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BEYOND SECURITISATION
Western Mediterranean International Relations from a Security Perspective
1989-2002

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Doctor of Philosophy

ASTON UNIVERSITY
February 2003

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Abstract

Following the end of the Cold War and the ensuing changes to the international landscape, thinking about security has tended to become more discursive and interpretative in nature. What counts as security has increasingly derived from security discourses (that is, 'securitisation') and uncertainty about the multi-faceted future facing various countries and regions. Within this post-Cold War discourse, the Western Mediterranean has emerged as a region fraught with latent and manifest threats in the economic, political, societal and military sectors. Improved access to EU markets for Maghrebi exports; the security of energy supplies to the EU from Algeria and Libya; lack of democracy and the advance of political Islam; the flow of northward migration and worries about law and order in France, Italy and Spain; the growth in military expenditure and weapons proliferation in the Maghreb; all have been central to the securitisation agenda. However, this agenda has often lacked credibility especially when inter-linkages have purportedly been established between economic underdevelopment and political instability, between the advance of political Islam and the threat to energy supplies, or between immigration and the threat to national identity. Such inter-sectoral linkages distract from the credibility of those ‘securitisation instances’ which correspond to reality; the former linkages have often been exploited by extremist politicians in south-west European countries as well as by regimes in the Maghreb to advance their respective interests. Thus, securitisation may defeat its main purpose; it may generate responses out of keeping with the aims proclaimed at the outset, aims centred on the countering of real threats and the ensuring of greater stability.

Key words: energy, EU-Maghreb, Islamism, migration, protectionism
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<td>AIS</td>
<td>Armée Islamique du Salut</td>
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<td>AMU</td>
<td>Arab Maghreb Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>ATC</td>
<td>Agreement on Textiles and Clothing</td>
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<td>BD</td>
<td>Barcelona Declaration</td>
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<td>BWC</td>
<td>Biological Weapons Convention</td>
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<td>CAP</td>
<td>Common Agricultural Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBM</td>
<td>Confidence Building Measure</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEEC</td>
<td>Central and Eastern European Country</td>
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<td>CFP</td>
<td>Common Fisheries Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMS</td>
<td>Common Mediterranean Strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Codac</td>
<td>Commissions d'accès à la citoyenneté</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSCE</td>
<td>Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSCM</td>
<td>Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DWC</td>
<td>Chemical Weapons Convention</td>
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<tr>
<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
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<td>EEZ</td>
<td>Exclusive Economic Zone</td>
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<td>EIB</td>
<td>European Investment Bank</td>
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<td>EMAAs</td>
<td>Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements</td>
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<td>EMP</td>
<td>Euro-Mediterranean Partnership</td>
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<td>EP</td>
<td>European Parliament</td>
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<td>EPC</td>
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<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<td>FAS</td>
<td>Fonds d'Action Sociale pour les travailleurs immigrés et leurs familles</td>
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<td>FIFG</td>
<td>Financial Instrument for Fisheries and Guidance</td>
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<td>FIS</td>
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<td>FIT</td>
<td>Front Islamique Tunisien</td>
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<tr>
<td>FN</td>
<td>Front National</td>
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<tr>
<td>FTA</td>
<td>Free Trade Area</td>
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<td>GIA</td>
<td>Groupe Islamiste Armé</td>
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<td>GMP</td>
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<td>HCE</td>
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<td>IAEA</td>
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<td>JHA</td>
<td>Justice and Home Affairs</td>
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<td>LDCs</td>
<td>Less Developed Countries</td>
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<td>LNG</td>
<td>Liquefied Natural Gas</td>
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<td>MDCs</td>
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<td>MDP</td>
<td>MEDA Democracy Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDS</td>
<td>Mouvement Démocratique Socialiste</td>
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<td>Mesures d’Accompagnement (financial and technical measures to accompany the reform of economic and social structures in the framework of the EMP).</td>
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MEPP  Middle East Peace Process
MFAs  Multi-Fibre Arrangements
MFN  Most-Favoured Nation
MINURSO Mission des Nations Unies pour le Référendum du Sahara Occidental
MTI  Mouvement de la Tendance Islamique
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NIP  National Indicative Programme
NIEO New International Economic Order
NGOs Non-Governmental Organisations
NPT  Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty
OAU  Organisation of African Unity
OECD Organisation of European Cooperation and Development
ONI  Office National d'Immigration
PAF  Police de l'Air et des Frontières
PBM  Partnership Building Measure
Polisario Popular Front for the Liberation of the Seguier el-Hamra and Rio de Oro (see SADR)
PP  Partido Popular
RCC  Revolutionary Command Committee
RCD  Rassemblement Constitutionnel Démocratique
RIP  Regional Indicative Programme
RMP  Redirected Mediterranean Policy
RND  Rassemblement National pour la Démocratie
SADR  Saharan Arab Democratic Republic
SCBM  Security and Confidence Building Measure
SEA  Single European Act
TMC  Third Mediterranean Country
VERs  Voluntary Exports Restraints
WB  World Bank
WEU  Western European Union
WM  Western Mediterranean
WMD  Weapons of Mass Destruction
WTO  World Trade Organisation
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION: A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR SECURITY IN THE WESTERN MEDITERRANEAN

From a traditional security perspective, a cursory glance at the Western Mediterranean (WM)\(^1\) leads to a comfortable conclusion. The north is economically and militarily powerful, and thus it is more secure and potentially more threatening to its southern neighbours. A closer look at the international relations of the region, however, reveals two major observations. First, certain ‘threats’ are seen as emanating from the south and others, of a different sort, as coming from the north. Second, most security initiatives designed to tackle these ‘threats’ have been taken by northern members. Discursive practices have had a significantly important role to play in the construction of threats. Particular issues have become a threat to security not only as a result of material and physical considerations but also, and increasingly so, as the outcome of conceiving them, referring to them and talking about them within a security framework. Thus, an analysis of the security questions from a traditional international relations perspective alone – i.e. in terms of military-economic capacities and objective threats – can often provide very little help, especially with regard to its ability to establish the security agenda as perceived and presented by the main political actors.\(^2\)

A key argument of the present study is that the dynamics of security in the WM cannot be fully grasped unless considered within a framework that, first, allows for security as a broad concept and, second, accounts for it not only in material terms but in social ones as well. That is, security in the WM should be studied as stretching beyond the narrow political-military preoccupations to include other sectors such as economy, society and the environment. On the other hand, considering security in social terms means that it is to be looked at and analysed as the result of a trade-off amongst actors who perceive it as such and not merely, or necessarily, as something intrinsic to the material reality in which these actors interact. In these terms, what counts as security is

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\(^1\) The Western Mediterranean is taken as a geopolitical entity that comprises Spain, France and Italy from the North, and Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya from the South.

\(^2\) Here political actors are mainly limited to state actors. Because the security agenda remains, to a great extent, a state monopoly, analysis takes a state-centrist focus; other political actors will be considered only when their ability to influence these agendas matches that of the state. This is so because non-state actors, especially the countries of Algeria, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia, remain very weak and, even more so, when one is dealing about security issues.
mainly contingent on the perceptions of actors and the consensus they build amongst themselves concerning such perceptions.

In this context, it is important, therefore, to examine which issues have been presented in security terms and by whom. Relative to this examination, a number of relevant questions emerge: What security? Whose security? What logic or interplay between threats and vulnerabilities? Such questions help to establish the security picture portrayed in the WM as well as to consider the regional policies designed to respond to it. Answers to these questions then provide the ground and pave the way to consider the security picture and gauge its credibility. Because security, according to the perspective of this thesis, is partly seen as a particular interpretation of reality that is predominantly shaped by the perception of state actors, there is need for a reality-check. The purpose of this reality-check is to trace the degree of match (if any) between the discursive pictures that frame security (i.e. ‘securitisation’), on the one hand, and the reality of this situation (i.e. security-reality), on the other.

1.1 MEDITERRANEAN REGIONALISM: THE SPECIFICITY OF THE WESTERN MEDITERRANEAN (WM)

Through most of the body of literature on Mediterranean security, one observes two predominant trends: one global, the other regional – both of which have certain drawbacks. The global tendency takes the Mediterranean as one region regardless of the specifics of certain sub-regions. It manages to capture the interdependence between north and south. Yet, it blurs the security characteristics which distinguish the eastern Mediterranean from the western Mediterranean. The regional approach, on the other hand, tends to cover one particular region from the south or the north and, as such, remains a ‘weak’ Mediterranean approach that could be described as merely European, Middle Eastern or North African. It is true that the Mediterranean in recent decades has been marked by a number of crises and conflicts that differ from region to region such as the Balkan crisis, the conflict between Turkey and Greece over Cyprus, the Algerian crisis and its potential security implications for the Maghreb, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, etc. This fragmentation justifies, to a large extent, the predominant tendency to opt for a regional analysis. Nonetheless, this tendency often favours a homogenous regionalism which separates north from south as not sufficiently interdependent over a
heterogeneous one that accounts for north-south security interactions.\(^3\)

Given this north/south and east/west split, the present work fosters a ‘heterogeneous regional approach’, one that caters to the overlap between security in the south and that in the north. It deals with the WM as a region which represents a convergence between what was previously seen as separate European and southern Mediterranean environments and whose regional particularities stand out as distinct from those of the eastern Mediterranean. Security issues in the eastern Mediterranean can be divided between north (Greece and Turkey, and the Balkans) and south (the Peace Process and the Israeli-Palestinian crisis). The WM, on the contrary, displays an intertwined web of security interactions which involve North African and south-west European countries, not least because of their historic political and economic relations and geographical proximity. Furthermore, the specificity of the WM owes much to a certain distance from the security dynamics of the Middle East crisis as well as little direct involvement in it. This makes it an area with a degree of independence from the Middle East security equation or any vision of security for the region of the Middle East, where the US vantage point remains preponderant.

Though the heterogeneous regional approach adopted here seeks to account for the security picture specific to the WM, it is not without limitations, however. Indeed, some security issues covered under this regional approach may not be exclusive to the WM alone. The WM is not an isolated area and, thus, events taking place in other regions (e.g. Middle East or the European Union (EU)) can have a considerable influence on the political and economic security situation of the Maghreb countries. The drawback of the present approach is particularly obvious when one critically considers the policies taken to tackle security in the region; most of these policies have not been designed solely for the WM but for the Mediterranean as a whole. In this regard, a global approach could seem more appropriate for a balanced judgement. On another level, the global approach has another advantage when dealing with the interrelations between national policies and EU policies, especially when dealing with the Mediterranean countries of south-west Europe.

The WM is taken as a region\(^4\) where there is increasing growth in relations

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\(^3\) See, for example, Barry Buzan and Barbara A. Roberson, “Europe and the Middle East: Drifting towards Societal Cold War?” in Ole Waever, et al., Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe (Pinter, 1993), pp. 131-47; and Stephen C. Calleja, Navigating Regional Dynamics in the Post-Cold War World: Patterns of Relations in the Mediterranean Area (Dartmouth Publishers, 1997).

\(^4\) The term ‘region’ is used loosely to refer to a geopolitical area with intensive interactions between its
between south-west Europe and the Maghreb – relations that span economic, political, societal, military and environmental sectors. Economically, the Maghreb countries had been heavily involved in the European economy as colonies, an involvement which later became a codified dependence with the European Economic Community (EEC) cooperation agreements after 1969. Most of Maghrebi trade is with the EU. As a result, the Maghreb countries are said to face economic problems partly because of EU protectionist attitudes in the agricultural sector, in particular. South-west Europe is dependent economically on the Maghreb in the energy sector, mainly gas and oil. Economic relations in some economic sectors have been characterised by both partnership and competition. Politically, colonial legacies still shadow relations in the region. ‘Special relations’, be they of amity or enmity, do exist between the two sides: France’s relations with Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, Italy’s relation with Libya, Spain’s relations with Algeria and Morocco. All these relations together continue to colour economic and political interactions. On the one hand, the Maghreb countries witness internal political difficulties owing to a volatile political scene. On the other, these same changes are sometimes followed with apprehension from Europe, where they are regarded as ‘threats’ to the interests of south-west European countries in the region. Societally, the two sides are linked by a large Maghrebi population living in France, Italy and Spain. ‘Illegal’ and legal immigration adds a societal colouring to interstate relations in the WM, particularly in respect of the rise of, and claims by, far-right parties with xenophobic programmes. The rise of societal violence and social problems, population growth in North Africa, daily reports of pateras (small wooden boats) jammed with (north) African youth sneaking their way across the Straits of Gibraltar and Sicily to the shores of Spain and Italy, all together take centre stage in the societal sector. Militarily, the particularity of the WM as a region with low intensity conflicts – not least when compared with the Middle East – and the fact that none of the Maghreb countries has been known to possess nuclear weapons have given primacy to threats of proliferation as well as other soft security issues such as terrorism.

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7 For example, 70 per cent of Spain’s gas supplies and 25 percent of Italy’s come from Algeria. Also, four of the eight European gas interconnection projects being planned or implemented link the Maghreb and southern Europe. See John Calabrese, "Beyond Barcelona: the Politics of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership", European Security Vol. 6, No. 4 (1997), p. 91.
'illegal' immigration, political violence, organised crime and drug and human trafficking. Environmentally, the Maghreb and south-west Europe share similar environmental concerns, not least for bordering the same sea. A case in point is sea pollution. Another has been water shortage – a problem that is becoming particularly acute in most North African countries and south-west Europe, especially in southern Spain and Italy. For example, the Algerian capital has had several periods of rationed water at a number of occasions.

The above interactions between the countries of the WM reinforce the specificity of this region. This is particularly important when one is considering these interactions within a framework that seeks to account for security both in a broader sense as well as in social terms. The five sectors in themselves account for security in the broader sense. On the other hand, the interactions amongst them, together with the use and inter-linkage political actors make of them, cover a great deal in relation to the social aspect of security, that is in relation to the way these actors manage to weave intricate security discourses around certain issues. For these reasons, an understanding of the security dynamics of the WM may provide insights that can be valuable to an understanding of the all-Mediterranean project of building peace and security in the region as a whole.

What follows delineates the theoretical framework within which the above WM security problématique will be considered. It provides a brief general account of social constructivism as the International Relations perspective that partly informs this study. It then moves to present a view of security as seen by social constructivists together with the particular regional security approach to be adopted. Subsequently, and building on this, it establishes a distinction between security and securitisation because of the need to apply a reality-check to all the issues that have been spoken of in security terms by the main actors involved.

1.2 SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVISM AND SECURITY

Social constructivism constitutes an appropriate way to approach the security problématique of the WM in the terms described above as it provides for security both in material and in social terms. Mainstream social constructivism considers states to be the principal actors in international relations, and takes states' identities and interests to be endogenous and not pre-given, as usually contended by neo-realism or neo-liberalism – terms used here in a generic sense to refer to the different strands of realism and liberalism. States' identities and interests are therefore constituted as well as constitutive
of the international reality in which states interact. Also, a constructivist analysis of international relations does not limit itself to the distribution of the material capacities of states but seeks as well to account for the social relations existing between them. Thus, international reality is considered to be the product of social (i.e. inter-subjective) interpretations and collective understanding rather than merely the outcome of material (mainly economic-military) capacities. Therefore, international relations for social constructivists appear as the outcome of a dialectic interplay between a material reality and its interpretation and understanding by the actors involved on the one hand, and the way this interpretation and understanding influence, in turn, the behaviour of these actors, on the other.

For the purpose of this study’s main focus, the element of constructivist analysis dealing with the manner in which states’ identities and interests influence and, in turn, are influenced by material reality, is not considered. This is mainly because the present study uses constructivism only to a limited extent; it is adopted as an approach to look into the way the security agenda in the WM has been constituted through a number of discursive practices and security interpretations. These interpretations and focal points of security in the WM are themselves submitted to a subsequent reality-check to consider their credibility and correspondence to reality. In other words, it seeks to ‘deconstruct’ these securitised issues to see if they have any match with the reality of the region.

Material reality is constituted of the economic, military and demographic capacities as well as the natural resources states possess. This material reality acquires a negative or a positive meaning according to the social structure in which it is interpreted, where social structure is the outcome of norms, collective understanding, perceptions and culture. In other words, meaningful attributes are imposed on a material reality, and those who impose and perpetuate these attributes as collective have the power to do so. Within such a framework, power is not restricted to material capacities but comprises

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9 Nonetheless, social constructivism shares with the realist and neo-realist approaches some propositions such as the anarchic aspect (absence of an international authority) of international relations, the offensive nature of states and their rationality as international actors and the lack of trust amongst them. It also shares with the neo-institutionalists the importance of ideas and the conceptions of actors. Social constructivism agrees with the neo-Marxist (or the whole critical school) that the fundamental structures of international relations are also social rather than merely material, and that these structures shape the identities and interests of actors.
discursive power as well.\textsuperscript{11} If material power is reflected mainly in economic and military force, discursive power is embedded in the capacity to (re)produce the social norms and collective meanings that constitute the social structures of conduct in which states interact as well as influence the interpretations of reality which they put forward.\textsuperscript{12} Thus, power in constructivist terms is not limited to material power but involves the ability to impose meaning and meaningful characteristics (in this case security) on material objects which do not \textit{a priori} possess them. The ability to do so becomes the subtlest form of power.\textsuperscript{13}

For security interpretations to endure, they have to become collective. Being collective does not necessarily mean that these (security) interpretations are the best or the most corresponding to reality. It simply means that they are the ones that have succeeded to assert themselves as convincing, historically contextual and opportunely related to other past and present ongoing events. Not only does collective (intersubjective, social) knowledge define the social reality in which actors interact. Most importantly, it constitutes it and sets the underlying ‘rules of conduct’ for others to follow and abide by.\textsuperscript{14} In light of this, particular interpretations grow into a social reality and persist as a social reality owing to what is referred to as ‘cognitive evolution’, this being a process that accounts for the diffusion, institutionalisation and learning norms which help converge the interests of governments towards similar, compatible interpretations of the material reality in which they interact.\textsuperscript{15} Within this framework, though security has often been difficult to define, what counts as security has become that which state actors declare as security and mobilise political support for it to be so. In other words, security has become a practice where certain actors use their particular interpretation of material reality so as to convince the others into a certain course of action. Such a practice is known, in the recent security literature, as ‘securitisation’.\textsuperscript{16}

\textbf{1.2.1 From security to securitisation: the social constructivist approach}

Shortly before the end of the Cold War and increasingly so afterwards, it became commonly accepted that the concept of security requires to be revamped for it to respond

\begin{itemize}
  \item Adler, \textit{Ibid.}, p. 336.
  \item This interpretation of power is reminiscent of Michel Foucault’s criticism of the concept of power. See Michel Foucault, \textit{Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977}, edited by Colin Gordon (Pantheon Books, 1980).
  \item Adler, “Seizing the Middle Ground”, p. 336.
  \item Adler, “Seizing the Middle Ground”, p. 339.
\end{itemize}
effectively to the needs and worries plaguing the contemporary international landscape. Security, which was tightly anchored in military rivalries and nuclear threats, has re-emerged as necessitating a new meaning, a broader one encompassing matters that were previously thought of as secondary, if not irrelevant to the security equation. Post-Cold War security agendas have ‘horizontally’ broadened to include sectors that range from the environmental to the politico-economic, the societal and the socio-cultural, and ‘vertically’ deepened to extend to other non-state actors as legitimate agents of security.17

This new and broad approach to security has been criticised for a number of reasons.18 First, the issues included under the security umbrella were regarded as mere ‘problems’ rather than as security ‘threats’ because they did not threaten the existence of the state as such. Second, these ‘threats/problems’ were not as powerful or as threatening as military ones; they often remain subordinate, and, thus, do not warrant a place on the national security agenda. Third, once security goes beyond the military, it becomes difficult to find a logical end-point, which renders the analytical power of the security concept loose and makes it lose its analytical edge. Partly because of these criticisms, new approaches to security started to develop.

Within a constructivist framework, the study of security started to go beyond redefining security and into the concept of security itself as something that has been neglected because of the military preoccupations of the field of security studies during the Cold War, or because of the ‘essentially contested’ nature of security, or because security has been regarded as ‘something valuable and good’. Consequently, security has increasingly been seen as a ‘discursive practice’ and not necessarily as something that is inherent to the material reality of international relations.19 The move has been from the study of security to the study of securitisation – securitisation being an instance where an

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issue is spoken of as a threat demanding extraordinary measures to deal with it, because otherwise it would be too late. Securitisation makes an issue a security issue by taking it from normal politics to ‘panic politics’. That is, when the word ‘security’ is uttered, under certain conditions, an issue becomes a security issue and the speaker/actor is thus legitimised to raise extraordinary actions to tackle it. As such, security is neither material nor objective: it is ‘self-referential’. Only through the practice of securitisation does an issue become a security issue and not in terms of its seriousness or danger as an exogenous threat.\footnote{Waever, “European Security Identity”, p. 107 and Waever, “Securitization and Desecuritization”, p. 49.} In this sense, security is taken as a ‘speech act’; when it is uttered something is done, like naming a ship or marrying a couple.\footnote{For an introduction to the concept of speech acts, see John Searle, \textit{Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language} (Cambridge University Press, 1969).}

Bearing the above considerations in mind, “security,” has been defined as “a quality actors inject into issues by securitizing them, which means to stage them on the political arena in a specific way ... and then to have them accepted by a sufficient audience to sanction extraordinary defensive moves.”\footnote{Barry Buzan et al., \textit{Security: A New Framework for Analysis} (Lynne Rienner, 1998), p. 204.} That is, security has become mainly an interpretation of material reality by actors who, under certain conditions, have the power not only to make particular issues into security issues but also to make their interpretations social in character and accepted by other actors. Therefore, the study of security becomes the study of “who can ‘do’ or ‘speak’ security successfully, on what issues, under what conditions and with what effect?”\footnote{Ibid., p. 27.} Therefore, security ceases to be only self-referential; it becomes social as well. In this sense, security can be defined as a social construct that is partly embedded in discursive practices, and, as a result, the study of security becomes the study of the process of securitisation.\footnote{The Copenhagen School also proposes the study of ‘desecuritisation’ as an instance where security issues are brought back from the realm of security to the level of ‘normal’ politics. See Ole Waever, “Securitization and Desecuritization”, pp. 46-86; as well as Barry Buzan, et al., \textit{Security}, Chapter Two. The appellation ‘Copenhagen school’ was used by Bill McSweeney to refer to those who have been working with Barry Buzan and Ole Waever under the auspices of the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (CORPI), see McSweeney, “Identity and Security: Buzan and the Copenhagen School”, \textit{Review of International Studies} Vol. 22, No. 1 (1996), pp. 81-93.}

\subsection*{1.3 Regional Security: Security Complex Approach}

The bulk of the literature on the theory of regional security generally falls within four analytical frameworks that span the security spectrum in its different stages, ranging from regional security formation, security complex, security regime to security community.\footnote{For the different stages, see, respectively, Raimo Väyrynen, “Regional Security Formations: An}
The importance of security complexes is that they reduce the conceptual gap between the two extremes of the security spectrum, namely regional conflict formations and security communities. As analytical frameworks, security complexes allow one to account for the security interdependence existing or building up in a region, and thus they accommodate both cooperation and conflict as the result of positive and negative regional interactions. Seen through a traditional international relations lens, a security complex was initially defined in terms of power relations and patterns of amity/enmity and restricted to the traditional political-military security. More recently, the concept of a security complex has been informed by writings from the constructivist camp. As a result, it has undergone two major developments: one in terms of the number of sectors involved, the other in terms of an explicit adoption of social constructivism. Given these developments, a security complex has become open to non-military sectors as well as to non-state actors. It is primarily concerned with the study of the processes of securitisation and desecuritisation, where security is taken as “a particular type of inter-subjective politics.”

A security complex approach, therefore, presents an adequate starting point for the analysis of the security dynamics at work in the WM. First, it is a framework that allows one to account for both negative and positive interactions across the five sectors of security (the economic, the political, the societal, the military and the environmental). Second, besides being explicitly regional, a security complex is based on a social constructivist approach. Nonetheless, unlike the Copenhagen School, which takes the heterogeneous and homogeneous security complex as distinct and almost mutually exclusive approaches, this study integrates them as complementary. In this way, it circumvents the contradiction that results from the adoption of a constructivist approach on the one hand, and a wider security agenda, on the other. That is, if one claims to analyse security as a social construct, one should not decide a priori what sectors are to be considered; because otherwise what the analysts themselves will be doing is indeed speaking ‘security’ (i.e. securitising certain issues and sectors) before even attempting to

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26 Buzan, People, States and Fear, p. 189.
28 Ibid., p. 16.
analyse it. In other words, how can one claim that one is analysing the process of securitisation if one is presenting at the same time five sectors as security sectors before even proceeding to examine them? This argument is in line with criticism levelled at the Copenhagen School, namely that their new security framework has acknowledged political implications for the analyst in the sense that it actively involves him or her in the process of securitisation.

Moreover, the regional aspect of a security complex has been criticised for an inherent tension between its sectoral nature, on the one hand, and its regionalism, on the other. That is, the sectoral (or exchange-oriented) and regional (territorial) dimensions of a security complex are said to be in tension with each other and thus a separation between the two is needed during analysis. However, this distinction between what is territorial and what is sectoral runs the risk of loosening the analytical power of security complexes. Being explicitly regional, a security complex is inevitably territorial. Combining the territorial and the sectoral aspects only reinforces the concept of a security complex and underlines the intensity of sectoral interactions existing or building up in a particular region. It also proves relevant to the discussion of regionalism in a less straightforward environment such as the Western Mediterranean or the Mediterranean at large, notably when one is dealing with questions of security.

All in all, to accept the homogenous and heterogeneous approaches as complementary, rather than distinct, analytical frameworks relieves (i) the tension between sector-specific and multi-sectoral approaches and (ii) the contradiction between the wider security agenda and the constructivist perspective of securitisation. First, since the homogeneous complex approach helps to uncover the security dynamics in each sector separately, it is rewarding to use it as an initial analytical slate to map securitisation instances without presenting the sectors themselves as security sectors. A homogeneous security complex approach teases out the securitised elements within each sector. A heterogeneous security complex approach, on the one hand, allows one to look at the

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29 Wever concedes to this as a plain ‘logical contradiction’ of the School, but he does not offer any solution and, thus, the tension between the constructivist approach and the sectoral approach remains unresolved. He discusses this criticism by pushing the argument to a radical ‘deconstructivist’ approach, claiming that even the criticism of an idea contributes to its establishment; see Ole Wever, “Securitising Sectors? Reply to Eriksson”, Cooperation and Conflict Vol. 34, No. 3 (1999), p. 336.
32 It is true that the Copenhagen School uses sectors as an organisational tool, but they still present the specific and multi-sectoral approaches as distinct.
cross-sectoral interactions between the main issues that have been securitised in each sector. Second, in studying the process of securitisation, one is inevitably concerned with how political actors use or exploit securitisation arguments across sectors. In examining the use of securitisation by different, often competing actors, one is unavoidably engaged in an analysis of the ‘power politics’ of securitisation33 – both in relation to the nature of security as an instance of ‘inter-subjective politics’ as well as in relation to the interaction between the securitising actors. Furthermore, in taking the two approaches as complementary, one is lessening the contradiction between adopting a constructivist approach and being actively involved in the construction of the security sectors; sectors are being used more as a tool to help organise the analysis rather than being an outcome of it.

1.4 AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE WESTERN MEDITERRANEAN

In order to capture the securitisation picture of the WM and consider its credibility, the present analytical framework integrates two approaches: security complex and the reality-check. The security complex approach teases out the securitisation instances together with the discourses which underpin and construct them. The second approach, which considers the credibility of these instances, allows one to submit them, together with the securitisation arguments underpinning them, to a reality-check. For this reason, the first approach combines the homogeneous and heterogeneous security complex approaches, described above, as complementary. The study starts therefore with elucidating the securitised issues in each of the five sectors: economy, politics, society, environment and military. This exercise serves to spotlight the issues that have been presented as pertaining to the realm of security in each sector as well as to uncover the securitising actors and the inter-sectoral arguments they put forward.

The second approach considers critically these findings and submits them to a reality-check. It seeks in particular to examine the degree of correspondence or match between securitisation instances and the security-reality of the region. In doing this, it will not only be looking at factual evidence for or against the securitisation instances. Indeed, factual evidence often proves a certain correspondence between the securitised issues and security-reality. More important, the reality-check is mainly concerned with the coherence of the linkages actors make between the securitised issues in one sector and their impact on security in other sectors. Therefore, in carrying out a reality-check one is

33 Buzan et al. Security, p. 32.
also considering – in addition to factual evidence – the various connections actors make between security sectors and the extent to which these connections are justified in the situation of certain actors.

For the purpose of these lines of analysis, a number of limitations should be drawn in terms of (i) the meaning of securitisation to be adopted, (ii) the guidelines for the sectoral analysis and (iii) the points of focus to bear in mind while examining the credibility of the securitisation instances.

1.4.1 Securitisation: a definition

In line with the constructivist approach, security is defined as a discursive practice, i.e., in terms of securitisation. Nonetheless, unlike in the Copenhagen School framework, securitisation here is not presented in terms of threats to the survival of cherished security referent objects because its impact is the same, whether it is presented in existential terms or not. Moreover, because the present study is concerned primarily with state actors, securitisation in international relations usually happens in a diplomatic discourse that tends to dilute or reduce its intensity by refraining to phrase it in existential terms, especially in respect of the post-Cold War conception of security. Because of the subtlety of diplomatic discourse, securitisation usually appears to lie between securitisation and politicisation as outlined by the Copenhagen School.²⁴ Therefore, a definition of security in terms of securitisation is as follows: an issue becomes a security issue when it is presented as a threat (without necessarily being articulated in existential terms), while saying that, if nothing is done about it, it will cause other serious problems to emerge. A look into the securitisation instances reveals who can convincingly speak ‘security’ as a particular interpretation of material reality and make others adopt it and abide by it as a collective interpretation.

If security is accepted as a discursive practice, then its examination is informed by a discourse analysis which enables one to look for a wording of issues that fits within the framework of securitisation. However, this should not give the impression that the analysis is purely discursive. Security-related issues have the strong propensity to go beyond the political and onto the security agenda, which raises no particular need for adopting a linguistically sophisticated discourse analysis in order to locate securitisation instances. In addition, elements such as power, culture and history, which facilitate the

²⁴ The Copenhagen School classifies issues on a spectrum that ranges from depoliticisation to politicisation to securitisation, see Ibid., p. 25.
occurrence of securitisation,\textsuperscript{35} are also considered, especially whilst dealing with the inter-sectoral linkages established by actors in order to make their securitisation convincing.

\textbf{1.4.2 Sectoral analysis}

Analysis at the sectoral level examines (i) the security agenda in a particular sector, (ii) the competing actors, and (iii) the logic of threats and vulnerabilities at play within it.\textsuperscript{36} The dynamics of sectoral security are not limited to interactions between a referent object (i.e. the element which is threatened) and a threat only. They also consist of securitising and functional agents.\textsuperscript{37} Securitising agents, such as governments, define what security is and act accordingly. Functional agents, on the other hand, contribute to the security dynamics without defining security; this is, for example, the role of firms in relation to environmental security and immigrants in relations to societal security. Thus, functional agents tend to provide a link between securitising agents and security referent objects. In this way, sectoral analysis sets a connection between the security agenda and the securitising actors and, thus, allows a consideration of the legitimacy of securitisation in each sector through a discussion of the logics of threats and vulnerabilities. Finally, it discusses the inter-linkages between the security sectors, that is, the relationship established between them as to legitimise their securitisation.

\textbf{1.4.3 Relation between security, securitisation and policy-making}

What counts as ‘security’ has preoccupied security studies so much that defining security has become ‘a cottage industry’.\textsuperscript{38} Debates over ‘what is security?’ has considerably preoccupied analysts and raised arguments over whether security is objective or subjective.\textsuperscript{39} To circumvent the barren objective/subjective dispute, securitisation has been introduced as an approach interested mainly in ‘how’ an issue becomes a security issue rather than in ‘what’ security is. The securitisation (i.e. security-perception) approach, therefore, concerns only the study of how an issue becomes a security issue. It focuses on how security is enacted through speech, and, in this respect, constitutes an instrumental approach in highlighting what counts as security in the

\textsuperscript{35} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 31.
\textsuperscript{36} The Copenhagen School discusses also whether the security dynamics are local, regional, sub-global or global. Since the present work is concerned mainly with the regional level and restricts analysis to states as securitising actors, the question of whether the security dynamics are regional or not will be raised.
\textsuperscript{38} Baldwin, “The Concept of Security”, p. 5.
\textsuperscript{39} \textit{Ibid.}, and Johan Eriksson, “Observers or Advocates?” and other articles in \textit{Conflict and Cooperation} Vol. 34, No. 3 (1999).

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perception/interpretation of actors. However, what is really at stake in security terms remains unsolved, and the securitisation approach itself proves short of any explication therefore the need to compare it with security-reality in search for a match or correspondence (or lack of it) between the two.

To be able to do this, one may borrow from traditional security analysis. If securitisation gives a picture of what issues actors perceive as security issues, traditional security analysis remains just as useful a tool in examining the correlations between security-perception and security-reality. It should be stressed that traditional security analysis in this sense retains its focus on material capabilities only. But it stretches to consider non-military sectors as well as the inter-sectoral linkages used in support of securitisation instances. That is, besides looking at the economic, political and societal sectors, it also considers the connections actors make between, for example, the economic difficulties and their political outcomes or between political instability and military threats in order to put forward their securitisation instances and to back their interpretation of a particular situation as a credible security issue that needs to be tackled urgently. Indeed, to consider these linkages permits one to examine the credibility of the arguments behind the ‘logic of vulnerability’ that is advanced in order to link different sectors together. This might seem to be a slight shift towards a traditional security approach. Nonetheless, the difference is that this present approach considers the links interwoven between sectors in the securitisation discourse, which permits the investigation of the credibility not only of the logic underpinning sectoral securitisation but also the logic underlying their interrelationships. In doing so, one is able to circumvent the contention that security remains largely subjective and is based primarily on perceptions even when it claims to be most objective. In other words, one could study inter-sectoral linkages without buying the securitisation perspective adopted by actors.

The special relevance of the distinction between security and securitisation lies in their relation to policy-making. At the heart of this distinction lies the impact securitisation as a security-perception (or interpretation) might and can have on the choice of policies and strategic initiatives aimed at managing security. If one allows for the considerable extent to which perceptions influence policy-making, then special attention ought to be paid to the extent to which securitisation matches security. This allows one to evaluate the coherence of the policies and initiatives taken to deal with security. The way an issue is perceived influences the measures taken to deal with it. Therefore, a gap between securitisation and security-reality can, at least theoretically, be found in the
policies designed to manage security and build peace because they are a response to securitisation instances rather than a reaction to a security-reality.

Equipped with the above analytical framework, it remains in order to set a time scale for the delimitation of this study. The analysis is based on the assumption that securitisation began in the very late 1980s and the intensity and pervasiveness of its discursive articulation has reached a high pitch since the end of the Cold War. The outbreak of the Gulf War in 1991, the open outburst of political violence in Algeria in 1992 and a perceived rise in immigration flows, have all contributed to nurture this attitude thereafter. Therefore, the examination of the issues and sectors which have been securitised focuses mainly on the period between 1989 and 2002. This helps to delineate the securitisation picture that dominated this period. The year 1989 marked the beginning of a major rethink in the policy of the European Community (EC) towards third-party Mediterranean countries (TMCs) with the launching of the Redirected Mediterranean Policy (RMP). It was also the year of the creation of the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) as a response, amongst other things, to the security worries plaguing the North African regimes with regard to the firm rise of Islamist groups and the deterioration of the socio-economic situation of their countries. However, the study of the credibility of the securitisation picture as a particular interpretation of reality, on the other hand, calls for a different and wider time scale. In addition to covering the period under examination in relation to securitisation (i.e., 1989-2002), it also stretches back to the 1970s and 1980s in order to provide the necessary background for a proper assessment of the broader security picture of the region. References to the situation in the 1970s and 1980s offer a ground for comparison and shed some light on the developments that took place in the 1990s and early 21st century.

To sum up, this introduction has outlined the theoretical framework that is to guide the analysis in the rest of the thesis. The argument is twofold: since what is seen as ‘security’ in the WM derives mainly from the perceptions actors have of the reality in which they interact and the interpretations they make of it, there is need for a reality-check in order to have a proper consideration of security. This reality-check is called for to trace the match or correspondence (or lack of it) between these security interpretations and the reality of security in the region. In other words, what counts as ‘security’ are merely instances of securitisation; that is, examples of a process whereby actors make an issue a security issue by referring to it in security terms and conceiving within a security
framework. These securitisation instances are submitted to a reality-check to gauge their credibility or correspondence to reality. To carry out this task, the thesis uses social constructivism (to a limited extent) as an instrument to single out those securitisation instances and uncover the way they have been constructed via a web of inter-sectoral linkages which actors establish in support of their security interpretations. This initial step helps to establish the security agenda as presented by the actors – i.e. the securitisation agenda – between 1989 and 2002. The second step puts this securitisation agenda to a reality-check by contrasting it with other developments in the region during the last decade as well as with references to the 1970s and 1980s.
PART ONE
CHAPTER 2

DISCURSIVE PICTURES: CONSTRUCTING WESTERN MEDITERRANEAN SECURITY

Since the late 1980s a southward-looking security discourse about ‘preserving security and stability in North Africa’ started to emerge amongst the WM countries. This discourse was increasingly intensified and repeated (especially in the early 1990s) so much so that it has become a leitmotiv. A number of declarations, reports and statements, be they made at national or European level, have referred to the social, political and economic developments in North Africa in security terms. Amongst the most famous, perhaps, is the description of the then Spanish foreign minister, Francisco Fernández Ordóñez, of the Maghreb as a ‘time-bomb’. Another is the statement of Felipe Gonzalez, the then prime minister, in agreement with the French President, François Mitterrand, that “the construction of Europe cannot be attained without first trying to resolve the explosive problems that are building up in North Africa with respect to demography, development, religion and the standard of living”.¹ Along the same line, the former Italian foreign minister, Antonio Martino, emphasised that “continental security cannot be separated from that of the Mediterranean area”.² In parallel, another security discourse, with a different focus, started to appear in the Maghreb countries and was meant to translate their worries about being marginalized as a result of the EU’s eastward orientation after the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989.

These preoccupations with security have coloured French and Spanish policies, in particular, and were incentives behind efforts to design EU cooperation initiatives for the Mediterranean region. This was plainly expressed in the Lisbon Report of 1992, in which the Maghreb was said to be “the Union’s southern frontier. Its stability is of important common interest to the Union.” “Population growth, recurrent social crises, large scale migration, and the growth of religious fundamentalism and intégrisme”, continued the Report, “are problems which threaten that stability.”³ Such security worries have been justified against a background of close political relations and economic interdependence

¹ Interview with Felipe Gonzalez, Le Monde, 20 November 1990, [emphasis added].
between the Maghreb countries and the EU. They have also been justified against the aggravation of the socio-economic situation in the Maghreb and the political implications it might have for the stability of the region as a whole. The Maghreb countries, for their part, have stressed that their security and stability have grown dependent on economic growth as a means to prevent violent socio-political developments and to pave the way to political liberalism – an argument that frequently reoccurs in the discourse of the governments of south-west Europe as well as amongst EU policy-makers in general.

To build security and preserve stability presupposes the existence of major threats which need to be successfully confronted. The perception of threats menacing the stability of the WM has been heightened by a number of developments. The outbreak of the Gulf War and the unrest it subsequently raised in North Africa (and in other Arab countries) was one example that contributed to reinforce these fears. More importantly, the intensification of political violence in Algeria, the upsurge of Islamist-related political violence and the beginning in 1993 of assassinations of European nationals living in Algeria\footnote{For the first time since the outbreak of violence in Algeria, an armed Islamist group (GIA) assassinated three French nationals in September 1993.} constituted major developments politically. The huge discrepancy in the Maghreb between economic development and population growth wedded to a perceived rise in the number of people ‘illegally’ crossing to the northern shores of the Mediterranean have combined to add more alarming ‘brushes’ to the overall picture. These and other elements such as terrorism, lack of democracy and economic difficulties, are amongst a myriad of security-related issues that have resurged through the discourse of actors as major forces that could jeopardise peace and security in the WM.

However, despite the wide scope of the security issues that are said to threaten the stability of the Mediterranean at large, few studies have tried to systematically map these ‘threats’ to security, and even less to study them from a securitisation perspective, that is to say, in term of the issues that are being spoken of as a danger to regional security and stability. Based on a homogeneous security complex approach, the analysis that follows seeks first to map the securitisation agenda in the WM. Then it looks at the interactions between the securitised sectors through a heterogeneous security complex approach in order to single out the main nodes around which security discourse in the WM revolves. The first section sets out instances of securitisation at the sectoral level; the second deals with the sectoral inter-linkages put forward to legitimise their securitisation. It also looks at the relations between sectors and actors to consider which actors stress which sectors.
2.1 Homogeneous security complex approach: Mapping securitisation in the WM

Security initiatives taken at the beginning of the 1990s emphasised the need and importance of a global and comprehensive approach to security in the WM. This justifies the mapping of securitisation in terms of five sectors: economy, politics, society, military and environment. However, because environmental security is more global than regional, it is difficult to speak of it as something that is specific to the WM. This owes much to the dual nature of environmental problems as both global and long-term potential threats. For these reasons, this section looks at the securitisation of four sectors only, namely the economy, politics, society and the military.

2.1.1 The economic sector and the securitisation of interdependence

According to a European Commission report, the economic disparity between the north and south of the WM averages roughly 1:10 and might increase to 1:20 in the future if nothing is done to improve the economic situation of the south. The economies of the south and north of the WM differ enormously in both their structure and performance. The economies of France, Italy and Spain are liberalised and highly integrated in the EU. France and Italy have been members of the EC since its inception in 1958 by virtue of the Treaty of Rome (1957). Spain’s subsequent accession to the EC in 1986 has contributed to anchoring the Spanish economy more firmly to the European market. These three countries conduct most of their trade with the rest of the EU or with the other countries of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).

On the other hand, the Maghreb countries do not have very developed economies; and, under the current terminology of the World Bank (WB), they are classified as ‘lower middle-income economies’ as opposed to ‘upper middle-income’ ones or ‘high-income’ ones (the latter comprising essentially the OECD area). Their economies are characterised by a low level of industrialisation. For historical reasons, industry production has been geared towards European markets. This explains, albeit only partly, the high degree of economic dependence on EU markets – a dependence that owes much to exports of raw material and agricultural produce and later textiles and clothing. Maghrebi exports to the EU tend to represent as much as 60 per cent of their total exports. This has been in stark contrast to a lack of horizontal economic integration between them, despite the various

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objectives of economic development included in the Treaty of Marrakech establishing the AMU in 1989 (see Chapter 3).

The share of Maghrebi goods in the total imports of Spain, France and Italy has been comparatively low, and has remained largely limited to energy imports, in the case of Spain and Italy. This is particularly true considering the important role played by natural gas as well as the growing involvement of, chiefly, Spain and Italy in the Maghreb through the energy sector. This involvement is physically clear in two major trans-Mediterranean pipelines, notably the Trans-Med linking Algeria to Italy (via Tunisia) and the Maghreb-Europe pipeline linking Algeria to Spain (via Morocco), and has been reinforced through plans to build a new direct pipeline linking Algeria to Spain.

However, in this context, the prevailing discourse concerns the relatively high degree of interdependence existing between WM economies. Against the backdrop of the potential and actual impact of (asymmetrical) interdependence emerges a securitisation discourse concerning the economic interrelations in the region. Economically, interdependence often means a high degree of sensitivity of a country or a region to economic (and political) changes in countries with which it has important trade and other (non-economic) relations. From an acknowledgement of interdependence has emerged a discourse that has tended to portray economic relations in security terms, and presents developments in the economic sector as having a paramount role to play in the security and stability of the WM.

In the Maghreb, further and more ready access to EU markets has been seen in security terms. That is, access to EU markets has been presented as decisive for the development and growth of the Maghreb economies. This security discourse has been more heightened especially with regard to agricultural produce and, in particular, produce of a Mediterranean kind that could enter into direct competition with Spanish and Italian produce. This has also been true of clothing and other textile products, though EC protectionism has diminished since the 1980s, while the conclusion of the Uruguay Round agreements of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1994 provides for the total dismantlement of protectionist quotas restricting trade in such goods. The securitisation of agriculture is mainly evident between Spain and Morocco over citrus fruits and horticultural products on the one hand, and between Tunisia and

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* For example, customs duty is still imposed on agricultural goods such as tomatoes, oranges, small citrus fruit, flowers, and olive oil.
Italy and Spain over olive oil, on the other. Exports of Tunisian olive oil are said to face great obstacles and competition in EU markets from Italy and Spain.

The tensions that competition in agriculture has generated between Spain and Morocco in particular have often influenced fisheries negotiations between the EC/EU and Morocco. A demand by Rabat for a cut in the number of the Spanish fleet fishing in Moroccan waters or refusal to renew fisheries agreements has often had adverse repercussions on Moroccan agricultural produce entering or transiting Spanish territories. These repercussions have usually taken the form of acts of retaliatory 'sabotage' not only by Spanish farmers, who suffer competition from Moroccan agricultural produce, but also by Spanish fishermen. Because of the importance of the fisheries sector to Spain, such cuts in fishing activities - even the (long) halts preceding negotiations for renewal of fishing agreements - are said to have a negative impact on the Spanish fishing industry, especially for the Andalusian and the Canary Islands fishing fleets (as opposed to the Basque and Galician ones). Similarly, less intense frictions over fisheries existed between Italy and Tunisia.

On another level, the security of energy supply has also been presented as a major issue of economic securitisation, mainly for the countries of south-west Europe. Energy dependence is more pronounced in the case of Spain and Italy than in that of France, the last-mentioned country having relied on nuclear power which constitutes up to 40 per cent of its primary energy consumption. In particular, dependence on North African natural gas has been growing exponentially for Spain but also for Italy. France, on the other hand, has been strengthening its already diverse reliance on gas from other sources, notably Norway. For this reason, uninterrupted access to energy supplies has often been framed in security terms, particularly in relation to the political stability of North African suppliers.

To recapitulate, the main issues that have been securitised, i.e. spoken of as detrimental to economic security in the region, have revolved mainly around: (i) further access to the European markets for certain types of Moroccan and Tunisian agricultural produce and textiles and clothing products, (ii) access to fishing waters for Spain, and (iii) security of the energy supply in general and natural gas in particular. The low degree of integration amongst Maghreb economies has limited securitisation in the economic sector to a north-south dimension. Even the economic securitisation occurring between two states has been coloured by this north-south dimension in the sense that securitisation of interstate economic relations still involves mainly one country from the south and one
country from the north (e.g. Morocco versus Spain, France versus Algeria) rather than all the countries of the WM speaking economic security on an equal footing.

2.1.2 The political sector: securitising political stability and Islamism

The political sector is generally the realm of domestic politics. It concerns especially the legitimacy of the political system and the governing elite. As is the case in the economic sector, differences at the political level in the WM have been evident. South-west European countries have democratic systems of government. Political systems in the Maghreb, on the other hand, are characterised by the predominance of one pole of power. They are organised around one strong party in Algeria and Tunisia, a strong (proclaimed constitutional) monarchy in Morocco, or around one person in Libya. Maghreb countries suffer from a quasi ‘chronic’ legitimacy crisis that varies, in degree, from country to country. Nonetheless, instances of political securitisation at the regional level have occurred.

Apart from their colonial past, the WM countries share a securitisation approach that is related, in different ways, to their internal politics. Legitimacy crisis in the incumbent governments in the Maghreb has raised questions concerning political stability, the lack of democratic systems and the rule of law. This political stability has been presented as a security concern for Spain, Italy, and, above all, France because of the fear of a spillover effect on their internal politics and the spread of North African violence onto their national soil through the presence of considerable numbers of North African immigrants living there. This phenomenon has been the most pronounced in France. The armed attack on a luxury hotel on 24 August 1994 in Marrakech as well as the hijacking of the Air France Airbus flight departing from Algiers to Paris on 24 December of the same year proved that the political violence simmering in Algeria can not only infiltrate into neighbouring Morocco; it can even cross the Mediterranean and manifest itself in the French city of Marseilles. This was exacerbated by a number of Algerian-related terrorist attacks on French soil between 1995 and 1996. More generally, there have been discoveries of Islamist affiliation groups in Western Europe.

Consequently, political violence in Algeria was trumpeted, both by the media and in official discourse, as the start of a ‘domino effect’ that would change the familiar,

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albeit domestically volatile, political scene into an unknown and less predictable Islamic fundamentalist landscape. The authoritarian bent of the regimes of North Africa nurtured fears about the rise of destabilising factors in the region – the October 1988 riots in Algeria having been widely interpreted as a rehearsal for revolution.⁸

The absence of real democratic political openings has also been perceived as a major obstacle to the construction of peace and stability in the region. The royal succession in Morocco was awaited with special apprehension because of King Hassan’s long and strong-fisted reign and the socio-economic difficulties of the country. In addition, the vicissitudes of political life in King Mohammed VI’s Morocco have been raising causes for concern, despite the country being seen, at least from the EU perspective, as having made significant steps towards the building of democracy and democratic institutions, as opposed to the other Maghreb countries, particularly Tunisia. Indeed, despite its economic and social take-off since the arrival of Ben Ali to power in November 1987, Tunisia’s political liberalisation has suffered a dramatic setback, while Ben Ali’s power hold has grown considerably and future constitutional reforms are on the way to allow him to run for the fourth presidential election as the leader of the presidential party, the Rassemblement Constitutionnel Démocratique (RCD).⁹ The high percentage of votes obtained by Ben Ali in the 1999 presidential election (99.4 per cent) and by his party, the RCD, in legislative elections (91.5 per cent), have, paradoxically, been viewed both inside and outside the country not as a triumphant victory of the incumbent president or his political party but as an obvious sign of the exclusion and cooptation of opposition parties, namely the Mouvement Démocratique Socialiste (MDS).¹⁰ In Algeria, Bouteflika’s presidency in April 1999 brought a relative degree of stability to the country but intermittent bouts of violence continued to take place. In Libya, despite cosmetic changes to the Revolutionary Command Committee (RCC) in

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¹⁰ The Tunisian elections raised a wave of criticism both from abroad as well as from inside the country. For example, Mohamed Talibi stated that “je dis et je redis solennellement ce que j’ai déclaré en public ... Je ne crois pas au 99,4% des voix importées par Ben Ali le 24 octobre 1999. Ce taux démentiel déshonore les officiels qui ont perdu tout crédit à avancer de tels chiffres, et il constitue une humiliation pour les Tunisiens ... si l’on veut m’emprisonner ou me pendre pour mes idées, j’y suis prêt”. See “Mohamed Talibi, le sage qui tourne le dos au régime”, Le Monde, 6 March 2000. Indeed, opposition parties in Tunisia are elected by a government decree that provides them with a quota of 20 per cent (that is 34 seats) whatever the result of the legislative elections.
1986 and the 'corrective measures' of the following year, all significant economic and military powers remained in the hand of Qadhafi and a small group of advisers.\footnote{Dirk Vandewalle, "The Libyan Jamahiriyya Since 1969", in Dirk Wandewalle (ed.), Qadhafi's Libya: 1969-1994 (St Martin's Press, 1995), p. 37.}

In the face of this lack of genuine multi-party systems, the rise of Islamism has been viewed by various observers as the only possible alternative to the current North African regimes. Even the arrival of the socialist opposition to government in the case of Morocco has been interpreted as leaving room for the Islamists alone to occupy the position of real opposition on the political scene. The fear and uncertainty surrounding the Islamists together with the ambiguity of their discourse – ambiguous not so much in terms of their fundamental opposition to the existing regimes as in terms of their relation to Western countries once they attain power – have put a premium on the importance of political stability and have encouraged initiatives of political reform aiming at improving respect for democracy, human rights and the rule of law. Thus, political security shows an intricate interplay between a tense status quo, involving a crisis of legitimacy on the one hand, and the need to establish democratic systems of government as guarantor of stability in the WM, on the other.

The same argument advanced in south-west Europe about the rise of Islamism and the risks the Algerian crisis generates has also been used by the other Maghrebi governments to tighten their grip politically and substantiate their demands for an increase in foreign support, both political and economic.\footnote{In fact, President Ben Ali declared in an interview to the French daily, Le Figaro, on 2 August 1994 that "l'intégrisme, c'est votre [Europe's] problème." Also, the Tunisian Ambassador, Driss Rachid, was reported to have said "the possibility itself of a dialogue between the two coasts of the Mediterranean is jeopardised; Islamism and Arabism reinforce one another and are likely to hinder any future co-operation with the European Mediterranean countries." See proceedings of the seminar on Mediterranean security organised by the Italian Military Centre for Strategic Studies (CeMiSS) and the French Armed Forces' Délégation aux Etudes Générales (DEG), 30 January-1 February 1991. The proceedings of this seminar provided the guidelines for the Spanish-Italian proposal for a C SCM.} More importantly, Morocco did not participate at the summit of the ministers of interior which was called for by the French interior minister, Charles Pasqua, and organised in Tunis on 21 January 1995. The summit, which was attended by the interior ministers of Algeria, France, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Tunisia, focused on measures to fight terrorism and the rise of Islamist extremism. An official in the Moroccan ministry of interior declared that the
security preoccupations of the Tunis summit did not concern Morocco at that moment. Also the authorities in Rabat reproached Paris with its interpretation of the Marrakech incident as an Islamist terrorist action. To turn to Libya, because of Colonel Qadhaﬁ’s anti-Islamic fundamentalist stance, Europeans countries, unlike the United States, have tended to view the situation in Libya more optimistically.

Thus, political stability and the rise of Islamism have tended to dominate securitisation politically. Nonetheless, there are a number of other issues that were referred to, albeit with less intensity or urgency, as having some bearings on the security of the WM. Despite the rhetoric about their ‘brotherly’ relationship, their belonging to ‘le Maghreb des peuples’ with a common cultural and linguistic identity and their forming part of ‘le Maghreb des États’ that reﬂects a common colonial experience and a cherishing of similar political objectives, Morocco and Algeria have often entertained tense relations that verge on conﬂict, mainly because of their different views regarding the Western Sahara. The establishment of the AMU changed little in this respect, though it was considered by most WM countries as an important step towards reconciliation between Rabat and Algiers.

Besides their traditional conﬂicting views with regard to the Western Sahara, a new political securitisation has emerged in relation to the presence of members of the Algerian Islamist armed group (GIA) at the borders between Morocco and Algeria. A number of incidents raised spates of mutual accusations between Rabat and Algiers. The Marrakech incident of 1994 was interpreted by Rabat as an attempt by the Algerian regime to destabilise Morocco. Thus, as retaliatory measures, Morocco closed its borders with Algeria and tightened its control of Algerian residents in Morocco, requiring them, consequently, to report to the local police. From the Algerian side, General Khaled Nezzar, former defence minister and a strong ﬁgure of the Algerian regime, described the common territorial boundary between Algeria and Morocco as a ‘passeport’ through which arms and drug smugglings have been taking place and which have served as a base for members of the GIA involved in a number of massacres inside Algeria. He also accused

15 Ibid.
Rabat of laxity with GIA members and lack of cooperation, especially because of its 'blackmailing' pressures on Algiers and linking the extradition of Abdelhak Layada, a high-ranking member of the GIA, to Algeria's position on the Western Sahara. Similar accusations continued even after the arrival of Bouteflika to power in April 1999 and the death of Hassan II in July of the same year. Despite declarations of good intent from both sides, relations between the two countries have not changed a great deal. Indeed, in 2000, both King Mohammed VI and President Bouteflika referred to the other country as mischievous.

As to relations with Libya, Italy has remained a strong 'defender' of dialogue, rather than sanctions, with Tripoli, despite its past experience with Libya (namely the bombing of the island of Lampedusa in 1986 and Libyan involvement in terrorist attacks in Rome in 1988). This is because of longstanding political and economic ties with its southern neighbour. In particular, Libya has been of considerable importance for Italy both in energy and military security terms and will continue to be so in the future.

Relations between Morocco and Spain have occasionally been coloured by an intermittent security discourse. This discourse has arisen in connection with the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla. Nonetheless, it has remained a low key one and has often been projected against the internal politics of both countries. For Morocco, the question of the enclaves is traded off against Spain's neutrality, or at least continued withdrawal of material and political support for the Polisario Front. The apprehension in Spain is that, because of the volatile political situation in Morocco, sovereignty over the enclaves could be used, in the context of a domestic political turmoil, as a nationalist political banner to gain support. Madrid has faced further complications with regard to the two enclaves. Any compromise in the matter of Spanish sovereignty over Ceuta and Melilla might be interpreted by other independence movements (in the Basque country and Catalonia) as a weakness on the part of the government and encourage them to harden their stance.

18 Ibid.
20 Mohammed VI: "There is a problem between Morocco and Algeria. There is no problem between Morocco and the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic... because we do not recognize it. This is Algeria's creation... As long as we will not discuss the issue frankly and logically with Algeria, we will not reach a solution." Interviewed in Time magazine, 26 June 2000. Bouteflika: "L'Algérie vient de traverser une décennie noire, je donne un coup de chapeau à nos voisins de l'Est [la Tunisie] qui nous ont fait aucun mal. Je ne peux pas dire la même chose pour nos voisins de l'Ouest [le Maroc]." Interviewed in Le Monde, 17 June 2000.
towards Madrid. The diplomatic tensions raised by the incident over Perejil, a rocky tiny uninhabited island west of Ceuta, in July 2002 could be seen within the larger perspective of the contention over the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla (see Chapter 5).

To conclude, securitisation in the political sector centres on such issues as (i) the rise of Islamism, (ii) political stability and the unpopularity of the existing political regimes and (iii) the building of democratic systems (democratisation). These issues are perceived mainly as problems pertaining to the Maghreb. Indeed, political stability and Islamism have been securitised by the Maghrebi regimes. However, although they have primarily an internal dimension limited to the Maghreb, they are often presented as a cause for great concern to Spain, France and, to a lesser extent, Italy.

2.1.3 The societal sector: immigration and cultural/national identity

Societal security means the ability of a society to exist as a culturally integrated whole, free from threats that could upset its cultural identity. Securitisation has revolved around issues that have been presented as a threat to the homogeneity of this cultural identity. Relations at the societal sector are established essentially via Maghrebi emigration northwards. Fast population growth in the south (as opposed to slow or negative demographic growth in the north) and a perceived 'rise' in the number of immigrants have constituted the focal base for securitisation in the societal sector.

Immigrants have been presented as a threat to national identity and to public (civil) security. Since the mid-1980s, France, Italy and Spain considered themselves as having the biggest flow of immigrants compared with other Western European countries. In all three countries, 'huge immigration flows' have been seen, albeit in varying degrees, as a threat to their internal stability and cultural cohesion. Images and reports of young unemployed Muslims/Arabs/North (and black) Africans crossing the Straits of Gibraltar and Sicily to Spain and Italy have conjured up memories of centuries past – memories of the Muslim invasion of southern Europe which may still be vivid in the imagination of some Europeans, especially Spaniards. In other cases, these memories go back only to the World War II atrocities involving a number of Moroccan soldiers, whereby the term 'marrochini' in Italy still bears negative connotations of violence and rape. In Spain, the term 'maroquinades' evokes similar images related to the Spanish civil war, when

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General Franco owed much of his victory to a Berber army of some 80,000 warriors.\(^{24}\) This anachronistic image of immigrants has considerably influenced the way in which legal and ‘illegal’ immigrants have been perceived and has become a sort of ‘Trojan horse’ for political parties with xenophobic programmes such as Jean-Marie Le Pen’s Front National (FN) and, even more so, Mégret’s Mouvement National Républicain (MNR) in France and Umberto Bossi’s Lega Nord in Italy. The latter has criticised the Italian Immigration Law No. 40/1998 as a ‘marronisation of Italy’ (see Chapter 6).

The threat to cultural identity in Europe has been used as an umbrella term to cover other securitisation instances and to link immigrants to cultural and economic ‘decline’. In Italy, Cardinal Giacomo Biffi, archbishop of Bologna, stated in a pastoral letter to his arch-diocese on 12 September 2000 that Italy should favour Catholic immigrants in order to preserve the cultural and religious heritage of the country.\(^{25}\) As Muslims, immigrants have been considered difficult to assimilate (or inassimilable) and hostile to ‘les valeurs républicaines’ in France (see, for example, the foulard affair). Alain Juppé, former French foreign minister, set the alarm by declaring that “generosity and fine sentiments are all very well, but the realities of the social balance in France also need to be taken into consideration ... other countries must help ... France cannot do everything on its own.”\(^{26}\) Besides launching a cri au secours to other European partners to help to marshal the waves of immigration from the southern Mediterranean, this declaration also alluded to the fact that France would not deal alone with any potential flood of political refugees in the eventual case of a serious escalation of violence in Algeria. This came only to underline statements made earlier by the interior minister, Charles Pasqua, who declared that France would refuse to accept any ‘wave’ of refugees fleeing Algeria if Islamic fundamentalists took power.\(^{27}\) As cheap labour, foreign residents have been accused of taking jobs and social security benefits from European citizens, namely housing and unemployment benefits.

North African immigrants are thus presented as a threat to the cultural identity of French, Italian and Spanish societies as well as a burden on the taxpayers and as unwelcome intruders into labour markets marked by high unemployment. This discourse has been present throughout the three countries and waves of racist xenophobic violence.

\(^{24}\) Yves Lacoste, “Introduction” Hérodothe No. 94 (1999), pp. 6-7.


\(^{26}\) The Economist, 16 July 1994 [emphasis added].

\(^{27}\) “France Throws Up Barrier to Algeria Refugees”, Reuters, 18 April 1994.
have often been manifest. The most recent to date were the El Ejido riots in southern Spain in February 2000. Anti-immigrant feelings have fuelled numerous debates concerning the disturbing impact of immigration on the internal politics not only of south-west European countries but of other immigrant receiving countries as well. This has been especially true of the exploitation of immigration-related issues in political elections. Because of the nature of immigrants in Spain and, to a lesser extent, in Italy (young, often single, and male), Madrid and Rome will still have to accommodate themselves to further rise of cultural differences within their countries once family building and regrouping, which has already started in the case of Italy, becomes a widespread phenomenon.

If legal immigrants are seen as a source of economic and cultural insecurity, 'illegal' immigrants are deemed a source of crime, disease, delinquency, lack of hygiene, etc. President Mitterrand described 'illegal' immigration as 'une immigration sauvage' and, since all that is 'sauvage' is threatening in a civic society, it needs to be controlled, if not eliminated. A number of laws were introduced to effect zero 'illegal' immigration (see Chapter 6). The most direct connection between 'illegal' immigration and public order was made by Jean-Louis Debré. He declared, "lutter efficacement contre l'immigration clandestine, c'est œuvrer pour une amélioration de la sécurité dans les villes et les banlieues, non que les étrangers et tout particulièrement les clandestins soient des populations en elles-mêmes spécialement portées à la délinquance, mais parce que la précarité de leur situations les y porte nécessairement".

In relating residence conditions to the 'menace à l'ordre public', immigration becomes connected to internal security and to issues of terrorism. The situation in Algeria has a great deal of influence on immigration policies in France. For example, the Debré

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29 For example, Jacques Chirac once declared his sympathy for those who suffer the 'noise and smells' of immigrants and spoke of the 'overdose' of immigrants that France is taking. Note that Chirac said this with his eye on and in preparation for the local elections of 1992. Others such as Michel Poniatowski, former interior minister and an UDF (Union pour la Démocratie Française) senator at the time, compared immigration in France to the German occupation. See The Economist, 23 November 1991. Similar views have been expressed in Italy and Spain. Some of the implications of immigration for internal politics of Western democracies are discussed in Gary Freeman, "Immigration as a Source of Political Discontent and Frustration in Western Democracies", Studies in Comparative International Development Vol. 32, No. 3 (1997), pp. 42-64.
30 "... D'une façon générale il y a une immigration acceptée qui donne lieu à des contrats de travail et des autorisations de résider et il y a une immigration qui n'est pas acceptée, une immigration sauvage," François Mitterrand, Press Conference after the Franco-Spanish Summit, Albi, 19 November 1992.
Law, which requires residents to inform the local police whenever they receive in their homes any non-EU immigrant visitors, was introduced in late 1996 after a series of terrorist attacks in France – attacks that were traced to the suburbs of Marseilles, one of the big French cities with a high number of immigrants of North African origin. Considering immigration to be prejudicial to internal stability is sometimes the outcome of a fear that racist actions against immigrants might lead to the spread of violence between immigrant communities and xenophobic groups. On the other hand, police efforts to counter ‘illegal’ immigration have heightened the securitisation of immigrants in general. Meetings of WM interior ministers, under the 5+5 Forum, have often listed ‘illegal’ immigration amongst the security risks that require urgent measures to tackle them.

A different and less significant societal securitisation has occurred in the discourse of some Islamists in the Maghreb. This discourse has been especially expressed in the image of the three ‘decolonisations’ – the political, the economic, and the cultural. Some Islamist groups have declared cultural decolonisation as their responsibility. In an often cited quotation, one of the leaders of the Front Islamique du Salut (FIS), Ali Benhadj, states that “If my father and his brothers [in religion] physically threw out the oppressive French from Algeria, I, together with my brothers, with weapons and with faith, dedicate myself to banishing them intellectually and ideologically”.

Parallel to this rejection of the West, the assimilation of immigrants is not always welcomed by the Maghreb governments. King Hassan II, for example, declared in an interview to the French weekly Le Nouvel Observateur in 1989 that he was opposed to granting the right to vote to Moroccan immigrants in France because voting involved, according to the Moroccan monarch, interference in French politics and was, in a sense, a betrayal of one’s origins. The Algerian National Charter of 1976 proclaimed the return of Algerian ‘children’ as one of the major objectives of the socialist revolution. Since 1992 Tunisian law has permitted Tunisian women married to non-Tunisians to pass their Tunisian nationality to their children, with their husband’s consent. To preserve ties with their communities abroad, Tunisia and Morocco have established institutions such as the Office of Tunisians Abroad and the Ministry for Moroccan Expatriate Communities Abroad. However, this lack of enthusiasm for the assimilation of their emigrants on the part of the Moroccan government was not primarily culturally motivated. It was rather the

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outcome of fears of the influence assimilated immigrants might have on the political situation back home. It was also the result of concerns about the economic loss that might be incurred owing to a decrease in emigrant remittances, considering that they constitute a large part of the balance-of-payments receipts for the Maghreb economies.

To sum up, the centre of securitisation in the societal sector revolves mainly around migration from the Maghreb and its impact on the national identity of the southwest European countries. Relatively, ('illegal') immigrants have often been connected to the rise of unemployment, delinquency, crime and terrorism, and, thus, have been seen as a threat to public order.

2.1.4 Military sector: proliferation and terrorism
Notwithstanding the unquestionable superiority of the south-west European countries militarily, an alarmist discourse emerged to the north the Mediterranean at the beginning of the 1990s about the military sector of security in the south. This is so partly because military security has broadened to include, in addition to traditional defence, new activities such as the fight against international organised crime, human and drug trafficking as well as the Western European Union’s (WEU) so-called Petersberg tasks, the latter comprising tasks of combat forces in crisis management, peace-keeping and humanitarian and rescue missions.

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and the anti-Western feelings that ensued because of the coalition against Saddam Hussein in the Gulf War, nurtured this military security discourse and prompted fears of military escalations in the Middle East. These developments also triggered fears about the possibility of plots whereby something similar to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait could be re-enacted on the Maghrebi stage in the context of latent regional tensions between Algeria and Morocco over the Western Sahara or between Spain and Morocco over Ceuta and Melilla, with the adverse consequences this could have on stability in the WM. This perception was lent credence by an increase in the military expenditure of the North African governments and led to imaginative scenarios of potential military attacks on the north – scenarios for which the Algerian 'civil war' and the anti-Western feelings raised by the Gulf War provided fertile grounds.

In this context, both Paris and Madrid came to be seen as lying within the range of a Scud-C missile launched by 'les barbus' from Algiers or Oran. Italy was also seen to be
at easy reach for missiles fired by the ‘maverick’ Qadhafi.\textsuperscript{34} Proliferation has subsequently become a buzzword. More particularly, proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) has been securitised in treaties, declarations and defence doctrines, as embodied, for instance, in France’s \textit{Livre Blanc sur la défense 1994} and Spain’s NORTE programme of the same year.\textsuperscript{35} In the area of ballistic missile development, Libya has been seen by the north as the most advanced in the Maghreb and has been viewed with suspicion because of Qadhafi’s outspoken Western antagonism and his past assaults on Western targets. Algeria, on the other hand, was considered a greater potential threat in the long run because of the internal instability caused by radical Islamist groups as well as Algeria’s covert engagement until 1991 in nuclear research programmes in collaboration with China.\textsuperscript{36} In response to this, the south-west European countries established in 1995 (in cooperation with Portugal) multinational Euro-forces answerable to WEU (notably EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR, see Chapter 3). They also managed to press Mediterranean and Maghreb security onto the NATO agenda. The creation of these Euro-forces in particular was met with suspicion in the south and provoked a number of criticisms.

In the \textit{Livre Blanc sur la défense 1994}, the French government declared that terrorist acts had become the principal threat to France’s security.\textsuperscript{37} When put into context, this statement was a clear allusion to Algerian terrorist attacks. If the securitisation focus in France has been placed on externally inspired terrorism, Spain’s securitisation of terrorism has been largely internally inspired and concerned mainly with terrorist actions by the ETA (\textit{Euskadi ta Askatasuna}) separatist movement. However, during the early 1990s Spain started also to direct its attention to external terrorism. Even so, this came more as a result of French pressures on Madrid to tighten its control measures against alleged Algerian terrorists than from a particular direct concern with any subversive activities. Spain had to respond to such pressures in exchange for more French collaboration in order to contain ETA terrorist activities.

Other issues that have raised a low level of securitisation have featured in Spanish security discourse, especially in connection with relations with Morocco. The great majority of Spaniards have not felt in recent times that Spain is militarily threatened by

\textsuperscript{34} “Tensions to the South”, \textit{Financial Times}, 14 March 1995.
\textsuperscript{35} NORTE stands for ‘Nuevo Organización del Ejército de Tierra’. Norte (north) can also mean in Spanish an azimuth direction or bearing.
\textsuperscript{36} Algeria operates two reactors, the ARR-1 acquired from Argentina, and Es-Salam developed in cooperation with China; see “Algeria: a New Nuclear Comet?” \textit{Middle East}, 19 June 2000.
any country. However, for most of the small minority holding the opposite view, it is especially Morocco that has been seen as a potential threat to Spain mainly because the former has laid claims to the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla. This threat is not perceived in terms of a full-blooded military attack. Rather, it is seen after the fashion of the ‘Green March’ in 1975 and – from a Spanish viewpoint – the hasty withdrawal of the Spanish armies from the Western Sahara. This is particularly significant against the background of a continued growth of the Moroccan (and Muslim) population in the two enclaves, especially in Melilla.

Thus, securitisation at the military level in the WM has revolved mainly around proliferation, low-level violence, terrorism and trafficking. The possibility of military confrontation involving more than two countries has not been considered likely. Yet, despite the reduced frequency of serious military escalation in the Maghreb, military securitisation has persisted and has acquired a new domestic, inward-looking direction mainly because of the simmering violence in Algeria.

2.2 HETEROGENEOUS SECURITY COMPLEX APPROACH: THE OVERALL PICTURE

For securitisation to be successful and for subsequent extraordinary measures to be taken in response to it, issues referred to in security terms have to be embedded in an argumentative discourse that is able to persuade other actors that these issues are legitimate threats to their security. For this purpose, these issues are usually put as the focal point of a series of sectoral criss-crossings and inter-linkages. Other facilitating conditions are also needed for securitisation to succeed, that is, in the framework of history, culture and social power. History and culture provide a realm of reference and a context within which to place particular issues identified as security issues. They also impart meaning to securitisation instances. On the other hand, social power entitles certain actors to make a number of claims/interpretations and convince others of their validity as a threat to security. Indeed, social power is the element which can bring both

38 According to a poll carried out in 1994, 42.4 per cent of Spaniards put Morocco at the top of the countries that are viewed as a threat to their country; Algeria was the next most highly rated risk, with 25 per cent putting that country at the top of the list, see Rafael Calduch Cervera, “La politique étrangère espagnole vers la Méditerranée. Possibilités et limitations”, Peace Research Institute, Tempere, 1998, p. 10.
39 After the declaration of The Hague Court, 350,000 Moroccans, answering the call of King Hassan, marched to the Western Sahara on 6 November 1975 “to restore the territorial integrity of the country”.
40 Indeed, small-scale military confrontations over southern borders involved Algeria and Morocco (the War of Sand, 1963). Territorial tensions also existed between Algeria and Morocco, and between Libya and Tunisia over the Gulf of Gabès. These conflicts were resolved by peaceful means.
history and culture to bear during a securitisation practice. The success or failure of a securitisation instance, therefore, depends largely on social power such as the status and ability of a certain actor to interpret certain issues in security terms and to make them social by getting others to accept them as valid interpretations of reality.

If the homogeneous security complex approach adopted in the previous section allowed the delineation of the various sectors as well as the issues that were securitised in each of them, the heterogeneous security complex approach serves a different but complementary purpose. It seeks to account for the overlap between the securitised sectors, on the one hand, and the relation of actors to the securitisation of particular sectors, on the other. Such an approach helps to capture not only the sectoral interconnections advanced to support securitisation instances but also the relations between actors and sectors. Analysed in this section are the linkages actors have established between the securitised sectors. This helps outline the different arguments deployed in support of the securitisation of certain issues rather than others. As such this approach complements the homogeneous security complex approach adopted in the previous section, thus providing a comprehensive picture of securitisation in the WM.

2.2.1 Inter-sectoral linkages and pivotal issues
The conceptual separation of the sectors in the previous section should not give the impression that they are or can actually be separable in practice. Indeed, security sectors are intertwined in their impact and consequences. Whether the question is societal security or political security, the ramifications are so intricate that sectoral interconnectedness appears hard to unravel. For example, one cannot avoid talking about economic security without going into the discussion of its subsequent impact on society, politics, the military and the environment. Political and economic rivalries or societal conflicts can lead to tense relations that might eventually escalate to military confrontation. Societal instabilities can fan the flames of political rivalries. To support a strong military capacity requires a strong economy. Yet, a good military capacity can undo a good economy and destabilise the political structure. The development of nuclear military power has the potential to inflict unacceptable environmental damage. Economic development can adversely affect the environment. In short, security sectors dovetail and interact with each other – and are mingled together by actors – so intricately that they all blur into one blended bloc. They constitute, to borrow Gunnar Myrdal’s term, circles of
cumulative causation as one type of factor feeds into another and as actors interweave sectors during their securitisation practice.\textsuperscript{41}

This sectoral interconnectedness does influence the thinking of actors and, consequently, makes securitisation itself non-sectoral; that is, it does not occur in each sector separately. Rather, it has the tendency to build up across sectors, which explains the occasional difficulty to focus exclusively and neatly on one sector without falling back into a repetitive discussion of a limited number of issues related to other sectors.

The analysis in the previous section has clearly shown securitisation in the WM to be limited to four sectors only, namely the economic, the political, the societal and the military. This does not mean that there are no security issues in the environmental sector; it simply means that the environmental security issues that might exist in the WM remain undeclared (i.e. not securitised) by the actors involved. Securitisation has been highly pronounced in the sectors of the economy, politics, society and, to a lesser extent, the military; and sectoral inter-linkages are established. And so, securitisation in the WM tends to be built around the following argument: 'socio-economic difficulties and demographic growth in the Maghreb are at the heart of the security equation in the region; they are considered to be the roots behind the insurgence of political Islam and the rise of migratory flows to south-west Europe; and these forces threaten the stability of the Maghreb and are bound to impinge on the security of south-west European countries and, ultimately, that of the EU as a whole'.

These arguments have constituted the backbone of securitisation in the WM. It is around them that actors have structured their security discourse. Nonetheless, there are major differences and nuances between securitisation for each actor. These differences have often been spelt out with regard to inter-sectoral linkages on the one hand, and the degree of the urgency of the securitised issue for certain actors, on the other. Economic development, political Islam, and immigration have been used to link up and construct security across the four sectors. Within this security discourse, the lack of economic development in the Maghreb has been presented as detrimental to the stability of the whole WM. The actual or potential ascent of political Islam and its claims to power are considered a threat to regime stability in the Maghreb and a menace to south-west European economic, societal and military interests. Similarly, perceptions of a cultural

\textsuperscript{41} The idea of circular and cumulative causation is developed, for instance, in Gunnar Myrdal, Development and Under-Development: A Note on the Mechanism of National and International Economic Inequality (National Bank of Egypt, 1956).
incompatibility between immigrants and their host communities have made their flow a declared source of societal imbalance but also – as a consequence – a source of political and economic problems.

Economic securitisation has usually been linked to its direct as well as indirect repercussions on the political sector. For southern actors, a major danger to their economies is perceived to come from their limited access to European markets. Therefore, improved access to these markets means more economic development, as Maghreb countries (mainly Morocco and Tunisia) could sell increased quantities of their agricultural produce to more northern countries of the EU. In turn, the need for economic development translates, politically, as an urgent necessity that would help considerably to lessen and perhaps even to defuse the ‘explosive’ internal socio-political tensions that have built up in the Maghreb. This argument appears to gain more credibility when projected against the backdrop of an acute dependence of the Maghreb economies on trade with, and on financial assistance from, the countries of south-west Europe in particular.

In France, Italy and Spain, economic securitisation has mainly focused upon the likely impact a cut in supply of energy from North Africa would have on the functioning of their economies. This has been put especially in the context of their reliance on Algerian and Libyan supplies of oil and natural gas, which has increased enormously in the 1990s. This energy consumption is estimated to continue rising in the future, making security of energy supply the more vital. This is particularly the case for Spain and, albeit to a lesser extent, Italy. Scenarios about a cut in energy supply have seldom been envisaged in terms of a shortage of supply; they have usually been put in relation to the accession to power of political actors in the Maghreb that would be antagonistic to Western interests. In this way, though economic securitisation differs in terms of issues, focus and urgency, it remains politically framed in relation to instability in the Maghreb.

Related to the threats to economic security in the WM has been the nature of the political systems in North Africa and their instability. Although there have seemed to be a tacit understanding between the countries of the WM on the importance of political stability for economic security, political stability itself has been interpreted differently in each side. In the Maghreb, at least for the incumbent regimes, it has often been synonymous with keeping the status quo and safeguarding the ruling regime. In the north, it has been considered within a general discourse about democracy and the need to promote democratic systems of government in the south. Diplomatic relations between
south-west European governments and North African regimes in the form of continuing economic assistance and political support – despite the lack of any tangible progress towards democracy – have testified to the ambiguity which shrouds the democratic argument coming from these European countries (and the EU in general) and its likelihood of helping to maintain political stability or establish democracy in the Maghreb. Indeed, reference to democratic principles has lost a great deal of its credibility especially after the violent and ‘undemocratic’ abortion of the Algerian legislative elections in January 1992 following the imminent victory of the FIS in the first round.

On a different level, the arguments which underpin the securitisation of the political sector revolve around the rise and impact of political Islam on the region. The Algerian case in particular has played a major role in this respect. Political violence, against both Algerians and foreigners, has nurtured the European imaginaire concerning the historical clashes between Islam and the West – an imaginaire which sensational media have contributed considerably to nurture and reinforce. These historical confrontations, be they religious or political, have played the role of facilitating conditions. They helped to represent the ascent of political Islam as marking a potential return to rivalry between Islam and the West in the form of a ‘clash of civilisations’.42 Through the media to the north of the Mediterranean, political Islam has usually been sketched in alarmist tones, often with reference to the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and Iran’s threat to export it, the assassination of President Anwar Sadat of Egypt (1981), the Algerian violence, the Taliban in Afghanistan and their appalling violations of human rights. The escalation of violence in Algeria has been used (and abused) as a reference in predicting what could happen in other neighbouring North African countries. The fear has been that the Algerian tragedy should be dramatically re-enacted in Morocco, Tunisia or Libya.

The prospects of the ascent of Islamists to power – be it through democratic means or not – has been put forward as having potentially harmful economic, military and societal consequences. Economically, it would pose a danger to the security of energy supplies and threaten Western economic interests in the Maghreb – interests such as the repayment of sovereign debt, the servicing of commercial credits, the protection of direct investments and the like. Militarily, the rise of political Islam would represent a return to a Jihad (holy war) against the West and, linked to the discourse over proliferation of non-

conventional weapons, it would have catastrophic dimensions. Other aspects of the scenario would be an ‘oil war’ and a ‘terrorist Jihad’. Societally, it would cause ‘Westernised’ populations in the Maghreb to flee the strict application of the sharia law (Islamic law) by ‘fundamentalists’, thus triggering an enormous rise in migration in the form of refugees seeking asylum in Europe. This, in turn, would engender a rise in far right movements and racist violence in the receiving countries. Immigration has partly been seen as the cause behind the resurgence of far-right movements. It has also been considered to have enflamed internal politics in more than one instance, not only in south-west European countries but all over Europe.43

Economic development, political Islam, immigration, and, to a lesser extent, demographic growth have, thus, been presented as the backbone of securitisation discourse in the WM. These issues span the four securitised sectors and influence the manner in which these sectors have been perceived – see Figure 2.1. This figure shows inter-sectoral linkages between sectors and pivotal issues to be of two kinds: direct and indirect. It is noteworthy that there is a concentration of direct inter-sectoral linkages related to immigration and the rise of political Islam. Almost all sectors inter-link with the rise of political Islam. For south-west European countries, political Islam has been seen as a direct threat to economic and military security. For the Maghreb countries, it has been mainly related to political security. Indirectly, political Islam could prompt increased waves of refugees to the north. Other issues have been securitised because they have been considered as the cause of the rise of political Islam. Such issues have been mainly related to economic and demographic factors but, strikingly, not to political ones. Immigration into the north has been at the nexus of a number of issues and sectors both as a source of societal insecurity, on the one hand, and a consequence of economic insecurity and demographic growth, on the other.

43 Examples of far-right anti-immigration political parties existed all over Europe, with the Vlaams Blok in Belgium, the Popular Party in Portugal, Pim Fortuyn’s party in Holland, the Law-and-Order Party in Germany, the Freedom Party in Austria, and the Danish People’s Party in Denmark. See “How the Extremists Have Thrown Another Rock in the Pool”, The Independent, 23 April 2002.
2.2.2 Social power and actor-sector relation

From a social constructivist vantage point, the above interconnectedness between sectors is not something that is inherently present in each sector separately. The security interactions that interlink sectors are elements introduced and acted upon by the actors according to their security perceptions. In the mind of actors, security is not divided into different sectors. Rather, it is conceived of in aggregate terms. That is, security concerns in one sector influence the actors’ definitions and views of the other sectors.44 Therefore, actors have tended to base their interpretations on some cumulative and overarching security narratives, with security nodes that are more pronounced in certain sectors than others. Particular security nodes in one sector are then stretched and presented as having adverse implications for the other sectors. Such inter-sectoral linkages are used to draw together elements from various sectors in order to construct an image of security that is under threat and which entails urgent and extraordinary actions to tackle it. The aim of this construction is to build more credibility and gain persuasiveness.

The purpose of this section is to trace the link between sectors and actors. It considers which actors emphasise which sector as the overarching sector in support of their securitisation instances. The following table sums up the securitisation of sectors according to actors. Based on the mapping of securitisation carried out for each of the sectors above, it presents the securitisation instances that occurred in the WM in each sector in relation to the actors involved in them. It also presents the degree of urgency

with which securitisation in each sector has been advanced by the various actors, from strong securitisation, to weak or growing to non-existent securitisation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector Actor</th>
<th>Economy</th>
<th>Politics</th>
<th>Society</th>
<th>Military</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
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<td>Spain</td>
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<td>Tunisia</td>
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Key: + strong securitisation; ± weak or growing securitisation; – no securitisation

The above table shows that all WM countries securitise at least two sectors. There is a particular concentration of securitisation in the political, economic and societal sectors, where all actors have a strong securitisation or a growing one. This owes much to the definitions given to these sectors and the issues that are securitised in reference to them. For instance, political securitisation is related to the impact of political stability in the region; this stability has itself been understood as mainly dependent on the economic sector. The concentration of securitisation in these three sectors shows the specificity of the WM and the primacy of political, economic and societal security. It also shows that securitisation is not dependent on one sector in particular but rather is influenced by events in other sectors. For example, it is the political consequences of economic insecurity which justifies its being put on the securitisation agenda. The presence of securitisation instances in the military sector of security is mainly due to the latter having now a broader agenda, in addition to the traditional defence one. Thus, military security has been seen to be concerned with low-level violence, notably terrorism and international organised crime.

Despite the occurrence of securitisation for all actors, actors securitise the same sectors differently. Though some sectors have been securitised by a number of actors, this does not mean that all these actors do so in the same fashion. Nor does it mean that these securitised sectors have the same weight for each country. Actors securitise sectors with varying degrees of intensity and urgency. For instance, securitisation of the economy has occurred in the WM as a whole; nonetheless, it has been more pronounced in Morocco and Tunisia than it has been in Algeria or Libya or in the countries of south-west Europe. The same is also found with regard to political instability. Instability in the Maghreb is certainly detrimental to North African governments but its political impact, according to
the securitisation discourse, can be felt, albeit only marginally, in the countries of south-
west Europe.

Moreover, Table 2.1 shows the existence of a pattern of securitisation in the WM with varying weight according to countries. France, Italy and Spain have securitised politics, society and the military, while North African governments have tended to securitise more the economy and, strikingly, politics - strikingly because the securitisation of the political sector by south-west European countries has often been conceived in relation to the volatile domestic political situation of the Maghreb countries and the lack of genuine legitimacy of their regimes. However, this pattern should not hide a number of differences within either the Maghreb or south-west Europe. For example, societal securitisation in France is more closely related to French internal politics than it is in Spain or Italy. In the latter countries, societal security is still of low intensity and has been connected to the flow of migrants (both legal and ‘illegal’) from North Africa than to settled or naturalised immigrants or citizens of immigrant origin, as it has been the case in France. But this difference has started to change as the dominance of single male immigrants in both countries has begun to give way to the creation of immigrant communities as a result of family reunion.

CONCLUSION
Analysis in this Chapter has shown securitisation to be limited to the economy, politics, society and, less so, the military, and that interconnections do occur between these sectors. These interconnections take place because of a number of pivotal issues which are highlighted to lend more credibility to the securitisation perspective. Nonetheless, there is a markedly important note to make in relation to the direction of this security discourse in the WM. Securitisation instances, together with the discourse underpinning them, have often been presented as having their roots mainly in North Africa. Whether securitisation has been conceived in the Maghreb or in south west European countries, its causes have almost exclusively been perceived as originating from the Maghreb. If these have been the securitisation instances seen by the WM states through inter-sectoral lenses, it is in order to look into the different policies that have been designed to deal with them. These policies have been a response to securitisation, that is, to security interpretation rather than necessarily to any security reality. The next Chapter cover these policies, both those designed for the Maghreb alone and those for all the countries of the southern Mediterranean.
CHAPTER 3

THE IMPACT OF SEcurITISATION ON THE WM: THE CASE OF REGIONAL SECURITY POLICIES

The securitisation instances delineated in Chapter 2 as well as the security discourse that has underpinned and interwoven them have combined intricately to construct a security image that is, in many ways, specific to the WM (though it still shares some broad features with the whole Mediterranean security landscape). In response to this securitisation agenda, a number of policies have been introduced with the aim of containing security threats, because, if nothing is done to tackle them now, it would be too late to do so later. In this context, the comprehensive security approach, which has dominated the thinking on the theory and practice of international relations in the post-Cold War era, appears to have informed the shape and structure of the security policies designed for the Mediterranean. And, consequently, such policies have increasingly been stretched to incorporate economic, political and social developments as integral elements making for security and stability.

The influence of south-west European countries on policies towards TMCs in general has considerably grown in weight, especially during the 1990s. And so has their tendency to channel their ‘grand actions’ into a supranational framework.¹ For these reasons, in discussing policies towards the WM, one is justified to focus on forums where south-west European countries exert their influence, channel their policies and ‘Europeanise’ their security issues in relation to the Mediterranean, notably the EU, WEU, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Though this Chapter presents the programmes and policies that cover other Mediterranean countries besides the Maghreb, special attention will be given to the implications of these policies for the securitised sectors and issues outlined in the previous Chapter.

Some of the policies developed for the Mediterranean were initially designed for, or involved, the Maghreb countries before they were later extended to include other

¹ See, inter alia, Hayée Chérgui, La politique méditerranéenne de la France. Entre diplomatie collective et leadership (L’Harmattan, 1997); Richard Gillespie, Spain and the Mediterranean: Developing a European Policy towards the South (Macmillan, 2000); and Stelios Stavridis, et al. (eds.), The Foreign Policies of the European Union’s Mediterranean States and Applicant Countries in the 1990s (Macmillan, 1999).
TMCs. This reflects the fact that some of the policies were put forward as a response to security worries arising primarily from the Maghreb. Having been adopted during various stages of cooperation with TMCs, these policies reflect the shift, development and preoccupation of the south-west European countries with the southern Mediterranean, and with the Maghreb in particular.

The aim of this Chapter is not to summarise these policies. Rather, the main purpose is to consider them in light of the securitised issues previously discussed. As such, this Chapter is both expository and analytical. It seeks to put these policies into perspective with the securitised issues that have contributed to generate them, in particular where their overarching goal has become – and even more conspicuously so since the establishment of the short-lived RMP in 1989 – the building of security and stability in the Mediterranean at large.

3.1 Towards a Comprehensive Security Policy Approach

During the Cold War, partly because of competition with the Soviet bloc, the development of relations with the countries of the Mediterranean was seen as a natural strategic extension of Western European security. This attitude gave birth at the 1972 Paris Summit to the Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP) decided upon in principle by the EC heads of state and government within the framework of European Political Cooperation (EPC). The general aim of the GMP was to establish a ‘global’ framework of cooperation between the EC and TMCs. Despite building a framework of cooperation, the GMP remained largely rhetoric and lacked particularly a framework for coherent security cooperation. It also remained bilateral in nature and was limited, essentially, to classical development assistance in the form of trade and financial agreements.

There was a perceived need for the EC members to rethink their Mediterranean policy after the felt failure of the GMP. This was motivated by the need to respond to the EC’s Mediterranean enlargements (to include Greece in 1981, and, more importantly, Spain and Portugal in 1986), as well as to the socio-economic and political discontent of the 1980s in the Maghreb which culminated in the October 1988 riots in Algeria. These worries led the European Commission to propose a RMP to the Strasbourg European Council in December 1989. The RMP was based on the recognition of the difficulties the EC’s Mediterranean enlargement had created for the TMCs and in view of the entry into force of the single European market by 1993. Therefore, one of its declared aims was to extend some of the benefits of the single market to TMCs. The Commission’s proposal
was based on the assumption that the economic and political development of TMCs was fundamental to the Community’s own security, echoing the idea of the indivisibility of European security from the continent’s neighbours to the south, not least because of geographical propinquity. The new aspect of this policy was clearly spelt out through an increase in the amount of funds allocated under the fourth financial protocol (1991-96). The fourth financial protocol provided for a 73 per cent increase in funds to the Maghreb countries in order to assist with the consolidation of economic and structural reforms, regional cooperation and the environment.

Though the RMP continued with the policy of developmental assistance, it also made a tacit reference to political reform by stressing the importance of human rights through new provisions enabling the European Parliament to freeze the budget of a financial protocol in the case of ‘serious and persistent’ human rights violations. The RMP was short-lived because of changes in the international political scene which ensued from the uncertainties that the end of the Cold War generated, the outbreak of the Gulf War, and the internal development of the EU after the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the establishment of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Consequently, multiple comprehensive security initiatives going beyond the economic arrangements that hitherto dominated EU-Mediterranean relations started to be introduced.

Inspired by the OSCE’s wider approach to security, an Italian-Spanish proposal called for the establishment of a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean (CSCM) during the Palma de Mallorca meeting of the OSCE in November 1990. The CSCM, which built on already existing security cooperation such as that between Morocco and Spain over air defence, was conceived as representing a global approach to the Mediterranean region both in its extensive geographical scope (including the EU, the northern Mediterranean and the eastern and southern Mediterranean, the Arab Gulf countries and Iran, the Balkans, the US and the ex-Soviet Union) as well as in the issues it covered (economy, politics, environment, security and culture). Nonetheless,

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2 References to the growing importance of human rights in foreign policy of the European Community were given a further push in the Single European Act (1986). These references were then made stronger in the Declaration on Human Rights adopted by the European Council, 28-29 June 1990. See Andrew Clapham, “Where Is the EU’s Human Rights Common Foreign Policy, and How Is It Manifest in Multilateral Fora?” in Philip Alston (ed.), The EU and Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 633.


4 This is the division of the Mediterranean that is usually adopted by the European Commission. The northern Mediterranean comprises Malta, Cyprus and Turkey; the eastern and southern Mediterranean comprises the Maghreb (Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia) and the Mashreq (Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria) and Israel and Palestinian Authority.
the proposal was rejected by the United States (preferring instead to focus on the Middle East crisis) and received only a lukewarm welcome from the other EU member states, including France and, even more so, Germany and the United Kingdom. Instead, the south-west European countries concentrated on putting more pressures on the EU so as to develop a more enhanced cooperation with the countries of the Maghreb in particular, especially now that the latter countries had established a ‘union’, the AMU, the construction of which was said to favour such cooperation.

It was with the aim of arresting their declining socio-economic conditions and tackling an increasingly changing domestic political situation (mainly in the form of the insurgence of Islamist opposition movements) that the North African leaders had signed in February 1989 the Treaty of Marrakech, establishing the AMU between Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. The AMU was partly intended to concert the economic efforts of the Maghreb countries in order to alleviate their deteriorating socio-economic situation. It was also partly intended to act as a framework for finding a common political response to security concerns raised by the challenges of Islamism. Furthermore, the creation of the AMU was seen as a sort of ‘reconciliation’ between Algiers and Rabat over the Western Sahara. For this reason, it was deemed a favourable move towards building up regional cooperation that would link all the countries of the WM together in a ‘constructive dialogue’. Exactly one month after the CSCM proposal, France revived President François Mitterrand’s 1983 call for the establishment of a Western Mediterranean Forum. This forum materialised when France, Italy, Portugal and Spain (later joined by Malta) and the AMU countries met in Rome in 1990 to sign the agreement which gave birth to what has been known as the 5+5 group.

The tensions following the incident of the freezing in 1992 of the fourth financial protocol (1991-96) for Morocco over human rights violations (in the Western Sahara) as well as the appalling conditions of political prisoners were to have a great significance in the upgrading of the EC policies towards the Maghreb as a whole. In addition to the RMP provisions on human rights, the European Council in Luxembourg adopted in June 1991 the Declaration on Human Rights as part of its international relations and an essential component of its cooperation and development initiatives with third countries. Against

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4 The origins of the 5+5 go back to the Marseilles Forum of May 1988 on “Réalités et perspectives des relations entre les pays européens de la Méditerranée occidentale et les pays du Maghreb associés à la CEE”. This was followed by another forum in Tangier (May 1989) after the creation of the AMU.
the background of this new acquis, the European Parliament (EP) refused, in January 1992, to give assent to the fourth financial protocol for Morocco (and Syria) on grounds of human rights violations. This refusal came about more by accident rather than as the result of a real majority view on the part of the Parliament’s members. By virtue of the Single European Act (SEA) of 1986, the signing of the fourth financial protocols required not only the unanimous endorsement of the Council of Ministers but also the absolute majority of the EP’s component members (rather than a majority of those sitting and voting), i.e. 260 out of 518 votes. Due to a low attendance of members of the EP on 16 January 1992, only 245 members of the EP voted for the Moroccan financial protocol. As a reaction to the freezing of the fourth financial protocol, Morocco retaliated by creating difficulties over its EC fisheries agreement, which expired by the end of February 1992.

This unexpected incident generated great tensions between Morocco and the EC. The importance of the fisheries agreement to Spain caused Spaniards – especially through the support of the Spanish EC Commissioner, Abel Matutes – to push for an enhanced EC cooperation agreement with Morocco that would lead progressively to free trade. However, this proposal was received with reluctance by other Spanish officials, especially as far as free access to agricultural products was concerned. Then, on 17 February 1992, the idea of developing a comprehensive partnership with Morocco was discussed in the Council within the framework of EPC, without however a final decision being reached.

As a result of this, the Spanish government, backed by France after more worrying political developments in Algeria, pushed forward the idea of developing even closer relations with all the countries of the Maghreb. This was the aim of the Commission policy document of 2 March 1992 entitled ‘The Future of Relations between the European Community and the Maghreb’. The Lisbon Summit of 26-27 June 1992 endorsed this Euro-Maghreb Partnership idea, thus moving away from just development cooperation. This partnership concept put premium on common commitment to: (i) respect for international law, the principles of the UN Charter and the Resolutions of the UN Security Council; (ii) respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in civil, political, economic, social and cultural matters and for democratic values exemplified by

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instances have largely informed the comprehensive framework which contains the EMP. Fundamental to the EMP enterprise is an inclusive vision of security that links together, at least in principle, economic, political and socio-cultural factors so that they are conducive in a cumulative way to the building of a prosperous, peaceful and stable Mediterranean region.

The BD establishing the EMP comprises political-security, economic-financial, and socio-cultural Chapters, with an annexed Working Programme outlining ways to implement the objectives of the preliminary Declaration. The Declaration must be, in the words of Javier Solana, the then Spanish foreign minister and president of the Barcelona Conference, “the backbone of the [EMP]. It is based on a balanced and comprehensive vision which throws into relief the interdependence of the political, economic and cultural dimension of the association.”12 Apart from vague preambular references to the strategic importance of the Mediterranean and the security challenges it faces, only Chapter One – Political and Security Partnership – makes direct mention of the need for security cooperation with the aim of “establishing a common area of peace and stability”. It is only the embedded principle that all of the Chapters are (and should be) mutually reinforcing which partly redeems the lack of any explicit or direct reference to security in the other two Chapters. In this sense, the EMP focuses on the building of security in its broader meaning, and, therefore, any investigation of the security dimension should take full account of its broader agenda.

Nonetheless, leaving the rhetoric over the inter-linkages between the three Chapters of the BD aside, the economic and financial Chapter remains – and is considered by all members of the Barcelona Process – a major element that will make or break the EMP. This is due to a number of reasons. First, the EU, as an economic power, enjoyed already established economic relations with the southern Mediterranean partners. Second, it would appear easier to reach consensus, both amongst EU members themselves and between them and their Mediterranean partners, over economic matters rather than over matters relating to what is commonly referred to as ‘high politics’ – that is, foreign and defence policies and issues of international order and security. Third, there is an underlying belief that the benefits of economic development will ultimately trickle down to other sectors and, consequently, consolidate socio-political security and stability.

For this purpose, every Chapter sets itself a core target. The economic and financial Chapter aims, through the bilateral Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements (EMAAAs), to progressively establish a Mediterranean-wide free trade area (FTA) by 2010. This date will be difficult to meet for all partners since a number of them were still at the negotiation stage by the time of the Fifth Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Conference in Valencia in April 2002. The adoption of a Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability remains the main undertaking of the political and security Chapter. The goals of the socio-cultural Chapter are shrouded in rather vague references to increased cooperation with civil society members in order to promote understanding between peoples and shoulder the objectives of the security and political Chapter, particularly those pertaining to the human dimensions of democracy and human rights.

3.2.1 Economic and financial partnership: seeking security through non-political means

With the aim of creating an area of shared prosperity, Chapter Two of the BD – Economic and Financial Partnership – contains three intertwined objectives: to establish a Euro-Mediterranean FTA by 2010, to support economic transition in order to help meet the goal of economic liberalisation, and to increase investment flows to southern EMP members. As such, the objectives of the economic Chapter are related to the securitisation of the economic sector of the WM as expressed mainly in terms of further access to the European market, the availability of energy resources and increasing foreign direct investment (FDI). Central to cooperation in this Chapter are the EMAAs signed between the EU and individual Mediterranean partners.\(^\text{13}\) In addition to political and social dialogues, the EMAAs seek to (i) attain a progressive and reciprocal elimination of all tariffs on industrial goods over a period of 12 years, (ii) effect a gradual but limited trade liberalisation for agricultural products, (iii) bring about measures to liberalise services and the right of establishment, (iv) facilitate the flow of capital and (v) encourage Mediterranean partner countries to adopt a wide range of trade-related EU regulations (e.g. competition, standards, intellectual property rights, etc.).\(^\text{14}\)

\(^{13}\) Association Agreements between the EU and Tunisia, Israel, Morocco and the Palestinian Authority (interim agreement) have already entered into force. Negotiations with Egypt were concluded in June 1999 and the Agreement signed in June 2001. Negotiations with Algeria were concluded in December 2001, and those with Lebanon in January 2002. Algeria signed its EMAA during the Fifth Euro-Mediterranean Partnership meeting in Valencia April 2002, while that of Lebanon was signed later on 17 June 2002 in Luxembourg because Lebanon having boycotted the EMP meeting in Valencia.

\(^{14}\) For this purpose, the European Commission has been supporting efforts to develop Euro-Mediterranean economic cooperation networks between economic institutes such as the FEMISE (Euro-Mediterranean
In recognition of the socio-economic cost that reforms to meet the demands of the FTA entail, the MEDA (Mesures d’Accompagnement) financing programme has been introduced, as a sort of painkiller, to support the implementation of economic transition in the southern Mediterranean. The MEDA programme takes the form of grants – as opposed to the complementary European Investment Bank (EIB) repayable loans – and replaces the classical financial assistance arranged in the framework of financial protocols. Unlike the entitlement system whereby funds of the financial protocols “shall be used until exhausted”, the distribution of MEDA funds is based on indicative planning and actual performance. Thus, fund allocation is determined with a view to financing projects designed under the National Indicative Programmes (NIPs). It is also determined by the pace of the speed of reforms in each country. Funds not committed by the time of their expiry date are returned to the general budget of the EC. This new approach to financial assistance was introduced as an incentive aiming to accelerate economic (and political) reforms in the southern Mediterranean, and to generate competition for funds in some cases.

MEDA I (1995-99) committed to €3.435bn of the €4.685bn allocated by the Cannes Summit in 1995 (73 per cent). This allocated amount was, however, almost €1bn less than the original amount proposed by the Commission but cut down because of German and British objections. During the same period, the EIB loans totalled €4.808bn. Out of the total MEDA I funds committed, the three Maghreb countries received €1.252bn, almost one third of the MEDA I budget. Nonetheless, disbursements by 2000 were made for the amount of €325m, or only 26 per cent of the committed amount. The EIB loans for the Maghreb countries in the same period totalled €1.447bn, of which €343m went to Algeria, €583m to Morocco and €521m to Tunisia.

The MEDA programme is now in its second phase and covers the period 2000-06. For the seven years, MEDA II has committed €5.350bn, almost the same amount as

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13 Funds from the second, third and fourth protocols are still available and are being used by the Maghreb countries.
14 NIPs are country programmes prepared by the Commission, following dialogue with the Mediterranean country concerned, and adopted in the Council by a qualified majority. NIPs outline objectives and priority sectoral projects, their estimated amounts, timetables and funding criteria for their execution. NIPs are usually linked to their counterparts at the regional level, Regional Indicative Programmes (RIPs).
15 European Commission, Union Européenne-Maghreb: 25 ans de coopération.
originally proposed by the Commission for MEDA I. For the same period, the EIB has provided €7.400bn in loans for the southern Mediterranean region. MEDA II, however, intended to adopt a more oriented and strategic approach to Mediterranean financing plans than its predecessor. For this reason, it has introduced strategic papers which, in the words of MEDA II Regulations, “should [together with the national and regional indicative programmes] define the main objectives of, and the guidelines for, and the priority sectors of the Community [financial] support.” MEDA II Regulations seek to strengthen the link between MEDA programmes and the implementation of reforms initiated by the Mediterranean partners under the EMAAs, thus aiming to take full account of the broader strategy for the Mediterranean. It has also placed particular focus on other guidelines that would accelerate growth, notably liberalisation of trade and services, improvements in governance and the rule of law, and the boosting of south-south sub-regional integration.

Since south-south economic integration is recognised as the main challenge to a future Mediterranean FTA, one of the economic priorities of the EMP is to encourage horizontal regional integration between the southern members in order to, amongst other things, increase the attractiveness of their markets to foreign investors. With this purpose in mind, 10 per cent of MEDA I money went to regional programmes and strategies prepared under the Regional Indicative Programmes (RIPs) with the aim of supporting and complementing NIPs. The importance of sub-regional integration was further emphasised during the visit of the President of the European Commission, Romano Prodi, to the Maghreb countries on 11-15 January 2001. From this vantage point, Tunisia and Morocco (together with Egypt and Jordan) announced in the Agadir Declaration in May 2001 their intention to establish closer links amongst themselves with the aim of building a multilateral FTA. It was also declared that this FTA would later extend to other south Mediterranean Arab countries; nonetheless, no final draft of the agreement was reached by the end of the first half of 2002.

Considering the EU’s economic power as well as its already existent economic relations with the southern Mediterranean countries, it is not surprising that the economic Chapter of the BD is the clearest and most elaborate of all the three Chapters; it is

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considered the major engine behind the working of the Barcelona Process. It becomes questionable only when considered against a rhetoric which links economical goals to political ends and presents economic development and the progressive building of a FTA as “not an end in itself but a means to a rather bigger goal: the creation of a stable, peaceful and prosperous Mediterranean.” 21 As such, the aims of the economic Chapter of the BD have been presented as a foundational base for building political stability and preserving security. Nonetheless, economic development has been made conditional on concomitant political liberalisation, and this political liberalisation, in turn, is considered more favourable when backed by economic reforms. Thus, the aim has been to build up a circle of cumulative causation between economic development and political liberalisation.

Indeed, behind the economic liberalism underpinning the EMP lies the assumption – or rather hope – that economic development will spill over to foster socio-political reforms that are conducive to security and stability in the Mediterranean at large. From this standpoint, the EU has reinforced, through Article 3 of the MEDA Regulations, 22 the position that financial assistance has become contingent on the recipient country’s respect for human rights and support for democratic principles and institutions. This move underlined and extended similar provisions already incorporated in the RMP and the Euro-Maghreb Partnership. What is new is that Article 3 clearly adds a suspension clause to the EU’s agreements with the Mediterranean partners, which could lead to the suspension of economic cooperation with a TMC found guilty of ‘serious and persistent’ human rights violations. The possibility of the suspension of cooperation is included in the political dialogue by virtue of Articles 3-5 of the EMAA. Nonetheless, this clause has remained so far only at the level of rhetoric and its presence seems to be more in conformity with EU requirements for cooperation agreements with third parties as defined in EU Council decisions, rather than any wholehearted belief or commitment to its application. The conditionality clause remains, indeed, an unsuccessful deterrent.

3.2.2 Political and security partnership: pending political and military cooperation

The proclaimed aim of the political and security partnership is to create an area of peace and stability. Cooperation under this Chapter revolves around human rights and

22 Article 3 stipulates “this Regulation is based on respect for democratic principles and the rule of law and also for human rights and fundamental freedoms, which constitute an essential element thereof, the violation of which will justify the adoption of appropriate measures”.

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democracy, regional security and respect for sovereignty, non-proliferation, confidence building measures (CBMs) and the fight against terrorism, organised crime and drug trafficking. According to these claims, the political Chapter of the BD appears to cater for two security sectors: the political and the military broadly defined. By and large, it is based on the democratic peace thesis, according to which democracies do not usually fight each other but tend to resort to peaceful means to resolve conflicts or disputes. In this spirit, the political Chapter seeks (i) to establish political stability by encouraging democracy and respect for human rights and (ii) to prevent or contain military conflicts by building regional security and reinforcing the non-proliferation of conventional and non-conventional weapons.

The chief aim of cooperation in the political and security Chapter is to establish mechanisms in the form of the already mentioned Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability. The idea of finding the appropriate means to implement the tenets of the political and security partnership was already included in the Working Programme annexed to the BD. In 1996, the Political and Security Committee of Senior Officials – the diplomatic body in charge of the implementation of the Barcelona principles contained in the political and security Chapter – developed an Action Plan that determined the relevant topics to be discussed in the political and security dialogue. These topics were formulated into a Euro-Mediterranean Security Pact.\(^ {23}\) This Pact included a list of initial issues related to confidence and security building measures (CSBMs). Nonetheless, by the time of Barcelona II in Malta in April 1997, little achievement was made apart from the establishment in June 1996 of the EuroMeSCo, a network of foreign policy institutes from the EMP member states.\(^ {24}\) Barcelona II itself did little to improve the unfavourable situation due mainly to a major breakdown in the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) following the resumption of Jewish settlements under the Netanyahu government in 1997.

To compensate for the considerable failure of Barcelona II, an ad hoc ministerial meeting was held under the British Presidency of the EU in Palermo (1998). In addition to opting for ‘Partnership Building Measures’ (PBM) – a term introduced to replace the previously used, but politically contentious, appellation of CSBMs – Senior Officials

\(^ {23}\) First mention of a Euro-Mediterranean Security Pact was made by Jacques Chirac when a candidate for the French presidency in 1994-95, and it was later reiterated by him during his first official visit as French President to Rabat on 20 July 1995.

were asked to prepare a draft version of a Charter to be submitted to Barcelona III in Stuttgart in April 1999, thus clearly preferring to use the term 'charter' instead of 'pact'. During the Stuttgart Conference, an informal document entitled 'Guidelines for elaborating a Euro-Mediterranean Charter' was endorsed. The aim of the Senior Officials at the time was to have a final version of the draft of the Charter ready for adoption in Barcelona IV in Marseilles in November 2000.

The ambitious intentions of the French Presidency to adopt the Charter were hindered by a further renewed outbreak of violence in the Middle East at the end of September, leading for the first time in the short history of the Barcelona Process to the absence of two of its members, as Syria and Lebanon refusal to attend. The conclusions of the French Presidency in Marseilles 2000 acknowledged the difficulties in adopting the Charter and emphasised the wish of EMP partners to extend the political dialogue to other themes such as regional development in the area of security, disarmament and the consolidation of democracy and the rule of law. At the same time, the contents of the Charter were made less ambitious and rather more global in character. This was done in relation to the EU's prospective taking over of WEU military responsibilities. By Barcelona V in April 2002, the Charter was still no more than what was agreed upon during Barcelona III, that is, merely a set of Guidelines for elaborating a Euro-Mediterranean Charter, and its adoption was adjourned sine die. Barcelona V just confirmed the mandate of the Senior Officials on the Draft of the Charter to continue their work as appropriate for the improvement of its terms.

If ever adopted, the Charter is intended to form a cornerstone and framework for cooperation in the political and military sectors in accordance with the general thrust of the BD. Its objectives, as outlined in the guidelines document, are specifically related to the promotion of peace and stability by addressing (i) global challenges to security, namely terrorism, trafficking, proliferation of WMD, 'illegal' immigration, etc., (ii) respect for democratic principles and (iii) the security requirements of the partnership including CSBMs and arms control. Besides these security objectives, the guidelines also included references to Barcelona-like issues such as improvement of socio-economic conditions, respect for human rights and the promotion of better understanding between the cultures and civilisations of the peoples of the Euro-Mediterranean region. To carry out these objectives, a number of means and mechanisms have been suggested, such as

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25 Various suggestions were introduced before all EMP members agreed on using the term 'Charter'. For instance, France suggested the term 'Pact', while Italy and Spain preferred the term 'Act'.

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enhanced political dialogue, partnership building measures, measures to improve regional cooperation, preventive diplomacy, and joint action modalities; the last-mentioned still remain unspecified.

The novelty as well as sensitivity of regional political and, even more so, military cooperation in the Mediterranean have ‘reduced’ the Charter to a politically but not a legally binding document to be adopted by a ministerial meeting when “political circumstances allow”.26 As such, its objectives seem to add very little to what the BD already offers, and thus, arguably, the importance the Charter has attracted derives merely from the opposition it has faced. This opposition has shown how difficult it is to achieve consensus over cooperation in what are considered hard security issues. Because of this, and considering the security worries of the WM, the Charter appears to be of little significance for the Maghreb countries in particular.

Despite numerous efforts to promote political and security cooperation, regressive developments in the MEPP continued to cast their auspicious shadows over the Barcelona Process, as they did during Barcelona II. To escape such stalemates, talks on ‘stability’ were seen as more realistically feasible than any attempts at security cooperation.27 In this context, the enhanced political dialogue the Charter seeks to foster seems to be more concerned with regional/external stability than with domestic/internal stability. What stability means, however, remains unspecified. Yet, the notion of stability endorsed so far seems to convey, not least for the informed populations of the southern Mediterranean countries, the impression that the whole Barcelona Process has just been a search for maintaining the status quo in the region.

Though building internal political stability is advocated as one of the major goals of Chapter One of the BD, most of the work designed to promote democratic reforms has been carried out through the activities of civil society presented under the socio-cultural Chapter (see below). The introduction of the MEDA Democracy Programme (MDP), which was designed within the framework of the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights of 1994, equally contributed to reinforce this tendency. The MDP fell within the scope of the EMP’s political Chapter but had a separate programme with a separate legal base and budget. Its principal purpose was to grant financial support to civil society members and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) that aim at the promotion

of democracy and democratic principles in the southern Mediterranean. The MDP was further indication of efforts to respond to the securitisation of the political sector, namely that a lack of democracy and democratic institutions endangers stability and breeds insecurity. However, the amount of money allocated for the implementation of these goals remained insignificant in comparison to the task at hand. A case in point was that the budget of the MDP for Morocco between 1996 and 1999 represented only a tiny 0.3 per cent of the amount absorbed by projects under MEDA I programme.24

If the general aim of the Charter is to consolidate the principles enshrined in the BD, its chief particular goal has been to promote an enhanced political dialogue that will provide a future basis for military and security cooperation. Also, the initial version of the Action Plan put forward to implement the Euro-Mediterranean Stability Pact placed a major focus on disarmament, CSBMs, preventive diplomacy, terrorism and organised crime.29

Thus, the policies aimed at the political sector in the Mediterranean have remained contingent on developments elsewhere. Political-military cooperation has been partly dependent upon the situation in the Middle East. The development of the military aspect of the Charter, both in form and content, also depends now on the internal developments in the EU in relation to the implementation of a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). This is particularly true with regard to the future provisions of the Charter touching on the EU’s military structure, but also on NATO’s Mediterranean dialogue.

3.2.3 Socio-cultural partnership and the building of trust

The third Chapter of the BD seeks to foster understanding amongst the peoples of the Mediterranean region through improving mutual perceptions and dialogue between cultures – the main objectives being to ward off xenophobia, racial violence, fundamentalism and extremism. As such, the socio-cultural Chapter seeks to respond to security worries voiced in the societal sector of security as established in Chapter 2 of this thesis. These objectives were first introduced through various MED-programmes, some of which were suspended due to management irregularities in the Commission but are probably going to be relaunched once a satisfactory management system is set up.

Nonetheless, the novelty of the BD has been its reliance on civil society to promote its cultural and social objectives. It stresses the need to effect cooperation in these fields through working with civil society and NGOs. To this end, a number of regional programmes have been set up and are currently being implemented, namely Euro-MED Youth, Euro-MED Heritage and Euro-MED Audiovisual.

In addition to these programmes, civil society actors have gathered under the Euro-Mediterranean Civil Forum, a network constituted of various NGOs seeking to voice their concerns for a more decentralised development of the Mediterranean. This Forum is divided into a number of groups covering particular topics of interest to the EMP, namely culture, development, human rights, environment, youth and peace. After the first Civil Forum meeting in Barcelona, which was organised within 24 hours of the ministerial Barcelona Conference, the Commission in a communication stressed the importance of the Civil Forum meetings and expressed its will to offer its support, both technical and financial. Indeed, the Commission supported a number of conferences and meetings between actors of civil society, including the Civil Forum meetings of Malta (1997), Naples (1997), Stuttgart (1999), Marseilles (2000) and Valencia (2002), which were held in parallel to the Euro-Mediterranean Conferences. Since Barcelona III in Stuttgart in 1999, meetings of the Civil Forum have been held prior to ministerial meetings so as to allow EMP governments to take the considerations and recommendations of the Forum on board. However, in practice, Civil Forum conclusions tend to be ignored by the EMP foreign ministers.

As such, cooperation at the level of civil society does exist, but the cultural cooperation intended and announced in Chapter Three of the BD remains very limited. Indeed, even within the EMAA document, cultural cooperation is covered through one Article, namely Article 74. The vague and long-term objectives of cultural cooperation tend to give it a low profile amongst other priorities of the EMP. This also owes something to the fact that cultural cooperation remains the least researched, even amongst students of the EMP. It is also due to the fact that cultural cooperation bears fruit very slowly and in the long run.

Apart from the cultural efforts covered by the above-mentioned MED programmes (Heritage, Media and Youth), most of the cooperation under the third Chapter of BD is overshadowed in practice by civil society taking more actions in the

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fields of human rights and democracy promotion. However, most of Maghrebi civil society, or at least those parts receiving EU funds, tend to lack credibility due to their close relation to the regimes in place in the south. On the other hand, some of the international NGOs benefiting from EU money and aiming to promote democracy programmes in the southern Mediterranean tend to lack a close involvement at the domestic and local level. There are striking examples of this in most southern Mediterranean partner countries.\(^{31}\)

This lack of focus on what is cultural is also clear in the inclusion in Chapter Three of other issues that echo some of the objectives of the security and political Chapter, such as illegal immigration, terrorism, organised crime, and drug and human trafficking. This, arguably, testifies to the inter-linkage between the three chapters of the Barcelona Process. However, it still leaves the cultural Chapter thin in content and well under-rated in importance compared with the political and, even more so, with the economic Chapter. Indeed, to promote cultural cooperation, Barcelona V agreed to the creation of a Euro-Mediterranean Foundation to promote mutual understanding and cooperation and exchange on cultural issues.

Despite rhetoric about the ‘comprehensive’ character of the BD, a number of issues have remained absent from its political, economic and social agendas or have not been given due attention or importance. For instance, within the (planned) Euro-Mediterranean FTA, agricultural products will be still subject to quotas defined in the bilateral association agreements and/or to certain custom barriers imposed by virtue of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). A clause is included in the association agreements providing for re-negotiation of the agricultural chapter between the EU and signatory countries in a period of three to five years after the entry into force of the EMAA. For Morocco and Tunisia, this period already started in 2000 and July 2001 respectively, although no major agreements have yet been reached (see Chapter 4).

The free movement of persons is another element which has been excluded from the EMAAs. The association agreements remain limited to equal treatment of immigrant workers, namely in relation to work conditions, social security, and the right of pension transfer (as agreed upon in Articles 64 to 73 of the EMAA). During the European Council meeting held in Helsinki in 1999, EU members agreed to include a readmission clause in all new EMAAs, requiring the Mediterranean partner countries to readmit not only their

\(^{31}\) See various contributions in Richard Gillespie and Richard Youngs (eds.), *The European Union and Democracy Promotion.*
nationals (who are in an ‘illegal’ situation) but also all ‘illegal’ immigrants who had crossed the partner countries into EU from other parts of the world.

Though the purpose of MEDA programme, according to its Regulations, is “to contribute to initiatives of joint interest in the three sectors of the EMP”[32], the lion’s share of MEDA I funds went to support for economic transition and structural adjustment programmes (Algeria 90 per cent, Morocco 58 per cent, Tunisia 71 per cent).[33] In fact, under the MEDA programme there is a stark absence of political projects, that is, projects for the promotion of democracy. For instance, in the case of Morocco, only one project for an amount of €4m was directed to supporting NGOs; it was developed and organised by the Ministry of Social Development and focused on the strengthening of the institutional structure of Moroccan associations.[34]

3.2.4 Looking for a (new) momentum?

The loss of momentum in the EMP, as a result of both internal cooperation problems and the repercussions of the situation in the Middle East, has generated a considerable amount of criticism of the Barcelona Process. Under these circumstances, the European Parliament, in March 2000, published a resolution on Mediterranean policy, which called on the Council and the Commission to relaunch the EMP. It also considered the lack of progress to be a potential crisis factor in the region, thereby undermining the EU’s political role in leading the efforts aimed at achieving regional stability.[35] This led, in 2000, to the EU adopting two major documents. First, as part of the EU’s new CFSP instruments introduced under the Treaty of Amsterdam (1999), a ‘Common Strategy of the European Union on the Mediterranean Region’ was adopted at the June 2000 meeting of the European Council in Fiera, Portugal. This was meant to parallel EU strategies for Russia (Cologne 1999), Ukraine (Helsinki 1999) and the western Balkans (yet to be

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32 Council Regulation (EC) No 1488/96 on financial and technical measures to accompany (MEDA) the reform of economic and social structures in the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership [italics added].
33 The sectoral distribution of MEDA I funds varied greatly between Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. In Algeria, support for economic transition accounted for 72 per cent of the total funds, while structural adjustment accounted for 18 per cent, the social sector three per cent and the environment seven per cent. Morocco’s funds were distributed between structural adjustment programmes, support for economic transition and rural development, which accounted for 27 per cent, 31 per cent and 22 per cent, respectively. The remaining 20 per cent went to the social sector and the environment. As for Tunisia, structural adjustment programmes accounted for 42 per cent of the total of MEDA I funds, while support for economic transition accounted for 29 per cent. The rest was distributed between rural development (11 per cent), the social sector (11 per cent) and the environment (seven per cent). See European Commission,
34 Haddadi, “Two Cheers for Whom?”, p. 162.
considered). The aim of the Common Mediterranean Strategy (CMS) is to guide the policies and activities of the EU in developing and strengthening the EMP. By virtue of the common strategies instrument, EU decision-making for the EMP will be accelerated as the adoption of joint actions or common positions concerning the region now requires only a qualified majority voting (QMV) (instead of unanimity voting) where the 'constructive abstention' by up to three members would not preclude the Union from adopting a common position.

As a result of the CMS, the Commission adopted a document entitled “Reinvigorating the Barcelona Process.”36 It covers subjects emphasised in the CMS document, including the EMAAs, the MEDA programme, political dialogue and civil society, and the Charter for Peace and Stability. The Commission document prepared for the fourth meeting of Euro-Mediterranean Foreign Ministers in Marseilles in November 2000. Yet, despite these efforts, little was added in the way of substance. Both the CMS and the reinvigoration documents simply reiterated the principles of the BD; they remained essentially rhetorical additions. The ‘reinvigoration’ of the Barcelona Process document put emphasis on a number of recommendations to relaunch the process. On the other hand, the institutional requirement of common strategies has the potential to make EU decision-making on the Mediterranean more flexible, as common strategies extend the use of QMV to the CFSP.

However, this institutional advantage itself downplays the importance of the Mediterranean to the EU as the CMS seems to have risen from institutional questions related to the internal working of the EU rather than from any committed concern with the Mediterranean. Indeed, the introduction of common strategies as a new CFSP instrument was a response to a major concern over the creation of more integrated internal, cross-pillar policy-making. This new instrument is meant to link economic, financial and trade mechanisms at the disposal of the Commission to the strategic, political and diplomatic objectives of the Union. Moreover, because joint actions and common positions taken within the framework of a common strategy do not require, for their adoption, the unanimity of the Council, common strategies bear the design of extending the use of QMV to other areas of the CFSP. As such, common strategies owe

their origin to institutional ambitions rather than being the result of any clear necessity to formulate them.\textsuperscript{37}

Despite tensions in the Middle East in 2002 being at their highest ever during the history of the EMP, foreign ministers of the Barcelona Process managed to meet for a fifth Euro-Mediterranean conference in Valencia in April 2002. This was done in order to reinforce the objectives of the EMP in the context of the violence in the Middle East, and to stress the need to continue negotiations so as to advance them. If a worsening of the situation in the Middle East has generally hampered any tangible developments in the EMP’s political basket, this time it constituted rather an incentive and, thus, injected new political blood into the Barcelona Process. Indeed, during the EMP meeting in Valencia an Action Plan was adopted by the foreign ministers, covering the three baskets of the BD and seeking to give a new and progressive momentum to the EMP. With the 11 September terrorist attack on New York and Washington in mind, the Action Plan broadened the scope of the political and security partnership and reinforced concerted cooperation to fight terrorism and work towards a common language on defence and security.\textsuperscript{38} This was reflected in the Barcelona V introducing cooperation initiatives at the level of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). The economic Chapter recalled the importance of the EMAAs and south-south integration, while the cultural Chapter was consolidated by the establishment of Mediterranean Foundation to promote cultural exchange between the two sides of the Mediterranean.

\section*{3.3 Contending or Complementary? OSCE, WEU and NATO Dialogues}

The circumstances that led south-west European countries to push for Mediterranean policies on the EU’s agenda have also been used to put the Mediterranean on the platforms of other organisations such as the OSCE, WEU and NATO. All these organisations have programmes for the same bunch of Mediterranean countries – programmes which are said to be complementary not only between themselves but also with the EMP. These programmes, as shown below, comprise similarly inspired packages for the Mediterranean dialogue countries.


\textsuperscript{38} “Valencia Action Plan”, Vth Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, 23 April 2002 (final version). An earlier conference of ministers of foreign affairs was held in Brussels on 5-6 November 2001. The conference reiterated the EMP members’ utter condemnation of the terrorist attacks of 11 September. It largely reinforced the commitment of the Mediterranean partners to advance security cooperation and to eradicate all forms of support to terrorism, noting, in this context, the importance of the conclusions of the Mediterranean Forum that took place on 25-6 October 2001 in Agadir, Morocco.
3.3.1 The WEU Mediterranean dialogue

By the time of the fifth Euro-Mediterranean ministerial conference in Valencia in 2002, WEU’s days were over since it had been dissolved and its role taken over by the EU. Already, at the EU meeting at Marseilles on 13 September 2000 it was decided, amongst other things, that WEU would be handing over its crisis management responsibilities to the EU, that its military staff would cease its activities, and that it would wind up its activities in the framework of the dialogues developed with Russia, Ukraine and the Mediterranean partners with the intention that they be taken up within the existing framework of political dialogue between the EU and the countries concerned. Despite the dissolution of WEU at the time of the writing of this thesis, it remains worthwhile to look at its activities in relation to the Mediterranean partners because of the insight they provide for the understanding of what the EU is taking over.

Relations between WEU and Mediterranean countries took shape in the form of a dialogue in the autumn of 1992. This dialogue had its origin in the sub-group of experts on the Mediterranean which was created by a ministerial decision in November 1986 to analyse the security situation of the Mediterranean region. The creation of this sub-group came in the same year as the huge slump in oil prices with all its subsequent economic and later socio-political effects on Algeria as well as on Morocco and Tunisia, these two countries having suffered earlier a number of ‘bread riots’ in 1983 and 1984. In 1992 the Bonn Ministerial Council mandated the group of ‘contact between WEU and Maghreb countries’. The dialogue was initially limited to the four Maghreb countries of Algeria, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. Other countries (Egypt 1994, Israel 1995 and Jordan 1998) joined as a result of further enlargement of the dialogue in 1994. The dialogue was bilateral in nature (i.e., involving WEU and one dialogue country at a time), and consisted of meetings of military and diplomatic experts from both sides. Though the dialogue was upgraded to a multilateral forum (leading notably to information seminars on WEU activities), it remained mainly a platform for the exchange of information and for comparing experiences between the participating countries.

Despite all this, the absence of advance information on the creation of EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR contributed to considerable diplomatic tensions in the WM and drew official criticism from Tunisia and negative reactions from the Moroccan press, as well as from the Libyan leader, Muammar Qadhafi. The birth of these two forces took place shortly before the convening of the Barcelona Conference, though their conception
is said to have germinated in the WEU Bonn Ministerial Council of 1992. At the Lisbon ministerial meeting on 15 May 1995, France, Italy and Spain (later joined by Portugal) declared the creation of multinational formations, namely a Rapid Deployment Euro-force (EUROFOR) and a European Maritime Force (EUROMARFOR), both answerable to WEU. In the eyes of the southern Mediterranean countries, these Euro-forces were seen as a means to intervene in their internal politics sometime in the future and therefore were perceived as a threat. WEU’s position was that these forces were confined to a limited number of WEU countries and so fell outside its authority; therefore, information about them or their activities could not be part of the information provided to the dialogue countries.39 Later clarification of the role and function of these European forces, defined as limited to Petersberg tasks, reduced these tensions, and attempts were made to find ways to involve the dialogue countries in the activities of EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR. For instance, it was proposed that Mediterranean partners should participate in WEU exercises as observers. Indeed, the Mediterranean partners were invited in 1999 to visit the EUROMARFOR headquarters in Lisbon, but only low profile officials from Algeria and Egypt attended, in the person of the embassy counsel and the defence attaché, respectively. Earlier, in 1997, the Mediterranean WEU partners were invited to visit the WEU Satellite Centre at Torrejón de Ardoz in Spain. In addition to the above forces, Italy and Spain declared at the meeting of the Chiefs of Defence Staff on 27-28 October 1997 in Bonn that they had signed an agreement on the nature of a Spanish-Italian Amphibious Forces (SIAF) that could be put at the disposal of WEU. The maritime nature of these forces testifies to interest in the Mediterranean as a potential area of intervention for the carrying out of future Petersberg missions.40

The dialogue has been regarded, at least from WEU side, as complementary and instrumental to the objectives of the Barcelona Process. Considerations of the ways WEU could contribute to the political and security partnership of the EMP were suggested shortly after the signing of the BD. In 1998 the WEU Mediterranean Group initiated work to this end. This work resulted in a document entitled “Elements for Reflection in Anticipation of Possible EU Request on the WEU contribution to the EMP” which was finalised in June 2000. This document identified a number of practical measures to be taken in coordination with the EMP, to enhance the WEU dialogue, on the one hand, and

the WEU contribution to the Barcelona Process, on the other. It also took account of the
future merging of WEU into the EU’s new military structure. In the spirit of
complementarity, the WEU Presidency started in 1997 to brief the Mediterranean Group
of WEU on the other ongoing Mediterranean initiatives, notably those of NATO, the
EMP and the OSCE. Also, the Mediterranean Group had representation at the
Maghreb/Mashreq meetings of the EU. The activities of the WEU Mediterranean group
opened the way for more direct contributions to the EMP’s political and security
partnership.

The winding up of the activities of WEU with the Mediterranean dialogue
countries and their inclusion in the political dialogue of the EMP has geared the latter
more towards hard core security, such as disarmament and military cooperation. These
elements were included as part of the political and security dialogue of the Action Plan
adopted during Barcelona V in 2002.

3.3.2 NATO’s Mediterranean initiative

Like the EU and WEU, NATO recognised the ‘instability’ affecting the Mediterranean in
the 1990s and declared its commitment to respond to the ‘changing Mediterranean
security’ situation. In December 1994, NATO decided at the meeting of the North
Atlantic Council “to establish contacts, on a case-by-case basis, between the Alliance and
the Mediterranean non-member countries with a view to contributing to the strengthening
of regional stability”. These contacts have been established with a group of countries
comprising Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia, thus constituting a
new framework of cooperation with the southern Mediterranean. The dialogue, which
was joined by Algeria in March 2000, came as a response to south-west European
countries’ pressures on NATO to pay due attention to instabilities in the Mediterranean
area so as to balance the Alliance’s preoccupation with security in central and eastern
European countries (CEECs). The return of France in 1995, at least as a de facto full
member of NATO’s integrated military command, has contributed to press the issues of
the south on NATO agenda.

Similar efforts came from the other south-west European countries. During the
Williamsburg ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council in the autumn of 1995,

41 North Atlantic Council Final Communiqué 2(49)116, quoted in Stephan F. Laarabec et al., NATO’s
42 For Italy see point 22 in the press communiqué issued by the North Atlantic Council meeting at the level
Italy put forward a proposal to develop a sort of Partnership for the Mediterranean (PfM) with the dialogue countries, in parallel to NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) designed for eastern Europe, notably states that have emerged from the break-up of the Soviet Union. The Italian proposal, which was supported by Portugal, met with considerable scepticism within the Alliance. Lack of enthusiasm for a PfM and fears that the cost of such an endeavour would adversely affect the PfP led to the proposal being turned down. Nonetheless, the Sixth Fleet’s facilities in Naples received a $500m ‘facelift’. This refurbishment has been regarded as a tangible proof of NATO’s commitment to the Mediterranean southern periphery as a potential venue for ‘out-of-area’ operations. Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH) – one of the two regional commands of NATO’s Allied Command Europe – has been pushing for initiatives that could secure funding for closer military contacts with the dialogue countries.

The declared aim of the dialogue has been to dispel misperceptions about NATO amongst the southern Mediterranean partners and create a climate of transparency and greater cooperation. To this end, information seminars and a number of other self-funded activities have been organised, including invitations to attend courses at the NATO School in Oberammergau, Germany, and the NATO Defence College in Rome. The objectives of the NATO’s Mediterranean dialogue were reinforced after the adoption of the Alliance’s new Strategic Concept in April 1999.

The Strategic Concept of NATO, as the authoritative statement of the Alliance’s objectives, provides the highest degree of guidance on the political and military means to be deployed in attaining those objectives. The new Strategic Concept of 1999 has reiterated the strategic importance of the Mediterranean and lent weight to the activities already undertaken or to come. Indeed, after the Washington Summit in 1999, which marked the 50th anniversary of the Alliance, the North Atlantic Council decided to enhance its political dialogue with the Mediterranean countries by including practical cooperation in the spheres of defence and security, particularly in relation to Petersberg tasks. For instance, in 1999, NATO’s two major commands (Allied Command Europe and Allied Command Atlantic) organised 49 military activities involving Mediterranean

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43 The Strategic Concept also outlines the rationale for the Alliance and its activities, and provides NATO Military Authorities with direction for developing military capabilities and preparing for possible operations. The Strategic Concept was first published in 1991. The most recent version of the Strategic Concept was approved at the Washington Summit of the North Atlantic Council in April 1999.
dialogue countries. These activities included observation of PIP activities as well as exercises related to peace support and humanitarian relief missions. Furthermore, to help foster a more reinforced exchange of information and dialogue, NATO designated an embassy of one of its members in each of the dialogue countries to serve as a contact point. Elements of the Mediterranean dialogue have been consistent with the NATO’s comprehensive approach to security as embedded in its new Strategic Concept. The new Strategic Concept covers issues such as proliferation of WMD, the international dimension of domestic conflicts, energy, rogue states (or states of concern), terrorism, immigration, as well as north-south and south-south conflicts. Also, in accordance with the broad security concept, the NATO Strategic Concept has given due importance to economic, political, social and environmental as well as defence factors. However, its focus has been placed more on ‘risks’ than on palpable threats and, as such, it has remained relatively vague.

Other NATO cooperation activities have included research and development programmes related to information technology, scientific cooperation, civil emergency planning and military activities. Within this framework of practical cooperation, a number of dialogue countries, including Morocco and Tunisia, participated in the NATO-led Stabilisation Forces (SFOR)\(^4\) in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Kosovo Forces (KFOR)\(^5\) in Kosovo. Yet, despite these efforts, the dialogue, especially at its political level, has remained bilateral because of the sensitivity of the political situation within and between some southern Mediterranean partners (e.g. the Middle East crisis, the conflict over the Western Sahara) as well as the different political stance of each dialogue country.

3.3.3 The OSCE Mediterranean activities

Though the relations of the CSCE – the future OSCE – with the non-European Mediterranean countries were established during the Cold War détente and were therefore considerably influenced by rivalries, the CSCE’s concern with the post-Cold War


\(^5\) The NATO-led Stabilisation Force (SFOR) has been deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina since December 1996 as part of efforts to underpin the Dayton Peace Agreement in the former Yugoslavia. It replaced the Implementation Force (IFOR), which was responsible for overseeing the fulfilment of the military aspects of the peace agreement. More than 35 NATO and non-NATO countries have contributed forces to SFOR, whose strength totals more than 30,000 troops.

\(^6\) Kosovo Force is a multinational force established in Kosovo under the auspices of the United Nations, in accordance with UN Security Resolution 1244 of 10 June 1999. An advance enabling the UN KFOR forces was stationed in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia by NATO in anticipation of a settlement. These forces were later reassigned to humanitarian tasks in response to the escalating refugee crisis.
Mediterranean scene became evident when the south-west European countries of Italy and Spain called, at the Palma de Mallorca Forum of the OSCE in 1991, for the establishment of a C SCM, on the lines of the CSCE itself. Indeed, the CSCE Mediterranean dialogue, which developed at the margins of the Helsinki Conference diplomacy as part of the Final Act (1975), sprang from the idea of the indivisible character of European security, meaning that it could not be separated from that of the rest of the world, especially that at Europe’s fringes. France and Yugoslavia were the two countries that took the lead in pushing for a commitment to this dialogue to be included in the Final Act. France demanded a security cooperation that would take on board non-European Mediterranean states. The French demands were accommodated in the Helsinki Final Act document under the chapter “Questions relating to security and cooperation in the Mediterranean”.

Within this framework, the OSCE subsequently fostered a dialogue with Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Morocco and Tunisia as non-participating Mediterranean states, with Jordan joining the dialogue in 1998. Since the Helsinki Final Act, a number of other documents which aim to reinforce cooperation between the OSCE and the Mediterranean countries have been adopted, notably the Helsinki Document 1992, the Budapest Document 1994, and, most recently, the Charter on European Security which was agreed in Istanbul in 1999. During the Budapest meeting, the establishment of an open-ended Mediterranean Contact Group was decided, which turned OSCE cooperation into a formalised dialogue. The contact group now meets periodically to conduct a dialogue with non-participating Mediterranean states in order to facilitate the interchange of information of mutual interest and the generation of ideas for more constructive cooperation. Some non-participating Mediterranean countries are also, when appropriate, invited to attend meeting of the OSCE’s Permanent Council when it is discussing Mediterranean issues.

Within a collective security framework, the OSCE activities span a large spectrum of conflict-related issues, including early warning and conflict prevention. The OSCE dialogue is meant to serve as a framework of cooperation, encouraging confidence building measures between the OSCE and the Mediterranean non-participating countries. These measures include peace keeping missions, good neighbourhood cooperation, and

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cooperation in the fight against terrorism. Apart from the secretariat, other OSCE bodies or officials include the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, the High Commissioner on National Minorities and the Representative on Freedom of the Media. They are empowered to carry out programmes in cooperation and/or coordination with the Mediterranean partners in various areas of action that fall within the OSCE’s scope. In the European Security Charter, the OSCE heads of state and government reaffirmed their commitment to reinforced cooperation with the Mediterranean partners. The OSCE dialogue remains fruitful at a ‘theoretical’ level since its seminars provide the Mediterranean partners with learning experiences in the OSCE’s field of expertise, mainly in peace-keeping and conflict prevention. In this respect, the OSCE Mediterranean dialogue can be of considerable use to Mediterranean partners.

CONCLUSION

There is little doubt that the various initiatives outlined above, from EMP to NATO dialogue, all testify to the strategic importance of the Mediterranean for European states and those to the south in particular. But the claim to the comprehensive nature of these initiatives has appeared in some of them at best forced and at worse mere rhetoric. This is particularly true of NATO’s reference to economic development or the EU’s insistence on building political and security cooperation within the EMP framework. The EMP, which has been presented as much more comprehensive than all previous types of EC/EU relations with TMCs, seems to have suffered a sort of décalage (disjunction) not only in terms of the progress achieved in each Chapter but also in relation to some of the objectives within each Chapter itself. The aims of the political and security Chapter have often been stymied by the Middle East crisis. The economic and financial Chapter, it has become clear, will not turn the Mediterranean into a FTA by 2010 as intended since negotiations with some Mediterranean partners have still not been concluded. The sociocultural Chapter is vague — a vagueness that allows it, however, to take other issues on board such as ‘illegal’ immigration and organised crime as part of human security rather than issues of relevance to its main goal, notably the creation of understanding and tolerance between the cultures of the Mediterranean. This discrepancy between the various Chapters of the DB is patent in the importance given to certain area of cooperation within the EMAAs. For example, economic cooperation covers twenty one articles (from art. 42 to art. 63) in all of these bilateral treaties, while that of political dialogue is formulated only in three articles (from art. 3 to art. 5).
Some of these initiatives for the Mediterranean have been triggered by developments in the EU’s as well as NATO’s relations with CEECs. This leads to questioning the degree to which they have been true initiatives and explains the lack of progress in some of them. The first years, for example, of NATO or WEU dialogues were limited to the exchange of information. NATO has declared its initiative to be primarily political. The WEU found itself in a stage of metamorphosis in relation to the EU, which allowed it little room for manoeuvre or enthusiasm, even if it did look for ways to contribute to the EMP.

The other characteristic of these various initiatives is that they have all been made in the claim to contribute to the building of security and stability through security cooperation. For this purpose, they have largely been designed to use the same means, which creates duplication especially for the partner countries. It often happens that the same people, especially from the southern Mediterranean, attend all the meetings and activities. Yet some of the important issues concerning security in the Mediterranean have been handled outside all of these Mediterranean framework initiatives or forums, e.g. the issue of Western Sahara or the MEPP. Furthermore, issues of terrorism and political Islam have remained contentious because of a lack of common understanding. Much of what keeps the Mediterranean security agenda floating are, indeed, vague references to energy security, Islamism, terrorism, ‘illegal’ immigration, and drug trafficking.

To account for the credibility of this security agenda, there is a need to separate facts from fears and real threats from mere risks. For this purpose, the next part seeks to dispel some of the haze surrounding Mediterranean security by putting the securitisation instances in the WM to a reality-check in relation to their coherence or correspondence to the reality of the region.
PART TWO
BEYOND SECURITISATION: A REALITY-CHECK OF THE SECURITY PICTURE IN THE WM
CHAPTER 4

ECONOMIC SECURITY: PROTECTIONISM, PARTNERSHIP AND (INTER)DEPENDENCE

The importance of economic power and its influence on other sectors (especially the politico-military) started to be felt and widely accepted with the increasing rise in interdependence during the early 1970s. This interdependence came mainly as a result of changes in the international scene that ensued from a number of factors, including a decline in American economic hegemony, the oil crisis of 1973, an increase in the growth of international trade, and greater integration of global markets. Growth in ‘complex interdependence’ \(^1\) blurred the demarcation between economics and politics. It exposed the vulnerability of states to the ‘whims’ of the international market and, subsequently, gave more prominence to economic security. This development was also reflected in a new surge in the literature of international political economy (IPE) as an expression of the growing tension between the state and the market. \(^2\)

In this context, economic security has come to be understood as the ability of states to have access to external markets and resources, both material and financial. In this sense, economic security relates to export trade, basic imports and long-term investment. If a country is heavily dependent for the good working of these three elements on external forces, it is said to be in a vulnerable situation. A disruption to the normal flow of exports, imports or investment in case of heavy dependence makes for serious difficulties that have the power to directly or indirectly affect the security of a state in terms of its sovereignty and/or legitimacy. Trade policy instruments such as tariff and non-tariff barriers and export taxes and subsidies can influence the capacity of a state to operate its economy efficiently.

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\(^1\) ‘Complex interdependence’ refers to a situation of reciprocal dependence between countries or actors of various countries. It is a complex interdependence in the sense that (i) it involves different channels of financial, social and intergovernmental communication; (ii) there is an absence of hierarchy among the issues, i.e. military issues do not subordinate other issues by being given a primacy position; and (iii) members of a complex interdependence do not resort to military force as they take other considerations (economic and ecological) into account in solving conflicts. See Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition* (Little Brown and Company, 1977), pp. 24-8.

and untoward developments can have an adverse ripple-effect on the security of the political, societal or military sectors.

If a country's main exports, for instance, face significant tariff and non-tariff barriers, this can damage the country's ability to import needed goods or raise enough capital to invest in development, be it industrial or human. This directly affects the well-being of citizens and has the potential to generate riots with disruptive socio-political consequences. Relatedly, the ability to attract FDI in order to offset any trade deficit could play a major role in preserving economic security and promoting development. Inflows of FDI have indeed proven important to the promotion of growth in developing countries. Nonetheless, heavy reliance on them can have a cumulatively pernicious impact, as it is difficult to control their inflows or outflows. On the other hand, a shortage of the supply of material resources essential to the running of an economy can lead not only to economic breakdown but also to the collapse of the state itself.

4.1 THE DEBATE OVER ECONOMIC SECURITY

Claims about the significance and importance of economic security are not uncontroversial; nor are they accepted by all. Since economic security is often linked to its political consequences, the debate that it raises revolves around the relation between economic policies and political interests.

For the liberal tradition, the controversy with regard to economic security is linked to the interplay between economic risks, vulnerabilities and market opportunities as integral elements of capitalist economies. It is this interplay which renders economic activities inherently insecure and risk-fraught and makes it rather debatable to highly privilege economic security. The main qualification to this approach is that market risks and competition are, arguably, inevitably accompanying economic efficiency and the maximisation of growth and development. Proponents of liberalism see it as a positive-sum game where all participants can reap a certain benefit from engaging in free trade. Participation in trade liberalisation, liberalist proponents contend, is more beneficial (in the long run) than trade protection. More exports pay for more imports, leading to more development and making for improvement in social sectors. Therefore, for liberalism,

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states should not worry about economic security since a free trade market can provide them with what they need and thus reduce, if not eliminate, fears about restrictions on resources that are considered essential for efficient and prosperous national economies. From this perspective, economics is given primacy over politics, and, consequently, claims about the impact of economic insecurity become difficult to justify or defend. Despite the benefits which countries involved in ‘free and fair’ trade can reap, these views about liberalism are not shared by advocates of economic nationalism or neo-Marxism, the other two main traditions in IPE as identified by Robert Gilpin.4

Contrary to liberalism, economic nationalism or – in its earlier incarnation – mercantilism gives priority to domestic interests and national security. Economic security becomes closely intertwined with national security. For this reason, states should protect their national economic interests rather than expose themselves to the vulnerabilities which free trade generates. Such an approach comes to the fore every time a state or group of states have more interests in protecting their economies than in exposing them to foreign competition. This has been particularly true of the need to protect ‘infant industries’ as a means to allow them to grow and be able to compete in the world market. Admittedly, the liberal tradition also allows for the ‘infant industry’ argument, but on a very qualified basis. Thus, political interests underpin economic security because security, from the standpoint of economic nationalism, is at once political and economic.

On the other hand, according to neo-Marxism, and its intellectual offshoot, dependency theory, market forces drive political interests because the strength or weakness of a state hinges on its position in the capitalist world economy. Neo-Marxists argue that economic insecurity for less developed countries (LDCs) is the result of their ‘exploitation’ by more developed countries (MDCs). This exploitation is held to account for the ‘unequal exchange’ which characterises the international economic order. Central to the dependency approach is a distinction between a centre (dominated by developed neo-imperialist states) and a periphery (of underdeveloped and exploited states). Free trade and intense foreign economic contacts are considered less favourable to genuine development. Rather, they are deemed a source of multiplied inequalities and of a consolidation of further dependence of the periphery on the centre of the capitalist world economy. This dependency generates more economic insecurity and widens the gap

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4 Gilpin, The International Relations of Political Economy, pp. 31-40.
between the capitalist elites and the impoverished majority. Therefore, to break away from this dependence and preserve their economic security, states at the periphery should instead close their markets to the outside world and seek to achieve self-sufficiency through nationalist import-substitution policies. The most obvious manifestation of this thinking was the demands of LDCs for the establishment of a new international economic order (NIEO) in the first half of the 1970s. Thus, for the neo-Marxist approach, economic security relates above all to independence, because economic independence is capable of bringing political independence and, subsequently, more security.

The three approaches sketched above are not altogether mutually exclusive in practice. Countries adopting a liberal approach to their economies might occasionally resort to protectionist practices; and economic nationalism often gives way to a certain amount of liberalism. This shows that claims about economic insecurity and the need for protectionism are not omnipresent but vary from time to time according to the political as well as societal circumstances that confront states.

In this context, with the notable exception of Libya, WM countries may be said to endorse a liberal approach to their economy, albeit with varying degrees. In contrast to Morocco and Tunisia, Algeria has been less enthusiastic about economic liberalisation. Unlike its two North African neighbours, which have been members of the GATT and later of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) since the outset (1994), Algeria applied for WTO membership only in January 2002. Also, if EMAAs for Morocco and Tunisia entered into force in 1998 and 2000 respectively, negotiations between the EU and Algeria led to the signing of the EMAA only in April 2002. WTO membership (and the conclusion of the GATT Uruguay Round in Marrakech) and the EMAAs attest to the North African countries’ option in favour of economic liberalism.

Though one can hardly sustain or justify claims about economic security from a liberal economic perspective, the analysis in Chapter 2 has shown that such claims do exist in the WM. They are concentrated on three main areas: European protectionism, access to fisheries and the security of trans-Mediterranean energy supply. Since all countries of the WM subscribe to the liberal economic approach, it is legitimate to look into how justifiable their claims about economic security are in reality.
4.2 Economic Security in a Liberal Age

The collapse of communism, the continuing rise in globalisation (through the intensification of cross-border economic, political and socio-cultural relations) and trends in world trade and on the international financial markets confirmed the liberal approach as the most successful in practice, at least in the 1990s. However, despite the ‘triumph’ of liberalism, claims for economic security still persist as one of the major national security issues. This is partly because of the ‘fungible’ character of economic power in the sense that a strong economy can usually translate into political influence or military might. Therefore, to justify their interpretation and lend credibility to their economic securitisation, actors usually link economic insecurity to its adverse impact on the socio-political sector and ultimately on national security. This is notably done in relation to two dimensions of security: one internal, the other external. The external dimension is related to political-military sectors with regard to the power and sovereignty of the state vis-à-vis its neighbours. The internal dimension, on the other hand, is connected to the socio-political sectors with regard to the legitimacy base of the state. In the post-Cold War era, this internal dimension of economic security has increasingly become more pronounced. This has been so due to two main reasons: the absence of interstate politico-military clashes and the presence of domestic justifications for sustaining the securitisation of the economic sector. The first owes much to the erosion in the external (politicomilitary) dimension in the sense that threats of outright attacks, or perceptions of them, by one state on another have relatively decreased since the end of the Cold War. The second reason relates to the fact that, in various instances, references to home-grown political threats which unfavourable economic developments might generate carry more weight in justifying the securitisation of the economic sector in the so-called liberal age. For these reasons, most economic policies are usually subordinated to and supportive of security concerns as they are often employed to complement security policies and to exercise or gain political influence.


6 Of less significance, from the securitisation perspective of the actors involved, is a third dimension which links economic security to the environmental sector (in terms of the negative impact fast economic growth could have on the environment) or the societal sector (in relation to the social cohesion of a society).
In their relation to south-west European countries in particular and the EU in general, Maghreb countries have contended that their trade is largely influenced negatively by the lingering protectionist policies of the EU and its insensitivity to their export demands, mainly in agriculture and, albeit to a lesser extent, textiles and clothing. Maghreb countries have argued that this European insensitivity has aggravated their economic situation. In view of the negative impact a bad economy can have on the socio-political situation, runs the argument, this European insensitivity has risked to lead to domestic socio-political disturbances with consequences extending beyond the Maghreb and adversely affecting European interests. The same reasoning has seemed to trigger fears in south-west Europe that a political change or social turmoil in the Maghreb would disturb a comfortable dependence on North African energy supply through a hostile cut in energy flows to the north. As such, securitisation of the economy in the WM is politically framed and centres primarily on political developments in the Maghreb. The linkage of economic security claims to their political consequences is what has legitimated their presence on the security agenda of the main actors from both sides of the WM.

What follows in this Chapter discusses protectionism, fisheries and energy security in the context of WM economic relations. It provides first an overview of the development of the economic relations between the Maghreb countries on the one hand, and south-west European countries, on the other. This overview offers a background against which to gauge the credibility of economic securitisation in the region. The examination of economic securitisation is carried out through a reality-check of the three main securitised instances (protectionism, fisheries and security of energy supply) and their relation to the socio-political situation in the region.

4.3 BUILDING ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP UNDER PROTECTIONISM

Economic relations between WM countries take place largely in an EU framework and thus have been influenced by the development of the EC throughout the years. North African countries were integrated into the world economy initially through their former colonial links with France and Italy, and later through establishing trade relations with other members of the EEC. The closer the economic ties which North African countries have developed with European markets, the more affected their economies have been by EC decisions and policies.
Shortly after recognising the independence of Morocco and Tunisia in March 1956, France secured preferential treatments for its former North African protectorates through a Declaration of Intent that was annexed to the Treaty of Rome signed in 1957 and establishing the EEC in 1958. Within the framework of this Declaration of Intent, Morocco and Tunisia started negotiations in 1963 in order to establish agreements with the EEC, and in 1969 they signed their first-generation association agreements. At the time of the signing of the Treaty of Rome, Algeria was still part of ‘overseas’ France, and thus benefited from its status in the form of overseas départements, and after independence in 1962, it felt no urgent need to sign any special trade agreement with the EEC. This reluctance owed much to Algeria’s acrimonious relations with France as the former colonial power. It was also partly because of the nature of Algerian exports, consisting mainly of hydrocarbons, and partly because of its aspiration for a leadership role in tiers-mondiste and non-alignment movements.

As for Libya, a separate Declaration of Intent, similar to the one concerning Morocco and Tunisia, was also included in the Treaty of Rome, providing the prospect of a convention of association with the EEC. This Declaration of Intent was never to be realised. By the time Morocco and Tunisia secured their first association agreement with the EEC in 1969, Libya had witnessed a military revolution that would radically change its political regime and its foreign policy towards the EEC and the Western world in general.

4.3.1 WM trade relations in goods
The striking feature of Euro-Maghreb trade relations is their asymmetric dependence. More than 60 per cent of Maghreb total flows in the trade of goods are with the EU whereas less than 5 per cent of the EU’s total flows in the trade of goods are with the Maghreb. A closer look at these EU-Maghreb trade flows reveals that the Euro-Maghreb trade relations are largely concentrated between the individual Maghreb countries, on the one hand, and France, Spain and Italy, on the other.
TABLE 4.1 - MAGHREB COUNTRIES’ TRADE IN GOODS WITH SOUTH-WEST EUROPE (11 YEAR ANNUAL AVERAGES AT CURRENT PRICES)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Exports (in US$m)</th>
<th>Imports (US$m)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Algeria Libya Morocco Tunisia</td>
<td>Algeria Libya Morocco Tunisia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1,573 528 1,400 1,234</td>
<td>2,261 325 1,659 1,818</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>2,296 3,707 262 974</td>
<td>1,015 1,094 475 1,245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>642 955 426 172</td>
<td>741 129 658 261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4,711 5,230 2,086 1,856</td>
<td>4,017 1,548 2,792 3,324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>7,281 7,718 2,902 3,786</td>
<td>5,727 3,231 4,877 5,086</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


TABLE 4.2 - SOUTH-WEST EUROPE’S TRADE IN GOODS WITH THE MAGHREB (11 YEAR ANNUAL AVERAGES AT CURRENT PRICES)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Exports (in m $ US)</th>
<th>Imports (m $ US)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>France Italy Spain</td>
<td>France Italy Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>2,355 925 670</td>
<td>1,655 2,473 1,044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>317 1,039 110</td>
<td>509 3,818 1,056</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>2,059 561 769</td>
<td>1,971 372 538</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>1,603 1,164 245</td>
<td>1,065 905 193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6,334 3,659 1,795</td>
<td>5,200 7,568 2,931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMEDE</td>
<td>5,464 6,703 1,540</td>
<td>2,415 3,147 1,112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEEC²</td>
<td>3,170 5,234 874</td>
<td>1,552 3,804 799</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ Eastern Mediterranean (EMED) comprises Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Syria and Turkey
² Central and Eastern European countries. Here they are taken to comprise the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia


Indeed, average annual trade figures for the period 1989-99 shows that Maghreb countries conducted more than half of their EU trade with France, Italy and Spain (see Table 4.1). For example, in the case of Algeria in this period, 65 per cent of its total exports to the EU went to the three south-west European countries, while 70 per cent of its total imports from the EU came from the same three countries. This tendency is equally obvious in the case of Morocco with 72 per cent of its exports going to the EU and 56 per cent of imports coming from the EU were distributed between France, Italy and Spain. Tunisia has the highest share of exports going to the EU. Nonetheless, its trade is not as heavily dependent on south-west Europe as is Morocco’s or Algeria’s. Apart from its trade with south-west European countries, a great part of Tunisia’s exports (particularly of clothing and textiles) is conducted with Germany and Belgium, both of which are more important trade partners for Tunisia than Spain. As regards south-west European countries, Libya conducts most of its trade with Italy. Indeed, 48 per cent of its EU exports went to Italy between 1989 and 1999.
Moreover, the above figures show that the high degree of Maghreb economic dependence on south-west European markets is not uniformly distributed. This dependence often involves very intense trade flows with one or two countries to the north. Tunisia's high level of trade with south-west European countries does not include any significant amount with Spain, be it for exports or imports. The same can be said of Morocco's trade relations with Italy. However, because of its colonial legacy and economic power, France remains the only country which enjoys strong economic relations with all the Maghreb countries, including even, to a certain extent, Libya.

This direction of trade is also true of the share of the Maghreb countries in the trade of the three south-west European countries, when compared to other TMCs or to CEECs. France, Spain and Italy conduct most of their trade with other OECD countries. Nonetheless, the amount of trade they conduct with the Maghreb is considerably higher than their trade with the Eastern Mediterranean countries (Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Syria and Turkey) or with the main group of CEECs (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia). France's exports to, and imports from, the Maghreb are both much higher than its exports to, and imports from, the other eight Mediterranean countries taken together or those to and from the CEECs. The same order of relative magnitude is true of Spain. Italy's imports from the Maghreb are superior to its imports either from the Eastern Mediterranean or from the CEECs; this is because of the high level of hydrocarbon imports from Algeria and Libya. Nonetheless, Italy exports more to the CEECs than to the Maghreb. All in all, the Maghreb countries account for a big part of the trade that the south-west EU countries conduct with non-OECD Mediterranean countries (see Table 4.2), though the latter account for only a small share of the total trade of the south-west European countries with the rest of the world.

Tables 4.1 and 4.2 show the nature of trade in the WM and underline the existence of an asymmetric dependence between WM countries. It may be argued that every dependence generates interdependence, in the sense that the dependence of Maghreb countries could also affect south-west European countries, both in providing important markets and being a source of important energy supply.

4.3.2 Agricultural preferences under CAP restrictions
Under their 1969 association agreements with the EEC (which, despite their appellation, were mere trade agreements with a limited period of five years), Moroccan and Tunisian
agricultural exports benefited from preferential access to all six EEC markets. These preferential treatments were subject to restrictions imposed by virtue of the CAP in order to limit competitive products from entering EEC markets as a means of protecting European farmers and promoting agricultural development. Preferential tariffs were limited to citrus fruit, for which there was an 80 per cent reduction in the common external tariff (Spain was not yet an EEC member) and to olive oil, for which there was a reduction of 30 per cent (Italy could not meet the demands of the European market alone). The preferences were made on condition that the import prices of citrus fruit and olive oil should be higher than the reference price decided under CAP regulations. Other concessions were granted to some types of canned vegetables. As for fish products, they were exempted from custom duties, though preferences granted to canned fish varied according to the national markets of respective EEC member states.

To maximise their benefits, Morocco and Tunisia concentrated their efforts on the development of the types of agricultural produce which enjoyed preferential access to EEC markets. These preferential treatments, however, started to erode progressively following the EEC’s growing interest in other Mediterranean countries beyond the Maghreb. In addition to its preferential trade agreements with Greece (1961) and Turkey (1963), the EEC signed in the late 1960s new preferential trade agreements with other TMCs. The extension of the preferential treatments granted to Moroccan citrus fruit and Tunisian olive oil to Spain and Israel had a negative effect on Moroccan and Tunisian exports mainly because of competition from those two countries.

This increase in the number of agreements with TMCs was the main incentive behind the decision in Brussels to launch a new and ‘coherent’ framework of cooperation between the EEC and certain TMCs. This took the form of the Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP), which had four main objectives: (i) free trade in industrial goods between the EEC and the Mediterranean countries, (ii) limited concessions on agricultural goods, (iii) technical and industrial cooperation and (iv) financial aid to TMCs.

Within the framework of the GMP, Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria signed ‘global’ co-operation agreements in 1976 replacing the 1969 association agreements. These

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7 Exception was made for tuna fish, which was subject to a French quota system.
8 These were the agreements with Israel in 1964 – which was revised in 1970 to grant concessions to citrus fruit exports because of the association agreement with Morocco and Tunisia –, with Spain and Malta in 1970, with Cyprus, Egypt and Lebanon in 1972 (Lebanon having had an earlier, albeit limited, agreement in 1964).
cooperation agreements were for an unlimited period of time and included, in addition to their trade chapters, financial and technical assistance as well as provisions regulating labour migration. This assistance was carried out through EEC budget funds and EIB loans; the aid was agreed in the framework of bilateral financial protocols. These protocols tied the Maghreb countries closer to the EEC and reinforced their economic dependence in trade, financial, technological and agricultural areas. Despite their 'euphemistically' global title, the cooperation agreements with the three Maghreb countries acquired restrictive twists because of the parallel expansion in the scope of the CAP and the strengthening of its price support for EC produce following reforms in the 1970s.

The broadening in the scope of the CAP consequently brought certain types of Moroccan and Tunisian agricultural exports under the bearing of the CAP rules. In particular, this expansion affected early vegetables, fruits and wines. Though these products continued to enjoy a reduction in the common external tariff, which varied between 40 per cent and 60 per cent, concessions were subjected to tight seasonal calendars and to a CAP reference price constraint when they were sold during normal season. These agreements were not favourable for North African fruit and vegetables. Citrus fruit and olives continued to enjoy a reduction in the common external tariff as under the 1969 agreements. However, their exports started to face difficulties when, as indicated above, the EEC granted preferential treatment to Spain and Israel, which were major exporters of citrus fruit and olive oil. This difficulty was clear in the drop in the volume of Moroccan exports between 1971 and 1973. Yet, in spite of this initial erosion, Moroccan exports of fruit and vegetables recorded a general long-term stability between 1975 and 1995, and resumed its growth between 1995 and 1999. The drop in Tunisian exports of olive oil, on the other hand, was slow and stretched over a long period between 1975 and 1990, just to register a remarkable growth between 1990 and 1995 (see Figures 4.1 and 4.2).

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9 The Maghreb countries benefited from four financial protocols between 1976 and 1996. Over this period, Algeria obtained €949m, Morocco €1.091m and Tunisia €742m. These figures include EIB loans.
Furthermore, preferences which some Maghrebi produce had enjoyed under French colonial legacy disappeared when the CAP rules were adopted at national levels in December 1969. Like fruit and vegetables, agro-food products enjoyed preferential treatments under restrictive conditions in terms of quota limits and quality. This affected especially Moroccan tinned vegetables and sardines, whose entry to EEC markets was subject to a reference price constraint. Apart from its negative impact on Algerian exports of wines, the 1976 agreement was of little importance to Algeria largely because of the

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Maghrebi exports of wines and fresh vegetables used to benefit from traditional French preferential treatment.
nature of its exports, which were (and still are almost entirely) constituted of oil and natural gas.

The accession of Spain and Portugal to the EEC in 1986, with a ten year transition period of two stages during which Spanish and Portuguese fruit and vegetables progressively came under CAP rules, constituted an added difficulty for Maghrebi agricultural exports of Mediterranean type in terms of their access to EEC markets. With this enlargement, the EEC became self-sufficient in nearly all agricultural products, especially those in which Morocco and Tunisia had considerably invested and specialised, namely tomatoes, citrus fruit and olive oil.

Recognising the adverse impact of Spanish and, to a lesser degree, Portuguese membership on Tunisia and Morocco, the EEC negotiated a special, seemingly more liberal, agreement with the two countries as well as with the other TMCs affected by the EEC’s third enlargement. This new deal further reduced customs duties and promised an end to the CAP reference price system in 1996, the year in which Spain and Portugal became effectively full EU members. Instead, a quota system was introduced, which subjected exports over the quota limit to ‘countervailing charges’.11 Initially, these annual quotas were calculated at the average annual level of the 1980-84 period—a period of low agricultural production and exports owing to severe droughts. French and Maghrebi pressures on the EEC led to further negotiations and eventually to a revision of the original trade proposal.12

This revision was the EEC’s last offer at the time; new trade protocols were to accommodate the cooperation agreements to the Community’s second Mediterranean enlargement. They were signed with Tunisia in 1986 and with Algeria in 1987. Similar protocols were signed with other affected TMCs. Morocco remained initially unsatisfied by the provisions of these protocols, intending instead to use the signing of a fisheries agreement with the EEC, replacing the one with Spain that expired in 1987, to exert some pressure for more favourable treatment of its agricultural exports as well as to win compensation for losses incurred for its agricultural sector. Consequently, Morocco signed a revision protocol with the EEC in May 1988 that allowed its exports of certain kinds of

12 France threatened not to ratify the treaty providing for the accession of Spain and Portugal unless measures were taken to preserve the existing flows of exports to the EEC from Mediterranean non-member countries. See Michael Sutton, Morocco to 1992: Growth against the Odds (EIU, 1987), p. 26.
fruit and vegetables to receive treatment similar to that granted to Spain and Portugal during the first stage of the ten year transition period; nonetheless, these exports remained subject to fixed quotas.

If the trade agreements which ruled in the WM since the 1970s were considered by the Maghreb countries to be restrictive towards their agricultural exports, developments in the 1990s introduced new moves towards a further liberalisation of the agricultural sector, yet without changing a great deal in favour of the Maghreb’s main agricultural exports. With the MacSharry reforms in 1992 and the inclusion of agriculture in the GATT framework of the Uruguay Round, a reshaping of the CAP took place.

A basic objective of the 1992 reforms was to partly de-couple the income support of EU farmers from price policy. As a result, intervention prices were lowered and were oriented more towards the efficient functioning of the agricultural markets. Direct income payments were used to offset any cuts in the income of farmers. These reforms were reinforced by the Agreement on Agriculture forming part of the overall settlement of the Uruguay Round of the GATT. The principal change agreed by the EU was to convert non-tariff barriers to agricultural imports into bound tariffs as a means of liberalising trade in agriculture. Under the Uruguay Round agreement, these tariff bindings, together with production and export subsidies, were subject to phased reduction over an implementation period of five years, between 1995 and 2000 (with developing countries allowed an extra four or more years).\(^\text{13}\)

As a result of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture, the CAP reference prices for determining import levies were replaced by entry prices. This substitution has not improved the situation in terms of the access to the EU markets for Mediterranean agricultural products, especially those products whose import prices are considerably lower than the entry prices decided by the European Commission. Within the CAP’s new price policy, there is an entry price for every product following its import calendar and two sorts of tariff: a lowest tariff and a highest tariff. The lowest tariff corresponds to the one

\(^{13}\) The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture set a global tariff reduction of 36 per cent. However, smaller tariff cuts were negotiated for fruit and vegetables, which benefit from a 20 per cent cut in tariffs. Tariffs on other Mediterranean produce (potatoes, asparagus, and table grapes) benefit from a 36 per cent cut between August and September. Other products enjoy even higher cuts. This is the case of apples and avocados between January and March, which benefit from a 50 per cent tariff reduction, and dried vegetables and melon, which benefit from up to 100 per cent cut. See Alejandro Lorea Corrons and José Vicéns (sous dir.), *L’Impact de la libéralisation commerciale Euro-Méditerranéenne dans les échanges agricoles*, (Femise Research Programme, 2000), p. 46.
set up by the Uruguay Round and applies to all agricultural imports whose prices are equal or higher than the entry price. Products with import prices eight per cent lower than the entry price incur the so-called ‘normal’ tariff and an additional tariff to cover the difference with the entry price. However, in case the difference between the import price and the entry price is higher than eight per cent, products incur maximum tariff. Thus, entry prices are more beneficial for expensive products than for cheap ones.

The application of maximum tariff for products eight per cent cheaper than the CAP entry prices does not improve the export situation for Moroccan tomatoes or Tunisian olive oil, produce where the two Maghreb countries are competitive in the EU markets. For example, in 1995 the total cost of the production of Moroccan tomatoes was €0.82 while that of Spain was €1.21 in Spain. According to these figures, Morocco could export to EU markets at lower prices than those set by the entry price. However, this would entail its tomato exports incurring maximum tariffs.\(^{14}\) Therefore, this ostensible liberalisation has put new constraints in terms of import prices to the EU, and limited exports of cheaper competitive fruit and vegetables. This explains the general stabilisation or slow growth in the volume of Moroccan fruit and vegetables exports or Tunisian exports of olive oil (see Figures 4.1 and 4.2).

In this context, and in response to provisions provided for under the framework of the EMAAs, the EU and signatory countries intended to start bilateral negotiations concerning measures for further liberalisation and mutual concessions of trade in certain agricultural products in 2000. New concessions in agricultural trade were indeed concluded with Tunisia in January 2001. The EU raised its preferential quotas for exports of Tunisian olive oil and wine. In return, Tunisia committed itself to progressively cut its tariffs on certain EU agricultural exports, mainly wheat and vegetable oil. These mutual concessions were incorporated into the association agreement. On the other hand, negotiations with Morocco, which were supposed to start in 2000 as required by the association agreement, did not do so. Their conclusion was instead deferred to 2002. Then, in January 2002, the first official meeting for negotiating EU-Morocco protocols on trade in agricultural products took place, with the hope of reaching an agreement by the end of the year. However, what was reached during these first meetings was a temporary accord with regard to tomatoes whose export volume had been set up by the Commission at

168,757 tonnes for the period from 1 October 2001 to 31 May 2002. Additional unilateral tariff quotas were set up for a total of 18,081 tonnes, broken down as follows: 4,000 tonnes in November, 2,000 tonnes in December, 7,500 tonnes in April 2002 and 4,581 tonnes in May 2002.15

4.3.3 Free industrial trade under VERs and non-reciprocity
Under the economic cooperation framework of the 1969 and 1976 agreements, industrial and artisanal products were granted free access to EEC markets. However, the scope of the concessions granted to Moroccan and Tunisian industrial exports under their first-generation association agreement remained subject to certain provisions concerning rules of origin. These concessions were not reciprocally applicable to EEC exports entering the Moroccan or Tunisian markets. For their part, Morocco and Tunisia were asked simply to reduce some customs duties, to be more flexible in the quota system imposed on EEC industrial exports and to apply Most-Favoured Nation (MFN) treatment.

In order to benefit from the advantages accorded to them under their 1969 agreements, Morocco and Tunisia invested heavily in goods that received special treatment, namely in the textiles, clothing and leather industries. Thus there were positive responses from both countries. The agreements also encouraged them to develop export-led economies making them even more dependent on European markets. Maghrebi textiles and clothing exports to the EEC rose considerably in value (see Figure 4.3 for Morocco, for example).

**FIGURE 4.3 – MOROCCO’S TEXTILES AND CLOTHING TO THE EU ($ ’000)**

![Illustration removed for copyright restrictions](image)


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Despite the commitment to the principle of creating industrial FTAs under the GMP, the reality of the economic deterioration of the EEC – and other developed countries – after the 1973-74 international oil price shock was to impose a policy contrary to the rhetoric with which the GMP was imbued. This economic slowdown coincided with the growing emergence of a number of developing countries as major exporters of textiles and, to a lesser extent initially, clothing. This was encouraged by easy access to raw materials, cheap labour and relatively free access to the markets of developed countries. The sharp increase in imports of textiles and clothing adversely affected the textile industries of importing countries. Subsequently, a series of restrictions under the framework of the Multi-Fibre Arrangements (MFAs) were imposed in order to protect the industries concerned.

International trade in textiles and clothing was governed by special regimes outside the normal arrangement of the GATT until ministers from GATT countries decided to include it within the scope of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations in 1986. Within the framework of the MFAs (1974-94), which replaced the previous Cotton Agreements, developing countries were obliged to sign ‘voluntary’ export restraints (VERs) agreements to limit the quantities of their exports of textiles. The MFA system developed as a response to protective pressures by industrialised countries following the crisis that hit their textile manufactures in the mid-1970s.

Restrictions on textiles and clothing were quite pronounced and deeply felt in the case of Morocco and Tunisia. Though exports of industrial goods continued to benefit from tariff free access to EEC markets, this was carried out under restrictive trade conditions mainly in the form of quota limits. Restrictions on textiles and clothing did not affect Algeria or Libya. These countries did not experience any restrictions in their exports of oil and gas, nor did Morocco in respect to its exports of phosphate rock or phosphoric acid. Certain customs duties were, however, kept in respect of refined petroleum.

Thus, despite their contradiction to the spirit of free trade, as proclaimed by the 1976 cooperation agreements, a series of VERs were ‘negotiated’ between the EEC and the Maghreb countries. Though VERs limited Moroccan and Tunisian exports of textiles and clothing to the EEC markets, they were less restrictive compared with those imposed by the EEC on south-east Asian suppliers. They were subsequently gradually liberalised in

16 See Richard Pomfret, Unequal Trade: The Economics of Discriminatory International Trade Policies
the late 1980s. The VERs agreements for the two Maghreb countries were, moreover, renewed in 1991 with an increase in the quota ceiling of certain products. This was not an act of generosity; it was in conformity with the MFA requirements of an annual growth rate of six per cent in the textiles and clothing quotas granted to the exports of developing countries. However, this norm was, in practice, flouted in many cases mainly through a sharp reduction of the exports quotas in particular bilateral agreements. The MFA was terminated on 31 December 1994 with the conclusion of the GATT Uruguay Round and was substituted by the Agreement on Textile and Clothing (ATC) upon the entry into force of the rule of the WTO on 1 January 1995. The main objective of the ATC is the progressive integration of textile and clothing products into the WTO. Another aim has been further liberalisation in the international trade of textiles; this process has been carried out through four stages closing up with the phasing-out of the MFA by 2005 (see Figure 4.4).

**FIGURE 4.4: STAGED INTEGRATION OF TEXTILES INTO THE RULE OF WTO (% OF 1990 IMPORTS, VOLUME)**

Another development, internal to the EEC, contributed to set further restrictions, though of a limited kind, on industrial exports into the EEC markets. This was the introduction of the ‘Completing the Internal Market’ programme in 1985, backed by the SEA in 1986 whose aim was the establishing of an internal or single European market by 1993. The entering into force of the SEA, one year following the fall in oil prices and the Mediterranean enlargement to include Spain and Portugal, held out even tougher prospects for the growth of Maghreb industrial exports to EEC markets in the 1990s. Though the single market seemed to have no particular consequences for the Maghreb economies, the  

reality was otherwise. By virtue of the single market a number of non-tariff barriers against non-Community exports were put into place. This was in particular related to the extra-cost Maghrebi industries have to incur so as to meet the tighter European industrial standards set by the single market.\textsuperscript{17}

After the signing of the EMAAs with the EU, free trade in the industrial sector, which was a one-way free trade under the previous bilateral agreements, has become a two-way affair. During the transition period, Tunisia and Morocco have to adopt a progressive dismantling of their tariffs on industrial imports from the EU member states. This development will have two main consequences for the Maghreb countries: it will reduce their revenues from custom duties; it will also foster the need for a serious upgrading of their industries to make them more competitive. For this purpose, the two countries (as well as the other members of the EMP) receive financial aid under the MEDA programme.

\textbf{4.3.4 The security dimension of protectionism: socio-economic challenges?} 

There is little doubt that EU protectionism in the agricultural and, to a lesser extent, textiles and clothing sectors has had some negative impact on the economies of the Maghreb countries. This was more true of some periods than others. Over the last forty years or so, agricultural exports have varied from year to year, but they been on a generally rising trend, both in value and volume terms. If this underlying growth trend was marked by occasional declines of exports towards EU markets, the only considerable fall to be recorded in the case of Moroccan exports of fruit and vegetables was between 1971 and 1973. Moroccan exports of fruits and vegetables registered a relative long-term stability from 1974 onwards (between 800,000 and 1m tonnes) save for two unexpected peaks in 1990 and 1998 (see Figure 4.1). In the case of Tunisia, exports of olive oil fell by an average of 10,000 tonnes between 1975-80 and 1985-90, despite an increase in production – before it witnessed a remarkable rise during the first half of the 1990s, only to fall back again after 1995 (see Figure 4.2). However, Tunisian exports of olive oil are expected to rise since the EU raised its preferential quotas for this produce in January 2001 within the framework of the agricultural negotiations going on under the EMAA.

\begin{footnote}
\end{footnote}
Moreover, Tunisian exports of olive oil to the EU are projected to reach 140,000 to 170,000 metric tons by 2010.

Unlike agricultural exports, exports of textiles and clothing have been characterised by a sustained rising trend. Indeed, exports of textiles and clothing were on a remarkable rise for ten years between 1985 and 1996. Thus, after a stagnation during the first half of the 1980s, Moroccan exports in this sector returned to a sharply rising trend in the second half of that decade. This trend continued during the 1990s; the value of exports increased by more than 350 per cent over a period of eleven years between 1985 and 1995 (Figure 4.3). Exports of textiles and clothing have benefited from further liberalisation process of their markets under the ATC provisions. This process is to end all quantitative restrictions on trade in textiles and clothing by 2005. Though this liberalisation is certainly favourable to Moroccan and Tunisian textiles and clothing exports, Maghreb exports registered a low growth. This is explained by the tougher international competition to which their industries have been exposed since 1995. This competition has come especially from south-east Asian suppliers, for whom the phasing out of quantitative restriction constitutes a good opportunity to further penetrate European markets as they were badly affected by the VERs which the EEC imposed on their exports.

This EU protectionism has gained more weight through the link actors in the Maghreb establish between it and its perceived socio-political consequences on their countries. In making for such a link, these actors seek to confer credibility on their economic securitisation. What is hard to pin down from a liberal perspective, however, is the relation between protectionism and economic security as it has been voiced through the securitisation discourse – that is, in terms of protectionism having nefarious repercussions on the socio-political life of the Maghreb countries concerned.

To be able to check the credibility of this securitisation, it is necessary to look at the links actors establish between protectionism on the one hand, and its impact on the socio-political situation in their countries, on the other. One way to apply such a reality-check is to look at the importance of these securitised agricultural and industrial (mainly textiles and clothing) sectors to the economy. This may be carried out at two levels: (i) in terms of the contribution of the output of these sectors to the total GDP, and (ii) in terms of their employment generating capacity. That is, a reality-check of economic securitisation has to look at the importance of agricultural and textiles and clothing sectors in the economic output of Morocco and Tunisia, as well as the correlation between
exports in these sectors and, on the other hand, their employment generating capacity, especially during the 1990s which was a period of high securitisation.

4.3.4.1 The case of agriculture

As elsewhere in the developing world, agriculture is highly important for the economies and peoples of the Maghreb. This is particularly true for Morocco and Tunisia, where the contribution of agricultural output to total GDP has been considerable. For Morocco, the share of agricultural GDP in the total GDP averaged 16.5 per cent for the six years between 1979 and 2000 that are taken from the WB’s World Development Indicators, 2001. In the case of Tunisia, the share was somewhat less at 12.9 per cent during the same years (see Table 4.3). Owing to a series of droughts in Morocco during the mid-1980s and 1990s, Moroccan agricultural production suffered seriously. This led to substantial fluctuations in the exports of the affected produce. However, these droughts were more damaging to the production of cereals than to that of fruit and vegetables. The export revenues of fruits and vegetables returned to a rising trend since 1983, after the serious drop from $500,000 to $280,000 between 1978 and 1982 (see Figure 4.1). Morocco has been the third largest (non-EU) Mediterranean exporter of agricultural produce to EU markets, behind Turkey and Israel. Moroccan agricultural exports to EU markets between 1996 and 1999 constituted 70 per cent of EU agricultural imports from the Maghreb, even if this 70 per cent represented only 17 per cent of EU agricultural imports from the 12 EMP partner countries and only one per cent of the total of EU-15 imports of agricultural produce from the rest of the world.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Morocco Agriculture*</th>
<th>Morocco Industry</th>
<th>Tunisia Agriculture*</th>
<th>Tunisia Industry</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>28.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>31.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>28.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>28.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>28.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>28.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual average</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>28.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Includes fishing ‡ Average for the six years on the table
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2001

The importance of agriculture to Morocco is also obvious in that, amongst all Maghrebi countries, Morocco has been the only one enjoying an agricultural trade surplus
with the EU.\textsuperscript{18} Tunisia’s agricultural trade has been near to equilibrium, while both Algeria and Libya have a substantial agricultural trade deficit. Nonetheless, all Maghrebi countries share a common characteristic; they have all been recognised in the WTO as net food-importers. But this feature has been much more pronounced in the case of the Algerian and Libyan economies.

Though the value of Moroccan agricultural exports has been on a rising trend (Figure 4.1), the percentage share of agriculture’s contribution to export earnings dropped from 33 per cent in 1979 to 22 per cent in 1999. In the case of Tunisia, this drop was one of only four percentage points between 1989 and 1998, from seven per cent in 1989 to three per cent in 1998. This falling trend was reflected in both countries in the size of the workforce absorbed by the agricultural sector. The economically active agricultural population grew in number between 1950 and 2000 in Morocco and Tunisia. Nonetheless, the size of this population in Morocco, expressed as a percentage of the total labour force, registered a massive drop of 41 percentage point in 2000 compared with 1950, and this declining trend is expected to continue in the future. The decline was even greater in the case of Tunisia (see Table 4.4). The fall in the relative size of the agricultural workforce was due to the growth in the total economically active population as a result of the modernisation of the economy, through industrialisation and the vast expansion of services, and population growth. Thus modern economic activities have absorbed a large new labour force as well as some of those previously employed in agriculture. Morocco and Tunisia registered an average annual growth in the labour force of 2.6 per cent and 2.8 per cent, respectively, between 1993 and 1999.

\textsuperscript{18} Substantial quantities of staples (particularly wheat, oils, sugar and milk), which constitute the major food imports for Morocco, come from outside the EU, notably from the US.
Table 4.4 – Economically Active Population in Morocco and Tunisia, 1950-2010: Estimates and Projections (’000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Population Urban</th>
<th>Population Rural</th>
<th>Economically Active Population</th>
<th>Economically Active Population Rural</th>
<th>Economically Active Population Urban</th>
<th>Economically Active Population as % of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>1,993</td>
<td>6,960</td>
<td>3,405</td>
<td>2,636</td>
<td>77</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>3,090</td>
<td>8,536</td>
<td>4,250</td>
<td>3,106</td>
<td>73</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>5,280</td>
<td>10,030</td>
<td>5,079</td>
<td>3,306</td>
<td>65</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>8,437</td>
<td>10,945</td>
<td>6,957</td>
<td>3,803</td>
<td>56</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>13,515</td>
<td>11,110</td>
<td>9,119</td>
<td>4,073</td>
<td>45</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>18,570</td>
<td>10,909</td>
<td>11,780</td>
<td>4,261</td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>24,942</td>
<td>10,303</td>
<td>15,084</td>
<td>4,376</td>
<td>29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The fall in the relative size of the agriculturally active population cannot be directly, or solely, related to the protectionism faced by North African agricultural exports on EU markets. World trade in agriculture has been increasingly liberalised since the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, and the ongoing negotiations of agricultural issues within the provisions of the EMAAs underlines this gradual liberalising trend. All this renders the securitisation of agriculture and its importance to the economies of Morocco and Tunisia less significant, especially when it is presented by political actors in the Maghreb as having socio-political implications for the security of their respective countries. This does not mean that protectionism has not had a negative repercussion on the development of agriculture and the economy in general; it certainly has. However, to place it as one of the main handicaps for economic development and, thus, as an ingredient for socio-political instability in the Maghreb is somewhat exaggerated, and even more so, when presented as a potential cause of political instability in the sense of regime change. This conclusion holds even more true of the situation in the textiles and clothing sector (see below). The gradual liberalisation of the trade in agriculture together with modernisation of agricultural methods (as part of some MEDA funded programmes) will certainly contribute to improving agricultural output and its share in exports, though exports of agricultural products to the EU will remain short of full liberalisation, at least in short and medium run.
4.3.4.2 The case of textiles and clothing

Textiles and clothing (including footwear) constitute a very large part of the industrial exports of both Morocco and Tunisia. This sector was important in the development of foreign trade, notably between 1985 and 1995. In the period between 1990 and 1999, the annual average share of industrial output in total GDP was 32 per cent and 29 per cent for Morocco and Tunisia, respectively. Much of this output was generated by textiles and clothing manufacture. The importance of textiles and clothing sector has been particularly evident in its share of export revenues. The share of textiles in the total exports revenues of Morocco averaged 23 per cent annually over the period between 1985 and 1997. During the same period, the annual average was even higher in the case of Tunisia; it accounted for 39 per cent of the country’s total exports earnings. Tunisia increased its textiles exports quite remarkably during the 1990s (see Table 4.5). Nonetheless, in the case of Morocco, this percentage dropped after 1993, from 27.9 to 21.2 in 1997. In the case of Tunisia, this percentage of the textiles value of total exports continued to rise.

**Table 4.5 – Value of textiles exports (% of total exports)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Morocco</th>
<th>Tunisia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>21.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>30.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>31.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>32.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>31.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>38.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>38.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>43.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>46.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>47.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>49.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>50.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>48.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Annual average**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Morocco</th>
<th>Tunisia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>39.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The deceleration in the growth of exports to the EU especially between 1995 and 1999 was the result of international competition on EU markets. With the progressive phasing out of MFAs, the effective preferences granted to Maghrebi exports in this sector started to be eroded. There is likely to be further erosion up to 2005, which will have an adverse impact on Moroccan and Tunisian exports. Thus, during the late 1990s, exports of textiles and clothing to the EU suffered less from protectionism than from a lack of competitiveness.
In this case, the securitisation argument seems to be largely unfounded, especially in terms of the negative impact protectionism has allegedly had on the labour market (see Figure 4.5). On the other hand, the Maghreb countries enjoy an advantage in labour costs as well as in terms of geographical proximity to European markets. This holds the promise of future development and growth in this sector, a development that has the potential to generate more jobs.

This expansion of the sector may entail difficulties for small domestic companies, which are based on informal family structures and suffer from lack in competitiveness. Nonetheless, this will not have a major impact on the size of the total labour force and thus on the socio-political difficulties that unemployment might generate. A look at the employment generating capacity of this sector in the case of Morocco shows – contrary to what the discourse on economic securitisation suggested – a rising trend. The number of persons working in the textiles and clothing sectors in Morocco registered an increase of 40 per cent between 1983 and 1992.

**Figure 4.5 — Textiles and Clothing Employment in Morocco (Number of Employees)**

![Illustration removed for copyright restrictions](Illustration removed for copyright restrictions)


From the above relation between the level of exports and the level of employment, it may be deduced that the link Maghreb actors have established between EU protectionism in the agricultural and textile and clothing sectors and, on the other hand, its impact on the employment as a socio-economic factor has been exaggerated, especially during the 1990s. This is due to a number of reasons. First, it is difficult to trace a tight correspondence or direct match between protectionism in the above discussed economic sectors and its impact on employment as an economic factor with socio-political implications for the Maghreb countries. Second, unlike in the early 1980s, in which the
degree of protectionism was considerable, exports of both sectors to EU markets in the 1990s grew in volume and value. This explains to a certain degree the parallel growth in employment creation capacity of these sectors. The growth in employment creation is expected to continue as a result of a gradual liberalisation of agriculture and the phasing out of tariffs on textiles and clothing under the rule of the WTO. Nonetheless, it remains heavily contingent on the upgrading of these sectors to enable them to face successfully international competition on their traditional markets in the EU. As such, securitisation may be credible when presented in sheerly economic terms rather than in trying to link it to its political impact.

Third, it is the failure to establish an important link between economic security and its political consequences which denies credibility to the calls for the securitisation of the economy in the Maghreb countries. Though the link between economic security and its political implications usually confers credibility on the former, in the case of the Maghreb countries this link has become barely convincing mainly because of the existence of political problems that could largely be separated from particular economic considerations. The alleged link was considered more pronounced in the 1990s, despite the fact that protectionism had been even more acute in the 1980s. The sharp emergence of political difficulties since the late 1980s together with the political challenges of the 1990s served as, a knot to tie protectionism in sectors considered vital to the economies of the Maghreb countries to the fears of ‘imminent’ political instability (see Chapter 5). In fact, the real fear in the Maghreb has been that economic competition ensuing from liberalisation would erode certain political privileges for the ruling elites. All in all, there is little doubt that protectionism has affected exports of some important Maghreb products. Nonetheless, that this has had significant adverse effects on the political situation has not been established, considering the lack of political openings and the continuance of the regime in place to rule.

4.4 THE INSTRUMENTAL BARGAINING POWER OF FISHERIES

Fishing cooperation has often been used by Morocco and Spain as an instrument of economic as well as political bargaining power. Politically, fishing agreements have been used by Morocco to exert political pressure over the Western Sahara and the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla. Economically, relaxing quotas and seasonal calendars regarding the access of Moroccan agricultural produce to the EU markets was often linked with Spain’s
need to have access to Moroccan fishing waters under less restrictive conditions. The 
barred of Spanish fleets from fishing in Moroccan waters led, on various occasions, to the 
barring of Moroccan agricultural exports from crossing Spain to other EU markets. This 
has been quite damaging for agricultural exports. Such sabotage of Moroccan agricultural 
exports transiting Spain has often coincided with the negotiation over the renewal of 
fishing agreements between Morocco and the EU. These disputes intensified especially 
during the renewal of fishing agreements in the 1990s, owing to a growth in consumption 
in fish and, relatedly, to socio-economic security implications for both countries. Such 
disputes have been a recurrent feature of Spain/EU relations with Morocco in this sector 
since the early 1970s.19

4.4.1 The development of Spain/EU fisheries relations with Morocco

The first Spanish-Moroccan fishing agreements were initially traded against the retreat of 
Spain from Moroccan territories. As early as 1969, a fishing agreement was signed 
following the Spanish withdrawal from Ifni. Because of declining fish catches and the 
illegal practices of Spanish fleets, Morocco decided in March 1973 to extend its exclusive 
economic zone (EEZ) from 12 to 70 nautical miles,20 which provoked a number of 
objections from Spain and led to escalation.21 This extension was carried out within the 
framework of the 1973-1977 plan whose objectives included the policy of maroceanisation, 
to put the economy under greater Moroccan control. It was one way of compensating for 
the exponential rise in the price of oil in autumn 1973, which weighed heavily on the 
Moroccan budget.

Another fishing agreement was signed in 1977 following the Madrid Tripartite 
Agreement in November 1975, which handed over the administration of the Western 
Sahara to Morocco and Mauritania. Nonetheless, this fishing agreement was never ratified 
by the Moroccan parliament because of the Spanish stance towards the Western Sahara at

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19 It is important to note that though this study is about the WM, these disputes are not over the 
Mediterranean exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of Morocco but over Atlantic fisheries to the south-west. 
Nonetheless, these disputes have influenced relations between the two countries as well as their relations 
with other WM countries.

20 This zone was limited to 6 miles in 1919 until Hassan II declared the extension of Moroccan national 
waters from 6 to 12 miles in 1962.

21 See Gerald H. Blake, “Mediterranean Non-Energy Resources: Scope for Cooperation and Dangers of 
Conflict,” in Giacomo Luciani (ed.), The Mediterranean Region: Economic Interdependence and the 
the time. Instead, Morocco continued to contract fishing agreements with Spain for short-term periods varying from three to six months. This increasingly limited access to fishing waters proved to be increasingly costly for Spain.

The situation in the 1970s brought no satisfactory progress for Spain and proved even less comfortable during the 1980s. Indeed, a major change, which was to have considerable influence on the development of fisheries worldwide, took place. This was the declaration by a number of nations to extend their EEZ to a 200-mile zone. In accordance with the United Nations Conference of the Law of the Sea of December 1982, Morocco adopted a 200-mile EEZ, by virtue of which the country extended its national waters and, at the same time, the right to monitor fleets fishing within its economic zone.

This new change dramatically reduced the fishing opportunities for Spain, as it found that its fishing rights along the rich Atlantic 3,000 km coastline (now including the Western Sahara) became greatly reduced. This did not mean the exclusion of Spanish fleets from Moroccan waters; it rather meant that fishing within the enlarged zone would have to be compensated for financially as well as through technical assistance to develop the Moroccan fishing industry. In addition to the increasing rise in the fee charges Spain had to incur for fishing within the Moroccan EEZ, the Spanish fleet faced an added difficulty as the Moroccan government was making determined moves to develop its own fisheries industry. Though the policy to develop the Moroccan fishing industry was launched with the 1973-77 plan, it was not until the early 1980s – following the greater prospects for growth promised by the 200-mile EEZ – that the Moroccan government invested heavily in fisheries and took additional measures to encourage national as well as foreign investment to develop this sector. The importance of fisheries was signalled by the establishment of a Moroccan Ministry of Fishing and Merchant Marine in 1981.

In August 1983, Spain signed a new fishing agreement with Morocco. This agreement represented a new generation of cooperation in the context of the prospective

23 Negotiations for the establishment of a 200-mile zone started in 1974; however, a number of (Latin American) countries had already extended their EEZ before even the start of the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). See Blake, “Mediterranean Non-Energy Resources”, p. 52. Morocco’s intention not to extend its EEZ at that time could be explained by its instrumental use of the fishing agreements to serve its interests in the Western Sahara.
24 The Moroccan Industrial and Investment Code of 1983 granted a number of incentives to foreign investment in fisheries, including the possibility of 100 per cent shareholdings in Moroccan firms, instead of the previous 50 per cent. See John Damis, “Morocco’s 1993 Fisheries Agreement with the European
accession of Spain to the EEC in 1986 and the establishment of the EEC’s Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) in 1983. Though this agreement, which was signed for a period of four years, put an end to the era of short-term agreements, it comprised a number of restrictive clauses. For example, it committed Spain to a 40 per cent reduction in fishing rights and to the protection of fish stock; it also obliged this country to cooperate in developing the Moroccan fishing industry.  

The 1983 fishing agreement expired in July 1987 and thus closed the phase of Spanish-Moroccan bilateral agreements; it was the last fishing agreement to be signed between the two countries. Following its accession to the EEC, Spain lost its right to negotiate or sign fishing agreements with third countries, as responsibility for fishing matters has been transferred to the European Commission’s Directorate XIV for fisheries. As a result, the 1988 agreement was negotiated by the EEC and constituted the first one of its genre between Morocco and the EEC. This agreement was of the type known as ‘agreements with financial compensation’, as opposed to the ‘reciprocal agreements’ and ‘second generation agreements’ types. It consisted of a mix of financial compensation and easier access to Moroccan fishing grounds in return for less restrictive export quotas for selected fishing products. Like previous agreements with Spain, it committed the EEC to cooperate in the development of the Moroccan fishing industry. Though this agreement was signed between the EEC and Morocco, the Spanish fleet continued, nonetheless, to dominate Moroccan waters and constituted up to 90 per cent of the total EEC fleets fishing within the Moroccan EEZ. Despite the transfer of Spain’s fisheries matters to Brussels after its accession to the EEC, Spain continued to be the principal beneficiary of the Community agreements and the role of its fishing delegation in the European Commission’s Directorate XIV has remained influential during negotiations with third countries and Morocco in particular.  

The accession of Spain to the EEC, the difficulties experienced in the exports of Moroccan agricultural produce, and the conflict over the Western Sahara being defused by

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25 See Rachel Jones, Beyond the Spanish State: Central Government, Domestic Actors and the EU (Palgrave, 2000), p. 193

26 A clause relative to the issue of the Western Sahara was included in the 1988 agreement. It specifies that the agreement applies to fishing grounds under Moroccan sovereignty or jurisdiction. This distinction between sovereignty and administration was later reiterated in the 1992 agreement. See Ben El Hassan Alaoui, La coopération entre l’union européenne et les pays du Maghreb, p. 71.

27 Jones, Beyond the Spanish States, pp. 141-2.
its being 'officially' put under the UN programme for a self-determination referendum, MINURSO,28 all these factors have contributed to give the bargaining over fisheries agreements a sharper economic edge. During the 1990s, fisheries agreements become indeed increasingly governed by economic calculations; political considerations were progressively diluted, at least as far as the Western Sahara conflict is concerned.

Within this context, the renewal of the fishing agreement, which expired in 1987, coincided with the difficult negotiations between Morocco and the EEC over less restrictive access to Community markets for Moroccan agricultural exports. The difficulties experienced during the negotiations were resolved when Morocco decided, only after reassurances from the EEC of fair treatment for its agricultural exports, to renew its fishing agreement with it in February 1988. In return, after one month, Spain agreed to the signing of an accord on the transport of Moroccan citrus fruits through its territory. This was also accompanied by the signing of a framework agreement for economic and financial cooperation.29 As to EEC markets, Morocco gained more access for the sale of its processed fisheries, especially for tinned sardines, which had been severely restricted by virtue of the 1976 cooperation agreement. The 1988 fishing agreement, which was signed for the period of four years, expired in 1992, which led to the launching of another round of negotiations and hard bargaining.

Negotiations for the renewal of the fishing agreement were made even more tense because of the refusal of the EP to ratify the accord for the fourth financial protocol for Morocco (see Chapter 3). Positive prospects for an FTA between Morocco and the EC within the framework of the Euro-Maghreb partnership idea relaxed these tensions and led ultimately to the renewal of the fishing agreement in May 1992 for a period of four years. Though this agreement kept to largely the same conditions for EC boats as the previous one, there was a 50 per cent increase in the financial compensation paid to Morocco.

The 1992 agreement was the most important EEC fishing agreement ever to be signed with a third country in terms of the number of EC fishing boats having access to Moroccan waters (700, 90 per cent of which are Spanish) as well as in terms of the size of the potential catch and an annual financial compensation of $135m.30 It was equally important in terms of its socio-economic impact on the Spanish fisheries and fishing

28 MINURSO stands for Mission des Nations-Unis pour le Référendum au Sahara Occidental.
industry. This agreement was estimated to sustain 28,000 Spaniards (and their families) involved in fishing from Andalusia and the Canaries. Not surprisingly, great tensions were generated by Morocco’s decision in 1994 – at the mid-term revision of the 1992 agreement – to reduce the number of boats by 200. As a result, the spirit of partnership which characterised the first stages of this agreement seemed to have withered away by 1994. In October of the same year, the EC and Morocco agreed that the fishing accord would remain unchanged only until April 1995, instead of the original expiry date of April 1996, thus shortening the agreement by one year.

If the difficulties which the mid-term revision of the 1992 agreement raised were circumvented by shortening the agreement to a three-year period, negotiations for a future renewal of the agreement were complicated by the parallel negotiations for the signing of the EMAA between Morocco and the EU. These two negotiations came to be linked together, which restricted the scope of Morocco for bargaining over fisheries. As a result of this linkage, the country faced pressure from both Spain and the European Commission. True the Commission also pressured Spain to compromise on its bargaining positions; nonetheless, these pressures were cushioned by the support Spain gained within the EU Fisheries Council as well as by an occasional partiality of the Commission itself.31

Spanish pressures on Morocco to relax its negotiating demands for the renewal of the fisheries agreement were manifest at the national level but also at the level of the EU. At the national level, there was a growing coordination between affected fishermen and protectionist agricultural associations from southern Spain with the aim of barricading and, on various occasions, sabotaging Moroccan (agricultural) goods transiting to other EU markets through Spain. When such incidents occurred – for example, in June 1995 – the Moroccan government opened a temporary shipping route from Tangier to France to avoid the blockade. Pressures were also applied by the Spanish government itself. In May 1995, the Spanish government threatened that it would apply rigorous health inspections on imported Moroccan fish, thus seeking to block or disrupt the flow of Moroccan fish exports to EU markets.32 These moves were made with the Spanish government’s awareness of its ability to delay, if not to completely stalemate, the ongoing negotiations.

30 Damis, “Morocco’s 1995 Fisheries Agreement”, p. 64.
31 Ibid., p. 68 and Jones, Beyond the Spanish State, p. 147. This support could be seen as a tactic by northern EU members to encourage Spain to give agricultural concessions.
for an association agreement between the EU and Morocco unless it gained satisfactory fishing concessions.33

The ability of the Spanish government to influence negotiations about fisheries and about the EMAA was also strengthened by the Commission’s pressures on Morocco. During a major breakdown in negotiations, Emma Bonino, then Commissioner in charge of fisheries, issued a warning to the Moroccan government that its relations with the EU would undergo a full re-examination.34 There was a tacit understanding that it would be impossible to reach an agreement on the EMAA, if Spain was not to get conciliatory fishing terms. In this way, a linkage between fisheries and EMAA was forged. The Commission speeded up negotiations with Tunisia and Israel with the aim of signing association agreements with them.35 These two countries are considered competitors with Morocco over textiles and clothing and citrus fruit. The Commission went even further and suspended the imports of tinned sardines from Morocco in September 1995.36 The pressures that the Commission exerted on Morocco were increased when Spain held the EU presidency during the second half of 1995.

In the midst of all these pressures and after eight rounds of negotiations, a fisheries agreement was reached on 12 November 1995, just 13 days before the launching of the Barcelona Conference on 25 November. Not coincidentally, negotiations over the association agreement were also concluded in the same month. The new fisheries agreement, which came into force on 1 December 1995, was, on the understanding of the Moroccan side, destined to be the last one of its kind, though the EU was to decide to ignore this view and rely on plans for future renewals of the agreement under new conditions. The agreement was signed for a period of four years, non-renewable and with no mid-term revision clause. It allowed for 500 vessels, the majority from Spain (and the rest from Portugal). In return, Morocco received a financial compensation of €500m, including a financial contribution (€355m) and lump allocations for the development of Moroccan fisheries (€121m) and for strengthening scientific research and management (€16m).37

34 Damis, “Morocco’s 1995 Fisheries Agreement”, p. 68.
35 Negotiations on EMAA were indeed concluded with Tunisia and Israel in June and September 1995, respectively.
36 Jones, Beyond the Spanish State, p. 147.
37 Fisheries Archives, “Fisheries: No Agreement between EU and Morocco”, 26 March 2001, p. 3
This sort of bargaining scenario began anew after the expiry of the 1995 agreement on 30 November 1999. After having secured its EMAA with the EU, which was signed in February 1996 and entered into force in March 2000, Morocco was in a position to set more favourable terms for its fisheries agreement with the EU. For several months after the expiry date of the fisheries agreement, Morocco refused to start any negotiations for renewal, stressing its position of non-renewal mentioned in the 1995 agreement. However, the detailed negotiations started in October 2000, following a meeting between King Mohamed VI and Franz Fischler, European Commissioner for Agriculture, Rural Development and Fisheries, in Casablanca.

From the outset, negotiations were launched with positions that differed in many respects. Morocco offered negotiations on the basis of a short two year fishing cooperation agreement with substantial reductions in fishing possibilities and a financial envelope proportionate to the one agreed for the last fishing agreement. The EU, on the other hand, foresaw a development programme running in parallel with large reductions and leading to the phasing out of the EU’s industrial fleet in Moroccan waters and, on the other hand, landing obligations in Morocco for freezer vessels nearing 100 per cent of their catches in the course of the agreement. Because of these different positions, negotiations reached a deadlock in January 2001. Progress had been made regarding the duration of the agreement (now limited to a three year period), the number of EU vessels, the landing obligations, fishing zones and biological rest periods. Nonetheless, the issue of financial compensation in particular remained a sticky one. Morocco asked for compensation amounting to an average of €90m per year, an amount that was said to exceed the EU principles of proportionality and budgetary discipline as mandated by the Council of Ministers.³⁸

On 26 March 2001, after six months of negotiations, thirteen technical meetings and seven rounds of meetings at the political level between Moroccan and EU representatives, no mutually beneficial deal had been reached. As a result, the Council adopted a Regulation aiming to promote the conversion and restructuring of fishing vessels and of fishermen that were, up to 1999, on the fishing agreement with Morocco. It also sought to enhance its southern fishing agreements with other third countries. For

example, in July 2001, it renewed its fisheries agreement with Mauritania for a period of six years, from August 2001 to July 2006, which was considered the most important between the EU and a third country at this period. This agreement increased EU fishing opportunities in Mauritanian waters for a total financial contribution of €86m per year, comprising both financial compensation (€82m) and development assistance for the Mauritanian fisheries sector (€4m). The EU also renewed its fishing agreement with Senegal, which became operative from July 2002 for a period of four years. At the same time, it initialled a protocol to renew its fishing agreement with Angola for a period of two years.

As to Morocco, it has sought to promote its fisheries relations with other partners as well as develop its own fishing industry. Indeed, in September 2001, the Moroccan minister for fisheries, Sai d Chbaâotou, visited Japan to discuss ways to improve fisheries relations between the two countries. Morocco also acquired new equipments to support its technical and scientific research with the aim of improving fisheries resources. This was the case of a new vessel, ‘Amir Moulay Abdellah’, which was constructed in collaboration with Japan. As a result of the non-renewal of the fisheries agreement with the EU, Morocco registered a rise of 44 per cent in fisheries catch in 2001, representing an increase of 23 per cent in value terms compared with the previous year.40

4.4.2 The socio-economic implication of fisheries

Though the failure to reach an agreement did not harm relations between Morocco and the EU, it did have an adverse impact on the Community’s fishermen, especially the Spaniards, and to a lesser extent, the Portuguese. Such has been the importance of Moroccan waters for the Spanish and Portuguese fleets.

The Moroccan EEZ has been part of the Community’s fishing zone covered under its southern fisheries agreements, which have included agreements with Angola, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Mauritania and Senegal. Out of the 777 Community vessels fishing under southern agreements (excluding tuna activities) between 1993 and 1997, 725 of them were Spanish and most of the rest were Portuguese. Out of these 725 Spanish vessels active under southern agreements, 552 operated within the Moroccan

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During this period, in volume terms, Morocco was the main source of the catch, accounting for over 74 per cent of the total Community catch under southern agreements; Mauritania, Guinea-Bissau, Angola and Senegal together represented little more than 25 per cent. Spain alone accounted for 87 per cent of all the Community catch (excluding tuna) under these agreements. In terms of the value of production, the total catch under the southern agreements averaged €484m annually during the period 1993-97, almost four times higher than the average value of production under the northern agreements (€131m). Catches in Moroccan waters represented 53 per cent of the Community’s total value of production in the south; and the value of production by Spain accounted for 82 per cent of the Community’s total. These figures show the great importance of the southern agreements, particularly the one with Morocco, to the Spanish fleet both in value and volume terms.

**Table 4.6 Number of Spanish Fleet Active Under Various Agreements (Five Year Average 1993-97)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agreement</th>
<th>Spain</th>
<th>Rest of Community</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Morocco Agreement</td>
<td>552</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Agreements</td>
<td>725</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Agreements</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>1796</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina Agreement</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Average of five years (1993-1997) excluding tuna activities.


More importantly, the southern agreements, which have been dominated by Spain with more than a 80 per cent share, have been a rich source of employment for Community members. Indeed, in 1993-97, the southern agreements created 83 per cent of the total Community jobs involved in fisheries (as opposed to 16 per cent under the northern agreements, and only two per cent under the Argentina one). The southern agreements (including that with Argentina) generated jobs for a total of some 34,000 persons, about 27,000 of which were Spaniards. Fishing activities in the Moroccan waters in this period provided some 19,000 direct and indirect jobs for Community members. In percentage terms, Morocco’s employment creation capacity amounted to 55 per cent for the

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These figures represent a five-year average of EU fleet active under southern agreements for the period 93-1997.

Community's fleet fishing under the southern agreements and 69 per cent of the total fisheries jobs for Spain alone.

**TABLE 4.7 – NUMBER OF JOBS GENERATED FOR SPAIN UNDER THE VARIOUS FISHING AGREEMENTS (FIVE YEAR AVERAGE 1993-97)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total Community Jobs (a)</th>
<th>Spain Jobs</th>
<th>As % of (a)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Southern Agreements &amp; Argentina</strong></td>
<td>34,232</td>
<td>28,963</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Of which Morocco</td>
<td>18,671</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>55*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Northern Agreements</strong></td>
<td>6,385</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>All Agreements</strong></td>
<td>40,997</td>
<td>27,393</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Represents the percentage of the total jobs generated under the southern and Argentina agreements.

Source: Various tables from IFREMER, Evaluation of the Fisheries Agreements concluded by the European Community (Commission Publication, 1999)

It is against these figures that the adverse impact of the failure to reach a satisfactory fishing agreement in 2001 between the EU and Morocco should be measured. When the 1995 fisheries agreement ended on 30 November 1999, 400 Spanish and Portuguese vessels were active in the Moroccan fishing waters. As a result, these vessels were tied up in port. The negative impact generated by the non-renewal of the fisheries agreement with Morocco reflected the heavy dependence of southern Spanish fisheries on Moroccan waters. The socio-economic shock ensuing from this was cushioned to some extent by compensation to the affected Spanish and Portuguese fleets through aid from the EU and national governments. This aid totalled €194m from January 2000 to December 2001; Spain received €170m and Portugal €24m. In parallel to this aid, the EU’s enhanced fisheries agreement with Mauritania has benefited a total of 137 vessels, 88 of which are Spanish; the rest are French, Italian and Portuguese.

The securitisation of the fisheries sector for Spain corresponds therefore with reality. But the EU financial aid attenuated the socio-economic difficulties that followed the non-renewal of the Moroccan fisheries agreement. Indeed, within the framework of a major reform to the CFP, the Council reached agreement on an EU programme for the conversion of vessels and fishermen affected by the non-renewal of the fisheries agreement with Morocco. The EU contribution will amount to €197m which is being made available over a period of two years: €170m in 2002 and €27m in 2003. This programme is complemented by measures financed by EU funds already available to Spain and Portugal under the Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance (FIFG). Thus, the social protection provided by EU programmes, be it made through conversion or compensation, lessens the socio-economic impact of economic security. Indeed, roughly half of the €3.7bn provided
for under the FIFG during 2002-06 goes to Spain. Italy, in second position, receives 11 per cent. Nonetheless, despite the inevitable cut in the Spanish fleet that will result from reforms to the CFP by the end of 2002, the non-renewal of the fisheries agreement between the EU and Morocco has caused some damage to the Spanish-Moroccan political relations (see Chapter 5).

4.5 **BALANCING DEPENDENCE THROUGH NATURAL GAS (AND OIL) TIES**

If relations between south-west Europe and Maghreb at the agricultural and industrial levels are shown to concern more Tunisia and Morocco on the Maghreb side, this situation is reversed in the energy sector. Morocco is not a hydrocarbon exporter; it remains a net importer of energy mainly from Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq and Nigeria (but no significant imports from Algeria or Libya). Tunisia’s production has hitherto covered its consumption needs. Only in 2000 – because of a rise in domestic demand and the quasi-exhaustion of its national proven reserves of oil (down to less than 0.3bn barrels in 2000 from 1.7bn in 1980 and 1990) – did Tunisia become a net importer of energy for the first time in 20 years. On the other hand, the proven reserves of gas and oil have increased in the case of Algeria and Libya. Proven reserves of Algerian crude oil increased from 8.2bn barrels in 1980 up to 9.2bn in 2000 and those of Libya increased from 23bn barrel up to 29.5bn in 2000. The same rising trend was registered for proven reserves of natural gas which stood at 4.5 trillion cubic metres in 2000, up from 3.7 trillion, in 1980 for Algeria, and at 1.3 trillion cubic metres in 2000, up from 0.6 trillion in 1980 for Libya. The importance of Morocco and Tunisia, from an energy security perspective, resides in their being major transit centres for Algerian gas to Spain and to Italy.

Energy relations between Algeria and Libya, on the one hand, and south-west European countries, on the other, have largely reflected an extensive dependence of the latter on gas. Oil dependence has been of less importance, with the exception of Italy’s energy supplies from Libya. The share of Libyan oil in Italy’s total imports of oil rose by 10 percentage points, from 19 per cent in 1986 to 29 per cent in 1998. This share had reached its highest level in 1991 with 35 per cent of Italy’s total imports of oil coming from Libya. There has been no significant dependence on Libyan oil in the case of Spain and, even to a less extent, in the case of France. For instance, the share of the Libyan oil in

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France’s total oil imports reached its highest level in 1991 at only 5 per cent. For Spain, this percentage in the same year was 11 per cent of total oil imports and reached its highest point so far in 1995 at 13 per cent.

These figures confirm the limited importance oil has played in the energy relations between WMC countries from a security perspective. This has been so for a number of reasons. First, south-west European countries have for a long time been dependent on oil supplies from the Middle East. Second, the share of oil in total energy consumption has fallen dramatically in all three countries (see Table 4.8). Oil has increasingly been replaced by nuclear energy or natural gas, a trend dating from the oil shocks of 1973 and 1979 when the need to reduce one’s dependence on oil became fundamental as a buffer against future oil shocks. For this reason, the advantages of natural gas started to be appreciated as early as the 1970s, and gained added importance because of the ‘environmentally-friendly’ nature of gas compared with oil.

| Table 4.8 Shares of Oil and Gas in Total Primary Energy Supply (TPES) |
|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|
|                             | Oil 1973 | Gas 1999 | Oil 1973 | Gas 1999 |
| France                      | 70.3     | 34.6     | 7.7      | 13.2     |
| Italy                       | 77.9     | 54.1     | 11.1     | 33.6     |
| Spain                       | 73.3     | 54       | 1.8      | 11.3     |

*Excluding electricity.

The importance of natural gas worldwide has been on the increase. According to the *International Energy Outlook 2001* the consumption of natural gas is projected to double to 4.6 trillion cubic metres in 2020 from 2.5 trillion cubic metres in 1999. This rise in consumption has been more evident in the case of Western Europe. Though the projected annual growth rate of 3.0 per cent for natural gas consumption in Western Europe is not particularly fast when compared to other regions, the rate is projected at 4.3 per cent for Spain between 1999 and 2020. Gas accounted for 11.3 per cent of total energy consumption in this country in 1999, compared with only 2.0 per cent in 1970. In Italy gas consumption accounted for 32 per cent of the total in 2001 and is projected to rise to 37 per cent by 2010. A similar, albeit less sharp, rise is projected in the case of France. All three south-west European countries have become increasingly dependent for their supplies on gas coming from outside Western Europe. Most of the natural gas...

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imported for consumption in Western Europe has for a long time originated mainly from Russia and North Africa, and Norwegian gas has grown in importance for France since 1994.

4.5.1 The development of natural gas relations in the WM

The use of natural gas from Algeria goes back to 1964 with gas being exported in liquefied form and transported by special tankers to ‘regasification’ terminals in France and Spain and later in Belgium. In 1971 Libya became the second country in the world, after Algeria, to have exported liquefied natural gas (LNG). Nonetheless, the capacity for LNG exports for both countries has remained weak, due mainly to technical difficulties.\textsuperscript{45} However, exports of natural gas were to be improved through the construction of pipelines linking North Africa to southern Europe. Algeria’s Sonatrach and Italy’s SNAM, a subsidiary of ENI, reached an agreement in 1977 to build a pipeline, Trans-Med, linking the Hassi R’Mel gas field in Algeria to mainland Italy via Tunisia and Sicily. The first phase of the Trans-Med was completed in 1981. However, delivery was delayed because of disagreement over delivery terms and prices in the early 1980s. With Algeria winning a political price premium for its natural gas, the construction of the second phase of the Trans-Med pipeline was speeded up. This second phase was completed in 1987, two years after the completion of a pipeline bringing Russian gas to Austria, West Germany, Italy and France. The construction of the second phase of the Trans-Med in the form of a new parallel pipeline doubled the export capacity from 8.5bn to 16bn cubic metres per year.

The uncompromising stance of Algeria on pricing won it a political price premium for gas supplies to France, Italy and Spain. In particular, in 1981, France agreed to a long-term contract to purchase Algerian LNG at a price 25 per cent higher than the then ruling world level; this was part of the tiers-mondiste policy of its socialist government.\textsuperscript{46} Before the fall in the prices of oil in 1986, successful attempts by Western European importers were made to renegotiate their commitment to import Algerian gas.\textsuperscript{47} This resulted in the

\textsuperscript{45} Javier Estrada et al., The Development of European Gas Markets: Environmental, Economic and Political Perspectives (John Wiley & Sons, 1995), pp. 34-5.
\textsuperscript{46} This agreement was later a source of price disputes between Gaz de France and Sonatrach which were resolved on in November 1988, see Michael Sutton, France’s Stamp on European Union (forthcoming, 2003).
\textsuperscript{47} Javier Estrada et al., The Development of European Gas Markets, p. 36.
indexing of the price of gas to that of oil, rendering gas prices responsive to those of oil. All this was intended to shift price exposure on to the shoulders of the producers.

The rise in demand for natural gas in Spain and Portugal, the ‘soothing’ of tensions between Algeria and Morocco following the establishment of the AMU, and Algeria’s need to boost its natural gas exports, all combined to encourage the construction of a new pipeline, the Maghreb-Europe Gas (MEG), which was completed in 1995 and became operational in November 1996. The MEG transports Algerian gas via Morocco and Gibraltar to Cordoba in Spain, where it feeds into the Spanish and Portuguese gas transmission networks. The export capacity of the MEG was initially 8bn cubic metres per year. In 2001, Algeria declared its plans to raise the yearly export capacity of the MEG to 11bn cubic metres through the construction of a new natural gas compressor station.\(^4\)

Furthermore, in recent years, there have been a number of feasibility studies for the construction of new pipelines to link Algeria to southern Europe. In 2000 Total Fina Elf, along with Sonatrach and Spain’s Cepsa, agreed to carry out feasibility studies for plans to build a natural gas pipeline, called Med-Gaz, to link Algeria directly to Spain.\(^4\) Med-Gaz is expected to export up to 15bn cubic metres per year. The first results of this study have shown that this project faces formidable sea-bed risks.\(^5\) One year later, Sonatrach also signed a deal with Italy’s Enel and Germany’s Wintershall on a feasibility study for another new pipeline to link Algeria to Italy and southern France.

To turn to Libya, most of its gas is exported in liquefied form. Though Spain has been the only major destination of Libyan gas exports, its sustained production and increased exports remain a high priority for the country. In 1997 Libya and Tunisia signed a joint venture to construct a pipeline to transport Libyan natural gas to the industrial city of Gabès. One year later, another agreement was signed between the two countries in order to export 2bn cubic metres per year of Libyan gas to Tunisia by 2003. Plans for further projects to boost Libyan gas exports to southern Europe were signed in 1999. For example, plans for the construction of a pipeline to link Libya to Italy via Sicily were finalised in 1999 as a joint venture between Libya’s state-owned National Oil Company (NOC) and Italy’s ENI.


\(^4\) The ambition to build a direct pipeline between Algeria and Spain dates back to the early 1970s, and two feasibility studies were conducted in 1973-74.

Besides the planned construction of pipelines, projects are being developed for the increase of LNG exports. France has been Europe’s largest importer of LNG. All of its imports of Algerian gas come in liquefied form to the ‘regasification’ terminals of Fos-sur-Mer near Marseilles and Montoir-de-Bretagne near Nantes. The second terminal has also served as a transit centre of Nigerian LNG which is traded out to the Italian company Enel.\(^\text{51}\) Spain has been the second largest LNG importer, after France; it has three regasification terminals (Barcelona, Cartagena and Huelva), which receive LNG from Algeria and Libya. Algeria has been Spain’s largest supplier of LNG. This is expected to increase as Sonatrach and seven Spanish companies, forming the Reganosa group, began in 2001 building a new LNG import facility. Its main aim is to supply gas to the Ferrol terminal in north-west Spain following its projected commissioning in 2004 for a period of ten years until 2014.\(^\text{52}\) To boost its LNG export capacity, Algeria completed a major programme modernising its LNG facilities in 1999. It has been exporting LNG to Italy through the Panigaglia terminal (near La Spezia) under a 25-year contract that runs until 2015. Libya’s LNG export capacity has generally suffered from technical limitations. Plans to refurbish the El Brega LNG plant has been delayed since 1992 because of Lockerbie-related sanctions. When the work is completed, Libya’s LNG exports to Italy and Spain may be expected to increase.

The overall picture is that of the WM as a centre of an intensive trade of both piped and liquefied natural gas. The existing pipelines and the plethora of projects to build new ones as well as plans to increase the LNG trade volumes attest to the growing importance of gas in general. Though gas can be (and is) transported in liquefied form, its transportation remains limited by technological costs. This justifies the preference for pipelines as a more efficient and less expensive means of transporting gas. The piped transportation of gas has a cost advantage; nonetheless, pipelines inevitably create a structural dependence between producer and consumer. The indirect cost countries importing piped gas have to pay is that of the building up of a lasting dependence on their gas suppliers.

\(^{51}\) Grandiose plans are being discussed to link Nigerian gas with Algeria via a 4,000km pipeline across the Saharan desert in conjunction with a new trans-Saharan highway. Under this scheme, Nigerian gas would be piped northward to integrate with Algeria’s existing gas network and then be exported to the EU. See PM Communications Reporting, “Algeria-Nigeria: African Energy Power to Succeed”, supplement to The Daily Telegraph 13 June 2002.

Unlike oil, the nature of gas transport renders dependence on it an issue of greater importance at regional level. The transportation of gas, and therefore its use, depends on the construction of a grid of pipelines. Not only does the construction of pipelines speed up dependence on gas, it also consolidates it and reinforces its regionalisation. Because they are fixed installations, pipelines tend to rigidify gas markets insofar as they are built for long-term use. This explains why contracts for the import of gas are usually signed for periods of 25 years or more. Also, the transport of gas through pipelines encourages international trade in it to remain confined to regional level. This ties the trading partners together and put them in a state of critical (inter)dependence.

4.5.2 Security of energy supply and political security considerations
The energy dependence of the three south-west European countries on North Africa has been given rise to a discourse concerning the security of supply; it was especially so in the early 1990s. This discourse was heightened by the political fears that the Algerian crisis, like the Iranian revolution, would lead to a soaring rise in the price of energy or to the interruption of its flow. This has been particularly true in the case of natural gas where the perceived vulnerability of south-west European countries is higher.

To assess the credibility of this securitisation approach, there is need for a reality-check to appraise the scale of flows of North African gas to Europe and the security implications of this for Spain, Italy and France. Here a definition of energy security is called for. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), energy security has been defined as the “reliable availability of energy in quantities and at prices that help sustain economic growth.”

This involves three main factors: (i) physical resources of primary energy, production, transportation, processing and distribution facilities, sufficient to meet demands; (ii) absence of political factors that restrict or prevent these resources from being made available or used when they are available, such as foreign policy developments and political limitations of trade (e.g. international sanctions); and (iii) a balance between energy security and other policies, such as fiscal and environmental policies.

The securitisation of the energy sector in the WM has been centred on the second factor. The security worries which have been raised about the reliability of Algeria and Libya as energy (mainly gas) suppliers are little related to the gas reserves or transportation capabilities. Energy security has been politically framed; it has been deemed
contingent on the political stability of the Maghreb regimes. Uncertainties about the supply of gas are linked to the countries’ fragile political situations, a latent political unrest and the potential rise of Islamists to political power in Algeria. The situation with regard to Libya has been different. The controversial character of Colonel Qadhafi, the underdevelopment of the Libyan gas industry and the UN sanctions imposed on the country have all contributed to stymie the further development of dependence on Libya’s gas. However, dependence on Libya’s energy supplies has been particularly pronounced in the case of Italy because of historical and political ties as well as the involvement of a number of Italian companies in Libyan energy projects.

A closer look at the flow of North African natural gas to south-west Europe portrays a picture that differs from the one presented through the securitisation discourse surrounding the security of energy supply. Energy security entails the reduction of dependence at least over the long term. In this context, after the first impact of the oil shocks of the 1970s, the European Commission recommended member states to diversify their dependence on energy both in terms of type and geographical source. But this diversification policy contributed little to affect the geopolitical dependence of European countries on the major suppliers of oil and gas, be they Middle Eastern, North African or Russian. This has been evidenced by the dependence of south-west European countries on gas supplies from Algeria and increasingly so from Libya as well.

| TABLE 4.9 – SOUTH-WEST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES’ DEPENDENCE ON ALGERIAN NATURAL GAS (MILLION CUBIC METRES) |
|---------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
|                              | Piped          | LNG             |                 |
|                              | Italy          | Spain           | France          |
|                              | Total | Algeria | %    | Total | Algeria | %    | Total | Algeria | %    |
| 1986                          | 19,816 | 7,992 | 40   | 2,096  | 1,457 | 70   | 28,590 | 8,281 | 29   |
| 1987                          | 22,673 | 10,327 | 45   | 2,130  | 1,525 | 72   | 27,455 | 9,246 | 34   |
| 1988                          | 24,054 | 10,035 | 42   | 2,823  | 2,156 | 76   | 28,822 | 8,891 | 36   |
| 1989                          | 28,086 | 10,654 | 38   | 3,354  | 2,465 | 73   | 28,158 | 8,429 | 32   |
| 1990                          | 30,470 | 10,559 | 35   | 4,940  | 3,045 | 75   | 30,197 | 8,712 | 31   |
| 1991                          | 33,028 | 13,375 | 40   | 4,815  | 3,223 | 73   | 30,038 | 8,605 | 29   |
| 1992                          | 33,952 | 14,047 | 41   | 5,299  | 3,769 | 72   | 31,083 | 8,766 | 28   |
| 1993                          | 32,146 | 13,269 | 41   | 5,574  | 4,110 | 74   | 29,640 | 8,515 | 29   |
| 1994                          | 29,156 | 11,127 | 38   | 7,105  | 4,445 | 63   | 30,910 | 7,573 | 25   |
| 1995                          | 34,865 | 16,747 | 48   | 8,235  | 5,027 | 61   | 32,220 | 7,103 | 22   |
| 1996                          | 37,006 | 19,000 | 51   | 9,104  | 5,574 | 61   | 35,218 | 7,680 | 22   |
| 1997                          | 39,085 | 20,342 | 52   | 12,635 | 8,512 | 67   | 35,333 | 9,440 | 27   |
| 1998                          | 42,646 | 22,820 | 54   | 13,202 | 8,799 | 67   | 35,103 | 8,514 | 27   |
| 1999                          | 49,484 | 28,302 | 56   | 15,222 | 9,804 | 64   | 40,625 | 9,844 | 24   |


The continued rise in the flow of Algerian natural gas to south-west European countries, as shown in Table 4.9, contradicts the message of the securitisation discourse over the flow of energy supplies. This contradiction is clear in the case of Spain and Italy and, to a lesser extent, in the case of France. Unlike France, Spain and Italy have been primarily business-oriented and have been helped in this attitude by their less complicated political relationship with Algeria. Despite a decrease in the percentage share of Algerian gas in the total imports of south-west European countries, there has been a considerable rise in the volume of these imports.

As regards the degree of dependence, Spain’s reliance on Algerian gas dropped by 8 percentage points, from 70 per cent in 1986 to 62 per cent in 2000. Nonetheless, this dependence still remains high. In the same period, the share of Algerian supply of gas in the total imports of France decreased by 4 percentage points, from 29 per cent to 25 per cent. Only in the case of Italy did the share of Algerian gas in total imports increase, rising to 54 per cent both in 1998 and 1999 up from 40 per cent in 1986, though it then dropped to 49 per cent in 2000. The overall decline in the share of the Algerian gas in the total imports of south-west European countries since 1992 corresponded to a need to diversify their suppliers, but also reflected concerns about the development of the political situation in the North African country.

Nonetheless, as has just been indicated, there was sizable growth in volumes. Italy’s volume of imports of Algerian gas has become much bigger reaching 28,110m cubic metres in 2000, and is expected to grow even bigger in the coming 10 or 15 years. Spain’s imports of Algerian natural gas have grown in volume, amounting to 9,887m cubic metres in 2000 as compared with 1,457m cubic metres in 1986. More importantly, even when the internecine political violence in Algeria reached a boiling point, the flow of Algerian gas to south-west Europe increased noticeably, especially to Italy and Spain. For instance, in 1992 when the Algerian elections were aborted, Italy’s import volume of Algerian gas almost doubled while that of Spain almost tripled, as compared with the two countries’ imports in 1986.

However, there was an opposite trend in the case of France. With the intensification of violence in Algeria, the volume of France’s imports of Algerian gas remained stable, despite the overall growth of the country’s imports of this type of energy. Over a longer period, French imports of Algerian gas as a share of its total imports have dropped considerably since 1988, the year of the first signs of the serious political malaise
from which Algeria has been suffering. Indeed, the share of Algerian gas in France’s imports dropped by 14 percentage points in the period between 1988 and 1996, with the Algerian gas down to 22 per cent of total imports in 1996. This decline led to French imports of Algerian natural gas falling short of the 10bn cubic metres volume contracted for 1995.

In 1994 France signed a new substantial import contract for about 4bn cubic metres per year with Norway, thus reaching a temporary ceiling for the volume which France was interested in buying from that country. This Franco-Norwegian contract was a clear gesture on the part of France to cut down its relative dependence on gas supplies from Algeria. This reduction in imports of Algerian gas has been balanced by increasing imports not only from Norway and but also from Russia (see Figure 4.6). Following the signing of this new agreement, the imports of Norwegian gas rose by 40 per cent between 1994 and 2000. The market share of total French imports of Norwegian gas is projected to rise to 37 per cent in 2005 compared with 29 per cent in 1996. Indeed, France holds second place in terms of its degree of dependence on Norwegian gas, being bettered only by Belgium, whose market share of imports for Norwegian gas was 29 per cent in 1996 and is projected to rise to 40 per cent by 2005. Nonetheless, France’s imports of Algerian gas registered a considerable rise since 1997, and in 2000 these imports reached 10,339m cubic metres, this being the highest import volume of natural gas ever to be registered in trade between the two countries. However, this volume remained low as a share of French total imports compared with 1988, for example.

54 Javier Estrada et al. The Development of European Gas Markets, p. 52.
The securitisation discourse loses in credibility when considered in relation to the projects finished, signed or negotiated in the 1990s. In particular, the MEG pipeline was inaugurated in 1995 during the bloody years of the Algerian conflict. As has already been mentioned, a number of new projects were signed or were negotiated between 1999 and 2001 for the construction of new pipelines and the renovation of LNG plants to increase exports.

The decrease of France’s imports of Algerian gas only confirms the predominance of political considerations over economic or environmental ones when energy security worries are important. This decrease was a guarded move by France to protect itself, and thus it reflected the feeling in France of closeness to the Algerian crisis. On the other hand, the increase in Spanish and Italian imports of Algerian gas testified to the conviction in Madrid and Rome of their distance from the Algerian problem, and indeed they both refrained from openly taking sides in the Algerian crisis. The fact that political stability takes centre stage in the securitisation of energy supply is primarily related to political stability being less predictable as well as harder to control or manage. It is based on uncertainties not only about the strength of the current political regime but also about the future behaviour of the challenging Islamist groups when they attain power in the Maghreb (see Chapter 5).

The conclusion that, in the WM, politics prevails over economics while considering the security of energy supply is obvious in view of the lack of a securitisation discourse on the part of Morocco as a net importer of energy, Tunisia having followed suit since 2000. This lack of securitisation in Morocco should be read against the fact the country gets most of its energy supplies from the Middle East. However, in the case of a sharp rise in
the prices of gas (and hydrocarbons in general), these two countries are badly hit. Indeed, if there is need to talk about energy security, the issue of price shocks should be of paramount importance for both sides of the WM.

Energy security in the WM, as suggested by the commonly expressed securitisation discourse, can be seriously compromised because of the potentially volatile political situation in Algeria and Libya. But the same can be said to happen because of the volatile nature of energy prices. Like major political changes, large changes in prices may be sudden and can cause energy crises. These crises could prove even more pronounced if the current trend of increased dependency continues. A sharp fall in energy prices can badly affect the exporting countries; this was, for example, the effect of the 1986 oil (and gas) price drop on Algeria so much so that this price drop has often been seen as the instigator of the crisis that followed in the early 1990s. Likewise, a sharp rise in energy prices can similarly affect the importing countries. Volatile prices more than volatile states should be seen to be the primary threat. Hence there is a need to build a more viable partnership in the energy sector, a partnership that has the potential to ensure greater stability in the region.

CONCLUSION

The securitisation of the economic sector has been given more weight by tying it to the political sector. This is in terms of its impact on the political sector as well as its being influenced by political developments. Though this link to the political sector gives claims about economic security more weight, it still leaves economic security itself difficult to measure and confined to the realm of uncertainties rather than to being the source of any form of substantial threat.

The Maghreb countries’ securitisation of their economic sector (through the link between protectionism, economic development and socio-political implications) has derived mainly from the situation in the 1980s when fears of the development of a ‘fortress Europe’ were vividly expressed and felt. The continuation of these fears during the 1990s created a mismatch between securitisation and the reality of economic relations in the WM. Indeed, the main characteristic of the 1990s has been the drive for more liberalisation. The difficulties confronting Maghrebi exports have been the result of the progressive erosion of preferential treatment, combined with a lack of competitiveness on the Maghrebi side, rather than the consequences of protectionism. Even the link
established between economic security and its socio-political impact has been exaggerated, especially when associated with protectionism in the agriculture and textiles sectors. Employment in both sectors rose in both Tunisia and Morocco even during periods of high protectionism. The linkage between economic security and the political sector might be seen rather in terms of a reluctance in the Maghreb to embrace liberalisation wholeheartedly because of the political challenges liberalisation generates for the traditional political and economic elites in these countries.55

Despite the absence of solid correspondence between economic securitisation and the economic reality of the region in the 1990s, the securitisation discourse and the association it makes between economic security and political stability has succeeded in catching the attention of south-west European countries and increasing their worries about a spillover of socio-political violence onto their territories. Indeed, political stability in the Maghreb has been of paramount importance for them, not least in terms of the security of energy supply. This has justified the efforts employed to encourage smooth and democratic political reforms in the Maghreb. These political considerations have been to the fore in Franco-Algerian energy relations.

All in all, the fact that economic development is related to security renders economic cooperation equivocal in nature. The disappointment of the Maghreb countries over the lack of progress in economic cooperation can be seen as a cause for securitising the agriculture and textiles and clothing sectors as vital ones for their economies. At the same time, however, without such securitisation, economic cooperation might be far less developed. For the upgrading of economic relations between the Maghreb countries and the rest of the Mediterranean has been motivated by security worries and the need to secure more stability in the region as a whole. Nonetheless, the need to guarantee security tends to preserve the status quo, rather than to construct a democratic stability. These inadvertent consequences of the ‘quest for security’ might be even more true when considered in relation to the issues that have been securitised in the political sector.

CHAPTER 5

POLITICAL SECURITY: INSTABILITY AND THREAT FROM ISLAMISM

Securitisation of the political sector in the WM has centred on the rise of political Islam1 (often regardless of its variants, radical or moderate) as a pretender to political power in the Maghreb, with Algeria providing the best example of such a manifestation. The Algerian experience, representing an unsuccessful and abrupt political attempt to democratise following the political liberalisation of the late 1980s, has provided firewood for the securitisation of the political scene in the Maghreb. With the outbreak of Islamist-related violence in Algeria and the occurrence of some instances of it in France as well as in other Maghreb countries,2 the securitisation of political Islam became increasingly pronounced.

The motives behind this securitisation, however, differed from one side of the WM to the other. For Maghrebi regimes, political Islam has constituted a serious challenge to their legitimacy (or has the potential to do so). It would, allegedly, cast their countries into a phase of dangerous instability that would drag the whole region into chaos. In the south-west European countries, political Islam has been linked with the fear that hostile (Islamist) powers might gain political strength in the Maghreb and, subsequently, jeopardise Western interests in the region in respect of markets and energy supplies. It has also raised fears of massive flows of refugees fleeing ‘fanatic’ Islamist rulers.

Because securitisation of the political sector in the WM revolves principally around political instability as a consequence of the resurgence of political Islam, what follows briefly reviews political developments in the Maghreb from a security perspective. In particular, this Chapter looks into how and whether political Islam constitutes a threat to the legitimacy and sovereignty of the states in the WM. In other words, it submits the securitisation discourse surrounding political instability and political Islam to a reality-check so as to see to what extent it matches any threats to security in the region.

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1 The terms ‘political Islam’ and ‘Islamism’ are used interchangeably throughout the thesis.
2 Between 1994 and 1996, Morocco and Tunisia witnessed two armed attacks within their territories. Similar Islamist-related attacks aimed at Qadhafi were reported in 1996.
5.1 POLITICAL SECURITY BETWEEN SOVEREIGNTY AND LEGITIMACY

Security in the political sector concerns, in theory, challenges that threaten to undermine the stability of a country or the continuity of the organisational ideology that holds together state sovereignty and legitimacy. The political nature of the state makes threats to it in the political sector as serious as traditional military ones because of their ability to erode its political foundations. Threats to the state can be external because of rivalry or enmity from neighbouring states, and/or internal because of (domestic) challenges to the legitimacy of the ruling elites. Thus, political security centres essentially around sovereignty, both external (international recognition) and domestic (legitimacy).³

Sovereignty and legitimacy, as fundamental foundations of the state, are elements which relate to politico-military power and socio-political cohesion, respectively. For this reason, the state remains the main, if not the sole, referent object for political security. The multi-faceted nature of the political sector (in the sense that issues in other sectors start, first, as being political before becoming a matter of security afterwards) tends to blur any distinction between political security and the primordial notion of national security. Antagonism to the ideas or ideology upon which the state has been established constitutes a threat to its continuity. This is particularly true in the case of weak states because their legitimacy is often contested from within by groups that have visions of or projects for the development of their societies which are different from or contradictory to those being implemented by the incumbent governing elites.

Indeed, at the heart of political security lies a distinction between weak states and strong states that hinges on the degree of socio-political cohesiveness.⁴ Strong states enjoy socio-political cohesion, and thus are more secure politically. Threats to their security involve (virtually) threats from external rival countries or ideologies infiltrating into their political society. Weak states, on the other hand, are often concerned for their security on account of internally generated threats. This has led some to distinguish between hardware security and software security.⁵ The first refers to traditional military and economic security; the second, to the extent of state legitimacy and integration.

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³ For various types of sovereignty, see Stephen Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton University Press, 1999), especially Chapters 1 and 8.
capacity. Therefore, political security for weak states involves (i) threats resulting from the security environment of the international/regional context in which they interact with each other as well as with other states, (ii) hardware security and (iii) software security.

Threats to political security, as suggested by the securitisation discourse, are seen to have roots in the domestic politics of the Maghreb countries as weak states. Therefore, a reality-check to the securitisation of the political sector focuses on the impact of political developments in Maghreb on the WM as a whole. This reality-check is carried out in relation to three main issues, namely (i) security of sovereignty, (ii) instability and the resurgence of political Islam and (iii) the assessment of the security implications of the Islamist challenge for the WM.

5.2 SECURITY OF SOVEREIGNTY: EXTERNAL FACTORS

During the early years of independence, state sovereignty in the Maghreb constituted a weighty political issue. All Maghreb countries were involved during the first days of nation-state building in territorial disputes of some sort as a result of decolonisation. This was heightened especially after the independence of Algeria in 1962. Competitive economic interests, antagonist ideologies and strategic factors aggravated these disputes. Tunisia had territorial conflicts on its south-eastern border with Libya, and on its south-western border with Algeria. The Tunisian-Libyan dispute over the delimitation of the Gulf of Gabès was resolved by virtue of a declaration of the International Court of Justice in 1982. Similarly, the Treaty of Friendship and Concord (1983) between Algeria, Tunisia and Mauritania put an end to their border contentions. The most serious disputes, however, took place between Morocco and Algeria. The two countries had border conflicts particularly over the delimitation of the boundaries in Tindouf, Figuig and Colomb-Béchar. At a meeting of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1972, the two countries signed an agreement accepting the territorial boundaries left after decolonisation. Algeria ratified the agreement in May of the following year while Morocco did so only in May 1989, after the creation of the AMU, which was understood by Morocco to provide further guarantees from Algeria over the Western Sahara conflict.

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Nonetheless, the establishment of the AMU did not imply an Algerian recognition or acceptance of the Western Sahara as part of Morocco.

Indeed, the question of the Western Sahara conflict and reactions to it shifted considerably during the 1990s. In 1980s the question of the Western Sahara constituted above all a military issue for Morocco, an issue between it and the Polisario, on the one hand, and between it and Algeria, on the other. In the 1990s, following the 1988 UN proposal for settlement, providing for an armistice and a referendum on self-determination, the issue of the Western Sahara continued to be high on the political agenda of both Morocco and Algeria, mainly as a bone of contention with political implications for the WM as a whole rather than as primarily a military issue.

5.2.1 The exception of the Western Sahara

With one notable exception, all the territorial conflicts in the Maghreb have been resolved through peaceful means or by resorting to international arbitration. Though these conflicts have resulted in a few isolated border armed clashes, they have been mainly territorial in nature and never amounted to a threat to sovereignty as understood in international relations, that is, as attempts at all-out war. The exception is the conflict over the Western Sahara which continues to play a significant role in the political relations between Algeria and Morocco. The Western Sahara has indeed huge regional political implications for the Maghreb, either in terms of the establishment of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) as a new state or in the acceptance and recognition of the Western Sahara as part of Morocco after a final conclusion of the self-determination referendum has been reached. However, the political dimensions of the Western Sahara and its impact on the region have not been limited to the Maghreb alone. They also stretch to France and Spain in particular, not least because of former colonial connections to the Western Sahara and involvement in the conflict through support for one party or the other.

The Western Sahara conflict has, since the withdrawal of Spain from the region and its annexation by Morocco, conditioned the creation of short-lived ‘alliances’ in the WM. After the ‘Green March’, which took place on 6 November 1975, the Tripartite Madrid Accords were signed between Spain, Morocco and Mauritania transferring the administration of the Western Sahara and its coastal waters to Morocco and Mauritania. The signing of these accords sparked off Algeria’s anger against Spain and triggered a heightened sense of marginalisation in Algiers. In retaliation against Morocco, the Algerian government declared its recognition of the Polisario Front in March 1976, after
the latter had proclaimed the Western Saharan territory as the independent SADR, following Spanish withdrawal in February 1976. Algeria also provided considerable military support and training to the Polisario Front. As a response, Morocco broke off its diplomatic relations with Algiers, putting paid to the reconciliation that had followed their border confrontation during the ‘War of Sand’ in 1963.

Furthermore, Algeria took some retaliatory measures against Spain. It sought to promote the Canary Islands liberation movement within the OAU. But this aggressive thrust towards Spain in particular was then brought into check owing to economic consideration from the Algerian side, as plans for the construction of a direct gas pipeline between the two countries were under discussion. Pressures from both the Polisario Front and Algeria partly influenced Spain’s non-official recognition of the Polisario; the latter was allowed to open a diplomatic bureau in Madrid. Economic interests with Morocco, however, compelled Spain to find some parity in its relations with Algeria and Morocco, but continued to push forward for the right of the Sahrawi for self-determination.

The French colonial legacy in the Maghreb contributed to the Western Sahara conflict having implications for France too. France’s inclination to support the establishment of ‘a greater Morocco’, particularly during Valéry Giscard d’Estaing’s Presidency, upset Algeria and strained its bilateral relations with it at the end of the Houari Boumedienne era in 1978. French policy towards the Western Sahara changed considerably with the arrival of the socialists to government in 1981. Evidence of this was the Polisario Front’s being allowed to open a diplomatic bureau in Paris in 1982. This change, however, did not preclude France from continuing its arms sales to Rabat, nor did it encourage France to express her wish for the establishment of a new microstate in the Western Sahara. For Mitterrand, the Western Sahara was and remained a problem between Algeria and Morocco. Like Spain, France had to find an equilibrium in its relations with Morocco and Algeria for economic and political reasons. Both France and Spain were aided in this by the rapprochement between Algiers and Rabat in 1988 and the subsequent establishment of the regional AMU the following year.

Indeed, the evolution of regional dynamics in the Maghreb was, and still is, linked with developments in the Western Sahara conflict. The Algerian and Libyan military and diplomatic support of the Polisario Front, especially in the first half of the 1980s, was

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behind a number of rhetorical and short-lived alliances in the Maghreb. In this context, Morocco declared in 1981 its acceptance of a referendum on self-determination to be organised under the auspices of the OAU, while Algeria considered such an exercise useless, encouraging instead direct negotiations between the Polisario leadership and the Moroccan government. Parallel to the diplomatic activities which Morocco carried out within the OAU to gain support for its position on the Western Sahara, the country began in 1981 the construction of the first of a series of defence ‘walls’ to protect itself from Polisario military attacks. However, when the OAU recognised the SADR in 1984, Morocco withdrew from the African organisation and decided to take its referendum proposal to the UN instead. The UN stressed the need for direct negotiation between the two conflicting parties. A number of unsuccessful meetings between the Polisario leadership and Moroccan representatives took place on various occasions in 1986. After the rapprochement between Algiers and Rabat in May 1988, a breakthrough in negotiation happened. Indeed, in August 1988, both Morocco and the Polisario accepted the UN proposal for an armistice and the establishment of a referendum on self-determination. A UN mission, MINURSO, was set up for this purpose in April 1991.

The agreement to find a UN settlement to the Western Sahara conflict was aided by various elements that came into play in the region in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The change of attitude was motivated in Morocco by splits in the Polisario Front as a number of its co-founders defected to Morocco in 1989. From the Polisario side, it was due to the weakening of military and political support from Eastern Europe as well as from the other Maghreb countries, especially Libya. In addition, the emergence of new politico-economic worries in the Maghreb contributed to the temporary retreat of the contentions over the Western Sahara to the background of Maghrebi relations in the early 1990s. This change was the result of the economic difficulties of the 1980s in the Maghreb, the Islamist challenge and the internal problems of Algeria. Concerns with these new issues contributed positively to the creation of the AMU. During the years leading to the creation of the AMU, there was a consensus in the Maghreb as well as in

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9 For a detailed discussion of these alliances in the 1980s, see Abdelkhael Berramadane, *Le Sahara occidental. Enjeu maghrébin* (Karthala, 1992), pp. 77-89.
10 The MINURSO mission was set up in accordance with the ‘settlement proposals’, as agreed upon by Morocco and the Polisario on 30 August 1988. Its main functions were envisioned as follows: to monitor a ceasefire; verify the reduction of Moroccan troops in the territory; monitor the confinement of Moroccan and Polisario troops to designated locations, and ensure the release of all Western Sahara political prisoners or detainees; oversee the exchange of prisoners of war; implement the repatriation programme; identify and register qualified voters; and organize and ensure a free referendum and proclaim the results. See International Institute of Strategic Studies, *Military Balance 1999-2000*, p. 293.
France and Spain that the Western Sahara conflict should find its solution within the Maghreb itself. Perceptions of a growing instability in the region helped to write off the idea of a Sahrawi new state, for fear of further destabilising effects. Indeed, stability in the Maghreb, and in Morocco in particular (considering the situation in Algeria), was deemed by Spain to be more pressing than any support to the Polisario Front that went beyond the UN resolution for a self-determination referendum. France, though it officially calls for the pursuance of the UN referendum, has tended to remain in favour of a greater Morocco.

Thus, after the establishment of the AMU, the truce between Morocco and the Polisario Front and the launching of the MINURSO, the conflict of the Western Sahara became primarily political. The UN established detailed criteria for who should be allowed to vote in the referendum. In a nomad land, where the last census was one taken by Spain in 1974, the identification of qualified voters does not appear to be an easy task. Unresolved difficulties regarding the eligibility of some voters and lack of progress limited the deployment of the MINURSO mission in its early years. It was further complicated by the deterioration in the Moroccan-Algerian relations in 1994, which was mainly brought about by President Liamine Zéroual referring in August 1994 to the Western Sahara as an ‘illegally occupied territory’ and by the controversy over the attack on the luxury hotel in Marrakech in the same month (which the Moroccan authorities linked to an attempt by Algiers to destabilise the monarchy). In the absence of any tangible progress and the high cost of maintaining the mission, the UN Security Council suspended in May 1996 the identification process, and withdrew the civilian police component, save for a small number of officers to keep contacts with the authorities on both sides, and decided on a 20 per cent cut in the MINURSO’s military component. The Polisario threatened a return to war; nonetheless, the cease-fire remained in force but the MINURSO reported a number of violations on both sides in 1996. A meeting at senior level was reported to be held between the two parties but failed to reach any conclusions.

In 1997, a new momentum was sought with James Baker as the UN special envoy to the Western Sahara. The MINURSO mission was given further extension in its mandate to carry out its activities, a practice that would continue until 2002. Realising the difficulties to reach a settlement on the issue of eligibility of voters, Baker started to look for alternatives to this endless and expensive mission, as the plan for a referendum had

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11 The cost of the MINURSO reached US$39m in 1996. Its total cost to June 1999 was US$337m.
been limping from one postponement to the next for more than 11 years. In June 2001, he proposed a plan that would, temporarily, put aside the referendum and discuss an autonomy project to the territory as part of Morocco. Under this proposal the Sahrawi people would have the right to elect their own executive and parliament and administer 20 per cent of the revenues from the territory, but with Rabat retaining responsibility for foreign affairs, defence and customs. This UN proposal was rejected by Algeria as biased and unjust; call was made instead for the pursuance of the already existing plan for a referendum.

The rejection of the proposal and the lack of cooperation on behalf of the conflicting parties led to the UN threatening to withdraw its mission from the Western Sahara, which could lead to a return to military confrontation in the region. In March 2002, the UN presented a bleak report on the regress in the region and sought to increase the UN power of decision. It put forward new proposals, including the possible partition of the territory between the conflicting parties.

Developments in the Western Sahara conflict have also influenced relations with France and Spain. France has been on the Moroccan side and has often favoured and defended its settlement plans. This was clear in visits of French government ministers to the territory despite these visits being a gesture of recognition of the ‘Moroccanness’ of the Western Sahara. Charles Pasqua’s visit in January 1994 raised a wave of consternation in the Polisario leadership because it contradicted France’s supposed neutral role towards the territory as a member of the UN Security Council. France’s position became even more ‘unacceptable’ to the Polisario when the French oil company, Total Fina Elf, was awarded in November 2001 a 12-month exploration licence off the coast of Dakhla.

On the other hand, Spain’s attitudes to the Western Sahara have often been linked to its economic and political relations with Morocco. Spain’s refraining from open support to the Polisario was often traded off against access to Moroccan fishing waters and phosphates exploration and exploitation. No immediate benefits were made out of these economic advantages because of the outbreak of military confrontation and Spanish fishing boats were being attacked by the Polisario at a various occasions. The worst of

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these attacks happened in September 1985 leading to the death of one Spanish fisherman. This tilt towards Morocco was later balance by seeking closer economic and political relations with Algeria. In 1985, Spain negotiated a contract for long-term purchases of LNG from Algeria. This was followed by a political rapprochement between the two countries as they signed anti-terrorism agreements in November 1986 and September 1987 in respect of the Spanish ETA (Algeria having facilitated negotiations between Madrid and the ETA) and, on other hand, of anti-FLN dissidents living in Spain. In December 1987, Spain proposed a resolution that supported a UN-OAU peace plan for the Western Sahara.

Spain’s caution in the matter of the Western Sahara started to gradually change in 1990s following Morocco’s hardening stance in its fisheries agreements with the EU, agreements of which Spain has been the principal beneficiary and, more recently, the most adversely affected when they were not renewed after 1999. Though both Morocco and Spain stressed their amicable relations regardless of the outcome of the fisheries negotiations in 2000, relations between them since 2001 have proved the opposite. Indeed, relations between the two countries became increasingly strained in mid-2001. The refusal to renew the fisheries agreement, together with the question of the control of ‘illegal’ immigration and the ‘complacency’ in some Spanish regional governments with independentist projects for the Western Sahara, seem to be behind these tensions: The convening of a conference of pro-Polisario European organisations in the Andalusian capital, Seville, contributed to worsen the already tense Morocco-Spanish relations. It is not striking that this conference was held in Andalusia, the region that was the most badly hit by the non-renewal of the fisheries agreement with Morocco and which has the biggest Moroccan immigrant community (35,500 in 2000).

The other issue at stake between the two countries, partly in connection with the Western Sahara, has been the Spanish external territories in the north of Morocco, namely Ceuta, Melilla (and its administratively attached Peñón de Vélez de la Gomera, a small fort on the Mediterranean coast, and two groups of islands, Peñón de Alhucemas and the Chafarinas), and the islet of Perejil (over which Spanish sovereignty is uncertain). Indeed, the issue of the Western Sahara and the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla are linked in many different ways.

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16 Naylor, “Spain, France and the Western Sahara”, in Yahia Zoubir and Daniel Volman (eds.), p. 29.
5.2.2 Changing colours: a ‘blue march’ on Ceuta and Melilla?

Despite various declarations about the need for opening negotiations with Spain with regard to Ceuta and Melilla, Morocco has made it clear that it will not push forward its demands for the ‘liberation’ of the two enclaves until Spain reaches a solution with Britain concerning Gibraltar. Nonetheless, with the scenario of the ‘Green March’ in mind, Spain has feared a re-enactment of it, with a march on the two enclaves. Claims over the two territories by Morocco were made as early as the 1950s. These claims grew less intense with the withdrawal of Spain from the Western Sahara and Morocco’s need of political support for its annexation of the Saharan territory. However, in 1978, King Hassan sought to link the issue of sovereignty of Ceuta and Melilla to that of Spain’s regaining Gibraltar from the United Kingdom. Spain continued to utterly reject any connection or comparison between Gibraltar and the two territories, or even any sort of negotiations over the latter. To exert more pressure, in 1982, the Moroccan political party, Istiqal, exacted action to regain the two enclaves as part of Morocco and, one year later, the Moroccan government blocked the passage of goods at the frontiers between the enclaves and restricted the movement of Moroccan workers to them. These tensions intensified following the controversial effects of the Spanish law on foreigners (ley de extranjería) of 1985 on the rights of the Muslims of Ceuta and, especially of, Melilla\(^{18}\) (see Chapter 5) and the accession of Spain to the EEC in 1986. Indeed, the Istiqal party orchestrated a rally in the Moroccan city of Nador, 20 km away from Melilla.\(^{19}\) However, Hassan II insisted on the need to find a political solution to the problem. This was suggested by his proposal to build a joint commission (or cellule de réflexion) to seek solution to the two enclaves, a proposal which was dismissed by Madrid. Instead, Spain reinforced its police and military presence in Melilla, partly, because of the deterioration of racial relations between Christians and Muslims in the city.

Within the system of autonomous regions in place in Spain, which was instituted by the 1978 constitution, the two North African enclaves were given a special status. Though they lodged a request for autonomy in 1981, it took more than 14 years for Madrid to decide on their final status in March 1995, and this was just to give them partial

\(^{18}\) By virtue of the 1985 immigration legislation on the rights of foreigners, foreign residents in Spain were required to register with the authorities or risk expulsion. If the most Muslims in Ceuta had the necessary documentation, out of 27,000 Muslim community in Melilla, only 7,000 had Spanish nationality. See Antonio Remiro Brotons, "Ceuta, Melilla, représentations espagnoles et marocaines", Hérodote No. 94 (1999), pp 57-8.

\(^{19}\) Gillespie, Spain and the Mediterranean, p. 73.
Not granting full autonomy status to Ceuta and Melilla could be seen in line with a prospective settlement of the issue between Rabat and Madrid, particularly considering the number of Muslims of Moroccan origins living in Ceuta and, especially, Melilla. This view could be reinforced by the fact that the two enclaves have not been annexed to any other Spanish mainland region, but have remained under the responsibility of the Spanish ministry of defence. For fear of Moroccan aggression, Spain has maintained its military presence in Ceuta and Melilla. The fear in Spain has been that the fanning of nationalist feelings in Morocco might lead to an orchestration of a new ‘blue march’ that would result in the annexing of the two North Africa enclaves.

The seemingly farcical disputes between Morocco and Spain over Perejil, a tiny, rocky, uninhabited island west of Ceuta, in July 2002 reflected greater tensions between the two countries in relation to the two enclaves. The Perejil dispute came at a time when the bilateral relations between the two countries were coloured by continued contentions over fisheries, control of clandestine immigration and the settlement of the issue of the Western Sahara. Spain still insisting that the latter should be resolved through a referendum that Morocco has been trying to avoid, especially after the declarations of James Baker in June 2001 (see above). Morocco’s settlement in Perejil was justified against claims that it intended to use the islet as a ‘surveillance post’ in its fights against ‘illegal’ immigration, drug trafficking and terrorism. Whatever the reason, the sending of a dozen of Moroccan soldiers to Perejil was used by Rabat to remind Spain of claims over Ceuta and Melilla. This was no surprise for Madrid, which declared, through its foreign minister, Ana Palacio, the españolidad identity of the two enclaves. This declaration was accompanied by a heavy military presence in the Strait of Gibraltar. In addition to support helicopters and reconnaissance aircraft, Spain also deployed two frigates with crews and marines totalling 400 men off the coast of Ceuta and another two corvettes with 300 men off the coast of Melilla in order to deter any attempts at penetrating the two enclaves.

Despite the clear link between the Perejil incident and the two enclaves, both parties to the dispute decided to dissociate them. The dispute reached a settlement on 22 July 2002, with Morocco and Spain agreeing to leave the island and to refrain from using it for any purpose in the future. Spain stressed the need to restore relations with Morocco.

20 The statutes of the two enclaves provided for 25-member local assemblies with powers similar to those of the municipal councils of mainland Spain, but with limited self-government.
The latter agreed to the settlement and declared, through its foreign minister, Mohammed Benaissa, that the incident in Perejil had nothing to do with the two enclaves. Nonetheless, the Moroccan foreign minister took the opportunity to stress the fact that the question of Ceuta and Melilla will be broached in due time. Indeed, with the run-up to the Moroccan elections in September 2002 starting to warm up, a number of political party leaders were more outspoken than the foreign minister, referring to the need to organise a ‘blue march’ to ‘liberate and regain’ the two enclaves, an allusion to the ‘Green March’ that resulted in Morocco annexing the Western Sahara in 1975.34

5.3 THREAT OF POLITICAL INSTABILITY AND THE RESURGENCE OF ISLAMISM

5.3.1 Political development and the loss of (performance) legitimacy

In their individual endeavours to build their nation-states, the four countries of the Maghreb took different political paths, varying from one-party system in Algeria, to a state-dominated system in Tunisia, to a (declared) ‘constitutional’ monarchy in Morocco, and, since 1969, to a revolutionary jamahiriyya in Libya. All countries embarked on programmes to modernise their societies through rapid urbanisation, education and the development of a large range of public services. Nationalist ideologies succeeded to monopolise supportive sentiments without causing the rise of any serious contestation of the legitimacy of the ruling elites. The leadership of Algeria’s Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) constructed a quasi-mythical image around its heroic nationalist role in a dearly gained independence during the Algerian War (1954-62). In Tunisia, nationalist feelings were woven around the charismatic, larger-than-life character of President Habib Bourguiba and his Neo-Destour Party. In post-independence Morocco, the traditional role of the monarch as a religious leader and a symbol of independence played a unifying factor that was later reinforced by rallying support over the ‘Moroccanness’ of the Western Sahara during the ‘Green March’ in 1975. In Libya, Qaddafi’s revolution put a premium on ‘people democracy’ as well as on the more ambitious theme of Arab nationalism in a period of heightened political and military tensions between the Arabs and Israel. However, in step with this growing modernisation and nationalist projects, the population of the Maghreb at large experienced a parallel growth in political authoritarianism and increasing restrictions on political freedoms. If the relative economic development of the 1970s lent credibility to these nationalist discourses, the realities of

34 “Une ‘marche bleue’ pour Ceuta et Melilla n’est pas ‘exclue’”, Le Monde 22 July 2002.
the 1980s stripped them off of their legitimacy and exposed the inability of the Maghrebi regimes to keep or deliver their post-independence promises.

Developments in the late 1980s ushered in further challenging political difficulties. Popular pressures in Algeria, top-down cosmetic political changes in Tunisia, the suspension of external conflict for Morocco (following an armistice with the Polisario Front in 1991 and the end of military confrontation between the two parties), each — combined with the progressive anchoring of the Maghreb countries to the EU during the 1990s — indirectly provided room for a long suppressed public discontent to be openly voiced. These internal and external developments have thereby pressed the governing elites to rethink their authoritarian attitudes within pluralist and democratic frameworks. Tunisia and Algeria managed to step out of long periods of one-party system that were dominated by the colossal Tunisian Neo-Destour Party and the Algerian FLN. As for Morocco, despite failed coups in 1972 and 1973, the Moroccan monarchy succeeded in establishing and reinforcing itself as the key player on the political scene and chief instigator of political change, as King Hassan initiated a phase of political liberalisation in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Qadhafi’s 1969 revolution ousted King Idris and heralded the inception of the jamahiriyya’s foreign policy of anti-Western (mainly anti-United States) militancy and integration into the African and Arab-Muslim worlds, yet without, domestically, any liberal political perspectives being opened.

The socio-economic difficulties generated by the economic liberalisation of the 1980s forced an upsurge of demands for political liberalisation and the establishment of democratic systems of government, with the Islamist call having emerged as the strongest vehicle of such demands. The dramatic drop in prices of oil from $40 to $18 per barrel in 1986 hit badly Algeria, Libya and, to a lesser extent, Tunisia in terms of their oil revenues. Even Morocco, as a non-hydrocarbon country, was also affected. This drop in the price of oil led to a significant decline in the financial assistance the country received from the Gulf monarchies in particular. The fall in the price of phosphate rock (an important export revenue for Morocco) from $68 per metric ton in 1975 to $34 in 1986 constituted an added difficulty. The decline in such revenues coupled with the adoption of International Monetary Fund (IMF) structural adjustment programmes generated greater difficulties for the Maghreb countries and exposed their inability to sustain their colossal administrative apparatuses and public services through thick and thin. Faltering and debt-burdened economies, coupled with political authoritarianism and an increasing population growth, provided, it seemed, the perfect recipe for socio-political frustration leading, inter
alia, to series of urban riots and the subsequent loss of ‘performance-legitimacy’. As a result, Islamists of various stripes, including the most radical ones, started to emerge conspicuously as alternative and major populist contenders to political power in the region.

5.3.2 Attempts at political liberalisation and the rise of political Islam

In agreement with the democratic discourse that has prevailed since the end of the Cold War and the changes that swept Eastern Europe in 1989, Maghreb countries, likewise, witnessed a series of (controlled) political openings. Changes started with the legalised medical coup d’état of the then prime minister, General Zine Al-Abidine Ben Ali, on 7 November 1987, ousting President Bourguiba and ushering in a series of political reforms. In a speech made that day, President Ben Ali declared the need for a revision of the constitution in order to end life presidency or automatic succession and to replace it with an ‘advanced and institutionalised’ political life based on political pluralism and mass organisations.25 These promising declarations to pave the way for a genuine democracy were made concrete with Ben Ali’s release of a number of political prisoners (most of them Islamists arrested during Bourguiba’s reign). Another symbolic move towards democratisation was the announcement to break with Bourguiba’s era. In the typical fashion of democratisation in the Maghreb, Ben Ali changed the name of Bourguiba’s socialist Neo-Destour party to the RCD, but the party remained a presidential one and continued to dominate the Tunisian political scene.

After the signing of a National Pact in November 1988 between the Tunisian political parties, including Islamist elements, a number of ostensibly ‘daring’ reforms followed. This included, in particular, the release of more Islamist prisoners and the acceptance of Islamist representativity in the Pact. These moves prompted some words of caution from other Maghrebi regimes. Algeria, for example, advised Ben Ali to be wary in his liberal moves, especially with regard to Islamist groups. This reaction came from Chérif Messadia, the FLN number two, who was also critical of the liberal moves of the Algerian President Chadli Benjedid.26 By this time, Tunisia’s nascent pluralism had already entered a strictly controlled structure under the RCD as new laws were introduced banning any political party with religious references from participation in the Tunisian political scene. In accordance with this new legislation, the Mouvement de la Tendance

Islamique (MTI) changed its name to *al-Nahda* (the Renaissance). Though it was allowed to run in the April 1989 election under the so-called independent lists and won 14 per cent of the votes cast, it was twice refused legal and official recognition.

Political liberalisation in Morocco in the late 1980s and early 1990s focused more on human rights and the release of political prisoners than on the political participation of the Islamists. Islamists were denied political participation and the power of their religious call was mitigated by the religious symbolism embodied in the person of the monarch as *Amir al-Mouminin* (Commander of the Faithful). The situation in Morocco was also fundamentally different because of a long standing socialist opposition. Though this opposition was not entirely excluded from the political life, its participation was often manipulated by the Palace. Considering the situation in Algeria, King Hassan was seeking, instead, to push forward a political *alternance*, with the participation of the two political blocs that started to form in the country in the early 1990s, notably the National *Wifaq* and the socialist opposition, the Democratic *Koutla*. Turning to Libya, the main preoccupation of the country in the 1980s was focused on a campaign to eliminate ‘the stray dogs’, Libyan dissidents living abroad. Reports of the activities of anti-Qadhafi Islamist elements started to emerge only in 1993.

The significant breakthrough in the Maghreb, however, occurred only with Chadli Benjedid's *suites en avant* as he went ahead with introducing further economic and political reforms, despite the internal resistance of some FLN members.27 These reforms were a continuation of previous efforts towards political liberalisation which had already begun with the adoption, by way of referendum, of a new National Charter in 1986.28 The Arabisation reforms that followed from the Charter provoked a number of riots by Berberist movements in the Algerian province of Tizi Ouzou. These riots indirectly induced more economic and bureaucratic (rather than political) reforms that were geared towards liberalising the Algerian economy. These moves towards economic liberalisation prompted episodes of social unrest which punctuated the second half of the 1980s, and culminated in major riots in October 1988. Whatever the reasons behind these riots and

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28 The 1986 Charter came ten years after Boumedienne’s Charter in 1976. Though it retained a blend of socialism and Islam (which were already defined in the old document), this new Charter introduced elements that were meant to set the country away from the *dirigiste* and *doctrinaire* socialism of Boumedienne’s era. It also included initiatives to start Arabisation in the administrative and educational systems. See Martin Stone, *The Agony of Algeria* (Hurst & Company, 1997), pp. 60-1.
demonstrations, one thing is clear: they translated a tense relationship between the masses and the Algerian ruling regime.

Nonetheless, these events paved the way for one of the most promising phases of Algeria's political life. Following the October riots, a new constitution, amending that of 1976, was adopted by referendum in 1989. The new constitution abandoned the commitment to socialist ideology; but, more importantly, it replaced the one-party-state political system by a multi-party one. These reforms received a positive response inside and outside Algeria and gave birth to a number of so-called political parties headed by historic figures. From this myriad of parties, the FIS emerged as the strongest opposition party, enjoying a good national organisation and a wide and effective network of mobilisation that was carried out mainly via mosques. The municipal elections of June 1990, the first multi-party election since independence in 1962, confirmed the FIS's status. The latter managed to score 54 per cent against 34 per cent for the historic FLN. At the time, Algeria appeared, to some, to be "the most free, the most pluralist and the most enthusiastic defender of democracy in the Arab world".  

Despite changes then made to the electoral law in April 1991 aiming to forestall the (probable) victory of the FIS in subsequent elections, the latter registered a sweeping victory in the first round of parliamentary elections in December 1991. The FIS won 47 per cent of the votes cast, which corresponded to 188 of 231 seats. The remaining 43 seats were distributed amongst three parties. The FLN incurred further losses in its support base and, despite its historic status, managed to win only 15 seats, 10 seats behind the FFS which won 25 seats, and ahead only of the independents who won 3 seats. The second round of legislative elections was scheduled for 16 January 1992; it never took place, however. It was cancelled by the army, thereby precluding the FIS's path to what seemed then a guaranteed victory.

Faced with these electoral results and the FIS's growing signs of outspoken antagonism towards the army (especially during the Gulf War), the military stepped in

29 For example, the Berberist RCD (Rassemblement pour la Culture et la démocratie) of Said Saadi, at-Tahadi (the Challenge), the ex-Parti de l'Avant-Garde Socialiste, an Algerian communist party, FFS (Front des Forces Socialistes) of Hocine Ait Ahmed, and the MDA (Mouvement pour la Démocratie en Algérie) of Ben Bella.
31 For example, provocation came in January 1990 from the FIS number two leader, Ali Benhadji, who, dressed in military uniform, organised a march to the Ministry of Defence asking for ammunition to go and fight on the Iraqi side. The second incident was an Islamist attack on a military post in Guemmar (El Oued) in November 1991.
on 11 January 1992, five days before the run-up to the second round of legislative elections. It forced Benjedid to resign as President and, subsequently, replaced him by a Haut Comité d’Etat (HCE), a collegial presidential structure directed by Mohammed Boudiaf (who was allegedly assassinated by one of his guards in June of the same year), until the expiration of Benjedid’s presidential term in December 1993. It declared a twelve-month state of emergency in February, which gave it the right to detain suspects, introduce press censorship and declare curfews. It outlawed the FIS and arrested its leaders one month later. Between 1992 and 1994, the military essentially ruled the country, before they designated Liamine Zeroual as President in January 1994 for a transition period of three years.

Thus, the varied pressures and attempts at political liberalisation in the Maghreb brought to the political forefront, especially in Tunisia and Algeria, Islamist groups as principal and credible contenders to play the role of the opposition, if not to take political power. In Tunisia, al-Nahda’s support was limited, though its role as a credible (non-official) opposition was strengthened. In Algeria, the victory of the FIS was precipitately heralded as the dawn of an Islamist state in the country. In Morocco, Islamist groups were denied official recognition, but their influence grew considerably outside the political arena through increased penetration of the social fields.

In this context, one may argue that the Maghreb countries have reacted differently to the rise of Islamism. Islamist movements in each country have moved in different political arenas facing different windows of opportunity for political participation; they have also faced different obstacles which limit their actions. Nonetheless, claims about the rise of political Islam as a threat that would sweep the Maghreb regimes and speculations about the violent escalations in Algeria following suit in the neighbouring countries remain, however, questionable.

5.4 ASSESSING THE SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF A ‘GREEN THREAT’ IN THE WM

With the Algerian experience in mind, the securitisation discourse of the WM portrays political Islam as a 1990s phenomenon with various reasons behind its rise and strength. Some have seen it as a phenomenon that fishes in the ponds of economic frustration and related political deprivation, and whose ideological precepts (of equality and justice) make easy prey of large numbers of angry, frustrated unemployed youth. This argument seems to find an explanation of the rise of political Islam in the political economy of the
state in which it emerged. It makes the appeal of political Islam a logical consequence of economic deprivation. That is, wherever there is economic deprivation and lack of political pluralism, the expected result is the emergence of religiously inspired political movements. The economic argument is not completely unfounded; it does give a partial explanation of the appeal of political Islam as a means to redress economic injustice. However, to give it precedence is to give short shrift to more important factors which are embedded in the political structure of the Maghreb countries as well as in the individual national experience of each of them.\footnote{For an excellent analysis of the question of Islamism, see François Burgat, \textit{L’islamisme en face} (La Découverte, 1996).}

Similarly, certain works seeking to examine and explain the rise of political Islam often go back to the Islamic past so as to dig up the roots of events happening today and extrapolate from there the reasons of the current ‘antagonistic’ discourse of the Islamists. Such an approach comforts some of these works in the belief of the continuity of ancient antagonisms and legitimises their conclusion of ‘a clash of civilisations’.\footnote{See, notably, Samuel Huntington, \textit{The Clash of Civilisations and Remaking of World Order} (Simon and Schuster, 1996), especially pp. 110-19.} In this way, like the political-economic argument, these works give scant attention to internal and national forces that are of similar, if not more, explanatory weight, especially in the context of the Maghreb countries.

The task here is not to review the different reasons advanced to explain the conditions of the rise of political Islam.\footnote{The different perspectives seeking to account for the rise of political Islam are ‘crisis perspective’, ‘success perspective’, ‘developmental-social perspective’ and ‘historical-cultural perspective’. For a brief discussion and criticism of these perspectives, see Emad Eldin Shahin, \textit{Political Ascent: Contemporary Islamic Movements in North Africa} (Westview Press, 1998), pp. 7-14.} Nor is it to find a comprehensive definition of what political Islam is; a large number of more able volumes have already been devoted to such tasks. Rather, the exercise at hand is to examine any match between the securitisation of political Islam and its security implications. That is, does the rise of political Islam perceived in its Maghrebi version match with its securitisation, i.e. as a threat to the security and stability of the WM? To answer this question it is reasonable to focus on Algeria as the pivotal state in the region in this respect, since political Islam is deemed at the heart of the securitisation of the political sector, and in Algeria it has found its most striking expression. Therefore, what follows looks at the influence of the Algerian crisis on the security of the WM. This is carried out in three steps: the impact of Algeria’s experience on the development of political Islam in the other Maghreb

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countries, its repercussions on security in the WM, and, finally, the reactions of other WM countries to Islamism within the framework of the democratisation discourse that has been considered to form an integral part of the EMP.

5.4.1 The Algerian experience and the development of political Islam in the Maghreb

Violent precedents of political Islam in the recent past have continued to nurture perceptions of it today. The Iranian Revolution (1979), the assassination of President Sadat of Egypt two years afterwards (1981), the anti-Western reaction of Maghrebian populations to the Gulf War (1991), and the tragic Algerian experience (starting in 1992), have all combined to render political Islam almost irreversibly synonymous with radicalism, fundamentalism, violence and terrorism. If the *imaginaire* of the West has nurtured memories of the crusades and invasions of southern Europe as pictures of past religious antagonisms, today’s modern and largely political encounter with Islam has often been couched within this *imaginaire* and has found its source of inspiration and imagination in images of Ayatollah Khomeini’s Iran, the Islamist republic of Sudan and Taliban’s Afghanistan. On the other hand, moderate Islamist figures have been sacrificed on the altar of sensationalism and stereotypes since they rarely hit the headlines and – having failed to conform to the fundamentalist stereotype – they have become looked upon, often dismissed, as abnormal.

The ‘myth of confrontation’35 between Islam and the West, which has been revived by the recent modern political encounter with Islamism, has also been occasioned by a complicit indictment of Islamists by the regimes in place in the southern Mediterranean. In the Maghreb, political Islam has usually been associated with an ideology that is antagonistic to the governing elite and has been put on equal footing with the blend of nationalism and Marxism that emerged after independence. Thus, political Islam is decried by the regimes of the Maghreb as a political opposition whose agenda is not, and will not be, compatible with that of the West or with any moderate project for their own societies. In south-west European countries, the rise of political Islam has been given, at least at the level of the media, political and civilisational overtones, pointing to political instability and the clash between Islam and the West. Those overtones have often been echoed in the securitisation discourse. Thus, through a combination of domestic and

external condemnations, political Islam has been presented as a threat to stability and menace to security in the WM.

Contrary to the belief in and anticipation of the ‘domino effect’ that political Islam would cause across the Maghreb, the tragic developments in Algeria have greatly harmed its growth in the neighbouring countries. With the simmering violence in Algeria having frightening consequences, the situation in the other Maghrebi countries has been observed with a great deal of apprehension from France, Italy and Spain. The regimes in place in the other Maghrebi countries have been vehement in their condemnation of political Islam and have concerted their efforts to limit, if not to quell, the political activism of their own Islamist groups in order to prevent anything similar to what has happened in Algeria from occurring inside their territories. Such reactions have been oblivious to many a declaration by some Islamist groups who have condemned the violence in Algeria and have declared themselves ready to participate in and respect the democratic game. This has notably been the case of Tunisia’s al-Nahda and Morocco’s Al-Adl wal-Ihsane (‘Justice and Charity’, hereafter, Al-Adl).

What the Algerian crisis did, therefore, was to cause other Maghrebi states to clamp down further on their Islamists as it reinforced an already expressed commitment to thwart their resurgence. Long before the eruption of violence in Algeria, the repression of Islamist groups was common practice. The creation of the AMU in 1989 was motivated, albeit only partly, by a need to counter the rise of Islamism in the Maghreb. In Tunisia, two laws were adopted in 1988 introducing more administrative control of mosques and declaring illegal any party basing itself on religious values or Arabism. To comply with these laws, the MTI changed its name to al-Nahda to be able to participate in the elections of 1989. Despite changing its name from MTI and its participation in the April 1989 parliamentary elections through independent candidates, al-Nahda was refused legal recognition for the second time in June 1989. The 14 per cent vote al-Nahda achieved did not win it any seats in the parliament. Nonetheless, these results were worrying to the government. With the outbreak of Islamist-related violence in Algeria, the narrow windows of opportunity open for the Tunisian al-Nahda were ultimately shut. Consequently, al-Nahda started to harden its line of action. On 17 February 1991, some of its radical members attacked the RCD’s offices in Tunis, giving Ben Ali a long awaited occasion to clamp down on its leaders and entirely ban its participation and dialogue with

it. By this time, regime repression of the Islamists reached degrees reminiscent of Bourguiba’s era, and Ben Ali was categorical in his rejection of any dialogue with them.\(^{37}\)

In Morocco, the role of the king as Amir al-Mouminin made the Islamists’ claims to religious power difficult and any monopoly of religious discourse unlikely. The Islamist discourse was used by the monarch to pre-empt any challenge from Islamist movements.\(^{38}\) Parallel to this, the regime continued its repression of Islamist militancy, especially against Abdelkarim Moutii’s radical al-Shabiba al-Islamiyya (the Islamic Youth). Unlike in Tunisia, events in Algeria prompted the Moroccan regime to try to include Islamist elements in the political game as a way of controlling them. Indeed, in late 1991 a number of Islamists were released as ideas for the establishment of a political alternance started to be developed. Yet, despite their design to enhance political liberalisation, the moves towards alternance were deemed, amongst other things, a ‘gentlemen’s agreement’ between the monarch and the opposition to neutralise any challenge the Islamists might engender. The overtures represented by the political changes leading to alternance resulted in the cooptation of one Islamist group, al-Islah wal Tajdid (‘Reform and Renewal’, hereafter, al-Islah), by the government, with a number of its members fielding their candidacies in the 1997 parliamentary elections under the Mouvement Populaire Constitutionnel Démocratique (MPCD).\(^{39}\) However, al-Adl, which is considered less moderate, is still being denied official recognition. But al-Adl itself also refuses to participate in the political arena until conditions are ripe for it to do so.

In Libya, the Islamist challenge became more evident only in 1993. This was said to have been the result of growing economic disparities between the rich Tripoli region and the poor Cyrenaica region in the north-east of the country. Indeed, a number of attacks between 1993 and 1998 were reported to have been carried out by the Militant Islamic Group (MIG), Libya’s most significant Islamist group.\(^{40}\) Some of these attacks, however, were either denied by the regime or blamed on extremist elements that had reportedly infiltrated the country from Egypt and Sudan. Nonetheless, in general Islamist

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\(^{38}\) For instance, King Hassan II established a High Council of Ulama in January 1980 and headed it; a decree (fatwa) was issued denouncing Khomeini’s views as un-Islamic. He also embarked on the construction of a monumental mosque, named after himself, on the shore of Casablanca.

\(^{39}\) After the 1997 elections, the MPCD became the Parti de la Justice et du Développement (PJD) to reflect its Islamist component.

militancy in Libya remained small, weak and scattered. In response, the regime has tightened its control over the Islamist resurgence. It was helped in this by the wearing-out of the Islamists themselves, both financially and politically as they lacked support from neighbouring sources.

The hypothesis that, without suppression from the Maghrebi regimes, the rise of Islamism would have fulfilled the ‘domino effect’ prophecy has little credibility when set against the realities of Islamist groups in the Maghreb. This prophecy has been based on the fear that the Algerian example would provide a positive source of influence for the other Islamists of the region. However, Algeria has never really served as a source of inspiration for the other Maghrebi countries, mainly because of its rivalry with Morocco and Libya. Even during its glorious, romanticised moments as a defender of tiersmondisme, Algeria was not taken as a model to follow by its neighbours. Qadhafi himself, who entertained similar visions of African and Arab unity and an anti-imperialist discourse, was rarely enthusiastic about Algerian projects.

This national attitude stretches to certain Islamist groups. For, as Rémy Leveau argues, there seems to be a national jealousy which has lived on in Islamist movements too. This puts question on another component of the securitisation discourse, namely the establishment of Islamist networks conspiring to topple the regimes in the Maghreb. Few contacts have been established between the Islamist groups of the region. When the leader of the Tunisian al-Nahda, Rachid Ghannouchi, was sojourning in Algeria between 1990 and 1991, the FIS did not associate him to their cause or recognise his moral authority as the leader of the Tunisian Islamist group. His expulsion from Algeria also passed as a non-event amongst the Algerian Islamist groups. Conversely, prior to the 1992 coup, the outbreak of violence in Algeria and the outlawing of the FIS, some Islamists looked to regimes in place in other countries rather than to other Islamists in the same countries for support. For instance, King Hassan received Abassi Madani, the FIS number one leader, twice before his arrest in June 1991. The King’s move towards the Algerian Islamists was taken because of the Western Sahara. He was attempting to secure a positive attitude from them in case they won power at home. However, apart from these initial contacts, there were no reports of other contacts with Algerian Islamists by the Moroccan state.

Another sign of this nationalist jealousy has been manifest in the way in which Islamists and their followers refer to themselves or have been referred to. In Tunisia,

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41 Leveau, Le Sabre et le turban, p. 188.
Ghannouchi spoke of ‘l’armée des vaincus de Bourguiba’; indeed, national reference has been to the ‘orphans of Boumedienne’. Indeed, national reference has remained dominant. For instance, the FIS’s call has been around the recurrent theme of ‘l’unité de la nation’, a theme that is very much reminiscent of the FLN’s ideological discourse after independence. Indeed, as Benjamin Stora has written, “les militants du FIS se posent ainsi en véritables héritiers d’un FLN débarrassé de toute idéologie exténe.” There was a sort of re-enactment of the colonial experience of the war for independence that surfaced in the discourse of the armed Islamists and their fight against the Algerian army. The same conclusion was reached by Luis Martinez, namely that the Algerian violence is the continuation of a culture of political violence that characterised the domestic scene even before the war for independence and a certainly during it. Even though this confrontation has been framed in generalising terms between the Islamists and the Taghout, it remains deeply embedded in a distinctive national experience.

The specificity of the Islamist experience is true not only in terms of the domestic conditions leading to the rise of Islamist movements in each Maghreb country, but also, and more importantly, in relation to the programmes and agendas advanced by the Islamists to tackle internal socio-economic difficulties. A declared intention to redress injustice, social, political and economic (whatever the meaning they may attach to it) has been a ubiquitous element in the agenda of all Islamists, which largely explains the popular support underpinning their appeal. But to talk of the establishment of networks of Islamists that are able to topple the Maghrebi regimes is, however, an overstatement, which has been nurtured by fear and inspired by a myth of unity amongst Islamists. If Islam is trans-national, Islamist movements have remained nonetheless nation-bound in their struggle for recognition as well as in their search for political participation or political power.

42 François Burgat, L’Islamisme en face, p. 49.
46 Taghout means “Tyrant” and is used, for instance, in the discourse of the Islamists in Algeria to refer to the authoritarian regime as an impious oppressor.
47 Another element common to several Islamist groups but often overlooked is their endorsement of the democratic argument and social justice, at least before they were banned.
Indeed, unity scarcely exists between Islamists within the same country or even within each individual Islamist group itself. Islamism runs the gamut from moderate, radical, non-violent to violent and extremist groups. These varieties have been classified, like regimes (see below), into two major groups: the ‘conciliators’ and the ‘eradicators’.48 The first group is made of those wanting to be integrated in the political arena in order to push for changes from within the legal political framework. This is the case in Morocco of the moderate, co-opted al-Islah. It was also the case of the Tunisian al-Nahda until it was cracked down on by the regime, a suppression which had started before members of its radical wing carried out violent activities. The second group was represented in Morocco by al-Adl; however, its radicalism has so far remained mainly verbal.

To turn to Algeria, despite some ideological affinity between different Islamist groups in the country, a distinction may be made between the FIS, on the one hand, and the more moderate Algerian al-Nahda and the Movement for Islamic Society (Harakat al-Mujama al-Islamiyya, HAMAS), on the other. HAMAS agreed to change its name to the Mouvement pour la Société de la Paix (MSP) after the constitutional reform of November 1996 banning political parties with religious reference. Moreover, major divisions have existed within the FIS itself, despite its being often represented as the major Islamist force in the country. This has been particularly obvious at the level of its military wings, namely between the Armée Islamique du Salut (AIS) and the GIA. A difference in vision has also existed between the two leaders of the FIS, Abassi Madani (as a moderate leader) and Ali Benhadj (as an extremist figure). During the second half of the 1990s, major disputes were reported not only between the AIS and the GIA but also within each of them as a number of warlords (emirs) and maquisards started to emerge.49 These divisions within the FIS were manifest in the inability of its political wing to reach a consensus during the negotiation proposals put forward by President Zéroual in February 1995. This factionalism has also explained the inability of the Algerian government to contain the conflict or to stop violent insurgencies in different parts of the country. It was also attested to by the growth in military confrontation between emirs of various regions in 1997 and 1998.50 The continuance of political violence after the 1997

50 Martinez’s La guerre civile is full of reported incidents of the involvement of emirs in violence where economic profit from the war, attacks on symbols of authority, clan war and pure hatred get confused and where violence became instrumentalised for particular ends.
elections, the signing of the ceasefire between the army and the military wing of the FIS—the AIS—in September 1997, and its upgrading to the status of a ‘Civil Concord’ granting amnesties to Islamists involved in violence after the arrival of Bouteflika in 1999, have all attested to the domestic nature of political violence in Algeria.

All in all, what has been presented above shows that the experience of Islamism in Algeria has not encouraged the development of political Islam in neighbouring countries; it has been rather detrimental to it. Having proven to be a tragic failure, the Algerian experience has been considered a bad instance of a ‘hasty attempt at democratic transition’ rather than a good example to follow. It has thus provided a good justification for certain governing regimes in the Maghreb to tighten their grips on power, restrict political liberalisation and slow down or manipulate political reforms. This has been particularly the case in Tunisia where political reforms have been, at best, cosmetic and highly superficial. The situation in Morocco has been different from that of Tunisia; the Algerian experience has partly made political liberalisation more pressing. Nonetheless, this Moroccan political overture has been directed more towards the socialist opposition and less towards the Islamists, some of whom have managed to participate politically and secured nine seats in the lower chamber in the 1997 legislative elections.

However, what has led to the rise of the Islamist challenge in Algeria and in the other Maghreb countries has indeed been the failure of the ruling regimes to deliver on their promises and their concomitant reluctance, often refusal, to initiate genuine political liberalisation. Relations between Islamist movements and the Maghrebi regimes seem to have developed within a framework of action-reaction. Violence perpetrated by Islamist movements has often been a reaction to actions taken by the ruling elites to marginalise or suppress them. State actions to contain Islamists only radicalised them and led to a split within them between two wings: political and military. The imprisonment of the political leaders of these groups left the military wings as the only actors. The radicalisation of the Tunisian al-Nahda, for example, followed the regime’s refusal to legalise it despite the several concessions it made following the signing of the National Pact of Reconciliation in 1989. Despite its radicalisation, its military wing was far weaker and short-lived than its Algerian counterpart.

In comparison to Islamists in other Maghreb countries, the split into the political and military wings happened most obviously in Algeria. The military splinter groups of the Algerian GIA proved more threatening because the political wing was increasingly losing control over them. Therefore, the political wing was usually held responsible for
acts of violence committed by the military wing, despite major divisions of opinion within the latter. The rise in the number of massacres since 1994 and the occurrence of other incidents in neighbouring countries heightened the feeling in the WM of Islamist networks operating all over the region.

5.4.2 Repercussions of Algerian Islamist violence on security in the WM

The realisation that the Algerian violence could cross the Mediterranean to be wreaked in France through terrorist acts, mainly in Paris and Lyons in 1995 and 1996, raised fears of it spreading all over the WM. These fears were heightened by similar incidents which have occurred in Morocco and Tunisia in 1994 and 1995, respectively, and nurtured a belief in the establishment of terrorist armed networks operating across the WM region. However, this securitisation discourse, once again, seems hardly justifiable when considered against a closer look at the background of what happened and where it happened in the region.

The fact that the Algerian violence crossed the Mediterranean to take place exclusively in France is not without significance. Terrorist attacks on France have sometimes been interpreted as an attack against France as a Western country and therefore as a harbinger of a series of other attacks to follow in other Western countries. However, to see the attack on France in this light is alarmist and rather simplistic. The fact that the Algerian violence crossed the Mediterranean to France and was limited to that country is very telling. Terrorist attacks occurred in France because France was seen as a source of aid and support to the Algerian regime, and not because it is a Western country. When seen against the history of Franco-Algerian relations, these attacks appear to be deeply political, and were meant as a ‘retribution’ for France’s involvement in the Algerian crisis and as a means to obviate further support to the Algerian regime. The absence of Algerian violence against Spain or Italy (or any other West European countries) only reinforces this point. These attacks constituted a serious threat to France’s domestic security, but the civilisational argument that considers them to have been anti-Western is ill-founded. This only stresses the point that the violence in France was an extension of domestic problems in Algeria.

Other domestic events and ‘fields of reference’ make the above point all too obvious. The FIS’s reference to ‘l’unité de la nation’, observed above, sheds more explanatory light on this argument. Algerian domestic terrorist attacks, especially during the first years of violence, were carried against representatives of Hizb Fransa (the party
of France). Whether those that were denounced under this banner were exponents of French-inspired politics or not is not the central issue. What is of significance is that they were attacked because they were, rightly or wrongly, perceived as belonging to *Hizb Fransa*. In light of this, the domestic violence against *Hizb Fransa* has usually been seen as a re-enactment of the struggle of FLN against the French during the Algerian War of independence. Therefore, the Islamist terrorist violence against France and, domestically, against Algerians has been caused by national political factors rather by anti-Western feelings. This reveals a gap between the securitisation discourse and the reality of the security equation in the Algerian crisis. To say this is not to deny or reduce the seriousness of the Algerian violence. No doubt the Algerian violence has been tragic, but its securitisation proves to be in disjunction with its security reality. The Algerian violence has been more fatal to Algerians themselves than to any other nationals inside or outside Algeria.

Furthermore, the limited spread of violence to Morocco and Tunisia had little direct relation to the violence in Algeria. The armed attack on the luxury hotel in Marrakech in August 1994, which resulted in the killing of two Spanish tourists, was not proved to have any direct link with Algeria’s Islamist groups. Reflecting the latent tensions between Morocco and Algeria, the Moroccan government blamed the incident on the Algerian intelligence services and refused to interpret it as an Islamist attack. Two weeks later, four alleged perpetrators were arrested; they were all Moroccans living in France, as French citizens or as resident immigrants, with links to Moutif’s *al-Shabiba al-Islamiyya*, a Moroccan Islamist organisation which was banned in Morocco in the mid-1980s but which remained active in France under the leadership of Lahbib Walad. 51 Apart from some documentations of FIS and GIA origin found at the residence of other two members related to the Marrakech group, no substantive links were discovered between the terrorist attack on Marrakech and those committed in Algeria or France.

Another armed incident happened on the borders between Tunisia and Algeria. This was the attack in February 1995 on the post at Tamerza on Tunisia’s southern border with Algeria, which resulted in the killing of six Tunisian border guards. Nonetheless, contrary to the tensions that the Marrakech incident generated between Algeria and Morocco, the attack on Tamerza did not give rise to any acrimonious tensions between Algiers and Tunis. After the Islamist attack, the Tunisian authorities stepped up their

security and played down the significance of the incident. They blamed the death of the six border guards on a car accident, despite the Algerian GIA and the Front Islamique Tunisien (FIT) claiming responsibility for the killings. Indeed, the attack was the work of a number of Algerian maquis in search for arms and provisions. No other similar incidents were reported to have occurred on the borders between the two countries ever since.

The above attack on the Tunisian border guards as well as a number of other armed assaults perpetrated against Algerian police and military posts were what appeared to be separate and desperate attempts at acquiring weapons. This points to the lack of any considerable foreign support in providing arms to those (Islamist) militants trying to obtain them. Furthermore, the armed group involved in the incident in Marrakech had carried out an armed assault on a butcher’s shop and stolen some FFr20,000, which shows a similar lack of outside financial support, at least at that time. These examples contradict the claim of some governments that militant Islamists within their borders have received support from hostile regimes abroad. For instance, Algeria has often accused Morocco of turning a blind eye on Algerian GIA members at its southern border or for bargaining strict treatment of radical Algerian Islamists against more Algerian lenience towards Morocco’s claims to the Western Sahara.52

Fears of the impact of the Algerian violence on their internal stability have led Maghreb regimes to concert their efforts so as to prohibit its spreading to their territories or, in the case of Libya, Morocco and Tunisia, to prevent the Algerian insurgent from using their territories to wage war in Algeria. The cooperation between Tunisia and Algeria following the Tamerza incident is a case in point. Other measures were also taken. These included the supply of intelligence and material assistance, as well as the creation of an Algerian-Libyan joint committee for the fight against Islamist terrorists.53 The most important sign of such cooperation has been the continuance of the activities of the WM forum in the form of meetings of interior ministers of Portugal, Spain, France, Italy, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya, the last-mentioned having returned to the forum as a full member after the lifting of UN sanctions in 1999. The activities of the forum have centred on the fight against terrorism, civil protection and the control of

53 In early 1996 the Libyan secretary for justice and public security and the Algerian interior minister met to discuss security cooperation, and there were reports that the Libyan authorities returned to Algeria 500 Algerians, mainly FIS members, who sought refuge in Libya after 1992. See Miller, “Insurgency Theory and Conflict in Algeria”, p. 66.
immigration flows. It is clear from these objectives that Islamist-related activities would be closely monitored, if not entirely banned by the regimes and governments of the WM. These efforts have contributed to pre-empt any serious or lasting development of Islamist networks and to cut support from the Algerian Islamists in the region as a whole.

The two terrorist attacks on Morocco and Tunisia aside, the violence that was simmering in Algeria for a great part of the last decade was limited to Algeria and France. This, in itself, is not striking when considering the relation between the two countries and the number of immigrants as well as French citizens of Algerian origin living in France. What is particularly striking for the purpose of this study, however, is the way this violence has been interpreted. Yet, despite the various domino effect ‘theories’ trumpeted both through the media and the official discourse about a wave of Islamist-related violence sweeping the entire Maghreb region, the Algerian violence has remained primarily algérienne, which proves the securitisation approach to be hasty and having little foundation. The Islamist-related violence was directed against the military elite and led to the killings of a large number of the population. However, it was never strong enough to seriously jeopardise the foundation of the Algerian regime itself, let alone the regimes in place in the other neighbouring countries. Amidst all the violent atrocities, there was no imminent danger of the Algerian government collapsing and the Islamists seizing complete control of power.

The situation has, indeed, never got out of hand; the hold of the Algerian government and army has usually been strong. Despite the simulacra of change in Algeria through the succession of five Presidents in ten years, some army Generals in 2001 still occupied the same positions as they did in 1992 (e.g. Mohamed Lamari, Tewfik Médiène and Smain Lamari) or continued to enjoy the same influence in the case of those who had retired (e.g. Khaled Nezzar, Larbi Belkheir and Mohamed Touati). Since the aborted election in 1992, the army has obliged Benjedid to resign, has allegedly been involved in the assassination of Boudiaf as head of the HCE, has dismissed Ali Kafi from the same position, has obliged Zéroul – after a serious disagreement over an accord between the army and the AIS – to cut short his candidacy as President, and has backed Bouteflika as President in April 1999 elections. Moreover, Larbi Belkheir and Mohamed Touati, though retired army Generals, have resurfaced in Bouteflika’s government as director of the presidential cabinet and president of the council of national security, respectively.54

What the securitisation approach has done is to lead to developments that have been, arguably, detrimental to the domestic security of the majority of Algerian citizens. The Algerian people have found themselves caught in the middle between an intransigent army and splinter groups of the GIA. Preoccupation with and trepidation about regional instability have led to an almost unconditional support for the Algerian regime against radical Islamist militants, especially during the first half of the 1990s. On the other hand, the impact of violence on the majority of the Algerian citizens has been given little importance, though the number of deaths amongst them having rocketed between 1995 and 1997. For reasons of legitimate self-defence, some civilians have asked to have arms, thus adding a third, so-called paramilitary, element to the conflict in Algeria. Only after the ambiguous nature of some armed attacks on civilians in Bentala in the Mitidja plain some ten miles south of Algiers in September 1997 did the international community, including the EU and France itself, start to put in question the involvement of the Algerian army in the conflict. This led to the dispatch of an EU ministerial delegation to Algeria in January 1998 and a group of members of the EP in February of the same year, and then the launching, five months later, of a UN fact-finding mission in July 1998. Proposals for a UN mission to Algeria had originated as early as 1994 following the killing of Italian sailors in the port of Djen-Djen near Jijel in north-west Algeria. Algerian officials have usually been adamant in their refusal to countenance any outside or independent inquiries into the various massacres.

Whatever the developments of the Algerian crisis, its causes have remained primarily domestic and its security implications have been limited to Algeria. The Algerian violence, be it perpetrated by the Islamist extremists or by elements of the Algerian army, has seriously damaged security inside Algeria. However, in comparison, its impact outside the country, which was the main axis of securitisation discourse, has been rather limited. This shows a considerable gap between what has been presented in this section and the perceptions underpinning the securitisation of political Islam in terms of its regional security implications. Fears and uncertainties have generally led

55 These massacres are too numerous to be cited here. But with the arrival of Bouteflika as head of the Algerian government in April 1999, the official toll resulting from the Algerian violence was reported to be over 100,000 Algerian nationals (or 1,200 death per month), which dwarfs the number of foreigners who died in Algeria or people who died abroad because of Algerian Islamist violence.
56 The number of these paramilitary groups was estimated in The Military Balance (2000-2001) to be around 100,000 men. These groups are made of self-defence militia and communal guards.
57 See, for example, Nesroulah Vous and Salima Mellah, Qui a tué à Bentala? Algérie: chronique d’un massacre annoncé (La Découverte, 2000) and Habib Soudia, La Sale guerre. Le témoignage d’un ancien officier des forces spéciales de l’armée algérienne (La Découverte, 2001).
governments on both sides of the WM to sideline other concerns and to condemn any sort of legitimate political dissent, thus delaying serious steps towards a genuine democratic political liberalisation.

5.4.3 Reactions to Islamism between a risk to democracy and a democratic risk
Reactions to Islamism have ranged from outright repression to co-optation and accommodation; they span éradicateur, conciliateur and assimilationist attitudes.\footnote{The reactions to Islamism have been classified along three lines: the éradicateurs (hard-liners), the conciliateurs (those willing to engage in dialogue) and the assimilationists (seeking to co-opt Islamists groups). The first opposes any participation or dialogue with the Islamists; the second group, on the other hand, allows for dialogue with them; and the third group permits a limited and controlled Islamist participation in government. See Álvaro de Vasconcelos, “Le Maghreb et l’Europe”, in George Joffé and Álvaro de Vasconcelos (eds.), L’Islamisme politique, p. 5.} During the 1990s, most WM governments affected by or confronted with the rise of Islamist movements have shifted their attitudes along these lines. The hard-line attitude dominated in Tunisia, Libya and Morocco during the 1980s and was more conspicuous in France after the outbreak of political violence in Algeria and its spreading to France itself in December 1994. Morocco’s hard-line stance started to shift after the 1997 elections to the assimilationist stance as it allowed for the participation of Islamist elements in the parliament. Examples of the first group dominated the Algerian scene especially in the early years of the conflict. The first years of the President Zéroaul’s government gave prominence to the second attitude, though the government occasionally fell back into adopting a hard-line attitude after the failure of various attempts at dialogue with the FIS leaders. Indeed, various attempts at negotiation and dialogue were launched by President Zéroaul between 1994 and 1996, but they were halted by a number of criticisms from the army elite as well as by a lack of consensus between the political and military wings of the FIS.\footnote{Stone, The Agony of Algeria, pp. 116-21.} These reactions to political Islam show a characteristic split in the manner in which these countries have chosen to tackle it.

This difference in stance towards Islamism has not only existed between countries, it also existed within each of them, as has just been indicated, and especially within those closely confronted with political and/or military challenges from Islamist militants. Algeria’s shift across all the three stances, even if its attitude has remained predominantly a hard-line one, has been telling of this split. Some army Generals were intent on eradicating the Islamists by seeking to isolate the political wing (FIS) from the military one (AIS). Other, particularly young military officers, were willing to negotiate
with the Islamists, especially when the army gained control and achieved a position of superiority in the conflict after 1996. This readiness for reconciliation was also encouraged by the reputation the army started to have internationally because of alleged involvement in the massacres.

Similarly, divergence in attitudes towards the Islamists has occurred in France. French governments, even before the 1992 military 'coup', had differing views of France's role in the Algerian conflict. These views have oscillated between support for the regime and support for a conciliatory dialogue. For example, when the Islamist violence crossed the Mediterranean to France, Charles Pasqua, then interior minister, became adamant that there should be no dialogue with the radical Islamists. This attitude generated diplomatic tensions with the Clinton administration in the US on account of the latter's support and readiness to dialogue with the FIS.

If the repression of Islamist groups has radicalised some of their members, attempts to give them political participation have been considered, within the securitisation discourse, to be a threat to democracy. This securitisation has been motivated by a fear, not of Islamists as such but rather of the establishment of an Islamic state. It was greatly heighted by the lack of guarantees from the Islamists themselves that this would not happen. The fear, therefore, has centred on the degree of commitment to democracy the Islamists would have once they were in power. The general feeling has been (and still is) that of an instrumentalisation of democracy and democratic opening by the Islamists. Thus, attempts to exclude Islamists from political participation have been motivated not only by fear of a probable Islamist victory, but also by fear that democracy might be 'hijacked' by them once they established themselves in power. This assumption was behind the halting of the Algerian elections in 1992.

The forced abortion of a short-lived era of political pluralism and democratisation that almost swept away the governing elite in Algeria was perceived with mixed feelings of apprehension and relief at worst, and an embarrassing silence at best. Relief that an 'anti-Western' actor was not going to seize power, but apprehension of the consequences that the undemocratic intervention of the military might have with regard to the spread of violence in the region. The silence that surrounded the military intervention appears to have been traded off against the Algerian government's (i) containing the violence from any spillover, (ii) preventing any massive outward flow of immigrants and (iii) ensuring

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the uninterrupted supply of oil and gas. Whatever the international reactions to the military intervention, it plunged the country into the chaos of a bloody political violence verging on civil war. Responses to political Islam and the silence over the military intervention in Algeria have seemed in contradiction with the concomitant discourse on democracy that was being preached in the region by the international community, mainly the EU, as a vector of peace and security.

In line with the democratic peace argument, human rights and democracy have turned into a leitmotiv and a vector for political-economic reforms. Aware of the tensions building up in the Maghreb as a result of political sclerosis, the EU, as well as individual EU member states, started to encourage political liberalisation as a cornerstone of their cooperation with TMCs as early as the second half of the 1980s, and increasingly so afterwards. For instance, respect for human rights and the building of democratic institutions was included as a major part of the Treaty of Friendship and Good Neighbourliness signed between Morocco and Spain in 1991 (the first ever of its kind between Spain and an Arab country). Similarly, the French government voiced its support for democratisation in the Maghreb. South-west European countries have played a major role in this regard, although their democratic preaching has been conditioned by political considerations in the Maghreb countries and, thus, has, arguably, remained mostly rhetorical. In a wider European perspective, respect for human rights and democratic principles were introduced as a new element into the idea of the Euro-Maghreb Partnership between the EU and Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia – principles that have lived on in the Barcelona declaration establishing the EMP and its ensuing EMAAs.

This democratic preaching faced its first test as early as 1991 with the ballot victory of the FIS in December of that year and the cancelling by the army of the second round of election to prevent, what seemed at the time, a definite victory for the FIS. The reaction of the European and the wider international community alike to the intervention of the army fell short of their democratic discourse and showed a lack of will to go beyond mere words. The international and European inertia that surrounded the military intervention and the blocking of a nascent process of democratisation reflected indeed a confusion over the kind of democracy the EU and the political elites in the Maghreb were seeking to promote in the region. The conclusion has been that political liberalisation was encouraged as desirable; the fact that it ‘degenerated’ into allegedly anti-Western Islamists seizing power was deemed equally undesirable. This attitude on the part of the outsiders has allowed the regimes to tighten their grips on power, as it has most
conspicuously happened in Tunisia. A project of a fundamental reform to the Tunisian constitution, which allows Ben Ali to run in for presidential elections for the fourth time, was announced by him during the 14th anniversary of his accession to power.\footnote{"Le président Ben Ali ouvre la voie constitutionnelle à son auto-succession", \textit{Jeune Afrique L’Intelligent} 7 November 2001.}

In light of the violence in Algeria and the denigration of Islamists, both by the Maghrebi regimes in place as well as by national political parties which rejected their participation in the political system,\footnote{For example, few Algerian party leaders denounced the abortion of the FIS victory, themselves refusing to accept the result of the ballot. This rejection of the electoral result and the victory of the FIS question the extent of the commitment to democracy across the spectrum of political parties in Algeria.} political Islam was perceived as anti-democratic. This perception was reinforced by reports of Islamists seeking to establish a religious state. Against this background, the democratic discourse as the discourse of peace and stability proved to have run into a dead end. The Algerian experience apparently provided a striking example that democratic overtures in the Maghreb were ‘counter-productive’: it proved that democracy, with the speed with which it was introduced in Algeria at the time, generated more serious problems than the peace it promised to provide or the political tensions it promised to ease.

The understanding (or rather dilemma) in the EU at large was that, if left to their own fate, the Maghrebi regimes might remain resolutely authoritarian, and the situation might degenerate into socio-political chaos. But, if they experimented with democracy, as happened in Algeria, their ‘free and fair’ elections resulted in victory for the Islamists, the latter being feared for their hijacking of democracy after having instrumentalised it to their own advantage. \textit{Many} a sceptic would argue that the democratic language the FIS adopted prior to the 1991 elections amounted to mere strategic posturing, to be swiftly abandoned if ever they should succeed to attain power. This dilemma, therefore, found expression in the realisation that democracy carries with it the risk of bringing Islamists to power while Islamists themselves were perceived as ‘sworn’ enemies of democracy. In this sense, political liberalisation and democracy itself became risks that needed to be managed in the region, because it would no longer be safe to encourage their promotion without close assistance (or control). This dilemma explains the silence that surrounded the 1992 ‘electoral coup’ in Algeria and is best embodied by the example of France’s relation/reaction to it.
5.4.3.1 The example of the French reaction

The historico-psychological relationship between Algeria and France deterred the latter – alone or in concert with other EU members – from intervening in Algeria. The international community’s response, especially the European one, often followed French leadership on Algeria, a leadership that was inconsistent rather than lacking, as it was sometimes suggested.\(^6\) This inconsistency stemmed from the succession of three governments between the military interruption of the electoral process in January 1992 and arrival of Jacques Chirac as President in July 1995. French policy towards Algeria in the first years of violence (1991-1995) consisted of continued support for the Algerian regime and refusal of the birth of an Islamist state in the country. The rise of Islamism was considered by both the Mitterrand/Beréguoy (1992-1993) and later the Mitterrand/Balladur (1993-1995) governments to be a consequence of under-development and thus the only way to help Algeria out of its dead end was to favour its development through aid, not intervention, deeming the crisis to be strictly ‘algéro-algérienne’. This stance was clear since the first signs of the Algerian crisis in 1988. Indeed, after the outbreak of violence in October 1988, Mitterrand’s attitude was clear: Islamists in power in Algeria would certainly be worse than the current Algerian regime (with all its records of human rights violations and stark absence of democracy).\(^6\) In December 1988, two months after the riots, France provided FFr7bn in the form of a loan to the Algerian regime. Even after 1992, Mitterrand refused to cut down economic aid to Algeria. Nor was he in favour of a dialogue with the Islamists. Rejection of any dialogue with the FIS led to a series of diplomatic tensions with the US.

In fact, though the Clinton administration deemed the Algerian crisis to be a French problem, it often entertained, especially before December 1995, different views from those entertained in Paris, mainly on the desirability of holding a dialogue with some of the FIS leaders.\(^5\) On a number of occasions, the Washington administration

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\(^6\) François Mitterrand summed up perfectly well this initial confusion: “Bien sûr, il n’est pas supportable qu’un pouvoir fasse ainsi son peuple, mais nul ne sait, si Chadli partait, quel pouvoir lui succéderait. C’est comme en Iran, le régime du Chah n’était pas supportable, mais la révolution ne l’est pas plus, même si ses objectifs sont plus sympathiques . . . Que va-t-il se passer en Algérie ? Je n’en sais rien. Mais, en tout cas, il y a une hypothèse à laquelle il est interdit, pour l’heure, de penser : l’établissement de la démocratie.” See Védrine, *Les Mondes de François Mitterrand*, p. 684.

contacted Anwar Haddam, the FIS representative in the US. These contacts were later discontinued in December 1995 and, in 1996, the US Immigration and Naturalisation Services arrested Haddam for violation of residence status. The arrest of the FIS leader contributed to ease the tensions between Paris and Washington in this respect. Against this background, Paris confirmed its support to the regime in Algeria through economic aid from international creditors, mainly the WB and IMF. Indeed, with the backing of France (and Washington), the IMF allowed Algeria a $1bn standby credit for the rescheduling of its debt in 1994 and, in 1995, another $1.8bn to support its cautious (or rather reluctant) free market reforms. Recognising the importance of the army in neutralising the Islamist challenge, France provided loans for arms procurement (mainly helicopters and night vision equipment), therefore, legitimising the fight of the Algerian regime against the Islamist insurgency. At this time, France was perceived as irreversibly favouring the ‘eradicators’, an attitude that was soon to change following the arrival of Chirac as President in May 1995.

This relentless attitude started to ease when the Algerian violence crossed to France, notably after July 1995, the time of the first terrorist assault in Paris. Consequently, the Algerian crisis was increasingly becoming a French internal problem, and the French government started to withdraw its vision of Algeria as a private element of its foreign policy. In this context, Mitterrand managed, in February 1995, to get Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s agreement regarding closer European involvement in solving the ongoing conflict in Algeria. This involvement was thought of in terms of more European aid to Algeria which should be concomitant with the North African country coming out of its crisis and ‘restoring’ democracy. This call by Mitterrand for a European conference on Algeria generated a wave of indignation from the Algerian regime and was considered an interference in its domestic politics.

The shift in French policy towards Algeria was encouraged by the creation of the EMP, the realisation of the difficulty of the Algerian impasse as well as by the sensitivity of any open French involvement at a time when the French government was lacking credibility and influence with both the Algerian regime and the Islamists. This change in attitude, albeit hesitant, began to take shape especially after the Rome platform sponsored by the Catholic community of Sant’Egidio in January 1995 (a first meeting had taken

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64 Gerges, America and Political Islam, p. 156.
65 This was the killing of Imam Sahraoui, a co-founder of the FIS.
66 Védrine, Les Mondes de François Mitterrand, p. 689.
place in November 1994).69 If the Sant’Egidio meeting enjoyed wide Spanish and Italian support, the French, in the words of Alain Juppé, then foreign minister, found it ‘interesting’.70 The Algerian regime, on the other hand, deemed it a source of interference in its internal affairs, which was primarily a manoeuvre to discredit its conclusions. Though the Algerian government rejected the conclusions of Sant’Egidio, the Rome meeting served to pull the government away from its repressive military solution to the conflict and to engage to some extent in dialogue. Thus, in April 1996 President Zéroual launched a three-week dialogue with the main opposition parties, including some moderate Islamist elements such as HAMAS and the Algerian al-Nahda – but excluding the FIS as a preparation for the constitutional reform of November of the same year. The Spanish support for dialogue in Algeria was manifest in the Madrid government’s hosting another low-key meeting of the main opposition parties, including the FIS, and calling for ‘dialogue for peace’ prior to the 1997 election.

French policy changed more significantly with the arrival of Jacques Chirac as President in May 1995. Chirac made it clear that economic aid to Algeria was to become contingent on its respect for and commitment to democracy. This declaration fanned tensions between Presidents Zéroual and Chirac – tensions between the two countries that had already been heightened by Mitterrand’s earlier proposal to convene a European conference on Algeria. By 1996, France accepted the ineluctability of the Europeanisation of the Algerian crisis. The declaration of Lionel Jospin in 1997 that “when France is silent about Algeria, the whole world is silent”, seemed more of an invitation for others to take responsibility with regard to the crisis in the North African country, especially considering the sensitivity of Franco-Algerian relations and any French open involvement at the time.71 The French-EU policy towards Algeria was now characterised by maintaining stability through the support of the Algerian regime, but simultaneously pressuring the Algerian government to speed up the democratic process. France declared its open backing of the ‘democratic party’ in an Algeria where democracy was lacking.

69 The Sant’Egidio meeting gathered representatives of opposition parties (representing 82% of the votes cast in the National Assembly) to suggest a dialogue with the government, the legalisation of the FIS and the rejection of any fundamentalist or military solution to the conflict in the country. At the end of meeting, the participants jointly signed a six-page document entitled “Platform for a political and peaceful solution to the Algerian crisis”. The document started with a preamble of the disastrous nature of the Algerian crisis, and declared the values and principles governing the meeting and proposed a series of measures to be taken to find a way out of the Algerian impasse. The parties represented were the Algerian League of Human Rights, the FLN, the FFS, FIS representatives abroad, the Mouvement pour la démocratie en Algérie (MDA), the al-Nahda, and the Parti des Travailleurs.


71 Quoted in Claire Spencer, “Algeria: France’s Disarray”, p. 177.
The twofold policy of continued support for the incumbent regime and, on the other hand, pressuring it to reform has led to the development of facade pluralism in Algeria. This policy, however, remains politically ambivalent and inefficient in relation to Algeria (and variably so in the other Maghreb countries). It has ended up consolidating the regime without working strongly enough for democratic reforms to be implemented. The victory in 1997 of the Algerian presidential party, the Rassemblement National pour la Démocratie (RND), which was only four months old during the 1997 elections, was the most obvious symptom of this type of pluralism. The last presidential elections in 1999 were another example. On 14 April, one day before the polling day, six candidates withdrew their candidacies on claims that the interior ministry was planning a massive fraud in the results. Bouteflika, who had the backing of the army, became President by obtaining only 28 per cent of the votes cast (a little more than 1m in total) owing to a very low turnout.\footnote{Le Monde of 17 April 1999, quoting a military source, estimated turnout at 23 per cent, with Bouteflika obtaining only 28 per cent of the votes cast, Ibrahimi 20 per cent, Ait Ahmed 13 per cent, Djeballah 13 per cent and Hamrouche 12 per cent. However, the official figures, which were widely held to be falsified, gave a turnout of 60.9 per cent and a 73.8 per cent victory for Bouteflika.}

Taking cognisance of the ‘Islamist risk’ that the promotion of political liberalisation can bring with it, the EU – in addition to making economic assistance for governments conditional on respect for human rights and the promotion of democratic principles – came to see that civil society and NGOs could be new and more reliable partisans in the democratisation project.\footnote{This conditionality falls within the general framework applied to the EU’s financial assistance under the MEDA programme. See Article 3 of the MEDA Regulations as cited in Chapter 3, footnote 21.} For this purpose, the MEDA Democracy Programme (MDP) was introduced, within the EMP framework, to strengthen the political objectives of the EMP. Its aim was to provide funds for civil society members and public bodies with projects seeking to promote democracy and democratic institutions. In accordance with the EU’s democracy promotion policy, MDP covered a number of action-themes (or intervention areas) such as democratisation and the rule of law, initiatives for target groups, and the development of pluralist civil society.

Nonetheless, the democracy projects financed under MDP as well as under MEDA seem to have fallen short of expectations on both sides of the Mediterranean.\footnote{See various contributions in Richard Gillespie & Richard Youngs (eds.), The EU and Democracy in North Africa (Cass, 2002).} Though the intervention area of ‘development of pluralist civil society’ received, during 1996-99, more than one third of EU spending in relation to democracy promotion
worldwide,\textsuperscript{75} a number of civil society members appear to have been left out. This has included Islamist civil society (regardless of the pacifist claims of some of its members) as well as NGOs that are not recognised by their respective governments. Thus government recognition as a primary requirement for fund legibility limited the activities and the efforts of MDP to those NGOs and civil society members that are recognised by their governments. In this sense, this aid and the engagement of certain NGOs have, in some cases, inadvertently contributed to the fossilisation of political life. For example, despite being one of the principal beneficiaries of the EU economic aid (per capita) in the Maghreb, Tunisia has continued to suffer from chronic political stagnation and frequent bouts of human rights violations. The economic achievements of Ben Ali’s Tunisia have for a long time served to mask its political shortcomings.\textsuperscript{76}

**CONCLUSION**

The investigation of the match between the securitisation of the political sector and its security-reality has demonstrated the central position the Algerian crisis played in this regard. Securitisation instances from both sides of the WM have been connected, directly and indirectly, to the internece violence that has almost torn Algeria apart. Indeed, the Algerian crisis was instrumentalised as an alibi for demonising any form of Islamism and establishing an easy link between indiscriminate acts of violence and Islamism that opposes the incumbent regimes in the Maghreb. In this context, many forms of political opposition or dissent were condemned as a source of instability and a threat to the sovereignty of the Maghrebi regimes. From the analysis made above, a number of conclusions may be drawn.

First, the securitisation of political instability was given weight only by relating it to the challenges of political Islam. The Maghrebi regimes have never enjoyed a widespread legitimacy and have, during the course of their nation-state building, faced a number of challenges that were quietly and bluntly suffocated. What gives a sense of novelty to the political challenges facing them at the turn of the 21\textsuperscript{st} century is the fact that the North African regimes can no longer afford to continue treating these challenges with the same post-colonial repressive attitude without attracting both internal and external pressures calling for more political opening and participation. Thus, presenting


the Islamist movements as a challenge to them and a threat to the stability of the whole region shows the Maghrebi regimes’ awareness of external pressures and their use of Islamist threat as a way to appease them. For this reason, in view of the atrocities in Algeria, political stability was elevated to the status of a ‘virtue’ on both sides of the Mediterranean. The need for stability in the Maghreb (and in the southern Mediterranean as a whole) has given birth to rather ambiguous projects calling for ‘change with continuity’ and ‘dynamic stability’ – projects in which the promotion of democracy has been presented as the main vector and a carrier of peace.

Second, democracy promotion has fallen short of its rhetoric, once faced with its own consequences, namely the rise of Islamist movements and their willingness to participate as political parties. Fear of Islamist projects and their populist power have led to its securitisation, and thus to the need to contain it. Viewing the Islamist challenge in the Maghreb as a security threat inevitably casts it in a confrontational perspective based on fears and past incidents of extremist violence. This view ignores the fact that the resurgence of political Islam has been the result of political liberalisation which has been positively encouraged as a vector of democracy and, subsequently, as a guarantor of peace. Nonetheless, reactions to political Islam have been in contradiction with the ‘religious’ belief in democracy and political liberalisation. The securitisation of Islamism in the name, and for the sake, of democracy has defeated its own objective, particularly to promote political opening and liberalisation. Both democracy and the acceptance of political Islam have entered into a relationship where one cannot exist without the other. The harm done to political liberalisation has been manifest in fostering cosmetic changes and blocking genuine democratic developments. The proof is that little qualitative political change has occurred in the Maghreb; however, the EU and individual south-west European countries are still pouring more money in the hope of containing Islamism and fostering more democratic development. But the situation in Tunisia stands as a reminder of the shortcomings of such a policy. Tunisia shows that socio-economic development cannot automatically guarantee democratic reforms, nor can it eradicate Islamism, because the key issues of the participation of Islamist parties and the need for reconciliation have not been directly addressed.

Third, the exploitation of the Algerian crisis to condemn or marginalise Islamist groups in the neighbouring countries was hasty and simplistic. This attitude has decontextualised the Algerian experience by ignoring its specificity. The rise of Islamism in Algeria together with the unfortunate resort to arms has been inspired and shaped by
the country's national, social and historical background. Apart from limited incidents outside the Algerian borders, the violence remained domestic in nature. Contrary to the securitisation discourse, the Algerian crisis has led only to the suppression of some moderate Islamist groups in the region and has been used as an excuse for taking more control of power. The exclusion of Islamists has occasioned the emergence of a facade pluralism and heavy-handed marginalisation and manipulation of opposition parties.

All in all, securitisation of Islamism and political stability has been based on the idea of making security issues regional or trans-national phenomena for the sake of rallying support from other partner countries. In this sense, it has, at the same time, legitimised many pre-emptive moves for self-protection or the preclusion of future violent acts. Though the securitisation of the political sector might have sought to pressure the Maghreb regimes to reform, it has also closed the route for any path-breaking success in positive political development. It has also justified a limited and selective political opening in the Maghreb. On the other hand, in south-west Europe, the securitisation of the political sector, and of political Islam in particular, has affected immigrants as well as citizens of Maghreb origin living there. These immigrants were once primarily viewed as a much needed addition to labour force requirements. Increasingly, they have become perceived as a threat (see Chapter 6 in relation to France in particular). Their cultural identity has become perceived by various radical movements in south-west Europe (and elsewhere) as a threat to European national identities and as a menace to public order.
CHAPTER 6

SOCIAL SECURITY: INTEGRATION AND THE CULTURAL COST OF IMMIGRATION

Societal security is often defined as a threat that a society faces in relation to its cultural identity and is usually linked to the cultural survival of a community. Cultural identity, as suggested by the securitisation discourse, can be threatened by the presence of immigrant communities as ‘carriers’ of different cultural values and principles. This is particularly contingent on the degree of integration allowed for by both the immigrant community and the receiving society. That is, societal security becomes especially pronounced if the immigrant community is not willing to be assimilated or integrated and/or if the receiving society has a limited cultural threshold of tolerance. Globalisation and the communication of hostile cultural and religious ideas and ideologies have also been viewed by nationalist groups as threats to cultural identity. However, because of the cultural difference between the south and north sides of the WM region, one cannot talk about the two sides facing a common threat to their societal security.

In terms of securitisation, immigration and the presence of immigrant communities have been one of the major vectors of societal security in Western Europe. This has been the case for south-west European countries as they have increasingly become Europe’s frontier to a volatile and culturally different southern Mediterranean. The securitisation of ‘illegal’ immigration by south-west European countries has been heightened given their geographical proximity to the Maghreb. This is particularly so because the Maghreb is a region that displays – in addition to reportedly ‘explosive’ demographic growth rates, economic and political difficulties and resurgent Islamism – cultural and other features that are markedly different from those of south-west European countries. On account of demographic growth and the rise of political Islam in the south and relatively high rates of unemployment in the north – certainly the case in Spain, France and Italy – immigration, as suggested by the securitisation discourse, has been elevated to a societal threat. The importance given to ‘illegal’ immigration by the media and the vociferous debate raised by far-right groups over both settled immigrant communities and incoming immigrants blur the distinction between real and passionate

1 Ole Wæver et al., Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe (Pinter, 1993), pp. 17-40.
issues in this sector. Attempts to clarify this distinction call for a new look at the societal sector with regards to the real stakes at play and the need to underline the difference in this respect between France, on the one hand, and Italy and Spain, on the other.

For this purpose, this Chapter submits the securitisation discourse in the societal sector to a reality-check. The main objective is to dispel some of the blurredness that shrouds issues over immigrants and immigrant communities as a security threat. This Chapter examines the plausibility of the securitisation discourse against the reality of the problems immigration and, in particular, immigrants as culturally different communities, pose. First, it looks at the demographic growth of the Maghreb countries as a source of immigration. Second, it surveys immigration from the Maghreb to south-west European countries in order to provide a background for the subsequent assessment of the credibility of its securitisation as a threat for these countries. Third, it looks into the real issues that have contributed to the perception of immigrant communities as a threat to cultural identity.

6.1 DEMOGRAPHIC GROWTH IN THE MAGHREB: THE POWER BEHIND IMMIGRATION

Population growth in the 1980-1990 period in the Maghreb, and in the southern Mediterranean in general, gave rise to precipitate projections about a future ‘explosive’ demographic growth in the region. These projections have prompted a securitisation discourse of the ‘invasion’ of Western Europe, through massive migratory waves, by a southern Mediterranean youth in search of a better life. The apprehension has been reinforced by the economic, political and cultural/religious disparities between the two sides of the Mediterranean. It has also been lent credence in the face of a decelerating or negative demographic growth in Western European countries. With an annual population growth rate averaging three per cent in the 1980-1990 period, the southern Mediterranean population has been turned into a security problem for Europe to deal with, especially when coupled with the political and economic problems that are said to face the Maghreb countries, and, on the other hand, their geographical proximity to France, Italy and Spain.

However, the UN’s past projections on which most of this securitisation discourse was based, have been progressively revised, with notably major revisions in 2000. These revisions have put into question the long-term ‘explosive’ demographic image of the
Maghreb as well as that of some other southern Mediterranean countries. In 1988, population projections for 2010, had put Algeria’s population at 40.7m, Morocco’s at 37.0m, Tunisia’s at 11.3m, and Libya’s 7.6m. When the projection made in 2000 are compared to those made in 1988, the number of people in the Maghreb in 2010 drops by 13.3m, from 96.6m to 83.3m. Part of the reason for the downward revision has been the sharp decline in fertility rates in the Maghreb countries since the early 1970s, and indeed even earlier in the case of Morocco and Tunisia (see Figure 6.1).

Figure 6.1 – Growth in Total Fertility in the Maghreb, 1950-2050

Source: UN Population Division, World Population Prospects: The 2000 Revision
http://esa.un.org/unpp

Total fertility rates in the Maghreb declined markedly between 1970 and 2000. They dropped from about 7 across the Maghreb in 1970 to 4.1 in 1990 in Algeria and Libya, and to 3.9 in Morocco. Having engaged in population planning much earlier than its neighbours, Tunisia registered a fertility rate of 3 in 1990. This decrease continued in the 1990-2000 period, albeit at a slower pace than over the 1970-1990 period. Tunisia was down to a fertility rate of 2.3 already in 2000. In the same year, the other countries having recorded a much slower decline, the fertility rates in Libya, Morocco and Algeria were respectively 3.8, 3.4 and 3.2. The fertility rate across the Maghreb is projected to decline to 2.1 by 2030 and to stabilise thereafter – the 2.1 rate being considered the

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2 Some nuance is called for when considering demographic growth in the Mediterranean. There is a difference in population between the Maghreb countries, on the one hand, and other countries such as Egypt or Turkey, on the other. In 2000, Turkey population was at 67m and Egypt 68m. These numbers have been projected, in the revised UN projections, to rise to 110m Egypt and 99m for Turkey by 2050.

3 Total fertility rate: the number of children that would be born per woman if she were to live to the end of her child-bearing years and bear children at each age in accordance with prevailing age-specific fertility rates.
threshold for a population to ensure its replacement in the future in the absence of migration.

These lower fertility rates, however, did not prevent the Maghreb countries from experiencing a fairly strong population growth. Nonetheless, the annual rate of growth in total population started to decline after 1990. In 2000, the increases were 1.23 per cent, 2.02 per cent and 2.07 per cent in, respectively, Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria. However, Libya’s population growth rate rose to 2.39 per cent. With the exception of Libya, whose population growth rate is projected to stabilise between 2.49 per cent in 2010 and 2.08 per cent in 2050, the rate of growth in the other counties is projected to continue falling to reach as low as 0.6 per cent by 2050 in the case of Tunisia, for instance (see Figure 6.2).

**Table 6.2 – Percentage Population Growth Rate in the Maghreb, 1950-2050**

With such rates of growth in 2000, the population of the Maghreb will still continue to rise. It is projected to total over 168m by 2050, but growth will be decelerating between 2010 and 2050. It is the period 2000-2010 which is said to be critical because of the projected rise in the percentage of youth aged 15-24 in the total population (see Table 6.1). Growth in this age bracket of the population is expected to put enormous pressures on the economy in terms of employment provision as well as to prompt further migratory pressures to the northern Mediterranean shores. These economic and migratory pressures will then ease as the number of people within this age bracket will start to drop. Their share in 2050 is projected to reach 15.8 per cent in the case of Algeria and only 13.1 per cent in the case of Tunisia, while it is projected to be

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4 Youssef Courbage, “Fantasmes et enjeux démographiques au sud de la Méditerranée”, in Thierry Fabre (sous dir.), *La Méditerranée, frontières et passages* (Babel, 1999), p. 204
higher in the case Libya and Morocco, 16.1 per cent and 16.3 per cent, respectively. In view of these projections, the migratory pressures on Western Europe, which are currently dominated by young immigrants, will be lower in the next decade and will continue to slow down in the long run.

**TABLE 6.1 – DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF MAGHREB COUNTRIES, 1950-2050 (SELECTED YEARS AND INDICATORS)**

<table>
<thead>
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<td><strong>Algeria</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Population ('000)</td>
<td>8,753</td>
<td>11,923</td>
<td>21,887</td>
<td>27,655</td>
<td>33,587</td>
<td>45,548</td>
<td>69,819</td>
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<tr>
<td>% aged 15-24</td>
<td>18.8</td>
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<td>20.7</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>15.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>% aged 60 or over</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of women aged 15-49</td>
<td>45.6</td>
<td>44.1</td>
<td>43.1</td>
<td>50.6</td>
<td>54.6</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>46.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant mortality rate (per '000 births)</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>63.7</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>35.9</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>12.4</td>
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<td><strong>Libya</strong></td>
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<td>Population ('000)</td>
<td>1,029</td>
<td>1,623</td>
<td>3,786</td>
<td>4,755</td>
<td>5,961</td>
<td>8,592</td>
<td>14,342</td>
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<tr>
<td>% aged 15-24</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>16.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>% aged 60 or over</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of women aged 15-49</td>
<td>45.4</td>
<td>45.2</td>
<td>43.5</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>54.8</td>
<td>49.5</td>
<td>46.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant mortality rate (per '000 births)</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>36.9</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>9.7</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Morocco</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population ('000)</td>
<td>8,953</td>
<td>13,323</td>
<td>21,995</td>
<td>27,273</td>
<td>33,056</td>
<td>44,492</td>
<td>69,241</td>
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<tr>
<td>% aged 15-24</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>16.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% aged 60 or over</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>13.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of women aged 15-49</td>
<td>45.9</td>
<td>44.7</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>51.3</td>
<td>53.4</td>
<td>49.8</td>
<td>46.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant mortality rate (per '000 births)</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>52.2</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tunisia</strong></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population ('000)</td>
<td>3,530</td>
<td>5,127</td>
<td>8,166</td>
<td>9,459</td>
<td>10,732</td>
<td>12,742</td>
<td>15,214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% aged 15-24</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>13.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% aged 60 or over</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>22.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of women aged 15-49</td>
<td>46.1</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>49.8</td>
<td>55.9</td>
<td>56.7</td>
<td>50.4</td>
<td>44.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant mortality rate (per '000 births)</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Because of the rising percentage of women aged between 15-49 in 2000-2010 and also the total growth in population, women in this cohort are expected to have more children in total than their elders. However, this should be considered in the context of the sharp decline in fertility rates indicated above, a decline that is projected to continue after 2010 (see Table 6.1). Apart from the family planning programmes, some of the reasons behind this decline in fertility rates have been related to socio-economic developments and attitudes in the Maghreb countries. In particular, the age of the first marriage, as cited by an INED report, has become higher across the Maghreb countries. In Tunisia, it rose from 19.1 in 1956 to 27.8 in 1999. It went from 17.3 in 1960 to 26.2 in 1995 in Morocco and from 18.3 in 1966 to 27.6 in 1998 in Algeria. This rise in the age of marriage has

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been the result of an increase in the number of women in education as well to the
difficulty of finding jobs and accommodation.

European preoccupations with the ‘explosive’ demographic growth in the
Maghreb has often been viewed outside the context of equally worrying degrees of
population ageing in today’s Europe as well as in that of the Maghreb countries in the
years to come. This ageing trend in the Maghreb is projected to be, like the fertility rate,
at a faster rate of change than it has been in Europe.\(^4\) If Europe faces increasingly
worrying rates of ageing coupled with fertility rates below the population replacement
threshold of 2.1, the continuing drop in fertility rates in the Maghreb is very likely to
affect south-west European countries too. In this context, there is a growing awareness, at
least amongst policy-makers, of the importance of an ‘open-door’ immigration policy.
This immigration is not only to serve as replacement migration for an ageing European
population, in the lines suggested by a UN report. It is also particularly important in order
to lower the old-age dependency ratio\(^7\) as it has the potential to increase the number of
economically active population and, thus, maintain a stable flow of benefits to the older
groups. This is because of the reliance of these countries on labour from the Maghreb as
well as because of growing anti-immigration attitudes.

6.2 FROM LABOUR FORCE TO SECURITY THREAT: THE DEVELOPMENT OF
MAGHREB IMMIGRATION TO SOUTH-WEST EUROPE

6.2.1 Fast beginnings and the dominance of economic factors

If securitisation of immigration has become more conspicuous since the mid-1980s in
France and during the 1990s in Spain and Italy, mass immigration from the Maghreb to
south-west Europe is not itself a new phenomenon. During the colonial era, north-south
immigration was mainly perceived as consisting in the movement of French citizens to
become North African *colons*. On the other hand, south-north immigration was triggered
by the recruitment of young North African men for the French army during the First
World War. Because of its colonial past in the Maghreb, France was the leading recipient
of the first waves of immigrants from the region. The preoccupation with this
immigration started on 20 September 1947, the day the French government decided to

\(^4\) Zahia Ouadah-Bedidi and Jacques Vallin, “Maghreb. La chute irrésistible de la fécondité”, p. 4.
\(^7\) An increase in the old-age dependency ratio indicates a situation in which a growing number of potential
beneficiaries of health and pension funds (mainly those aged 65 or over) are supported by a relatively
smaller number of potential contributors (those in the economically active age of 15-64). See United

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grant citizenship to Algerian Muslims, giving them the right to freedom of movement between Algeria and metropolitan France. Economic growth, demographic decline and the ideological belief in the absorbing power of the Republican tradition were all factors supportive of expansive immigration policies. The signing of the Evian Accords in 1962 as the basis of the Algerian independence was viewed as a guarantee for both Algerians and French colons to move freely between the two countries. This Accord benefited Algerian workers and led to a remarkable increase in emigration from Algeria, as the country encountered a number of economic difficulties already in the early years of independence.8

This increase in the number of Algerian emigrants to France led to the signing in 1964 of a labour agreement, known as the Nekkache-Grandval Accord, between the two countries, introducing for the first time a quota system to be specified every three months as a function of the need of the French labour market. This quota was set more with a view to the diversification of the sources of immigration than in terms of restricting the Algerian one, which had already shown signs of a slowdown between 1962 and 1964. In the perspective of diversification, France signed a number of labour agreements with Spain in 1961, with Morocco, Portugal and Tunisia in 1963, and with Yugoslavia and Turkey in 1965.9 Unlike the labour agreement with Algeria, the agreements with other Maghreb countries did not, however, comprise any quota limits. The one with Tunisia was suspended by France in May 1964, less than a year after its application, following the nationalisation by the Bourguiba government of lands still owned by colons.10 The creation of the Office national de la main-d’oeuvre algérienne (ONMOA) in November 1962 reflected the importance of the labour agreement signed between France and Algeria. The purpose of the ONMOA was the selection of emigrant workers in accordance with Algerian national development projects. Nonetheless, sanitary control remained in the hands of French doctors of the Office National d’Immigration (ONI). In Morocco and Tunisia, the recruitment of emigrant workers was carried out by representatives of the ONI. The dominance of economic calculations in the following

8 The flow of Algerian emigrants to France at the end of October 1962 reached 70,000 per week at departure points. See Patrick Weil, La France et ses étrangers. L’aventure d’une politique de l’immigration de 1938 à nos jours (Gallimard, 1995), p. 96.
10 Wihtol de Wenden, Les immigrés et la politique, p. 141.
years rendered the ONI less influential compared to private recruiters as its role became increasingly limited to the regularisation of workers when they arrived to France.\textsuperscript{11}

These initial labour agreements speeded up the flow of North African emigrants in general. If the first labour agreements, especially those signed between 1962 and 1967, reduced the number of Algerian emigrants to France, the opposite happened in the case of Morocco and Tunisia, whose presence on French territory was barely noticeable in 1962. During this period, the number of Moroccan immigrants more than doubled; it rose from 49,653 to 112,479 in 1967. The same trend happened in the case of Tunisian immigrants; their number rose to 70,274 in 1967 from 34,443 in 1962. However, during the same period, the number of Algerian immigrants increased by 105,000 only, from 425,000 in 1962 up to 530,000 in 1967. This slower growth in the number of Algerian immigrants was inadvertently enhanced following the 1968 agreement which fixed Algerian entries to France on a yearly basis at 35,000 for a period of three years; there were 754,452 Algerian immigrants in total in 1971.

The growth in the numbers of Algerians in particular, and of North African immigrants in general, between 1962 and 1968 generated domestic pressures urging the French authorities to stop the flow of migration. In 1971, the quota laid down in the 1968 Franco-Algerian accord was reduced in terms of both the number of immigrants allowed to enter France as well as of the duration of their stay. It was set at 25,000 entries per year for a period of two years only. The need for a presidential meeting between Georges Pompidou and Houari Boumedienne in order to sign a labour agreement in 1971 was, moreover, a clear indication of the difficulty to reach agreement over immigrant recruitment in the early 1970s. Indeed, the 1971 accord with Algeria marked the end of a period of intensive labour immigration and ushered in a series of restrictive policies in France.

Immigration relations between France and the Maghreb countries grew tense with the end of the 1971 accord in 1973, the year of the first oil shock and the subsequent deterioration of economic conditions in the mid-1970s. The worsening social conditions of immigrant workers and the rise of anti-immigrant xenophobic feelings in 1973 prompted Algeria to stop all emigration to France.\textsuperscript{12} The Algerian decision to halt its

\textsuperscript{11} Ibid., p. 99, p. 117 and p. 124. For example, in 1946, the ONI introduced 74 per cent of immigrant workers and regularised 26 per cent. In 1966, it introduced 23 per cent and regularised 77 per cent, entirely the reverse of the situation in the mid-1940s.

\textsuperscript{12} The Algerian reaction to halt its emigration towards France should also be understood in the light of Algeria's \textit{niers-mondisme} and its relative prosperity owing to a significant rise in oil revenues. See Well, \textit{La
emigration was seen with considerable apprehension by France as well as by other immigrant-host European countries which feared a similar ‘embargo’ to follow from other emigrant exporting countries. This reaction also reflected the importance of North African emigrants for the French economy. However, the social problems of immigrants (in terms of accommodation facilities) and the difficulties of the French economy faced in the mid-1970s (with the end of les trente glorieuses) changed the parameters of immigration and led to a re-examination of the French immigration policy.

In line with other Western European countries, and in agreement with the majority of labour recruiters and labour unions, the Giscard/Chirac government decided in July 1974 to end further immigration into France. However, family reunification was reinstated by a new law in 1975 because its suspension was deemed unconstitutional. The new policy offered a choice between staying permanently in France and integrating into the French society, and a financial incentive for those wishing to return to their country of origin. Aware that the growing presence of immigrants was becoming a major social phenomenon, the government decided to invest in improving the social living conditions of settled immigrant workers. This decision marked the first concerns with the social integration of immigrants into French society.

The decision to halt labour immigration had an unintended result. It generated a low rate of return to the countries of origin (mainly amongst Maghrebi immigrants) and prompted a significant rise in the number of family reunions (despite attempts to curb it by denying work permits to family members on arrival in France). Family reunification reflected as well as reinforced a tendency for the permanent stay of the supposedly temporary immigrants in France. This rendered the likelihood of a retour to the countries of origin remote, despite financial incentives. Indeed, the policy of financial incentives failed to attract any considerable number of North African immigrants. Instead, it benefited mainly Spaniards and Italians who had already decided to return home. Thus, labour immigration agreements ended in 1974, but did not seem to have reduced the inflow of immigrants. Because of family reunification, which continued to rise, together with the phenomenon of seasonal workers employed mainly in agriculture, immigration remained substantial. The choice between integration and the policy of returns was

France et ses étrangers, pp. 114-5.
13 Ibid., p. 115.
14 Wihtol de Wenden, Les immigrés et la politique, p. 194.
reflected in various forms in the French debate over immigration, an issue that had by then been qualified as a *problématique centrale*.

### 6.2.2 The illusion of temporary immigration and the rise of politicisation

The decline in Spanish and, particularly, Italian emigration to France by the late 1970s and the rise in family reunification of dominantly Maghrebi origin changed greatly the social map of immigration in France. Instead of the predominantly – at least nominally – Christian and European immigration of the post-1945 period, immigration in the 1970s became predominantly Arab-Muslim and African, so much so that Maghrebi and African immigrants emerged as the most conspicuous foreign communities in France. Thus, change in immigration policies in the 1970s was associated with a change in the thinking about immigration in France.

The French government’s view of immigrants as guests was reinforced, despite allowing family regroupings to take place. Family regrouping was seen as part of an attempt to improve the social conditions of immigrant workers. Nonetheless, it led to an increase in the number of entries into France. The annual total of the Maghrebi nationals entering France as a result of family reunions reached 30,049 in 1982 before falling to 23,088 in 1990 and 17,318 in 1993 (see Table 6.2). This increase was particularly pronounced in the case of Moroccan immigrants. Consequently, the number of immigrants living in France grew not as single male workers but rather as settled families who started to consider themselves as permanent residents. This rendered them conspicuous not only as a work force but also as a social community within French society, leading to a noticeable change in the French social fabric. This rise in family reunification together with economic difficulties in Western Europe and rising unemployment, all made the high cost of social integration of immigrants and the difficulties to cover it all too obvious. In addition to this economic cost, another cultural cost started to prove even harder to manage because of its moral implications.
<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
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<td>1982</td>
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However, despite attempts at the integration of immigrant workers and their families, their social isolation\(^\text{15}\) from the majority of the French society and their cultural difference only reinforced the awareness of them as a source of societal change within French society. The opinion of the immigration administration in France was more favourable towards European family groupings than towards the Maghrebi one. During the 1970s, family regrouping of Portuguese immigrants was preferred to that of Algerians, the latter being considered temporary and bound to return to the country of origin.\(^\text{16}\) These elements combined to politicise the question of immigration and to put the issue of integration more forcefully on the French political and economic agenda by the end of the 1970s and early 1980s. Conformity with the French Republican model was considered the correct response to problems raised by integration and a powerful means to ‘convert’ the *immigrés* wishing to stay in France into French *citoyens*.

The intensification of the already vociferous debate over immigration in the 1980s (especially over the nationality code) under the aggressive prompting of the FN and the

\(^{15}\) Immigrant workers were often lodged in isolated accommodation, usually designed for single male workers.

perceived threat to national identity generated growing pressures. Not only were there calls for external control (introduction of visa requirements in 1986) but also for new and stricter regulations in the nationality law in order to reinforce internal control. Important seeds for new legislation on immigration, including provisions for what were to become the Pasqua Laws and the Débre Law, germinated during this period.

A number of policies were introduced in order to bring about zero-immigration and cut down the number of asylum seekers to a minimum. More importantly, this was done mainly to reform the nationality code so as to block the fraudulent naturalisation of as many resident foreigners as possible. In particular, a number of these objectives were included in Pasqua Laws (1993). The Pasqua Laws, like the first provisions of 1986, were meant to change the naturalisation procedures; it compelled children born in France of foreign parents to make a formal request for naturalisation between the ages of 16 and 21. In addition, these laws made immigration a matter of the police, and new powers were given to the Police de l’Air et des Frontières (PAF) to detain and deport anyone with irregular status (sans papiers). The Pasqua Laws were later reinforced by the Debré Law (1997). The latter was mainly concerned with civil security and public order in relation to foreign non-EU visitors; it has spread feelings of mistrust and constructed a sort of surveillance society, implicating mere citizens in police functions.

After the much publicised immigration crisis in France as a result of the protests of the sans-papiers in Church of St Bernard in Paris in 1996, a new law amending the Pasqua and Debré Laws was adopted in April 1998 after the arrival of Lionel Jospin to government as a socialist prime minister. This was the Loi reseda (loi relative à l’entrée et au séjour des étrangers et au droit d’asile). Its main principle was to restore the automatic acquisition of nationality through the jus soli (or nationality through place of birth); it abolished the need for a formal declaration to request the acquisition of the French nationality. The Loi reseda – which was said to ‘depoliticise’ immigration issues – also sought to (i) simplify the procedures for entry to France, (ii) diversify and personalise residence permits, (iii) guarantee the right of asylum and (iv) control, in a strict but humane fashion, the flow of clandestine immigration.

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17 The introduction of visas in 1986 was also prompted by a number of terrorist attacks which took place in France and which were related to the crisis in the Middle East.
18 Some of the provisions of the Pasqua Laws were ruled out as unconstitutional by the Conseil Constitutionnel.
Entry to France has been principally governed by the November 1945 ordinance. This ordinance defines entry requirements depending on the nationality of the applicants. Immigration relations between France and Morocco, together with fifteen sub-Saharan countries, are governed by the 1945 ordinance. On the other hand, bilateral agreements between France and Algeria (1968) and Tunisia (1988) govern the entry of Algerian and Tunisian immigrants, and determine the conditions of their stay and employment in France. The 1988 Franco-Tunisian agreement benefits from the reform introduced by the Loi reseda. Negotiations for the renewal of the Franco-Algerian 1968 accord were opened with the official visit of Bouteflika to France in June 2000. An agreement was signed one year later in July 2001 between the two countries granting Algerian immigrants the same rights as other immigrants to France.

### 6.2.3 The case of late-comers: Italy and Spain

The restrictive immigration measures adopted by France, as well as by Belgium, Netherlands and West Germany in the 1970s, led Maghrebi emigrants to consider other destinations. Spain and Italy have figured amongst major new ones. Italy has emerged as the main destination for Tunisian and Moroccan emigration since the mid-1980s. However, Algerian emigration continued to be directed to France, though a number of Algerians have increasingly chosen Spain as a destination, either for settlement or as a means to transit to France in the future. Thus, Spain and Italy, which were net emigration countries until the mid-1980s, have progressively turned from being transit countries into net immigration countries and their importance as such has grown considerably since the early 1990s.

The rise in both regular and irregular migration from North Africa to Italy and Spain may be explained by a number of reasons. Besides the closing of the frontiers of northern European countries, there was also a lack of strict immigration control in these countries during the second half of the 1980s and the lack of any immigration policy. This was the consequence of Italy and Spain having long been emigration countries. The geographical propinquity of Spain and Italy to North Africa is another reason that explains their emergence as destination countries. Most important, however, was strong

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20 The Ordinance also governs the nationality code. The latter was amended four times since 1945, namely in 1973, 1984, 1993 and 1998.
economic growth in Spain and Italy which generated new demands for cheap labour, mainly in sectors of little attraction to nationals such as agriculture, construction and domestic services; these sectors have been increasingly referred to as ‘immigrant sectors’.

The unprecedented rise in immigration to Italy since the early 1980s led to the adoption of a number of laws with the aim of controlling it. As early as 1982 the Ministry of Labour circulated a memorandum calling for a halt to all non-EU immigration and for the regularisation of immigrants already on Italian soil. This regularisation was later considered by many to have borne none of the intended fruit.23 Instead, it increased the number of immigrants seeking clandestine entry into Italy. In response, the Italian parliament passed its first ever comprehensive law on immigration on 30 December 1986. This was the law on ‘Foreign Workers and Control of Illegal Immigration’ (No. 943 1986). It was designed to regulate the rights of immigrants in employment and to control both legal and clandestine immigration as well as to provide for the regularisation of those immigrants already present inside the country. Nonetheless, only 20 to 25 per cent of the estimated clandestine immigrants came out to regularise their situation. The aim of this law, which was to curb immigration, proved to be a failure mainly because it was not followed by other provisions to control the flow of still more clandestine immigrants and ‘false tourists’. This failure was also the outcome of the fact that residence permits were not compulsory; they became so only in 1989 with the introduction of new legislation, preparing for what was considered the first proper law on immigration in Italy.

The failure of the 1986 law and the rise in the number of immigrants and refugees (mainly from central and eastern Europe) prompted the Italian government to adopt in 1990 a new and more liberal law (No. 30 1990), known as the legge Martelli, named after its promoter, the then deputy prime minister, Claudio Martelli. This law was widely viewed as a regularisation programme. However, in addition to provisions for political asylum and regularisation, it contained other provisions (i) to reduce the number of ‘illegal immigrants’ and to impede the arrival of new ones, (ii) to plan for the legal entry of other foreigners and (iii) to facilitate the integration of non-EU immigrants. It also included quota systems for the entry of non-EU nationals. The debate over immigration in the early 1990s gained more intensity especially following the wave of migrants who came from Albania in 1990. The large flow of Albanian migrants occasioned the creation

in Italy of a ministry of immigration to deal with the problem of refugees from that country, but it was to be dissolved just four months later.

The habit of issuing emergency immigration laws during periods of perceived sharp rises in the number of immigrants, or popular protests against them, continued. For instance, the Italian government proposed the adoption of a decree on immigration after two Romanians committed a rape in early October 1995. Shortly afterwards, the Dini Decree, named after Lamberto Dini, then prime minister, was adopted in 19 November 1995. It sought to tighten the loopholes of the five-year old Martelli Law. It also permitted the immediate expulsion of foreigners who committed a crime and a fifteen-day order to leave the country for any persons who lacked residence permits. It also added criminal penalties to its employer sanction law to sanction business employing irregular immigrants. The failure of the provision for expulsion orders to bring about the deportation of irregular immigrants led to a condemnation of the decree as inadequate and there were calls for more intransigent measures to be adopted.\textsuperscript{24} Criticism of the Dini Decree led thus to the introduction of the draft for a new immigration law, which was approved in September 1997 and became Law No. 40/1998 in March 1998. It introduced stricter measures as Italy prepared for entry as full member of the Schengen zone in April 1998.

Hence, during the second half of the 1990s, Italy's immigration policy started to be marked by stricter regulatory measures. The immigration law of 1998 provoked a lot of contention within the Italian political elite.\textsuperscript{25} Some viewed it as the most comprehensive immigration law ever to be adopted by the country. Others, with more radical stances, argued that it was not restrictive enough and that it did not respond to the security worries of Italian citizens. Others, on the other hand, welcomed it, but expressed concern about its regressive attitude towards some rights (including certain asylum rights) as well as about the absence of propositions relative to the reform of the citizenship rights and the protection and stability of immigrant residence.

Regardless of these varying views, Law No. 40/1998 is similar to the Martelli Law in various of its provisions. It included provisions for the fight against clandestine

\textsuperscript{24} In 1995, about 56,000 expulsion orders were issued, but only 7,400 were expelled. Most of those asked to leave the country took the fifteen-day grace period to leave Italy to move on to France or Germany; others disappear and continue to live as irregulars.

\textsuperscript{25} For a detailed account of the 40 1998 Law and the debate it provoked amongst political parties, see Franco Pittau et al., "Le cas italien dans le contexte européen", \textit{Migrations Société} Vol. 11, No. 64-65 (1999), pp. 137-42.
immigration, the implementation of a system of quotas, and recognition of the rights and duties of regular immigrants akin to those of Italian nationals. The difference between the two laws lay in Law 40/1998 being stricter in its application of these provisions. It replaced the fifteen-day period of grace by allowing local police to detain irregular immigrants for up to one month before their deportation. On the other hand, it granted more rights to legal residents, including permanent permesso di soggiorno for those having worked legally in Italy for more than five years – the aim was to facilitate their integration as well as that of their children. The 1998 law included provisions allowing for the introduction of guest-worker programmes for seasonal workers and the setting up of annual quotas with non-EU countries. The other major difference was that the new Italian law was in conformity with the requirements of the provisions of European laws on immigration as established by the Treaty of Amsterdam.26

Criticism of the current law on immigration in Italy together with the arrival of a centre-right coalition led by Silvio Berlusconi in June 2001 reinforced immigration issues back on the governmental agenda. Reducing immigration to Italy was one of the campaign themes of the new government. Indeed, in March 2002 it planned to toughen its immigration laws with a new proposal, Fini-Bossi, named after Gianfranco Fini, the vice prime minister, and Umberto Bossi, minister of institutional reform and leader of the Lega Nord. Three months later, on 4 June 2002, this proposal was approved by the lower chamber (La Camera italiana) with 279 votes against 203. This law was passed by the Italian ‘Senato’ in July and will enter into force as the Legge Fini-Bossi in September 2002.27 This new law gives more power to the ministry of interior over that of labour in respect of immigration issues. Residence and work permits have become interlinked. Thus non-EU immigrants without jobs have to leave Italy within a period of six months, down from the one year that was granted in the previous legislation. The Fini-Bossi Law has also ended the regularisation practice allowing foreigners who legally or illegally entered the country to regularise their situation as long as they have found employment. It has made it easier to expel ‘illegal’ immigrants within 48 hours, thus criminalising – for the first time in the legal history of immigration in Italy – ‘illegal’ entry to the country.

26 The Treaty of Amsterdam established for the first time Community competence for immigration and asylum. The European council at its meeting in Tampere in October 1999 agreed the development of a common EU policy with relation to issues of immigration and asylum. The milestones of this agreement included partnership with third countries, a common European asylum policy, fair treatment of third country nationals and the management of migration flows.

27 Migration News Vol. 9, No. 7 (July 2002) <http: migration.acdavis.edu/mn/archive_mn>.
External control has been reinforced by increasing the patrol capacity on Italy’s coasts and requiring non-EU citizens to be fingerprinted if they remain in Italy.

To turn to Spain, the strong economic development of the 1980s reversed migration flows, rendering Spain a net immigration country. It also modified the labour market as the Spanish labour force started to move out of ‘immigrant sectors’, namely agriculture, construction and domestic services. Spain’s political opening towards the EU contributed to the rise in luxury immigration from other European countries, notably from Germany and Britain. On the other hand, economic development and integration in the European market favoured the growth in agricultural production, for which non-EU immigration provided a cheap labour force. Indeed, economic immigration to Spain increased after 1986 and was mainly from North Africa, and, since the mid-1990s, from sub-Saharan Africa.

The rise in economic immigration inflows to Spain prompted the country to adopt a number of immigration laws. Spain introduced its first immigration law in 1985; this was the organic law regulating the rights and liberties of foreigners (No. 7/1985), known as la ley de extranjería, and gave, for the first time, a status to immigrants in Spain. Indeed, the 1980s witnessed a considerable increase in immigration of North African origin, notably from Morocco. Many Moroccan immigrants, who earlier would have transited to France via Spain, decided to settle in the economically prosperous region of Catalonia. With the ‘end of labour immigration’ in France after 1974, this wealthy Spanish region became the final destination for an increasingly large number of immigrants from Morocco.

The adoption of la ley de extranjería translated an awareness in Spain of the existence and increase of clandestine immigration. This explained the wave of regularisation that took place between 1985 and 1986. With the second regularisation programme in 1991, the rise in the number of non-Community immigrants, notably from (North) Africa became noticeable, and increasingly so, with the phenomenon of the pateras. Indeed, in 1991, the number of regular resident immigrants from Africa constituted 17% per cent of the total foreign population; they numbered 62,925, 80% per cent of whom were Moroccans. The Spanish government regularised 100,000 cases in total in 1991. This regularisation, which covered a large number of Moroccans, coincided with

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29 Its status as an ‘organic law’ means that it was fully debated in the Congress and the Senate and was signed by King Juan Carlos, and that, constitutionally, it must be applicable throughout the country.
the Gulf War and the subsequent unrest it raised in the Maghreb, consequently attracting huge media attention and fuelling the debate over (Moroccan) immigration as a threat to the Spanish society. This attitude towards Moroccan immigration was reinforced by the perception of the role of Ceuta and Melilla following the unrest in 1986 and the subsequent EU-funded fortification of the two enclaves as well as by Spain setting up an expensive radar system to use in the fight against clandestine immigration.

**Figure 6.3 – The growth of foreign residents in Spain (1989-2000)**

![Illustration removed for copyright restrictions]

*Source: Spanish Ministry of Interior, 2001.*

The large rise in the number of non-EU foreign residents, together with the phenomenon of large scale irregular immigration, prompted proposals from the Immigration Forum\(^\text{36}\) which led to a number of reforms to the 7/1985 law in February 1996. These reforms centred mainly on the social dimension of clandestine immigration and the further integration of regular immigrants. They favoured family regrouping and sought to prevent the sliding back into irregularity for regular immigrants as a result of changes in the immigration laws. For this purpose, these reforms extended the validity of the period of work and residence permits and facilitated their renewal. Within the framework of the reformed immigration law, the government launched a new programme of regularisation between April and August 1996. However, it concerned only immigrants who were in possession of a job and their families, and thus left out a large number of clandestine immigrants who had entered the country without proper papers.

\(^{36}\) The Immigration Forum is a purely consultative body composed of administrative representatives, trade unions, NGOs and immigrant associations.
Alongside these regularisation policies, Spain put into place, in 1993, another policy governing the issuance of work permits to stop immigrants falling into underground economic activities. However, the number of work permits delivered remained well below the demand. With the arrival of José María Aznar’s Popular Party to power in 1996, the number of work permits was reduced. For example, the government made available 15,000 permits, while applications stood around 62,000. Following pressures from employers complaining about labour shortages, the government increased the number of work permits to 28,000 in 1998 and to 30,000 in 1999. But these measures did not seem to curtail clandestine immigration, which continued to flow unabated.

As a response to this, the Spanish government called for a new regularisation programme to cover 60,000 to 75,000 immigrants, and expressed the urgent need for a new immigration law to replace the reformed _ley de extranjeros_ of 1985. Indeed, the need to modify the law on immigration was signalled in 1997 by a parliamentary sub-commission. This sub-commission stressed the need to improve the integration of immigrants, given their widespread presence. In this context, and after long parliamentary debates, a new law was adopted on 22 December 1999 and entered into force in February 2000. This was the Organic Law on the Rights and Liberties of Foreigners in Spain and their Social Integration (No. 4/2000).

Soon afterwards, because the new law was judged too permissive with regard to clandestine immigrants, the newly re-elected Aznar government – with the Partido Popular (PP) now enjoying absolute parliamentary majority – promised to modify it in order to make it conform to the EU directives on immigration (which allowed social and medical rights to legal immigrants only) as well as to make it more acceptable to the Spanish people. Thus, in August 2000, the government proposed a legislation that tightened the previous law, especially through reserving the social rights of education and health care to legal immigrants and their children only. These amendments to Law No. 4 2000 were adopted in December and gave birth to a new law – Law No. 8/2000 – which entered into force in January 2001. In 2002, new proposals to further tighten an already restrictive immigration law have been discussed. These have included less resort to regularisation of clandestine immigrants in the future as well as limiting entry through family reunion to spouses and children of the nuclear family under 16 years of age. These reforms have been presented as a policy of ‘hospitality with responsibility’ that Madrid

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has adopted. Though these proposals enjoyed support from some EU member states at the meeting of the European Council in Seville in June 2002, the decision to clamp down on immigration still further poses some cause for concern in Spain over its impact on the Spanish economy.32

6.2.4 The European context and south-west Europe

The development in immigration policies in Western Europe in general has moved into a restricted direction since the mid-1980s as immigration has increasingly been related to matters of security. Even during the first years of mass immigration to France in the 1960s, there was already an awareness that problems could be caused by the fact that some immigrants were more culturally different than others. This awareness was heightened both by the realisation of the permanent nature of the stay of immigrants and the big increase—despite restrictive attempts—in their numbers in the 1970s and early 1980s. This shift from temporary guest-workers to permanent immigrant communities raised calls for the adoption of a zero-immigration policy to go hand in hand with the social integration of immigrants and their children. In parallel, at the national level, regularisation policies have been adopted as a way to cut down the number of ‘illegal’ immigrants by regularising successful applicants and expelling those that do not fulfil the residence and/or labour regularisation requirements. These restrictive policies have also been a response to a growing public concern over greater security, both in relation to a national identity perceived as under attack from culturally different immigrants as well as to large numbers of ‘illegal’ immigrants being apprehended at national borders. To curb ‘illegal’ immigration, a number of restrictive and ‘punitive’ actions have been taken within the framework of the Schengen Agreement of 1985.33

The rise in immigration inflows in the early 1990s and the entering into force of Convention on the implementation of the Schengen Agreement in 1995, fleshing out of the Schengen Agreement of ten years earlier, triggered major reorientations in the immigration policies of south-west European countries, leading to a series of

33 In June 1985, Germany, France, Belgium, Holland and Luxembourg signed a joint agreement for the gradual abolition of border checks between their frontiers. Its scope covers an entire range of procedures on checks at the borders on Community nationals and nationals of third countries and persons seeking asylum. As regards matters of immigration policy, the Agreement covers, inter alia, common rules on the checks at external borders, conditions for the crossing of internal borders and policies on visas, the imposition of fines on airlines carrying passengers who do not possess the requisite documents. See, Blanca Vilá Costa, "The Quest for a Consistent Set of Rules Governing the States of non-Communities Nationals", in Philip Alston (ed.), The EU and Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 437-38.
regularisations and the establishment of quota systems together with projects for the integration of immigrants. These policies were also partly pressed on Spain by virtue of its membership of the EU. With Italy and Spain joining the Schengen Group in 1990 and 1991 respectively, these two countries became the southern frontiers of the EU in respect of the free movement of persons. As a result, both countries introduced visa requirements, Spain having imposed an entry visa requirement for the Maghreb countries in May 1991. Sometimes the Schengen Convention, which did not enter into force until March 1995 (and until the end of 1997 in the case of Italy), have limited the scope of new immigration policies in Italy and Spain, especially in terms of quotas and eligibility for social security entitlements. If Law No. 40/1998 in Italy was viewed to be in agreement with the EU regulations, the Spanish Law No. 4/2000 was criticised from within Spain for its lack of conformity with the EU immigration laws as agreed upon in Tampere, Finland, in 1999, because it was said to extend social and health services to ‘illegal’ immigrants. Indeed, the Treaty of Amsterdam, which came into force in May 1999, incorporated as an integral part of the Third Pillar (Justice and Home Affairs, JHA) the so-called Schengen acquis comprising the 1985 Agreement, 1990 Convention and additional Accession protocols and executive decisions.

Thus, the perceived increase in number of immigrants, the need to tackle inflows through internal as well as external controls, the political debate raised by immigration laws in the three countries and in other Western European countries, have all contributed to push the issue of immigration high on the political and societal agendas of these countries. Immigration issues have not stopped at the level of politicisation; they have often assumed a security dimensions and have been taken up by a number of security organs, for instance the Trevi group up to 1993 when its work became subsumed under the JHA provisions of the Maastricht Treaty. In all three countries of south-west Europe, immigration is institutionally under the control of a department in the ministry of interior. The treatment of immigrants has too often been related to the treatment of public disorder and civil insecurity. It has also been related to threats to national identity. In this sense,

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35 The Trevi (Terrorisme, radicalisme, extrémisme et violence internationale) Group, consisting of EC home affairs ministers and comprising working parties and subgroups, was initially set up to combat terrorism and establish an airports security network linking a number of countries, including Australia, Canada, France, Germany and Switzerland. In 1980s, work was carried out in the fields of justice and home affairs not only by the Ad Hoc Working Party on Immigration but also by the European Committee to Combat Drugs (CELAD), the Groupe Assistance Mutuelle (GAM), empowered to act in the field of customs, and the Schengen operational structure units.
both ‘legal and illegal’ immigration have been presented as having links to insecurity in Europe. Therefore, for the purpose of the security-check, there is need for a clear distinction to be made between immigration as a threat to national identity and (‘illegal’) immigration as a threat to public and civil order.

6.3 ‘ILLEGAL’ IMMIGRATION AND INTERNAL SECURITY

A great part of the securitisation discourse has revolved around ‘illegal’ immigration. This is partly because of the extensive media attention clandestine immigration attracts. But it is mainly because, unlike other issues on immigration in general, ‘illegal’ immigration in particular draws a consensus across the whole political gamut, and, therefore, creates no major split in the host country’s ideological, political or social precepts. It triggers unanimous reactions of condemnation across the whole political spectrum in all European countries and gives rise to the expression of the urgent need to stop it.

Despite the existence of a general consensus on the need to stop ‘Illegal’ immigration, what counts as ‘illegal’ immigration remains controversial. To start with, the term ‘illegal’ itself has been disputed as a stigmatisation of immigrants because it is a construction resulting from the legal system which has been put into place to regulate immigration. The idea of ‘illegal’ immigrants, at least for the population at large, has often been that of foreigners trying to force their way through the borders of the target country, an image that has been reinforced by daily media reports on the number of pateras that failed to cross the Straits of Sicily and Gibraltar or on the number of those who were intercepted at the borders or washed dead to the shores. However, the ‘illegality’ attached to immigrants can be the result of their (i) being illegally smuggled into the host country (clandestines), (ii) entering legally and then overstaying beyond visa entitlements (‘false tourists’), (iii) becoming illegal through a change in the immigration law of the host country (the sans papiers in France in 1996-1997) and/or (iv) working illegally and infringing labour restrictions on foreigners.36 Therefore, ‘illegal’ immigrants are also conceived by domestic policies intended to counter their existence. In other words, the legal framework set up to deal with immigration contributes to construct and shape the identity of ‘illegal’ immigrants.

The link between ‘illegality’, crime and immigration was more forcefully underlined in the early 1990s within the framework of the Schengen Implementation Convention. While the 1985 agreement comprised only three articles on immigration, the issue came to dominate the discussion in the groups in charge of the Implementation Convention of 1990. There was a linking, in both Group 1 (on police and security) and Group 2 (on movement and persons) of the Implementation Convention, between immigration and cross-border criminality, terrorism and border control.\(^{37}\) The transfer of the Schengen *acquis* to the First Pillar in 1999 has put immigration-related issues under the institutional competences of the Community. This has also led to their inclusion, as regards third countries, under the remit of the Community’s development policies. Consequently, this transfer has brought about the ‘communitarisation’ of the security paradigm that dominated immigration-related issues under the Third Pillar.\(^{38}\) As a result, the link between immigration and security continues to exist, despite a slight shift in ference, at least at Commission level, to managing rather than restricting immigration flows to EU countries.\(^{39}\) The inclusion of immigration under the first pillar has allowed, for example, proposals to cut economic aid to third countries failing to show more responsibility in controlling their emigration towards Europe; this was suggested by Spain at the meeting of the European Council in Seville in June 2002.

In this context, the picture which securitisation paints of ‘illegal’ immigration has usually been joined to a security worry that associates ‘illegal’ immigrants to a threat to public order and to a rise in crime and criminal activities. This association often blurs an important distinction between people seeking to emigrate for economic and other reasons, and, on the other hand, both those who traffic them as a part of an organised network of human smuggling and a domestic labour ‘mafia’ who supply immigrant workers as cheap labour for underground economies. If the decision to enter a country without acquiring a visa puts people trying to emigrate through such means outside the law, the fact that they have been smuggled by criminal gangs also contributes to rendering them ‘illegal’. Thus, in most cases, the ‘illegal’ status of immigrants has little relation to any criminal activities perpetrated by immigrants themselves; it may bear relation to their unauthorised entry


into the receiving country. Because of the nature of the ‘illegality’ of foreigners as unregistered immigrants, it is difficult, often impossible, to obtain an accurate estimation of their numbers. Data on their presence is often exaggerated (when, for example, it counts those who have tried to enter ‘illegally’ more than once) and sometimes politically biased.

It is estimated that one third of the 3m immigrants living ‘illegally’ in Europe are distributed between France, Italy and Spain. According to Spanish sources as reported in 2001, there were 500,000 irregular foreigners in France, 300,000 in Spain and 235,000 in Italy in 2000. According to 1997 figures provided by Caritas di Roma, one notices that despite Moroccans constituting the largest irregular foreign community in Italy (25,000), in percentage terms however, their number represented only 17 per cent of all Moroccan residents in Italy in 1997, which was twice as low as it was notably for Romania (37 per cent), Poland (32 per cent), or Brazil (29 per cent). The difference between the overall presence of immigrants of one country and the percentage of irregular immigrants from the same country could be the result of the differing degrees of integration the immigrant community provides and the help it gives to facilitate the regularisation of its co-nationals. These numbers seem to strongly contradict the securitisation approach offered concerning regular and irregular immigrants. Indeed, immigrant communities often facilitate the integration of newly arrived immigrants, especially in helping them to find jobs in order to regularise their situation.

The question and credibility of the ‘illegality’ of immigrants, and by extension their securitisation, becomes even less clear when one looks at their contribution to the crime rate. Though it is difficult to find the extent of involvement of illegal immigrants in crime, a look at the criminal records in relation to immigrants in general can shed some light in this respect. The presence of foreigners in police reports has usually little to do with involvement in criminal activities. This is clear from the fact that a large number of police reports concern irregular foreigners, i.e. people who have been arrested because they fail to meet the requirements of residence (e.g. visa, labour, etc.). For example, in 1996, Italian police reports, all categories confounded, covered 100,053 non-Community members, made up of 23,605 regular immigrants (24 per cent) and 76,448 irregular

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42 Ibid., p. 131.
immigrants (76 per cent). This percentage increased in the following years. In 1998, 87 per cent of the immigrants arrested or interrogated by the police failed to present a valid residence permit, which makes it difficult to see whether they were arrested because of criminal activities or simply for failing to present valid residence papers. As regards the origins of irregular immigrants arrested in Italy in 1998, 47 per cent of them were from Albania and ex-Yugoslavia, followed by 43 per cent from Africa.

The link between immigration and security became more pronounced because of the Algerian crisis and the terrorist attacks that took place on French soil. This led to stricter control, both internal and external. The need to report the arrival of non-EU nationals staying in private homes to the local police in France, instituted by the Debré Law, fell within this worry about security. This was also obvious in a major reduction in the number of visa entries granted to Algerians; these fell from 80,000 in 1989 to 57,000 in 1997. Indeed, over the period of ten years since the outbreak of violence in Algeria, the foreign population of Algerian nationality resident in France fell by 11 per cent, from 609,847 in 1991 to 545,129 in 2000, despite a noticeable rise in total entries of any nationality into France after 1997. Also, the stop-and-search policy increased in intensity between 1995 and 1997, and targeted mostly people of North African appearance. With the 11 September attack on New York and Washington in 2001, the connection of immigration to terrorism and the need to control it became all too pressing. Nonetheless, some of those involved in activities linked to September 11 were found to be individuals carrying the nationality of EU states or residents in them, and not immigrants who had newly arrived in Europe ‘illegally’.

On another level, the threat that immigration in general is said to present to economic security appears unfounded. ‘Illegal’ immigrants have been ‘exploited’ for underground economies and have been a source of enrichment for southern farmers as well as providing “the backbone of the service industries that have sprouted to support middle-class, dual-income families”. Though it has been argued that the presence of a large number of ‘illegal’ immigrants might end up undermining jobs for nationals, this would happen only when they occupied all primary jobs and then started competing for well paid ones. But a look at the distribution of immigrants in south-west European

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41 Ibid., p. 225.
42 This figure does not account for those that were naturalised and became French citizens during this period.
countries shows that immigrants, and also occasionally their children, still occupy low paid jobs.\textsuperscript{47}

Furthermore, work carried out by illegal and even legal immigrants is characterised by the ‘three Ds’ (dirty, demanding and dangerous) and is often eschewed by nationals. For these reasons, immigrant unemployment in Italy dropped from 21 per cent in the early 1990s to only 15 per cent in the second half of the same decade.\textsuperscript{48} These percentages include those who, for regularisation purposes, declared themselves unemployed, though they were, in truth, involved in underground or informal economic activities. Often ‘illegal’ immigrants are preferred to legal ones because of their low cost, which contributes to perpetuate their illegality and explains the relative failure of amnesty programmes to regularise them. This tension between illegality and employment was manifest in the case of Spain after the adoption of the organic law in January 2001. This law, which provides for heavy sanctions of €60,000 fine against farmers caught employing irregular immigrants, raised a wave of protest amongst Spanish farmers.\textsuperscript{49} The attitude of the Spanish farmers translates the dependence of some economic sectors on irregular immigrants as a cheap source of journaliers in agricultural activities such as the picking of fruit. Thus, immigration underpins economic activity; it is not detrimental to it.

The challenge in (south-west) Europe, at the beginning of the 21\textsuperscript{st} century, is to find a balance between populist anti-immigration attitudes and the needs for immigrants that the economies demand. In 2000, the policy of quotas to favour some immigration seemed to be back in vogue in many Western European countries. This was against a background of an economically prosperous and demographically ageing Europe. According to UN estimates, the EU would have to admit 1.4m immigrants a year, up from 860,000 a year between 1990 and 1998, in order to keep its working-age population at 170m.\textsuperscript{50} For example, in 2000, Italy’s interior ministry set an immigration quota of 63,000, up from 58,000 in 1998 and 27,000 in 1997. A similar call for an increase in labour quotas was made by ex-prime minister, Alain Juppé in October 1999.\textsuperscript{51} This need for economic migrants because of economic and demographic reasons, nonetheless,

\textsuperscript{47} See, for example, “L’accès des Français d’origine étrangère et des natifs des DOM-TOM aux fonctions d’encadrement dans les entreprises et les administrations.” Centre de Recherche pour l’Étude et l’Observation des Conditions de Vie (CREDOC) (Paris, July 2001).

\textsuperscript{48} See Enzo Mingione and Fabio Quassoli, "The Participation of Immigrants in the Underground Economies in Italy", in Russell King, et al. (eds.), Eldorado or Fortress? p. 45.


\textsuperscript{51} "Alain Juppé: Il faut accueillir de nouveaux immigrés", Le Monde 1 October 1999.
comes with a cultural cost for their integration, especially those who emigrate from non-European countries. Indeed, this cultural cost and the difficulty to integrate some categories of immigrants lie at the heart of the securitisation of immigration as a threat to national identity.

6.4 IMMIGRATION, INTEGRATION AND THREATS TO NATIONAL IDENTITY

According to securitisation discourse, Maghrebi immigration constitutes a threat to the cultural identity of south-west European countries. This securitisation discourse has been more pronounced in France because of its long history of immigration and the existence of a large number of immigrants and citizens with Maghrebi origin. It has also become increasingly intense in Spain and Italy. Since the threat to identity is related to a cultural difference that comes not only from immigrants but also from citizens of immigrant origins, then the failure to integrate them into the host community is at the heart of societal insecurity and the feeling of a national identity at risk. The success or failure of integration depends on the ‘threshold of tolerance’ in the host community, on the one hand, and on the willingness of immigrants to integrate, on the other. In this context, integration has more to do with legally settled immigrants than with ‘illegal’ immigration. If one accepts immigration as a threat to the cultural identity of a nation, then it is the integration of immigrants, and not the handling of ‘illegal’ immigrants, that is central to societal security.

6.4.1 De l’immigré au citoyen: the assimilatory power of the French Republican model?

The policies of quotas giving entry preferences to particular nationals over others translate an implicit preoccupation with issues of immigrant integration. These policies have usually tended to favour nationals who were deemed capable of being ‘integrated’. As early as April 1945, the ONI refused the offer of the Governor of Algeria to transfer 100,000 Muslim-Algerian workers to metropolitan France because of the “sanitary, social and moral” risks involved. This decision echoed a scheme that was under discussion at the time in Paris with regard to the ethnic and national selection of immigrants on a ‘desirability’ scale, which put Nordic people at the positive end and North Africans at the negative end. The principle of an ethnically based selection, which was behind the rebuff of the said transfer, was later abandoned with the adoption of the ordinance on

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52 Patrick Weil, La France et ses étrangers, p. 93.
immigration in November 1945. Though the ordinance did not include any provisions or means to carry out a selection of immigrant workers in accordance with ethnic desirability, there were a number of institutional ways to favour the more assimilable Italian, Spanish and Portuguese immigrants to the less assimilable North African ones. To this effect, the French state implemented in 1956 a practice to bypass the official institutions created to manage immigration flows.\textsuperscript{3} Nonetheless, the liberal, business-oriented approach to immigration and recruitment at a time of a slowdown in Italian and Spanish emigration still resulted in an increase in the number of immigrant workers from North Africa.

The decline in the number of assimilable European immigrants and the rise in the number of North African (and other) immigrants in the late 1960s highlighted the problematic status of the latter, especially when they turned into settled, permanent immigrant communities in the 1970s. The question of their integration into French society acquired a place of importance on government agendas. This was accompanied by the belief in the assimilatory power of the French Republican model. Its capacity to absorb difference was at the basis of attempts to “turn immigrants into French citizens”. The example of the successful assimilation of Poles and Portuguese was expected to be repeated with North African immigrants as their presence and cultural difference started to be felt. This feeling was heightened after the increasing settlement of supposedly temporary immigrants as families and the birth on French soil of a new generation that, despite being born in France, was referred to as first generation ‘immigrants’.

The other immigration phenomenon which dominated the late 1970s and early 1980s was a rise in the requests for naturalisation. Family regrouping and the restrictions on work permits contributed a great deal to this rise because of the social benefits which come with naturalisation. Though the percentage of the immigrant population of foreign nationality in the total population has remained virtually unaltered from 1975 to 1990 (around 5.6 per cent), this masks an increase in the number of people acquiring French nationality. The total number of naturalisations more than doubled between 1985 and 1994.

Nonetheless, despite the rise in number of naturalisations, the power of the Republican model to integrate Maghrebi immigrants and their children was called into

question following various developments. Urban riots in French cités, the rise of the FN, and the foulard affair in November 1989 (which coincided with the preparation for the centenary of the revolution), all combined to intensify the debate over immigration and constituted a test of the French Republican model of integration. As James Hollifield has remarked, “immigration control was inextricably linked with problems of integration and religion, as French authorities started to come to grips with the permanent settlement of millions of Muslim North Africans and the arrival of an increasing number of sub-Saharan Africans”.55

The debate over immigration in the 1980s and early 1990s ineluctably fuelled another debate over Republican principles of nationality and citizenship. Apart from increasing demands for tighter border controls to curb down the number of unauthorised immigrants, there also existed pressures for stricter regulations of the ways in which French nationality may be obtained. The persisting cultural difference of immigrants and their children (many of whom are French citizens) constituted, especially from a nationalist vantage point, a threat that could undermine the French cultural identity. This idea of a national identity under attack was partly behind the first proposals to reform the nationality code in the second half of the 1980s. The proposal by the Chirac government (1986-88) to reform the automatic acquisition of French nationality for children born in France of foreign parents (jus soli) was of paramount significance to those concerned: it rendered the concept of national identity and the right to French citizenship something that one deserves rather than automatically acquires – ‘être Français, cela se mérite’, as the phrase went. Thus, to ‘deserve’ French nationality was rendered contingent on a personal formal declaration to be made at the age between 16 and 21, and a clean criminal record (including no record of drug related crimes). This proposal, which later constituted the backbone of the Pasqua Laws (1993), aimed at limiting the number of Français de papier and ensured that those who take French nationality be Français de cœur – that is, they should be able to prove that they believe in and respect French Republican values.

The link between a cultural identity at risk and immigration appears to have been behind the new requirements for naturalisation and citizenship. These requirements put more emphasis on civil security and law and order, rather than on the main roots of the

54 The challenge of Republican values is clear in the need to resort to the Conseil d’État for arbitration over immigration policies taken by political leaders with regard to their respect of the Republican values as well as in relation to their constitutionality.
problems of integration. The most (in)famous were the Pasqua Laws relating to the reform to the nationality code, the reinforcement of identity checks and the control of immigration flow (including asylum and family reunion). These laws, according to Paul Masson, a French Senator, were implemented in defence of Republican values. By virtue of the Pasqua Laws, the personal declaration for the acquisition of French nationality made by those born in France of foreign parents became ‘a manifestation of will’ to become French. Nonetheless, this revision to the *jus soli* was made further conditional on a clean criminal record in order to obstruct the acquisition of nationality for those who were deemed a threat to public order. In mutually reinforcing fashion, the Pasqua Laws and the subsequent Debré Law sought to respond to two security worries, notably integration into French society and security concerns regarding civil security and public order.

Thus, instead of addressing the reasons behind the failure to integrate certain immigrants, notably poverty, exclusion, declining welfare and social inequality, the French government was seeking to promote an ideology of consensus around cultural and Republican issues. By reinforcing the importance of cultural and Republican values, France highlighted the cultural difference of its North African community. When this difference was brought to the fore, the link between immigration and the threat to national identity was easily exploited by far-right elements. Consequently, existing policiés of naturalisation were called into question because they were considered too liberal insofar as they failed to produce French citizens. This failure has often been underlined with reference to North African immigrants and their children; they have been decried as a community that has refused to integrate. Policies that have sought to focus on the need to integrate immigrants have been divided into three models: *assimilation*, *intégration* and *insertion*. Failure of integration owed much to the fact that the kind of integration required has been too often conceived in terms of *assimilation*. Indeed, *The Economist* summarised the French integration model as one which expects newcomers to “speak

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54 In 1994, shortly after the adoption of the Pasqua Laws, Jean-Claude Barreau, the advisor on immigration to the French minister of interior, was reported to have said that “... foreigners arriving to France must understand that from henceforth their ancestors are the Gauls and that they have a new homeland ... But Muslim extremists have begun arriving in France as colonizers, with gods and weapons in their baggage ... Today, there is a real Islamic threat in France”. See "The Muslims in France Rejecting their Ancestors the Gauls", *The Economist*, 16 November 1996.

French, eat French food, wear French clothes, [and] observe French customs". This model looks to create ‘ideal-type’ Republican citizens, rather than a multicultural society.

Demands for integration into French society have been accompanied by various attempts to improve the social integration of immigrants in terms of accommodation and employment. As early as 1958, the FAS (Fonds d'action sociale pour les travailleurs immigrés et leurs familles) was set up. Its task was to help in the integration of immigrants through measures for families, children and young people in the areas of housing (participation in the management of migrant workers’ hostels), training (including literacy) and employment. However, the failure to cater for the social promotion and equal treatment of immigrants seeking integration has been considered by the first and second generation immigrants as a failure of the French Republican model to keep its promises. It has also raised a sense of frustration amongst them because of the disparity between their reality and the ideals of French Republican values. They have found out that their attempts at integration into French society have not been beneficial since they have continued to face discrimination and unequal treatment. As such, the counterpart of integration (that is, social promotion and equal opportunities) has not been delivered by French society. Thus, the inability to meet the high cost of social integration has isolated immigrants, both in their accommodation and in the kind of jobs they occupy. This socio-economic situation was relatively acceptable to immigrants when they arrived in the 1960s, but it could no longer be acceptable to their children, who are now French citizens. Therefore, after the adoption of the Loi reseda, a circular of the ministry of interior in January 1999 requested the creation of around 115 Codac (Commissions d'accès à la citoyenneté) in order to guarantee equal employment opportunities to the youth of immigrant origin.

The contradiction in the Republican model with regard to the integration of immigrants becomes even more obvious with the children of immigrant parents. The discourse of integration may have appeared plausible for immigrants in the 1960s or new foreign residents. Nonetheless, it contradicts the same Republican values it itself seeks to promote when directed towards first and second generation immigrants mainly because of the status of most of them as French citizens. Indeed, emphasis on integration already presupposes the fact that it is directed to an outsider, not to a citizen or to someone who has been brought up in the French Republican institutions intégrantes (schools,

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34 "The Muslims in France Rejecting their Ancestors the Gauls", The Economist, 16 November 1996.
workplace, political parties and organisations). Thus, these integration policies tend, inadvertently, to alienate the very people they are targeting. Having been born and educated in the French Republican school system, ‘children of immigrants’ have expected to receive equal treatment within French society in accordance with Republican principles of equality. Instead, they have often been constantly reminded – through the debate over immigration and integration as well as through the policy of stop-and-search during the second half of the 1980s and between 1994 and 1997 – of their status as Français issus d’immigration as opposed to Français de souche. This categorisation draws effectively a distinction between being a French citizens and being French. It also creates a difference between various citizens and perpetuates the status of the ‘children of immigrants’ as first and second generation ‘immigrants’, regardless of their being French citizens.

The contradiction ensuing from the need to integrate ‘citizens’ highlights the main difficulty faced by the French model of integration, namely the assimilation one, which is the refusal of differences in the public space. If integration proved hard for (Christian/European) Poles, Portuguese and Italians in the 1970s, it has even been more so for (Muslim/Arab) North Africans in the 1980s and 1990s. The difficulty encountered by the French Republican model in integrating some of its North African immigrant citizens has reinforced the need of a generation of youth to search for an alternative model where they can express their difference and find an identity. Islam and the feeling of belonging to a Muslim community have provided both an answer and a refuge. The (re)assertion of a Muslim identity as a major component of their French identity coincided with the politicisation of immigration and the first proposals to reform the nationality code during the second half of the 1980s. It also coincided with the emergence of a new political awareness among immigrant communities that led to their cultural claims and the problems associated with them being given a widespread airing politically and by the media.59 This political awareness and subsequent engagements in associational and organisational movements made their presence as well as the difference (or ‘droit à la différence’) they sought to underpin the more conspicuous.

This droit à la différence has led the ‘children of immigrants’ of Maghrebi origin to stress their difference as Muslims, Maghrebis and Arabs, without this having to be in contradiction with their French citizenship. Indeed, references such as ‘French of Algerian nationality’ or ‘Moroccan of France’ or ‘Muslim made in France’ are widely

used to underpin this difference and right for a dual identity. In the context of this dual identity, the question of integration through the adoption of French Republican values has become entangled with issues about Islam and Muslim identity in France. Questions of the relation between Republican laïcité and Islam became central to integration. The social public presence of Islam has appeared to contradict the tenets of laïcité, as demonstrated by the foulard affair in 1989. The latter was indeed considered by the Maghrebi community as an assertion of and demand for difference.

To tackle questions of Islam and integration, the French government established in 1990 two councils, namely the Haut Conseil à l'Intégration (HCI) and the Conseil de Réflexion sur l'Avenir de l'Islam en France (CORIF).60 The creation of these two councils took place with the Salman Rushdie affair in mind (just nine months before) as well as the violent tensions that were then boiling in Algeria between a secular (military) regime and Islamist pretenders to power. Despite the establishment of these councils, no uniform solutions were found. New foulard affairs occurred in 1992 and 1994, prompting the then minister of education, François Bayrou, to issue, in September 1994, a memorandum forbidding the wearing of “ostentatious religious signs” in school communities.

The apprehension with which the rise of a Muslim identity amongst French citizens of Maghrebi origin has been met has owed a great deal to the emergence of Islamist movements in North Africa and the fear of Islamist fundamentalism in France. In this context, integration has become intertwined with provisions for the religious practices of Islam. Awareness of the presence of Muslim communities has increased considerably, especially between 1986 and 1995, and the debate over integration has had to focus on how to deal with Muslim communities as a permanent component of the French cultural and religious scene. Half of the total population of Muslims living in France (around 5m) are French citizens. Yet, in 1997, there were no more than 1,100 prayer places, 90 per cent of which were simply houses of worship (salles de prière) managed for prayer purposes. There are only eight mosques in architectural terms (also known as mosquées-cathédrale) with a capacity for at least 1,000 persons.61

60 CORIF is a sort of ‘conseil de sages’ comprising 15 persons in charge of suggesting policies to the public authorities in relation to Islam, rather than representing Islam as such in France.
61 By comparison, there are 40,000 religious edifices (cathedrals, churches and chapels) for 45m Catholics; 957 churches or temples for 900,000 protestants; and 82 synagogues for 500,000 Jews. See Olivier Morgan, “Vers une fin de ‘l’exceptionnalité musulmane’”, Esprit (January 1998), p. 8.
The involvement of the ‘children of the republic’ in a number of terrorist attacks in Paris and the radicalisation of a number of them was not well received by the French authorities. The killing by the French metropolitan police, in September 1995, of Khaled Kelkal, a French citizens born in France of Algerian parents and linked to the terrorist attacks on the Paris metro, was a painful realisation of the failure of the French republic to integrate certain elements of its society. Another particular reminder to the French Republic of the difficulty it has in integrating some of those it has called Français issus d’immigration was the incident that took place in October 2001 in the Stade de France, where la Marseillaise was booed by some Algériens de France during a friendly football match laden with symbolic values of reconciliation and friendship between France and its former colony, Algeria.62 This incident bears witness to the ongoing difficulty France faces in successfully integrating its immigrants and, more importantly, their children.

6.4 2 Spain and Italy: the development of family reunion and the need for integration

Because of the status of Spain and Italy as late-comer immigration countries, integration is growing into an urgent political issue as both countries are facing major problems with irregular immigration. Nonetheless, in similar fashion to earlier French immigration practices, Article 2 of the Martelli Law echoed preoccupations with issues of the integration of immigrants in Italy. It included provisions enabling the Italian government to decide on the categories of foreigners to be admitted and the procedures to be followed, as a function of the demand on the labour market. This was done through a policy of quotas for regularisation as well as for the yearly entry of regular immigrants. This policy of quotas could be used to allow in foreigners that could be easily integrated.

The presence of foreigners (including other EU nationals) in Italy accounted for 2.6 per cent of the total population in 1999, rising to 4 per cent and 3 per cent in the centre and north of the country, respectively. Unlike the case in France, where there are strong concentrations of foreign residents and citizens of Maghrebi origins, the immigration map in Italy remains diverse and polycentric in terms of its ethnic or cultural origins. Immigration flows to Italy have come from North Africa and central and eastern Europe as well as from the Philippines, Brazil and Peru. Nonetheless, the majority of non-EU nationals living in Italy in the 1990s was made up of Moroccans, Albanians and Filipinos. These three nationalities accounted for 252,093 immigrants, according to data based on residence permit, in 1998. Though the number of non-EU nationals in Italy

remains well below the average of other West European countries; the fact that it rose by 62 per cent, from 548,531 in 1992 to 887,689 in 1998, has rendered the presence of immigrants a noticeable societal phenomenon.

The presence of immigrants has started to be felt for a number of reasons. The hitherto dominant feature of immigrants as single and male has changed as the numbers of women and immigrant families have risen considerably. The growth in family regroupings has been more conspicuous in relation to immigrants who have been in the country for longer periods, notably those from North Africa. The percentage of residence permits granted for family reasons in 1997 was 25 per cent of the total, rising from 14.2 per cent in 1992. For example, out of the total of 5,185 Moroccan immigrants who entered Italy legally in 1997, 4,014 did so for family reasons, that is 77 per cent of the total Moroccan entries for that year. A large number of these residence permits were increasingly being granted to women (see Table 6.3).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total (a)*</th>
<th>Women as % of (a)</th>
<th>Residence permit for family reasons as % of (a)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>474,947</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>412,681</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>466,922</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>487,218</td>
<td>41.2</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>528,430</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>6.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>779,738</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>809,269</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Total of obtaining residence permits from countries with strong migratory pressures.  
Source: ISTAT, Rapporto Annuale 1998, p. 381.

The rise in family regrouping has also made the presence of the children of immigrants at school and immigrant communities more conspicuous. The number of school children of foreign origin rose by 22 per cent between 1996 and 1998. Also 4 per cent of registered births were of babies of foreign parents, and growth in birth rates amongst foreign communities has generally increased from 1.16 per cent in 1993 to 1.33 per cent in 1996. These numbers are a sign of a gradual but permanent foreign presence in Italy, leading to future changes in the social fabric of Italian society. This change in immigration in Italy was reflected in the immigration legislation, Law No. 40/1998, which recognised the permanence and growth of the number of immigrants and the need to tackle their integration.

Such figures have been used in relation to the securitisation of immigrants in the societal sector. Fears of a threat to national identity coming from immigration have been
expressed in relation to the cultural difference of immigrants as well as to their religious identity. The coming into force of Law No. 40/1998 was a bone of contention both within the government as well as in Italian episcopal circles. A small minority of the latter, as awkwardly represented by Cardinal Biffi radical declarations, advised the Italian government to accept only Catholic immigrants in order to preserve the Italian national identity, and expressed their worries about the growth in the number of non-Christians in the country, especially Muslims.\textsuperscript{63} The Italian episcopal conference announced in 2000 new pastoral rules for the arrangement of marriages, one of whose effects was likely to be a reduction in the number of inter-religious marriages between Muslims and Christians.\textsuperscript{64} However, unlike in France, where Islam is the second largest religion, foreigners of Christian faith living in Italy represented 51 per cent of the total of non-EU immigrants in 1998, followed by Muslims in the second position with 35 per cent (see Table 6.4).

**TABLE 6.4 NON-EU NATIONALS IN ITALY ACCORDING TO RELIGIOUS CREED**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Faith</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Christians</td>
<td>637 000</td>
<td>50.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>436 000</td>
<td>34.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>4 000</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian Religions</td>
<td>83 000</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aminists</td>
<td>18 000</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>65 000</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-classified</td>
<td>7 214</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


That non-EU Christian nationals come at the top of the list is due mainly to the presence of large numbers of central and eastern Europeans and also of Americans. Despite the large Moroccan presence in Italy, central and eastern European nationals remain the most numerous category of immigrant in terms of geographical origin. They represented 40 per cent of the 1.25m non-EU nationals living in Italy in 2000. They consisted of mainly Albanians, Romanians and nationals of ex-Yugoslavia.\textsuperscript{65} They were followed, in second position, by immigrants from Africa who represent 30 per cent of the foreigner population and comprised mainly Moroccan, Tunisian, Egyptian and Senegalese nationals (the overwhelming majority of which are Muslim). Asian foreigners

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\textsuperscript{63} Umberto Bossi declared that "immigrants bring with them a cultural baggage that nobody can confiscate at the borders". See "Bossi eyes Tochold in Italian Government," *Financial Times* 6 March 2001. For a declaration of Cardinal Giacomo Biffi, see "Bishop's Call for Migrant Curb backed by Vatican," *The Guardian*, 16 September 2000.

\textsuperscript{64} *Migration News* Vol. 7, No. 3 (March 2000) <http: migration.acdavis.edu/mn/archive_mn>.

\textsuperscript{65} For Albanian nationals, statistics are not broken down to distinguish between Muslims and Christians.
living in Italy accounted for 20 per cent, distributed largely between Filipinos and Chinese. The remaining 10 per cent was made up of nationals from the Americas, including the US. Half of all the foreign population live in the north and north-west of the country.

Faced with this reality, questions regarding the social situation of immigrants as well as their degree of integration in the Italian society started to be raised. According to the 1998 annual report of Italy’s national statistics institute, ISTAT, the choice of handling immigration in Italy lies between “integration and emergency”. The importance of integration has been recognised as a pressing issue in the future, especially with the growth of a new generation of immigrants who are would-be Italian citizens.

Similarly, the continual rise in the number of immigrants in Spain has prompted the need to think about the various ways to integrate them. This need was raised in 1991 and 1994, but this was then nothing more than a statement of principles and intentions rather than a series of effective and practical measures. Preoccupation with the issue of immigrant integration continued to be on the agenda but with few institutional changes being made. These changes included the transfer of a great share of immigration management to the National Agency of Social Services, which became the National Agency of Social Services and Immigration. However, this piecemeal change of attitude and the recognition of the importance of integration for any coherent Spanish immigration policy led in 2000 to the new immigration law, with its telling title, namely the Organic Law on the Rights and Freedoms of Foreigners in Spain and their Social Integration [our italics].

Under the 4 2000 organic law on immigration, a new programme was designed as the first Spanish initiative ever to streamline all aspects of immigration at the domestic level and to have everything in conformity with EU policies on the subject. This programme is known as the GRECO programme, or The Global Programme to Regulate and Coordinate Foreign Residents’ Affairs and Immigration in Spain. It has been designed for the period between 2001 and 2004 and is being coordinated by the Governmental Immigration Department composed of an inter-ministerial committee.

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68 There were even proposals in 1998 to appoint a junior minister to coordinate official responsibilities on immigration and to manage immigration policy.
69 See the website of the Spanish ministry of interior at <http://www.mir.es/dgei>
involving the ministries of foreign affairs, justice, interior, education, culture and sports, labour and social affairs, public administration and health and consumption. The programme contains four basic lines of action: (i) the creation of a global and coordinated design for immigration, (ii) the integration of foreign residents and their families, (iii) admission regulations to ensure peaceful coexistence within Spanish society and (iv) the management of shelter schemes for refugees and displaced persons.

Though the meaning of integration as understood in this law and in previous attempts at immigrant integration remains limited to civil rights and duties and social integration (rather than to societal/cultural integration as the nexus of societal security), it still shows Spain’s awareness of the importance of integration as a necessary and integral part of its immigration policy at the beginning of the 21st century. This change of attitude and the preoccupation with integration may be summed up, in the words of a high official in charge of immigration policy, as “let all those come whom we can integrate, and for whom we have an economic need.”

To boost the number of immigrants who can be integrated as well to respond to labour shortage in certain economic sectors, Spain has adopted a number of bilateral quotas with various countries. Encouraged by common historical and cultural ties with Latin America, Spain has favoured the integration of Latin Americans through adopting less complicated measures for the granting of residence permits to these nationals (as provided for in the organic law of 1985) as well as through bilateral agreements concerning dual nationality. However, this attitude has become less clear later on. Faced with the reality of the rise in the number of African immigrants entering the country in the early 1990s, Madrid decided to extend its quota system to other countries, notably Morocco, whose nationals in 2000 constituted the largest foreign community in Spain and more than 70 per cent of all African immigrants living there. The number of Moroccan residents alone in Spain was almost equal to the total of the residents from the Americas, 199,782 and 199,964, respectively, in 2000. In the same year, the number of Moroccan residents in Spain was the highest of all while Algeria was second in comparison with

71 Delpin, “L’Immigration nord-africaine”, p. 89. Under the 1985 immigration law Latin Americans immigrants were given two years only to qualify for the acquisition of the Spanish nationality, while other nationals, including North African nationals, were given a qualification period of eight to ten years.
other African countries with 13,847, followed by Senegal with 11,051. All of the three countries are of Muslim faith.

Agreements signed between Spain and the designated emigration countries to implement the quota system include a readmission clause concerning the repatriation of irregular immigrants to the country of origin. The most recent of a series of these agreements between Morocco and Spain was signed in July 2001 in order to regulate the flow of migratory workers from Morocco. Under the agreement, workers were to be hired through a joint Moroccan-Spanish commission that would set an annual quota of guest workers, expected to be between 10,000 and 20,000 workers a year. However, this agreement was suspended by Spain in November of the same year following diplomatic tensions between the two countries.

Despite their small number in comparison to their presence in other Western European countries, the geographical distribution of immigrants in Spain contributes largely to their degree of securitisation. Though the share of immigrants in the total Spanish population is only 1 per cent, their uneven distribution, rather than their overall number, has made them more visible. Thus, there is a concentration of Maghrebi immigrants in the five main regions of Spain, namely Andalusia, Catalonia, Madrid, Valencia and Murcia. In these regions, the rate of foreign residents as of the total of population is of 2 to 2.5 per cent.

| Table 6.5 Regional distribution of Maghrebi residents in Spain in 2000 |
|------------------|-----------------|--------------|--------|--------|--------|
|                  | Algeria | Libya | Morocco | Tunisia | Maghreb |
| Total             | 13,847       | 164 | 199,782 | 643 | 214,436 |
| Total of the 5 regions | 8,898 | 125 | 158,506 | 513 | 88,842 | 02 |
| Andalusia         | 1,596 | 13 | 35,646 | 86 | 37,341 |
| Catalonia         | 2,565 | 25 | 72,748 | 196 | 75,474 |
| Valencia          | 3,450 | 2 | 10,968 | 84 | 14,524 |
| Madrid            | 578 | 82 | 26,353 | 138 | 27,751 |
| Murcia            | 679 | 3 | 12,261 | 9 | 12,352 |


This concentration has been reflected in the numbers of immigrant children attending school. The share of immigrant children in all children attending Spanish schools was 1.4 per cent in regions of concentrated immigrant communities in 2000. In Madrid, where approximately 25,000 of all school children were of immigrant parents,

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72 The first agreement was signed in 1992, to be followed by other agreements in 1996, 1999 and 2001. Note that the first agreements correspond to the signing or renewing of fishing agreements between Spain and Morocco. Spain also signed similar agreement with other Latin American and central and eastern European countries, namely Columbia, Ecuador, the Dominican Republic, Poland and Romania.
the share was of 2.5 per cent. In 1996-97, 80 per cent of immigrant children going to
school were either in Andalusia, Valencia, Catalonia or Madrid, with the latter two
regions alone catering for 50 per cent. Of the 33,000 pupils who dropped out of school,
10 per cent were children of immigrant parents and three out of four went to public
schools. Linguistic, cultural and religious problems (related to timetables and holiday
calendar) are amongst the difficulties reportedly encountered by these pupils, according to
the Spanish ministry of education.73

If Spain has managed so far to deal adequately with the integration of immigrants,
helped by the fact they are young, usually male and single, the situation was starting to
change gradually with the increase by the mid-1990s in family regrouping as well as
female immigration. Because of the cultural difference of immigrants and the Spanish
historical memory of them, the concentration of immigrants in certain regions – which
has primarily been motivated by economic reasons – has also given rise to the use of
images of invasion to bolster the feeling of a national identity under attack from More74
immigration. Though the alarmist discourse over a threat to national identity remains of
low intensity in Spain, there have been a number of signs that point out to a growing
change of attitude. This change was clear in the political split engendered by the
immigration law of 2000 and its reform in 2001. In ordinary day life, the number of
reported xenophobic incidents and racial discrimination has been on the increase in
different part of Spain; most of them have been directed towards Africans, according to a
survey carried out by the Spanish Observatorio Permanente de la Inmigración.75 These
discriminatory attitudes have recently grown in schools. Discrimination against
immigrants was reported in relation to the schooling of immigrant children inasmuch as
school principals, especially of private establishments, often deny enrolment of
immigrants on the basis of lack of space.76

Nonetheless, the fact that Spain began to establish the institutional framework for
social integration as early as 1991 should help family regrouping and immigrant
integration in the future. The difficulty of the first attempt at integrating immigrants owed
a great deal to their mobility and their status as bachelors. Family regrouping has the

74 'More' is a term used to refer to immigrants from Morocco. Historically, it usually refers to the Muslim
in Spain (711-1492) whose last stronghold in Granada was recaptured by the Christian forces of Ferdinand
V and Isabella II in 1492.
75 Observatorio Permanente de la Inmigración, "Indicadores de la inmigración y el asilo en España", No. 9,
April 2000, p. 1.
76 Migration News Vol. 9, No. 1 (January 2002) <http: migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/archive_mn>
potential to encourage the geographical stability of hitherto mobile young immigrants, and, therefore, to contribute to their easier integration. However, a number of signs indicate the opposite as anti-immigrant attitudes are on the rise and the degree of relative tolerance is being challenged.  

6.5 BEYOND SECUITISATION: PROBLEMS OF INTEGRATION AND CULTURAL IDENTITIES

Despite the fact that potential threats to national identity are closely connected to integration and despite obvious indications of the difficulty, and sometimes failure, to integrate immigrants or their children (who are often citizens of the host country), xenophobic incidents against immigrant communities or acts of violence by the latter tend to trigger incoherent emergency reactions from different governments. Instead of tackling issues of integration, by building and strengthening the social inclusion of immigrant communities and their youth and improving the welfare system, governments often adopt restrictive measures to curb clandestine immigration as an easy response to public attitudes concerned with internal security and cultural cohesion. Thus, when attempts by the host countries to integrate their immigrant communities are made, this often results in a complex cultural interplay that verges on confrontation and often hinges on past historical memories.

South-west European countries are in different stages in their relation to the integration of immigrants. The presence and depth of integration is more pronounced in France than it is in Italy and Spain. The cultural identity of Maghrebi immigrants and the question of Islam have been presented as the basis of difficulties to integrate immigrants and citizens of immigrant origin. However, the relationship between south-west European countries and Islam differs in each of them. France’s domestic encounter with Islam was mainly through its history in Algeria and the presence of Islam is still strong through the 5m Muslims living there. Integration in France is more complex because it concerns, besides immigrants, French citizens of immigrant origin and, therefore, Islam has become a part of French identity – albeit a difficult one to accept in a society that perceived and wants itself as laïque. Spain’s encounter with Islam has been in part conflictual and goes back centuries past; nonetheless, it remains present as the religion of a small minority of Spaniards. Apart from its colonial relations with Libya, Italy’s recent encounter with Islam has been mainly through immigration from North Africa.

These relations with and memories of Islam seem to largely condition the perception of and reaction to immigrants of Muslim origins. Fear of Islamist fundamentalism is at the heart of the securitisation of immigrants and the efforts to integrate them. The fact that this fundamentalism seems to find hotbeds in (south-west) European countries themselves is what has been prompting calls for an urgent integration (and control) of immigrants. Though economic development was prescribed as a cure to counter the growth of Islamist fundamentalist groups in North Africa, the same remedy does not seem to follow, in the mind of policy makers, for European countries with similar problems where there is a fear of such confrontation with the Islamists on their own soil.

The isolation of immigrants of the first and second generation and the failure to integrate some of them may be seen as the cause of this Islamic fundamentalism that exists in the heart of European countries. However, immigrants of the first and second generation are more the product of the European social fabric of the host country in which they live and less the product of the country of origin of their parents. Therefore, their Islam could be a Euro-cultural product, and is increasingly being seen in academic circles as such. This has led some of observers to talk about a European Islam or an Islam of Europe. So the equation between immigration and Islam, though still applicable, has, in practice, lost a great deal of its force as large numbers of European citizens are born Muslims of immigrant parents and as, accessorily, growing numbers of European citizens are converted to Islam. For these reasons, the Islam of today’s Europe has been described as a post-migration European Islam.78

European Islam has a number of distinctive features.79 First, it is and will remain the religion of a minority that is characterised by cultural diversity. For example, the Islam in the south-west European countries is predominantly culturally Maghrebi, as opposed to the kind of Islam one finds in Germany, which is very largely of Turkish extraction. Second, unlike the Islam of the countries of origin where some Islamist groups have representation as political parties, this European Islam is severed from politics. It remains limited primarily to cultural associations and organisations. Third, with the exception of the harkis in France, the mudéjar in Spain (Muslims who remained in Spain

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under Christian control after the Reconquista) and the converted, this Islam was brought to Europe by people who migrated for economic rather than cultural or religious reasons.

Therefore, having grown in a European milieu, European Islam has acquired some European aspects that tend to set it apart from the Islam of the countries of origin. These aspects have contributed to turn it more to an Islam-religion than an Islam-culture, making it more individual than communitarian.\(^8\) If one allows for the existence of ‘de-culturated’ Islam, the difficulties and problems faced by the integration of immigrants becomes less religious and more cultural. The acceptance of this Islam as represented by the converted, the *mudejars* and, to a lesser degree, the *harkis* seems an indication of the cultural, rather than the religious, dimensions of integration and immigration.

Indeed, if societal securitisation has focused on the inability to integrate Muslim immigrants or their children, this discourse is almost absent in relation to the autochthonous European Islam. The absence of securitisation in respect of this category of Muslims lessens the religious confrontation with Islam, as Muslim converts have not been referred to as a threat to security or national identity. This conclusion puts the almost mechanical relation established between Islam and the inability of Muslim immigrants to integrate at odds with the existence of a European Islam. It reflects a picture that is wider than religious identity and extends to cultural belonging.

Spain provides a good example in this respect. Some Islamic associations in Spain include only Spaniard Muslims. This is the case, for example, of the two associations, the Federación española de entidades religiosas islámicas and the Unión de comunidades islámicas de España, which represent the official Islam of Spain. These two associations were regrouped under a single commission. This commission signed in April 1992 an agreement with the government concerning matters related to the construction of mosques, the declaration of religious holidays, the appointment of religious figures and marriages. Though they could benefit immigrants, these associations do not include any large number of them. Immigrant Muslim communities do not have any legal existence as *Muslims*, nor do they need any special legal permission to carry on their religious activities or hold meetings.\(^9\) Immigrants, especially from Morocco, have been creating associations with the aim of building a mosque in Catalonia. Thus, for example, the


Muslim community of Premia de Mar near Barcelona sought to build a mosque. However, following protests and protracted negotiations with the local community, the mayor of this small Catalan village revoked permission to build it. 82

This distinction between an autochthonous Islam and an Islam of immigrants could explain the contradiction in Spain about its capitalising on its past Muslim/Moorish experience and heritage for tourism, on the one hand, while rejecting immigrants as a potential and growing threat to cultural identity, on the other. The fact that most of these Islamic associations are concentrated mainly in the south, a region with a high proportion of immigrants, could contribute, in the medium to long run, to facilitate the integration of immigrants and their children into Spanish society. 83 This could be encouraged by the absence of a model of integration similar to the French Republican model, which rejects the existence of a multicultural public community.

CONCLUSION

It has become clear that societal security as portrayed in the securitisation instances has little match with the security reality in the region, and when it does the link has been an uneasy and incoherent one. The main securitised issues of the societal sector, namely a cultural threat to national identity and ‘illegal’ immigration, are not security issues per se. Rather, they are elements connected primarily to the difficulties faced in integrating not only immigrants but also citizens of immigrant origin. The other securitised issue is related to the legal framework in which immigration-related issues are considered and which links criminality to ‘illegal’ immigration.

Difficulties of integration appear to be more due to socio-economic failure rather than to a ‘cultural clash’ in the south-west European countries. This has been particularly the case for France. The confusion over integration has been exacerbated by political factors. Indeed, it is the politicisation of immigrants and immigration-related issues which often leads to the rise of securitisation as an easy way to win support at the political hustings. The politicisation of immigration has led to the strengthening of far right political parties which resort to securitisation as a way of consolidating and widening their support base. This has been obvious in all three south-west European countries. In France, the politicisation of immigration in the early 1980s and the rise of the FN is a case

83 For instance, more than fourteen such associations are grouped in Andalusia for the total of 6,000 autochthon Muslims.

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in point. The result of the first round of elections to the presidency in May 2002 has been a reminder of the persistence of such attitudes. In the 1990s, the same phenomenon was seen in Italy with the Lega Nord and in Spain with the nascent Democracia Nacional, (albeit to less significant extent).

The legal framework that is designed to counter human trafficking has not only constructed the category of ‘illegal immigrants’, it has also affected legally settled immigrant residents. True, ‘illegal’ immigration might be a source of disturbances to ‘public order’. Nonetheless, particular care needs to be given to the kind of policies and measures put forward to fight human trafficking and to stop clandestine immigration. Restrictive policies and measures to clamp down on clandestine immigration have ended up affecting the rights of legal immigrants, the latter being reminded of their status as immigrants and as different. These measures sometimes inadvertently encroach on the rights of citizens with immigrant origins whose integration is more sought after than that of other immigrants. The outcome of restrictive policies has not stopped ‘illegal’ immigration to any considerable degree; they have sometimes resulted in slowing, if not harming, the integration of legal immigrants as the basis for a peaceful, secure and cohesive society. Indeed, the conclusion to be drawn from a number of studies of immigration in post-industrial societies is that immigration policies have often been defensive short-term ‘muddling through’ policies.⁸⁴

The history of these laws, as detailed above, provides a confirmation of their failure whenever they sought to restrict migration. It is these restrictive measures which seem to make immigrants decide to settle in the host country. Free movement and easy returns of immigrants could lead to less permanent settlement; the increase of family regroupings in France is a perfect case in point. The securitisation of immigration and the restriction on the movement of persons appear in stark contrast with the economic and demographic needs of Western Europe. The need for immigration should be seen neither as a problem, nor as a solution. Rather, immigration has become a European reality that needs to be managed independently of emergency decisions and policies lacking long-term commitment or vision. There is need for administrative regulatory measures rather than politicised debates over immigration laws, laws which do not usually work but often lead to the securitisation of immigrants.

⁸⁴ See various contributions in Wayne A. Cornelius et al. (eds.), Controlling Immigration.
However, even if 'illegal' immigration could be controlled, in the short term, through the setting up of quotas in proportion to the number of emigrants from the home countries, the main challenge still remains, namely that of the 'threshold of tolerance' in relation to the formation of immigrant communities in the long run. The issue of integration transcends the cooperative measures taken to control the flow of immigrants as it raises questions of the cultural identity of immigrant communities and their economic needs, as opposed to the economic needs and the cultural worries of the host countries. The fear of Islam owes a great deal to views on the integration of North African immigrants. The emergence of a European Islam points in the direction of the need for an accommodation to the following reality: Islam in Europe has minority status that it has to accept, and Western European countries should ensure the protection of this minority status within the boundaries of the law and respect for individual rights.
CHAPTER 7

MILITARY SECURITY: THE THREAT OF PROLIFERATION AND TERRORISM

Military security might seem the easiest sectoral security area to define because of the obvious threats with which it is concerned – that is, threats relating to the possibility of physical attack by one state on another. This remains a narrow view. Indeed, post-Cold War military security has become a diffuse and imprecise concept. In addition to traditional threats of interstate war, it subsumes new issues such as terrorism, proliferation of conventional and non-conventional (nuclear, chemical and biological) weapons and related internationally organised trafficking. This new nature of military security was underlined as one of the main objectives of NATO's Strategic Concept of April 1999 (see Chapter 3). These issues have also been considered part and parcel of the concerns of other international (military or security) organisations such as WEU (and its successor, the EU's nascent military structure) and the OSCE. The close involvement of interior ministers in much of this security cooperation also underpins this change. With the inclusion of these 'new' issues as an integral part of military threats, military security is no longer restricted to or conditioned by military capabilities or traditional military threats.

In this context, military securitisation in the WM has revolved mainly around the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their use by terrorist Islamist fundamentalists. Since the issue of political Islam and terrorist political violence have been dealt with in Chapter 5, the following Chapter focuses on questions related to proliferation alone, seeking to link it to its implications for terrorism in the region. Thus, the present Chapter analyses claims about proliferation against the reality of the military sector in the Maghreb. It looks at weapons proliferation in the Maghreb in the past few years, its implications for stability in the WM as a whole and its impact on the national security of the Maghreb countries.

7.1 MILITARY PROLIFERATION IN THE MAGHREB IN THE 1990S

With memories of the Libyan bombing of the Italian island of Lampedusa still vivid and the Gulf War (1990-91) unveiling Iraq's WMD capabilities, the dangers of proliferation
have become a hot issue. They were heightened by reports on Libya’s incessant search to acquire and develop WMD as well as by the violence that has torn Algeria apart. In this context, non-proliferation of WMD, together with their delivery systems or use by Islamist fundamentalists, became a major preoccupation of the EU, NATO and the OSCE. The control or elimination of such weaponry was included as one of the principal security objectives of a number of international security structures. The promotion of non-proliferation was also reiterated in the BD in 1995 as well as the Euro-Mediterranean Charter. Signatories to the BD have been in favour of nuclear, biological and chemical non-proliferation through adherence to arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation regimes, such as the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).

### 7.1.1 The rises and falls of military expenditure

As elsewhere in the post-colonial world, the Maghreb countries put themselves on the path of increasing military expenditure after independence, both as a means of nation-state building and as a way to assert their regional and territorial sovereignty. This rising trend of post-independence expenditure was sustained throughout the 1980s in the form a massive increase in defence spending by all the Maghreb countries (see Table 7.1). The rise was conditioned by regional dynamics. Thus, the noticeable rise in military spending in the Maghreb during the 1980s was driven principally by regional conflict. For Morocco and Algeria, it was boosted by their regional rivalry and conflicting stances over the Western Sahara. In Morocco’s case, the considerable rise in military expenditure in 1981 coincided with the beginning of the construction of the ‘security walls’ in the Western Sahara to protect the area from Polisario raids from the south. After finishing the construction of the last ‘wall’, Morocco adopted a more defensive attitude as Polisario attacks were largely curtailed and limited mainly to sporadic raids of a hit-and-run nature. Libya’s military expenditure was driven by its expansionist policies in the region and influenced by Qadhafi’s seeking a leadership role in the Arab as well as African worlds. It was also largely motivated by Libya’s interventionist policies in Chad and by military and

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1 Statistics on national and international military balances differ from one organisation to another. Differences result partly from different modes of calculations according to whether these organisations use official or constructed defence budgets. This Chapter uses statistics compiled by different organisations (International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), United States Department of Statistics and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), and thus there is lack of coherence between the data provided here. For instance, IISS figures for defence expenditure data depend upon changing US$ exchange rates, which explains the difference in figures from year to year, especially over a long period of time.
diplomatic support for independentist movements worldwide, including the Polisario Front. On the other hand, Tunisia’s increase in military spending was motivated by fears of Libya’s aggressive foreign policy towards Gafsa as well as by its territorial disputes with Algeria.

**TABLE 7.1  MILITARY EXPENDITURE IN THE MAGHREB COUNTRIES (AT CURRENT PRICES, SELECTED YEARS)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1972</th>
<th>1981</th>
<th>1989</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>US$m</td>
<td>% of GDP</td>
<td>US$m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>804</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>1,687</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: The Military Balance (IISS, various years).*

The rising trend in military spending that characterised the 1980s continued generally in the 1990s. However, it was by far the most striking in the case of Algeria. Indeed, military expenditure at 1998 constant prices rose from an estimated US$608m in 1990 to US$2,341m in 2000. The changes were less pronounced in the other Maghrebi countries. In Tunisia, military expenditure rose progressively from US$281m in 1990 to an estimated US$371m in 2001. There was no noticeable rising trend in Morocco; the situation differed from year to year, tending to stabilise around US$1,400m between 1990 and 2001. From the data provided by the IISS, it would appear that the situation in Libya between 1993 and 1999 registered a rising trend as well (see Table 7.2). This rise, according to the 1998 report of the World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfer (WMEAT) section of the US State Department,\(^2\) corresponded to an increase in military spending worldwide since 1994.

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\(^2\) Data provided by WMEAT and published by the US Department of State correspond to data previously provided by the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) before its merger with the US State Department.
TABLE 7.2 – MILITARY EXPENDITURE IN THE MAGHREB COUNTRIES, 1988-2001 (AT 1998 PRICES)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Algeria*</th>
<th>Morocco</th>
<th>Tunisia</th>
<th>Libya</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mil. Exp.</td>
<td>as % of GDP</td>
<td>Mil. Exp.</td>
<td>as % of GDP</td>
<td>Mil. Exp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>582</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1,239</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>569</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1,797</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>[608]</td>
<td>[1.5]</td>
<td>1,315</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>622</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1,382</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>[1,041]</td>
<td>[2.2]</td>
<td>1,570</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>1,119</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>1,375</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>1,302</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>1,602</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>1,319</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>1,442</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>1,502</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>1,593</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>1,761</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>1,335</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>1,911</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1,319</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>2,017</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>1,440</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>2,341</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>1,486</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>1,554</td>
<td>..</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The figures for Algeria are budget figures for recurrent expenditure only.
† Figures between [ ] are SIPRI estimates. ‡ The figures for Libya are taken from various years of the IISS Military Balance.

However, the nature of the increase in military spending in the 1990s was different from that in the 1980s. If in the 1980s expenditure was predominantly motivated, especially in the first half of the decade, by a race for regional hegemony and the conflict of the Western Sahara, expenditure in 1990s was largely driven by domestic motivations. For example, the completion of the ‘security walls’ by Morocco put more strain on the Moroccan army, which deployed reportedly 100,000 men to garrison them and maintain their operational capabilities. This number was kept even after the creation of the MINURSO in 1991 as Morocco did not respond to the demands to reduce by half its military presence in the Western Sahara. The rise in military spending for Morocco’s facing down the Polisario has represented a considerable economic cost.

The rise in military expenditures has owed much to the policies adopted in the 1980s. It was influenced by the need for the technical maintenance of the large arsenal purchased in the 1980s and the upkeep of big armed forces. A large part of military spending of the 1990s was used to maintain the armed forces, which, as of 1999, ranged from 35,000 in Tunisia to 196,300 in Morocco, the latter having the largest number of personnel in active service. Libya in 1999 had less than 100,000 armed forces, including reservists. On the other hand, Algeria, which had an active-duty military personnel of 122,000, had the largest number of paramilitary forces, totalling 181,200 (of which an estimated 100,000 were self-defence armed militia and communal guards). In varying

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degrees, joining the military in the Maghreb became an attractive career in countries smitten by high rates of unemployment. The lack of alternative employment and career paths, together with the important role of the military, fostered the growth in the size of armed forces. These forces still absorb increasing budgets, though their numbers did not change greatly in any of the Maghreb countries between 1989 and 1999. In 1991, in order to maintain its military forces Morocco had to spend 7 to 9 per cent of its central government expenditure, Algeria was spending 8 to 9 per cent, Libya was spending over 11 per cent, while Tunisia devoted the least with 4 per cent.

Even if military expenditure has been generally high across the region, a military threat to security emanating from proliferation has been less menacing than it has been made to appear in the securitisation discourse. A military threat as a consequence of proliferation becomes less obvious when defence expenditure for each country is broken down into its sub-components, notably in terms of spending on arms imports and the type of arms imported. Therefore, to critically consider the security threat that proliferation could pose to the WM, there must be a closer look at these sub-components of military expenditures in the Maghreb.

7.1.2 Arms imports into the Maghreb in the 1990s

Contrary to the rising trend registered for the total defence expenditure, spending on arms imports fell drastically during the 1990s. This fall characterised both the total imports of the Maghreb countries as a whole as well as individual countries. During the 1980s a large amount of defence expenditure had been spent on arms acquisition. This amount dropped considerably in the early 1990s for Algeria, Libya and Morocco. The change was extremely pronounced in the cases of Algeria and Libya. The UN sanctions on Libya between 1992 and 1999 were largely responsible for the decrease in arms imports to this country. Algeria’s spending on arms imports, which were mostly paid for by oil and gas revenues, dropped sharply as the shock of the fall in oil prices in 1986 started to be badly felt. As for Morocco, the end of open armed military confrontations in the Western Sahara following the armistice between the Polisario and Morocco explained the significant drop in arms imports by the latter, especially after 1990. Arms imports in Tunisia remained relatively stable and at a low level throughout the period of 1989-1997 (see Figure 7.1).

6 Ibid., p. 3.
The decrease in arms imports came to an end for Algeria in 1993. Indeed, Algeria accounted for 62 per cent of the total cumulative value of arms transfer deliveries to the Maghreb between 1995 and 1997, while Morocco accounted for 27 per cent only. The situation in the former country was fairly stable throughout the 1991-97 period (between roughly US$100m and US$200m). The major supplier for Algeria during this period were eastern European countries (Slovakia and Bulgaria) and Russia, while Morocco’s supplies of arms came mainly from the US and France. This renewed rise in arms imports involved the purchase of different equipments from those bought in the 1980s; these imports have related to the domestic crisis in Algeria and the need to guard coastal waters for Morocco.

Military purchases by Morocco between 1993 and 1998 were mainly of artillery, five offshore patrol vessels (OPV), one cargo ship and two frigates and 80 anti-tank guided weapons (ATGW) (see Appendix B). The artillery orders may be seen in the context of the stalling on the Western Sahara issue and Algeria adopting a harder line in its support to the Polisario since 1995. The strengthening of the naval forces, on the other hand, was in line with Morocco’s determination to guard its coastal waters against (Spanish) fleets illegally fishing in its EEZ, especially after the 1995 crisis and the termination of its fisheries agreement with the EU in 1999 (see Chapter 4). Indeed, the two French frigates purchased by Morocco are equipped with highly sophisticated radar systems allowing a much better scanning of the Moroccan coasts.

Turning to Algeria, most of its post-1992 military spending was related to its domestic crisis and the fight against GIA splinter groups. The military purchases were
varied and ranged from light armed combat vehicles, tanks, helicopters, aircrafts to a 'seeker' unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) system (see Appendix B). The largest order was made for the purchase of 700 light armed combat vehicles (LACV) from Turkey in 1995 and their delivery continues as of 2002. The decision to acquire this material was shaped by a will amongst the army Generals to eradicate the GIA splinter groups, especially after the breakdown in negotiations in July 1995 (see Chapter 5). It also reflected the need to arm an estimated 100,000 paramilitary members in response to their demands to protect themselves and their families against attacks by the GIA members. In 2000, following the continuation of violence in the form of sporadic armed attacks by remnant GIA members on civilians, Algeria ordered the purchase of six electronic support measures (ESM) for signal intelligence from the US, which will reinforce its already existing capacity in search helicopters and night vision equipment.

Thus, the purchases of arms by both Morocco and Algeria in the 1990s appear above all related to domestic security. Nonetheless, their potential use for external purposes cannot be ignored. This explains the suspicions that acquiring arms by one country raises in the other. Indeed, their mutually suspicious attitudes towards one another and their opposite stances on the nature of a settlement for the Western Sahara have often been canvassed as a source of military confrontation between them and as a threat to stability in North Africa.

7.1.3 Development of WMD: the case of Libya

Countries of the Maghreb are all signatories to the NPT, the BWC and the CWC, with the notable exception of Libya, which has yet to accept the CWC, and Algeria, which still has to accept the BWC. This non-acceptance gave rise to numerous reports that Libya has been developing or planning to develop chemical weapons. Of the Maghreb countries, it is widely known that Morocco and Tunisia, being net importers of energy, are seeking to build nuclear plants for the generation of electricity. Indeed, Morocco signed in September 2001 an agreement with the US for the construction of its first nuclear power station. This agreement gave effect to an agreement of principle signed in 1980 and the construction of the nuclear station is planned to start by the end of 2002.  

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7 This section is largely based on material drawn from the website of the Center for Non-Proliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, Washington, DC (http://cns.miis.edu) as well as material taken from the website of the International Atomic Energy Agency (http://www.iaea.or.at).
Hitherto, the only known presence of nuclear plants in the Maghreb has been in Algeria. Algeria acquired a one-megawatt nuclear reactor from Argentina in April 1989. A covert nuclear development programme, which had been established with Chinese assistance, was exposed in 1991. This was the 15-megawatt nuclear reactor, Es-Salam, at Ain-Oussouara, 150km south of Algiers. Though the production capacity of this reactor has remained too small to enable any nuclear warfare development, the fact that it was built in secret has caused concern that it might be used for a nuclear weapons programme in the future.9 After the exposure of the Es-Salam reactor programme, Algeria became party to the NPT in 1995 and signed an agreement, which entered into force in 1997, allowing for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to inspect its nuclear facilities and to provide technical assistance.10 Thus, the two Algerian nuclear reactors have been placed under the safeguards of the IAEA. However, reports by Spain’s military secret services of further assistance from China and Argentina for the development of a nuclear programme that exceeds civilian needs have raised more alarm concerning Algeria’s plans to divert its nuclear programme to military ends.11 Indeed, the Financial Times reported in July 2002 that it is still suspected that Algeria has a clandestine nuclear programme.12

Yet of all the Maghreb countries, Libya has been the only one engaged in seeking to develop and acquire WMD and their delivery systems. It is also the only country in the region to have been reported to have used chemical weapons; this was in its conflict with Chad, small quantities of mustard gas having been used against Chadian troops in 1987. Reports on Libya’s WMD capabilities differ from one source to another. Nonetheless, there has been a general agreement as to the country’s nuclear, chemical and biological weapons capacity and their delivery systems. Libya is said to have little capacity to develop nuclear weapons. It ratified the NPT in 1975 and placed its nuclear capabilities under IAEA safeguards. The only significant nuclear facility in the country is a ten-megawatt reactor installed in Tajura, near Tripoli, which was supplied by the ex-Soviet Union in 1979. In 1984 the Soviet Union committed itself to construct two 440 megawatt power stations in the Surt region; nonetheless, this project never materialised. After the lifting of UN sanctions against Libya in 1998, Russia renewed its nuclear cooperation

10 The other Maghreb countries had ratified the NPT in the 1970s but the treaty did not enter into force until 1992.
with Libya in order to renovate the Tajura nuclear complex. At present, Libya is reportedly lacking the technical infrastructure to support a nuclear programme.

Libya’s chemical and biological warfare capabilities, on the other hand, are said to be more advanced than its nuclear ones. Indeed, the country has three primary facilities for the manufacturing and storage of chemical and biological agents for use on warheads, namely the Pharma-150 plant in Rabta, south-west of Tripoli, the Pharma-200 plant in Sebha and the Tarhunah plant, south-east of Tripoli.13 Because Libya is not a signatory of the CWC, the activities going on in these plants have been very suspicious. The Rabta plant, which is considered the largest chemical centre in the Third World, has been particularly important for Libya. Nonetheless, its production capacity has been badly affected first by an earlier fire of unknown origins in 1988 and later by the UN sanctions on the country. However, Libya managed to produce a limited amount of chemical agents in the late 1980s. In 1990, its output was reported to be a maximum of 30 to 50 tons of mustard gas only. Besides its limited production capacity, the Rabta plant has had some operational difficulties since the early 1990s, which have further constrained its output capacity. It has been reported to have produced only 100 tons of mustard gas to date.14 As to the development of biological weapons, Libya’s capability has been equally limited. Though the country signed the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention in January 1982, there are still allegations that the chemical plants, especially the one in Tarhunah, are being used to develop and produce warfare biological agents such as toxin and pathogens. According to US sources, Libya’s programme has been in the research and development stage but the country may be capable of producing small quantities of biological agents.15

With regard to the means of delivering WMD, Libya’s capabilities are not advanced. The country acquired a number of Soviet missiles of the Scud-B type in the 1976. It also continued to buy Scud parts both from the Soviet Union and North Korea in the 1980s. UN sanctions badly hampered the country’s acquisition of these parts. With the lifting of the sanctions, Libya started to buy Scud parts anew on the world market as a means of maintaining its Scud arsenal operational as well as improving the development of its own home-designed missile, Al-Fattah. However, Libya’s reliance on foreign assistance remains crucial in developing its missile projects. This assistance, like Libya’s

14 Cordesman, A Tragedy of Arms, p. 239.
15 “Death out of Life” Financial Times 10 July 2002.
acquisition of missile parts, was seriously affected by the UN sanctions, thus restricting the country’s ability to keep its missile arsenal fully operational and ready. On the whole, as Table 7.3 shows, Libya’s delivery capabilities still remain limited to low range missiles, compared with North Korea’s Taepo Dong II (5,000km) or Israel’s Jericho II (1,500km), for instance.

**Table 7.3 Libyan Ballistic Missile Capabilities**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>System</th>
<th>Supplier</th>
<th>Range (km) Max</th>
<th>Payload (kg)</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SS-21 Scud</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>In Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS-1 Scud-B</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>985</td>
<td>In Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scud-C</td>
<td>N. Korea</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>In Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Fattah</td>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>950</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>Development</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Centre for Defence and International Security Studies (http://www.esis.org)

7.2 Proliferation and the Threat to Regional Stability

If proliferation has been seen as a threat to security in the WM, this threat has been framed within a southern intra-regional conflict resulting from military escalation. In the past Maghreb countries were engaged in intermittent and isolated military confrontations, especially after independence. These confrontations punctuated Maghrebi relations until the first half of the 1980s. Most of these post-independence territorial conflicts – between Algeria and Tunisia, between Libya and Tunisia, and between Algeria and Morocco – were terminated by resorting to the International Court of Justice (in the case of Tunisia and Libya) or by peaceful accords (between Morocco and Algeria, and Algeria and Tunisia). However, they never amounted to total war, or anything similar in intensity and durability to the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988), for instance. The closest Maghreb countries come to this situation was the military confrontation between Morocco and Algeria during the ‘Sand War’ in 1963. After the annexation of the Western Sahara by Morocco in 1975, interstate relations between Rabat and Algiers continued to be strained. Indeed, the potential for intra-regional military conflict has seemed most marked in connection to the Western Sahara conflict, which has never ceased to condition and shape relations between Algeria and Morocco.

The question of the Western Sahara remains the chief source of any potential military confrontation in the Maghreb. Military conflicts in general have been limited to

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the post-independence period and the possibility of future eruption in the form of outright war seems quite remote. The establishment of the AMU eased relations between Morocco and Algeria in 1989; nonetheless, this did not imply any recognition by Algeria, or any other Maghrebian country, of Moroccan claims over the Western Sahara. The relative warming of relations between Rabat and Algiers in 1988 and the ceasefire between the Polisario Front and Morocco in 1991 did not change a great deal in this respect. What it did was to shift the Western Saharan conflict more towards the political sector as a political settlement was searched. Algeria has continued to provide military training and oil to the Polisario and to defend its right for self-determination. Political tensions between Algiers and Rabat have emerged every time there has been a delay in the progress of the MINURSO mission (see Chapter 5).

These tensions over the Western Sahara have influenced Algerian-Moroccan relations on various occasions. For instance, Algeria has often claimed that arms acquisitions have been in response to the domestic situation and a determination to fight terrorism. Nonetheless, their acquisition by Algeria has often been seen as provocative move by Rabat and has never ceased to raise suspicion and complaints in Morocco about the effect on security in the region. This was said, for instance, of military purchases made by Algeria in 1995 and 2001. In particular, Algeria’s arms deal with Russia for the purchase of 22 Su-24 tactical bombers aircraft in June 2001 and with Czech Republic for the purchase of 17 subsonic L-39 Albatros aircraft in December of the same year were seen from Rabat as a sign of provocation, since it was hard to justify them in relation to the fight against Islamist political violence in Algeria itself. A look at the overall military expenditures of both countries reveals that their military spending followed a rising trend especially after 1995, with a military expenditure of US$3bn for Algeria and US$1.7bn for Morocco in 1999 (see Figure 7.2). This represents the highest expenditure the two countries have ever reached.
The Western Sahara conflict, even when eventually resolved, will probably continue to have critical security implications for the domestic political-military situation in both Morocco and Algeria. The end of the Western Saharan conflict raises questions in relation to the future redeployment of the Moroccan contingents stationed in the Western Sahara and of Algerian troops stationed on the southern borders with Morocco to protect the refugee camp of Tindouf from Moroccan attacks. The issue of a large-scale demobilisation of these forces must be a cause for concern in these two countries.

Besides the territorial disputes over the Western Sahara, Morocco and Spain have been intermittently involved in confrontations over the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, albeit less intense ones. From the Moroccan side, silence over the claims of the two enclaves has often been traded off against Spain’s neutral attitude towards the Western Sahara. Though Rabat and Madrid had agreed not to let any escalation between them take place over this issue, the Spanish hosting in Seville of a conference of pro-Polisario European organisations in October 2001 contributed to a deterioration in relations between the two countries, relations which had been adversely affected, leading Rabat to recall its Ambassador to Madrid later that month. The suspension of a number of agreements between the two countries, namely a fisheries one by Morocco and a migration one by Spain, further deteriorated their relations. These confrontations, however, have never led to a military clash or violent incidents. Nonetheless, the

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18 The link between the termination of the fisheries agreement and refusal to renew it has had a great deal to play in the diplomatic tensions between the two countries. After all, it is not surprising that the pro-Polisario conference was organised in Seville, the capital of Andalusia, the region mostly hit by the termination of the 1995 fisheries agreement by Rabat.
seemingly insignificant, almost farcical, crisis over Perejil island in July 2002 remains as a clear reminder, not only of the sensitive nature of future of relations between Spain and Morocco, but also of the impact a final settlement of the Western Sahara might have for the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla as well as the region as a whole.

7.3 THE SECURITISATION OF PROLIFERATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE MAGHREB

If regional stability is what is at stake in the Maghreb, a threat to it may potentially happen as a result of the diverse impact continuous rises in military expenditure could have on the economy and politics of each country, rather than as the outcome of a severe direct military confrontation involving some of them. If there is any threat, to adopt the economic argument that dominates the securitisation discourse in most sectors, it is one that is likely to result from the impact of the cost of defence spending on southern economies. As mentioned above, though military expenditure registered generally a slight fall during the 1989-90 period, its growth picked up anew the following year. This happened markedly so in the case of Algeria. The percentage of GDP spent on defence expenditure in the 1990s was high in relation to the economic performance of the Maghreb countries. Indeed, growth in defence expenditure has been at a higher rate than economic growth. The average annual of percentage growth of real GDP slowed down during the period between 1989 and 1999. This deceleration was pronounced for Algeria and Morocco, which registered average annual growth rates of 1.2 per cent and 2.3 per cent, respectively. However, Tunisia registered an average annual growth rate of 4.7 per cent during the same period. Figures available for Libya between 1998 and 1999 showed the country had registered a decrease in GDP of 1.8 per cent in 1998, though the rise in oil prices in 1999 and 2000 contributed to a sharp recovery, with an increase of 5.4 per cent in 1999. The low figures on annual growth for Algeria and Morocco contrasted with the percentage of GDP spent on defence in the same period. The share of military spending as percentage of GDP recorded a marked growth in Algeria and Libya; it rose from 1.2 per cent in 1991 to 3.5 in 2000 for Algeria, and from 3.3 in 1993 to 5.0 in 1999 for Libya. In Morocco, it remained stable at around 4.0 per cent during the 1990s. Only in Tunisia did this percentage decrease between 1989 and 2000 (see Table 7.2).

A continued rise in military expenditure could – rather than generate direct military conflict in the Maghreb, as entertained by the securitisation discourse – exhaust the Maghreb economies as they are facing difficulties both in terms of exports to
European markets and competition from opening up their own markets to European exports (see Chapter 4). Though total Maghrebi arms imports, as a percentage of total imports, dropped from 9.4 per cent to 2.1 per cent in a decade (1987-97), this trend was not representative of Algeria in practice. Algeria's arms imports as a percentage of total imports reached 5.6 per cent in 1997 after having dropped to only 1.9 per cent and 1.7 per cent in 1991 and 1994 respectively.

Not only do rising military expenditures drain the economic capacity of the state, they can also contribute to building strong police states, which, in countries lacking in democracy or undergoing a process of democratisation, can be used to inhibit political freedom or curtail opposition. This was the case for all the countries of the Maghreb during the 'bread riots' that punctuated the 1980s. The army was often called upon to restore law and order and in some cases even to cancel democratic elections and counter Islamist violence.

In Algeria, the 1990s provides a good example in this regard. The unfortunate unfolding of events in Algeria since 1991 and the 1995-1996 attacks on French soil have justified the link between violent terrorist acts and Islamism. As shown in Chapter 5, the terrorist attacks on France and Algeria were essentially domestic in nature; they resulted from the lack of political opening in Algeria and a hesitant will in countries of south-west Europe as well as other Western countries to accept the Islamist victory of the FIS.19 (This is to be contrasted to the kind of terrorism that Libya is said to have sponsored). Because of fears of the arrival of an Islamist party to power in Algeria, the involvement of the army to cancel the elections in Algeria was not contested. Nor was there any outspoken condemnation of the Algerian military regime. However, condemnation, or at least the questioning, of the army's involvement in the massacres in Algeria started to germinate, albeit hesitantly, only when its role in a number of reported massacres remained ambivalent or unexplained (see Chapter 5).

Thus, the existence of an army supported by a rising military expenditure in the political situation of the Maghreb, where there is little democratic accountability, can indeed prove threatening, especially considering the status of national armies in relation to domestic governing institutions. Heads of regimes in the Maghreb are all military Generals in civil suits or closely connected to the military. In this context, the small degree of political freedom enjoyed in each country could lead easily to the army.

curtailing political liberty, as happened in Algeria. The main solution for terrorism in Algeria must remain above all a political one that aims at a ‘moral’ application of democratic principles and the inclusion of other (opposition) political actors and entails a reassessment of the role and weight of the army Generals. The role of the army, nonetheless, remains determinant for the future development of a more liberal political life in the region, especially in the case Algeria.

CONCLUSION

From what has been said regarding proliferation in the Maghreb and its security risks for the WM as a whole, a number of conclusions may be drawn. First, the picture of a rise in military spending painted by the defence expenditure or defence budgets of the Maghreb countries does not show any substantial rise in arms acquisition in the region, at least compared to the situation in the 1980s. Second, with some exceptions, the weapons acquired have remained geared to domestic situations. These two points reinforce the absence of a security threat to the region as envisaged in the securitisation discourse. Nonetheless, there are serious causes for concern about the economic and political implications of this military expenditure, including arms imports. In fact, the direct economic and political repercussions of this ‘proliferation’ have been mainly domestic: the high cost of military expenditure has created socio-economic difficulties, empowered the army, but simultaneously precluded any political opposition to it to emerge. A vicious circle arises between military expenditure, economic development and political liberalisation. It is these connections which could prove to be the source of political instability that has frequently been securitised.

On the other hand, a look at the arms acquisitions record of the Maghreb countries suggests a second point. That is, even with the arrival of an Islamist group to power, the danger of its using military weapons of mass destruction would be quite remote. Fears about such weapons being smuggled and made available to terrorist groups have been on the rise. Different scenarios to this end have been devised. However, the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington on 11 September 2001 showed the varied sources terrorist groups could use to achieve their goals. It also proved the need, or rather necessity, for more concerted efforts in intelligence information exchange away from emergency and hasty securitisation practices.

However, what the September 11 did is to increase securitisation, as events following it have demonstrated. The concept of terrorism itself – slippery as it might have
been before the September 11 attack – has now being increasingly ‘hijacked’ for various ends. Words such as ‘terrorism’ and ‘war against terror’ have been excessively (ab)used since last September in all the sectors of security presented in Chapter 2 of this study. They have been evoked, for instance, to condemn political opposition and seek appreciation of what Algeria has suffered for a decade, to increase restrictive measures in respect of clandestine immigration over the EU southern borders (as was reiterated forcefully at the European Council meeting in Seville in 2002), or to ‘diplomatic manoeuvring’ by Morocco over the Perejil in response to Spain’s laxity towards autonomy movements and plans for the Western Saharan territory.20

This shows that, despite all the enthusiasm that followed the end of the Cold War regarding the emergence of a new concept of security where military security is secondary, military or quasi-military issues still occupy the centre stage at the beginning of the 21st century. This primacy of the military sector has not excluded the importance of the other sectors; rather they have been used as secondary and supportive to it. Economic welfare, societal control and political stability have all been subjected to serve the needs for more security.

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

BEYOND SECURITISATION: EMERGENCY POLICIES AND THE QUESTION OF SECURITY

The present study has sought to cast light on the reality of the security situation of the WM by going beyond 'securitisation'. It has established the securitisation agenda as presented in the discourse of the main actors, and then it has assessed it against the reality of the region. This assessment has been carried out in allowing for a key distinction between 'securitisation' and 'security'. Such a distinction has proven crucial when tracing the match or correspondence between securitisation instances and, on the other hand, the economic, political, societal and military dynamics at play in security terms in the WM. Part One has delineated the securitisation picture together with the policies it has prompted in order to deal with instances of securitisation. Part Two has provided a reality-check with the aim of determining the extent of match or correspondence between these securitisation instances presented in each sector and their security reality.

The securitisation picture has shown the issues that actors have perceived of as security issues and it has uncovered the inter-linkages they have established between the different sectors in support of their particular interpretations. Analysis of these securitisation instances has established that securitisation varies in intensity and urgency between sectors as well as between actors. Certain trends may be discerned. In south-west European countries, the highest degree of securitisation has occurred in relation to political instability in the Maghreb and to the impact of such an instability on their economic situation in respect of the security of energy supply; it also occurred with near equal intensity in relation to the societal sector within their own borders and to the impact immigration may have on social balance and security in the sense of 'law and order'. For the Maghreb countries, on the other hand, securitisation has been highly pronounced in the political and economic sectors. A lack of development in the latter sector has been presented as having nefarious effects on political security. As to the securitisation of the military sector, it has been present on the agenda of south-west European countries because it has hinged on the link made in these countries between political instability and the consequences it could have militarily.
In this process of securitisation, political Islam and immigration have been perceived as major hubs of security in the Maghreb as well as in south-west Europe. They have provided a source of security materials upon which actors could draw so as to confer credibility on instances of securitisation in other sectors, namely the economic and, to a lesser extent, the military sectors. Political insecurity in the Maghreb has occupied a central position. It is around it both as cause and consequence – that securitisation is constructed. Political insecurity, especially in the form of the challenge posed by political Islam, has been perceived as a threat that could occasion economic insecurity for south-west European countries (through a cut in the flow of energy supply), and also as a political challenge that could overthrow regimes in the Maghreb. However, if the challenge of political Islam has been perceived as the cause of economic insecurity for south-west European countries, it has also been perceived as a consequence of economic underdevelopment in the Maghreb. In this connection, economic development through winning further access to EU markets has been the focal point of economic securitisation in the North African countries. That is, only a limited access to EU markets and a corresponding lack of economic development have been viewed as leading inevitably to the ascent of political Islam in these countries and to encouraging more emigration northwards.

Immigration and the presence of immigrant communities in south-west Europe has increasingly become a prime source of societal securitisation, being viewed as a threat to the societal security of the host countries. The securitisation of the societal sector has been based on the perceived threat immigrant communities present to national identity and also on the threat that ‘illegal’ immigration is said to present to civil security and public order. Immigration as a threat to national identity has, moreover, acquired more weight through the link some actors in south-west Europe have established between it and their past and present experience with (political) Islam. On the other hand, Maghreb regimes have used migration into the north to strengthen their claims with respect to economic insecurity and the related need for more economic development and financial aid so as to prevent in the longer term further northward emigration.

In response to securitisation, a number of policies have been designed to tackle and/or prevent the threats emanating from the region. These policies have reflected the inter-sectoral linkages established by the actors involved in securitisation. From the EMP to NATO’s Mediterranean Initiative, the goal of these policies has been to counter the various threats to security, not as these threats stand in relation to the actual context of
political, economic, societal and military dynamics, but as they have been presented in the
securitisation picture that was drawn when these policies were first launched. It should be
noted that the perceived urgent need to upgrade some of these policies, moving from
classic development aid to a comprehensive security-oriented approach, was mainly
prompted by the dramatic development of the situation in Algeria and fears that it might
spread to the country’s neighbours on both rims of the WM. The comprehensive
framework of these policies has appeared to reflect the inter-sectoral linkages that were
already established between perceived insecurity in one sector and the quasi-ineluctable,
almost mechanical, impact that insecurity was seen to have on other sectors.

The reality-check in Part Two has contrasted the securitisation of the economic,
political, societal and military sectors with their reality in the region. This was done by
establishing the background of relations between the WM countries in respect of the
securitised issues and assessing these issues in terms of their impact on security in the
region. This reality-check has uncovered a number of difficulties, not only about the
connection (or lack of it) between securitisation and security but also, and more
importantly, about the nature of inter-sectoral linkages made in support of the
securitisation approaches. Indeed, there are a number of cases where securitisation does
not correspond at all to the security reality of the region. In these cases, actors have
usually relied on linking their securitisation instances to the impact the latter might have
on developments in other sectors. Often this supposed link has proved elusive or weak in
terms of credibility. This has been particularly the case of immigration when presented as
a threat to national identity, an identity that has been already challenged, to a certain
degree, by some of the global trends that characterise the beginning of the 21st century.

However, there have been other securitisation instances which are credible.
Nonetheless, they may stop being so when actors seek to link them to security in other
sectors as a means to enhance their credibility. This has been, for example, the case of
Moroccan and Tunisian demands for further access to the EU markets for their
agricultural produce. Indeed, CAP protectionist attitudes still hamper the agriculture
exports of these two countries. Nonetheless, to link this protectionism to the potential rise
and encouragement of socio-political instability remains questionable. It is even more
questionable when considered within the context of a lack of political liberalisation that
varies in degree between the two countries and that actually constitutes the primary
source of political instability. In other words, the credibility of some securitisation
instances may remain viable as long as these securitisation instances are considered in
their own right. It is inter-sectoral connections that often render them problematic. Therefore, interconnections in some instances of securitisation may seem to defeat their own objectives, namely to establish and boost the credibility of the securitised instances.

The inter-sectoral linkages serve often to reinforce the picture of a ‘domino effect’. But such alarmist discourse may be refuted by a simple contrast with reality. Thus, after one decade between 1992 and 2002, the spiral of violence that swept Algeria in the 1990s has not been repeated in any of the neighbouring countries. The terrorist attacks occasioned by the Algerian crisis have remained primarily driven by domestic dynamics, and their continued reoccurrence in Algeria, even if less frequently today than in the past, only adds more force to this point. Indeed, rather than promoting the Islamist cause in other neighbouring countries, the Algerian experience has had just the opposite effect. Islamist political participation is either banned altogether, as is the case in Tunisia, or largely co-opted, as is the case in Morocco. Also, despite a discourse on democracy which prevails as an element of the EU’s foreign and security policy and despite clauses on the commitment to democracy having been included in the EMAAs with the Maghreb countries, all this has not been positively translated politically in the Maghreb countries. Issues such as allowing expression of political Islam and Islamist associations, in particular, have not figured on the agendas of the different national and international bodies in Europe or in the Maghreb, which have sought to be the promoters of democracy and democratic principles in North Africa.

Economic liberalisation and development have been celebrated as harbingers of political opening, democracy and peace. However, the political reality of the Maghreb countries tells a somewhat different story. The economic situation in the Maghreb countries has improved in varying degree in each country compared with the 1970s and 1980s. Nonetheless, the socio-political phenomena that economic development was said to eradicate, namely social tensions, emigration northwards and the assertion of political Islam, are still much in evidence. Political sclerosis has seemed generally in the past ten years or so to paralyse any genuine political movement towards greater democracy in the region. Ben Ali has been building a constitutional framework that could make him president for life in Tunisia – strikingly re-enacting the experience of Bourguiba, the man he himself disposed of in November 1987. In Algeria, the FLN was back in force after the legislative elections of June 2002 and the power of the Generals has not lessened an inch since 1992. King Mohamed VI in Morocco has continued to give mixed signals, though the legislative elections of September 2002 have been praised as a ‘democratic
exception". As to Libya, Qadhafi has been opening up his country since the quasi-settlement of the Lockerbie case, but this opening is directed, in terms of partnership, more towards Africa than towards Europe.

Moreover, economic development does not seem to have countered emigration from the Maghreb. Nor have the various restrictive European policies and national laws that were adopted to this end. Maghrebi migration has continued to flow northward, and warnings of a national identity in danger have been on the increase. However, the manner in which immigration has been securitised has been somewhat exaggerated, especially in the context of Europe's demographic slowdown and faltering economic growth. This context, on the contrary, suggests a more structured need for immigrant workers in the future. As to the question of a national identity under attack from immigrants, it has less to do with the arrival of new immigrants in the 1990s. Rather, it is closely related to already settled immigrants and the national policies adopted (or not adopted) to integrate them and their children, the latter being still referred to as 'immigrants' despite their being citizens of the countries that hosted their parents as workers in the past. The apparent difficulties these integration policies have encountered and the rise of political Islam inside the host countries have contributed to reinforce the apprehension of a national identity under attack, particularly from Muslim immigrants.

Furthermore, Islam, immigration and the inability to integrate immigrants into the host societies have become entangled phenomena, providing propitious grounds for the rise of nationalist anti-immigration sentiments. These sentiments were heightened, for instance, when the terrorist attacks on France in 1995-1996 brought to public attention the involvement in them of a number of 'children of the Republic' who were also children of Muslim immigrants. However, the reality of the Muslims of Europe is that they have particular characteristics that are very largely European. This European Islam, as noted in Chapter 6, is shifting from being less of an 'Islam-culture' and more of an 'Islam-religion'. Despite the fact that unity between the Muslims of Europe is lacking, not least because of their different nationalities and their different ways of 'doing' Islam, the presence of this religion in Europe is still perceived by others as a unified force. Indeed, there is a great disparity between 'being' a Muslim and 'doing' Islam. Nonetheless, the myth of Islam in Europe in the mind of some nationalist radicals, aided by sensationalist media, sometimes tends to conflate the different categories of Muslims into one mould;

\[1\] "L'exception marocaine", Le Monde 2 October 2002.
they are defined as people who practice Islam fanatically and who want to apply all its rules inexorably and with little regard to the time or place of their application.

In general, the picture of the Maghreb still appears to contain a number of uncertainties at economic and political levels, despite an increase in cooperation with Europe. The main question is whether confronting this reality warrants a securitisation approach. True, securitisation approaches allow for extraordinary measures to be taken, for new policies to be adopted and for resources to be mobilised. Such approaches often have the capacity to rally support for action, but their credibility remains questionable in a number of cases. For example, without adopting a securitisation approach to the political situation in the Maghreb and the need for political reforms, the upgrading of cooperation with the EU so as to put it in a comprehensive security framework, would, perhaps, never have been realised at the pace at which it has moved in recent years. However, this very securitisation approach has harmed genuine political liberalisation in the Maghreb when it has seemed to have encouraged a mere facade of political pluralism.

Because securitisation is inevitably infused with urgency and points to emergency reactions, some of the principal factors responsible for the deterioration of the political, economic, societal or military situation have been aggravated. This has been particularly evident in the political and societal sectors, notably as regards the lack of political liberalisation in the Maghreb and immigration control in south-west European countries. The securitisation of political Islam for the sake of political liberalisation and democracy has generated political regression in the case of Tunisia and reinforced the status quo in the cases of Algeria and, to a lesser extent, Morocco. Attempts to curb immigration or to integrate immigrants have occasioned results opposite to those intended: they have reinforced the perceptions of the existence of undesirable differences within a particular society and also encouraged a thrive in clandestine immigration and its exploitation by criminal networks.

However, as a theoretical tool, securitisation enforces some constraints on the analyst. First, because, according to the securitisation approach, an issue becomes a security issues simply by speaking about it in security terms, the analyst’s need to be alert not to contribute to the securitisation agenda (by securitising certain issues) is sometimes carried out at the detriment of the analysis and a full engagement as to what constitutes security. Second, securitisation in itself does not provide much help in terms of security. That is, though it is extremely instrumental as a tool to outline the security agenda as perceived by the main political actors, it runs into the dead end of a ‘so-what question’.
For this reason, and for a good understanding of the different elements at play, there is a need for a reality-check in order to complement the securitisation approach. This reality-check should not only cover facts and factual data; it should also examine the inter-linkages constructed between the various sectors so as to come up with a convincing security picture that is able to warrant extraordinary measures to be taken to tackle it. Third, a securitisation approach leads to the imposition of a certain unity of the discourse of each country, especially when applied to a region, as is the case in this thesis. Indeed, the thesis has to work with a sort of ‘ideal’ discourse existing in every country regardless of its inclination to change with the change of government and party alternation. Indeed, this ‘ideal’ discourse itself has, at various occasions, run the risk of reinforcing stereotypes. On the whole, if the strength of securitisation is its ability to tease out securitisation instance, its major weakness remains its inability to check whether those instances have any credibility or legitimacy once they are spoken.

The securitisation approach adopted in relation to certain issues in the WM has succeeded in being the quickest way to draw attention to them and to mobilise action to cope with them. But securitisation has often been built on feelings of uncertainty that are hard to pin down in terms of security-reality; and it is this uncertainty which confers strengths on the securitisation process. However, it simultaneously exposes its weaknesses. An inability to ascertain the credibility of securitisation instances has led securitising actors to link them to other instances in other sectors so as to build a comprehensive and, allegedly, more convincing security picture. Consequently, inter-sectoral connections sometimes appear forced and almost mechanical, which often harms the handling of other issues that have little to do with security. Securitisation seems to have generally contributed to foster a sense of confrontation in the WM. In particular, it has been more of a hindrance than a help in the Maghreb area in respect of democratisation; and the same holds true in south-west Europe in respect of the social integration of immigrant communities.
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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: CHRONOLOGY OF MAIN EVENTS

1951
_December_, Libya gains independence.

1954
_November_, Algeria: Beginning of armed insurgence for independence.

1956
_March_, Morocco and Tunisia: independence, end of French protectorate.

1958
_July_, Tunisia: the Assembly votes for the abolition of the monarchy, declares Tunisia a Republic and invests Habib Bourguiba with power as Head of State.

1959
_June_, Tunisia: a new constitution is adopted, providing for the election of a President of the Republic for five years. The 8 November presidential elections make Bourguiba the first President of Tunisia.

1962
_July 5_, Algeria: signature of the Evian Accords granting Algeria independence from France.

1963
_April_, Algeria: Ahmed Ben Bella elected as first President
_October_, Morocco Algeria: ‘War of Sand’, a violent clash opposing the Algerian army and Moroccan troops concerning Tindouf, whose inclusion in Algeria by France in 1934 was denounced by Morocco.
_July_, France and Morocco sign their first labour immigration agreement.
_October_, France signs labour immigration agreement with Tunisia.

1965
_June_, Algeria: in a coup d’Etat, Colonel Houari Boumediene overthrows Ben Bella and pledges to end corruption.

1966
_May_, Algeria: the start of a wave of nationalisation of the industrial and petroleum sectors.

1969
_September_, Libya: a military coup, headed by Colonel Muammar Qadhafi, overthrows King Idris. Qadhafi pursues a pan-Arab agenda by attempting to create mergers with several Arab countries, and introduces state socialism by nationalising most economic activity, including the oil industry.
_October_, Qadhafi orders the closure of a British airbase in Tobruk and the giant US Wheelus air force base in Tripoli.

1972
_June_, Algeria/Morocco: during the summit of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the two countries sign an agreement accepting territorial boundaries bequeathed by decolonisation, thus
putting an end to the Tindouf dispute. Algeria ratifies the agreement in May of the following year. Morocco does so only in May 1989 (after the creation of the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU)) because of the Western Sahara conflict.

*October*, The launch of Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP) during the EC’s Paris summit.

1973

*March*, Morocco decides to extend its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) from 12 to 70 nautical miles, which has led to tensions with Spain.

*October*, the first international oil price shock.

1974

*January*, GATT: the start of Multi-Fibre Arrangements (MFAs) replacing the Cotton Agreements and obliging developing countries to sign ‘voluntary’ export restraint agreements to limit the quantities of their exports of textiles.

*September*, Tunisia: Bourguiba is elected President for life.

1975

*September*, The US announces restrictions on strategic equipment purchased by Libya and restrictions on the training of Libyans in the use of certain types of aircraft.

*November*, Morocco: the Green March, 350,000 volunteers cross the borders between the ‘mother land’ and the Western Sahara.

*November*, Spain delegates the administration of the Western Sahara to Morocco and Mauritania.

1976

*February*, the leadership of the Polisario Front declares the Western Sahara as the independent Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR).

*March*, Algeria officially recognises the SADR.

*April*, Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia sign cooperation agreements with the EEC.

*November*, Algeria: Boumediene introduces a new constitution, confirming commitment to socialism and the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) as the sole political party.

1979

*January*, Algeria: Colonel Chadli Benjedid becomes Secretary General of the FLN and unique candidate for the Presidency. He is elected President on 7 February.

1981

*July*, Tunisia: the Tunisian Communist Party, hitherto banned, is officially recognised, giving room to limited multiparty system

*October*, Libya: creation of the National Front for the Salvation of Libya as an opposition movement to Qadhafi.

1982

*December*, Qadhafi announces the replacement of the country’s armed forces by a popular army.

*December*, Morocco extends its EEZ to 200 miles.

Italy: ministry of labour circulates a memorandum calling for a halt to non-EC immigration and the regularisation of immigrants already on Italian soil.

1983

*March*, Algeria, Mauritania and Tunisia sign a Treaty of Friendship and Concord calling for the establishment of a regional community in the Maghreb.

*June*, Libya: second major Libyan invasion of Chad.

*August*, Morocco and Spain sign a new four-year fisheries agreement replacing the previous short-term agreements.
1984
November, The OAU recognises the Polisario Front as an independent government, causing Morocco to quit the pan-African organisation.

1985

1986
April, Libya/US: US aerial attacks on Tripoli and Benghazi.
November, Algeria: rising inflation and unemployment, exacerbated by the collapse of oil and gas prices, lead to a wave of strikes and violent demonstrations.
December, Italy adopts its first comprehensive immigration law, Law No. 943/1986.

1987
March, Libya: announcement of infitah (economic liberalisation)
November, Tunisia: Ben Ali overthrows Bourguiba by constitutional means and assumes Presidency himself.

1988
February, Morocco and the EEC sign their first fisheries agreement, replacing the Spanish-Moroccan ones.
June, Qaddafi orders the release of some political prisoners and embarks on limited economic liberalisation
August, Morocco and Polisario accept a UN proposal for a ceasefire and resort to a UN monitored referendum on self-determination.
October, Algeria: urban riots calling for reform result in the killing of 400 people according to official sources. The government announces a curfew.
November, Algeria: adoption by referendum of constitutional amendments separating the powers of the President and the prime minister.

1989
February: Creation of AMU between Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia.
March, Algeria: the official creation of the Front Islamique du Salut (FIS).
December, EEC: the decision of the European Council in Strasbourg to set a Redirected Mediterranean Policy to accommodate new changes at international level as well the earlier EC enlargement to include Spain and Portugal in 1986.

1990
February, Italy: adoption of a new immigration law, Legge Martelli.
May, King Hassan II announces the establishment of an Advisory Council for Human Rights.
June, Algeria: local elections, FIS wins 856 municipalities out of 1,541 and 32 departments out of 48.
November, During the Palma de Mallorca meeting of the OSCE, Italy and Spain propose the creation of a Conference for Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean (CSCM).
December, the establishment of the 5+4 Group between Algeria, France, Italy, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Portugal, Spain and Tunisia. It is later joined by Malta and becomes the 5+5 Group.

1991
March, Algeria: government announces parliamentary elections in June 1991 and plans changes to electoral system, including restrictions on campaigning in mosques. The FIS reacts by calling for a general strike.
April, The set-up of the UN mission, MINURSO, to monitor the ceasefire between Morocco and the Polisario and to organise a referendum on self-determination for the Western Sahara.
July, Morocco/Spain: signature of a treaty of Friendship, Good Neighbourliness and Cooperation.
November, Libya is indicted by the US and Great Britain in connection with the 1988 Lockerbie blowing up of the Pan-Am Flight 103.

1992
January, Algeria: in response to the victory of the FIS, the Army forces President Chadli to step down, creates a Haut Comité d'Etat (HCE) headed by Mohamed Boudiaf, suspends the elections and declares a state of emergency for 12 months.

January, The European Parliament decides to freeze the fourth financial protocol for Morocco.

January, Libya: UN imposes sanctions on Libya in an effort to force it to hand over for trial two of its citizens suspected of the blowing up of the Pan-Am Flight 103.

March, the signing of the second EEC-Morocco fisheries agreement for a period of four years; the first agreement ended one year earlier because its mid-term revision led to a reduction in the number of Community boats fishing in Moroccan waters.

June, Algeria: assassination of Boudiaf allegedly by a member of his personal guards.

June, The Lisbon Summit endorses the idea of a Euro-Maghreb Partnership with Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia.

1993
January, Tunisia/Algeria/Egypt: interior ministers from the three countries meet in Tunis to coordinate action against fundamentalist terrorism.

February, France offers FFr6bn worth of tied credits to Agleria.

February, US officials claim Libya is building underground chemical weapons plants.

June, Algerian foreign minister, Redha Malek, visits Paris and obtains aid to combat terrorism.

October, King Juan Carlos of Spain addresses the French National Assembly and speaks of the need to reinforce relations between Europe and the Maghreb.

October, Reports that an anti-Qadhafi coup led by the commander of Libya's forces in Chad has been thwarted by the air force; 250 soldiers are reported killed and hundreds captured.

November, The UN announces that it has begun work on the identification and registration of voters for the referendum on self-determination in the Western Sahara.

1994
January, Algeria: replacing the HCE collegiate, Lamine Zéroual becomes President for a transition period of three years.

April, Algeria: signs structural agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

April, Morocco: ministerial conference of the GATT held in Marrakech for the signing of the Uruguay Round agreements.

June, Algeria obtains a restructuring of its foreign debt (estimated $26m), reducing by $5m the reimbursement due by Algeria between 1994 and 1995.

August, Morocco: armed attack on the Islí Hotel in Marrakech.

October, A major rebellion by the army units near Misrata is put down by units loyal to Qadhafi.

November, Algeria: leaders of the democratic opposition meet with the FIS representatives in Rome under the auspices of the Catholic community of Sant'Egidio in order to discuss conditions for dialogue.

December, Algeria/France: an Islamist commando hijacks an Air France aeroplane in Algiers.

1995
January, At a second Sant'Egidio meeting, leaders of the democratic opposition in Algeria sign the "platform for a political and pacific solution to the Algerian crisis" document.

February, Tunisia: Algerian Islamist militants attack a border post in the south of Midès, Tamerza, killing six Tunisian border guards.

July, Tunisia and the EU signed an agreement establishing a bilateral EMAA which enters into force in March 1998.

July-October, France: GIA members perpetrate a number of terrorist bomb attacks in Paris and Lyons.
October, Italy: the Dini Decree on immigration is adopted allowing the immediate expulsion of immigrants who commit a crime with a fifteen-day order to leave the country.

November, Morocco and the EU sign a new fisheries agreement after tough negotiations.

November, Morocco and the EU conclude negotiations on the establishment of a bilateral EMAA.

November, the EU-15 and 12 southern Mediterranean countries sign the Barcelona Declaration establishing the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP).

November, Zeroual wins a five-year term as President of the republic with a comfortable majority.

1996

February, Morocco and the EU sign an agreement establishing a bilateral EMAA which enters into force in March 2000.

May, Le Monde newspaper reports that the French government is cutting financial aid to Algeria by half.

May, The UN Security Council decides to suspend the process leading to the referendum on Western Sahara and to reduce UN personnel there.

September, Spain: the army builds a three kilometre wire fence at the Spanish-Moroccan frontier at Melilla.

October, Italian foreign minister, Lamberto Dini, says Italy would welcome a review of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership to include Libya.

November, At the Franco-Spanish summit in Marseilles, Chirac and Aznar agree to establish a permanent consultation mechanism to develop EU Mediterranean policy. They invite Italy to join.

November, France, Spain, Italy and Portugal officially create the WEU rapid reaction force EUROFOR.

November, Spanish defence minister, Eduardo Serra, calls for NATO to shift its European focus to the Mediterranean.

November, Algeria: constitutional reforms, including a ban on using Islam as a political platform and an increase in the powers of the Presidency, are approved by 85.5 per cent of the votes.

1997

April, Second Euro-Mediterranean Conference in Malta achieved very little; an ad hoc meeting under the British Presidency is held in Palermo in early 1998 to compensate for this failure.

July, Algeria: release of Abassi Madani and of Abdelkader Hachani, FIS number three leader.

September, Algeria: AIS (Armée Islamiste du Salut) declares a ceasefire starting 1 October.

October, Algeria: parliamentary elections won by the newly-created presidential party, the Rassemblement National Démocratique (RND).

1998

March, Italy: the adoption of a new immigration law, Law No. 40/1998, introducing stricter measures as Italy prepared for entry as full member of the Schengen zone in April 1998.


September, Zeroual decides to cut short his term and hold early presidential elections.

Summer, Tunisia: with the forthcoming presidential elections of 24 October 1999 in sight, the parliament approves a draft law proposal from Ben Ali, allowing Presidents and secretary generals of the opposition parties to run in presidential elections as long as they have been in that position for at least five years.

1999

April, The third Euro-Mediterranean Conference is held in Stuttgart. A draft entitled ‘Guidelines for elaborating a Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability’ is endorsed. Libya is present as an observer.

April, Algeria: former foreign minister, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, is elected President by 73 per cent of the votes cast, after the withdrawal of six other candidates for alleged ‘massive electoral fraud’.

July, Algeria: Bouteflika calls for national reconciliation, announcing a programme of amnesty for thousands of Islamist militants not involved in killings.
September, A referendum approves Bouteflika’s law on civil concord, the result of long and largely secret negotiations with the armed wing of the FIS, the AIS. Thousands of members of the AIS and other armed groups are pardoned.

December, Spain adopts a new immigration law (No. 4/2000), which entered into force in February 2000.

Libya: Lockerbie suspects handed over for trial in the Netherlands under Scottish law; UN sanctions suspended; diplomatic relations with UK restored.

2000

March, Algeria joins NATO’s Mediterranean dialogue initiative.

June, EU: a “Common Strategy of the European Union on the Mediterranean Region” is adopted at the June 2000 meeting of the European Council in Fiera, Portugal.

September, Libya: dozens of African immigrants are killed by Libyan mobs in the west of the country in supposed anger at the large number of African labourers coming into the country.

November, Fourth Euro-Mediterranean Conference in Marseilles; Lebanon and Syria absent.


2001

March, EU and Morocco declared they could not reach a mutually beneficial and satisfactory fisheries agreement and called their negotiations off.

April, May, Algeria: scores of demonstrators are killed in violent clashes between security forces and Berber protestors in the mainly Berber region of Kabylie.

May, Algeria: the main Berber party, the Rassemblement pour la Culture et la Démocratie, withdraws from the government in protest against the authorities’ handling of riots in Kabylie.


October, Algeria: government agrees to give the Berber language official status.

2002

March, Algeria recognises the Berber language, Tamazight, as a national language.

April, Algeria signs its EMAA during the fifth Euro-Mediterranean conference in València.

June, Algeria: FLN wins general elections marred by violence and a low turnout. They are boycotted as a sham by four parties, two of which represent Berbers. Twenty three parties and 123 independent electoral lists take part.

June, Morocco: terrorist members with links to Al-Qaeda network are arrested in Casablanca, they are suspected of planning attacks on military installation in the Strait of Gibraltar.

July, Italy: the Italian Senate adopts a new immigration law, Legge Fini-Bossi, giving more power to the ministry of interior.

July, Morocco Spain: crisis over Perejil, an inhabitant rocky islet on the Mediterranean Sea.

September, Morocco: first legislative elections under the reign of Mohamed IV registers an importance advance for the moderate Islamist party, Parti de la Justice et du développement (PJD), with 41 seats in the lower chamber, up from 14 seats.
APPENDIX B: IMMIGRATION AND MILITARY DATA

Societal sector
ITALY — RESIDENTS OF FOREIGN NATIONALITY BY RANK, 1991-2001

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Source: Cartas, Deoletar Statistico Immigrazione (Cartas, Rome 2001).


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SPAIN — RESIDENTS OF FOREIGN NATIONALITY BY GEOGRAPHICAL ORIGIN, 2000 (% BREAKDOWN)

source: Police Headquarters, Spanish Ministry of Interior, 2001
<http://www.mir.es>
### Spain – Residents Holding African Nationality, 2000 (% Breakdown)

![Pie chart showing the distribution of residents holding African nationality in Spain, with 77% from Morocco, 18% Rest of countries, and 5% from Algeria.](http://www.mir.es)

Source: Police Headquarters, Spanish Ministry of Interior, 2001

### France – Maghrebi Nationals Holding Residence Permits, 1980-2000

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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Foreign Residents (A)</th>
<th>Algeria</th>
<th>Morocco</th>
<th>Tunisia</th>
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<td>% of A</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>% of A</td>
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### Military sector

**MAGHREB – ARMS ORDERS AND DELIVERIES: ALGERIA, MOROCCO AND TUNISIA, 1992-2001**

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**Abbreviations:**
- AIFV: Armored infantry fighting vehicle
- AK: Armored personnel carrier
- APC: Anti-tank guided weapon
- arty: Artillery
- ATGW: Anti-tank guided weapon
- cbr hel: Combat helicopter
- ESM: Electronic support measures
- FAC: Forward air control
- FF: Frigate
- FGA: Fighter, ground-attack
- hel: Helicopter
- LACV: Light armored combat vehicle
- MBT: Main battle tank
- trg: Training
- UAV: Unmanned aerial vehicle
- LUS: Logistic, supply