fact that these Interpreters were expected to work in the military, which customarily applies certain restrictions of age, health,

34 See Appendix IV for a table of benefits.
and gender because of the extreme situations encountered by military staff in wartime. This fact also explains why Interpreters with unhealthy life habits (e.g., drinking and smoking) were not wanted: a healthy body was the basis of an Interpreters’ efficiency, especially during times of war.

The second type of capital sought was an Interpreter’s competence in military interpreting. As might be expected, the foremost condition was knowledge of the English language; therefore, applicants had to take both written (English to Chinese and Chinese to English translation) and oral tests (English dialogue). This reiterates the doubt cast in the Introduction to this thesis regarding the exclusivity of the role of the interpreter, as the KMT government apparently had a clear expectation that qualified Interpreters should be able to handle both written and oral translation tasks. Moreover, that the written test was designed to test both applicants’ language skills and their knowledge of the military is made clear by the following excerpt from an English to Chinese translation test:

Translate the following paragraphs into Chinese
1. Nothing more spacious than your own backyard is needed for your take-off and landing when you own a helicopter, while any airplane will need a field of substantial size for safe operation.
2. The war has hastened the development of aviation by many years and the airplane will be one of the greatest factors in developing political and economic internationalism in a post-war world.
3. At present the speed, ceiling, ruggedness, and especially the effectiveness of the long-range high velocity .50 calibre guns of the Fortresses and Liberators give the Americans an edge over the best fighter defence the Luftwaffe can muster.

... 

The oral test, however, measured applicants’ ability to conduct conversation in English, rather than their interpreting skills. Presumably, this goal was partly related to the fact that the career of Interpreter had yet to become well established in China, and a majority of applicants had no prior interpreting experience. In addition, military Interpreters might need to put themselves forward and be more assertive than professional Interpreters of today. A dialogue test could also assess such factors as an

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35 Junwei, hangwei, jiaoyu guanyu zhengzhidiao yingyu yanyuan de xunling gongzhan deng cailiuo. 军委、航委教育部关于征调英语翻译人员的训令。公函等材料（Orders and government correspondence issued jointly by the Central Military Commission, Air Force Committee and the Ministry of Education on recruiting Chinese/English interpreters), HPA 61-1-38.
applicant’s quick response, personality, and interpersonal skills, all of which could be highly valuable for military Interpreters in wartime, who would quite probably have to work autonomously and deal with unexpected situations.

The third type of capital was the applicant’s political loyalty to the KMT Party, which was measured by a separate exam on Party knowledge. More specifically, Interpreters were expected to exhibit certain qualities (e.g., “patriotic passion” and “an uncontaminated mind”) or potential for their commitment to work under the KMT. This inclination is also indicated by the actual Chinese to English translation test for Interpreter applicants, a part of which is reproduced below. Clearly, the KMT chose the source text for the translation carefully: besides testing the Interpreters’ English language knowledge, the KMT wanted to examine their understanding of military discipline and authority, and to inculcate a sense of duty and loyalty. The three beliefs stated at the end of the source text are in fact the three limits that the KMT tried to impose on Interpreters: loyalty to the Party, absolute obedience to the superior, and self-discipline. The training had already begun!

Translation (from Chinese to English)
Please translate the following paragraph from Chinese into English.
Discipline is the lifeline of the army. A strict adherence to its discipline and a spiritual solidarity are key to the army’s strength in the field. In wartime, different troops will have different tasks and encounter different situations. The only way to keep the army integrated and all following a specific direction and taking consistent actions, from its generals to its soldiers, is to rely on army discipline. Therefore, all army regulations and rules should be well remembered and applied in daily work, especially our routine requirements of manners in clothing, meals, living and talking. Habits of tidiness and cleanliness should also be formed to nurture a solemn and just

36 Ibid.
army discipline. And the core of this discipline is the three strong beliefs held by the entire army. Hence, every staff member, from officers to soldiers, at any time, should believe in his superiors and subjects, as well as in his own loyalty to the Party, obedience to orders, care for the public, and strict self-discipline as an army man.

For the KMT government, however, an Interpreter’s knowledge of the KMT Party and success in the translation test were not enough. Before formal registration, the Interpreters had to find a prestigious sponsor to attest to their reliability and character. According to the KMT request, this sponsor had to be someone directly affiliated with the government or a commercial organization approved by the Foreign Affairs Bureau. Interpreters had to have their sponsors fill in and sign the following warranty form:

保证书

兹担保唐翘平在外事局充任译员决不见异思迁倦怠及怠职伤情事，并绝对保守机密，如有泄漏及失职与反动行为，保证人愿负完全责任。

保证人 被保人

签名 盖章 机关 级职 通信处

Warranty

This is to warrant that Mr. Tang Qiaoping will commit himself to his yiuyuan work for the FAB with diligence and sincerity. He will obey the rule of confidentiality. If he discloses any confidential information, dismisses his work, or betrays the government, I, the warrantor, will take full responsibility for him.

Warrantor Warrantee

Signature Seal Institution Title Address

37 Zhongxuntian yiuyuan xunlian yi, san, si qi fenpei foryi guan wen 中训团译员训一三四期分配翻译官文 (On the appointment of interpreters trained in the interpreter training program, sessions 1, 3, 4, at the Central Training Organization), 6 June, 1944, NHA 763–338–18.
This warranty system is a good example of the KMT’s control over the capital reproduction process, or, in Bourdieu’s (1998a/1994: 41) words, the “statist capital granting power over different species of capital and over their reproduction.” To request that Interpreters obtain sponsorship from agents affiliated with the government or authorized organizations was to ask for evidence of the Interpreters’ social capital; that is, the social connections and networks on which they could call. In other words, only agents who were in the same class or close to it would be granted entrance. Theoretically, this system could reinforce the KMT’s control of the value of capital and maintain the social structure under its dominance. Pragmatically, it would help the KMT impose a double constraint on Interpreters because their behaviour would also affect their sponsors, who would not want to jeopardize their own positions by sponsoring “potentially dangerous” Interpreters.

As for benefits, the recruitment document provides a fairly clear explanation of such details as Interpreter rank, salaries, subsidies for service abroad, and medical care, although it is difficult to extrapolate the exact monetary or material value of the compensation because of regional differences and the high inflation in the 1940s. For example, in 1945, a Rank 3 Interpreter serving in India would have received 7,000 Chinese yuan as salary and 190 rupees as subsidy. However, some Interpreters recall that by the end of the war, a salary of 8,000 Chinese yuan was only enough for four packs of Camel cigarettes (Lu 2005), while an Indian rupee was merely the value of a bowl of noodles (Su 2005: 204). Rather, what is central to this discussion is Interpreter perception of these stakes. In other words, were these stakes attractive and competitive enough to draw agents from other fields (e.g. education, political) to the field of interpreting, regardless of the potential danger in battlefield? A letter

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38 See Appendix IV for a table of benefits.
39 In Zhengdiao ge jiguan xuejiao gongjiao renyuan, xuezheng chongren yiyuan buqu minhan 征调各机关学校教职工、学生充任译员录取名单 (A list of government employees, university staff, and students recruited as interpreters), NHA 763–27. The original letter was written in English.
written jointly by two applicants for the Interpreter positions provides some insights into this question:

Customs House, Nanning, January 21, 1945
To: the Foreign Affairs Bureau
Military Commission, Chungking

Sir,
Having learned from various newspapers that interpreters are to be conscripted from employees of government organizations, we, the undersigned, have been desirous to offer ourselves to the service. The reason for our delay in submitting applications was that the Customs Service has so far not transmitted the said government regulations for the guidance of the staff. With the re-occupation of Nanning and the expected landing of the allied forces, the need for interpreters has become a burning question, and the time seems to have come for us to furnish, as required by the government, particulars of our qualifications, etc., to the FAB for detachment from the Customs Service to the American armed forces as interpreters. Should our records kept in the Inspectorate of Chinese Maritime Customs, Chungking, be verified and found satisfactory, we hope that we may be permitted to report for orders at the American military headquarters in the Nanning area so as to meet the urgent need; or else might we be provided with a means of transportation for proceeding to the training camp.

... Jiang, Shouli, 29 years old, Rank 1 customs inspector, Nanning Customs House.
Yang, Wenhao, 31 years old, Rank 1 customs inspector, Nanning Customs House.

This letter stands out from other documents in the FAB file folder because, other than the FAB’s correspondence with the US forces in China, it is one of few letters originally written in English. Why did these two Chinese custom inspectors address the FAB in English? Most probably, they wanted to impress the FAB officers with their English language skills. Since knowledge of the English language was advertised as a pre-requisite for the position of Interpreter, a letter written in English would be one way to demonstrate the applicants’ command of the English language. Evidently, these two applicants, Jiang and Yang, had an acute perception of both the FAB’s Interpreter recruitment and the value of their linguistic capital. Moreover, as they claimed in the letter, “the time seems to have come for us to furnish, as required by the government, particulars of our qualifications, etc., to the FAB for detachment from

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40 Alternative spelling of Chongqing.
the Customs Service to the American armed forces as Interpreters.” These two applicants also showed great initiative by offering the FAB information on their background, as well as proposing possible locations for their service (i.e., the American military headquarters in the Nanning area).

Nevertheless, it may not be accurate to claim that every Interpreter perceived the stakes as Jiang and Yang did; perception of the field is always subject to position and previous social experience (see Section 3.3 for a more detailed discussion). In addition, despite the KMT’s expectation, it is unlikely that every Interpreter recruited possessed all the capital requested, especially given the urgent need for Interpreters and the limited number of agents with sufficient English language knowledge. This reality is probably one reason that all Interpreters had to undergo a few weeks of intensive training before their service in the army.

Training and Interpreters’ professional habitus

Interpreter training is a crucial issue in this discussion because, being recruited from the public, few had any prior interpreting experience. Although the length of Interpreter training varied over time (from 4 to 6 weeks), for most recruits, it constituted their earliest experience as Interpreters in society. Hence, this early understanding of the Interpreting profession was the basis of their professional habitus, which, as discussed in Chapter Two, would be continuously refined in their later interpreting practices. As Simeoni (1998: 14-5) emphasizes, the notion of translatorial habitus refers to “a complex, adaptive habitus finely tuned to the practical demands of the (special) field(s) in which it operates”. For the KMT, training was not only a process of imparting the knowledge and skills essential to military interpreting but an indoctrination of ideology and principles favourable to itself: the “ethics” of a military Interpreter. This indoctrination continued in the Interpreters’ post-training interpreting practices because the KMT still held the upper hand in their employment and evaluation.
The following Interpreter training outline, compiled by the FAB in November 1941, not only sets out training goals, trainee requirements, and length of training but suggests training methods, subjects (content, hours), and relevant education (seminars and speeches) for a four-week curriculum (see Appendix V). Obviously, as this outline was produced in the training program’s infancy (late 1941), the details could be expected to change as the war developed. Nevertheless, the directions set out here by the KMT are explicit and applicable in the long term. In addition, because investigations of interpreting and translation history cannot always unearth training syllabi, this training outline and curriculum is a particularly useful source for analyzing the formation of the Interpreters’ professional habitus.

军事委员会外语训练班训练纲要

第一章 训练目的
为适应国际局势发展之需要, 招考及选调精通外国语文之人员或学生施以短期训练俾能担任军事译述及联系工作

第二章 训练要点
一、使受训人员恪遵总理遗教, 服务革命领袖，认识本身所负之师明，尽忠职守完成任务
二、了解与外人应按之礼节翻译之技术联络之要求及国际军事常识与基本动作。

第三章 训练方式
一、精神训练方面 在以强烈之 XX 严格之考核培养爱国之热忱救国之决心与牺牲奋斗之勇气
二、学术训练方面 严格施以军事管理与训练使具备现代军人之基本条件对于外交礼节及有关国际战局尤其太平洋战争中之实际问题与我国之外交政策军事计划加以提要之指示并着重自 XXXX 讨论

第四章 训练对象
一、每期学员暂定一百名
二、学员须经严格之检验与考试并具备下列条件
一) 身体健康，仪表端正，思想正确机警罗敏并具国家观念与革命热情。
二) 限制资格，但须精通外国语文

第五章 训练期限
一、训练期限为一个月必要时得缩短或延长之
二、毕业以后为外事局委派工作

第六章 训练内容

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41 Junweihui wei wosu weishijiu wengyu kailian woyu xunlianban de baogao ziling, woyu xunlianban zuzhi dagong. 军委会所属外事局关于开办外语训练班的报告、指令、外语训练班组织大纲 (the Military Commission’s report, instructions, and organizational guidelines for the Foreign Language Training Program).
NHA 763–456

42 Although called “外语训练班” woyu xunlian ban (Foreign Language Training Program) in the original file, the program only taught English. Therefore, here and in subsequent text, it will be translated as the English Language Training Program unless otherwise indicated.
Chapter Three

Training Guideline for the Military Commission's Foreign Language Program

I. Training goal
Given the international geo-political situation and increasing need for interpreters, staff members or students who are proficient in foreign languages shall be procured and recruited. After a short training, they shall be able to take responsibility for military interpreting and liaison work.

II. Main training points
A. Trainees shall follow the three principles formulated by former President Sun Yat-sen and commit themselves to our great revolutionary leader. They shall also recognize the significance of their positions and be fully devoted to their work.
B. Trainees shall understand the proper way to deal with foreigners, the skill of translating and the requirements for communication, as well as common military knowledge and basic practices.

III. Training methods
A. Spiritual training: to foster, through intensive lecture (one character illegible) and strict revision, patriotic passion, determination to save the nation and courage to sacrifice and struggle.
B. Academic training: to equip the trainees with the basic qualifications of modern military staff through strict military management and training; to instruct them briefly on diplomatic protocol and manners, relevant international politics – especially, relevant issues in the Pacific War – as well as our foreign policies and military strategies. Self-study and group discussion will be encouraged.

IV. Candidates to be trained
A. 100 students every session.
B. All candidates shall be carefully checked and examined and shall meet conditions below:
   a. Have a healthy body, good appearance and correct thoughts, and be alert and wise, nationalistic and passionate for revolution
b. No qualification limits, but a good command of a foreign language is required.

V. Training period
A. The training period will be one month, which may be shortened or extended as necessary.
B. After training, the Interpreters will be assigned work by the FAB.

VI. Training content
A. Spiritual training: inculcation and influence through spirit speech, anniversary speech, speech at the flag-hoisting ceremony, speech in public meetings, (one word illegible) speech, slogans
B. Political instruction: reflection on life, group discussion, public speech, individual consultation, investigation and exam.
C. Military management
D. Academic training
E. Physical education

VII. Training course plan (see Appendix V)

VIII. Appendices
A. Academic calendar and course guidelines, to be drafted.
B. Political education plan, to be drafted.
C. Military management, to be drafted.
D. Anything unexplained in this guideline may be supplemented anytime.

Clearly this training outline sets the Interpreters’ work as “military interpreting and liaison”, thus distinguishing these Interpreters from civilian staff who performed translation work in offices. However, it seems that for the KMT, military Interpreters were to serve the military in diverse aspects, rather than professionals working exclusively as interpreters. Such multiple expectations are also apparent in the curriculum (reproduced in Appendix V), in which language courses (e.g., English dialogue (36 hours), English writing (16), and interpreting military terminology (16) account for 47% of the training hours. In addition, 11% of the training time was devoted to background knowledge – the military operations of foreign countries (4), the geography of the Pacific Ocean for military purposes (4), and research into the opposition (8). The remaining hours were then to be spent on the Interpreters’ “spiritual training” and military duties, including liaison and intelligence work. The former was to be addressed by courses on President Sun Yat-sen’s three principles (4), the political leader’s speech and behaviour (4), and domestic politics (4), as well as presentations by guest speakers (8), all of which accounted for 14% of the total hours. The remaining 17% consisted of coursework on a military attaché’s duties (4).
diplomatic protocol (4), international politics (4), international intelligence (4), and intelligence science (8).

The outline above raises an important issue for this thesis; the question of the potentially different perceptions and understandings of the Interpreting profession between the past and the present, at least in the context of China. Naming the interpreter training program as “a foreign language training program”, the KMT government did not seem to see interpreting as a professional practice but rather as a type of work that could be accomplished by anyone with sufficient knowledge of languages and a short-term course. Although its training outline specifies the necessity of Interpreters’ knowledge of military terms, diplomatic protocol and manners, and the relevant international political background, no specific requirements are set for Interpreters. The KMT’s understanding of the interpreting profession reflected through this training outline is important as it contrasts with some individual interpreters’ perceptions, as found in their memoirs, while it confirms those of others. These discrepancies not only show that the interpreting profession had not been widely established and recognized in China at that time, but also further indicate the potential danger of applying the label of “interpreter” in a historical study of interpreting. The term as it was used in the past might differ from our current understanding of this profession.

Despite a lesser emphasis on the professionalism of the Interpreter, the KMT apparently paid close attention to Interpreters’ political loyalties. As seen in the outline, Interpreters’ belief in the KMT Party’s three principles and commitment to its “great revolutionary leader” are explicitly set out as the foremost training goal. Since these three principles of minzu (nationalism), minquan (democracy), and minsheng (socialism) – initially proposed by Sun Yat-sen, founder of the KMT Party and the republican government – were recognized as the basis of the KMT’s ideology and political stance (Chang 1991), this emphasis is in fact a demand for political loyalty to the KMT and Jiang Jieshi, the KMT government’s president and military leader. According to the curriculum, almost 12 hours of training would concentrate on intensive political education, including the three principles, the leader’s statements, and relevant political propaganda materials. This loyalty was even raised to the level of individual worship in courses such as the “Political Leader’s Speech” and
"Behaviour and Domestic Politics", in which Jiang's speech and practices were studied as textbooks. In one sense, this political loyalty became the key principle of the Interpreters’ professional ethics.

For Interpreters, training encompassed more than coursework because the instructional material that was emphasized conveyed important messages about the military interpreting profession, including the types of qualities and competencies that would be valued or devalued, and the types of behaviour considered appropriate or inappropriate for military Interpreters. In other words, the training process was in fact one of fostering and reinforcing certain categories of perception of the field. For example, the “Foreword to Teachers and Students” in one of the training materials, *Forty English Lessons for Interpreting Officers*, proscribe Interpreter professional performance as follows:

11. Interpretation from one language to the other should be rapid, accurate, clear, and in good conversational style.
12. The teaching and study of these lessons should also provide valuable opportunities for education in citizenship, true patriotism, international cooperation, Chinese-American understanding and goodwill, and in those qualities of discipline, courtesy, industry, perseverance, character and service that should characterize the work of an interpreting officer.

These two statements are in fact the KMT’s definitions of good interpretation (“rapid, accurate, clear, and in good conversational style”) and the attributes of a qualified Interpreter (“citizenship”, “true patriotism”, “discipline”, “courtesy”, and so on), or in Bourdieu’s words, the rules of the game. These definitions were an extension of the value system determined and maintained by the KMT and could be seen as an initial form of the Interpreters’ practice code. Through the offering of examples, the correction of mistakes and examinations, training thus became a process of endowing and reinforcing Interpreters’ perceptions of the value system orchestrated by the KMT.

Nevertheless, in terms of the formation of the Interpreters’ professional habitus, training was probably only a beginning due both to its brevity and to the limited

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43 Unpublished source compiled in 1945 by the Liaison Group of the Foreign Affairs, Bureau National Military Council, provided to the author by retired interpreter, Yan Jianrui, during a personal interview on 8 January, 2009.
extent of the Interpreters’ interaction during training with other agents and institutions. Moreover, an individual’s habitus is always unique and varied, owing to individual social experiences in the social world. Hence, despite the influence of general training, Interpreter perceptions of both the interpreting field and the social space develop with their professional practice, a factor that the KMT’s Interpreter management relied on heavily. For example, the following excerpt from the Interpreter evaluation system established by the FAB puts forward six types of practice that qualified for honour and/or prizes:

外事局译员管理规则，民国三十二年七月二十七日

乙. 译员著有左列之功绩或优行者分别奖励之
1) 服务成绩特别优良者；
2) 办理困难或危急事件甚著切机宜者；
3) 破获国际阴谋扰乱机证据确凿者；
4) 冒险达到命令重之任者；
5) 带病或负伤仍勉力服务者；
6) 工作时能留心考察当地情形，拟具报告供改善参考之资料者。

Regulation of management of the CMC’s FAB yiyuan, July 27, 1943:

B. yiyuan with any of the following achievements or behaviours will be rewarded⁴⁴:

a) Outstanding service.
b) Dealing with difficult or emergency situations in a properly and timely manner
c) Destroying international plots aimed at disturbance on site with substantial evidence
d) Risking their lives to accomplish their work
e) Committing to their work while being sick or injured
f) Carefully investigating local areas during work and submitting relevant reports for improving current references and materials.

These six categories of honourable yiyuan’s behaviour are directly relevant to the FAB’s yiyuan (hereafter Interpreter) training. Besides interpreting skills, an Interpreter’s ability to solve difficult and emergent problems (alertness, wisdom), information collection and anti-spying practices (intelligence activities), and commitment and willingness to sacrifice (nationalism and passion for revolution) were all recognized as valuable points. Clearly, for military Interpreters, moving

⁴⁴ Junshi weiyuanhui weishifu yiyuan guanli guize mingao sanshisan nian qi yue er shi qi ri. 军事委员会外事局译员管理规则 (Regulation of Management of the CMC’s FAB Interpreters), 27 July, 1943, NHA 763–452–36.
closer to any of these six categories was the only way to attain the honours or rewards (e.g., promotion, prizes) offered by the FAB for professional performance.

Apart from the above honour system, through its client, the US forces, the KMT also introduced an evaluation system to monitor all FAB Interpreters in service. To this end, the FAB designed an Interpreting officer performance rating sheet (reproduced below) to be filled out by the American clients. This evaluation assessed Interpreters’ work on five aspects: interpreting performance, working attitude, professional development, courtesy, and character. In this manner, the KMT re-applied its standards of “good” interpretation and “qualified” Interpreters: the closer the Interpreters’ performance to the standards, the higher their ratings. The evaluation thus forced all Interpreters to check their behaviour against the standards. In other words, to secure their positions and obtain further interests, they had to follow the standard set by the KMT. Any positive consequences resulting from this evaluation, such as praise, promotion, or subsidy, would then encourage them to shape themselves more closely after the KMT’s model.

**Interpreting officer performance rating sheet**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Consideration on which rating is submitted</th>
<th>Percentage rating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quality of service rendered</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attention to duty</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efforts to improve his usefulness</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neat appearance and dignity of demeanor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Character</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

75% satisfactory, 80% very satisfactory, 85% excellent, 90% really excellent, 95% superior.

Obviously, the American clients played a crucial role in this evaluation system given their observation of the Interpreters’ daily performance and their subsequent ratings. This feedback was expectedly to be crucial for the Interpreters’ professional life. In fact, many of the FAB’s decisions to promote or punish Interpreters were based directly on the Americans’ reports. For example, Cheng Ching Tung (FAB

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45 Interpreting Officer Performance Rating Sheet, NHA 763–420–12. The original file is in English.
46 招安 Jiangcheng 译员奖惩 (Rewards/Punishments for Interpreters), NHA 763–34.
Interpreter with payroll no. 241) was suggested for promotion for his willingness and readiness to “work in any capacity for this service, no matter what it may be”, and his colleague Wang Han Ping (FAB Interpreter with payroll No. 272) was also proposed for promotion because of his “exceptional ability in interpreting” and “perfect courtesy”. At the same time, however, certain Interpreter behaviour was also reported by clients as problematic and unacceptable. For instance, Interpreter Lin Tsu Chang (FAB Interpreter no. 218) was called to account for his attempts to “avoid field duty” on the excuse of ill health. After two physical examinations, the clients formally requested that Lin be replaced with someone who did not “mind the rigor of field duty” and suggested a necessary punishment for Lin.

Through follow-ups, the FAB kept brief records of almost all reports on Interpreter performance. Whereas Interpreters Cheng Ching Tung and Wang Han Ping were both honoured by the FAB, which was officially recorded in their profiles, Lin Tsu Chang was given a formal warning. This employee-client evaluation system thus became the basic framework for the Interpreters’ professional development. The honours granted and warnings issued from the KMT amounted to a direct increase or reduction in reputation or social credit; that is, social and political capital. Moreover, because these honours and warnings were written up in these Interpreters’ work records, they would continuously affect their careers, including both their current positions and their chances for promotion. Hence, these negative or positive consequences were personal, and directly influenced the Interpreters’ understanding of both the military Interpreter’s profession and of themselves. The message in practice was much clearer than in training: play according to the rules; otherwise, you will be out of the game.

That these Interpreters perceived the objective relationships in this sub-field of interpreting and embodied the rules and expectations as part of their professional habitus is partly evidenced by the fact that some did try to earn good feedback by working towards the standards set by the employer and client. These individuals carried out their professional practice in the manner expected and requested both because they knew it was appropriate and in order to pursue their own further interests.

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47 Some interpreters’ names are in Wade-Giles system in the original documents. For accuracy, no conversion to pinyin system is made in this thesis.
48 May 15, 1944.
49 May 26, 1944.
At the same time, the honours or warnings received by certain Interpreters set an example for their professional peers. Once Interpreters recognized this client-employer feedback structure, they would try to initiate similar practices in their interaction with the client. Hence, from training to practical experiences, these young Interpreters gradually absorbed the so-called professional rules, which then constituted the basis for their perception of both the sub-field of interpreting and generated their later professional practices.

However, this absorption of professional habitus demonstrated in the above context of the KMT Interpreters does not mean that professional interpreters are merely the mechanical products of training and the professional interpreting world. Rather, like all social beings, these KMT Interpreters also had families, friends, and other social affiliations separate from their interpreting work. Their professional habitus, therefore, was always part of their general habitus and subject to their previous social and educational experiences. These experiences thus constituted the basis of the Interpreters’ perception of the social world, including their initial movement into the interpreting profession and their self-perception of their professional practice.

3.3 A case study of university students as military Interpreters

Bourdieu (1998a/1994: 76–7) argues that agential decision-making is a result of illusio, a practical sense of the game, rather than rationality. For him, his agential illusio is produced by his habitus – embodied objective conditions – and is acquired through experience in the field (ibid.: 77). If KMT training was a starting point for the Interpreters’ perception of this “immature” profession, how did their previous social experience and later interpreting practice relate to this notion of illusio?

To investigate this issue, this section focuses on a special group of the KMT Interpreters – university students and graduates – who, as documented in two Interpreter yearbooks stored in the Hunan Provincial Archive, made up a high percentage of the Chinese/English Interpreters. These two yearbooks give some basic information – including age, birthplace and educational background – on a total of 419 FAB Interpreters who received their training in two groups in Chongqing in
February\textsuperscript{50} and June\textsuperscript{51} 1945, respectively. One of these Interpreters from the August cohort, Yan Jiarui, graciously granted me a personal interview.

As shown in Figure 3.3\textsuperscript{52}, these 419 Interpreters were particularly young: 273 (65\%) between 20 and 25, and 100 between 26 and 29 (24\%). Of the remainder, except for 3 (1\%) who were under 20, 30 Interpreters (7\%) were aged 30 to 35, 11 (3\%) from 36 to 40, and 2 (0.4\%) over 40. In other words, despite the original age limit set by the KMT (20–40),\textsuperscript{53} 373 (89\%) Interpreters in these groups were aged 20 to 29, and over two thirds were actually in their early twenties.

![Figure 3.3 Interpreter age](image)

This trend of youthful Interpreters can be understood in two ways. First, given the war situation and the military Interpreting needed, being young could be a significant capital for Interpreters because of its direct relation to many factors, including health, stamina, quick response, and fast learning. Thus, an age preference (when possible)

\textsuperscript{50} Guanyu zhongxuautian yi yuan xunlianban tongxuehu ji xingzhengbu, chongqings fen yuan huan tongxue deng \textit{fandong gugan de zhaopian} 关于中训团学员训练班同学会及行政部，重庆分团湖南同学等反对骨干的照片 (The yearbook of the alumni Interpreters trained at the Central Training Department of the administration's training program, including photos of Hunan-born key anti-revolutionists of the Central Training Department's Chongqing branch), HPA 59-1-15. Words such as “反对骨干（the key anti-revolutionists)” appearing in the archive file title is probably related to the ideological and political pressure during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) in China.

\textsuperscript{51} Zhongyang xunlianban yi yuan xunlianban disi qi guanzhu tongxue tongxuan 中央训练团训练班 第四期官佐同学通讯 (The yearbook of the alumni Interpreters and officers in the Fourth Interpreter Training Program at the Central Training Department), HPA 0-5-137.

\textsuperscript{52} The information in Figure 3.3 was extracted from the two alumni yearbooks, HPA 0-5-137.

\textsuperscript{53} \textit{Jianshi weiyuanhui weishijiu kaoxuan gongyi yiyuan jianzhang (yu sanshisi niandu) 军事委员会外事局考选高级译员简章(第三十四年度) (the FAB’s advertisement for Interpreter recruitment, Chongqing, 1945), HPA 60-1-227-11.}
during KMT selection of Interpreters would not be surprising. Second, because of their current positions and habitus, younger agents were probably more likely to need particular stakes. For example, for students with little working experience or social status, military Interpreter positions might be a good wartime option given the welfare and material compensation provided by the government. However, for those with established careers or more social experience, the benefits offered by the KMT government might not seem sufficient, especially given the danger and pressure associated with working in the army. This assumption was confirmed in my interview with Yan Jiarui (2009). In 1945, as a 20-year old high school graduate from a single-parent family in Kunming, Yan urgently needed a job to relieve the financial pressure on his mother, who had worked very hard to support his studies. For him, being a military Interpreter was a convenient way out because, besides his interest in the English language, the military Interpreter position was at least a stable job with fixed salary from the government.

Another interesting finding in terms of birthplace or geographic origin is that, as Table 3.4 shows, although these Interpreters came from a total of 23 provinces, the majority were from areas that had been continuously controlled by the KMT government before the war. The top three provinces – Guangdong (17.9%), Jiangsu (16.5%), and Zhejiang (16.2%) – were the KMT’s political and economic strongholds in China. In contrast, few Interpreters came from provinces in north and north-west China like Jinlin, Liaolin, Heilongjiang, and Shanxi, which had all been occupied or controlled by either the Japanese forces or the Chinese communists before or during the war.

This imbalance in Interpreter origin may be related to many factors, including poor transportation and communication during wartime and regional differences in the availability of higher education. It does reveal, however, the potential geopolitical constraints imposed on Interpreters by their physical locations and social backgrounds: the birthplace being the usual locus of agents’ early social experience, Interpreters born and raised in KMT-controlled areas would be more likely to embody the extant political and social structure. This incarnate habitus would in turn affect their *illusio*. As Yan

54 The information in Table 3.4 was also taken from the two alumni yearbooks, HPA 0–5–137.
claimed in our interview, one reason for his applying to the Interpreter program was to “报效祖国” baoxiao zuguo (to serve my motherland) (Yan 2009) after witnessing the damage caused by the Japanese bombing of Kunming. However, when asked to clarify what “motherland” meant, he admitted that at that time serving the KMT government equalled serving the motherland, and he thought of no other options. Given that Yan had spent his whole childhood and youth in Kunming, where the KMT had long maintained political and military dominance both before and during the war, his recognition of his national identity was presumably the accumulated result of his education and social experiences.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guangdong 广东</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>17.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jiangsu 江苏</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>16.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhejiang 浙江</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>16.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hunan 湖南</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hubei 湖北</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hebei 河北</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anhui 安徽</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sichuan 四川</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shandong 山东</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fujian 福建</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henan 河南</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jiangxi 江西</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liaoning 辽宁</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shanxi 山西</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guangxi 广西</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qingdao 青岛</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guizhou 贵州</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yunnan 云南</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shanxi 陕西</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suiyuan 绥远</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gansu 甘肃</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jilin 吉林</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lichongjiang 黑龙江</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 419 100%
Yan’s case may not be sufficiently representative of the other 418 military Interpreters in that he was comparatively younger and had just finished high school. Overall, among these 419 individuals, the ratio between Interpreters with and without higher education experience was 14:1, meaning that 389 had attended university/college before their interpreting training, while 27 (including 3 for whom educational data are missing) presumably had no more than a secondary education.

Interestingly, a similar trend also emerges for educational background. Although the group as a whole represented a total of 84 public and private universities/colleges in China, the majority of Interpreters had attended one of a few universities/colleges. Specifically, as shown in Table 3.5\textsuperscript{55}, there are 17 universities/colleges that at least five Interpreters had attended or graduated from; together, they produced 291 Interpreters, almost three fourths of the 389 with higher education. Most particularly, apart from some foreign-funded universities like Hujiang University, Yanjing University, St. John’s University, and Jinlin University, almost all universities listed in Table 3.6 were in fact national universities funded and directly supervised by the KMT government. These include the top five universities of the time: National Fudan University (76), Central University (42), Central Political University (37), National Transportation University (23), and National Zhejiang University (23).

As these data suggest, it is no coincidence that a majority of these military Interpreters were university students: their ages, origins, and former universities all indicate particular patterns related to social position and educational experience. However, are these patterns also related to these Interpreters’ illusio and their position-taking in the field? Do they explain what type of capital would be valued by the KMT? What role did the universities play in the interaction between the Interpreters and the KMT government? To answer these questions, it is necessary to consider them in relation to higher education in China during the 1940s.

Before the outbreak of the war, higher education in China had developed in both public and private sectors. By 1931, there were 31 national universities, 37 private universities, 20 national technical colleges, and 10 private technical colleges, most of

\textsuperscript{55} Information listed in Table 3.5 was taken from the two alumni yearbooks, HPA 0–5–137.
which were situated in large cities like Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, and Nanjing (Hsu and Chang 1972: 119). During the 1930s, the KMT government also established academic screening institutions whose main responsibilities were to review educational qualifications, publish college curricula, hold joint entry exams, and provide funding and loans to universities and colleges (ibid.: 121). These screening institutions and their activities were an extension of the government’s control over institutions of higher learning and their students. In fact, it could be said that through a series of screening and funding measures especially related to public universities and colleges, the Nationalist government expected to turn the higher education institutions and their students into a national repertoire of manageable agents with knowledge, skills, and even bodies subject to its command.

Table 3.5 Number of university-supplied Interpreters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>University</th>
<th>Number of Interpreters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 National Fudan University</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Central University</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Central Political University</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 National Transportation University</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 National Zhejiang University</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Jinling University</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 National Zhongshan University</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Chongqing University</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Hujiang University</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Yanjing University</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 St. John University (Shanghai)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 National Wuhan University</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 National Northern East University</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 National Guangxi University</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Datong University</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 National Tongji University</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 National Qinghua University</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>291</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This entire education system, however, was disrupted by the war. The Japanese forces’ expansion into China and their massacre of Chinese civilians forced many students and universities/colleges to retreat physically, along with the KMT
government, to the interior. After 1938, a majority of these institutions transferred their students to the unoccupied areas in the southwest and northwest, especially Sichuan, Guizhou, and Yunnan provinces, where the KMT government still maintained control. Therefore, geographically and politically, through its Ministry of Education, the KMT government retained direct administrative control over these universities/colleges and their students.

In fact, as Table 3.6 shows, the number of university students and graduates grew between 1936 and 1945; given the KMT’s age limitation (20–40) for military Interpreters, these were more likely than others to be potential candidates. Moreover, despite a significant loss of students and universities in 1937 (17 fewer schools and 108,043 fewer students than in 1936), after 1938, the number of students and universities returned slowly to its previous level. By 1942, university students and graduates numbered 64,097 and 9,056, respectively, and by 1945, the total number of students reached 83,498, almost double the 41,922 in 1936. Hence, even without considering either physical condition or language skills, in each year between 1941 and 1945, at least 50,000 university students and 10,000 recent university graduates had received years of formal training in KMT-controlled academic institutions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No. of Schools</th>
<th>No. of Students</th>
<th>No. of Graduates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>41,922</td>
<td>9,154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>31,188</td>
<td>5,137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>36,110</td>
<td>5,085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>44,422</td>
<td>5,622</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>52,457</td>
<td>7,710</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>59,457</td>
<td>8,035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>64,097</td>
<td>9,056</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>73,669</td>
<td>10,514</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>78,909</td>
<td>12,078</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>83,498</td>
<td>14,463</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If there were no requirements for Interpreter major or subject field, then what did this formal education mean for Interpreters and for the KMT? It is highly probable that

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56 NHA 763–338–18.
57 This table was taken in its entirety from Hsu and Chang (1972: 12).
enrolled students or recent graduates from government-recognized institutions were endowed with certain symbolic capital recognized and valued by the KMT government. For example, the opening text of *An Educational Objective and Implementing Policy* (1929), compiled by the KMT before the war, emphasizes that the KMT’s political policy, the Three People’s Principles, is the basis of its educational objectives (Hsu and Chang 1972: 110). Immediately following the statement of objective is the policy for its implementation, whose first two sections explain how the objective could be achieved:

a. The instruction on the Three People’s Principles at various levels of schooling should be interrelated with the entire curriculum and extracurricular activities. History and geography instructional materials should be used to explain the essence of nationalism; group living training should be employed to develop the principle of democracy; and practice in production labour should be employed to lay the foundation for the Principle of People’s Livelihood. *All in all, knowledge and virtues should be combined under the Three People’s Principles to achieve faithfulness and pragmatism.*

b. Ordinary education should be designed in accordance with Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s teaching to *indoctrinate children and youth with the national virtues of loyalty, filial piety, kindness, love, faith, righteousness, harmony and peace,* to train the people to acquire necessary skills and to increase the people’s productivity. *58* (Hsu and Chang 1972: 110, emphasis added)

Evidently, the KMT’s basic political policy of the three principles was also the core idea of this KMT-orchestrated educational policy. Curricular and extracurricular activities at all levels were supposed to inculcate these principles or, simply put, to indoctrinate and reinforce the KMT’s dominance. Hence, the concept of nation in “national independence” and “nationalism” was narrowed down to the KMT government. Likewise, the document emphasized that subjects like history and geography should instil this “essence of nationalism”, while the aim of knowledge and “national virtues” like “loyalty, filial piety, kindness, love, faith, righteousness, harmony and peace” should be “faithfulness and pragmatism” under the KMT government. Hence, within the framework of such a policy, after successfully finishing elementary and secondary education, university students and graduates were

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58 All information quoted from this policy was translated by Wen Ha-hsing.
the end product of a process of indoctrination. In fact, their student status in KMT academic institutions was the capital that the KMT sought.

In addition to the above factors, the KMT also had practical considerations in recruiting university students and graduates, including the convenience of command and control, in which the universities/colleges played an indispensable role. That is, through its Ministry of Education, the KMT government could reach all universities and colleges in its controlled areas; these institutions not only had detailed information on their students' ages, gender, and skills, but also the ability to assist in the initial organization of student applications and language testing. Moreover, being degree-granting institutions, universities and colleges could exert a more direct and immediate influence on students. This connection in Interpreter recruitment between universities and the KMT government is apparent in the KMT's formal dictum to many universities and colleges, issued in 1943 via the Ministry of Education, requesting Interpreters and making clear the universities' responsibilities in supporting their recruitment (see Appendix VI). These responsibilities included supplying an approximate number of students, organizing the test, establishing records of students' physical conditions through the resident university doctors, and receiving and distributing travel grants for students who passed the test.

In fact, many universities and colleges showed their own initiative in Interpreter recruitment. For example, the Southwest Associated University in Kunming even issued a formal regulation on student responsibility in this recruitment, using both carrot and stick to persuade and encourage students to serve as Interpreters in the army.\footnote{Xinan liuxue xuesheng zhengzhong chongren yiyuan banfa 西南联大学生征调充任译员办法 (Regulations concerning the Southwest Associated University students' applications to be an interpreter), 3 December, 1943, See also Xu (1998), 668–9.} According to this regulation, all male students in their fourth year had to serve as military Interpreters unless they failed the physical examination. Those no more than 30 credits away from degree completion would receive their degrees immediately after their interpreting service in the army. However, anyone not responding to the call for interpreting services would be seen as breaking the conscription law by purposely avoiding military service. As a result, they would be deprived of their student status and referred to relevant military authorities. The regulation also included applications from students in the first, second, and third
years, as well as from transfer or trial students. Hence, the KMT’s power over its academic institutions was relayed, reinforced, and translated into an influence over the university students. This intervention of the universities also proves that the sub-field of interpreting was not only embedded in the KMT dominated political and military fields, but also overlapped with its educational field, particularly in higher education.

Although data from only one first-hand interview makes it hard to speculate on or generalize the *illusio* of this group of Interpreters almost half a century ago, Interpreter Yan’s reminiscences do provide some clues to this perception. First, Yan, like many Interpreters, claimed nationalistic passion as one of the most important motives for joining the military Interpreter program (quoted in Lu 2005; Mei 2004: 10; Cai 2005). In fact, since the early twentieth century, Chinese university students had been very keen on national politics and reform, and were probably the most passionately nationalistic demographic in Chinese society, more on account of China’s almost century-long humiliation by foreigners than of manipulation or propaganda (Israel 1966: 8. 184). Although in the early 1930s, Chinese students, especially university students, had vehemently protested against the KMT government’s policy of appeasing Japan’s aggression (Twitchett, Fairbank et al 1993/1986: 138), the relationship between students and the KMT during the war was not one of alienation because the nationalism prevalent among students was “anti-imperialist” or “anti-Japanese” (Israel 1966: 184–5).

Although it may be problematic to assume that this nationalistic goal was part of the *illusio* possessed by all the Interpreter candidates, the fact that many claimed it as a major motive is enough to imply that they perceived the would-be honour of becoming military Interpreters as a potential capital for their further positioning in the nationalism-emphasized Chinese society. In addition, whether this *illusio* was based on a genuine nationalistic passion or was a glory-based excuse for obtaining symbolic capital (or both), the Interpreters’ beliefs about this honour would be tested and refined in their behaviour. In Bourdieu’s terminology, they would learn whether joining and investing in the game was worthwhile. This latter probably explains why

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60 Yan Jiarui, personal interview, 8 January, 2009.
Mei Zuyi, a KMT Interpreter working for the US forces’ Kunming headquarter in 1943 and 1944, was troubled by the gap between his ideal of serving his motherland and the reality of his military interpreting work. According to Mei, he had joined the KMT’s Interpreter team based on his ideal of belief in his work as resistance to the Japanese. In this case, however, his ideal was more likely a self-perception of his social position in the social space; that is, what he should be doing and what he could do with his knowledge and skills in that specific social context. However, in his memoir, he writes

I was upset by my interpreting work in the first couple of months. I thought I had reached my goal of serving the country by joining the army to resist the Japanese. But when I witnessed the corruption of the KMT government and its army, I felt that I was helping the bad side. Also, some American staff members were very arrogant towards the Chinese because they saw us as inferior to them. So I was always thinking how we could make China richer and stronger, so we would not need to fear Japanese aggression or ask for help from the Americans. Of course, in that situation, a young man as innocent as I could not find any answers, but only trouble himself more. (Mei 2004: 11)

It seems that, like Yan in my interview, Mei had similar problems in perceiving alternative options when there was discrepancy between his expectations (illusio) and actual position. Charles Romanus F. and Riley Sunderland (2002/1953) also provide interesting information on problems related to this issue among student Interpreters. Being based on a direct summary of US military reports and their interviews with relevant American staff, their data should accurately reflect the client’s perception of the Interpreters and their behaviour. For example, some American staff in an artillery training centre described their 23 Chinese student Interpreters as “a problem for the centre”. Besides a lack of knowledge of military phraseology and concepts, and their “embroidering” of the source text (Romanus and Sunderland 2002/1953: 219–20), these student Interpreters seemingly had problems fitting into the military Interpreter positions. Although Romanus and Sunderland do not specify the nature of these
problems, they emphasize their relevance to the Interpreters’ self-perception as “members of the superior scholar class” living the reality of “fixed incomes at a time of rampant inflation” (ibid.: 294).

This feeling of belonging to “the superior scholar class” is actually not surprising when related to these Interpreters’ university education. Although in the 1940s, China had at least 50,000 university students and 10,000 university graduates (Hsu and Chang 1972: 12), university degrees were still a rare and valued form of capital in Chinese society, given the total population and sparse higher education resources at that time. In addition, in that era, a majority of Chinese university students were from upper or middle-class families, with parents who were officials, businessmen, teachers, and other professionals (Israel 1996: 6). Given their education and family background, it is easy to understand why some regarded themselves as members of a superior class and were dissatisfied with their lot.

Admittedly, however, ‘dissatisfied’ may not be the right word to describe the student Interpreters’ situation. In fact, after 1943, the KMT started to see an increasing number of student Interpreters trying to delay or desert their service. For example, in May 1944 alone, the US forces reported four Interpreters to the FAB, two for desertion and two for shirking field duty on the (proven to be fake) excuse of language insufficiency and sickness.\(^{61}\) This problem of Interpreter desertion or shirking became so common in late 1943 that the FAB had to enforce a policy throughout all universities that without certificates from the FAB, no student Interpreters could resume their student status or obtain their degrees even if they claimed to have finished their military interpreting service.\(^{62}\)

However, as recorded in a letter that the FAB received from the Secretariat of the Central Military Commission on September 7, 1943, these were not the only problems with Interpreters in service.\(^{63}\) In this letter, the KMT government shows great concern about certain Interpreter behaviours, in particular, criticizing the government

\(^{61}\) NHA 763-34.

\(^{62}\) 聆询朱步青告 No. 49361, 1943-10-9, 楼仲鸣留学救学之毕业学校证书及教育 部训令 61号 1943年10月9日, 无证明书院校教师应学勿入学 (Orders from the Ministry of Education, No. 49361, 9 October, 1943, that interpreters without certificates should not be allowed to resume their university studies), HPA 61-1–38–7.

\(^{63}\) Ibid.
and requesting benefits from the Americans. To stop such ‘improper’ conduct and encourage Interpreters to work, the KMT government increased the benefits for recruited Interpreters by raising their starting military rank (e.g., to the equivalent of a major in the infantry), thereby improving the salary level and enhancing the subsidies for service abroad:

... 

计其实所得，不仅凌空而将，而服务国家有年已有功勋之军政长官无获此优厚，现本局局内服务人员，心羡译员待遇之特厚，凡熟悉外语者，纷纷请求派到军队中其他技术人员之退服精神，签请委座予以核减，计其明证人事译员多属 XX 之学生而其享受即以超过陆军少校所 X 政府方面，是以特别优待，乃尤谓待遇过菲，实属缺乏为国服务精神。

[w]ith all these subsidies, (yi yuan’s) salaries are even higher than for those fighting at the front and military officers with years of service or who have made significant contributions. Many FAB staff envy yi yuan positions [so] those with foreign language skills are asking to serve with the troops. Although a majority of our yi yuan are only university students, thanks to the government’s considerate arrangement, they are able to enjoy better benefits than army majors. If they still complain about their low pay, they should be ashamed of their insufficient commitment to their country.

On the other hand, the KMT was also looking for ways to strengthen its control over its nearly 2,000 yi yuan (Interpreters), particularly the student Interpreters. As the letter states, although many Interpreters worked very hard and had contributed much to the army, it was not unusual to see inappropriate Interpreter behaviour, such as stirring up chaos, blackmailing others, shirking duties, or fleeing positions. It is important to bear in mind that these descriptions by the KMT government should be carefully considered in that they might be one-sided stories and not representatives of the whole picture. However, the above letter at least shows that a majority of these problematic Interpreters were students enlisted directly from universities. Not only were the directors in local FAB branches informed of precautionary measures, but Wang Shijie, Deputy Director of FAB Central, travelled to meet these ‘trouble-making Interpreters’ in person. Interpreter training thus again enters the discussion:

今办理是次业务对译员之受训无方致若专注，实不能辞此重咎，现正设法纠正，今后拟于征调派遣服务之学生，先施以严格政工训练，冀 X 正其思想，启发其爱国心，而能忠诚服务以期人尽其才，共抗建大业...
As the institution supervising the training of these yiyuan, the FAB is responsible for proper solutions. Rectification measures should be carried out immediately. From now on, before their service, all students who will serve as yiyuan shall receive proper political training, so that their thoughts are corrected and their patriotic hearts inspired for loyal service. Then yiyuan can be deployed according to their talents and contribute to our resistance against the Japanese and to national reconstruction...

No official information is available on whether the KMT’s adjustments of Interpreter payment were effective in encouraging them to remain in and concentrate on their work. However, the fact that many Interpreters left their positions or tried to make use of their interpreter status when quitting was impossible shows that many Interpreters with university degrees found the benefits insufficiently attractive for them to risk their lives with the army. Therefore, when the stakes associated with their positions were no longer perceived as worth adherence to and investment in the game, they left their positions in this sub-field of interpreting and moved to other fields in the social world.

Conclusions

This chapter has described four groups of Interpreters employed by the Chinese KMT government during the war – Chinese/Japanese Interpreters, Chinese/German Interpreters, Chinese/Russian Interpreters, and Chinese/English Interpreter – whose educational backgrounds it then examined in more detail. Subsequently, it presented separate discussions of these four groups, with a focus on the Interpreters’ various responsibilities in different political and military contexts ranging from military training, liaison, military supply, and combat practices to intelligence activities. As the analysis has clearly shown, the Interpreters’ position-taking and practices were greatly affected by the KMT government’s foreign policy during the war. This policy not only influenced the availability of Interpreter positions but the relative value of their capital, including linguistic capital (knowledge of language), cultural capital (cultural competencies), social capital (educational background, social networks), and political capital (political loyalty). Some forms of capital, including knowledge, competencies, and networks, were accumulated through the Interpreters’ educational and social experiences; others, such as political beliefs and values, were inculcated through the
Interpreter training orchestrated by the KMT government.

The latter, in particular, suggests that Interpreter training involved not only Interpreter pursuance of more capital and better positions in the arena but also a struggle by the Chinese KMT to recruit useful and loyal workers for its competition or cooperation with other international political and military powers. This dialectic interaction during training between Interpreters and the KMT authorities was also part of the formation of the Interpreters’ professional habitus, though the profession of interpreting might still be blurred and immature at that time. Through exams, evaluations, and employment by the KMT, the standards for ‘good interpreting’ and ‘honorable Interpreters’ were established, reinforced, and embodied as part of the Interpreters’ professional habitus, which not only generated their illusio, whether or not eventually realized, but directly affected their interpreting practices. Hence, the following chapters further explore the formation of an Interpreter habitus and the Interpreters’ relevant strategies under other political powers during the war.
Chapter Four:
Interpreting for the Chinese Communist Party

Interpreting for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was somewhat different from interpreting for the KMT government. First, the CCP had less need for Interpreters and therefore organized less training. In fact, Interpreter was not even a distinctive profession until the late 1940s, especially because during the war the CCP had not yet become an established political power in China and had limited influence and control over resources (Kataoka 1974: 95–6; Fairbank 1993/1986: 632–4). Indeed, prior to the KMT’s 1938 acceptance of the United Front Policy, the CCP had always been labelled and suppressed as a rebellion force. At the beginning of the war, therefore, its main force was almost limited to its base in Jiangxi province, where it struggled for survival in civil war with the KMT. Moreover, despite its success in resisting some of the KMT’s “extermination campaigns”, it was defeated in the fifth campaign in 1934 and had to give up its base and begin the famous Long March to seek safety in other places (Guillermaz 1968: 239–40; North 1963: 163–4). Before it had finished this lengthy trek and settled down in 1936 at a base in northern Shanxi province, the CCP had too little strength to put up any substantial resistance to the Japanese or contact any foreign powers for support (Van Slyke 1968: 32–3). But this almost isolated sub-field of interpreting also presents a very interesting situation for studying Interpreters’ positioning in the social space. Because unlike those KMT Interpreters, these Interpreters working with the CCP often concerns more about their political survival and less about their interpreter career.

During this period, because of the KMT’s military and economic blockade, it was very difficult for the CCP to establish any connection with foreign powers and organizations other than the Comintern (Communist International, also known as the Third International) and the USSR. However, as discussed in Chapter Three, despite its ideological support for the CCP, the USSR maintained its formal diplomatic relationship with the KMT government, whose military supplies and advisers “went exclusively” to the KMT rather than to the CCP (Van Slyke 1968: 226–7). As regards its connection with the Comintern in Moscow, the CCP managed to maintain
communications through telegraph and messengers from the late 1920s until 1943. This type of communication, however, was unstable and difficult given the Red Army forces’ frequent military actions and movements (North 1963: 164). As a result, in the 1930s, interpreting activities under the CCP were very limited, primarily to its communication with the few Comintern representatives in China.

The Japanese aggression and the formation of the anti-Japanese United Front in late 1937 temporarily stopped the civil war between the CCP and the KMT, thereby opening up opportunities for the CCP to consolidate its bases and develop contacts with foreign powers. Compared to the situation in the early 1930s, the CCP influenced more areas and so established some anti-Japanese bases. By the end of 1937, it had control of north-east Shanxi, west Hopei province, and part of central Hopei and southern Chahar. However, apart from its Shan-Gan-Ning base (the CCP headquarters in the Yan’an area), its control of other regions was not strong and its military forces even in the areas under its control lacked coordination because they were not geographically adjacent (Fairbank 1993/1986: 640). In addition, a majority of CCP-held areas were backward and rural, with sparse resources and difficult travelling conditions. Even the CCP’s political centre, the Shan-Gan-Ning base, was behind Japanese lines during the war. Such communication and transportation difficulties impeded the CCP’s wartime connection and cooperation with international forces, including its interpreting activities, although the isolation, to some extent, also left it free to develop its military and political strength because the Japanese forces targeted primarily cities and areas adjunct to railways.

However, as the war developed, the situation began to change, especially after the KMT encountered heavy losses in resisting the Japanese while the CCP gradually increased its military strength in its bases in northwest China. Hence, the CCP began to play an increasingly important role in China’s resistance to the Japanese and started to appeal for domestic and international support to further strengthen its political and military power. This inclination is made clear by the CCP’s training of Chinese/Russian military Interpreters in the early 1940s in anticipation of military cooperation with the USSR against the Japanese forces. At the same time, given the
increased visits by Western correspondents to Yan’an, Chinese/English Interpreting became ever more important for the CCP’s propaganda work. The arrival of a US Military Observation Group, the Dixie Mission, at Yan’an in 1944 further stimulated the development of Chinese/English Interpreting, which constituted a crucial part of the CCP’s efforts to seek support and aid from the Americans. As regards Chinese/Japanese Interpreting, the data available did not permit an accurate assessment of the situation, although it is known that the CCP ran the Japanese Workers’ and Farmers’ School for Japanese prisoners in Yan’an, where CCP cadres with knowledge of the Japanese language trained captured Japanese soldiers for psychological warfare against the Japanese forces (Barrett 1970: 34–35; He 2008).

The following sections therefore focus on the Chinese/Russian and Chinese/English Interpreters trained and/or used by the CCP, highlighting the Interpreters’ positioning as well as self-positioning in the CCP context. The underlying argument is that when providing linguistic assistance to clients, Interpreters not only participate in the interaction between their clients but develop new social and working relationships with them. This personal acquaintance and experience of assisting communication enlarges the Interpreters’ social network and offers them opportunities for better positions and more capital.

4.1 Chinese/Russian Interpreters

4.1.1 Comintern agents and students returned from the USSR

Unlike the KMT, who received both military aid and personnel support from Germany and the USSR, respectively, in the 1930s, because of the KMT government’s military blockade, the CCP was almost encircled by the KMT’s army in its Soviet bases and had hardly any contact with the outside world except for the Comintern. As noted in the memoir of Otto Braun, a Comintern agent attached to the CCP in the 1930s, his journey from Shanghai to Ruijin, the centre of the CCP’s Soviet bases in Jiangxi province, was very difficult because in the early 1930s, a majority of Chinese territory was still under the KMT government’s control. Not only did foreigners need a visa for inland travel, but they were banned from “bandit fighting
zones” (areas under CCP influence) (Braun 1982: 29–30). In addition, the highly unstable telegram communication between the CCP and the Comintern in Moscow improved little even after the CCP gained its legal status with the formation of the United Front in late 1937 (Harrison 1972: 295).

Thus, in the 1930s, the CCP’s need for Chinese/Russian Interpreters was limited to its communication with the few Comintern representatives in China, who either worked in the Comintern’s Far Eastern Bureau in Shanghai or resided at the CCP headquarters. Although the sources accessed do not record the exact number of Comintern representatives during the 1930s, it is certain that most Comintern representatives left China around 1931 because of the KMT government’s political oppression and military blockade and the Shanghai Bureau was permanently closed in 1935 (Yang 2005). From 1933 to 1939, the only Comintern agent in China was Otto Braun, who worked as the Red Army military adviser to the CCP (Braun 1982). As a result, there would have been few positions open for Chinese/Russian Interpreters working within the CCP during the first decade of the war as their clients (the CCP and the Russians) were physically separated. Apart from this limited need for Chinese/Russian Interpreting, there were also other factors affecting the formation of the sub-field of interpreting as well Interpreters’ position-taking. How many social agents, for example, had the necessary capital to be Chinese/Russian Interpreters, and what did these social agents perceive as the stake associated with such Interpreter positions? These relevant factors are best addressed by examining a special group of social agents associated with the CCP, students who had returned to China after a sojourn in USSR, termed by many historians, the “Russian-returned students” (Price 1976: 75, 128; Harrison 1972: 151, 171–172; North 1963: 140).

Specifically, this term refers to Chinese communists who had been selected by the CCP to be trained in the USSR during the 1920s and then returned to join the Chinese communist movement in the 1930s to 1940s. This training was partly attributable to support from the Communist Party in the Soviet Union and the Comintern’s Far Eastern Secretariat and partly related to the harsh environment for the CCP in China because of KMT government pressure since 1927 (Price 1976: 89). As a result, in the
1920s, many well-known Soviet institutions received Chinese communists sent by the CCP, including the Communist University of the Toilers of the East in Moscow (CUTEM), the Moscow Sun Yatsen University (MSYU), the Red Army (Frunze) Academy in Moscow, and the Leningrad Military-Political Academy (Price 1976: 89). Since the CCP’s major need for Interpreters in the 1930s originated from its connection to the Comintern in Moscow, these Russian-returned students seemed ideal candidates for the positions because of their Russian language training and communist education in the USSR.

Above all, some of these students had already had some Interpreting experience during their training in the USSR, primarily assisting at and Interpreting Russian lectures and seminars for newcomers to the Russian institutions. Because a majority of these newcomers arrived with no knowledge of the Russian language, many Russian universities had to use senior Chinese students as Interpreters until they had acquired basic language skills. For example, at CUTEM, at least four Chinese students (Jü Qiupai, Li Tsengwu, Wu Flei, and Wang Hungtung) were recognized as student Interpreters who could help other Chinese students in lectures and seminars (Price 1976: 33). The number of Chinese/Russian student Interpreters at MSYU was probably even greater, because MSYU was the university that the Comintern founded in 1925 to train both KMT and CCP members for a national revolution in China. It is estimated that around 1,400 Chinese students (CCP- or KMT-sponsored) graduated from the MSYU institution in the five years from 1925 to 1930 (Dan and Wang 2006), though almost all KMT sponsored students returned to China in 1927 because of the tense relationship between the CCP and KMT (Price 1976: 90–4). If, as its alumni recall, every class for Chinese students at MSYU was equipped with an Interpreter (ibid.), the number of Interpreters in total would have been significant. Moreover, some Chinese communists who studied at MSYU, including Wang Ming (Chen Shaoyu), Yang Shangkun, Yang Song, Yang Fangzhi, Liu Shaowen, Zhang Wentian, and Wu Xiuquan, had previously served as Interpreters in the Soviet Union (Price 1976; Wu 1991). Some, such as Wu Xiuquan, had also been formally employed as Interpreting staff by MSYU after graduation (Wu 1991: 64). At SYUM, one Interpreter recalls in his memoir, not only did many Chinese students serve as Interpreters in lectures taught in Russian, but a class was also set up especially to train
Chinese/Russian Interpreters for teaching purposes (Xiong 2009: 24). In other words, several “Russian-returned students” not only possessed sufficient language skills but had also taken interpreting as their career.

Another important characteristic of these Russian-returned students is their political affiliation with their respective political parties. No matter whether established CCP cadres or young activists; they were believed loyal to the Party because almost all had undergone CCP screening prior to studying in the USSR. At least two institutions were directly involved in CCP recruitment of these students: Shanghai Foreign Language School (August 1920–July 1921) and Shanghai University (October 1922–April 1927) (Price 1976: 30–40). Shanghai Foreign Language School, founded by the early Chinese communists to “recruit and prepare young Chinese activists for study in the Soviet Union”, taught only Russian language and Marxist theories (Price 1976: 31), although its advertisement to the public claimed it to be an open foreign language school with English, Russian, French, German, and Japanese programs. A majority of its registered students were young Chinese activists from diverse regions, who were recommended by “reliable” references to visit Shanghai in preparation for their trip to the USSR (Zhang and Ding 2002: 30–31; Price 1976: 31). In less than a year after the school opened, around sixty students were secretly sent by the CCP, in three batches, from Shanghai to Moscow for training (Hao 2006: 58; Price 1976: 31).

Unlike Shanghai Foreign Language School, Shanghai University was an academic institution operated jointly by the CCP and the KMT when the two parties were still in the warm relationship of their first United Front.64 Despite its connection with the KMT, from 1923 to 1927, Shanghai University was a significant institution in terms of CCP training because of “the presence of Soviet-trained faculty members and a large contingent of Chinese Communists in the student body” (Price 1976: 39–40). By 1927, when Shanghai University was forced to close down because of conflicts between the CCP and KMT, its graduates had reached a total of 1,800, many of whom

64 Scholars disagree on the exact date of Shanghai University’s founding and organization. Price (1976: 39) contends that it was founded by the KMT in 1923 with four departments (social sciences, Russian language, Chinese language, and English language); however, Zhang and Ding (2002: 30–31) claim that it was founded in October 1922 with only three departments (Chinese literature, English literature, and social sciences) but courses in Russian as a foreign language.
were sent directly to MSYU and joined the CCP during their stay in the USSR (Zhang and Ding 2002: 30–31; Price 1976: 40).

Besides recruitment at the above two institutions, the CCP also tried to select its candidates directly through its subordinate organizations, including its branches in China and overseas, and the CCP-sponsored Chinese Socialist Youth League (Qian 2008). For example, in January 1926, a total of twenty Chinese communists were transferred from the CCP’s European branch to attend MSYU (Dan and Wang 2006). Hence, these “Russian returned students” that rejoined the CCP in the 1930s were those individuals originally selected by the CCP, whose pre-approved political loyalty based on references and screening was a sort of belongingness—a necessary capital for agents to be included and considered candidates for positions within the Party, including Interpreters.

In addition, because of the privilege of studying in prestigious Russian institutions, many of these Russian returned students developed a certain understanding of and/or personal relationship with the Comintern, which supervised almost the entire training process. Given the Comintern’s profound influence on the CCP in the early 1930s (North 1963: 147–156), diplomas issued by the Comintern-sponsored Russian institutions, participation at Comintern-organized conferences and workshops, or even personal acquaintance with key members of Comintern could significantly boost these Chinese communists’ personal profiles once they returned to China. In fact, after training in the USSR, many, including Wang Ming (Chen Shaoyu), Wu Xiuqian, and Wang Jiaxiang, held senior positions (Price 1976: 9, 101–102). Some not only worked continuously as student Interpreters but also benefited substantially from the contact developed with the Comintern through their interpreting practices.

Wang Ming’s early success as a Russian-return student and Interpreter with the CCP is an excellent example. As one of the first group of Chinese students at MSYU, he was chosen for training as a student Interpreter because of his quick learning of the Russian language in class (Xiong 2009: 23–4). In the Interpreting training class, he met one of his professors, Pavel Mif, who was also rector of MSYU and director of the Chinese section of the Comintern. Wang Ming’s Russian language skills and
organizing ability not only impressed Mif but also helped Wang earn a position on MSYU’s interpreting staff once his two-year education at MSYU had been completed (ibid.). Besides his interpreting work in the classroom, Wang Ming showed great motivation in assisting Mif’s work with Chinese students and soon acted as his personal Interpreter on many public occasions, including his trip to China as the head of the USSR delegation in July 1927 (Li 2008: 61). Indeed, Wang not only served as Mif’s Interpreter at the CCP’s Fifth Congress in 1927 but was also recommended by Mif to interpret for Mikhail Markovich Borodin, the Comintern’s representative in China, in the same year and to serve as Chief Chinese/Russian Interpreter at the CCP’s Sixth Congress in 1928 (ibid.).

Later in his political career, Wang consciously used these connections with Mif and the Comintern, accumulated during his interpreting work, to seek better positions and more power within the CCP. In one of a few letters that Wang wrote to Mif in August 1929, he complained that after returning to China in early 1929, he was not trusted by the CCP leadership and was only assigned some translation and technical work (quoted in Li 2008: 63). Wang’s complaints seemingly made an impression not only on Mif but also on the Comintern because in December, the CCP received official instructions from the Comintern concerning the positions of the Russian returned students, especially a young comrade [Wang] who had worked with the Comintern for a long time but had not been treated fairly by the CCP (ibid.). With support from Mif, Wang was soon included on the CCP’s central committee and by 1930 occupied a senior leading position in the CCP, later becoming its representative to the Comintern in Moscow from 1931 to 1937 (Zora 1977).

This progression from student Interpreter to Interpreting staff to important political figure in both the CCP and the Comintern exemplifies the success stories of Russian-retumed students who acted as Interpreters in the late 1920s and early 1930s. Undoubtedly, Wang Ming’s success was a result of many factors, including both his personality, knowledge, and the internal conflicts among the CCP leadership in the late 1920s, but the social network he built up through his interpreting work, especially that with influential Comintern figures like Mif and Borodin, was particularly significant and ultimately enabled his movement up the CCP power ladder. Hence, for
Wang, Interpreting was far more than a linguistic professional practice: it constituted a crucial transition in his political career, one in which he developed his habitus and acquired essential social capital.

Nevertheless, Wang Ming’s legendary success would be difficult for those wanting to follow suit to emulate, simply because the political power relationship in the social space changed significantly for the CCP in the 1930s and thus affected the close-related sub-field of interpreting. Not only had direct communication between the CCP and the Comintern become increasingly difficult because of the civil war between the CCP and the KMT, but their relationship had changed subtly owing to an internal power struggle within the CCP between the pro-Soviet group and the new power centre led by Mao Zedong. This change directly affected the Chinese/Russian Interpreters because of their direct interaction with the Comintern representatives. More specifically, the stake associated with their positions changed, and their capital was re-evaluated. These changing influences are particularly well illustrated by the cases of Wu Xiuquan and Wang Zhitaao, the two Interpreters who worked with Otto Braun, the only resident Comintern representative to the CCP in the 1930s.

It is first important to mention that as the first and only Comintern military adviser, Braun was initially warmly received by the CCP, who made careful arrangements to support his life and work at the Soviet base, including the selection of Wu Xiuquan and Wang Zhitaao as his Interpreters (Braun 1982: 31). Both were Russianreturned students with years of training in prestigious Russian military institutions and specialized political and military Interpreting (see Table 4.1 for their basic characteristics).

Besides such factors as age and gender, which could be related to the CCP’s consideration of the harsh environment at the Soviet base and Braun’s position as a military adviser, these two individuals clearly share some similarities of background. This latter may, on the one hand, confirm the assumption that Russian-returned

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65 The data for this table were taken from Wu’s memoir Huyi yu huainian 回忆与怀念 (Memory and memorial) (1991) and other resources (Chen 1993; Cui 2006).
students were favoured as Chinese/Russian Interpreters, and on the other, reflect the CCP’s high evaluation of the capital associated with Interpreter positions. For example, both Interpreters graduated from Moscow Infantry School almost at the same time, with four years of formal political and military education. In the subsequent two years, Wu Xiuquan worked as a university staff Interpreter and then as a military and government Interpreter; Wang Zhitao taught university-level military classes. Hence, Wu Xiuquan apparently gained more experience in interpreting; while Wang Zhitao could have become more familiar with military matters. This situation matches Wu’s description in his memoir of their divided responsibilities.

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<th>Table 4.1 Characteristics of Braun’s two Chinese/Russian Interpreters</th>
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<td>Age (in 1933)</td>
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<td>Gender</td>
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<td>Family background</td>
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<td>Social and political activities before training in the USSR</td>
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<td>Education</td>
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<td>Party membership</td>
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Most especially, Wu (1991: 105–107) recalls that Braun arrived during the KMT’s fifth extermination campaign, so that besides daily communications, the immediate work for
him and Wang Zhitao was to support Braun’s military advising by translating intelligence reports and telegrams from the front (Chinese to Russian), drawing military maps, and interpreting Braun’s strategies for and advice to the CCP Military Affairs Committee. In addition, their work was divided according to expertise. Whereas Wu was primarily responsible for interpreting at the CCP’s administrative and military meetings, Wang interpreted mostly at lectures and seminars given by Braun as military adviser to the Academy of the Red Army in Ruijin (ibid.: 105).

The two Interpreters’ family backgrounds and political affiliations with the CCP also share similarities. Family background, especially, was an important criterion by which the CCP judged its members’ ideological and political loyalty (Hsiung 1970: 67–71). More specifically, Mao identified four social classes as supporters of the CCP’s national revolution: the working class, the peasantry, the urban petty bourgeoisie (the intelligentsia, urban poor, functionaries, handicraftsmen, professionals and small merchants), and the national (middle) bourgeoisie (Mao 1991/1939: 645; Chien 1970: 70). For Mao, the peasantry and working class peasants were the backbone of the revolution, the urban petty bourgeoisie could be a reliable ally, while the national bourgeoisie might be less firm in their determination and should only be allied during certain periods and to a certain degree (Mao 1991/1939: 645; Chien 1970: 70). Hence, the CCP regarded family background as a significant index of belongingness and commitment to the Party, a type of warranty similar to that requested by the KMT government to ensure its Interpreters were from social classes favourable to its political goals (see Chapter Three). On this point, both Wu and Wang were impeccable candidates, Wu being from a poor working class family and Wang from a typical peasant family living in poverty. Ironically, in this situation, no significant economic capital became a type of political capital for both Interpreters.

As regards Party affiliation, both Wu and Wang seemingly had early connections to the CCP and in the early 1930s, both held membership in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). Since high school, Wu had been a member of the Youth League, a CCP sub-organization for young members, while Wang joined the Revolutionary Army at the age of fourteen. Although it is unknown whether the CCP would value CPSU membership more than CCP membership, the former was
probably true of many Russian-retumed students as it was easier for them to join the CPSU while in the USSR.

Above all, Wu and Wang’s work and positions after returning to the CCP in China are important to analyzing their positioning and practice as Interpreters, because they not only reflect the relative value of their capital as recognized by the CCP but also show their social practices in a chronological and historical context wherein interpreting was only a temporary profession. For example, Wu returned to China in 1931 but was not selected to be Braun’s Interpreter until October 1933. During the intervening two years, he was a staff Interpreter at the headquarters of a sub-Soviet base, a lecturer at the Academy of the Red Army, and then promoted to Political Commissar in both the army and the Academy. In Wang’s case, his period of service to the Party was comparatively short. He returned to China in 1933 and began as Braun’s Interpreter in October of the same year. Before that, he served for a short time as teaching staff at the Academy of the Red Army. Although it is impossible to know how Wu Xiuquan and Wang Zhitaot actually felt about their new appointments as Braun’s Interpreters, these appointments clearly represented careful decisions by the CCP based on both the candidate’s individual competence and the CCP’s relationship with the Comintern.

In fact, the Comintern’s influence on the CCP was significant, and, at least during the period of 1933 to 1934, even more specific and direct because of Braun’s residence. In fact, according to Braun’s Interpreter Wu Xiuquan (1991: 105), during this period Braun seemingly held decisive rights in CCP military matters and acted as the messenger between the CCP and the Comintern even though he only spoke Russian and had to rely continually on CCP Interpreters. Hence, almost all the CCP’s important political and military decisions had to be first endorsed by the Comintern through Braun (ibid.). Wus perception of Braun’s position with the CCP reveals the Interpreter’s consciousness of the power relationship in which he was involved, which in turn partly explains his later reaction to the Interpreter position when this power relationship changed.

This changed relationship can be traced back to 1934, when the CCP’s Red Army, advised by Braun, encountered a series of problems during the KMT government’s
fifth termination campaign. During the resulting Long March, the CCP suffered great losses and lost contact with the Comintern. As a result, the myth of the Comintern military adviser gradually disintegrated and the worship of the Comintern also began falling apart. In contrast, a new power centre led by Mao was rising, which was gradually replacing or at least affecting the position of the Russian-retumed students in the power structure. Earlier, in the late 1920s, Mao had expressed disagreement with many of the Comintern’s policies in China, including its policy of “cantering attention on the conquest of the cities” to counterattack the KMT government’s “annihilation campaigns”, and he had thus “won the disfavour” of the Comintern (Van Slyke 1968: 25–6). Mao had also been dismissed by the Central Committee and the Political Bureau in 1928 for his failure in leading the Autumn Harvest Uprising (ibid.). Hence, despite his success with the peasant movement in a few Soviet bases, Mao did not have Braun’s support for his strategies in either the peasant movement or guerrilla warfare (Xiao 2006: 51). This continual failure of the Red Army under Braun’s advice and its loss of contact with the Comintern provided Mao with opportunities to enhance his political influence and win over supporters.

The CCP’s meeting at Zunyi in January 1935 was a turning point in its history, as well as a watershed in the influence and positioning of the Russian-retumed students in the Party. At this meeting, Mao’s faction gained a voice, and Braun’s military policies came under vehement criticism and were blamed for the Red Army’s military failure in late 1933 (Harrison 1972: 246). In the final resolution of the meeting, “A review of the military errors of comrades Bo Gu [Qin Bangxian], Zhou Enlai, and Li De [Otto Braun]”, Braun was repudiated as military adviser, and the CCP leadership was reorganized (Harrison 1972: 245–46). Specifically, because of his firm support of Braun’s military line, Bo Gu, Head of the Political Bureau and General Secretary of the Party, was replaced by Zhang Wentian. As Harrison notes, Zhang’s appointment was an obvious “compromise between Mao’s group and the ‘Russian returned student’” because although Zhang was one of these students, he had tried to stay neutral in all Party debates (ibid.: 246). Moreover, despite his title, Zhang held little power in the CCP. The real winner was Mao, who was not only elected Secretary of the Central Secretariat and member of the Standing Committee of the Political
Bureau, but became Director of the Central Military Affairs Committee while keeping his position as Chairman of the Government Executive Committee (ibid.).

This adjusted power relationship within the CCP directly influenced the Interpreters. First, Interpreting for Braun was not as urgent and demanding as before, because after the Zunyi meeting in which Wu interpreted for Braun, Braun had no access to the latest intelligence reports and news from the front and was not invited to military meetings as frequently as before (Braun 1982). Would Braun’s decline in the power hierarchy, then, affect the Interpreters’ stake? If Braun was responsible for the Red Army’s military failure, would being his Interpreters still be an honourable work? Whereas it is unclear whether the two Interpreters were excluded from important Party meetings because of their connections with Braun, clearly, they would not attend any meetings as Braun’s Interpreters. How did the Interpreters perceive and respond to this changed situation?

Wu Xiuquan, who had earlier been in the shadow of Braun’s superior power, commented both at the beginning of the Long March and before the Zunyi meeting that he was not very happy about Braun’s arrogance and rudeness at work. For example, in a complaint to Li Weihan, the director of the Party’s propaganda department, he claimed that “Li De [Braun] is actually an imperialist. I agree to Interpret for him only for the sake of my dangxing [literally, the nature of the Party]” (quoted in Wu 1991: 116). It is interesting that the Interpreter attributes his motives for Interpreting for Braun to his dangxing, an incarnated belief in the CCP. He not only sees his Interpreting practices as something necessary to prove his political loyalty, but he does not hide his personal dislike of his client because it makes his claim of loyalty more convincing. Wu’s second comment was made in 1936 when he was no longer Braun’s Interpreter but was asked to do temporary Interpreting work for him. At that time, Braun was no longer in the power circle but was teaching military theory at the Academy of the Red Army in Yan’an. Wu (1991: 128) emphasizes in his memoir his reluctance to take this Interpreting work – “I would rather be a cook or a groom than an Interpreter for Li De [Braun]” – and that it was
only after much persuasion by Zhou Enlai, Head of the Central Military Committee, that he agreed to work again as Braun’s Interpreter.

Wu’s comments are very revealing in that they reflect the Interpreter’s perception of changes of power relationships in related political and military fields as well as their corresponding interactions with relevant institutions. Before Braun lost his status as the CCP’s military adviser, Wu chose to continue his Interpreting work despite his claimed personal dislike for Braun because his work was related to his commitment to the Party – his dangxing – and he would gain political capital. However, in 1936, when Braun lost his influence over the CCP leadership, Wu was seemingly determined to decline Interpreting work until Zhou’s intervention. Given Zhou’s senior status in the CCP, his intervention was actually a negotiation between the Party and the Interpreter over the capital associated with the Interpreter position. For Wu, taking up the Interpreting work – that is, showing willingness to set aside personal feelings and work for the Party’s interests – proved his commitment to the CCP. In this case, Interpreting for Braun was no longer his profession but a means to acquire more political capital and increase his political profile in the CCP.

In fact, after the Zunyi meeting, given the reduced interpreting need, both Wu Xiuquan and Wang Zhitaoh gradually left their Interpreter positions and took up other duties in the Party. Wu transferred, or was transferred, to the Third Division of the Red Army, while Wang was assigned responsibilities in the CCP’s training and logistics section in early 1935 (Wu 1991: 128). Unlike Wang Ming, neither of these two Interpreters benefited significantly from their Interpreting work. On the contrary, they tried to avoid any personal connection to their clients, and neither actually chose interpreting as their profession in subsequent years because both held their political roles and social goals separate from their interpreting activities. That is, interpreting was not simply a profession; it was part of their struggle for position and a stake in the social arena and used to expand their personal social network in the same manner as Wang Ming did. However, when the power relationship became negative, Interpreting might actually have impeded their social practices, so both Braun’s Interpreters tried to withdraw from the scene. This case underscores the reality that Interpreting is not a
reclusive profession but rather a social practice based on Interpreters’ interaction with other institutions and social agents. Therefore, Interpreters’ position-taking and behaviour are more likely to be affected by political and military power relationships in the social space, which could in turn lead to agents’ speculation of corresponding changes in the field of interpreting.

4.1.2 A speculative stake: training Chinese/Russian Interpreters in the 1940s

One very important precondition for an interpreting event, as opposed to a translating event, is the face-to-face meeting of agents. This personal interaction was especially true in 1940’s China when long-distance interpreting through the Internet was unimaginable. Although the CCP resumed telegraphic communication with the Comintern after 1936 (Vladimirov 2004/1975: 13), Chinese/Russian Interpreting was inactive even in Yan’an, the CCP’s political and military headquarters, because only about three residents were Russian native speakers — a doctor, a radio technician, and a Tass correspondent and Comintern liaison officer (Peter Parfenovich Vladimirov) who, having sufficient knowledge of Chinese, did not need an Interpreter (Vladimirov 2004/1975: 366; North 1963: 202). Interestingly, however, after the early 1940s, the CCP began creating and investing in its own Chinese/Russian translator and Interpreter training program. Although information on this program is limited and scattered among former CCP cadres’ memoirs, Chinese scholar Cao Murao has compiled a brief history from its August 1941 founding to war’s end (Cao 2002: 21–3), which is summarized in Figure 4.1.

As the figure shows, at the time of its founding, this training program was a Russian language program affiliated with the Anti-Japanese Political and Military University in Yan’an. Within three years, it grew into a foreign language school, with both Chinese/Russian and Chinese/English language pairs. In its second month, it merged with the Russian language department at Yan’an University and formed the Russian language program at the Yan’an Military Academy. This reorganization is important because it set the direction of the program as militarily rather than academically.
oriented. At this time, the number of students totalled around 100, but within two months, it was reorganized and became a sub-program of the CCP’s Central Military Committee (CMC). Its students increased to 200 and even included 20 women. In June 1942, the CMC’s Editing and Translating Bureau joined the program, and in April 1944, the training program became Yan’an Foreign Language School, with half of its students studying Russian and half studying English.

![Diagram of the evolution of the CCP's Chinese/Russian interpreter training programs (1941-45)]

Although these programs were not specifically named as training programs for translators or interpreters, the CCP’s frequent re-organizations and direct supervision of these programs imply its practical goals in training and using personnel equipped with specific language skills. Unlike the KMT, the CCP did not seem to set any
specific requirements on students’ interpreting or translation skills, which may be partly related to the fact that at that time the CCP had not had any substantial interaction with any foreign military or political powers, therefore there was no guidance reflected in training. But, it is clear that this sub-field of interpreting was embedded in the CCP’s political field, because these Russian and English language training programs were actually the results of the CCP’s speculation of its connections with international political, military powers. On the other hand, it also confirms our assumption discussed before, that is, language training was perceived as the appropriate way to produce suitable candidates for translation and interpreting work.

In addition to the CCP’s directly supervised programs, Yan’an also witnessed an emergent public interest in learning Russian language. Hence, many institutions offered part-time Russian language courses, including the Party’s Central Bureau of the United Front, the Xinhua News Agency, the New China News Agency, Shanbei Public School, Lu Xun Academy of the Arts, the Yan’an Society of Culture, the Marxist Academy, and the Cultural Club (Zhang and Ding 2002: 31). The Yan’an public’s passion for learning the Russian language was unparalleled; it was not unusual for 200 to 300 students to be enrolled in a part-time Russian course, although a majority could not finish because of such factors as a busy schedule, work transfer, or learning difficulties (ibid.).

Both this public interest in learning Russian and the CCP’s investment in training Russian and English Interpreters are particularly interesting in light of Yan’an having only three Russian residents and the CCP’s communication with the Comintern being limited to telegrams. Why, then, did the CCP want to invest in training at this moment, especially when the Russian-returned students were an obvious source upon which to draw? Why did people in Yan’an suddenly have an interest in learning the Russian language? Answering these questions requires reconsideration of the situation that the CCP was facing with the USSR rather than with the Comintern in the 1940s, following the great reduction in the Comintern’s influence on the CCP after the 1930s and its official disbanding in May 1943 (McLane 1972: 160–161). Most particularly, as discussed in Section 3.2.2, the Comintern was only part of the USSR’s dual
wartime strategy of reaching out to the CCP while retaining its official diplomatic ties with the KMT government.

Although all the USSR’s aid to China was provided to the KMT, the CCP apparently firmly believed that the USSR was its political and military ally in the war. As Mao (1991/1935: 161) emphasized in late 1935, “our resistance to Japan needs international support, of which the Soviet Union is at the forefront; and it will definitely help us because we have mutual interests and depend on each other”.

Indeed, as pointed out in a July 1945 report by the United States Department of War, during the Second Sino-Japanese War, the CCP took great care to maintain good relationships with the Soviet Union, even when the USSR signed a Soviet-Japanese pact in early 1941 (Van Slyke 1968: 212). The CCP’s strategy is also obvious from Mao Zedong’s 1939 article, “苏联利益和人类利益的一致” (The identical interests of the Soviet Union and all Mankind), in which he defends the USSR’s strategy of signing the Soviet-Japanese pact but criticizes Britain’s policy of directing the war to communist countries and the American government’s indifference to the situation (1991/1939: 593–601). Most particularly, Mao emphasizes the importance of maintaining the friendship between the USSR and the CCP:

As regards the USSR, we [Chinese] should strengthen our friendship with it in order to establish a front of unity of both great nations, to secure still greater support… (See Van Slyke 1968: 213)

The above paragraph should be understood in light of the fact that almost all the USSR’s wartime military aid to China went to the KMT government. Hence, rather than complaining, the CCP chose to appeal for “greater support” by endorsing and supporting the USSR’s political and military strategies. As pointed out by Vladimirov (2004/1975: 199), Comintern liaison agent and Tass correspondent in Yan’an from 1942 to 1945, many CCP leaders, including Mao, were seeking opportunities to obtain substantial support from the USSR, especially in the form of weapons and ammunition. Hence, in June 1941, when Hitler attacked the USSR and brought it into the European war, the CCP leaders began seeing possibilities of military cooperation with the USSR in North China because of its wartime position close to the northern
border area with the Soviet Union and behind the Japanese lines. It is this latter that primarily explains the CCP’s sudden interest in training Chinese/Russian military Interpreters, although translating classic Marxist works in Russian might also be one of the CCP’s interests for ideological purpose (Zhang and Ding 2002: 30–3; Hao 2006: 58–61; Qin 2001: 115–7).

But, why would the CCP want to invest time and energy in training a new generation of Chinese/Russian Interpreters rather than using the existing source – the Russian-returned students? As already discussed, many of these returned students had not only undergone years of systematic training in the Russian language but also had experience in Interpreting and working with the Russians. One potential answer could be that the type and amount of capital held by these returned students in the 1940s exceeded that required by the Interpreter position. Moreover, almost a decade after their return to China, they might not find interpreting work an attractive proposition, having accumulated a decade’s experience of working in the Party and secured senior positions. Put simply, they would not see it as worthwhile to relinquish their current positions. For example, Wang Jiaxiang and Yang Shangkun, who had been Interpreters at the MSYU in the 1930s, now held senior positions in the Party, Director of the Central Political Commissar and Chairman of the Party’s General Political Department, respectively (Van Slyke 1968: 129–33). Likewise, Braun’s two Interpreters from the 1930s, Wu Xiuquan and Wang Zhitao, had both stopped working as Interpreters and moved up to higher positions in the Party. Since July 1941, Wu had headed the Military Operations Bureau of the General Political Department (Wu 1991: 185), while Wang had become Deputy Director of the No. 14 Army in Jidong Military Zone (Chen 1993). For these returned students, who had acquired enough capital for a higher position, the Interpreter position must have no longer seemed attractive even though the CCP might still be interested in training Chinese/Russian Interpreters for its long-term political and military interests.

As regards Yan’an public’s passion for learning the Russian language, it is unlikely that all set Chinese/Russian Interpreter as a career goal. In fact, most may simply have wanted enough basic language knowledge to work with the expected Russian troops. In other words, they tried to capture the direction of the CCP’s foreign policy and
speculate on the positions to which the potential stake would be related. Hence, the passion they showed in learning the Russian language may rather reflect competition among social agents to acquire the capital essential to certain envisaged positions. If so, the CCP’s language training program might have played a role by conveying an official message about the potential changes in the social space, particularly in the sub-field of interpreting, thereby stimulating and encouraging this competition among social agents. Nevertheless, the impetus of Yan’an people’s perception and speculation came from their habitus, incarnated in the objective relationship in the field; that is, the CCP’s policy towards the USSR. This type of perception and speculation is another example of social agents’ illusio and their corresponding strategies in the social world, including career orientation. That is, because they believed in the forthcoming military cooperation between the CCP and the USSR, these social agents tried to acquire the capital they speculated would be essential for certain positions and stakes in the social space, including but not exclusively in the field of interpreting, even though this hope was never realized because until 1943 the USSR was busy with its battles against the Germans far away from China (McLane 1972: 156–7).

4.2 An unexpected stake in the field

4.2.1 The visit of Western journalists and the US Dixie Commission

With the development of the war, opportunities for Interpreters in Yan’an finally emerged in 1944; although they were not for Chinese/Russian Interpreters but for Chinese/English Interpreters. This development was partly due to increased visits by Western journalists who were curious about the Chinese communists in North China, given the CCP’s increased strength and influence on China’s resistance against the Japanese forces. As early as 1937, some Western journalists, including Edgar Snow, Anna Louis Strong, Hans Shipper, and Agnes Smedley, had made their way to Yan’an to report on the CCP-led forces (Zhang 2007: 20–29). Before the 1940s, the number of these journalists was fairly small because of the KMT’s military blockade, and they usually foresaw the language problem and brought their own Interpreters. Therefore, Chinese/English interpreting was not an issue for the CCP until spring 1944, when
Yan’an finally hosted a KMT-sanctioned foreign tour group composed of Western correspondents.

Apart from receiving the Western correspondents, there was another reason for this emergent need for Chinese/English Interpreters. That was the CCP’s amended foreign policy in the 1940s towards other Western countries, especially the United States. In fact, while working on its relationship with the USSR, the CCP also tried to keep its door open at home and in the world for more foreign support and cooperation. As early as April 1940, the CCP had founded an international propaganda committee in its south China branch. Since the Pearl Harbor incident in 1941, the CCP had stopped using the word “imperialists” for the Americans and referred to the Second World War as a “global struggle between ‘Fascism’ and ‘Democracy’” in which the United States was only one of the Allied countries (Readon-Anderson 1980: 37).

To the Americans, the CCP seemed to be a growing force in restraining Japan’s expansion into China and Asia. As early as June 1943, in a memorandum to General Stilwell, Chief Commander of the US Force in China, John Paton Davies, a US Foreign Service officer in Chongqing, suggested a US mission to contact the Chinese communists in Yan’an. Specifically, he observed that the communists were the “most cohesive, disciplined and aggressive anti-Japanese group” in China, and their military expansion in North China would exert an important influence on the wartime activities of both Japan and the USSR (quoted in Barrett 1970: 23). The Chinese Nationalists’ military failure in Japan’s Ichigo Offensive in 1944 also gave the CCP opportunities to appeal for a joint effort by the United Front, which captured the Americans’ interest and attention in China. Therefore, despite impediments set up by the KMT government, a US Army Observer Group – the Dixie Mission – was sent to Yan’an on US President Roosevelt’s insistence (ibid.: 23–4).

To make full use of the chance to promote its national and international image and enlarge its political influence, the CCP invested much effort in receiving both the Dixie Mission and the group of journalists. In July 1944, it established a Foreign Affairs Office (FAO) for all matters related to foreign visitors, which directly reported to the Party’s Central Military Committee (Ling 2008a: 21–2). On August 19, 1944, just before the arrival of the Dixie Mission, Mao called a central committee meeting.
in which a formal document, “关于外交工作的指示” (On diplomatic work), compiled by Zhou Enlai, was approved and issued to Party members as a guide to the CCP’s foreign policy. In this document, Zhou emphasizes the Party’s aim to “secure foreign assistance, without compromising the gains of the movement to date or its commitment to self-reliance” (quoted in Readon-Anderson 1980: 41). He also points out that besides addressing issues like accommodation, food, military information, and intelligence reports and providing opportunities for individual meetings with many communist leaders (ibid: 37), the US Dixie Mission is the beginning of the CCP’s formal diplomatic work. Hence, all Foreign Affairs Office staff should hold firmly to a nationalistic viewpoint and avoid being exclusive, xenophobic, or fetishist. This document’s importance to this study stems from the fact that these principles applied to all CCP Foreign Affairs Office staff, including Chinese/English Interpreters, whose stake in the field was associated with the CCP’s diplomatic relationship with the KMT’s foreign supporter, the United States.

4.2.2 From Interpreters to diplomats

As previously explained, in April 1944, the Chinese/Russian language training program separated from the Central Military Committee and was renamed the Yan’an Foreign Language School. Another crucial change in this training program was its addition of the Chinese/English language pair, for which there were 90 students, almost half the total enrolment. Although little information is available on these students’ origin and background, a majority were seemingly selected from those in the CCP membership or cadres in Yan’an who had some knowledge of the English language (Ling 2008a: 19–22). However, little time remained for training given that the US Dixie Mission was to arrive in only three months. Therefore, the school divided the students into three groups (A, B, C) according to their performance in a language test and set different training periods (ibid.: 19–20). For example, group A underwent three months of intensive training and by the end of 1994, had only about 11 to 12 students who were expected to gradually take on small but authentic Interpreting tasks during their training (ibid.). A few well-known foreigners in Yan’an, such as Michael Lindsay (Lord Lindsay of Birker) and George Hatem (Ma Hai De), joined the training program as teachers (ibid.).
Like the KMT government’s FAB, the CCP’s Foreign Affairs Office (FAO) acted as the primary institution responsible for communication and liaison between the CCP and the foreign visitors, although the type of interpreting needed was more likely diplomatic than military. Compared to the FAB, the CCP’s FAO was much smaller and although it was divided into four sections – liaison, research (translation of books and newspapers about the Americans), translation (including interpreting), and administration – the actual number of its staff was very limited and they often shared responsibility for Interpreting. Three Chinese/English Interpreters are known to be primarily responsible for the FAO’s interpreting activities at that time: Huang Hua, Chen Jiakang, and Ling Qing (Barrett 1970: 31; Ling 2005: 16–23). Huang Hua began as leader of the Interpreter group and then led the liaison section, of which Chen Jiakang was initially the leader while also acting as the chief Interpreter in the early days of the US Dixie Mission in Yan’an. Ling Qing (2008a: 23) refers to himself as the FAO’s busboy, going wherever (and whenever) a need arose for Interpreting, liaison, or even research.

One major reason for this multi-tasking was that the actual need for Chinese/English Interpreters in Yan’an was not that significant. Other than some Western journalists and the US Dixie Mission, the CCP did not develop any formal diplomatic relationships or regular communication with any foreign powers. In addition, many American officers in the Dixie Mission were staff selected from the US Foreign Service or the US Embassy in China. As military attachés in China, some, like John Paton Davies, David D. Barret, and John S. Servie, had received Chinese language training in the 1930s and had sufficient language skills to carry on a conversation in Chinese and to interpret for other American officers (Davies 1974: 162–4; 1974: 318). Accordingly, another goal of the Chinese/English Interpreter program in the Yan’an Foreign Language School was to prepare for potential military cooperation between the CCP and the US Army after the latter’s scheduled landing in China at the end of the war. However, the honeymoon between the Americans and the Chinese communists (from August 1944 to February 1945) did not last long owing to the US government’s decision to sustain the KMT government’s power in China.
Nevertheless, this short rapprochement between the CCP and the Americans had a significant impact on the CCP’s Chinese/English Interpreters. With the establishment of the FAO, these Interpreters were officially designated language and liaison staff of a diplomatic institution. They thus represented and served only the interests of China (under the CCP) rather than those of any foreign powers dealt with in their interpreting work. In other words, these Interpreters were formally positioned at the forefront of the CCP’s institution of international relationships. Given the growth of the CCP’s political and military strength at the end of the war, these Interpreters benefited greatly from their Interpreting work, especially in terms of enhancing their own political and social profiles within the CCP. Ling Qing, who was trained at the Yan’an Foreign Language School and served as one of the FAO’s Interpreters for the US Dixie Mission, comments on this in his memoir:

The Party’s decision [to train me as an Interpreter] not only transformed my whole revolutionary career but constituted a cornerstone of my life. I felt proud of being one of the Party’s earliest staff members in its foreign service. My interpreting work, especially, allowed me to meet many important figures of the CCP’s first generation leadership, including Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Liu Shaoqi, Zhu De, Ren Bishi and others. Even old Party cadres with ten or twenty years’ experiences in the Party would not readily have had this opportunity, never mind those like me who had just joined the Party recently. (Ling 2008a: 19–20)

Apparently, even after so many years, Ling Qing’s above statement is still affected by his previous and current relationships with the Party and thus full of gratification and praise for the Party. However, it does reflect that Ling Qing was well aware of how much he had benefited from his Interpreting and liaison work. Even though a young inexperienced junior Party member, he was able to reach directly into the Party’s power centre. Such face-to-face interpreting obviously gave him many opportunities to become acquainted with Party leaders, which significantly expanded his social network and increased his profile in the CCP. As he explains later in the memoir,
when the CCP gained full control of China and became the official Chinese government, he was soon appointed to work directly under Yang Shangkun, Director of the Foreign Affairs Department (Ling 2008a: 19–20).

In 2008, Ling was interviewed by Chinese Central TV (CCTV) and made some brief comments on his Interpreting work in Yan’an during the war. When asked whether he recognized himself as a fanyijia (an expert in translation), his answer was a resounding no. Using the Chinese metaphor of a monkey being king of a mountain on which there is no tiger, this now ninety-year old Interpreter explained: “There were few people in Yan’an who could speak English as well as our students educated overseas. We had some English training, plus our young age, so we were selected to do fanyi (translation in general)” (Ling 2008b). Clearly, Ling does not distinguish his interpreting work from translation in general, and only sees it as an initial stage of his work within the CCP’s FAO section. According to Ling, as his experience in Interpreting and liaison increased, he was soon assigned more diplomatic work and gradually occupied senior positions in what eventually became the Foreign Affairs Department of the People’s Republic of China (ibid.).

Ling Qing was not the only Chinese/English Interpreter in Yan’an to develop a career in another direction. Huang Hua, the leader of the FAO’s translation/interpreting section in 1944 accompanied and Interpreted for Edgar Snow, author of the 1938 book, Red Star over China (Ling 2008a: 22). Huang Hua not only acted as chief Interpreter in the CCP’s final negotiations with the US representatives in 1945 but attended many important diplomatic occasions as the CCP representative. In the 1980s, he even became the PRC’s foreign minister (Huang 2008).

Like the Chinese/Russian Interpreters discussed earlier, for both Ling Qing and Huang Hua, interpreting was once a profession, but not merely a profession. Although chosen as Interpreters because of their language knowledge and other qualities, their interpreting work enabled them to acquire more capital and move to better positions. For them, interpreting was part of their job in the Party, and Interpreter was the role they were assigned to play in this institution within a certain period. However, this closer examination of these Interpreters’ lives and careers as a social whole also raises
the question of whether they could actually be called professional interpreters, if we insist that the term ‘interpreting professional’ is judged by the length of interpreting time or the exclusiveness of the interpreting work. As previously discussed, many individuals were greatly affected by their interpreting experience. Such short-term Interpreter positions thus problematize the notion of professional habitus (Simeoni 1998; Inghilleri 2003, 2005a). For example, how should the profession habitus of interpreter be defined? As we know, not every Interpreter receives formal training before they start interpreting, and the time and extent of the Interpreter’s exposure to the professional world varies in different social, cultural, and historical contexts. Moreover, if interpreters’ professional habitus is continuously refined on the basis of professional training, actions, and observations in the social world, it is hard to judge when an individual is ready to be called a professional and has developed a professional habitus.

However, despite their short-term interpreting practices, the Interpreters discussed in this chapter are, undeniably, a group of specialized professionals who enabled communication and interaction among social agents with different backgrounds and in different relationships. At the same time, they also participated in the interaction between their clients and tended to make use of the personal relationships developed with clients via their face-to-face interpreting work. This relationship became social capital with which they could compete for more interest in the social arena and move to better positions with more benefits.

Conclusions

This chapter has described the Chinese/Russian and Chinese/English Interpreters trained and/or used by the Chinese Communist Party during the war. Unlike the KMT, and in the face of its conflicts with the dominant KMT government, the CCP did not hire its Interpreters from the public but mostly from its Party members. Hence, loyalty to the Party and belief in communism were emphasized and incarnated in the Interpreters’ habitus through their Party-supervised training and employment. As a result, these Interpreters seldom saw themselves as independent professionals, but rather related their interpreting practices to their political status and positions with the
CCP, and their political Party advocacy constituted an important facet of the Interpreter profession during the war. Moreover, the CCP’s foreign policy directly affected Interpreter positioning. For example, Interpreters working with Comintern representatives could have very different attitudes and reactions to their work at different times because of the CCP’s changed policy toward the Comintern. These observations problematize the definition of interpreter profession and challenge the notion of professional habitus in translation studies. Individual interpreters’ different self-perception of their interpreting work mirrors problems underlying our understanding of the profession and research methodology in historical studies.

In addition, as the CCP’s need for interpreting stemmed mainly from its senior leaders’ communication with foreign powers, including the Comintern, its Interpreters often acquired significant socio-political capital from their acquaintance with and service to the Party’s senior members or Comintern leaders, though this capital turned to be negative for these Interpreters in later times, especially during the Cultural Revolution (1967-1977) in China. Accordingly, for the CCP, Interpreters were a crucial resource for international support and links with the foreign military and political power, while for the Interpreters, interpreting was an important step in developing their social network, proving their political loyalty, and seeking better positions within the Party. This dynamic was especially true when the Interpreters had to deal with unbalanced power relationships between different groups: for example, when one involved party relied on or sought profits from the other. This latter is discussed in detail in Chapter Five using the example of the Chinese/Japanese Interpreters, who had to face a conflicting relationship between the Japanese occupiers and the Chinese civilians.
Chapter Five:

Chinese/Japanese Interpreters and the Japanese Forces

I am a Chinese. If my country is finished, won’t we all be slaves of a foreign nation? If you don’t believe me, ask the local guerrillas. [...] I tried very hard to persuade the Japanese forces to set both of them [captured guerrillas] free. If I was willing to be a hanjian, why would I do this? 

Although Interpreters were undoubtedly a crucial component of the Japanese army’s warfare in China, given the length of the war and Japan’s military occupation of China, interpreting for the Japanese forces was a far more complicated issue than interpreting for the KMT or CCP. Above all, because Interpreters working for the Japanese were serving their country’s enemy, they were seriously criticized by the Chinese public as hanjian (literally, betrayers of the Han – the Chinese people) or traitors. This specific political context distinguishes Chinese/Japanese Interpreters from others in our previous discussion (e.g. Chinese/German Interpreters, Chinese/Russian Interpreters and Chinese/English Interpreters), because the latter were at least all on the side for China. On the other hand, for those who could not withdraw inland and had to face the brutal realities of occupation, collaborating with the Japanese was not only a survival strategy but also a practical means of avoiding loss of property and life and even struggling for their own interests. Depending on their proficiency in the Japanese language and other skills, Chinese Interpreters were employed at different levels in a variety of settings, from local collaborating governments to municipal courts to police squads. Because of their Japanese language knowledge, these Interpreters held crucial positions in the Japanese-dominated power hierarchy in occupied areas, which had a significant impact on the local Chinese public. Given the above situation, these Chinese/Japanese Interpreters could be seen

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66 Dilu zhanggu guanbu shengxun di fanyi Zhang Hecheng kangong bili 第六战区首部审讯敌翻译张和臣口供笔录 (Transcriptions of the Chinese KMT No. 6 War Zone Headquarters' interrogation of Zhang Hecheng, a captured Interpreter for the Japanese forces), NHA 787-17362-0790 (160-0823, 0790-0796).
as situated in a different sub-field of interpreting embedded in the Japanese dominated political and military fields, though in many cases they also encountered constraints from other political and military fields coexisting in the social arena. Moreover, due to some interpreters' border-crossing strategies, this sub-field of interpreting was even stretched to cross political, military boundaries.

Like the Chinese government, the Japanese had tried to use their own Interpreters during the war. As early as the late 1890s, Japan had founded programs in China to train Japanese students in Chinese language and culture, including the Japan-Qing Business Research Centre, Shanlin Academy, Fuzhou Society of East Asian Study, Nanjing Tongwen Academy, and Shanghai East Asian Tongwen Academy (Shi 1992:246). Graduates from these institutions constituted a significant source of Chinese/Japanese military Interpreters for Japan. For example, most graduates of the Japan-Qing Business Research Centre had served as Interpreters to the Japanese troops during the first Sino-Japanese war (1894–1895), and around a hundred Japanese students from the Shanghai East Asian Tongwen Academy were directly drafted as military Interpreters during the Second Sino-Japanese War (Zhao 2002: 53; Zhou 2006: 56–57, 112). In addition, Japan transferred and used “assimilated” Chinese Interpreters from Taiwan, where Japan had established colonial control in the late nineteenth century following the Maguan Treaty between China and Japan.

However, Japan’s need for local Chinese Interpreters was still significant during the war, because it maintained 800,000 to one million troops in China (Barrett 2001: 8) and thus had to heavily rely on Interpreter assistance with everything from military supply and intelligence work to military battles. At the same time, it had to face the problem of consolidating its control of occupied areas: the majority of North China, especially the Manchurian area from 1932 onwards, and a majority of cities and towns of eastern and central China from the Great Wall in the north to Guangdong province in the south by late 1938 (ibid.: 2). In this case, although the actual need for Chinese/Japanese Interpreters varied for many reasons (e.g., the length of the Japanese occupation, education, and population density), locally recruited Chinese Interpreters obviously were more useful for the Japanese forces to strengthen their
control of the local Chinese people because of their knowledge of the language (including local dialects) and familiarity with local areas.

Since the Japanese army’s primary need for wartime Interpreters came from its encounters with Chinese resistance forces and local Chinese, the field of interpreting examined here is a field of complicated political and military power relationships in which the extent of Japanese control varied and resistance forces co-existed with the collaborators. This chapter focuses on these collaborating Chinese Interpreters; in particular, their decision to collaborate, their positioning within the prevailing power structure, and their embodiment in their interpreting work.

5.1 Hanjian: collaborating Interpreters

As discussed in Chapter Two, hanjian is a special label applied, even today, to almost all Chinese people having connections with conflicting foreign forces (Wong 2007; Luo 1995; Barrett 2001; Chow, Doak and Fu 2001). During the Second Sino-Japanese War, the Chinese public’s use of this word was also prevalent and referred to Chinese people who collaborated with the Japanese forces. In fact, however, hanjian is a problematic description of the collaborating Interpreters because it presumes a “righteous practice” of advocacy for the Chinese people, which might not be the perception that many Interpreters actually had of their own interpreting work. That is, it not only oversimplifies the complex situations that Interpreters could encounter in extreme situations but also dismisses individual differences resulting from positioning in the field. For example, senior Interpreters who mediated between Chinese and Japanese officials in political negotiations might see themselves differently from those who accompanied the Japanese army onto the battlefield and witnessed the violence of the Japanese invasion.

As a nationalistic term, the word hanjian reflects the moral and political value system with which every Chinese Interpreter was inculcated during the war, as well as the clash between the Chinese and Japanese political and military powers. This latter is
especially true for collaborating Interpreters in occupied areas: physically situated in
an area under the Japanese military and political domination, because of their Chinese
cultural and national identities, they were at the same time subject to judgment and
pressure from another political field in which the Chinese retained dominance. The
extent and degree of this pressure, however, or the perceived value of this moral and
political loyalty, differed among individuals according to political belief and social
position, and was subject to situational factors related to the varied length and strength
of Japanese control in different areas.

For example, the Chinese history specialist Poshek Fu’s (1993) case studies of
Chinese intellectuals in occupied Shanghai reveal a very tense situation for those
choosing to work with the Japanese. For these intellectuals, loyalty to national identity
was an essential index of integrity, making collaboration far more humiliating than
the loss of a job or even one’s life (ibid.: 82). However, as war historian David
Barnett (2001: 116, 130) observes, those who had lived in occupied areas actually
tended to be more tolerant of collaboration because, on the one hand, they had had to
face the brutal realities themselves, and on the other, they indeed benefited from the
cushioning role played by collaborationist authorities between the Chinese and the
Japanese. Therefore, the majority of the population in occupied areas saw
collaboration as a practical issue that could be justified by the need to survive in
occupied areas.

This basic need for survival might explain why many Interpreters chose to collaborate
with the Japanese forces even though they knew their behaviour would be criticized.
After all, moving and relocating a family was not realistic for everyone, especially
during wartime when thousands were trying to escape from danger (Barnett 2001:
125–6). Those who could not afford tickets for planes, trains, or other transportation
and were unable to find shelter elsewhere had to stay and make a living in the
occupied areas. Hence, to earn enough to feed their families, they would take any
positions available, as exemplified by the case of a hànjiàn Interpreter captured by the
Chinese KMT government: 67

问：姓名，年龄，籍贯，职业
答：张和臣，46，浙江宁波人，贸易
问：你在什么学校毕业？
答：宁波育才中学
问：你学过日文没有？
答：我在学校没有学过日文，我自民国十五年到日本做过生意，十八年才回上海做生意，以后才搬到宜昌做生意，所以知道日文。
问：宜昌沦陷前你为什么不离开？
答：因手中拮据二老年高家小众多，所以不能离开
问：你参加他们工作是哪一年？
答：就是宜昌失陷的那年。没有走的老百姓都到天主堂躲避敌人。乘天主堂大肆搜索，全叫我向敌人说好话，正在两难之间，没有办法，只有挺身而出，为他们说好话。结果都脱了虎口。

Q: Name, age, birthplace, and occupation
A: Zhang Hecheng, 46; Ningbo, Zhejiang Province; business
Q: Where did you graduate from?
A: Ningbo Yucai Middle School
Q: Have you received Japanese language training?
A: I never learned Japanese in school. But I went to Japan for business in 1926 and came back to Shanghai in 1929. I moved to Yichang [where Zhang was captured] for business. So I know the Japanese language.
Q: Why didn’t you leave Yichang when it fell into Japanese hands?
A: I couldn't afford to move, and my parents were too old to travel. I couldn't just leave.
Q: When did you start to serve them [the Japanese forces]?
A: Since the year Yichang was occupied. Those who didn’t leave all went to the church for protection. But the Japanese troops came to search the church, and I was nominated to say some good words to the enemy [the Japanese troops]. I didn’t know what else I should do but go ahead and speak for the Chinese. Because of my mediation, all of us were saved.

Regardless of the possibility that Zhang might have structured his statements to ensure a light punishment from the Chinese authorities for his “traitorous” interpreting work, his case does suggest that some Interpreters chose to collaborate with the Japanese forces for self-protection and/or protection of local communities during the war. Such communication initiated by Chinese Interpreters was very important when the Japanese army conquered a city because the silence of Chinese
civilians could be understood as resistance and result in punishment and death. However, active communication, which implies a willingness to cooperate, might give civilians a chance to survive.

Nevertheless, interpreting might not have been simply a trade-off by agents for self-preservation. As the following sections show, not every Interpreter had to collaborate with the Japanese in order to survive the violence; on the contrary, in certain circumstances, those in occupied areas made great efforts to obtain Interpreter positions. Most particularly, because Chinese Interpreters were an indispensable resource for the Japanese to consolidate their occupation and sustain their troops, some Chinese saw Interpreter as a fairly good job, compensated by the Japanese, and with many potential material and non-material benefits in local communities because of the relationship with the Japanese occupiers. Therefore, although collaboration was the prevailing strategy for Interpreters during occupation, their positioning and practices could be very different owing to their different motivations and personal experiences. In addition, as Barnett (2001: 116) emphasizes, because of variations in social status and educational background, survival could mean different things to different people. Therefore, it is important to know who these collaborating Interpreters were and how they were positioned within the Japanese-dominated power hierarchy.

5.2 Japanese recruitment of Chinese Interpreters

On the whole, the Japanese forces' recruitment of Interpreters was less formal and centralized than that of the Chinese KMT government; for example, the Japanese had no designated institution or authority like the KMT's Foreign Affairs Bureau (FAB) or the CCP's Foreign Affairs Office (FAO) for addressing the need for wartime Interpreters. Rather, as in the case of Interpreter Zhang, many Interpreters were simply hired from among local residents, especially given the Japanese forces' wide need for Interpreters at different levels during the war. For example, some Interpreters were responsible for liaison and communication between the Japanese occupiers and local Chinese collaborationist governments; some were needed to work primarily in
local communities with Chinese police and Japanese military squads, while others might have to work on the battlefield with Japanese troops. These different responsibilities resulted in different positioning of Interpreters with different competences and experiences. These collaborating Interpreters can be classified into two groups based on where they acquired their Japanese language skills: those that had studied or worked in Japan and then returned to China (the Japanese-returned Interpreters) and the locally trained.

5.2.1 The Japanese-returned Interpreters

The Japanese-returned Interpreters can be further divided into two sub-groups: those with higher education (the Japanese-returned students) and those without. It is estimated that from 1890 to 1937, at least 50,000 Chinese students graduated from universities in Japan (Keishu 1983: 122). These returned students often had years of experience studying and living in Japan and thus had both the necessary knowledge of the Japanese language and specialized knowledge in certain domains. In addition, a certain number of Chinese had visited and worked in Japan and thus had acquired particular Japanese language skills. Although they may not have had formal language training or education, these individuals usually had no problem holding daily conversations in the Japanese language and were a useful resource as Interpreters for the Japanese. Compared to the Russian-returned students, the Japanese-returned students were facing a more difficult situation because they were involved in the conflicting power relationship of competing interests between China and Japan. Like every Chinese individual, they were under pressure to resist the foreign invaders; if they chose to collaborate, they would be held in disdain as hanjian and thus risk losing their social and cultural capital in Chinese society. However, these Japanese-returned students also had certain opportunities to gain other capital because of their knowledge of Japanese and their higher education experiences in Japan.

Table 5.1 lists some information drawn from the Beijing Municipal Court’s files concerning its employment of Chinese/Japanese Interpreters from 1938 to 1941. Within these first three years of occupation, a total of four Interpreters worked in the
court. Evidently, although none had had any past interpreting experience, all had higher education backgrounds in pre-war Japan. Hence, although no files indicate that agents without educational experiences in Japan were rejected for the positions, the 100% employment of Interpreters with similar backgrounds is telling. Three Interpreters, Jin Zongxian, Chang Rupei, and Zhou Chuangang, even had law degrees from universities in Japan, which partly explains their appointment as court Interpreters.

68 Beijing dafang fayuan xingzheng juanzong, tongyi jizhi renshi (Administrative files of the Beijing Municipal Court: Interpreter recruitment), March 26, 1941, BAJ 65–3–142.
Obviously, the occupation had a significant impact on these Japanese-returned students. Before occupation, all four held positions in local government, and two, Zhou and Wang, even held the title of Director. However, when the area fell to the Japanese, the change forced them to position themselves within the dominant power relationship in the field. According to the court records, the employment of these four Japanese-returned students was based on their voluntary application. Hence, their collaborative Interpreting may not merely have been a compromise for physical survival but rather a strategy to readjust their positions by making full use of their capital in the social arena; that is, using their Japanese degrees to gain positions in the Japanese-sponsored government. However, although such re-positioning was a necessary adjustment to the change in dominant power relationships resulting from the Japanese occupation, it might not necessarily have meant an increased gain in the form of promotion or salary.

The potential capital of Japanese-returned students and their relative value in this sub-field of interpreting is well illustrated by two instances of Interpreter recruitments in Beijing: the official appointment of Jin Zongxian (see Table 5.1) as a court Interpreters and a 1941 request for Interpreters by the Beijing Police Bureau. Although both recruitments emphasized Chinese/Japanese language skills, they were clearly designed for different groups of Interpreters with different language proficiencies, education, and social backgrounds. More important, there were differences in the pay and status associated with the positions.

[...]呈为日文译务日益繁多，一不敷分配，拟请按照预算原定员额增派金宗宪充本院译员以资办公，仰于查核事审查我院预算原规定译员两人，除现任译员周传纲以外尚缺一名以一人兼任院检方。每日应应友邦接洽或参观以及出庭翻译等事务秘属日 XXX，益以友邦兵队直接送来案卷甚多，厚集盈寸之卷宗均须详译成中文，彼之移时累月难哉其事。影响案件之进行殊非浅二十八年八月三日因日文译文不敷，应用曾以呈文第三十九号呈请前法部选派日文译员在某译以一时难以物色相当人选未获实现。现兹有金宗宪，系日本早稻田法科毕业，现年二十八岁正值年富力强，且留日有年语言文字颇有娴熟。归国后曾在北京特别市公署自治监理处秘书上任事，并交山西省公署咨议又系肆业法律，

[...recently, there has been a remarkable growth in yiwu (interpreting and translation work), too heavy for one court tongyi (Interpreter). It is thus requested to hire Jin Zongxian as another tongyi (Interpreter) to assist the court, since, according to the original budget, the court can have two tongyi (Interpreters). Currently, apart from Zhou Chuangang, another tongyi (Interpreter) is needed for work in both the court and the procuratorate, as well as in daily liaison with youbang (our friendly Japanese neighbour), visiting officials, and fanyi (Interpreting) in court (three unintelligible characters). There are also many case files from the youbang military police squad piling up for translation. Over time, these untranslated files have seriously affected the processing of cases. As early as August 3, 1939, the request for a Chinese/Japanese tongyi (Interpreter) was referred to the Judiciary Department in file no. 39. However, this request was not satisfied at that time because of the unavailability of qualified applicants. The current applicant, Jin Zongxian, is a law graduate from Waseda University in Japan. He is only 28 years old, full of energy and vigour, with years of experience living in Japan and excellent writing skills. Since returning to China, Jin has been working with the Beijing Special Autonomous Committee and Shanxin Provincial Public Bureau. Both his working experiences and knowledge qualify him for the tongyi (Interpreter) position. Because the need for a Chinese/Japanese tongyi (Interpreter) is urgent, it is suggested that Jin be appointed as court tongyi (Interpreter) with a temporary monthly salary of 100 yuan (the original budget for this position). (March 26, 1941)

Evidently, Jin’s post was a formal position with the court with regular monthly pay. His responsibilities included daily liaison with the Japanese authorities, reception of visitors, interpreting in court, and translation of case files sent by the Japanese military police squad. That the court clearly had high expectations of applicants for this position is apparent from its inability to find any qualified candidates until Interpreter Jin appeared. The court’s description of Jin’s suitability is also revealing in that it stipulates the capital valued for this position, including Japanese language skills, specialized knowledge of law, relevant educational background and experience living in Japan, age, physical condition, and experience working in local government. Most particularly, the court emphasized the Interpreter’s educational background and sojourn in Japan as evidence of proficiency speaking and writing in Japanese.

Interestingly, apart from Jin’s language skills, it also valued his work experience with the Chinese government after his study in Japan. This emphasis reflects an important reality for the Japanese-returned students working as Interpreters in occupied areas; that is, many were actually employed directly by Chinese collaborators, who held the main administrative responsibilities in Japanese-occupied areas. The Interpreter’s previous experience in Chinese government, far from being a negative, was seen as evidence of his social competence and personality and added value to his capital.

The second Interpreter recruitment aimed at filling some temporary positions in local communities. As explained in the job advertisement below, the Interpreters would be paid a daily stipend when asked to work. The task for these positions was fairly clear: to assist the Japanese police squad’s investigation of information on Chinese residents in Beijing. The requirements were also straightforward: local residence, excellent knowledge of the Japanese language, and availability. However, despite the temporary nature of the positions, applicants were also requested to provide personal information, including name, age, birthplace, profession, and address. Clearly, the police bureau was looking for individuals who could speak Japanese but were familiar with the local population and environment:

查北京日本宪兵队为调查户口情况方便起见，嘱由各派出所巡官在本管段内住户中调查或推荐能有余暇之精通日语住民。每段选一人以备由局临时聘请充当普通调查户口通译员。按日酌予酬金。基于四月十二日选报到局。除分段外，应通知分局查照办理，开具姓名年龄籍贯职业，住所详单见覆。73

Since the Japanese military police squad will conduct an investigation of Chinese residents in Beijing, for the convenience of inquiry, all security offices in Beijing shall locate or recommend some local residents who have mastered the Japanese language and have spare time to work. Every duan (residential block or section) shall have one Chinese/Japanese tongyi (Interpreter) ready for temporary recruitment as a residence investigation tongyi (Interpreter) to work as needed and be paid per day. The list of

73 Jinchou guanyu diaocha yiban langong changquang ji ge gongchang de zich ji bao an ke xuan tongyi yuan dong xunleng 警察局关于调查一般劳工矿及各厂的自治及保安科选通译员等请令 (Instructions from the Police Bureau concerning the investigation into the situation of ordinary laborers and organizations in factories, as well as recruitment of Interpreters by all security offices), April 1941, BA J183-2-30008.
applicants shall be submitted to the Beijing Police Bureau no later than April 12. Besides each duan, all branches of the Beijing Police Bureau shall contribute to this tongyi (Interpreter) recruitment by providing information on the applicants, including name, age, birthplace, profession, and address, as listed on the enclosed form.

The above examples make it clear that, despite having the same title of "tongyi" (Interpreter), the two sets of Interpreters were working in a stratified field of interpreting in positions at different levels in the prevailing power hierarchy and with different stakes. As Table 5.1 indicates, all the Interpreter positions at Beijing Municipal Court were occupied by Japanese-return students, who not only held relevant degrees but also had experience working with local governments. However, the second Interpreter recruitment was obviously not aimed at these foreign-educated students: its requirements for applicants were much lower, and the employment was only temporary and paid daily. Hence, the status of the Interpreter positions in the second recruitment could be expected to be correspondingly low. In other words, the distribution of the stakes in the field, rather than being even, varied according to the position and Interpreter capital. Would the Japanese-return students, then, have been interested in these positions? If not, who were the potential candidates for this type of Interpreter post? The Nanjing City Archive contains a case file74 on Interpreters employed by the Nanjing Public Affairs Bureau during occupation which shows that, as in the Police Bureau case, these Interpreters were responsible for assisting communication between local Chinese communities and the Japanese forces.

In this record, the Nanjing Public Affairs Bureau shows concern about the Interpreters currently employed, because “当时人才缺乏率皆满充数对于学术深浅豪未计及” (it was hard to find the right candidates; therefore, many Interpreters were employed in a rush without careful consideration of their competencies). In September 1938, almost ten months after Nanjing was conquered by the Japanese forces, the Public Affairs Bureau conducted an evaluation of these Interpreters, especially their backgrounds, Japanese language knowledge, and attitude towards work. The evaluation was based on a ten-point scoring system in which better performance

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74 Benchu quanyu xundian ge qingongwo tongyiwan banfa 本处关于训练各区分公所通译员办法 (Training of Interpreters employed by the public affairs offices in all districts), September 16, 1938. NCA 1002–2–1292.
earned a higher score. The evaluations were reviewed by a Japanese intelligence agent and an established Chinese Interpreter, who provided the results shown in Table 5.2.

Evidently, none of the seven Interpreters evaluated fell into the category of the Japanese-returned students. In fact, except for the oldest, Yuan Qiseng, aged 59, who had graduated from a local Japanese-sponsored school, they had no education in Japanese but had acquired their Japanese language skills from years of work experience in Japan or in Japanese stores in China. Apart from Interpreter Yuan, who scored 8 on his Japanese language proficiency test, these Interpreters scored relatively low, an average of 5.4. Moreover, two, Wang Changfu and Cai Wingke, could not write Japanese. Compared to their Japanese language skills, the Interpreters’ attitude was evaluated as slightly higher, with an average of 7.1 points and full points for one, Yuan. In fact, based on the reviewer’s suggestion, these Interpreters subsequently attended a two-month training session covering honorific expressions in the Japanese language, politeness in Japanese culture, and administrative regulations at the Public Affairs Bureau. Apparently, the reviewer considered these Interpreters’ expression of the Japanese language problematic and their understanding of their positions inadequate. In other words, in the reviewers’ eyes, besides having language proficiency and commitment to their work, qualified Interpreters should also master cultural etiquette and be familiar with governmental rules and regulations.

Table 5.2 各区通译员鉴别结果报告(Report on the evaluation of Interpreters employed by the public affairs offices in all districts [of Nanjing city])

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<td>日东去昌十</td>
<td>3.神户理发师</td>
<td>大阪经商</td>
<td>东京大坂经商</td>
<td>足力制革所</td>
<td>二年</td>
<td>9.日本履历</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6年</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>7.10</td>
<td>十五年</td>
<td>南京东亚书院</td>
<td>商六年</td>
<td>在上海日人经历</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

25 For the convenience of readers, the right-to-left order of the columns in the original is changed to left-to-right in the translation.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>District 1</th>
<th>District 2</th>
<th>District 3</th>
<th>District 4</th>
<th>District 5</th>
<th>Shangqing</th>
<th>Yanzij</th>
<th>District Absent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Qin, Sandu</td>
<td>He, Zongxian</td>
<td>Yuan, Qisen</td>
<td>Zhu, Lanting</td>
<td>Leng, Rengecai</td>
<td>Wang, Changfu</td>
<td>Cai, Qingke</td>
<td>Absent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>35</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birthplace</td>
<td>Wujin, Jiangsu</td>
<td>Wenzhou, Zhejiang</td>
<td>Nanjing</td>
<td>Jinh County, Jiangsu</td>
<td>Jinh County, Jiangu</td>
<td>Zhong</td>
<td>Zhong</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese proficiency</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>4 can't write</td>
<td>6 can't write</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitude</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work experience</td>
<td>Worked in a Japanese store in Shanghai for 6 years</td>
<td>Ran a business in Fufu County, Japan for 6 years</td>
<td>Worked in Zuli Copper Mine for 2 years;</td>
<td>Ran businesses in Tokyo and Osaka over 10 years</td>
<td>Worked as a barber in Kobe, Japan for 16 years</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[run by the Japanese before the war]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As a conclusion to this evaluation, the reviewer made an interesting comment: “经以上考察，王长福蔡清科太不行了，他们只配充军队通译，候机更换实为必要”76 (from what we have observed, Wang Changfu and Cai Qingke do not have the necessary competencies for the position. They are only qualified to be military Interpreters. They should be replaced whenever possible). However, the available information provides no evidence for reviewer suggestions that military Interpreters should have fewer language skill requirements, although it is probably true that military interpreting might be harder work with greater risk of physical danger.

From the Japanese-returned students to court Interpreters, from the Japanese-returned small businesses owner, barber, and store assistant to community Interpreters, these Interpreters’ taking on these positions reflects the movement of capital as a result of the changing structure in the social arena brought about by the Japanese occupation. On the one hand, the Japanese-returned students, with their language skills and social and educational experience, held upper-level positions, especially posts requiring specialized knowledge; whereas those whose lack of education and low social status

76 NCA 1002-2-1292.
had not equipped them with sufficient linguistic and social competencies were positioned in low-level interpreting work. Accordingly, the label “tongyi” (Interpreter) covered a wide range of positions associated with different stakes and filled by agents with different capital. On the other hand, these Interpreters’ position-taking and actions also constituted part of this sub-field of interpreting. That is, the value of Japanese language knowledge materialized through these Interpreters’ status and stakes, encouraging other agents to move towards similar positions. This latter dynamic produced another group of Interpreters – the locally trained.

5.2.2 Locally trained Interpreters: forced Japanese language education and linguistic habitus

Strictly speaking, “locally trained Interpreters” is not a good term for the Interpreters discussed in this section because few ever received professional Interpreter training. Rather, they acquired their language skills in the mass Japanese language education enforced in occupied areas. Such enforced language education was part of the Japanese occupiers’ aim, in place since the beginning of the war, to popularize and legitimize Japanese as the official language in occupied areas, especially in the educational sector, in the hope that eventually the language problem would cease to be a problem. This policy gave rise to a boom in Japanese language schools and courses in occupied areas, whose graduates constituted another important source of Interpreters, especially for regions in which the occupation had been comparatively lengthy. For example, if a Chinese student in the Manchurian area began receiving Japanese language training at age 16 in 1932, when the area was officially under Japanese control (Barrett 2001: 2), he would have had six years’ experience learning the language by 1938, the middle stage of the war.

In addition, besides the many Japanese-sponsored public and private full-time and part-time Japanese language courses, Japanese language was also the official language to be taught in every elementary and secondary school in the occupied areas. Although the ultimate goal of this enforced Japanese language education was to remove language barriers, which would of course have led to a decreased need for Interpreters, changing the socio-linguistic environment was a long complicated
process that lagged behind the Japanese army’s rapid expansion across China. Therefore, the Japanese occupiers’ language policy actually stimulated the emergence of the Interpreter career; that is, the mass Japanese language education and associated Japanese language qualifications and exams not only encouraged agents to acquire necessary language skills but also helped the Japanese to locate those with the proficiency to become Interpreters.

Many Chinese historians (Qi 2002, 2005; Wang 1989; Yu and Song 2005) have conducted research on the Japanese forces’ language policy – “enslavement education”, as it is often called – as an important component of Japanese colonial education in occupied areas. This policy is also very important for this present study of locally trained Interpreters because it was not merely a practical Japanese strategy for solving the communication problem in these areas but a tool to legitimize the official status of the Japanese language. Such legitimization was designed to crush local Chinese residents’ original language identity and construct a new state subject to Japanese control. This inclination was well articulated in 1927 in the following paragraph by the Japanese headmaster of the South Manchuria Railway Society School:

We shall break the barrier from language first. Teach Chinese students Japanese language and let them act as the mediators to influence their families, so all of them will have less hatred towards Japan and be emotionally closer to the Japanese people and thus start to appreciate them. This can first begin from Dalian to areas controlled by the South Manchuria Railway and then to the whole of northern China. The consequential benefit to Japan’s interest in northern China would be significant. (Gu and Zhang 1991: 488)

Why was language emphasized as the first step to breaking through these barriers? If this language policy aimed at changing Chinese people’s attitude towards the Japanese, what influence would it have on Interpreters who acquired their linguistic capital through this education? According to Bourdieu (1991: 45), a political unit always wants to legitimize an official language and impose it on the population in a

77 The South Manchuria Railway Society (1907-45) was a Japanese colonial institution in the Manchuria area, whose first President was nonlinear (Sanpo Okama), in his book The Nature of the South Manchuria Railway Society, aptly describes the society as follows: “It was a state-owned company initiated by the Japanese government, bearing the government’s administrative responsibilities in Manchuria. The initiation and running of this society is one part of state affairs, and the society is actually an institution of the state” (quoted in Gu 2001: 125).
certain territory, that is, a desire “bound up with the state, both in its genesis and in its social uses”. Hence, this imposition and legitimization was a way to secure and distinguish the language users’ political dominance in the state. The policy of language unification, as Bourdieu notes, is in fact a way to “crush local characteristics” and centralize a state’s power (ibid.: 48). Although, because of the wartime situation, the Japanese forces’ imposition of the Japanese language was more a political strategy than a process of creating a national identity in Bourdieu’s sense, it was a strategy by which the Japanese occupiers forged a linguistic habitus that would guide agents’ perceptions of the social use of the language and the linguistic market in which their linguistic capital was valued (ibid.: 52–7).

Indeed, education, especially language education, played a crucial role in the Japanese fostering of a linguistic habitus favourable to their military occupation and political dominance. For example, the Cultural and Education Department of the Japanese-sponsored North China government once issued an official announcement, “关于在学校教育彻底普及日语之建议” (Guanyu zai xuexiao jiaoyu shang chedi puji riyou zhidian, Instructions on the popularization of the Japanese language at all levels of school education), which proposed nine guidelines to promote the teaching and learning of, as well as instruction in, the Japanese language in classrooms and local communities. As its first guideline, this work explicitly stated that, apart from teaching linguistic skills, teachers should “help students understand the spirit of Japan, as well as Japanese customs and traditions, because the key concern in teaching shall be the promotion of the mutual development of Manchuria and Japan” (quoted in Wu 1993: 29–30).

The Japanese occupiers’ fostering and inculcation of Chinese students’ linguistic habitus is also evident in their emphasis on Japanese as the only official language in elementary and secondary schools (Qi 2005: 49). Not only were new textbooks for Japanese language education composed and issued to these schools in occupied areas, but Chinese teachers who taught the Japanese language were screened, retrained, and monitored by Japanese advisors (Wu and Ding 2008: 86–91). For example, in areas controlled by the Japanese-sponsored Nanjing government, all elementary school teachers had to pass a political examination and undergo a month’s training before
taking up their teaching posts and then had to take political tests regularly to provide evidence of their “political integrity” (ibid.). This emphasis on teacher qualifications in elementary and secondary schools mirrors the Japanese occupiers’ interest in inculcating elementary and secondary students in occupied areas with Japanese knowledge, which could relate to Bourdieu’s argument on the importance of agents’ early family and educational experiences in the formation of their habitus. A similar argument is put forward in George E. Taylor’s *Japanese Sponsored Regime in North China* (1980), which analyzes the group of Chinese that the Japanese forces were most interested in manipulating and assimilating through elementary and secondary education. That is, rather than concentrating on those who had already begun university degrees (who had already formed their basic perceptions of Japan and the war and were unlikely to be loyal to the Japanese even after re-education (Taylor 1980: 79–80)), the Japanese saw elementary and secondary students as ideal candidates who would be comparatively easier to shape and indoctrinate.

One direct outcome of this emphasis on Japanese language education in elementary and secondary schools was the production of potential candidates for Interpreter positions. That is, in this enforced Japanese education system, Japanese language proficiency was a decisive index for academic performance: to progress further and graduate, a student had to prove Japanese language knowledge by taking a test. As admitted by Xu Deyuan, an interviewee in Professor Qi’s (2005: 119) oral history project on wartime “enslavement education”, after ten years of Japanese language study from elementary school to secondary school, students could not help but have learned the language whether they wished to or not. More important, to encourage Chinese students and the Chinese public to learn Japanese, the Japanese occupiers created a system of Japanese language proficiency tests to recognize and reward those with satisfying knowledge of Japanese language, on the one hand, and to set a threshold for profitable positions, on the other. Hence, the Japanese language became a necessary capital for social agents seeking good jobs and decent salaries, thereby directly linking this education system (or linguistic market) to the labour market.

Zhou Duo, another interviewee in Professor Qi’s (2005: 142) project, also confessed that after six years of Japanese-controlled education, he knew little about Chinese history, did not understand the terms “enslavement” or “colonial”, and had little
comprehension of his Chinese cultural identity. Accordingly, he decided to apply to the best Japanese high school in his area, not only because students from this high school had a chance to go to Japan for further study but also because its students spoke excellent Japanese:

从他们口中讲出来的日本话，真叫一般人望尘莫及。垂涎三尺。你不知道当时会讲日本话的人该多么吃香。流利的将日本话的人不说是凤毛麟角，也确实没有多少。当时谁要是会讲日本话，就可以毫不费力的找到一份称心如意的洋差事干什么。

The Japanese that they spoke was far much better than that spoken by ordinary people and so enviable. Do you know how important it was if an individual could speak Japanese well? The number of people who could speak fluent Japanese was not few, but it was limited. So, if you could speak Japanese, you would have no difficulty finding a satisfying job and working with foreigners [the Japanese]. (Quoted in Qi 2005: 142)

Zhou’s words paint a vivid picture of the linguistic market in occupied areas while also explaining his motive for learning Japanese language in a reputable Japanese-sponsored high school. As Bourdieu (1991: 49) observes, the education system can help the imposition of a legitimate language by increasing or decreasing the value of certain modes of expression in the labour market. Hence, even though the Japanese military occupation might have affected social agents’ perception of this value and the status of both the Chinese and the Japanese language, the linguistic hierarchy established through education would undoubtedly affect the labour market so that those with dominant linguistic competencies would obtain better positions and more benefits. At the same time, this situation would stimulate the linguistic market to perceive the advantages of the dominant language and adjust its reproduction of the same (ibid.).

In fact, the reality of the Japanese occupation and encouragement of Japanese language education did spur the Chinese public’s interest in learning Japanese language. For example, prior to the end of 1938, only fifteen Japanese language classes were offered in Shanghai, most affiliated with secondary schools and involving only fourteen teachers and 2,763 students (Yu and Song 2005: 235). By 1943, however, according to a survey by the education department of the Japanese-sponsored Nanjing government, the number of professional Japanese
language schools in Shanghai had increased to fifty-eight, with both day and evening course options. Moreover, in the occupied areas, a Japanese language competence evaluation system became increasingly popular because many governmental authorities and public institutions used it to judge their employees’ Japanese language skills. As a result, for many Chinese, taking this test became a way to secure better paid positions or retain current jobs. As Table 5.2 clearly shows, the number of Chinese taking this test in the Manchurian area grew from 3,607 to 29,223 over a five-year period (1936–40), more than a nine-fold increase (Okada 2001/1940: 173):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1936</th>
<th>1937</th>
<th>1938</th>
<th>1939</th>
<th>1940</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of test takers</td>
<td>3,607</td>
<td>4,841</td>
<td>17,083</td>
<td>24,527</td>
<td>29,223</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This significant population learning Japanese obviously increased the ease of Interpreter recruitment for the Japanese occupiers. In fact, professional training was often dismissed because Interpreters with sufficient Japanese language skills could be found in local areas just by advertising and testing. For example, in Qingdao, the municipal government publicly advertised tongyi (Interpreter) positions in early April 1944 and then administered an examination that included written (70%) and oral tests (30%). The written part tested Interpreters on Chinese language (20%), Japanese language (20%), translation (Chinese/Japanese) (20%), and mathematics (10%), while the oral part consisted of interpreting (Chinese/Japanese) and answering questions in Japanese. The minimum score to qualify for the position was 80%, and the minimum to be put on the waiting list was 60%.

Two months later, on June 1, the results were published to the public. Five Interpreters were formally employed and assigned to work (no information is found on the content of their tasks) with different government sections, and another four were notified that they were on the waiting list for upcoming posts. More important,

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78 *Shanghai teibi shijiaoyiju: jiaoyu bu yinfang shengyi shiyi xiaoxiao guikuang diaocha biao* 上海特别市教育局：教育局各省市日语学校概况调查表 (Shanghai Special City Education Bureau: results of a survey by the National Education Department on Japanese language education in cities and provinces in China), March 1943, Shanghai Archive (hereafter, SA) R04-01-370

79 *Guanyu lun yong hongshi yu tongyiyu dui huguo* 关于录用办事员通译员的佈告 (Public notice on the recruitment of administrators and Interpreters), April 10, 1944, Qingdao Municipal Archive (hereafter, QMA) B0031-001-00171-0127.
almost all the Interpreters employed at this time were graduates of local schools. Admittedly, the situation may have differed in different regions because Japanese language education was fairly mature and stable in Qingdao, which had been under the influence of the Japanese forces since the early twentieth century and formally occupied by the latter since the very beginning of the war. Nevertheless, these locally trained Interpreters in occupied areas did present an interesting contrast to the citizens in Yan’an who were eager to learn Russian in the 1940s but failed to find opportunities to use their language skills. Although both groups were situated in very different sub-fields of interpreting which were respectively embedded in conflicting political and military fields, they showed similar inclinations to speculate on valued capital and move towards positions that they perceived favourable in social arena. 

More importantly, for these locally trained Interpreters, interpreting was more likely to be a strategy for upward mobility in the Japanese-dominated power hierarchy rather than a professional practice. As pointed out by Zhuo Duo, Professor Qi’s (2005: 142) second interviewee, it was not only “a satisfying job” but a chance to “work with foreigners [the Japanese]”. This comment raises the question of whether even working with foreigners was a stake for the Interpreters, which in turn raises the issue of Interpreter embodiment

5.3 Interpreter embodiment

As previously mentioned, the Interpreters under discussion constituted a special group of Chinese collaborationists. That is, no matter whether their direct employers were Chinese collaborators or Japanese forces, these Interpreters certainly constituted part of the collaborator group and contributed to the collaboration with the Japanese. On the other hand, given the nature of interpreting work, Interpreters were often physically present with the Japanese forces, thereby representing an incarnated collaborationist relationship. For example, the court Interpreters discussed in Section 5.1.1 would have had to deal on a daily basis with the Japanese military police squad — a body representative of the occupiers’ power. Thus, these Interpreters’ bodies

80 Qingdao tebieszhi zhengfu laqu banshiyuan tongyi yuan bangshi 青岛特别市政府录取办事员通译员榜示 (Results of the Qingdao municipal government’s recruitment of administrators and Interpreters), June 6, 1944, QMA B0031-001-00031-0082.
became the nexus of the collaboration between the puppet government and the foreign invader.

This type of Interpreter embodiment often led to two extremes. On the one hand, the Interpreter position could be very powerful in that Interpreters play the key role in facilitating or obstructing communication between local residents and the occupiers. The more the Japanese forces relied on Interpreters, the more powerful the Interpreters became, because they could not only speak for but also act for the invaders, thereby providing many opportunities for Interpreters to manipulate both sides and pursue their own interests. This situation somewhat resembles Palmer’s (2007) model of the interpreter as fixer, in which interpreters work for international organizations that have no direct conflicts with local residents. There is, however, one major difference: the collaborating Chinese Interpreters had to deal with an extreme relationship between foreign invaders/occupiers and local resistance forces and civilians. Although this military and political conflict could not be resolved as long as the war continued, these collaborating Interpreters could also act as buffers in the clash and provide certain protections to the local Chinese public.

On the other hand, despite being powerful, the Interpreters, seen as “traitors” who acted at the forefront of the collaboration, were easy targets for revenge stemming from the Chinese people’s hostility towards the Japanese invaders. Although these Interpreters did not wear masks to hide their identity from the local public as those Iraqi Interpreters did (Cronin 2006), physical danger was especially true for those serving the Japanese troops and working in areas in which Japanese control was comparatively weak and subject to frequent attacks by Chinese forces. Hence, with these two possible consequences in mind, the following sections examine Interpreter embodiment in interpreting practices, as well as corresponding strategies, with a focus on two interesting phenomena: fake Interpreters and Interpreters as double agents.

5.3.1 Fake Interpreters

The Beijing Municipal Archive currently contains 447,711 files on the Republican period (1911–1945), all available through an online catalogue search. Setting the key words as fanyi (翻译, translator/Interpreter) or tongyi (通译, a direct translation into
Chinese of the Japanese term for interpreters, see Chapter one), with condition of time frame from 1938 to 1945, 33 results can be found among these files.81 Surprisingly, 20 of these 33 files, almost two thirds, are criminal records of fake Interpreters who, with or without knowledge of the Japanese language, pretended to be working for the Japanese occupiers in order to blackmail local Chinese residents. These bogus Interpreters tried their luck in such places as individual residences, shops, restaurants, and even brothels and universities.82 Although their specific interests varied from case to case – money, opium, clothes, watches, or even women – their common practice was to exert pressure by claiming Interpreter status and threatening serious consequences if the victims did not satisfy their requests. As part of their ruse, these individuals also employed fake artefacts related to the Interpreter identity, including uniforms, business cards, and even a Japanese accent.83 The high percentage of fake Interpreter cases in the official records, as well as the fact that the majority were reported only after the perpetrator’s blackmail had been successful, shows clearly that local residents recognized and valued the Interpreters’ power even outside interpreted events and in the absence of either interpreting activities or the other parties involved (i.e., the Japanese forces). Why, then, did the residents perceive and acknowledge the Interpreters’ power, and how were the fake Interpreters able to convince locals of this power potential? The following paragraphs examine three cases of fake Interpreters in occupied Beijing that may provide some answers to these questions.

81 Undoubtedly, there are many ways of setting key words to refine the catalogue search and retrieve information relevant to interpreting during this period, for example, waishi (foreign affairs), waigyou (foreign language), riyufan yi (Japanese translator) and etc. But, after a few tests, it was found that these key words actually turn the result into an unmanageable volume of information but not always relevant to the focus of this thesis, i.e. interpreters or translators. Hence, this thesis decides to narrow down to these two key words, fanyi (translation, translator in general) and tongyi (通译, interpreter). But, of course, the selection of key words for a better result in this kind of research is always open for further discussions.

82 Riben xianbingdai guanyu zhidui Li Yaying de deng maochong ri fanyi de cheng. 日本宪兵队关于李一莹等冒充日翻译的呈 (Report from the Japanese military police squad concerning the case of Li Yaying and others pretending to be its fanyi (Interpreters)), June 1938, Beijing City Archive (hereafter, BMA) J 181-26-2995 (395–26–1); Beijing tebieshi gongshi jingcha ju tewuke guanyu Jiang Yile maochong ri xianbingdai tongyi deng xiang shangming zhaci yi an gei jingfa de deng. 北京特别市公署警察局特务科关于姜一力冒充日宪兵队通译等向商民诈财一案给警务科的函 (Report to the legal office by the police intelligence office of Beijing’s special city committee concerning the case of Jiang Yile’s blackmail of shopowners and residents in the guise of being a fanyi (Interpreter) for the Japanese military police squad), May 1944, BMA J181-26-6085 (598–51–6); Beijing shi tewuke guanyu Wu Zixiu de maochong xianbingdai fanyi qiyi zhaci de cheng. 北平市特务科关于吴子秀等人冒充宪兵队翻译起意诈财的呈 (Report by the Beijing City Intelligence Office regarding the case of Wu Zixiu and others’ blackmail for money in the guise of being a fanyi (Interpreter) for the Japanese military police squad), May 12, 1941, BMA J181-26-4632 (1-11-22–10).

83 Ibid.
In the first incident, Mr. Guo Rui (living on Old Drum Street in the Beijing suburbs) was blackmailed by two strangers, one of whom claimed to be an Interpreter for the Japanese. After investigation, the police arrested Mr. Zhao Songyan, who returned to ask Mr. Guo Rui for more money the day after the case was reported. At the police station, Mr. Zhao confessed to the following:

在东华门外大街北京营缮所充当办事员，兼在朝阳门内大街华北交通株式会社警务处中央特班效力服务，因因经济困难，遂与小菊胡同居住之人素识人谢占魁，商要同伙诈财分角，经谢占魁访得旧鼓楼大街郭瑞家，富有可诈，伊冒充平谷县翻译，伪造郭家私藏八路军枪支，并接济匪军给养，向郭家诈索钱财，拟要六千元，经谢占魁假作说合人，先后诈得钞洋二百元分用，与十九日晚间，伊又至 X 郭家诈索，并殴打事主改为勒索一千元，并定于二十日早晚八时取款，拒被获案”不语，复按址将伙犯谢占魁缉获供同前情，添传事主郭瑞来案，供明被诈情形，并认明化剩赃洋四十元恳求给领，当伤其听后传领。[85]

[He] was a clerk at the Beijing Yingshan Bureau at Donghuamen Wai Avenue, and at the same time served in a Central Intelligence Group of the North China Transportation Society’s Police Bureau at Chaoyang Men Nei Avenue. Because of financial difficulties, he [Zhao] had a discussion with Xie Zhankui, whom he knew from Xiaoju Alley where he lived. They [Zhao and Xie] decided to cooperate to blackmail someone for money. After some investigation, Xie Zhankui got to know that Guo Rui living at Old Drum Tower was rich. So, disguising himself as an Interpreter for the Japanese from Pinggu County, Zhao fabricated the case that Guo had hidden guns for the CCP’s Eighth Army and provided them with supplies. He then asked Guo for money to keep the secret, asking initially for 6,000 yuan. During the negotiation between Zhao and Guo, Xie Zhankui acted as a mediator to persuade Guo to meet Zhao’s request. On two different occasions, these two men obtained 200 yuan from Guo and split it between them. On the evening of the 19th, Zhao came again to Guo. He beat Guo and asked for 1,000 yuan by 8:00 pm the next day, but was caught before that time. Xie Zhankui was also arrested at the address provided by Zhao and gave a statement similar to Zhao’s. During further inquiries, Guo identified the 40 yuan that the criminals had not yet spent and asked for it back. He was informed that he would have to wait for a final decision [on the case].

[84] *Cheng jie huotong zhacaifan Zhao Songyan deng er ming yi’ an qing* 皇解伙同诈财犯赵松岩等二名一案请 (Report on two criminals who blackmailed a local resident), August 1942, BMA J181–26–5200.
Interestingly, in the two accomplices’ eyes, the Interpreter position was not only powerful but also profitable. Acutely perceiving the conflict between the Japanese occupiers and anti-Japanese forces, Zhao and Xie craftily fabricated a dangerous accusation against Guo and in the guise of an Interpreter, Zhao adopted two independent roles. In the first, he pretended to be investigating for (and obligated to report to) his boss, the Japanese forces; in the second, through Xie’s mediation, he demonstrated his power by bringing the entire incident to a close and protecting Guo and his family from potential violence by the Japanese forces. Guo, however, would have to pay 6,000 yuan for their peace of mind and safety.

Obviously, this blackmail is the antithesis of the buffer role that helps protect the ordinary citizen (as exemplified by the case of Interpreter Zhang discussed earlier). In reality, during the cruelty of war, concrete evidence was minimally important in the Japanese force’s decision to kill someone, especially an ordinary Chinese citizen. Rather, particularly in the conquered areas, the Japanese occupiers’ primary concern was to remove any potential resistance. In this context, given their language knowledge, Interpreters were powerful figures because of their access to information on both the Japanese and the Chinese side. Moreover, because Interpreters could both provide and process information for their own purposes via their interpreting, the linguistic barriers between the Chinese public and the Japanese occupiers endowed them with even greater power. Hence, Zhao and Xie could level the accusation against Guo and ask for money under the pretence of Zhao’s being an Interpreter for the Japanese.

What also makes the scene set by the perpetrators so telling is the total absence of one crucial party, the Japanese forces, and thus any source language input. Despite such absence and even though the suggested compromise was indirectly set in motion by the mediator, Xie, the Interpreter was still the key figure, pretending to represent his boss’s interest, on the one hand, but showing willingness to help his fellow countrymen (subject to conditions), on the other. Xie’s mediation is also interesting in that he not only helped to exert more pressure on Guo but, by putting a certain distance between Zhao and Guo, fostered Guo’s perception of Zhao’s higher position.
and power. Not that the 200 yuan that the Guos were forced to pay was a large amount in 1942 Beijing, probably only about one or two months’ salary for a clerk, but the fact that Guo actually agreed to pay even though the accusation was false until Zhao and Xie used violence to push for more money shows his acknowledgement of an Interpreter’s power. Although Zhao and Xie soon raised suspicions because of their greed and led to the police’s intervention, the second case may throw more light on just how far a fake Interpreter could go.

In this second incident, the Fuji Store at Dongsi North Avenue reported that it had been blackmailed by someone claiming to be an Interpreter for the Japanese military police squad. The suspect, Bai Zhaoxiang, was arrested and admitted to the following:

于本月三日，在东四北大街富记商行以冒充日本宪兵队杨翻译用代卖大米名义诈骗洋四百元自行车一辆，有前数日在崇内大街晋生源粮店骗得洋三百元，又在东四南大街聚星齐牌汉式骗得票洋四百五十元，又在大齐家胡同恒记钟表铺骗得男女手表各一只，又在崇内大街盛永粮店，骗得票洋三百元，又在大栅栏协盛祥铺得西服一套花格布料等物，所骗之手表卖给亨大利表行，其余财务均携往天津分别变卖花用无存等供不讳[...]

On the 3rd of this month, in the guise of being fanyi Yang of the Japanese military police, he cheated Fuji Store at Dongsi North Avenue of 400 yuan and a bicycle with the excuse of purchasing rice for the Japanese troops. In similar fashion, a few days ago, he also obtained 300 yuan from the Jingshengyuan grain shop on Chongnei Avenue, 450 yuan from the Juxingsi Cake Shop on Dongsi South Avenue, two watches (a man’s and a woman’s) from Hengdian Clock and Watch Shop in Daqijia Alley, 300 yuan from the Yuanshengyong Grain Store on Chongnei Avenue and a set of suits and fabrics from the Xieshengxiang Shop in Dazhalan. Except for the woman’s watch, which he sold to the Hengdali Watch Shop, Bai spent all the money and cashed the valuables in Tianjin.

86 In October 1941, in Shanghai, the monthly salary for a Chinese translator and editor of an international organization was 145 yuan and that for a female high school teacher was 45 yuan: Shanghai huaji zhiyuan jiating shanghai zhongkang yanjiu 上海华籍职员家庭生活状况研究 (A survey of the family incomes of Chinese staff, Shanghai City Archive (hreuter, SMA) JJ1-10–801.

87 Cheng jie zhenhua li di maochong xiaobingdai fanyi xiang gesheng suoyu caiwu feishen Bao Zhaoxiang yiming qing yu xinhu yu yin you 呈解职获授次冒充宪兵队翻译向各商索取财物犯白兆祥一名请子讯清一案 (Report on the case of Bao Zhaoxiang who, pretending to be a fanyi (Interpreter) for the Japanese military police, made several requests for money and property from a few shop owners), BMA J181-2-1623.
Bai’s statements were confirmed by the police after they had made inquiries of the victimized store owners. The police also found that Bai had “在崇内东城根魁聚兴铁工厂骗得票洋四百元，又民生绒线铺骗得汗衫等物，又琉璃厂和记士膏店骗得烟土五两” (blackmailed Kuijuxing Iron Factory for 400 yuan, Minsheng Fabric and Clothes Shop for shirts, and Heji Opium Shop near the Factory of Coloured Glaze for 5 tael of opium). In fact, according to the police records, in the prior August, Bai had been arrested and sentenced to prison for similar offences but had been bailed out the following April.

Evidently, Bai well perceived the value of an Interpreter’s identity in occupied areas and tried to exploit it as much as possible. Although what he gained was comparatively small – ranging from money, watches, and clothes to opium – his continuous success mirrors the Chinese public’s, and especially small businessmen’s, prevailing perception that in occupied Beijing, Interpreters could manipulate situations because of their language skills and connections to the Japanese forces. This perception is probably why a majority of the people Bai approached seemed to, willy nilly, recognize and give value to his Interpreter status: only one shop out of six was actually suspicious and reported the fake Interpreter. This collective expectation encouraged Bai, to some extent, to use his Interpreter disguise repeatedly. Although what he gained from this strategy may seem unimpressive to today’s Interpreters, given the scarcity of material during the war and the difficulty of making a living in occupied areas, the material benefits of his ruse are important. Moreover, these two cases reflect only a handful of the strategies used by the Interpreters to serve their own immediate interests. Assumedly, real Interpreters wanting to manipulate the situation would have even more ability to do so. This ability of the Chinese/Japanese Interpreter is also mirrored in the third case, though a slightly different strategy was used by the Interpreter.

In this case, the University of China in Beijing reported that someone purporting to be an Interpreter from the Japanese Guhe Troop had come to the university several times and conducted individual conversations with a couple of students. This so-called

88 Wei Chahuo Yang He maochong riben budui fanyi zhuangguo daxue konghe nan 'nu xuexueng deng qing yi an jie qing xunbian you' 为获取杨贺充充日本部队翻译扰乱中国大学恐吓男女学生等情一案解请讯办由 (Report on the case of Yang He who disguised himself as a fanyi (Interpreter) for a Japanese troop, disrupted order
Interpreter’s behaviour had upset many students and raised the university’s suspicions. A few days later, police found and arrested this suspicious individual, Yang He. After making inquiries of Yang and other involved parties, including the students Yang had approached, the police learnt that Yang had indeed once served in Guhe Troop but had recently quit his service. His reason for disguising himself as an Interpreter for the Guhe Troop was to approach and court Miss Fang Ji, a student at the University of China. According to Miss Fang,

三星期前星期一有先不认识之杨松泉即杨贺身穿国防色制服，戴白底红字臂章，有古贺部队字样态度严厉。他说古贺部队捕获北大学生张姓承认是匪徒被打死该匪说与伊及大男生张武英认识语杨贺曾叫伊到南池子北口与该生质对伊未前去。伊与杨姓并不认识 [...] 

[On a Monday three weeks ago, a stranger named Yang Songquan (i.e., Yang He) had approached her. Yang was in military green uniform and wore an armband with the mark of the Guhe Troop. He was very serious and told her that a Beijing University student with the surname Zhang had been arrested by the Guhe Troop and beaten to death after admitting that he was a communist bandit. However, before he died, he had confessed that he also knew a student at the University of China, Zhang Wuying.]

Mr. Zhang Wuying then revealed during the police investigation that Yang had even registered for classes at the university and asked him [Zhang] if he knew any students at Beijing University and what he did in his spare time. During interrogation, Yang made the following admission:

伊已不在古贺部队服务，因爱慕大女生方楫之人为人拟向其追求交友。曾托素识之女生陆岚介绍，经陆岚拒绝，伊冒充古贺部队翻译官往中大接近方楫，并无别意。至臂章已撕毁抛弃等语 [...] 

[He was no longer serving with Guhe Troop. Since falling in love with Miss Fang Ji, his plan had been to court her. He once asked his acquaintance, Miss Lu Ying, to introduce him to Fang, but Miss Lu declined. Therefore, he tried to approach Miss Fang by himself claiming to be a fanyi guan (Interpreting officer) from Guhe Troop; however, he had no other goals. As for his armband, he had destroyed it and thrown it away.]

Yang’s case is particularly interesting in two respects. First, he was not interested in material gains but in a relationship with the woman, Miss Fang. He chose the identity
of Interpreter to approach Fang and her classmates, hoping his status would impress them, on the one hand, and push Fang towards him, on the other. As recorded in the university’s report, many students did indeed feel the unusual pressure of undergoing questioning by an Interpreter from the Japanese troop. Evidently, apart from small business owners and ordinary citizens, young people with higher education could also be affected by the appearance of Interpreters in their lives. Second, Yang did indeed have experience in the service of the Japanese troop, although it is unclear whether he was an Interpreter. However, Yang’s actions are seemingly attributable to his expectation of the public response to the image of an Interpreter and his bodily expression of his Interpreter identity. As Miss Fang Ji herself observed, not only was Yang wearing his military green uniform and armband when he approached her, but, using a serious tone, he initiated topics related to the punishment of anti-Japanese forces, implying both his relationship with the Japanese army and the potentially serious consequences of the entire issue.

In fact, Yang is not the only one who attempted to convince the public with symbolic items related to the Interpreter identity. Some, for example, tried to fake name cards that carried the title of Interpreter or certificates of authorization from a Japanese squad, while some boasted of their acquaintance with certain Japanese officers or even spoke a few Japanese words to create an impression of proficiency in the language.\(^{89}\) Whatever the strategy, their shared goal was to persuade local residents that they were Interpreters, most particularly, Interpreters for the Japanese military police. The emphasis on this association is also important in that the military police held high authority in issues related to social security in occupied areas, and thus their Interpreters were likely to be perceived as more powerful than others. As a result, many fake Interpreters, either explicitly or implicitly, used a conditional clause in their threats to the locals: “If you don’t...I will tell the Japanese police that you...”. In other words, all the disguising and imitation by these fake Interpreters was based on the local Chinese people’s perception and recognition of [real] Interpreters’ positions or, in Bourdieu’s words, symbolic capital.

As the above three cases show, a majority of the local Chinese people did not immediately report their victimization but chose to tolerate it unless reporting became necessary. That is, rather than risk offending the real Interpreters and causing unnecessary trouble, many people chose to believe and satisfy these Interpreters’ requests. This tolerance of the public shown in these cases of fake Interpreters is revealing in that it mirrors the potential space for Interpreters’ agency if they wanted. This potentiality of Interpreters’ power will be further reflected in the next section, particularly on their border-crossing strategies to cope with the complex power relationships in the social space.

5.3.2 Interpreters’ border-crossing strategies

问：你去抓过人民没有？
答：我出去抓人均是随同宪兵去的，我自己没有抓过人。
问：所带来的人犯审问是你审问吗？
答：审问案犯是由日本宪兵班长以上人员来审问的，我做翻译。
问：审讯时拷打人是由谁来打呢？
答：是宪兵队自己拷打，我没打过人犯。
问：该宪兵队打死的中国人犯有多达数？
答：打死病死的大概有三十多人，再那里的拘所一件小屋多者拘押五十余人各，最易使人犯染病。

Q: Did you hunt and arrest Chinese people [during the war]?
Q: Were you the one that interrogated captured Chinese people?
A: Only those Japanese police who were above the level of monitor had the right to interrogate [Chinese] prisoners. I was just an Interpreter.
Q: During interrogations, who was responsible for torturing prisoners?
A: The Japanese police did that. I never beat prisoners.
Q: How many Chinese prisoners were beaten to death by the Japanese police?
A: Over thirty, including both those beaten to death and those that died from disease. It [disease] happened because there was only one small room in the prison, but the number of prisoners could be over fifty. In such a crowded place, it was easy for prisoners to get sick.\(^\text{90}\)

\(^{90}\) Cheng wei Niu Xinye jianju xiaoren Baiyanruai qian sai Shaxi Fenyang xian di riben xianbingdai ren tongyi shi can sha tongbao yeqian jieqing xunban you. Xiuwei 新业检举押解侮辱汤议事申诉同犯再审询邦。Yi shihui 詎时调查同犯申诉审讯由. Report on Niu Xinye’s accusation of Bai Tianrui (Xian minority) who slaughtered his fellow countrymen [the Chinese people] during his tongyi service for the Japanese military police squad in Fenyang county, Shaxi province, 1946; BMA J181-26–2420.
The above dialogue is part of the official transcript of the post-war interrogation of the Interpreter, Bai Tianrui, by the Beijing local government. Bai was reported by local Chinese residents because, after claiming service as an Interpreter in the Japanese police squad in Fengyang county, Shanxi province, he “无恶不作，并逮捕国民党工作人员爱国青年及基督教徒牧师等加以暴刑残杀” (committed all manner of crimes, arresting the KMT’s underground agents, patriotic Chinese youth, Christians and priests, and tortured them to death). It is particularly interesting that Bai was reported by Beijing residents for his earlier interpreting related behaviour thousand of miles away in Shanxi province, with witnesses found as far away as Shanxi. 91 Even though Bai tried to deny these accusations, the Interpreter was clearly perceived by the public as having helped the Japanese forces to control the local Chinese public. Hence, by working closely with the Japanese forces, Interpreters apparently not only embodied the power relationship but were also endangered by their physical presence as part of the Japanese forces’ violence and domination.

Bai’s case, however, only exemplifies the Chinese people’s punishment of traitors via legal procedures after the war. During the war, interpreting for the Japanese forces was an even more dangerous job. Besides exposure to clashes between the Japanese and Chinese forces, the collaborating Interpreters had to face possible death and attack by all types of anti-Japanese forces, especially local CCP guerrillas and KMT intelligence agents. This situation was particularly true in areas not under full Japanese control, which were frequently disrupted by Chinese resistance forces. Bai was lucky enough to at least survive the war, but another Interpreter, Zhu Shiqing, was not so fortunate. Zhu was an Interpreter for a collaborationist local government near Shanghai, who was reported missing and then abducted by Chinese guerrillas on a business trip to Shanghai on December 10, 1938. 92

Evidently, despite their enjoyment of temporary convenience and benefit, Interpreters were caught between two opposite poles. On the one hand, to survive the Japanese forces’ violence and make a living during the occupation, they had to collaborate; on the other, to collaborate could mean being executed by anti-Japanese forces as

91 Ibid.
92 Cheng weili chengbao shuhai tongzi Zhu Shiqing shizhong you, (Report on the disappearance of Zhu Shiqing, the interpreter for our county), SMA R18-1-229.
traitors. Therefore, some Interpreters chose a compromise by acting as double agents for both sides during the war. That is, besides interpreting for the Japanese, they also tried to protect local Chinese residents and assist the Chinese forces where possible in exchange for their own safety and long-term interests. This dynamic is exemplified by the case of Zhang Hecheng, the captured Interpreter whose words were reported in Section 5.1. The text of his interrogation continues as follows:

[...]  
问：你现在负的什么责任？  
答：我是最近调到江口。是我请求的因为江口我很熟悉，便利。  
问：你别说假话。  
答：我不是说假话。我是中国人，要使祖国亡了，我们是不是当亡国奴呢？要是不相信我们游击队今年正好有两个人，名叫汪振华（大队长）汪济民在江口被敌捉住。使我费了许多口舌 XX 方才把他们给放了。要是甘心当汉奸，我可不必过问。  
[...]  

[...]  
Q: What kind of responsibilities do you have currently?  
A: I was just transferred to the river area. I asked for the transfer, as I am very familiar with this area.  
Q: You liar.  
A: I am not lying. I am a Chinese. If my country is finished, won’t we all be slaves of a foreign nation? If you don’t believe me, ask the local guerrillas. They had two persons, named Wang Zhenghua (the leader) and Wang Jimin, caught by the Japanese forces near the river this year. I tried very hard to persuade the Japanese forces to set them both free. If I was willing to be a hanjian, why would I do this?  
[...]

Clearly, the Interpreter was trying to minimize the accusation against him of being hanjian by emphasizing his contribution to the Chinese side – he had once saved some captured Chinese guerrillas. The last question that he raised “If I was willing to be a hanjian, why would I do this” is particularly interesting in that the question could also be read to mean, “I did this because I don’t want to be a hanjian”. In other words, the Interpreter had made up his mind before capture that he would also help the Chinese even when forced to serve the Japanese. The fact that he not only remembered both guerrillas’ names and repeated them during the interrogation clearly
shows that he might have even foreseen the consequences of his service to the Japanese forces and might have expected that his secret assistance to the Chinese could help save him from accusation and execution as an absolute hanjian. Again, Interpreters’ border-crossing became a self-preservation strategy within the social arena with conflicting power relationships.

Despite the Interpreters’ diverse reasons and strategies, they did serve as a cushion for the Chinese public during occupation by protecting local residents and the Chinese forces from unnecessary loss of life and property. For example, these two reminiscences by Chinese villagers of a Chinese Interpreter, Su fanji, emerged during a recent oral history project by two Chinese historians, Zhang Chengde and Su Liping, on the resistance by local communities to the Japanese forces in Shanxi province during occupation:

日本人在这儿住了几年哩，早先有个苏翻译，中国人，他给日本人当翻译官...苏翻译给咱八路军办了几件好事，要是逮住说你是“八路军的探子”，就（可能）在城墙上挖个坑，把你活埋了，苏翻译问问怎么回事就把人放了...八路军的探子抓过去，苏翻译就放了，后来解放了没枪毙他，在畜牧场喂牛。

The Japanese lived in our village for a few years. At that time, there was a fanji guan (Interpreting officer) known by his surname Su. He was a Chinese but worked as a fanji for the Japanese army... Su fanji did some good things for our Eighth Route Army [forces led by the Chinese communists during the war]. If you were caught and suspected as spies from the Eighth Route Army, you would be buried alive [by the Japanese army]. But if you met Su fanji, he would ask the reason and then set you free. If anyone from the Eighth Route Army was caught, Su fanji would try to get him out. When the day of liberation came, Su fanji was not killed [by the communists] but was sent to feed cows on a farm. (Quoted in Zhang and Su 2005:156–7)

村里有个人，他爸是南京人，大学毕业，中央军拔壮丁拔出来，叫日本人俘虏了，他会日文，当了翻译了，叫苏坤。翻译官是个好人，人好得多，说话也好，对待人好得多了。...（苏翻译是不是掩护过好多人？）人家苏翻译说了，你要是有证据没法说了，你要是没有证据，就说你是共产党，保险你没事，那人是个好人。

At that time, our village had a man with a university degree whose father was born in Nanjing. He was once conscripted into the [Chinese Nationalist
government's] Central Army but was captured by the Japanese forces. He knew the Japanese language and thus became a fanyi. His name was Su Kun. This fanyi guan (Interpreting officer) was a nice man, a very nice man. He was polite and very nice to others... (Did Su fanyi try to protect many people at that time?) Su fanyi said, if you were caught with evidence, [he] wouldn't be able to argue for you; but if there was no evidence against you but only suspicion of your being a communist, [he] could guarantee that you would be fine. That man [Su fanyi] was a nice man. (ibid.)

Apparently, in the villagers' eyes, Su fanyi was not a traitor at all but "a very nice interpreting officer". On the one hand, he gained sympathy from villagers because of his experiences as a captured soldier forced into collaboration; on the other, he won admiration and respect by providing the villagers with safety and assurance during the Japanese occupation. Specifically, he saved villagers from being buried alive and protected the safety of suspected communist spies. Although it is unknown how the Japanese occupiers actually perceived this Interpreter, when he was serving the Japanese forces throughout those years, he seemingly convinced the Chinese villagers that he could intervene in many situations and wanted to help them whenever possible. Therefore, at the end of the war, Su fanyi was not killed for his wartime efforts to rescue the communists and Chinese villagers. However, according to the villagers, the Interpreter did receive some punishment for his service to the Japanese: he was sent to work on a farm and feed the cows.

These two examples, the captured Interpreter, Zhang Hecheng, and Su fanyi, provide a very different perspective on wartime Interpreters who were ordinary people rather than military officers or professionals. With their knowledge of the Japanese language, they were positioned as Interpreters within the social space with complex power relationships and frequently had to cross military and political borders in the struggle for their own survival. In this case, interpreting was not only a means of communication but more specifically one of obstructing information and misleading one party but not the other. It is in this context that Interpreters could act as double agents and reconcile incompatible interests, also protecting themselves in the long run. After all, life had to go on, and the war would end some day.
Conclusions

This chapter has analyzed the complex social, political and military backgrounds for Chinese Interpreters who collaborated with the Japanese forces during the war even though they knew that their connection with the Japanese might lead the Chinese public to disdain them as traitors. For these Interpreters, such collaborative interpreting was not simply a compromise for physical survival during violent times but an active adjustment of their positions within changed fields, as well as a struggle for personal interests within the newly emergent power hierarchy.

In occupied areas, the profession of Chinese/Japanese Interpreter was perceived by local Chinese as both powerful and profitable, a perception motivated not only by agential pursuance of Interpreter positions through the learning of the Japanese language but also by the opportunities such learning provided agents to disguise themselves as the Interpreters for the Japanese forces for their own material interests. On the other hand, Interpreter was also a dangerous job in that it made survival a more complicated and long-term problem for Interpreters who had to bear the consequences of collaboration with the enemy and a loss of cultural identity and capital. Many thus chose to secretly position themselves within different political and military fields, frequently across military and political borders, to seek long-term safety and interests. Hence, unlike other groups of Interpreters discussed before, these collaborative Interpreters positioned themselves in a sub-field of interpreting crossing different political and military fields coexisting in the social space. To a certain extent, these Interpreters’ different positioning and border-crossing also served as a cushion, protecting local Chinese residents from violence and helping maintain social order during the Japanese occupation, although the extent or degree of their agency varied according to personal and situational factors, such as social skills, personality, and status in local power hierarchies. This last issue is addressed in the next chapter, the case study of two Interpreters who served in the KMT government and the Japanese forces, respectively.
Chapter Six:
A Case Study of Two Interpreters:
Xia Wenyun and Yan Jiarui

文官不爱财，武官不怕死，则天下可治也。
(If civil officers do not love money, and military officers do not fear death, the nation can be well governed.) (Xia 2000/1967, 3: 94).

Civil officers should not love money; military officers should not fear death.
(文官不爱财，武官不怕死) (Yan 2009)

The above versions of an old Chinese saying were quoted by the two Interpreters who are the subject of the case studies presented in this chapter. Whereas in previous chapters, Interpreters have been discussed separately according to the political power they served (i.e., the Japanese, the Chinese KMT government, or the Chinese Communist Party), this classification, although reasonable and convenient given that a majority were indeed directly trained and/or recruited by a certain side, is also problematic (see Section 3.4). First, the situation on one side cannot present a complete picture of the social arena within which the Interpreters were acting. After all, interpreting is a two-directional activity, and the wartime Interpreters were embroiled in power relationships far more complicated than what two or three major political and military institutions can represent. Second, the fact of being based in one political camp does not mean that the Interpreters worked only for this political power. Rather, they may have straddled sides or secretly worked for another power. Third, Interpreters are mobile biological agents who can move around and switch sides if their bodies encounter danger or they perceive interests elsewhere. Therefore, it is very important to consider the difference between those Interpreters who worked beyond the boundary of the political side or geographic area and those who worked within a certain political power framework.
As Richard Jenkins (1992: 90) notes, habitus and fields may not necessarily be in a continually reproductive relationship; that is, agents may grow up in one field and then, as “mature, formed adults”, encounter another field. Hence, new habitus and capital may be imported from one field into another through Interpreters’ interpreting and other social activities, thereby bridging different fields (e.g. different sub-fields of interpreting, competing and conflicting political, military fields) and shaping the development of the social space on the whole. Indeed, agential positioning within and movements across different fields is a core idea of Bourdieu’s notion of social space, a “multi-dimensional space” comprising multiple fields (e.g. education, publishing, literary and media fields) with different hierarchies within and between (see Section 2.1.1). But Bourdieu (1991: 230) also sees the social space as “a field of forces” within which different power relationships are imposed on agents; on the other, the social space is also a social arena in which agents compete with each other and struggle for resources and positions. These competitions and struggles among agents determine that the social space is never static but always changing, whether it is within one field or in the inter-relationships among different fields. Bourdieu (2004/2001: vii) argues that scientific field(s) at the turn of the twenty-first century were increasingly affected by “external economic interests” and “internal denigration”, which even intervened in the reproduction of habitus in the field. In other words, capital incorporated from other fields may intervene in the previous value system and structure of one field, and ultimately transform its reproduction process. As the carriers of capital and habitus, individual social agents – in this case, individual Interpreters – certainly play a significant role in constituting and shaping the social world. But, at the same time, almost all the sub-fields of interpreting discussed in this thesis were also conditioned and restrained by other political and military fields. Often the structures of interpreting fields were subject to their corresponding dominant political and military structures, because during the war interpreting was greatly institutionalized and militarized. Therefore, political interest and ideology became the decisive value system of this interpreting field at this specific historical moment.

Using a case study of Xia Wenyun and Yan Jiarui, this chapter aims to further explore this issue of Interpreters’ positioning and corresponding strategies in the social space.
Moreover, it highlights the potentialities of Interpreters’ active agency in transforming and constructing not only interpreting but also political and military fields, as well as the ideological and political constraints imposed on them through training and other channels. Overall, the case study is designed as an in-depth analysis of individual Interpreters and their behaviour during the Second Sino-Chinese War. It therefore provides more detailed and finely textured information to complement and crystallize that presented in previous chapters, which tended to be more numerical and focused on Interpreters within certain institutions. The first Interpreter studied, Xia, was a Chinese/Japanese Interpreter who served the Japanese forces but secretly cooperated with the Chinese Nationalists during the war. The second Interpreter, Yan, already discussed in Chapter 3 (Section 3.3), was one of the military Interpreters trained by the KMT during its military collusion with the United States.

6.1. Xia Wenyun: a wartime Chinese/Japanese Interpreter

6.1.2 A brief biography of Xia Wenyun

This chapter chooses Xia Wenyuan (see Figure 6.1 on the left\(^3\)) as the subject of the first case study partly because he was one of the special group of Interpreters discussed in Chapter Five – the Japanese-returned students – and partly because of his double agency in high level political negotiation between the Japanese forces and the Chinese KMT government. To provide readers with a clear picture of Xia’s life trajectory (1906–1978), Table 6.1 provides a chronology based on information drawn from three sources: Xia’s (1999/1967, 2000/1967) own memoir Huangchen wanzhang: Riben qinhua milu 黄尘万丈: 日本侵华秘录 (A different world: untold stories in the Japan’s invasion of China); the Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen (General Li Zongren: 1979),\(^4\) an important witness of Xia’s service to the KMT; and some investigation by some Chinese news reporters (Wang

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\(^3\) “Yige huangyun gaoji fanyi guan de kangzhi chuanshi” 一个“皇云”高级翻译官的抗日传奇 (A Legend of Resistance to the Japanese by a Senior fanyi guan in the Japanese Troop) (cited in Wang and Wen 2005). The original file gives no date for the photograph.

\(^4\) Tong Tekong is listed in the memoir as the co-author as he was the one who interviewed General Li and drafted and translated the document.
and Wen: 2005) including their interviews of Xia’s daughter and other witnesses. The table is divided into two parts (Japan and China) according to Xia’s physical whereabouts before and during the war. Xia’s activities in China comprise two columns (A and B), that focus on Xia’s service to the Japanese forces and his secret contact with the Chinese KMT government (i.e., his different positions in two political fields). Given that many of his activities were interwoven – for example, his Interpreting work for the Japanese and his intelligence collection for the KMT – broken lines between the three columns emphasize the blurred boundaries between his Interpreting work and his political mediation. Although this timeline only gives a rough picture of Xia’s education and social and political experience, his connections to Japan, whether cultural, social, or political, are clear.

Table 6.1 A Chronology of Xia Wenyun’s life (1906–1978)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IN JAPAN</th>
<th>IN CHINA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1925, studied law and history at Hiroshima Higher School, funded by the Japanese-sponsored South Manchurian Railway Co.</td>
<td>1906, born in Dazhujia Tun, Laohu Shan, Jinzhou, Dalian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928–31, studied Japanese literature at Kyoto Imperial University</td>
<td>1913, attended No.1 public school, teacher Laohu Shan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937, Tokyo, appointed as liaison officer by Japan’s Military Ministry</td>
<td>1917, senior at Nanjin Academy, teacher Guandong Zhou</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1919–25, Lushun Normal School</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A. Activities related to the Japanese

| 1931, Worked as a lecturer at Feng Yong University (FYU) and acted as secretary to Feng Yong, FYU President |
| 1932, secretary and Interpreter in the military department of the Manchurian state |
| 1935, Interpreter to General Wachi Takaji (Head of Japan’s Special Agency in Beijing) |
| 1937, counsellor for the Jinchia Autonomous Committee and Tianjin government, Interpreter for General Wachi Takaji, Japan’s Garrison Army Staff in China |

B. Activities related to the KMT

| 1934–41, secret contact with General Li Zongren, intelligence agent for the Chinese KMT Zone 5 Intelligence Office, political mediator and messenger between the Japanese government and the Chinese Nationalist government in Chongqing |

(Continued)
### IN JAPAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activities related to the Japanese</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1937–41, liaison officer for Japan’s intelligence agency in Tianjin and Shanghai, Interpreter and assistant to General Wachi Takaji (the key figure in the peace negotiation between the Japanese government and the Chinese KMT government in the early 1940s).[^96]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 1940, Tokyo, political mediator accompanying General Wachi Takaji</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942 suspected by the Japanese as double agent, transferred to Taiyuan, Shanxi as Director of Japanese sponsored Xinhua newspaper.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943–44, Head of construction department in Japan sponsored Shanxi provincial government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spring 1945, back to Beijing, proposed mediation between Chinese collaborationist government and the Chinese KMT government in Chongqing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early 1950s, resident in Tokyo with his family, worked as counsellor to Wachi Takaji, Head of the Tokyo Railway Society (TRS).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After retirement from the TRS, ran a restaurant in Tokyo, died in 1978.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### IN CHINA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activities related to the KMT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Important intelligence activities:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 1937, information on the military operation plan of the Japanese No13 Regime.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 1938, information on the military operations by the Japanese No 5 Regime.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr. 1939, Japan’s military operation plan and strategies in Zone 5.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 1940, a military and political intelligence report to the Chinese Nationalist government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 1945, contact with organizations of the Chinese Communist Party, resumed contact with General Li Zongren, mediation between the Japanese people and the Chinese KMT government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946, arrested as a traitor by the Chinese KMT government. Freed a year later with no conviction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949, arrested again by the Shanghai Military Committee (of the CCP) but released shortly. Made a trip to Japan with help from a former CCP friend.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[^96]: During this period, Takaji was the head of Japan’s intelligence agency in Shanghai, Commanding Officer of the 44th Regiment, staff of Japan’s 21st Army and Central China Expeditionary Army, and Chief of Staff of the Japanese army in Taiwan.
Despite the sparse information available on Xia’s family background, it is known that he was born and grew up in Dalian. This geographical origin is important, because Dalian was under the control of Japan as early as 1905 as a result of Japan’s 1904–05 victory over Russia. In other words, Xia was not only born into but also grew up and received his primary and secondary education in a place under Japanese control. Among the secondary schools that he attended, Nanjin Academy played a particularly important role in his life in that his teacher, Lu Yuanshan, later became Chief Secretary of the Military Ministry in the Japanese-sponsored Manchurian state founded in 1932. Lu recommended Xia for work in the ministry, which was a turning point in his service to the Japanese forces. After six years of study at Lushun Normal School, Xia won a full scholarship from the Japanese-sponsored South Manchurian Company to study in Japan.

Between 1925 and 1931, Xia studied in two reputable schools in Japan: Hiroshima Higher School and Kyoto Imperial University, majoring in history and law, and literature, respectively. According to his published memoir (1999/1967, 1: 77), during this period, Xia also tried his hand at literary translation from Japanese into Chinese, translating Kuriyagawa Hakuson’s 1923 novel, 東方の十字街頭を往く (Towards the Crossroad), and a few other novels by Kikuchi Kan and Arishima Takeo. His translations were published in Shanghai and, as he recalls, were well accepted by Chinese readers (ibid.). However, he did not carry his literary translation any further. Before his 1931 graduation from Tokyo Imperial University, Xia left Japan and took up a teaching position at Feng Yong University in North China, where he not only taught classes but worked as an assistant to Feng Yong, head and sponsor of the university.

Within less than a year, following an incident on September 18, 1931, the war broke out, and Xia lost his job when the Japanese forces closed down the university. However, thanks to a recommendation by a Japanese officer whom he had met on his graduation trip back from Japan, Xia soon found another position in the Manchurian state’s Department of Human Resources. His clerical work in this department, however, also lasted only a short time because his former teacher, Lu Shanyuan, offered him another job as secretary to the head of the Japanese-sponsored
Manchurian government’s military department, in which he received the salary and benefits of the rank of colonel. As mentioned above, this position was a turning point for Xia because he began his interpreting work between the department head and the Japanese military officers that staffed or were related to the Manchurian state. More important, many of the Japanese officers with whom he worked were to become influential figures in the ongoing conflicts between China and Japan, so his connection with them would benefit his later political negotiation and intelligence work (Xia 1999/1967, 1–3).

One of the Japanese military officers befriended during his secretarial service was Wachi Takaji, to whom, as Table 6.1 shows, a majority of Xia’s interpreting and political mediation activities after 1935 were related. Wachi, who once headed the Japanese wartime intelligence agency in Shanghai, requested Xia from the military department after finding out about his social connections with some Chinese KMT officials in the southwest, the main target of Wachi’s political work (Xia 1999/1967, 2: 77). Xia relates his conversation with Wachi about this request as follows:

某日, 接到过去的旧知“关东军”参谋和知少佐要求会面的通知。见面之后, 和知少佐说: “此次晋升中佐, 调转至广州任驻广东武官。为此想与广东的西南派实力人物白崇禧打交道, 不知应采取什么方法联系接洽。”我便答称: “有办法。白崇禧的侄子白维义是日本士官学校毕业的, 我在日本留学时, 与他交往甚密, 可以通过他与白崇禧取得联系。”“那么, 就请您同我一起去广东吧。军政部方面, 我可通过最高顾问多田骏大佐打招呼, 暂时将您借调过来好啦。”

One day, I got a message to meet my old friend Wachi Takaji, who was staff in the [Japanese] Guandong Army. When we met, he said, “I have been promoted to Chusa (lieutenant colonel) and will be transferred to Guangzhou. I would like to meet Bai Congxi, the leading figure of the southwest clique of the Chinese KMT government in Guangdong province. Do you know how I can contact him?” I answered, “I can help you on this issue. Bai’s cousin, Bai Weiyi graduated from the Military Officer Academy in Japan. I knew him quite well while I was studying in Japan. I can reach Bai through him.” “Great. Then please come with me to Guangdong. As for your current position in the military department, I will inform the senior counsellor, Tada Hayao taisa [Colonel], requesting your temporary assignment.” (1999/1967, 2: 77)

However, almost at the same time, as the third column of Table 6.1 shows, Xia began secret contact with General Li Zongren, head of the Chinese KMT forces in
Guangdong (War Zone 5), who was seemingly a key figure in Xia’s secret service to the Chinese KMT government. Although for some reason, Xia does not mention his intelligence cooperation with Li in his memoir, he repeatedly alludes to their personal relationship, especially the general’s protecting him from punishment as a traitor when the war ended.

General Li’s memoir, however, shows that this special “personal relationship” was more complicated. According to Li, his contact with Xia began during Xia’s interpreting work between him and Wachi, when he invited Xia for a private talk in which he asked him why he chose to serve the enemy rather than his home country. As Li recalls, at that moment Xia “burst into tears” and exclaimed “if there is a chance to serve the fatherland, I am ready to die for it without hesitation” (Li and Tong 1979: 316–317). Li then asked Xia to work as the Chinese KMT government’s intelligence agent in the Japanese camp, an offer Xia accepted immediately, refusing “any remuneration” (ibid.: 317). However, Xia (1999/1967, 2000/1967) discusses neither the above scene of Li’s persuasion nor his own self-confession, a dismissed detail that, to some extent, reflects Xia’s self-perception of his Chinese national identity and the motives underlying his service to the Chinese government. Hence, Xia’s emotional confession to Li and his efforts to clarify and prove his stance should be considered in light of Li’s questioning and his high political and military status in the KMT camp. That is, Xia might have seen Li’s question as external pressure for him to justify his practices as a Chinese so as not to lose social and cultural capital in the Chinese camp. In other words, Interpreter identification may be stimulated and shaped by external pressure. Hence, Xia’s acceptance of Li’s offer to become the KMT’s secret agent and his refusal of any material benefits (Li and Tong 1979: 317) might not have been due solely to his patriotic passion but also related to his leaving himself more options in the future and gaining political and social capital for his present and future work.

Whatever the motivation, from 1934 to 1941, Xia kept his promise and provided Li with valuable information, thereby greatly helping the Chinese KMT’s military operations against the Japanese forces (see the third column of Table 6.1). Xia’s social networks in the Japanese camp and his Interpreting service apparently made his intelligence work extremely easy. With support from the Japanese, Xia even
established a personal radio station in Tianjin (later transferred to the French concession in Shanghai), which he used in his later political mediation to communicate with both the Japanese intelligence agencies and the Chinese KMT government in Chongqing (Xia 1999/1967, 4: 76, 1999, 5: 78, 2000/1967, 2: 96; Li and Tong 1979: 178).

In fact, in his memoir, Xia talks less about his Interpreting and intelligence work than his political mediation activities, particularly the high-level political negotiations between the Chinese KMT government and the Japanese officials to which his friendship with Wachi Takaji gave him access. After the Chinese KMT government’s official declaration of war with Japan in 1937, Wachi was looking for chances of unofficial political cooperation with the Chinese KMT’s southwest clique, many of whose officials and military officers were pro-Japanese and had conflicts with the Chongqing government led by Jiang Jieshi (Xia 1999/1967, 2: 77). Wachi saw these conflicts as a chance for Japan to realize its peace negotiations with China; therefore, Xia, with his language skills, social network, and understanding of Chinese culture and politics, became an important bridge between Wachi and those he considered useful towards meeting this goal.

To some extent, Xia played a role similar to Palmer’s ‘fixer’ discussed in Chapter 2 by finding contacts and arranging meetings for Wachi. According to Xia, besides assisting Wachi, he helped set up over a hundred meetings between Japanese officials and Chinese KMT politicians at which he assisted as Interpreter. Indeed, Wachi once made the following comment about Xia and his interpreting and mediation: “夏启为余之秘书，翻译，保镖，有时则是先生” (To me, Xia is my secretary, *fanyi*, and bodyguard, and sometimes he is also my teacher) (Xia 1999/1967, 1: 78). Clearly, Xia’s influence on both these officials and the negotiation process was recognized and appreciated. More important, even two decades after the war, Xia made note of and reflected on Wachi’s comment, implying that he was not only conscious of but also proud of his influence on Wachi (ibid.). Hence, to Xia, the Interpreter position was valuable and important rather than subservient or meaningless.
According to his memoirs, Xia’s mediation with and influence on the Japanese was also valued by the KMT’s Chongqing government. In addition to luxury accommodations, women, opium, and a personal bodyguard, Xia received praise and monetary reward (300,000 USD)\(^{97}\) from Jiang Jieshi, the KMT’s military and political head. Indeed, Xia (1999/1967, 6: 77) claims that Jiang once honoured him as “孤臣孽子用心良苦” (a lonely and ‘evil’ subject but with a very deep thought for the whole matter). However, because of the rising nationalism among the Chinese public and political pressure from inside both the Chinese KMT and the Chinese Communist Party, the political negotiation ended fruitlessly. Xia’s position in the Japanese forces was also jeopardized by growing Japanese suspicion that he was releasing information to the Chinese side. Therefore, to avoid possible danger, Xia backed down from his interpreting and political activities, and transferred to Taiyuan, Shanxi province, in 1942. There, he first became Director of the Xinmin Bao (New Citizen Newspaper) – a Japanese-sponsored news agency – and then Director of the Ministry of Construction in the Japanese-dominated Taiyuan government until almost the end of the war.

In the spring of 1945, Xia returned to Beijing from Taiyuan and, foreseeing Japan’s loss in the war, tried to re-initiate interaction with the KMT government via his old connections, including his former Chinese classmates in Japan. However, these attempts did not go as hoped because of the politics and competition among Chinese officials (Xia 2000/1967, 2: 96). Interestingly, however, when Xia was in Beijing, he was approached by someone from the CCP, who showed interest in his connections to the Japanese and requested his help with such matters as persuading the Japanese forces to surrender to the CCP rather than the KMT and attaining weapons for the CCP (ibid.). Xia seemingly noted the quick expansion of the CCP’s power on China’s political stage and did not want to burn a bridge by turning down the CCP’s request. As Xia claims in his memoir, he felt the situation was difficult for him because at that time he did not support the KMT politically, but its monitoring of his activities precluded him from offering significant help to the CCP (ibid.). In any case, Xia tried to use his networks among the Japanese to obtain the weapons requested by the CCP and to arrange secret meetings between his Japanese friends and the CCP cadre (ibid.).

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\(^{97}\) Although 300,000 USD seemed a significant amount of money in the late 1930s, according to Xia (2000, 3: 93), the value of all his real estate at the end of the war (1945) was only 100,000 USD.
As already mentioned, General Li had promised and offered Xia special protection. When Xia was later arrested and imprisoned, General Li intervened and, with permission obtained directly from Jiang Jieshi, claimed that he himself had authorized and approved Xia’s activities, including Xia’s work for the Japanese-dominated government in Taiyuan after he backed down from his intelligence work. This strong support was apparently given in return for the service that Xia had rendered over the years to the KMT. With Li’s support, Xia’s 83-day prison term ended and he regained his freedom (Xia 2000/1967, 2: 100). However, Xia soon lost his protective umbrella when the KMT lost its control of China in its civil war with the CCP and withdrew to Taiwan in 1949. In CCP-controlled Shanghai, Xia (2000/1967, 3: 93) felt increasing pressure after seeing more and more hanjian unearthed and punished. He therefore tried to sell his real estate in Shanghai and prepared to emigrate to Japan, trying in the meantime to connect with one of his CCP friends, Wu Kejian98, for assistance with his trip to Japan via Hong Kong (ibid.). During the war, Xia had helped Wu after his arrest and torture by the Japanese military police. Because of his knowledge of the Japanese language and his social network among the Japanese, Wu helped Xia to contact Zhang Ruoyu, a senior CCP international intelligence officer with the North China Military Committee. Zhang arranged a contact in Hong Kong for Xia to go to Japan, and in exchange, Xia agreed to act as a CCP intelligence agent and collect information during his sojourn (ibid.). However, before his trip, Xia was involved in a legal case related to selling his real estate and was again imprisoned in Shanghai. According to Xia, he worried very much that the police would find out about his wartime service to the Japanese and thus the situation would become more complicated (ibid.). Again, with help from Wu, Xia was set free and successfully reached Hong Kong. However, he did not go to meet the CCP contact in Hong Kong as arranged by Zhang but chose to make his own arrangements to be smuggled into Japan (ibid.: 94). Arriving in Tokyo, he managed to obtain legal right of residence and

98 Wu Kejian was Chief Secretary of the CCP’s Shanghai Municipal Intelligence Committee in 1949 (Wang and Wen 2005).
find a position with the Tokyo Railway Society, where his old friend, Wachi, held the position of Chief Executive after six years’ imprisonment as a war criminal (Wang and Wen, 2005). Xia never returned to China in his lifetime.

6.2.2 Xia’s social capital and stake in the field

Evidently, Xia played a complicated role as a double agent for the Chinese KMT, being not only Interpreter but also mediator and intelligence agent. Nevertheless, these different roles were interrelated and complementary. On the one hand, his interpreting work expanded his social networks and gave him access to high level politicians on both sides; on the other, his social networks made him a valuable political source for the Japanese and thus reinforced his Interpreter position. Hence, Xia’s value as Interpreter, informant, and mediator was recognized not only by the Chinese KMT and the Japanese, but even by the CCP. In contrast to professional Interpreters today, who often emphasize their linguistic roles and exclude themselves from any potential involvement in power relationships (Wadensjö 1998: 285), Xia did not try to exclude himself from the complicated politico-military relationships of the time but rather tended to position himself within multiple fields (not exclusively or dominantly within interpreting fields) and enjoyed the benefits provided by different agents and institutions whose specific needs he met. His doing so raises at least two questions: What capital enabled Xia’s access to these positions? What stakes were associated with these posts? To answer these queries, it is necessary to place Xia into the framework set out for the interpreting profession as a whole in Chapter Two, while jointly considering his educational background, his social experiences, and the work that he had to accomplish.

For the Interpreter position Xia filled, knowledge of both the Chinese and Japanese language and culture were of course a prerequisite. In this sense, Xia’s early experience in a Japanese-controlled city, including his primary and secondary education, even privileged Xia, as he had learnt Japanese in early childhood and even been funded by the Japanese South Manchurian Company to study in Japan. His six years of education and living experiences in Japan (from 1925 to 1931) are likely to have further enhanced his linguistic and cultural capital. Indeed, such living experience and cultural exposure are crucial for Interpreter acquisition of essential
cultural knowledge and communication skills. More important, this cultural capital was continuously recognized, increased, and converted into symbolic capital and social capital through the honours, grants, and degrees obtained in both China and Japan. For example, apart from material interests, the recommendations and scholarship from the Japanese company for study in Japan are a type of symbolic capital — recognition of his school performance and Japanese language skills — which was no doubt boosted by the two degrees earned in Japan. Hence, Xia was not only equipped with the linguistic skill and special knowledge for his subsequent interpreting work but gained official endorsement of his academic competence with diplomas issued by two prestigious Japanese institutions.

Another crucial form of capital that enabled Xia to act as wartime double agent and mediator was his social capital in the form of social connections and interpersonal skills, which originated partly from his educational experiences in Japan. On the one hand, as a Japanese-returned student, Xia was able to connect himself to many senior Chinese KMT officials who were direct or indirect alumni of study in Japan. On the other hand, his Japanese educational background also helped him secure a position in the Japanese-staffed Manchurian state, where he began to expand his social networks among the Japanese officials. Another decisive factor for Xia’s acquisition of social capital was his social competency, especially his interpersonal skills. According to General Li, Xia was “an honest young man, brimming over with vigor” (Li and Tong 1979: 316). He was also seemingly very skillful at socializing with different people and made friends everywhere. From his first job in the human resources department of the Manchurian state, which he obtained during casual conversation with a Japanese officer on a train, almost every step in Xia’s career was related to social relationships developed and accumulated in his study and work. For instance, his Interpreting and secretarial job for the head of the Manchurian state’s military department was attributable to his acquaintance with Lu Shanyuan, once his teacher at Nanjin Academy. Then, through this job, Xia met and made friends with many Japanese military officers, including Wachi Takaji. According to some resources, to express his gratefulness to Wachi, whose name was He Zhi (和知) if translated into Chinese, Xia even changed his name to He Yizhi (何一之/何益之, “Yi” means “only”/“benefit”), implying that he would fully commit to Wachi for his support and trust (Xiao 2005).
This friendship with Wachi, in particular his network among the Japanese senior officials, brought him into the centre of power during the war, which in turn endowed him with more power in his politico-social activities.

On the other hand, Xia was also valued by the Japanese camp because of his social relationships with Chinese KMT officials. For the Japanese, Xia was an unofficial contact for secretly reaching certain important Chinese politicians or military leaders, particularly given the politically sensitive situation between China and Japan. Xia was apparently well aware of the value of his social connections with the Chinese side. He voluntarily put himself forward to the Japanese and exploited any potential social connections to help them, which consequently enhanced his political capital and reinforced his position with the Japanese side. For example, during his political mediation work, his contact with Kong Xiangxi, head of the KMT government’s financial department, was established through his friend, Xiao Zhengying, with whom Xia became acquainted during his interpreting work in the 1930s (Xia 1999/1967, 4:76; 5:80). Likewise, his contact with Tang Shaoyi, a well-known Chinese military leader in the early Republican period who was seen by the Japanese as a potential candidate for leader of the Japanese-sponsored Nanjing government, was enabled through his friend Jin Deguang, whom he got to know when studying in Japan (Xia 1999/1967, 5:78). Jin later married the daughter of Tang’s eighth concubine and thus became Xia’s contact for Tang.

In addition, Xia’s interpersonal skills and popularity among the Japanese senior officers was recognized by his Chinese contacts. His frequent presence as Interpreter to the Japanese in various formal and informal meetings between Chinese and Japanese officials impressed some senior Chinese officials, including General Li, who saw the value of Xia and his position and so asked for his secret service to the KMT:

...[he] had covered up his movements by working for the enemy [the Japanese forces] and had exploited his friendships, cultivated over the years, with certain young Japanese military leaders who had taken part in the invasion of China. They supplied him with important military secrets, and he had built a secret radio station in the home of a Japanese friend in the French concession in Shanghai by which he communicated with the intelligence section of my headquarters. During the early stage of the war of resistance the speed and accuracy of Ho’s reports were unsurpassed. They
gave us full knowledge of the enemy’s strategy and of how their forces were to be deployed [...] His every report subsequently turned out to be correct and of far greater value and accuracy than the information received by the intelligence department of the central [the Chongqing KMT] government. (Li and Tong 1979: 178)

Xia’s positioning within the two political fields dominated respectively by the Chinese KMT and the Japanese forces became the source of his power as a double agent. Not only was his capital increased through his border-crossing and different positioning, but his activities created new power relationships between the above two political fields. Thus, Xia’s case reflects an alternative perspective to Inghilleri’s argument that Interpreter positions in converged interlocking fields are often dependent on other more powerful agents and institutions (Inghilleri 2005a: 72–3). Xia, regardless of his dependence, played a more active role in initiating and fostering interaction among three political fields respectively dominated by the Chinese KMT, CCP and the Japanese forces.

As regards the stakes associated with Xia’s double agent position. General Li’s description of Xia’s free offer of intelligence work should be interpreted carefully. As easy as it would be to assume that Xia was a passionate nationalist, caring less about himself than about his fatherland’s interest, such an assumption is misleading and not even perceived this way by Xia himself. In fact, in commenting about his political mediation work, he saw himself primarily as one who stood between China and Japan and delivered the Japanese peace proposals to the Chinese KMT (Xia 1999/1967, 6: 79). Thus, regardless of his intelligence work for the KMT, he (2000/1967, 2: 97) saw himself more as a Chinese cooperating with the Japanese, a stance he once tried to defend in his memoir: “引起事变导致日本占领中国的责任在政府方面，因此不应责难我们中国老百姓。” (The outbreak of the war and the Japanese occupation of China are the governments’ fault; our ordinary Chinese persons should not be blamed.)

As “an ordinary Chinese person”, Xia also showed interest in material gain and social position when describing his wartime Interpreting and political work. For example, when offered the job of secretary in the Manchurian state’s military department, his response was “慨然应允出任军政部秘书，中校待遇” (immediately accepting the job
offer with the benefits of a colonel) (Xia 1999/1967, 1: 80). Indeed, in his memoir, Xia frequently mentions, or even boasts about, the material benefits enjoyed from this position. For example, he gives the following recollection of his days in Guangdong as Wachi’s Interpreter:

[My] expenditure in Guangdong was over one million USD. At that time, my family was still in North China. They could maintain a comfortable life with my salary from the military department. As for me, I had a luxury house in Guangdong and sufficient funds for social activities. I remember that there was one time when I lost 10,000 USD at the mahjong table; Wachi paid it off for me immediately. (Xia 1999/1967, 2: 78)

As Wachi’s political work developed, Xia’s socio-political activities also rose to a higher level. Considered the new “political celebrity” by both Chinese and Japanese officials, he began enjoying benefits such as free opium, luxury accommodations, a personal bodyguard, free transportation, and evening entertainment (Xia 1999/1967, 6: 77). He even received monetary rewards and honours from Jiang, although, according to Xia, he did not keep this 300,000 USD for himself but contributed it to activities relevant to his political mediation work (ibid.).

Apart from the economic benefits, Xia was also very cautious about self-preservation, especially his physical safety. Indeed, although provided with a comfortable life and security, at the same time, his double agent activities put him in jeopardy, so personal welfare was one part of the stake associated with his position. Nor does Xia try to hide this practical concern. For example, when working in Wachi’s intelligence agency in Shanghai, he realized that he was being closely watched by Chinese intelligent agents who several times at midnight had written “Hanjian He Yizhi” (the traitor, He Yizhi) in chalk on the door of his flat. Seeing himself in danger, Xia (2000/1967, 1: 71) not only reduced his public meetings with Wachi but found shelter for himself in other places in Shanghai. He once hid in Hong Kong for nearly half a year when he was suspected by the Japanese of disclosing confidential information to the Chinese KMT. When the war came to an end, Xia smelled the coming danger after observing the KMT’s ruthless punishment of ‘traitors’. He therefore planned to use his former relationships to turn to the CCP, although in the end this plan was not carried out because of General Li’s persuasion and promise of support. This strong will for survival and self-preservation permeated his Interpreting, mediation, and
intelligence work. Whenever he felt danger approaching, he immediately chose to hide or switch sides to save himself.

Nevertheless, although well aware of the danger associated with double agent work, Xia also knew that the war would end one day and siding with the Japanese could potentially have a tragic ending because of Chinese Nationalist culture and the Chinese public's hatred of *hanjian* (traitors). As Xia (1999/1967, 4: 68) points out in his memoir,

[In China, those who are pro-Japan and well accepted by the Japanese are called *hanjian* [traitor]. None of them would have a happy ending. Chinese people emphasize humanitarianism and internationalism. As the sayings go, “Everything belongs to the country” and “Only the virtuous can rule the nation”, meaning that only those with good virtue can govern the country, and those without will be condemned forever. Emphasis on virtue and morality, this is the essence of Chinese culture, even over ethnicity and nationalism. Therefore, all Chinese people who worked for the Japanese forces will be severely punished as *hanjian*.]

Xia's observation offers a different and more personal perspective on the Chinese public's usage of the word *hanjian* than that in the earlier discussion of the term (see Section 2.2.2). That is, Xia makes it clear that his cooperation with the Japanese violates the bottom line of Chinese morality and virtue and thus led to his labelling as *hanjian*. This label is the cultural capital that he had to sacrifice and whose consequences he had to bear. Thus, in some sense, his double agency was his self-preservation strategy in a complicated political relationship. With connections to different sides, he could find shelter elsewhere when the situation turned unfavourable, but because of this loss of cultural capital, there were no positions for him when the war finished. As Xia recalls, when his neighbour in Beijing, who had a certain connection with the Japanese forces during the war, came to him for help and was relieved to know about his close relationship with General Li, Xia (2000/1967, 2: 98) gave him the following warning:

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You seem not to understand the current situation in Chinese society. You’d better not be that happy. The issue of hanjian is something that even the chief military commander [General Li] could not cover, let alone your connections to the Japanese military police. It is not that simple.

Today, Xia’s story has been retold through his daughter, witnesses, and Chinese journalists. This re-telling emphasizes and puts value on his intelligence work for the Chinese KMT government and his contribution to the Chinese resistance against the Japanese. Thus, Xia is described as “out of污泥而不染的‘皇军’翻译官” (a Japanese forces’ fanyi guan [Interpreting officer] who kept his integrity in an adverse environment), “客死东瀛的‘海外赤子’” (a patriotic son of China who died in Japan), and “无名英雄” (an anonymous hero) (Wang and Wen 2005). After almost half a century, these titles re-confirm Xia’s observation of the predominant moral standard in Chinese culture by which individuals, including Interpreters, are evaluated.

Whereas this perspective may seem limited and confusing, it is not only a topic frequently excluded from Interpreter professional training but reveals something important for Interpreters in the real world. An individuals’ social identity, especially national identity, is to a large extent equivalent to a value system imposed on practice in that individuals want to be accepted by their social group and must respect and obey the rules of this social group. This social group can be very big to include a cultural community (e.g. all those with Chinese cultural background) or as small as a specific group of professionals (interpreters, teachers, lawyers, etc.). For the Interpreters discussed in this thesis, the value systems were inscribed in their habitus through both their early social experiences and later professional performances. Hence, their behaviour was not only judged by those from the same professional group but also from outsiders, for example, the Chinese public. The external pressure from Interpreter professional group is made particularly evident by the second case study of Yan Jiarui.
6.3 Yan Jiarui: a trained military Interpreter

Whereas Yan, in our interview at his Guangzhou home on January 8 and 9, 2009, expressed his understanding of and sympathy for some Interpreters’ collaboration with the Japanese as a way of survival, he also pointed out that the Chinese public’s hate or criticism of these collaborating Interpreters is understandable, because: “他没有记住他是中国人，他做了帮凶，为虎作伥，中国人的精神强调的是威武不屈，宁死不屈。” (The collaborating Interpreter did not remember that he was a Chinese. He acted as an accomplice and helped the evil side. The essence of being a Chinese person is to be unyielding to the force and die before giving in). Given Yan’s status as a military Interpreter trained by the Chinese KMT during the war, the above opinion raises important questions about both training for the Interpreter profession and the positioning of military Interpreters in wartime.

In comparison to Xia, Yan’s experience during the war was much simpler and more straightforward. Born in 1927 to a poor single-mother family in Kunming, Yunnan province, Yan (see Figure 6.2 on the left) finished his primary and secondary education with his mother’s support. As noted in Chapter Three (see Section 3.3), he was one of the youngest student Interpreters recruited and trained by the Chinese KMT for its military cooperation with the Americans. Only 18 years old when he joined the KMT’s three-month military Interpreter training program in Chongqing in May 1945, his military Interpreter experience was fairly short because the war ended before he could be transferred to Yunnan for weapons training. As a result, Yan and the other Interpreters were dispersed with some monetary compensation for their short service.

As already outlined in Chapter Two, our interview sessions were divided into two hour-long parts, one on each day, and were based on pre-planned questions that Yan had already previewed, although the actual interview followed Yan’s train of thought rather than strictly adhering to the protocol. The interview sessions were video-taped

99 Photo taken by myself during my interview of Yan on Jan 9th, 2009.
and later transcribed, and the resulting transcripts were submitted to Yan for proofreading and approval.

One strong impression from my two-day visit – particularly the two hours of formal interview sessions – was that this 81-year-old Interpreter is still very excited about his military Interpreter experience, even though it only lasted a short time and took place almost 63 years ago. In fact, Yan has reflected continuously on his military Interpreter experience and in 2005 even published an article “Er’zhan shouxunban huigu yu ganxiang” 二战受训班回顾与感想 (Memories of and reflections on the WWII Interpreter training program) on the Guangzhou Translation Association website. Besides personal observations, this article includes the foreword and content page of the training textbook used in 1945. As a witness to history, as well as a military interpreting officer in China’s resistance to Japan, Yan greatly values his three-month Interpreter training and over past decades has continued interpreting as a profession. He even retains military courtesy when speaking English with his foreign clients. For example, in both the interview and in his published paper, he emphasized the importance of addressing and answering the other party using “Sir”, an important lesson learned from his military Interpreter training.

During the interview, I raised the issue of Interpreter identity and asked how Yan understood this word, especially in Chinese. After thinking for a second, he engaged me in the following dialogue:

Yan (Y): 在中文里是身份，更确切地讲是有自己的立场。
Ting (T): 身份和立场观点？
Y: 嗯，立场观点。Identity, 平常讲 identity card，就是你的身份。你自己要明确你是什么样的身份。你是个翻译, 你是一个 co-star, not star, 我是这样理解身份的。在战场上，你不是指挥官，你不是 commander，你不能发号施令，你是 assistant，是助手。

Yan (Y): [This word] means “shenfen” (status); more specifically, one should have one’s own “lichang” (position or stand).
Ting(T): “shenfen” and “lichang”? 
Y: Your position or standpoint. Identity, as in the use of “identity card”, is your “shenfen”. You should understand what kind of “shenfen” you have. You are a fanyi, and you are a “co-star, not a star”. That’s my understanding of “shenfen”. On the battlefield, you are not the commander. You can’t give orders. You are an assistant.
The duality of Yan’s interpretation of the identity of a fanyi (Interpreter), in particular the blending of his military Interpreter experience, is particularly interesting: on the one hand, he sees identity as a “shenfen” or “lichang”, a position adopted rather than born into; on the other hand, he emphasizes that Interpreters have a specific social position – as linguistic assistants rather than as part of a psychological reflection. For him, military Interpreters have no right to command but should always be obedient to higher authority. However, he also emphasizes that this Interpreter positioning does not mean that Interpreters should try to be neutral. On the contrary, Interpreters should take a clear political stand:

Y: 中国的译员在战场上当然要站在中国军队的立场。现在改革开放的时代，你要代表中国公司的立场，中国人的立场。那外交部的翻译怎么办？（对呀？）绝对是中国政府的立场。

Y: On the battlefield, Chinese yiyuan (Interpreters) should of course stand for Chinese troops’ interests. Nowadays, in the period of reform and China’s opening up, You (the Interpreters) should thus represent Chinese companies’ interests and stand for the Chinese. Otherwise, what should fanyi (translators and interpreters in general) in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs do? (T: Yes?) They should absolutely stand for the Chinese government’s interests. (Yan 2009)

Although the above clarification of Interpreter positioning may not be applicable to all interpreted events in different cultures, its emphasis on interpreters’ political stance and advocacy for the national interest is revealing in that it reflects a military Interpreter’s self-perception generated from the habitus developed throughout training. My copy of the primary textbook for the Interpreter training, Forty English Lesson for Interpreting Officers, generously provided by Yan, provides some clues to the possible impact of this training program. First, to enlarge Interpreters’ vocabulary and help them practice after class, this textbook lists words and sentences at the beginning of each lesson, which are then applied in relevant dialogues and monologues. Every lesson covers a specific topic, ranging from medical service, geography, transportation, mapping, and military intelligence weapons to army service, forces, supplies, and chemical warfare. For example, the third lesson specifically addresses discipline, security, and courtesy in the military camp, and the related vocabulary covers army regulations and disciplinary measures; for instance,
“obedience/disobedience; the final decision rests with the commanding officer; absentees will be fined; deserters will be court-martialed; promotion/demotion”. A dialogue then provides Interpreters with practice:

C: There seem to be a lot of rules and regulations posted on that bulletin board.
A: That’s true of any military camp, and more so here, for the C.O. is very strict. Failure to obey orders leads to immediate disciplinary action; and serious disobedience means the guard-house or severe punishment. But Col. Lyons says that good morale is more effective even than rules or punishment.
C: I see the great importance of military discipline. It is really the development of the “team spirit” in the army where the interest of the team is above that of any individual.
A: That’s well put. The lack of discipline may result in serious military defeat.
(Liaison Group of the Foreign Affairs Bureau 1945: 8)

As emphasized in its foreword, this Interpreter training textbook is not limited to language training; it also aims to educate the candidates in the “qualities of discipline, courtesy, industry, perseverance, character and service which should characterize the work of an interpreting officer” (ibid.: 2). Obviously, the above dialogue was compiled or selected specifically to convey to the prospective Interpreting officers a message of absolute obedience to authority and group interest above the individual. Practicing this vocabulary and dialogue therefore instilled the idea of military discipline and commitment to the army in the Interpreters’ minds, thereby shaping their self-perception and perception of their position within the field.

During the interview, Yan also referred to the Chinese saying whose English version he was taught in his military Interpreter training: “Civil officers should not love money, military officers should not fear death” (文官不爱财，武官不怕死). For him, this saying was meant to remind Interpreting officers that they should not pursue material benefits and be afraid of difficulties or loss of life. “这是中国很好的格言，超越时代，今天仍有现实意义” (this is a very good Chinese proverb, with a meaning that transcends a specific time and is still applicable to interpreters nowadays!). Interestingly, Xia Wenyun (2000/1967, 3: 94), the Interpreter discussed in the first

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100 Abbreviations used in the training texts are as follows: C—Chinese Interpreting Officer; A—American officer or enlisted man.
case study, also quoted this Chinese saying in his memoir, attributing it to the original speaker, Yue Fei, a well-known national hero who led the resistance against the invasion of the Jin minority: “文官不爱财，武官不怕死，则天下可治也。” (If civil officers do not love money and military officers do not fear death, the nation can be well governed.) However, immediately after this quote, Xia comments that during the war the KMT government was seriously corrupt and thus lost the support of the Chinese public and that many well-known military leaders switched to the CCP.

Clearly, both Yan and Xia see the importance of individual commitment to their country, but from different perspectives and with a different focus. Yan values and promotes Interpreters’ self-sacrificing spirit, whereas Xia tends to be more realistic, questioning the KMT government’s political strategies. Regardless of the temporal and situational factors, the differences in their observations seemingly arise from their different life experiences. That is, Yan, being only 18 years old and with limited exposure to the social world, especially of political struggle, was substantially influenced by his training and incorporated ideas like military discipline and political loyalty as part of his professional habitus. Xia, in contrast, was relatively more mature and experienced: despite not having received any formal training, he had experienced the cruelty of war and been embroiled in far more complicated political and military relationships. As a result, he had had to employ every means to survive.

Seeing himself as part of the Chinese forces resisting the Japanese, Yan clearly had a strong sense of duty and is now very proud of his military Interpreter position, probably a result of both his military training experiences and his early experiences in Kunming, where the KMT’s control was seldom disrupted before or during the war. A large part of Yan’s memory of the war is Japan’s bullying of China and their bombing of his hometown, Kunming. Therefore, according to Yan, “报效祖国，打日本” (to serve the motherland and fight against the Japanese) was part of his strong motivation to join the army and become an Interpreter (Yan 2009). As previously discussed, individual memory of the past is always mixed in with subsequent experience and affected by the way that information is retrieved; nevertheless, it is important for the discussion of Interpreters’ self-perception to take into account Yan’s patriotic passion. On the one hand, this feeling must have been very real for an 18-year-old who not
only grew up and received all his education in a KMT-governed area but witnessed Japan’s invasion of his country and the bombing of his hometown. On the other hand, Yan’s emphasis on the honour of serving his country and his patriotic passion as strong motivation for his interpreting work is actually his interpretation of previous experiences in the light of his continuing self-perception as a Chinese patriot.

It is also important to point out that during the interview, Yan talked about his personal interest in and the practical considerations of joining the Interpreter training program. For Yan, joining the army and serving the fatherland was also “出路” (a way out, a means to survive). Specifically, after graduation from Nanqing High School, Yan immediately faced life’s pressures and needed to make his own living because his mother, with his younger sister to support, could not pay for his further education. Hence, for Yan, joining the army was a two-fold blessing: not only was it honourable to serve one’s country, but it offered a way to be independent financially and relieve the burden on his family. In Yan’s words, it was an advantage “当兵吃粮，报效祖国” (to become a soldier fed by the government and serving the fatherland). He also asked me smilingly, “你知道为什么叫做GI?” (Do you know why American soldiers were called GIs at that time?):

云南人称当兵的叫吃粮的，就是当兵可以吃饱肚子：government issued 就是政府供给，一切由政府配发，真是异曲同工.

People in Yunnan used to call soldiers “grain eaters”; that is, joining the army can help you fill your stomach; “government issued” means provided by the government, or everything will be supplied by the government. Its meaning is the same but expressed in different ways. (Yan 2009)

Hence, for Yan, the decision to join the army seemed natural, given his family situation and the difficulties of making a living during wartime. However, becoming a military Interpreter was also related to his interest in the English language and his dream of studying in the United States, which, he told me, the KMT claimed they would sponsor for Interpreters with excellent performance. In actuality, because Yunnan is close to Vietnam (a former French colony) and the French influence was very strong, Yan’s first foreign language was French not English. However, after the outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941, Yan decided to give up his over three years of
French language learning for English because the KMT and US forces’ main military base at Kunming was soon packed with American soldiers.

This influx of American soldiers changed Yan’s life. Still a high school student, he not only had his first live English conversation with American GI’s on his school playground but had the courage to show these Americans around and sneak into the army cinemas to watch the latest American movies with subtitles. Yan was very impressed by both the movies and the translations. He still remembers the names of movies such as *30 Seconds over Tokyo*, *The Great Waltz*, *Gone with the Wind*, *Wuthering Heights*, *Rebecca*, and *Casablanca*. The American influence on Yan, however, was much more than these movies. Yan recalled his personal observation of an American military drill in Kunming, which was accompanied by a military Interpreter from the Associated Southwest University. He was impressed by the English/Chinese interpretation, as well as the Interpreter’s American military uniform: "我也想穿上美军的服装, 去做美军的翻译” (I wanted to wear that uniform and to become an Interpreter for the American troops). Then, in a local newspaper, he read the FAB’s Interpreter recruitment advertisement, particularly the chance of sponsorship for Interpreters’ further education in the United States. He applied and, despite his youth, impressed the American interviewers with his spoken English, which led to his acceptance into the training program to formally become an FAB military Interpreter.

From a Bourdieuian perspective, Yan’s investment in learning the English language and his movement to the Interpreter position was due not to rational calculation but to his previous experiences with the American troops and his perception of the field through observation of the Chinese military Interpreter accompanying the American troops. For Yan, this Interpreter’s American military uniform symbolized a capital associated with military position, with honour, with chances for study in the United States, and similar interests of an 18-year-old – everything, that is, except the risk to his life as a military Interpreter. When asked whether he would choose a different path if given a second chance at life, Yan gave no direct answer but made the following comment:
Life is like an ocean; you have to take things as they come. I think I only had this choice, because that was the choice of the time. Life is very difficult. In that [wartime] situation, you actually had no other choices. It was the time that chose us. (Yan 2009)

At that moment, Yan showed his mixed feelings about the past. It seemed to him that he had simply taken what history offered and followed social developments rather than his personal choice or plan. This viewpoint contrasts starkly with his earlier description of his efforts to seek a way out and pursue honour and a better life in difficult times. Apparently, together with his sense of achievement and patriotic passion, Yan could see other better choices and felt the constraints and limitations of his options. In other words, for him, joining the army and becoming a military Interpreter were the best choices given the circumstances. Most particularly, Yan, unlike Xia, was a young man with very limited social experience and relationships to help him see and explore other possibilities. This aspect is one that Bourdieu often emphasizes in his theory of practice: agents’ illusio – their practical sense of the field – is generated from their habitus, the embodied objective conditions, which directly affects their perceptions of both self and the field developed through their social experiences. In other words, Yan’s habitus was not sufficiently developed to enable a wider view of the social arena and to position himself differently within or beyond the KMT dominated political and military fields.

However, Yan's military Interpreter experiences did significantly change his situation. First, during training, Yan met Dr. Frank W. Price, Director of the Chongqing Interpreter Training Program, who had a significant impact on Yan and his post-war life. According to Yan, he established a very good personal relationship with Dr. Price (Yan 2009), and, like Xia, he took his mentor’s first name as his English name during his military Interpreter training. When the war ended and the Interpreters were dispersed by the KMT, Yan went to Frank Price for a private talk and asked for his help. Price wrote a letter recommending him to his brother Harry B. Price, Deputy Director of the China Branch of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation
Administration (UNRRA). In this manner, Yan received his first formal job after his life as a military Interpreter. In a later letter to Yan, Price wrote,

It is a joy to have you come and to talk with me a few evenings ago and I appreciate your sharing your difficulties and problems with me. I do feel as if you are my own son and I hope you will let me help you in the future as a father could. That means I will give you any assistance in my power and also talk friendly and lovingly to you [...] 107

Whereas Dr. Price’s help was substantial and timely for Yan, Yan’s initiation of a talk with Price about his difficulties and his request for help are equally important. That is, his acquaintance with Price was the social capital accumulated during his training, and as in the case of Xia, when the situation changed, the social capital developed from interaction with a teacher enabled movement to other potential positions in the social space.

Second, despite its short duration, Yan’s military Interpreter training greatly shaped his subsequent life. With the military Interpreter certificate issued by the KMT, Yan was recognized as retired military staff and entitled to pursue further study at Wuhan University for free. With his university education background and English language skills, he was selected by the CCP army for further training and after 1949, became a CCP cadre. However, during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), Yan was persecuted for his past service to the KMT and his connection with the Americans. This persecution underscores Bourdieu’s claim that the relative value of agential capital is determined by the dominant power relationship within the field. Yan’s Interpreter certificate was issued and valued by the KMT, and thus brought Yan benefits; however, once the CCP came to power, with a different ideology and political structures, the certificate was not only valueless but became a negative factor that reduced Yan’s social and political capital.

As Yan emphasized in the interview (2009), “人生路，关键就几步”。或者关键就一步，你读什么学校，你做什么工作，你叫什么朋友，你跟什么人结婚，就是这么几步。” (There are only a few key steps in your life. Or one or two crucial steps. They are the schools that you attended, the work that you did, the friends that you

107 This letter, copied and given to me by Yan after the interview, is dated September 7, 1945.
made, the one that you married. These steps decide your life). Yan’s words echo the major points set out by Bourdieu in his argument on agential practices: education, career, social network, and personal/family relationships. These four aspects together constitute the largest part of agents’ social experiences and determine their possession of cultural and social capital.

Conclusions

This chapter has presented the case studies of two individual Interpreters, Xia Wenyun and Yan Jiarui, and their own representations of their social and professional activities during the war. Examination of these individuals’ social trajectories – in particular, an analysis of their self-perceptions – reveals that despite the differences in their ages, social origins, and life experiences, their practices follow similar patterns; that is, their Interpreting was not a neutral linguistic service but a personal action to make a living, gain honour, seek protection, and pursue better positions in the social world. For Xia, interpreting was a means to exploit and cash in on the linguistic, cultural, and social capital accumulated through his education in Japan and work in the Japanese-dominated Manchurian government. On the other hand, as it turned out, his interpreting activities further expanded his social capital and enabled his later double agency in the political negotiations between China and Japan. Xia’s example adds another layer to this understanding of collaborating Interpreters: some Interpreters’ positions and movements in the social space, not exclusively or dominantly within interpreting fields, actually endowed them with more power and capital because of their roles linking different type of fields and creating new power relationships.

In contrast to Xia, Yan had no chance to straddle sides or position himself differently because of factors related to his limited life experiences, including his age, student status, and limited social networks. However, Yan’s recollections during the interviews of his professional training experiences – in particular, his self-representation of his Interpreter status – offer a more individually oriented perspective on the profession and cast a different light on the Interpreter training discussed in Chapter Three, though Yan’s memory may have been mediated through time and thus affected by his current perception of the profession. Most particularly,
education—in this case, professional training and overseas study—was a very important socialization process for the Interpreters. It was, first of all, through this process that they acquired essential linguistic and cultural knowledge as well as interpreting skills for their professional practice. But education is never conducted in a vacuum, free of value and ideology. On the contrary, the values and beliefs prevalent in the structure were gradually incorporated as part of their habitus through both their own observations and stimulations from feedbacks that they received from others during this education process. This habitus, in turn, continuously influences their self-perception and subsequent social and professional practices. Despite the limited information that this thesis presents, it does offer some insight to our understanding of the significance of training in translators’/interpreters’ professional development, particularly in terms of raising their awareness of the value systems underlying various professional codes.

This analysis of individual Interpreters’ self-representation and their socialization process through professional training and practice benefited greatly from a Bourdieusian sociological framework, which proved an especially fruitful conceptual tool for such an analysis. In contrast to traditional historical analyses of Interpreter life trajectories, which focus on Interpreters’ contributions to history (Delisle and Woodworth 1995; Roland 1982, 1999; Wong 2007), this sociological approach not only opens up discussions on the social factors affecting the formation and development of Interpreters’ professional habitus, but offers a valuable perspective on the potential of individual Interpreters’ active agency in the social world. In addition, as this chapter has demonstrated, when interpreters’ self-representations are analyzed, it is important to consider factors affecting their current narratives, such as the elapse of the time, their later experiences and current status.
Chapter Seven: Conclusion

This thesis has presented an overview of different political and military situations that Chinese Interpreters faced during the Second Sino-Japanese War. Although it is only able to present a limited number of case studies on some individual Interpreters, this thesis clearly depicts the challenges and opportunities that the Interpreters encountered in this long-lasting conflict. On the one hand, they had to struggle for their lives during violent military clashes and under harsh political dominance. On the other, given the conflict between China (KMT/CCP) and Japan, the KMT’s military cooperation with Germany and the United States, and the CCP’s political interaction with the Comintern and the United States, their knowledge of a foreign language and culture, a necessity for Chinese interaction with these foreign powers, endowed them with both a social position and power.

Although a war setting, in which interpreters usually have little control over the interactions among involved parties, may represent an extreme case in interpreting studies, it offers an important historical context for study of interpreters’ actions in the social world. More specifically, the cultural, military, and political tensions, as well as the pressure to survive physical dangers on the battlefield, surely adds a different layer to our understanding of the interpreter profession and individual interpreters’ social praxis. In contrast to conference interpreting or community interpreting today, Interpreting during the war was more institutionalized (and even militarized); Interpreters were specifically selected, trained, and employed by particular authorities for specific political and military purposes. This relates to the first research question posed at the beginning of this thesis:

1) Is there a field of interpreting? If so, how is the field structured, and how are interpreters positioned?

As discussed in Chapter Two, many controversies remain on the application of Bourdieu’s notion of ‘field’ in translation studies; for example, whether an actual field of interpreting exists and is mature enough to contain distinctive symbolic capital, and whether an interpreting event is one single field or a place in which interlocking fields
converge (Simeoni 1998; Wolf 2007a; Inghilleri 2003, 2005a). By investigating Interpreters’ activities in different military and political contexts during the War, this thesis has shown that the field of interpreting was actually embedded in other types of fields (e.g. military, political and educational fields), mutually constructing and shaping the social space. Its borders were hard to define due to the Interpreters’ frequent movements and multi-positioning within the social arena, and it was composed of a few sub-fields with conflicting interests given the war situation. In many cases, not only the Interpreters but also other social agents and institutions with which Interpreters interacted were actually part of or directly affiliated with certain military or political structures.

For example, from Interpreter recruitment and training to management, the KMT government’s Foreign Affairs Bureau (FAB) monitored the entire process of producing its military Interpreters, including compiling training textbooks, setting training syllabi and disciplining or rewarding Interpreters. As the products of this process, the FAB Interpreters were not independent professionals in our current sense, but constituted part of the KMT government’s political and military structures. Although the CCP did not encounter the same need for military Interpreters, the Interpreters for its communication with the Comintern and later the American Dixie Commission were also carefully chosen, but from its Party members. In other words, before they became Interpreters, the CCP’s Interpreters had already positioned themselves in the CCP’s power structure; their interpreting work, to some extent, was merely a function of their positions in the CCP’s political field, given the Party’s overwhelming influence over almost all relevant interpreting activities in areas under its control. This inclination to institutionalize the Interpreting profession was also evident for the Interpreters who served the Japanese forces. Given the Japanese forces’ practical needs for Interpreters during the war, the Chinese Interpreters were usually directly affiliated with Japanese or Japanese-sponsored military and political institutions, such as the Japanese military police, Japanese troops, local Japanese-dominated administrations, and intelligence agencies. As discussed in Chapter Six, this attachment to the dominant power endowed the collaborating Interpreters with certain symbolic power.
Admittedly, this embeddness of the field of interpreting in other political and military fields was partly attributable to the unusually overwhelming military presence of wartime. As many above-mentioned scholars have implicitly or explicitly addressed, this situation is also relevant to the fact that as a social event, interpreting connects social agents from different fields and with different backgrounds. When responding to these different parties, interpreters inevitably engage in their interactions and position themselves within fields other than interpreting. Therefore, the structure of the field of interpreting is greatly affected by power relationships underpinning interpreting related agents and institutions. As exemplified through the situations of the KMT Interpreters, who had gone through many changes in terms of the active working language, task and working environment due to the KMT’s adjustments in its foreign policy throughout the war, the field of interpreting was significantly affected by the changing relationships among different domestic and international political and military powers, which in turn influenced the relative value of Interpreters’ capital and positioning in the social world.

2) What is Interpreters’ professional habitus? What factors can affect the formation of Interpreters’ professional habitus?

This thesis began with the assumption that interpreting is not merely a linguistic action carried out indifferently by professionals but rather a type of social practice by individual interpreters for particular purposes and with continuous repercussions on both the interpreters themselves and other social agents and institutions. Given this sociological direction, Bourdieu’s notion of habitus thus provides a fruitful perspective for understanding the profession of interpreter in a wider social context. As discussed in Chapter Two, many translation scholars (Simeoni 1998, Inghiellri 2003) thus tend to argue for a professional habitus possessed by interpreters/translator, apart from their social habitus, although the notion of professional habitus is seldom defined and explained adequately in the contexts of translation and interpreting.

Being aware that the Interpreters discussed here might not be exclusively interpreters, this thesis has tried to argue that without a careful definition of and reflection on interpreter/translator profession, the notion of an interpreter’s or translator’s
professional habitus will be too blurred and meaningless. This thesis’s exploration of a specific history of Interpreting in China fills a gap in the history of wartime interpreting and sheds light on our understanding of the profession of Interpreters in wartime. As many examples of this thesis clearly illustrate, the Interpreters, trained or not, had to perform a variety of military and political tasks if only a language issue was involved, including both interpreting and translation tasks. This situation destabilizes our understanding of interpreting profession and problematizes the usage of the notion of professional habitus in the discipline of translation studies. This thesis contends that an interpreter’s professional habitus is part of a primary socialization and displays in his or her dispositions towards the profession and its formalized practices. However, in the above situation, we cannot separately measure the Interpreters’ incarnated interpreting and translation experiences, and we do not know when an interpreter’s experience meets the professional standard, if there is any formalized practice. Moreover, for many of the Interpreters discussed in this thesis, interpreting was only part of their personal development and/or a self-preservation strategy in extreme circumstances rather than a profession in our current sense. Depending on their personal experience and working environment, individual Interpreters’ understanding of their interpreting activities and professional status could be very different. For example, Yan Jiarui, the second Interpreter in the final case studies - seemed to pick up a lot of components relevant to his military interpreter training (e.g. political loyalty and obedience to authority) as part of his habitus. Others, however, such as Wu Xiuquan and Ling Qing (see Chapter Three) tended to decline or avoid the label ‘professional interpreter’ in order to secure their positions in the CCP political field. Therefore, it is important to point out that although this thesis adopts the notion of professional habitus in certain places, it does not intend to imply that this concept is applicable to all individual cases and in different contexts, especially when there is insufficient evidence available to analyze whether there was a professional community with specific interests and stake, and whether those who worked as interpreters or translators formed a sense of professional practice.

However, as this thesis tries to prove, education and training played a crucial role in many aspects during Interpreters’ formation of a sense of profession. By investigating the KMT’s training of its military interpreting, this thesis argues that interpreter
training was an important channel in terms of creating and fostering a community of professional interpreters. The initial selection of candidates began to distinguish some social agents from the others by determining the value of the formers’ possession of certain capital. The subsequent training and employment thus further reinforced this newly formed community of Interpreters. It was in this community that values and norms favourable to the dominant power, such as interpreter obedience to the higher authority, standards for honourable or dishonourable behaviour, and political advocacy were legitimated and taught to novice Interpreters, who gradually internalized them through self-perception and observation of their peers’ behaviour.

However, as emphasized before, this sense of professional practice is neither a case applicable to all individuals nor a finished product of training. Although the war stimulated the institutionalization of the interpreter profession, it is problematic to assume that all Interpreters had similar professional habitus automatically and exclusively generated from training and employment within institutions. On the contrary, not every Interpreter discussed in this thesis received formal training; even those who went through the same training process seemed to act differently in similar situations. That means the values and norms that interpreters have incorporated are subject to continuously defining in their social practice.

The above observations are also very useful for our thinking on contemporary interpreters’ professional codes and ethics, as well as understanding of individual interpreters’ norm-governed behaviour. For example, impartiality and neutrality are one basic ethical principle currently emphasized and reinforced in court interpreter training and professional code, but at the same time, interpreters are asked to perform in the interests of the court, which, to some extent, is actually an implicit expression of interpreter advocacy and loyalty to the democratic legal system. Training, in this process, as emphasized and required by many institutions who employ interpreters, plays a crucial role in fostering such a community of interpreters, who are not only equipped with sufficient language and interpreting skills to perform their work but provided with guidelines for good practices and consequences of behaviours breaching these guidelines. These principles of correctness and appropriateness are thus gradually incarnated as part of interpreters’ habitus through the feedbacks they received from their trainers and via their observation of their peers’ practices being
rewarded or punished. This internalization process partly explains how interpreters perceive and follow norms in their practices. In other words, their norm-governed behaviour is in fact an expression of their habitus inculcated through training and professional practice. However, for individual interpreters, training is also an effective way to acquire essential skills and legitimate their knowledge in the form of qualifications and certificates. Such legitimization was often a necessary and crucial process for the military interpreters discussed in this thesis, to enter the field and become eligible for the positions. This thus leads to our third research question:

3) What type of capital do interpreters need to enter the interpreting field? How do interpreters respond to situations that endanger their lives and positioning in the social world?

In the previous chapters, this thesis emphasized that despite the importance of knowledge of language and culture in interpreters’ professional development, other skills and qualities are also needed for interpreters to successfully complete their interpreting work, such as interpersonal skills, social network and loyalty. These qualities and skills are not always to be obtained directly from short-term training, but are relevant to one’s family background and social experiences. Drawing on Bourdieu’s concept of capital, especially his emphasis on the relative value of social agents’ capital and his notion of symbolic capital, this thesis has argued that the valued qualities and skills of interpreters may vary depending on the contexts of interpreting. For example, interpreters at diplomatic occasions will need to possess high social competence; but in battlefields interpreters’ healthy body, strong will and good knowledge of military matters may be much more important. In other words, even within the field of interpreting, interpreters’ positions are stratified and associated with different stakes depending on the relative value of the capital that they possess in specific interpreted events. The key to this relative value of interpreters’ possession of capital is the power relationships underpinning the interpreted events.

It is found that despite its merits, Bourdieu’s concept of capital also has some limitations when it is applied to our analysis of interpreters’ positioning within the social arena. For example, although it explains the type of political capital that Interpreters needed for their entrance to certain military and political structure, it fails
to account for the complex situations for collaborating Interpreters, whose social
capital should be decrease in Chinese society due to their traitorous behaviour.
Unexpectedly, they seemed to hold more social capital in local Chinese communities
due to their affiliations with the foreign occupiers. In addition, Bourdieu does not
specify the basic feature of capital and its implications in empirical study, that is, what
kind of skills and qualities can be conceptualized as capital of interpreters and how we
measure and compare the same or different types of capital in different contexts.
Given its limited space and resources, this thesis could not address all the above
issues but argues that there are more forms of capital than those that Bourdieu has
proposed, and that a finer analysis is needed on the application of the abstract form of
capital in different contexts, particularly in more complicated cases involving
conflicting interests and power relationships.

Although lack of professional training, a low social profile, and humble payment
often lead to an image of the Interpreter as subservient to other agents and institutions
(e.g., Simeoni 1998; Wolf 2007a; Gouanvic 2005), investigation of the collaborating
Interpreters in this thesis clearly indicates that interpreters do not only position
themselves/are positioned within the field of interpreting but often straddle different
fields (e.g. political field, military field) co-existing in the social arena. This type of
multi-positioning increased the interpreters’ social or economic capital and protected
them from violence. As many examples in this thesis have shown, individual
Interpreters also apparently had concerns about the consequences of their physical
participation in interpreting work. Like others, they feared danger and death, and tried
to use their Interpreting positions in their own best interests.

Interpreters’ awareness of physical danger and resultant strategies in adverse
environments are the expressions of interpreters’ embodied habitus. Indeed, one
crucial aspect of interpreting, unlike translation, is the necessity of interpreter’s
physical presence and bodily actions, an aspect further crystallized by the harsh living
environ of wartime. As discussed in the previous chapters of this thesis, not only
were healthy bodies an important condition for recruitment of military Interpreters,
but the Interpreters’ physical condition, will to survive, and quest for a better life were
the basis of their social practice. Since any values and norms incorporated by the
Interpreters had to be expressed through their individual actions, Interpreter practices
were not standardized professional products but personal actions whose effects varied because of individual Interpreter characteristics, including bodily stature or appearance.

The impact of this practical consideration emerged clearly in the examination of both the KMT's military Interpreters and the Interpreters collaborating with the Japanese. Whereas some Interpreters chose to escape their military duty during training or on the battlefield, other collaborating Interpreters chose to secretly serve the Chinese public and Chinese resistance forces to avoid assassination or punishment as traitors. For example, the final case study of Xia Wenyun has shown that as an Interpreter serving the Japanese, Xia made full use of his social networks on both sides (China and Japan), which became the basis for his political mediation between Japan and China and his double agency activities for the Chinese KMT government. His multiple positioning in the social space not only helped him acquire more capital and survive the violence during and after the war, it enabled connections and dialogue among the Chinese KMT and the Japanese forces and greatly contributed to the Chinese KMT's military victory during the war.

**Contributions and potential future research**

By investigating Chinese interpreters' activities in different military and political contexts during the Second Sino-Japanese War, this thesis has represented a specific interpreting history seldom addressed by either historians or translation scholars, which surely constitutes a contribution to the history of interpreting in wartime. A majority of information used in this thesis is herein presented to the public for the first time and fills a gap in scholarly studies of interpreting-related activities during this war. Studies of this specific interpreting history also provide a good example of research methodology in interpreting studies: when the available documentation (e.g., transcripts) is insufficient for linguistically oriented research, a sociological approach can be a fruitful way to reconstruct and analyze interpreters' relationship with other social agents and institution. This thesis's use of multiple sources, such as archival files, individual memoirs and interviews, well complements the insufficiency of information from the war and provides an analytical framework that other research can replicate or further develop. Interpreters' training and employment, as recorded in the archival files or narrated in their own words, are fertile sources, equally in
importance as Interpreter transcripts, for our research on this special group of professionals in society

Apart from the above, this thesis has also made a contribution to the overall discipline of translation studies by reflecting on some important issues relevant to the whole discipline, such as the function of training, professional qualifications, understanding of Interpreters’ socially constituted power and multiple positioning in the social space. These reflections offer important avenues for further research on the definition of interpreter/translator profession and factors underlying the process of professionalization. After all, even though the wartime setting represents a profile of disorder, chaos, and violence, it gives a real sense of the world in which both interpreters and translators were living and working. Not only do the studies presented here broaden our view of the interpreter/translation profession, but also shed lights on both the value and underlying problems inherent in current applications of Bourdieu’s sociological framework to translation studies, which should be of use to any researchers interested in a sociological approach to translation studies.

Finally, some part of this thesis can also be useful for further research on China’s domestic and international policies during the war, including the Sino-German cooperation and the Sino-US military coalition during the war. Problems that the Interpreters encountered in different social contexts and relevance to their cultural identities also offer interested scholars rich materials for political and sociological studies.
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## Appendices

### Appendix I. Chronology of the Second Sino-Japanese War

(1931–45)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>The September 18 Incident (the Mukden Incident; military clashes between Japan and China in North China); within five months, most of Manchuria is under Japanese control.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>The establishment of Manchukuo, a Japanese-sponsored Chinese government in Manchuria.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>China signs the Tangpa Truce with Japan and formally gives up its guarding right in areas along the Great Wall, as well as its control of Manchurian areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>He-Umezu Agreement and Chin-Doihara Agreement; Japan is able to establish a North China Autonomous Area under its control.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>The Xi’an Incident (Jiang Jieshi is kidnapped by KMT generals and forced to resist the Japanese); resumed cooperation between the CCP and KMT; Japan joins the World War II Axis of Germany and Italy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1937</td>
<td>The July 7 Incident (a conflict between Japanese and Chinese troops at Lugou Bridge); the KMT’s declaration of war with Japan; Beijing lost.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 1937</td>
<td>Battle of Nanjing; Nanjing lost; the KMT government transferred to Chongqing, Sichuan province; the Nanjing Massacre by the Japanese.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar. 1938</td>
<td>KMT victory in the Battle of Tai’erzhuang.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 1939</td>
<td>Beginning of war in the European theatre.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar. 1940</td>
<td>Wang Jingwei betrays the KMT government and establishes a new puppet government in Nanjing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 1941</td>
<td>The Wan’nan Incident (CCP troops are ambushed by KMT troops in Maolin, Anhui province); war time conflicts between the CCP and the KMT reach a climax.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 1941</td>
<td>The Pearl Harbor Incident (Japan attacks the American naval base at Pearl Harbor); the outbreak of the Pacific War.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>KMT aid to the resistance in Burma.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>KMT aid to Britain’s troops in India.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>Counter-attack by the allied forces; partial counter-attack by the CCP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1944</td>
<td>The arrival of the American Dixie Mission.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1945</td>
<td>The Potsdam Declaration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 1945</td>
<td>The dropping of two atomic bombs by the US on the two Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki; Japan surrenders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 9, 1945</td>
<td>Instrument of Surrender in Nanjing, signed by the KMT and Japan.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>