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MOTIVATION AND THE GIFT RELATIONSHIP

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This copy of the thesis has been supplied on condition that anyone who consults it is understood to recognise that its copyright rests with its author and that no quotation from the thesis and no information derived from it may be published without the author's prior, written consent.
This thesis proposes a theory of Motivation to Work, as a particular condition of general motivation, using the Maussian concept of the Gift to explain the operation of Lacanian Desire. Specifically, it argues that de-motivation stems from Gift rejection.

However, as the arguments are not paradigmatically commensurable with managerialist theories, it has been necessary to establish the epistemological tradition of which this work is representative, namely, Critical Theory and Post-Structuralism/Post-Modernism.

In distinction to the managerialist explanations of motivation, management and work, behaviourist theories of motivation are characterised as more properly a concern with psychological incentives, management in its current socio-historic institutionalised form as a process of social domination and work as a social experience of domination, but also as a forum for social life generally.

However, as such a view receives little theoretical or empirical confirmation from managerialist literature, it is argued that it is necessary to broaden the catchment area of relevant writing, and that the literary arts are more insightful than orthodox science. This is supported by reference to modern literary theory in terms of the Form/Content distinction. Central to this argument is the ontological concept of Difference and its 'political' use in maintaining social domination by privileging certain forms over others.

Having established the basis on which to articulate this theory of motivation, the Lacanian concept of Desire is explored, together with its relevance to motivation and management/organisation theory. The theory of the Gift Relationship is then explicated and developed, together with some of its popular sociological conceptualisations, and an argument made for an understanding in terms of its psychological significance in explaining the operationalisation of Lacanian Desire. This is related to the work situation and to its relevance for organisational management.

In conclusion, its utility is considered, as are some potential criticisms of the arguments put forward.

Key Words:  
Motivation to Work  
Lacanian Desire  
The Gift Relationship  
Critical Management/Organisation Theory  
Management and Post-Structuralism
To Les and Hilda, without whose positive support this thesis would not have been possible.
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| APPENDIX            | Published Work submitted in support of this thesis under regulations 9.4 and 10.6 of the 1979 Regulations for Higher Degrees by Research. This does not form part of the thesis. |
This work stems from an interest in the question of the Motivation to Work. This interest is undoubtedly related to many years spent as a manager with some special responsibility in this area. There are, of course, many theories of Motivation to Work available to the manager, but experience of implementing such theories, and their inevitable failure to produce the expected results, led to a scepticism regarding their claim to explicate the issue of motivation. A critic may, of course, suggest that the problem was not with the theories, but with their (inadequate) application. My response to this would be - where is the theory? The motivational nostrums of the period (1960's and 1970's), whether concerned with job enrichment, expectancy, or participation, were, in one form or another, loosely associated with the idea of 'personal growth'. People would produce more work if they were interested, could realise some potential condition, or were 'involved'. All 'theories' contain explicitly or, more usually, implicitly, some notional model of man, and the motivational theories were no exception. For present purposes, the model implied in behavioural motivation theories can be understood as Rational Economic Man - rational in the sense that a person would behave so as to maximise their own self interest, and economic, not in the narrow financial sense, but in the sense of a wider, more spiritual, economy of self (1). The failure of motivational theories was, in effect, caused by the failure of those subject to them to behave in accordance with the principles of Rational Economic Man. In other words, if Rational Economic Man did not hold, then neither did the so-called theory of motivation. Why then did theorists employ such dubious models? All theories must be informed by a meta-theory, again simplistically, a set of pre-epistemological beliefs or ideology. In other words, the model of man underpinning motivation theory derived not so much from theory as from ideology. Theories of motivation were not so much 'scientific' theories as
empirically based rationalisations of prior ideological commitments. In the absence of a shared ideology of capitalist exploitation even the most competent application of motivational theory would be doomed to failure. This does, of course, assume the absence of a shared ideology, yet, even if this was not the case, the failure to make specific such pre-epistemological bias - i.e., portraying claims as scientific and therefore ideologically neutral - acts effectively to de-value the ensuing knowledge claims.

That knowledge claims are biased is, of course, widely accepted, and the emergence of paradigmatic understanding of knowledge claims has reduced the legitimacy of claims for absolute knowledge. This, of course, implies two problems for someone with a prurient interest in motivation theory. Firstly, any knowledge claims must be related to particular interests, and secondly, omnibus empirical evidence can obviously be interpreted in more than one way, and indeed ways which may be mutually exclusive. Abandoning the assumption of the value neutrality of empirical evidence, however, has not diminished scientific enthusiasm for reading its entrails. Instead, an epistemological problem has been redefined as an ontological one. Knowledge claims may be relative, but that to which they refer is still to be considered as real. Emphasis shifts from the empirical to the experiential. Paradigm incommensurability becomes merely a problem of frame of reference, with the potential for some (future) aligning of disparate views. Belief in the reality of empirical data remains undiminished. This does, of course, leave the problem of how to reconcile, in the short term, opposing interpretations.

Shifting the focus from the empirical (neutral and available to all) to the experiential (personal) does not imply, however, the ontology of the object of interest. In fact, it is the subject rather than the object whose 'realness' is
emphasised - prioritising subject over object. In other words, conflicts of interpretation are resolved by the triumph of the subject - the interpretation which can gain legitimacy over the opposition by virtue of the power of its advocate. This, of course, brings us back to the endemic problem of the more traditional scientism.

Subjective interpretations of empirical evidence amount to a de facto 'reading' of the symbols (or 'signifiers') observed, as understood in the tradition of semiotics, and it is this tradition which provides an approach to knowledge which escapes the temptation to false objectivity. Seeing language as the key to understanding and constituting the social world means that interpretation of empirical evidence equates to the interpretation of any other 'text'. Whereas in traditional empiricism, of either the scientific or phenomenological type, the researcher presents himself as an authority figure - as a seer, as the priest with the secret and ancient knowledge to translate the signs, to identify the latent meaning - textual approaches insist on de-centring the subject, in denying the authority of the one privileged interpretation of the empirical runes. Now all possible 'readings' have legitimacy, and the scientist cannot, by virtue of his status, claim privilege in interpreting the world. Does this then indicate an unreserved relativism, and does 'science' therefore have nothing to offer? Such a question is only of concern to those who cling to a belief that scientific knowledge is to be held as distinct from other forms of knowledge. In terms of textual approaches to knowledge the question is, by and large, redundant. I suggested earlier, with reference to motivation theory, that such knowledge claims served particular ideological interests, i.e., that the empirical evidence had been read in one particular way, so that the effect of such epistemological claims is to reinforce the social status quo. Workers remain workers, owners still accumulate disproportionate amounts of created wealth, managers retain their power vis a vis
workers, etc. The very best outcome from such claims would be a lowering of the level of boredom and disinterest on the part of the workers, coupled with a reduction in marginal costs, allowing a greater surplus to be distributed, hopefully according to an equitable formula. But overall, social relativities would be maintained. Thus the 'special power' of scientific knowledge lies in its ability to reinforce a particular model of the social world. If the role of science is to discover law-like generalisations about the way the world is naturally structured, then, of course, the praxis of science is of no consequence. Science is merely a neutral agency using its special talents to unlock nature's secrets. However, if such a naturalistic view of science is rejected then the activities of its practitioners have an effect in constituting the social world. Science ceases to be a commentary on the world and becomes an active part of it. What then should be the role of science? Obviously, in a purely relativistic world science may as well be used to assist in social domination as in emancipation - it is difficult to substantiate a transcendent claim for either. However, as few would openly espouse the purpose of assisting repression, it is fair to assume, notwithstanding the almost empty semantic content of such an expression, that science should be concerned with emancipation. The role of science should be to contribute to the amelioration of socially unnecessary suffering. Knowledge claims become judged, not in so far as they unlock the secrets of an impartial universe, but by how efficacious they are in pointing the way to social emancipation, i.e., in terms of their emancipatory praxis. That determining the semantic content of such a claim remains a task to be completed should not detract from its importance as the 'true' goal for science.

How then does a textual approach to knowledge help in this respect? Empirically, the (social) world is understood to comprise symbolic entities. In the absence of an absolute translator of symbolic codes we fall back on personal, though possibly
inter-subjective, interpretation. Thus epistemological significance lies not in the unmediated symbol, but in the mediated understanding of the reader, trying to make sense of his experienced world. Obviously, the emancipatory potential varies between readings, and each reading needs to be assessed in this light. However, the empirical world is not equally accessible to all readers. Symbols, or their accumulation, texts, imply information, and information for obvious reasons is subject to strict censorship. Certain types of information are emphasised or privileged, and others suppressed. Given the latent bias in information, how is an informed reading of the text to be achieved? Fortunately, since the Enlightenment, the emergent trend has not been the absolute repression of 'undesirable' information, but an attempt to marginalise it as fiction rather than fact, enforcing a channeling of information according to its type. This tendency, as regards scientific and non-scientific information, has already been alluded to. Thus 'subversive' information flourishes, but heavily disguised as non-information, or at least non-fact. From a textual point of view, however, such distinctions are meaningless, the format irrelevant - what is important is the message, not the medium. The world is revealed through the text, through the 'stories' that are told by the text, but as the text never tells a single story its significance must be judged in terms of the emancipatory potential it possesses.

I have suggested here that the form of the textual message is not important. What is important is its content, and it is this awareness that informs the usage of the textual method. Traditional science concerns itself solely with the issue of form, ie., with the relationship between parts. It has little or nothing to offer on the experience of these forms, ie., content, which is a metaphysical issue deemed relevant to philosophy rather than science. The prioritising of form over content in a purely deterministic world would be bad enough for those repressed, though excusable as inevitable. However, if the world is constituted, at least in part, as a
consequence of human desire, then the prioritising of form becomes inescapably the servant of those exercising most social influence. Obviously, the models of theodic or natural order provide a convenient, apparently non-ideological, metaphor for such emphasis on form, any opposition to such structuring exposing itself as inescapably ideological. Whilst the debate was between a supposed non-ideological science and an ideological non-science the situation was clearly defined and contained. With the acceptance, previously noted, of an inescapably ideological science, then the issue, whilst clearly illuminated as ideological, becomes at the same time obscured by the notable absence of explicit ideological commitment informing specific knowledge claims. Content, however, is par excellence the realisation of repression. Repression is not just about relationships between individuals, groups, classes, etc., but also about the substance of transactions between such factions. To return to the managerial theories of motivation, such theories were primarily concerned with the form or structure of the work relationship, particularly in the way they were operationalised. Thus, job enrichment was expressed as a concern for structures which could reasonably be labelled 'enriched jobs'. How such structures were experienced by those subject to them was irrelevant, either in terms of the specific task, or the general social organisation of those tasks. Similarly, participation was defined in terms of form, eg., consultative machinery or decisions which were permitted, not in terms of whether people were, or felt they were, participating.

This thesis, therefore, is presented both as a text to be read in the light of its emancipatory potential (or lack of it), and as a text of texts, as a textual reading of (part of) the empirical world. Whilst it reflects to some extent the scientific tradition, and certainly, and inescapably, presents itself to some degree as authoritative, it makes no claim to a neutral transcendent objectivity. Nor does it claim to be an accurate mirroring of unequivocal empirical evidence. It is
concerned to attempt an illumination of the issue of motivation which recognises the unique subjectivity of the individual. Whilst certain forms or structures may be posited they are not intended to be prioritised over their content. Being human must ultimately reside in the qualitative experience of living in the world. It should be remembered that structuring as such is a linguistic device, a way of arranging words (signifiers) in order to convey the impression of structure, whereas content remains ultimately experiential. Structure is thus a device, a metaphor, for forcing the essentially unintelligible world into something we can understand - in a systems sense, it is a device for attenuating proliferating variety. It is a signifier of man's arrogance that he assumes that he does possess the intellectual capacity to order the variety in the world, that he can truly understand how the world is organised, discover its hidden laws. Yet, if we accept an evolutionary explanation of the animal world, there is nothing which requires man to possess sufficient information processing capacity to understand the universal order. All he requires is the brain power to survive as specie, not to understand his position in the cosmos. The reader looking for claims for scientific certainty will be disappointed. The test of this work is not whether it has identified regularities in the world, but in terms of its implied praxis.
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

To paraphrase Derrida (1982:3), I will write of a word: 'Work'. When Derrida used this opening gambit he was referring to his neologism 'différence', which he introduced to French linguistic philosophy to supplement the concept of 'différence'. Difference is the basic ontological characteristic of language, identified seminally by Saussure (1960), who pointed out that language functions, not by naming of objects, but by a coding system which allows the perception of difference between a word (signifier) and that which is thereby signified, and any other word and its signified, (see also the work of Peirce, eg., 1931). Or, as Norris (1982) puts it,

"... language is a differential network of meaning."
(p.24, emphasis in original)

However, Derrida, playing on the fact that 'différence' in French means both to differ and to defer, exploited this important distinction by his use of the word 'différence'. Derrida is pointing out that the use of a word defers, both in time and in space, the presence of that which is named by the word.

The idea that that which is named by a word is not present is well established in semiotics, ie., that a sign denotes an absence, but Derrida goes further. The absence of that which is named allows words to be (mis)used in ways which escape the verification which presence would insist upon, yet which cannot happen - in other words, words can 'lie'(1). It is this ability of words to mask that gives power to those who can appropriate the meaning in language to their own purposes. And yet the presence which would unmask the lie or reveal the truth in language can
never be, the potential of presence is an illusion - the play between the word and that which it is intended to represent, between signifier and signified. If, then, there is no possibility of transcendent finite meaning in language, how can words lie - how are we to judge one meaning as 'more correct' than another?

The subject of this thesis is work, specifically motivation to work. Yet what is the work towards which one is to be motivated? Work is an important facet of human existence. For Habermas (1978) it is, with interaction, one of the two ways in which man reproduces himself. Yet work appears, inescapably, as a paradox. It is claimed, on the one hand, as 'good', in the sense of a manifestation of some essentialist understanding, or model, of man, (eg., McGregor, 1960), or as a means of achieving psychological or spiritual growth, (eg., Maslow, 1954) - a transcendence of the secular experience. On the other hand, it is simultaneously claimed to be 'bad', either in terms of its debilitating effects on the body and/or psyche, (eg., Russell, 1976), or in terms of its de facto role as an instrument of social control and repression, (eg., Jackson and Carter, 1985, 1986).

Obviously, this paradox can be dissolved to some extent, by qualifying statements on work in terms of whether they represent a positive or normative claim. Hence the claims of writers from Ure (1835), through Taylor (1921), to Drucker (eg., 1977b) that (in this case organised) work is, or has been, bad, but is now, or should be (when adjustments have been made), good. Alternatively, one can fragment the concept of work by the use of appropriate adjectives, such that excessive work is bad, but the correct amount is good (Taylor, op. cit.). Thus, rather than a singular absolute concept of work, there emerges work as a social construct, (with the possible exception of the physicist's concept of work).

One of the major attempts at a social definition of work, which would help to
illuminate this dichotomy, was the Marxist understanding of alienated work. Retaining an essentialist understanding of work as an inescapable part of being human, and therefore 'good', it was the contemporary socio-historical form of labour domination which made work 'bad' - in other words, simplistically, coercive wage labour, opposed to either a voluntaristic labour, as exemplified in, say, hobbies, or the possibility of some other form of social organisation of labour, stripped of its alienative characteristics. However, the historical inevitability, for Marx, of the worker forcing a revolutionary change in the process of domination of organised labour, not coming to pass, illustrates to some extent the inadequacy of such simple dichotomies. This is especially so when research continues to demonstrate inherent 'satisfactions' within the contemporary organisation of supposedly alienated labour. Even if one dismisses so-called scientific claims in this matter, as produced by dependent apologists for the capitalist system (eg., Herzberg, 1959), there is a wealth of less (directly) dependent writing which substantiates this claim. (For a 'non-scientific' confirmation, see, eg., Terkel, 1985; for a minimalist view, see, eg., Thompson, 1983, ch.5.)

Attempts to explain the contradiction of experiencing psychological satisfaction in a condition of alienated labour, whilst still retaining the broad historical and social vision of the human condition as explained by Marx, have focussed attention on the mechanisms of social control which maintain people in a state of subservience. Thus Marcuse (1966) points to the power of a supposed transcendent administrative rationality, with its appeal to the determinism apparently self-evident in a technological world - technology as a metaphor for human life. Deleuze and Guattari (1984) go further, positing an appeal to a latent facism in man which encourages co-operation in one's own repression.
Essential to the perspective represented by Marcuse and Deleuze and Guattari is an acknowledgement of the seminal role that symbolic representation, particularly language, plays in maintaining asymmetric relations of social power. The abandonment of a correspondence view of language following on the work of Saussure and Peirce, (see, for example, Culler, 1981), has highlighted the benefit to those seeking to exercise power, of the value of being able to privilege their linguistic meanings over opposing definitions, (see Marcuse, op. cit.; Habermas, 1978, 1979; Foucault, 1972), the essence of such manipulation residing in the use of metaphor. Thus for Marcuse the metaphor of technology provides the locus of non-physical power of control and domination, the rhetorical appeal to the transcendence of technological rationality. Thus, as regards work: whilst orthodox texts on work lay claim to formal logic in terms of propagating certain explanations, their language is in fact inescapably rhetorical, in so far as, on the one hand, the possibility of a formally logical symbolic language, at least at present, does not exist, and, on the other, the de facto language in use in such texts is plainly rhetorical (see, eg., Morgan/Bourgeois and Pinder debate).

As Culler (1981:188) points out, rhetoric was assumed to have passed away in the 19th Century (see Perelman, 1982:162; also introduction to this by Arnold:xviii; Barthes, 1972a:134), following on the Enlightenment and the triumph of 'reason' over theology, established in, and from, science, when there arose the dominance of formal logic. Interestingly, this rational belief in science reached its zenith in logical positivism and the Vienna Circle at precisely the same time as its antithesis was germinating in structural linguistics and the social theory of the Frankfurt School. The rehabilitation of rhetoric as the New Rhetoric, (see Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969; Perelman, op. cit.), purged it of its Aristotelian mysticism. Post-Saussurian linguistics has seen a renewed interest in metaphor, as one of the fundamentals of rhetorical theory, in the analysis of
figurative language, along with other tropes such as metonymy and synecdoche, (see, eg., Hawkes, 1972). Linguistics, however, is no longer merely to be seen as the study of language, but as an essential component in understanding social man (see, eg., Manning, 1986). The conceptualisation of language as seminal in the psycho-social development of the individual and the community rooted in the emergence of psycho-analysis has led, for example, to Lacan's use of metonymy in theorising the psyche and Levi-Strauss' use of synecdoche in anthropology. More recently, in post-structuralist/post-modernist thought, metaphor has become the over-arching trope, prioritised as the 'figure of figures' (Culler, 1981:189). This, to some extent, recognises the fact that a word is in itself a metaphor, in so far as the definition of metaphor also describes the essence of the word (see Derrida, 1982, esp. pp.207-271).

The traditional definition of metaphor, deriving from Aristotle, is the perception of similarities in the dissimilar. Thus the use of language in the poetic sense uses words to present an image of similarity in the dissimilar. The value of the metaphor is in its ability to evoke an awareness of the appropriateness of a particular implied comparison. However, in the way that images can be dissimilar and yet poetically evoke similarity, so with the words themselves. If one uses the word CAT, for example, there is evoked a similarity between the word and the object notwithstanding their inescapable differences. That is to say, the word stands in place for the presence of the Cat itself. Yet, on the one hand, the word CAT and the object CAT are essentially dissimilar, and, on the other, the object CAT cannot possibly represent all the significations which attach to the word CAT, nor even to any particular usage of the word. This, of course, is Derrida's point about différence. The presence of the cat is deferred even though its image is evoked by the use of the word. Thus all language is in itself metaphorical. As long as language when used continues to evoke, and is used to evoke, an image, it
remains thus. Attempts have been made to discover or identify a language of zero
degree metaphor (see, eg., Ricoeur, 1978), but generally, within the contemporary
deconstructionist tradition, this is held to be impossible (Barthes, 1967; Cooper,
1986c). This does, of course, mean that writing on metaphor is itself metaphorical
and this is the inescapable burden imposed on man as a user of symbols. Or, as
Norris (1985) puts it:

"Deconstruction is therefore an activity performed by
texts which in the end have to acknowledge their own
partial complicity with what they denounce." (p.48)

The possibility of a single authoritative interpretation of language statements is
thus refuted, in spite of the fact that such statements present themselves as
possessed of absolute meaning. However, this does not necessarily imply a strict
relativism. On the one hand, the very existence of language implies the possibility
of intersubjective communication, to a greater or lesser degree. On the other
hand, it is clear that such communication is not total or ubiquitous. Language
statements privilege intersubjective meaning only within particular social
groupings, which makes such use, in the broadest sense, political, ie.,
representative of certain interests. It is appropriate therefore to judge such
statements, not in terms of the words used (signifiers), but in terms of what is
being signified.

This intrinsic culpability of the word is compounded when considered in relation to
the juxtaposition of other words. Jakobson, in his research into aphasia, related
metaphoric and metonymic use of language to the syntagmatic and paradigmatic
axes of language, (see Hawkes, 1983). That is to say, whereas words are clearly
metonymical in so far as they abstract something recognisable (symbolically) from
that which they name, when used syntagmatically meaning is derived in terms of
what they 'draw' from other words. Thus, paradigmatically, the use of one word in
preference to a possible synonym is an attempt to privilege a specific meaning, and this is compounded by its syntagmatic use. For example, work and labour can be seen (paradigmatically) as synonyms for the same process, but certainly from a managerial interest, the former is preferred to the latter, precisely because of the acquired meaning of the two words. When used syntagmatically, the privileging is compounded. Management may well speak of hard work, but would not use the expression 'hard labour'. (Though not offered as a piece of empirical research, a glance at books representing a managerialist perspective shows that 'labour' does not feature strongly as opposed to 'work', with the notable exception of those dealing with labour as a cost head, i.e., Labour, Plant and Material. However, the term is popular with writers of a loosely Marxist persuasion, (see Fowkes, in Marx, 1976:87).)

The concept of work, therefore, can be seen as metaphorical, both paradigmatically and syntagmatically, when contained in expressions of claimed or implied authority. The use of metaphor, (and, of course, language generally, which is inescapably metaphorical), constitutes a de facto prioritising of supposed similarities over other possible claims. (This is nicely illustrated by a comment in the second edition of Beynon's 'Working for Ford', (1984:11) - at least one reader saw the book as an indictment of the shop stewards as uncouth!) Implicit in this is the possibility of claims of similarity where none exist - for example, the claim of the Nazi concentration camps to provide 'Freedom through Work'. However, for the present this facility is best seen in terms of multiple, though often mutually exclusive, possibilities of supposed similarity, all having equal claims to validity, thus avoiding the need to introduce the idea of 'right' and 'wrong' in judging claims. It is the idea of a 'claim to validity' which is the focus for the deconstructionist project. As Norris (op.cit.) puts it:
"It is here that deconstruction finds its rock-bottom sense of the irreducibility of metaphor, the difference at play within the very constitution of 'literal' (valid) meaning. It finds, in short that there is no literal meaning." (p.66)

That is to say that the deconstructionist position denies any authoritative reading of a text and even denies the authority of the author. This is manifest in both a strong and a weak version. In the first it is denied that there can be any essential message in a text, that all interpretations are valid, even mutually exclusive interpretations, such that a text can be deconstructed to the point of no intersubjective meaning - a sort of textual anarchism, (see, eg., the work of G. Hartman and J. Hillis Miller, eg., Miller, 1979). The weaker version retains the idea of some irreducible message which a competent reader would understand and which would (possibly) reflect the intentions of the author, (see, eg., Derrida, 1984:156), on 'Finnegans Wake'). This in no way invalidates contrary readings of the text, nor diminishes the power of consensus about such a reading (eg., de Man, 1982). Thus whether or not Tolkein in 'Lord of the Rings' or Junger in 'On the Marble Cliffs' were allegorising Fascism does not prevent them fulfilling such a role for the reader. Conversely, that Orwell's 'Animal Farm' was an allegory of Stalinism does not, from personal experience, prevent it from being enjoyed, in ignorance of this fact, as a story (2). The problem with the strong version is its negation of the possibility of effective communication, and one could go so far as to argue that the very fact that the proponents of such a view continue to make public their arguments presupposes the immutability of the possibility of intersubjective communication. With the weaker version, if we ignore the authority of the author - a phrase significant in itself - are we left with merely a pluralism of claims to understanding, and if so, are there any grounds for accepting one and rejecting another? The key to this problem is to restate the question asked by Foucault (1972):
"... how is it that one particular statement appeared rather than another?" (p.27)

In other words, when someone claims an authority for their words, or claims an authoritative interpretation of someone else's statement, we must ask what is the 'meta-message' of that statement, what interest is being prioritised over others, what is the implied praxis of such a statement - i.e., we must deconstruct the text. Or, to put it another way, what competency is being sought in the reader? Clearly, competence in this sense relates to the ability to share in one particular interpretation, i.e., to understand one particular meaning. Each claim to authority reflects some claim to power, each agreement with that claim accepts that power. In other words, in assessing claims to authoritative texts we are assessing claims to power. How do we judge the veracity of such claims? A solution to this problem is provided by Habermas (eg., 1979), with his theory of 'communicative competence'.

Diverse textual readings represent excursions in the exercise of power, i.e., the attempt to prioritise one meaning over another, and thus language (metaphors) becomes the signifiers of power. This can be simply illustrated, both paradigmatically and syntagmatically. Wilde's famous inversion, 'Work is the curse of the drinking classes' can be contrasted with McGregor's 'Work is as natural as rest or play'. Clearly the power of Wilde's metaphor, as a statement, would be lost had he said 'Labour is the curse of the drinking classes', notwithstanding the power such a statement may have in contemporary society, given the meanings acquired by the word 'labour' since Wilde's day, eg., as in 'the Labour Party'. For the reasons suggested earlier, 'Labour is as natural as rest or play' would probably be less welcome in management circles, sounding, perhaps, a little too much like Marxist dogma! However, it is syntagmatically that the intended power of the statement is fully revealed. With Wilde, there is a clear allusion to the dysfunctions of work, to work as an imposition, to work as an
opposition to pleasure and man's hedonistic tendency, especially for that class in
society which was 'not born to work'. McGregor, on the other hand, clearly
suggests an affinity between man qua man and the necessary complement of work,
the essential component of being human. Clearly, at the risk of oversimplifying,
the power of metaphor lies in its correspondence with, and reinforcing of,
Ideology. The inability to communicate between ideologies, (see Burrell and
Morgan, 1979), on paradigm incommensurability), leaves language as both the
process and product of sustaining the domination of one ideology over another.
Habermas' project to purge language of meanings sustained through power, (see
Carter and Jackson, 1986), gives us the possibility of 'true' communication
between author and reader which, as suggested earlier, must underly the very act
of communication itself. Obviously, in the absence of (yet) a universal
communicative competence, we are forced to rely on a partial communication of
the message (intended or otherwise), where the author and reader are not
distanced by a mediating component of power - a form of 'preaching to the
converted'. This does, of course, presuppose a coalition of interest, (along the
ideological lines of demarcation), which does nothing, in itself, to alleviate the
problem of power differentials, which must be challenged to be overcome. This
does mean that the competent audience of any text must be limited, the challenge
is to expand such an audience, to expand true communicative competence.

When using the word 'work', or attempting to explicate its praxis, there is an
inescapable privileging which will have limited appeal and can only be sustained by
reference to an (explicit) (political) purpose. The paradox of work dissolves into a
range of possible scenarios of meaning relative to the social paradigm or interest
which the author is representing (consciously or otherwise), (see Jackson and
Willmott, 1986). Accordingly, there can be no claim to a transcendent authority
when dealing with the subject of this thesis. The unpacking (or deconstructing) of
the metaphor 'work', as a signifier, is informed by the coalition of meaning
suggested by the specific conditions of use of that signifier to the competent author. In other words, the metaphor 'work' comprises a number (possibly infinite) of what might be referred to as sub-metaphors which are open to exploration. For example, in Wilde's aphorism, the work which he refers to appears to me to be the notion of having to work for one's living, (or, possibly, having inescapable duties to perform), rather than the simple expenditure of energy. With McGregor, work clearly refers to, or, at least, is commonly taken to refer to, wage labour in a capitalist economy. Thus Wilde would lead us naturally in the direction of concepts such as earned income versus unearned income, of time constrained versus time unconstrained, of a working class versus a leisured class. McGregor would point to managers versus workers, to directing versus being directed, to alienation, to power. The selection of such sub-metaphors must, of course, be open to criticism as being inescapably partial. However, equally as they must always be partial, their justification lies in their metonymical/synecdochal adequacy in representing the whole. In other words, if, for example, work implies subordination, then to deconstruct such a concept is justified in so far as it typifies the socio-political condition of that work. In order to deconstruct the concept 'work' this study selects and addresses a number of these 'sub-metaphors' to explore as indicators of the working condition, bearing in mind the overall project, which is to suggest a theory of motivation, itself, in this case, a sub-metaphor of work.

**Guide to the Text**

The text thus breaks down into two parts. In the first I will be considering what might be seen as implicit in the orthodox management text. It is impossible to address seriously an issue such as motivation to work without first trying to lay bare the basic qualities and characteristics of what is subsumed in modern day forms of institutionalised wage labour. This involves questioning some of the
taken for granted foundations of current work organisation practices, in order to
demonstrate their essentially arbitrary nature in relation to any absolute claim for
their necessary form. Having 'deconstructed' these assumptions it is then possible,
in the second part of the thesis, to offer a theory of motivation to work which
takes account of the disparities between the contemporary situation of labour
management and the conditions which would hopefully obtain in a more
emancipated society.

I start by looking at the general issue of motivation to work from an essentially
historical perspective and in terms of its perceived centrality in a well-managed
organisation. Given that motivation to work is such a well-entrenched concept in
management, to the extent that it exists within management discourse as a most
basic and unremarkable axiom of management dogma, I am concerned to identify
from whence such an idea came. I find that it is of surprisingly recent origins and,
notwithstanding its apparent semantic integrity, rests on most uncertain
foundations. The attraction of motivation to work theory for management lies in
its reinforcement of certain normative views of the purpose and nature of workers
as creators of wealth for capitalism, and, as such, helps the managerial task of
getting more for less out of productive resources. Accordingly, the behavioural
theories of motivation are primarily concerned with the provision of psychological
incentives and, as such, more correctly form part of incentive theory than
motivation theory. I argue that the distinction between incentive and motivation
is crucial for those interested in social emancipation. Incentives, as currently
used, especially where masquerading as motivators, aid the maintenance of power
differentials and sectarian interests.

This suggests that management is significant not just in terms of process, but also
in terms of its social role. Management is naively understood as a neutral,
objective and necessary process in creating social good. However, I will
characterise management in terms of the exercise of social control, where maintaining specific asymmetries of power takes precedence over their functional social wealth-creating role. This in turn leads to consideration of the supposed rationality of the management process. I consider the genesis of management in its contemporary social form as agents of control and look at the techniques developed as a body of codified skills and, not necessarily related, practices. I raise the issue of what is to be opposed to management in order to suggest the idea of mis-management - in other words, to argue that management is not, by definition, inevitably good, and opposed to some notion of chaos, but that, if it were judged in terms of its social praxis, then much so-called management would in fact be mis-management.

I take, at this point, the raison d'etre of management to be control and that its progress is informed by attempts to extend its control. I here suggest two foci for management control, (i) inanimate resources and (ii) human resources, and it is with the latter that this thesis is, of course, concerned. However, control is not an absolute concept, but is relative to the purpose of the controller. Control is informed by the concept of efficiency, which, I will argue, is itself a relative concept, in so far as it too relates to purpose.

I now turn my attention to workers, which, to me, is a somewhat less complex area than management. There has been much self delusion on the part of management about workers, at least as signified by writers on management, and this has been so since at least the Industrial Revolution. There is a tendency to define workers as somehow distinct from mankind generally, as if they exhibit very specific characteristics when considered as workers, rather than as just people. This is no doubt aided by perceived differences on the part of management between themselves as people and workers as people. There seems little doubt that workers are workers through dint of necessity. However, whilst
acting as workers, they are still people and therefore act socially as do people generally. Certainly, the constraints of work influence and shape the 'social' worker, but the fact that management may possess a normative view of the ideal worker does not mean that workers living the experience of work reflect, or are even conscious of, or would give any credence to, such pious hopes. Workers are social beings and work is a social experience and, furthermore, not merely a diversion, but the real thing. Thus we need to understand workers as people, not people as workers.

Such an insight is not furnished by the management text, which acts as a de facto obstacle to such an understanding. This, of course, is reasonable if the purpose of the management text is merely to reinforce asymmetries of social power and confirm management's position as the controllers of labour. However, for those seeking to escape the attenuation of managerialism in order to gain a better understanding of the work situation, I suggest that the Arts, particularly literature, provide such an outlet and that this is furnished in two ways, i.e., form and content. The managerialist illusion of rationality and order is countered in a genre of writing, exemplified in the 'nouveau roman', where the inevitable disjunction and uncertainties of social existence are highlighted. Similarly, the position of the author as the source of knowledge is challenged, allowing the inevitable multiplicity of reader interpretations to become an integral part of the text, instead of being suppressed, or at best marginalised, as occurs with the authoritative academic text. The novel also provides a richer picture of the human condition and its social forms, and allows comments influenced by a different ideology to the almost exclusively capitalist one of the management text. As such, the novel provides not only a greater insight into organisational life, but can also represent perspectives totally ignored by the orthodoxy.

Many 'scientists' would, of course, argue that 'knowledge' furnished by the arts is
not the same as scientific knowledge, i.e., that they are different in some way, and it is to this idea of the perception of 'difference', real or otherwise, that I now turn. The ability to perceive difference is necessary to cognitive functioning. It is a way of attenuating the total volume of information present in the world to a level which we can handle. However, what is a useful and necessary feature of the thinking individual is not so benign in the way it functions in practice. The perception of difference is independent, to a large extent, of 'real' difference, at least at the social level. However, by the very act of differentiating we inevitably privilege one part over the other and impart an ontological status to that entity which we have created. This ability to privilege one part over another constitutes a de facto mechanism of social domination. Thus from a generalised mass of humanity we create the category 'worker', and hold it to be different from the category 'management'. Whilst there may be substantive differences between managers and workers, they are not defined by these 'real' differences, but by an accumulation of supposed differences - such as, workers are stupid, idle, have lesser needs, tire less easily, are less human - which facilitates their subordination. Again, it is important to establish the arbitrariness of non-substantive difference in terms of its social significance, if we are to move towards an emancipated society.

Having undertaken a deconstruction of the contemporary work situation, I am now in a position to reconstruct my theory of worker motivation. I take the Lacanian model of desire as the source of motivation per se. Lacanian desire constitutes one of the two main theoretical foundations for this work and I make no revision to its basic premises. However, I do undertake an extended restatement of the theory in such a way as to illuminate its relevance for the subsequent arguments. Lacanian desire is a total desire to fill man's central Lack, and is the desire of the subject to gain access to the social world as an inescapable condition of human existence. The escape from the unimaginable state of being a totally isolated
entity is found through social interaction and it is this interaction which establishes the identity of the subject. However, there is no end state of subjectivity which can be achieved. Lacanian desire cannot be fulfilled, but we must continually attempt so to do, and it is this which constitutes motivated behaviour.

The second theoretical basis is the Maussian concept of the Gift. The insight provided by Mauss has been a constant source of inspiration for social theorists, particularly as an explanation of social structure and stability, and in terms of exchange theory. However, my use of the Gift is substantially different from these sociological explanations, and treats the Gift at the psychological level. My proposition is that the Gift provides an explanation of how Lacanian desire is operationalised. Gift giving is motivated behaviour intended, not necessarily consciously, as a lack-filling initiative. Mauss characterised the Gift relationship in terms of three imperatives - to give, to receive, to reciprocate - and, whilst these were principally, though not exclusively, formulated in terms of material gifts, it is the symbolic essence of the Gift, material or otherwise, which is significant for this work. I argue that acceptance of the Gift in a complex social network of giving and reciprocation sustains motivated, lack-filling, action. Consequently, rejection of the Gift, which amounts to rejection of the giver's concept of self, promotes de-motivation. It is my central argument that management cannot motivate workers, though they can provide conditions which will facilitate sustained motivated behaviour. They can, however, and do, de-motivate workers.

The remainder of this work is concerned with locating the concept of the Gift within the work context and illustrating its relevance in terms of motivation to work. I consider several aspects, including the need to understand the superordinacy of subjective valuations of the Gift, and how the ability to reject or
under-reciprocate with impunity rests on the possession of power over others, ie., that Gift rejection equates with social domination. I also look at the implications of the Gift relationship for management, as, clearly, managers, being in a position of social domination, have the power to reject the worker's Gift. If there is real concern with motivation, then this would require managers to stop rejecting worker's Gifts. However, this implies a reduction in management's ability to impose its definitions on the work situation and acceptance of the individual worker understandings of their situation. This, of course, implies a wholesale re-definition of organised work and its management. However, this would be a necessary precondition for achieving an emancipated society and, as such, understanding motivation in terms of the Gift relationship can be seen as commensurate with this end.

Before moving on to the main arguments of the thesis, I wish briefly to consider two other issues which are fundamental to an understanding of the text.

**Management and Post Modernism**

Modernism is a term widely used to describe a tendency in the arts, emerging in the late 19th century and continuing into the 20th century, peaking just prior to the second World War, and since then, either being superceded by some other form, or developing into a mature phase. Such definitions are gloriously imprecise and not always consistent, or widely agreed upon, by those claiming expertise in the matter. However, recently, the expressions modernism and its 'successor', post-modernism, have acquired a new currency in the social sciences which, whilst having a strong affinity with the artistic usage, are developing as useful heuristics in attempting to understand social structures and the potential for, and dangers of, social change.
As Habermas (1985; see also Jauss, 1982) notes, the idea of a modern period in terms of a new way of understanding the world is a theme recurrent in history. As the old way of thinking becomes recognised as inadequate to the time, it becomes superceded by a new 'modern' thinking and, as such, bears an affinity with the idea of Kuhnian paradigms (Kuhn, 1970). The most recent appropriation of the term modern can be seen in terms of a change of consciousness, reflecting the arrival of the mature industrial/scientific age, signifying the demise of the romantic naturalism of the preceding period. Modernism represented a conscious shift from traditional values in search of a mode of expression commensurate with the materiality of the new age. It was very much a concern with the 'achievement of the possible', that something could be done was sufficient justification for it being done. A homogeneity informed by function gave way to a heterogeneity based on style, reaching a zenith with the surrealist movement. Thus content became subservient to style or form - a defining characteristic of modernism. It was in this atmosphere that modern organisational management, and its informing theory, grew up, very much reflecting the spirit of the times.

Management theory has traditionally been dominated by a concern with form to the effective exclusion of any concern with content, which has been left as the problematic of the more radical interest, which, given the almost total absence of a radical management theory, has, in practice, tended to emerge in more mainstream social science. A concern with content inevitably poses a threat to the dominance of capitalist interest, which effectively exerts a stranglehold on organisational life, as it is an inescapable concern for the nature of content, not just its presence. A formalist approach, however, has no such worries, as all that matters is the achievement of the necessary form. In the area of motivation this orientation has been evident since the time of F.W. Taylor. Taylor fully represented the emergent modernism, in so far as he was actively seeking to break down the traditional approach to labour management, and was using a scientific
approach to help achieve this goal. Furthermore, it took place within a context of
general social change, prominent in the USA, in which the old hierarchial
structure was succumbing to a new era, in which the ability to acquire relative
wealth became paramount. Taylor's idea was to replace the arbitrary autocracy
of management with one whose actions were only justifiable in terms of an
'absolute' notion of efficiency, together with voluntarily increasing workers' wage
rates through bonuses, on the basis of performance. This meritocratic approach
was quite revolutionary when compared to the old values of status and absolute
power which dominated the old world. It is interesting to compare Taylor's
European contemporary Henri Fayol, with his concern for, absolute order and
structure, with the functional approach of Taylor (Taylor, 1921; Fayol, 1949). It
has long been recognised that the modernist project - achievement of the
achievable - has failed. The strong connection between the modernist ethic and
western pluralism, with its associated impact on the quality of life (and death) in
the world (see eg., Capra, 1983), has led to the search for a means of applying the
benefits to man of a modern society in such a way as to realise this benefit, as
opposed to a way which inevitably leads to a worsening of the social condition.
This search for an application of the 'new' which would recognise the importance
of content rather than form has been termed post-modernism, again, as with
modernism, a notoriously imprecise term. However, within this response to
modernism there are two identifiably distinct and divergent tendencies, which
have been termed the post-modernism of reaction and the post-modernism of
resistance (Foster, 1985). The former is a repressive conservative tendency to
seek solution to the problems of modernism in the pre-modern era. The popular
call of the New Right for a return to Victorian values is a graphic illustration of
this tendency. This, unfortunately, has been the dominant response of post-
modernism in the arts, particularly architecture, which has tended to give post-
modernism a bad name and obscured its other face, which is more prominent in
social science. This post-modernism of resistance represents, in part, a coming
together of the two major radical strains of European thinking - Critical Theory and post-structuralism. (I recognise that there is a strong North American input to both these traditions, but they are essentially aberrant as regards North American thought. Critical theory and post-structuralism remain essentially representative of European thought.) Critical theory's desire to promote an emancipated society comes together with the post-structuralist project of revealing tacit mechanisms of social domination structured into the very way we understand social existence.

As regards management, the post-modernism of reaction has been more prominent to date in managerial practice, rather than theory (though see Butler, 1986). The liberal approach to management of the past thirty years, with its concentration on the form of liberal structures rather than their substantive content, has been shown to fail in terms of producing a highly motivated compliant workforce. Thus we now see a concern with the effects of management and a referral to the pre-liberal doctrines of the pre-modern period. This is illustrated by management reclaiming an absolute 'right to manage', by the progressive destruction of the influence of the trade union movement, by the adoption by management of unilateral changes in working practice, by the removal of protection for low-earning groups, etc. The whole philosophy of the post-modernism of reaction is summed up by the Japanese work ethic being introduced into the United Kingdom, many characteristics of which were almost universal in this country before being ousted by the modernist trend. With this there is an overt paternalism, careful selection procedures to ensure 'compatibility', weak unionisation, high concern for quality of product, relative security of employment. The awareness of the importance of content is shown by the focus on quality of product as a major aim. Quality is no longer the responsibility of the quality control function, i.e., a form introduced to handle the quality question, but is to be achieved collectively by those able to influence it - quality circles. Thus the emphasis switches from a
concern with a form of quality control to the actual achievement of adequate quality, i.e., the control of quality.

Even if less obvious in terms of its presence, post-modernism has emerged in management theory, as is evidenced by the rising interest in organisational culture and symbolism, representing both the reactive and resistive approaches, the former being more prominent. One of the most influential books of recent times, (Peters and Waterman, 1982), finds that success for a company is more likely to be achieved by specialising in what it does well - reversing the eclectic tendency of recent years.

It is with the post-modernism of resistance that this work is mainly concerned. Modernism in management failed due to a preoccupation with form rather than content. It failed management by not providing a highly motivated compliant workforce. It failed society by creating an excess of destructive products (including unemployment) and a deficit of necessary ones. The response of the post-modernism of reaction may allow capital to maintain or increase its wealth, but will do nothing to alleviate either of the two problems mentioned. Strictly speaking, a highly motivated compliant workforce is not necessary to management. As long as the workers are compliant, that is all that is necessary. Compliance can be achieved by fear as well as by more liberal means, so the post-modernism of reaction does offer management some pay-off. However, in terms of the general social good, it offers nothing beyond the cosmetic promise of increased discipline and social order. As the Director of the Oxford Polytechnic commented recently (see Judd, 1986), 'By the end of century we will be a well policed, well defended banana republic'. The post-modernism of resistance offers the chance of using the benefits of a modern society for the betterment of that society. If the project is to protect the sectional interests of capital and to produce a grateful peasantry of workers, then it has nothing to offer. If, on the
other hand, the project is to emancipate the worker from the socially unnecessary
demands of capital, then the post-modernism of resistance can indeed provide
some possibilities.

If the commitment is to emancipation, there is nothing to be gained by a
concentration on reviving past control mechanisms. I will argue that classic
motivation theory is in fact a masque for incentive theory. Regression to previous
conditions is prima facie a concern with incentive - how to get the worker to do
what management wants. The liberal psychological approaches of the immediate
past give way to the previous model - fear. Whereas the post-modernism of
reaction is essentially a re-use of an already existing language, the post-
modernism of resistance requires a new vocabulary. The assumptions of the
previous era are no longer adequate to sustain a theoretical understanding of
organisational life. As Marcuse (1986) pointed out, the seeds of the new order are
not to be found in the ruins of the old. The new lies outside the comprehension of
the old - it uses a language unintelligible to the established authority - it is not a
development or evolution of what is, but its negation. Accordingly, this work will
be founded on concepts alien to orthodox organisation theory, excluded not by
their proven irrelevance, but because of a conscious and arbitrary bounding of
what shall count as relevant to management theory, largely because of the threat
to established order presented by that which is excluded.

In order to avoid confusion over my usage of the terms Modernism and Post-
Modernism, I will pre-empt an argument to which I will be returning later in more
detail. I am taking the Frankfurt tradition and post-structuralism to be
representative of post-modernism, and this lies counter to one popular use of the
term. The argument as represented by Habermas and Lyotard centres on whether
the (modernist) enlightenment project is as yet incomplete or has failed. In the
former view, the 'good' society is to be achieved by the application of rational
thought to dissolving the mechanisms of domination, whereas, in the latter, the absence of the possibility of (transcendently) rational thought leaves the possibilities for social life ultimately dependent upon political praxis. Whereas the possibility of the ideal speech situation is certainly at odds with the inevitability of irreducibly subjective meaning, I take the resolution of this question to be, as yet, unknowable. Accordingly, I choose to concentrate on the marked similarity of the two positions, in so far as they both embody a critique of the capitalist domination of ordinary language meanings and both require the concept of praxis to judge its amelioration. This concern with the content of social life marks them as distinct from a modernism concerned with form, and in this sense marks them as post-modernist, in so far as post-modernism is not seen as a successor to modernism in the history of ideas but as a dialectical negation and, therefore, contemporary, of modernism (Bernstein, 1983; Dews, 1986; Habermas, 1985; Lyotard, 1986; Rorty, 1989; Wellmer, 1985).

Praxis

If the 'scientific world' is truly deterministic, an aggregation of law-like relationships, then presumably motivation to work is governed by such a law, or laws, which are potentially discoverable. If the world, at least the social world, is not deterministic, then presumably there are no 'laws' (of human behaviour) to discover. What, then, is there to be 'discovered' by science? If the social world is not governed by universal laws, this does not mean that there are no patterns, or structures, in the social amenable to explication. However, the test of such relationships is not their regularity, but how well they serve social good, as the implication is that such structures are 'man-made' and can, therefore, be changed, if there are better ways of achieving social good - the emancipated society. Thus, the test of social regularities - relations and structures - is their praxis, and the task of science is to illuminate such regularities and their praxis, and to suggest
improvements on existing ways of 'being social', which implies a normative rather than a positive science. I will, from time to time, refer to the concept of praxis, which is in fact an underlying theme of this thesis, and, as praxis is a somewhat nebulous concept, some indication of what I intend when I use this term will be useful.

Praxis, like motivation, is a source of recurrent interest in social science and, also, like motivation, has a long history. Aristotle distinguished between two symbiotic 'projects', or dispositions, for the good (morally and politically) life - the contemplative concern, theoria, and the active concern, praxis. However, it is the more modern - post-Marxian - interpretation which has the most relevance for this work. This is not to suggest that there is any unified concept of praxis in this area, and merely to distinguish between the various nuances to be found would be a substantial undertaking, (see, for example, Bernstein, 1983; Kilminster, 1979; Kotarbinski, 1965; Crocker, 1983; Jackson and Willmott, 1986). Central to the concept of praxis is a dialectical relationship between theory and action (or practice) relative to some particular intention - specifically, an emancipated or good society. Thus praxis (normative) is distinguished from practice (positive) by its conscious critically reflective relationship to theory, (see, eg., Kilminster, op. cit.:17). One manifestation of the praxis orientation is to be found in the scientific theory of efficient action as argued by Kotarbinski (op. cit.), and it is from Kotarbinski that I will abstract a definition of action, formulated by the Belgian scholar, Georges Hostelet, which will serve as a working definition, for present purposes, of praxis, though without any commitment to Kotarbinski's scientism:

"To act - or at least to act on reflection - means to change reality in a more or less conscious manner; to strive for a definite goal under given conditions by appropriate means in order to pass from existing conditions to conditions corresponding to the adopted goal; to include into reality factors determining the passage from a system of initial conditions to be determined to a system of definite final conditions. The
action thus to be brought about requires triple
determination: 1) determination of the goal, 2)
determination of conditions involving reality, 3)
determination of means adjusted both to the chosen goal
and to existing reality. There is no deliberate action
which does not include the desire to achieve cognition
of something real and to find appropriate means.
The goal, the conditions, and the means - these are the
three elements of practical activity, including scientific
activity." (cited in Kotarbinski, op. cit., p.10)

In so far as the idea of a goal reflects a concern for an emancipated society, and
the idea of reality a concern for content rather than form, or, more correctly,
that form should be a consequence of content rather than form being an end in
itself, praxis implies the need for both a deconstructive (Post-Modernist) and a re-
constructive (Critical Theory) approach and, as such, is antithetical to the
modernist science of pure capitalist form. As Marx (1980) argued, capitalist
production

"... is founded not on the development of productive
forces in order to reproduce a given condition and, at
best, to extend it" - the concern of praxis - "but is one
where free, unhindered, progressive and universal
development of productive forces itself forms the
prerequisite of society and thus of its reproduction;
where the only prerequisite is to proceed beyond the
point of departure" - the art of the possible. (p.128)

The idea of praxis thus constitutes a unifying theme between the post-modernist
project and the neo-modernist concern referred to elsewhere, and one of the
intentions of this work is to (tentatively) bring together these two approaches in
the light of this common interest, (though for a critique of post-modernism from
the neo-modernist perspective, see Burisch, 1986). This concern has been explored
at length by Bernstein (1983), in relation, particularly, to Gadamer, Habermas and
Rorty, who, whilst recognising the disparities in their various positions, seeks to
focus on their common concerns with contemporary domination and the prospects
for its alleviation. Thus Rorty's (1980) project for philosophy, of 'edification',
constitutes the basis for understanding the 'real' condition of Mankind. Whether or
not this leaves us with an absolute relativism from which to reconstruct an
emancipated society, or whether the conditions for reconstruction 'really' lie within the critical reason of undistorted communication, lies outside the scope of this work. What can be asserted is that the achievement of social emancipation requires the concept of praxis to determine its realisation.
CHAPTER 2

MOTIVATION AND INCENTIVE

In this chapter I take as a starting point, for the modern concern with 'Motivation', the Industrial Revolution and indicate the source of my own interest in the topic and my eventual disenchantment with the behaviourist theories of Motivation to Work. I then look at the genesis of academic interest in Motivation to Work in the context of Motivation generally, concentrating particularly on the Motivation-Hygiene theory as an exemplar of the behaviourist tradition. From this I suggest that such theories are not concerned with motivation per se, but with psychological (non-material) incentives and I examine the rationale for, and function of, the use of incentives on workers.

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PART I

Context

Motivation to Work has been a subject of concern for most of recorded history. An early reference to this concern was the biblical 'Parable of the Talents' (Matthew, Ch. 25). Whatever the moral imperative of the story, it is clear that a central issue is the motivation to work. The person with the higher motivation showed the best return. However, this thesis is concerned with the issue of motivation to work in the context of an industrial society and, therefore, a more relevant place to begin an investigation is the Industrial Revolution.

The Industrial Revolution witnessed a profound change in the social organisation
of work, and by work I am referring to the process of creating material wealth together with associated services. The changes wrought by the Industrial Revolution in the social organisation of work have lasted to the present day as, of course, have the associated problems. One of the major features of this period was the supercession of the purely domestic system and the putting out system by the factory system of work. Two important points must be made here. Firstly, industrialisation, the eponym of the Industrial Revolution, is not the same as factoryisation. In popular mythology factoryisation is explained in terms of technological determinism: the industrialisation of production processes led inevitably to their factoryisation. This is well illustrated by the emergent cotton industry. For example, the arrival on the scene of the steam engine provided a constant source of power independent, to a large extent, of the vagaries of nature, such as would be experienced, say, with water power. However, steam engines were only efficient when supplying a 'large' number of machines, i.e., each independent weaver could not have his own engine. Thus looms, and their operators, had to be grouped together - hence the factory (see, e.g., Carter, 1987). However, modern research has shown that the grouping together of machines was independent of such technological innovations and that the early factories used the old technology, e.g., grouped hand loom weavers together in factories, and only later did factories become industrialised in the popular sense. In fact, some historians hold industrialisation to be a consequence of factoryisation and not the other way round. (See eg., Bland, Brown and Tawney, 1914; Cressey, 1915; Wadsworth and de Lacy Mann, 1931; Hammond, 1966; Addy, 1976; Foster, 1977; Marglin, 1980; Thompson, 1980.)

The second point of importance is suggested by the first. If factories were not a consequence of industrialisation, why did they arise? Marglin (op. cit.) has suggested that this was a consequence of developing capitalism. Simply put, it
was the desire of the capitalist to gain control over both product and production process that was the impetus to factoryisation. In the domestic system the producer controlled both product and process. With the advent of the putting out system, the product was owned by the capitalist but he had little control over process and was, to some extent, exposed to the whims of the individual worker. The solution to this problem was for the capitalist to gain control of the production process, which was achieved by resorting to a factory system of production.

The social impact of this change has been well documented (Thompson, 1967, 1980). Factories required a new discipline which was totally incompatible with that which obtained in the pre-factory era, and problems of motivation were soon apparent (Fielden, 1836). Thus early on we have the use by manufacturers of inducements to the workers to attend regularly, and thereby produce more (Wadsworth and de Lacy Mann, op. cit.; Marglin, op. cit.). One characteristic of the introduction of the factory was an extension of work hours, the assumption being that the longer the working day, the more would be produced and the greater the profit generated. Eventually the working day was stretched to a commonplace 12 hours. The iniquity of this was evident even to some capitalists and eventually a 10 hour day was legislated for, notwithstanding the altruistic attempts of people such as Ure to extend the 12 hour day to as much as 16 hours for the benefit of the workers (Ure, 1835; Fielden, op. cit.). Enlightened manufacturers such as Owen found that an 8 hour day was not detrimental to production and profits, anticipating the findings of the infant industrial psychology a century later (Rose, 1978).

Prior to the 20th century, motivation to work had been the concern of social commentators, journalists, moralists, capitalists, managers, etc., (eg., Ure, op.
cit.), but, with the arrival of academic interest in work, it became the main concern, at a theoretical level, of the academic - it moved from the domain of the Ure to that of the Mayo. The years between the two world wars can be seen as the gestation period for this interest, prior to its bursting forth into the world, in much the form we understand now, after World War II. Before this point in time motivation to work was not seen as a specific form of the more general issue of motivation. The problem of people and work was, to a large extent, understood in terms of identifying barriers to achieving 'maximum' production. Thus the Myerians looked for fatigue and monotony and stress, etc., as (removable) obstacles to production. Sociological influences were identified by the Hawthorne experiments and the concern was how to take advantage of these phenomena to the benefit of profit - i.e., motivation per se was not of concern to these researchers. In fact, explicit research into motivation at this time was essentially concerned with need gratification, and work was definitely not identified as a human need.

The Hawthorne experiments (Roethlisberger and Dickson, 1939) were important for identifying sociological man, but it was Maslow's (apparent) identification of his psychological counterpart which enabled 'motivation to work' to emerge in its current form (Maslow, 1954). It was perhaps with Herzberg's (1959) Motivation - Hygiene theory that we attain the most explicit formulation of motivation to work. Work had finally been transformed from an inescapable necessity, a burden to be eased whenever possible, officially or otherwise, but mainly otherwise, to a basic psychological need. We have finally achieved the theoretical justification for the histrionic claims of Ure over a century earlier. Work really is good for the 'soul' of the worker. This trend forged ahead, through expectancy theorists such as Vroom (1964) and Porter and Lawler (1968), but, to some extent, ran out of steam in the 1970's. In the U.K. this may have been a function of falling demand
for labour, which allowed the more traditional influences on desire to work to regain their utility, eg., fear. Inducements to work such as were offered by behaviourist theories of motivation are only of use to the capitalist in times of scarcity of labour, as was experienced for the first 25 - 30 years after World War II, which would help to explain the popularity of such theories in this period, (Ramsay, 1977, 1983; see also Mandel, 1980).

The Influence of Personal Experience

It was in this period of the popularity of theories of motivation to work that I first became acquainted with their application, whilst employed in a management services department. However, before dealing with this experience, it would be useful to expose my personal 'prejudices' about people and work. Work is a fascinating subject, as evidenced by the old joke, 'I love work - I could watch it all day' - reinforced by the apparent need to install viewing galleries wherever major civil engineering works are in progress, in order to regularise the inevitable casual observations by the general public. The transition from a school environment, where work seemed at best autopoietic, to employment in a 'real work organisation' and the production of something 'obviously useful', was another confirmation of my latent interest in work. My first five years of work constituted learning the job. This entailed working in different departments for a period of three months each, and so, over five years, one could expect to experience about twenty different environments. In practice this varied, as the three months was a notional rather than an actual 'tour', as was the idea of a 'department'. Some departments, in effect, comprised a number of discreet sub-departments engaged in significantly different enterprises. All in all, over this period I certainly worked with far more than twenty work groups. The first two years were allocated to learning the manual processes, and the following three to
professional and administrative work. Thus in the first period I tried my hand at
digging holes in the road, operating metal cutting machines, wiring electrical
supplies, repairing equipment, jointing underground electric cables, building
overhead power lines, maintaining power station equipment, installing heavy
electrical machines, and other tasks far too numerous to mention. In the second
period, I designed, built, tested and maintained electrical supply systems, worked
as both a cartographic and an engineering draughtsman, was involved in a
marketing and selling function, in a stock control function, in equipment testing,
in system planning, etc. Accordingly, I worked with labourers, craftsmen,
supervisors, clerks, administrators, professional grades, and senior managers. In
other words, I gained the acquaintance of most of the functions and many of the
people to be found in the organisation in which I was employed.

This experience left me with two particular impressions. One was that people at
work were, by and large, O.K. The other was that people seemed, more or less,
positively oriented to the actual work they performed, and that dissatisfaction
seemed to derive from the social organisation of that work. However, some
qualifications of this are called for. There is a popular assumption that manual
jobs are intrinsically boring and centre on some approximation to a factory-based
production line system. This is by no means the case. In the organisation in which
I was employed there was no work of this nature. Most work took place away
from the depots of the organisation and so there was very little control of the
environment, or supervision. Workers had high levels of personal autonomy in
when and how to work during the day. As work locations often changed from day
to day, or even during the day, there was a high level of environmental variety
and, therefore, of interest. High levels of social interaction were possible, often
unavoidable, with people not employed by the organisation - again, a source of
variety. Very few facilities for subsistence were provided for the workers,
tradition being that workers would seek their own from the local environs. Thus, access to shops, pubs, betting shops, banks, etc., was easy, which permitted some integration of what, in factories, would be distinct intra- and extra-organisational activities. Even work in the depots bore little resemblance to factory work. There were very few, if any, repetitive tasks, each job providing new variety. As the supervisory culture was very much oriented to the organisation of work away from the depot, (most supervisors had at least some of their men working outside), there was not strict control of worker movement in the depots, so that people could also make use of local facilities with reasonable ease. Thus my views on work and workers by no means reflected an experience of, e.g., short cycle repetitive paced work in a factory, as described, for example, by Linhart (1981). In addition, my own experience of any particular job was gained in the light of it being for a relatively fixed and short duration. I was always aware that in a few weeks I would be doing something different. Thus, personally, all work had a novelty value, which might have evaporated during the life-time’s exposure, which was the lot of those for whom such work was the only expectation within that organisation. However, I did talk to the people with whom I worked and certainly gained an impression, accurate or not, about the way they felt, both about the actual tasks, and about the social organisation of those tasks.

Some explanation of what I mean by 'tasks and their social organisation' would be appropriate here. By 'tasks' I have in mind the more or less physical aspects of the job. For a labourer, for example, this may be the digging of holes in the road. He would expect to be provided with certain equipment, for example, a pick and a shovel, which he would expect to use to excavate the ground. The 'social organisation' of the labourer's task refers to the specific social conditions under which he performs this task. Part of this organisation is unintended and can be seen as having some correspondence with the idea of the 'informal organisation'.

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The other part, however, reflects the intention of some authority figure superior to the labourer, e.g., supervisor, manager, etc. It is from this aspect of the social organisation of work that I perceived dysfunctions to derive. The concept of the 'social organisation of work' is partially illuminated by the following story, possibly apocryphal, which is widely told as a cautionary tale in management services to illustrate the need for adequate communication: "On his first day with a new employer a labourer is taken to a piece of open ground and told to excavate a hole at a point indicated. He is left alone to accomplish this task, which he duly does. The supervisor returns, looks in the hole, tells the surprised labourer to fill it in, and indicates another spot where the labourer should dig a hole. The process is repeated throughout the day, the labourer becoming increasingly exasperated with his pointless task. Eventually, the labourer explodes and tells the supervisor what to do with his pick, his shovel, and his holes! Our supervisor, who is in every way a pleasant person and who has dealt kindly with his new charge, is amazed at the labourer's reaction. Has he not spoken nicely to him? Has he not been attentive to the labourer's work? Has he not been reasonable in the amount of work asked for? The labourer admits that indeed all this is true, but that it does not excuse the sadistic practice of making him dig holes just to fill them in again. At last, all is explained. The supervisor was not being sadistic. The labourer was in fact trying to locate a pipe which was around there somewhere, but not precisely known and the only way to find this pipe was to dig trial holes, and so his task was far from pointless. At which our labourer sees his job in a new light and presumably returns the next day to continue his quest with renewed vigour."

This helps to illustrate the influence of the 'social organisation' of work on the worker. Presumably, from a strictly contractual point of view, the labourer was doing what he was paid to do and therefore should be satisfied. He has no right to
be told why he is doing something. Dissatisfaction stems neither from what he has to do, his task, nor from the fact that he has to do it, but from an angle which has little bearing on the physical aspect of his work. To be satisfied our labourer needs to be a party to why he is doing it, even though it is not something of which he can be sure of the truth. However, the social organisation of work is much more extensive than this illustration would suggest. Management styles, presence or absence of other workers, length of work hours, provision of work, general working conditions, such as heating, lighting, and noise levels, payment systems and procedures, canteens, lockers, protective clothing, holiday arrangements, sickness schemes, etc., - the list is endless. Their common feature is that they are all attributable to the organisers of work, in its broadest sense.

Subsequent to my training I was employed in the practice of the role for which I had been trained - which was, basically, engineering management. Being aware of the 'motivational' problems caused by the social organisation of work, for which I now had some responsibility, I made conscious efforts to avoid possible pitfalls in this area. I tried to ensure workers were fully informed about the job in hand, that adequate resources were available, that sufficient time was allowed, not to be too close in my supervision, to make allowances for workers' needs, not all of which were related to work. In fact, I employed what I would later understand as the 'human relations' approach to management. Two significant learning points resulted from this experience, though the importance of the second took several more years to reveal itself. Firstly, although I was being totally reasonable and considerate with my human relations style management, the workers did not always see it the same way. They wanted more information than I knew they needed, or more resources, or more time. On occasions they were quite stubborn in refusing to see that my decisions were obviously correct. They would insist on having their own point of view. Where it was possible to make some accomodation
of their childish fancies, I, of course, did, but ultimately, if they did not see reason, then I had to insist things were done my way - after all, I was the manager. The second, and not unrelated, point was that, as a naive junior manager, I had limited discretion in improving the social organisation of work. Many things I had no power to change - I could not shorten hours of work, or increase wages, or increase the number of workers employed, etc. In other words, 'I could only change things which I could change', not those which might need changing to improve the social organisation of work: a classic case of bounded discretion (Shull, Delbecq and Cummings, 1970). Furthermore, my thinking was bounded by the self-evident rationality of the work process. Obviously, there were right ways and wrong ways to do a job; obviously, costs had to be minimised; obviously, managers knew best; etc. - (even if some of my own superiors didn't!).

Armed with these insights, I moved to a management services environment and came face to face with behaviourist theories of motivation. I learned of Maslow's hierarchy (Maslow, op. cit.), that workers were now ripe to self-actualise, that they did it, at least in part, through their work, and that Herzberg had provided the model for achieving this (Herzberg et al, 1959; Herzberg, 1968). People were not motivated by money, a hygiene factor, but through job enrichment, a motivator, though to be on the safe side, we should stick in a bit of Taylorism, as insurance (Taylor, 1921). The problem was that managers believed in Theory X, whereas they ought to believe in Theory Y (McGregor, 1960), and thus all we had to do in management services was to change the managerial model and introduce job enrichment in industry, and thus the country would be back on its feet in no time. As 'no time' elapsed without a perceptible improvement in 'achieving a congruency of individual and organisational goals', as workers clung to their own view of the world and refused to play their part in the grand design, we were provided with reinforcements in the more arcane achievement motivation theory.
of McClelland (1953, 1961), the expectancy theory of Vroom (op. cit.) and ultimately Organisational Development (O.D.).

It was during this period that the significance of my earlier conclusions about work and people fully revealed itself, and one event in particular contributed to this. One very large intervention in the redesign of a particular job failed to furnish the improvements in output anticipated, and my task was to investigate this failure. This I did, with some very sophisticated cinematic techniques, as it was assumed that the problem lay in the new design for the job. To my surprise, the design was fine and the worker was producing the anticipated rate of output. The problem was that he had run out of work by mid-morning! Thus the solution was simple: ensure an adequate supply of work. However, nine years later, when I finally said farewell to management services, this problem had not been solved. Briefly, the supervisor needed to make more work available, but this would increase his own work load, as well as altering its structure. The manager had to rely on the supervisor, or in effect, do the supervisor's job for him, but this, of course, was not the manager's job. Furthermore, he relied for his awareness, not on his own observation, but on computer-generated management control information. Workers' unoccupied time was not included in the unit cost which thus appeared 'in budget'. Unoccupied time was booked to maintenance duties, and so did not show against the job in question. Thus, from the manager's point of view, his control information showed nothing amiss; if nothing was amiss, then there was nothing to correct. An appeal to higher management that the control information masked the real situation met two obstacles. Firstly, the computing facility was big and expensive, and could be justified only in relation to its superior performance over a manual system. To question the veracity of its output was to question the usefulness of the computer, but the computer had to be used to justify its existence. Secondly, there was no incentive to reprogramme
the computer to show the 'real' situation, as this would require action which would make problems for everyone. Furthermore, any attempt to solve the situation would incur costs and money was tight. If the possible levels of productivity were achieved, some labour would no longer be required, which would cause further problems, etc.

It was clear that the only people to be 'unequivocally committed' to achieving increased productivity were those in the management services function. Other peoples' best interests were served by leaving things as they were, even those who had given the brief to improve productivity in the first instance. People could continue to treat as true information they knew to be false, because that again was the best option. Moreover, no one appeared to have the power unilaterally to make the changes necessary - the condition of bounded discretion I had experienced personally years before. The supervisor could not spend more time servicing this particular job, as he would have to stop doing something else which he had to do. The manager could not increase his supervisory costs by employing an extra supervisor, nor could he make his existing supervisor take on extra duties. Senior managers, if they pursued the problem, would be left with it to solve, as it could not be solved at lower levels, etc. In fact, to use a systems approach, the people involved were caught up in a situation where there was too much variety for them to handle. In order to maintain control of sorts, they had to ignore things which they could not change. Given the over-arching rationality of the situation, they were powerless to effect significant changes of the type implied.

The purpose of this illustration is not to comment on the quality of management, which I have no reason to believe was any worse than average, but to point to the reasons for my final disenchchantment with a rationalist view of work.
organisations. People at work had their own interests to protect and service. Whilst the logic of the organisation might dictate one course of action, it was not necessarily possible to follow it, and thus some compromise had to be made. Now I could understand my earlier problems with my human relations management: it only reflected my definition of the situation, it had no transcendent claim. Similarly with behaviourist attempts to improve motivation. It was only the arrogance of the managerial interest that labelled things 'hygiene factors' and others 'motivators', and told workers which they needed, that decided worker could self-actualise at work if we redesigned the job within parameters acceptable to wider interests, which believed worker interests were congruent with those of the 'organisation'. Job Design strategies may have changed the social organisation of work, but never with the intention of genuinely achieving conditions that would allow workers to self-actualise on their own terms, only in so far as it would improve profitability. Of course, the problem was not the workers: the positive feelings about the work they did were possibly present, but this did not mean that management could harness these feelings in their own cause, in ways defined by them, under conditions which would necessarily increase profits. No - management could not motivate workers, all they could do was de-motivate them. There was no way management could unilaterally determine the conditions of motivation for workers. One would at least have to consider the worker's definition of his own situation. But this meant that a blanket approach which treated workers as a homogenous mass could never succeed. Potentially, each worker might need different conditions to motivate him. Certainly, management could provide incentives, but wisdom had it that motivation and incentive were different concepts. Certainly, it was widely held in incentive theory that, for example, with financial incentives, the incentive was to get the reward, not to do the work for it. Or, with time saving schemes (task and finish), the incentive was to get the time off, rather than doing the necessary work. Furthermore, whilst
pursuing the incentive, the worker may be actually sabotaging the job (see Beynon, 1984).

Was there, then, no prospect other than a conflict of interests between workers and managers? Did work inevitably have to be demotivating? Were managers really policemen? What was the implication for being a manager? Notwithstanding the apparent contradiction, however, I was still left with the impression that workers, by and large, did not resent work, that there was some latent interest in it for them, and that people in organisations did not necessarily resent that form of labour. The obstacle to satisfaction still seemed to be the way it was organised.

The consequence of these ill-formed notions about people and work have led, in one way or another, to the attempt to provide a theory of motivation to work with an improved explanatory power. One which recognises the positive attitudes of people to work, but does not then try to harness these in the narrow service of capitalism. It is important to recognise that, although I am addressing the issue of motivation to work, this does not imply, as is the case with some behavioural theorising, that it exhibits characteristics different from motivation to do other things. Motivation to work as understood here is just a specific case of motivation in general. It is possible to speak of motivation to work only in so far as the work situation, as a social situation, may exhibit specific influences on a person's motivation. In other words, the motivational process is viewed as relatively universal - it is the influence of the environment which is seen as a variable.
The Historical Context of Motivation to Work

In arguing for the theory of motivation being presented here, I am not merely introducing a virgin concept onto an unsuspecting world, a process which is only possible when addressing an issue which is at present unknown in the world, something which rarely, if ever, happens. Of necessity, as the concept of motivation to work already exists, I am also questioning previous theorising. This critique is not addressed solely to the substantive arguments which others have put forward, but also to the interest which they conceal, whilst at the same time represent.

There is a temptation, sometimes, to see history in terms of a search for origins, for the point in time when a significant change occurred, such as the Industrial Revolution, or the Hawthorne experiments, which inevitably tempts others to argue for a different origin (see, for example, Rose (1978) on the Hawthorne Effect). However, the value in 'history' to understanding the contemporary social, is not in the search for origins, (an issue to which I will return), but in terms of social praxis - i.e., the significance of the history of an idea lies in the history of its social praxis. To ignore such influences, to take an ahistorical view, impoverishes our understanding of the functioning of our social organisations.

For reasons of space, not to mention utility, it is not possible to examine all recent theories and crypto-theories of motivation to work, (for a critical review of theories of motivation to work, see Cooper, 1974). Accordingly, I will address some of the major issues, and group them loosely around the Motivation-Hygiene theory of Herzberg et al (1959) as an exemplar of this genre of theorising. I select Herzberg for two reasons: firstly, his is possibly the most perfectly articulated theory of motivation to work, and secondly, he probably had a greater influence,
directly or indirectly, on management thinking than any other contemporary theorist, (see, eg., Carey, 1977).

I am greatly assisted in this task by the work of the Danish scholar, K.B. Madsen, who in his two volumes on modern theories of motivation, (1968, 1974), has provided an excellent guide to the development of motivation theory, which illustrate that, whilst motivation to work may be a key component of the management canon, it is conspicuous by its absence from the general literature on motivation.

Madsen examines in varying depths some 50 theories of motivation spanning the years 1930-1971. Admittedly, this is not an exhaustive treatment, as motivation theory represents an enormous area of study, (see, for example, the Nebraska Symposia on Motivation), but Madsen certainly addresses the major theories of the period. According to Madsen (1974:435) motivational psychology was a product of American behaviourism. Of the preceding psychological traditions - experimentation, Gestalt, etc. - only psychoanalysis had dealt seriously with motivation. Even the 'classic' behaviourists, Watson and Skinner, did not develop a psychology of motivation, this being the project of the 'neo-behaviourists', particularly Tolman. Madsen divides his study into two periods, 1930-1957 (Madsen, 1968), and 1957-1971 (Madsen, 1974), but this is somewhat confusing, as Maslow appears in the later period, whereas his theory of motivation had appeared in 'Motivation and Personality' in 1954, though the seeds of his theory can be found earlier, in the 1940's. However, in his first period, although the various theories are not totally compatible, Madsen attempts to specify the various motivating factors, yet nowhere does work, or any synonym for work, appear as a motivator. Certainly there are social and creative motivators under which work could be subsumed, but to see such work as defined in the context of a capitalist
bureaucracy would be stretching matters rather excessively. Although Madsen
does not attempt a similar comparison for the second period, by reference to the
individual theories work again does not appear as a motivator. Madsen does not
make reference to the behaviourist motivation to work theories, which certainly
fall within his second period, but this is presumably because his concern is for
general theories of motivation, rather than the somewhat peculiar, partial,
theories of work motivation, which, as I suggest shortly, are largely informed by
Maslow's work. However, I think two significant points can now be made vis à vis
motivation to work. Firstly, concern with the psychology of motivation is a
relatively recent phenomenon, attributable to the behaviourist tradition.
Secondly, work as a motivator is even more recent and it has no discernible roots
in early behaviourism. In other words, Motivation to work appears on the scene as
a fully-fledged concept without any significant antecedents. Using Maslow's
concept of self-actualization, theorists, particularly Herzberg, translate this
concept to be synonymous with wage labour in a capitalist bureaucracy, but
without any obvious justification for such a metamorphosis.

Such a manoeuvre owed more to the managerialist tradition in social science
generally, than to pure scientific research, and represented merely the latest
development of this tradition, as I will now suggest.

As noted, a significant contribution to the genesis of theories of motivation to
work was the 'discovery' of social man during the Hawthorne studies
(Roethlisberger and Dickson, 1939). Previous to this, the 'humaness' of man was
seen as a pathology to be suppressed by the management process, achieving its
most exquisite articulation in Taylorism. However, whereas social man would
seem at first glance to be a threat to the rational control of Labour, Capitalism
responded to the threat in the manner at which it is so adept - it incorporated
social man, via the Human Relations School of Management. The real
breakthrough came with the work of Maslow (1954), who appeared to be providing
the psychological component of social man. Of course, Maslow did not provide a
theory of motivation to work, at least not motivation to work in capitalist
bureaucratic organisations. What he did provide was a theory which could be
appropriated in the interests of capitalism by an accommodating academia.
Maslow's hierarchy of needs is too well known to require any explanation here.
What is necessary, though, is to illustrate its appropriation. Slightly condensing
the hierarchy into three significant levels (for managerial purposes), the
physiological and safety levels can be classified as physiological, the next two,
love and esteem, as social, leaving the summit, self-actualization, as
psychological. Remembering the aphorism, 'There is nothing so practical as a
good theory', (Kurt Lewin), we now have our 'good theory'.

The basic assumption of the managerial interest could be summarised thus:
physiological needs are satisfied, thus money cannot be a motivator any more;
social needs are satisfied, now that we have 'human relations style of
management'; workers therefore must be ripe for self-actualization. What,
therefore, is needed is a theory which tells us just that. Conveniently, this was
supplied by Herzberg. Though he makes little acknowledgement of Maslow, the
chronology of his theory suggests an inevitable influence, at least. Herzberg's
theory has been roundly criticised in terms of methodology, and in terms of its
extensibility from professional workers to all workers (see, eg., Luthans, 1977;
Burrell and Morgan, 1979). However, I am less concerned with such issues than
with how work suddenly became a motivator, and with why self-actualization was
assumed to occur in working for capitalist organisations.

The Motivation-Hygiene theory stemmed from initial research into job attitudes,
but, unfortunately, in 'The Motivation to Work', (1959), Herzberg et al are not
overly explicit about how they latched on to the idea of Motivation to Work:

"These effects on the individual can be conceptualized as actuating approach rather than avoidance behaviour. Since it is in the approach sense that the term motivation is most commonly used, we designate the job factors as the 'motivators.'" (p.114)

However, the situation becomes clearer in 'Work and the Nature of Man', (1968). The research into job attitudes was concerned with job satisfaction and dissatisfactions:

"The 'satisfier' factors were named the motivators, since other findings of the study suggest that they are effective in motivating the individual to superior performance and effort." (p.74, emphasis in original)

Thus it appears that motivation is to do with superior performance and, ipso facto, that motivation to work is to do with superior performance at work. Ignoring the fact that motivation as seen here connotes an acceleration of performance, (ie., there must be increasing performance to denote the presence of motivation), let us consider why we need constant superior performance and effort at work. In the Forward to 'The Motivation to Work', J.C. Flanagan notes that the study of Job Attitudes is concerned with "the effect of job attitudes on work performance", and that, therefore, the book "should be immediately helpful to supervisors and managers". It will be noted that J.C. Flanagan does not articulate its usefulness to the worker. The authors, however, do consider this aspect:

"To industry, the pay off for a study of job attitudes would be in increased productivity, decreased turnover, (presumably of Labour, N.J.), decreased absenteeism, and smoother working relations. To the community, it might mean a decreased bill for psychological casualties and an increase in the over-all productive capacity of our industrial plant and in the proper utilization of human resources. To the individual, an understanding of the forces that lead to improved morale would bring greater happiness and greater self-realization." (p.ix)

Thus motivators are those things which lead workers to give superior performance
at work, for which the benefits are: to industry, profit; to community, possibly reduced costs; to the individual, happiness and greater self-realization, predicated, of course, on his gaining "an understanding of the forces that lead to increased morale". Failing this understanding, presumably, he gets nothing. It will be noted that morale is apparently associated with motivation. It is interesting that the O.E.D. defines morale as 'moral condition especially as regards discipline and confidence' - note how motivation is inescapably identified with control.

Whilst the authors note the opportunities for such a theory to be used by "men of ill will" for manipulating others, they justify their work on the grounds of its potential for increasing human happiness. Happiness to industry, (and by this presumably is meant the owners of industry), is of a material kind, whereas happiness to the worker is more spiritual.

However, let us consider some of the understandings of Herzberg et al in a little more detail. Motivation is associated with approach behaviour. If we take an analogy from mechanics, to approach one thing is to move away from (avoid?) another, so can we assume approach behaviour and avoidance behaviour to be the same? True, we can introduce the idea of an object, so that to approach A is not the same as avoiding B. However, if motivation is to be judged by action, rather than meaning, then presumably, according to this definition, coerced action would also count as motivated. Presumably coercion results in approach behaviour to A as a consequence of avoiding B, which leads us back to square one. As Herzberg sees avoidance behaviour as not motivated, then we need some understanding of what the actor thinks he is doing - but, of course, behaviourist approaches are concerned with objective behaviour not subjective experience. It is therefore incumbent on the researcher to supply the meaning contained in his subject's actions. This is where we get the farcical circular argument of such strategies.
The researcher determines thus: 'If a person 'approaches' A then he is motivated so to do, thus if I observe a person doing this, then, ipso facto, he is motivated'. How can they go wrong? Considering such a theory's application in terms of job enrichment: if we enrich a job, i.e., take a boring job and make it less boring, then, if people 'approach' this job, they are motivated to do it. Could it not equally be that doing the enriched job is a way of avoiding the dysfunctions of the unenriched job?

It is difficult to escape the conclusion that this genre of industrial/organisational psychology was acting as a legitimation for the capitalist/managerial interest, whose primary objective was labour intensification. The definition of what was to constitute motivated behaviour was clearly reflecting the ideological preferences of the researcher. Given the logic of the behaviouralist approach, a totally different construction could be placed upon specific behavioural acts with equal validity. Why then was one particular construction placed upon actions rather than another? Returning to Maslow for a moment, there was nothing in his theory of self-actualization that said it was to be found working in capitalist organisations in enriched jobs. Herzberg's 'Self-Realization' clearly equates with Maslow's self-actualization, and so it appears that a set of implicit assumptions have been imported by Herzberg without any scientific foundation. Motivation to Work appears on the scene as a fully-fledged concept without any theoretical foundation whatsoever. This is why Herzberg is so important: the claim that organised wage labour in a capitalist system was a motivator appears to be his invention. (As an aside, at the moment, it is interesting to note that, notwithstanding popular managerial understanding to the contrary, Herzberg is the only major theorist of this genre who had an explicit theory of motivation to work. That Maslow did not has already been noted. The other popular so-called motivation theorist of this time was McGregor, but his Theory X - Theory Y related to a set of managerial beliefs, not specifically to worker motivation (1).)
It is obviously important, from a behaviourist point of view, to exclude the idea of subjective meaning. If the subject declared he was not approaching A but avoiding B, then the whole theory of motivation would collapse. It is interesting to note in passing that Herzberg's methodology was based, to some extent, on subjective understandings of the target group, but in translating the meaning of this into a theory this aspect is sanitised.

Avoiding the inconvenience of actors' meanings allows for a strictly deterministic model of human behaviour. The advantages of this to both theorists and managers is immeasurable. By definition, job enrichment must improve motivation: as managers or their representatives ordain what constitutes enrichment, they therefore determine the motivators. Failure to increase motivation, i.e., productivity, must then be attributable to faulty practice, not to faulty theory. The issue, and utility, of deterministic models of man in organisation theory has been dealt with at length by Burrell and Morgan (1979), and its importance as a device in maintaining social domination cannot be overstressed. It is a point which will be returned to later.

I have selected Herzberg's work for comment not just because it most clearly articulates the idea of motivation to work, but because it exemplifies an approach to increasing labour productivity which has been dominant since at least World War II, and has its roots in World War I. Herzberg may no longer be taken seriously by managers, but his successors are (2). The principle idea underpinning this tradition is that, by regulating conditions of work, increased productivity, in one form or another, can be achieved. Thus, Vroom's (1964) expectancy theory was translated into a strategy for improved worker performance; Organisation Development was going to do the same, through controlled catharsis; worker participation was going to harness the worker's latent sense of responsibility; etc. (3). Common to all these approaches was the determination of the criteria for
change by management, who ensured that they were fully compatible with the capitalist desire for increased relative profit. The assessment of the success or failure of these ventures was determined metonymically by their impact on productivity. In other words, there was never an absolute desire to promote, for example, worker satisfaction. It would only be created where it was congruent with producing more for less. Where satisfaction could be created but at a cost to profit, then it remained unrealised.

This approach has been based upon the assumption that man has a need to grow, psychologically, and that, by providing appropriate conditions, this could be achieved with benefits for the organisation. However, one key assumption of need theory which has consistently been ignored is that, once a need has been satisfied, it ceases to motivate. Thus, for Herzberg's thesis to be sustained, jobs would need continual enriching; Vroom would require a constantly renewable challenge, etc. (4). Initially it may be possible for organisations, by varying conditions of work to their own benefit, to improve performance, but eventually workers would require levels of enrichment, etc., in their jobs which would violate the dominant principles of contemporary organisation of labour.

Any theory of motivation which seeks to impose meaning on the actors involved, and which refuses to recognise their meanings, is fated to be refuted by subsequent experience, which is, of course, the fate of Herzberg. Furthermore, as I will argue later, any theory of motivation which relies on the provision of external stimuli is actually a theory of incentive, not of motivation, and should be understood in that light.
Motivation, Incentive and Productivity

In opposition to the orthodox view, where organised work is understood to consist of workers who produce socially desirable goods and services, and managers who plan, organise and control this process, all within a rational framework, I am suggesting that the contemporary form of work organisation is primarily concerned with social control beyond that which is socially necessary, enforced by an appeal to a claimed transcendent logic which imparts a totally spurious legitimation to the process, rather than by direct coercion. Furthermore, not only is the production of goods and services not the sole purpose of organisational control, neither is it an adequate explanation of why people work. Whereas Tannenbaum (1968) has argued that organisational control processes

"... help circumscribe idiosyncratic behaviors and keep them conformant to the rational plan of the organization," (p.3),

Marcuse (1969, 1986) has shown that 'rational control of idiosyncratic behavior' constitutes social domination in the service of the one best way of the capitalist interest, what Deleuze and Guattari (1984:246) call the "flattening axiomatic" of capitalism. The arbitrary nature of organisational control has been a subject of attention in the labour process literature, though Thompson's (1983) claim that

"... it would be wrong to imply that the motivation to impose structures of control could be based on domination by capital for its own sake." (p.151)

seems unduly sanguine, though perhaps not surprising as he (p.261, n.20) appears to view efficiency as, potentially at least, non-ideological, a view which MacIntyre (1981), at least in managerial terms, has cautioned against. Thus Clegg and Dunkerley (1980, Ch.13) point out that organisational controls which reflect the
desire of capitalism for the efficient conversion of resources are extensible to both non-productive and non-capitalist organisation of work, which reflects more a generic concern for order - the circumscription of idiosyncratic behaviour - than a concern for pure efficiency, a point recognised also by Thompson (op. cit.:122).

Management as a function constitutes a means for encouraging workers to cooperate in this process of domination, often against their latent inclination and certainly against their class interest, as explored by Deleuze and Guattari, (see also Jackson and Carter, 1986). It is widely understood that there are better and worse ways of achieving particular levels of production, in so far as some ways are more efficient than others in generating profits, a matter of prime interest to managers. 'Good' management is the maximising of productivity in its various manifestations, subject to unavoidable constraints, such as legislation, which may act as obstacles to such action (see Storey, 1980).

In some historical situations management has resorted to brute force, or near versions, to encourage productivity, but this form has not been generally popular in the past 200 years. In the early days of industrialisation increases in productivity were gained by new technology, such as steam power, and by gaining control of some of the variables, such as labour hours, by introducing new organisational forms such as factories. However, having brought together all the necessary ingredients for maximising productivity, it was realised that their efficient usage depended upon the efforts of the non-deterministic component - labour. Mere presence was not enough to ensure efficient production - something had to be done to encourage effort. Whilst more or less raw forms of power could be used if circumstances were propitious, such as high unemployment, this was not totally satisfactory and was, of course, expensive to enforce. Much better was some form of a self-policing system, where workers would voluntarily maximise their effort. The obvious answer was some form of inducement, the benefits of
which were linked to some aspect of productivity, such as the use of handkerchiefs as an inducement to spinning operatives, already referred to, (Marglin, 1980; Wadsworth and de Lacy Mann, 1931). At times the fashion has swung towards financial forms of inducement, as, for example, with the advent of Taylorism, and it is interesting to note the contemporary return to favour of non-money material benefits, but this time for the executive class. However, in more recent times the focus has shifted from material forms to non-material forms, such as promoting feelings of satisfaction, etc., and it is with this development that we have acquired the concept of motivation rather than incentive. It is my contention that such motivators are in fact merely psychological incentives - the supercession of material inducements by non-material forms. However, we may wish to enquire why it is that we need constantly to improve productivity. That we do is rarely, if ever, questioned in managerial literature as, presumably, the truth of such a proposition is held to be self-evident. Certainly, at a superficial level, increases in productivity create more surplus wealth, which eventually is distributed to the general good of all. More output for a given input means that society generally becomes more affluent. The standard of living rises and more wealth becomes available for the amelioration of social ills such as poverty, ignorance and ill health. That such an even-handed benefit from increased productivity does not accrue to the general population is hardly contentious, yet this 'of course' is not a problem for organisational management, but for 'others', such as politicians, administrators, etc., and consequently does not detract from the principle that increased productivity does indeed carry potential benefit. However, as will be explored, such a naive faith in productivity obscures a more fundamental urge to produce more, which, whether by design or accident, constitutes a de facto mechanism of social domination - in Bataille's (1985) terms:

"The end of the worker's activity is to produce in order to live, but the bosses' activity is to produce in order to condemn the working producers to a hideous degradation ..." (p.125-126)
An insight into this problem is provided by Cooper (1974), when he notes, in relation to Maslow's hierarchy of needs, that Maslow

"... viewed satisfaction as the major motivational outcome of behaviour and his theory, therefore, is not manifestly relevant to productivity outcomes." (p.25, emphasis in original)

In other words, there is no reason whatsoever to assume that, if there is such a phenomenon as motivation to work, its resultant should relate in any way to productivity - production possibly, but not productivity. In fact, is it perhaps stating the obvious to say that motivation to self-actualise may well lead to a reduction in productivity as conventionally understood, in so far as there is no reason why self-actualisation should not be a function of quality of production rather than mere quantity, (see Schwartz, 1983). As Maslow (1954) says:

"A musician must make music, an artist must paint, a poet must write if he is ultimately at peace with himself. What a man can be, he must be. He must be true to his own nature. This need we may call self-actualization." (p.47)

Was Beethoven's motivation to write more notes, Turner's to make more brushstrokes, Shakespeare's to produce more sonnets? Does the factory worker really want to produce more cars, washing machines, bombs? In other words, is it the form that is produced, rather than the content, which is the source of motivation. This separation of the qualitative appreciation of production from its quantitative aspect has been highlighted by Lyotard (1986). The naive systemic, essentially Parsonian, view of society subordinates the sensuous potential of the social to the perfection of its process:

"... the harmony between the needs and hopes of individuals or groups and the functions guaranteed by the system is now only a secondary component of its functioning. The true goal of the system ... is the optimization of the global relationship between input and output - in other words, performativity." (p.11)
It is the 'performativity' of a system which has become the raison d'être of that system - what is produced is of secondary importance, it is how efficiently it is produced that is of primary concern. The pathological urge to performativity has been exposed by Marcuse (1969), when he claims that the 'Performance principle' is the contemporary form of the Freudian 'Reality principle' (Freud, 1922).

Briefly, the urge to instinctual gratification of the Pleasure principle gives way under the influence of 'civilisation' to its modified form, the Reality principle, a necessary repression of the instincts, which act as a barrier to survival in the social world, one component of which is the necessity of working and producing. However, Marcuse has argued that there exists in contemporary society a level of repression greater than that which is necessary for the maintenance of civilised society. This he has termed 'surplus repression' - repression necessitated by social domination. In consequence, the necessary Reality principle becomes debased into the Performance principle, where society

"... is stratified according to the competitive economic performances of its members." (p.50)

"The performance principle, which is that of an acquisitive and antagonistic society ... presupposes a long development during which domination has been increasingly rationalized ..." (p.50)

"Under the rule of the performance principle, body and mind are made into instruments of alienated labor." (p.51-52)

Whilst the scenario of organised work is of primary concern here, the Performance principle is not limited to this arena. As Marcuse notes, man

"has to work in order to live and this work requires not only eight, ten, twelve daily hours of his time ... but ... during these hours and the remaining ones a behavior in conformity with the standards and morals of the performance principle." (p.82)

We are thus left with an inescapable social dialectic between performance and
domination. The urge to liberating performance gives rise to social domination.
The urge to domination is realised in performance. Domination/Performance is
the enfolding structure and logic of contemporary society - which seems to call
into question the utility in Giddens' (1979) notion of the 'dialectic of control'. This
concept, informed by the imagery of resolution of forces from mechanics and
suffering the limitations of such analogy, implies a thesis of domination and an
antithesis of resistance. Yet, according to the Performance principle, both
oppressor and oppressed are held within a greater logic of performance. Specific
occurrences of idiosyncratic behaviour do not imply in themselves the presence of
a more benign Reality principle. The workers share equally with the managers the
presence of the Performance principle, to their own detriment, as will be
explored. In other words, recalcitrance does not imply negation if the
Performance principle holds, and it is this which throws light on the use and
success of incentives.

If work was merely a rational means of creating social wealth for the benefit of
all, then we could assume that all would work conscientiously to that end, and that
incentives to work would not be necessary. However, other than perhaps in times
of crisis such as war, this condition has not been prevalent. Why is this so?
Various explanations have been offered, which form something of a hierarchy of
sophistication, from the simple individualistic to the more complex sociological:

Man is naturally lazy and must be driven - Theory X.

Man, though a willing animal, is incapable of organising
in his own best interest - Paternalism.

Whilst not lazy as such, man would only work to produce
adequate wealth for himself. Only some have the urge
to create a 'better', more wealthy, society - Weberian.

Man is forced into forms of organised work which he
finds unsuited to his nature and is, therefore, reluctant
to work - Humanist.

As above, but he also realises that he is not getting a
fair return for his labour - Marxist.
Hence the need for an incentive. In other words, whatever the reason, it is held that with the application of an incentive man will work more than he would without it. From this we can consider why he should be induced to work more. The impetus to providing an incentive, which is the prerogative of management, stems, not from an urge to produce more social benefit, but ultimately to produce more shareholder wealth, as any text on incentives will acknowledge, if only tacitly. True, in the process the worker may make some gain, and society at large may benefit from lower costs, but the inescapable decision criterion is impact on profit. Any other benefit is vicariously achieved. (For a typical text on incentives, see Marriott, 1968, though for a view of incentives in use, see Lupton, 1963.) Thus the manager's concern with incentives is not directly the welfare of the worker, but that of capital. Where then does the worker's interest lie? Certainly, at an individual level, he may obtain some material benefit, especially in times of high employment, but, certainly in high unemployment, his class interest will suffer. However, the small immediate material benefit at the individual level may well mask a greater disbenefit when a wider perspective is employed. Deleuze and Guattari, in 'Anti Oedipus' (1984) have argued for the seeds of a schizophrenic society in Capitalism. Briefly, they suggest that the individual desires his own repression so as to obtain the 'benefits' of capitalism in terms of goods and structures. I would suggest a modification of this thesis, whereby repression is not sought but is accepted as an epiphenomenon of capitalist productions. This does not deny the essentially schizophrenia-inducing nature of capitalist society.

One of the aims of a capitalist system is to promote a desire for its goods and structures, i.e., to create absolute demand. The agents of demand creation in a work context are managers, both in a formal demand generating function, such as marketing, and informally, as managers of labour, and whilst the two facets are inextricably interwoven when considered as co-conspirators in promoting demand,
it is the latter role that is of most concern here. However, we must realise at the same time that capitalism, through management, furnishes objects of desire, so the labour manager can offer increased prospects of acquiring these objects through increased effort.

Money is not, of course, the only object of desire provided by capitalist production. Access to certain privileges, such as are provided by hierarchy, may be another form, or status accruing from certain occupations, e.g., Airline Pilot vs. Train Driver. However, desire may not always be in the desirer's best interest, e.g., a desire for certain types of food, if fulfilled, may lead to premature death, pace existentialism and suicide. Similarly, desire for the productions of the Capitalist system generally may be against a person's interest. Such benefits as accrue to a worker under capitalism are, by definition, a spin-off from the primary activity of creating wealth for the owners of capital. Marx's theory of surplus value demonstrates the mechanism for this. Only by accepting that he is not entitled to participate directly in the benefits of his labour and that his benefit is a residual of capitalist benefit, can a worker acquiesce in his exploitation. But manifestly he does. Furthermore, the disbenefits to him by so co-operating can be much more than receiving a disproportionate share of the wealth he creates, it may mean he excludes himself from the system altogether - he becomes so efficient that he, or some of his peers, are no longer necessary to sustaining a given level of economic activity. Thus we achieve the double bind, where, by pursuing the objects of his desire, he accepts his own repression.

Why is it that he suppresses an awareness of his own interest in order to satisfy his desires? This again is a task of management, and is achieved in part through control of language and information channels. The language and information of management is that of promoting desire, it is not that of alerting the worker to his own best interest. So, typically, where attempts to increase productivity are made, the worker's co-operation is sought by appealing to his desire for, say,
material betterment, not by explaining that he may work himself or a colleague out of a job. A good illustration of the conflict between desire and interest, and how management 'manage' desire against interest, was provided by the recent U.K. dispute between the National Coal Board (NCB, now British Coal) and the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM). The messages emanating from management were those of cash opportunities and non-forced redundancy - suggesting a win-win situation. They did not give equal prominence to the social/community effects of a shrinking workforce and towns losing their source of employment, i.e., class interest. This is obviously quite legitimate as the responsibilities of industry are now understood. Social ills are not the responsibility of the NCB and therefore can be excluded from the debate. But, of course, a miner has to live outside of work, (see the arguments in Gouldner's (1969) 'The Unemployed Self'). But this is part of the double bind. The NCB can provide access to the productions of the capitalist system and, at the same time, can apparently do nothing to ameliorate the wider social problem, as it has no language to deal with this aspect. Thus we can see how desire transcends interest. Certainly, the NUM can provide information and has a language to highlight class interest, but it cannot provide access to the desire-satisfying productions that the NCB can.

This then, I would suggest, provides an insight into the general principles underlying the use of incentives. The desire/interest gap is unbridgeable under the capitalist system, as capitalism provides for desire but not interest, and counter organisations can cater for interest but not desire - and, of course, in the process, must appear as ideological. (This can be expanded in terms of the general argument for the ideological appearance of opposition, but also possibly by juxtaposing ideas against the material. Counter organisations deal in mentalistic wares (ideas), whereas the dominating organisation (capitalist) deals in material wares.)
Summarising, incentives are used to get a worker to do that which he would not do in its absence. An orthodox epistemology of non-repressive work would see the lack of desire to work in terms of some natural characteristic, such as laziness or inability to organise. A scenario based upon repression, such as I am suggesting, would, whilst possibly accepting the previous value judgements, also include interest as a basis for restricted productivity, and, certainly at the somatic level, the desire for less rather than greater activity may also be in the individual's interest, as, at the psychological level, may be the desire to avoid complex organisational situations (a barrier against stress/anxiety). To suggest, (as the use of incentives does), that the individual should abandon his inclination and work harder implies a 'we know best what is good for you' approach to man management which, when related to who benefits - cui bono? - is of doubtful validity.

The use of incentives, up to comparatively recently, has been relatively unproblematic and, ignoring coercive measures, has been on the principle of some material gain to the worker in return for greater effort. Recently, however, as noted, a new, non-materialist, form has arrived on the scene, but, before examining this development, it is necessary to look a little more closely at what incentives do.

**Incentives**

There are two types of incentive, pain-lessening and pleasure-increasing. The former can be seen as coercive approaches and the latter as 'cajoling' ones. In our industrial society, and for the purpose of this work, it is the second type which is of interest. As suggested, an incentive typically provides for some material gain if the worker does something which he would not otherwise do, but which management wishes him to do. Early in the industrial period the manager could well have been the owner of the firm, today he is likely to be the agent of the owners of the firm. In both cases the interest which seeks certain action by
workers is owner interest. Now arguments have been made that, with the separation of ownership and control, owner interests are subverted by manager interests. This, however, does not substantially alter the case. Managers interests coincide with those of ownership to the extent that the welfare of management is correlated with owner welfare, to a greater or lesser degree, but also, and possibly more significantly, the meta-theory which informs management action is not a meta-theory of management per se, but derives from that of ownership, at least in the form it was understood in early industrial capitalism (for example, see Storey, 1980). Part of this meta-theory concerns the economic rationale of the entrepreneur, which is here seen in terms of money invested in some process which will give an adequate positive return on investment. Other arguments have been advanced for entrepreneurship, such as certain psychologies, or social reasons, such as desire for retaining control, etc., but the desire for a positive return is necessary to most, if not all, entrepreneurial ventures. True, what constitutes adequate is a variable, but this need not concern us here, except to take note of some economic theory on this point. In drastically simplified terms, in a perfectly competitive market an average Rate of Return will pertain. Whilst our individual may operate with some degree of integrity at less than this figure, i.e., between 0% and market average, through either 'incompetence' or choice, he does not have the choice of making a significantly above average return. Thus there tends to exist in any market a tacit agreement on what constitutes an adequate return. If the average drifted up, others would be attracted in, causing increased supply, and lower pricing, and the rate would fall. If it drifted down, the investor would seek some other use for his money. Thus, on the one hand, if costs drift upwards the future becomes uncertain, as the enterprise may cease, which leads to an internalised pursuit of cost minimisation (a control of upward tendency). On the other hand, if the means exist for reducing costs, e.g., presence of new and more efficient technology, this must be taken advantage of, otherwise those who do will gain an advantage. (Supernormal profits will be made initially, this will attract others into the market, and will
force down profit margins to the adequate average; our firm which did not use the new technology has higher costs than the others but cannot maintain a higher price, and so its margins are squeezed.) This, then, gives another, process-related, urge to minimise costs (Performance principle). Whether or not the market functions as per the classic model does not really concern us, the argument here is that this understanding of entrepreneurial risk, which informed the early industrial capitalist, still forms part of the meta-theory used by contemporary managers (Carter and Jackson, 1986).

This cost-cutting or cost-controlling mentality is the prime motive behind the use of incentives. True, evidence exists for the introduction of incentives at the instigation of workers, so that they could increase their material benefit. However, the economic justification for introducing them must be present, and in the final analysis it is management who make the decision. For example, could pressure from workers force management to introduce incentives where there was a cost disadvantage? No, because cost-increasing management action is against the theory of management and, in tune with economic theory, would reduce profit below the average, and therefore acceptable, figure. Thus cost-cutting or cost control must be the rationale behind incentives.

Now some incentives are aimed at inducing workers to work harder, such as piece work, longer, such as attendance bonuses, more carefully, such as quality bonuses. In fact, whatever the identified opportunity for cost control, an appropriate incentive can be applied - but cost awareness is the bottom line. However, it can be seen that the inherent weakness in this approach is that some increased expenditure has to be incurred in order to gain the co-operation of the workers. (Piece work may be excluded from this, as it is possible sometimes just to cut the rate, though this may provoke dysfunctions in other directions - there is a long history of this practice, though, (see, for example, Styles, 1983). However, it is not strictly necessary to include piece work as an incentive, as, in one way, it
is merely a base wage rate - obviously, there is an incentive element in so far as more work done provides more money.) This strategy of increased expenditure to save money is not, however, without risks. The skill in applying incentives is in identifying where costs are generated. It may seem obvious that, if a person makes 10 units of something in a certain period, if he can be induced to make 11 in the same period, given that the incentive does not over-reflect this increase, then the company finances should benefit. Not necessarily so. If, for example, material costs are high compared to labour costs, it may be that 9 units per period with better use of material is the way to cut costs, i.e., less 'work'. The use of incentives is replete with examples of cases where the incentive led to dysfunctional action. Very often, these dysfunctions are not amenable to control. One vexed issue with incentive payments is whether or not there should be an upper limit. The absence of such a limit has often caused tremendous increases in earnings, beyond that which makes the incentives scheme of benefit financially - that is, to the 'organisation'.

However, the new regime of motivation theory did, to some extent, alleviate this problem. Theories such as those of Herzberg, McGregor, etc., stressed the productive benefits to be gained without having to pay for them, (Carey, 1977). This, of course, is an oversimplification. Job enrichment strategies, which were a feature of the new approach, were often cost-incurring. However, job redesign often went with incentives anyway. What could be said was that firstly, the costs were usually one-off, as opposed to recurring, and secondly, they were by nature finite and relatively knowable in advance, not open-ended like material incentives. The raison d'être of motivation theory was precisely that of incentives - effectively, labour intensification. The new approach which used motivators instead of incentives was in fact merely the substitution of psychological incentives for material incentives, and conformed to the same essential principles. The objective is to provide a stimulus to certain actions which would not take place in the absence of that stimulus, based upon the assumption of
deterministic behaviour - ie., provide a particular stimulus, material or otherwise, and, ipso facto, some particular behaviour will ensue. As will be developed later, models of human behaviour are based, either upon the assumption that man is deterministic, or that he is voluntaristic. The assumption underlying this work is that man is voluntaristic, in which case his behaviour cannot be explained by deterministic theories. However, incentives, in opposition to motivation, require that man should respond deterministically - otherwise, where lies the power of the incentive? If man appears to be responding deterministically, then we must examine why such a response is evoked.

It has been suggested that compliant behaviour in a work situation can be understood in terms of power relations, the relatively unimportant meaning in work behaviour, as opposed to more general social meaning, and the manipulative effects of management on desire vis à vis interest, and it can be seen that incentives, psychological and material, do, or at least can, fall into such definition. We must now address the distinction between motivation and incentive, remembering that, according to the theories underpinning them, response to incentives cannot be voluntaristic.

Motivation vs Incentive

My basic argument here is that behaviour which is in response to an extrinsic stimulus is incited, ie., the subject of an incentive, and that behaviour which emanates from some inner conviction is motivated behaviour. The etymology of the two terms supports this. Motivation has its roots in the Latin for movement or motion, ie., merely implies action, whereas incentive's Latin root is 'to sing to', ie., to incite - definitely, an extrinsic influence on action. Such a distinction has not been popularly made in motivational research, and so is it a useful distinction? The answer is manifestly yes, though some clarification of the concepts is necessary. Firstly, we cannot infer motivation from behaviour, it may
be intrinsically motivated or extrinsically incited. For example, take the sex drive or need. Sexual need may be aroused spontaneously or by the presence of an incentive, i.e., an explicit gesture or thing intended to incite sexual desire - thus, incentives are always intentional, intend some particular response. In the first case action arising from spontaneous arousal would be motivated and, in the second, incited. Food provides perhaps a better example: hunger can occur naturally, without the presence of an incentive, or it can be induced by an external source, i.e., at a time when it would not occur spontaneously. It can also be seen from this example how behaviour not in the best interest of the individual can be induced - this, however, does not make man deterministic! It is also obvious that it may not be easy in practice to distinguish such behaviour, or, to put it another way, motivated and incited behaviour may not be discrete. Hunger may be present spontaneously but given a particular form by the simultaneous presence of an incentive, as, of course, may sexual action.

It follows from this that behaviour can be intentionally manipulated by the use of incentives which serve some sectarian interest. Thus their use cannot be seen as a neutral condition, but as serving some specific interest. Incentives are rarely applied, if ever, to the self, there must be, usually an 'apply-er' and an 'apply-ee', each with their own interest. The apply-ee interest can only be realised where it happens to be congruent with that of the apply-er. For attempts at removing socially unnecessary suffering, this is of undoubted importance. A second point of importance regarding the distinction between motivation and incentive is that, if we reject the deterministic claim of incentive theory, the relationship between incentive and action only holds good as long as the subject chooses, or is forced. Furthermore, as the effective relationship between incentive and action cannot be stated, the incentive may not provoke the reaction intended. This condition has been widely experienced in the work situation, with financial incentives. Whereas the theory held that the incentive should promote the urge to do more work, in practice it has been to acquire more of the incentive, i.e., subjects are actually
striving to acquire the incentive and not to do the work, which is essentially Cooper's point, as noted earlier. The relationship holds good only if the incentive can only be achieved through work, but, as incentives are usually based on production rather than on effort, and production is not synonymous with effort, then the whole relationship may be different to the one intended. Thus, if we have a real desire to understand the basis of action, the distinction between motivation and incentive is crucial. Even in a deterministic relationship, action following from incentive could only be understood if the causality of the relationship could be specified. But there is no objective way of doing this, hence the appeal and weakness of behaviourism. Using a presumed rational model, we equate certain behaviour with certain meaning, and then treat behaviour as meaning. But this is obviously tautological, eg., I will take certain action to indicate X, if I then observe the action, I assume X. This then gives us two weaknesses for incentives. We assume a deterministic relationship, yet cannot specify it, and we use certain behaviour as evidence of certain meanings being present.

Incentives are, a fortiori, manipulative devices and surplus repressive, and the true nature, praxis, of an incentive can only be arrived at by determining who is manipulating whom, and in whose interest. Society cannot be purged of all incentives - some occur naturally - but what we should be alert to is the conscious use of incentives. McCormick and Tiffin (1975) state "One of the inescapable responsibilities of management is the establishment of incentives for employees" (p.337). They do not explain why it is an 'inescapable responsibility', but such avowals do need to be understood. That incentives may not be in the 'best interest of the subject', (however defined), is already recognised, eg., in the regulations governing cigarette advertising - the health warning is an appeal to the concept of interest - note, however, the amount of copy space given to the desire-promoting 'information', as opposed to the interest-promoting.
In an emancipated society incentives would only be used as instruments of necessary repression in promoting the general social good, i.e., judged by their praxis. In private life we cannot 'prevent', under normal circumstances, one person using an incentive against another, e.g., sexual incentives, though one can assume free choice on the part of the subject (marriage perhaps excepted). However, in a work system such free choice is rarely present, e.g., it is unusual to offer an individual worker the chance to be subject to an incentive or not - of course, where incentives are used on an 'efficiency and rationality' basis, it is difficult for management to accommodate the higher unit costs of those who wish to remain outside the incentive.

Incentive, at the moment certainly, implies unfreedom. In an emancipated society this should not be the case. However, incentives would still be substantively different to motivators, even in an emancipated society. However, perhaps the ability to distinguish incentive from motive is a key factor in being able to specify the mechanisms for achieving emancipation. Incentive, by definition, would be of a transitory or reviewable nature, i.e., they would not be generally/universally present, but only to achieve a specific praxis.
CHAPTER 3

MANAGEMENT

Starting from the premise that management, as a process, is socially useful, I distinguish between management in this sense and management as a social group. I suggest that 'social good' is a meaningful concept and that the test of management should be its synergetic contribution to social good, rather than to private profit. I introduce the Modernism/Post-Modernism debate in the context of management, in terms of the distinction between form and content, and query the claim of management to possess special, legitimating, knowledge. From this, I characterise contemporary management as an instrument of social domination. I question management's right to manage, and their claim to a transcendent rationality, and consider how they became established in their present powerful position.

I have suggested in the previous chapter that a genre of thinking, typical of orthodox management theory, has been concerned more with furthering the interests of managers and owners, than those of workers. I have further suggested that language is both a constructor of, and masque for, reality. In this chapter I wish to explore the concept and role of the manager, to attempt what can be seen, either as a definition, or as an unmasking of the orthodox definition.

Management theory, which I take to be a discrete body of literature as recognised by its practitioners, is a most remarkable animal, for it deals almost exclusively with one point of view, i.e., that of the managers, and totally ignores the other
side of the equation, the managed, (other than as understood by managers). The popular image of the manager in management theory is as a cross between a social worker, a policeman, a priest and a soldier (officer, of course). He must look to the welfare of his workers, but ensure that they do not misbehave. His is the task of providing salvation for the nation by creating wealth, by recognising and seizing the opportunities presented for so doing. For Simon (1976) he is a decision maker, for Barnard (1938) he maintains the organisation, for Drucker (1977, (a), (b)) he is almost a Saint, (see Willmott, 1984). Criticism of management as a social group is principally found outside management writing, usually in sociology and politics. This lack of reflexivity in management theory would lead the student of this literature to think that management was universally benign and beneficial. Where it does have to inflict some (local) damage on society, it is never voluntary but always as a result of force of circumstance. However, very few social groups, if any, can claim such a transcendent benefit to society generally, and it is with a rather different understanding of management that I am concerned here.

Management, as conceived here, is taken to refer to a state of asymmetric power relations, where the manager has the advantage of power. The weaker side of the relationship is understood as the worker. Some would protest that this is a gross over-simplification, that managers do other things besides exercise power over workers. This is very true, but I am not primarily concerned with the duties of managers, but with the structural relationship between the manager and the managed. I view this in terms of power because, if this dimension was removed, management as we know it would disappear. Management concerns the prioritising of one world view over others, a world view that could not be self-sustaining, without the reinforcement of a powerful advocate. If managers no longer had the right or ability to prioritise their view, then others would prevail. If we take the popular view of management as a process of planning, organising
and controlling, then this point is reinforced. Controlling needs no further examination as, prima facie, it is concerned with power. As regards planning and organising, it is not the exercise of these functions in the absence of some planning and organising, (i.e., a state of non-planning, of non-organising), but of one plan, one form of organisation as opposed to that which would obtain without their efforts. However, it is not the perceived transcendental rationality of management's plan, etc., which legitimises it over all others, it is the manager's right to enforce his view. This is not to say that his rule is absolute, that there are no countervailing tendencies, (Beynon, 1984), but that, in the long run, managements' view must prevail in one form or another, to justify their existence.

However, whereas the process of management may refer to a set of relationships, the constituents of the relationship are not so well defined. Manager and Worker are pure types, and are only found in their pure form at the very top and the very bottom of the job hierarchy. Most roles exhibit both manager and worker characteristics in some more or less significant proportion. This is because the role of manager can be defined in terms of responsibility for, and the role of the worker in terms of responsibility to. I use 'responsibility' here not in an absolute sense, but in a notional sense. This understanding avoids having to take into account the totally misleading issue of job titles. The popular attachment of the title 'manager' to virtually any job one cares to name illustrates the lack of any objective meaning in such a word, (Jackson and Carter, 1985).

The asymmetry of power between manager and worker receives formal legitimation from the corporate organisation, reinforced, at least tacitly, by social attitudes to authority. However, informal power may also be present and function so as to reinforce the formal structure, or to negate it. An example of the former might be, perhaps, management service functions, which may possess
no formal managerial power, but may have a de facto influence, due to, for example, status. Countervailing power may be that possessed by an informal group to regulate the output of group members. As circumstances which militate against formal power are seen as pathological in managerial terms, it is only those which reinforce it that are of concern here.

Managerial power is of two types. Using an analogy from mechanics, there is potential power and kinetic power. The former is power which a person has, formal and informal, by virtue of his formal status. This power may or may not be realised kinetically - the application or use of power. For example, take two persons of equal organisational status: it may be that, because of the nature of their individual roles, one has direct control over others, but the second does not. They both have the same potential power, but different kinetic power. Potential power thus reflects an institutionalised structure of power, hierarchy, symbolising the relationships between individuals, and is important in normalising attitudes to, or acceptance of, power relativities. Such power functions as a control mechanism, even though it may never be actually applied as kinetic power. In fact, as regards management as management of interpersonal relationships, such power is little used kinetically.

It will be appreciated that, although most people, (or hierarchical roles), exhibit characteristics of both manager and worker, the two roles have a differential impact in individual cases. In other words, the manager/worker mix varies between roles, the proportion of 'manager' increasing as one moves up the hierarchy. However, at any instant in time, any person may be considered all manager or all worker. Before anyone cries 'reductionist', let me qualify this statement. Certainly, the two roles mutually inform each other, and the execution of specific acts will reflect this, and, of course, other aspects of the
person concerned. However, such acts can be seen as management-oriented or worker-oriented. Thus, if a person ('legitimately') issues an order to another, then that is unequivocally a managerial act. If the other obeys, that is a worker act. The impact of the manager/worker mix is, however, not just one of quantity, it also has a qualitative dimension, especially between levels in the hierarchy. Thus, when a foreman experiences being a worker, it is different to, say, a personnel manager’s experience of the same. This is not just an obvious claim for perceptual differences. I am suggesting a much more substantive difference. For example, the worker (responsible to) component of being a foreman may, for example, mean 'clocking in', whereas the same may not apply to our personnel manager. The qualitative gap is probably more pronounced looking at the management dimension. One can suggest at least three distinct strata of management:

**Top:** This is management at, or about, the Board level of a large company or analogous organisation. Here there is, of course, very little, if any, worker component. Such work is characterised by high remuneration, membership of an exclusive socio-economic group, and a high level of abstraction as regards human resource management, as concerns are more at the level of corporate strategy.

**Middle:** This is the professional level rather than the economic (top) level. It is typified by a functional role and is remunerated within a 'normal' salary scale.

**Lower:** This is supervisory and non-professional management. It has a low socio-economic reference group, but has high immediacy in 'people management'.

Top-level management is not a major concern of this thesis in so far as they affect motivation. Such effect as they do have is likely to be as a result of policy decisions. However, their role in maintaining the overall power structure cannot be ignored.
Direct access to management roles (ignoring the top level) is a relatively recent phenomenon, (that is, people trained, from scratch, as managers via M.B.A. courses, etc.). Often access to management is via the legitimacy of a professional or craft skill, eg., proficiency as a professional engineer brings with it the right to manage, regardless of whether or not trained in management. Similarly, at a lower level, with craft skills, where there is the archetypal story that the best craftsmen make the worst foremen - yet these are the people who are promoted because of their craft skill. If management is a 'leading group', as Drucker (1968:461) suggests, then it seems strange that access should have remained, for so long, informal. This prompts the question as to what is the nature of management, if it can be assumed that little formal training, if any, is necessary, as opposed to, say, the rigours of professional training for areas such as accountancy, law, etc. One possibility is, of course, that it has been in the interests of owners to socialise managers into a particular process of management, rather than use people trained in the 'principles' of management. Perhaps the ubiquity of the capitalist bureaucracy stems, not from it being the most efficient means of creating wealth, but because of the controls on access and training maintained by such organisations, very much like the military and the church. Even now, when some professionalisation is creeping in, management education still favours the contemporary dominant forms of organisation, though whether as a reflection of contemporary social values, because owner interests can exercise influence, even at a distance, over education, or merely because of the scarcity of empirical alternatives, is open to question.

If managers are such an important, more or less self-regulating, body, serving, one would assume, the good of society, then surely they have some notional ethical code of practice, like the law and medicine. But not a bit of it. Management is basically self-validating as regards its social contribution, claiming a neutral role informed only by the concept of efficiency. However, MacIntyre (1981) argues
that, not only is neutrality of that sort impossible, but also that management does
not even have the stock of knowledge to enable its achievement, or recognition if it were achieved. One cannot escape the conclusion that management, in its
contemporary popular form is merely an apologist for, and agent of, the interests
of ownership (Carter and Jackson, 1986). In this, management can be seen as the
contemporary socio-historic form of agents of the rich. As the rich find it
difficult, if not rather tedious, to organise the wealth-creating worker themselves,
they have traditionally employed agents to do it for them. This concept of the
agent has been visible throughout recorded history, eg., coal agents to realise
mineral wealth, land agents to do the same for land usage, and so on. With the
rise of the commercial class and the shift in wealth from land to manufacturing,
some appropriate form of agent was required, whom we now understand as the
manager. If one looks at the emergent industrial organisation of the 19th century,
the metamorphosis of agent into manager is quite clear (see Pollard, 1968; Mant,
1977). However, one of the most remarkable aspects of management is that it is
held in esteem by society in a manner entirely disproportionate to its social role.
Here we have a group in society which exploits the many in the service of the few,
with scant regard to the effects of their exploitation on either the social or the
natural ecology, and yet not only is their role, relatively, socially unchallenged,
but it is, on the contrary, glorified. Not only do they portray themselves as the
long-suffering victims of worker and government intransigence, and as the last
bastion of patriotic concern, and as thoroughly unloved and oppressed animals,
but, at the same time, manage to project a set of values associated with them as
unequivocally desirable - witness the popularity of the adjective 'executive',
applied to brief cases, airline seats, railway trains, houses, suits, watches, etc.
This insidious marketing of managerial values no doubt contributes to the
maintenance of their social position, and the retention of the approbation of their
employers.
Management's Right to Manage

Given that we supposedly live in a democracy, where all people are equal and free, we might ask from where do managers derive their right to manage - an oft-vaunted claim. Perhaps from some transcendent authority, like the state? No - there is no licence from the state, as with, say, the police, nor from some quasi-legal body itself recognised by the state, as is the case with, eg., medicine. Perhaps it derives from the consensus of the managed? After all, it is a popular aphorism of managers that they manage by consent of the managed, not by the authority vested in them. If this is the case, how is this consent articulated? How does one explain dissent against management, or the characteristic unrest found in industry? Even if consent is implied, what about mis-managing? Surely, the managed do not consent to that? Perhaps it comes from the owners? Sure enough, this is true; but do the owners have the power to delegate a transcendent right to manage? To be sure, the deeply entrenched concept of property rights gives ownership wide ranging legal and moral powers, but, except in strictly limited cases, such as trespass, the right is the right to manage the property in ownership, not to manage other people. Perhaps then it is a tautology? Managers must have the right to manage, otherwise they would not be managers. Yes - this seems much nearer to the 'truth'. In fact, the manager's right to manage seems a self-evident truth itself. However, not only does it become truth, it also becomes unequivocally 'good'. Managing (order) becomes opposed to non-managing (chaos), rather than opposed to mis-managing. In other words, management becomes a quantitative concept, not a qualitative one. Its presence is proof of its bona fides, it does not need otherwise to justify itself. This masquerade is aided and abetted by the absence of a normative catechism for management, (an appropriate metatheory); we cannot distinguish management (good) from mis-management (bad). Mis-management becomes subsumed within management, so that the right to manage includes the right to mis-manage (Carter and Jackson, 1986).
Management as a Rational Activity

It is an explicit claim of management that it acts in a rational, (that is, objectively rational), manner. In classical economics, the theory of the firm assumes that managers will make objectively rational decisions in pursuit of profit, (or, in a weaker version, of other specified goals, such as growth, market share or survival), (Savage and Small, 1975). The idea of absolute rationality in decision-making has, of course, been refuted by Simon (1976) with his concept of bounded rationality, and perhaps more significantly, by Shull, Delbecq and Cummings (1970), with their notion of bounded discretion. However, notwithstanding theoretical limitations to absolute rationality, the assumption remains, that, ceteris paribus, managers will behave as near as possible in an objectively rational manner. The idea is reinforced by the claims of a 'management science'. Two versions of this are apparent. Firstly, the broad approach, which sees all aspects of management, including people, as conforming to some model based on traditional physics, Taylorism and Behaviourism being examples, and secondly, a narrow perspective which sees managers as users of scientific (mathematical) tools, such as operations research. The impact of relativity on physics, as exemplified in New Physics, or the fact that mathematics is merely a symbolic language, has done little to dampen the enthusiasm for rationalist views of management as exemplified in any orthodox management text.

Management is traditionally defined in terms of the function of planning, organising and controlling, and, notwithstanding some challenge to the narrow understanding of management in these terms by theorists such as Simon, there is still an assumption of an underlying function which is not too dissimilar from the traditional position (Willmott, op. cit.). This issue has been addressed by Bryman (1984), who identifies a number of challenges to a strict objectivity in management. However, the alternative is not apparently a strictly subjective, or
relativist, rationality, but some sort of consensual inter-subjective rationality. In other words, whatever the underlying impulse to manage, there is the same assumption of function involved, i.e., managers provide some input which has a synergetic effect on the social activities with which they are concerned. It is this assumption that requires further examination. My purpose is not to suggest that management cannot produce social benefits, but to question whether or not it does, or at least to question if it does so effectively and efficiently. It is, of course, possible that management does produce synergy, but in terms of a sectional interest (ownership), rather than a general social interest. There is, of course, an argument that general social good is achieved vicariously, through serving owner interests. If this is the underlying belief which legitimises managerial power, then why is it not made explicit? Why is management not conceptualised as conscious service of owner interest? Surely, if that is how we achieve social good, then we would do so more effectively by an open and honest commitment to owner interest. The fact that such a commitment is not openly admitted as the raison d'être of management, that management hides behind a spurious claim to serve a wider interest, suggests that such a claim would be difficult to sustain empirically. This point has been addressed more fully in Carter and Jackson (1986), and suffice it to say, at this point, that I do not work from the position of accepting social good as best achieved by serving owner interest.

In suggesting that management, as currently practised, is not maximising its contribution to the social good, I am not suggesting that it makes no contribution to social good. I take it as axiomatic that the irreducible justification for management is in its capacity for such a contribution, that, by organising the utilisation of resources more efficiently than would otherwise be the case, managers add directly and unequivocally to the creation of wealth, both 'material' and 'spiritual'. This is, of course, not to be seen in terms of an absolute material
efficiency. The concept of efficiency should be tempered by the recognition of the need to achieve or sustain certain social conditions. In other words, the value of management should be judged in terms of some explicit social praxis. For the argument that such a condition is yet to be achieved, see Carter and Jackson (1986) and Jackson and Willmott (1986). The argument of vicarious or accidental achievement of such an aim, as already suggested, is thoroughly rejected, as is the claim that management does indeed possess such a concept in 'profit as praxis', which would be merely a metaphor for sectional interest. If management is indeed creating some social benefit, then the concern here is to establish the importance of this role vis a vis any other substantive roles which they fulfill. To describe a hangman as someone who works with ropes would not be an adequate description of his de facto function. Is it, therefore, adequate to describe a manager metaphorically as someone who creates social good, and thereby use this model to understand the rationality of his actions? Or is there some other overweening model which would provide a better explanation?

**Genesis of Management**

The ahistorical tendency of management theory facilitates the portrayal of management as a self-evident and essential functional activity. Where the history of management is addressed, it tends to be in terms of its practitioners, i.e., managers and management theorists, rather than in terms of process, i.e., why they are managers (Drucker, 1968, 1977). In terms of practice, one could argue that management consists, essentially, of two activities. One is the control of resources (economic use of resources), and the other is a concern with organising, or technique, though these are obviously not totally discrete, depending upon one's purpose in trying to 'pigeon-hole' specific events - for example, a concern with organising may be informed by a concern for efficiency of organisation. Looking at these two basic characteristics, one could posit a certain (historical) line of
development culminating in management as we know it today, that is, as a social force, rather than in terms of its superficial characteristics as suggested by, say, Mintzberg (1980).

(i) Control: The control aspect of management can be understood as the latest form of an historical tendency where some people have immediate authority over other people and material things. Whether or not such authority relationships are natural, (Dumont, 1970), or merely socially practical and therefore self-validating, (Parsons, 1951), or just traditional, (Weber, 1968), is, at the moment, irrelevant. The fact is that there is a widespread acceptance, (in some cases legally reinforced), of the right of one person to direct another. As regards management, although there are forms of authority which are hereditary at the individual or class level, much is acquired on an ad hoc basis, for example, by gaining admission to a particular social group - managers. In other words, much managerial power is not strictly functional, strictly necessary to a particular circumstance, but is acquired as part of the mantle of management. To return to an earlier analogy, it is potential power, but which is, of course, amenable to operationalisation as kinetic power. (This is very much in line with the idea of micro-power, (see eg., Foucault, 1980; Daudi, 1986), the possibility of the exercise of discrete, small, 'amounts' of power (1).) Such power is, to a large extent, institutionalised in the sense that the normal form of managed organisation is hierarchical - there is a specific assumption that groups of workers will require someone to control them, without reference to specific circumstance, i.e., it is not directly coupled with overt purpose. The hierarchical structure comes as a ready-made concept to be applied in appropriate circumstances regardless of purpose.

I would argue, however, that control, the exercise of power, only leads to a synergetic effect in so far as it counteracts an inherent tendency of that which is controlled to produce less, or even negative, synergy. From a systems point of
view, control is only necessary in a homeostat once the system violates its stability criteria. Control when the system is stable is totally useless, and certainly this applies to conceptualisations of management systems, eg., exception reporting. However, I am not here dealing with necessary acts of control within a system, but with unnecessary control. What is necessary or 'productive' must be related to purpose, or to the informing meta-theory behind the specific act of organisation. Returning to the example of a homeostat, if this is a device for controlling, say, temperature, (a thermostat), then it will only function in respect of certain specific temperatures, in accordance with Ashby's Law (cf. Ashby, 1964; Beer, 1979, 1981). However, even though the thermostat will function without any conscious purpose of its own, its use value is only realised when it is set to control some specific situation, ie., when it reflects some conscious purpose of the user. This applies equally to management control. There cannot be absolute productivity - it must always be related to some conscious purpose reflecting an informing ideology or interest. It is obvious, therefore, that what workers might see as synergetic may well be different from management's view. For this not to be so, we would have to assume some absolute good as the informing meta-theory of management - which certainly it is not! - or that the controlled should see their interests as congruent with those of the controller - which, again, is not normally the case. If this latter condition were the case, then the only justification for management would be to counter any unintended (presumably unknowing) action on the part of workers which was against the collective interest, ie., a benign paternalism. This model, of course, is rampant in organisation theory, illustrated by Burrell and Morgan (1979) as the 'sociology of regulation'. The institutionalised power to control is power per se, and though constrained in certain ways, and legitimised by reference to specific types of institution - (what is legitimate power in the military would not necessarily be legitimate power in a business organisation) - is nevertheless without reference to specific macro-social interests, benefit or purpose.
(ii) Technique: Managers can provide specific skills relevant to the assumed purpose of collective action (in the form of a work organisation). This is not to say that only managers in an organisation possess such skills. On the one hand, there may be relevant skills possessed naturally by a wide spectrum of people within an organisation, eg., skills of organising people, but which are the prerogative of the group called managers. On the other hand, there may be specific acquired skills possessed by few people - eg., linear programming - but again the prerogative to practice such a skill is determined by managers (see Gouldner, 1969; Allport, 1969). This is not to say, either, that there are only managerial skills in organisations. Craftsmen provide craft skills, necessary to the collective purpose, and presumably the capitalist provides speculative skills, also necessary, at least in a capitalist economy. What perhaps sets management skills apart is that they tend to be related to specific functions, (eg., marketing, accounting, etc.), rather than to particular crafts, as with craft skills. Management skills become incorporated in the general institution of management, such that management skills are what managers have - or, perhaps more correctly, managers have things called management skills. Marketing managers have management skills, finance managers have management skills, production managers have management skills, and thus, the concept of management transcends all cognitive division or distinction. Certainly, such skills may be of a particular type, eg., innovative, or may be perceived socially as distinct from other skills, such as manual, eg., professional, but such qualifications are not themselves absolutes. Is, for example, a train driver so different from an airline pilot that one job should be thought manual and the other professional?

What needs to be established is: (a) what are the social benefits accruing from such skills, if any?, and (b) are they applied in an optimal form? For example, the business application of computers can be seen as a managerial act. It may be the manifestation of an innovative skill, or of a skill in efficient use of resources, or
of a marketing skill to show that one's company is 'up-to-date'. Has, however, the business computer contributed to social good, or has it, in fact, worked against it? Certainly, the early application of large main frames led to capacity chasing uses. Very often, the criterion for judging a particular application was the size of its 'number crunching' requirements - the bigger, the better. Thus, wages calculations were favoured, and yet these were not particularly suited to the technology of the period. However, the computer has had a major impact at the social level. It has been inevitable that systems have been bent to fit computers, rather than vice versa. Anecdotes about computer accounting are legion - for example, the electricity authority whose computer billed a customer who had not used any electricity. The bill, quite correctly, was for £0.00, which, of course, the customer ignored. The computer threatened disconnection of supply unless the account was settled forthwith, and was only mollified by a cheque for £0.00 - an example of the rationality of the machine transcending human rationality, though the machine is irrational to the human. Obviously, a simple programme amendment would correct this, but had the customer not co-operated in what was a silly act, then presumably he could have been disconnected. How many other similar programme errors can exist in a suite which could provoke similar dysfunction? At the opposite end of the spectrum, a university library transferred its catalogue to computer, accessible through V.D.U. terminals, and literally discarded its previous card system. Fine, except when the computer goes down. Then there is no way of interrogating the catalogue - in other words, you cannot fully use the library. Clearly, this calls for a redefinition of popular expectation of a library, which sensibly should not be merely an epiphenomenon of the introduction of new technology, but a conscious decision consensually, at least, arrived at by those concerned, which surely should include the user. It is interesting to note that another university library uses the same computer system, but retains the card catalogue as its main source of access, and sees the computer system as a 'useful aid' to users. The use of computers generally raises many
questions, which remain largely unaddressed, regarding the effect on man, as a social animal, having to interact with machines rather than with people. The isolating tendency of such a development can be seen as part of the modern drive towards the dissolution of the social in favour of the integumented individual (Cooper, 1982, 1983a). I am not, however, adopting a Luddite approach to computers, merely suggesting that their application is not by definition socially good (see Solomonides and Levidow, 1985). As with any technology, it needs to be critically assessed, in terms of its social impact, not just in terms of potential dysfunction, but also in terms of whether or not it is being used in the most effective manner. A recent report suggested that computer applications have been mainly in the area of games and leisure, whereas, for example, medical use lags far behind, notwithstanding immediate benefits which would accrue from such use. Apparently, there is more money to be made from leisure applications than from medical ones, (see also Woolley, 1986).

Another aspect of technique is that associated with planning and co-ordination (organisation). Certainly, benefits are available from improved organisation, but is this something better done by managers than by, say, the group itself? This is an enormous area beset by definitional problems. For example, Likert's (1961) 'link-pin' approach would integrate managers within the concept of a group. However, the hierarchical structure still obtains, as with more traditional conceptualisations. The degree to which such a concept is entrenched in the modern organisational mind is illustrated by Herbst (1976:40), in his book entitled 'Alternatives to Hierarchy', where he writes of his idea being applied 'at different levels in the organisation'. The genuine integration of the manager into a group is certainly possible where the concept of management is seen correctly as a process and not in terms of power and status (Vanek, 1975; Coates and Topham, 1970; Adizes and Borgese, 1975). The self-managing or autonomous group has had partial empirical verification within socio-technical systems, as the Autonomous
Work Group, and the evidence suggests that such groups can effectively organise themselves. The fact that limits to discretion on organising in its widest sense, eg., pay, selling price, etc., are attributable to the conflict of interest between ownership rights and the unfettered principle of self-organisation - ie., the possibility of organising so as not to generate a profit for owners is not normally an option available to an autonomous work group - emphasises that organisational structures are much more a reflection of sectional interest than of a desire for, say, absolute productivity. It has been argued that alternatives to managerial bureaucracies are possible, but are not tried because they would be less effective. If they have not been tried, how do we know they are less effective? It is interesting to compare this claim with one reported by Marx: a correspondent of the Spectator in 1866, writing about the Rochdale Pioneers, was alarmed precisely because they were efficiently organised and demonstrated that there was no need for a managerial class! - as Marx comments, 'Quelle horreur!' (Marx, 1976:449).

In seeking to establish what managers do, it is useful to determine what it is that managers do which distinguishes them from other groups in society. The classical model of management as forwarded by such as Fayol (1949) in terms of Planning, Organising and Controlling, has been attacked by realists such as Mintzberg (1980), who have demonstrated that this popular conception is a fiction. However, in cataloguing the activities of a manager, either in terms of the classical or the realist view, one does not reveal his substantive social role. Many people plan organise and control who are not necessarily managers, - in fact, it is almost a requirement of living generally that one should indulge in such activities. Similarly, not only managers use the telephone, write letters and attend meetings. What is it then that distinguishes managers from others? I have suggested two factors. One is that they exercise a particular form of social control, and the other is that they have claim to a set of techniques called management techniques - ie., it is the social context in which they perform their
role which defines them as managers. Now, this would, no doubt, be criticised as reductionist, and so it may well be. On the one hand, a certain amount of reductionism in understanding the world is inevitable, due to our limits as information processors. What is significant about reductionism is not that it occurs, but its quality (Jackson and Carter, 1984) - how appropriate is the reduction to the purpose of the individual? How well does the reduction stand scrutiny in respect of claims made for it? Certainly, to reduce to two factors, which themselves are not totally discrete from one another, seems less than is offered by either the classical or the realist school. However, as I certainly do not deny that managers indulge in such activities as those schools claim, it follows that they can be included within my own schema. It is not actions per se that are significant, but the exercise of social power of which the actions are signifiers. There has not, to my knowledge, been an objective assessment of management in terms of its exercise of social power, in terms of what it does, what it should do, what it could do, etc., neither in the positive sense at the macro-social level, nor in a normative sense in the light of some desired social praxis. Such studies as there are tend to be at the micro-level, dealing with a comparison of alternative management case studies, or perhaps demonstrating how non-traditional forms fail in specific cases. The dominant capitalist interest in maintaining orthodox management roles acts as an effective barrier to genuine alternative forms. Restriction on access to capital markets, for example, tends to marginalise non-traditional organisations, which too easily become crushed or incorporated into the orthodox, as it is often essential that such radical forms have to interact with mainstream organisations, who tend to set the rules. Micro-level judgements are, therefore, a wholly inappropriate measure of performance of alternative organisational forms.

However, even though they often deal with specific cases, there are plenty of studies which demonstrate the inadequacy of management, (eg., Dixon, 1976;
Fiennes, 1967; etc.) Two strands of mis-management so reported can be discerned in this literature. There are those where observers could predict the result, (see Beer, 'Platform for Change', (1978) on the collapse of Rolls Royce), and those which no one could, or did, foresee, and which could only be 'predicted with hindsight' (see Rolt, (1978), on railway accidents). Most mis-management is of the former type, though it is unusual to find a general consensus of opinion as to whether a situation is leading to success or failure, in which case some informed opinion is, of necessity, wrong. With unpredicted failures, if, in principle, even with hindsight, they were predictable, we can say that failure to anticipate was wrong. If management is an objectively rational process, it is difficult to explain such lapses. Even with the small residual group of failures where mis-management was totally unpredictable, even with hindsight, we still have problems if management is objectively rational.

In the first case, the ability to predict mis-management would indeed support the argument of a rational, calculable, function for management. However, all the other cases suggest that, even if the situation is calculable, managers fail so to calculate. If managers fail to anticipate and manage failure, how do they achieve success, even in their own terms? The answer would appear to be, in its strong form, happy accident, and in its weak form, absence of unhappy accident, (i.e., things which would lead it to fail, the very things that management is there to deal with). This may sound deterministic, but I would argue not. If management are not controlling what they think they are controlling, then all that is assured is that outcomes, however achieved, are relatively independent of them. How can this be? Well, firstly, we lack any firm knowledge of how the responsibility for the success of a co-operative social venture be determined or apportioned. Take, for example, a football match. If we assume success for a team is represented by a victory, how do we know who contributed, and how, to that victory? To be sure, the goal scorer contributed, but so did those who 'set up' the goal. How do we
determine the relative contribution here? What about the team's own goal keeper? He too helps to achieve victory by preventing the other team's goals, but, there again, he does not do it by himself. We also have the managerial component of the team - captain, coach, manager. How did these contribute? Any measures we do have are crude and spurious. The answer is that we really just don't know. In fact, victory in a game may have more to do with the contribution of the losing side than that of the winning side! Similarly, in a work organisation - what do workers contribute, what do managers contribute, what do external factions contribute? This is without addressing the difficult question of what success means. The problem is complex enough using a managerial measure of success, without relating it to the wider issue of a social definition.

Modern management has much affinity with 'primitive' tribal societies, insofar as its efficiency relies on an act of faith on the part of the believer. For example, the potlach of North American tribes accords fairly well with the modern manager's practices of entertainment - it being deemed 'necessary' for the organisation to prosper. The worship of icons has parallels in executive 'toys' such as executive computers, executive pens, executive brief cases. Of course, modern management has its witch doctors and seers, - Drucker, Peters and Waterman, etc., - and it makes votive offerings (to political pressure groups). Imagine if the modern productive process was accompanied by ritual slaughter of some animal - we might find such a proposition strange, especially if we could not determine the efficacy of the sacrifice on production. Yet we indulge in precisely analogous acts, and, just as the member of the 'primitive tribe' may believe his ritual to be effective, so does the modern manager. In the way the former must have faith in his tribal 'officers', so we must have faith in the modern manager. It is the case that we accept management without knowing whether or not it 'works', even in terms of its own supposed purpose! This is without considering the more general social concept of purpose. Management is assumed necessary, on the basis of
reason, but this is reason built on unsubstantiated a priori, notwithstanding evidence which contradicts the need for a managerial class/function as it is now constituted. Management may indeed function as it supposes, but as we have no way of knowing if it does, we carry on as if it does, and ignore contradictions.

Not only can the efficacy of management not be known generally, it is unknowable to the individual manager, i.e., the manager cannot know the overall efficacy of his own actions. He may know the immediate effects, but that is a different proposition. To be sure, he may know the overall efficacy in terms of management logic, but this is a circular argument anyway. Let me expand on this. Let us assume that a manager has the task of reducing the costs of a particular department. He will have, (must have), a figure representing current costs, calculated in some particular way, and access to a revised cost as the result of his action, which demonstrates his success or failure. If the second figure is lower than the first, then, in line with his brief, he has indeed reduced costs. However, as management determine both the syntax and semantics of managerial action, we have no way of knowing the social effect of such action. It may be said that a manager is only responsible for the effects of his action on company profits, and cannot be held responsible for social costs. This may be fair enough, but if a social cost is incurred as a result of his actions, someone has to pay for it. Take the 1984/85 British coal miners strike, already referred to: in well rehearsed arguments about pit closures, the employers could demonstrate that reducing capacity, including labour, reduced the costs of the National Coal Board, however, counter arguments showed that the NCB was, in effect, transferring costs from its own accounts to the general public (Glyn, 1984; Berry et al, 1985; Goodman, 1985; Carter and Jackson, 1986), and in fact figures were produced to show that the minimum social cost was incurred by retaining the specific costs within the NCB. This is particularly significant when one considers that the NCB is a publicly owned concern. The implication is that by transferring costs from
one public account to another, the total cost to the public was increased. It is not important here which version was correct. What I wish to stress is, firstly, that with such a complex problem no one knows what the outcomes are, and secondly, that in principle social costs can be increased by reducing organisational costs, (cf. Kotarbinski (1965) on efficient action). If reduction of organisational costs increases social costs, then this must, in the long term, be detrimental to the society at large (2).

This problem can be ameliorated, to some extent, by recourse to a praxis-oriented concept of management, which would, of course, have strong implications for our current notions of managerial action. However, if managers were agents of the social good, this would not present a problem. If management is a rational process of achieving specific ends, then a change in those ends would not pose particular difficulties. However, if managers are de facto agents of ownership serving sectarian interests, then they may very well pale at the thought of such a change in role. If management were to be assessed as a process in terms of its efficacy in serving social goals, then we might find that the 'executive culture' is redundant. We may no longer need a social group distinguished by its favourable share of available wealth vis-à-vis the work force, together with its favourable conditions. Bertrand Russell (1976) wrote that "work is of two kinds ... the first (doing) unpleasant and ill paid, the second (telling) pleasant and highly paid", (p.13). Such distinction may become unnecessary.

I have suggested here that management's claim to a transcendent rationality is untenable in the final analysis, because they cannot point unequivocally to the benefit accruing from their actions, either at the organisational or the social level (MacIntyre, 1981). Given the inherent undecidability of the efficacy of management, even in terms of its claimed role, how can we continue to give attention to this role at the expense of the other substantive roles which are
decidable, even in social terms? I have argued that management should be understood in its contemporary social form as the agent of exploitation and social control, representing the interests of a particular sector of society, (ownership), at the expense of the general social good. The apparent improvement in social conditions deriving from a capitalist society via the managerial process has not been demonstrated as attributable to management. Such a proposition relies on an act of faith.

Technics and Control

I have suggested that management exhibits two characteristics which distinguish it from other work - one is control of others, and the second is possession of a set of techniques of management (Braverman, 1974). I have further suggested that the practice of control and technique is not a transcendently rational action, and that it is rational only in the sense of some particular interest, that of capital. To consolidate the argument that management is the agent of capitalism, I would now propose that the idea of management technique can in fact be incorporated into the principle of control, in effect as techniques of control.

Many techniques within management are overtly techniques of control. There are techniques of labour control - time recording, incentives, sanctions, etc., - there are techniques of cash control - accounting procedures, material/stock control, etc. However, less obvious techniques can be seen in terms of control, e.g., engineering. Engineering can, in part, be seen in terms of bettering what is, or creating what is not. Thus, for example, the creation of the steam engine was at once a means of controlling nature in terms of energy (steam), and of putting it to useful work in the form of an engine. Furthermore, the managerial acquisition of the technique allowed it to be used on very particular work, as a means of increasing control (eg., Marglin, 1980). Very few new processes, (ie., previously
unknown), emanated from the steam engine. What the steam engine allowed was the rebounding of existing problems, it allowed better control of an existing situation. For example, the initial application of the steam engine was to pump water from mines. The pump was already known, from at least the time of Archimedes, (incidentally, itself a device for controlling nature), and what the steam engine provided was increased control, i.e., more water could be controlled with the steam pump than with previous versions (hand, horse, wind), which themselves were presumably improvements on the previous system - buckets? Similarly, railway engines replaced horses; steam hammers replaced hand and water hammers; marine engines replaced sail - all extending an already existing capability. Aeroplanes, in a later age, replaced balloons - though it must be admitted that balloons themselves did represent a totally new practice, manned flight; electronic calculators replaced slide rules, etc. Thus most engineering inventions improve man's control of resources when employed as part of the management function.

Management control of resources other than labour is a relatively straightforward operation, (a) within the given limits of technology, and (b) in the absence of absolute measure or standards of efficacy of control, i.e., control is assumed or perceived rather than real, as confirmed by the refutation of management control furnished by such events as those at Bhopal and Three Mile Island. In the absence of any refutation by inanimate resources, as is the normal case, the assumptions remain inviolate and unchallenged, i.e., the assumption is formed as a result of the 'dialectic' between manager and managed - materials, by and large, do as they are told. However, labour as a resource is not so compliant, being a particularly recalcitrant element of the work situation, refusing to conform to the presumptions of management (see Pollard, 1968:295-297), and it is on management control of labour that I will now concentrate.
As labour has always been difficult to control, presumably mechanisms for control have always been present. Whilst the modern structure of management has its roots in the Industrial Revolution, its control function is much older, as I have already suggested. Ownership and management may have been largely undifferentiated pre-Industrial Revolution, as is popularly supposed, (see Burnham (1942) on managerial revolution), but the managerial function was still discrete and being obviously fulfilled. However, the non-owner manager also existed and had done for a considerable period of time. Take, for example, the army. The army has, since at least Roman times, and no doubt well before that, employed professional managers, and more recently, in Britain, the Model Army of Cromwell had clearly established management roles. Landowners (Pollard, op. cit.:38) who employed agents to organise the estate workers were also using managers. Interestingly, coal owners employed agents who were, at least in the North East, known as viewers, which no doubt contains the same thrust as the 'overlooker' or 'overseer' found in other industries. In civil engineering managers were also employed. This is certainly true of the canal and railway building era, but was also found much earlier, in cathedral building. The army has already been mentioned, but the navy, merchant as well as military, had analogous managers. Any large undertaking must have required some form of labour control - slave overseers for building the Pyramids, and Stonehenge, perhaps? Management as a mechanism for controlling labour is undoubtedly of some antiquity. Why then is there this need/obsession for controlling labour?

Firstly, labour is the source of creating wealth, which, traditionally, does not accrue to those creating it, as argued by Marx, but to those who, ultimately rather than immediately, control labour. Management is thus seen as the agent of this controlling interest. Wealth does not have to be seen necessarily as material wealth. The builders (workers) of the medieval cathedrals, monasteries, etc., could be seen as creators of spiritual wealth for the clergy. Presumably, there
was not much exchange value in a cathedral on the open market, but no doubt it carried great value in heaven. With the military, it may be material wealth, but may also be symbolic - for example, with the navy exercising control over the seas, when no one is disputing them, or with the American space programme symbolising the power of the state - though, of course, more material wealth is created at the manufacturing level.

It can reasonably be suggested that creating wealth for others is not an intrinsic desire of wage labour and that, left to their own devices, they would pursue other goals, i.e., they are not likely to want to spend their time creating surplus value where this accrues to the private owner (Kotarbinski, 1965; Ch.12). However, it has been demonstrated historically that this reluctance to create wealth for the benefit of others can be overcome, which, in modern society, is accomplished by the manager, not by the exercise of raw power, but by recourse to a greater truth or rationality (MacIntyre, 1981; Marcuse, 1966). It might be argued that in 'encouraging' such efforts from the workers the manager is indeed creating synergy, and thereby justifying his position as practitioner of management as process. Such a claim would have to be judged in three ways. Firstly, could equal synergy be created without the manager? Secondly, does this synergy contribute to the social good, as opposed to the private good? Thirdly, could the same effort, with or without the manager, produce more synergy if consciously oriented towards serving the social, rather than the individual, interest? (Cf. Kotarbinski, op. cit., Ch.1). Clearly, efficient labour (conventionally defined) per se, does not necessarily contribute to the social good, and yet can still create surplus value for the benefit of the owners. Whilst we can reasonably assume that 'necessary value' created by the worker contributes, almost by definition, to the social good - notwithstanding the lack of a full description of what is so meant - the same cannot be assumed about surplus value. In which case, the time spent on creating this value may as well not have been spent on it. However, if the time spent on
creating this private wealth were directed towards a conscious contribution to social good, then the surplus value so created is indeed worth spending the time on. This then provides the basis for a true evaluation of management's contribution - what form of management would maximise the synergy of co-operative action in the service of social good? In fact, subject to the establishment of a definition of social good, it could be assumed that all labour exhibits the characteristics of necessary labour, if one allows for the betterment which would accrue from what was surplus labour. Or, to put it another way, labour which provides for the reproduction of the worker does not necessarily allow for the betterment of the human condition. On the assumption that such betterment is a desirable goal for man, then it will be provided for by the production of what is now surplus value. Under the present conditions of surplus value - accruing to private ownership (ignoring publicly owned ventures) - not all surplus values are additive in terms of social good, some surplus values serve to cancel each other out, as regards contributing to social good. This, of course, is not the conventional wisdom of the utilitarian liberal understanding of welfare economics, where personal benefit is held to aggregate to the public good - as was noted previously, there is no independent concept of a social good distinct from private good in this philosophy, (I will return to this point later). However, with a unitary focus of social good such contradictions are susceptible to empirical investigation and resolution. With necessary labour the evaluation of managerial action in terms of efficient creation of synergy is relatively straight-forward, and this condition would be extensible to the total labour process, were social good the focus, as is not now the case.

An example may serve to illustrate this point. Take, for example, the building of a house, as a case of necessary co-operative action. Taking as given the necessary pre-conditions for building a house - a design, a technical specification and a plot of land, which, though, of course, not immune from management as process, can
for present purposes be ignored - a number of people and skills have to be co-
ordinated for a successful execution of the process, (accepting conventional
division of labour, as would be found on any building site). Thus, for example, it is
of no use trying to build the roof before the walls have been constructed, (ours is a
conventional structure!). Whilst this requires management as process, does it
require management as social group? There is no reason why such a project could
not be self-managed, as, (a) it is self evident that the roof cannot precede the
walls, and (b) even if it is not, it would soon be found experientially that this is
so. It is, though, true to say that finding out experientially the 'correct' sequence
would be relatively inefficient, as regards synergy, though, again, we could assume
that, in an ongoing situation of house-building, the same 'realities' would not have
to be learnt afresh each time, ie., a skilled house-building team would eventually
know how to sequence the necessary activities. This does not, of course, make
any allowance for accommodating variations in the condition of production, but
there is every reason to assume that these could, in one way or another, be
overcome.

However, we can question whether this approach would allow the house to be built
as cheaply as possible. Probably not, unless this was a primary objective of the
building team. After all, under wage labour there is no particularly immediate
impetus to minimise costs. The cost of a process and the wages paid for it are
relatively unrelated, at least in the short term - and labour has very little control
over total cost anyway. This then is the rationale for using formal managers, to
impart or impose the dominant criterion of economy. Management (social group)
enforces, or attempts to enforce, adherence to the principle of economy,
determined by a belief in absolute Reason (Marcuse, 1986). The appropriation of
the hedonistic principle of rational action to an exclusively economic mode, (see,
eg., Schein, 1970), has led to 'rational' becoming nothing more than a synonym for
'economic', making Rational Economic Man a tautology (Richman, 1982:24ff).
Both Marcuse (op. cit.:22) and Polanyi (1971:70), as well as Foucault, (see, especially, 1967), note the association of 'madness' in questioning this relationship. Thus the relatively 'uneconomic' self-managed venture has no claims for recognition in the face of a managed 'economic' venture. However, as I have already argued, 'economic' is not an absolute concept. I have suggested that management's power lies in its ability to specify the meaning in language of work, in this case to specify what 'economic' means - to specify the inputs and outputs, the system, to prioritise form over content, quantity over quality. Whereas our self-managed worker may decide to stop work and shelter when it rains, the economy of the 'managed' system would dictate that he would not. Rather than economic being subordinate to the 'social', the economic has become the social (Polanyi, op. cit.:70ff) - thus, the worker bears the effect of the dysfunction of the weather, not the capitalist. I have used this example as it is very familiar to me and totally typifies the conflict between the desires of labour and the resistance of management on behalf of ownership. The ultimate rationale of management must be getting workers to do what they would not otherwise do.

I should reiterate at this point that my initial proposition was that workers would not voluntarily spend their time creating wealth for capitalists. This is not to argue that workers would necessarily cease work once they had provided for their own reproduction. What I am arguing is that the criteria for assessing efficiency or economy in respect of necessary labour are distinct from those in respect of labour engaged on producing surplus value for private gain. However, the sheer size and complexity of the socio-economic world is such that, in practice, it is not possible to distinguish between the two conditions, i.e., we cannot normally know when a worker is creating necessary value or surplus value, because of the abstracted nature of wage labour. Furthermore, because of cognitive limitations and natural preferences, (see Simon, on bounded rationality), in the context of our complex world, the very definition of necessary and surplus value is impossible,
which, of course, is one of the problems which is dissolved, using the focus of social good. If, then, it is reasonable to represent management as social controllers in the service of private ownership, or, at least, some abstracted notion of private ownership, the theories of management must serve to reinforce this role, which manifestly they do. Techniques which would weaken real management control would be counter-productive. Challenges to this authority do from time to time emerge, but one of capitalism's strengths is its ability to incorporate oppositions, turning them to its advantage and leaving relativities of power unchanged (Storey, 1980; Lyotard, 1974). Thus, for example, was Flexible Working Hours, prima facie a weakening of managerial control, used as a mechanism for labour intensification. It is in this light that managerialist theories of motivation must be understood. The problematic of such theories, or at least their application, has never been to discover an absolute theory of motivation to work, but to furnish a theory consistent with maintenance of the capitalist tradition. They can only be of use to management if they reinforce control over labour. Thus, McGregor (op. cit.) argued for creating a situation where the individual could identify his own interests with those of the organisation, (N.B. - not the other way round). This is also the case with Herzberg's de-emphasising the importance of money to the worker, so that 'psychological benefits' accrue to the worker and material benefit to ownership. The test of success for this approach lies not in the absolute level of worker satisfaction, or in an improvement in motivation to work, but in the maintenance of managerial control. Because management's role is so well 'defined' in terms of control, little attention need be paid to its social consequences. The syntax and semantics of management theory are such that no reference to any overarching or enfolding logic is necessary. Efficient labour becomes an end in itself, divorced from any transcendent notion of social good or even intrinsic purpose - if the task is to whitewash coal, the only point of importance is that it is done efficiently. This ignoring of context allows the meta-language of capitalism to inform the object language of management.
One could suggest that management (control) is the object language of capitalism, thus defining management rationality in the logics of capitalism. This is why we can be efficient in building nuclear bombs, and equally efficient in polluting our environment. As Marcuse noted (1986:9-90), no language should be capable of conjoining such ideas.

**Management, Synergy and Social Good**

I take it as axiomatic that management is socially useful, i.e., contributes to the general social good, leaving aside for the moment any attempt to define social good. It is, however, necessary here to be a little more specific about what is meant by management. First and foremost management is a process, not a social institution. The fact that in contemporary society there is an institutionalised form - people we call, or whom we consider to be, managers - merely signifies a particular socio-historic form of the process, which stands in relation to other possible forms. It is one of the problems for those adopting a critical perspective on management that it is taken, commonly, to be synonymous with the modern institution. Thus what is understood as management theory tends to relate, not to process, but to its contemporary form. It follows from this that particular social forms of management may contribute in a more or less efficient way to the social good, a fortiori if we accept the possibility of more than one understanding of social good.

What I will attempt to argue here is that the very real distinction between management as process and management in its particular contemporary socio-historic form has become blurred, if, in fact, it was ever distinct. This conflation of process and form in favour of the latter has allowed management researchers to construct their theories on the givenness of the capitalist bureaucracy, without reference to the underlying concept of process. This concern reached perhaps its
most acute condition in the work of the contingency theorists, where management is taken, as irreducibly something done by managers (3). Thus Child (1977) opens his book, 'Organization - a guide to problems and practice' with the claim that "the design of its organization is one of management's major priorities" (emphasis added), and treats management as a social group throughout. Even the realist school of management theorists, as represented by Mintzberg in 'The Nature of Managerial Work' (1980), relates such action not to process but to the actions of the social group managers. This confusion, on the one hand, condemns any further theorising built on the existing foundation to being as unsound as the present orthodoxy and, on the other, requires the exposure of the inconsistency and weakness of the conventional wisdom before the process of reconstruction can be undertaken.

I have suggested that management as process contributes, or at least in principle contributes, to social good, thereby justifying the serious attention of the social scientist. What, however, is, or should be, this contribution? In a word - synergy. If management as process can be taken as the organisation of available resources in such a way as would not occur naturally, then management is socially effective if it creates synergy, ie., if the output achieved is greater than the sum of the inputs. Synergy strictly indicates co-ordination, co-operation - working together, and, in fact, is an alternative form of syn-energy. Synergy in its common usage contains the notion of purpose - working together to achieve that which cannot be achieved as individuals. For example, if the purpose is to lift a weight, say, a large stone, when building a wall, that is greater than one person can achieve but can be done by two, then the co-operation of two people allows the achievement of a goal which neither could achieve singly. In performing this co-operative act, the process of management has been practiced. Clearly, purpose need not be of a material kind but may be social: thus, two people working in proximity on their own tasks may achieve some synergy in terms of their social
interaction. Where the organising of resources results in no synergy, or worse, in negative synergy, then the raison d'être of management as a process remains unfulfilled. It follows, however, from this that management may achieve positive synergy in terms of one definition and negative synergy by a different definition, i.e., depending upon what purpose is being served. Returning to our wall builders, if all stones are capable of being lifted by one man, then there may be no wall-building synergy in organising two people to work proximally. However, the two wall-builders may find non-wall building synergy in their working together, say, reduced boredom or feeling of social isolation. Clearly, it is feasible that the two possibilities of synergy may be in some sort of opposition. If our example is contextualised in terms of the contemporary organisation of wage labour, then the social synergy experienced by the workers may reduce the material synergy of their efforts to build the wall, which, for the person paying the wages, may not be acceptable.

It can be seen that synergy is not an absolute concept in the social world, but relates very much to social purpose. In assessing the various claims to produce synergy through management of process, reference must be made to purpose, to what purpose is being served - which is why I suggest that such claims should be evaluated in terms of the general social good, as an alternative to sectarian interest. This then provides a point of departure for distinguishing management in its contemporary form from management as process. The ethos of contemporary management, which I will call managerialism, lacks any transcendent notion of social good and relies, at best, on social good being served vicariously through an aggregation of individual good. The liberal, democratic, pluralist tradition of western capitalism celebrates the realm of the individual over the collective. The Cartesian separation of the individual, as representative of the scientific tradition of the enlightenment, is, of course, deeply entrenched in the positivistic social science tradition underpinning managerialism. The dialectical relationship
between capitalism and scientism has been comprehensively exposed by, eg.,
Marcuse, (1986); MacIntyre, (1981); Capra, (1983); Ellul, (1964); Gouldner, (1976);
etc., to the extent that the social can only be considered as an epiphenomenon of
individual action in pursuit of self interest. I have argued elsewhere, (Carter and
Jackson, 1986), the absence of an adequate concept of the social in
managerialism, so for present purposes I will concentrate on the arguments of
Wolff (1968) in this respect. Wolff notes that the liberal philosophical tradition
insists

"... that there is simply no sense to be found in the
concept of a general good or public interest which
transcends private goods or interests and stands in
contrast to them as an appropriate ideal of social
action." (p.166)

He, on the other hand, sets out to argue that

"... the phrase "general good" has a legitimate, coherent
usage". (p.167)

Wolff seeks then merely to establish that the idea of social good is meaningful,
not to establish what that meaning is. If Wolff is correct and there is such a
transcendent concept, then (a) there is still the need to establish what it means,
and, more relevant for my purpose, (b) there are in principle some grounds for
choosing between the various claims of management to produce synergy.

The relevance of the liberalist separation of the individual and the social is
reinforced by the writers in the New Physics, such as Bohm, (1983) and Capra, (op.
cit.), with their preference for understanding the problem in terms of
fragmentation (individualism) and wholeness (social). We are currently organising
the world's resources - managing - in such a way that an unintended consequence
of our action could be the total destruction of human life. As Capra (op. cit.) puts
it:
"For the first time we have to face the very real threat of extinction of the human race and of all life on this planet." (p.1)

In other words, pursuit of individual interest can lead to the destruction of the social. If acting as an individual in the individual interest can destroy the total social, then equally, not acting in the individual interest can ensure the survival of the social - that is, if the survival of the social is the informing interest of individual action, then presumably individual action inherently serves the social good. I am suggesting here that long run survival of human life is the irreducible foundation of a concept of social good, that if we take the decision that such a goal is desirable then we have in fact accepted the principle of social good. I am here ignoring the possibility of a more or less intentional extinction of life, through, for example, a 'just' war, as a morally preferable condition to some alternative - eg., 'better dead than red' - in favour of such extinction as an unintended consequence of superficially life enhancing action. If the principle of social good is, by this argument, legitimised, its extension to a more qualitative state becomes a matter of political will. However, in this respect the ecosystemic approach of Capra et al provides us with an immediate conceptual framework for evaluating managerial claims. That is, evaluation of managerial claims to promote synergy within an acceptance of serving social good can be facilitated by reference to their ecosystemic implications.

Such an approach does in fact reduce the need for an axiomatic belief in the social efficacy of management as process, which is important when considering management in terms of its socio-historic form, which is, contemporarily, more to do with social control than synergy. However, it may be argued that social synergy is produced by managers acting as agents of social control, ie., in terms of ameliorating the natural recalcitrance of the worker, in order necessarily to maximise their contribution to social good. This I take to be a perfectly fair
argument. However, if the desired role for management is as social policeman, why is this not explicit? Furthermore, if we are to accept this definition of management, it too is subject to scrutiny in terms of how effective it is in serving social good. If, as I have suggested, management as process is concerned with organising resources, there is no implication for how, or by whom, this task should be performed. That the contemporary form of management is performed by a distinct and elite group is merely a reflection of preference by those with power so to choose, it is not an imperative of the concept of management as process.

As I have already argued, this unacknowledged distinction in management theory prevents the meaningful construction of further theory in this tradition. It becomes necessary to regress to the basic principles of management in order to provide a theoretical base to management of process. Managerialist theory has in effect gone astray, and results in de facto attempts to theorise the current form of management as practiced by a social elite. Managerialist theory has become obsessed with form rather than process, or, to use a familiar dichotomy, with form rather than content, (Oakes, in Simmel, 1980, p.3).

**Modernism and Post Modernism - The Implications for Management**

The critique of managerialism which I will undertake will draw heavily on the perspective sometimes referred to as post-modernism, and some further explication of this position, and how it relates to management, is necessary. The modernism/post-modernism debate falls within the generic 'history of ideas', but, as noted, has received its greatest articulation in relation to the arts. Broadly speaking, modernism was the developing culture reflecting a technological society. It was a break with tradition, where tradition was seen as an expression of the necessity of a social existence in a pre-technological age. Thus 'new' building materials such as concrete and iron allowed the development of different
designs of building which reflected the possibilities of these materials, as opposed to the designs informed by the necessary use of wood, stone and brick of the premodern period. For example, the first U.K. mass concrete viaduct (Glenfinnan) used the traditional round arch necessary to the then predominant masonry viaduct, whereas, following the modernist canon, the flat arch, as is nowadays ubiquitous, was more appropriate or pragmatic, (Morgan, 1971). (I am not, of course, suggesting that the technology to build a modernist Glenfinnan viaduct existed at that time.)

In relation to modernism in the literary arts Rorty (1982) suggests that pragmatism is the philosophical counterpart to literary modernism. Modernism here relates to the essentially realist attempt to centre subjective experience as the essence of the novel, as an escape from the cautionary moralising of the Victorian novel. Modernism represented the triumph of 'enlightened' reason (Norris, 1985) over tradition (4). This was most striking in the visual arts, the emergence of the expressionist mode to replace the representative narrative mode of the pre-modern period. Modernism became the art of the possible, exemplified as regards management in the garbage can theory of Cohen et al (1972) - solutions chasing problems. For a cogent illustration of the post-modernist critique of organisational modernism, see Cooper (1986 a) on organisational Kitsch. In other words, it became an obsession with form rather than content. Whereas in the arts this may have had a liberating influence, in the social world it led to a growth in the individualist tradition at the expense of the social. Scientific management was totally appropriate to its time, at the birth of the modernist period. Taylor's interest was purely formalist, with the way work was organised, not with the consequences or content of such organisation. Scientific management may well have created some forms of synergy as suggested earlier, but created possibly negative synergy in others. For example, Taylor's own obsession with fitting the man to the job (form) neglected totally the fate of those who were not fitted.
Certainly Taylor had the pious hope or belief that everyone could eventually be fitted successfully to a job according to his principles. However, in practice this ignored (a) whether his hope could be realised in practice; (b) the organisational problem of actually realising it, even if it was theoretically possible; (c) whether changes in the pattern of labour would allow continuing matching of man to job to be achieved; (d) the social dysfunctions of the change process. Taylor, not taking an ecosystemic view, could ignore such factors in making his claims for synergy, leading to what Rose (1970:31) calls "barbarities" when his ideas were applied in industry.

What mattered in Taylorism was not subjective normative issues of what it was reasonable to ask a person to do at work, or what happened to those who could not be 'first class men' at anything, or what happens to displaced labour generally, or what are the effects of the destruction of social groups, etc., but that an organisation should exhibit the 'correct' form of scientific management. The industrial unrest which followed was not an item of relevance. This concern with form has extended through the human relations school, behavioural motivation theories, worker participation, autonomous work groups, and so on. Thus with McGregor's work, what mattered was the relative strengths or presence of Theories X and Y. With Herzberg, it was the relative presence of hygiene factors and motivators. With worker participation, it was important to have the right committees or to have identified the decisions which could be safely taken by workers. With autonomous work groups, it was important that the production line be abandoned, etc. What was never considered was what sort of organisational life should exist consequent on the theory or otherwise. Thus, with job enrichment, there was never an absolute desire to enrich jobs, i.e., it represented a concern with content merely to achieve a form which conformed to the label of job enrichment. With Theory Y, it was never intended that worker and organisational goals should be truly congruent. Theory Y only required individuals
to identify with the organisation's goals, not the other way round. All autonomous work groups had to achieve was optimal production, the fact that autonomy was, at best, a very limited understanding of the word was irrelevant. Perhaps the most recent manifestation of the formalist approach has been contingency theory, where what is 'important' is that the design (form) of organisation should reflect the 'realities' of the production process. If the product is bombs, butter mountains or declining health care, this does not matter (other than in affecting production), one output is as good as any other. Whereas, at first glance, it may appear that job satisfaction was indeed concerned with content, this view cannot be sustained. As noted, there has never been an absolute concern with providing satisfying jobs. Satisfaction can only be achieved within the given form of a managerialist organisation, eg., as long as de facto power relativities were maintained. The managerialist outlook is thoroughly representative of the modernist perspective, confined by the concern to purge tradition where it is taken to be for tradition's sake. Thus the exhortation to orient management towards the technological future, to abandon the practices of the past as by definition inappropriate to the modern world. It is precisely this modernist outlook which has, according to Bohm (1983),

"...brought about pollution, destruction of the balance of nature, over-population, world-wide economic and political disorder, and the creation of an overall environment that is neither physically nor mentally healthy for most of the people who have to live in it." (p.2)

as a major casualty of modernism is the 'whole' in the social justification for action. Managerial modernism thus provides us with a world of 'rubber ducks, plastic gnomes, and fruit machines'; (Ward, 1986).

The ability to produce some article or condition becomes sufficient reason for its creation, regardless of any intrinsic worth, or its impact on the social or natural
world. Truly, markets are created, demand is engineered for that which can be provided, (Deleuze and Guattari, 1984; Jackson and Carter, 1986). Meaning (form) takes precedence over information (content), (Robbe-Grillet, 1977). This is perhaps most visible in advertising where the image is everything. If there is no 'real' substance to legitimate the image, it is of no consequence (Jamieson, 1985). The pay-off is increased fetishisation. Cars are no longer means of transportation, but male virility symbols. Houses are no longer places to live, but shrines to adorn with the prescribed (by the marketing/taste industry) offerings/oblations. Health care no longer relates to any qualitative notion of health, but, on the one hand, to 'making noses more beautiful' - what the American humourist Tom Lehrer once referred to as 'diseases of the rich' - and, on the other hand, to administrative cost effectiveness - the fetish of the beautiful or the fetish of the cheap, our only options. In a more strictly management context, we have the cult of the executive. This not only applies to the materialism of executive life, but to the deification of the executive, (see Sievers, 1985). The executive (manager) lays claim to an absolute right to manage based on the principle (form) of good management practice, totally divorced from any recognition of the social impact of such managerial action. This situation was well illuminated in the U.K. miners' strike, already referred to, where this very situation was a major issue - the closure of a pit on economic (form) grounds, as opposed to its retention on social (content) grounds, (pace the problem of 'economic'). The chronic levels of unemployment characteristic of capitalist economies provides a more general illustration of the problem with modernist views of the world. The modern period has seen the growth in technology which is capable of ameliorating the material existential conditions of living in the world. The 'synergetic' union of man and technology can provide for man relative freedom from want, toil, illness, ignorance. In reality, and in accordance with the principles of good management practice, increasing numbers are excluded from such benefits by being marginalised as the unemployed. For many of those in work the situation is scarcely better, with the managerial obsession (fetish) of
minimising wage rates. For those in work who enjoy a more substantial share of
the available wealth - increasingly, professional service oriented occupations - the
benefits lie in increased consumption of, to a large extent, totally unnecessary
individually and socially - commodities, commodities produced by resources thus
denied to activities which would truly ameliorate the human condition.

Perhaps not surprisingly, the reaction against modernism, or at least an opposed
way of thinking, from which the post-modernist critique emerged, developed
simultaneously with modernism. Indications can be found, for example, in the
work of Simmel (1858-1918) - eg., Simmel, (1964, 1971) - and Tonnies (1855-1936)
- eg., Tonnies, (1974) - in so far as they exhibited a concern for content over
form. Post-modernism has an essentially humanist concern with enlisting the
benefits of the modern world in the struggle to improve the human condition in
the context of an appropriate post-modern culture, in opposition to the self-
seeking, self-validating, self-centred modernist culture. Post-modernism
attempts to reveal the underlying bias of the epistemology of certainty which
informs, or rather legitimates, the naturalistic (theodic or Darwinian) social order,
and its concomitant inevitability. The determinism of the 'scientific'
understanding of the world is replaced by a more voluntaristic epistemology, at
least as regards the social. This is manifest in either a strict relativism (eg.,
Rorty, 1980), whereby there is no appeal to a transcendental truth and man must
make his own moral conditions, or a weaker version (eg., Habermas, 1978), where
rational thought can lead towards, if not discover, some more or less transcendent
truth, (Wellmer, 1985; Jackson and Carter, 1984). Either way, some agreement is
possible on the general condition to be desired - an emancipated society - even if
the ontological status of those conditions is still in doubt. (I must re-emphasise at
this point that my including Critical Theory in Post-Modernism is slightly unusual,
but not inconsistent, as already argued, if one sees Critical Theory as a critique of
formalist modernism (Wellmer, op.cit.).)
The formalisation of the critique of modernism emerged with the Frankfurt School, where concern for the quality of life (content) claimed precedence over mere concern with the technologically possible. With reference to the Frankfurt School, it must be stressed that post-modernism (of resistance) is not an attempt to regress to a pre-modern or traditional society, but to structure the benefits of the modern in a particular way, i.e., in favour of the social. Thus, for example, Adorno's attraction to atonal music was an embrace of the modern in music, of what he saw as its revolutionary potential (Buck-Morss, 1977). This, however, did not mean that he also embraced the consequences of modernism in social practice. For Adorno, the commodification of bourgeois popular music emphasised the need for a revolutionary music which would escape such appropriation. As Jay (1984:115) notes, art was to be judged as worthy or otherwise in this context. However, one could see both atonal music - or, more generally, modernist, and therefore revolutionary, art - and its predecessor as forms, which violates Adorno's precepts of non-identity. Modernist forms achieve identity as form, if not as content, as precisely as does bourgeois art, as illustrated by the fact that, in the intervening sixty years, they have become equally appropriated by the bourgeoisie. Or, in Adorno's terms, "The qualitatively different and non-identical" has been "forced into the mould of quantitative identity" (Jay, op. cit.:37). This, of course, becomes the fate of all modernism. That change of form per se could not emancipate man - that emancipation is a 'content-concept' - is emphasised by Adorno's concern for non-identity. As he notes in 'After Auschwitz', "Auschwitz confirmed the philosopheme of pure identity as death" (in Adorno, 1973:362). One could argue that Adorno's faith in the revolutionary potential of modernist art forms was ill-founded - for Jay, it was a, perhaps aberrative, elitism (1973:23) - and support Lyotard's view that modernism as a project has failed, or, alternatively, adopt a temporal view and say that, with hindsight, such a view was naive, and thus support Habermas' argument that the modernist project is, as yet, incomplete - bearing in mind Adorno's (1973) caution that
"If negative dialectics calls for the self-reflection of thinking, the tangible implication is that if thinking is to be true - if it is to be true today, in any case - it must also be a thinking against itself." (p.365)

That is, even with critical reason, we can make mistakes which are themselves amenable to critical reason, but which do not negate the project of critical reasoning itself. (I have referred to this debate elsewhere in this thesis.)

My own inclination is to see Adorno's faith in the revolutionary potential of atonal music as typical of modernism and, as such, misplaced, in so far as it consciously excluded any appeal to the 'proletariat', to the extent that their consciousness had become as "stupified as that of the bourgeoisie" (Buck-Morss, 1977:37, and following; see also Adorno, 1978:270-299; Arato, 1978:197ff). This can be contrasted with Benjamin's belief that avant-garde art should be accessible to the masses, (see, eg., Benjamin, 1978:255-269). In other words, the revolutionary content of art is as important as its revolutionary form. For an opposite comment on the development of Surrealism, (contemporary with Adorno), and its subsequent failure "to change the world", see Bunuel (1985:122-3). As regards Adorno, we should perhaps place most emphasis on his overall concern for revolutionary praxis, and concentrate on his marked similarity, in his critique of identity, with the post-structuralist project of Derrida, as noted by Ryan (1982) and Jay (1984).

Post-modernism is thus a normative reaction to a positive practice. Perhaps, rather than speak of modernism and post-modernism, the distinction would be made clearer by referring to positive modernism and normative modernism. Thus for Adorno a change in philosophical consciousness, (eg., from pre-modern to modern), did not in itself bring about an improvement in social conditions - this could only be brought about, or fail to be brought about, by social action. In other words, modernism per se will not inevitably bring with it an improvement in the social condition, (see Buck-Morss, op. cit.:36). Whereas the philosophy of the Frankfurt School was influenced by the rise of fascism, its later developments
have been in the context of the growth of consumer capitalism. Marcuse's (1986) challenge to post-war modernism provided a clear dichotomy between the formalism of the dominant technological rationality and the marginalised logic of the arts as the repository of the concern for the content of social life. This marginalisation as a consequence of the liberal pluralist tradition was facilitated by the bounding of such truth claims (e.g., poetic truth, metaphysical truth), (op. cit:184), as distinct from scientific truth, allowing claims for the possibility of a society free from oppression as a consequence of human action to be dismissed as utopian romanticism, and thereby successfully neutered as a threat to the status quo, (see also Wolff, 1968; Wolff, Moore and Marcuse, 1965).

However, in spite of this, it is from the arts, particularly the literary arts, that much of the recent post-modern critique has come. Management, either as part of social science generally, or as a specific discipline, has remained largely immune to this argumentation. On the one hand, such a perspective presents a serious challenge to capitalism, as management as social action would cease to be driven by an unquestioning allegiance to private profit, and, on the other, it is 'clear' anyway that the literary arts have little or nothing to do with the 'real world' activity of business management. However, the coming together, to some extent, of critical social theory and literary theory, (Norris, 1985), and the similarity of concerns with writers in the New Physics, etc., illustrates a coalescing of ideas which point to the possibility of a new paradigm in management thinking. At the most immediate level, this would signify a shift from a fragmented form-oriented concern characteristic of modernist managerialism, to a concern for content, perhaps best understood in terms of an ecosystemic approach. Whereas, as noted, the social good cannot be served directly in the modernist mode, there is no such problem with a post-modernist theory of management.

A post-modernist approach to management, i.e., management as process, enlists its
aim of organising resources in the service of social emancipation, which, of course, includes those being managed as well as the larger society. Management is no longer understood as a neutral process serving some abstracted concept of efficiency, (MacIntyre, 1981), but as an aid to the achievement of possible, real, ends. The gap between such a condition and that which obtains at present, where management is understood principally as a social group, is such that it cannot be bridged. Rather, the present condition, its contradictions, its biases, must be uncovered to reveal it as essentially a masque (see also White, 1979:89), and from this to reveal its substantive, if undisclosed, purpose. As Marcuse (1986:257) tellingly notes, "the critical theory of society possesses no concepts which could bridge the gap between the present and its future...". However, having argued for a conceptual difference between management as process and management as a social group, one must confront the possibility of this being nothing more than semantic confusion. After all, is it not possible that management as social group are the ones who indulge in management as process? Certainly, it would be taking an extreme position to argue that this in no way the case; however, the important question is not whether or not management (the social group) manage, but to what extent is this their substantive role, compared to any other function or role, and relatedly, how good at managing are they, especially if managing is not their primary function?

MacIntyre (op. cit.), as noted, in relation to management (social group), has argued that their claim to authority rests on two assertions. Firstly, a morally neutral effectiveness, and secondly, the ability to predict outcomes based on a stock of knowledge derived from a set of law-like generalisations. MacIntyre is a little unclear as to whether he seeks to distinguish effectiveness from efficiency and, though such a distinction is in practical terms not significant, it is useful to explore the difference, if only so that the more useful 'efficiency' can be substituted. Strictly speaking, there is nothing in effectiveness that presupposes efficiency, one can be effective in achieving certain goals without being
particularly efficient. If the objective was to arrive in Birmingham from a
starting point in London, then if I travelled via Bristol I could effectively achieve
my goal, but it would probably be more efficient to travel direct. (This, of course,
leaves the question as to what is meant by efficient, but I will ignore this for the
moment.) However, in the context of management (social group), it is not an
abstract concept of effectiveness that underpins management action, but efficient
effectiveness. As it is not part of the assumed practice of management to pursue
either inefficient effectiveness or effective inefficiency, I think it is fair to roll
the two concepts into one, as

"Managers themselves and most writers about
management conceive of themselves as morally neutral
characters whose skills enable them to devise the most
efficient means of achieving whatever end is
proposed." (MacIntyre, 1981:71, emphasis added)

At the risk of having taken a liberty with MacIntyre's argument, I would indeed
agree that the twin claims of efficiency and expertise appear to substantiate
management's role. There is indeed a relatively discrete body of knowledge which
informs specific technical skills for the achievement of specific purposes.
Furthermore, management does, by and large, claim to use its skills in the pursuit
of efficiency (Drucker, 1968, 1977a). However, MacIntyre insists that both these
claims lack any substance when scrutinised. The claim to serve an absolute
morally neutral efficiency has already been questioned, if indirectly. Efficiency,
is essentially the relationship between the inputs to a system and the outputs.
However, what constitutes the system, and thereby what shall count as inputs and
outputs, is by no means given. System definition is a particularly social process
and does not constitute some irreducible absolute. People determine what should
be included, what are inputs and outputs, and such decisions are, by definition,
purposeful. The conceptualisation of a system, therefore, is a reflection of the
purpose being served. As people are not inherently morally neutral, neither are
their purposes, nor their systems. Efficiency is only understood in the light of
specific purposes, of specific moral conditions, and efficiency under a modernist concept of management will not be the same as under a post-modernist concept. It follows from this that, even if management did possess knowledge related to achievement of a specific concept of efficiency, it would not be extensible to a concept of efficiency from a different paradigm, and thus knowledge claims cannot be absolute.

If management knowledge is not transcendent knowledge and if the object of application of their knowledge is itself relative, then whatever management (social group) do, it is not the absolute application of management as process, as the agent of creating synergy. The only way that management could fulfill this role would be if (a) management as the creation of synergy could/must be delegated to a particular social group, and (b) a universal set of conditions, system definition, could be achieved. This latter condition brings us back to the post-modernist project. Accepting that management as currently practiced by the social group managers does not reflect the general social interest, are we left with a strict relativism, as suggested by Rorty, such that the best we could achieve is a set of agreed objectives for society? I think not. Certainly, if the Habermasian goal of an 'ideal speech situation' could be achieved, this would not be the case; however, this, at best, is a long-term proposition, which, if we believe such as Capra and Bohm, we cannot afford to wait for. Fortunately, if we take the minimum criterion of the long-run survival of mankind and adopt an ecosystemic perspective, we have an immediate model for determining a normative condition of management, to be assessed in the light of competing models.

From this position it is possible to be specific about the de facto role of contemporary management practice, and the extent to which it facilitates or acts
as an obstacle to serving the social good. Recognising the impossibility of bridging the gap between what is and what ought to be, it is possible to deconstruct the orthodoxy of current management practice by reference to the values embodied in a post-modernist perspective.
CHAPTER 4

WORKERS

In this chapter I consider workers as the subjects of social domination, and why they appear to collude in their own repression. I suggest that 'work' must be understood as a social experience - as a forum, by and large inescapable, in which the individual interacts with society at large. To a great extent, the constraints of work are a given, and, as such, should not be overemphasised in understanding work as an opportunity for locating the social self. Rarely is work so totalising as to preclude social intercourse, not withstanding attempts to make it thus, and so we should consider work, albeit sub-optimally, as a social experience where people make the best of the impositions on them, but do not allow them totally to define their situation.

Management in its current socio-historic form exhibits many of the characteristics of a religion (Degot, 1986; Durkheim, 1965). Firstly, it relies on the faith in its efficacy of those who believe in it, as empirical evidence of its 'success' cannot be furnished. Secondly, it has a priestly class in whom reposes the special knowledge of the practices of the religion. Thirdly, it has recourse to a dogma to justify its teachings and demands. Fourthly, it has specialists, gurus, who interpret and re-interpret the world conditions in the light of the dogma. Fifthly, it trains its practitioners, at least the more important ones, in special seminaries - business schools, and sixthly, it demands unswerving and unquestioning loyalty from its servants. Furthermore, it requires necessary sacrifices from its followers, including the ultimate sacrifice - redundancy. It
also has artefacts peculiar to its function - executive cars, executive briefcases, etc. - and indulges in frequent ritual - business lunches, etc. This, of course, indicates a very jaundiced view of contemporary management and begs the question of what should be the nature of management. Staying with the religious metaphor for a moment, the good Catholic is required by his Church periodically to examine his conscience and to confess his sins. Confession for the Catholic is the time when he is most exposed in front of God's agent on earth, when he openly admits of his sins, his faults, his imperfections - the obstacles to his achieving the good, the perfect life. One of the functions of confession for the Catholic is for him to gain self-knowledge, to confront honestly (hopefully) his weakness. Contrast this religious life with the scientific life. The positivist does not need to question his own self as it is irrelevant to his life as a creator of knowledge, either because of the strict independence of the world as object of study, or because of the exclusion of any contaminating influence by proper application of the scientific method. Thus the claims of the positivist management theory are not held to be influenced by the researcher's commitment to his 'religion' or desire to serve his 'church'. The self-ness of the researcher is not a matter of any relevance. The phenomenologist, on the other hand, does recognise his imperfections, and accepts their potential for contaminating his science. The task for the phenomenologist is to purge such influences, to avoid imposing his own meanings - it is "the intentional grasping of the experience of the other" (Burrell and Morgan, 1979:245). However, the attempt, particularly of Husserl, to separate knowledge from interest has been rejected by Habermas (1978), who sees them as inescapably interwoven. Habermas accepts this inevitability and concentrates instead on the implication of an interest-laden science for the human condition. He identifies three 'contaminations', 'sins', or, in Habermas' terms, knowledge constitutive interests, in science. There is the technical cognitive interest, whose concern is with control, and which informs much management
theory; the practical cognitive interest, concerned with the essentially passive establishment of meaning, and the emancipatory cognitive interest of a critical science, whose concern is with social change. The technical and practical interests serve, by and large, to protect the status quo. The good society can only be achieved by conscious commitment by science to an emancipatory interest. I have argued that private interest, as presently served by management, is not synonymous with social good. Consequently, a scientific interest which continues to reinforce the present social structure acts as an obstacle to ameliorating the human condition. Only a critical science serving an emancipatory interest can achieve this. Part of this task must be the de-mystification of management, the dissolving of its 'religious' nature, the unfrocking of managers as priests (for a landmark study in this respect, see Anthony, 1978).

The emancipatory interest is therefore the 'sin' or 'contamination' that informs this investigation. It makes no claim to be pure in the positivist sense. It does not seek merely to point the way to greater control, nor to furnish a neutral description of the current state of management. Rather, it seeks to provide a base for changing management. This I take to be necessary, if only because of the material dangers of the way we presently manage the world's resources, as highlighted by, eg., Bohm (1983) and Capra (1983). Such a project obviously implies a critical view of the present situation and the understandings which sustain it. One of the most fundamental phenomena which needs such a reassessment is the condition and role of the wealth creators in society - the workers. I take a simple definition of worker, at least in contemporary bureaucratic organisations, as someone who is responsible to, as opposed to a manager, who is responsible for, as previously noted. (This is explained at length in Jackson and Carter, 1985; see also Maclagan, 1983; Downie, 1971, Ch.3.) The fact that the task of management as I have outlined it is one of controlling labour,
and that presumably management sees labour as needing control, suggests a Cartesian separation of management and worker as I and other, i.e., that management see workers as, of nature, different to themselves. This question of models of man I will return to later. I would substantiate my claim to this implied dualism in two ways. Firstly, at the substantive level, if workers need control to make them work effectively and managers do not, (at least, not the same sort of control), then this implies dissimilarity. Secondly, at the symbolic level, workers require different conditions to managers - dining facilities, toilets, working hours, etc., (see Jackson and Carter, op. cit.). This point is reinforced by the belated interest in 'harmonising non-substantive' conditions for different grades of employees (see Rail, 1986). This separation is neatly summed up in transaction analysis by the concept of being 'O.K.' (Harris, 1973; de Board, 1975). Notwithstanding the doubtful theoretical basis of transaction analysis and its blatant manipulative use, the notion of being O.K. does provide a useful heuristic as a desirable model of an emancipated interpersonal relationship. I would suggest, however, that the absence of such a relationship between managers and workers signifies a belief on the part of managers that workers are not O.K. In a study by Haire, Ghiselli and Porter in 1966 covering 3,600 managers in 14 countries, it was found that whilst support for the principle of participative management was widely expressed, the general belief of managers was that workers were not capable of participating, (see also Fein, 1976). Belief in the inferiority of others is, of course, an important pre-requisite for social domination, and whilst such otherness is readily symbolised by race, ethnicity or sex, it is less obviously so where workers are concerned - otherness may not seem an immediate characteristic of a worker. However, this can be explained by reference to the pluralist tradition. The social status of management locates them as part of the middle class, or bourgeoisie. Notwithstanding the imprecision of such terms, they do serve as a means of providing some distinction from
workers, (see Esland et al (eds.), 1975, especially the paper by Wedderburn and Craig, pp.59-69). The utility in such a distinction is confirmed by the use made of it in Marketing! (see Kotler (1972) on Market Segmentation). As Daniel Bell (1974) notes, 'bourgeois' has indicated, both historically and contemporarily, avarice and monetary acquisitiveness, though he does note that "A bourgeois was a bourgeois by day and a bourgeois by night; it would be hard to say this about some of the managers who are executives by day and swingers at night" (p.164). However, if to be bourgeois is to be selfish, to acquire on the liberal principle of an absolute right to acquire, then, if one is thus entitled to acquire more than one's fair share, presumably it must be permissible for others to have less. Furthermore, if the means of acquiring more rests in the 'gift' of others (workers), then they must be made to give it. If workers are prepared to labour so that a disproportionate part of the wealth they create goes to the benefit of those who control them, then possibly this forms the basis for a perceptual difference between managers and workers - workers are not O.K. (see Knights and Willmott, 1983, on dualism).

If this relationship is not a signifier of being 'not O.K.', then what does it signify? At the very least, it suggests that the rationality of the manager is not the same as that of the managed. I have already suggested that the managerial rationality of efficient wealth creation is not necessarily shared by workers, but this does not explain why they continue to co-operate in their own domination. It is reasonable to assume that if people were poorly treated, they would in time become totally antagonistic to their situation, but this does not appear to be universally the case. It may be, on the one hand, that workers exhibit a limited desire to accumulate wealth, as Weber (1976) suggested, which makes them substantially different in nature to the bourgeoisie, and at the same time, ripe for, and capable of, exploitation by being managed. On the other hand, one could suggest that there is a different, more significant meaning, derived from their efforts and
social situation, which transcends their immediate exploitation. Roethlisberger and Dickson (1939) suggested a distinct difference between logics of efficiency and logics of sentiment, which indicates the need for an understanding of the worker frame of reference, as distinct from one imposed on them by managerial interest.

Much academic concern with workers is related to the possibilities for their manipulation by management. Of less concern is an interest in why workers work. Clearly, in the first instance, for economic reasons, but this does not explain why workers co-operate more than minimally (see, eg., Kotarbinski, 1965, Ch.12). There is the argument that some betterment of their social position can accrue from higher levels of co-operation, but only a relative few can benefit this way. There is the possibility of indirect benefit as a reflection of the prosperity of the capitalist, but this supposes a knowledge of economic theory and a rather large amount of faith! Part of the problem stems from the researcher's arbitrary bounding of his area of interest: work appears to be a fairly discrete area of social life, therefore 'let it be studied as such'. Work thus becomes perceived as qualitatively different from non-work in all significant dimensions - significant, that is, to the researcher (although see Thompson, 1967; Reid, 1976; Clayre, 1974). One of my own concerns is the relative absence of 'worker generated' texts on work. Where such texts are available, they tend to produce a picture of work distinct from that which researchers assume it should be. There are, of course, perfectly good reasons why 'academic texts' are not produced by workers - it is the 'managers' of the knowledge industry to whom that task falls. There have been some notable exceptions where authors have allowed the workers' voice to be heard, (Beynon, 1984; Linhart, 1981; Terkel, 1985), but these tend to be regarded as significant more in sociology than in management studies. Another, 'more respectable', contribution was that of Hughes' *Work and the Self* (1975) whose project was to
"... understand the social and social-psychological arrangements and devices by which men make their work tolerable, or even glorious to themselves and others." (p.212)

However, even in this strand of research, the focus is still on the substantive task of the worker - on the rationale for him being so employed. It is not that there is any shortage of workers' own accounts of their work life, just that these tend to be anecdotal, and, of course, autobiographical, (Stewart, 1982; Fawcett, 1981), which, for some strange reason, is a style more acceptable to management theory when written by managers, rather than by workers (Sloan, 1968).

Accordingly, I would like to widen out the narrow perspective which I have suggested characterises much interest in work, by highlighting some general conditions of the individual's experience of work as part of his experience of the social world generally. The idea that the worker, or any person, takes on some distinct, bounded, work-oriented, mantle when at work, independent of his life generally, is exhibiting an unwarranted reductionism. Man is a social animal, yet at the same time, he is alone. Man's being in the world is not given to him at birth, like the handbook for a new car, nor is it anywhere inscribed on tablets of stone, so that he may, a little later in life, go and read an authoritative statement on what it means to be human. Man discovers himself, to a greater or lesser degree, through living, and living is essentially experiencing the social. Being social, or social being, cannot be avoided, even by the recluse. The isolate, by rejecting the social, becomes a part of it by his very rejection of it - one can be unsocial but not asocial. No one under normal circumstances can remain independent or ignorant of his fellow men.
It is from his experience of the social that man gains knowledge of himself. At a general level, a person knows he is A by knowing he is not B. At a more specific level, he knows he is a craftsman by knowing that he is not a clerk or a ship's captain, etc. Yet again, a person knows his status by reference to those of different status. Thus, living in the social world, of which work is a part, serves to define a person (for a theoretical explanation of the binary nature of self-awareness, see Cooper, 1983b). Traditionally, work has been an extremely important part of this defining process. With the exception of sex, religion, nationality/ethnicity, work is possibly the major medium of self-knowledge. Work is a good indication of social class, economic class, status within society. It separates the brainy from the brawny, provides a measure of historical continuity where roles are strong on tradition, eg., mining. It determines, in some measure, the possibilities for the future, and explains the effects of history. It indicates the individual's worth to society - for the working class, low in peacetime, high in war. The list is endless. Additionally, in the current situation of high unemployment, work provides certain social reinforcements that the unemployed are denied. For man as a social animal, cast as the producer of wealth for society, work occupies a central position in determining knowledge of oneself.

Accordingly, whilst we can posit the major influence on 'man as worker' as economic, ie., coercion through the possibility of restricted access to the materials necessary to support life, this does not explain why workers co-operate with the aims of owners beyond a minimal necessity, nor his failure to realise collectively his enormous power to secure a better deal. To be sure, his co-operation is secured in part by the use of managers, who influence worker behaviour either by the use of more or less material power, or by the use of psychological influence. Managers can enforce a certain level of co-operation, of performance, dependent, to a greater or lesser degree, upon environmental
circumstance. For example, in some jobs he can obtain 'objective' measures of performance through the use of the techniques of scientific management, applying sanctions where targets are not met. The principle that workers should attend between certain hours, a principle generally accepted by unions, allows managers to enforce this regardless of its effect on production. Management has relatively wide-sweeping rights over workers, (see Jackson and Carter, 1985), yet workers consent to, and even assist, the application of this control. One argument is that the worker perceives some material benefit, such as higher bonuses, increased job security, etc., in co-operating, and certainly this must have some influence, especially at higher worker levels in the organisation, (ie., the worker component of management). Socialisation and other normative pressures may also contribute, and, of course, some would make the argument for a genuine coalition of interest between the worker and the capitalist. Deleuze and Guattari (1984) have suggested a latent fascism in people which encourages them to seek their own domination in a confusion of desire with interest, (see also Jackson and Carter, 1986). Yet history constantly demonstrates the expendability of labour - the contemporary condition of high unemployment is merely remaking this point, reasserting something which has been a recurring experience within the working class. It might be argued that those in work perceive unemployment as something that only happens to the other person, or that hard work will prevent or ameliorate it, yet, equally, the worker is unlikely to have any hard evidence that this is the case. Cycles of unemployment were very much the norm prior to the second World War, yet with a prospect for a return to work at some point in the future - a contrast with today's structural unemployment. The relatively long period of full employment after the second World War broke this cycle, and economic and technological changes appear to have effectively ended, for many, the prospect of ever working again. It is worth noting that unemployment started its upward progress in the 1960's, earlier than is popularly supposed, which means
that, since the second World War, unemployment has been, at least, equally as prominent as full employment. In fact, it is only those growing up in the period, say, 1940-1960, who would lack any first-hand knowledge of systematic unemployment. Functional approaches to understanding the worker's commitment to work fall short of providing a convincing argument for worker co-operation, and so, I would suggest, it is to a social understanding of work that we must turn.

Work can be seen as exhibiting three major, distinct, characteristics. Firstly, the social: relationships with others within varying degrees of constraint, eg., good and bad. Secondly, the work itself as activity. Thirdly, the social organisation of work. The first two characteristics represent the positive influences of work on man, and the third the essentially negative influence. I would argue that, as work is a primary social experience, it needs to be understood in this light, and not just in terms of its supposed function.

The social dimension of work provides an opportunity for knowing oneself in the world. It also provides the opportunity for a certain amount of pleasurable social activity, in the broad sense. Social relationships can be divided into three conditions: (a) those relationships one would wish to sustain, and from which one can derive pleasure, eg., friendships, but which may also contain sado-masochistic elements and elements of dependency/domination; (b) relationships which are undifferentiated, ie., interactions at a superficial level, which carry no implications of a deeper relationship but which are nonetheless important as a way of confirming the self - this category probably accounts for most work relationships; (c) those relationships one would choose to avoid. All these types have some implication for, and impact on, the self, but types (a) and (b) - (particularly (a)) - would be important in creating a positive influence to one's work, whereas (c) would tend to produce a negative influence. Thus a person's
general orientation to their work is influenced by the quality of social relations
found there, and is, by and large, independent of the work itself (see eg.,
Thompson, 1983, Ch.6; Burawoy, 1979).

Work (activity) itself is, of course, an important source of influence on
satisfaction/dissatisfaction. On the one hand, if one wishes to be an engine driver,
there are limited possibilities for fulfilling this desire, one is constrained by the
limited possibilities for obtaining such work. Attendance at work does not
therefore necessarily signify any particular commitment to the organisation. On
the other hand, even with less differentiated jobs, say, carpenter, activity does
not signify commitment. The particular organisational role may provide, at best
incidentally, opportunities for achieving some personal satisfaction from the work
itself. The logical consequence of wage labour is total alienation from the
product, and yet the potential for satisfaction does still persist, either as an
opportunity to, say, produce a 'good' piece of work, or as some symbolic
interaction with, say, a consumer. The possibility of such satisfaction can be set
against a tendency to adopt a nihilistic approach to one's work. Notwithstanding
the over-determined nature of the received work infrastructure and the imposed
duty to attend, it is difficult to reduce the belief in the worth of one's effort, to
society, to zero. Production itself can, therefore, provide tangible evidence that
what one does is necessary and worthwhile, even if the social organisation of
production militates against this.

The social organisation of work (production) can be understood at two levels. One,
the macro level, is the meta-systemic principle which informs work organisation -
currently, the capitalist bureaucracy. This presents both the main objective of
organised work, eg., profit, and the appropriate process, eg., production line. It
defines and determines the relationships of production, eg., product, process,
user, etc., and can be seen in the contemporary dominant form as the classic condition for alienation, the potential for which has already been noted. That is, attachment to the product is not necessary for the purposes of capitalism, it represents a strict commodification of the product. The other is the specific, or micro, level, which rather than fostering alienation, is better understood in terms of irritation, and is concerned with the immediate conditions of work organisation. For example, the prescription of a production line as the mode of manufacture does not determine the precise conditions experienced working on the line. This may be in terms of non-human factors, such as temperature, lighting levels, etc., or human factors, such as the people one works with, or being separated from human contact, etc., (Burrell, 1984; Linhart, 1981). It may be to do with colour of walls, (ambient stimuli), meal breaks, canteens, payment systems, etc. Such factors are not necessary epiphenomena of the macro system, but are essentially arbitrarily determined by those with the power so to do, in the light of some particular interest (see Linhart, op.cit.). However, it is worth noting that macro level characteristics do contain some consequences for the micro level, particularly where no rational alternative is thought to exist, i.e., the production line does prevent certain micro level possibilities. Conversely, office layouts are manifestly the selection of one possibility out of many, with consequences for the experienced micro level conditions.

Ignoring the economic impulse, work can be seen as having a dual nature for the worker. It liberates in terms of understanding the self, even though sub-optimally, but in the only real sense available to him, whilst, at the same time, it represses him because of the particular organisational form chosen for him by others in the light of their own sectional interests. Obviously, co-operation can, to some extent, ease the tendency of dysfunction, from the social organisation of work, to increase, allowing the individual to experience as much social meaning as
possible. To deny these opportunities is to reduce the possibility of a developing self-knowledge. Clearly, however, it is possible that the same effect can be achieved by non-cooperation, e.g., strikes, (see Linhart, ibid), when meaning can be found in not acceding to managerial demands, and the solidarity experienced in the act of opposing provides the key to selfhood, (Dubois, 1979). Very often such non-cooperation is a direct response to rising dysfunctions of the particular social organisation of work, or at least a refusal of the demands for change.

Work then constitutes a necessary experience for workers. However, it is inadequate to explain this experience solely, or even principally, in terms of such characteristics as economic necessity, creative effort, or even domination. In so far as the constraints of work constitute a given for the worker, we should not assume that they are totalising, or even important, characteristics for workers. Work is primarily a social experience and the demands of work, in so far as they cannot be avoided, are to be minimised as much as possible in the day to day business of living. The impositions of work are undoubtedly something which have to be endured by the worker, but not allowed to be overwhelming. Certainly, conditions can, and ought to, be improved, but, in the meantime, workers will continue, as they have always done, to create their own definition of the situation and to 'use' the work experience as both a signifier and a constituent of their social being.

The whole 'problem' of work, in both a normative and a positive sense, cannot, I think, be better expressed than by referring to Freud's own words on the matter (1963:17n.1). For Freud, work (professional activity) is important both in terms of social identity and, as unalienated work, as a potential source of satisfaction through libidinal displacement. Yet work is not sought after by men - in fact it is
"No other technique for the conduct of life attaches the individual so firmly to reality as laying emphasis on work; for his work at least gives him a secure place in a portion of reality, in the human community. The possibility it offers of displacing a large amount of libidinal components, whether narcissistic, aggressive or even erotic, on to professional work and on to the human relations connected with it lends it a value by no means second to what it enjoys as something indispensable to the preservation and justification of existence in society. Professional activity is a source of special satisfaction if it is a freely chosen one — if, that is to say, by means sublimation, it makes possible the use of existing inclinations, of persisting or constitutionally reinforced instinctual impulses. And yet, as a path to happiness, work is not highly prized by men. They do not strive after it as they do after other possibilities of satisfaction. The great majority of people only work under the stress of necessity, and this natural human aversion to work raises most difficult social problems."
CHAPTER 5

LITERATURE

Orthodox management 'science' presents an arid and sterile picture of humanness at work, characterised by a devotion to an administrative rationality, and a covert normative approach to what is relevant to management science, and what is not. Accordingly, if the value of a text, for the student of organisational life, lies in its illuminatory potential, I suggest that Art provides better models of human experience than does 'science'. By particular reference to modern literary theory, I suggest that the novel provides two insights not found in the management text. One is in terms of form - a way of writing which destroys the illusion of certainty and continuity which is characteristic of the academic text, as a function of the authority of the author. The second is in terms of content, where 'realistic' images of people and organisational life are portrayed - a notable absence in the academic text.

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I have argued that management and organisation theory are dominated by an orthodoxy which reflects the interests of ownership and management. Such theory is not scientifically neutral, if such a condition were possible, and consequently any additions to this genre of 'scientific knowledge' will tend to reinforce this bias. No amount of new theorising will change the basic sectarianism. No amount of 'regulation' (Burrell and Morgan, 1979) will bring about a change in the fundamental conditions of social domination, endorsed and reinforced by management theory. It is precisely this problem at the general social level which gave rise to the concept of negation in critical theory. As already noted, Marcuse (1986) points out that
"The critical theory of society possesses no concepts which could bridge the gap between the present and its future; holding no promise and showing no success, it remains negative." (p.257)

Since these words were first written, in 1964, there has emerged an embryonic critical theory of management and organisation (eg. Alvesson, 1982; Reed, 1985; Willmott and Knights, 1982), but it is still dwarfed by the prevailing orthodoxy. Such literature, however, tends to base its critique in the socio-political tradition, particularly neo-marxist, (though see Berry, 1986), and, because of the need to find legitimacy as research, tends to adopt the authoritative form of academic writing and, inevitably, says little about the cognitive experience of work. It is undoubtedly true that most writers on work are not of the working class, and even those with working class origins tend to have been educated to the level of writer, an essentially middle class occupation. If one considers academic texts then this is the case a fortiori (Chancellor, 1970; Hoggart, 1958) (1). Where then is the alternative to the academic orthodoxy?

Marcuse (1986) provides an answer to the problem in what he calls the Great Refusal - Art (p.63). Under the suffocating logic of absolute Reason, manifest in, and relevant to the argument here, of 'Total Administration', Art provides the 'rational transgression' of the 'Happy Consciousness' - "the belief that the real is rational and that the system delivers the goods" (p.84) -

"...art contains the rationality of negation" (p.63).

To be sure, art is not unproblematic itself in the question of social domination, both in its elitist, high culture, 'affirmative' mode and its lower 'mass' mode. With the former, the very exclusivity of its (possible) revolutionary and/or utopian pretensions makes it the tool of the rich, as both an investment - a way of
attracting more wealth and, consequently, influence - and in terms of the ability to regulate any revolutionary potential by controlling access and use. As regards the latter, art becomes a factor in the selling of goods and privileging of certain social values. Certainly critical theory has a complicated attitude to art, both in terms of its influence on, and participation in, the more general culture. Thus Adorno, using Simmel's immanent and transcendent critiques, sees emancipatory potential only in non-fetishised works of art (Arato, 1978). The then avant garde art became the cultural measure of art generally and the reflexive ideological critique of critical theory located it politically as critical art. Art must, according to Habermas,

"... incorporate the cracks and crevices of a world torn mercilessly apart into its representations." (Arato, op. cit.:204)

In other words, the bucolic phantasy of the, say, romantic period was unacceptable. Art must not only show the world 'warts and all', but this new 'realism' must not reduce the world to mere representation - the medium must also contain the message. It should be borne in mind that this approach was initially of the 1930's, and reflected the optimistic expectations of modernism in the face of rising fascism in Europe, with its repressive appeal to classical themes in art.

It is clear that art is an inescapably imprecise concept. The 'fetishised' art of Adorno stresses the commodification of art as objects (Wollheim, 1980), reducing the artistic concept in its realisation to merely another input of the 'restricted' economy of Bataille (Richman, 1982). A different attack has been mounted on authoritative art (Marcuse, 1986; Jauss, 1982), where certain arbiters of fashion determine what is good art, and more provocatively, what art 'means' (though see de Man, 1982:xx, 1983:147 on fashion). Thus the 'end of art' approach tends to see
art as artifacts, and not as process, and it is the artifacts that make art reactionary. However, equally art is seen as a political force, as witnessed by the extensive interest shown by the Marxist perspective and the harnessing of art in, say, Soviet Realism, (see Swingewood, 1975). It is, to some extent, this latter approach which signals the relevance of ('generic') art to the study of management and organisation, and it certainly informs Marcuse's concept of the Great Refusal. If management theory is ideological then, in the absence of a 'neutral' ideology, it must serve some more or less political ends. Equally then, wherever its negation is to be found, this will also be ideological, and thus, by implication, political. However, it is fair to say that this has not been the thrust, at least overtly, in the emergence of art as a critical force in the work of some theorists, and I will, for the moment, pursue this scholarly (though still inescapably ideological) approach, rather than the political.

The literature on management and organisation is singularly lacking in any reference to the arts (Waldo, 1968), and so one may assume that there is little perceived utility in them. Classically, they are dealt with in terms of representing a debased logic (Marcuse, op. cit.), and, as such, not part of the real world, other than as a focus, in object form, for corporate and individual investment. However, it is clear that art occupies a central role in the general history of ideas (Jauss, op. cit., Ch.2). It illustrates a possible way of looking at, and making sense of, the world, relative to an historical period. This is true both in terms of form and content; for example, the Impressionists were arguing a prioritising of perception over, say, the formalism of the romantic period, in the way that pop art eschewed the elitist thematics of more traditional art. Management and organisation studies has always been prepared to borrow ideas from other areas of intellectual thought - physics, biology and law being particular examples - therefore, why not art? Surely what is significant is the intrinsic value
of an idea, not its area of application? There have, of course, been examples of management borrowing from the arts, particularly in the Quaker/paternalistic tradition (see Bergin, 1987), though such approaches, notwithstanding their influence both socially and academically, have tended to be seen as marginal to the main business tradition. Thus the relevance of the emergent ideas in literature relates not to literature qua literature, but to their applicability or capacity to illuminate, in this case, the world of organised labour.

One objection to conjoining art and studies of real life is that they have different objects or intentions. This prioritising of the artist, for this is what it amounts to, is difficult to sustain, other than with an extremely naive empirical and realist epistemology. How are we to know what the artist intended? Presumably the artist, like any other mortal, can lie (Leach, 1972). Belief in the unambiguous signifier restricts all art to a conscious process and effectively denies the influence of the unconscious. Art becomes atemporal, carrying a fixed message, equally accessible to all historical periods, interpretation is unnecessary. It is because such certainty is impossible that the signifier is an unreliable guide to the signified. Lacan stressed the primacy of the signifier precisely because of its ambiguity in terms of what is signified (see later). For example, what about the use of tropes? This intentionally ruptures any simple relationship between signifier and signified. The use of allegory insists that the de facto subject is not revealed directly, but must be inferred, i.e., interpreted. The problem of signification applies equally, of course, to the 'non-artistic' communication. A good example of this is furnished by news reporting. The intended signification of a particular news item is heavily influenced by the political colour of, say, the newspaper in which it is reported. Of course, some would argue that 'scientific' communication is distinct from other forms precisely because of its unambiguous and neutral presentation. However, this particular paradigmatic view has been
largely discredited, though, of course, not necessarily to the discomfort of those who cling to such a faith in 'science' (Morgan, 1983a).

If then we cannot rely on the intentions of the 'author', can we rely on the medium? For present purposes, it can be said that Art as the Great Refusal provides, in principle, for the articulation of an understanding contrary to that promulgated by the dominant ideology. As Rosenweig says—

"...art, then, is the language of what is otherwise still unpronounceable..." (cited in Buck-Morss, 1977:194 n.37).

All forms of art possess a 'language', but I wish to concentrate on the more narrow understanding of language, as the medium of the literary arts. As the major medium of communicating (formally) the theory of organisation and management is the text (in the ordinary sense of the word), the literary arts provide the closest parallel, and it is, of course, this medium which has been the source of the emergent critique of both realism and ego-centrism, represented by post-structuralism and post-modernism. Both the academic text and the novel, or, as Culler (1985) describes them, critical text and creative text, use a common system of signification - words, which are joined together in chain-like formations and which convey certain messages. Thus, at a simple level, there can be nothing in the medium which distinguishes art from science. However, some may point to more subtle differences, eg., vocabulary. Both critical and creative texts share a, largely, common vocabulary - and, the, large, fast, satisfied, cold, etc., - but it is arguable that there are specialised words which science would use and art would not, and vice versa. Identifying just what this specialised vocabulary would be, though, presents a problem. If one consults the novel, 'The Name of the Rose' by Umberto Eco (1984a), one will find much the same paradigmatic vocabulary of semiotics as will be found in his scientific texts (eg., Eco, 1984b). Pirsig's 'Zen
and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance' (1976) contains much of the language of Greek and Eastern philosophy, though, of course, there is the problem of how we are to classify this work - novel?, autobiography?, autobiographical novel?, philosophical text? Equally, if we look at the 'scientific' text, in Maslow's 'Motivation and Personality' (1954, eg., Ch.12), when he writes about love and sex, though in a most serious vein, the words he uses could be found in any romantic novel. In a different tradition, one can find a similar use of words in the work of Erich Fromm in, for example, 'To Have or to Be?' (1979).

If then, the words themselves are not sufficient to distinguish the critical from the creative, perhaps it is the way in which words are used that is significant. Though there are, of course, stylistic differences between the academic text and the novel, there are equally differences within each genre. How then do we distinguish between styles? There is, of course, a research tradition which does concern itself with stylistics - 'poetics' - but this is essentially concerned with the taxonomy of form and says nothing of content (de Man, 1982). As it is the content of the message which is significant, though, of course, style can influence the perceived message, stylistic analysis provides little justification for separating art and science. There is, of course, the possibility of the 'truth' content of the text differentiating the scientific from the artistic, at least in terms of the author's intention. I have already suggested that one cannot necessarily infer the intentions of the author, but possibly one could view the question of truth in terms of a correspondence with the 'real world'. This presents problems in so far as a novel can easily represent a 'truth' in the 'real world'. However, ignoring this for the moment, let us consider the Bible. Let us say, simplistically, that, pre-Enlightenment, the Bible purported to explain the truth about the world, eg., its Creation, and in this dimension possessed precisely the same authority as today's scientific text. Since the Enlightenment this authority has been eroded by
science, to the extent that, for many people, the Bible, in some respects, is a fiction. However, others retain a belief in its truth content, as witnessed by the current debate in the Church of England (Schwarz, 1986). This, of course, is merely to re-state the paradigmatic view of science (Kuhn, 1970), where 'truth' is, at best, peculiar to its time. Scientific truth of today may become the untruth of tomorrow. Does this mean that the split between science and art is temporally mediated - in which case, in what time period are we? Or does it mean that a scientific text can, over time, achieve the status of the novel, and presumably vice versa? If, then, the medium cannot distinguish the transcendentally scientific from the transcendentally artistic, we appear to be left with only relativistic and personal distinctions. In the way that difference can be claimed for them, so can similarity. If we cannot judge on 'form', then the test must be 'content', - on what the text contributes to explanation and understanding, - on the praxis of the text.

The deconstructionist approach concerns itself with an explanation of the 'textual topic' underlying the text. According to Culler (1985),

"...deconstructive criticism is not the application of philosophical lessons to literary studies but an exploration of textual logic in texts called literary." (p.227)

However, literary is not be understood as non-academic writing, for as Culler (p.8) notes, the 'text' is "whatever is articulated by language." Neither is it an exclusively artistic or philosophical pre-occupation, as Saussure, Marx, Freud, Goffman and Lacan are as involved as Hegel, Nietzsche and Gadamer (Culler, ibid). As literature in its widest sense,

"...analyzes the relations between men and women, or the most puzzling manifestations of the human psyche,
or the effects of material conditions on individual experience, the theories that most powerfully and insightfully explore such matters will be of interest to literary critics and theorists." (pp.10-11)

In other words, not only do creative and critical literature use the same undifferentiated language, they write about the same human social conditions.

The literary arts, or more particularly, the novel, provide two important insights not furnished by the contemporary academic management text. One concerns form, and its influence on the evocation of organisational life, and the other is concerned with content, illuminating the experiential dimension.

Form

The academic literature on management and organisation represents itself as based upon formal logic. Organisations are held to be rational in terms of structure, as is the behaviour of the participants in the organisation, at least at the collective level. This is a central assumption in neo-classical economics, in terms of the theory of the firm (Savage and Small, 1975), based on the model of Rational Economic Man so essential to capitalist dogma. The emergence of more behaviourally-oriented understandings of human action, eg., social man, complex man, (Schein, 1970), has merely displaced the naive understanding of 'economic', the belief in rational action remaining intact. This is an objective rationality rooted in an absolute Reason (Pirsig, 1976; Marcuse, 1986) and traceable to the Enlightenment. The emergence of Newtonian mechanics and Cartesian philosophy represented an escape from the domination of the theology of the Dark Ages (Geoghegan, 1981). God and Nature, as the rulers of the world, were replaced by man. Nature was there to be bent to man's will and controlled, science triumphed over myth and superstition. Explanations of the world could be proved right or
wrong. The universe was a great machine of immutable regularity, there to be discovered, though, of course, the Great Creator was needed to design and start the machine in the first instance. However, as He had 'built in' the regularities, the act of discovery could be man's task and need not be attributable to God. As the universe was God's creation, running to immutable cosmic laws, and as man was part of this machine, then he too was so governed (Capra, 1983). His behaviour inescapably corresponded to this all-transcending Reason, embodied in the formal (or mathematical) logic of Physics, i.e., was determined, albeit at one remove, by the will of God as expressed in his physical laws (Alexander, 1972, Ch.2). The emergence of Relativity and Quantum Mechanics, however, demonstrated that the determinism of Newtonian mechanics was somewhat illusory and had integrity only in particular and partial circumstances. Similarly Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle called into question Cartesian dualism - man was no longer a spectator of God's world but 'made' the world himself (Bohm, 1983; Capra, 1983; Jones, 1983; Leach, 1972; Zukav, 1984). Such theory has made remarkably little impression on physics (Jones, op. cit.), let alone the social sciences. (Searle, in the 1984 Reith Lectures examines at length the conflict between determinism and free will in terms of the micro (physical) level implications for the macro (psychological level.) It is not surprising, given the aversion to relativism, that the dominant models of social organisation are based upon formal (mathematical) logic. However, certainty provided by clinging to a deterministic world is little more than an illusion. As Alexander (op. cit.) notes:

"...mathematics is a closed system. In other words it is we who define the starting points and make up the rules of the game." (p.50)

This point is extended in Marcuse (1986, particularly Ch.7), where in the formal logic of Reason, the outcome is given a priori, all other possibilities being declared invalid, often being relegated to other dimensions of meaning (p.184). Marcuse notes that the neo-positivist critique
"...is motivated by a notion of exactness which is either
that of formal logic or empirical description." (p.184)

Man, as part of the world, in thus 'correct' - what fits the pre-determined answer
is right, and what does not is wrong, and obviously the 'machine' must be purged of
the wrong. Unfortunately, the exactness of the social is not that of the machine.
The machine is physical and its exactness is of the physical - replicable. The
social, on the other hand, can hardly be claimed as physical, that is to say, the
best that can be claimed is that it is analogous to the physical, or, failing that, it
must be dismissed as metaphysical. One, of course, cannot refute such a position,
representative of, say, logical positivism, all one can do is claim a paradigmatic
objection, as previously explored. Certainly, modern linguistic theory sees the
social as a function of language (eg., Lacan, 1968; Habermas, 1978), and it is
certainly defined by language, which, even when applied to the physical, lacks
exactness. Some would, of course, argue that this applies only to 'word' languages
and that mathematical language, the language of physics, does not exhibit such
inexactness. However, Alexander's comment on the human impact on
mathematics has already been noted. Jones (1983) in this respect goes further, in
his book 'Physics as Metaphor', deconstructing physical concepts such as time,
space, etc., as metaphoric, and thus ordinary language, concepts.

Language can never be exact, as the post-Wittgenstein developments in philosophy
of language indicate (Winch, 1958). The power of language lies not in its
exactness and replicability, but precisely in its inexactness, its ambiguity, in fact,
precisely in its lack of precision. It is not the formal logic of language that is
significant, but the rhetorical logic, and it is this recognition of the power of
rhetoric which informs so much of post-structuralist and post-modernist thought.
It is this quality which makes language such an instrument of power. Because of
the immediacy of the literary arts, I have chosen to ignore the visual arts.
Certainly the visual arts provide some potent imagery of exploitation and
domination. The German expressionist art of Grosz is surely a classic fulfillment
of the demands of critical theory for a revolutionary art. It is interesting,
therefore, that Foucault, with his insistence on language as the 'carrier' of
discourse (1972), should, in his earlier work, make such direct reference to the
visual arts. In relation to his analysis of 'Las Maninas' by Velasquez in 'The Order
of Things' (1970), Foucault states:

"It is not that words are imperfect, or that, when
confronted by the visible, they prove insuperably
inadequate. Neither can be reduced to the other's
terms: it is in vain that we say what we see; what we
see never resides in what we say. And it is in vain that
we attempt to show, by the use of images, metaphors or
similes, what we are saying; the space where they
achieve their splendour is not that deployed by our eyes
but that defined by the sequential elements of syntax."
(p.9)

(See also 'This is not a Pipe', Foucault's (1983) essay on Magritte's painting 'Ceci n'
est pas une pipe'.) As language is constantly representing that which is not there,
(Derrida, 1982), it merely presents the illusion of presence, yet in the
authoritative text absence is never even recognised and certainly is not used to
illustrate this as an inherent weakness of the text. The power in scientific
language is greatest when masquerading as exact, and formally logical, a role it is
possible to play because of the absence of that which is written about. As
Foucault is pointing out, language is not 'real' and risks unmasking when presented
with the 'real' of which it speaks. This is why management texts can maintain a
fiction about the nature of organisational life - they rarely have to confront that
reality. It is modern analysis of language which has highlighted the programmatic
nature of language. Kristeva's (1980) idea of the 'bounded text' reveals the same
predication of the answer a priori in the text that Marcuse noted in the formal
logic of absolute Reason. Whilst the 'bounded' or 'closed text' derives from analysis of the novel, it applies a fortiori to the academic text. Thus, for example, by almost universal consent in the orthodox management text, efficiency is good, as, for example, is hierarchy. Writers on efficiency do not have to demonstrate its merit - it pre-exists the text: efficiency cannot be bad! The flaw in this is pointed out by MacIntyre (1981), who sees such concepts as inescapably ideological, serving certain interests rather than universal good. Equally the assumption of exactness as another a priori precludes the acknowledgement of inexactness as an acceptable proposition. It violates, for example, Habermas' (1978) empirical-analytic knowledge constitutive interest, the aim of which is technical control over objectified processes, sustainable only through the dominance of technical rationality. Inexactness would, by definition, be 'wrong'. It is interesting to note that, from the assumption of formal (mathematical) logic that exactness is 'right', it follows that there is only one condition of 'right', but many conditions of 'wrong' - as with the computer, an input is only understood as correct or incorrect and, though there can be degrees of incorrectness, there is only one of correctness - it is exact. Right is thus a digital concept, whereas wrong retains its analogue nature (see Jamieson, 1985; Wilden, 1980). 'Right' therefore possesses tremendous power because of its exactness, whereas 'wrong' has no power at all because it is inexact. Exactness implies no discretion, and therefore determinism. Inexactness, on the other hand, suggests discretion, and therefore voluntarism. The retention of the assumption of formal logic maintains the certainty of the 'one best way', relegating contrary views to the irrational, and therefore 'wrong'.

The illusion of a certain, and thereby understandable, predictable and controllable world, fostered by the orthodoxy through its insistence on the 'closed text', whilst necessary in sustaining social domination, barely withstands a close examination.
I have already alluded to the arbitrariness of form, the basis of certainty, as a consequence of human action - the process of man's constituting of the world - which is an inescapable cognitive necessity whilst it is also inescapably partial. Freud (1978), in 'The Future of an Illusion', wrote:-

"But the less a man knows about the past and the present the more insecure must prove to be his judgment of the future." (p.1)

The illusion that Freud was concerned with here was religion, but science manifestly functions for its adherents much as religion does for 'the faithful' in explaining the world. The more certain the knowledge of the past and present, the more certain the future, and the greater man's control of the world. Separating past and present is, to some extent, artificial. Scientific claims must inevitably be based on history. Even the most contemporary empirical research will, by the time it is published, be based upon what has passed. Bachelard (Tribe, 1978:7) argued that science reconstructs its history as one continuous progress, marginalising its failures so as not to rupture the illusion of its continuity. This is particularly the case with the history of management. Scientific management gave way to Human Relations, which gave way to Behaviourism, and then Socio-Technical systems, all building on what went before by correcting the 'méconnaissance' of the earlier period. (Some may object to the chronology, terminology and neatness of succession of my illustration, though for a fairly typical treatment see Luthans (1977). I, of course, commit the same 'sin', for example, with my account of the development of motivation theory. To some extent, this is difficult to avoid if one is to defer to the conventions of academic writing.) However, the 'reconstructed logic' of the authoritative history reflects a massive attenuation of variety, (Jackson and Carter, 1984), continuity being given presence by the suppression of the discontinuous background. (For an extensive theoretical development of the underlying basis for these arguments, see Cooper,
especially 1986 b, c, d.) Canguilhem (Tribe, op. cit.) suggests that historians create the origins of concepts through language, simultaneously 'creating' the substantive - the possibility of presence. Derrida (1982), of course, has demonstrated, with his concept of 'differance', that this is illusory as language prima facie defies presence. The suppression of discontinuity is, of course, arbitrary. Bataille (1969) points to the inescapable discontinuity, man's death, yet, as Sievers (1985; 1986) points out, organisation theory fails to recognise even this simple fact. Interestingly, Sievers argues that in contemporary organisations management are deified, the ultimate continuity, whilst workers are reified - the prioritising of form bounding the ultimate discontinuity, that is, the discontinuity of labour from humanity. Labour thus appears as continuous with management and capital. For Foucault (1971) the scientific text, or, more correctly, scientific writing, acts to suppress the boundaries of discontinuity:

"It is as though these taboos, these barriers, thresholds and limits were deliberately disposed in order, at least partly, to master and control the great proliferation of discourse, in such a way as to relieve its richness of its most dangerous elements; to organise its disorder so as to skate round its most uncontrollable aspects." (p.21)

The impossible project of what Foucault (1972:9-10) calls 'total history' is to establish homogenous relations between the various phenomena within a network of causality which links them to a common core. As Cousins and Hussain (1984) comment,

"What such a history privileges above all is continuity. Any apparent discontinuities in an historical analysis appears as failure - a failure to put phenomena into a relation with other phenomena." (p.81)

In opposition to 'total' history Foucault posits his 'general' history, essentially a particular 'reading' of history, a 'deconstruction' of history, as part of a 'discursive formation'. However, paradoxically, this is not (necessarily) to be understood in terms of the Deconstructionist project. Cousins and Hussain (op. cit.) suggest that
"The identification of a discursive formation is an irreducibly theoretical decision, it is not an archival discovery." (p.91)

Accordingly in general history:

"What shall count as the series of relevant events will depend upon a theoretical decision of the historian, which in turn is governed by the type of problem which is being posed." (p.83)

Clearly then, management theory appears as general history, in so far as it has a clearly delimited area of concern and specific problematic. However, it is not consciously general history, it masquerades as a part of the total history. It leaves 'connecting points' at its boundaries which, if an interested person so chose, could be integrated into the encircling totality. Because of this pretence it can, of course, never be conscious of its partiality, the discontinuous is repressed - deferred indefinitely.

Robbe-Grillet (1977) makes a useful distinction between information and meaning. He illustrates the point that total information contains no meaning and total meaning contains no information with the following example. If it is August in Chicago and someone says 'It is not freezing outside', then this contains no information, as one would not expect it to freeze in August in Chicago. However, its meaning is complete. On the other hand, if the statement was 'It's freezing outside; the lake is frozen', then we would have an enormous piece of information but would find difficulty in locating the meaning of this statement. Cooper (1986b) uses this insight to explain how the need for meaning represents an attempt to bound the variety (information) in the world, creating in effect closed systems. Information at its most basic level represents the unknown, the uncertain, the unpredictable - existential angst. This anomic condition is
countered by the pursuit of meaning, of certainty and predictability. Yet this is the very condition that cannot be achieved. Some will protest, no doubt, that at least part of management theory does deal with uncertainty, even as regards human behaviour, eg., investment decisions. This raises many questions regarding the assumptions of mathematical modelling of human behaviour which it is not here appropriate to address. However, as Morgan (1983a) perceptively comments, a positive correlation of .45 still leaves .55 unaccounted for. In other words, the presence of regularities does not explain the irregularities, which are, in effect, un-privileged. Concentrating on what appears certain is a choice we make, it does not make uncertainties go away, nor relegate them to the relatively unimportant.

If the inherent discontinuity and disorder in organisational life, as in social life generally, has been ignored by the academic text, this is not the case with the novel and there is a useful model therein for understanding the management of organisations. It is an a priori of the management text, in its support of the dominant ideology, that it precludes the need for interpretation - the 'correct' interpretation is given, we know that we shall not read anything which constitutes a plea for the negation of our current concept of order. Management is presented as an ordered process, very much like a network chart, where all relationships are known. Thus production is about inputs, followed by process, followed by outputs. We assume knowledge of significant events and that the relationship of the events, chronologically, matches our knowledge of them. This is patently untrue, as we are, for example, usually aware of the material output before we are aware of the costs of the output. Whereas this may be corrected at some future point as knowledge of the unknown history becomes available, at the moment of managing it is unknowable. Management theory thus assumes a chronology of managing which is totally false. This, of course, is why, for example, historical costing fell into disrepute, though, of course, standard costing,
in so far as 'actual' costs, or accuracy of the standard cost, are only known after production, fails to escape the illusoriness of presence. In life generally we do not possess the exactness of knowledge which management assume for themselves, and as management constitutes part of the general social existence, it too must share the basic uncertainties. The assumption of the availability of knowledge accords very much with the traditional closed text novel, i.e., in which the correct information is supplied at the right time to ensure that we know what is 'going on' (Kristeva, 1980; MacCabe, 1978). This certainty came into question in the Modernist period, particularly with the advent of the Surrealists, who deliberately introduced, not just ambiguity and irregularity, but a definite opacity which can be seen as an early recognition of the autonomy of the signifier. In the literary mode this was expressed by Bataille at various levels, with his attack on signification, echoed in Adorno's concept of non-participation or non-identity (Bataille, 1985; Buck-Morss, 1977; Jackson and Carter, 1986; Richman, 1982), and his celebration of the non-rational (Bataille, 1969, 1982). However, it is with the emergence of the nouveau roman that the rupturing of continuity achieves its most direct expression (Goldman, 1975; Heath, 1972). As an example, in Alain Robbe-Grillet's 'The Erasers' (1966) we are presented with a 'murder' mystery whose events cover a modest twenty-four hours. As the plot unfolds we are consciously presented with only a partial revelation of what has happened. In fact, it is unclear whether events have happened or are yet to happen, or even whether they are actual events at all or merely conjecture. Things which we are yet to read have already happened, yet when they occur (our reading) we will not know. The story is very much like a network diagram with all the connections removed. Occasionally, we are given a 'Node' which allows some orientation, but the events are ultimately discrete and so may have occurred or be yet to occur. The parallels with the above remarks on production are evident. Production can only be explained in retrospect, as history, but it is explained as if it were
current. More than this, forward assumptions are made on conditions assumed after the event! When we locate the management act as a social event we find ourselves in precisely the same condition as with Robbe-Grillet's novel. The manager at his desk occupies the same role as the reader in 'The Erasers', which is that of the manager of the murder investigation (Wollas). Some things relating to that which he manages he is aware of, through his own experience, but many he is not. Some he will become aware of in the future, but that will be too late to inform his synchronous activity. Many he will never know, but he will act as if he did - a basic assumption of management theory. This is nicely illustrated empirically by Linestead (1983) who relates the story of Louisa

"...bawling out in the loudest and most unpleasant manner a worker who she thought was leaving early ... The worker turned out to have a legitimate reason for doing what he was doing." (p.185)

At the time of the management act Louisa assumed she knew what she was doing - programmed text - (unless, of course, we assume she knew she was not managing!) - only to find that she did not - her knowledge, on which her synchronous action was based, was chronologically incorrect. There is the question of whether, as a 'good manager', she should have known 'the facts' before acting, but here we reach the limiting case of information capacity - the worker's action contained meaning but not information, further information would have constituted uncertainty. Furthermore, if managers only acted when they had full information, it would violate the managerial principle of being pro-active. Action would always be too late - always reactive. Not knowing does not prevent management action, yet we manage as if we know, either actually or in terms of probability. Both the disjunctions, of time and of knowledge, portrayed by Robbe-Grillet provide a much more accurate picture of organisational (social) life and the problems of trying to understand and control events. It provides a window on the world almost Realist
in its faithful attempt to portray human experience. In a later novel, "Djinn" (1983), he takes the sense of disjunction further by emphasising the irrational or phantom dimension, which deals not just with the reactive engagement with the world but also stresses the 'distortion' of experience very much as illustrated by the actions of Louisa already mentioned. (For a more literary analysis of Robbe-Grillet's novels see Fletcher, 1983; see also Robbe-Grillet, 1965.)

The aim of Robbe-Grillet in the **nouveau roman** is to deny the authority of the author. The reader must fill in the gaps for himself, must interpret such information as is provided to furnish such meaning as the reader can derive. The management text, by providing for a single authoritative reading, that intended by the author who, as already argued, inevitably represents a particular ideology, portrays an exactness which cannot be replicated in the social world. People, the material of organisations, are themselves inexact, as are people as readers - thus we have a double distortion. This need to abandon the authority of the writer was very much the project of James Joyce (in, eg., *Ulysses*, 1971), who has provided much of the inspiration and direction of the Deconstructionists (Attridge and Ferrer, 1984). Programmed writing is inescapably informed by a meta-language identifiable as ideological (Carter and Jackson, 1986). The Joycean escape from meta-language places the authority for interpreting the text on the reader. The text can no longer be used to sustain a particular discourse. Foucault's (1972) caution that we must ask:

"How is it that one particular statement appeared rather than another?" (p.27)

evaporates. The question becomes 'what is it that was said?'; and the concern for what are the possible interpretations (Culler, 1985). Judging between the implied praxis of the various interpretations, judging their emancipatory potential,
becomes the overriding concern, whether in terms of Habermas' communicative competence, or Rorty's more relativistic pragmatism (Bernstein, 1983).

**From Deconstruction to Reconstruction: From Form to Content**

It is with the insights provided by Joyce that this thesis reaches a turning point. My project is to offer an explanation of motivation to work. However, as I pointed out at the outset, it is not just a question of adding to the existing corpus of management theory, owing to the inherent capitalist bias in this research tradition. It was first necessary to deconstruct the dominant model of management in order to expose its partiality - to try to achieve a firm basis or location for the subsequent theorising. At best this would be an offering free from the bias of existing theory, (a claim which I would strenuously avoid making!), or, at worst, merely an extra-paradigmatic critique. Inescapably, the very act of offering a (transcendent) claim for theory violates the principles of deconstruction, as such a claim is itself open to being deconstructed. This highlights one of the major debates in the philosophy of science, and one which is foremost in the problematic of critical science - are we ultimately confronted with an absolute relativism, or are some readings - interpretations - more 'correct' than others? This inevitably becomes an issue for the reader, rather than for the writer, at least where science is concerned. Scientific writing must, unavoidably, make authoritative claims, even where the author accepts the autonomy of the reader. Thus Deconstructionist writers such as Culler, de Man, Derrida, no matter how much they try to mask their authority, cannot avoid at least a trace of it through their paradigmatic and syntagmatic use of language. It is fair to argue, I think, that the very act of scientific writing implies some claim to authority. Other than, perhaps, where the sole raison d'etre of critical writing is critique itself, some notion of reconstruction must be present. The limit of
deconstruction, therefore, is nihilism, or, in the area of management and organisation studies, detotalisation. Any project which aims at some measure of order must in consequence address itself to reconstruction, and this work is no exception. Reconstruction thus implies the possibility of, if not transcendence, at least consensus. Consensus is, of course, a dangerous concept. Apologists for the contemporary form of social domination, expressed in the liberal-pluralist mode, point to the utilitarian consensus definitive of Western democracy. The effeteness of such an understanding has been clearly exposed by Wolff in 'The Poverty of Liberalism' (1968) and Wolff, Moore and Marcuse in 'A Critique of Pure Tolerance' (1965). (For a discussion of this issue in the context of management theory, see Carter and Jackson, 1986.) Consensus in this tradition constitutes a legitimation of the necessity to experience socially unnecessary suffering, which is precisely the target of critical theory (Habermas, 1978; Marcuse, 1969). However, the project for critical theory is not to abandon consensus per se, but to purge consensus of the domination enforced through the prioritising of linguistic meaning - the achievement of communicative competence (Habermas, 1979). But Lyotard (1986:60-61), though he would share much of Habermas' critical intent, finds either conception of consensus unconvincing:

"Consensus is a horizon that is never reached." (p.61)

This can be seen as the crucial point of separation between the post-modernist school, where deconstruction constitutes the major form of analysis, and the modernists, who argue for a rational reconstruction (Power, 1986). This difference is most forcibly expressed, as already noted, in the Habermas-Rorty debate, (Bernstein, 1983), in terms of reconstruction and deconstruction, and in the Habermas-Lyotard debate, (Norris, 1985), in terms of Modernism and Post-Modernism. Habermas, in arguing for communicative competence, projects the possibility of a unitary reality - "... of a unitary end of history and of a subject",

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(Lyotard, 1986:73) - achievable when language is purged of distortions which presently exist as a result of the power of certain individuals or interest groups to prioritise meaning - a 'universal pragmatic'. Rorty, on the other hand, sees the choice as, not between prioritised meaning and non-prioritised meaning, but between different prioritising, ordered by political choice informed by the restricted pragmatics of praxis. Habermas' support for his position relies on the power of reason or rational thought. The Enlightenment project, for Habermas, where rational thought displaced mythology and superstition, is as yet incomplete (1985). The full potential for rationality is not yet realised, because of the appropriation of meaning by capitalism (Marcuse, 1986). The task therefore is not to abandon reason but fully to exploit it. Artistic knowledge, which has been marginalised, is to be re-appropriated as part of the general corpus of knowledge and judged by its contribution to political praxis (Lyotard, 1986). The early modernist revolution, which sought to fragment the homogeneity of form, is now seen to be anomic. For Habermas the task is to weld together fragmentary form:

"Habermas...thinks that if modernity has failed, it is in allowing the totality of life to be splintered into independent specialities...while the concrete individual experiences "desubliminated meaning" and "destructured form", not as a liberation but in the mode of...immense ennui...". (Lyotard, 1986:72)

Lyotard, as the advocate of post-modernism, starts from a not dissimilar point to Habermas:

"Post-modernism...is not modernism at its end but in the nascent state, and this state is constant." (ibid:79)

However, whereas modernity retains its concern for what is 'presentable', ie., form, in relation to the possible, the post-modern retains faith in the 'unpresentable', that which is yet 'unformable'. In this sense modernity can only deal with that which is recognisable in the present; post-modernism looks for a
new presence, invoking the Kantian idea of 'formlessness' as a possible index to the 'unpresentable', (ibid:78). However, this is a little unfair to Habermas, in the sense that Lyotard is invoking what is outside the realm of experience, and, whereas this certainly accords with the ideal of negation, it leaves the scientist little material to work with. Whereas what we have at the moment may prove ultimately to be a fiction, to abandon it totally means to abandon science itself, not science in its traditional sense but in the sense of critical thought.

I think, however, that the conflict I have outlined can usefully be side-stepped. Both positions have a measure of agreement on identifying the mechanisms of social domination, diagnosis, albeit one epistemologically and the other ontologically. However, one advocates an ultimately realist prognosis, whilst the other plumps for an inescapable relativism. This demonstrates the intrinsic arrogance of the thinking man. There is nothing in the diagnosis of the human condition which entails its prognosis. Whether the world is ultimately transcendentally objective or transcendentally relative is as yet unknowable. At some future point it may become knowable, but as yet we have not achieved that juncture. The best we can do is to grope forward using the undeniable insights from such diagnosis, and perhaps strive to achieve a world as free as possible from social domination. We can act as if there is an objectivity which informs our decisions, whilst retaining the consciousness of the possibility that it may be nothing more than a useful heuristic (Jackson and Carter, 1984). We must remain conscious of the barriers (form) to the achievement of a reduction of socially unnecessary suffering (content), and use our power of thought to transcend them.
Content

That many of these barriers are formed in language brings me back to the importance of such insight furnished by Joyce. As Lyotard (1986) notes,

"Joyce allows the unrepresentable to become perceptible in his writing itself, in the signifier". (p.80, emphasis added)

Joyce, in 'Ulysses', (1971), and more particularly in 'Finnegans Wake', (1964), abandons the conventions of writing in order to allow the infinite readings possible to emerge via the reader. For Joyce, punctuation, use of capital letters, the very words themselves, are devices for suppressing possible meaning, for prioritising the author (see, for example, Derrida, 1984). In other words, the very act of writing is an attempt to bound the signifier. Lacan has illustrated the independence of the signifier from the signified, connection being achieved by the play of the unconscious:

"...language is merely ratifying the works of the human mind with its perpetual creations." (Lemaire, 1979:48)

Language acts both paradigmatically and syntagmatically in creating the signified, and Joyce has consciously attempted to escape such pre-conditioning of responses by use of what is conventionally a dissolution of these two dimensions - non-paradigmatic, non-syntagmatic language forcing the reader to determine for himself the signification. (For an illustration of the effects of this attempt, see Norman Brown's 'Closing Time', 1973.) In other words, Joyce not only throws off the straight-jacket of certainty in relation to form but, as with Robbe-Grillet, also denies the authority of content.
The model of man implied by management theory is a product of severe variety attenuation, facilitated by the means which Joyce seeks to avoid. Typically, man is reduced synechdochally and metonymically to 'Labour' - or what Sievers (1985) referred to as 'reified labour'. This is particularly well illustrated in Gouldner's (1969) concept of the unemployed self, (see also Jackson and Carter, 1985). This particular form of attenuation becomes necessary in order to legitimate the dominant ideology where some should be rich and powerful and others poor and powerless. As Leach (1972) puts it, man

"...is always a man-animal, never a human being."
(p.153)

Orthodox theory uses a model of man expressed as a function of an objective rationality, what Leach calls Cartesian Man. We

"...reduce the status of the human beings under observation to that of mechanically controlled natural objects." (ibid.:153)

The machine metaphor provides the necessary non-human characteristics which management requires - man is machine, machine is deterministic, machine has low intrinsic variety, (see Beer's classification of systems, 1959). The naturally occurring high variety in man is thus attenuated to the low variety of the machine as an a priori of the text. Again, a useful illustration of this is provided by Burrell (1984), on the absence of any recognition of sexuality in organisation studies. It is remarkable how, in the non-work situation, sexuality permeates every conceivable niche of human activity, as expressed in advertising and popular culture, but it apparently does not exist at work. However, such an exclusion is only on the conscious part of the author - it manifestly exists for the employee! (See also Ross, 1982). To be sure, such attenuation of the signifier does not prevent a deconstruction of the text which illuminates possible interpretations which the
author could never have actively imagined, but this does not excuse or totally correct the imbalance caused by such primary attenuation. As a means of communicating information to the intended audience, it is preferable that this should not be achieved by consciously partial explanation.

Elsewhere I have argued that the model of the worker implied by the semiotics of modern management can be characterised as a "sado-masochistic, Faustian, altruistic, child-like automaton prostitute with feelings of inferiority", (see Jackson and Carter, 1985). That such a model could never be explicit in management theory emphasises the need for the worker as the willing victim. It is important for management to believe that they are not repressive, illustrated by the aphorism that 'managers manage by the consent of the managed and not by the authority vested in them'. Historically, it is easy to demonstrate that management has been repressive, but contemporarily that is seen as a thing of the past, (Huggett, 1973; Tressell, 1965). What divides the past, and thus repressive, from the present - not repressive - is unclear, (see Anthony, 1978). Possibly, the rise of the Trade Unions, but as they now appear to be in decline, how does this affect such a distinction? Possibly it is the advent of labour-easing technology, but this does not account for the many low technology industries. It is difficult to see that such a belief is nothing more than the natural tendency to view history as inevitably 'worse' than the present, coupled with a convenient blindness to the present, an absence of which would perhaps 'force' us to take action to ameliorate the situation. Since we live in a democratic, and thereby non-repressive, society, it follows that man as worker occupies his role without coercion, i.e., he is a willing 'victim'. This concept, so notably lacking in management theory, is, however, well illustrated by Hasek in 'The Good Soldier Schweik' (1951). Schweik exhibits the perfect worker characteristics, whereby he (apparently) sees the world only in terms of the rationality of his masters. He 'welcomes' punishment as
being good for him, he 'delights' in putting his master's interests first. Even though he exhibits certain 'human' frailties, they are obviously aberrant and pathological, due to his 'untermenschen' status and quality. He is manifestly not of the same stuff as his 'betters'. We have clear parallels to Schweik's situation in modern industrial life. When, for example, an organisation wishes to close down a production unit and thereby displace labour for reasons of profit, the workforce are supposed to recognise the correctness of such a move, notwithstanding the effects on them personally. Should they decide to protest in the limited ways they have at their disposal, they are portrayed as irrational.\(^2\) Whether or not Schweik believes in his master's reality is, of course, a different matter. We have the Schweik that his betters would like and the Schweik that Schweik thinks he is, but knowingly 'suppresses' in favour of his supposed persona. Similarly with the worker. Compliance does not indicate agreement - it is merely the response of the powerless (Thompson, 1983; Storey, 1980).

The image of the 'worker' as a low-variety willing victim set in a world of only one possible interpretation is most forcefully expressed by Kafka, especially in *The Castle*, (1957). This can be seen as a powerful analogy of the bureaucratic life. We have the (new) worker - 'K' - caught in a world where reason flows only from the top down. The worker cannot penetrate the heights of bureaucracy and therefore cannot exert an influence on the forces which dominate him. The force is benevolent in so far as he remains unthreatening. It copes easily with his attempts to impose his own reason on that already given. The more he struggles rationally, the more he becomes enveloped in the quicksand of bureaucracy. His only 'sensible' course is to accept the reason of the organisation and conform to its desires. But K is not the willing victim desired by the organisation. Notwithstanding his apparent irrationality to the villagers - the other 'employees' - who have been totally incorporated by the organisational logic and have come to
accept it as the absolute truth, the newcomer K imparts a different rationality and thus a struggle ensues between the establishment and the radical. The outcome, as with 'The Trial' (1963), is never in doubt - the bureaucracy ultimately wins. Again, the parallels in industry are not hard to find. The fate of the Lucas Aerospace workers' initiative was a case in point (Wainwright and Elliot, 1982; see also Beynon, 1984; Linhart, 1981).

The celebrated American poet Charles Bukowski, in his novel 'Post Office' (1984), provides one of the clearest insights into organisational life. It is particularly cogent, as it expresses the inevitable conflict and tension between work and non-work. Bukowski's hero Chinski experiences all the alienation and anomie of modern organisational life for the worker. His commitment to work is primarily one of economic necessity and, to a lesser extent, an escape from the alienation and anomie of non-organisational life experienced by the working poor. Work offers him little advancement or progress of any sort, yet he does not particularly seek such rewards from it. He is not particularly resentful, and accepts the inevitability of his existence at the bottom of the economic pile. He conforms, to an extent, as it would be too much trouble to rebel. However, he is not totally submissive. He tries to create 'personal space' within the organisation and when the organisation tries to reclaim it, he resists. His main weapon of resistance is, however, not open confrontation, but subversion, using the inevitable gaps in organisational surveillance to his own ends. Inevitably, as with K, the organisation wins - there is too much to resist; our hero tires of, and retires from, the contest. Organisation 1 - Worker 0.

The concept of a win-lose situation between the organisation and the individual does not, of course, feature prominently in management theory, yet it is a constant theme in the novel. Can it be that art is merely inventing the struggle,
and that the management text is true to life in ignoring the problem? Clearly not, as many non-management academic texts attest (eg., Beynon, op. cit; Hyman, 1977). Interestingly, another American poet, Charles Olson, in a biographical work also called 'Post Office' (1975), relates the personal tragedy experienced by his family as a result of the individual opposing the organisation.

Of course, such novels as I have cited do not particularly purge the authority of the author, as did Joyce. They do, however, make explicit provision for the reader to impose his own signification. For example, 'The Castle' is not prima facie about bureaucracy, it can only be seen as such by reading it as an allegory. However, such a reading is not contrived. As Waldo (1968) says,

"'The Castle' is in essence a superb psychological study of an individual facing a relentless, seemingly capricious, and presumably dangerous bureaucracy."

(p.114)

The use of allegory (as a trope) has been attacked by Pinder and Bourgeois, (Pinder and Bourgeois, 1982; Bourgeois and Pinder, 1983), in a debate with Morgan (1983b). Pinder and Bourgeois seek to purge organisation theory of the use of tropes as detracting from the necessary precision required by scientific thinking. (Note again the desire for exactness.) Morgan, however, argues that it is impossible to purge tropes as they are a natural ingredient of organisational thinking. More than this, tropes are an essential characteristic of all thinking, as language is inescapably tropic. As Lacan has shown, the quest for the 'pure' signifier - "for the pristine, word-free structures of thought - is frivolous" (Bowie, 1979:128) -

"For the function of language is not to inform but to evoke." (Lacan, 1980:86)
The power of the signifier lies in its evocation - the signified created like a phoenix rising out of the ashes of the signifier. Conscious allegory and orthodox text are both signifiers and both evoke a signified. The difference is that the orthodox text claims implicitly to link the signifier and signified in a definite unambiguous relationship, whereas the power of allegory is to leave such a link unfurnished, to be provided by the reader. If the important service to be provided for the student of management is an evocation of organisational life which is as 'real' as possible, then the form of the signifier should be irrelevant. The novelist can provide alternatives which facilitate this level of signification - 'to say what is otherwise unpronounceable'. It is for the reader to determine its relevance for organisation studies.
CHAPTER 6

DIFFERENCE

Here I introduce and stress the importance of the concept of 'difference', in terms of creating identity. Creation of identity allows a privileging, a prioritising, of what has identity over what has not. However, I argue that the process of creating identity is an arbitrary process in terms of any notion of transcendence, and that such bounding is, in fact, in the service of some interest - in this case, capitalist interest. By prioritising one supposed difference over another, a process which denies the possibility of other forms, we constitute a doctrine of 'the one best way' as an aid to social domination.

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In what must surely be one of the most perceptive comments of all time, Gouldner (1976:49) states:-

"Rationality is ... the capacity to make problematic what had hitherto been treated as given; ..."

- in other words, rationality stems from the perception of difference. In relation to difference, I have already made reference to the arbitrary creation of organisational forms or characteristics and to the role of difference in understanding the self. One of the great contributions of post-structuralism is the thorough-going analysis of the arbitrary nature of difference, and as this concept is central to this work, I will explore its theory in some detail.
Saussure's awareness of difference as a fundamental characteristic of language has already been referred to, together with the essential arbitrariness of such difference, and, whilst this understanding informs much of the post-structuralist concern with language, the concepts are much wider than this. It is characteristic of our ontology that things which we take to be real are assumed to have some natural priority over other possibilities, (Brown, 1966, especially Ch.VIII), eg., Weber's claims for the bureaucratic form. Whilst this assumption has most significance in regard to this work in terms of social organisation, its exposition can be usefully commenced by considering physical objects. Take, for example, the common or garden house brick. The clay from which a brick is made does not have the immediate shape of a brick, nor is a brick shape implicit in the clay. The brick shape is one possibility out of many, possibly infinite, shapes which could be produced. Whilst it may be difficult to envisage bricks of, say, triangular section, there is no intrinsic reason in the clay why this should not be so. It could be argued that there is some organisational imperative why bricks are shaped the way they are, such as the convenience of standard units, but, whilst this may be so, it would not preclude the effective use of irregular bricks. For example, we use irregular stone to great effect - in fact, irregularity is, or can be, an aesthetic feature of stonework - yet we also use regular stone, again with its own aesthetic. We also, on occasion, build in brick against the uniformity of the medium, for example, with different bonds and with decorative brickwork. Certainly, one may claim that there is an advantage in uniformity in making the bricks, though, of course, bricks are only uniform in so far as (a) the particular standard of measure they are made to, eg., metric or imperial; (b) within the limits of measurement used (not very tight where bricks are concerned?); (c) variety is built in - different textures, colours, types, shapes, etc.; (d) there are still handmade bricks. In other words, bricks are only uniform within certain limits.
Whilst economies undoubtedly exist in making bricks relatively alike, it is not an absolute economy, but is judged relative to other criteria, such as aesthetics. Thus the brick as we know it is not inevitable, it is selected in the light of certain a prioris - it is quite possible that a different size or shape of brick could be equally useful - and, if the determining criteria changed, the brick would certainly change, (as in fact happened with metrication).

What can be said about the arbitrary organisation of the brick also holds good for forms of social organisation. Certainly, as regards work organisations, any claims for naturalism in organisation design must be rejected. This, of course, runs counter to the assumptions underpinning main-stream organisation theory. Naturalism, explicit or implicit, is endemic in such theory. For example, we have the naturalistic metaphors of 'mechanistic' and 'organic' in the work of Burns and Stalker (1961), (see also Morgan, 1981; Fayol, 1949; Weber, 1968; Dumont, 1970).

If clay is the homogenous background for bricks, then people are the same for organisations. In the way that man forces a form onto the clay, so man forces certain forms of organisation on people. Organisation designs are selected in terms of prior criteria. The fact that bureaucratic organisations are hierarchical is because hierarchy serves, or is deemed to serve, certain prior interests. Certainly, this does not need to be a conscious process, or even strictly related to the raison d'etre of the organisation, e.g., labour control structures may reflect a paternalistic belief system - 'workers need a firm hand' - and certainly this was explicit in much 19th century theorising. However, the fact that such beliefs serve the material interests of those with the power to 'design' organisations is probably not coincidental. What can be asserted is that different informing interests contain the possibilities for different forms of organisation (see Vanek, 1975; Coates and Topham, 1970; Adizes and Borgese, 1975). The implication here
is, of course, that certain forms are selected in preference to others but that the other forms still exist as a potential in the background medium but are, at the same time, negated by the presence of the chosen one (Cooper, 1986 b, c, d). The form selected is presented, not as one possibility amongst many, but as the only possible rational form - the one best way. Thus the bureaucratic organisation is not justified in terms of one amongst a number of 'equal' possibilities, but because it is the best way, not in terms of specific a prioris, of sectional interest, but in terms of the supposed general good. Other forms would be less effective, and therefore irrational. However, rarely is the question posed - effective for whom?

In the way that the informing meta-theory of brick-making produces uniform bricks, so with organisations. Now it may, of course, be that in terms of the raison d'être of bricks, simplistically as a medium of construction, uniformity is held to have distinct advantages. Can the same claim be made for organisations? Clearly, all organisations are not alike, as, for example, contingency theorists would argue. However, as I have already argued, all bricks are not strictly alike, but the significance of the variations is, par excellence, relativistic. What is important is the substantive effect of the variations, or, perhaps more usefully for present purposes, the similarities. The fact that we may have the odd co-operative, or that some organisations are mechanistic whilst others are organic, does not substantially affect the fact that most organisations are characterised by the needless repression of the many for the needless benefit of the few. One objection may usefully be considered at this point. I have suggested that organisations consist of people. Some will, no doubt, protest that organisations are more than just people, that they contain buildings, money, systems, equipment, materials, information, knowledge, etc. This can be addressed in two ways. Firstly, people are qualitatively different to other aspects of organisation. You cannot underpay a computer, demotivate a desk, or, to the
best of my knowledge, expose a pound coin to an industrial disease. To be sure, plant can become redundant, as can workers, but, to other than those who view labour as literally just a resource to be considered like any other resource, redundancy in plant and in people are similar only syntactically, and there the similarity ends. It is unfortunate that in this day and age this point has to be restated. The role of non-human resources in organisations is largely unrelated to the human form of the organisation and the latter is certainly not an epiphenomenon of the former, notwithstanding the technological determinism held dear by many with an interest in organisation theory. The second response is to those who would argue that the conditions between organisations vary, which makes them substantively dissimilar. It is certainly true that the ambient stimuli can vary significantly - for example, one may work in a warm factory and another in a cold factory. However, if both work on production lines to create wealth for ownership, then, whilst one may experience less discomfort than the other, the social organisation of their task at the macro level remains essentially the same. What, then, about those who work in autonomous work groups (A.W.G.), surely the organisation here is different? This is so - but only in part, if the A.W.G. forms part of a bureaucratic hierarchy where unnecessary levels of social control are exercised for the benefit of others. Making adjustments to the micro level characteristics of work does not in itself imply any change at the macro level. This is not to deny the immediate sensory benefit to workers from improved conditions, and indeed, such improvements should certainly be strived for, but put central heating, double glazing and carpet in a prison cell and it still remains a cell. However, this does present us with the conditions for determining the sameness or difference in organisations. As with bricks, it depends ultimately on the purpose of those making the claim. The fact that a scientist could prove that two bricks are in fact dissimilar may not impress the person who is going to put them side by side in a building. Thus the social scientist who claims that
organisation A differs from organisation B because, in the former, managers and workers dress the same, and, in the latter, they are distinguished symbolically by dress, is not going to impress his colleague who is asking why we have managers and workers. Questions of difference and sameness must be resolved ultimately by reference to a set of criteria related to the sort of social structure and quality of life a society wants for itself. Overall here, I am not trying to suggest that the non-human aspects of organisation do not influence the human aspects - if we have ships presumably we must have sailors. What I am arguing is that the decision to have, say, a particular technology is made by people, who could make a different decision. If one technology has implications for people who use it which are, or should be, unacceptable, then that technology can be changed, or done without (Gouldner, 1976). Even if someone can point to a particular situation where this does not obtain, surely there is no reason for failing to change conditions where this is possible?

The establishment of one form - the selection of one possibility out of many - gives it an ontological status vis a vis that which is not chosen which is purely arbitrary. Form presupposes difference, in fact cannot exist without it, and yet has no transcendent claim over that excluded from the form. Yet, inevitably, what is chosen comes to be regarded as good (real) against the bad of what is not chosen (unreal). Whilst it is obvious that creating a particular boundary or form does not negate the existence of what is not bounded, the not-bounded is assumed not to exist. (This is nicely explained in reference to pluralism by Wolff, 1968.) Creating the boundary, or establishing difference, is what gives substance to the entity created, and it is from this boundary that it draws its energy, (Cooper, 1986 c), in the sense of legitimating what is. To return to our bricks: the individual brick derives energy from its form, and this energy is multidimensional; for example, the equivalent amount of clay, (in its pre-brick state), could not perform
the same building function as a brick, it is only when constituted as a brick that it is legitimated and gains authority as a building material. It also gains energy from its physical boundary. Take, for example, two similar amounts of clay; one is made into a standard brick and the other into one of triangular section. In a building to be constructed of standard bricks (a priori) there is no role for our triangular brick. The standard brick draws its authority, (power, utility, etc.), from its specific shape - its specific boundary - selected by man, as previously noted, from a possibly infinite number of possible shapes, i.e., the brick in this sense forms part of a socially constructed order. Our triangular brick does not share this authority. However, it may gain a different authority from its scarcity value or its idiosyncratic appeal - as a work of art? However, bricks do not need to be physically different to be viewed as a work of art. Some years ago the Tate Gallery in London, amid much outrage, purchased a work of the American artist Andre, which consisted of a 'pile' of ordinary bricks. Their authority as a work of art was derived from their being different to building bricks. Yet they were not physically different - their difference was a symbolic difference. Some significant (in the art world) people agreed that they were different, and therefore they were. It is, though, interesting to note that some people did not accept this definition, denied they were different - yet the bricks were still different precisely then because of the controversy which was provoked in denying their difference (Marcuse, 1968). The only way they could cease to have their power was by returning to a stack of like bricks where they could not be perceived as different.

Approaching this example from a slightly different perspective - to examine the idea of arbitrariness - then, if we had to select our bricks for a work of art from a totally undifferentiated pile, then, (assuming equal accessibility, etc.), the choice would be purely arbitrary. From a homogenous background we would choose some
to be considered as substantially different to the rest. Any other selection would
do equally as well, so how does the difference arise? - obviously, from the human
act of selection, (of bounding), even though this decision is purely arbitrary
(Brown, 1966). Certainly, there must be some prior determination, eg., to select a
certain number of bricks. However, as, in practice, bricks are never precisely the
same and some differences are detectable by the bodily senses - sight, touch, etc.
- then other a prioris in terms of selection come into play, such as preferred
colouring, etc. Thus, again, difference resulting from the bounding process
provides its own energy - a brick of shade X being more likely to end up as a work
of art, rather than as part of a building, than is one of shade Y. If our medium
was one where inherent difference was not detectable in meaningful terms - say,
ball bearings - we could claim an absolute arbitrariness in selection, yet our
selection gains authority simply from having been differentiated from the rest.

Now, to return to forms of organisation. I posed the question earlier as to
whether or not uniformity of structure was advantageous. I have suggested that
uniformity is a relativistic concept informed by purpose. I have further suggested
that form derives from the perception of difference, again related to purpose.
Whilst this may be acceptable in terms of understanding the various roles of a
brick, is it extensible to the organisation of people? I would argue that it is, that
the purpose of those with the power to organise underlies all such organisation.
At one level, the raw materials of organisations - people - are totally
undifferentiated, they are just people. If a particular form of organisation is
selected, it is not because of something intrinsic to those objects we call people,
 ie., there is nothing in the concept 'people' that dictates a particular
organisational form. Yet, as we have seen, once an organisation is created it
possesses an authority of its own. I have characterised the normal work
organisation as capitalist bureaucracy, whilst recognising that all work
organisations are not so organised, and that it is not a particularly precise
description. Whilst it is difficult, and not necessarily fruitful, to attempt a more
detailed definition, it can be argued that there are certain characteristics
commonly found in most work organisations. I have argued elsewhere, (Jackson
and Carter, 1985), that these characteristics include hierarchy, time-structuring,
reduced personal autonomy, prostitution of the body, submission to discipline,
amorality, altruism. If there is nothing implicit in the 'concept' of people that
prescribes such characteristics, how do they appear as such common features of
work organisations? Basically, some people have the power to create such
arbitrary forms, but, if exercised purely randomly, it would not explain
contemporary organisational structures. Whilst at one level people are totally
undifferentiated, at another level they are obviously highly differentiated. In
fact, the lack of differentiation is essentially a philosophical/meta-physical claim,
and it is at the physical level that difference is inescapable. In fact, the ability to
perceive difference is what enables us to cope with the proliferating variety
experienced in the world, and so make sense of it. As Bateson (1973, 286/428)
succinctly puts it, a 'bit' of information is a 'difference which makes a
difference'. (For a description of the neurological function of difference in terms
of perception, see also Bateson, 1985.) This process of attenuating excess variety,
whilst inescapable, is undertaken in the absence of any rubric which guides us in
terms of which variety can be safely discarded, and which is essential to our
needs. I have argued elsewhere, (Jackson and Carter, 1984), that this process
produces essentially mythical understandings of the world whose validity is
legitimated, not by reference to truth, but to adequacy in terms of one's purpose.
The reduction of variety by the identification of difference is an extremely useful
strategy. For example, a person seeking to fill a post and being faced with, say,
50 application forms - not an excessive response - would find it impossible to
make an even-handed analysis and assessment of all the information present, (see
bounded rationality). Such variety can be very rapidly reduced by deciding that, say, women are not suitable. If that does not reduce the pile to manageable proportions, one can take out foreign-sounding names, those too old or too young, those who are single or those married, etc. - there are an enormous number of ways of rapidly reducing variety in this manner (Thompson, 1983, Ch.7; for a 'real life' example of this, see Wolmar and Kerr, 1986). However, once our person filling the job has decided to reject women, i.e., has created a boundary, then, indeed, a certain energy or authority has been created for the maleness of that post. Notwithstanding the now illegality of such discrimination in practice, it does provide a very tempting use of difference. Men are, by and large, perceivable as different to women, blacks to whites, young to old, etc., but that does not mean that such difference has a universal significance. Our hypothetical job filler may be using identifiable difference in a way which has absolutely no social relevance for the job to be performed, (Jackson and Carter, 1986). The use of difference in such bounding processes creates a totally spurious authority - creates something out of nothing. However, it is much easier, often, to create a justification for such action, usually by a recourse to naturalism, than to adopt a more socially responsible attitude to reducing variety. In fact, it can be argued that one feature of modernism is a failure to react to the proliferating variety of the modern world with adequate rubrics for variety attenuation. The cult of the possible has no place for normative rules, for choosing between alternatives, and it is, to some extent, this problem that post-modernism seeks, in part, to address. Such naturalistic justifications can be seen in the repression of women as regards job opportunities. I am not, of course, suggesting that the conscious motive behind this repression was purely a rational attempt to reduce variety, but what I am suggesting is that holding the belief that women are 'not as good as men' for a particular job does facilitate the creation of work structures as we know them. The mutability of this process in war time, for example, reinforces
the arbitrary nature of such bounding, as does the unilateral redefining of women by women in recent years.

What then are the implications of this for the design and management of organisations? Specific organisational forms reflect a priori interests and (a) are not natural, and (b) do not eliminate alternative possibilities. Organisational forms are sustained by the maintenance of boundaries, i.e., by maintaining difference. Once difference is allowed to decay, so the energy accruing from that difference decays, e.g., equal pay for men and women removes some of the impetus to employ women in low paid jobs instead of men (though see Thompson, op. cit.). The question to be answered here is, what is the justification for the particular uses of perceived difference in organisation design, or, in other words, what is the legitimacy of the informing interest? There are some organisational features which may be either implied by the job itself or could be fairly well agreed to be reasonable and not injurious to the social good. For example, it may be reasonable to exclude people with certain characteristics such as colour blindness, poor hearing, height, etc., from some jobs. Such exclusion in no way necessarily implies any social inferiority, such as is currently experienced by, say, the unemployed. However, beyond this possible minimum, we enter the realm of sectarian interest. This is immediately illustrated by the dichotomy between managers and workers. This is a widely recognised distinction, and one which I have used extensively, but what is the substance of this difference? I have characterised it in terms of responsible for, as against responsible to, but this by no means explains all the difference signified in its contemporary usage. There are many other differences in practice, both material and symbolic, e.g., remuneration and conditions, status, titles, experienced control, power and influence, social grouping, etc. If we take management to be a necessary function in creating synergy, then what characteristics are necessary to it? The idea of
responsibility for may be a necessary characteristic implied by the role, ie., serves the general interest - however, can this be said for the other characteristics? This can be seen in terms of a transcendent notion of social good or in terms of a socially agreed definition. For example, there is absolutely nothing in the concept of management which implies that managers should enjoy better working conditions than the managed. In other words, the difference in working conditions reflects an arbitrary conceptual bounding of the process 'management'. Now it may be that society determines that managers should enjoy better conditions than workers because social benefit accrues from this. However, as the mechanism for determining this fact, and for obtaining a genuine social agreement on it, in the absence of domination, is unresolved, this possibility is outside the scope of this work. Instead, I will content myself with the process of giving managers improved conditions in the absence of these two criteria. Managers have achieved better conditions than workers because of their ability to appear substantively different to workers, and can either appeal for, or enforce, special recognition. However, difference per se is merely relational - there is no implied transcendent value in either side of the divide. Relative value is prima facie a matter of judgement - not of all those who have involvement in the matter, but of those who have the most influence. Thus, there is nothing implicit in management as a process which dictates its performance by a distinct social group and, even if this were not the case, there is no implied social merit vis a vis other groups. Now there may be very cogent reasons why managers are a distinct social group with higher status and conditions than other groups, but whose reasons are they?

The whole of the social organisation of work as we know it can be understood in terms of the perception of difference and the prioritising of one part over the other by those with the power to enforce that prioritisation. The characteristics previously referred to - hierarchy, time-structuring, personal autonomy,
prostitution, discipline, amorality and altruism - are all a function of this process serving some interest, and can be changed in the light of some other interest. It follows, therefore, that to maintain a particular structure depends upon maintaining a set of 'differences' in the face of any challenge to such identification. Turning briefly to the question of motivation: if a theory is to be of service to capitalism, it must obviously reinforce the necessary structures which allow the ongoing maintenance of social control. Whilst certain characteristics of the work place can safely be changed without eroding this control, some can not. One fundamental and necessary difference to any structure of social domination is the one between the dominators and the dominated. As there is little opportunity to claim a definite physical difference, at least not one unrelated to social deprivation, notwithstanding the opportunities presented by socio-biology (see Sahlin, 1977), difference needs to be of a symbolic nature. One of the main prerequisites of capitalism is that workers should not receive the surplus wealth created by their labour. Historically, this has been achieved by a mixture of raw power and moral (religious) stricture. However, with the declining possibilities afforded by such strategies, some other mechanism was required, provided, opportunistically, by industrial psychology. Early applications of industrial psychology appeared to offer possibilities of ameliorating the lot of the worker. It is interesting to compare, for example, the moralising outrage of the early management theorist Ure (1835) at the non-scientific attempts to reduce normal working hours to 12 per day, with the scientifically demonstrable benefits of reducing hours to as low as 8 per day during the first World War, following from the work of the early Myersians on fatigue and monotony (see Rose, 1978). This emancipatory trend had the potential for eroding some of the essential differences between workers and their 'betters'. If workers suffered from fatigue and monotony they started to look remarkably like people and this could be dangerous for capitalism - notwithstanding that the
thrust behind much of this research was with improving productivity, to the immediate benefit of the capitalist. This erosion was, to some extent, reinforced by the emergent human relations school of management, with its emphasis on the human-ness of workers. However, the dangerously egalitarian trend was successfully halted by the behaviouralists, particularly Herzberg, with his suggestion that 'workers do not work for money'. Much confusion has arisen over the precise role of money in Herzberg’s theory, so I will repeat the main points. Salary is a Hygiene factor, not a Motivator, (1959:113) - "... fair treatment in compensation is an essential pre-requisite to motivation", (p.114-5). In other words, a fair remuneration is necessary before motivators can function. However, as regards motivation, "Money thus earned as a direct reward for outstanding individual performance is a reinforcement of the motivators of recognition and achievement. It is not hygiene as is the money given in across-the-board wage increases", (p.117, emphasis added). In other words, money is not a motivator per se, it is not valued for itself, but as a symbol of personal performance. Here then, we have the authoritative re-statement of the intrinsic difference between workers and capitalists. The former want money per se only to the extent of meeting their 'real needs' (Herzberg favourably quotes James E. Lincoln of Lincoln Electric on this, p.117). Money surplus to this is desired only for its symbolic value as an indicator of performance. Thus, 'excess money' not linked to personal performance will be of no value whatsoever to the worker. In contrast, the whole raison d’etre of the capitalist is the accumulation of money (wealth) - owning more. In fact, the very principle of market capital dictates that owners of capital will invest where, ceteris paribus, they will get the greatest return. Now the psychology of capitalism, not to mention its ideological foundation, may indeed be complex - Weber’s Protestant Work Ethic, Veblen’s conspicuous consumption, Tawney’s acquisitive society - but the measure of success in capitalism remains the expansion of wealth, what Tawney (1961) calls "the insatiable expansion and
aggregation of property itself", (p.57). However, where do managers fit into this polarisation? Managers obviously work for money, as one of the differentiating features of management is that they should be paid more than workers, (notwithstanding certain possible overlaps), not in the form of performance bonuses but in terms of basic salary, (which for workers is a hygiene factor). In fact, many managers are on an incrementally increasing scale as part of a career structure of which one of the major aims is financial advancement, a characteristic rarely found, or at least as well developed, with worker pay structures. There is, of course, a 'market explanation' for this, that managers are being rewarded for scarcity and skill, and certainly the de facto barriers to entry would reinforce this. However, unless one is positing some genetic difference in managers, (hard to sustain where managers rise from the working class), would not market economics anticipate attracting more people into management and thus driving down managerial salaries, notwithstanding the aforesaid barriers? Surely this would be of advantage to owners in terms of profit margins? As this is not the case, we must assume that ownership finds some advantage in maintaining a managerial elite, and that one way is to pay for it, and also that managers are attracted, or at least not deterred, by the higher wages. Herzberg's conclusions are all the more startling in the light of his research being done on professional groups rather than workers! However, managers being identified as manifestly different from workers allows managers to draw energy from this distinction. Managers continue to manage knowing that they are different and therefore having the authority that such difference imparts. As Herzberg's prescriptions were clearly intended for workers, this lends further reinforcement to this assumed difference.

A similar reinforcement can also be found in the work of McGregor (1960) and the claimed coalition, or potential for a coalition, of individual and organisational
(management) goals. Whilst this is manifestly impossible in capitalist society, this is not allowed to impinge on the utility of the theory. However, as noted, the achievement of this state in practice is not to be gained by the organisation (management) adopting worker goals, it is by workers adopting those of management, i.e., Theory Y was never intended to release workers from managerial control or from serving the interests of capital, it was to encourage workers to serve the interests of capital more efficiently. Thus, on the one hand, workers did have different goals to managers, reinforcing the concept of inherent difference, whilst, on the other, at the same time justifying the existence of managers as necessary to forge the 'coalition'. If there really were no difference in the goals of managers and workers it would dissolve much of the need for a distinction between the two. As workers cannot, yet, be dispensed with, but managers (as enforcers of compliance) could be, with the disappearance of the need for a symbolic of management, all would become workers, albeit with different roles and perhaps even with status differentiation, but whatever was good for the worker would be, by definition, good for the manager.

What therefore is inherently undecidable, i.e., forms of organisation, without the informing thrust of prior interest, becomes decidable only in the light of some specific interest (Cooper, 1986 c). To understand organisation, the power relationships and the maintenance of that power by agents - management - and the instrument of that maintenance - the management process - one must view them in the light of the interest being served - not in neutral terms and not in management-serving terms. It is obvious that the interest of the worker is (a) subsumed under that of the dominant interest, and (b) systematically denied by management. To continue to define worker interests in management terms is to protract the delusion.
Having established the relationship between organisation and difference, I wish to return to the subject of difference in language. Difference is one of the key concepts in post-structuralist thought, and the post-Saussurian tradition in language has already been referred to. However, this mode of thinking has had remarkably little impact on organisation theory, and, where recognised in the orthodoxy, its implications are denied. This is well-illustrated by two recent and contrasting additions to organisational theory. The first, 'Re-Directions in Organisational Analysis' (Reed, 1985), identifies two distinct perspectives on organisation theory, one which sees it as part of the general body of socio-political theory, and the other which sees it as a 'distinctive discipline or technical specialism', the former being the perspective represented by Reed and by this work. The other contribution, 'In Defence of Organization Theory' (Donaldson, 1985) represents Reed's second category and refutes the first (see p.120). In defending organisation theory, Donaldson recognises many of the substantive criticisms of the orthodoxy but dismisses them as largely unfounded, a position made tenable largely by the rejection of paradigm incommensurability. The idea that scientific paradigms possess a discrete language which makes meaningful communication with another paradigm impossible stems from Kuhn (1970), and was adapted by Burrell and Morgan (1979), though implicitly rejected subsequently by Morgan (1983 a), (see Willmott and Jackson, 1985). Paradigm incommensurability in contemporary organisation theory is perhaps best understood in terms of the synchronic paradigms of Burrell and Morgan, and it is to these that Donaldson most closely refers, finding the diachrony of Kuhnian paradigms less challenging (Donaldson, op. cit., Ch.4). Burrell and Morgan identified four discrete paradigms, Functionalist, Interpretive, Radical Humanist and Radical Structuralist, and it is in the first that the bulk of orthodox
organisation theory lies - and it is essentially this position that Donaldson is defending. However, whereas in some of the other paradigms incommensurability is an acceptable fact of life, it is more or less precluded by the pre-epistemological assumptions of the functionalist paradigm, (Jackson and Willmott, 1986). His rejection of paradigm incommensurability allows rejection of other criticisms, such as managerial bias, by retaining a belief in the "relative" objectivity of scientific language. Thus when Donaldson addresses the question of language he asserts that scientific discourse is distinct from, and superior to, ordinary discourse, agreeing with Popper "... that scientific data are those on which there is a high degree of intersubjective agreement between trained scientists" (p.76). As Burrell and Morgan (p.395) point out, such a view is consistent within its own paradigm, but not in terms of other paradigms. To reject the contrary argument is to indulge in a form of epistemological imperialism which denies the worth of the views of others. Does Donaldson mean that data is what is agreed between scientists of all paradigms, or just within his own paradigm? (The indications are that it is the latter, as, for example, he asserts that the idea that language games prevent an agreement on the meaning of organisation is testable empirically. However, his very commitment to a generalised empiricism and the data generated already puts him at odds with other 'competent' scientists.) As Morgan (1983 a) argues, there are pre-epistemological influences which have already 'contaminated' data before they are even produced. Thus when Donaldson writes of organisation design, (Ch.14), he exhibits a very specific understanding of an organisation, unquestioning in his acceptance of particular structural elements which are by no means unquestionable, such as hierarchy and management, and in fact advocates an approach intended to provide "a value-neutral way of describing an organization" (p.156). Presumably then, those who reject such a theory as value neutrality are either not competent scientists or are making statements whose validity can simply be denied.
Whilst Donaldson's position is relatively extreme paradigmatically, it does represent the major genre of organisation theory (Willmott, 1986b). Similarly, much of the theorising of the competing paradigms represents Reed's more expansive perspective, where organisation theory is part of a wider discourse and therefore is not so readily identified as organisation theory.

Much of the mainstream academic literature on management and organisation presents two major problems for critique. Firstly, as Donaldson illustrates, it is based exclusively on an appeal to formal logic. Secondly, though Donaldson denies this, it represents predominantly, if not exclusively, the view of the dominant interest, management (as agents of Capitalism). Formal logic relies firmly on the assumption that language conveys precise and universally understood meaning. The fact that this is an obvious nonsense, as regards ordinary language use, is dealt with by identifying specialist languages which are used in specialist discourse rather than ordinary discourse. The relevant language as regards organisation studies is, of course, scientific language, which, as already noted, is Donaldson's position. Those who are competent in this language can thus make meaningful and objective statements, not only to others who share this language, but also to those who do not share it. These people, however, should accept the wisdom being handed down to them, because of the superior knowledge of the scientist. This is illustrated by Donaldson's refutation of managerial bias in orthodox organisation studies. He argues (p.86) first that theorists and managers have 'logically' distinct perspectives on organisations and follows with arguing that organisations and managers have different goals, i.e., that management and organisation goals are not synonymous (p.91). He achieves this as follows: Organisational goals are defined by humans, but become organisational goals by 'authorization' and 'institutionalization'. Authorization "involves the organization giving its legitimacy to the objectives ..." (p.22). All very neat, until we question
the meaning of the words used. For example, what is the organisation which authorises organisational goals? Donaldson himself answers the question - an organisation is "any social system which comprises the co-ordinated action of two or more people towards attaining an objective" (p.7). Thus organisations are made up of people and organisational goals are therefore the goals of people! Ignoring the 'truth' content of Donaldson's claims for the moment, the essentially circular argument he uses is characteristic of formal logic, and relies, as noted, on a belief in a lack of ambiguity in the concepts used. Once this unitary meaning is challenged, proponents use the 'no true Scotsman manoeuvre', and argue for a superordinate scientific meaning. The irony of the appeal to formal logic is that it relies on rhetorical logic to make its claims, i.e., the claims for the superordinacy of scientific language can only be a rhetorical ploy, as there is no external validation of its claim possible. I have already referred to the importance of rhetoric in post-structural analysis, even though in orthodox organisation theory it invariably appears in the guise of formal logic, and this points to another problem with the orthodox position. Donaldson stresses, as already noted, the special quality of 'scientific' knowledge but does not explain the status of 'non-scientific' knowledge. In discussing Silverman's (1968) claim that formal = rational and informal = irrational, Donaldson notes (p.88), in the context of the Hawthorne Studies, that Roethlisberger and Dickson point out that "the informal practices they observed, though contrary to management's intentions, were rational when looked at from the viewpoint of the workers...". What he does not point out is that Roethlisberger and Dickson distinguish between the logic of efficiency and the logic of sentiment. In other words, rationality is related to specific logics. Marcuse too notes this, in that the logic of poetry/art is marginalised by being taken to be something distinct from 'real' rationality. Returning thus to the content of Donaldson's argument on the absence of managerial bias in organisation studies, the best that can be said is that
organisational goals as people goals are wider than just managerial goals - in other words, an appeal to the 'creative conflict' of pluralist competition. The shortcomings of plural analysis have, extra-paradigmatically to Donaldson, been widely argued, (Wolff, 1968; Wolff, Moore and Marcuse, 1965; Connolly, 1969; Carter and Jackson, 1986). If one rejects the pluralist argument then one returns to seeing organisations as reflecting the goals of those with the de facto power - owners and their agents, managers. This, of course, does not demonstrate a managerial bias in organisation theory, but it does demonstrate the latent tendency of the orthodoxy to confuse and conflate the organisation with a managerial perspective, notwithstanding their protestations to the contrary. In fact, other than as some of the voices in the pluralism of organisations, workers barely feature in Donaldson's concept of the organisation. In the chapter on 'The Design of Organization' there is very little reference to workers, and where he does make such reference there is little sensitivity to the subjective nature of his claims and the view of such strategies by those affected. Thus he states that, once a procedure is established such as standard start time for factory employees,

"a specialization ... enhances effectiveness. ... Part of this cost saving is through the creation of routine jobs which require less education for their performance and which can be filled with employees on lower wages." (p.157)

What is it in the principles of organisation that requires work to be made simple for the less educated to be paid less? Nothing. It is the principle of personal wealth accumulation that dictates it. Not surprising, therefore, that organisation theorists are accused of managerial bias (Reed, 1985).
In this chapter I look at the issue of the Models of Man implied in science, in terms of the determinist/voluntarist debate. Arguing for man as a voluntaristic desiring being, I look at the Lacanian model of desire as the source of motivation. In the Lacanian model, man is possessed of a central lack, which he tries to fill by gaining the recognition of the generalised other, consequent on his accession to language, as a means of establishing self as subject. Whilst Otherness presents the opportunity for lack filling, it is a condition which cannot be achieved, and yet which must be constantly striven for. It is this persistent urge to acquire the social other which is the source of motivation.

Models of Man

Any theory of human behaviour carries with it, implicitly or explicitly, a model of man - an understanding of what it means to be human (Hollis, 1977; Chapman and Jones, 1980; Simon, 1957). One feature of this model is whether man is held to be deterministic or voluntaristic. However, as Burrell and Morgan (1979, Ch.1) point out, any claim for man's determinism, or lack of it, is ultimately a question of belief ('assumption'). In spite of our lack of certainty on this issue, (orthodox) science proceeds as if it is knowable, notwithstanding the fact that, given its foundational nature, any error in this matter reduces, if not eliminates, the integrity of resulting theory. Paradoxically, of course, a determinist would not recognise voluntarism as a possibility, and thus would not see it as an issue. Even
to make the claim, as Burrell and Morgan do, that determinism or voluntarism is
ultimately an assumption marks the proponent as a de facto relativist, and not a
neutral commentator. The intractable and contradictory nature of this problem
has led to some proponents of each case retreating to a position of accepting both
cases, i.e., neither a strict determinism nor an unresolved voluntarism.
Representing the determinist camp, Searle (1984) has recently examined the
argument that we carry with us the illusion of Free Will, but that is all it is - the
illusion that we could have acted differently. Voluntarists, on the other hand,
tend to argue for some social conditioning, so that some behaviour functions as if
deterministic and, whereas the possibility of free action exists, the limiting
circumstances make its existence purely 'academic', (see O'Connor, 1972). The
spirit of this condition is perhaps exemplified by Rousseau's famous dictum
(1966:3)

"Man is born free; and everywhere is in chains."

However, it must be stressed that, whereas Rousseau's man may accept the chains
in the name of social good, for Deleuze and Guattari (1984) he accepts them for
the good of capitalism. These chains are not the chains of necessary repression,
but the chains of surplus repression, (Marcuse, 1969) - the chains of social
domination. The project for Deleuze and Guattari, as it must be for all those
interested in human emancipation, is to show how

"... in the subject who desires, desire can be made to
desire its own repression". (p.105)

If the potential for the exercise of free will is always present, and if it is in some
cases quasi-deterministic as a result of circumstance, a change in circumstance
allows the possibility of the re-emergence of genuinely free action. Minimally, if
quasi-deterministic behaviour can be encouraged by certain conditions
(incentives), and if we are interested in the achievement of an authentic, emancipated society, surely we must at least question the bases of circumstance which lead to unfree behaviour.

The basis for deterministic views of the world, including human behaviour, is, as noted, rooted in the essentially Cartesian/Newtonian model of physics, as the progenitor of all science, whose claimed neutrality would seem (to its proponents) to disqualify any claim for voluntarism as irrational or metaphysical. However, the emergence of post-Einsteinian physics (New Physics) exposes this legitimation as epistemologically spurious, and suggests that appeals to determinism relate more to the possibilities for exercising social domination than to purely scientific explanation. A certain strain in the literature of New Physics, (Bohm, 1983; Capra, 1983; Jones, 1983; Zukav, 1984), is at pains to point out the ecological and social damage being inflicted and justified by deterministic philosophy. The fact that this critique argues that we have the choice to pursue an alternative means that, at least as far as man is concerned, voluntarism does exist. However, given that there appears to be no way of empirically resolving the determinist/voluntarist debate, any claims made in this respect must remain a matter of conviction, and, in order to illuminate the rationale for my arguments, must be made explicit. I would take the existentialist position that man is free in the world to make his own decisions about his own future. However, this is not to argue for an unreserved voluntarism in man in all circumstances, as, although the potential for free choice is present, the alternatives available to man are not equally attractive to him. For example, the option is available to a motorist to park his car wherever he physically can, regardless of circumstance. He may, however, feel that the penalties to which he would expose himself, by ignoring the conventions, or more particularly the law, are not worth the risk or ultimate loss. Thus, 'sensibly' he opts for conforming to the rules necessary for social
order, to the extent that he may internalise the rules, such that he would never even contemplate their violation, i.e., his behaviour may appear deterministic, though, as with organisational behaviour, as noted earlier, such behaviour does not prove the case for determinism. What it does indicate is the notion of interest - the motorist perceives his individual interest as best served by conforming to the rules. Some might argue that a similar concept of interest is what informs cooperative conforming behaviour on the part of the worker, but such a claim does not bear examination. The assumption here is that parking regulations are conceived as a rational system serving the social good, and, as such, are even-handed as regards all motorists - and indeed all non-motorists. However, I have argued that this is not the case with the contemporary organisation of work, as this system serves certain class interests rather than the general social good, and therefore conforming behaviour cannot be understood as the same process in both situations. It is worth noting in passing that it can be argued that even parking as a social system is not even-handed across the motoring population, serving the general social good. Parking, as with so much of our social life, favours those who can afford to pay the most. Typically, with city centre parking the cost increases the more convenient the location. Equally, some can afford, better than others, to bear the costs of illegal parking. Even with car parking, a person may not be acting in his own class interest, but merely minimising individual dysfunction. In an emancipated society, surely we should not take the management of individual loss minimising as a way of subverting genuine class interests as a measure of the good society.

Returning to the organisational context, if systems of management are designed with the intention of promoting a particular form of compliant behaviour, and if this is justified and legitimated by theories founded upon man's supposed intrinsically deterministic nature, and if these forms represent the subordination
of the interest of one group to another, then the basis of such systems must be questioned. It is obvious, however, that any voluntaristic theory of motivation to work based upon a desire for an emancipated society must address the twin issues of why, under the present repressive system, people co-operate in their own repression, and how people would be motivated in the absence of repression. The theory of the Gift, as will be argued shortly, does indeed accommodate these two points. As regards the first, it has already been argued that all work behaviour is not primarily concerned with the ostensible production purpose, but that there is also a social production function operating. Secondly, and not surprisingly, the process of motivation is the same in an emancipated society as in a repressive society. What would change is the concern with incentive in a repressive society, to 'genuine' motivation in an emancipated society. The focus must inevitably be on the amelioration of the manipulation of the symbolic order, or, in the terms of Deleuze and Guattari, the relationship between desire and interest (Jackson and Carter, 1986).

If we have recourse to a deterministic model of man, then explaining individual actions becomes, in principle, relatively unproblematic, merely a question of discovering the appropriate governing laws. With a strictly deterministic view, actions become pre-ordained at the creation of the universe, latent within the master plan, awaiting their inevitable moment in time. With a weaker determinism, action occurs according to some intrinsic stimulus-response relationship. Once the appropriate stimulus occurs, for whatever reason, then a particular action will inevitably follow. However, with a voluntaristic model, explaining action, assuming that it is capable of being explained - that is, that action does correspond to some coherent model - does present problems. Voluntary action presupposes the possibility of choice, and choice implies the concept of desire as the informing logic of choice, which has become the object of
interest for the essentially post-Freudian desirants, prominently in the structuralist/post-structuralist tradition. Desire for the determinist, in so far as it exists as a meaningful concept, can merely be an epiphenomenon of the sentient being, a condition which may have subjective meaning in so far as it is experienced but which has no objective function in determining outcomes. For the desirants, on the other hand, desire is the source of all action and as such the driving force behind motivated behaviour. Desire, of course, underpins, explicitly or implicitly, much of motivation theory, especially need theories. As noted, desire in this sense, merely indicates the objective presence of some superordinate need, hunger, for example, preventing us from inadvertently starving to death for want of the action of eating. However, desire in the Freudian tradition is not a mere epiphenomenon of the needing individual, but the very basis of human action.

**Origin of Desire**

Whereas it is not appropriate in this text to explore fully the psycho-analytic explanation of desire, it is useful briefly to summarise the argument. The child is not born with an already formed awareness of itself as an individual being or ego, the Lacanian 'I'. Rather, it 'understands' itself as an integral part of its mother. The creation of social identity, of the subject, finally articulated in the entry into language, emanates from the separation of child from mother by the intervention of the symbolic father as authority figure - as the law giver. The awareness of the symbolic father as independent entity, ('the name of the father'), creates the psychic individual, not at the moment of birth, of the emergence of the physical individual, but sometime later, which is why Lacan refers to the "specific prematurity of birth in man", (1980:4). It is the trauma of the forced creation of identity which is the source of desire, the desire to regain unity with the mother - the lost object. The symbolic father signifies the basic triadic structure of the
social. The closed world of the mother/child dyad is forced apart by the Other. The response of the child is to seek to acquire the role of the Other - the third term - to become the generalized Other of the mother - to restore the primal dyad. For Lacan this represents the awareness of language, of the function of naming objects. Through the process of sublimation and repression in the development of the child, the object becomes the object of desire - that which holds the promise of fulfilling desire for the lost object - but which, of course, never can. The ontological status of desire, therefore, is of an experienced 'lack' which can never be fulfilled, and yet which, at the same time, gives rise to a constant striving, motivation, to fill it. In other words, desire is omnipresent and inescapable. (For a detailed explanation of the relationship between Lacanian desire and motivation, see Leather, 1983.)

The Lacanian Lack which gives rise to desire leads in turn to action if desire is to be 'gratified'. Does this then imply a purely unstructured (ie., random) model of human behaviour? - which, if it was the case, would surely render futile any attempt to generalise about human behaviour. Fortunately, this is not the case, as action is informed by the specific possibilities in the symbolic structure for filling the lack. Leclaire has argued that the drive for gratification - pleasure -

"is linked to the satisfaction given by an object whose only value is its imperceptible difference from a lost model." (Lemaire, 1979:169)

(i.e., the lost object). In other words, it is the perceptible difference between objects as regards their potential for gratification which allows differential motivation towards various objects. Thus action vis a vis particular objects will be more or less motivated, dependent upon their apparent possibilities for regaining the lost object. It is obvious that the importance of an object - Other - lies not in itself but in its symbolic significance. However, most importantly, as
will become apparent in the discussion of the Gift, what the individual desires from the Other is to be recognised by the Other, i.e., the object of desire is recognition (Lacan, 1980:58). According to Lemaire (1979)

"Every desire, even the apparently purest of desires, is a desire to have oneself recognised by the other, ... and a desire to impose oneself in some way upon the other" (p.174, emphasis added)

and again, it is the desire to impose which is fundamental to the Gift. The possibility for understanding behaviour is a function of the procedure for creating identity, furnished by the symbolic order within the social structure, as, for example, exemplified in the Hegelian Master/Slave dialectic (see, for example, Wilden, 1980:30).

Greatly simplified, this process is as follows: in the social we enter into a pre-existing world which is not of our creation or making, but of those who 'went before', essentially the Lacanian Real (2). For example, a person born today experiences the de facto, a priori, existence of football and nuclear bombs, he does not bring them with him at birth. As Bowie (1979) explains,

"... the Real is that which is there, already there, and inaccessible to the subject ... when we appear on the scene as subjects certain games have already been played, certain dice thrown. Things are." (p.133, emphasis in original)

Of course, 'appearing on the scene' is not merely a question of our physical birth, but of our continual entry into a constantly 'new' social existence. We are, however, not provided with any authoritative 'meaning' to be found in the symbolic order of society, we have to acquire it, largely by inference. Even where, prima facie, information is provided, it is inescapably at the level of the autonomous signifier. What the signified may be, for us, is essentially personal. Thus, as regards sexuality, Lacan (1979) states that
"... the human being has always to learn from scratch from the Other what he has to do, as man or as woman." (p.204)

- such learning being accessible only through the signifier. Given the fundamental importance of this insight, I will attempt a more general illustration, as follows.

Imagine, for instance, walking into a room and encountering a person with a pack of playing cards who is engaged in a game of ordinary Patience, and let us assume that we know nothing about cards. After studying the play for a while we might discern that there are 52 cards of four suits, ordered from 1-10 with Jack, Queen, King having the effective numerical values of 11, 12, and 13. We may further come to realise that, whereas 2-Queen obey some particular logic, Ace and King behave differently. Thus we may come to understand the rules and purpose of the game, (of course, we do not know it is a game), and may conclude that we understand the use/utility of cards, eg., 52 cards, one person, certain objective. We then walk into a second room and find a similar pack of cards being used by 4 people playing Solo Whist. Here the cards are being used to a different purpose and with different rules, (the medium remains the same, but the syntax and the semantics have changed). We may eventually reconstruct, more or less, the purpose, procedure and outcome of the game, and expand our understanding of cards to a 'game', (though whether we know it is a game is another matter), played with 52 cards according to variable rules, by a number of people. We then proceed to a third room and find a game of Bezique in progress. Here we only have two players, but this is no problem as we already know this as a variable and, apart from having different rules, procedures, etc., we may assume a variation of what we have already witnessed. However, if we are observant, we will realise that something is different. The cards are just like the ones with which we are already familiar, but there are no 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6, and every card there is, is there twice, i.e.,
we have 64 cards, yet less variety than the previous games. And another
difference, the hierarchy is disrupted. We have already experienced Ace being
high or low, but, as it is a polar card, this does not take too much accomodating -
but here we have the 10 coming between King and High Ace, so it appears that the
symbolic value of a card hierarchy is not just its substantive numerical value -
strange indeed. Imagine coming across more and more card games until we
understood how they all functioned, we would still not necessarily know it was a
game. If, at the end, we were given this information, could we then use it to
understand, say, chess? - ie., other games - could we understand other uses of the
word 'game', as in 'hunted animal', 'cripple' or 'on the game' - prostitution?
Probably not. Even at this point we are not aware of a great deal of the other
symbolic meanings, eg., why 4 suits, why 'Hearts', 'Clubs', 'Diamonds', 'Spades',
why picture cards, etc. True, we could perhaps get a book which would tell us all
this, but we still would not know why the people were playing.

If all these problems attach to a relatively discrete entity such as cards, how
much more attaches to the experienced world at large? Even if we were very
lucky and had the 'rules of life' in a book or some equivalent medium, it would still
leave us unaware of the symbolic meanings. In other words, to understand the
things which are amenable to our senses does not allow us access to the meaning
contained in them. There is very little recorded information on symbolic
meanings and, where there is, it is, at best, partial and the unrecorded meaning
can often be mutually exclusive, eg., the Union Jack has an official symbolic
meaning, but numerous unofficial ones, some of which are mutually exclusive - as
a symbol of freeing people for democracy or as a symbol of imperialistic
oppression, etc.
The argument being forwarded here is, of course, for a social existence on the deep structure/surface structure model, where the surface structure (signifier), ie., that which is available to us through direct experience, is symbolic of an underlying meaning (signified). Now whereas access to the surface symbols is 'relatively' easy (or made easy) for the 'person in the world', access to the meaning structure is not, and cannot be directly given, ie., it must be acquired, inferred, etc., by the individual. True, in some cases partial and biased (interested) interpretations can be offered, but these are themselves symbolic systems, and contain the same problems of ambiguity.

This not knowing, or estrangement from the world of the Other, is the central lack in man posited by Lacan. (True, the world of the Other continually evolves in his presence, ie., whilst in the world, but access is no more given than it was initially.) However, to exist in the world we must acquire (partial) access to the world of the Other, ie., we strive to fill the lack, and this is the basis of desire. Obviously, we can never fill the lack, to do so we would have to become the Other, at which point we would no longer be that which is distinct from the Other, ie., the self or I. However, filling the lack is not even achievable in principle, if only, ignoring the psycho-analytic limitations, because of proliferating variety. If achieved, it would be the end of the social, end of difference, no energy, all sameness. Thus like someone condemned to fill a bucket with water using only a sieve, we are condemned to try to fill the lack - even though this can never be done.

Equally, to live in the presence of total lack is impossible. In this case, we would be nothing, totally isolated, unable to communicate, unable to understand our existence. Whereas with a filled lack all is sameness, with a total lack all is difference. Thus we are condemned to the limbo between the anomic of
difference and the oblivion of sameness, and it is desire which maintains us in this condition.

Desire then is to gain access to the Other, or, more properly, desire of the Other. It is this desire which produces specific action, i.e., it is the source of motivation. Returning to the example of the playing cards: on our first encounter, card playing existed in the world of the Other, it was not of our world. If we are to join the world of the Other (card players), we must, of course, ideally learn the syntax of cards, but, more important, we must learn the semantics, i.e., the symbolic meanings. (It is possible to share the world of the card players to some extent without being able to play cards.) Imagine for a moment that the world of the Other contained but a single characteristic - card playing. If we do not enter the world of card playing we live in a state of nothingness, we have no social existence. (To share meaning we must take on, initially, the meaning of the Other - we cannot just import our own meaning.) As we acquire an understanding of cards we begin to be social - we gain a relationship with the Other.

As Lacan (1979) said,

"The Other is the locus in which is situated the chain of the signifier that governs whatever may be made present of the subject - it is the field of that living being in which the subject has to appear." (p.203, emphasis added)

It is to the question of the Other that I will now turn.

**Other**

Central to the Lacanian argument is the concept of otherness. Such a concept has a long history - e.g., Descartes and the separation of I and other. The more recent
symbolic interactionist approach sees, to varying degrees, the I and other as mutually defining yet part of the same whole, (Mead, 1962), ie., the I is known because it is not the other - in the context of work, part of a worker knowing he is a worker is knowing that he is not a manager. In other words, one of the defining characteristics of self is difference - as was explored earlier, in the context of how some forms come to predominate. In the same way that organisations can achieve an identity through difference, so can the individual.

Imagine a quantity of water in a condition of perfect stillness - at least to the human eye. Within that mass it is impossible to identify one unit of water vis a vis the rest. If we take a unit of the same quality of water and add it to the mass, once any disturbance has settled it will be impossible to identify the water which was added and, for all practical purposes, it will be impossible to recover from the mass the water which was added, ie., the same molecules. All this is obvious and can be explained by reference to the fact that the added water has no distinguishing features vis a vis the rest, ie., it contains no difference. There is no way in which, by sight, we can identify the added portion. If we want to distinguish one part of the water from another part, we must create some difference. For example, dropping a pebble into the water will cause some surface change, so that a ripple can be distinguished from a not-ripple. We can create a spatial difference by extracting a portion of the water, ie., we construct a spatial (symbolic?) boundary - (with water we also need a more material boundary in the shape of a container). The water extracted thus acquires a separate identity by virtue of acquiring some difference, in this case spatial position. It is this bounding process, this creation of difference, that allows the self to be understood as unique in comparison to the rest of society, eg., the worker/manager distinction already mentioned.
However, otherness does not have to be seen purely in terms of other living creatures, (human or otherwise - i.e., I am a man because I am not a dog or a cat), but also in terms of inanimate objects. For example, books serve as an indicator of relative literary-ness, (amongst other things), cars can indicate social status, etc. Returning to the example of the cards, imagine for the moment that we encounter only the cards and not the players. Furthermore, imagine the cards are the only other component of our world, besides ourselves. We could perhaps argue that selfhood would be established by a realisation that we were not cards. However, more than this, we may be able to establish some interaction with the cards. One is reminded of the Wink Martindale song 'Deck of Cards', where a soldier used the characteristics of the cards to remind him of certain social facts, e.g., a card for each week of the year, the number of spots for the days of the year, four suits for four seasons, etc. - cards were prayer book, almanac, etc., and, despite the awfulness of the song, one could perhaps see that a person isolated with a pack of cards might use them to this end, i.e., they provide identity with a greater social world.

The binary nature of the I/other relationship is crucial to identity. But, as previously argued, difference or boundary creation is essentially arbitrary. We noted how we could create identity for a unit of water by separating it from the mass, yet the form of the boundary and that which is contained, as opposed to that which is not, is purely arbitrary. The set of molecules of water we scoop out could, for our purposes, be any other set - but it is this concept of purpose which defines the particular boundary or difference. For example, if we wish to drink some water, we may use a tumbler to differentiate our extraction; however, if we wanted to bathe, we would probably use a bucket to differentiate - of course, in these examples we give a different end purpose (teleology) to the extraction - thirst-quenching versus cleansing.
If we focus on organisational identities, e.g., worker, manager, following from earlier arguments, the concretisation of such identities must be seen as essentially arbitrary, in so far as there are no a priori imperatives which dictate this distinction. A word of clarification on the terms 'worker', 'manager', is necessary here. It was argued earlier that most organisational employees exhibit characteristics, to a greater or lesser degree, of both workers and managers. However, here we are considering identities rather than characteristics. Notwithstanding that the terms 'worker' and 'manager' as identities are relatively loose, it is fair to say that they serve some purpose, albeit as stereotypes, as social identifiers. For example, some people, as regards self identity, would claim to be workers or managers, and would so identify others. However, is a foreman a manager or a worker? A common split is that those below him hierarchically see him as a manager, whereas those above him see him as a worker - but what does the foreman think he is? It is, of course, possible to see oneself (or others) as manager in one context and worker in another. Equally, such titles may have a formal as well as an informal contextual meaning. Again, foremen provide a good example, as, although often they are formally considered part of the management team, say as regards the organisation chart, (albeit lower management), it is quite usual in some industries for them to be grouped with the workers, with whom they are identified, for pay and conditions.

It can be seen that as an identifier, or symbol, or metonym, titles such as worker or manager lack any (scientific?) precision, and can only be understood in terms of context and by reference to the operant meta-language. In terms of trying to appropriate the concepts of worker/manager in the world of the other, there is no appeal to an instruction manual, all we can do is acquire a (partial) understanding through usage - partial in the sense that such understandings are not universal but,
at best, shared by certain sections of society (unified more or less ideologically?). Such words and their usage form parts of particular (Foucauldian) discourses, representing more or less particular power relationships or interests (Foucault, 1971, 1972; with specific reference to organisation, see Daudi, 1985).

Given the imprecision in such concepts in terms of what they represent or symbolise, it is obviously important to question how they come to arise in their particular historical forms, and what interests they are serving.

It has already been suggested that managers and workers exist in an asymmetric power relation which favours management, that management action, despite its insistence, has no claim to a transcendent rationality and that its power is substantially to exercise a level of socially unnecessary repression over workers. However, there is no claim that management exercises its power in its own interest. To be sure, defining management interest at the collective or individual level is not a simple (if possible) task, and is compounded by the inherent heterogeneity of management, as previously discussed. However, what can be said is that their efforts do not promote their own immediate interest, in so far as their benefits are received vicariously from those who are the immediate beneficiaries, namely the capitalists. Management logic of action is derived from this capitalist interest (albeit mediated by management's own ideology), and not from the immediacy of their own position. To accept these as congruent would require management generally to heed the 'security' provided by deferring to the capitalist the risks of their ventures. Of course, in practice, they can only defer part of this risk, in so far as their fortunes are regulated by, or dependent upon, those of capital. Were this collective neurotic dependency to exist because it was socially induced by the very structure of our material society, it would not vitiate or legitimate the continuation of this condition/relationship. This could only be achieved by recourse to some naturalistic justification, which, of course, must be rejected here.
The origins of manager/worker meaning, (ie., meaning in the symbols manager/worker), as enforced by management as part of the process of organisational control, reflects the interests of capital, (and, of course, the status differential of management, which is here distinguished from 'genuine' interest). In other words, the particular semantic form represents the interests of social domination. These concepts are presented as absolutes, and are not negotiable. Neither are they presented in opposition to their negation. There can be no negative, as only one 'interpretation' is possible - it is not a binary concept but a unitary concept, in so far as it contains and incorporates its own negation by appealing to a superior level of discourse (see Deleuze and Guattari, 1984:255; D'Amico, 1978). To be sure, there is 'another way', but that gives disorder, chaos, anarchy, and who wants that? Given that 'no-one (in their right minds) wants that', then the only way to achieve what we do want is by accepting the received wisdom of the historically current form of social domination.

Thus management, as otherness, in addition to being, by definition, given, is of a particular form which presents itself as relatively immutable. To question its position requires a language which is not recognised by the dominant rationality and thus, by definition, is irrational, illogical, ideological, etc. Thus the social order of work reproduces itself. Given the almost total presence of this particular form of otherness, we are obliged, for the reasons articulated earlier, to seek to fill our lack by recourse to this Other. Now, admittedly otherness is not as one-dimensional as this. There is a life outside work which also forms part of generalised otherness, which, on the one hand, certainly does contain elements, or at least seeds, of an alternate rationality(s) and which permits a reflexivity on the nature of work relationships - The Great Refusal. On the other hand, this world is also contaminated by/contains characteristics of, and reflects, the logic, ethics, etc., of the dominant capitalist interest. However, given the almost total penetration of the current form of organisational rationality, at least formally,
opportunities for reacting against it are very limited in terms of formal action, and exist principally at the informal level - e.g., if one wishes to retain one's livelihood as furnished by a particular organisation, formally to oppose its activities, such as questioning the morality of some of its acts, would certainly lead to the organisation dispensing with the dissenter's services. Thus, to a very large extent, individuals in the world must accept the particular form of organisational otherness as determined by interests other than their own.

An interesting and illuminating parallel can be drawn here between organised work and the world of the prison. Prisoners (workers) exist in a social arrangement, in which participation is more or less mandatory and to which no alternative forms are offered. The day to day (formal) organisational rationality is determined by prison officers (managers), who control the formal language of the organisation. However, in performing this task they are not enacting their own immediate interests, but are acting as agents in the service of - depending upon one's interpretation - the interest of the state, the interests of the state as interpreted by the judiciary, or a predominantly sectarian interest (incidentally largely that of capital). Whereas the prisoner does have informal access to an alternative rationality, his possibilities are strictly limited. Organisational principles and how they are to be interpreted are largely under the control of others, with whom interaction is necessary. However, whereas a dialectical relationship might be posited, this cannot be, as the prison officers act, not on their own behalf, but on the behalf of others, i.e., management is always an intermediary. Otherness, and therefore self, is informed by a pre-existing, non-negotiable, immutable actuality, (see, of course, Foucault's 'Discipline and Punish', 1979).

It can be seen that the opportunities for filling the central lack through the mediation of the Other - and, therefore, for motivation - are, to a large extent, circumscribed by the particular social form of organised work. Clearly, with this
scenario there are greater or lesser opportunities for seeking the informal Other, which is, to a greater or lesser degree, contaminated by the formal structure. However, as regards the raison d'être of particular social forms of organised work, the organisation, through its managers, arrogates to itself - (pace counter-vailing tendencies - see, as a possible illustration, Giddens (1979), on Dialectic of Control) - the power to determine the particular form of work related events, activities, etc.

The correspondence between the individual's lack and the lack-filling opportunities provided by the organisation, formally and informally, is crucial in terms of motivation. Furthermore, if legitimate lack, (legitimate in terms of congruency with the requirements of an emancipated society), is to find the possibility of satisfaction within organisational life, it is obvious that organisations must be fitted to people, rather than the other way round, as at present.

The experienced lack is clearly multi-dimensional and consequently so is desire. Failure to understand this characteristic results in a highly reductionist conception of motivation. Matte Blanco (1975) warns of the dangers of three dimensional thinking in conceptualising human psychology, informed, no doubt, by our experience of Cartesian Space. One can see this perhaps in Herzberg's theory, where motivation is explicated in terms of the dimensions of work, motivators and hygiene factors (though one could conceptualize this as only two dimensional, as motivators and hygiene factors are essentially on the same dimension). One might also point to this tendency in terms of methodology, in, eg., Bulmer's (1977) argument for triangulation, as an example of its pervasive influences on thought. If we were to succeed in filling the lack, (which is impossible), we would reach a state of zero degree social interaction - the absence of difference - the one dimensional society. One of the dominant forces in the logic of management (in its wider social sense) is the reduction of difference. One meaning of 'to
rationalise' is to reduce variety or difference. We see this at the organisational level, but also at the political level. For example, decimalisation and metrification were attempts to reduce difference. Attempts have been made to make clock time in the U.K. match that in Europe. The E.C.U. is an attempt to standardise monetary units. The list is endless. If we were to achieve this ultimate undifferentiated state, it would be the end of desire. How can it be then, that the dominant interest seeks to reduce desire, whilst at the same time, it has been argued, one of their objectives is to stimulate desire (as per Deleuze and Guattari)? This again provides a powerful reason for distinguishing between incentive and motivation, for the desire being suppressed is that identified with motivation, whilst that being promoted is of incentive.

It has been argued that there is a, by and large, spontaneous desire which motivates action. The origins of the particular form of this spontaneity are obscure (deriving from the formative experiences, particularly of early life), but are manifest as the lack. Now spontaneity is one of the phenomena that must be suppressed by rational organisation, in favour of the promotion of calculated and structured action - action in favour of the ends of interest being served by the organisation (see also the anarchist arguments of Guillet de Monthenoux, 1983). It is this form of desire which is being suppressed in favour of a controlled desire maintained by incentive - in fact, one could suggest the term DESIRE MANAGEMENT. Sex in advertising provides a paradigm case of this condition, as noted. At the same time as repression of sexual desire is officially encouraged, sexual incentives are widely used to promote commerce, even in areas where there is no obvious connection. Sex is used to promote the desire to acquire capitalist goods - perish the thought that it should encourage unorganised sexual activity (see Marcuse, 1969, on organisation of sexuality). Given the tenuous link between the signifier and the intended signified, it can be seen that the incentive
value of sex is for the symbol (and, hopefully, vicariously for the product), i.e., the incentive is to create desire for the symbol. The symbol is the only thing that the subject can access - he cannot achieve the sex object, only the symbol. We are reaching a stage where symbols do not symbolise anything substantive, (eg., badge engineering in cars). The symbol is becoming everything - it symbolises itself. Symbols are used to create/denote artificial difference - which is really no difference. True, there is a supposed difference and the possibility of vicarious satisfaction via the product, but there is no direct or spontaneous connection. (For example, sex is widely used to promote industrial goods, where the subject of the incentive does not even use the good.)

It can also be suggested that desire management is primarily concerned with the material rather than the social. Accordingly, incentives are aimed at stimulating material desires rather than social ones. Where social incentives are used, eg., holiday advertising, the product is still the ultimate goal, rather than the social. Possibly man is basically non-materialistic as regards spontaneous desire, i.e., spontaneous desire reflects the social rather than the material, and where material, it is only as means to a social end. Hence the need in capitalist society for incentives which promote the material.

It is interesting to note that self-actualisation, (and its related interpretations), is exclusively seen in material terms, rather than social - (I am thinking here of managerial uses of the concept of self-actualisation). Self-actualisation is interpreted in terms of a creative propensity re. material goods, eg., job enrichment strategies are held to stimulate the creative desire to produce goods.
If man has this basic creativity, why not see it in terms of social creativity, rather than material? This, of course, would be no good for those seeking to apply incentives, but may fit in well with motivation in terms of providing a lack filling opportunity. We can point here to Bataille's argument for the generalised economy, which includes such non-material exchanges but which, of course, can find no place in the restricted economy, in which they have no use value.
CHAPTER 8

THE GIFT RELATIONSHIP

I introduce and define the Maussian concept of the Gift, and use Leach's extension of this, whereby he furnishes a model of social man as Gift giver. I consider some of the more functionalist explanations and uses of the Gift, in terms of exchange theory and the promotion of a stable society. I reject such explanations in favour of seeing the giving of gifts as an operationalisation of the Lacanian desire - man gives gifts in order to fill his lack. This requires an understanding of the Gift in symbolic rather than material terms, as a signifier of man's desire to locate himself in the Other. I examine the principles of the Gift relationship in the light of the construction which I am placing on it.

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Introduction to the Gift

It is important to establish at the outset that the scientific concept of the Gift is distinct from the ordinary language use of the same expression and as commonly understood in Western Culture. The common understanding of a gift is in terms of a voluntary, altruistic act, usually of material nature - for example, Birthday and Christmas gifts. I will argue later that the idea of such dis-interested giving is in fact an inadequate understanding of the processes involved, as such gestures indicate self interest rather than altruism, but, for the moment, it can be said that, at best, giving of this type forms only a small subset of the total process of the Gift relationship.
The origin of the scientific concept of the Gift is conventionally attributed to the French sociologist and anthropologist, Marcel Mauss (1872-1950). The essence of the Maussian concept of the Gift, rather than altruism, is one of obligation and interest - 'we give in order that we may receive'. Mauss saw this as a fundamental component of establishing and maintaining social order and cohesion by creating a mutuality, and interdependence, between individuals and between groups. However, as Hamnett (1983:496) has suggested, Mauss' concept has been more noted for prompting the development of the idea by other theorists, than as a fully integrated thesis in its own right, and the present work is no exception to this trend. I will argue that Mauss' theorising of the Gift shows at best a partial understanding of the significance of his insight, even to the extent that the very description 'Gift' is possibly a misleading appellation. It is perhaps the Surrealist, Georges Bataille, who has provided one of the most penetrating insights into the Gift, who captures its essential nature in his preferred term - depense (expenditure), (Bataille, 1985; Richman, 1982).

Mauss argued the theory of the Gift in his seminal work, 'Essai sur le don', (translated Cunnison, as 'The Gift', Mauss, 1969), where he considered the ceremonial exchange of gifts in primitive (archaic) cultures and sought to establish the Gift as an essential prerequisite of a social existence. The raison d'être of the gift is, according to Mauss, "economic self-interest" (p.1) and, whereas one could not gainsay this claim, its veracity lies not in the conventional understanding of economic - the restricted economy - "restricted to commercial values ... a "science dealing with the utilization of wealth," limited to the meaning and the established value of objects, and to their circulation", (Derrida, 1978:271, emphasis omitted), but in the understanding of the general economy - the economy of the self (see Prologue, note 1). As an understanding of the general economy in opposition to the usual restricted economy is necessary to my later arguments, it
is opportune to undertake a short digression in order to explicate this concept. In the science of Economics relevant commodities are those which possess a discrete exchange value. In other words, Economics represents a bounding of such exchanges from a background of all possible exchanges. Those which possess an 'objective' exchange value thus count as part of Economics and those which do not are deemed outside its sphere of interest. However, there is nothing intrinsic to the concept of exchange which prescribes such a bounding. To be sure, such bounding may have relevance for a science of Economics, but hardly accounts for the perceived value in an exchange to the individual. Thus, for example, the exchange of words in conversation is prima facie an instance of exchange with relative value for its participants, but would not feature in an economist's calculations. The restricted economy of Economics therefore takes as real only those exchanges within the total set of all exchanges which form a subset to which 'objective' values can be assigned, and ignores the residual subset of non-'valued' exchanges, i.e., those which have only sensuous values. Thus, for example, when a soldier dies in battle his exchange of life for death concerns the restricted economy only in so far as there is a calculable balance between the savings to be made in maintaining him as a fighting entity and the loss of his services in achieving the objective of defeating the enemy. However, it would be naive to suggest that this was the limit of the concern of the soldier involved. The soldier possesses the identity of self which is implicated in the exchange, and we cannot argue that this lacks any ontological status when compared to his quantitative exchange value. This then indicates the importance of the idea of the general economy - the set of all possible meaningful exchanges, meaningful in so far as they inform the identity of the self (see also Simmel, 1971:43-44).

The relevance of this basic proposition will be emphasised when it is understood that Bataille formulated his theory of the general economy in relation to Hegel's
Master/Slave dialectic. The Master's identity depends upon his recognition by his Slave and, for Hegel, the preservation of the life of the Master, as one who risks his life on the battlefield, is essential, as "without this "economy of life" the supreme proof of self would be eliminated." (Richman, 1982:66). However, the 'economy of life', as expressing a concern for presence, or objective value, in essence relates to the restricted economy. Bataille chooses to concentrate, not on the potential for conservation, but on expenditure - sacrifice. Identity confirmed merely by presence is a static concept drawing substance, not from any qualitative notion of self, but from its quantitative status - form rather than content. The Slave merely reflects the presence of the Master, as object rather than subject. For Richman, this underlies Derrida's distinction, already noted, between différence and différence (Derrida, 1978, 1982). Différence in this sense requires presence, as does the restricted economy, in so far as commodities which count in the restricted economy must have the potential for physical presence - the potential of being realised. Différence, on the other hand, 'requires' presence only in a metaphysical sense, otherwise, for example, we could not have a concept of history, and, whereas history has little relevance to the restricted economy, it does have relevance, a least for some, if only emotionally, which illustrate its significance to the general economy. Whereas the restricted economy only deals with expenditures which have the potential for material presence, the general economy contains all possible expenditures. Accordingly, the restricted economy concerns itself with production, without which there is no presence, whilst the general economy concerns itself with expenditure - material or emotional but always symbolic. Without expenditure the identity of Master and Slave is semantically one of différence. Expenditure or sacrifice is what creates identity, even to the point of the ultimate sacrifice - death. The soldier may choose death as a statement of his identity, but this is distinguished from his death being forced upon him by others, in effect his Masters. Identity thus stems from the total possibilities of exchange, the possibility of expenditure which will serve to
promote awareness of self - the hedonistic tendency, the 'pleasure principle' (Bataille, 1985) - see also Freud, (1922), 'Beyond the Pleasure Principle', on the economy of the psychic processes.

To return to the more conventional understanding of Mauss' argument: whereas he has pointed to the ubiquity of giving as a social phenomenon, in its symbolic form, as opposed to the restricted material sense, there is an unfortunate tendency on the part of Mauss, and other writers, (see below), to stress the material aspects. It will be one of the objectives of this work to re-emphasise the non-material aspect of the gift exchange.

Mauss has written:

"We shall note the various principles behind this necessary form of exchange (which is nothing less than the division of labour itself)," (p.1),

in which he is suggesting that division of labour presupposes a relative economic surplus which can be exchanged. As Brown (1985) notes,

"It is only at a very advanced level of organization that households dare to depend on something other than their own production for economic necessities." (p.260)

In a scarce economy, the individual family must look to its own efforts to provide for its survival, in effect a subsistence economy. As relative surplus becomes available, so the basis for exchange emerges. In the absence of a mediating commodity (money), direct exchange of goods must occur - 'A' gives his surplus to 'B' in return for 'B's surplus - such that, Brown claims,

"The division of labor does not grow out of the realm of economic necessities in the strict sense, but out of the realm of economic surplus." (p.260)

It is this point that Bataille takes up in relation to the general economy,
"which looks at excess rather than scarcity, consumption rather than production for the etiology of social solidarity and conflict." (Richman, 1982:2)

The Gift therefore necessitates the prior existence of surplus. Furthermore, the transition from a state of total consumption to a state of surplus also supposes the establishment of the division of labour - i.e., an exchange society. As Gouldner (1973) describes it,

"...reciprocity is conceived as the complement to the fulfillment of the division of labour. It is the pattern of exchange through which the mutual dependence of people, brought about by the division of labour, is realized." (p.240)

Exchange or giving is carried on at the level of surplus as an exchange or disposal of surplus. However, I will argue later that to see exchange in terms of division of labour is unduly restrictive, as it constitutes nothing less than the division of identity or self.

The Three Obligations

The institutionalisation of the Gift relationship resulted in the emergence of three obligations - (i) to give, (ii) to receive, (iii) to reciprocate - which endow the relationship with its cyclic, ongoing nature.

Obligation to Give - Mauss explains the rationale of the obligation to give in terms of achieving social recognition - not status, but recognition by the generalised other. In other words, not to give is to be non-social, to be lost in the background of undifferentiated nature. It is giving which identifies us, which differentiates us - it is the emergence, or arising, of difference, it signifies our inclusion in the social whole, it signifies our participation in the social. In an archaic society, to remain apart, in addition to the risk to the individual, also represented a risk to the social whole. Not to give may deprive others of some material necessity, say,
where one person or tribe controls a particular commodity. On the other hand, it may signify hostility, or at the very least, some confusion over group identity:

"To refuse to give ... is ... the equivalent of a declaration of war; it is a refusal of friendship and intercourse." (Mauss, op. cit.:11)

Thus repeated instances of giving represent a reinforcement of a commitment to the social, a commitment in primitive societies deriving from a desire to avoid conflict. In modern societies the obligation to give retains this function. It can be seen, for example, at the international level in terms of overseas aid, where a commodity scarce to one country is furnished by another which has a surplus, albeit for a price, material or ideological. It is also found, in a more active and specific sense at the social level. This is where gift giving in its popular sense provides a useful illustration of the obligation to give. For example, with Christmas presents: although in the U.K. the practice is both geographically and culturally varied and changes over time, there becomes established within particular social groups, say, families, an accepted gift giving protocol. Arbitrary and unilateral change in this practice is likely to cause confusion within the group, at least until the new behaviour is rationalised and 'understood'. Certain expectations arise as to the nature, quality, etc., of the gift and, again, to vary these may be threatening to the group. Other obligations to give also exist in society, for example, with regard to charities, such as the Poppy Day appeal, or social bodies, such as Churches. Office collections also provide an interesting illustration of the obligation to give.

**Obligation to Receive** - No less than the obligation to give is the obligation to receive. Violating this obligation can be seen as having two forms, refusing the gift through feelings of (a) inferiority or (b) superiority. If a person feels unable to accept a gift through, say, lack of self-confidence, this may be seen symbolically as a refusal to take part in a social relationship, in effect refusing to
pick up the thrown-down gauntlet. However, more seriously, it may be seen as a sign of hostility to the giver and is therefore potentially dangerous to the giver - for example, the refused handshake. Hostility may be of a very material nature, e.g., war, or may be more symbolic, in the nature of a 'put-down' - a statement that the giver is unfit for social intercourse, a social snub. Whatever the reason, the failure to receive effectively blocks any possibility of a developing relationship, at least on equal terms, and is effectively a gesture against social solidarity.

**Obligation to Repay** - Having received a gift the recipient accepts the obligation to repay the gift - hence the idea of the gift as indicative of an exchange society. To fail to repay is, again, effectively to degrade or destroy the relationship, with perhaps a change of emphasis where the odium accrues totally to the defaulter. However, more than just an obligation to repay, there is the imperative that repayment should be appropriate to the original gift. An inadequate repayment may indicate an inability to repay, with the attendant possibility, (at least in archaic society), of loss of face or status. Alternatively, it may indicate an unwillingness to recognise the value of the original gift, suggesting meanness or, perhaps, a deliberate snub. To be over-generous in repayment may also degrade the relationship. Again, it may be an inference on the value of the original gift, or it may carry added significance - turning a prima facie repayment into a bribe as a way of shaping or influencing the nature of future exchanges.

Though Mauss' treatment of the Gift is of little direct help in terms of the present work, he does lay down the irreducible conditions for the Gift which inform the subsequent argument, namely:-
The Gift relationship is a social phenomenon which is interested.
There is an obligation to give, receive and repay.
Repayment must be appropriate.

Mauss, then, has suggested a fundamental structure of social existence, perhaps most thoroughly explicated by Levi-Strauss in 'The Elementary Structures of Kinship' (1969). Where, or when, society develops, if only heuristically, from a posited atomistic/individualistic structure to an interactive/mutually dependent one, some conditions for that mutuality are necessary (Gouldner, 1973:281). This is achieved through the giving of a surplus to other persons, along with the obligation that, at some point, a repayment must be made. This interdependence, which introduces notions of trust, honour, responsibility, identity, etc., necessary to social existence, promotes over time a solidarity - gives existential confidence and makes investment in the social worthwhile (Gouldner, op. cit.:252-3).

As Sahlins (1974) puts it,

"The 'Essai sur le don' is a kind of social contract for the primitives." (p.169)

However, this essentially calculative model assumes a high degree of rationality and conscious action which leaves many unanswered questions.

The Gift and Materiality

Whilst most commentators on the Gift, including Mauss, stress that it is not to be seen in terms of material exchanges, equally, as noted, most seem to concentrate on this aspect. Mauss clearly expresses the inherent heterogeneity of the Gift when he claims
"... what they exchange is not exclusively goods and wealth, real and personal property, and things of economic value. They exchange rather courtesies, entertainments, ritual, military assistance, women, children, dances, and feasts; ..." (p.3)

The nature of the Gift must be seen as essentially symbolic. All the items identified by Mauss above clearly have a constitutive symbolic value. As Sahilins (1974:168) summarises Mauss' 'argument', it is the exchange of everything between everybody and 'everything' is a symbol. That is, the things that are exchanged are not necessarily materially important, so much as important in what they represent. That the things in themselves are unimportant is emphasised by the fact that in some archaic societies, as part of the ritual giving, the goods were deliberately destroyed, (see, for example, Mauss, op. cit., Ch.1, on the Potlach).

In terms of semiotic theory, of course, this is of no surprise - symbols and meanings, signifiers and signifieds, are, by their nature, separate. Thus to appreciate the importance of the Gift we must consider it in two parts. Firstly, the symbol, which may or may not be material, and secondly, the significance underlying the symbol.

Thus with the Gift we see not so much the exchange of symbols, as the exchange of meanings. This will be explored in more detail when considering the concept of value. For the present, however, it is worth noting the idea of the symbolic Gift in relation to the three obligations of giving. As the nature of the symbol is relatively arbitrary, it can be seen that its particular form is generally irrelevant. As with Christmas presents, the present itself is variable but what remains 'constant' is that which is symbolised - in terms of the old adage, 'it's the thought that counts'. Certainly, in some classes of exchange the actual form is significant, eg., money, but, equally a similar process can be, and has been, achieved on the basis of variable goods. But money exchange should be seen as a particular/debased/distorted condition of the Gift. (Sociologically/psychologically
debased rather than symbolically debased.) Hence the need to understand the obligation to give in terms of its symbolic import.

Similarly, with the obligation to receive. Rejection implies not just a lack of desire for the Gift, but symbolises a rejection of the underlying intent. To accept carries with it the possibility of insincerity, as with many verbal exchanges, eg., at a diplomatic level (Trilling, 1972). To make a sincere acceptance requires recognition of the norms associated with the Gift, eg., the appropriate display - say the gift was a picture, to accept and openly put it in the loft would not be appropriate; lack of effusion, or too much, can equally question the sincerity of the recipient.

As regards repayment, the necessary appropriateness of the response has been noted. However, certain other conditions may pertain. Repayment may need to be public, (eg., honours), or private, (eg., affection). There may be a temporal dimension - say, if one is loaned something, to return too quickly, or too slowly, may be wrong, etc. However, as with all aspects of the Gift, what constitutes 'appropriate' is culturally specific.

**Leach and the Gift**

It has already been noted that beliefs about human activity carry with them, implicitly or explicitly, a model of man. Edmund Leach, in an essay 'Models of Man', (1972), has looked at such a concept in terms of the Gift. Leach's intention in this essay is to present a number of popular conceptualisations of man and to consider how they relate to the purpose and process of science. His suggestion of Cartesian Man, and its modified version, Darwinian Man, represent the popular naturalist stereotype underlying positivist science. In opposition, he presents Maussian Man, and its modified version, Marxian Man, as a way of introducing the
idea of human agency into science. What is important for this work is the
generalisation of the archaic process found in Mauss into a model applicable to, at
least Western, Social Science. To be sure, in Mauss there is the intention of
demonstrating a universal process which carries implications for modern man, but
the intent is more in terms of lessons to be learnt, rather than an extrapolation of
the past.

Leach has taken the implied characteristic of man as a giver of gifts, and has
made it explicit as a general case with direct relevance to theorising about
modern man. However, Leach finds Mauss' explanation of man as giver and
receiver as a means of securing solidarity, economic security and absence of war,
inadequate, as it ignores the concept of power. Now, it is certainly true that
Mauss ignores this point in his explanation of the meaning of gift giving, but it is
not true to say that the concept of the Gift itself excludes the idea of power. In
fact, Mauss quite clearly demonstrates how the Gift relationship does indeed
function within power hierarchies and across power boundaries, eg., between
tribes.

It is central to this work that the model of man as a gift giver can be retained
from Leach's work, whilst at the same time dealing with the shortcomings both
identified and ignored by Leach. A purely sociological explanation, in terms of
promoting the idea of a social and secure existence, is too superficial an
explanation, even incorporating the concept of power, to do justice to the concept
of man the giver. (If Gift exchange resulted from rational calculation, then the
same process would surely have refined the system so that, for example, goods
need not be destroyed, ie., more wealth created, or less work have to be
performed. Or, better still, created a social structure free from conflict, etc.,
based on pure reason.)
Mauss has argued that exchange represents an alternative to war. A philosophy of taking what one wants, (goods necessary or not), say, as popularly exemplified by the Viking raids on Britain, is at once wasteful, ignores the mutuality in the situation, does not allow for the proper use and distribution of necessary goods, promotes uncertainty, and is only of attraction to the powerful, and for as long as they can retain dominance. Thus an exchange society is a rational improvement on this condition, which promotes security and certainty, and optimises the utility in pre-surplus goods. The particular form of disposing of surplus goods is obviously not significant, as long as they are not a means of acquiring power or upsetting existing power relations.

However, the power of such a rational explanation, as offered by Mauss, is related to the existence of particular forms of society, and may be less applicable to others, such as our own. Clearly, the precise form of such exchange no longer applies, if only because of the intervention of money as a medium of exchange. If the thrust of Mauss' argument is cautionary, by trying to point to a more golden age of exchange, or merely to cite the importance of concentrating on exchange as a means of deferring conflict, then its use is limited. It is worth noting that the 'Essai sur le don' was written in the aftermath of the First World War, in the period of post-war 'attempted' economic reconstruction and attendant problems. However, if, after Leach, we are to see it as a generalisable statement about man, then this avoids the temporal/cultural limitation.

Sahlins, who develops Mauss' line of argument, sees a strong parallel with the Hobbesian idea of a social compact. The Gift becomes a form of political economy as a stable antidote to the war of all against all. In fact, Sahlins (1974) notes that "The primitive analogue of social contract is not the State, but the
gift." (p.169). However, this view of the rational use of the gift can be challenged from two directions. Firstly, in terms of it only offering a partial explanation of rational action and secondly, in terms of a particular scientific approach to explanation.

If rational thought determined that an exchange society was preferable to a conflictual society - perhaps, welfare rather than warfare society, (see Marcuse, 1986:48ff) - then one might ask why the same reasoning was not extended further. The recognition that human action could ameliorate some of the pain and general dysfunctions inherent in a social existence may be seen as an early form of radical humanism, reflecting an emancipatory interest - possibly, if seeing the entities of exchange in symbolic (language) terms, a suggestion of communicative competence, and most certainly a concern with the relationship between theory and social praxis. If this was the case, why was this approach so limited in its effect? Clearly, as Mauss relates (p.80), conflict was not eliminated - 'how close was feast to battle'. (In fact, one could perhaps argue that exchange merely deferred conflict (Gouldner, 1973:248-9).) If man could reason out his own best interest, then clearly there were no limits to the co-operative benefits which could be gained. Why then did he seek such a limited benefit? Gift giving as an emancipatory approach did not, in Mauss' example, alleviate the condition of women as goods, or eliminate power hierarchies. However, there are clear limitations in pursuing such questions, from a modern western point of view, save to say that the claim to rational thought was at best limited, and certainly ignores the psychology of man.

The second problem stems from the partiality of scientific explanation (paradigms). Mauss, having identified a particular set of social phenomena, was constrained by his own relatively functionalist position in explaining them. Science generally is constrained by the dominant forms of understanding of its
time. Habermas, in 'Knowledge and Human Interests', (1978), has argued how empirical-analytic and historical-hermeneutic research traditions are both informed by the prior belief in the presence of some pre-existing 'real', which is susceptible to identification, one way or another, and that such entities must be amenable to our existing modes of thought.

A good example of this is furnished by the interest in the origins of man. Neither of the two dominant western explanations, Creation and Evolution, are surprising as they both conform to existing empirical experience and, as such, provide adequate (as opposed to true) explanations. With creation, if we take the known empirical facts of new life emanating from the union of a man and a woman, then, logically, genus man must be traceable back to a first man and woman (Adam and Eve). How these arrived is first solved by making woman from man and man from God, QED. (Some form of the myth of creation (Eliade, 1967) is found in a wide variety of societies.) Clearly, without the presence of a divine creator, the first person could not be accounted for. The need to regress to an origin is also found in an evolutionary position, which can be seen as just a variant of the creation argument. Instead of regressing towards an ultimate parent, we regress to a more primitive life form. This in turn is regressible to the primeval slime, and the creation of protein via lightning, ie., life created from the physical world. The physical world can be further regressed to the big bang, and, in at least one explanation, the thing which banged was itself of infinite smallness. (This does not seem a million miles from counting the number of angels on a pinhead - a 'creationist theory' contemporary with evolutionary theory!)

This originism (Foucault, 1972) can be seen as endemic, at least to western modes of thought, (e.g., Gouldner, 1973:251), and can be seen as a further consequence of three dimensional thinking. The assumption that the world exists in three dimensions is a natural product of our experienced three dimensional environment,
and yet there is no transcendent reason why the world should be only three dimensional, (Matte Blanco, 1975). However, this mode of thinking clearly indicates the ultimate existence, in the past, of an origin, though why we are not moving towards, rather than away from, an origin is not explained, though it is quite consistent with three dimensional thought. Certainly, an impression of expansion, say, of population, gives the impression of moving away from something, but this is clearly no more than an impression, favoured by selecting some particular indicators. Other indicators could be seen as suggesting condensation, eg., communication, or perhaps better, reduction in the number of species. Such indicators give no clear justification for moving away, three dimensionally, from an origin. True, with the advent of a posited fourth dimension by Einstein, in the shape of a space-time continuum, we have the basis of a shift from the idea of a simple origin, and in fact some modern physics suggests an eleven dimensional universe (angels on pinheads again?), but even the concept of a fourth dimension has hardly been incorporated into explanations of the social world. (See New Physics writers, eg., Jones, 1983, on the absence of impact on science of the theory of relativity.) The empirical experience of time certainly gives credence to the idea of movement away from an origin - day following day, year following year, life following life, all support a linear view of time - though, of course, time as a circle would produce the same illusion, at least until the end of a cycle, but, given the relatively short duration of recorded time (history), this presents no problems of explanation. However, two dimensional time with life experienced, say, as a 'Brownian Motion', would similarly provide an explanation of experience, but without the need for the concept of origin. (It may also provide an explanation for the so-called paranormal - recrossing old paths.) This may not accord with the concept of time in modern physics, but, equally, not all people are aware of modern physics. All that matters is an adequate explanation of the empirical experience. (See Jones, op. cit., on time as metaphor.) (1)
To return to explanations of the Gift based upon the idea of social solidarity - to observe certain phenomena and seek the explanation by regressing to some prior condition and seeing the former evolving from the latter is the same appeal to an origin: a less ordered prior condition giving way to a subsequent more ordered condition as a process of betterment. Such a structural functional approach does, of course, require the notion, at least implicitly, of rational behaviour, i.e., the second case could be clearly seen as better than the first case. In fact, it is not going too far to claim that Mauss (and Sahlins) are actually using a model of Rational Economic Man in explaining the Gift, albeit with a somewhat particular view of economic, especially relevant with regard to the already mentioned dichotomy between the restricted and general economies. Certainly, to take Leach's point that Mauss' theory fails to deal with power, rational thought did not appear to be effective in regulating or emancipating other relationships.

However, if Leach's notion of man as a giver is to be of utility, an explanation which incorporates the 'irrational' is necessary. If giving is seen as an inherent psychological characteristic of man, then we move nearer to addressing the problem of the irrational. If giving was of the same order as, say, jealousy or affection or creativity, then the structural functional explanation can be made redundant and, at the same time, irrational behaviour can be explained, along with phenomena such as power.

Before exploring this issue, it is necessary to formulate a modern concept of the Gift relationship in terms of general social behaviour, and to develop the idea of a dynamic component, as opposed to the essentially static view taken by many writers. However, first of all, it is necessary to review the modern understanding of the Gift, as exemplified in functionalist sociology.
The Gift and Functionalist Sociology

The Gift relationship has proved an enduring source of interest to social science but, as I have already indicated, the emphasis has tended to be on explanations which focus on its influence on social structure and stability. Notwithstanding the awareness of the non-material possibilities of the Gift already referred to, it is the material aspect which arouses most interest in arguing its role in the survival of social relationships. My concern is to switch the focus from the social to the psychological, from the material gift to the general class of gifts, and from a concern with social survival to one of psychological survival. However, if only because of the sheer volume of work in this tradition, I wish to illuminate the treatment of the Gift in functionalist sociology. More importantly perhaps, there has been a large measure of similarity between various writers in this field, and it is important to establish that the interpretation of the Gift being offered here is not intended as a continuation of this tradition, but represents a significantly different usage of the concept.

The Gift has, to a large extent, in the functionalist tradition, been subsumed under the rubric of exchange theory, though not necessarily with a capital 'E'. This generalised view of exchange, as opposed to the more rigorous exposition of Exchange, is perhaps exemplified by Gouldner's 'Norm of Reciprocity'. Gouldner, (1973), has argued, by specific reference to the work of Merton and Parsons, amongst others, that functionalist sociology has an implicit notion of reciprocity central to its argument, and his concern is to make this explicit. Merton and, to a greater extent, Parsons adopt a naive systems approach to their explanations of social interaction or structure, and Gouldner is at pains to demonstrate that some sort of feedback mechanism is necessary to substantiate a systems understanding of human action, particularly with regard to stability and long run survival, and suggests that this is absent, citing Merton's work on the North American political
machine (Merton, 1957). Merton argues that the survival of the 'political machine' in spite of its 'illegality' can be explained by the latent functions which it can fulfill, which are not otherwise provided for. For Gouldner, this is prima facie an illustration of a reciprocal function - simply, people derive benefits from the 'political machine' and thus maintain its long run viability by making repayments to the 'machine' - the principle of reciprocity. However, Heath (1976, Ch.10) takes Gouldner to task for ignoring the opportunity cost analysis in specific acts of reciprocal behaviour which would result from a rational approach to exchange events - that is, reciprocation would be contingent on the benefits which would accrue from reciprocation, as opposed to those which could be obtained by other, non-reciprocative, behaviour. One of the problems for Heath is whether the rational choice approach to economic exchange can apply to the non-economic social exchange, as distinguished by Blau (1964). Social exchange, essentially the Maussian concept of the Gift, is distinguished from economic exchange because of the relative objectivity of the values present in the latter, and the quasi-legal status of such exchange. However, for Heath, the utility in the distinction suggested by Blau is lost because of Blau's application of economic theory to social exchange (Heath, op. cit.:115). It is not my intention to resolve this debate, but to point to the fundamental obsession in sociological use of the concept of the Gift - that of objective or calculable value. Various attempts have been made to explain the Gift relationship as exchange in terms of a rational calculus where expenditure and return could be objectively assessed, in effect, to the satisfaction of both parties to the exchange - see, for example, Homans' Rule of Distributive Justice, (Homans, 1973, Ch.4). Ekeh (1974) sees this as characteristic of the individualistic tradition in U.S./U.K. sociology, of which the above theorists are totally representative, which he contrasts with the European collective tradition - for example, Levi-Strauss (1969), who concentrates on symbolic value, (Ekeh op. cit.:44), and, certainly as regards Levi-Strauss, Heath agrees that his understanding of exchange "is nothing like that of the economist", (Heath op.
cited). The individualistic understanding of exchange events certainly implies that exchange succeeds when an act of reciprocation reflects the conscious abdication of any power to under-reciprocate - a point I will return to. Gouldner's argument is that this rupture is avoided by the existence of moral norms - in this case, the one of reciprocity. He suggests that the norm of reciprocity makes two demands on the individual (Gouldner, 1973:242):

1. People should help those who have helped them;
2. People should not injure those who have helped them.

However, Gouldner is at pains to distinguish between what he calls 'complementarity', where exchange is in recognition of rights and duties, from genuine reciprocation which actually mobilises egoistic motivations and channels them into the maintenance of the social system (see Parsons, 1951). In other words, in the former case, reciprocation presupposes nothing in terms of social identity, in contrast to the latter, which more correctly embodies the norm of reciprocity - that is, "there is an altruism in egoism, made possible through reciprocity", (Gouldner, op. cit.:246).

Exchange, therefore, is a rational activity governed by a norm which specifies certain behaviours and mores which are intended to prevent the abuse of power and maintain a stable society. The focus thus tends to be on the repetition of calculated acts made complete by the similar return gestures of the other. In fact, by carefully delaying the act of reciprocation, social stability is further enhanced by the rule that conflict cannot take place whilst an exchange cycle is in process (Gouldner, 1973:248-9). This, of course, can only function with an individualistic approach to exchange as discrete cycles, and is a nonsense as regards the 'generalised exchange' of the collectivist approach. Overall, exchange theory is substantively different from the concept of the Gift being put forward here, in so far as it is concerned with cycles of reciprocal behaviour rather than the act of giving. Certainly, people give in the anticipation of reciprocation, but
it is not an anticipation based upon 'contract', which is what characterises exchange theory, where the act of giving becomes important only as a component of a cycle which must be completed in order to be evaluated in terms of function. The Gift must always possess a certain autonomy, and this is where the focus must remain, not on reciprocation. Accordingly, I would reverse Gouldner's aphorism and say that there is an egoism in altruism made possible through reciprocity.

To be fair, as Richman (1982) notes,

"The idea of the archaic "gift" is particularly elusive as it links the many possible modes of exchange but is never exclusively identified with any single component of the act involved: giving, receiving, or returning." (p.11)

The fact that the idea of the Gift has become subsumed under exchange is therefore unsurprising, but it does indicate the way in which the process has become understood. The idea of giving as an isolated act is ignored in favour of a prima facie balanced relationship - the 'system' of Gouldner. However, this is only a superficial balance, as exchange is almost exclusively explicated in terms of reciprocation. There is little attention paid to the initial gift or offering, and even less to the third term, that of receiving, which, as I will argue, is of crucial importance in understanding the Gift relationship - potentially more important than reciprocation. A notable exception to this criticism is the unique study of Blood Donation by Titmuss ('The Gift Relationship', 1970). Here attention is given to both giving and receiving in what are particularly interesting circumstances, in so far as it is not clear who is the recipient - the blood bank or the person who ultimately gets the blood in their body. Accordingly, the idea of discrete cycles of exchange breaks down, apart from, perhaps, where the donor is paid in material terms for his blood. Certainly, with the U.K. system, reciprocation can only be of a symbolic nature, even if the idea of reciprocation has, for the donor, any
meaning in this case. We see here the relevance of the general economy, as opposed to the restricted economy of exchange theory. The mechanistic model of the Gift relationship as exchange signifies a concern with the adequacy of reciprocation so that a perceived balance can obtain in the relationship. This, of course, accords with the naive systems perspective, where the measure of variety in the reciprocation must balance that in the Gift. However, variety comes to be understood purely in economic terms (Ekeh, op. cit.:44), to the extent that the exchange process metamorphoses into a relationship of classical economics. Notwithstanding the desire to explain the Gift relationship as, prima facie, a mechanism of social stability, the social becomes subordinate to the economic. More than this, as a result of the separation in modern society of the economic and the social (Richman, op. cit.:15), not only is the social subordinated to the economic, it becomes subsumed within it - thus, the social becomes defined in economic terms. This manoeuvre allows exchange theorists to thus understand the maintenance of social stability in terms of the economics of exchange. Assuming for the moment that we can determine objectively the economic value of a gift and that it is possible to perceive some absolute correspondence of value in possible reciprocation, then, with material exchanges, this argument may have some appeal. However, the principles of the Gift relationship apply both to material objects, whose value is symbolic rather than real, and to non-material gifts, which are totally symbolic. Naturally, it is the symbolic value of the gift which is judged in any instance, as even economic goods have, ultimately, only a symbolic value in exchange. In other words, at best, the measure of exchange is in symbolic values which are inaccessible to external objective valuation, or, at worst, the economic must be subsumed in the social and not vice versa. It is the social value of exchange which is important, not the economic.
Generalised Theory of the Gift Relationship

Mauss has established the presence of the Gift relationship and formulated its basic precepts, whilst, as noted, limiting its importance to its sociological function. He has identified the crucial obligations of giving, receiving and repaying, and the necessary concept of value (appropriateness), but failed to establish why there is a need to give, other than as a means to social stability.

Lacan's theory of desire has been identified as a key concept - how we are born into the pre-existing world of the Other which we must try to appropriate in order to be social. However, the Other, the central lack which desire attempts to fill, is unobtainable, and yet is the source of motivation - a continuous motivation from which stems man's action. It will be argued here that the theory of action to fill the lack is in fact the theory of the Gift, ie., that gift giving is how we attempt to fill the lack. It has also been argued that the significance of the Gift lies, not in its material or surface presence, but in its symbolic sense - in terms of its underlying meaning, ie., the Gift is a signifier. In Lacan's concept of the lack, attempts to fill the lack are through the mediation of the symbolic, eg., language. Thus, the mediation of the Gift gives us a generalised concept of the Lacanian symbol, (Lemaire, 1979:24,47; Lacan, 1980). To make a gift is an attempt to fill the lack.

Again, it has been noted that the Gift is not to be seen as purely material, it can also be a word, a gesture, a facial expression, etc., and as such is an act of communication (Simmel, 1971, Ch.5). In the way that certain assumptions are made about the purpose of speech acts - the intention to send some particular message, (not necessarily, if at all, found just in the words, syntagmatically) - so with the Gift. Todorov generalises this to all signifying systems, which, of course, by the above definition, includes the Gift (see Hawkes, 1983:96).
Thus the general proposition is that where there is a desire to fill a particular aspect of the lack, i.e., to attempt to enter or appropriate the world of the Other, this will be made manifest by the giving of a gift(s) and, as such, must conform to the rules of the Gift relationship. This can be illustrated by recourse to a specific, but hypothetical, example in the world of work.

Suppose a person joins an organisation, and, for the purpose of this illustration, that joining is more or less voluntary and desired. It is axiomatic that our new starter is a stranger to the pre-existing organisational world which he is joining, and which can be seen in terms of the generalised Other. To exist socially within this situation he must appropriate, to such an extent as he can, this world of the Other, i.e., he will have a desire to fill his lack by gaining the Other. Had he no such desire then he would be committed and condemned to remain outside the social milieu of his de facto environment. His life will be a succession of giving gifts to the organisation, (principally in the shape of its people), and, of course, receiving, and repaying with other gifts. Thus his initial gifts, on day one, may be making the appropriate social gestures, handshakes, verbal greetings, etc., paying appropriate attention to instructions, etc. Subsequently, he will want to come to know people with whom he works, gain information about organisational practices, join in some of the structures - which may be sitting with certain people for lunch, joining a pools syndicate or observing custom and practice in work, including patterns of resistance. In due course he becomes assimilated into the organisation, and then continues in a 'maintenance' role.

This is not to be confused with the concept of socialisation, to which, of course, the Gift concept can also be applied. Such socialisation as occurs, which may be in terms of the orthodoxy or its antithesis, is too broad an understanding of the specific gift exchanges that the individual undertakes. The Gift can only be understood in terms of relatively specific actions and the general aggregate effect.
is important in terms of the impact on the self, rather than a means of explaining social behaviour/conformity.

At the specific level, it has already been noted how such gestures as the handshake can be understood as a gift. So, therefore, can an appropriate word - saying 'Hello' to a person; asking a question - 'How are your family?'; offering comfort - 'Would you like a cup of tea?'; encouragement - 'That's a good piece of work', etc. Thus any social action can be seen as a gift - the amount and quantity of work, timekeeping, attitudes to customers. But, again as noted, these gifts must not be regarded as things in themselves, but as symbols of underlying meanings. As with all signifying systems, meaning cannot be determined by reference to the signifier alone and, of course, one signifier can reflect more than one signified. As Mauss has pointed out, (also Cooper, 1986b), giving is interested, ie., we are giving for ourselves - we give so that we may receive, ie., in the anticipation of reciprocation. Thus the nature of our gift is determined by what we want symbolically out of the exchange. Equally, the gift may be a non-gift - a snub, an insult - rather than intending to appropriate the Other, it may be intended to distance the other.

This then is the nature of gift as action. What is not conveyed is the dynamic, relationship sustaining, character of the Gift. There is a tendency to understand the Gift in terms of discrete events, give-receive-repay-give-receive-repay, very often in terms of simple dyads or groups. In which case, it becomes difficult, if not impossible, when generalising to the social, to determine what is a gift and what is a repayment. However, when considered in terms of continuous cycles of giving, receiving and repaying, this distinction is unnecessary, as a gift can also be the repayment of a previous gift. The need for understanding discrete cycles may be seen as a form of 'seeking the origin', noted earlier - a desire for beginnings, middles and ends. However, whereas some actions might be identifiable as
discrete gifts, most are of the form gift/repayment. Again, an illustration may help. A and B meet:

A proffers hand - Gift

B declines - Gift rejected

B accepts and shakes - Gift accepted and repaid as new gift

A says 'How are you?' - B's gift accepted and repaid, a new gift

B says 'What is it to you?' Gift rejected

B says 'Very well thank you, - and you?" - Gift accepted and repaid, a new gift

This clearly illustrates, (assuming good intentions), how giving, receiving and repaying are easily condensed in an ongoing situation, but, equally clearly, how a rejection is identifiable. The question of meaning here is manifestly tied up with intention - as Leach (1972) notes, people can lie. However, more than one intention (positive) is possible.

The cycle can, of course, be extended so that the giving, receiving, repaying are not confused, eg.,
A offers cigarette to B,  
(Give)  
B accepts -  
(Receive)  
and later, B offers drink to A  
(Repay - and possibly new gift)

This could be the end of the transaction, but, equally, it could be continued. However, we are still dealing with simple dyads and discrete cycles. A person's gift could, for example, be the work he performs for an organisation. This would comprise numerous individual actions which are not individually received and repayed - in fact, the recipients may be unknown to the giver. It is quite consistent in terms of the Gift for a person to aggregate their actions in terms of, say, work contribution, and to view reception and repayment in a generally abstract form, eg., recipients may be superordinates, subordinates, peers, customers, the 'organisation', the state, etc., and repayments similarly fragmented. It can be seen from this that there need not be a direct link between giving, receiving and repaying, but that a generalised relationship is adequate, ie., a perceived relationship, by the worker, dispersed both spatially and temporally.

This may be reinforced by reference to a passage in Mauss which has caused some interest in interpreting its significance. Mauss cites an example of the Maori culture and the spirit of the Gift:

A gives something to B

B gives it to C

C repays B

B repays A

B must do this because A's gift contains a spirit, hau, which emerges in C's gift to B. It would be ill for B to keep this hau, which is rightfully A's, and therefore must pass it on to A. Now, the hau could be simply interpreted as interest and, as a means of avoiding usury, all interest is returned with principal. The inclusion of a third party has caused Sahlins and others to ponder on its significance, and certainly Sahlins (1974) comes down on the side of the theory of interest, eg.
A is bank, lends to B, who invests with C, who makes profit and repays B principal and interest, who repays to A.

However, I think another explanation of the third term is possible. It is this third term which illustrates the dynamic content of the Gift.

The necessary existence of a third term to create the social has been explored by a number of writers, (eg., Caplow, 1968; Peirce, 1931-58; Simmel, 1964; Wilden, 1980). I have already referred to its function in terms of creating the social individual in the Oedipal phase, where the imposition of the father on the mother/child dyad releases the child as a social individual. As noted, this is not the real father, but a generalised authority figure, what Lacan calls the paternal metaphor (Rose, 1982). In commenting on the work of Safouan, Rose notes:

"... it is the intervention of the third term which counts, and that nothing of itself requires that this should be embodied by the father as such." (p.40)

The recognition of the third term marks the subject's accession to language. Peirce, writing on thirdness, notes that, in so far as thought is linguistic, it is not mosaic or linear, but constitutes a network of signs, the nature of which precludes reduction to expression in terms of dyadic relations (Wilden, 1980). With reference to the Lacanian Other, Wilden (1968:269) goes so far as to suggest that Thirdness could be substituted for Otherness. The social, therefore, cannot be understood as an aggregation of dyads, but requires, minimally, the concept of the triad. Interestingly, Lemaire (1979:180) suggests that the triadic relationship, as signified Oedipally, is also the basis of equality, providing an escape from the potential domination in exchange of the simple dyad as identified by Gouldner (1973:257, n.45).

As noted there is a tendency to view the Gift in terms of exchanges between
simple dyads with discrete giving and repaying, as illustrated diagrammatically below:

**Patterns of Exchange between Discrete Dyads**

No concept of time, improvement, etc., is implied, after each cycle we return to the status quo. No obligations are maintained, each contract fulfilled is finished. Social existence is episodic, little social cohesion exists, individualism is the model. If the Gift is not considered in such discrete terms but as a process of generalised exchange, then we get a different picture. The three terms of the Maori maxim give us this illustration:

**Generalised Exchange**

A much clearer temporal dynamic appears. Gifts enter a generalised network and reappear at some future point as a generalised repayment. The specific link between giving and repaying becomes extended to a general link, (see also Levi-Strauss (1969) on generalised exchange, summarised by Ekeh (1974:50)). Thus the three terms are intended to illustrate this link, this general interdependency, to
emphasise the obligation to give and repay 'into the system', distinct from what is given and repaid.

**Giving**

Having suggested a temporal dynamic of social existence, we can now examine the idea of obligation to give. This can be seen in two lights, one a ritual obligation based upon social custom, and the other a generalised obligation to give as a condition of being social. The first, which is essentially Mauss' explanation, covers such things as birthdays, religious festivals, birth, marriage and funeral greetings, etc., and can be seen as a special, if prominent, example of the following general case. Action to create the social self, based on the Lacanian desire, is what identifies the social to the generalised Other, i.e., it forms a basis for recognising the social person. To fail to become social is to remain separate. However, the separate person is almost a fiction. The social is not a club which we can choose to join or not, but is an inescapable condition of human existence, albeit with different forms of engagement. Thus even the total recluse is a de facto member of the social body, by virtue of his presence in a nation state, (pace the ones who live on desert islands), and, as such, is, for example, protected by the nation's defence system, (whether he likes it or not). But clearly most people inhabit a much more dense social role and, certainly if we concentrate on the work organisation, even to the exclusion of the inevitably associated non-organisational life, then clearly the individual inhabits a complex social milieu.

To gain access to this milieu, to establish one's self within it, to attempt to fill the lack, one must give. To be social is to give, there is no social without giving. However, we do not have the 'right' to remain unsocial. To be unsocial is to reject others, but, more than this, it is to impoverish the pre-existing social. Thus the obligation to give is a social obligation, and a condition in itself of being social.
The social obligation to give is not to be seen in structural functional terms as a basis for social solidarity, or to pre-empt the war of all against all, but is to identify the self within the social, and does not imply any concept of solidarity. In other words, the principle underlying the gift is always self-interest. The gift is a gesture of good faith to the social body, but serves primarily the interest of the giver. An illustration of this is, perhaps, where a group of people, say, in an office, collect for, say, a person leaving. If a person declines to contribute, this is to violate the obligation to give and may be perceived as a gesture against the social body. Allowing for the possibility of cash flow problems, or other 'excusable' reasons for failing to give, the person distinguishes himself from the social group. To give discharges the obligation to the social for the benefit of the giver, yet does not imply solidarity with the group, as giving may be merely the desire to conform, (Asch, 1956), but this is totally consistent with maintaining self-interest.

Receiving

One of the key concepts in this work is that of receiving the gift, and this will be developed later in terms of motivation. However, for the present it will be considered in relation to the act of giving. Receiving is the initial confirming action of the social relationship. It is at this point that the relationship can be terminated or extended. It contains the initial indication of hostility or goodwill. It is the recognition of the sacrifice made in the gift, and whether or not the sacrifice propitiates. Without an acceptance of the gift the social cannot flourish.

Clearly, the obligation to receive has similar characteristics to that of the initial gift. There are well defined ritual acceptances, corresponding roughly to ritualised giving, but there is also a more generalised concept of receiving. As part of the temporal dynamic, clearly, receiving is an act which sustains the
momentum of the social exchange process and, as such, is a generalised, rather than specific, receiving of benefits from the total social network. In the same way in which, when we withdraw money from the bank, that which we receive is not that which we gave in the first place, so with that which we receive from the social. All that receiving must do is recognise an act of giving.

Clearly, this presents problems. In order to receive one must first recognise the presence of a gift. However, recognition of the gift is of two parts. Firstly, there is the gift as recognised by the giver, and secondly, as recognised by the receiver. These two may be significantly different, which is problematic. The most satisfactory condition is when there is a high degree of correspondence between the two views. This point will be developed later when considering the question of value. However, for the moment, let it be noted that an unrecognised act of giving cannot be received, and one cannot receive something which was not given.

A dysfunction between giving and receiving presents a break in social interaction, a 'tearing' of the social fabric. Here we have social difference created where it is not intended. It is a devisive, rather than a cementing, event. In line with the argument on individualism, it promotes fragmentation against wholism, (see Mauss, op. cit.:77; also, eg., Bohm, 1983; Capra, 1983).

What I have suggested so far is social life as an intense network of acts of giving and receiving, not necessarily as discrete coupled events, but as a generalised concept of giving and receiving into and from the social network. It is giving and receiving which sustains the social dynamic. Failing to give and receive creates tears in the social fabric and impoverishes social existence. However, not to give is less problematic than not to receive. As will be concentrated on later, giving is endemic, mandatory, inescapable, cannot be avoided. The same cannot be said for
receiving. This is a much more arbitrary process and is, as, again, will be
developed, the mechanism of creating social divisions, class, hierarchy, etc., and
is the obstacle to an emancipatory praxis which would enhance the quality of life.

Repayment

As already noted, repayment is an essential component of the Gift relationship,
yet, outside of discrete examples of the gift, becomes obscured in the complex
mass of exchange activities, in relation to the act of giving. In other words,
primary acts of giving are relatively rare. They most frequently form part of a
repaying/giving event as part of a dynamic network. However, the difficulty in
isolating specific repayments does not detract from its important and essential
nature.

In so far as we receive from the social world, so we must make repayments. In
this sense, many of the remarks made about giving apply here. There is, however,
one subtle distinction. Giving remains, as a concept, independent of having
received - it is a true sacrifice. Repayment, on the other hand, assumes that one
has already received, i.e., implies debt to the system not implied in giving. To
receive is to accept the obligation to repay. To renego on this duty is, as Mauss
stresses, to be unworthy, to be stigmatised. However, this is one point where
Leach's criticism becomes clear, regarding the absence of a theory of power in
Mauss. If one has sufficient social power it is quite feasible to renego on the
obligation to repay without forfeiting any social advantage. It is the ability to
renege with impunity which allows the functioning of surplus repression, as noted
by Marcuse (1969). It is the basis of social domination. The only ones who can
afford to renego are the socially weak and the socially powerful. The former case
does not primarily concern us here, as the implication is of a pathology which is
amenable to therapy.
Under peer group circumstances, failure to repay, as exemplified by contractual penalties, results in action by the group to exorcise, in some way, the problem members. To be able to avoid repaying without suffering sanctions, one must have sufficient power to escape retribution and certainly, in social situations such as work, to gain acceptance of such asymmetry from those violated. Taking without repaying can only exist under conditions of social domination, and acceptance of this condition becomes the grounds for perpetuating it, (Leach, 1976:6).
CHAPTER 9

THE VALUE OF THE GIFT

Firstly, I look at value in terms of it being a property of an object, external to the individual, and in terms of it being a function of the subject, and argue that the subjective concept of value is essential to understanding the Gift. I look at the problem created when giver and receiver value the Gift differently, as a de facto barrier to communication. In opposition to the sociological explanation of giving I suggest a psychological one in terms of the Lacanian subject and relate it generally to the work situation. I consider gift rejection as a signifier of social power and a characteristic of social domination. Gift rejection constitutes a rejection of the self by the Other and, where the individual must endure a continuing relationship with a rejecting Other, as in the work situation, a state of repression exists.

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Value

It has been argued that giving is always interested and that the interest served is that of the self established in the world of the social other. Thus any idea of altruism as explanation must be seen in terms of psychological benefits to the concept of the self underpinning the action. Furthermore, in this vein, the materiality, or surface structure, of the gift is, by and large, irrelevant in itself. Its relevance is in the underlying symbolised meaning which informs the gift. The idea of some calculus of the gift deriving from this requires some attention to how meaning is valued, how the value of the gift is assessed.
Most conceptualisation of value, and its near relatives, worth, price, etc., concern some notion of inter-subjective agreement or relative objectivity. This is illustrated by the marketing adage - 'a thing is worth what someone will pay for it', (see Marx, 1976:126 n.7, on Nicholas Barbon and Samuel Butler). Thus value becomes some external property of the thing itself. This idea was developed by Marx in terms of use value and exchange value. This represents an attempt to escape the essential irrationality, at least from a humanist point of view, of, eg., a diamond, which has little use value, having a greater market value than water, which has great use value. Thus value systems based solely upon scarcity and which favour those with the most spare resources are subordinated to value in terms of utility or social concepts of value, which, of course, favour the poor. However, value still remains, to some extent, external to the object.

Whereas the idea of use value is easily conceived in terms of a field or a tractor, it is much more difficult in terms of, say, a work of art. Clearly, the value in the former case embodies the idea of a material value, in the second, it is non-material, or symbolic (other than as a commodity). Therefore, in distinction to the idea of value external to the object, which has a mutual basis - extrinsic value - we need to consider the idea of private value as part of the object - intrinsic value.

Marx (1976:176) has suggested that the idea of intrinsic value appears to be a contradiction in terms. However, this is because Marx is dealing with a restricted concept of economy, rather than the general economy. As already noted, the restricted economy requires that its components (commodoties) must, in principle, have a material form, and exist independently of, or external to, the subject, and satisfy human needs directly through consumption or indirectly through production (p.125). Whereas, in so far as the restricted economy can be understood as part of
the general economy, one can point to analogous concepts of value in the latter, it
is not particularly useful to pursue this perspective, as the 'commodity' in the
explanation here being offered is certainly not external to the subject. Whilst it is
certainly implicit that the intrinsic value of the Marxian commodity approximates
to the socially necessary labour employed in its production, in terms of the social,
or perhaps more correctly, biological, survival of the producer, the intrinsic value,
as a symbolic value, relates to an idea of psychological survival - by and large, a
concept independent of more material survival, (though, of course, psychological
survival presupposes biological survival). Furthermore, as all expenditures in the
general economy are not of a material kind, then the idea of a labour component
is not particularly relevant, notwithstanding that all expenditure does imply the
expenditure of effort. For example, whilst a smile as a psychological expenditure
or investment requires the expenditure of some effort, it does not really equate
with Marx's concept of labour. Sahlins (1976), who undertakes a useful exploration
of the concept of value, provides some illumination by referring use value and
exchange value to the Saussurean model of signified and signifier, whereby use
value can be seen as the arbitrary signified and the exchange value as a pragmatic
shifter, so that

"No object, no thing, has being or movement in human
society except by the significance men can give it."
(p.170)

The use value as signified by the exchange value in no way implies the material
concept of use value, but relates to it as the experienced satisfaction, or, more
correctly, as the anticipated potential satisfaction, of an object. This, of course,
suggests, not the somatic satisfaction of needs, but the emotional satisfaction, as,
of course, Marx recognised (op.cit.:125). In so far as satisfaction is emotionally
experienced, there seems no reason why it should relate only to material objects,
as a similar experience is equally attainable from non-material phenomena, i.e., in
both cases it is the symbolic which is the source of satisfaction.
If I have a car to sell, then, by and large, I must accept the market value for such a vehicle. However, acceptance of this does not mean that I accept it as symbolic of the intrinsic value of the car. I may accept it as the only choice I have got, but may still feel that I have had a bad deal. In the same way, if I sell my labour to an organisation, by and large, I will have to accept the going rate for the job. But this is not something which I, as a price taker, have determined, and therefore there is no reason why I should feel attachment to it. A change in market relationships may mean, tomorrow, that the rate is reduced, yet am I not the same person as yesterday, do I not still have to eat, do I not still produce as much work? How come then, that today I am worth less than yesterday? If the next day my services are no longer required, does that mean I am worth nothing? - valueless?

Clearly, in terms of the economy of the self this makes little sense. If my actions - gifts - are intended to understand the self in the world of the Other, how can I know anything, when what was one thing today becomes something different tomorrow? This is why, when determining the symbolic interest or meaning in the Gift, the concept of value must be related to the understanding of the individual, ie., the intrinsic value.

It has been suggested that actions to fill the Lacanian lack are gifts whose symbolic meaning relates to how we perceive they will fill the lack. Thus giving becomes an investment in the Other, or, as Bataille puts it, an expenditure (see also Simmel, 1971:51). This expenditure, or value, derives from within the self as an indication of likely benefit - lack filling - which may accrue, ie., we give to the extent that we hope to receive, what we receive going to 'fill' the lack. Any extrinsic value in the gift, ie., value of the symbol, rather than in the symbol, is at best merely part of the total intrinsic value. For example, if I pay £5 for a bunch
of flowers for a favoured person, (which in itself is a market value and may vary in terms of the number of flowers it buys), the price is largely irrelevant in terms of the intrinsic value I perceive - (other than that a £10 bunch may increase the intrinsic value!) - the interest served, which may be that of the dutiful son of a dear mother, or to alert the object of one's not too platonic affections, or to console a suffering fellow human being.

Returning now to the world of organised work: It has already been suggested that work is a social experience, in which the actual task may be only a small - in meaning - and inescapable part. Furthermore, the intrinsic value of the work contribution is not reflected, other than partially, by the wage rates pertaining to the role, or by any other extrinsic concept of value. The value of the work as action, as gift, is intrinsic to the giver in terms of its lack filling potential, and makes no reference to a transcendent rationality. Components of intrinsic value may relate to the quantity and quality of output, to ideas of equity, to feelings of commitment or lack of it, to political, ethical, moral, etc., beliefs - in fact, to an almost infinite range of possibilities. Thus will the worker value his gift to the organisation.

Clearly, however, we have, as previously noted, two perspectives on the gift - the giver's and the receiver's. As with our bunch of flowers, the recipients may not share the giver's enthusiasm - mother might not like the sort of flowers, object of affection might think, 'what a small bunch!', and the sufferer may have preferred grapes. Diverse perceptions of the gift between giver and receiver clearly represent a barrier to communication. Similarly with work, if the value placed upon his contribution by the worker is not shared by his employer (manager), then we have a medium of communication - 'language' - whose meaning is not shared/understood by sender and receiver. In simple terms, whereas the manager
sees the worker's 'gift' as, say, his labour, the worker makes a gift of himself as a totality through his work to the Other (organisation, manager, peer, etc.). The principles of the Gift dictate that it is made for some purpose - filling the lack - and that it anticipates some level of recognition, i.e., the giver attaches a certain value to it. This is not to say that the gift is consciously valued, or that value is perceived in every discrete action, (i.e., taking as an example the production of a worker, the efforts included may be aggregated into some cumulative concept - work?), but that a basic principle underlies such action. The problem of subjective intrinsic value is well illustrated in systems of barter, (though, of course, to the participants an idea of objective - 'market' - value is, no doubt, present), where the clearly transcendent equitability provided by a money system, as a mediating commodity, is absent (1). Suppose, for a moment, a situation where parties to an exchange using money do not share an agreement as to the value of that money, then we have an effective barrier to further interaction, yet without any apparent basis for such a block. Yet this is precisely the problem with the gift as a medium of interaction. An example is provided with the, now less common, experience of having, say, a Scottish bank note refused by an English shopkeeper. In this case, the signified (monetary value) is clearly common to both parties, but there is some surplus symbolism, (say, it being a 'foreign' note), which makes the shopkeeper refuse it. A better example of the problem, is, perhaps, furnished by the German currency of the 1920's and 1930's, where the value of the coinage could decline rapidly in a matter of hours, making it useless as a medium of exchange - Worker accepts X pay, assuming it will buy Y subsistence, only to find it buys Y - y. What he really needed was X + x but, by the time he gets that, it buys only Y - 2y. This uncertainty in symbolic value led to, (or was a feature of), the rapid collapse of the economy. (Interestingly, the new currency introduced to combat this problem was underwritten by land - a much more stable commodity whose value could not vary so widely.)
Unless there is a shared concept of value between giver and receiver, (even though the receiver may deceive), there can be no (true) communication or, more correctly, only distorted communication (2). The giver attaches a certain (intrinsic) value to his gift as a measure of utility in terms of filling his lack, in the anticipation of an appropriate reciprocation. However, if the recipient values the gift differently, he cannot make the appropriate return, and so denies the confirmation of the self that the giver is seeking. Clearly, at least for present purposes, the undervaluing of the Gift by the recipient is the most significant. The recipient will only respond appropriate to how he values the gift, which will clearly not match the expectation of the giver. Whereas the recipient's understanding of the gift's value will tend to confirm his view of the exchange process, clearly the giver will feel disconfirmed. Prolonged cycles will tend to reinforce both the certainty of the receiver and the uncertainty of the giver. There are no reasons why the receiver should move from his relative position, but obvious ones why the giver should start reducing the value of his gift (not de-valuing). In a mechanistic system this would lead to an infinite regress but, in terms of the social system, it can be better understood as tendencies which appear to confirm popular stereotypes of, e.g., voracious managers and indolent workers.

In a benign world the mismatch of valuation would cause no more than a minor hiccup whilst some sort of balance was re-established. However, in a world of asymmetrical power relationships, use can be made of such distorted communication to maintain domination. Habermas (1978, 1979) has argued that an emancipated society is predicated upon the possibility of 'communication free from domination'. That is, where language is used in such a way as to give priority to one semantic content over another, then conditions of social domination exist. Emancipation requires 'communicative competence' in users, i.e., language purged of its dominant interest. Clearly, by extension to the concept of Gift as a system
of communication (language), the same claim can be made. Distorted communication of the Gift facilitates social domination. Communicative competence, in this case, is where the intrinsic value of the gift is shared by both giver and receiver. As noted earlier, the ability to reject the gift with impunity, of which undervaluing the gift is a form, can only be achieved by the very weak or the very strong. The first case clearly does not apply here. Maintenance of distorted communication obviously is a feature of social domination.

To achieve communication free from systematic distortion in the Gift relationship, it is essential that a match is achieved between giver and receiver in extended cycles of the gift. Some recognition of the intrinsic value of the gift must exist. If the gift represents a valuation of self, it is no use it being understood by the receiver in some other terms - say, market value. Certainly, the possibility exists for a giver to place an exceptionally high value on his gift, determined as such by reference to some idea of a social norm. Individual cases of this are not in themselves problematic. However, where the general class of value attaching, say, to worker effort is seen as too high, we are left with a large problem. The manager, as the generalised recipient of the worker's gift, will find it difficult to respond to this, but, if this is the case, then it must be faced and accommodated. This presents us with the issue of a major re-thinking of social norms and expectations, but, if this is what is required to achieve an emancipatory society, then so be it. (This assumes, of course, the absence of a generic psychopathology in workers where the gift is 'over-valued' - if this is possible?)
Why Do We Give?

It has been noted that a popular sociological explanation for the Gift relationship is based upon a rational/calculative action to obviate conflict and to promote social stability. This was rejected on the grounds that such an approach was extensible to the solution of all social ills, but which does not occur. As Leach (1972) notes, the absence of a concept of social power in such explanations makes them totally unsatisfactory.

More satisfactory explanations have been suggested at the psycho-analytic level, by Brown (1985), and Bataille (1985), (see Richman, 1982). Brown has pointed to the ego-centred psychology of a Maussian explanation of social solidarity, which is not consistent with the principle of no gain, i.e., reciprocity, characteristic of the Gift relationship:

"Archaic gift-giving ... is one vast refutation of the notion that the psychological motive of economic life is utilitarian egoism." (p.265)

Man, according to Brown, gives in order to lose - in fact, the whole objective of creating an economic surplus is so that it can be given away. The psychology of economics is the psychology of guilt. Giving is self-sacrifice - what is given away is guilt - the etymology of debt and payment (owe) are the same as those of guilt (ought). (Is Christianity, as a theology of unpayable debt, related to the unfillable Jack? - see Brown, op. cit.:267.) For Brown, "Man entered social organisation in order to share guilt" (op. cit.:269). The idea of giving as self-sacrifice is certainly germane to the idea of gift as action. When a person gives they do so in the hope of reciprocation, but in the knowledge that they are powerless to enforce reciprocation and, as such, may suffer a loss. In fact, until reciprocation occurs the Gift is a de facto loss - an unsecured investment (see also Simmel, 1971,
Ch.5). Thus, in giving the giver is clearly sacrificing himself. Many good historical illustrations of this point exist in the work context, and it is still current in the idea of wage payment in arrears. Guilt may be seen in terms of the indebtedness of the I to the Other whose world he inhabits, and whose recognition he seeks, (a popular theme in myth, fairy stories, etc.). Reciprocation thus represents the recognition of legitimate presence - forgiveness for intruding, for 'being so bold'. The 'joy' of guilt is not in its perpetuation but in its amelioration. However, as noted above, social organisation is a shared guilt system - guilt is ultimately un-escapable - the lack is unfillable.

Bataille (see Richman, 1982) situates Mauss' understanding of the Gift within what he calls the 'restricted economy' and proposes instead an understanding based on the concept of the 'general economy'. That is, he sees Mauss' interpretation as one lying within a fairly traditional view of economy, i.e., something which can be distinguished from non-economy. This is emphasised by Bataille's insistence upon heterogeneity, rather than the assumption of homogeneity upon which the traditional view of economics is founded. Bataille's somewhat complex position, informed by a Surrealist outlook, sees capitalism emphasising a social homogeneity, not unlike Marcuse's notion of one dimensional society, which allows certain acts, etc., to be defined as irrational, and therefore dismissed as aberrative - i.e., events which contradict the idea of Rational Economic Man can be disregarded as inconsequential (Bataille, 1985). In contradistinction, Bataille's model of man would be of Irrational Uneconomic Man, in so far as man exhibits a heterogeneity of action - meaningful to himself and contradictory of rational, reductive, normative assumptions about what man is and does. In this sense it would be anti-behaviouristic, and perhaps reflect Schein's (1970:69 ff) notion of 'Complex Man'. Bataille expands the traditional concept of gift to one of expenditure, which is essentially the disbursement of excess energy created in
human society. The desire to expend these surpluses - which are varied in nature - in a variety of ways gives us the generalised notion of *depense*.

In one way this is a little unfair to Mauss as, as noted, he does recognise the very general nature of the Gift, though, again as noted, he does concentrate on a materialistic aspect, or, as Bataille puts it, within a restricted concept of economy. It is the concern to achieve a more general understanding of the Gift that this work shares with Bataille. Whilst much of Bataille's analysis of the Gift is germane to this work, it leads him to a somewhat different conclusion to that being put forward here.

Part of the problem with Bataille's work stems from his retaining the concept of the Gift as part of an economy. This tends to lead to explanation at a sociological level rather than the psychological level. Whereas Bataille shares with Brown a belief in the self-sacrificial nature of guilt, he does not see it as the motivation to give, but sees this latter as just existing - "for no reason other than the desire one may have for it" (Richman, 1982:33). Though recognising the presence of desire by merely stating that it 'just exists', Bataille fails to demonstrate the psychology of the Gift, and therefore must rely on sociological explanations.

One can infer from Bataille's position a notion of economy as a network of ecosystemic exchange relationships and, even allowing for some semantic uncertainty, this is acceptable. However, his general economy exhibits the characteristic of being greater than the sum of its parts. On the one hand, this presents problems in so far as, if the economy is based upon the existence of units of exchange, certainly in terms of a static analysis, this is difficult to see. However, taking a dynamic view, as with the restricted economy, added utility can be derived from the velocity of circulation of exchange, (Keynes, 1971), as
with money. As the economy of Bataille, and Mauss for that matter, does not envisage a mediating commodity such as money, the parallel becomes weaker. Certainly, on the other hand, a dynamic is implied by Bataille's category of transgression, which is essentially a violation of existing boundaries and the creation of new forms, particularly in terms of communication and the process of communication. On top of this, Bataille claims that, whereas within the strict concept of the Gift no loss or gain is implied, i.e., reciprocation is obligatory, within his notion of depense loss can be experienced - expenditure for which there is no return. This is perhaps where the lack of a psychological explanation of the desire to give shows. Within the explanation offered here, pure expenditure would only occur where the gift was rejected or not recognised. All expenditure is made in order to receive, not in order to lose. If loss occurs, this is because of an 'error' in giving. Where, prima facie, loss is intended, say, in altruism, this is because the anticipated return is of a different kind - say, self-satisfaction. Whilst a zero sum game is not obligatory in the short term within the Gift relationship due to the possibility of error, the long term trend must be so. Giving without receiving negates the impact of giving as a means of locating the self. Giving for itself is, in theory, pointless, but in practice unattainable, some feedback or reflection is inevitable - which is why inanimate objects can also form part of the Gift relationship. Even the Kwakiutl chief of Mauss 'hurling his copper blazons to an indifferent sea', (an image of which Bataille was fond (Richman, op. cit.:4)) - even if done in private, still retains the characteristics of the Gift and provides a return - the satisfaction at the sea accepting the gift? (See Richman's discussion of Bourdieu's praxeological explanation of the 'gift' (op. cit.:42).) The theory of the Gift - to the giver - must ultimately reside in some implicit notion of praxis.

I have argued that the value intrinsic to the Gift has meaning for the self only at the symbolic level, and it is now necessary to be precise about what this means in
terms of the Lacanian subject. The symbolic, as noted, refers to a relationship between signifier and signified. Whilst recognising that this, for simplicity of expression, ignores the nuances of the underlying psycho-analytic theory, it can be suggested that the signifiers operate at the conscious level, whereas the signifieds relate to the unconscious, (see, for example, Lemaire, 1979, Ch.3). That is to say, that signifiers must have a materiality, in so far as they are amenable to the senses. (This is not to suggest a physicality of the signifier, merely that the subject must be aware of their presence.) Conversely, the signified is not always available to conscious thought, at least in so far as it relates to the signifier. This is not to say that the subject is never conscious of signification. For example, the subject can be aware that a bus stop as a signifier indicates (the signified) that a bus will stop at that place to allow him to board it. However, this is to attenuate the signified, in so far as the overt function of the bus stop is at best only part of the total signified, as any one who has stood at a bus stop only to see the bus drive straight past, for whatever reason, could confirm. The bus stop may have, for students of such artefacts, an aesthetic dimension, which may or may not move the individual; it may signify the individual's lack of a motor car and perhaps his lack of economic status; to a person who is tired of walking it may offer the prospect of relief to a weary body - the possibilities are endless. Just what the network of signifieds may be is not open to conscious discovery. Even if the signifieds could be uncovered, why they are signified would not be explained (3).

It has further been established that desire for the signifier as embodied in Otherness resides in the signified's perceived potential for restoring the lost object, and that this is a project which cannot be abandoned or achieved. The Other provides this focus, as it constitutes the locus of social being. It is the world of the Other as given that the subject must access in order to be social. However, the world of the Other constitutes, not an objective attainable entity,
but a network of signification, forever floating into view but always out of reach. I have further argued that the subject accesses the world of the Other - enters into interaction with the Other - by the giving of Gifts which presuppose reciprocation by the Other as prescribed by Mauss' formulation of the rules of the Gift relationship. The value of the gift to the giver represents a statement by the giver of the expectations of such interaction - (ignoring the case where the gift is enforced through domination) - i.e., its symbolic value, and this is the characteristic which must now be explored in detail.

That which the subject seeks to find in the Other is himself. In making a gift to the Other the subject is making a statement about himself, which he hopes will be reflected back to him by the Other as a confirmation of his hope for himself. However, if we here use the metaphor of the Other as a mirror, we should not understand the Other as a plane mirror, but as one which induces some distortion in the reflected image. In other words, the subject as expressed in the Gift must be acted on by the Other before the image can be returned - reciprocated. Having suggested the basic mechanism, it is necessary to abandon the metaphor of the mirror, as Lacan has specified 'the mirror stage' as representing the primary awareness of self in the child, which is ultimately confirmed in the subject's entry into language. Accordingly, the reflection of the subject must be understood as effected through the symbolic mediation of the Other, as a semiotic process. As Lemaire (1979) explains,

"From the mirror phase, when, through narcissism and structural necessity, the child lives himself in his external image, until his accession to the symbol which represents him in the pre-existing symbolic world, the human being is subjected to the pressure of external symbolism and submits to it." (p.182)

In effect the possibilities for the subject as self are prescribed by the parameters
of the pre-existing symbolic world, what is in effect the Lacanian Real, and must, at least in the immediate sense, find himself within that. As Lemaire continues,

"This submission is a limit on being, which may well be beneficial to humanity as a whole, but which is still a limit. The history of the subject, who is de-centred from himself, is an endless dialectic of the vain search for the self." (ibid)

In so far as the subject is constituted as a mere epiphenomenon of the pre-existing world of the Other, he cannot escape this de-centring - in effect, alienation of the self. For Lacan, "Alienation is the fact of giving up a part of oneself to another" (Lemaire, op. cit.:176), i.e., a consequence of the Gift - "alienation is the doing of the subject" (Lacan in Lemaire, op. cit.:76). The very essence of giving is expressed by Lemaire when she writes of the "oblativity" of the subject towards the Other (pp.174, 180).

Ignoring for the moment the distortion furnished by the Other for the self, it will be seen that, as the intention of the gift is a re-presentation of the self, it follows that the value placed on the gift reflects ideally the valuation of the self, or more realistically, the value that the subject perceives in the likely re-statement of the self by the Other. The value of the gift resides in its potential for regaining the lost object, for the gift only fulfills its function when it re-emerges from the Other and returns to the subject (Lacan, 1979:206). Earlier I emphasised how, in exchange theory, the gift and its reception had been largely ignored in favour of concentrating on reciprocation. It can be seen that the reception of the gift is crucial in terms of the possibility of the gift 'returning to the subject'. Of this process Lacan (op.cit.) has explained,

"The process is circular, but, of its nature, without reciprocity. Because it is circular it is disymmetrical." (p.207)
In other words, the significance of the reciprocation of the Other is constituted by its correspondence to the original intention, i.e., the meaning for the reciprocator in such a singular exchange is irrelevant for the subject. However, because of the imposition of the active Other, reciprocation is never pure, it contains something of the Other. Inevitably, that which is received back by the subject cannot be that which was given, and in this disparity, this frustration of desire, lies continual alienation. As Lacan (1968) notes,

"Not frustration of a desire of the subject, but frustration by an object in which his desire is alienated and which the more it is elaborated, the more profound the alienation from its jouissance becomes for the subject." (p.11)

In other words, the less the alienative potential, the greater will the subject value the gift.

So far, in considering the relation of the subject to the Other, the latter has been understood as a generalised Other, standing in binary opposition to the Subject. Clearly however, the Other does not constitute an undifferentiated whole for the subject, but comprises multiple and differentiated possibilities for social interaction. The subject cannot be reflected, at least in a meaningful sense for the subject, by the generalised Other, if only because he cannot be cognisant of the totality of the generalised Other. It is now appropriate, therefore, to consider the subject in relation to the Significant Other. The significant Other for the subject is represented by the real possibilities for reflection of the self. Even all Others of which the subject is aware do not present equal possibilities for reflection of the self and, in fact, the possibilities may be as numerous as there are Others of which the subject is aware. However, for the moment, I propose to distinguish between two subsets of the Significant other - those whose significance is based on a de facto power relationship, and those with whom no such
relationship exists, whilst recognising that the two roles can, in practice, be realised in the same person.

Where significance is not a function of power, we may assume that it is an intrinsic quality of the Other for the subject. I do not intend to pursue this line, other than to state the assumption that egalitarian involvement with such Others is, relatively, a function of choice, i.e., there is no compulsion to interact. Accordingly, it may be assumed that the individual achieves some satisfaction in terms of locating the self which makes continued association worthwhile. No such choice is available to the individual compelled to recognise the significance of an Other maintained through power. I have already noted in my discussion of voluntarism that, where there are no absolute power relationships, the possibility to disengage exists, but I share the sentiments expressed by Marglin (1980) with regard to factoryisation, that where

"... the worker's freedom to refuse factory employment was the freedom to starve" (p.249),

then this is no freedom at all. In other words, participation may be seen as a function of opportunity cost, rather than as an absolute expression of free will.

Power relationships can, of course, refer to the individual's power over others, or to his subjection to the power of others. Whilst the former is certainly of relevance, it is, other than an expression of the demands of an even greater authority, amenable to amelioration by the one exercising the power. Where the exerciser of power derives some satisfaction in terms of self from the domination of others, I take this to be a pathology, and somewhat outside the scope of this work. Accordingly, it is those subjected to the power of others from whom they must derive significance that is of concern here. As the individual must achieve
awareness of self through the powerful Other, it is clear that this Other has some discretion in terms of how this role of significance is practiced. I have already alluded to the significance of this in terms of how the gift is received and reciprocated, but my concern here is to illuminate how such a significant Other can manifest itself as an object of desire or as a mediator of desire for the subject. This is precisely why motivation is so poorly theorised, and why incentive theory is so well understood. This manipulation of desire is well expressed by Deleuze and Guattari (1984), in their exposition of capitalism in terms of appeal to desire over the class interest of the subject, (see Jackson and Carter, 1986). I have suggested that power can be understood as the ability to prioritise one meaning over another. In other words, from a total background of possible meaning, certain ones are selected and emphasised over others because of their potential for serving particular interests. Whereas a myriad of possible meanings of self for the subject are possible, not all are equally available to the subject. The effect of this is that the quest for self can only be made amongst those that are available. This can be understood simplistically in terms of stereotypes. For example, the possibilities for the self as male are indicated by the stereotypes of maleness promoted, say, by the media, as agents of capitalism. A popular current definition of maleness is expressed as macho man. Thus the cinema portrays images of the muscular, aggressive, patriotic, sexually dominant male. Car advertising confirms this model, as do advertisements for such innocuous products as deodorants and beer. The power of such imagery as incentive is recognised by the controls, albeit half-hearted, within the advertising industry on juxtaposing certain products, eg., cigarettes, with certain images such as social success, or health. The social ideals portrayed as incentives, which it is suggested we can all achieve vicariously through the appropriate commodities, leave no room for the reality of the less than beautiful, of the disabled, the poor, the unintelligent, the social 'minorities'. On the one hand, the possibilities of identity are limited by the
authorised stereotypes, such that if I wish to purchase, say, a motor car which conforms to my self image and which signifies utility of transportation, conservation of scarce resources, concern for other road users, then the possibilities are strictly limited, if they exist at all. (Witness, for example, the names given to cars: Avenger, Hunter, Cavalier, Orion, Maestro, Allegro, Executive. True, there are the Cherry, the Robin and the Kitten, but where are the Housewife, the Clerk, the Anxious, the Coward? I suspect the most honest car of recent years was the Charade!) On the other hand, if the subject is unable to find identity in these images, where is he to find it? At worst, nowhere, at best, through some compromise. However, as the image must always remain a fiction, even the most gullible subject will find his desires frustrated. The fragmented social individual portrayed in the dominant imagery maintained by the emphasis on certain human characteristics helps sustain social domination, or, in Deleuze and Guattari's, (1984), terms, cruelty:

"Cruelty has nothing to do with some ill-defined or natural violence that might be commissioned to explain the history of mankind; cruelty is the movement of culture that is realized in bodies and inscribed on them, belaboring them. ... It makes men or their organs into the parts and wheels of the social machine. The sign is a position of desire; but the first signs are the territorial signs that plant their flags in bodies." (p.145)

Once the 'territories', (see Carter and Jackson, 1987), have been determined by the dominant Other, the 'ground' on which interaction shall take place differentiated from that where no one shall go, the subject has little option but to exist within these prescribed boundaries. To refuse them requires not only an excess of critical reflection, but the material resources, as Marglin implied, to exist independent of the dominant institutions of modern society, a possibility available to few. This, of course, would amount to a denial of the significance of the Significant Other, a reduction to the ranks of the undifferentiated Other; ie,
it is not Otherness but significance which is denied. However, the ability to deny the significance of the socially dominant is not available to the majority, where self can only be found through such a relationship.

This, then, can be seen as the fundamental power of the significant Other, the ability to fragment the individual and to prioritise and specify the meaning of such fragments. The powerlessness of the subject is, conversely, specified by his inability to refute such definition and escape its consequences. The relevance of this in terms of the Gift can now be explored.

The utility in the gift as interaction lies, not in the gift itself, but in the response which it provokes, as a means of locating the self in a world of otherness. In this it bears a resemblance to such physical phenomena as utilised in the concepts of radar, asdic, etc. When a transmitter sends out a signal, (the gift), its utility lies in what is reflected back. Thus can a ship, say, in poor visibility, understand its position vis a vis other physical objects, and so maintain its integrity. A signal which does not return means, either that there is nothing there, equivalent to a social void, or that the assumption in the system is not being validated in practice - not appropriating the world of the Other.

Extending this analogy: If we switch our focus to that of energy, it is clear that the gift is analogous to the expenditure of energy. For our radar to find out where it is, it must expend energy. It is only when energy is expended that useful work is done, ie., the utility in potential energy is only realised when it is released. Thus the individual only does useful work, (in this case, in locating himself), when he expends energy, ie., when he gives. This accords with Bataille's understanding of the Gift predicated upon the expenditure of (surplus) energy, though not with his insistence on absolute loss (unreciprocated giving).
However, the utility in Bataille’s work lies in his claim for the universality of the Gift, the rejection of the concept of the non-gift. This totality of the Gift obviously extends to the giver - the rejection of the possibility of a non-giver, especially where the two roles are seen as part of the same person. Bataille thus resurrects the whole, heterogeneous person. It has previously been noted how the tendency to view the world in terms of discrete parts reinforces certain relationships of domination. How this stems from the arbitrary recognition of difference, which allows one thing to be privileged over another - in other words, allows the identification of different meanings - is illustrated by oppositions such as male-female, rich-poor, working class-leisure class, etc. Bataille wishes to break down these artificial boundaries and restore the whole person:

"The fundamental right of man is to signify nothing. This is the opposite of nihilism, for it is meaning that mutilates and fragments. The right not to signify is none the less the one least recognized, most openly ignored. As reason extended its domain, the part of non-sens was diminished. Fragmented man is, at the moment, the only one whose rights are recognized. The rights of total man are declared here for the first time." (cited in Richman, 1982:138) (See also Adorno, 1973; Buck-Morss, 1977; Ryan, 1982)

The significance of man should be in his being, not in terms of his having - that is, having specific characteristics (see also Fromm, 1979). This essentially fascistic concern was demonstrated recently in the case of the down-and-out in Oxford, who was reportedly refused medical aid because his quality of life was insufficient - insufficient for what? - is life not sufficient unto itself?

Turning to the work situation, it has already been suggested that for significant others to consider people as workers independent of their total existence is a meaningless concept, and purely arbitrary. Whilst the concept of 'worker' may be a useful heuristic, as is soldier, clergyman, shopkeeper, etc., it needs to be
recognised as only a facet of a larger entity, and not as a discrete fragment. What constitutes the worker as a heuristic is not, of course, given, but is determined in the light of some interest, (see Jackson and Carter, 1985). Thus, taking a temporal dimension, for many purposes the 'worker' only exists between, say, start and finish times, yet for others he 'exists' also outside this period - say, for example, with seamen, who must be provided for, outside periods of duty, because they cannot go home. In terms of capacity for work, it is not necessary for the organisation to satisfy itself, beyond those hours it pays for, that a person is capable of producing. However, for taxation purposes, this is not the case. People researching, say, workers spending power are clearly interested in what they do outside of work, whereas those providing the money are not, (see, eg., Goldthorpe, 1968).

In the same way in which the arbitrary creation of a 'worker', say, for organisational purposes, does not produce an entity who begins and ends at the factory gate, so they do not create an entity independent of, either the world outside of work time, or the world of non-work in work time, (see, for example, Gouldner, 1969; for an interesting illustration of this issue, see Rolt, 1978, on the Thirsk railway accident). Work is a formal interlude within a continuous social experience, and not a total interlude at that, in so far as, by and large, it is impossible to confine experience, events, etc., to that which would be purely functional to the raison d'etre of organised labour, even if this could be unequivocally identified, (eg., is the ability to socialise functional or dysfunctional to productivity/profit?).

If the idea of an integumented worker is a fiction, then presumably trying to theorise him as such is likely to be unrewarding. Rather, we need to reconceptualise our worker as a total social being, albeit, possibly, a being
identified by particular characteristics (as, of course, are all people). To concentrate on him as a 'worker' can only be fruitful in so far as such a definition overwhelms, suppresses, sublimates all other facets of his self, which, for all practical purposes, cannot be done, if only because of the impossibility of defining the 'boundaries' of the 'worker'. Rather, to understand the gift and its value, we need to comprehend workers as people, not people as workers. Thus whatever descriptions of people are meaningful must also apply to workers. If optimistic/pessimistic are useful concepts in terms of 'people psychology', then they are in terms of worker psychology. If people are sexual, then workers are sexual (see Burrell, 1984); if people are religious (or irreligious), then so are workers. To reduce or attenuate workers down to certain factors perceived as useful to the organisation is to fail to encompass fully the human-ness of workers.

In trying to understand work behaviour, we have to understand a more general level of behaviour in the world at large. Organisation studies comes into its own by seeking to understand how behaviour is affected (if at all) by the particular social constraints found in the world of organised work. For example, hierarchy is not usually experienced in the general world in such an intense way as it is in a work organisation. Thus a good question for organisation studies to address may be, how does a close, formal hierarchy affect behaviour? Equally with the Gift relationship. If there is a universal concept of the Gift, then what are the organisational influences on its operation? Clearly, whereas the particular form may be shaped by an organisational experience, the underlying process is not. Thus work becomes a particular expression, or circumstance, of a more general case of being/living.

The universality of the Gift and the totality of the individual provide an irreducible core/principal for human action, of which particular forms must be
seen as being shaped circumstantially. Where actuality varies from some perceived ideal, either at the macro level, in terms of an emancipated society, or at the micro level, in terms of specific behaviour, then one must consider what are the influences which so shape actual behaviour.

Freud has proposed the simultaneous existence within the psyche of two antithetical forces: Eros the life instinct and Thanatos the death instinct. Both Brown and Bataille ascribe the Gift to Thanatos. Brown justifies this with relation to the self-sacrificial nature of the gift as a way of purging guilt. Bataille, rather differently, sees it in terms of the urge to consume - the destruction of excess - to

"propel individuals toward destruction as the affirmative willingness to lose things, meaning, and even self." (Richman, op. cit.:3)

('Self' in Bataille's sense needs to be seen in terms of the corporal self, rather than the metaphysical self, as I am using the term - this will be of importance later. Furthermore, the situation is complicated by the fact that Bataille sees Death as the apotheosis of the erotic, very much in the tradition of de Sade.)

Brown's equating of the Gift with Thanatos stems from a fairly uncritical reflection of a traditional Freudian concern with guilt, anality and sacrifice, and so his position is readily understandable. Bataille, on the other hand, as noted, is more informed by de Sade, and by Lautreamont, than by Freud, and, in fact, a little deconstruction in terms of his background and other interests reveals possibly the basis for his linking giving with death, (see, especially, the essays by Barthes and Sontag in relation to Bataille's book, 'Story of the Eye', (1982)).
However, my position would be that the Gift is within the realm of Eros, as a life-affirming force. Marcuse (1969) has noted,

"Under non-repressive conditions, sexuality tends to 'grow into' Eros - that is to say towards self-sublimation in lasting and expanding relations (including work relations) which serve to intensify and enlarge instinctual gratification." (p.179)

The Gift, as an action to acquire a location of the self as a reflection or output of the desire to acquire the world of the Other, is manifestly a life-affirming action. It implies an optimism or hope for the future - it signifies a search for happiness, security, contentment. The thrust of the Gift is not to lose but to gain - to gain the recognition of the Other, to grow in terms of self-knowing. The Gift is part of the search for the self - the prize is finding the self. Even though the prize can never be gained - the lack never filled - we can move nearer to knowing.

The problem stems, as Marcuse notes, from repression. Repression by Significant Others is often, if not always, as noted earlier, characterised by gift rejection - by the power to reject. Removal of repression must be characterised by the absence of rejection, by the acceptance of the gift, by allowing the individual maximum lack filling opportunity. Thus is the gift part of Eros.

However, such is the nature of repression, and the lack, that the gift must be made even though it will be rejected by the Significant Other. The individual is not free, or able, to change the rejecting other for an accepting other. He is forced to live in the world of rejection. Yet he cannot withhold his gift - to do so is not only to succumb to repression, but to accept its definition of his worthless life. Thus we perpetually give in hope (Eros), knowing the reality and inevitability of rejection, and thus do we co-operate in our own repression.
The compulsion to give, which cannot be avoided, in so far as it is an act of self-seeking, of locating the self in the social Other, gives an action base to the attempt to fill the Lacanian Lack.

Lacan has argued that we are born into the pre-existing world of the Other and, in order to be able to participate in this social world, we must acquire an understanding of the 'rules', in effect determined by Significant Others. The medium for acquiring this knowledge is language in particular, but also, more generally, any symbolic system. However, although access to the medium is relatively unproblematic, its use is not so easy. Firstly, language is not universally specific, so there is no ready made teaching possibility. Secondly, as language is a symbolic system, it represents some other thing, rather than itself. However, there is no ready-made access to the rules which link symbol to meaning. Furthermore, symbols have multiple meanings, very often mutually exclusive. Neither is language a static system, so meaning/symbol relationships are in a continuous state of flux. However, we have no choice but to use the language of the Significant Other as part of being social.

This inability to access the pre-given world leaves us with a psychic vacuum, which we attempt to fill by efforts to acquire the Other, what Lacan calls our central lack. This lack is the source of desire and the desire is of the Other, notwithstanding the domination of the Other. This is like being in a room full of 'food' and being hungry. However, we cannot just go and eat, as some food may be poisonous, or we do not recognise it as food, or we do not know how to prepare it so that it can be eaten. In other words, we do not have the knowledge of food necessary to satiate our hunger. However, we must eat or die of starvation. So we pick up an object - a piece of 'food' which we do not recognise - and try to bite into it. It is a piece of soap. Next we try a similar looking object, which turns out
to be chocolate. So far, we know not to eat soap, but that chocolate seems to be
OK. However, man cannot live by chocolate alone. We find we cannot bite into a
walnut, but that a plum is fine, but we also find that, if we break into a walnut,
then there is food also. Next, we try the same technique on an egg, and whilst we
find food inside, we also find a different extraction technique is called for. So we
find we can satisfy our hunger but, as with the psychic hunger of the Lacanian
Lack, it is still there, lurking, waiting to make its presence felt again.

Such an analogy obviously has limitations in terms of understanding the lack, if
only because hunger is satisfied materially, whereas the lack is not so
unidimensional. Furthermore, hunger is seen as a need exhibiting similar
characteristics to psychic needs in terms, say, of Maslow’s hierarchy. Whereas in
Maslowian terms needs are relatively discrete and ordered, in Lacanian terms the
lack is polymorphous and diverse. Food becomes a symbolic entity, a signifier. To
appropriate the signifier is to seek the signified. Food can never, other than under
the most abject repression, be seen as merely something to satisfy hunger.

Food here, then, has the characteristics of Capitalist productions, and the
inevitable but uninformed consumption of the food is likened to the consumption
of these productions. In the way that the bar of soap does not carry the warning ‘I
am soap, do not eat me, I cannot satisfy your hunger’, similarly with the
productions of Capitalism. John Osborne wrote recently (1986) of the ‘world of
Guardian vacancies, invented occupations with official titles’ - language used to
obscure the actuality of the experienced role. Thus job titles do not convey the
risk of industrial diseases or accidents, with which the jobs are associated. Car
advertisements do not dwell on the likelihood of a fatal accident. Chocolates do
not warn of rotten teeth or obesity. Capitalist signifiers do not reveal their
signifieds, but obscure them in capitalist rhetoric. As with all language, such
rhetoric is used to enhance certain images and deny others. Aware of the captive audience condemned always to be the recipient of such images, capitalism has a relatively free hand to determine the programme, the cast, the text, the mise en scene. However, this is not the theatre of the prosenium arch and the auditorium, but of audience participation. The audience may not be passive, but must actively engage in its own exploitation.

Attempts to fill our psychic hunger can never bring more than a transient gratification, and so we are condemned to keep trying - like breathing, it is a constant activity. How then do we try to fill the lack? Firstly, the effort must come from the subject. Lack filling cannot be initiated by the Other. This would be like living in a country where one did not speak the others' language and they did not speak ours. (However, the normal pursuit of the Other is very much like living in a country which speaks a different language. To be part of it one must acquire a working knowledge of the language. The better the knowledge, the greater the understanding and participation. But the knowledge can never be total, and, therefore, neither can understanding and participation. Even though, in the Lacanian sense, the language is common, it is only the object language that is truly common, i.e., the signifiers are common, but not the signifieds. As meaning lies at the level of the signified, then total access to meaning, and, therefore, knowledge and understanding, becomes impossible.) That is, a gesture from the Other is a signifier, but we do not know what it signifies. True, we are often, if not always, in the position of the Other to another person's lack filling gesture, but our role here is not to fill our own lack but to fill another's. It is true that being the object may help to fill our lack, but this would be object as subject, i.e., to ourselves. That is, two distinct roles, events, etc., can occur simultaneously, in line with the dynamics of social interaction referred to previously. But intentional lack filling must result in initiation, it is incidental lack filling which results from a passive involvement.
It is this initiatory attempt to fill the lack which I have argued is described by the Gift. The raison d'être of a lack filling gesture is a reciprocation from the object, of acceptance in the world of the Other by means of a signifier from the Other, in which we hope we can correctly identify the intended signified, i.e., we seek acceptance and reciprocation. For example, a person attends for an interview, which is, in a very immediate and literal sense, entering the world of the other. Let us suggest that the first communication between interviewee and interviewer (Significant Other) on entering the room may be the physical appearance of the interviewee. (This example can clearly be reversed in terms of the interviewer, but for illustrative purposes just one case is being highlighted, that of the interviewee.) Assuming the interviewee has a reasonable amount of discretion over his appearance, e.g., can afford to dress appropriately, it is clear that he will dress in accordance with his desired outcome, as best he understands it. Assuming the job is in an office, and that the hope is to get the job, and that this is thought to be facilitated by a certain conformity of dress, then we might also assume the applicant to wear a 'suitable' tie, i.e., the tie would be an intended signifier to the interviewer of a willingness to conform to accepted practice. The hope is, of course, that the interviewer will see it as a signifier of this intent - that this can be problematic is demonstrated by the fact that, in a well-known firm of management consultants, the consultants were not allowed to wear college or regimental ties, etc., in case a client had different affiliations and might see a different signified in them, which could cloud the business relationship.

Assuming he perceived his tie as appropriate to the situation, the interviewee may well assume that it would not be the subject of comment - passive acceptance. However, if our interviewer were to say, without preamble, 'I do not like your tie', our interviewee would perhaps be disoriented. Such a reciprocation would indicate non-acceptance by the other - that the interviewee and the interviewer did not
share a common signified as regards the tie. It indicates an error of judgement on the part of the interviewee, about the world of the Other, and that in his attempt to appropriate this world his overture (gift) was disastrously wrong - disastrously in the sense that his error was not overlooked, but brought into prominence by the action of the interviewer. The interviewer is pointing out to the interviewee his misplaced aspiration to join the world he seeks.

This example was chosen because it was a favoured device some years ago, when 'stress interviewing' was in vogue. The interviewer would indeed suddenly state an aversion to the interviewee's tie, and, although the significance of the tie was not actually being treated by the interviewer, as it was just a trick to test the reactions of the interviewee to what was apparently irrelevant and rude, this was not known by the interviewee. (At least, the assumption was that the candidate did not understand what was going on. Any who were aware of 'stress interviewing techniques' might, of course, be very aware of what was happening, which detracts from the effect of a very silly abuse of power. In this case, there is a risk of those who respond well doing so because they know what is happening, and not because they cope well with sudden increases in stress.) However, a naive interviewee might well indeed assume he had misunderstood the other, that his attempts to appropriate the world of the Other were misplaced, that he was not 'located' just where he thought he was, socially. In other words, that his view of self was misconceived. However, the most interesting aspect of the technique is the assumption that such a non-reception of the gift, refusal to reciprocate, would be stressful. In terms of the Gift relationship, the gift of the interviewee (which is not just his tie!) is being rejected by the Other with impunity. As noted earlier, this is characteristic of an asymmetrical power relationship, and is an example of the use of such power. Whereas the subject is attempting to locate himself in the other's world, the Other is quite deliberately dis-locating him. As Mauss notes,
such an act is a gesture of hostility, that the giver is not worthy of social intercourse with the object of his action.

The problems of non-acceptance (rejection) of the gift will be returned to later. However, I now wish to return to an earlier comment, where I suggested that the Gift was nothing less than a division of 'selves'. Mauss, writing of the Gift, said, as noted earlier,

"We shall note the various principles behind this necessary form of exchange (which is nothing less than a division of labour itself)." (1969:1)

By equating the Gift with the division of labour, and bearing in mind his socio-economic explanation of the Gift, Mauss is indicating that the different economic roles are symbolised by the material of the gift. In other words, as emphasised by Brown, Bataille and Sahlins, the Gift presupposes an economic surplus - that is, more goods must be produced than are necessary for consumption - and it is this surplus which forms the material of exchange - Bataille's 'part maudite'. On the one hand, the ability to produce such a surplus presupposes the economics of the division of labour and, on the other hand, such specialisation is a logical, necessary pre-requisite of the Gift. This is in so far as the underlying principle is the exchange of one thing for another, not for the same, i.e., difference is a necessary presence, and that it is this dialectic of difference which produces the idea of interdependence of the social. If each person was an intact individual economy, self-sufficient in all things by his own efforts, then each person would be independent of each other. Division of labour creates an interdependence, a social, which needs maintaining to demonstrate some notion of equity. Exchange of surplus, in Mauss' eyes, provides this cement.
However, in the way that Mauss' view of the raison d'être of the Gift is unduly restricted, so therefore is his equation with the division of labour. To be sure, the Gift equates with division, but it is the division of selves, the identification of one from another, the ontology of social being. Not only does the Gift identify the fisherman from the farmer, the labourer from the manager, it identifies the one person in distinction from all others. This is not the Cartesian separation of subject from object, (as is inferred at a social level by Mauss' analysis), but the Lacanian subject, lost in the world of the Other. The one standing only because of the binary opposition, the one unthinkable without the other, like two sides of a coin, or like the individual in relation to the collective, each defined by the Other (see, eg., Cooper, 1983b). Mauss stresses the need to understand the Gift in terms of "wholes", of systems in their entirety, but retains such a concern at the social, rather than the psychological or individual, level. The only psychology present in Mauss' man is that of avoiding war. Bataille's claim for the general economy, over what he sees as Mauss' restricted economy, is precisely an attempt to encompass the whole, and the whole must include the whole person, not just (rational) economic man. Thus the individual would rarely, if ever, see himself as an assembly of discrete parts. He may identify himself in terms of maleness, of religion, of occupation, of class, but all his parts stand in mutual definition as part of a total man whose actions, etc., represent the total person, not just a part. Thus the Gift is a unique reflection (or more correctly, anticipation) of this total self, in a world of other selves.
CHAPTER 10

THE GIFT AND WORK

I distinguish the arguments which I am making from the 'actor's frame of reference' approach, to establish the importance of understanding the unconscious as a major determinant of the 'worker'. I then explore the work situation in the context of the Gift relationship. I suggest a way of understanding the workers' experience of organisational life in terms of giving and having one's gifts accepted or rejected, and the symbolic significance therein. I argue that new starters must be distinguished from mature workers as being less able to discriminate in their giving, and therefore open to greater exploitation. I suggest that motivation is sustained through gift acceptance, but that gift rejection is the source of de-motivation. Management, by rejecting the worker's Gifts, promote de-motivation.

I have attempted to show, in a relatively abstract situation, how the Maussian concept of the Gift can be extended in such a way as to account, operationally, for the way in which the individual fills the lack at the centre of his being, as identified and described by Lacan, and which is the source of motivated behaviour. I will now attempt to illustrate how this can be understood in the context of work. I am here understanding work primarily in the sense of wage labour, and whilst other formulations of work, such as creative effort, may be equally understood in terms of the Gift, and indeed to some extent subsumed within work as wage labour, it is with the very particular influences of wage labour on the Gift that I am primarily concerned.
This is a not inconsiderable task. If a person works an eight hour day, five days a week, for forty-six weeks per year, and does this for forty years - a not unrealistic fate for an average worker - then, in this period, he will have occupied nearly four and a half million minutes of his time, each one potentially filled by some experience or awareness of his situation as worker. If we apply this to a notional twenty million workers in the U.K. alone, then we are dealing with a substantial quantity of human experience. Any attempt to attenuate this variety to an amount capable of being grasped by the human mind must, of necessity, result in a poor representation of the original experience. Ashby's Law, (see Jackson and Carter, 1984), prescribes the necessary conditions for achieving a model of the real world free of pathological distortion, though, of course, this provides no certainty in terms of it being achieved, or even that it is achievable. The sheer volume of variety in human life may ultimately be just too great for the mind ever to grasp, with any degree of realistic correspondence to the original. If we add to this the inevitable distortion provided by using language as a symbolic system to describe something that was not, initially, of language, at least in any transcendental sense, then, bearing in mind Derrida's caution as to spurious presence, the problem is compounded, a fortiori when the inevitable ideological construction of language is included. Thus, for example, to attenuate this experience down to a single word - 'worker' - is a violence of such gigantic proportion as to call into question the very utility of such a label, (see Fromm, 1979:92). However, and there must inevitably be an 'however', any attempt to comment on the 'real world' requires attenuation of this order. Such attenuation inescapably serves the interests of the commentator, as already explored, both in the sense of being able to make apparently authoritative statements and in the sense of his ideological interest. As all claims to authority must be judged in terms of their emancipatory praxis, or, more usually, lack of it, so must the authority of authorship, or use of language, as an attenuation. When Marx and
Engels (1965) urged the 'Workers of the World, Unite' as they had nothing to lose but their chains, they could equally as well have urged an intra-personal unification as an interpersonal one, in so far as it is the ability to fragment the individual, as worker, which contributes to his domination by capital. (Marx was, of course, fully aware of the fragmentation of man as worker (1976:799).

Before looking in detail at the implications of these arguments for the work context, it is useful to offer some clarification of an important point. It may appear that I am making a not too oblique allusion to what is usually understood as the 'action frame of reference' in explaining social behaviour. Whilst some of the insights provided by this mode of analysis are certainly germane to the arguments which I am making, it would be incorrect to understand them in these terms. Silverman (1970) has synthesised the essential propositions of the 'action frame of reference', whose focus is the explication of meaning rather than merely of behaviour. The main points of Silverman's summary, for present purposes, are:

"Sociology is concerned with understanding action rather than with observing behaviour. Action arises out of meanings which define social reality."

"Meanings are given to men by their society."

"Explanations of human actions must take account of the meanings which those concerned assign to their acts." (p.126-7)

Clearly, we have the idea here of action as signifiers of actor's meanings (signifieds), where such signification is a product of the social world. However, the implication of Silverman's explanation is that such meanings are constituted at the conscious level, i.e., that the subject is aware of the meaning contained in, or implied in, social interaction. Action is a function, not of observable stimuli, but of expectations based on past experience and the subject's perception of the likely reaction of others:-
"At the level of cognition, the actor defines his situation in this way and becomes aware of alternative courses of possible action." (p.130)

Burrell and Morgan (1979) note the realist assumption here, not to be confused with the Lacanian Real, where the

"... actors occupy a 'realist' social world which is external to the individual and has a reality which is independent of any individual's social construction of it." (p.198-9, emphasis added),

(though they do note that Silverman is not consistent on this position). Here then, we have two significant differences from the model which I am proposing. Firstly, in my model, the meaning which informs action is not to be understood as conscious meaning but as at the unconscious level. Secondly, the social world as a signifier cannot exist external to the subject, its signification being inescapably a function of the subject.

If the social world is real and external to the subject, then the way it is experienced must be accessible to the observer, i.e., the subject's meaning must be capable of being shared with the observer - the observer must be able to describe the meaning for the subject. As Habermas (1978:303) points out, this implies positivistic assumptions about the world, and yet Silverman specifically rejects positivism as relevant to the action frame of reference (op.cit.:140-1), (see Burrell and Morgan, op. cit.:200). In other words, meanings must be capable of being shared. Now, certainly at the level of consciousness, this is reasonable. Action such as shaking hands as a greeting ritual clearly has a shared meaning for both participants and observer, at the conscious level, yet, equally clearly, meaning is not furnished merely by the observable act or behaviour, or by the explication of the actor's conscious meanings, when what takes place is understood as a lack filling social interaction. Meaning, shared or not at the conscious level, carries no
implication for meaning at the unconscious level, and yet to consider them as totally independent ignores the fact that both conscious and unconscious signifieds, in this case, share the same signifier. Barthes (1972:111ff) has offered a model of this situation at the social level, which can be paralleled at the individual level, when he argues that the linguistic sign, which we can here understand in terms of a generalised concept of the conscious symbolic - eg., handshake ritual - signifier/signified, becomes in turn the signifier of a second-order semiotic relationship (1), which Barthes labels Myth, but which we can understand as the unconscious, (see also Hawkes, 1983:130 ff). Whereas there is nothing implied in the initial sign which would indicate its Mythic function - which is

"... the system of images and beliefs which a society constructs in order to sustain and authenticate its sense of its own being: ie. the very fabric of its system of 'meaning'." (Hawkes, ibid:131)

- so analogously with the unconscious subject: meaning is immanent to the subject, not externally located in the social. A useful illustration of this has been provided by Lyotard (1977), using the metaphor of the theatre. The idea of the reality of consciousness as the driving force of human action is illusory, in so far as, in the Freudian tradition, it is the unconscious which is the 'control room' of motivated behaviour. Consciousness can be seen as analogous to a theatrical performance. Actors perform in accordance with some more or less logical plot or purpose, but this purpose is not an autonomous function. It is the product of an underlying logic of direction, presentation, etc. - the mise-en-scene, analogous in its influence on the performance to the influence of the unconscious on the conscious. It is within the unconscious as mise-en-scene that conscious action is to be understood - it is here that the unconscious 'actor's frame of reference' is to be located.
The Worker and His Gift

It is now necessary to sketch out the Gift in terms of the worker, to see the worker as a giver in the context of a particular form of social organisation. Whereas man the giver, as worker, is the same as man the giver in any other social situation in terms of structural principles, the particular circumstances of being social are clearly influenced by work and social position in a work context.

It would be tempting at this point to sketch, or define, the anatomy of a worker, in which to be specific about the Gift. However, this would not be fruitful for two reasons. Firstly, I would choose to define a worker as someone who is responsible to someone else in a bureaucratic organisation. Such a definition clearly includes many who would be defined as manager, etc., in other taxonomies, or by virtue of their job title, etc. The second, related, reason is that, as noted earlier, the use of specific conceptual boundaries, in this case around people, creates a fiction, albeit normally regarded as fact, and reflects a certain a priori interest on the part of the person doing the bounding.

The application of a label such as worker can never be more than a useful heuristic. But the worker as a real category, however defined, does not exist - what is real is the whole indivisible person, who is as much the non-worker, (i.e., outside work), or parent, child, pigeon fancier, or whatever, as he is worker. Admittedly, one of the influences upon his person is the reality of his experienced world, part of which is the work experience. Particular actions, etc., are influenced by this experience and, as such, are amenable to some sort of study and reflection. However, as the concept 'worker' is not an indisputable given, it is incumbent upon each scholar to determine what aspects of the work influence he wishes to consider. My interest stems from a critique of bureaucratically
organised work as a rational activity, and focuses on the claim that it represents a form of social repression. Thus the worker, for me, is defined by his being subjected to this particular form of repression, which, though experienced differentially, is none the less a de facto structure. What makes work particular vis a vis other social structures is its particular repressive mechanisms, in opposition to what would be found outside of work, and the possibilities for a reconstructed work purged of unnecessary repression.

By focussing on this repression, i.e., in being responsible to someone, it is possible to examine the effect on the individual, as a giver of gifts, of his real experience of work (2). Admittedly, the individual’s total work experience is not fully described in terms of responsibility to, yet this provides a shading, at least, to all other intra-organisational experiences, such that, for example, peer group interactions typically take place within the constraints, severe or otherwise, imposed by the context of the formal work organisation, (see, for example, Linhart (1981) on production line interaction). Or, in other words, peer group interactions within work are likely to be materially different to the same interactions outside of the confining organisation. It is, further, the case that responsibility to is also combined with responsibility for in the same person (Jackson and Carter, 1985). However, responsibility for equates to possession of relative power compared to the objects of that responsibility. It was argued earlier that Gift rejection, effectively, can only occur with impunity where people possess such power. Thus responsibility for equates with the power to reject the gift of others. In the context of this work, those who reject the gift are considered in terms of opposition to those who give. Clearly then, giving on the part of those responsible for is not the subject of this enquiry, (NB: ‘worker’ also includes the portion of responsible to found in those responsible for. This does not violate the wholistic argument, in so far that it is a heuristic device and makes no
claim that the two are discrete, only that it is an influencing characteristic in human action.) It must also be noted that those who are responsible for, and who have the power to reject the gift, can also be givers in their role of responsible for. However, the role of the worker is given as an existential necessity, historically true contemporarily, by virtue of restraints on welfare payments, in effect, on the ability to exist outside organised work), and is therefore 'pure' or 'natural' - i.e., is not constructed as a consequence of a set of conscious beliefs on the part of the worker, whereas management represents a particular set of human values or beliefs about man - in effect, similar to 'Theory X', in holding that people must be controlled - and is, therefore, ideological and culturally specific, and thus 'contaminated'. Thus gifts by the (voluntary) repressor as a means of locating the self must be different to gifts by the (involuntary) repressed - (pace desire to be repressed - see Jackson and Carter, op. cit.) - i.e., make different assumptions about the Other, though being experientially, as process, the same. However, no doubt the rules of rejection would also apply equally to the gift of the repressor as to those of the repressed, at least in so far as the repressor does not see himself primarily as an instrument of repression.

Thus the fundamental scenario here is one of the relatively powerless worker making gifts as a self-seeking action in the received and highly constrained world of work. A world, furthermore, in which the gifts which are desired from the worker by the (reified) organisation relate to a totally different purpose - i.e., profit, efficiency, etc. - to that implied for the worker in his gift. What we are interested in then, is the degree of correspondence between the gifts of the workers and the wants of the organisation, expressed by the agency of management. The immediate condition is that the two are, by definition, antagonistic, and therefore can never be compatible. However, as argued earlier, the context of the world of work being a received (from the powerful), and being
an existentially real, situation does not totally prescribe the lived experience of the worker - even though this would possibly be, organisationally, ideal. Thus the work context is something to be endured but not over-emphasised, in so far as it must not be allowed to infringe too much at a micro level, on the minute by minute experience of living. Work makes certain specific demands, but the 'spaces' in between these demands allow for the emergence of the individual. In addition, work provides the de facto presence of the Other and so is an inescapable command to interaction, i.e., cannot be ignored. Thus, while it may provide a historically biased infrastructure of Otherness, it does represent, in part at least, all we have.

Given this inescapable presence, the individual must interact with it - people, things, etc. - and can do so in the only way open to him. As the alternative would be social isolation/non-existence, he must seek himself by reference to the available Other (see Habermas, 1978:196). This is not to say he gives even-handedly, or does not give negative gifts, but this happens in the world generally. (See, for example, Dubois (1979), 'Sabotage in Industry'. Interestingly, 'sabotage' is said to derive from the practice of French workmen of throwing their wooden 'sabot' - clog - into their employers' machinery, when in dispute, in order to break it - the Gallic equivalent of throwing a spanner in the works. However, see note (3).) What is of concern is the gifts the worker does give, understood as important signifiers, and how these are received by the organisation, through its managers. What diminishes in importance is the question of why a person works, often seen as central in terms of motivation - the important thing is that he does (attend) work. The position here would be that a person attends a bureaucratic organisation for primarily financial reasons, in so far as, if he was not paid, he would be unlikely to attend (Kotarbinski, 1965, Ch.12). Once he attends, then his subsequent actions, as social actions, are conditioned by this fact. Clearly, a
more or less 'positive' attitude to the work experienced will affect the particular quality of the actions (more correctly, interactions), but not their essential nature. This then reverses the normal view that motivation follows from job satisfaction. More likely, job satisfaction follows from motivation - or, more correctly, from absence of de-motivation.

The Worker Experience of the Organisation

For convenience, I will divide the worker’s experience of the organisation into two periods. The first is as a new starter, unaware of the organisation as Other, and how he relates to it. The second period is when he does, through experience, know the organisation. It must be said, of course, that these are not two distinct periods, but that the first evolves into the second with experience of the organisation - thus no specific time period is involved, everything depending upon individual experience. Also, this assumes that the organisation is relatively static. In the short run, this is not unreasonable; only rarely do dramatic changes in the ongoing organisation occur suddenly. However, the dynamic characteristic is in itself not a problem. Changes in the organisation only affect experiences for better or worse, the individual responding accordingly. The fact remains that knowledge of the organisation can only be acquired over time.

The significant difference between the two periods lies in the fact that the new starter cannot know the organisation as Other - it is, by definition, beyond his experience, other than where a general or specific prior experience is relevant, eg., at the general level, if a worker has experienced hierarchy before, then he may have some general prior understanding of it - though not specific to the organisation being joined - and, at the specific level, he may know some of the people already in the organisation, either socially or through having worked with
them before, but elsewhere. But these only shorten the path to the second phase - the principles remain the same. However, with the second phase the worker has inescapable, experientially based, knowledge, which will mediate his relationship to the organisation. Or, to put it another way, what distinguishes the new starter from the organisationally mature worker is that the former is, by definition, unaware of the specific lack filling opportunities (or absence of them) furnished by the organisation, whereas the latter does have such an awareness. Accordingly, the new starter must adopt an optimistic proactive or exploratory attitude to the organisation, until he has acquired knowledge to mediate his relationship to it. This constitutes a lowering of his 'self' defence mechanism in his innocence, which makes him ripe for exploitation to a degree not experienced by the mature employee.

The New Starter: The situation of a new starter is analogous to that of a person deposited in an unfamiliar land. In the way in which our traveller needs to gain intelligence about the land, to be able to orient himself, so the new starter must attempt to become familiar with the organisation. However, the organisation is not an empirical material entity which he can survey. (Certainly, some bits can be so seen, but I am here primarily concerned with the organisation as people - the physical aspects are important, but as signifiers, not as things in themselves as natural objects - for example, where workers 'clock-in' and managers do not, then the time clock can act as a signifier of the formers' lower status.) In the way in which the traveller makes expeditions into the hinterland to know his physical location, so the new starter makes expeditions into the organisational Other to locate his metaphysical self. The metaphor of expending energy, previously noted, reappears here, in the attempt to connect with the 'out there', for the purpose of knowing one's own position.
This action by the new starter is manifest in the Gift. As previously argued, passivity will not lead to finding the self. Acting passively, as a receptor, one is primarily a mirror for Other's attempts at self-identification. By only reacting to others' gifts one would be a little like putty being moulded by Others, so as to be an imprint of the moulder and not have any intrinsic form of one's own. As Fromm (1979:93) notes, "passivity excludes being". Thus finding the self in the world of the Other is predicated upon action, not re-action. In this necessary action, the Gift, the individual exposes himself, or, in Brown's and Bataille's terms, sacrifices himself. Other useful metaphors to illustrate this essential point are those of the offensive or pre-emptive action (military), where an initial calm or balance is disturbed with the hope of advantage but with the possibility of terrible overwhelming reaction if we have guessed wrong; the generalised idea of risk-taking, gambling, is also appropriate, the principle of 'speculate to accumulate', to act in anticipation of a return - 'we give in order that we may receive'. However, the general whose attacks always failed, or the investor whose shares always fell, or the gambler whose horse always came in last, may perhaps question their competence in these roles, i.e., their identity with such roles - a disconfirmation of self.

Our new starter, in making his necessary gifts, does so in anticipation of some particular reciprocation, appropriate to his gift, (which is made in an attempt to fill his experienced lack). This presupposes that he has some model of what an appropriate response would be. Being new to the situation, he cannot know what the particular responses will be, so one must assume that reference is made to some generalised model of situational response, as the only aid available, until such time as a more accurate specific understanding is acquired through experience. Thus when meeting a person for the first time, traditional greeting rituals may take place, whereas there may be a vernacular style practised in the
ongoing situation which, in time, the new starter will appropriate, but which initially is unknown to him. Thus we can say that our new starter has some expectations of 'normal' response. Clearly, what he sees as normal will vary experientially and culturally. An example which illustrates this is use of first names. If one's experience, etc., leads one to use first names, then to do so in an environment where it is not normal may lead to an unanticipated response. (The use of titles, or non-use, is a signifier, say, of attitudes to status and deference, which will underly all signifiers - ie., indicate the ethos of the organisation.)

This example will stand a little extension. Our new starter will already possess a necessarily imperfect 'image' of himself as a social being, based upon his already experienced world. Now he is expanding that world, ie., the generalised Other is being expanded. He must, of course, try to appropriate this Other, and so he makes a gift of a greeting, using a first name, as his experience leads him to do. His anticipation is of a response which would recognise his gift as appropriate and which would confirm his understanding of self within the world of the Other signified by the existence of the person he is greeting - positive feedback. However, if the response is that a formal mode of address should be used - negative feedback - then his self-knowledge in the world of the Other is not correct, ie., he has not appropriated the world of the Other. Now clearly, negative feedback can be of immense utility in locating one's 'true' position, ie., from the use of negative feedback one can adjust one's understanding to something 'more correct', (Achievement Motivation theory uses this principle). Also, continuous positive feedback can itself be disastrous - in terms of this work, sycophancy would be continuous positive feedback, leading to system instability. Negative feedback, ie., denial of lack filling opportunity, is not in itself 'bad', and can be seen as part of the 'necessary pain' involved in being social. But excess negative feedback is dysfunctional, as will be developed later.
The situation of the new starter is the stranger in the world of the Other. In order to avoid remaining isolated, he must attempt to appropriate, or gain access to, Otherness. This he does by repeated cycles of giving and receiving which, by confirming or denying the assumptions underlying his gift, allow him to locate himself. However, (i) the location is not a fixed point to be achieved and maintained; it is like a ship trying to maintain a stationary position - wind and tide constitute a shifting environment which must be continually monitored and adjustments made, and the position striven after can never be assumed, it can only be maintained through constant effort; (ii) the work experience does not present a totally new and pristine environment - some general experience of Otherness accompanies the new starter - but the specific setting and nature of Otherness in that new context is novel and unique.

Being motivated is, therefore, an inescapable commitment on the part of the worker - for his own ends. If he were not motivated he could not acquire the world of the Other, and would remain in 'splendid' isolation. However, the motivation is the one central motivation, to seek the self in the world of the Other - not the motivation to work in the crude reductionist sense argued by the behaviourist, for, as Fromm (op. cit.:100) has cautioned, behaviour is a mask, yet "Behaviourism deals with this mask as if it were a reliable scientific datum". It is not.

A person will be motivated to work in so far as it presents a lack filling opportunity - (this excludes effort achieved through coercion and incentive). However, this is not a purely arbitrary possibility - the chances of being motivated to work are better than evens because of the particular given context. It is possible to suggest several reasons for this, all, however, relating to finding the self.
Taking the normal work organisation, it has been suggested that a person's presence at work reflects a certain powerlessness - i.e., the choice not to be there does not really exist. A person does not have a right to a job, but is given it by some other person on behalf of a corporate organisation, i.e., access to work is controlled by the organisation, (pace certain industries, such as printing, which may have some peculiarities in this matter - see, e.g., Cockburn, 1983) - the offer of employment is an act by the organisation through its officers. It does, in this sense, conform to the rules of the Gift relationship, and as such, the worker is bound to reciprocate. The reciprocation may well be in the form of the need to work 'well', to put in effort, in other words, to exhibit the behavioural characteristics of the motivated worker - NB., this assumes effort over and above what would be minimally acceptable, or that the worker does not try to 'get away with' the least possible effort.

A second possibility is that the worker possesses some particular skills and that using these skills is central to his position in the world of the Other. This may be manifest in the satisfaction from using the skill or in demonstrating one's value to the world of the Other. Thus there is an existing orientation to work (now in the sense of production) and motivation will be present as long as work presents an opportunity to find the self in the Other. As, to some extent, work is inescapable, it must provide, initially, access to self through Other.

The Mature Worker: the continuous process of giving and receiving provides information about the location of the self vis a vis the social Other. Intelligence is acquired, some experiences/knowledge provide a lack filling, whereas others do not. The innocence of the new starter gives way to the informed awareness of the Mature Worker. What must be remembered here is that the worker does not achieve a static goal - as earlier noted - but becomes able to differentiate
between things which offer the prospect of filling the lack and things which do not, and accordingly will tend to concentrate on lack fillers over not-lack fillers. (Note the essential role of perception of difference here.)

Thus, where the worker's gifts do not result in an adequate reciprocation, his motivation will reduce, i.e., circumstances will de-motivate him. If work ceases to be recognised as a lack filler, the motivation to work will decrease. This does not mean that expenditure of effort on work will decrease. This may be sustained by incentive (including coercion). However, the tendency will be to less effort, as 'motivation' through incentive is not motivation to work, but motivation to acquire the incentive, as well recognised in incentive theory. As the focus of the incentive cannot be made congruent, whatever the effort, with the focus of work, then some disjunction is inevitable, with a resulting change of emphasis by the worker. For example, if a worker feels his gift reciprocated by the size of his pay packet, then his focus will be on his pay, not on his performance, with the consequent sacrifice of, say, quality.

One may assume that, if work was not a lack filling experience, then effort would drop to zero. However, this is not necessarily so. Gift (effort) is proportional to reciprocation - thus work, however alienative, may provide some reciprocation and thus maintain some effort. For example, it may be that the reciprocation provided by work is to offset the boredom of being unoccupied. Thus a person would work to the extent that it combatted boredom. Some obligation may be felt to give in such a way as to reflect the reciprocation of the wage packet. Or, alternatively, some peer group 'benefit' may serve as the reciprocation for a certain effort, as identified in the Hawthorne studies.

What can be said is that, if the work starts to present less of a lack filling service,
then motivation to work will decrease. I have suggested two reasons why new starters may feel motivated. One is to reciprocate the gift of the job, though once this is perceived as paid back it will cease to motivate. The second, and much more crucial, is the 'use' of the employee, which, if it is not commensurate with his giving, will also cease to motivate. This second condition requires illumination, as it can be argued that the prevailing tendency in bureaucratic organisation is to misuse (reject the gift of) the employee, and therefore to demotivate.

It is fruitful to look at the question of gift rejection in this context, in terms of both the specific and the general case. Specifically, let us assume for illustration, (and I derive this illustration, as with many of the ones I have used, from my own experience of the work situation), a scenario of Otherness where the worker perceives that a certain gift will merit a certain confirmation, through reciprocation, of his place in the world of the Other, as represented by the authoritative organisation. Let us say that a certain job must be produced by a certain time, and it can only be achieved by our worker working overtime, perhaps at some inconvenience to himself. He agrees to work over and the job is completed on time. The lack filling here may be confirmation of his 'importance' to the Other. This can be seen in terms of positive feedback. Let us now assume a later situation, where our worker needs to finish work an hour early for some personal reason, which does not delay completion of his work. His request, however, is refused - negative feedback. Thus the world of the Other for our worker is one where he can put himself out for the organisation, but the organisation will not do the same for him - i.e., the relationship is asymmetrical. If our worker was approached again to work overtime he may not now be motivated to so do - his gift has been rejected and so his motivation has declined. Two points should be noted from this example. Firstly, the fact that
motivation was sustained in the first case does not preclude it from being subsequently affected by what may be seen in organisational terms as a distinctly separate issue. Note here the danger of imposed boundaries, using one set of (organisational) logic which may not correspond to other, in this case worker, logic. Secondly, to promote de-motivation it is not necessary to establish some like correspondence between events such as time discretion, etc. Unlike events may equally produce specific de-motivation.

This point leads us to the general case. As argued earlier, the Gift relationship is best understood in terms of a dynamic network of giving and receiving, where unlike and superficially unconnected events can have a complimentary effect. In this 'general economy', events can be seen as combining to give an overall level of motivation (in this case, motivation to work), determined by the lack filling opportunities presented by work. To understand the general case we need to look at and consider the whole person. One of the shortcomings of conventional motivation to work theory is the assumption of the worker as distinct from other 'roles' he may have, and thus there is an implicit normative case as to what workers should do in the context of the particular interest of ownership or property rights. Certain criteria have been identified in terms of being 'correct' for workers in order to increase satisfaction, i.e., satisfaction is only increasable in line with certain aspects of work determined by the agents of ownership - there is no absolute pursuit of satisfaction. If satisfaction does not attach to those aspects, then hard luck - there is no absolute desire to maximise satisfaction.

Let us therefore re-examine the gift of the worker, again focussing on work. A person will have a certain perceived level of capability/competence, which may or may not correspond to his actual level. This image of the self will bear upon the perception of the Other, to which access is required. For example, and all things
being equal, a Carpenter would not seek Otherness in the Otherness of, say, Brain Surgeons, (bearing in mind that the focus is work, rather than the generally social), and though he may well share a work environment with Brain Surgeons, it would be as Carpenter, not as Brain Surgeon, i.e., he would not normally want to be judged as a Brain Surgeon by other Brain Surgeons. (However, let it be recognised that the general case of Brain Surgeons may well be a fundamental part of establishing the selfhood of the Carpenter.) All I am seeking to establish here is a general awareness of the self in one's social world - what one is from what one is not. One may see it as an assessment of one's worth in the social world. This recognition materially affects one's expectations of the social and thus the possibilities for filling the lack. This, in turn, puts some value on the gift one gives to actuate a lack filling exchange. However, if the opportunities for lack filling presented by the situation, in this case work, in which we are 'forced' to live are insufficient, then the assessment by the relevant other, of us, is less than our own, i.e., we are valued less than we would value ourselves, which is reflected in relatively over-valued gifts and under-valuing reciprocation, i.e., rejection. Thus if we have a certain level of skill which we can give to the social world through its agents of control, and if this skill is underused in one form or another, then we are being rejected. If our perceptions of (the) work are refused, then, again, our gift is rejected. If we are addressed in an abrasive or condescending manner, then, again, we as people are being rejected as not the equal of the Other - not a fit partner in exchange - Mauss. It can be seen that this awareness of the relative rejection/acceptance of the gift accumulates over time as part of the dynamic network suggested earlier. Specific acts may themselves be unimportant in the long run motivation, even if they have a short term effect. Specific rejection may not have a lasting effect, say, if we are aware that our gift has been benignly misunderstood, as may not specific acceptance. Sometimes a gift may be rejected by accident - where no rejection was intended - thus it is the
cumulative effect which is important. It is this which leads to the general condition of relative de-motivation.

The argument then is that Motivation to/at Work is dependent upon the lack filling opportunities presented by work. Principally as regards work as expenditure of effort, these opportunities are controlled by management. These opportunities may be either strictly social, in terms of interpersonal relations, eg., prescribing or proscribing certain relationships, or may be of a socio-technical nature, eg., through job design, etc. Attempts to fill the lack on the part of the worker will be made through perceived appropriate gifts. Where these gifts are reciprocated, motivation is sustained. Where the gift is rejected, de-motivation is promoted. The Gift may be unrecognised as such by the recipient, (in fact, within current organisation theory, there is unlikely to be an understanding, at the moment, of the Gift), and, of course, does not particularly conform to popular stereotypes of the gift. However, it should be remembered that the gift, however framed, is in fact merely a symbol - a signifier of the underlying desire. What is being given in effect, is the entire person - the self. Clearly, an adequate reciprocation can only be given knowingly when the recipient understands the gift as a signifier - which is the challenge here for management. Can management develop the skills to manage the Gift relationship? (This is to be developed later, along with the question of whether management can afford to manage the Gift.) Trying to manage (motivation) in the absence of an understanding of the Gift, as a signifier of self, allows success only by accident, and, more likely, promotes failure. The relevance of the concept of the Gift to other theories of motivation will be briefly examined shortly.
CHAPTER 11

MANAGEMENT AND THE GIFT

I argue that, as motivation is inherent in the individual, management cannot motivate workers - only de-motivate them. I consider the Gift in relation to other theories of motivation, etc., and suggest how their claims could be understood in terms of the Gift. I then look at the implications of the Gift for management and whether it is of any practical relevance, either now or in some future, more emancipated, society. There are, of course, important implications in the Gift for management's role as a social elite with repressive powers over workers.

My argument at this point is that management as a function cannot motivate its workforce. Or, perhaps more precisely, management as a process, as contemporarily understood and practiced, does not and cannot encompass an expertise for motivating workers. They can certainly provide incentives, and incentives can provide an object which will encourage certain behaviour. Though such behaviour may be said to be 'motivated' in a general sense, in so far as any action may be said to be 'motivated', it must be distinguished from non-incited behaviour, on the basis that such behaviour is only a function of the incentive. Remove the incentive and related behaviour will cease - or, at least, it ought to do, if the incentive was doing its job efficiently. Certainly, all objects of desire may be said to act as an 'incentive', in so far as they promote action towards their achievement, but this use of the term must be properly distinguished from incentives provided by one person with the aim of encouraging, in another person, certain actions desired by the person applying the incentive, which is the sense in
which it is being used here - i.e., as a device to manipulate behaviour. Furthermore, the incentive, as with all objects of desire, 'motivates' behaviour to achieve the incentive, and not anything for which it stands proxy, such as work. As all motivated behaviour is toward an object of desire, any theory of motivation must cope with, and be able to explain, both incited and non-incited behaviour using a common language. Additionally, whereas work per se certainly could, in principle, act as a motivator, i.e., for the joy of working, there are no grounds for believing that motivated work can be, or ever has been, an epiphenomenon of capitalist need.

Management can also de-motivate, in so far as it can deny workers access to what would appear as potentially lack filling opportunities. Or, to put it another way, the opportunity cost of capitalist management for the economy of self is the loss of 'lack filling' possibilities. Capitalism, in terms of the presence which it furnishes, denies entry (or presence) to more fruitful experiences for the individual. It could be argued that management's role vis à vis labour is solely concerned with the provision of incentives and, as such, precludes, or excludes, the presence of non-incited motivation, or, more correctly, that non-incited behaviour is an unintended consequence of management due to the absolute limits on control of labour that can be exercised by management. This claim deserves, perhaps, a little more development. First of all, the very possibility of a job (employment) with an organisation, which is inevitably in the gift of management, provides, for the would-be worker, an incentive. On the not unreasonable assumption that workers would not give their labour at no cost to the organisation, a job acts as an incentive for the worker, in so far as it contains the promise of a wage. Paying wages can only be in the interest of the organisation, i.e., its owners, in so far as it enables labour to reproduce itself for further work in the service of capitalism. However, given the risk to capitalism that workers could
survive other than by wage labour, the rates paid must be large enough to attract such labour as it needs away from any other, more attractive, possibilities for survival. This, of course, is a real issue at the moment, where, supposedly, low paid jobs go unfilled because welfare payments are marginally more beneficial, in whatever way this is understood, to the potential worker. It also explains why ventures such as co-operatives appear as threatening to capitalism and must be squeezed out, by, for example, capitalist control of access to sources of finance. Whereas co-operatives can provide opportunities for capitalist exploitation, in so far as they must necessarily operate within a capitalist society, were they to prove more attractive to labour than capitalist employment, they would deprive capitalism of the labour which it needs to promote its own interest.

Having obtained possession of labour, capitalism must encourage it to produce surplus value. It must, through its agents, management, provide work to be done, which, of course, means appropriating the rights to produce to the exclusion of any other claimant. Thus, for example, as noted re the NCB and NUM, capitalism can provide work, whereas the unions cannot. (The Co-operative Movement, as successor to the Rochdale pioneers, as a means of providing an alternative locus of the right to produce, has manifestly failed to overcome capitalism.) However, the mere presence of work is not enough, it is quantity which counts - literally! Whereas this problematic is the provenance of the incentive, both material and psychological, to attend and produce, as conventionally understood, it is much more extensive than this. Thus, in so far as production is not an absolute consequence of the hours attended at work, the prescription of certain attendance hours by management is also an incentive, albeit coercive rather than cajoling. This is clearly illustrated by the lack of enthusiasm on the part of management for the general application of Task and Finish systems of work. Whilst certainly there are 'real' problems of control for management with task and finish systems, this
merely emphasises the absolute limits to managerial control and the need for incentives to supplement their repertoire of control. Similarly, direct supervision, status, hierarchy, job titles, all the prerogatives of management, are all incentives to attend and produce. In the absence of these, either as objects of desire or instruments of coercion, some other object of desire (or instrument of coercion), as a source of motivation, would exist in the space created. Certainly, some alternatives may be, more or less, as repressive as the foregoing, but equally need not be, and this perhaps highlights one of the problems with orthodox motivation theory. Take, for example, job satisfaction strategies. In the absence of such provisions, what are we to understand exists in their stead? Clearly, not some neutral state, some zero degree of incentive or object of desire. In so far as action of some sort still occurs, even if in a productive sense it is inaction, some impulse to act is clearly present. All that can be said is that it may be different to that desired by management. Thus unenriched jobs can still be a strong source of motivation - but not necessarily motivation to work. Similarly, Theory X management may promote non-compliant behaviour; expectation that work will not give access to desired outcomes may lead the worker to seek other channels for their appropriation, or suggest a switch of focus to other outcomes; the absence of a financial incentive may cause the worker to concentrate on other use of time, such as maximising idle time. Just because motivation as managerially defined, i.e., motivation to work, is deemed not to be present, one cannot claim that no motivation is present. Thus I argue that it is management's task to furnish certain forms of incentive in order to exclude other possible forms. It therefore follows that, in so far as we are dealing simplistically with, in effect, mutually exclusive possibilities for objects of desire, i.e., those promoted by management in the interests of capitalism, and other possibilities which may be in the individual's interest, management possess the general facility to de-motivate the individual vis a vis what could be 'true' objects of desire.
I am not, of course, seeking to argue that we should understand the possibilities for motivated, (rather than incited), behaviour in terms of a simple binary relationship between alternatives which are present and those which are absent, although, in terms of motivation to work as a discrete phenomenon, this may possess some utility. However, as motivation to work is not sensibly distinguishable from what is a complex web of motivational impulses, we should not concentrate exclusively on this interest. Neither am I suggesting the possibility of an end state of achieving the object of desire even in the absence of capitalist domination, i.e., I am not suggesting the individual's lack could actually be filled, remembering that the quest to fill the lack is an ongoing situation. However, there certainly are differential possibilities for lack filling, apparent to the individual.

I would like now to return to the more specific problems of de-motivation, of gift rejection. Accordingly, I will now situate the Gift relationship in relation to a number of aspects of the work situation where it has particular relevance. It is, of course, implicit that contemporary management do not understand the rules or the presence of the Gift relationship, and so do not view their actions in terms of accepting or rejecting the gift, with inevitable consequences for motivation.

A rationalist view of managerial action, including the Human Relations School, sees management action as related (deterministically) to some transcendent quasi-objective goals. This claim exists at two levels. At the macro level, appeal is made to ideas of economy, efficiency, productivity, market forces, etc., as some ontologically immutable imperative. However, as has been argued, such a position is only valid from a particular ideological standpoint, with no transcendent claim to be universally valid. At the micro level, similar arguments obtain, in the belief that the aggregation of small economies necessarily leads to large economies -
another fallacious argument. At the micro level we also have a much more immediate interpersonal relationship - or, to put it another way, a very direct involvement in the Gift relationship. The current pursuit of market economics, which characterises the politico/business ethic of the U.K., provides the most clear illustration of the ignorance of the Gift in relation to work.

The miners' strike (already referred to), as an exemplar of numerous other such events, is a case in point. At the macro level, the argument for closing mines is ideologically masked by the claim to be reflecting market conditions. The weakness of this argument is demonstrated by, eg., Glynn (1984) and Berry et al (1985). As there is virtually no presence or recognition of the individual at this level, as people are aggregated into quantities to be sacrificed, very general assumptions about people can be made by managers - in this case, that workers ought to accept the loss of their job willingly because circumstances, (market forces), demand it and because, anyway, financial compensation is being made. However, such loss is experienced, not by the aggregated worker, but by the individual, yet the individual is too small a unit to consider when weighed against 'corporate need'. Yet this gives an intolerable contradiction - decisions about the fate of workers are made on the assumed aggregation of workers but must be experienced at the singular level. The inconsistency in this must be obvious to those implementing change, and yet is held to be outside the area of responsibility of management - not managerially 'real', though there are apparently not the same doubts about the reality of the reified market force (see Harrison's (1985) reply to Berry et al (op. cit.) on what constitutes 'real'). The issues in the pit strike, particularly regarding the impact on the individual, have been well rehearsed. Suffice (at the moment) to say that, when relational rules are changed unilaterally, in this case by a decision to close a pit and terminate a job, this creates an imbalance in the Gift relationship. The miner attends and works to a
level 'acceptable' to the organisation, he pays rates, taxes, etc., to the government; he supports local commerce and services, etc. The withdrawal of his job potentially changes all these relationships for the miner. As regards his employer, (pace redeployment), it is seeking to withdraw from the relationship, in effect wishing no longer to be part of the miner's social Other. But the effect of such action is not limited merely to the two parties to the relationship. It also affects related social Others, such as peers, shops, schools, etc. - in fact, the entire social milieu of the miner. The miner's gift, i.e., self as miner, is no longer required by those with the power to use it. Although there is coal to dig, a social market for it and he is willing to do it, someone decides that it is 'better' if he does not - in the current circumstances of high unemployment, decides he is of more social use on the dole than producing coal. This represents gift rejection on a total scale. One may suggest that there is a lack of empathy - management insensitivity - or that it is just unfortunate but necessary that such events should occur. However, the reality for the NCB should be that motivation to dig coal is unlikely to be sustained by the mere offer of an alternative job. This is, of course, not a problem for the NCB if redundancy rather than redeployment is chosen by the displaced miner, as the problem is bought off, though, of course, they cannot buy off the sense of collective rejection that may be felt throughout the mining industry, even by those not, superficially, affected.

The micro level provides a more immediate case, and again the miners provide a good example. The management of the NCB owe allegiance to the macro decision of their employer and must implement the corporate wishes. In the affected pits management carry out the specific activities which estrange the individual miner from his social world. In the pits generally there is the issue of handling the return to work - as has now become apparent. Thus we have the dismissal of men for picket activities, even where no equitable grounds exist for such action, based on the argument that it is in the best interest of the industry. More generally,
there is reallocation of duties, separation of peer groups, etc., all to benefit the industry.

All these events based upon inequality of power, (the power to reject the gift with impunity), serve to demonstrate the inferiority of the miner as an equal partner in exchange. His gift of himself as a miner is not wanted, or not wanted in the form he would wish to give. Rationalist understandings of management do not depend upon the unique self, but on the idea of mutable resource, where rejection or acceptance of self is not relevant. In other words, managers claim to control a function whose nature is, by and large, unknown to them. (Common parallels exist here in nuclear management, chemical management, etc., as witnessed by events such as those at Chernobyl and Bhopal.) Whilst managers continue to see workers as partial human beings and as a resource in the service of organisational aims, albeit reinforced in this by behavioural theories of organisation, the relative motivation of people must remain hidden from them.

However, the individual worker cannot escape such awareness and cannot remain blind to the de facto rejection of his gift and, thereby, of himself. Rejection shows a misplaced understanding of his place in society, i.e., creates uncertainty (disorientation). This must be moderated as much as possible but will not, of course, be so done by repeating errors of the gift. Accordingly, the individual will find less desire to pursue certain actions, in order to reduce the level of his rejection, - in effect altering to conform with the view others hold of him.

**Other Models of Motivation**

A common theme in motivation to work in recent years is the assumption of psychological growth. This has been assumed largely as a result of the (misused) work of Maslow on self-actualisation, to be achieved through increasing job
satisfaction by reversing the preceding trend of job simplification. The problems with such need theories are that continual enrichment would be necessary to sustain motivation in line with people's expanded psychological capabilities, a situation which cannot be achieved, certainly not within the existing capitalist managerial ethic. However, this inconsistency in managerial theories of motivation has been conveniently ignored by their supporters.

Whilst the idea of the Gift may be thought to have some correspondence with increasing job satisfaction, this similarity is superficial. Job satisfaction is synonymous with need satisfaction - usually seen as social and self-actualising needs. However, Lacan has supplanted the collection of needs with a single need, that of finding the self in the Other. Whereas all need theories agree that needs cannot be satisfied - that is, bundle theories say that once satisfied they are no longer operative as needs and must be replaced - and although Lacanian need is also not satisfiable, as the lack cannot be filled, their nature is dissimilar. Bundle theories require a replacement strategy of particular stimuli, whereas Lacanian need concerns not achievement but process. It is the process of lack filling which gives substance to Lacanian motivation - not achievement. Thus the principle of growth is not essential to such motivation. As regards work, people do not require (continually) enriched jobs, what they require are jobs which confirm the self. True, increasing complexity of task may be a component of confirmation and thereby, for some, important. But for others, once (and if) adequate confirmation is received, there is no desire for psychological growth. The idea of growth is not central to the Gift relationship.

Similarly, Herzberg's identification of Hygiene factors and Motivators is not necessarily relevant. The attempt to establish categories independent of the individual is relatively meaningless. Depending upon the perception of the individual in terms of what signifiers confirm the self, hygiene factors and
motivators can have the same effect. This is not to deny that, in particular cultures, some signifiers may be more valued than others in this respect, but then why limit the categories, as Herzberg has done, to what is achievable within the current power relativities of capitalism? Perhaps absence of hierarchy, sharing of ownership, might have even greater signification and motivating power!!

Again, with Theory X - Theory Y we have imposed categories reflecting certain interests. Either style of management may contain the possibility of self-confirmation. This could explain why Theory X styles can work in, say, the military.

Expectancy theory is similar to growth theory, in anticipating change from one condition to another - action to turn one state into another. From the point of view of the Gift, maintenance is clearly more significant than change per se. The focus is more on knowing where one is, than on moving elsewhere.

Much of behavioural motivation theory can be explained by reference to the Gift relationship, and thus what are apparent successes by the theories can be seen as, at least temporarily, resulting from a change in the level of reciprocation. This is perhaps most strongly suggested by the Human Relations School, in what has been termed the Hawthorne Effect. Increased attention to people can be seen as an increase in the level of reciprocation and will promote increased motivation. Clearly however, the long term problem is that, if such attention is not really increased reciprocation, then the benefits will not be sustained.

**Management of the Gift**

It was suggested earlier that management as a profession evolved from an early concern with control, largely of 'recalcitrant' labour, and has been developed as a
full-blown functional process that has little external legitimacy. Management's fundamental raison d'être is to assist in maintaining certain interests and yet it does not publicly proclaim such an allegiance. Rather, it maintains a claim to serve 'neutrally' the general social good, and yet lacks any means of validating this claim, which makes it on a par with theology. The blind faith demonstrated by much management in a purely functional, socially neutral role can be explained either ideologically or in terms of some naivety of understanding. That the contradiction between these assumed and actual roles is maintained only at a cost has been argued by Deleuze and Guattari (1984), (see also Jackson and Carter, 1985; Carter and Jackson, 1986), in terms of the conflict between desire and interest. At best, management willingly deludes itself as to purpose to satisfy desire, or, at worst, they are truly the unwitting servants, and victims, of a greater interest.

However, it is clear that most managers, by and large, seem able to rationalise their position in terms of supposed benefits to themselves or society generally, at least in the short term. The long term effects of 'modern management' are not so easily dealt with, but an optimistic view would be that the contemporary situation of asymmetric power relationships in the production process will be maintained with its attendant ills, whereas the pessimistic view would be of accelerating ecosystemic damage (eg., Capra, 1983).

If motivation to work is of importance to managers, and society generally, then the arguments here should be of consequence. It may, of course, be that motivation is a luxury, and only production matters, which can be achieved through the use of incentives. The answer to this problem relies to some extent on forcing managers to recognise their contradictory position and to choose consciously between serving sectarian interest or the more general social interest. I have argued elsewhere that management can only serve the general
social good when it possesses an appropriate meta-theory of management in place of its present one which reflects entrepreneurial interest (Carter and Jackson, op. cit.). However, such a change of focus would require a powerful sector of society (money) to relinquish a substantial part of its power and influence. There is no evidence that they would do so willingly and it is by no means certain that management has the power unilaterally to change these rules. Should management become politicised, they may find that they have no more substantive power than the people whom they control, and that such power as they have is in the gift of some greater power. Clearly, if the sole function of labour is to provide profit for the investor, then motivation is, at the moment, with high surplus of labour, probably irrelevant, though, if so, we must question the use of the concept motivation as a mask for exploitation. If, however, work is a social function which should contribute to the general benefit, then motivation is clearly important. If managers are mere lackeys of capital then they need not be concerned. If they are truly attempting to serve social good, then motivation must be of great concern.

Before considering how management might use the concept of the Gift, certain other questions need addressing.

**Is There a Social Function for Management?**

It has been argued that, as yet, management has failed to provide a validation of its synergetic role, so any consideration of this question must be speculative.

Firstly, we must separate out management as a professional class with claims to special knowledge and privileges, from management as a process. If management as a process is deemed valid, then the social position of its practitioners must be decided by society and assessed alongside other such claims. However, at present
any claim to status on the basis of specialised knowledge is extremely dubious (MacIntyre, 1981), and were management to be judged on its praxis, new knowledge of its process would be required.

As regards management as process, some normative statement of the nature of this process is necessary. If, however, the raison d'être of management is an emancipated society, is that of optimising the use of resources within the context of the natural and social ecosystem, then we arrive at the fundamental question - Can resource optimisation be improved by a managerial function? It is implicit in this work that the answer is yes, but that does not imply an endorsement of the present managerial practice. On the contrary, whilst I would argue that the concept of management is socially useful, there is little in current practice which reflects this benefit. This could be summarised in the argument that contemporary management is highly reductionist, and yet can only succeed in a wholistic context.

The next point to consider is, how does a reductionist management practice stand in relation to a theory of the Gift? Management action has a wider-reaching effect than it is prepared to accept responsibility for. This is contained by an arbitrary bounding process of a quasi-legal and customary nature. Thus there is the formal concept of the organisation, which is supposed to contain management responsibility. Some transcendence of this does occur, for example, with responsibility for pollution, but circumstances tend to be well-specified (legally). There is also some voluntary assumption of responsibility where company interests are vicariously served by such action - eg., sponsorship of the arts. However, as contemporary events show, eg., Bhopal, where damage caused exceeds the value of the company, such bounding processes are inadequate for an emancipated society. Focussing now on labour, the same reductionist mentality obtains. Allowing for certain legal obligations, which mainly relate to the worker as a
member of the public rather than as worker, and certain 'voluntary' commitments in special circumstances, eg., scarce skills, the boundary of managerial action on the worker is held to be congruent with the worker's presence at work. This condition is reflected in managerial theories of motivation, where it is assumed that organisational process can be manipulated independently of any dialectical relationship with a worker's extra-organisational existence, (and indeed without reference even to his total intra-organisational existence). Clearly from the point of view of the Gift as an instrument of seeking self-identity, there can be no division between 'inside' and 'outside' the organisation. For example, changing a person's status within an organisation, seen in terms of reciprocation of the Gift, can influence a person's relationships outside work. This then can be seen as an arbitrary spatio-temporal bounding.

Another form of arbitrary bounding concerns the model of man as worker held by management, as regards both motivation and capability. The general question as to why people work has already been addressed and, as noted, their attendance should not be confused with desire. This may become an issue of increased importance, should any policy be adopted to cope with the apparent long term surplus of labour which involves a shift from a purely economic assessment of work. The question of capability is also important, both for current work practice and for possible future forms. One of the key assumptions of management, which is not widely shared by workers, is that they bring something to the work process - skill, perspective, control, etc. - which would be otherwise absent, ie., we have the condition of over-management. This, of course, at one level, is a form of job simplification and, at another, a form of surplus repression (Marcuse, 1969). Clearly, surplus repression is not compatible with the Gift relationship, as it represents a form of rejection, as, of course, does job simplification. Where the skills exist for achieving the necessary social ends of work within the workforce, then repressing such skills, by whatever process, is potentially to reject the Gift.
What then does management have to do to successfully manage the Gift relationship? Firstly, it would need educating in terms of 'gift technology', i.e., to understand social interaction in terms of the Gift. However, such knowledge can only be operationalised optimally within a system of organised labour which has a commitment to motivation (not incentive), i.e., is emancipated. This is probably impossible to achieve where management is concerned with maintaining its social position of privilege and authority, as opposed to a productive role (see Jackson and Carter, op. cit.; Carter and Jackson, op. cit.). Over-management as a general principle would be dysfunctional in terms of the Gift. However, even in the present organisational scenario there still exist opportunities for managers with an emancipatory interest to analyse their interpersonal roles within the context of the Gift, with some melioration of the present condition.
CHAPTER 12

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

This attempt to construct a theory of motivation to work had its roots in a twofold disillusionment with the experience of managing motivation. Firstly, management was clearly not the neutral, rational, process it was supposed to be and secondly, available theories of motivation, which reflected and reinforced a neutral rational management did not produce the supposed benefits in practice. Clearly, the two aspects of my disillusionment were interlinked and any escape would have to deal with both constraints, and one experience whilst still a manager exemplified this problem.

As a member of a national advisory body, I had the task of preparing a report on some particular aspect of our area of interest. Some people reacted to my report by saying it was 'absolute rubbish', and, equally, others said they could not agree with me more. How was it, I wondered, that a group of people with a more or less common experience of, and expertise in, this subject could have such diametrically opposed beliefs about the truth of the situation? Interesting though this question was, even more interesting were those who said 'Yes, we agree with what you claim, but it is not politic to say such things'. Here were people who agreed that black was black, but felt it was 'better' to say that black was white. Whilst not trying to make any claim that such an experience typifies management, it does seem that if, on the one hand, experts cannot agree upon the validity of the same data and, on the other, data is political and therefore must be censored, trying to base any claims regarding motivation must rest on a critical assessment of management in its current institutionalised form. Accordingly, I have sought to distinguish management as a necessary process from this institutionalised form.
Further, I have suggested that this latter has little provable relevance to management as process, but is far more concerned with social repression than efficiency. However, this policing role is not randomly focussed, but reflects the interests of capitalism. As such it is reinforced by knowledge claims which, whilst offering the promise of social emancipation, in fact act in entirely the opposite way. However, I have elected to challenge management and its theorists not so much directly on epistemological grounds, (if for no other reason than paradigm incommensurability), as on an orientation based on a textual deconstruction of their claims to authority.

Having reached, tentatively, a datum for management and motivation, I attempted a reconstruction of the concept of motivation which would accommodate a model of human action which accorded with my experience of man at work, which explained why people worked (expended energy) beyond a minimum and could derive some satisfaction from it, under conditions of social domination. Given the (capitalist) interest-serving nature of a large part of the body of science which supports management, I have suggested that we must be prepared to look outside this sector, in order to provide adequate explanation of organisational behaviour. As part of this quest I have identified from psycho-analysis a theory of human motivation based upon the work of Lacan. However, theories of individual behaviour cannot be sustained by reference to the individual alone, but require a concept of social interaction. Such an awareness lies at the very heart of Lacan's theorising, and I have sought to emphasise this relationship by reference to Mauss' concept of the Gift, particularly as extended by Leach into a model of man as a generalised giver of gifts as a characteristic of being social.

From this I have argued that a condition of being motivated is intrinsic to man, constituted by his entry into language, and that his motivation is operationalised
through the giving of (not necessarily material) symbolic gifts as a means of locating the social self. Acceptance of the gift as understood by the giver constitutes a reinforcement of the social individual, and tends to sustain motivation, whereas rejection of the gift constitutes a rejection of the social individual and thereby de-motivates. Accordingly, I have suggested that management cannot motivate workers, they can provide incentives and, under contemporary capitalism, do provide incentives congruent with the interests of capitalism. Furthermore, management can, and do, de-motivate the work force by the de facto rejection of the workers' gifts, as part of the process of domination.

With the achievement of an emancipated society, where management served social good rather than sectional interests, it may be that such a society could not afford the luxury of a concern for worker motivation and must still rely on the use of incentives, albeit with a different focus, in which case an 'improved theory of motivation' would have little practical use. However, I do not believe this to be the case. I see no reason why the motivated individual should not be commensurate with an emancipated society. I believe man is, or can be, motivated to work, both for social reasons, in terms of creating social benefit, and for personal reasons, in terms of the basic psychological satisfactions in terms of lack filling which can be achieved through work - whether or not such urges represent an essentialism or merely socialisation. I cannot claim any empirical confirmation of such a proposition, at least in the rigorous sense, but Lyotard's (1986a) forceful comment relating to empiricism is appropriate. He points out that such questions are underlaid by another question,

"Is it possible to continue to say what society is in a conceptual way?" as though we were ever going to be able to show anything experiential to correspond to this term, to prove what we are talking about. Nobody has
ever seen a society. Nobody has ever seen a beginning. An end. Nobody has ever seen a world. In this case, can we have a sensory intuition of what these questions are about? The answer implied in the critical approach (in Kant's sense) is, no, it's impossible, they are Ideas of Reason (of Reason, they're not fantasies). We must consider these Ideas as Ideas if we are to avoid illusion ..." (p.11, emphasis in original).

However, my arguments are based upon an attempt to theorise the experience of everyday social living and, as such, do appear to offer possibilities for the reconstruction of social life, including work. .
EPilogue

During the gestation period of this thesis a number of critical comments have been variously made which, I feel, merit some attention. All of these points have provoked much reflection on my part, (not to mention discussion), and yet reasonably it could be claimed that I have left them unresolved. However, I can, at least, respond that this is, by and large, a conscious decision, and not merely oversight!

A reader of an early outline of my intended arguments commented that it was another male view of the world, signified by exclusive use of masculine terminology, which took no explicit account of the gender issue. This I took to be a perfectly fair, though disturbing, comment. Certainly, anyone with an emancipatory interest must recognise that women suffer their own forms of repression, and that any claims for the domination of men apply, a fortiori, to women. Accordingly, I had no wish to contribute to reinforcing a male world view. However, using masculine terms can indicate two possibilities - one is that it relates only to men, and says nothing about women, or, alternatively, that the masculine is intended to stand for both masculine and feminine - both cases anathema to the feminist movement (Spender, 1981). This problem has been popularly resolved, to some extent, either by a statement that 'he' should also be taken to mean 'she', etc., or by the use of terms such as 's/he', 'his/hers', etc. However, I do not consider that such devices provide a suitable solution. A text should be judged in terms of its emancipatory potential, of its signification. Simply changing a signifier (word) does not necessarily substantively change the signified - does Windscale emit less pollution now that it is called Sellafield? Whether or not this work has anything to offer for the emancipation of women is indicated by the message (or messages) which can be read into the text, not by the
use of particular words. Changing the implied gender would not necessarily increase its emancipatory potential. In other words, it is a classic Form/Content situation - the text should be judged on its content, not on its form.

My doubts about the utility of the usual ways of trying to indicate a gender neutral position lead to my second point. Being male, for me, means that, if being female is an irreducible world-constituting experience, it is something in which I cannot share. In other words, I can write only from a male point of view, and cannot say anything meaningful about the female world, in which case, perhaps, it is better to be explicit about one's orientation than to try to mask it through the manipulation of symbols. However, this is a rather discouraging prospect. If men cannot write for women, nor women for men, we appear condemned to two separate worlds, a perpetual and irreducible opposition. If, by the same logic, white-skinned could not write for black, Protestant for Catholic, 'rich' for poor, etc., we arrive at a total individualism, unless there is some concept of humanity common to all people. Of course, the nature of sexual difference can be seen as distinct from, say, religious differences, as being genetic rather than social, but equally there are an infinite range of possibilities for identifying genetic, but non-sexual, differences. My own inclination is to the belief that many of the differences between male and female are social, and therefore, amenable to change, and that where non-social differences exist, whilst they certainly contribute to the uniqueness of the individual, they do not constitute a totalising definition. In other words, there is some common irreducible concept of being human at the psycho-social level, (see Walker, 1981).

Some confirmation of this position can be found in Lacan (1982, Ch.6), in that there is no such thing as The woman, which, whilst yet another male view, has received some qualified acceptance within the feminist literature, (Mitchell, 1975,
1982; Rose, 1982; Walker, 1981). As the object of desire - the Lacanian \textit{objet a} - the concept 'woman' is a phantasm, which offers no possibility of satisfaction. This is not, of course, to be confused with the possibility of immediate satisfaction of sexual desire, which reposes in the integumented 'woman' - what Lacan refers to as a supplementary jouissance, i.e., woman has (for heterosexual man) a supplementarity over the class 'person', which is capable of providing sexual satisfaction, but which is distinct from any concept of the class 'symbolic woman'. This applies equally in reverse, for women vis à vis men, notwithstanding the problems caused by the primary phallocentric symbolism of human social existence (Lacan, op. cit.:143). In other words, womanness or manness, as a symbolic object of desire, constitutes a spurious difference - what is real is the 'person'.

Derrida (1986:71) contributes to the clarification of this issue, (albeit another male contribution), when he argues that, whilst sexual differences are real, they should not, as they are, popularly, be understood as a 'sexual binary opposition'. Accordingly, I would hope that no sexual bias is indicated by this text being written in terms of the masculine gender. I cannot make any definite claim that it applies equally to women, for the reasons stated, but I believe that it does.

The question of the use of language brings me to my next point. I have not always been very specific in my use of certain words, particularly 'management' and 'work', and their derivatives. Very often the use of such words is clarified syntagmatically, and in other cases I have added some clarification of my intended meaning. However, in some cases I have allowed the Derridean 'play' to remain intact. Taking a strictly post-structuralist/deconstructionist line, one should avoid authority in authorship, and allow the reader full autonomy in determining any meaning. However, the context of a work such as this demands 'authoritative'
statements and, to a large extent, this text accedes to this demand - it is a brave writer who writes the post-structuralist text! There are, though, occasions within the text where a conscious play in the use of words enhances the message, by indicating extra variety, and it is where these occur that words are left unqualified.

This leads to a second, related, problem. Having argued that there is no authoritative reading of a text, am I not being inconsistent by trying to offer an authoritative statement on motivation? Firstly, the fact that a text cannot be read authoritatively does not mean it is incumbent upon the author to adopt, at a superficial level, a Joycean approach to writing. If a text is intended to communicate the author's ideas, then a logocentric approach is not in itself illegitimate. (There is, of course, no reason to assume that Joyce was not clearly expressing himself, at least as far as he was concerned.) A text should be judged in terms of possible meanings, and how these rank in terms of their emancipatory potential. The fact that the writer makes apparently authoritative statements should not seduce the reader, who should remain critically aware of the text which he is reading. Secondly, making definitive statements does not, in itself, imply claims for absolute knowledge. Lyotard's (1986a:11) point about absence, already referred to, applies here: "We must consider these Ideas as Ideas if we are to avoid illusion". A contribution such as this seeks to furnish an aid to understanding the human condition. Whatever was written would never be more than symbolic. To write of the Gift, or lack, or motivation, or management, or worker, is merely to create the illusion of presence - in no way can the text be held in place of what is symbolised, but should be seen, in Rorty's terms, as an attempt to edify.

This then brings me to the question of Empiricism. I have presented here a theoretically based arguments, but have made no attempt to 'prove' it
empirically. Whilst central to this issue is the debate on the status of empirical knowledge, I will not restate the arguments but merely add some observations. The fact that one cannot support an argument empirically does not, in itself, indicate the 'truth' or 'falsity' of that argument. Many would claim that, on the contrary, because an argument can be proved empirically, it does not demonstrate the truth content of that argument. Given that, historically, many theories have been proved empirically and yet subsequently discredited, adds weight to this argument. What constitutes empirical proof typically relates to the ability to make generalisable statements about the human condition, based upon some concept of the average case. In other words, uniqueness is of little use in establishing positive correlations, what we need is some average expression of aggregated data. However, this is a nonsense in terms of individual experience. We do not experience the world as some average aggregated condition, but at the specific level. Clearly, as regards the Gift relationship and motivation, as these are not observables it is possible to translate conforming data into some synonym, which would then be calculable over prima facie dissimilar (in ordinary language terms) events. This, of course, is the normal practice when studying metaphysical phenomena, such as motivation, as I have already indicated. Thus, a variety of real experiences become synthesised as, say, Hygiene Factors, and a similarity declared, at the scientific level, in what is dissimilar at the ordinary language level of experience.

I am not suggesting that such an approach cannot be useful, yet, on the one hand, from where do we derive authority for such translation, and, on the other, how are we to avoid the tautological or circular proof which is an almost inevitable consequence of such a 'positivistic' approach? Clearly, a normative, or praxis-oriented, approach avoids this problem, and yet is not concerned with the positivist concept of proof. Proof, as such, can only be furnished by application -
post hoc - in terms of how well the theory contributes to an emancipated society. Translating primary experience into some 'user' language, even though it may claim to be scientific, cannot escape the tropic nature of language per se, (again, 'Hygiene Factor' furnishes a cogent example), and thus prioritising certain images over others. Furthermore, empirical data as language inescapably gives the illusion of presence. Not, however, the presence of the original experience, but of some abstracted, supposed, characteristic of that experience. Thus we have a double distancing from any possibility of presence, even if presence were possible. This applies no less to the Gift than to any other use of 'scientific' language. Setting aside the conscious/unconscious problem, previously referred to, we must take into account the unique primary experience when considering the empirical world. The actor's frame of reference, as indicated anecdotally through the actor's description of his experience, must be taken seriously, though not unreflectively, and not attenuated, and therefore sanitised, by translation into an averaging scientific language. Yet to describe such events in terms of the Gift relationship is to do precisely this violence to the original ordinary language (anecdotal) description. The 'anecdote in use' can legitimately be seen as a signifier, yet we should bear in mind that, properly, the signified is a property of the subject, not of the original event. Yet can we then call this empirical, or should it be more correctly understood as experiential, (see Jameson, 1981:294)? Any commentator on the world, scientific or otherwise, is inescapably conditioned by experience, which acts as an effective obstacle to zero degree descriptions of the world, even if there is a positive world to so describe. Thus the acid test of a theory, whatever the empirical prescriptions of its truth content, must, ultimately, lie in its praxis, in what it contributes, in use, to an emancipated society.
NOTES

Prologue

(1) By 'economy of self' I am referring to the idea that people judge, not necessarily consciously, social transactions of which they are a part, or which materially affect them, in terms of what I will call intrinsic, or subjective, value, notwithstanding the supposed presence of any extrinsic, or objective, value. Thus, for example, whilst a human life may possess an acturial value, it is not reasonable to assume that a person would accept this as the subjective value of his own life. 'Economic', therefore, cannot be understood merely in terms of acturial values, but must incorporate the subjective assessment of value to the individual in terms of his own qualitative life, and, as such, must include metaphysical 'commodities' such as love, pleasure, preference, etc., as being equally important as, if not more important than, physical ones. In this sense it bears affinity with the idea of 'libidinal economics' in psychoanalysis, and the 'general economy' of Bataille. Economics, in this sense, thus refers to the posited utilities to the individual of the totality of his experiences, without distinction between the physical and the metaphysical.

Chapter 1: Introduction

(1) I am not, of course, trying to suggest that Derrida claimed that words lied, or could be misused. One of the major issues in post-modernism, as will surface from time to time in this thesis, is whether or not some understandings of the world are transcendentally more 'true' than others, or whether there are only different understandings which we must prioritise by reference to particular moral values, as perhaps exemplified by Rorty (1980), (see, eg., Ryan, 1982). My own inclination is to accept that all possible uses of words have a personal legitimacy, but that there are grounds for prioritising meanings which transcend the purely personal. This may be explicated by the difference between meaning and information, as suggested by Robbe-Grillet (1977), (see also Cooper, 1986a, 1986b). Meaning can be misconstrued sustained through shortage of information. Given adequate information, some meanings could not be sustained. For a similar argument, see Jackson and Carter, 1984.

(2) Deconstruction is, in a large part, an outcome of literary criticism and much of the theorising which surrounds it reflects this genesis. One potential criticism which much be addressed is whether or not a novel, which is overtly fictive, can be conflated with the academic text, which claims to be truthful. This issue does not present itself as a problem for deconstruction, which takes as its raw material the 'text' irrespective of its generic claims. Thus Derrida can address Joyce's 'Finnegan's Wake' and Hegel's 'Phenomenology' from essentially the same critical perspective. The text of a literary text must ultimately be its utility in explicating a particular message, rather than its claims to be literally true (see, eg., Cooper, 1983c). Thus, is the work of Dickens any less
powerful in evoking the social ills of Victorian Britain because he uses the novel format rather than, say, Fielden's more literal account. The message in Dickens is not one of history, i.e., recording 'real' historical events, but as an allegory of real social ills. The stories may not be true but the message is. However, truth of any sort is not necessary for a text to have a powerful influence. The notorious 'Protocols of the Elders of Zion', which was used to legitimate Nazi philosophy regarding the Jews, was fictive, both in terms of history and of its message (see, e.g., Cecil, 1972; Lane and Rupp, 1970). Yet did the Jews suffer any less because their persecution was built on a lie?

Chapter 2: Motivation and Incentive

(1) I am not trying to suggest that McGregor's Theory X - Theory Y does not constitute a de facto theory of motivation. In fact, McGregor himself is quite specific about this (McGregor, 1970). However, Theory X - Theory Y does not particularly address the psychological processes of motivation; rather, it states the conditions under which people will exhibit motivated behaviour. In other words, motivation to work is, in effect, an epiphenomenon of a particular managerial culture, such that if management create the 'right' atmosphere - that is, adopt the 'right' assumptions about workers - then motivated behaviour will ensue.

(2) Whilst academics may dismiss Herzberg, (see Cooper, 1974), I would suggest that his theory still retains considerable currency with managers. It has recently been brought to my attention that there is currently (1986) an intervention in the Civil Service which is applying Herzberg's theory.

(3) Vroom's Expectancy Theory is held to be significantly different to the main behaviourist theories of motivation, particularly in so far as it emphasises intrinsic influences on motivation, as opposed to extrinsic ones (Cooper, 1974); and, as such, may be thought to exhibit similarities with the arguments being presented in this thesis. However, I have chosen not to undertake any detailed assessment of expectancy theory, because of its affinity with exchange theory, and it is susceptible to the criticisms which I will make regarding exchange theory in general. Briefly, the problem with expectancy theory is that it demands a high level of conscious, rational, instrumental calculus, as regards desired outcome, the means by which these outcomes may be achieved, and the probability that such means will produce the outcomes. It does, of course, share with other managerialist theories the belief that work per se can act as a motivator in terms of achieving certain satisfactions. However, as I will argue with regard to incentives, the desired outcome is to gain the object of desire, and not particularly to do the work which is implied by that outcome - and thus there is no reason to assume that work, qua work, constitutes a motivator.

(4) Strictly speaking, satisfaction of higher level needs leads to repeat demands for the same satisfaction (Cooper, 1974:24). However, in a work
context, this would imply that repeated cycles of a job could continually
provide higher level satisfactions. Whereas for the artist the satisfactions
from completing one painting may motivate him to attempt another, but
presumably different, painting, for the workman the satisfaction from
assembling, say, a washing machine should, according to this argument,
give rise to a desire to assemble another washing machine, identical to
the previous one. I would argue that it is naive to equate the motivation
to produce discrete and distinct works of art with the 'motivation' to
replicate the assembly of identical products. If self-actualization is to be
achieved through work, then this implies continual enrichment of jobs, not
merely a one-off and once-and-for-all enrichment.

Chapter 3: Management

(1) The model of managerial power which I am suggesting bears much affinity
with Foucault's description of power. For Foucault, power is a
characteristic of relationships between individuals or groups (Foucault,
1982:217) - the ability of one person to determine, or influence, the
actions of another. Dreyfus and Rabinow (1982) argue a common theme in
Foucault's work concerned with the impact of control technology on the
person - Foucault

"is seeking to isolate the specific mechanisms of
technology through which power is actually
articulated on the body" (p.113)

- such that a 'docile' body may be 'forged' that may be "subjected, used,
transformed and improved" (Foucault, 1979:136; Dreyfus and Rabinow,

"The construction of a "micro power", starting
from the body as object to be manipulated, is the
key to disciplinary power." (Dreyfus and Rabinow,
op. cit.:153)

Or, as Foucault (1982) himself expresses it,

"Let us not deceive ourselves; if we speak of the
structures or the mechanisms of power, it is only
insofar as we suppose that certain persons exercise
power over others." (p.217)

This is, prima facie, a description of the role of management, as
controllers of the body 'worker'. Foucault's understanding of the nature of
power has been developed, particularly in relation to organisational
structures and practice, by Daudi (1981, 1982, 1983, 1985). (See also
Cousins and Hussain, 1984; Smart, 1985; and, especially, Deleuze and
Guattari (1984) on the role of the body in capitalist domination.)

(2) Light can be thrown on this problem by analysis in terms of Systems Theory. Organisations are conventionally viewed, as regards responsibility, as relatively closed systems, whereas to maximise social good they need to be seen as part of an ecosystem. Concepts such as Variety Attenuation can illustrate the viability of organisational decisions in this context. The sheer complexity and volume of information in modern society requires massive attenuation, but the question raised is what are the grounds for judging between what shall be included, and what excluded? The answer to this is provided by a praxis oriented model of social action (Jackson and Willmott, 1986; Carter and Jackson, 1986; Jackson and Carter, 1984). However, it can be categorically stated that reducing organisational costs does not by definition reduce social costs.

(3) I recognise that, with regard to contingency theory, there was an ostensible concern with process. However, process in this context relates to production process, which, in the sense in which I am using process, relates to form, i.e., the form of production process. This is a graphic illustration of the relativity of semantic content in language, which, on the one hand, is a recurrent problem with trying to achieve a supposed objectivity in the use of language, an inescapable pre-requisite of 'scientific' writing, and, on the other, constitutes, at least in part, the substantive problematic of this thesis.

(4) With reference to Rorty, we should bear in mind Norris' (1985) criticism that he (Rorty) is blurring the distinction between modernism and post-modernism. However, this is not significant at this point in so far as, as post-modernism is seen as the latest phase of modernism, they inescapably share some traits. For my purpose what is important is the literary shift from Romanticism to Realism, paralleled in philosophy by the shift from Scientism/Theism to Pragmatism. The question of transcendence, or meta-narrative, germane to Norris' criticism is dealt with elsewhere in this thesis.

**Chapter 5: Literature**

(1) Hoggart (1958), perhaps more implicitly than explicitly, notes the problem of middle class interpretations of working class culture, but also notes that writers from the working class, of whom he counts himself one, are also prone to erroneous representations, albeit of a different nature. Keating (1979), in a book on middle and upper class fictional representations of the Victorian working class, notes the twentieth century trend of a working class fiction by authors from the working class. However, I would suggest that academia still draws its writers predominantly from the middle class, almost by definition.

(2) For a graphic illustration of an alternative to bourgeois rationality, see the works of the Irish humourist Flann O'Brien - for example, the story of the new 'pig-house' (1975, Ch.1). For a 'real life' example of a not too
dissimilar way of living in the Australian Bush, see Beadell (1965, Ch.1).

For another, very relevant illustration, more closely related to management, especially as regards the 'willing victim', see the story of Billy Budd (Melville, 1970). For a deconstructionist analysis of this story in an organisational context, see Cooper (1986c) Hannah Arendt (1973) has also used Billy Budd to illustrate the conflict of good and evil, and private and public life, (see also Dossa, 1982).

Chapter 7: Desire

(1) For an argument on the pathology of the Subject/Object (I/Other) separation, see Willmott, 1986. The possibility of a return to the pre-Oedipal unitary subject has, of course, serious implications for the explanation of the source of Desire.

(2) I say 'essentially' as the Lacanian Real is rather more rigorous than merely the pre-existing order. It is not the symbolic presence of 'nuclear bombs' and 'football', i.e., as signifiers, but their immutable unmediated presence.

Chapter 8: The Gift Relationship

(1) I am not attempting to make any scientific claims for time in terms of 'two dimensions', or Brownian Motion, or for the paranormal, nor am I attempting to refute any scientific explanation of the Universe, including time. What I am trying to suggest is (i) that ill-informed, non-scientific, ordinary language explanations of the world - those used by the man in the street - are the basis of popular belief systems about life, what I have, elsewhere, referred to as Myth, (see Jackson and Carter, 1984), and (ii) that the general obsession with origins, at least at the social level, is more to do with desire for psychological security through 'adequate' explanation of uncertainty in the world, and bears little relevance to the construction of a society fit for man.

Chapter 9: The Value of the Gift

(1) I take this to be what is implied in Adorno's (1973) comment that

"Barter as a process has real objectivity and is objectively untrue at the same time, transgressing against its own principle, the principle of equality." (p.190),

such that
"The universal domination of mankind by the exchange value - a domination which a priori keeps the subjects from being subjects and degrades subjectivity itself to a mere object ... The process of abstraction - which philosophy transfigures, and which it ascribes to the knowing subject alone - is taking place in the factual barter society."

(2) The problem of achieving meaningful communication in the absence of a shared signifier is illustrated in contract law by the case of Raffles v. Wichelhaus, (1864, 2 H. & C. 906:33 L.J. Ex.160), where Wichelhaus contracted to buy from Raffles a cargo due from Bombay on the ship 'Peerless'. However, there were two ships of that name, one sailing in October and the other in December. Wichelhaus had in mind the first, and Raffles, the second. As the shipment was late (travelling by the second ship), Wichelhaus refused the goods. This action was upheld in court, as the parties to the contract, though both referring to the ship 'Peerless', had in mind different ships - or signifieds, (see, for example, Foulkes, 1971:66).


Chapter 10: The Gift and Work

(1) This does not imply the possibility of an infinite regress, where one signified becomes the signifier at the next level. Barthes is dealing with the sign as an integrated signifier/signified, at the discrete levels of language and myth, as a sufficient explanatory system. This parallels my concern with the conscious/unconscious - without any implication of a 'meta-unconscious'. Though Barthes himself would incline towards a meta-level of signification in his example.

(2) I am not, of course, trying to suggest that the concept of responsible to is not applicable to a work situation free from repression in an emancipated society. What I am suggesting is that, under contemporary forms of work organisation, responsible to is characterised by social repression, and it is with this particular historical condition that I am concerned.

(3) Sabotage is also claimed to derive from the practice, in a dispute of 1912 on the French Railways, when workers cut the shoes (sabots) holding the rails, (Brewer’s 'Dictionary of Phrase and Fable', 1977, Cassel, London). However, the O.E.D. cites a usage in 1910 by the 'Church Times' which suggests that the other explanation may be more correct.
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APPENDIX

Publications submitted in support of thesis:

(1) The Attenuating Function of Myth in Human Understanding
N.V. Jackson and P. Carter
Human Relations, Vol.37, No.7, 1984, pp.515-533

(2) The Ergonomics of Desire
N.V. Jackson and P. Carter

(3) Desire Versus Interest
N.V. Jackson and P. Carter
Dragon, Vol.1, No.3, 1986, pp.48-60

(4) Management, Myth and Metatheory - From Scarcity to Post-Scarcity
P. Carter and N.V. Jackson
International Studies in Management and Organization, 1986; forthcoming

(5) Beyond Epistemology and Reflective Conversation -
Towards Human Relations
N.V. Jackson and H. Willmott
Human Relations, 1986; forthcoming

(6) 'Nature Hath No Outline But Imagination Has'
P. Carter and N.V. Jackson
Dragon, 1987; forthcoming