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The Making of an Ideology of the Third Way.

The Evolution of Christian Democracy in Germany (with special reference to 1945-49)

Michelle Cupples
Doctor of Philosophy

The University of Aston in Birmingham
October 1999

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For Neil and
my family
The University of Aston in Birmingham

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Summary

This study investigates the search for the third way in the history of German Christian Democracy. Today, in the United Kingdom, the ‘third way’ is seen as a new phenomenon, a synthesis of post-war belief in the welfare state and neo-liberal conservatism. Yet it insufficiently acknowledges that the origins of third way thinking, the marriage of social justice with free market economics, of individualism with collective responsibility, are found in the early philosophies of Catholic Social Theory and Protestant Social Ethical Teaching in Germany.

This study shows that in the hundred years from the 1840s to the end of the 1940s, there were Catholic and Protestant socio-ethical thinkers and political reformists in Germany who attempted to bridge the philosophical differences between liberalism and socialism, to develop a socio-economic order based on Christian moral values.

It will focus on the period 1945-1949, when the CDU was founded as the first interdenominational, Christian party. The study provides the first comprehensive account of the political debates in Christian democratic groups in the Soviet, British, French and American allied occupied zones, also giving equal attention to the contribution from the Protestant wing, alongside the more widely acknowledged role of Catholics in the birth of the CDU.

It examines how Christian Democrats envisaged correcting the aberrations of German history, by uniting all social classes and Christian religions in one all-embracing Volkspartei, and transforming party politics from its earlier obsession with sectarian and ideological interests towards a more pragmatic ‘third way’ programme. The study argues that through the making of its ideology, the CDU modified the nation’s understanding of its history, re-interpreted its traditions, and redefined the meaning and perception of established political philosophies. This reveals how the ambiguity of political terminology, and the flexible practice of ‘third way’ politics, were an invaluable political resource in the CDU’s campaign for unity, ideological legitimisation and political power.

Five keywords
Politics
Religion
Social
Economic
CDU
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Introduction

The politics of the third way can appear a nebulous notion, yet it is gaining currency among parties of the centre and centre-left across Europe. World economic crises and the devastating collapse of national economies and financial infrastructures, particularly in Asia and Latin America, have generated some disillusion with capitalism. The belief that the free market can offer a panacea for society's inequalities and act as a guarantor of universal welfare and prosperity has been eroded. Whilst few of the centre and centre-left governments in Europe seek a collectivist style socialism to restore social and cultural cohesion and full-employment, or to deal with the challenges of globalisation, many agree that politics has to become more meaningful, inspirational and idealist to tackle modern issues. The free market continues to be praised for its positive contribution to democracy and for respecting the freedom of the individual, but the consensus is growing that the more disruptive and exploitative effects of the global market must be tamed by standards and rules of good state practice, with a return to the pursuit of high ideals and public purpose. This is the essence of the current debate on the third way.

That debate\(^1\) however is misguided in its narrow belief that the origins and the principles of the third way reside in Social Democracy. Social Democracy may in future choose to aspire to these ideals (in many European Union countries such as England and Germany the indication is that it is) but this study will show that the core values of the third way thinking, such as solidarity, subsidiarity, rights with responsibility or joint stakeholding, more accurately belong to Christian Democracy, which in turn relies on the Christian

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teaching of social ethics and Catholic Social Teaching. It is Christian Democratic conservatism that has placed the greatest emphasis on the inviolable political and economic freedoms of the individual, not the historically collectivist approach of Social Democracy.

Despite Germany’s turbulent past, the search for the political centre runs like a *Leitmotiv* through the nation’s history. From the 16th century Reformation, to the social and political repercussions of the French Revolution in the 18th century, to the rise of capitalism in the industrial revolution of the 19th century, and finally to the 20th century search for a social form of market economy, Germany sought to reconcile the opposing forces of conservatism and liberalism. An individual’s confessional allegiance as well as their socio-economic status, were references for an individual’s either more conservative or liberal personal philosophy. With the advent of the German party system in the mid-19th century, political parties translated deep-rooted religious conviction into pronounced, political interest and defended their beliefs as socialist, conservative, nationalist or liberalist ideologies. Since the semi-absolutist nature of the regimes of Bismarck and Kaiser Wilhelm prevented political parties from holding any real political responsibility however, parties primarily defended regional and sectarian interests. Bismarck’s alliance with Protestant liberals during the latter half of the 19th century instigated the systematic discrimination of Catholics in the *Kulturkampf*, inciting bitter antagonism between the Christian confessions and inflicting irreparable and interminable damage on the political system.

Protestant and Catholic differences were related to how they approached solving ‘*die soziale Frage*’ or ‘social question’. Industrialisation and the rise of capitalism were blamed for society’s ills and injustices, for a loss of faith and social cohesion. The need to restrain the excesses of the capitalist system and to enfranchise the alienated and exploited working classes, became the chief motive of the burgeoning Catholic social movement in particular. Catholics looked for a way to resolve the conflict between capital and labour, either by completely abolishing capitalism or alternatively by seeking

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a synthesis to reconcile capitalism with social equality, thereby ensuring welfare and prosperity for all classes. There were contributions to ethical, social and political reform from the Protestant community too, but liberal-Protestant visions for achieving social harmony with prosperity were sadly too often clouded by nationalist endeavours. Deep-seated mistrust of the other’s confessional interests also prevented the development of a united Christian front of Catholics and Protestants, to jointly address the social question. Third way observers sought in vain to develop an alternative to hostile sectarianism and ideological extremism, and to conduct more meaningful and less confrontational politics, based on moral values, religious tolerance and inclusiveness.

It is the nature of this inextricable link between religion and politics in German society, succinctly expressed in the untranslatable and peculiarly German concept of Weltanschauung, that provides the key to understanding Germany’s socio-political history and goes to the very heart of an investigation into Germany’s century-old search for a third way.3

The legacy of ‘die soziale Frage’ persisted into the post Second World War period as Christian democratic groups wrangled over the most appropriate form of socio-economic policy to adopt to solve social injustice. It soon became the most controversial issue in post-war German party politics, when the decision to adopt a planned economy, a free-market economy, or something in-between, looked set to determine Germany’s entire future economic direction. It was also a choice that directly influenced the political fate of Germany.

Recognising that confessional interests had been the root cause of intolerance and conflict in German society, nascent Christian democratic groups in 1945 aimed explicitly at modifying and correcting some of Germany’s early traditions and most notably of forging unity and co-operation between Protestants and Catholics. The Christian Democratic Union (CDU) did not seek to remove religion from politics, but simply to redefine their relationship to each other. By bringing autonomy to the spheres and

3 "Im Gegensatz zu den meisten anderen Ländern wird Deutschland bestimmt durch einen konfessionellen Zwiespalt, der ein ausschlaggebendes Moment grundlegender Differenzierungen ist." Sigmund Neumann, Die Deutschen Parteien, Junker und Dünnhaupt Verlag, Berlin 1932, p.17.
institutions of religion and politics, the CDU hoped to avoid state involvement in Church affairs, and so prevent sectarian interests exerting a direct influence on political decisions. In future religion should assume a peripheral, but nevertheless important moral function in society. An interdenominational party built on the basis of shared Christian values would provide the impulse in 1945 for a socially inclusive and classless Volkspartei. This, they hoped, would replace the multiplicity of narrow, class-based ‘interest parties’, that had brought down Weimar and opened the door to National Socialism.

The demoralising experience of National Socialism shared by Protestants and Catholics alike, had undoubtedly generated a powerful catalyst for forging a new consensus between Weltanschauungen in 1945. Regional groups were in spirit committed to the Christian Democratic cause, adamant that never again would religious divisions allow a repeat of 1933. Yet whilst the potential to unite Catholics and Protestants in a new third way existed, the social, political and cultural abyss that accompanied the end of the war, meant the allegiance to former Weltanschauungen and entrenched traditions remained problematic. It was over-optimistic to expect a century of religious conflict and bigotry to disappear overnight. It soon emerged, that many of those individuals who were involved in establishing the CDU, were not of one mind in drafting party manifestos. Historical political traditions dominated the formulation of socio-economic policy. Religious tolerance and consensus - the cornerstone of the CDU’s new programme - were adopted only very gradually by party members and conceded only on account of the fact that it was the only way to secure the Volkspartei’s long-term political survival. Without the formal constraints imposed by the allies and their policy of installing a stable democracy, German-led political discussions risked ending in turmoil. Consolidation of disparate Christian democratic parties throughout the regions progressed slowly and unenthusiastically. Even at the occasion of the first elections in west Germany in 1949, the CDU was still unable to stand as a united party. This did not occur until 1950 when the party finally convened at Bad Godesberg to unite the CDU as a party for the entire Federal Republic of Germany.4

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4 Bavaria was to form its own Christian Social Union (CSU). Owing to this unique party political development of the CSU, Bavaria has been excluded in this analysis.
Despite clear evidence of political continuity of programmes and traditions before 1945, it has been common practice amongst historians writing about the CDU, to present the CDU as a ‘new’ party in conception, an organic development which emerged across Germany in the closing stages of the war. This view was consistent with the metaphor of ‘Hour Zero,’ connotating a new beginning or a tabula rasa. The concept of ‘new’ however demands qualification. The differing interpretations given to socio-economic policy by regional groups and individuals not only reflected diverse regional traditions and confessional background of the German states, but they are also an indication of the eclectic nature of Christian Democracy, owing its existence to conservative, socialist, liberalist and nationalist influences. Far from being something entirely new, the CDU was an amalgamation of traditions and ideologies from the past, but all earlier initiatives for a Christian, democratic, interdenominational Volkspartei had simply failed.

Only by investigating the genesis and the evolution of Christian Democracy’s core ideas, can the study demonstrate how in 1945, the Christian Democratic Union found the third way among Germany’s diverse political and sectarian traditions. The CDU succeeded where others had failed, by modifying the nation’s understanding of its history, re-interpreting its traditions and its ideas and creatively redefining their meaning and their public perception. In the course of programme discussions, the CDU exploited the stylistic ambiguity of political concepts as a useful party political resource in the campaign for ideological legitimisation and political power. Both objectives of the study, tracing first the genesis and then the modification of Christian democratic ideas by the CDU, underpin an intellectual and a political history of the development of Christian Democracy’s third way programme and illustrate how historical tradition combined with pragmatic skill to modify ideas where politically expedient, were important requisites for the formation of a successful new party.

The post-war period was necessarily a period of ideological stock-taking that compelled the CDU first to analyse the mistakes of past ideas and Weltanschauung, before embarking on the definition of a new identity. Their programmes thus confronted the causes of National Socialism, and the dangers of Materialism, Marxist-Socialism and Liberalism. Finally, the study argues that only with the culminating development of the Social Market Economy in 1948, concluding a whole century of philosophical socio-
economic discussions, were efforts towards a third way manifested in policy and in practice. The Social Market Economy succeeded in providing a viable political and socio-economic synthesis of the major political and religious traditions in the previously divided German party system.

This study aims to provide the first comprehensive account of the socio-economic debates that took place in individual Christian democratic groups in the German states of the Soviet, British, French and American allied occupied zones between 1945 and 1949. As regional discussions were often held without any knowledge of Christian democratic developments in other parts of Germany, their content reflects the historical, political and sectarian idiosyncrasies of individual regions in north, south, east and west Germany. These manifestations of a new Christian democratic political identity across Germany’s regions, reveal where former patterns of ideological continuity remained and where they were disrupted. The study can be read in two ways, either with a specific regional focus, or as a comprehensive overview of the CDU’s emergence as a national party and the consolidation of one social and economic programme. This approach illustrates how the differing forces in the party were politically reconciled, and why certain programme ideas superseded others in the quest to form a united party. The study also seeks to correct some previous assumptions about the early development of the CDU in the regions.

Among these is the influence of political Protestantism. Previous studies that have investigated the CDU’s development have largely focused on the influence of political Catholicism, overlooking the party’s other liberal-Protestant roots. It is worrying that this very significant area of the Christian democratic ideology has been neglected, since it was precisely the aim of the CDU party, to embrace Catholics and Protestants equally in one united party, whether they were liberals or socialists, conservatives or nationalists. The bias shown in the literature towards the Catholic contribution to Christian Democracy fuels the suspicion that the CDU was a Catholic dominated movement and even a continuation of the Catholic Centre party, a suggestion that the CDU consistently rebutted in the late 1940s. Many regional Christian democratic groups

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3 Whilst every effort has been made to cover Germany’s main towns and regions, some have been ignored where no substantial archival sources or published records exist.
were custodians of liberal values and quietly endorsed a liberal economic programme. This study provides the first formal recognition of the role of political Protestantism in instilling liberal values in German society, and seeks to redress the balance in the history of the CDU by acknowledging the importance of liberal Protestantism in the development of the party’s programme. It is particularly alarming that the Social Market Economic programme has been neglected in respect of its liberal Protestant roots.

There are many reasons why political Protestantism has not received the same attention as political Catholicism. Historically ‘Political Protestantism’ did not even exist as a concept and is an indication of Protestant bourgeois passiveness in 19th century political affairs and its apathy towards joining the social debate or to co-operate with Catholics in instigating social reform. Internal Protestant disunity was a chief reason for this lack of social and political engagement, and it should not overshadow very worthwhile individual endeavours by Protestants to undertake social reform. The initial reluctance shown by liberal Protestants in 1945 to co-operate actively in social reform debates is also understandable in view of the shame many liberal Protestants felt in facilitating National Socialism. Perhaps more significant, laissez-faire economic liberalism, the preserve of liberal Protestantism, was wholly discredited in 1945 and made Protestants reticent to support the free market, for fear of accusations that they were restoring former capitalist practices and structures.

The post-war mood had swung decisively to the left, to embrace Socialism as the new, most favoured alternative. Yet ironically, Germany had had no direct experience of a Socialist system, apart from its failed National Socialist experiment. Liberal-capitalism was in fact a more familiar system to both Protestants and Catholics. Significant trade union efforts to develop a Christian Socialism in the 19th century notwithstanding, Christian Socialists in 1945 found that they could not easily define their ‘Socialist’ objectives, relying more on negative definitions of what Socialism was not, but not what it actually was. Christian Socialism was also ambiguous about its attitude to capitalism, which under specific conditions it clearly endorsed. This meant that although old style liberalism would be unacceptable to Christian Socialists in the new Germany, the possibility for a new interpretation of capitalist-liberalism was not inconceivable. This neo-liberalism would not focus on the pursuit of narrow economic goals but would
recognise its responsibilities to society as well as the individual. But liberalism's more notable cultural and political values could also be resurrected to guarantee individual freedoms and promote democracy.⁶

In part one, chapter one and chapter two lay the foundations for the study through an investigation of the main tenets of Catholic and Protestant thinking and their social reform movements in the 19th and early 20th centuries, exploring how sectarian interests and political ideas were communicated in the emerging party political spectrum. Whereas the Centre Party was the focus for Catholicism's political expression between 1870 and 1933, the many conservative and liberal parties in the same period became the main political representatives of political Protestantism. Chapter three then devotes its attention to the neo or ordo-liberal movement which began to actively develop third way theories in a period of exile during the Third Reich. Neo-liberals looked ahead to a post-war socio-economic programme that would combine both elements of market forces and state regulation. This historical backdrop leads into the core of the study, namely the immediate post-second world war period. By examining the long gestation of Christian Democratic thinking, it is possible to appreciate the origins of the CDU's political ideas and to understand the motives of individuals in continuing to defend them in political programmes and discussions after the Second World War. Chapters four to seven investigate these key political debates between 1945 and 1947 across the regions and zones of Germany, when Christian groups first assembled to found Christian Democratic parties and draft political manifestos. Discussions reveal how former political ideas and historical traditions resurfaced, underwent mutation or where new thinking emerged. The period from 1947-1949, the focus of chapter eight, was a period in which diverse programme suggestions were consolidated. Fierce battles were fought between the main centres of Christian democracy to defend the supremacy of regionally established ideas. Here the study analyses which programmes and ideas were accepted and why others were sidelined. 1947 was the first time theoretical programme formulations were tested for their practical relevance, as the CDU was called upon to take responsibility for

⁶ In the decades following the birth of the Federal Republic, the CDU was often criticised for having restored former capitalist-liberalist structures and for reneging on implementing genuine social reform. Whilst this study does not seek to endorse or refute this allegation, it must be acknowledged that this angle of criticism was partly derived from the fact that the socialist agenda of some Christian Socialist groups was frustrated.
shaping its own political and economic destiny as a member of the all-German Economic Council, or Wirtschaftsrat in Frankfurt. It is here that we witness the change underway in the tone and the role of the political programme and accompanying discussions. The philosophical, spiritual and hypothetical tone of programmes and statements - characteristic of the late 19th and early 20th centuries - gives way to a new confidence and pragmatism, and the extrapolation of policy from principles. The sudden transformation of programme to practice however, rapidly exposed the true level of conflict and disunity in the party. The chapter is dominated by the figure of Ludwig Erhard, who appears from relative political obscurity in 1947 to take centre stage in the emerging political arena. He dramatically impacts on the CDU’s prevailing objectives and its policy line in the American and British Bizone Economic Council, steering the CDU’s programme discussions to their conclusive end in the Social Market Economy and to election victory in 1949.

The existing literature on the CDU’s programme discussions is fragmented. There are a number of very good regional studies and some incisive analyses that have considered the ideological aspect of the CDU’s programme discussions, but no single, comprehensive historical study on the early CDU in all regions of Germany exists. The consequences of the division of Germany and the ensuing Cold War meant that post-war history was written from separate east and west German perspectives with ideological bias. The dominant figure of Adenauer and his skilful management of events in the CDU, moreover led to the British zone - and specifically the state of North Rhine-Westphalia - becoming the most dominant and most researched region, with the result that alternative initiatives in other regions and other zones, deserving specific acknowledgment, have been ignored. Developments of the CDU in the Soviet zone for example have, with some notable exceptions, been restricted to Berlin, and whilst there have been some worthwhile regional studies on the CDU in states in the American and French occupation zones, there are no studies that cover these zones as a whole or indeed, to undertake a single study of the Christian Democratic programme debates in all four zones. This gap in the research has become all the more important to fill since the unification of east and west Germany in 1990. It is timely therefore after a decade of national unification, in the 50th anniversary year since the birth of the Federal Republic
and the 10th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall, that a national German history of the early development of the CDU is written.

The research for this study is based on a reading of a wide range of primary literature sources from the archives for Christian Democratic politics at Sankt-Augustin in Germany. These include programmatic statements, manifestos, speeches, memoirs, contemporary newspapers, periodicals and journals, plus many unpublished archival sources and private papers, year books and annals. Full acknowledgement has also been given to all existing secondary literature on the rise of Christian Democracy and the early CDU, for which a comprehensive list of bibliographical details is included.

**Ideology, Programmes and Theory**

The party programme forms both the focus and the backdrop for the investigation. The ‘programme’ is understood here in its widest sense, to include not only written and verbal statements but also ideological statements concerning the party’s ethos and the doctrines on which its policies were based. The party political manifesto is the principal vehicle for expressing a party’s political objectives, its philosophy and identity, enabling it to compete with other parties for votes and political power as well as generate internal cohesion and identification in the party by dissemination of its aims and principles across society. A programme’s statements anticipate the future, justify the present and evaluate the past. Since this study argues that the CDU learnt to re-invent the meaning of traditions using the ambiguity of political language, it is essential in the prelude to this study to consider the political programme as an ideology and as a party political resource. Only by recognising the theoretical framework in which programmes operate, is it possible to investigate how the political programme, consciously or subconsciously, served the internal and external political ambitions of the embryonic CDU between 1945 and 1949.

The existing theoretical framework nevertheless reveals limitations for programme analysis. Early empirical sociological research into parties and politics by figures such as Weber, Michels and Osgorski at the beginning of the century was overtaken after the

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Second World War by political stabilisation, pluralism and faith in the western democratic system. This led research in the 1950s and 1960s to adopt a ‘de-ideologised’ approach, championed by thinkers such as Duverger\textsuperscript{10} and Satori.\textsuperscript{11} Daniel Bell’s\textsuperscript{12} ‘The End of Ideology’ argued that the general consensus that grew among the new post-war \textit{Volksparteien} on factors such as the welfare state, the mixed economy, democracy, individual freedom and \textit{Gemeinwohl}, made former ideologies entirely superfluous. Party political research no longer focused on beliefs or party values but on institutional structures. Klotzbach\textsuperscript{13} writes;

\begin{quote}
“Programmatik der Parteien, ihre soziale Basis, überhaupt gesellschaftliche und ökonomische Umweltbedingungen, Geschichte, Kultur usw. treten dahinter zurück oder verschwinden ganz."
\end{quote}

A party’s role became primarily functional. Parties were seen as no more than constituent elements in the social and political system. This trend characterised the direction of Duverger’s institutional research theory, that Klotzbach summarises as an ‘Isolierung der Parteien von ihrer Umwelt.’ From the mid 1960s however, some studies, such as those by S.J Eldersveld,\textsuperscript{14} began to re-include the social, political and environmental conditions in which a party exists, thereby helping to put the party back into the social system from which it had been separated. But the increasing segmentation of social research disciplines soon led to a loss of overview\textsuperscript{15} and prevented clear methodological guidelines being established for party research.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{9} Moisey Ostrogorksi, \textit{Democracy and the Organisation of Political Parties}, Band 2, Macmillan, New York/London 1922.
\item \textsuperscript{10} Maurice Duverger, \textit{Political Parties}, Methuen & Co. Ltd., London 1954.
\item \textsuperscript{15} Richard Stöß/Oskar Niedermayer, \textit{Stand und Perspektiven der Parteienforschung in Deutschland}, Westdeutscher Verlag, Opladen 1993, p.9.
\end{itemize}
Klaus von Beyme\textsuperscript{16} has noted that the lack of a general theory for party research is not disastrous. Any one theory risks compromising and oversimplifying the diversity of inquiry into an otherwise complex subject area. It is entirely questionable whether a single framework for analysis can adequately be applied to any one part, since its origins and characteristics are highly individual; circumstantial and historical events will always challenge the parameters of a fixed model. A party is the product of its history and its present environment and will orientate its organisational structure, ideology and behaviour according to the prevailing socio-economic and political circumstances.\textsuperscript{17} The need to evaluate ideas in their context has been endorsed by a number of political scientists. Ware\textsuperscript{18} believes;

"Attempts to impose single approaches on political science are misguided. The causal factors involved in producing outcomes in politics are so complex that the dominance of any single approach will surely lead to distortion and oversimplification in an attempt to explain the political world."

Any analysis of a party programme should then include an analysis of the prevailing social, political and economic situation to which the programme is responding. Raschke\textsuperscript{19} argues;

"einerseits Programme nicht im Rahmen einer abstrakten Ideengeschichte, sondern in ihrer Abhängigkeit von sozialen und politischen Realfaktoren untersucht werden müssen und daß sie andererseits nur ein Element neben anderen im System einer Partei sind."

Flechtheim\textsuperscript{20} also insists on an inclusive approach to programme analysis;

\textsuperscript{16} "Für die Zusammenfassung des bisherigen Wissens über Parteien schließlich ist eine allgemeine Parteientheorie wünschenswert, aber ...schwer zu erreichen. Unerläßlich ist sie auch nicht ... Für die großen Systeme werden wir weiter damit leben müssen, daß nicht alles von der Wahlwerbung bis zur Parteienfinanzierung in einer sich schlüssigen Theorie untergebracht werden kann, es sei denn, sie riskierte als gesetztes Leerformelgebilde in die Arena der Wissenschaft zu treten." Klaus von Beyme, "Theoretische Probleme der Parteienforschung" in; Politische Vierteljahresschrift. Jg 24, 1983, H3. p.250f.


\textsuperscript{18} Alan Ware, Political Parties and Party Systems, Oxford University Press, New York 1996, p.20.


\textsuperscript{20} O.K Flechtheim, Dokumente zur parteipolitischen Entwicklung in Deutschland seit 1945, Band 1, Dokumenten Verlag, Berlin 1962, p.1 of Introduction.
“Man wird - so schwierig das sein mag - nicht umhin können, den Zusammenhang zwischen der Programmatik einer Partei, ihrer organisatorischen, sozialen usw. Struktur und ihrem gesamten Verhalten im politischen Alltag zu untersuchen. Alle drei Ebenen stehen in Wechselwirkung miteinander.”

Finally Rudolf Hars' study on the CDU’s education policy confirms that programmes cannot be analysed in isolation, but must be reviewed in the context of their political implementation, since it is only possible to tell if discrepancy exists between programme and practice once an overview of a party’s world view has been gained. A narrow investigation, he says, obscures the vision of the propaganda function of political programmes. Ideological interference will always affect political reality. The idea that universal values and truths exist is denounced by current social research theory as ‘myths,’ ‘prejudices’ or ‘ideologies’ themselves. Social science instead turns to the agents who disseminate ideas and the structures of influence which allow ideas to be acquired, to ask if the existing power relationship is legitimate. A purely philosophical, absolute approach is inadequate, because it is too abstract and so mistakenly deals with ideal conditions for consent but not actual ones.

Ware further observes that although a programme is a party’s public face, outlining what the party intends to do in government, there are many aspects of a party’s beliefs, values or ethos which may not be stated in its manifesto. The programme reveals only a fraction of the ideas generated by a party whilst possibly also concealing or suppressing an equal number of divergent views. A programme generally represents compromises reached between different internal views held by sub-groups, left or right wings and party factions within the party. Part of the methodology therefore in examining a party and its programmes must surely be to investigate the breadth of viewpoints held within the party. Narr’s study on the CDU chose not to concentrate on individual and regional

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23 Alan Ware, op. cit. p.20.

24 Joachim Raschke, op. cit, p.8

programmes of CDU groups across Germany, preferring a thematic approach that distinguished between the main political strands only. Although this method has perhaps facilitated a simpler overview of the subject, and thereby also the task of critical analysis, as Narr himself concedes, it has given unfair emphasis to certain political viewpoints over others. The best example is Christian Socialism, which has received over-inflated relevance in the literature on the CDU’s development. Opposing strands to Christian Socialism and advocates of alternative programme directions have, as a result, been neglected or sidelined in critical analyses. In an attempt to simplify the subject of analysis, many other interesting programme suggestions from CDU groups across the country risk being ignored. The very federal nature of the CDU’s development plus the obvious logistical obstacles to regional political integration and merger, such as geographically divided allied zones and poor communication, meant that until 1946, programme developments were predominantly isolated developments. The method applied here thus works on the basis of actual historical circumstances as evidenced in the material and does not seek to impose artificial conceptual structures, which may seem to solve the social scientist’s methodological dilemmas.

Reflecting on the correct methodological approach for party political research, Bergsträsser 26 insisted that research into Geistesgeschichte must be distinguished from research into Parteigeschichte. He warns against combining both types of research, party history with the history of political ideas, since the history of ideas is criticised as too isolated from actual political events and therefore unreliable. An investigation into the origins of a party’s world view, such as conservatism or socialism, would not adequately account for a party’s change in image and policy direction as political events unfolded. It is not the ‘idea’ that is important, but the consequences of that idea, when it is translated into political action. The history of ideas transforms into party history when politicians seize those political ideas and apply that vision to political reality. 27 Attempting to distill the essence of a politician’s ideology from his political speeches or written drafts therefore, is for Bergsträsser a false theory. A politician must clearly not be judged by their theory but by their behaviour in real situations. It has already been established here


27 Ibid., p.17.
that ideas are not to be discussed in isolation from their political context and impact on reality, yet Bergsträßer's advice to separate the research discipline, Parteiengeschichte from Ideengeschichte undermines the importance of a party's manifesto pledges and the commitment it owes to voters. It would imply that there is no relation between a party's declared principles and policy objectives and its responsibility to fulfil its promises in government. If a party's political theory has no intrinsic basis in reality, then the programme is flawed and insincere. If the political programme or a politician's statements and world view are no longer considered sacrosanct or are rendered worthless in the face of a politician's practical conduct, the voter is denied the power to hold that party to account once it is in power. Programmes are thus important instruments of criticism and control, and symbols of democracy. Bergssträßer does however partly concede that a party is not simply a product of changing political circumstances;

"Jeder Einzelne zieht aus politischen Ereignissen bestimmte Folgerungen, je nach seiner Weltanschauung und seiner gefühlsmäßigen Einstellung"28

In the final analysis he is unable to deny that a party's world view does also determine the way that a party responds to political events and decisions.

Recognising the need for both an empirical and a pragmatic approach to the subject matter is therefore important here. This study avoids narrowing the CDU's ideology to a study of its programme ideas alone and broadens the view by incorporating the historical dimension, the real-life social and economic context, the drive for power and the dynamics of political personalities into the analysis. The party programme - in its broadest sense - will nevertheless provide the point of departure for this study and continue to occupy a central position since it is the most constant and accurate reflection of how a party wishes to be seen. It provides the closest barometer for an objective analysis of a party's declared ideology and a strong point of reference from which deviations, modifications and disparities to that ideology can be measured as a party develops and matures. Duverger believed that greater emphasis is placed on the programme in the early stages of a party's existence before it is superseded by party interests and organisational matters. Since this study is concerned with the early

28 Ibid., p.18.
development of the CDU, focus on the programmatic discussions is justified. It avoids the danger of overtheorising party programmes, which Stammen also warns, usually results in the use of jargonistic terminology and complicated theoretical social scientific explanations, which lead more to confuse than to clarify a party's programme. The statements which academic theorising constructs around the ideological content of programme statements are themselves to be criticised for their incomprehensible and esoteric nature! The risk is that the same criticism which is levelled at politicians for their failure to simplify and clarify their political rhetoric for the purposes of general comprehension, might be more appropriately directed at social scientists themselves.

Having considered the methodological difficulties of analysing a party's ideology via its programme, it is necessary briefly to identify what factors are relevant in the analysis. The approach must assess the value a party itself places on its programme, the form the programme takes, its internal and external functions and finally the language and programmatic style of political programmes - essential for communicating policies and for manipulating the political process. These factors are all interwined. When we ask why a party needs a programme, what function it fulfills, whether its declared intentions bear any relation to subsequent reality, we are inquiring into the purpose and meaning of a programme's statements. Because a programme is multifunctional, it is also reasonable to find variation in its form. Traditionally there has been more than one type of party programme in the German party system. In the immediate post-war years, parties not only had no mandate to govern their own affairs, but were called upon to provide moral explanations for the evils of National Socialism and give spiritual guidance for the future. Programmes therefore by nature constituted ideas and philosophy in so-called

29 Theo Stammen, Programme der politischen Parteien in der Bundesrepublik in Rainer Kunz, Herbert Maier, Theo Stammen (Hrsg.), Bayerische Landeszentrale für politische Bildungsarbeit, München 1975, p.33.

30 Hans Bachem, "Programme sind kurzlebig" in; Dr Lothar Kraft / Gerhard Reddemann (Hrsg.), Mit der Union in die Zukunft. Grundlagen, Kritik, Aufgaben, Vorschläge, Perspektiven. 'Die Entscheidung' Verlag, Bonn 1969.

31 Heino Kaack defined these as the Grundssatzprogramm, a basic programme with the most long term validity, setting out a party's core principles, the 'Aktions-,' 'Wahl-' and 'Regierungsprogramme' define more specific, short term objectives and are aimed at specific election campaigns. Heino Kaack, Geschichte und Struktur des deutschen Parteisystems, Westdeutscher Verlag, Opladen 1971.
Grundsatzprogramme. A party’s Grundsatzprogramm is like a state’s constitution. The political language of Grundsatzprogramme is by definition abstract. It is emotive, value-laden, characterises ideas, values, aims and interests, and is kept deliberately vague. Flohr explains, a Grundsatzprogramm is discursive and ‘expressed’ “in der Sprache der Begriffe.” Kaack adds that;

“Die Grundsatzprogramme müssen so allgemein gehalten und damit im Grunde genommen unverbindlich sein, daß sie für längere Zeit gültig blieben, aber dennoch offen sind für Veränderungen in den strukturellen Grundbedingungen der Politik und in den konkreten politischen Entwicklungen.”

Kaack correctly denoted that programmes fulfil internal and external functions and distinguished between the advertising function which aims at recruiting new members and gaining votes and the ‘profile function’ which aims at distinguishing a party from its rival parties. Internally a programme acts to integrate differing points of view and engender identification within the party. During the formulation of a manifesto, these integrative and identification functions offer the party the opportunity to discuss and question its inherited values, the future direction of its policy and to formulate an agreed party response to changes in the social and political environment. Once consolidated, the programme provides the party leadership with an ‘innerparteiliches Herrschaftsinstrument’ to compel members to toe the agreed party line.

Political events further rely on language to explain the meaning of events on behalf of individuals for whom the reality of the incident may be too complex or remote and beyond their personal experience. Many studies thus point to the importance of myths and metaphors in political language, to the creation or suppression of certain forms of perception;

33 Flohr is sceptical of pragmaticians who believe parties could do away with the ‘ideologischen Ballast’ of programmatic statements and focus on practical politics, warning that these people disguise the lack of principles as realism; “sie preisen als Realismus, was in der Wahrheit bloße Konzeptionslosigkeit ist.” Heiner Flohr, Parteiprogramme in der Demokratie, Otto Schwarz & Co. Göttingen 1968, p.62.
34 Kaack, op. cit. p.402.
"Die Sprache spiegelt nicht eine objektive 'Realität', sondern schafft sie, indem sie von einer komplizierten und verwirrenden Welt bestimmte Wahrnehmungen abstrahiert und sie zu einer Sinnstruktur organisiert."  

Empty value statements such as 'freedom', 'equality' and 'justice' frequently found in party programmes serve to enhance integration and identification within the party or to conceal internal party conflicts and misunderstanding. Unlike individual words, fixed terms and concepts contain symbols, triggering a range of related responses. In isolation such concepts often demand explanation but employed in the context of a political programme, many things can be implied through the use of only one term, aiding orientation and our perception of historical and political events. It is not important whether the programmes defines such terms as democracy, equality, freedom, socialist, but merely whether these concepts elicit negative or positive responses from voters. From this it follows that parties increasingly reduce their election campaigning to a combination of clever and positive soundbites. A party's discourse is an essential political resource. Bergsdorf even maintains ideologies are no other than 'sprachliche Gebilde,' comprised of specialist economics, legal and technical jargon and opinion forming language or 'Meinungssprache.' A party lends its politics legitimacy by mixing value statements with technical jargon. Indeed the lack of precision in ideological language is not a deficiency but a condition of its effectiveness. The less meaning a phrase conveys, the easier it is for party leaders to later claim continuity in policy. A party often develops its own branded concepts such as the CDU's 'Social Market Economy' or 'Politik aus christlicher Verantwortung', that become characteristic of that particular party. Brand names nevertheless risk becoming hollow and meaningless over

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37 "Die Politik wirkt ein auf die Inhalte der Begriffe und ist bemüht, sie zu verändern und durch neue Begriffe abzustützen, damit ihre Wertgrundlagen und Ziele sich in der Sprache niederschlagen." Wolfgang Bergsdorf, Herrschaft und Sprache, Neske, Pfuhllingen 1983, p.28f.

38 "Die Ideologisierbarkeit der zentralen Begriffe der politischen Terminologie ist Voraussetzung ihrer Wirksamkeit." Bergsdorf, op. cit. p.65.
time if their relevance is not reaffirmed and updated or their historical context explained.\textsuperscript{39}

Inherent in all these factors - value, form, function, language and style - is the problem posed by ideology itself. Typically ideology is understood as a set of values and ideas that justify and rationalise the programme that a system has put forward. It is the philosophical and intellectual justification for political rule.\textsuperscript{40} Exploring a party’s Weltanschauung or its philosophy for explaining the world, thus intrinsically demands an investigation into ideology as a dynamic force impacting on a party’s value system. The problem lies in the mix of value statements with prescriptive formulations of party objectives and evaluative or emotional elements. It is the ambiguity of the term ‘ideology’ which constrains and clouds the analysis and therefore begs closer scrutiny.\textsuperscript{41}

Ideology is as ambiguous in its definition as the objects it aims to describe. One dictionary\textsuperscript{42} definition gives four possible meanings; it is a body of ideas that reflects the beliefs and interests of a nation or political system; it is an idea or set of ideas that is false, misleading or held for the wrong reasons but is believed with such conviction as to be irrefutable; it is speculation that is imaginary or visionary; and it is the study of the nature and origin of ideas. The term ‘ideology’ was invented by the French aristocrat and philosopher Destutt de Tracy in 1796. De Tracy sought a ‘science of ideas’, which he called ideology. In searching for truth other than through religion, he believed that by ‘purifying’ ideas it was possible to achieve ‘objective’ truth and ‘correct’ thought.\textsuperscript{43} He believed innate ideas did not simply exist but that all thought was derived from sensation.\textsuperscript{44} When Marx ‘rediscovered’ the phrase, he did not accept that reality could be

\textsuperscript{39} Wulf Schönbohm, op. cit. p.34.

\textsuperscript{40} Karl Dietrich Bracher cited in; Lewis S. Feuer, Ideology and the Ideologists, Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1975, p.2.

\textsuperscript{41} "Als Gedanken- und Sinngebilde haben die Programme zwar auch ihren Platz in der Geistes- und Ideengeschichte, vor allem aber wirken sie als Momente der politischen Realität, als Ideologien in der geschichtlichen-gesellschaftlichen Entwicklung, als Vehikel oder Verschleierungen von Interessen. O.K Flechtheim, Die Parteien der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Hoffmann und Campe, Hamburg 1973, p.132.

\textsuperscript{42} Collins Dictionary of the English Language, Patrick Hanks (Editor), Collins, London/Glasgow 1985.


\textsuperscript{44} David Hawkes, Ideology, Routledge, London 1996, p.55.
explained by ideas. In *The German Ideology* (1845-6) Marx, the materialist, believed "existence determined consciousness" not vice versa.45 The realm of ideas belonged to the Überbau which merely reflected and was dependent on the dominant and decisive underlying social consciousness, determined by the fixed relationships between social classes to the means of production. He believed ideas and matter form a totality, implying that the objective circumstances that people inherit and their ability to impose their subjective will on this material environment in order to alter it, are mutually determinable.46 From this he concluded that imaginary representations, or ideology can not only be used to conceal the material interests of a particular class or group in society and present those interests as if they were in the general interest of humanity, but these representations can also exert influence on the way people think and behave. Representation can thus actively determine material conditions. The result is that people are no longer able to differentiate representation from reality. For Marx ideology meant 'false consciousness' and referred to the maintenance of social and economic interests by the middle classes who supported the ideology.

Karl Mannheim's47 early study *Ideology and Utopia* rejected the attempt to identify where thinking is distorted in the pursuit of society's interests. Instead he wanted to neutralise the "*totaler Ideologiebegriff*" that had been so critically influenced by Marx. Mannheim made a distinction between ideas which defended the existing order, these he called 'ideological' and ideas which sought to change the existing social order, which he called 'utopian'. It is not so much of interest in this study to make the distinction between an ideology and a utopia. Mannheim's theory is of interest for the suggestions he makes to understand how the values, the ideas and the interests of a particular group, in this case, a political party, are expressed in doctrine. His concern is with the social conditions in which intelligence and thought emerge inquiring into the role of ideas in social change. His theory of the *Sociology of Knowledge* asks us to analyse a person's or a group's 'perspective' if we want to understand their interests, by which he means their mode of conceiving their society as determined by their particular social setting and

45 Daniel Bell, op. cit., p.395.

46 Hawkes refers to this process as the 'aestheticization' of politics. David Hawkes op. cit. p.93.

historical experience. It is assumed therefore that social relations influence our thought. Thought is not derived from immanent laws or pure logic but are shaped by real, existential factors that we all experience. This approach provides a very useful and direct way of explaining the CDU’s postwar discourse, since it not only forces us to consider the socio-economic conditions which prevailed between 1945 and 1949, but also to consider the impact of Germany’s collective history, the experience of National Socialism and the Weimar Republic in particular, but also of earlier political and sectarian factors in determining the nation’s ‘perspective.’ Criteria include analysis of the meaning of concepts being used, the counter-concept phenomenon, the absence of certain concepts, or the identification of dominant models of thought and the level of abstraction. Mannheim suggests tracing single expressions that appear to relate back to a central Weltanschauung and to question whether these explicit references, which proceed on an intellectual level, actually correspond to the facts. Using aspects of Mannheim’s theory, the analysis of programmatic statements of the CDU would determine firstly the particular perspective dominant in the CDU and secondly to test whether their doctrine was a truthful reflection of that perspective or indeed a deviation from it. In each case it is imperative that political ideas, as expressed in programmes and secondly, their outcome, as displayed through the practical implementation of policy, are both analysed in the context of their own time.

In his pioneering study Ideologie und Wahrheit, Theodor Geiger claimed that it is only possible to describe but not to define ideology. He is able to place ideology within the realm of ideas as opposed to the material or perceptible world, but is reluctant to define it as the opposite to truth since ‘truth’ is also too vague a term about which to generalise. Ideologies are the result of the distortion of opinion with theory. When a person attempts to present his/her subjective opinion as factual, the statement becomes theoretical or ‘objectified.’ It cannot be claimed as a legitimate fact but is a value judgement. In the same way, the CDU can be seen to mix opinion with theory to produce a powerful and convincing cocktail of political rhetoric employed in programmatic statements. Adenauer

48 Theodor Geiger, Ideologie und Wahrheit, Humboldt Verlag, Stuttgart/Wien 1953.

49 "Das Werturteil also objektiviert ein subjektives Verhältnis des Sprechenden zu einem Gegenstand und macht dieses Pseudo-Objektive zum Aussagebestandteil eines Satzes von der Form theoretischer Sachaussagen." Theodor Geiger, op. cit., p.600.
for example made ‘anti-materialism’ central to his discourse style. Based on his own fear and perception of the threat from the east he ‘objectified’ materialism into a value judgement on the Soviet system, with persistent repetition of the materialist mantra until it was sufficiently entrenched in society that it no longer appeared an ideological value judgement but more as a pseudo-theory. Geiger\textsuperscript{50} in fact prefers to talk of ‘ideologischen Aussagen’ than ‘Ideologien’ because he believed that the only truthful part of a value judgment is the statement itself. All we know for sure is that such value judgements have been made and their relationship to truth remains obscure.

Spranger\textsuperscript{51} resents the negative association that the word ideology has adopted. He believes that ideology is in essence, Gedankengebilde, with which every politician has to contend. Spranger blames the studies of Mannheim and Marx for seeking to expose and unmask what ideologies were meant to be concealing. This tainted history says Spranger has not only served to discredit the meaning of the term, but it has unjustly evaluated it. It has falsely believed that a political ideology is a truthful statement about reality. It has been modelled as a theory and postulated as a science. Ideology, says Spranger, was never intended to be a science. An ideology does not endeavour to explain truth, it merely formulates ‘gedankliche Zukunftsentwürfe’ or ideas of what the future should be like, but not what that reality actually is.\textsuperscript{52} It is part myth and part dogma, which defies any scientific criticism or deconstruction. By attempting to remove the myth one removes the very essence of the ideology. There is no relevance in the question whether the hopes, fears, expectations and desires that make up an ideology are ‘true.’ Spranger would thus like to reinstate the term ideology, fusing it with positive meaning, to describe these future objectives, but realises the opposition he faces due to the experiences of 20th century ideologies and their totalitarian regimes. What is of real interest to this study however is Spranger’s view that Gedankenmächte, can and have actively influenced the course of political life. Religious ideologies, he says, have shaped the whole culture of the middle ages. The Law of Nature, the rule of law, the economy,

\textsuperscript{50} Theodor Geiger, op. cit., p.66.

\textsuperscript{51} Eduard Spranger, “Wesen und Wert politischer Ideologien,” in; Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte, Jg 2, 1954 p.119.

\textsuperscript{52} “Eine echte Ideologie hat nicht die Kühle einer wissenschaftlichen Theorie, sondern die Wärme eines Glaubens, genauer gesagt; eines Zukunftsglaubens.” Eduard Spranger, op. cit. p.123.
human rights and sovereignty of the people similarly were *Gedankenmächte* which influenced the political development of the 19th century. It is at this point that the divisions between political history and the history of ideas are blurred.\(^5^3\)

Despite the obvious problematic nature of the term ideology then and the tendency amongst sociologists to criticise its value as an interpretative category, the term has not disappeared from our vocabulary. The need to explain and evaluate a person’s enunciations, to discover their value system and possibly concealed interests, persists as a sociological and political issue. The interest still exists in trying to understand the relation between the ideal and the material, and is backed up by the consuming concern in postmodern politics with ‘image’ and ‘perception’. Although methodologically it is difficult to accurately test the equivalence of an ideology’s theory with its practice, between a statement and a party’s subsequent actions, ideology as a ‘media of representation’\(^5^4\) was necessary in post-war Germany in order to effect social change.

This study then is not concerned with the idea that ideology is concealing ‘truth,’ but with the influence of that party’s world view on political outcomes. Since programmes rely on ideology and an ideology relies on a programme, this interdependency of programme and ideology suggests the two factors are inseparable. Stammen\(^5^5\) also observes that party ideologies and party programmes are interchangeable; “Sehr oft spricht man im Hinblick auf Parteiprogrammen auch von Parteideologien.” Narr\(^5^6\) adds, “Alle und jede Aussage wird eben, da sie subjekt und situationsgebunden ist, ideologisch.” The link between abstract and visionary ideas and political reality cannot be ignored and the potential that a party’s ideology possesses to make or change history is of paramount interest in this study. Klaus von Beyme\(^5^7\) stated that over the longer term

\(^{53}\) “die angebliche Grenze zwischen rein politischer und Geistesgeschichte wird flässig. Sogenannte Realitäten werden Gedankenmächte, Gedankenmächte werden realisiert.” Eduard Spranger, Ibid.

\(^{54}\) David Hawkes has referred to an ideology as ‘a media of representation,’ David Hawkes, op. cit., 1996, p.55.

\(^{55}\) Theo Stammen, op.cit., p.31.

\(^{56}\) W. D Narr, op. cit. p.297.

\(^{57}\) Klaus von Beyme, Political Parties in Western Democracies, Gower, Aldershot 1985.
only parties based on an ideology have succeeded in establishing themselves. As this study will now show, the role of ideologically inspired ideas and principles was paramount to the birth of the CDU. Then, once perceptions had been shaped by the CDU's ideology, more direct power political aims could be achieved.

"Never before did political systems and forms of government or politics itself, democratic and dictatorial alike - display such an overwhelming need to justify themselves intellectually ... they require an 'ideological infrastructure.' "

58 Even Ralf Dahrendorf and Raymond Aron who spoke of the end of ideology in the post second world war mood of scepticism and antipathy towards politics, later revised their forecasts to talk of the continuation and immortality of ideologies.

Traditions and Weltanschauung

1. Political Catholicism before 1918

A study of the origins of German Christian democracy is a study in parallel of Catholicism, Protestantism, socialism, conservatism and liberalism, since all have been important factors in its development. The Christian denominations of Catholicism and Protestantism learnt to assimilate the attributes and aspirations of political ideologies to fulfill partisan, class interests and thus acquire a political identity in the decades following the end of the Napoleonic Wars. By consciously choosing to adopt a political agenda, Catholics in particular sought to gain an equal share of power and influence in society.

The motives for the tactical politicisation of Catholicism in Germany can only be understood by first acknowledging the antipathetic relationship between Protestants and Catholics and the nature of their relationships to the state. The Reformation marks the beginning of Germany’s religious divide and the birth of antagonism between the State and its people. The Catholic Church faced a struggle to arrest the absolutist tendencies of the state to intervene in Church affairs and undermine Church freedom and independence, whilst the Protestant Church profited by fortifying its links to state authority and gained legitimation directly from the state. Alienated from political involvement, the Catholic Church increasingly saw the need to express and defend its own political and social interests and protect its independence from state secularism. The Reformation however paradoxically also engendered spiritual and ethnic solidarity amongst Germans of both confessions, and a sense of shared belonging to European Christian culture.60 This longing to establish national unity, combined with a parallel insistence on diversity and separate cultural identities is characteristic of the ‘German Question’ which dominated the development of 19th century Europe and is essential for understanding an interdenominational political movement such as Christian Democracy. The minority status of Catholics was compounded in subsequent centuries by the process

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of secularisation that accompanied the Enlightenment, and reached its peak during the 19th century *Kulturkampf* in Bismarck’s authoritarian Prussian state. Here the Catholics seriously questioned the democratic integrity of Protestants for voluntarily supporting authoritarian centralism, with the result that Catholics became profoundly sceptical of forging an interdenominational party in the period of political Catholicism between 1870 and 1933. This, together with a genuine moral responsibility felt by the Catholic Church to solve the social inequalities of the capitalist industrial age, was sufficient legitimation for forming an interest group of otherwise politically diverse Catholics. Becker notes;

“Die Legitimation des politischen Gebildes Katholizismus könnte bezweifelt werden, vereinigte es doch in sich auf religiöser, deswegen politisch fragwürdiger Basis, auf eine unorganische Weise heterogene politische und soziale Vorstellungen. Das politische am Katholizismus konnte dann lediglich in der Organisation von Katholiken ganz verschiedener politischer Meinung gesehen werden.”

The aim of this chapter is to explore the content of this heterogeneous, but politically and socially inspired Catholic movement in Germany from the late 19th and early 20th centuries. It will identify the political, economic and social conditions which initiated and sustained the need for a political form of Catholicism and examine the political intransigence of its Catholic members. It will show where political Catholicism maintained continuity in its doctrine, where it broke with tradition and where it absorbed alternative political influences, most notably liberalism, in an effort to adapt to changing circumstances. This is best illustrated by focusing on the Catholic Centre Party which increasingly abandoned its anti-liberal stance to manoeuvre its policies more closely to those of Bismarck’s national, liberal-capitalist order. In the quest to establish equality and social justice for Catholics, a gradual diminishing in the application of Catholic ethics took place in favour of a pragmatic and politicised approach by Catholics, also employing legislative means for introducing social and political reform. By learning to work with, and not in hostile opposition to the state, Catholics hoped to realise their vision of a democratic society. This discussion of the early development of political Catholicism as an historical backdrop and a prelude to Christian democracy, will assist later chapters in demonstrating that the vibrant diversity in political *Weltanschauung*

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61 Winfried Becker in; *Geschichte der christlich-demokratischen und christlich-sozialen Bewegungen in Deutschland*, Günter Rüther (Hrsg.), Wissenschaft und Politik, Berend von Notbeck Köln 1986, p.98.
between liberal, conservative and socialist Catholics remained as marked after 1945 as it had been in the previous century. In fact it was the eclectic spectrum of political interests within the Catholic community that offered the potential for political union with Protestants who held corresponding political convictions. This begs the question, what was it that was different about political Catholicism after 1945 that made the CDU a success, but by its absence had caused the Centre Party between 1870 and 1933 to fail?

Germany's debate between Conservatism and Liberalism in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, is central to the political divide within the Catholic community. Political Catholicism formed along the same liberal-conservative divide that had characterised Germany's conservative and liberal movements in the post 1789 period. Conservatism developed in opposition to the French Revolution\(^6\) whilst liberalism developed in support of the ideals enshrined in the Revolution. Liberal ideas of the Enlightenment interpreted by Lessing, Kant and Humboldt challenged the Romantic-conservative ideologies of Adam Müller, Carl Ludwig von Haller and Friedrich Julius Stahl.\(^6\)

Conservatives held on to the 18th century romanticist view of society in which monarchy and Church held the authority. They felt threatened by the views of the Enlightenment - symbolised by the French Revolution and Germany's revolution in 1848 - claiming that the new spirit of rational individualism was the cause of social disruption. They criticised political liberalism for interpreting a free, secular society as a state polity, where individual freedom was inscribed in a "contrat social" binding both citizen and state to rights and obligations. Romantics repudiated these principles of freedom of the French Revolution, claiming people were not mechanistically equal, but each member of society had a different function to fulfil. Individual freedom was thus gained by each individual's own role and responsibility within the community whatever their vocation might be, based on the belief that by contributing to the principle of mutual exchange and accepting our reliance on interdependency in society, we achieve personal and individual satisfaction. The Romantic-Conservatives argued that we are by nature free,


\(^6\) Friedrich Julius Stahl was one of the most important of conservative theorists. He believed the state derived its origin from God and the state must therefore protect Christianity and the Christian Church. See Helga Grebing, Geschichte der deutschen Parteien, Franz Steiner, Wiesbaden 1962, p.47. Also see comments in chapter 2 of this study.
and this innate freedom is not enhanced or extended by the compulsion to enter into a political contract with the State. Conservatives hoped to counteract the secular forces of the Enlightenment by reinforcing the core values of Christianity, that had once brought solidarity and cohesion during the Middle Ages. The political thought of Novalis, one of the most important thinkers among the early Romantics, best exemplifies the conservative mood. Novalis was stimulated by the discussions about the French Revolution and romanticised about nobility, who, he believed, was an important "moral faculty" in the state and who embodied the conservative principle of tradition. In his 1799 essay *Die Christenheit oder Europa*, Novalis called for Christianity to be revived and enforced in the face of growing secularism and dreamed of a united Europe under the spiritual leadership of the Catholic Church. He broadly acquainted Catholicism with allegiance to the monarchy and Protestantism with democracy.\(^{64}\) But in pursuit of political ambition the Protestants, Novalis argued, had;

"...trennten das Untrennbare, theilten die untheilbare Kirche und rissen sich frevelnd aus dem allgemeinen christlichen Verein, durch welchen und in welchen allein die ächte, dauernde Geburt möglich war."\(^{65}\)

The Catholic Church, defiant in its support of authoritarian and conservative structures would however learn to apply the liberal principles of freedom and tolerance as weapons in its own struggle against the power of the state. Political Catholicism therefore derived its concept of freedom directly from the ideals of the French Revolution, but altered the liberal meaning of 'freedom of the individual' to a Christian, biblical interpretation of social solidarity.\(^{66}\)

In contrast to the early religiosity that characterised the Catholic movement, it was not until the revolution in 1848 that Catholics began to differentiate between a cultural and a

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\(^{64}\) Reinhold Aris, *History of Political Thought in Germany from 1789 to 1815*, Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., London 1965, p.279. Aris notes that the Romantics had originally been brought up as Protestants but rebelled against their faith as they saw the impact it was having on the political situation in Europe and many converted to Catholicism.

\(^{65}\) Novalis (Friedrich von Hardenberg), "Die Christenheit oder Europa." Ein Fragment in; Paul Michael Lützeler (Hrsg), Hoffnung Europa. Deutsche Essays von Novalis bis Enzensberger, S. Fischer, Frankfurt am Main 1994.

political agenda and to perceive social issues in a political context. In 1848 it seemed as if the entire party system would also develop into a bipolar structure consistent with the conservative-liberal fronts in the French Revolution. Conservatism and Liberalism were the basic orientations for the political spectrum, based on whether support was shown for the monarchy or for a republican form of government, or according to the more simple definition, that the liberal seeks to change the existing order, whilst the conservative seeks to maintain it. Yet it transpired that a multiple party system was in fact a more realistic response to the many different opinions which emerged within the Catholics' conservative and liberal camps. A range of political interests across the party political spectrum satisfactorily addressed the diversity of political Catholicism. The socialist Catholics for example could offer an alternative to Social Democracy, which after the 1848 publication of the Communist Manifesto, began to imbue socialist ideas with political clout. By 1848 political Catholic activity began in the form of Vereine (a form of legion, society or association often industry linked) and soon Germany's political spectrum became subdivided into moderate liberalism, conservatism, political Catholicism, the democratic movement and the labour or workers' movement. Catholics showed support for all political persuasions, emphasising their religious confession only when the Church was directly implicated in political decisions or when the status of Catholics appeared to be in jeopardy. This development shows that conservatism and liberalism originated as cultural-religious definitions in Germany, before maturing into specific political expressions. The study will reveal that this primary allegiance to quasi-religious Wettanschauung cuts across the entire political divide of Catholics and Protestants.

67 Hans Maier, Politischer Katholizismus, sozialer Katholizismus, christliche Demokratie, Pesch-Haus Verlag, München, 1962, p.11.

68 Neumann suggests that initially it seemed as though Germany would also develop into a two party political system of Liberals and Conservatives, as in England and the USA. Sigmund Neumann, Die Parteien der Weimarer Republik, Kohlhammer, Stuttgart 1973, p.20.

69 This classification is provided by Ludwig Bergsträsser, op. cit. p.16.

70 As arose during the territorial issue of a grossdeutsche and kleinendeutsche solution to the German Question. Karl Rohe, "Entwicklungen der politischen Parteien und Parteiensysteme in Deutschland bis zum Jahre 1933," in; O.W Gabriel/O.Niedermayer/R. Stöss (Hrsg.). Parteiendemokratie in Deutschland, Bonn 1997, p.44.

71 "Liberalismus und Konservatismus, die nun nicht nur in einem formalen Sinne um Wandel oder Wahrung gegebener Verhältnisse kämpften, sondern als eine Frontenbildung, die auf menschliche Grundgegentsätze zurückging, geradezu Idéotypen eines Parteischemas zu repräsentieren schienen." Sigmund Neumann, Die Deutschen Parteien, op.cit., p.15.
The expression of a political form of Catholicism can only be properly examined in connection with the role of Catholic Social Teaching, which places society as its primary object and aim. The ‘teaching’ aspect refers to the responsibility of the Catholic Church as a whole, in matters relating to social welfare, whilst the word ‘Social’ is the dominant and most pervasive definition of the entire concept. Catholic Social Teaching was the most important underlying theory by which political Catholicism took its reference, and many political Catholics often attempted to sanction their political actions with statements from the papal encyclicals. A Catholic party may indeed find itself torn between the eternal and universal demands of the Catholic doctrine, and the temporal interests of the state. It effectively has two programmes.

“Catholic Social Teaching is a form of social moral authority. It does not provide a direct political or social programme … but it does insist that the economic and social order cannot be totally separate from the moral order.”

It thus places moral demands on society, but does not purport to be a programme, which can be used for political action. Catholic Social Teaching, moreover, openly stated that Catholics can operate within any given political system, whether it is a monarchy or a republic, provided the independence of the Church was guaranteed.

Although a general form of Catholic social doctrine can be traced to the 15th century, by the 19th century the principles of Catholic Social Teaching became a force for

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The 1891 papal encyclical Rerum Novarum begins with an attack on the devastating political changes brought about by the French Revolution which now threatened social stability. “Der Geist der Neuerung, welcher seit langem durch die Völker geht, mußte, nachdem er auf dem politischen Gebiet seine verderblichen Wirkungen entfaltete hatte, folgerichtig auch das volkswirtschaftliche Gebiet ergreifen.”


74 The Centre Party later exercised caution in quoting the papal encyclicals in connection with its political programme for fear that it would be accused of comparing the Pope’s authority with that of the Kaiser.

75 Godfried Lindgens, “Die politischen Implikationen der katholischen Soziallehre” in; Iriing Fetscher und Herfried Münkler (Hrsg.), Piper’s Handbuch der politischen Ideen, Neuzeit: Vom Zeitalter des Imperialismus bis zu den neuen sozialen Bewegungen, Band 5, Piper, München/Zürich 1993, p.84.
binding politically diverse Catholics. Catholic Social Teaching was concerned with the conflicts surrounding state and society, the question of Catholicism’s political organisation and the question of social justice. Catholic Social Teaching tackled the “Social Question” in an effort to improve the living and working conditions of the proletariat during Germany’s industrial revolution. It unequivocally opposed capitalism and individualism, which it claimed was inherent in liberalism and so sought to mitigate the excesses of capitalist-individualism in the economic and social spheres through social legislation. Yet the mixed political heritage and socio-economic status of Catholics held significant implications for the political representation of conservative and liberal philosophies. Differing interpretations of ‘individualism’ or ‘liberalism’ meant that in the practical application of Catholic teaching, opposition to capitalism was often modified.76 Conservative Catholic views differed from liberal, Catholic views with regard to the role of the Church in the State and to the State’s responsibility for social welfare and the freedom of its individuals. There were those who embraced socialist reform measures, those who favoured a monarchy, others a republic, those who welcomed state intervention measures and those who resisted any involvement with the state. Although the most progressive of solutions were often found where attempts at a synthesis of divergent political thinking were made, the political climate created by Bismarck’s regime was not conducive to their implementation.

E. R Huber’s77 history of the constitution, divides the political Catholic movement into three groups; the conservative Catholics represented by the Munich circle and who supported an organised monarchy; the liberal Catholics of the Rhineland who favoured a constitutional monarchy and constitutional rights for Catholics, as defended by the brothers August and Peter Reichensperger; and thirdly - with some overlap - the Catholic social movement, characterised by figures such as Wilhelm Emmanuel von Ketteler. These early Catholic conservatives, Catholic liberals and Catholic social reformers became the inspiration for a vibrant Catholic movement. Despite post First

76 “Catholic social ethics are always antithetical to those of capitalism. It may none the less come about that here and there a less rigorous interpretation of this or that point may have favoured a mental trend towards capitalism.” Amintore Fanfani, Catholicism, Protestantism and Capitalism, Sheed & Ward, London 1935, p.152.

World War reforms, political Catholicism after 1918 displayed a remarkable pattern of continuity through the Romantic-Conservatives, the more liberal Solidarists and the reformist group of Christian Socialists. With these three main strands in mind, the development can be divided into six periods,⁷⁸ that begin in the 1840s and culminate in 1933. The first phase which unfolded from the 1840s through to the 1860s was a conservative response from the Catholic Church to the working classes who sought protection from the adverse effects of capitalism and industrialisation. Phase two from the late 1860s to the early 1880s covers the birth of interdenominational Christian social associations and their social reform plans, but also of the first real political party, the Centre Party, which initiated attacks on social democracy and bourgeois liberalism. The third phase from the mid 1880s to the end of the century was characterised by Catholic Workers’ Associations⁷⁹ and a growing indictment of socialism. From 1900-1918 - the fourth phase, the Christian trade unions and the ‘Volksverein für ein katholisches Deutschland’ were the dominant forces of Catholic political activity, which triggered the fifth phase between 1918 and 1928 - a commitment towards democratic reforms. Finally, phase six, from 1928 to 1933, sees the depoliticisation of social and political Catholicism, as the Centre Party tried unsuccessfully to tame Hitler’s politics but also revealed attempts by a number of Catholic groups to bring National Socialist views in line with their own. Whilst it may not necessarily be correct to refer to all earlier initiatives as ‘political Catholicism’ they may be seen as representative of the Catholic reaction to the challenges of Modernity and “must be seen as the beginning of the development of a Catholic political party.”⁸⁰ These groups succeeded in provoking the debate on the conflict of modernism and prompted German Catholicism to decide how it should best respond to the social inequalities thrown up by the industrial revolution. In the remainder of this section the study will examine the six periods of political Catholicism.

⁷⁸ This division is based on the phases suggested by J. Stegmann (1969) and Franz Focker (1978).
⁷⁹ Ketteler’s Workers’ Association, founded in Mainz in 1872, became the first mass political organisation of political Catholics and attracted the largest membership of any political organisation. Jonathan Sperber, Popular Catholicism in 19th Century Germany. Princeton University Press, New Jersey 1984, p.211.
⁸⁰ Wilhelm Mommsen (Hrsg), Deutsche Parteiprogramme (Deutsches Handbuch der Politik Band 1), München 1960, p.191.
1840s-1860s

True to conservative tradition, the early conservative Catholics sought to defend the authority of throne and altar and hold on to established traditions of a corporative society or ‘städtische Gebundenheit’, which had characterised the middle ages. A society arranged according to Stände or estates, is best described as a pre-capitalist social order or social arrangement in which the rights of an upper class and a lower, largely agricultural class are divided according to their status as aristocratic, free or unfree. Based on a system of manorial rights and lineage, each individual belonged to a particular Stand, or estate, which was accepted as both permanent and pervasive of all aspects of life. Each and every individual gained their status in society by virtue of their membership of a Stand and their valued contribution to its wealth and cohesion. The estate idea further relies on a class or group of classes that is selected as eligible for leadership, and so conflicts with the liberal idea of self-governing of the people, where all classes and members of society are invited to participate. The Bavarian Catholics, characteristically anti-liberal, were particularly in favour of a monarchy. Figures such as Josef von Görres, spokesman for the Catholic Church and supporter of confessional unity, Franz von Baader and other Catholic conservatives in the Munich Circle, argued that the relationship between state and society encompassed more than the principle of reason, as political liberalism maintained. A liberal view of society, they argued, failed to understand the individual as a metaphysical being. This romanticist strand of social critique mirrored the views of French traditionalism, voiced by figures such as Gustav de Failly and the French parliamentarian Abbé Felicité Robert de Lamennais, whose ideas had a significant influence on the development of modern German Catholicism.

The Rhenish Catholics, represented by August and Peter Reichensperger, favoured a constitutional monarchy, but were also more liberal in their political-economic outlook and in favour of limiting monarchical powers, to allow more democratic, constitutional

81 Ludwig Bergstrasser, op. cit., p.48.
82 The Rhineland Romanticist Josef Görres believed strongly in the organic concept of the state and, like Novalis, ascribed the monarch a symbolic role. His 1816 essay 'Germany and the Revolution' philosophically summarises his vision of liberal conservatism and the need for German unity. Conflict with the Prussian government over the issue of German unity and frustration with an apolitical middle class caused him to abandon his campaign and by the 1820s retreated to studying the history of mysticism.
rights to be passed to the people. This liberal strand of Catholics firmly believed that a reconciliation could be reached between Christianity and democracy, since state and society, they argued, cannot coexist without religion, and a democracy could only be established on the basis of the moral authority provided by the Church. The answer to social inequality, they claimed, could be found in the moral code of Christian religion. The responsibility for social issues should therefore come from the Church and Christianity rather than from the state. The Reichenspergers' initiative was a subtle attempt at reconciling the Catholic Church with the principles of the French Revolution. De Lamennais also sought to forge links between conservative Catholicism and liberalism. He envisaged that the Catholic Church was the natural leader for managing the new social and political order and for guiding the masses towards democracy. The book by the Bishop of Mainz, Emmanuel von Ketteler, 'Die Katholiken im Deutschen Reiche' and subtitled 'A draft for a political programme, also investigated the possibility of closer understanding between the Catholic Church and the Prussian state and between Catholics and Protestants in general. Ketteler took a broad, holistic view of an individual's place in society incorporating all aspects of their political, economic, religious and social interaction. Regrettably Ketteler's social reform initiatives were ignored by the middle classes, who became too preoccupied with issues of national unification in the second half of the 19th century and paid scant regard to social issues. Both Lamennais and Ketteler and other Catholic liberals were condemned by Pope Gregor XVI and his successor Pius IX for their apparent promotion of liberal and democratic ideas. Papal authority expressed vehement opposition to industrial progress, to liberalism and enlightened political education. Capitalism was labelled as a direct

extension of the liberalist order and therefore fundamentally incompatible with Catholic ethics.\(^{84}\)

Ketteler’s programme for social reform was even categorised by the term “Christian liberalism.”\(^{85}\) In his 1862 pamphlet ‘Freiheit, Authorität und Kirche,’ Ketteler openly states that the words Aufklärung, Fortschritt, Freiheit, Brüderlichkeit and Gleichheit, contained a superior, godly and heavenly meaning. Like de Lamennais and other liberal Catholics, Ketteler understood the need for the Church to establish a dialogue with liberalism and socialism, if it was to respond to modern society and encouraged conservative Catholics to reassess their understanding of the term liberalism;

“Wer möchte nicht liberal sein in der eigentlichen Bedeutung des Wortes? Es bedeutet ja: freigiebig sein; billig sein; vorurteilslos sein; freisinnig sein; nach wahrer Freiheit streben.”\(^{86}\)

Ketteler could not hope to challenge entrenched Catholic beliefs that associated socialism with atheism and, later, liberalism with Bismarck’s Kulturkampf, yet Catholics did appear to be increasingly willing to accept a liberal economic order, once they found themselves benefiting directly from it. Earlier Catholic demands for the overthrow of the entire capitalist system waned, to be replaced by a milder more pragmatic criticism of existing social policy, and support for labour and social welfare legislation. In a speech in 1869, Ketteler encouraged the new wave of liberal thinking in Catholic circles, when for the first time he advocated; “die unbedingte Freiheit auf allen Gebieten der

\(^{84}\) “The capitalist does not doubt the lawfulness of any act that fully corresponds to what he considers the exigencies of human reason. The Catholic order is a supernatural order, the capitalist order is a rational order in the sense of the Enlightenment.” Amintore Fanfani, op. cit. p.143.


Volkswirtschaft.  

This marked an historical watershed in the social and economic aims of political Catholicism. Instead of campaigning for the end of capitalism, liberal Catholics agreed to carry out modifications to the system where necessary, to ensure that the workers also benefited from capitalism’s opportunities.

Late 1860s- Early 1880s

After Prussia’s victory over Austria in 1866, Emmanuel von Ketteler and other prominent Catholics, who continued to campaign for equal social rights for Catholics, feared that Catholics were now even more at risk of becoming a minority in Protestant dominated Prussia. Bismarck, with backing from a conservative, Protestant majority had succeeded in pushing through a kleindeutsche solution to the German question, angering and alienating many German Catholics who had preferred a grossdeutsche solution to include Catholic Austria. Prussia’s subsequent annexation of many south German states, also meant that the Catholic communities there embarked on a long struggle to retain the independence of their Church and schools. Catholic minority status in Prussia became a significant motive for the rise of the Christian Social Unions in the 1860s, but there was also a general incentive among Christians, in particular those Catholics in regions where they did not suffer minority status, such as Bavaria, to emphasise shared Christian unity, as a bulwark against the secular forces of liberalism. They maintained that the State should be run according to the principles of Christian Natural Law, which prescribed a democratic state form.

Speaking as a Christian lay preacher at a Christian Social Association in Berne, Prof. Dr. Carl Hilty disagreed with the motives driving the Christian Social movement.

87 Speech in Offenbach at the Liebfrauenheide, cited in Josef Stegmann, op. cit. p.383.
88 The explanation given in 1945 that it had been Germany’s fall from Christianity that caused national socialism is reminiscent of the views of Ketteler who in his advent sermon in 1848 says “die sozialen Zustände [sind] zum grossen Teile als eine notwendige Folge .... des Abfalls von Christus... der Abfall vom Christentum habe das Verderben über uns gebracht, die Rückkehr zum Christentum könne nur helfen”. W.E von Ketteler cited in Wilfried Gottschalch/Friedrich Karrenberg/Franz Josef Stegmann, op. cit., p.344.
89 Prof. Carl Hilty was born in Switzerland in 1833 and was a professor of law in Berne from 1874. He played an active role in public life, becoming a member of the National Council in 1890, chief auditor of the army and Switzerland’s first representative at the new International Court of Arbitration in The Hague. His two major works ‘Glück’ and ‘Was ist Glaube?’ which appeared around the turn of the century had a significant impact on Konrad Adenauer, who after his studies had suffered a crisis of religion, in which he began to question his own faith. Hilty’s pragmatic, undogmatic Christian faith, his principles and practices are reflected in Adenauer’s later life and in particular in his treatment of the
Christianity, he said, was not suitable as a political programme and questioned why the name Christian Social was being used as a party name. The only way to solve the Social Question, he argued, was through the individual and their religion but not by virtue of their political association to a Christian socialist party whose aims were covertly more revolutionary than Christian;

"Die Schwierigkeit der socialen Frage liegt auch nicht darin, daß man nicht weiß, wo es unmittelbar und zunächst fehlt, sondern die Einen verstehen unter Sozialpolitik und socialer Demokratie eine so große Umänderung aller bestehenden Verhältnisse, daß sie auch ganz entschlossen ihn herbeiführen, wenn es auf gütlichem Wege, mit dem Stimmzettel, nicht geht."

The Church-led Christian social associations finally disbanded under pressure from within the Catholic communities to unify more closely in the face of the Kulturkampf.

By 1870 the Centre Party was founded to represent the political interests and concerns of Catholics of both conservative and liberal persuasion. Like its name, the Centre Party saw its role as an honest broker between left and right wing politics, a party to engender harmony and moderation. Rainer Barzel described the Centre Party’s motives as the rejection of an extreme and doctrinaire position;

"Das politische Wollen der Partei ist weder totalitär, noch radikal, einseitig oder ideokratisch."

One year after its foundation, the Centre Party was elected to join the first Reichstag in the Kaiser’s new German Reich. It did not postulate itself as an exclusively Catholic party, but as the guardian of Christian influence in the national state and a protector of freedom for all confessions. Its first programme, the Soest programme of 1870 outlined


90 Prof Carl Hilty, Einige Gedanken über die Gründung christlich-socialer Vereine, Verlag von U. Siebert, Bern 1896, p.32.


93 Karl Buchheim, Geschichte der christlichen Parteien in Deutschland, Kösel, München 1953, p.205.
only nine directives and sufficed as a party programme for almost fifty years!\textsuperscript{94} The Soest programme was committed to natural law, declared inviolable respect for human rights and equality in class and religion. It was national in its outlook and supportive of the State, (its central party organ carried the patriotic title “Germania”) yet emphasised the constitutional nature of its programme as a committed \textit{Verfassungspartei}. The Reichstag deputy, Carl Bachem confirms that the development of its profile as a political party was essential, since it would not have survived on exclusively Church principles for very long.\textsuperscript{95} Its politics however were soon criticised for opposing the state, and for only representing Catholics and not the whole nation, as parallel liberal and conservative parties could claim. The Centre was thus charged for contributing to more pluralism and division in society and not to furthering national unity. It was true that the Centre’s declared principal objective of its 1870 election campaign, was to protect the freedom of the Catholic Church;

“\textit{Manche Zeichen der Zeit ...deuten auf Angriffsversuche gegen die kirchliche Freiheit. Es gilt daher, die verfassungsmäßi ager anerkannte Selbstständigkeit der Kirche unversehrt zu erhalten.”}\textsuperscript{96}

Catholics in the Centre also strove to provide a counterweight to liberal Protestant hegemony, and strongly opposed the close relation between the Protestant Church and the State. Yet the Centre Party’s opposition to Bismarck’s Protestant state was fuelled not only by its confessional allegiance to Catholicism or to maintain Church independence, but was the consequence of the party’s sociological structure.\textsuperscript{97} Its representatives were working class factory workers, clerical employees and agricultural labourers, hostile to capitalism and the nationalist, bourgeois middle classes. The party was thus held by the nature of its constituency to be libertarian, constitutionally

\textsuperscript{94} The next programme to be produced after the Soest 1870 programme was in 1922. This contained vague and non-committal formulations but maintained its middle ground. See Sigmund Neumann, \textit{Modern Political Parties. Approaches to Comparative Politics}, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1956, p.358.

\textsuperscript{95} Carl Bachem cited in Rainer Barzel, \textit{Die Geistigen Grundlagen... op. cit., p.146.}

\textsuperscript{96} \textit{Soest Wahlprogramm, June 1870}, cited in Wilhelm Mommsen, \textit{Deutsche Parteiprogramme... op. cit., p.212ff.}

\textsuperscript{97} Sigmund Neumann, \textit{Die Deutschen Parteien, op. cit., p.39.}
conservative, socially meliorative and pragmatic. This social heterogeneity would also become the source of the party's identity crisis during Bismarck's Kulturkampf which brought anti-Catholic legislation and the widespread persecution of Catholics. Guaranteed support from the Church and other clerical organisations also meant that the Centre was not compelled to act as a fully fledged political organisation responsible to party members, with party leaders, conferences and manifestos until as late as 1911 when it finally developed as a unified organisation.

In 1872 the Centre Party leader, Ludwig Windthorst, emphasised that the party welcomed all Christian confessions on the condition that they agree to the principles laid out in its programme. Bismarck and the Liberals were not convinced and continued to disapprove of a confessional party in their political assembly. Even Windthorst's attempts to encourage Evangelical representatives into the party, were undermined by Bismarck's contempt for the Centre. Many other disgruntled groups, including Social Democrats, who opposed the foundation of Bismarck's Reich or who feared a spread of his Kulturkampf to all confessions, began to see the Centre Party as an ideal forum for expressing their resistance and protest. This further inflamed Bismarck's hatred towards the Centre Party (in his 'Gedanken und Erinnerungen' Bismarck calls the Centre Party 'an enemy of the state') causing him to predict that a coalition of the Centre and the Social Democrats would ensue, should the Kaisereich collapse. The statement demonstrates that not only were the SPD and the Centre Party seen as compatible, but that the Kaisereich's existence was not compatible with either. The fact that both the Centre Party and the Social Democrats emerged as parties in clear opposition to Bismarck's state gave both parties a point of communality in joint coalition and goes

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100 Helga Grebing, Geschichte der deutschen Parteien op. cit., p.83.

101 The Altkonservativen's fear that the Kulturkampf could spread to Protestant Church was reflected in their 1872 programme. Wolfgang Treue, Deutsche Parteiprogramme 1861-1954, Musterschmidt Wissenschaftlicher Verlag, Göttingen 1954, p.16.

102 This observation was noted by Dr Anthony Glees, Department of Government, Brunel University.
some way to correcting the widespread belief that they were hostile and incompatible partners.\textsuperscript{103}

Mounting hostility towards the Centre Party finally resulted in Bismarck drafting the 1873 \textit{Kulturkampf} legislation which undermined the freedom of the Catholic Church. The accusation that the Centre had been attempting to mobilise Catholic forces against the state in a ‘national provocation’ unwittingly altered how the Centre party began to see themselves. They identified themselves more forcibly as a Catholic \textit{Volkspartei}, and Catholic members began to show a deeper identification with the Catholic \textit{Weltanschauung} than expressing their usual national patriotism and loyalty to state authority.\textsuperscript{104} Catholic emancipation increasingly sought to create its own Catholic \textit{Sonderwelt} in place of campaigning to improve the social and political integration of Catholics.\textsuperscript{105} Despite its ongoing internal identity crisis, the Centre became the second largest party in the 1874 Reichstag elections, leaving Bismarck no choice but to scale down his attacks on the party, to declare an end to the \textit{Kulturkampf} and to promise to revise Church and cultural policy legislation. With time, growing economic success and national political consolidation, also made the Reich appear more attractive to the Centre Party, and members gradually urged Windthorst to abandon the party’s hostility and seek compromise and closer understanding with state authority. Observing the potential for Germany to develop from an agrarian to an industrial state, Windthorst gradually sought to remove Catholics from their isolated and economically retarded position and introduce them to the wider forum of the Reich’s politics, whilst also aiming to overcome the division between Protestants and Catholics. As Windthorst became more favourable to co-operation with Bismarck’s government and to supporting his reforms, this in turn brought Bismarck’s recognition for many of the Centre’s policy recommendations. Attitudes towards liberalism among the Catholic community were more positive but still ambiguous, which reflected different economic interests between the landed, property and agricultural groups on the one hand and the small business and manufacturing communities on the other. This diversity continued to pose a difficult dilemma for the

\textsuperscript{103} Sigmund Neumann, Die Deutschen Parteien, op. cit. p.38.
\textsuperscript{104} Helga Grebing op.cit., p.84.
party over the nature of its political representation. The large property owners and farmers in particular urged the Centre Party to endorse Bismarck’s customs legislation for example, as a way of protecting their economic interests, whilst an increasing number of successful Catholic businesses in Germany’s burgeoning industrial revolution found the policies of the Reich in tune with their own interests. Discrepancies also existed in Catholics’ attitudes towards the role of the state. Aristocratic Catholics favoured the authoritarian-monarchical structure of the Prussian state whilst the Catholic Bürgertum or middle classes were more democratic in their thinking.

This right-wing shift of many Catholic groups, meant that the Centre had left a vacuum for a truly representative workers’ body which represented the social concerns of the Catholic proletariat and could fight the SPD’s socialism on equal terms. The rise of the Catholic Workers’ Associations from around 1884, and later of the Christian trade unions, was a direct response to the growing neglect by the Centre Party of social issues. Although the Centre first deployed the Workers’ Associations as a useful aid in mobilising proletarian support during the elections, the Associations soon withdrew their support from the Centre Party once they felt that their specific interests were not being represented.106

On the sensitive issue of social legislation, Catholicism, both within the Centre Party and within the Catholic community as a whole, found itself divided over the extent to which it felt the state should intervene to solve social inequalities and to what degree these should be resolved by individual economic initiatives. Sufficient Centre Party members voted for a number of state controlled social measures to rival the conservative members of the party who were courting favour with the nationalist state. The Christian Social Associations in the Rhineland-Westphalia industrial regions for example were for state intervention, as were the representatives of the Association for Social Policy who believed in the primacy of political and ethical goals above pure economic advantage and in the need for an effective social policy programme. They hoped to introduce their own social initiatives via state legislation and, most importantly, they believed that it was compatible to establish trade unions within the existing liberal economic order.107 They

106 Wolfgang Schröder, op. cit., p.41.
107 Josef Stegmann, op. cit., p.402.
saw trade unions and cartel associations as an effective way of binding market forces into an organisational framework and can therefore be seen as early social marketeers.

By the end of the 1870s Bismarck’s protectionist economy nevertheless continued to enjoy support from the industrialist community in the Centre Party, whose contribution was welcomed during the economic boom at the turn of the 19th century. A core number of ardent Catholic traditionalists such as the Centre Party MP, Graf von Galen, who later became the Centre’s social policy spokesman in the Reichstag, invoked memories of the solidarity that had existed among members of the former guild associations which he maintained could provide the answer to the current individual isolation suffered by the egalitarian nature of the industrial age, and offer a fairer alternative to the capitalist model. The social conservative Karl Freiherr von Vogelsang also kept up protests into the 1870s and 1880s at the growing Catholic acceptance of the existing liberal order;

"Das kapitalistische Wirtschafts- und Sozialsystem, welches jetzt die ganze zivilisierte Welt absolut beherrscht, heute jedoch den Kulminationspunkt seiner Herrschaft bereits überschritten hat und dem Untergange zueilt, steht in einem unversöhnlichem Widerspruch zu der gesamten etischen Veranlagung des Christentums. Ein dauerndes Nebeneinander beider entgegengesetzter Systeme ist unmöglich."  

Vogelsang became unique in his blatant condemnation of liberalism, individualism and capitalism, but by 1890 such anti-capitalist sentiments among Catholics were increasingly suppressed. Extremist views of the kind held by Vogelsang were almost entirely discounted in favour of a more pragmatic social programme.

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108 It followed that the individual attention characteristic of a guild system could also be applied to the individual’s position in society and their relation to the state. This line of thinking would also explains preferences in the Centre for self-administration and autonomy in regional political affairs, namely towards a federal organisation of the state and which was in contrast to the centralised Prussian state that developed in 19th century Germany. In its very first programme after its 1871 election into the German parliament the party had called for a maintenance of Germany as a Bundesstaat and opposes all attempts to change the federal structure of the constitution. The Centre’s initial defence of the federal state also gradually receded as the party gained more power and influence in moulding Bismarck’s constitution.


1880s - 1900

By the mid to late 1880s the Centre Party had manoeuvred itself into the position of the most influential conservative party in parliament, with its focus on maintaining the status quo in Germany’s social and political order. It had not completely removed the danger of discrimination by Bismarck’s liberal, conservative supporters however, as the experience of the Kulturkampf had made many Catholics inherently suspicious of potential maltreatment by the state and cautious about state intervention in social issues. The central issue still to be decided by Catholics, of all socio-economic classes, was whether to continue to campaign for root and branch social reform and the establishment of a new social and economic order, or whether they would attempt to bring about change from within the existing economic system, by introducing social legislation and by limiting only the worst excesses of the liberal-capitalist society. It was not easy for those Catholics who had traditionally rejected economic liberalism and any moves to resolve the Social Question by reconciliation with the capitalist system. The Catholic Church had viewed liberalism as endemic of the process of state secularisation and throughout the century had become its most vociferous critic. The tone of early papal encyclicals, Mirari vos in 1832 and Singulari nos in 1834 as well as Pius’ IX’s Quanta cura in 1864 was unforgiving, rejecting freedom of thought, culture, expression and the liberal embrace of modern civilisation and progress.

Not all forms of liberalism had to follow classical, liberal lines however. The more liberal Rhenish Catholics for example sought to justify their own interpretations of liberalism. They endorsed a liberalism that was socially responsible, yet also helped to promote and advance industrialisation in the Rhineland. The change in mood by the Catholic Church towards the end of the century towards capitalism is best exemplified by the 1891 papal encyclical by Pope Leo XIII, Rerum Novarum. The encyclical was written as a response to the need to reconcile the conservative philosophical traditions of the Catholic Church with the modern social and political developments brought about by socialism and liberalism. It was no coincidence that Rerum Novarum appeared at a time when the Centre Party also faced modification of its political direction to adapt to its new influential role on government.\(^{111}\) Although the text blames class divisions as the root of

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\(^{111}\) Ibid., p.262.
social inequality, importantly it does not advocate the abolition of the right to private ownership or call for nationalisation of all means of production, two key characteristics of a liberal economy. It maintained that the state, together with the Church, and the proletariat were jointly responsible for tackling social misery. The Pope also settled the internal Catholic controversy over the question of a public or a private sector approach to social reforms by coming out wholeheartedly in favour of state intervention. *Rerum Novarum* significantly did not argue for a radical overhaul of the existing social structure and wide-reaching social reform, but for implementation of social policy within the existing capitalist order. The Berlin CDU member Otto Heinrich von der Gablentz, later suggested that *Rerum Novarum* was a search for a third way; “Hier sollte ein dritter Weg gefunden werden”\(^{112}\) deliberately ruling out a radical form of socialism to tackle the social question. He feared that socialism could unleash full-scale revolution, which would be far worse than tolerating social injustice; “die Angst vor der Revolution ist stärker als die Empörung über das Unrecht.”\(^{113}\)

Catholicism’s early preoccupation with maintaining the cultural and confessional integrity of the Catholic Church and its abhorrence of liberalism meant that before now the Centre Party had not given the formulation of social policy serious attention.\(^{114}\) After Bismarck’s departure in 1890 and with him many of his anti-clerical, national liberal supporters, the *Kulturkampf* had been scaled down. With its confessional dilemmas resolved, the Centre soon found itself at odds over social and economic policy. In direct competition with the Social Democrats who profiled themselves exclusively as the party of the working classes, the Centre faced the practical political question of how society’s ills should best be solved. The trade unionist and Centre Party member Adam Stegerwald, defended the working classes, arguing that the changes in class relations brought about by the industrial revolution, still demanded radical change to the political structure and gave his backing to the idea of a democratic and social *Volksstaat*. The working classes, he noted, made up the majority of Centre Party voters and insisted that


\(^{113}\) Ibid.

\(^{114}\) Helga Grebing, Geschichte ... op. cit., p.87f.
their rights and concerns should not be ignored. The direction of his programme suggestions was significant, because it challenged existing state structures, which had, in the meantime, come to rely on the support of the middle classes. Stegerwald condoned that the state should have powers to intervene to correct economic imbalances and introduce fundamental change to social and political relations. His aim was not to create a centralised state, but simply to grant more constitutional powers to the government. He believed that since the state gained its legitimacy from the people it served in society, communities, families, Churches and trade unions, the state was compelled to fulfil its moral responsibility.

This naive assumption of the state’s benevolence did not stand up to reality. Windhorst’s successor from 1891, the lawyer Ernst Lieber, steered the Centre party programme in even greater support of national and military aims and convinced a majority in his party to back Wilhelm II’s colonial ambitions. The Centre’s new nationalistic programmatic course was confirmed when the party gained a record number of votes in the 1898 Reichstag elections. Staunch anti-Prussian Catholics witnessed the trend of combining capitalism and Wilhelmian militarism and imperialism with grave scepticism, but could do little to stop it in its course.

1900 - 1918

The Centre broadly agreed to introduce social legislation within the existing liberal economic system, ceding specific policy areas to state responsibility, and confirmed that Catholics had finally accepted social legislation in preference to sweeping social reform and abolition of the capitalist system. This shift was advocated by the Centre Party member and Reich Chancellor Georg Frhr. von Hertling (1843-1919). Now that the mainstream party had found a working relationship with the liberal economic system, the concern with social issues was taken up by the Volksverein für das katholische Deutschland which had been founded on papal recommendation at the Katholikentag in

115 W. Becker Die Zentrumspartei op. cit., p.130.
116 Hertling developed a theory of the rule of law in the late 19th and early 20th century based on social and cultural obligations to the individual. It is the responsibility of the state to provide each and every individual with the rights and freedom to develop his or her full potential. His position and influence made it possible to forge closer ties between the Centre party and the former political representatives of the Kaiser regime.
1890. Its aim was to mobilise the masses, publicise the party’s socialist programme to compete with the Social Democrats, and appeal for unity amongst the Catholic community;

"Es gelang ihm (dem Volksverein) ...., die sozialen und wirtschaftlichen Spannungen in der Zentrumswählerschaft besonders nach der Jahrhundertwende wirksam zu neutralisieren und auszugleichen und die Diskrepanz zwischen der ständisch-hierarchischen Struktur der Partei und der Klassenschichtung der modernen Industriegesellschaft zu überdecken."\textsuperscript{117}

The political authority of Windthorst, who had been proclaimed the father of the Volksverein at the time of its foundation, was important for the Volksverein’s survival and influence. Windthorst himself found the Volksverein idea of a specific Catholic association anachronistic, and harnessed some of the Verein’s more radical intentions by steering its energies towards fighting the challenge from social democracy. The Verein’s activities nevertheless proved crucial in widening the Centre Party’s representation in regions of the Reich where previously no party organisation had existed and its activity became indispensable to the Centre Party during election campaigns, helping the Centre Party to develop a social programme for parliamentary representation.

Speaking at the Katholikentag in 1907, a forum that since its inauguration in 1848 was designed to represent the views of all Catholic associations and unions, the leader of the Centre Party in parliament Adolf Groeber, explicitly called for Streben nach Reichtum! revealing the extent to which Catholicism had adapted itself to the capitalist order;

"Das System des Wirtschaftsliberalismus galt somit nicht mehr als eine grundsätzlich abzulehnende ökonomische Ordnung. Man sah im Kapitalismus lediglich eine Wirtschaftstechnik, in der der Produktionsfaktor Kapital eine hervorragende Rolle spielte.....Sozialpolitik bedeutete nicht mehr Kapitalismusfeindlichkeit."\textsuperscript{118}

Catholicism therefore no longer chose to condemn capitalism, but increasingly believed that it should maximise the benefits of capitalism such as greater wealth and prosperity, by extending these privileges to all groups in society. Catholicism would continue to

\textsuperscript{117} Horstwalter Heitzer, Der Volksverein für das katholische Deutschland im Kaiserreich 1890-1918, Matthias Grünwald Verlag, Mainz 1979, p.146f.

\textsuperscript{118} Josef Stegmann, op. cit., p.420.
monitor and ensure that the excesses of the capitalist system were minimised. This apparent softening of Catholic opposition to capitalist-liberalism was the result of the long line of efforts by Catholic spokesmen such as Ketteler, Groeber, de Lamennais and Pope Leo XIII in his *Rerum Novarum*. Goetz Briefs, a sociologist and prolific speaker at Christian trade union congresses, later explains that liberalism was condemned purely on moral grounds, for claiming to be economically autonomous and operating according to its own laws. Capitalism, whilst criticised for its excesses, was however perceived as reformable. Capitalist-liberalism relied on a minimum of state and on a maximum of individual responsibility. The dynamic nature of the free market, driven by self-interest and competition, meant it offered an opportunity for social adjustments and thus made it acceptable to Catholics.\(^\text{119}\)

With Lieber’s nationalist shift in the Centre Party’s programme, and the *Katholischer Verein* defending Catholic interests, the perennial need for an interdenominational body to represent the working classes, to achieve equality and solidarity among all workers, and fight socialism on equal terms with the Social Democrats, was even more acutely exposed. This vacuum was filled by the emergence of the Christian trade unions to be set up. At the first Mainz congress of the Christian trade unions on May 21-22, 1899, programme guidelines called for Christian, interdenominational trade unions. Unlike the social democratic workers’ organisations, who operated as political agitators for the SPD, the Christian trade unions should not affiliate themselves to any particular party. Their aim was simply to develop a common representative organ to defend (Christian) workers’ interests, without interfering in specific political or cultural predilections. Class differences were not recognised since employers and employees were seen to share common goals. Although the majority of members were Catholic, there was also an Evangelical wing which leaned more heavily on Christian social traditions. Tension often arose between the Christian trade unions and the Catholic Church, since the unions’ views were focused on tackling the conflict between work and capital for all Christians, and liberating the working classes from the strict tutelage of the clergy, but not on representing the Catholic Church’s concerns. Adam Stegerwald, Centre party member and trade union chairman noted;

\(^\text{119}\) Goetz Briefs, "Liberalismus und katholische Sozialehre. Bilanz der Gemeinsamkeiten," in; Die politische Meinung, Heft 52, Jg. 5, 1960, p.36.
"Sprachen die Führer der christlichen Gewerkschaften nur als Katholiken, so wurden sie von ihren evangelischen Kollegen nicht verstanden, redeten sie aber als Vertreter einer interkonfessionellen Organisation, konnte man ihnen Unehrerbietigkeit gegen das Oberhaupt ihrer Kirche vorwerfen."

The unions’ claim to independence in steering social policy however is relativised by the close personal contacts that the unions had to the Centre Party and to the Verein für das katholische Deutschland. The unions furthermore took their policy impetus from Catholic Social Teaching. This does not diminish the fact that the formation of independent, Christian trade unions represented the first real attempt to create a forum for interdenominational co-operation on social and economic issues affecting the working classes.

In the new liberal climate, the powerful binding force of the Catholic Weltanschauung was weakening. It appeared as if the solidarity shown throughout the Kulturkampf, when Catholics of all classes pulled together to defend their existence began to disintegrate once the threat had been overcome. Catholic doctrine had provided the necessary ideological consensus and was an important factor for maintaining cohesion between Catholics of conservative and liberal persuasion. In an atmosphere of normal cultural relations between the Catholic Church and the state however, the Catholic Weltanschauung was not quite so necessary. The question remained, whether, faced with a future national moral crisis, the Catholic Weltanschauung would be strong enough to hold Catholic groups together. Sadly, this was not the case.

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120 Adam Stegerwald cited in; Helga Grebing, Geschichte..., op. cit., p.91.  
121 Rolf Thieringer cited in; Wolfgang Schroeder, op. cit., Bonn 1992. p.44.  
122 Ernst Deuerlein, op. cit. p.28.
1.1. The Centre Party before and during the Weimar Republic

By the end of the 19th century the Centre Party had already begun to suffer from dwindling support, as a result of the broadening of Germany’s party spectrum. Many Catholic voters drifted from the Centre Party to the social democrats, or from 1925, to the communists, but also to the Deutscher Nationale Volkspartei (DNVP) that set up its own Nationale Arbeitsgemeinschaft deutscher Katholiken in 1920. By 1917, when it seemed as if the parliamentary system would not survive the growing radicalism of German parties, the Christian trade unions emphasised that it saw interdenomination as the only force that could harmonise left and right wing factions. Unlike the Berlin Workers’ Associations, which were led by Catholic clerics, the interdenominational trade union organisation in Cologne was led by ordinary members of the Christian Churches, and the movement was shown special recognition by Pope Pius X in his 1912 encyclical Singulare quadum. The unions supported private ownership rights but demanded reforms in the capitalist economy, to introduce joint ownership and worker participation rights in industry, public shares initiatives, and a trade and industry body with parity in its membership to monitor all economic activity. The fundamental difficulty for the Christian trade unions however was how, if at all, they distinguished themselves ideologically from the socialism of the SPD, and their success ultimately depended on developing and defending a unique Christian trade union ideology. By 1920, the Christian trade unions nevertheless boasted 1.25 million members. Ideas were expressed to reform the party system to allow the divided and disparate bürgerlichen groups and Christian workers to form a united and powerful opposition to social democracy. In the same year Adam Stegerwald held his famous speech, Die christliche Arbeiterbewegung und die Lebensfragen des deutschen Volkes also calling for an interdenominational Christian democratic party, that was “deutsch, christlich, demokratisch, sozial” echoing earlier suggestions for a Christian-national, conservative and social party by figures such as Emmanuel Ketteler or Friedrich Naumann.

123 Godehard Lindgens, op. cit., p.87.
124 Helga Grebing, op. cit., p.91.
125 Centre Party leader Heinrich Brüning later claimed that he had in fact been the author of Stegerwald’s famous speech. Letter from Brüning to Johannes Main, 14 Nov 1945, cited in; Friedrich Brickwedde, Die frühgeschichte der westfälischen CDU. Hausarbeit zur Erlangung des Magistergrades der Philosophischen Fakultät der Westfälischen Wilhelms-Universität zu Münster. 1978, p.10.
The Centre Party meanwhile had not fully resolved the question of its identity and political representation. The question now focused on whether the Centre should remain an exclusively Catholic party or whether it should broaden its appeal to Protestants, thereby putting aside confessional differences and emphasising their shared belief in Christianity. The party became embroiled in what was termed its Zentrumsstreit or the Centre’s conflict, over the denominational and political character of the party. This prompted the famous article by the Cologne newspaper publisher, Julius Bachem, in 1906 calling for the Centre to come out of its ‘tower’ - a symbol of the shelter it offered Catholics. It could end its own segregation by welcoming Protestants to take Centre Party seats in parliament. The article attacked those in the party who saw their main programmatic item as that of satisfying Church demands and as protector of Catholic interests. Bachem would not accept that the confessional division in politics was due to ideological principle, but was a result of historical tradition\textsuperscript{126} and so strove for Catholics and Protestants to overcome their mutual prejudices. Sceptics believed the Catholic Weltanschauung was singularly unique and resisted any kind of merger with other Weltanschauungen such as Protestantism. Other Centre Party members were concerned that closer interdenominational co-operation could dilute Catholics’ interests with those of the Protestants, many of whom were supportive of nationalist, right-wing or bourgeois policies.

Bachem’s motivation for forging interdenominational unity was based on the fear that the Centre might otherwise lose the support of the Catholic working classes who would drift to the SPD if the Centre failed to secure them political recognition. The need for a new programme and a new profile thus became a matter of winning the political competition with the SPD. Programmatic reform would then provide the catalyst for further structural reforms in the party. Cary\textsuperscript{127} believes Bachem’s designs would achieve three things; reconciliation between Protestants and Catholics, a solution to the social inequalities caused by industrialisation and support for the trend towards parliamentary democracy. Bachem was thus tentatively preparing the Centre Party to become a catch-

\textsuperscript{126} Noel D. Cary, op. cit., p.31.

\textsuperscript{127} Ibid., p.9.
all party in a pluralistic, democratic system. Carl Bachem, Julius’ cousin and deputy in the Reichstag noted that the phrase *Christliche Weltanschauung* was intended only as a political formula and not a theological amalgamation. The aim was not to ‘represent’ Catholic teaching but simply to ensure that Catholic moral beliefs were adhered to in politics.\(^{128}\)

By the end of the first world war the Centre Party had shifted its traditional support for the Church towards support for the state with a distinct change in attitude towards the idea of a Republican order. After the defeat in war and revolution, social Catholicism was no longer a uniform social group but had developed into a pluralistic Catholic social movement.\(^{129}\) In its Duisburg and Cologne conferences in November 1918, the Centre Party confirmed the ongoing validity of its Soest Programme but in view of the forthcoming election to the National Assembly and the uncertainty of the new political order in Germany, the Centre agreed to wait for a decision from the National Assembly before deciding its own position on the state form. The trade union wing boldly pronounced its ongoing support for a monarchy and whilst the Cologne Centre Party spoke of modifying structures within the party, Berlin members talked of renewal and adapting itself to the modern political climate, implying that it was now even less committed to the party’s traditional left-wing, socially progressive policies. In its final proclamation on December 30, 1918, the Centre acknowledged that a new political order was inevitable after the fall of the monarchy but insisted that the new system must be a democracy and not a socialist republic. It reaffirmed its original commitment to a Christian based society and its original motto ‘Für Wahrheit, Recht und Freiheit’, but discussed changing its name to *Christlich-demokratische Volkspartei (Zentrum)* \(^{130}\) and reforming its programme to attract a wider Christian appeal and to signal recognition of the new democratic republic. In reality it failed to attract Protestant voters who leaned more naturally towards the recently formed Evangelical *Christlich Sozialer Volksdienst*\(^{131}\) whilst some members still felt that the Centre’s original policy of protecting religious

\(^{128}\) Carl Bachem cited in; Ibid., p.36.

\(^{129}\) Josef Stegmann, op. cit., p.435.

\(^{130}\) Wolfgang Treue, Deutsche Parteiprogramme 1861-1954, op. cit., p.32.

\(^{131}\) Sigmund Neumann, Die Deutschen Parteien, op. cit., p.40.
freedom and equality should be upheld in view of radical cultural policies of the new Prussian government. Talk of real party reform therefore was diluted.\textsuperscript{132}

In his famous Essen Speech on November 21, 1920, the Christian trade unionist Adam Stegerwald spoke of the crisis of capitalism in German society. The pace of development of science and technology, he said, had advanced beyond humankind's moral development. The resulting social dislocation could only be cured by infusing public life with Christian spirit. Stegerwald's desire was to unite the trade unions to create a mass base for building a new party, an interdenominational 'Labour' party. The move would result in a marked shift to the left for many conservative minded Catholics but was based on Stegerwald's belief that it had been the lack of solidarity between the trade unions of the two main parties - the Centre and the SPD, that had prevented the trade unions extending their influence before. The political values of the Centre Party and the SPD were not truly compatible but they shared the view that there was a need for constitutional reform. Both socialists in the SPD, and Catholics in the Centre, believed there was a need for a parliamentary majority in government to act as an effective opposition to Prussian-German Protestantism. Their fundamentally opposing viewpoints however created unbridgeable tension. For Catholics, a constitutional pact with avowed revolutionary atheists and advocates of class struggle did not qualify as the kind of philosophical starting point implied by the word \textit{Weltanschauung}.\textsuperscript{133}


\textsuperscript{133} Noel D. Cary op. cit., p.61.
1928-1933

In the polarised parliamentary state system of Weimar, the Centre struggled to maintain its middle position. It could not yet lend its full commitment to the Republican idea and hesitated in embracing democracy. The 1922 manifesto guidelines did not feature the words democracy or democratic anywhere in the text.134 Between 1925 and 1933 the Centre was torn over its political representation and provoked rumours that the Centre should split into two factions to accommodate the right and the left-wing tendencies in the party.135 On the right, wavering Centre voters were attracted to the Deutsch Nationale Volkspartei and on the left, Centre members migrated to the SPD. Adam Stegerwald was one of the few right-wing, conservative nationals who stayed in the Centre, but who also remained chairman of the Christian trade unions. Opposing the radical, right-wing shift in the party, were the left-wing Catholic Workers’ Associations and the Catholics of the south-west. Stegmann divides the post-war pluralism in political Catholicism into three categories, Romantic Conservatism, Christian Socialism and Solidarism. An examination of their content reveals continuity with the categories of pre-war political Catholicism and a reoccurrence of political issues that had survived the widely proclaimed need for post-war party reform.

**Romantic Conservatism**

Romantic Conservatism, or Universalism, as it is often referred to, has its roots in the ideas of Karl Freiherr von Vogelsang. In accordance with its conservative tradition, Romantic Conservatism supported a system of estates, rejected liberalism and capitalism and advocated an economy based on the independent Mittelstand. The Viennese economist and social philosopher Othmar Spann (1878-1950), is exemplary of the Universalist philosophy, of a Ganzheitslehre for society. Spann’s theory distinguished between the universalistisch-organisch and the more liberal individualistisch-atomistische approach to social organisation. He favoured the universalistisch-organisch approach since it defined religion, science, economy, the state and its individuals as composite parts (Glieder) of society’s whole. An individual, he argued, could only realise their full

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135 The Bavarians split from the Centre Party, over the issue of federalism to form their own conservative Bayerische Volkspartei.
potential through participating within a universalist society. Spann believed the state should be arranged on the guild idea of estates but where the state’s power and authority should not be derived from individuals or estates or even from a parliament that represented the views of the people;

“Staatswille leitet sich nicht von dem Willen einzelner ab, er ist daher nicht atomistisch-mechanistisch, sondern lebendig gebildet, nämlich von Führern.”

This leading group of Führern is not only motivated by their responsibility to governing the state but by Kriegergeist and Kriegertum based on their specific training as Führer. Universalism thus unequivocally leads to an authoritarian state and renders democratic mass elections superfluous. In the same way that political individualism was considered to be against the natural order of society, economic freedom of competition and trade are arranged according to a system of industrial guilds. In a speech held before a fascist organisation in 1933 in Rome, Spann did not conceal the fact that this characteristic group of individuals were represented by the fascists in Italy and by the national socialists in Germany.

In 1930s Vienna, a group of Catholic sociologists attempted to co-ordinate Spann’s ideas with those of other Austrian groups. One of these sociologists was Eugen Kogon a former pupil of Spann’s and editor of the Christian pamphlet Schönere Zukunft and later a co-founding member of the CDU in Hesse in 1945. The 1932 Catholic-Social Manifesto was demonstrably in favour of a universal social tradition branding liberalism as an Abfall von der gottgewollten Ordnung and vilifying heavy industry, mass production, freedom of trade and competition, and economic activity carried out in pursuit of profit. The Catholic Social Manifesto argued that although a dictatorship meant the removal of self-administration, it could be;

“je nach den Umständen vielleicht ein brauchbares, ja sogar unumgängliches, wenngleich paradoxes Mittel zur Errichtung des Ständesstaates.”


137 The Catholic Social Manifesto cited in; Ibid., p.442.
Kogon himself favoured a comprehensive corporate system of estates, encompassing industrial democracy, industry regulation, training, the control and reform of finance institutions and national economic planning. Kogon explicitly adds however that this corporate system could function in almost any type of state, with the exception of a dictatorship or a formal party democracy.\textsuperscript{138}

**Solidarism**

The Solidarists believed in a regulatory and integrative system which drew on the constitutive elements of the market, guilds and a welfare state to balance and correct social inequality in industrial society. In 1926, Cardinal Schulte emphasised that capitalism was merely a technical economic system and not therefore to be seen as unchristian. His position was endorsed three years later by the Bishop of Innsbruck, who said private ownership, capital, credit and the stock market were not immoral instruments, if used and interpreted correctly. This was the view of the 1931 papal encyclical, *Quadragesimo anno*, which reflected many of the Solidarists’ own views. *Quadragesimo anno* recognised the need for a new social order based on subsidiarity and ranking of professional groups or *Berufstände*.\textsuperscript{139} Solidarists did not support the guild system in order to return to a feudal order of the middle ages. Solidarism aimed at setting up a number of parallel groups in society, equal in status but representative of different professions. Membership of a particular estate was no longer based on background, but was voluntary, and movement between ranks was possible. The main objective was to overcome class structures by co-operation between workers and employers. The Solidarists’ understanding was that the state should leave the professions to administer their own interests, but did not go so far as to believe that competition\textsuperscript{140}

\textsuperscript{138}Eugen Kogon cited in Josef Stegmann; Ibid., p.443.

\textsuperscript{139}“Kaum bedarf es eigener Erwähnung, daß das, was Leo XIII über die Staatsform lehrte, auch auf die Berufstände oder berufständischen Körperschaften sinngemäß Anwendung findet, nämlich: die Menschen haben die volle Freiheit, eine Form nach ihrem Gefallen zu wählen, wenn nur der Gerechtigkeit und den Erfordernissen des Gemeinwohls Genüge geschieht.” Die Enzyklika Pius’ XI, *Quadragesimo anno*, Amtlicher deutscher Text, Hrsg. vom Erzbischöflichen Seelsorgeamt Köln, Düsseldorf 1946, p.48f.

\textsuperscript{140}“Die Wettbewerbsfreiheit - obwohl innerhalb der gehörigen Grenzen berechtigt und von zweifellosem Nutzen - kann aber unmöglich regulatives Prinzip der Wirtschaft sein .... Daher besteht die dringende Notwendigkeit, die Wirtschaft wieder einem echten und durchgreifenden regulativen Prinzip zu unterstellen.” Die Enzyklika Pius’ XI, *Quadragesimo anno*, op. cit., p.49.
could act as the sole mechanism on which to run an economy. Gustav Gundlach, an exponent of Solidarism, criticised the Universalists for rejecting parliamentary democracy in favour of *Führertum* and perceived that there were political motives behind the theological rhetoric. Paul Jostock criticised universalism because he saw that the Catholics' task was to protect the individual from the *heidnisch-herrischen Staatsgeist Hegels* from which Universalism descended. The solidarist, Nell-Breuning, who was also one of the most outspoken of thinkers, condemned Universalism as an offspring of Hegelian philosophy and German idealism. Nell-Breuning did not inherently see any conflict between the Catholic Church and a capitalist system, but the pursuit of profit, he claimed had to be restrained by adequate state regulations.

**Christian Socialists**

The third group of Catholics in the period 1928-1933 were the Christian Socialists, who descended from the pre-war Christian trade unions. The trade unions were the strongest force behind democratic reform and saw the practical necessity for introducing interdenominational politics and overcoming sectarian conflict. Rather than revelling in class conflict like the Social Democrats, they applied themselves to making the working class a respected part of civil society. In essence, the unions remained non-partisan, but some labour activists still looked to the Centre Party as their natural party representative. They hoped to initiate realignment of the Centre Party yet the party continued to pay only lip service to interdenomination, whilst remaining a Catholic party with only a nominal number of Protestant members.

Christian Socialists such as Josef Kral, Theodor Brauer, Adam Stegerwald and Theodor Steinbüchel all shared a similar abhorrence of capitalism as the Romantic-Conservatives. They believed in a planned economy but one which did not suppress

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141 In 1947 Gundlach would later plead with the Christian Socialists to drop the politically ambiguous term Christian Socialism and replace it with the acceptable term Christian Solidarism.


143 Noel D. Cary, op. cit., p.31.

144 Steinbüchel in his book, *Der Sozialismus als sittliche Idee*, contributed to softening the attitude amongst Catholics towards Marxist-Socialism, emphasising ethical values as the organising factor for a political and economic order which he claimed existed in Christianity as well as in Socialism and Marxism and saw no reason why dialogue could not be established between them. See Bernd Uhl, *Die Idee des Christlichen Sozialismus in Deutschland*. Hrsg. KAS, V. Hase & Koehler, Mainz 1975, p.37f.
individual freedom. It was not enough to simply remove the excesses of capitalism, but argued that the economy must be made the responsibility of society, of Gemeinschaft.\textsuperscript{145} Theodor Brauer, the leader of the Christian trade unions during the closing stages of the Weimar Republic, supported the guild system of ranking people in categories according to their professional status. This not only reaffirmed the Centre’s 1922 programme, but featured as article no. 165 of the Weimar Constitution, guaranteeing mutual recognition to workers and employers in an equal partnership. Yet ambiguity within the group over the meaning of its philosophy of Christian Socialism meant that it was often tactically employed for propagandistic effect, to create the impression of a revolutionary spirit among Catholics.\textsuperscript{146} Christian Socialism has also been accused of disguising the relationship social Catholicism already had with socialism and its secret desire to form a coalition with the socialist democrats.\textsuperscript{147} The Christian trade union’s slogan Nation, Authorität, Volkstum, Volksgemeinschaft, Stand und Führung also made it difficult to distinguish the Christian Socialists’ programme from that of the National Socialists.\textsuperscript{148} Opposition to this surreptitious right wing drift among Catholics, was staged by the Hesse group of Christian socialists, including Friedrich Dessauer, Walter Dirks, Heinrich Scharp and Ernst Michel of the Frankfurter newspaper, the Rhein-Mainische Volkszeitung. Some of these went on to become influential co-founders of the Hesse CDU in 1945.

The differing views of the Solidarists, the Universalists and the Christian Socialists reflected the diversity of Weltanschauungen that the Centre Party and political Catholicism in general had historically always contained. Party leader Joseph Joos (1919-1927) described the Centre’s position not as “entweder-oder” but as “sowohl als auch”. The Centre stood for;

\textsuperscript{145} What is meant by Gemeinwohl is uncertain, since different interpretations can be given depending on whether the Catholic is Jesuit or Dominican. Oswald von Nell-Breuning. Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Heute. Band III, Zeitfragen 1955-1959, Freiburg 1960, p.15.

\textsuperscript{146} Josef Stegmann, op. cit., p.446.

\textsuperscript{147} Bernd Uhl, op. cit., p.22. See section II in this study which deals with Christian Socialism after 1945.

\textsuperscript{148} Wolfgang Schröder, op. cit., p.50.
“Religion und Vaterlandsliebe, Vaterland und Menschheit, Deutschland und Europa, Zentralismus und Föderalismus, Macht und Recht.”

It was precisely this lack of a clear political identity for the Centre that also made it susceptible to National Socialism, a movement promising unity across all party divisions in Weimar's party system. Centre Party chairman and Reich president Brüning believed he could reinforce parliamentary democracy by turning it into 'authoritarian democracy' and made gestures to Hitler for a sharing of power. In 1932 he envisaged serving as Foreign Minister in a right-wing government with the National Socialists. Brüning believed that once the flood of radicalism receded (after the election of the NSDAP), a Protestant conservative party, that could work with the Centre, would finally emerge.

The Reich's Chancellor Franz von Papen was also sympathetic to Hitler's programme, and believed he could tame the more radical elements once Hitler was in power. In the September Reichstag elections of 1930, the NSDAP won over 18% of the vote and the Centre only just over 11%, demonstrating that the NSDAP had accommodated the disaffected and alienated voter. When Hitler requested the Reichstag to pass the Enabling Act that would clear his way to govern without legislature for four years, a two-thirds majority was required in parliament. Fearing reprisals, such as expulsion from government or even physical attacks, the Centre voted unanimously for passing the Enabling Act. Before conceding to the Act, the Centre handed Hitler a list of conditions that he must comply with, but did not include civil rights among them. It was here that the Centre committed its most fundamental error. By failing to mention the civil rights of others, the Centre silently abandoned its venerable claim to be defending not just Catholic rights but the general principle of minority rights.

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140 Joseph Joos, "Die politische Ideenwelt des Zentrums", in; Ungerer Emil (Hrsg), Wissen und Werken, Braun, Karlsruhe 1928, p.23.
150 Noel D. Cary, op. cit., p.137.
151 Stegerwald had previously already been beaten up by Nazi insiders whilst holding a speech.
Once the Concordat had been signed in Rome, which secured the Catholic Church state guarantees such as denominational schools and government subsidies, the Centre Party was dissolved.¹⁵³

¹⁵³ To explain the apathy that Catholics demonstrated towards Hitler in 1933 and the late development of any unified resistance to the regime, critics point to a political quietism that existed amongst Catholics, the belief that the freedom of the Catholic Church was not at stake in the dissolution of the Weimar state and its constitution. This tendency amongst Catholics to focus narrowly on social reform issues meant that they tragically neglected to monitor parallel political developments. See the views of N. Monzel and E.W Böckenförde and Hans Maier cited in; Hans Maier, “Politischer Katholizismus, sozialer Katholizismus, christliche Demokratie”, in; CIVITAS, Jahrbuch für christliche Gesellschaftsordnung, Band I, Pesch-Haus Verlag, München 1962.
2. Political Protestantism before 1918

In the previous section, political Catholicism was investigated for its significance in laying the foundations for a Christian based political party and a socio-economic programme, acceptable to all political views across the diverse political spectrum of Catholicism. It focused on the role of Catholic Social Teaching, the Catholic social workers’ associations, Christian trade unions and the Centre Party. The factor that defined the CDU as an entirely new phenomenon in the German party system in 1945 however, was its unique character as an interdenominational Christian party, that embraced the Catholic and the Protestant faiths. The CDU modelled itself as a genuine Volkspartei, that drew its support not only from both Christian confessions but from all socio-economic classes, professions and political backgrounds. A significant number of the founding members of the CDU in 1945 were indeed Protestants from the ranks of Weimar’s former liberal parties and many features of the CDU’s programme after 1945 reflected political tendencies of the liberal and conservative Protestant traditions. This clearly shows that the investigation must be extended beyond the confines of political Catholicism, to include an appreciation of the Protestant history of the Christian democratic movement. The section will examine which Protestant traditions would later help to determine the direction of the CDU’s socio-economic programme and, in so doing, aims to redress the imbalance in the literature on the CDU, which has so far concentrated on social and political Catholicism as the chief inspiration for the CDU’s political programme.

Immediately this raises the question why the history of the Protestant wing of the CDU should have received less attention in the literature on the CDU to date. Political Catholicism is an established term in Germany which has not only generated discussion and interest in scholarly and clerical spheres but also in sociological and political circles, both in terms of its historical and its current political relevance. Political Protestantism on the other hand is more obscure and cannot be treated as a single unified phenomenon. The German Reformation was in this respect a contributory factor, by creating divisions within the Protestant faith. The division of the Church into a separate Lutheran and Calvinist branch, meant differences evolved in their respective interpretations of Protestantism. Later attempts to reunify the two confessions failed on account of
fundamentally opposing confessional differences between the monarchical and Episcopal Lutheran tradition and the synodal democratic tradition of the Calvinist reform Church.

National, liberal Protestantism originally derived its philosophy from the Enlightenment ideas of the French Revolution, including the right to national sovereignty and self determination.\(^{154}\) As a political idea therefore, German liberalism is inextricably linked to western European civilisation and notions of culture and human liberty. Yet German liberalism also refers to the degenerate 19th century version, where liberalism came to represent the particular political and social movement and state of mind amongst the German middle classes. In the course of the 19th century, liberalism underwent political mutation to the right, parading a nationalist, imperialist programme before finally reaching its pinnacle in fascism in 1933. As a political concept liberal Protestantism reflected the political cultures of certain liberal political parties such as the Deutsche Demokratische Partei (DDP) and Deutsche Volkspartei (DVP) and the interests of the secular middle classes. 19th century middle class Protestants leaned more naturally, but not exclusively, towards laissez-faire economic liberalism. Lutheran traditions encouraged the Bürgertum in German society to become apolitical and submissive to political authority, hostile to democracy and susceptible to the notion of Führertum. Unrestrained capitalist liberals were blamed for worshipping the authoritarian German state, for blind obedience to authority which led to Germany’s loss of Christianity and ultimately to the rise of National Socialism.\(^{155}\)

Protestantism has been further criticised for its failure to mount a concerted and united response to the social challenges of 19th century German society or to engender a feeling of Protestant social responsibility.\(^{156}\) Rooted in Christian trade union and Christian social

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\(^{155}\) Although Protestantism, was a relatively homogeneous block during Weimar, in the Third Reich the block split between a obrigkeitststaatliche group and a democratic group. Joachim Perels, Die Entstehung demokratischen Denkens im deutschen Protestantismus in; Gegenwartskunde 2/81, Jg 30, 1981 p 153-163.

\(^{156}\) The Catholic commentator O’Shanahan remarked that between the initial pleas to a Protestant social conscience by Johann Hinrich Wichern at the Wittenberg assembly of the German Protestant Churches in September 1848 and the first Evangelical Church day at Bethel-Bielefeld in November 1924, no initiative was made to create a feeling of Protestant social responsibility. *Die Verhandlungen der Wittenberger Versammlung für Gründung eines deutschen evangelischen Kirchenbundes im September
parties, the Social Protestant agenda transcended the institutional confines of the Evangelical Church, and Protestant political parties were historically more passive than their Catholic counterparts in tackling political issues such as inequality, injustice and poverty. The history of a specific social ethical movement in German Protestantism has therefore been less documented than the history of the social movement in German Catholicism. In social policy terms therefore the Protestants could be seen to have very little to bequeath to a new, socially responsible Christian democratic party in 1945.

Protestant-Evangelical social ethical teaching, unlike the documented encyclicals in Catholic Social Teaching, appears obscure and intangible, and makes theorising on the subject often difficult and imprecise. Evangelicals have also adopted a complex and ambiguous attitude towards the idea of a Christian political party. The Evangelist theologian Helmut Thielicke\textsuperscript{157} for example, thought that from a practical point of view Protestants and Catholics could co-operate in an interdenominational Christian party, but whilst Catholics had Catholic Social Teaching to provide them with Christian criteria in accordance with Natural Law, the Evangelical Christian had nothing comparable. Evangelists rejected the idea that politics rests on fixed Christian axioms, and instead claimed to respond to a moral or political situation as it arises, but nevertheless applying a Christian frame of mind. This can be problematic in the political sphere however, given that a party cannot operate without a programme. Evangelists may thus find themselves in an interdenominational Christian party which is bound by Christianity but whose programme content is Catholic and not Evangelical.\textsuperscript{158} It can be argued\textsuperscript{159} however

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item Thielicke was an important participant in the Freiburg group discussions during the war. See Helmut Thielicke, Theologische Ethik II/2, p.689-698. Also see section 3 of this study.
\item Wilhelm Hahn, “Die CDU als Problem der evangelischen Theologie”, in: Demokratische Bewährung, Staatsbürger Verlag, Bad Godesberg 1965 (p.79-96).
\item Whilst Catholicism traditionally wrangled with the form the State should take, be that a monarchy, aristocracy or republic, the non-Orthodox Calvinist form of Protestantism placed less emphasis on the state form per se and has been more concerned with finding a way of securing principles of Christian natural law, human rights, individual liberties and the constitutional rule of law within political ethics. According to this theory Protestantism’s interest in democracy as a form of government stemmed largely from the fact that this represents the best possible system for protecting human rights. See Joachim Staedtke, “Demokratische Traditionen im westlichen Protestantismus,” in: Hans Pflemn (Hrfg.) Demokratische Traditionen im Protestantismus, Hans Seidel Stiftung e.V, Akademie für Politik und Zeitgeschehen, Heft 2, Olzog Verlag, München 1969, p.9ff. (7-30).
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
that the lack of a comparable Evangelical teaching or programme must not necessarily be seen as a sign of weakness. The need to rethink and reformulate each new problem as it occurs could mean that Evangelism is less doctrinaire and more flexible and dynamic in its response. Compared to the unity and consistency of Catholicism, Evangelical teaching may thus appear tactically inferior but in fact forces Protestants to develop a clearer understanding about the specific nature of their character. This taught them that the most important task was applying the most important principle of Evangelical ethics, that of freedom, in the political context.

Since the Evangelical Church distanced itself from socio-political issues, it could not hope to fulfil the didactic role within Protestantism as the Catholic Church played within Catholicism. Like political Catholicism, Protestants were divided between conservatives, liberals and social-reformists, but this lack of Church involvement meant the Evangelical Church could not reconcile political differences between Protestant groups, as the Catholic Church had tried to do.\(^\text{160}\) It is also not possible to talk of The Protestant Church in the same way as The Catholic Church, since the Protestant Church was divided into a number of independent Evangelical Landeskirchen and into many separate communities and Protestant sects across Germany, all with their own individual rules, traditions and denomination. The Landeskirchen were often closely integrated into the political affairs of local government and lost true independence of activity. This was a situation that not only existed in the 19th century but was criticised for persisting beyond the immediate second world war period.\(^\text{161}\) Despite its fragmented nature, Protestantism is still seen as a credible force, “eine politische Größe ersten Ranges.”\(^\text{162}\)


\(^{161}\) The former member of the Freiburg Circle, Erik Wolf noted; “Eine verhängnisvolle Verquickung der religiösen und sittlichen Begriffe mit den herrschenden politischen Anschauungen und Verhältnissen ... hemmt noch immer die freiheitliche und einheitliche Entwicklung des kirchlichen Verhältnisses.” On a positive note Wolf interestingly also suggests that the relatively autonomous arrangement of independent Churches also meant that they were more resistant to the totalitarian endeavours of the unitarist Reichskirche created in 1933 as the Nazis Christian umbrella organisation. Erik Wolf, “Die Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland” in; Frankfurter Hefte, Heft 2, 1. Jg, 1946, p.83.

The neglect of Protestantism in studies of the origins of the CDU’s Christian democracy can also largely be explained by the perception of Liberalism after 1945. Protestant traditions were not welcomed in the CDU’s programme. Anti-liberalism became a cornerstone of the CDU’s early programmes condemning it alongside Marxism, for instilling a secular and materialist Weltanschauung in German society. Yet the history of political Protestantism is as important to the history of German Christian Democracy and the CDU’s policy of the Social Market Economy, as political Catholicism, and must jointly be examined for its contribution and influence on the CDU’s policies and identity. The study does not refute the negative assertions made about the nature of liberal-Protestantism, indeed it will demonstrate how they hold up under historical scrutiny, but seeks to correct the bias that has been shown towards Catholicism. The study will now highlight the social ethical thinking that emerged in the 19th century and Protestant efforts to develop an interdenominational party. Section 3 examines the significant neo-liberal movement, that began a third way alternative during the Third Reich. This Freiburg circle of neo-liberals rejected the classical 19th century liberalism, driven by exploitative, economic and monopolistic practices, in favour of a neo-, social-ethical liberalism, that still believed in a market economy but with social responsibility. This demonstrates that the Evangelical Weltanschauung, whilst different to Catholic Social Teaching, also contained a code of political ethics which relied on Christian social teaching for reference. It also suggests that from the late 1930s, liberalism was starting to undergo redefinition and revival, to restore those aspects of its original humanitarian interpretation and its association with European western culture, and give new emphasis on a moral economy. It was this strand of liberalism that would have a significant impact on politics after 1945.

To examine the liberal and conservative traditions in German Protestantism, this section will begin with a short inquiry into the religious forms of Protestantism, namely Lutheranism and Calvinism in order to understand the religious motives driving political Protestantism. Here the study draws on the thoughts of Max Weber and Ernst Troeltsch, two of the most eminent sociological and economic thinkers of in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. They offer a good insight into the parallels between Protestantism and Catholicism, and their theories of the relationship between religion and the economy aid deeper understanding of the CDU’s programme after 1945. The study continues by
tracing political initiatives within 19th and early 20th century German Protestantism towards a social, ethical, political programme, examining political parties and individual social reformists who contributed towards that aim. It took no less than three hundred years from when the first Protestant reformers Luther, Calvin and Zwingli formulated initial ideas on how society should be organised,\(^{163}\) to the rise of a specific Evangelical-social movement in the 19th century, marked by figures such as Johann Hinrich Wichern (1808-1881), Adolf Stöcker (1835-1909), Viktor Aimé Huber and Friedrich Naumann (1860-1919). Specific attention will be paid to those political parties whose programmes represented the interests of German Protestants from the mid 19th century until the dissolution of political parties by Hitler in 1933. Besides the focus on liberal parties in this period, some attention will be given to the conservative parties in the mid to late 19th century period, in order to demonstrate where liberal and conservative\(^{164}\) programmes meet and diverge and secondly to highlight how many of the Conservative parties' ideas were generic to conservative Catholics and to conservative Protestants alike. Finally the study will examine the neo-Liberalist programme developed during the Third Reich by Evangelicals and Catholics of the Freiburg Circle. The third way solutions put forward by the Freiburg groups of economists and socialists must be considered as forerunners to the Social Market Economy in the immediate post second world war period.

**Towards an understanding of Lutheranism and Calvinism through**

**Max Weber and Ernst Troeltsch**

Troeltsch was interested in the importance of religious thought for the development of the modern state and Weber was concerned with investigating the origin and the nature of capitalism, by identifying causal links between Protestantism and the pursuit of capitalism. Weber himself summarised that Troeltsch's two volumes of *Die Sociallehren*  

\(^{163}\) Karrenberg however maintains that even the leaders of the Reformation, Calvin and Luther, were not concerned with economic and social issues and had never claimed to have devised a concept of a society based on a Christian order. Friedrich Karrenberg, "Geschichte der sozialen Ideen im deutschen Protestantismus" in; Wilfried Gottschalch/Friedrich Karrenberg/Franz Josef Stegmann, op.cit. p.563ff (563-694).

\(^{164}\) Whilst it is possible to show that there were elements of programmatic continuity from the conservative party traditions beyond 1945, there were equally as many items, which due to their implicit links to national socialism, were consciously expunged from the CDU's new programme.
der christlichen Kirchen in 1911, were primarily concerned with the Lehre, the doctrine of religion, unlike Weber who was concerned with what he calls the ‘practical’ consequences of religion. Troeltsch himself stated that;

"Without a definite mental and spiritual background, a system of this kind (capitalism) cannot become dominant.”

This supports one of the central themes of this study, namely that the CDU concentrated on establishing a religious ethical substratum to its politics in order that a market economy could subsequently flourish in a stable political and moral society.

**Ernst Troeltsch**

Troeltsch outlined that the early forms of Protestantism, Lutheranism and Calvinism, were representative of a Church civilisation that existed during the middle ages, a universal Christian civilisation, regulating State and society, based on the belief that Natural Law is identical with the Law of God. Obedience to authority was the essence of Luther’s political thought. Luther believed that by serving the State one was also serving God, indeed it was the State that made a religious life possible. Since authority is divine authority, obedience to the state was both a political and a religious duty. Luther was not an exponent of early political liberalism however. His orthodox philosophy demanded subjection to an absolutist ruler and did not encourage the individual to develop as a liberal and critical citizen. As a conservative, Luther supported the ruling classes and prophesised that there would be those in the Catholic Church who would also choose to embrace Protestantism, not for theological reasons, but as a means of stabilising and maintaining their political power. Conversely Troeltsch conceded that Lutheranism closely followed Catholic social philosophy. It adopted the same Catholic doctrine that since the Middle Ages had relied upon the unpoltical character of a society’s individuals and on the traditional economic arrangement of society into guilds.

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167 Ibid., p.51.

168 Reinhold Aris, op. cit. p.297.
Luther encouraged the attitude that the order of things in society, including the ruling authorities, were beyond reproach. Nurtured obedience to state institutions and a passive acceptance of one's place in society instilled the correct conservative attitude amongst Protestants. Luther's *Zwei-Reich Lehre* was intended to separate the roles and responsibilities of Church and State, yet the Reformation actually introduced a closer, more dependent relationship between the Evangelical Church and the State, where the Church became subordinate to the dictates of the State. As the links between the State and the Evangelical Church continued into the 19th century, religion came to be seen as a way of actively strengthening people's identification with king and country.  

The *Zwei Reiche Lehre* distinction between an earthly world and a spiritual sphere was not intended to absolve individuals of their responsibility in society.  

Like Catholicism, Lutheranism felt threatened by the challenges of modern society, the formation of the nation state with its political and economic struggle for power, the unlimited aspirations of capitalism and the rise of the masses. In the modern liberal society, social cohesion would be sought through equality before law and not by the traditional doctrine of social harmony and of a system of guilds or estates. Further Catholic and Lutheran parallels are found in the idea of the organic state, the inspiration of the philosopher and 'founder' of political Protestantism, Friedrich Schleiermacher. The organic state was anti-Enlightenment and above all anti-revolutionary, since it is the nature of an organism that it does not alter violently or suddenly, but evolves over a period of time. This thinking formed the backbone of Catholic and Protestant Conservatism, as a safeguard against the alienation of the individual in society. The urgent need for social reform as a response to the challenges of the modern age, was, according to Troeltzsch however, only successfully understood and developed by Catholicism. Indeed Luther's reform of the Church saw Protestantism simply as a modification of Catholicism. Like Catholicism it was also concerned with assuring man's salvation, but Protestantism held different views.


170 "Die viel zitierte lutherische Zwei-Reiche-Lehre... wäre völlig mißverstanden, wollte man sie so interpretieren, als sei die Ordnung der weltlichen Bezüge damit aus der christlichen Verantwortung, aus christlichem Mitdenken entlassen." Friedrich Karrenberg, op.cit. p.563.

171 Reinold Aris, op.cit.. p.291.
about how this could best be achieved. (These answers were partially linked to the concept of predestination which most concerned Weber). Catholicism believed the Church would be the guide of social reform, whilst involving a return to Christian Natural Law in which group-solidarity and a respect for a system of class distinctions prevailed. In contrast to early Catholic thinking however, 19th century political Catholicism believed capitalist activity could be incorporated into the system, provided that it did not threaten social cohesion in society. Troeltsch concluded that: “the modern Catholic social policy is a capitalistic regenerated programme of mediaeval class ideas.”

Although German Protestantism is generally understood to belong to the Lutheran variety, the Calvinist strand must not be forgotten. Calvinism took a more active role in the changing modern social, political and economic conditions of the industrial revolution, transforming the entire Christian social philosophy and ethics in countries such as England and the United States where it took root. As Calvinism developed, Troeltsch maintains, Lutheranism was left behind and soon became stationary. Calvinism showed all signs of becoming a major political influence in the world, in all matters of ethics, organisation, politics and social questions and makes its practical influence all the greater. Calvinism stood as the democratic, revolutionary strand in Evangelical thinking, inciting resistance to despotic rule in the Anglo-Saxon revolutions. The Calvinist version of Protestantism defended itself against suppression by the State and placed the right to resist (Widerstandsrecht) as the central tenet of its philosophy. This contrasts sharply with the non-revolutionary Lutheran Protestantism with its belief in the patriarchal state that demanded state power was respected as a manifestation of God’s will.


173 Ibid.

174 Ernst Troeltsch, Protestantism and Progress. op.cit., p.54.
After the defeat of the First World War and the upheaval of the 1918 Revolution in Germany, Troeltsch delivered an essay on the opportunities for German Democracy insisting that democracy was no longer only a doctrine but had become a practical necessity;

"Democracy can unite broad social strata to facilitate enormous productivity, can supply a foundation of love and affection for the common state, can bring into greater play the dignity and personality of each citizen, can root responsibility and initiative in individual will and can effect a selection of fresh talents and will: all things of the highest ethical value and most fruitful political significance." 176

He insisted that while the Germans have; "no talent for democracy and none at all for politics or what amounts to the same thing," they must learn it. Social conservatives, he argued, who believed that the German spirit and culture descended from the traditions of the romantics and humanists, the German empire of the middle ages and from Luther and the Reformation, must learn that democracy is not incompatible with this line of tradition. Importantly the essay foresees areas of linkage;

'our classical spiritual heritage also offers sufficient lines of connection to a spiritual-ethical conception of democracy.' 177

This highlights the potential compatibility that existed between conservative traditions and liberal democracy, that would later lead to third way political solutions in Christian Democracy.

Max Weber

The views of Max Weber both complement and complete Troeltsch's analysis on the relationship between politics and religion. As a member of the Deutsche Demokratische


177 Ibid.

178 It is not possible here to enter into a full detailed discussion of Weber's political ideas and their possible impact on the development of German history. The study will restrict its focus to the relationship between religion and politics and consider Weber's contribution in the DDP. Indeed Weber's views on
Partei (DDP) and as a prominent sociologist in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Weber actively contributed to the shaping of German politics in this period. Weber’s ideas would most certainly have influenced the political thinking of senior post Second World War politicians who had served alongside Weber in parties in the Weimar Republic. Max Weber belonged to the class of German Liberals who admired the parliamentary system in England and glorified England Protestantism for the promotion of German modernisation, hoping that imperial Germany would emulate Great Britain in political liberty and world power. At the same time Weber also believed in the notion of Germany’s anti-western, non-democratic Sonderentwicklung and was committed to the pursuit of German nationalism.

Weber showed no more sympathy to Protestantism than he did towards Catholicism. In fact he did not follow the ethics of Jesus Christ but adhered to his own absolutist ethics of responsibility. Midgley has noted;

“If Christianity were content to be an ideology - a subjective meaning imposed upon a meaningless universe - it would be awarded a place. Given that Christianity .... is not an ideology, there is no room for it in Weber’s realm of values.”

the influences of religion for economic society have undergone considerable scrutiny and the validity of his theories have been fundamentally questioned. The study’s further neglect of other subjects in Weber’s thinking in particular the very relevant questions of Volkssoveranität and Führerdemokratie have for reasons of space been compromised here.

179 A parliamentary monarchy was in fact the best form of state that Weber could envisage, based on the belief that if the highest position in the country was ‘occupied’ by the monarch, politicians would not be consumed the ambition to become head of state. A politician’s power was thus adequately restrained. Wolfgang J. Mommsen, Max Weber und die deutsche Politik 1890-1920, Mohr, Tübingen 1959, p.311.


182 His nationalism was not of a kind that inspired the Nazis’ National Socialism. Despite supporting Realpolitik and German Kultur, he was not a Social Darwinist or anti-Semitic. See W.G Runciman, Max Weber. Selections in Translation, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1978. p.209. National identity for Weber was not based on specific categories of language or ethnicity, but was a dependent concept, shaped by its relationship to political events and the state. See also Harry Liebersohn, “Weber’s Historical Concept of National Identity” in; Harmut Lehmann/Günther Roth op. cit., p.131.

So Weber treated Protestantism and Catholicism as if they were ideologies, where the Christian confessions had imposed a subjective meaning upon the institution of the Church, which is merely a human organisation, and not a divine society.

During the nineteenth century, economists and sociologists, including Weber, found themselves embroiled in the so-called 'Methodenkrieg' debating the merits of different economic models for social organisation. The debate was broadly divided into two schools of thought: the English tradition of the ‘Classical Economic School’ and the German ‘Historical School.’ The classic economics of the English tradition or ‘Manchesterism’ was based on a set of ahistorical, economic rules which were fuelled by self-interest and laissez-faire. In Germany however it was thought that the lateness of the industrial revolution and a largely agrarian population made the English approach unsuitable. Society, it seemed, was changing too rapidly in Germany and demanded that the economy was obliged to also take the negative social consequences of the industrial revolution into consideration. The organisation of the economy is thus crucially held to be historically variable. The German Historical School further argued that society’s economic activity can not be divorced from legal, political and religious factors. Individuals are influenced by ethical considerations such as duty, the desire for glory or their wish to conform. Since these factors are changeable, it follows that economic phenomena must also remain variable.\textsuperscript{184} Weber importantly followed the teaching of the German Historical School, postulating that Germany’s unique form of capitalism was an historical phenomenon.

In his classic treatise \textit{The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism}, Weber hoped to contribute to the debate on how ideas affect historical reality:

"Zur Veranschaulichung der Art, in der überhaupt die ‘Ideen’ in der Geschichte wirksam werden."\textsuperscript{185}

\textsuperscript{185} Max Weber, \textit{Die protestantische Ethik} I in; Johannes Winckelmann (Hrsg.), op. cit., p.76.
It is worth noting that the *Protestant Ethic* was written in a period in history when Weber sought to reinvigorate the middle classes to engage in a class conscious, political struggle against conservatism. He hoped that the implementation of a liberal, social policy would attract the support of the German Bürgertum and the proletariat to join in the fight against conservatism.\(^{186}\) Even if historians and sociologists have since re-evaluated the tenability of Weber’s ‘Protestant Ethic’ thesis and the efficacy of religious ideas in reality, the work nevertheless enforces the ideological interest that Weber pursued. It is also important to recognise the great impact of the work, not only after its release in 1905 but also in the Weimar period and beyond. Weimar politicians and specifically those that went on to shape the CDU’s programme after 1945 were, as contemporaries of Max Weber, direct recipients and therefore also practitioners of his political thinking.

It is not the occasion here to assess the validity of Weber’s Protestant Ethic thesis, but to understand Weber’s distinction between Catholic and Protestant attitudes to capitalism. Weber focuses his attention in *Die protestantische Ethik*, on the affinity between religious beliefs and a rational economic ethic, which he said embodied the ‘spirit’ of capitalism. This affinity would suggest that there is a causal link between Protestant beliefs and the rational capitalist mentality, with the assertion that it was Calvinistic asceticism which produced the capitalist spirit on which the capitalist system relies.\(^{187}\)

The capitalist spirit was seen to create the correct psychological conditions ‘eine anerzogene geistige Eigenart’ for capitalism to emerge and be sustained. The fact that Protestants predominately occupied the upper echelons of modern industry could, Weber concedes, be as much historically determined as causal, admitting for example that more Protestants had access to a university education than Catholics, and hence their enhanced wealth creating opportunities. Yet he insists in his final conclusion that there are differing attitudinal and psychological dispositions between Protestants and Catholics.\(^{188}\)


\(^{187}\) The exact nature of the causal link between Calvinism and Capitalism is ambiguous, since the capitalist spirit is both the distinguishing characteristic of and the important precondition for the capitalist system.

\(^{188}\) "Der Grund des verschiedenen Verhaltens muß also der Hauptsache nach in der dauernden inneren Eigenart und nicht nur in der jeweiligen äußeren historisch-politischen Lage der Konfessionen gesucht werden" in; Max Weber , *Die protestantische Ethik* I, op. cit., p.33.
The ethical teachings of Calvinism are believed to be conducive to fostering a capitalist economic order and outlook, allowing spiritual energy to be channelled towards capitalist ends.\(^\text{189}\) Its premise is based on the Calvinist concept of 'predestination'. Before discussing the term, it should be remembered that Weber's interest was not in the official doctrines of Protestantism but rather on the \textit{unintended} consequences of accepting them. These consequences included what Weber described in \textit{The Protestant Ethic} as a "direction to practical conduct".\(^\text{190}\) It is interesting to briefly consider how the belief in predestination impacts on practical conduct. The doctrine of predestination is based on an individual's ignorance of their ultimate destiny and an obsession with salvation from God's damnation. This predicament is characterised by the question "am I among the chosen?" The individual is powerless to intervene to change God's decree, but by conducting a life according to the doctrine of Protestant ethics, the individual could win God's favour and be assured of the certainty of salvation. The Calvinist is freed from the fear of damnation by becoming successful in one's profession or chosen career. This encourages work to be performed as if it were an absolute end in itself - a calling. By virtue of continuous capitalist enterprise, profit is renewable and so becomes an end in itself. The 'ethic' or 'ethos' of modern capitalism develops from the individual's belief that it his or her 'duty' \textit{(Berufspflicht)}\(^\text{191}\) to increase and accumulate wealth and capital where the motivation is driven by transcendent values and not through selfishness or greed. The need for this new spirit of modern capitalism stands in contrast to the classical economic morality that preceded it, when capitalist endeavour sought the ruthless acquisition of wealth, connoting vulgar materialism, 'adventurist' speculating and risk. Weber's new vision of the modern capitalist therefore is of a frugal individual, tamed by 'bourgeois rationality'\(^\text{192}\) who restricts personal consumption, maximises profits rationally, runs low risks and calculates returns on investment. For Weber ethics formed the basis of an individual's activities.

\(^{189}\) The assumption that Calvin and Calvinism led the way to capitalism has been strongly disputed by Karl Holl who claims Calvinism did more to fight the capitalist economy than foster it. Karl Holl, \textit{Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Kirchengeschichte. Band 1}, p.385ff; cited in Friedrich Karrenberg, op. cit., p.564.


\(^{191}\) "Der Mensch ist auf das Erwerben als Zweck seines Lebens, nicht mehr das Erwerben auf den Menschen als Mittel zum Zweck der Befriedigung seiner materiellen Lebensbedürfnisse bezogen." Max Weber, \textit{Die protestantische Ethik} I, op. cit., p.44.

\(^{192}\) Gordon Marshall, op. cit., p.44.
In the Lutheran tradition, work or Beruf is carried out as a God ordained duty to authority, whilst in Calvinism the motivation is ascetic. It is due to this distinction that Catholics regarded Calvinism and not Lutheranism as its religious opponent.\footnote{In Calvinism "eine ganz andersartige Beziehung zwischen religiösem Leben und irdischem Handeln hergestellt ist als sowohl im Katholizismus wie im Luthertum." Max Weber, Die protestantische Ethik I, op. cit., p.73.} Although Weber never fully pursued the subject of Protestantism and modernity in Germany, leaving this task to Troeltsch,\footnote{Thomas Nipperdey, "Max Weber, Protestantism and the Debate around 1900" in; Harmut Lehmann/Günther Roth (Editors), op.cit., p.80.} Troeltsch’s influence on Weber should not be underestimated.\footnote{Friedrich Wilhelm Graf, "The German Theological Sources and Protestant Church Politics" in; Harmut Lehmann/Günther Roth, op.cit., p.32.} Troeltsch believed the Protestant concept of the calling as ‘the Christian justification of industrial life’ is derived from the conservative doctrine of each and every individual or worker contributing to society in accordance with their appointed function or class, the guild system which is Catholic in origin.\footnote{Ernst Troeltsch, Protestantism and Progress, op. cit., p.129f.} The chief architect of the Social Market Economy, Alfred Müller-Armack\footnote{Alfred Müller-Armack, Religion und Wirtschaft, Kohlhammer, Stuttgart 1959, p.545.} defined what he saw as the fundamental differences between Catholicism, Lutheranism and Calvinism:


This not only demonstrates the more obvious correlation between socio-economic development and religion but implies that the nature of that development is defined by the particular denominational characteristics of that religion. Whereas Catholicism focused its economic activity on agriculture and handicrafts, attacking finance, credit and wholesale trade and adhered to the Canon-Law ban on investment and interest, Calvinism encouraged the expansion of industrialisation and capitalism and rejected Canon-law restrictions on investment. The natural if not simplified conjecture to this,
which is inferred by Troeltsch, is that modern capitalist development can be ascribed not
to Protestantism as a whole but to Calvinism in particular. ¹⁹⁸

The religious sociology practised by Ernst Troeltsch and Max Weber was an
investigation into how far religious ethos influenced political, economic and social
aspects of life. It needs little elucidation to see why this inquiry should also preoccupy
Christian Democrats after 1945, when the challenge lay in instigating the correct ‘spirit’
for capitalist activity in Germany, whilst at the same time preventing the development of
an unrestrained form of capitalism, that is driven by profit and power and lacking in any
ethical foundation. Weber’s pertinent essay ‘Politik als Beruf’¹⁹⁹, written in the post-war,
revolutionary mood of 1919, but not published until the later years of the Weimar
Republic, must be examined not only for its influence on Weber’s intended audience of
post first world war politicians, but re-examined for its lessons for politicians after the
second world war, among them, those individuals who took up responsibility in the new
CDU.

The essay investigates the nature of a politician’s calling to a political vocation. There
are two ways of making politics one’s vocation; either one lives ‘for’ politics or one
lives ‘off’ politics, although he adds that the contrast is not exclusive and in reality the
politician does both. ²⁰⁰ The politician who lives for politics makes politics his life. He is
not dependent on his vocation for his livelihood but gains meaning in his life by serving
this cause. He who lives ‘off’ politics as a vocation makes politics his permanent source
of income. Although the power instinct belongs to the normal attributes of every type of
politician, the danger exists when that urge for power detaches itself from reality and
drives only self-interest. This type of politician is a contemptible species of politician
who acts out of vanity and lacks realism and responsibility. ²⁰¹ Weber inquires whether it

¹⁹⁸ Despite important areas of incompatibility between Calvinism and Lutheranism in the Protestant
tradition, in the context of 19th century Germany they represented one united front against Catholicism.
Albert Ritschl had sought to emphasises the unity amongst Lutheran and Calvinist Protestants, even if
he had a higher regard for Lutheranism. Weber strong opposed Ritschl, arguing that Lutheranism was a
deficient form of Protestant religiosity and relied on Matthias Schneckenburger for his analysis of the
differences between the Lutheran and Calvinist religions. See Friedrich Wilhelm Graf, op.cit., p.46.


²⁰⁰ Ibid., p.16.

²⁰¹ Ibid., p.63.
is even possible to talk of compatibility between ethics and politics, when the instrument of politics is power which by definition relies on the threat or the use of violence.\textsuperscript{202} The answer is found in the nature of \textit{justified} intention. The ethical standards that govern political activity are based on \textit{intentions,} \textit{Gesinnungsethik,} or responsibility \textit{Verantwortungsethik}. If the \textit{intentions} of a particular action are noble then the code of ethics behind that action are justified as meaningful, even if in reality they are not. An action governed by the ethics of intention is based on the Christian belief that if the Christian acts correctly, whatever the outcome may be, it will be decided by God. The ethics of \textit{intention} falls short when the end, or intention, is considered to sanctify often violent or evil means. The individual is not compelled to feel personal blame or moral responsibility for improper behaviour, arguing that it was God’s will to create humans this way, however imperfect they might be. The ethics of \textit{responsibility} on the other hand, presupposes that the individual is answerable to the consequences of their own actions. An individual behaving according to the ethics of responsibility also acknowledges that humans have faults, but instead of shifting the blame and responsibility, they accept the full consequence of their behaviour. It was precisely Weber’s appeal to those called to political life to employ an \textit{ethics of responsibility,} to accept the consequences of their actions, rather than an \textit{ethics of intentions} which implied that any means could be justified in the name of an ultimate end.

What then is the relevance of \textit{Gesinnungsethik} and \textit{Verantwortungsethik} in the context of this study? Protestantism, according to Weber had legitimised the power of the state and thereby also legitimated violence as a means. Lutheranism in particular had taken the responsibility for war away from the individual and transferred it to government, which for the individual, it could never be a sin to obey. Luther is thus blamed for fostering an attitude that legitimatised an authoritarian state as a divine institution. Weimar’s \textit{Interessenparteien} as this section will now show, did not pursue worthy political ideals since they were harnessed by the need to fulfil particular class interests and short term goals. They did not project their vision of a \textit{bonum commune} through their programmes but sought only to retain political power, failing to take the full responsibility of a political party. These are examples of Weber’s \textit{Gesinnungsethik} and point to failure of

\textsuperscript{202} Ibid., p. 68.
the Bismarckian, Wilhelmian periods and the Weimar Republic to correct elements of German political society. An ethics of responsibility therefore clearly represented the best ethics for Germany to adopt after 1945. Weber finally concludes the essay by stating that both the ethics of intention and the ethics of responsibility are not diametrically opposed but indeed complementary and that only together do they make a man truly qualified for a political vocation.

"Insofern sind Gesinnungsethik und Verantwortungsethik nicht absolute Gegensätze, sondern Ergänzungen, die zusammen erst den echten Menschen ausmachen, den, der den 'Beruf zur Politik' haben kann." 203

Germany's historical experience nevertheless demanded a re-assessment of the individual's role towards political responsibility, both as voter and as politician, one which sought to replace the passive, submissive character for an active, democratic and responsible participant in political affairs. Later sections will show that among others, Konrad Adenauer embodied the post Second World War figure of the Verantwortungsethiker, whilst even retaining some Machiavellian characteristics that could be seen to fulfill the complementary measure of Gesinnungsethik. There are further, more minor incidentals in applying Weber's theory of the vocation of politics to the figure of Adenauer. According to Weber, the lawyer was the kind of educated professional suitable for political service. Adenauer also studied law. The wider significance of the lawyer as politician in the rise of a political party is an interesting one to draw parallels with the rise of the CDU. According to Weber, a political party relies on the same techniques as a lawyer, since parties who manage politics are simply managing interests. The skill of the trained lawyer is to plead effectively the cause of his or her client. The lawyer wins by making a 'strong case' for his or her clients' arguments and knows how to use language most effectively for success. These are obvious parallels to the task of a political party in legitimating its political programme to win elections, and to Adenauer's rhetorical skill in particular.

Social ethical thinking in German Protestantism

Protestantism has been criticised for its failure to recognise or adequately respond to the 'social question' in late 19th century society and those attempts to instigate a social movement from within the Protestant camp have been accused of not going beyond the experimental stage.\textsuperscript{204} The movement was marked by the figures of Johann Hinrich Wichern, Victor Aimé Huber, Friedrich Karl von Bodenschwingh and Adolf Stoecker. Bodenschwingh differed from other social thinkers of his time, emphasising that the responsibility of the Protestant Church did not lie with solving the social question, but with its involvement in state institutions and its development towards a parliamentary system. This stood in contrast to the approach by the Catholic Church which campaigned for the freedom of the Church and for the rights of the working class individual in society.\textsuperscript{205}

Described by one post war commentator with some exaggeration as "die stärkste und eindrucksvollste Persönlichkeit, die der Protestantismus im 19. Jahrhundert hervorgebracht hat",\textsuperscript{206} Johann Hinrich Wichern may be seen to be a pioneering representative of the early Christian social movement. His \textit{Innere Mission} was aimed at supporting individuals' social and religious needs and reuniting the divided Protestant Church. He believed that through a renewal of the Christian faith and Christian socialism, he could establish the basis for social and economic renewal.\textsuperscript{207} His historical sermon at the Wittenberg \textit{Kirchentag} in 1848 succeeded above all in raising awareness of the struggle Christianity would face in future with communist-socialism over the social plight of the proletariat, and established the Central Committee for the Inner Mission in 1849 to act as a Christian bulwark against communism. A series of follow-up Church

\textsuperscript{204} Gerhard Schulz, "Die 'Christliche Union' und die kirchliche Tradition" in; M.G Lange/G. Schulz, K. Schütz. Mit einer Einleitung von Sigmund Neumann, Parteien in der Bundesrepublik. Studien zur Entwicklung der deutschen Parteien bis zur Bundestagswahl 1953, Ring Verlag, Stuttgart/Düsseldorf 1955, p.36 (p.26-40).

\textsuperscript{205} "Der deutsche Protestantismus, in einem anders gearteten Verhältnis zur staatlichen Autorität, stieß bei seiner Sorge um den Arbeiter zunächst auf wirtschaftliche Probleme, deren Wechselwirkung mit politischen Problemen er jedoch bald erkannte." Ernst Deuerlein, CDU/CSU 1945-1947 Beiträge zur Zeitgeschichte, J. P Bachem, Köln 1957, p.25.


\textsuperscript{207} William O'Shanahan, op. cit., p.212.
congresses gave an important impulse to social policy initiatives within the Evangelical Church, even if his ideas remained largely theoretical judgements which never went so far as practical social policy recommendations or resulted in industrial legislation to improve workers' conditions.\footnote{Hans-Georg Aschoff, op. cit., p.70.} Wichern sought to implement the kind of traditional, patriarchal spirit to regulate employer-employee relations that harked back to a pre-industrial, romantic age and advocated gradual social reform through state institutions. This is cited as an explanation why Wichern is not remembered as a true initiator of an Evangelical social movement.\footnote{Günter Brakelmann, Die Soziale Frage des 19. Jahrhunderts. Teil II: Die evangelisch-soziale und die katholisch-soziale Bewegung, Luther Verlag, Witten/Ruhr 1962, p.35.} In the same year he outlined his views in the Denkschrift entitled Die innere Mission der deutschen evangelischen Kirche which interestingly was reprinted in a new edition in 1948.\footnote{J. H Wichern, Die inner Mission der deutschen evangelischen Kirche. Eine Denkschrift an die deutsche Nation, im Auftrage des Centralausschusses für die innere Mission. Martin Gerhardt (Hrsg), Agentur des Rauhen Hauses, Hamburg 1948.} Under the influence of Friedrich Julius Stahl, Wichern adapted his programmatic concerns to more conservative viewpoints, and the reform element in his social thinking was diluted to idealise a more traditional Christian ordered community. Further examples of theological inconsistencies in his thinking and his inability to create a true dialogue between the Church and the modern, secular world have caused him to be criticised for encouraging a geistige Ideologisierung in Christianity's relationship to socialism.\footnote{"Seine ganze Konzeption des christlichen Staates und der christlichen Gesellschaft, auch wenn sie einzelne großartige Elemente enthalten hat, wurde somit zur spätbürgerlichen christlichen Ideologie" im: Günter Brakelmann, op. cit., p.37.} Closely related to the views of Wichern was Victor Aimé Huber, a less well-known Evangelical social political thinker, who first saw the social question as a working class issue.\footnote{Fritz Fischer, "Der deutsche Protestantismus und die Politik im 19. Jahrhundert" in: Historische Zeitschrift Nr.171, 1951, p.505 (p.473-518).} He recognised the importance of the new industrial age and the significant role that the working classes would play in future.\footnote{Günter Brakelmann, op. cit., p.46.} In strong opposition to the revolutionary politicisation of the labour movement by Ferdinand Lassalle, Huber single-handedly sought to bring about social change from within existing society, attracting the attention of Catholic social thinkers including Bishop von Ketteler. Huber's programme
suggestions for workers' participation in industrial production, industrial action, plus profit share schemes, reflect trade unionist ideas even before workers and parties had begun to mobilise the trade union movement. In contrast to Wichern, Huber did not advocate state intervention to solve the social question. His vision of co-operative associations would allow individuals the freedom to perform 'self-help' programmes and offered the best guarantee for solving social injustices between the rich and the poor. Huber saw the possibilities for a non-political social reform by calling upon private responsibility in the name of religion and insisted that Gewerbefreiheit, Freizügigkeit und freies Niederlassungsrecht represented the three pillars of social freedom.

The earlier section on political Catholicism showed that appeals by the Christian trade unions in the 1920s to recognise their common Christian values could not combat the years of ingrained prejudice between Protestants and Catholics. Yet those moves towards creating an interdenominational party by Christian trade unionists including Adam Stegerwald were supported by prominent Evangelical figures such as Heinrich Braun, Rudolf Bornemann and Karl Anton Schulte. They emphasised the communality shared in Christianity, the freedom of the individual and sovereignty of the people, and sought where possible to minimise confessional differences. The views of the Evangelical teacher of national law and Protestant conservative, Friedrich Julius Stahl coincided with the romantic views of the Catholic and liberal conservative Josef Görres, who believed in forming a 'Christian state' where political parties were bound, not by organisational factors, but by confession. Although there is evidence between 1815 and 1933 of real links between the Centre Party and humanitarian, socially conscious Protestants such as Adolf Stoecker, Friedrich Julius Stahl and Johann Hinrich Wichern, Becker maintains however that it would be illusory to talk of any real political break-through.

"Eine gemeinsame Parteibildung auf der Grundlage eines Einverständnisses über das christliche Menschenbild wurde nicht erreicht. Das Trennende zwischen den Konfessionen wurde zumal in Deutschland stärker empfunden als die Infragestellung

214 Friedrich Karrenberg, op. cit., p.577.
215 William O'Shanahan, op. cit., p.283.
216 Ernst Deuerlein, CDU/CSU 1945-1947, op. cit., p.16.
217 Winfried Becker, Die Zentrumspartei., op. cit., p.276f.
des Christentums durch die tendenziell oder offen säkularistischen Weltanschauungen."
2.1. Liberal and Conservative Parties before and during the Weimar Republic

Chapter one of this section on political Catholicism discussed the ideological conflict between conservatism and liberalism, that defined the Weltanschauung and the region-specific, socio-economic Milieu of Catholics and the basis for Germany's political parties.\(^{218}\) It was discussed, that as a political idea, conservatism - whilst in existence before the French Revolution\(^{219}\) - gained new force as a specific political movement to respond to the liberalism of the Enlightenment. The early Romantic definition of conservatism aimed at protecting the status quo, was anti-establishment and anti-liberal in tone and took a defensive reaction to state power and interference.\(^{220}\) In the period 1850-60, the Conservative-Liberal dichotomy sub-divided into six further categories which distinguished between social democrats, left liberals, right national liberals, Catholics, plus at least two factions of Conservatives, and was a clear indication that Germany would develop into a multi-party, pluralistic state. German parties were characterised by loyalty to philosophical and ideological principles, and political campaigns were run on “politische Glaubensbekenntnisse”\(^{221}\) earning German parties the title of ‘Weltanschauungsparteien.’ By the time of the Reich’s foundation in 1870, the shared antagonism towards Socialist and Catholic ideologies and mutual nationalist interests led to a fusion of liberal and conservative groups into one united national camp, shrinking the previous six ideological categories to just three, Catholics, Socialists and

\(^{218}\) It has been argued that the regional dimension of a particular socio-cultural milieu, including its religious and social characteristics were the most significant influences on voting behaviour. See M. Rainer Lepsius, “Parteiensystem und Sozialstruktur. Zum Problem der Demokratisierung der deutschen Gesellschaft” in; Gerhard A. Ritter (Hrsg.), Die Deutschen Parteien vor 1918, Kiepenheuer & Witsch, Köln 1973, p.67. Karl Rohe goes so far as to suggest that the party system of the early Kaisereich should be understood as a loosely connected system of regional party systems, which were only transformed once national politics took a more dominating role. Karl Rohe, Elections, Parties and Political Traditions. Social Foundations of German Parties and Party Systems, 1867-1987, Berg, Providence 1990, p.9.

\(^{219}\) Panajotis Kondylis defines the beginning of conservatism as the reaction to the emergence of the absolutist state. Panajotis Kondylis, Konservatismus - Geschichtlicher Gehalt und Untergang, Klett-Cotta, Stuttgart 1986.

\(^{220}\) Karl Rohe, “Entwicklungen ....” op.cit., p.43.

Nationals. Conservatism had thus developed into a movement which sought its identity not anti, but indeed with the State.

Liberalism and Conservatism therefore prove wholly inadequate terms to accurately describe the political aspirations of the parties of the newly found Reich. Between the 1848 revolution and the foundation of the Reich and beyond, the terms defy any attempt to maintain ideological continuity. It is a task of this study to show that re-definition and re-evaluation of the concepts 'conservative' and 'liberal' in the mid to late 19th century and early 20th century, can account for seemingly dramatic re-inventions of parties’ political identities over time. In the same way that the Centre Party deserved specific mention for its influence on the CDU, certain conservative and liberal parties from the late 19th century and early 20th century Weimar Republic also provided political impulses for the content of the CDU’s programmes after 1945, as well as a body of able conservative and liberal politicians. This will therefore provide the focus for the remaining part of this chapter.

Conservative parties
The conservative wing of Protestantism included those who saw the root of all evil in the liberal ideas of 1789, such as the brothers Gerlach, Friedrich Julius Stahl, and the federalists who were sceptical of the State and its central bureaucratic authority. Both strands held common core conservative values, rejection of the parliamentary system, suspicion of modernity, support for the monarchy, emphasis on the 'whole' society and not on the individual, and loyalty to tradition and religion. The Protestant orthodox-conservatives, the Altkonservativen were among those who opposed the Prussian annexation of German Länder in 1866 for fear that the Evangelical Church would become part of the Prussian Union, causing the party to split in 1867. A break-away group calling themselves the Freikonservative Vereinigung thereby demonstrated their support for Bismarck's policies. The Altkonservativen who also found themselves unable

222 Karl Rohe, Entwicklungen .." op.cit., p.47ff.
223 Ernst Ludwig von Gerlach who opposed the ambition of the Kulturkampf to achieve state omnipotence left the Prussian Konservative Partei to join the Centre Party.
224 Referred to as a champion of autocratic hierarchy, Stahl differed in philosophy to the Gerlach brothers in granting people some constitutional rights. He could therefore be seen more as a reformist conservative who suggested a way towards a constitutional monarchy.
to withstand the nationalism which followed the Reich’s foundation, gradually drew their cause closer to Bismarck too. The Deutscher Nationalverein and the national, liberal Protestantenverein were conservative parties that sought to redefine Protestantism by bringing it in line with modern society. But they too were rapidly subsumed by Bismarck’s nationalist striving for German unity. A further group of federalist conservatives, the Deutschkonservative Partei founded in Frankfurt/Main in 1876, declared themselves representatives of non-Prussian conservatives, yet continued to endorse Prussian hegemony and uphold the status of the aristocracy within the German Reich.225

The traditional show of Conservative opposition to a liberal, anti-feudal and democratic nationalism was further distorted once German nationalism adopted imperialist and expansionist ambitions from the turn of the century, inciting the Conservatives to declare in the Reichstag in 1910;

“We sind fürs Königtum, wir sind für Herr und Marine, wir sind für alles Nationale.”226

Bismarck could confidently rely on conservative support for almost all government policies, in particular military expansion where it promised to increase the Reich’s power and influence in international affairs. Former political divisions between the conservatives and the liberals increasingly blurred and the conservative cause soon became synonymous with the national cause. They shared a vehement opposition to socialist and ultramontane political majorities, and found common ground with the liberals’ anti-federal and nationalistic outlook.227 Among the ideological shifting and shuffling of the mainstream parties, unexpected but significant parallels were redrawn across the party spectrum, causing Friedrich Naumann for example to note in 1911 that

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225 The federal ambitions of the Deutschkonservative Partei were questionable as they continued to see the Reich as an enlarged Prussia and explains why they failed to draw support from conservatives in other regions of the Reich. From 1890 they turned their support to representing the interests of agricultural industry. Helga Grebing, Geschichte der deutschen Parteien, Franz Steiner, Wiesbaden 1962. p.59.

226 Ibid., p.69.

227 Karl Rohe, “Entwicklungen...” op.cit., p.44.
the Centre Party, as a Catholic conservative party and the *Konservativen* as a Protestant conservative party, had very little difference between them.\(^{228}\)

After 1918, conservatives turned their attention to evaluating the First World War and its significance. They longed to see the war as a natural and self-justifying event and to attach a higher meaning to the war experience. This new conservative tendency, termed *neo-conservatism*, was not a reactionary movement that sought to restore the authoritarian nationalism of the pre-war era. Once it had been freed from the constraints of the monarchy, nationalism found a new freedom of expression. Also abandoning their former contempt for socialism, these conservatives believed in reconciling their conservative-nationalist traditions with Socialism and the organised labour movement, to develop a new German version of National Socialism. This movement has been termed the ‘Conservative Revolution.’\(^{229}\) Neo-conservatives had a vision of a *Volksgemeinschaft*, a community based on principles beyond the established political categories of left and right. By transcending the political framework of left and right, they hoped to create a sense of German national identity.\(^{230}\) The conservative adviser to Franz von Papen, Edgar Jung, expressed views which would later be echoed by Christian democrats. Jung believed in a community based on shared interests between workers and employers, and whilst the economy should remain in private hands, the state was responsible for keeping the ‘greed’ of capitalism in check. In *Die Herrschaft der Minderwertigen* from 1927, Jung criticised Socialists for wanting to ‘socialise the basically healthy system of private enterprise’ and together with thinkers such as Moeller van den Bruck and Karl Radek envisaged a ‘third idea’ between capitalism and socialism.\(^{231}\) Neo-conservatism hoped to combat the Marxist idea that socialism should be class-based and looked to embrace both workers and middle classes. It did not seek to eliminate capitalism as a suitable economic system but rather to give it the ‘correct’ moral spirit of a national socialism.

\(^{228}\) Friedrich Naumann cited in; Wolfgang Treue, Deutsche Parteiprogramme 1861-1954, op. cit., p.16.


\(^{230}\) Roger Woods, op. cit., p.62.

A Christian Conservative: Adolf Stoecker and the Christliche Arbeiterpartei

The division of the Evangelical Church into 39 separate territorial Churches and their dependence on local property owners, and those in local governing authority, frequently meant that the Church was tied to the vested interests of the ruling authority. Evangelical Bishops were often Landesfürsten, whilst aristocrats and high level civil servants were Evangelical Church leaders. This symbiotic relationship between the Evangelical Church and State authorities, and the aristocratic, property owning members of the Church alienated the working classes. The Church showed little understanding or sympathy for the fate of the Protestant working classes when they looked in vain to their Church for support in matters of social injustice. 232 As a result the Church became distant and detached from the people, losing popularity and influence and ultimately any moral hold on its members.

Adolf Stoecker recognised this deficiency in the Evangelical Church by comparing it to the efforts of the Catholic Church, with its modern form of Catholic Social Teaching and unrelenting struggle against liberalism. Originally a member of the Protestant orthodox movement and a descendant of the Deutsch Konservativen, Stoecker criticised Wichern's Innere Mission as inadequate for solving the social question. He claimed that a party political response was needed, in the hope that this would intensify the activities of political Protestantism. 233 His first attempt to mobilise Protestant support for social policy was via the 1877 Zentralverein für Sozialreform with co-founder Friedrich Naumann. Stoecker left only one year later to form his own party, the Christian Arbeiterpartei. He had recognised a gap in the party spectrum for a party of the masses to reinvigorate the influence of the Church in society. Stoecker aimed his Christian labour party at tackling the plight of Christian workers, alienated by liberalism and abandoned by the Evangelical Church. By incorporating social reforms into its programme Stoecker hoped to gain the working class vote, reform their anti-Christian attitudes as well as make the monarchical state more palatable to them. Besides the proletariat, he targeted the religious and patriotic Kleinbürgertum who found little

affinity with social democracy. But as far as the workers could see, Stoecker was a figure of the ruling classes and working class suspicions arose about Stoecker’s real intentions. Further criticisms were levelled at Stoecker’s Christian, conservative programme and its attacks on liberalism, Marxism and social democracy, accusing it of lacking clarity. Stoecker’s former influential position in the Evangelical Church had also not helped in motivating the Church to develop its own social policy. In October 1878, the Evangelische Oberkirchenrat voiced their concern that Stoecker’s actions were eroding people’s trust in the Church, compounding the general Evangelical anxiety that Stoecker was employing Christianity for political purposes.

Although his party failed to win a place in the Reichstag, Stoecker’s charismatic image was noted by conservatives who believed Stoecker could become a useful figure for the conservatives to gain the support of the politically disinterested right-wing class. Stoecker eventually changed the name of the party, removing Arbeiter from the title and announced that the party was directed towards "eine christliche-konservative Volkspartei," a programme change that was warmly received by conservative Protestants. Further transgressions in his programme followed as Stoecker adopted an anti-Semitic tone, attacking Jewish liberalism.

Deutschnationale Volkspartei (DNVP) and conservative splinter groups

By 1918 the conservatives faced an identity crisis. Traditionally they had been in favour of the Kaiser, the state and the military, but after the 1918 revolution these institutions faced radical reform. The conservative ideology had no viable alternative to offer to the new parliamentary democratic order of society. The chauvinism and antidemocratic irrationalism on which conservatism had survived until the outbreak of the first world war was no longer tenable. In November 1918 the Deutsch Konservativen, the

234 Franz Fischer, op. cit., p.508.
237 Hans Georg Aschoff, op. cit., p.71. Comments here suggest the motive of Stoecker’s anti-semitism was not racist, only anti-liberal, yet this claim would require more substantive argument to prove its validity.
Freikonservativen, the Christlich-Sozialen and some members of the Deutsch-Völkischen merged to form the Deutsch-Nationale Volkspartei, (DNVP). The DNVP's hurriedly produced election programme opposed the new constitution and the Versailles treaty and launched an assault on democracy and the republican idea. The DNVP underwent increasing radicalisation and internal party tensions, until finally the Völkisch members left to form their own party, which later became the north German representative wing of the Nazi Party. A more moderate wing of the DNVP resigned to accept the republican order and became a credible force between 1924 and 1926, when its candidate Hindenburg was elected Reich president. It also drew closer to Centre Party members including Adam Stegerwald, who began to look for a way to embrace right-wing forces into Centre party ranks. 

The structure of the Church was also affected by the 1918/19 revolution, freeing the confessions from the rigid confines of the State and removing the position of the highest bishop, the 'Summus Episcopus' from the Evangelical Landeskirchen. This forced the Churches to focus more independently on developing "eine neue, aus der Verantwortung des Gewissens kommende Ordnung." The earlier claim by the Church to support all political parties, was also revised in the aftermath of the First World War when the Church sought to reinstate its political influence and now began to support only those parties that promised to secure Church interests. The prospect of a Church related interest party being founded along the lines of an Evangelical wing of the Centre Party seemed unlikely and the Church finally threw its support behind the DNVP which committed its Gründungsauftrag to combining Christianity with nationalism. The leader of the Evangelical Vertrauensrat Otto Dibelius, became a member of the DNVP's Berufständischer Ausschuss committee in 1919 and the priests Gottfried Traub, who represented the liberal-conservative middle classes in the DNVP, and Reinhard Mumm, who supported Christian social traditions, further strengthened links between the Protestant Church and the DNVP.

239 Kurt Nowak, op.cit., p.222f.
**Christlich-Sozialer Volksdienst**

The appeal of the DNVp declined after the 1924 elections, as voters drifted to the Nazi Party and to a number of splinter parties\(^{240}\) that had broken away from the DNVp. One of these splinter groups, the *Christlich-Sozialer Volksdienst* founded in 1930 is interesting for its interdenominational programme and its choice of ‘Christian’ in its title. The aims in setting up the *Christlich Sozialer Volksdienst* was to become the Evangelical counterpart to the Centre Party and encourage a more positive acceptance of democracy. Together with leading Centre members the CSVD launched a newspaper called *Der Zusammenschluß* to campaign for interdenominational co-operation in political affairs. The publication was short-lived but its idea confirms the relevance of discussions about an interdenominational party. The CSVD programme targeted those German Protestants who felt that the DNVp was unchristian. They did not refer to the CSVD as a party but as a *lebendige Bewegung* committed to “innere Erneuerung, für die nationale Befreiung und für die soziale Neugestaltung”\(^{241}\) and to forming a unified *Einheitsfront* across the party spectrum in defence of German Christian culture. They refused to be labelled as specifically right or left wing, conservative or national, claiming these terms had undergone inimical redefinition, emphasising only that they represented a synthesis of religious, national and social elements.

**Liberal Parties**

Whilst the roots of western liberalism can be found in the Enlightenment and principles of the French Revolution, in the American wars of independence, in Locke, Hume, Montesquieu, in Rousseau or Voltaire, German Liberalism represents more of a literary and philosophical inquiry than political\(^{242}\) and a product of the social peculiarities of 19th century German society. Yet the fate of Germany and German democracy is inextricably linked to the fate of German liberalism\(^{243}\) and represents one of the most important

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\(^{240}\) The splinter parties included the interest based Wirtschaftspartei founded in 1920, the Konservative Volkspartei established in 1930 and the Christlich-Sozialer Volksdienst from 1930. See Wilhelm Mommsen, *Deutsche Parteiprogramme. Deutsches Handbuch der Politik*, op.cit., p.533ff.


\(^{242}\) In his book, *Das Kulturideal des Liberalismus*, Schulte-Bilmke, Frankfurt am Main 1947, Wilhelm Röpke who primarily saw society as an organic whole and not a sum of its individual parts, did not subscribe to the view that Rousseau was a liberal. “Der Liberale hält es mit Montesquieu und nicht mit Rousseau, mit dem “Esprit des Lois” und nicht mit dem “Contrat Social.”

\(^{243}\) Thomas Nipperdey, *Deutsche Geschichte* op.cit., p.314.
subjects of party political discussion in Germany. German liberals were predominantly law theorists and not economists as in the English liberal tradition, and were primarily concerned with the role of the state and its responsibility for social issues.\textsuperscript{244} The 1848 liberal movement for instance had not envisaged a democratic republic where sovereignty lay with the people, but a constitutional monarchy with restricted democracy.\textsuperscript{245} Liberals and democrats were anti-federal and inspired by the dream of national unification. They compromised the liberal principle of extending individual freedom to all members of society, the proletariat in particular, in order to facilitate a monarchist-aristocratic form of government favourable to advancing the liberals’ own economic interests.\textsuperscript{246} This failure to bring about a true social and political revolution based on constitutional freedoms and rights of the individual was compensated by nationalist power politics. National unification would be brought about via an authoritarian, monarchist nation state, subordinating the goal of ‘\textit{Freiheit}’ to that of ‘\textit{Einheit}.’ After achieving the goal of German unity in 1871, the liberals retreated from political activity and placed blind trust in Bismarck’s policies of expanding the German Reich.\textsuperscript{247} It was a flight into idealism, which Weber interestingly termed an ‘ethnicizing’ of Bismarck’s power.\textsuperscript{248}

The Liberals were broadly represented by the \textit{Deutsche Fortschrittspartei},\textsuperscript{249} that had been formed in 1861 by democrats and liberals, and by the National Liberal Party

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\item[\textsuperscript{245}] Helga Grebing, Geschichte der deutschen Parteien, op.cit. p.1.
\item[\textsuperscript{246}] Wolfgang Treue, Die Deutschen Parteien vom 19. Jahrhundert bis zur Gegenwart, Walter Hubatsch (Hrsg.), Verlag Ullstein, Frankfurt/Main 1975, p.19.
\item[\textsuperscript{247}] Nipperdey does not believe that the liberals capitulated before Bismarck so easily as other historians have maintained. He claims the National Liberals held on to their aims to strengthen parliament and continually improve the constitution and since in the early years after the Reich’s foundation after Bismarck had fallen out of favour with the Conservatives, the National Liberals were relied upon almost as a joint-ruling party. Thomas Nipperdey, Deutsche Geschichte. 1866-1918, op. cit., p.318.
\item[\textsuperscript{248}] The Protestant Treitschke provided Bismarck’s Realpolitik with spiritual justification “Treitschke born into an austere Protestant family gradually embraced the religion of Idealism and invested Bismarck’s new state with the same passion and absolute moral righteousness that had previously belonged to religion.” Fritz Stern, The Failure of Illiberalism. Essays on the Culture of Modern Germany, Alfred A. Knopf, New York 1972, p.9.
\item[\textsuperscript{249}] The Prussian based Fortschrittpartei was incidentally the first party to develop a central party organisation. Other parties continued to rely on regional groups and established associations or Vereinswesen.
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(Nationalliberalen) formed in 1867 to specifically represent Prussian liberalism. A succession of left and right wing liberal party factions ensued,\textsuperscript{250} as liberals disagreed internally over Bismarck's foreign and domestic policies. In the first German parliament after the foundation of the Reich, liberal parties were most dominate and included the National Liberals and the Progressives (Fortschrittspartei). The Demokratische Partei (DP) established in 1885, was a loose organisation of urban middle class, democratic and left-liberal groups,\textsuperscript{251} whose first programme in December 1884 appealed to democrats to halt the right wing drift, and to establish democratic associations as a way of disseminating and enforcing democratic principles across society. Its democratic, antimilitaristic programme still lacked a comprehensive social programme\textsuperscript{252}.

By the turn of the century, German liberalism found new expression in the views of Max Weber and Friedrich Naumann.\textsuperscript{253} Naumann was conscious of the "Emanzipationskampf der Arbeiterchaft"\textsuperscript{254} and believed liberalism should learn to embrace socialism. A generous and sensible social policy, he argued, would help to secure the support of the masses for the state to exercise power politics in foreign affairs. Weber condoned socialism and a dirigiste economy as temporary measures to free Germany of its economic difficulties, to eventually return to a free capitalist economy and to satisfy Germany's economic dependence on foreign trade.\textsuperscript{255} By 1910, a union of the Freisinnige Vereinigung, to whom Friedrich Naumann now belonged, the Freisinnige Volkspartei and the Deutsche Volkspartei formed the Fortschrittliche Volkspartei to develop social

\textsuperscript{250} The Nationalliberalen Partei emerged from a break-away faction of the Fortschrittspartei but then redivided into left and right wing groups with the left wing rejoining the Fortschrittspartei to form the Freisinnige Partei. This then also redivided into the Freisinnige Vereinigung and the Freisinnige Volkspartei.

\textsuperscript{251} The DP emerged when the Fortschrittspartei joined with the Liberale Vereinigung in 1884 to form the Deutsche Freisinnige Partei. Democratic members of the Fortschrittspartei protested against the merge because it risked compromising the democratic principles of the party and so left to form their own party, the DP Demokratische Partei.


\textsuperscript{253} In 1896 Naumann had founded the National Sozialen Verein.

\textsuperscript{254} Helga Grebing, Geschichte der deutschen Parteien. op.cit., p.36.

\textsuperscript{255} Wolfgang J. Mommsen, Max Weber und die deutsche Politik op.cit., p.320ff.
oriented policies within a liberalist programme. Naumann’s transition from an Evangelical-social philosophy to a national-social philosophy, which had begun in the closing years of the 19th century, also clouded his social reform initiatives. Encouraged by the views of Weber, Naumann now maintained that socialism was only attainable by first fulfilling national political ambitions. Martin Wenck, priest and contemporary of Naumann, commented on this significant development in Naumann’s thinking;

“Und von dieser Stunde an begann der Aufbau des nationalen Sozialismus aus dem christlichen Sozialismus heraus.”

A total of four new liberal parties emerged after the war, the DVP, the Christliche Volkspartei, the Deutsche Demokratische Partei or DDP and the Demokratische Partei, DP. Other liberal parties that had existed during the foundation of the Reich in 1871 survived the changes that took place during the Wilhelmian period and those that unfolded as the state passed from Kaiserreich to republic. The newly constituted parties had done nothing more than change their names with considerable programmatic continuity between Kaiserreich and Weimar, which is startling given that the state had been transformed from a constitutional monarchy to a parliamentary republic. Support for the monarchy was generally upheld or either alternative, diluted forms of parliamentary democracy were suggested such as that by Windthorst, the Centre leader’s advocation of an authoritarian democracy or Max Weber’s constitutional monarchy. Their re-emergence after the end of the war thus showed the liberals intact but still disunited. Leading members of the Fortschrittliche Volkspartei, including Max Weber and Friedrich Naumann, joined with members of the left wing of the Nationalliberalen Partei to form the Deutsche Demokratische Partei, DDP in the hope that this would provide the organisational basis for active democratic involvement of the middle

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258 Sigmund Neumann, Die Parteien der Weimarer Republik, Kohlhammer, Stuttgart 1977, p.27.
The DDP’s 1919 programme declared its allegiance to the Weimar constitution, to the Republic as a Volkstaat and Rechtstaat and affirms its Volkspartei character in the preamble;

"Das ganze Volk! - ohne Unterschied von Klasse, Beruf und Religion; innere Einheit tut uns vor allem not und der einzige Weg zu ihr ist die Demokratie."

The programme openly favoured a private economy, individual ambition, personal responsibility and initiative. But the economy must ensure that democratic principles of individual freedom, social justice and human dignity were respected and economic exploitation avoided. In the National Assembly elections, the DDP became the second largest party of the middle classes after the Centre. Yet the DDP voters, representatives of the middle class Mittelstand, and formerly protected and secure in the monarchical order, found themselves alienated in the new republic between industry representatives and trade unions. Once the DDP signalled that it would also consider socialisation plans and co-operation with the SPD many members switched their allegiance to the Deutsche Volkspartei DVP. Having being denied entry to the DDP, the former National Liberal Party leader Gustav Stresemann formed the DVP. Had Stresemann been given access to the DDP, Treue believes that he would have attempted to transform it into a force to fuse the centre ground with the far right wing conservatives. Since the DVP’s 1919 programme rejected the Weimar Constitution and the Versailles Treaty and a return to a monarchy any possibility of political co-operation with the DDP was quashed. Faced with growing economic crisis during the Weimar Republic, the gap widened between the left reaching DDP and the now right reaching DVP under Stresemann. After Stresemann’s death, the DVP, moved even further to the right until it finally agreed to the 1933 Enabling Act and to the dissolution of its own party. By 1930 the Deutsche Demokratische Partei then reassembled to become the Deutsche Staatspartei (Theodor

259 Wolfgang J. Mommsen, Max Weber und die deutsche Politik, op.cit., p.326. With this aim in mind Weber produced a series of articles for the Frankfurter Zeitung entitled "Deutschlands künftige Staatsform." It is interesting to note here that a central tenet of his democratic vision was the incorporation of federalism. In his 1918/19 plans for the constitution he tackled the issue of the rights of the Länder to influence government decisions.


Heuss was one of its MPs) that campaigned in its 1930 manifesto for a ‘staatspolitische Erneuerung’, to develop the Republic into a social and national Volksstaat. It was in favour of capitalism so long as private ownership was extended to the majority and those property owners who held power were also committed to their social responsibilities. They called their vision “Social Capitalism” which appears programmatically close to the idea of a social market economy. It believed that the capitalist economic system would only be capable of competing with the socialist economy if it proved that its social commitment and responsibilities to the state and people surpassed those promised by socialism.

Considerable blame for the collapse of the Weimar system must clearly be laid at the door of the conservative and liberal parties for failing to carry out their party political functions responsibly, and for not fully grasping the meaning of government and opposition in a democracy. The fate of the Republic was in the hands of the parties in the middle ground, in particular the Centre, the DDP and the DVP whose task it was to consolidate middle class voters and integrate them with those working class voters who could not find sympathy for the socialists, to prevent the polarisation of the party system, which ultimately facilitated the rise of the National Socialists. As Weimar’s conservative and the liberal parties progressively weakened, voters abandoned their party loyalties to support the new inclusive programme of the National Socialists. Catholics and Communists remained the most resistant to Nazism, but the Nazis otherwise drew support from a cross-section of the former middle class parties, carving the image of the NSDAP as the first successful Volkspartei. During the course of the Third Reich a number of protest and resistance activities emerged from the camp of the Evangelical Christians, signalling a fundamental re-evaluation of Evangelical social-political thinking. Other signs of protest and recommendations for a renewal of Christian

263 Peter Löshe, Kleine Geschichte der deutschen Parteien, Kohlhammer, Stuttgart 1993, p.66.
264 Larry Eugen Jones, “Adam Stegerwald und die Krise des deutschen Parteiensystems” in; Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte, Jg. 27, 1979, p.1.
266 The most important results of these reviews are the Barmer Theological Declaration in 1934, the controversial Stuttgart Schuldbekenntnis in October 1945 and the 1947 Darmstädter Wort by the Reichsbruderrat of the EKiD (the German Evangelical Church).
Evangelical thinking beyond the Evangelical Church came from the Freiburg group of neo-liberals.
3. Ordo-liberalism in the Third Reich

The neo- or ordoliberal movement began in the 1920s and 1930s and later gave its name to the ORDO year book founded in 1948 by W. Eucken, A. Rüstow, W. Röpke, F. Böhm, L.v. Mises, F.A Hayek and A. Müller-Armack. Like the Catholic social reform movement, ordo-liberalism took Germany’s turbulent historical development as the basis for their investigations, analysing the liberal, monopolistic style economy of the late 19th and early 20th centuries and the extreme centralised, economically restrictive economy experienced in Hitler’s Third Reich. The ordo-liberals sought an alternative which would avoid the worst excesses of both systems, a third way between the system of laissez-faire capitalism and centralised collectivism. Neo-liberalism sought to reconcile the best elements of established economic liberalism such as economic freedom, individuality, freedom and material wealth for the nation, the right to private property ownership, the rule of law and moral foundations for society with moral and social concerns. Yet as its name suggests, neo-liberalism takes liberalism rather than socialism as its point of departure. Economic liberalism it seemed, remained the only economic form that closely corresponded to the essential and original form of political, democratic and cultural liberalism.

For the lessons of the post Second World War period, Röpke remarked that the decision to abolish laissez-faire style economics would not automatically require abolition of the market economy. The market economic principle, he said, must be upheld and protected at all costs since it represented "geradezu eine Schicksalsfrage unserer Zivilisation." Salvation from a catastrophic form of liberalism of the past and from the threat of

267 In exile in Turkey Wilhelm Röpke turned his attention to the origins of totalitarianism and a critique of society and civilisation. In Civitas Humana and Die Gesellschaftskrise der Gegenwart, Röpke explains that the erosion of values of western liberal civilisation and Christianity had been underway since the industrial revolution in England and the French Revolution. The Enlightenment, he argued, had given the false impression that freedom was to be found in the dissolution of order and democracy had come to mean nothing more than the proletarianisation of the masses with conflicting values of individualism and collectivism.


269 Wilhelm Röpke, Civitas Humana, Grundfragen der Gesellschafts- und Wirtschaftsreform, Eugen Rentsch Verlag, Erlenbach-Zürich 1944, p.46.
Socialist collectivism in the future is, he argues, to be gained by a reinvigoration and a return to those original principles of humanity, where individualism is brought into harmony with social justice. In neo-liberalism the individual is not answerable to the state but to God alone and relies on personal rationality and reason for orientation. Wilhelm Röpke’s ‘Civitas humana’ claims that his version of liberalism is entirely compatible with Christianity and even dares the phrase “un bon chretien est un liberal qui s’ignore” 270 (a good Christian is a liberal without knowing it). Importantly the market economy would not be the sole preserve of individuals to operate but should be steered and monitored by state regulation and economic policy, guided by the interests of social justice. Franz Böhm believed in setting up constitutional guarantees that would protect the freedom of competition and control monopolies. After the framework and the conditions in which the economy should operate had been established, the state should not influence the economic process itself. The natural regulatory principle of supply and demand and the system of competition should remain the cornerstone of the economic order which in turn operates in accordance with defined, fair, market economic rules. The ordo-liberals rejected the old-liberal theory, that an appropriate and workable economic system could evolve spontaneously and naturally as a product of the free market alone. Trust in the freedom of markets, unfettered competition and state non-intervention had failed to regulate a fair economy and provide for a just society. The economy, they argued, must be imbued with rules, in an ‘orderly’ framework that takes account of social values. Rules and economic principles were seen as important for analysing the economy and, where necessary, for removing obstacles to economic freedom, such as price fixing or supply regulation. If these rules are disregarded the economic system will decline.

Classification of Ordo-liberals

Distinctions can clearly be drawn between the socio-liberalism of the Freiburg School of ordo-liberals and the more extreme representatives of a laissez-faire liberalism - F.A. Hayek and C. Mötteli. Whilst Hayek and Mötteli are particularly closely affiliated to the classic, English liberal tradition, the more moderate Freiburg School believed in the

270 Ibid., p.18.
interdependence of economic policies and state responsibilities. Walter Eucken’s ‘Grundsätze der Wirtschaftspolitik’ stipulated that:

“eine rationale Wirtschaftspolitik die Interdependenz aller gesellschaftlichen und staatlichen Ordnungen sowie wirtschaftspolitischen Maßnahmen beachten muß.”

A further distinction⁷⁷¹ is made within the Freiburg School between those who gave the state the task only of creating and maintaining competition in the economy and in protecting and promoting the freedom of the individual, and those more religiously oriented neoliberal thinkers, who believed the state should also be responsible for directly implementing social policies. Böhm, Eucken, Lutz and Meyer formed the first sub-group in the Freiburg School of ordo-liberals who focused their attention on the interaction and comparison between different economic systems, whilst Müller-Armack, Rüstow and Röpke all emphasised the spiritual, ethical values of the social market.

"The Social Market Economy must be the servant of humanity and of trans-economic values. All social, ethical, cultural and human values are more important than the economy yet the economy must prepare the ground for their fullest development. For this reason the economy must not take on forms which are incompatible with these trans-economic values."²⁷²

The aim at a synthesis between economic, political and cultural elements is thus more pronounced among the second group of neo-liberals. Alexander Rüstow²⁷³ emphasised the need for a comprehensive ‘Gegenprogram’ to Bolshevism. He observed that the Soviet system had a clearly defined concept, enforced by notions of social ‘Geschlossenheit’ and ‘Einheitlichkeit’. The economic element - the ‘Planwirtschaft’ - formed the centre point of the programme with interdependence to corresponding social forms. In contrast, he argued, western capitalism, had no such programme or order. It was based more on practice and tied loosely around the notion of ‘maintaining peace.’ The west therefore was suffering from a ‘Mangel an Eingliederung’ or

²⁷¹ Manfred Wulff, Die Geistigen Grundlagen und Quellen des Ordoliberalismus in den 30er und 40er Jahren in; Jörg Dieter Gauger/Klaus Weigelt (Hrsg), Soziales Denken in Deutschland, op. cit. p.156-170.

²⁷² Alex Rüstow cited in; Alan Peacock and Hans Willgerodt (Editors), German Neo-liberals and the Social Market Economy, Macmillan, London 1989, p.108.

²⁷³ Albert Hunold, Wirtschaft ohne Wunder, Eugenrentsch Verlag, Erlenbach-Zürich 1953, p.106.
‘Unterintegration’ and Röpke attacked this deficiency by searching for an integrated economic and constitutional ‘order’ that would finally be embodied in the Social Market Economy. The religiously motivated ordo-liberals intended that this should be "eine bewußt gestaltete marktwirtschaftliche Gesamtdnung" and a counter-ideology to Marxist socialism. The concept of the ‘Social Market Economy’ thus descended from the strand of Christian neo-liberals. The slogan was the brain-child of Alfred Müller-Armack, the Social Market Economy’s intellectual and spiritual leader. Müller-Armack descends from the intellectual traditions of Weber, Scheler, Plessner, Sombart and Marx and was therefore preoccupied with the impact of cultural and religious factors on political dogma.

"Immer aber blieb mir der Erkenntnis aus meinen geistes- und religionsgeschichtlichen Forschungen bewußt, in welch hohem Maße geistige, religiöse und philosophische Faktoren die politische, wirtschaftliche und soziale Realität des letzten Jahrtausends europäischer Geschichte bestimmt haben." 

This revelation is important for an understanding of the CDU’s motive for basing its programme on a synthesis of Christianity and politics. As fellow liberals returned from exile in 1945, meetings were held between Protestant and Catholic academics, church men, politicians, economists and trade union representatives. Müller-Armack describes the objective of one such meeting, organised by Gustav Heinemann, adviser to the Comite Monnet in Holland;

"Die Tagung galt dem Versuch protestantische Richtlinien einer künftigen Gesellschaftspolitik zu entwickeln. Daneben kam die Frage eines ersten ökonomischen Wiederaufbaus zur Sprache."

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277 Ibid., p.40.
This would suggest that for many ordo-liberals, Protestantism’s traditional emphasis on economic freedom as the precursor, to and the guarantor of political freedom, was the starting point of the search for principles of a modern social order.

Alfred Müller Armack’s\(^{278}\) 1948 work, ‘Das Jahrhundert ohne Gott’, is characteristic of the intellectual debates that dominated the CDU’s early manifestos, in their appeal for a re-christianisation of society and politics. The evils of the early 20th century were explained by secularisation and the loss of belief in transcendent values, as society devoted itself to materialistic, earthly idols. A Godless society, we are given to understand, is a life without any fixed order. The task in 1945 would therefore consist of ‘rechristianising’ German society. The Christian denominations, explains Müller-Armack must learn to put their religious differences aside, since the Christian faith had been under threat for over one hundred years, and Catholics and Protestants jointly shared the same fate and religious communality. In future, religious values should determine the organisation of social, political and economic affairs. Although the economic system was bound by its ethical responsibilities, the economy still remained of central importance to Armack’s social critique. The economy he describes;

“Es ist und bleibt ein wichtiges, wenn auch nicht das zentrale Lebensgebiet, und von seiner guten Ordnung hängt für die Kultur sehr viel ab.”

The question of the best economic system, maintained Armack, must be discussed impassionately so that economic principles do not become religious maxims as the intransigent liberalism of the past was, or - as the post second world war trend was indicating - a centralised, administrative economy that was being heralded as the new economic solution to a better society. This all pointed to the need for the economy to be assigned a set of ethical principles, drawn from Christianity.

Ordo-liberal theories were expounded by a third group of ordo-liberals, the Freiburg Group, whose programme further differed to those of the Freiburg School. Whilst the Freiburg School broadly sought a more independently functioning market economy, the

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Freiburg Group adhered to market economic measures defined within the state's overall economic policy.\(^\text{279}\) The Freiburg Group was further sub-divided into the Freiburg University Group (or Freiburger Konzil), the working committee of Erwin v. Beckerath and the Bonhoeffer Circle. The studies by Christine Blumenberg-Lampe,\(^\text{280}\) and Hauenstein\(^\text{281}\) succeed in distinguishing between the different groups in Freiburg, suggesting that other literature has tended to subsume all three groups under one 'Freiburg Group' heading, on the grounds that the economists Eucken, Lampe and Dietze were participants in all three groups. The Beckerath group, Blumenberg notes, has often been neglected altogether.\(^\text{282}\) The Working Committee of Erwin v. Beckerath produced an economic programme in 1943/44 closely related to the ideas of the Bonhoeffer Circle for a post-war system of economic management. Both programmes respond to the 19th century dilemmas of Catholic and Protestant political and economic traditions and offer solutions through a programme of third way politics that combine the best aspects of both socialist and liberalist systems. Their programmes are axiomatic in understanding how the programme of the Social Market Economy came about.

**Freiburger Konzil**

The Department of Law and Political Affairs at Freiburg University provided the seeds of resistance to the Nazi regime with more than half of the department's members belonging to the *Bekennende Kirche*.\(^\text{283}\) In 1938 a group of Protestants and Catholics including Walter Eucken, Constantin v. Dietze, Gerhard Ritter and Adolf Lampe, calling

\(^{279}\) Blumenberg argues that the two programmes should be viewed as one joint endeavour, where the Bonhoeffer programme forms the preamble to the subsequent Beckerath audits. The groups' economic objectives were after all the same. Christine Blumenberg-Lampe, Das wirtschaftspolitische Programm der 'Freiburger Kreise'. Entwurf einer freihheitlichen-sozialen Nachkriegswirtschaft. Nationalökonomie gegen den Nationalsozialismus, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 1973, p.130.

\(^{280}\) Ibid.


\(^{282}\) Blumenberg believes this was because its members were not pursued by the Gestapo. The Beckerath group's investigations into the post-war economy had greatly interested many SS officials who also envisaged a free market economy as a viable post war solution, arrogantly assuming at this stage that even after Hitler had gone, they would remain in power. There was thus little incentive to persecute the committee's members.

\(^{283}\) Blumenberg-Lampe, op.cit. p.15.
themselves the ‘Freiburger Konzil’ met to discuss the merits of Catholic and Evangelical Christian ethical teaching and the prospects for forming a Christian based national economy. Inspired by Eucken’s views on economic theory, the group questioned the most suitable economic system, a centrally planned and administered economy or a free, market led economy. The arrest of Constantin v. Dietze however soon forced the Konzil to suspend their meetings. In 1946 when members were released from Berlin concentration camp, the Freiburg group of Professors, Adolf Lampe, Otto Hof and Gerhard Ritter, renewed the Konzil discussions for establishing a Christian based economic order. Their discussions resulted in the ‘Freiburger Denkschrift.’

Erwin von Beckerath

Erwin von Beckerath was commissioned on behalf of the Nazi Academy for German Law at Freiburg University, to conduct a working committee of economists to investigate theoretical ways of solving problems in the economy. Basing its views on Eucken’s recently published ‘Grundlagen der Nationalökonomie’ the Zentralsausschuss, discussed the merits of a regulated (gelenkte) economy in its first meetings at the end of 1940. Their discussions resulted in a series of audits between 1942/43, intended as draft programmes or guidelines for a “klar umrissenes wirtschaftspolitisches Programm” for post-war Germany. Stackelberg in Berlin, outlined that the first task of post war reconstruction was to decide between a market economy or a centrally administered economy. Although a centrally controlled economy was practical and necessary in the short term, he believed a centrally administered economy was too primitive to manage the complexities of modern society. The centralised economy, he argued, had been sustained by the state as its only and largest consumer during the war, but in peace time a central economy would not be sophisticated enough to meet consumer needs, and so

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284 Beckerath’s group occupied a leading role, as the Zentralsausschuss, among eight further research groups. The director of the Political Economic Research Academy, Jens Jessen, recruited many former members of the defunct ‘Verein für Socialpolitik’ which had been founded in Eisenach in 1872 to counteract the growing influence of free market economic liberalism. It shared its protest with the social Catholics and middle class social reformists in the Evangelical camp. Its programme direction was based on the belief that unequal and individually pursued interests are not conducive to providing for the good of the whole society. “Wir sind der Überzeugung, daß das unbeschränkte Walten teilweise entgegengesetzter und ungleich strarker Einzelinteressen das Wohl der Gesamtheit nicht verbürgt, daß vielmehr die Forderungen des Gemeinsinns und der Humanität auch im wirtschaftlichen Leben ihre Geltung behaupten müssen.” Einladungsschreiben zur Gründungsversammlung des Vereins für Sozialpolitik 1872 in Eisenach in; Franz Boese, Die Geschichte des Vereins für Sozialpolitik 1872-1932, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 1939, p.4.
risked harnessing individual freedom in consumption and in business. Whilst advocating a market economy in principle however, the group agreed that the correct market economic conditions would not be immediately be in place and could lead to social and economic chaos if introduced in post-war Germany too soon. Their suggestion was a third way, ‘a market economy, based on market economic planning and control (Lenkung).’ In 1943 the working group for ‘Political Economy’ was suspended following closure of the Academy for German Law. Beckerath, Böhm, v., Dietze, and Eucken continued their work clandestinely in cooperation with trusted personalities from industry and commerce who acted as temporary advisers to the group, now known as ‘The Working Committee of Erwin v. Beckerath.’ When Dietze and Lampe were arrested in September 1944 for their involvement in the Bonhoeffer Circle, Beckerath’s Working Committee was disbanded and through fear of discovery by the Nazis, members destroyed the Committee’s material.

Dietrich Bonhoeffer

In 1942, Dietrich Bonhoeffer was assigned the highly confidential task of producing a Denkschrift as a platform for discussion at the forthcoming World Church Conference and which could become a programme for Germany’s future new order;

‘eine Art Programmschrift ..., in der womöglich alle Hauptzweige des öffentlichen Lebens unter den Gesichtspunkten christlicher Sozialethik behandelt werden sollten.’

The Denkschrift focused on the social and economic Gesamtdnung, and less on ethical principles of Christian Social teaching applicable to an individual’s own economic activity. Bonhoeffer envisaged a co-ordinated and detailed planning of a ‘staatliche

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285 The audits were only a segment of the work produced by the group before its members were arrested, dealing with all aspects of the envisaged economy including the transition from a war economy, economic reconstruction, currency reform, the tax system and regulation for industrial relations and the trade union organisations. The work by Lampe in Freiburg was supplemented with contributions by other Freiburger individuals, Eucken and Dietze who together focused their attention on specifying the tasks facing the future post-war German economy. Additional draft programmes were submitted to Beckerath by Lampe and Stackelberg.

286 It was suspected that the oppositional nature of some of the working groups had been identified, contributing to the decision to close the Academy. Blumenberg-Lampe, op.cit., p.37.

287 Significant numbers of documents and material were successfully hidden by Lampe’s wife Gertrud in her home and cellar and survived not only searches by the Gestapo, but also those by the French military when they occupied the house in 1945.

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Wirtschaftsordnung' rooted in Christian ethics. Whilst the socialist Catholics maintained materialism was synonomous with capitalism which justified the removal of the entire capitalist system, more liberal minded Catholics and Protestants equated materialism with secularism and a Godless society, one that was capable of morally condoning a national socialist programme. They did not condemn capitalism however, arguing that it was not people's striving for wealth per se that puts a nation in moral jeopardy but an underlying materialist attitude that threatened the moral, ethical fibre of a society's individuals.288

Divided into two main sections,289 section one of the Denkschrift provides an historical analysis of National Socialism, entitled "Das politische Chaos unserer Zeit und seine Ursachen" and section two presents a catalogue of conditions that a future German state would have to fulfil, entitled "Grundzüge einer politischen Gemeinschaftsordnung nach christlichem Verständnis." It was particularly aimed at;

"einer theologisch-historischen Besinnung auf die Grundzüge evangelischer Sozialethik und das Wesen gesunder politischer Gemeinschaftsordnung nach evangelischem Verständnis."

Bonhoeffer identified the need to lay Christian foundations of an ethical social and economic doctrine in Evangelical thinking. They were concerned with creating a philosophical underpinning for a political programme, to extend Christian ethics to social and political ethics. The central question whether there were basic differences between Catholic and Evangelical ethics or where there was communality between them to

288 Christine Blumenberg Lampe, op.cit., p.55.

289 The ordo-liberal Franz Böhm and Erik Wolf also produced an appendix on the law, whilst the three Freiburg economists, Lamper, Hof and Ritter drafted appendix 4, Economic and Social Order. After discussion of the text by a group of eminent individuals including Carl Goerdeler, Erik Wolf, Franz Böhm, Helmut Thielicke, Theophil Wurm, Otto Dibelius and Walter Bauer, three further appendices were added to the Denkschrift, covering church and education policy and the Jewish Question. Helmut Thielicke laments that this question should have preoccupied the Bonhoeffer group in the way it did. "Daß der nazistische Rassengedanke hier so naiv und unkritisch übernommen wird, zeigt einen Grad von Zeitgehörigkeit." The appendix includes such statements as Jews possessing "gefarhvolen Anlagen und Charaktereigenschaften" and warns of possible damage that could result from "einer engen Berührung oder gar Vermischung mit anderen Rassen." Their concern with racist issues is incompatible with their moral, ethical position. Helmut Thielicke, In der Stunde Null. Die Denkschrift des Freiberger 'Bonhoeffer-Kreises,' J.C.B Mohr (Paul Siebeck), Tübingen 1979, p.22.
facilitate co-operation, puts the work of the Bonhoeffer group at the heart of the CDU agenda.

"Die politische Krisis unserer Epoche ist zutiefst eine seelisch-geistige Krise und ihre Ursachen gilt es aufzudecken, ehe an ein Programm des Wiederaufbaus auch nur gedacht werden kann." ²⁹⁰

Their views were guided by three considerations, first by God’s word as expressed in the Ten Commandments, second by factual economic necessities which have a permanent impact on the economic order and third by rational assessment of the current economic situation. According to the first consideration, they held no pretence that religious doctrine provided permanently valid guidelines for economic activity. More useful solutions they thought were provided by individuals’ evaluation of each issue as it arises, based on the powers of human reason, revealing Calvinist thinking. The second consideration influencing the economic order was determined by the desire for an individual’s self-development and material benefit, by the need to exercise frugality in one’s economic affairs, as well as by the State’s obligation to provide a stable currency and sound financial policies. Whether the State chose to operate a planned or a competitive economic policy, they argue, it must always ensure that it operated a viable economic policy in accordance with the ‘Gesamtwirtschaft.’ Here the rules for the State’s social policy were as important as its rule for economic policy. Thirdly, the catastrophic situation that Germany found itself in towards the end of the second world war demanded specific economic measures to enable its reconstruction.

The Bonhoeffer Evangelicals were as condemnatory of the late 19th century liberal order as Catholics, which they said had failed to create a moral framework for social justice and had led to exploitation of the proletarian workers during the industrial revolution. They complained that it destroyed the relevance of Christian values in society and respect for economic freedom, as cartels and industrial monopolies took control over any existing economic policy. Under no circumstances must the future state permit laissez-faire style economic management but would be required to set rules to which private business must adhere, and then monitor that these rules are not contravened. The principles of a competition based economy would be used to regulate future economic

²⁹⁰ Ibid., p.37.
policy including employment and wage policy. No direct action on the part of the state, can force people to adopt a community spirit and a moral social awareness per se, but it can aim to create the right conditions for people to foster their own social harmony. A fair social policy will result if the individual develops and exercises his/her own set of ethical principles in social and economic life. Other moral institutions besides the state, such as Church associations, voluntary organisations or even individual firms were also equally seen to be as capable of engendering social ethical solidarity. The *Denkschrift* argues that 19th century social policy wrongly attempted to impose a community ethos from above, dividing people into specific social groups and defining how the relations should function between them. More concrete measures for a social policy included trade union organisations, a labour chamber comprising employees and employer and other recognised chambers of industry and workers' committees as well as legislation for the protection of employees and regulation of industrial relations between employer and employee. The tone of the programme is sober, avoiding any specific religious dogma and encouraging only moral values in the new social order. Whilst this was Christian in origin it did not imply that only Christians should participate in its activities and benefit from the social policy.

One interesting difference is the decision not to equate a liberal economic order with a capitalist order, as the socialist Catholics had done. Instead they chose to make explicit mention of their standpoint on capitalism;


This indicates that certain groups with a socialist agenda may have been employing the term ‘capitalist’ in a derisory manner in order to further their own programme’s popularity but clearly the Bonhoeffer Evangelicals also had their own motives for detaching capitalism from its Liberalist counterpart, to rid capitalism of its tainted image

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and so allow for its future regeneration in post-war Germany. In 1943 and 1944 the majority of those who had worked on the Freiburger Denkschrift were arrested by the Gestapo and Bonhoeffer and Goerdeler were subsequently killed. After a few minor adjustments to the original text by Protestants and Catholics in 1945, the Denkschrift was published.
Continuity and Change 1945-1947

4. British Zone

4.1. Rhineland and Westphalia

The first political programmes to appear in 1945 gave a reflective, philosophical account of Germany’s history, the failures of the Weimar Republic and the lessons of the National Socialist dictatorship. Social Catholicism still maintained liberalism and capitalism had been the root cause of materialist thinking and the cause of National Socialism, encouraging Catholics to rekindle their affinity with undertaking socialist reform.1 Dr Zimmermann, General Secretary of the Christian Democratic Party in the Rhineland best captured the mood in the winter of 1945;

"Die politische Tendenz geht in aller Welt nach links. Die soziale Not, die in Verfolgung dieses Krieges überall entstanden ist, macht dies verständlich ...Links nicht im Sinne einer radikalen politischen Umwälzung, sondern im Sinne einer sozialen Reform und einer sozialen Politik."2

Besides the physical devastation and destruction, the post war mood of a new beginning presented an opportunity to implement Catholic Socialism that had been developed during the late 19th and early 20th centuries3 and for left-wing Catholics to stage a radical overhaul of Germany’s economic and social system. Christians of all denominations were in agreement that a fundamental Gesinnungsreform was needed to correct the secular trend they claimed had weakened religious values and moral standards

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1 "Diese verschieden gefärbten sozialen und sozialistischen Ideen, Programme und Vorschläge ....... waren schlechthin atmosphärisch in ihren weitgehenden und konkreten Äußerungen, wenn auch in der Grundlage von Elementen der geistigen Tradition katholischer Sozialehren bestimmt." Gerhard Schulz, op. cit., p.89.


in society and had increased Germany’s susceptibility to National Socialism.\textsuperscript{4} Catholics pledged to resolve their earlier scepticism towards liberal democracy\textsuperscript{5} and the century-old conflict between individual freedom and social equality by following a higher form of \textit{Christian} democracy. Socially, spiritually, politically and economically, Germany was set to undergo complete renewal.

In the period from 1945 to 1947, almost all programmatic discussions among Christian democrats - including those that took place in Rhineland and Westphalia - were defined by this post war revival of Christian Socialism. Like its pre-war variety, Christian Socialism was predominantly supported by the Catholic members of the Cologne Circle. But it was opposed by the Solidarists, who favoured Solidarism as an alternative interpretation of Christian social teaching, and by Protestant liberal, conservative groups who instead backed a programme of Christian Realism. Christian Socialism nevertheless made a lasting and significant impact on the new CDU, even though it was just one of a series of programme suggestions put forward by Christian Democrats at the time. Previous studies have often overestimated Christian Socialism’s influence on the CDU’s programme discussions and given comparatively little attention to Evangelical or Solidarist reform initiatives, despite the fact that Konrad Adenauer’s personal philosophy, as this chapter will reveal, more closely resembled Evangelical social ethics than Catholic Social Theory. At the heart of conflicting discussions in 1945 was the question that had dominated politics throughout the last century; should Germany adopt an individualist or a collectivist approach to socio-economic policy in order to ensure individual and collective prosperity and social justice?


\textsuperscript{5} Friedrich Zimmermann of the CDU’s young Christian Democrats, the Junge Union describes the difficulty that the term ‘democracy’ traditionally represented, emphasising that it was the CDU’s conscious aim to overcome it; “Wir Leute von der Union glauben indessen, bei allen Vorbehalten der Parteilichkeit, denen wir uns unterwerfen sollen, dennoch einer Antwort nahezukommen, wenn wir sagen: die Gründung der Union stellt den kühnsten Versuch dar, das grundgelegte Spannungsverhältnis der Formaldemokratie, das zwischen der Freiheit und der Gleichheit, aufzulösen, um zu einer höherentwickelten Demokratie zu gelangen. Denn nur christlicher Geist, der keinen Wertunterschied zwischen der Freiheit (des Christenmenschen) und der Gleichheit (des Menschen vor Gott) kennt, kann nach unserer Überzeugung auch im politischen Raum beiden Grundformen gerecht werden. Wir glauben uns frei von Anmaßung, wenn wir uns deshalb die christliche Weltanschauung für den eigentlichen Oberbegriff, für den Beziehungspunkt einer wahren Demokratie halten.” Friedrich Zimmermann cited in; O.K Flechtheim, Dokumente zur parteipolitischen Bildung in Deutschland seit 1945, Band I, op. cit. p.20.
Uertz's classification of these competing programme perspectives is useful. Christian Solidarists descended from the liberal, market-oriented Jesuit School, who believed in a less regulatory framework for society. Christian Socialists came from the Dominican tradition, and were strictly dedicated to socialism and a 'Ganzheitlich' approach to the Catholic notion of Gemeingut. The Gemeinwohl or common good, was both the starting point and end objective of the Christian-socialist society and took precedence over the status of the individual. Despite the attempt to relativise the importance of Christian Socialism in the CDU's programme history, it remains of considerable interest in this investigation, since it emerges that it was the phrase itself and its perception in society that was most problematic and controversial for the party, more than the actual content of the Christian Socialist programme. This indicates that shaping the CDU’s programme profile was determined as much by tactical, ideological and image considerations as by the genuine search for a new order. The double weaponry of Christian Socialism was skilfully exploited by Adenauer, through his tactical use of political programmes and programmatic discussions for gaining political advantage.

One of the founding members of the CDU in Cologne, Leo Schwering, claimed that the Rhineland-Westphalia region, the former home of the Centre Party and the Catholic social reform movement, was decisive for the success of the CDU;

"So lag damals in ihren Händen die Zukunft der ganzen CDU. Infolgedessen übertrifft die Bedeutung der Rheinischen und westfälischen Gründung diejenige aller anderen Landesparteien im gesamten Bundesgebiet."7

Schwering's failure to acknowledge the importance of the Berlin group of Christian Democrats who met to discuss the foundation of a Christian party one day ahead of the Cologne group, is an indication of the early dominance displayed by the CDU in the British zone and the fierce competition that rapidly emerged between the main centres of Christian Democracy.


Both in programme and personnel terms there was a degree of continuity with the Centre Party, even if old disputes blocked close unity in the Rhineland and Westphalian CDU. In October 1945 the Centre Party was formally relaunched in Soest\(^8\) and its former general secretary, Hamacher rapidly criticised the new CDU for occupying the middle ground in German politics with a diverse amalgam of political groups (\textit{Sammelpartei}) inevitably harbouring Nazi reactionaries.\(^9\) The new Centre party leader, Spiecker, also criticised the CDU for describing itself as a ‘\textit{Weltanschauungspartei}’ claiming religion and \textit{Weltanschauung} were “values unto themselves” and should not front political life. Yet the belief that politics should descend from a spiritual, Christian basis was inherited from the Centre Party\(^10\) with the exception that the CDU focused more broadly on ‘western European values of humanistic and Christian traditions’ in contrast to the Centre Party’s old reliance on Catholic Social Teaching and exclusive representation of Catholic interests.\(^11\) For a while the Centre Party existed alongside the Christian Democratic Party (CDP) in Cologne, as the region’s Catholic majority meant Centre Party members outweighed all other former party affiliations in the region. The Centre Party’s attempt to push the CDU to the right of centre\(^12\) however, provoked the CDU to denounce all affiliation with its political predecessor and to focus on building a party of all Christian denominations and socio-economic classes and put an end to Germany’s centuries’ old confessional schism.

\(^8\) There was fierce opposition to refounding the Centre Party by former members including former Chancellor Brüning who warned of the party’s past failure to modernise itself from a confessional to a political party. In a letter dated October 1945 to Dr. Hamacher, the new party chairman after 1945 Bernhard Kaes warned “Die große katholische Kirchenpartei in Deutschland ist mehr statisch als dynamisch und trägt manche Züge des altern Liberalismus. Sie hat sich keine großen politischen Ziele setzt [sic] und keine Parolen ausgegeben zur Neuformierung des Reiches und der Gesellschaftsordnung.” ACDP, Landesverband Westfalen-Lippe, III-002-025/1.

\(^9\) Noel D. Cary, op. cit., p.171.


\(^11\) Not all members agreed with Spieker. Centre Party member Helene Wessel believed that \textit{Weltanschauung} had a very valid role to play in a political party and she was convinced that the only parties to prosper after the war would be those that gave politics a spiritual dimension.

This section will consider the course of the political discussions on the alternative strategies of Christian Socialism, Solidarism and Christian Realism in the Rhineland and Westphalian states\(^\text{13}\) of the British zone, and examine the written manifestos that they developed. These are the Cologne Principles from June 1945, the Principles of the Rhineland and Westphalia CDP\(^\text{14}\) in September of the same year, the Neheim-Hüsten manifesto in March 1946 and the Ahlen programme in February 1947.

**Christian Socialism**

The Cologne Circle or ‘Walberberger Movement’ of Christian Socialism was initiated during the Nazi period by the Walberberg monastery priests Laurentius Siemer and Eberhard Welty. In 1941 Siemer and Welty were approached by the Catholic workers’ movement representatives in Cologne, Nikolaus Groß and Heinrich Körner to discuss a society based on the natural rights inherent in Christianity, as a model to replace the now defunct Nazi system. Groß and Körner were specifically concerned by “which ethical principles should become the foundation for their work.”\(^\text{15}\) Meetings followed in the Kettelerhaus, the centre of resistance discussions in Cologne, with other Cologne trade unionists and Catholic labour representatives including Johannes Albers, Karl Arnold, Andreas Hermes as well as Jakob Kaiser and the resistance member, Carl Goerdeler from Berlin.\(^\text{16}\) Contacts were established with other members of the German resistance\(^\text{17}\)

\(^\text{13}\) The State of North Rhine-Westphalia was formed in July 1946.

\(^\text{14}\) The party was called Christian Democratic Party until the joint meeting of all regional Christian Democratic groups in Bad Godesberg in December 1945 when it was agreed to adopt the Berlin party name Christian Democratic Union.


\(^\text{16}\) The Kettelerhaus group also had contacts during the Nazi period to Social Democrats where the idea of a Labour Party was first discussed. For details of the members and activities of the Cologne group during the Nazi period. See Vera Bücke, “Der Kölner Kreis und seine Konzeption für ein Deutschland nach Hitler” in; Historische Politische Mitteilungen, 2/1995.

\(^\text{17}\) The German resistance was broadly represented by three core groups. The Kreisauer Circle with approximately 20 members including Helmuth James von Moltke and York, Eugen Gerstenmaier, Theodor Steltzer. Their programmatic ideas for a post Hitler era were developed from around 1940-1943 and focused on foreign policy and economic policy and the notion of a ‘Personal Socialism’ to counteract the decline in religious faith. The second and most significant of resistance groups was that led by Carl Friedrich Goerdeler’s and Ludwig Beck’s known for their two memorandum documents Das Ziel from 1941 and Der Weg from 1943/44. Their programmatic ideas looked particular at aspects of constitution, domestic and foreign policy based on an ‘organic’ order and the principle of subsidiarity. This included the estate system in which interest groups, workers and employers collectively managed their own affairs thus doing away with the need for one ‘Führer’. The third group was the Freiburg Bonhoeffer Circle focused on economic, social and domestic policy and produced their programme.
such as the Kreisau Group, K.D Bonhoeffer and Eugen Gerstenmaier and Bernhard Letterhaus, secretary of the Catholic Workers' Movement (KAB). Following a number of arrests however the Cologne group was disbanded and those who managed to escape, including Kaiser and Hermes, went into hiding in Berlin. Welty had documented the group's discussions in the manuscript 'Was nun?' subtitled 'Grundsätze und Hinweise zur Neuordnung im deutschen Lebensraum.' The manuscript was published immediately after the war, and became one of the first platforms for political discussion.

The basic philosophy of the Dominicans’ Christian Socialism was derived from Christian social ethics, which offered a Gesamtenwurf for all aspects of social, ethical, political and economic life. Dominicans extracted the social aspects of Catholic Social Teaching, in particular its focus on 'Gemeingut' as guidelines for developing a socialist order. They believed that by overcoming the confessional conflict between Catholics and Protestants and initiating a return to God and to Christian values, they would lead the way to a new reformed society. Morals and an ethical code of behaviour should determine the public as well as the private sphere and the interests of individuals and society should be put before those of the state. The statements were clearly a reaction to the immorality of National Socialism but also revealed the conservative backlash against modernity, capitalism and the liberal progressive thinking of a secular society. They were a reminder of those same views that in the 19th century had blamed liberalism and individualism for undermining Christianity's influence in society and man's sense of spiritualism ever since the French Revolution. Liberalism, capitalism, collectivism and fascism, they argued, were the consequences of a secular society, and only by the overthrow of capitalism, and the establishment of a Christian socialist order would Germany avoid a repeat of its historical mistakes. In his work Christlicher Sozialismus Welty writes;


18 Rudolf Uertz, "Verpflichtendes Erbe? Ursprung und Programmentwicklung der CDU" in; Die Neue Ordnung, Nr.39, 1985, p. 86 (84-93).


20 It is the metaphysical nature of the human spirit not the material that forms the basis of his Christian ethics. Eberhard Welty, "Christlicher Sozialismus" in; Die neue Ordnung, Heft 1 Jg. 1, Kehle Verlag,
Emphasis on the individual was not to be misinterpreted as liberal individualism, but meant individual freedom within the context of the community. The state was equally bound by its duty to serve the community, the ‘Gemeingut’ ensuring its spiritual, cultural and ethical well-being, as well as the more obvious material benefits. Welty envisaged a centrally administered economy, to satisfy society’s ‘needs’ or ‘Bedarfsdeckung.’ The market is not given any regulatory function in Welty’s economic order but the state may assign economic planning to self-administering bodies, that operate under the auspices of the state. Large industry should be nationalised to allow for better state planning and production, but small and medium sized businesses should remain in private hands, provided that no threat of monopoly existed. Where monopoly occurs the state is granted the right to confiscate property and transfer it to public ownership. The measure was targeted primarily at those industries accused of carrying out exploitative economic practices in collusion with Hitler, including heavy raw materials and manufacturing industries, banks and finance institutions. Property ownership on the other hand should be distributed fairly, allowing individuals to improve their own personal welfare.\textsuperscript{21}

Welty’s Christian Socialism unmistakably reveals similiarity to the central tenets of ordo-liberalism. Even though the overtly theological aspect of Welty’s programme is less marked in ordo-liberalism, both philosophies advocated the idea of a third way programme, as a holistic solution to society’s needs. Catholic Social Teaching was the basis for Welty’s Christian democratic programme and relied, like ordo-liberalism, on the same Thomist tradition.\textsuperscript{22} Christian Socialism may have oriented its economy around the

\textsuperscript{21} Eberhard Welty, Die Entscheidung in die Zukunft, Grundsätze und Hinweise zur Neuordnung im deutschen Lebensraum, Kerle, Heidelberg 1946, p.288.

\textsuperscript{22} Gerold Ambrosius, op. cit., p.33. Ambrosius shares the view that there is significant communality between ordo-liberalism and Christian socialism but qualifies ordo liberalism as a theoretical concept and not a specific programmatic response to dealing with post war society like Christian Socialism.
principle of *Gemeinwohl* in contrast to the competition driven economy of ordoliberalism, but Christian Socialism upheld state protection for full and fair competition. Like ordoliberalism, Christian Socialism granted the state the right to intervene in the case of monopolies and seize state ownership of industry. In 1947, Joachim Tiburtius\(^2\) from the Berlin CDU drafted a Christian socialist economic programme, to specifically prove the contentious issue, that it was possible to produce a Christian economic programme. The post-war efforts by Protestants and Catholics to bring about social reform was in simplified terms aimed at introducing Christian elements into policy decision making, such as working hours, wage or employment conditions and to promote a sense of Christian responsibility in those politicians implementing reforms. Unlike Socialism, which attempted to overthrow the existing economic order to replace it with state ownership of all means of production, socialist reform, sought to minimise the negative consequences of a liberal economy that is run according on the principle of private ownership of the means of production. Christian Socialism looked to encompass and integrate all aspects of the economy in a *Gesamtordnung*.\(^3\) Like ordo-liberalism private ownership of monopoly industries, such as gas and coal was endorsed on the condition that consumer interests were not curtailed. In Tiburtius’s vision of a *Gemeinwirtschaft* there is no barrier to a state owned industry being managed by an independent board, where the state’s interests are represented longside those of employers and consumers. Given the mixed structure of this economic model, Tiburtius himself questions if his ideas can truthfully be termed ‘socialist,’ since all indications point to a more liberal economy;

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\(^2\) Prof. Dr. Phil. Habil. Joachim Tiburtius, Christliche Wirtschaftsordnung: ihre Wurzeln und ihr Inhalt, Union Verlag, Berlin 1947, p.29ff. See section II, chapter 5.1 of this study for a discussion of developments in Berlin.

\(^3\) Tiburtius outlines a strong moralising and monitoring role for the state, identical to ordo-liberalism “Der Staat ist in unserem Plan Herr über die Grundstoffe der gewerblichen Wirtschaft. Er entscheidet über Betriebegrößen und Besitzverteilung in der Landwirtschaft. Er gibt dem Wettbewerb sittliche Normen, ordnet das Rechnungswesen an Grundlage der Selbsterkennnis der Unternehmer und seiner eigenen Unterrichtung für notwendige Ergänzung und Eingriffe. Er soll den Wettbewerb durch Aufhebung der Kartelle und durch Zugang der Verarbeiter zu den Grundstoffen wirklich freimachen…. Das Arbeitsverhältnis wird auf Gesamtverträgen unter staatlichem Schutz aufgebaut.” Ibid., p.82.
The intention of Christian Socialism was therefore more ‘social’ than ‘socialist’ but reveals that the ensuing fate of Christian Socialism lay in its controversial name and its scope for misunderstanding and possible deliberate misrepresentation, rather than in its content per se. Welty’s socialism was derived from its original Natural Law definition, denoting ‘social’ in the context of Soziallehre and rejecting any ideological or historical affiliation with Socialism, in particular with its Marxist version. In view of the striking similarities between Christian Socialism and Ordoliberalism, Kraiker\footnote{G. Kraiker & M. Welteke, “Die politische Reorganisation des Bürgertums” in; Huster/Kraiker/Scherer/Schlotmann/ Welteke, Determinanten der Westdeutschen Restauration 1945-1949, Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt/Main 1975, p.217 (214-260).} goes so far as to suggest that Christian Socialism was an ideology of reformed capitalism. Although Christian Socialism found its strongest and most dedicated advocates in the Cologne Group in the Rhineland, discussions reveal that some members were anxious about adopting a Christian Socialist programme due to mounting ideological confusion between the Socialism in Christian Socialism and the Socialism of Marxism and Social Democracy. Inevitably Welty’s version of Socialism - genuine or not - was open to misinterpretation. Many in the CDU were unable to overcome their suspicion that the substance of Christian Socialism ultimately harboured the same ideals as Marxist collectivism.\footnote{"Am ehesten, viel früher als die entsprechenden politischen Entscheidungen fallen, zeigt sich das in der Ebene der Sozialphilosophie, der Interpretation der kirchlichen Soziallehre, der allgemeinen, gleichsam ‘ideologischen’ Haltungen zu den Grundproblemen der Zeit. Wer im Jahre 1946 eine sozialistische Entscheidung für akzeptabel, wenn nicht vom theologischen oder sozialmetaphysischen Standpunkt aus gar für besonders begrüßenswert hielt, wird 1947 und erst recht danach seine Zweifel haben, ob denn das mit christlichen Sozialismus Gemeinte Gemeinsamkeiten mit dem aufweise, was der Sprachgebrauch sonst unter Sozialismus versteht, ob nicht verschiedene Dinge gemeint seien, ob nicht in der Sache viel eher eine Gegnerschaft als eine Bundsgenossenschaft begründet sei." Arcadius R. Gurland, Die CDU/CSU. Ursprünge und Entwicklung bis 1953, Dieter Emig (Hrsg), Europäische Verlaganstalt, Köln/Frankfurt am Main 1980, p.208.} Programmatic discussions were clearly not only concerned with the substance but also with how the political concept was perceived and its potential for manipulation in political campaigning. It was perhaps naive in the context of 1945, to expect socialism to be taken as a neutral concept devoid of all ideological links and traditions. The Christian Socialists’ demand for Gemeingut vor Eigengut for example
would naturally evoke connotations of universalistic, fascist and collectivist theories of Gemeingut.²⁸

In May 1945 Leo Schwering, Wilhelm Warsch and Theodor Scharmitzel of the Cologne Circle re-assembled. Schwering says, drafting a programme was the most important task for the first meeting:

"Diese erfahrenen Politiker kannten ihr Publikum. Sie wußten um die Programmseligkeit des Deutschen.... War schon das Programm bei den historischen Parteien der Vergangenheit stets eine Frage höchsten Ranges, wieviel mehr jetzt, da man es unternahm, etwas völlig Neues zu schaffen."²⁹

Schwering describes that the only programme outline available to them at the time was from a man called Hans Schäfer, drafted March 19, 1945 who had thought of the name Christlich Demokratische Volkspartei for a party that integrated Catholic and Protestant middle classes and the non-socialist working classes. It was agreed that democracy and parliamentarianism should be among the primary aims of the new programme, and should also include the words 'Christian' and 'Socialism,' as a way of reclaiming the term from the Marxists. Following several initial discussions, the group produced a 29-point programme. Although emphasis was on the 'social' aspect of the new programme, it rejected nationalisation plans for industry and supported a market economy, further evidence that Socialism was not a key feature. Schwering finally presented their programme at the first official meeting of the Cologne CDP on June 17, 1945, at the Kolpinghaus in Cologne. A total of eighteen individuals, all Catholic, and several former members of the Centre Party, the clergy and the Windthorstbund met to define the ethical and spiritual foundations for the new party. Eberhard Welty who presented his work 'Was nun?' was warmly received, since it clearly built on Adam Stegerwald's 1920 Essen Programme.³⁰

²⁸ Bernd Uhl, op. cit., p.70
²⁹ Leo Schwering, Vorgeschichte ... op. cit., p.21.
³⁰ The Waltherberger-Cologne Circle took nationalisation plans further than those envisaged by Stegerwald back in 1920. Rudolf Uertz, Christentum und Sozialismus...op. cit., p.33.
In an effort to create an interdenominational party structure, Protestants including Hans Ecke and Fritz Fuchs were invited to join chairman Leo Schwering and other Catholics at the first meeting of the newly constituted programme commission in the Walberberger monastery\textsuperscript{31} from June 23 to June 30 to discuss drafting the party’s new programme - the Cologne Principles. Siemer and Welty were not direct members of the Programme Commission but forwarded their ideas for socialist reform, including the suggestion that the party should be called a “Christlich-sozialistische Gemeinschaft.”\textsuperscript{32} The group agreed to emphasise the social aspect of the programme but they did not follow the Dominicans’ other more radical suggestions. Schwering insisted on the continued value of private property and individual initiative, bourgeois society and culture.

“The Name sozialistisch in der Verbindung mit christlich sei, richtig verstanden, zwar nicht anstößig, doch müsse es bei der alten Bezeichnung christlich-demokratisch bleiben.”\textsuperscript{33}

The term Christian Socialism was clearly problematic, and caused critics to lament that the focus has always been directed on the name and not the content of Christian Socialism. Uertz\textsuperscript{34} has argued that the group was under great time pressure to publish their programme, and explains why the Cologne Principles did not sufficiently communicate the true meaning of Christian Socialism, as explicated in the more profound and comprehensive ‘Was Nun?’ Time pressure or not, the reaction that the phrase provoked, indicates that the powerful impact of political concepts on public perception, must first be acknowledged by political parties before drafting programme statements and manifestos.

\textsuperscript{31} Other members of the Cologne Circle’s Programme Commission were Johannes Albers, Hans Ecke, Fritz Fuchs, Sybille Hartmann, Joseph Hofmann, Peter Schaeve, Thedor Scharmitzel. Peter Schlack, Wilhelm Warsch and Karl Zimmermann.

\textsuperscript{32} Franz Focke, Sozialismus aus christlicher Verantwortung. Die Idee eines Christlichen Sozialismus in der Katholisch-Sozialen Bewegung und in der CDU, Peter Hammer Verlag, Wuppertal 1981, p. 211.

\textsuperscript{33} Leo Schwering, Vorgeschichte ... op. cit., p.35.

\textsuperscript{34} Uertz argues the true basis of a new social and political order suggested by the trade unions was combined with the social ethical ideas of the Walberberger tradition. Rudolf Uertz, op. cit., p.28ff.
The Cologne Principles

Although the phrase Christian Socialism appeared in the preamble to the Cologne Principles\(^{35}\) it is otherwise apparent from the manifesto, published on July 1, 1945 and subtitled Der Ruf zur Sammlung des deutschen Volkes! that many of the radical and theological aspects of the Walberberger philosophy had already been dropped.\(^{36}\) The manifesto\(^{37}\) contained a preamble followed by twenty individual points. The emphasis in the preamble on ‘Gemeinwohl, soziale Gerechtigkeit and soziale Liebe’ are values taken directly from Catholic Social Teaching and Christian ethics,\(^{38}\) whilst the call for a;

“soziale Ordnung, die der demokratischen Überlieferung der deutschen Vergangenheit ebenso entspricht wie der Weite und dem Geiste des christlichen Naturrechts”

is reminiscent of demands by the Centre member and trade unionist Adam Stegerwald in his 1920 Essen Programme, for a Germany that was ‘deutsch-christlich-sozial.’ The main body of the Cologne Principles\(^{39}\) determined that private property ownership must be; ‘nach den Erfordernissen des Gemeinwolhs geordnet sein’ whilst the ‘Vorherrschaft des Großkapitals, der privaten Monopole und Konzerne wird gebrochen’ and the economy must be aimed exclusively at the ‘Bedarfsdeckung des Volkes.’ These few examples reveal that the Christian Socialist views of the Dominican priests Eberhard

\(^{35}\) Some of the dissenting views within the group were aired at the first conference after the foundation of the CDU in Düsseldorf on 24th November 1945. In his speech Karl Arnold upheld traditions but pointed to the need in future to embrace the working classes and confessions, “...bleiben wir unserer politischen Tradition treu und werden auch damit auch der Arbeiterschaft gerecht, der es auch heute wie früher ablehnt, den Reichsgedanken zur Diskussion zur stellen.” Karl Arnold, Der Soziale und der sittliche Geist in der Demokratie, Gründungsversammlung der CDU in Düsseldorf 24. November 1945, Schriftenreihe der CDU des Rhinelandes Heft 3, Köln, p.14.

\(^{36}\) The terms Verstaatlichung and Sozialisierung for example were removed after the very first draft discussions. Wolfgang Jäger, “Adenauers Einwirkung auf die programmatische Entwicklung der CDU 1945 bis 1949 in der Frage der Wirtschaftsordnung” in; Dieter Blumenwitz et al, Konrad Adenauer und seine Zeit, DVA, Stuttgart 1976, p.431.

\(^{37}\) In the Cologne Circle’s 10 year Festschrift from August 1955, Dr Warsch recalls the work of the programme commission. Despite the fact that its members were different - both “kirchlich und dogmatisch” he reveals that Christianity provided them with a political platform “Dieses Werk wurde das geistige Rüstzeug und die erste Grundlage des beginnenden Kampfes um die Seele und das Vertrauen unseres Volkes.” ACDP Landesverband Rhineland III-002-025/1.

\(^{38}\) Peter Hintze (Hrsg), Die CDU Parteiprogramme. Eine Dokumentation der Ziele und Aufgaben, Bouvier Verlag, Bonn 1995, p.IX.

\(^{39}\) Copies of all CDU programmes and draft principles are printed in O.K Flechtheim, Dokumente ..., op. cit.
Welty and Laurentius Siemer had succeeded in making a significant influence on the July version of the Cologne Principles, even if from this point, the priests' impact steadily declined. From 1946, Welty and Siemer no longer participated in the development of the CDU’s programme but Welty nevertheless kept his Christian Socialism alive through the Walberberg monastery’s publication ‘Die neue Ordnung’.

**Christian Realism**

Prior to any knowledge of the Cologne Principles, Protestants in Wuppertal drafted their own Barmer Guidelines in July 1945. Author of the *Barmer Erklärung*, the priest Lutze, believed a Christian party must be founded on the principles of democracy and a secular state. He was also aware that some Protestants put political interests before religious ones, as well as including people in the party who held no particular religious commitment. They were driven politically by the desire to form a; ‘Christian motivierten bürgerlichen Sammlungsbewegung als Gegengewicht zu den ‘linken’ Parteien.’

By the beginning of 1946, Wuppertal Protestants brought out their programme of Christian Realism, to prevent the trade union strand of Christian Socialists assuming they had exclusive representation of the CDU’s working classes. Christian Realism supported a liberal, market oriented economy corresponding closer to the traditional

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40 The terms Christian Socialism or Socialism with Christian Responsibility did not feature in the first programme of the Berlin CDU.

41 Franz Focke, op. cit., p.211.

42 The first issue of Die neue Ordnung in January 1946 perpetuated the apocalyptic fear of the demise of Christian culture in the western world, of the Abendland under existential threat. “Welt und Menschen sind über ihre eigene Grenzen hinausgewachsen.” Germany’s new order must therefore entail a “Rückkehr zu dem, was wir verlassen und sogar geschmäht haben” a return to a natural order as devised by God. “Wenn das christliche Abendland den Mut besitzt, heimzukehren zu Gott und zu Christus, dann bekennt und entscheidet es sich gleichzeitig zu seiner eigenen Geschichte und Vergangenheit, zu seiner eigenen Lebens- und Geisteshaltung, zu seiner eigenen Sitte und Kultur …… Die Kultur des Abendlandes wird christlich bleiben oder – sie wird untergehen.” The pamphlet declares its approach to be unashamedly dogmatic “Was immer der Betrachtung unterstellt wird, das wird vom Grundsätzlichen her gesehen und behandelt.” Their ideology “die Weise der Schau” is the main determinant. Christianity represented an ideological framework which the Walberberger group sought to impose on the chaos and ruin they found in Germany. Die Neue Ordnung, Heft 1 Jg 1, Kerle Verlag, Heldelberg 1946.

43 The Wuppertal Evangelicals in the early CDU circles descended from the former middle classes and had supported liberal parties during Weimar including the right-wing DNVP. Arcadius R. Gurland, op. cit., p.27-31.

44 Franz Focke, op. cit., p.211.
Protestant proclivity for an ethics of liberal-individualism, but accepting that the immediate post war period required a degree of socialist measures such as economic planning and control to solve immediate shortages. Yet the liberal-conservative Christian Realists clearly envisaged replacing the planned economy with a liberal, competition based economic system as the best mechanism, where private business becomes the vehicle for economic regeneration. The Wuppertal group saw social policy as an extension of the existing liberal economic system which distinguished them from Christian Socialists who viewed the social and economic system as a ‘Ganzheit.’ As discussed earlier in the study, Evangelical theology holds that a system of Christian ethics can only be imposed on the personal, individual sphere, but maintains that each individual possesses or develops a socially conscious ‘Gesinnung.’ Politics and economics (and here the issue of property ownership is paramount) are part of this individualistic, non-metaphysical domain. Although confessional and sociological differences threatened to impede co-operation on social and political reform between Catholics and Protestants, by September 2 1945, the Cologne group of Christian Democrats successfully merged with Düsseldorf and Wuppertal to form the Rhineland CDP in Cologne.

The Principles of the Rhineland and Westphalia CDP (second draft of the Cologne Principles)

On the same day that the Rhineland CDP was formed, a Westphalian CDU was founded in Bochum. The Rhineland and Westphalian groups had previously met on August 13, in Wattenscheid, to agree on the Cologne Principles as the basis for a joint programme commission and to establish a united Christian Democratic party for the states of Rhineland and Westphalia. The Rhineland based Düsseldorf group wanted to rework the entire document of the Cologne principles to give more emphasis to the ‘Einheit des Reichs’ whereas the Westphalians were content with the federalist elements offered by

45 Gerold Ambrosius, op. cit., p.31.

46 “Für die christlichen Sozialisten waren ihre sozialen Ordnungsädeen nahezu identisch mit Christentum, für die Protestanten dagegen war die politisch-soziale Ordnung ein metaphysikfreier, eigengesetzlicher Raum, für den Ethik und Theologie keine unmittelbar gültigen politischen Normen abgeben können, da diese einzig für die Gesinnung relevant sind.” Rudolf Uertz, op. cit., p.40.

47 “So wiederholte sich das Bild von Kloster Walberberg, aber es war doch anders. Nicht nur das Milieu war verändert, auch der Akzent hatte sich verlagert.” Leo Schwering, Vorgeschichte .. op. cit., p.53.
the Cologne programme. Before negotiations began, both parties aimed to clarify their position on the relationship between Christianity and politics in order to reconcile their confessional differences. They did not aim however to produce a detailed religious response to all aspects of the social and political system. By the third meeting of the programme commission in October, the group agreed that the programme should not be dominated by religious and theological statements, but that these should be limited to the preamble and employed only for enhancing the programme’s political credibility; “um die Wirkung des Religiösen im Raume der Politik handele.”

The Principles of the Rhineland and Westphalia CDP, or the second draft of the Cologne Principles as it was known, demonstrated a compromise between the views of the two state parties. The first part of the preamble was formulated by the Christian realist Otto Schmidt and the second part by the Christian Socialist Karl Arnold. Differences between the first and the second draft of the Cologne principles show the scale of the Christian Realist influence. They made several revisions to the Cologne Programme to express their objection to the terms Christian Socialism and Christian natural law and to the lack of reference made to German national unity. They altered the text to include; “Die deutsche Einheit ist für uns ein unabänderlicher Grundsatz, sie zu wahren unsere höchste Pflicht.” Gradually Socialist Catholics and Liberal Protestants appeared willing to compromise, and by the second draft of the Cologne Principles in September 1945, the term Christian Socialism was avoided. The phrase “wahrer christlicher Sozialismus” that featured in the June draft of the Cologne Principles was replaced with “christlich, deutsch, sozial” the term favoured by Adam Stegerwald. They altered the programme’s standpoint on private business and individual responsibility, claiming private business initiative should not merely be ‘erhalten’ as the first draft condoned, but positively ‘erweckt.’ The implementation of ‘freie körperlichen Selbstverwaltung’ should also be altered to ‘öffentlich-rechtlichen Wirtschaftsvertretungen’ which implied a change from state run to joint associations of worker and employer bodies to oversee and control policy. The interesting point here is that Christian Realism only demanded modification

49 Ibid., p.170.
50 Ute Schmidt, op. cit., p.526.
of two relatively minor points of the Christian Socialist programme to suit their more liberal, realist objectives,\textsuperscript{51} suggesting that the differences between the two philosophies of Christian Socialism and Christian Realism were surmountable and permanent political interdenomination could become a reality.

**Christian Solidarism**

Welty's and Siemer's Christian Socialist views came under fire from those social and moral philosophers who believed in Christian Solidarism over Christian Socialism, including Heinrich Pesch, Oswald von Nell-Breuning and Gustav Gundlach SJ. Their criticism was a revival of pre-war antagonisms, once again attacking the Dominicans' attempt to recreate a social order in 1945 similar to that which existed in the Middle Ages, subordinating the individual to the community. Section one of this study showed how the Christian Solidarist Jesuits were credited with influencing the 1931 papal encyclical Quadragesimo anno, calling for the existing liberal economy to be adapted to meet its social responsibility. Jesuit thinking also underpinned the early Christian trade union movement, including Stegerwald's Essen programme in 1920 and the Centre Party's programme. Their notion of Christian Solidarity was crucially defined by their acceptance of a liberal-individualistic society. They believed that society was characterised by liberal-individualism, maintaining the separation between politics and ethics, yet their thinking departed from liberal-capitalist support for a true competitive economy on account of their preference for the guild system.\textsuperscript{52} Whilst the Solidarists did not oppose the capitalist economic system per se\textsuperscript{53}, they did not accept the classic economic view that the market is self-regulating or individuals' pursuit of wealth

\textsuperscript{51}“Dem Christlichen Realismus genügten also zwei geringfügige Veränderungen der an sich christlich-sozialistisch inspirierten Waltherberger Leitsätze, um diese in seinem realistischen (liberalen) Sinne interpretierten zu können.” Rudolf Uertz, op. cit., p.57.

\textsuperscript{52}According to the solidarists, each member in the guild system voluntarily contributes to the whole, based on the belief that this works to the benefit of all. These parts could be professional bodies, administrative bodies or associations.

\textsuperscript{53}Oswald von Nell-Breuning's assessment of the papal encyclical Quadragesimo anno and its standpoint on capitalism cites that "die kapitalistische Wirtschaftsweise .... seel nicht als solche in sich selbst verwerflich" but is condemned only when either the capitalist partner or the proletarian partner involved in the capitalist relationship tries to exploit the capitalist system exclusively to their own advantage. The mistake of the capitalist system in the past was namely that it was allowed to develop into this individualist, liberal type of capitalism. A capitalist system that contains inbuilt social obligations and a legal framework of rules and regulations by which it must abide however is acceptable. Oswald von Nell-Breuning S.J, "Kapitalismus und Sozialismus in katholischer Sicht" in; Frankfurter Hefte Heft 7 Jg. 2, 1947. p.665-681.
creation will naturally bring about a healthy balanced economy. They claimed that the economy must be ‘managed’ to ensure that society benefits as a whole. The Solidarists defended state intervention as a natural and necessary function, whilst the risk of too much state power and control was tempered by the Solidarists’ rule of subsidiarity.

By April 1946, the party’s *Interzonenausschuss* confirmed that agreement on the basic direction of the party had been achieved, but there were still a number of conflicting concepts in the area of economic and social policy among Socialists and Solidarists. 54 Jesuits argued that Christian Socialism was too preoccupied with providing theoretical, philosophical explanations that did not translate to a practical programme, and furthermore was a contradiction of the teachings of the Church on the issue of property ownership. Although the final draft of the Rhineland-Westphalia Principles retained the original Christian Socialist thrust of the first Cologne Principles, it does not disguise the obvious opposition from Evangelical Christian Realists and Catholic Solidarists. Although in the immediate post-war climate no group openly expressed its views on the liberal economy for fear of being labelled liberal-capitalist or reactionary, 55 once the Wuppertal group and Konrad Adenauer had both joined the Rhineland CDU, their principal motive became to defend the party from the left-wing ambitions of the Christian Socialist authors of the Cologne Principles. 56 Uhl 57 has suggested that despite its genuine proposals for social reform, the Christian Socialist programme of Welty failed because it was too authoritarian, illusory and even dangerous. Ambrosius 58

54 The *Interzonenausschuss* had been set up during the meeting at Bad Godesberg in December 1945 under the leadership Dörpinghaus. Controversy over Christian Socialism and Solidarism came to a head in their first meeting in Mingoldsheim. See Akte Zwischenzonenverbindungsausschuss, ACDP, NL-Dörpinghaus: I-009-0071.

55 Gerold Ambrosius, op. cit., p.25.


57 See Bernd Uhl, op. cit., p.82ff. Uhl is sceptical of Welty’s aim of ‘rechristianisation’. Since a Christian order must by definition be imposed from above and not as in a democracy from below. Christian Socialism thus leads to an authoritarian state form. “Der Wunsch Welteys, aus christlicher Liebe heraus eine vollkommene Ordnung für die Menschen herzustellen, wird zur Gefahr für ihre Freiheit und zur Gefahr für den Glauben, der ein Akt der freien Entscheidung sein sollte. Die Planung der Menschen auf Christus hin, um sie dadurch zu “vollguten” Menschen zu machen, führt konsequent zur Gefährdung, ja Aufhebung der Freiheit der Menschen.” W.D Narr also remarks that the weakness of the Christian Socialist programme was that the focus on rechristianisation caused them to neglect plans for reform of institutional structures. Wolf-Dieter Narr, CDU/SPD op. cit., p.86.

58 Ambrosius p.16.
believes Welty’s social reform measures were contradictory; advocating private ownership over public ownership but supporting nationalisation plans, calling for worker co-determination rights but then doing nothing to restrict the power of the employer; favouring state control of the economy but rejecting a centralised, administered economy. Kraiker\(^{59}\) claims that there was not one socialist, progressive feature put forward in the first two years of programmatic discussions that did not undergo revision or rejection at some later date. Even Welty, as the original theoretician of Christian Socialism, expressed anxiety that Christian Socialism could be misunderstood and warned that unless they succeeded in explaining the meaning of the term and how it differed from all other forms of Socialism, then it might be wiser to forego use of the term;

"Wir betonen nochmals, daß wir die Fragen und Befürchtungen, die das Wort hervorruft, genau kennen. .... Es muß unbedingt gelingen, die weiten Schichten unseres Volkes, die für diesen Sozialismus aus christlicher Verantwortung gewonnen werden sollen, genügend darüber aufzuklären, worin der christliche Sozialismus besteht, und wie er sich von allem sonstigen Sozialismus unterscheidet. Sonst wäre es ratsamer, auf den Ausdruck zu verzichten."\(^{60}\)

In the Jesuit journal *Stimmen der Zeit* in October 1947, Christian Socialism received its harshest criticism yet. It demanded that Christian Socialism asked what it really wanted to achieve. Did it want to socialise the whole economy or at least all of its decisive parts? Or would it be satisfied with the nationalisation of certain areas of the economy, in particular the key industries? The former, they said, would be in clear contradiction to the teaching of the Church and economic common sense, and if Christian Socialism wanted only the latter, then, they argued, it is just no longer Socialism.\(^{61}\) Christian Solidarists felt that their political concept more truthfully reflected the socialist aims and spirit of Catholic Social Theory.

The programmes by Evangelicals and Solidarists have also been accused of attempting to bring about the correct theological condition or *Gesinnung* in society at the expense of

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\(^{59}\) G. Kraiker & M. Welteke, op. cit., p.218.

\(^{60}\) Eberhard Welty, Christlicher Sozialismus, op cit., p.69.

formulating a concrete programme. They took the naive assumption that instilling the correct Christian behaviour and attitude in individuals was sufficient to bring about a stable social and political order. Since the social and political system should remain secular in structure, Evangelicals and Solidarists did not foresee a closed and rigid set of rules on which to run society such as in classic Liberalism, collectivism or Christian Socialism, but one which acted flexibly, pragmatically to current circumstances. This lack of a tangible programme, says Schmidt, did not make Solidarism any less successful, since;

"der Solidarismus als die liberale Form der katholischen Sozialethik, der auch die flexiblen Liberal-Konservativen um Adenauer zuneigten, die ideologische Grundlage für die praktisch-politische Zusammenarbeit und das spätere Regierungsbündnis von Christlichen Demokraten und Liberalen in der Frühphase der Bundesrepublik schuf."

Schmidt claims that Catholicism learnt to assimilate the liberal economic views of thinkers such as Pesch, and combined these with its own 19th century achievements in social reform and Solidarist thinking and so learnt to accept that the modern industrial economy thrived on the principle of market economics and the granting of individual economic freedoms. Schmidt believes it was the Jesuit 'individualist' interpretation of Catholic Social Teaching that enabled dialogue to take place with conservative Protestants in the first place. These liberal thinking Catholics shared the view with Evangelicals, that the political and social order was a secular sphere and not synonymous with a closed, Christian society run according to natural law.

The Rhineland-Westphalia CDU and the ‘Reichstreffen’ in Bad Godesberg
Between 14-16 December, 1945, Andreas Hermes, Chairman of the CDU in the Soviet zone, invited all Christian ‘Volksparteien’ to a ‘Reichstreffen,’ under the supervision of

62 Rudolf Uertz, op. cit., p.54.
63 Ute Schmidt, op. cit., p.520.
64 Heinrich Pesch, the Volkswirtschaftler (1854-1963) did not think the individual was a means to an end for society but was free and independent. Pesch was concerned with the economy and the individual’s place in it as the source of national prosperity. Competition was desired and necessary as was the right to private ownership. Solidarism for Pesch was not a theological concept but a social, philosophical one and he believed no national economic programme could be gained from Christianity directly. Christianity only offered guidelines for a moral code. See section by Wilfried Gottschalch in Wilfried Gottschalch/Friedrich Karrenberg/Franz Josef Stegmann, op. cit.
65 Schmidt’s view is also shared by Rudolf Uertz, op. cit., p.53 and Wolf D. Narr, op. cit., p.88.
the British and US military authorities, to declare their joint aim of co-ordinating all regional Christian democratic Landesverbände into one central Reich organisation, to establish a “wirtschaftliche und soziale Neuordnung” and a “neue Politik aus dem Geist des Christentums und der Demokratie.” The meeting demonstrated the beginning of a strong ideological and organisational influence by the Berlin Christian Democrats over the western zones. Yet calling the meeting a Reichstreffen was an exaggeration, since many states were not represented. Representatives from states in the French zone and Bavaria in the US zone, were among those absent dashing hopes of achieving a national consensus on key issues. The conference secured formal agreement on the party name, accepting the Berlin party title the Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands (CDUD) and, most importantly, consensus was reached on adopting Berlin’s programme of Sozialismus aus christlicher Verantwortung as the official party programme. It was here that Christian Socialism appeared to regain some of its lost profile in the western CDU. Yet the resolutions reached at the conference have more adequately been termed a pyrrhic victory for the Christian Socialists. The claim to have given recognition to the party’s trade union wing by establishing ‘social committees’ or Sozialausschüsse was a mild concession by the right-wing members of the party who

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67 Hans Peter Schwarz, Konrad Adenauer. A German Politician and Statesman in a Period of War, Revolution and Reconstruction Vol 1: From the German Empire to the Federal Republic, 1876-1952, Berghahn Books, Providence, Oxford 1995. Berlin’s claim to national leadership of the Reichspartei was undermined by the fact that Kaiser and Hermes were prevented from attending by the Soviet military authorities. In his absence Hermes’ speech was read out. See section II, chapter 5.1 of this study for the programme discussions in Berlin.

68 Adenauer was also prevented from speaking because of the ban on political activity which had been imposed by the British High Authority.

69 All regional groups agreed to adopt the name except for the Christian democrats in Bavaria who preferred to call themselves the CSU. The first CDU Chairman Josef Müller in Bavaria, said “Christian Social Union corresponded more to our conception of social evolution deriving from a Christian sense of responsibility in cultural, economic and above all social policy than the idea Christian Democratic” cited in Geoffrey Pridham, Christian Democracy in West Germany, Croom Helm, London 1977, p.24. The CDU was the only party at the time not to use the word ‘Party’ in its title because of its negative connotations of ‘Weimar parties’ and the ‘Nazi Party.’ A J Heidenheimer, Adenauer and the CDU, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague 1960, p.22. In conversation with the mayor of Hamburg Adenauer stated; “There were many arguments for and against the name Christian Democratic. But we definitely think that the name ‘Union’ should not be adopted for the following reason: it is impossible to know what path the Christian Democratic Union will take under pressure from the Russians. This might eventually provide valuable material for hostile agitation.” Hans Peter Schwarz, Konrad Adenauer. A German Politician ... op. cit., p.339.

70 Franz Focke, op. cit., p.219ff.
sensed labour representatives' dissatisfaction with their lack of power and influence in the party. Erich Kühler from the CDU Hesse launched the party’s projected socio-economic and political platform, which was virtually identical to the Berlin CDU’s founding manifesto, the Gründungsauftrag71 from June 26, revealing a clear trade union influence.72 The meeting confirmed a commitment to state ownership of key industries and private monopolies and to a system of central economic planning or ‘planvoller Wirtschaftslenkung.’

Adenauer’s influence on the CDU’s Programme

The question when Adenauer’s influence on programmatic development in the region really began has not been conclusively resolved. During 1945 Adenauer is believed to have had little involvement with developing the party’s first programme. Leo Schwering is reported to have contacted the lord mayor Adenauer in Cologne in April 1945, to discuss the foundation of a new party, but Adenauer expressed that he preferred to wait to consult northern Protestants first. Later that year however Schwering is also reported as criticising Adenauer for his “continued meddling.”73 Other reports insist that Adenauer’s background influence should not be underestimated,74 claiming he was kept informed of all developments by Schwering and Warsch who frequently sought his advice and also sent him a copy of the Cologne Principles. One thing is clear however. Once he was elected Chairman of the Rhineland CDU and of the British zone as a whole in January 1946, his subsequent influence on the direction of the programme and the party was unchallengeable.75 There is an inherent contradiction when analysing Adenauer’s programmatic involvement in the party,76 between the theoretical and

71 Uertz believes that the Berlin manifesto was chosen as the party’s official programme, because it was more pragmatic than the social, ethical and theological basis of western Christian Socialism. Rudolf Uertz, op. cit., p.62.
72 Horstwalter Heitzer, Die CDU in der Britischen Zone ..., op. cit., p.178.
73 Noel D. Cary, op. cit., p.165.
74 Horstwalter Heitzer, Die CDU in der Britischen Zone ... op. cit., p.483.
76 Wolfgang Jäger, Adenauers Einwirkung ....in; Dieter Blumenwitz et al. op. cit., p.427-451.
theological basis of his personal political Weltanschauung on the one hand and Adenauer's tactical and pragmatic utilisation of programmes on the other. As a result one can never be sure when Adenauer was acting out of genuine conviction and when he was using philosophical, ideological arguments as an instrument for gaining political advantage.

Adenauer's world view\(^\text{77}\) was best communicated in his memoirs\(^\text{78}\) and in his many speeches as party chairman. Probably the most well known and exemplary of these was his famous speech at Cologne University on August 24, 1946.\(^\text{79}\) This speech provides a useful source of entry into an investigation of Adenauer's Weltanschauung as it encompasses almost all his key political values and demonstrates Adenauer's rhetorical skill in relating diverse themes into one coherent whole. He most frequently refers to 'christlich-abendländischen Kultur' and to the 'Würde' of the individual, but also to his abhorrence of an all-powerful, omnipotent state whether this was the fascist regime of National Socialism or the communist version in the Soviet Union. He makes cross links between the values of western culture and European economic interdependence and the potential threat from communism. By repeating the same pattern in later speeches, Adenauer succeeds in consolidating and reinforcing his message, until the values appear indissoluble and one could not be achieved without implicating another. On economic policy Adenauer believed in private enterprise and the right to private property ownership, insisting on the inextricable link between political freedom and economic freedom. This principle became polarised so that a centralised, administered economy became associated with dictatorship and a liberal, market economy with political,

\(^{77}\) For a comprehensive account of Adenauer's personal philosophy, see Werner Weidenfeld, Konrad Adenauer und Europa. Die Geistigen Grundlagen der westeuropäischen Integrationspolitik des ersten Bonner Bundeskanzlers, Europa Union Verlag, Bonn 1976 and Anneliese Poppina, Konrad Adenauer. Geschichtsverständniss, Weltanschauung und politische Praxis, DVA, Stuttgart 1975 and Hans Peter Schwarz, Konrad Adenauer, A German Politician ...op. cit.

\(^{78}\) Adenauer's memoirs Erinnerungen 1945-1953, Band I, DVA, Stuttgart 1965, is a comprehensive collation of original documentation from the period overlaid with Adenauer's subjective interpretation of events. Retrospectively the impression is created that developments in Germany between 1945- 1949 were the result of a coherently executed concept. Hans Peter Schwarz commented on Adenauer's memoirs "Zwischen der argumentativen Selbstdarstellung und den tatsächlichen Motivationen klafft erhebungsweise oft ein Abgrund." Hans Peter Schwarz, Konrad Adenauer. Seine Deutschland- und Außenpolitik 1944-63. DTV, München 1975, p.102.

freedom and democracy. Adenauer tactfully did not blame capitalism for the rise of fascism, as the Christian Socialists did, but on materialism in general. Although at first Adenauer seems to lean more naturally towards the liberal-conservative strand in the Rhineland and Westphalia, in practice;

"Adenauer's Konzept stimmte mit den beiden Gründungsimpulsen der CDU nicht überein, sondern es deutete voraus auf eine Entwicklung, die 1946 noch nicht eingesetzt hatte."

**The Neheim-Hüsten Programme**

Any gains made at the Godesberg meeting in December, such as parity of decision-making for employees in industry, were negated once Adenauer became chairman of the newly constituted committee of the British zone and chairman of the Rhineland CDU on 5th February 1946. Leo Schwerding had opposed Adenauer's appointment, predicting that it would entail a right-wing shift for the party and years later referred to the day as the day of Adenauer's *Machtergreifung*. In the spring of 1946 Adenauer single-handedly drafted a programme for the British zone CDU in Neheim-Hüsten disregarding all party resolutions made at the December meeting in Godesberg. Adenauer formulated his programme as a unification document to merge the *Landesverbände* in the British zone with those of the US zone and represents one of the key texts for understanding the ideological shift that the CDU undertook in 1946.

The most important element of Adenauer's Neheim-Hüsten programme was respect for the individual's economic and political freedom;

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82 Leo Schwerding cited in H.P Schwarz, Konrad Adenauer. A German Politician ... op. cit., p.352.
83 Horstwalter Heitzer, Die CDU in der Britischen Zone......op. cit., p.182.
84 Heizer notes that Adenauer was the only one from a total of 30 delegates at the Neheim-Hüsten conference who had succeeded in producing a complete and comprehensive manifesto. "Durch das Fehlen eines Alternativentwurfs war der Programmausschuss nicht nur psychologisch sondern auch faktisch auf die Beratung des Adenauerschen Programms festgelegt und damit weitgehend auf redaktionelle Aufgaben beschränkt." Ibid., p.486.
Adenauer’s emphasis on ‘personalism’ and ‘freedom of the individual’ marks the new focus of a Christian political programme.\textsuperscript{86} Earlier demands for a \textit{Bedarfsdeckungswirtschaft} was subtly modified by his adding the sentence; “\textit{und vor allem der Befreiung und Entfaltung der schaffenden Kräfte des Menschen.}”\textsuperscript{87} The programme condoned nationalisation of the coal industry as a concession to the Christian Socialists but Adenauer circumvented more wide reaching nationalisation plans for German industry by stating;

“The sich aufdrängende Frage der Vergesellschaftung von Teilen der Wirtschaft ist zur Zeit nicht praktisch, da die deutsche Wirtschaft nicht frei ist.”

The coherence and structure of the programme also distinguishes Neheim-Hüsten from previous programmes and is indicative of the move from the earlier, heavy philosophical style of \textit{Grundsatzprogramme} towards a more pragmatic style of \textit{Aktionsprogramm}.\textsuperscript{88} The programme comprised three separate sections - A. Fundamental Principles and Requirements B. Urgent measures for the period of reconstruction and C. Relations to other countries.

Always conscious of the political and tactical impact of programme statements, Adenauer removed the term Christian Socialism, but had also become uneasy with the status given to the term ‘Christian.’ Adenauer feared that the reference to Christian could risk alienating the liberals in the Free Democratic Party (FDP) with whom he later

\textsuperscript{86} Neheim-Hüsten programme, printed in O.K Flechtheim, Band 2, op. cit., p51 (48-53).

\textsuperscript{87} Rudolf Uertz, op. cit., p.76.

\textsuperscript{88} Horst Walter Heizer, Die CDU in der Britischen Zone ... op. cit., p.487.


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aimed to encourage coalition. Comments in his memoirs also indicate that Adenauer did not consider early programme statements to hold any real, lasting relevance.

"Eine Partei wie die unsrige konnte erst im Verlauf einer gewissen Zeit die ihr zugrunde liegenden Ideen zu füsten und klar umrisenen gemeinsamen Programmsätzen entwickeln."

Christian Socialism in the CDU, he claimed, was a preliminary phase only, until the trade union wing grew to accept Adenauer’s belief in Christian individual ethics in combination with liberal, market economics. Neheim Hüsten intended to provide a compromise between liberal-conservative and Christian Socialist forces, in order to avoid a split in the party, as well as to moderate the party’s left-wing influence. Interestingly the Neheim-Hüsten programme generated more criticism from Otto Schmidt in the Wuppertal Protestant camp than from Christian Socialists. Schmidt protested that the programme did not have democratic credibility, since its contents had not been approved with leading Länder members of the British zone, and it further lacked theological underpinning and sensitivity for the party’s range of confessional interests. Christian Socialists in the British zone on the other hand chose to ignore the personalistic, liberal tone in Adenauer’s Neheim-Hüsten programme and continued to regard the Cologne Principles as their official programme.

Two main programmatic alternatives were thus fighting for party dominance; Christian Socialism supported by Jakob Kaiser in the Soviet zone and Karl Arnold and Johannes Albers in the British zone and Christian liberal-individualism backed by the Solidarists, the Wuppertal Protestants and Adenauer. Adenauer was aware of the need to reach a

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81 “Adenauer did not intend to make the party programme into an avowal of Christian faith.” H.P. Schwarz, Konrad Adenauer. A German Politician ... op. cit., p.353.


83 Ibid., p.61.

84 From the beginning of 1946 Otto Schmidt was elected the representative for Protestant workers’ rights in the Rhineland CDU with equal powers as Adenauer and Johannes Albers.

85 Anselm Doering Manteuffel op. cit., p.94.

86 Further to the socialist demands from within the party there were also those from the British Labour Government in the British Occupied Zone. British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin spoke in the House of Commons on October 22, 1946 declaring British support for the socialization of German industry and called on Germany to initiate the necessary steps. Arnold J. Heidenheimer; op. cit., p.123.
compromise with the Christian Socialists, in order to avoid internal party conflict. He tactfully cited Christian Socialist rhetoric in subsequent speeches, a tactic that involved giving Christian Socialist views sufficient exposure but at the same time keeping them under tight control.\textsuperscript{95} Just five and a half weeks after releasing the Neheim-Hüsten programme, Adenauer’s party in the Rhineland set up a programme commission to reconcile the party’s divergent socio-economic views. Adenauer himself took an active role in drafting its contents. When it was finally presented on August 24, 1946 at the Essen Burgplatz as the ‘Social Programme of the CDU,’ there was evidence that a compromise had been reached, through the decision to opt for a mixed economic model or ‘Gemischtwirtschaft.’ The Social Programme was followed up by the ‘Essen Programme’, effectively a bridging programme for North Rhine-Westphalia before the release of the Ahlen programme for the entire British zone.\textsuperscript{96}

\textit{The Ahlen Programme}

The British zone programme drafted in Ahlen, Westphalia in February 1947, was a consolidation of the economic principles of Neheim Hüsten, the work carried out by the economic and social committees, and the Essen programme. Ahlen outlined the economic and social policies of the CDU in the British zone as preparation for the state parliamentary elections in spring 1947, providing an alternative to the nationalisation plans of both the British government and the German socialist parties, the SPD and KPD. It signalled a move towards a mixed economy that included nationalised, private and co-operative structures for industry. Adenauer’s definition of a mixed economy almost certainly differed to that by the Christian Socialists, who would interpret a mixed economy for example as parity in decision making for employers and employees.\textsuperscript{97} Yet it mattered little, so long as consensus was perceived to have been achieved on all sides, and co-operation could be furthered. The Ahlen programme sought to bring about a new order, a third way between the extremes of collectivism and capitalism. From the autumn of 1946 to January 1947, two separate drafts were put forward, the first by Albers, the second by Adenauer. After joint consolidation, Adenauer agreed to accept

\textsuperscript{95} Horstwalter Heizer, Die CDU in der Britischen Zone op. cit., p.489.

\textsuperscript{96} Ibid., p.495ff.

\textsuperscript{97} Rudolf Uertz, p.90.
the nationalisation plans put forward by Albers, most notably for the coal industry, whilst Albers agreed to drop the phrase Socialism;

"Wir wollen das Wort Sozialismus bei uns nicht, auch nicht Sozialisierung soll Ausgangspunkt unserer Orientierung sein." 99

The term ‘Gemeinwirtschaftlich’ was suggested in place of socialism. Ahlen’s nationalisation plans were more extensive than those outlined in Neheim-Hüsten but upheld Adenauer’s belief in the ‘Machtereilendes Prinzip,’ first introduced at Neheim-Hüsten, to avoid a concentration of power among private individuals or the state and to distribute the power of large and monopoly style industries to smaller representative bodies, including employees, trade unions and regional councils, communities and private individuals. Liberal influences are further expressed in the statement;

"Freiheit der Person auf wirtschaftlichem und Freiheit auf politischem Gebiet hängen eng zusammen."

Industrial democracy is encouraged with co-decision making powers for employees, trade unions and profit share schemes in industry, but there is no mention of the role of the market in Ahlen, neglecting entirely to state which mechanism should be used to regulate the economy. This gap in the programme would enable the CDU in 1949 to introduce market economics via the Düsseldorfer Principles, without seen to be contradicting the principles of Ahlen. Economic planning was no longer conceived as an aim in itself, but;

"Planung und Lenkung müssen deshalb auf das unbedingt notwendige Maß beschränkt werden." 100

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98 In a meeting of the North Rhine-Westphalian Landtag, on 23-24 January 1947 Adenauer nevertheless qualified his acceptance of nationalisation plans by stating that the decision for or against a socialist organised society would ultimately depend on wider external factors.

99 Meeting of the CDU Sozialausschuß of the British Zone, 23/24 January 1947 in Cologne. ACDP, NL Dörpinghaus Sta. The exact date of the meeting is not certain and may have been a few days earlier or later.

100 Ahlen Programme, printed in O.K Flechtheim, op. cit., p.53-58.
The traditional Catholic condemnation of capitalism featured significantly in the programme but equally rejected the state socialism that characterised the Soviet Union or the type of state capitalism of Hitler’s regime. The provision was made for profit sharing schemes and to channel co-decision making powers to employees. Employee representatives would be invited to sit on industry’s executive boards to jointly decide on key economic planning and social issues together with management. It was envisaged that economic planning and administration would be undertaken by independent economic bodies in designated chambers of commerce, both in the more regulated post-war economy and once normal economic conditions had been restored. In short the Ahlen Programme;

"could rouse the enthusiasm of Catholic adherents of social reform on the principle of Solidarism without imposing too rigid a system on the Protestants in north Germany."

The Ahlener Programme most accurately summarises the ambiguities of the CDU’s programme in the immediate post-war period and it would be false to assume that the outcome was the preserve of the Christian Socialists or a product of Adenauer’s tactics. Heizer disagrees with Uertz that the Ahlen Programme was a synthesis of Christian Socialism and private economics, arguing instead that Ahlen was nothing more than; “ein zeitlich begrenztes Nebeneinander grundsätzlich verschiedener Ordnungsvorstellungen” This theory also contradicts the views of Narr and Heidenheimer who see Ahlen ‘clearly as a programme of the left’ and the ‘high point of Christian Socialism.’ The indecision that prevails among post-war historians over Ahlen’s true meaning is an exact indication of the vagueness of third way politics. It is precisely the level of ambiguity and imprecision over the origin, significance and direction of its ideology that made Ahlen acceptable to all groups. Each group could

102 Arnold J. Heidenheimer, op. cit., p.128.
103 Whilst some historians have argued that the Ahlen programme was primarily the brain child of Adenauer, Uertz insists that Adenauer’s draft programme was simply a modified version of that put forward by the Christian Socialists, Albers, Arnold and Welty. Rudolf Uertz, Verflichtendes Erbe?...op. cit., p.89.
104 Horstwalter Heizer, Die CDU in der Britischen Zone .... p.504.
find, if not all, then some of its views represented, and was free to draw its own interpretations from the text. Emphasising Christian Socialism in the preamble and economic freedom in the main body of the text, it succeeded in placating both poles of opinion.

Schmidt\textsuperscript{105} believes the Ahlen programme;

"erfüllte für die Union eine wichtige Funktion in der Außendarstellung und diente kurzfristig als Wahlplattform, die trotz innerparteilicher Kontroversen den Eindruck erweckte, als sei die CDU in der Frage des wirtschafts- und sozialistischen Neuaufbaus einhelliger Meinung."

Apart from its propagandistic effect, the non-committal nature of the Ahlen programme had benefits for reconciling the party’s differences on economic policy. As the study will show, just two years after Ahlen, the trade union wing would show support for social market economics by accepting the Düsseldorf Principles, without experiencing a compromise of their principles. Adenauer himself certainly only conceived Ahlen as a temporary campaign programme for the Landtag elections in order to highlight in the public realm the main programmatic differences between the CDU and the SPD.\textsuperscript{106} Right-wing voices in the CDU would later denounce the early programmes as obsolete and relevant only to those unique post-war circumstances. Christian Socialists on the other hand, residing in the party’s affiliated Verbände and Vereinigungen, in particular the Sozialausschüsse or the Junge Union placed more value on the early programmes of Neheim-Hüsten and Ahlen since they relied on them as legitimation for their existence.\textsuperscript{107}

\textsuperscript{105} Ute Schmidt, op. cit., p.535.

\textsuperscript{106} Bruno Heck, Adenauer und die Christliche Demokratische Union Deutschlands, op.cit., p.197.

\textsuperscript{107} Ute Schmidt, op. cit. p.531.
4.2. The North - Lower Saxony, Hamburg, Schleswig-Holstein, Bremen

Lower Saxony
The north German towns of Hanover, Braunschweig, Oldenburg and Schaumburg-Lippe, which later formed the state of Lower Saxony in the British zone, differed considerably in confessional and political structure from the Rhineland and Westphalia regions. Not surprisingly this was reflected in its Christian party development. Despite a predominantly Evangelical population, it was former Centre Party members Christian Blank and Bernhard Pfad, together with Christian trade unions Anton Storch and Wilhelm Naegel who set about establishing a new Christian party in Hanover in 1945. Centre Party members were suspicious about joining forces with the formerly national socialist inclined middle class Protestants\(^{108}\) but were encouraged by the Westphalia CDP member, Kannengießer to overcome their prejudices. Kannengießer visited north Germany to report on the foundation of the CDP in the Rhineland and Westphalia, prompting Pfad to extend the party’s appeal to former conservative, agrarian based ‘Welfen’ party voters in the region. Yet Pfad held onto his fear that the party would be overwhelmed by the Protestant majority. The subsequent intervention by Adenauer to elicit a positive response from the Hanover group proved decisive. He sent his delegates Leo Schwering and Theodor Scharnitzel to hold discussions with the Hanover group to convert them to the Christian democratic idea. It took until September 1945 for the Hanover group to concede to the foundation of a joint Christian democratic party and from this point on, Pfad sought contact with Evangelicals.\(^{109}\)

At the Evangelicals’ conference on 28-31 August, 1945 in Treysa, Hesse, Evangelicals jointly declared their readiness to join a ‘politisches Zusammengehen beider Konfessionen auf dem Boden christlicher Union.’ It was an ideal forum for contacts to be forged, between figures such as Oberkirchenrat in Hanover, Adolf Cillien and the former CSVD member Arnold Fratzscher. Although most of the early documents on the CDU in Lower Saxony have been lost or were destroyed, with little remaining to

\(^{108}\) Horstwalter Heitzer, Die CDU in der Britischen Zone, op. cit., p.93.

\(^{109}\) Ibid., p.96.
indicate the course programme discussions took in 1945, Fratzscher\textsuperscript{110} himself reported that a number of similar initiatives ran in parallel to the establishment of the CDU in the region, which for a while threatened to steal the thunder of the Cologne based CDP. One such initiative came from Wilhelm Naegel\textsuperscript{111} who called for a socially committed market economy. Naegel did not want simply to mimic the development of the Christian Democratic groups in Cologne and Berlin, but to develop the region’s own specific Christian, democratic and social manifesto. The former mayor, Arthur Menge, also campaigned for a separate union of non-socialist groups, but alienated liberal voters by including ‘Christian’ in his party’s title, \textit{Christlich Demokratische Union}.

At the founding party conference of the CDU in Hanover on 18 November 1945, both the Catholic figure Pfad and the Protestant Cillien signalled the historically unprecedented commitment shown by Protestants and Catholics to interdenominational cooperation. Their shared experiences in the resistance against Hitler had forged what was termed a \textit{Leidengemeinschaft}. Mutual recognition by Christians of both denominations that the loss of Christian faith and an obsession with materialistic ambitions had led to the National Socialist catastrophe, provided sufficient justification for the two communities to come together. Evangelicals acknowledged their mistake in adopting a passive role in politics and pledged to take a more active role in shaping political events in future. In an unprecedented move by Protestants, the fusion of Christianity with politics in the form of a Christian party was deemed legitimate. The Christian faith, claims Fratzscher, was no closer to offering direct guidelines for economic and political policies, but could nevertheless become the basis for all political action and decisions.\textsuperscript{112} Economic policies drafted by Wilhelm Naegel, rejected nationalisation and showed support for private business as an invaluable aid to the process of economic reconstruction. Some of the group’s early ideas are also reported to have found expression in Adenauer’s Neheim-Hüsten manifesto in February 1946.\textsuperscript{113}


\textsuperscript{111} Naegel later became the leader of the Economic Committee in the Bizone Wirtschaftsrat.

\textsuperscript{112} Arnold Fratzscher, op. cit., p.35.

\textsuperscript{113} Ibid., p.33.
In the Catholic dominated areas of Lower Saxony, such as south Oldenburg, the launch of the Rhine-Westphalia CDP was met with greater enthusiasm and it was adopted as the CDP programme in the region. In Protestant north Oldenburg on the other hand, the CDP could not compete with the liberal democratic DP party, which contained both Protestants and Catholics.\footnote{Ibid., p.17.} Virulent conflict between the confessions in the DP however, soon sent Christians of both denominations flocking to join the CDP. In Braunschweig, where three thirds of the population were Protestants, Christians, liberals and conservatives, who traditionally voted SPD, left liberal or Deutschnationale, first met in May 1945, but it took until December to launch a Christian party.

**Schleswig-Holstein**

In the period before 1933, northern Germany had had no experience of a Christian party that had attempted to engender political reconciliation between right and left wing parties.\footnote{Horstwalter Heitzer, Die CDU in der Britischen Zone, op. cit., p.105.} The Centre Party never gained more than about 1\% in elections whilst Protestants voted DDP, DVP, Deutschnationale or SPD until around 1930, when the National Socialists were swept in to dominate Schleswig-Holstein’s party spectrum. On 18 September, 1945 in Plön, Schleswig-Holstein, the former DNVP Reichsminister Schlange-Schöningen\footnote{Schlange-Schöningen has been described as a “reactionär-aggressiver Konservativer mit starker völkisch-alldeutscher Orientierung” In May 1924 he wrote a Denkschrift to Hugenberg stating “Wir müssen den parlamentarischen Weg mißbrauchen, um in die Machtstellungen des Staates zu kommen mit der festen Absicht, eines Tages von diesen Machtstellungen aus das Parlament zu vernichten.” The aim was dictatorship “die Diktatur, von der man möglichst nur wenig sprechen soll, die man aber wollen muß” in order to “den inneren Aufbau der Staatsmacht und der Wehrhaftigkeit zu ermöglichen.” He later distanced himself from the DNVP, and until 1932 lent his support to forming a new ‘bürgerliche’ movement to support Brüning’s increasingly authoritarian style of government but gravitating towards acceptance of the republic. During the Nazi period he sought contact with members of the resistance including Molte and Goerdeler. Schlange-Schöningen later became director of the Economic Administration in the British Zone and agricultural minister in the Wirtschaftsrat for the Bizon. Günter J. Tittel, “Hans-Schlange Schöningen. Ein vergessener Politiker der ‘ersten Stunde,’” in, Vierteljahresheft für Zeitgeschichte, Jg.35. Heft 1, 1987, p.28 (25-63).} set out to form a Christian conservative party to combine all forces to the ‘right of the SPD’ and which he first named Christlich Soziale Aufbau Partei. By November, after recruiting other Christian democratic groups across Schleswig Holstein he changed the party’s name to CDAP Christlich Demokratische Aufbaupartei. Among those invited to join Schleswig-Holstein’s CDAP was former
member of the Kreisau resistance group, Theodor Steltzer\textsuperscript{117} who, returning to Schleswig-Holstein from Berlin, related details of the Berlin CDU development.\textsuperscript{118} Like the Berlin group, Schlange-Schönningen also wanted to overcome the confessional and political antagonisms that had paralysed the Weimar Republic. Yet it was difficult to dispel scepticism amongst liberal and conservative Protestants who feared that joining forces with Catholics concealed a hidden Catholic agenda to resurrect the Centre Party. When former Centre Party MP for Lübeck, Adolf Ehrtmann met with opposition from Liberals to the idea of co-operating with Christians in a joint broad based party, he turned to Adenauer in the Cologne CDP for support, but Adenauer offered no reply. Finally, Kannengießer at the Westphalia CDP, supplied him with names of members of the \textit{Bekennende Kirche} whom he could approach,\textsuperscript{119} enabling Ehrtmann to strike an alliance with the popular \textit{Bund freier Demokraten}. On 23rd November they jointly formed the CDU for Lübeck, basing their programme on the Hamburg manifesto, the Hamburger Principles. Schlange-Schönningen meanwhile focused his efforts on promoting his own unique version of Christian-conservatism in Hamburg, Westphalia and Lower Saxony, inciting political conflict with the CDU groups in these regions. The task of forming a party in Schleswig Holstein was thus passed to Carl Schröter, who proceeded to form the \textit{Demokratische Union} (DU) in January 1946, before finally agreeing to merge the DU with the CDU.

\textsuperscript{117} Theodor Steltzer was jointly responsible for producing the 15th July 1944 Denkschrift a post-war programme for a new German order which he says was aimed at giving pragmatic not metaphysical recommendations and at communicating to the allies a truthful picture of the post war domestic situation in Germany. His regrets however that his suggestions were not implemented by the allies. "Es gehört zu den Enttäuschungen der jüngsten deutschen Geschichte, daß diese wohl stärksten Ansätze zu einer organischen deutschen Neuordnung und zu einer aus echten Antrieben stammenden deutschen Selbstreinigung achtlos liegenblieben und stattdessen durch die Alliierten die mechanische Restauration eines überlebten formalistischen Parlamentarismus und eine oberflächliche und von Ressentiments nicht freie Reeducationspolitik betrieben wurde." Nachwort to Theodor Stelzer, \textit{Von deutscher Politik. Dokumente, Aufsätze und Vorträge}, Josef Knecht, Frankfurt/Main 1949, p.151. The British authorities elected Stelzter minister president of Schleswig Holstein.

\textsuperscript{118} Gerhard Schulze, op. cit., p.60.

\textsuperscript{119} Horstwalter Heitzer, \textit{Die CDU in der Britischen Zone}, op. cit., p.113.
Hamburg

In Hamburg Christian Democrats broadly fell into two groups. The Christian Socialist Catholics who relied on the organisational structure of the Catholic social associations and on the former Centre Party, and the liberal-conservative, Hanseatic *grossbürgerlichen* Protestants who made up the DVP, DNVP and the ‘Wirtschaftspartei’ during the Weimar period. Liberals could only overcome their scepticism of the CDU idea when the opportunity arose to participate as ‘*Honaratioren*’ in the upper echelons of the party. Protestant circles still believed that the Catholic Centre Party was behind the new Christian democratic movement. and only in the summer of 1946, when the Protestant mayor Rudolf Petersen and other non-party affiliated individuals joined the CDU, did Protestants succeed in swinging the party majority in their favour.

During the first meeting on 19 September 1945 discussions focused on the need to convert Hamburg’s existing Christian democratic working group, or *Arbeitsgemeinschaft christlich-demokratischer Gruppen* and the *Bund Freies Hamburg* BFH into one ‘Christian Union.’ The Christian Union should become a cross-party Christian organisation aimed at anchoring Christianity in political life, that encouraged understanding between different Churches and faiths, persuaded *all* political parties to adopt Christian principles and promoted Christian individuals as MPs for the newly emerging parties. Catholics and Protestants in the Christian Union called for mutual respect for their respective Church traditions and a policy of non-interference into their faith. Since they did not consider themselves a political party, members contemplated excluding people from joining if they did not belong to a Christian church. The Treysa conference of Evangelical Church leaders gave Hamburg’s interconfessional ‘Christian Union’ its full support. Church leaders were keen for the Union to base its programme on Christian principles but were hesitant about political parties employing the word Christian in the context of political programmes.

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121 In the home of Herr Schmidt in Oesfeldt, Hamburg. ACDP, Hamburg III-010-039.

122 Helmut Stubbe-da Luz, op. cit., p.31.
During the September meeting, former Centre Party figure Franz Beyrich and the author Rudolf Beissel urged that an interdenominational Christian, democratic party should be set up in addition to the ‘Christian Union’ umbrella organisation. They recognised the potential of Christianity for political legitimacy;

“der christliche Gedanke allein allen Stürmen standgehalten habe und daß deshalb eine christliche Partei notwendig sei, aber auch eine ungeheure Anziehungskraft haben werde.”

The party could further rely on support and ideas generated by the Christian Union. Suggestions were put forward for the new party, including the idea of a Labour Party and a draft programme, *Aufruf für Solidarität* was formulated by Dr von Poll. It was criticised by Hopmann of the Political Committee for not possessing the “ideenmässig geeignete Grundlage” referring to insufficient concern for social issues. Hopmann instead recommended adopting the ‘Cologne Principles’ even if most members present were not familiar with the Cologne programme. Hopmann and Heyn thus set about formulating new guidelines more closely related to the Cologne programme than to Poll’s *Aufruf*, suggesting the party should be called *Deutsche Freiheitspartei*. Their recommendations however did not stress the party’s link to Christianity, prompting Dr Günther to argue that a Christian democratic party could contribute to overcoming political divisions within the middle classes;

“Gerade da das bürgerliche Lager, um einmal diesen überholtten Begriff zu verwenden, in sich uneins sei, sei eine christliche -demokratische Partei unentbehrlich.”

Christianity further provided the most solid foundation in 1945 to rebuild a new society; “Da sei das Christentum eine volle tragfähige Grundlage.” Dr Heyn thus subsequently recommended discussions with the military authorities to establish a Christian democratic party but expressed some reservation over including the word Christian in

123 Dr Beissel, ACDP, III-010-039.
125 Minutes from founding meeting on 19th September 1945 in house of Herrn Schmidt Oesfeldt, Hamburg; Hamburg III-010-039.
the title; "wobei allerdings die Frage, ob das Wort "christlich" aufzunehmen sei, einer sorgfältigen Prüfung bedürfe."

The initiative to found the Christian Democratic Party was finally seized on October 1, 1945 by Theodor Steltzer, who successfully campaigned opposite the newly founded free democrats, the FDP, to attract the liberal vote. Since the British military did not tolerate political splinter groups in its zone, recognition was given to the Christian Democratic Party only. The Christian Union and the Bund Freies Hamburg BFH thus lost their significance once licences had been granted in November 1945. Basing their programme on the Cologne Principles, the Hamburg CDP could demonstrate continuity across the British zone, but the Hamburg programme was also more pragmatic than the Cologne Programme and the guidelines emphasised the liberal-democratic aspects over those of Christian Socialism. The programme refrained from using the ambiguous term 'Allgemeinwohl' and point eleven in the programme described nationalisation as a question of Zweckmäßigkeit to be advocated only if it could prove to bring advantages to the individual and the community. The decision by the Hamburg CDU to adopt only fifteen of the twenty points of the Cologne programme reflected Hamburg's own specific confessional and political situation. The Christian Democratic Party's (CDP) first party conference finally took place in Hamburg on 27 November 1945, with twenty-nine founding members, eight of whom were former Centre Party members, two from the DVP, and eighteen were non-party affiliated before 1933. Of the eleven members of the executive committee, it was stipulated that a maximum of three should be of Catholic origin. The group advertised its cause appealing principally to Protestants as potential members.

126 Gerhard Schulze, op. cit., p.61.
128 The Hamburg CDU left out statements about the "Kräftigen Bauernstand" which did not apply so much to a city, and 'Handwerk', as well as cleansing the civil service and economy of Nazis. The foreign policy should be 'Christianised' whatever that should mean and they showed their preference for a decentralised independent status for Hamburg with self-administrative powers and not the Länder structure favoured by the Cologne CDP. No reference is made to Christian Socialism or of condemning private business monopolies. Horstwalter Heitzer, Die CDU in der Britischen Zone, op.cit., p.126.
The *Hamburger Allgemeine* of 11 October 1946, a newspaper claiming to support *christlich demokratische Erneuerung* devoted its leading page to the discussion of economic policy which it saw as the solution to the current misery;

"Die Wirtschaft soll den Menschen freisetzen von der Bedrückung der Not. Sie soll ihm helfen, die Freiheit zu gewinnen, damit er die in ihm ruhenden geistigen und seelischen Kräfte entwickeln kann."

Germany should channel its *seelische Kräfte* into economic reconstruction. This contrasts to the Cologne programme and other Christian democrats in the west for whom economic policy was secondary to social policy and the nation’s moral and social well-being. The article continues;

"Wir fordern Freiheit der wirtschaftlichen Betätigung...... Nach wie vor messen wir der privaten Initiative des einzelnen grosse geistige und materielle Werte zu."

Significantly the article does not envisage the deconstruction of capitalism and is unique in questioning whether National Socialism should indeed be seen as the culmination of fervent capitalist activity. On the contrary, business entrepreneurs are applauded for their achievements;


Such language would have caused outrage in the Christian Socialist Rhineland. It is interesting to note that a Social Committee, formed in the Hamburg CDU and made up of representatives from trade and industry, later participated in producing the CDU’s Ahlen Programme. Like the Christian Socialists, the committee also promised to introduce social legislation in the area of social insurance, trade unions, and employer-employees relations, but with the important difference that it aimed to combine Conservatism with Socialism.
Bremen

Bremen was the only independent state to form a CDU party. Established in spring 1946 the party was described by Holzapfel as the most difficult case in the whole of the British zone.¹²⁹ Protestants had opted to join the newly established liberal bürgerlich party, the Bremer Demokratische Volkspartei and at first it seemed Catholics had no choice but to join them too. Separate initiatives by former Centre Party member Philipp Jahn and by Christlich Soziale Volksdienst (CSVD) members Johannes Kaum were however brought together through the voluntary intervention by Hanover’s CDU candidate Arnold Fratzscher, but were interrupted, when, on 10 May 1946, Protestants including Kaum, suddenly applied to the American authorities for a license to found the CDU in Bremen. The Christian wing of the Bremer Demokratische Volkspartei (BDV) made up of majority Catholic Centre Party members subsequently left to join the new CDU, causing irreparable rifts within the liberal camp. By June 1946 the CDU in Bremen was formed under chairman Kaum and deputy chairman Jahn.

5. Russian Zone

5.1. Berlin (Brandenburg)
Historical accounts of the CDU in the Soviet occupied zone\textsuperscript{130} published during the Cold War not surprisingly reflect a Marxist bias. Although no comprehensive history of the CDU in the Soviet zone was produced during this time, regional developments were chronicled in the party's series \textit{Beiträge zur Geschichte der christlichen Demokratischen Union Deutschlands} and \textit{Hefte aus Burgscheidungen} or \textit{Dokumente der CDUD} and reveal the extent to which the party underwent rapid ideological \textit{Gleichschaltung} in accordance with the Russian occupation policies for the Soviet zone;

\begin{quote}
"Die Geschichte der CDU in der SBZ bzw. DDR ... ist in erster Linie die einer erzwungenen Anpassung an die ideologischen und gesellschaftspolitischen Vorstellungen der SED bis hin zur Umwandlung zu einem bloßen Instrument kommunistischer Kader - und Machtpolitik." \textsuperscript{131}
\end{quote}

Research into the east CDU must therefore take into account the problems of reliability and objectivity of east German sources, the distorted facts of oral history and biased or censored party newspapers. There is little reference for example to the degree of ideological pressure the CDU was under to define its programme according to Soviet policy.\textsuperscript{132} The censorship and repressive tactics of the Soviet military and the SED party would inevitably have imposed ideological constraints and affected the freedom of action, the motives and the manner of expressing the Berlin CDU's programmatic principles. Attention therefore is paid to the immediate post-war period, when the Soviet military was only beginning to make their intentions known and when the CDU still held

\textsuperscript{130} For example Rolf Badstübner, Günter Wirth, Werner Wünschmann, Erwin Krübke, Friedrich Kind (Brandenburg), Hans Koch (Mecklenburg) Hans Joachim Koppe (Berlin), Alwin Schaper (Sachsen-Anhalt), Victor Thiel (Thüringen) and Hans Zillig (Sachsen).


\textsuperscript{132} Norbert Mattedi, Gründung und Entwicklung der Parteien in der sowjetischen Besatzungszone Deutschlands 1945-1949, Bundesministerium für gesamtdeutsche Fragen (Hrsg), Deutsche Bundes-Verlag, Bonn & Berlin 1966, p.9. Other west German historians who have written on the CDU in the Soviet zone include Werner Conze, Peter Hermes, Anna Hermes, Johann Baptist Gradi, Peter Bloch, Siegfried Suckut, Christian Hacke.
onto a degree of political autonomy. Agethen believes *Gleichschaltung* began as early as 1945;

"Eine wirklich freie programmatische und organisatorische Entwicklung der Parteien war von Anfang an nicht möglich."\(^{133}\)

Agethen notes that the events in the Soviet zone were of course also weighted differently by east and west German observers for obvious propaganda reasons. This serves as a necessary reminder to adopt a critical appraisal of all documents and statements from the period, in the west as well as in the east zone, but also supports the thesis of this study, namely that ideology played a fundamental role in the development of the CDU. The party needed a *Weltanschauung* as a pre-requisite to seeking political power, formed by the philosophical principles expressed in the first party manifestos. Ideology then became an instrument employed by the CDU’s political leaders to aid practical implementation and legitimisation of their political aims and ambitions.

Although many of the studies on the CDU in the east may be ideologically loaded, it would be incorrect to label them as flawed, since they demonstrate what was political reality for the east at the time. The charge that the Marxist-Leninist slant makes it ‘false’ vis a vis the ‘correct’ western view is outdated and naïve. History of the western occupation zones was also influenced through ideological tampering as a result of specific allied interests. From a post cold-war perspective then it is reasonable to assume that ideology and tactical politicking were at work on both sides of the German border. Like Konrad Adenauer in the west, Jakob Kaiser, the second CDU leader in the Soviet zone was blessed with the political acumen necessary to exploit party programmes and political terminology for political advantage. In the period from 1945 -1947, Kaiser’s operative political performance was bolstered by a convincing programme concept. Christian Hacke\(^{134}\) remarks;

\(^{133}\) Manfred Agethen op. cit., p.48.


153

This section will trace the development of the CDU’s platform in Berlin from 1945 to the end of 1947 when the Soviets finally removed Jakob Kaiser from his position as party leader. The study will focus on examining the transmutations in the CDU’s programme from its original declaration in the July 1945 Aufruf an das deutsche Volk! through two successive leaderships against the backdrop of escalating east-west tension and intra-party competition.

The beginning under Soviet Military Administration

On May 8th, 1945, the day of German capitulation, control over central and eastern Germany and Berlin was placed in the hands of the Red Army. By June 9, the Soviet military authorities, had been set up to direct the entire administrative and governmental powers of the Soviet zone with the aim of transferring Stalinist socialism to its occupied zone in Germany.135 Driven by political motives to establish a model party system before the remaining three allies arrived in July to occupy their own sectors in Berlin, the Soviets immediately licensed German political party activity. The Soviets thus preempted the political arrangements for Germany planned for Potsdam in August, and effectively set a precedent for the British, American and French zones to follow suit.136

The Soviets aimed exclusively at a centralised party structure and permitted only those

135 The Soviet military was following a programme conceptualised during the 1930s by the German Communist party that did not envisage the immediate introduction of socialism in Germany but to install a ‘Demokratische neuen Typs’ which took its inspiration from western style democracy but removed all capitalist hegemonic tendencies. See Arnold Sywottek, Deutsche Volksdemokratie. Studien zur politischen Konzeption der KPD 1935-1946, Bertelsmann Universitätsverlag, Düsseldorf 1971, p.74. Hermann Weber believes until 1945 the Soviet zone had not finalised any fixed strategy for post-war Germany. “Die Entmachtung Deutschlands, seine militärische Entwaffnung und Besetzung sowie die wirtschaftliche Wiedergutmachung in Form von Reparationen schienen ihm vordringlicher als ein ‘sozialistisches’ Deutschland.” Immediate ‘Stalinisation’ plans would have raised protest from the western allies and in the beginning Stalin needed the support of those democratic anti-fascists in Germany as erstwhile allies in order to install his vision of an ‘antifascist democracy’ before proceeding with a more ambitious long term plan to extend Soviet structures across Germany. Hermann Weber, Von der SBZ zu DDR. Band 1. 1945-1955, Verlag für Literatur und Zeitgeschichten, Hannover 1966, p.10ff.

parties in the states of the Soviet zone that had been licensed in Berlin. These were the Communist Party (KPD) the Social Democratic Party (SPD), the CDU and the Liberal Party (LPD). As time progressed and parties in the west gradually gained more, but not complete independence, parties in the Soviet zone increasingly became the puppets of the Soviet military authorities.  

Andreas Hermes as first party leader

Andreas Hermes, former Centre Party member and activist in the resistance group against Hitler, was one of the key founding fathers in Berlin. Following his arrest with other members of the '20th July Group' in Cologne, Hermes was imprisoned in the Lehrter Straße in Berlin until the end of April 1945 and only narrowly escaped execution. On his release by the Red Army he was given the post of director of the ministry for food and nutrition for Berlin city. Jakob Kaiser became Hermes's deputy. Kaiser had also escaped to Berlin following the attempted assassination of Hitler, where he hid from the Gestapo for nine months at a house in Babelsberg. On May 25, Hermes and Kaiser met at 11, Plattenenallee where they began to exchange ideas with former political activists from the old Volkskonservativen and Christlich-Sozialen Volksdienst, the Centre Party and the liberal Staatspartei (formerly DP) as well as with non-socialist trade unions, businessmen and intellectuals with a view to producing a draft political programme. There is little coincidence that the visions of a new order devised by Hermes and Kaiser in Berlin should correspond to those formulated by the


138 Andreas Hermes was former President of the Reichsverband of the Raiffeisen Cooperative, and as a member of the Centre party Reichsminister for food, agriculture and forestry (1920-22) and for finance (1922-1923) during the Weimar Republic, member of the Prussian Parliament (1924-1928) and of the Reichstag (1928-1933).


140 From 1919 Kaiser was director of the Christian trade unions in Berlin and from 1924 for the Christian trade unions in Rhineland and Westphalia. From 1928 he became member of the Centre party executive and MP in the Reichstag in 1933. He dedicated his life to resolving the religious and political differences among trade union groups with the aim of one day forming one united trade union.


142 Johann Baptist Gradl, op. cit., p.15.
Walberberger Circle in Cologne.\textsuperscript{143} As members of the resistance movement, Hermes and Kaiser had been involved in the discussions at Walberberg and the Kettelerhaus in the early 1940s.

Some of the more friendly party literature on the history of the CDU has sought to deflect attention from historical continuity of political traditions that originate with the beginning of the German party system. Instead the party’s inception has been mysticised, giving an almost romantic image of the solidarity and \textit{Katakombengeist} shared in the resistance. This gives a misleading belief that the communality of ideas which emerged in 1945 was derived from a shared spiritual awakening experienced during National Socialism. More credible is the reality which reveals that many of the founders of the CDU in 1945, such as Hermes and Kaiser, were participants from the Walberberg and resistance group who had held programmatic discussions during the Nazi era and found themselves scattered around the regions of Germany at the end of the war.

Lemmer and Kaiser believed the CDU founders were martyrs of democracy and pillars of resistance, who not having bowed to the Nazi dictatorship, had a moral right to represent Germans.\textsuperscript{144} The first round of meetings was followed on June 15, by a series of programmatic discussions with 23 participants, equally represented by Catholics and Protestants,\textsuperscript{145} and including Ernst Lemmer, Walther Schreiber, Emil Dovifat, Otto Heinrich von der Gablentz, Theodor Steltzer, Heinrich Krone, Josef Ersing, Ferdinand Friedensburg and Elfriede Nebgen.\textsuperscript{146} The political diversity of the Berlin group is partly

\textsuperscript{143} Kurt Witt paradoxically termed the way in which groups of Christian democrats found each other as; “spontan, aber auf reifem Feld.” Kurt Witt, “Wie die Union entstanden ist”, in Bruno Dörpinghaus/Kurt Witt (Hrsg), Politisches Jahrbuch der CDU/CSU, Jg 1, K.G Lohse, Frankfurt am Main 1950. Conze adds, “Es muß freilich betont werden, daß nicht nur die Parteigründer in Berlin, sondern auch in Köln ihre Grundlagen nicht primär von Walberberg übernahmen, sondern die Walberberger Anregungen mit älteren Programmforderungen verbanden.” Werner Conze, op. cit., p.38. This should help to dispel the myth of the so-called ‘Hour Zero’ in Germany in 1945.

\textsuperscript{144} Ernst Lemmer, Jakob Kaiser, ACDP, I-090-015/1.

\textsuperscript{145} 17 former Centre members and 6 from the DDP. Siegfried Suckut, “Christlich-Demokratische Union Deutschlands, CDU(D)”, in: Martin Broszat und Hermann Weber (Hrsg), SBZ Handbuch, Staatliche Verwaltungen, Parteien, gesellschaftliche Organisationen und ihre Führungskräfte in der sowjetischen Besatzungszone Deutschlands 1945-1949, Oldenbourg/München 1990, p.515.

\textsuperscript{146} Elfriede Nebgen, Kaiser’s wife, had completed her PhD on the topic of the synthesis between Socialism and Catholicism and gives some clue as to her background and influence on the party’s programme and on Kaiser. Numbers and attendance fluctuated at the early meetings. For full details of participants and dates of attendance between 15-22 June, ACDP, I-090-016/2.
explained by the fact that many resistance members were sent to Nazi prison camps in Berlin, whilst the high-calibre of party activists is derived from the fact that many senior politicians had been residing in Berlin since the Weimar Republic.

The early meetings were dominated by the search for a party name. Suggestions included Deutsche Demokratische Aufbaupartei, Christliche Volkspartei, Soziale Volkspartei, Deutsche Erneuerung and Neues Deutschland. Hermes put forward Demokratische Union to adequately describe the mix of social classes, religions, and political tradition, "als ein Programm zur Überwindung der konfessionellen Gegensätze in der Politik." All members were in agreement that 'democratic' should be included in the title but for many, including Hermes, the word 'Christianity' remained controversial. Christianity, Hermes stressed must not represent a 'Scheidegrenze' for access to the party and, echoing similar demands to the Protestant Otto Schmidt in the Rhineland, insisted that the party should be open to all those "die ohne Bindung an eine kirchliche Gemeinschaft das Gesetz der natürlichen Ethik in sich tragen." The term Christian was particular problematic for those Lutherans who drew a distinction between the worldly and the spiritual sphere. 'Christian' was finally adopted in the title to symbolise the desire to overcome confessional divisions between Catholics and Protestants, and in particular to establish a moral code for political life following twelve years of fascism. There were other more tactical reasons for calling the party Christian. Failure to do so risked losing the traditional Catholic voter and could as a result lead to a revival of the Centre Party. Both before and after the party's foundation, there was close, intense contact between the Protestants in the founding group of the CDU and Church leaders, most notably the Evangelical Bishop in Berlin, Otto Dibelius, who joined the CDUD to demonstrate his support for their programme and to lend the party a degree of moral credibility.


149 Werner Conze, op. cit., p.20.

150 In contrast to the Catholic dominated Rhineland, Evangelical church figures largely initiated the regional CDU political groups across the Soviet zone, which in turn stirred up criticism from Protestants. This prompted Dibelius to warn all Evangelical priests to exercise caution and restraint in
Yet including the word Christian also carried the risk of alienating liberal groups in society and soon led to a separate Liberal Party (LPD) in the zone.\textsuperscript{151} Despite this, the CDUD succeeded in attracting many former Democratic Party (DP) members to its ranks, proof that the CDUD could also profile itself as a liberal, middle class party. There was widespread agreement that the party should not be a revival of the Centre\textsuperscript{152} even if the Centre’s legacy had still very much survived. Trade unionists in the group sought to integrate all salaried workers and labourers into the new party and drew inspiration from the Centre Party figure Adam Stegerwald and his 1920 Essen programme of a \textit{Christlich-Nationalen Volkspartei} that included all social classes from workers to property owners. Although basically conservative in outlook, Stegerwald had believed social reform was possible by combining elements of Evangelical social ethics and Catholic Social Teaching.\textsuperscript{153} Stegerwald’s mantra of Christian – German – democratic- social was echoed in the first Berlin programme;

\textit{"aus heißer Liebe zum deutschen Volk die christlichen, demokratischen und sozialen Kräfte zur Sammlung; zur Mitarbeit und zum Aufbau einer neuen Heimat."}\textsuperscript{154}

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\textsuperscript{151} The Soviets also granted the Liberal Democratic Party a license so it was not possible for the CDU to tap all of the votes right of the SPD and KPD. Alexander Fischer, "Der Einfluß der SMAD auf das Parteiensystem in der SBZ am Beispiel der CDUD", in: Parteienanfänge in der Sowjetischen Besetzten Zone. Zwei Vorträge, Archiv für Christlich Demokratische Politik der Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (Hrsg), Deutscher Bundestag, Sankt Augustin 13/11/92, p.26.

A possible union with the LDP remained ideologically difficult for the two parties even though considerations had pointed in that direction. For example a letter from the CDU Landesvorstand in Thuringia to the LDP regional group in Schallenburg on 4.10.46 outlines that although cooperation between their parties would have been possible on the basis of democracy, the obstacles remained the CDU’s emphasis on Christailnity the LDP’s emphasis on liberalism, which neither party was prepared to accept. In Landesverband Thuringia, ACDP, III –031 90. This is confirmed also by Krippendorff: "Das Zusammengehen mit der profilierten Gruppe der Liberalen jedoch hätte einen echten Kompromiß erforderlich gemacht, und zwar in jedem Falle auf Kosten des Wortes 'christlich' im Parteienamen - dazu aber war man nicht bereit." Ekkehart Krippendorff, "Die Gründung der Liberal-Demokratischen Partei in der Sowjetischen Besatzungszone 1945", in: Vierteljahresschrift für Zeitgeschichte, Jg 8, 1960, p.293 (290-299).

\textsuperscript{152} The Soviet military authorities would have preferred a revival of the Centre party as they anticipated a Catholic party to have little chance of survival in a zone that was predominantly Protestant. Johann Baptist Gradl, op. cit., p.18.

\textsuperscript{153} Siegfried Suckut, op. cit., p.515.

\textsuperscript{154} Aufruf an das Deutsche Volk, programme printed in O.K Flechtheim, Band II, op. cit., p.27-30.
Jakob Kaiser had not exactly envisaged setting up a new party. He was more in favour of an integrated trade union or a British style Labour party and instead proposed a Christian Volksblock in co-operation with the Social Democrats. This idea was rejected by the CDU group and finally abandoned by Kaiser once the SPD was relaunched at the end of May. By June 22, a total of 35 members had given their agreement to the CDU’s founding programme in Berlin, and with Soviet approval was published on 26, June 1945, entitled ‘Aufrufer an das deutsche Volk!’

The CDUD’s founding programme: Aufrufer an das deutsche Volk!

The programme opened with the call for a ‘Sammlungspartei’ to end conflict between religions, parties and politics and support for a new democracy;

“Deutsche Männer und Frauen! Wir rufen Euch auf, alles Trennende zurücktreten zu lassen. Folgt unserem Ruf zu einer großen Partei, die mit den anderen Parteien der neuen Demokratie gemeinsam am Aufbau Deutschlands arbeiten will.”

The programme promulgated religious tolerance and independence of the Church from the State, the rule of law and the guarantee of political freedoms. There was some disagreement among members over the question of Germany’s collective guilt and how this should be formulated in the founding document, but finally agreeing on the short and vague formulation;

“Groß ist die Schuld weiter Kreise unseres Volkes, die sich nur allzu bereitwillig zu Handlangern und Steigbügelhaltern für Hitler erniedrigten.”

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155 Werner Conze, op. cit., p.15.
156 In negotiations with Karl Germer and other SPD figures about forming a new Labour Party, Kaiser even suggested it should be called ‘SPD’ in order to adopt the party’s antifascist credentials for the new party. Franz Focke, op. cit., p.199.
157 Siegfried Suckut, op. cit., p.516.
158 The SPD produced a more left wing programme than they had had before 1933 in an attempt to bridge their differences with the communists.
159 Of the 35 who initially signed the founding Gründungsauftrauf 19 were Catholics and 14 Protestants, 6 were formally non party affiliated, 17 were former Centre members and 6 were from the DDP.
160 Aufrufer an das Deutsche Volk! op. cit., p.27-30.
161 Ibid.
Internal party dissension on matters concerning the economy is disclosed in two brief paragraphs calling for urgent measures to alleviate acute food and housing conditions, under ‘straffer Planung’; “ohne jede Rücksicht auf persönliche Interessen und wirtschaftliche Theorien.”\textsuperscript{162} Private property ownership was endorsed for individuals but was bound by its social obligations to society as a whole, and long term nationalisation were prescribed for the basic utility industries, coal, iron and energy production, as well as for large chemical manufacturers and other monopoly industries. Many of the original members genuinely believed that the free liberal economy had outlived itself, but the more market oriented thinkers in the party, Walther Schreiber, the former Prussian minister for trade and industry, Plewes, Haas and Schmettow, who had not been present at the very early discussions, conflicted with Kaiser and the trade union wing once they had entered discussions. Their disagreements caused a delay in the programme’s launch.\textsuperscript{163} Hermès’ conservatism was also partly responsible for the scant reference to economic policy in the founding July document, as he sought to avert Kaiser’s more pronounced socialist ambitions from getting through.\textsuperscript{164}

The lack of clarity and detail over social and economic questions in the first \textit{Aufruf} was also due to ignorance of the political future. It was easier to fall back on philosophical statements to build moral and respond to the economy’s most immediate needs for providing food and housing.\textsuperscript{165} Party founders furthermore expected all four allied zones soon to be merged, and a unified economic system to be established for the whole of Germany. As was the case in drafting the Cologne programme, statements in the Berlin \textit{Aufruf} were often deliberately ambiguous to cloud differences in opinion between the

\textsuperscript{162} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{165} “Wie dieses Deutschland verwirktlicht und verfälscht sein sollte, wurde noch nicht einmal angedeutet. ...Der erste Anruf enthielt noch kein Programm, sondern nur ein ‘Notprogramm’ für die grundlegende Gesinnung und das zunächst Vordringliche.” Werner Conze, op. cit., p.22.
members. Ferdinand Friedensburg,\textsuperscript{166} former member of the Demokratische Partei (DP) and cofounder of the CDUD, notes that the disagreement on economic policy helped to produce the programme’s conciseness as well as awareness of the need to distinguish themselves to socialist party programmes. Yet conscious political ambiguity\textsuperscript{167} entailed consequences for the party, as Suckut\textsuperscript{168} remarks:

"Nachteilig konnte es sich unter diesem Gesichtspunkt auswirken, daß die im Gründungsauftrag niedergelegte Programmatik breiten Raum für unterschiedliche Interpretations- und Konkretisierungsversuche ließ."

It is important for understanding the underlying liberal influence in the party, to note that the document made no mention of Christian Socialism or ‘Socialism with Christian responsibility’.

From the outset, the Berlin Christian Democrats pursued a national agenda, in the belief that their party would soon take up the role of representing the whole of Germany. They called themselves a ‘Reich’ party and insisted on the title CDU Deutschlands (CDUD). Policies were aimed at national implementation and not restricted to zone level as in the west. This premature assumption that it would become the party’s headquarters was largely based on Berlin’s status as the capital city and as the seat of the allied control office, making the Berlin CDUD best placed for direct liaison with the allied authorities. The self-nominated party headquarters, the Reichsgeschäftsstelle\textsuperscript{169} prepared to establish


\textsuperscript{167} The CDU was not alone in its ambivalent programme formulation. Even the German Communist Party had declared its support in its first programme from 11th June 1945 for a “völlig ungehinderte Entfaltung des freien Handels und der privaten Unternehmerinitiative auf der Grundlage des Privateigentums.” Wolfgang Treue, Deutsche Parteiprogramme 1861-1954, op. cit., p.162.


\textsuperscript{169} The name Reichsgeschäftsstelle was later changed to Hauptgeschäftsstelle due to protest from Adenauer who refused to accept Berlin as the party’s central headquarters.
links with the *Landesverbände* in other states in the zone, whilst Kaiser set up a liaison office for establishing contact with CDU groups in the British, American and French zones. The party was divided into five areas of responsibility -women, culture, law, welfare, economy and finance and assigned the task of transforming the founding manifesto into specific policies to then advise the party leadership, Chairmen Andreas Hermes and Walter Schreiber.\(^{170}\)

The CDUD's first party conference

On the same day that the CDUD held their first party conference in the theatre *am Schiffbauerdamm* in Berlin-Mitte on July 22, 1945, the first issue of the CDUD's party organ *Neue Zeit* went into circulation. The military authorities unfairly delayed granting the CDUD a license to publish a party newspaper or to hold its initial party conference, which meant that in the first month of the party’s existence, the CDUD had little opportunity to publicise their programme. At their founding conference Hermes thus took the opportunity in a long and detailed speech to expand on the party’s founding programme. The speech interestingly reveals the growing influence exerted by the market economic advocates in the party.\(^{171}\) Hermes believed the decision over state intervention and which industries should be nationalised, was a pragmatic one, to be made on the merits of each individual case. Although the free, laissez-faire economy was declared well and truly defunct, Hermes openly supported the role of private business initiative;

> "Die freie Unternehmerinitiative wird in diesem Gesamtrahmen eine der stärksten Garantien für unseren Wiederaufstieg sein."

\(^{170}\) Heinrich von der Gablentz, *Gedanken zur Parteiarbeit*, 8 August 1945, ACDP, I-155-001/1. The original founding committee members remained the leading representatives for the CDU until January 1946 when, after Kaiser took up the leadership, a more permanent executive board was constituted.

The block of anti-fascist democratic parties

On June 23, 1945, Hermes was informed by the KPD and SPD that the CDUD’s license was also conditional on the CDUD’s agreement to join the so-called Anti-fascist-Democratic-Parties or Einheitsfront, a ‘block’ that comprised the SPD, KPD, LPD and the CDUD. Hermes gave his agreement by July 29, because he believed that the experiences of party conflict and competition during Weimar and the memories of the Nazi party’s grip on totalitarian power, meant political parties in future should cooperate despite differing ideological traditions.172 The four party block was established on July 14, with CDUD representatives Hermes, Schreiber, Kaiser, Steltzer and Lemmer, with the explicit aim of forming joint policy proposals in specialist committees containing representatives from all four parties. A ruling stating that all resolutions must be unanimous and that veto rights would only be granted to the Communist Party however, meant that the CDUD could not oppose any Communist motions. At first Hermes paid little regard to the constraints, anticipating that the Potsdam Conference from July 17- August 2, 1945 would in any case grant Germany the right to its own administrations and eventually its own government.173

The antifascist block undertook to develop policies for the quick reconstruction of the economy, the restoration of legal protection on the basis of the democratic rule of law, a campaign for freedom of conscience and religion and to restore peaceful relations to other countries, de-nazification, land reform, the dismantling of German industry and acknowledging the right to war reparations. Interestingly no statement was made about the block’s political direction, but ironically; ‘Von Sozialisierung war nicht die Rede.’174

The block parties reached basic agreement on an antifascist democracy but other

172 "In der Überzeugung, daß diese Einheitsfront allein das Gelingen unserer schweren Aufgabe zu verbürgen vermag, stehen wir zur Zusammenarbeit der antifaschistisch-demokratischen Parteien und sind entschlossen, unsere ganze Kraft an ihre Festigung und Vertiefung zu setzen. Nicht Trennung, sondern Sammlung kann und muß unsere Lösung sein." Andreas Hermes' speech at the first conference of the four block parties on August 12th, 1945 in Berlin. Printed in Anna Hermes; Ibid., p.299.

173 Johann Baptist Gradl, op. cit., p.25. The non-communist parties were also convinced that they would outnumber the communists in the Einheitsfront and thus be able to diminish the special relationship enjoyed by the KPD with the Soviet authorities and so gradually exert more influence on the party system themselves. Norbert Mattei, op. cit., p.55.

programme statements lacked clarity and direction, with the result that the block’s Aktionsprogramm was never formally ratified.  

Land Reform

The CDUD was able to test the block’s commitment to the rule of law in the summer of 1945, over the issue of land reform in Saxony. With the support of the KPD and SPD, the Soviet denazification programme sought to confiscate property from all identified war criminals. Land over 100 hectares would be redistributed to small farms, resettlers and refugees without paying compensation to private landowners for the loss of their land. The CDUD’s founding programme showed that the party was in favour of land reform (on condition that compensation be paid) but these statements now proved too vague for the CDUD to enforce in the block. This led Hermes to fear that after the Soviets had confiscated land, the integrity of industry and small business would also be threatened. When the block refused to amend land reform policy, the CDU rejected the resolution. This marked the first time that the CDUD had chosen to oppose a motion by the other three parties and the issue soon developed into a real test of the CDUD’s status in the block. The Soviet military authorities responded to Hermes’ obstinacy by


177 “Als christlich-demokratische Partei, die das Privateigentum bejaht, lehnen wir es ab, einer entschädigungsgesetzlichen Enteignung zuzustimmen .... Wenn heute an das Privateigentum des landwirtschaftlichen Besitzes gerührt wird, so wissen wir nicht, ob nicht morgen an dagegen der Industrie und übermorgen an das Handwerk usw. gerührt wird.” Andreas Hermes’ speech on September 16th in Berlin. Printed in Anna Hermes, Und setzet Ihr..., p.306-315.

178 In a letter from Hermes to Eisenhower on September 20th, 1945 the CDUD executive wrote to the Control Council to voice its protest on agarian reform; “eine der Bodenreform vorausgehende gesamtdeutsche Landesplanung: die sofortige Aufteilung derjenigen Grossbetriebe bei denen das ohne Leistungsminderung geschehen könne: die vorläufige Weiterführung aller anderen Betriebe in der bisherigen Form: die Überlassung von Restgütern an die bisherigen Besitzer, die entschädigunglose Enteignung von NS Verbrechern: in allen anderen Fällen eine Entschädigung unter Berücksichtigung
blackmailing regional CDUD groups and forcing them to vote for land reform and to declare a vote of no confidence in their party leader Hermes.\textsuperscript{179} Any refusal to do so resulted in threats and interrogation by the Soviet military. On December 19, the Soviet military demanded Hermes' and Schreiber's resignation on account of their attitude to the land reform proposals and the increasingly 'reactionary' course in which they were accused of steering the party.

The meeting of the CDU in Bad Godesberg

The land reform debacle had other serious repercussions for Hermes at the occasion of the national meeting of the CDU on December 14-16, 1945 in the Rhineland town of Bad Godesberg. Hermes had planned the meeting to unite all regions and all zones and to present his draft programme to CDU delegates before launching a national debate with all delegates to discuss the aims and tasks of the Christian democratic movement.\textsuperscript{180} Hermes' intransigence over the land reform issue however, prompted the Soviets to reject his travel visa request to the west, where Hermes was expected to chair the meeting. In his absence, Hermes' lengthy speech was read out.

The speech\textsuperscript{181} emphasised the aims of an interdenominational \textit{Volkspartei};

"Ebensowenig wie wir in unserer Bewegung einer Konfession eine Monopol zubilligen, ebenso sehr rufen wir alle Stände unseres Volkes. Wir sind keine Partei

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{179} The lack of a credible party newspaper (Neue Zeit was banned from reporting on the land reform) to distribute information, an incomplete party structure and deficient lines of communication meant that the land reform issue was not fully discussed internally. The Soviet military was in a position to wrench submission from other levels of the party without the central committee having any knowledge of their actions and themselves powerless to exert any influence over their own party members. Programmatically it was not clear to the regional CDU groups that there was indeed any area of conflict between their party's vague programme and the recommendations put forward by the Soviet military authorities.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{180} In a letter to the author Gertrud Bäumer on November 27, 1945, Hermes wrote: "Wir wollen den ernsten Versuch machen, die in den einzelnen deutschen Landesteilen zum Teil unabhängig voneinander entstandenen Parteibildungen auf der Grundlage eines umfassenden Programms zu einigen." Alexander Fischer, Andreas Hermes und die gesamtdeutschen Anfänge der Union, op. cit. p.17.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{181} Hermes speech produced for the meeting of the CDU in Bad Godesberg December 14th-16th, 1945. ACDP, III-012-923.}
Endorsing the Potsdam agreement, Hermes believed Germany should be treated as one unified economy and was staunchly opposed to change of the east German border, arguing that the area east of the rivers Oder and Neisse was profoundly German in history and culture;

"Zum deutschen Land gehört besonders der Osten jenseits der Oder und Neisse .... Dieses Land ist deutsch zunächst seiner Lage nach ....... Dem Blut und der Seele nach sind die deutschen und slawischen Bevölkerungsteile verschmolzen."

The region of Pomerania and Silesia, he said, was a bridge to reach cooperation and understanding with the east. His remarks are compatible with the foreign policy of his successor Jakob Kaiser. Both men shared the view that Germany should resist any development that sought affiliation either exclusively with the east or with the west or encouraged the division of Germany into separate states. On internal affairs, Hermes was committed to political decentralisation in the spirit of bringing more democracy to Germany, but restrained federalism where it could impinge on national interests.\textsuperscript{183} He reiterated his support for nationalising the coal and iron industry, but maintained manufacturing industry could not be nationalised and heavy industry was ‘indispensable’ and therefore played a ‘special role’. Wilde believes that Hermes’ clarification of his political message at Bad Godesberg had consciously extracted and accentuated the market economic elements of the party’s original June declaration.\textsuperscript{184} Hermes defended private ownership as a “unantastbarer Rechtsgrundsatz” and a “Grundlage für den Wiederaufbau” and expressed his concern at Soviet intervention in management and

\textsuperscript{182} J.B Gradl notes that the choice of the term Volkspartei in the Soviet zone later earned the CDU criticism as being a party of the right, since it also welcomed reactionary members. Johann Baptist Gradl, op. cit., p.53.

\textsuperscript{183} "Diese Auflockerung des preussischen Blocks schafft die Möglichkeit, dem deutschen Volk eine politische, staatsrechtliche Gliederung zu verleihen, die dem Gewicht seiner Stämme volle Geltung und Entfaltung ermöglicht, ohne die natürliche Einheit des Reiches und die geschlossene Vertretung seiner Interessen nach einheitlichen Gesichtspunkten zu verhindern." Hermes speech produced for the meeting of the CDU in Bad Godesberg December 14th-16th, 1945, ACDP III-012-923.

property relations. Despite this conservative-liberal thrust of his speech, Hermes also devotes attention to increasing the status and influence of the trade unions and extending co-decision making powers for employees. Conforming with the party’s founding document, Hermes did not specifically refer to Christian Socialism, but delegates at the conference ratified the party’s economic and social programme as a ‘Socialism with Christian responsibility’;

‘Insgesamt muß das System planvoller Wirtschaftslenkung mit der alten abendländischen Idee der freien und verantwortlichen Persönlichkeit ausgefüllt und belebt werden. So vertreten wir einen Sozialismus christlicher Verantwortung.’

The term Christian Socialism had been coined by the left wing members of the CDU in the British zone but by the time the Godesberg meeting took place in December, it had already been modified to suggest a politics of the third way rather than an explicit left wing programme. Hermes conceded that the Berlin Aufruf had offered insufficient detail about the party’s economic system, but he tried to explain the deficiency as flexibility and by the fact that were not tied to any fixed dogma;


The refusal to be tied to one permanent economic model was the CDUD’s pragmatic solution to the century-old dilemma over whether Germany should adopt a socialist or a liberal economy. It had begun to recognise that the favoured model was in fact a mixed economy with a move away from state intervention. A third way style alternative had the advantage that the rules, according to which the economy is run, are not rigid rules but negotiated and pragmatic responses, depending on individual and current circumstances. Importantly third way politics allows for change without jeopardising political credibility.\(^{186}\)


\(^{186}\) This was obviously hard for Hermes to advocate in view of the Soviets’ plans.
Many of Berlin’s founders on the CDUD executive board nevertheless perceived this modern approach to economic management as a programme deficit, in particular those members of the Economic Committee\textsuperscript{187} who began questioning what was new about the CDUD’s programme vis a vis other parties.\textsuperscript{188} Two days after delegates had pledged their commitment to a Socialism with Christian responsibility at Godesberg, v. d. Gablentz, called an urgent committee meeting in Berlin to discuss the party’s problematic profile and its understanding of the term Christian Socialism or \textit{Sozialismus christlicher Verantwortung}. The Catholic member, Dovifat, was concerned how the term would be received by the public, while Strauss feared its unclear definition may be exploited for tactical use. Tillmann was more pragmatic. He saw benefits in employing the term, to convince the electorate that the party had socialist credentials and because it enabled them to compete with parties who signalled socialism to be the new \textit{Zeitgeist};


d\'aß heute z.B in einer öffentlichen Versammlung jeder, der es ablehnt, sich als Sozialisten zu bekennen; als liberal-kapitalistisch-reaktionär abgestempelt werden würde.”

Uncertainty over the party’s programme identity continued into the January of 1946, even once the Soviets had removed Hermes and Schreiber from their positions as leaders of the party and replaced them with Kaiser and Lemmer. Questions such as “worin besteht denn aber unsere neue Gesinnung?” unser Radikalimus?” were still being raised and Plewe wondered whether the party should attempt to formulate a theoretical basis for their programme. This prompted Dovifat to formulate the Committee’s views on Christian Socialism to submit to their new leader Kaiser. But there were divisions. Whilst Dovifat maintained their version of ‘socialism’ should be defined solely by its Christian profile and respect for the inviolable freedom of the individual, Gablentz wanted an economic interpretation of Christian Socialism, emphasising commitment to public ownership or ‘\textit{Gemeinschaftseigentum}.’ Strauss and Tillmann remained fundamentally opposed to a planned economy, arguing that a Christian party should not commit itself to \textit{any} specific order, and reminded the committee that advocating a

\textsuperscript{187} The majority of the Economic Committee members were Evangelists and included Dovifat, Tillmanns, von der Gablentz, Gravenhorst, Plewe, Pfarrer Schwartzkopff and Walter Strauss.

\textsuperscript{188} Protocols of the CDUD Economic Committee in ACDP, I-090-016/4.
'planned' economy could be misunderstood as a Soviet type administered economy. Tillmann in particular emphasised that economic planning would strictly be a temporary measure until normal conditions returned and a free market could be reintroduced, guided by an overarching macro-economic policy. Nationalisation plans should only be implemented to satisfy the population's needs and - as a direct backlash of the Weimar period experience - to avoid exploitative economic practices or monopolistic tendencies from developing in the economy. The Mittelstand, he said, should be given priority at all times.

Kaiser as leader

Jakob Kaiser and deputy Ernst Lemmer, were installed as the party's new leaders just one day after Hermes and Schreiber had been dismissed by the Soviet authorities. The Soviet authorities welcomed Kaiser's arrival, since he had been an active and respected member of the resistance movement who had suffered Nazi persecution. He was also known as a leading member of the Christian trade union movement and the former deputy chairman of the Rhine Centre Party.¹⁸⁹ Kaiser recognised German working class divisions and the need for one integrated trade union, and his new socialist rhetoric, promising to rid Germany of the evils of capitalism, was obviously in step with Soviet thinking.

In December, shortly after learning of his nomination as new leader of the CDUD, Kaiser received a letter from his foreign policy advisor and editor of the Neue Zeit, Alfred Gerigk,¹⁹⁰ informing him, that now the SPD was planning to fuse with the KPD (to form the SED) there was a unique chance for a party political programme to be drafted for a British style Labour Party, attracting those workers and the Kleinbürgertum voters traditionally hostile to Marxist dogma and now politically alienated by the launch of the SPD/KPD merger. Gerigk believed the Christian element adopted by the CDU would help to make their political campaign even more effective. The move towards a

¹⁸⁹ Johann Baptist Gradl, op. cit., p.50.
specific Labour party, could now be made without any drastic or obvious change of course in the CDU’s existing programme;

"Wenn es bisher als ein Mangel angesehen werden konnte, daß die CDU kein Parteiprogramm bekanntgegeben hat, sondern nur den Gründungsauftruf, so kann diese vorhandene Lücke jetzt die Möglichkeit bieten, die von mir angedeutete Entwicklung vorzunehmen, ohne daß rein äußerlich ein solcher Vorgang als eine Schwenkung oder Wandlung erscheint."\(^{191}\)

The possibility to ‘interpret’ the principles contained in the party’s founding document ‘differently’ notes Gerigk, means the new direction must not appear as if the CDU had abandoned any of its former values. The emphasis could simply be shifted to other aspects. He did not anticipate any friction with the Soviet authorities either;

"weil ja der Grundton dieses Programms äußerlich manchen Forderungen von sowjetischer Seite anscheinend entgegenkommen würde."

By virtue of its socialist credentials, the CDU appeared sufficiently distinct from the liberal LDP and enabled it to escape charges by the SED and the Soviets, that it was middle class, liberal-reactionary and fascist.\(^{192}\) Kaiser had registered the considerable interest in a Christian socialist programme among regional Christian democratic groups at the Reichstreffen in Godesberg in December 1945, as well as the western CDU’s enthusiasm for Berlin to adopt the party leadership.\(^{193}\) It seemed opportune therefore to act on Gerigk’s advice, and adopt a Christian socialist discourse, transform it into a comprehensive programme, and so unite the party under one slogan and one political direction. It was also an opportunity to raise the profile of Kaiser’s own campaign for assuming the national party leadership.

\(^{191}\) Ibid.

\(^{192}\) Manfred Wilde, op. cit., p.325ff.

\(^{193}\) In particular the speeches by the western CDU members Leo Schwering and Erich Köhler supported the Berlin CDU. Köhler from the CDU Hessen gave a speech on the economic and social aspects of the party programme. "Die programmatischen Aussagen sind zum Teil wörtlich dem Berliner Gründungsauftruf vom 26. Juni 1945 entnommen und verraten die Handschrift ehemaliger christlicher Gewerkschaftler." Horstwalter Heizer, Die CDU in der Britischen Zone .... op. cit., p.180.

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Meeting of the Soviet zone CDU executive, February 13th, 1946

Kaiser had previously employed the term Christian Socialism in speeches and articles, such as in the article entitled *Zum Weg der Union* in the December 30 issue of the *Neue Zeit* in 1945, and at the rally of the *Einheitsfront* on January 30, 1946. But it was not until the first meeting of the zone executive board on February 13, 1946 that Kaiser proclaimed Christian Socialism to be the party’s official programme for the Soviet zone. In a speech entitled, "*der soziale und staatspolitische Wille der Christlich Demokratischen Union Deutschlands*" Kaiser, as the new party chairman, talked of consolidating the party’s programme to aid internal cohesion and to stand firm against the increasingly tense political climate in the Soviet zone. He talked of uniting as one *Volkspartei*, with an economic and social system that was driven by its duty to serve the *Gemeinwohl* and achieve German unification. Like many of his counterparts in the west, he pronounced the liberal, capitalist era dead. The future, he said, belonged to democratic socialism with Christian responsibility, even though middle class traditions remained integral to the concept of the *Volkspartei*;

"Nur eine revolutionäre Partei verlangt stets dem radikalen Bruch mit den Traditionen der Vergangenheit. Für uns dagegen ist es eine Selbstverständlichkeit, daß wir keinen Bruch in der Tradition wollen, sondern daß alles, was die bürgerliche Kultur an Werten geschaffen hat – und sie hat Unvergängliches geschaffen – als Bestandteil ewigen Volksgutes auch in eine neue Ordnung mit hinüber genommen werden soll. Die Ordnung aber, der die bürgerliche Ordnung nunmehr Platz zu machen hat, wird eine sozialistische Ordnung sein müssen."

This combination of liberal, middle class traditions and social reforms defined the moderate character of Kaiser’s socialism, and was not unlike his ‘liberal-socialist’ counterparts in the west. Socialism was not socialisation of the means of production or class struggle but one whereby society adopted a social conscience. Private property ownership was not questioned, and should be restrained only if monopolist tendencies emerged in the economy. Kaiser makes an additional concession to large scale industry, arguing that ownership issues were less significant than the introduction of co-decision making powers for industrial employees. Building a synthesis between Christianity and


195 Kaiser, Der soziale und staatspolitische Wille, op. cit.
Socialism and between east and west, he said, was Germany’s ‘historic responsibility,’ combining eastern emphasis on the Gesamtheit with western values of the importance of the individual. This also offered a solution to social reform and to German unification:¹⁹⁶

“Mir scheint für Deutschland die große Aufgabe gegeben, im Ring der europäischen Nationen die Synthese zwischen östlichen und westlichen Ideen zu finden. Wir haben Brücke zu sein zwischen Ost und West; zugleich aber suchen wir unseren eigenen Weg zu gehen zu neuer sozialer Gestaltung.”

For Kaiser, Christian Socialism was not only an organising principle for engineering social reform, nor was it simply a tactical device to reunite the splintered labour movement with the chronically undermined middle classes, but a fundamental principle for balancing the forces of capitalism and democracy in the west, with socialism and dictatorship in the east.¹⁹⁷ It was an idea best encapsulated in the Christian Democratic Union.

The change in leadership from Hermes to Kaiser has frequently been termed a left-wing programme shift, due to Kaiser’s new adherence to a Christian Socialist agenda. Yet if the personnel and programmatic transition was significant, the question is raised, why did it only cause minimal internal party division and discussion?¹⁹⁸ Wilde¹⁹⁹ claims that since the autumn 1945, other leading Berlin members in the economic and social policy committee, had begun to move towards Christian Socialist thinking anyway. Suckut²⁰⁰ describes the leadership change as a move from an undefined, representative party of the middle classes, to an explicit Christian Socialist opposition, that strengthened the party’s overall political importance. In actual fact, the leadership change was less significant than is assumed. Kaiser’s politics were not dramatically different to Hermes’. Both were former Catholic trade union activists in the Weimar Republic who believed in worker participation in industrial decision making and the nationalisation of some industry, but

¹⁹⁶ Bernd Uhl, op. cit., p.130.
¹⁹⁸ Norbert Mattedi, op. cit., p.78.
¹⁹⁹ Manfred Wilde, op. cit. p.326.
fundamentally they upheld the importance of middle-class liberal traditions for the future. Their policy aims for Germany were also compatible. They were reluctant to grant Germany’s regions too much decentralised power and rejected the Oder-Neisse border as Germany’s eastern border and any loss of territory in the west. Kaiser did expand the party’s Christian Socialist programme when he took over the leadership, but it is his ‘instrumental’\textsuperscript{201} use of Christian Socialism for gaining political advantage that was most significant, rather than any fundamental departure from the economic and social principles documented in the 1945 Aufruf. Kaiser did not consider his change in leadership constituted the need for a revision of the party’s programme, and kept the original Aufruf as the official party programme. If he did make alterations to his programme, they were more subtle and were reflected via his speeches during 1946 and 1947. Gradi\textsuperscript{202} also denied that Kaiser’s more frequent employment of the term ‘Sozialismus aus christlicher Verantwortung,’ indicated a real programmatic shift to the left, or indeed a fundamental departure from earlier Catholic social thinking;

“Das was wir in der Sache wollten, war gar nicht etwa von Grund auf neu. In der christlichen Morallehre war Kritik am Laissez-Faire eine Selbstverständlichkeit. In den Zeiten des Widerstandes, vom Kreisauer Kreis bis zu den Dominikanern von Walberberg, dachte man genauso über eine freiheitliche, aber disziplinierte Wirtschafts- und Sozialordnung nach.”

Gradl agrees that the motive for the rhetorical emphasis of Christian Socialism was more ideological;

“.... eben besonders im sowjetischen Besatzungsbereich war es notwendig, sachlich und politisch der Geschlossenheit des kommunistischen Systems und der Selbstsicherheit der Kommunisten eine andere, ebenfalls weltanschaulich fundierte und auf Gemeinschaft ziellende Grundvorstellung entgegengesetzt. Das hat mit einer ‘Schwenkung nach links’ nichts zu tun.”

Besides placating Soviet proclivities, Kaiser saw Sozialismus aus christlicher Verantwortung as a pragmatic slogan, to win respect and support from Christian Socialists in the west and to genuinely assist him in describing and communicating the

\textsuperscript{201} Manfred Wilde adds, “Die SBZ-CDU instrumentalisierte den Christlichen Sozialismus jedoch nicht nur ganz anders als beispielsweise die Union der britischen Besatzungszone, sondern entwickelte ihn auch programmatisch eigenständig weiter.” Manfred Wilde, op. cit., p.278.

\textsuperscript{202} Johann Baptist Gradl, op. cit., p.56.
society that he wanted to create, namely Christian and socially responsible.\textsuperscript{203} He also saw it as a counterweight ideology to the cohesiveness of Marxist-Socialism.

Although the leadership change did not amount to a radical left-wing shift, Kaiser did however exercise his trade union influence to introduce better working relations between employer and employee 'als Mitgliedschaft in einer wirtschaftlichen Gesamtheit' in a working partnership that negotiated salary, working conditions and labour legislation.\textsuperscript{204} Kaiser's tendency to articulate his views on a high, abstract level, referring only to a \textit{Wirtschaftsdemokratie} when discussing his policy on industrial democracy, may have been difficult to discern whether Kaiser was advocating a centrally administered or a market economy, but the ambiguity allowed Kaiser to keep his options open.

The search for programme consensus
The details of Kaiser's vision were left to his policy specialists to flesh out. Their task was to expand a two worded slogan into a comprehensive political programme. The specialist committee included the individuals Georg Grosse, Herschel, Dovifat, von der Gablentz, Gradl, Tiburtius, Tillmann and Walter Strauss. Their aim was to develop a new economic and social order, based on Christian social principles to overcome the alienation of mass society. Small and independent autonomous communities were understood to be more resistant to totalitarian tendencies in the state.\textsuperscript{205} In line with Hermes' plans for nationalisation, the control of mineral resources and public utility firms should be held in public ownership and all other monopolies and cartels dismantled. Plans to implement a currency reform\textsuperscript{206} were initiated by Friedrich Ernst,

\textsuperscript{203} J.B Gradl cites Kaiser's comment in the \textit{Neue Zeit}, on 5th May 1946, when Kaiser noted that whoever does not desire the term socialist should choose another one! Johanna Baptist Gradl. op. cit., p.56.

\textsuperscript{204} Retaining party political neutrality had formed the basis of the agreement on a united trade union organisation, the Einheitsgewerkschaft. In a Informationsbrief Nr.12 'Aus der Arbeit der Union' containing extracts from Albert Voss's speech from the executive board meeting on 13th February 1946 on the trade union movement, Voss expressed the Union's firm commitment to a unified trade union, but did however suggest that the CDU should instill the trade union with "unsere Prägung" namely christian democratic thinking and recommended seminars to encourage political activity and involvement among the workers. "Wir müssen dafür sorgen, daß unsere Ideologien, unsere Ideenwelt in die Gewerkschaften hineingetragen werde." Albert Voss in ACDP, III-012-1063.

\textsuperscript{205} "Die Gliederung der Masse in übersehbare kleine Gemeinschaften der Nachbarschaft und der Arbeit." Albert Grosse in Deutschland und die Union, ACDP, I -155-001/1.

\textsuperscript{206} The CDU's Gründungserklärung in July 1945 had already highlighted the need for a currency reform not as a specific feature of a socialist or a market economy but as a measure to tackle their biggest fear.
former ministerial director in the Prussian ministry of trade after the First World War and Reich commissioner for banking under Chancellor Brüning. Ernst suggested devaluation, accompanied by a reinstatement of the Reichsbank to control money supply, to reactivate the banking industry as a whole across Germany and to introduce tax reforms, spending and price controls. He anticipated that the allies would supply the capital required to set up the Reichsbank, thereby committing the allies to establishing uniform economic planning for Germany.

In his 1946 pamphlet Über Marx hinaus the key spokesman on economic policy, v. d. Gablentz, explained that their programme of Sozialismus aus christlicher Verantwortung did not aim to emulate Marx but, as the title suggests, to go beyond Marx - Über Marx hinaus, to supersede Marxist Socialism. Gablentz refers to the Communist Manifesto as a 'geniale Leistung,' but the task was to now write the second half that developed a programme for a classless society. The fundamental challenge in economic policy was to overcome the conflict between Freiheit and Bindung. 'Freedom' and 'restraint' were thought to be elements contained within every economic policy, and implemented according to prevailing 'psychological and technical' circumstances. Current conditions demanded a stronger tendency towards Bindung than Freiheit;

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208 The CDU executive submitted a request to the allied Control Council pointing out the benefits of reopening the banks, suggesting a future bank system for Germany and reevaluation of the Reichsmark. When the CDU put its recommendations to the four party Einheitsblock it was welcomed by the LPD but rejected by SED on the grounds that bank capital had been to blame for causing inflation and the war. Since the SPD and KPD were not willing to formulate their own suggestions for the Soviet military authorities and following the removal of Hermes and Schreiber as well as the LPD chairmen at the end of 1945, discussions on currency reform did not resume until January 10, 1946 when the CDU again pushed to reopen banks, release hoarded cash and fund business activity. See Siegfried Suckut, Blockpolitik in der SBZ/DDR 1945-1949. Die Sitzungsprotokolle des zentralen Einheitsfront-Ausschusses, Quellenedition, Mannheimer Untersuchungen zu Politik und Geschichte der DDR 3, Köln 1986. Copy of CDU application p.106. In the final statement by KPD and SPD in the 10 January meeting little remained of the CDU’s reform plans as these had almost entirely been replaced by KPD and SPD reform measures.

209 For Tiburtius’s economic policy programme see the section on the CDU’s early development in the Rhineland in this study, where his views are compared for their similarity to ordo-liberalism.


211 Gablentz’s programme emphasised three aims: a ‘planned’ or publicly administered economy, public ownership of industry and codecision making rights for employees, but Uhl has criticised Gablentz for
"Deswegen treten wir ein für die unsere Zeit gemässe Ordnung der öffentlichen gelenkten Wirtschaft. Wir sind Sozialisten." 212

By March 1946, Kaiser secured his first travel visa to the west, to outline his vision of a socialist new order to the western CDU. He held two speeches on March 29 and 31, in Düsseldorf and Essen, that upheld the commitment to a socialist order, but he endeavoured to define what he understood by the term;

"Der Begriff Sozialismus ist nicht, wie oft behauptet wird, gleichbedeutend mit ‘Sozialisierung aller Produktionsmittel. Sozialismus bedeutet nichts anderes als der Wille, jede öffentliche Aufgabe, jede Arbeit auf allen Gebieten des Lebens auf die soziale Wirkung, d.h auf die Wirkung für das gesamte Volk hin auszurichten.....Es ist kein Schlagwort, sondern der Ausdruck einer Einsicht."213

Yet he reinforced the left-wing aspect of his programme that made trade unions the main architects of the new social order. Socialism would be the link or Bindeglied to unite diverse political interests in the trade union movement. He touched on the more controversial response to socialism in the west and acknowledges the difficulty of eliciting western commitment to the term, which; "mag hier im Westen des Reiches schwerwiegender klingen, als auf Berliner Boden." Kaiser hoped to resolve political differences between the east and the west CDU at the forthcoming party conference in Berlin, during which a vote would also be held to replace the provisional party leadership with a democratically elected leader.214

The Berlin party conference
The first Berlin party conference on 16th and 17th June, 1946 was an occasion for Kaiser to consolidate his leadership across all zones and to more widely publicise his

[Notes]

lacking programmatic clarity. Whilst both Tiburtius and Gablentz independently produced draft recommendations for a new socialist economic order, which Kaiser of course did not, Uhl argues that the planning aspect of Gablentz's concept failed to conclusively state whether he is in favour of a market economy or an interventionist, centralised economy. Bernd Uhl, op. cit., p.144.


214 Johann Baptist Gradl, op. cit., p.63f.
programme. Growing conflict and competition with the Soviets and with Adenauer's western CDU, meant Kaiser could not voice programme statements without careful consideration of the political climate and was forced to compromise some of his earlier political idealism. CDU leaders in the British and American zone had met prior to the conference, on 3rd April in Stuttgart, to discuss merging their zones and uniting their party. Adenauer subsequently wrote to Kaiser reporting\(^{215}\) that western members had expressed disagreement at holding the party leadership election in the Russian zone and were, moreover, deeply concerned with elements of the CDUD’s programme. The western CDU, he said, disagreed with the controversial and misleading statements such as “Wir sind Sozialisten” and with Kaiser’s claim that Berlin was a synthesis between east and west. Finally Adenauer pointed out that members disputed that the ‘bürgerliche Epoche’ was over and contested the claim that the communist manifesto was a feat of genius.

The subsequent attendance by 91 western representatives at the Berlin party conference can only indicate that Adenauer’s written description of the level of opposition to Kaiser’s programme was - if not blatantly untrue - then certainly exaggerated, to bolster Adenauer’s own interest in taking the leadership. Amongst those present at the conference, Gradl remarked:

"So war der Charakter eines überzonalen, eines ‘gesamtdeutschen’ Parteitages wie schon in Bad Godesberg 1945 unverkennbar. Schon aus diesem Grunde war der Parteitag ein Erfolg."\(^{216}\)

The series of resolutions from the conference\(^{217}\) provides an invaluable insight into the Union’s culminate programme objectives. Declared commitment to a ‘socialism with Christian responsibility’ implied individual economic freedoms with selective

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\(^{215}\) The Stuttgart meeting was important for Adenauer since he could return to Christian Socialists in the Rhineland and report that the north and south German union leaders had protested against Kaiser’s Christian Socialism. No copy of the minutes from the Stuttgart meeting exists and only a report of the meeting is in the file.Nr. 200A. Rudolf Morsey/H.P Schwarz (Hrsg), Bearb. Von Hans Peter Mansing, Briefe 1945-1947, Adenauer Rhöndorfer Ausgabe, Siedler, Berlin (West) 1983, p.208/209.

\(^{216}\) Johann Baptist Gradl, op. cit., p.65.

\(^{217}\) Wege in die Neue Zeit, Berliner Tagung der Union. Die Entscheidungen, Jg. 1946, Nr. 5, Union Verlag, Berlin. A total of 14 resolutions were passed covering a range of topics including monetary policy, communal policy, private property, food and agriculture, labour protection and social welfare.
nationalisation plans. Its most important demand was the implementation of a regulated economic order. One resolution was dedicated exclusively to the party’s cultural policy and this revealed the importance of creating a new moral structure for society and the continued importance of culture as Weltanschauung in politics. Cultural policy had the unique function of underpinning economic and social policy. In a keynote address to the conference, Tillmann outlined the Union’s ‘spiritual’ responsibility. The holocaust was not to be attributed to economic and social factors but to Germans’ failed moral and spiritual integrity. Man’s progress from the Enlightenment to the industrial revolution had caused society to worship materialism and reason over God and religion. As ethics and values disappeared, the power and politics of totalitarian ideologies replaced religion as the new form of Weltanschauung. 1945 should therefore be aimed at reversing that trend, replacing ideologies with religion, whilst also benefiting from man’s technological achievements by combining these with Christian culture. The new post-war responsibility represented a challenge to find a third way - a synthesis of morals and industrial progress.

"Wir wollen die Ergebnisse der großen geistigen Epochen der neueren europäischen Geschichte der Naturwissenschaften und der modernen Technik nicht abtun oder irgend etwas rückwärts drehen, sondern sie in den geistigen Grundkraften unserer abendländischen Kultur neu fundieren, um so eine echte Synthese von Geist und Materie von Kultur und technischer Zivilisation zu finden." 218

Christian ethics in future would not be limited to the private sphere but extended to the social and political realm. Again Kaiser219 used the occasion to differentiate his programme from Soviet socialism;

"Unser Sozialismus ist wesensverschieden vom Marxismus. Das christliche Sozialgesetz kann uns sozialistische Wege führen, da es an eine bestimmte Gesellschafts- und Wirtschaftsordnung nicht gebunden ist. Aber im christlichen Sozialgesetz und im Marxismus begegnen sich zwei Weltanschauungen, die einander ausschließen.... Wir lehnen es ab, den Menschen im Grunde als das Ergebnis der

218 CDU 2nd annual party conference ACDP I-171-001/2. Tilmann’s speech in Sondermaterial ACDP III-012-1063 amongst speeches held at party executive board meetings, Berlin 5/6 March 1946.

219 The speeches by Kaiser and western spokesmen including Andre, Arnold, Heinemann and Holzapfel, Josef Müller, Roos and Weber all spoke against separatism and regionalism tendencies and expressed their ongoing support for a united Germany. Kaiser called for a "Bekundung des Zusammenghörigkeitswillens über alle Zonengrenzen und Zonenschwierigkeiten hinweg" Manfred Wilde, op. cit., p.358.
wirtschaftlichen Umwelt zu sehen. Freiheit und Eigengesetzlichkeit der menschlichen Persönlichkeit sind uns unantastbare Lebensgesetze."\(^{220}\)

The conference concluded with a resolution in favour of Christian Socialism and with a unanimous vote to elect Kaiser and Lemmer as party leaders.

Kaiser’s depiction of Christianity as a *Weltanschauung alongside* Marxism is further developed in an article he wrote in the *Neue Zeit* entitled; "Um was es geht."\(^{221}\) Kaiser maintains that the three registered parties in the Soviet occupied zone were based on the three schools of thought - Marxism, Liberalism and Christianity. Liberalism was least decisive, he said, since the CDU had incorporated the best traditions of liberalism in its thinking, but rivalry remained between Marxism and Christianity. Subsequent articles emphasised the “geistige Entscheidung” that voters faced between Marxism and Christianity. This tactic reduced a party’s political programme to a singular political ideology and most alarming, equated Christianity with the ideologies of Marxism and Liberalism. The method was also employed by Adenauer in the west to demonize Marxism in order to minimise the threat of a SPD election victory. Powerful though it was, it entailed the risk of dividing Germany into east and west and so indirectly betrayed Kaiser’s own ‘Brückentheorie.’

**The impact of the autumn elections in the Soviet zone on the CDU’s debate**

A comprehensive review of the CDU’s disappointing performance\(^{222}\) in the Soviet zone communal elections on August 1 and September 15, 1946 by executive committee member Dertinger concluded that policy was still too philosophical and lacked in practical relevance;

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\(^{221}\) Um Was es geht, Neue Zeit, August 11, 1946.

\(^{222}\) Communal elections in the Soviet Zone took place on 15th September and the Kreis and Land parliamentary elections on 20th October 1946. In the communal elections the results were CDU = 18.7\%, LDP = 21.1\%, SED = 57.1\% giving the SED an absolute majority. In the Kreistag elections CDU = 35.2\%, LDP = 18.6\%, SED = 50.1\% also giving SED an absolute majority and the Landtag elections CDU = 24.5\%, LDP = 24.6\%, SED = 47.6\% The LDP and CDU ran virtually neck and neck with the SED gaining only a relative majority. Günter Braun in Martin Broszat and Hermann Weber (Hg), SBZ Handbuch, op. cit., p.396f.
“Dringend erforderlich ist zunächst eine Klärung und vor allem eine Popularisierung
derer Ideologie. Aus der allgemeinen weltanschaulichen Darlegung müssen wir zu
konkreten Formulierungen hinsichtlich der aktuellen Tagesfragen vorstossen.”

Kaiser’s own assessment of ‘Die Union nach den Wahlen’ on November 6, 1946 at
the extended zone executive committee also requests a pause for a Gewissensforschung to
consider the party’s image and objectives following poor regional election results. In an
atmosphere of heightened Soviet dominance, Kaiser further modified his definition of
socialism, noting that nationalisation was now not an absolute principle, but just one
method of socialism alongside many others. The elusive goal of German unity was also
made a policy priority, that must be met before the subject of the new economic order
could be tackled. By insisting on the unlikely event of German unification however,
Kaiser effectively signalled an indefinite postponement of the decision on economic
reform. Kaiser expressed his growing concern at the ideological wrangling between the
allies, the political rivalry between parties and even between the right and left wing in
the CDU;

“Es ist kein Geheimnis geblieben, daß die Welt trotz der Niederrigung Hitlers noch
voll ideologischer Spannungen ist..... Was nützen all wohlgesetzten
Wirtschaftsprogramme, was nützen radikale Parteigrundsätze, über die in
bombastischen Worten debattiert wird: Sicherung des täglichen Brotes, des
menschenwürdigen Obdaches, Erschliessung der kargen wirtschaftlichen Möglichkeiten,
die uns noch geblieben sind , sind das Nächstliegende ..... Verzweiflung und
Hoffnungslosigkeit in den Herzen der Millionen zu tilgen, bleibt die erste
Aufgabe.”

Kaiser’s specialist committee produced a document on December 6, 1946 entitled
Grundbegriffe des christlichen Sozialismus that attempted to summarise the philosophical

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223 It was felt that the CDU’s chances had been actively impeded by the Soviet military and SED
intervention. “Hinzukommt als wesentliches Merkmal der Ausgangslage dieses Wahlkampfes eine
Wahlbeeinträchtigung verschiedenster Art und von ausserordentlichem Umfang. Nicht nur konnten wir
teilweise nur 50% der wahlberechtigten Bevölkerung überhaupt erreichen, sondern darüber hinaus
waren wir auch sonst in jeder Hinsicht organisatorisch-propagandistisch benachteiligt, und unsere
Wähler und Aktivisten waren einer ausserordentlichen Wahlbeeinflussung ausgesetzt. Die Ausgangslage
für die Wahlen war also denkbar ungünstig.”Report prepared by Dertinger for the executive committee
meeting on 17th September 1946 following communal elections. ACDP, III-012-1063.

224 “... es zunächst der Einheit unseres Landes bedarf, um die lebenswichtigen Fragen der Neuregelung

Jakob Kaiser. Wir haben Brücke ... op. cit., p.156.
and theological aspects of their political ideology and in particular Christian Socialism's relation to Marxism. Individual statements by committee members revealed that significant differences in opinion still prevailed over the economy. Despite basic philosophical agreement, Berlin's Christian Socialists frequently arrived at dramatically different policy formulations, and confirms that;

"Politik aus christlicher Verantwortung und sozialer Liebe zwar bestimmte politische Grundhaltungen ausschließt, aber nicht gleichzeitig sachlich eindeutige Ordnungsvorstellungen einschließt. Hier bleibt Raum zu durchaus pluralen Modellen." 226

Tiburtius 227 emphasised free market competition as the principal driver of the economy but Gablents's 'economic planning' concept, is less clear about whether it envisages a regulatory framework or more pervasive powers of intervention by the state. It appears that committee member Gablents had chosen to ignore Kaiser's conscious shift in programme, and continued to recommend industries for nationalisation and restrictions on private ownership. The important fact remains that Christian Socialism as understood by Kaiser and by some members of his specialist committee was open to interpretation as a neo-liberal economic system.

In preparation for the second party conference on September 6-8, 1947, Kaiser disregarded his own committee's programme suggestions and chose Karl Arnold to address the conference. Arnold had the advantage not only that he was minister president for the western state of North Rhine-Westphalia but was also a member of the Christian trade unions and campaigned for German unification. It was hoped that Arnold would raise the profile of the CDU in the eyes of the Soviets. 228 Arnold's speech 229 makes no mention of Christian Socialism, but the conference resolutions agreed on central

226 Bernd Uhl, op. cit., p.137ff.
227 Tiburtius, op. cit., p.29ff.
229 Gradl was assigned with writing Arnold's conference speech.
economic planning, public ownership and co-decision rights in industry. Nationalisation was significantly curtailed and now became more the exception than the rule. Alternative market economic mechanisms including tax, credit and interest, price and customs policies were recommended to achieve similar control to nationalisation. The socialist elements contained in Kaiser’s previous visions of a new order had been noticeably weakened.

Kaiser’s references to Christian Socialism did not continue for very long after the 1946 autumn elections. Until this point Christian Socialism had been useful in warding off insinuations that the CDU was a ‘bürgerlich’ party. After this date however, the encroaching and more dangerous socialism of the SED and the suspicion that the word socialism continued to arouse in the west, forced Kaiser to revise his Christian Socialist programme and to re-emphasise market economics. A speech held in Cologne on April, 16, 1947 best exemplifies the modification of Kaiser’s programme. Kaiser still insisted that ‘a new order’ was necessary, but significantly no longer absolutely insisted on it being socialist. He sought to reassure western audiences that a new order does not equate with a loss of wealth and prosperity;

“Es gibt Leute, die meinen ………gepflegte Lebensformen gingen zugrunde, wenn sich die Union zur Notwendigkeit einer neuen Ordnung, meinetwegen mit sozialistischem Vorzeichen, bekennt ………. Es muß ausgeräumt werden mit der Auffassung, als bedeute die Ableitung der kapitalistischen Wirtschaftsordnung eine Proletarisierung des deutschen Volkes.”

Kaiser redrew the Union’s profile from a socialist party to a ‘socially progressive party,’ recommending wealth distribution measures to ensure social justice and congratulating the merits of middle class conservatism;

“Ich habe stets auf dem Standpunkt gestanden, daß nach Auffassung der Union zu jedem sozialen Neuordnungswillen ein Stück konservativen Geistes kommen muß. Es


231 Manfred Wilde op. cit., p.294.

gibt keine gesunde politische und soziale Neuordnung ohne die Erhaltung wertvollen Geistes und wertvollster Eigenschaften, wie das deutsche Bürgertum sie verkörpert hat."

**National representation**

By the autumn of 1946, Kaiser’s anxiety that actions by the SED and the Soviets were isolating the Soviet zone from the west, led to the suggestion for an all-German body of representatives from all zones to pressure the allies to confront the issue of German unity.\(^{233}\) The campaign for ‘National Representation’ became Kaiser’s new goal which he pursued until the middle of 1947. The inspiration came from American Foreign Secretary Byrnes, who in a speech in Stuttgart on September 6, 1946 endorsed a merger of the US and the British zones and invited other zones to set up joint German administrations to manage Germany as one economic area in accordance with the Potsdam agreement. Kaiser took the speech by Byrnes and the willingness\(^{234}\) by Soviets to settle a peace treaty once a German government had been established, as a sign that preparations for a provisional federal German government could go ahead. Kaiser assumed the British would follow the US suggestion and was confident that the French would also agree, based on Foreign Secretary Bidault’s approval for a central German administration, at the Paris Conference on July 12, 1946. Yet to Kaiser’s amazement, his idea to reach a compromise between all party differences and between all allied powers collapsed when agreement could not be reached.\(^{235}\) Mentalities and views in the west, and in particular their views on German unity were too disparate and lacked the minimum requirement of an ‘intaktes Nationalgefühl.’\(^{236}\) Kaiser held onto the belief in a national representation, a permanent council of German parties that would be a powerful negotiating aid to secure the CDU greater influence and freedom in the antifascist block;\(^{237}\)

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233 Johann Baptist Gradl, op. cit., p.78.

234 Speech by Molotow on July 10, 1946.

235 Disagreement between the allies erupted over issues such as reparation payments, conditions for US aid and suspicion of the Soviet expansionist aims also made any hope of a German administration illusory. The reality was that allied powers in the east and the west were more interested in establishing their own specific political and economic system and their own spheres of influence than in supporting a joint administration or even a committee of German party politicians. Manfred Wilde, op. cit., p.387.

236 Hans Peter Schwarz, Vom Reich zur Bundesrepublik, Luchterhand, Neuwied/Berlin 1966, p.336.

“Es war der Sinn der Forderung nach einer nationalen Repräsentation und nach einem Konsultativrat, die Verbreitung der Basis gegen den Kommunismus auf gesamtdeutscher Ebene zu schaffen.”

From the summer of 1947 and following the Soviet's rejection of the Marshall Plan, Kaiser strengthened his opposition to the Soviet military. He signalled a change of course in what has been termed his ‘Opposition Speech’ at the extended executive meeting on July 12, 1947. Kaiser’s programme now suffered opposition on two fronts, from those politicians committed to a western political orientation and from the Soviet military who pressured Kaiser’s CDU to conform to block politics. Kaiser voiced his severest criticism yet of Soviet occupation policy and the discrimination mounted against the CDU, marking the beginning of the end of his party leadership.

“Die Union ..... kann keine Politik decken, die dazu dient, unter Führung der SED etwas wie einem Einheitsblock, den Weg zu bereiten, der nach und nach Instrument einer Politik wird, die mit den Grundsätzen der Union nichts mehr zu tun haben können.”

By November 24, the Soviet military presented their own proposal for an all German body, a Volkskongress to represent the parties of the Soviet zone at the forthcoming London Conference of foreign ministers. The CDU rejected the proposal on the grounds that the west German parties were not included and because it contravened the party’s

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241 Kaiser’s speech provoked the CDU member Kratin to seek opinions from the regional CDU Landesvorsitzenden across the Soviet zone on the Marshall Plan and Blockpolitik. The fear of threats and reprisals for a negative reponse or sharing in Kaiser’s criticism of the Soviet military authorities ensured that their statements were positive. The SED planned to use these submissions by the CDU Länder chairman to undermine Kaiser and prevent his reelection at the forthcoming 2nd Union conference in September in Berlin.


commitment to restoring German unification. In Kaiser’s mind, the idea of the Volkskongress signalled the beginning of the division of Germany.\textsuperscript{244} The Soviets coerced representatives from the CDU regional states to attend the first meeting of the Volkskongress on December 6 and 7, circumventing the opposition by the CDU leadership. Kaiser meanwhile used the invitation to address the conference of the CDU’s Sozialausschüsse in Herne, in western Germany on November 30, 1947 not to talk about trade union policy or Christian Socialism and its relation to the Ahlen programme, as anticipated, but to make a last desperate appeal for western dialogue with the Soviet authorities to avert the threat of a division of Germany.\textsuperscript{245}

It was only a matter of time before the Soviet military authorities would retaliate to Kaiser’s open display of opposition. The occasion came at the meeting of the zone’s executive board on December 12, when the Soviet military leader Kratin brought a vote of no confidence against Kaiser, claiming he had become isolated in his party and lacked the trust of the occupation authorities. Members of the CDU executive were internally divided over their loyalty to Kaiser. The five Landesverbände still basically supported Kaiser, but they desperately needed to counter mounting Soviet threats and personal hostility inflicted on individuals in their regions. The party executive therefore took the decision to oust Kaiser.\textsuperscript{246} After Kaiser and Lemmer had been removed on December 19, 1947, Hickmann the new chairman of the six Landesverbände in the Soviet zone claimed Kaiser and Lemmer had not been sacked but had merely been; “vorläufig für


\textsuperscript{245} He had first spoken out on his policy for Germany at a speech entitled “Die deutsche Situation vor London”, in the Friedrichspalast in Berlin on 16th November 1947, in anticipation of the London Conference of Foreign Ministers. The content of the speech denied the occupation powers the right to divide Germany and emphasised need for Germany to formulate its own standpoint vis a vis the occupation authorities, outlined his position on Oder-Neisse border, the Saar and reparations issue but still voiced his wish to reach an understanding with the Soviets and to strive for synthesis between personal freedoms and socialist obligations.

fungtionsunfähig erklärt." The dismissals coincided with the London conference of foreign ministers, just four days earlier, in which ministers failed to reach a solution that would have united all allied zones. This led to the Soviets to abandon their hope of uniting Germany under communism, and so they turned their attention to consolidating socialism in the Soviet zone only.

At the inter-zone meeting of the CDU, on December 28 and 29, one week after Kaiser and Lemmer's dismissals, a total of 34 union politicians from the Soviet, British and US zones showed symbolic support and sympathy for Kaiser. They declared that until a formal election voted to change the leadership at the next zone party conference, Kaiser and Lemmer remained the legitimate representatives of the Soviet occupied zone, affirming that Berlin retained "das volle Vertrauen der Gesamtunion." This had little tangible benefit for the CDU in Berlin, since they could no longer function as an autonomous party. The SED and the Soviet military authorities had moreover successfully coerced the Landesverbände in the Soviet zone to oppose the CDU party leadership and adopt the SED and Soviet line. Kaiser's and Lemmer's forced resignations also marked the end of party co-operation between the east and the west CDU. The Telegraf newspaper remarked at the time that the gradual erosion of the CDU's representation in the block undermined any previous opposition that the party had held;

"Es wäre auch dagegen noch Widerstand möglich gewesen, wenn nicht nach und nach einzelne aus der Front herausgebrochen worden wären. Sie tragen die Verantwortung dafür, daß nunmehr die Bewegung zusammenbricht, denn darüber wird wohl kein Zweifel mehr bestehen: das Fortbestehen der CDU in der Ostzone wäre eine reine Farce. Die CDU hat in der Ostzone kein politisches Gewicht mehr."

247 Formally the legal status of Kaiser and Lemmer as party leaders had not been changed. The Soviet military authorities had merely raised the profile of the chairmen of the CDU groups in the Länder of the Soviet zone to that of the highest representative level of the party and shifted the hitherto sole leadership role held by Kaiser to the three directors Hickmann, Lobedanz and Dertinger.


The CDU in Berlin had set out in 1945 to become a right of centre Volkspartei representing all working and middle classes in the whole of Germany, to uphold property rights and a market economy but also to introduce new social reforms to prevent the formation of monopoly industries and exploitative economic practices, to improve industrial democracy and worker-employer relations. The slogan Christian Socialism had not been a feature of Hermes’ ideology and was not adopted by Kaiser until he took over the party leadership and needed a label to publicise his arrival and the party’s future programme. Christian Socialism both satisfied the Soviets and the Christian Socialists in the west, of Kaiser’s good socialist credentials. Kaiser’s Christian trade unionist background lent the party a naturally left-wing stance and once he became party leader Kaiser was in a more powerful position to implement those economic policies that had been left out by the liberal members of the party in the founding document from June 1945. Yet Kaiser possessed a genuine idealism about socialism and the need to introduce social reform measures in society, and grew aware that a socialist campaign could tap into votes from estranged SPD supporters once the SPD and KPD had merged to form the SED. But ironically Kaiser had to then learn to abandon Christian Socialism as a slogan and as a left-wing programme once the true Soviet ambitions had begun to materialise and the west CDU modified its socialist discourse. Kaiser realised that the skill of formulating a programme lies not in producing dogma but in observing and reflecting the Zeitgeist, and he learnt therefore where and when to place new emphasis on conservative bürgerlich traditions.

But Kaiser’s Christian Socialism was also never sufficiently defined, and may suggest that the term was more opportunistic than of real substance. Hacke remarks;

“Aber nüchtern muß man feststellen, daß die Künstlichkeit des Begriffs symbolisch für die Künstlichkeit des Konzepts steht.”

Suckut agrees that the slogan Christian Socialism was hollow;

“So gelang es der CDU nicht, ihr Sozialismus-Konzept über einige Grundaussagen (betriebliche Mitbestimmung, Verstaatlichung der Schlüsselindustrien, wirtschaftliche Rahmenplanung des Staates) hinaus, mit konkreten Inhalt zu füllen.”

251 Christian Hacke, op.cit., p.21.
The impact of Kaiser’s rhetoric of Christian Socialism was undoubtedly powerful, and brought tactical benefits, but it was precisely these socialist visions contained in his Christian Socialism, the efforts for trade union recognition and industrial democracy that also succeeded in making a lasting impact on the western CDU’s programme. Adenauer, who was now clearly taking the lead in the CDU’s development, could not have proceeded with a more liberal policy line, without giving due attention to the socialist wing of die-hard Kaiser supporters across the party’s diverse programmatic spectrum.\textsuperscript{253} Hacke\textsuperscript{254} remarked that the history of Kaiser’s influence is a history of a political failure. Yet at the beginning of this section, Hacke was cited for his warning that when attempting to judge the success or failure of Jakob Kaiser in the east CDU, a distinction must be made between his conceptual ideas and his practical politics. On this point Schwarz\textsuperscript{255} believes that if only the allies had succeeded in resolving their differences, the third way political programme devised by Kaiser would have had every chance of success if implemented in a future German government;


Irrespective of the merits of Kaiser’s political vision, aimed at avoiding the division of Germany through its role as a bridge between east and west, and Christian Socialism as the synthesis, a third way between Marxist collectivism and western style capitalism, it was the harsh political realities of the Cold War that gained the upper hand. Kaiser’s overriding aim had been to avoid the isolation of the CDU in the Soviet zone by the west whilst maintaining the authority of the Berlin executive for future national party leadership.\textsuperscript{256} As the sole champion of western civilisation in Berlin, he believed it to be

\textsuperscript{252} Siegfried Suckut, \textit{Die CDU in der DDR. Zu Funktion und Funktionswandel …..} op. cit., p.703.


\textsuperscript{254} Christian Hacke (Hrsg), Jakob Kaiser. Wir haben Brücke ….. op. cit., p.9.

\textsuperscript{255} H.P Schwarz, Vom Reich zur Bundesrepublik, op. cit., p.299.

\textsuperscript{256} Kaiser was not ignorant of the fact that his claim to all-party leadership was fiercely contended by Adenauer in the British Zone and by Dirks and Kogon, the Christian Socialists in the American zone.
his duty to strive for German unity,²⁵⁷ but his failure and political naiveté lay in making German unification a prerequisite for introducing all other reforms. Unlike Adenauer, Kaiser had failed to fully anticipate and successfully master the political reality of the emerging east-west conflict.

²⁵⁷ Manfred Wilde, op. cit., p. 351.
5.2. Berlin and the Soviet zone *Länder*

From the outset the Berlin CDU(D) did not hide its ambition to become the party’s national representative and home of the party’s central office headquarters, with Jakob Kaiser as CDU leader. Yet the party’s record for managing the five regional states in the Soviet zone - Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-West Pomerania, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt and Thuringia, reveals complaints about Kaiser’s democratic credentials and leadership skills. Poor information transfer and inadequate channels of communication from the CDU’s head office in Berlin to the regions of the Soviet zone, resulted in widespread ignorance about the party’s programme content and direction. This was compounded by censor and discrimination by the Soviet authorities of the CDU party newspaper ‘*Die neue Zeit*’. Lamenting the inadequacies of the zonal party headquarters in Berlin, the Brandenburg state parliament for example, suggested as late as autumn 1947\(^{258}\) to the CDU party in Saxony, to set up a network of CDU parliamentary representatives across the Soviet zone to exchange their own views on legislation. Earlier that year on April 19 and 20, 1947 the chairmen of the CDU *Landesverbände* in the Soviet occupation zone (except Thuringia which did not have a chairman at the time) met in Halle specifically to discuss problems experienced with Berlin. Dertinger,\(^{259}\) General Secretary for the CDU in Berlin was also invited, to learn that the regions did not feel sufficiently involved in shaping the party’s political direction, expressing their wish; “an der Gestaltung der Dinge stärker und verantwortlich beteiligt zu sein.”\(^{260}\) Kaiser and Lemmer attempted to improve co-operation with the *Landesverbände* in the Soviet zone by increasing the number of sub-committees at the *Reichsgeschäftsstelle* in Berlin and then inviting representatives from the regional states to participate. Yet the initiative never really took off. Invitations to meetings were lost and there was a slow and half-hearted take up of

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\(^{258}\) Letter from Brandenburg CDU Landtagsfraktion to Saxony CDU Landtagsfraktion on 14th October 1947. ACDP, III-035.-041.

\(^{259}\) The CDU’s General Secretary in Berlin, Dertinger descended from the right of the Weimar Republic political spectrum. He had taken part in the Kapp-Putsch, went into the management of the Stahlhelm and then entered Franz von Papen’s close circle of advisers.

posts. The *Landesverbände* across the Soviet zone were therefore to some extent also to blame for their lack of interest in policy work at Berlin central office. In a speech entitled *Der Wille der Union* Pfarrer Kirsch\(^{262}\) noted that the CDU would have been more successful in the zone if the party had dealt more efficiently with Soviet and SED injustices and had solved their inferior press and propaganda services.

Aside from organisational factors, the priest Kirsch also hints that the chief impeding factor dogging the establishment of an interdenominational party was east Germany’s sectarian traditions. In the case of Saxony he notes;

> “die seelische Struktur unseres sächsischen Volkes gerade für den Ruf der Union sehr ungünstige Vorbedingungen bietet.”

Berlin, with a Protestant majority in the region, had shown the most political allegiance to liberal, conservative parties during the Weimar period. The political traditions of the Centre Party, the trade union movement and the Social Question that had preoccupied the predominantly Catholic west since the 19th century, were all factors of marginal historic relevance to the Protestant regions of the east. Discussions show that Protestants did not envisage socialist reform ideas to correct the mistakes of history, but the prevailing belief was that politics and morals were mutually exclusive. Resolving this would involve closer assimilation of elements of Evangelical Social Ethical Teaching (*christliche Sozialehre*) to fuse politics and personal morality in society. The distinct lack of reference to socialist traditions in programmes of the east is representative of the regions’ wider ignorance of Socialism. This was demonstrated by remarks by the priest Bitter at the CDUD’s meeting in Annaberg-Buchholz\(^{263}\) in March 1946, shortly after Kaiser first began to incorporate the word socialism into his speeches. The priest recounts that he did not even understand what Kaiser meant by the word ‘socialism.’ In an effort to trace the significance of the word socialism, Bitter claims he was forced to consult the theories of *christliche Sozialehre* only to conclude that ‘Socialism’ aspired to

\(^{261}\) Manfred Wilde, op. cit., p.24.

\(^{262}\) Ludwig Kirsch, *Der Wille der Union*, ACDP, III-035, p.71.

\(^{263}\) Pfarrer Bitter, 20.3.46 in Saxony ACDP, III-035-075.
the same social objectives as 'Christian social teaching,' only by a different name.\textsuperscript{264} The Christian Socialism that developed in the Berlin CDU leadership was not peculiar to east German traditions but was an import from the west. Both leaders, Andreas Hermes and his successor Jakob Kaiser were Catholics who descended from the Centre Party tradition and trade union movement in the Rhineland, who had escaped to Berlin at the end of the war. Based on its political history, the east German region would not therefore naturally have leaned towards Socialism, in its widest or narrowest sense, had it not been nurtured by socially conscious Catholics and then subsequently enforced through Marxist-Socialism by the Soviet military occupation.

In 1945 Socialism was a \textit{Leitmotiv} that succeeded in uniting Christian democratic forces in the west, but it rarely featured in any of the first programmes in the east. If the CDU programme found any purchase with the average Protestant in east Germany, it was on account of its support for a liberal economy, 'democratic'\textsuperscript{265} rights and individual freedoms, rather than for its Christian socialist message. The party's initial profile in the eastern states was that of a centre-right, socially conscious, liberal party. Communality was engendered through references to \textit{bürgerlich} traditions characteristic of so many of the former Weimar parties. The politically diverse composite traditions that constituted the CDU, classified by Heidenheimer\textsuperscript{266} as Christian Socialist, liberal, capitalist and social conservative, thus received greater or lesser commitment in their manifestos depending on the region of origin of the CDU. Not until Kaiser's advocacy of Christian Socialism at the beginning of 1946 did the eastern regions even begin to perceive the CDU as a 'Socialist' party. Christians in the Soviet zone showed closer affinity to the liberal party (LPD) programme than to the socialism of the Social Democrats, in contrast to Catholics in Hesse for example, who had always been sympathetic to the idea of a coalition with the SPD. Given the rapid intervention of the Soviet military in the

\textsuperscript{264} The Sächsische Volkszeitung, the party organ of the German Communist Party made much political mileage out of this admission by the priest in its commentary on 29th March 1946 where it criticised Pfarrer Bitter for diverting from the line taken by its party chairman Kaiser who in his 13.2.46 speech had declared that "Die Ordnung, der die bürgerliche Ordnung Platz zu machen habe, eine sozialistisch sein wird." They accused Pfarrer Bitter of "von Sozialismus ein Zerrbild entworfen und esposed the priest by stating "Wer vertritt nun die wirkliche Meinung de CDU über den Sozialismus – der Vorsitzende der Christlichen -Demokratischen Union, Kaiser oder der Pfarrer Bitter aus Marienberg?"

\textsuperscript{265} Here the use of 'democratic' must be understood in the context of its Weimar party definition, namely liberal-conservative.

\textsuperscript{266} Arnold J. Heidenheimer; op. cit., p.233.
development of the CDU in the Soviet zone and its pressure on groups to conform to the model of the Berlin CDU, the eastern states were forced to adopt Berlin's programme and support the Berlin party executive, even if local frustration continued to be directed at Kaiser's leadership.

Four different impulses have been identified for Christian Democratic groups starting up in the Soviet zone states.\textsuperscript{267} Firstly those who sought to re-establish the Catholic Centre Party,\textsuperscript{268} secondly those who looked to establish a \textit{Christlich-Soziale Partei}, influenced by Weimar's former \textit{Christlich Soziales Volksdienst} and the Christian trade unions, thirdly from the autumn of 1945 the foundation of a \textit{Demokratische Partei} as a united liberal-democratic party, as a result of secessionists from LDP and CDU groups, and fourthly the foundation of the CDU in Berlin, whose programme provided a blueprint for party political initiatives in Brandenburg and in the vicinity of Berlin.\textsuperscript{269} The co-founder of the Berlin CDU, J. B Gradl\textsuperscript{270} notes, that although CDU initiatives already began in the summer of 1945 in Saxony, Brandenburg, Saxony-Anhalt, Mecklenburg and Thuringia, in many places there were serious start up difficulties and local resistance to the Christian democratic idea, as this section will highlight.

In the same way that monastery priests, Welty and Siemer initiated political activities among Christian democrats in the west, influential Church leaders were also influential in setting up local CDU groups in the east, and included the priests Ludwig Kirsch (Chemnitz) and Hugo Hickmann (Dresden), and members of the \textit{Bekennende Kirche} Adalbert Küntzelmann (Chemnitz) and Martin Richter (Dresden). A certain \textit{Konkurrenzenken} reigned between the Protestant and Catholic communities in establishing confessional representation and influence in the east CDU.\textsuperscript{271} Since Centre

\textsuperscript{267} The classification was devised by Günter Wirth, "Die Beteiligung der CDU und der Umgestaltung der DDR in den fünfziger Jahren" in: Kirchliche Zeitgeschichte, Jg 3, Heft 3, Mai 1990, p.125-151.

\textsuperscript{268} In Cottbus the authorities forced the re-emergence of the Centre Party. On June 30 Willy Heller held a speech to this effect, yet once the news of the CDU development in Berlin transpired the group which had so far only registered but not yet received a license was renamed CDU.

\textsuperscript{269} Communication restrictions meant that the Berlin programme did not usually reach further than the neighbouring region of Berlin.

\textsuperscript{270} Johann Baptist Gradl, op. cit., p.31.

Party members initiated most of the CDU groups, many Protestants were sceptical of the new movement and so aimed to quickly reach parity in Protestant representation. In September 1947, Catholics made up no less than 40% of CDU members in the six states of the Soviet zone, even though Catholics only represented 11% of the population. Catholics were dominant in the CDU in Saxony-Anhalt and Thuringia. Only in Saxony did Protestants reach parity;

“Im Land Sachsen mochten es die Protestanten als Verhandlungserfolg werten, als sie schließlich die konfessionell paritätische Besetzung des ersten Führungsgremiums erreichten.” 272

In the populations of Thuringia and Saxony, postwar migration brought a shift in the ratio of Catholics to Protestants in the Catholic areas of the east. In Upper Silesia and south west Prussia for example Catholics came to represent a third of the population. 273

5.3. Mecklenburg - West Pomerania

In the first few months after the CDU Landesverband for Mecklenburg-West Pomerania was formed in Schwerin, it experienced rapid expansion. By December 1945 it had a total of 238274 local CDU affiliated groups, that aided the positive reception of Berlin’s July Aufruf in Mecklenburg. 275 Ernst Lemmer from the CDU in Berlin also appeared at many CDU public conferences in Mecklenburg-West Pomerania to personally promote the Berlin programme.

Although the Mecklenburg CDU became quickly linked to the development in Berlin, it is proud to record that it began independently of any other Christian democratic developments;

“In unserem Lande hat sich zunächst die Partei selbständig gebildet, ohne von Berlin oder dem Westen dazu einen Anstoß erhalten zu haben.”  

272 Siegfried Suckut, Christlich-Demokratische Union Deutschlands (CDU(D)), op. cit., p.521.
273 Südwestdeutsche Union (Halbmonatszeitschrift), December Nr.1-2 Jg. 1946, p.8.
It admits to joining the CDU because its programme was broadly in line with Berlin’s views, in particular in its desire to maintain contact with the west and south allied zones and in campaigning for German unity, but pledged its unrelenting commitment to a political direction that was “Christlich, antifaschistisch, demokratisch und sozialistisch,” and a ‘Partei der Mitte und des Ausgleichs.”\(^{276}\)

Siegfried Witte, the minister for economics in Mecklenburg was keen to stress that the CDU was not a Wirtschaftspartei of the type that had characterised the party system in Weimar, with a focus on representing the exclusive interests of a certain branch of industry. This, he said, had led to the neglect of political issues;

> “Unsere Väter und wir selbst sind wirtschaftlich allzu tüchtig und allzu arbeitsam gewesen. Wir sind viel zu sehr in der Arbeit unserer Betriebe aufgegangen und haben die Politik früher den Feudalen und dann später den Abenteuerern überlassen.”

He criticises the obsession with Marxism and the primacy of economic interests in society;

> “Allzu sehr liebe Freunde hat sich auch bei uns der marxistische Grundsatz eingelebt, eine Art vulgärer Marxismus breit gemacht, daß die Wirtschaft das entscheidende, daß wirtschaftliche Verhältnisse die Geschichte der Völker und der Menschen bestimmen.”\(^{277}\)

In future, he claims, a planned economy shall serve the people “im Sinne des christlichen Sozialismus.”\(^{278}\)

There was a suggestion in Mecklenburg for a programme of Democratic Federalism. Prof Dr U. Noack communicated this proposal to v. d. Gablentz in Berlin in August 1945\(^{279}\) in the hope that his ideas would be incorporated into the CDU programme.

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276 Dr. Reinhold Lobedanz, Der Weg der Union, Verlag ‘Der Demokrat,’ Schwerin 1947, p.5-7.
277 Dr Siegfried Witte, Minister for economics, minutes of the Landesversammlung, 18th May 1947, in ACDP, III-036-082.
278 Dr Siegfried Witte, in Der Weg der Union op.cit., p.38.
279 Prof. Dr U. Noack, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, ACDP, I-155-030/5.
Gablentz responded cautiously, showing tacit agreement with federalism, but warned that federalism held a different connotation in Mecklenburg than in the Rhineland and in Bavaria, where it risked developing into narrow regionalism. He concluded:

"Wir dürfen auch grundsätzlich Dinge über den Föderalismus in grösserem Kreise nur sagen, wenn wir gleichzeitig den anderen Pol, der Reichseinheit mit auf das stärkste betonen und auch dessen verfassungsmässige Sicherung verlangen."

Here Gablentz not only reveals early concerns at the possible subdivision of Germany into independent federal regions but indicates his party’s goal to secure political power and maintain Berlin as the capital of a united Germany.

5.4. Thuringia

The most significant Christian democratic groups in Thuringia were formed in Weimar and Eichsfeld with a revival of the former right wing party, the Christlich Soziale Volkspartei (CSVP). The first meeting was initiated by Max Kolter in Weimar on July 20, 1945 during which he was nominated vice president with Georg Grosse as his deputy. Here Kolter related the development of the CDU in Berlin, noting that an interdenominational party had been established; “die auf dem ethisch sittlichen Fundament der christlichen-germanischen Kultur stehen”\textsuperscript{280} A twelve point programme was drafted and submitted to General Zhukov, head of the Soviet military administration, requesting a license to form a Landesverband for Thuringia. Point eight of programme outlined clear aims for a free market economy with limited nationalisation of certain industries;

"Wiederaufbau des Wirtschaftslebens auf der Grundlage freier Initiative, Vereinigungsfreiheit zur Währung und Förderung der Arbeits- und Wirtschaftsbedingungen. Sozialisierung von besonders wichtigen Betrieben (Kohle und Strom)."\textsuperscript{281}

\textsuperscript{280} The word ‘Germanisch’ did not however feature in the Berlin programme.

\textsuperscript{281} Thuringia Landesverband, ACDP, III – 031-199.
There is noticeably less reference to socialism in the Thuringia discussions than in comparable programme developments in the west with greater accent placed on democracy. Land reform legislation introduced by the Soviets in September, which aimed to confiscate private land and property from all identified war criminals without compensation and subsequently redistribute it to small farms, migrants and refugees, was broadly accepted by Thuringia, but they campaigned alongside Kaiser in Berlin for the introduction of co-operative schemes that permitted private property ownership and compensation payments for confiscated land and property.

The official party foundation took place on July 22, with 52 representatives invited from former liberal-democratic or bürgerlich parties. Yet the Thuringia CDU never progressed with its programme discussions beyond this stage and the original twelve point plan was never published. Instead it chose to follow the Berlin development;

"Auf eine Veröffentlichung des Programms wurde verzichtet, da ein schnellmöglicher Anschluß mit der CDU in Berlin gesucht werden sollte."\(^{282}\)

In his opening speech at the first state party conference on April 13-14, 1946 in Erfurt, deputy chairman of the Thuringia executive Georg Grosse, spoke of the desire for members of the old democratic parties, by which he also included the KPD and the Centre Party, to join forces with the liberal-democratic camp to form one unified democratic party;

"mit dem bürgerlichen Lager zur Bildung einer einheitlichen demokratischen Partei zu kommen."

The political developments in the east, he said, had been eclipsed by the actions of the Berlin CDU. By immediately publicising its programme, the Berlin CDU became 'richtungsgebend.' The Berlin development was also significant for Thuringia, since the need to respect parity amongst parties until elections, prevented the opportunity to merge the region's Centre Party, the Bekenntniskirche, the Christlich-Sozialen Volksdienst, the Landespartei and the Volkspartei into one new party. Allegiance to the CDUD instead

\(^{282}\) Ibid.
soon became inevitable. Grosse attempted to eliminate potential rumours that the CDU would become a reactionary imitation of the old Centre, claiming the CDU did not back specifically Catholic or Protestant policies but Christian ones. As late as April 1947, at the second party conference in Erfurt, the party still gave the impression of an independent and self-confident party, reticent to forego its political principles and determined to legitimate key elements of its own political programme. In a speech by the newly elected chairman, Otto Schneider, clarification was given to their specific understanding of Christian socialism in economic policy and included a variety of business structures and forms, both private and public, in an effort not to alienate the sceptical liberal Protestant voter.

Discussions suggest that liberal, middle class 'bürgerlich' traditions were not so tainted in the east as they were in the west, where programmes graphically portrayed liberal-capitalist individuals as Steigbügelhalter for Hitler and liberalist behaviour as symptomatic for the rise of National Socialism. In the Neue Zeit the Berlin CDU's Dovifat specifically emphasises the importance of liberal elements in the new order;

"In einer starken Vereinigung demokratischen und christlichen Wollens sind auch echte liberale Elemente." ... "Wer die liberale Grundhaltung und ihr individualistisches Streben nicht zum Anlaß individualisierender Abspaltung nimmt, sondern zur Entfaltung persönlicher Kräfte zur zupackenden Nothilfe und friedlichen Neuordnung der Welt, der gehört in die neue, in die christliche Demokratie."

Individual developments in the east advocated a return to liberal Protestant traditions in a right of centre, 'bürgerlich' party and support for a capitalist economy with limited and temporary central economic planning. To some extent the discrepancy between east and west reveal a failure on the part of eastern groups not to sufficiently acknowledge the consequences of past liberal economic practices, but may also indicate the willingness by Christian Socialist groups in the west, to exploit Protestant complicity in the National


284 The Berlin Aufruf programme from June 1945 read; "Groß ist die Schuld weiter Kreise unseres Volkes, die sich nur allzu bereitwillig zu Handlagnern und Steigbügelhaltern für Hitler erniedrigten."

285 Dovifat, Neue Zeit newspaper Nr. 7, (no date).
Socialist catastrophe, to denigrate liberalism and to help promote a superior Catholic agenda.

Thuringia’s economic policy objectives were outlined in ‘Wirtschaftspolitik – Ihre Aufgaben und Ziele im Sozialismus christlicher Verantwortung’. Although adopting the Berlin phrase ‘Sozialismus aus christlicher Verantwortung’ the party insists that it did not advocate a socialist programme per se, but a pragmatic, flexible approach to politics;

 Wie all menschliche Ordnung sich zwischen den beiden Polen Freiheit und Bindung entfaltet, so muß auch die Wirtschaftspolitik diese Spannung bewältigen. Unser christlicher Realismus überschätzt die Fähigkeit des Menschen ebensowenig, wie er die Gefahren einer die Persönlichkeit aufhebenden Bindung unterschätzt... Freiheit und Lenkung müssen beide da sein in der Wirtschaftspolitik, denn beide sind unerlässlich. Was zu betonen ist, bleibt eine psychologische und technische Frage, nach den Bedingungen des Falles zu unterscheiden.”

These remarks signal a desire for a third way economy with its key components of ‘freedom with responsibility’ and echo programmes endorsed by Christian Realists, ordo-liberals and more moderate Christian Socialists in the west. On account of historical circumstances, the current trend favoured Bindung over Freiheit. The post-war situation in Germany called for a straffe Planung in a öffentlich gelenkte Wirtschaft to overcome industrial monopolies exploiting their economic freedom and curtailing the freedom of the individual, but did not permanently commit Germany to any particular economic system;

 “Das endgültige Verhältnis von Planung und Freiheit hängt von der weltwirtschaftlichen und weltpolitischen Entwicklungen ab, die wir nicht bestimmen, die wir nicht übersehen können.”

286 In a set of documents entitled ‘Stoffsammlung zu den Redebeispielen’ a number of programmatic issues are illuminated including the economy, democracy and constitution, cultural policy, social policy, labour policy, and agricultural policy. The material dates from 5th and 6th March 1946 following ratification at the executive meeting in Berlin, and must originate therefore with the CDUD programme discussions in Berlin and forwarded to Thuringia and other regions and Landesverbände for distribution and campaigns. CDU Landesverband Thüringen ACDP, III, p.31-227.

Gradl has also noted that the CDU Landesverband in Saxony chose to set up a rhetorics school for members of the CDU in the Soviet zone to educate and inform on the thinking behind Christian democracy which may reflect on the fact that its ideas were less familiar and less consolidated in the east than in the west, where the traditions of the Centre Party and Catholic Social Theory were more firmly rooted. Johann Baptist Gradl, op.cit., p.31.
This left the option open to revise the level of state intervention in the future once post-war recovery was underway.

Economic measures would stabilise the economy, avoid unemployment, and ensure a fair distribution of basic goods in a ‘vorsorgende Gesamtplanung’ prescribing a comprehensive management of agricultural, industrial, manufacturing and financial services. In time however economic planning could be scaled down to the task of monitoring economic policy;

“Es ist sogar dringend zu wünschen, daß diese Planung mit der Zeit gelockert wird, daß sie sich weithin mehr auf blosse Beobachtung des Wirtschaftsgeschehens beschränken kann und daß nur noch eingegriffen werden muß, wenn die Beobachtung ergibt, daß einzelne Glieder in der Wirtschaft nicht mehr das richtige Verhältnis zueinander entwickeln.”

Small business entreprise furthermore was fully endorsed;

“Im Rahmen einer solchen öffentlichen gelenkten Wirtschaft werden sich neue Wirkens- und Aufstiegsmöglichkeiten für selbstständige Existenzen ergeben und die alten erhalten lassen.”

Public ownership was envisaged for basic industries and tighter controls on privately owned large scale industry. Following the example of Berlin, ‘economic socialism’ thus translated to state monitoring but not wholesale confiscation. It did not translate to nationalising all means of production, but to selective nationalisation of private monopoly industries seen as a threat to society. Private ownership was fully supported since it corresponded to Christian teaching of the role of the individual and personal freedoms in society. In industrial relations policy, industries were described as “Arbeitsgemeinschaften” enlisting co-determination rights for employees in industry with the direct participation of trade unions representatives. It proposed that the German economy should develop in three stages: an initial planned ‘emergency’ economy to reinstate the food, transport, construction and agricultural industries, followed by town planning, construction and currency reform before entering the final phase of an ‘ordered’ or managed economy, the ‘wieder geordnete(n) Wirtschaft.’

287 “Jetzt hat die Allgemeinheit das Eigentum an Bergwerken, Kraftwerken und einigen anderen monopolistischen Grossbetrieben übernommen. Im übrigen steuert sie durch ein Rahmenprogramm, die
more than a 'Sozialismus der Tat' and emphasised for its moral and not its economic content;

"Blosse soziale Neigungen oder sogenannte soziale Einstellungen genügen dabei keineswegs. Dieser Sozialismus christlicher Verantwortung ist zunächst eine geistige Grundhaltung."

The very notion of an interdenominational Christian democratic party forced Protestants in the east to confront their old vexation over the relationship between Church and State in Germany that originated with the question about the role of the pope and the Kaiser during the Reformation, the 19th century Kulturkampf and the Kirchenkampf during National Socialism. A pamphlet entitled Warum Christlich? Warum Union? was distributed among church goers on Sundays directly targeting public concern with mixing politics and religion. A further document entitled Die Christlich-Demokratische Union und ihre Grundsätze im Neuaufbau Deutschlands adopted the Catholic argument that the 19th century had been the Jahrhundert der bürgerlichen Welt. It read;

"Die innerlichen kalten und gleichgültigen egoistisch um ihre Interessen pendelnden Menschen sind Deutschlands Unglück, die auch nicht in Jahren grimmiger Volksnot sich zu einer Überzeugung bekennen..... Die innere Gesinnunglosigkeit, die mangelnde Kampf- und Opferbereitschaft im Politischen ist eine der Hauptmängel des deutschen politischen Charakters. Es ist dies 'politische Treibholz', diese heute hier und morgen dort stimmende kalt und gedankenlose politische von jedem Winde zu bewegenden Masse, die eine schwere Gefahr für die Demokratie darstellt und eine der Ursachen war, daß Hitler sich in die Macht schwang."

This avowal of Catholic doctrine indicates a willingness to learn from the lessons of Christian Social Teaching, to democratise society, analyse the mistakes of the illiberal past and passivity in politics and teach people to take responsibility in society.

Yet there is some evidence of resistance within the Thuringia CDU against adopting Berlin's programme of Christian Socialism, that reveals reactionary tendencies in the party. The dispute erupted in the CDU group in Erfurt and communicated in a letter to

Investitionen und den Aussenhandel ..... So könnte eine Wirtschaftspolitik aussehen, in der Freiheit und Lenkung im richtigen Verhältnis zueinanderstehen."

the central CDUD division in Berlin in June 1946 summarising the position of the Erfurt CDU two years after its foundation. Its author was group representative Walter Weber, a former anti-fascist, persecuted in the Third Reich for resistance activities. He complained that some in the party did not adhere to the course laid down by Kaiser and Lemmer towards a *Sozialismus aus christlicher Verantwortung*, in particular those in the economic committee and in the party leadership. Weber reveals;

"Dem diametral entgegen sind in unserer Ortsgruppe .... insbesondere muß hier das Referat Wirtschaft erwähnt werden, Bestrebungen im Gange, die mehr oder weniger offen in klarstem Gegensatz zu diesen Zielen Jakob Kaisers stehen. ..... Es zeichen sich hier immer deutlicher zwei Richtungen ab und es ist zunächst noch so, daß die Richtung, die auf Seite Jakob Kaisers ... von den entgegengesetzten Bestrebungen kraft ihrer Stärke bzw. ihrer Stellung in der Partei vollkommen an die Wand gedrückt wird. Bestrebungen ..... in der Richtung zum sozialistischen Ziel auf christlicher Grundlage durchzustossen, ..... werden, soweit möglich abgedrosselt und auf ein totes Gleis geschoben, wo nach Ansicht der Gegner dieser Ziele unsere Bestrebungen in dieser Richtung kraftlos und handlungsunfähig werden müssen."

The issue extended into a protracted dispute between Erfurt, the Thuringia *Landesverband* and the CDUD in Berlin. By August 1947 Walter Weber emphasised the need for "Festhalten und klares Herausstellen zum Mindesten eines klaren Zieles und Kurses" insisting Thuringia should once and for all commit to Kaiser's programme.289 Yet this was met with steadfast opposition from Weimar party executive representative Rücker, who, according to Weber, explained; "es Diktatur wäre, zu fordern, daß wir alle das gutheissen müßten, was Kaiser wolle" adding that Weber's demands were nothing less than Nazi. According to Weber, certain individuals in Thuringia's CDU executive avoided all discussion about *Sozialismus aus christlicher Verantwortung*. They believed their Christianity was inherently socially responsible and it was therefore superfluous to further reinforce Socialism in the programme;

"... was hier gemacht wird, das ist das, daß man jede Auseinandersetzung über das Wort Sozialismus, das diese Kreise überhaupt nicht hören wollen, abwürgt und damit

289 On 8.7.1947 in a letter to the CDU Landesvorstand he says that after yesterday's Parteiversammlung in Erfurt he wants to clarify a few points; "Ich betone auch an dieser Stelle, daß ich bewußt und ausdrücklich nicht gefordert habe, ein 100% als Dogma festzusetzendes Programm - dass ich auch nicht gefordert hatte, dass man die Vorschläge von Herrn Dr. Geflitter unwidersprochen annehmen müsse, was ich forderte war, zum Allermindsten endlich die Grundprinzipien des Sozialismus auf christlicher Grundlage, wie sie Jakob Kaiser und Lemmer immer wieder verkündigten, als für uns bindend anzuerkennen und auf dieser Basis vorwärtszuschreiten."
abtun möchte, daß man sagt, mit dem Wort Christentum ist unser Sozialismus genügend erwiesen."

Weber however sought to give socialism a stronger, more autonomous political profile, protesting;

"Wir CDU-Mitglieder der anderen Richtung, die hinter Kaiser steht, sind absolut anderer Überzeugung und mit einem Abschieben unserer sozialistischen Ziele auf das Christentum sind wir nicht einverstanden."

The letter finally reiterates the frustration felt in Thuringia, over the lack of a consolidated and distinct political direction in the CDU. Weber denies allegations by party leaders Herr Rückner Herr Dr. Fleckner and Herr Dorsch,\(^{290}\) leader of the committee for economic and social policy, that he was pursuing a "diktatorisches Nachlaufen für Kaiser." He concludes his letter on a pessimistic note;

"Ich sehe seit langem bereits zu, wie so viele Erfurter Geschäftsleute .... sich in unserer CDU einmischen und teils vordrängen und ich kann nun nur den Schluß ziehen, daß ich als überzeugter Antifaschist den Weg, den die CDU in Erfurt geht, nicht mehr gutheissen kann. Meine Tätigkeit in und für die Partei kann sich künftig nur darauf erstrecken, abzuwarten, ob sich meine Befürchtungen bewahrheiten werden, daß reaktionäre Kreise in unserer CDU mehr Einfluss bekommen als die antifaschistischen Mitglieder. Ich sehe dann allerdings ziemlich schwarz für die Partei."

Those CDU members that upheld their loyalty for Kaiser’s policies and programme were indeed ‘systematically removed.'\(^{291}\)

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\(^{290}\) Weber further expresses his disgust that Herr Dorsch had been made responsible for economic decisions in the Thüringen CDU since Dorsch was a former member of the Deutschenationalen, and guilty of causing the downfall of the Weimar Republic and the rise of National Socialism. Since taking up his position in the economic committee he had furthermore created in Weber’s opinion “einen verheerenden Eindruck von der hier herrschenden geistigen politischen Verfassung”

\(^{291}\) Markus Kiefer, op. cit., p.12.
5.5. Saxony

Saxony was the most populated state in the Soviet zone and witnessed some of the most important autonomous political developments outside of Berlin in its two main centres of Christian democratic activity—Chemnitz and Dresden.

Before 1933 Saxony was not a region in which the Centre Party had established a foothold, gaining on average only between 3 and 4% of the vote. The Catholic priest and former Centre party chairman of Saxony state, Ludwig Kirsch was the driving force behind the group in Chemnitz and by June 15 had initiated the foundation of a Christian party with former Centre and Christlich-Sozialen Volksdienst (CSVD) members, in advance even of the launch of the Berlin Aufruf. The programme for the Christliche Volkspartei (CVP) for the Chemnitz region, dated July 1945, is characteristic of the programmes from the Catholic dominated CDU in the west, blaming the decline in Christian values for the national socialist catastrophe. Kirsch saw the main task in resolving confessional divisions between Protestants and Catholics and in an open letter which featured as a preamble to the programme, Kirsch called for a; “bewussten Rückkehr zu wahrhaft christlichen Grundsätzen auch in Politik und Wirtschaft.” The programme is followed by eight points including reinstatement of the rule of law, the guarantee of democratic liberties in the realm of religion, freedom of speech and freedom of conscience and instilling ‘echt-demokratische Gesinnung’ in the state bureaucracy. The word Socialism does not feature once in the entire programme.

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292 Since the few archive sources available reveal that Christian democratic circles in Saxony-Anhalt mirrored the programme developed in Berlin, a separate examination of the region Saxony-Anhalt has been spared here.

293 Manfred Wilde, op. cit., p.126.


295 Ralf Baus, op. cit., p.87.

296 Aufruf der Christlichen Volkspartei, Kreis Chemnitz, 4 July 1945 in NL Karl Buchheim ACDP, I-188-002/1.

Without any knowledge of the CDU group in Berlin, Pfarrer Mühr of the Bischoflichen Rates rallied Protestant and Catholic Christians and former Centre Party members to Dresden on July 8, to discuss the CVP Chemnitz programme as a possible platform for the foundation of Dresden’s party, the Christlich-Sozialen Volkspartei, (CSV) which was intended to become the party to represent Saxony. On July 21, a total of 71 participants founded the Freunde der Christlich-Sozialen Volkspartei in Dresden with Protestant theologian and former President of the Evangelical Landessynode Prof. Hugo Hickmann as chairman. The Christlich-Soziale Volkspartei nevertheless sparked protest among Protestants in Dresden, including Johannes Dieckmann a former member of the right-wing Deutsche Volkspartei (DVP), who argued that the name Christlich in the title could evoke the dangerous impression that other parties were somehow less Christian than the CSV. Hickmann defended the Dresden party, stating that unlike the Chemnitz Christliche Volkspartei which made an exclusive claim to practise Christian politics, the choice of Christlich-Soziale Volkspartei for the party name in Dresden merely sought to underpin “welche weltanschauliche Grundlage und welche Ausrichtung für unser politisches soziales Wollen maßgebend ist.”

Since two-thirds of the population in Saxony were Protestant Hickmann was confident that the party leadership should reside with the Protestant CSV in Dresden, and so pleaded with other Protestant and Catholic members of the clergy to look to Dresden for its leadership instead of Berlin. Yet the CSV’s claim to head the Saxony party headquarters in Dresden was soon contested by Christian democrats in the Chemnitz group, in particular its leader Ludwig Kirsch. Kirsch disagreed above all with

298 Manfred Wilde, op. cit., p.126.
300 Hugo Hickmann was previously closely affiliated to Friedrich Naumann’s Christian social movement before becoming a member of the right wing Deutsche Volkspartei (DVP) in 1919.
301 Correspondence between Johannes Dieckmann and Hugo Hickmann 21st and 24th July, 1945, cited in Ralf Baus, op cit., p.86.
302 Ibid., p.104.
303 In a letter from 7th Sept 1945, Hickmann had demanded that “die evangelischen Kreise nicht zurückstehen, sondern die Führung übernehmen wie sich das gehört!” ACDP III-035-016.
the modifications the Dresden group had made to the original Chemnitz programme, incorporating German nationalistic language into its version.\textsuperscript{304} The original Chemnitz programme had emphasised the restoration of Christian, spiritual values and in a Catholic minority saw interdenominational co-operation as the prime objective in the party. Kirsch was all too conscious of the influence Weltanschauung had played in German politics in the past and frequently appealed for a Christian tolerance and a new political pragmatism, a middle way between Weltanschauung and practical politics;

"Gerade das deutsche Volk muß lernen, Politik ohne Leidenschaft zu machen und dem kühlen, sachlichen Verstande den Vorrang zu lassen..... im politischen Leben geht es in erster Linie nicht um Feststellung von Dogmen, wie im religiösen Bereich, sondern um die praktische Wegfindung für die realen Dinge des aktuellen Lebens. Gewiß stehen oft hinter den entgegengesetzten Vorschlägen weltanschauliche Grundsätze .. aber da nun einmal ein Millionenvolk nicht aus Menschen einer einheitlichen Weltanschauung besteht ... so muß mit aller Sorgsamkeit, Klugheit und nicht zuletzt auch Geduld ein mittlerer Ausweg gefunden werden."\textsuperscript{305}

By August, conciliatory changes had been made to the Dresden programme and the Soviet authorities agreed to register the CSV on condition that it and all other regions in Saxony adopted the Berlin party name Christian Democratic Union. A working committee\textsuperscript{306} of twelve individuals was selected as the leading CDU executive for the Landesverband in Saxony,\textsuperscript{307} closely affiliated to the CDU(D) in Berlin. The competition between Chemnitz and Dresden for Saxony's party leadership thus automatically terminated. The ten-point programme demanded reinstatement of the rule of law, freedom of conscience, speech and religion and in a later amended version also demanded protection of private property ownership rights "als Grundlage

\textsuperscript{304} Ralf Baus, op. cit., p.102.


\textsuperscript{306} The task of the working committee was to bring Protestant and Catholic individuals together. It secretly began producing its guidelines before the party had been granted a license and without the knowledge of the soviet occupied authorities and in a letter dated 2nd August 1945, party chairman Hugo Hickmann instructs the group to silently recruit men and women for the cause who can then become active once permission was granted. He stipulates that although over 90% of members were not formally affiliated to any party, NSDAP members should be allowed to apply and each application is given individual consideration. Saxony Landesverband ACDP, III-035, p.61.

wirtschaftlicher Selbstständigkeit und persönlicher Unabhängigkeit. Before the programme was finally ratified on August 14, 1945, the Dresden group, now also aware of the existence of the Berlin programme, made a last attempt to define its leadership ambitions. It formulated a separate programme for Saxony which it intended to use for applying for a party license from the Soviet authorities. Only in the event that this programme was rejected, would they concede to accepting the Berlin Aufruf. Even after its subsequent union with the Berlin CDU(D), the Saxony Landesverband in Dresden remained proud of its independent foundation and whenever possible continued to use its original name, the CSV, alongside CDU. 

Although Dresden and Chemnitz have been noted as the centre of Christian democratic activity in Saxony, a separate Christian democratic development in Leipzig also merits a brief reference to complete the spectrum of party initiatives in the Soviet zone. It was Karl Buchheim who, together with liberals and Christians, formed a Demokratische Partei Deutschlands on July 10, 1945, unaware that parallel developments were taking place in Chemnitz and Dresden. Lengthy debate in Greifswald over whether the Democratic Party should join up with the LDP or the CDU finally opted for the CDU, further demonstrating the proximity in programme and political philosophy between the Christian democrats and the liberals in the east. A similar union in the west between the CDU and the liberal Freie Demokratische Partei (FDP) certainly in the early years of vehement anti-liberal attitudes, would have been inconceivable for Rhineland Catholics to contemplate.

The Democratic Party’s programme in Leipzig originated with the document ‘Deutscher Sammlungsblock’ in July 1945, aimed at all those;

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308 Richtlinien für die Christlich-Demokratische Union Deutschlands, ACDP, III-035-061 and III-035 – 115.
310 Johann Baptist Gradl, op. cit., p.30.
311 Only Adenauer managed to break with this tradition by seeking cooperation with FDP liberals no less with a view to welcoming them as a future coalition partner.
312 Its true source is unknown.
".. welche an die besten durch den Nationalsozialismus unterbrochenen oder umgefälschten menschlich-christlich-abendländischen Überlieferungen unseres Volkes auf breitester Grundlage anknüpfen wollen."

In contrast to other programmes of the period, specifically the Berlin Aufruf, which called for a complete overhaul of the last two hundred years of German history, the DP clearly envisaged a continuation where the Weimar parties had left off in 1933. The programme contained 21 points, including protection of private property and freedom of business enterprise. A summary was published on July 21, as the "Aufruf der Demokratischen Partei Deutschlands." The programme revealed the liberals’ dominance in the group. The demand for a religiösem Geist featured last in the programme statements, after freedom of speech, legal rights, a strong currency and fair wages;

"Zwar kam hierin das Profil der christlich orientierten Mitgründer deutlich zum Ausdruck, doch fehlten Hinweise darauf, daß die neue Partei auf den Fundament des Christentums und der Überwindung der Spaltung der Konfessionen ruhen sollte." 313

Co-founder in Leipzig and member of the extended executive committee, Ernst Eichelbaum reveals that there were two strands in the party, a weltliche and a christlich-orientierte 314 which soon led to the Christian wing breaking off to form their own party. Once they learned of the Berlin CDU development, contact was established at the beginning of August with Hermes and Kaiser, with a view to joining the Berlin movement, as they were now also under pressure to do by the Soviet military authorities. After his first meeting with Hermes, Eichelmann observed;

"Wir hatten sehr bald die Erfahrung gemacht, daß die Christen in Sachsen keine aktiven Calvinisten waren, sondern vielfach und gerade, je kräftiger ihr Glaube war, zur politischen Passivität neigten, d.h. nicht in den politischen Kampf mit Gegnern und Andersmeinenden hineinwollten, sondern lieber nachgaben und sich in 'duldendem Gehorsam’ gefallen liessen, was die anderen taten." 315

313 Rolf Baus, op. cit., p.93.
314 Ernst Eichelbaum, Wie es in Leipzig begann, ACDP, NL I-188-002/2.
315 Ernst Eichelbaum, CDU in Leipzig 1945-1948. Bericht über die Anfänge der CDU in der sowjetischen besetzten Zone Deutschlands, Leipzig, August 1982, ACDP, I-201-001/7 in II-002-024/1 Landesverband Berlin 1945-.
A further split occurred within the already fractured DPD as members opted to join the Liberal LPD party instead of the Berlin CDU. The remaining Christian Democrats in Leipzig thus abandoned the attempt to form their own party and instead adopted elements from the Berlin initiative and the Chemnitz programme. The result was a concise nine point programme\(^{316}\) in plain, straightforward language claiming Christianity provided a guarantee against fascism and militarism. It made no mention of socialism, Marxism or liberalism, but called for the establishment of a true democracy. Like Dresden it supplemented the core content of the Chemnitz programme with the following addition:

"Die CDU tritt ein für den Wiederaufbau unseres zerschlagenen Wirtschaftslebens auf der Grundlage des Privateigentums, der Beschränkung der staatlichen Eingriffe auf das Notwendige und der selbstverantwortlichen Mitarbeit aller Schaffenden in Stadt und Land."

Protestants could still not hide their scepticism at the fusion of religion and politics. Georg Klause\(^{317}\) admits during the inaugural speech at the foundation of the CDUD in Oelsnitz, Saxony, that "Unklarheit die weiterhin das Verhältnis des Christen zur Politik verdunkelt" delayed the party's foundation six months, as fellow religionists struggled with finding affinity with politics;

"Dadurch daß sich die Christen aus dem politischen Raum zurückzogen oder sich in ihm, dann aber eben nicht als Christen betätigen, überliessen sie das Feld den Dämonen."

In the work, *Luthers Antwort auf die Frage nach dem Verhältnis von Christentum und Politik*, Pfarrer Werner Hartung\(^{318}\) from Störmthal in Leipzig quotes Oswald Spengler's *Untergang des Abendlandes* when he says; "Ein Herrscher, der die Religion in der Richtung auf politische, praktische Ziele verbessern will, ist ein Tor." Hartung then goes

\(^{316}\) "Leitsätze der Christlich-Demokratischen Union Deutschlands, Unterbezirk Leipzig, 1945." NL-Karl Buchheim, ACDP 1-188. Also printed in; Günter Rührer im Auftrag der Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (Hrsg), Geschichte der christlich-demokratischen und christlich-sozialen Bewegungen in Deutschland, Schriftenreihe der Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, Band 216, Qu. 175, Bonn 1987, p.701.

\(^{317}\) Georg Klause speech at the foundation of the CDUD Oelsnitz in Bobenweikirchen (no date). Manuscript was distributed for campaigning on 7th March 1946, Sachsen ACDP, III-035-075.

\(^{318}\) Prof. Werner Hartung in III-035-075.
on to quote the Liberal Party (LDPD) representative Dr Kült\textsuperscript{319} who once claimed for his own party;


The embrace of Liberal party principles reveals the persisting Lutheran influence on the political consciousness of the east, and the difficulty experienced in combining morality and Christian values with politics. Yet in the same speech Hartung also acknowledges Kant\textsuperscript{320} phrase; "Die wahre Politik kann keinen Schritt tun, ohne vorher der Moral gehuldigt zu haben," indicating that after 1945 Protestants were gradually reassessing their attitude to politics, and considering the consequences of having maintained a passive role during the rise of National Socialism.

In future it seemed as if the teaching of Catholic Social Theory and its insistence on social commitments and the fulfilment of individual responsibilities would take precedence over Protestant political indifference. Individuals would learn to accept that they were Bürger zweier Welten. Indeed after the initial Protestant opposition to the Catholic programmes from Berlin and Chemnitz, and with pressure by the Soviet military to conform to the Berlin programme, the Protestant regions of the Soviet zone finally gave their allegiance to the CDÜD and its leader Jakob Kaiser. The politics of the Berlin programme consequently became the standard for all CDU groups in the Soviet zone. Throughout most of 1947 they managed to resist Soviet pressure to denounce Kaiser as an agent of western reactionary forces, and by 1948 most states declared support for Kaiser's programme of Christian Socialism.\textsuperscript{321} Eichelmann\textsuperscript{322} nevertheless highlighted the difficulty the slogan, Christian Socialism continued to cause;

\textsuperscript{319} Dr. Kült in Der Morgan, Nr. 31 von 7.2.46 p.4.

\textsuperscript{320} Immanuel Kant, Anhang I, Zum ewigen Frieden, Insel Verlag, Werke in 6 Bände, V.703.

\textsuperscript{321} The archive collection ACDP, III-031-147 contain the discussions over 'Sozialismus aus christlicher Verantwortung.' Interesting is that the 4\textsuperscript{th} Leipzig Jahrestagung in 1950 decided to set up a committee to

By 1948 many CDU members were arrested by the Soviet forces and once Kaiser had technically been removed from his post as party leader (he was still the formally elected chairman and was now operative from west Berlin) individual state chairmen of the party steered their programme progressively closer to that of the Soviet military authorities. From 1947, for example, Thuringia conceded to participate in the Soviet Volksparteitag and criticised Kaiser for not adhering to the zone’s Blockpolitik system. Members of the party in Saxony criticised its chairman Hickmann who was increasingly willing to reach a compromise with the Soviets, causing many local CDU groups to disband in protest.

Early programme discussions in Thuringia, Saxony and Mecklenburg-West Pomerania indicate a tendency in the Protestant camp to develop in regionally independent political directions, reinstating some former party traditions from the Weimar Republic. The initiative for a joint interconfessional Christian party was primarily driven therefore by Catholic circles, who were at the same time also responsible for drafting the most significant programmes. Where Protestants were in the majority in the group such as in

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322 Ernst Eichelbaum, CDU in Leipzig 1945-1948, Bericht über die Anfänge der CDU in der sowjetischen besetzten Zone Deutschlands, Leipzig August 1982, ACDP I-201-001/7 in III-002-024/1 LV Berlin 1945-


324 21 of the 23 members of the Thuringia Landesvorstand voted against continuing to support Kaiser. Those in the Kreisverbände who continued to support Kaiser, were gradually removed from their positions by the Soviets. Members were arrested, all meetings required permission, speeches were rewritten and censored so that Richter concludes “Im Frühjahr 1948 konnte von einer normalen Parteienarbeit der CDU Ortsgruppen keine Rede mehr sein.” Michael Richter, Die Ost CDU 1948-1952, ... op. cit., p.56.
Dresden and Leipzig, liberal economic features such as support for a free market and private property were upheld. Catholic programmes such as that which originated from Chemnitz however were most preoccupied with engendering spiritual renewal. Ironically the Catholic programmes employed more religious justification and arguably more ideological symbolism to communicate their political message, whereas the Protestant programmes were less historically reflective and arguably more pragmatic in tone. Yet the sincerity of social Protestant groups to reform the party system and to introduce true democracy via economic liberties remains questionable. Initiatives were rapidly subsumed by the Berlin CDU’s version of Christian Socialism which may be the result of the Soviet intolerance of splinter parties and their coercion for groups to adopt the Berlin programme, or may have been a sign that Protestants were gradually learning to assimilate Catholic values in the spirit of Christian (Catholic) social theory. This is plausible given the lack of a counter Protestant philosophy, that was equally capable of forging unity and consolidation among Protestant groups. Firstly the fear that the political diversity so characteristic of Protestant groups in the past could again give rise to a disunited and unstable party system and secondly Catholic concern that the primacy shown by Protestants to reinstating a liberal economy, could potentially engender exploitative capitalist patterns of behaviour in society, prompted Catholics to seize the upper hand in shaping the political future.
6. American Zone

6.1. Hesse

Hesse state was created by the allies in September 1945 from the former Prussian provinces of Hesse-Nassau and Hesse-Darmstadt to become the second largest state after Westphalia.\(^{325}\) The migration of post-war Catholic refugees to the area altered the traditionally Protestant population to an homogeneous mix of Catholics and Protestants in the new state of the American occupation zone.\(^{326}\) Hesse thus offered fertile and sturdy ground for the dissemination of Christian democratic thinking at regional and state level. By November 1945, no less than 48 Christian groups had been licensed in the state's municipalities.\(^{327}\) The core group of Christian Democrats to found the ‘Frankfurt Circle’ incorporated former left wing Centre Party members, intellectuals, Christian Socialists and trade unionists. In other parts of Hesse many groups also originated from the liberal-conservative parties in Weimar - the DDP, DVP, and CSVD, as well as the Centre Party. In the initial period, the CDU in Hesse could not therefore be classified as specifically right or left wing, although the emphasis in the literature so far has been directed to the left-wing socialist element. The party’s economic and social policy for example reflected a variety of views.\(^{328}\) Northern and central Hesse were predominantly liberal-conservative. They thought the CDU provided a counterweight to the labour parties SPD and KPD, and a home for safeguarding their liberal economic interests and existing ownership structures. south Hesse on the other hand, was more religiously oriented, whilst trade unions and left wing Catholics in Frankfurt advocated a specifically Christian Socialist order.

\(^{325}\) The former province Rhinehessen was given to Rhineland-Palatinate.

\(^{326}\) The policy of the US allied occupiers blocked many socialist reforms in Hesse. The first Hesse constitution had planned for the nationalisation of basic industries, but this clause was eliminated by the Americans. See preface to Eugen Kogon, Die Restaurative Politik. Zur Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Band 3 der Gesammelten Schriften, Michael Kogon und Gottfried Erb (Hrsg), Quadriga, Weinheim, Berlin 1996, p.23-48.

\(^{327}\) Arcadius R. Gurland, op. cit., p.40.

Wieck’s early analysis of the CDU in Hesse suggests the prelate priest Dr Herr, who formed a Catholic committee, the *katholische Volksarbeit* at the end of the war in 1945, marks the starting point for the CDU. In a later study Rüschenschmidt contests that the *katholische Volksarbeit* committee as the CDP’s starting point, maintaining that it originated with the *Katholische Aktion* committee in 1926, in which Walter Dirks and former colleagues from the leftist Centre newspaper, the *Rhein-Mainische Volkszeitung* and Karlheinz Knappstein from the more radical socialist magazine *Die Deutsche Republik*, set up to campaign for Christian principles in society and for a potential successor to the Centre party that could protect the political interests and status of Catholics in Frankfurt. There was no mention of Protestants being incorporated as equal partners.

The *Katholische Aktion* was then revived on 20th April 1945 in Frankfurt as the *Katholische Volksarbeit* by Catholic priests Herr and Eckert and other member of the clergy and Catholic laity. Editors, journalists and intellectuals including Schulte, Knappstein, and Eugen Kogon featured prominently in the Frankfurt Christian Democratic Circle, significantly influencing the party’s early programmatic direction. Kogon and Dirks had already begun to discuss launching a political cultural journal when they first met in June 1945, and gives an early indication that their longer term interests were primarily journalistic, not political. Other individuals including Werner Hilpert, Jakob Husch Wilhelm Fay, Bruno Dörpinghaus, Josef Arndgen and Paul Friedrich Weber, were all dedicated to forming an interdenominational party with a Christian Socialist content. A second source of CDP members came from the *Bürgerrat*, a group set up to support the US military organisation in Hesse and comprising SPD, Catholics, Catholics, Catholics, Catholics, Catholics.

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331 Walter Dirks belonged to the left-wing Catholic tradition. Born in the Ruhr in 1901 worked from 1924 as cultural political editor and director for the left wing Centre Party party affiliated newspaper the ‘Rhein-Mainischen Volkszeitung’ and from 1933 for the only non-National Socialist newspaper the ‘Frankfurter Zeitung’ until it was banned in 1944. From this point on he turned his attention to what later became the Frankfurter Hefe.

Protestants and Communists. They provided a platform for forging links with the Protestant Church, most notably Priest Otto Fricke.\textsuperscript{333} Over the summer of 1945, the group worked on producing a party manifesto, the Frankfurt Principles whose content rivalled not only the liberal Catholics in the Rhineland but also Christian Socialists in Berlin. A party license was granted in Frankfurt on September 15, 1945 and Werner Hilpert, following a six year internment in Buchenwald concentration camp, became the new party leader, and minister president for Hesse. He backed a concept that was;

\begin{quote}
"betont sozialen, in wirtschafts- und sozialpolitischer Hinsicht eng an die Sozialdemokratie angelehnten und auf Ausgleich und Harmonie ausgerichteten Politik."
\end{quote}\textsuperscript{334}

As the Frankfurt group was almost exclusively Catholic, their initial discussions were chiefly concerned with the role of the Catholic Church in Germany’s post-war reconstruction,\textsuperscript{335} Catholics’ political representation before the American allies and the overall direction political Catholicism should take in 1945. Historically they had come to recognise that many political structures and ideas can be derived from Christian teaching for use in a social order, but Christian teaching did not provide a fixed and comprehensive framework for devising a political programme. Above all;

\begin{quote}
"Mehrere gute Katholiken können aus verschiedener Einsicht in die politische Welt mit gutem religiösen Gewissen zu verschiedenen politischen Lösungen und Entscheidungen kommen."
\end{quote}\textsuperscript{336}

The Frankfurt group soon fractured into a right and a left wing group and each developed its own interpretation and application of Catholic Social Theory. There was anxiety over the group’s intended target group, harking back to old Centre party dilemmas. Although the idea of a revival of the Centre generated less interest in Hesse as in Westphalia, any successor party to the Centre Party was nevertheless confronted by the old choice over whether it intended to prioritise the religious and cultural interests of all Catholics or the political ones of only a few? It had to decide whether it should

\textsuperscript{333} Hans Otto Kleinmann, op. cit., p.39.

\textsuperscript{334} Heinrich Rüschenschmidt cited in Hans-Otto Kleinmann; Ibid., p.74.

\textsuperscript{335} Marcel Schulte in a letter to H.G Wieck on 13th October 1953 in H.G Wieck, op. cit., p.35.

\textsuperscript{336} Martin Stankowski, op. cit., p.73.
continue as a Catholic based religious and cultural party similar to the Centre Party before 1914, keeping political activities to a minimum, or whether it should become like the Centre Party after 1918, a party with a particular programme and fixed political motives but which risked losing the support from Catholic voters who did not endorse the party’s political programme. Despite the desire to remain a Catholic interest party, neglect of its political responsibility risked losing voters, and could also fail to reach its target for a governing mandate in parliament. In 1945, Brüning concluded that the Centre concept was irreconcilable with the need to fulfil its state political function and advocated founding a new interdenominational party. This also suggests that the CDU’s advocacy of an interdenominational Volkspartei to solve cultural antagonisms between Catholics and Protestants was based on an evaluation of its own real power potential and influence. Protestant votes were needed more than any genuine Catholic desire to embrace Protestants and Protestantism in the party.

**Christian Socialists in the CDP**

The first of the two starkly contrasting programmatic directions to develop in the main centre of Christian Democratic activity in the Frankfurt CDP was that spearheaded by Walter Dirks and Eugen Kogon. Dirks was a former pupil of Theodor Steinbüchel, and Eugen Kogon had completed his doctorate on the Korporativstaat des Faschismus with the Austrian economist and social philosopher Othmar Spann. During the Weimar Republic, Kogon and Dirks belonged to Spann’s universalist group, the Studienrunde katholischer Soziologen and helped to produce the Catholic Social Manifesto, a collection of authoritarian views of a society ordered by a system of hierarchical estates (Berufsstände) an alternative to the capitalist order. Kogon clarifies;


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337 Hans Georg Wieck, op. cit., p.35f.
Kogon thus envisaged a non-intervening state with only peripheral powers, leaving the economy to operate independently according to the rules of industrial democracy. The universalists had initially hoped that they could reconcile Social Catholicism with National Socialism but as Nazism began to reveal its true colours Kogon became a severe critic of fascism, for which he served a seven year internment at Buchenwald concentration camp. Like Dirks, Kogon believed that 1945 was the beginning of a new phase in history. His lack of support for a parliamentary democracy and his 1947 prognosis in the essay *Über die Situation* that capitalism and individualism had outlived themselves and would never be restored in Europe even with capital investment by the Americans reveals a degree of political naivete and idealism. Although still fundamentally anti-capitalist in outlook, by 1947 Kogon gradually modified his opinions. He no longer employed the term *Berufständische Ordnung* although he maintained this type of system was compatible with parliamentary democracy.

Dirks rejected the conservative explanation for the rise of National Socialism, namely that the loss of western morality and centuries of decline from the middle ages, through the Reformation, to the Enlightenment, to Nationalism and Socialism, to culminate finally in National Socialism. Dirks accused the conservative interpretation of German history, and its condemnation of socialism, for consciously feeding a *reaktionären Abendland-Mythos* and an "*Ideologie des besseren deutschen christlichen Bürgertums.*" The preoccupation with the decline of the morals and culture of western civilisation, the *Abendland*, he argues, failed to recognise the misplaced responsibility of the middle classes, or *Bürgertum* for the present chaos and their preoccupation with economic interests over political or social issues. Dirks argued that conservatism propagated the myth that the disorientation, uncertainty, anarchy and evil in the west was due to society

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339 See section I, chapter 1 of this study for a discussion of the universalist philosophy.


341 Franz Focke, op. cit., p.205.

having divorced itself from middle class values and behaviour. To regain a sense of order and proportion, conservatives will seek to reestablish a Christian order, but Dirks argues that this reinstates the same bourgeois values of capitalism and political impassivity, that had sparked the crisis in the first place. Dirks thus prescribes socialism as the best form for a new society. Conscious of its negative associations, he quickly qualifies the term;

"Man kann die handfeste, praktische, gerechte europäische Lösung der ökonomischen und sozialen Frage... auch anders nennen als Sozialismus, aber wir wissen keinen anderen geschichtsgesättigten Ausdruck, der einerseits genügend prägnant und anderseits genügend unbestimmt (denn wir legen hier kein sozialökonomisches Programm vor) die Aufgabe bezeichnen könnte."

Dirks’ reference to the need for a party’s programme to be ‘geschichtsgesättigt,’ ‘genügend prägnant’ but also ‘genügend unbestimmt’ confirms the CDU’s concern with the force of ideological images, and their function in legitimating political programmes. But perhaps most importantly, Dirks’ vision of a socialist order did not seek to abolish capitalist values per se, but pragmatically looked for a fusion of both traditions. His socialism, he said, should be ‘penetrated’ with ideas of the European ‘Abendland.’

"Abendland und Sozialismus müssen einander durchdringen. In einer sozialistischen Ordnung muß sich die abendländische Grundsubstanz die aktuelle, realistische, faktische moderne Gestalt geben und zugleich das gute Gewissen im Sinn der sozialen Gerechtigkeit wiedergewinnen, das nicht in der Sehnsucht nach dem intakten Abendland (dem mittelalterlichen ‘Ordo’ vor dem bürgerlich-kapitalistischen Sündenfall) zu suchen und zu finden ist."

Dirks’ unique interpretation of socialism thus combines the best features of western liberal traditions with the provision of social justice inherent in Socialism to represent a politics of the third way. Unlike Jakob Kaiser in Berlin, Dirks did not envisage a Labour party for post war Germany, but one more radical than that. In May 1945 Dirks formulated what has been described as;

"vielleicht das erstaunlichste Dokument aus dem “christlichen” Lager zur Parteigründung nach 1945."

343 Ibid.
344 Ibid.
345 Martin Stankowski, op. cit., p.76.
In a 12-point programme he outlined his vision of a *Sozialistischen Einheitspartei*, a united front of communists, socialist democrats and Christians, who would jointly pave the way towards a *Zweite Republik*. His ‘Socialist Theory’ was not based on confessional, Church or Christian interests but on “die wesentlichen Elemente des Maximus aus den Erfahrungen der letzten dreißig Jahre ergänzt und erneuert.” Stankowski believes the programme did not find purchase because it was either too socialist, not sufficiently strategic or it underestimated the *Beharrungsvermögen* of traditional parties rapidly regrouping in 1945. Dirks only took up the idea of a Christian party once he found his initial programme to be unpopular with the anti-fascist community, yet he succeeded in retaining his most cherished of socialist ideas and transferring them to the Christian CDP. The social values in Dirks’ socialism were freedom, security, justice and respect for the individual and he believed that a socialist, planned economy was the method to implement these values. Property ownership was endorsed provided *das Recht auf Eigentum* is not distorted as *Das Recht des Eigentümers*. Interesting is that Dirks also advocated socialism as a powerful force for forging European integration. The first point in the programme cited;

“Ein wirklicher Ausweg aus dem deutschen und europäischen Chaos kann nur in einem deutschen und europäischen Sozialismus gefunden werden.”

Dirks’s 1945 essay ‘*Rechts und Links*’ further defines his version of Socialism but also addresses this study’s interest in the implications of ideological perception of political terminology for practical politics. Terms, he reveals, do not always mean what we think they mean and can change in interpretation over time. In 1945, he notes, Socialism still retained its left-wing associations but also happened to be endorsed by all three main parties in Germany! Dirks wanted Socialism to adopt a wider definition, in order to lose its exclusively left-wing image and become a universally accepted term for all parties. The traditional left-right political divide, would then lose validity, allowing new dynamics and political definitions to occur. A more indirect or ‘umwegigen’ socialism could emerge to represent farmers, small businessmen and the ‘so-called new middle

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classes.' These groups will become the new ‘right’ wing in the reformed political spectrum, whereby their individualistic and middle class interests would equally be addressed by socialism. Dirks warns that should the party renege on its responsibility to socialism, it risked being hijacked by reactionary interests with motives to restore capitalism or by more radical left wing initiatives with disastrous consequences for the freedom of the individual. Dirks chose the CDU as the party of this new version of Socialism. By instilling their party slogan ‘Sozialismus aus christlicher Verantwortung’ with real meaning, he says the party would play a key role in Germany’s new political order, supporting economic democracy as an alternative to state socialism, support federalism over state centralisation, and uphold individual ethics and Christian values in the face of collectivism.\(^{347}\) This was neatly encapsulated by Dirks in the phrase;

“So müßte die CDU sich links entscheiden, um rechts werden zu können.... Entschiedet sie sich links so hat sie gute Aussicht, die neue deutsche Rechte zu werden.”

Since Dirks equated traditional Christianity with a middle class ideology of tradition and the nation, he believed the move would liberate ‘Christianity’ to prevent conservative reactionaries from reclaiming exclusive ‘ownership’ of Christianity. In Dirks’ view the CDU was the party that could cut across divisions in the political spectrum and could break down fixed, rigid perceptions of ideology and Weltanschauung that had hitherto hidden the path to a politics of the third way.\(^{348}\)

The liberal, conservative wing in the CDP

Bruno Dörpinghaus represented the right wing strand in the CDP, that favoured a Christian party to enter a dialogue with trade, industry, the self employed and the

\(^{347}\) "Sie hätte gegen jeden Zentralismus den regionalen und wirtschaftspolitischen Föderalismus, gegen den Staatssozialismus die Wirtschaftsdemokratie, gegen den Kollektivismus den ‘personalistischen Sozialismus’ zu vertreten ...... Aber alle diese echten Kräfte und ernsten Anliegen werden sich reaktionär und tödlich für das Ganze auswirken, wenn jene Grundentscheidung für den sozialistischen Gesamtentwurf ausbleibt." Ibid.

agricultural community; in short, with the middle class Bürgertum. As early as May 28, 1945, Dörpinghaus published a Denkschrift outlining the existing post war political spectrum of communists and social democrats, creating an obvious vacuum for a Rechtspartei built on Christian foundations. This reveals that the Christian party idea did not only originate from the conservative historical analysis of the loss of Christian faith, of Weimar’s failings and of the causes of National Socialism as programmes were keen to convey, but was also based on a sober analysis of the probable party political line up in 1945, identifying where gaps had developed in voter representation. Image and ideology were then crafted accordingly. The Denkschrift remarks:


In contrast to other Christian Democratic programmes at the time, Dörpinghaus does not refer to the word ‘Christian,’ remarking simply that the party should be based on Christian principles and aimed at Centre Party voters, liberals and conservatives from the Weimar period. This may reflect a certain caution by Dörpinghaus, unwilling to touch on the sensitive issue of mixing politics and religion, and so risk offending the Protestant voters he wished to target. Unlike Dirks, Dörpinghaus did not believe in the possibility of co-operation between all anti-fascist groups and envisaged a more restricted Volkspartei, that excluded the traditional working class voter. He based this on the assumption that these groups would be represented by the social democrats and communists, or even by a newly founded Soziale Volkspartei which he predicted could emerge if the SPD failed to modernise its own programme and profile. He did not rule out the possibility either that this Soziale Volkspartei could co-operate with his envisaged Rechtspartei. Protestants such as the priest Fricke, involved in early political

\[349\] Bernd Uhl, op. cit., p.94.

\[350\] H.G Wieck, op. cit., p.44.

\[351\] The socialist members would only contemplate cooperation with the SPD. This was demonstrated in the CDP protocol of meeting on 31.10.1945 in which Knappstein expressed his opposition to setting up a ‘Bürgerblock’ because this would provoke an ‘Arbeiterblock’ to be set up in opposition.
discussions, was positive to Dorpinghaus’s suggestions. Dorpinghaus labelled his programme direction *Aktion der deutschen Erneuerung*, a movement aimed at a new morality in society, at European unification and at a parliamentary constitution. The ‘Aktion’ maintained rights of property ownership but restricted these to serving the vague notion of *Allgemeinheit*. It did not entail nationalising monopoly industries but made them subject to state monitoring. Importantly Dörpinghaus did not believe Socialism conflicted – or was a system to be contrasted – with capitalism. Socialism was more a correct frame of mind;

“Sozialismus ist für Dörpinghaus nicht – wie etwa für die Vertreter der “Frankfurter Leitsätze” eine Frage der Organisation bzw. der gesellschaftlichen und insbesondere der wirtschaftlichen Veränderung, sondern eine Frage der ‘charakterlichen Haltung.’”

**The Frankfurt Principles, September 1945**

Like liberals in other Christian Democratic regions, Dörpinghaus had to bide his time. The more liberal overtones of Dörpinghaus’ programme had difficulty at first competing with the more popular socialist programme by Dirks and other Catholic members. This was demonstrated by the Frankfurt Principles probably the most political of all the CDU programmes drafted in 1945 and 1946, and the most specific about which traditions they intend to restore or reform. They emphasise a ‘new’ Germany, one that differs not only from the previous twelve years but also from that before 1933 or even 1914, condemning the last two hundred years of *preußisch-deutscher Geschichte*;

“Wir wollen heute nicht einfach da fortfahren, wo unsere Vorgänger 1933 aufhören mußten, so als ob seitdem nichts geschehen wäre.”

In language uncharacteristically plain and simple for a political manifesto, the Frankfurt programme campaigns for reform in all areas of society with strong emphasis on democracy. It condemned violence, racism and Germany’s hegemonic striving for world

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352 Heinrich Rüschenschmidt, *Die Entstehung der hessischen CDU 1945/46 .... op. cit., p. 40.*
354 Wolf Dieter Narr, *op. cit., p.81.*
355 The programme cited the areas youth, education, the relationship between State and the Church, the family and marriage, socialism and private property, the press, radio and currency,
domination. Unlike other programmes of the period, the Frankfurt Principles did not aim to conjure up images of the spectre of materialism or elevate Christianity as the bulwark against a renewed materialist threat. In this important aspect the Frankfurt programme can be distinguished from the more propagandistic style detectable in the language of the CDU in Cologne. Christianity remains the basis for all political activity on account of the Christian doctrine of the "unschätzbaren Wert des einzelnen Menschen," but unlike the Christian Socialists in Cologne, the Frankfurt group was open to co-operation with all political groups and parties, Christians and non-Christians, including Marxist Socialists so long as they could demonstrate that they were equally committed to a Christian democracy;

"Daß das christliche Menschenbild in wesentlichen Zügen das gleiche ist, wie es auch vielen Nichtchristen als das einer weltlichen Humanität vorschwebt, werden auch sie mit uns zusammengehen können."  

Kogon and Knappstein were the authors of the programme's economic policy. Certain features bear striking resemblance to economic reforms suggested by Gablentz and Kaiser in Berlin and Welty in the Rhineland. Under the heading 'Socialism and Property,' however, the programme makes no explicit mention of 'Socialism with Christian responsibility.' Instead it expresses its commitment to an 'economic socialism.' Economic Socialism implied the transfer of primary industry, large manufacturing industry and banks into public ownership through wide scale planning and state control of all capital investment. It did not aim to increase the power of the state but to provide Bedarfsdeckung and the opportunity for extensive private property ownership for all. They envisaged a democratic socialism, that left sufficient room for private initiative and competition. Extending the term Socialism to 'wirtschaftsdemokratischer Sozialismus'

356 Die Frankfurter Leitsätze, op. cit., p.38.
358 Die Frankfurter Leitsätze, op. cit., p.38.
359 At a joint meeting of Christian Socialists from Frankfurt and Berlin on 31.10.1945 Hermes spoke of his plan to unite all Christian democratic groups in the former Reich territory. After this visit the Frankfurt Group adopted the Berlin founding programme and published it under the name "Das Programm von Brot, Obdach und Arbeit". An indeterminate change was made to the Berlin demand for Verstaatlichung in the Frankfurt version stating that industry would be transferred to "Gemeineigentum."
illustrated that they did not want to be directly identified with the ideology Socialism.\footnote{360} ‘Sozialismus aus christlicher Verantwortung’ was a reflection of the prevailing economic and social circumstances in 1945/6 and a continuation of the Centre Party’s social programme and the 19th century social reform movement. The Frankfurt version of Christian Socialism comprised three main aims 1. Economic Planning 2. Nationalisation 3. Industrial democracy (Mitbestimmung). Economic planning through the policy of ‘Bedarfsdeckung’ was a response to economic not ideological motives, whilst the nationalisation of monopoly and key industries was seen as the way to enable social elevation of the lower socio-economic classes. It did not entail the end of private economy but, moreover, supported medium and small sized businesses as the cornerstone of the new economic system.

Knappstein’s economic socialism was thus a combination of a planned economy with the western liberal understanding of free, responsible individuals, exemplified through the introduction of co-decision rights for employees in the industrial economy. ‘Planning’ envisaged a decentralised approach to policy on the basis of subsidiarity and involving trade unions, economic organisations and state administrations in the decision making process. Besides co-decision making, workers should also benefit from profit share schemes, as a part of the decentralisation of industrial ownership. Nationalisation is thus understood as Vergenossenschaftung or co-operative arrangements or Vergesellschaftung where state and groups in society share ownership and small and medium sized private businesses are to be retained.\footnote{361} The market is given an undefined, ambiguous position, but in his later essay ‘Ja und Nein. Zur Politik der Frankfurter Hefte’\footnote{362} Dirks modifies his stance to endorse the market economy;

“als das feinfühligste Instrument der Ermittlung der Verbraucherwünsche und als das reibungsloseste Instrument der notwendigen Steuerung der Verbraucherwünsche”

\footnote{360} Bernd Uhl, op. cit., p.94.

\footnote{361} Uhl is sceptical that Sozialismus aus christlicher Verantwortung can successfully reconcile freedom with planning. Codedecision, decentralisation and shared property ownership does not he says guarantee freedom of individual but indeed risks it being removed even more, op.cit. p.136.

Kogon even defined their third way alternative as a "Markt-Planwirtschaft!"

The fate of Sozialismus aus christlicher Verantwortung.
The foundation of the CDU Hesse on 25 November 1945, with former Centre member Werner Hilpert as Chairman and former DVP member and Protestant Erich Köhler as deputy, was later than in comparative regions. The CDP was formed in Wiesbaden and in Frankfurt in September, and in Kassel and ten other towns across Hesse in August. The CDUD in the Soviet zone "cannot be overestimated enough" for its impact on the foundation of interdenominational Christian parties in the north, east and central Hesse regions.

With time the CDU Hesse corrected the over-representation of Catholics in the party to achieve a more even balance of Protestant and Catholic members. None of the former left leaning Catholic 'intellectuals' and only one trade union representative were on the executive board. The intellectuals "wollten Anreger und Motor sein, aber keinesfalls in einen Apparat eingespant werden" even if they continued to exert some influence on policy via the party's original chairman, Hilpert. Employee co-determination legislation in industry was devised by the Oberurseler Kreis and only pushed through Hesse state parliament by Hilpert, the then Labour Minister for Hesse. Marcel Schulte, co-founder the CDU Hesse, backs the claim that the intellectuals had no party political interest, but does not detract from the fact that they made an impact in the embryonic stages of the party, on a scale unparalleled with any other CDU group at the time. Schulte never accepted Berlin's version of Christian Socialism, saying that the combination was implausible, whereas Frankfurt's 'Socialism with Christian responsibility' directly sought to solve social problems from its theory of socialism. The Christian Socialist Eberhard Welty in the Rhineland, on the other hand, condemned Frankfurt’s Socialism with Christian responsibility for implying that traditional socialism had a Christian foundation;

365 Hilpert suffered some opposition in the Hesse parliament from the Evangelical Erich Köhler, but this subsided when Köhler later took up his new responsibility as President of the Economic Council.
366 Eberhard Welty, Christlicher Sozialismus, op. cit., p.140.
“Als gäben sie dem überlieferten Sozialismus ein christliches Vorzeichen oder eine christliche Grundlage.”

Welty was dismayed that Christian Socialism was being used so flippantly, criticising that;

“verschiedene ideen- und grundsätzmäßig sogar gegensätzliche Richtungen für sich beanspruchen, einen christlichen Sozialismus zu vertreten.”

Whether Christian Socialism was primarily aimed at the social component of the original Catholic Christian Social movement and ‘Socialism with Christian Responsibility’ at incorporating more socialist aims into Christian thinking, as Narr has suggested, is a case for semantic definition, although the definition would suggest that the Frankfurt left was more socialist in its traditional sense. More interesting however is the importance shown by rival Christian democratic groups to slogan superiority, confirming that the description of a group’s ideology was crucial for gaining political legitimation.

Because of the inevitable correlation between either ‘Sozialismus aus christlicher Verantwortung’ or Christian Socialism with the traditional understanding of collectivist Socialism, Jostock and others in the Rhineland had favoured the term Solidarism. Dirks saw Solidarism as an offshoot of the middle classes and an unsuitable response to the new social structure of post-war Germany. The solidarist, Oswald von Nell-Breuning conversely, criticised ‘Sozialismus aus christlicher Verantwortung’ for committing itself to the revolutionary and unChristian methods of historical materialism, but did not admit to endorsing the ideology itself. Dirks had indeed once declared that his envisaged socialist party must be more than reformist, it must be in a preparatory, revolutionary state;

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367 Ibid.
368 “Soll ersterer nur die Ziele der alten katholischen, christlich-sozialen Bewegung mit einem neuen, die soziale Komponente hervorhebenden Ausdruck erneut zur Geltung bringen, so wird letzterer eine Rezeption sozialistischer Ziele durch Christen kennzeichnen.” Wolf Dieter Narr, op. cit., p.79.
"Sie kann aber ebensowenig grundsätzlich reformistisch sein, sondern muß ihre Tagespolitik ständig unter die Kritik ihrer totalen sozialistischen Theorie und ihres totalen sozialistischen Zieles stellen, muß grundsätzlich mit der revolutionären Aktion rechnen und sie für den richtigen Augenblick vorbereiten." 371

Socialism was the natural consequence to twelve years of fascism, the qualitative leap between the old capitalist system and a new classless society, but despite talk of revolution, Hars doubts that the concept of Christian Socialism, in Frankfurt or anywhere else bore any real relationship to Socialism, maintaining that;

"hier ein Sozialkonzept vorliegt, das der Tradition antisozialistischen Denkens in Deutschland noch nicht ganz entwachsen ist." 372

Advocating middle-sized industry, small traders and farmers, the protection of property and capital rights, are policies of a distinctly middle class conservatism and since Christian Socialism remained true to most of the basic values of middle class society, it can not be described as a revolutionary alternative to the much criticised ‘old’ order. The early programme theoreticians, whose Christian Socialist agenda was genuine and seriously intended, thus descended into the role of Rechfertigungsdenker who provided the newly founded party with a theoretical programmatic guise that was driven by other motives to those the thinkers originally intended. The willingness to uphold the capitalist economy and former socio-economic structures also offers a decisive explanation as to why the neo-liberal and Christian conservative groups in the early CDU never actively mounted an effective opposition to Christian Socialism, but silently tolerated its development in the first two years of the party’s existence. Once the first consolidation phase during those early programme discussions was over and groups had experienced the moralising appeal of a Gesinnungsozialismus, confidence grew to back a more overtly liberal social market economic order.

Hars has termed the CDU’s efforts to legitimise its politics with a radical, reformist rhetoric to reflect the contemporary socialist mood, whilst trusting its traditional conservative solutions for policy implementation, a “Revolutionäres Gestaltungswollen

371 Walter Dirks, Thesen zu einer ‘Sozialistischen Einheitspartei,’ May 1945, Gesammelte Schriften Band 4, op. cit., p.36.
372 Rudolf Hars, op. cit., p.98f.
mit konservativen Gestaltungsideen." Ambrosius also believes there is a contradiction in the Frankfurter's synthesis of Christianity and socialism:

"gleichberechtige Selbstverwaltung auf betrieblicher und überbetrieblicher Ebene, relativ intensive gesamtwirtschaftliche Planung und Lenkung bei prinzipieller Anerkennung des Wettbewerbssystems aber Erhaltung und Stärkung des privaten Eigentums. Die Fragen, wie unter diesen Umständen das Recht auf Selbstbestimmung verwirklicht werden konnte, wie die Trennung von Arbeit und Kapital aufgehoben und die Gemeinwohlbezogenheit tatsächlich hergestellt werden sollte, wurden nicht schlüssig beantwortet."

The indication that there may have been discrepancies between the theoretical claims of the party manifesto and policy implementation is supported by a case concerning the plans for nationalising key industries in the drafting of the Hesse economic constitution (Article 41, 1946). CDU member Fedor Reuscher of Lüdenscheid in Westphalia remarked the constitutional demand that industry should be nationalised or "in Gemeineigentum überführt" does not detail the actual implementation legislation, so the question of how the law should be translated into practice was not "abschliessend geklärt." The further issue of co-determination rights for employees in the management of company and economic decisions affecting the company, he notes, gained virtually universal support, but:

"Allerdings trifft hierfür vor allem die bereits angedeutete Feststellung zu, daß selbst eine eindeutige positive Entscheidung dieser Frage lediglich ein Programm bedeutet, dessen praktische Verwirklichung von vornherein noch recht problematisch erscheint. Das 'Mitwirkungsrecht' ist an sich nämlich ein unbestimmter Begriff." 375

The many levels of decision making powers could equally be interpreted as "blosse Anhörung", or "Beratung" or "massgeblichen Mitentscheidung."

In Frankfurt, as in Berlin and Cologne, the problematic term Socialism, never escaped its negative associations, despite specific attempts by party leaders to define what they

373 Wolf Dieter Narr, op. cit., p.76.
375 Paper by Fedor Reuscher in NL Dörpinghaus, ACDP, I-009-009/5.
meant by socialism. In the November 1946 edition of the Hesse CDU party newspaper Dirks addresses the controversy surrounding their use of the term Socialism:

“In fast jedem der unzähligen Gespräche, die in den letzten anderthalb Jahren bei vielen Gelegenheiten und besonders unter Christen über jenen ‘Sozialismus’ geführt wurden, in dem wir einen gangbaren und notwendigen Weg aus dem Abgrund zu einer sinnvollen Ordnung erblicken, fiel irgendwann einmal die Bemerkung: ‘in der Sache stimme ich Ihnen zu, aber können Sie das, was Sie wollen, denn gar nicht anders nennen?’ Auch brieflich wird immer wieder gesagt: Die Sache ja, - das Wort nein …. Es geht nicht um die Theorie - freilich auch um eine Theorie- sondern um einen wirklichen Weg zu einem wirklichen Ziel und es geht um die Einsicht, den Willen und die Tat derer, welche diesen Weg wirklich gehen sollen.”376

Whilst the tone of the Frankfurt Christian Socialists revealed the closest affinity to Marxist socialism of all other groups, its real influence on the continued development of the Frankfurt CDU must be understood to have been both short lived and geographically limited. The influence of the left-wing in the Frankfurt CDP had already reached its climax with the Frankfurt Principles and it was after this date that the right wing forces became more prominent.377 Events such as the refusal by the US military to back K.H Knappstein as the CDP’s nominated party chairman in Frankfurt in favour of the more liberal Centre figure Jakob Husch or the decision by Kogon and Dirks in April 1946 to retreat from the central activities of the party and dedicate themselves to setting up the Frankfurter Hefte, signalled a premature decline in influence of the Frankfurt group’s socialist programme. By the end of 1946 the left-wing programme direction of Knappstein and Dirks had lost all credible influence in the party and have been described them as ‘Offiziere ohne Mannschaften.’378 On his and Kogon’s departure, Dirks himself admitted that they were in fact better journalists than political organisers. Although they retained some influence on the Hesse CDU, Dirks distanced himself more and more from the party and drew closer to the SPD. Together with the other Christian Socialists Kogon, Schulte and Knappstein, Dirks remained affiliated to the CDU through the Oberurseler Kreis that went on to campaign for the idea of a Europe Union. Whilst Dirks’ socialist programme succeeded in defining the official party profile, the non-socialist advocates soon made up the majority in the party.

377 Bernd Uhl, op. cit., p.94.
378 Arcadius R. Gurland, op. cit., p.81.
"Aufgewertet wurde die Haltung der konservativen Mitglieder, die im Gegensatz zu Dirks und Knappstein keinen "bewussten" sondern allenfalls einen "situationsgebundenen" Sozialismus vertraten."\(^{379}\)

The Frankfurter Hefte

Like Welty's pamphlet *Die neue Ordnung*, the *Frankfurter Hefte* continued Sozialismus aus christlicher Verantwortung in a journalistic rather than in a practical political capacity, symbolising the overriding intellectual significance of the slogan above its direct political usefulness. The motive of co-editors Kogon and Dirks for founding the *Frankfurter Hefte* held less significance for progressing the cause of the Hesse CDU, but was aimed at defending Christianity from exploitation as a mixed class ideology.\(^{380}\) Indeed Dirks and Kogon had proclaimed that their journalistic objective with the Frankfurter Hefte was that the journal should not be party affiliated.

"Der Blick auf und für das Ganze schließt eine parteipolitische Bindung der Zeitschrift aus.... Sie wird sich aber andererseits nicht damit begnügen allgemein geistige Voraussetzungen der Politik zu klären, sondern eine bestimmte politische Konzeption für das Deutschland und das Europa der nächsten Zukunft ausbilden und vertreten."\(^{381}\)

The *Frankfurter Hefte* supported a symbiosis between Christianity and Marxism, but in the first two years after its first edition, actual strategies defining how their visions should be implemented rarely appeared.\(^{382}\) Focke\(^{383}\) agrees that the Frankfurter Hefte;

"stellten von Anfang an weniger ein fertiges, nur zu propagandierendes und zu realisierendes Programm eines Sozialismus aus christlicher Verantwortung als vielmehr die Idee eines erst zu erarbeitendes Konzeptes und die Spitze ihrer publizistischen Pläne."
In the Frankfurter Hefte, Socialism was upheld as a uniting symbol to unite the two basic groups anticipated to form a governing coalition - workers and those Christians who had found their way to socialism.  

**Programmes beyond Frankfurt. Regional tendencies in Hesse**

The Frankfurt Group had the least success in disseminating the messages of its programme to other regions of Hesse, on account of strong regional loyalties to middle class political traditions there. The Frankfurt Principles were distributed to all regional CDU/CDP groups across Hesse but this did not guarantee that the programme’s contents were accepted. In fact opposition to Hilpert’s and Köhler’s Christian Socialism in some state regions led to complaints to the US military demanding that restrictions on party licenses should be lifted to allow these regions to found their own non-socialist parties. Further regional complaints to the CDP party executive in Frankfurt also failed to secure a democratic solution according to members’ wishes.

The Offenbach CDP was in fact the only group in Hesse to agree with Frankfurt’s left-wing, social reformist, Christian socialist version of economic socialism. The Wiesbaden CDP chose to adopt and modify the Berlin Aufruf instead of the Frankfurt principles. It accepted the term ‘economic democracy,’ and its emphasis on state control of large industry, protection against monopoly developments in the economy, but disagreed with the alteration of existing private ownership structures. The Deutsche Aufbau Bewegung (DAB) in Darmstadt was a conservative Christian group that welcomed private ownership rights, albeit with social responsibility, making no mention of any nationalisation plans. Its programme was closer to Dörpinghaus’s Aktion der deutschen Erneuerung than that of the CDP and their Allgemeinen Grundsätzen contained little

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385 H.G Wieck, op. cit., p.52f.

386 Heinrich Rueschenschmidt, Die Entstehung der hessischen CDU 1945/46, op. cit., p.152.

387 Heinrich Rüschenschmidt, Gründung und erste Jahre.... op. cit., p.21.
concrete information about the political and economical future of Germany. The DAB co-founder Maria Sevenich despised the soporific nature of political programmes;

"Das Programm bedeutet nämlich eine Art Schlafmittel. Wenn man sein Programm hat, dann guckt man unter den Paragraphen nach, wie es da steht, und dann kommt das zustande, was man das Murksen von früher genannt hat. Wenn man eine geistig klare Grundlage hat, wie wir diese konkreten Aufgaben zu lösen haben, dann entsteht lebendige Verantwortung."

The Darmstadt DAB was concerned with religious renewal and saw Christianity as a spiritual defence against Marxism. Darmstadt did not demand a separation of responsibility between Church and State as the Frankfurter Principles, but the Church was expected to fulfil a central role in social renewal, by helping to implement Christian principles in politics.

The deeper one descends into northern Hesse the less one encounters the demand for restructuring the economy and for an upheaval of existing ownership structures. The Giessen group rejected any structural changes in the economy and demanded state protection for the free economy, whilst the Kassel CDU demanded competition and freedom of private initiative and the protection of private property rights to be kept sacrosanct. The Wetzlar CDP adopted the Frankfurt programme as a basis for drafting the Principles of the CDP Wetzlar, in October 1945, but exchanged the policy of 'wirtschaftlichen Sozialismus auf demokratischer Grundlage' into an explicitly liberal economic system which rejected planning as an economic steering mechanism altogether and tolerated it for exceptional circumstances only in the first few months after the war. Even the otherwise widely accepted reform of workers’ participation rights in industry was struck from the CDP’s programme in Wetzlar;

"Wir bekennen uns zur freien Wirtschaft, zur Entfaltung persönlicher Initiative und zum Wettbewerb der besten Leistungen. Daher lehnen wir die bürokratische

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388 Maria Sevenich, "Die Union als Gottesarbeit" in; Dienst am Kreuz. Speech held at Godesberg meeting 14-16 December 1945. Schriftenreihe der CDU des Rheinlandes, 4, Köln 1946, p.6. A. H Berling interestingly reported on the CDU meeting in Godesberg in the 'Hessischer Nachrichten'on 22.12.1945 describing it more as a 'Fühlungnahme' of various groups who had found their way to found a new party than the ambitiously portrayed 'Reichstagung,' ACDP, III- 155-001/1 CDU 1945-49.

389 Heinrich Rüschenschmidt, Die Entstehung der hessischen CDU 1945/46. Lokale Gründungsvorgänge und Willensbildung im Landesverband (Staatsexam) p.70.
Planwirtschaft ab, die die Verantwortung und die Arbeitsfreudigkeit hemmt .... Solange gewisse Rohstoffe und Arbeitskräfte infolge des Krieges besonders knapp sind, halten wir aus sozialen Gründen eine Weiterführung planwirtschaftlicher Massnahmen für erforderlich. ..... Die Aufhebung aller planwirtschaftlicher Massnahmen muss daher gefördert werden, sobald die Vorbedingungen für die Wiederherstellung einer freien Wirtschaft gegeben sind. Wir stehen auf dem Boden der Erhaltung des Privateigentums, wir fördern jede Massnahme, die dem arbeitenden Volke den Erwerb von Eigentum, insbesondere Hausbesitz, ermöglicht."\(^{390}\)

A letter from Ernst Leitz jr\(^{391}\) of the CDP in Wetzlar to Dörpinghaus in Frankfurt, comments on an article in the CDU-Mitteilungen, the CDU party organ for Hesse, on 9, December 1946 that had suggested that;

"Diese früheren Anhänger der CDU stießen also zur Partei nicht etwa weil sie für die Frankfurter Leitsätze mit ihrem klaren Bekenntnis zum *Sozialismus aus christlicher Verantwortung*, sondern weil sie gegen die SPD und KPD gestimmt waren."

Leitz reveals that the Frankfurt Principles had originally included provision for a land reform but this disappeared from the programme following pressure from within the party ranks that this could risk alienating the farmers and losing their vote. Leitz further adds that since the SPD did not have any leading personalities, the CDU was forced to include socialist elements in its party programme as a way of attracting the socialist SPD voters. Leitz concludes "Das hat mit christlicher Verantwortung wenig zu tun" suggesting socialism was only added as a tactical consideration.\(^{392}\)

Catholics from the Centre Party and Protestants from the *Christlich-Sozialen Volksdienst* in Kassel, saw the opportunity for setting up a party as a counterweight to the SPD and KPD even if separate confessional parties would have been preferable. Kassel did not

\(^{390}\) Leitsätze der CDP Wetzlar in NL- Dörpinghaus, ACDP, 009/003.


\(^{392}\) Leitz adds that in Wetzlar many people who had experienced the nationalisation of many German businesses in Czechoslovakia after 1919 developed an antipathy towards the word "Gemeineigentum" which had been responsible for their businesses being raided by the Czechs. Hence he warned that despite the Catholic majority in the region the slogan 'Christliche Verantwortung' was not convincing and were sceptical of the promise that the introduction of Gemeineigentum could bring progress.
adopt the term Christian socialism or socialism with Christian responsibility, but chose to emphasise private initiative and free competition;

"In solcher Gemeinschaftsordnung muß weitester Raum für eine private Initiative bleiben, die Erstarrtes durch neue Entwicklung in Fluss bringt und durch Wettbewerb die bessere und preiswertere Leistung fördert." 393

The Marburg CDU employed the Hesse formulation Sozialismus aus christlicher Verantwortung but "füllte sie aber so aus, daß ihre konservativen-deutsch-nationalen Vorstellungen gewahrt blieben." 394

Although Christian Socialists were the co-founders of the party, the drafters of the first official programme, and dominated the CDU Hesse party executive and leading positions in the party, the parallel opposition from other CDU groups in Hesse to the Frankfurt programme reveals that Christian Socialism did not represent the real views of Hesse state. Politically the ideas of Hilpert's Christian Socialist wing were in the minority. Their gradual loss in influence (a failure to distance themselves sufficiently from Marxist interests almost certainly led to their irrevocable downfall) and their replacement by the more liberal figure and programme of Bruno Dörpinghaus is further evidence of the underlying trend towards a liberal, whilst at the same time social, market economic model.

393 "Richtlinien der CDU Kassel" in: J. Lengemann (Hrsg), 25 Jahre Christlich Demokratische Union in Kassel 1945-1970, Kassel 1970. Stenzel the Chairman of the CDU Kassel confirmed at the first meeting on 2.12.45 in the Gildehaus that it was not the aim to change the economic form, structure or methods, but of changing the ‘Geist,’ people’s attitudes, and the way that they behaved in the capitalist system.

394 Heinrich Rüschenschmidt, Die Entstehung der hessischen CDU 1945/46, op. cit., p.115.
6.2. North Baden

The north Baden development was divided between three different groups in the American zone regions of Karlsruhe, Mannheim and Heidelberg, before finally agreeing to form a Landesverband for north Baden in February 1946. Whilst its initiators were predominantly Centre Party figures, they were, unlike their south Baden counterparts in the French zone, not plagued by desires to revive the Centre Party, thus making the transition to an interdenominational organisation both smooth and straightforward.

A Christian democratic party (CDP), with a ‘starken und unentwegten sozialen Einstellung’ was formed in August 1945 in Karlsruhe. Since co-operation with the SPD and Liberals was unimaginable, their only remaining partners for political collaboration were the former conservative parties and members of the Christlichen Volksdienst.\(^{395}\) The group\(^{396}\) was exclusively Catholic, as sceptical Protestants could not be persuaded to join. The CDP’s first political programme in September 1945 contained specific references to economic and social policies and was characteristic of the social reform measures advocated by trade union groups in other CDU regions, upholding private property and business ownership rights, but also the nationalisation of large, monopoly industries and measures for implementing economic democracy in industrial relations between employers and employees. The Mannheim CDP on the other hand could boast parity in confessional representation of its members even if its foundation did not occur until as late as October 1945 under Mannheim’s former deputy chairman of the Centre Party, August Kuhn. Plans were underway in Heidelberg to found a Christian bürgerlich catch-all party, calling itself the Christlich-Soziale Union, CSU. Since the population was majority Protestant, there was little chance of a revival of the Centre Party. The first programme from November 29 contained many liberal economic elements and contrasts with the Mannheim and Karlsruhe programmes, due to its lack of nationalisation plans.\(^{397}\) Following the national meeting of the CDU in Bad Godesberg in December

\(^{395}\) Gerd Hepp, “Die CDU im Landesbezirk Nordbaden” in; Paul Ludwig Weinacht (Hrsg), op. cit., p.113.

\(^{396}\) Co-founders included Fridolin Heurich, Adolf Kühn, Wilhelm Baur and Robert Beck.

\(^{397}\) Gerd Hepp, op. cit., p.119.
1945, that aimed to unite all Christian democratic groups across Germany, north Baden’s three centres of Christian democratic activity Karlsruhe, Mannheim and Heidelberg agreed to form a *Landesverband* for north Baden and to adopt the uniform party title CDU.

There was little to emerge from the north Baden CDU in the subsequent period that departed significantly from the early programmes in the region. The concern with dealing with urgent daily political issues meant there was little opportunity to formulate the party’s more philosophical ideas. Close contact took place between the north Baden leadership and the CDU in Cologne and Berlin, in particular Berlin’s Jakob Kaiser and the work of the Christian trade unions, and this meant attention was focused on events taking place there. It was only once relations with the east CDU worsened from 1947 that the region adopted the views adumbrated by Adenauer. North Baden’s CDU member, Anton Schwan, harboured ambitions that the region’s party newspaper, the *Südwestdeutsche Union* would become a central discussion forum for the party’s political programme and the paper published regular reports on decisions within the CDU leadership as well as publishing its own programme guidelines for north Baden. In an article entitled ‘Christentum – Demokratie – Sozialismus’ from August 1946, Schwan gives insight into the importance attached to ideology and Weltanschauung in shaping the CDU’s identity in a period of economic, political moral and social reconstruction;

> "Deutschland ist zerbrochen. Allenhalben sucht man Wege aus dem Zusammenbruch. Diese Wege sind nicht nur mit guten Vorsätzen, sondern auch mit Schlagwörtern gepflastert. Schlagworte tragen ihren Namen nicht umsonst: sie schlagen die Begriffe tot, die sie verlebendigen sollen."

He refers to the blanket claim by all of the political parties in 1945 to espouse the values Christian, democracy and socialism. Christianity, he feared, was being employed to enhance a party’s political legitimisation;

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398 Gerd Hepp, op. cit., p.123.

399 Christentum – Demokratie – Sozialismus, Südwestdeutsche Union, Halbmonatszeitschrift der CDU, Landesverband Nordbaden, 1 Jg August 1946, 1/2.
"Die CDU bezeichnet es als Grundlage ihrer Arbeit, die DVP anerkennt seinen ethischen Gehalt, die SPD behauptet, es praktisch am besten zu verwirklichen und selbst die KPD will es wenigstens tolerieren."

The trend to declare oneself Christian, democratic and socialist was equally a symptom of the current party system, and is condemned as 'propagandistischen Geschwätz.' He acknowledges however that 'Prinzipienreden' provoked more positive reactions from participants at election rallies than the focus on everyday political affairs. This he says is based on the belief that political decisions are deemed more legitimate if they are derived from 'Grundsätzlichen' or from moral principles. Schwan's remarks indicate that Weltanschauung in 1945 was still important as a legitimating device for political decisions, not with demagogic intent, but for providing citizens with some direction and purpose in the moral and political vacuum that they faced after the war. It had traditionally been the nature of the German party system that historically only those parties that could demonstrate ideological integrity were deemed worthy;

"Die politischen Parteien waren in Deutschland immer Weltanschauungsparteien und sie sind auch heute wieder."

Parties that attempted to represent only interests, not Weltanschauung, would thus always remain an ephemeral factor in the German party system;

"Die Atmosphäre über Deutschland ist zu sehr weltanschaulich gesättigt, als daß der deutsche Mensch sich ihrem Einfluss entziehen kann."

This clearly coloured the CDU's discussions of its political manifesto in 1945. Programmes should not only deal with solving immediate economic deficiencies in the post-war climate, but with also establishing a party's political identity and its own strand of ideology with which it could compete with the SPD and KPD and their traditions of social democracy and Marxist socialism. Yet Schwan strongly criticised the use of Christianity as the foundation for the CDU's party ideology, since this committed the party to adhere to the Christian sense of responsibility in conducting all its political affairs at all times. Any failure to do so would simply denigrate Christianity;

400 Ibid.
"die Unzulänglichkeiten einer betont christlichen Politik zu Lasten des Christentums verbucht werden."

Committing itself to Christian behaviour placed the onus and responsibility on the CDU to deliver peace and democracy in Germany.

6.3. North-Württemberg

North-Württemberg offered little potential for an interdenominational Christian party. The Centre Party had gained a negative reputation among the population for its failure to reach political compromise in coalition during the Weimar Republic and for agreeing to the Enabling Act that facilitated the Nazis' rise to power. Stegerwald’s idea of an interdenominational Volkspartei from the 1920s coupled with mutual experiences of Protestants and Catholics in the resistance, were significant impulses in the Stuttgart region for a Christian political union. The Centre Party figure Anton Huber summarised in his memorandum "Volkspartei für Frieden, Freiheit und Gerechtigkeit," that it was imperative for a new Christian democratic union of middle class liberal groups to offer a programme of social reform to counteract the Marxist-socialism of the left wing parties and overcome the antagonism amongst the working classes towards the Church and the role of Christianity in politics. Joseph Ersing, who co-founded the Berlin CDU, but then returned to Stuttgart in July 1945, was instrumental in promoting Berlin’s CDU model of interdenominationalism in north-Württemberg. Although some willingness was expressed by former members of the Christlich-soziale Volksdienst (CSVD) to join in a political union of Catholics and Protestants, Protestant church representatives, notably Theodor Wurm, continued to express strong disapproval for developing a political programme on the basis of Christianity, and so denied the CSVD Church support for its interdenominational initiative in 1945.

401 In September 1945 Eisenhower had ordered North Baden and North Württemberg to become one state, Württemberg-Baden, triggering the protracted dispute over the founding of a separate south west state. North Baden fought to retain its independence within Württemberg-Baden and from 1948 campaigned for unification with its southern partner, south Baden. See Gerd Hepp, op. cit., p.123ff.

402 Karl Schmitt, “Die CDU in Landesbezirk Nordwürttemberg” in; Paul Ludwig Weinacht (Hrsg) op. cit., p.139.
Other Protestant contenders for an interdenominational party were members of the former DDP and DP parties. After a series of meetings during the summer of 1945, the Centre Party group agreed to co-operate with the CSVD. Together with further representatives from the Bauern- und Weingärtnerbund they formed the Christlich-soziale Volkspartei (CSVP) whose programme closely reflected the contents of the Berlin Aufruf. Liberals proceeded to revive the Deutsche Volkspartei. Yet political groups in the regions and localities of north-Württemberg almost overwhelmingly opted to follow the CSVD model in setting up regional political affiliations in the localities. All subsequent attempts to integrate the DVP, including the personal intervention by Berlin’s Andreas Hermes in Stuttgart in January 1948, failed. Hermes’ influence plus the impact of the meeting of the CDU in Bad Godesberg in December 1945 led the CSVP at their first party conference on January 13, 1946 to change their name to CDU. But the marriage of Catholics and Protestants in north-Württemberg did not remain harmonious for long as disputes over imbalance in confessional representation in the party during 1946-1948 revealed that interdenominationalism demanded more than a political fusion simply for the purpose of gaining more votes at elections. Success demanded a genuine will to co-operate with former political adversaries to stage meaningful social, economic and political reform.
7. French Zone

7.1. Rhineland-Palatinate

The birth of the CDU in Rhineland-Palatinate is characterised by its stubborn and fragmented development. The state of Rhineland-Palatinate was not created until August 30th, 1946 and the CDU did not form a Landesverband there until February 1947. Separate Christian political developments began in 1945 in the individual provinces of the Palatinate, in Rhinehesse and in Rhineland-Hesse-Nassau, before finally consolidating into two independent Christian parties: the CDP in Rhineland-Hesse-Nassau and the CDU in the merged region of Rhinehesse-Palatinate. When Rhinehesse-Palatinate and Rhineland-Hesse-Nassau then joined to become Rhineland-Palatinate, both state level parties continued to maintain separate identities for local elections. In fact;

"Die Vereinigung dieser beiden regional geprägten Parteien ergab sich nicht zwingend aus einem Gleichklang der Ziele und Interessen, sondern war eine verhältnismäßig späte Reaktion auf die französische Grenzziehung." \(^{404}\)

French military influences exerted the most dominant influence on the course and the content of programme discussions among the region's Christian parties. The parties themselves were also too concerned with the correct choice of party name and too harnessed by their own entrenched confessional attitudes and traditional political bias to develop any real new programme for Germany's economic and social reform. Without French military regulations permitting only one Christian party to be licensed in each of the two regions, a political union of Protestants and Catholics, a new CDU party, would almost certainly not have emerged. There was every sign that the former Weimar parties such as the Christlich-Sozialen Volksdienst, the Demokratische Partei, the Deutsche Volkspartei, the Bayerische Volkspartei and the Centre Party would have gradually

\(^{403}\) "Die Konferenzen zur Konstituierung eines Landesverbandes hatten den Charakter von Koalitionsgesprächen zwischen zwei ideologisch völlig verschiedene Parteien, nicht aber zwischen Schwesterparteien....." The discussions were "aus engstirnigem Prestigedanken geführt, ohne Rücksicht auf gemeinsame Ziele und programmatische Ideen." Weitzel Kurt, Von der CSVP zur CDU, Peter Lang, Frankfurt am Main 1982, p.190.

reinstated themselves across the culturally diverse region. The question of a federal versus a central structure for Germany was an important feature of the discussions, since federalism offered an opportunity to retain regional independence. Hostility to a centralised Germany was so great in some areas, that individuals looked to nurture closer relations with the French and suspicions even suggested that some groups entertained separatist desires. The Frenchman General Bouley for example recorded in December 1945, that Catholic groups in Germany had presented him with the idea of an independent Frankreich consisting of the regions of Westphalia, Rhineland, Hesse, Palatinate, Baden, Württemberg, Bavaria and Austria!

The following will consider how Christianity Democracy emerged in each of the three regions, Palatinate, Rhinehesse and Rhineland-Hesse-Nassau.

7.2. Palatinate

The Mayor Gustav Wolff and former Centre Party chairman priest Johannes Finck championed the idea of interdenominationalism in the Palatinate as a way of replacing the former Centre Party and the Bavarian Volkspartei with a new type of German party. The Christian trade unionist Adam Stegerwald shared personal exchanges with Wolff after the war and Stegerwald’s account of Germany’s political and moral dilemma ‘Wo stehen wir?’ in 1945 was printed and distributed across the Palatinate. It was in fact Stegerwald who encouraged Wolff to set up a party to prevent Protestants and Catholics from embarking on separate political developments. Helmut Kohl confirmed from early discussions that he himself held with Wolff, that many of the initiatives for the CDU in the Palatinate were derived from the close and regular contact the party had with the programme developments in the Berlin CDUD. The speeches by Hermes,

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405 Anne Martin, Die Entstehung der CDU in Rheinland-Pfalz, V. Hase & Koehler, Mainz 1995, p.77.
406 Kohl points out that a large majority of Catholics in the Palatinate were conservative and critical of western democracy and liberalism and more in favour of forming a “römis-ch-katholisch Staatspartei.” Helmut Kohl, Die politische Entwicklung in der Pfalz und das Wiedererstehen der Parteien nach 1945, Dissertation zur Erlangung der Doktorwürde der Philosophischen Fakultät der Ruprecht-Karls Universität zu Heidelberg, 1958, p.70.
408 Helmut Kohl, op. cit., p.84.
Kaiser and Lemmer and others from the Godesberger meeting were for example also distributed in the Palatinate.

Yet by the end of November 1945 no agreement had been reached between Protestant and Catholic groups, prompting Finck and the Catholic prelate Martin Walzer to apply for a French military licence to refund the Centre as an interdenominational party. The claim that they were not an exclusively Catholic party and were open to Protestant members, is starkly reminiscent of the empty declaration made by the Centre Party in the 19th century, that had roused Julius Bachem in his famous article from 1906 to rally the Centre Party into abandoning its Catholic ghetto and throw open its doors to Protestants. Finck and Wolff nevertheless succeeded in bringing together over 40 prominent personalities to Neustadt, in December 1945, to make a final attempt at consensus between Protestant and Catholic circles. A proposal was finally made in January 1946 to start an interdenominational Christian Democratic Party (CDP), but the sincerity of their commitment has been doubted;

"Jener erste Schritt war jedoch nur dazu angetan, die Differenzen zu verschleiern, nicht sie zu beheben. Anders als der Wortlaut des Antrags vermuten ließ, hatten sich die katholischen-klergalen Kräfte noch nicht dazu durchgerungen, Protestanten in ihrer Partei zu dulden, geschweige denn, sie als gleichberechtigte Partner anzuerkennen." 409

The application was backed by ten signatures of three former Centre Party members, two BVP, three DDP and one DVP, a configuration that revealed the Palatinate CDU as an amalgamation of middle class liberal parties. Walzer's name did not feature on the license application since Walzer would not relinquish his desire for a Catholic party based on the old Centre. In the meantime he had joined forces with Centre Party members in Rhinehesse to form a Christlich Soziale Union for Rhinehesse and Palatinate. This fixation on sectarian and Catholic religious principles has been criticised for neglecting current social circumstances. 410 Martin 411 is able to confirm Wolff's claim that Walzer and his CSU group in Rhinehesse had been in close negotiations with the

409 Anne Martin, Die Entstehung der CDU in Rheinland-Pfalz, op. cit., p.73.
410 Kurt Weitzel, Von der CSVP zur CDU, op. cit., p.43.
411 From recently released sources in the French military archives in Colmar.
French military over the future political structure for Germany, but adds that French military sources would not go so far as to support the thesis that they gave support to German separatist tendencies. Both Finck's and Wolf's CPD and Walzer's CSU applications were rejected by the French military however on the grounds that only one Christian party would be licensed. By January, the Palatinate CDP opted to change its name to CDU in order to harmonise with the wider Christian democratic movement across Germany.⁴¹²

Protestant liberals not willing to join Catholics in the new CDU also made a separate application for a ‘Christlich Sozialen Volksbund,’ but anticipating its rejection by the military or the compulsion to join the CDU, rapidly changed its name to Sozialer Volksbund to circumvent the French ruling on granting only one Christian party a license. The emergence of the Sozialer Volksbund demonstrates the animosity Protestants still felt towards political co-operation with Catholics. This had to a certain extent been alleviated by their shared resistance against Hitler and by the more recent Treysa conference during which prominent Protestant representatives, including the former Chairman of the Christlich Sozialer Volksdienst, Friedrich Risch, declared their support for the CDU as a vehicle to end sectarian antagonism, "politische Gegensätze zwischen Protestantismus und Katholizismus auszuräumen."

7.3. Rhinehesse

Mainz was the centre of Christian democratic activity in Rhinehesse. In April 1945 the former Centre Party member Lorenz Diehl drafted his visions ‘Gedanken über künftige politische Entwicklungen’. Diehl expressed sympathy towards the idea of founding a new 'christliche, demokratische, und soziale Volkspartei,' one that whilst predominantly oriented around the former Centre Party, should also welcome Protestants. Protestant liberals had been a major influence in Rhinehesse before 1933 but links had not been forged between the confessions before Nazi resistance fostered solidarity among the Church communities. In September 1945, Diehl met with members of the former

Weimar party, the *Christlich-sozialen Volksdienst* including its chairman in Hesse, Wilhelm Greb, to choose the clumsy name *Zentrum – christlich-Demokratisch-Soziale-Volkspartei* (CSVP), demonstrating the party’s dilemma in attempting to simultaneously address the problems of the past and the future. Individuals looked to retain continuity with the Centre Party but also to begin meaningful co-operation with Protestants. Yet there was disagreement, not only amongst some Centre Party members, who held on to conservative traditions of serving an exclusive Catholic electorate, but also from those advocates of a CSVP over the party’s basic political position in the party spectrum;

"auch in den Vorstellungen ihrer Befürworter taten sich Gegensätze auf, die zu unterschiedlichen Standortbestimmungen der neuen Partei im Rechts-Links Spektrum und zum Nebeneinander prononierte föderalistischer und eher auf die Einheit Deutschlands gerichteter Strömungen führten."

Diehl never intended the CSVP to become a;

"Auffanglager für alle nun politisch heimatlos gewordenen Menschen, Rechtsreaktionäre, Deutschnationale und liberal-demokratischen Kreise"

but advocated a centre-left party, committed to the ideas of the Christian trade union movement. His main aim was to transfer Catholic-socialist ideas into a new party rather than recreate Catholic predominance and a political representation for Catholic interests.

During the autumn, Protestants met with members from the *Bekennende Kirche* and from other liberal parties before agreeing to form a joint Programme Commission with Catholics in December. Protestants set about drafting the CSVP’s programme showing its commitment to democracy, freedom, respect for the individual and freedom of

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413 Kurt Weitzel, Von der CSVP zur CDU, op. cit., p.37.

414 Anne Martin, Die Entstehung der CDU in Rheinland-Pfalz, op. cit., p.68.

415 This clashed with the Berlin CDUD’s principle of welcoming "alle liberalen Kreise, auch sämtliche Konfessionen, alle die Kreise, die nicht in dem Programm der SPD und KPD ihr Heim finden, einschließlich jüdische Mitbürger aufnehmen." The Mainz CSVP was crucially never conceived of as a catch-all party for liberal, democratic groups. It feared that opening the programme to influences from Berlin and Cologne would cause its Catholic principles to become diffuse. Kurt Weitzel, Von der CSVP zur CDU, op. cit., p.41.

416 Anne Martin, Die Entstehung der CDU in Rheinland-Pfalz, op. cit., p.79.
expression. Protestants and Catholics thus first concentrated on achieving consensus within their own camps before committing themselves to an interdenominational union.\textsuperscript{417} Even then, efforts were often half-hearted and slow to sacrifice their sectarian traditions. By the time the preparatory committee met in January 1946 to discuss the draft, the programme corresponded closely to that of the Centre Party’s before 1933, retaining most of the previous Catholic principles but no real commitment to interdenomination. This indicates that Diehl remained fundamentally sceptical of accommodating the liberals, who he blamed for Weimar’s downfall. Yet the CSVP interestingly also distanced itself from the left-wing, reformist Christian Socialism backed by the Christian trade unions in Berlin and the Rhineland. The CSVP supported an open market and individual property ownership and rejected social reforms that could change existing ownership structures such as nationalising industry. On closer inspection the CSVP revealed itself to be a conservative, liberal Catholic party, whose interests were more \textit{bürgerlich} than proletarian. Although the liberal elements, such as the economic and social paragraphs on ownership rights and social obligations, originate from the former Protestant Weimar party- the \textit{Christliche Soziale Volksdienst}, similar liberal policies were also demanded by Centre Party members, suggesting that;

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"die wirtschafts- und sozialpolitischen Aussagen der CSVP auch \textit{ohne} die evangelische Seite in diesem Sinne zustande gekommen wären." \textsuperscript{418}
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Independent Christian democratic activities in the Protestant dominated town of Worms, displayed more support from the Centre Party for a neo-liberal course, and former members expressed their desire to co-operate with earlier representatives of Weimar’s Democratic Party (DP) and \textit{Deutsche Volkspartei} (DVP), in a party of the ‘\textit{bürgerliche Mitte}’ committed to Christianity and democracy.\textsuperscript{419} They opted to call themselves the CDU, not the CSVP as in Mainz. At the first founding conference of the Worms CDU on January 11, 1946, no working classes were represented. No less than 41% of

\textsuperscript{417} Kurt Weitzel, \textit{Von der CSVP zur CDU}, p.45.

\textsuperscript{418} Ibid., p.55.

\textsuperscript{419} The military occupiers did not permit supporters of the former liberal parties DDP and DVP to cooperate with the Worms group and many conferences were banned. Not until January 1946 could they resume activity freely; Ibid., p.67.
participants were self-employed individuals, characterising the middle class, liberal tone of Christian parties in Rhinehess.\footnote{Ibid., p.67.}

At first the moves to set up the \textit{Christlich Soziale Volkspartei} in Rhinehess went unnoticed by the CDU in the Palatinate\footnote{Helmut Kohl, op. cit., p.77.} and their application, like the parties in the Palatinate, was also rejected by the French authorities. In February 1946, the CDU in the Palatinate struck up agreement with a further Christian group in Rhinehess, the Oppenheimer Circle, who were keen to set up a Centre style party, open to co-operation with Protestants. By March 5, 1946, they formed a joint CDU \textit{Landesverband} or state council for Hesse-Palatinate, based largely on Palatinate’s terms, but with both regions retaining a certain degree of regional autonomy.\footnote{Hans-Otto Kleinmann, op. cit., p.47.} Critical of the Palatinate group’s close links to the Rhineland CDU in Cologne and the Hesse CDU in Frankfurt, Diehl kept up opposition to full merger with Palatinate and his party in Mainz stubbornly held on to their own name CSVP. Some CSVP members in Rhinehess however began to abandon the idea of an independent political party and left to join the Rhinehess-Palatinate CDU, thereby forcing Diehl to finally withdraw the CSVP’s license application;

"Während hier (CSVP in Mainz) der weltanschauliche Charakter der Partei in allen Verlautbarungen und programmatischen Aussagen zutage tritt, zeigte sich in der Pfalz ähnlich wie in anderen Gebieten die Tendenz, aus der CDU eine säkularisierte Partei zu machen, um Konsequenzen aus der Zentralgeschichte zu ziehen."\footnote{Kurt Weitzel, \textit{Von der CSVP zur CDU}, op. cit., p.70.}

Once the CDU for Rhinehess-Palatinate had resolved the question of its underlying political principles it could concentrate on their practical application.\footnote{"Die nun gestellte Aufgabe hieß, die ideologischen Grundlagen und Vorstellungen der Partei im politischen Alltag in die Praxis umzusetzen, zu überprüfen, inwiefern sich die Vorstellungen der CDU realisieren liessen." Kurt Weitzel, \textit{Von der CSVP zur CDU}, op. cit., p.93.} The first joint party conference for Hesse-Palatinate was held on August 24th, 1946 in Mußbach where
they launched a pragmatically formulated programme. Many former Centre Party members were particularly keen to be involved in the new Christian democratic movement to ensure their interests were adequately represented.

7.4. Rhineland-Hesse-Nassau

Trier and Koblenz became the main centres in the province Rhineland-Hesse-Nassau for a comparatively smooth and rapid development of an interdenominational CDP. The support given by Catholic bishops to a new Christian democratic party was particularly decisive in helping the movement take root in Rhineland-Hesse-Nassau. Since Catholics were in the majority in the region there was little need for a party that stood specifically in defence of Catholic interests. Yet former Centre Party member Jakob Diel, who later became the first President of the Rhineland-Palatinate parliament, was against establishing a Christian 'catch-all' party. The French military was suspicious of the Centre Party and by adhering to its ruling that only one Christian party would be permitted, only gave its backing to the CDU. In September 1945, Christian democrats drafted a set of programme points based on the Cologne Principles but it took until the first party conference on 31 January, 1946 to ratify the programme. The delay indicates there was still widespread hesitancy in the population to join a 'democratic' middle class, bürgerlich party. Despite some differences in policy, the Trier group agreed to join the CDP in Montabaur and Koblenz, a party that had modelled itself on the same lines at the Cologne group and together they produced the 'Koblenz Principles.'

The CDP in Rhineland-Hesse-Nassau was more conservative in its programme than the CSVP in Rhinehesse or the CDU in Palatinate and sought to distance itself from the

425 Helmut Kohl, op. cit., p.85.
426 "damit die Rechte des katholischen Volksteils in dem nun werdenden neuen Verhältnissen gewahrt werden könnten." Anne Martin, Die Entstehung der CDU in Rheinland-Pfalz, op. cit., p.70.
427 Ibid., p.66.
428 Anne Martin, Die französische Besatzungspolitik und die Gründung der CDU in Rheinland-Pfalz, op. cit., p.134.
429 Ibid., p.134.
430 ACDP III-028 -032/1.
direction of the Berlin CDUD. There was every reason to expect support for an initiative to revive the Centre Party in 1945, since the Centre Party in Trier gained 46.1% of votes at the last free elections in March 1933, compared to 30% for the NSDAP. Almost all Christian democrat activists in the region were former Centre Party members and Christian trade unions, and their party application indicated that it was their aim to extend their particular influence over the whole region;

"Aus diesem Antrag wird deutlich, daß das grundlegende Prinzip des alten Zentrums eine Volkspartei zu sein, die alle Stände umfasst von der neuen Partei übernommen worden war."  

7.5. Baden-Württemberg

Originally the preserve of the French, the region of Württemberg was forced to concede to sharing its territory when the American military authorities arrived in Stuttgart in July 1945. South Württemberg and south Baden were subsequently assigned to the French zone whilst north Baden and north Württemberg came under control of the American occupied zone. This division into a north Württemberg and a south Württemberg (called Württemberg-Hohenzollern) further corresponded to existing confessional and socio-economic divisions with a Catholic dominated, largely agricultural south and a Protestant, industrial north. Not until 1952 did the Länder merge to form the new federal state of Baden-Württemberg. The early development of Christian democratic parties in these provinces were thus shaped by their own different political and sectarian traditions and subject to the unique policies of their respective American or French military occupiers. The following reveals that they all arrived at a different political interpretation of Christian Democracy.

431 Ibid.
432 Protocoll September 20th, 1945, ACDP, III-028 -032/1.
433 Herr Dr Zimmer in Herr Dr Zimmer and Frau Dr Mathilde Gantenberg, Die Gründungsgeschichte der CDU in Trierer Land 1945/6, 1955, ACDP III-028 -032/1.
7.6. South Baden

Separated from its northern counterpart in the American zone, south Baden underwent a unique development under its French occupiers. The French did not licence political parties until the end of 1945 and stipulated that they adopt federalist, 'anti-Reich' policies. Parties were criticised by the French allies for postulating a future German nation state in its programmes or for even mentioning 'Germany' in its party title. Parties were not permitted to form affiliated *Landesverbände* belonging to a national *Reichspartei* and were restricted to forming regional parties at state level only.\(^434\) Ironically such draconian French military policies corresponded to Baden's own peculiarly separatist mentality which sought to keep Baden *badisch* and resist re-integration into a centralised Germany. In 1945 there was little motivation in the Catholic dominated region to reconfigure those party alignments that had existed before 1933. A successor party to the Centre Party could comfortably rely on summoning Catholic support in 1945 and the desire to return to its former traditions encouraged a strong regional focus amongst Baden Christian democrats. The suggestion of a trans-zonal party aspired by the wider CDU was met with little enthusiasm. As was common to other regions of the south-west there was also a unique feeling of moral superiority in Catholic dominated Baden with a tendency to apportion the blame for National Socialism to the former liberal parties. Prussian notions of centralism and militarism were portrayed as alien to their culture and history;

"Die Berufung auf das Naturrecht entsprang dem Bedürfnis, sich vom Nationalsozialismus nicht nur programmatisch abzuziehen, sondern diese Programmatik auch weltanschaulich, gewissermassen philosophisch zu fundieren. In dem man derart die Gegenwart von einem Wertesystem aus betrachtete, das keiner geschichtlichen Relativierung unterlag, hatte man es auch leichter, sich in den Wirren der Zeitläufe zurechtzufinden."\(^435\)


An order based on Christian Natural Law, since it was devised by God, would by contrast be immune to such abuse and interference by State power.

Some of the early Christian political movements in the region included the Christlich-Soziale Vereinigung and the Vereinigung Abendland. The Christlich-Soziale Vereinigung was backed by Christian trade unions from south Baden and south Württemberg (Württemberg-Hohenzollern) who met in December 1945 to discuss how they could steer party programmes towards improving workers’ social, political and economic interests in a type of Labour Party. Here it was Hermann Hessler’s objective to ensure that liberal Catholics did not gain the upper hand in the new party as they had many decades earlier;

“die reaktionären Elemente, oder richtiger gesagt die kapitalistisch denkenden Kreise in der Partei zurückzudrängen, damit sie nicht, wie mancher im früheren Zentrum, wo sie als die eigentlichen Geldgeber oft den Kurs bestimmten, die Oberschaft gewinnen und das alte Spiel wieder von neuem beginnt.”436

Their programme views mirrored those of the trade unionist-Christian Socialist wing of the CDU in other parts of Germany such as Berlin, Frankfurt and the Rhineland, calling for workers’ protection legislation, employment rights, and social insurance but are a further example of how a Labour Party concept could not compete with the conservative, liberal Catholics who were opposed to any radical notions of anti-capitalist, socialist reform. The Vereinigung Abendland was a Christian conservative group conceived to mark a departure from Germany’s history of Prussian war ideology and Prussian world leadership ambitions in favour of a “Rückbesinnung auf das gemeinsame christliche und humanistische Erbe des Abendlandes”437 which harked back to the traditions of the Middle Ages, such as authority of the Church and Christianity.

The first Christian parties to appear were an interdenominational Christlich-soziale Volkspartei in Neustadt and a Christlich-Soziale Union in Konstanz in the summer and autumn of 1945. At the Neustadt party conference in January 1946, suggestions by the local activist Paul Fleig of the Konstanz group, to change the Neustadt party title to Christian Democratic, were resisted through fear that they would be forced to consider

434 Ibid., p.55.
437 Ibid., p.43.
liberal views in their programme and so hinder implementation of Christian ideas. This was based on the assumption that that those members who wanted to include ‘democratic’ in the title, did so, because they wanted to attract former liberals to join. The word ‘democratic’ was still largely equated with liberal Protestants and ‘socialism’ with Christianity and Catholics. ‘Democracy’ and all that its meaning evoked, offered a powerful instrument with which to appeal to co-operation with the Protestant communities. In Freiburg, the Priest Ernst Föhr campaigned to reinstate the Centre Party but unashamedly rejected co-operation with Protestants. Somewhat conceitedly he argued, that for the benefit of gaining some extra votes from former ‘Volksdienst’ voters, the Centre Party should not sacrifice its fundamental principles for a ‘weltanschaulichen Mischmasch.’

The real pioneers of a Christian interdenominational party in south Baden however was the Christian Arbeitsgemeinschaft (C.A.G), formed in Freiburg in July 1945 and which became the main centre for Baden’s long-term Christian party. Freiburg political initiatives have already been shown to be significant for their influence on the development of the Social Market Economy. Initiators included Catholic and Protestant professors from Freiburg university and active members of the resistance including Constantin von Dietze and Franz Büchner who believed that the Christian confessions should unite against the emerging threat from Bolshevism in a broad based Christian party - a Christlich-soziale Volksunion. They drew on the views of the economic theorist


439 In 1945 the Beckerath group in Freiburg updated its 1942 currency policy audit to assist the American occupiers in effecting an efficient transition of the war-economy. No less than 20 audits were also prepared for the French military in Freiburg. In each case the recommendations met with little enthusiasm and found minimum implementation by the US and French militaries, who were following their own political and economic occupation agenda for Germany. In September 1947 the group’s economic programme, in particular currency policy, received renewed interest at the so-called conference of High school teachers’ in Rothenburg as part of the initiative by Gerhard Albrecht to re-establish the ‘Verein für Sozialpolitik’. Many of the seventy participants did not agree with the prescribed nature of the proposals laid out in the “wirtschaftspolitisches Sofortprogramm” criticising them as too liberal and market oriented. Nevertheless the programme was sent to Erhard and later to all those responsible for economic affairs for example in the Bizeone, in the regional state (Länder) governments, and the Reichsbank successor institute, the Bank deutscher Länder. All attempts at a revival of the group and its activities were eventually abandoned once the Economics Council (Wissenschaftlicher Beirat) in the Economics’ Administration for the Bizeone (Verwaltung für Wirtschaft des Vereinigten Wirtschaftsgebietes) was formed in January 1948. Beckerath was nominated the Economics Council’s deputy Chairman and later Chairman, a position he occupied until his death in 1964.
Walter Eucken and the Freiburg School of political economists for their vision of a new social and economic order for Germany after the war. No less than 40 prominent names from both denominations, including the Centre Party members Fleig, Zürcher and Person, pledged support for the Volksunion idea. By December 16, Fleig and Zürcher had formulated a programme for what became known as the Badisch-Christlich-sozialen Volkspartei (BCSV). It advocated a federal structure for Germany, a democratic bicameral system and the rule of law. Reflecting third way ordo-liberal economics, the programme rejected both collectivism and private industrial monopolies. The principle of competition was at the heart of the economic order, whilst the State had responsibility for macro-economic decisions, for the ‘planvolle Gesamtdnung des Wirtschaftslebens’. Although private property was favoured the state had the power to nationalise branches of the economy if it furthered the interests of the community.

In the early months of its development however the BCSV contended with its more reactionary Centre Party wing, led by Leo Wohleb, who also later became the BCSV’s party leader at the foundation of the CDU Landesverband for Baden in Karlsruhe in February 1946. The social elements in Christian democracy were weakened by the predominance given to Baden’s specific regional interests. Whilst the party aimed for Christianity to form the basis of the new society, the commitment to being ‘Christian’ and ‘socialist’ was pure rhetoric that primarily aided party integration. By emphasising the Badisch element, traditionalists like Wohleb could thus resurrect the region’s conservative, liberal traditions. Its programme reflected the existing socio-economic structure of Baden’s population promising a ‘mittelständisch und genossenschaftlich orientierte soziale Marktwirtschaft’ with seldom any mention of socialist policies. There was no significant industrial proletarian base in the region and the population was either agrarian or small and medium sized self-employed manufacturing businesses. There was thus little incentive to instigate radical change of previous ownership structures. The BCSV is thus best described as a conservative movement that sought a continuation of the status quo.

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40 Peter Füssler, op. cit., p.207ff.
Other former Centre Party figures in the party such as Gröber,\textsuperscript{441} sought to steer the party back to a reformist Christian socialist programme adopted by other regions of the CDU. Protestants in the party also pressed for the BCSV to change its name to harmonise with the CDU in other parts of Germany, but this did not happen until as late as November 1947 and even subsequent to this, the party retained its traditional Badisch and Centre Party character. The party newspaper, the \textit{Südwestdeutsche Union}, launched as a forum for programme discussions, warned of the party’s parochial tendencies;

"Man bedauert, daß sie nicht den gleichen Namen hat wie die christlich-demokratischen Parteien in den übrigen Zonen was ihrer eigentlichen Anschauung und ihrem gemeinsamen Wollen entspräche und sie auch nicht immer in den Verdacht der Eigenbröteleri und eines überspannten Föderalismus brächte."\textsuperscript{442}

Only during the course of 1946/7 did the opposition to Wohleb’s conservative Centre Party style programme succeed in directing the party towards the socially diverse nature of the CDU as a true \textit{Volkspartei}.\textsuperscript{443} The religious basis adopted by the BCSV’s programme was therefore suspicious.\textsuperscript{444}

As in other CDU groups across Germany, differing political trends within the BCSV in Baden, from trade unionist, to representatives of the Catholic conservative \textit{Mittelstand}, to ordo-liberals, resulted in a delay in the drafting of the party’s ‘Economic and Social Guidelines’ until as late as April 1947 whilst compromise was being sought. It finally appeared however that the Catholic liberals had succeeded in pushing through their programme whilst partially acknowledging ordo-liberal objectives. The programme recognised competition in the economy as the central organising factor and with

\textsuperscript{441} Gröber was an ambiguous character. He had been involved in instrumenting the Reichskonkordat with Hitler believing a compromise could be reached with the NS regime. Gröber’s Hirtenbriefe nevertheless criticised the Church during the national socialist regime, for only staging its protest once Christian figures came under attack.

\textsuperscript{442} Südwestdeutsche Union, Halbmonatszeitschrift der CDU, Landesverband Nordbaden. 1 Jg. August 1946, 1/2, Bad Carl Fuerst from Offenburg, p.12.

\textsuperscript{443} Peter Fässler, op. cit., p.129.

\textsuperscript{444} "Die religiöse Tonart, die in der Parteiprogrammatik angeschlagen wurde, konnte auf grossen Zuspruch hoffen, baute sie doch auf den von der katholischen Kirche vermittelten Ordnungsvorstellungen auf. Zudem ermöglichte die weltanschaulich-religiöse Deutung der Zeitlage dem Einzelnen, Gedanken an eventuell vorhandenen Schuld zu verdrängen, und dem Schuldiggewordenen, wieder reumütig in den Schoss der christlichen Gemeinschaft zurückzukehren." Peter Fässler, op. cit., p.114.
reference to the principles of Natural Law, maintained its commitment to private ownership. Class antagonism would be avoided through emphasis on social partnership between workers and employers, and the development of a new Gemeinschaftsdenken, yet the BCSV did not interpret their aims as socialist. The word Socialism was used for its contemporary relevance and to prevent it being permanently confiscated by their political opponents. The word never found its way into the BCSV programme and when it was used it was also meant in a practical sense of decent and fair treatment of workers and security for old aged and sick or as an expression of solidarity and brotherly behaviour in society. The BCSV can therefore also be seen as proof of the compatibility that exists between Freiburg ordo-liberal thinking and a liberal Catholic conservatism, the dualism that later provided the model of the CDU’s social market economy.

7.7. Württemberg-Hohenzollern

Discussions between Protestants and Catholics in south Württemberg, the French occupied state of Württemberg-Hohenzollern were slow to start up, choosing to first observe Christian party developments in other regions of Germany. The foundation of the Christlich-soziale Volkspartei in the American occupied town of Stuttgart, north-Württemberg in October however, propelled Württemberg-Hohenzollern into action. Following Order no. 23 by the French military that permitted the formation of political parties on 13 December 1945, former Centre Party leader Franz Weiß campaigned almost single-handedly\(^{445}\) to attract Centre Party and Volksdienst members to join a new interdenominational political movement. The first programme from January 6, 1946 corresponded closely to Christian Socialism in other regions of the country. Later versions in March of that year gave even more emphasis to the Christian and social components, but fell short of the Berlin programme’s express condemnation of the ‘bürgerliche Gesellschaftsordnung.’ As with other Christian Socialists across the country, there were competing views as to whether the economic programme should primarily draw on Christian social teaching or on socialist principles, but the need to respond to more immediate and acute concerns in the region’s towns and communities by

\(^{445}\) Uwe Dietrich Adam, “Die CDU in Württemberg-Hohenzollern” in; Paul Ludwig Weinacht (Hrsg), op. cit., p.168.
providing housing and material provisions, pushed such ideological and seemingly long-term decisions, off the agenda.
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8. Consolidation in the CDU

8.1. CDU in the Bizone

When the US proposed merging the British and the American zones in the summer of 1946 to form a ‘Bizone,’ the primary concern was to bring economic autonomy but not yet political autonomy\(^1\) to the region. Speaking before the US military and the German minister presidents for the American zone in Stuttgart on September 6, 1946, US foreign minister J.F Byrnes noted, that it was the express wish of the US people, for Germany to regain its own government. Adenauer registered this as an early indication of US intentions,\(^2\) presenting the CDU with a window of opportunity to become a powerful political party in Germany.

Once the Bizone had been inaugurated in the autumn of 1946, its institutions subsequently underwent three separate phases of development.\(^3\) In the first phase, which lasted until mid 1947, there were five independent administrations or Verwaltungen. These were modified in the second phase when the Bizone expanded to form the ‘Wirtschaftsrat des vereinigten Wirtschaftsgebietes.’ A further restructuring took place in at the beginning of 1948, augmenting the influence of the economic department or administration in the Wirtschaftsrat, called the ‘Verwaltung für Wirtschaft.’ During the last stage in 1948, the Bizone developed into the Trizone when the French zone joined forces with the British and American allies. The Wirtschaftsrat continued to operate in

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1 Uwe Uffelmann, Der Weg zur Bundesrepublik. Wirtschaftliche, gesellschaftliche und staatliche Weichenstellungen 1945-1949, Schwann, Düsseldorf 1988, p.79. See also Günter Plum’s introduction to Akten zur Vorgeschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Band 3, Juni -Dezember 1947, Berarb. von Günter Plum, Hrsg. von Bundesarchiv und Institut für Zeitgeschichte, Oldenbourg, München 1982, p.4.

2 Konrad Adenauer, Erinnerungen, op. cit., p.106.

3 Tilman Pünder, Das bizonale Interregnum, Grotes, Waiblingen 1966.
this form until its activities were terminated in 1949. The entire development was underpinned by two strategies. The first and most decisive strategy during the Bizone’s lifetime was pursued by the British and American allies, (although the US quickly emerged as the most dominant and decisive). The second strategy was determined by the actions of German political representatives\(^\text{4}\) nominated to run the Bizone institutions. The influence of the German political parties and representatives depended entirely on the degree of freedom granted by their respective military occupier to participate in shaping social and economic policy. It is not the aim here to examine the British and American allied policy on Germany\(^\text{5}\) but to focus on the second level of influence, on the policies pursued by the German representatives, specifically those pushed through by the CDU parliamentary group in the Bizone.

It is also beyond the scope of this investigation to examine the CDU’s involvement and the thrust of its policy objectives in all of the Bizone’s separate institutions during all three stages.\(^\text{6}\) It will focus only on those individual committees, departments and bodies in which CDU representatives actively participated in the development of Germany’s social-economic order, questioning whether the policy line adopted by the CDU’s parliamentary representatives in the Bizone between 1946 and 1949 was in line with the party’s political thinking in the American and British zones or if it deviated from the party’s existing programme, in particular the official CDU programme for the British zone, the Ahlen programme.

The CDU’s Hermann Pünder and director of the Bizone’s \textit{Verwaltungsrat} from 1948, later noted that in the years after 1949 there was a tendency to portray the CDU’s political representatives in the Bizone as all having been in favour of market economic reforms. But this conceals the reality of the level of scepticism towards introducing a


\(^6\) For a detailed account of the institutional arrangements of the Bizone see T. Pünder, op. cit.
liberal economy still shown by many members at the time.\(^7\) The remark indicates a young, disparate, disoriented party, wrangling with its members’ commitment to both social reform and conservative, liberal traditions - a party desperate to avoid the laissez-faire economy of the past, but anxious of the political consequences of adopting socialism. At the heart of this section’s inquiry is the question how Erhard’s Social Market Economy, which was adopted as the basis for the CDU’s Düsseldorf manifesto and its campaign slogan for west Germany’s first federal elections in 1949, was able to satisfy the diverse cross-section of the party’s political aspirations.

**Bizone administrations**

The establishment of joint administrations for the British and American zones served the allies’ primary aim of solving acute food shortages and stagnating industrial output. There was also a clear desire for the zones to merge by Germans in the US zone, since they would benefit from a share in the economic potential of the Rhine-Ruhr region.\(^8\)

The Bizone administrations were also set up in response to the growing realisation that the original aims to set up central German run administrations jointly with the French and the Soviet zones were unlikely ever to succeed. The economic imperative for forming the bizone administrations quickly revealed that economic matters were also inextricably linked to questions of the state’s political framework.\(^9\) It was illusory to imagine that economic co-operation could take place between the zones without paying equal attention to the region’s political structure.

After the establishment of the Bizone’s institutional and administrative bodies confronted German political representatives were confronted with the decision over what basic form


\(^9\) On 20 July 1946 US military governor McNarney had recommended one economic system to be applied across all four occupied zones. The British military were in favour but the suggestion was rejected by French and Soviet forces.

\(^10\) Gerold Ambrosius, op. cit., p.7.
the German economy should take - a central, state planned or a free market oriented economy. Until this point, the parties had had little direct influence over the management of individual administrations in the British and the American zones. as this task had been carried out by appointed German officials who had often come to enjoy close relations with the military authorities. German political parties and the trade unions frequently came into conflict over policy issues with German state administration officials and the minister presidents in the British and American zones. This political alienation meant that until now political parties had exercised the freedom to discuss and air their policy recommendations without restraint or interference, but also without any real influence. The establishment of the Bizone however offered parties the first real forum to shift attention from their philosophical, ideological and largely hypothetically formulated programmes to focus on the practical application of their ideas in a real life political environment. State level governments however were now forced to cede decision making powers to Bizone departmental level, where representatives were drawn from the German political parties and a fairer sharing of power was gradually attained. Demands by the parties for an immediate parliamentary structure to be set up in the Bizone, went unheeded as long as the US and British allies insisted that the joint institutions constituted no more than an economic merger of the two zones.

Early indications that the Bizone’s first phase would fail, were evident. The five administrations were divided geographically between both zones, to avoid being forced to nominate a capital city and give the appearance of political fusion. But problems resulted when insufficient co-ordination and information exchange took place between ministries and states showed uncertainty where and with whom powers lay. Besides clashes between Germans’ insistence on introducing a parliamentary structure and the allies’ economic objectives for the region, conflict among Germans themselves added a

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11 Walter Vogel/Christoph Weisz, op. cit., p.27.
12 Gerold Ambrosius, op. cit., p.54.
13 Walter Vogel/Christoph Weisz, op. cit., p.84.
further obstacle to building cross party co-operation in the Bizone. The impasse developed as the states in the American and the British zones competed to install their own representatives in senior administrative positions and to secure their own state’s ideological legitimacy in every Bizone institution. Each zone attempted to impose its own zonal model of economic and political organisation on the nascent Bizone. States in the British zone for example, sought to maintain the centralised economic model that they had become familiar with in the British zone administration or Zonenbeirat, whilst the states in the American zone defended the federalist structure of its Länderrat. Adenauer was actively involved in discussions to reform the structure of the British zone Zonenbeirat, and put forward recommendations that would increase the overall influence of political parties. He argued that the parties were more democratically accountable to the people in the British zone than the military nominated German administrators, but vehemently rejected the American zone Länderrat model for the British zone.

Ironically the dispute over whether a federal or a centralised economic order should be adopted for the new Bizone mirrored the conflict that had, until now, characterised the CDU’s own regional discussions. Although the CDU groups in the south German states of the US zone recognised a degree of central economic planning was unavoidable for tackling the urgent economic difficulties of post-war reconstruction, they nevertheless feared that their traditional southern mittelständisch style economy could become subsumed by the industrial might of the Rhine-Ruhr region. With the exception of

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16 The Länderrat of the American zone elected its candidates for the Bizone. In the British Zone, selection was less democratic as individuals were nominated by the British military authorities.


18 Activities surrounding the initiation of the Bizone unfolded chiefly between the Länder and the zonal authorities as leaders of the political parties were given little opportunity to participate. Wolfram Werner, op. cit., p.86.

19 In view of his own leadership style, it is ironic that Adenauer should argue; “der süddeutsche Zustand alles andere als erstrebenswert ist. In Südästerreich habe ich mich darauf vorsichtig auf den Führergedanken, in dem sie den Länderchef mit einem großen Stamm von Beamten immer frei und willkürlich schalten und walten lassen. Ich kann namens meiner Partei erklären, daß wir den Führergedanken überall dort erkämpfen, wo er sich bemerkbar macht.” Konrad Adenauer, minutes of “Tagung des Hauptausschusses des Zonenbeirats der britischen besetzten Zone in Bad Godesberg, 14. Dezember 1946” in; Walter Vogel/Christoph Weiss, op. cit. p.1130ff. Theodor Steltzer disagreed with Adenauer arguing that the British Zone ‘Zonenbeirat’ should look instead to adopting the political model of the Länderrat and focus on building joint Bizone institutions, not separate ones in each zone.
Hesse, the south German states put up a fierce resistance to full economic merger with the British zone. Ongoing battles between differing British and American occupation policies also frequently led to a conflict of interests for German representatives, since they were not always clear whether they were representing their political party, their state government or their military occupier. The south German state representatives for example had been issued specific guidelines by the American military for conducting negotiations with British zone representatives in the Bizone, which prompted them to defend free market economics, private business rights, and to reduce bureaucratic planning to a minimum.  

Political parties in the British zone had been freer than their counterparts in the American zone to publicly articulate their policies and their programmes since they were not directly answerable to the British military authorities. The British zone Bizone institutions were more party political in tone and the CDU party in particular had succeeded in establishing itself as a credible force there. The Ahlen programme had been ratified in the North Rhine-Westphalia parliament, bringing widespread nationalisation plans to the region, and an elevated status to the CDU in the British zone as a whole. Compared to the disparate regional CDU parties in the American zone states, the British zone CDU also boasted a superior organisation. It had concentrated the party’s activities in North Rhine-Westphalia and had formed a special Zonenverband and a Zonenausschuß for representatives from the CDU in all states of the British zone. In terms of a political manifesto, neither the CDU in the US zone states or the CDU in the northern states in the British zone had a programme to compete with the Ahlen programme of the CDU in North Rhine-Westphalia. Without the political weaponry of a popular party manifesto, the CDU in the south-west state governments of the US zone lacked the consolidated, united voice with which it could effectively counter the British zone proposals and so contributed to their gradual loss of political influence, whilst Adenauer’s CDU in the British zone, gained in political ascendancy.

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20 Gerold Ambrosius, op. cit., p.64f.
21 Walter Vogel/Christoph Weisz. op. cit., p.28.
Of the five\textsuperscript{22} administrations or \textit{Verwaltungsräte} established in the Bizone in January 1947, it quickly emerged that the \textit{Verwaltung für Wirtschaft} or Economics Committee, would become the most powerful.\textsuperscript{23} Situated in Minden in the British zone, site of the former British zone \textit{Zentralamt für Wirtschaft}, it was perhaps inevitable that the new \textit{Verwaltung für Wirtschaft} should inherit the centralist structures that characterised the British occupation, even though this further aggravated the south German states of the American zone.\textsuperscript{24} The SPD currently held the leadership of individual economic ministries in all eight Bizone states, and soon the \textit{Verwaltungsrat für Wirtschaft} also looked as if it would become a SPD domaine. Indeed after an initial brief period in which Hesse's Rudolf Mueller (LPD) held the leadership of the \textit{Verwaltungsrat für Wirtschaft}, the position was taken over by the SPD's Victor Agartz in January 1947. On visiting Minden, the social democrat and general secretary of the south German \textit{Länderrat} Erich Roßmann, expressed concern that the Bizone administrations in the British zone were being set up with 'treibhausartiger Raschheit',\textsuperscript{25} a deliberate move so as to present the decision over the Bizone's future political course with a fait accompli. Roßmann knew the power potential housed in the \textit{Verwaltung für Wirtschaft}, remarking that those who had the command of the economy would become the country's future leaders.\textsuperscript{26} After his nomination, Agartz set about installing a centrally administered \textit{Bewirtschaftungssystem}, that as Erhard later claimed, if it had been allowed to continue, would have led to a continuation of the strict war economy.\textsuperscript{27} This immediately triggered

\textsuperscript{22} These were the departments Economy, Food and agriculture, transport, finance, post and telecommunications. They were headed by a 'Verwaltungsrat' or Executive Committee.

\textsuperscript{23} The worsening economic outlook and catastrophic food shortages led the committee's later leader, Ludwig Erhard, to remark; "Es war der erste Ausdruck für das Erkenntnis, daß der Wiederaufbau der deutschen Wirtschaft einer gemeinsamen deutschen zentralen Verwaltung bedarf." Ludwig Erhard, "Das Aufbauwerk der Verwaltung für Wirtschaft" in; Politisches Jahrbuch, CDU/CSU, 1. Jg, 1950, p.116.

\textsuperscript{24} Their protest was voiced by Ludwig Erhard, representative for Bavaria. See minutes of the meeting of the 'Verwaltungsrat für Wirtschaft' on 26th September 1946, Walter Vogel/Christoph Weisz, op.cit. p.871ff.

\textsuperscript{25} Aufzeichnung Roßmann, cited in Wolfgang Benz, Von der Besatzungsherrschaft ... op. cit. See also Christoph Weisz, "Deutsche Überlegungen zur Bildung der Bizone. Erich Roßmanns Reise in die Britische Zone im August 1946" in; Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte, Jg 22, Heft 1, Januar 1974. p.204-225.

\textsuperscript{26} Erich Roßmann on 10. September 1946 in Walter Vogel/Christoph Weisz, op. cit., p.872.

\textsuperscript{27} Ludwig Erhard, Das Aufbauwerk der Verwaltung für Wirtschaft, op. cit., p.116.
opposition not only from the more liberal CDU groups in the states of the US zone,\textsuperscript{28} but also from the CDU’s Christian Socialist wing in the CDU in the British zone, who also vehemently opposed Agartz’s extreme Marxist-Socialism. CDU antagonism towards Agartz thus sparked an unprecedented campaign of attacks on the SPD’s economic dominance, indirectly strengthening the position of the liberals within the CDU\textsuperscript{29} who campaigned for a more liberalised economy. Besides voicing criticism, the CDU did not offer their own viable alternative to Agartz’s much derided economic policy, and is a clear indication that by 1947 the CDU had still not managed to sufficiently consolidate liberals and socialists in its own ranks to produce a party consensus on economic policy.

\textit{Wirtschaftsrat für das Vereinigte Wirtschaftsgebiet}

When the Moscow meeting of allied foreign ministers in March and April 1947 failed for the fifth time to formulate a joint occupation policy for all four allied zones, the US and British allies agreed to undertake a reform\textsuperscript{30} of their Bizone, concentrating on economic reconstruction in the western zones, in the knowledge that this would lay the foundation of west European integration.\textsuperscript{31} The existing five administrations of the Bizone were restructured to create what officially became known as the \textit{Wirtschaftsrat für das Vereinigte Wirtschaftsgebiet} with a capital city in Frankfurt and comprising a separate economic council— the \textit{Wirtschaftsrat}, an executive council - the \textit{Exekutivrat}, plus a number of executive directors - \textit{die Direktoren}.\textsuperscript{32} The inauguration of the second stage of the Bizone, the \textit{Wirtschaftsrat für das vereinigte Wirtschaftsgebiet}, has since been regarded as the birth place of the Social Market Economy and the beginning of the development of a west German government.\textsuperscript{33} By introducing a parliamentary structure

\textsuperscript{28} The south German Economics ministers opposed Agartz because they feared distortion of “die Angelegenheit auf das politische Gebiet gespielt.” See minutes of the meeting of the ‘Verwaltungsrat für Wirtschaft on 26 September 1946,’ in Walter Vogel/Christoph Welsz, op. cit., p.872.

\textsuperscript{29} Wolfgang Benz, Vorform des Weststaats, op. cit., p.382. The US and UK allies welcomed Agartz’s appointment no more than the CDU. The allies would have preferred a non party affiliated individual for the position.

\textsuperscript{30} Das Abkommen über Neugestaltung der zweizonalen Wirtschaftsstellen, May 1947.

\textsuperscript{31} Hans Peter Schwarz, Vom Reich zur Bundesrepublik, Luchterhand. Neuwied/Berlin 1966, p.81.

\textsuperscript{32} Members of the Wirtschaftsrat were elected by the Länder parliaments, the Executive Council comprised one representative from each Land government. The individual administrations were assigned individual directors to manage their separate activities.

\textsuperscript{33} “Die Ereignisse im Wirtschaftsrat waren für die Entwicklung des parlamentarisch-demokratischen Lebens in Deutschland ebenso von Bedeutung wie für die gesamte zukünftige Politik der Westzonen, insbesondere für die Wirtschafts- und Sozialpolitik.” Gerold Ambrosius, op. cit., p.91.
to the Wirtschaftsrat, the Bizone as a whole became more democratic in structure and the Wirtschaftsrat’s legislative powers meant resolutions became binding for the individual states. The opportunity to put economic policies into practice with a degree of legal permanency in the region was quickly identified by the CDU group. US general Clay’s decision to select the Wirtschaftsrat’s candidates according to their party’s parliamentary majorities in the constituent states of the Bizone\(^\text{34}\) was a move that not only advanced democracy but most importantly, resulted in the predominance of Christian Democratic and Liberal Party representatives over Social Democrats. The Americans believed that the new Wirtschaftsrat could manage economic policy with a broader perspective than the individual state governments had done so far\(^\text{35}\) and would be better equipped than the previous five independent administrations to co-ordinate activities. State minister presidents and their local administrators began redirecting their political focus from responsibility to their state parliaments, towards backing the aims of their party political affiliation instead. The status of the parties progressively surpassed that of the zones’ state parliamentary representatives.

The socio-economic spectrum of the twenty CDU representatives in the Wirtschaftsrat was almost as diverse as that in the CDU party itself, although those from industry, banking professions and private businesses outnumbered those from trade union backgrounds.\(^\text{36}\) Having failed to consolidate a unified party programme among the diverse strands in the CDU in the two years since its foundation, the party’s parliamentary group could not be issued with clear instructions of the political line it should now follow in the Wirtschaftsrat. Even the predominance of liberal members did not guarantee that the CDU parliamentary group would steer a liberal, economic course. It soon emerged that the Wirtschaftsrat’s socio-economic policy as a whole would not be driven by pragmatic and objective cross-party initiatives to resolve Germany’s economic issues, but by fiercely competitive ideologies of the main political parties. Party

\(^{34}\) This translated to 20 representatives from the CDU/CSU, 20 from SPD, 4 from FDP 3 from KPD, 2 from the Centre, 2 from DP and 1 from WAV. Rainer Salzmann, Die CDU/CSU im Frankfurter Wirtschaftsrat. Protokolle der Unionsfraktion. 1947-1949, Band 13, Drose, Düsseldorf 1988. p.8.


\(^{36}\) Gerold Ambrosius, op. cit., p.88.
representatives were often politically motivated personalities, chosen for their political nous rather than their economic expertise. At the launch of the Wirtschaftsrat, Friedrich Holzapfel, who became the CDU’s parliamentary committee leader in the Wirtschaftsrat, also spoke of the many ambiguities that continued to disable the CDU’s profile as a nationally unified party. He called for a new economic policy to solve the 'jämmerliche Situation,’ that had come about through the dismantling of Germany’s industrial infrastructure and the stifling of production.\textsuperscript{37} He wanted to overturn the socialist programme of the Bizone’s first phase to embrace a freer market, but he then paradoxically went on to reaffirm the validity of the Ahlen Programme as the basis for the party’s economic policy. The contradiction in Holzapfel’s own remarks show that it was still too soon for the CDU to commit itself to a liberal economic strategy. Further consolidation and conciliatory discussions were needed in its ranks to accommodate and restrain the loose canons in its socialist wing.\textsuperscript{38} The Wirtschaftsrat would eventually provide the forum for the CDU to actively move its programme towards a more liberal agenda, but for the sake of party unity, politicians meanwhile cautiously continued to chant from the same Ahlen hymn sheet.

The CDU’s participation in the Wirtschaftsrat became immensely significant for the CDU’s programme as a whole. The CDU parliamentary group was now the only group in the entire party dedicated to developing the party’s economic policy. Policy discussions in the mainstream party had virtually ground to a halt and economic policy had not been properly addressed since the publication of the Ahlen Programme. The Economic and Social Committee that had helped to draft the Ahlen programme in the British zone had last met in January 1947. Adenauer’s decision in March to split the Committee into a separate economic committee led by Franz Etzel and a social committee led by Albers, reflected a shift in priority from social policy to economic reform, but was also an act that would undermine and weaken the Christian Socialists in the British zone and correspondingly strengthen the party’s liberal wing. Etzel’s


\textsuperscript{38} It soon emerged that the views of the trade unionist representatives in the Wirtschaftsrat’s CDU parliamentary group were more liberal than those in the CDU’s social pressure groups, the Sozialausschüsse.
economic committee later formulated the first draft of the party’s election winning Düsseldorf Programme in 1949.

The CDU participated in a bürgerliche majority in the Wirtschaftsrat, sharing a coalition with the Bavarian Christian Socialist Union (CSU) and the Democratic Party (DP) and enjoying support from the FDP, Centre and WAV when voting on most major issues. The liberal coalition further occupied all five Executive directorships in the Bizon. The CDU, otherwise accustomed to sharing power in many state government coalitions with the SPD, was now freed of socialist policy constraints. The CDU Regierungspartei with its liberal majority in the Wirtschaftsrat was now in a stronger position to reject the SPD’s socialist proposals, and gradually socialism could be pushed to the periphery of the Wirtschaftsrat’s agenda. The CDU’s own Christian Socialist strand, now also facing a liberal majority, learnt to abandon its earlier hopes of a socialist coalition with the SPD. The CDU parliamentary group could now focus exclusively on developing liberal solutions to the Bizon’s economic chaos.

Based on the number of CDU majorities in the regional parliaments, Holzapfel claimed the CDU therefore represented the strongest party in the Bizon, and this granted his party the automatic right to nominate the President of the Wirtschaftsrat. After expressing initial disagreement, the Communists (KP) and the Social Democrats (SPD) withheld their protest and allowed the CDU’s Erich Kähler to take up the Presidency. Remembering earlier experiences with the SPD’s Victor Agartz, the CDU was also keen to nominate the candidate for the director of the Wirtschaftsrat’s most important administration, the Verwaltung für Wirtschaft. The CDU knew this position was more than managing current economic shortages, it was an opportunity to define the Bizon’s entire future economic strategy. Adenauer was not a member of the Wirtschaftsrat, but

39 Peter Horn and Bruno Hessenmüller, “CDU Verantwortung im Zweizonen-Wirtschaftsrat” in; Politisches Jahrbuch der CDU/CSU, Bruno Dörpinghaus/Kurt Witt (Hrsg), 1 Jg, K.G Lohse, Frankfurt/Main 1950, p.108.

40 The five ‘Direktoren’ or administrations were directed by Economics Johannes Semler (CSU), Food, Agriculture and forestry Hans Schlange-Schönening (CDU), Finance (Schlewind), Transport (Walter Strauss) and Post (Christian Blank) (CDU).

41 A.R.L Gurland, op. cit., p.387.

42 Gerold Ambrosius, op. cit., p.92.
as the leading figure of the CDU in the British zone, he had not only exercised decisive influence in nominating individuals for the Wirtschaftsrat but also made frequent personal interventions in the CDU parliamentary party. His decision to intervene on behalf of the nomination for the post of director of the Verwaltung für Wirtschaft was indicative of the profile and influence the position would wield. Adenauer spelt out the consequences if the CDU were to sacrifice this significant post to the SPD at the occasion of the second meeting of the CDU parliamentary group in the Wirtschaftsrat; "die CDU in der britischen Zone einen Stoß erhalte, von dem sie nicht mehr erholen werde." The SPD argued that since the CDU’s interests were dangerously close to the former capitalist-liberals, the SPD should occupy the post of director of the Verwaltung für Wirtschaft. Finally the SPD volunteered to go into opposition allowing the CSU’s Johannes Semler to be unanimously elected as director. The CDU parliamentary group in the Wirtschaftsrat insisted that its candidate should be someone who was ‘100% behind Ahlen’ yet Semler, who was an advocate of social justice and a state monitored economy for an interim period during economic reconstruction, remained a liberal figure whose commitment to the socialist principles of Ahlen was at best tenuous. He saw the revival of the German coal industry and export market as the key to economic

43 Rainer Salzmann, op. cit., p.10.

44 Adenauer welcomed the CDU and SPD controversy over the post of director of the economics department; "Adenauer wünschte, daß die CDU vor den Augen der Wähler als scharf konturierte politische Alternative zur Sozialdemokratie erschien, war daher auf öffentliche Distanz zur SPD bedacht und mißbilligte das Frankfurter Einheits- und Harmoniegetue." Volker Hentschel, Ludwig Erhard. Ein Politikerleben, Olzog, München 1996, p.44.


47 Adenauer welcomed the concession by the SPD to go into opposition as this signalled a move towards a more parliamentary model of a party in government and a party in opposition. Länder governments largely still fell back on coalition arrangements for the post war period of reconstruction. The SPD incorrectly anticipated that the Länder would ultimately wield more power than the Bizeone administrations.

48 The CDU offered the SPD the post of director of the Economics Council in exchange for three of the eight economic ministries dominated by the SPD but was not accepted.

regeneration and the removal of state subsidies and a realistic pricing policy as essential
"wenn wir zu einer freien Wirtschaft wieder kommen wollen."\textsuperscript{50}

Although the CDU policy line in the \textit{Wirtschaftsrat} still required considerable
clarification within the party as a whole, the nomination of a CDU representative as
director of the Verwaltung für Wirtschaft marked the beginning of a more aggressive
profiling of the CDU's programme, one that would sufficiently contrast to the SPD's
programme in future anticipated elections. A large gulf continued to divide the
programme pursued by the CDU in the Bizone and that followed by mainstream CDU
groups in the states and regions. This is exemplified by debates conducted in the regional
land parliaments of Hesse, North Rhine-Westphalia and Bavaria, where the CDU
continued to campaign for the nationalisation of key industries. A number of CDU party
members also observed the new style of confrontational politics between the parties in
the \textit{Wirtschaftsrat} with scepticism. Christian socialists including Karl Arnold and Jakob
Kaiser remained committed to building consensus politics and cross-party initiatives in
economic and social policy. Criticism also came from south German CDU
representatives, Walter Strauß and Heinrich Köhler and the Bavarian CSU figure Hans
Ehard, who all expressed their disagreement with the parliamentary group’s tactical
politicking in the \textit{Wirtschaftsrat}. It was an issue which provoked Heinrich Köhler,
Württemberg-Baden's representative in the Executive council, to resign on August 9,
1947. Observing general unrest that the nomination of the economics director was
causing in the CDU party, the \textit{Wirtschaftsrat}'s President Erich Köhler even
recommended ceding his post to a SPD figure\textsuperscript{51} after all, much to the consternation of
the rest of the CDU parliamentary party.

Subsequent CDU regional party conferences would be a test of the true level of support
within the party for the growing strength of the liberal wing determining CDU policy in
the \textit{Wirtschaftsrat}. The CDU's first party conference in Recklinghausen, North-Rhine
Westphalia, on August 14-15, 1947, was an opportunity for party leaders to provide

\textsuperscript{50} Johannes Semler in Rainer Salzmann, Protokolle der Unionsfraktion 1947-1949, op. cit.,

p.54-56.
clarification and justification for the apparent shift in party policy based on developments in the Wirtschaftsrat. Yet Holzapfel, himself a member of the liberal wing of the party, offered little clarification in his speech on economic and social policy. In his own speech Adenauer also upheld the Ahlen programme as a; “Markstein ... in der Geschichte des deutschen Wirtschafts- und Sozialebens,” but did not neglect to emphasise the importance of the ‘Machtverteilende Prinzip’ in political and economic policy to avoid a centralisation of state power, and arguably was steering towards a more liberal interpretation of the Ahlen programme. Adenauer still wanted to dilute the Christian Socialist influence in the party, but had not yet signalled that he was in favour of a full-blown, liberal, market economic course. His intention it seemed was simply to bring about a more flexible interpretation of Ahlen. Franz Etzel concluded the CDU’s conference at Recklinghausen with a treatise on how the Bizone’s economic system had failed under the previous SPD direction, indicating that the system of centralised economic planning was both corrupt and inefficient. He recommended expanding the social policy of the Ahlen programme into an economic programme as a way of solving the current chaos;

“Wir müssen unser Ahlener Programm, das im wesentlichen ein soziales Programm ist, hinaus zu einer konstruktiven Wirtschaftsform kommen.”

The statement signals a new interpretation of Ahlen. Until this point there had never been any doubt that Ahlen represented a comprehensive economic programme, indeed its subtitle called it an Economic and Social Programme. Etzel was correct to point out that the contents of Ahlen had never been sufficiently specific to offer clear guidelines for an economic system, yet his comment indicates his intention to now use the programme’s


53 Gerold Ambrosius, op. cit., p.96.

54 Born in the Catholic Rhineland Adenauer was at heart anti-liberal. He showed himself to be in favour of an institutional, sectoral rather than a national, free market approach to managing economic policy. His endorsement for a more liberal market programme for Germany, did not come until 1948 when he observed that the success of Erhard’s economic formula would serve his wider political aims of European integration.

vagueness to introduce more pronounced liberal elements into the party through a separate economic programme.

Jakob Kaiser also attended the Recklinghausen conference, to voice the growing suspicions of many in the Christian Socialist wing of his party, who thought that the party should focus on a ‘Neugestaltung’ of society and not on ‘Restauration’ of former capitalist structures. Yet Kaiser was also closely observing a changing tide of opinion in the party and appeared to be uncomfortable when he now spoke of the ‘Sozialistische Zug der Zeit.’ From summer 1947 Kaiser had begun to lose his influence with some key Christian Socialists in the west, as they began to view Adenauer’s new liberal course more favourably. The tendency was encouraged by the threatening development of Soviet style socialism in the east, but also by the worsening economic situation in the west, where centralised economic planning was failing to correct social imbalances. The CDU in the Soviet zone also held their party conference in the summer of 1947, on September 6-10, in Berlin, just four weeks after the meeting in Recklinghausen. At the meeting, Kaiser no longer spoke of Christian Socialism but merely of ‘die soziale Haltung,’ a considerably diluted form of socialism, to bind forces between all CDU groups, and advocated a ‘gesunde Mitte’ between capitalism and collectivism. Karl Arnold’s address to the Berlin party conference also denied audiences of anticipated criticism of Adenauer’s new course, evidence that even Arnold, one of the staunchest of Christian Socialists had begun to see liberal market economics as more promising than Christian Socialist solutions.

Against the background of obfuscatory party political statements by leading members of the CDU, Walter Strauß, Semler’s deputy director at the Verwaltung für Wirtschaft, criticised the Bizone parties’ failure to devise a viable and comprehensive economic system and for focusing; “mehr auf parteihistorischer oder emotionaler, als auf erkenntnismäßiger Grundlage beruhte.”56 The CDU had veritably succeeded in formulating its own policies on a theoretical level, but it sorely lacked a pragmatic individual who could translate those ideas into practice in the Bizone. Erhard remarked shortly before stepping up to take up that challenge;

56 Walter Strauß, Wirtschaftsverfassung und Staatsverfassung, Recht auf Staat in Geschichte und Gegenwart, Tübingen 1952, p.165.
From August 1947 the CDU acquired a more pragmatic approach to policy. The introduction of the Marshall Plan from the summer of 1947, confirmed some benefits of following British and US liberal objectives in the Wirtschaftsrat. The western allies for example had agreed to permit an increase in west German production and exports to revive the economy. This prompted the CDU Zonenausschuß in the British zone to support the initiative by producing a document entitled; *Die neue Wirtschaftspolitik in Frankfurt*, backing the liberalisation of consumer goods manufacturing, curtailment of the existing Bewirtschaftungssystem and welcoming the introduction of market economic principles into the economic system. Positive endorsement of US allied policies also enabled the CDU to win greater influence in the Wirtschaftsrat over the more principled and rigid approach of the SPD.

The real test of where the CDU stood on central economic planning policies came with the so-called Bewirtschaftungnotgesetz. CDU representative of the Wirtschaftsrat’s smaller economic committee, the Wirtschaftsausschuß, Alex Haffner, criticised the decision by the Wirtschaftsrat to introduce this emergency legislation to relieve immediate pressures in the economy. The issue soon developed into the first serious policy dispute between the SPD and the CDU parliamentary group in the Wirtschaftsrat in the autumn of 1947.58 Failing to formulate an equivocal position, the CDU is accused of reverting to its customary *dilatorische Taktik*.59 Haffner quickly resumed the party line set of Ahlen, suggesting that the CDU still believed planning was necessary; “Wir sind die letzten die sich gegen eine solche (planvolle Wirtschaftsführung) sträuben.” But pressure from its liberal coalition partner, the FDP, forced the CDU to refrain from using the word ‘planning’ and to actively stage opposition to the Bewirtschaftungsgesetz,

57 Ludwig Erhard, *Das Aufbauwerk der Verwaltung für Wirtschaft ...* op. cit., p.117.
58 “... bei dem grundlegenden Bewirtschaftungsgesetz” klagten die Gegensätze der Grundaussagen, so daß dieses Gesetz gegen die Stimmen der SPD verabschiedet werden mußte.” Peter Horn/Bruno Hessenmüller, op. cit., p.109.
demanding relaxation in the economy and more market freedom. The inter-party debate over the \textit{Bewirtschaftungsnotgesetz} revealed the Union’s inchoate and confused economic policy.\textsuperscript{60} There was still no guarantee that the future economic system would be based on a market economy any more than that it would be a centrally planned system. Despite a core of liberal representatives in the CDU, many members in the \textit{Verwaltung für Wirtschaft} still favoured some degree of economic planning,\textsuperscript{61} prompting real doubts whether Semler had in fact made any headway as director of the \textit{Verwaltung für Wirtschaft} in promoting a more liberal course.\textsuperscript{62}

\textbf{The ‘second’ \textit{Wirtschaftsrat für das Vereinigte Wirtschaftsgebiet}}

At the December 1947 meeting of foreign ministers in London a final attempt to coordinate all four allied policies on a joint strategy for Germany failed and confirmed the western allies’ (now also including the Benelux states) desire to form an independent west German state. Organisational difficulties emerged within the Bizone, prompting a third re-shuffle of its internal structure. US General Clay reported that;

\begin{quotation}
the Bizone organisation would not be fully effective until it became something very close to government even though it was not called one or given any powers of sovereignty.”\textsuperscript{63}
\end{quotation}

Kaiser in Berlin and Adolf Süsterhenn from the south west CDU expressed their concern that the reshuffle meant the beginning of a separate west German state. The restructuring of the Bizone administrations was certainly akin to that of a parliamentary system; the \textit{Wirtschaftsrat} formed a parliament, the new \textit{Länderrat} an upper house, and the new \textit{Verwaltungsrat} the cabinet. The structure of the \textit{Wirtschaftsrat} remained the same but doubled the number of members to produce a liberal majority of 44 CDU/CSU/DP and

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext[60]{\textsuperscript{60} "Die Fraktion schwankte zwischen einem schnellen Abbau der Bewirtschaftung und der Rückkehr zu einer freien wettbewerblichen Marktverfassung und dem Auffüllen eines Systems, das zwar ebenfalls möglichst viel Freiheit ließ, auf eine direkte Planung und Lenkung aber nicht verzichtete. Eine Entscheidung über die endgültige ordnungspolitische Auffassung stand weiterhin aus." Gerold Ambrosius, op. cit., p.143.}

\footnotetext[61]{\textsuperscript{61} This was modified once the Wirtschaftsrat augmented its political influence over the direction of the Verwaltung and could intervene in the implementation, the ‘Durchführungsverordnung’ of the ‘Bewirtschaftungsgesetz.’}

\footnotetext[62]{\textsuperscript{62} Gerold Ambrosius, op. cit., p.142.}

\footnotetext[63]{\textsuperscript{63} Lucius D. Clay, Decision in Germany, Greenwood Press Publishers, Connecticut 1950, p.175.}
\end{footnotes}
eight FDP MPs against 40 SPD and 6 KPD MPs. The Länderrat, a replacement for the former Executive Council, became a representative council for the Bizone states with rights to veto resolutions and legislation imposed on it by the Wirtschaftsrat. Köhler himself had argued that only through a commitment to federalism would the Wirtschaftsrat succeed. The Länderrat was thus a response to this and other criticisms by individual minister presidents that they had become marginalised by the power of the Wirtschaftsrat. The Länderrat therefore granted individual states more influence in shaping policy in the Wirtschaftsrat. Finally the Verwaltungsrat was erected as an umbrella organ to manage the activities of the individual Direktoren, or administrations. The directors of all individual administrations were CDU personalities including the Verwaltungsrat’s co-ordinating director, Hermann Pünder and were elected by and subordinate to the Wirtschaftsrat.

The restructuring process introduced more conservative-liberal CDU individuals into the Wirtschaftsrat, who resisted any compromise with the SPD on socialist policies, and more strongly backed the interests of the German Mittelstand. President Köhler sought to allay suspicions of growing liberalism in the group, assuring members that the economic council had not changed as a result of the allied restructuring of the Wirtschaftsrat and denied rumours suggesting meetings had secretly been held to discuss the foundation of a separate west German state. There were fears in the CDU parliamentary party that coalitions forged between the CDU and SPD in some state


65 The administrations were led by Erhard (Economy), Frohne (Transport), Schlange-Schöningen (Food), Hartmann (Finance) and Schuberth (Post).


67 "Es haben im Bereich des Wirtschaftsrates weder geheime Konferenzen stattgefunden noch sind Verfassungsentwürfe ausgearbeitet worden." Erich Köhler, at the 9th meeting of the Wirtschaftsrat, on 18th December 1947 in; Christoph Weisz /Hans Woller, op. cit., p.238. This statement contradicts Köhler’s earlier admission at a CDU meeting in Frankfurt in November 1947 when he pointed out the Wirtschaftsrat would potentially become a powerful instrument with which it could influence political events. “Es ist immerhin fest, der Wirtschaftsrat ist allen theoretischen Reden zum Trotz eine gesetzgeberische Realität geworden, und er wird es bleiben und wird es mehr denn je sein werden und sein müssen.” Erich Köhler, Ohne Illusionen - Politik der Realität. Reden. Walther Gericke., Wiesbaden 1949, p.36.
parliaments, could risk derailing the liberal programme now being pursued by the CDU/DP coalition in the Wirtschaftsrat. The decision by the CDU in Lower Saxony to form a coalition with the SPD in spring 1948 for example, provoked Holzapfel to intervene, warning them their actions were not consistent with the CDU’s policy line in the Wirtschaftsrat and could have ‘intolerable economic consequences’. This highlights the unresolved conflict between the CDU’s agenda in the Wirtschaftsrat and that pursued by CDU representatives in the state governments and the regional CDU state parties, but also of the increasing power of the CDU parliamentary party in the Bizon to determine policy for the whole of the party. Many CDU members in the individual states remained sceptical of the motives of its representatives in the Wirtschaftsrat, criticising above all the lack of democratic accountability in the Wirtschaftsrat, where representatives had not been democratically elected by their own party.

Comments by Semler in January 1948 criticising the allies for the region’s ongoing economic crisis, swiftly led to his dismissal as director of the Verwaltung für Wirtschaft. On March 2, 1948 at the 12th meeting of the Wirtschaftsrat, a successor was nominated, not from the ranks of the CDU/CSU, but a non-party affiliated liberal, Ludwig Erhard. CDU representatives had been slow to elect a candidate, preferring to leave the post vacant until they had decided on their political economic course, but this was denounced by the SPD candidate Schoettle in the Wirtschaftsrat as a tactical move to delay the decision in view of the forthcoming currency reform. The candidate election was planned to take place on March 1, but was postponed as the CDU attempted to remove Ludwig Erhard’s name from the list of seven other nominees. Appeals not to disrupt the CDU’s coalition with the FDP however finally persuaded members to accept

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69 For details on Semler's dismissal, see Wolfgang Benz, Von der Besatzungsherrschaft.... op. cit., p. 86-88.

70 ‘eine bewusste Taktik im Hinblick auf mögliche wirtschaftspolitische Entscheidungen.’ Minutes of 12th meeting of the Wirtschaftsrat on 2.3.1948, in; Christoph Weisz /Hans Woller, op. cit., p.332. Blum also points out that the members of the ‘Verwaltung für Wirtschaft’ department were also hesitant to commit themselves to any fixed economic policy before the currency reform had been implemented. For example the Verwaltung chose deliberately not to respond to the law put forward by the Wirtschaftsrat to relieve the hoarding of goods in case this could interfere with the currency reform and subsequent economic plans. Reinhard Blum, Soziale Marktwirtschaft, J.C.B Mohr (Paul Siebeck), Tübingen 1969, p.264.
Erhard’s candidature. Erhard did not gain a majority. He received only 47 votes from the Wirtschaftsrat’s 104 MPs of which no more than a dozen could have been CDU/CSU votes. He would not have been elected if the SPD had given a clear ‘no’ vote instead of indignantly returning blank slips into the voting urn. All blank slips were classed as abstentions, with the result that Erhard secured sufficient yes votes to become the new director of the Bizone’s Verwaltung für Wirtschaft.22

8.2. Excursion - Ludwig Erhard

Before discussing Erhard’s successful move to director of the Verwaltung für Wirtschaft, it is necessary to briefly explore the background to Ludwig Erhard’s thinking, his early intellectual influences and his experiences. This will complete the historical perspective for analysing the origins of the Social Market Economy and shed light on the motivations driving Erhard’s policy decisions.

Despite vehement opposition from the CDU parliamentary group to Erhard’s candidature for the directorship of the Verwaltung für Wirtschaft, Erhard did not in fact represent the free market individualist-capitalists or even descend from the tradition of classical economic liberalism, as was feared. He was a moderate, socially responsible economist whose early, less known, political-economic beliefs contrast sharply with his later defence of market liberalism. Liberal elements did not become a feature of Erhard’s thinking in fact until 1947. His own background and experiences mirror Germany’s historical dilemma over the alternatives of a planned or a free market economy that had dominated the previous century of socio-economic policy. Erhard always maintained that Germany’s market economy was a ‘specific’ type of market economy exclusive to Germany’s own peculiar situation and history.

Erhard differed to his more ideologically bound contemporaries however through his ability to develop practical and workable solutions to programme issues. Erhard was also

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71 See Rainer Salzmann, Protokolle der Unionsfraktion 1947-1949, op. cit., Sitzungsprotokoll Nr.35 am 23.2.48, p. 138-143; Sitzungsprotokoll Nr. 39 am 29.2. 48, p.151-152; Sitzungsprotokoll Nr. 43 am 1.3.48, p.156-157; Sitzungsprotokoll Nr. 45, 2.3 1948; op. cit.

72 Volker Hentschel, op. cit., p.53.
adept at modifying his belief in a socialist, planned economy in the early 1940s, to advocate a mixed economy in 1946/7, to fully endorsing the liberal economy in 1948/9. Such flexible convictions reveal Erhard was not so much an original thinker, but one particularly skilled at acquiring and adapting others’ theories to suit the current economic climate. He could quickly condemn socialism when faced for example with the need to discredit the SPD’s programme or to undermine the influence of the Christian Socialists in the CDU. Erhard shaped his programme as political reality unfolded, continually assessing and adapting his vision of a socially responsible liberal market economy and its suitability for the prevailing economic and political climate and as an acceptable programme to the CDU. This unique and dynamic approach coupled with personality and rhetorical skill, helped Erhard succeed in injecting pragmatism into the CDU’s hitherto ideologically-driven discussions.73 Erhard exploited the ambiguities of ideological terms to deconstruct biased thinking among the many CDU groups and then introduce a new style of more flexible, programme discourse that allowed for the implementation of differing degrees of market mechanisms and state intervention depending on current economic and political conditions. This third way thinking was later expressed in the phrase Social Market Economy, but was preceded by other ordo-liberal phrases such as liberal socialism, Rüstow’s liberal interventionism, or marktkonforme policies, that aimed at monitoring the level of state intervention to avoid a retreat into collectivism.

Background and Influences

Background

With a quintessentially liberal74 background in the Protestant dominated city of Fürth in Bavaria, a Catholic father and Protestant mother, Erhard learnt the importance of religious tolerance from an early age. As a doctoral student of the political economist, philosopher and medic Franz Oppenheimer at Frankfurt University, Erhard was introduced to the third way between capitalism and socialism through Oppenheimer’s


theory of ‘liberal socialism.’ Oppenheimer’s ideas on the relationship between the state and the economy, competition and a rejection of industrial monopolies exerted a marked influence on Erhard’s own post second world war programme of ‘social liberalism’. From 1928 to 1942 Erhard carried out research at the Nürnberger Institut für Wirtschaftsbeobachtung, on behalf of the Nazi’s Reichsgruppe Industrie, and it was during this time that Erhard made the acquaintance of Alfred Müller-Armack and the resistance figure Carl Goerdeler, whose views later impacted on Erhard’s own understanding of liberalism after 1945. Until 1942 however Erhard advocated state control of the economy, and claimed free trade was incompatible with social harmony or with serving society. He did not believe in market driven pricing but in setting prices based on national political objectives. He anticipated that the state should set economic goals and define industry’s objectives, whilst industry specific Unternehmerverbände affiliated to the Reichsgruppe Industrie would set guidelines for private businesses. Individual consumer freedom could be guaranteed within a state monitored market economy. Erhard was of course forced to work within the constraints of Nazi tolerance in the Nuremberg institute, and it is questionable whether he exercised any real degree of conceptual freedom in his policy formulations. The discrepancy between these views and those he later endorses, is nevertheless evidence of Erhard’s capacity for tailoring his views to the prevailing political and economic trends and in supplying ready, pragmatic solutions to the government of the day.

When Erhard left the Nuremberg institute in 1942, he received substantial personal and financial support from top rank officials at the Reichsgruppe Industrie to set up his own consultancy. Here Erhard embarked on devising concepts for rebuilding the economy and industry and financing the war deficit after an anticipated lost war. In his 268 page Denkschrift from 1943/4, he concluded;

“...das erstrebenswerte Ziel bleibt in jedem Fall die freie, auf echten Leistungswettbewerb beruhende Marktwirtschaft mit den jener Wirtschaft immanenten Regulativen.”

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76 Volker Hentschel, op. cit., p.35f.

77 Ludwig Erhard, "Kriegsfinanzierung und Schuldenskonsolidierung, Denkschrift 1943/44, Schlußkapitel March 1944" in; Karl Hohmann (Hrsg), Gedanken .... op. cit., p.50.
After a necessary post-war transition period of state economic control, Erhard believed in liberating the economy from the "Fesseln der staatlichen Bevormundung." Yet his subsequent *Gutachten* from the summer of 1945 adds;

"die sichere Grundlage für den Neuaufbau der Wirtschaft nur aus den höheren Erkenntnissen über die Struktur der spezifisch deutschen Wirtschaft (my italics) ... fließen kann. Damit rückt auch der Gedanke der Planung in den Vordergrund. Der Verfasser, der sich grundsätzlich zur Idee der freien Wirtschaft bekennt, glaubt nicht eigens betonen zu müssen, daß er der wirtschaftlichen Planung und Organisation keinen originären Wert zuerkennt, aber die Einsicht gebietet zu berücksichtigen, daß die deutsche Wirtschaft in dieser und der nächsten Phase ihrer Entwicklung solcher Hilfen nicht wird entraten können."\(^78\)

His contradictory views reveal a degree of uncertainty and inexperience with openly espousing free market economics in 1945, combined with the belief that Germany’s version of free market economics should continue to be bound by its own specific tradition of state intervention in the market economy.

Employed by the US military from October 1945 as economics minister for Bavaria, there are further signs of reassessment and reorientation in Erhard’s thinking. In a series of articles he wrote for the US military newspaper, *Die neue Zeitung*, from September 1946 to the spring of 1948, when he was appointed director of the *Verwaltung für Wirtschaft*, Erhard outlined the contours of his economic policy and tries to consolidate inconsistencies in his own ideas. The articles reveal a man personally undergoing the transition from advocating state planning to free market economics. In September 1946\(^79\) he maintains the necessity of a planned economy, but registers the important difference;

"Zwischen der allseits anerkannten Notwendigkeit einer sozial ausgerichteten planvollen Wirtschaft und der vollen, das heißt totalen Planwirtschaft."

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\(^78\) Ludwig Erhard, “Gutachten zum wirtschaftlichen Wiederaufbau. Auszug 1945” in; Ibid., p.54.

\(^79\) “Zonenausschuss und Wirtschaftseinheit” article in *Die neue Zeitung*, 23 September 1946 in; Ibid., p.67.
An article that featured in the *Neue Zeitung* a month later entitled *Freie Wirtschaft und Planwirtschaft*, shows Erhard seeking to resolve his own conceptual dilemma through reconciliation of economic alternatives, in a mixed economic structure. He writes;

“Es ist charakteristisch, daß die abweichenden Auffassungen immer in der Zuspitzung auf scheinbar unversöhnliche Extreme - hie freie Wirtschaft, dort Planwirtschaft, hie Sozialismus, dort Kapitalismus, Ausdruck finden, während die tatsächliche wirtschaftliche Entwicklung uns fragen lassen sollte, ob nicht von beiden Fronten her Einflüsse wirksam sind, die auf eine Annäherung der Standpunkte schließen lassen.”

He appeals to a new, modern interpretation of planned and free economies, and to a new, post-war redefinition of socialism and capitalism;


A modern capitalist system he claims no longer precludes “die volle Berücksichtigung sozialer Erfordnisse.” It would appear from the above quote that Socialism and capitalism, can become compatible ideologies. The new message reads that policy is not based on rigid dogma, but remains negotiable with inbuilt flexibility to adapt to political change and incorporate the best of both systems. This becomes the formulae to Erhard’s future success to change fixed attitudes in the CDU and to break the deadlock in CDU negotiations over economic and social policy alternatives.

**Influences**

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81 Ibid.
Müller-Armack\textsuperscript{82} described the concept of the Social Market Economy as "\textit{ein der Ausgestaltung harrender, progressiver Stilgedanke.}" In other words, the exact contours of the Social Market Economy were not defined. Liberal and Christian Socialist Weltanschauungen could therefore conceivably be combined. This flexibility aptly suited Erhard’s relative inexperience in practising ordo-liberalism. When Armack introduced the concept of the Social Market Economy in \textit{Die Wirtschaftsordnung, sozial gesehen}\textsuperscript{83} he challenges the traditional view that social responsibility was only inherent in a socialist order as socialists claimed and that centralised economic structures were the only way of responding to social needs in society. Neo-liberalism moreover did not mean contempt for social measures either. Before change could take place however, incontested orthodox beliefs that had made terms and concepts historically bound and definitions rigid needed to be revised - "eine Umwertung überlieferter Begriffe vorzunehmen" - a prescription that was indeed followed by Erhard. Müller-Armack argued that market economic structures offered the best framework for providing for social needs;

"Wenn uns eine "Soziale Marktwirtschaft" d.h. eine nach den Regeln der Marktwirtschaft ablaufende, aber mit sozialen Ergänzungen und Sicherungen versehene Wirtschaftsordnung vorschwebt, geschieht dies in der Überzeugung, daß keine andere soziale Ordnung den gleichen Grad von sachlicher Produktivität und technischer Fortschrittlichkeit mit der Möglichkeit persönlicher Freiheit und sozialer Gestaltung vereinigt. Sie allein bietet... eine Ordnung in der durch weitgehende Neutralisierung der Machtpositionen und eine Aufteilung der Macht ein erträgliches Minimum gesellschaftlichen Zwanges der Entfaltung persönlicher Freiheit nicht im Wege steht."\textsuperscript{84}

Müller-Armack saw the post war task as that of \textit{redefining} the contours of the liberal market economy, by keeping its essential principle but infusing it with social content. He saw the market as a mechanism superior to state planning but did not believe markets could regulate themselves and maintain their own equilibrium or perform an automatic distribution of wealth.


\textsuperscript{83} Alfred-Müller Armack, "Die Wirtschaftsordnung sozial gesehen" in; Ordo-Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, Küpper Bondi, Walter Eucken/Franz Böhlin (Hrsg), Opladen 1948, Band 1, p.125-154.

\textsuperscript{84} Ibid., p.149.
As a practitioner more than a theorist, Erhard never belonged to a specific group ofordo-liberals. As their theories pervaded academic circles from the 1930s, Erhard would mostcertainly have come across them. Once the 1948 west German currency reform wasagreed, Erhard gained confidence from reading ordo-liberal theories in steering Germanytowards a market economy. Ordo-liberal theory provided him with the necessarylegitimisation for his future practical policy manoeuvres. It was Röpke, who Erhard metin Geneva in 1948, who also made a significant impact on Erhard’s thinking. In theordo-liberal tradition of Röpke and Müller-Armack, Erhard became concerned with thespiritual and the economic elements of the social market. He disagreed with theindividualist ordo-liberals who focused too narrowly on economic measures and whofailed to consider individuals interdependence on other aspects of society. A system thatoffers a third way between collectivism and laissez-faire, he argued, did not guarantee that society will choose to always follow that course. It is doubtful that any economic system can claim to be inherently moral, since it ultimately relies on the moral of thepeople who operate within it, and confirms the importance of developing an ethicallygrounded approach to economic policy, drawing on all aspects of an individual’s life.

In tune with this strand of ordo-liberals, Erhard also distanced himself from old styleliberalism. He believed that the ‘new’ way economics would in contrast to 19th centurylaissez-faire economics, promote the much neglected aspect of social harmony. Erhard’sspeech at the CDU’s second party conference in August 1948 illustrates this;

“Nicht die freie Marktwirtschaft des liberalistischen Freibeutertums einervergangenen Aera auch nicht das ’Freie Spiel der Kräfte’ und dergleichen Phrasen,mit denen man hausieren geht, sondern die sozial verpflichtete Marktwirtschaft, die das einzelne Individuum wieder zur Geltung kommen läßt, die den Wert der

85 “So geriet der Ordo-liberalismus zum dogmatischen Bezugspunkt seines Denkens, das der Pragmatikseines Handelns einen prinzipiellen Rückhalt gab.” Volker Hentschel, op. cit., p.64.

86 Erhard’s later use of terminological extremes to describe the planned economy descends from Röpke’svocabulary in particular terms such as ‘Termitienstaat’ and ‘Kollektivismus.’ Daniel Körfer, Kampf umsKanzleramt, Erhard und Adenauer, DVA Stuttgart 1987, p.32.

87 It must be noted that the rejection of liberalism was part of a longer trend amongst ordo-liberals. From1924 Keynes had already begun to talk of The End of Laissez Faire. John Maynard Keynes, Sidney Balllecture delivered at the University of Oxford 1924, published London 1926. Cited in HerbertEhrenberg, Die Erhard Saga. Analyse einer Wirtschaftspolitik, die keine war, Seewald Verlag, Stuttgart1965. In the 1940s the need to correct the mistakes of the centralised economy of National Socialismbecame a more urgent objective.
The concept and the content of the Social Market Economy idea were thus derived from Alfred Müller-Armack and other ordo-liberals. Erhard’s conversion to ordo-liberalism also clearly entailed a reform of his own politics. Once Erhard had discovered the Social Market Economy’s potential in west Germany’s political campaign, he adopted it as his own. During a period in the Sonderstelle für Geld und Kredit in Bad Homberg, where he and other prominent economists were assigned the development of German recommendations for currency reform, he demonstrates the progressive move towards ordo-liberal theories. A further article in Die Neue Zeitung on June 23rd, 1947 entitled Sprachverwirrung um die Wirtschaftsordnung reflects the process of revision underway in Erhard’s own thinking, but perhaps more importantly, the title confirms the significance of political terminology in legitimating a political programme and how the misunderstanding of political concepts can distort reality. Erhard learnt to systematically exploit this phenomenon to renegotiate the meaning of established ideologies. The article summarises Erhard’s attempt to revise the rigid dichotomy in attitudes towards planned and free market economic alternatives;

“Wenn heute in breitsten Schichten die Meinung vorherrscht, daß die Anhänger sozialistischer Ideen unbedingt für die Planwirtschaft eintreten müßten, während die Verfechter der Marktwirtschaft notwendig als Vertreter eines kapitalistischen Systems zu gelten hätten, so muß dem widersprochen werden.”

Whilst abhorring exploitative capitalist activity Erhard believes the market economy had been misrepresented and portrayed as synonomous with the 19th century’s version of unbridled capitalism;

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"Die sozialen Störungen, die der aufkommende Kapitalismus im Gefolge hatte, waren Begleiterscheinungen einer technischen Revolution und einer falschen Auslegung der sogenannten liberalen Freiheiten, nicht Wirkungen des marktwirtschaftlichen Prinzips an sich."  

He blames "eine fatale Verwechslung von Ursache und Wirkung" in historical perceptions. Erhard's mixed arguments for and against socialism and capitalism, free market economies and planned economies could be seen as a sign of Erhard's inability to fully commit himself to a market economy or uncertainty over the best economic system for Germany.  

But although Erhard is equivocal on these issues, his search for a synthesis between socialism and capitalism is entirely compatible with the nature of ordo-liberal or third way thinking. His unique approach demonstrates his capacity for seeking pragmatic political solutions. In attempting to reconcile socialism and capitalism, if only at a semantic level, Erhard must be credited for setting in motion a new style of consensual politics, that contained the potential to resolve traditional antagonisms inherent in the German party system. By redefining the meaning of traditional ideologies and in particular changing often false perceptions of the market economy, Erhard was able to encourage dialogue between socialists and liberals and thus aptly supported the Christian Democratic objective of an all-embracing Volkspartei.

8.3. Erhard, the CDU and the Social Market Economy

Those who voted for Erhard as the new director of Economics of the Verwaltung für Wirtschaft, may have surmised that his election could entail a dramatic turnaround of the whole economic system, since Erhard and a group of other specialists had drawn up a concept of reform in October 1947 in the specialist department, 'Sonderstelle Geld und Kredit' and produced "unabhängig und unbeinflußt von den Militärregierungen und den politischen Parteien" the Homburger Plan in February 1948, which they handed to the allies as their suggestion for a currency reform. Under Semler's direction, the majority of the CDU parliamentary party had backed the Wirtschaftsrat's central economic policy

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90 Karl Hohmann (Hrsg), Gedanken ..... op. cit., p.75.
91 Volker Hentschel, op. cit., p.46.
aimed at restoring production in heavy industry. DP representative Mühlenfeld\textsuperscript{93} was now anxious that Erhard’s nomination would entail a rejection of this strategy in favour of restoring the consumer goods industry.\textsuperscript{94} Jakob Kaiser travelled to Frankfurt specifically to block the vote of ‘the liberal’ Erhard, expressing the sentiments of Christian Socialists who were still reluctant to trust the market to provide social justice.

The CDU programme commitments were tested at the 14th meeting of the \textit{Wirtschaftsrat} on April 21, 1948, where Erhard appeared as the newly elected director of the \textit{Verwaltung für Wirtschaft}, to give a detailed presentation of his proposal for economic reform. The SPD representative, Kreyßig argued that his programme statement had been more of a “ein verworrenes Durcheinander-bringen von Begriffen” than a clear presentation of economic policy\textsuperscript{95} He accused Erhard of failing to produce a coherent economic framework, and his opportunistic exploitation of the timely arrival of Marshall\textsuperscript{96} aid and the currency reform to re-introduce ‘freie Unternehmertum’. Erhard’s speech did not mention the role of the trade unions, or co-determination policies for employees and so marked a distinct departure from the CDU’s Ahlen programme. Industrial democracy had been a core feature of the Ahlen programme, yet even the more socialist inclined members in the CDU parliamentary group in the \textit{Wirtschaftsrat}, had paid suspiciously little attention to co-determination policies and had regularly

\textsuperscript{93} Letter from Mühlenfeld to Holzapfel on 19th March 1948 in; NL-Holzapfel 32, cited in; Ibid., p.34.

\textsuperscript{94} See discussion from 18th meeting of the CDU parliamentary group in the Wirtschaftsrat on 12th October 1947 in; Rainer Salzmann, op. cit., p.76-90. Here the call for state control of industry was tempered however by its insistence that central administration was purely temporary.

\textsuperscript{95} Dr Kreyßig (SPD) at the 14. Vollversammlung des Wirtschaftsrates des Vereinigten Wirtschaftsgebietes 1947-1949 in; Christoph Weisz/Hans Woller, op. cit., p.446.

\textsuperscript{96} The CDU parliamentary group was further criticised for undemocratic behaviour in handling the issue of Marshall Plan aid and its dominance of the economic council in an article by the New York Times on 10 May 1948. The German representatives in the Bizone were reported to have requested Marshall aid totalling a third of the total amount the US had allocated for all 16 European countries. This request, it states could only have originated from “den bürgerlichen Vertretern” since the SPD had not been permitted to take part in drafting the Wirtschaftsplan. “Die deutsche Sozialdemokratie hat im Wirtschaftsrat in Opposition gehen müssen, weil die bürgerlichen Parteien ihr nicht den Einfluss einräumen wollten, der ihr schon rein zahlenmäßig gebührt. Nichtsdestoweniger hätten die bürgerlichen Vertreter des Wirtschaftsrats, wenn sie nur eine basse Ahnung von Demokratie hätten, eine derartige weitgehende Forderung nicht ohne Verständigung mit der Sozialdemokratie erheben dürften, wie das in England und den Vereinigten Staaten ganz selbstverständlich wäre.” NYT Press release cited in appendix to minutes, Rainer Salzmann, Protokolle der Unionsfraktion 1947-1949, Sitzungsprotokoll 10. Mai 1948, op. cit., p.194f.
blocked trade unions involvement in the council’s negotiations. Erhard’s presentation of his neo-liberal strategy gave priority to market-led economics, competition and private business enterprise even if his pronouncements may have appeared more of a declaration of desires than guidelines for a practical political programme. He employed ordo-liberal terminology to damn a state planned economy rather than give wholehearted support to an, as yet untested, social market economy. He nevertheless aimed to divert attention away from rigid ideologies as a way of overcoming political infighting amongst liberals and socialists;

“Die herkömmlichen Vokabeln, wie freie Wirtschaft oder Planwirtschaft, wurden in der Parteien Streit schon so stark abgenutzt und verwässert, daß sie für ernsthafte Darlegungen unbrauchbar geworden sind.”

By eliminating the phrases ‘planned economy’ and ‘free market economy’ Erhard believed he could avoid having to choose between them. Erhard had identified the currency reform and Marshall aid as methods to initiate economic liberalisation. The currency reform would clear the way to abolishing the system of centralised economic Bewirtschaftung, to introduce tax reform and remove price fixing;

“Es bedarf - und das ist zwingend - der Wiederherstellung geordneter Geldverhältnisse. Nur durch dieses Mittel allein ist wieder eine wirtschaftliche Ordnung sicherzustellen.”

97 In June 1948 for example trade unions staged a strike following a rash decision by a select number of members of the Wirtschaftsrat to install Mr Hermann Reusch in the ‘Hauptausschuss of the Wirtschaftsrat.’ Reusch was described by labour representative Anton Storch as a liberal capitalist. Liberal representatives Dr Bucerius and Dr v. Campe were against trade unions participating in the Wirtschaftsrat’s Hauptausschuss as a ‘dritte Gewalt’ at such a ‘delicate stage of political and economic developments.’ Rainer Salzmann, Protokolle der Unionsfraktion 1947-1949, op. cit., Sitzungsprotokoll, 4. Juni 1948, op. cit., p.206-216.


99 “Ein Fanfarenstoß für die freie Marktwirtschaft kam dabei noch nicht heraus. Es fiel Erhard immer noch leichter, die staatliche Bewirtschaftung zu verdammn, als die Marktwirtschaft zu preisen.” Volker Hentschel, op. cit., p.57.

100 In the run up to the elections in 1949 Erhard paradoxically redeployed the terminology of political extremes for distinguishing the CDU’s programme from the SPD’s.

101 Ludwig Erhard, 14th meeting of the Vollversammlung of the Wirtschaftsrat in Christoph Weisz /Hans Woller, op. cit., p.437.
The advent of currency reform had in truth taken all parties, trade unions and business representative committees by surprise,\textsuperscript{102} and they had not drafted any political programmes in preparation for the economic transition. Erhard’s liberal reform programme was therefore only supported by a very select Vertrauensvorschub of liberals, who hesitated before speaking out in favour of a liberal economy. Kreyßig accused Haffner and the CDU parliamentary party for having consciously encouraged Erhard’s new liberal economic course\textsuperscript{103} when Haffner signalled a positive reception to Erhard’s programme;

“Wir haben Vertrauen zu dem neuen Direktoren der Verwaltung für Wirtschaft, daß er diese Wiederherstellung der Marktwirtschaft, des Wettbewerbs, die allein die Produktion steigern kann, schnell und radikal durchführt. Schon jetzt müssen alle Vorbereitungen getroffen werden”\textsuperscript{104}

Haffner qualified his enthusiasm however by adding that other CDU members in the Wirtschaftsrat only agreed to Erhard’s programme; ‘in großen Zügen.’

By spring 1948, the French had also agreed to join in the preparations for currency reform and the establishment of the Bank deutscher Länder, even though principles of ‘trizonal’ fusion were still under discussion.\textsuperscript{105} On June 17 and 18, 1948, two days before the launch of the currency reform, the Wirtschaftsrat voted on the ‘most important parliamentary decision of the German post-war period.’\textsuperscript{106} Erhard’s Gesetz über Leitsätze für die Bewirtschaftung und Preispolitik nach der Geldreform set about defining the type of economic system that should follow the currency reform, the issue

\textsuperscript{102} Georg Müller, op. cit., p.111.

\textsuperscript{103} “Das, was Herr Dr Haffner eben für seine Fraktion erklärt hat, unterstreicht noch deutlicher was der augenblicklich größte Teil dieses Hauses vom Direktor der Verwaltung für Wirtschaft verlangt und wahrscheinlich von ihm auch dann verlangen wird, wenn dieser Direktor von sich aus .... bei dieser Prozedur oder diesem Vorhaben langsam vorgehen würde oder langsam vorgehen möchte.” Dr. Kreyßig, 14th meeting of the Vollversammlung of the Wirtschaftsrat in Christoph Weisz / Hans Woller, op. cit., p.446.

\textsuperscript{104} Alex Haffner, 14th meeting of the Vollversammlung of the Wirtschaftsrat. in; Ibid p.445.

\textsuperscript{105} Lucius D. Clay, op. cit., p.205.

that had most preoccupied the CDU’s entire programme discussions. The CDU’s response would determine whether it agreed to lifting state control in the economy and replacing it with free market competition. The CDU’s representative in the *Wirtschaftsrat*, Wilhelm Naegel, gave his party’s wholehearted support to the reading of the bill, since he believed it offered a method for abolishing the defunct *Zwangsbewirtschaftungssystem*;

“Dann muß man dem freien Spiel der Kräfte, der gesunden Kräfte in der Wirtschaft wieder eine Möglichkeit zur Entfaltung geben, dann muß man eben versuchen, auf diesem Weg wieder das gutzumachen, was staatliche Zwangswirtschaft verdorben hat.”

The bill was fiercely opposed by the Christian Socialists in the CDU’s *Sozialausschüsse* with the exception of Theodor Blank who believed it was compatible with the interests of the trade unions, the German people and with the CDU’s economic programme as a whole. Surprisingly, Anton Storch, director of the new labour administration in the *Wirtschaftsrat* from August 1948, also supported Erhard’s liberal policies and himself spoke up for minimum state intervention in the economy. The positive reception shown by the labour representatives Blank and Storch towards Erhard’s legislation was decisive in securing a yes vote by the rest of the CDU parliamentary group in the *Wirtschaftsrat*. Without their endorsement, the socialist wing of the party would almost certainly not have agreed to passing the *Leitsätzegesetz*. Erhard’s law was passed by 52 votes in favour and 37 against, without the support of the SPD or KPD, initiating an immediate revision of the *Bewirtschaftungsnotgesetzes*.

It is impossible to understand the reasons for the CDU’s positive response to the law and the subsequent development towards a market economy without acknowledging the

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107 18th Volksversammlung des Wirtschaftsrat on 17.6.48 in Christoph Weisz/ Hans Woller, op. cit. p.631.

108 Theodor Blank 18th Volksversammlung des Wirtschaftsrat on 17.6.48, in Christoph Weisz/ Hans Woller, op. cit., p.655.

109 Georg Müller, op. cit., p.284.

110 Fritz Hellwig, “Das Programm der Sozialen Marktwirtschaft 1949 und seine politische Umsetzung bis zur Gegenwart” in; Soziale Marktwirtschaft, Ordo liberalismus und Christliche Soziallehre. 35 Jahre Düsseldorfer Leitsätze der CDU, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Arbeitsheft 5, Klaus Weigel (Hrsg), Wesseling-Eichholz 1984, p.25.
contribution of the *Wissenschaftliche Beirat*, the new sub-committee of the *Verwaltung für Wirtschaft*, formed in January 1948 with individuals from the Rothenburg group of neo-liberals including Beckerath, Böhm, Eucken, Hoffmann, Lamp and Müller-Armack.\(^{111}\) In September 1947 they had produced a document entitled *Grundsätzen eines wirtschaftspolitischen Sofortprogramms*. The Committee's recommendations subsequently became Erhard’s blueprint for introducing social economic reform.\(^{112}\) The *Wissenschaftliche Beirat* had produced an audit on April 18, recommending a relaxation of price and wage policies and the abolition of *Zwangsbewirtschaftung* following the introduction of the currency reform.\(^{113}\) It concluded that;

> "Die Währungsreform ist nur sinnvoll, wenn eine grundlegene Änderung der bisherigen Wirtschaftslenkung mit ihr verbunden wird ... Die Steuerung durch den Preis dient dazu, das Sozialprodukt zu steigern. Dies ist die wichtigste sozialpolitische Aufgabe des Augenblicks."

It should be noted that currency reform itself had been drafted and implemented entirely by the western allies with only token recommendations from the German representatives. The *Wirtschaftsrat*'s proposals for tax reform, for example proved unacceptable to the allies and the role of the *Wirtschaftsrat* was reduced to reviewing allied reform proposals only. Curtailment of their sphere of influence plus dissatisfaction with allied policies incited many members of the CDU parliamentary group, including Lower Saxony’s Dr Gereke, to threaten resignation and withdrawal of German party political support to the allies. CDU representative Dr Seeling\(^{114}\) reported pessimistically on the *Wirtschaftsrat*’s achievements in the first year of its existence and demanded an independent public office to monitor activities since the "Wirtschaftsrat nicht gewillt sei, noch länger als Verbrämung für die Massnahmen der Besatzungsmächte zu dienen." At the *Wirtschaftsrat*’s meeting on June 14, Seeling finally tendered his resignation, but Erhard

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\(^{111}\) Reference to section on ordo-liberals in Freiburg CDU.

\(^{112}\) Georg Müller, op. cit., p.113f.


and Holzapfel warned that if the CDU group refused to carry out allied policies then the allies would surely find a party that would, and the CDU would always be remembered for having failed to take on that challenge itself. It was important that the CDU learnt to endorse allied policy in order to gain control in the Wirtschaftsrat and ultimately in leading a future German government.\footnote{Georg Müller, op. cit., p.279.}

Meanwhile some leading CDU members could not suppress their criticism of Erhard’s liberal economic reforms and the disastrous effect that they were having on prices and salaries. On August 17, the CDU jointly debated with the SPD whether Erhard should be forced to resign. Despite the show of no-confidence, Erhard survived the motion by 47 votes to 35. The CDU in Baden-Württemberg, Lower Saxony and North Rhine-Westphalia, normally known for their liberalism, were also accustomed to coalition with the SPD in their state parliaments and were among those who opposed Erhard’s programme. Anxiety over price increases during the summer of 1948 also created opposition from the CDU in the Länderrat, headed by Karl Arnold. Arnold urged the Länderrat to place a ban on Erhard introducing any further price relaxation, suggesting responsibility for price fixing should be passed to an independent Preisamt. All CDU representatives gave the Länderrat unanimous agreement and the decision was forwarded to the Wirtschaftsrat. But firm support for Erhard from Punder, Schlange-Schönningen and other members of the Wirtschaftsrat however resulted in the Länderrat’s appeal finally being rejected. Paul Bausch, deputy chairman of the north Würtemberg CDU signalled his opposition by calling for a “grundsätzlichen Kurswechsel der Frankfurter Politik” and coalition with the SPD.\footnote{Gerold Ambrosius, op. cit., p.184.}

Erhard sought to allay such fears and criticisms of his policy at the CDU’s 2nd party conference in Recklinghausen, on August 28, 1948.\footnote{Ludwig Erhard, August 28, 1948, in; Helmut Pütz, Konrad Adenauer und die CDU der Britischen Besatzungszone, op. cit., p.658.} To convince the CDU of his market economic reform programme, he reassured delegates that a market economy did not eschew economic planning and order.
Erhard exploited ideological terminology to his advantage, positioning the two alternative economic systems in the east and in the west as the choice between Zwang and Freiheit. Although the SPD condemned the Zwangwirtschaft as fiercely as the CDU, maintaining there were significant distinctions between a Zwangs-, a Plan- and a gelenkte Wirtschaft, Erhard hoped to discredit the SPD by condemning economic planning. In the run-up to the first federal elections, sloganeering with political extremes became Erhard’s chief political weaponry to demarcate the programme of the CDU from that of the SPD. He distinguished between the control economy and socialism or even Marxism of the Social Democrats, and a free, socially responsible economy and democracy of the Christian Democrats. Albers responded to Erhard’s speech, firstly expressing the scepticism that the liberal tone of Erhard’s policies generated amongst the trade union wing of the CDU, but then diluting his criticism by demonstrating ‘respektvolle Reverenz’ for the CDU in the Wirtschaftsrat.119 By the end of the conference it appeared as if Erhard had rallied the party behind his Frankfurt programme. When trade unions went on strike on November 12, as a protest against the market economy, Albers dutifully kept to the party line. In truth, Albers feared the economic agenda favoured by the Christian Socialists too closely resembled that of the SPD’s and knew that failure to give the CDU his formal trade union backing could threaten the CDU’s governing status in the Wirtschaftsrat and bring unwarranted advantage to the SPD.

Only once the currency reform and new market economic structures had begun to yield positive results could a detectable change be observed in the CDU’s attitudes towards Erhard’s programme.120 The Sozialausschüsse representatives in the Wirtschaftsrat voiced their support for Erhard’s programme and early demands by Christian Socialist for a radical restructuring of the economy were toned down, requesting only minor policy adjustments to correct social injustices and deficiencies. Crucially the Christian Socialists lacked an equivalent institutional framework to the Wirtschaftsrat, to promote

118 Ibid.
119 Johannes Albers, in; Ibid., p.700ff.
their alternative policy of co-operation with the SPD and the trade unions. Meanwhile even Kaiser had agreed to a 'sozial gesteuerten Marktwirtschaft.'\(^{121}\) This growing polarisation between the right wing coalition in the Wirtschaftsrat and the SPD also meant more liberal minded CDU representatives could force the weaker left wingers into submission.\(^{122}\) Threatening to stage a left wing opposition to Erhard's course could seriously risk damaging the CDU's parliamentary majority in the Wirtschaftsrat and expose the level of party disunity.

After almost a year in the Wirtschaftsrat, the CDU parliamentary group had still not reached consensus on policy and action. Disunity existed between the CDU in the states and the CDU parliamentary group in the Wirtschaftsrat, as well as between the organs of the Wirtschaftsrat themselves. In desperation Köhler had made an appeal in spring 1948 for the party to show at least the appearance of unity;

"die Politik des Verwaltungsrats in toto so geführt werden müsse, dass nach außen hin der Eindruck der Geschlossenheit zwischen Fraktion und Verwaltungsrat bestehe."\(^{123}\)

Adenauer's North Rhine-Westphalian CDU condemned the haphazard political management in Frankfurt and the dissenting economic opinions by directors in the Verwaltungsrat administrations, insisting that individuals should either back Erhard's programme or resign. Indeed in November 1948, Alex Haffner, formally a loyal supporter of Erhard's reforms, did indeed resign as leader of the Economic Committee, frustrated with the Wirtschaftsrat's internal political bargaining and for its alleged neglect of real economic issues.

By 1949, economic conditions showed signs of improvement and Erhard experienced the first signs of praise when he delivered a long speech advocating a liberal market


\(^{122}\) Horst Albert Kukuck, "Etappen im Ringen um eine Wirtschaftskonzeption der CDU 1945-1949" in; Lothar Albertin und Werner Link (Hrsg), Politische Parteien auf dem Weg zur parlamentarischen Demokratie in Deutschland. Entwicklungslinien bis zur Gegenwart, Droste, Düsseldorf 1981, p.255.

economy, at the CDU’s Zonenausschuss meeting in Königswinter on February 25, 1949, where members met to decide on an election strategy for the forthcoming federal elections. The need for a suitable economic policy had intensified, but committee member Fritz Hellwig reported; “there were still serious misgivings in the CDU about embarking on (Erhard’s) economic course.”  

Prior to the meeting Erhard privately communicated his campaign recommendations to Adenauer, prompting Adenauer to see the meeting as an opportunity to forge an official link between Erhard, his programme and the CDU’s election strategy.  

Adenauer publicly praised Erhard’s speech for its simplicity and clarity;

“Dieser Vortrag war so klar und lichtvoll und hat namentlich die grundlegenden Wahrheiten so deutlich und überzeugend in Erscheinung treten lassen ......... Er hat in seiner Rede das Geheimnis jedes Erfolges wirken lassen, die Dinge zurückzuführen auf möglichst einfache und klare Begriffe.”

Albers retorted that Erhard’s speech was “mehr oder weniger das Prinzip einer liberalen Wirtschaft” and signalled a significant departure from the spirit of Ahlen. Erhard insisted that if he had been advocating the classic liberal economy, he would not now be showing his allegiance to the CDU. His social policy beliefs, he said were almost certainly closer to those of Albers, but added that he had not intended to address social policy in his speech. A separate social policy programme, he stressed, should be developed to co-exist alongside the Ahlen programme. Adenauer also assured the group; “Mit dem Ahlener Programm, zu dem ich restlos stehe, hat das nichts zu tun.” Not until Erhard’s illuminating speech had Adenauer fully realised the benefits of espousing a market economy in political campaigning. His aim was merely to develop a manifesto for the purpose of the elections only, noting that;

“.. alle solchen Programme und programmatischen Sätze haben keinen Ewigkeitswert, sondern sollen sich mit den Dingen beschäftigen, die jetzt akut sind.

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124 Fritz Hellwig, op. cit., p.27.


126 Stenographische Niederschrift über die Sitzung des Zonenausschusses der CDU der Britischen Zone am 25. Februar 1949 in Königswinter (Steigerwaldhaus), in Helmut Pütz, Konrad Adenauer und die CDU der Britischen Besatzungszone. op. cit., p.854.

127 Ibid., p.863.
Akut ist im kommenden Wahlkampf die Frage: Planwirtschaft oder Marktwirtschaft."128

Jakob Kaiser voiced agreement to Erhard’s liberalism;

"Es sind unverlierbare Bestandteile, die erhalten werden müssen. Es ist genau so mit den Konservativen, was böse Leute meist als reaktionär bezeichnen. Es darf nicht verlorengehen, und es ist die Aufgabe unserer Partei, diese unverlierbaren Werte mit dem, was neu werden muß - ... in eine Harmonie zu bringen."129

Adenauer had gained not only an economic programme but, in Erhard, also a man who could present his programme with practical success, someone who was a good campaigner, and a popular economics minister once the election was won.

Independent to Erhard’s efforts in Frankfurt, the CDU’s own Economic Programme Committee of free market advocates, including Franz Böhm, Bernhard Pfister, Hugo Scharnberg and Franz Etzel had continued on a less active level to develop its own economic programme. More than a year after commencing its task the committee was also called upon to report to the party in Königswinter in February 1949. Etzel had distributed copies of the committee’s draft economic programme and was scheduled to follow Erhard’s speech. Adenauer’s enthusiastic reception of Erhard’s speech and his immediate insistence that Erhard’s speech should become the basis for the CDU’s new economic programme hopelessly overshadowed any subsequent announcement that Etzel was to make, and led Etzel to restrict his presentation to a few modest words only;

"Ich stimme damit überein, daß die Fassung eines Programms eine dringende Notwendigkeit ist. Sie ist auch insofern notwendig, als wir durch ein solches Programm nach außen den schlechten Eindruck verwischen, der immer wieder dadurch entsteht, daß von den verschiedensten Parteistellen, vor allem auch von unseren Ministern in den verantwortlichen Funktionen, immer etwas anderes getan wird, als es die Frankfurter Wirtschaftspolitik macht."

Etzel conceded that their own programmatic endeavours had yielded little result;

128 Ibid., p.858.
129 Ibid., p.859.
“Wir haben, wenn ich es glatt heraussagen darf, ja gar keine Wirtschaftspolitik der CDU, sondern die Wirtschaftspolitik von Professor Erhard; von der CDU haben wir sie dann sanktioniert.”

He concluded by agreeing to transform Erhard’s speech into a programme, admitting; “dann haben wir mit dieser Tagung etwas erreicht, was wir bisher in einem Jahr nicht erreicht haben.”

The Düsseldorf Principles
A committee comprising Albers, Seidel, Scharnberg, Ernst, Müller, Holzapfel, Etzel, Storch and Kaiser, but not Erhard, (Kaiser’s plea to include a Berlin representative was rejected by Adenauer) was subsequently assigned to formulate a CDU election manifesto on the basis of Erhard’s Königswinter speech. The result, the Düsseldorf Principles was presented on July 15. The decision to call the manifesto the Düsseldorfer ‘Principles’ and not a ‘Programme’ was an aim to demonstrate that the document was meant to supplement but not replace the Ahlen programme. To help project an image of political consistency and internal cohesion, the programme stipulated that Düsseldorf was not a departure, but a continuation of Ahlen. “Aufbauend auf dem Ahlener Programm erstrebt sie die soziale Marktwirtschaft.” The Düsseldorf Principles were never formally and democratically endorsed by all CDU members and it is difficult to say whether the Düsseldorf programme would have received cross-party support if members had been given the chance to vote on it. It is fair to assume that many members agreed to forego their principles for the sake of pragmatism.

The Düsseldorf programme set out to define exactly what it meant by a Social Market Economy. It contained a preamble, a short statement on ‘What the CDU understands by the Social Market Economy,’ followed by 16 individual guidelines, outlining how the

120 Franz Etzel, stenographische Niederschrift über die Sitzung des Zonenausschusses der CDU der Britischen Zone am 25. Februar 1949 in Königswinter (Steigerwaldhaus), in Helmut Pätz, Konrad Adenauer und die CDU der Britischen Besatzungszone, op. cit., p.861.


133 Volker Hentschel, op. cit. p.84.
Social Market Economy should be implemented. The preamble promised individuals the maximum of economic benefits, social justice and protection for the economically weak, sovereignty for the consumer, free competition, and an ordered monetary system. The preamble also offered justification for its apparent policy U-turn;

"Nachdem die Kritiker durch die Entwicklung der Ereignisse wiederlegt worden sind, melden sie sich erneut mit dem Vorwurf, unsere Wirtschaftspolitik führe zurück zu kapitalistischen Formen und zu altem Liberalismus unsozialer, monopolistischer Prägung. Nichts liegt der CDU ferner als ein solcher Weg."

Unlike earlier programmes the Düsseldorf programme reflected a new pragmatism and relevance to political developments, marking a departure from the idealistic and ideological tone of Ahlen's *Grundsatzprogramm* towards a new style of *Aktionsprogramme*, an election manifesto targeted specifically at the first west German parliamentary elections. It seeks recognition for economic recovery, triggered, as it claims, by currency reform and a commitment to social market economic principles;

"Der 20. Juni brachte den Umschwung. Die von der CDU vertretene Wirtschaftspolitik führte zu einer wirtschaftspolitischen Wende.... Der Währungsreform allein hat diesen Umschwung nicht herbeigeführt ... Der wesentliche Impuls aber kam aus der Inkraftsetzung marktwirtschaftlicher Grundsätze. Diese marktwirtschaftlichen Grundsätze wurden durch die von der CDU vertretene 'soziale marktwirtschaft' am 20. Juni 1948 zur Grundlage der deutschen Wirtschaftspolitik gemacht."

The primacy of economic reform, already detectable in the Ahlen programme, was continued in the Düsseldorf Programme, highlighting the economy’s importance as an election winning issue. Maintaining commitment to the third way of economic ‘*Freiheit und Bindung,*’ the programme hoped to placate both liberal and socialist strands in the party. Ordo-liberal theories are evident throughout the document, outlining safeguards for the control of monopoly industries and reiterating its support for industrial democracy, already a feature of Ahlen, to ward off criticism that its aims were a

*134 Reflecting the priorities of the CDU parliamentary group in the Wirtschaftsrat, the Düsseldorf principles made only a very vague reference to employee co-determination rights in industry, claiming that the emphasis on monitoring monopolies and protecting competition in the economy would lead ‘näben den im Ahlener Programm genannten Mitteln zu wahrer Wirtschaftsdemokratie und deshalb nennen wir sie die ‘soziale Marktwirtschaft.’ A central independent commission should be set up to monitor money value, free choice of employment and careers, whilst private ownership participation of
restoration of the free, unregulated market. Equally it sought to ensure that state economic planning extended only to macro-economic management in a combination of tax and monetary policies and regulations for trade, investment and social policies but excluded state interference in manufacturing, employment and supply levels. Nationalisation plans are rendered secondary, superfluous even; “Das Sozialisierungsproblem erhält zugleich durch sie (die Soziale Marktwirtschaft) eine nachgeordnete Bedeutung.” Whilst the social policies and ownership principles that characterised Ahlen are acknowledged, they are only vaguely upheld in Düsseldorf; “nach der marktwirtschaftlichen Seite hin ergänzt und fortentwickelt.” The document otherwise contained no specific social policy reference and follows on from Adenauer’s statement at Königswinter that the Düsseldorf programme and the Ahlen programme were to be supplemented by a separate social programme, although this never materialised. Düsseldorf positioned itself primarily as an economic programme, and claimed the Social Market Economy framed a comprehensive social, political and cultural order for society based on the central tenet of the individual;

"Es sind also nicht nur wirtschaftliche und soziale Überlegungen, sondern auch politische und kulturelle Gründe, die uns verlassen, die soziale Marktwirtschaft zu fördern. Wir sehen in ihr eine Wirtschaftsordnung, die zu echter Freiheit führt. Wer frei sein will, muß sich dem Wettbewerb unterwerfen."

Since the Düsseldorf manifesto had to account for two political viewpoints in the party, the liberal and the Christian Socialist, it was not surprising that it should become the most comprehensive of all the CDU’s programmes. After a long line of philosophical debate and political enquiry into the best socio-economic programme to adopt, the Düsseldorf principles were for the CDU;

“der letzte Akt, bei dem ein geistiges Ringen um die Konzeption einer neuen Wirtschafts- und Sozialordnung seinen vorläufigen Abschluß fand, ein Akt, mit dem dann die Partei in die Bundestagswahl 1949 ging.”

the means of production must be constitutionally guaranteed. The Düsseldorf Principles printed in O.K Fleschheim, (Band II), op. cit., p.61.

135 Georg Müller, op.cit., p.302.
136 Fritz Hellwig, op. cit., p.25.
With Erhard as one of its main protagonists, the Social Market Economy became the central slogan of the CDU’s election campaign and one which brought a narrow victory of 31% against the SPD’s 29.2% in the federal elections on August 14, 1949. The real task of fulfilling its political mandate however was only just beginning for the CDU. The controversy over a market economy or a planned economy had still not been successfully resolved by the CDU despite the party’s tacit acceptance of the Düsseldorf Principles as the basis of their election campaign. The election result of 31% for the CDU was less than a third of the votes cast and despite a significant 12% support from the votes cast for the FDP, they still did not reach an overall majority. Following the disappointing election results, some prominent voices in the CDU renewed their demands for forming a coalition with the SPD. Adenauer called a meeting on Sunday August 21, with Erhard and several other prominent politicians, to his house in Rhöndorf, to discuss coalition with the SPD. Here Erhard argued that a coalition with the SPD would jeopardise his entire economic policy. Adenauer was surprisingly less resolute, reserving judgement until he had consulted the CSU’s Hans Ehard. Only once the CSU had refused coalition with the SPD, did Adenauer argue that after winning the election on Erhard’s Social Market Economy, it would be foolish to now dispense with it and indeed also with Erhard. Critics in the party who were still in favour of coalition with the SPD retorted that the election had narrowly been won not because but despite of Erhard. In truth, they said, it had been the ‘christlichen Kitt’ that had won them the

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137 The ‘provisional’ constitution or Basic Law was completed in May 23, 1949. A controversial debate had sparked over whether the new constitution should decide on a specific economic order or whether it should leave this area of legislation open. Finally no mention was made of an economic order, Gerhard Stoltenberg., op.cit. p.269.

138 Once the Bizone was to be represented by German and not allied personnel, the CDU fraction highlighted the need for young talented Germans; “die sich aus der eigenen deutschen Kenntnis heraus in das Spannungsverhältnis marktfreie Wirtschaft – Planwirtschaft einfühlen könnten,” revealing that the choice of economic order had by no means been clarified. Rainer Salzmann, Protokolle der Unionsfraktion 1947-1949, Sitzungsprotokoll, 12. April 1949, op. cit., p. 385-387.

139 Erhard announced he would stand as a candidate for the CDU in Nordrhein-Westfalia and in Ulm-Heidenheim only two months before the election. He justified his decision to the liberal FDP, in particular to its leader Theodor Heuss, explaining that the CDU needed a liberal figure like himself to ensure that they stay true to a liberal course. Yet Erhards also knew that the success of his programme depended on widescale public support. The Volkspartei character of the CDU was thus more promising than the smaller FDP. Karl Hohmann, Ludwig Erhard 1897-1977, op. cit., p.14.

election. Members had nevertheless been aware of the tactical necessity of showing agreement to Erhard's programme, to create the appearance of party unity. Without Erhard's workable programme the CDU had embarrassingly little to show for its five years of intense debate over economic and social policy, both in the party and in the Wirtschaftsrat. Their saving grace was their timely realisation that a stubborn refusal to accept political compromise on this occasion would have spelt the final death knell of the Christian Democratic Union.
Conclusion

This study was concerned with the historical development of a politics of the third way in German Christian Democracy. It began by investigating the core ideas of Christian Democracy in early expressions of conservatisn and liberalism as understood by Catholics and Protestants and followed their evolution through 19th and early 20th century derivative ideologies to include Christian Socialism, Solidarism, Christian Liberalism, Ordo-Liberalism, Christian Realism, Liberal Socialism, Social Liberalism, Democratic Socialism, and Democratic Federalism. Against the century’s backdrop of ideas and historical political traditions, the Christian Democratic Union emerged in 1945 with the aim of producing a third way socio-economic programme, uniting Catholics and Protestants in one all-embracing Volkspartei and consolidating diverse ideological forces into one, inclusive ideology - Christian Democracy. It was precisely the polarity between earlier ideologies and the extremist tendencies that they housed, that prompted the search for an alternative, centrist position. The CDU hoped to channel the polemical debate between socialist and liberalist visions of a new order towards a more pragmatic third way, whilst bridging the sectarian divide between Catholics and Protestants. Its task focused on reinventing and realigning earlier traditions and often bigoted political ideas, into a new and more workable philosophy acceptable to Protestants and Catholics.

Comprehensive analysis in the first section of the study, of the early influences in Christian Democracy, illustrated this intense sectarian divide between liberal and social versions of social and political organisation. Socialism was inherent in Catholic Social thinking, in beliefs in a strong, autocratic state, in notions of ‘Gemeinwohl’ and ‘Gemeinschaft,’ in Romantic visions of solidarity, and in the system of estates, guilds and social hierarchy. Liberal values on the other hand characterised Calvinist Protestantism, the belief in the powers of reason of the individual, in economic liberties and political rights as citizens of the state, and in the principles underpinning Enlightenment thinking. Because the hundred years between the 1840s and the 1940s were spanned by a clash of values and vested interests, many significant parallels in Weltanschauung between Protestants and Catholics were masked. Religious antagonism
had fuelled political animosity and ignored the potential inherent in the ideologies of the so-called ‘interest’ and ‘Weltanschauung’ parties, for creating a third way alternative, overlooking liberalism and socialism as oxymoron terms. The conservatism of Lutheran-Protestantism was shown to have similar traits to the conservative-romantic strand in Catholicism.\footnote{Both showed authoritarian tendencies that fanned the flames of Germany’s nationalist-fascist aspirations} The Jesuit-Solidarist strand of Catholics and liberal Calvinist Protestants jointly believed in developing a socially responsible form of capitalism and can therefore be considered as early social marketeers. Liberal Catholics, such as Emmanuel von Ketteler and his programme of Christian Liberalism, actively sought to solve social ills through the capitalist system, and not by abolishing it, as more extreme conservative and socialist Catholics advocated. By encouraging Catholics to enter a dialogue with liberalism, to reassess their prejudiced views of what liberalism stood for, Ketteler hoped that they would embrace the freedom and tolerance that defined early liberal values.

Besides Ketteler, the study revealed other dedicated social reformers in political Protestantism and political Catholicism, who had launched significant initiatives for an interdenominational ‘catch-all’ political party, and made recommendations for a third way socio-economic programme. Figures such as Heinrich Brüning, Friedrich Naumann, Carl Bachem, Adolf Stöcker, or Adam Stegerwald had sensed there was sufficient scope for political dialogue in Germany, for closing Germany’s troublesome gap between liberalist and socialist traditions, yet their efforts persistently failed due to society’s intractable and rigid adherence to sectarian Weltanschauung. Political deadlock between parties peaked during the Weimar Republic, finally extinguishing all impetus for cooperation. The shared core beliefs of Catholic and Protestant ‘Weltanschauungen,’ which could have enabled individual liberalism to be married to social obligation in a new third way, were disregarded.

There was a progressive and conscious movement underway in late 19th and early 20th century political Catholicism, to adapt and redefine the contours of its political programme to align its ideas more closely with liberal-conservatism. Once resentment towards the Protestant state in the Kulturkampf began to subside, a considerable number
of Centre Party Catholics grew more supportive of the capitalist system, but regrettably also began to support the more sinister, nationalistic aspirations of the Protestant state. Conservative Catholics’ visions of a social and political order closely conformed to the authoritarian-monarchical system that characterised the German Kaiserrreich. Many Catholic industrialists found the expansionist policies of the Protestant Reich favourable for advancing their own economic interests, and urged the Centre Party to exert its political influence more emphatically.

Both political initiatives, the more sinister conservative variety that became the precursor to fascism, and the social-reformist movement, confirm that latent potential for an inclusive political alternative existed in the German political system well before the CDU arrived in 1945. The National Socialists, as the first attempt at a Volkspartei failed in that mission. The second Volkspartei, the CDU, succeeded in harnessing that potential by focusing on Christian based politics.

Throughout the period, Christianity had failed to reconcile the hostile relationship between Protestants and Catholics. The ineffectual, self-obsessed and weak ‘Weltanschauungspartien’ and the nationalistic, interest-driven ‘Interessenparteien’ nurtured in Bismarck’s semi-absolutist state and sustained in the Wilhelmian and the Weimar periods, prevented a Christian bond ever cementing. Sectarian antagonism was kept alive until the point when in Hitler’s Third Reich, Christianity itself came under threat. Without sufficient resistance from Protestants and Catholics, the political willingness or a stable political and economic democracy, the rise of the degenerate Nazi Party, was unstoppable. It is lamentable however that an event as catastrophic as National Socialism was first required before a Christian solidarity and genuine cooperation could be forged between Protestant and Catholic confessions and their affiliated parties. The memories, experiences and guilt shared by political parties and the Christian Churches in enabling National Socialism to take root, unavoidably imposed a moral imperative on post-war Protestants and Catholics to undertake reform and fulfil their political responsibility in society. In 1945, Christianity would not only become a moral obligation but a factor that could secure democracy and unity in a new political order.
Concluding section 1, chapter 3 outlined the significant influence of ordo-liberals in promoting a Christian, social liberalism and in laying early foundations for Erhard's Social Market Economy. Ordo-liberalism outlined a third way programme of socio-economic management, whilst its spiritual strand of ordo-liberalism - as endorsed by Röpke and Müller-Armack - emphasised the need for a moral basis on which to practise market economic liberalism. The efforts of the ordo-liberals fulfilled an important bridging function in the transition from the old order and National Socialism, towards a politics of the third way.

Not surprisingly the first task of the first regional manifestos to appear by young Christian Democratic parties in 1945 and 1946, the focus of section two, were preoccupied with providing religious and philosophical explanations for the aberrations of German political history. By opening this forum for discussion, the CDU was then able to actively shape and modify how Germany's former ideologies were perceived, as a way of serving its own political ends. Programmes described not only the failing of the previous century, but centuries of moral and religious decline from the middle ages, through the Reformation, to the Enlightenment, condemning secularism and materialism as evils which had bred nationalism, liberalism and socialism, before their culmination in National Socialism. The conservative myth that depicted a loss of faith and morality, helped to advance the CDU's political credibility as the new defender of Christian western civilisation. Appealing to Germany's disorientation and insecurity as a defeated nation, Christian Democratic programmes could claim that only by imposing a Christian order on society, with its emphasis on social justice, community and individual responsibility, could the current crisis be adequately addressed. A Christian order, they argued, would anchor democracy and secure those individual freedoms, that had been violated under Weimarian liberalism and the Third Reich's National Socialism and which, they claimed, were now again under acute threat from the totalitarianism of Soviet socialism and the socialism of the Social Democrats.

It was not surprising that this conservative legacy should continue in the intense ideological climate of 1945. As Weltanschauungsparteien, German parties historically had been accustomed to explaining the political situation with religious and philosophical arguments. The CDU's choice to focus their manifestos on the ideologies of materialism,
secularism, liberalism and capitalism, demonstrates the unmitigated importance of Weltanschauung in shaping and explaining German political history after 1945. Few Christian democratic programmes highlighted the more tangible factors of the economic climate in the 1930s, global depression, rampant inflation, chronic levels of unemployment or Weimar’s divided party political system as contributory factors in bringing about National Socialism. Their experiences told them that Programme, Aufrufe, Leitsätze or speeches and manifesto statements, grounded in sound moral principles and religious piety would provoke a more positive reaction from participants at election rallies. Reference to traditions and Weltanschauung provided citizens with direction and purpose in the moral and political vacuum that they faced after the war.

Furthermore Christianity helped the CDU in establishing its political identity and its new party ideology, with which it could compete with the SPD’s and Communist Party’s (KPD) longer, more established ideologies of Social Democracy and Marxist Socialism. The CDU could creatively employ its Christian credentials and commitment to liberal democracy to win ideological legitimacy and proof of its moral and political integrity. The preoccupation with ideology as a political resource however, underpinned the CDU’s justification for a conservative Christian order with which to defend western civilisation from the evils of materialism. The post-war political spectrum of communists and social democrats had left a vacancy for a right-wing party and an attractive and promising opportunity for seizing mass political support from the pool of alienated conservative voters. The Abendland argument was propagated to help advance the CDU’s political ends, revealing the need for a new party to combine a coherent system of ideas, concepts and historically established principles with political pragmatism and a degree of tactical myth-making, if it were to gain political recognition. Troeltsch’s comment from 1912 that; “Without a definite mental and spiritual background, a system of this kind (capitalism) cannot become dominant”\(^{142}\) adds insight into the political mechanisms at play. In the same way, the CDU concentrated on establishing a religious and ethical substratum to underpin its political programme, in order that a market economy was given the best possible opportunity to flourish in a stable political democracy.

Significant regional and confessional differences of the first programmes by Christian Democratic groups revealed an initial continuation of ideological and sectarian interests during the development of the CDU. Each regional group sought to legitimate their view of ‘reality,’ and to pursue their own agenda in the new Germany, based on historical tradition and experience, promoting either more federal or more centralised solutions to socio-economic policy. Catholics in the CDU were conscious of the political discrimination that they had suffered in the past, and were keen to secure wider power and influence in the future party system. Yet it took some Catholics in regional Christian democratic groups a long time to accept that the old Centre Party idea of exclusively representing Catholic interests had failed, and could not be repeated. Only by extending party representation to a wider electorate would a successor party to the Centre stand to gain a parliamentary majority. Catholic enthusiasm for an interdenominational Volkspartei must be explained as much by the Catholics’ realisation of their own dilemma over their future power and influence, as by any genuine, altruistic desire to embrace Protestantism in the spirit of interdenominationalism. Recurring patterns of political continuity in 1945 with earlier conservative, liberal or social reformist traditions also revealed a repeat of the readiness by some Catholics to strike an accord with Protestant liberalism, as many Centre party members had earlier proposed. Not only could this alliance widen Catholics’ influence but it meant Catholics of a liberal persuasion could continue to practise capitalism, albeit with corrective social measures, whilst legitimately endorsing a liberal-capitalist new order after 1945.

Whilst some conservative Protestant groups supported the Christian western civilisation myth, other Protestants recognised the vehement anti-liberal rhetoric in the programmes of many Catholic regions in the west as Catholic criticism of the Protestant Bürgertum and ideological propaganda to promote a Catholic reform agenda, making Protestants sceptical of forming a political alliance with Catholics. By highlighting Protestant complicity in National Socialism, Catholics could conveniently assuage their own guilt in facilitating Nazism. Many Protestant dominated programmes, particularly those from the eastern Soviet zone, upheld liberal, middle class ‘bürgerlich’ traditions, and promoted liberal democracy as a way of reinstating capitalism, which they maintained was the key to economic revival. This contrast in programmes between Catholics and Protestants and
between east and west may point to a failure of Christian Democrats in the east to fully acknowledge the wrongs of liberal Protestantism, or Protestants’ political passivity and support of unbridled capitalist activity. In actual fact they articulated the views of many in the northern states of the British zone, and in the south-west states of the American zone, who quietly also supported a revival of liberal-economic values.

It could be further concluded that the ‘ideologisation’ of the post-war situation by Christian conservatives, and the specific nature of its Christian Abendland argument actively encouraged a revival of capitalism in German society, the very thing that it claimed it was condemning, since capitalism is a prominent feature of western liberal democracies. Whilst there may be some truth in this, it does not adequately explain the motivations of many genuine third way thinkers in the CDU, or diminish the very real beliefs that had existed throughout the century to combine Christianity with democratic politics to provide a stable, conservative order. It was the Protestant Bonhoeffer who sought to reassure that endorsing capitalism was not in itself corrupt, provided it was also socially responsible. It was not people’s striving for wealth per se, that put a nation in jeopardy, but individual and secular attitudes threatened society and its moral and ethical fibre. Catholic socialists, who were hasty to condemn capitalism in 1945, therefore risked throwing the social market economy baby out with the bathwater of 19th century laissez-faire capitalism. By adding ‘Christian’ to their party name, the CDU also pledged that politics in future would be performed according to Christian principles and to Weber’s maxim of a ‘Politics of Responsibility.’ Any future abuse of political power would mean an implicit betrayal of the Christian faith. This dramatic revival of Christianity and of Christian based politics after 1945, and of a commitment by Protestants and Catholics to unite in an interdenominational party, must therefore be seen to represent the most fundamental shift that had occurred in German political thinking since the beginning of the German party system.143

143 Waldemar Besson called the CDU’s new direction in 1945, the alignment with Western European style democracies, a ‘neue Traditionslinie’ for Germany, implying that the turning point was so radical and so profound that it also meant the end of Germany’s previous foreign policy traditions. Waldemar Besson in; The Conflict of Traditions. The Historical Basis of West German Foreign Policy in Britain and West Germany. Karl Kaiser & Roger Morgan. Oxford University Press, London, 1971. p.61-80.
Catholic Social Teaching had never presented a barrier to interdenominational cooperation and as a doctrine did not defend a specific form of state, constitution, political system or a particular type of economic and social order. The new era of pragmatism after 1945 combined with the effective restraints imposed by the allied powers on party political activity, meant that even the persistence of political and sectarian tendencies and the display of loyalty to 19th and early 20th century reform agendas, would not be allowed to hinder progress. The allies’ measures forced Christian Democrats of a liberal, conservative or socialist persuasion, to join forces, to consolidate their areas of programme agreement and reconcile their areas of difference. Often without realising, socialists and liberals in both confessions campaigned for the same aim; namely to resurrect individual economic freedom, but underwritten by state guarantees to intervene in the economy where necessary to restore social justice and equality. Regional groups conflicted over the exact nature of liberal or socialist policies in the system, such as the level of state intervention in the economy or the freedom that should be granted to economic monopolies, the number and nature of nationalised industries, or the role and power of the employee in industrial relations, in co-operative decision making and share ownership schemes, but the basic consensus remained the same. The strict monitoring of events by the western European allies, ensured that political parties acted pragmatically and abandoned partisan Weltanschauung, instilling a new era of party political thinking. By relinquishing parochial confessional allegiance and class based politics, Germany’s political parties were finally liberated from the environment of mistrust and suspicion in which they had been born and educated. Weber’s prognosis of the ‘Politics of Responsibility’ had triumphed over the past practice of the ‘Politics of Intention’.

All parties in 1945, the regional CDU parties included, were obliged often irrespectively of their true political intentions, to prove not only their Christian faith, but also their democratic and socialist credentials. The deployment of these terms in the CDU’s regional programme pronouncements did in truth reflect many of the party’s historical traditions, but undeniably Christianity, democracy and socialism were terms that helped to enhance a party’s political legitimacy in 1945. By boasting socialist qualities for example, the CDU could effectively deflect accusations that it was middle class, liberal-reactionary or even fascist. The factor of Weltanschauung, that inextricable and complex historical link between religion and politics in German society, further explains why the
defence of socialism or liberalism by regional Christian Democratic programmes, did not neatly translate to a desire by socialists to construct a centralised economy and by liberals to implement a market economy, as is normally understood in the Anglo-Saxon tradition. German ordo- or neo-liberalism stood for a reformed liberalism, a liberalism that was imbued with social responsibility and is markedly distinct from Anglo-Saxon neo-liberalism.\textsuperscript{144} German neo-liberals desired that the correct spirit or ethos was instilled in society, that people adopt either a more liberal or a more socially responsible attitude. In the post-fascist mood of 1945, moral reform became as important as reform of the economic and political system. The promotion of liberalism after 1945 was not to resurrect an exploitative \textit{laissez-faire} economy, but to incorporate social measures in its economic policies. Even the 19th century German Historical School had maintained Germany’s economy was unique, arguing that state intervention in the German economy would always be required to counter imbalances which arose from the arrival of industrialisation and capitalism. The economy still formed the point of departure for many liberals, but it was intended to serve the good of society and not understood exclusively as liberal economic freedom. So whilst conservative Catholics chose to find fault with the liberal economy of old, often for partisan reasons more than any strong aversion to capitalism, there was no reason why it could not find common ground with the German neo-liberalism of a Social Market Economy. Even the liberal market economy envisaged for Germany in 1945, would be constrained by its historically social commitment.

When other regional groups across the states and zones advocated a Christian Socialism, it also did not always imply that they were striving to bring about a socialist utopia through a radical upheaval of the social order - the conventional route for revolutionary socialist movements. German Christian Socialists in actual fact backed a programme with many restorative, conservative features, committed to private property ownership and to the middle class agricultural and small manufacturing industries. The ‘socialism’ they projected, paradoxically represented little more than support of private ownership, free market economics, industrial democracy and the prevention of economic monopolies. With a few notable exceptions, Christian Socialists broadly upheld the basic

\textsuperscript{144} This is usually associated with Thatcherism and Reaganism and denoting free market philosophies of the ‘new right’ conservatives.
values of middle class society and would not accurately be described as a revolutionary alternative. The concept ‘Socialism’ also fulfilled an important moralising function in the immediate post-war period, reflecting first and foremost, a Gesinnungsozialismus rather than a radical economic programme. In the initial wake of fascism in 1945, Christian Socialists in the main centres of Frankfurt, in Berlin, North Rhine-Westphalia, as well as in other regions, benefited from demonstrating socialist credentials and a socialist political programme, since socialism initially appeared to be the answer to Germany’s social, political and economic ills. Yet deep-rooted traditional German fears of socialism plus the proximity of the term to the SPD’s programme, caused some Christian Democrats, most notably Adenauer, to harbour real doubts that its party’s Christian Socialist wing was seeking affiliation with the parties on the left, and risked Marxist Socialism gaining a foothold in Germany. It was thus the historically problematic term ‘socialism’ and not its content per se that alienated conservative circles. By the time the first CDU party conference was held in Godesberg in December 1945, the definition of the phrase had already been sufficiently modified to reinforce its advocacy of a mixed economic structure, preventing any genuine left-wing programme from developing further.

The continuity of earlier conservative and liberal party movements to regional Christian Democratic groups emerging in 1945, dispels any suggestion that the post second world war period was a tabula rasa in socio-economic policy. But Section 3 of this study revealed that the Social Market Economy, which finally emerged between 1947 and 1949, was new in one very important aspect. It was the first time that an attempt at a third way had successfully been forged in a whole century of trying. Whilst individual elements of the programme were similar to earlier reform plans, the combination of liberal, social and conservative elements in one programme was unique. The circumstances in which the Social Market Economy was launched and the attitudes of the people now implementing those policies had also begun to change. Had the CDU in the Wirtschaftsrat or in the party at large, stubbornly rejected Erhard’s course or failed in the final hour to demonstrate unity behind the Social Market Economy, this would inevitably have led to the demise of the CDU. A new era of pragmatism and an ability to compromise was beginning to crystallise. Like the century of Christian Democratic movements before, the CDU in the years between 1945 to 1949 had failed independently

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to consolidate its ideological differences and to develop its own socio-economic concept. Without the Social Market Economy to act as the CDU’s election campaign in the 1949 federal elections, the risk of the young party disappearing into political oblivion was sufficiently great to silence those dissenting voices in the CDU. Erhard, who at this stage was still not politically affiliated to the CDU, had not launched his economic plan in the same way as previous CDU political programmes. He introduced his programme as a plan that would bring practical measures to solve the economic crisis during economic reconstruction and this meant that his ideas were not subjected to the usual intense scrutiny normally applied to the CDU’s party programmes. The party was accustomed to formulating profound philosophical and historical arguments for their political strategies and Erhard’s modern, unconventional and pragmatic approach was not immediately recognised as a programme that could permanently and decisively reform west Germany’s future political and economic order.

Erhard’s third way Social Market Economy is best described as a framework for practising liberal democracy more than a defined party political manifesto. It offered a way of synthesizing competing traditions in German society and the flexibility for devising politics in either a more liberal or a more socialist direction. The controversy over a planned or a free market economy that had dominated the CDU’s discussions and the century of ethical, socio-economic debates before, was ironically never conclusively resolved in the post-war period. Even the Basic Law drawn up in 1949 avoided a specific definition of the type of economy Germany had adopted. Although until recently the Social Market Economy was judged as an economic policy and for its success in bringing west Germany’s economic miracle, it is clearly more accurate to analyse it for its ideological and symbolic qualities. The conceptual ambiguity of ideological terms such as socialism and liberalism, inevitably meant that the CDU’s new third way programme, as a hybrid of liberal and social philosophies, would feature the same degree of ambivalence. Parties were accustomed to using political terminology as ideological weaponry to undermine their political opponents and resulted in socialism and liberalism undergoing periods in which they alternated between being terms of abuse and aspirational political goals.
It is also the nature of the third way that its parameters are not clearly delineated, and that it defies an all-encompassing and permanent definition. Policy in the third way is negotiable and flexible, allowing for either a more socialist or a more liberalist interpretation depending on political circumstances and demands in the economy. CDU politicians between 1945 and 1949 could draw manifold political advantages from this in-built ambiguity. Formulating policy with a degree of vagueness enabled their programmes to be modified at a later date without being seen to betray or contradict earlier statements. Despite the shift in thinking between the first Cologne Principles, the Ahlen Programme and the Düsseldorf Principles for example, the party was able to retain a semblance of ideological continuity in its programme statements. Through the political language of its programmes, the CDU succeeded in masking areas of intractable policy disagreement in the party, in concealing disputes between its members and in hiding areas of weakness or uncertainty over policy direction. Jakob Kaiser, Konrad Adenauer and Ludwig Erhard in particular, were exemplary at exploiting political language as a political resource. They formulated programme statements that withheld firm policy commitments when the outcome of events could not be predicted. Erhard for example was reluctant to back a market economy until he could be assured of the currency reform’s success. Adenauer was liberal in his thinking but cautious about abandoning socialism until he could be assured that a market economy would be accepted politically. The political chameleon and opportunist Jakob Kaiser altered his political hue from liberal to socialist, then back to liberal, to reflect the new Zeitgeist and rapid changes in political climate.

Ludwig Erhard was judged for his success in modifying and realigning Christian democracy’s former ideologies. By transforming the party’s perceptions of liberalism and socialism, he challenged entrenched prejudices and successfully convinced his sceptics that prosperity, social responsibility and justice could simultaneously be obtained within a capitalist system. Importantly, Erhard reversed the belief that had prevailed within the trade union and political Catholic movement in the late 19th and early 20th century, that social change must come about through an explicit social policy. Social change via economic policy characterised Erhard’s new mantra, emphasising the importance of free market enterprise, but always flanked by a commitment to social responsibility. Erhard’s programme rehabilitated liberalism from being a pejorative term
in the 19th and early 20th century, denoting exploitative laissez-faire capitalism and Protestant discrimination of Catholics, to denoting a positive affiliation to liberal-democracy that guaranteed political and economic freedoms for the individual and future prosperity for the nation. Erhard’s mixed professional experience and thinking, his earlier support for both socialist and liberalist economies at different moments in his own history, and finally his success in dynamically uniting liberal and socialist traditions, epitomise Germany’s search for an alternative third way programme. With the Social Market Economy, Erhard successfully broke the deadlock in the CDU’s programme discussions, convincing party members that pragmatism could win over dogma and reverse the tradition in which parties and individuals acted according to fixed, historical Weltanschauung. The more radical socialists could be persuaded to shed their historical antagonism towards capitalism and overcome their prejudices towards the market economy, the more moderate Christian Socialists who had never harboured anti-capitalist sentiments provided social provisions were accounted for, could nurture their affections for the market economy, whilst liberals learnt to accept that with freedom also comes responsibility in society.

It was the rhetoric of the Social Market Economy more than its economic formula that suggested Germany could reach a synthesis of its conflicting political traditions. This synthesis is not the result of opposing forces which become permanently reconciled in one final conclusion, as this would imply stagnation and political inertia. Rather the dialectics of ideological opposites remained in a state of dynamic flux, and could help lead to a higher level of dialectical synthesis. Debate and disagreement were intrinsic to performing third way politics, requiring flexible pragmatism and creativity in policy making. The Social Market Economy was not bound by dogma or fixed economic and social criteria and principles, indeed its role was more advisory than prescriptive. Significantly, the Social Market Economic system succeeded in generating consensus not only initially within the different political strands in the CDU, but later across Germany’s entire party political spectrum. The SPD most notably gave their formal recognition to the Social Market Economic principles in Bad Godesberg in 1959.

The Social Market Economy had grown from a century of initiatives to create an economic solution that could provide social welfare and prosperity. Those early
endeavours by Catholic and Protestant social reform movements and the subsequent conservative, socialist and liberal parties in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, were important foundations for the CDU’s first programmes, providing a collection of political ideas which could be adapted to suit the climate of 1945. The importance that has been ascribed to the more active political Catholic social reform movement or to the Centre Party, has clearly underplayed the role of political Protestantism and conservative liberalism in the development of the CDU’s programme. The contribution by Protestant social reformers in the 19th century, the inherently flexible nature of Evangelical social ethics, Calvinism’s link to democracy and to the spirit of capitalism, Weber’s call for a Politics of Responsibility, the vision of some of Weimar’s liberal parties, such as the DDP, who campaigned for a Social Capitalism, the extensive achievements of the ordo-liberals for devising a socially responsible market economy, the high degree of support for liberal programmes in the states of the eastern Soviet zone, the northern Länder of the British zone and the south-west Länder of the American zone, and finally the liberal programme of the Social Market Economy, have all been insufficiently acknowledged factors in the liberal and the Protestant origins of Christian Democracy.

A sufficient degree of compatibility between the principles and Weltanschauung of Catholics and Protestants and between their ambiguous interpretations of liberalism and socialism made a future for the Christian Democratic idea possible. Indeed it could be said that the CDU prospered not despite but rather as a result of its inherent heterogeneity in philosophies and programme. Neither confession was obliged to renounce their own religious beliefs, and neither Protestantism nor Catholicism subsumed the other in terms of validity of their principal values. Each confession brought very important and very different qualities to the relationship from their ethical teachings and their historical traditions. The more active role of Christianity in politics tempered Protestantism’s traditional passivity, whilst an appreciation of Catholic Social Teaching led to a revision of how Protestants viewed the relation between religion and politics. Catholicism on the other hand learnt to modify its indiscriminate criticism of Protestant liberalism and to see its benefits in promoting democracy and prosperity through a Social Market Economy.
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Appendices

Map 1 shows Germany after the Second World War divided into four allied occupation zones.

Map 2 shows Germany’s regional states or Länder, towns and cities.
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