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A comparative study of ‘joined-up’ working in three regeneration programme case studies

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Abstract

This research concerns the development of coordination and co-governance within three different regeneration programmes within one Midlands city over the period from 1999 to 2002.

The New Labour government, in office since 1997, had an agenda for ‘joining-up’ government, part of which has had considerable impact in the area of regeneration policy. Joining-up government encompasses a set of related activities which can include the coordination of policy-making and service delivery. In regeneration, it also includes a commitment to operate through co-governance.

Central government and local and regional organisations have sought to put this idea into practice by using what may be referred to as network management processes. Many characteristics of new policies are designed to address the management of networks. Network management is not new in this area, it has developed at least since the early 1990s with the City Challenge and Single Regeneration Budget (SRB) programmes as a way of encouraging more inclusive and effective regeneration interventions.

Network management theory suggests that better management can improve decision-making outcomes in complex networks. The theories and concepts are utilised in three case studies as a way of understanding how and why regeneration attempts demonstrate real advances in inter-organisational working at certain times whilst faltering at others. Current cases are compared to the historical case of the original SRB programme as a method of assessing change. The findings suggest that:

- The use of network management can be identified at all levels of governance. As previous literature has highlighted, central government is the most important actor regarding network structuring. However, it can be argued that network structuring and game management are both practised by central and local actors.
- Furthermore, all three of the theoretical perspectives within network management (Instrumental, Institutional and Interactive), have been identified within UK regeneration networks. All may have a role to play with no single perspective likely to succeed on its own. Therefore, all could make an important contribution to the understanding of how groups can be brought together to work jointly.
- The findings support Klijn’s (1997) assertion that the institutional perspective is dominant for understanding network management processes.
- Instrumentalism continues on all sides, as the acquisition of resources remains the major driver for partnership activity.
- The level of interaction appears to be low despite the intentions for interactive decision-making.
- Overall, network management remains partial. Little attention is paid to the issues of accountability or to the institutional structures which can prevent networks from implementing the policies designed by central government, and/or the regional tier.
Dedication

I would like to thank many people for supporting me in the process of completing this research. Firstly, the University of Aston’s Business School who funded this research through their own bursary scheme, I hope they feel that it was worth it. Secondly, to the many research respondents who gave their time to be interviewed at such a busy period in the implementation of regeneration policy. Thirdly, to my supervisors Professor John Mawson and Professor Stephen Osborne who have over the four years played two very different but important roles, both contributing to the finished work. John provided much of the policy context and kept me up to date on ongoing developments in central and local government concerning regeneration activities. Stephen has been very supportive in what seemed like an interminable analysis and writing up phase which I had hoped would have gone very much quicker than it did. Fourthly, I would also like to acknowledge other academic staff, particularly Graham Pearce, Drs Paul Davis, Jill Schofield and Ian Taylor whose guidance developed my interests in public policy issues. And finally to my family who have gone without an attentive mother and partner at times whilst I struggled to balance work, study and homelife. Without their patience this thesis would never have been produced.
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PART ONE

DEVELOPMENT OF THE RESEARCH FOCUS
Chapter one

Coordination and Co-governance in New Labour's Regeneration Policy

INTRODUCTION

This research focuses on the themes of coordination and co-governance within regeneration policy. It is proposed that these are important characteristics in the current phase of policy under New Labour. In addition, they are viewed as having been pursued in ways that represent a meta policy for this area (Hooghe 1996). For regeneration policy this means that new policies are characterised as much by how policy should be implemented, in terms of processes, as what type of substantive interventions are used. This view in no way claims that substantive interventions are not important in their own right, but in a similar way to other policy areas, regeneration policy has undergone a reshaping of its polity.

This chapter provides a summary of the context in which New Labour came to power in 1997, seeking reforms in public services and in central and local government. It is intended that this will provide a broad perspective within which this research on regeneration policy can be situated. The broad research question which provides a focus for the study is presented followed by a summary of the theoretical and methodological approaches taken. Finally, there is a synopsis of the thesis chapters.

THE RELEVANCE OF COORDINATION AND CO-GOVERNANCE IN REGENERATION POLICY

Greater coordination has been a continual aim within the management of this policy area. This is due to the broad range of policy interventions, from economic to community development, which regeneration encompasses. Such interventions emerge from various central government departments, and involve an array of local governance actors from central and local government institutions, and the voluntary, community and business sectors. However, the purpose of all these interventions is to regenerate
deprived areas. Therefore, there is often a need for these to work together to achieve improved policy outcomes.

However, developing more coordinated approaches has not always been straightforward, although some authors argue it has improved over time (Mawson and Spencer 1998; Mawson and Hall 2000). Coordination has been re-emphasised as a policy goal by the New Labour government under the label of joined-up government. Furthermore, this approach to joined-up government within regeneration policy is designed to occur within a situation of co-governance, that is, a situation in which a broad range of actors are involved in decision-making through which consensus is created about the right way to proceed. Thus, the notion of coordinated activity in current policy could be seen as being quite novel, having undergone further development in both coordination and in co-governance, compared to policies in operation before 1997.

THE RISE OF THE THIRD WAY AND JOINED-UP GOVERNMENT

Regeneration policy is highly politicised. Successive governments have sought to stamp their mark upon the nature of policies and New Labour are no different in this respect. It is therefore useful to provide an overview of what New Labour as a government represents in terms of their political philosophy.

Prime Minister Blair led the labour party to victory after 18 years out of office. To achieve this feat it necessitated a shift in labour party thinking towards something that offered a viable alternative to the market individualism that had characterised the previous conservative governments, but one that also rejected the collectivist state centred approach (Driver and Martell 1998). Discarding both socialist and neo-liberal ideologies this approach has become known as the third way.

The third way is thought to represent a valid alternative approach to managing a post-industrial society challenged by globalisation and rapid change. Giddens (1994) has put forward the most significant account of the third way which seeks to offer a way of living with uncertainty. Uncertainty, which Giddens argues, is manufactured. That is the
very processes of human intervention creates much of the uncertainty in which we live. This philosophy assumes that there are fewer factors in life which are seen to be fixed by tradition or nature. This leads to an increased questioning of the human decisions which affect our lives. A new politics for this era, therefore has to be generative, ‘it is a politics which seeks to allow individuals and groups to make things happen’ rather than having things done to them (ibid:15). Giddens argues:

‘Generative politics is a defence of the politics of the public domain, but does not situate itself in the old opposition between state and market. It works through providing material conditions, and organisational frameworks, for the life-political decisions taken by individuals and groups in the wider social order. Such a politics depends on the building of active trust, whether in the institutions of government or in connected agencies. A key argument of this book is that generative politics is the main means of effectively approaching problems of poverty and social exclusion in the present day’ (ibid:15).

For generative politics, the notion of dialogue between groups is promoted as a way to further democratising democracy in a world where few citizens have an active interest in politics. Dialogic democracy can both represent interests and provide an arena for the discussion of controversial issues. Furthermore, there needs to be a rethinking of the welfare state, because it has been less than successful in countering poverty or in redistributing wealth. The welfare state was about protecting against misfortunes, new ways need to deliver positive welfare. Welfare measures should encourage autonomy in the individual whilst encouraging personal and collective responsibility.

Whilst Giddens is reputed to be Blair’s favourite intellectual and the ideas expressed above can be identified in New Labour policies. Giddens has by no means been the only influence upon their thinking. It has also been influenced by Blair’s own communitarian beliefs which emphasises mutual support within communities and the notion of rights and responsibilities for individuals. Government is also bound by such concepts and their obligations include making demands on individuals to fulfil their responsibilities (Driver and Martell 1998).

For the purposes of providing a policy framework, the third way means:
• A commitment to capitalism as the economic order;
• Prudence and orthodoxy are the guiding principles by which the economy is to be run;
• A continuation of supply-side interventions to help individuals and businesses compete more effectively: recognising the value of human capital in the competitive global environment;
• The fostering of a stakeholder society, one in which everybody has a place but also responsibilities;
• A reformed welfare system, in which the individual has a right to equality of opportunity but not necessarily to equality of outcome. Greater attention is paid to productive or positive forms of welfare spending, for example, on welfare to work rather than on increased social security payments; and
• A commitment to prevent social exclusion in order to harness the resources of the whole community, for the good of the whole community (based on Driver & Martell’s analysis).

These ideas can be identified within regeneration policies in terms of the emphasis on work and training; on self-help; and on a partnership approach which stresses broad sectoral involvement and influence from across the community.

In addition, there is an attention to meta policy issues. New Labour are as insistent on innovation within the public sector as they are in the business sector. This has led to criticisms that they are merely continuing the ‘reinvention of government’ (ibid). Such innovation is intended to create new ways of tackling old problems. Across government there are attempts to ‘modernise’ (Newman 2001). New Labour’s modernisation agenda was formalised with the publication of the Modernising Government White Paper (Cabinet Office 1999). This policy statement concerned the modernisation of public service delivery while other aspects concerned democratic renewal through devolution and the reform of central and local government.

A central part of this meta policy concentrated on how the different parts of government can work better together. Jack Cunningham, Minister for the Cabinet Office argued ‘We need joined-up government. We need integrated government’ (ibid:5). Much of the White Paper concerns the use of information and communications technologies to improve the quality and availability of public services. It does however include statements on the use of partnership and the goal for integrated policies and programmes to tackle social issues. Despite the commitment by New Labour to achieving greater coordination, in practice it remains a huge task.
WHY DO WE NEED JOINED-UP GOVERNMENT?

The need for more coordination in government stems from four pressures: Firstly, some social issues are considered difficult or intractable and the solution remains unknown. Richards (2001) places the problems of deprived communities in this bracket. Therefore, a coordinated approach is assumed to bring about more effective outcomes than could be achieved by single interventions.

Secondly, there is an assumption that greater coordination will produce resource synergies. In a situation where citizens' pressure government to keep taxation at relatively low levels whilst demanding ever better standards of service, this also constitutes a pressure.

Thirdly, the administrative structures of government are formed around specific policy areas such as health, it is a functional form of organisation. Traditionally this has led to problems when inter-departmental working is attempted. Functional arrangements have been the traditional form of central government organisation since the Northcote-Trevelyan report of 1854 and were further supported by the Haldane Committee's report in 1919. Other forms of organisation were dismissed as being unworkable (Leat, Seltzer and Stoker 2002). It should be noted that this system works perfectly well for the majority of government-citizen transactions which are straightforward in nature (1997). However, for some policy areas, and regeneration is a prime example, the lack of coordination has made the implementation of effective policies on the ground a difficult and often an inefficient task (Higgins, Deakin, Edwards and Wicks 1983).

Fourthly, management reforms have exacerbated the problem of functional organisation. The White Paper echoes other reports and academic analyses which have been critical of the emphasis given to economy and efficiency in public services by the previous Conservative Governments. Such changes were successful in reigning in spending and sometimes led to improvements in services. However, new organisational designs which simplified structures, breaking up large public service bodies into smaller units, often separating out the strategic commissioning (the purchasing) from the provision of services and increasingly centralising power at the same time, led to
perverse results. Many of these efficiency measures led to central government working within silo structures to an even greater extent than before. Whilst for the majority of public service recipients there was no fundamental change in service provision, it has been recognised as a cause of the emergence of wicked issues (Richards 2001). These emerge when agencies adopt rational efficient behaviours. By fulfilling narrowly defined performance measures one public service has often created or contributed to a worse problem for another service provider. The exclusion of children from school, leaving them open to getting into further trouble with the authorities is cited as one example (Jervis and Richards 1997). Others have argued it has led to a tendency for efficiency measures to have the greatest negative effects on the most vulnerable in society such as children leaving care (6 1997; Richards, Barnes, Sullivan, Gaster, Leach and Coulson 2000).

Perri 6 et al (2002) argue that the search for holistic approaches are set to be the hallmark of public service reform in the early twenty first century, just as the reinvention of government was at the end of the twentieth. Richards (2001) argues that joined-up government could represent a paradigm or step change in the management of public policy. Today’s public policy is differentiated from the welfare state of the post war era. In this phase, the government planned for social welfare and economic security. The large bureaucracy and the multi-functional local authority were the key organisational forms used to deliver these. By the late 1970s, this approach was replaced by a focus on micro-efficiencies, the centralisation of control and the break-up of large bureaucracies into smaller more focused agencies. The present phase is a reaction to the problems created by the second for problems of an intractable nature and those tame problems for which there is a solution, but one that has not been addressed. She argues that a new paradigm is now appearing which aims to achieve both social justice and economic dynamism through competitiveness.

THE RESEARCH FOCUS

It is this current phase of urban regeneration policy, reflecting the concerns about joined up government, which is the focus of this research. The research will investigate the ways in which regeneration policy under New Labour is being implemented and what
the preliminary outcomes of this are in terms of the level of coordination and co-governance achieved.

Therefore the central research question for this research is:

'How is regeneration policy being managed in the era of joined-up government?'

Subsumed in this question are a range of other more specific questions: Have central, regional or local actors adopted new techniques for managing regeneration in order to better achieve coordination and co-governance? If so, what are they? How have actors responded to these new techniques? Coordination and co-governance have been features of regeneration policy for some time, even if they are underdeveloped, have they changed in type or degree? What are the outcomes of policy developments?

In answering these questions, the research has sought to assess the extent to which the reality of urban regeneration implementation matches the rhetoric of policy which claims that it is intended to operate in both more co-ordinated and co-governed ways. Newman (2001) has argued New Labour policy is defined by paradoxes in approaches, some of them creating tensions in policy implementation. This is particularly evident in the way they operate hierarchical or rational goal systems alongside more participatory or open systems models within single policy areas. Despite the effort given to policy development, attention to implementation remains absent and the results on the ground are variable being affected by local institutional structures.

THE THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

The policy network concept forms the basis of the theoretical approach. This asserts that elitism, corporatism or pluralism are unlikely to offer satisfactory explanations of decision-making in complex situations, such as those found within regeneration policy. It assumes that policy network members can have some impact on decision-making and relies on empirical observation as to the exact nature of this in each situation. The partnership structures which implement regeneration policy along with central government are perceived of as a type of policy network (Rhodes 1988).
The analysis of the research findings goes beyond the assessment of the degree of joined-up working which partnerships have managed to achieve. An important criticism of the policy network approach has been its preference for providing critical empirical accounts of policy making situations over providing recommendations for the improvement of the networks which they study (Metcalfe 2000). The literature which focuses on the practical management of policy networks through network management is used as a way of assessing the management of regeneration with a view to making recommendations for improvements. It is argued here, that governments past and present have utilised network management concepts in managing regeneration partnerships. Past attempts have had shortcomings, now a range of new institutional processes have been put in place with the hope of increasing the effectiveness of regeneration networks. Whether or not they achieve this aim is a key question for this research.

METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH

The research has been carried out using a comparative case study approach. Three regeneration partnerships constitute the cases, all of which were located within the Midlands city of Coventry. Each case being drawn from a different regeneration programme. Two have emerged directly from central government and one from the Regional Development Agency. This approach has allowed two outcomes: Firstly, by choosing three different programmes: the Local Strategic Partnership; the Regional Development Agency’s own ‘regeneration zone’ programme; and the ‘refocused’ Single Regeneration Budget, the research represents a variety of new types of intervention. This provides the possibility of making a better assessment regarding how much has changed in the management of regeneration policy since New Labour came to office. Secondly, by focusing on one area for the case studies, it has allowed a more rounded view of the development of joined-up approaches to regeneration as they are played out in situ.

In more scientific terms, this approach has allowed a comparison of the impact in management process terms, of different programmes within a reasonably stable environment, although of course the organisational and individual actors in each
partnership have varied to quite a large degree. Nevertheless, there has been some consistency in this respect as well.

In addition, the refocused SRB has allowed a comparison of two new programmes against one developed under the previous Conservative administration. This has highlighted the continuity existing within regeneration policy programmes over the previous decade.

Each case is compared in terms of the management process outcomes relating to how well coordination and co-governance have been developed. The cases are investigated in terms of how the institutional structures of the programmes, i.e. the rules and resources support the development of a more joined-up approach. In addition, the cases are investigated in terms of how local partnerships have interpreted the requirements made by these institutional structures, thus together these two aspects provide a balanced assessment of how each case is progressing.

SYNOPSIS OF CHAPTERS

Chapter two has a dual role. Firstly, it provides a brief review of the urban regeneration literature. There is a particular reference to policies introduced over previous decades, which have also addressed the issues of coordination and co-governance. It begins with a definition of urban regeneration policy followed by the review covering the five phases of policy from the 1940s to 1997 when New Labour came to power. Overall policies are seen to have made little impact. Regeneration policy, at best, is seen as having been partially successful in alleviating deprivation. The situation of deprived areas, compared to the average, is seen to have widened in terms of wealth over the past 20 years (Social Exclusion Unit 1998). Furthermore, attempts to achieve greater coordination and co-governance have not been particularly successful over this period although they have improved (Brennan, Rhodes and Tyler 1998; Mawson and Spencer 1998).

Secondly the chapter addresses New Labour’s approach to regeneration policy, providing a review and comparison of the development of the three policy programmes
which form the focus for this research. Situating these developments as part of joined-up government, it is argued that they continue the development of multi-sectoral strategic partnership working and the development of institutional capacity through which to build competitive localities. New Labour have, however, largely abandoned the allocation of resources through competition. The development of new organisations, new ways of working and the introduction of new requirements are viewed as a wholly institutional approach to development and as a meta policy. Some changes are identified as positive drivers for supporting regeneration partnerships in their work.

This section ends with a statement of the research questions and the objectives sought through carrying out the research thus providing the focus for the theory and methodology chapters.

Chapter three outlines the theories and concepts used in the analysis. The chapter begins with a discussion of the concept of partnership and the issues concerning the way in which partnerships work.

This is followed by a summary of the policy network approach, together with a review of the network management literature. This literature asserts that networks can be managed to produce optimal or at least better results. Both literatures suffer a range of critiques, nevertheless, the concepts are useful for understanding regeneration partnerships.

As coordination has become more important, the chapter reviews the literature on models of joint working. The phrase joint working has been used as an umbrella term for activities which are variously described as cooperation, coordination, collaboration, co-evolution and joined-up or holistic government. Whilst Huxham (1996) has rightly asserted that there is no consistency in the use of terms there is some overlap. Much of the literature points to a continuum with joint working at one end representing informal cooperative ventures and at the other more formalised arrangements or even pooling of resources and authority. Perri 6 et al’s (2002) idea of holistic integration, represents the highest level of holistic governance involved in building fully seamless services, is at this end of the continuum. Attempting to analyse different ways of joint working does
provide some useful organisational concepts for making evaluations about the degree to which regeneration partnerships might be said to be working jointly and how they might be compared to other types of joined-up government venture.

Models of participation are also reviewed in order to assess the extent to which co-governance exists in the partnerships. For co-governance to be said to exist, a partnership has to be both inclusive in the sense of gathering people together in ways that may foster shared decision-making and it has to show evidence of influence from the various members.

In chapter four the original Single Regeneration Budget is analysed using the network management framework adopted in chapter three. This is intended to provide a greater understanding of how network management can be applied as a set of analytical tools through observing how processes which could be seen as network management have failed to be totally successful. This case will provide the basis for comparisons with the primary research.

Chapter five focuses on the methodology employed in this research. The comparative case study approach is viewed as a research strategy within which other more specific methodologies are used to collect and analyse the data. Data has been collected via documents and semi-structured interviews and analysed using documentary and qualitative analysis using the NUD*IST programme for coding. The chapter also discusses the issues concerning case study and qualitative methods more generally and of applying them in this research context.

Part two of the thesis begins with chapters six, seven and eight which contain the findings from the case studies. Firstly, though there is a brief introduction to the City of Coventry where the research was conducted which highlights the degree of deprivation which it suffers. This is followed by the individual cases. Each case is presented in the following format: An introduction to the case followed by a summary of the findings in relation to the key questions regarding the level and type of coordination and co-governance.
Chapter nine discusses the findings using the models of coordination and co-governance for analysis. This summarises the level of success the partnerships have had regarding these developments and provides the basis for the theoretical analysis using network management concepts presented in chapter ten. In this chapter the findings are discussed in relation to the extent central government; the Regional Development Agency; the local authority and other actors have employed new and/or successful network management techniques and conversely to what extent are the processes which were evident during the early phase of the SRB still prevalent. Can we say that this era has been or is likely to be a success in the future?

Chapter eleven concludes the research by assessing the degree to which the research objectives have been achieved and suggests areas where further research could usefully focus. In terms of theory, it suggests that much more attention could be paid to the development of theory around joint working beyond the very useful best practice material developed from practitioner focused academics. This is true for both the models of joint working and network management. Network management appears to be a highly developed approach in the United States where its need has been evident and in Europe where consensus politics has allowed a more favourable environment for such approaches to joint working. In the UK, however, little interest has been paid to network management as an organisational issue.

KEY FINDINGS

From an empirical perspective, this research has found that there is a high degree of policy coordination within current regeneration schemes and between these and mainstream and other ‘special’ policies from central government. Service level coordination is less well developed overall with some schemes showing more than others. Nevertheless, there are some important examples occurring in the case study area. It is concluded that there is more coordination although this is far from highly developed and organisations are finding it a huge task. The issue of duplication remains as does the proliferation of funding streams and the complexity of the policy landscape upon which coordination is designed to operate.
In relation to co-governance, whilst there have been some important developments within some programmes, and partnerships have been keen to implement measures to support co-governance, as yet, it appears that weaker partners have not been highly influential in the decision-making. In many ways, despite the good intentions of new programmes, the very fact that it was a new programme which took time to implement formed a barrier to effective co-governance. Nevertheless, some partnership structures may offer opportunities in the future for increased and better quality co-governing. Furthermore, in certain situations the drive to gain more coordination appears to have prevented or at least stunted the development of co-governance. Coordination can be more easily pursued through smaller groups of individuals and organisations or within hierarchical structures, whereas co-governing in this policy area requires open and inclusive processes. Coordination and co-governance tend to be contradictory processes and none of the three cases presented here demonstrated high levels of co-governing.

In terms of a theoretical understanding of current regeneration programmes a number of themes emerge. The positive aspects include:

- There has been a more proactive network management and this has been identified as operating at all levels of governance and impacts upon the structure of the network and the network 'game';
- Partnerships appeared to support central government’s general approach to policy thus a certain amount of consensus existed; and
- Partnerships were typified by cooperative relationships.

Less positively, regeneration policy still contains barriers which limit the effectiveness of joint working:

- The acquisition of resources remains the major driver for partnership activity;
- It has not been universally possible to activate an ideal set of actors into a network and there are tensions between having members who can drive coordination and those necessary for greater co-governance;
- Institutional barriers remain important for preventing the acquisition of the synergy potential of partnerships. These include the time frames allowed for partnerships to develop and the differential levels of resources among members;
- The accountability mechanisms remain weak thus not supporting co-governance; and
- Overall network management in regeneration has improved but it remains partial. This applies to both central government and local actors.
Chapter two

Policy Developments in Urban Regeneration

INTRODUCTION

This chapter provides a general overview of developments in regeneration and more specifically it reviews recent developments in regeneration policy under New Labour. It focuses on how new programmes differ from previous ones; how they reflect New Labour's joined-up approach and how they fit into the broader regeneration strategy. The two new programmes reviewed here (the Zone and the LSPs), along with the refocused SRB, in no way reflect the whole of regeneration policy under New Labour, there have been a plethora of initiatives. These two new programmes do, however, represent the two strands of New Labour's approach, the first being largely about economic development which is pursued at the regional level, and the second, which represents part of the social regeneration strand and is national policy.

The chapter is organised as follows: Firstly, an attempt to define urban regeneration policy is made. This is followed by a summary of the five historical policy phases. This provides the context necessary for understanding recent developments in regeneration policy. It is not intended to provide a highly detailed analysis, but to highlight the variation in approaches over time and aspects of continuity in New Labour's approach. The chapter then turns to a review of recent developments and focuses on the particular programmes which are represented by the case studies chosen for this research. The three programmes' institutional rules and aims are compared for similarities and differences between them. Whilst these show important differences they are comparable in much of the basic processes by which regeneration partnerships should work. The chapter ends with a statement of the research questions and objectives.

DEFINING URBAN REGENERATION POLICY

Definitions in this area are sparse, possibly due to the various conceptions of the problems and solutions which specific policies have proposed. Urban regeneration
policy refers to particular types of interventions which may be physical, social or economic in nature that are designed to bring about renewal in urban areas. Robert and Sykes (2000:17) define urban regeneration as the:

‘comprehensive and integrated vision and action which leads to the resolution of urban problems and which seeks to bring about a lasting improvement in the economic, physical, social and environmental condition of an area that has been subject to change’

This definition, as this short resume will demonstrate, aptly describes urban regeneration policies which were developed at the end of the 1970s, and from the early 1990s where such policies have taken a holistic approach and have attempted to renew towns and cities through physical, social and economic regeneration. However, given the different approaches used over time, many of which were quite narrow in their focus, the definition is not universally applicable.

It might be argued that the looseness in the definition of terms has been advantageous in so far that it has not limited central governments in their successive revision of policy direction. In addition, it may have also allowed local actors to have a degree of latitude in the interpretation of central policy requirements.

THE INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT OF URBAN REGENERATION

Urban regeneration is carried out at the local authority level whilst central government determines policy and provides much of the financial resources used. Central Government thus tend to control expenditure at the local level in terms of how much is spent, and on what. Since the late 1970s, there has been an increasing tendency for central government to centralise decision-making regarding local expenditure and policies and this has affected regeneration policy in the same ways as other policy areas (Wilson and Game 1998).

Central government’s overwhelming power relies on the constitution of the UK as a unitary state, with central government as primary legislator. Sovereignty is concentrated in Parliament and the powers of local government are conferred and withdrawn at the
will of the centre. Local government has no formal countervailing power and this results in a power imbalance between the two levels of government (ibid).

Regeneration policy became a target for resource constraints and increased central intervention from the late 1970s, and many of the analyses which follow in the literature review reflect the feeling that central government have disproportionate power over this policy area. Policy outcomes at the local level, it is argued, are often less than optimum because of centralisation (Mawson 2000).

Local government itself plays an important role in regeneration policy, as an accountable body for the receipt of special government grants. At the local level they also suffer the critique of having too much power over other local actors (Geddes 1997). However, it is important to emphasise that local government is often one among many local actors within regeneration policy and the relationship between them and the centre is just one shaping policy outcomes. Dunleavy (1980) has argued researchers need to look further than central and local government relations to understand what he termed the ‘national local government system’ which includes professional, local authority and quasi-governmental organisations.

The following sections will summarise each phase of regeneration policy introduced in the UK. This provides the policy context for this study. It is argued that New Labour’s phase is the sixth identifiable phase and is wholly institutional in its character.

**PHASE 1 – A PHYSICAL APPROACH TO URBAN POLICY 1945-1968**

Atkinson and Moon (1994) argue there were no urban initiatives until the late 1960s. However, post-second world war policies attempted to address urban problems. Urban problems were defined in physical terms and policies existed to remove slum dwellings and redevelop cities; to facilitate the dispersal of urban problems through the creation of new towns and through regional policy which sought to address the differential economic activity between areas.
The result of these policies was often high-rise accommodation to replace the terraced streets and the shifting of population to new towns: both now considered to have had a negative impact on inner-city communities. In other places, local authorities built traditional replacement housing which added to the urban sprawl. The success of regional policy is also subject to debate. It relied on incentives and regulations, there was never an overly planned or directive approach to industrial location, with the result that it never wholly addressed regional disparities (ibid).

At this time, little research was carried out into the nature of the urban problem. The physical issues were obvious and social issues were thought to have been addressed by the introduction of the welfare state. By 1950, the Labour Government was convinced that whilst it may not yet have eradicated poverty, the right mechanisms were in place. Crosland (1964) argued that primary poverty had been vanquished. As a result urban problems were seen as residual and largely the result of the physical causes outlined above. Urban policy, such as it was, thus reflected the ideas and understandings of the time. Part of this was that collective action could be successful as it had been during the war, and the solution would come about through planning, cooperation and state involvement (Atkinson and Moon 1994).

PHASE TWO - A SOCIAL APPROACH TO URBAN POLICY 1968-1977

By the late 1960s, urban problems were understood to be social in nature. There was a realisation that poverty continued despite the welfare state (Townsend 1962). The problem was defined in terms of a culture of poverty, whereby the poor were kept poor due to early marriage and child rearing and new immigrants needed to be assimilated into society through educational programmes. The policy solution was thus social in nature and focused upon education, health, housing and community development. Programmes aimed to improve the individual or at most small communities in order that they could compete more adequately in the market. Due to the nature of the programmes, it was the local authorities, local mainstream providers and the voluntary sector were highly involved in the implementation of these policies (Atkinson and Moon 1994).
Importantly for this research, the Urban Programme also focused on improving management and coordination to facilitate improved services with constrained resources. This involved the use of decentralised structures for service delivery and significantly, the use of community development to enable communities to help themselves (Lawless 1988).

Various studies were commissioned and the Comprehensive Community Programme was introduced. This was concerned with the issue of how to coordinate services at the local level in order to have the most impact in deprived areas. This programme intended to develop a comprehensive approach bringing together all the main agencies who would analyse problems and generate priorities (Higgins, Deakin et al. 1983).

Greater coordination was similarly sought within central government. An interdepartmental working group led to the establishment of the Community Development Programme. The creation of the Urban Deprivation Unit in 1974 was a reflection of the thinking at the centre: that departments needed to work together more closely and develop common aims rather than pursue a purely vertical line structure within government (ibid). However, such experiments bore little fruit. It was difficult for the Home Office to encourage interdepartmental collaboration against individual department’s wishes especially when no additional resources were available (Lawless 1979; Higgins, Deakin et al. 1983).

Critics argued that the preoccupation with management and coordination was simply a smokescreen behind which the lack of effective policies and resources could be hidden (Lawless 1979). In Coventry, for example, Benington (1970) argued that no amount of change in local management would address deprivation.

Decentralised structures, through which to deliver initiatives, were also used. This followed the idea generated in the Seebohm Report which advocated a ‘one door’ approach to delivering social services to deprived neighbourhoods. The advantages of this method were better local adaptation of services; better communication between local authorities and communities; and it could lead to cheaper services. The power of such organisations has usually been highly limited (Lawless 1979).
Community development at this time failed due to the realisation by community
development workers, that nothing short of the reorganisation of the capitalist economic
system would solve the problems which deprived communities faced. Thus, workers
began to raise the consciousness of these communities as to their role in the capitalist
economic order and residents began to make more demands on local authorities and the
Community Development Programme was dismissed by central and local government
at the earliest opportunity (Higgins, Deakin et al. 1983).

Overall, this phase of policy had little impact on outcomes (Atkinson and Moon 1994).
It lacked coherence and it was under resourced, receiving only half of one per cent of
total government expenditure (Lawless 1979). It did, however, influence the view of the
cause of deprivation. The research carried out together with the findings from the
Community Development Programme, effectively replaced the social pathology
perspective with economic restructuring as the key cause. The Comprehensive
Community Programme, although failing in its own partnership development between
the centre and locality, was influential in terms of bringing the first notion of
partnership into urban regeneration policy (Atkinson and Moon 1994).

PHASE THREE - A STRUCTURAL APPROACH TO URBAN POLICY 1977-1979

In 1977, the Policy for the Inner Cities was published. This marked a new era for
regeneration policy and is important since it shares many characteristics with current
policies. It was intended to be a more strategic approach which recognised that
deprivation was linked with the operation of the market, policy needed to have a social
and economic element. The solution would be brought about through a partnership
between local authorities and other local actors and between them and central
government. Whole areas, perhaps at the level of the local authority, would become the
focus in order to reach the majority of deprived people. Mainstream agencies rather than
the use of special funds were thought to be the most effective weapon against
depprivation (Department of Environment 1977).
However, a concern with management and coordination remained. Partnerships were designed to coordinate activities between public sector actors (Geddes 1997). The outcomes for coordination were poor. Lists of projects, previously shelved by local authority officers due to the lack of funds, became the basis of the strategies (Higgins, Deakin et al. 1983) and partnerships were identified as bureaucratic and unimaginative (Lawless 1988). A relatively high level of resources were used but the important links needed between industrial development and training were absent (Hambleton 1981).

However, some blame for the poor outcomes has to be placed at the level of the centre. Any increase in resources was equalled with cuts in the basic grant to local authorities. They were merely trying to make sure they clawed back funds which they saw as rightly theirs. Central departments did not support the partnership activity to the extent necessary and did not always divert funds within mainstream agencies to areas of special need (Higgins, Deakin et al. 1983). After the 1979 election, new Conservative ministers avoided attending the partnership meetings. The policy was unpopular with the incoming administration as it lacked the new spirit of enterprise.

PHASE FOUR – A PRIVATE SECTOR LED DEVELOPMENT POLICY 1979-1991

Lawless (1988) divides the policies developed during the 1980s into two strands, enterprise policies which sought to secure a private sector led development; and coordination, demonstrating a continued search for managerial solutions.

The culture of enterprise and inner city policy

Enterprise was seen as the primary solution to urban problems which were understood to be caused by the decline of urban areas through processes of de-industrialisation. (Robson and Parkinson 1994). This view reflected their political philosophy of neoliberalism which asserted that it was government intervention that prevented markets from working successfully.

During the 1980s, the institutional and policy framework was changed as government tried to encourage ‘private sector led urban entrepreneurialism’. This was constituted as
the maximum involvement of private sector investment, property led regeneration and the encouragement of small business. A key part of this institutional change was a further reduction in local government’s role. In addition to the reduced resources, a shift towards capital expenditure and the setting of new economic priorities upon regeneration policy, there were other changes in planning regulations and financial incentives for developments (Atkinson and Moon 1994). These laid the basis for the such policies as the Enterprise Zones (EZ) and Urban Development Corporation (UDC) policies.

EZs were intended to forward development through a relaxation in planning, employment, welfare, taxation, pollution and health and safety regulations, however, the actual reduction in regulation was minimal (Atkinson and Moon 1994). Evaluations suggest that EZs had a limited impact. In some places they did create jobs, but at an estimated cost per job of £30,000 (National Audit Office 1990). Furthermore, there was the question of additionality, Talbot (1988) argued that the rates incentive had merely led to a redistribution of jobs as it allowed incoming firms to compete unfairly with existing companies. Others have argued that the real winners were land owners who received higher rents or land values as a result of the zone developments (Cadman 1982).

Urban Development Corporations were, however, the flagship policy and came to epitomise the conservative government policy (Brownill 1990; O’Toole 1996). They were centrally initiated, funded and controlled. They were accountable only to central government, and early schemes had no local authority involvement. They were run by appointed boards or quangos which aimed to replace the slow bureaucratic nature of local government in development. These developments would encourage the private sector to invest since they were designed to make an area more attractive to potential investors (Parkinson 1996).

UDCs did achieve considerable physical regeneration, this type of development was successful in terms of tackling market failure in the housing, land and commercial property markets and ensured that private sector funding would continue (Roger Tym

However, they also had severe weaknesses. UDCs relied on the theory of 'trickle down', that is, the wealth created by flagship developments would automatically trickle down to the less well off as they got their share of the increased wealth. This theory was shown to be unsupportable. In the early stages, UDCs focused too narrowly on the designated area and did not address issues in the wider urban area. They failed to supplement economic development with social projects (Robson 1998) and therefore made little difference to local levels of unemployment (Roger Tym and Partners 1998). This outcome was especially disappointing in the context of the vast public sector investment. However, some of the later UDCs were more successful, since they developed better relations with local authorities and local policy networks. Local authorities often welcomed the funding they brought in and a change in their remit extended the UDC's role to include social and community issues (Parkinson 1996; Wilks-Heeg 2000).

The continued search for coordination - City Action Teams, Task Forces and Action for Cities

Coordinated approaches to management were still pursued. This would enable limited funds to achieve objectives beyond the baseline expectations. There were many individual programmes which intended to improve inter-agency coordination, including City Action Teams (CATs), Task forces and Action for Cities (Lawless 1989).

The CATs are cited as the first explicit attempt at coordinating inner city policy on the ground. It is argued that their remit was to ease the way for enterprise by helping the private sector through the maze of local and central government agencies working on the ground (Deakin and Edwards 1993). CATs were to build up links between local agencies and if necessary overcome inter and intra-authority conflicts (Atkinson and Moon 1994).
Task Forces followed in 1986/87, created by the Department of Trade and Industry with the explicit role of helping to stimulate business and preparing inner city residents to take advantage of the opportunities created. These were highly targeted responses in areas where there were large ethnic minority populations, a reflection of the need to quell urban unrest (Deakin and Edwards 1993).

The evaluation of both programmes has been minimal, both Robson and Parkinson (1994) and the NAO (1990) have argued that they made a valuable contribution to inner city policy but needed to improve their procedures and effectiveness. Atkinson and Moon (1994:138) argue that the centrally controlled methods used by government which attempted to foster a more coordinated response still lacked ‘any reference to the wider local, let alone, regional and national problems which created and intensified the very problems they were intended to address’.

In 1988, yet another initiative attempted to coordinate activities. The fourteen constituent elements of urban regeneration policy were repackaged under a new policy heading called Action for Cities. It was not a specific programme, and had few resources. It aimed to encourage greater coordination among existing programmes. The government argued that resources for regeneration were substantial but that programmes and projects needed to be ‘pulled together more effectively, and brought to bear in the same place at the same time’ (HMSO 1988:4).

Robson and Parkinson (1994) argued that whilst Action for Cities had reduced unemployment in the fifty seven urban priority areas, areas in the inner cores were becoming progressively worse. In addition, despite the claim for coordinated action some of the worst areas attracted few resources, coordination in general had not worked well either at the local or the central level. Partnerships had been biased towards securing private sector leadership at the expense of providing longer-term commitment from public agencies and building the capacity of local communities.

Importantly, for the Single Regeneration Budget programme and the newer policies which this research is concerned with, are the conclusions of the Action for Cities evaluation which endorsed the changes that were already starting to take place in
regeneration policy in terms of the development of the City Challenge, and SRB, and other aspects which have filtered through to newer policies. A particular concern was with the idea of partnerships. This was welcomed by Robson and Parkinson’s interview respondents, but the conclusion was, as yet, that partnerships had to prove themselves in terms of good inter-agency working. There were six recommendations relating to how future regeneration initiatives should operate. These were:

- The promotion of long-term partnership arrangements;
- Local authorities should have a more significant role;
- Local communities should also have a role in partnerships;
- Greater attention should be paid to achieving coherence between government departments;
- There needed to be a greater degree of public expenditure flexibility; and
- There should be a single urban budget administered regionally rather than nationally.

These represent important recommendations and remain as key aims and characteristics in current policy.

PHASE FIVE - THE RISE OF COMPETITION IN URBAN REGENERATION POLICY 1991-1997

This phase represented the realisation that effective regeneration needed to incorporate elements of economic, social and physical regeneration; and actors from the business, public, voluntary and community sectors. However, the solution proposed was novel having its roots in better management. The introduction of competition reflected the rise of managerialist ideas within the public sector which sought to introduce market type measures into the business of government. There were two main programmes during this phase, City Challenge and the Single Regeneration Budget (SRB). A further programme, City Pride is also mentioned, however, this was not based on a competitive process.

This phase marks the beginning of the current era of urban regeneration policy of which New Labour’s policies are a part, but also, arguably, have begun to depart from. The City Challenge Initiative was introduced in 1991. Central Government argued it represented a revolution in urban policy. It is renowned for introducing competition for
resources between competitor authorities (Stewart 1996). Whilst historically, competition should not be diminished in importance, it is the purpose of the competition which has greater significance. This was about the creation of institutional capacity through which to compete in the global market. Part of this process involved the rehabilitation of local government in regeneration but under new conditions where their influence would be curtailed (ibid).

The impetus for its development included: a withdrawal from New Right policies (Stewart 1996; Mawson and Hall 2000); economic recession; and consensus in the criticism of property led policies which had failed to address urban problems (Oatley 1998).

A powerful critique came from the Audit Commission (1989:1), which argued that urban policy had become 'a patchwork quilt of complexity and idiosyncrasy'. There was little coordination between different strategies at the local level. Importantly, whilst they acknowledged that private sector growth was the main long-term answer to urban deprivation, they also argued for the return of local authorities as key players. This would allow the development of coherent local strategies, thus breaking away from a scheme by scheme approach. A change was considered necessary to address the lack of coordination; the need to include local authorities and the community and address social need.

By the early 1990s the relationship between central and local government had improved and the exclusion of local government as a major player in regeneration was no longer thought necessary. Local government was rehabilitated through the institutionalisation of competition. However, partnership was to run alongside competition among the three sectors in localities: local government, the private sector and the community. Community was used as a catchall phrase for a variety of voluntary and community based organisations and residents of deprived areas (Oatley 1998).
An institutionalist approach to development

Before describing the characteristics of City Challenge, it is necessary to link it with the underlying theoretical approach which informed its development. The challenge funding approach, Stewart (1996) argues, has two dimensions peculiar to the 1990s, firstly, that urban policy was recognised as being about more than the resolution of problems; and secondly, it recognised that there may be a positive relationship between urban performance and that of the economy as a whole. In which case, cities were important to the success of the overall economy. Part of this competitive response is the improvement of the 'political and administrative capacity to compete in a market of cities' (ibid:21).

Oatley (1998) argues the policy represented a significant change in the approach to urban decline. It can be seen as part of the emergence of the new institutional framework in local governance. This approach emphasises the building of institutional capacity, among governmental and non-governmental organisations (Davoudi and Healey 1995; Amin 1999). Kresl (1995) has outlined a number of institutional factors which determine urban competitiveness, these include hard factors such as: factors of production; infrastructure; location; economic structure and urban amenities; and soft factors, including governmental effectiveness; urban strategy; public-private sector cooperation and institutional flexibility. Both sets of factors are important, and theorists put forward the view that among competitively successful localities there are certain shared characteristics within their local institutional arrangements. Central to these is cooperation between governmental and non-governmental bodies in partnership arrangements which can deliver effective strategies and plans (Oatley 1998).

The rise of competition – City Challenge

City Challenge was the first urban regeneration initiative to rely on competitive bidding as the mechanism for the allocation of resources (ibid). It moved funding away from routine allocations, instead partnerships would have to compete for funding. Through working together, partnership members would build the necessary institutional capital needed for regeneration.
Partnership working is central to the development of institutional capacity for indigenous development and central to this and later stages of urban regeneration. It served multiple purposes, it limited local authority control; it was hoped that the interaction would lead to a lasting capacity within localities and it offered the prospect of greater impact through integrated working. The formation of a partnership was a prerequisite of funding eligibility in the competition. Partnerships had to demonstrate their effectiveness through making plans, delivering projects and the setting and achievement of output targets. Suitable organisational arrangements were also stressed in the bidding guidance (Department of Environment 1992).

The City Challenge initiative ran for two years in 1991/2. Research suggests it had both strengths and weaknesses (Shaw and Robinson 1998). Considered among its successes were:

- Competitive bidding had helped partnerships to form effectively;
- There was evidence that it achieved some bending of mainstream programmes (Russell, Dawson, Garside and Parkinson 1996);
- Local authorities were able to integrate neighbourhood regeneration with their other strategies (Parkinson 1996); and
- As an integrated approach it worked to effect change in areas where it was applied. This was due to the provision of sufficient resources over a sufficient length of time to enable real progress to be made. There was also greater inter-departmental working (Oatley & Lambert 1998).

However, doubts were expressed about the competitive nature of the programme. The Local Authority Associations (1995 quoted in Environment Committee 1995b) felt that competitive bidding was unfair and divisive and the Labour Party argued for a return to needs based assessment. Critics argued that areas already had differing levels of institutional capacity with which to compete and the likelihood of their failure to win resources would deepen already significant social and spatial inequalities between places (Malpass 1994). Further problems included:

- The high costs associated with bidding (Oatley 1998);
- Strategies tended to allow a bias towards physical development whilst social programmes were downgraded;
• Partnerships were critical of the excessive focus on outputs as this detracted from their focus on strategic issues necessary to develop a longer-term view of regeneration (Russell, Dawson et al. 1996);
• The programme continued to be bureaucratic, partnerships who did not spend money within the year lost funds. This took little account of the complexity of spending strategically on regeneration (Stewart 1993);
• Although some integration occurred there were still problems in certain areas. There were failures to integrate neighbourhood renewal with the wider policy priorities of mainstream programmes. Policy integration was also lacking between different areas of policy which could have usefully been more coordinated (Oatley and Lambert 1998); and
• Central government departments failed to foster a comprehensive approach to regeneration at the national level (Russell et al 1996).

In terms of partnership working, members had a varied impact on decisions. Davoudi and Healey (1995) argue that local authorities varied in the extent that they would open up decision-making and even where local authorities were proactive in gaining community involvement; community representatives struggled to confront local authority positions. Central government were also powerful as they controlled the rules and resources. Thus central government’s policy prescriptions for involvement of the various sectors in partnerships was insufficient.

The City Challenge initiative was judged as a success by government and the principle of competition was carried over to the Single Regeneration Budget. However, another development was the City Pride Initiative which varied in that it did not involve a competition for resources.

City Pride was part of the same reframing of regeneration policy as City Challenge and the SRB. It therefore reflected the commitment to shift power from Whitehall to local communities and to make government more responsive to local priorities (Williams 1998). City Pride in particular, was about ‘a challenge to the civic and business leaders of our three great cities to prepare a prospectus detailing a vision of their city’s strategic development over the next decade’ (Department of Environment 1993 quoted in Williams 1998). Williams (1995) argues that Government did not issue detailed guidance regarding how the initiative was to operate, and this reflected the fact that there were no statutory provisions nor funding regime attached to it. It was an exercise in resource procurement rather than merely resource allocation (Williams 1998). It was
designed to encourage long-term city-wide strategic approaches to support development. Multi-sectoral partnerships were central to the production of *Urban Prospectuses*, which would act as vehicles to build up consensual and holistic visions.

This policy was innovative and has paved the way for further policy developments, most notably the Local Strategic Partnership concept. They share many characteristics and therefore the research findings are of some importance in assessing its contribution to regeneration. The outcomes of academic analyses suggest that the City Pride initiative had some successes, which are summarised below. It does seem, though that positive developments were rarely found to occur together in one partnership.

- The approach provided a useful framework for priority setting (Department of Environment Transport and the Regions 1997a);
- It supported the integration of schemes across cities (Williams 1995);
- Williams (1998) has argued that central government support and the emerging institutional flexibility of the regional government offices were important factors for its success; and
- The partnerships, although not without real difficulties, did attempt to make concerted efforts to involve the broad community in creating the city visions (ibid).

There were though, some outstanding problems which stemmed from a lack of resources. Hall et al (1995) argued that Birmingham had a lack of clarity in their strategic aims which was created by the indeterminate nature of the exercise and were unlikely to fulfil the vision it had set itself due to the lack of resources. The danger was that this would affect the maintenance of the partnership since interest might wane if little operational work was being carried out.

The Single Regeneration Budget was introduced in 1994, brought together twenty urban policy funds from five government departments (Ward 1997). This represented a shift towards a holistic strategy. The fund has been cited as representing one of the first holistic budgets, the use of which were assumed to increase coordination within government (6 1997). The operation of a single fund to which partnerships could bid for resources, together with the creation of the new Government Offices for the Regions, intended to aid coordination and to simplify the way central government supports regeneration at a territorial level (Oatley 1998). Oatley argues these two developments
heralded the most significant reorganisation of urban policy since the 1977 policy. It consolidated the practices and procedures used in City Challenge, particularly competition and the use of multi-sectoral partnerships.

The SRB’s aims were broad, reflecting the joining of disparate budgets. These included supporting schemes which dealt with: 1) Employment 2) Sustainable economic growth; 3. The Environment; 4. Housing; 5. Ethnic minorities; 6. Crime; and 7. Health, cultural and sports opportunities. It was to achieve these aims by using a more flexible approach to regeneration, allowing bids with an area or thematic focus (Ward 1997).

Despite the similarities with City Challenge, the SRB differed in important ways. Unlike the City Challenge, the amount of funding that would be available to successful partnerships was unknown at the bidding stage. In addition, the distinction made between the needs of the 57 Urban Priority Areas and the rest of the country was dropped in favour of open competition between partnerships from urban areas from across the country (Wilks-Heeg 2000). The SRB, therefore, while representing the rolling out of the City Challenge idea worked along substantially different principles.

The Government Offices were to improve the territorial coordination of central government policies. This was in response to criticisms from the Civil Service Select Committee regarding the insufficient impact government expenditure made in the regions and from the Audit Commission (1989) and National Audit Office (1990:104), who argued that centralised decision-making had 'historically presented considerable difficulties in securing effective policy coordination at the urban and regional levels'. Other factors leading to their creation was the pressure for cost efficiencies, and the need to increase income particularly from the European Structural Funds.

Government Offices had representation from four key government departments: Environment, Transport, Trade and Industry and Employment. Mawson and Spencer (1998:101) state they represented a 'radical administrative departure from the traditional, centralised, compartmentalised, departmental and fragmented structure of Whitehall' and even that 'this innovation...has placed senior regional civil servants at the
cutting edge of cultural change within the civil service as it moves towards more holistic governance.

Mawson and Hall (2000) argue that they have developed into effective regional organisations. They have successfully coordinated the management of programmes which cut across departmental boundaries.

The SRB together with the Government Offices have been positively evaluated. In an interim evaluation, by Brennan, Rhodes and Tyler (1998), the SRB was successful in the following ways:

- Competitive bidding had raised the quality of bids;
- The quality of partnership working had improved over time;
- Synergy had been realised through partnership working and this led to improved coordination; project design and the removal of duplication; and
- Effective partnership working led to more resources becoming available for regeneration through both private sector leverage and the bending of mainstream programmes.

Whilst it is accepted that the SRB programme has improved over time, when first introduced it caused considerable controversy. More attention will be paid to the SRB in chapter four. Firstly, because it represents the programme around which the third case study is focused and secondly, network management concepts have been applied to the introduction of this programme.

CONCLUSIONS

The previous section has provided an overview of urban regeneration policy in the UK. Policies have been categorised into five phases. In the following section, it will be argued that New Labour’s policies represent a new phase which has sought to build on aspects of the competitive phase. They have done this through the development of an institutional approach. The institutional approach is seen to have become embedded.

This approach is seen to be a significant continuation of the perceived need to address how governance institutions work in order to foster the partnership working necessary
for regeneration. The 1977 policy sought to change the institutions of government through greater joint working, in fact little was actually done to improve the way government institutions worked, therefore City Challenge can be regarded as the first concerted attempt to introduce institutional change with the SRB and the development of the GORs representing further developments.

Many of the features of City Challenge, concerned institutional change regarding its rules. This can be compared to developments within European Structural Fund programmes. Hooghe (1996) has argued that the reforms made to the Structural Funds in 1988, concerning the introduction of new ways of working in partnership, was a meta-policy. A policy about how policy should be managed. It relates to the processes about boundary and decision rules, about who participates and who does what, as much as it is about the implementation of substantive projects. Similarly, this policy was based on an institutional approach embedded within contemporary theories of regional development policy.

For some, these policies represent an 'institutional fix'. Oatley (1998) argued the SRB was a last attempt by the conservatives to change the institutional and policy frameworks in order to respond to urban decline. There is scepticism regarding the ability of institutional reforms to adequately address issues of regeneration. This research however does not directly deal with issues of impact but rather of process. It concerns how well current policies address issues of coordination and co-governance.

As the preceding review has shown the quest for coordination in regeneration policy has been a continuous process since the Social Phase. During the 1980s, economic renewal was thought to be possible by using the market as a form of coordination (Thompson 1991). However, even this phase also wanted better coordination between central government departments, between central and local government and between local actors. Such coordination has unfortunately been difficult to realise. Throughout the different programmes, from the early attempts at partnership working in the CCPs, Policy for the Inner Cities, Task Forces and Action for Cities, none have adequately achieved this. Problems existed at all levels but it is acknowledged that the problems within central government are particularly problematic. City Challenge and particularly
the SRB have improved this situation, certainly in relation to which individual SRB schemes would operate within a strategic framework for the local area. The extension of the remit of Government Offices has been credited with much of this development. New policies now seek to create even greater coordination.

Despite the growing emphasis on partnership working the degree of co-governance: that is the influence which different actors have had over the decisions taken in the partnership have varied enormously. In general, it has been acknowledged that better partnership working has developed over time. In the City Challenge, the level of resources on offer encouraged partnerships to develop, although as we have seen some of the outcomes were less than ideal. Early SRB partnerships were often also of poor quality, which was partly at least, caused by the way in which central government managed the implementation of a competitive bidding regime. Evidence suggests though that the later SRB partnerships have had more but certainly not equal relations as local actors from all sectors became accustomed to the system.

The remainder of this chapter reviews recent developments in attempts to create more coordination and co-governance through the establishment of new programmes and amendments to the SRB.

**REGENERATION POLICY UNDER NEW LABOUR: A FULLY FLEDGED INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH**

Despite the continuation of the key characteristics of regeneration policy begun in the early 1990s, New Labour have placed considerable effort into developing new approaches. This reflects two things: their definition of the problem in relation to concerns about social exclusion; and their brand of solution which emerges from their political philosophy and approach to managing policy. New Labour came to power with a manifesto for radical change and a desire to govern actively, after a period in which government involvement was subject to a 'rolling back' ideology (Marsh and Rhodes 1992).
New Labour had no firm plans for regeneration policy in 1997 (6, Leat et al. 2002). They did however have some principles by which regeneration policy was to be implemented, which are outlined in *Regeneration Programmes - The Way Forward* (Department of Environment Transport and the Regions 1997a). This discussion paper outlined the ways in which regeneration programmes of the future would have to work in order to:

‘link more effectively with the overall thrust of Government policy and, specifically, help to fulfil the Government’s Manifesto commitment to attack the multiple causes of social and economic decline’ (ibid:2).

Future policy needed to:

- Break the vicious circle of deprivation and provide the basis for sustainable regeneration and wealth creation;
- Regeneration had to take account of mainstream funding as main programme expenditure would always dwarf special initiative funds;
- New policies would also have to be better targeted at the most deprived areas to tackle social exclusion;
- Local communities needed to be involved and empowered and partnership working needed to improve;
- New policies would work best within a single strategy or hierarchy of strategies; and
- Regeneration interventions should be more coordinated (ibid:3).

The advantages of partnership were understood to outweigh the disadvantages in this particular policy area due to their suitability for bottom-up development. In this document, central government recognise they have placed unrealistic burdens on local actors, requiring them to fulfil numerous bureaucratic procedures in return for funding. In the future, if joined-up approaches were to be achieved, the centre would have to be more supportive of partnerships (ibid).

In regeneration a key feature is the embedding of the institutionalist approach which emerged from European policy in the 1980s and in UK policy from the early 1990s (Hooghe 1996). Joined-up government and an institutionalist approach appear to work in tandem in this policy area, with the creation of institutions and reliance on
partnership being consistent with the concepts of joining-up policy making and implementation processes.

After the election, regeneration policy became a focus for change. The outcome is firstly, an increase in the number and type of units; organisations or partnerships involved in the governance of urban regeneration, evidenced by the development of:

- The Regional Development Agencies (RDAs);
- The Regional Coordination Unit;
- The Neighbourhood Renewal Unit (NRU);
- Local Strategic Partnerships (LSPs); and
- Organisations designed to carry out Neighbourhood Management (as yet pilot studies).

These have created the basis for a multi-level governance in regeneration. Through the creation of strategic partnerships there is also the intention to rationalise partnership proliferation.

Secondly, there has been a set of administrative and managerial requirements placed on actors involved in regeneration which outline how regeneration policy will be implemented. For example:

- Implementing a targeted approach;
- A requirement to dovetail strategies up through the levels of governance institutions;
- An emphasis on coordinated responses;
- An emphasis on long-term preventive work linked with mainstreaming regeneration;
- The emphasis on the involvement of communities and broad inclusion generally to foster co-governance;
- The use of floor targets for which several organisations have a role to play in achieving; and
- A greater awareness of the issues of managing networks particularly at the central and regional level to support a more joined-up approach.

It is argued, that these two sets of features within which specific programmes operate, represent a meta-policy. A policy about policy-making and implementation which goes beyond the specific policy guidance within any particular programme.
Furthermore, these changes can be seen as a part of the wider reforms within New Labour's attempts to 'modernise governance', which affects all levels of governance-governance institution. At the centre, government has attempted to become more open in policy-making processes; in the regions, Regional Development Agencies and Chambers are involved in policy-making and the role of Government Offices has been developed to support work in the localities; and in local government, through local government reform, there is community planning\(^1\); Best Value; voluntary sector compacts and Public Service Agreements. Much of this modernisation process rests on collaboration and inclusiveness which will open up decision-making, allowing individuals and organisations to both contribute and to promote checks and balances. However, there also remain aspects of top-down control from central government (Newman 2001).

The following cases provide a focus for researching these trends in modernisation within regeneration policy.

**THE SINGLE REGENERATION BUDGET: POLICY DEVELOPMENTS**

One of the first policy developments related to refocusing the aims and objectives of the SRB to more adequately address the social inclusion agenda. Despite the change in government and minor changes to its operation, the programme shows a great deal of continuity in terms of more 'holistic' working (Ginsburg 1999), and the use and utility of using bidding competitions. It continued with a bidding round for each year up until 1999.

**Aims and objectives**

In the guidance for bidding partnerships the aims of the programme are to:

'tackle social exclusion and promote equality...by reducing the gap between deprived and other areas and between different groups...[including] ethnic minority communities...[its] activities...are intended to make a real and sustainable difference in deprived areas. It funds schemes which work with other programmes and initiatives – public and private, build on good practice, represent

\(^1\) Community planning is now referred to as Community Strategy within Central Government.
value for money and promote modernisation’ (Department of Environment Transport and the Regions 1998).

These aims are slightly different to those in previous publications (see Department of the Environment 1996). Gone is the emphasis on competitiveness; on funding as a catalyst for regeneration; there is a shift away from resources ‘complementing or attracting’ other resources through matched funding to a focus on coordinated schemes which work together, in addition, there is an emphasis on social exclusion and embedded in the above extract is the idea of the modernisation of public service.

Institutional structures and evaluation

The basic process of bidding for funds has changed little. There have, though, been some small but significant changes made to the programme, most of which address issues that were highlighted as problematic (Wilks-Heeg 2000), these are:

- To address the strategic vacuum New Labour instigated the production of Regional SRB Frameworks by the Government Offices in 1998 for Round Four (Department of Environment Transport and the Regions 1997a);
- A two-tier approach to funding was introduced for Round Five – comprising the allocation of 80% of the funding to the most deprived areas for comprehensive action and the remaining 20% for rural, coalfield and other areas which had pockets of severe deprivation;
- In recognition of the lack of capacity in some areas, which acts as a barrier to regeneration, funding for capacity building, as stand alone bids or part of a larger programme, would now be allowed; and
- In 1999 the administration of the SRB was transferred to the RDAs (Department of Environment Transport and the Regions 1998).

These aspects are intended to shape the programme towards meeting the aims laid out above, i.e. a more planned and coordinated approach. One that targets the worst deprivation; recognises the complexity of areas in need of regeneration; and importantly that the first step towards community involvement in regeneration may be capacity building.

The objectives of the programme have also undergone some minor changes. The housing, cultural and leisure foci have been taken out of the remit of the SRB and the
ethnic minority element has been removed and replaced with a general category outlining the need to address social exclusion and provide opportunities for the disadvantaged (ibid).

There is also a clear statement concerning what the government mean by coordination within the SRB, much of this remains at the policy level. A requirement of the bidding process is that bids should relate to other initiatives, the bidding guidance states:

‘A bid should show how the SRB contribution will promote synergy by reinforcing or adding value to other public spending programmes, and maximise the leverage of private sector investment’ (ibid:7).

A further aspect of coordination lies in the aim to ensure that bids work with the grain of national policies and programmes, for example welfare to work.

New Labour have been particularly keen to incorporate the views of a wide range of actors in the decision-making processes over regeneration. This is an attempt to increase the likelihood that schemes will be successful by drawing on the capacities and support of deprived communities and to reduce the power, particularly of local authorities, in shaping regeneration schemes. How much actual difference there will be in relation to the later rounds (four, five and six) is a question for empirical research. There is however, a clear restatement of this aim in the bidding guidance, as follows:

‘The Government believes it is crucial to ensure the active participation of local communities in...regeneration... they should be directly involved, both in the preparation and implementation of bids. Bids should mobilise the talents and resources of all sectors. Volunteers should be encouraged to participate fully in local regeneration activity because of the knowledge, skills and expertise they can make available’ (ibid 1998:5).

A measure of New Labour’s commitment to inclusion is evidenced by the guidance given to bidders, it states that ‘the mere presence of community representatives in partnerships is not enough, however, to ensure that the community has a significant say in decisions’. Partnerships are now required to indicate how local communities have been involved in the development of the bid; how the community’s voice in decision-
making is ensured; what role the community have in implementation; and what arrangements will be put in place to fund community projects (ibid.28).

Summary

The SRB in its refocused form has much to commend it, it is focused on need; supports comprehensive regeneration; aims to be coordinated through a regionally based strategic approach and through working with mainstream policies; it has amended the rules regarding capacity building and appears to have a genuine desire to see community involvement. It represents a renewed attempt at managing regeneration networks which has taken into account many of the criticisms of the programme.

THE WEST MIDLANDS REGENERATION ZONE PROGRAMME

Part of New Labour’s modernisation agenda includes greater decentralisation and devolution. In England, devolution rests on the creation of Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) designed to promote economic development. This development, while limited in terms of political control, is nevertheless significant for regeneration policies. Effectively, RDAs can support their own programmes as long as they meet the aims of central government. Advantage West Midlands (AWM), the West Midlands RDA has developed the Zone initiative which targets resources on six broad areas in the region. Before discussing the details of this policy it is useful to highlight the nature of the RDAs and their remit.

The development of regional policy

For many years there has been a growing critique that the UK central government is over centralised (Stewart 1994). Subsequently there has been pressure to create regional institutions to offset this trend (Dungey and Newman 2000).

Regional policy has varied over time. The Conservative Governments of the 1980s had little interest in a strategic regional policy relying instead on facilitating the operation of
market forces at the urban level (Townroe and Martin 1992). Two main sources of pressure have existed for the establishment of regional institutions: Firstly, urban based initiatives have led to successful locally tailored schemes. However, in an increasingly globalised economy there is some question as to the effectiveness of local schemes. Furthermore, the proliferation of schemes led to duplication, integration and coordination problems. Townroe and Martin argue that a strong argument exists for a regional body capable of taking a broader view, linking and harmonising local policies. Secondly, Mawson (2000) argues government agencies and ‘quangos’ at the regional level are still perceived to lack accountability which was only partly satisfied by the development of the Government Offices.

When New Labour came to power the concept of RDAs, developed by the Regional Policy Commission (1996), grew in favour as the solution to these regional issues (Mawson 1999). However, the issue of democratic accountability was at least initially sidetracked\(^2\) as the RDA’s remit is designed purely to address the issues of regional development and coordination of policies.

The policy for RDAs

The White Paper Building Partnerships for Prosperity (Department of Environment Transport and the Regions 1997b) set out the policy for the RDAs. An important aspect of current regional policy is that whilst it has recognised inter-regional disparities it has also encouraged RDAs to focus on intra-regional disparities (those occurring within each region). In fact the White Paper stresses that the most acute disparities exist between different wards at the local level. This is a significant move away from traditional approaches to regional policy which attempted to even out development across the country (Hall 1973). Each region now has the duty to reduce such disparities alongside developing the regional economy.

RDAs were formally vested in April 1999, as non-departmental public bodies, with the specific objective of economic development. They are funded through a single pot

\(^2\) New policies for extending democracy are outlined in DTLR (2002) Your Region Your Choice
allocation and have devolved responsibility for its allocation and management. Their key roles are to:

- Produce a regional strategy, based on the views of partner organisations and communities, which will guide development in the region;
- Promote integration and coordination to enable the problems of social decay to be more effectively and efficiently dealt with; and
- Provide feedback to government on the regional dimension with a view to improving national policy (Department of Environment Transport and the Regions 1997b).

Whilst there were concerns that the RDA’s strategies would have an economic bias and would therefore fail to address issues of social exclusion (National Council for Voluntary Organisations 1999), AWM like others have produced balanced strategies (Roberts and Benneworth 2001). In particular they aim to address the issues of intra-regional disparities through their strategy and Zone initiative (Advantage West Midlands 2000).

The Regeneration Zone Initiative

The Zone Initiative is based on the principles of prioritising scarce resources and encouraging an integrated approach to regeneration which explicitly links need and opportunity. It aims to secure the benefit of development for deprived communities thus addressing the weaknesses of previous regeneration activities. The initial idea for this emerged from consultation workshops and AWM argue that it has generally received support from local partnerships. Central government have also expressed their support (New Start 2001).

At the time of the Zones ‘going live’ in April 2002 there were six identified to which between 65% and 75% of the single pot resources allocated to AWM for regeneration will be transferred. Coventry and Nuneaton represent one such Zone. They are long-term ventures likely to be the focus of activity for between five and fifteen years (Advantage West Midlands 2000).
Aims and Objectives

Following AWM’s (1999) economic strategy document, the *Regeneration Zone Prospectus Guidance* (Advantage West Midlands 2000:1) was published. This document lays out the aims and requirements of AWM in relation to the work of the Zones. Each Zone has to produce a prospectus which will provide the ‘context and structure to inform strategic choices’ and ‘set a framework for the coordination of projects and programmes within each zone. The production of a prospectus has a set of varied objectives:

- To secure commitment;
- To set the strategic agenda;
- To prioritise activities;
- To provide a timescale;
- To establish a framework to attract other funding sources; and
- A framework for a monitoring structure.

The nature of the projects which can be included within local strategies span training; employment support and guidance; transport and access; environmental improvement; health improvement and any measure designed to ensure that the benefits of growth are captured locally (ibid).

Institutional structures and evaluation

The guidance is intended to support partnerships through the process. However, at the time of this document going to print there were aspects which were left unspecified. The prospectus was designed to be flexible in terms of AWM’s own agenda. Furthermore, AWM’s role was left unclear, they are keen to be involved but are aware that their level of involvement may vary according to the experience of the local partnerships. It is AWM’s aim to use existing partnerships where this is possible to avoid further partnership proliferation. The guidance note states:

‘AWM are committed to playing a full role in the work of the partnerships. Agreement will be needed between local partners and AWM on how this will work in practice... At certain points AWM may need to step back from detailed engagement where decisions are to be made that involve AWM funding.”
However, AWM are confident that this relationship can work more effectively with the agreement and understanding of partners than if AWM were seen merely as passive observers’ (Advantage West Midlands 2000:16).

It appears from this statement that AWM are intent upon developing what might be referred to as a more pro-active network management style than has been prevalent within regeneration policy hitherto. Furthermore, AWM’s approach is viewed as positive due to their willingness to meet 50% of the costs of development of the prospectus (ibid).

The Zone partnerships are to work at a sub-regional level which has been a popular management response by the RDAs towards dealing with regeneration issues (Liddle 2001). AWM argue that these cover a larger area than most previous initiatives. The zones have been intentionally designed to cross local authority boundaries in recognition of the sub-regional nature of labour markets. The Zone initiative specifically sets out to encourage joint working across local authorities as a way of securing more coordination of effort over natural rather than artificially delineated administrative boundaries (Advantage West Midlands 2000). This does however increase the complexity of network management within the Zone partnerships and possibly for AWM itself.

In terms of actors to be involved, again the guidance is flexible suggesting that there should be a core of long-term partners ultimately responsible for the Zone combined with actors involved on a short-term flexible basis and they ‘are keen for Zone partnerships to engage with business and voluntary sectors to avoid local authority and other public sector dominance’.

The abandonment of the competitive bidding process can be viewed as positive. Partnerships have more or less been commissioned to carry out their own locally devised strategy. Although, whilst the initial competition for resources has been removed stringent appraisal processes remain. Projects which meet the appraisal criteria will be funded while those that fail will be held back temporarily or permanently. Initial funding will come from the single pot to support the Zones’ work, but it is AWM’s plan that funding is also sought from European Objective 2 and mainstream funds. There is
no guarantee of funding merely because of Zone status, in this sense the Zones are procurement partnerships, seeking funding from a variety of sources.

Like other public bodies, AWM are required to meet the floor targets set for performance set by central government. Regions which fail to deliver these outcomes will suffer financial penalties (Her Majesty's Treasury 2000). Creating productive relationships with local partnership actors is vital if RDAs are to meet these targets as they do not directly deliver services themselves.

Summary

It is clear from the guidance documents that the Zone partnerships are intended to achieve greater coordination between interventions and to carry this out in a situation of co-governance between locally based organisations. The Zone guidance has much to commend it, the programme remains flexible with the RDA willing to treat each local partnership according to their experience. This provides the freedom to manage often sought by managers. Importantly, they have provided financial aid for the development of the partnerships’ strategies, something which has not occurred before. It has also eschewed bidding arrangements preferring to commission, often existing, partnerships to develop a strategy which the RDA will then fund if it meets the criteria, thus avoiding wasted resources from competitive bidding.

The RDA and Zone partnerships both have a clear network management role, in encouraging organisations to work together to achieve joint objectives. As a programme though, it has fewer institutional rules regarding how this is managed leaving considerable freedom and responsibility at the partnership level. It therefore varies considerably from the SRB and the research will concentrate on whether these new institutional rules will achieve the aims of joined up government in regeneration at the local level.
NEIGHBOURHOOD RENEWAL POLICY AND LOCAL STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS

The focus for the third case study is the role of Local Strategic Partnerships (LSPs) within the wider policy for Neighbourhood Renewal (NR). It would be impossible to understand the significance of LSPs without first outlining NR policy. Therefore, this section is divided into three parts: 1). a summary of the development of NR; 2). the development of LSP policy and their role in NR; and 3). an evaluation of LSP policy.

The development of neighbourhood renewal policy

Although RDAs were initially given the primary role in regeneration policy, New Labour have also developed a social strand. Neighbourhood Renewal policy was put forward with the publication of *A New Commitment to Neighbourhood Renewal: National Strategy Action Plan* (Social Exclusion Unit 2001) (hereafter known as the Action Plan). It took three years to develop and is the outcome of much preparatory work undertaken from 1997 onwards. This began with the establishment of the Social Exclusion Unit, whose remit was to address the causes of social exclusion by developing integrated and sustainable approaches to the worst housing estates where deprivation had become increasingly concentrated.

The Social Exclusion Unit’s (1998) first report *Bringing Britain Together* identified that the causes of deprivation emerged from multiple factors. One factor was the lack of comprehensive policies where each aspect of policy would reinforce the other. Echoing the policy for the regions, the report emphasises the disparities between local authority wards.

New policies should be comprehensive, long-term and founded on what works. The report acknowledged that problems were interlinked but they had never been addressed in a joined-up way. Problems had fallen through the cracks between Whitehall Departments, or between central and local government and at the neighbourhood level. No one had been in charge of pulling together services to effectively address deprivation (ibid).
This issue has been addressed in two phases of policy-making. Initially, the strategy developed in *Bringing Britain Together* contained three strands which laid the basis for the final strategy development:

- Firstly, there was a range of national programmes intended to tackle social exclusion, such as the New Deal for Jobseekers;
- Secondly, there were new funding programmes designed to regenerate poor neighbourhoods, *e.g.* the New Deal for Communities which focuses comprehensive activity on small neighbourhood areas; and
- Thirdly, more information was necessary on which to base a long-term strategy, ‘to fill in the missing bits of the jigsaw’ (ibid).

The outcome of this last strand was the establishment of eighteen cross-cutting Policy Action Teams. One of their themes was *making the government work better*. The teams were drawn from departments across Whitehall, Government Offices for the Regions, Local authorities, mainstream service providers, the community, voluntary and business sectors. This research is concerned with this final theme.

In spite of the stated vision for joined-up-government, this wave of initiatives has been viewed as a return to a patchwork quilt scenario as the number of initiatives increased (Mawson and Hall 2000). Too many rapid and substantial changes were made without paying attention to strategy and coordination, invoking complaints by organisations at the regional and local levels that nothing had changed in the relationship between the centre and local institutions. Government had little awareness of the demands new initiatives made on local service providers and research carried out for the Performance and Innovation Unit showed the continued disillusion of practitioners about the way central government dealt with local implementation agencies (Mawson and Ipsos-RSL 1999).

A more sympathetic view holds that initiatives represented the use of pilot schemes to test policy interventions with some including a remit to show how more joined-up working could be gained. The Policy Action Teams were a concerted attempt at researching how best to improve the coherence and coordination of policies.
Of particular importance is the Policy Action Team 17 (Social Exclusion Unit 2000b) research which focused on how to get partners and initiatives at the local level working together. There was a need for greater coordination to pull together complex and fragmented planning and service delivery frameworks. Although the idea of Local Strategic Partnerships has emerged from several strands of policy over the last decade, it represented the Action Team’s central recommendation. Key recommendations made by the team and others were translated into the Action Plan (Social Exclusion Unit 2000a). Hilary Armstrong, Minister for Local Government and the Regions (2001) has described the Action Teams as the biggest example to date of joined-up government.

The Action Plan like the earlier strategy contains three strands:

- Firstly, a focus on new policies, funding and targets, including tackling worklessness, weak economies; crime; poor health, housing and improving the physical environment. A raft of floor targets were set during the Comprehensive Spending Review Process in the year 2000 to support the delivery of these policy objectives. Floor targets focus on raising the standards in the worst performing areas of government intervention. Departments and service deliverers will in future be judged on how well they have improved poor results rather than being judged on average scores across the country;
- Secondly, the strategy focuses on ‘joining-it-up locally’, it concerns better local coordination and community empowerment through the use of LSPs and neighbourhood management; and.
- The third dimension of the strategy concerns the roles of regional and central government in providing leadership and support.

All three strands focus on how regeneration policy can be improved by better management. The changes represent an example of the creation of new institutions within which regeneration will operate. All have a role within NR, and furthermore each organisation and every level should work with the others to produce greater coordination in implementing NR policy. Therefore, within regeneration policy a system of multi-level governance has been created. The changes made in the governance of regeneration now focus on four levels which have three collective aims: 1) To bring about joint working at the neighbourhood and local level; 2) To make it easier for communities to influence decisions; and 3) To bring national government to
the table as an active partner. These steps are a ‘critical counterpart’ to the new resources, policies and targets (ibid).

Figure 1 below illustrates the links between the organisations and the multiple levels of governance which provides a new context in which a more coordinated and co-governed regeneration policy is being implemented. It includes all three programmes involved in this research and highlights the links for partnerships beyond the local authority. This is important since it reflects the more active role of central government in local partnerships.

The role of Local Strategic Partnerships

LSPs are the vital link in NR. The Action Team 17 Report agreed that core public services should be the main weapons against deprivation with specific regeneration initiatives playing a new role in supporting joining-up and innovation. LSPs are designed to be long-term partnerships formed at the level of the local authority³. This level is seen as crucial for the renewal of deprived areas as it is at this level that services carry out their operational planning and resource decisions. The Report states LSPs,

‘are needed to co-ordinate analysis, aims, objectives and targets as they relate to the poorest neighbourhoods, and to bring together action to deliver progress’ (Social Exclusion Unit 2000b:10).

Where possible these partnerships should be modelled on those already in existence and their roles would stretch beyond NR but would be very relevant to it.

Among the antecedents for LSPs are: City Pride partnerships; those developed from the bottom up, such as the Coventry Forum and through the New Commitment to Regeneration initiative. The latter were singled out as a particularly useful model (ibid). New Commitment to Regeneration was sponsored by the Local Government Association and supported in principle by central government. Like the other initiatives mentioned it was unfunded. Its defining feature was that it offered a vehicle for strategic

³ There are some variations in this for example the Greater Nottingham partnership.
planning for the locality within which individual programmes and initiatives could operate.

Figure 1 - A Multi-Level Governance Framework For Regeneration Policy. Includes Case Study Partnerships

Adapted From Social Exclusion Unit (2001).

Notes. (a) Twin pointed arrows denote a distinct two way relationship between organisations. The neighbourhood management link to Government Offices represents pilot areas only.
(b) The placing of the partnerships above the LA has been done to enable the direct relationships to be illustrated, it does not represent a hierarchical relationship.
The core idea behind New Commitment to Regeneration was that developed by the French *Contrat de Ville* which used negotiated contracts between local and central government, effectively central government became a partner in the development of the local strategy and a signatory to it (Mawson and Hall 1999). If transferred into the UK context it would represent an innovative approach and would challenge the way civil servants worked and give local and national government a more equal partnership in the regeneration process. Another aspect of the NCR approach was the exploration of freedoms and flexibilities in policy rules (Russell 2001).

A series of pathfinders were established in 1998. The outcome of the evaluation has set the agenda for the study of LSPs. Evidence from the pathfinders suggests that a new relationship between local and central government has not materialised. Whilst, certain area-based schemes did win flexibilities, many were refused: and some for good reasons, however, the impression given to partnerships was that the centre were reluctant to let go. Respondents expressed disappointment about central government’s lack of commitment as a partner. This led to less requests and a return by all to existing custom and practice. (Russell 2001). In view of the Cabinet Office’s call for better leadership and increased capacity in Whitehall to manage cross cutting policies and services (Performance and Innovation Unit 1999:2000) and the rhetoric concerning localism this report paints a disappointing picture of the precursor to the LSPs.

**Aims and objectives**

Central government asserts that LSPs can provide the concerted and coordinated effort which is needed: Their core tasks are to:

- Prepare and implement a community plan for their areas, identify, deliver and track progress on local priorities;
- To work with local authorities helping to develop and meet suitable targets for local public service agreements (LPSAs);
- Develop and deliver a local ‘neighbourhood renewal strategy’ to help close the gap between deprived neighbourhoods and the rest of the country; and
- Rationalise local plans, partnerships and initiatives, providing a forum through which mainstream public service providers work effectively together to meet local needs and priorities (Department of Environment Transport and the Regions 2001).
To achieve this partnerships will have to develop consultation mechanisms; provide a forum for debate; build a common purpose and shared commitment; value the contribution of all partners; develop and publicise aims and priorities; share information and good practice; support local initiatives; and develop common performance systems (ibid). In short, their role is to manage the relationships and the inter-organisational coordination necessary to carry out their objectives.

**Institutional structures and evaluation**

Neighbourhood Renewal policy is a complex raft of initiatives all of which converge at the local authority level. Local authorities and LSPs are to provide greater coordination at a strategic and policy planning level and perhaps increasingly at a service delivery level too, with neighbourhoods being the focus for delivery. The overall aim of NR is to ensure that in 10-20 years no one is seriously disadvantaged by where they live (Social Exclusion Unit 2001).

Importantly, LSPs are promoted as a general policy mechanism through which special initiatives such as NR can operate. There are two modes of LSP\(^4\), distinguishable by the availability of funding. In the first, LSPs are a general mechanism for the improvement and coordination of mainstream services and a vehicle for the creation of community plans which form the basis of development plans. The formation of an LSP is not a statutory requirement and will not automatically receive funding to support joint planning, joint working or community involvement. The second has the same roles: both are expected to gear their work towards tackling deprivation where it is significant. However, mode two partnerships do receive resources through the Neighbourhood Renewal Fund (NRF). This is allocated on the basis of deprivation criteria to 88 local authorities. Coventry is one such authority.

NRF is not allocated to LSPs but to local authorities as they act as the accountable body. However, from 2002 only those authorities which are part of and working with an LSP will receive funding. Partnerships in receipt of funding are required to produce a neighbourhood renewal strategy outlining how funds will be spent. Funding has been

\(^4\) A third variant can be acknowledged where neighbourhood pilots exist.
available since 2001. The intention is that this will help local authorities and other service providers improve services. The guidance states that NRF can be spent in any way that will tackle deprivation, it can be spent on improving services, particularly, but not exclusively, in relation to the floor targets,

'It is both acceptable, and strongly desirable where service quality is at risk or requires improvement, that NRF funding should be devoted to mainstream services. No resources are allowed for the establishment and administrative costs of the LSP' (ibid:25).

Coordination is also supported by flexibilities, targets and performance management systems. The notion of flexibilities has remained important for LSPs. Central government is keen to remove unnecessary barriers preventing LSPs from working successfully. Local government has new powers to foster partnership work and central government can amend legislation concerning statutory requirements which could prevent local authorities from acting to improve the well being of their areas (Local Government Act 2000).

 Freedoms and flexibilities have though been diverted towards the Local Public Service Agreements. Outcome targets have been agreed between central departments and top tier local authorities which are designed to encourage joint working between local authorities and other mainstream service providers. These targets are one step removed from the LSP although from 2004 partners will be expected to be included in the decision-making process (Office of the Deputy Prime Minister 2000; 2001). In part the Local Public Service Agreements relate to the floor targets set by central government but also relate to regular targets. Performance management systems should also be, as far as possible, aligned between members of the LSP to help with the effort towards coordination (Social Exclusion Unit 2001).

 The LSP’s coordinating role includes rationalising partnerships, plans and initiatives. It is argued LSPs present opportunities for streamlining existing arrangements. An idea which emerged from the GI DA Cross Cutting Review conducted as part of the Comprehensive Spending Review (Her Majesty’s Treasury 2000). Rationalisation aims

\[5\] GI DA stands for Government Intervention in Deprived Areas
to reduce the duplication and bureaucracy involved in partnership work. It is hoped that this will make it easier for local partners to get involved by reducing the burden and its associated partnership fatigue. However, it is not the intention that LSPs will replace neighbourhood level partnerships but they will work with these bodies.

In addition to their coordination focus, LSPs are to include a broad range of organisational actors having a particular emphasis on the inclusion of mainstream service providers. Hilary Armstrong has stated that

‘The aspiration behind local strategic partnerships is that all local service providers should work with each other, the private sector and the broader local community to agree a holistic approach to solving problems with a common vision, agreed objectives, pooled expertise and agreed priorities for the allocation of resources’ (Department of the Environment Transport and the Regions 2000b).

It is intended that mainstream service spending will be bent towards areas of deprivation thus addressing the lack of investment in deprived areas identified by Bramley (1998). The policy recognises that other mainstream partners in addition to local authorities may also need to be subjected to checks and balances regarding their activities.

Community participation is considered a vital factor in the success of the LSPs. The guidance states that

‘Effective engagement with the community is one of the most important aspects of the LSP’s work, and they will have failed if they do not deliver this’ (Department of Environment Transport and the Regions 2001:27).

Potentially, community members could face increased difficulties participating in high level strategic partnerships. Central government, having learned from initiatives such as the New Deal for Communities, recognise that effective involvement requires capacity building. To address this, government envisage the establishment of a community network which would facilitate and support community involvement. This network should act as a broker between communities and the LSP. There is little prescription in how this should work but it is intended to bring together residents; voluntary and community groups; social enterprises and voluntary sector service providers. It should
aim to include the widest possible range of interests particularly from those often underrepresented such as the disabled (ibid). A new Community Empowerment Fund (CEF) is to support the full participation of this network in decision-making. Each partnership will receive a share of £36 million over the three years 2001–2004. The fund is distributed by the Government Office who will form a contract with a local body capable of bringing together an effective network.

Performance measurement particularly in relation to outputs is well established within regeneration programmes. However, the LSP guidance differs because of the emphasis in the accreditation process regarding assessing qualitative aspects of the partnership process as well as more substantive outcomes. This was a particular criticism of the SRB and shows learning on the part of central government. Given the failings of previous policies to bend mainstream resources and allow greater inclusion (Rhodes 1988; Hall, Beazley, Bentley, Burfitt, Collinge, Lee, Loftman, Nevin and Srbljanin 1996; Wilks-Heeg 2000), an important consideration is the way in which LSP activities will be monitored to ensure a more productive partnership process.

The accreditation process assesses each LSP against six criteria:

- That they should be strategic;
- Inclusive;
- Action focused;
- Performance managed;
- Efficient; and
- Exhibit learning and development.

Therefore, there exists a potential balance between the hard aspects of performance management and control over outcomes and the soft aspects to do with measuring the degree to which the LSP has an open inclusive forum which supports equal opportunity and transparent decision-making.

The accreditation process is based on self-assessment carried out collectively by the LSP. Partners should assess the progress of the LSP against the criteria above. This assessment is then presented to the Government Office who make their judgement after taking ‘soundings’ from key stakeholders within and outside of the LSP as to the
accuracy of the assessment (Neighbourhood Renewal Unit 2001a:8). Local actors are thus provided with a direct route to central government if they feel aggrieved by their position in the partnership. From 2002, if the LSP fails to meet the criteria, the local authority could lose access to the funds, and central government

‘would take steps to ensure that other neighbourhood renewal resources reached communities by other means’ (Social Exclusion Unit 2001:50).

The accreditation process is based on learning and improvement. It has acknowledged that partnerships have varying degrees of experience and they can only be expected to improve from their initial positions.

An important development is the emphasis on developing leadership within Whitehall in order to improve relations with local areas. Both regional organisations have linkages with LSPs but Government Offices have primary involvement. The Reaching Out report (Performance and Innovation Unit 1999) recommended that Government Offices should be strengthened to provide a brokerage role between the centre and locality. Their role within NR, besides accrediting LSPs is to facilitate and mediate. Neighbourhood renewal teams dealing with specific geographical areas, operate from the Government Offices overseeing the development of LSPs and neighbourhood renewal strategies. As facilitators and mediators their role is:

- To ensure that all government departments participate in NR;
- To create linkages between key actors;
- To address concerns about the performance of the LSP or other partners;
- To become a point of contact for sharing good practice; and
- To mediate between partners if conflict should emerge (Department of Environment Transport and the Regions 2001).

The Neighbourhood Renewal Unit within the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister⁶, is intended to provide a link between NR Teams in Government Offices and Whitehall. This is intended to provide a central focus for the National Strategy and so manage NR more productively than previous programmes (Social Exclusion Unit 2001).

⁶ Formally in the Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions
Summary - A comparison the strengths and weaknesses of programmes

Table 1 provides a summary of the features contained in each programme. The two new programmes can be seen to contain some novel characteristics whilst continuing features of past programmes. In some instances these are strengths, however, there remain weaknesses in the new programmes.

The LSP and NR policies appear to address many of the weaknesses found in previous regeneration programmes. The LSP programme is particularly interesting as it is part of a much larger, long-term joined-up strategy comprising NR and policies developed for local government such as community planning, as such it aims to mainstream regeneration. LSPs have key roles in both increasing coordination and co-governance in regeneration. These aims are supported by the eschewing of wasteful competition; by supporting co-governance through the CEF; and by evaluating the qualitative aspects of partnership work in addition to numerical outputs and outcomes. The LSP and the related NR policy is perhaps the most significant new policy through which the relationships between the centre and locality can be viewed. Central government have a clear network management role through the Government Offices and Neighbourhood Renewal Unit in supporting the aims of the programme.

However, the policy contains some weaknesses. Central government have refused to fund the management and administration of the partnership, relying instead on the members recognising the value of the partnership and therefore being willing to contribute to the running costs. The scale of the work expected might also weaken the ability of the LSP to operate effectively.

The policy for Regeneration Zones also contains interesting features. Again it is a large scale, long-term intervention not based on competition. The RDA are also attempting to avoid micromanagement by using a differentiated approach to partnerships dependent upon their experience. Like the LSP/NR policy it has a remit to coordinate activities and funding streams and to make decisions on a co-governed basis with key local actors.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>SRB</th>
<th>Regeneration Zones</th>
<th>Local Strategic Partnerships</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Aims</strong></td>
<td>Initially-to promote sustainable, competitive economic regeneration. Latterly to reduce the gap between deprived and other areas.</td>
<td>To promote economic development by matching need (social exclusion) with opportunity. Thus reducing the gap between deprived and other areas. Funding is to be co-ordinated from all UK &amp; EU sources.</td>
<td>To improve quality of life by meeting people’s needs, through joining-up services and initiatives, i.e. making holistic. NRF to support mainstream service development. Where applicable this aims to support sustainable regeneration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Focus for activity</strong></td>
<td>Refocused SRB has focus on social exclusion and creating opportunities for the disadvantaged. Can be area based or focused on target groups usually within LA boundary.</td>
<td>Economic development within sub-regional areas. Includes, physical development, creating a more diverse and dynamic business base and social enterprise. Linking opportunity with need is key to raising floor targets.</td>
<td>Service improvement within LA area with proviso it helps to raise floor targets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Types of partnership</strong>¹</td>
<td>Multi-sectoral, membership based on suitability, i.e. for focus.</td>
<td>Multi-sectoral, but aim is for business led partnerships (51% membership quota)</td>
<td>Multi-sectoral, with membership from all key actors, including business, community, voluntary and elected members. No exact prescription.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Roles of:</strong></td>
<td>Financial and expert support from private sector to be maximised.</td>
<td>Expert support from private sector engagement essential, but financial support desirable.</td>
<td>Business members key community stakeholder.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Business sector</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Voluntary sector</strong></td>
<td>Voluntary sector mostly involved in service provision – in some cases can be a lead body.</td>
<td>Voluntary sector seen as a key social enterprise and vital link into communities.</td>
<td>Voluntary sector key actor in community life and as service provider.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Community sectors</strong></td>
<td>Consultative relationship but in rare cases communities have led schemes.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Community involvement key to more effective outcomes.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ All necessary for funding
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regional body to lead</th>
<th>GOR until 1999 then RDA.</th>
<th>RDA lead and sponsor of specific policy proposal.</th>
<th>GOR – through NR teams reporting to NRU.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Funding mechanisms</td>
<td>Competitive bidding used for allocation; latterly based on deprivation criteria. Funds to act as catalyst and complement to other UK &amp; EU funds. Funding allocated for management of partnership and recently for capacity building. Funding relies on the production of a detailed implementation plan.</td>
<td>RDA reject the use of competition and focus on the relevance of proposals in relation to their priorities. Funding relies on the production of a detailed implementation plan for scheme and each project. Capacity building considered part of holistic regeneration proposals.</td>
<td>Competition is rejected for funding allocations by central government. Funding available on the basis of eligibility under deprivation criteria. LSPs are to spend NRF according to locally agreed Neighbourhood Renewal Strategy¹. Funding for capacity building is provided through CEF.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key mechanisms for co-ordinating activity</td>
<td>Initially - through partnership and support from the Government Offices. Latterly via regional planning statements and community planning.</td>
<td>Through strategic partnerships and production of regional and zone strategies which lay the basis for the co-ordination of local spending on regeneration particularly in economic development.</td>
<td>Through strategic partnerships, the production of community plans and Neighbourhood Renewal Plans which lay the basis for the co-ordination of spending on public services with a particular focus on raising standards in deprived areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Method of performance management</td>
<td>SRB has concentrated on output measurement, although there is a concern with impacts and outcomes.</td>
<td>At the zone level performance management focuses on outputs with some emphasis on the impact of interventions. Also some interest in the way in which partnerships are managed. Work of RDA is driven by need to address floor targets.</td>
<td>Accreditation intended to secure better process outcomes as well as substantive outputs and outcomes. Backed up by threat of withdrawal of funding. Work of LSP is driven by need to address floor targets and LPSAs.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ Local authorities were allowed to spend year one NRF without the formation of a partnership.
Its weaknesses include a lack of detailed guidance for partnerships by which to operate. This may leave the way open for poor partnership working. In terms of inclusion, the RDA has a clear idea who it does and does not want to be involved. This also may not provide the most constructive approach to partnership working. Like the LSP, Zones will have a plethora of responsibilities to fulfil in regenerating large sub-regional areas including the remit to work across local authority boundaries.

By comparison, the SRB remains more manageable in many respects with its shorter-term and smaller scale of activity. The strengths are that it has been revised following previous experience and the revisions provide a managed context in which competition can take place. It also aims to coordinate with other policies and funding streams and to operate in an increasingly co-governed way with the guidance for inclusion having made it clear that community involvement in multisectoral partnerships which are genuine is necessary.

Its weakness remains the wasteful competitive element, although this has raised the quality of bids, it may still be problematic. Despite the new guidance, the quality of partnership working may still be questioned, as the SRB has a history of poor partnership working. The short-term nature of the schemes may be insufficient to properly address issues of regeneration thus leaving issues to do with forward strategies. It is this issue of the necessity of longer-term or at least more flexible approaches that new programmes are particularly designed to address.

CONCLUSIONS

This chapter has highlighted the unequal power relationship between central and local government and has summarised the relevant features and outcomes of the five phases of regeneration policy identified in the literature.

Although significant gains have been made from the early 1990s regarding more balanced approaches to regenerating areas, this phase also had some severe weaknesses. These were summarised briefly here in terms of poor partnership working; a lack of targeting and coordination; limited resources and a wasteful competitive process. Newer
policies, including the revised SRB, have been discussed in part two of this chapter and have demonstrated some important developments. The aims and institutional rules by which central government or the RDA attempt to manage regeneration through these programmes have been assessed. In all cases, significant improvements have been made compared to previous programmes. Therefore, the aims to generate greater coordination and co-governance could, in theory, be supported by these.

There is an identified shift towards ‘superboards’: large strategic partnerships which oversee large area strategies at the local and sub-regional levels. Greater coordination of planning, programmes and projects is the aim to create sustainable long-term regeneration. Coordination with mainstream funding is a key feature as this will bring the most benefit, through multiple interventions, to deprived populations. In addition, the importance of co-governance, whereby the many actors involved in partnerships together with local residents have some influence upon the nature of interventions is stressed as a necessary factor of regeneration.

However, as we shall see in chapter three, inter-organisational and governance theory suggests that managing for coordination and co-governance present enormous challenges to organisations. The review of previous regeneration policy has shown that persistent difficulties exist in developing better coordination and co-governance. Although there were examples in the recent past where more success had been achieved, particularly in the area of coordination.

New Labour have made a concerted effort to create a system of joined-up government around regeneration policy. If the criteria for measuring success depended on the expenditure of effort then current policy would show a considerable level of achievement. New Labour are trying, albeit rather unsuccessfully, to develop a new culture of public service, one that is outcome oriented. Some theorists have also suggested that there is also a change in practice with many public service managers working hard to reform the ways in which the public sector works (Goss 2001). There is also a need for central and regional civil servants to change practices and research cited in this chapter suggests that a lack of change in the relationship between centre and
locality remained a barrier to a more productive partnership between centre, region and locality (Mawson and Ipsos-RSL 1999).

Nevertheless, central and regional government have produced new programmes which embody new ideas around how to manage and gain synergistic results from the use of networks. A new approach to managing networks can be identified. Increasingly also local programme managers recognise the need to manage the relationships created around regeneration in a more proactive and careful way. Network management theory suggests better management can create optimal conditions for the work of partnerships. It remains for these new management techniques to be researched and analysed in order to make an assessment of the degree of change, if any, that is being achieved.

In the following summary the principal research question introduced in chapter one is restated. This is followed by a set of more detailed and focused questions which will guide the research methodology. These questions and research objectives are intended to surface the degree of change achieved and the nature of any possible changes in the management of regeneration policy through a detailed empirical analysis of the three programme case studies. The questions focus on the degree of coordination and co-governance achieved and the techniques used to achieve these aims.

**Research questions and objectives**

Several related research questions have been asked to answer the principal question

> 'How is regeneration policy being managed in the era of joined-up government?'

These include:

1. In what ways do the cases reflect coordination?
2. What drivers and constraints affect the development of coordination?
3. In what ways do the cases reflect co-governance?
4. What drivers and constraints affect the development of co-governance?
5. Has network management changed during this era?
6. What impact have central government’s attempts to manage the network had on the outcomes?
7. What impact have local actor’s attempts to manage the network had on the outcomes?
8. Do new programmes represent a step forward?

There are no formal hypotheses about likely success or failure, although it is recognised that delivering a high level of coordination and co-governance may not be straightforward. The research effort has focused on assessing the implementation of new programmes and analysing them using the models and theories presented in the following chapter.

Research objectives

The objectives of the research are outlined below, these intend to:

1. Review the urban regeneration policy literature, focusing on issues of coordination and co-governance. Is there anything fundamentally new here?;
2. Take case studies as examples of developments within three different regeneration programmes;
3. Assess the type and extent of coordination and co-governance evident in the case studies;
4. Place regeneration policy within the context of wider policy developments in terms of joined-up government. Is joined-up government the same in all policy areas?;
5. Utilise concepts derived from the network management literature to describe and explain these policy developments as a way of assessing the degree to which joined-up government is being implemented on the ground in ways which the policies prescribe;
6. Assess the utility of network management concepts. How useful are they? Do they bring something new to the theory used in urban regeneration management?; And
7. Apply the network management concepts in order to propose ways forward for the management of regeneration policy.

In the following chapter the theoretical framework for the study is outlined. This includes an introduction to the concepts and approaches to network management and how these can be applied to the case studies, including the SRB which is analysed in chapter four. In addition, two frameworks are proposed through which the levels of coordination and co-governance can be assessed.
Chapter three

Theoretical conceptualisations of joint working in public policy:
Policy Networks; Network Management; Partnerships, coordination and participation

'A major task confronting political systems in any advanced industrial
country is securing coordinated policy actions through networks of separate
but interdependent organisations where the collective capabilities of a number
of participants are essential for effective problem solving' (Humphrey et al. 1978:2)

INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents the theoretical approach used in the analysis of the data. The
justification for the inclusion of the following literature is its relevance to the research
topic. Network management theory was adopted since this was identified as existing
within the policies during the review of policy developments. The literature on policy
networks is important due it being the overarching theoretical perspective within which
network management is placed. The discussion of partnerships and the issues in
partnership working is used to outline some basic parameters to the area of study. The
literature on organisational coordination and co-governance, or more particularly, the
participation literature, forms the basis of the analysis regarding the substantive aspects
of coordination and co-governance.

The chapter is thus divided into three sections. In the first section, the concept of
partnership is introduced. The second section summarises the policy network approach;
partnerships are conceived as policy networks. An outline of the network management
literature follows. This details the types of intervention which can be used to foster
more productive joint working within networks. In section three, the literature on
models of coordination and participation are reviewed. These will enable an evaluation
of the type and extent of coordination and co-governance achieved in the case studies.

This analysis of the cases will then form the basis for the application of network
management concepts. The analysis thus shifts to the types of management used in the
partnership situations and whether or not there is evidence to suggest that the
management of the networks has improved at either central, regional or local levels, particularly in comparison to the SRB which has been researched in some detail.

THE CONCEPT OF PARTNERSHIP

Partnership forms of organisation have long been used in urban regeneration. Their precise form has changed, with a movement from the use of bilateral partnerships between central and local government in the 1970s and 80s to multi-sectoral partnerships in the 1990s and beyond, which incorporate business, voluntary and community sectors and citizens (Skelcher, McCabe, Lowndes and Nanton 1996).

A definition of partnership is provided by Bailey (1994:293),

‘the mobilisation of a coalition of interests drawn from more than one sector in order to prepare and oversee an agreed strategy for regeneration of a defined area’.

Whilst partnership has been the mainstay in urban development its role has been widely promoted more recently as part of the saviour of public services through the involvement of either: the for profit; not-for-profit or the voluntary and community sectors (Home Office 1998; Institute for Public Policy Research 2001; Sullivan and Skelcher 2001; Her Majesty's Treasury 2002). The use of partnership also reflects ‘new patterns of local governance’ (Geddes and Benington 2001).

The rationale for partnership

The recent report from the Commission on Public Private Partnerships (Institute for Public Policy Research 2001) highlights five reasons for using partnerships in public service delivery:

- Improving service quality through greater diversity and contestability;
- Focusing on outcomes;
- Getting more from public assets over their life cycle;
- Accessing private sector management skills and expertise; and
• Engaging citizens and civic groups in the governance and monitoring of activities.

For regeneration policy in particular, the benefits of multi-sectoral partnerships are expressed in terms of the capture of synergy (Mackintosh 1992). Synergy can be gained through either the sharing and exchange of resources (financial) or policy ideas (intellectual resources) (Hastings 1996). The involvement of citizens in the partnership structures is an extension of community involvement in regeneration more generally which has been on and off the agenda in various forms since the 1970s. Partnerships offer a formalised route for the involvement of communities themselves in the processes of regeneration (Colenutt and Cutten 1994). Geddes & Benington (2001) argue partnerships may in theory be seen to offer:

• A form of legitimation in societies where the traditional democratic processes of representative government are challenged;
• A capacity to pool the risks and costs of innovation; and
• Provide a problem solving capacity under the environmental conditions of complexity and uncertainty.

The issues concerning partnerships

Despite the advantages which partnerships seem to offer the evidence produced by research upon them has been less sanguine. Despite the claim by the Institute for Public Policy Research that there have been few balanced studies, most having allowed prejudice and anecdote to dominate analysis, there exists a rich source of material focused on partnerships, particularly within regeneration policy. The research often provides evidence of both positive and negative outcomes although negative analyses do dominate.

The positive outcomes of partnerships have been cited as follows as:

• Members have been cooperative (Hambleton 1981; Geddes 1997);
• They have fostered changes in officials’ working practices in some instances; enabled communities to shape policy and/or projects; and created positive externalities, such as employment (McArthur 1995);
• The quality of partnership working has been seen to improve over time (Hall, Beazley et al. 1996);
• In some cases partnership working has been carried over beyond particular funding regimes (Environment Committee 1995b); and
• Coordination in localities has improved with the instigation of strategic partnerships from the early 1990s (Hall, Mawson and Nicholson 1995).

However, urban regeneration partnerships have been characterised as having highly unbalanced power relations between members and this is viewed as problematic in relation to the stated aim of the creation of synergy between equally involved members (Higgins, Deakin et al. 1983; Davoudi and Healey 1995; Mawson, Beazley, Burfitt, Collinge, Hall, Loftman, Nevin, Srbijanin and Tilson 1995; Hall, Beazley et al. 1996; Geddes 1997).

An assessment of partnership working during the first three rounds of the SRB is provided by Hall et al (1996) who offered a typology in terms of shell; consultative, participative and autonomous partnerships. This was based on levels of involvement from: the nominal involvement of partners other than the lead partner (shell) through consultative and participative to autonomous partnerships which had unity and an independent identity. The research suggested that only one quarter had progressed beyond consultative with the majority of partnerships falling short of full integration and participation.

As such there has been a tendency for the partnership’s plans to be developed by key partners alone with other partners being asked to sign up to the plan to provide credibility (Higgins, Deakin et al. 1983; Mawson, Beazely et al. 1995). In addition, there has been a reluctance to divert resources from mainstream programmes towards deprived areas (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 1996).

Geddes and Benington (2001) argued that few of the partnerships they studied were able to offer systematic evidence of outcomes and fewer still were able to link outcomes to the partnership structures, working practices and relationships. Since many of these partnerships and still more in practice are experimental pilot programmes designed to disseminate good practice: finding ‘what works’ is a crucial issue.
Mackintosh (1992) has argued central government aimed to achieve synergy through pooling resources. In practice two further processes could operate within partnerships: budget enlargement where partners aim to gain resources to meet their organisational goals, and transformation which was the less often stated motive for partnership work. Central government wanted to see a transformation of public sector cultures towards private sector ways of working. Hastings (1996) developed the notion of transformation to produce unidirectional (one way) and mutual transformation (two way). Mutual transformation was possible, however most transformation was unidirectional as the pressure increased on the public sector.

Hudson et al (1999) argue that collaboration is conceptually elusive and perennially difficult to achieve but this has not reduced its popularity. In the arena of regeneration, Hutchinson (1994:335) has argued that while a

'properly applied partnership approach can be almost universally accepted as a positive theme in local economic development, there are certain fundamental problems arising from the nature of the arrangement which have to be addressed for the partnership to achieve success'.

Hutchinson (1994) and Hastings (1996) argue there is a political consensus that a multi-sectoral partnership approach is essential to achieve urban regeneration, it has a politically neutral appeal (Hutchinson 1994). Bailey (1994) has added that it is popular amongst practitioners. Despite this support for partnership, researchers have remained sceptical as to the benefits that partnership brings over and above what could be achieved by single organisations. The complexity of partnership working may also inhibit the clear findings in relation to what works.

Partnerships appear to be in the difficult domain of neither their undesirability or desirability being proven, however, recently the Commission on Public Private Partnerships (Institute for Public Policy Research 2001) called for a moratorium on the development of new funding streams for at least three years in order to allow time for evaluation. However partnership continues to be pursued.
THE POLICY NETWORK APPROACH

The policy network approach is one method of studying policy-making processes. It has developed from and builds onto earlier traditions of studying interest group politics such as pluralism, sub-governments and corporatism (Blom-Hansen 1997). It has been influenced by the European inter-organisational relations literature (Rhodes 1981) and by ‘bottom-up’ implementation studies (Hjern and Porter 1981); and inter-governmental relations (Friend, Power and Yewlett 1974; Scharpf, Reissart and Schnabel 1978). It is associated with the multi-actor perspective which asserts that policy making and implementation is the result of a series of interactions between many actors rather than viewing it as a rational process executed and evaluated by a central actor (Simon 1957). Furthermore, the ‘process approach’ has to be studied from the perspective of all actors involved to obtain a thorough understanding of policy process.

The concept of policy networks connects public policies with their strategic and institutionalised context. (Kickert, Klijn and Koppenjan 1997:6) provide a useful definition,

‘Policy networks are (more or less) stable patterns of social relations between interdependent actors, which take shape around policy problems and/or policy programmes’.

Various perspectives coexist within the policy network approach. Borzel’s review of the literature highlights two main perspectives: that of interest intermediation and governance. The interest intermediation school comprises two strands (Rhodes 1997): 1) The inter-personal relations perspective which is described as focusing on the micro level relations (Richardson and Jordan 1979; Hecl and Wildavsky 1981; Wilks and Wright 1987); and 2) the more dominant structural perspective (Rhodes 1988; Atkinson and Coleman 1989; Jordan and Schubert 1992; Van Waarden 1992; Bache, George and Rhodes 1996). This approach focuses on interest group intermediation. Policy networks are political structures which both constrain and facilitate policy actors and policy outcomes. These authors treat the term policy network as a generic term for different forms of network relationship. Analysis focuses on the patterns of interaction between
interest groups and government departments in discrete policy areas and it is assumed
that policy areas will vary in terms of their structural relationships.

The dominant Rhodes model (Rhodes 1988; Marsh and Rhodes 1992) contains four
structural dimensions for analysis: Membership; Levels of integration; Resources; and
Power and these provide the terms of reference for different modes of policy network
along a continuum from a loosely integrated network of many actors, an issue network,
to a tightly integrated network with few actors, a policy community.

Rhodes utilises the theory of power dependence to explain outcomes (Benson 1982).
Power relies on the level of resources held. Therefore the distribution of resources
between actors in a specific network remains central to any explanation of the
distribution of power in that network. Resources can be constitutional-legal,
organisational, financial, political or informational. All organisations are dependent on
other organisations for resources in order to achieve their goals in a network, but they
are not necessarily equally dependent. The dominant coalition retains discretion over
decision-making, and determines the rules of the game, which in turn regulates resource
exchange. Policy outcomes thus reflect the relative status or power of the particular
interest in a policy area (Rhodes 1988). Overall, accountability is viewed as weak both
to government and to outside interests such as consumer groups.

In Borzel’s second category policy networks are viewed as a specific form of
governance in modern political systems. Governance is defined broadly as ‘directed
influence of social processes’ (Kickert, Klijn et al. 1997:2). This form of governance
has developed rapidly along with an increase in societal differentiation, sectoralisation
and policy growth which leads to political overload and pressure on the governance
system. Modern governance thus contains decision systems which are disaggregated
through territorial and functional differentiation. Problem solving is difficult to achieve
by government alone as all actors have limited resources and competence through which
to tackle problems but through joint action goals can be achieved (Kooiman 1993).

It is argued that Government is increasingly dependent upon the cooperation of actors
outside their hierarchical control and this has encouraged the emergence of policy
networks. Policy networks are thus a new form of governance differentiated from hierarchy and markets and deal specifically with dynamics; diversity and complexity in social conditions (ibid). Networks rely on trust as the central coordinating mechanism as opposed to authority in hierarchy and the price mechanism in markets (Rhodes 2000). They also work through reputation, reciprocity and mutual interdependence (Larson 1992). As Mayntz (1993:5) has argued the concept of policy networks ‘does not so much represent a new analytical perspective but rather signals a real change in the structure of the polity’.

For some authors, policy networks are potentially valuable. They can increase the level of knowledge within a policy area by incorporating views from implementers and users, leading to better policy solutions and may address the problems of representative democracy. Such participation can lead to easier implementation due to the level of legitimacy it affords. Networks may thus help governments to address societal needs when government has a restricted capacity (Kooiman 1993; Kickert, Klijn et al. 1997). Rhodes (2000) adds that networks can be useful where: quality cannot be specified; professional expertise is a core value; flexibility is required; multi-agency cooperation is needed; and monitoring and evaluation incur high costs.

Kickert (2002) argues that networked governance or ‘public governance’ is an alternative way forward for the governance of public policy and is distinct and superior to either central rule by hierarchy or Anglo-American managerialism, see table 2 for a summary of the characteristics of these three forms of governance.

Public governance has a broader meaning beyond the transfer of private sector management theories and includes notions of legitimacy. However, Kickert asserts that government is important in these network situations as a steering agent or network manager. Government can and does play an important role. Kickert thus argues for a distinction between autonomous actors and a multi-actor network. Actors are not autonomous in a public policy network as government does have a special role although it can neither ‘dominate or unilaterally hierarchically dictate’ (ibid:192).
Table 2 - A comparison of forms of governance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mode of governance (ideal types)</th>
<th>Hierarchy/Rational central rule perspective</th>
<th>New Public Management</th>
<th>Network perspective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Characteristics Perspective</td>
<td>Hierarchical rule</td>
<td>Management and competition determine conditions</td>
<td>Rule emerges from interactions between actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Characterisation:</td>
<td>Authoritative - Neutral implementation of ex ante formulated policy</td>
<td>Mixed mode - Centralisation of control/Decentralisation of management responsibility</td>
<td>Interdependent Interaction process in which information, goals and resources are exchanged for common goal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- of relations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- of policy process</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criterion of success</td>
<td>Attainment of formal policy goals</td>
<td>VFM/3 E's</td>
<td>Realisation of collective action and responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cause of failure</td>
<td>Ambiguity of goals, too many actors, lack of information and control</td>
<td>Too much emphasis on efficiency led to fragmentation which makes collective/holistic action difficult</td>
<td>Lack of incentives for collective action or existing blockages</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on Kickert, Klijn And Koppenjan (1997); and Kickert (2002).

Borzel (1997) states that the governance perspective does not constitute an explanatory theory. The most important theoretical position used for explanation by the governance school is actor-centred institutionalism (Scharpf 1997). It combines a sophisticated institutional theory which takes account of informal and formal institutional settings in which policy is made (norms and cultures as well as rules) and a socially constructed rational actor approach, in which actors act rationally but their rationality is not assumed a priori out of context but is assumed to be developed through the actor’s socially constructed understandings of their institutional environment.

Of the two factors, institutions are thought to be more powerful for explanation but the role of actors with their perceptions, preferences and capabilities situated within specific institutional environments are also important. Like other theorists such as Rhodes the game concept is used, however unlike Rhodes who uses it simply as a metaphor, Sharpf draws on a modified form of formal game theory which is used to map out alternative policy outcomes. This framework can be used to explain and perhaps even predict policy outcomes.
A similar conceptualisation of policy processes forms the basis of the analytical model by Klijn and Teisman (1997) which is adopted to analyse the following case studies from a perspective of network management. However, these authors do not go as far as to map out game theoretical alternatives formally. The notion of the game remains metaphorical since the focus is on management strategies used to structure the network and facilitate the game rather than strategies to secure outcomes from any one actor’s perspective.

Rather confusingly, Rhodes now also adopts a similar perspective on networks as the governance school, for him governance refers to ‘self-organising, interorganisational networks’ (Rhodes 1996:660) and argues this is an increasingly common form of governing in Britain which has emerged since the 1980s and 90s as the state and its power has been ‘hollowed’ out. Networks are assumed to be relatively autonomous and central government has a limited capacity to control and indeed he also argues that ‘they are not controlled by any single superordinated actor’ and furthermore they resist government steering (ibid 659). Rhodes also highlights the increasingly ‘differentiated’ nature of the polity where interdependence confounds centralisation, but where the centre still exerts more control but over less, principally over resources and regulation (Rhodes 1997; Rhodes 2000).

As Borzel points out there are other perspectives on networks which emphasise the beliefs and ideas within them. These focus on networks as advocacy or discourse coalitions (Sabatier 1993; Singer 1993). A fourth perspective is found in the network management literature which is dealt with here separately despite its close association with the governance school.

**Critiques**

The policy network approach has been severely criticised in both its main forms. The interest intermediation approach is criticised for the lack of clear concepts and theoretical foundations. The network concept, it is argued is used primarily as a metaphor, it does not provide explanations for outcomes (Benington and Harvey 1994; Dowding 1995). Dowding (1995) argues, it is the characteristics of the actors, their
interactions and resource exchanges which provide explanations rather than the network structure itself. As such it is difficult to see what the approach offers over and above that of other forms of analysis, such as pluralism or implementation studies. Others have argued that it both needs to be: linked to other levels of analysis at the macro ‘state theory level’ and the micro ‘individual action theory’ and the use of comparative analysis to further its explanatory power (Marsh 1998). However, Marsh concedes that the concept has proven useful and networks are important, it is merely the theory about why that is lacking.

The major critique of the governance school is their tendency towards a normative prescription of policy networks as a solution to policy making and implementation problems (Mayntz 1993). Although most authors merely suggests that the network form is a suitable mode in certain circumstances. Kooiman (1993) highlights the extent to which forms of ‘co-working’ between actors are pursued relatively successfully in terms of co-governing or co-steering, co-producing, co-managing and co-allocating. Mayntz (1993) draws attention to the benefits of partial decentralisation allowing local implementers greater discretion. Kickert et al (1997) and Kickert (2002) perhaps responding to critiques regarding normative prescription, simply argue that networks exist therefore governments have to learn how to deal with them effectively.

To a large extent such critiques are embedded in the debates around the weakening of the state as mono centric ruler and the emergence of the defence of bureaucracy (Du Gay 2000). Brans (1997) asserts that the bureaucratic mode has been challenged simultaneously by two forces; the challenge of new public management and of ‘new’ forms of governance which focus on steering and the use of policy networks. They share the same starting point in terms of increased reliance on private and individual actors for policy implementation and the delivery of services. They also share the same problems, they overlook power and access issues, marginalise representative bodies and obscure ideological choices.

There also exist normative objections against the use of policy networks, because private interests have gained too much power and government have failed to protect the public interest. The outcome is seen as stalling policy innovation and a lack of
transparency leading to a lack of accountability for the decisions made. In addition, they lack democratic legitimacy and as such, they should not be allowed to take the place of elected institutions (Brans 1997; De Bruijn and Ringeling 1997).

A further critique is that network governance lacks the capacity to be subject to standard evaluation using ex ante formulated goals. However, Klijn and Koppenjan (2000) argue that a top-down approach in which the public actor decides what the goal should be, is incompatible with the network approach to governance through which decisions are sought through co-governance. A major advantage of using policy networks is to harness the input a larger number of people all of whom are considered valuable for the outcome. Even the definition of the problem is part of the network’s role and acknowledging this process is critical. Goals and objectives should be the result of the interaction which takes place in the network (Klijn and Koppenjan 2000).

**Application to regeneration policy**

Regeneration partnerships are viewed as policy networks. They concern the coordination of actors and actions for a common outcome. Rhodes (1988) identified the regeneration partnerships in Labour’s 1977 policy as issue networks, others have also cited the applicability of the concept (Bassett 1996). Such networks were characterised as involving many members and diverse interests but with little integration; they were conflictual; and access to resources and thus power was unequal. Government consulted members rather than involving them in making policy (Rhodes 1988).

The lack of an integrated policy network explains why policy has been able to shift significantly in terms of its content and which actors should be involved in implementation. Had a stable network existed it may have successfully mediated change, through the power which can be exerted in the process of exchanging ‘acknowledged and valued’ resources between members.

This research rejects the governance perspective in terms of the network as a specific form of governance. Partnerships are not conceptualised as self-organising and autonomous as Rhodes (2000) posits. They are conceptualised as containing a mix of
governance modes. Lowndes and Skelcher (1998) have argued that partnerships have combined market, hierarchical and network forms during different phases of their operation. Davies (2002) has argued that hierarchy remains the dominant form and further asserts that regeneration partnerships are a distinct mode of governance in themselves, characterised by the diffusion and augmentation of state power. They are ‘bureaucratic conduits of government policy...with little local autonomy, trust or collaborative synergy’ (ibid:316). Lowndes and Skelcher (1998) argue that in analyses, differentiation must be made between the network as a form of organisation (inter-organisational form) and the network as a mode of governance (self-organising and autonomous) and the latter does not necessarily follow the former.

Some authors have argued that policy network theorists have not contributed to the debate concerning improvements to policy making and implementation (Metcalf 2000). Some community partnership literature alludes to the use of network management. Skelcher, McCabe et al (1996) have argued that working in partnership needs much more than ‘networking’ among individual members. It needs leadership; coordination, especially of information; a supporter to make those involved feel valued; those who can turn ideas into action and intermediary organisations to supervise network activity. This is echoed by other theorists (Huxham and Vangen 2001).

Urban regeneration partnerships thus have a difficult task, in providing joined-up solutions through greater coordination and to support these organisational efforts through processes of co-governing. The use of network management concepts both by central government and by local actors could in theory be highly important for the outcome of this present phase of regeneration.

NETWORK MANAGEMENT

Network management is a form of public management (Klijn and Koppenjan 1999). In Europe it addresses the problem of Steuerung or steering: the governing ability of political authorities over networks of organisations.
It is influenced also from the United Kingdom through the work of Friend et al (1974) on town expansion. In the US, there has been a long-standing interest in managing networked organisations within the Intergovernmental Management (IGM) tradition (Agranoff 1986; Gage and Mandell 1990; Proven, Milward and Brinton 1995; Agranoff and McGuire 1998; Meier and O'Toole Jr 2001). In some cases the use of large scale quantitative methodology has allowed theory development. Proven, Milward et al (1995); Meier and O'Toole (2001) and Lynn (2001) have all argued that network forms can offer good performance. Crucial to success is appropriate management suited to networks. This counters negative research findings on UK ‘partnerships’ which suggests their advantages are much vaunted but rarely substantiated (Hudson, Hardy, Henwood and Wistow 1999).

The works cited above suggest that network management is worthwhile in terms of organisational performance although there is still scepticism within the public administration/management community that it could or does work in practice. Furthermore, networks of organisations involved in the co-production of services i.e. purely implementation networks (Kooiman 1993) are very different from partnership forms which are designed for policy making and implementation. Here the problem is one of joint decision-making concerning policy.

There is some evidence that the techniques work in relation to governance issues i.e. on the possibility of facilitating co-governing rather than simply co-managing or co-producing. For example, the case studies provided by Klijn, Koppenjan et al. (1995) and Glasbergen (1995).

In the UK, the concept has been used to analyse policy situations such as the distinct roles that British central government and regional and local government play in local service provision networks (Painter, Isaac-Henry and Rouse 1997; Bache 2000; Painter and Clarence 2000). However, none have formally tested or evaluated network management interventions. Within areas such as regeneration there is no evidence of the successful use of the techniques offered by these authors. Neither can this research fill this highly important gap. This research seeks to apply the concepts to what is occurring
and to analyse where further attempts at managing networks could prove useful in reaching the broad objectives of regeneration.

Within regeneration policy the techniques used by central government can be conceived of as forms of network management. Not only have these practices been used for some time but they have increased in number and sophistication as ways of managing the networks which government normatively prescribes as necessary to effectively develop deprived areas (Social Exclusion Unit 2001).

Indeed, Kickert, Klijn and Koppenjan (1997:2) argue that the ‘consciously and deliberately undertaken actions of public actors to influence societal processes should therefore be seen as network management’ (ibid:3).

These authors have usefully drawn together a vast number of ideas and distilled them into a governmental/practitioner tool kit which importantly aims to tackle the problems of governance rather than just inter-organisational management.

Defining network management

Any definition relies on the type of intervention particular theorists prescribe. Kickert, et al have drawn mainly on the Inter-Governmental Management (IGM) literature which stresses that the organisational structure is taken as given: therefore network management must discover how to manage within existing structures (Hanf 1978; Agranoff 1986). Network management is thus

‘a form of coordination of strategies of actors with different goals with regard to a certain problem or policy measure within an existing framework of interorganisational relations’ (Kickert, Klijn et al. 1997:44).

Other literature from the IGM and economic institutionalist traditions suggests that network management can also consider restructuring relations within a network should the existing formation be unsatisfactory for successful policy solutions (Scharpf, Reissart et al. 1978; O’Toole Jr 1988; Ostrom 1990). Network management is conceived of as encompassing three sets of activities which includes restructuring: 1) Intervening
in existing patterns or restructuring of network relations; 2). Furthering conditions for cooperation and consensus building; and 3). Joint problem solving.

This distinction leads to two distinct categories of techniques (see table 3): 1). Managing interactions or *game management* which attempts to improve interaction in a policy game, but operates within a given 'structural context': the extant network with its actors, rules and resources; and 2). Building or changing the institutional arrangements or *network structuring* which aims to alter the structural context thereby affecting the games played within the networks in an indirect way (Kickert and Koppenjan 1997).

Game management is aimed at integrating the actors, resources and perceptions present within the network and thereby promoting suitable conditions for joint action' (Klijn, Koppenjan et al. 1995:442). While network structuring is aimed at changing the culture and the structure of a network. It aims to design a structure to fit the task structure more appropriately, thereby reducing the risk of failure.

A further difference between game management and network structuring is the range of actors who can be involved in these activities. Game management techniques can be practised by any network member, while network structuring, is more likely to be limited to public actors because of the requirement for legal resources, as restructuring may require changes in the budgeting rules, mandates and powers (Klijn and Teisman 1997). Public actors in the UK, namely central government, have more opportunity to adopt these kinds of strategies.

**Perspectives within Network Management**

So far network management has been viewed simply as a set of tools without recourse to the theory of how they work. Kickert argues that three perspectives on network management exist. Firstly, the instrumental perspective, this is nearest to the hierarchical central rule approach where instruments such as regulation are used to control the activities of governance actors. De Bruijn & Ringeling (1997:182) argue that instruments such as regulation and central planning which are successful in hierarchies
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of intervention</th>
<th>Possible management tools</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Game management</strong></td>
<td>Network activation</td>
<td>The initiation of interaction processes, in order to solve particular problems. Can include ‘selective activation’ of actors from a larger established network.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reticulism</td>
<td>Selective distribution of information across organisational boundaries to facilitate joint working.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Arranging</td>
<td>Provision of ad hoc arrangements which facilitate the development and course of actions in interaction processes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Facilitating</td>
<td>Organising meetings, keeping minutes; monitoring the dialogue; and intervening to enhance understanding between actors. It may entail using techniques such as brainstorming, workshops and role-play. The aim of this is to create the conditions for consensus building.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Brokerage</td>
<td>Matching problems to solutions and actors by an intermediary.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mediation/Arbitration</td>
<td>Interventions to manage conflict. The outcome of mediation is the responsibility of the participants whereas arbitration involves the intervention of a third party to provide a solution. Solutions can be binding or non-binding.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Network structuring</strong></td>
<td>Influencing formal policy</td>
<td>Operates in two ways: 1). Alteration of distribution of resources, 2). Alteration of relationships via rules.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Influencing interrelationships</td>
<td>Changing the structure (number of actors and their interrelationships) of mutual dependence within the network.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Influencing values, norms and perceptions</td>
<td>Steering the value and interest definitions of a target group in a desired direction by mass information campaigns or targeting information on specific groups or reframing challenging the actor’s frame of reference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mobilisation of new coalitions/Management by chaos</td>
<td>Network structuring may have opportunities for inclusion of previously excluded actors in decision-making. Network management has been associated with mobilisation and conflict and also with management by chaos.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from Kickert & Köppenjan (1997).
because the context is 'given and immutable' are unlikely to work in horizontal networks because of their pluriform and self-referential nature. Effective instruments for networks have to be second generation instruments, such as covenants, contracts, communicative planning, parameters and incentives.

In making this distinction they accept that institutions are important, the difference between hierarchies and networks are institutional ones. As instrumentalists they normatively prescribe the role of the network manager to governmental actors because of their democratic authority but do not revert to a mono-centric view that government should make all decisions.

Secondly, the interactive perspective championed by Klijn & Teisman (1997) is based on understanding the network as a multitude of actors and interactions and is nearest to the ideal of a horizontal network. From this perspective network management concerns the provision of the right conditions for the process of finding a common purpose. Importantly a common purpose which is not predefined by a single actor but created through the development of dialogue.

Importantly, this perspective is consistent with the thrust of at least the rhetoric of regeneration policy and important influences such as collaborative planning (Forester 1986; Healey 1998) and notions of the need for participatory democracy to replace the decline in the legitimization of representative democracy (Hirst 1990). Both of which have been influential upon regeneration policy. However, interactive decision-making processes are difficult to put into practice. Even Klijn and Koppenjan's (2000) own research suggests that politicians in particular find it a threat to their political primacy.

Thirdly, the institutional perspective emphasises the role of institutions in shaping the strategies and intentions of actors. Rhodes is cited as an important author in this tradition due to his attention to institutional structure. However, institutional analysis is not limited to structural aspects but also includes cultural aspects such as norms and values. This neo-institutional approach (March and Olsen 1989; Scharpf 1997) pays more attention to the dynamic processes of institutionalisation and re-institutionalisation. As institutional structures shape actions they can be a powerful
force preventing interaction processes from reaching agreement; they can also become embedded and be difficult to change. From this view network management has to acknowledge institutions if change is sought, and institutions must be built upon rather than swept away completely (Ostrom 1990).

Authors vary to the extent they represent these perspectives and in reality Kickert et al (1997) argue most authors use all three. All three contain biases, they represent ideal types. The instrumental perspective is in danger of being instrumentalist because it tends to ignore the interests of other actors and the institutional context. However, in reality, a certain amount of instrumentalism often exists (Rhodes 2000). The interactive perspective highlights the dynamic of collective action. This approach relates very closely to the policy rhetoric within local governance. The problem with this perspective is that structural or institutional features such as hierarchical actors are left unacknowledged, as such this perspective can lack empirical validity since in reality within public policy, hierarchy always exists, as Kickert (2002:192) argues ‘the concept of network governance lies somewhere in the grey intermediate area between the extremes of hierarchy and market’.

The analytical framework

The analytical framework used is that put forward by Klijn, Koppenjan & Termeer (1995) and Klijn & Teisman (1997). These authors have analysed games (interactions) in the context of rules and the institutional embeddedness of games, thereby combining the interactive and institutionalist perspectives. It is possible also to analyse such games and institutions in relation to the instrumental approach as instruments can be seen as forms of institutions or rules in themselves. Their approach is consistent with actor centred institutionalism although this is not made explicit. Gidden’s (1984) theory of structuration is also cited. This theory is drawn upon as it combines the study of interactions or games with their institutional context. Thus, social structure is equated to the network structure and agency is equated to the network game. Structuration theory delineates how processes of institutionalisation are produced and reproduced by social actors in specific situations of interaction. It is not necessary to use this theory in terms of applying a set of analytical terms upon the study of regeneration games played within
regeneration networks. It is however, necessary to understand the implications of the theoretical underpinnings.

Klijn and Teisman interpret the theory in terms of it neatly disaggregating the network structure from the agency exhibited by the network members. In this interpretation, whilst the two interact they are separable and can be viewed as separable. The way the theory has been used by the previously mentioned authors concerning UK policy has also interpreted it this way, outlining central government’s role as being one of structuring the network and local government's role being one of game management and interpretation and as such exhibiting a margin of liberty. This is not quite how Giddens would use it as he would emphasise the role of agency in supporting the structures as structures don’t exist outside of human action. Nevertheless, the approach taken by Klijn and Teisman regarding the core concepts of structure and agency are reasonably realistic in this situation and confer to a large degree with Giddens’s work.

The implications of this approach are:

- Policy is the outcome of games played within an institutional setting;
- Actors act rationally but this is socially constructed and dependent upon the institutional setting (Crozier and Friedberg 1980);
- Actors may play in many games over time and/or concurrently;
- Institutions are important but not deterministic, actors retain a margin of liberty (ibid); and
- Both continuity and change is possible in policy situations.

This has implications for network management and its analysis. Firstly, the tendency for structures to be chronically reproduced means institutions have to be acknowledged and respected, and the processes of their reproduction known if changes are sought. Secondly, it is this very institutionalisation of structures, which offer opportunities for improved network operation. Although it may be difficult to change structures, once changed, they may continue if they become routinised within normal organisational conduct.

Klijn & Teisman (1997) argue that network management techniques of both types have to deal with questions of content, players and their strategies and institutional
arrangements. In this way, both types can be directed at actors, their perceptions and institutions in the network. The relevance of actors, perceptions and institutions is explained below and examples of network management techniques are provided in table 4.

Table 4 - Management strategies in networks.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors in the network</th>
<th>Actors</th>
<th>Perceptions</th>
<th>Institutions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Types of network management</td>
<td>Selective (de) activation: (de) mobilising actors who possess resources (to block a game)</td>
<td>Covenanting: exploration of similarities and differences in actors perceptions and the opportunities that exist for goal convergence</td>
<td>Arranging: creating, sustaining and changing ad hoc provisions which suit groups of interactions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Game management to improve the game</td>
<td>Network (dc) activation: bringing in new actors or changing positions of existing actors</td>
<td>Reframing: changing actors' perceptions of the network (which games to play, which professional values matter)</td>
<td>Constitutional reform: changing rules and resources in networks of trying to fundamental change the ecology of games.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted From Klijn & Teisman (1997)

Actors

The quality of policy making relies on the selection of actors involved in a game. Game management techniques attempt to activate the optimal number and type of actors. Managers need to possess the skills to attract, utilise and retain useful members.

Network structuring techniques lay the structural basis for network membership. This may refer to new members or to new networks and is often the consequence of formal policy or mandates and will influence many games which are to be played within the network.

Perceptions

Termeer & Koppenjan (1997) argue that conflicts in the perceptions of actors are equal in importance to conflicts of interest and power relations for explaining policy failure.
These authors argue that perceptions affect the way actors define problems. The way the problem is perceived determines what the interaction is about, which solutions are appropriate and which actors should be involved. Therefore, finding appropriate policy solutions is not just a question of choosing an intervention but securing agreement about the nature of the policy problem.

The degree to which perceptions can change depends on actors’ belief systems. Sabatier (1993) distinguishes between core and peripheral beliefs. Peripheral beliefs are fairly open to policy learning and therefore to change. Core beliefs however, are more resistant to change. When perceptions are based on core beliefs and underlying values, any attempt to change them will challenge an actor’s assumptions about the nature of the human world.

Challenging perceptions can be exercised by game management through covenancing or through the network structuring techniques of reframing. The term covenancing refers to a management strategy aimed at improving the consistency of the decisions made in the game by exploring and consolidating the perceptions of different actors in the game (Ostrom 1980). Covenanting is based on the notion that policy making is the outcome of interaction between several actors. This implies that the quality of decisions are not the result of the consistent nature of one participant but of all those involved. Consistency therefore, cannot be improved by improving one actors’ knowledge so that they can make more rational decisions, but consistency has to be improved through social knowledge.

Klijn & Teisman (1997) state that strategies aimed at the perceptions of actors regarding the nature and functioning of the network are termed reframing. Policy documents can ‘reframe’ the policy problem, its solutions and the actors to be involved (Rein and Schon 1992). This is more of a top down process, and Klijn & Teisman argue that reframing represents a paradigmatic shift and once a redefinition is accepted it is assumed that games will be played in different ways.

In complex policy making situations, actors are required to work with those who have differing perceptions. Termeer & Koppenjan (1997) argue that a mutual adjustment of
these perceptions is an essential prerequisite for the accomplishment of joint decision-making. Changing perceptions involves actors recognising that there are differences; see this as problematic; and be willing to reflect on their own perceptions. Changing perceptions from a network management perspective should not be confused with creating consensus. A variation in policy solutions is viewed as a resource from this perspective, therefore the exclusion of new ideas has to be resisted and a continuing dialogue encouraged.

Termeer & Koppenjan make a differentiation between an instrumental strategic option and a procedural strategic option. It is argued that the latter process is more useful in policy situations. The instrumental approach is used by a network manager to impose their goals and objectives onto the network. This is seen as problematic as it assumes that perceptions can be changed in a particular direction which these authors argue is unlikely. By contrast the procedural strategic option is based on the belief that interaction can forward policy making by allowing a learning process to take place.

Institutions

Institutions are Klijn & Teisman’s third factor upon which network management techniques can be used. Institutions here are understood as rules which relate to the policy programme, the network or the game. In terms of game management techniques, these are organisational provisions which support the game such as meetings, protocols for action and management arrangements.

The techniques of network structuring aim to change the institutional provisions, the procedures which channel interactions in the network. They determine the rules and the allocation of resources. Rules can change the incentive structure which in turn affects the likelihood of actors taking part in the game. This is an indirect method, individual rules are not designed to produce a particular outcome, but they form the basis upon which decisions shall be made in general.

These techniques for network management are not proposed as a tool kit for the successful management of policy networks. They do, however, argue that if
consideration is given to network management it is more likely that the joint objectives of organisations will be met. They provide the appropriate conditions for joint policy making and mutual adjustment. Policy failure could still occur if the particular policy case proved to be too difficult, however, in most cases network management has the potential to improve interactions in the policy network.

Critiques

There are also critiques which apply to network management. Firstly, network management itself suffers from the evaluation critique. Klijn et al (1995) argue that evaluation should not start from a set of ex ante constructed criteria for success. They propose an evaluation which measures the satisfaction of each party ‘ex post’ and also appreciates the learning which has occurred in the processes of resolution. Both processes and outcomes should be the subject of such evaluation.

Secondly, network management, it is argued neglects conflict and power in concentrating on attempting to facilitate cooperation and consensus (Brans 1997). It may therefore be seen to aid the cooption of weaker members through management perceived of as a negative process (Cockburn 1977). However, Klijn and Koppenjan (2000) argue that power and conflict are not neglected. Conflict is a central concern in the processes in which consensus is sought and is often a key part of the process in reaching agreement. For example, Susskind and Cruickshank (1987) argue that the most satisfactory resolutions are borne out of situations in which conflict is removed by addressing all parties concerns and promoting solutions that are better than were expected: the so called win-win situation. In addition, conflict avoidance strategies can also be used, for example establishing all groups in a network on an equal basis.

Summary

The preceding sections have provided a summary of the issues surrounding partnerships in regeneration and an overview of the policy network and more particularly the network management literature. The major debate beyond whether or not network forms are a suitable approach to manage public policy interventions at all is that around how
best can networks of actors be brought together to focus on providing solutions to public policy issues?

Network management although understood to be a weak form of steering clearly does have a range of perspectives and interventions some of them being very close to the standard tools of government with some being relatively strong (Hood 1983). We know also that within regeneration policy central government provides a strongly hierarchical governance structure which works alongside the introduction of a more interactive governance structure. Both work with institutional rules and within institutional settings. A key question for research in this area is to ask to what degree should central government exert its hierarchical power? In some respects centralised hierarchical governing may be seen as negative especially where decisions are made on the basis of treasury rules or central dictat. This can leave precious little localism in the manner of policy making and implementation. However, localism in policy is not necessarily better, sometimes government acting in the best interests of its citizens are right to support universalist policies. It is possible for government action to foster the inclusion of actors previously excluded or to incorporate them into the process in more fundamental ways through changing institutional structures over whose involved and how they are involved (Richardson and Jordan 1979; Kickert, Klijn et al. 1997). Network management, just as any other sort of management or governance regime, can be used positively or negatively.

This research evaluates current central government policy regarding regeneration. It has been carried out with an acceptance that multi-sectoral partnerships within this particular area may be appropriate (albeit not the only nor necessarily the most successful way) to produce solutions to the problems which exist and that central government just as the other actors: from local authorities; mainstream service providers; business; voluntary and community sectors do have a role to play. The focus for the research turns to the presence of and success or failure of network management within these settings.

As such the evaluation will have to recognise the perspectives of all the actors involved including central government. Network management has been described as a success
when ‘it promotes cooperation between actors and prevents, by-passes, or removes the blockades which obstruct that cooperation’ (Klijn, Koppenjan et al. 1995:450). It has already been stated that evaluations of network governance cannot be carried out via a set of pre-established objectives. Klijn and Teisman (1997) argue that neither can it be evaluated using pluralistic types of evaluation since this is based on each actor’s own perspective: it is necessary to develop the notion of joint interests. However, all these forms of evaluation relate to the substantive outcomes of policy i.e. the decisions, when in fact for the purposes of this research it is largely the processes which are evaluated. Klijn and Teisman argue processes can be evaluated through the criteria of: 1). The quality of the context: the ability for actors to be involved in covenaning; 2). The quality of the interaction process, who is involved and how this is managed; and 3). The structure of the game, how decision-making processes are structured to achieve outcomes.

ISSUES OF COORDINATION

Whilst the previous sections dealt with notions of coordinating systems as forms of governance (markets; hierarchies and networks), this section deals more specifically with inter-organisational coordination and seeks to define and discuss coordination within the era of joined-up government.

Coordination has been stated as a major aim of current regeneration policy. Coordination is often used (as it has been here thus far) without reference to theoretically informed organisational definitions (Mawson and Spencer 1998; Mawson and Hall 1999; Mawson 2000; Mawson and Hall 2000). Huxham (1996) has argued that the coordination literature fails to build on existing concepts to the extent that she simply refers to collaboration as a generic term for research on inter-organisational working. However, for the purposes of this research some attempt has been made to conceptualise coordination in order to assess the type of inter-organisational working that is in existence at the partnership level and to place regeneration policy within a policy wide movement towards greater joined-up government.
What needs to be coordinated?

Perri 6 et al (2002) have defined in general terms what needs to be brought into a coherent system in public policy through holistic working:

- Policy – the process of making, formulating the content of policy, and then exercising oversight or scrutiny over its implementation;
- Regulation – the organisation, content and impact of regulation of individuals, private organisations and within government;
- Service provision – the organisation, content and impact of service provision; and
- Scrutiny – the evaluation, audit, interpretation and appraisal of performance in policy, regulation or service provision.

The extent to which these provide useful categories may well be variable but neither the policy documents or literature closely define what it is that should be or is coordinated.

Barriers to Coordination

Hardy et al (1992) list five categories of barriers to coordination: structural; procedural; financial; professional; and those to do with status and legitimacy (see table 5). Huxham (1996) adds, differences in aims; language and organisational

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structural</th>
<th>Fragmentation of service responsibilities across inter-agency and within agency boundaries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inter-organisational complexity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-coterminosity of boundaries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procedural</td>
<td>Differences in planning horizons and cycles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Differences in budgetary cycles and procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial</td>
<td>Differences in funding mechanisms and bases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Differences in the stocks and flows of resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>Differences in ideologies and values</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Professional self-interest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Threats to job security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conflicting views about user interests and roles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status and legitimacy</td>
<td>Organisational self-interest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Concern for threats to autonomy and domain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Differences in legitimacy between elected and appointed agencies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5 - Barriers to Coordination.

cultures. The cumulative barriers are described as collaborative inertia: a situation in which the potential output from collaborative activity is stunted. Urban regeneration partnerships could potentially suffer from any or all of these problems.

**Defining coordination**

Coordination should not be confused with cooperation. They differ in terms of decision rules; the degree of formalisation; the goals and activities emphasised; the extent of personal resources involved; the threat to autonomy and implications for vertical and horizontal control. Cooperation is less formalised than coordination. Schermerhorn (1975) argued that the major difference between the two relates to the goals sought. Cooperation is defined as:

‘deliberate relations between otherwise autonomous organisations for the joint accomplishments of individual goals’ (cited in Mulford & Rogers 1982:13).

Whilst in coordination the goal is also jointly agreed. Thus, cooperation is less likely to have a major impact on inter-organisational linkages. By contrast, coordination among horizontally organised units may have a lasting impact particularly if it is mandated. Coordination is associated with a larger commitment of resources and of the involvement of higher ranking persons within the organisation.

Warren et al (1974) provide a definition of coordination as a:

‘structure or process of concerted decision-making or action wherein the decisions or actions of two or more organisations are made simultaneously in part or in whole with some deliberate degree of adjustment to each other’ (cited in Mulford & Rogers 1982:16).

Similarly to the governance literature the inter-organisational literature notes that different philosophies and strategies of coordination are associated with general environmental conditions present at a particular time (Rogers and Whetton 1982). The management of coordination between multiple organisations reflects important forces in the social, political and economic environment which organisations operate
(Stinchcombe 1965 quoted in Rogers and Whetton 1982). Joined-up government can be conceived of as a network type of organising principle for coordination (Thompson 1991) which has replaced the emphasis on market mechanisms without returning to a bureaucratic mode (Richards, Barnes et al. 2000).

Developing an analytical framework for coordination

The recent emphasis in the policy agenda on devising more effective interventions to combat social exclusion by joining-up different agency’s contributions has raised interest into coordination once more. More recent notions of partnership or inter-organisational activity represent certain principles which aim for an inter-organisational form which extends notions of cooperation or coordination by focusing on ‘collaboration’. This reflects a move towards new ways of working in both the private and public sectors which attempts to capitalise on the cultures, organisational differences and learning between organisations in order to be more productive (Huxham 1996).

The related topics of cooperation; coordination and collaboration have been extensively discussed in the policy literature. There have also been discussions regarding the kind of ‘joining-up’ needed in particular situations and levels of governance (Taylor 1998). The Performance and Innovation Unit (2000) argued that the type and extent of joining up should reflect the task requirements, wholesale linkages should be rejected. Taylor (1998: based on Mattesich and Monsey 1994) differentiates between cooperation, coordination and collaboration. The first two are comparable with Mulford & Roger’s typology. The third emphasises a further degree of integration in terms of organisations being committed to their representatives; there is a common mission and goals; a new organisational structure with authority to promote a balance between ownership by individual organisations and expediency to accomplish a purpose. There are joint strategies, resources are pooled, risk shared and the potential for synergy achieved. Importantly, it has a focus on long-term efforts rather than short-term projects. Taylor argues it is the distinction between the maintenance of individual authority in cooperation and pooling of authority in collaboration which is the most important.
Pratt et al (1999:104) propose that if two organisations share a collective goal but the way to achieve it is unknown or unpredictable, the concept of co-evolution is relevant, which Taylor argues is consistent with collaboration. Co-evolution describes behaviour which can ‘lift the game to a new level of operation’. The first task in this form is to create conditions where long-term productive partnerships can thrive. Both Pratt et al and Richards (2001) state that complex ‘intractable’ problems around social exclusion and regeneration could be usefully tackled by the ‘co-evolution’ approach.

In a recent publication, 6 et al (2002) reviewed the concept of coordination within the UK government context. Rather confusingly they introduce a whole new set of definitions and concepts. They use collaboration as a general concept for joint work. Coordination ‘refers’ to the development of ideas about joint and holistic working and this is differentiated from integration which is concerned with operational implementation through the development of common structures and merged professional practices and interventions. Integration is thus a process whereby the principles of coordination are executed. Furthermore, they differentiate between merely joined-up working and holism, see table 6 for a summary of these differentiations.

Table 6 – A conceptualisation of joined-up and holistic working

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Coordination</th>
<th>Integration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relationship between</td>
<td>Information, cognition, decision</td>
<td>Execution, implementation, practical action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>means and ends</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joined-up government</td>
<td>Joined-up coordination</td>
<td>Joined-up integration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mutually consistent</td>
<td>A most modest level – agreement by two agencies</td>
<td>Joint work but focused principally on prevention of negative externalities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>objectives and means</td>
<td></td>
<td>and of conflict between mission critical programmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holistic government</td>
<td>Holistic coordination</td>
<td>Holistic integration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mutually reinforcing</td>
<td>Understanding necessity for mutual involvement, but precise action not yet</td>
<td>Highest level of holistic governance, building fully seamless programmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>objectives and means</td>
<td>defined</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Reproduced from 6 et al (2002).
Joined-up working has been defined as

‘the bringing together of a number of public, private and voluntary sector bodies to work across organisational boundaries towards a common goal’ (National Audit Office 2001:1).

This defines joined-up government in organisational terms only and excludes the broader notions of engagement of the public. Veryard (2002) argues that it takes a variety of forms including engaging with and involving the public.

Perri 6 et al argue that joined-up working describes a situation where the goals and the means to achieve them of two organisations are consistent, but are not necessarily mutually reinforcing; whilst holism has the characteristic of mutual reinforcement, as its defining feature. Holism is,

‘working back from a clear and mutually reinforcing set of objectives to identify a set of instruments which have the same happy relationship to one another’ (2002:32).

In addition to collaboration ‘as necessary’ organisations are expected to alter their priorities to support such areas as anti-poverty work. They cite the Health Action Zone and Education Action Zone initiatives as examples of this aim, also noting the difficulty in achieving it. Joined-up working they argue asks ‘what can we do together?’ while holistic working asks ‘who needs to be involved, and what basis, to achieve what we are all really here to achieve?’ (2002:32).

Perri 6 et al argue that New Labour are currently pursuing joined-up working in general and not holistic working. If ‘holistic governance’ is to develop it needs to be supported and developed continually through the use of institutional mechanisms through which it can embed.

The analytical framework, see table 7 below, represents these ideas around how we can understand coordination. The first two categories represent standard inter-organisational
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CRITERIA</th>
<th>Cooperation</th>
<th>Coordination</th>
<th>Collaboration</th>
<th>Holistic integration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Presence/ absence of rule system</td>
<td>No formal rules</td>
<td>Formal rules</td>
<td>Formal rules</td>
<td>Formal rules*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of support/ legitimation given to joint work</td>
<td>Cooperation relies on individuals</td>
<td>Organisations support joint work</td>
<td>Organisations committed to their representatives</td>
<td>Organisations committed to their representatives*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resource implications</td>
<td>Resources kept separate</td>
<td>Resources made available for a specific project</td>
<td>Resources pooled or jointly secured for a longer term effort that is managed by the collaborative structure, organisations share in the product, synergy achieved</td>
<td>Resources may be pooled but this is not the key way to secure joint work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information</td>
<td>Conveyed as needed</td>
<td>Communication channels created</td>
<td>Many levels of communication channels created</td>
<td>Information sharing is key aspect of holism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning implications</td>
<td>No joint planning</td>
<td>Joint planning for specific projects</td>
<td>Joint ‘long-term’ planning would be necessary*</td>
<td>Long-term planning would be necessary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goals emphasised</td>
<td>Organisation’s emphasise own goals and activities</td>
<td>Joint goals emphasised</td>
<td>Common mission and goals, new organisational structure with formal division of labour, leadership dispersed and control shared</td>
<td>Partnership is about building seamless ‘integrated’ programmes Built on mutually reinforcing means and objectives. Means support objectives in mutually reinforcing ways</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat to organisational autonomy</td>
<td>Partners function separately with little threat to authority</td>
<td>Authority rests with individual organisations but there is risk sharing, shared control and leadership</td>
<td>Authority is determined to balance ownership by individual organisations with expediency to accomplish purpose risk is shared</td>
<td>Holistic governance prevails – authority may be pooled*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Asterisk denotes my interpretation of text where it is not made clear by the author.
models in which coordination is more formalised and has greater impact upon an organisation than cooperation. The last two represent newer models borne out of the perceived need for public services to be produced jointly in more collaborative and holistic ways.

What Taylor (1998) adds is the emphasis on strategic long-term goals; a focus on information transfer; and a more greatly integrated organisational structure managed through collaboration. 6 et al add a focus on seamless integration of services; shared accountability mechanisms and other active forms of organisational integration. It is a more managerialist model than Taylor’s and reflects the perspective of the author on the need for more effective and efficient interventions rather than ones based on co-governance.

The framework will be used to assess the extent to which coordination is occurring within the partnership structures. There is no implication that one type of joint working is preferable to another per se, or that cooperation necessarily compares unfavourably with holistic integration. Neither is it assumed that all schemes and projects have to display a specific kind of integration. It might be expected that schemes and projects show some level of joint working beyond cooperation given the emphasis in the policies for greater coordination. However, given the divergence in the literature around what exactly holistic or joined-up government means in practice it is likely that characteristics from all four typologies might be evident.

**Placing regeneration policy within the wider joined-up government context**

Assessing the level of coordination within the partnership’s activities is only one objective of this research. In addition, an assessment of where regeneration policy fits within the overall policy for joined-up government will be attempted. It is not assumed that any one area should fit certain pre-established criteria but it is assumed as the Performance and Innovation Research Report (2001) and Richards (2001) asserts that different types of joint working are likely to be relevant in different situations. It has already been stated that joined-up government could mean a variety of different processes, with regeneration type policies based on co-governing just one of them.
Below, in table 8, is Richards’ typology of joined-up government in which four different strategies towards creating joined-up government are presented.

Table 8 - A typology of joined-up government.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Four types of joined-up government</th>
<th>Degree of centralisation in governance</th>
<th>Key performance indicators</th>
<th>Key element of knowledge base</th>
<th>Key structure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Traditional professional services</td>
<td>Decentralised</td>
<td>Input</td>
<td>Community of professional practice</td>
<td>Specified service unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dealing with intractable problems</td>
<td>Decentralised</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Situational</td>
<td>Community partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross-boundary solutions to tame problems</td>
<td>Centralised</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Evaluation and research based</td>
<td>Service provider partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seamless service</td>
<td>Centralised</td>
<td>Output</td>
<td>Expert systems based on explicit knowledge</td>
<td>Call-centre/internet service</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Reproduced from Richards (NAO 2001:67).

Regeneration partnerships approximate to the second type; dealing with intractable problems. However, to what extent they should be characterised as focused local interventions by community partnerships when they are in fact developed out of central and regional policy is questionable. Additionally, there may be situations where regeneration activities operating through partnerships also have features of the single professional bureaucracy which deals with tame problems and situations where the tame problem is dealt with by two or more mainstream service providers.

Although 6 et al (2002) merely list the various approaches used in the UK to joined-up government (see table 9); these provide a more all encompassing taxonomy of what central government are doing across a range of policy areas.

Perri 6 et al (2002) have argued that the UK central government’s style of holism has been centralist but has not adopted a single grand method. Clearly there are a whole range of activities occurring within joined-up government and many of these differ from a governance perspective on networks.
The literature reviewed in this section has been organisational, that is, it is not concerned with issues of co-governing in the sense in which it is used in this research,

Table 9 – A taxonomy of joined-up approaches.

- Those conducted by a single department in government which have implications for cross-cutting work, for example The Comprehensive Spending Review Process
- Those joined-up by the centre in terms of policy formulation and oversight but which affect only one or two department or agency in terms of implementation for example the New Deal operated by the Treasury with the Departments of Social Security and Education and Employment.
- Those which involve many agencies in policy development and implementation in specific geographic areas for example the Zone initiatives.
- Those designed around outcomes – for example the Crime and Disorder Partnerships.
- Those designed around clienteles for example Surestart.
- Those designed to deal with problematic policy areas for example coordination in the criminal justice system.
- Those designed around building generic capacity in fragile areas for example New Deal for Communities.
- Budget based generic schemes such as Invest to Save.
- Rebadged traditional forms of joint working such as planning in rural areas.
- Central exercise of regulation of local authorities with the specific intention to incentivise joint work such as Best Value and Compacts such as New Commitment to Regeneration designed to help coordinate mainstream budgets.

Based on 6 et al (2002).

despite Perri 6 et al’s title of Towards Holistic Governance, references to decision-making concern organisational actors only. Regeneration partnerships have to deal with the incorporation of views from many actors, many of which are in a structurally unequal position. This, like greater coordination, is something which central government want to achieve in regeneration programmes. The following section focuses on the topic of participation to achieve co-governance.

ISSUES OF CO-GOVERNANCE: DEVELOPING AN ANALYTICAL MODEL

The review of policy developments in chapter two described how central government have put in place new ‘network management’ practices which may encourage better partnership working, in particular, a better quality of partnership for previously poorly empowered groups. We have seen from the literature on urban regeneration and partnerships more particularly that decisions are often taken by a single organisation or
just a few members of a partnership. This is despite the fact that a key purpose of a partnership is to bring a group of actors together in order to make decisions collectively. The notion of co-governance is used here to express this aim pursued by central government policy. Kooiman (1993) defines this as a new form of steering, its about doing things together instead of doing them alone. In this research, it is used to describe joint decision-making. Kickert and Koppenjan (1997) use co-governance to describe negotiating government whereby opportunities for creating win-win situations by means of integrative strategies are explored and pursued.

Most of the literature which explicitly deals with the theoretical aspects of co-governing refers to the empowerment of communities or citizens within what may be called the participation literature. In this research, the focus is on the ability of the many less powerful members of the partnership to exercise power, including small voluntary and community organisations as well as the communities themselves. The reasons for participation are similar for citizens and for organisations. It is sought to gain the community’s own definitions of need, problems and solutions; to gather local knowledge resources; to builds skills in communities through partnership; and increase democratic legitimacy (Burns and Taylor 2000).

Arnstein (1969) argued that participation could be represented by a wide range of interactions, some of which did not result in the exercise of power and influence in decision-making. Her model of the ladder of participation includes eight forms from manipulation to citizen control (see figure 2).

**Figure 2 - Modes of (non) participation.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degrees of citizen power</th>
<th>Citizen control</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Degrees of tokenism</td>
<td>Delegated power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-participation</td>
<td>Placation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Consultation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Informing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Therapy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Manipulation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Partnership in Arnstein’s model is fairly high on the ‘ladder’, and represents real influence, while consultation is widely viewed as a minimal approach to participation (Barnes, Hall, Leurs, McIver and Stewart 1997; Smith 1999; Burns and Taylor 2000; Yorkshire and Humber Regional Development Agency 2000), or ‘tokenistic’ in Arnstein’s model. By itself, consultation, is considered insufficient for the purposes of gaining involvement in regeneration activities (Social Exclusion Unit 2001). Involvement, however, is difficult to achieve. Burns and Taylor (2000) argue that marginalisation emerges from three sources:

- The rules of the game are set from above;
- The cultures and structures of public sector partners are not compatible with effective community involvement; and
- Communities themselves do not have the organisational capacity and resources for effective involvement.

Others cite different reasons for failure. Barnes et al (1997) argue that even if appropriate structures are put in place there is no guarantee that communities will respond positively and if they do, there is the danger that community representatives will be co-opted by authorities into thinking about partnership as professionals do and in doing so lose their legitimacy in the community they represent (Cockburn 1977). In addition, professionals and elected members often feel threatened by the involvement of communities (McArthur 1995).

The difficulties which community involvement presents while having enduring appeal has produced various strategies for both its development (Renn, Webler, Rakel and Johnson 1993; Department of Environment 1995) and more usefully for the purpose here, its evaluation (Barnes, Hall et al. 1997; Smith 1999; Yorkshire and Humber Regional Development Agency 2000).

An important distinction to make is between the notion of evaluating process or outcome (impact). Impact or outcome usually relates to substantive aspects of the partnership’s work, for example the creation of employment. While process relates to the organisational systems which are developed to manage the partnership. Although as Barnes et al (1997) emphasise it is difficult to distinguish between these two in practice.
They assert that aspects such as gaining recognition between partners can be considered an intermediate outcome which occurs previously to any distinct influence partners may have. A further distinction can be made in relation to processes. As Davis (2000) asserts influence can be exercised initially in the ‘formative’ period or during later processes, what can be called ongoing influence. Ongoing influence is often reliant upon formative influence.

Impact/outcome assessments cannot be carried out within this research. It is primarily the processes established which are subject to evaluation, however the notion of intermediate outcomes may be important for an assessment of future possibilities.

Stewart (1996) highlighted the various methods used by local government and other agencies to gain genuine community participation. Those which are most likely to be used in the arena of regeneration are:

- Citizens’ juries
- Involvement in evaluations of services
- Forms of appraisal
- Community forums
- Stakeholders’ conferences
- Standing panels

Added to these may be those developed by groups in the community (Barnes, Hall et al. 1997). In some cases particular methods are a requirement within a partnership programme in others greater latitude exists.

Barnes et al (1997); Smith (1999); Burns and Taylor (2000) and Yorkshire Forward (2000) have offered ‘flexible qualitative’ models for evaluating or benchmarking regeneration partnerships. Their content and emphasis vary but they overlap to a great extent onto issues of power sharing and the ways in which this can be evidenced.

Barnes et al focus on who or what is the source of participation; who is involved; why are they involved; what knowledge is sought from them; over what is the participant’s scope of influence and what is the degree of power sharing. Burns and Taylor’s audit model focuses on the history and pattern of participation; the quality of partnership
strategies; the capacity of organisations to support participation and of communities to take part.

Smith offers a dynamic model in which balanced power; strong participation; and strong partnership values promote effective involvement while the opposites demote effective involvement. The model provides an evaluative tool for qualitative features of partnership working through the use of various indicators:

- **Power** or influence is assessed through the *distribution of power; access to resources and empowerment*;
- **Participation** or who should be involved? is assessed through *representative legitimacy; accountability to stakeholders and openness; and*
- **Partnership values** or how people are treated, is assessed through recognising *positive difference; learning to learn and goal alignment*.

A similar but more detailed approach is taken by Yorkshire Forward (2000) their approach is divided into four subheadings: Influence; Inclusivity; Communication and Capacity. Similar indicators allow assessments to be made for example: representation; participation; the recognition of community members in all stages of the process from initiation to evaluation; access and control over resources: the importance of clear management procedures regarding information transfer and day-to-day management; the building of capacity (knowledge and organisational based) throughout the partnership.

Table 10 outlines the framework adapted from Yorkshire Forward and other literature which will form the basis of the evaluation of case study data. It summarises the distinctions made between different forms of participation and outlines when influence can be identified and the nature of that influence. It differentiates between consultation and involvement/engagement, with the latter representing a more important variant. It also differentiates between formative and ongoing influence to distinguish between the influence that is exerted at the beginning and which can lay the basis for how the influence may operate in the future and ongoing influence which often relies on formative influence.
Table 10 - Evaluative criteria for interpreting the findings for the study regarding co-governance.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria for distinguishing between consultation and forms of participation which imply involvement/engagement</th>
<th>Criteria for distinguishing between types of process influence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) Formative</td>
<td>b) Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factors: Inclusion from the start; access to resources/assets; influence over participation (who and what); influence over strategy (analysis and planning); influence over management; projects; partners are recognised and fully informed. There may be evidence of change or ‘transformation’ of other partners attitudes/practices.</td>
<td>Factors: Influence over recruitment; implementation; building capacity; appraisal and evaluation. There should be evidence of change or ‘transformation’ of partners’ attitudes/practices.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultation</td>
<td>Ongoing influence would depend upon ongoing consultation and would be less likely.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Usually perceived to be low level participation e.g. process of explaining, informing, may include the seeking of views; demands that prior work has been undertaken; sometimes choices are offered, community may have limited influence</td>
<td>Formative influence potentially possible: especially when deriving from choices. Influence should be evidenced by changes in actions following consultation. A lack of conflict over decisions or change emanating from consultation may be due to manipulation; therapy; informing or just poor consultation practice.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Involvement/Engagement</td>
<td>Influence should be evidenced in a number of ways including how the scheme or project is run. Processes should be institutionalised for ongoing involvement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This implies engagement, deciding together; acting together. Community may be involved in activities and/or service delivery as long-term partners.</td>
<td>Ongoing influence would be evident from the processes established.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on Arnstein (1969); Davis (2000), Yorkshire and Humber Regional Development Agency (2000).

CONCLUSIONS

In this chapter regeneration partnerships have been viewed as policy networks in which the power of members may vary. Those with access to the most resources may also be the most powerful. The partnerships are not viewed as an example of a specific form of governance, rather it is expected that the network as an organisational form is different from the network as a governance form. Network governance in terms of co-governing may not be apparent. It would be expected that central government will retain a significant amount of bureaucratic control despite it also requiring elements of an
interactive approach within the network. Regional governmental organisations and local government may also be powerful actors. This situation is accepted, what the research intends to reveal is what the particular relationships are in the case study programmes and whether or not these have improved compared to previous programmes.

Joined-up or holistic government can be seen as synonyms for steering networks (ibid; 6 et al 2002). The network management approach is in tune with ‘third way’ thought in terms of harnessing the potential of a range of societal resources, ‘network management provides a way for actors to cooperate without solutions being forcibly imposed or cooperation becoming redundant as a result of decentralisation or privatisation’ (Kickert & Koppenjan 1997:43).

The concepts of network management will be used to analyse the successes and failures of the cases. Both types of network management will be investigated as both are important, a well designed programme at the centre still requires adequate implementation at the local level for success. An evaluation of the extent of coordination and co-governance will provide a focus on the substantive issues which the partnership is required to deal with. Whilst the network management concepts will provide a perspective on how they are managing the partnership relations.

In the following chapter, the network management analytical framework is used to analyse the original SRB programme over the first few years of its operation. As the focus of the programme was not based on the core themes of coordination and co-governance (although these aspects were important) there is no attempt to use the analytical frameworks outlined in tables 7 and 10 presented in this chapter. Nevertheless, the original SRB programme will be the comparator against which the new programmes will be judged.
Chapter four

Applying Network Management Concepts to the original SRB Programme

INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, Klijn & Teisman's (1997) framework adopted in chapter three has been used to analyse the introduction of the SRB programme. The analysis reveals that central government implemented partial network management during the introduction of the SRB programme. They attempted to structure the network whilst leaving the management of the game to local actors. This led to failure in many respects. The key points of analysis are outlined below:

- The SRB was an attempt to use an interactive approach but resorted to instrumentalism to instil this, forcing organisations into joint work;
- Weak actors were often excluded from interaction, which limited their influence over funds, as lead agencies had ready made plans or were increasingly focused on the bureaucratic elements;
- Some benefits have accrued in terms of embedding partnership working;
- Central government used a mixture of active and passive management, active over resources and upwards accountability and passive over managing interaction and downwards accountability. Thereby not supporting interaction; and
- The overall conclusion is that government paid too little attention to the institutional aspects to gain the potential synergies of multi-sectoral partnership working.

Table 11 provides a summary of the network management techniques, perspectives utilised and the key outcomes based upon the three key aspects upon which network management focus: on the way actors are drawn into the network; on the way policies are perceived and acted upon by actors; and on the institutions of the programme. Each section is discussed below and deals with issues of network structuring and game management.
Table 11 - A summary of the network management techniques, perspectives and outcomes used in the SRB.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Network Management</th>
<th>Actors</th>
<th>Perceptions</th>
<th>Institutions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Network Structuring</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Techniques</td>
<td>Policy instrument requires that new actors are brought in and old actors are re-established</td>
<td>Policy documents reframed perceptions over problems and solutions</td>
<td>Policy instruments require: Competition for scarce funds (at the regional level); bureaucratic systems for upward accountability and output measurement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Perspective</td>
<td>Interactive/ instrumental</td>
<td>Instrumental</td>
<td>Instrumental/Institutional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Outcomes</td>
<td>Broad membership exists but influence is limited</td>
<td>Instrumental strategic option' i.e. paper partnerships ensued</td>
<td>Active approach led to regularity, propriety and VFM: - Output monitoring - Upwards accountability Passive approach led to: - Poor inclusion - Poor downward accountability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Game management/</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Techniques</td>
<td>Use of game management techniques variable</td>
<td>Use of game management techniques variable</td>
<td>Competition for scarce funds (within scheme) game management largely left to local partnerships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Perspective</td>
<td>Interactive/ Institutional</td>
<td>Interactive/ Institutional</td>
<td>Interactive/Institutional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Outcomes</td>
<td>Power game within existing institutional structure works to limit the acquisition of full synergy However some local authorities work on capacity building</td>
<td>Institutionalisation of partnership occurred in some instances through interaction i.e. 'Procedural strategic option' and produced partnerships which either work more effectively or provide a basis for future work</td>
<td>Regional variation emerged in relation to management - reticulism Scheme level variation in relation to: - Influence - Accountability</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on Klijn & Teisman’s framework (1997).
DETERMINING THE ACTORS IN THE NETWORK

Which particular actors are included is highly important for the nature of regeneration schemes. It can be argued that the SRB programme institutionalised multi-sectoral partnership in regeneration. The SRB exemplifies the introduction of new actors into networks to provide a structure in which future games would be played differently. New and more varied actors were to ensure decisions were taken in the interests of the broader community.

It is necessary to consider both inclusion in partnerships and the degree of influence afforded by inclusion as we have seen having a seat at the partnership table does not imply equal or even considerable influence over decisions.

Network Structuring

The programme’s aims for partnership was rooted in an interactive perspective with the added value emerging from the resource and policy synergy created through interaction between the different sectors. However, the formation of partnerships was a prerequisite to funding, and as such embodied an instrumental approach, albeit one of a second-generation ‘incentive’ rather than directive nature (De Bruijn and Ten Heuvelhof 1997). Partnerships were thus formed largely to receive funding.

The outcomes of the early rounds of the SRB were disappointing, with ‘paper partnerships’ being common. This was particularly true of the first round of bidding where actors, often from the voluntary sector were asked to sign up to the pre-made plans of local authorities. Furthermore, 54% of the successful bids had no voluntary or community sector inclusion in any form. To the surprise of the Environment Committee tokenism also existed in relation to the private sector who also had marginal involvement (Environment Committee 1995/96a:8). Hall et al (1996:72) concluded that the partnership model to which the government aspired, whereby

‘all partners have equal access to all stages of the bidding and decision process’...‘remained largely unfulfilled’.
In rounds two and three, central government amended the bidding guidance requiring bidders to provide evidence concerning how the voluntary and community sector were included. The quality of partnership working improved but Hall et al (1996:77) remained sceptical about their success. Round two saw an increase of 30.1% in the inclusion of these sectors. It has however, remained unequal in terms of influence. For example, only 13% of all subsidiary partners, including the private sector had seen their involvement in the original bid as significant.

These outcomes suggest a need to consider game management. It is the management of the game which translates policy into practice through implementation. SRB games around particular schemes did not benefit all actors equally. Strong lead partners tend to dominate decision-making during the formative stage and then by implication, the ongoing stages also.

Game management

The quality of partnerships varied which implies that the management of the game also varied. Decisions were made by lead partners in relation to how they would manage the inclusion of other actors. It appears that Local Authorities have managed the game to secure advantage over decisions taken to regenerate local areas. That is, they may have avoided instigating systems and processes which would have led to greater debate between partners over what the aims and objectives of regeneration programmes should be. Local Authorities in many cases were remiss in setting up ‘structures’ to manage the game. Significantly this is an illustration of the margin of liberty local actors have in policy implementation. However, not all Local Authorities took this approach. Those with a community focus were resourcing capacity building for smaller groups in their areas (Environment Committee 1995/96a), in order that they would be able to take a larger role in regeneration partnerships.

This was despite the Conservative government’s steadfast refusal to fund capacity building in the first three rounds of the SRB (Environment Committee 1995/96a). Had they done so, it may have strengthened weaker partners in the game enabling them to exercise their skills through interaction, something which central government ostensibly
desired. Paradoxically, the outcome of capacity building may have been less of the ‘municipalisation’ (control by local authorities) that central government wanted to avoid and a key reason for the use of multi-sectorial partnerships. Whilst their lack of support for interactive decision-making fuelled just such a municipalisation.

CHANGING PERCEPTIONS

Changing the ways in which regeneration would be carried out was problematic and has, in general accepting a diversity of approaches, only been partially successful. Although partnership appeared to have become institutionalised throughout the networks, the full value of partnership had yet to be realised.

Changing perceptions is difficult, the extent to which perceptions may be changed relates to the perceptual gap between existing beliefs and the details of any new policy proposal. The SRB can be analysed by drawing on the concepts of instrumental and procedural strategic options (Termeer and Koppenjan 1997).

Network Structuring

Central Government regularly uses policy instruments to reframe perceptions regarding policies. The SRB was no exception. The policy documents aimed at changing or at least embedding policy ideas introduced into the smaller City Challenge programme. It defined both the problem: the lack of competitiveness of place, firms and individuals; and the solution; interventions were to increase their competitiveness in the market place. This emphasis led to an increase particularly in training programmes intended to increase the individual’s capacity to compete (Davis 2000).

In addition to the content of policy, the documents also outlined the processes by which actors would address the problems. It was to operate in a relatively decentralised and coordinated way, with central government emphasising the need for locality based solutions. Central to the SRB allocation process was competitive bidding. Funds had to be bid for at the regional level by partnerships (Mawson, Beazely et al. 1995). They too were affected by the principles of competition having to improve their competitiveness
in the ‘market’. As such both content and process were brought into a competitive system.

Neither of the developments in content or process were welcomed. The proposal that bids should be responsive to local needs and coordinated was welcomed by local actors and to a certain extent partnership working was accepted. It had after all been part of regeneration policy during earlier phases. Other proposals, concerning the basis for urban policy and the competitive mechanism were highly controversial.

Government ministers used competition to break away from routine allocations which they saw as ineffective. However, rather than policy actors adopting the perceptions of central government that competition was advantageous, the result of the first round led to the development of range of negative perceptions regarding the policy. The Urban Forum argued that if competition was the mechanism, it was necessary to supply knowledge about the rules. Although, the situation has improved, during the enquiry into the first round, the programme was literally compared to a game in the trivial sense and the use of gaming metaphors was a recurrent feature. The SRB, it was suggested was an unfair competition, and was likened to a lottery type game with its random probabilities of ‘winning’ (Environment Committee 1995b).

Competition effectively forced actors into partnerships since funding was reliant on their formation. This process equates with an instrumental strategic option. Central government managed the network to fulfil their own goals and objectives. This might suggest that perceptions were altered only superficially, the following quote provides some evidence for this view. Referring to the lack of attention given to the root causes of urban deprivation, it states that

‘Local Authorities and TECs, rightly, concentrate on the problems of their particular area, and are adept at playing whatever games central government invents as they work to win resources for their areas’ (Association of Local Government quoted in Environment Committee 1995b:143 my emphasis).
It can be argued that the instrumental approach encouraged actors to form partnerships simply as a way to draw down resources which they were dependent upon and were often previously entitled to by right.

**Game Management**

Despite the instrumentalism of the policy, some evidence suggests that partnership working has become embedded into the institutional cultures of regeneration actors. Through partnership working, the perceptions of actors have been challenged, as actors from different sectors have interacted. Government ministers argued that partnership working had encouraged a learning process. Actors such as the business community and local authorities had begun to change their previously held, ‘almost genetic antipathies’ towards each other. This process can be understood in terms of a *procedural strategic option* through which joint action is facilitated by interaction. Through this approach partnerships were seen to become ‘extremely productive’. Relationships were built which ‘carried over beyond particular programmes’ (Environment Committee 1995b:122). This outcome suggests that actors have genuinely found joint working to be mutually beneficial and challenges the notion that perceptions have altered only to gain resources. In the long term these processes may be highly important and may have laid the foundations for more productive joint working currently. However, when the only game in town is partnership working for a whole range of funding opportunities, it might be considered mutually beneficial to make the best of existing systems.

**THE PROGRAMME AND ITS INSTITUTIONS**

The institutional rules of the programme are viewed as the explanatory factors which limited the success of the implementation of the SRB. Whilst introducing rules which ostensibly aimed to encourage interaction, central government also introduced rules which undermined these objectives and which failed to challenge the institutional environment in which regeneration policy was being implemented. Interaction over a single game usually takes place in an institutional context where many similar games are played. Thus, any game can be affected by existing structures within networks of organisations as new policy rules overlay those already in existence. Therefore these
broader contexts have to be considered. This is particularly true of the first three rounds, but as we have learnt the SRB has continued to be flawed in terms of achieving its objectives (Brennan, Rhodes et al. 1998; Davis 2000; Hall 2000).

This section identifies institutional rules as a barrier to the objectives of the SRB. Whilst teasing apart inter-related policy rules is problematic, the argument will be presented under three headings: resources; management and accountability.

Network Structuring

Resources
Resource dependencies are fundamental to understanding policy networks (Rhodes 1988). The rhetoric concerning the SRB was based on an ‘inclusionary’ principle. Therefore, the ability of organisations to access resources is a key element in testing the degree to which inclusion was obtained. At the level of the network there have been two resource issues, the adequacy of funds and the methods of allocation.

Many local authorities (Environment Committee 1995b:49) viewed the SRB as a mechanism for budget cuts rather than a way of deploying funds more effectively. As individual budgets were combined they were often reduced in amount. This resulted in a £300 million reduction in regeneration expenditure for the second to the fifth bidding rounds. In addition, much of the available funding was in fact ‘top-sliced’ to meet existing commitments. Importantly, this took place in the context of central government imposed constraints on local authority expenditure via the Rate Support Grant (Stewart 1994). What was left was a small fund being bid for by many partnerships.

Competition was an essential element used by government. It was intended to gain cooperative and constructive proposals. Whilst many disagreed with the concept of competition, it was the particular process which was regarded as problematic. The competition suffered from severe information asymmetries which was a far cry from the ideal of perfect competition. It was described as a monopsonistic market (Hall and Nevin 1999). Regions were allocated part of the budget but the amounts were not revealed. Potential bidders therefore had no way of knowing how much money was
available, nor was there any information regarding the basis for the regional distribution. In short they had little information about how to play in this competitive game (Environment Committee 1995b:6).

The construction of the fund was a blunt attack on the organisations which had previously been involved in regeneration activities. From an institutional perspective the new rules challenged organisational domains. Once individually held funds were now pooled and the only possibility of releasing them was to form a partnership. However, due to the small amounts of funding, organisations could never be sure of receiving back ‘their share’. Whether or not funding was received at an organisational level depended on the success of competition at the regional level.

Management

Whilst central government wanted a more coordinated approach they resisted making demands on Government Offices to develop Regional Regeneration Statements. The lack of local and regional strategies was perceived as a barrier to the stated aim of coordination. Government argued these would act as regional blueprints reducing diversity and innovation in bids. Hall and Nevin (1997) have argued this created a policy vacuum with bidders second guessing what government wanted in order to gain funding. In reality, Government Offices did have some criteria for shaping bids based on the Single Programming Document which provides the framework for EU funded programmes.

The Local Authorities Association (Environment Committee 1995/96a) also argued for SRB coordination groups at the local level which would steer bids to support identified priorities. In addition, after the first round, they wanted a more systematic process by which to downsize bids which acknowledged the holistic nature of bids and would avoid the regional offices making arbitrary cuts. This process, it was argued, caused unnecessary strain on embryonic partnership relationships.

A further problem in the first round was the short time allowed for bidding approximately 10 weeks were allowed between publication of the guidance and initial submission and a further 9 weeks to develop full submissions. The Association of
Metropolitan Authorities had argued this had militated against partnership working since it was difficult to form a partnership in a short time (Environment Committee 1995b). In subsequent rounds, other factors have continued to militate against extensive discussions within partnerships. As the years have passed lead partners have gained additional schemes and the cumulative effect on management time from these continues to limit the time available for interaction (Hall, Beazley et al. 1996).

Whilst there was a lack of planning, there existed an extensive set of rules which govern how the schemes are managed with regard to finance. Overtly, this is not expressed as an attempt to manage the network. Nevertheless, the establishment of rules which affect multi-organisational working can be understood in this way. Rules impact on actors either directly or indirectly. It is not argued here that central government is aware of the implications of the rules in terms of the impact they have on the networks of organisations. However, the result is that programme requirements in total have a tendency to conflict with each other.

The rules contained within the SRB are dominated by the requirements for ‘regularity, propriety and value for money’ (Department of Environment Transport and the Regions 1999:3). This is a major role for central government within the SRB process. Furthermore, the guidance manual states that it ‘is not intended to be a desk instruction’ for the day to day management by Partnerships and Regional Offices. They must develop and use their own detailed procedures (ibid:1). Central government thus delimits its role in an active network management of the game, establishing the broad parameters regarding how regeneration is to be carried out but with detailed prescription for how the budget funds will be managed.

An important part of the assessment for propriety is the measurement and control of outputs. The programme has been criticised for being output oriented. This has had the effect of creating a vast amount of bureaucracy particularly for lead agencies, which has negative effects on local level management and it has led to an emphasis on quantifiable outputs at the expense of less tangible and qualitative results such as the creation of strong partnerships (Ward 1997).
Accountability

A pattern of active and passive management on the part of central government also applies to accountability. Partnerships are both under and over managed in relation to accountability. Central Government place many requirements for financial accountability upon partnerships. The need to have an accountable body to manage the financial affairs of partnerships immediately creates a lead body within the partnership. It affords power through centrality within the network which creates a dependency upon them by other actors.

In addition, it facilitates a tightly coupled relationship between the Regional Offices and lead agencies. This aspect is important as it has been recognised that the regional bodies did have a role in shaping the priorities of individual schemes and yet this influence was often unrecognised by subsidiary partners. Hall et al (1998) found that among subsidiary partners only 41% thought the Regional Offices had been influential as opposed to 71% of lead partners. A further 41% were unable to comment on how important the Regional Office advice had been. A hierarchy of actors is thus formed through the institutional structures which creates further barriers to community and voluntary sector involvement beyond those already in existence to do with their resource base.

By contrast to the high levels of accountability and linkages up to the Regional Offices and on to central government, Hall & Nevin (1997) have argued accountability downwards to local stakeholders is underdeveloped. Central government have been passive in relation to encouraging accountability to partners and communities. Partnerships thus exist in an accountability void without any of the usual ‘downward’ accountability required of local government.

Game management

Resources

Competition also had to be managed at the scheme or ‘game’ level. There is evidence that some types of project and some groups have found operating in a competitive context problematic thus not necessarily fulfilling the aim of producing a balanced
scheme. For example, one outcome of the single pot funds was a reduction in housing expenditure within regeneration due to the large capital requirements for housing. The combination of necessarily high expenditure and small funding awards, meant that housing, although essential to regeneration, was sidelined in favour of cheaper initiatives (Hall et al 1999).

It was also argued by The Black Training and Enterprise Group that competition was a constraint on the creation of an integrated or holistic approach. It had in their words

‘institutionalised competition with regard to the intense competition for resources within bids. Those organisations...who have access to policy and strategy thinking...have gained an advantage’ (Environment Committee 1995b:88).

Management
Whilst analysts have argued that the SRB tended towards centralisation despite the localism claimed for the programme (Hall and Nevin 1999). Actors at the local level are afforded a ‘margin of liberty’ regarding how they manage the game. This leads to substantial variation. Two examples of this are: Firstly, despite Central Government’s resistance to regional and local planning, the Local Authority Associations and the TEC National Council independently recommended principles by which local actors should work in order to provide increased coordination.

A second example is the actions of Regional Offices in the way they dealt with partnerships over bidding. The Minister for Local Government argued in defence of the SRB process that it was not from the ‘blind date school of politics’ (Environment Committee 1995b:116) but a type of managed competition. Regional Directors were to work with bidders to improve their bids. Only after this process would they adjudicate as to the likely success of the bids. At this point some bidders were advised not to go ahead. However, during the first round there was a high level of variability concerning the level of information and the clarity of guidance given to bidders.

Other differences were found in the level of interaction and way in which bids were reduced to reflect the limited availability of resources. It was clear some Regional Directors had taken a more proactive approach in informing potential bidders of their
competitive situation. It was considered that this helped bidders through the bidding phase. Conversely where information was withheld a situation of mistrust developed. Regardless of these outcomes, Ministers saw a proactive management as a form of negotiation between central and local government which corrupted the competitive ideal (ibid). This is a clear case of reticulism on the part of Regional Offices as they sought to manage the bidding game.

Accountability
There has also been variation in accountability procedures. Hall et al (1998) state that while 76.6% of local authorities published newsletters, only 37.2% publish minutes of board meetings; 25.6% held open board meetings; and 29.5% published accounts which are open to public scrutiny.

Conclusion
In conclusion, the SRB was an attempt to realise goals through using an approach which could broadly be called interactive. However, in trying to instil this, government resorted to instrumentalism. The funding mechanism forced organisations to work together. The outcome of which, in the main, has meant weak actors have yet to realise their potential in terms of control over regeneration funds. However, it is true that there have been some benefits through interaction. This aspect has had some long-term impacts which are perhaps important for the future of regeneration, i.e. in terms of embedding partnership working.

However, neither the interactive or instrumental perspective offer a full explanatory theory for why interventions are successes or failures. For this it is necessary to understand the institutional context of regeneration policy.

An institutional perspective would suggest that network managers, in this case central government, should seek to work with other actors, and their institutional contexts, rather than against them. A failure to manage policy processes this way has a tendency to result in failure. As we have seen an institutional perspective can be seen to have been lacking in the implementation of the SRB programme. Central government were
neither fully aware of the institutional structures which existed or of those it had initiated itself. This led to the partial achievement of the programme’s objectives: partnerships existed but the full value of synergy was not realised.

Therefore, it can be argued that central government operated a partial approach to network management that aimed to change the institutional structure of regeneration policy networks but it did so without taking proper account of the institutional context. The programme was strong in terms of encouraging action to form partnerships. This analysis supports arguments made by Mackintosh (1992) and Hastings (1996) that central government’s approach was rooted in the acquisition of resource synergy only. Central government ultimately used partnerships to eek out ever thinner resources it can be quite rightly called an institutional fix (Oatley 1998). The programme was however weak in supporting policy synergies (Hastings 1996) brought about by collaborative processes. Central government instigated institutional rules into the SRB which were dominated by financial accountability, whilst, neglecting areas where greater focus and enforcement may have been productive for governance purposes, for example in inclusion, power sharing and accountability to local deprived populations.

In particular, central government were concerned with network structuring to a far greater extent than aspects of game management. This incidentally, can also be seen to structure interaction, but at lower levels of implementation. Game management was more or less the preserve of local and regional actors. Central government set requirements for inclusion but then did little to enforce it. For example, through procedures which would facilitate interaction among members within partnerships, and would set in place ad hoc institutional structures by which mediation and arbitration could take place if consensual outcomes were lacking. For this an active rather than a passive management strategy is essential. In these ways it can be argued that the SRB programme failed to manage the very changes it sought through the programme.

The following chapter focuses on the methodological approach used in the research. It includes a discussion of the case study approach and the methods of data collection and analysis, in terms of how they are used and their suitability, strengths and weaknesses in relation to this research.
Chapter five

Methodology:
The case study as research strategy

INTRODUCTION

This chapter outlines the methodological approach taken in this research. It includes a description of the case study approach as a research strategy and a discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of this approach. Furthermore, it provides a framework for the research which highlights a range of issues that need to be addressed in order to carry out case studies to a high standard.

The chapter is organised as follows: a general discussion of the case study approach is presented with a discussion of the issues which surround the approach concerning methodological rigour. This is followed by the research framework which includes sections on: the role of theory; the initial development of the research and an outline for the rigorous analysis of the data. It goes on to discuss the individual data collection and analysis methods used. This includes a discussion regarding the use of documentary sources; semi-structured interviews and computer aided qualitative data analysis. The chapter also includes a section on writing and presenting case study evidence and the ethical considerations of carrying out the research. Throughout the chapter, the discussion is related to the research in question and includes a discussion on how the analysis stage helped to challenge some of the assumptions present in some of the theoretical literature discussed in chapter three.

CASE STUDY METHODOLOGY

Given the nature of the research with its intention to follow a process of policy implementation via a diverse set of actors drawn into a partnership situation, a case study approach was chosen. Following Yin (1994), this was considered an appropriate research strategy due to: the research questions being of a ‘how’ and ‘why’ nature; the
fact that the ‘investigator has little control over events’; and the ‘focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within a real life context’.

Yin argues that the case study approach has contributed uniquely to our knowledge of individual, organisational, social and political phenomena. Its strengths lie in its ability to study complex situations because it allows investigations to retain a holistic view of real life events, as data is not extracted from its context as in experimental or survey research. It is also usual for case studies to adopt multiple methods of data collection in order to build such holistic views. Agranoff (1986) who has previously adopted a case study design for a study of network management processes has argued it is particularly useful for the examination of processes which are difficult to capture with some other approaches.

Some author’s (Hamel 1993; Robson 1993; Yin 1994) argue that case study is a research approach or strategy, in a similar way to the experiment or survey rather than a method as such, although Hamel recognises the ‘case method’. Within this broad strategy various methods can be used for data collection and analysis.

Although the case study approach can be used with either quantitative or qualitative methods, its development has been biased towards qualitative methodology (Hamel 1993; Yin 1993; Stake 1995). Similarly, case studies can be hypothetico-deductive or inductive (Yin 1994). For the purposes of this research, qualitative methods are used with an inductive approach.

The research has been heavily influenced by the institutionalist tradition within political science and public administration, which uses the case study approach as a major method of enquiry (Rhodes 1997). This tradition studies political institutions, that is the ‘formal rules, the compliance procedures and the standard operating practices that structure relationships’ (Hall 1986:19). It has no particular stance upon methods, although traditionally has been anti-theoretical in its approach and insistent upon inductive procedures (Rhodes 1997).
METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES IN CASE STUDY RESEARCH

Like any methodology, a case study approach has weaknesses, and studies based on qualitative research perhaps have even greater methodological issues to face. As Stake (1995) argues, qualitative study has everything wrong with it that its detractors claim. The case study approach has been particularly criticised, despite its popularity and longevity (Yin 1994). Historically, case study approaches were used in anthropology and later by the Chicago School, but as the social sciences developed, methodological battles emerged between those who adopted the case study approach and those who used survey methodology. The case study approach was accused of being unable to properly validate theory and validation constitutes proof that a theory has explanatory value. If the case study approach could not do this then it had little value.

Yin (1994) reviews the issues associated with case study methodology. Three key criticisms are: that it lacks rigour; findings cannot be generalised; and it takes too much time, finally producing unreadable documents. The lack of rigour has been the greatest concern. Researchers have been sloppy, have allowed equivocal evidence or biased views to influence the direction of the findings and conclusions. Yin argues that rigour can be gained and other issues minimised through careful consideration of the design.

The research design must be judged on its logicality like any other research strategy. All case study research must meet the tests of construct validity, external validity and reliability. For causal or explanatory research it must also meet the test of internal validity. Construct validity can be helped by using multiple sources of evidence; by establishing a chain of evidence; and having key informants review the draft case study. External validity or generalisability can be fostered by using replication logic in multiple case studies. Generalisability has been a major barrier to the case study approach being accepted as a bonafide methodology. Yin argues that the basis of the criticism concerning generalisation is misconceived. The case study approach cannot simply be compared to survey methodology with its tests for statistical generalisation as they do not adopt sampling techniques, rather they use analytic generalisation which relates particular findings to some broader theory. Validity here is not, however, automatic and requires more than one case to generalise. Reliability can be improved by
using a case study protocol which lays out how the study will proceed, together with its rules and associated information. This is especially useful for multiple cases.

Finally, internal validity relies on rigorous analysis using pattern matching, explanation building or time-series analysis. It is necessary to subject the inferences the researcher makes to rival explanations which could undermine the conclusions drawn.

These concepts have been applied to the research design in the following ways: To meet the requirement of construct validity, multiple sources have been used, chains of evidence have been established through careful analysis of events and key informants were consulted regarding the final report (more is said about this aspect under ethics). External validity or generalisation is maximised through multiple case studies although it is accepted that the use of three different programmes challenges this notion. However, regarding the concept of analytic generalisation, it is considered that the cases do allow a certain amount of generalisation to be made. The reliability of findings are supported by the use of a protocol which applied to all three cases.

Internal validity is ensured through a cross examination of the different sources of evidence in order to conclude on the most likely explanations.

RESEARCH DESIGN AND FRAMEWORK FOR THE STUDY

Like many areas of research methodology researchers exhibit different perspectives within the case study approach. Stake (1995) for example takes a highly qualitative approach using naturalistic, holistic, ethnographic, phenomenological and biographical methods. Others like Yin (1994), Hamel (1993) and Robson (1993) pay more attention to the use of hypotheses and theory testing (although not exclusively). However, regardless of these differences authors tend to agree that case studies can be difficult to carry out and the researcher invariably needs a well developed framework from which to begin work.

Miles and Huberman (1994) argue that a case study design should include four components: a conceptual framework; a set of research questions; a sampling strategy
and methods and instruments for data collection. However, with a case study approach it is especially useful to think further ahead with the design, to analysis, writing and presentation, as it is this stage which tends to be most problematic. Yin (1994) puts forward what is possibly the most well developed approach specifically for case studies which can usefully serve as a guide to carrying out case study research and has been invaluable. Drawing on Yin’s work the rest of the chapter will deal with the role of theory within this research, with issues of design; of data collection, analysis and writing. In addition, ethical issues are also dealt with. A summary of the case study design as it applies to this research is provided below in figure 3.

The role of theory

Although the case study approach has been accused of lacking theoretical output, Yin (1994) argues that theory is central to case study design from the outset. The use of theory goes beyond that of establishing cause-effect relationships. Theory can play an important role in specifying what to study; choosing cases; defining the boundaries for description; stipulating rival theories for explanation; and generalising results to other cases. Theory thus means the design of the research steps according to some relationship with the literature, policy issues or other substantive source. It does not necessarily mean theory testing. The role of theory is related below to three basic types of case study: exploratory, descriptive and explanatory.

Exploratory cases do not test theory. Data collection begins before the final definition of the study questions and hypotheses. Such research is often a pilot case in order to refine an approach and generate hypotheses. Thus it may lead to further studies perhaps using a different strategy such as surveys. Descriptive cases describe events within the case, theory may or may not be developed. Yin argues that such case studies can develop descriptive theory, i.e. theory derived from the comparison of descriptions between cases but not based on cause and effect. The theory in a descriptive case study (as Yin broadly conceives it) lays the ground for analysis. Explanatory cases can test theory to see if its predictive value is useful or use theory as forms of explanations for what they find. The use of rival theories is also a possibility in order to examine cases from multiple perspectives.
This research is certainly not exploratory. It would be untenable to think that studying regeneration programmes could be seen as exploratory, we simply know too much about how this policy area works. The research does have a descriptive element but the case studies can be seen more accurately as explanatory. The multiple cases are explanatory in two senses. Firstly, theory is used to explain or categorise findings, for example in answering the questions: What is the nature of inter-organisational
working? and To what extent has co-governance developed? In short, this analysis relates to what has been achieved in substantive terms. Findings can thus be compared to previous programmes on these measures.

However, judging cases by categorising them using models from the literature is only one part of the analysis. The second part relates to how central government and the partnership have implemented the programmes. How government, organisations, partnerships and individuals have sought to manage the network they find themselves in. In both senses, the findings can be compared to earlier programmes. This was the reason for analysing theoretically the early SRB programme. Although this was done at a national ‘aggregate’ level it forms the basis for the comparison of how network management concepts can be seen to be applicable to what central government does when it institutes a new programme for regeneration and what local actors do to implement it.

It is then an explanatory case where competing perspectives within network management theory are used to explain why the policy programmes do or do not seem to work when implemented. This offers a theoretical explanation for what we see in empirical terms and since two cases are new programmes, it also offers a view concerning the future for these types of programme based on theoretical knowledge.

**Issues of case study design**

Case study design according to Yin (1994) has five general characteristics. The first three are particularly useful, the last two, because of their lack of development less so:

The initial development of the research:

- The study’s questions
- Its propositions
- Its unit of analysis

An outline for analysis:

- The logic linking the data to the propositions, and
The criteria for interpreting the findings

The initial development of the research

The study questions
The study began with an interest in how regeneration policy was being managed under the New Labour government? In chapter one, the style of New Labour was briefly delineated and this style heralded changes within regeneration policy just as in other areas. This led to the development of a set of research questions and objectives outlined in chapter two.

Its propositions
It has been stated previously that the research did not intend to test particular theoretical hypotheses, as the research has taken an inductive approach, using theory to explain the outcomes found in the cases. However, the review of the policy developments literature has informed the development of lower level questions used to gather data and these have been driven by certain propositions. A highly generalised proposition is that whilst central government have made some progress in their efforts to design appropriate programmes for regeneration, for example, in the development of more coordinated approaches to planning at the local and regional levels. A review of previous literature on regeneration programmes would suggest that achieving the twin goals of coordination and co-governance could be difficult. There may still be too many barriers for programmes to be deemed fully successful. Tightly theoretically informed propositions were not used since the purpose of the research was to gain insights about the cases and programmes and be able to explain why they do or do not work. As Kelle (1997:10) has argued

‘the theoretical knowledge of the qualitative researcher does not represent a fully coherent network of explicit propositions from which precisely formulated and empirically testable statements can be deduced. Rather it forms a loosely connected heuristic framework of concepts which helps the researcher to focus his or her attention on certain phenomena’.

The questions, emanating from the concerns in the literature over partnership work, have focused on the particular institutions of the programme, such as rules concerning
funding; which actors would be involved; what their role would be and how local partnerships interpreted these.

Following Rhodes (1997:65) the approach has been to ‘let the facts speak for themselves’, and although the critique from a relativist or social constructionist approach around ‘facts’ is acknowledged, it has been the institutions developed which have formed the basis of the research. For example, the Community Empowerment Fund to support community involvement is an institutional rule. How it has been constituted, interpreted and utilised, and its relative success or failure in this particular case, is what this research is about.

Its unit of analysis

Yin argues, that it is important to define the case clearly in order to delineate its boundaries. In Yin’s view, the cases in this research would be the programmes, however, this creates difficulties since it is the interaction between the programme and the organisation (the partnership) which is at the core of the research. Hamel (1993) argues that the object of study should be differentiated from the selected case used for purposes of observation. This provides a solution to the difficulties of defining a policy case which inevitably has two foci, one on the programme’s rules (in this case the SRB, Neighbourhood Renewal and the West Midlands Regional Development Agency’s Zone Programme) and one on the implementing organisation (the Coventry Partnership for Youth; the Local Strategic Partnership and the Zone partnership).

A further choice in the design is that between single or multiple cases, a multiple design was chosen in this context since a comparative approach between cases was thought necessary to generate robust enough findings to afford some measure of generalisation. However, it is recognised that some findings may be more generalisable than others dependent upon the degree to which they are affected by the local context.

The choice of different programmes obviously makes this design more complicated. It would not be expected that the programmes would be exactly the same as they contain different institutional rules, but they do have similar objectives.
Furthermore, the cases chosen, those of the partnerships and the case site, may be regarded as exemplary, i.e. they exhibit strong positive examples of the phenomenon of interest (Yin 1994). Coventry as a city has been at the forefront of developing new approaches to regeneration. If Coventry is an exemplary case then the partnerships developed within the city could be also. There are, however, specific reasons why these cases can be thought of as exemplary. The SRB case, has as part of its remit an objective to adopt ‘progressive’ methods of working with young people with a view to informing practice at national level. The Local Strategic Partnership is exemplary in the sense that it had developed ‘bottom-up’ as a City Forum, and therefore had a partnership which had already gained experience at being a strategic level partnership. The Regional Development agency’s ‘Zone’ partnership, although delivering a new type of programme, is essentially a well established sub-regional partnership and within the six Zone partnerships developed in the West Midlands area, it was the most well developed.

Yin (1993) argues if cases are chosen on the basis of them representing exemplars then the researcher must determine that they have produced exemplary outcomes. However, in this case exemplary relates to the expected outcome not so much in substantive impact terms (i.e. the number of unemployed found work) but in process terms, i.e. that they would have set in train good organisational processes for handling the work of the partnership. Following Goldthorpe, Lockwood, Bechofer and Platt (1969), Coventry was chosen as it would be expected that these partnerships would be in a good position to demonstrate ‘strong positive examples of the phenomenon of interest’ i.e. of increased coordination and co-governance. If these aspects are not developing or are developing very slowly, then it can be expected that they will be slow to develop elsewhere.

**An outline for data analysis**

The last two areas of Yin’s design: *the logic linking the data to the propositions and the criteria for interpreting the findings* are the least well developed and relate to analysis. Despite the difficulties and under development particularly for explanatory cases, Yin
argues that in the design it is necessary to at least lay the foundations for this analysis. What follows is an interpretation and application of these ideas to the analysis here.

On the first point of the logic of linking the data to the propositions. Whatever research strategy is used it is necessary to be able to demonstrate how the data collected will answer the research question/s.

More detailed questions were used to collect data from research respondents through acquired documents and interviews concerning local level implementation. Such questions were designed to find out more about the implementation of specific policy rules, such as questions relating to

- How the accreditation process had worked? And what impact extra funding had on the processes within Neighbourhood renewal?

And questions which asked respondents to state what in their view/experience were

- Factors that acted as drivers and constraints on developing coordinated and co-governed approaches? And
- Whether there are any issues regarding policies at national or local level?

These questions were asked to gain additional information that respondents felt were key in their experience, but may not have been the topic of an individual question nor thought of as important by the researcher. They were used to avoid premature closure in the scope of the research (Agranoff 1986). This approach was justified as some aspects within the research were decidedly less important to respondents than the researcher had initially thought.

Obviously, many individual questions were used for the inquiry with some relating to issues of coordination and some to issues of co-governance. The three basic interview schedules used can be found in the appendices (2a, 2b, and 2c). The schedules had to vary in order to make the interview meaningful to the respondent regarding the particular programme structure, however, all questions relate to the processes under review.
In terms of the criteria for interpreting the findings, this relates to the problem of how the data can be said to represent a specific finding. There has to be a way of judging whether or not a finding represents something meaningful in the context of the research. An interpretive and analytical approach was used based on the models developed in chapter three.

**DATA COLLECTION METHODS**

Research methodologies include two elements, data collection and data analysis. Analysis will be dealt with in the following section. Documentary sources and semi-structured interviews were used for data collection. This approach was fruitful for two reasons, the data complemented each other and it provided a degree of triangulation for the study. In this study it has offered what is referred to as data triangulation which is one of four possible forms of triangulation comprising: theoretical; investigator and methodological (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Lowe 1991). Later in the analysis theoretical triangulation is also provided by the three perspectives used to analyse the case studies.

**Documentary sources**

The use of documentary sources is a major method of social research which can be used either to reflect literal phenomena or ‘societal rules, practices, norms or mechanisms’ (Mason 1996:75). Robson (1993) argues the strengths of documentary sources are: that they are unobtrusive and therefore non-reactive, behaviour is not changed by the enquiry; they are permanent and can be reanalysed; and it is a comparatively low cost method. The documents were used alongside interviews to provide verification and contextualisation of personal views. Documents filled gaps, when respondents could not remember details, such as the names of places, projects or other members of the network. However, they were not limited to the verification of other sources they provided key sources of information in their own right. Mason argues that documents can provide three kinds of information, literal, interpretive and reflexive. Documents have been used primarily as literal sources, but they have also provided information that
helped in the interpretation of cases and therefore have aided reflexivity in the research process.

Yin (1994) argues documents have two weaknesses. Firstly, if they are taken as representations of the ‘truth’, when in fact as Robson (1993) argues they can be limited or partial; and secondly, they can be imprecise having not been developed specifically for the research. Finnegan (1996) argues that truthfulness and accuracy of documentary evidence can never be guaranteed. Because of these problems, Mason (1996) argues we have to be aware of what documents can and cannot do and apply a critical scrutiny to these data sources just as we would any other.

At a practical level, the researcher has to accept these problems and verify data where possible from other sources. The use of interviews allowed some measure of triangulation and gap filling in this direction too. The first problem can be mitigated by an understanding of how to use documents as a research method. One way of doing this is to adopt the approach of a historian. Finnegan (1996) argues that there are distinctions between different types of documentary sources and between ways of using them. Firstly, there are primary and secondary sources. Primary sources are those produced by those involved in an event contemporaneous with that event. Secondary sources are those which refer to the event but are written later by those not directly involved. Both types of documents have been used but the majority of the data is drawn from primary sources. Some evaluation documents were used which are clearly secondary documents, written for the purposes of those authors.

The second distinction is between the direct and indirect use of the documents, what Marwick (2001) refers to as the witting (intentional) and unwitting (unintentional) evidence. Documents can be used as a factual source of information or they can be used as an indirect source. Information can be gained from an interpretive approach, i.e. drawing out the information which is unintentional in that the author did not wish to convey any meaning beyond the data which they intended to provide. Looking for indirect information from documents leads the researcher to ask questions such as why is this information given and other information is not? What is missing, what does the
document not tell us and is this significant? Why is the document put together in this form?

Documentary sources were collected from partnerships from the beginning of the study usually before interviews began but also throughout the interview period. The types of documents collected fall into five categories:

1. Policy statement documents: a) local policy frameworks and b) local policy documents describing the scheme which represents the policy programme;
2. Financial data about projects;
3. Baseline research;
4. Accreditation documentation; and
5. Third party evaluation material.

Not all types of document were necessarily collected from each case, but all provided financial data and the local policy documents describing the aim, objectives and the projects established. This enabled a comparison between cases. Documentary sources proved to be an invaluable addition to interviews for the reasons stated above, although care was taken against assuming they represented the truth. At times, what the documents did not say was useful in the analysis, for example the degree to which projects had already been planned before the partnerships were established.

Semi-structured interviews

The majority of the research data was collected using semi-structured qualitative interviews. Interviews are usually thought of as either: structured, unstructured or semi-structured. Structured interviews are akin to the use of a survey instrument which may have a limited set of response categories but carried out face to face or over the telephone. The researcher will aim to stick closely to the prescribed questions thus avoiding influencing the respondent’s replies. Unstructured interviews, have little guidance in terms of questions and are closely associated with ethnography where the researcher typically develops a relationship with the respondent whom s/he is studying (Fontana and Frey 1998). These interview strategies are associated with hypothetico-deductive and inductive approaches respectively.
Kvale (1996:6) promotes the use of semi-structured interviews which straddles the two above extremes. Kvale argues that the research interview is a conversation with ‘structure and a purpose’. Structure is necessary to avoid the pitfalls of unstructured approaches through which too much data is collected, take too long and produce incomparable accounts (Miles and Huberman 1994). The choice of a multiple case study approach thus necessitated the use of a fairly structured discussion guide.

Semi-structured interviews were chosen because it was felt that this was an appropriate method for gaining knowledge about how new programmes were being implemented in a situation where little research knowledge existed. The long-interview (McCracken 1988) was felt to offer flexibility whilst the semi-structured nature of the interview schedule maintained sufficient comparability. It enabled the researcher to discover aspects that may not have been thought of in the design phase. The use of interviews also allowed the research to continue to collect documents as they became available or other issues were raised such as previous evaluations of policy interventions which then became the focus for further data collection.

The strengths of using qualitative interviews are that they allow the researcher to learn firsthand what people think and feel about their real life situations ‘to uncover their lived world prior to scientific explanations’ (Kvale 1996:1). Interviews are thus flexible and can allow the researcher to follow up or probe more accurately; they can provide rich and illuminating material; face-to-face interviews allow non-verbal clues to be used in addition to straightforward answers; and they can access material which would be difficult using other less intrusive methods (Robson 1993). Therefore in principle the data gathered should have a high degree of construct validity, i.e. that the research does indeed investigate what it intended to (Kvale 1996).

The weaknesses of semi-structured interviewing is that it requires a high level of skill; it may still suffer from a degree of lack of standardisation; and like the case study approach more generally, they can be time consuming, in terms of gaining access, carrying out the interview; and dealing with the data (Robson 1993).
Although interviewing appears to be a simple process, and indeed, is compared to a conversation by some theorists (Kvale 1996), its ordinariness belies the skill necessary to carry out successful qualitative interviewing. Interviewing has been described as an art form (Kvale 1996; Fontana and Frey 1998) in which the interviewer is the primary methodological tool (Kvale 1996).

Kvale argues that philosophically qualitative interviews fall more neatly into the realms of post-modern, interpretive, phenomenological and dialectical views. However, in his examples he deals with findings as assignable features to certain models or theories and to material which can be interpreted. An interview seeks to cover both a factual and a meaning level. Therefore, the method appears to be appropriate for substantive findings which can be relayed as objective facts as well as attitudinal data and interpretations.

Qualitative research interviews attempt to understand the world from the subject’s point of view. It has thus been criticised for lacking objectivity and relying on interviewer bias. However, Kvale argues it cannot be objectively characterised as an objective or subjective method. Rather, the objectivity of the knowledge produced by the interview must be discussed in respect of the different conceptions of objectivity and the topic of inquiry. He argues knowledge is sought through the interaction between the researcher and researched. The outcome of the process, he argues is an ‘inter view’ literally a view created by the interaction between the two partners. In this research, inter-subjective knowledge is also provided by the rational argumentation in the varying discourses of the many respondents. It is precisely the variation in the views of respondents that the research aimed to surface rather than a single objective ‘truth’.

Kvale argues that there are seven stages to an interview investigation: 1. thematising; 2. designing; 3. interviewing; 4. transcribing; 5. analysing; 6. verifying and 7. reporting. These phases map closely onto Yin’s case study approach and have been followed in this research, more will be said about this below.

The design of the interview schedule has been discussed previously and although there was no pilot ‘case study’, the initial interview schedule produced was piloted with colleagues: fellow students and staff who are active researchers in the field of
regeneration. This revealed at least some of the usual problems to do with ambiguity in the questions and muddled thinking on the part of the researcher. The schedule was subsequently revised for use with the first case.

Other choices had to be made in relation to who exactly would be interviewed and how many would be appropriate. The initial strategy was to interview all board members of the chosen partnerships, their chairpersons and the relevant officers servicing the partnership. This, it was hoped, would provide sufficient and relevant data for how regeneration policy was being implemented and managed at the local levels. Interviews were not generally conducted at project level, as a comparative approach was taken at the level of the partnership board and scheme, unless specific actors were recommended as potentially important respondents.

Board membership in the first two cases to be researched (the SRB and the Zone) numbered 16 and 14, however in the final case the membership of the board numbered 41 members. This would have been particularly time consuming in the transcription and analysis stages, therefore a sample had to be taken. Based on findings from the first two cases which had already been carried out it became apparent that more important than interviewing all members it was important to interview both key members and a spread of members from different sectors involved with the scheme. New or conflicting information about cases fairly quickly dried up during the interviews in the first two cases, leaving the feelings, views and opinions of respondents as new material to add to the cases. Taking a sample from the larger final case study is justified on this basis. The sample was based on choosing at least two members from each grouping and preferably those who had a high degree of involvement.

Access to the partnerships was gained by a variety of methods. The initial choice of Coventry had been made because it was both known to the researcher’s supervisor and therefore access was simplified and knowledge of the area existed. It also provided a rich source of possible case studies and provided an exemplary site in which to conduct the research. Other possible sites were discounted when the final focus for the research became the study of different but comparable programmes. Access to the first case study partnership was arranged by the researcher. Access to the second was arranged
through a combination of the use of the supervisor’s existing contacts in the Regional Development Agency and the researcher following up further contacts. Access to the third case was arranged by the researcher after an initial approach made by the supervisor and researcher to the Local Authority. However, beyond the initial contact and approval each participant in the research had to be contacted individually. This was the result of the non-hierarchical nature of network forms of organisation, which means that no one, not even the Chair person, can demand others’ cooperation. This remains a difficulty in researching partnerships and implies a great deal of work in arranging access.

Nevertheless, access was smoothed in the first case study by the Chair who recommended that partners should provide an interview. Access in the second partnership was not similarly recommended by the Chair but the partnership secretariat did all they could to provide information on who to contact to ask for interviews. In both these situations the vast majority of respondents were easily persuaded to provide an interview. Access to the third case study was much more problematic than the other two. Some respondents did not respond or refused my request for an interview. Enough respondents of a suitable kind were persuaded and it is the researcher’s view that not requesting interviews from everybody possibly helped in acquiring enough of those who filled the criteria outlined above. However, it has to be admitted that this approach and their resistance led to gaps in the range of respondents. For example, it may have been interesting to interview a representative from the smaller voluntary organisations, new to regeneration partnerships at this level.

Methodological issues concerning interviews are very close to those of case studies and qualitative research more generally. The antidote to this from Kvale’s perspective is similar to Yin’s, qualitative interviews call for rigour in the approach throughout the seven stages.

In practical terms the interviews attempted to deal with a range of different respondents from many walks of life within each case and a range of different cases. A major difficulty was the many different kinds of actor present in the partnerships, from mainstream public sector representatives; councillors; council officers, partnership
managers; voluntary and community sector representatives and representatives from the community itself. The implementation situation as such has to be reconstructed from this multitude of views. It has to be interpreted through the different ways that people subjectively experience working in this area and the aim has been to show the situation as it is with all its complexity. The narrative is a version of events, not complete but hopefully, full enough to gain sufficient understanding.

A specific issue was raised by the variety of people to be interviewed who have nothing in common other than their involvement in the partnership. The skill required to carry out qualitative interviews has already been mentioned. Skill suggests that being a good interviewer is something that is learnt experientially through doing it and reflecting upon it. Kvale (1996) also states the importance of being able to present oneself in ways to encourage acceptance from those interviewed. However, faced with so many different sorts of professionals and people from communities it was felt that this reduced the extent to which it is possible to generate a high level of expertise or acceptance in dealing with any one group.

Despite these difficulties the interviews were considered successful. None of the interviews were terminated early and respondents were considered to have been honest and helpful. In some instances, where one might have expected respondents to obscure the truth, they appeared to be completely honest. Equally though, there were some instances where interviewees declined to answer a particular question and the interview was moved on. There are limits, perhaps, to the likely honesty of interviewees, especially if the truth reflects badly upon them, this limits what we can expect. Overall, the information provided by the respondents was consistent across interviews and documentary sources. Respondents perhaps felt that there would be little advantage in misleading the researcher in a situation where respondents who would have different views and experiences would also be interviewed.

THE DATA ANALYSIS

The analysis of qualitative data is a lengthy and involved process, Miles (1979) has described it as an attractive nuisance and whilst textbooks such as Miles and Huberman
(1994) and Yin (1994) offer help in this respect the process remains one that has to be negotiated anew by each researcher to suit their particular circumstances.

**Using the NUD*IST programme**

Before data analysis could proceed the interviews were transcribed to enable the use of the computer programme ‘NUD*IST’ to aid the analysis. NUD*IST stands for *Non-numerical, Unstructured, Data: Indexing, Searching and Theorising*. Qualitative data is unstructured at the point of collection, it is simply text. Computer packages facilitate the indexing of segments from textual documents, which can then be stored and retrieved. Previously unstructured data is then structured in a way determined by the researcher to make it usable for analysis. Further analysis can be carried out using the package to develop associations or cross tabulations between factors and can thus help with the development of theory.

Using a computer package has advantages, at a practical level they provide easy and accurate access back to documents and to the indexing and memoing that has taken place relating to those documents (Richards 1995). At a methodological level computer programmes have, perhaps optimistically, offered a more *systematic, objective and rigorous* approach to qualitative analysis. This promise of a more positive reputation for a methodology which has been accused of bias and subjectivity has been taken up eagerly (Kelle 1997).

However, there has been a vigorous debate about the usefulness of computer programmes, referred to as the CAQDAS (computer aided qualitative data analysis software) debate. Such software has been accused of alienating the researcher from their data and enforcing analytical strategies that go against the methodological and theoretical orientations of qualitative research (Seidel and Kelle 1995). Some have gone so far as to suggest that the computer would take over and control the research (Lee and Fielding 1991). Coffey, Holbrook and Atkinson (1996) have argued that the use of computer analysis could lead to a new orthodoxy based on grounded theory in qualitative analysis which would go against current postmodernist and poststructuralist trends which celebrate diversity in analysis rather than searching for overwhelming
associations of data on which to base theory. Kelle (1997:14) argues that part of the problem is that the programmes claim to do analysis when they don’t, what they do is allow analysis to take place in a more efficient manner and we should rather ‘address these programmes as software for data administration and archiving rather than as tools for data analysis’.

Kelle (1997) has argued the dangers have been overemphasised. Computer aided strategies and methodological approaches are far more loosely connected than is often assumed. Grounded theory has been adopted by packages to show the possibilities for theory building. Programmes do not drive the analysis in any form. The structure of the data, how and where it is linked is always defined by the researcher in the same way in which index cards could be used manually. The quality of theory building is dependent upon the quality of the theoretical reasoning behind data conceptualisation. The real danger according to Kelle is that strict theoretical rules necessary for theory building are applied to vague and fuzzy codes which may lead to ‘artefact effects’, a situation in which a theoretical code is attached to spurious evidence. To avoid this researchers have to assign theoretically or explanatory inspired codes carefully and this usually requires more than one attempt at coding.

The programme was used here rather simply as an indexing, storage and retrieval tool which made these processes convenient to carry out. It was not used for building associations or cross tabulations in any way driven by the programme. Artefact effects could still have occurred, though, if the coding was done badly and then used in the analysis for building explanations. Artefact effects were avoided by careful and repeated coding, particularly in the first case, and care taken when carrying out the analysis in terms of what data could be taken as evidence in a particular situation. Even after coding it is necessary to question the assumptions and conclusions drawn in order to be content that the explanations conclusions are valid in terms of construct and internal validity.

The limitations of the programme relate to the fact that the NUD*IST programme is not particularly suited to case studies. There is little in the handbook on the ways in which the programme can aid case studies except for the storage of data. The programme
appears to be much better suited to the analysis of data where the unit of analysis is a single person or a single organisation with the data based on single interviews or focus group sessions. Such a scenario allows associations to be built from the interview data within each case and then across the interviews in order to develop theory or propositions from the findings. With a partnership situation the unit of analysis is the partnership not the individuals and yet individuals are interviewed in order to build up the picture of the partnership. The processes of the partnership are built from the individual views, perceptions and experiences of the members and officers serving the partnership. Therefore, in this research there was no attempt to build up a series of correlations between factors relating to individuals to discover theories but to trace the factors which had led to certain outcomes and processes at the level of the partnership. It is already known, for example, that small organisations are at a structural disadvantage in regeneration partnerships when it comes to the distribution of resources. What this research sought to discover was whether or not this had changed: and if not why?

Given the limited usefulness of NUD*IST it took a while to assess how best the programme could be used. The first case was used to experiment with the different capabilities of the package. Researchers are advised to use open-coding (indexing), that is, coding which is not hierarchically linked to other data at first as this supports the development of grounded theory. However, this process can produce a multitude of coding categories which may not be particularly theoretically or practically useful. There is always a tension in qualitative research between coding everything which is interesting and staying within the boundaries of the aims of study. It was decided that the categories should be clarified at least partially without reducing the scope for the development of new categories as necessary. Despite this focus, between 70 and 90 categories were developed to categorise each of the cases. Some categories are the same across cases, for example, policy institutions while some are particular to the case, for example, accreditation criteria.

It was found that using the index tree, rather than open coding, to develop categories was more useful, an example is provided below in figure 4 of the indexing of factors which were identified as drivers for coordination in the Local Strategic Partnership case.
There are four levels of data within this part of the index tree. The node numbered (3) refers to drivers for coordination. This is the topic of interest. Followed by (3 1) the type of driver is thought of as structural, that is, it is created by the rules within the programme or another structure already in existence, followed by (3 1 1) for organisational mechanisms, as particular types of structural drivers, this code also represented experience in relation to organisational mechanisms and (3 1 1 2) represented administration. These are attached in hierarchical form. This was the general pattern used for indexing the interviews. Such coding was not applied to the documents although NUD*IST can be used for coding documents.

Such coding sheets also exist for drivers for coordination which are seen to be created by individual or group actions or ‘agency’. In addition, index trees were used to code factors which constrained coordination: either structural or driven by individual or group actions and examples of successful coordination and failures in coordination.

The same pattern was used for coding co-governance: in terms of examples of co-governance: either successes or failures, drivers for co-governance: either structural or driven by individual or group actions and constraints against: either structural or driven by individual or group actions. This overall pattern of coding was repeated for each case study.
The data attached through coding to nodes can then be retrieved. If the index tree is used to pre-structure indexing, all the data relating to the reasons why a certain activity took place can be gathered together easily and quickly. The indexed code could potentially form the headings for the written report and the data held within it the content of that part of the discussion. For example, it was possible to gather together all descriptions of the level and type of coordination identified or indeed where coordination had failed and then to gather the data that explained why these had occurred. However, even at this stage the data has to be studied carefully to be able to draw conclusions, just as it would if a manual system of indexing had been used. The indexing in this case represented what may be thought of as the first round of analysis: an exploration of the ways in which the data could be seen. Becker and Geer (1960) have argued that coding in the first instance is simply to make sure that all relevant data is included in the analysis. However, the fact that the evidence is drawn together does help to save time. Any system of indexing ultimately relies on the concentration of effort during the indexing process and the subsequent quality of the indexing.

It is also possible to search data for key words and answers to particular questions. Thus, all material which can be identified this way can be retrieved together. Text searches were particularly useful for accessing data on other partnerships and programmes which respondents often discussed in comparison to the case which was being investigated. Often important information was gathered on other cases while the respondents were to some extent caught off guard. This material was added effortlessly to the data collected through the interviews carried out for the other cases.

Where systematic coding helped in the analysis particularly was in the differentiation which was made between structural and agentic factors in the analysis. This form of coding was carried out in order to correspond to the theoretical categories of network structuring and game management used in the theory of network management. Klijn and Teisman (1997) conceptualise the management of networks as corresponding to structuration theory where the network structure and game management can be neatly differentiated and compared to structure and agency respectively. Given the noted importance of central government in regeneration policy which overtly sets the structures which local partnership actors have to implement (Painter, Isaac-Henry et al.
1997), it was thought appropriate to code actions by the centre as network structuring activities and actions by the partnership as agentic or merely game management activities.

However, in coding this way it became apparent that this was theoretically incoherent and the approach had to be revised leading to the theoretical developments outlined in chapter ten. It was not sufficient to code local partnership activity as simply game management activity or agency, local actors were also involved in creating structures and central government and their agents were involved in aspects of game management.

WRITING AND PRESENTING CASE STUDY EVIDENCE

Writing up and presenting qualitative research can present a major issue for qualitative researchers. The books written on the topic whilst helpful, for example, Wolcott (2001), do not offer recipes to be followed. The researcher has to find a way through this phase taking whatever help that exists in the literature.

Yin (1994) argues that written reports can be of four different types: single case narrative; multiple case narrative; an alternative to narrative, ‘the question and answer format’ and the multiple case study in which the material is arranged simply as cross-case analysis. A linear analytic structure has been used together with a question and answer format or more accurately an issue based format. This arrangement is used to both conform to the traditional research report and to reduce the evidence presented into manageable focused chunks.

The findings have been presented as follows:

- An introduction to the case study area and information regarding participants;
- A brief narrative about each scheme being implemented, what they are concerned with and their distinctive features; and
- The presentation of the findings which is divided into three sections: 1). Examples of where coordination and co-governance have been achieved along with examples where there has been failure to achieve coordination or co-governance; 2). The drivers for and constraints on coordination and 3). The drivers for and constraints on co-governance.
This method of presentation allows the contradictions in the evidence to emerge. In many instances the scheme was both positively and negatively affected by certain processes or events. Of course, the importance of these is not that they exist but how important they are as drivers or constraints for the successful implementation of particular regeneration programmes.

ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Ethics have to be considered in all research if only to know why ethical issues may not be an impediment to the research. Cochrane (1998) highlights the situation in which ethical considerations have usually been raised in relation to the power imbalance created between researcher and researched through the research agenda being defined by the researcher. Obviously where such power imbalance exists ethical considerations to do with the responsibility of the researcher to protect the respondents from harm is paramount. However, in this case many of the respondents are local elites, in which case, as Cochrane points out, the power relationship is reversed. How then does this affect ethical issues?

Kvale (1996) states that there are three main aspects to ethics: the informed consent of respondents; confidentiality of interview material and the consequences of the research. There appeared to be no particular ethical problems with this research, the partnership Chairs’ agreed to allow me to approach members and in one case encouraged members to respond positively to my requests. No one was forced into the interview and some took the option to refuse.

Special consideration was given to members of the community where a power relationship could have potentially existed. It was decided in this instance to treat them as equals to anyone else in the research, as an important respondent and not to treat them as somehow less knowledgeable which may have implied ‘less important’ in their eyes. It was explained that the interview schedule was a general document and respondents may have a differential capacity due to their structural position in the partnership to answer questions.
The real issue of ethics emerged when the reports to the board members which had been promised as part of the access agreement had to be written. In the findings actual names of respondents are not used, merely their organisational affiliation. However, this has a varying impact upon respondents. The local constabulary or careers service are just that, a single organisation, the representative of which cannot be disguised. Respondents from such organisations would be easily identifiable from my findings for those with a working knowledge of Coventry’s regeneration scene. For others, for instance members from the private sector or small community organisations which are not named and are multitudinous in their nature have an anonymity not afforded to the previous group. As is usual in urban regeneration research, the City has been named rather than attempting to disguise it as would be normal in sociological research, here place matters.

Subsequently, the format of the findings chapters were considered unsuitable to send to the partnerships for fear of aggravating already difficult working relationships. At this stage all quotes and attributions had to be removed and the case reported in more abstract terms without too much detail. Here it was useful to draw on the theory and focus on central government guidelines and local interventions rather than on the relationships as such.

CONCLUSIONS

This chapter has outlined the methodology used in this research, it has argued that the case study has particular strengths for investigating regeneration partnerships. This is thought to be especially so when new programmes are introduced which may have quite different characteristics to those which have preceded them. The research has thus been involved in asking how and why questions in a real life context for which case study is a suitable choice (Yin 1994). The qualitative case study, although suffering from some acknowledged weaknesses, not least in the amount of time expended in comparison to the generalisability, and therefore importance of the findings, remains an appropriate research approach. The study was time consuming and this can be a serious weakness of this methodology and can inhibit making the findings known within the community at a useful stage. In terms of rigour, all possible steps have been taken to ensure that the findings are valid within the terms established by Yin as appropriate for case study
research. The issue of the generalisability of the findings will be discussed further in the concluding chapter, however, it is considered that the findings presented in the case study chapters do have an important degree of generalisability.

The combination of the use of documentary sources and semi-structured interviews complemented each other. They offered useful ways in which to collect data in order to build up a more holistic view of the case in question. The balance created in using these two methods to collect data together with the use of semi-structured interviews through which the worst pitfalls of unstructured interviewing were avoided whilst gaining the advantages of using face-to-face interviewing in terms of flexibility, has provided access to a rich source of data.

The following three chapters contain the presentation of the case study data gathered from the documents and interviews for each of the case studies. This data is arranged in the order laid out previously and presents all the relevant factors found in the research. These lay the basis for making a judgement regarding the extent to which the cases represent successful attempts at creating more coordinated and co-governed regeneration schemes and allow an examination of the processes of network management used by central, regional and local actors.
PART TWO

Findings from the case studies

INTRODUCTION

The case studies were carried out in the city of Coventry in the West Midlands. Coventry has a population of around 300,000 and a unitary local authority. It shares many of the economic characteristics of Birmingham, thus it suffered high unemployment during the recessions of the 1980s and 1990s as much of its traditional manufacturing industry declined (Coventry Partnership 2002c).

The statistics show increases in employment over the 1990s, with the average rate of unemployment in 2002 being low at 3.6%, however this rate varies across the wards in the area. For example in Willenhall the rate is nearer 30%. Deprivation in Coventry is above average with many wards being included in the worst 10% nationally (ibid). In this respect Coventry is typical of the situation nationally highlighted by the Social Exclusion Unit (1998). Whilst the overall situation appears good behind the averages lie wide variations in the living standards of the local population. The recent turnaround in Coventry’s economic fortunes has therefore not benefited everyone leaving the need for continued regeneration interventions.

The research on the three regeneration partnerships was carried out over a period of 15 months between July 2001 and September 2002. They are presented in reverse order compared to the way in which they were presented in chapter two. The Local Strategic Partnership case is presented first followed by the Zone and finally the SRB. This is due to the degree of embeddedness that the LSP has in relation to general developments in Coventry concerning regeneration and partnership development. This case therefore forms a backdrop against which the others can be studied.

Given the early stage of partnership development, the findings are necessarily preliminary, and any negative assessment of the partnership’s work should not be considered as failure. The partnerships still had much work to do and all may have
success in the long-term. The analysis has attempted to provide an assessment of the introduction of new approaches in terms of new policy structures and the success of local partnerships in implementing these.

It is to the member’s credit that, despite the difficulties in which partnerships find themselves during the early stages of development, they were willing to be interviewed and take part in the research.

Interviews were carried out with range of board members, others involved in the partnerships and also with representatives from the regional organisations. Table 12 provides a list of respondents in each case study.

**Table 12 - List of respondents interviewed in each case**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>LSP (16 interviews)</th>
<th>Zone (16 interviews)</th>
<th>SRB (18 interviews)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Board members</td>
<td>1 Councillor</td>
<td>4 Councillors</td>
<td>1 Councillor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 Community rep.</td>
<td>2 Community rep.</td>
<td>1 Community rep.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 Voluntary sector</td>
<td>2 Voluntary sector</td>
<td>5 Voluntary sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 Private sector</td>
<td>1 Private sector</td>
<td>2 Private sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5 Public sector</td>
<td>1 Public sector</td>
<td>5 Public sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officers/Secretariat</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chair</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service manager</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultants</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional level organisations</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>1 Community Network Support Officer</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter Six

Case study one:
The Local Strategic Partnership

INTRODUCTION

During 2001, Coventry followed central government guidelines on setting up a Local Strategic Partnership (LSP). The Coventry Partnership was formally established as an LSP in the Spring of 2002, in line with the requirements to have an accredited partnership through which Neighbourhood Renewal Funds would be distributed to qualifying local authority areas. Coventry will receive a total of £11.9m over three years (Coventry Partnership 2002a).

Coventry is well known for having developed its own prototype strategic partnership called the City Forum in 1997. The history of this earlier partnership is relevant as the Forum expressed many of the characteristics of LSP policy. In addition, many of the policies and organisational structures which were important in the work of the Forum have been retained by either the Local Authority and/or the Forum and work alongside the new LSP structures, at least temporarily. Therefore discussions concerning the development of the LSP have to acknowledge these two distinct and yet overlapping phases.

THE COVENTRY FORUM

Key features of the Forum included its intentions to develop a Community Plan, be strategic and holistic. One of its first tasks was to consult key service delivery agencies, including the voluntary sector, via a city conference mechanism. The purpose of the consultation was to produce the key strategic aims for the City. In 1997, the Coventry Community Plan\(^7\) was produced which guides much of the regeneration work now taking place in Coventry. The Plan has six strategic objectives:

\(^7\)The Community Plan was one of the first of its type and occurred three years before central government introduced the Local Government Act (2000) which requires Local Authorities to produce a local plan based on consultation with local stakeholders.
• To create more jobs for Coventry
• To tackle crime and make communities safer
• To invest in young people
• To create an exciting and vibrant city centre
• To tackle poverty, and
• To meet the needs and aspirations of older people (Shared Intelligence 2002)

Many of these objectives had themselves been part of the focus for service activities through local initiatives such as the production of Area Plans, Area Coordination and the Action Against Crime Partnership. The formal evaluation of Coventry’s Community Plan, has stated that it ‘largely consolidated existing programmes rather than being a programme of new actions’. It is therefore suggestive that a more joined-up approach at the local level was developing before central guidance required it (ibid:11).

In terms of adopting a holistic approach the Forum’s aims were similar to those which central government have specified for LSPs. The partnership has been committed to improving mainstream services and increasing the level of coordination among key service providers. The following quote from the partnership’s documentation reflects their support for the concept of holistic working and of the potential of gaining resource and/or policy synergy through collaborative service provision,

‘Work started in 1997 based on the concept that if all the organisations in Coventry were to agree on priorities and targets for the following five years to address the city’s needs, and if we agreed to tackle these together, we would have the best chance of success’ (Coventry Local Strategic Partnership 2002d: 2).

The Forum together with the Local Authority used an array of organisational structures through which to deliver the Community Plan. The Local Authority had previously established a single Area Coordination office in 1994 through which local service plans were developed and public services were more greatly coordinated within this deprived community. During the development of the Community Plan and Forum, the Area Coordination office programme was rolled out into five other deprived areas within the city (Coventry Partnership 2002a). Area Coordination aims to develop and coordinate mainstream services in response to local needs (Warwick Business School & Local
Government Innovation Unit 2001). Another part of Area Coordination is the Area Forums which are essentially public meetings through which community consultation can take place on an ongoing basis. Ward Councillors on the Area Forums are given direct access to the Cabinet in the City Council thus strengthening their scrutiny role within the local authority. They are also supported by officers from the local authority. Area Coordination in essence corresponds with the principles of Neighbourhood Management which has been pursued by the New Labour government (Social Exclusion Unit 2001).

The second major organisational feature is the Programme Delivery Groups. These were created to plan and deliver each of the six priorities of the community plan. The six objectives with their Programme Delivery Group organisation and Area Coordination converge upon each of the most deprived areas within Coventry forming a matrix structure.

ESTABLISHING THE LSP

The Forum operated between 1997 and 2002 with the Coventry Partnership undergoing development in 2001. In line with central government policy, the Local Authority received funding through the NRF to support the bending of mainstream services to better meet the needs of deprived communities. In essence, what the Forum were already doing without additional funding.

Besides the grant aid from central government, the key difference between the Forum and the LSP is its membership. The Forum had a relatively small membership of approximately 16 members drawn from key service delivery agencies; the voluntary sector; the city council and the private sector within the city. It therefore had an exclusively ‘professional’ membership (City Coventry City Forum 2001). By contrast, the LSP is required to include the community itself on the board.
AIMS AND OBJECTIVES

The approach developed during the transitional year between the first and second rounds of NRF funding closely adheres to central government guidance. The Coventry Partnership Neighbourhood Renewal and Social Inclusion Strategy (2002) also corresponds well with New Labour’s approach.

The Partnership accepts central government’s definition of the problem of social exclusion and the necessity to have a joined-up approach to dealing with issues of regeneration. Therefore, Coventry’s approach to Neighbourhood Renewal is similarly focused on ensuring ‘that within 10-20 years, no-one should be seriously disadvantaged by where they live’. Their aim is to narrow the gap between the most disadvantaged neighbourhoods and the rest of the country in relation to worklessness, crime, health, skills, housing and physical environment (Coventry Partnership 2002a).

There is a strong emphasis on social inclusion within the documents to support the meeting of the targets. A mapping exercise has been carried out on spending across the most severely deprived areas, both those that feature in the worst 10% nationally and the other areas identified. This will allow better targeting of interventions and their likely impacts. Statistical evidence from small areas (i.e. those below the level of the wards) has been the basis for the identification of 31 priority neighbourhoods which are the focus for Area Coordination. The Area Coordination boundaries contain 60% of the deprived population of Coventry. Neighbourhood Renewal work has focused on a few areas within this (Coventry Partnership 2002c).

A further strand of work focuses on communities of interest. Acknowledging the problems associated with area based initiatives in dealing with certain groups of people the partnership has also targeted resources on these groups. It is accepted that communities such as black and minority ethnic groups are not concentrated into specific areas but dispersed across the city and therefore service provision must reflect this (ibid).
The outcomes in terms of the foci for NRF spending has been as follows: In Round 1, following the Community Plan, spending was targeted in two of the six main areas of deprivation. In addition, two communities of interest were identified as being in special need of better services. In the second round 4 further areas have been targeted and 1 community of interest (ibid). All projects funded through the NRF must aid these areas or groups.

Besides the substantive aspects of the partnership’s aims, another strand emphasises how the partnership will operate. In the neighbourhood renewal strategy, it states that ‘we will work together to improve services in our priority neighbourhoods’ (Coventry Partnership 2002a:3). They recognise the need to work together more effectively. They intend to do this by:

- Improving planning and linkages between strategic plans, partner’s activities and partnership initiatives to avoid gaps, duplications and conflicts in services and to reduce bureaucracy;
- Share skills and knowledge needed for neighbourhood renewal amongst Coventry Partnership members, service providers and priority neighbourhoods; and
- Pool information and expertise to make sure they are targeting resources at those in need first (ibid).

A key feature of the partnership’s documentation is the emphasis on service providers becoming more responsive to the needs of disadvantaged residents. If mainstreaming regeneration is to work the local authority and other mainstream service providers need to become more socially inclusive in their approaches. To this end the partnership is required to develop a Learning Action Plan for the partners and an equivalent for the local authority through which the aim of making the improvement of services central to their corporate objectives. It is hoped that Neighbourhood Renewal will form a learning experience for local service providers and will create knowledge through dissemination and sharing good practice (ibid). This recognises that in the past learning within partnerships has been hindered by a lack of appropriate machinery such as professional training through which to channel learning.
There is also a recognition of the need for evaluation which is unified to enable comparisons between different interventions. There are issues surrounding whether or not programmes or projects are actually delivering results or whether they work well together, duplicate or conflict. The evaluation seeks to gain the information required to respond to these issues. Like the learning plan, it is based on a continuous improvement approach. The evaluations will be carried out by both internal and external groups and they aim to focus on both substantive impacts and process issues such as the quality of partnership arrangements (ibid).

ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE PARTNERSHIP

The management structures being used at the time of the research were an Operations Group, NRF Panel and a Monitoring and Evaluation Group. The operations group was chosen from representatives of the board and included a member from both the community and voluntary sectors, it has 10 members in all. The NRF panel oversaw the allocation of the neighbourhood renewal fund. This panel comprised five councillors and other representatives from the Forum/LSP including those from the community. The Monitoring and Evaluation Group oversees the monitoring of the Community Plan process and will now do the same for the LSP.

In the future the operations group will be supported by an independent ‘partnership’ manager assisted by two administrators. However, this had not materialised by the summer of 2002.

COORDINATION IN THE COVENTRY PARTNERSHIP

There is a strong element of coordination stated within Coventry’s plans. Data from interviews suggested a good deal of coordination had been or was developing across the area. Much of this had begun before the LSP itself was established but had been a slow process. The local authority officer argued that the Forum, after four years, had only just begun to grapple with the greater coordination of activities. Partners were now moving away from endorsement to actually taking responsibility for work.
Many of the examples of coordination outlined have been influenced by the existing structures of Area Coordination (AC), Programme Delivery Groups (PDG) and partnership structures developing from central government policy such as joint working between the local authorities and the health service; the Crime and Disorder Partnerships, Connexions and the SRB.

An example of previous success is illustrated by the Jobs PDG enabling a more effective approach to creating jobs for local unemployed people through joint working. Peugeot’s Managing Director was also Chair of the PDG working with key providers of employment services. Peugeot normally recruited from a pool of experienced workers rather than the local unemployed. The existence of the PDG allowed jobs to be matched with 150 local people and the City Council funded extra training. This had been seen as a particular success as these workers had remained with Peugeot when many of the newly recruited experienced workers had left.

Overall, there has been a high degree of policy coordination in areas of planning for example in the approach taken to baseline research and targeting and in the way the LSP is developing their evaluation processes. However, there is less coordination in relation to the spending of neighbourhood renewal funds beyond having to fit with the strategic aims of the renewal plan. Individual projects are not in general linked either to others within the scheme or to other programmes or policies. Figure 5 highlights where some linkages exist between some of the projects within each category (area or community of interest). Each category actually contains numerous projects. To avoid complex mapping the arrows represent one link between a project within the scheme to one outside.

Most projects in round one were sponsored by more than one organisation in a joint bid. However, there is little evidence that any further coordination was planned for the projects in terms of the co-location of services or how one intervention would fit with or reinforce another to achieve holistic aims. Some projects may complement mainstream interventions and be coordinated in that sense although this was not emphasised.
Figure 5 - An illustration of the level of coordination within NR projects.

Based on data supplied by the Coventry Partnership (2002b; 2002c).


The use of a bidding system encouraged duplication. Many of the bids submitted for NRF were subsequently matched with another almost identical project whilst others were rejected because existing funds had already been allocated to deal with a particular issue (Coventry Partnership 2002b; 2002c). In this respect the LSP did prove to be an effective mechanism for reducing duplication.

A council officer argued that only during the second round of the NRF had the issue of how interventions would work with others become a focus for planning spend (Conversation with City Council Officer). The year two strategy had focused more on issues of coordinated action. However, this is not apparent in relation to the actual projects for which bids were placed this time by individual organisations rather than partnerships (Coventry Partnership 2002c).

Part of central government’s aims was to use the LSP as a vehicle for rationalisation of partnership structures which had developed over time, many from New Labour’s own policies. As the Government Office representative said ‘the LSP was the final straw and that has forced the issue’ of rationalisation. In Coventry rationalisation appeared to be developing well in some areas for example in the crime and disorder partnership:
'a lot of what we have in place is as a result of the community plan. There are elements of duplication. I'm hoping that we achieve some assimilation in some of the groups. The legislation demands that all statutory partners are there so it is a powerful body. However, now people go to the LSP and not the crime and disorder partnership so its becoming already a body which rationalises' (Interview with Chief Superintendent of Police).

The same was happening within the partnerships working with young people. The PDG for young people, Connexions and the SRB partnership (Case study 3) were merging together for the purposes of board meetings. The Connexions representative argued that 'there were too many meetings about nothing and too few which actually make decisions'. However, as yet they had not got into creating blueprints for how rationalisation was to occur. It was happening simply through pressure of work for certain key players such as the Council’s Chief Executive who was required to attend them all.

Whilst there certainly was a greater degree of joint working it had been difficult to develop. One interviewee argued that in relation to the allocation of NRF that:

'Part of the problem for me was how it fitted together with other initiatives such as New Deal for Communities and making sure that these were complementary to other work...not overlapping and seeing the big picture. I think this is missing' (Interview with Higher Education representative).

This view was reiterated, by the community representative, in relation to the greater coordination of services

'I don’t know I am not sure, the NRF has only just taken effect. Basically, it hasn’t worked so far' (Interview with community representative).

The Government Office representative raised the issue of this project based approach. She insisted that the Neighbourhood Renewal Fund had been allocated to support mainstream services. It could also be used by the voluntary sector where this was appropriate, accepting that in many areas such as homelessness the voluntary sector are major providers of services. However, the way that funds were allocated in both Coventry and other areas had led to a project driven approach which failed to be adequately coordinated with mainstream services and was in danger also of not
contributing to the targets. Linkages with targets were increasing but ‘are a bit tenuous because you are starting at grass roots level’.

Partnership members also argued that the existing structures in Coventry such as the PDGs and AC, which potentially could have contributed to coordination, had not always been important. The PDG

‘is not really central it’s a gadfly, we lobby organisations and try to influence the organisations who will continue to put money where they wanted it. We use a tortoiseometer to measure slow progress’ (Interview with Poverty PDG Chair).

Area Coordination offices, which had varied in quality, were under review and were not necessarily going to exist into the future. The Chief Executive of the Learning and Skills Council had argued in his view AC

‘is the jewel in the crown of the city…it is…closer to the issues of specific areas [but] I don’t know whether they recognise that’

From this evidence it appears that coordination has been slow to develop despite the advantages that Coventry had in terms of a head start in the process. Below is an analysis of the drivers and constraints which have been identified as important to the case in relation to the degree of coordination Coventry achieved to date and importantly may achieve in the future.

DRIVERS FOR COORDINATION

The drivers for coordination are summarised in table 13 and discussed below.

Central Government Policy

Some examples were provided in the previous section around the degree to which existing policy structures had contributed (however imperfectly) to the ways in which coordination was occurring within the LSP. Both policies that have emerged from the centre and those which have been developed at local level have had a degree of importance in many cases this has provided the basis for greater coordination.
Table 13 – Factors emerging from the research findings which appear to be important drivers for coordination within the Coventry Partnership (LSP).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Central Government Policy</th>
<th>Partnership activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government led policy:</td>
<td>Development of new structures at organisational, partnership or local government level.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Community strategies</td>
<td>- AC/PDGs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- For other regeneration programmes, local government or other public bodies</td>
<td>- Administration and Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Targets for mainstream agencies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy structure for Neighbourhood Renewal:</td>
<td>Established network/networking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Funding</td>
<td>Partnership relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Accreditation</td>
<td>Key individuals – boundary spanners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Government Office role</td>
<td>Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Culture change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Local Authority commitment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Community Strategies
The Community Plan has been an important influence on neighbourhood renewal, providing the basis for targeted NRF spend. The need to develop a second community plan was seen as a particularly strong driver for the future of the LSP by the Council Officer as it would be the outcome of the LSP’s rather than the Forum’s deliberations.

Broader policies
Other drivers were perceived in the many other plans and strategies such as the Crime and Disorder strategy and Housing Strategy. It is now a requirement for these to be presented to the LSP for consultation. The Council Officer argued that

‘Certainly these external agenda will drive it because if you have got x number of things saying you will take it to the LSP’

Although such plans already get sent to key players it was perceived that the LSP could make a difference by commenting on proposals that would be additional to the regular consultation processes (Interview with Council Officer).
Targets

The floor targets and other PSAs set for mainstream service providers and local authorities were accepted as a major driver for the LSP. A great deal of energy has been expended on establishing base lines and targeting resources correctly in order to facilitate the accurate assessment of interventions against the Public Service Agreement targets at some future date. The ability of projects to contribute to meeting targets was an important aspect of project appraisal. Although interviewees were quick to point out that the link between the intervention and how it would meet the targets were often necessarily loose because attribution is difficult, it was also the case that at this early stage fulfilling targets was not a key issue for interviewees, especially those outside the mainstream services. One of the Councillors argued that targets

‘will drive things forward by necessity. They will determine whether we receive money it will be a loop’...and anyway ‘they are not dissimilar from our aspirations’

However, the Government Office representative argued that the targets seemed to lead to the mainstream organisations driving the partnership rather than the LSP driving the mainstream organisations.

Neighbourhood Renewal Policy Structures - Funding

The policy structures for Neighbourhood Renewal and LSPs themselves do appear in this instance to be working relatively well in creating a more holistic approach to regeneration. Again this appears to work more at a policy level than at a service level. The funding had encouraged the LSP to be formed, as one Councillor argued it provided an incentive so ‘the LSP has got to work’. Partnership structures had been a proven way of increasing the funding into the city and the Council did not want to disrupt this. However, in her view budget sharing remained a goal to be aspired to but an increased focus was now given to it.

Accreditation

The Accreditation procedure had ensured that the partnership process was taken seriously in terms of its formation and particular attention had been paid to the issues of
quantitative and qualitative evaluation of both substantive and process issues within Neighbourhood Renewal.

**Government Office Role**

The role given to the Government Office is also seen to support the LSP. Their role as mentors helping to interpret guidance; facilitating the sharing of good practice among LSPs; and intervening in disputes, were seen as important by both themselves and the partners. The Council Officer argued that their Government Office representative had been ‘incredibly supportive and helpful’ and the relationship with the Government Office remained good.

**Partnership Activity**

*Developing new management and administrative structures*

The Council had worked hard to try and develop appropriate structures for the partnership. Although the City Forum and the City Council had both initiated organisational structures such as the PDGs and Area Coordination, laying the basis for further work towards more coordination in both policy or planning and at the service level in terms of co-location, these structures were not automatically transferred to the LSP. Rather new ‘purpose built’ structures were being created for the LSP such as the Operations Group, NRF Panel and Monitoring and Evaluation Group. The operations group has the role of driving the LSP’s work; facilitating decision-making; evaluating the work being undertaken; progress chasing; problem solving and commissioning necessary research. The use of the NRF panel to make decisions regarding the appraisal of projects afforded some coordination of activity during the two rounds of NRF.

The Monitoring and Evaluation Group oversees the monitoring of the Community Plan process and will now do the same for the LSP. They are tasked with developing a more unified approach to performance for all members which may also drive coordination.

Importantly for the future the Operations Group will be supported by an ‘independent’ operations or ‘partnership’ manager assisted by two administrators. This was seen as crucial by many members for coordination especially if they got the right person who
would be pro-active within the LSP. It was however, recognised that the success of this would be reliant on getting someone with personality and strength of character to make sure things happen.

The aim of these structures is to promote the LSP as an equal partnership rather than one which could become dominated by the City Council. However, in these early stages the role and influence of the Council had been necessarily high. It was their members and officers who had been key to the success of the LSP so far.

Established networks

The fact that in Coventry there has been a great deal of partnership working and that they had their own version of a strategic partnership has meant that an established network has existed, this applies to all the partnerships in this study. An established network even if partial in relation to the much broader partnership of the LSP has provided a boost for the LSP. Many of the relationships are well developed and these have assisted the development of a new partnership.

Established networks provide much of the basis for sharing of perceptions between actors and the experience of partnership working which occurs through having worked together before on similar projects. Once a network is established it reduces the investment of time needed for ‘networking’. As the Learning and Skills Council representative argued

'what happens is almost not at a policy coordination level but at a delivery level my ability to pick up a phone and speak to the Chief Superintendent of Police is there we can do it together very simply. That depends on the interaction between us and the understanding which the meetings bring as opposed to going to someone cold'.

Partnership relations

The partners were generally in agreement that partnership working was good in the city and had provided a sound basis from which to go forward.
Key individuals

In such a large and complex network and at a very early stage, it was difficult to find key individuals who were particularly important for driving the partnership forward. The Chair was picked out as a key player supporting the goals of the LSP. The Chief Executive of the City Council was regularly drawn out as being key, not so much to the partnership itself but to a change in the approach to regeneration within the city council. It was argued that in the past:

‘the regeneration unit outfit did like to do their own thing they have gone now and have been reorganised. It may well be that the Chief Executive spotted it. She is excellent...It [the City Council] had begun to change but the regeneration unit were not. She has brought back into prominence people who had been in the shadows to reflect her principles and convictions. She is now the secretary of the LSP and controls things’ (Interview with Leader of the Poverty PDG).

Culture change

In addition, the City Forum had ‘shared and disseminated a change in culture’ among the members and it was thought that the LSP would continue this approach which would foster better joined-up working. Changes in cultures at an organisational level are difficult to measure, however, among the key service providers including the City Council and Councillors there was an understanding that more holistic working was necessary. There was also a high level of support for NR/LSP policy, particularly from mainstream service providers. The Police representative argued that service providers needed to move to more outcome based interventions. The best scenario was preventing crime in the first place and therefore whatever he could do in partnership with others to help was positive. Another factor was that individual organisations could simply not deal with problems entirely on their own.

‘I think it has the potential to have a very positive effect, to pull together all aspects of provisions, young people for instance in terms of offending, that can be done through the LSP. I have to say though that the partnership working in Coventry is fantastic. You could take the view that it will happen anyway here’ (Interview with Learning and Skills Council representative).
Local Authority Commitment

Although the City Council argued that they did not want to dominate the partnership, and thought that the LSP should be independent, it has been the Council’s commitment to the administration of the partnership that has helped in the development of the LSP. As the Chair of the LSP put it

'if the councils don’t make this work it won’t work...They [the government] think someone else might do but they don’t. We have put in the resources we have to bend that into mainstream funding our commitment is serious’

CONSTRAINTS ON COORDINATION

The constraints on coordination are summarised in table 14 and discussed below.

Central government policy

Neighbourhood Renewal Policy Structures

Just as new policy structures can forward the aims of Neighbourhood Renewal, it is also possible for them to create new or additional problems especially during the early stages of implementation, thus limiting the impact of new policies.

Table 14 – Factors emerging from the research which appear to constrain coordination within the Coventry Partnership (LSP)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Central Government Policy</th>
<th>Partnership activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Policy structures in Neighbourhood Renewal:</td>
<td>Policy structures at the local level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Absence of strategic approach</td>
<td>- Size</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Resources – Funding; Time</td>
<td>- Bidding mechanism/consultation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Reduced role for Government Offices</td>
<td>Questioning of the value of coordination and of the need or value of the LSP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complexity</td>
<td>‘Rubber stamping’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflicting demands by the centre</td>
<td>Lack of knowledge or interest in certain matters – e.g. NRF allocations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Twin goals, targets</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Business planning cycles</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Partnership proliferation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Absence of strategic approach

It was argued that the process of providing funds for work which had to be both joined-up and strategic should have really followed the submission of the Neighbourhood Renewal strategy. In the absence of this during the first year the Community Plan had formed the basis of the NR strategy.

'We had the NR fund from last April (2001) so its not been ideal'...I would actually work with communities and commission and be much more specific about where the money was going to be spent. We can do that once we have the strategy in place because we didn't have the strategy in place in was quite difficult'. Once we have this we can say OK if we have x additional funding we can use it to do this, this and this (Interview with Council Officer).

Funding

There was also the realisation that, in the words of the Council Officer

'as the Government Office keep saying NR is just a distraction, NR is really about the long-term bending of mainstream funding, but its a £12 million pound distraction'. 'Its just a flea bite compared to the millions that the Health Authority, Local Authority and Police get...and if those billions were targeted more on narrowing the gap and that is what we have got to do then that would make a much bigger difference' (op cit).

This point was reiterated in a general statement made the Government Office representative who argued that in some places the funding had got in the way of joined-up work.

'To be fair to them the money became available to partnerships before they were established...and the pressure was on to spend it'.

She also argued that:

'What we want them to do with the NRF is not - its too late now but it has diverted the partnerships away from doing it, they have too many meetings on how they will divi up the NRF and monitor and control it and not used enough time to think about the real things they want to do and tackle the big issues. The strategic bit of the partnership has been the down side'.
Another issue was the short-term nature of the funding which left many wondering about what will happen beyond the three years. The Treasury has committed a further two year’s funding but this may not go to the same areas.

Furthermore, resource issues existed over the fact that there was no allowance within the NRF for the management of the partnership. Unlike the SRB and Zone partnership, the LSP which is arguably the most complex partnership had no access to funding for administration. In Coventry this had caused problems when the Council first broached the issue of members contributing funds to the running of the secretariat. The private sector were particularly reluctant and at the time of the research whilst most members had made contributions including the voluntary sector, the private sector were still having discussions. The feeling was that they contributed in all sorts of ways to the city already and what they could offer is expertise not funding.

Time
The time it took to be an active member of the board was universally seen as a problem and a constraint on creating more coordination.

Reduced role for Government Offices
In addition, the way that the neighbourhood renewal policy had been designed had sidelined the Government Office, their representative felt that the regional presence was not strong enough and LSPs were often referred to the Neighbourhood Renewal Unit within central government. She argued particularly that the loss of any contract relationship with LSPs did not help as it removed their leverage over of the partnership’s work. They had no real monitoring role as such in this process. The fact that in principle the money could be spent on anything so long as it was on deprivation had in her view not worked to support a strategic coordinated approach.

Complexity
The complexity of the LSP’s work was raised as a barrier to coordination. Not only was their remit proliferating with more roles being given to them regarding scrutinising planning documents there were also issues to do with the structures. One councillor argued there was a need to sort out the
structures, and the lines of demarcation. For decisions to be binding, we need to be far more structured about what we expect and who is going to take away an action point and deliver it, this is not there yet’...this is all a bit woolly’

Conflicting demands

Conflicting demands by the centre were viewed as a barrier. The representative from the Government Office argued that partners were often in a difficult position regarding what their priorities were and this was made harder by central government:

‘To be fair to the partners it is the conflicts they face as well the police for example might well have bought into local needs and then someone in Whitehall says street crime is our priority’.

There were also conflicts between what the community and service providers wanted. The representative from the Government Office argued that spending the NRF needed to be directed at causes not symptoms and that communication needed to be better between communities and service providers and government. For example, one community had wanted sleeping policemen put in their area, however, the real policy issue was why drivers go too fast.

One of the voluntary sector representatives argued that the LSP needed to develop a different relationship with people in order to meet its twin objectives of improving services and being inclusive ‘sometimes you are trying to keep quality as well as achieving hard targets, it is challenging’.

Targets

Targets were seen as an issue by some statutory sector representatives. There were too many of them and joint targets could conflict with the organisation’s own performance targets. This has a tendency to undermine the priority given to partnership work. Interviews with mainstream service providers raised this issue

‘at the end of the day I am not judged on being a member of the LSP I am judged on achieving our targets’ (Interview with Chief Superintendent of Police).
Furthermore, there was distrust about who would receive the rewards from meeting targets. Coventry plans to benefit from £6 million if it is successful. As the LSC representative argued

‘if that’s down to the LSP do the partnership share in that reward. Will the £6 million go into the coffers of the Council or LSP?’

At this point in time no one knew what central government had intended.

The issue of central determination was also raised

‘we need to go carefully about being steered or pushed to achieve the West Midlands Government Office issues, the floor targets etc. [We should be] masters of our own destiny achieving on the issues of Coventry, we only want six priorities (Op cit).

Planning cycles
Planning cycles were raised as an ongoing issue which the LSP had not solved or even managed to address. Planning cycles were not coordinated and remained problematic.

The Learning and Skills Council representative argued that it was business planning rather than strategic planning cycles which were important. He argued:

‘You could...have a yearly conference which is [around] what are the issues then money could be committed. That for me would be the ultimate in coordination. We would then start from a common starting point’.

The problem was of course not amenable to solutions at the local level it was something which central government had to address. In Coventry,

‘the LSP was moving towards a planning cycle which was more akin to academic years which takes it away from finishing in March with the financial year’ (Interview with Learning and Skills Council Representative).

Partnership proliferation
Central government policies in the first term of the New Labour government had increased the numbers of partnerships on the ground. This had created a more complex
system to be joined-up. The representative from Government Office argued that the rationalisation process had been limited due to partnership proliferation,

‘It’s very early days more partnerships have sprung up it has to go through that phase first’.

Partnership activity

Size
The size of the partnership at thirty five members plus others from the PDGs, was for some seen as problematic for a strategic body to be effective. As one Councillor argued it was still a talking shop.

Bidding mechanisms
It was generally accepted that the bidding mechanism whilst having been implemented at the local level for reasons of fairness and access to funding had in practice been a time consuming and fraught exercise which had not helped coordinate activities. It was decided that after Round two there would be no more bidding rounds and the three year’s funding had been committed.

The Government Office representative argued that each LSP had invented their own internal rules on how they allocated NRF, all had followed SRB or European programmes. There was no requirement on them to do that from us...we don’t want them to be bureaucratic’.

‘There’s been a knee jerk response, lets go and get people to put bids in and set up huge teams assessing bids...It is interesting that they have gone down this approach if they had thought about it, it would have been different’.

‘They needed to identify where the problems were and then decide what the solutions might be and they were not that far in their thinking. The money was not intended to go into projects’.

The government had wanted money spent on developing services which were more appropriate to deprived populations and if they were successful they could mainstream them.
The Police representative had argued that

'There is a danger that the LSP will be too consultative and then will it be strategic? We have seen that around the NRF'.

The outcome was slow progress in terms of spending the NRF and Coventry had to lobby hard to retain its funding from government.

*Questioning the value of coordination*

Although there was a general support for the basic idea of LSPs there were issues around coordination and in some instances views were expressed which suggested that members were not highly involved in the important processes which have been established to increase coordination.

For the Local Education Authority representative, the idea of discussing how to coordinate better was not something on which she would want to see the LSP spending time, in her view ‘nothing could be more dull’. The value of the LSP was as a debating forum for issues. For another respondent there was a real limit to the levels of coordination desirable.

‘I am suspicious of grand plans because they become dinosaurs. Someone came up with a grand plan for housing and someone had said it was Stalinist...you can’t be too tidy it leaves out human beings’ (Interview with Voluntary sector representative).

Some respondents questioned the potential for added value from the LSP, in one interview the respondent argued ‘there is an interesting potential for linkages between services’ for example introducing health screening for groups of trainees but ‘the question is whether this sort of thing will happen because of the LSP? He argued that much of joint working around key areas would happen anyway in Coventry.

*Rubber stamping*

It was recognised that the LSP had to be about more than rubber stamping decisions. The involvement of members in the allocation of NRF was not high given the numbers on the board and this had led to a situation where most members simply endorse what the panel had recommended.
In this sense the Government Office representative’s comment seems to aptly describe the processes within the LSP. She argued that

‘we are trying to encourage them to use their LSPs as a kind of conduit for these [service provider’s planning documents] [but actually] ‘they are rubber-stamping not directing’.

Lack of Knowledge

In the other cases it was clear that members of the partnership were often not up to date with events or seemed to have gaps in their knowledge about basic structures and processes. In the LSP case this was still apparent, even mainstream partners did not know the details concerning sub-groups for example. Others seemed to have little interest in some of the work or the processes. For instance, none of the interviewees raised their lack of involvement over NRF as an issue. This is despite the fact that some of the very same people had expressed a critical approach to dealing with regeneration issues and who are arguably the very people that can have an impact on how partnership work is organised. The leader of the PDG, for example, had said that he had no issues over where the NRF was spent

‘when it came over the horizon I thought about it and decided that a lot of it would be for mainstream services and I could not see the local authority relinquishing control of it until I had left so I took a policy decision and I don’t see it as my problem’

CO-GOVERNANCE

The LSP is a multi-representational body numbering approximately 40 members at present but will be reduced to 35 after the term of the existing community plan (see table 15). In principle it is a highly inclusive board comprising five members from each of the community, voluntary and private sectors; ten from mainstream agencies; six Councillors and a further four to come from a variety sectors not already involved.

The notion of co-governance asserts that all actors involved in the policy will have some influence in decision-making within the partnership. In this network it includes deprived communities in addition to community representatives and other partners. The
analysis aims to draw out the influence which actors have rather than their mere inclusion.

Despite the partnership being in its formative stages there are substantive examples of co-governance. For example, deprived communities have been involved in decision-making regarding which projects were funded through the NRF. The bids submitted to the partnership were prioritised in order of preference by the local communities targeted for help (both geographical and interest based). On occasions projects were rejected by communities, for example

“There was a big bid from the police and when the people of Holbrooks looked at it they said no way. They said we don’t believe they will do what they say and if they do we don’t want extra people at 4 pm we want them at night’ (Interview with Councillor).

Table 15 – Sectoral representation on the LSP board (correct at the time of the research).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Number of seats allocated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Community</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Councillors</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public sector</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private sector</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others (general category open to trades unions, religious organisations or other public sector organisations such as the Fire Service)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leaders of the Community plan PDGs (these were included as of right until the end of the term of the first community plan)</td>
<td>5 (to be phased out)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>40 (35 in future)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on accreditation documentation (Coventry Partnership 2002).

Another example of community power can be seen through the request from asylum seekers for driving lessons to be funded from the NRF. The outcome of this was not settled but the partnership was approaching the bid sympathetically, even though they knew it would be contentious. The Leader of the Council argued this was something which the Council or LSP ‘would never have done, [but] the community see it as a basic’.

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In addition, the community representatives were beginning to have an impact upon key service providers in the City. One of the representatives argued

'We are making alterations we’ve affected this cosiness, we are changing that. Where there are faults we are trying to make changes'. For example, 'We were talking to the Chief Executive of the local Health Trust, he wants to talk to us that is a change in direction from what has happened before. So I think we will have more control of services. Hopefully local people will shape what the nature of the service is in their areas according to what they need'.

The views expressed by this actor were backed up by other key service providers in the partnership who saw the community representatives as having had an important impact. Although this had not reached the level of changing services yet the representatives were listened to.

In addition, key actors involved on the Forum had pressed for an open competitive bidding process as a way of generating projects through which the NRF could be allocated. This is also evidence that co-governance exists. The Police representative had argued

'that we have got some latitude in that process (over spending the NRF) [but] it has emerged through tension'.

Despite these important examples, it could also be argued that the notion of co-governance was struggling. Firstly, areas targeted for funding derived from the community plan and this can be seen as an example of the limited influence within the LSP system regarding the spending of regeneration grants. This is not to say that these were not perfectly reasonable targets or were developed by a single actor in isolation. However, the communities did not have the opportunity to set the agenda in the first instance merely the opportunity to choose from available project proposals.

Neither did the whole newly created LSP membership have a role in setting the agenda, as the Councillor put it

'One of the reason we have got to get over the first lot of the NRF...with the setting up of the LSP which had to, in effect
rubber stamp it and we knew we would be going with a fait accompli, almost, and that is why the subgroup - we very carefully involved health and voluntary sector colleagues so we were able to go along to them and say look we as the LA did not do this all on our own. So will you trust us?'

As we have seen above the Forum were instrumental in incorporating a bidding process, however, this had emerged from what could be considered an early failure in co-governance. A private sector representative argued

‘there was a meeting to explain what it [the NRF] was all about. They did not involve business in that meeting, they said sorry they did not mean to do it’.

Whilst the funding could ‘legally’ be spent by the Council alone in this transitional year, the spending plan presented to the Forum by the Council outlining the spending plans for year one was rejected whole heartedly.

Clearly the Council were intent in taking advantage of central government’s policy in relation to the first year’s NRF despite the establishment of the Forum in this area. This led people to think that the Council wanted to dominate the process particularly over the spending decisions. This did not happen and the outcome was a bidding process, also one that was inclusive of the targeted communities as well as the board members, thus the Council threw the decision-making out into a much broader arena.

Unfortunately, the result of co-governance in this instance almost backfired because the process took so long it was 6 months late and there was a real risk that Coventry could lose the funding altogether. The Council lobbied the Government Office and the NRU to retain their NRF allocation. This in itself can be seen as another failure of the co-governance process. The Council argued this situation was problematic because Government had wanted communities to be involved but were not then prepared for the process to take a little longer because of it. The underspend then led to a rush to spend the money to avoid losing it.

'I think the communities are a bit bruised by the experience but I genuinely think in the circumstances we did our best' (Interview with Council Officer).
By necessity this has led to a situation whereby any further funding will be allocated by the NRF panel without further recourse to the community or necessarily to the wider LSP. However, as most of the funding for the three years has been allocated there is little left.

A further issue is the extent to which the community network is successful in their outreach work. Representatives of the network were supposed to collect views from community groups in the representative’s allocated area providing a conduit for communication to the LSP and to feed back what was happening in the LSP to these groups. The task was far bigger than anyone had calculated and the representatives were not able to achieve theirs and central government’s objectives.

Table 16 provides a summary of the level of resources allocated to each sector. Resource allocation can be used as a proxy for the level of influence sectors have had: more resources equals greater influence in the decision-making, although in this case it has to be borne in mind that mainstream service providers were intended to be the key recipients for NRF, therefore, the public sector would be expected to be the main recipients of funding.

Table 16 – Allocations to specific sectors and the percentage of these in relation to the total funding allocated through NRF in Rounds one and two.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sectoral ownership of projects</th>
<th>Number of projects in first round</th>
<th>Total funding to each sector (£5,878,604m)</th>
<th>Percentage of total spent in round one</th>
<th>Number of projects in second round</th>
<th>Total funding to each sector (£5,653,692m)</th>
<th>Percentage of total spent in round two</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public sector</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>5,179,604</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>£3,934,123</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community/ Voluntary sector</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>239,000</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>£1,719,569</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public/Voluntary Sector</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>305,000</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public/private partnerships</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>155,000</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>5,878,604</td>
<td></td>
<td>59</td>
<td>5,653,692</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on data supplied by Coventry City Council.
In the first round allocations were indeed dominated by the key public services who took a total of 88% of funding, and 96% of the funding if the partnerships with other sectors are included with just 4% of funding going into the voluntary or community sectors alone. The total allocated during this period represents approximately half the total allocation over the three years at £5,878,604 m.

In the second round public sector domination is reduced with a total of 70% of funding going to public sector organisations and 30% of the funding going to the community or voluntary sectors. The projects were listed in the documentation as either public or voluntary suggesting that in the second round much less emphasis was placed on cross sectoral or even partnership working. This figure of 30% is high when compared with the other cases cited here even though in this case funding was specifically for the improvement of mainstream services. The total amount was a little less than in the first round at £5,653,692 m.

**DRIVERS FOR CO-GOVERNANCE**

The drivers for co-governance are summarised in table 17 and discussed below.

Table 17 – Factors emerging from the research which appear to act as drivers for co-governance within the Coventry Partnership (LSP).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Central Government Policy</th>
<th>Partnership activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central Government led policy</td>
<td>City council actively rejects their dominant role through active management of interaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Broad sectoral membership</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- NRF and CEP funding</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Accreditation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constitution</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support and commitment of members shown through attendance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active community participation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Central Government led policy

Broad sectoral membership
A great deal of effort has been expended in trying to ensure broad sectoral representation to meet the requirement of central government policy. This relates particularly to the voluntary and community sectors. Broad representation is also reflected in the membership of the Operations Group and NRF panel. The City Council were praised in the Comprehensive Performance Assessment for their approach to building and maintaining external relations.

Funding arrangements
NRF has been instrumental in forwarding the swift establishment of the partnership. In addition, the Community Empowerment Fund (CEF) is important for securing a significant role for community representatives. The CEF is managed by the Council for Voluntary Services who have played a vital role in developing this aspect of the partnership. Funding has supported a full-time development worker who has enabled community representatives be more effective. A training course had been developed for representatives and the development worker also briefed participants regarding forthcoming issues and debates within the LSP. The five representatives are employed part-time for two years while the Community Network develops, then network members will vote for their own representatives. As well as contributing as board members, representatives are active within the community relaying the community’s views to the LSP and vice versa.

Accreditation
The accreditation process has potentially had a very great impact upon the partnership. It has required the submission of a document outlining in detail who is participating and how the structures of the partnership will operate to ensure that all actors in the partnership have the opportunity to influence proceedings. The Government Office have had a key role in the accreditation process assessing the processes which Coventry have established. As Coventry had few issues the Government Office have not played a large role in facilitating and mediating.
Partnership activity

Council avoids dominance

Although the City Council have been key to the development of the partnership, as the former discussion attests, they have been aware of their potential for dominance and expressed a wish to be seen as facilitating the inclusion of the other sectors. They have done this in three ways: firstly, by the inclusion of communities in the NRF process; secondly, by developing for the future an independent secretariat with an operations or partnership manager to guide the LSP; and thirdly by the way in which the current interim secretariat were active in trying to facilitate interaction within the partnership over key aspects of their work.

For example, they were very conscious of managing interactions within the group. The Council Officer raised the issue of the lack of some participant’s knowledge concerning regeneration issues, she argued

‘why is the LSP to have more knowledge [around regeneration], some have not seen neighbourhood and renewal in the same sentence before. So we have been trying to do some training around that for all members not just the community’.

Furthermore, in terms of the involvement of communities, she argued there is a tension around expecting local communities to have a strategic view ‘why should they? ‘So there’s an element [of needing] to train people to enable them to make those decisions’.

The potential for co-governance is also increased by the active management of external agendas. For example, the housing strategy had been managed successfully by asking members in advance of the meeting to think about how their service or their area is influenced by or influences the housing sector in order to encourage members to make the links between difference aspects of public service. This type of management had been successful in gaining the

‘dynamic of having all those people there who can then bounce ideas and take things forward and that’s where we thought the LSP had a unique contribution to make that the partners on their own did not’ (Interview with Council Officer).
This had been a lesson learnt over the Crime and Disorder Strategy, which was taken to
the partnership fully formed due to a lack of time and therefore the partnership had little
impact upon this strategy. She argued

‘there were a whole lot of issues around what is the best way for
them to contribute’ (Interview with Council Officer).

Constitution

Another driver for co-governance is the adoption of a constitution for the partnership.
This contains voting procedures that are based on a two thirds majority to pass a
motion. However, the general principle is to gain a consensus within the partnership
regarding decisions and the voting procedure will only be invoked as a last resort. Other
rules designate meetings inquorate if less than 50% of members are present. Although
decisions can be taken in an emergency by the elected spokespersons of each sectoral
group.

The constitution also places a requirement on members to act in the interests of the
partnership, for example making sure they communicate effectively to their
organisations or the interests they represent. They are also required to communicate
positively about the value and role of the partnership. Members undertake not to
criticise the functioning of the partnership meetings without first discussing any
criticisms or concerns within the partnership and providing the partnership the
opportunity to address them. Accountability for actions rests on the LSP giving an
Annual Report to an open City Conference about its work. Coventry followed other
local authorities in developing the constitution but central government are also now
recommending that LSPs have one.

Commitment

Support and commitment to the policy was manifested in the regularity of member’s
attendance at LSP meetings. A level of minimum attendance had been written into the
constitution and therefore formed a policy structure supporting this but as yet it had not
been invoked. It was unfortunate that it was the very members who were not regular
attendees that were the ones considered the most important and were allowed to send a
substitute. Overall though, attendance was cited as good comparative to other partnerships (Interview with Council Officer).

**Active community participation**

There were no problems in relation to people expressing their views in the meetings and this included the community representatives. They were praised for their work in challenging service providers by asking questions which providers often found difficult to answer. The Chief Executive of Connexions, similarly to other members, argued that representatives had a freshness or naivety. He noted the community representatives did not conform to the rules of being a peer, i.e. polite and uncritical. They just said what they thought from their perspective and he felt that this was perhaps no bad thing and would be a loss if the members became institutionalised. A good example was around a complaint to do with community-police interaction.

"One of the representatives lives in a block of flats... the police had been dropping leaflets to residents about how to maintain security in their dwellings. It was Sunday morning and the officer banged on the door very loudly. He argued this would not have happened in this way in the leafy suburbs the police would have more respect.

This type of interaction was just what central government wanted to enable services to be improved in deprived areas.

**CONSTRAINTS ON CO-GOVERNANCE**

The constraints on co-governance are summarised in table 18 and discussed below.

Table 18 – Factors emerging from the research which appear to constrain co-governance within the Coventry Partnership (LSP)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Central Government Policy</th>
<th>Partnership Activity</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central government prescribed policy for NR:</td>
<td>Partnership’s systems</td>
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<tr>
<td>- GOR role</td>
<td>Challenging community representatives</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Funding and timescales</td>
<td>Limits to bending mainstream resources</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Community Empowerment Fund</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Targets</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Accreditation process</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Accountability</td>
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</table>
Central government policy

Neighbourhood Renewal LSP Policy
Whilst the LSP was received positively on the whole there were a range of outstanding issues. One interviewee argued that the creation of the LSP had held back the progress of the Forum due to the demands to fit with central government's ideas:

‘When its something that’s emerging from the City Forum we have had that and that has led us to work together better and towards a set of priorities, in some way the development of the LSP has put a gap in this now, it was working and now this is new, it is a hiatus’(Interview with Local Education Authority Officer).

Government Office role
The interest in co-governance extends to the relationship between the partnership and regional and central government. Respondents were asked to what extent the relationship had changed with the regional office and the centre? In general, whilst the feeling was that the Government Office representative who came to meetings was helpful and central government rhetoric had changed. There were limits to what the Government Office could do given the policy institutions created by central government which did not always support the ideals of the policy.

Resources were also stretched at Government Office level for the facilitation and mediation role they were supposed to play. Furthermore, their policing role within the accreditation system complicated the relationship. However, the Government Office representative suggested that the accreditation process had been weak leaving them with little leverage in the future

‘We can’t decide what is good etc. we can’t say you are not having any impact which is a real measure. The feeling is others should not have got through. It is very much harder to fail them a second time’

Funding and timescales
A factor which has got in the way of the NR process (arguably made worse by the bidding systems introduced at the local level) is the continuation of annual grant allocations by central government. The council argued they also wanted to include
communities in the decision-making. In essence community participation was also part of central government’s aim but the partnership found that attempting to put this into practice was difficult since central government had not allowed sufficient flexibility in the grant aid rules. Timescales were tight for the statement of use for grant aid. These had to be produced by October for that year’s funding. This effectively gave the partnerships just 6 months to develop proposals and consult with communities even in the second year of NRF. The pressure to commit money to projects which could go ahead may not have supported considered choice over projects. In this way central government actions worked against the principles of co-governance laid out in their own policy.

Community Empowerment Fund

The way the Community Empowerment Fund has been managed by central government has not supported co-governance in an ideal way. The representative from the Council for Voluntary Services argued that the money had come too late in the development of the LSP. The first funding was released in the Autumn of 2001 to prepare a community network and representative for the first formal meeting of the LSP in the spring of 2002. What this meant was that there was a potential for the community representatives to come in as late entrants when ‘other people will have got cosy and used to working with each other’ (Interview with Voluntary Sector Representative). The funding was limited to three years and the viability of an ongoing strong and effective community network beyond this point was questioned.

Although community representatives were effective in their roles the extent to which they could reach out to the multitude of community organisations is limited by the nine hours a week for which the representatives are paid to do the work. One of the community representatives argued that

'We are stressed out because we are not doing the follow-up visits that we want to. We’ve started a newsletter to explain why we have not been back it has turned out to be a much bigger project than we thought'.
Targets

There was recognition of the issues around the supposedly open and consensual process that partnerships and communities were to employ in spending the NRF and the way that this clashed with meeting targets and working towards central government’s core objectives. This was most eloquently expressed by the Government Office representative who felt that the NRF had been a missed opportunity to tackle some of the really difficult issues of public service. Central Government had argued that NRF could be spent on anything so long as it was fighting deprivation. The Government Office representative had argued they were

‘not trying to...tell them what the partnership should look like or do or how it should do it’

However, there was also an assumption that spending would be on mainstream services and more particularly on those areas which were identified in the floor targets: education; employment; crime; health and housing.

‘Getting the whole idea of the floor targets and the linkages with the communities has been very difficult’

However, increasingly the floor targets were shaping outcomes. The representative argued that in further rounds of NRF the funding

‘would not be to fund projects but to improve mainstream services...[and we would have to] give them much clearer guidelines’.

Accreditation

The accreditation guidance was also described as ‘not terribly helpful’ in terms of process. Again the timescale for developing the document were described as tight. They had at most three months between the guidance document being released in October 2001 and the submission being required before the first formal meeting in March 2002. The absence of community representatives during this time limited their input to the process (Interview with Council Officer).
Accountability

Some members argued that there were accountability issues concerning LSPs. From their perspective they had been set up to circumvent local authority control because of the Prime Minister’s distrust of local government. For one public sector provider this move was all part of a wider scheme to undermine local democracy perhaps in favour of the regional level.

The Council Officer argued that whilst LSPs were supposed to make the decisions it was local government that were still the accountable body. LSPs are non-executive bodies but they are expected to make decisions which a non-executive body can’t do. The partnership have elected to be an unincorporated body due to the problems of being incorporated which means that members have to represent that body. Clearly this would go against the principles of the LSP which is specifically to gather various interests within the community with a view to them reaching consensus regarding a way forward for that community. Accountability remains an aspect that has not been thoroughly addressed. This view was reiterated in a personal conversation with an NRU representative (Anon. 2001).

The Council were now regularly asked who the LSP is accountable to. The Council Officer had some sympathy with the view often expressed that Local Government used to be responsible for joined-up local services.

‘I think there is a feeling that government are desperately trying to join things back up again its not quite the same and there isn’t necessarily any democratic accountability’.

Because of these issues she argued central government had taken a step back with the NRF. They had stated in year two the NRF would be allocated by the partnership. Now the guidance states the LA ‘should allocate in collaboration with the LSP’ (Interview with Council Officer).
Partnership Activity

Partnership systems

Although the Coventry Partnership had developed well, some respondents were not content with the way the LSP’s systems had been established. Not surprisingly as the inclusion of the community representatives had come late, one of the representatives objected to the automatic appointment of the Council’s Chief Executive as Secretary and the Leader of the Council as Chair, he and others had raised this as an issue arguing that such positions should be filled through a voting process within the LSP. This was something which he would like to change and felt hopeful that these kinds of changes could be made in the future.

In addition, the operations manager was to be employed by the council, which raises issues regarding the level of true independence this person would have if they were dependent for their income from the council. This decision was taken for the pragmatic reason of an unincorporated body being unable to employ staff but it remains a way for the Local Authority to steer the LSP via the manager when ideally the manager should be accountable to the whole LSP.

Challenging Community Representatives

Paradoxically a constraint for co-governance can be seen in the way that the community representatives were ‘flexing their muscles’ and challenging public sector providers. Whilst this is their assigned role in central government policy, there had been incidents in which some respondents felt that they had gone too far in challenging other members, as the Local Education Authority respondent argued

‘There have been some issues around crime and disorder for some of them so there have been some sharp exchanges. There are five of them they are a big group against a single policeman. It does not feel altogether comfortable’.

Limits to bending mainstream resources

The limitations on the degree to which the bending of mainstream agencies’ work would happen was raised as a constraint on co-governance. It was difficult for most respondents to actually provide an example of where this had actually happened at the time of the research.
By contrast, in some instances the NRF panel had overridden the community’s views to an extent and had funded projects which they saw as important. One councillor, had argued

‘We said that a certain project is important so we said yes. I cannot remember what it was exactly but one of the less popular ones mental health or something, but you can sell that if you’ve taken on board what they wanted’.

It remains that communities felt they had lost control over something which they had been invited to participate in although the council were acting to fulfil their legal obligations to provide services for those in need.

SUMMARY

Overall, the LSP case shows some interesting developments in relation to coordination and co-governance. To an extent they have had some successes in both areas. There is no doubt that Coventry City Council have followed government guidelines and made a concerted attempt to develop an LSP.

In terms of coordination there were examples where this was developing. Much of it emerging from both: local interventions such as the City Forum, Area Coordination and PDGs; and from central government policy in other areas which were driving forward joined-up policies in health, crime and policies for young people. The LSP’s work was coordinated with the existing Community Plan and this formed the basis for the Neighbourhood Renewal strategies. The LSP had also effectively reduced the occurrence of duplication although the bidding system had potentially increased the likelihood of such duplication. The LSP was also acting as a rationalising body for the proliferation of partnerships in the area.

A particular area that had been given attention was the collection of baseline and summative evaluation data and a process for learning across the public sector in Coventry about what interventions were successful.
The NRF was spent on key strategic objectives but the actual interventions were not particularly highly coordinated. This had been something that the LSP had paid little attention to, especially in the first round and there was no evidence that any more coordination had been established in the second. For example, there was no acknowledgement of the co-location of interventions or how one intervention would reinforce another at the service level. This may of course, be carried forward at the service level but was not part of the stated strategy. The Government Office representative argued that interventions were too project based and were not designed to become part of mainstream services in the future. Coventry had not used the NRF in the way that central government had wanted.

In terms of co-governance, there had been examples of a co-governed approach and the structures put in place regarding the establishment of the LSP offered opportunities for improving services and developing co-governed approaches to development in the future. However, in the first year there had been a series of constraints on the development of genuine partnership around the spending of NRF. Many of these constraints were created at central government level. For example, the development of the Community Network needed to run alongside the development of the LSP. It did not and the result was that the community had not been involved in creating the basic structures of the partnership and in some cases this was seen as an issue. There were also difficulties around the development of the strategy for spending additional funds. Funding was effectively awarded to an embryonic partnership without a jointly developed strategy. Given the limitations on spending these funds even in the second year of the NRF, genuine co-governance over how to spend the funds would have been difficult in the time frame. The particular way in which this was handled in Coventry perhaps exacerbated this problem with the result that the three year’s funds were committed almost entirely by year two.

Overall, there had been limited influence from the wider LSP. However, as we saw the voluntary and community sectors did receive substantial amounts of funding particularly in the second round of NRF thus their place as service providers is well established.
Whilst the LSP is a promising development there are outstanding issues regarding the ongoing funding of community inclusion. Government have planned for three years funding only. There are also ongoing issues relating to the funding of the LSP itself and the lack of formal accountability. The success of the LSP will depend on the goodwill of its members to keep up momentum particularly if the NRF funding stream ends.
Chapter seven

Case study two:
The Regeneration Zone Partnership

INTRODUCTION

The Coventry and Nuneaton Regeneration Zone partnership (CNRZ) is a sub-regional partnership covering Coventry and the Nuneaton and Bedworth district. It delivers Advantage West Midland’s (AWM) Zone Initiative. The partnership developed from the spring of 2000 and at the time of the research, in the spring of 2002, it was about to go ‘live’ receiving funding to deliver their strategy. It is estimated that the potential level of funding from AWM could be in the region of £21.8 m over the 2002-2005 period and therefore represents a substantial investment in regeneration in the Coventry area (Coventry Solihull and Warwickshire Partnership Ltd 2001a).

This partnership is closely related to its ‘parent’, the Coventry, Solihull and Warwickshire Partnership (CSWP). Although the research does not concern CSWP directly, it is important to note that this partnership was established in the early 1990s by the Coventry and Warwickshire Councils to address economic development within the sub-region. The lack of development land within the Coventry City boundary was the key driver for this strategic alliance with Warwickshire. Warwickshire have available development land and the partnership allowed both areas to develop employment opportunities. It is therefore no surprise that the partnership has been dominated by Local Authority interests and as a limited company has acted as the accountable body for various SRB and other schemes in the area. It is, therefore well established as a local institution. AWM invited the partnership to develop a regeneration zone board and strategy for the sub-region to be funded through the Zone initiative.

AIMS AND OBJECTIVES

The principle underlying the Zones is the investment in deprived areas which also have opportunities for development emerging out of demand from inward investment or local development opportunities. In this way the Coventry-Nuneaton Zone is no different
from any other Zone within AWM’s remit. It is hoped that an initial round of concentrated investment will create additional engines of growth that will continue to transform the sub-region.

The Zone partnership’s approach has two main themes which provide a framework for action:

- Spreading Market Confidence to the north of the sub-region; and
- Creating ‘Bridges to Success’ between residents facing deprivation and the new opportunities created (ibid)

Within these themes the four pillars of the RDA’s Economic Strategy guide the strategic objectives:

- Bringing forward physical regeneration opportunities;
- Growing a more diverse, dynamic and competitive business base;
- Maximising the benefits of new employment opportunities in and close to the regeneration zone (Bridges to Success); and
- Promoting communities of interest and social enterprise (Advantage West Midlands 1999).

The stated principles which guide the Zone partnership’s work are:

- Partnership working to enable coordinated and focused action to maximise partner inputs;
- The promotion of equal opportunities;
- The creation of neighbourhood-based partnerships and strategies which are linked to sub-regional and regional developments as part of bridges to success; and
- Building on good practice and success whilst addressing weaknesses (Coventry Solihull and Warwickshire Partnership Ltd 2001a).

Within the Action Plan there is a clear commitment expressed to forward both coordination and co-governance. It aims to support broad inclusion. An example of this is demonstrated through the principle of equal opportunities, the Action Plan states that the partnership will

‘ensure that all groups and residents within the zone which are often excluded from regeneration processes...are involved in our structures and in any other consultations which we sponsor’ (ibid:12).
Coordination is a central strand within the Zone Initiative. In this case coordination is largely thought of in a strategic context. The Zones are to achieve their goals by steering funding streams to work in unison. AWM state that in addition to the zone’s own spending priorities,

'regeneration zones provide the basis for coordination of policy and resources in order to boost wealth creation by encouraging enterprise and providing access to opportunity through 'Bridges to Success' (Advantage West Midlands undated:6).

AWM and the Zone partnership form an organising network designed to ‘influence actions and spending in initiatives’ that will encourage economic development. They are tasked with pulling other scarce public resources in a focused way onto these Zones. In principle the CNRZ forms the second strategic partnership for the Coventry Area and in this role they are attempting to forward a ‘focused, joined-up, 10 year action plan’ (Coventry Solihull and Warwickshire Partnership 2001a:2).

It is intended that the Zone will provide a strategic framework for other funding streams such as those for Objective 2 and Assisted Areas. It is hoped they will also influence the allocation of mainstream funding (Advantage West Midlands 2000).

Currently work is focused upon 16 wards, 6 of which are among the 10% with the highest levels of deprivation. Regeneration investment has been placed in a wide range of projects which are economically based such as new office developments; city centre redevelopment; a sports stadium; theatre redevelopment; community based economic development; developing high tech industries; contributing to an existing ‘holistic’ area based scheme and establishing neighbourhood partnerships (Coventry Solihull and Warwickshire Partnership Ltd 2001a).

Similarly to the LSP some attention has been paid to the development of a common format for monitoring and evaluation across the partnership to ensure that comparisons can be made and data is accurate (ibid).
ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE PARTNERSHIP

The partnership is led by a management board responsible for the Zone strategy, the allocation of resources and the monitoring of the delivery plan. A dedicated secretariat of two administrators will serve the partnership. In addition there exists a Task Group comprising Local Authority officers. This has been the main vehicle for the development of the strategy and implementation plans. There are also four Theme Groups which were a later development. These focus on various areas of the partnership’s work and intend to implement and further refine the strategy. The groups are listed below:

- The Property Advisory Group
- The Coventry and Warwickshire Business Link Partnership
- Bridges to Success Group
- Communities of Interest group

The groups comprise a combination of board members and other individuals from Local Authorities; mainstream providers; and the private sector and voluntary sector.

COORDINATION

In terms of policy coordination, CNRZ is in principle highly coordinated. A key feature of the Zone initiative is the coordination of different sources of funding. There is a strong correlation between the objectives of the Single Programming Document, which is the regional strategy for funding Objective 2 bids from the European Regional Development Fund, and the CNRZ strategy. Both aim to contribute to environmental sustainability; equality of opportunity and creating a culture of innovation to restore competitive advantage (Coventry Solihull and Warwickshire Partnership Ltd 2001a). European Regional Development Fund, European Social Fund and Learning and Skills Council funding has been used to co-finance training services. This is intended to allow greater coordination of training services that more precisely match supply with demand and therefore create added value.
The partnership has also coordinated their work with the existing themes for the sub-region developed by CSWP, for example, the focus on hi technology corridors. Furthermore, there is a strong link between the two local authorities’ strategies and those now embodied within the Zone strategy document (ibid). For example, the ‘Arena’ development in Coventry and the ‘Pride in Camp Hill’ scheme in Nuneaton. The latter had originally been funded through SRB and now the project is to be extended using Zone funding.

Figure 6 - An illustration of the level of coordination within the Zone plan.

Based on CSWP (2001a; 2002).

Key: LSC/SBS - Learning and Skills Council/Small Business Service; NDC - New Deal for Communities; ERDF - European Regional Development Fund

The degree of coordination across projects varies. The Camp Hill scheme represents a highly coordinated and holistic attempt at regeneration that combines physical, social and economic regeneration. Other schemes such as the Theatre project are less coordinated but nevertheless designed to fit with the broader strategies. Figure 6 shows the links between each project and others within the scheme and those outside the scheme. The thicker lines denote links between projects within the scheme. Arrows denote links with policies and programmes outside of the scheme. This demonstrates that coordination across the strategy has been given some thought. In addition to Camp Hill there is also substantial coordination between the Central Depot and Electric Wharf and in the integrated Town Centre Revitalisation. However it may be just as, if not
more, important to note the links between the CNRZ projects and other ‘holistic’ plans, for example, the Neighbourhood Renewal developments, European Funding, New Deal for Communities, and Community Planning.

In terms of service level coordination this appeared to be underdeveloped by the Zone partnership. Where clear service coordination was taking place for example in the Camp Hill scheme in areas such as advice work, this had developed before the Zone work began and was the result of individual agencies’ work.

Despite the evidence of coordination, particularly at the strategic/policy level, the interview material highlighted the slow progress made and in some cases the lack of a clearly articulated approach to achieving certain types of coordination. In some instances it was recognised that schemes which offered prospects of job creation such as the Arena had yet to coordinate plans for the physical regeneration of the football stadium with the Bridges to Success concept. This prevented funding from being awarded.

In fact the whole of the Bridges to Success strand was underdeveloped. The representative from the Learning and Skills Council argued that one of the weaknesses of the implementation plan for CNRZ

'is that it is very heavily biased toward infrastructural developments...and perhaps' at this point there is not sufficient activity in terms of supporting business, education and training. I think we need to understand that more fully'... 'this is an area that we have still got quite a lot of work to do in the regeneration zone and sub-region we do need to work much more closely in terms of the way that we manage strategically funds to regenerate areas'.

A further area where coordination had been difficult to develop concerned the difficulties the two regional bodies (AWM and GOWM) had fully coordinating their activities around co-financing. The result was a developing strategic joined-up-ness that was being 'tacked together operationally at the last minute' (Interview with Council Officer). Officers working up programming documents for the sub-region still had to write two separate bids, one for Objective 2 and the other for the CNRZ even though the council officer argued 'they are the same documents' and are coordinated. Furthermore,
encouragement for bidders to work up bids that applied for both sources of funding together had been late coming and this had prevented some bidders from applying.

DRIVERS FOR COORDINATION

The drivers for coordination are summarised in table 19 and discussed below.

Table 19 – Factors emerging from the research which appear to be important drivers for coordination within CNRZ.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Central or Regional Policy</th>
<th>Partnership activity</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central government policy:</td>
<td>Established network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- RDAs</td>
<td>Partnership strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Social Exclusion</td>
<td>Commitment</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Targets</td>
<td>Good partnership relations</td>
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<tr>
<td>AWM policy:</td>
<td>Key actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Funding</td>
<td>Investment in evaluation research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Support</td>
<td>Administration (particularly for the future)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Central Government Policy

RDA and Social Exclusion

Central government policy has clearly been influential in the development of the CNRZ strategy. It is consistent with national and regional government policy on regeneration. It has a strong emphasis on dealing with social exclusion through education and training and to dealing with a lack of competitiveness through business support and innovation clusters (Coventry Solihull and Warwickshire Partnership Ltd 2001a). Both areas which benefit from coordinated approaches.

Targets

Similarly to the LSP case, targets were an important driver in the development of both the regional and CNRZ strategy and the thinking behind them. As in the other cases through meeting targets and the pressure this would create was not a current reality but was nevertheless influential.
AWM policy funding

From the partnership’s perspective AWM had been sensible in allowing funding for development work and had since agreed to fund a dedicated secretariat to enable better management and administration of the Zone partnership. The funding of £343,000 for year one was thought to be a substantial amount and would support the ongoing work. This should rectify some of the difficulties there have been over staffing the partnership to date. At the time of the research the secretariat were place but had joined late after the strategy had been developed.

Part of this funding would also help to address some of the identified issues to do with developing the theme groups who are supposed to carry out much of the actual operational planning for coordination around issues such as business support and training. The council officer also explained that Theme Group champions will be employed who will bring together the partners working on the ground and manage them.

Support

Although there were problems to do with the relationship between AWM and the Zone partnership, it was recognised that AWM were attempting to support coordination. A particular example of this is the support for the coordination or Zone and Objective 2 funds through AWM chairing a road show ‘to enthuse people to put bids together’ (Interview with Council Officer).

Partnership Activity

Established network

The existence of an established network that has a substantial degree of experience working together and has achieved results has undoubtedly helped CNRZ to develop. Whilst its achievements may be small, compared to the other Zones in the West Midlands it is highly developed. In addition, CSWP already had strategies for the area which have provided the basis for the CNRZ work.
**Partnership’s Strategy**

The documentation provides evidence that policy level coordination is attempting to establish suitable mechanisms for service level coordination to develop in the future. The Camp Hill scheme already has elements of service level coordination for example within its advice services and Opportunities Centre. In other projects such as the Neighbourhood Projects there are opportunities for joined-up service delivery since centres such as the Willenhall Employment Centre are already delivering training services along with advice and support. Similarly since the strategy seeks to utilise existing structures, there are opportunities for service level coordination within business services projects. It cannot be argued that little thought has been given to the subject of coordination.

**Commitment**

Similarly to the other partnerships respondents expressed a commitment to serving the partnership and trying to deal effectively with regeneration issues. In general there was support for the Zone Initiative and what central government were hoping to achieve.

**Good partnership relations**

The partnership relations had been developed through CSWP

> 'In terms of the partners and coordinating these we have built up through CSWP largely a very good working relationship. And it has be said when I was Leader we had a very good working relationship with the county and the districts and with the private and voluntary sector [this] has been carried over into the Zone' (Interview with Councillor).

It was perceived that there was real value in partnership working for these local authorities. The Chair argued that

> 'There have been substantial gains to date. Things have been achieved that would never have been achieved without partnership working the gains for the future could be immense'.

**Key actors**

Furthermore, the contribution of individual members, particularly the Task Group has allowed some coordination between projects and in the strategy generally.
Investment in research

Board members, particularly those from the public sector were well aware that there were gaps in the strategy where the coordination of activities were concerned and further development work had to be done. The Learning Skills Council representative argued that in terms of funding for training what they needed to know was

‘what we are funding now, this is probably the holy grail it is one of those sorts of things really, in a sense it is mission impossible you will never get it right but you try to improve what you are doing’.

To address this they were reviewing what funds were available, what is being funded and what outputs are being sought to avoid duplication of effort. Other research was also being conducted around matching the unemployed to work opportunities and the necessary training (Interview with CNRZ Officers).

Administration

During the development of the Zone the administration had been poor in relation to the scope and enormity of the task. In part there was no dedicated secretariat because of funding. Initially, the lack of a secretariat had left the council officers to do the development work which had supported coordination simply because less people had been involved in decision-making. The council officer explained that CNRZ

‘rely on us partners quite a lot. The Zone Initiative had put a lot of pressure on GSWP. Really they are quite small. They are asked to lead on this sort of stuff as well as manage existing programmes’

The Chief Executive was in no doubt that better partnership management was of crucial importance for the future. He argued that an effective secretariat provided

‘a focal point they are a lynchpin, they work 100% on this. They rattle cages where necessary and things get done’.

CONSTRAINTS ON COORDINATION

The constraints on coordination are summarised in table 20 and discussed below.
Table 20 – Factors emerging from the research which appear to constrain the development of coordination within CNRZ.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Central or Regional Policy</th>
<th>Partnership activity</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central government policy proliferation</td>
<td>Resistance to coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional level institutions and policy</td>
<td>Poor management</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Resource constraints</td>
<td>Rubber stamping</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Complexity</td>
<td>Administration</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Size</td>
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Central Government Policy

Policy proliferation

Despite New Labour’s interest in coordination, it was argued by a senior AWM Officer that there had been a lack of joined-up thinking by central government which affected a range of issues.

Central government had created the RDAs in 1999 as the main vehicle for regeneration. However, by 2002 central government had overlaid the RDAs with their own regeneration programme, Neighbourhood Renewal. From the perspective of AWM, this clashed with their own policy. LSPs and Zones both have responsibility to plan within their geographical areas. This was problematic in terms of who had authority over any one area. It was felt that the City Council were unlikely to concede authority to the sub-regional body and yet the Zone partnership and AWM felt that their approach was superior as it offered the potential of a more genuinely joined-up approach (Interview with AWM respondent). The CNRZ’s Chief Executive argued that ‘LSPs are a distraction’.

Furthermore, central government had created tension between AWM and the Government Office because they had failed to clarify the roles of the two organisations which left both

‘not quite knowing where either of them are sitting on the social policy side because AWM up until now have said no social regeneration that’s Government Office business’ (Interview with Council Officer).
This had not helped in the quest for the coordination of European and Zone funding as European Programmes were at the time under the remit of the Government Office.

At a time of rapid policy development, other policies were also constraining coordinated activity in the Zone. Explaining why training was poorly integrated into the Zone Initiative, the Learning and Skills Council representative argued that

'I think it is a function of a lot of issues really, it is a function of the development of the plan not coinciding particularly well with the formation of the new Learning and Skills Council and Small Business Service'.

Respondents also complained that central government's approach was too complicated.

The Chief Executive of the Zone argued there

'are too many pots of money still, it takes too much time no one can be aware of all these sources of funding. Why can't they just give the money...and leave it to the people on the ground. It would be easier to monitor'.

A community representative argued that coordination becomes

'unmanageable because people want to coordinate things on different levels...at the neighbourhood...ward...citywide and then sub-regional, then people have to make a decision on which bit they play and people like the [representative from the Council for Voluntary Services] it on everything'.

The whole thing was simply too complex and made too many demands. This was something that was felt by many actors from both the statutory and voluntary sector.

From the Voluntary Sector's perspective central government weren't

'putting in the necessary resources into it...each year more is expected with no more resources so how many times can you make the same amount of money work in different ways and there is the compulsion to do it without the resources to back it up' (Interview with representative from the Council for Voluntary Services in Nuneaton).
Regional level institutions and policy

Issues were also raised about actions from the two regional institutions which had constrained greater coordination. AWM had been slow making decisions regarding funding for projects. This new organisation was less than efficient, the Zone’s Chief Executive argued that it took 12 weeks to process a project funding request. One councillor argued they ‘are a difficult bird to deal with’ they found it difficult to make commitments. One of the community representatives complained that AWM were too concerned with strategy, the plan kept being revised as AWM wanted it to be a working document but it was now preventing the delivery of services.

There were also issues concerning AWM not being clear about what they wanted, the Chief Executive had argued ‘they make it up as they go along’. As AWM were creating their own processes they were moving away from the Government Office processes which made life difficult for actors on the ground. The council officer argued that rather than becoming more coordinated

‘the delivery issues are getting worse...AWM are working out their appraisal process for Zone projects we have totally different ones for Government Office its frustrating’.

Overall the partnership members and officers found AWM too controlling. The Chair argued that AWM is prone to be an organisation that is controlling just as central government had been rather

‘than being willing to believe and trust the sub-regional partnerships underneath them’.

A further factor which affected the management of the partnership was the lack of authority held by the partnership managers (secretariat). AWM wanted them to check bids as they were accepted and then after the contract had been awarded by AWM, the secretariat were to manage the projects. This caused some concern as one officer argued

‘How am I supposed to get information to say that we are on track, they say the board is responsible for delivery, how can that be we’ve got no authority’...‘we don’t manage the contract ourselves’ (Interview with Zone Officer).
Where AWM, like central government before them, were going wrong was not thinking through the implementation. There was too much emphasis on strategy.

'Structure is the problem there is a presumption that collaboration and cooperation will occur and [the idea that] the only way to do it is through partnership is flawed...we used to do it through management' (Interview with Chief Executive).

Resource issues - funding

Whilst AWM had funded the development of the plan they had been slow in funding the secretariat. In part because of this and partly because of the shortage of experienced staff the Zone partnership had suffered from the lack of quality and continuity in staffing. The Chief Executive had been replaced just as the CNRZ went live. Previously there had been three senior officers working on the administration of the partnership since its inception (roughly over an 18 month period). Other more junior officers had also left the partnership and had been difficult to replace. The impact of what was admitted to be poor administration had left the Task Group of council officers developing the plan in isolation which had affected what was included and how it was developed.

Complexity

The major difficulty for coordinating activities was the time it was taking to collect good data on where the funding currently went. This work was being carried out and had rooted out duplication The Learning Skills Council representative argued that they had awarded contracts only to find out that the same people had gained funding for the same training projects from elsewhere. He argued you have to try and improve what you are doing but you do have to ‘ask yourself how strategic are you being when this sort of thing happens’.

Size

The size of the Coventry area also impacted on the level of coordination achieved, the Warwickshire Council Officer argued that its

'coordinated here in Warwickshire because everything goes through me, in Coventry it is more difficult because it is much more dispersed...its much bigger than us. They have found it more
difficult to be gatekeeper than I am here’ (Interview with Council Officer).

Partnerhip Activity

Resistance to coordination
Problems were also highlighted concerning the basic partnership model. While many members were committed the Zone partnership had also suffered from a lack of commitment to the process by some members. In terms of coordination it was argued by the Chief Executive that.

‘you can’t get coordinated action through a committee’ ‘People say (to the secretariat) fine you do it all and they go off and do other things - develop other strategies’ ‘they all come to the table but they don’t allow you to develop ideas for their businesses. It is just a resource’ (op cit).

Poor management
One way CNRZ have attempted to improve coordination has been through the creation of Theme Groups. These were introduced eighteen months into the process. All four had been difficult to establish. The Task Group who had been responsible to date for developing plans had not wanted to create new bodies but to feed into things that already existed for other purposes. The Bridges to Success theme was picked out as a particularly poor example,

‘we tried to do that (avoid creating new bodies) for...particularly for the bridges to success it hasn’t worked largely because the employment service has been going through so much turmoil...we’ve really got to create something that is actually additional to what we already have. Otherwise you don’t get the focus on the regeneration side of it you just do your job...just your business agenda. We are still working on it...I am part of it I am part of the problem as well...we have got to do a lot more’ (Op Cit).

The business theme group was also in its early days,

‘there are existing partnerships etc, which they are trying to build into but what we’ve done is got a consultant in to try and work it out that is where the resourcing issue is really bad’ (Interview with Council Officer).
CO-GOVERNANCE

Membership of the Zone board is multi-sectoral with 12 members in total plus the Chair. Other members were still required particularly from the business sector and ethnic minority representation. The sectoral mix is outlined in table 21.

Table 21 – Sectoral interest representation on the Zone Board (correct at the time of the research)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Number of members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public Sector</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Sector</td>
<td>1 (Chair is from the private sector)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary Sector</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Sector</td>
<td>3 Community representatives (1 yet to be appointed)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Councillors</td>
<td>4 Councillors (2 from each LA area)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on information provided by partnership officer).

There is a much less pronounced public sector representation, the Learning and Skills Council being the only one. This reflects the economic development role this board is to play. The other key difference is that the two local authorities have a higher profile despite AWM’s insistence that they would like to reduce LA input particularly from the political side (Interview with AWM representative).

During most of the development period the board could not be said to be representative. The voluntary sector had been there from the beginning but the decision to include community representatives came later. At the time of the research the private sector remained underrepresented. The Chair argued that

‘I don’t know that we have got wholly adequate representation of the private sector but that’s very difficult to achieve so we have to achieve it through the Chamber who are allegedly representative of the private sector one hopes that they are...but I am not sure that they are wholly representative of the larger manufacturing companies’

He also argued that the Chamber could help in achieving the business representation on the board,
organisationally they have got the ability to contribute by linking in with the businesses in the regeneration zone...but I don’t think we have yet seen it’

The board had its failings in terms of being representative although most respondents were reasonably satisfied given the difficulty of the task and the recent improvements vis a vis the community representatives, as one community representative argued

‘I don’t think you will ever get the balance right in a group of 14 people trying to be representative, you are going to come under scrutiny from all sort of groups. It is really difficult what you have to try to do is pick people that have got a broad base and are involved in a lot of things’

There had also been genuine attempts to consult more widely with communities even though there had been no requirement for the partnership to do this.

More important than the sectoral representation on the board is the level of influence board members have had. Board members have had little to do with influencing the development of the strategy. What has happened in the past is that

‘A lot of work gets done behind the scenes...by other people and then just rubber stamped’ (Interview with Community representative).

Respondents argued that there had been little debate and argument over the Zone’s activities in the board meetings. The Chair had argued that there had not been any issues with the plans thus far, because,

‘the first year’s plans are obvious, everybody is going to agree with them and run with them’

At the time of CNRZ going live all of the projects put forward had been planned by the two local authorities. The following quote provides evidence of this:

‘as an officer doing the work...for me the important work is actually done by the officers we have a task group which is me [and the officer for Coventry] and we make sure that the work gets done with the CSWP secretariat because on its own the Zone is powerless to do anything without us as regeneration officers doing it for them’ (Interview with Council Officer)
The level of resources allocated to a sector can be used as a proxy for the level of influence various sectors have had. Table 22 shows the spread of projects across sectors with the percentage of total funding allocated to each of these sectors. The table also includes the situation in year one and the provisional situation for the following three years.

**Table 22 – Allocations to specific sectors and the percentage of these in relation to the total funding to be allocated through AWM in years one to three (nb actual allocation will depend upon approval of later projects).**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sectoral ownership of projects</th>
<th>Number of projects in first year (2002/3)</th>
<th>Total funding to each sector (£)</th>
<th>Percentage of total spent in round one</th>
<th>Number of projects in 2003/4 and 2004/5</th>
<th>Total funding to each sector</th>
<th>Percentage of total spent in round two</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public sector</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>226,000</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>600,000</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary sector</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public/Voluntary Sector</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1,205,000</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8,200,000</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public/private partnerships</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>145,000</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9,995,000</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3,000,000</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1,676,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
<td>21,795,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on data supplied by the Coventry and Nuneaton Regeneration Zone (2001a; 2002).

As the table shows the spread of projects is as follows, the public sector have 1, the voluntary sector have 1; public/voluntary partnership have 4 and the public/private partnerships have 3. The public sector is dominant with their involvement in 8 of the 9 projects. There is, though, a difference within the Zone as less activity is carried out solely by public sector partnerships or public sector organisations. There is also a healthy spread of voluntary sector activity within some of the projects which compares favourably with the SRB scheme. Again the Voluntary sector have not gained many solely owned projects.

For the future, as it is currently projected, it is the public and business sectors which will gain in terms of projects with the public sector gaining another 2 on their own and another 3 in partnership with the business sector. The business sector are to gain 1
which they will operate solely. There is currently no planned increase in voluntary/community sector involvement.

**DRIVERS FOR CO-GOVERNANCE**

The drivers for co-governance are summarised in table 23 and discussed below.

**Table 23 – Factors emerging from the research which appear to act as drivers for co-governance within the Zone.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Central and Regional policy</th>
<th>Partnership Activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central Government Policy</td>
<td>Support for:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AWM policy</td>
<td>- Community membership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Community consultation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Raising awareness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Partnership relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Commitment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Leadership</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Central and Regional Policy**

*Central policy*

Undoubtedly the general thrust of central government policy had an impact on the way the Zone operated. Issues of co-governance and the perceived benefits from broad inclusion were largely accepted by the board and its officers.

*AWM Policy*

Whilst AWM had not implemented a set of policy institutions to facilitate broad inclusion they were particularly keen to support the inclusion of the voluntary sector. Without this the *Bridges to Success* theme would probably fail.

The funding AWM provide will not only support the secretariat but will also cover aspects of consultation with the community and voluntary groups, via publicity, information events, public meetings and seminars and in addition to allow capacity building among the voluntary and community groups to encourage continued
involvement. The Theme Groups would also benefit from funding which in turn would increase the levels of potential co-governance.

However, most of the drivers supporting co-governance in this case were emerging from the actions of the partnership itself.

**Partnership Activity**

**Strategy**

Whilst broad inclusion had not characterised the strategy making process, two strands of the strategy put forward by the two local authorities were described as generic strategies. These had yet to be fully developed either in terms of focus or in terms of precise project proposals. It was hoped that during implementation this would allow greater involvement of the community, voluntary and business sectors.

**Partnership membership**

The partnership had addressed what could be seen as some of the weaknesses in the board membership. The private sector remained difficult to attract but the board had voluntarily included community representatives to help provide the vital links into deprived communities which the strategy would need. They were also aware of the need to provide induction training for new board members particularly those from the community in order that they can be more effective. One community member had argued that they had a lot of support regarding the structures and how things worked, they were also invited to pre-board meetings so they could raise issues in a less threatening environment. This had helped to increase their knowledge which despite their experience was useful as the use of jargon abounded.

**Community Consultation**

There had been no requirement for the CNRZ to carry out direct consultation with communities themselves, although individual projects had been required to do this. Nevertheless some consultation with the communities within the Zone had taken place. Consultation booklets had been created in which the basic purpose and outline of the CNRZ were laid out and responses were invited (Coventry Solihull and Warwickshire
Partnership Ltd 2001b). The Chief Executive argued that part of this had been driven by the need

‘to test...partner consultation processes...if people were emerging saying they had not been consulted on this and essentially we have made it very clear to partners that when they put a programme together they need to consult’.

However, turnout had been poor, but the partnership found they could address this by ‘piggy backing’ onto other community involvement exercises such as that for the Nuneaton & Bedworth Community Plan or where an active community was already set up through Area Coordination within Coventry.

It had been decided in the future to concentrate efforts through the Communities of Interest Theme Group as the main route into further consultation. ‘We want the voluntary organisations which we employ to have good governance so that they can engage with local communities and groups’ (Interview with Chief Executive). He also argued that it was really ‘involvement rather than consultation that we are seeking’, and a similar process was to be applied to the business sector through the Business Theme Group.

Raising awareness
There were two other ways in which consultation might improve in the future. Firstly, the Chair was keen to look at the whole communications exercise, Public Relations consultants were being employed to help with this. He argued that regeneration exercises in this country were not publicised they failed to have a high profile and they need to do more but it had to be ‘simple, clear and innovative’. This would be an additional way to make people aware of the existence of the Zone and could perhaps generate some interest in taking part in consultation exercises.

Furthermore, a second way in which community consultation may improve is through existing consultation exercises, for example routine consultations by LAs; scheme level consultation for Camp Hill and the Area Forums. In addition, there was now the developing LSP Community Network. It was the partnership’s aim that this could
interweave with what the Communities of Interest theme group was doing in the regeneration zone and would help to avoid consultation fatigue.

**Partnership relations**

It has already been argued that partnership relations were good between core members but had been less good from the perspective of the community and voluntary sectors. The meetings had not been characterised by open discussions. However, one of the community representatives argued that at more recent meetings there was

'quite a discussion on various things, people were getting involved and really putting forward or giving information about particular things that are happening'

The Council officer argued that

'we actually spend a long time thinking about our strategy for getting voluntary sector involvement'.

**Commitment**

There was a commitment to the ideals of reaching consensus through interactive processes. The Chair argued that

'you have to look at where the deprivation is and where the need is greater and hopefully that's what the board will be able to bring to it...there are sufficient people on there with wholly objective minds and no baggage from the political side that can override the self-interests'

**Leadership**

Furthermore, the Chair showed leadership in the way he attempted to manage the partnership meetings

'in such a way that people feel that they are able to contribute that they are listened to and will have the opportunity to put their point across'

**CONSTRAINTS ON CO-GOVERNANCE**

The constraints of co-governance are summarised in table 24 and discussed below.
Table 24 – Factors emerging from the research which appear to constrain co-governance within the Zone.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Central and Regional policy</th>
<th>Partnership Activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AWM policies:</td>
<td>Inadequate membership -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountability</td>
<td>Timescales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time-scales</td>
<td>Partnership organisation:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Task Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Theme Groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Lack of time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Lack of knowledge</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Central and regional policy

AWM Policy
AWM had no policy on the inclusion of the community sector nor community in general. Nor did it have any realistic way to support the inclusion of the business sector which they wanted and felt they badly needed to make the strategy effective.

Accountability
Although there were moves to build better communications processes and the partnership were taking this seriously. There were no requirements nor developments in the partnership concerning accountability to the local population. Accountability would be gained through the usual requirements for regularity, propriety and value for money required from existing funding schemes such as the SRB.

Time-scales
The time-scales set by AWM which expected the partnership to be developed and the strategy and action plan to be developed within a nine month period further limited involvement from board members. Even the council officer was concerned about the way the strategy had been developed by the Task Group in isolation. She argued that

"It was a last minute scramble to put bids together. We had a strategy we knew what we wanted to do but we did not have the projects. Given a clean sheet of paper they are not necessarily the projects I would choose, but these could spend in time. It is so difficult to tap into it, it may distance innovative bids from the private and voluntary sectors. I do have the concern about it being a clique. The big players are soaking up the year one money,"
we have to be careful no one is kicking up a fuss yet that they’re not just duplicating spending it has to be additional spend’.

**Partnership Activity**

**Inadequate Membership**

Given the late inclusion and development of some sectoral representation, the level of influence has necessarily been limited in terms of involvement in decision-making. In part it could be argued this was created by the weak involvement structures compared which AWM instituted.

For the first 18 months of the formation of the Zone partnership there were no community sector members. Furthermore, it might be argued that the Zone partnership had managed the involvement of community members in such a way as to minimise criticism from over zealous community members. One community representative argued that the partnership did not want people off the streets, from the community as it were. There was in her words a ‘conflict between the skills that board members or community people have and the skills required on the board’. The specification for the members included knowledge of regeneration programmes and applicants needed to have already been involved in delivering a project. Therefore, they wanted people from the community sector already involved in regeneration. Appointments were then made via interview by the board. This particular respondent was nominated by the local community forum to apply so in this sense there had been some influence but the decisions on appointments rested with the partnership.

It was argued by the consultant working for the partnership that the representatives were chosen in this way to avoid the problem, as they saw it, of people not thinking beyond their interests in their street, or their client group or area. They had to look ‘at how all this affects Coventry’ (Interview with the Consultant to the Zone).

In terms of the recruitment exercise for community representatives one of the Voluntary sector representatives argued the process had been badly organised and she was not surprised few people came forward from them. The two Voluntary sector representatives had been vocal about the short deadlines for calling meetings; meetings
clashing with others and the contract given to the Community Education Development Centre was poorly specified and there was a delay in it being signed off.

'It all had to be done in a matter of a few weeks it was crazy. I think we have done extremely well to get as far as we have got with a sensible programme' (Interview with Council for Voluntary Services representative).

**Partnership organisation- Task and Theme Groups**

It has already been stated that the Task Group developed the strategy in isolation. Furthermore, the original theme groups had also been officer only groups and included many members who were not represented on the board such as the employment service who sat on the Bridges to Success. It prevented the board operating effectively due to inadequate input from the board and linkages between professional staff working on the Theme Groups and the board. One of community representatives argued that

'what appears to be happening is people sit on the main board and then there appears to be another group of people who sit on subgroups but there isn't much of a linkage up between them'.

This situation had since begun to improve with the two community members being appointed to the Theme Groups as 'champions' on the Communities of Interest Group and the Bridges to Success. They both felt they had something to offer in terms of professional knowledge in these areas and the lack of a clearly defined and significant role for them had caused them some concern. Both members argued they did not want to be on the board for its own sake and wanted to make a positive contribution to the work of the zone.

The officers which serve the board also have an important role in shaping the direction of the CNRZ. Although at the time of the research their capacity had been limited by a shortage of staff and funding. They had resorted to employing a consultant to carry out some work for the partnership. Nevertheless, their views concerning the CNRZ are important for the future direction of the scheme. The officers, both of which were experienced, expressed doubts in relation to the adequacy of the present structures put in place by AWM to fulfil the Zone's objectives. The nature of broad inclusion on the board was limited.
'collaborative structures are about engaging business they (AWM) can’t engage business on their board how do...[you]...engage business. Business will only engage if there’s some power, there is no power. Who engages, the technocrats, quangocrats’ (Interview with Chief Executive).

In terms of the influence which the community had exercised thus far, he agreed that neither geographical communities nor communities of interest had been influential. He defended the outcome by arguing that

'I think at the start of any programme you always have this, a lot of people are saying this is another regeneration programme they don’t understand the language it is different but as people get to know about the zone and the timescale I think it will get better there is a lot of consultation fatigue’ (op cit).

However, among board members there seemed to be a lack of knowledge about how involvement operated. One Coventry City Councillor argued

'In all honesty I don’t know how Nuneaton consult if they tell me they have I believe them’

The Chair also revealed a lack of knowledge on the subject of exactly how consultation was carried out ‘We have had I hope extensive consultation before it was set up’ and one of the City Councillors argued that at this early stage he did not know how the structures for improved participation were developing.

The partnership administrator also expressed doubts as to the efficacy of community consultation

'I do recognise the need for community involvement but I do question whether it pays back in a better product for the time delay and money spent’

Doubts about how useful community consultation or involvement might be were also expressed by the Voluntary Sector representative, she argued ‘how much people want to be involved is questionable’.
The conference had been well attended but the smaller specific Zone partnership meetings held in the communities were poorly attended. As such these exercises were seen as a waste of resources by the officers and so were unlikely to occur again.

**Coordination**

The outcome for co-governance had been limited by some of the very same processes that had fostered the coordination which had existed. The Council Officer argued that

‘some people can be outside the process and not have the opportunity to bid’...’with Objective 2 and AWM you have to spend it quickly so its always the big boys the local authorities who get the bids in...the community and voluntary sector groups are always very...late in our case its really dreadful we’ve sort of allocated all the money more or less’

**Administration**

During the early period of the Zone the administration of the partnership had been very poor and had not supported the ideals of co-governance. One of the Voluntary Sector representatives argued ‘its not one of the better examples of partnership’. One Councillor argued that the communication of information in the partnership had been

‘bloody awful 6-8 months ago’...’it’s a lot better than it was. We actually get reports now which tell us what is happening and list all the projects which we did not have for a long time’.

**Time**

The shortage of time provided by the partnership administrators for members to read reports was acknowledged as a problem and did not support co-governance for one of the community representatives this was a particular issue because the work had to be done outside of normal office hours

‘there is not enough time to read the literature...which obviously has an impact on the meetings and the relationships. Because I said that I can’t possibly comment on this when you have only given it to me on the day’.
Lack of knowledge

The situation of board members lacking knowledge led to further issues over co-governance. The community representative argued that making decisions did not get held up because people were unsure of what they are formally agreeing to, they just say ‘come and talk to me afterwards and its approved anyway whether you are happy with it or not’.

SUMMARY

The Zone partnership had in principle developed a coordinated approach in its strategy, however, in practice it was far from well coordinated. Furthermore, the coordination which did exist had emerged not from a co-governed approach but from an exclusive approach.

CNRZ had a coherent strategy and detailed implementation plans. They had drawn on various sources of funding and had attempted to address the perennial problem of ensuring that the outcomes of regeneration attempts in terms of economic development and employment creation benefit those most in need. It is also the case that despite the debates which were common between the politicians on both sides of the partnership that the partners had developed a strategy which they were both content with. Other policies such as those of the Learning and Skills Council and Objective 2 fed into and dovetailed with the strategy for CNRZ. In this sense it demonstrated policy coordination.

Nevertheless, actual levels of coordination were shown to be much less well developed than the plans claimed. There were issues concerning how to get coordination between the private and public sectors when gaining the membership of the private sector was particularly difficult. Issues also surrounded the links between how the economic benefits would actually be delivered to the communities which needed them most.

The coordination which existed in the strategy was unfortunately achieved at the expense of a co-governed approach from the whole board. The need to address the strategy within a fixed timescale together with the difficulties concerning the lack of a
secretariat to support the partnership’s work effectively left the strategy to be developed by the Task Group. The plan was endorsed by the other members and effectively those projects which were incorporated were often those already developed by the local authorities. The strategy was not developed consensually as had been the intention of Advantage West Midlands and central government.

A problem which may arise in the future given that the Zones are not guaranteed funding at a certain level is that the areas of the scheme yet to be developed such as training may be restricted through funding constraints.

Despite the early failures of co-governing the partnership were addressing this issue but seemed to have little experience in community consultation and furthermore they appeared nervous about allowing the community representatives to play a full role in the partnership despite the fact that both worked in the community sector and had been carefully selected.
Chapter Eight

Case study three:
The SRB Partnership

INTRODUCTION

The Coventry Partnership for Youth (COPY) is a multisectoral partnership delivering the SRB Round 5 scheme Valuing Young People (VYP). This scheme is closely integrated with other areas of planning and policy formulation as Investing in Young People is a Coventry Community Plan strategic priority. The scheme provides an example of the renewed interest in the coordination, planning and targeting of regeneration activities which has occurred since the early 1990s. The bid was first developed for the Round 4 (1998) submissions, but failed to receive funding. It was revised for Round five (1999) and was successful receiving funding of £8.6 million (Coventry Partnership for Youth 2000)

AIMS AND OBJECTIVES

The overall aim of the scheme is to be

‘the catalyst to maximise the potential of Coventry’s young people through building their capacity, promoting their social inclusion, encouraging their participation and avoid wasting their life chances’ (Coventry Partnership for Youth 1999)

The scheme’s documents state that it is designed to develop leading-edge practice in services for young people and intends to inform national policy to enable the spread of good practice. The scheme contains 19 separate projects focusing on many areas of policy including: education; training; support and guidance; health care; substance misuse; housing; leisure; crime prevention; encouraging democratic participation and sustainable regeneration. VYP intends to help provide holistic services to young people (ibid).
Issues of coordination and co-governance are central to the aims and objectives of the VYP scheme. The scheme is intended to realise highly coordinated service interventions to enable easy access to services for young people. Also, following best practice in youth services, young people are to be highly involved in the decision-making regarding service needs (ibid).

Like the LSP the scheme has been influenced by baseline research and it takes a targeted approach. It hopes to target 5000 young people between the ages of 14 and 24 focusing particularly on the 6 areas of deprivation selected for Area Coordination (Field and Merrill 2000).

Evaluation of the scheme is carried out externally and similarly to previous cases the aim is to mainstream interventions if they are necessary and are shown to be effective (ibid).

ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE PARTNERSHIP

In addition to the board there is a management team made up of two council officers one of which provides administrative services to the board. Three policy teams existed which focus on Evaluation, Publicity and Succession Strategies. Membership of these varied, in principle all have four representatives from the board, representatives from the management team and project officers. The Publicity groups also have representation from the Coventry Youth Council (Coventry Partnership for Youth 2000).

COORDINATION IN THE COPY PARTNERSHIP

A key aim of the VYP scheme is to 'identify and promote linkages with other related initiatives, to promote a joined-up approach' (ibid) and there are examples of a coordinated approach within and around the scheme. One of the six Community Plan priorities is Investing in Young People and developments within this policy area are overseen by a Programme Delivery Group (PDG). In effect this is a partnership itself and members are drawn from organisations with a direct involvement with young people and many are also part of the COPY partnership.
A result of the emphasis on young people is that extensive baseline research has been
carried out on how services can best be developed for this group. Much of this was
carried out by the Careers Service through the use of in-depth interviews (Field and
Merrill 2000). These findings showed that the young were critical of service provision
and revealed gaps in services for young people. This has formed the basis for the
approach to both dealing with helping young people to achieve vocationally and
offering them leisure services (Interview with Chair of COPY).

An evaluation of the VYP scheme asserted that while 'programmes largely operate
independently of each other...some coherence is achieved through some individuals'
(Field and Merrill 2001). A particularly important link which facilitates policy
coordination is provided by the Chair who leads on both the PDG and COPY boards.
This has undoubtedly helped assist the coordination which exists.

Coordination is also created due to developments within mainstream services. A key
feature of the VYP scheme is the way it dovetails with the mainstream agency
Connexions. Connexions is itself a joined-up service providing one-stop access to a
range of services. This is seen as a cutting edge development in services for young
people and addresses the problems young people have in accessing services where
young people with multiple problems will

'probably be sent to at least five different people, in five different places, to get
any help and they don't bother, so who cares? Actually quite a lot of people care,
but the system means they all care about different little bits which means that the
needs of the young person get somewhat lost' (Coventry Partnership for Youth
2000).

Through Connexions young people see a Personal Advisor. The service is seen as an
integral part of the whole VYP scheme. As the documentation states 'Connexions and
the YYP scheme go hand in hand and will learn and feed off each other in future years'
(op cit).

The Connexions service is part of the larger One Stop Shop initiative funded through
the SRB. This had initially been the health representative's idea. He had put forward this
project in round four and it had since developed and grown with the outcome of round
five. This is an important example of service level coordination and intends to provide a holistic service to clients. It has two important elements. Firstly, there are a range of services on site including, health, careers, financial and housing advice together with on-site IT training. Secondly, the service revolves around the presence of Personal Advisors from the Connexions service. Importantly, it does not operate merely as a sign-posting service, where clients are given information concerning where to get help. Advisors offer advice and counselling to clients and put together packages of help linking clients with appropriate service providers (Interview with Health Authority representative). A further project funded within the scheme is also co-located within the one stop shop.

Figure 7 illustrates the linkages, curved lines represent referral patterns; thick lines represent co-location and arrows represent links out to other policies or programmes.

Figure 7 - An illustration of the level of coordination within the VYP scheme.

Based on Coventry Partnership for Youth (2000).

Key: YOTS - Youth Offending Teams; EAZ - Education Action Zones; EBP - Education Business Partnership; CTC - Communities that Care.

At an individual project level there has been some integration with Area Coordination (AC). Whilst the bid is thematic, rather than area based, the links with AC allow much of the activity to be located in their boundaries. As the majority of disadvantaged young
people live in these six areas it is felt that the scheme will be able to reach a greater number of young people. The AC offices receive a block grant from the SRB fund to be allocated to small ‘quick win’ projects operating at the local level (Interview with Council officer).

Two other projects, both with an overlapping focus on drug misuse, are co-located. In addition many of the individual projects have a range of interventions as part of the same project which offers a coordinated approach to intervention. However, this same trend leads to a great deal of overlap and duplication in the type of interventions which are offered to young people. There is a strong emphasis on employment and the development of personal skills and this theme runs across many of the projects. In some cases this trend had led to projects being merged before they were granted funding (Interview with Council officer).

The remaining projects are not highly coordinated within the scheme having been largely developed as stand-alone projects emerging from individual organisations although as figure 7 shows there are considerable linkages to other policies and programmes. In an attempt to create more coordination service providers were being encouraged to be proactive in providing information for each other through Project Link which provides a formal route to achieving coordination. Project champions have been appointed to represent the project at board level and project forums are held to enable service providers to network. In addition, information about the projects and contact details are distributed through the induction pack for new members.

Referrals between service providers were occurring within the scheme, for example the One-Stop Shop referred young people to the voluntary organisation who provided services to the young homeless. In addition, there were 'mutual referrals' between this organisation and one of the drugs misuse projects funded by the scheme. Work was also developing with the soon to be built Foyer in the areas of homelessness and links with a local college to enable training to be provided for clients (Interview with Housing Association representative).
Coordinating activities were not the preserve of mainstream organisations. The Voluntary Services Council representative argued that she helped coordinate activities in the area, arguing that

'I make the connections between the things that happen under SRB 5 and things that are happening under the Neighbourhood Support Fund making sure where there are obvious links those are exploited'

Some respondents were happy with the approach to coordination for example the Local Education Authority representative whose own organisation was involved in much successful joint work between agencies argued

'it doesn't feel that we ought to be saying this project needs to talk more to this one. I think that happens on the ground more. I don't think the board would necessarily get into that level of detail'

Others were concerned that coordination was low, particularly at the beginning a voluntary sector representative argued that ‘two years ago people were putting the pieces together and coordination didn’t seem to be happening’. The Council Officer supporting service developments for the Afro-Caribbean community argued that projects still worked in silos but COPY were now looking for gaps. The representative from the Learning and Skills Council said coordination was

'one of the things I am sort of plugging away at we need to make sure that projects within the SRB are making links within as well as without'

In her opinion it would possibly be the factor that will ultimately bring success. The Chair argued that evidence was accumulating that they were having an impact through Connexions.

One Local Education Authority respondent argued that coordination needed to operate at the level of themes rather than at the level of the scheme and that projects need to work with agencies, all organisations involved with a particular theme had to be aware of what else was going on.
A particular example of failure of the scheme to provide better coordinated services was provided by the representative from the Voluntary Services Council. This concerned a potential recipient of funds which had slipped through the net.

'There are some things in the city that desperately needed funding but weren't in at the beginning that ought to have been like the young carer's project...this was initially funded from SRB 1 or 2, that has now come to an end...they have got to the point where they are having to make their worker redundant. It's absolutely crazy that there is so much money sloshing around in the city on the young people's stuff and we have lost a resource to a very particular group of young people'.

Overall there is a degree of coordination but the example above also highlights the difficulties in achieving greater coordination.

**DRIVERS FOR COORDINATION**

The drivers for coordination are summarised in table 25 and discussed below.

**Table 25 – Factors emerging from the research findings which appear to be important as drivers for coordination within the COPY Partnership.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Central Government Policy</th>
<th>Partnership activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central Government policy: Community strategies</td>
<td>Local government coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainstream policies: LEA</td>
<td>Local organisational strategies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HA</td>
<td>Established networks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connexions</td>
<td>-Partnership relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRB policy structures</td>
<td>-Networking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Leadership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Commitment/External focus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Culture change</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Central Government Policy

Central government policy has been an important driver through their policies for joined-up working across a range of organisations. This has enabled more joint planning and service delivery although as we have also seen this has been not been straightforward and the outcomes are variable.

Community Strategies

In terms of wider policy, it was the Community Plan which had been the most crucial and was the most often mentioned as a development spur for the VYP scheme through its focus on Investing in Young People.

Mainstream Policies

Another driving force from central government policy is the pressure from policy requirements in terms of organisations such as the Health Authority, the Local Education Authority, the Learning and Skills Council and the Police Service. They have all been required to pay more attention to issues of regeneration, social exclusion, coordination and improvements in service quality for vulnerable groups. Perhaps one of the most surprising changes were those being made by the Police Service. They have transformed their organisational structures to more adequately deal with the agenda for joined-up working. An example of this is the placing of individual officers within the Local Authority which allows links to be created with the council on the issue of crime and disorder. The Police Service representative argued that this was the first time that the police service had been involved in joined-up policy at the strategic level. Although, interestingly, partnership or inter-organisational working on the ground had always been part of their remit (Interview with Chief Superintendent of Police).

It might be argued that more coordination was achieved through links between the scheme projects and mainstream provision rather than that which occurs within the scheme itself. The coordination with the Connexions service was particularly important. The Learning and Skills Council representative argued that
things like the one-stop shop which were in there right from the beginning was actually a forerunner of Connexions as it turns out. So things have gelled together quite nicely’.

In addition, much of the evident coordination was driven by the organisation’s own strategies. The LEA officer argued that they only got involved in projects within such schemes if they contributed to their own organisational strategy (Interview with LEA representative). The Learning and Skills Council’s representative and the Councillor whose portfolio contains Social Services for Young People and Children also stressed the idea that the scheme fitted with their own organisational goals. The One-Stop-Shop idea was put forward by the health representative during the preparation of the Round Four bid. It was accepted as a good project which has since been developed alongside the Connexions service and grown with the outcome of Round Five. He argued ‘There’s like almost a bit of a sea change in terms of people’s attitudes and opinions for it’. The project had attracted the attention of senior managers and particularly the Chief Executive of Connexions saw how it fitted with the kind of work which was needed (Interview with Health Authority representative).

**SRB Policy Structures**

Without doubt the new policy guidance for SRB funding has had an important impact. The guidance emphasises tackling social exclusion, working with other programmes and initiatives and promoting modernisation. It could be argued that the VYP meets all these requirements. It has clearly focused on meeting the needs of young people and it has clear aims and objectives for the scheme. It certainly intends to work with the grain of other policies for example in the initial round four bid it stated that the submission related to the Government’s new priorities especially in the fields of education, community safety and Welfare to Work.

It might also be argued that the bid through having been rejected during the first round was improved and now delivers a better scheme. As the Health Authority representative argued

‘the bid had a year to 18 months of development work before the SRB was actually put in so it is much better balanced across the themes and in terms of its strategic thinking of how it would work across Coventry’.
Partnership Activity

Local Government

As we have seen in the last section an important driver for the scheme and for coordination lies in the structures which were put in place by the local authority. Coventry was one of the first authorities to develop a community plan before the Local Government Act (2000) required local authorities to do this. This has generated a good deal of joint work in the area and put in place partnership and management structures which have had an impact upon the VYP scheme. Coventry’s local policy for Area Coordination has also been utilised to develop joint work within the scheme.

Local organisational strategies

Other drivers for coordination came from voluntary and private organisations. Two voluntary organisations had developed services for the scheme which directly extended and complemented their existing services (Interviews with National Children’s Homes and Voluntary Services Council representatives). The private sector input was largely concentrated into two projects concerning the Education Business Partnership\(^8\) (EBP) which is a well established public-private partnership within Coventry. Education being the focus for the private sector member’s community relations strategy (Interview with private sector representative).

Management

Concerns raised about the lack of coordination by partners and by the evaluation team (Field and Merrill 2001) appear to have had an impact. This is particularly true for inter scheme coordination which had not been well developed initially. The management changes made through Project Link should offer the possibility for greater knowledge about projects among the board members and service providers this in itself may encourage coordination as the projects develop.

Established network

A recurring theme in interviews was the notion that there was an established network in Coventry from which different partnerships were drawn. It was likely then that

\(^8\) The EBP is a national scheme that has been operating for some time, Coventry’s own scheme dates back to the late 1980s.
partnership membership would overlap and many interviewees found themselves on different boards working with the same people, the phrase, *usual suspects* was frequently mentioned. It was suggested that this was one of the main reasons for greater coordination generally in the city and the SRB board in particular. The Chair stressed that,

'the decisions about who was going to be in there in the partnership were actually very obvious because they were the key players and stakeholders that work with young people'.

The Police representative remarked that part of COPY'S success depended on ‘the fact that we do meet…fairly frequently at all sorts of forums’. It was also argued by the Local Education Authority representative ‘that people were using existing partnerships more frequently now’ for example, the Coventry and Warwickshire partnership were becoming an umbrella board for things like Connexions. Coordination is more likely to occur in such a situation.

**Partnership Relations**

Closely related to the above observation is the subject of *partnership relations*. The majority of interviewees agreed that there were good partnership relations within COPY. For example, the Council for Voluntary Services representative argued ‘it is one of the more effective partnerships that I have been involved in’.

**Networking**

It was apparent from the interview discussions that whilst ‘networking’ had its place and was important, other factors were of greater importance towards bringing about good partnership relations. The Learning and Skills Council representative argued that ‘some people think that [partnership working] is about everyone being nice to each other and making sure we don’t upset each other’. It was in fact built on shared experiences. A private sector representative argued that

‘In terms of quality its through projects so its not just a case of I’m Les and your Bill how are you, in a lot of cases its actually working in partnership on given projects’
The COPY partnership had benefited from having a long-standing core of members there has ‘been a core group over that period there is a heart to the partnership’ (Interview with Learning and Skills Council representative). The Health Authority representative argued that they have a long history of working together they know each other and have very good working relationships’.

Key individuals
It was mentioned previously that the Chair of COPY had also been the Chief Executive of Careers during the development of the Community Plan and is now Chair of the PDG and Chief Executive of Connexions. To an extent membership of the PDG and COPY overlap which supports joint work and a particularly important link which facilitates policy coordination is provided by the Chair.

Commitment
My interpretation of the interview material even where the word commitment was not used directly was that this group of people were committed to the partnership and to the issue of improving young people’s lives. The Police representative argued

‘there are some good people on there, I think most importantly it is about the subject matter…people don’t have a problem with. There are, in truth, relatively few vested interests other things I have exposure to have a lot of political dimensions to them and organisational interests that people get very protective about I think with the young people pleasingly that is not the case’.

The Chair of COPY argued that COPY was a real partnership, a ‘JFK’ partnership

‘where members asked not what the partnership could do for them but what they could do for the partnership’.

Culture Change
The Chair also associated an external focus with a more general culture change. Most interviewees agreed that there had been some sort of change in the culture which could be associated with New Labour’s approach. The Chair claims change within the partnership culture emerged from the Community Planning process, and the realisation
'that if we all pooled our resources together what we could do would be greater than if we didn’t...’ and it suddenly became a case that we were putting what we did and who we did it for ahead of how we could gain at the expense of someone else’

He compared this to earlier partnership forms

'I think partnership working is new to virtually every organisation I think partnership working previously is a term that was used to describe contract cultures’.

CONSTRAINTS ON COORDINATION

The constraints on coordination are summarised in table 26 and discussed below.

Table 26 – Factors emerging from the research which appear to constrain the development of coordination within the VYP Scheme.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Central Government Policy</th>
<th>Partnership Activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central government’s actions: Funding</td>
<td>Resistance to coordination by partners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRB bureaucratic/Controlling</td>
<td>Lack of knowledge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transfer of SRB to RDA</td>
<td>Management and Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resource constraints: Time</td>
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<tr>
<td>Finance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Expertise</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complexity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional structures and cultures</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service priorities</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Central Government Policy

Funding

Despite the rhetoric and in some cases clear actions from central government regarding their relationships with local actors over regeneration policy issues, what emerged from the interviews was a situation of continued strain in this relationship. In relation to coordination this was a topic of concern. The government while expounding the virtues
of coordination continued to make available new pockets of special funding into mainstream agencies. A key example was provided by the Local Education Authority representative. The VYP scheme provided funding for interventions dealing with disaffection. This was additional to several other sources of funding available to Education Authorities which led to the situation whereby a number of different projects focused on disaffected youth. This was potentially a problem, there was nobody was looking at this across the theme in order to provide more coordination. The concern was that you may have many sources of funding chasing very few pupils.

**Bureaucratic nature of the SRB**

Complaints were also made about the excessively bureaucratic nature of the SRB and how the focus on funding limits flexibility in the programme. The Health Authority representative argued

> ‘there is still an awful lot of control through RDAs and back to the Treasury about what money can be spent on...there is this new shift between the capital-revenue split which is making it very difficult for a revenue based scheme like ours. That’s quite controlling so I don’t know that the decentralisation bit has happened in that respect’.

The treasury had decided that the appropriate ratio between capital and revenue should be 70:30. Should revenue be underspent in any one financial year at the level of the scheme there was a danger that it could not be rolled forward into the following year if the overall spend was not balanced at the level of the region. Exactly how this was going to affect the management of the scheme in relation to coordination was unknown. However, it did not help partnerships plan or be flexible with the funding.

**Transfer of the SRB to RDAs**

Constraints on coordination were also brought about by the transfer of the SRB programme management to the RDAs. Firstly, this had slowed the process down as the RDA took over responsibility even though some staff had previously been employed by the Government Office. This had a particular impact upon the development of the Foyer project and the Education Business Partnership Centre at Jaguar. Both had to wait for
their projects to be appraised. Secondly, the LEA representative argued that the RDA had not been positive towards the scheme and that it seems that they had ‘gone right back to being economically driven’. In some ways she argued it feels like it has gone backwards rather than made a transition to a more joined-up approach at the regional level. Others also argued there was no decentralisation with AWM, they remained agents of the centre (Interviews with Learning and Skills Council representative and City Councillor).

Resource constraints

One of the most important areas cited in interviews as a barrier to coordination was the strain on time, and this is evident by the poor level of attendance at board meetings. One respondent summed up the problem in terms of partnership activities as having to be done ‘in addition to the day job’ (Interview with Local Education Authority representative). Although the working relationships were good there were problems in

‘getting together a big enough group of people to have quorate meetings it couldn’t be described as perfect because quite often we can’t formally make decisions’ (Op cit).

The lack of a quorum had caused some concern as it held up decision-making

‘They have been trying to make a decision for example about not needing two members of the City Council there in order to formally make a decision and they have not been able to make that decision because we have never been quorate to allow that decision to be made’ Op cit).

The businesslike approach which the Chair took to meetings which as one interviewee put it ‘Steve always wants to finish them earlier than they ever do’ is perhaps also indicative of the pressure on time (Interview with Health Authority Representative).

Finance

Related to time there are financial issues. Involvement on partnership boards has costs associated with it. This is especially relevant to the private, voluntary and community sectors. Mainstream organisations are funded for this work although as we have seen it is often adds to an already full work load for employees. For the voluntary sector in
particular there were ongoing difficulties created by the government's desire for their greater involvement. The representative from the Council for Voluntary Services argued

'We are just a hostage to fortune, [around] how much time we can put in. [Our national organisation] has been talking to government about properly resourcing it but with as you would expect all results'. So I think there is a mismatch between government's stated policy (for voluntary sector involvement) and the practicalities of delivering it. They have no idea what it is like on the ground to deliver it'.

In addition in the VYP scheme the community representatives were unpaid, although at least they did get their expenses paid now. One representative argued that if the board were serious about him reading all the paperwork they needed to offer a reward.

Expertise

Another area of concern was the shortage of expertise. Some respondents were concerned that the administrator was too inexperienced to manage the partnership. Another Council officer argued that 'he serviced the board he was not a programme manager'. He had no clout. A private sector representative argued that the difficulties with AWM were exacerbated by this as the administrator was not able to say no I'm not going to do it that way. Skills shortages relate to the sudden expansion in the area of regeneration whereby in the space of 2-3 years, those with a high level of skill and experience were in high demand and tended to fill vacancies in the new programmes such as the New Deal for Communities which were by comparison to the budget responsibility, generously paid. This left other areas 'running out of people' as the resources and the skills for partnership management were getting thinner (Interview with Councillor). This is a particularly evident in Coventry which has been at the forefront of innovative developments in areas such as neighbourhood management (area coordination), community planning, and the LSP.

Complexity

The scale of the task of coordinating services also acted as a barrier. The Representative from the Council for Voluntary Services argued joining-up 'was an enormous task'. The Councillor also argued that when you actually get down to mapping out the linkages as they had done for health it gets incredibly complex.
Institutional Structures and Cultures

Institutional structures and cultures within organisations also formed a barrier to joint work between organisations. The Chair argued that there were massive institutional structures working against partnership work.

'There are 19 secondary schools with 6th forms, 3 Further Education Colleges and 44 training providers and yet we still have unemployed young people who don't have any provision which will do the job. And yet we still have a culture where people want to fill their places at the expense of somebody else'.

The funding rules within which these organisations operate forces them to compete with each other to gain students as funding is paid on a per capita basis. Whilst central government were pressurising agencies to develop co-ordinated ways of working to improve public services, they were leaving in place institutional barriers which prevented holistic work.

Service Priorities

A related issue is the organisation’s own priorities. For example, the Health representative argued that regeneration schemes were never that important nor could they be because the focus had to be on acute services. The LEA and Police representatives argued similarly. Individuals in these organisations were responsible for day-to-day tasks and coordination was less important than achieving their organisational goals. For the Police service, targets meant that the resources which could be put into regeneration were always going to be small.

‘On the wall there’s the local policing plan now that’s what I have to deliver, yes partnership working is key to that but at the end of the day the partners do not get beaten up if I don’t deliver that I do. I may have to make decisions that say in the long-term that is the answer but in terms of delivering this year’s PIs there are some short-term solutions’. [in the] future and that might only be 2-3 years down the road is in how we work together but I’m judged on what I deliver today, this month and this year’.

In this context individual officers had to make decisions about where their time could be most usefully focussed. He argued that until government addressed these issues it was always difficult for officers to work against the trend for meeting targets. He felt
confident that he had some leeway but there were always questions about what he was doing and if at another time he did not feel as confident then he may have to change his view.

Joining-up also faced problems of a cultural nature in relation to the youth workers. Youth workers had a particular cultural stance which was dependent on their ideal of professionalism. This had emerged when the Connexions service were recruiting. Existing youth workers were the obvious choice. However, they were unsure that the nature of the work, particularly regarding vocationalism was in fact their domain. Furthermore, they did not wish to extend their domain into these areas (Interviews with Chair of COPY and Manager of Democracy Project).

**Partnership Activity**

*Resistance to coordination*

There were other examples where resistance to coordination could be identified A voluntary sector member raised concerns about the lack of willingness of some organisations to engage in networking events organised specifically to develop relationships within the partnership. These were avoided by some members continually. These partners were often those who had been funded under the partnership but now had very little to do with the partnership activity (Interview with Representative from Voluntary Sector). This view was endorsed by the Learning and Skills Council representative who argued that some members only turned up if their project interests were on the agenda.

*"There have been people on the board who were there because they had a very specific area of interest, be it a single project or particular area of work...and we have had quite a few changes on the board because people move on...they do not attend board meetings unless their particular project is on the agenda"*

The Health Authority representative’s assertion of his own expertise at joint-work can also be taken of evidence of a continued even if reduced resistance to collaboration. He had been praised by the senior SRB administrator for his ability to ‘take such a holistic
view’, balancing the different themes not just health. He made a good partnership member implying that others did not. Nevertheless, overall the findings suggested that resistance to joint work was being challenged.

_Lack of knowledge_

In general from the interviews it was clear that board members had very little knowledge about projects other than those they had had direct links with in some way. In addition there was evidence that partners lacked knowledge about the board’s work and its management. This went beyond the problems of jargon. The members from the Local Education Authority did not know the policy teams existed and the Councillor was unsure about what they did. He had in fact been a member of one without knowing. On finding out he still did not go because he felt they weren’t looking for lay membership.

_Management and administration_

The management and administrative structures were thought to be very good generally, but like other areas brought a range of responses from interviewees. It has already been mentioned that concerns were raised about the lack of experience of the administrator. A common complaint was the large volume of paperwork and that it is sent out to members only three days before meetings. Some interviewees felt this was too short notice and the amount represented an unrealistic drain on their time. Some argued that they needed a summary version and then the full report at the back for consultation if necessary. This draws attention to the lack of time in reality that many partners have for such boards. A third area of complaint was about the arrangements of meetings. The community representative argued that he missed them because he didn’t always know when they were. The timing of meetings had become a particular bone of contention for the Councillor. Meetings were usually held on Tuesday evenings when he had to attend council meetings and had led to the meetings being inquorate.

**CO-GOVERNANCE**

The structures within the partnership, such as broad sectoral involvement, community representation and the emphasis on involvement within projects supported the notion of
co-governance. However, although the COPY partnership was characterised by good relations, finding substantive examples of the impact of co-governance is difficult.

Membership of the COPY partnership is broad. In addition to the Chair there are 15 members. These represent the Public, Private, and the Voluntary and Community sectors. Table 27 below provides a summary of the organisations involved as members of the partnership’s board.

Table 27 – Sectoral interest representation on the COPY board (correct at the time of the research).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Number of members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public Sector</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Sector</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary Sector</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Sector</td>
<td>2 (youth community representatives)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Councillors</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Table</strong></td>
<td><strong>16</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on information provided by the partnership.

There has been a substantial degree of co-governance between key members of the partnership around some of the key projects particularly. The voluntary sector and the community representatives had been highly involved. A key example of co-governance in the partnership concerned the use of young people as interviewers for prospective candidates (Interview with Chair).

The appraisal system for the bids also showed evidence of co-governance. The whole board had been included in the appraisal processes. The Police representative argued it does allow ‘two different perspectives from the first and second appraiser’. On some occasions bids had been rejected or deferred for further work if they did not meet the criteria.

Overall though, there were more instances reported where co-governance had not operated well. For example, a new member whose professional role was to develop policies specifically for the Afro-Caribbean community was acutely aware that the lack of representation of this group on the board during the early development of the VYP bid had almost certainly led to there being no projects designed for this group. She argued that it would not happen now that she was on the board, but given that the
decisions over funding were more or less complete, her late inclusion had been costly.

The representative from the Council for Voluntary Services complained that a young carer’s project had somehow slipped through the net, it had been funded through the SRB Round One Scheme and it was now under threat of closure because of lack of funds. She did not now how this had come about but felt that it should have been included as this group were one of the vulnerable among young people.

Peripheral members such as the representative from a smaller voluntary sector organisation and a community representative argued that the partnership was characterised as having an inner and outer circle among members.

Table 28 details the sectoral ownership of projects and the respective actual and percentage allocations to sectors at an aggregate level. Many of the projects are

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sectors involved in projects</th>
<th>No. of projects</th>
<th>Project funding (£m) and distribution of total grant of £8,674,000 at the time of scheme award</th>
<th>No. of projects</th>
<th>Project funding (£m) and percentage distribution of total grant of £8,674,000 at the end of the project appraisal stage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3,982,496 46 %</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3,640,785 42 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>596,416 7 %</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>505,725 6 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public/Business</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1,421,657 16 %</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1,631,770 19 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public/Voluntary</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1,820,667 21 %</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2,448,900 28 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-sectoral</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1,440,500 17 %</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>9,261,736</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>8,227,180</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figures do not total the full amount or percentages, in year one the scheme was deliberately over committed and the number of projects decreased in year two. This allows part of the budget to be given over to management.

delivered through partnerships of service providers. The voluntary sector as sole delivers of projects have taken only 6% of the total allocated. Increases in funding were
allocated to projects run by both the voluntary and the private sector together with the public sector, increases of 7 and 3 % respectively between the outline bid and project appraisals. Public sector only projects have received the largest share at 42 %, but their overall share had fallen over the two phases. Public-Business projects have received 19% and Public-Voluntary projects have received 28 %. Multi-sectorally owned projects initially planned failed to get funding in that particular form. Overall whilst the public sector remain highly dominant in terms of receiving funding from the SRB the level of involvement from the voluntary and private sectors is high even if the actual level of funding is minimal.

DRIVERS FOR CO-GOVERNANCE

The drivers for co-governance are summarised in table 29 and discussed below.

Table 29 – Factors to emerge from the research findings which act as drivers for co-governance in the VYP scheme.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Central Government Policy</th>
<th>Partnership activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central government led policy:</td>
<td>Broad sectoral involvement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Approach to partnership work</td>
<td>- community members on the board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Approach to voluntary sector</td>
<td>- community consultation/involvement in the conference process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRB policy requirements for involvement.</td>
<td>- involvement in the projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management and Administration</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constitution</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council avoids dominance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Established Good partnership relations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key individuals: Chair</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Central government policy

Approach to partnership

Other policy changes were also having an impact upon the work of the partnership. The community plan has already been mentioned in relation to coordination, the Chair argued that it was also fostering a new attitude to partnership work. Like other respondents the Chair felt that New Labour’s approach to encouraging real partnership was having an impact.
'I think it has had a massive impact and its biggest impact has been to say its ok not to rush around and compete all the time, its ok to work in partnership’

Although it was noted by several interviewees that partnership working had been a gradual process it was also argued that the pressure from central government in requiring partnership work had led to

'some agencies are now realising they have to work in partnership, there are hard nuts who need that pressure...the employment service would not have engaged with anyone a few years ago’ (Interview with LEA representative).

**Approach to Voluntary Sector**

Central government’s new approach to working with the voluntary sector was also supporting improved co-governance. The representative from the Council for Voluntary Services argued that New Labour

‘has put a hell of a lot of compulsion into it...much of the funding that the government is currently handing out can’t be had unless there’s partnership with the voluntary and community sectors...I think it has brought a gasp of change in this city in terms of where we sit at the table and the degree to which we are listened to’

**Policy requirement for involvement**

Broad inclusion has always been an important factor on the boards of SRB partnerships, however previously to New Labour there was no requirement to involve communities. The bidding guidance now requires partnerships to involve communities in both the preparation and implementation of the bids.

**Partnership Activity**

Within this scheme the importance of community consultation and involvement was evident. The Chair argued that,

'It was always going to be the case that young people...were going to be involved at the heart of it'.
The Learning and Skills Council representative also argued it was the most participative scheme she had worked on. Young people were involved as board members and wider consultation also existed.

**Community board members**

Two youth members had seats on the board and had done so from the beginning of the formal establishment of the COPY partnership. These were elected by the Coventry Youth Council. The community representative felt their presence was effective on the board, they were able to speak out when necessary (Interview with community representative).

**Consultation processes**

In addition, there is an annual *Standing Conference on Youth* which is a professional event which emerged through the consultation for the Community Plan. It was this conference which developed the first draft of the *Investing in Young People* part of the community plan. Now one of the projects which the SRB 5 scheme itself funds, *The Democracy Project* has set up a small forum of young people to feed into the conference. In terms of wider consultation the conference process had been ‘reasonably successful’ (Interview with Health Authority Representative). This itself is part of a broader attempt to create long-term structures for the involvement of young people in decisions which affect them. It had allowed groups of young people to be involved in discussions about the priorities for services.

Perhaps more important was the involvement at project level, all project proposals had been required to show how young people had influenced their development and how they were to continue to be involved.

One voluntary sector member praised the effort made by

> 'the wide range of agencies and groupings that are involved with this and they are always very keen to seek the opinion and advice of as wider cross section of people in Coventry as we can' (Interview with Youth Worker from Coventry Diocese).
In the main, the respondents were positive about the level of inclusion. In relation to the choice of members, this had been guided by the view that it was the key players who would be involved. The Chair argued ‘we must have got it right because no one complained that they weren’t in’.

The Police Representative said that they were often mandated to be part of the group for the bidding process, this does help to enable the board to be heavily weighted with mainstream partners.

The board was by and large satisfied with the sectoral mix,

‘I think the programme itself is reasonably inclusive, although I think we’ve worked quite hard on it in Coventry because we were concerned that it was economically focused’ (Interview with Local Education Authority Representative).

There was an appreciation of the skills each partner had to contribute to the partnership

‘they bring their own perspective on the issues and they are chosen for that...so the idea is that the board will have that synergy of experience’ (Interview with Councillor).

**Council avoided dominance**

The COPY board has a degree of independence from the council although they remain the accountable body and employ the administrator. The council were avoiding dominance of the partnership at least in overt ways. In the documents it states that in the case of the VYP scheme ‘COPY drives the scheme’ (Coventry Partnership for Youth 2000). It was argued ‘it looks to the Council for help and assistance as and when it needs it but it doesn’t feel that it is instructed by the Council’. Complaints were made about the level of interference from AWM who felt the board was dominated by the council and they thought the management team ought to be outside the council. This was resisted by the partnership who were happy with the relationship. The member from the Learning and Skills Council argued ‘we told them no...we could see no good reason for doing it’.
Management and Administration

The administration of the partnership was seen to support effective partnership working. The management team were described as doing

‘a very good job...they work in a way that exploits the best of the board members...I think the way and the amount of information they bring to the board meetings is appropriate it feels like we are not being completely overwhelmed by things...it feels ok to be involved with it...I think if were poorly serviced people would have less of a commitment to it’ (Interview with representative from the Council for Voluntary Services).

An induction process had been put in place to try and assimilate new members into the partnership after it had been argued that latecomers had not felt at ease and didn’t fully understand their role (Interview with voluntary sector representative).

Constitution

COPY had a constitution which laid down the role of the partnership and of members. It also outlined the nature of the partnership membership and that the number of young people would be varied according to the needs of the partnership. The document is written in plain English rather than being a legalistic document and can be seen to foster co-governance through clearly stating the boundary rules in decision-making. In addition, the constitution itself was reviewed every twelve months allowing different views to be articulated about what the organisational arrangements could be.

Established partnership

In the same way that established partnership relations aided efforts to coordinate they were also seen to be important for the subject of co-governance.

‘Its having that understanding you get from working with people from different areas all the time. That’s why it works if they had to develop and gel as an organisation or as a partnership because people didn’t know each other it might be harder. But as we keep saying it’s the usual suspects’ (Interview with Councillor).

However, these established relations did not it was argued get in the way of ‘objecting to things we don’t agree with’ (Interview with Council for Voluntary Services representative).
Key individuals

Another important factor highlighted by practically all interviewees was the Chair’s style. His leadership skills were highly praised ‘there is so much energy…it is infectious’ (Interview with Chief Superintendent of Police). He managed the group actively but with good humour and in a way that was not domineering. However, this did not mean a lack of a businesslike culture. Far from it, the board were often involved in what the Chair called ‘hot conversations’ in which members were not scared of saying that projects did not meet the established criteria. They were acting, in his words as ‘critical friends’.

CONSTRAINTS ON CO-GOVERNANCE

The constraints of co-governance are summarised in table 30 and discussed below.

Table 30 – Factors emerging from the research which appear to act as constraints on co-governance in the VYP scheme.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Central Government Policy</th>
<th>Partnership Activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Policy structures:</td>
<td>Limits on broad involvement and influence:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Resources</td>
<td>- Policy Teams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- LA centrality</td>
<td>- Poor administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Accountable bodies</td>
<td>- Lack of attendance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Community representation issues</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Central government policy

Policy structures

The structural barriers which were apparent in earlier rounds of the SRB to do with the differential resources that organisations have are still apparent. In this case the mainstream agencies led by the Local Authority have had overwhelming influence over the scheme. The bid was devised by them, the lynch pin of the partnerships work has been the Chair who has been involved in many of the key organisations who were involved in the bid’s preparation. This has undoubtedly added to the level of the coordination within the scheme and to the scheme being highly embedded with mainstream work, particularly that of the health, police and the new Connexions service. Furthermore as accountable bodies the local authority are automatically central
to the management of the scheme. AWM, as we saw earlier, were keen to remove this dominance which they saw as problematic.

**Partnership activity**

**Policy teams**

A limitation on the level of co-governance can also be seen to emerge from the way the policy teams are organised. The policy teams deal with specific management issues. The Chair argued that they carried out the work separate to the board and that was what such sub-groups were for, if they had to come back for approval there was no point in them. The Policy Teams in principle did have representation from the board however this appeared not to operate well with regard to co-governance. Only one sub-group had community representation all others had professionals or councillors. The councillor argued that in relation to the sub-group he attended that

> 'the extent to which they are relying on lay members as opposed to bringing in people who have some particular expertise... I think that as a lay representative I have less use in terms of policy development’

**Poor Administration**

A further area of concern was that meetings were not booked ahead or held at fixed times and often meetings were cancelled at short notice. Having fixed times for meetings would facilitate attendance. However, others claimed that meetings were booked ahead, and were held at regular times unless cancelled, in fact this was part of the problem with the elected member not being able to attend regularly. In conclusion there appears to be confusion about the administrative arrangements regarding meetings even though attendance at meetings is vital for co-governing.

**Lack of attendance**

The lack of attendance of board members had constrained co-governance in the sense that if decisions were needed urgently and the board was inquorate decisions were left to the Chair and one other board member.
Community representation issues

Despite the claims for broad sectoral involvement and the fact that a board can never involve everyone in terms of interest inclusion, not all members were totally happy with the mix on the board. A board member representing the Black and Ethnic Minority community was a late addition to the board. Furthermore, the Health Authority representative argued that while Voluntary Sector membership is usually easy to acquire, especially through the Council for Voluntary Services. It was always a struggle to gain Black and Ethnic minority representation and this SRB had been no different. He argued

"For me it is a constant cycle of trying to get both representation and trying to support that representation and make sure they are included."

There are also problems to do with the community members who had been drawn from the Coventry Youth Council. These young representatives tended to come and go but one long-standing representative was interviewed for this research. A key characteristic emerging from respondents was the limitations of the Youth Council membership. It was commonly expressed that the representatives did not represent those for whom the board were working, the disadvantaged. They were seen as young leaders, the Church representative argued that ‘inevitably you get the young people who will end up as MPs one day’. The Police representative argued that,

"Young people who come to the board are drawn from almost institutionalised... they're not the kids on the margin they are actually those locked in to the understanding that there is something to be done."

However, it was also recognised that the youth members would be the first to say that they don’t represent disadvantaged young people. It was however, better than nothing and disadvantaged young people would be hard to engage with at this level.

"You are not going to get those on the edge coming to a meeting at 4.30 in some building that is true of any consultation" (Interview with Chief Superintendent of Police).

"It's no good trying to bring a 15 year old whose been kicked out of school and then try to bring him in to the committee to talk
sensibly about what we are trying to do’ (Interview with Private Sector Representative).

From the community representative’s perspective, although he had been an active member throughout the development of the scheme, he was ‘dislocated from projects’ he didn’t know what was going on in most of them. In this sense he felt he was not useful on the board. Furthermore, he found it hard to understand everything that was discussed, the terminology was difficult.

His main concern at present was that they needed to let young people know about the projects. He wanted to see a pop concert type venue organised where information could be offered about the scheme. He felt that there had been enough conferences, this was not what was needed. He had been disappointed at the level of communication and profile raising of the scheme’s work. A newsletter had been published and sent to schools for distribution, however, he had checked with his own ex school and they had argued they had not received anything.

In addition, a website had been built but had not yet been promoted because it was not right. He argued that whilst it was impressive to look at it had too much text for the age group it is intended for. Overall there was just too little communication and too few young people were involved.

The Learning and Skills Council Representative argued that while all this consultation had gone ahead,

‘It’s hard to see it as a board member, I mean during all of the project appraisals...we have looked very closely how have young people been involved in developing this and how are they going to in an ongoing basis in terms of evaluation and changing things’

‘It almost seems to have not ridden over it but not actually made a single bit of difference and I think going back to the point I made earlier, the key purpose of this scheme was to improve opportunities for young people particularly 16-19, that theme hasn’t changed...So I think the scheme has almost gone along without being significantly altered’.

Some projects though had been referred because the board could not see where the influence from the young was. This is ongoing work and as the Afro-Caribbean worker
had argued it all depends on who you have working on the ground. Getting all sections of the community involved was an ongoing struggle. She was the only respondent to be outspoken, she felt that the board was not inclusive, because they were all suited professionals.

The Councillor argued that the fact that they board members were all the usual suspects and argued that this was why people got on together and there was little conflict on the board. However, this one particular interviewee acknowledged as others did that it did help with co-ordinating activities across the city, they were ‘so well trained’ (Interview with Councillor).

SUMMARY

Despite the continuation of some of issues found in earlier SRB schemes regarding unequal partnership relations created by the differential resources organisations hold. The SRB scheme did compare relatively well against the new programmes.

In terms of coordination this scheme was the most coordinated overall. Perhaps this was driven by the theme based nature of the scheme which allowed coordination to develop more easily. The scheme certainly meshed with mainstream services particularly Connexions and worked with the grain of other policies around education, training and the welfare of young people. The scheme has in this sense been successful.

However, paradoxically this level of coordination raises issues regarding co-governance. In many ways it is the level of coordination which has prevented broader input into the decision-making in the scheme. There were only a few bids ever considered for appraisal within the SRB scheme and as we have seen this did mean that some areas were left unfunded. There was a lack of inclusiveness at this stage with the thrust of the scheme being put forward by the key mainstream players.

In general terms, though, the COPY partnership was inclusive of members from the community and voluntary sectors. Voluntary organisations were quite highly involved although only a small percentage of the resources were allocated to them alone. Community members, in this case young people, were both involved on the board and
consulted widely. In general though, their impact on the design of the scheme has been highlighted as low.

A further problem was the level of non attendance at board meetings which suggests that some of those who had gained funding were no longer highly involved within the partnership. Although the timing and management of meetings may have undermined the members’ ability to attend. In addition, whilst partnership relations had been good it appeared that no special attempts had been made to create an arena where discussion and debate took place. This is perhaps a function of the established network where it was thought unnecessary to make a special effort since most of the members knew each other anyway. This issue was addressed in some small way by developing the induction pack for new members. Despite these factors the scheme as a whole appeared to be as successful as any other for delivering regeneration interventions. As the most highly developed scheme the evaluation of the impact they were having suggested that it was effective.
Chapter nine

Cross Case Analysis of Coordination and Co-governance

INTRODUCTION

Thus far the cases have been presented separately and without theoretical analysis. The focus has been on the extent to which issues of coordination and co-governance were being genuinely addressed. In this chapter, the cases will be analysed using the frameworks developed in chapter three regarding the type and extent of coordination and co-governance. This will provide a measure of success regarding the processes through which regeneration was designed to occur and these can be viewed as intermediate outcomes for the partnerships. As such, it also provides the basis for the analysis of network management in the following chapter.

The chapter is divided into three main sections: section one will deal with the type and extent of ‘coordination’; section two, the type and extent of co-governance and section three, regeneration policy as a type of joined-up government.

In analysing these cases, a set of questions have been asked regarding the findings:

- In what ways do the cases reflect joint working, are they cooperative, coordinated, collaborative or co-evolving?
- Are the ‘new’ strategic partnerships more successful at coordination?
- In what ways do the cases reflect the ideals of co-governance, are partnerships more inclusive?
- Do the ‘new’ strategic partnerships demonstrate more success regarding co-governing? and finally
- How do the cases reflect joined-up government?

JOINT WORKING

Drawing on the typologies of joint work developed in chapter three (table 7) in which four types of joint work or coordination were identified from: 1) cooperation, defined as
informal; it makes few demands on resources; goals remain those of the individual organisation, thus, there is little threat to autonomy; to 2) coordination, in which joint work is formalised; coordination is possibly mandated from organisations with hierarchical control; goals are shared and thus adjustments have to be made which could become a threat to autonomy. Two further positions were also highlighted, 3) collaboration, which is similar to coordination but reflects the contemporary need to capitalise on the intangible aspects of organisational cultures; differences and learning. In other words collaboration is supposed to bring resource and policy synergies (Hastings 1996) but also explicitly acknowledges and exploits differences in order to find resolutions to problems through co-evolution (Pratt, Gordon et al. 1999). The final position integration, reflects a full merging of organisations through common structures and common professional practices. Here, the differences between organisations and professions are minimised in order that joint work can proceed in meaningful ways. Holistic working which is reflected in current policy is the most extreme form of integration as it aims to gain advantages through reinforcement between different interventions to gain increased 'value'.

The findings of this research suggests that no single case approximates closely to any one particular typology. In this sense, the individual typologies were not particularly useful descriptors for the cases regarding the types of joint working which were being developed. For example, it might have been expected that the new programmes would have more highly developed systems of joint working between organisations, this was not apparent. In reality, cases tended to cross over two or more typologies sharing characteristics from many of them. The partnerships are not, in this sense, examples of ‘pure or ideal types’.

The following sections will outline the ways that the cases reflected each of the typologies.

Cooperation

As Hambleton (1981) and Geddes (1997) have argued, partnership working whilst far from perfect had been largely cooperative within regeneration policy. Individuals and
organisations have cooperated in the processes. The features of cooperation remain highly important for the regeneration partnerships studied here and characterise much of their work. Cooperation was defined in terms of the low impact that joint working had upon individual organisations. In the cases studied here aspects such as voluntaristic type partnership relations; no formal rules; organisations retaining control over their own financial resources and goals and therefore ultimately maintaining autonomy; and information transfer, like interaction is left largely to the individual’s discretion were the norm overall. Despite the seemingly formalised structure of the partnership organisational changes were limited.

The cooperation model also suggests that joint planning does not exist. In this respect the model does not accurately describe regeneration partnerships as organisations involved do take part in joint planning in some respects, although the degree of joint planning may vary significantly between partners. Despite the strong affiliation with cooperative forms of organisation, all three cases can be characterised as also exhibiting elements of other more significant forms of organisational joint work.

**Coordination**

All cases were highly coordinated in terms of them representing current joined-up actions at the policy or planning level. Such coordination occurred both, between and at local, regional and national levels. In addition, sometimes from the European levels as policy emphases cascaded down to the national level. Policy coordination was high, even if at times this had not been realised through the concrete implementation of services.

The Zone and SRB cases also demonstrate aspects of organisational coordination using this model. The coordination model asserts that some formal rules are created through which resources can be secured; joint planning promoted and joint goals can be emphasised for specific projects or schemes. Here, organisational coordination has led to service delivery level coordination and not just policy coordination. Communication channels thus have to be generated to service the joint work (Mulford and Rogers 1982; Taylor 1998). The Camp Hill scheme (Regeneration Zone Partnership) and the One-
Stop-Shop project (SRB Partnership) represent good examples of where joint work at the service delivery level was occurring. Importantly, authority remains with individual organisations but there is risk sharing, shared control and leadership. However, the partnerships’ work in total did not reflect this type of coordinative activity at organisational levels as the mapping of the coordination of projects within the schemes showed in each case study chapter (figures 5; 6 and 7). There was for example no emphasis on joint work around service delivery occurring in the LSP scheme although considerable attention had been paid to policy level coordination.

Collaboration

Importantly all three cases, not just the two new types of programme partnership, correspond in some ways with the collaborative and possibly the holistic integration ways of working jointly (Taylor 1998; 6, Leat et al. 2002). It might be posited that a movement towards more collaborative and integrated forms of joint working has been identified in these case studies during this phase of regeneration policy. This was particularly important in the two ‘new’ strategic partnerships in terms of the emphasis that had been placed on developing more formalised rules such as constitutions and joined-up evaluation strategies. Furthermore, organisations appeared to be committed to the partnership rather than relying on individuals; many communication channels had been created; and there had been the creation of new missions and goals and inter-organisational structures through which the partnership’s work could be managed. These were far from fully developed and operational but were developing because they were seen as important for collaboration to be improved in order to deliver better outcomes.

However, the SRB also exhibited many of these same features even though the programme was developed earlier and under slightly different more straightforwardly competitive conditions. This suggests that the basic structure of the programme, albeit having been changed slightly to fit with the priorities of a new government, had absorbed other changes in the general cultural climate surrounding regeneration and the general policy environment. In some senses, it could be argued, the SRB was the most successful. It had the clearest case of service integration in terms of the One-Stop-Shop
and another instance of co-location. At least some of its interventions were clearly designed to reinforce each other. It had also jointly secured and pooled funding to support the One-Stop-Shop which was the flagship within the scheme. The SRB case also reflected the importance placed on longer-term interventions through its attention to the development of a succession strategy and the way it had integrated mainstream and special funded projects.

In all cases authority was not pooled in the strict organisational sense but all three showed that there is a balance being struck between ownership by individual organisations and expediency to achieve a purpose which Taylor (1998) argues is important for collaborative ventures.

An important distinction in the collaborative model might be seen in its emphasis on creating a new organisational structure. In this sense all the partnerships could be described as collaborative. All had developed some sort of sub-group system where a division of labour took place, leadership and control were thus shared. However, there are limits to this, individual agencies still retain authority and risk is shared only insofar that individual contractors for the receipt of funding take some risk in getting involved. The necessity for accountable bodies assures that risk and accountability is not shared but carried by a single organisation.

Holistic Integration

Holistic integration implies the most ‘coordinated’ form of joint work with the attention given to the sharing of information to support holistic or seamless service interventions which would be mutually reinforcing (6, Leat et al. 2002). Each intervention working towards the better achievement of others and to the collective goal/s. Whilst none of the cases could realistically be placed within the holistic integration typology all cases showed important examples of a better planned approach. All emanated from pooled budgets at the centre and the Neighbourhood Renewal Fund is fully delegated to the LSP’s to deliver their own strategy. Although as Perri 6 et al (1999) have argued pooled budgets are not necessarily the key way to secure joint work. This assertion could be supported in relation to these cases. Pooling budgets does not appear to encourage
organisations towards higher levels of joint working. Funding had been divided and given to individual organisations or to partnerships of organisations to deliver a project that they had previously planned. The Zone represented a particularly significant case of funding being allocated to the existing projects of key organisations. Only a very small amount of money remained for further developments. The LSP had allocated to projects which fitted with the strategy regardless of the consideration to use budgets to drive forward holistic aims. There were no explicit references to interventions or projects reinforcing others. Again the SRB appeared to be the most well planned scheme in terms of reinforcement, although in fairness, their single theme does foster this more readily.

Information generation and sharing was particularly key to the Zone and LSP, it was built into their long-term strategies for Coventry. They would only be effective if they continued to map the baselines, inputs and impacts of policy. The LSP had also developed its own ‘scrutiny’ role in terms of common performance systems and evaluation strategies.

Despite the LSP being an important development in joined-up thinking by central government, it was the SRB which had successfully developed services which could lead to mutually reinforcing interventions because of their level of integration. Of course, this is not to argue that other interventions will not work to reinforce each other. The Zone in principle had accepted that interventions should work with others in their policy decisions but actually developing linkages had been difficult to achieve. The LSP’s attempts at the coordination of interventions remained underdeveloped. Projects were coordinated in the sense that they supported mainstream service provision and they were focused on some of the key areas identified in the Community Plan. Thus, at these formative stages many aspects which could be placed under the heading holistic integration remained more at the policy making level rather than service delivery.

Table 31, overleaf, provides a summary of this comparative analysis of the key features identified in the cases using the framework developed in chapter three.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CRITERIA</th>
<th>Cooperation</th>
<th>Coordination</th>
<th>Collaboration</th>
<th>Holistic integration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Presence/absence of rule system</td>
<td>All cooperative - not bound by rule systems</td>
<td>Some formal rules exist</td>
<td>Some formal rules exist</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of support/legitimation given to joint work</td>
<td>Individuals important in SRB</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Evidence that organisations are committed to their representatives in all cases</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resource implications</td>
<td>Control over own resources is maintained in all cases</td>
<td>Resources made available for specific projects particularly SRB &amp; ZONE</td>
<td>Resources jointly secured and managed for longer term in LSP &amp; ZONE</td>
<td>Resources pooled at central and regional level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Many levels of communication channels created</td>
<td>Information sharing is a key goal in all three cases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning implications</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>SRB worked with grain of policy and was coordinated</td>
<td>LSP &amp; ZONE have joint long-term planning. SRB also has succession strategy</td>
<td>Planning for LSPs &amp; ZONE will rely on good information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goals emphasised</td>
<td>Organisations emphasise own goals but do not preclude joint goals in all cases</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>All cases exhibit collaborative machinery including joint goals</td>
<td>All have goals to achieve reinforcement between interventions. SRB has integrated projects. LSP &amp; ZONE plans remain underdeveloped.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat to organisational autonomy</td>
<td>No threat to authority in all cases</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Whilst authority is not pooled from an organisational sense a balance is struck between ownership and expediency. Risk is not fully shared.</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Summary

The question relating to whether or not partnerships have been more successful at joint working is difficult to answer based on three case studies from one area. Although there is evidence of coordinative activity particularly at the planning and policy level, in no case could this be said to be very high if the cases are viewed as sites of possible policy, planning and service coordination. Where coordination was planned it was often hard to implement and all cases showed evidence of failure to coordinate activities in appropriate ways. What is evident is that some coordination was brought through the development of other mainstream interventions such as Connexions and Community Planning. Other examples emerged through existing developments such as the Coventry Forum and Objective 2 funding. Important in these developments were key actors working to coordinate regeneration activities. In all three cases there was a strong pull from well established actors and their organisations towards receiving regeneration expenditure. An argument that in previous eras has been a criticism of regeneration partnerships (Mawson, Beazely et al. 1995). In this sense it is of no surprise that mainstream actors have managed to draw down the bulk of regeneration resources. In the LSP case of course this was what the NRF was for. However, because of local diversity and perhaps because of the embedding of the voluntary and community sectors as service delivery agents these sectors have done particularly well out of the NRF.

However overall, in all three cases the planned and hoped for situation of co-governance was circumscribed by the power and resources of mainstream agencies aggravated by the introduction of new programmes. Coordination was then often working in a contradictory rather than complementary ways to the pursuit of co-governance.

Overall if regeneration policy is mapped out onto a matrix (see figure 8), which provides a graphical representation of the four typologies with Integration and Coordination reflecting more hierarchical and integrated forms of joint working and collaboration and cooperation reflecting more networked governance forms with low organisational integration: regeneration policy remains closely associated with cooperation, but overlaps with coordination; collaboration and even slightly with
holistic integration. There is little overall difference between cases concerning the degree to which they are coordinated.

Figure 8 - A graphical representation of regeneration policy within joined up government using the concepts of joint working.

CO-GOVERNANCE

In each programme, the cases were intended to be strongly influenced through co-governing activities. As we have seen in the findings the notion of co-governance in terms of joint decision-making has been constrained, although in all cases it had been attempted. Below, the findings are discussed in relation to the distinctions developed between, consultation and involvement or engagement and formative and ongoing influence in chapter three (table 10). In which consultation is differentiated from involvement by its lower levels of participation by all actors and particularly those actors who traditionally have been weak. Consultation implies explaining and informing, and the community in particular, may be given options derived from prior work carried out by those more closely involved in decision-making. Involvement implies full engagement among all actors through which decisions and actions emerge. Full involvement is assumed to be a superior type of participation since it can involve influence from weaker actors (Yorkshire and Humber Regional Development Agency 2000).
Formative influence describes influence exerted from the start of any process of decision-making. In this way all actors can influence who is involved and over what they will participate in. If this is operating there may be a transformation in the attitudes and practices of actors. Ongoing influence refers to the influence which can be exerted by actors once the basic processes have been established. Influence should be evident over time between actors. However, it has been noted in the literature that ongoing influence can often rely on formative influence having preceded it (Davis 2000). A summary of the type and degree of co-governance achieved within each partnership is presented in table 32.

Consultation and Engagement

Using the evaluative criteria described above, the LSP in principle falls into the involvement/engagement mode of participation, although there are additional examples of consultation. The board of 35 contains a broad sectoral mix within its membership and these are almost equally distributed, although mainstream actors were more highly represented at the time of the research numbering 10. However, those actors from traditionally weaker sectors such as the community and voluntary sectors together equalled the public sector. Added to these are the Councillors which it could be argued also represent the wider citizenry as well as the local authority. A further four members can be co-opted from organisations such as Trade Unions. Overall, the board can be seen to be weighted with those who seek to represent the community at large rather than the mainstream public services. There is an intention for the board members to be fully involved and there is evidence in the case study that this has occurred. Furthermore, local communities had a direct role in contributing to the decisions regarding the acceptance of projects to be funded through NRF. This process had elements of involvement in decision-making but also of consultation. Residents were offered a series of choices developed by various service providers which fitted with the strategic objectives of the Forum. These projects had not themselves been generated through a co-governed approach, they had been decided upon as being important by the service providers and residents chose those which appeared to them as most urgent.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programme/Partnership</th>
<th>Consultation</th>
<th>Formative influence</th>
<th>Ongoing influence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>LSP</strong></td>
<td>This exists at the wider community network level and has occurred through community planning and Area Forums.</td>
<td>Community did not shape Community Plan.</td>
<td>Wider community network is feeding into the LSP via community representatives. Consultation is ongoing with citizens around the Community Plan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ZONE</strong></td>
<td>Consultation took place in the Zone partnership despite no requirement to do so.</td>
<td>Consultation occurred after the initial strategy and action plan were developed and therefore had little impact.</td>
<td>The strategy has left some aspects underdeveloped (such as training needs) and potentially consultation could influence this as an ongoing activity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SRB</strong></td>
<td>Within the SRB this exists within projects themselves; has occurred through research and the City Conference process.</td>
<td>Consultation was important for issue raising. But scheme and projects were shaped beyond this by professional workers and the local authority. Young people in Coventry were identified as one of the 6 key issues. Furthermore the scheme is orientated towards central government objectives.</td>
<td>As consultation is an ongoing process opportunities for influence continues. However, much of the management is now carried out between core members and council managers. Theme groups comprise few board members although their role is to support management functions.</td>
</tr>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programme/Partnership</th>
<th>Engagement/Involvement</th>
<th>Formative influence</th>
<th>Ongoing influence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>LSP</strong></td>
<td>Most participation concurs with the involvement/engagement modes. All actors are equals in principle. The community network representatives are well integrated into the LSP.</td>
<td>The City Forum/Community Plan had been influential in how the LSP developed: including the management shaping the NRF focus.</td>
<td>Community network representatives are influential in the ongoing work of the LSP. But the lack of funding in future may threaten this.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ZONE</strong></td>
<td>Community members were also involved as board members in addition to the voluntary sector representatives despite no requirement to do so but on strict terms chosen by the existing board.</td>
<td>The voluntary sector members are reported as being influential and the strategy is balanced. However, the voluntary and community sectors have poor access to resources at present.</td>
<td>Ongoing influence may be limited by the use of specialist consultants and those outside of the board membership on sub-groups dealing with specific aspects of the work.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SRB</strong></td>
<td>Involvement exists in youth board members; general broad involvement; projects; the Democracy Project; and youth involvement in the recruitment of personal advisors.</td>
<td>Influence from engagement excepting recruitment was identified as hard to see. Young people are listened to but don’t really impact greatly on key decisions. Voluntary sector has gained respect via support for them from government.</td>
<td>Ongoing influence is likely from the processes established but limited by the time limited nature of the SRB.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The LSP has extended the existing Coventry Forum which comprised service providers together with a representative from the voluntary and private sectors. However, in this limited way the Forum did operate as an inclusive board with actors from various sectors taking the lead on different areas of work. Whilst the Forum had been initiated by the Leader of the Council it had not been Local Authority dominated prior to the availability of the neighbourhood renewal fund.

Furthermore, the Community Empowerment Fund has facilitated the development of what is in principle a robust mechanism for representing communities’ interests. Although the research took place in the early stages of implementation the representatives were proving to be effective communicators and were certainly not passive observers of the proceedings. In fact, their vociferousness had on occasions been seen as problematic for lone representatives from key public services who were lambasted about the way services were delivered.

Other aspects of the community network and LSP more generally fall into the consultation mode of participation. The work that the representatives do in the wider community, explaining their role and that of the LSP and feeding back issues to the LSP can only be seen as consultation. The council also consults more generally around the community plan. Such consultations also feed into the work of the LSP and will do particularly via the community plan mechanism in the future. It could be said that overall the LSP represents a model form of participation.

Comparatively the Zone has been poor regarding participation. Consultation with the local community has taken place and there are community members appointed to the board in a non-executive capacity, but neither were well established. The wider community were often disinterested and the community representatives felt that they were not being given full roles which utilised their knowledge and skills. Nevertheless, the Zone partnership were going beyond their remit in including the community or directly consulting the community, neither were required by Advantage West Midlands. In this sense the partnership should be given some credit for attempting this. Overall participation in the Zone appeared low with few having had a role in making decisions, most members had merely rubber stamped the plans created by the small local authority
dominated task group. Importantly for the partnership, the private sector had been particularly difficult to engage with, although they took roles in terms of funding and delivering projects. A private sector consultant had been employed to develop the work needing private sector input.

The SRB scheme, although not as participative as the LSP in its board structures overall and suffering problems with poor attendance among its members, did have some redeeming features. The scheme was better coordinated responding to the multifaceted problems often facing young people from deprived backgrounds. The development of the scheme had been carried out by a few key members. This had included those from the voluntary sector who played smaller but key roles in the partnership. This partnership had also engaged the private sector to a full extent with private sector members having contributed expertise to the management of the scheme and others were involved in educational schemes to which they contributed resources and shaped the project to meet private sector interests.

The scheme, having successfully managed to develop a scheme using key players in the City from education; social services; health and voluntary organisations focussed their work more closely as an overall partnership with regard to their target group. As a consequence these key players were highly involved.

It also had a high level of consultation and involvement with young people, perhaps limited by the fact that this community were minors. This had led to some influence, for example, they had shaped the original bid through their complaints about services. Young people had also been appointed to the board and played a full role in discussions. In particular areas of work such as the development of the Connexions service young people had sat on the interviewing board for personal advisors. All projects had to show how young people had been consulted or involved in its development. Furthermore, part of the Democracy project’s role was to encourage young people in the city to take part in local democracy.
Formative and ongoing influence

It is also necessary to evaluate the extent to which these forms of consultation and engagement from members have had formative influence (that which occurs at the beginning of a partnership) and ongoing influence (that which continues) and may rely on having had formative influence.

It is at this point that the LSP looks less than encouraging as a model partnership. An initial assessment would have to conclude that in relation to formative influence it would be difficult to say that the LSP as a whole has been influential. It is fair to accept that existing members of the Forum including the key voluntary sector member had been highly involved in setting up the processes and aiding the transition from a loosely integrated voluntaristic network to a more formalised partnership working to central government’s remit and therefore eligible to receive grant funding. The processes which had been instigated were either consistent with the details of the guidance for setting up an LSP or in some cases as we saw in the case study evidence had been shaped by the existing Forum members, for example in terms of operating a bidding system for the distribution of the NRF.

The community network was set up during the spring of 2002 and had little influence on where the NRF had been spent or how it would be distributed although the communities themselves had influenced decisions. In this sense the LSP had failed if their role was to influence decisions regarding that spending. There was also a lack of influence over decisions regarding how the LSP would be managed. The decisions taken to structure the partnership in relation to the appointment of the Leader of the Council as Chair and the Chief Executive as Secretary; the instigation of the Operations Group; Secretariat; NRF panel and the evaluation teams were all aspects decided upon before the community network were involved. The community representatives were thus allowed to participate in an already established network.

In addition, there had been no influence over the strategy. This had been based on the Community Plan which had been developed by the key actors within the city.
In terms of ongoing influence, the opportunities have improved. An example of the future prospects has already been provided by the community representatives particularly in the development of an embryonic dialogue between them and the Health Sector. The representatives were also beginning to question the way certain aspects of the partnership had been instituted. They particularly disliked the idea that the Leader and Chief Executive would be the Chair and Secretary. Both they and others particularly from the private sector would prefer an elected system open to a wider set of people. This is clearly a case of limited formative influence having a negative, albeit hopefully temporary, impact on the ability of the broader membership having ongoing influence.

Overall, with the accreditation systems, the constitution and the management and representative systems in place, the LSP could be an effective way to foster regeneration activities on a long-term basis. It will take a concerted effort amongst members, particularly with the short-term funding provided for the community network and the fact that the NRF is not guaranteed either beyond the initial three year period. Thus, the impact of this wider influence may be constrained in the future.

Whilst the LSP displays its usefulness as a debating forum, it has not been an effective way to use additional funds along the lines which government planned. There has been too little influence from the current members in general. However, because of the way the Neighbourhood Fund was instituted, decisions about how to spend the funds, has not been overly influenced by central government either. There are, of course, the Local Public Service Agreements and floor targets which have shaped the projects to an extent but the variety of projects was wide with some having only a tenuous link with the floor targets. This is something which may be amended, if central government does not see the targets being met, thus drawing back from the concept of decentralised control in the neighbourhood renewal programme. It might be seen as paradoxical that in this case neither central government with its history of over centralisation nor the broadly conceived local stakeholders had any real influence on where the funding went.

The use of a bidding system turned into an exhaustive exercise of consultation and involvement over decision-making around the spending of the NRF where the LSP were not overly involved and to a large degree effective control remained with the Local
Authority. Broad influence was also cut short as funds for the three years were committed in year two of the three year funding regime. There is no doubt that the communities involved had a say in decisions although at times they did not feel particularly empowered. The Local Authority felt obliged to make decisions on behalf of the minority groups which wider communities did not recognise since they have differing, albeit at times, interconnected problems. Tensions emerged over how exactly funds would be distributed in this context which raises the issue of the suitability and effectiveness of co-governed approaches versus planned bureaucratic approaches. This suggests that this sort of activity does have to be managed in some way to avoid services being voted for by ‘general populations’ which will most likely always ignore the needs of minority populations.

In the Zone partnership, voluntary sector members have been influential although they have recognised that this particular programme and partnership has not been the most productive. The strategy is balanced in theory. The issue for the Zone partnership is how this is to be delivered. The Voluntary and Community sector have had poor access to resources thus far leading to gaps in the important service linkages which can bring added value such as linking job creation with deprived populations. The future in terms of ongoing influence between the Zone’s membership remains a challenge. There are opportunities for other projects to be developed but the funding for them may be limited. It is certainly not the case that further funding is guaranteed which is partly a problem emerging from the low level of commitment from AWM which in turn is affected by funding allocations to the RDAs from central government. Other barriers to success for the Zone may be the use of specialist consultants, the task group and those outside the board membership on sub-groups who are one step removed from the main board or their interests. The appointment of Theme Group Champions may deal with this issue effectively for the future.

The SRB case whilst being highly consultative and engaging with young people on the board is difficult to assess. From one respondent’s perspective you could not see the impact of their influence. The scheme appeared to address issues about which there was at least some sort of consensus and the early outcomes were promising (Field and Merrill 2001). Nevertheless, the way the scheme had operated in the past suggested that
ongoing influence from the section of the youth population that were reachable would be possible but those less reachable would remain a problem. However, the degree to which this would be the case regardless of the way the participative processes were operated is unknown.

Figure 9 provides a graphical illustration of the positioning of each of the cases. The degree of inclusion and involvement is mapped against the degree of influence in a matrix form. If programmes were working successfully then the degree of influence should be high where there is a high degree of inclusion, this should determine a high degree of involvement. Where inclusion is lower, in the case of consultation and at the extreme level cooption, the degree of influence expected would be lower. Unlike the issue of coordination, the cases were more varied on the issue of overall co-governance as this analysis describes. The LSP was perhaps the most co-governed overall but perhaps did not match the rhetoric of the policy. The SRB despite its poor history followed closely behind and the Zone was the weakest in relation to influence. However, none showed a particular propensity for a high degree of influence from a broad range of members suggesting that regeneration programmes and partnerships have some way to go yet before they attain the aims in the policy rhetoric.

Figure 9 - A graphical representation of regeneration policy within joined up government using the concepts of participation.
HOW THE CASES REFLECTED JOINED-UP GOVERNMENT

A further objective of the research was to assess how the programmes under review in each case reflected broader developments in joined-up government. The evidence collected in the case studies identifies several facets of joined-up government. This section draws on the distinctions concerning the different focus for coordination made by 6 et al (2002), in terms of policy; regulation; service and scrutiny.

In particular, regeneration policy in its entirety is characterised by an increase in the requirements for joining-up at the level of policy and planning: something to which scant attention was paid during the preceding conservative administrations. This is evidenced by:

(i) The planning occurring at central level particularly through the Neighbourhood Renewal Action Plan, which has set the agenda for regeneration at the local level and the less detailed planning surrounding regional policy;
(ii) The requirement for planning at the regional level which has been executed within the RDAs in line with their devolved status;
(iii) The requirement for local authorities to produce community plans (strategies) and the more detailed plans produced by LSPs concerning neighbourhood renewal; and
(iv) The instigation of Regional SRB Frameworks to guide the work of SRB partnerships.

Such planning has overlaid existing practice in terms of the regional plans required for the European Union Structural Funds. All the cases were characterised by a high level of policy coordination as individual schemes were integrated into a larger strategic plan for the area or region.

Other forms of joining-up, for example around service provision has been considerably more weakly evidenced but was found in the SRB and Zone cases. Although in the case of the Zone, such service coordination had been implemented prior to the implementation of the Zone strategy as the Zone Partnership further developed existing work within the area. Nevertheless, it is an example of the support given to service coordination in the Zone partnership’s work. The LSP, arguably the place where high levels of service coordination might have been expected, exhibited no evidence of any
such provision developing. Indeed, the topic of how projects would have a simultaneous impact upon regenerating the local area, were only being addressed during the second (and possibly the last) round of NRF funding. However, there was no evidence that this had actually occurred.

In terms of regulation, if incentives can be categorised under the aegis of regulation, local authorities are being incentivised to work jointly through the establishment of the LSPs through which members can act as a check on local authorities. Other key public services are affected similarly. Furthermore, the Local Public Service Agreements including the floor targets expect that local authorities will work with other members of the service community to meet these targets. In some cases joint work between the Local Authority and other services would be imperative for their achievement. Local Authorities which meet the targets are rewarded financially in terms of pump priming investment; performance rewards and access to further borrowing. Floor targets were also set for the RDAs, for which they and other regional, sub-regional and local bodies are intended to work towards.

The final category of coordination, that of scrutiny, is exhibited in the LSP and the Zone. The rules for the LSP programme required partnerships to produce a strategy for the appraisal of performance and in this sense contains a system of coordinated scrutiny where all the partners would be judged via the same performance system. AWM were keen to collect performance material from organisations that would be comparable based on what was already collected for the SRB and European Regional Development Funds.

Regeneration policy also shares characteristics from other examples of joined-up government such as:

- Work conducted by a single unit or department, such as the SEU and DETR\(^9\) having implications for cross-cutting work;
- The involvement of many agencies in policy development and implementation in specific geographical areas;

\(^9\) DETR - Department of Environment, Transport and the Regions.
• Regeneration activities in ‘principle’ have been designed around policy outcomes;
• Programmes are designed to build generic capacity for regeneration in their areas;
• Particularly with the LSP/NR there are aspects of regulation to incentivise joint work; and
• Given the history of the development of joint work in regeneration policy there is an element of ‘rebadging’ existing forms of work.

CONCLUSIONS

Due to a continuation of past development in regeneration concerning partnerships, the use of holistic budgets; regional and local strategic planning and coordinated responses to service delivery together with the highly diverse nature of regeneration which can encompass a colossal variety of service specialisms with an equally vast range of objectives; joined-up government in this area remains a loosely constructed notion. It differs in scope from activities such as the One Agency, Connexions or the Children’s Trust concepts, all of which are more tightly integrated.

The current emphasis on coordination has overlaid existing practice. The outcome as we have seen in these particular policy programmes is a concerted effort to create more coordinated attempts in regeneration starting at the centre and cascading down through the region and local government. The bifurcation of responsibility for regeneration between the region and locality is perhaps an unfortunate development in an era where the aim was for joined-up government.

If we ask the question, have new policies fostered more coordination? The research findings suggest that policy developments have had an impact upon coordination although it is impossible to assess the degree of this since we have no detailed comparative data concerning the time before these new policies were introduced in Coventry. We do know that coordination has been a developing feature of regeneration programmes since the early 1990s, but we also know generally that this has not been extensive. We know also that Coventry was developing its own systems for creating a more ‘voluntaristic’ coordinated approach between organisations. Even here
coordination remains difficult to achieve in practice although we have seen some examples of good practice.

We also have to ask, what would the counterfactual situation have been? Would this level of coordination would have been achieved without these new policies? It can be suggested that coordination may have improved without new policy rules. This is particularly true of Coventry. In other areas without these previous developments the new policies may be having quite an impact on the thinking of local partnerships about the possibilities for coordinated responses. Indeed a feature in Coventry, was the disruption of a certain amount of organisational coordination, or at least potential for it, within the Forum due to the new rules and funding for the LSP. The availability of funding has meant that the Local Authority has taken a more active role in the LSP than it had in the Forum. This outcome does not seem to have created further coordination between agencies although there is some joint work. Overall, it might be argued that, in the short-term particularly, the new policies may have had only a marginal impact, particularly in the case of the LSP. Whether new policies have actually led to a reduction in coordinated responses within the LSP compared to the Forum is impossible to assess objectively. However, given that the Forum was not highly coordinated in its activities it is unlikely.

Regarding the SRB, it might be that this particular scheme was particularly well coordinated due to the efforts of the local partners. My conclusion, that this is in many ways the best example of a coordinated response, may not hold across the entire cohort of Round five and six schemes under this funding regime. Nevertheless, the interview data did suggest that, whilst more coordinated ways of working were accepted as necessary, the policy rules do help to reinforce and in some cases force such developments.

The Zone policy was perhaps the weakest of the three in its expectations, and in a similar way to the LSP, this partnership was well established, albeit in a slightly different form, and already took forward some coordination for regeneration in the two Local Authority areas. It is doubtful that the increased funding and the policy framework has led to increased coordination, it has led to more work being carried out
but this was more redolent of funding being diverted into existing plans, something which the history of regeneration policy has often showed has occurred to the detriment of new programmes. New plans based on the partnership’s wishes were the least well funded and there were questions concerning whether the more coordinated aspects such as linking training to available jobs would develop at all due to funding shortages.

Another factor to be considered is that Coventry is a Labour controlled authority. It would be surprising if their policies at the local level were not at least partly in tune with New Labour’s strategy at the national level. In Conservative controlled areas or areas which had hung councils, what would have developed without new policy rules may have been extremely limited for this reason. Labour do have a tradition of active intervention and planned approaches.

A related factor to the above, is that of the general cultural climate within the country which supported the election of a Labour Government in the first place. Some respondents did express this in interviews arguing that the conservative era with its divisive individualism was something which should be replaced with a more collectivist culture. Although it is always difficult to pin down cultural change, this may be a factor which supported the move towards more cooperation.

For all the above reasons the development of coordination, which appears to have occurred, albeit only partially, may not be solely derived from the policy rules of new programmes. As we saw in the case study chapters, existing practices and experiences together with the influence of particular individuals and pressures from other policy areas all influenced the development of coordination. However, the policy programmes were important, although the totally new and different nature of the new programmes perhaps prevented the levels of coordination expected in the policy rhetoric.

A further important feature in this policy area is the marrying of co-governance with what are basically the managerialist notions of joined-up government around coordination. User involvement is designed to be part of other policies such as Children’s Trusts but in regeneration it remains a core feature reflecting other pressures within the policy system to meet the need for indigenous institutional development and
involve deprived communities in order to gain the most in terms of outcomes. Whilst the theory may be managerialist the practice is also based on co-governed approaches, as Veryard (2002) argues.

An issue this raises is the extent to which these two policy aims are compatible. Is it possible to have highly coordinated responses based on the shared decisions of practitioners; elected officials; the private sector and the communities affected? It is an appealing concept, but difficult to deliver in practice and by its very nature the two strategies are potentially contradictory. A coordinated approach would normally be based on what was understood as the best way forward to achieve sought after objectives making the best use of the possible resources available, it would therefore be a planned approach. Unfortunately, allowing communities to participate often interferes with this approach. Understandably, communities choose what they see as the most important interventions to them and this may not be particularly well coordinated to achieve the policy objectives of government. There were some tensions, especially regarding the community consultation and involvement processes used in the LSP. Communities did not always choose interventions which would deal with the issues of the whole community, minorities such as asylum seekers and the mentally ill were ignored. This meant that the Local Authority had to overturn some decisions by communities to allow interventions for all groups to be considered.

A further factor regarding the constraints on community consultation and involvement which impacts on all the case studies but perhaps most greatly upon the LSP is the impact of community planning. This was a significant factor in creating coordination generally in policy developments in Coventry. It did however, take away part of the role of the LSP in deciding what the neighbourhood renewal strategy should be as the community plan had already been introduced. This is an example of the conflict between coordination and co-governance. The community was invited to participate in a process that had largely been defined by the existing Forum and the Community Plan process which was not particularly co-governed.

There was much less conflict within the SRB scheme, perhaps this was because it dealt with one particular group. However, a more cynical view might be that the young
people were co-opted into the decisions made by professionals, and since they did not represent the youngsters for which policies were developed anyway, it is likely that they all shared much the same views.

Consultation and involvement were poorly developed within the Zone Partnership’s scheme so there was little opportunity for disagreement.

If we ask the same questions as before, has co-governance, sought through consultation and involvement, increased through new policies? It might be argued that it has made a small difference overall and certainly the potential for the future of the LSP is important, especially as the community representatives wanted to reassess how the LSP’s governance system works to allow communities to impact upon formative decisions in the future.

Regarding the counterfactual question, could this have developed anyway regardless of the new policy rules? In this particular SRB scheme, it possibly could have done, as it was the drive by involved professionals that created the high levels of consultation and involvement that existed. In the LSP, it is unlikely, the Forum had a fairly narrow remit regarding co-governance. It was to include members from a range of sectors, including the voluntary sector and in principle perhaps also the community sector, who were involved in service development and delivery. It had no plans to develop greater involvement to include communities themselves. Therefore, the LSP’s policy rules have changed the nature of co-governance regarding the Coventry partnership’s work. It can be concluded that here this was not going to change on its own in the short-term. The Zone Initiative’s rules made few demands upon the partnership regarding co-governance systems and as such the partnership spent little time in its formative period discussing such issues, unlike the LSP, who arguably spent their time discussing these issues to the almost exclusion of service level coordination and policy reinforcement. This case does suggest that policy rules are an important factor in policy interventions. However, as we have seen they did eventually decide that greater involvement was necessary and took steps to try to ensure this at the board level with the inclusion of community representatives. This was a limited development but represented a move in the right direction.
Overall, it can be argued that the policy rules in general do impact on the outcomes in positive ways but this varies in its extent according to what the rules concern and the context into which they are introduced, i.e. the developments already taking place in the political and professional arenas locally and nationally. There is no simple straightforward trajectory as policy change is introduced into already complex systems. These findings will be returned to in the discussion relating to the degree of generalisability of the case study findings in chapter eleven.

This chapter has focused solely on the degree to which coordination and co-governance have been attained and the nature of their development. In the following chapter, the findings are discussed in relation to network management and the discussion turns to the success or otherwise of the particular management interventions that have been used to foster the development of coordination and co-governance.
Chapter ten

The Cases as Exercises in Network Management

INTRODUCTION

In this chapter the cases are analysed as examples of network management. The purpose of this analysis has been to provide a comparison between different approaches to network management: particularly by central government who are the key network structuring agents within regeneration policy but also those at the partnership and regional level. Cases have been compared as examples of their respective programmes and against the original SRB. This we saw earlier was not an overwhelming success at gaining co-governed coordinated behaviour. The research was conducted primarily in order to assess the use and success of network management within this policy area.

The chapter comprises an overview of key findings from the cases. This is followed by a comparative analysis of the three cases using Klijn and Teisman’s (1997) analytical framework presented in chapter three and applied to the historical SRB case in chapter four. It looks at partnership formation in terms of the actors; it focuses on the perceptions that existed in the policy network and it deals with the policy institutions used in relation to resourcing; management and accountability. Finally, conclusions are drawn in relation to the extent to which network management has developed in the implementation of the three case studies.

Network management - Key findings

It is clear that all the cases have shown developments in the way that networks of actors have been managed in comparison to the original SRB. However, the overall conclusion is that the two new programmes, despite the improvements in network management that have been identified, have added little value to the implementation of regeneration policy concerning the two themes which this thesis has focused upon: issues of coordination and co-governance. It is possible that the existing SRB structure could have delivered better results for the resources used at this particular point in time. However, this is not to say that new programmes are manifest failures. Particularly
regarding the LSP, whilst in the short-term this new structure has not worked successfully from a network management perspective, in the longer-term the LSP in Coventry could be important for addressing issues of regeneration and improved service quality for its residents.

The LSP case demonstrates the most well developed attempt at network management being exercised by actors at the central, regional and local levels: the Zone, less so, but this has still developed compared to the original SRB. In contrast to earlier applications of network management concepts to aspects of local government activity, both here and elsewhere (Painter, Isaac-Henry, et al. 1997; Painter and Clarence 2000), whereby local government’s role has been classified as game management and central government’s as structuring the network, both new programmes studied here suggest that network structuring and game management are increasingly practised at all levels. Nevertheless, central government’s role in setting the institutional structures should not be underestimated. This situation exemplifies the greater interaction sought between central government and local areas in order for them to work more effectively in ‘partnership’. Many in local government express similar sentiments. Although, this new partnership approach is as yet underdeveloped, it does signal a move away from the battles seen in earlier policy phases, such as the 1980s, when central government bypassed local authorities in many regeneration programmes it introduced.

Partnerships, and the local authority in particular, are highly involved in game management but also add their own structures to manage the process. The instigation of managerial and political processes such as establishing a constitution, setting up particular sub-groups to deal with particular areas of work; introducing a management structure and bidding systems may be defined as game management techniques but they operate as structures which can be as important as central government guidelines, if not more so, for the way the partnership works. The assumption that such processes are merely ad hoc and therefore perhaps not as important as the network structures per se is misleading.

Thus, network structuring and game management activities in reality overlap. This is particularly true of new programmes which offer greater freedom for local management.
In both new programmes the broad outlines of the policy have been introduced with their attendant rules and resources. Local partnerships are then expected to interpret those rules to ensure applicable policies at their own local level.

Klijn and Teisman (1997) equate these two activities to the theory of structuration, thus attempting to differentiate neatly between structure and agency in order to then analyse how these two interact to produce outcomes. When this concept was applied in the analysis of the case study data it was found to be problematic, theory did not explain practice fully. The structures in the policies could not be neatly placed under the actions of central government as they seek to establish the network structures within which partnerships would then manage the game. It became clear, once the complexity of the situation in which partnerships fulfil national guidelines, that central government and the regional level were involved in game management and the partnerships were involved in creating structures.

Further structural influences also came from other policies and professional practices at the local level. Thus, the type of activity has to be divorced from the actors pursuing it. In relation to the new programmes, the agency exercised in the implementation of the overarching policy institutions necessarily implies the instituting of more structures through which to manage them as local actors exercise their margin of liberty (Crozier and Friedberg 1980). Furthermore, the way central government implements policy through the Neighbourhood Renewal Unit, Government Office and Regional Development Agency also shows a margin of liberty through agency. How actors implement policy structures can vary substantially and affect the reception and outcomes of new policies at all levels. This has methodological implications regarding the generalisability of the findings which will be dealt with in chapter eleven.

It is important to understand this analysis as not just a new interpretation of Klijn and Teisman’s framework and their application of Giddens’s concepts of structure and agency. Nor, does it seek to correct previous analyses by (Painter, Isaac-Henry et al. 1997) which are most probably highly accurate. What the analysis has surfaced, is that new programmes have created a new and different situation regarding the level of freedom which local actors have in implementing regeneration programmes. What local
actors do with this new freedom will be of great interest to central government. In many ways, the evidence found in these case studies, and that reported by the Government Office representative concerning the LSP development in the West Midlands more generally suggests that local partnerships have not made the most of such local freedoms.

Of course, if networks continue to be involved in a variety of simultaneous or sequential games within the existing structure then the two types of network management may be distinguished more rigidly as new and different games require a different approach to their management. Some issues may require only an overarching framework whilst others may require the institution of what may be called ‘ad hoc’ rules and processes.

In the following three sections of this chapter the analytical framework adopted from Klijn and Teisman (1997) in chapter three (table 3) is applied to the three current case studies. The sections deal with actors; perceptions and institutions respectively and within each section network structuring and game management activities are dealt with using the definitions of interventions adopted in table 2, chapter three drawn from Kickert & Koppenjan (1997).

A summary analysis of each separate case study is provided in table form (tables 33, 34 and 35, pages 290-292).

DETERMINING THE ACTORS IN THE NETWORK

Network Structuring

In the current climate, in which partnership working has become institutionalised, central government and the RDA have through formal policy encouraged the formation of multi-sectoral networks for regeneration activities. The rules used in policies structure the network, at least to a degree. In the case of the LSP the membership is broad and exhibits the successful inclusion of both mainstream service delivery organisations and community representatives. In comparison, the membership of the SRB is more specialised reflecting their theme of Young People. The Zone has perhaps been the least successful in establishing a broad based membership. It has found
activating private sector interest in membership difficult not unlike AWM itself at the regional level.

Like the SRB, the new programmes aimed to establish partnerships which were rooted within the interactive perspective (Klijn and Koppenjan 2000). Similarly also, the LSP and Zone programmes have relied on the use of second generation instruments to do this (De Bruijn and Ten Heuvelhof 1997). The formation of partnership was a prerequisite of funding. Partnership development was thus incentivised, even though there was no guarantee of funding for the Zone.

Whilst in general this has successfully generated strategic level partnerships and in the case of the LSP it has ostensibly created an ideal type of LSP partnership. It has, nevertheless, in this case, undermined the voluntarism which characterised the Coventry Forum and the principles held within the New Commitment to Regeneration. In Coventry, it was argued that the imposition of central government policy institutions (the formal rules of the policy) necessary for the receipt of funding had stalled developments which were already underway addressing core issues around deprivation. So in spite of the fact that additional resources have been allocated to Coventry the issue regarding the degree to which they have a more effective strategic partnership in the short term remains questionable. The robustness of the partnership necessarily affects the quality of actions taken in spending funds. Whilst the Forum were successful in preventing the local authority from controlling the NRF funds by demanding an open bidding process, which has also been shaped to an extent by deprived communities, the local authority have remained the most powerful actor. The evidence certainly does not support the notion that either the LSP or Forum were particularly highly involved or influential as a group once the NRF funding became available.

The similar argument can be made for the Zone partnership. The voluntary and community sectors were involved, the latter only in the eighteenth month of the Zone’s development. The influence of both had been limited regarding spending decisions. The representation of the two local authorities dominated the decision-making even though this was what AWM particularly wanted to avoid.
Comparatively the board of the SRB scheme was more cohesive with members being drawn into the partnership because of their expertise in the welfare of young people. Despite this the scheme had been largely shaped by a core of key players who were involved from the beginning. Nevertheless, the young people on the board were taken seriously even if the evidence of them shaping the outcomes of decisions is hard to detect.

**Game management**

In terms of game management the implementation of new programmes at the local level exhibit a sensitivity to the issues raised regarding inclusion in the SRB programme (Mawson, Beazely et al. 1995). This includes the refocused SRB. Coventry City Council in many ways cannot be faulted in their network management role. AWM and the Zone partnership have also been sensible in many of their arrangements regarding the management of the game. The latter took the decision to encourage community representation which was not required which demonstrates a commitment to a broad sectoral partnership.

They have put enormous effort into developing regeneration programmes after a realisation that a purely economic approach was an inadequate response to the issues of deprivation. In this sense local actors have followed central government policy taking on board the need to open up regeneration activities to new groups and take new approaches.

Regarding the LSP much effort was expended in developing an appropriate membership. To an extent actors were drawn from an existing network (*network activation*) of possible actors already involved in regeneration activities but less visible groups such as the Council for Racial Equality and small local voluntary sector organisations working with the disabled have been included. Compared to the original SRB there has been a great deal more emphasis on establishing a network of equal partners although weaker partners were not initially highly influential. There are signs though that the community network could develop into an effective force. Ongoing organisational *arrangements* within the LSP, exemplified by the constitution, secretariat
and partnership manager may also facilitate constructive interaction between members in the future.

The Zone partnership went beyond AWM’s requirements, including community members and introducing consultation exercises within communities. The board actually wanted involvement from communities but were ill equipped to carry this out despite the dominance of local authority membership with considerable experience in consultation. It seems that the links into the community were weak. Like the LSP the partnership had a constitution, an experienced secretariat and offered induction training for its members. Despite this the Zone was not characterised as an open forum in which decisions were developed together. The existence of various theme groups (network activation), which in some instances comprised mostly of actors outside the board, and particularly the Task Group, made up of officers from the two local authorities, limited the debate and opportunity for weaker partners to get involved. The community representatives who had been appointed by the board found it difficult to find the active role they desired in the organisation. The facilitation role which should have been taken by the board’s secretariat was poorly executed.

The SRB, although far from a perfect programme or partnership appeared to exhibit positive game management activities especially in relation to facilitating interaction, this was partly through the actions of the Chair. Like the LSP, but unlike the Zone, its constitution was readily understandable as a code of conduct for members. There were some comments relating to unequal relations but the focus of work remained on the young people. A degree of consensus here may have emanated from the themed focus of the bid. The individual bids and to some extent the scheme had been subject to a high degree of consultation with young people starting at the point of drafting the original bid.

SRB board members rejected the charge by the RDA that the partnership was controlled by the Local Authority as it acted as the accountable body. Furthermore, sub-groups (network activation) were used in the partnership for management processes, for such things as publicity, evaluation and the development of a succession strategy in a similar way to those used in the LSP rather than as key planning agents as they are in the Zone.
In conclusion, the levels of interaction borne out of the establishment of multi-sectoral partnerships and the possibility for subsequent consensus building appeared to be limited despite central government's rhetoric about the value of creating resource and policy synergies and supporting weaker members within partnership structures. This is true despite the use of what seemed to be appropriate interventions such as formal policy which influences interrelationships and resource distribution (network structuring) and facilitation (game management). There were important instances though, for example, from the Voluntary sector, where they felt their general position within local governance structures had been substantially bolstered. However, from this analysis this had not been associated with an increased access to resources.

CHANGING PERCEPTIONS

Network Structuring

The shaping of perceptions over the definition of problems and solutions has been overwhelmingly influenced by central government policy. All three schemes have sought to address social exclusion and secure the benefits of regeneration for targeted groups. Partnership members were in broad agreement with central governments and the RDA's approaches. Although the consultative processes which New Labour instituted have undoubtedly contributed to such definitions, the impact which New Labour have had reframing policy is substantial. Given the agreement regarding such definitions it is not surprising that there were few instances of outright conflict over the substantive issues.

What remains of course and is of more interest in this research is the conflict over how regeneration should be managed. Regarding this aspect there were more disagreements. The concepts of instrumental strategic option and procedural strategic option are used to analyse the case studies (Termeer and Koppenjan 1997).

There remains in central government action a strong affiliation to the instrumental strategic option the 'do what we want option'. Despite the rhetoric of localism,
Table 33 - A Summary of Network Management Techniques; Perspectives and Outcomes from the LSP Case.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Network Management</th>
<th>Actors</th>
<th>Perceptions</th>
<th>Institutions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Network Structuring Techniques</td>
<td>Formal policy requires new actors to be brought in, especially from the mainstream and community sectors.</td>
<td>Policy documents reframed perceptions over problems and solutions E g over social exclusion and intraregional disparities.</td>
<td>Formal policy requires: - formation of partnership for funds; - accreditation to include soft and hard performance measures; - bureaucratic systems for upward accountability remain – this includes target meeting.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perspective</td>
<td>Rooted in the interactive but remains instrumental.</td>
<td>Instrumental approach dominates.</td>
<td>Instrumental/interactive/institutional approaches can be identified in central government’s strategy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcomes</td>
<td>LSP is formed as ‘ideal type’ at local level.</td>
<td>‘Instrumentalism continues’ as local actors follow resources. However in the main the definition of the problem and solutions are accepted. Some differences remain over how to manage problems.</td>
<td>More proactive approach leads to - continued emphasis on regularity, propriety and VFM but more relaxed; - outcome not output monitoring against targets; - upwards and increasing downward accountability - improved inclusion mechanisms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Game management Techniques</td>
<td>LSP and particularly the LA have acted as network managers at the game level, selective activation has taken place but also structuring</td>
<td>Local policy documents (community plan) shape the work. These strongly reflect central government priorities.</td>
<td>Good quality mechanisms are in place for managing the game: - GOR level facilitate, mediate and arbitrate - Local Authority are involved in network activation; reticulism, arranging; facilitation and brokerage.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perspective</td>
<td>Interactive/Institutional as local environment influences decisions.</td>
<td>Interactive/Institutional Interaction takes place at this level around definitions and solutions.</td>
<td>Interactive/Institutional Mechanisms to manage interaction local level.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcomes</td>
<td>Mixed group of actors has emerged some new and others selected from an institutionalised set of regeneration actors.</td>
<td>Institutionalisation of partnership working already in existence. The degree to which the ‘procedural strategic option’ has begun to develop through interaction is still variable due to inadequate interaction. Actors keen to keep local control.</td>
<td>High quality interaction in the main exists within the LSP particularly for ongoing work; formative work (spending NRF) was influenced less by the LSP. In Coventry’s case the Government Office had not been influential as the area is well developed.</td>
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### Table 34 - A Summary of Network Management Techniques; Perspectives and Outcomes from the Zone Case.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Network Management</th>
<th>Actors</th>
<th>Perceptions</th>
<th>Institutions</th>
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</table>
| **Network structuring**     | Formal policy requires that new actors are brought in, especially business and voluntary sectors. | Policy documents reframed perceptions over problems and solutions. E.g. over social exclusion and intraregional disparities. | Formal policy requires:  
  - formation of a partnership to apply for funds;  
  - bureaucratic systems for upward accountability remain – this includes target meeting.  
  Also provides:  
  - funding for development of strategy and for administration |
| **Techniques**              | Rooted in the interactive approach but remains instrumental.           | Instrumental approach from central government.                             | Instrumental/interactive/institutional approaches                          |
| **Perspective**             | Zone board only partially successful regarding membership. Private sector representation sought through consultants. Partnership committed to community inclusion later on in development process | ‘Instrumentalism continues’ as local actors follow the resources. However in the main the definition of the problem and solutions are accepted. Some differences remain over how to manage problems. | More proactive approach leads to  
  - continued emphasis on regularity, propriety and VFM;  
  - comprehensive monitoring against targets;  
  - upwards accountability;  
  - increased management freedom and responsibility for partnerships. |
| **Outcomes**                | Zone partnership acts as network manager at the game level. Selective activation and network structuring has taken place. | Regional policy documents (WMES) shape the work. These strongly reflect central government priorities. | Good quality mechanisms are in place for managing the game:  
  - RDA wants to play as minimal a role as possible, leaving more control with the partnership;  
  - partnership is involved in network activation; arranging and facilitation. |
| **Game management**         | Interactive/ Institutional as local environment influences decisions. | Interactive/ Institutional Interaction takes place at this level around definitions and solutions | Interactive/Institutional approaches  
  Mechanisms to manage interaction local level |
| **Techniques**              | Partnership membership dominated by local authority reflecting parent partnership but disregards AWM’s policy. Business partners difficult to activate. The influence of community is limited. | Institutionalisation of partnership working already in existence. The degree to which the ‘Procedural strategic option’ has begun to develop through interaction is highly limited due to inadequate interaction. Key actors keen to keep local control. | Formative work (developing strategy) not highly influenced by the partnership. |
# Table 35 - A Summary of the Network Management Techniques, Perspectives and Outcomes in the SRB Case.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Network Management</th>
<th>Actors</th>
<th>Perceptions</th>
<th>Institutions</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Network Structuring Techniques</td>
<td>Formal policy requires that community and voluntary actors are fully included and paper partnerships end.</td>
<td>New policy documents reframe perceptions over problems and solutions in line with ideas concerning holism and social exclusion.</td>
<td>Policy instruments require: Competition for scarce funds (at the regional level); bureaucratic systems for upward accountability and output measurement Instrumental/Institutional.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perspective</td>
<td>Interactive/Instrumental</td>
<td>Instrumental approach.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcomes</td>
<td>Broad membership exists, with good partnership relations but influence over spending is limited.</td>
<td>‘Instrumental strategic option’ still relevant concerning activities but partnership relations are considered very good.</td>
<td>Active approach led to regularity, propriety and VFM: - output monitoring - greater attention given to outcomes - upwards accountability remains SRB still takes largely passive approach to: - inclusion - downward accountability What exists relies on local actors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Game management Techniques</td>
<td>Partnership and RDA involved in game management. Network activated largely from professionals with some private sector members.</td>
<td>Game management techniques used at partnership level particularly by Chair and Management Team. GOR play a role also.</td>
<td>Competition for scarce funds (within scheme) game management largely left to local partnerships with support from RDA. Interactive/Institutional/instrumental</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perspective</td>
<td>Interactive/Institutional</td>
<td>Interactive/Institutional.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcomes</td>
<td>Institutional position of actors affects the degree of influence which different actors can have. However, the scheme is strongly oriented towards the target group and is characterised as consensual. Ongoing consultation and board membership includes young people.</td>
<td>Institutionalisation of partnership working already in existence. ‘Procedural strategic option’ can be identified as second bid is improved and discussions continue about how best to allocate funds</td>
<td>There exists variation in influence but among the key actors partnership working was good. Accountability issues not resolved although consultation and involvement are good.</td>
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</table>
particularly in new programmes there are strong drivers for certain actions and ways of doing things emerging from central government. Fulfilling central targets are a case in point. Members of the LSP argued that localities needed to retain more control over strategy and targets if they were to be successful.

Moreover, the continued emphasis on funding control in both new programmes has reduced the capacity for consensus to genuinely emerge from dialogic processes. The pressure to spend has meant that money was diverted to projects which were already part of existing local strategies rather those developed through the multi-sectoral boards. In this respect new programmes appear to offer little extra value over the revised SRB process.

The partnerships have responded conventionally to this instrumentalism themselves. A key driver for the development of the LSP and Zone partnership remained the availability of funding. Of course this was also evident in the SRB, with certain members avoiding board meetings unless their project was being discussed. It might be argued that while ever resource synergy is the prime objective from central government’s perspective, the processes of interaction necessary for policy synergy themselves will be downgraded at the local level too. Central Government’s emphasis on gaining resource synergies appears to persist (Hastings 1996).

**Game Management**

Despite the identification of instrumentalism, the sharing of perceptions is important and there is evidence that genuine interaction may be developing through the *procedural strategic option*. This was undoubtedly starting to take place in the LSP, for example in housing policy where the breadth of views expressed were raising important new ways to tackle the problem of poor quality homes in the area. Furthermore, community representatives had successfully persuaded the Health representative to discuss issues identified around health service provision.

Unfortunately, there was less evidence that alternative approaches to regeneration *per se* were being discussed. It is difficult to see that the LSP as a partnership has shaped the
agenda for regeneration, the projects funded and approaches taken were in this early period shaped by the community plan, city council and Forum, and are heavily influenced by central government's agenda. Much store was set on developing the second Community plan as this would enable the partnership and wider community to be more influential.

There is also evidence, perhaps less strong, that the other cases were also developing through the procedural strategic option. In the Zone, debate had been high between the two local authorities, if not between the whole membership. The majority of projects were chosen by the local authority officers and taken to the board for consultation but there were underdeveloped areas which could have been contributed to more by the whole board. Relationships were also good in the SRB case with key actors at least being involved in the bid development process and discussions were ongoing about where spare funding could be spent and how projects should be managed. However, given the more rigid nature of the SRB, being time and funding limited, the opportunities for this may have less impact in the future.

In all cases actors revealed the ongoing problems of getting the different sectors to work effectively together. There remain stark differences between the way the public and private sector work, with the latter keen to make decisions and operationalise them, whilst for the former strategy is too important to rush.

Overall, notwithstanding the differences of opinion between partnership actors and between those actors and central government, the LSP process particularly is an improvement on the original SRB where arguments raged regarding the competitive processes used and differential power between various sectors.

THE PROGRAMME AND ITS INSTITUTIONS

Many of the institutional rules contained within the original SRB acted as barriers to the interaction which central government wanted to encourage. As we have seen the LSP and Zone cases contain different institutional rules. The analysis will now turn to a discussion of those institutional rules.
RESOURCES

Network structuring

Resource distribution and therefore, resource dependencies between organisations, are fundamental to policy networks (Rhodes 1997). We have seen in chapter four, that a lack of access to resources is linked with an organisation's power in the process. Power is usually translated into access to resources and the reason why Local Authorities continue to dominate regeneration networks. The ownership of resources can also bring power in the process. New policies are no different, access to resources remains key for understanding how much power actors have.

Compared to the processes established during the introduction of the SRB, the formal rules surrounding the NRF are by comparison ostensibly unproblematic and good in many of their principles. The allocations are based on eligibility criteria and substantial amounts are allocated through the NRF. These factors should have provided the basis for the LSP to guide spending in productive ways. The CEF also supports community involvement which addresses the shortfall of resources for weaker partners to get fully involved in partnership processes. This, if it worked properly would mean that a more level playing field was created between the partners and the smaller partners would have more power to shape outcomes. However, despite the principles being sound the actual management of the resources was poor, particularly in terms of the timing of the allocations and central government’s refusal to fund the administration of LSPs. Funding was distributed to Local Authorities, in the first year before the LSP was established, even by year two, the partnership was not well developed enough to have shaped spending decisions. In addition, central government’s refusal to fund the administration led to disagreements within the partnership. The private sector members felt it was not their role to fund this development, their contributions were more usually made in kind. It is also problematic to have all public sector members funding the partnership when the potential rewards from meeting targets will return to the local authority alone.
The Zone partnership is receiving substantial resources to cover administration and overall will potentially receive up to £21.8 m. Funding for the administration is important and was welcomed by the partnership. Nevertheless, resource issues remain, since further funding is not guaranteed over the lifetime of the Zone project. As such, the Zone is a procurement partnership similar to the City Pride Partnerships who developed extensive plans only to find that funding fell far short of that necessary to deliver their plans. This situation could potentially leave the smaller community and voluntary sector projects unfunded due to the larger public sector projects having already been funded out of first tranche of spending.

The SRB partnership at least had the advantage of knowing how much funding they would receive if they won in the competitive process. Under the revised SRB rules, cities such as Coventry which contain substantial pockets of deprivation, have greater opportunity to obtain funding under this system thus reducing some of the negative aspects of the SRB’s competitive process.

**Game management**

The management of the game regarding resources within the SRB has been reasonably good although the public sector have dominated the planning and have received a very high proportion of the funding available possibly because of it. Despite the ongoing inequalities the partnership has good relations and appears to have an external focus on the needs of deprived youngsters.

Central government’s formal rules for the LSP was that it would operate as a system of commissioning by the local authority alone in the first year and then in the following years together with the broader LSP. The LSP would thus shape new services or service improvements. The adoption of a bidding system, pressed for by the Forum, complicated the process of allocating the NRF, slowing down the allocation and implementation processes. This was frustrating for central government and Government Office since they had abandoned competitive bidding for funds at the regional level. This highlights the scope for local partnership freedom within a broad institutional structure. They developed their own policy rules with regard to implementation of
resource allocation. It is also a demonstration of the extent to which competitive processes have become embedded in a relatively short period of time within local governance structures. It has to be said that it was not particularly the local authority's wish to engage in this since they could legally spend the fund as they wished in the first year. The processes of co-governance in this instance led to a problematic outcome as much time and energy was expended on the process. However, given the timescales and funding rules, even if a bidding process had not been introduced, it is unlikely that the influence from the LSP would have been more evident. However, the local authority did ensure that the community had some influence over decisions.

The outcome of the resource allocation process was similar to earlier SRB schemes: larger organisations had the competitive edge on smaller ones. Although as we have seen in year two of the NRF, a considerable percentage of funds were allocated to smaller voluntary and community organisations, despite the official policy bias towards funding mainstream service providers.

The Zone Initiative rules also meant that the partnership was expected to commission in a similar way to the LSP, steering funding decisions for local regeneration interventions. Due to the short timescales again, the board with its top-heavy membership of Councillors under the guidance of local authority officer Task Group, the outcome was a strategy which was initially planned by these officers. Thus resource allocation within the partnership was controlled largely by officer advisors to the board. Like the other partnerships most projects and most funding went to the public sector even if through joint bids between the public and voluntary or private sectors.

MANAGEMENT

Network structuring

Whilst the funding allocation rules appeared unproblematic within the LSP, the management of the funding did not support the aims and objectives of NR and LSP policy. Central government after taking three years to develop a regeneration strategy was clearly keen to allocate funds to local authorities and partnerships. An exogenous
issue for central government was the under-spending of funds during both New Labour administrations to date. In response to this, it is reported that Blair 'told ministers to get spending' (Stone-Lee 2001). The way in which this process unfolded upon LSPs undermined the espoused principles of co-governance within the partnership. Effectively central government operated two conflicting systems. In the first, partnerships were to establish themselves, and then develop and implement a strategy. Where deprivation existed, funding would be allocated to encourage joint work. In the second, government wanted local authorities to spend immediately from 2001 alone and in 2002/3 together with the LSP according to the neighbourhood renewal strategy which was expected to have been developed.

These two systems were contradictory, and inevitably the local authority became dominant. This occurred in Coventry despite the existence of the Forum which was not local authority dominated. Even in year two (2002) the Coventry Partnership could only be described as emergent and its strategy remained based on the community plan and not necessarily what the partnership would have developed given the opportunity. By the third year of funding the LSP could have been in a strong position to influence the strategy. However, because of the particular situation concerning bidding within Coventry the funding had already been committed. Thus funding has more or less effectively slipped through the hands of the LSP in Coventry which runs counter to the aims of the policy. This of course was not the fault of central government. However the timing of the funding allocation and the tying of these funds to the formation of the LSP has unfortunately seen history repeat itself. The criticism of the SRB's short time scales which did not allow the formation and development of a genuine partnership driven strategy unfortunately hold true for this phase too. In some ways the NRF was worse since funding was provided before the existence of any strategy. Therefore, the management processes were insufficient drivers to forward the aims of the programme towards a coordinated response shaped by co-governance.

The management of the CEF was less problematic but government guidance regarding applications for funding were not published until September 2001. Between this time and the end of February 2002, the Community Network had to be developed ready for the formal start of the LSP. As the voluntary sector respondent
argued, government intentions were genuine, but there was a lack of understanding regarding the pressure on local voluntary organisations to fulfil the government’s agenda for them to play a bigger role generally in the provision of services. There was a mismatch between government’s stated policy and the practicalities of delivering it. In practice, in Coventry, it took until February to appoint a development worker to support the network. Effectively, whilst the community representatives were on the board from the formal start of the LSP, many decisions regarding how the partnership would operate had already been made by this time.

The way that the Zone partnership was managed by the RDA was similar, again short time scales prevented the necessary background work by the partnership and full consultation with communities. Respondents complained that the relationship between the RDA and Zone was not good. The relationship remained along the usual central-local model with the centre being too top-down in its approach.

In comparison to these new programmes, the SRB scheme, in this instance, was a good example. Experience and widely held knowledge about how the SRB worked together with improvements in the programme’s rules allowed the scheme to operate without too many problems. It was far from perfect but at least did not suffer from many of the problems of introducing new programmes whose advantages have yet to be garnered.

Game management

A major difference between current programmes (including this SRB case) and the previous SRB programme is that the bidding systems have operated in an increasingly managed context. The local authority with some input from the Forum had drawn on the existing Community Plan to develop the foci for NRF spending. An invitation to tender bids was then published. All bids received were then put out to community consultation and were discussed by the Neighbourhood Renewal Panel. This process reduced duplication. The panel advised bidders as to how they could improve their bids sometimes by joining forces with another provider. In this sense the Local Authority, Forum and the Panel acted in ways consistent with a brokerage role. Although it can be
argued that such bidding wasted resources, in fact approximately two thirds of the bids were funded compared to less than half during the first round of the SRB\(^\text{10}\). 

The SRB case was similar with approximately only 20 projects ever being considered for the scheme. Even so duplication existed. The Zone although not using a bidding system also profited from a managed situation in which projects were developed or adopted to complement the whole scheme. However, in all three cases this could be interpreted as a continuation of strong local authority dominance over regeneration schemes.

Despite the local management of the CEF by the Council for Voluntary Services being good and the existence of a proactive local authority officer who facilitated the inclusion of the community representatives, they have had limited influence regarding the NRF.

In relation to the LSP, both central government and the local authority have been proactive game managers. It has been central government’s strategy to develop more productive relationships with local and regional actors. Regeneration policy is one example of this, the NRU and Government Office were to become more proactive in managing the implementation of policy. This is a shift away from the passive management identified during the implementation of the SRB. Although central government have kept tight control over resources (see accountability) their approach to the management of relationships is certainly more proactive and positive. Perhaps the only negative aspect concerned the Government Office role. They felt their leverage over partnerships had been reduced with the abandonment of competitive processes. The NRU was effectively in charge and the Government Office were intermediaries trying to encourage LSPs to meet accreditation criteria.

Government offices have been given key network management roles in terms of facilitating, mediating and overseeing the accreditation process. The latter may be seen as a form of arbitration since the decisions are binding. By contrast the RDA came

\(^{10}\) In round one of the SRB only 201 out of 469 bids were successful nationally.
under the most severe criticism for continuing the top-down control and poor relations which has characterised central government. From the Zone Officers’ perspective the RDA were not always supportive in their dealings with the Zone. SRB members also complained about this. In part the RDA were suffering from teething problems as a newly created organisation dealing with a plethora of new roles.

The local authority, unsurprisingly, were particularly important in network management in all cases. They were involved in network activation, when establishing subgroups to deal with issues such as evaluation. We have seen that they were involved in reticulist activities (Friend, Power et al. 1974) when managing the distribution of information within the LSP. Through doing this and other activities such as managing the meetings and the distribution of information they were involved in arranging and facilitating the interaction. Their brokerage role has previously been mentioned.

The only aspect of network management which was identified as missing by the Government Office during accreditation of the LSP was conflict management techniques via mediation and arbitration. This was something that the partnership argued they would develop as and when necessary. There were though some guidelines for proper behaviour within the constitution to minimise the occurrence of self interest issues in the partnership. Very similar guidelines were operationalised in the SRB. Again though there were no procedures for conflict management. By contrast the Zone partnership’s constitution was a legalistic document which laid out the responsibilities and liabilities of board members and was not an aid to game management in the way that the other constitutions were.

ACCOUNTABILITY

Network structuring

LSPs, although having been given considerable management freedom, remain subject to strong Treasury rules and the need for an accountable body regarding the use of NRF. Coventry City Council has been central within NR processes because of this role. Strong upward accountability continues although there has been some relaxation
regarding spending, reflecting the flexibility now provided within central government departments (Stone-Lee 2001). However, from the evidence collected in this case it does not seem that central departments are keen to pass on this flexibility over the annuity rules as the ability to retain unspent funds during the first year was by no means a certainty from Coventry's perspective. This is evidence that central departments are not necessarily implementing government policy as intended, but rather using their margin of liberty regarding their power over local government.

The Zone partnership have also been provided with management freedom and gradually will take over much of the role of an accountable body as they have the status of a company limited by guarantee. Upward accountability remains strong here, in part because of the use of various funding streams some of which may come from Europe or even the SRB. As such the Zone partnership are subject to these ongoing rules. The SRB does not seem to have benefited from the same flexibilities. In fact the Treasury were changing the rules regarding the capital-revenue split which would undoubtedly limit the choice of what the partnership could do in the future as it was a revenue intensive scheme at a time when Treasury wanted capital intensive schemes.

What is novel within the LSP process is the accreditation process, which in theory offers scope for downward accountability through the focus on the quality of partnership processes. In theory members can complain to the Government Office should they feel that the partnership is preventing their full inclusion and capacity to influence. In reality during the first phase accreditation was weak, key public sector members complained that it was a ‘ticking boxes’ exercise and furthermore few wanted to get involved in something which would add to their workload. Even the Government Office representative argued the process lacked teeth. Accreditation did not raise any particular issues from weaker members, ironically it was the powerful actors that argued it was weak. Given the issues around time scales it is not surprising that there were no complaints at this point in time. The Government Office had raised the issue of the lack of conflict resolution mechanisms such as mediation and arbitration otherwise the Coventry Partnership was given a clean bill of health. Despite weaknesses in the processes this development remains positive compared to the continued lack of similar developments in other cases.
However, even in the LSP case there remained issues regarding downward accountability. Civil Servants from within the Local Strategic Partnership Team in the NRU have been honest in admitting this (Anon. 2001). Furthermore, Coventry City Council representatives were also concerned about the accountability of LSPs. Whilst central government expected local authorities to share power: accountability and effectively, responsibility, remained squarely with them.

Game management

There is much less guidance handed down to partnerships about how they should manage LSPs and Zones compared to that required for the SRB. The existing guidance merely provides a broad framework for day-to-day activities. In the case of LSPs this affects their overall accountability. Partnerships have not been required to submit detailed delivery plans or details of individual projects for in-depth appraisal purposes, they are required to merely present their strategy. The Government Office had no power to restrict what the LSP was doing. The documents containing the NRF allocations and information relating to individual projects were less detailed than those produced for the Zone and the SRB as a result.

The Zone and SRB are also required to produce detailed documents regarding monitoring and evaluation. In the Zone this was justified because the partnership would be receiving grant funding from more than the single RDA source. If they were collecting data for one part of the funding stream it made sense to collect data for all projects. By contrast within the LSP, the data collected will most likely be that required for the national deprivation index and targets from central government. Therefore, there is less central regulation regarding detailed monitoring requirements. Nevertheless, the LSP were actively developing complex monitoring and evaluation systems for neighbourhood renewal strategy.

Furthermore, in both the Zone and LSP there is no information regarding the appraisal criteria used to select the projects for funding. In some ways it might be argued that this perpetuates the lack of knowledge for those who wish to place bids and represents a very similar problem to those encountered in the early SRB process. Developing clear
appraisal criteria was something on which the SRB partnership had spent considerable
time in order to determine which projects were funded and how they needed to be
improved. The outcome from this was a clear framework for appraisal which members
felt was fair.

Beyond accreditation, accountability mechanisms for the LSP are controlled by the local
authority. Whilst the council officer stressed that the minutes of meetings are publicly
available under the Freedom of Information Act (2000) and the same is stated in their
accreditation document (Coventry Local Strategic Partnership 2002(d), they do not
provide links to these through their exhaustive list of available documents on their web
site. There is in reality little accountability reporting other than financial outlines of
where NR funds have been spent which has already been said to provide limited
information in comparison to SRB and Zone documentation. Therefore, overall
accountability mechanisms although demonstrating important developments, remain
underdeveloped in the LSP. This is true also in terms of downward accountability in
both other cases although upwards accountability remains stronger for these.

CONCLUSIONS

Given the acknowledged importance of drawing various sectoral actors into
regeneration efforts due to its complexity and need for interventions which are balanced
economically and socially; the quality of network management is important. This
analysis has sought to investigate both network structuring and game management
interventions occurring throughout the multi-level governance context.

The questions we need to ask are has network management improved since the
introduction of the SRB and if so, in what ways? We saw in chapter four that the SRB
was rooted in the interactive perspective (Klijn and Teisman 1997) in the sense that
central government wished to secure the benefits of resource and policy synergy from
the use of networks. The hoped for outcome would be well balanced approaches for
dealing with the multiple issues facing deprived areas.
In practice, the programme was not overly successful much of its failings were due to the competitive nature of the programme. Furthermore, instrumentalism (De Bruijn and Ten Heuvelhof 1997) from both the central and local actors led to paper partnerships in which the hoped for synergies gained through interaction were not realised:

- strong actors (local authorities and Training and Enterprise Councils) dominated decision-making while weaker actors had little say in the determination of strategies;
- central government managed for regularity, propriety and VFM but not for the quality of partnership, downwards accountability was thus poor; and
- little attention was paid to the context in which the programme would be implemented and the impact this would have on the programme’s potential achievements.

The reasons for the SRB’s failure can be largely explained by the impact of institutional factors, both the institutional rules of the programme and the existing institutional context. Nevertheless, the partnership relations in this newer SRB scheme appear to show improvement in contrast with the original SRB and in this sense these findings concur with Brennan et al’s (1998).

The new programmes presented here also remain rooted in the interactive perspective but are similarly instrumental in the way partnership formation is required in order to receive funding. Instrumentality affects both central and local actors. The charge of failure is premature for these nascent partnerships but both had failings. The explanation for why they have lacked success with regard to their own terms of reference is similarly institutional. Using this form of analysis implies we have to analyse the institutional rules and the institutional setting into which these rules are implemented.

From an institutional perspective (March and Olsen 1989; Scharpf 1997), there have been some important developments in the programmes’ institutional rules. It may be argued that the New Labour government have taken an approach which has worked with other policy actors. Examples of agreement between central and local government concerning policies were provided across the cases. For instance, there is consensus in the policy community regarding the need to address social exclusion and essentially in relation to the use of partnership, notwithstanding some ongoing concerns relating to
accountability issues. It is certainly not the case that central government are forcing through a policy which has little support as happened with the original SRB. In the LSP/NR policy some attention has also been given to the issue of the centre's passive management over some issues which occurred in the SRB. Examples of which include: the accreditation process; abandonment of competitive processes; the CEF and the support provided through the Government Office. The Zone programme has also attempted to address issues of competition; have adopted existing partnerships and supported them financially to develop a strategy.

However, even in this era we have seen that central governments and AWM's management of partnership based programmes has not always supported their aims. LSPs and the Zone have suffered from issues not dissimilar to those suffered when the SRB was introduced, such as:

- problems encountered when creating a new partnership along new guidelines;
- issues to do with time to work through partnership properly when central government are keen to spend resources in time for results to be seen in following elections (this affects RDAs as well); and
- related to this last point is the inevitable differential in knowledge between the different parties with local authorities being the most likely to possess the knowledge and capacity to develop such partnerships;

The SRB has been improved and the case studied here compared favourably to the new programmes yet even in this case strict Treasury rules regarding what funding can be spent on may undermine the success of the SRB.

In relation to both the LSP/NR and Zone Programmes, it can be legitimately argued that central government have failed to acknowledge the institutional context in the implementation of the programme and in doing so has allowed the local authorities to dominate once more. To avoid this central government and the RDA needed to have given much greater attention to the institutional context. Changing the rules, ostensibly for the better has not necessarily achieved the aims of the partnership.

Given these outcomes it might be argued from an institutional perspective, particularly with regard to the LSP, that as Coventry already had a strategic partnership, funding
could have been given to the local authorities without a whole new range of complicated structures being tied to it. Even though it might be argued that the LSP policy has built on existing institutions; which indeed they have, particularly in Coventry, this process has not been overly successful. Central government’s plans were highly ambitious for local areas and even in the well developed area of Coventry the LSP has not really met the expectations of the programme in this initial period. It has to be asked was the SRB sufficient for regeneration to be supported through special funds in local areas? If local areas wanted voluntary strategic partnerships they were free to develop them. Alternatively central government could have invested in these outside of regeneration spending in the first instance. In this way LSPs could have begun with a limited remit through which they could develop methodologies and capacity which could have then been used to address issues of regeneration.

It does have to be acknowledged, though, that LSPs may be a promising vehicle for the future of interactive decision-making within communities particularly so in Coventry, and may, in the long-term contribute effectively to the regeneration of this area.

However, given the fact that it was the availability of additional funding that motivated the Coventry Forum to become an accredited LSP, the future of this body may be uncertain. It will depend on the commitment of the members which on the basis of this research cannot at be questioned. Furthermore, it is likely that central government may use the established accreditation processes as a lever for the receipt of other funding sources in the future. Coventry and other areas may thus receive further funding even from alternative sources. This is certainly the assumption among local authorities in general.

In the case of the RDAs, they were given freedom over resources from central government as funding was transferred via a single pot grant. AWM have decided to instigate the Zone Programme through which to allocate this funding to localities. Central government and the RDA have thus responded to the arguments that lower levels of governance know best how to support regeneration in their areas. AWM like central government have made some seemingly sensible decisions regarding how to manage this programme, such as: using existing partnerships; funding development and
administration and gearing their involvement to match the experience of the partnership. However, on the basis of the evidence collected here it seems they too have not addressed some of the institutional problems of poor co-governance or an appropriate balance of actors on the board. By adopting an existing partnership as parent to the Zone partnership, AWM undermined their own aims for sub-regional boards not dominated by local authorities. Moreover whilst they wanted voluntary sector inclusion they did not address the issue of the need for broad based membership leaving local partnerships having to create their own methods for inclusion at a late stage arguably to address more fully the identified issues. This is true particularly in the case of developing links into deprived communities to ‘sell’ training and the work ethic.

It might also be argued that AWM have undermined the programme by not building in ways in which the partnership had some leverage over the partners in order to get things done. In the situation where contracts were held with AWM and not the partnership the partnership officers felt powerless to control members who did not deliver the goods.

Once more network management could be said to have been partial. It is partial at the central level because they do not take proper account of the institutional context into which new programmes are introduced, even though the LSP programme has sought to manage some of the power differentials within partnerships by supporting community inclusion. At the Government Office level it is difficult to see how they could improve their network management role since it is prescribed by the centre. At the local level actors appear to try their best to manage what remain fairly unmanageable systems.

In relation to the RDA, they appear to have not considered as fully the issues and problems of partnership working and how in reality a broad sectoral partnership will need to be managed. This at least has been recognised at the central level but even here the management of the implementation has not been fully thought out.

To return to the original research question, how is regeneration policy being managed in the era of joined-up government? Despite central government’s rhetoric concerning their aims for a new ‘partnership’ between central and local government, much remains the same as in previous administrations for regeneration policy. There has been little
change regarding the level of decentralised power, even for the English RDAs, and what freedoms have been granted have perhaps not been used wisely, for example, where LSPs have not quite done what government wanted them to regarding focusing the NRF on single key areas of work. However, given that central government gave them the freedom to choose, their disappointment with the developments is redolent of their mistrust of local government.

Regeneration is, despite its importance for the development of local areas and the alleviation of deprivation, a peripheral, small scale, low budget policy compared to the mainstream services of health and education etc. To be fair, a great deal of investment has been placed into mainstream services, many of which now have targets for helping to deal with issues of deprivation. Perhaps more than these other areas of policy, regeneration policy still suffers from underinvestment in management time and funding and from substantial changes in approach. Although in this era the changes have been largely process changes rather than shifts in the development theory in use. The regeneration policy network, whilst having worked together on the research into why deprivation still exists and why regeneration policy appears not to be particularly effective, is not well integrated in the sense that they do not form a policy community in which the policy professionals have countervailing power in decisions around what policies are implemented. Despite some noises regarding a need for professionalized regeneration specialists, this is not in evidence. In fact, the very number of different initiatives was beginning to weaken the strength and experience that existed in local areas with experienced staff being spread too thinly and posts remaining unfilled due to skills shortages.

The outcomes as we have seen from this is more of the same. The investment made in research has to some extent gone to waste as the processes of managing developments have once more been inadequate. This is not to argue that regeneration efforts make no inroads into the issues of deprivation, they do, but they have limited impact and part of this is due to the processes used.

It has been argued in this thesis that there has been a meta policy change in regeneration policy which has affected how regeneration policy is managed. This has led to the
extension of the institutional approach to development outlined in chapter two and has
led to new organisations and new rules regarding how regeneration should be managed.
New programmes have adopted these and developed rules which are intended to work
alongside this more coordinated and co-governed approach. The outcomes, it has been
argued, have been a development of coordination, but largely at a policy level, although
there have been some important examples of service level coordination. In terms of co-
governance, there has been less development in terms of influence, although new
structures have been developed particularly within the LSP process, which may foster
this in the future. Overall, it has been argued that the new programmes have not
achieved the levels of coordination and co-governance which might have been expected
and the extant SRB programme has been assessed as having performed relatively well
in comparison under its revised rules.

Through adopting a network management perspective, it is the policy institutions and
the way that these are implemented that have been the area of interest. It has been
argued that network management is important and worthy of attention. The previous
analysis of the SRB demonstrated that the introduction of this programme was poorly
managed and thus the programme was limited in its success. I have argued here that
whilst it appears that network management has improved under New Labour, there
remain issues largely to do with the way that the LSP has been managed. The RDA’s
Zone programme has also been poor despite some apparent novel developments from
this devolved body.

Therefore, network management is an important factor, but, we also have to consider
what other factors had influenced the outcomes in the case studies. Some aspects that
were identified in the case study evidence had been regarded as drivers for coordination
and co-governance and some were regarded as constraints, many had elements of both
as implementation is a complex process.

Alternative explanations for why the new programmes were not highly coordinated and
cogoverned and that these developments have been important but not an overwhelming
success include the following:
The task has been highly complex, this issue was highlighted by some respondents, however, most public servants did not overtly reject the aims of the programmes, nevertheless in a resource constrained situation it is likely that organisational actors will pursue that which brings the most results most quickly.

At times respondents suggested that there was some resistance to the aims of coordination since it was redolent of Stalinist regimes. Resistance can occur through individuals and organisations and may lead to lip-service being paid to coordinative activities such as partnership work, however, because of resource constraints and in particular, the historical antecedents of resourcing regeneration policy, actors may be likely to try to access funding for work they want to carry out without any particular desire to be part of something bigger. There probably is some truth in this but most of the public sector respondents argued that a joined-up approach was necessary if local areas were going to meet the government’s targets. Of course there are many involved in these activities who were not part of the research and what they actually do as opposed to what their managers say they want to do, may be totally different and not conducive of more joined-up approaches.

Despite attempts to foster good partnership working which does seem to have been genuinely attempted by New Labour, the organisational problems of coordinating work activities is difficult for all the reasons cited by Hardy et al (1992) in chapter three. In this case, even the most sophisticated network management interventions may not be successful. Different business planning cycles, differing priorities for each organisation and resource issues were all cited by respondents as important.

This thesis, while arguing that network management is important, does not seek to negate the important of these constraints to achieving coordination and co-governance in regeneration policy. Other influences were positively searched for in the data collection phase, in order to highlight these factors as well as highlighting the factors that were drivers for the policy including policy factors.

In the following chapter, this thesis is evaluated in relation to the objectives set in chapter two. Part of this includes a series of recommendations for the future
management of regeneration policy which would go some way to addressing some of
the problems highlighted in the implementation of the two new programmes and may
avoid the same outcomes in the future.
Chapter eleven

Conclusions and Reflections

INTRODUCTION

This chapter will conclude on the research reported in this thesis: it will assess the extent to which the objectives of the research have been achieved and will state how a contribution to knowledge has been made. This contribution is evidenced empirically and theoretically through the study of new policy programmes and the application of theory to the understanding of them in relation to previous phases of regeneration policy. In addition, recommendations are made for the future management of regeneration activities based on the findings from this research and avenues for further research are proposed. The findings are discussed under the relevant research objectives.

The chapter is organised as follows: each research objective is considered in terms of the extent to which these objectives have been achieved along with a summary of the findings which relate to these objectives. This is followed by sections on methods and policy recommendations.

RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

Objective 1. To review the urban regeneration policy literature, focusing on issues of coordination and co-governance. Is there anything fundamentally new here?

In terms of the theory upon which regeneration policy is based there has been limited change. The main developments detailed in chapter two suggested that there is an embedding of an ‘institutionalist’ development perspective within the UK which at least partly follows previously developed European Regional Development policy (Hooghe 1996). This research has focused on some of these institutional developments and the extent to which they foster a joined-up approach to regeneration.
The review of the regeneration policy literature suggests that the drive for greater joined-up government, although not fundamentally new, is different in type and magnitude compared to previous interventions. Developments have occurred in two key areas: Firstly, an increase in the number and type of units, organisations and partnerships; and secondly, the placing of new administrative and managerial requirements on actors involved in regeneration. This it was argued represented a meta-policy which goes beyond the specific policy guidance within any particular programme.

The outcome has been the creation and further development of the tiers of governance in order to tackle regeneration more effectively. The plethora of plans now required, along with the instigation of RDAs; LSPs and the further development of Government Offices, is an acceptance that region and citywide planning is a necessary counterpart to more localised geographic or theme based actions. In addition, the emphasis on co-governance between actors within and between geographically based and professional communities is a key element. Greater co-governance has been supported by policy requirements from central government and the RDA. Nowhere greater have these policy requirements applied than in the LSP. This policy represents the most important new development containing some novel institutional rules such as the CEF and accreditation process with its emphasis on a qualitative assessment of partnership relations. The impact of these have not led to exactly the changes outlined in the policy rhetoric but they are important and may become more so over time.

Despite new developments, there are continuities in practice. LSPs and the Zone follow in the footsteps of earlier programmes such as City Challenge; City Pride and the New Commitment to Regeneration and the RDAs follow earlier developments in Scotland. In this more general sense, the present era can be seen as a further development of what ‘theoretically’ has already been put into practice.

**Objective 2. To take case studies as examples of developments within three different regeneration programmes.**

The case studies chosen have provided an interesting and appropriate focus for the research. The choice of three cases from different programmes operating in one area has
provided a better overview of developments than would have been gained through the choice of three cases from one programme in different areas. This strategy has prevented an in depth assessment of each case, both new programmes could have been more thoroughly covered. Nevertheless, the areas of interest have been investigated fully across the three cases which was the primary objective. The particular choice of Coventry was illuminating. It had many different regeneration programmes operating plus many other related government initiatives. This revealed the reality of recent policy developments in terms of the constant demands made on local areas to respond to central government led initiatives and also that local areas themselves can be highly innovative in terms of developing new ways of dealing with the problems of economic and social development. Interviewees complained that there was simply too much happening. It had drained resources to the extent that hiring experienced personnel had become difficult. They were simply running out of skilled people who have the abilities necessary to manage complex activities through networks of actors.

Objective 3. To assess the type and extent of coordination and co-governance evident in the case studies.

The emphasis in current policies is to support highly coordinated and co-governed attempts at regenerating local areas through partnership structures. A key objective of the research was to assess the type and extent of coordination and co-governance which had been fostered by the current approach to ‘network management’ by central government. In short, to assess what had happened in the implementation of new programmes. The findings on both aspects are dealt with empirically in this section and theoretically using network management concepts under objective 5. The empirical findings were assessed using the analytical frameworks developed in chapter three and represent an original contribution to knowledge in regeneration policy.

Coordination

It has been argued in this thesis that levels of coordination have increased during the New Labour period, although it is recognised that previously coordination had also been improved. The main focus was placed on coordination within the partnership’s work, however, it is important to note the broader context in which partnerships operate in terms of the development of coordination.
Despite the considerable effort to develop joined-up approaches from the centre, the findings highlighted that policies were still being separately developed. This was particularly relevant in relation to the Zone Initiative. The development of AWM’s own strategic partnership for the sub-region ran counter to the thrust of central government’s policies and created increased complexity on the ground. This produced clashes between the RZ and the LSP over who would have control over certain aspects of regeneration policy. Even in Coventry where a high level of integration and overlap in the two board’s membership existed, this caused problems and tensions remained, despite the fact that both partnerships were working hard to resolve the issues. Central government had not considered this scenario when developing the RDAs in the early part of their first term of office. Unfortunately, this outcome emerges from the devolution of overall control from the centre and whilst such devolution is to be welcomed, it is one example of the tensions created between pursuing both a co-governed and coordinated approach.

Other issues were created through the lack of clarification over the roles of the two regional bodies now overseeing the two separate strands of economic and social regeneration. This had created particular difficulties for the Zone partnership in developing a coordinated approach to drawing down European and AWM funds.

At the local level, there remained multiple pockets of potential funding for individual areas of work such as youth disaffection and interviewees worried that multiple service providers were chasing too few people and simply duplicating work. All the above are examples of the lack of coordination in the broader policy environment and reflect the huge task that New Labour are faced with in creating more coordinated approaches.

Coordination or the ‘degree of joint work’ within each partnership was assessed using organisationally based models as evaluative tools which comprised, cooperative; coordinated; collaborative and holistic integration modes presented in table 7, chapter three, based on Mulford and Rogers (1982), Taylor (1998) and 6 et al (2002). The cooperative model representing the least well integrated and holistic integration, the most well integrated. In carrying out this analysis, judgements were not based on a normative concept of how much joint work should exist but it was expected that
partnerships would show signs of a coordinated approach and that implementation would reflect the partnership’s own aims and objectives. Issues regarding the lack of coordination were highlighted throughout the literature review. A key area was the coordination of economic development with training facilities necessary for the benefits to accrue to deprived populations.

The findings suggest that the current institutionalist approach has not necessarily achieved a high degree of coordination. This research suggests that it is variable, and does not represent a comprehensive form. Overall, it is not highly developed in any one of the cases.

The limits to levels of coordination were identified by the use of organisationally based models of coordination. There are issues concerning their utility when applied to regeneration partnerships as these models tend to emphasise aspects which impact upon the organisational boundary, such as the creation of new management structures. In reality, such impositions are not a key aspect of regeneration policy; notwithstanding the Treasury’s aim to foster rationalisation at local levels through the LSP. Realistically, regeneration policy and programmes emphasise policy level coordination which is just one aspect of inter-organisational working. Furthermore, such planning in the first instance does not necessarily relate directly to an organisational level but to the aims and objectives for the development of an area. In this sense, the organisational models that were used seemed insufficient for analysing the full complexity of these cases.

Partnership forms do not have a strictly organisational basis. Organisational coordination of the more formal type can occur but need not. It cannot be argued that a partnership has failed if it has not coordinated its activities in the formalised terms outlined in the more highly integrated models. There were examples from the case studies, particularly the SRB, where a considerable degree of joint working had developed in certain areas without the need for new organisational structures subsuming the individual organisational bases. The partnership forms evident in New Labour’s regeneration policy remain a hybrid form of implementing organisation; expected to work on the basis of goodwill rather than highly integrated inter-organisational processes. At a basic level, partnerships are cooperative ventures although as we have
seen in the analysis more integration than the model of cooperation suggests were clearly visible in all three cases. Aspects of deeper collaboration and even elements of holistic integration were noted, but all were taking place within a cooperative framework.

A realistic conclusion is that regeneration programmes and their implementing partnerships are working towards a collaborative form of joint working without the organisational pressure to actually coordinate aspects of their organisations beyond the important policy planning stage. There are some important exceptions to this for example the nationally driven attempts to rationalise partnerships through the LSPs which was identified in Coventry; and the local developments of common operating systems regarding performance measurement and evaluation and the highly integrated SRB One Stop Shop.

The models have successfully highlighted the continuing lack of organisational coordination, and thus may be seen as being only partly successful in allowing an analysis of current policy because of the nature of it. In using these models as an analytical tool it is easy to downgrade the importance of policy level coordination which in this policy area is at least as important if not more so than more formal organisational coordination. As we saw holistic integration was poorly represented in the case studies although certain characteristics were evident, for example the notion that services would reinforce each other.

Whilst the overall conclusion is that the case study partnerships represented a well developed degree of policy coordination operating within a more coordinated central and regional framework, with respect to the other forms of possible coordination particularly at the service delivery level, it was low overall. Given that this research focused on emergent partnerships, more coordination may occur in the future but this research has shown that the levels of coordination that were espoused in local policy documents are a long way from being fully achieved. Furthermore, the research findings have shown that the levels of coordination achieved have relied heavily on the particular circumstances in which it has been attempted. The level of coordination achieved in the SRB case relied to a large extent on the Chair of the partnership being a key player
across many initiatives concerning policies for young people. Increased levels of coordination in the future are thus likely to rely on the efforts of individuals and organisations at the local level.

Other factors of coordination which are thought to allow greater integration and the reinforcement of activities, such as the coordination of regulation and scrutiny, were underdeveloped but not totally absent. Although, coordination by regulation could be seen in the Local Public Service Agreements, which are designed to incentivise joint work by rewarding local authorities for the successful outcomes which flow from it, and coordination by scrutiny could be discerned in the development of a joint approach to performance management and evaluation which the LSP was pursuing.

To a large degree, this era of regeneration policy echoes past interventions where the benefits of espoused partnership working and greater coordination have not been fully captured. There is more than a hint that what occurred was very much in the existing pattern. Local authorities or other large public sector organisations dominated decision making in all three cases. Importantly though, it was this situation that brought a certain amount of coordination to the activities. In many cases, the existing policy plans of such organisations became embedded in the so called ‘new’ strategies. Such projects then became the recipients of the new funding opportunities. This unfortunately does not reflect the new vision for joined-up regeneration activity. There seemed to be little new thinking emerging from the two new partnerships and by comparison the SRB was a more integrated approach to dealing with issues in joined-up ways. In addition, it seemed little work went into the development of links with training in order to realise the benefits of economic development for those highlighted as most in need. Both issues represent well trodden failure routes within the implementation of regeneration policy.

Overall, the extent of coordination was mapped against the two opposing dimensions of ‘hierarchy and high organisational integration’ and ‘networked governance and low organisational integration’. The case studies were placed towards a mid-way point between hierarchy and high integration and network governance and low integration, they were thus mostly cooperative. This reflects largely the same conclusions as earlier
studies that argued partnerships were a mix of modes of governance and organisational forms (Lowndes and Skelcher 1998).

Co-governance
The subject of co-governance relates both to the relationships within the partnership and between the partnership and central and regional levels. Despite central government’s intention that a new central-local relationship should be fostered the evidence from the cases presented here suggests that these relations have not been transformed. There may have been some improvement between the centre and local government but overall it was difficult to discern any significant change. It was the perception on the ground that central government still controlled too much. A key example is provided in the change in the capital revenue split within the SRB budget which was unlikely to help the partnership deliver a revenue intensive programme. Furthermore, whilst there has been much rhetoric concerning the change in approach by central government towards more flexibility this was not readily identified. The LSP still had to fight not to lose unspent funds within the financial year. Neither was the relationship between AWM and the Zone partnership a reflection of reformed relations. The new, supposedly, devolved regional organisation appeared to work in the same way as previously and had not managed to create more productive relationships nor command the loyalty of those working on the ground.

Nevertheless, the research also highlighted some significant developments at both the policy development level, for example through the development of the PAT Reports and at the implementation level through the actions of local partnerships. In relation to the LSP, central government have engendered a new way of allowing co-governance to operate through the establishment of the Community Empowerment Fund and accreditation process. The issue here is one of the need to continue supporting these innovations in order to develop them for the future. Central government have also influenced the SRB so that it is more compatible with the New Labour approach to co-governance. In principle these are positive developments.

The framework for analysis, presented in table 10, chapter three, based on Arnstein (1969), Davis (200) and Yorkshire and Humber Regional Development Agency (2000),
distinguished between consultation and involvement/engagement regarding the extent to which actors have the power to influence formative and ongoing decision making. In terms of influence on formative decisions the new broader based partnerships could not be said to be operating in a co-governed way. Formative influence is important since influence at the beginning tends to lead to ongoing influence. There are exceptions to this of course, but this is a general principle in situations where ongoing actions rely on the strategies and plans initiated at the beginning of the scheme.

In terms of formative influence, there is some evidence from the SRB and LSP cases that communities have contributed to shaping policy. We should avoid being overly optimistic in the short term: co-governance in the LSP has been limited overall and this includes influence from a wide range of organisations. Comparatively though the SRB had high levels of consultation and involvement. Although questions were raised regarding the lack of substantial changes to the plans emanating from this involvement. This could mean that the SRB case was addressing widely acknowledged and agreed upon needs among the young people of Coventry or it could represent a situation of cooption of youth interests into the actions of government and/or professionals (Cockburn 1977). The LSP as a standing partnership has an ongoing role even if it does not attract direct funding. There is scope here for a more highly developed co-governed regime over time.

Participation in the Zone partnership was poor with respect to the wider membership and to the broader community. The partnership were increasingly aware over the period of implementation that this side of AWM’s approach was deficient and were keen to engage with communities and instigate community membership on the board despite there being no requirement for them to do so. Overall, in the Zone evidence of co-governance was virtually unidentifiable. Rather ironically, the board was under what appeared to be the total domination by the Local Authority led Task Group despite AWM’s desire for non-local authority dominated partnerships.

However, while there are positive elements, none of the case studies could be held up as exemplars regarding a high degree of co-governance. Large public sector organisations controlled the majority of the funding and the setting of strategies. The place of the
voluntary and community sector has improved but from the evidence in these case studies their level of influence (as opposed to mere inclusion) in the formative and ongoing decisions has been low. Furthermore, with respect to the role of the RDA, the situation of continued distrust expressed by local actors regarding their relationship with this body does not bode well for the further devolution of power to these organisations. Even the Government Office representative noted that during this era they appeared to have been given less power to act from central government regarding LSPs suggesting that over centralisation continues.

In conclusion, it has been argued that there have been small but significant developments which have led to an increase in coordination, and perhaps in terms of outcomes, slightly less so in terms of co-governance. In chapter's nine and ten, the questions of what the alternative explanations for outcomes were and what the counterfactual situation would have been: what would have occurred without the policy developments New Labour have implemented?

It was argued that overall institutional change, in terms of policy rules, does have an impact but this impact can be either limited or enhanced by the context of local social and managerial processes. In Coventry, a variety of factors were acknowledged which included: other policy processes such as community planning; the political environment; what professionals consider best practice; existing structures emerging from local developments; the influence of key individuals; the complexity of the task; resistance to coordination; and organisational barriers to coordination. All of which can affect the trajectories of development. Outcomes then vary considerably in terms of how policies are implemented. This research has suggested that local actors do not always comply to each and every element of policy. It has also shown that local actors can be innovative and lead the way in many instances. There are thus limits to what institutional rule adjustments can achieve in the short-term and maybe in the long-term too. It also has to be accepted that central government do not always follow institutional rule change with others which support the drift of new policy which tends to undermine some of the principles of new policies. It was concluded in chapter nine that new policies had had an impact and that these developments would have been limited without such intervention.
A much more general factor is that this policy era is the result of dissatisfaction with the ideals of individualism and competition represented by the previous conservative administrations. Whilst this had already begun to ebb away, the policies of New Labour have extended the alternative of collectivism and coordination to many policy areas besides regeneration policy itself. The fact that New Labour were elected is itself part of the development. To argue that these developments would have taken place anyway regardless of which party was in government is unlikely to be true although the developments in policy under John Major were important.

In conclusion, whilst a change in institutional rules are unlikely to be 100% effective, as has been shown in these case studies, they are important for driving policy in certain directions. Part of the reason for failings, it is suggested in the following sections on network management, is that central government fail to take into account the full complexity of the policy system when introducing changes and this leads to minimal success.

Objective 4. To place regeneration policy within the context of wider policy developments in joined-up government. Is joined-up government the same in all policy areas?

Regeneration policy shares some of the basic characteristics of joined-up government, such as the improvement of policy outcomes through joint work. However, beyond this it represents a particular form of joined up government which builds on previous practice, for example in the use of partnerships; the emphasis upon community participation; and the use of special funding to encourage joint work. Regeneration policy cannot readily be compared with other more tightly joined-up interventions such as the Benefit Agency’s One Scheme; Welfare to Work; Surestart or Children’s Trusts. Such interventions are intended to be much better integrated leaving less to individual cooperation and therefore chance. Joined up government within regeneration policy is more than just the managerialism of Perri 6 (1997), as it also incorporates a commitment to co-governing activities. It is important for the meta analyses of public policy to recognise that whilst there are some shared features joined-up government is not a clear and comprehensive toolkit applied uniformly across different policy areas.
Objective 5. To utilise concepts derived from the network management literature to describe and explain these policy developments as a way of assessing the degree to which joined-up government is being implemented on the ground in ways which the policies prescribe.

Network management concepts were applied to four cases in total including the historical SRB. All three perspectives have been drawn upon to analyse the approach taken to determining the actors in the network; changing perceptions and the programme and its institutions (Klijn and Teisman 1997). These foci have been analysed at the level of network structuring and at the level of game management.

Although New Labour have attempted to address some of the issues highlighted in the management of previous regeneration programmes, network management has continued to be partial. It cannot be seen as totally effective, by either a standard management by objectives evaluation nor by the type of process evaluation suggested by Klijn et al (1995). Thus far, the goals of coordination and co-governance have not been reached, although undoubtedly, overall, there has been greater effort made in both areas.

Network management in regeneration by necessity encompasses the roles of both the central or regional and local levels. Thus the centre or region cannot carry the blame for the lack of success. Local partnerships do have a responsibility to implement suitable mechanisms at the local level. However, the role of central government and in the case of the Zone, AWM, are particularly important for creating the basic structures by which the partnerships will work.

The evidence and analysis offered here suggests that the two new programmes have in the short term failed to offer added value over and above the refocused SRB. The latter had been improved and after several years of operation had become an embedded feature of regeneration policy known and understood by a wide range of organisational actors involved with it. The SRB case cited here was comparatively successfully implemented, not perfect, but at least it appeared to have a clear strategy and a framework for the network structure and a partnership that managed the game, both of which worked reasonably well. Most importantly they appeared to have a genuine external focus which allowed reinforcement to occur between different interventions.
The LSP had some redeeming features in terms of the network structures and the way that the LSP had developed. However, particularly for the purpose of regenerating the local area, the LSP in this first phase has had its difficulties. These were created through the ambitious nature of the development and also the approach by central government towards resourcing the partnership which did not support the objectives of the policy.

This situation was created by the way funding was awarded to get additional spend quickly. However, this has precluded shared decision making over where to spend these extra funds among the LSP. Other factors also impacted on these developments in Coventry such as the existing community plan and the decision to run a bidding system for projects and allow communities to be involved. These factors together affected all three years spending. While central government was not responsible for all these aspects, providing funding in year one for the local authorities to spend alone contributed to the chain of events which followed. The Local Authority, like many others, had made plans for the three year spend which understandably infuriated the membership of the nascent LSP and led to the bidding system to which the local authority responded by throwing the decision making process out to consultation with communities.

In a sense the LSP has been a missed opportunity to develop highly coordinated attempts in regenerating local areas. Given this was the outcome despite Coventry having an existing strategic partnership the outcomes for other areas may have been even less productive. It seems that awarding funding before the strategy is submitted does not work to the best advantage of partnership projects. Central government have lost an important lever over partnerships which reduces the probability that partnerships will function as intended. It would have been better to award local authorities extra funding as a separate item and keep the NRF for LSPs which had successfully formed and produced an adequate strategy.

Regardless of these early outcomes there may be improvements in services in the longer term from the use of LSPs. There is some evidence that they could develop into a valuable forum where community perspectives can be voiced. This will depend on the inclusion of community representatives and more rigorous accreditation.
The RDA and Zone partners have attempted to manage this subregional network but have not been overly successful. The RDA have pursued a low key role especially with this particular partnership as it was well established. AWM have more or less allowed the partnership to take control. The outcome was some coordination in its work but it had severe weaknesses regarding the coordination of new employment opportunities and training. It might be argued that the partnership required greater guidance from above. AWM’s approach to developing a partnership in which co-governance could operate suggests that the management of the network is poor. At the local level there were attempts ultimately to widen the membership to include the community sector. In these senses, the Zone as a regeneration partnership was somewhat behind the general trend for more open co-governed approaches.

The Zone initiative displayed similar outcomes regarding the funding, although they were required to put forward detailed plans the timescales precluded joint decision making. This repeated much the same process as the original SRB. Neither of the two new programmes allowed for the long lead in times necessary for development of partnerships.

In conclusion, the aim has been once more for interactive approaches in regeneration partnerships. However, instrumentalism continues to pervade the relationships which tends towards resource acquisition being the key driver for the establishment of partnerships, rather than the genuine formation of partnerships with an external focus on what they want to achieve collaboratively (Hastings 1996). Whilst the new programmes did contain some new and innovative institutional rules, overall these sets of rules have not been overly successful in achieving the objectives. From an institutional perspective the outcome has been in many respects a repeat of some of the issues which affected the SRB initially such as short timescales; the problem of embedding new rules; and the inevitable differential in knowledge between different actors. All of which disrupt the way in which the partnership is supposed to work and requires much thought to prevent this. Sadly in the two new programmes this level of thought was lacking. Realistically new programmes will have teething problems, which raises questions about the desirability of changing programmes radically or at a rapid rate. This analysis suggests
that we should avoid drastic change unless absolutely necessary and work incrementally to develop useful programmes for regeneration.

Through comparing the three programmes it can be seen that whilst the SRB had contained serious weaknesses when first introduced, these have largely been solved by the recent innovations to the programme in making it a more managed process, less competitive and more planned at the local and regional levels. It is no longer an open competition and this scheme has demonstrated that it can work well. Of course it still operated to the end of its life with a bidding process which inevitably wastes resources through competition. However, it may be that this is necessary to ensure the quality of the plans.

Although, this conclusion is unfortunate, the LSP in Coventry, which was comparatively well developed, does not appear to have been successful in creating the strategy for neighbourhood renewal. This is at least partly explained by the way in which resources were provided before it was necessary to produce a strategy. The chain of events was somewhat dissimilar in the case of the Zone, but was similar to the extent that the partnership was confident that it had access to resources and these would not be reliant on co-governed approaches. There was no pressure to work in partnership in this situation for either partnership. Certainly in the LSP the allocation of resources and the establishment of the partnership were to an extent separate processes which did not support the development of co-governance concerning the strategy.

Overall, there is no simple approach to partnership working and each partnership approach has had strengths and weaknesses. The principle of partnership approaches should be to generate shared approaches to dealing with particular problems, as the literature suggests, to generate policy and resources synergies (Hastings 1996). However, all too often, and this era does not seem to be wholly dissimilar, is that partnerships are used as ways to access increased amounts of funding only.

Central government do have a powerful tool in using funding as an instrument to achieve objectives and although ‘instrumentalism’, in the sense of central government operating a ‘do what we want’ option, such tools can be useful in generating appropriate
ways of working. In principle, in the LSP with its accreditation and community network/CEF processes should have worked, but a factor in its failings is the lack of a requirement to develop a strategy. If they had been required to do this the approach may have been different. Of course it is not fair to blame the partnership or local authority, it is central government’s role to develop processes which support achievement of their own objectives.

In chapter nine, consideration was given to the notion that new programmes, in particular the introduction of the LSP in Coventry, had disrupted partnership development. Respondents at times alluded to this issue. Although, the new rules did disrupt the development of the local Forum partnership, whether we can argue that in the longer term this has damaged partnership work is difficult to establish. Overall, the new rules have allowed the development of a partnership which offers more promise for the future, and this is important. The Zone was in a similar situation, but here the new programme has perhaps had a more limited impact but it cannot be argued that partnership work has been damaged, if anything this may also improve for the future. In relation to the SRB scheme, the programme changes seemed to improve partnership work. Overall, change as such is not so much of an issue in itself as continuous change and a lack of refining what we already have, something, which on the basis of the evidence here would appear to be worthwhile for the future.

Objective 6. The utility of network management concepts are assessed. How useful are they? Do they bring something new to the theory used in urban regeneration management?

This author believes that the concepts of network management are useful in this particular policy making context and may also be useful for others. Network management is the study of the techniques used by governments and other actors to manage outside of strictly hierarchically configured organisations. Actors work across networks of organisations where they often find themselves managing from the side. They lack the formal authority necessary to force other actors to do what they want and so they are forced to build consensus through leadership and persuasion. This type of working is challenging but often necessary to achieve public service goals. Central Government in this situation have stronger tools at its disposal such as the withdrawal
of funding, nevertheless persuasion is often the necessary counterpart to policy instruments to gain successful outcomes. As we have seen in this thesis local partnerships do not always do what central government want despite their dependence on central funding. The implementation of policy programmes is a highly complex process and this body of theory offers concepts for understanding how they are managed, how they could be managed and why that management is not always successful.

The value of using network management concepts as analytical tools includes the following:

- The approach encompasses both institutional and behaviouralist approaches, focusing on the structures and the actors’ behaviours in a given situation. Of course this is nothing new, in essence, many policy analyses focus on both these aspects;
- It also focuses on policy making and implementation situations;
- Its unique addition over and above a traditional policy network approach is the incorporation of different perspectives (interactive; instrumental and institutional) into the understanding of the management of networks. These perspectives are thought to bring a useful focus to the different issues and problems of managing networks although the institutional approach is widely thought to be the most important (Klijn 1997), a view which this research confirms. In this sense the network management approach has something to add to policy analyses; and
- It also allows the possibility of improving management in practical ways.

**CONTRIBUTION TO THEORY**

Network management concepts have been applied to regeneration policy past and present and they have allowed a novel analysis to occur. The analysis of current regeneration programmes offered a different conclusion to previous analyses that have utilised network management concepts (Painter, Isaac-Henry et al. 1997; Painter and Clarence 2000). These have asserted that central government and local government play fundamentally different roles in network management with central government being dominant in network structuring and local government being dominant in game management. The analysis of new programmes suggests that this is too simplistic, network structuring and game management occur at both levels. To a certain extent this
was also true of the SRB programme in relation to the way Government Offices. This situation is created by central government becoming less prescriptive in the detail of implementation whilst being more active in the management of the relationships with local actors. Local actors thus have to implement their own structures in order to manage the network as well as managing the game. Actors at the local level have ostensibly been given more power to manage the networks.

Klijn and Koppenjan’s (1997) use of structuration theory as a way of differentiating neatly between network structure and agency played out at the game level was not a particularly useful theorisation. Structuration theory is useful, but only if it is used dynamically to understand the interaction between structure and agency at all levels. Structure does determine individual actors’ responses to an extent, but not completely, there is a large margin of liberty in the day to day management in many cases. The outcome of agency provides the basis for more structures, formal and informal as it has done in the implementation of new programmes. These structures may vary of course as actors exploit their margins of liberty. Furthermore, local structures may be adopted and disseminated as good practice by central government. Overall, network management concepts can be usefully contextualised within the theory of structuration.

From a network management perspective there has been a change in the way that regeneration networks operate with local actors being given more freedom to implement policies locally. However, key factors to do with the network structure established by central government have not supported these developments well in the short term and central government remain the most important actor.

As argued in chapter ten, this analysis is not just a new interpretation of Klijn and Teisman’s framework and their application of Gidden’s concepts of structure and agency. The analysis represents a shift in the institutional rules around regeneration operating within new programmes in which local actors have greater freedom to generate institutional structures when implementing regeneration programmes. What local actors do with this new freedom will be of great interest to central government. In many ways, the evidence found in these case studies suggests that local partnerships have not made the most of such local freedoms.
Objective 7. As network management concepts can be used analytically they can suggest reasons for successes and failures and can therefore propose ways forward for the management of regeneration policy.

The research findings suggest several improvements could now be made to improve the programmes and institutional structures that we have.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS:

- The research conclusions support the call for a moratorium on the creation of partnership programmes suggested by the IPPR. As a policy area it needs more stability and care taken in policy developments. The proliferation of partnerships and programmes has created a mass of interventions at the local level, the value of which is difficult to establish. The sheer number of interventions makes evaluation difficult. Whilst the notion of policy communities has been criticised for excluding community input. Issue networks such as regeneration partnerships have their limitations too. These would benefit from a stronger interest body to prevent such regular and far reaching changes in the way regeneration policy is managed;

- A stronger interest body in addition to a more knowledgeable workforce could be developed through a professional body and accredited training courses leading to recognised qualifications. There may well be costs associated with this in terms of higher pay claims and even the exclusion of certain groups of people. However, if handled carefully, it would bring rewards to regeneration practice. It would bring a requirement on practitioners to justify their approaches more fully in terms of theory and may prevent funding being spent on projects that were ready to be implemented as this is the only way to secure the funding for local areas.

- The current structures that we have (LSPs and RDAs) should now be closely evaluated using a variety of evaluation techniques to allow the problems in their working to be identified. The nature of this evaluation should give special attention to a focus on organisational effectiveness. Without effective organisation even good policies will flounder. Attention must also be given to the evaluation of substantive impacts and the contribution such multi-sectoral networks really make to the regeneration of areas.

- Greater clarity needs to be brought to bear on the role of LSPs, and how the RDA’s work impacts upon the work of LSPs and vice versa. The creation of the RDAs has unfortunately created a less joined-up approach in some local areas such as Coventry and may potentially undermine some of more hopeful changes made by New Labour in terms of creating democratic renewal. This of course may be something which will occur in the next phase of RDA policy with the development of regional democratic structures.
• Probably the most important aspect is that LSPs should not be replaced but made to work more effectively. While ever the government replaces one programme with another, weaker partners will suffer structural barriers to participation. The LSP should be developed towards being a body that fosters interactive processes. Such interaction may be uncomfortable at times, however, if there is value in democratic debate then these are issues that should be faced. LSPs may develop to perform roles similar to the Social and Economic Councils operating within Europe. Here these bodies are included in ongoing mainstream budgeting and policy decisions in a direct democratic way (Talbot and Johnson 2003).

• Given that, in reality, it is difficult to have large steering partnerships which are also involved in the practical implementation of schemes, it would seem sensible that a part of developing the LSPs into a workable body may involve allowing other partnerships such as the COPE partnership to operate in the detailed policy areas. Of course the funding structures would have to be amended in some way to allow this. However, there has to be serious consideration of the extent to which LSPs can rationalise partnerships in the way that it was intended.

• For the development of LSPs into important participative bodies, continued funding for community involvement will be necessary. If central government are serious about their inclusion this can’t be avoided. LSPs as standing partnerships will need to be properly resourced. Furthermore, there appears to be little wisdom in central government not allowing resources to be spent on the administration of the LSP, like the CEF this facilitates the joint work necessary and would remove the incidence of members feeling that too many demands were made upon them.

• All major actors involved in regeneration need to pay more attention to matters of inclusion and the ways in which meetings are set up, run and information shared. Part of the failings of the LSP was that the funding had to be spent or they would lose it, thus undermining the principles of the interactive approach. This makes no sense except for reasons that would affect New Labour’s own election prospects. Finally, in this case there was some leeway provided by central government, but they must recognise that making plans takes time particularly if it is based on broad inclusion, and

• Finally, central government needs to become more realistic about the limitations of participatory democracy and provide a certain amount of funding which could be brought under community control with the rest being retained for use by professionals.

METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES

Coventry successfully provided a microcosm of policy developments in regeneration policy, illustrating what is actually happening through the introduction of new regeneration programmes. The choice of a case study approach has proved to be a
viable approach for this research as regeneration policy is a highly complex area and a key strength of case study is its suitability for studying complexity (Yin 1994). The methodology has also allowed a more holistic perspective on the research than would have been gained from the use of interviews, documentary analysis or questionnaires alone. The focus on a single city provided information which cut across the different cases and proved enlightening at times.

The methodology has provided almost ‘first hand’ experience of what it is like working in this policy area and has brought an understanding to the research and researcher that hopefully has avoided glib criticisms of what practitioners do at the local and regional levels. Had survey methodology been used, it could have been quite easy to miss the complexity and to conclude that there were simplistic chains of cause and effect at work in creating outcomes. The findings are therefore considered valid, they have explanatory value within the constructs used in case study research (ibid).

One key problem which presented itself is that regeneration partnerships are difficult contexts in which to conduct research. One issue concerns the busy schedules of respondents working in this area which can make it difficult to arrange interviews even when they are willing. This can create a time lag between individual interviews which would be less likely to occur in ‘single’ organisational research as timetabling might be agreed along with access. This timing issue has negative and positive impacts. It would be usual to constrain the time lapses between interviews in order to better ensure the validity of the research output. However, this did not appear to be a problem. More positively, it did provide a longitudinal element to the study, and thus a wider source of information. Inevitably though, responses have then to be considered within the context of a particular phase of the partnership and this adds to the complexity of the data analysis.

A further problem, for this research was that the programmes under review were at different stages of development, particularly, the difference between the SRB and the two new programmes which were operating more or less in tandem. Very little was known in the academic community regarding the new programmes, whereas, a great deal was already known about the SRB programme and its strengths and weaknesses.
However, in reality much less is known concerning the more recent examples of the SRB. The research findings demonstrate that it was worth focusing on an SRB partnership in the later rounds since it was found to be working relatively well, better in fact than either of the two new programmes. There is a tendency for researchers to only focus on new developments and ignore aspects of public services which have become embedded. Within regeneration policy this can create difficulties because it may distort our understanding of the outcomes. Given that regeneration policy changes quite markedly at least each decade (Roberts and Sykes 2000), our understanding can be partial.

There is a sense in which the study compared the incomparable. However, in all programmes the basic aims and the ways in which they would operate were shared. The purpose of including the SRB case was to assess how New Labour had influenced this existing programme so that a more complete picture of the regeneration programmes currently running could be gained in relation to the areas of focus. It was only after the research was completed that the findings suggested that the new programmes, however promising, had not worked quite as intended and led to the conclusion that radical shifts in programme structures are perhaps best avoided in this area. This finding emerged from the in-depth nature of the case study approach and was counter intuitive. It certainly was not the conclusion that the researcher expected given the extensive research upon which new programmes were based.

The issue of the programmes operating on different timescales also requires consideration for the comparisons. The LSP was intended to be a long-term solution to the development of local areas and it has been concluded that the particular partnership here could well develop into a useful forum which will guide spending on development in the area. The Regeneration Zones were more limited with the intention that they may run for approximately 15 years. The findings are less clear that this partnership had developed in ways which would address regeneration in the long-term. Both partnerships may suffer from a lack of funding which may make achieving change and keeping the momentum in the partnership difficult in the future. By comparison, the SRB had limited objectives and a time scale in which to work. The funding had been awarded and the partnership knew that it would disband within seven years.
This raises important questions concerning the idea that long term approaches are always better than short term ones and, furthermore, it does not matter if the longer term programmes take a while to embed as they will bring rewards. This might be true, although some consideration of what has occurred during the first phase has to be considered as well as what the future will bring certainly in terms of funding. This phase did not emerge as a particularly good example of partnership working. In addition, as the funding was uncertain for both the process and the substantive aspects this could undermine the partnership especially if members became involved because they felt they could have an impact.

A further problem lies in the fact that previous research has highlighted the issues of partnership working and current partnership members are in no doubt as to the views expressed by academics about the power imbalances. Interviewees appeared wary of being too outspoken and thus upsetting what may be fairly delicate relationships in fear perhaps of losing status or losing financially. It has to be remembered that in the current climate being a good partnership member is an advantage in many managerial jobs and no one would intentionally reduce their career opportunities. The consequences of this may be that there was underreporting of difficulties in the relationships.

Case study methodology also has weaknesses and in a sense its strengths are also its weaknesses. Its approach to acknowledging complex environments instead of simple linear cause and effect, also makes the research highly time consuming and difficult to draw clear conclusions from. Most of the findings here are qualified by some other piece of information which has to be taken into account when coming to a final overall judgement. Furthermore, because the findings tend to be equivocal, then it can be harder to provide what are ‘marketable’ outcomes which can emerge quite easily if one excludes or limits factors to be taken into consideration.

It also has to be recognised that the complexity which case study allows becomes a weakness in the sense that the human brain has limits to the degree of complexity it can handle. It is then necessary to move away from the notion of holistic case studies which intend to include all factors in one study and use case study to ask a set of clear
questions about a narrow range of factors. Even so, as a methodological approach it is extremely time consuming which is one of its key weaknesses (Yin 1994).

The most crucial aspect concerning case study as a research methodology is the question of generalisability. However, valid the findings are considered within the few cases completed, can the findings from these cases be considered generalisable to all other similar cases? Of course, in the usual sense they cannot but they can in terms of terms of analytic generalisation (Yin 1994). Furthermore, the history of regeneration practice has been one rich in variation. For example, we saw this in the first round of the SRB where some local authorities were involved in capacity building despite central government’s dismissal of such activity. Another consideration is the fact that the Zone programme is unique to the West Midlands. Clearly, as such, this could only be generalised to others in this area. The national programmes could however be more widely generalisable.

On the basis of this research the author would be highly cautious in relation to generalisability on the issues concerning game management at the local level. If the research were replicated in several other places a high degree of variance would be expected in activities such as consultation and how partnerships were managed locally. Another important factor is the level of previous experience of partnership working. Generalisability is thus a problematic concept. However, some degree of generalisability is realistic. We know from past programmes that relationships were unequal and many of the reasons for this were structural. It would be unlikely that issues of this kind have been overcome in other areas if they have not in Coventry. Therefore even in respect of game management there is likely to be a fair degree of generalisability although no other single case may be exactly the same.

Furthermore, on issues concerning network structuring, particularly by central government, the author would expect very similar outcomes if the research was repeated elsewhere. On the basis of this research it can be suggested that if the processes leading to coordination and co-governance are not highly developed in the exemplary case of Coventry then they are unlikely to be highly developed elsewhere. There may of course be cases where the processes have operated more successfully, despite the structural
barriers which have been identified. In conclusion, New Labour's regeneration programmes have made a significant but still limited impact upon the issues of coordination and co-governance.

FURTHER RESEARCH

Completing this research has led to more questions in relation to New Labour's approach to regeneration. Further research is needed in various areas including the following:

- Assessing the impact of policies. It could be that Coventry will be successfully regenerated through these attempts. The management concerns which interest academics may be unimportant to communities for whom the issue of better housing; more and better jobs and better services are key concerns. They may not for instance care who has had a say in its development. Useful research could be carried out on what deprived communities think about the policies. These two aspects are necessary to fill the gaps around management research. If this research were carried out in Coventry a more holistic view would emerge.

- More in depth analysis needs to take place around the issues that are discussed and how these are worked through in partnerships. Unfortunately this relies on a level of access which is difficult to obtain and sustain and can perhaps only be carried out by consultants or those already working in the area that they are researching. This then raises issues to do with the researcher maintaining their role and retaining the necessary levels of objectivity.

- Longitudinal research is needed on the RDA's and LSP's work and this author would like to do conduct a broader survey of developments across the country.

- There is still a need for the evaluation of existing SRB schemes to act as a comparator for new programmes such as the LSP, New Deal for Communities and RDA inspired partnerships. It could be all too easy to see the SRB as a spent force when in reality Round Six schemes have several years yet in which to operate. This research suggests that this programme may have more impact than the newer ones in many respects.

- Research should focus on similar European 'superboards' (some embryonic work is currently taking place on this) but also upon the widely found European Social and Economic Councils which have some similarities with LSPs. The LSP model, could in, time offer the sort of participatory democracy which would be useful in ensuring an ongoing dialogue between groups in society. This can only be positive, society is complex and the issue of what the public sector should or should not do ought to be open to dialogue. More participation
is necessary to move beyond the headline grabbing critiques of such things as the Health Service’s failure to meet targets.

- The theory used here has only been partially explored further research could look in depth at some of the techniques which are suggested. Many of these are based on bodies of theoretical work such as conflict resolution. To fulfil this experimental situations would have to be established in which action research can take place. Given the outcomes when networks are managed poorly it does appear that better management at the network and game level do have something to offer in situations where organisations and individuals are brought into situations where they are expected to produce developmental schemes.

CONCLUSION

This research has studied three new regeneration partnerships representing one old and one new programme, it has also carried out a theoretical analysis of the original SRB programme which is used as a comparator for the new SRB, LSP and Zone programmes. All partnerships were studied to assess the degree to which they fostered coordinated and co-governed approaches. Overall more coordination was identified but the individual cases varied and the two new ones seemed to add little value to these developments, the SRB case displayed the most coordination. In terms of co-governance, the new programmes, particularly the LSP had established some important new structures, but neither partnership had been particularly successful at co-governing. The SRB again was a little better.

It is important to recognise the broader shifts in regeneration policy within which these partnerships operated which has developed a meta policy in terms of creating more coordination and co-governance. It has, though, yet to become fully established.

The research has thus made an empirical and theoretical contribution. It has produced original knowledge of the implementation of current regeneration programmes. It has also made a theoretical contribution in terms of revising the view that structure and agency can be applied to the notions of network structure and game management and that these two concepts are neatly separated. Previous network management studies in this area suggest that network structuring is the preserve of central government and
local government are involved in the lower level game management. These studies have shown that most actors are involved in both aspects. Furthermore, in the current policies local actors are more involved in creating structures although this does not diminish the importance of English central government and their power to structure networks.
References


Coventry City Forum (2001). Minutes of meeting 1st May.


Coventry Partnership (2002c). Neighbourhood Renewal and Social Inclusion Strategy Supplementary Information.


Appendices

Appendix 1 - Protocol for research
Appendix 2a - Discussion guide for SRB case
Appendix 2b - Discussion guide for Zone
Appendix 2c - Discussion guide for LSP
Appendix 1

Protocol for research

This protocol was adapted from Agranoff's (1986) study into problem solving in networks of service delivery organisations. All cases were conducted following these guidelines.

1. Possible cases of programmes and examples of partnership organisation were identified.

2. The literature review comprised of:
   - The general development of New Labour's approach to policy development and regeneration policy in particular.
   - A focus on specific developments in regeneration policy as they emerged through the policy making process, for example the developing LSP/NR policy.

3. Cases were chosen to provide variety but the relative ease of gaining access was also paramount. Coventry was chosen since it had been involved in various developments. It had, more or less, an example of all new policy programmes. Existing links between academic staff and key members of the local authority were also important.

4. The partnerships were contacted and access arranged - although this did not reduce the necessity of contacting each individual involved to request an interview.

5. Local documentary material concerning partnership development was collected and collated with the national level developments.

6. An initial review of the case was written. Particular attention was paid to the ways in which programmes and partnerships were the same or differed to determine how the cases could be compared.

7. A 'discussion guide' for each case was developed keeping a focus on the key themes but taking account of the different structures which were in place in each case.

8. Interviews were carried out with one partnership at a time to provide a focus for the interviews. However, if key respondents were also involved with another of the cases an interview was requested after the first one had taken place. Analysis took place on an ongoing basis as soon as it was feasible.

9. Further documents were collected during interviews as they became available.

10. The cases were written up in the format produced here and analysed further in a comparative context.
Appendix 2a - Discussion guide for SRB case

(note these were not necessarily all the questions asked nor were all questions necessarily asked of each respondent)

Section A - Role of individual and organisation within the partnership.

1. How long have you been involved in the scheme?
2. How did you/your organisation get involved?
3. What is your role within the partnership?
   (Probe - holding contracts for specific projects/ involvement on special groups etc).
4. Is partnership working new to you?
5. What do you feel you/your organisation offer through membership?
6. Are there benefits for your organisation from being involved?

Section B - Coordination

7. What is the extent of coordination in the scheme?
   (Probe - joint work; co-location; planned together).
   (Policy and service; between projects/between the scheme and other policy areas).
8. Would you say coordination is an important aspect of the SRB scheme?
9. Are there any other drivers or pressures to coordinate activities?
10. Are there any barriers which work against coordinating activities?
11. Are there any issues around coordinating activities?
12. To what extent are targets/cross cutting affecting what you do?

Section C - Co-governance.

13. How much influence have you/your organisation had on the scheme (Examples?)
14. Did members influence the appraisal process? (Examples?)
15. To what extent is there participation from Young people?
   (Probe - Influence -Examples).
16. Is the voluntary sector influential in the partnership?
17. Are there any other drivers or pressures to be inclusive in decision making?
18. Have there been any constraints on being inclusive in decision making?
19. Are there any issues or conflict concerning the SRB?

Section D - Regional/local and Central/local relations.

20. Statement - Central government have made various changes to their general approach to regeneration policy. From your experience how has this affected the following:

   a) Inclusion - especially of communities?
   b) Partnership working?
c) Decentralisation?

(Probe on role of RDA and Centre).
d) Joining-up or coordination?
e) The culture surrounding regeneration policy?

Section E - Partnership/inter-organisational working.

21. What are the partnership relations like?
   (Probe - do people get on well/communicate/work together).

22. How are the meetings organised and run?
   (Probe - Is attendance good? Are there high levels of discussion?)

23. What is your assessment of the administration?
24. What do the management board? and policy teams do?
25. Do these organisational elements i.e. policy teams facilitate the partnership’s work?
   (Probe - In what ways?)

26. Are there any issues to do with the way the partnership is managed?
27. Has there been any conflict?
   (Probe - are there any procedures for managing this).
Appendix 2b - Discussion guide for Zone

(note these were not necessarily all the questions asked nor were all questions necessarily asked of each respondent)

Section A - Role of individual and organisation within the partnership.

1. How long have you been involved in the Zone partnership?
2. How did you/your organisation get involved?
3. What is your role within the partnership?
   (Probe - holding contracts for specific projects/ involvement on theme groups etc).
4. Is partnership working new to you?
5. What do you feel you/your organisation offer through membership?
6. Are there benefits for your organisation from being involved?

Section B - Coordination

7. What is the extent of coordination in the scheme?
   (Probe - policy and service; between projects/between the scheme and other policy areas).
   (Joint work; colocated; planned together).
8. Would you say the coordination is an important aspect of the Zone’s work?
9. Are there any other drivers or pressures to coordinate activities?
10. Are there any barriers that exist around coordinating activities?
11. Are there any issues around coordinating activities?
12. To what extent are targets/cross cutting targets affecting what you do?

Section C - Co-governance.

13. How has the funding been allocated?
14. How much influence have you/your organisation had on the strategy (Examples?)
15. Did members have influence over the appraisal process? (Examples?)
16. To what extent is there participation from the community?
17. Are they influential? (Examples).
18. Is the voluntary sector influential in the partnership?
19. Are there any other drivers or pressures to be inclusive in decision making?
20. Have there been any constraints on being inclusive in decision making?
21. Are there any issues or conflict concerning the Zone’s activities?

Section D - Regional/local/central/local relations.

22. Statement - Central government have made various changes to their general approach to regeneration policy. From your experience how has this affected the following:

a) Inclusion - especially of communities.
b) Partnership working?
c) Decentralisation?
(Probe on role of Regional Development Agency and Centre).

d) Joining-up or coordination?
e) The culture surrounding regeneration policy?

**Section E** - Partnership/inter-organisational working.

23. What are the partnership relations like?
(Probe - do people get on well/communicate/work together).

24. How are the meetings organised and run?
(Probe - Is attendance good?)

25. What is your assessment of the administration?
26. What do the management board? and policy teams do?
27. Do these organisational elements e.g. policy teams, facilitate the partnership’s work?
(Probe - In what ways?)

28. Are there any issues to do with the way the partnership is managed?
29. What do feel about the fact that government don’t want to fund the administration?
30. Has there been any conflict?
(Probe - are there any procedures for managing this).
Appendix 2c - Discussion guide for LSP

(note these were not necessarily all the questions asked nor were all questions necessarily asked of each respondent)

Section A - Role of individual and organisation within the partnership.

1. How long have you been involved in the LSP?
2. How did you/your organisation get involved?
   (Probe - relationship with Forum)

3. What is your role within the partnership?
   (Probe - holding contracts for specific projects/ involvement on theme groups etc).

4. Is partnership working new to you?
5. What do you feel you/your organisation offer through membership?
6. Are there benefits for your organisation from being involved?

Section B - Coordination

7. What is the extent of coordination in the scheme?
   (Probe - joint work; colocated; planned together).
   (Policy and service; between projects/between the scheme and other policy areas).

8. Has the LSP had an impact on mainstream services within Coventry?
   (Probe - do you think it will?)

9. What effect has Area Coordination and PDGs had on the work of the LSP?
10. Would you say the coordination is an important aspect of the LSP’s work?
11. Are there any other drivers or pressures to coordinate activities?
12. Are there any barriers that exist around coordinating activities?
13. Are there any issues around coordinating activities?
14. To what extent are targets/cross cutting targets affecting what you do?

Section C - Co-governance.

11. How has the spending of the NRF been organised?
10. How much influence have you/your organisation had on Neighbourhood Renewal?
   (Examples?).
11. Were members influential over the appraisal process? (Examples?).
12. Are the community members influential? (Examples?).
13. Have the wider community been influential?
   (Probe - how have they participated?).

15. Are there any other drivers or pressures to be inclusive in decision-making?
16. Have there been any constraints on being inclusive in decision-making?
17. Are there any issues or conflicts concerning the LSP?)
Section D - Regional/local and central/local relations.

18. **Statement** - Central government have made various changes to their general approach to regeneration policy. From your experience how has this affected the following:

a) Inclusion - especially of communities.
b) Partnership working?
c) Decentralisation?

(Probe on role of Government Office and Centre).

d) Joining-up or coordination?
e) The culture surrounding regeneration policy?

Section E - Accreditation.

19. Were there any issues around the accreditation process?
20. How involved was the Government Office?
(Probe - Were they supportive?)

Section F - Partnership/inter-organisational working.

21. What are the partnership relations like?
(Probe - do people get on well/communicate/work together).

22. How are the meetings organised and run?
(Probe - Is attendance good?)

23. What is your assessment of the administration?
24. What do the management board? and policy teams do?
25. Do these organisational elements i.e. policy teams facilitate the partnership's work?
(Probe - In what ways?)

26. Are there any issues to do with the way the partnership is managed?
27. What do feel about the fact that government don’t want to fund the administration?
28. Has there been any conflict?
(Probe - are there any procedures for managing this).