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THE ROLE AND RELEVANCE OF NON-GOVERNMENT AID:

A CASE STUDY OF KENYA

VOLUME II

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A thesis submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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APPENDIX I

SKETCHES OF SOME BRITISH NGOs

This appendix contains descriptions of six major NGOs:

a) Action in Distress
b) Christian Aid
c) Oxfam
d) Save the Children Fund
e) Voluntary Service Overseas
f) War on Want

Although during this study it was not possible to research in detail into the work of different NGOs, from their publications, from conversations with their staff, and in some cases, from a first-hand view of their work overseas, it has been possible to compose these sketches of the NGOs and their different policies, operating styles and images. In each sketch these are, as far as possible, compared with the sorts of criteria discussed in Part II of this thesis.

The above six NGOs were selected on the basis of their size and significance. CAPOD and Help the Aged were also approached for information, but did not respond.

Each NGO is described under the following headings:

1. History
2. Size
3. Main activities
4. View of development/underdevelopment
5. The NGO in Britain
A. ACTION IN DISTRESS (AID)

A1. HISTORY

Although AID only began in 1972, it arose out of "Voluntary and Christian Service", a charity which dates back to 1953.

AID was the idea of Cecil Jackson Cole who was also a co-founder of Oxfam, founder of Help the Aged, and founder of Voluntary and Christian Service. According to an obituary in "Action News" (AID's quarterly magazine) in 1979, he was known to the press as "Mr. Charity", and "He was proud to call himself a fund-raiser..." :

"With the end of the war, and with the tremendous needs he saw arising, he realised that the traditional approach to charitable work would be inadequate and charities would have to be run on business-like lines. He also realised that if he wished to accomplish the task he had set himself, he needed money and people to help him.

In 1973 he launched a new charity, Voluntary and Christian Service. The main committee consisted of businessmen, so business techniques were used to get it off the ground. Initially it helped social service organisations to raise funds."

The original idea behind AID was that young Christians in Britain should raise funds to help children overseas, and it was first launched under the name "Christian Youth Appeal", but the appeal soon dropped its religious overtones and its concentration on youth.

Since its beginnings AID has grown rapidly. In 1972 it had only 80 "sponsors" (its main activity, as described below, is the sponsorship of individual children by people in Britain), but by 1979 the number had risen to 32,500. AID became a charity in its own right in 1977 (rather than an appeal of Voluntary and Christian Service). In 1979 it was decided that the sponsorship scheme should be promoted under the name "Action Aid" : "Action in Distress" was causing misunderstandings with both donors (as AID is not a disaster relief agency) and overseas governments, as well as confusion with U.S. AID.
In 1978 AID's income was over £1½ million, and the amount given as aid passed £1 million for the first time. It has a small staff in Britain, and expatriate field officers with locally employed assistants.

A3 MAIN ACTIVITIES

AID gives aid to children in India, Kenya and Burundi, principally for educational work, but also in health and agricultural programmes. In 1979 AID was planning new work in the Gambia. Most aid is given through a sponsorship scheme whereby, for selected children, school fees are paid, school uniforms and books bought and school meals supplied. By the middle of 1979 there were 32,500 sponsors.

A4 AID'S VIEW OF THE DEVELOPMENT/UNDERDEVELOPMENT

In January 1978 AID produced two leaflets for its supporters on "What is Development?" and "Aid".

On development, AID rejects the use of economic growth alone as an objective, and warns against the dangers of imposing European values and of not appreciating other cultures. According to AID, development is

"...raising the living standards of the poor. Economic growth is thus an indispensable part of development."

"...building a free, just and humane society, where people are helped to fulfil their potential as human beings"

"...encouraging people to discover and promote all that's best in their culture."

"...something that grows from within. Outsiders may help, but it is the people of the country who have to make it work, and who have, in the future, to live with its results."

The leaflet on aid begins at looking at different types of aid, the performance of countries against the 0.7 per cent GNP target set by the UN, and at some of the reasons why people should give
aid - "Morally, we ought to", "It's in our (economic) interests", and "To avoid another war".

The AID view is

"...that under present circumstances aid is essential:

a) to attack immediately hunger, illiteracy, unemployment, high mortality rates, etc. The poor cannot wait while long-term plans and large-scale structural change are discussed.

b) to help developing countries create their own organisations and the sort of societies they wish to live in."

However, the statement goes on to say:

"...that does not mean that any kind of aid will do. Nor is aid enough. For those reasons any agency like AID has to keep its aid policy under continuous and critical review, and to examine other ways of influencing public opinion."

The leaflet then notes some criticisms of aid, such as

"Aid soothes consciences, but changes nothing. Why? Because the real problem is not the Third World (as aid implies) but the First, the rich",

and

"It also perpetuates a state and a feeling of dependence"

but in reply, AID quotes Nyerere:

"The transfer of wealth from the rich to the poor is a matter of right: it is not an appropriate matter for "charity"."

These two leaflets have been considered in some detail because they convey an impression of AID as charity whose concern for people overseas is accompanied by a realistic view of the potential, limitations, and even dangers of aid-giving. A brief look at AID in practice, however, raises serious questions about whether AID's programme "soothes consciences, but changes nothing", or "perpetuates a state and feeling of dependence", and about the ways in which AID is "influencing public opinion".

In its brochures AID calls for concern for the basic needs of children: articles draw attention to the number who face "death or illness" through malnutrition, and photographs show children naked or poorly clad. According to AID literature, however, AID
sees the solution to many of the problems of poor children in the
provision of education, and this generally means formal schooling.
Whether the lack of education is always a key constraint is doubtful
(see, for example, Section 13.3, and Mbiti's (* (2), p.12) conclusion
that in Kenya "formal education does not correlate at the lower and
higher levels with innovativeness"), and in some cases may not even be
a relevant factor. For example, on India AID's 1977 Annual Report
states that :

"The future lies in developing irrigation and dry farming techniques
as well as diversifying from a dependence on subsistence agriculture.
Basic education is a prerequisite for both these steps."

On drought problems in the Isiolo District of Kenya, the report states
that :

"...the traditional nomadic existence is no longer able to supply even
a minimum standard of living. The Kenyan Government has stepped in with
famine relief but a long-term reconstruction of these communities'
life-style is inevitable. The first step in the process is getting
the primary school age children into classes."

In these situations, many would dispute the priority given to education,
and if the primary basic needs are seen to be food, health, shelter and
employment, AID's approach to the provision of basic needs is unlikely
to be relatively efficient. Even if schooling were considered to be the
key to development in the long-term, the use, for example, of about
£50 p.a. in the sponsorship of a child in an area of India where the
average annual income is estimated to be £23 p.a. is unlikely to
represent the best use of resources, and the purchase of school
uniforms may be considered an extravagance.

There are signs, however, that AID is becoming more conscious of the
limitations of its approach, and more emphasis and greater publicity
seems to be being given to vocational training and other projects.
Education appropriate to live in the rural areas and the need to stop
the drift to the towns is a main theme of many AID articles, and the
new work being planned in the Gambia will consist of training in basic
literacy and numeracy, health and nutrition and vocational skills,
carried out in "community centres" in the villages.
AID's work does not, however, appear to be aimed at any structural changes in the economic or political positions of those it helps. Although in its leaflet on development it refers to the need for "some fairly drastic changes in trade terms and political attitudes", an AID staff member at a conference in 1978 claimed that AID's role was to help people but without getting involved in politics, or even having political views. Nevertheless, in all countries in which AID is working, it is doing so in close co-operation with the government. Moreover, in its literature, government links are presented as positive factors in programmes, which is surprising in view of some of AID's choices of countries. The AID director has claimed (at a conference in 1978) for example, that AID works in Kenya because it was invited to do so by President Kenyatta, and in its magazine "Action News" in 1979 (no. 16) it spoke of new work in Kenya in response to a directive from the President (it does not state to whom), and the supporting photograph is of Arap Moi with the Queen during his state visit to Britain. Even agencies which are generally uncritical of Kenyan policies do not look for such close identification with the Kenyan regime.

However, quite apart from the general political statements of AID, its style of work - individualistic and aimed at children - is not likely to bring about fundamental changes. As put by Heatley (*, p.40):

"It is hard to see how this kind of activity can meet the requirement that aid should increase the power of the poor in the Third World. By giving only to children in this very individualistic way, its funds cannot possibly be used collectively by organised groups of the underprivileged. Moreover, the concept of relief via adoption creates dependence of children and their families on donors in the West - and therefore both mirrors and strengthens the existing power structure in which the Third World as a whole is dependent on the West."

A5 AID IN BRITAIN

AID's work in Britain is mainly fund-raising, and in this the main thrust is the sponsorship scheme. This involves becoming a "postal parent":

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"Being a 'postal parent' means having a very real personal involvement. Before you finally decide you are sent a case-history of a child awaiting sponsorship.

This contains a photograph together with such details as we have of age, lifestyle and family situation.

Then, if you do agree to sponsor, you and 'your' child can exchange letters throughout the time of your sponsorship."

To many critics this approach is seen as institutionalised paternalism. The image portrayed is of hungry, passive people, objects for pity, dependent on AID for help: an advert for for sponsors showing a naked, malnourished child states:

"Without your help, this child faces a bleak future. And quite possibly a brief one...

Please help. We're relying on you. And so are the children."

(Action News no. 17).

Moreover, in Action In Distress literature the needs of the sponsor seem to be an important consideration. For example, the section on Kenya of the 1977 Annual Report noted

"...a higher than average drop-out rate as many of the children find it difficult to live away from their families. But we feel that this inconvenience to sponsors is justified when measured against the tremendous needs of these children",

and

"...there are occasionally times when the child's ability to communicate through the written word is limited. Sometimes, indeed, it may be minimal as a result of brain damage caused by malnutrition."

The very first section of an internal report from Kenya for part of 1979 deals with the problem (and, some may say, the absurdity) of servicing sponsors:

"There has been a certain number of complaints from sponsors that they have received no communication from or about the children they are sponsoring...

While an improvement in the quantity of letters to sponsors can be reported, the quality leaves a lot to be desired. (A fieldworker) spent time in June observing Fieldworkers taking letter-writing sessions with sponsored children. The methods used and the assistance given to the children were disappointing. The practice of gathering all the sponsored children into one classroom to copy a letter written on the blackboard by the Fieldworker must stop.
"The next one-week training course for Fieldworkers...will concentrate on letter-writing. In particular, ways will be looked for to ensure 
greater personal attention by the Fieldworker to individual children 
greater responsiveness by the children to the letters from their sponsors."

It would seem difficult to reconcile this approach with AID's stated 
recognition of the dangers of creating "a feeling of dependency", or 
its belief that aid is a "right" of the poor rather than "charity".

It is certainly true that AID has attracted the attention of many people 
in Britain, and that is running a very successful fund-raising 
organisation. Whether or not, and in what way it is "influencing public 
opinion" (something which it claims is important) is another matter. AID 
argues that sponsorship is educational - through an exchange of letters 
the sponsor gets to know something of Third World problems - but it 
would require some research to see whether AID is leading people to 
see the Third World in terms of poverty and passive dependency, or 
whether sponsors go further and see the political and economic structures 
behind the underdevelopment. Although AID's magazines ("Action News") 
contain some informative articles, the copies examined in this study 
say little about the relations between the Third World and the West 
(with the possible exception of a column on World Bank/UNCTAD-type news 
and some book reviews (e.g. of that by Susan George (*)) and contain 
no analysis of socio-economic structures of even the countries in 
which AID is working, and it therefore seems unlikely that AID will 
lead its supporters to a deeper understanding of world problems.

However, in 1979 AID announced its affiliation to World Development 
Movement (WDM), an organisation which campaigns for better aid and trade 
terms for the Third World: a study of how many AID supporters join 
WDM, and why they do so, may in some ways give a measure of the 
educational effects of sponsorship.

Although the above discussion has concentrated on the sponsorship scheme, 
AID, like the other NGOs considered here, has local support groups and 
runs special fund-raising functions. It also has a trading department 
running about 50 shops, and an education department which gets schools 
to join the sponsorship scheme. However, in 1979 there were plans for 
an AID youth organisation which may have a much wider educational 
effect.
B. CHRISTIAN AID

B1 HISTORY

The origins of Christian Aid can be traced to "Christian Reconstruction in Europe", a fund-raising effort of the British churches during the Second World War. After the war it became the 'Department of Inter-Church Aid and Refugee Service' of the British Council of Churches: it had close links with the World Council of Churches (WCC, formed in 1948), and it was soon realised that the problems which it was dealing with were not confined to one continent, and were not just short-term post-war phenomena.

During the 1950's, refugee work was a major activity, and in 1959, World Refugee Year, the organisation raised more money than any other NGO in the world. At the same time activities were being diversified into long-term development projects. In 1958, Inter-Church Aid played a major part in creating V.S.O. With the increasing success of the "Christian Aid Week" appeals (started in 1957), the name of the organisation was changed in 1964 to "Christian Aid". It is now a registered charity in its own right, but remains a division of the British Council of Churches.

B2 SIZE

In the year ended 31st March 1979, Christian Aid's income was £5,380,000 of which £3 million was raised from Christian Aid Week activities. About £340,000 was received from the government through the co-financing of projects, but it is Christian Aid's policy not to let government grants exceed 10% of income. Of a total project expenditure of £4,610,000, £2,880,000 was classed as "development" work and about £440,000 was spent on work in Britain (excluding administrative costs).
B3 MAIN ACTIVITIES

Christian Aid raises money to support Third World development projects, to provide help for refugees and in emergencies, to provide scholarships for overseas students, to support projects in development education and race relations in Britain, and gives some support to the work of churches overseas. Development work, however, accounts for over 60 per cent of Christian Aid's expenditure (other than on administration).

Christian Aid does not operate projects overseas and has no permanent overseas representatives of its own (although it often uses those of WCC). Instead, it works through local churches, councils of churches in different countries, WCC programmes, and occasionally through secular organisations, but generally only when suitable church partner organisations do not exist.

In the year ended March 1979, the geographical distribution of grants was as follows:

- Africa: 26%
- Asia: 26%
- Latin America: 10%
- Emergencies: 6%
- Middle East: 4%
- Caribbean: 3%
- Pacific: 3%
- Others (including UK): 22%

B4 POLICY TOWARDS DEVELOPMENT/UNDERDEVELOPMENT

Christian Aid’s constitution defines its objects as follows:

"a) The primary object shall be the furtherance of charitable purposes which relieve or combat malnutrition, hunger, disease, sickness or distress throughout the world;

b) The secondary object shall be the furtherance of charitable purposes which advance or assist such other charitable work as may be carried on by or with the support or approval of the British Council of Churches."
Thus Christian Aid's work arises from a concern for the provision of basic needs, and other policy statements indicate that this is based on Christian teachings and a concept of justice. In keeping with this basic-needs approach, a Christian Aid committee in 1975 recommended that 75 per cent of the overseas expenditure should be in countries with a per capita GNP of less than US$200 p.a. In 1977, however, the Christian Aid Board noted that

"...it may be more important to support projects which offer a strong likelihood that they will reach the poorest individuals and groups whatever their nationality, than to select projects on the ground that they are located in countries which are reckoned the poorest by the World Bank's yardstick based on national GNP."  

(from an internal Christian Aid paper)

A Christian Aid list of desirable characteristics of projects also shows a concern for the basic needs of "the poorest of the poor", but at the same time shows a concern for promoting self-reliance, avoiding dependency, tackling the causes rather than the symptoms of problems, and long-term objectives. Thus Christian Aid's basic-needs approach attempts to be much more than the provision of welfare aid. However, a study of the policies adopted by Christian Aid in different situations demonstrates a lack of consistency and apparent contradictions, as discussed below.

Of the NGOs considered in this thesis, Christian Aid is second only to War on Want in openly recognising the political factors behind world poverty. According to the Annual Report for the year ended March 1978:

"Preaching in Westminster Abbey on Sunday 4th September the Director of Christian Aid said: "Christians are committed to all that makes for change from a world of injustice to one in which God's righteousness finds some reflection."

This worried a few people, for in the context of overseas aid and development the word "change" has political implications. Most of us are happy to help bring about change in economic circumstances but are uneasy about helping to change social and political circumstances. What we have all been learning over the last few years is that economic change on the scale required for the well-being of the wider community is often impossible without prior political change. More to the point, the poor are discovering this for themselves."

And in August 1977 an internal Christian Aid paper noted that:
"Christian Aid frequently re-affirms that it is 'non-political', in the sense that it does not mount political campaigns or regard itself as a parliamentary pressure-group. It would be both naive and dishonest, however, to ignore the fact that every project which enhances the ability of the poor to improve their conditions and to resist exploitation is liable to be interpreted as having political effects. On the contrary, every project decision aims to be in some measure a contribution to promoting international justice, both in the situation where the project is carried out and by helping to awaken the donors to their global obligations."

The political nature of project support is perhaps most clearly seen in Christian Aid's work in Latin America, where, according to the 1978/79 Annual Report, poverty is

"...more directly and deliberately man-made than on any other continent ...Repressive regimes in Latin America preserve the privileges of the rich minority by legislation and armed forces. Christian Aid supports such projects as soup kitchens, clinics, nutrition and the like, but recognises that these do no more than treat the symptoms of a crippling and spiritually debilitating disease whose only cure is political and social reform."

Thus in Latin America, although Christian Aid is helping people to obtain their basic needs through projects such as legal help to peasants in the Dominican Republic to defend their rights against American multi-national companies, organisational help to migrant cotton workers in Bolivia, and grants to the Chilean Commission for Human Rights, Christian Aid is tackling the structural nature of underdevelopment.

In Africa, however, although Christian Aid has assisted refugees from Ethiopia, Western Sahara, Namibia and Zimbabwe, their approach seems to take less account of structural problems than in Latin America, and projects appear to be geared towards providing basic needs within the existing structures. One reason for the difference, of course, may be that the process of class formation and conflict is much more pronounced in Latin America than in Africa. However, it is also possible that differences arise from the nature of Christian Aid's partners overseas, and of Christian Aid's support base in Britain.

In Latin America, Christianity is in many cases the religion of the poor and oppressed, and church groups are often in the forefront of campaigns for economic and political justice. In many African countries
however, Christians are in a minority and not generally amongst the most underprivileged minorities in that through Christianity many have received education (and vice versa). Moreover, the national leadership of many churches is closely tied to the governing classes, and within many churches there is still a strong expatriate influence. Christian Aid's policy of working through local churches may therefore mean that its view of development in a country may be influenced by the social and political position of the church there. This is shown, for example, by the descriptions of Christian Aid's work in Kenya in Section 14.2, and of the National Christian Council of Kenya in Appendix IV.

However, that Christian Aid has an independent policy is shown in its attitude to the WCC's Special Fund to Combat Racism. This Fund was formed by WCC to raise money for groups struggling against racial injustice, and accordingly it made a grant for the humanitarian projects of the Patriotic Front in Zimbabwe. Although Christian Aid works closely with WCC, it has always dissociated itself from the Fund. In 1977, Christian Aid's Director maintained that "not a penny of Christian Aid money goes the World Council of Churches' Special Fund to Combat Racism - the source of so-called grants to guerillas". During 1978/79 when the matter was receiving some publicity, Christian Aid went to great lengths to reassure their supporters that they were not supporting liberation movements (even the humanitarian work of liberation movements). Propagandists sympathetic to (and allegedly financed by) South Africa produced pamphlets attacking Christian Aid's link with WCC, but Christian Aid produced a leaflet dissociating itself from the Special Fund which ran to five reprints and a total of 120,000 copies. That Christian Aid was not supporting the Fund appeared to be the main message behind Christian Aid Week in 1979.

According to the 1978/79 Annual Report,

"Christian Aid does make its own unilateral grants to relieve the hardship of communities and refugees wretchedly caught up in actions between the opposing forces in Southern Africa. But these grants are made within Christian Aid's own terms of reference consistent with its status as a registered charity. Those terms differ from those of the WCC's Special Fund whose grants, though also for humanitarian projects of relief, are additionally intended to symbolise solidarity between the Fund's contributors and the victims of racial discrimination. Christian Aid recognises the evil of this discrimination but cannot and does not use its own funds to express solidarity or anything other than compassion."

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Why should Christian Aid not wish to see its grants as an expression of solidarity with the victims of racial discrimination? In 1978 a Christian Aid article on a project in Chile was entitled "Solidarity - A Cure for Hunger" (in "Grassroots", Christian Aid, 1978), and yet the concept of solidarity does not seem acceptable in the context of African liberation. Two possible factors which create this situation are firstly an objection to violence, and secondly political influences on Christian Aid in Britain.

A Christian Aid pamphlet dated July 1979 tries to justify the organisation's non-violence stance as follows:

"Namibia is one country where there has been injustice and where many Christians support the Namibians in their struggle for freedom and the right to govern themselves.

Other Christians believe that it is never right to support violence and armed resistance. Christian Aid represents Christians who hold a variety of different opinions. Therefore as a matter of policy, it does not offer aid which can be used for violence.

Individual Christians have to make up their own minds about this - and learn to respect those who disagree with them!"

However, if this was the only argument against support for the WCC's Special Fund it would not appear to have been necessary for Christian Aid to go to such lengths in dissociating itself from the Fund, because even the Fund does not offer aid which can be used for violence.

It is therefore possible that a more significant influence on Christian Aid's policy has been the political position of many Christian Aid policy-makers and supporters. Many church leaders in Britain, especially within the Anglican church, tend towards the conservative side of the political spectrum, and the church-going public has a strong representation from the middle-aged and middle class, and is possibly therefore to the political right of the public at large (there are, of course, many exceptions, even amongst the church leadership). A policy of support for the Patriotic Front with its threat to "British interests" and to "kith and kin" in Southern Africa may be ideologically objectionable to some Christian Aid committee members and to many of their fund-raisers.
The Christian Aid Board's original explanation of its refusal to support the Special Fund - that an unearmarked contribution would be unconstitutional (Christian Aid News, April 1974) - does not seem plausible in view of Christian Aid's willingness to make block grants to other organisations, e.g. NCCK.

Summarising, although Christian Aid has a basic needs approach to development, the extent to which it is willing to challenge political and economic structures seems to vary between different parts of the world. Possible explanations of these variations may be in the different natures of overseas partner organisations, in different interpretations of Christian principles and in Christian Aid's socio-political base in Britain. (Individual staff members do not, of course, necessarily support all of Christian Aid's policies, and in particular, many members of the headquarter's staff would be happy to see Christian Aid support the WCC's Special Fund).

B5  CHRISTIAN AID IN BRITAIN

Christian Aid has an education department producing materials "to stimulate informed discussion and foster understanding so that the root causes of poverty are seen in the light of both compassion and justice" (1978/79 Annual Report). These materials are chiefly aimed at schools and student groups, although they are no doubt also useful in stimulating fund-raising. However, Christian Aid takes a fairly progressive line in fund-raising - child-sponsorship schemes are considered inappropriate and even in project sponsorship, each sponsoring group is given materials "which enable the chosen project to be seen in the broader context of development". Education and fund-raising work is carried out through 36 field officers around Britain, although the main fund-raising event is Christian Aid week which receives the support of most churches.

Additionally, Christian Aid undertakes what Lissner terms "education by proxy" (* Lissner, p.197) - the funding of other organisations to carry out educational work which the funding agency may not be able to, or may not wish to for fear of alienating supporters, undertake itself.
World development Movement and Returned Volunteer Action are among those which have been supported in this way, as well as the Chile Committee for Human Rights before objections were raised by the Charity Commissioners.

Christian Aid also produces a quarterly newspaper which contains reports from overseas projects as well as news of fund-raising events in Britain. However, reporting is not confined to matters of specific concern to Christian Aid but also covers government policies, often in a critical way, towards aid, UNCTAD, etc.
C. OXFAM

C1 HISTORY

Like Christian Aid, Oxfam had its beginning during the Second World War. In 1942, the "Oxford Committee for Famine Relief" was set up to assist Greek civilians who lacked food and clothing as a result of the war. Up until 1948, work was confined to Europe, but in 1949, relief operations in other continents began: Palestinian refugees in 1949, the Bihar famine in 1950/51, Korean refugees in 1951/52, and Hungarian refugees in 1956/57. Throughout the 1950's, Oxfam was a relief organisation, clothing making up a large proportion of the value of its aid (above 80 per cent until 1953/54, and even 10 years later it was more than 20 per cent), and like Christian Aid in the 1950's, refugee problems were a main concern.

World Refugee Year in 1959 increased the annual aid total from £464,951 in 1958/59 to £876,035 in 1959/60, and there were further increases to over £1 million in 1960/61, and over £2 million in 1963/64.

In the 1960's the emphasis changed to long-term development work and the organisation continued to grow. Field directors were appointed to administer the work overseas, and regional organisers to promote fund-raising in Britain. In 1974 there was a decision to spend up to 5 per cent of income on educational work in Britain.

C2 SIZE

In the year ended April 1979, Oxfam paid £5,769,873 in grants to overseas projects and sent supplies valued at £226,361, making a total of nearly £6 million. The total income was £9,662,403 (of which £1,632,324 was used for fund-raising and administration in Britain, and £701,711 for overseas administration). In 1979 Oxfam was employing 36 overseas field staff, and about 200 staff in Britain.
C3 MAIN ACTIVITIES

Oxfam mainly works by making financial grants to projects which make contact with, or are contacted by Oxfam field staff. Available funds are allocated to different geographic areas, and within these areas country and sectoral priorities are chosen. In 1977/78 and 1978/79 the geographic and sectoral breakdowns of the total aid were as follows:

Table 1A
Oxfam: aid by geographic area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>1977/78</th>
<th>1978/79</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>31.5%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caribbean and Latin America</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1B
Oxfam: aid by sector

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>1977/78</th>
<th>1978/79</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social development</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Oxfam also operates a scheme ("Bridge") for marketing handicrafts from overseas groups in Britain. Like Christian Aid and Save the Children Fund, it is a member of the Disasters Emergency Committee (a group of NGOs which co-ordinate their appeals when major disasters arise) and its activities have included the development of technologies for emergency housing and sanitation in post-disaster relief work.
Oxfam takes a basic needs approach to development. In an organisation so diverse in its activities and geographical concerns, however, it cannot be expected that there will be a clear and consistent policy line which all staff will follow, but Oxfam literature points to a policy of support for projects which are community-based and which assist people towards being able to provide their own basic-needs.

For example:

"Oxfam's overseas work includes a new emphasis on helping the poorest of the poor - often in rural areas - to achieve basic needs: food, health, shelter, work. But it also stresses the need for people to have some control over their lives and environment."

(*Oxfam (1))

According to a statement of Oxfam's aid policy in 1978, Oxfam adopts "...wherever possible an integrated approach to the problems of poverty and hunger, realising that an isolated attack on any one problem will seldom have lasting benefits unless a general improvement in people's conditions can be achieved.

For this to be successful the people in need must themselves be fully involved in projects leading to greater self-reliance. They must be aware of their own potential, decide for themselves the improvements they desire, and be prepared and helped to work towards them. Our aid programme, therefore, has a strong emphasis on developing the human resources for self-help of local communities, especially the very poorest groups, and assisting them in attacking their poverty at grass-roots level."

(from "Oxfam at work throughout the World, 1977/78")

The "problems of poverty and hunger" referred to above are also prominent elements in some of Oxfam's advertisements and fund-raising pamphlets.

Very little reference is made in Oxfam literature to the international aspects of development, and references to political and economic repression within countries tend to be vague. Moreover, they have been getting progressively more vague in recent years. Heatley (*, p.40) has noted a change of stance from 1974/75:

"...we can act as a small-scale socialist catalyst;...helping small groups to become self-reliant and to combat the oppressive factors in their environment" (Heatley's emphasis)
to a less radical statement in 1976/77:

"Oxfam is having to assess the social and economic structures in which poor farmers and others are forced to live, and to seek ways in which they can be encouraged to react to those conditions."

A statement of Oxfam's policy in 1979 was even more guarded:

"The reasons and causes of poverty are manifold and vary from one country to another; often they are involved and difficult to understand. They depend so much on the local situation, the people themselves with their varied backgrounds, traditions and cultures. Problems of land, employment and economics are relevant, and over and over again we must try to help the people to understand what they themselves can do to better their own conditions."

(from "Oxfam at work throughout the World, 1978/79")

The impression given in the above quotation that Oxfam is unwilling to mention the political aspects of underdevelopment is strengthened by the annual report for the same year: under a prominent heading, "The Political Debate", Oxfam states little other than its intention to respond to need in a "non-violent, non-racial, non-religious, non-sectarian way". Lissner (*, p.248) has accused Oxfam of a combination of "progressive terminology and traditional operational practice": it appears that Oxfam has moved towards more traditional terminology, perhaps in response to stricter controls by the Charity Commissioners, and perhaps in response to perceived changes in political attitudes in Britain, fund-raisers preferring a more conservative line.

Heatley (*, p.41) has criticised Oxfam's allocations of aid to different countries, little aid being given to countries trying to steer a socialist, self-reliant path to development. A examination of Oxfam aid to countries in Africa shows this criticism to have some validity. Table IC shows aid to the 15 African countries (with populations over 1,000,000) which had per capita GNP's of less than US$200 p.a. in 1976 and other major recipients of Oxfam aid on an aid per capita basis. This certainly shows that in recent years no aid has been sent to the ex-Portuguese colonies for development work, and although Tanzania ranks highly, so do Togo, Malawi and Kenya, countries with free enterprise economies and governments which do not always show great respect for democracy and economic justice.
### Table IC

Oxfam's aid to selected countries in Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>GNP under $200</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>x (1)</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>7 (2)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Volta</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>97</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td>57</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaire</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td>164</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>34</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>37</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>1 (3)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other major recipients</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td>156</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**

(1) Although in some respects socialist, many are critical of its oppression of human rights and its wars against socialist liberation movements.

(2) Much of this aid is for work with refugees.

(3) All aid to Mozambique is for refugee and other relief work.

It could be argued that the nature of the projects supported are more important than the countries in which they are set, and here Heatley's criticisms of Oxfam's large programme in Brazil do not seem valid, even by her own criteria (ibid). In 1978/79, for example, Oxfam gave more to groups in Chile (£345,822) than to any African country, and almost as much to Upper Volta in aid per capita terms. In this respect Oxfam shows itself to be more radical in its actions than in its recent policy statements, although as with Christian Aid the approaches in Africa and Latin America appear to be different. In 1979 in Upper Volta, for example, this writer was told by Oxfam field staff that in that country poverty alone was a justification for Oxfam's large input, and that Oxfam did not require a political analysis: many Voltaic intellectuals, however, analyse their country using theories of underdevelopment which have been developed in Latin America. Heatley also reports on a study made of Oxfam's programme in Bangladesh which suggests that the reality does not match the rhetoric of self-reliance, local participation, etc.

C5 OXFAM IN BRITAIN

Oxfam is one of the best-known of British charities, and through the widespread advertising of its need for funds, it has made its name a household word. Throughout the country it has about 550 shops and as many support groups. The shops sell donated goods (principally second-hand clothes) and other items from the Third World or with Third World links.

Oxfam's educational work is directed mainly towards schools, and a number of education officers are based in various parts of the country to help teachers introduce Third World topics into their curricula. An Education Department produces study packs and other resource materials on peoples and countries with whom and in which Oxfam is working.

Oxfam does not often involve itself directly in campaigns aimed at changing government policies. Instead, it gives some support to World Development Movement (a non-charitable organisation which Oxfam, along with Christian Aid, War on Want and others helped create, and which
campaigns in a liberal, non-militant way for changes in aid and trade policies), Third World First (a more militant student off-shoot of Oxfam) and the "New Internationalist" magazine. Relationships with Third World First and the "New Internationalist" however, have not always been easy when these organisations have made criticisms of the Oxfam line. Oxfam itself has a Public Affairs Unit for the "distribution and dissemination of researched material for politicians, trade unionists, etc.", but with Oxfam's apolitical stance and pressure from the Charity Commissioners, this Unit can have little room for manoeuvre. An example of Oxfam's nervousness about political controversy arose in July 1979 when Oxfam was asked to take part in a joint NGO approach to the government requesting more aid for Tanzania. Some Oxfam Council members (according to a newspaper report) blocked Oxfam's participation in the approach on the grounds that Nyerere is a socialist. Nevertheless, an Oxfam report pointed out that "What governments do is politics... It follows, therefore, that you cannot keep politics out of development" ("Guardian", p.4, 21.7.79).
D. SAVE THE CHILDREN FUND (SCF)

D1 HISTORY

SCF is the oldest of the NGOs examined in this appendix, beginning in 1919 as a consequence of the First World War, in much the same way as Christian Aid and Oxfam were to emerge from the second. In 1979 SCF celebrated its diamond jubilee.

The founder of SCF was Eglantyne Jebb. According to an SCF booklet, she was born of the landed gentry, and after being thwarted in love, threw herself into voluntary social work with the poor of Britain. In 1913 she travelled to Macedonia to administer a relief programme for victims of the Balkan Wars, and there she saw at first hand the plight of children in such situations. Towards the end of the First World War she learnt of the suffering being caused by the allied blockade of Austria, and without the permission of the censor, she had published and distributed a handbill showing a photograph of an emaciated Austrian baby. The ensuing court case brought huge publicity — a public meeting four days later filled the Albert Hall in London — and out of this publicity Save the Children Fund was born.

Within two years nearly a million pounds had been raised and in 1921 teams of relief workers were sent to the Volga basin where 157 million meals were provided following the harvest failure there. Since then, work has expanded both in Britain and in all continents of the world.

From the start, SCF has had close links with similar organisations which were established in other developed countries, and what is now the UN's Declaration of the Rights of the Child began as a unifying charter for these organisations drafted by Eglantyne Jebb. "Save the Children Funds" now exist in Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Norway, New Zealand and USA, and with SCF (UK) they form the Save the Children Alliance (branches of SCF in South Africa are also linked to the Alliance). This study, however, is only concerned with SCF in Britain.
In 1978/79 SCF had a total income of £6,638,715, of which £4,769,572 was spent on "Relief and Welfare work" as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Cost of relief work</th>
<th>Sponsorships</th>
<th>Value of gifts in kind distributed</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overseas</td>
<td>£2,157,128</td>
<td>£641,611</td>
<td>£615,145</td>
<td>£3,413,884</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In UK</td>
<td>£1,346,559</td>
<td>£8,511</td>
<td>£618</td>
<td>£1,355,688</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>£3,503,687</td>
<td>£650,122</td>
<td>£615,763</td>
<td>£4,769,572</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(The difference between income and the above expenditure is accounted for by fund-raising costs (£900,025), transfers to reserves, and other administrative costs).

### D3 MAIN ACTIVITIES

According to a SCF magazine in 1979 ("The World's Children"),

"Today The Save the Children Fund is Britain's largest international children's charity, spending £6 m. each year to help children in more than 50 countries. Its 2,000 fieldworkers run clinics for mothers and children in areas like Afghanistan and Bangladesh. In southern Africa alone, they feed some 250,000 children every day. Here in Britain the Fund sponsors more than 150 projects, including research into vandalism, gypsy education, and community play-groups and youth clubs in Northern Ireland."

Overseas, SCF's principal work is in the health care of children through mother-and-child clinics, immunisation programmes (for example, SCF is embarking on a "Stop polio" campaign which is expected to last for 25 years) and nutrition programmes. In this work are employed about 40 expatriate administrators overseas, and about 50 medical staff. The number of staff employed locally totals more than 600.
In many countries SCF is also engaged in providing schooling costs to individual pupils, mostly in secondary schools. These pupils are usually supported through a "sponsorship" scheme similar to that used by Action in Distress (see Section A3 of this appendix) - such sponsorship of individuals has been part of SCF's approach since its early years.

Table 1E shows the main recipients of SCF aid in Africa:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>540</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Volta</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>470</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seychelles</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>610</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Britain, SCF runs Day Care Centres and playgroups for children, and special centres for the handicapped and children from "disturbed backgrounds", and employs more than 450 full-time or part-time staff.

D4 SCF'S DEVELOPMENT POLICY

SCF is concerned with the provision of basic needs: in a "seriously underdeveloped" country

"...initially, foreign aid should be mainly devoted to ensuring that nobody suffers from malnutrition or the lack of adequate accommodation and clothing, and that all are protected from avoidable illnesses and preventable epidemics. When this has been achieved, aid if still forthcoming can be directed towards the technological development of the country"

(from an SCF booklet on self-help, 1978 (?)).
In this approach (according to a letter from a senior staff member) SCF has made
"...no statement on the process of development and indeed our views are continuously changing as new evidence becomes available. We have always regarded the family unit development, both economically and socially as the key to all development, particularly in terms of benefit to children".

In examining SCF pamphlets and reports, however, two themes which often recur are (i) work in collaboration with local authorities who will eventually take over programmes when SCF withdraws, and (ii) the need for self-help, which is in part related to the first theme.

In 1977 in Jordan this writer was able to see some of the difficulties in withdrawal. SCF had recently decided that Jordan was not a priority area and that its activities there could be passed over to a Jordanian SCF which had been formed and which hoped to operate with local support. The support, however, was not forthcoming, and for a while it looked as if a children's home would need to close as neither the government nor the local community would take responsibility for it. Eventually, UNDP made a grant to cover the costs while a more permanent solution was sought. And in spite of SCF's decision to withdraw, in each of 1977/78 and 1978/79 more than £5,000 was sent to Jordan.

SCF has gone a long way towards accepting the need for appropriate medical care rather than high-cost hospital programmes. The 1978/79 Annual Report states that
"The standards set by Save the Children must be appropriate to the resources of skill and finance of the host country. This is often difficult to achieve but the Fund would not be serving the world's children if this aim was not a priority in the planning of new work."

Discussions with SCF staff in Upper Volta in 1979, however, suggest that the above principles are not always applied very rigorously, and that integration with the government's services is not always a priority. An SCF administrator wished to keep SCF's work outside the government system so that SCF could maintain its control and a level of efficiency which he did not think the government could match because of its lack of resources. Moreover, SCF could purchase and transport
its drugs from Britain while government-run clinics often faced supply problems. As a matter of policy it was stated that SCF would not finance a government project unless SCF could take it over and run it itself. This independence of approach was a source of frustration for the local médecin chef who himself was committed to appropriate health policies and wished to co-ordinate the work of the various NGOs operating in his region. Although it may be unfair to generalise from a single SCF programme, it should be noted that the administrator was someone with experience of SCF work in several other countries.

SCF has produced a pamphlet entitled "The Importance of Self-Help in Countries which rely on Foreign Aid". Here the main concern seems to be preparing recipients of aid for "the day when foreign aid dries up". It argues the need for "teaching and inducing self-help" because a time will come when "SCF must transfer its help to some other even more deserving cause or country". But to SCF, self-help seems to be something to be taught: Bangladeshi communities have been "taught to grow cash crops to enable them to buy food if their staple food crops are destroyed" and thus to help themselves; in Guatemala SCF has established centres where "mothers are taught how to look after their children", and others are "trained to carry on this work in their own villages". There SCF co-operates with organisations which are "teaching better methods of agriculture and improved building techniques".

According to SCF,

"Such measures teach the people of the country to help themselves and hasten the day when, without depending on foreign aid, even the poorest will be free from hunger, adequately housed, and protected from epidemics and the diseases caused by malnutrition, bad sanitation and polluted drinking water."

The implication appears to be that what Guatemala needs is improved technology: there is no mention of the fact that Western technology is already in Guatemala with the multi-national companies, and that a distorted economy and an inequitable distribution of land may have something to do with the poverty there. In fact, to SCF "self-help" seems to be synonymous with the teaching of new skills, and there is no suggestion that self-help may be a counter to underdevelopment caused by dependency on the West.
Heatley (*, p.43) has examined the emotional appeal of an SCF brochure and has concluded that the message is:

"Poverty is inevitable, a fact of life rather than a result of unjust social and economic structures. Poor people depend on us, not only for money but also to teach them how to look after themselves."

Certainly the discussion of SCF's views on self-help support the view of the poor as being dependent and passive. This is not to say, however, that SCF is unaware of unjust structures: in a pamphlet entitled "Who Cares?" (undated), SCF makes a remarkably clear statement on links between the developed countries and the Third World. The belief that poverty is due to chance, or to problems internal to the Third World are attacked, and the statement continues:

"These sentiments ignore the interdependence between rich and poor nations and, thereby, reduce the necessity for redressing the balance. But they also ignore the fact that virtually every Third World country was originally colonised by European nations to obtain cheap supplies of raw materials and ready markets for manufactured goods. Although some colonial powers, including Britain, provided tangible and lasting benefits, for example, in the form of transport networks or administrative structures, this does not negate the self-interest originally involved. The belief that rich nations are in no way responsible for the plight of the Third World deliberately overlooks the fact that the industrialised countries control world trade and shipping, demanding cheap raw materials whilst erecting tariff barriers to protect home industries. The only countries which have managed to obtain substantially higher prices for a raw material have been the oil producers."

The above paragraph could equally well have appeared in the publications of the more radical War on Want or the campaigning World Development Movement. However, where SCF differs from these organisations may be not so much in analysis as in what they see as solutions. Heatley's interpretation of the SCF message (see above) should perhaps be changed to "Unjust structures are inevitable - let's try to make sure people don't suffer too much within them..." (This acceptance of inequity becomes apparent when the pamphlet "Who Cares?" considers Britain: "No matter how affluent the British nation becomes in the future, it seems a tragic inevitability that some families will always be subjected to the cruel handicaps of poverty and deprivation").

However, this critique of SCF's policy has so far been largely confined to an examination of their publications, and some may argue that these are only important in the support they give for SCF overseas. Table I
(in D3 above) shows SCF's aid to Africa. If Heatley (see C4) is critical of Oxfam for not giving more aid to socialist countries trying to achieve self-reliance, then she may be especially horrified at the distribution of SCF's work. With the exception of Ethiopia (and possibly now the Seychelles), all the major recipient countries in Africa are ones in which free enterprise appears to be valued more highly than economic justice. SCF has been involved in Ethiopia since the time of Haile Selassie, and it was criticised both for its apparent support for that regime as well as for the nature of some of its projects (over-Westernised orphanages from which it would be difficult to re-integrate children into Ethiopian society), and it may now be criticised for working with a government which has suppressed political opposition and which is fighting a war against the Eritrean liberation movements. SCF would no doubt counter that it aids children and not governments, but its support of projects may not be interpreted so simplistically by Africans who are looking for more fundamental changes in their situations.

In conclusion, SCF is certainly a relief agency, but its relief may be more sophisticated than traditional welfare aid. However, it could be criticised for doing little to tackle the root causes of Third World problems, and for doing nothing that is likely to lead to any structural change in the position of the poorest groups. Its work in countries which may be considered reactionary and which have economic systems which aggravate the problems of child destitution is perhaps consistent with its policies.

D5 SCF IN BRITAIN

Unlike the other NGOs considered in this appendix, SCF uses a major part of its income in Britain (in 1978/79, 28 per cent of project expenditure was in UK). SCF runs day centres for children, community play groups, hospital play groups, play groups for gypsies, and residential centres for the "intermediate treatment" of children on "the fringes of delinquency", and for children from "disturbed backgrounds" who need to be educated away from their homes.
Like the other NGOs considered here, SCF has a network of local fund-raising groups - 784 branches throughout the country as well as schools which give support. Money is also raised through sponsorship schemes (see above), shops, Christmas card sales, special events, etc. Although SCF has a Schools Department, the materials produced (at least, those encountered during this study) are more geared towards SCF's work than some of the educational materials of Christian Aid, Oxfam and War on Want.

Perhaps the most interesting part of the SCF Annual Reports come at the beginnings and ends - the lists of Council members, and the area organisers. The President is Princess Anne, and the Vice-Presidents include 5 archbishops, 3 other leaders of religious denominations, and 9 other titled or "right-honourable" people out of a total of 22 Vice-Presidents in all. The Council contains 12 titled or decorated people out of a total of 47, which is not to surprising as organisations often co-opt members because of their status and contacts. The real surprise is with the branch organisers: out of 31 (which excludes those dealing with "Industry and Commerce") more than 50 per cent are ex-military men - a lieutenant colonel, a colonel, 5 majors, 2 naval commanders and a captain, and 6 wing-commanders! One can only assume that SCF's support base is closely aligned with the establishment, and this no doubt explains (as well as being a consequence of) SCF's non-radical line overseas.
E. VOLUNTARY SERVICE OVERSEAS (VSO)

E1 HISTORY

VSO began in 1958 when 14 school-leavers were sent to work for a year in Nigeria, Ghana and Sarawak. The organisation quickly grew: five years later there were more than 500 "volunteers" overseas, about 30 per cent of them being graduates or people with other post-school qualifications. In 1966/67 the number nearly reached 1500 of which two-thirds were graduate/qualified volunteers.

The idea behind VSO came principally from Alec Dickson, an ex-colonial officer who was interested in youth work and who had seen something of the work-camp movement in Europe. An account of the beginnings of VSO written by a former deputy director (*Adams) suggests that VSO was established with several very different objectives:

- to provide a service where the service of volunteers may be needed;

- to provide opportunities for young people in Britain:
  "there was need for a stimulus, a challenge, which could restore to life some of the excitement it had held for previous generations and which seemed to have been squeezed out of it by the benevolent machinery of the welfare state".

  (*Adams, p.42)

  (The ending of compulsory national service seems to have been a factor in the thinking);

- to create a new sort of relationship with the peoples of colonies which were approaching independence:
  "...once independence had freed both sides from a relationship which inevitably generated frictions of all kinds, it would be easy, and very desirable, to create a new relationship, a more easy-going and spontaneous one...(Britain) should be thinking not in terms of "pulling out" but rather of going in on a different basis, of looking for fresh openings and planning fresh initiatives...(as) partners in a joint venture"

  (*Adams, p.44)

Because the early volunteers were sent to projects arranged through Dickson's colonial service contacts, overseas administration was not a problem. With the expansion of the programme, however, a structure had to be found through which new projects could be contacted and support given, when necessary, to serving volunteers. At the time of Dickson's
initiative, the British Council was considering establishing a similar scheme, and consequently there was much contact between the two organisations. This made the British Council a natural choice as the overseas representative of VSO, and the British Council link, which, in 1980, is still strong although diminishing, has no doubt been a major influence on the development of VSO's policy.

The nature of VSO's programme soon became more closely related to the demand for manpower in developing countries, and consequently the emphasis in VSO's programme shifted from school-leavers to more qualified volunteers. The school-leaver programme ended in the early 1970's, and although volunteers still tend to be young, VSO is increasingly trying to recruit people with work experience as well as formal training. Additionally, all volunteers now serve for two years.

Christian Aid (or Inter-Church Aid as it then was) financed VSO in its early years, but funding for VSO has increasingly come from the government. Since 1978, 90 per cent of VSO's costs of administration, recruiting and training volunteers and of their air fares have come from the government, and VSO has accepted a close relationship with the official British aid programme. VSO may therefore be regarded as a quasi-governmental organisation rather than an NGO.

It is claimed that VSO provided the model for the American Peace Corps, as well as for other national volunteer-sending organisations in Europe. There are, however, differences in the policies and operational methods of the various volunteer organisations, and in Britain, VSO's approach is significantly different from those of smaller volunteer-sending organisations which receive the same percentage level of government support, and which, together with VSO, constitute the "British Volunteer Programme".

At 31 March 1978, VSO had 956 volunteers working overseas. This was the first time for several years that the number had dropped below 1,000, principally due to a decrease in the numbers being sent to secondary school posts.
The cost of the operation in the year to March 1978 was £1,245,460, of which £1,036,725 (83 per cent) was contributed by the British Government. (These costs exclude the salaries paid to volunteers overseas, which generally are supplied by the host projects.)

**E3 MAIN ACTIVITIES**

VSO sends people to work on two-year assignments in the Third World. In general, volunteers are young people with a formal qualification (most are graduates), and increasingly those recruited have had some practical work experience in Britain. They are "volunteers" in that they receive salaries only sufficient to cover modest living costs (generally equivalent to a local salary rather than to the terms under which many expatriates work in developing countries) and in that they have a commitment to the service of less-privileged peoples.

In most countries the majority of volunteers work with government departments and institutions (e.g. schools, health services, etc.). In the past these placements were organised through the British Council, and in some cases, British embassies, but now VSO has its own field staff in countries where it has a sizeable number of volunteers.

In March 1978 the geographic and sectoral distributions of VSO-supported projects were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>By area</th>
<th>(%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Africa</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East &amp; Central Africa</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab world</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caribbean</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Islands</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Papua New Guinea</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>By sector</th>
<th>(%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social &amp; Business Development</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As a member society of the British Volunteer Programme (BVP), VSO only receives British Government support for work in certain countries (other countries being covered by other societies of the BVP): these countries are mainly countries of the Commonwealth.

E4 POLICY ON DEVELOPMENT

VSO has maintained that for it to have a "policy" of its own in any country, other than on operational matters, would constitute a form of neo-imperialism (a view stated, for example, by a deputy director at a BVP seminar in January 1977), or, as put by a BVP evaluation team:

"VSO strongly upholds the right of developing countries to express their own needs for volunteer manpower"

(* Baker et al., p.38)

The same evaluation team analysed volunteer organisations in terms of "responding agencies", "merely responding to requests for manpower from less-developed countries with the agency acting as a middleman in a low-cost labour employment market", and, at the other end of a spectrum,"initiating agencies" with "a clear and argued concept role of the volunteer, usually leading to an interventionist, 'grass roots' and initiating approach" (ibid. p.10). On this scale, VSO tends towards the responding approach.

Although requests for volunteer help are filtered by the application of selection criteria, it is generally the wishes of the host government which determine the nature of VSO's country programmes. Consequently VSO has been criticised, particularly by returned volunteers, for not taking a more critical view of the governments and institutions it is working with, and of the effects of its programmes. For example, as early as 1965 volunteers (of all nationalities) formed 25 per cent of all graduate teachers in Northern Nigeria (* Moyes, p.47), and in some schools the proportion was as high as 70 per cent: nevertheless, even in the mid-1970's VSO had about 200 teaching volunteers in Nigeria. Many ex-volunteers were critical of a situation in which the pressure to train teachers and restructure the educational system was being taken off the Nigerian Government, in which there was a danger of "cultural imperialism", pupils not regarding their education as
satisfactory unless they had been taught by a white teacher, and in which the educational system was acting in the interests of elite groups rather than the rural poor. But VSO still defends its sending of large numbers of teachers to Nigeria on the grounds that the Nigerian Government has made the request.

VSO would regard its stance as apolitical, and it claims that it does not wish to interfere in the affairs of other societies other than in offering the assistance which is requested. An ex-deputy director has written of social conflicts in some Third World countries and has explained the VSO approach as follows:

"How is a volunteer to avoid taking sides on such issues?...there is a short answer...it is: don't get involved - and as far as it goes, it is the right answer."

(* Adams, p.183)

He continues by noting that many volunteers will tend to get involved, but that nevertheless VSO's policy must be a cautious one, especially in countries where there is risk of political conflict. Referring to post-independence disputes in some countries, "non-involvement was of necessity a stricter rule and VSO could only hope to survive if it was carefully observed" (ibid., p.186). It is also clear that VSO saw its first responsibility as being to the volunteer rather than to the overseas community being supported.

But, as Heatley (*, pp.39, 40) argues:

"'Apolitical' agencies are making implicit political choices all the time as they decide which projects to support. VSO, for example, responds to government requests for volunteers. In repressive Third World countries (e.g. Thailand, Indonesia), this certainly isn't seen as non-political behaviour by the governments' radical political opponents. It is seen as support for the status quo...".

Baker et al. (*, p.74) suggest that VSO's policy is in part determined by VSO's close links with the official British aid programme:

"It is in part a reflection of VSO's peculiar quasi-national status that it has operated on the principle of granting due respect to the right of the recipient country to define its own criteria of the way in which volunteers may help to meet the needs which the developing country itself sees as legitimate. There are a number of issues here. First, we have argued that a comparative advantage for the volunteer among expatriate workers should be an orientation in the job towards working with a relatively disadvantaged target group of the local community. National manpower planning authorities and requesting ministries may very well have other roles than this in mind for volunteers."
Thus it may be difficult for VSO even to pursue a basic-needs approach to development if that is not the orientation of the host government.

However, it is questionable whether VSO needs to maintain such close links with the official aid programme, and whether it needs to remain a responding agency. All NGOs which do not themselves set up and run projects are to some extent responding agencies in that their aid follows a request for help, and all NGOs are to some extent initiating agencies in that they put themselves in situations in which requests for help are likely to be made. Thus VSO takes an initiative by putting itself in a position in which it can receive requests from Indonesia, while other BVP agencies have refused to consider requests received by British diplomatic missions from much less objectionable governments. VSO may not have taken initiatives in making itself known to organisations which other NGOs would regard as natural partners, but in view of VSO's "policy" this is not altogether surprising. There is therefore a danger that concentration on the initiating/responding agency classification may just be diverting attention from VSO's "apolitical" policy.

VSO does not, however, automatically respond to a request for help, and in recent years the use of increasingly refined selection (or, more accurately, rejection) criteria has reduced the size of the programme. The criteria are:

- that the job aims "to change and improve the circumstances of some of the poor and disadvantaged, in ways and styles determined by communities and governments in the Third World. Its benefits will not accrue only to a small minority wishing to maintain a privileged position" (in other words, a basic-needs approach, but not necessarily linked to structural change);
- that local manpower is not displaced;
- that a local person is being trained, by the volunteer or otherwise, to take over the volunteer's job;
- that the volunteer is not just cheap labour;
- that there is a realistic, full-time job with adequate support;
- that there is an indigenous community to which the volunteer can relate.
Moreover, in 1979 VSO published a health policy paper (*Mackay*) which called for a move from traditional types of hospital-based assignments to appropriate community-based projects.

Thus there has been a move in VSO towards a more critical approach to project appraisal, and this move has no doubt gained from VSO's gradual appointment of its own field staff, rather than having British Council officers as the initial project assessors. VSO field staff should also be able to take a more independent and initiatory approach, but whether or not they will may depend on the viewpoints of the people appointed (e.g. a VSO field officer maintained at a BVP seminar in 1979 that human rights considerations were of no concern to VSO). Improved project appraisal and more independent field staff should improve the effectiveness of VSO's programme, but major changes cannot be expected without a more fundamental change in VSO's overall policy.

E5 VSO IN BRITAIN

VSO has little in the way of a British presence. In 1979 there were about 80 local committees throughout the country - their membership often consists of local businessmen, people from careers and appointments services and some ex-volunteers, and they assist with fund-raising (especially when there are volunteers being sent from their areas) and recruitment.

VSO does not see itself as having a role in educational work, but considers that it makes its contribution through the individual activities of its ex-volunteers. Returned volunteers certainly appear to have a significant role in the NGO movement as a whole - many, either as a positive or a negative reaction to their overseas experiences, take up staff positions or play a leadership role in NGOs and campaigns on international issues. Others turn to domestic issues, applying the insights they gained overseas to local social and political problems. Many who join the organisation "Returned Volunteer Action" (RVA) do so through dissatisfaction with their own overseas postings, and through RVA campaign for changes in BVP societies.
However, other BVP societies argue that by having volunteers overseas they are in an ideal position for collecting information and mounting educational programmes, and that their chief constraint is lack of finance. VSO has the same financial problems, but many (e.g. RVA) consider its lack of activity in this field a disappointment.

Difficulties in recruitment led VSO in 1979 to consider the image of volunteering. As with other BVP agencies, the typical volunteer is young, a university graduate, middle-class and white. Whether in the long term VSO can change this image without changing the nature of the organisation remains to be seen.
F. WAR ON WANT

1. History

In 1951 the publisher, Victor Gollancz, wrote to the 'Guardian' arguing that the gap between the developed and underdeveloped countries was as much a threat to world peace as the beginning of the Cold War. Readers who agreed were invited to send Gollancz a postcard, and from the large response an organisation called the "Association for World Peace" was created. This body set up a research team headed by Harold Wilson which produced a pamphlet and held a conference with the title 'War on Want', and this gave the organisation its name.

War on Want did not begin as a charity, but as a political campaign with a large number of pacifists among its early members, and although it is now registered as a charity, its objectives still include:

"To conduct research into the causes of and ways of relieving poverty ... and to publish findings ... in order to educate the public".

The 'organisation' started as a number of independent campaign groups of voluntary workers around the country, and a group in Ealing in West London was asked to co-ordinate activities. This group was to become the centre of the organisation, but for some time it was to rely on volunteer help.

While groups were formed through a political concern for the plight of the Third World, they decided that their work should involve raising funds to give direct support to Third World projects. Even in project support, groups operated independently, and there was much diversity in the projects which different groups assisted. The possibility of direct contact between groups and overseas projects was seen as an important factor at this time. However, with increasing co-ordination among the groups and the introduction of government controls which made the business of transferring money overseas more complex, the overseas funding operation became centralised in Ealing.
War on Want grew as a relief-orientated aid agency. Up until the early 1970's, War on Want's style was to use emotive advertising to attract funds for projects, many of which were in the medical field and many of which were run by expatriates. A feature of the approach was to be, and to be seen to be, a low-cost agency: a list of projects produced for would-be donors in 1972 (?) claimed that "Unique to War on Want is its guarantee to prospective donors that each contribution will be forwarded to specific projects, with no deduction for administrative expenses."

The dishonesty of this claim has been criticised by Nightingale (*, p. 230). Funds are always needed for administrative expenses, and if one donation is sent overseas with any deduction, then a higher administrative charge must be deducted from another donation. The technique may also have encouraged competition between NGO's on their "cost-effectiveness" whereby the public assesses NGO's on the basis of the percentage of income sent overseas rather than on the qualitative aspects of their work. Moreover, the approach puts the allocation of the NGO's income into the hands of the donors rather than into the control of the NGO's professional staff - donors may prefer to support projects which have an emotive appeal (e.g. orphanages) rather than development projects.

The first General Secretary was a founder of the Ealing group, a man of some wealth who supplied the NGO with its first premises, and while his successor did much to establish the organisational structure, War on Want continued to work from its Ealing base and to rely much on voluntary help.

Things began to change in 1972. The NGO's headquarters were moved from West to North London, and as a result the services of many of the local volunteers were lost, and the organisation became a more 'professional' one. Moreover, a new General Secretary was appointed who tried to involve staff more in decision-taking, and this resulted in the organisation gradually moving to a more radical policy position (although the tensions which this created between staff and Council of Management were to lead to the General Secretary's resignation in 1976, the eventual result was a more democratic organisation and a more radical Council of Management).
In the 1972/73 Annual Report, the then General Secretary wrote:

"The gap between rich and poor has grown wider, and the need for radical solutions to the problem of world poverty has become even more urgent. The poor and the depressed have begun to confront the injustice being done them, and to claim a more equal share of the world's prosperity as a right, not as charity...

It is in this social and political context that we must look to the future. I have no doubt that we shall continue to have a special role to play in the war on want, one that does not merely duplicate the work of the other great charities in this field. I believe that this future lies as the leader of a new and more intensive campaign to involve the British public in the universal war against poverty and inequality.

Those who have been associated with War on Want from its early days will know that we began life, first and foremost, as a campaign. Over the years the need to raise funds for our work in the Third World, tended, I think, to obscure the need also to raise the level of public understanding and to stimulate public action towards social justice. We must now return more closely to our original purpose."

Since 1973, War on Want has given more priority to its research and educational role and there have been changes in the types of projects it supports overseas - see F4 below.

F2. Size

In recent years, War on Want's annual income has fluctuated around half a million pounds. It is thus the smallest of the NGO considered in this appendix, at least as far as income is concerned.

The actual level of income has, in the past, varied with the donations received for disaster relief as is shown below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total income (£)</th>
<th>From disaster appeals (£)</th>
<th>Other income (£)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1974/75</td>
<td>537,182</td>
<td>93,582</td>
<td>443,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975/76</td>
<td>694,700</td>
<td>313,975</td>
<td>380,725</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976/77</td>
<td>363,271</td>
<td>62,439</td>
<td>300,832</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977/78</td>
<td>550,126</td>
<td>169,740</td>
<td>380,386</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978/79</td>
<td>405,786</td>
<td>24,056</td>
<td>381,730</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In 1979, War on Want left the Disasters Emergency Committee (see F4 below) and so will no longer receive a share of the Committee’s appeals. Nevertheless, it appears that War on Want may be able to increase its total income to £500,000 again in 1979/80.

In Britain, War on Want employs around 26 staff (excluding print-shop and shop staff).

**F3. Main Activities**

War on Want gives financial support to relief and development projects overseas as well as in UK. Its main areas of work are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Allocations as percentage of project expenditure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1976/77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India, Sri Lanka and other</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central America</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Column do not add to totals due to rounding).

(UK allocation increased considerably in following year)

The areas in which War on Want is working have, to some extent, been determined by its membership of the Disasters Emergency Committee (DEC - see C3 above) through which War on Want has been led to major projects in Mauritania, Bangladesh (in both cases agricultural projects) and Guatemala. In 1978, however, War on Want left the DEC for reasons described below.
Since 1977/78 the main changes in the above distribution of expenditure have been more work in southern Africa, a shift from Guatemala to other Central American countries (with plans for a major programme in Nicaragua in 1980) and a higher proportion of work in Britain.

War on Want does not have overseas field staff, except a part-time worker in Central America. It does, however, have a few expatriate advisory staff attached to its projects in Mauritania and Bangladesh.

War on Want also commissions and publishes research reports from time to time (see F5 below) as well as producing educational material for its supporters. The organisation is run by a staff of about 25 in Britain, or more strictly, in England and Wales, because War on Want organisations in Scotland and Northern Ireland retain some autonomy. Additionally, War on Want has about 40 shops (including Wales and Northern Ireland), and up until 1980 it has had a print-shop, a high proportion of whose work has been for other NGOs and community groups in Britain. In 1980, however, it is planned that this becomes an independent printing co-operative because of complaints by the Charity Commissioners that much work being done was outside War on Want's objects.

F4. War on Want's view of Development/Underdevelopment

Although up until the early 1970's, War on Want was mainly a relief agency, in the editorial of the first issue of a magazine called "Poverty and Power" which it published in 1978, it stated:

"We see poverty in the Third World as a result of the colonialist looting in the past and neo-colonialist exploitation in the present. The cure does not lie in the Third World following in the development process of the First. In the most general terms we believe that development in the Third World will only be possible if peoples of these countries gain control of their own resources and means of production, free from external domination."

However, moving towards such a structural view of underdevelopment was not easy for War on Want as it involved severing links with projects which had previously enjoyed the popularity of donors, abandoning a medical department in which volunteers collected drug
samples for dispatch to overseas hospitals, and trying to define a new role for the organisation in terms of underdevelopment (which emphasises problems rather than development which emphasises projects).

These changes caused some conflict within the organisation while Council of Management members and staff tried to reach a consensus view on problems and appropriate policies for the organisation, and from these discussions emerged the need for a clear statement of War on Want's philosophy and aims. As a result a "Policy Consultation Document" was prepared in 1978 ("consultation" in that it proposed policy to the membership and invited a response).

This document noted that while environmental factors may play a part in causing poverty, the main causes were seen to be:

- social structures, including land distribution and the control of resources;
- foreign interests, including the control of technology, industry and marketing by multi-national companies;
- overseas aid programmes which create dependence;
- terms of trade and restrictive trade policies; and
- the arms trade which diverts resources from development programmes.

The document went on to identify a number of themes for future work. These fall into three categories:

(i) The need for local control of resources and freedom from external domination - this was seen to imply both that War on Want should support programmes aimed at increasing self-reliance, that research, projects and programmes should, where possible, be related to the activities of multi-national companies, and that, where appropriate, War on Want should support those engaged in liberation struggles;

(ii) A second theme was that of equality in society, including freedom from racial and cultural discrimination, women's rights, and freedom from sexual discrimination, and the right of people to organise themselves together so as to defend their rights; and

(iii) Thirdly, democratic control of resources so as to benefit the poorest sections of society - in this section the appropriateness of production systems was considered in terms of the extent to which they are geared towards fulfilling basic needs.
From this discussion the document then proposed two general criteria for War on Want's work:

1. To work with groups which share War on Want's principles;
2. Where possible to concentrate on programmes with a UK dimension through trade and aid links and historical involvement so as to facilitate educational work.

Thus War on Want has gone much further than any of the other NGOs considered in this appendix in taking a structural view of underdevelopment and seeking the implications of such a viewpoint on project support (although it is not possible in this thesis to measure how closely War on Want's work matches its policies).

A consequence of this redefinition of policy has been War on Want's decision to leave the Disasters Emergency Committee (DEC). This decision was based on a number of factors:

- the necessity of spending DEC funds in disaster areas tended to spread War on Want's concerns, and therefore resources, into areas in which the organisation would not choose to operate in normal circumstances;
- War on Want considered that larger NGO's were better equipped to handle large relief programmes, and it did not itself wish to be involved in work purely of a relief nature (in 1978, War on Want passed some of its share of a DEC appeal to Oxfam which, with the field staff in the disaster area, was considered better able to use the money);
- War on Want was unhappy with the approach which based an emotive appeal around a disaster situation without attempting to explain the factors which may have led to the disaster: as War on Want described the situation in one poster:
  "All it takes to raise money for the poor world is a few more disasters."

War on Want sees problems of malnutrition in the context of structural underdevelopment. An "Educational Sheet" on "Hunger" produced in 1979 (?) gave the reasons for hunger as follows:

"In order to eat, you have to be able to grow food or buy it. To grow food you need land. To buy food you need money."
The sheet then goes on to describe the problems of land distribution, the use of land in large farms for cash crop rather than food crop production, and the way in which peasants can be made more vulnerable to famine through being forced to farm in poorer lands, their own lands and grazing areas being taken over by large landowners. A final section of the sheet suggests a strategy for "overcoming hunger" as follows:

"When people in England were hungry there were two things which helped to improve the situation. First, Britain was able to import cheap food from its colonies - wheat from Canada was one important source of food. Britain was rapidly becoming industrial and so it could afford to do this. Poor countries today, however, cannot do the same thing. They do not have reserves of money to spend on food, and in addition, they often have to buy from richer countries which control the prices.

The other thing which happened in Britain was that workers organised themselves into trades unions so that they could demand better wages and working conditions. This was an extremely important step as it forced employers to pay their workers a living wage, and so got rid of some of the worst problems of poverty. The food that was available could now be bought by working class people as well as the rich. Many workers in the poor countries today are trying to form unions but it is often difficult for them because governments and landowners do not like it - they can make more profit if they pay their workers low wages."

Thus hunger is presented as a symptom of underdevelopment whose removal requires a radical change in the political and economic structure.

Similarly, as noted in the Policy Consultation Document above, self-reliance is seen in the context of a structure in which countries and communities are controlled by outside interests. Projects aimed at self-reliance are linked to investigations into the actions of multi-national companies. With such a view of underdevelopment, self-reliance as a characteristic to which all communities should aspire has become a frequently occurring concept in War on Want's publications. Moreover, the concept of self-reliance is kept distinct from that of "helping people to help themselves" which many other NGO's prefer - War on Want's 1974/75 Annual Report notes that "it must be remembered that our assistance...is only a fraction of the contribution made by the poor to help themselves."
F5. War on Want in Britain

In Britain, War on Want is probably best known for its research reports. In March 1974, following a television documentary some six months previously, War on Want published "The State of Tea" which exposed the living conditions of workers on tea estates owned by British companies in Sri Lanka. Subsequent reports attacked the activities of multinationals which promote artificial baby foods in the Third World in circumstances which may lead to higher infant malnutrition and mortality, Rio Tinto Zinc's involvement in the expropriation of Aborigines' land in Australia, and tobacco companies which may be contributing to "Tomorrow's Epidemic" (the title of the report) in underdeveloped countries through their promotion of smoking as well as distorting the economies of the country concerned. Other reports have examined the world food crisis and the activities of the fertilizer industry, and in 1978 a significant and controversial report, "Where were you, brother?", described the inadequacy of British trade unions' support for the organised poor overseas and exposed the manipulation of trade union aid by Western governments' political interests.

War on Want has regarded these reports as essential parts of its "campaign against world poverty" (a sub-title which War on Want puts to its name). However, as noted in Section 14.4 of this thesis, the Charity Commissioners have not always considered the publication of these reports, and particularly of the recommendations for changes in government policy which they usually contain, to be within War on Want's charitable remit. The solution to these legal problems which War on Want is planning to adopt in 1980 is described in Section 14.4.

However, from the point of view of many supporters, a major criticism of War on Want is its inability to effectively follow up the recommendations made in its reports. In some cases, the issues have been taken up by other organisations (e.g. the Baby Foods Action Group), but War on Want's own membership is very weak, many of its supporters being people who became involved in the organisation in its relief programme days, and War on Want has not succeeded in mobilising them (with, of course, some exceptions) towards a more active campaigning role.
In 1976/77 War on Want funded its first major project in Britain, arguing that "poverty is indivisible" and that poverty in Britain and poverty overseas have similar characteristics and are often the result of the same economic processes. A Bengali community worker was supported to work in one area of London, and an Indian Association was supported in another.

A consequence of this type of work was War on Want's support for Asian families which were suffering hardship as a result of the Grunwick strike in West London in 1977 (see Section 14.4). This was a major step for War on Want as it was seen to be taking sides in an industrial conflict. The amount of money involved was not very significant, but in giving support (through monies donated specifically for the purpose) War on Want affirmed its view of the "indivisibility of poverty" and called for attention to be given to the injustices in Britain as well as overseas. As a result, many people ended their support of War on Want, but many others joined the organisation. Whether or not this action was politically sensible as a tactic for attracting support for War on Want's wider aims is still debated within the organisation, but even if the net financial result has been a loss in income, it has been a significant step for War on Want in defining its image.

A further new line of work began in 1978 with the support of a resource and research centre for trade unionists and other community and campaign groups in Nottingham, such a project appearing to fit the criteria which War on Want had devised for appraising projects overseas.

Like all other NGOs considered in this appendix, War on Want has a number of branches of supporters around the country. But ironically, whereas with its intended campaigning style War on Want has the greatest need for active supporters, War on Wants support base is probably the weakest of all. Although in 1977 War on Want tried to make itself into a "membership movement", the number of branches has steadily declined, and at present the number of active branches
is probably under 10 (most supporters give their support on an individual basis). The drop in active support has, no doubt, partly been due to the organisation no longer having regional staff because of financial problems, to the organisation's failure to adequately communicate its new thinking to its membership, and its failure to win new constituencies. With its more radical policies, War on Want has hoped to recruit support from the trade unions and from people with similar political viewpoints to itself, but War on Want has not yet managed to do this.

The existing membership is essentially a fundraising membership. Nevertheless, fundraising remains a serious problem for War on Want. In order to carry out the campaigning work it would like to do, War on Want considers it necessary to maintain a certain size of overseas programme on the grounds that if the proportion of income going to overseas projects becomes too low, then the organisation's image and future fundraising potential will be damaged (although this assumption would be debated by some supporters). But although War on Want has rejected the use of emotive appeals and other forms of fundraising used by other NGOs, it has not yet developed a successful alternative fundraising style. The next few years may be critical ones in determining whether War on Want can find the support which it needs to exist as the type of organisation which its policy-makers would like it to be.
APPENDIX II

THE POSSIBLE USE OF NUTRITIONAL STATUS AS AN
INDICATOR OF RURAL PROBLEMS

At an early stage in this study, it was suggested that nutritional status might be used as an indicator of rural problems and their severity. Normally, an NGO's first contact with an area may be the receipt of a project request: the project is the starting point rather than the outcome of an NGO's investigations, and it is possible that this will lead to biases in the composition of an NGO's portfolio of projects. This can be seen, for example, in Kenya where there is a preponderance of NGO-supported projects in the central highland areas which have better communications with NGO staff, and many of the projects supported have expatriate staff or contacts who are better placed to solicit help from the expatriate NGO network. The suggestion was that nutritional status might provide a more objective method of identifying areas of greatest need, and (assuming a basic-needs approach to development) therefore areas in which NGOs should be working.

This appendix examines the feasibility of such an approach. The following sections

1. argue that attention can be confined to the nutritional status of young children;
2. examine the types of nutritional measurements which are likely to be encountered;
3. note the difficulties in interpreting anthropometric measurements, the type of measurement most likely to be used by NGOs, and
4. note that even if nutritional measurements were considered to be reliable and objective indicators of problems, the lack of data and the difficulties in obtaining it make the approach of little practical value for NGOs.

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1. In assessing the nutritional status of communities, attention can be confined to young children (under 3 or under 5 years old)

According to Blankhart (* (2)) :

"If these children under three enjoy a good nutritional status, it may safely be assumed that the whole community is well-nourished. On the other hand, the number of malnourished (underweight) children indicates the degree of malnutrition in the community concerned."

The reason is that malnutrition in any other sector of the community is likely to lead to child malnutrition, e.g. malnourished mothers will not be able to adequately breast feed infants, and malnourished workers, through low productivity, will result in the whole community being malnourished. (Workers are probably the least vulnerable group because of traditional food-sharing habits: feeding workers first was a sensible strategy for a community's survival). A possible exception is malnutrition only in the elderly, but such problems are not confined to the developing countries.

Concentration on children has some practical advantages:
- the symptoms of malnutrition can be most clearly seen in infants;
- it may be easier to carry out a survey among infants than among working adults (although it has been claimed by some NGO staff that this is not always the case); and
- data on children is more likely to be available, e.g. from mother-and-child clinics.

2. Types of nutritional measurement

There is no single measurement of nutritional status. NGOs may encounter data collected through any four types of survey:

1. Clinical
These are the most accurate as they directly measure the body's absorption and utilisation of different nutrients. But such surveys are expensive and NGOs will rarely get information in this form.
(ii) **Physical inspection**

I.e. estimates of the prevalence of different observable symptoms. The difficulty here is that data may be a bit subjective, especially with marginal cases (and hopefully, problems can be identified before marginal cases become acute). Nevertheless, the value of such surveys has probably been underrated, researchers preferring surveys which give more measurable data, irrespective of how meaningful such data might be.

(iii) **Dietary surveys**

Quantitative surveys give much useful information but are expensive to conduct, hence data will rarely be available. Qualitative surveys do not actually measure malnutrition, but once malnutrition has been found, they may be a useful diagnostic tool. A simple survey technique developed by Blankhart is described in Jelliffe (*, pp.119,120)

(iv) **Anthropometric measurements**

These are simple and cheap to collect, and therefore most common. Nutrition is a major, but not the only determinant of the rate of growth of a young child, and there is hence a high correlation between physical development and malnutrition. Children whose growth lags behind some standard are assumed malnourished. Common measurements are:

Weight for age: Many consider this to be the most reliable statistic and it is widely used in nutrition clinics (e.g. C.R.S.). Children can be given a card on which their monthly progress is charted. When a child's weight falls below a certain percentage of the standard for its age (80 per cent for C.R.S.) then malnutrition is assumed and remedial action taken. Errors can arise through inaccuracies in weighing equipment (which can receive rough treatment in mobile clinics) and in estimating children's ages. The latter can be a major difficulty when a child has not entered a monitoring programme at an early age.
Weight for height: This is often used when the age of a child is in doubt, but with an infant, height measurement with accuracy may be difficult. Some object to weight for height because it does not detect growth stunting caused by malnutrition. Others argue that this is not serious as people of small stature are better adapted to areas where food shortages are likely.

Arm circumference: The beauty of this method is its simplicity. The mid-upper arm circumference of a well-nourished child only increases by 1 cm. between the ages of 1 and 5 years, while that of a malnourished child may be up to 4 cm. below the standard. Age determination is no longer a serious problem, and the only equipment required is a marked piece of tape. Shakir (*) and Morley (Institute of Child Health, London) have found this method to give good accuracy compared with other anthropometric measurements. Field Workers in Tanzania (according to Sr. J. Lynch, Medical Missionaries of Mary), however, report the method giving highly inconsistent results - they believe the problem is that while measurements should be taken with the arm relaxed, children become tense when the measurement is being taken.

Morley has suggested that by using arm circumference measurements it should be possible for communities to measure their own nutritional status and in this way, the process of assessment is itself developmental as it makes the community nutrition conscious.
A strip of old X-ray plate can be marked with a base-line and coloured bands at the appropriate intervals. The proportion of young children (1-5 years) whose arm circumferences come within the red (lowest) band, gives a measurement of the community's nutritional status. Morley claims to have used such methods with success elsewhere, and, therefore, even if some problems have been found in East Africa, the technique cannot be ignored because of its simplicity, cheapness and educational value.

(3) Problems in the interpretation of nutritional measurements

The data which NGOs will be able to obtain will most often be anthropometric. During the study, however, several fieldworkers and researchers pointed out difficulties in interpreting such data. The problems are as follows:

(i) The measurements taken are compared with the distribution of measurements which might be expected from a population of well-nourished children. An individual child cannot be judged malnourished on the basis of anthropometric measurements alone - it is only possible to state the probability of a well-nourished child having lower measurements. This, however, is not a serious objection for NGOs looking for a measurement of malnutrition in a community, and not so concerned with identifying malnourished individuals.

(ii) A more important objection is that the distribution used as the standard for comparisons may not be appropriate. It is likely to have been derived from studies of American or European children, ignoring possible differences in the African physique. (although Maletnlema of the Tanzania Food and Nutrition Centre was, at the time of the study, collecting data to establish a more appropriate standard). And even if there were no differences
in physique, the standard may be unrealistically high for problem definition in a developing country. According to Joy (* (2), p.8):

"One suspects that the recommendations of the various international agencies are higher than can be afforded by many countries... poor countries will have difficulty enough, however, in eliminating frank, clinical deficiency systems. They are generally likely to be well advised to set targets only marginally above the levels that would achieve this until such levels have been reached by the mass of the population."

(iii) There is some doubt about the sensitivity of anthropometric indicators. If a community is faced with a relatively sudden and acute food shortage, will anthropometric measurements be responsive enough to indicate a problem?

(iv) Some regard the usefulness of any nutritional indicator in problem assessment as questionable. Nutritional status is a function of many variables, and the dominant ones may be outside a community's or an NGO's control, e.g. the weather. It may therefore be a long time before a project can be shown to have produced a statistically significant improvement. If nutritional indicators cannot measure progress, it is debatable whether they can measure problems, because, for example, a community would be just as likely to "have problems" (i.e. low anthropometric measurements) after the implementation of a project as before. (This, however, may be more of a criticism of some nutritional projects than of the value of nutritional measurements).

(v) How much malnutrition can be tolerated before a situation is considered a problem? The criterion may take the form, "X per cent, or more, of children with weight below Y per cent of the standard weight for age", but how does one judge the seriousness of a problem, knowing that some malnutrition will exist in all communities, even affluent ones? For "X", 80 per cent is often used. Blankhart has written (* (1), p.413) "Areas with 40% or more of children showing under weight (PCM) have to be considered as high risk areas..." but some fieldworkers have reported cases with much higher
percentages under weight which they do not consider to be nutritionally serious. For example, and NGO staff member regarded a situation in eastern Kenya, in which 66 per cent of children were under 80 per cent of standard weight as extremely serious, while a fieldworker from Tanzania did not consider the figure as a cause for concern.

(iv) Low anthropometric measurements are a symptom of low calorie intake, but they need not be a symptom of mineral or vitamin deficiencies.

(4) The non-availability of nutritional data

The above problems are, however, perhaps only minor difficulties for NGOs, as an NGO will rarely need a precise measurement of malnutrition. But the major stumbling block in the approach may be the lack of available nutritional data. Wide-scale nutritional surveys are not carried out as a matter of routine, and the chances of an NGO finding sufficient up-to-date information in a country to identify the main problem areas are low.

An NGO may be able to carry out a survey in an area in which it is already working, but otherwise, to make surveys as a way of establishing priority areas would normally be beyond an NGO's resources. Moreover, carrying out surveys is not likely to be an efficient approach, as other socio-economic information may enable the areas in which malnutrition is serious to be identified much more quickly and cheaply. The surveying of nutritional status may also be politically unacceptable, both at national and local level.

An exception may be in areas in which nutritional monitoring is already being carried out, e.g. through mother-and-child health clinics (e.g. one of the C.R.S. type - see Chpt. 3). Such areas are generally areas in which nutritional problems might be expected, e.g. areas affected by drought, but the measurements collected may pinpoint communities which are suffering most seriously from malnourishment.
(5) Conclusions

It must, therefore, be concluded that the use of nutritional data to identify the parts of a country in which the lack of basic-needs is most acute is not a realistic approach for NGOs. In regions where nutritional monitoring is already being undertaken through existing programmes, nutritional data may indicate which sub-regions are most seriously disadvantaged, although even in such situations nutritional data may neither give a complete nor a precise measure of the problems.
APPENDIX III

A POSSIBLE APPROACH TO THE ANALYSIS OF NUTRITIONAL PROBLEMS

Malnutrition may arise as a result of many different types of problem (and for that reason, the use of malnutrition as an indicator has been considered). During this study, an attempt was made to devise a procedure by which an analysis could be made of the circumstances behind any incidence of malnutrition. The type of procedure considered is described below, and some comments are made on its likely usefulness.

General approach

In Section 5.2 of the thesis, it was argued that communities must be regarded as social systems, and that it is never possible to define a single "underlying problem". However, the point is made that certain features of the system may be regarded as contributing more to a problem than others.

The procedure considered here is:

Step 1 - an examination of the nutritional data to establish the seriousness of the situation and the need for further analysis;

Step 2 - identification of the main, relevant "problem area" (or "problem areas"), each problem area being a first stage in the classification of "problem types" which lead to malnutrition;

Step 3 - identification of the relevant problem types within the relevant problem areas;

Step 4 - further analysis of the problem types.
The problem areas and problem types considered are shown in Diagram IIIA, and the above four steps in the procedure are described below.

**STEP 1**

*Nutritional evidence*

(a) If there is nutritional data which indicates a serious nutritional problem, it may assist in the subsequent analysis and in the formulation of assistance programmes if the following questions can be answered.

- What is the extent of the problem?
  - geographical area (the defining characteristics of the area may give a clue to the problem).

- What form does the nutritional deficiency take? (Protein, calorie, vitamin, mineral)

- Is the problem periodic, seasonal or chronic? (periodic or seasonal occurrence of malnutrition may indicate weather-related problems)

- Is there a particular sector of the population which is malnourished?
  - socio-economic groups (these may indicate distributional problems (1.4 in Diagram IIIA))
  - women and children, the elderly (possibly indicating social problems).

- Is there a general health problem which may contribute to malnutrition?

(b) If the data suggests that there is not a serious nutritional problem, then the analysis need be carried no further, unless there is some other form of evidence or reason for NGO involvement.
TABLE III A: OUTLINE ANALYSIS FOR NUTRITIONAL PROBLEMS

EVIDENCE OF PROBLEMS
- Malnutrition data
  - Extent of problem?
  - Nutrient deficiencies?
  - Periodic/seasonal/chronic problems?
  - Malnourished groups?
- Health data
  - Nutritional diseases?
  - Other diseases?

PROBLEM AREAS
1. INCOME
   Do people have sufficient income to adequately feed themselves?

2. USE OF INCOME
   Is income used in the nutritionally best way?

3. USE OF FOOD
   Could better use be made of the food available in a household?

4. HEALTH
   Is disease a cause of malnutrition, and are their other health problems?

PROBLEM TYPES
1.1 Production
1.2 Marketing
1.3 Wage employment
1.4 Distribution of income

2.1 Lack of variety of food produced
2.2 Essential foods being sold
2.3 Insufficient cash used on food
2.4 Low nutrient value purchased foods
2.5 Misallocation resources between food and cash crops

3.1 Food preparation
3.2 Serving and sharing of food
3.3 Customs governing food use
3.4 Child care

4.1 Nutritional deficiency disease
4.2 Contaminated water
4.3 Other nutrition-related diseases
4.4 Insect-borne diseases
4.5 Other endemic diseases

STEP 1
STEP 2
STEP 3
(c) If there is no data available, subjective assessments may be obtainable from people who know the area. It may be necessary to start the analysis and then see if any of the problem areas appear to be relevant.

STEP 2

Identifying the relevant problem areas

Given that a nutritional problem exists, the next step in the procedure is to try to identify the relevant problem areas. Four have been considered:

- Income
- Use of income
- Use of food
- Health

The ordering of this list corresponds to the process by which food is obtained and used, from the resources used to produce food to the effect of food on the body. These problem areas are not exclusive, but they are interrelated and, for example, improving the use of income will never completely solve a nutritional problem if the level of income is too low.

(1) Income

Do people have sufficient income to adequately feed themselves and meet their essential expenses? This is seen as a key question in the procedure, dividing problems into income-related problems, and those not related to income.

It is unnecessary to have a very precise definition of sufficient income - a general indication is all that is required, say 2,000 calories per day and US $30 per annum for each person (averaged over all ages and sexes). Assuming that about two-thirds of a poor household's income will be spent on food, it should be possible to make rough assessments of cash-only or food-crop-only incomes.
A difficulty may be finding information on incomes, especially in areas where a significant proportion of income comes from subsistence farming. It may be possible to estimate incomes from other data, e.g. the calorific values of different foodstuffs, likely wastage, seed requirements, etc. Data on areas under crops, yields, market prices, etc. may not be very reliable, and one must therefore be careful not to dismiss income problems without strong evidence. For example, during this study a rough, food balance sheet for Kitui District in Kenya was calculated, using reported areas under crops and the most pessimistic estimates of average yields which could be found. The calculations suggested that food crop production alone should supply 150 per cent of the district's calorie and protein requirements, and yet the district had a food shortage. Indirect estimates of this kind also have the disadvantage of giving aggregate measures, while an examination of income as a possible source of malnutrition requires information on the incomes of the poorer households.

The calorific value of income alone is not, of course, a complete measure as a balanced diet is likely to cost more than, say, an all-maize diet. However, the calorie total may be a useful starting point, even if the shortage of particular nutrients necessitates a return to income considerations later in the analysis.

(2) Use of income

Is income being used in the best way to provide a satisfactory amount and variety of food?

This question will be difficult to answer, and it may be necessary to wait and go through the checklist of problem types in Step 3. However, it may be possible to spot some indirect indications of income misuse, e.g. malnutrition and high income, more ownership of luxury goods than might be expected, high sales of processed foods, alcoholism, a recent change from a subsistence to a cash economy or from one food crop to another. Where income is very low, it may be best to give this problem area low priority as the situation may be quite different after incomes have been raised.
(3) Use of food

Could better use be made of the food available in the household?

Poor use of food may be suspected if the nutritional data show only certain age or sex groups malnourished, or from knowledge of the social customs in the area. As with (2) above, it may be difficult to assess the relevance of this problem area without using the checklist of Step 3. In some cases, however, it may be possible to deduce poor use of food by elimination of problem areas (1), (2) and (4).

(4) Health

Most health problems should be identified in Step 1. If problems are the results of nutritional deficiencies alone, then this problem area should be left out of the analysis. But if there is evidence of malnutrition, a careful check should be made to ensure that poor health is not contributing to the problem.

STEP 3

Identification of problem types in the relevant problem areas

In this step, the relevant problem areas are examined and the specific problem types are identified.

(1) The "Income" problem area

This has been subdivided into four, partly overlapping problem types:

(1.1) Production

Where production is mainly subsistence with few cash needs or other obligations (e.g. to landlords), then low income will imply low production. More often, households will have some contact with a cash
(or at least an exchange) economy, and production will no longer be the sole determinant of income. It will then be necessary to see how production compares with the norms in other areas: if it is low, the production problems and possibilities for improvement can be investigated in Step 4.

(1.2) **Marketing**

Buying and selling prices and access to markets need to be considered. Price fluctuations caused by weather and market factors may also need to be examined.

(1.3) **Wage employment**

Where wage employment is the principal source of income, this problem type may be easy to identify. In many societies, however, the households most vulnerable to malnutrition may be the landless (or those with insufficient land) who must seek employment on small farms (this is also a distributional problem - see (1.4) below).

(1.4) **Distribution of income**

Inequalities in income will often lead to inequalities in economic opportunities and access to government service and advice, and that may be a constraint to poorer farmers' development. Distributional problems will not exist in isolation, but will occur within production, marketing or wage employment problem types. For example, production may be low where the distribution of land has caused a shortage for some, marketing problems may be caused by powerful and monopolistic traders, and wage problems may be due to the distribution of power between employer and employees. If this problem type is considered relevant, it may be necessary to redefine the target group so that any assistance programmes will narrow the income distribution.

(2) **The "Use of income" problem area**

Income will generally be part subsistence and part cash. Both forms of income must be considered, as well as the allocation of productive resources between them.
(2.1) **Lack of variety of food produced**

Could the food produced by households provide a balanced diet?

If it could not do so in a purely subsistence economy, then nutritional diseases would result (is there evidence of such diseases?). More generally, many nutrients will be purchased with cash income and the lack of variety of produced foods may not be a problem. However, the question may be helpful in assessing the prospects for self-sufficient food production, and for determining the food supplements which cash income must buy. This problem type should be suspected in areas where a single crop (e.g. maize or bananas) provides a large part of the diet, and particular nutritional deficiencies which have been identified should be kept in mind.

(2.2) **Essential food being sold**

Often, food is produced for sale as well as household consumption. It must be checked that households are not selling the important nutrients which they require. For example, it is reported from some parts of East Africa that households suffering from protein malnutrition continue to sell their eggs and poultry as that is their only source of cash income. This, of course, would suggest that the "income" problem area is also relevant.

(2.3) **Insufficient cash used for food**

Even if a household has adequate cash income, it is not certain that enough of the income will be used for food purchases, or for the particular foods required to supplement subsistence produce. If malnutrition is accompanied by relatively high spending on non-food items, then this problem type needs to be examined. For example, it has been reported from Machakos District in Kenya that some relatively wealthy parts of the district, with good communications with Nairobi have more malnutrition than neighbouring areas which rely more on subsistence production (*El Baradi and van Rijn*). When a harvest is sold, farmers may decide to buy radios, bicycles, metal roofing, etc.
rather than foodstuffs. In some cases, the aggressive advertising policies of companies may aggravate the situation (e.g. the advertising of cigarettes, alcoholic and soft drinks, and patent medicines).

(2.4) Low nutrient value of purchased food

As with (2.3), this should be investigated when cash is a substantial part of the household income. Tinned or packaged foods may be used for convenience, for prestige, because of taste, or because of the non-availability of other foods, but they may not have the nutrient value of fresh foods, and because of their high cost, a smaller quantity will be bought. The quantity of processed foods being stocked in local stores may be an indicator of this problem type.

(2.5) Misallocation of resources between cash and food crops

Resources allocated to cash crop production may give a better cash return than could be obtained from those allocated to food crop production (through sales of surpluses), but the latter may give a better return in nutritional value. Furthermore, food production may avoid the problem of non-availability of certain food types. However, the prospect of cash income and its more visible attractions, often coupled with a bias in government services, may lead farmers into giving their food crops insufficient attention. This may take the form of concentration on, say, cotton at the critical planting time for maize, using fertilizers only on cash crops, or planting cash crops on all the best land. The opposite problem may exist, i.e. neglecting opportunities for cash crop production which would give a better food supply, but it is not expected to be common.

(3) The "Use of food" problem area

Four possible problem types are described below, but the list is unlikely to be comprehensive.
(3.1) **Food preparation**

Kreysler (in *Dumont*) has estimated that the traditional crushing of maize after soaking in water causes the loss of 40 per cent of the nutritive value, 60 per cent of the protein, and 80 per cent of the fats and vitamin A. The loss in cooking ("ugali crust") has been estimated at 10-15 per cent (*Maletnlema*).

There may, therefore, be a big difference between the maize harvested and the maize available for consumption. No doubt losses are also incurred with other crops and methods of preparation.

(3.2) **The serving and sharing of food**

It may be the social custom for the men to eat first, and for women and children to eat what remains. This will create a danger of malnourishment among women and children, especially when meat is scarce and all taken by the men. Further problems may arise when the food is served in a communal bowl and it is difficult for the smaller and younger members of a household to claim their fair share. The serving of only one main meal each day may also contribute to malnutrition.

(3.3) **Customs governing the use of particular foods**

Some traditional taboos may still be observed, e.g. the eating of eggs by women, but they are probably now uncommon. More serious may be the diets given to invalids, e.g. the stopping of breast-feeding while infants have diarrhoea.

(3.4) **Child care**

The vulnerability of young children to malnutrition has already been mentioned, and they may well suffer if suitable foods and feeding methods are not used. Problems of this type should be suspected when children are separated from their mothers at an early age, or when
particularly heavy demands are made on the mother through family split-up (e.g. because of migration of father), agricultural work, water carrying, or large family size. Motherless children, of course, present a special problem.

A well-publicised problem of this type is the use of powdered milk in place of breast-feeding. A sudden change from breast-feeding to foods of much lower nutrient value (e.g. maize porridge) may also cause malnutrition.

(4) The "Health" problem area

It is necessary to distinguish between those health problems which are symptoms of malnutrition and those which are causes, and those which must be regarded as separate problems.

(4.1) Nutritional deficiency diseases

If such diseases are present, another relevant problem type must be found. On occasions, it may, however, be necessary to treat the disease directly through a food supplement programme (e.g. iodization of salt).

(4.2) Diseases leading to malnutrition

In some areas, contaminated water supplies and poor sanitation may make dysentry common, and this will affect the people's absorption of nutrients.

(4.3) Other diseases

Some diseases are closely associated with malnutrition, e.g. measles and tuberculosis, and it may be possible to classify them with (4.1) above. Otherwise, disease problems may be unrelated to malnutrition, although they may be equally serious.
STEP 4

Detailed analysis of problem types

After Step 3, one or more problem types will have been singled out as "relevant" to the problem of malnutrition. Some of these problem types are quite explanatory, but others call for much further analysis into the structure of the problem before the "solutions" can be considered. As an example, a possible scheme for analysing production problems is shown in Diagram IIIB. This, however, may be the most complex problem type to analyse, and within it there may not be a single cause – poor crop production, for example, may be a result of both low yields and shortage of land.

SOME COMMENTS ON THE PROCEDURE

It would be theoretically possible to devise flow-charts of all the questions which need to be asked in analysing any problem situation, and in formulating the response for an NGO. However, because of the number of conceivable problems, the flow-charts would need to be very extensive. Diagram IIIB, which deals, no doubt inadequately, with only one problem type, is rather cumbersome, and consequently of limited usefulness.

During the study which led to this thesis, the procedure was considered as a framework for analysis both in Kitui District in Kenya and in Igunga District in Tanzania, but it was not found to be particularly helpful for the following reasons:

(i) Data on malnutrition is not usually the starting point in any analysis. Only after much investigation could any available nutritional information be found, and by that time its value was only as corroborating evidence. Other indications of problems, including subjective impressions, were strong enough to make a case for NGO concern without the need for nutritional information.
(ii) Although complete information on exactly who in a community is malnourished and what is the nature of the nutrient deficiency, may take one a long way towards understanding a problem, by the time such detailed information could be found, the investigator would already have gone a very long way towards identifying solutions.

(iii) The procedure was a rather laborious way of reaching conclusions which might have been regarded as "obvious". For example, a shortage of water and its consequent problems may be the reason for an NGO giving attention to an area, and the problems may be evident without an NGO needing to work the analysis of Diagrams IIIA and IIIB.

(iv) Although it is possible that some causes of malnutrition may not be detected if an NGO does not use a procedure such as the one described above, this is unlikely to be an important difficulty in practice. After a study of available literature on an area, discussions with others working there, and field visits, it is unlikely that an NGO will not have sufficient information to identify the major problem types, and that the analysis is incomplete need not prevent an NGO supporting projects aimed at overcoming the most pressing problems.

Consequently it is concluded that while the above procedure may be of use to an NGO checking its analysis of a situation, it is unlikely to be helpful in initially making the analysis.
APPENDIX IV

EXAMPLES OF POSSIBLE CONSTRAINTS TO RURAL CHANGE

Section 5.3 of this thesis proposed a classification system for the constraints to rural change. This appendix elaborates on the proposed system by giving examples of the types of constraints which may be found in each class.

The primary classification follows Myrdal (see Section 5.2.) in dividing factors into six categories:

1. Output and incomes
2. Conditions of production
3. Levels of living
4. Attitudes to work and life
5. Institutions
6. Policies

Streeten (*1,p.440), discussing Myrdal's classification, has written: "The first three categories comprise what are usually called "economic" conditions while categories (4) and (5) would normally be called "non-economic", psychological, social and cultural conditions. Category (6) is a mixture..."

These categories have been further sub-divided as shown in Section 5.3, and the examples, taken from other studies and discussions with other researchers and NGOs, on which the sub-divisions have been proposed are as follows:

1. Output and incomes

These constraints arise from farmers' lack of economic resources, generally a consequence of a low level of labour productivity.
a. Lack of resources to implement change.

Most changes require some form of investment, e.g. a farmer may need to buy new seed or to use more labour in attending to his crops. Clearly, the poorer farmers will have less opportunity for investing in new ideas than those with surplus incomes, and some changes may be outside the means of poor farmers.

b. Lack of resources to risk change.

Hunter (*, p.32) has noted that for many "traditional" societies, "...the first concern...is not prosperity, but survival." Joy (* (1), p.177) has pointed out the complexity and interdependence between different activities in poor-country farming systems, and that change in one part of the system may have serious repercussions elsewhere. Change, therefore, has associated risks, and a farmer operating at a meagre subsistence level cannot afford to risk errors: his policy must be one of ensuring a minimum income. Joy concludes:

"For poor farmers, risk and uncertainty may have a seriously inhibiting effect on their willingness to innovate, for they cannot afford to suffer a setback which might mean deprivation – perhaps chronic indebtedness, loss of their land, or even starvation."

(*Joy (1), p.182)

c. Proposed changes not sufficiently attractive.

This problem is closely linked to 'b' above. The farmer must weigh the expected benefits of change against the consequences of things going wrong. Only if the expected benefits are significant will the risks of change be worth taking. Schultz argues that the returns on investments in traditional farming are low (*, p.96), and Heyer (* (3)) has found that in a part of Kenya, credit schemes are not helpful because there are no attractive investments open to farmers. For a farmer to adopt a new practice, either the risk must be low, or the expected benefit great.

2. Conditions of production

This category, like '1' above, to which it is closely related, is principally of economic constraints, but environmental factors are also included.
a. Environmental/technical constraints.
The physical environment - soil quality, water resources, etc. - will limit the yields which can be expected, the types of crops which can be grown, etc. If a new innovation is not technically suited to the environment, then either it will not be, or it will not successfully be adopted.

b. Economic infrastructural constraints.
These are both economic and organisational. For example, a new crop may require more efficient distribution channels for seeds and fertilizers, and better marketing facilities than exist at present.

3. Levels of living
An NGO's objectives may be to raise levels of living, but low levels of living may themselves be a constraint. According to Myrdal (*, p.80), "In circular causation a rise in levels of living is likely to improve almost all other conditions, in particular the effort put into work and the efficiency of labour, and thus, productivity. Equally, attitudes and institutions are affected by rises in these levels."

a. Disability from disease or malnutrition.
Where disease or malnourishment is serious this will obviously be a constraint as well as a symptom of the problem. But even where the symptoms are less evident, it may be a factor which reduces productivity, etc. - data from Tanzania shows a clear relationship between food intake and work output (*Maletnlema).

b. Constraints of knowledge.
- No knowledge of possible changes. That this is a constraint is self-evident. It is a constraint which could be expected to arise more often in remote and relatively closed communities. Certain nutritional deficiencies may also belong to this class, communities being unable to link their symptoms with their diet.

- Insufficient knowledge to implement a change. A community may know of the existence of a new technique, but lack the know-how needed to adopt it. For example, some cash crops may need special husbandry methods or processing.
4. **Attitudes to work and life**

a. **Social conventions which inhibit change.**

For example, in some societies the men may control the cash crops and the households' cash incomes while the women are responsible for growing food crops. It may then be difficult to implement a change which requires cash to be spent on fertilizers for food crops. Changes which require men to undertake tasks traditionally regarded as women's work may also be resisted, as may changes which alter the women's role in Islamic societies. It has been suggested that obligations at marriages and burials may be a constraint to progress, but it has also been argued that the economic effects may not be great, and that in poor communities there may be a psychological need for such apparent "extravagances" (*Hunter, pp. 33, 34 and *Schultz, p. 27). Obligations within the extended family may reduce the attractions of some innovations to individuals as the benefits must be shared among many relatives, but such obligations can also be regarded as a positive feature of traditional society as they give security to the less successful members (*Rogers, p. 123 and *Castillo, p. 137).

b. **Attitudes and beliefs which inhibit change.**

Moves towards better animal husbandry may be obstructed by "traditional" attitudes towards livestock, cattle being regarded as signs of wealth and status; improvements in nutrition may be hindered by local taboos (e.g. the belief that eggs will make women infertile); and the introduction of new food crops or the development of fisheries may be inhibited by taste preferences for traditional crops and meat. Many attitudes and beliefs may have been based on sound reasoning (e.g. the economic importance of cattle, and the avoidance of eating contaminated eggs), but in new circumstances it may be necessary to overcome traditional views. Rogers (*, p. 115) argues that a feature of peasant communities is mistrust in interpersonal relations and that this attitude makes it difficult to organise projects on a community basis (see also 4a above). His argument appears, however, to be based on examples from Latin America and Asia, and different results may be found in tribal (as distinct from peasant) societies in Africa.
c. Lack of innovativeness.

According to Rogers (*, p.117), "Peasants generally lack innovativeness in their reaction to new ideas. To say that farmers are oriented to tradition is to state a truism rather than to offer an explanation of their behaviour." Both he and Castillo (*, pp.137,138), however, note that the peasant's response to innovations is probably a result of the inappropriateness of many of the innovations, and a consequence of risk avoidance (see 1b above). Perhaps, more subjectively, Hagen (*) has argued that innovativeness is the key to economic development, and it depends on the characteristics of a society. "Authoritarian" societies, which many "traditional": societies are, are unlikely, he argues, to produce as many innovators as non-authoritarian society.

d. Different value systems.

Farmers may evaluate changes differently from planners. Whether this is regarded as a constraint or not depends on one's viewpoint. The poor farmer, like everyone else, must decide how to divide his resources between investment and consumption, and his time between work and leisure. He may reject a proposed change which involves more work if he values his leisure time more than the expected benefits of the change. Similarly, he may value the cash to buy a transistor radio more than a slight improvement in the nutritional status of his children.

e. Mistrust of change agents.

In colonial situations many changes were imposed, sometimes forcibly, by the ruling administration. Moreover, many of the changes were based on inadequate understanding of the local situation, and involved the local population in extra work for no benefit. To the farmer, the colonial extension officer may not just have been an enemy, but an incompetent one. The situation may not be too different in some now independent countries, and the farmer may be unlikely to adopt a new technique on the advice of an extension worker alone. Even when there is no history of hostility and mistakes, the farmer can be expected to be suspicious of those who wish to change his way of life (*Rogers, p.113).
5. **Institutional constraints**

a. Constraints arising from the existing economic organisation of the community.

Traditional work arrangements may make the introduction of new techniques difficult, e.g. Curtis (*) has noted how the rules governing co-operation in ploughing may make it difficult for farmers to change to new practices. Changes which, when viewed on their own may appear technically good, may require a reallocation of labour and other resources.

b. Constraints arising from social structures.

As was noted in 5.1, economic changes may necessitate social changes, and these may result in new determinants of status and leadership. Hunter (*, pp.56-71) gives examples of how the Hindu caste system is being undermined by changes in economic life. Traditional leaders can be expected to use their influence to oppose changes which threaten their position. In the economic field, merchants may use their power to oppose co-operatives. Inequitable socio-economic structures may make it difficult for poorer people to benefit from changes, e.g. changes aimed at increasing agricultural productivity may benefit landowners more than tenant farmers, thereby reinforcing the structures. Innovation by the young (who are often educated) may challenge the authority of the elders.

c. Limits on a community's ability to organise.

Certain changes may require communal organisation, e.g. pooling of cash, labour or land resources, to achieve economies of scale, or for disease control. "Self-help" projects will often be in this category. Such changes may require institutions through which plans can be formed and leadership can act.

6. **Policies**

Policies may be more a feature of national rather than community systems, but nevertheless, policies have consequences at the community level. In this study, the government has been treated as a single factor, but there may be large differences between the stated policies and motivations of a central government and the motivations and
practices of those who implement policies at community level.

a. Government apathy, or even hostility towards change.
A change is more likely to take place if the government creates an environment favourable to it, i.e. instructs extension staff to give the change their backing, provides services such as distribution of fertilizer and marketing outlets, sets prices which are attractive to farmers, etc. Cases in which the government opposes change are likely to be rare (if attention is confined to the types of change which NGOs would wish to promote, and if Latin American examples are excluded where the very formation of a co-operative may result in the arrest of the leadership), but a government’s indifference may make it difficult for a change to be achieved.

b. Lack of government investment in change.
Some changes may require resources far beyond the reach of individuals or communities, e.g. the building of a dam, a new road, electricity, etc., and government help may therefore be needed. 6b may often be a consequence of 6a.
APPENDIX V

GOVERNMENT SERVICES IN THE RURAL AREAS OF KENYA

The Kenyan Government, through the services it provides, is perhaps the major agent of change in most of Kenya's rural areas. The adequacy and nature of these services will therefore be important factors for NGOs to consider when they themselves are trying to promote changes.

Services such as schools and hospitals were first introduced to Kenya by missionary societies, and those services were later expanded by the colonial government. Agricultural extension services were started in the 1920s, but during the colonial period they only reached a small percentage of the population, and then primarily in the high-potential areas of the country.

At independence the administrative structure of the colonial regime was retained by the new government, but although services have been expanded, many people are never visited by agricultural extension staff, many have access to only very basic health services, and many children receive no schooling. Extension services remain biased towards economic production: Almy noted in her study in Meru that: "Distribution of extension staff...was closely related to their expected influence in the expansion of economic production. The agricultural extension staff was nine times as large as the health extension staff, and twenty times the size of the community development staff." (*Almy, p.95).

The present provision of agricultural health and educational services is described below:

(i) Agricultural services

There are crop and livestock officers in most districts whose job it is to advise on farming methods, introduce new crops and practices,
and generally to promote the government's agricultural policies. Doubts, however, have been raised about the effectiveness of their work:

- their advice is not always in the best interests of the farmers (e.g. *Hunt (2), pp.12-17) whose real problems they do not always correctly identify (*Mbithi (2), p.12);

- most attention is given to better-off and more 'progressive' farmers (*Almy, p.94; *Heyer (2), pp.75-78; *Heyer and Ascroft; *Hunt (2); *Leys, p.101; and *Mbithi (2), p.11);

- services are constrained by shortages of staff and other resources (e.g. *Almy, p.95).

Moreover, Mbithi (*(2), pp.9-11) has pointed out that government research efforts are biased towards the large-scale and educated farmers and cash crops. He and Heyer (*Heyer (2), p.59) note that rural credit schemes discriminate against the small farmer, although Heyer (*(3)) notes that this may not be a constraint because of the lack of productive investment opportunities available to small farmers.

(ii) Health Services

In the financial year 1971-72, Kenya's recurrent expenditure on health services was K£9.6 million, which was K£0.81 per capita. As much of the health budget must be used in running large, urban hospitals, it can be assumed that many, if not most, Kenyans receive next to nothing in the way of medical care.

The 1969-74 and 74-78 Plans both reported that more emphasis would be put on preventive programmes, and set a long-term target of one rural health centre per 20,000 population, but of the planned development expenditure in the 1969-74, period, only 2½ per cent was budgeted for health centres and 8 per cent for public health programmes, compared with 58 per cent for hospitals and 20 per cent for staff housing. The situation improved slightly in the 1974-78 Plan, with 14 per cent of the development expenditure going to expanded rural programmes, but still with 52 per cent on hospital development (including staff housing).
There is a serious imbalance in the distribution of health facilities. In 1972, Nairobi had about a quarter of all hospital beds in the country, a third of all the doctors, and half of all nurses and midwives (G of K (7) and (8)). Thus, per member of the population, Nairobi has 40 times as many doctors as Nyanza Province (Nyanza has one doctor per 56,000 inhabitants compared with one per 1,400 in Nairobi) and 63 times as many nurses and midwives as North Eastern Province. It has been argued that urban hospitals accept cases from rural areas, but research has shown that in general, in developing countries, large hospitals only serve those living within a few miles of the hospital (*MacKay, p.4).

In her study in Meru, Almy (*, pp.95-99) found the health extension service totally inadequate. 52 per cent of her sample of 672 families had never been visited at all, and only 14 per cent had been visited in the previous year. Moreover, the approach of some staff, threatening prosecution to those who did not obey directives, had led to a situation where they had to be accompanied by sub-chiefs when visiting some villages for fear of attack.

There do not appear to be plans in Kenya for creating village health cadres along the lines followed in, for example, China, Cuba, Tanzania or Guinea Bissau, although the need for paramedical staff to work within the health service structure is noted in the 1974-78 Plan.

Churches continue to play a significant role in health services, and in 1974, they provided about 30 per cent of the hospital beds in the country, often in the poorer areas. They are also involved in the training of paramedical staff.

(iii) Education

The structure of the Kenyan educational system remains much as it was when it was inherited from the colonial regime: seven years of primary schooling, with a small proportion of leavers getting up to six years of secondary education with university in Nairobi for a select few. Since independence, however, there has been a rapid increase in school enrolments. Table y shows the increase in enrolments since 1965.
TABLE V
Enrolments in '000, 1965-73

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1965</th>
<th>1973</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>1,015 (50%)&lt;sup&gt;(a)&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1,816 (68%)&lt;sup&gt;(a)&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher training</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*G of K (6), p.199)

(a) Enrolment as a percentage of the 6-12 age group.
(b) The 1974 Statistical Abstract (*G of K (6)) estimates an increase of 50 per cent in primary enrolment from 1973-74. As this implies more primary school pupils than children between the ages of 6 and 12 (inclusive) the estimate seems improbable.

The increase in school enrolments, especially in secondary enrolments, has been dictated more by popular demand than by the country's manpower needs or the relevance of the educational system to the country's development. Nearly half of the secondary pupils are in "harambee" (self-help) schools (see 11.2 (E)) built using voluntary subscriptions, financed through school fees higher than those charged in government schools, often ill-equipped and with unqualified staff, and catering for pupils unable to gain places in the government schools.

In a survey in 14 districts, secondary schools were found to be considered only second to health and maternity centres by villagers, as self-help priorities (*Heyer et al., p.36).

The reasons for this growth in education are identified in the 1974-78 Plan (*G of K (5), p.404) :

405
"...the formal educational system is seen as the most accessible route to individual social and economic advancement. In the period since independence, most of the gains from Kenya's rapid economic growth have tended to concentrate in the modern formal sector of the economy. Entry into this sector of the economy has been easiest for those who have completed the secondary and tertiary levels of the formal educational system. The second factor is that the structure and content of the formal educational system has reinforced this pattern."

In her study in Meru, Almy (*, p.94) concluded:

"The educational system...was thus almost totally dedicated to the selection and training of a small minority for clerical or professional employment. This system was heavily supported by parents and students alike, a kind of divisional sweepstakes in which the prize was a middle-or-upper-class income and status. But only people of above average wealth could actually afford to pay the necessary fees for secondary schools, even in the government system."

There has been little change in the curriculum towards technical subjects: a classical academic education is required for urban office jobs, and not agricultural know-how. The educational system thus reflects Kenya's competitive, free-enterprise society.
APPENDIX VI

DRUGHT IN KITUI AND ITS LIKELY EFFECTS ON CROP PRODUCTION

As reported in Chapter 9, this study was conducted at a time when Kitui District in Eastern Kenya was suffering from a period of drought. The subjective impressions of rain failure and poor harvests which were obtained from conversations in the district were reinforced by an examination of the rainfall data and an estimation of its effects on crop production. Firstly, the rainfall statistics are examined.

TABLE VI.A: Rainfall at 14 Stations in Kitui District, 1971-74

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Station</th>
<th>Height (ft)</th>
<th>Years of recording</th>
<th>Annual rainfall Ave. to 1971</th>
<th>1971</th>
<th>1972</th>
<th>1973</th>
<th>1974</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Northern Kitui</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Tharaka</td>
<td>3000</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>823</td>
<td>516</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Tseikuni</td>
<td>1950</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>593</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Mvukoni</td>
<td>2900</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>510+(a)</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>376</td>
<td>464</td>
<td>277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Katse</td>
<td>2500</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>565 (b)</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>440</td>
<td>516</td>
<td>484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North-central</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Mwingi</td>
<td>3450</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>794</td>
<td>486</td>
<td>1027</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>419</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Mutonguni</td>
<td>4500</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9555</td>
<td>571</td>
<td>526</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>620</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Migwani</td>
<td>4000</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>821</td>
<td>511</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Kitui</td>
<td>3860</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>1294</td>
<td>939</td>
<td>1815</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>1145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Tiva</td>
<td>3400</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>671</td>
<td>490</td>
<td>991</td>
<td>617</td>
<td>603</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South-central</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Ikanga</td>
<td>2800</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>730</td>
<td>584</td>
<td>539</td>
<td>473</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Mutomo</td>
<td>3000</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>823</td>
<td>651</td>
<td>490</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South-east</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Voo</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>548</td>
<td>412</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>307</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Mutha</td>
<td>2200</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>853</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>484</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>726</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Kanziko</td>
<td>3000</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>657</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>508</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Notes on Table VI.A

a) The 1971 figures, the averages up to 1971 and the heights of the stations are taken from "Summary of Rainfall in Kenya" (*E.A. Meteorological Dept. (1)). The 1972, 1973 and 1974 figures are from provincial agricultural reports (*G of K (10)).

b) For Mvukoni, no long-term average figure was available, but Map 9 A of Chapter 9 (which is from the National Atlas of Kenya (* G of K (9)) suggests that it is in the range 510-760 mm (200-300 ins) p.a.

c) An estimate by Wisner and Mbithi (*), although Map 9 A suggests that the average should be higher.

d) "n/a" indicates that the data is not available, or that there is a clear error in the reported data. In some of the cases marked "n/a" data will be given in reports for either the first or second halves of the year.

e) The average annual rainfall figures appear to be, in most cases, high when compared with Map 9 A (Chapter 9). However, figures for Kitui town from 1931 to 1960 (*E.A. Meteorological Dept. (2)) show that considerable variation can be expected in 10 year averages (see also *Masaya). In the 28 years recorded during 1931-60 the average is about 950mm, which suggests an average of over 1500mm for the other 35 years during which data has been kept.

f) For Katse (station no. 4 above), Wisner and Mbithi (*) have estimated that the standard deviation of the annual rainfall is 45% of the total.

From Table VIA and the above notes, no clear pattern emerges, but the following conclusions can be tentatively drawn:

1. All of the district, with the possible exception of the central Tiva-Kitui area, suffered from lower than average rainfall in the period 1971-74 (Wisner and Mbithi (*) add 1970).
2. During each of the four years shown, most stations (other than Kitui and Tiva) recorded only between 40 and 80 per cent of their long-term averages, although a number of very low figures were recorded.

3. These severe local droughts appear to have been confined to the years 1972 and 1973, although there is insufficient data to draw firm conclusions. They can occur at different altitudes (e.g. Tseikuru in 1972 and Mutonguni in 1973) and in areas in which the average rainfall is quite high. They can be extremely localised (see the 1972 figures for Mwingi and Migwani which are only about 12 miles apart).

4. Out of 50 annual rainfall measurements shown, 47 are below their average values. This suggests that the arithmetic mean is, perhaps, not a helpful statistic to use in forecasting annual rainfall.

From the data it would appear possible to examine the district in terms of three zones:

I The area around Kitui town which does not seem to have been affected during the four years (stations 8 and 9 in Table VI.A).

II The areas of higher ground to the north and south of area I (stations 5, 6, 7, 11 and 12 in Table VI.A).

III The far north and the eastern part of Southern Division (stations 1-4 and 12-14 in Table VI.A). These areas are, in general, lower and with smaller average annual rainfalls than types I and II, but there are exceptions.

These zones are shown in Map 9B in section 9.3.
As with most districts in Kenya, rainfall comes in two distinct seasons: the long rains in March to May, and the short rains in October and November (although monthly figures suggest they continue into December). According to the "Crop Calendar for Kenya" (*G of K (11)), Kitui differs from most other parts of the country in that most rain falls in October and November, although the "National Atlas" (*G of K (9)), suggests April as the main peak. Data seems to suggest that rainfall is quite equally divided between the two seasons, some stations recording higher falls in the long rains, and others in the short rains. Many stations record no rain at all in January, February, June, July, August and September.

Crops may be grown in either rainfall period, and it is therefore important to know whether a reduced total rainfall has been caused by complete (or near complete) rain failure in one season, or two seasons of mediocre rainfall. An analysis of seasonal rainfall in 1971, 1973 and 1974 shows that the latter is more often the case.

In considering crop production in a rainfall season, however, the distribution of the rains throughout the season is also important. Ominde (*, p.45) mentions problems of high temperatures causing high evaporation rates, and the destructive effect on crops and soils of "the torrential nature of spasmodic rainfall". Nevertheless, total seasonal rainfall has been used as a single determinant of crop production in this analysis, and estimates of the rainfall requirements of different crops have been taken either from the district, or from areas with similar problems of irregular rains and high temperatures.

The main food crops grown in the district, and their rainfall requirements are listed in Table VI.B.
TABLE VIB: Rainfall requirements of food crops in Kitui District

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crop</th>
<th>'000 ha 1974</th>
<th>Rainfall requirements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maize</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Local</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>Satisfactory yields from 300mm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Katumani</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>175mm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Millets</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>Both drought resistant, and because of its short maturation period, drought evading. Areas with ave. 500-625mm p.a. are suitable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sorghum</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>Very drought resistant. 300-380mm during the growing period, but 175mm can suffice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pigeon peas</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>Drought resistant and well suited to Kitui District</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cow peas</td>
<td>(est.15)</td>
<td>Drought resistant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grams</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>650mm p.a. gives reasonable yields</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(from *Acland)

From Table VIB rainfall seasons can be roughly classified into four categories, as in Table VI.C below:

TABLE VI.C: Categories of rainfall season

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Rainfall in season</th>
<th>Crop production</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N- Normal</td>
<td>over 300mm</td>
<td>No loss in production (of listed crops)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L- Low</td>
<td>200-300mm</td>
<td>Seriously reduced yields for local maize. Reduced yields for all crops except Katumani maize, and perhaps sorghum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VL- Very Low</td>
<td>150-200mm</td>
<td>Crop failure for local maize and grains, reduced yields for Katumani maize, and seriously reduced yields for all other crops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P- Rain Failure</td>
<td>below 150mm</td>
<td>Complete crop failure</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An examination of the distribution of seasonal rainfall totals in each of the three zones in Kitui District identified above leads to the following table:
TABLE VID : Distribution of seasonal rainfall categories 1971-74

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Percentages in zones</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VL</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It should be noted that Table VID has been derived from a rather simple model which takes no account of factors such as rainfall distributions within seasons, local soils and topographies, etc. Nevertheless, Table VID suggests the following picture:

1. During 1971-74 there have been wide variations in the seriousness of the reduced rainfall within the district. It appears that the "core" of the district, around Kitui town, was hardly affected, while the far north and the eastern side of the Southern Division suffered much. (No data is available for Eastern Division).

2. In the parts of the district worst hit:
   - it is likely that every other rainfall season all crops failed with the possible exception of Katumani maize and sorghum;
   - every fourth rainfall season it is possible that all crops failed with no exceptions.

3. The central (generally medium-potential) areas excluding the area around Kitui town were less badly hit, but even there it is possible that all crops other than Katumani maize and sorghum may have failed in 20 per cent of rainfall seasons.
APPENDIX VII

SOME STATISTICS ON MIGRATION FROM KITUI DISTRICT

This appendix contains three estimates of the number of migrants leaving Kitui District each year.

1. Comparing the number of boys in different age ranges recorded in the 1962 and 1969 censuses (*G of K (2)) gives the following results:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age groups</th>
<th>Numbers</th>
<th>Differences</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>1969</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-9</td>
<td>20,470</td>
<td>18,960</td>
<td>1,510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-14</td>
<td>19,670</td>
<td>12,370</td>
<td>7,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-19</td>
<td>12,710</td>
<td>1,310</td>
<td>3,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-22</td>
<td>4,980</td>
<td>4,740</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-22</td>
<td>57,830</td>
<td>45,380</td>
<td>12,450</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE VII

Although these figures may be very approximate, they show very large population movements between 1962 and 1969. It appears that 37% of boys in the 10-14 range in 1962 left the district by 1969, and there is a strong indication that many more will have left in the following five years. Of girls in the 5-22 age range in 1962, the decrease by 1969 was only 10% (6270). Thus during the years 1962-69, there was a net migration in this age range of 18,720 (ignoring mortality for this range). This figure is about 6.6% of the 1962 population and so annual migration in this range may be about 1% of the district's population. (Some migration in the period between the censuses would also have taken place among those under 5 years and those over 22 in 1962, but the above figures suggest that 5 - 22 covers the age range in which most migration takes place.)
2. The above estimates seem conservative when compared with those given in the Eastern Province Regional Physical Development Plan of 1970 (*G of K (10)) (based on 1962 figures):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outward migration</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To Nairobi</td>
<td>5,395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To Mombasa</td>
<td>9,361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To Thika</td>
<td>1,705</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To Embu</td>
<td>1,256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>17,517</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inward migration</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>From Machakos</td>
<td>6,698</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Net migration 10,819 (outwards)

In 1962 the net migration was therefore about 4% of the population according to the above figures. (It is possible that the population movements in 1962, however, were greater than normal following the extreme weather conditions of 1961 (severe drought followed by floods) (*G of K (12)).

3. Figures from the 1969 census, however, suggest a much smaller migration rate. These showed 90.8% of those born in Kitui still to be living there. If it is assumed that all migration takes place at age 'n' and if those who move into Kitui are ignored, then if $X$, $Y$ and $Z$ are the percentages of those born in Kitui such that:

- $X =$ those under 'n' years old
- $Y =$ those aged 'n' or over who are still in Kitui
- $Z =$ those aged 'n' or over who have migrated;

then:

$$X + Y + Z = 100$$

$$Z = 9.2$$

and $X/Y$ can be found from the age distribution (e.g. if $n = 16$ then the age distribution suggests that $X = Y$; if $n = 20$ then $2X = 3Y$, etc.)

For most probable values of 'n' (Omide (*, p.118) from a study of sex ratios at different ages puts most migrants in the 15-19 age group), the proportion who migrate $(Z/(Y+Z))$ is in the range 0.17 to 0.20. The proportion of the population of a given
age (in the age range of new migrants) is about 2.2% to 2.5%, and thus those who migrate in any year will be less than 0.5% of the total population (say, 0.185 x 2.235%).

Note that the above three estimates use data from the 1962 and 1969 censuses, both of which were conducted in the second half of August, while the longer of the two dry seasons in Kitui is from June to September. The above estimates will therefore include seasonal as well as permanent migration.

These estimates, however, only give an indication of the magnitude of the problem. The rate of migration will vary from year to year depending on the rainfall, and there will also be longer-term variations determined by the comparative employment opportunities in Kitui and elsewhere.
APPENDIX VIII

PROBLEMS IN THE INTRODUCTION OF KATUMANI MAIZE TO KITUI DISTRICT

In Section 10.2.1 the limitations of Katumani maize as a crop likely to make farmers in Kitui less vulnerable to drought were noted. These limitations are described in greater detail in this appendix.

Firstly, however, the potential of Katumani maize is considered.

Local varieties of maize require about 300 mm. of rain in a growing season to produce a satisfactory harvest, but Katumani maize, a composite variety, can produce a crop with only 180 mm. of rain. Thus, with local maize, "drought" occurs and food shortages can arise when rainfall drops below 300 mm. in a season, but if Katumani maize is being used the situation need not (at least as far as maize production is concerned) be considered a drought unless the seasonal rainfall drops below 180 mm.

Mbithi and Wisner (*, p.30) have written that

"Rainfall probability calculations...show that (complete adoption) would reduce the incidence of crop failure and food shortage from once in every three years (1 : 3) to once in every eight years (1 : 8). This means a reduction of crop failure and food shortages rate from 33.3 per cent to 12.5 per cent..."

(Unfortunately it is not clear whether Mbithi and Wisner have calculated on the basis of one or two harvests per year - one crop failure in three years may be one failure in six growing seasons and a rate of 16.7 per cent).

In 1973, Mbithi (* (3)) estimated that famine relief was costing the Kenyan Government KE250,000 per drought season per district. If Mbithi and Wisner's figures are accepted, the saving on complete adoption of Katumani maize would be KE250,000 x (0.333 - 0.125), or KE52,000 p.a. per district at 1973 prices, and this is in addition to the saving in suffering and human dislocation which droughts cause.
Furthermore, trials in Western Kenya have shown that there Katumani maize can increase yields but up to 40 per cent, thereby giving a very high return on investment in seeds (*Allan).

However, the above calculations are based on the assumption that Katumani maize will perform as expected, and that complete adoption is a realistic proposition. On both grounds these are unfortunately difficulties.

(1) The availability of seed

With local maize the farmer holds back some of his harvest each season to use as seed in the next season. Katumani maize seed must, however, he bought every other season, unless farmers can keep a plot genetically "pure" (which is unlikely) (*Hunt (2), p.32). This means that there needs to be an adequate distribution network for seed, but unfortunately this does not exist, and even in the highlands of Kitui seed is sometimes not available until after the planting season has started (*Mbithi (3), p.18).

Part of the difficulty is that the seed is grown at Kitale in western Kenya on the argument that Kitale has a more reliable rainfall and therefore there is less chance of the total seed supply failing. If the rain season in western Kenya is late, however, then the seed may not arrive in Kitui in time for planting. At the time of the study Mbithi had proposed that a proportion of the seed be grown in the Eastern Province, but it is not known if this idea has been acted upon (*Mbithi (3), p.18).

But even if the seed were grown in Kitui, it would be a huge task to distribute it throughout the district. Considering that the district agricultural staff in Kitui town often do not have sufficient petrol to visit the south or east of the district, and that during the rains the roads down the escarpment on the eastern side of the highlands are often closed, it appears that farmers in the remote parts of the district would have little chance of buying seed.
(2) The cost of adoption to the farmer

Farmers must buy seed. After a drought season farmers may have little reserve cash left, and therefore it may be difficult for the poorer farmers to take advantage of Katumani maize. Furthermore, to get the benefit of Katumani maize, fertilizer must generally be used (although according to Allan (*) this is not the case in Western Kenya), and so farmers need to buy another input which is not so essential with the local maize varieties. (Moreover, fertilizer supply has the same problems as seed distribution described in (1) above).

(3) The technical performance of Katumani maize

The yield given by Katumani maize depends on how it is cultivated. Under optimal conditions it gives better results than local maize, but rarely will farmers cultivate under optimal conditions - they may lack the recommended inputs, and there may be other demands on their time and resources. Mbithi (* (3), p.18) reports that:

"The Katumani maize seed has been recommended to farmers on the basis that it yields better than local maize under the conditions 7" rainfall to 12" rainfall. But the extension workers did not inform farmers that this performance is only true under optimal husbandry conditions. Our observations of Katumani under poor, exhausted and compact soils is that it grows to about 2-3 feet high, turns yellow and purple, and produces 1" cobs with or without any grain!"

(Mbithi's emphasis)

With local maize under poor conditions, the farmer usually, at least gets more sizeable plants which can be used for animal fodder. Also, under higher than average rainfall conditions some farmers growing local maize have achieved better results than those who have paid for Katumani seeds.

It is reported, however, that the quality of Katumani maize has been much improved since it was first introduced, but farmers who have suffered from crop failures after following the advice of extension workers may have formed negative perceptions which it may be difficult to overcome (* Mbithi (3), p.14).
It appears, therefore, that Katumani maize will not benefit many farmers in Kitui for some time to come. Farmers outside the centre of the district will find it difficult to get seed and fertilizer, and even in the centre of the district there may be supply problems from time to time. Only the more wealthy farmers will be able to afford adopting Katumani maize unless the government heavily subsidises the price. A survey by Hunt (* (2), pp. 31,32) in a neighbouring part of Embu District in 1972/73 found that only 4.5 per cent of farmers bought new Katumani seeds each season, and all belonged to more prosperous households. A research worker in 1974 reported that:

"...about 500,000 acres of maize are grown in Embu, Meru, Machakos and Kitui districts, and enough new Katumani seed is sold to plant about 5,000 acres every season, i.e. 1 per cent. Since 99 per cent of the acreage is planted with local seed, or possibly 2nd, 3rd, 4th generation Katumani seed, I reckon that the Katumani maize has not had much impact yet."


Thus, the overall effect of Katumani maize in Kitui District may be:

(i) Katumani maize may increase the surpluses of the more wealthy farmers and thus help national economic growth;

(ii) Katumani maize is unlikely to help the poorer farmers, given the present infrastructure for its distribution and its pricing;

(iii) It will not make changes in the economic bias in favour of the more wealthy, but may increase the dependency of those who use it on purchased inputs.

The potential of a crop which can increase yields under drought conditions should not, however, be ignored. Nevertheless, the problem of how poor farmers might benefit from Katumani maize lies more in the economic structure of the country than in the technical merits of the seeds.

In considering Katumani maize, however, it must be remembered that Katumani maize and local maize are not the only two options in Kitui District. During this study some researchers and NGO staff made criticisms of the government planners' "maize fixation" whereby most of the country's food problems are seen in terms of maize. Millet,
the traditional crop in Kitui, is much more drought resistant and
has equivalent nutritional value (Burgess and Burgess (*) say it has
less, but Hunt (* (1) claims it has more). A district crop officer
in Kitui in 1975 recognised the value of millet, and in a letter to
NCCK put millet above maize in a list of required seeds. In average
rainfall years millet yields are certainly much lower than maize
yields, but Hunt (* (2), p.39) has pointed out that maize, as a crop
of the high potential areas has benefited much from research, but
there have been no similar efforts to produce improved strains of
millet.

As a footnote to this appendix, a study made by the writer in 1976
in Igunga District of Tanzania makes an interesting comparison.
Igunga is also a marginal farming district which had been suffering
from several years of drought, and as a result (following a donation
of seeds by the President) the district began a nursery for "Serena"
sorghum, a fast growing variety. In 1976, the nursery had supplies
for about one-third of the district, but there were plans to increase
production to make the district self-sufficient in seed. By producing
in the district it was also hoped that the seed would be better suited
to district conditions. In some mixed stands of maize and sorghum,
the maize had only grown to about 3-4 feet high, while the sorghum
had grown to about 6 feet and had produced heavy heads.

Thus the argument of this appendix is not against new varieties of
fast-growing crops, but against the promotion of new crops which are
technically imperfect, innovations which require an infrastructure
which does not exist, and innovations which are likely to increase the
economic differentiations within societies.
APPENDIX IX

SOME NOTES ON GROUP RANCHES IN KITUI DISTRICT, KENYA

As noted in Section 10.2.2, a main approach to livestock development in Kenya is through the creation of group ranches. This appendix examines some of the problems which may be encountered in the establishment of group ranches with particular reference to Kitui District.

In 1974, Kitui had only three ranches consisting of 800 members and covering 38,000 ha. (*G of K (10), p.78). The 1974-78 development plan (ibid., p.82) envisaged a further eight ranches in Kitui with a total area of about 46,400 ha. Assuming a similar population density, the number of people who will benefit from this development will be relatively small.

The advantage of ranches is that they facilitate herd and pasture management. It is not in the interests of the individual farmer to destock or improve pastures if other farmers who use the same land do not take similar action. In a ranch scheme it is possible to control grazing, access to water, dipping, etc. for a group of farmers. Ranches have not, however, been entirely successful in Kenya.

The existing ranches in Kitui are "co-operative ranches", issuing shares to members who invest in it. Members will generally be farmers who have their own fields outside the ranch. The ranch may own a herd, and possibly land, although this may be rented, possibly from shareholders (* Livingstone).

The ranches proposed in the 1974-78 plan for Kitui, however, are to be "group ranches" which will be formed through the land registration programme. Farmers can form a group and have their land registered in
the name of the group. They may use the land title as collateral to raise loans for starting a communal herd and other improvements, but in general they will continue to own their individual herds.

Although much of eastern Kitui could be described as communal grazing, ownership rights are recognised by the local people (according to researchers working in the area). The ownership pattern created by the land registration programme may not exactly coincide with the traditional pattern, and the planners of group ranches may not always allow for the flexibility of traditional organisation (e.g. arrangements through which herds can be split between several locations to guard against the effects of local droughts, access to water, and that pastoralists may move herds 30 to 40 miles each year in response to rainfall variations (according to local researchers). Group ranches may therefore bring new controls on grazing which may not be recognised by farmers. These difficulties are noted in the 1974 Agricultural Report:

"...(land registration) has proved to be progressing at a very slow rate...In Kitui the problem is localism. Residents of bordering locations have boundary disputes and this has delayed the process of Land Adjudication."

(*G of K (10), p.80)

"Illegal grazing and squatting which was the prominent problem in ranches in Kitui in 1973, was reduced considerably in 1974. This improvement came about through the employment of grazing guards by the ranches themselves."

((ibid., p.79)

The Report notes that on a ranch in neighbouring Embu District:

"Illegal grazing...is still prevalent. The problem is still from the members themselves. This makes it difficult for the manager of the ranch to take any legal action against the culprits. The ranch, up to the close of 1974, still had no lease from the County Council. Any management practices were therefore nil. Apparently, the problem here is political."

( ibid., p.80)

Thus group ranches necessitate changes in the traditional land tenure system. It appears, however, that the economic changes which group ranching would bring may be much more fundamental: Hedland (*) has noted that "the social, political and economic structures...have been
influenced and are changing through the establishment of "group ranches", ranches interfering with existing forms of economic and social organisation, and Davis (*, p.15), in considering the legislation behind the programme, concludes that:

"...it proves an evolutionary or transitional mode of change based as far as possible on the traditional ways. The outcome of the transition presumably is a more highly commercialised and individualised livestock operation..."

Whether further commercialisation and individualism is desirable in communities whose economies are weak but perhaps well adapted to the environment is debatable.

Davis and Hedland both have noted problems in transforming traditional social institutions into modern commercial ones: there are likely to be conflicts of authority and leadership and effects of changes on individuals will much depend on the intra-group economic organisation, but policy-makers seem to have given insufficient attention to these issues.

Hedland (*) has studied the effects of group ranches on Masai society. Ranches were not introduced with sufficient regard to traditional social organisation, and as a result, they cut across some existing social units. He found that

"As the group ranches were not based on any traditional units, and because the registration was rather haphazard, the identification and commitment to the group as a unit will be a very slow process. Because technical and social development have in no way been synchronised, it is very likely that factions and various divisions within ranches will continue to exist."

( Ibid.)

There seems to be no reason to believe that the same problems could not occur in Kitui.

A major concern for NGOs is who the group ranches will benefit. The inequities in livestock ownership have already been noted. Livingstone found in a study of pastoralists in western Kenya that egalitarianism did not seem to be a value of society: if others have more cattle it is "God's will" (*Livingstone, p.12). This, perhaps, suggests that the distributive mechanisms of traditional societies (e.g., the employment of those without cattle) have worked reasonably well. But with group
Pages 424 & 425 are missing in the original
APPENDIX X

KENYAN NON-GOVERNMENT ORGANISATIONS (KNGOs)

This appendix describes some of the major KNGOs. These organisations were defined in Section 11.3 as Kenyan-based and controlled NGO which receive voluntary contributions and make grants to welfare and development projects. Some are involved in the initiation and management of projects, but all have wider concerns than single projects, and all operate in several areas of the country. Their importance as intermediaries between small projects and foreign NGOs was noted during this study, and some general observations on their nature and their role are made in Section 11.3 of this thesis.

The KNGOs described below are:

(i) Kenya Freedom from Hunger Council (KFFHC)

(ii) National Christian Council of Kenya (NCCK)

(iii) Kenya Catholic Secretariat

(iv) Kenya Red Cross Society (KRCs)

(v) Kenya YMCA

(vi) Kenya Voluntary Development Association (KVDA)

(vii) Kenya Charity Sweepstake

(It is noted that the Kenya Charity Sweepstake is not strictly a KNGO).
Some of these organisations are described in more detail than others. This partly reflects their relative importances, but is mainly due to the amount of information available at the end of the study. The above list is not, of course, a complete list of NGO’s.

(i) **Kenya Freedom from Hunger Campaign for National Development** (KFFHC)

KFFHC began in 1964 as part of the world-wide Freedom from Hunger movement started within FAO.

KFFHC’s first chairman was Humphrey Slade, a European, then Speaker of the National Assembly (parliament), and there was much European involvement. The organisation is now fully Africanised, with the exception of a Dutch volunteer acting as an assistant projects officer. According to the KFFHC Programme Extension Officer, KFFHC began as an attempt to move wealth from the rich parts of Kenya to the poorer parts, although it was soon realised that international help would be required. According to a KFFHC listing of projects, of more than K£1½ million channelled to complete projects in 1965–72, only 0.4–0.6 per cent was actually raised in Kenya (see below).

KFFHC does not become involved in project administration, but either gives support to selected projects or arranges support through a donor agency. KFFHC staff describe their work as attacking the problems of under-development rather than just the symptoms, and the projects they support as being "self-help". They claim to be giving priority to the poorer parts of the country, but an examination of their list of funded projects does not show this to be the case. For example, for on-going and completed projects for the years 1965–72, Kiambu (a relatively prosperous district in the highlands near Nairobi) received about K£0.25 per person, compared with K£0.06 per person in drought-stricken Kitui District (figures are not exact because of some projects of national or regional impact).
To stimulate requests for help, KFFHC have a "Programme Extension Officer". Lack of finance for travel, however, sometimes confines this official to Nairobi, and when he does travel to remote districts his programme is arranged by the district administrations.

Villages seeking KFFHC support must make applications on a standard form. Applications are then examined and approved, or otherwise, by the appropriate district officials (agricultural officers, etc.). Approved applications are then considered by the KFFHC selection committee which includes senior officials from government ministries and some MP's. This process can take some time, and some have complained that as a result, "harambee" groups can lose their enthusiasm while waiting for support to arrive. According to one district commissioner, the problem is lack of commitment among the MP's who serve on the committee.

Those applying for help must prove their commitment, generally by contributing a proportion of the total money required, the proportion depending on the relative wealth of the area. Care is taken to avoid misappropriation of funds. Projects are not evaluated after implementation, and if donor agencies require a report, this is obtained through the district administration or other agencies operating the project. Nevertheless, the acting general secretary in 1974 believed that it would be difficult to find a KFFHC-supported project which could be considered a failure, because of the selection process.

Although, as is shown in the above description, KFFHC has very close links with the government, it has been quite successful in establishing itself as a channel for aid from expatriate NGO's, and in the period 1965-72, more than K£2½ million has been found for completed and on-going projects. The sources of these funds are shown in Table IVA below:

Table X.A shows that only a small proportion of the money used has been raised in Kenya. Assuming that half of the "KFFHC and others" category was raised by the KFFHC, the total raised in Kenya over the period is only about K£0.14 per wage employee per year. Although the grants are not dated in the listing, it can probably be assumed
Table X.A: Source of KFFHC Funds, 1965-72

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Completed Projects (K£'000)</th>
<th>On-going Projects (K£'000)</th>
<th>Total (K£'000)</th>
<th>%age Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KFFHC</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KFFHC and others *</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other NGO**</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other FFHC**</td>
<td>499</td>
<td>513</td>
<td>1,013</td>
<td>39.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oxfam</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>369</td>
<td>14.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christ.Aid</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other NGO</td>
<td>577</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>702</td>
<td>27.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other ***</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>** Totals</td>
<td>1,666</td>
<td>870</td>
<td>2,535</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Figures may not appear to be (From KFFHC projects listing, total due to rounding)
* Some projects are listed as being funded jointly by KFFHC and NGOs.
** European, Canadian, American and Australian FFHC's.
*** FAO, UNDP.

that "on-going" projects give a better picture of the 1972 position, and this certainly shows a much higher contribution from KFFHC. This is no doubt due to the KFFHC Walks begun in 1970 (see below).

As might be expected, KFFHC tends to support small-scale projects from its own resources, looking to outside organisations for larger amounts. This is shown in Table X.B.

This pattern may be partly due to the way KFFHC Walk funds are administered. The "Walk", a sponsored walk which takes place annually in all the main towns, is KFFHC's main fund-raising event. In each case, it is the district commissioner's responsibility to arrange the Walk, and as an incentive, 50 per cent of what is raised in a district is given to be allocated by the district KFFHC committee. This means that the wealthy districts benefit much more, as it does not follow that all the money controlled centrally will go to the poorest
Table XB: Grants Administered by KFFHC, 1965-72

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grant size (KE)</th>
<th>KFFHC funded no.</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Funded by other donors no.</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>less than 50</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-99</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100 - 199</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200 - 499</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500 - 999</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000 - 4999</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5000 - 9999</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10000 - 99999</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>over 100,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All sizes</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

districts. The Walk is widely supported, particularly by school children, but its fund-raising effectiveness is questionable. Some KFFHC staff have privately admitted that if the costs of organising the Walk and collecting the proceeds were to be put against the income, the Walk may not even show a profit. Certainly it appeared that much staff time and paperwork were used in trying to collect debts of only a few shillings.

However, the Walk may be more useful as an educational event than as a fund-raising one. It may alert urban children to the problems of the poorer rural areas. For example, the slogan for the 1976 Walk was "Walk for Water". Similarly a sponsored tree-plant may have been more important educationally than financially or environmentally. However, a fashion show in 1975 which raised KE500 in a Nairobi school would hardly have had positive educational effects for the country’s development.

KFFHC is very much an establishment organisation. Its staff are appointed by the government, and at no time during the study were they heard to criticise government policy. KFFHC relies much on government officials to carry out its work, and all projects it supports are government vetted and approved. On occasions, it is the
government which brings projects to KFFHC when the government is having difficulty financing parts of its own development plans. MPs sit on its committees, and cabinet ministers, and even the President, support its fund-raising (when the President gave money for food purchase the staff "would have preferred to use the money in other ways", but they felt obliged to carry out the President's instructions). For support, KFFHC also relies on the Kenyan business elite - in 1976, the chairman resigned, for with more than 30 company directorships he had no time left for KFFHC.

Thus KFFHC is a quasi-governmental organisation, and as such it cannot be expected to challenge Kenya's existing free-enterprise ideology. The relevance of the projects it supports to "development" will often depend on district officials' outlooks and judgement, as they are the people who assess, advise, and, no doubt, often initiate projects. The KFFHC Walk may have value in that it moves self-help from a local to a national level, and it may have educational effects, but up until 1972 it had not been particularly successful as a money-raiser, and without much further research, its impact on public attitudes cannot be assessed.

(ii) National Christian Council of Kenya (NCCK)

NCCK is the central organisation for all protestant churches in Kenya. In the development field it both co-ordinates the work of individual member churches, and operates projects itself, generally using money donated by expatriate NGOs.

It began in 1944, and according to one of its pamphlets, its first concerns were the rehabilitation of soldiers returning from the war, evangelisation of the Indians, and Christian education. Its real entry into rural development work was in 1960–61 when an agricultural and nutritional project was established to help after some abnormal weather (drought followed by floods). It was also around this time that a NCCK working party led to the start of the village polytechnics, rural training centres aimed at equipping school leavers for employment (and, where necessary, establishing employment) in small village enterprises. Since 1961 it has grown from a staff of 6 to a staff, in 1974, of 130 (although not all in development work), with
another 200 working in the projects it supports.

NCCK's work is organised in various "divisions", covering rural and urban development as well as religious matters, and there is a special division concerned with the problems of northern Kenya.

The Rural Development Division gives support to village polytechnics (as does KFFHC and other agencies), a type of project considered to be highly successful both inside and outside Kenya. Yet the head of NCCK's Rural Development Division considered them over-rated: for many people in Kenya, part of their attraction, he believes, is that they qualify for grants from the Ministry of Housing and Social Services. The Division also operates rural training centres giving two-week courses to farmers, and it gives assistance to various church-run projects.

On northern Kenya, the NCCK analysis appears to be that the rural economy was seriously weakened by the Shifts troubles, and several years of drought, coupled with an increasing population have now created a crisis. NCCK is providing famine relief (in 1974 about KE10,000), but it is hoped to transform relief centres into "growth centres" with settled agriculture, village polytechnics, schools and clinics, etc. It has not been possible, as part of this study, to examine their work in northern Kenya, but in 1974 they were looking for KE25,000 for a university-based research project to study the problems of the north, and possible solutions. Professor Mbithi and Dr. Wisner, who already had carried out studies of drought problems in Kenya, were giving advice (see list of references). Staff and project descriptions show a concern for the effect of changes on community structures, and on the ecology of the area.

Most of the finance for NCCK projects comes from protestant church-based organisations (such as Christian Aid in Britain) in Europe, USA and Australia. Sometimes, a member church of NCCK will arrange for money from a congregation in a relatively wealthy part of the country to be sent to a project of a congregation in a poor area. Figures were not available, but as with NCCK, it can be expected that large sums required must be sought outside Kenya.
According to the head of the Rural Development Division (an expatriate), allocation of resources was only in 1975 becoming a problem. Churches had not always been orientated towards development work and had been slow in putting forward possible projects for support. Nakuru District had been the only exception, and this was thought to be due to a large number of expatriate staff there, but by 1976, several young African bishops had been appointed who had more enthusiasm for organising development projects.

NCCK, however, works closely with government officials and all projects must be agreed with the District Development Committees, even when agreement cannot be easily reached. All famine relief must go through government channels, as NCCK considers that it would be politically undesirable to send relief through the churches. An NCCK staff member admitted a fear that in northern Kenya there is a risk that NCCK takes over some of the responsibilities of government administration and is perceived as the government by local people. Nevertheless, NCCK staff admitted criticisms of the competence of some government officials, of the commitment of politicians, and of the country's development policies.

Often churches are given lump sums as "starting grants" to be used in any way which the church wishes, and then for any follow-up grants, full details are required by NCCK. Care is taken to ensure that groups supported are properly constituted and that funds are not misappropriated. Nevertheless, NCCK's staff stress the idea that aid should be a partnership, although in discussions, the partnership concept was applied more often to relationships between KNGOs and supporting expatriate NGOs. For example, Christian Aid was praised as being "well in advance of other agencies" for giving a block grant to NCCK, trusting NCCK to use the money as it saw fit, and only reporting to Christian Aid afterwards. Other NGOs were criticised for preferring to support European-led projects (described by one staff member as the "Oxfam approach"). Such projects may, according to an NCCK staff member, be generally better run than the average indigenous project, but the European-led projects may not always fit into the country's development plans.
Although it was not possible to collect statistical evidence on which to make a comparison between NCCK and KFFHC, discussions with the staff of each, and with other Kenyan and expatriate development workers gave the following impressions:

(i) A clear difference is that NCCK operates some projects and programmes while KFFHC does not (NCCK operates some KFFHC-supported projects).

(ii) NCCK is not as closely tied to government policy as KFFHC. Although NCCK projects must have government approval (e.g. through the district development committees), government priorities do not dictate resource allocation in NCCK as they do in KFFHC. While KFFHC staff praised government policy, NCCK staff were, on many occasions, prepared to be critical.

(iii) While NCCK co-operates (and in many cases acts in support of) district officials, KFFHC depends on them. KFFHC uses district officials to appraise projects while NCCK uses its own resources.

(iv) In conversation it appeared that NCCK paid greater attention to the problems of development, as distinct from project support. For example, in discussing fisheries projects on Lake Rudolph, KFFHC staff spoke only of the success in increasing incomes, while NCCK staff showed much concern about the preservation of fish stocks and the social problems of a community of subsistence pastoralists who suddenly get the opportunity to earn relatively good cash incomes.

(v) NCCK seem to take a more analytical approach to their work, as demonstrated by NCCK's proposed study of Northern Kenya. KFFHC does, however, have university staff on its advisory committees, but they do not appear to be very active. Senior NCCK staff who were consulted seemed to be more experienced than KFFHC staff, yet NCCK staff were willing to admit their mistakes while KFFHC staff were not.
Nevertheless, NCCK and KFFHC work together on occasions, as is shown by the fact that 11 of the 93 projects completed by KFFHC during 1965-72 were operated by NCCK.

However, NCCK is not free from criticism. For development work, NCCK normally acts through church groups, and inter-church politics may affect where NCCK works. For example, at the time of this study, NCCK had relatively little involvement in Kitui because previously the missionary society active in the area did not want a strong link with NCCK. On the other hand, a staff member of NCCK admitted that Nakuru District had gained through having a large expatriate involvement better able to make claims on NCCK resources.

An expatriate head of an NCCK-supported project claimed that NCCK worked well under the current head of the Rural Development Division, but in the past that it had been "Kikuyu-dominated and political". The project head had a letter from NCCK which threatened to "turn off the tap" of aid if the project committee did not toe the NCCK line, and the project head does not, therefore, want to see NCCK having a monopolistic position for handling protestant church aid in Kenya.

The general secretary of NCCK at the time of the study was also the owner of a large, dry-cleaning business in Nairobi. He was a member of the YMCA committee, but regarded as a "troublemaker" by fellow committee members. There were also allegations that his private life did not demonstrate Christian ethics.

The role of NCCK in Kenyan development is therefore difficult to assess. Undoubtedly, it had some committed staff who have an understanding of Kenya's problems, and through them, some valuable development programmes have been initiated. NCCK has a weakness in its inter-church structure which may limit its effectiveness in some areas, preventing optimal allocation of resources. It also has links with the Nairobi business community, although it is not clear whether this may limit its possible operations or not.
(iii) Kenya Catholic Secretariat

The Kenya Catholic Secretariat is the Catholic Church's equivalent of NCCK, and there is a certain amount of co-operation with NCCK.

However, the work of the Catholic Secretariat was not examined during this study, except in Kitui where the Catholic church was so expatriate-dominated that they have been considered as expatriate NGOs (see Section 11.2).

(iv) Kenya Red Cross Society (KRCS)

Like KFFHC and NCCK, KRCS is based on similar organisations in other countries. It is a membership organisation and according to its general secretary in 1976 it has "over 1000 members in every district", the membership is concentrated in urban areas, and pays a "nominal subscription". Being urban-based and paying subscriptions it would be surprising if membership was not concentrated in the educated and salaried classes, and it is difficult to believe that KRCS has over 1000 members in each of the poorer districts.

KRCS's main work is in nutrition programmes, although it also runs first-aid courses, and it was KRCS which started the blood-donor service in Kenya, although this has now been taken over by the government. Youth groups in schools and colleges undertake community work, visiting the sick, etc.

KRCS's approach is to start nutrition education programmes in different districts, and after a few years when the programmes have shown themselves to be successful, they are handed over to the government or to the local district council. Programme teams consist of a qualified nurse (usually supplied by the German Volunteer Service) and a trainee. When a district programme is handed over from KRCS, the trainee should be in a position to take over from the volunteer. The teams operate extension services from centres at which two-week courses are given to mothers who are brought to the centres
at KRCS's expense. The general secretary seemed well aware of the problems of nutrition education, of the need to relate nutrition to agriculture (six sessions on each two-week course are given by a district agricultural officer), of extension problems, etc., and the Institute of Development Studies in Nairobi had been assisting in an evaluation of KRCS's methods.

The handover to district councils has not always been successful. In Kitui, for example, KRCS continued its programme for 18 months after an initial 3 year period, but, as the council even then refused to take over the programme, work in Kitui had to be abandoned.

KRCS can only operate in a few districts simultaneously, and when work in one is finished, KRCS transfers its efforts to another. The general secretary complained, however, that the choice of district tended to be political, local KRCS committees wanting equal attention to be given to all provinces rather than the choice being based on nutritional considerations.

As well as receiving support from expatriate NGOs, KRCS raises money in Kenya from street collections (not regarded as successful because of the number of organisations in Kenya looking for funds) and other ventures. For example, the Mombasa branch of KRCS, in March 1976, ran a raffle in which tickets cost K£1 and the first prize was a "fabulous three-bedroomed house" in Mombasa. Although KRCS operations have not been examined in detail, such ventures perhaps illustrate KRCS's social base and acceptance of Kenya's style of development.

Some staff members of other NGOs expressed to the writer serious misgivings about the way KRCS was being run. In March 1976, a "scandal" was front-page news in the "Nation" (Nairobi, 26.3.76): in the Nairobi branch of KRCS there appeared to be "administrative irregularities", a discrepancy of over £500 in the accounts, misreporting of the quantity of donated drugs, doubts about the whereabouts of protein flour donated by the German Red Cross, and a rumour of a dismissal of German volunteers. However, the reports suggested mismanagement rather than misappropriation of donations (and they did not implicate the general secretary referred to above).
It has also been alleged by an expatriate that the KRCS "International Christmas Food Fair" up until 1974, raised KE30-40,000 each year, with the support of high commissions and embassies which specially imported their national foods for KRCS to sell. During 1975, a wealthy Kenyan on the KRCS management committee asked for KE10 per month for expenses for his time, and an expatriate committee member who objected that such claims were not in keeping with the spirit of the organisation was asked to resign. When news of the incident reached the diplomatic community, they withdrew their support from the International Food Fair, resulting in a large loss in income for KRCS. It has not been possible, however, to fully check this account of the incident.

(v) Kenya YMCA

The YMCA runs training centres at which otherwise unemployed youths in the towns produce handicrafts (mainly for the tourist market) and its hostels offer cheap accommodation to young workers.

Much of the YMCA's income is raised in Kenya from their central hostel in Nairobi. This is run on a different basis to other YMCA hostels: it is a well-situated building offering inexpensive accommodation to young Nairobi professionals, postgraduate students of the Kenyan elite, and expatriate tourists and research workers. The hostel is run to high (European) standards, and its prices include substantial meals (including afternoon tea) served by uniformed waiters. There is a distinct class division between the clientele and the servants: most expatriate visitors treat staff with a benign paternalism, but many of the Kenyan elite assume a colonial-style master-servant relationship. Only in 1975 were the early-morning-tea and shoe-cleaning services removed from the inclusive prices, and then on cost rather than ideological grounds. The hostel's swimming pool is used more by the expatriate community than by Kenyans.

In running their hostels and training centres, the YMCA has also had staffing problems — officials who receive training at YMCA's expense often leave for better paid jobs, and there has also been some petty
pilfering. Some YMCA officers have told the author that they regretted that VSO has stopped its school-leavers programme (see Appendix I) as such volunteers had organisational abilities, initiative and commitment which they cannot find in the Kenyans they are employing: they regard the qualified volunteers of VSO as "overpaid" (in 1976 they were receiving about KE45 per month plus rent!) and too expensive for the YMCA.

It is therefore difficult to regard the YMCA as a development agency in Kenya. It certainly offers a number of youths employment and training, but while it shows concern for the problems of unemployed youths, it appears quite willing to accept the type of society which creates the problems it is tackling.

(vi) Kenya Voluntary Development Association (KVDA)

KVDA began in 1962 as the Kenya Voluntary Workcamps Association. The organisation was probably influenced by the Quaker-supported workcamps which were held in Kenya during the 1950's, and up until the early 1970's, its main finance came from the Rowntree Trust and the Friends Service Council.

According to a KVDA information sheet:

"KVDA is a non-political and non-sectarian indigenously orientated and inspired voluntary organisation, trying to afford opportunities for young men and women of different background, races and nationalities, to work together on a practical project for the benefit of the community."

KVDA arranges workcamps, each of several weeks duration. Between 10 and 40 volunteers work at each camp, and in 1975 between 400 and 500 volunteers worked in rural areas in different parts of Kenya. The volunteers are mainly Kenyan school and college students, but they include youths from Europe, North America, and other African countries. However, because for most people in Kenya "volunteering from altruistic motives is at best a luxury" (*Mbithi (4), p.20) and because volunteers must contribute to their own costs, Kenyan
participants must almost necessarily be from the middle class (as must those who pay their fares from Europe). KVDA has therefore been accused of being elitist.

However, the KVDA director (who had been involved in KVDA since its inception) appears to be well aware of the apparent contradictions in volunteering in Kenya, and sees the main purpose of KVDA being not the completion of projects, but educational. His view is that projects should lead to increased mutual understanding between volunteers and the communities they are working with, a learning or re-learning of the possibilities of co-operative action on both sides, and a realisation that education need not be a social barrier. He believes that the educated elite in Kenya, who are also the policy-makers, have little knowledge of rural conditions, and that the universities and colleges are only serving a capitalist system which allows some to get rich in Nairobi while others face famine: KVDA projects are therefore an educational experience aimed at correcting this trend. (According to the director, KVDA’s office being in a less fashionable part of Nairobi is a consequence of this philosophy).

Similarly, KVDA sees value in having a small proportion of expatriate volunteers on its projects in order to correct the Kenyans’ colonial view of the expatriate and show Europeans as normal human beings. In doing so, KVDA hopes to change some of the misguided aspirations of Kenyan youth (e.g. the wearing of suits and ties, even in the heat of Mombasa). That European volunteers will have an educational role to play on their return to Europe is recognised. Consequently, special programmes are arranged for foreign volunteers consisting of “information camps” (to orientate and acclimatise the volunteers), a short holiday period, and then the main project on which foreign volunteers will only be a minority.

KVDA receives requests for help from local communities, school committees, etc. and most projects require only unskilled or semi-skilled manual work. Requests are assessed using two criteria: how badly is the project needed, and to what extent is the project being requested by the community. KVDA puts much stress on this second factor, fearing that projects initiated and controlled by administrators or politicians will rarely get the interest of local
people, and that such projects may have little to do with
development. Consequently, the director keeps contact with district
officials to a minimum, and holds open meetings with communities
before agreeing to support projects. He does not like the term
"workcamp": volunteers should integrate with and live in accommodation
provided by the community, and should work with the local people
rather than doing work for them. The volunteers' approach to the
community should be "...when you sit, we sit; when you dance, we
dance; when you work, we work."

In 1976, KVDA was experiencing financial difficulties with the end
of Rowntree Trust and Friends Service Council support. It still had
a number of European supporters, but was trying to increase local
fund-raising through Christmas card sales and donations from Kenyan
businesses.

Mbithi's assertion (*Mbithi (4), pp 25-26) that foreign finance and
former expatriate involvement alienates KVDA from local communities
does not seem justified on the evidence found in this study. However,
KVDA's claim that they are "working towards defining volunteering
within the African context by trying to base its volunteer services
on the traditional African volunteer service" also seems extravagant.
Given KVDA's emphasis in project selection on community involvement,
it is likely that KVDA's efforts are aimed at solving many real,
rural problems (even if the provision of manual labour may not always
be the most appropriate form of input). KVDA's work in educating the
Kenyan elite, however, may be much more important, even if difficult to
evaluate.

(vii) Kenya Charity Sweepstake

Although the Charity Sweepstake is not non-government, it is included
in this appendix as an organisation which attracts donations in
Kenya and allocates its funds to development projects in all parts
of the country.
The Charity Sweepstake is a lottery and its fund-raising style is a reflection of Kenya's economic structure. For example, the top cash prize in December 1975 was K£5,000, while other special prizes included a set of golf clubs, a radiogram and an encyclopaedia set, all far removed from the needs of average Kenyans, but no doubt items of status.

Unfortunately, it has not been possible to examine what the Sweepstake does with its money, but a district commissioner described it as a "big headache" because of its use as a political tool. As an example, he told this author of an occasion on which he was asked to go to Nairobi to receive a cheque from the Sweepstake for a water project. However, none of his staff knew of the project, and on checking, he found very few people living at the site of the proposed project. However, it transpired that the local MP had influence on the Sweepstake committee and had obtained the grant, even when the project was far from a priority. The MP then contacted the district commissioner saying that as the grant had been awarded, it was the commissioner's job to make sure that a project materialised.
APPENDIX XI

BRIEF NOTES ON TWO PROJECTS IN KENYA

This appendix is based on notes made after visits to two projects in Kenya, both of which were receiving support from several of the NGOs considered in this thesis. In each case, descriptions of the projects are followed by some criticisms, and then information on NGO support. The projects are:

1. Limuru Boys’ Centre

2. Samburu Rural Development Centre

1. Limuru Boys’ Centre

This centre is situated 15 miles north of Nairobi in a rich agricultural area. It was founded in 1968 by an expatriate who put much of his personal savings into the project after leaving the Tanzanian Police. In 1976 he was still the Centre’s Principal. Some of the ideas for the centre were derived from the Starehe Boys’ Centre in Nairobi (see "Save the Children Fund" in Section 11.2) and Kenya YMCA played a part in its establishment (see Appendix X).

The Centre is residential and gives two-year agricultural courses to boys selected from all over Kenya. To qualify for a place at the Centre, a boy must be between 14 and 16 years old, have completed seven years of schooling and have satisfactory examination results, and be either destitute or from a poor home (the probation service assists in identifying suitable applicants). Only 24 boys are enrolled each year, although in 1974 there were about 2,000 applicants for places.

The Centre trains boys for employment on large farms and estates rather than for self-employment or in peasant farming. The syllabus is divided into four sections:
(i) Practical farm work - the Centre itself is a mixed farm from which much of its income is derived. In addition to working on the farm, the boys are given a small plot each from which they may earn pocket-money.

(ii) Theoretical farm work - students sit the London City and Guilds examination and a very high pass rate has been achieved. The Principal thinks it necessary that the students have the backing of such a certificate, but stressed that academic education was not the aim of the Centre.

(iii) Tractor driving and vehicle maintenance - the boys sit a test for a Kenya tractor driver's licence.

(iv) Character training. This is regarded by the Principal as an important part of the Centre's work and the feature which distinguishes it from other training centres. The boys are sent on a number of Outward Bound courses (including cold-weather survival on Kilimanjaro!), taught first-aid, basic civics, letter writing, etc. and even family planning. They are encouraged to take part in voluntary services such as the blood donor service and the KFFHC sponsored walks (see Appendix X).

At the end of their stay at the Centre, the boys are given a certificate which includes a character reference. The centre also helps the boys to find suitable employment, but this has not proved difficult as large farms and estates are generally keen to recruit the Centre's graduates.

The Centre operates a scheme through which individual donors (many of them in England) can sponsor particular boys; donors are sent photographs and background information on the boys; the boys are required to write to the donors and often receive money and gifts in reply.

The following notes were written by the writer after a visit to the Centre in December 1974:
"Any assessment of LBC's work must be made against the background of Kenya's social and economic structure. Kenya's agricultural areas range from high potential land with estates and relatively prosperous farms, through marginal lands where farmers may be faced with periodic famines caused by unreliable rains, to the semi-desert areas of the north and east. Wealth, political power and development resources in Kenya are concentrated in the high potential areas: problems and poverty are most acute in the other areas.

"LBC selects boys from all parts of the country and trains them for wage employment in the estates and larger farms of the high-potential zone.

1. LBC does nothing to help the poorer parts of the country—instead it provides a service for the businessman-farmer. Students are given a training appropriate for large-scale farming rather than being taught skills relevant to small-scale peasant farming in their home areas (to which, of course, the graduates will not return).

2. Although LBC enables 24 boys each year to find employment, it does not increase employment opportunities—it merely gives 24 people chance of a much increased income than the less educated peasant. And although all students come from underprivileged homes, the Centre's insistence on 7 years of schooling means that entrants from some areas are already relatively privileged.

3. The cost per pupil is high, according to development workers in Kenya, and the Centre is not, therefore, of a type which could be copied in Kenya. LBC has been criticised for giving students a much higher standard of living (accommodation, facilities, etc.) than is necessary.

4. LBC is heavily financed by individual donors (e.g. sponsorship of individual students) and voluntary agencies. The Principal does not want to hand the Centre over to the government as he thinks the quality and character-training aspects of the Centre would be lost. Kenya YMCA who have some association with LBC, are unwilling to take over the Centre, mainly because of its financial position. At present, the Centre is therefore very dependent on overseas donors, most of whom have been attracted to LBC by the Principal's fund-raising genius. When he retires (in the near future?) the continuation of the Centre in its present form is not certain.

5. I have heard rumours of discipline problems among the students which suggest that the character-forming part of the syllabus has not been too successful. I have also been told of friction within the governing committee."

The criticisms in the above notes, however, are not criticisms of the sincerity and devotion of the founder and Principal of the Centre.
As well as receiving money from individual donors through the sponsorship scheme, the Centre's supporters have included Christian Aid, Oxfam, Scottish War on Want, volunteers of various nationalities, Norway's Save the Children Fund, the Irish Freedom from Hunger Council and other charities, as well as the Gulbenkian Fund, Barclays Bank DOO, UNDP, and many businesses in Kenya. A KFFHC grants list shows that in the period 1968-72, KFFHC channelled KSh 38,792 to the Centre compared with only KSh 8,500 to projects in the whole of Kitui District in the period 1965-72. Nevertheless, a KFFHC staff member in 1974 described the Centre as "an ideal project", and in 1976, Oxfam announced a further programme of aid totalling nearly £11,000 over the years 1975/76 to 1980/81.

In 1974, Scottish War on Want agreed to pay three year's rent for the Centre's stand at the Nairobi Agricultural Show - even the Principal admitted to this writer being surprised at an NGO being willing to pay this cost. However, a report on Scottish War on Want's 1979 AGM states

"...Another project which was no longer being supported was the Limuru boys in Kenya (sic). It was felt that this had lost sight of its original aims and also had an extremely healthy bank balance of about £55,000."

(S.W.O.W. NEWS, No. 2, 1979)

Whether there were indeed changes in the Limuru Boys' Centre between 1976 and 1979, or whether the above statement reflects changes which had taken place in Scottish War on Want is not known.

2. Samburu Rural Development Centre (SRDC)

SRDC is near to the small town Maralal, in a poor area of northern Kenya. The Samburu tribe are pastoralists who have received few benefits from development in Kenya. It is likely that they have been underdeveloped by the loss of grazing land to European-farmed ranches in the south of their tribal area, and by the control of all marketing outlets from the district by non-Samburu traders. An increasing population and increasing herd sizes through better
disease control has created serious problems of over-grazing, erosion, and in places, the need for famine relief.

SRDC’s aim was to act as a demonstration ranch, showing the Samburu what is possible with improved herd and pasture management. The project began in 1972 with the backing of the Anglican Diocese of Nakuru and the Kenyan Government, and was led by a person who had worked for ten years on similar problems with the Masai. According to an Oxfam report

"Work began in the first months of 1973. 70 men were employed to dig a trench round a ranch to keep out wild animals and protect the pastures. 20 other men set to work on the few tumble-down buildings already on the ranch, converting them into stores, accommodation for staff and a farm shop. They fenced off areas and built pens so that the animals could be kept to pastures which were ready for grazing while the rest of the pasture was left free to grow. A broken dam was repaired and water channelled throughout the ranch. By Spring, the farm shop was open, selling seeds, fertilizers and tools, and by the Summer the surrounding ditch was completed on the north and west sides, a total of six miles."

(Oxfam Information Unit, January 1974)

According to the head of the project:

"A rural development centre should have a two-way traffic with the local people. They will visit the centre for various reasons, e.g. to buy a bull or farm supplies, and staff from the centre will also go out to them, e.g. to demonstrate sheep-drenching or to advise on dip building. Formal residential training is expensive and heavy on staff, but a development centre can remain more flexible to meet the development needs of the local people as and when they arise."

(Ibid.)

By the time the present writer visited the centre in February 1976, two local people had been employed as extension workers, and the project head himself was spending some time in extension work.

However, in 1976, SRDC had the appearance of a relatively highly capitalised, European-run farm with little in common with the surrounding area. As the SRDC’s own annual report in 1975 noted:

"There is a danger that the Development Centre will have a successful farm and nothing else in the District change much. There is no point in having good grass and good cattle inside the Centre if nobody outside is trying to do the same."
Possible factors which detract from the Centre being a model for the District include:

(i) The cost of establishing the Centre ("70 men were employed to dig a trench...20 other men set to work on the few tumble-down buildings...") makes it a type of enterprise which could only be set up with much outside assistance. It may demonstrate the benefits of controlled grazing, but it does not demonstrate a solution which Samburu tribesmen could use.

(ii) That SRDC is sited near a permanent water source makes the ranch exceptional in Samburu District. Most Samburu need to migrate with their herds in search of water.

(iii) The two project leaders are Europeans living in European-style houses. There is a danger that the technology being promoted by the Centre is regarded as something for Europeans and not something for the Samburu.

(iv) The project employs its African workmen (at wages which are low, but probably not relatively so) rather than offering them partnership in the venture, and there do not appear to be plans for African control of the Centre.

(v) The Centre has a strong Christian orientation in an area in which only a minority, and perhaps not the poorest minority, are Christians. A short religious service is held each morning before work begins and the only "self-help" project of the local staff in 1976 was the building of a church near the Centre.

(vi) The costs of extension work, courses and open days at the Centre was only a very small proportion of the total cost of running the Centre.

There are, therefore, serious doubts about whether SRDC can be expected to have a great impact in the area. Certainly, the project is being
run with the interests of Samburu in mind, but it is possible that Mbithi's criticisms of Kenyan research centres may apply:
"To the rural farmer they are ivory towers, useful as employment agencies, and good government shambas."

(*Mbithi (2), p.10)

Nevertheless, SRDC is one of the very few projects attempting to assist people in one of the poorest districts of Kenya. However, it appears that the problems of development in Samburu District, which are similar to the problems of eastern Kitui District described in chapter 9, cannot easily be tackled on a project-by-project basis, and that appropriate land-tenure, pricing and marketing policies and supporting infrastructure must come from the government. It could also be argued that projects such as SRDC can only provide a narrow, technical solution while the problem requires more fundamental socio-economic changes and a strengthening of the pastoralists political voice in the country.

SRDC has been financed by Christian Aid, Oxfam, Scottish War on Want, the Church Missionary Society, CARE and Catholic Relief Services as well as Barclays Bank International and the Ford Foundation. In the first years of the project, Oxfam was the main donor, making grants totalling £19,588 in the years 1972/73 and 1973/74.

The following footnote describes the problems which SRDC had with one of its donors.
FOOTNOTE TO APPENDIX IX

An example of problems in receiving aid

On visiting the project in February 1976, this writer was asked by the project head to examine his correspondence with Scottish War on Want (SWOW). The essence of this correspondence is outlined below, and it demonstrates the problems which NGOs may cause for the projects they wish to support:

(i) During 1971 when SRDC was being planned, the need for a vehicle was mentioned to SWOW. Only after several exchanges of letters in which SRDC's choice of a Volkswagen pick-up was questioned as the best buy in view of the floating Deutschmark, did SWOW indicate that it did not normally give grants of the size required for purchasing a vehicle.

(ii) From November 1971 until the end of February 1973, SRDC and SWOW (through a voluntary worker for the organisation) were in correspondence over a grant of £500 to buy sheep:

Nov. 71: Following an invitation to apply for SWOW support, SRDC asked for £500 to buy sheep.

Apr. 72: SWOW wrote to say that the application had been approved in principle, but that "some dear old ex-colonial buddies" of the correspondent wanted more details.

June 72: After SRDC's reply SWOW told SRDC that they should have the money by August.

Sep. 72: SWOW wrote to say that the grant had been approved!

Dec. 72: SWOW wrote to apologise for the delay in sending the money - this had been caused by a change in the treasurer and delay in transferring the books from one to the other.

Jan. 73: The SRDC project head told SWOW that it had a "very serious obligation with donors in Scotland to move the money. I would be very fed-up donating to SWOW and then to have the money sit in a bank in Scotland".

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Feb. 73: SWOW wrote to say that the money had been sent in November, in spite of their letter in December. Moreover, extra money had been sent by mistake.

Feb. 73: SRDC reported that the money had at last arrived after having been sent to the wrong address.

It is not suggested that cases such as that described above are typical. The example shows that at that time there were serious shortcomings in SWOW's ability to take decisions and act upon them, and it is possible that some of these problems may stem from SWOW having been run entirely by voluntary helpers. However, SWOW has undergone many changes since 1973.
BRITISH AND OTHER OFFICIAL AID TO KENYA

At various points in this thesis the attractiveness of Kenya to NGOs has been noted (e.g. sections 6.1, 11.4 and 14.1). Kenya also, however, appears to be attractive to donors of 'official' aid (i.e. aid to the Kenyan Government from other governments or international organisations such as the World Bank). Arnold (*2), p.147) notes that:

"Kenya is one of the largest recipients of aid anywhere in the world and by 1975 its development had become increasingly dependent on aid inputs. Some of the loans made available for that year reveal how extensive aid interest in the country had become. From the World Bank Kenya received $10m for education, $40m for an oil pipeline and forestry, $63m for power, $15m for farm rehabilitation and $30m for assistance with balance of payments problems."

Arnold (ibid., pp 150-154) gives statistics showing Kenya's major aid donors to be as follows:

**Table XII.A: Kenya's major aid donors**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country/organisation</th>
<th>Aid in $ millions from independence to 31.12.77</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Grants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W Germany</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEC</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) Excludes loans which have been repaid.
Kenya's total debts (including private debts) amounted to $626 millions at the end of 1975. Very little aid has been received from communist sources - credits from the Soviet Union and China remain largely unused.

Table XII.B shows aid to Kenya analysed by development sector:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Aid in $m. from independence to 31.12.77</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Grants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture etc.</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fisheries etc.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport/communications</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>460</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(COLUMNS MAY NOT ADD TO TOTALS DUE TO ROUNding.)

Thus total official aid (grants and loans) amounts to about $105 per capita.

As is shown by table XII.A, other than the World Bank, Britain is Kenya's principal donor. According to Sharkansky and Dresang (*, p.214):

"The United Kingdom is the largest single source of financial and technical assistance for Kenya... It is clear to anyone who travels through Kenya that the former colonial power is the dominant supplier of equipment and supplies and the major source of expatriate personnel."

Since independence a major part of Britain's aid to Kenya has been for the purchase of land from settlers for transfer to settlement schemes for Kenyan smallholders: in 1961/62 Britain agreed to
provide £22 million for land transfers, and further interest-free loans of £3 million and £18 million were made in the periods 1963-66 and 1966-70 for land transfers and subsequent settlement programmes (*Streeten (3), p.22). It is debatable, however, whether such payments are 'aid', or merely the return to Kenyans of what was taken from them during the colonial period. Streeten (*3), p.59) argues that "Compensation payments for expatriate farmers (e.g., in the white highlands of Kenya)" are among types of payment which "should be clearly distinguished from aid, because if they are aid at all, they can be regarded as aid, not to a developing country, but only to a group of citizens in the donor country".

However, the land transfer programme came to an end in 1979, by which time British aid to Kenya was averaging £10 million p.a., all in grants, and mostly for 'developmental' projects and programmes. This figure was expected to increase as a result of a commitment of £80 million for the three-year period 1979/82 (*ODA (4)). Moreover, through an agreement in 1978, repayment of past development loans was waived.

In allocating the aid commitment for 1979/82, "special emphasis" was to be given to projects in Embu, Meru and Isiolo districts (districts largely of marginal lands in Eastern Province) "because of the importance of bringing marginal agricultural lands into more intensive production, and in accordance with the wishes of the government of Kenya" (*ODA (4)). (This may also have been in accordance with an EEC agreement in 1978 whereby different donors were allocated different areas of the country (*Arnold (2), p. 150).) Aid commitments for 1979 and 1980 include contributions of £10 million for construction of a dam on the Tana River, £5 million for irrigation and settlement projects on the lower Tana River, £13.7 million for road improvements in Embu and Meru, and £6.7 million for feeder roads in a sugar-growing area of western Kenya. The British aid programme also involves substantial technical assistance: according to ODA (*4) :

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"About 770 UK citizens employed by the Kenya Government on their establishment have their salaries supplemented by us at a total annual cost of about £6 million. Secondly, about £1 million is spent each year on the cost of fully-funded experts who are sent to Kenya to carry out specific assignments of varying lengths, and on the cost of consultancy studies in the country; about 60 people are involved in this each year. Lastly the training of Kenyans in the UK costs around £1 million each year."

Thus it appears that by 1980 the British aid programme in Kenya may have been giving more attention to 'development' needs than had been the case in the decade after independence. However, it may be dangerous to draw conclusions without having made a detailed study of the projects supported and the assignments of the 'experts'. E.g. the road improvements in Embu and Meru referred to above, although in districts which are mainly of marginal lands, "passes through a ... region of high agricultural potential, where many crops, especially tea and coffee, are grown by smallholders" (*ODA (5)) (such a project may, of course, be justifiable under 'basic-needs' considerations, although it is unlikely to benefit the very poorest in Kenya). Nevertheless, in 1976 this writer was told by a British official that Kenya had asked for aid to improve the road from Nairobi to Mombasa and to develop colour television, but these requests had been rejected as being outside the guidelines of the "More help to the poorest" policy (*ODM (3)). Holtham and Hazlewood (*, p.223) in their study of aid to Kenya concluded (in 1976) that:

"ODM has kept up with current thinking in development. Obviously it would be unreasonable to blame an agency for not thinking more about appropriate technology and rural development in the intellectual climate of the early 1960s. Once a view has taken hold, however, ODM attempts to apply it in a fairly disinterested way. The sectoral preferences it has shown have by and large been appropriate therefore, as far as anyone can tell."

They do, however, note that aid given to provide basic needs of the poorer sections of the population may not alter the pattern of government spending, but merely enable the government to use more of its own resources on growth-orientated projects in the modern sector (ibid. pp. 184,185). While they comment that:
"Aid has constituted a flow of resources to Kenya, and nothing that we have seen leads us to reject the common-sense conclusion that it has raised incomes in the country" (ibid. p.222),

they also conclude that

"Aid has probably increased economic inequality among Kenyans. It has done so partly as a simple by-product of raising incomes. In releasing resources for modern sector development, aid probably caused a relatively few highly-paid jobs to be created, so increasing inequality." (ibid. p.223).

Thus official aid, even given according to basic-needs criteria, may reinforce the economic structure of the country.

However, a question which remains is why Britain, and other donors, should give Kenya such favourable treatment compared with other countries. Table XII.C (see below) shows that in 1977 Kenya was the second largest recipient of British aid in Africa (in terms of gross disbursements), and in per capita terms British aid was well above the average of other African countries (note that many countries such as the Gambia, Lesotho and Swaziland with populations under one million receive high levels of aid per capita). And although Kenya is a poor country, it is not relatively so when compared to other African countries, and yet it receives much more aid than would be expected if per capita GNP were to be a major criterion of aid donors.

Table XII.C: Principal recipients of British aid to Africa, 1977

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Population ( n ) millions</th>
<th>GNP £ per cap</th>
<th>Disbursements in £m. Gross</th>
<th>Disbursements net £ per cap</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>15.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>239.9</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>19.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(derived from *ODM* (2), pp.20,21)
Sharkansky and Dresang (*, p. 210) attribute Kenya's success in attracting aid to

"a good image among foreign donors and private investors. The government publicizes its political and economic stability and its hospitality to private enterprise. Representatives of donors and profit-making institutions view Kenya as an aggressive and shrewd participant in its quest for outside aid. It compares favorably with other developing countries in its shopping list of projects suitable for aid, and in its capacity to absorb aid into effective programs. Kenya has sold itself well ....".

That Kenya's "political and economic stability" attract aid and investment may be true, but Parkin (*) notes that the relationship may be that Kenya's stability depends on the aid and investment which it receives. Sharkansky's and Dresang's view of Kenya's relative efficiency in producing project proposals which match donors' criteria was confirmed to this writer by an ODA official in London who claimed that this was a major factor behind the size of Britain's aid programme in Kenya. (In contrast, a British official in Tanzania told the writer that Tanzania was not making use of the much smaller aid commitment to the country because of its inability to present sufficient proposals acceptable to the British Government.)

Economic links and political considerations, however, are no doubt principal factors behind aid to Kenya. Arnold *(2), p.154) writes that:

"Kenya's ability to attract aid - overwhelmingly from the West - must cause debate. The country, it is true, is capitalist-orientated, allows investment and easy repatriation of profit. It also possesses regional advantages in relation to its neighbours and pursues a general approach to development which is acceptable to the major donors, such as the United States and Britain, as well as to the multilateral organizations such as the World Bank."

Sharkansky and Dresang (*, pp.217-219) have noted, however, that Kenya's policies may not be attractive to all donors, and not even all Western donors. They found (in 1972) that Swedish aid representatives in Kenya felt

"that the principle of relying on the priorities of the developing country compromises the principle of a more equal distribution of wealth. They find that Kenya's formal plans for rural development do not actually guide government policy when it faces tempting options to develop the economies of Nairobi and other areas in Kikuyu-dominated Central Province."
Swedish unhappiness with Kenyan policies was confirmed in a meeting between a Swedish official and this writer in 1975 when it was suggested that aid to Kenya would be decreased while countries such as Tanzania, Mozambique and Guinea Bissau would receive a larger share of the Swedish programme.

Nevertheless, not all donors share Sweden's aid criteria, and a change in Britain's aid policy in 1980 to give greater weight to "political, commercial and industrial considerations" and USA's establishment of military bases in Kenya are likely to ensure a relatively good supply of aid to the country.
APPENDIX XIII

EXTRACTS FROM THE REPORT OF THE CHARITY COMMISSIONERS FOR ENGLAND AND WALES FOR THE YEAR 1969

Section 14.4 of this thesis examines the dividing line between 'charitable' and 'political' activity and notes the difficulties which an NGO viewing underdevelopment as a structural problem may have in remaining within the bounds set by charity laws. The most recent full statement on how these laws should be interpreted is contained in the Charity Commissioners' report for the year 1969, paragraphs 7 to 16. Extracts from that report are given below:

"One contemporary development which has given us some concern has been the increasing desire of voluntary organisations for "involvement" in the causes with which their work is connected. Many organisations now feel that it is not sufficient simply to alleviate distress arising from particular social conditions or even to go further and collect and disseminate information about the problems they encounter. They feel compelled also to draw attention as forcibly as possible to the needs which they think are not being met, to rouse the conscience of the public to demand action and to press for effective official provision to be made to meet those needs...

"It is a well established principle of charity law that a trust for the attainment of a political objective is not a valid charitable trust and that any purpose with the object of influencing the legislature is a political purpose... Thus it is unlikely that it will lie within any charity's purposes and powers to sponsor action groups or bring pressure to bear on the government to adopt or alter a particular line of action...

"There is a... tendency for those registered charities which have as a subsidiary object the education of the public in the particular aspect of charity with which the organisation is concerned (for instance the relief of poverty in under-developed countries) to overstep the boundary of what might properly be described as education and pass outside their declared purposes into the field of propaganda. There is obviously difficulty in determining exactly where this boundary lies but if a charity with general objects, such as the relief of poverty or distress issues literature urging the government to take a particular course or organises sympathisers to apply pressure for that purpose to their elected representatives, we think it clear that the boundary has been overstepped..."
The report continues, however, by giving three types of situation in which it may be proper for a charity to make representations to the government:

Firstly

"...examples in which it is the government itself which is investigating or has propounded proposals for changes in the law."

A second type of situation is much less clearly defined, and what can and what cannot be done seems to be left to the interpretation of the Commissioners:

"It is probably unobjectionable for a charity to present to a government department a reasoned memorandum advocating changes in the law provided that in doing so the charity is acting in furtherance of its purposes...A charity would be well advised to seek advice from legal advisers or from us before undertaking any such activities."

A third class comprises cases where

"although Parliament is involved, it appears to us that the reason for approaching it is not to be regarded as political."

This exception gives charities freedom to promote or oppose private bills which "are free from taint of political activities".