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THE INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY IN THE GDR UNDER HONECKER:
ORTHODOXY, DISSIDENCE AND INTERNAL DEBATE

VOL I

LOUISE JANE GIBSON

Doctor of Philosophy

THE UNIVERSITY OF ASTON IN BIRMINGHAM

SEPTEMBER 1991

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SUMMARY

THE UNIVERSITY OF ASTON IN BIRMINGHAM

THE INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY IN THE GDR UNDER HONECKER: ORTHODOXY, DISSIDENCE AND INTERNAL DEBATE

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The thesis offers a comparative interdisciplinary approach to the examination of the intellectual debates about the relationship between individual and society in the GDR under Honecker. It shows that there was not only a continuum of debate between the academic disciplines, but also from the radical critics of the GDR leadership such as Robert Havemann, Rudolf Bahro and Stefan Heym through the social scientists, literary critics and legal theorists working in the academic institutions to theorists close to the GDR leadership. It also shows that the official line and policy of the ruling party itself on the question of the individual and society was not static over the period, but changed in response to internal and external pressures.

Over the period 1971 - 1989 greater emphasis was placed by many intellectuals on the individual, his needs and interests. It was increasingly recognised that conflicts could exist between the individual and society in GDR socialism. Whereas the radical critics argued that these conflicts were due to features of GDR society, such as the hierarchical system of labour functions and bureaucracy, and extrapolated from this a general conflict between the political leadership and population, internal critics, that is critics from within the system, argued that conflicts existed between a specific individual and society and were largely due to external and historical factors. They also pointed to the social phenomena which were detrimental to the individual's development in the GDR, but they put forward less radical solutions. With the exception of a few radical young writers, all theorists studied in this thesis gave precedence to social interests over individual interests and so did not advocate a return to 'individualistic' positions.

The continuity of sometimes quite controversial discussions in the GDR academic journals and the flexibility of the official line and policy suggests that it is inappropriate to refer to GDR society under Honecker simply as totalitarian, although it did have some totalitarian features. What the thesis demonstrates is the existence of 'Teilköpfnlichkeit' in which critical discussion is conducted even as the official, orthodox line is given out for public consumption in the high-circulation media.

subjectivity
human rights
individualism
intellectual discussion in the GDR
individual and society in the GDR
Dedication

For my grandmother
Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Dr Roger Woods, Mecki, my family and, most of all, my husband Paul for all their support, without which this thesis would not have been possible.
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The individual and society in the GDR under Honecker: orthodoxy, dissidence and internal debate

Introduction

During the seventies and the eighties there was intense intellectual discussion of the relationship between the individual and society in the German Democratic Republic. Although this question had already reared its head in the late 1960's in GDR literature in works such as Christa Wolf's *Nachdenken über Christa T.* (1968), further discussion of this theme was stimulated by shifts in ideology at the beginning of the Honecker era in 1971.

In September 1967 the then First Secretary of the Socialist Unity Party (SED) Walter Ulbricht departed from the traditional Marxist-Leninist view and suggested that socialism was not a 'short transitional phase', but a 'relatively autonomous socio-economic formation in the historical era of transition from capitalism to communism'. Thus he considered socialism to be a long historic period. To substantiate this view Ulbricht developed the notion of a stable society free from internal conflict, in particular class conflict. In this society all groups shared the same basic interests; namely higher output and a concomitant rise in the standard of living. Emphasizing the harmonious nature of GDR socialism, Ulbricht increasingly spoke of a 'socialist human community' in the GDR, (sozialistische Menschengemeinschaft). This term was enshrined in the 1968 constitution.

At the Eighth Party Congress of the SED held in 1971, the year in which Erich Honecker replaced Ulbricht, the concept of a 'socialist human community' was abandoned since it was deemed to overestimate the closeness of various social classes and strata. This was an
admission on the part of the SED that conflicts of interest still existed in 'actually existing socialism'. However the SED was careful to make a distinction between 'antagonistic' contradictions or conflicts and 'non-antagonistic' contradictions. According to the SED, antagonistic conflicts, that is unsolvable conflicts, existed between the bourgeoisie and the working class in capitalism. However, the economic basis for this antagonism had been removed in GDR society with the abolition of the private ownership of the means of production. Therefore the official line, that is the interpretation and application of Marxist-Leninist ideology by those in the highest ranks of the SED, was that conflicts present within actually existing socialism were of a non-antagonistic, temporary nature. In other words, socialist society would in time resolve them as it progressed towards communism. It is against this background that the intellectual discussion of potential conflicts between the interests of the individual and society, as defined by the SED, is particularly interesting.

The rejection of the concept 'socialist human community' encouraged critical GDR literary authors to portray the contradictions within GDR society. The West German literary critic, Wolfgang Emmerich, commented:

Damit (with the rejection of this concept L.G) war auch der Literatur die Last abgenommen, wider besseres Wissen harmonische, versöhnende intersubjektive und gesellschaftliche Verhältnisse vorführen zu müssen. Die Darstellung gravierender Konflikte, an die Wurzel gehende Kritik war damit legitimiert (1).

Indeed Honecker explicitly instructed writers and artists to treat the 'contradictions to be overcome' in society as well as what was 'great and beautiful'. This was followed in December 1971 by his much-quoted speech at the Fourth Plenum of the Central Committee of the SED in which he stated:

In the period 1971–1976, before the enforced exile of Wolf Biermann, the SED appeared to pursue a more liberal cultural policy. Works such as Ulrich Plenzdorf’s _Die neuen Leiden des jungen W._ (1972), which were originally ‘written for the desk-drawer’, were published and Christa Wolf’s _Nachdenken über Christa T._, originally attacked for its subjectivism on publication in 1968, was suddenly reprinted, a larger number of copies being published than previously. More open discussion flourished in literary circles. East and West German critics agree that the opportunities open to the individual for self-fulfilment in GDR society, the search for one’s own identity and being at ease with oneself were all dominant themes in GDR literature during the Honecker period.

The literary discussion of the relationship between the individual and society was taken up by other sections of the intelligentsia: radical critics of the official view such as Robert Havemann, a physical chemist and former professor at the Humboldt University; the writer Stefan Heym and a former SED functionary, Rudolf Bahro, and establishment critics such as Jürgen Kuczynski, an eminent economic historian with a keen interest in literature; the legal theorists Eberhard Poppe and Uwe-Jens Heuer and the cultural theorist Irene Dölling.

This thesis will offer a comparative analysis of the discussion of the relationship between the individual and society as presented in works by the following types of intellectuals: radical critics of the regime, theorists within the party institutions, particularly the above-mentioned theorists, the GDR literary intelligentsia and
the SED leadership. On the basis of this analysis I shall draw a conclusion about the extent to which one can speak of a continuum of views encompassing both 'insiders' and 'outsiders' of the GDR establishment and test theories about the nature of GDR society.

The internal debates in the GDR

During the Honecker period most Western researchers working on the GDR focussed either upon the writings and the political statements of the 'dissidents', who published extensively in the West, or upon a relatively small group of middle-aged or older writers, whose works were well known on both sides of the intra-German border. This was partly for reasons of accessibility of the research material and partly because some theorists who tended towards the totalitarian model of the Soviet and East European communist system, concluded that there was no meaningful debate within the system itself. The views of less well-known writers – particularly the younger generation –, and of GDR academics who were engaged in debate in the various institutions and academic journals were comparatively neglected. Yet, as will be demonstrated below, there were often striking parallels between the views of these academics and young writers and the radical critics of the GDR leadership. In this thesis I examine some of the often well-documented theories of the radical critics and older writers such as Wolf, but mainly as a point of reference and comparison for a more detailed analysis of other debates conducted in the institutions and cultural journals.

The steady stream of emigrant writers and academics from the GDR since 1971 has given Western researchers an insight into the workings of some of the state and party institutions of the GDR. Western theorists became increasingly aware of an internal debate
in the GDR going on 'behind the monolithic facade of Party rule' and 'under a superficial consensus between the leadership, literary critics and writers' (3). Vera Wollenberger, a former research worker at the Academy of Sciences and founder member of the grassroots church movement 'Kirche von unten' has, for instance, pointed to the often lively discussions within the party prior to the finalising of policy decisions. Once a decision was reached, the party member was, however, expected to fall in with the decisions of the party in accordance with the principles of democratic centralism (4).

It is also clear that there were occasionally deep rifts within the SED on questions such as Eurocommunism (1976) and the Polish crisis of the early 1980's (5). More recently, the fact that at the party congress in Spring 1986 1360 party secretaries were forced to leave their offices and 3787 party members to leave the SED (6), that in 1987 the SED took action against 19,470 members, expelling most of them and that an 'exchange of party-cards' took place on May 29, 1989 is a further indication of a certain lack of ideological discipline within the party. As a document published by the Central Party Commission explained:


As will be seen, the official view or line was itself not static, but continued to evolve in response to changing circumstances and sometimes to reflect the new challenges presented by both radical and establishment critics (8). In the Eighties leading SED theorists such as Harald Lange and Rolf Reißig stressed that the
Marxist-Leninist ideology had to be flexible to meet the requirements of a changing world (9).

In the Honecker era there were certain vague terrains, where there seemed to be no clear doctrine (10), or the party might deliberately blur the official line in an attempt to avoid confrontation with potential opposition groups (11). Sometimes the official position was left dangling when authoritative party documents became outdated, implicitly contradicted, but never really disavowed (12). As will be seen, the question of whether contradictions in socialist society can be of an antagonistic nature was an example of this in the seventies.

Given that the official line could be so flexible, it was impossible always to predict the precise parameters of permissible debate in the GDR (13). However, one can say that there were certain 'taboo subjects', usually associated with the fundamental principles of the political system, especially the party's monopoly of ultimate authority (14).

As will be seen, the concept of an all-embracing, dogmatic and rigid system of censorship is not valid for the GDR of the seventies and eighties. Whilst censorship undeniably existed, decisions on literary publications were subject to the arbitrary will of the people controlling the publication censorship apparatus and influenced by the overall political context (15). Indeed one Western theorist, Zimmermann, has gone as far as to dispute that the SED even had a long-term cultural policy under Honecker. In his view, the much-vaunted cultural policy of the SED was an ad-hoc affair (16). Furthermore, the concept of an all-powerful, bureaucratic system of censorship does not make provision for the
element of self-censorship.

How can one define the role and position of the academics and writers who fall somewhere between the radical critics and the SED leadership in the spectrum of opinion? In his works of the late sixties and early seventies the then leading Western researcher on the GDR, Peter Christian Ludz, was one of the first theorists to highlight the pluralism of views within the East German ruling party. He distinguished between various factions within the party and its leadership, namely experts or technocrats; dogmatists and middlemen (17). In his view, the technocrats were well-educated and willing to change the system. They were coopted into the leadership because of their technical expertise. The dogmatists, by contrast, were older, loyal party functionaries. They were less well-educated and therefore unable, or indeed unwilling to make changes in the system. In his view, the technocrats, an 'institutionalised counterelite', did not challenge the validity of the system as such, but criticised specific decisions of the politbureau with the aim of improving the industrial performance of the GDR and increasing its political and military strength (18). Ludz therefore refers to their criticism as 'institutionalised revisionism' as opposed to radical criticism. This counterelite was 'institutionalised' in the sense that it was rooted in the party, state and economic hierarchy (19). Ludz uses the example of Uwe-Jens Heuer in the late sixties as evidence of this institutionalised revisionism, which was partially accepted by the party and thus ultimately widened the range of internal party discussion. He writes that in the sixties the SED made use of this revisionism to modernise GDR society (20).

Western theorists have given various interpretations of this
concept of institutionalised revisionism. Baylis rejects the term 'revisionism', arguing that it was rather a set of ideological trial balloons permitted by the regime as a basis for discussion and possible later adoption (21). Lippmann writes that by systematically applying scientific principles to problems of social organisation, the pragmatic critics sought to bring about a gradual liberation from party dogma (22).

Some Western theorists see the phenomenon which Ludz describes as 'institutionalised revisionism' as a 'specific, loyal opposition'. Writing on Eastern Europe as a whole, Gordon Skilling distinguishes between 'fundamental, non-loyal opposition', that is a basic opposition to the system on the part of key interest groups within and/or outside the party, and the 'specific, loyal opposition' of party members either within the party apparatus or in officially sponsored organisations (23). The latter seeks to make peaceful changes in the system, but does not aim for a wholesale replacement of the system (24). The chief proponents of this 'loyal opposition' are professional interest groups. Whilst they do not have the power of the bureaucratic interest groups, they do have the knowledge and prestige which enable them to express their views and give these views a certain authority and influence. Gordon Skilling notes that they often operate as pressure groups seeking to influence the actions of the existing leadership. They are not always organised institutionally but are usually amorphous and informal groupings of likeminded individuals (25). He writes that whilst the party sometimes encourages the latter form of opposition, it also seeks to channel and limit it. This kind of discussion, however, often has a tendency to escape party control and go beyond the prescribed limits (26).
Other theorists have variously referred to the internal critics of the political leadership as 'establishment critics', 'socially critical artists' and 'committed critics' (27) and to this internal, 'orthodox' criticism as pragmatic dissent (Schapiro, Woods), infrastructural dissent (Shtromas) and pragmatic opposition (Kusin) (28).

Shtromas writes that these insider critics are initially driven to 'positive dissent' by their professional motives since the whole system not only submits them to the dictates of a non-professional, arbitrary, partiocratic leadership, but also undermines the realisation of their full potential by depriving them of any initiative and by restricting the use of their skills and knowledge (29).

DeBardeleben notes that scientists, humanistic intellectuals and writers were in the vanguard of the environmental movement in the GDR because they were in a strategic position to understand the problems and implications of the issues; they had the expertise and access to sources of information denied the general public – including Western publications – and, finally, because they were accustomed to putting their ideas on paper and experienced in shaping their public positions to the demands of a censored press (30).

Western theorists who adhere to the industrialisation model discussed below argue that the high level of industrialisation in the East European states means that the political leaders have to rely on expert opinion to facilitate their decision-making (31). They have suggested that these experts tend to stimulate opposition
and increase pressure for the liberalisation of the system. They argue that as long as the trend towards an elaborate consumer-led and highly technological economy persists, pragmatic dissent is also likely to persist. Clemens Burrichter, for example, sees a new informed elite emerging in the GDR, which would not let itself be 'instrumentalised' by the political and economic system and which was becoming ever more critical (32).

Woods, however, notes that this kind of pragmatic dissent was largely absent as a form of opposition in GDR society during the eighties. Furthermore, he argues that the scientific and technical intelligentsia had not brought about a liberalisation of the political system, nor had they challenged the authority of the party. He therefore concludes that internal discussions were not a further form of opposition, but came from a largely conformist technical elite anxious to fulfil the goals of official policy as efficiently as possible (33).

Western theorists who subscribe to the totalitarian model also discussed below tend to divide GDR intellectuals into 'orthodox' and 'oppositional' camps, thereby ignoring the existence of these internal debates. Brettschneider, for example, takes the view that the writers who accepted the official regulation of literature were state functionaries, 'Dichter im Dienst' and that all other writers attempted to preserve some degree of the writer's traditional autonomy, thereby automatically finding themselves in confrontation with the state (34). Critics who polarize the GDR literary scene in this way tend to see the development of cultural policy from 1971 onwards as a series of struggles between a hardline, conformist faction and an oppositional-autonomous faction, accompanied by waves of liberalisation and repression of
literature. Furthermore, for them the orthodox writers were associated with affirmative, unsubtle propaganda literature and oppositional writers with quality literature. They often made the writer’s degree of apparent loyalty to the GDR state a criterion for assessing the quality of the literary work (35).

Many theorists reject this polarised view, preferring the concept of a continuum of views ranging from radical criticism of the official view via internal, specific criticism of the official view to the official view itself. For Gordon Skilling, the complex interaction between the various forms of opposition cannot be adequately reflected in a simple dichotomy between orthodox/loyal and unorthodox/non-loyal opposition. He notes:

If this dual classification is used, it must be understood not as a clearcut demarcation of two sharply opposed forms, but as a continuum stretching between opposition and dissent, control and contestation, orthodoxy and unorthodoxy (36).

Woods states that on issues such as the environment the continuity of criticism running from the dissidents to establishment figures was strengthening in the eighties and the distance between the two ends of the spectrum of views shortening (37). He has written of a pyramidal structure, the broad base of which was pushing for reform and located partly within the official political system itself. In this context he believes that GDR opposition had an important function as an indicator of problems which have to be faced. He writes that dissidents were dealing with the fundamental problems of East German society and that these problems were widely recognised as such and taken up by groups which influenced the decision-making process (38).

Rossade states that the ruling ideology in the GDR was gradually
adopting 'revisionist' concepts to such an extent that the main distinction between the revisionist elements tacitly accepted by the party leadership and those publicly attacked as revisionist, in other words between the internal and radical critics, seemed to be whether they maintained the leadership's position, that is whether they could be easily incorporated within the dominant ideology or not (39). Similarly, Woods states that the opposition in the GDR represented an unwelcome pressure for significant political change, thus implying that establishment critics represented acceptable criticism or a welcome pressure for change (40).

Rossade writes that this 'revision' has two main forms: scientism, that is the introduction of modern scientific, social science and philosophical concepts to complement and replace essential theses and theories of traditional Marxism, and anthropologism in the sense of replacing the primarily socially-oriented view of a social individual with an apparently humanistic, abstract, individualistic and irrational portrayal of the individual. Rossade suggests that one must distinguish between the ideological 'deviations' which are merely specific attempts at innovation within the leadership itself and those which are hitherto underdeveloped, temporarily alternative positions to the official view (41). Given what he saw as the wide adoption of revisionist concepts by the political leadership, Rossade concludes that the ideological basis of the GDR was increasingly reduced to the leading role of the party (42). Marxism-Leninism was sometimes also moulded to legitimize policies adopted by the leadership for other, more pragmatic reasons (43).

One of the basic arguments in support of the concept of a continuity of criticism of the official view in the GDR is that most critical intellectuals saw themselves as socialists. Their protests were usually directed at certain forms and phenomena of
GDR society rather than the totality of GDR society. Most hoped for a better socialism and were therefore anxious to reform GDR socialism rather than destroy it (44). Typically they demanded the fulfilment of the original communist goals rather than a return to capitalism. They often clearly expressed the view that the GDR was the 'better German state' (45). Some theorists argued that their privileged position in society necessarily ensured a commonality of interests with the bureaucrats of the GDR system (46).

The Western theorists who continued to cling to a dichotomous view of the intellectual scene in the GDR, however, attacked those writers who were critical of the official view and yet proclaimed their loyalty to the GDR state and their political reliability, implying that they were opportunistic or hypocritical. Marcel Reich-Ranicki, for example, criticised Christa Wolf and Volker Braun for initially signing the Biermann petition and subsequently withdrawing their signatures (47).

The resonance of the internal debates

It is of course true that the debates on the relationship between the individual and society in the specialist journals were often esoteric. This fact, combined with the relatively low circulation of these journals, meant that the debates were not generally accessible to the public. Although at first sight this might have seemed a disadvantage in terms of mobilising popular support for certain policy-changes, it did mean that specialists had more opportunity to discuss controversial issues (48).

Little reliable information is available on what resonance internal critics could expect to find in the GDR population throughout the Honecker period. Although the works and statements of the radical critics were widely known in the GDR via the West German media, it
is difficult to assess the degree of their support in the population, though the events of Autumn 1989 and after showed that these critics had more in common with the population when it came to stating what had to be removed than when the new structures were under discussion. Yet the possibility of unification opened up new horizons of change and encouraged new political demands which cannot simply be projected back into the Honecker period. The aim of this thesis will therefore be to uncover common concerns and arguments amongst different sections of the intelligentsia, including the political leadership in the Honecker period and, where possible, to point to examples of interaction between the different viewpoints on questions relating to the individual and society in the GDR and relevant changes in official policy.

When assessing the impact of internal debates in the GDR upon the official line, the time-scale involved is important, for 'loyal dissenters' often only influenced the tone of official ideology in the long term (49). At a writers' meeting in Berlin Christa Wolf, referring indirectly to the censorship of certain sections of her works Voraussetzungen einer Erzählung: Kassandra. Frankfurter Poetik-Vorlesungen (1983) and Kassandra, Erzählung (1983) stated:

Ich habe es erlebt, wie innerhalb eines Jahrzehntes eine Reihe solcher gestrichener Sätze zu Aussagen und Forderungen der großen Politik werden, die in den Zeiten stehen. Mir macht das Spaß, aber es regt mich auch an, weiterzudenken, über das hinaus, was heute noch nicht in den Zeiten steht (50).

Furthermore, the timing of the debates in the sense of the overall political context was also important. In the last years of the GDR Stefan Heym argued that internal discussions would carry more weight at a time when reform was sweeping through Eastern Europe (51). He was proved right in the sense that the GDR population seized the opportunity for political freedom and freedom to travel,
although the GDR population's fight for political and human rights gradually became allied with a fierce anticommunism. There was a clear overlap between the internal debates and the views expressed by groups such as Neues Forum which in the early stages of the 'Wende' became mass movements (52).

As far as the radical critics are concerned, Ramet points to the following positive functions of their dissent, defined as discontent with the system coupled with a belief that one can change the system: the articulation and expression of the meaning of disaffection; the critical opposition to the leadership and the defence of the right to think differently; the presentation of alternative sources of information and the demonstration of alternative models (53). Above all, one can say that events such as the intellectuals' protests against Biermann's enforced exile and the Bahro affair indicated a new self-confidence on the part of the 'dissidents' and demonstrated that the monolithic unity of the party apparatus, hitherto the regime's greatest asset, was vulnerable:

... as even the tiniest scratch can lead to gangrene, even the tiniest opening in the monolithic structures of the bureaucracy, once established, can lead to more significant fissures (54).

The dissidents did, of course, on occasion succeed in forcing the regime to publicly polemicise with them (55).

The interdisciplinary nature of intellectual debates in the GDR

In 1971 when Kurt Hager suggested to social scientists that they should concentrate upon the actual problems of 'developed socialist society' in order to explain and attempt to resolve the conflicts of GDR society, he stressed the importance of cooperation and interdisciplinary debate (56). Throughout the ensuing period the
value of interdisciplinary discussion on major issues such as the
environment was recognised in the GDR, and East German academics
often crossed disciplinary publishing lines to appear in print in
literary and cultural journals (57).

Given the central importance of the theme of the relationship
between the individual and society in Marxist-Leninist ideology, it
is hardly surprising to find that experts from various academic
disciplines researched the different aspects of this relationship.
From 1971 onwards there was a great deal of cross-fertilisation
between the disciplines which was sometimes made explicit. Thus,
as will be seen below, the legal theorists Eberhard Poppe and Uwe-Jens
Heuer claim to have been stimulated in their research of subjective
rights by literary discussions, and Rudolf Bahro quotes Christa
Wolf and Volker Braun on the question of subjectivity in his key
work Die Alternative: Zur Kritik des real existierenden Sozialismus
(1977). There was thus not only a continuum of debate on the
relationship between the individual and society in GDR socialism
from radical criticism of the official view to the official view
itself, but also a continuum of debate on this subject across the
various academic disciplines and literature.

Given that the debates on the relationship between the individual
and GDR society during the Honecker period present such a vast area
of study, I have confined this thesis to a consideration of the
concept of forms of individuality; subjective and personal rights;
individual and collective activities in leisure time; the self-
realisation of the individual in socialism and the literary
concepts of self-realisation and subjectivity.

In this thesis I will primarily make use of material published in
the GDR; both the mass media (Einheit, Neues Deutschland) and specialised academic journals (Neue Deutsche Literatur, Weimarer Beiträge, Sinn und Form, Forum, Sonntag, temperamente, Staat und Recht, Neue Justiz and Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie). This makes it possible to compare the official explanations and assessments of the relationship between the individual and society in the GDR found in the Neues Deutschland and Einheit with the academic discussion of this question and to examine the continuum between these and the discussions presented in the works of the radical critics, whose works were for the most part published outside the GDR.

DeBardeleben, who has already used this approach to establish a continuum of debate on environmental issues in the GDR between the political leadership, academic specialists and alternative critics of the regime in The environment and Marxism-Leninism. The Soviet and East German experience (1987), suggests that articles in the mass media mainly served a legitimizing function and articles written by academics in scholarly journals an advocacy function, as scholars addressed the issues relating to policy priorities and the budget allocation facing the political leadership (58). In The environmental dialogue in the GDR. Literature, church, party and interest groups in their sociopolitical context (1987), Mallinckrodt concludes that the literary and cultural journals functioned as 'agenda-setters' for opinion-leaders throughout the system, offering them a forum for candid, substantive discussion about various aspects of the debate on the nature of social progress. In her view, they were launchers of socio-political trial balloons (59). They, for example, published works or excerpts from works which later fall into disfavour, for example Braun's
Unvollendete Geschichte (1975) and Gabriele Eckart's So sehe ich die Sache. Protokolle aus der DDR (1984). At times they went beyond the boundaries of criticism acceptable to the SED and provoked a reaction from the leadership. Early in 1983 Forum, the biweekly FDJ paper and initiator of sometimes controversial debates, was one of the journals which ceased publication, officially on the grounds of a paper shortage. In July 1978 the entire editorial board of the lively literary paper for new young writers temperamente was sacked, because their journal had published factory reports which were critical of working conditions in the GDR.

DeBardeleben suggests that the theorists publishing in the scholarly journals worked on the basis that they and their specialist audience were loyal to the leadership. If arguments using Marxist-Leninist language and concepts were interwoven with and formed the substance of scholarly analysis, this was, she argues, either because Marxist-Leninist language and concepts formed part of the deeper conceptual structure defining the problem of the author, or, more pragmatically and, in my view more likely, because the scholars concerned believed that this was the only way to put their arguments across effectively to fellow-scholars and/or policymakers (60). It is interesting to note that the radical critic Hermann von Berg writes in the introduction to his attack on GDR socialism Marxismus-Leninismus Das Elend der halb deutschen, halb russischen Ideologie (1986) that, like the medieval heretics, he is forced to use the forms and vocabulary of the official ideology to criticise effectively the dogma of Marxism-Leninism (61).

This primary use of Marxist-Leninist ideology as an acceptable form
of presenting policy options naturally makes the task of the Western analyst more difficult. Controversial views often lie hidden in the different interpretation of apparently uniformly laid-down terms (62). One is therefore forced to distinguish between subtle nuances. Despite this difficulty and the trend towards secrecy inherent in the GDR system, it is worth persevering for the scientific and political discussions in the academic journals can give a significant portrayal of the real problems of GDR society in the period under study (63).

The thesis will cover the period from 1971 to 1989, the period in which Honecker was General Secretary of the SED. 1971 is of course the year in which Ulbricht relinquished the leadership of the SED to Honecker. Under Honecker's new leadership there were major shifts in the interpretation of Marxist-Leninist ideology and policy. 1971 was therefore widely accepted by both Western and GDR theorists as marking the beginning of a new period of GDR history. In the GDR this period was officially designated as the period of the further development of advanced socialist society. The length of the period under study will allow me to follow the development of, and interaction between various intellectual views of the relationship between the individual and society.

The thesis has two goals. Firstly, to address the themes of the relationship between the individual and society in the GDR under Honecker. What was, for example, the nature of the increasing emphasis upon the individual and the private sphere in the GDR throughout the eighties? Was this emphasis a reaction to the official ideology? What was the official reaction to the widespread political apathy, 'privatism' and the concentration of the
individual upon self-interest (65)? Is the view of some Western theorists correct, that in the seventies the GDR leadership, like its counterparts in the other East European states, was forced to concede that the experiment to create a new socialist man had failed and therefore turned towards a more 'legalistic' view of the individual's behaviour? In other words, under Honecker did the state allow the citizen to do what he pleased in the private sphere, providing he did not break the law (66)?

What were the implications of the growing emphasis placed upon the individual and the private sphere by theorists and politicians alike in the GDR since 1971? What does this development tell us about the nature of GDR society during this period? If there was a continuum of intellectual debate throughout this period, what does this tell us about the workings of GDR society? The second goal of the thesis will be then to contribute to the Western debate about the nature of GDR society. Western theorists writing on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe have made use of theoretical models, which are based in their turn upon certain assumptions about the nature and the development of these societies. I will comment on the validity of the elements of these models in the light of the discussion of my subject: the relationship between the individual and society.

It is not an aim of this thesis to give a detailed discussion of Marxist theory, for example to compare the practice of GDR socialism with original Marxist theory. This is partly due to the lack of space and time to devote to this complex subject and partly due to the fact that the theorists studied in this thesis themselves sought to ultimately explain the practice of GDR socialism in terms of its own laws, rather than with reference to
Marxist theory. Similarly, due to constraints of time and space, it
is not possible here to make a detailed comparison between
Eurocommunism and the theories of radical critics, although there
were clearly parallels between the two. As stated above, the period
under study in the thesis is 1971 - 1989, the years during which
Erich Honecker was General Secretary of the SED. Therefore a
discussion of the impact of pre-1989 reformism, for example the
theories of Jürgen Kuczynski, upon the Round Table discussions
which took place in Germany between December 1989 and March 1990,
falls outside the remit of this thesis.

Chapter one outlines and comments on the main Western theoretical
models for the study of the Soviet and East European societies:
totalitarianism, pluralism, industrialisation, convergence and
modernisation models, the systems/functional analysis approach and
political culture model, with particular reference to the
relationship between the individual and society.

Chapter two will consider the official SED line on the relationship
between the individual and GDR society. It will specifically
examine the SED’s definition of the position of the individual in
socialism, the official view of interests within society, the
official view of subjective and human rights and of the
relationship between the public and private spheres. Shifts in the
official line over the period under question will be highlighted
and discussed.

Chapter three will look at the radical criticism of the official
view of the individual and society. Here the theories of Rudolf
Bahro, Robert Havemann and Stefan Heym on the position of the
individual, the role of interests and human rights in actually
existing socialism will be outlined and assessed.

Chapters two and three will then, as explained above, provide the point of comparison for an analysis of the internal academic and literary debates on the same themes. Chapter four will home in on the non-literary internal debates, chapter five on the debates in the literary and cultural journals. Key concepts examined in chapter four are: antagonistic and nonantagonistic interests in socialist society, human and subjective rights, the opportunities for self-development in actually existing socialism, the new emphasis upon the private sphere, forms of individuality and the ideal of the universally developed personality. Chapter five will begin with a brief overview of the development of GDR literature as a background for the understanding of the trends apparent in GDR works since 1971. The themes considered in this chapter include: the opportunities for self-development in GDR society; the depiction of the private sphere in GDR literature using the example of Erich Loest's Es geht seinen Gang oder Mühen in unserer Ebene (1978); the concepts of subjective authenticity and documentary literature in the late seventies and the subjectivity of writers in the late seventies and eighties.
Footnotes


4. 'With God on her side', The Guardian, June 8, 1988, p.16.


23. H. Gordon Skilling, 'Background to the study of opposition in Communist Eastern Europe', Government and Opposition, 3 (no.3, 1968), 294 – 324 (pp.298 – 300); for this distinction see also A. Mallinckrodt, The environmental dialogue in the GDR. Literature, church, party and interest groups in their socio-political context, University Press of America (Lanham, 1987), p.22 and Starrels, 'Political development in the German Democratic Republic', p.159.


26. ibid., p.300.


31. ibid., p.13.


37. Woods, 'Opposition or alternative culture', p.17.


41. Rossade, *Literatur im Systemwandel*, p.27.

42. ibid., p.28;


45. The young critical writer Thomas Brasch stresses that the past conflicts between official institutions and him were about the methods of attaining socialism, not about alternatives to socialism, T. Brasch, 'Antwort auf Marcel Reich-Ranicki', *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, November 13, 1987, p.27.

46. Zimmermann, *Industrieliteratur in the GDR*, p.2. Brettschneider implies that it is because of their basic agreement with GDR socialism that writers such as Heym and Kunert were permitted to have some influence within the GDR, whereas others such as Biermann and Huchel were condemned to silence. In his view, Heym did not overstep the official line of the acceptable, Brettschneider, *Zwischen literarischer Autonomie*, p.279.
47. 'Macht Verfolgung kreativ?', Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, November 11, 1987, p.25.


49. ibid., p.99.


52. J. Kosta, 'Apparatschiks haben den nötigen Umbau immer wieder verhindert', Frankfurter Rundschau, February 19, 1987, p.12; Gordon Skilling, 'Background to opposition', p.321; Starrels, 'Political development in the GDR', p.160. Writing from a left-wing point of view, Minnerup sees the challenges of Havemann and other lesser-known intellectuals to the party apparatus as helping to prepare the ground for the workers' struggle for democracy in the GDR, Minnerup, 'The GDR's frozen revolution', p.27.


54. Minnerup, 'The GDR's frozen revolution', p.27. Pedro Ramet similarly writes that internal dissent concerns the GDR authorities because it threatens to create splits within the party ranks and to divide the official ideology, 'sowing doubts and creating cracks in which new forms of pluralism might take root and diluting the fundamental operational code of political control', Ramet, 'Disaffection and dissent', p.106.


63. P. von Oertzen, 'Foreword', in Biermann, *Demokratisierung in der DDR*, p.IX.


66. ibid., pp.270 - 271.
Chapter One. Summary of the Western views of the relations between the individual and society in the GDR

This chapter examines some of the main theoretical models used by Western theorists to explain the nature of the communist system in the Soviet Union and East European states and show what implications these models have for the study of the relationship between the individual and society in the GDR under Honecker.

lia. The totalitarian model

Perhaps the most well-established model employed by Western theorists studying the communist system in the Soviet bloc is totalitarianism. The basic concept underlying the totalitarian model is that the ideologies of National Socialism/Fascism and Stalinism/Communism share certain totalitarian features. In the mid-fifties Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brezinski, key proponents of this model, pointed to the following as key features of the totalitarian state: an official ideology binding on all members of society; a single mass party; a system of police control; the near-monopoly of control by the state of all means of mass-communication and of all means of armed combat and the centralised control and direction of the entire economy. Other theorists have also cited the following as features of the totalitarian state: the administrative control of the courts; the party's claim to have a monopoly upon the truth; an hierarchical structure of politics; intolerance of oppositional concepts; a simplistic view which eliminates whatever does not fit the theory and the concept that the end always justifies the means (1). According to this model, all the goals of state are identical with the goals of society and society has no goals other than those of the state. The totalitarian state therefore denies autonomy to the individual, his
private wishes, his judgement, his conscience and his moral responsibility (2).

The theorists who use this model argue that totalitarian societies are totally political societies. All areas of life are politicised, even the private sphere, which, it is argued, in Western liberal democracies is unpolitical (3). The role of the individual is reduced to that of a subordinate (Untertan) of this society and nanny-state (Vormundstaat) (4). The individual in such societies is totally controlled in all aspects of his life, even the most intimate, and in all his capacities by the state. The following is a typical example of this view:

For what is totalitarianism, if not this... regarding of the individual as swallowed up completely, without any remainder, in the citizen or the subject, this denial of any autonomy other than the state's? The total state seeks to regulate every activity, from poetry and philately to sexual intercourse (5).

According to the totalitarian model, the elimination of all competing groups within the system means that the state becomes ultimately responsible for everything which happens within its borders and the individual concomitantly totally dependent upon the state (6). The philosopher Leszek Kolakowski argues that totalitarian states tend totally to dispossess the individual in both a material and mental sense, thereby transforming him into state property and eliminating all traces of individuality and the private sphere (7). According to Kolakowski, the goal of Marxist-Leninist ideology:

...geht über die Beherrschung und Steuerung des persönlichen Lebens eines jeden einzelnen hinaus bis zu dem Punkt, wo sie im Grunde das persönliche Leben gänzlich ersetzt, die Menschen zu Kopien ideologischer Parolen erniedrigt. Mit anderen Worten: Sie vernichtet die individuelle Lebensform (8).

In his view, the system functions as long as the regime merely
requires passive obedience on the part of the individual, but fails as soon it needs his personal commitment in times of crisis (9).

In most descriptions of totalitarian society the individual is treated as a passive object of state control. Paradoxically, however, according to the classic totalitarian model the individual is also continually subjected to political pressure to publicly demonstrate his loyalty to the state (10).

Some theorists equate communism with anti-individualism. Jean-Paul Picaper for instance argues that whereas fascism was the irrational, new romantic form of anti-individualism, communism is its rational, organised, more stable and impenetrable form (11).

The concept of a ruled society is very similar to the totalitarian model. According to this concept, the ruling party directs all members of society and all aspects of social life. Furthermore, free political discussion is not possible within the ruling party itself. Party members are told what to discuss and the role of the lower ranks is merely to report on the execution of orders from above (12).

There is considerable doubt about the concept of a totally ruled society as it deals with the relationship between the party and the members of society. From the mid-eighties onwards the concept of a totally ruled society also seemed out of date and increasingly irrelevant for the study of Eastern Europe. According to White, both the totalitarian and modernisation theorists have accepted most of the assumptions of the 'directed society' image of communist states, the central element being a small, monolithic and monopolistic party directing all aspects of society with little
reference to the views and wishes of its members. He rightly argues that even the general public in these states can boycott unwanted goods or engage in other forms of protest (13). He writes that the adherents of the totalitarian theory and 'directed society' concept take a simplistic view of policy progress. They believe that communist regimes have simple policies, giving their priority to economic growth. Writing in the early eighties, White, however, points to the fact that political leaderships are often unsure of their priorities, or even divided into rival factions and that the various policies of the ruling party are increasingly complex and difficult to reconcile (14). White further argues that officials do not implement policies blindly and that the major institutions protect their own specific interests (15) and that, although the Soviet or East European policy process is not pluralistic, policies are not simply promulgated by the party and then implemented. The final outcome of the political process is negotiated and not imposed (16).

Maria Huber also rejects the concept of a 'directed society', given that there is a degree of debate, if limited, in the press and that the political system does not control all social processes. She notes that Soviet social scientists themselves indicate that professional and regional mobility and personal and political behaviour are relatively independent and spontaneous factors in their society, which the economic planners must take into consideration (17).

Flechtheim points to yet another problem regarding the relationship between the individual and society in so-called totalitarian states. What degree must there be of mobilisation, intervention or
manipulation for one to refer to a regime as totalitarian rather than authoritarian or autocratic? Strictly speaking, a regime can only be considered totalitarian if it constantly mobilises its citizens in order to maintain the exercise of totally centralised power and if it makes total claims upon the individual's time and life (18). However, as Dahrendorf noted in 1986, one finds only periodical mobilisation of communist populations, usually before key political political events such as party congresses. Furthermore, the party bureaucracy often seems more interested in maintaining the continuity and stability of the system than in mobilising the population (19).

Many Western observers pointed to the increasing apoliticism and emphasis upon the private sphere in East European states up to the end of the eighties. White writes that the move from monolithism and the shift towards more pragmatic politics in most East European states from the sixties onwards signified a more limited form of control over the individual and a restriction of the party's monopoly to the broad political sphere. One consequence of this was to withdraw party control from certain areas of life, especially the family, and to permit a range of individual choice in economic, if not in political matters (20). The individual, argued Dahrendorf, was no longer required to constantly reaffirm his ideological loyalty through compulsory rituals:

Wer nichts will und sich nicht beklagt, wird ja auch in autoritären Staaten meist in Ruhe gelassen (21).

The political apathy of the population in the public sphere is seen here as protecting the private life of the individual in these states (22).
1b. The pluralism or interest-group model

According to the pluralism or interest-group model, loosely defined interest groups made up of visible public figures such as politicians, scholars, bureaucrats and artists existed in the East European states. These groups often had institutional bases, but were sometimes only identifiable as a trend of opinion observable in the media (23). Gordon Skilling has suggested that they can influence public policy:

Sometimes the decisions of the rulers are taken as a result of the influence of groups and in a milieu of competing and conflicting tendencies. Leaders may 'respond' on occasion to the threats and the arguments of rival groups, favouring one over another, or seeking a compromise between their interests (24).

Gordon Skilling has also concluded that, apart from immediate policy impacts, public discussion by representatives of various interest groups may influence public opinion and the long-run climate of thinking (25).

In the late eighties the role of interest groups in Eastern Europe seemed to become particularly significant given that some socialist countries were trying to increase popular influence on political decisions and the levels of political participation, whilst simultaneously keeping firm control over the system's organisations and interest groups. In this period the Western media predicted the collapse of the communist regimes and announced the breaking out of pluralism in Eastern Europe. In the Frankfurter Rundschau Harry Schleicher referred to a move towards 'an autonomous social pluralism' (26). In 1988 The Economist announced that 'pluralism is breaking out in Eastern Europe' and also referred to a hidden pluralism gradually becoming visible there (27). However, this was not a multi-party, free-election pluralism as practised in the
West, but a 'semi-pluralism' in the sense of a range of pressure groups and a half-open opposition (28).

Some Western theorists looked upon this officially sanctioned pluralisation of states such as Poland and Hungary as an attempt by their leaderships to quell unrest and to involve the opposition in unpopular decisions, forcing them to take joint responsibility for them. In other words, they implied that it was a method employed by the leaderships of retaining power in an increasingly difficult situation (29).

However, many theorists took the almost contradictory view that this kind of drive for political democratisation and pluralism was ultimately incompatible with the monopoly of power appropriated by the communist party and exercised according to the principle of democratic centralism (30). In other words, they perceived a basic conflict between a ground swell struggle for political pluralism and the above-mentioned totalitarian features of the political system in East European states. They argued that if this system allowed pluralism in any corner of society, the system would stop being totalitarian (31).

The question of political reform was of course particularly difficult for the GDR due to the existence of the other German state. Wolfgang Seiffert wrote that the Honecker leadership dared not speak of a democratisation process in the GDR, because it suggested that what had hitherto existed there was not democracy. It was argued that if the GDR became more like its Western neighbour, this would undermine the grounds for its separate existence (32). In the late eighties the GDR was closer to the conservative end of a continuum scale of interest group
articulation in East European states (33).

Although under Honecker the SED clearly rejected the concept of pluralism, as will be seen in chapter two, some SED theorists did refer to the stage of GDR development in the eighties as a phase in which the population's influence on the leadership was increasing. In this period the mass organisations of the GDR were encouraged to represent and integrate specific group interests into the wider social interest, rather than merely being monolithic instruments of control (34).

Some theorists argue that the pluralism model, like the totalitarianism model, is based upon normative assumptions (35). Others concede that there are rivalries between the branches of bureaucracy and varying degrees of specialist influence in the policymaking process in the communist system, but they also point to a supreme, unifying super-bureaucracy, the party apparatus, holding the whole structure together, the lack of a significant political opposition, of free trade unions and of organisations which do not serve the implementation of the regime's interests (36). The critics of the pluralist model therefore argue that, although an approach to the study of East European states should take into consideration the role of bureaucratic and group interests and popular pressures, to define communist states as pluralist stretches this concept too far and minimises the differences between the social systems (37).

This led to some Western theorists asking whether the corporatist model was more valid for the study of East European states, since it provides for specific interests to participate in the policy process without assuming the existence of equal competition between
autonomous political groups (38). Hough seems to have moved in the
direction of a corporatist, or at least a qualified pluralist
model. He refers to 'institutionalised pluralism', defined as a
political process taking place within an institutional framework.
In other words, those seeking to exert influence must work through
the official channels, i.e. the various social and party
organisations (39). The various organisations are designated for
this purpose by the party and state authorities. One of this
model's components is the willingness of the political leadership
to listen to policy advice from society and to permit a far-ranging
public discussion of policy questions (40).
lic. The bureaucratic politics model

The bureaucratic politics model focuses upon the dominant role of the communist party and upon its leadership. The theorists who use this model point to the absence of competitive elections and of effective instruments of control and to the wide powers exercised by the ruling communist party. Unlike the totalitarian theory, this model suggests that competition exists within the party and the other bureaucratic organisations which collectively administer the state.

In the eighties Weber referred to the GDR system as 'bureaucratic-dictatorial communism', as opposed to revolutionary and reform communism (41). Some theorists referred to the GDR as an authoritarian regime (42). Ludz, for example, adopted Rensis Likert's term 'consultative authoritarianism' for the ruling system in the GDR, given that there was a significant proliferation of consultative and control bodies (43). Other theorists use the concept of 'efficient authoritarianism'. According to this concept, in East European societies interest articulation is only allowed within the party through the bureaucratization of major interests; party-run mass 'participation' techniques and the cooptation and consultation of the professional and technical elites (44). Unlike the totalitarian model, the authoritarian model does not imply the strict control of all aspects of the individual's life by the state and ruling party (45). Another group of theorists rejects the concepts of totalitarian, authoritarian and autocratic rule as either inaccurate or too vague to be useful (46).
The convergence, industrialisation and modernisation models

At the end of the sixties Raymond Aron published key articles on industrial society in Western and Eastern Europe entitled '18 Vorlesungen über die industrielle Gesellschaft'. Here he argued that the requirements of growth create a range of similarities in all modern industrial societies: the role of labour and profession; the central importance of economic businesses and the dominance of certain social groups. He argued that the social differences between states could be largely explained in terms of the stage they have reached in terms of the modernisation process (47). This provided the basis of the convergence and other similar models.

The adherents of these models argue from the basic premise that the greater degree of social and economic development, the more complex are the decisions that have to be taken by government, the wider the expertise that has to be taken into account, the greater the devolution of decision-making from the centre and the less appropriate the instruments of coercion and command. According to these models, the populations of Eastern Europe are increasingly urbanised and well educated and thus increasingly sceptical of official Marxist-Leninist dogma. They are also increasingly able to protect their own interests through professional groups and associations. Jancar, Barghoorn, Rakowska-Harmstone and Lippman argue that this ultimately leads to the modification and transformation of communist systems and their political superstructures (48).

Similarly, some theorists argue that marketisation creates conditions which are more conducive to the struggle for political rights, because it makes people less economically dependent on the
state, and because it enhances opportunities for gaining better access to information and for learning to invoke rules against the abuses of authority (49).

The implication of the convergence theory was that industrialisation would lead to increased pluralism and diversity with the result that in East European states the ruling party would gradually lose its monopoly on power and be obliged to assume the role of a mediator between competing interests within society. It also claimed that the increased affluence produced by industrialisation would lead to a decline in the significance of ideology in these states (50). Convergence theorists predicted greater and more sophisticated demands of the population upon the political system and an increasing confidence on the part of the individual. They therefore foresaw a conflict between the political structures which imposed a rigidity upon these societies and these new developments (51).

Bleek and Sontheimer, however, argued that whereas Western industrialised societies were more orientated towards the individual as a customer, and their achievements were measured in terms of what they can do for his real/manipulated interests, GDR society had also been shaped by the demands of its political system, which was orientated towards the fulfilment of collective interests and the reconciliation of private and social interests. GDR society therefore did not allow the individual citizen as much political freedom as his counterpart in Western industrial society (52). Modernisation and similar theories, it is argued, underestimate the importance of politics in the East European system and the role of the interests of the political leadership as a factor of social change (53) and do not allow for the possibility
of a relative autonomy of the elements of traditional culture in modern society (54).

Some theorists write that there is no proof of an explicit link between socio-economic and political change in East European states (55). They note, for example, that the greater economic independence of the individual from the state may well have the opposite consequence of promoting both non-political attitudes and the pursuit of strictly private interests, particularly after a string of frustrating political experiences (56).
lie. The systems/functional analysis approach

Within the systems/functional framework the focus is upon the possible input influences of interest groups. Unlike the pluralism model, it did not presume that interest groups in socialism were voluntary associations, but that they operated in a very structured context under the firm control of the ruling Communist party. Unlike the totalitarian model, this approach also presumed that the state lacked total control. Scholars spoke of a 'relative autonomy' of the state because there were influences on the government and different points of view and influences within the government and the ruling party. In other words, there was a diffusion of influence, if not of power (57). Mallinckrodt concluded that in the eighties there were intensifying and multiple influences on policymaking and at the same time official theorists were repeatedly calling for a more active public input to develop socialist democracy (58).

One advantage of the systems/functional approach is that it allows for an interdisciplinary approach. Mallinckrodt used it to develop a political sociology of literature, considering this conceptual framework a useful aid for collecting information otherwise not generally available about the GDR (59). Another advantage is that the systems/functional model allows one to focus upon change, the interdependencies within the system and the sources of pressure for sociopolitical change (60). It can also suggest how these pressures make themselves felt and show some of the results (61).
lif. The political culture model

In the early seventies there were increasing efforts to apply political culture analysis to communist culture by theorists such as Archie Brown, Stephen White and Robert Tucker. In his key work Political culture and change in communist states (1977) Brown writes that political culture expresses the subjective dimension of politics; that is perceptions, beliefs and knowledge. Whilst he excludes behaviour from his definition of political culture, Brown uses behaviour to infer the attitudinal content of political culture. Krisch believes that this is a sensible approach, given the relative inaccessibility of survey research findings from these states (62).

Brown cites four major components of political culture: previous political experience; values and fundamental political beliefs, that is the degree of attachment to security, liberty, independence, egalitarianism, individualism, collectivism, or paternalism and to beliefs concerning the efficacy of the individual in relation to the political process; foci of identification and loyalty and political knowledge and expectations. This last component includes what people know or perceive of their own political system and its policy outcomes and what they know of alternative political systems. Relevant factors here are the degree of freedom in mass media; the extensiveness of contact with Western societies and the popularity of foreign broadcasts. Expectations can also include expectations of certain norms of political behaviour, of the decision-making process and of policy outcomes (63).

Theorists who use the political culture concept distinguish between
the elite/official and mass/dominant political cultures. The official political culture is based upon the values of the official, Marxist-Leninist ideology and continually promoted by the political leadership through the mass media, education system and other agencies of socialisation. The dominant political culture is based upon the privately held values and beliefs held by the majority of the population (64).

Using this new concept of political culture, most theorists presume two-way flows of influence between the official and dominant cultures (65). Theorists see the dominant political culture as a constantly changing mixture which affects and is in turn shaped by official policy (66). Mallinckrodt suggests that in 'maintenance'–oriented political systems such as the GDR after 1971, sociopolitical changes offered from the top down are primarily changes of political form, whereas changes in content come chiefly, albeit slowly, as demands from the political culture base of the system up to the decision-makers (67). These newer conceptualisations of political culture with their emphasis on the feedback function of the socio-political system no longer see citizens as passive or manipulated objects of the domestic political culture, but as participants, whose attitudes change in reaction to the objective conditions of their life and place in the system (68).

Some political cultural theorists further distinguish between elements which make up the dominant and non-dominant culture. The three important elements of GDR dominant culture were:

1. **Communist goal culture** which encompassed values such as social security; optimism; the acceptance of social and collective goals
and behaviour as preferable to private and individual ones; the
development of the socialist personality; the acknowledgement of
the SED's role as a director of all political action; extensive
personal involvement in social organisations under party guidance
and control (69)

2. **Industrial culture** which encompassed the goal of growth,
efficiency, consumerism and alienation

3. **Traditional culture** which encompassed subordination to the state
and the tradition of German Romanticism which incorporated the
tradition of a non-political culture (70).

The important elements of non-dominant culture in the GDR were:

1. **Oppositional culture** which usually combined a collectivised
means of production with guarantees of individual liberties

2. **Alternative culture** which was typically the search for other
forms of existence than socialism (71).

In the eighties many Western observers wrote about the emergence of
an alternative political culture. Rüdiger Thomas spoke of the
development of an 'Alternativbewuβtsein' among GDR youth and of a
second culture (72). Volker Gransow pointed to a decline of
oppositional political culture and the rise of an alternative
political culture, which he called 'antipolitical politics' (73).
Christiane Lemke referred to the emergence of a new political
counter-culture which resembled the new social movements in the
West (74). Lemke saw this as part of an alternative political
culture which was quite different from earlier opposition and
dissident activity. Similar ideas were also put forward by GDR
citizens who emigrated to the West, for example Guntolf Herzberg, Sascha Anderson and Hans Noll (75).

If one follows the concept of an alternative political culture to its logical conclusion with Czech dissidents, this leads to the concept of a parallel society (Benda) and of an independent life of society (Havel). Havel believed that this independent life of society was ultimately in basic conflict with the official political system (76).

The apparent confusion amongst theorists in the eighties as to whether the alternative culture was a new form of opposition indicated for Woods the possibility of a political conflict emerging from the new forms of critical activity and the possibility of a continuity with traditional forms of opposition (77). He noted that the new alternative movements in the GDR were returning to the classic themes of the opposition such as the defence of human rights and political freedoms and the elimination of political censorship (78).

The debate over whether the emergent alternative culture was a new form of opposition in the GDR was not merely a question of semantics, but had implications for the view of the individual and society. As Woods and Krisch point out, the classic opposition models imply politics based upon confrontation; that is a conflict between the individual and the state. In contrast, alternative culture models imply that the individual has a measure of freedom to go his own way and develop his own lifestyle (79).

According to Huntington and Domínguez, the political culture and political structure of a state are congruent when there is a high
degree of compatibility between the political roles and structures on the one hand, and the central political values of the system on the other. Political change occurs when the congruence between the political culture and structures erodes or breaks down (80). Increased congruence increases the regime's legitimacy by improving the 'fit' of attitudes and structures (81).

Western theorists have therefore suggested that whereas in the immediate post-revolutionary period a revolutionary regime attempts to replace the traditional political culture with a new official communist culture, in a later period it is often forced to reabsorb elements of traditional culture and other political cultures in order to maintain its legitimacy (82). According to Gransow and Krisch, in the Honecker period the SED used its cultural policy to integrate various elements of culture in the GDR in order to strengthen the official communist culture. Certain elements of the industrial and traditional cultures such as consumerism and the concentration upon the private sphere were, for example, absorbed under the rubric 'satisfaction of needs' (83). Traditional Prussian/Protestant values were also relatively compatible with the Marxist-Leninist concepts of activism and of a balance between rights and duties (84). Elements of non-dominant cultures could be integrated under the rubric 'development of socialism'. Thus, ideas which were initially parts of oppositional culture and labelled 'revisionist' often later became part of the dominant culture.

Some elements of other political cultures, however, could not be so easily reconciled with the official culture and were therefore repressed by the political leadership. In this context, Gransow pointed to the SED's suppression of non-Marxist-Leninist ideas such
as individualism and pluralism and its denunciation of alternative lifestyles as petit-bourgeois (85).

Western theorists, however, generally agree that GDR cultural policy was relatively unimpressive as far as strengthening the communist goal culture was concerned (86). Gransow believed that the communist goal culture was losing its hegemonic power as the industrial, traditional and alternative political cultures were strengthened (87). Brown points to how the ruling communist party was often unsuccessful in decisively influencing the private sphere. Gransow also pointed to the beginning of a merger between the remnants of oppositional culture and the alternative culture of the 'new social movements'. Brown took the view that these movements asserted 'private' ways of life and identities in a political way (88).

Writing in 1987 and 1986 respectively, the theorists Gransow and Krisch pointed to three future options for official cultural policy:

1. It could strengthen ties between different parts of the dominant culture. However, this meant that the non-communist elements of dominant political culture would become even more influential in the GDR. The indirect promotion of non-communist elements of dominant culture could lead to an unpredictable and, from the point of view of the SED leadership, not wholly acceptable outcome. Promotion of the industrial culture could, for example, lead to a non-quiescent political style or a retreat from public life, both of which were ultimately incompatible with the official interpretation of individual participation in social and political affairs (89).
2. It could adopt the issues of alternative groups and form coalitions with them. However, this might alienate the consumerist element of the GDR population.

3. It could promote the communist culture on its own. However, if this was strictly enforced, it would provoke the intelligentsia and cause increased unrest among the post-industrial alternative movements (90). DeBardeleben warned that a greater emphasis on Marxist-Leninist values could lead to a principled opposition and also make political cynicism more likely (91). Continual official emphasis upon the need for participation and individual initiative could lead to pressure for more autonomous forms for participation (92).

The political culture model can be used to explain political change in East European states. The extent to which alternative and traditional values are accommodated within the official political culture determine whether political culture and structures are congruent and the extent and/or direction of political change (93).

The distinction made between the official communist culture and other political cultures is also useful in explaining why, for example, contrary to official propaganda, the socialist personality did not develop in East European states. It also allows for a certain autonomy of the individual from the state.

Many Western theorists underlined the significance of pre-war German traditions and war and post-war experiences for GDR political reality (94). They pointed to the Prussian tradition of austerity and self-sacrifice on the part of the individual for the
well-being of the whole and a certain submissiveness towards the state (95). This focus upon the influence of tradition and history upon political culture is an obvious advantage of the political culture model over the modernisation model.

Barrington Moore argues that if so much is done to people with the aim of changing their value system and yet the official values are not internalised by a majority of the population, there are some grounds for scepticism about the malleability of political culture. Brown's countercriticism is that institutional structures and even overt patterns of political behaviour can apparently be changed much faster than political cultures, so a revolutionary change in the political system can lead to a dissonance between the political culture and the political system (96).

A major criticism of the political culture approach is the difficulty of obtaining accurate information about the beliefs and values of East European populations and therefore of distinguishing which culture is dominant. Brown, however, suggests that this problem can be overcome by the discriminating use of survey data collected within the communist states by citizens of those states and by using creative literature:

Creative literature, for example, gains in importance in any state which operates a literary censorship, since it is frequently easier to include social observation of popular beliefs, values and knowledge in the form of 'fiction', where the author's personal attitudes to the views expressed are less easily identified than in more overtly socio-political writings (97).

In summary, the political culture approach encourages interdisciplinary study, and this will be a feature of this thesis.

To conclude, Western models have been concerned with the extent of
control from above and autonomy and influence from below. They deal with the relationship between the individual and society when they posit either total, centralised control of every aspect of the individual's life or else a measure of autonomy, even pluralism in actually existing socialism.

This thesis will examine debates on the individual and society conducted by intellectuals inside and outside the official political system. It will therefore examine the models described above for what they have to say about the scope for debate and discussion. An examination of the debates and discussions on the individual and society will indicate which of the models is the most appropriate and fruitful for the analysis of the relations of the individual and society in the GDR.
Footnotes


8. ibid., p.8.

9. ibid., p.8.


14. ibid., p.146.

15. ibid., p.170.

16. ibid., p.170. Similarly, Dahrendorf argues that the
nomenclatura is so large that they can not be totally controlled, R. Dahrendorf, 'Wandel, Annäherung – und der entscheidende Unterschied', Die Zeit, July 4, 1986, p.3.


20. White, Gardner, Schöpflin, Communist political systems, pp.54, 145 - 146.


22. White, Gardner, Schöpflin, Communist political systems, pp.54, 145 - 146.


25. ibid., p.391.


27. 'Eastern Europe rumbles', The Economist, April 2, 1988, 11 - 12 (p.12).

28. ibid., p.11.

29. 'Packeis aufgetaut', Der Spiegel, 43 (no.8, 1989), 148 - 149 (p.149); 'Kommunisten wollen Dialog', p.2; A. Korbonski, 'Poland', in Rakowska-Harmstone, Gyorgy, Communism in Eastern Europe, 37 - 70 (p.59).


31. 'The Gorbachev factor', Time, June 8, 1987, 4 - 13 (p.11); see also von Berg, Marxismus-Leninismus, p.12; Mieczkowski, 'Studien über Staatsbewußtsein', p.35.

32. 'The Gorbachev factor', p.11.

34. A. Mallinckrodt, The environmental dialogue in the GDR. Literature, church, party and interest groups in their socio-political context, University Press of America (Lanham, 1987), pp.8 - 9.


37. Brown, Gray, Political culture, pp.70 - 71; White, Gardner, Schöpflin, Communist political systems, p.171.

38. Brown and Gray, Political culture, p.75.

39. Cited in ibid., p.75.


Brown rejects the totalitarian, pluralist and corporatist conceptualisation of the Soviet system and adopts Shakhnazarev's view of the system, 'diversity within monism', Brown, Gray, Political culture, p.95. Skilling similarly refers to 'imperfect monism', cited in ibid., p.95.


44. Rakowska-Harmstone, 'Nationalism and integration', pp.319 - 320.


47. Cited by Dahrendorf, 'Wandel, Annäherung', p.3.

48. B. W. Jancar, 'Modernity and the character of dissent', in C.


55. White, Gardner, Schöpflin, Communist political systems, p.16.

56. Brus, 'Political pluralism and markets', pp.126 – 127

57. Mallinckrodt, The environmental dialogue, pp.7 – 8.

58. ibid., pp.155 – 156.

59. ibid., preface, vii.

60. ibid., p.7.


63. Brown, Political culture, pp.17 – 18.


65. L. Dittmer, 'Comparative communist political culture', Studies in Comparative Communism, 16 (Spring/Summer, 1983), 9 – 23 (p.13); White, Gardner, Schöpflin, Communist political systems, p.12;


68. ibid., p.13.

69. see Krisch, 'Changing political culture', p.46; Gray has gone as far as to suggest that there are perhaps two Communist Party political cultures: one surrounding the ideal of the socialist personality and the other the operational code of the hierarchical, self-perpetuating party enjoying a monopoly of political power, J. Gray, 'Conclusions' in Brown and Gray, *Political culture*, 253 – 272 (p.260).

70. V. Gransow, 'The political culture of pop music in the GDR', *GDR Monitor* (no.17, Summer 1987), 30 – 47 (p.30).

71. ibid., p.30.


74. C. Lemke, 'Politics and political culture in the GDR', draft paper for *Journal of communist studies*.


77. Woods, 'Opposition or alternative political culture', p.168.

78. ibid., p.167.

79. ibid., p.165; Krisch, 'Changing political culture', p.51.

80. Cited by Krisch, 'Changing political culture', p.44.

81. ibid., p.44.

82. ibid., p.50.


86. ibid., p.32; Krisch, 'Changing political culture', p.41.
87. Gransow, 'The political culture of popmusic', p.34.
88. Brown, Political culture, p.5.
91. DeBardeleben, The Environment, pp.61, 190.
93. ibid., p.45.
96. Brown, Political culture, p.4; Mallinckrodt, The environmental dialogue, p.154.
97. Brown, Political culture, p.11.
Chapter Two. The official view of the individual in actually existing socialism

In this chapter I will outline the official GDR view of the individual and changes in that view during the Honecker period. The main sources for this chapter are Einheit, the SED journal for the theoretical study of socialism, and a range of reference works.

21a. The official definition of concepts relating to the individual

How did the leading SED theorists define the individual? Official GDR sources variously referred to the individual as 'Individuum', 'Mensch' and 'Persönlichkeit' and underlined the social character of the individual (1):

Der Mensch als Individuum ist kein isoliertes auf sich gestelltes Einzelwesen, wie der bürgerliche Individualismus behauptet, sondern lebt stets in und mit der Gesellschaft und ist von ihr abhängig (2).

The reference here to a dependence of the individual on the society (abhängig) indicates the subordination of the individual to society.

Marxist-Leninist philosophy held that in any historic period the method of producing material goods and living conditions essentially determined the development and actions of the individual. Therefore the needs, abilities and the freedom of the individual were a product of social relations and did not stem from an abstract concept of man. However, the individual was not merely a passive object moulded by his environment. The development of individual abilities, needs and actions and the production of social relations were indivisibly linked. Work was necessarily of a social nature. To survive, the individual had to exist within and through society. Material production thus formed the basis for and
conditioned the unity of the individual and society.

Social relations and conditions did not exist independently of the individual, but the forces and relations of production were 'different aspects of the development of the social individual' (Marx). Society was not merely the sum of all individuals, but expressed the totality of the relations existing, the interaction between these individuals (3).

Thus it was argued that society was not a separate, coexisting, all-powerful force which dominated the individual. However, it was conceded that in practice the individual might perceive society as something separate from him and temporarily become isolated from society (4). It followed that the individual could subjectively perceive that certain of his interests differed from the general social interest.

It was argued that in capitalism the dialectic unity of the individual and society assumed the form of an antagonism arising from the antagonism between the individual and his living conditions, determined by the methods of production (5). In socialism, with this antagonism overcome, there was a new quality of relations between the individual and society based upon a coincidence of social and individual interests.

The last of the three terms referring to the individual, 'Persönlichkeit', stressed the social quality of the individual, largely ignoring the biological, physical characteristics of the individual, except where they influenced, or were themselves the product of environmental factors (6). The Wörterbuch der marxistisch-leninistischen Soziologie (1977) defined the concept of 'Persönlichkeit' as the:
soziale Bestimmung des menschlichen Individuums als Repräsentant, individuelle Daseinsweise und Subjekt gesellschaftlicher Verhältnisse und produktiver Kräfte (7).

According to this reference-work, the term 'Persönlichkeit' emphasised that the individual was an active being which shaped society and nature. In this process he changed himself, therefore his social characteristics were constantly changing. The individual was not born a 'personality', but developed into, and as a personality through social activity, education, training and absorbing the cultural traditions of his society.

As a social being the individual actively shaped his environment and gave a concrete form to essential subjective forces. Thus he changed the object of his activity, the activity itself and himself. The characteristics of the object of his activity and the social forces and experiences accumulated in the means by which he dominated the object were acquired by the individual in this process in the form of new strengths and skills. In this sense the personality was the measure in which the individual appropriated his objective social being and actively expressed it in the form of his subjective capabilities, interests and needs. Personality development was a process of individualisation and socialisation in which the individual individualised his objective social existence and socialised his subjective forces. The important point about this definition of the relations between the individual and society was that it stressed the interaction between the two and the fact that both were in a constant state of flux.

The socialist personality was officially deemed to be the typical form of individual in socialism and fundamentally different from individuals found in other socio-economic formations. Features of
the socialist personality included internationalism, discipline, a belief in the inevitability of the victory of socialism over capitalism and the necessity of the leading role of the working class, respect for one's fellow man, a high level of education and training and a desire to play an active role in the community and at work (8).

The setting-up of one type of 'personality' valid for all individuals in GDR society reflected the concept of a growing coincidence of all sets of interests within GDR society, despite the admission that specific characteristics such as one's job, education, training, age, sex and one's social experience led to differences in the intensity and the extent to which the essential features of the socialist personality were found in an individual.

The determining factors and features of socialist personality development and its main characteristic, the all-round development of the individual, were deemed to be constantly changing. This meant in practice that the SED could always redefine the concept in such a way as to best meet the political and economic exigencies of the moment. The development of the socialist personality on a mass scale was deemed to be one of the driving forces of social development. It was therefore considered a major task of the state and party organs to create conditions in which the individual could develop into a socialist personality.

It was argued that the extent to which an individual could develop his 'biogenetic features', his skills and knowledge was fundamentally determined by the type of society in which he lived. Whereas capitalist society was deemed to block the development of individuality and deform it through exploitation, incomplete
education and training, intellectual repression and manipulation, socialism was considered to be the first social order to provide the necessary conditions in which the individual could begin to achieve his full potential.

In all official definitions of the term individual emphasis was laid upon the social nature of and the social influences upon the individual. It is however significant that whereas the 1967 edition of the Kleines Wörterbuch der marxistischen Philosophie totally ignored the hereditary factors influencing the individual's development, editions of reference works published after 1971 referred to them, whilst continuing to stress the primacy of environmental factors.

GDR theorists violently reacted to charges from the West of a loss of individuality, the disappearance of the individual into the grey, anonymous mass, to charges of 'Vermassung', 'Gleichmacherei', 'Gleichförmigkeit', 'Uniformierung' in socialism. They were at pains to point out that individuality and collectivity were a dialectical unity, that both the individual and society benefited from the development of individuality:

Die Individualität des einzelnen wird in der sozialistischen Gesellschaft gesetzmäßig in dem Maße reicher, wie er die produktiven Erfahrungen der ganzen Gesellschaft, die Errungenschaften der Wissenschaft, Technik und Kultur und den Reichtum der neuen gesellschaftlichen Beziehungen sich bewußt aneignet... Je besser er alle seine schöpferischen Anlagen bewußt ausbildet, je stärker er seine individuell-einmaligen produktiven Fähigkeiten und Talente gesellschaftlich zur Wirksamkeit bringt, um so mehr bereichert er damit gerade durch die Ausprägung seiner nur ihm eigenen Individualität die ganze sozialistische Gesellschaft (9).

Collectivity was deemed not to imply a 'devaluation' of individuality, but to provide the individual with greater scope to
develop his varied interests, talents and needs (10).

Theorists also stressed that the advanced socialist society of the GDR was not homogeneous (11). They argued that the very biological uniqueness of the individual and his unique way of reacting to natural and social influences guaranteed differences between individuals and would continue to do so, even in conditions of complete social equality such as would exist in communism (12). The legal theorist Eberhard Poppe pointed out that the inclusion of the productivity principle, 'from each according to his abilities, to each according to his work', in Article 2 of the GDR constitution recognised individuality, in other words that a range of needs, interests and attitudes existed in GDR society (13).

It was asserted that, provided that the individual's activities were not directed against society and that the individual did not withdraw from society, he had a wide scope within which to develop his personality:

*Unterschiedliche Interessen und Neigungen sind ein belebendes Element der gesellschaftlichen Entwicklung. Allerdings können gegen den Sozialismus gerichtete Aktivitäten oder auch nur gesellschaftliche Passivität nicht toleriert werden, aber innerhalb des Spektrums zwischen guter Arbeit und sinnvoller Freizeitbeschäftigung gibt es eine große Vielfalt von Differenzierungen, die Raum für unterschiedliche Persönlichkeitsentwicklungen im Rahmen der Normen, Prinzipien und Werte des Sozialismus geben (14).*

It is clear, however, that the individual was encouraged to develop those skills or modes of behaviour which were considered the most useful to society. The *Kulturpolitisches Wörterbuch* (1978) referred for example to the task of political socialisation as forming 'socially important features and modes of behaviour' (15).
As has already been seen, the official GDR view rejected the notion that individuality can develop outside society:

Individualitätsentfaltung ist...mit der Fixierung des Einzelnen auf eine private d.h. eine begrenzte Lebenssphäre, unvereinbar; sie ist vielmehr stets an die persönliche aktive Aneignung des Beziehungsreichtums der Gesellschaft durch den einzelnen gebunden (16).

Hans Koch, Director of the Institute of Marxist–Leninist Culture and Arts and candidate member of the Central Committee, warned that any concept of the individual becoming emancipated in a moral world determined by values outside or against the political and economic spheres was utopian. He argued that such a concept was disastrous because it hindered social development (17).
2ib. The official view of interests in GDR socialism

The official concept of interests in GDR socialism reflected, indeed underpinned the view of relations between the individual on the one hand and the collective, society and the state on the other. The *Kleines Wörterbuch der marxistisch-leninistischen Philosophie* (1981) distinguished between four sets of objectively based interests in GDR society (18): the interests of society as a whole, (gesamtgesellschaftliche Interessen); class interests; group interests and individual interests.

In socialism the interests of society as a whole were considered to be not a sum of the interests of all members of society, but the essential and general aspect of their interests. As such they were directed towards social progress, that is they were the expression of the 'objective requirements of social development'. They were determined by the interests of the working class as it fulfilled its historic mission to build communism. Working-class interests were likewise objective interests, with which the other classes and strata increasingly identified with the development of socialism. Thus after 1971 official theorists referred to a growing 'political and moral unity of the people' (politische-moralische Einheit des Volkes). According to this view, all individuals in socialist society already objectively shared certain interests where basic questions were concerned; the need for a strong, dynamic economy, an improvement in living and working conditions and peace. The term 'Interessenübereinstimmung', a 'coincidence' or 'bringing together' of interests was used by GDR theorists to refer to the existence of common interests at this fundamental level. It was meant to convey
the essential, typical nature and particularly the harmony of the relations between the individual, society and the collective (19). The coincidence of basic interests supposedly had its objective political basis and expression in the SED's 'Bündnispolitik', its strategy of a political alliance of all classes and strata who had an objective interest in the building of socialism under the leadership of the SED. The partners of the SED in this alliance were the German Democratic Farmers Party (DBD), the Liberal Democratic Party of Germany (LDPD), the Christian Democratic Union of Germany (CDU) and the National Democratic Party of Germany (NDPD). They all unreservedly recognised the leadership of the SED and had the primary role of mobilising support for official policy amongst sections of the population who would not otherwise be inclined to support the SED.

After 1975 the SED permitted the allied parties to intensify their recruitment of new members (20). There was a further upgrading of the allied parties at the Tenth SED Party Congress in April 1981 when Honecker demonstratively stressed their role in actually existing socialism (21). By upgrading the role of these smaller parties and the social organisations the SED hoped to absorb a wide range of specific interests in GDR society. According to Poppe, the social organisations made possible the development of all the individual's forces and abilities and the satisfaction of his needs, as well as the realisation of the social interest (22).

It was argued that, given this objective political basis for a coincidence of interests, there could be no system-immanent opposition in the GDR (23). Manifestations of political opposition in the GDR were therefore largely attributed to hostile, external
forces.

The economic basis for the coincidence of basic interests in actually existing socialism was said to be the socialist ownership of the means of production. Increased production provided the basis for higher living standards and so benefited all members of society. Thus it was theoretically in the interest of the individual worker as well as to the common good if he maximised his productivity. The concept of economic planning in socialism was seen as the means with which the socialist economic interest was realised. As the Western theorist Thomas Baylis points out, it implied a 'unified public will' and suggested 'an authority based on social consensus and societal integration' (24).

Under Honecker the 'unity of social and economic policy' was used as a tool to persuade the individual that his economic interests were in line with those of society as a whole. The bonus system was designed to give the individual the material incentive to improve existing production methods, to innovate and take the initiative with a view to increasing his personal wealth and that of society as a whole. Although the performance principle seemed to accentuate already existing inequalities, it was defended on the grounds that it served to increase social wealth and so laid the basis for the development of society towards communism and for the all-round development of the individual. It was also argued that social policy partially mitigated social inequalities.

Policies such as the 'unity of social and economic policy' led Western theorists to talk of a social contract between the state and the population in socialist states, whereby the population recognised the political supremacy of the socialist party in
exchange for a certain level of economic and welfare benefits guaranteed by the state. GDR theorists themselves linked economic prosperity with political stability:

Je besser die Arbeits- und Lebensbedingungen sind, je wohler sich die Menschen in ihrer Stadt, in ihrem Heimatort fühlen, desto enger verbinden sie sich auch persönlich mit den gesellschaftlichen Aufgaben ihres Territoriums und mit der Politik ihres sozialistischen Staates (25).

The GDR's main economic policy in the eighties was to intensify the use of its resources, including manpower. If the individual was to increase his productivity, it was important that he subjectively perceive the 'objective' coincidence of decisive economic interests. Throughout the eighties it was increasingly asserted by official theorists that political education would play an increasing role here:

Es ist eine der wichtigsten Aufforderungen an die politisch-ideologische Massenarbeit in den achtziger Jahren, deutlich zu machen, daß weltanschauliche Überzeugungen und politische Klarheit ihre Entsprechung vor allem im Verhalten zur eigenen Arbeit und zum gesellschaftlichen Eigentum finden. Das schließt ein, dazu beizutragen, daß die Arbeit Schritt für Schritt zu einem entscheidenden Lebensbedürfnis wird und sich die Verantwortung des einzelnen für das Ganze sowie die sozialistische Einstellung zum gesellschaftlichen Eigentum festigen (26).

With Kurt Hager's public rejection of Ulbricht's concept of a 'socialist human community' (sozialistische Menschengemeinschaft) in 1971, declaring it to overestimate the closeness of the various classes and strata in GDR society, it was officially recognised that a variety of interests existed in the GDR (27). The fact that the term 'Interessenübereinstimmung' was always used in reference to the important questions facing socialist society implied that contradictions could exist between sets of specific interests on
less fundamental questions. These specific interests were related to factors such as class, age social group, gender, locality and job.

It is significant that the term 'Interessenidentität', implying a static identity of interests, was very rarely used in GDR sources, whereas the widely-used term 'Interessenübereinstimmung' incorporated an element of dynamism. It reflected the official view of an ongoing process to reconcile the various sets of interests (28). Hence the implication of temporary contradictions between the various sets of interests. However, by stressing the secondary and temporary nature of these contradictions, the official view minimised their significance.

In pre-1971 editions of GDR dictionaries entries relating to the concept of interests do not explicitly refer to the possibility of contradictions existing between interests. This is merely implied, as mentioned above, by the use of the term 'Interessenübereinstimmung'. However the 1981 edition of the Kleines Wörterbuch der marxistisch-leninistischen Philosophie not only explicitly mentions the existence of contradictions between the interests of the individual and of society as a whole in actually existing socialism, but also refers to them as a positive force of social development (29). This represented a shift in the official view which became apparent during the debate initiated by Kuczynski in the early seventies about the precise nature of interests in socialism. This will be examined in detail in chapter three.

It was the task of the party to create the conditions in which
contradictions between interests could be resolved so that socialist society could move onto a higher plane of development. It was in this sense that contradictions between sets of interests were seen as a motor of social development.

Official theorists argued that in the case of a contradiction between individual and social interests the former should be subordinated to the latter (30). This was based upon the argument that the party was objectively able to define the social interests which in the long term coincided with the objective interests of the individual.

As the vanguard of the working-class, the SED theoretically defined its objective interests, which in turn fundamentally coincided with the objective interests of the other strata, classes and indeed of the individual. In short, with its 'scientific' insight into the laws governing social development, the SED alone had, according to the official view, the capacity to define the objective, long-term, basic interests of all groups and individuals within GDR society. This view however presupposed a certain immaturity of the individual. It assumed that the individual, left to his own devices, was likely to have a subjective perception of his interests and thus had to be educated by the party to recognise where his 'objective' interests lay. Interests which deviated from those defined by the SED were seen as ultimately a threat to its supremacy. Thus, official theorists rejected the Western pluralist model for socialism, perceiving it to be not only an attack upon the concept of 'Interessenübereinstimmung', but also upon the leading role of the SED in GDR society (31).
Given the political risks associated with the official policy of giving more emphasis to the specific needs and interests of the individual, it was not surprising that the GDR leadership preferred to talk about an increasing differentiation rather than pluralism in GDR society and constantly stressed the differences between socialist and Western societies.

The concept of 'Interessenübereinstimmung' was the theoretical basis for the integration of the individual into society. Since the social interests were always given priority over the interests of the individual, the aim of the socialisation process was not so much to reach a compromise between the two sets of interests, which would have implied that they had equal status, as to establish the predominance of the social interest over the individual interest:


The socialist values to be acquired in the socialisation process therefore revolved around the identification with the collective at all levels. The discipline of the individual and his submission to the collective were built into the political system of the GDR. For example, the principle of democratic centralism governing the SED and the mass organisations incorporated the concept that all resolutions of higher organs were binding for those beneath them and that the minority, and hence the individual, should, in a disciplined fashion, fall into line with the decisions approved by
the majority.

Although collectivism was considered the norm for socialist society, after 1971 it was officially conceded that individualism was still firmly entrenched in the GDR (33), despite the fact that the 'objective' basis for individualism, the private ownership of the means of production (34), had almost disappeared in the GDR. The SED programme of 1976 made explicit reference to the need to intensify Marxist-Leninist propaganda in order to overcome 'egoism, individualism and other phenomena of bourgeois ideology' (35). Erich Mielke, Minister for State Security, stated that these bourgeois values still held by sections of the GDR population were exploited by Western states for propaganda purposes and were a breeding-ground for crime (36).
24c. The official view of human rights

As early as the beginning of the sixties GDR legal theorists, influenced by their Soviet colleagues, began to examine the legal position of the individual in detail. In the seventies this debate became more intensive with the international recognition of the GDR state. In 1973 the GDR joined the UN, thereby giving its implicit approval to the 1948 UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In the seventies it also ratified the 1966 UN Conventions on political, economic and social rights and signed the Helsinki Final Document. Given these developments and the fact that over the last decades the question of human rights became a focus of ideological conflict between East and West, GDR legal theorists were under increasing pressure to develop the socialist theory of human rights and, in Poppe's words, to 'mount an ideological offensive' against the West on the human rights issue (37). Furthermore, GDR theorists recognised that the development of human rights theory was an ongoing process. As another leading legal theorist, Hermann Klenner, pointed out in 1982, certain human rights questions, for example the problems regarding equality of opportunity for both sexes, overqualification and the resultant lack of fulfilment of the individual, still had to be resolved (38). Theorists argued that as the socialist system developed in the GDR, increasing attention would be paid to human rights issues (39).

In official pronouncements human rights were variously known as 'Menschenrechte' (human rights), 'Zivilrechte' or 'Bürgerrechte' (civil rights), 'Grundrechte' (basic rights) and 'Persönlichkeitsrechte' (personality rights), 'Grundrechte' and 'Menschenrechte' being the most commonly used. Although these terms
were sometimes treated as synonyms, they did vary slightly in meaning. When the term 'Menschenrechte' was used in the context of socialism it was to stress the humanism of this social order. In the *Kleines Politisches Wörterbuch* (1985) it is stated:

Ihnen (Grundrechte) gebührt die Bezeichnung Menschenrechte in voller Bedeutung dieses Begriffs, weil sie die unbehinderte Entwicklung aller Bürger im Staat zum Ziel haben, wie sie keine Ausbeutergesellschaft mit ihren staatlichen Grundrechten jemals verwirklicht hat noch verwirklichen kann (40).

Whereas the term 'Menschenrechte' referred to the relations between the individual and society, the term 'Bürgerrechte' specifically referred to the relations between the individual and state. The term 'Grundrechte' was used to stress the fact that these rights were fundamental to the individual and to distinguish them from other, less important rights of the individual.

The term 'Persönlichkeitsrechte' stressed the view that human rights were instruments with which the individual developed as a socialist personality. It emphasised the qualitatively new nature of rights in socialism. During the seventies this term was rarely used, but Honecker himself used it in the eighties. The *Wörterbuch zum sozialistischen Staat* (1974) also defined this term in a narrower sense as a group of rights which essentially protected the individual (41).

All GDR theorists recognised three groups of rights: socioeconomic, political and cultural rights. In theory these groups had equal status and were indivisible (42). However, in *Einheit* articles on the subject of human rights, particularly where comparisons between the realisation of human rights in socialism and capitalism were drawn, discussion largely centred upon socio-economic rights. Whilst postulating a unity of rights, official
legal theorists laid particular emphasis upon the realisation of socio-economic rights as a prerequisite for the realisation of other rights and thus implied a primacy of socio-economic rights:

Auch in punto Menschenrechte gilt die von Marx entdeckte "einfache" Wahrheit, "daß die Menschen vor allem essen, trinken, wohnen und sich kleiden, also arbeiten müssen, ehe sie um die Herrschaft streiten, Politik, Religion, Philosophie usw. treiben können". Sind die Rechte auf Arbeit, Wohnraum, Bildung, Gesundheit usw. nicht gewährleistet, dann bleiben eben viele in bürgerlichen Verfassungen festgeschriebene politische und auch persönliche Freiheitsrechte für die Werktätigen eine Farce, von der Wahrung der Würde der Persönlichkeit ganz zu schweigen (43).

According to the official view, whereas the Western concept of human rights was based upon the abstract, timeless, inherent dignity of man, upon the assumption that the individual was essentially in conflict with society and the state, the socialist view of human rights was based upon the assumption that man was a social animal, that his essential interests coincided with those of society. Indeed, human rights were considered to have primarily an integrative function in socialism:


In socialism the citizen was considered to have a measure of responsibility in ensuring the realisation of his rights. The human rights of the citizen were therefore inextricably linked with his basic duties vis a vis the state and society. GDR legal theorists often referred to a unity of rights and duties (45). The basic duties of the GDR citizen laid down in the GDR constitution included the following: the duty to secure peace and protect the
socialist fatherland, the duty to work, the duty of children and young people to attend school and training courses to prepare for working-life, the duty to protect and increase socialist property and the duty of parents to look after their children. Although not all basic duties could be directly linked with specific rights, many of those mentioned above were clearly a prerequisite for availing oneself of one's constitutional rights in socialism. There was, for example a clear linkage between the duty to attend school and to prepare oneself for working life and the right to work. Therefore the basic duties of the citizen outlined in the constitution were seen as a built-in guarantee for the realisation of human rights in the GDR.

According to the official view, basic rights were considered not to be fixed quantities, but to reflect relations between the individual and society or state at a given point of time:

Die Menschenrechte entsprechen den objektiven Bedingungen der jeweiligen Gesellschaft, ändern sich mit ihr und werden durch sie verändert (46).

GDR theorists postulated that the scope of human rights would be extended in the GDR as certain material and economic constraints disappeared with the development of socialism (47). Their scope would gradually be extended until the stage of communism was reached. According to Klenner, in communism the individual would have acquired the necessary values and human rights and it would therefore no longer be necessary to secure the all-round development of the socialist personality (48).

Given that human rights were rooted in the economic conditions of a specific society and reflected the fundamental interests of specific classes, the official view held that there could be no
simple, objective continuity between human rights in capitalism and socialism. Poppe, for instance, argued that 'socialist human rights' were not merely an extension, or even the final realisation of basic rights proclaimed in capitalism. In support of this argument he pointed to the series of socio-economic rights, notably the right to work, enshrined in socialist constitutions, which he claimed no Western constitution could ever guarantee or secure, given the economic conditions of capitalism (49). Although he admitted that certain human rights were similarly formulated in Western and socialist constitutions, he claimed that this similarity was purely of a superficial nature (50).
The official view of the private sphere

Although official theorists occasionally referred to the phenomena of apoliticism and consumerism in the GDR, they not surprisingly rejected the view that this represented a withdrawal into the private sphere. Publicly to have acknowledged the validity of this view would have been tantamount to acknowledging the failure of the socialisation process in the GDR and would have implied that the interests of the individual did not coincide with those of the state and society.

The official concept of a 'socialist way of life' (sozialistische Lebensweise) reflected the official view that the spheres of work and leisure were closely linked in socialist society. The 'unity of social and economic policy' made a linkage between productivity in the work sphere and the standard of living in the leisure sphere. One of the foremost functions of leisure time was seen as the relaxation and recuperation of the labour force. Furthermore, the socialist nature of collective relations and the propagation of socialist values in the work sphere were considered to have a positive influence upon the behaviour and actions of the individual in the private sphere.

The official theorists Gerd Fiedler, Günter Hoell and Rainer König stressed the importance of collectivity for the development of the socialist personality at work and leisure. They contrasted the principle of collectivity expressed in the slogan 'Work, learn and live the socialist way' (Sozialistisch arbeiten, lernen und leben) with 'bourgeois individualism'. For them, Western individualism was a demagogic programme to split the working class and transform it into a mass of egoistic 'Spießer' (51).
The official view was that, given the common ownership of the means of production and the socialist nature of work, there was no objective basis for an opposition between work and free time in socialist society (52). Similarly, it was argued that there was no social basis for the individual to 'drop out' of socialist society, for the implementation of socialist democracy meant that the individual felt needed in socialist society and was actively involved in social and political affairs. Political activity rather than apoliticism was considered to be the norm for GDR society (53).

Official theorists made it clear that free time was not to be equated with a 'private sphere' in the sense of a sphere free from the influence of the party and state. As the leading SED philosopher Wolfgang Weichelt argued, the existence of such a sphere would imply a (non-existent) dichotomy between 'rulers' and 'the ruled' in the GDR:

Es gibt also in der Tat keine 'statsfreie Sphäre', und es kann sie auch nicht geben, weil die Menschen im Sozialismus ihr eigenes gesellschaftliches und staatliches Zusammenleben gemeinsam selbst gestalten, es nicht 'von oben' gestaltet wird. Gerade in diesem Prozeß entfaltet sich die Individualität, die Persönlichkeit des Menschen nicht als eines gesellschaftsfremden, von ihr isolierten Einzelgängers, sondern als aktiver und bewußter Gestalter seines eignen und des Lebens der sozialistischen Gesellschaft (54).

The philosopher Alfred Kosing even went as far as to enclose the term 'private life' in quotation marks (55).

Given that the individual was a social being, it was argued, he could only live and develop his potential within society. The official SED position was therefore that the individual could not fully develop his personality in a private idyll:

A commentator in Einheit addressed the point that the majority of free time was spent in the private sphere. He made a distinction between the, in his view, negative trends of a 'cultural self-isolation' (kulturelle Selbstisolierung) and a 'private home-based culture' (private Heimkultur) on the one hand and the positive phenomenon of culture being a question of individual freedom and initiative and therefore promoted by the collective. He acknowledged that the negative trend of a 'private home-based culture' coexisted with and was sometimes in conflict with the cultural life of work and other collectives (57).

The SED was certainly not indifferent to how the individual spent his free time:

According to the official view, the party or work collective could legitimately intervene in all areas of the individual's life, even those such as personal relationships and family planning, generally regarded in the West as belonging to the most intimate sphere of the individual's private life. The *Kulturpolitisches Wörterbuch* (Berlin, 1978), for instance stated that:


In an *Einheit* article a leading GDR sociologist Herta Kührig argued that more propaganda was needed to make couples aware of the social interest when determining their family size:

Natürlich wird in der Familie nicht nach bevölkerungspolitischen Motiven, sondern nach individuellen Motiven entschieden. Die gesellschaftlichen Auswirkungen sind den meisten gar nicht bewußt; es wurde auch selten angeregt, darüber nachzudenken. . . Es wäre sicher keine unzulässige 'Einmischung in die Privatsphäre', wenn bei Kadergesprächen, und bei Festlegung von Kaderentwicklungsplänen auch solche Probleme eine Rolle spielen würden (60).

As stated above, the official view was that the spheres of work and leisure were interlinked in socialism. However, some GDR theorists conceded that there could be a separation between the public and private spheres, between work and free time for some people. Eberhard Mannschatz writing on the family concluded that a contradiction between the norms of the family and social norms could hinder child development and warned the reader that he could not afford to have a 'public' and 'private' opinion (61). Joachim Römer stated that the positive, socialist values developed in the work process were not automatically transferred to the sphere of
free time (62). He concluded from this that the political and social organisation in residential areas should be improved, but, more importantly, that the individual's needs for social communication and contact in his free time should be developed (63). In 1982, whilst repeating the official line of the primacy of the work sphere over that of leisure in terms of personality development, Otfried Arnold observed in Einheit that individuals dissatisfied at work tended to seek compensation for this in their leisure time (64). This phenomenon of compensatory activity was analysed by Bahro, Heuer and Dölling and this will be examined in chapters 3 and 4.

It is worth noting briefly specific developments in official thinking relating to the private sphere since they show that the SED revised policy to meet the interests of the individual in the private sphere in cases where no threat to its leading role was posed and where a relaxing of policy could conceivably help the SED to achieve its economic goals.

**Private home ownership**

Many GDR citizens dreamt of owning their own home. In November 1971 the state passed a 'Directive on the construction of private houses', thereby making this dream possible by providing substantial financial aid. This was followed by further directives by the Presidium of the Council of Ministers in June 1976 which simplified planning and building procedures and promoted the construction of private houses in rural areas. After 1971 approximately 12,000 small houses were built each year. In 1984 private housing accounted for 12% of all new housing, 55% of which
was in villages, 40% in small or medium-sized towns and 5% on the edge of large towns (65). In rural areas many people formed teams with friends and helped each other to build their own houses in their free time.

The authorities saw the construction of private houses as an important means of encouraging individuals to take the initiative in improving their housing conditions and as one element of their strategy to solve the GDR housing problem by 1990 (66).

Private agriculture and datscha-ownership
Privately owned and worked agricultural land in the GDR mainly consisted of a small number of small holdings and numerous allotments. Until 1977 only members of agricultural cooperatives and their heirs were permitted to farm privately owned land. In 1978 this right was extended to the increasingly large group of blue and white-collar workers. Privately owned land, although almost exclusively farmed in individuals' free time, was some of the most intensely farmed and most productive land in the GDR. It was economically significant in terms of meeting the food-needs of the population. In 1983 it accounted for the total GDR production of rabbit meat and honey, 40% of goose and egg production, 30% of wool, 13% of pork, 10% of beef, 40% of fruit and 20% of vegetables (67).

The allotment would seem to have been an anachronism in a socialist society and an industrial society tending towards agriculture on a mass-scale, industrial farming processes and specialised units. In Hermann Kant's novel Die Aula (1965) a teacher looking out of his window at allotments comments:
Wir sehen uns fast eingeschlossen von einer Obstbaumsiedlung, von Laubensiedlungen, von kleinbürgerlichem Besitz (68).

In 1979 the DDR-Handbuch stated that the basis of GDR agricultural policy was:

die Überwindung der einzelbäuerlichen Wirtschaftsweise sowie der damit verbundenen Denk- und Handlungsweisen und der schrittweise Übergang zur genossenschaftlichen und industriemäßigen Produktion (69).

Nevertheless, allotments were extremely popular in the GDR. By 1977 one in eight families had an allotment and 10,000 more families were on the waiting-list for one (70).

In the early seventies Koch noted that a 'humanist relationship of the individual with nature' was an important element of the socialist personality. For this reason he welcomed the popularity of gardening, breeding small animals and trips to the countryside in the GDR. However, he advocated improving the access to the countryside and improving public institutions such as parks and zoological gardens rather than increasing the number of allotments to satisfy these obvious needs of the GDR population (71). In 1986 Kurt Hager made the following statement in an interview with the Western journalist Theo Sommer:

Warum soll der Mensch nicht eine Datsche haben? ein bestimmtes Publikum bei Ihnen sieht darin etwas völlig Antisozialistisches. Ich sehe darin etwas Selbstverständliches (72).

During the Honecker period the official view therefore seemed to shift to accommodate the widespread interest owning an allotment or weekend house (datscha) in the country.

In the eighties GDR economists began to argue that private agricultural production on a small scale was ideologically acceptable since it was usually carried out by workers as a
secondary activity or by otherwise non-working members of GDR society, that is pensioners and housewives and by families for themselves. As such, they argued, it was not an anachronism in a socialist society and was moreover a useful contribution to the economy. Agricultural cooperatives and industrial concerns should therefore encourage their members to increase their private production of foodstuffs (73). In this period private food-producers received new incentives from the leadership. They were, for example, permitted to sell their produce at markets for up to 10% over the normal stipulated shop prices.

The SED leadership nevertheless seemed to devise a strategy for ensuring at least partial political control over this sphere. Gardeners and small animal breeders were organised in the Verein der Kleingärtner, Siedler und Kleintierzüchter (VKSK), which had 1,050,000 members in 1984. All local gardening associations were subsumed in the VKSK, which formulated goals, distributed information and materials and issued directives, often liaising with the Academy of Sciences. The local associations organised social events such as parties and voluntary work on community projects. In summary, Moray McGowan, in my opinion, has neatly encapsulated the official strategy towards the widespread interest in the ownership of a datscha or allotment as follows:

To escape the near-omnipresence of the state, the GDR citizen flees to his Kleingarten. But the state does not really try to bring him back. Instead it leapfrogs him, to stand on the far side with open arms, ready to receive as contribution to the common wealth the economic and social fruits of the citizen's essentially privately motivated productive energy... This game of leapfrog on the people's potatoes is one model, though not of course the only one, of the relationship between the ordinary individual and the state in the GDR (74).
Private businesses

At the Fifth Party Congress of the SED Ulbricht announced the imminent collectivisation of the private sector of the economy. In the following three years the number of craftsmen fell dramatically by 30,000, causing a squeeze on certain customer services. In the sixties the authorities encouraged traders to join together to form 'production cooperatives of traders' (PGH). With the exception of bakers, traders who wished to continue working for themselves found it almost impossible to get official permission to train apprentices or acquire a new workshop. The remnants of private ownership of the means of production in the GDR were almost eliminated in the nationalisation campaign of 1972. As a result of this action private and semi-nationalised concerns accounted for a mere 4.2% of the net product of manufacturing industry, trades and the construction industry in 1973, as opposed to 17.2% in 1971 (75). Articles 12 (paragraph 1) and Article 14 of the revised GDR constitution also made it clear that the private sector was to play only a minor role in the GDR economy.

However, as a former GDR economist Hermann von Berg has noted, the GDR leadership was soon forced by growing consumer demands to drop its ideological reservations and revise its policy towards private businesses (76). A decision taken by the Council of Ministers on 12 February 1976 referred for the first time to a deliberate policy of promoting private small businesses, restaurants and tradesmen in the interest of improving consumer services. By 1978 the number of private tradesmen had risen to 85,218, the highest since the founding of the GDR. A year later private tradesmen accounted for over half the total turnover of GDR tradesmen (77). In 1982 the
view that private tradesmen and craftsmen were a relic of a capitalist past was rejected in the journal *Wirtschaftswissenschaft* as 'sectarian' (78).

**Sport**

Official sports policy was geared towards discovering talent early in young people and encouraging the wider sections of the population to actively participate in sports activities. Regular sports training was deemed to be both in the individual's and the social interest and an element of 'meaningful' leisure activity. In the official view, it contributed to the formation of the socialist personality. Traditionally the GDR authorities preferred sport to be undertaken in organised groups.

Despite the large numbers of GDR citizens involved in organised sporting activities and the GDR's spectacular international sporting successes, official sports policy was not entirely successful in fulfilling its goals. Researchers noted a fall in interest and participation in sport with age. Furthermore, some social groups such as working women, apprentices and and shiftworkers rarely participated in sports (79). According to Peter Voß of the Leipzig Central Institute of Youth Research, after marriage young people participated less in organised sports activities than before and spent more time training alone or with their family (80).

In the Honecker period there was a growing recognition in the GDR that it was better for the individual to undertake individually-based sports-activity than none at all. In the eighties Voß advised young GDR citizens that the regularity and intensity of sports
activity were more important than the form of its organisation (81). The authors of Jugend und Sport (Berlin, 1987) and Hanke recommended that sports administrators should aim to cater for a wider range of interests and abilities in sport and should react faster to fashionable trends in sport to encourage wider sport-participation amongst young people (82). In the eighties sports administrators increasingly catered for the population's interest in sports which were relatively new to the GDR, including bodybuilding, aerobics, bowling, tennis and horse-riding (83). This trend towards the promotion of individual rather than team-oriented sport was certainly an attempt by sports administrators to overcome the above-mentioned apparent discrepancy between the aims of official sports policy and individual interests. This trend did not, however, meet with approval from everyone. Karin Brand, for instance, criticised the mass manufacture of sports equipment primarily geared towards individual-oriented sports (84).

In summary, the official view was not fixed during the Honecker period, but was constantly redefined to meet the increasingly sophisticated needs and interests of the population and counter external threats such as the 1980 Polish crisis and internal threats such as the increasingly significant independent peace, ecological and women's movements. In the seventies official legal theorists were forced to develop their theory of human rights in reaction to international pressure on the GDR regarding human rights issues. In 1986 Otto Reinhold, a leading SED philosopher, explained that the SED interpretation of Marxist-Leninist ideology was subject to an ongoing process of development as a result of changing circumstances in the world:
Naturally have we a series of fundamental positions, but these fundamental positions must also be creatively applied, further developed. Practice leads constantly to new insights and corrects many, so that the understanding of the theory, that the theory is a theoretical generalization of practical experience is (85).

This analysis of the changes in the official view of the individual will form a background for the analysis of the debates on the individual amongst radical critics and 'insider critics'.
Footnotes


4. ibid., p.276.


7. ibid., p.476.

8. ibid., p.479.

9. ibid., p.281.


21. ibid., p.72.


For the Western theorist Mampel, there was a fundamental tension between the two official concepts that 'Interessenübereinstimmung' was a driving force in socialism, a view expounded since 1974, and that contradictions could be a driving force. Mampel also took the view that despite the shift in official policy towards the meeting of specific interests, greater weight continued to be given to the wider social interests in cases where there was an apparent conflict of interest, S. Mampel, *Die Funktion des Rechts bei der Bewältigung von Interessengegensätzen*, in *Sozialstruktur und Sozialplanung in der DDR. Achte Tagung zum Stand der DDR-Forschung in der BRD. 20. bis 23. Mai 1975*, Edition Deutschland Archiv (Cologne, 1975), 69 – 90 (pp.74, 90).


Poppe, Die Grundrechte des Bürgers, p.124.


Poppe, Die politischen und persönlichen Grundrechte, p.158.

See also Edler and Seidel, 'Demokratie, Freiheit und Menschenrechte', p.397.

44. Wörterbuch zum sozialistischen Staat, p.185.


46. Wörterbuch zum sozialistischen Staat, p.185.

47. Klenner, Marxismus und Menschenrechte, p.129.

48. Klenner, Studien über die Grundrechte, p.64.


50. ibid., p.8.

52. See B. Bittighöfer, 'Sozialistische Lebensweise -
Erregungsschaft und Aufgabe', Einheit, 32 (no.1, 1977), 25 - 29
(p.28).

53. M. Banaschak, 'Zielbewußt und festen Schrittes', Einheit, 36
(no.6, 1981), 515 - 525 (p.518).

54. W. Weichelt, 'Politische Macht und Demokratie in unserer
Gesellschaft', Einheit, 37 (no.7/8/82), 768 - 773 (p.773).

55. A. Kosing, 'Sinnerfülltes Leben in unserer Gesellschaft',

56. ibid., pp.683 - 684.

57. 'Kulturarbeit – gemeinsam und planmäßig. Erfahrungsaustausch in
der Sonderschule Hans Marchwitza', Einheit, 29 (no.1, 1974), 74 –
77 (p.79).

58. H. J. Hoffmann, W. Kühn, 'Sozialistische Patriotismus und
proletarische Internationalismus', Einheit, 32 (1977), 460 - 463
(p.461); see also U. Schönfelder, 'Sozialistische Produktionsweise
und sozialistische Lebensweise', Einheit, 33 (1978), 200 - 204
(p.204).


In Arbeiterpersönlichkeit und sozialistische Lebensweise, Verlag
Tribüne (Berlin, 1977), J. Römer argued that through continuously
promoting the welfare of the individual the work collective
acquired the moral right to concern itself with the individual's
lifestyle in the private sphere (pp.22 – 24). See also R. Miller,
'Ist Privatleben Privatsache?', Tribüne, 32, 30 January, 1976,
cited by W. Mieczkowski, 'Formen der Selbstbehauptung in der DDR.
Politururgie und Symbolkrieg', Deutsche Studien, 16 (1978), 121 - 137
(pp.127 - 128).

60. H. Kührig, 'Die Familie in unserer Gesellschaft', Einheit, 30
(1975), 969 – 972 (p.970).

61. E. Mannschatz, Familienerziehung, Dietz Verlag (Berlin, 1971),
p.37, cited by A. Hanhardt Jr, 'East Germany: from goals to
realities' in I. Volyges (ed), Political socialisation in Eastern
- 80 (pp.70 - 71).

Günter Kräupl argued that society should quickly intervene if
problems with rearing children occurred within the family, that the
work collective should not hold back with the appropriate criticism
in such situations, G. Kräupl, 'Familiäre Fehlerziehung und
Jugendkriminalität', Neue Justiz 34 (no.7, 1980), 303 - 306
(p.306).


63. ibid., p.24.

65. In the period 1971 – 1987 172,900 families moved into their own home. The construction of privately-owned homes was subsidised in the following way: free land; interest-free credit on 40% of the standard construction costs and further credit at the rate of 4%, 'Zur Sozialpolitik der SED', Neues Deutschland, January 29, 1987, pp.3 – 4. The desire for one's own home led to illegal speculation in private property, 'Kleine Fluchten', Der Spiegel, 39 (no.16, 1985), 36 – 41.

66. H. Bussiek, Notizen aus der DDR, Fischer (Frankfurt, 1979), p.120; see also Dr. W. Niemke, 'Zur weiteren Entwicklung des Eigenheimbaus', Architektur der DDR, 26 (no.3, 1977), pp.134 – 135


In 1986 over 50% of public houses were under private management and there were over 1000 private opticians working in the GDR, Sommer, 'Am Staate mäkeln, doch ihn tragen', p.12.

78. Cited by H. Bussiek, Die real existierende Republik. Neue
Notizen aus der unbekannten Republik, Fischer Verlag (Frankfurt/Main, 1985), p.90.


80. P. Voß, Freie Zeit, was nun?, Dietz Verlag (Berlin, 1986), p.88 or P. Voß, 'Freizeitgestaltung der Jugend', in Friedrich and Gerth, Jugend konkret, 158 – 182 (pp.164 – 165).

81. Voß, Freie Zeit, pp. 91 – 92.


Chapter Three. Radical criticism of the official view of the individual

3i. Rudolf Bahro, Robert Havemann and Stefan Heym

3ia. Introduction

In this section I will examine the works and public statements of Rudolf Bahro, Robert Havemann and Stefan Heym as examples of the most radical views within the GDR on the position of the individual in actually existing socialism. The concept of the subordination of the individual was central to Bahro's analysis of actually existing socialism and universal emancipation the goal of his proposed cultural revolution. Havemann's various works and statements focussed on the relations between the individual and the state/party apparatus in the GDR, specifically upon the issue of civil and political rights. This was also true of Stefan Heym:

Eine gewisse Rolle spielt bei mir die Frage des Kollektivs, der einzelne gegen die Macht des Staates. Dadurch ergeben sich Konflikte, die interessant sind. Darüber habe ich geschrieben (1).

3ib. An overview of the radical view of the position of the individual in actually existing socialism

The subservience of the individual, (Subalternität), was the key concept in Bahro's analysis of actually existing socialism. The movement towards general emancipation, the cultural revolution, had the task of eliminating those conditions which forced individuals into subservience. According to Bahro, all class societies and hierarchical relationships gave rise to subservience, that is a situation where a higher body determined the extent of the sphere of influence of the subservient individual (2). Beyond the limits of this defined sphere he was not permitted to act independently. He had no overview of, and therefore no responsibility for the more
general economic, social and political processes. Thus Bahro linked
the system of subservience of the individual in actually existing
socialism with Andreas Hegedus' concept of a 'system of organized
irresponsibility' (3).

The term 'Subalternität' was rejected by Havemann (4). Nevertheless,
there are clear parallels between Bahro's concept of 'Subalternität' and
the concepts of 'Entmündigung' and 'Bevormundung' used by Havemann
and Heym amongst others in that they all implied a higher authority
restricting the individual's freedom of action in actually existing socialism.

Bahro argued that the individual in actually existing socialism was
not only subservient in terms of his labour function, but
subservient in all spheres of his life, given the centralization of
political power and state administration (5). There was thus a more
general subservience of the individual in actually existing
socialism than in other social systems:

Angesichts der totalen Konzentration der
gesellschaftlichen Macht tritt die Bedeutungslosigkeit
des Individuums hier sichtlicher und allgemeiner zutage
als bei dem Spiel der Zufälle und Wahrscheinlichkeiten an
der schillernden Oberfläche des kapitalistischen
Reproduktionsprozesses (6).

He listed the following as factors leading to subservience in
actually existing socialism: the hierarchical labour organisation
of non-capitalist industrial society; the social structure; the
impotence of the direct producers and the brakes within the system
itself upon the driving forces of society. The common denominator
underlying all these factors was the basic relations of production,
that is the total state organisation of society on the basis of
the traditional division of labour (7).

Connected with the division of labour in actually existing
socialism was a structure reflecting the differentiated access to information, participation in the management processes of society as a whole and differentiated levels of consciousness:

Die Hierarchie der Arbeitsteilung drückt institutionell die Hierarchie der informationellen Kopplungen aus, und dieser ganze Apparat spiegelt letztlich die Gliederung des materiellen Reproduktionsprozesses nach Verarbeitungsstufen, Kombinationsformen und -graden sowie die notwendige innere Arbeitsteilung des Informationsverarbeitungsprozesses wider. Alle an der Kooperation beteiligten Individuen verfügen auch über Bewußtsein als Naturkraft, aber nicht alle nehmen hauptsächlich in dieser Eigenschaft daran teil (8).

The party and state bureaucracy attempted to appropriate surplus labour-time not for profit, but as a means of domination and of securing its political power (9). It determined the division of the portions of the concrete labour to be performed by the mass of producers in the name of the common interest (10). Bahro argued that the mass of producers were politically exploited in the sense that they were unable to make their own decisions regarding their material living conditions and that a paternalistic state determined their social and even biological existence (11).

The subordinate individual had no form of direct control over the dominant party and state apparatus:


Bahro and Havemann made the point that all individuals in actually existing socialism were trapped within the hierarchical pyramid, even those at the apex of the pyramid who by virtue of their
position had an overview of the management of the entire system. Bahro for instance referred to the General Secretary of the ruling communist party as the highest ranking subordinate individual of all in actually existing socialism.

Bahro argued that in actually existing socialism certain groups not only monopolized the elements of labour conducive to individual development, thus condemning other sections of the population to stultifying work, but they sought to perpetuate their privileged position by maintaining the status quo (13). Therefore the differentiation within the social structure was defined not in terms of income but of access to fulfilling work, which promoted the individual's capacity for abstract thought and hence ultimately his participation in the decision-making processes (14). He argued that, contrary to the official concept of socialist democracy, it was not intended in actually existing socialism that all individuals should take a full and equal part in the political and economic decision-making processes:

Im real existierenden Sozialismus versteht man unter Demokratie, daß die Menschen nach ihrer Kompetenz mitarbeiten, mitplanen und mitregieren sollen. Kompetent ist die Reinemachefrau für Scheuerlappen und das Mitglied des Politbüros für die Vorbereitung auf Krieg und Frieden (15).

Excluded from real participation in the planning and management processes of society, most individuals in actually existing socialism displayed subordinate forms of behaviour, hence the mass phenomena of the 'Flucht ins Private', apoliticism, consumerism and alienation (16). In the sphere of work alienation had led to a lack of morale in the workforce since increased productivity did not necessarily bring greater rewards for the individual. The attitudes and values of individuals in all sections of the population had not fundamentally changed in the transition period from capitalism to
actually existing socialism; all sought to gain as large a slice of the cake as possible. Thus all attempts to instill socialist values towards work had failed (17).

Havemann's utopian solution to the problem of the division of labour was the maximization of free time. Bahro, however, noted the low degree of industrial automation in the GDR at the time of writing Die Alternative. He therefore assumed that most individuals would continue to execute necessary labour in the foreseeable future. He further assumed that subordinate individuals did not use their free time for self-fulfilment, but rather sought to compensate for their lack of fulfilment in the work sphere, to satisfy their compensatory needs. He concluded from this that it was not sufficient merely to reduce necessary labour time and gave priority to the reduction of psychologically unproductive labour time within necessary labour time (18). He proposed that all members of society should be compelled to undertake some form of routine work and also be given access to more fulfilling work. Going beyond the Western concept of job-sharing, he stressed the necessity for a flexible and multiple connection between individuals and jobs along the lines of several individuals for each job and several jobs for each individual. However, it should be noted that he did not propose that the division of time between routine and fulfilling work in the individual's schedule should necessarily be the same for all individuals. Therefore an element of social inequality arising from the division of labour was built into his utopian model.

Bahro extended the above concept to incorporate the proposal that socialist economic planning should not revolve around the balancing of material stock, but around the social balancing of labour time.
In other words, time should be deliberately allocated for the all-round development and the satisfaction of needs on a social as well as on an individual scale (19). The individual should only spend time in the production process up to the point where the expenditure of time in this sphere became counterproductive to his all-round development (20).

Although Bahro stated that in the transition period a certain rate of economic growth would be necessary in order to ensure the necessary economic flexibility to overcome the division of labour, he did not believe that quantitative economic growth was a necessary prerequisite for, and a measure of social progress in socialism. As discussed in Chapter Four, this view was also expressed by Kuczynski (21).

In his work Bahro made reference to the exchange of views between Harry Maier, deputy director of the Central Institute for Economic Sciences in the GDR, and Harry Nick, head of the research group "Scientific and technological progress" at the Academy of Social Sciences on this subject (22). Maier had stated that the goal of economic activity was to satisfy human needs whilst reducing the necessary labour time and material resources absorbed in this process and thus releasing them for the satisfaction of individual needs (23). Nevertheless, he differed from Bahro in that he did not challenge the official view of the necessity of economic growth. Nick had emphasised the orthodox view that economic growth was necessary if the GDR was to progress towards communism (24).

Bahro explicitly rejected Nick's view, believing that one should put an end to the quantity principle as the basis of the economic system so that economic growth could take a qualitative turn, a
'turn into the subjective' (25). Priority had to be given to all-round human development, to an 'increase in the positive possibilities of human happiness' (26).

It should be noted that in his alternative model Bahro did not provide for the abolition of all forms of hierarchy and division of labour. He recognised, for instance, that for technical reasons the continued division of labour within production and the processing of information would be necessary (27). He pragmatically stated that one could not suddenly destroy the administrative apparatus without engendering the collapse of the whole organisation of society. However, in communism individuals would be freed from the reduction to their functions within the pyramidal structure. Society, made up of freely associated individuals, would have control over the processes of information, knowledge and decision-making. In this way the hierarchy which was still required for the regulation of social life and of labour would not be reflected in the social structure (28). Individuals would be equally and simultaneously present at all levels of subjective interest. There would be a 'top' and a 'bottom', but in a system that no longer defined people in those terms (29).

Havemann rather vaguely defined the hierarchical structure of GDR society in terms of three strata; the party and state leadership, the intelligentsia and blue collar workers. Real political power lay in the hands of the few at the top of the social and political pyramid, that is the members of the Politburo. Living in a self-imposed ghetto, they were largely isolated from the working masses whose interests they purported to represent. The middle stratum was made up of party and state functionaries and the rest of the intelligentsia, who were privileged in comparison with the ordinary
workforce in terms of income, freedom to travel and access to information. The third stratum, the blue collar workforce and thus the vast majority of the population, was excluded from any real form of participation in the political process and bore the brunt of arbitrary decisions taken by a few and executed by an all-pervasive state and party apparatus. It had no means by which to protect its interests vis-à-vis this apparatus (30).

Havemann thought that the political leadership on the whole neither politically, nor economically exploited the workforce, but was genuinely motivated by the desire to act in what it perceived to be the best interests of socialism (31). This was less radical than Bahro, who clearly stated that the state and party apparatus were politically exploiting the masses (32). As early as the sixties Havemann stated that the hierarchical structure of GDR society was the root of social inequality and thus a brake upon the development of individuality. He concluded that the problem of the hierarchical structure would only be finally overcome with the gradual abolition of the state (33).

The bureaucratic elements of the GDR system were a particular target for Havemann's criticism. He saw the bureaucracy as pervading every sphere of social life, like an uncontrollable fiend and a parasite upon the productive section of the workforce (34). He rejected the concept of the state planning every aspect of the individual's life from the cradle to the grave:

Heym thought that the bureaucratic apparatus should be subsumed to the needs of the citizens rather than vice versa (36). As was seen above, the official view had traditionally stressed the duties of the citizens vis à vis the state and rejected the concept that the individual could make demands of the state.

Bahro saw the radical revision of the educational system as an important element in the cultural revolutionary process in which the universal subordination of the individual in actually existing socialism would be overcome. He rejected the argument that the distribution of labour simply reflected the natural distribution of aptitudes and talents, believing that most differences in the capacity for learning were the product of childhood socialization, the latter being determined by the prevailing division of labour and its planned reproduction (37). Here he took the nurture view of the nature–nurture debate to the extreme and totally disregarded the hereditary factor. As was seen above, during the period under study official definitions of the individual began to give more consideration to the hereditary factors influencing the individual’s development than was previously the case.

Bahro argued that the party and state apparatus used educational policy to plan the proportions in which individuals could fulfil their potential and attain a position in the hierarchy where they could fulfil their material needs (38). He specifically referred to the restrictions imposed upon the number of students entering tertiary education in the GDR after 1971 as reactionary. Furthermore, he criticised the GDR educational system for producing narrowminded specialists rather than well-developed individuals (39).
In line with these views Bahro proposed in his alternative model that children should be reared in and by the community in order to offset potential negative family circumstances. All young people would receive a thorough, comprehensive university-level education and then spend a further period teaching and studying (40). In the cultural revolutionary process a revised educational system would have the specific task of 'forcing the overproduction of surplus consciousness' (41). Bahro thought that the reorganisation of the production and education process would enable the individual to gain an overview of society and lead to the self-management of society (42).

Havemann dismissed the official argument that economic planning required a tight control over the number of people entering the various levels of the educational system. He believed that this system was not only economically inefficient, but also that it was inhumane in that it often prevented the individual from discovering and pursuing his own interests. Under the system, he argued, the hierarchical social structure and the vast social inequalities meant that only those in the higher social strata had real freedom of choice as regards a career (43). He suggested that each individual should be given a broader-based training so that a range of jobs was open to him (44). In Havemann's utopia study, teaching and research were a lifelong process for all citizens (45).

The most radical concept put forward by Bahro to overcome the problem of the subordination of the individual was the redefinition of the structure of social and individual needs with the shift from what he termed compensatory needs to emancipatory needs. Compensatory needs were the needs of the individual to compensate for his subordinate, passive role in society by retreating into the
private sphere and indulging in the conspicuous consumption of material goods. Whereas the individual merely enforced the status quo by satisfying his compensatory needs, his attempts to satisfy his emancipatory needs, that is his need to take control of his own existence and participate fully in the regulation of social affairs, would involve him in the struggle to bring about Bahro's cultural revolution.

Similarly, Havemann presented anticonsumerist arguments. Like Bahro, he believed that one could not define communism in terms of a specific standard of living, nor that communism would be a consumer's paradise overflowing with riches. For him, communism meant that every citizen had an adequate supply of necessary goods. He approvingly cited Khruschev's policy of promoting public rather than private consumption as an economically more efficient method of fulfilling individuals' needs. Both stated that as the standard of living rose, the average citizen would be increasingly free to concentrate his energies upon political issues. Yet here Havemann apparently contradicted himself, for elsewhere he acknowledged that the rise in the standard of living in the GDR after 1971 had led to increased material expectations and apoliticism:

Die Menschen haben es aufgegeben, die Führer ernst zu nehmen, und sie haben die einzige Sorge: so gut wie möglich zu überleben (46).
3ic. The radical view of interests in socialist society

Bahro argued that in actually existing socialism society produced a mass of universal talent and human expertise, 'surplus consciousness', which could not be directly used by the apparatus. The apparatus therefore sought to undermine this surplus consciousness by absorbing it with unproductive activity, paralysing it with terror and primarily by stalling it with substitute forms of satisfaction, this being the main aim of the SED's unity of social and economic policy. From childhood onwards the individual was compelled to seek substitute forms of satisfaction in material consumption, passive entertainment and prestige or power-orientated attitudes. This was the basis of what Bahro called 'compensatory interests', which ensnared the individual and prevented him from reaching self-fulfilment (47).

Similarly, Havemann stated that the SED-sponsored trend towards consumerism in the GDR made individuals increasingly the perfect slaves of their consumer desires, eradicating the last traces of individuality (48). Heym saw the unity of economic and social policy as an instrument used by the leadership to politically neutralize the masses. The anarchistic element within him, however, welcomed the 'Flucht ins Private', in so far as it implied a purely formal acceptance of the political system and official ideology (49).

Diametrically opposed to the compensatory interests were the 'emancipatory interests', which were the real expression of surplus consciousness. Bahro said of these emancipatory interests:

Sie richten auf das Wachstum des Menschen als Persönlichkeit, auf die Differenzierung und Selbstverwirklichung der Individualität in allen Dimensionen sozialer Aktivität. Sie verlangen vor allem die potentiell allumfassende Aneignung der Kultur, die
zwar mit den Sachen zu tun hat, die man verbrauchen kann, aber prinzipiell auf etwas anderes zielt: auf die menschlichen Wesenskräfte, die in anderen Individuen, in Gegenständen, Verhaltensweisen, Beziehungen, auch in den Institutionen verwirklicht sind. Das höchste Ziel dieser Aneignung ist die Befreiung von all"er Beschränktheit und vor allem Subalternität des Denkens, Fühlens und Verhaltens, ist die Erhebung des Individuums auf die Ebene des Gesamtlebens der Gesellschaft (50).

In the cultural revolutionary process the struggle would be between the emancipatory interests represented by the League of Communists and the interests of the apparatus to influence the mass of 'psychosocial potential' currently bound up in necessary labour and compensatory satisfactions.

According to Bahro, it was the surplus consciousness in the GDR that would provide the potential for change. Given the well-developed educational system, there was already a reserve of actual and potential surplus consciousness at all levels of the hierarchy of labour functions (51).

For Bahro, the greater and more complex the organisation of modern, industrial society, the more subservient the individuals in that society. He saw the extreme degree of centralisation in actually existing socialism as 'constitutionally hostile to individuality and initiative'. The individual was treated merely as a statistical quantity and had no overview of decisive social, economic and political relationships (52). Thus he proposed that in socialism-communism individuals should work, live and spend their leisure time in small, autonomous territorial units, 'communes', where all could play a full part in the decision-making processes. All political, economic and social organisation would be based upon the values of association and cooperation.

SED theorists writing in Einheit frequently made the similar point
that the individual had to have an overview if he was to accept more responsibility and work productively. However, they did so primarily in the context of the problem of how to increase industrial productivity (53).

One can infer from the bibliography of Bahro's thesis that he was familiar with the contradictions debate initiated by Kuczynski at the beginning of the seventies and discussed below (54). In Die Alternative he wrote that there were antagonisms in GDR society, not between the various classes and strata, but between the emancipatory interests of the population and the political interests of the state and party apparatus (55). Here it is interesting to note that, despite their different viewpoints, Bahro, Havemann, the philosopher Franz Loeser and economists Hermann von Berg and Harry Maier all referred to a dichotomy between the 'rulers' and the 'ruled' in the GDR in their analyses of actually existing socialism (56). In so doing, they went a step further than Kuczynski, who merely hinted at this.

Bahro argued that as long as the antagonistic interests stemming from the inequitable distribution of education and the type of labour which promoted self-development existed in GDR society, then the priorities and preferences involved in the elaboration of the plan could not be determined in an objective scientific manner. He thus rejected the official concept of 'Interessenübereinstimmung' for actually existing socialism (57). In his view, the specific interests of the bureaucracy were hidden within the concept of the common interest. In the planning process the state apparatus balanced the various unexpressed interests within society whilst giving priority to its own (58).
In 1970 Havemann wrote that the contradiction between the individual and society had not been resolved with the transition from capitalism to actually existing socialism. Indeed, he believed that it had assumed a new form. He foresaw the continued existence of a contradiction between the individual and society as long as state repression of the individual was the basis for the regulation of society and as long as the workers did not have real power of disposal over the means of production (59).

In *Fünf Tage im Juni* (1981) Heym depicted the extreme form of antagonism between the population and the GDR government. In his view, the party leadership was totally isolated from the population in 1953 and unaware of the population's justified grievances until it was too late because the lower and middle ranks of the party and state apparatus had not provided an accurate assessment of the situation (60). However, unlike Bahro who actively advocated the abolition of existing political structures including the SED, in *Fünf Tage im Juni* Heym was careful not to directly challenge the supremacy of the SED leadership. Alluding to Brecht's comment on the events of June 1953, the trade unionist Witte concludes that since the government cannot choose another population and since the population cannot choose another government, all communists have the duty to think independently and thus bring new life into the SED (61). Heym emphasised this point by quoting the clause in the Statute of the SED adopted at the Fourth Party Congress in 1954 regarding the duty of each party member to develop criticism and self-criticism from below. Yet at the end of the novel Sonnenberg reminds Witte that he must fall into line with the party, that the party and collective cannot be expected to fall into line with the individual (62).
Similarly, in Schwarzenberg the hardline communist Reinsiepe always gives priority to the collective, to the party – to the extent that mindful of the task allocated to him by the party and thus of the necessity of his personal survival to fulfil that task, he ignores a girl's cry for help during a bombing-raid. He is critical of Wolfram, the independent thinker:

ein anständiger Mensch, tapfer und auf seine Art sogar brauchbar, wie sich wahrscheinlich noch erweisen werde, sobald er sich abgewöhnt haben würde, das eigene Urteil über das des Kollektivs zu stellen, und sich einzufügen lernte in die wohlbewährten Strukturen (63).

Witte points out that the party, enamoured of its mission to lead society towards communism, has lost sight of the individual:

Wir vereinfachen so gerne: die Arbeiter, unsere Menschen, die Jugend, die Klasse – als wären es lauter Schafherden, die man hierhin treiben kann oder dorthin. In Wirklichkeit sind das alles Menschen, Einzelwesen, im Falle der Arbeiterklasse geeint nur durch eines: ihre Stellung in der Gesellschaft, im Arbeitsprozeß. Aber das garantiert noch kein einheitliches Verhalten. Die einen haben heute gestreikt, die anderen nicht; was wissen wir, wie viele Faktoren das Bewußtsein beeinflussen (64).

Witte accuses Banggartz, the SED secretary at his factory, of not allowing a margin for the variables in the individual's makeup (65). Whereas Banggartz intended to impose the new production quotas across the board, Witte favoured a more selective implementation of the quotas (66). Here Banggartz is clearly representative of the official view which tended to stress the social determinants of the individual.

Heym argued that all negative phenomena of actually existing socialism, including intellectual slackness, lack of originality of thought, the abuse of positions of power, the privileged existence of the leadership, the lack of courage of one's convictions, the fear of taking risks and responsibility, gave rise to 'disturbed relations' between the individual and society. Indeed, he went
further and stated that if the negative phenomena and contradictions in socialist society were not analysed and openly discussed, they could make the individual ill. The schizophrenic situation of saying one thing and thinking another was harmful for the individual and society as a whole (67).

It is striking that in several of Heym's works illness acts as a defence mechanism protecting the individual from potentially difficult situations in socialist society. In Fünf Tage im Juni Banggartz develops colic at critical moments and thus is absolved of taking on responsibility when a strike threatens his factory. The narrator of the short story Der Gleichgültige is spared by illness from the task of writing an official report on the political trial of his friend. This theme is most salient in Collin (1981) where the writer Collin and the Minister of State Security Urack are both afflicted by illness due to their inability to come to terms with their Stalinist past. The doctors treating these cases are aware of their root cause, but draw very different conclusions. Professor Gerlinger concludes that given the type of society they live in and the fact that it is unlikely to dramatically change in the foreseeable future, it is wiser not to cure the illness by confronting the patients with the root cause of their illness (68). He states that Collin, like everyone else, will have to come to terms with his situation (69). Dr Roth however decides to help Collin uncover the causes of his illness and thus remove the block to his creativity. The therapy is successful in that Collin decides that he will overcome his illness by writing a full and honest account of his past. In so doing he finds a new inner freedom for the first time in his life, but he is aware that the price to pay for this freedom is ostracism. Naturally this
theme was totally unacceptable to the SED leadership. At the Leipzig Bookfair in March 1979 Klaus Hörcke, Deputy Cultural Minister, criticised Heym for having been taken in by the "historic lie that socialism makes the individual ill'. However, the writer Günter Kunert reached similar conclusions about the relationship between the individual and society:

So schließe ich im Stile der im "Pamphlet für K." zitierten Heil- und Unheilpraktiker, doch eingedenk der Wahrheit, daß der einzelne seelisch nur so krank sein kann, wie ihn die Gesellschaft macht (70).

Although Havemann offered collective solutions to the problems facing actually existing socialism (71), there was no form of enforced collectivity in his utopia. Anna, one of Havemann's guides in Utopia, explains, for instance, that for a while her community had experimented with communal meals. However, this canteen-type system was abolished by common consent and meals now taken in family groups. The individual utopian citizen is supported by the collective without forfeiting his individuality. Women can, for instance, choose to delegate the rearing of their children so that they can seek others forms of self-fulfilment. The well-developed individuality of utopian citizens is expressed in the infinite variety of their clothes and houses.

One of Havemann's utopian guides states that absolute freedom of the individual is an unobtainable goal and thus does not exist even in Utopia. Havemann specifically states that there are still conflicts between individuals and the individual and society as a whole in Utopia (72). These conflicts are partly due to vestiges of past traditions and culture and partly inherent in the new society (73). The variety of opportunities open to the individual in Utopia for self development, for instance, makes him keenly aware that it is impossible in one lifetime to fully reach one's potential in all
areas. Inevitably one has to make choices throughout one's life:


Although Havemann believed that the attainment of one's full potential was an unobtainable goal, his Utopia was clearly a society which was closer to providing the conditions for the realisation of this goal than actually existing socialism. His pessimistic view of the opportunities for the development of the individual in actually existing socialism is diametrically opposed to the official concepts of the all-round development of the socialist personality and of the self-fulfilment of the individual through work and participation in social affairs.

It is significant that both Bahro and Havemann put forward collective solutions to the problem of how the individual could fulfil his potential and made it clear that the individual could only achieve self-fulfilment within society. Bahro cited Christa Wolf's comment that, most of all, the individual needed the recognition of others in this context (75). This is fully in line with the official concept of the dialectic of the individual and society.

Bahro rejected the official concept of the primacy of the objective factor, that is the concept that there were historical laws which existed independently of the concrete needs and actions of individuals, which were recognised by the party alone and then imposed upon society (76). His work with its emphasis upon the consciousness of the individual clearly focussed upon what was
known in official terms as the subjective factor, that is the needs, interests and actions of the individual.

Despite his emphasis upon individuality, Bahro stated that in a developed communist society priority should be given to the general interest over specific interests. Thus he apparently adhered to the official GDR definition of collectivism for all stages of socialism, whilst rejecting its implementation in actually existing socialism (77).
3rd. The radical view of the rights of the individual in actually existing socialism

According to Havemann, the GDR's official policy on human rights was based upon the assumption that the party with its unique insight into the laws governing social development was omniscient and inevitably knew better than the individual. As early as 1964 in his Humboldt lectures and later in _Berliner Schriften_ (1977), Havemann demonstrated how, in his view, the GDR leadership had interpreted Hegel's concept 'Freiheit ist Einsicht in die Notwendigkeit' in such a way as to justify depriving the individual of his basic rights and freedoms:

Die Freiheit (des Staates) erfordert Einsicht in die Notwendigkeit der Unfreiheit (des Individuums) (78).

Freedoms were withdrawn from the individual until he was able to understand what was 'socially necessary'. Havemann considered that only those who determined what was socially necessary were free under this kind of system (79). For him, individual freedom meant a choice between alternative courses of action. The GDR state did not respect the full range of basic rights and freedoms because it did not trust its citizens to undertake the 'correct' course of action:

Wenn man die drängendsten politischen Forderungen auf einen Nenner bringt, betreffen sie ganz allgemein das Verhältnis des Staates zu seinen Bürgern. Er behandelt sie wie unmündige Kinder, die weder richtig denken noch vernünftig handeln und stets Dinge im Kopf haben, die fehlerhaft, schädlich oder sogar bösartig sind. Bei dieser Einstellung des Staates fühlt sich jeder, wie ein noch nicht ertappter Sünder, weil er ja auch tagtäglich Dinge tut und gern tut, von denen er weiß, daß sie dem Vater Staat gar nicht gefallen (80).

Havemann referred to the bridging of the gulf between the population and the political leaders in the GDR as the main political task facing the GDR leadership (81). He implied that the
GDR state should allow its citizens to acquire political maturity and learn to make decisions for themselves. In response to a question from a Western journalist in 1977 as to whether the GDR population was ready for free, general elections, Heym expressed a similar view:

Zur politischen Reife der Menschen hier: Wir erwarten von ihnen, daß sie den Sozialismus aufbauen; müssen wir da nicht auch von ihnen erwarten können, daß sie reif genug sind, selbst über ihr Schicksal zu entscheiden (82)?

The recognition of the citizen's political maturity necessarily implied a redefinition of the nature of the SED's leading role in GDR society and so was a crucial step in the process towards a democratic form of socialism.

All the concrete proposals for the democratisation of the GDR formulated by Havemann in the seventies were based upon his belief that to overcome the mistrust between the state and the population, the state had to first display trust in its citizens by guaranteeing certain basic rights. In 1970 he put forward a four-point programme to reestablish freedom of speech, freedom of information, the freedom to choose where one lived and worked and one's career and the freedom to establish societies, organisations and parties (83). Unlike the orthodox legal theorists, he stressed that these rights were absolute. No-one, particularly not the state, should have the power to restrict these rights.

In 1976 he made the following proposals: a lowering of the age at which GDR citizens could travel to the West; a general amnesty for all political prisoners, the abolition of Paragraph 106 of the Criminal Code (slander of the State), the reversal of all sentences on this charge and compensation for those involved; the reintroduction of the right to strike in the GDR constitution; the
introduction of an independent newspaper; the nomination of several independent candidates for each seat in the People's Chamber and the introduction of at least one independent opposition party.

In 1978 he suggested that there should be more discussion in the state and party institutions and organisations. It should be noted here that, whereas Bahro proposed the founding of a League of Communists, a new type of movement, Havemann proposed the renewal of the existing structures. Secondly, Havemann called for freedom of the press and stressed the need for an independent literary magazine. In 1979 Havemann also called for the abolition of all forms of censorship exercised by the Office for Copyrights (84).

Heym believed that during the initial revolutionary period it was necessary to restrict freedoms and establish a dictatorship to ensure the survival of the revolution. However, the questions of who was to lead the dictatorship and the extent to which freedoms had to be restricted had, in his opinion, never been resolved, let alone fully discussed in Eastern Europe. In his view restrictions upon the full exercise of human rights were an endemic feature of actually existing socialism, where there was a dictatorship of the apparatus rather than of the proletariat (85).

In his novels Heym used the technique of dialogue between characters representing a hardline, Stalinist view and characters representing a more democratic, indeed his own view, to discuss the problem of political power. Hardline communists such as Reinsiepe (in Schwarzenberg (1984)), Urack (Collin) and Banggartz (Fünf Tage im Juni) take the view that the party cannot trust the instinct of the masses. Since, however, the masses are objectively the progressive force in history, it is the duty of those who have
the correct consciousness to lead and cajole the population forward - by force if necessary. Urack, the Minister of State Security, argues that the arrest and political trials of innocent people during the Stalinist period can be justified according to the principle that it was better to commit an injustice against one individual than to allow the revolution to be threatened. This inhumane attitude is, according to Urack, justifiable given that socialism-communism will ultimately bring about a more humane world (86). From this Stalinist viewpoint the system whereby the vast majority of the population are deprived of their rights and freedoms is justifiable, as is made apparent in the following scene between Urack and his doctor Christine Roth:

Sehen Sie sich um im Lande, Frau Doktor, und was erkennen Sie? Da haben wir auf die Leute eingepaukt, jahrelang, aber sie haben immer noch keine Konzeption von sich und der Welt, höchstens wollen sie materielle Vorteile. Ein erbärmlicher Zustand, den ich mir nicht habe träumen lassen, als ich jung war, ein junger Revolutionär. Jetzt bin ich ein alter Revolutionär und ich habe lernen müssen, daß wir die Fristen zu kurz gesetzt haben. Was also erfordert die Lage?" sagte er. "Daß die mit der Perspektive im Kopf, die paar Klugen und Courageierten, sich erheben über die Misere und stellvertretend handeln für die andern, die sich selber in die Unmündigkeit begeben haben - zu deren Wohl natürlich, ausschließlich dazu, kann ich auf Sie rechnen?". "Offenkundig glaubte er, seine Offerte sei ungeheuer verlockend. Und es war ja auch etwas Verlockendes daran: Mitglied werden im Klub der Stellvertreter der Massen, zum inneren Kreis gehören, zur Schar der Eingeweihten, die Informationen erhielten und auf ihre Art mitbestimmten und mitregierten - statt sich abrackern zu müssen draußen im täglichen Trubel, blind wie ein Maulwurf, frustriert wie ein Goldhamster (87).

On the other hand the independent thinkers Witte (Fünf Tage im Juni) and Wolfram (Schwarzenberg) have confidence in the masses' ability to rule themselves. Witte is convinced that the masses, if presented with the facts and consulted, will be able to think further than their own immediate interests (88). When drawing up the constitution for the Schwarzenberg Republic, Wolfram is
conscious that one must take the risk of allowing the masses to find their own way towards communism, that if one establishes a permanent body of people to rule on their behalf, then this body is likely to begin to rule over the masses and pursue its own interests. Therefore he concludes that one must place political power firmly in the hands of the masses themselves, even if they are not yet experienced in managing the political processes.

Heym expressed the view that his fictional Schwarzenberg constitution was more progressive than either of the German constitutions (89). For Heym, accountability was the key element of democracy, which ensured that one group of people did not begin to rule over the whole population in their name (90). His constitution therefore contained the clause that the people's representatives were to be elected by and collectively and individually responsible to the people and removable from office at any time.

The principle of equality is enshrined in the Schwarzenberg constitution; no-one is to have privileged access to publicly owned goods or to state power. Citizens holding a public office are to serve and not rule over the population. In the section of the constitution pertaining to freedoms and rights of the individual there is a catalogue of rights including the freedom of movement and settlement and to leave one's country, the freedom of association and the right to strike. When drawing up the constitution Wolfram decides not to insert any form of clause in the constitution which could be interpreted in such a way as to restrict these rights and freedoms. Principles such as secrecy of the mail, open trials and independence of the courts are also guaranteed by the constitution (91).
Havemann's and Heym's statements on human rights reflected their primary concern for the respect of political and civil rights, especially the freedom of expression, rather than that of economic and social rights:

_Das Schlimmste ist eben die Unterdrückung des Geistes (92)._

This can be contrasted with the official preoccupation with economic and social rights.

Havemann was motivated by the belief that the denial of human rights and freedoms was irreconcilable with the principles of socialism and indeed obstructed the way to true socialism (93). For him, the recognition and legal guarantees of basic rights were the necessary condition for the renewal of Marxist discussion and theory. Thus the implementation of socialist democracy was the key to the transitional process from actually existing socialism to democratic socialism. Havemann and Heym rarely referred to international human rights documents, but demanded that their government fully guarantee the rights enshrined in the GDR constitution. Here one should note that for Havemann the GDR constitution always had precedence over other branches of GDR law, some of which he considered to be arbitrary and unconstitutional (94).

In calling for the implementation of certain rights already formally guaranteed in the West, Heym and Havemann were by no means advocating a return to the capitalist system. Havemann in particular was very scathing about what he considered to be sham democracy and merely formal rights in the West. He followed the orthodox line that real democracy was only possible in the socialist system where there was no form of class exploitation.
(95). In this respect he believed that the East European states were closer to true democracy than capitalist states (96). Heym considered the common ownership of all major economic assets to be the basis for social justice and thus for the freedom of the individual (97).

In the West some observers criticised Bahro's position on human rights and democracy (98). As Mleczkowski pointed out, Bahro appeared to judge Stalinism solely by the yardstick of efficiency (99). In Bahro's eyes Stalin's methods of terror and coercion were historically justifiable given that they had brought about the rapid industrialization of an economically backward country. Even in its inadequate form the Stalinist superstructure was, in his view, initially the instrument of social and industrial progress in most of Eastern Europe (100).

Bahro looked upon human rights campaigns in the GDR as merely a 'reactive response to the anachronistic forms of the politbureaucratic dictatorship' (101). He was afraid that the minimal programme of a democratic revolution against the politbureaucracy would become autonomous and lead to bourgeois democracy, which he dismissed as 'one-sidedly fixed on its guarantees', and to the restoration of capitalism. Such demands reflected, in his opinion, only intellectual interests (102). He criticised the East German human rights campaigners for making isolated proposals rather than having a comprehensive, ideological counterposition to the party and state apparatus and for being too West-orientated (103).

In line with this thinking rather than making frequent references to specific human rights Bahro set out a programme to attain Marx's
original goal of the general emancipation of the individual. He seemed to believe that the specific questions relating to human rights and democracy would be automatically resolved in the progress towards this objective. In his vision of communism there would be socialist democracy, a qualitatively higher form of democracy. He envisaged complete freedom of expression; the election of delegates to each higher level of government, who would be accountable to their electorate; referendums on all major political and social questions and guaranteed access of all citizens to sources of information (104). The individual would have the guaranteed right and duty to uncover bureaucracy, mistakes and corruption (105). The party member would have the right to break from party discipline and make a decision of conscience (106). Within the party and in society democratic principles of free discussion and persuasion rather than coercion would be the basis of all decision-making. He was, however, vague about how the individual's rights would be guaranteed in his utopian model.

The freedom of movement and the right to emigrate from one's country were the most controversial basic rights in the GDR context. Havemann stated unequivocally that it was an elementary right of the individual to choose where he lived and worked (107). Bahro wrote that a small, but significant proportion of highly skilled GDR citizens would, given the opportunity, leave for the West for reasons of professional self-fulfilment rather than for purely economic reasons. Bahro argued that in this situation the GDR government was justified in restricting freedom of movement: if people with these skills were allowed to leave, the country would suffer and the state would in practice be financing capitalism (108).
Heym considered the construction of the Berlin Wall as both an act of desperation and as a new beginning. Stabilising the situation in the GDR was the first step in the slow process of the diplomatic recognition of the GDR as a sovereign state by most of the world (109). The Berlin Wall was at the time of its construction a cruel and ugly necessity, but its continued existence was a sign of weakness, a symbol of the lack of confidence of the GDR government in the strength of actually existing socialism and socialist ideals. In the eighties the Berlin Wall could only be justified if it was a form of shield protecting an emergent form of humane socialism (110).

Heym believed that the fact that the majority of GDR citizens were continually presented with positive images of the world on Western television and yet could not travel freely and see the reality for themselves led to frustrations and illusions (111). In Collin he illustrates this with his sympathetic portrayal of the young Peter Urack who eventually escapes to the West. Urack explains his need to leave the GDR in the following way:

Ich habe ja alles versucht. War brav wie ein Hündchen und stumm wie ein Regenwurm, habe gearbeitet wie ein Vieh und gelebt wie ein Mönch, und dann habe ich alles hingschmissen und herumgammelt – aber die Mann sich auch dreht, überall sind die Mauern, überall stößt man sich wund (112).

Although Heym implies that Urack has reached the point where he can no longer be integrated into socialist society, he, like Havemann, made it clear that the emigration of independent thinkers was a loss for socialism. All three radical critics argued that the government should do everything in its power to make the socialist system more attractive so that the citizens no longer wished to emigrate (113).
The official line regarding the right to strike was that it was a weapon used by the workers in the class struggle against the bourgeoisie in capitalism. It was therefore inappropriate in a socialist system where the workers were in control of the means of production (114). Havemann accepted this argument, but used it to demonstrate that the GDR system was not socialist. According to him, GDR workers were well aware that the means of production were not in their hands, but in the hands of an anonymous concern, the state (115). Therefore the GDR worker felt just as exploited and alienated as his counterpart in capitalism, even more so given that he had been deprived of the right to strike in the 1968 revision of the GDR constitution (116). In Havemann's vision of a democratic socialism the workers would have complete control over the means of production and manufactured products and would take all decisions associated with the production process (117). The alienation of the individual in the workplace would be overcome through codetermination:

Nur auf diese Weise wird die Möglichkeit geschaffen, daß das Mitglied eines großen gesellschaftlichen Arbeitsprozesses, innerhalb dessen es nur ein kleines Rädchen ist, sich doch mit diesem Gesamtprozeß und seinen Produktionsleistungen identifizieren kann (118).

Heym expressed very similar views. He saw, for example, the rise of the trade union Solidarity in Poland as the result of the profound alienation of the workforce in actually existing socialism (119).

The role of trade unions in actually existing socialism was clearly the major theme of Heym's *Fünf Tage im Juni*. In his view, they could not provide adequate representation of the workers' interests because they lacked autonomy vis a vis the government. The trade union in actually existing socialism had therefore degenerated into a 'travel bureau for the handing out of health cures and vacation
places, or, at best, a society for mutual backslapping and the creation of enthusiasm' (120). In Schwarzenberg Heym proposes the setting up of work councils in all factories, which together with an elected management would regulate all the internal affairs of the factory.

Although Bahro envisaged the reestablishment of the right to strike in the transition period between actually existing socialism and real socialism-communism (121), he believed that it would become increasingly irrelevant in the course of the cultural revolution and eventually be abolished.

On the basis of Article 27, Paragraph 1. of the GDR constitution, Havemann defended the principle of the freedom of expression and associated freedoms. The only restrictions which he accepted upon these basic rights were those laid down in Article 6, Paragraph 5, regarding the dissemination of racist, fascist and militaristic sentiments. He refused to interpret the clause "den Grundsätzen dieser Verfassung gemäß", (Art.27), as meaning that the individual's opinion could not deviate from the official line. In his view the clause merely stated that it was in line with the constitution for the GDR citizen to have the right to freely and publicly express his opinions (122). Following this logic, he argued that in repressing the views of dissenters the state and party apparatus in fact acted unconstitutionally (123). He particularly attacked Paragraphs 106, 219 and 220 of the revised 1979 Criminal Code relating to anti-state agitation, unlawful contact with agencies hostile to the GDR and the defamation of public bodies respectively. He was under no illusions that the revised Criminal Code was a further weapon in the arsenal of the state which sought to suppress all those views which contradicted
its own image of a relatively harmonious socialist society. In this context he referred to how the attempts of Heym and Rolf Schneider to accurately depict the internal contradictions of their society had been labelled as slander of the state (124). Havemann concluded that in democratic socialism there would be no repression of public criticism of the state or party (125).

Havemann proclaimed that the individual's religious and ideological beliefs did not lie in the jurisdiction of the state (126), a principle which was in fact enshrined in the GDR constitution, and roundly condemned the discrimination against GDR citizens in terms of career and educational prospects on ideological, political and religious grounds (127).

As a writer, Heym was particularly interested in all forms of censorship, including self-censorship (128). He specifically protested against the coupling of Gysi's decree to protect author's rights with the currency regulations in 1979 as a new instrument of censorship (129). The President of the Writers Union Hermann Kant objected to his use of the term censorship in this context:

Der Ausdruck 'Zensur' Herrschaften, ist besetzt: belesenen Leuten muß das nicht erläutert werden. Wer die staatliche Lenkung und Planung auch des Verlagwesens Zensur nennt, macht sich nicht Sorgen um unsere Kulturpolitik – er will sie nicht (130).

It should be noted that, with the exception of the freedom of expression, none of the basic rights examined above were specifically guaranteed by the GDR constitution.

Havemann often stressed the ineffectiveness of the petitions-procedure as a guarantee of the citizen's basic rights, given that petitions were dealt with in internal enquiries. He also referred to the procedure as humiliating for the individual involved. He
therefore called for a system of independent administrative courts, where the citizen could bring to bear his rights vis-a-vis the authorities (131). Heym similarly criticised the lack of legal procedures whereby the individual could protect himself against the arbitrary will of the state in actually existing socialism (132).

Thus we see the radical critics tackling the themes of the subordination of the individual in terms of his access to information and influence, 'Flucht ins Private', the conflict of interests between the individual and society, a critique of the omniscient party, the importance of human rights rather than economic rights, censorship and the need for independent administrative courts. It is striking that every one of these issues has also been taken up by critical thinkers operating inside the official political system and concerned with the relationship between the individual and society. What the rest of this thesis examines is the continuity between the radical dissent from outsiders and the critical discussions of those operating within officially sanctioned political structures.
Footnotes


6. ibid., p.11.

7. ibid., p.20.


9. ibid., pp.177, 493; Bahro, Ich werde meinen Weg fortsetzen, p.23.


Bahro, Ich werde meinen Weg fortsetzen, p.13.
Hermann von Berg made a similar point:

Ohne Ausbeutung ging und geht es nicht einer arbeitsteiligen Gesellschaft. Es fragt sich nur, wie hoch und wie erträglich diese Ausbeutung ist und wie gut oder schlecht die politischen, materiellen und finanziellen Lebensbedingungen für die Lohnabhängigen sind.


13. ibid., p.212.

14. ibid., p.144.
Bahro, Ich werde meinen Weg fortsetzen, p.21.


16. ibid., pp.14, 97.

17. Bahro, Die Alternative, p.495.

18. ibid., p.495.

19. ibid., p.495.

20. ibid., p.511.


26. ibid., pp.33 - 34.

27. Bahro, Die Alternative, pp.176 - 177.


29. ibid., p.526.


38. ibid., p.338.

39. ibid., p.320.


42. ibid., p.488.

44. 'Scharlatane in den Schlüsselstellungen', p.70.

45. Havemann, Morgen, p.86.


50. Bahro, Ich werde meinen Weg fortsetzen, p.29.


52. ibid., p.529.


54. See the section below on the Forum debate initiated by Kuczynski in 1978 on the nature of work in actually existing socialism.


Bahro, Ich werde meinen Weg fortsetzen, p.24.

56. Bahro, Die Alternative, p.49.


58. ibid., p.187.


60. Heym, Wege und Umwege, p.199.

Heym also referred to antagonistic conflicts between the workers who made up the state and the workers who made demands of the state in actually existing socialism, Spiegel (no.44, 1980), p.67. See also H. Kleinschmid, 'DDR-Schriftsteller zum 8. Mai', Deutschland Archiv, 18 (1985), 660 – 664 (p.664).


62. ibid., p.263.


65. ibid., p.196.

66. ibid., p.8.


69. ibid., p.80.

70. G. Kunert, 'Notwendiges Nachwort zum Pamphlet', *Sinn und Form*, 27 (1975), 1091 - 1097 (p.1097).

The film-script writer Wolfgang Kohlhaase also stated the following:

Ich glaube, daß wir immer wieder versuchen müssen, über möglichst viele Dinge miteinander zu reden, und zu verstehen, daß Verdrängungen nicht nur einen einzelnen Menschen krank machen können, sondern auch eine Gesellschaft.


71. See the following statement by Havemann:


73. ibid., p.130.

74. ibid., p.166.


76. ibid., p.289.


87. ibid., p.175.
see also Wolfram in Heym, *Schwarzenberg*, p.138.
91. ibid., p.147.
94. ibid., p.216.
See also 'Dokumentation. Züriick in die fünfziger Jahre', *Deutschland Archiv*, 12 (1979), 975 – 994 (pp.975 – 981).
W. Mleczkowski, 'Grenzprobleme regimekritischen Denkens', *Der Liberal*, 21 (1979), 545 – 563 (pp.550, 559).
102. ibid., p.367.


Heym, 'Warum kein Sozialismus', pp.54 - 67.


117. ibid., p.125.


123. 'Dokumentation. Züruck in die fünfziger Jahre', p.979.


128. The theme of self-censorship was most fully explored in S. Heym, Der König David Bericht. Roman, Fischer (Frankfurt, 1979).


Havemann, Morgen, p.41.

See also Heym, Wege und Umwege, pp.245 - 247.
Chapter Four. Internal criticism of the official view of the individual in actually existing socialism

4i. Jürgen Kuczynski and Uwe-Jens Heuer

In this section I intend to examine the views of the individual in actually existing socialism held by Jürgen Kuczynski and Uwe-Jens Heuer. As I aim to demonstrate, these two men can be considered to be critics of the mainstream SED view of the individual in actually existing socialism whilst remaining within the official sphere of debate.

Kuczynski, the 'Nestor of the GDR social sciences' (1), had a distinguished academic career characterised by a prolific output of publications which not only focussed upon his specialist subjects: economics, economic history and statistics, but which also reflected his interest in literature. His academic positions included Director of the German Economic Institute, Berlin, (1949 – 1952) and Head of the Department of economic history at the Institute of History (1956 – 1969). From 1976 onwards he was Professor of Economic history at the Humboldt University and Chairman of the National Committee of Economic Historians.

He held a variety of official positions including the presidency of the Society of Culture and Civilisation of the USSR (1947 – 1950) and representative of the People's Chamber (1950 – 1958). His decorations included an honorary doctorate of the Humboldt University (1964), the Karl Marx Order (1969) and the Friedrich Engels Prize (1970). In 1979 on the occasion of his 75th birthday the SED's theoretical journal Einheit paid him the unusual tribute of devoting an article to his career (2). According to Klaus Höpcke, the Deputy Minister for Culture, Kuczynski had always
combined continuous intellectual productivity with an unshakeable loyalty to the revolutionary cause (3). Yet Kuczynski had not always been on such a good footing with the SED. In 1956 one of his articles was officially condemned as revisionist (4).

In the period under study he continued to cause controversy. Kuczynski’s work Dialog mit meinem Urenkel. Neun Briefe und ein Tagebuch (1983) met with criticism from within the party. According to Western reports, copies of this book were at one point withdrawn from the bookshops (5). In a somewhat belated review in Neues Deutschland Harald Wessel conceded that the book had promoted lively discussion and productive debates, but criticised Kuczynski for being subjective and treating communist ideals in an offhand way (6).

Despite these political difficulties and the occasional official criticism of some of his views in the period under study, his loyalty to the SED apparently never wavered. The following statement in Kuczynski’s memoirs reveal his attitude towards the communist party:


Indeed, Kuczynski proudly pointed to his close relationship with Honecker and the politburo members Hager, Albert Norden and Hermann Axen:

Ich habe natürlich keinerlei Einfluß auf 'Staatsgeschäfte', weder im großen noch im kleinen. Doch in Einzelfragen auf meinen wissenschaftlichen Spezialgebieten besitzte ich das Ohr unserer Führung – ein
mir zugeneigtes Ohr –, weil sie mich als Wissenschaftler und alten Genossen achtet (8).

As the young GDR writer Wolf Spillner noted, on the basis of his long political experience, his distinguished academic career, his seniority and personal friendship with politburo members, Kuczynski seemed to have official licence to go further than others in his criticism of actually existing socialism, whilst remaining within the bounds of the official sphere (9). This led to him being dubbed an 'orthodox dissident', a 'loyal, political deviant' by some Western observers, whilst others considered him 'an incredibly naive communist' (10).

Kuczynski was painfully aware of the inadequacies of GDR socialism and therefore referred to the GDR as a 'developing socialist society', rejecting the official terminology of a 'developed socialist society' (11). He was loyal to the socialist cause, whilst criticising weaknesses of the GDR system (12).

Kuczynski considered debate to be essential to the development of the social sciences and contrasted the apparent stagnation of open discussion in most academic journals with the often virulent debate of social scientists behind closed doors. He saw the root cause of this situation lying in the reticence of individual scientists to express their views openly rather than in restrictions laid down by the party (13). This perhaps explains why in the period under study Kuczynski consistently went out of his way to provoke open and lively debate amongst GDR intellectuals by expounding his views in a variety of GDR journals. He was scornful of the, in his view, primitively instigated debates in magazines such as Sonntag and pointed to Neue Deutsche Literatur and Forum as examples of magazines promoting real debate. It is not surprising that
Kuczynski heartily welcomed Gorbachev's reforms and referred to the Gorbachev era as the 'Sternstunde meines späten Lebens' (14).

Later in this chapter I will examine Kuczynski's contributions to the various debates which are relevant to the topic of this thesis, and in particular his view that there was an antagonism between the individual and society in actually existing socialism.

In 1965 the legal theorist Heuer tried to replace the dogma of an identity of party, state and society with a more differentiated analysis in his controversial *Demokratie und Recht im Neuen Ökonomischen System der Planung und Leitung der Volkswirtschaft*. Writing in 1968, the Western expert on the GDR, Ludz, called Heuer the 'most prominent representative of institutionalized revisionism to date' and saw his works, especially the above-mentioned, as a 'basic criticism of the centralist bureaucratic organizational and social policy of the strategic clique, as well as an independent attempt to design a positive theory for this society' (15). The Western political scientist Gransow stated that Heuer was 'one of the most daring participants' in the discussions going on within the analytical framework of the concept of 'developed socialism' (16). He also saw Heuer as an exception amongst GDR political theorists in that he did not reduce Marxism to the function of legitimising the political leadership of the SED (17).

In 1967 Heuer revoked some of the more controversial aspects of the above-mentioned work and also left the post of director of the Department of Public Law at the Humboldt University to become Division Head of Socialist Economic Law at the Central Institute for Socialist Economic Management, a body associated with the Central Committee. According to Ludz, he was thus removed from a
position of influence over students whilst being given the opportunity to further explore his own concepts (18). In 1975 he received the Fatherland Medal in Bronze.

Despite his clearly well-established place within the official sphere, he faced political difficulties in the period under review. Immediately after the publication of Gesellschaftliche Gesetze und politische Organisation (1974) his travel opportunities to the West were, for instance, restricted.

In the following sections I shall outline Kuczynski's and Heuer's views of the individual in GDR socialism and demonstrate, where possible, their interaction with the official and radical views of the individual in actually existing socialism. This should enable me to look at the following questions. To what extent was it possible to use official structures: the publishing-houses, institutes and officially sanctioned journals, to put forward a critique of the official view and where does this critique stand on the spectrum between dissidence and party loyalty? Is the concept of 'Teilöffentlichkeiten' valid, whereby academic journals provide a forum for a limited number of intellectuals to debate controversial issues, whereas the mass circulation papers and the reference works lay down the conservative official line for general consumption?
4ia. Kuczynski’s thesis of antagonisms in socialism

Perhaps the most controversial of the views put forward by Kuczynski during the Honecker period was that there was an antagonism between the individual and society in actually existing socialism. Before elaborating on this point, it is necessary to set it in the context of the wider debate at the beginning of the seventies as to whether antagonisms could exist in advanced socialism.

In the early seventies the Marxist-Leninist parties of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe focussed upon the question of the dialectic of socialist development towards communism. The Eighth Party Congress of the SED (June 1971), for example, stressed the increasing importance of the materialist dialectic as an ‘element and instrument of Marxist-Leninist ideology, as a philosophical theory of development and a philosophical method of scientifically based, revolutionary thought and action’ (19). The official rejection of the concept ‘socialist human community’ at the Eighth Party Congress implied recognition of existing contradictions, indeed conflicts in GDR society. This Party Congress thus created a favourable climate for discussion amongst social scientists and other intellectuals, notably writers (20), and led to increased realism in the study of social conditions in the GDR.

The debate on the existence of antagonisms in advanced socialist society was sparked off in 1972 by G. Gleserman’s article ‘Widersprüche der gesellschaftlichen Entwicklung im Sozialismus’ in Probleme des Friedens und des Sozialismus (no.3, 1972) and by Kuczynski’s article ‘Gesellschaftliche Widersprüche’ in Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie (1972) (21). The ensuing debate took
place in the journals *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie* and *Forum*. I intend to examine Kuczynski's article in detail and compare his view of contradictions in socialism with the range of views put forward by GDR philosophers, with specific reference to the distinction between nonantagonistic and antagonistic contradictions.

In his article Kuczynski firstly attempted to disprove the widespread notion amongst GDR philosophers that contradictions were essentially a negative phenomenon because they were associated with subjective errors of judgement. He quoted Hegel, Marx, Engels and Lenin to support his positive view of contradictions as a mainspring and necessary condition of all development and progress:

Grotesk ist darum die Vorstellung, daß Widersprüche etwas Negatives für die Entwicklung wären und daß es sie etwa im Sozialismus nicht geben dürfe. Ganz im Gegenteil ist die Zahl der Widersprüche, ist die Häufigkeit der Widersprüche in der Schnelle der Zeitfolge ihrer Lösung und ihres neuen Aufbrechens selbstverständlich im Sozialismus größer als in irgendeiner anderen Gesellschaftsordnung, denn der Sozialismus ist lebendiger und entwickelt sich schneller als irgendeine andere Gesellschaftsordnung, er ist die revolutionärste aller Gesellschaftsordnungen (22).

In his view the SED had the task of not only finding ways and means of resolving contradictions, but also of promoting the laws of social development in such a way that a greater number of contradictions developed faster, were resolved and socialism progressed in the next, higher phase of development towards communism (23).

In the second section of the article Kuczynski examined the distinction between nonantagonistic and antagonistic contradictions. He summarised the traditional distinction between antagonistic and nonantagonistic contradictions made in most reference works with the following quote from
Marxistische Philosophie. Lehrbuch (Berlin, 1967):

Unter antagonistischen Widersprüchen verstehen wir vor allem diejenigen Widersprüche, die Klassenantagonismen zum Ausdruck bringen, also gesellschaftliche Verhältnisse, die auf Ausbeutung einer Klasse durch eine andere, auf Klassenunterdrückung, auf Herrschaft und Knechtschaft beruhen. Nichtantagonistisch werden Widersprüche genannt, wenn sie gesellschaftliche Verhältnisse zum Ausdruck bringen, die durch grundsätzliche Interessengemeinsamkeit verschiedener Klassen und Schichten... oder durch die sich entwickelnde politisch-moralische Einheit des von Ausbeutung befreiten Volkes charakterisiert sind. Das ist der entscheidende und primäre, der Hauptinhalt dieser beiden Kategorien. Antagonistische Widersprüche sind typisch für antagonistische Klassengesellschaften. Nichtantagonistische Widersprüche sind typisch für die sozialistische Gesellschaftsordnung (24).

Whilst Kuczynski agreed with this official distinction between nonantagonistic and antagonistic contradictions in terms of the main antagonism, that is between the bourgeoisie and the working class in capitalism, he pointed out that alongside this main antagonism there was also a multitude of other antagonistic and nonantagonistic contradictions, which were not related to the antagonism between classes in capitalism and on a world scale (25). For him, the material base of society, the economy, was the source of antagonisms, not classes which merely reflected the material base of society (26).

According to the official view, antagonisms generally tended to intensify and thus usually led to conflicts between the opposing sides of the contradiction. Hence antagonisms could only be resolved by violent means, that is war or revolution. Nonantagonistic contradictions, however, did not necessarily develop into conflicts and could therefore be resolved by peaceful means, taking into account the common interests uniting the social forces. In Kuczynski's view, the essential distinction between antagonistic and nonantagonistic contradictions lay in the method
of their resolution; antagonistic contradictions could only be solved by the elimination of one side of the contradiction either by violent or peaceful means, (which in turn altered the other side of the contradiction), and the nonantagonistic through the synthesis of both sides of the contradiction – either through changes on both sides, or on only one side of the contradiction (27). Thus, whilst the official view distinguished between antagonistic and nonantagonistic contradictions in terms of their root causes, Kuczynski distinguished between them in terms of their method of resolution.

Kuczynski then addressed the question of whether antagonistic contradictions still existed in socialist society. From Lenin's statement:

Antagonismus und Widerspruch sind keineswegs ein und dasselbe, der erste verschwindet, der zweite bleibt im Sozialismus bestehen (28)

he concluded that antagonisms would gradually disappear in socialism, that not all antagonisms disappeared with the main antagonism and that antagonisms in socialism were not only of an endogenous nature.

Kuczynski isolated three groups of factors which gave rise to antagonisms in socialism: 1) genetic factors, 2) external and historic factors and 3) political errors, and he examined the first two of the three groups. The fact that he chose not to examine the third subjective factor, political errors, shows that he was seeking to avoid direct criticism of the GDR leadership. He did not wish to imply that the SED leadership was in any way responsible for any antagonism between the individual and society in the GDR.

Kuczynski argued that antagonisms due to genetic factors resulted
from the fact that socialism had developed from capitalism. This
gave rise to antagonisms between socialist principles and phenomena
typical of capitalism, for example the division of labour and
payment according to productivity. The second group of antagonisms
in socialism resulted from the historical world struggle between
capitalism and socialism. He cited as an example of this the
socialist states' investment of resources in defence at the expense
of the economy. Whilst antagonisms arising from genetic factors
would gradually disappear in socialism, those due to external and
historic factors could only be ultimately eradicated with the
eradication of capitalism itself (29).

Kuczynski pointed out that, unlike the capitalist system, socialism
was not permeated by a fundamental antagonism. The antagonisms
within socialism were of a secondary nature and so did not
inevitably develop into conflicts. As socialism grew stronger in
its world struggle against capitalism, the effects of antagonisms
in socialism would be reduced:

Wir sind auf dem Wege, antagonistische Widersprüche
zweiten Grades in solche dritten Grades zu verwandeln.
Wir bringen sie ihrem Verschwinden einen qualitativen
Sprung näher. Dieser Prozeß ist ein Zeichen
außerordentlich gewachsener Stärke des sozialistischen
Lagers (30).

Elsewhere Kuczynski asserted that, although the main antagonisms of
capitalism had been overcome in socialism, new antagonisms had
sprung up in their place, for example certain sections of the
population linked the advantages of socialism with a petty
bourgeois way of life and thinking. As examples of this he pointed
to the negative effect of guaranteed job security upon discipline
at the workplace and the increasing bureaucracy in actually
existing socialism (31). Here he directly challenged the view put
forward by the historian P. Bollhagen and the philosopher G.
Stiehler that the contradictions between socialist democracy and forms of bureaucracy in the GDR were of a nonantagonistic nature (32).

In a 1980 review of Erwin Strittmatter's *Die Wundertäter. Teil III*, Hermann Kant suggested that the official concept of 'Interessenübereinstimmung' had led to an overemphasis upon the collective at the expense of the individual:


In a response to Kant's article Kuczynski elaborated his thesis of an antagonism between the interests of the individual and the interests of society in actually existing socialism. He stated that Marx' and Engels' assertion in *The Communist Manifesto* that society was responsible for the happiness of the individual and vice versa, was not yet valid for actually existing socialism for the following reasons: firstly, because of the class struggle the GDR could seldom pay adequate attention to the happiness of the individual and, secondly, because GDR socialism had not yet reached the stage of development where the happiness of the individual and society necessarily always coincided (34). Thus he was even more radical than Kant in his criticism of the official concept of a basic 'Interessenübereinstimmung' in actually existing socialism.

The logical conclusion of Kuczynski's thesis was that the antagonism existing between the individual and the collective could
be partially resolved by political education, but would only be ultimately resolved by the eradication of capitalism on a world scale. GDR foreign policy under Honecker, however, apparently for the peaceful coexistence of different social systems and for a 'Xoalition der Vernunft'. Otto Reinhold, the President of the Academy of Social Sciences, emphatically rejected, for instance, the concept of exporting the socialist revolution (35). Consequently, according to Kuczynski's logic, individualism was likely to continue to exist in the GDR.

The concept of antagonisms between the individual on the one hand and society and the state on the other would seem to be irreconcilable with the concept of a basic 'Übereinstimmung' of interests. To concede the existence of antagonisms in socialism could also imply a rift between the GDR population and the GDR leadership and hence undermine the legitimacy of the SED. Looking back on the contradictions debate, Franz Loeser, formerly Professor of Ethics and Philosophy at the Humboldt University, noted:

Die Aufregung unter den DDR-Gesellschaftswissenschaftlern war verständlicherweise sehr groß, denn hier ging es um eine politische Grundfrage des realen Sozialismus! Wenn es einen Antagonismus gab, dann könnte dieser letztlich nur zwischen der Diktatur und dem Volk, dem realen und dem wirklichen Sozialismus bestehen (36).

It was therefore not surprising that in the early seventies very few people raised their voices in complete agreement with Kuczynski's thesis. The notable exceptions were Lutz Rathenow and Karl Heinz Dorzäpf in Forum. Lutz Rathenow, later well known as a writer and peace activist, fully agreed with Kuczynski that the role of contradictions was underestimated in the media. He suggested that young people should be encouraged in school to voice constructive criticism, so that they would want to discover and resolve the contradictions in actually existing socialism (37). In
Dorzäpf's view there was an antagonism between an objective equality of opportunity and subjective inequality of opportunity in the GDR educational system due to remaining class differences (38).

There was widespread agreement amongst GDR philosophers that contradictions arising from objective factors were a mainspring of development of socialism and as such should not be regarded as a negative phenomenon, as had often the case in the past (39). However, the historian Bollhagen, and the philosophers Stiehler and G. Pawelzig disagreed with Kuczynski that all contradictions were productive in this way and argued that those arising from subjective factors hindered social development (40). Stiehler also warned against putting too much stress upon contradictions at the expense of the other factors which promoted the development of socialism (41). That Kuczynski's article was one of the factors which ultimately led to the widespread recognition that contradictions existed in socialism and were a positive phenomenon was in itself significant, given the tendency of GDR social scientists to emphasise the harmony within GDR society. Indeed, Kuczynski often stated that the most accurate description of GDR society, warts and all, was to be found in novels rather than in the pages of scientific and philosophical journals (42).

The question dominating the contradictions debate in the early seventies was whether antagonisms could exist in actually existing socialism. At that time the official, dominant view held that antagonisms did exist in socialism during the transition period from capitalism to socialism, reflecting the coexistence of capitalist and socialist sectors of the economy (43). However, these contradictions gradually lost their antagonistic characteristics and became nonantagonistic as socialism developed
(44). According to the official view, since GDR society was developing upon the basis of socialism, not capitalism, there was no social basis for any form of antagonism within the GDR:

Nachdem die sozialistische Gesellschaft in ihre Vollendung eingetreten ist und als entwickelte sozialistische Gesellschaft gestaltet, sind die inneren Widersprüche dieser Gesellschaft keine Antagonismen mehr. Sie können sich auch nicht mehr in Antagonismen verwandeln, weil dafür alle gesellschaftlichen Bedingungen fehlen (45).

However, there were certain inconsistencies in this view. Wolfgang Eichhorn, a philosopher close to the official view, for instance rejected Kuczynski’s thesis of antagonisms in socialism, but in the same article he argued that in the GDR there was still an element of private ownership of the means of production which could provide a basis for phenomena such as exploitation and corruption (46). The conventional Marxist-Leninist view was, it must be remembered, that the main antagonism in capitalism stemmed precisely from the private ownership of the means of production.

Nonantagonistic contradictions were considered by official theorists to be typical for actually existing socialism (47). In terms of the official view laid down in reference works, this meant that contradictions arising in socialist society could be resolved taking into account the common interests in GDR society. Thus it neatly dovetailed with the concept of a fundamental 'Interessenübereinstimmung'. However, it was indirectly conceded that, although there was no objective basis for antagonisms in GDR society, nonantagonistic contradictions in socialist society could sometimes evolve into personal and social conflicts:

Die gesellschaftlichen Konflikte tragen dann aber keinen gesetzlichen Charakter, ihre Entstehung ist nicht unvermeidlich, denn die sozialistische Gesellschaft schafft objektiv die gesellschaftlichen Bedingungen, ihre nichtantagonistischen Entwicklungswidersprüche so zu lösen, daß keine gesellschaftlichen Konflikte auftreten,
wenn den objektiven Entwicklungsgesetzen in der
gesellschaftlichen Tätigkeit nicht entsprochen wurde oder
objektive Widersprüche nicht entsprechend den objektiven
Gesetzen des Sozialismus gelöst werden (48).

Following Kuczynski's article Teichmann and Ruhnon argued in
_Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie_ that the complex linkage of
antagonisms and nonantagonisms in the transitional period from
capitalism to socialism and arising from the world struggle between
capitalism and socialism, was proof that in practice there was no
clear distinction between antagonistic and nonantagonistic
contradictions. They concluded that antagonisms did exist in
actually existing socialism and that to ascertain the specific
nature of a contradiction one had to look at the overall context
(49). They seemed to suggest that contradictions due to genetic
factors were nonantagonistic, whereas those arising from the
influence of capitalism, that is to External and historic factors,
could be antagonistic (50). Thus remnants of nonsocialist ways of
thinking and behaviour, for example religion and bureaucracy, gave
rise to nonantagonistic contradictions in the period of advanced
socialism, where the foundations of socialism had been established.
However, antisocialist ways of thinking and behaviour could lead,
in their view, to antagonisms within socialism (51). They seemed to
suggest that, although there was no general antagonism between the
individual on one hand and society and the state on the other in
actually existing socialism, there could be an antagonism between
certain, isolated individuals and society and/or the state:

_Sicher bedarf es auch keiner weiteren Diskussion, daß
Antagonismen auftreten solange dem Sozialismus feindliche
Denk- und Verhaltensweisen wirksam werden. In
Einzelfällen kann das für noch lange Zeit gelten (52)._

Here they take a clearly different view from the radical critics
who explicitly stated that there was a general antagonism between
the individual and the state in the GDR.
It is interesting to note that in the eighties some official theorists expressed a view very similar to that of Teichmann and Ruhnon. Alfred Kosing, Director of Marxist-Leninist philosophy at the Institute of Social Sciences, for instance, stated:


and Erich Hahn, Director of the Institute for Marxist-Leninist philosophy at the Academy of Social Sciences and after 1981 a full member of the Central Committee, wrote:

Es geht darum, daß der Sozialismus nicht durch eine undurchlässige Scheidewand von der alten Welt getrennt ist. Er entwickelt sich im unerbittlichen und unversöhnlichen Kampf gegen sie. Die Wahl der Mittel und der Schauplätze dieses Kampfes hängt nicht nur von ihm ab. Vor allem deshalb kann keine ein für allemal feststehende Grenzlinie zwischen Nichtantagonismus und Antagonismus angegeben werden (54).

However, in the same decade Hager, Secretary for Science and Culture in the Central Committee, continued to publicly express the view that genetic, external and historic factors did not lead to antagonisms in socialism. The influence of capitalism could, in his view, only lead to antagonisms in socialism giving rise to counterrevolutionary activities, in an extreme situation if the basis of the socialist society was threatened, that is if forms of capitalist ownership of the means of production were reestablished and the socialist party no longer fulfilled its leading role in society (55). According to these terms, antagonisms clearly existed in Poland during the 1980 crisis. In December 1980 Kuczynski wrote in his diary that the events in Poland that year had strengthened his view that antagonisms existed in socialism (56).
Given the political implications of Kuczynski's thesis outlined above, it is not surprising that Hager and other theorists at the highest levels of the SED continued to publicly proclaim that antagonisms did not exist in actually existing socialism. Loeser has suggested, however, that even these theorists tacitly accepted Kuczynski's thesis of antagonisms in actually existing socialism:

> Als die Diskussion zu dieser Frage, hinter verschlossenen Türen, versteht sich, nicht abbrechen wollte, sprach Hager ein Machtwort. In der DDR gäbe es keinen Antagonismus, ließe er die Gesellschaftswissenschaftler wissen, und damit war die Diskussion in der DDR beendet. Aber offensichtlich nicht der Antagonismus, denn in der philosophischen Literatur der Sowjetunion breitete sich der Gedanke vom Antagonismus im realen Sozialismus, besonders nach dem Aufstand in Polen, immer weiter aus und griff schließlich über auf die philosophische Literatur in den anderen sozialistischen Ländern, einschließlich der DDR. Und diesmal sprach Hager kein Machtwort. Die These vom Antagonismus im realen Sozialismus blieb unwidersprochen (57).

This example shows the appropriateness of the concept of 'Teilöffentlichkeiten' to describe the different levels of discussion in GDR society under Honecker.

Thus in the seventies Kuczynski's thesis of antagonisms in actually existing socialism was first adopted by a minority of theorists in the journals *Forum* and *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie* which discussed views other than those dominant in the SED and then explicitly and tacitly adopted by proponents of the official view in the eighties. What caused this apparent shift in the official view after 1971? Loeser, as indicated above, has implied that the SED found it increasingly impossible to sustain its resistance to Kuczynski's thesis given the dynamic nature of the contradictions debate and the Polish crisis. Another factor also mentioned by Loeser is the debate in Eastern Europe and particularly in the Soviet Union. It is interesting to note that at the Plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the CPSU in November 1982 Yuri Andropov
referred to the presence of antagonisms in the Soviet Union, which could only be overcome by economic reforms (58).

In conclusion there is no doubt that Kuczynski achieved his aim of promoting debate in the GDR. This was in itself no mean feat. Some teachers wrote to *Forum* complaining that the discussion had spread confusion amongst their pupils (59). Others voiced the fear that a public discussion of the contradictions and conflicts in socialism played into the hands of the ideological enemy (60). Hahn, for example, took the view that the West abused the contradictions debate, implying that objective contradictions were really subjective, that is due to errors by the party, and that nonantagonistic contradictions were antagonistic. He concluded:

*Es ist deshalb nicht nur eine theoretische oder definitorische Frage, den nichtantagonistischen Charakter der Widersprüche des Sozialismus herauszuarbeiten. In der philosophischen Arbeit werden wir mehr Augenmerk darauf zu lenken haben, den veränderten Charakter der Widersprüche des Sozialismus und der grundlegenden Wesenszüge unserer Ordnung aufzudecken und darzustellen (61).*

The debate generally heightened the awareness that a precise description and analysis of contradictions and conflicts in GDR society was needed. Hager made the following appeal to GDR philosophers:

*Philosophen und Propagandisten unserer Partei haben in den letzten Jahren eine beträchtliche Arbeit geleistet, um den Charakter und die Rolle der dialektischen Widersprüche im Sozialismus zu klären und ihnen das Stigma des Negativen zu nehmen. Es genügt aber nicht, dabei stehenzubleiben, obwohl auch in dieser Hinsicht noch qualifiziertere Anstrengungen notwendig sind, denn manche beschränken sich immer noch auf eine nur formale Anerkennung der Existenz von Widersprüchen. Es kommt aber darauf an, detaillierter in das Wesen, in den Inhalt, in die Bewegungsformen und in die Wirkungsweise der bestimmenden Widersprüche der sozialistischen Gesellschaft einzudringen, und vor allem kommt es darauf an, die Wege zu ihrer Lösung im Interesse des weiteren gesellschaftlichen Fortschritts zu bestimmen. Das ist eine notwendige Voraussetzung, um sie bewußt als Triebkräfte des gesellschaftlichen Fortschritts nutzen zu können.*
Finally, the discussion revealed the inadequacy of the official theoretical distinction between antagonistic and nonantagonistic contradictions (63).

In 1986 a key work, *Der Staat im politischen System der DDR*, was published which again focussed upon the question of interests in GDR society. Its authors made a distinction between antagonistic contradictions stemming from capitalist society and still existent in socialism and nonantagonistic or functional contradictions. Whilst the latter were the driving force of social development, the former were disruptive. Functional contradictions were expressed in the range of social interests in socialism which the socialist state had to carefully balance. In so doing, the state developed policies based upon the fundamental interests of society as a whole. At the same time it had to assess the political significance of these conflicts of interests and set its priorities accordingly (64).

The writers conceded that because of the interference from Western states or of insufficient attention given to a problem, contradictions could sometimes be exacerbated and become conflicts to the point of social crisis. They saw such conflicts as an indication of ineffectiveness in the political system which needed to be promptly remedied.

They pointed to the fundamental contradiction between the inequality and equality of individuals in GDR society. On the one hand, all individuals were equal in terms of the ownership of the means of production. On the other hand, GDR society continued to promote differentiation in terms of the distribution of consumer
goods according to one's productivity. These differences and the resulting conflicts of interest were unlikely to be eliminated in the foreseeable future. However, they considered this differentiation process a positive factor which promoted the economic and social development of the GDR at the stage of advanced socialism (65). Similarly, a group of GDR sociologists led by Manfred Lötsch argued on the basis of empirical evidence that the increasingly evident process of differentiation in the GDR in line with the development of the division of labour and income-differentiation was a positive phenomenon in that it stimulated individual performance and social mobility in the GDR (66).

The authors of Der Staat im politischen System further pointed to a contradiction between the need for expert knowledge in an increasingly complex world and the need to widen socialist democracy to include larger sections of the population within the democratic process. In this context they conceded that there was a danger of excessive bureaucracy, but they denied the Western view of a self-perpetuating bureaucratic and centralist management apparatus.

They rejected a crude opposition of consciousness and spontaneity. Spontaneity could, in their view, be the incipient form and beginning of the development of socialist consciousness. The spontaneous thoughts and actions of citizens should therefore have their place in a system of socialist democracy. They warned that if this was not the case, the socialist state apparatus could become alienated from the bulk of the GDR population (67).
4ib. Heuer's concept of interests

In the work *Demokratie und Recht im neuen ökonomischen System der Planung und Leitung der Volkswirtschaft* (1965), Heuer criticised the official view that there was a 'unified subject' (einheitliches Subjekt) in socialist society, based on the concept of a complete identity of non-conflicting interests because he believed that this view necessarily led to a denial of the democratic needs of the masses (68). In 1967 he reiterated this view:


Heuer's book promoted a controversial discussion on the nature of interests in socialist society which, according to the GDR theorists Quilitzsch, Segert and Will, led in the sixties to the theoretical insight that society in its totality was a unified subject, (einheitliches gesellschaftliches Gesamtssubjekt), which was constantly transformed through the political mediation of conflicts between the autonomous parts of this unified subject and that individual and collective interests had an objective basis (70). Writing in the eighties they noted that the questions regarding the various interests within socialist society raised by Heuer in 1965 were still topical and that social scientists such as Lötsch working on the issue of social inequality in GDR society had only just begun to lay the basis for providing adequate scientific answers to such questions (71).

Heuer's concept of interests did not fundamentally change after 1967. According to Heuer, social interests were inextricably linked with collective and individual interests. Once formulated, each
kind of collective or individual interest was inevitably a constituent part of the social interest. Thus Heuer argued that there was no such thing as a 'pure social interest', totally separable from other interests, and correspondingly all collective and individual interests were influenced by the social interest (72). Heuer believed that socialism was the first social order in which social, collective and individual interests could objectively coincide, a statement which did not preclude the existence of conflicts between these interests at certain levels (73).

Given the socialist ownership of the means of production, social interests had predominance over other interests (74). However, in his view, social interests could only be successfully realised if the collective and individual interests took the same direction (75). In other words, the immediate, daily interests of the individual should be taken into account and could not be totally ignored. Heuer cited the principle of payment according to work done, (Leistungsprinzip), as an example of this linking of personal and social interests in the economic sphere.

Like Kuczynski, Heuer stated that in actually existing socialism it was impossible to accommodate all individual interests. Given the conflicts of interests which, in his view, would exist until communism had been established (76), it was necessary to promote the individual interests which coincided with social interests and to suppress other individual interests which could not be so easily integrated. Like the official theorists and the radical critics, he made it clear that individual interests should not be accommodated to the detriment of wider, social interests (77).

In Gesellschaftliche Gesetze und politische Organisation (1974) and
other earlier works Heuer generally used the official term 'Interessenübereinstimmung' in reference to the interests in socialism (78). In the later work Recht und Wirtschaftsleitung im Sozialismus (1982) and later articles he preferred the concept of a 'conflicting unity of interests', (eine widersprüchliche Interesseneinheit) (79). In a footnote he explicitly stated that this term did not denote a conflict between social and individual interests at a general level, but rather between the interests of society and those of a specific individual, namely conflicts at a specific level. Heuer was careful to note that potential conflicts of interest, that is between the state and an enterprise or between management and workers, were not of an antagonistic nature (80).

For Heuer, the political organisation in socialism had the key task of consciously resolving conflicts of interests (81). Indeed, he partially justified the continued existence of the state in socialism in terms of an apparatus to enforce the realisation of social interests (82). He warned that if conflicts of interests were not recognised and solved within the framework of the political organisation, individuals would take it upon themselves to resolve them. He foresaw this leading to individualism and 'negative spontaneity', both of which would hinder the progress of society towards communism (83).

Heuer stated that in socialism there would always be a certain degree of spontaneity, where individuals, motivated by their specific considerations and interests, acted without foreseeing the social implications of their action and where these motivating interests were not determined by capitalist ideology. He agreed with the official theorists Stiehler and Wolfgang Eichhorn that spontaneity was not necessarily a negative phenomenon in the
context of socialism:

Die gesellschaftliche Wirkung derartiger spontaner Abläufe hängt von ihrer Einordnung in den Gesamtprozeß durch die politische Organisation des Sozialismus ab. Ob eine derartige Spontaneität negativ oder positiv wirkt, wird also letztlich durch die Leistungsfähigkeit dieser Organisation bestimmt, die zugleich das Hinüberwachsen der Spontaneität in Bewußtheit bewirkt. Voraussetzung für diese Einordnung ist aber wiederum die Zunkenntnisnahme der spontanen Abläufe, die Aufdeckung entsprechender Gesetzmäßigkeiten (84).
Heuer argued that social goals were laid down in legal norms, specifically in the form of subjective rights, that is rights belonging to the individual, and duties, and that the function of subjective rights was to protect and promote the individual's interests which coincided with the basic social interests by laying down duties or obligations for other individuals or state organs (85). The system of obligations was based upon the premise that deviations from the social interests in one's actual or perceived interest were possible and had to be curtailed. In his view, in advanced socialism the law was a necessary expression of conflicts, and legal sanctions the means of resolving these conflicts (86). Thus, more explicitly than other legal theorists, Heuer explained the necessity for subjective rights in socialism in terms of a conflict-model. The invalidity of a conflict-model for socialism was, as will be seen later in this chapter, the main argument used by many official theorists in the sixties against the acceptance of the concept of 'socialist subjective rights'.

He further argued that the rights and obligations of the individual should be clearly defined so that he could participate as fully as possible in the formulation and realisation of social interests. This was particularly in the economic sphere (87). He stated that as management processes became more complex, as initiative and creativity became an increasingly essential resource in the production process, so it would be increasingly necessary to formalise the relations between legal subjects in order to guarantee their cooperation and the realisation of the social interests. In other words it was necessary to expand the system of subjective rights (88).
He considered that because social interests were formulated in legal norms, these norms were binding on all sections of society, including state organs. Thus legality (Gesetzhlichkeit) was objectively needed in socialist society (89). In this context he quoted the following from the Marxistisch-leninistische allgemeine Theorie des Staates und des Rechts. Volume 1. Grundlegende Institutionen und Begriffe:

Die Mißachtung der sozialistischen Gesetze, der Rechte und Interessen der Werktätigen, das Streben, das Gesetz unter irgendeinem Vorwand zu umgehen, sind Erscheinungsformen einer niedrigen Kultur (90).

Perhaps indirectly criticising the well documented violations of the petitions procedures, he reminded the reader that the behaviour of the state organs influenced the citizen's own attitude towards the law (91). If the principle of legality was violated, he argued, the legal system would lose credibility in the eyes of its citizens (92).

He advocated well defined administrative procedures as a guarantee of subjective rights (93). In particular, he spoke out in favour of the reinstitution of the administrative courts (94). He also criticised the fact that in appeals procedures cases of alleged violations of subjective rights were investigated internally by the bodies involved themselves. In his view, in appeals procedures cases of alleged violations of subjective rights should be dealt with by an independent body (95). Official theorists, however, dismissed the concept of independent courts and the corresponding concept of a separation of powers as bourgeois.

For Heuer, subjective rights and duties demarcated the scope of the individual's freedom of action and decision-making. They were thus a prerequisite for the development of the individual's creativity,
initiative and expertise (96). Subjective rights had a social basis in that the development of the individual and the increasing satisfaction of his needs were in the social interest (97).

Heuer also discussed the 'protective function' of the individual's subjective rights. However, here, in his view, subjective rights essentially had the role of promoting progressive modes of thought and behaviour in the face of bureaucracy and other negative attitudes of the central authorities: they were therefore ultimately always directed towards social interests (98). For him, their function was not to defend the individual's interests, perceived or actual, against the social interests.

He believed that there was a trend towards the extension of subjective rights, particularly in administrative law. This branch of law was, in his view, particularly important since it directly regulated the relations between citizens and state organs (99).

The concept of socialist democracy was a central theme linking Heuer's works Gesellschaftliche Gesetze und politische Organisation, Recht und Wirtschaftsleitung im Sozialismus and a more recent article 'Zur Geschichte des marxistisch-leninistischen Demokratiebegriffs' (1986), and he considered that this was one of the most important questions confronting GDR theorists (100). In his view, the fact that most people in the world claim to be committed to democracy demonstrated the real, deep-rooted human need for control over one's immediate living conditions and over the political and state decision-making processes:

Solang es Politik gibt, ist das Bedürfnis der Volksmassen nach Demokratie eine notwendige Triebkraft des politischen Lebens. . . (Das Bedürfnis nach Demokratie ist) unvergleichlich gleich den Bedürfnissen nach Essen, Kleidung, Wohnung, Arbeit und Kultur und gleich ihnen ein Versprechen auf den Sieg des Sozialismus und
Kommunismus (101).

This is very similar to Gorbachev's famous statement that the Soviet people needed democracy as it needed air to breathe.

The implication behind Heuer's discussion of socialist democracy was that the individual in GDR socialism was not given sufficient opportunity to express his views and influence decision-making in the economic sphere. He made the point, for instance, that the efficiency of political organisation in socialism and of the socialist state was partially determined by the level of the actual participation of the individual (his own emphasis). He added that participation of course required that the individual be adequately informed (102). The individual had to have the opportunity to participate in decision-making if he was to see himself as the owner of the means of production and if he was to identify with the socialist state (103). There are clear parallels between this indirect critique of actually existing socialism and the radical critics' arguments that most individuals had only restricted opportunities in GDR society to take part in the decision-making processes. However, unlike Heuer, the radical critics put this down to the hierarchical structure of GDR society based on the division of labour.

In his work Demokratie und Recht im Neuen Ökonomischen System der Planung und Leitung der Volkswirtschaft, Heuer called for the recognition of autonomous levels of decision-making and action for individuals and groups and for the possibility of them democratically forming their own organisations and regulating their own affairs. Although, in his view, management and self-organisation, the leadership of society on a scientific basis and democratic participation were not necessarily mutually exclusive,
there was potential for conflict between them (104). Only two years later Heuer modified this direct criticism of the official concept of democratic centralism. He distinguished between a narrower and wider definition of socialist democracy. In the narrower definition he continued to differentiate between the objective interests of individuals, groups and society as a whole, whilst giving the following as the wider definition of socialist democracy:

Die Verwirklichung der Interessen des Volkes durch das Volk, also durch die Arbeiterklasse und ihre Verbündeten, durch seine Entscheidungen, mit Hilfe seines Staates als Bestandteil der Demokratie (105).

In Gesellschaftliche Gesetze und politische Organisation he reaffirmed the role of the state and party in the building of socialism:


From the late sixties onwards Heuer held the view that increased loyalty and discipline on the one hand and initiative and creativity on the other were required of the individual if progress was to be made in all areas of social life. However, he no longer considered that there was necessarily a contradiction between these two elements of democratic centralism (107). He constantly stressed that centralized planning and socialist democracy were equally
important in the building of socialist society (108). He nevertheless warned that overcentralization of decision-making could be to the detriment of collective and individual interests and could restrict the participation of the individual in the decision-making processes (109). In 1986 he called for an analysis of the relationship between centralism and bureaucracy and of ways of overcoming bureaucracy (110).

Heuer believed that an extension of socialist democracy would involve the population influencing the state in the process of defining the social interests as well as individual and collective interests (111). In his eyes, an expansion of socialist democracy would not only be a means of overcoming bureaucratic tendencies and the dangers of a self-recruiting administrative elite, but, more fundamentally, it would nurture the development of individuality as a productive force. He reminded the reader that, despite Western propaganda and ideological misconceptions in the GDR itself, the development of individuality was from the outset a basic goal of Marxism. Here he referred in particular to the following passage in *Manifest der kommunistischen Partei*:

> An die Stelle der alten bürgerlichen Gesellschaft mit ihren Klassen und Klassen-Gegensätzen tritt eine Association, worin die freie Entwicklung eines Jeden, die Bedingung für die freie Entwicklung Aller ist (112)

and to an address given by the Central Committee to the Tenth Party Congress in 1986, according to which:

> Die sozialistische Gesellschaft wird selbst um so reicher, je reicher sich die Individualität ihrer Mitglieder entfaltet (113).

For him, the scientific-technological revolution both made possible and required the development of individuality. Like Lötsch, he implied that social differences could be a driving force in the development of socialism (114).
In his view, the real needs of individuals could not be recognised or satisfied without the active and conscious participation of an ever increasing number of people (115). Therefore the individual should, where possible, always be consulted:

Niemand geht davon aus, daß alles und jedes demokratisch beraten werden kann. Soweit aber solche Beratungen durchgeführt werden, die Werktätigen nach ihren Meinungen, nach ihren Vorschlägen gefragt werden, ist es entscheidend, daß diese Meinungen, daß diese Vorschläge ernst genommen werden. Die Entfaltung der sozialistischen Demokratie, ihre organisatorisch, auch rechtlich gesicherte Festigung ist eine wesentliche Voraussetzung für eine höhere Befriedigung der Bedürfnisse. Sie ist gleichzeitig von erheblicher Bedeutung für die höhere Wirksamkeit des Leitungssystems und für die Erhöhung der politischen Stabilität (116).

However, he was accused of ignoring the basic contradiction between the necessity of drawing the population more directly into the management processes and the need for a centralized, well-educated and qualified management (117).

Drawing upon Lenin's writings, Heuer also later put forward the thesis that as long as the state apparatus existed, there could not be full democracy in socialism (118). He claimed that socialist theorists had lost sight of this fact during the transitional period from capitalism to socialism. They had equated the dictatorship of the proletariat with socialist democracy, ignored the elements of continuity between Western-style democracy and socialist democracy and neglected the specific issues arising from the dialectic between the individual and the state. According to him, in the GDR such thinking resulted from Ulbricht's concept of the 'socialist human community' and ideological pressures from outside the GDR. In the sixties, however, the ground was also laid for a more differentiated concept of democracy in the GDR. In this context Heuer mentioned the declaration of the State Council on October 4, 1960 and the publication of his work Demokratie und
Recht im neuen ökonomischen System der Planung und Leitung der Volkswirtschaft (1965)). However, after 1971 there was only very slow change in the official view on the question of democracy. Indeed, writing in 1986 Heuer thought that there was still inadequate discussion of the concept of democracy in general constitutional law, and saw his works as a contribution to the development of this concept (119).

Like the other theorists examined in this thesis, he did not call for a restoration of Western-style democracy in their country. He clearly stated that socialist society had to develop its own form of democracy in line with its needs, interests and situation (120).
4id. Kuczynski on human rights

It is perhaps not surprising that Kuczynski, a founder-member of the 'GDR Committee for Human Rights', devoted one of his works, Menschenrechte und Klassenrechte (1978), to human rights issues and that he was one of the few theorists to broach the thorny subject of freedom of movement in the GDR media. In 1980 the legal theorist Poppe publicly acknowledged Kuczynski's contribution to the formulation of a socialist human rights theory by making the whole human rights debate more accessible to other disciplines (121). In the following section I will examine Kuczynski's statements on the theory and practice of human rights and compare them with the views of legal theorists close to the dominant official view outlined in chapter two and with the dissident views in chapter three.

In Menschenrechte und Klassenrechte Kuczynski wrote that the human rights which had been proclaimed in capitalism as external or natural rights of the individual, were increasingly realised as a system of basic rights in actually existing socialism. This system of basic rights would gradually be transformed into a system of basic needs, all of which would be adequately satisfied in communism (122).

In the above-mentioned work Kuczynski contributed to the debate about the continuity / discontinuity of basic rights from capitalism to socialism. Firstly, Kuczynski observed that Marx and Engels did not envisage the existence of 'human rights' in socialism, because for them 'human rights' were linked with the idea of the inalienable, God-given, natural and innate and therefore a product of bourgeois ideology. According to Kuczynski, the concept of 'human rights' had never been valid because there had never been one set of rights applicable to mankind in its
totality. A set of laws and basic rights could only be valid for members of a specific society. He therefore regarded the continuity/discontinuity question as superfluous as there could be no continuity or discontinuity between bourgeois 'human rights' and socialist rights, that is between what he considered to be a fiction and a reality (123). This minority view that there was no continuity between Western human rights and socialist human rights was shared by a leading legal theorist, Klenner (124).

Official theorists regularly vaunted the achievements of the GDR in providing work and education for all. Proceeding from the principle that full employment and free education for all were 'objective laws', (objektive Gesetzmäßigkeiten), in actually existing socialism, Kuczynski argued that it was nonsensical to proclaim a 'right to work' or a 'right to education' in this social order. Society led by the SED had rather a duty to provide the conditions in which these objective laws could have full effect:

Es wäre unsinnig zu behaupten, die Menschen hätten im Sozialismus ein Recht darauf, daß die Gesetze der sozialistischen Gesellschaft sich durchsetzen. Wohl aber sollen sie an sich selbst die Forderung stellen, sollen sie sich die Aufgabe stellen, den Gesetzen des Sozialismus zum vollen Durchbruch zu verhelfen (125).

He agreed with Klenner that the 'right to work' in actually existing socialism was not merely the right to paid employment, but the right to work suited to one's abilities and talents (126). However, he went further and concluded that the right to work should be identical with the right to the fulfilment of one's potential, a right which he believed would be increasingly realised, but in the sphere of free time (127). As for the 'right to education', he stated that in the context of education the individual had technically only one right, namely the right to criticise the implementation of educational policy (128).
observed that, given the underdeveloped social awareness of some individuals in actually existing socialism, certain basic rights and basic guarantees such as job-security could be abused and become an obstacle to social progress (129).

Kuczynski argued that, given the world struggle between capitalism and socialism and the underdeveloped individual awareness of what was 'socially necessary' within the GDR itself, not all decisions could be fully and democratically discussed in actually existing socialism. Indeed, where the class struggle was involved, decisions had to be taken by a few and implemented by others in a disciplined fashion (130). To this extent he seemed to adhere to the official interpretation of the Hegelian concept of 'Einsicht in die Notwendigkeit' and the official concept of democratic centralism. However, he did acknowledge that democratic centralism could lead to overcentralisation in the economic and cultural spheres (131) and, like Bahro, stated that this inhibited initiative and democracy. Furthermore, Kuczynski specifically stated that bureaucracy was an antagonistic contradiction in actually existing socialism (132).

Like the official theorists, he seemed to have an instrumental understanding of political and civil freedoms:

Freiheit allen, die auf der Basis der revolutionären gesellschaftlichen Verhältnisse kritisieren. Keine Freiheit den Feinden des neuen gesellschaftlichen Systems (133).

He argued that only in communism, when all individuals had acquired the necessary insight into what was 'socially necessary', would there be absolute freedom of the press (134).

In an interview published in Sinn und Form Kuczynski tackled the controversial question of restricted travel opportunities for young
GDR citizens. Although Kuczynski expressed his sympathy with the desire of young people to travel, he thought that it was necessary to implement certain security measures and protect young GDR citizens from Western exploitation. Whilst he claimed to lack the competence to judge on security matters, he tended to support the cautious approach of the GDR leadership on this question (135).

In conclusion, whilst Kuczynski challenged certain academic points relating to official human rights theory, he generally supported the SED policy on human rights. He blamed existing restrictions upon basic rights on genetic and external factors of the development of GDR socialism, namely on factors beyond the direct control of the political leadership.
Die Kuczynski on the opportunities for self-development in actually existing socialism

Kuczynski believed that the new social conditions in socialism were already forcing individuals to change their attitudes and behaviour, a process which would become far more apparent in communism (136). He cited as an example of this the effect of job-security on the individual in actually existing socialism:

Der Mensch wird gefestigt und reifer, unbekümmert, interessenreicher, im genauen Sinn des Wortes geistreicher - selbst wenn wir wünschen müssen, daß dieser Prozeß schneller vor sich ginge (137).

However, as was seen above, he also noted that the job-security in the GDR also led to a lack of work discipline. He was in complete agreement with the officially endorsed socialist theory that the all-round development of the individual was a condition for the development of socialist production, socialist democracy and the new relations in socialist society (138). However, he disagreed with official theorists that the majority of citizens in socialist society had already attained their full potential and acquired the 'status' of socialist personality. For him, the universal fulfilment of the individual was the goal of a higher stage of communism (139). He argued that to unrealistically assess the level of social progress in this context was to seriously underestimate the task facing the education and propaganda system in socialist society, which were still battling against the remnants of bourgeois thought and behaviour and subversive Western influences (140).

In 1978 Kuczynski further explored the opportunities for self-development in actually existing socialism when he initiated a debate about the nature of work in socialism in the magazine Forum.
In his first article he made his main point that the constant, rapid increase in productivity and technological progress did not in themselves constitute social progress from the viewpoint of the individual (141). Once the primary needs of the population had been satisfied, the increase in free time resulting from technological progress would be the precondition for the comprehensive education and full development of the individual's potential (142). He stated that, given the negative aspects of work in actually existing socialism, for example long working hours and heavy or monotonous work, the individual could not fulfil himself in this sphere (143). Elsewhere, he stated that he found it difficult to accept the official use of the term 'Kultur' to refer to the nature of work in actually existing socialism:

Sie ist entweder langweilig oder schwer. Und selbst wenn bestimmte mechanische Griffe gelernt werden müssen, die auch Affen lernen...so würde ich das nicht als Kultur bezeichnen. Auch Ratten gewöhnen sich an alle möglichen Komplikationen, um an ihr Futter zu kommen (144).

Indeed, like Havemann, he stated that even if work within the sphere of production was creative or character-building, it could not provide the conditions for the all-round development of the individual (145).

Kuczynski stated that in communism free time would become the primary work time. Like Havemann, he used the term work here in the sense of activity. In communist society the individual would develop his full potential by engaging in a wide range of activities. Furthermore, he shared Havemann's view that the individual would be mainly interested in cultural and scientific activities (146) and would merely perform a control function in the production process. Indeed, Kuczynski envisaged that in developed communism individuals would only work one or two years in
industrial production during their lifetime and subsequently pursue a variety of careers (147). Thus in communism the boundaries between work time and free time would disappear; what was currently considered free time would also be time for work in the sense of activity, whilst what was currently considered work time would gradually disappear with the complete automation of the production process (148). This is very close to Havemann's utopian vision in Morgen. Die Industriegesellschaft am Scheideweg.

Several Forum readers rushed to the defence of the official line on the nature of work in socialism and communism. The readers Uwe-Eckart Böttger and Dr Lutz Hoyer rejected Kuczynski's implied anthesis between free time and work time and defended the official view that in communism the individual's primary need, self-fulfilment through work, would be satisfied in the sphere of production (149). Professor Alfred Lemnitz criticised Kuczynski for looking upon work in production as merely a means of acquiring the material basis for living and of fulfilling the 'most primitive needs' of the individual. He implied that Kuczynski as an intellectual gave undue priority to non-manual labour:

Er überträgt auch den Gegensatz zwischen geistiger und körperlicher Arbeit auf den Kommunismus, wenn er uns den Wissenschaftler und Kulturschaffenden als den Repräsentanten der Arbeit, die zum Lebensbedürfnis geworden ist, vorstellt, der sich zwar bei der Arbeiterklasse bedankt, sie im Übrigen aber wegen 'der oft noch schweren und monotonen Arbeit so gar nicht weniger Arbeiter in der Produktion oder im Handeln' bedauert (150).

This same criticism could, of course, be made of Havemann's utopian concept of work.

Lemnitz believed that in communism not all individuals would be primarily artists or scientists, with production work a secondary activity in their lives. As for actually existing socialism, he
believed that workers were not only encouraged to develop material and cultural needs that went far beyond their most basic needs, but that they were also called upon to defeat capitalism in the spheres of production and technology. In this context, he argued, the work and role of intellectuals, isolated as they were from the production process and entirely absorbed by non-productive activity, and yet held up by Kuczynski as the ideal for all individuals in communism, paled into insignificance.

The following year Hanke apparently reaffirmed the dominant official view on the function of labour in socialism:

Art Arbeit und nicht die Freizeit ist und bleibt das Hauptfeld schöpferischer Naturaneignung und gesellschaftlicher Veränderung! (151).

He criticised Kuczynski's statements for being based upon a pre-industrial cultural ideal which, with its vision of the multi-faceted activity of the individual, was increasingly irrelevant in an age of specialisation. Bahro's proposals laid down in Die Alternative (1978) could of course be criticised on the same grounds. Hanke believed that these 'utopian' visions of the function of work in socialist/communist society would get short shrift from those directly involved in the production process (152). The Western theorist Gransow believes that Hanke completely missed the point here, namely that Kuczynski's views were based upon a post-industrial, rather than a pre-industrial ideal. They demonstrated a 'change in values' similar to that happening in the West, resulting from industrialisation, an improved level of education and changes in technology (153).

It is interesting to note that others involved in the Forum debate took a more differentiated view. Christoph Links criticised Kuczynski for taking a too narrow view of social progress and made
the points that the individual could only achieve full self-
development in all spheres and that the social relations which
develop in the work process were an element of social progress (154).

In the closing article of the Forum debate the cultural theorist
Lothar Kühne rejected both of the extreme viewpoints, namely that
the sphere of the all-round development of the individual was
restricted to either the realm of production on the one hand, or to
the realm of free time on the other:

> Denn das Motiv der Universalität bedeutet doch, daß die
einzelnen Individuen in allen gesellschaftlich
wesentlichen Tätigkeitsformen individuell entfaltet sind.
Nicht in dem einfachen und einfältigen Sinn, daß nun
jeder alles, beliebiges tut, aber eindeutig in dem Sinne,
daß bestimmte Individuen nicht nur auf bestimmte
Grundformen der Arbeit festgelegt sind (155).

Kühne pointed out that the abolition of the division of labour
based upon class or stratum in the second stage of communism could
only be achieved if all individuals found fulfilment in their work.
Like Bahro and Heuer, he warned that individuals not stimulated by
their work would tend to compensate for this in their free time. He
foresaw the continued existence of a division of labour for certain
work operations and of negative elements in the content of work
even in the second stage of communism. He therefore came to the
same conclusion as Bahro that party policy should not only be aimed
at an extension of free time, but, more importantly, at developing
the communist nature of work. In his view this required the
development of productive forces. Finally, he called for a more
differentiated view of work in actually existing socialism (156).

In 1983 Karl-Heinz Schiller, Chairman of the Leipzig Area Committee
of IG Metall, provoked a controversy in the trade-union paper
Tribüne by expressing the view that shift-work was not a desirable
goal in socialism, a view expressed earlier by Bahro in *Die Alternative*. According to Schiller, shift-work was temporarily necessary in the GDR in order to secure a high standard of living, but GDR scientists and technologists were already exploring possible alternatives. The Head of the Labour and Wages Section of the Federal Committee of the FDGB, Gerhard Moth, called Schiller's comments misleading and incorrect and reaffirmed the official view that shift-work was not an interim solution, but rather the long-term deliberate use of available resources to increase efficiency and productivity in the GDR. Shift-work was therefore in the interest of both society and the individual (157).

In the following section I intend to consider Kuczynski's views on the GDR educational system, drawn from his long experience of lecturing. Like Bahro, he clearly believed that the system inhibited the full self-development of the individual and was therefore in need of reform. He frequently criticised the GDR educational system on two counts: firstly for producing over-specialized graduates and secondly for failing to meet the needs of the most talented students.

He put the technology-gap existing between the GDR and the most advanced Western countries partly down to the fact that young people were not encouraged to develop their creativity and own ideas at an earlier stage in their educational career. He believed that the GDR educational system under Honecker produced passive, obedient pupils capable of retaining vast volumes of facts, in short, mediocrity. He noted that unassumingness and a quiet temperament seemed to be common criteria used in the selection of university students (158). Elsewhere in a review of Strittmatter's *Die Wundertäter*, Kuczynski examined the all-pervasive mediocrity in
GDR society which is criticised by Strittmatter's young heroine Eva:

Aber wogegen sich Eva mit Recht wendet, ist das durch Planung gesicherte Mittelmaß und 'stabile Gleichgewicht' des Lebens, das wir unserer Jugend vorsetzen. Man kommt kontinuierlich vorwärts, verdient entsprechend mehr, kann sich genau ausrechnen, wann die Frage 'Kind oder Auto' steht, und kennt sehr genau die gesellschaftlichen Verhaltensregeln, die notwendig sind, um all das kontinuierlich zu sichern. Alles, was die sozialistische Revolution beinhaltet. . .wird als 'gefühlvolle Romantik', wenn freundlich geurteilt wird, oder als gefährlicher Anarchismus abgetan oder auch langsam durch den Druck der Mittelmäßigkeit, durch Trägheit des Gedankens, Bürokratie, Langeweile, Überfütterung mit Dogmen und Phrasen oder auch durch kleinbürgerliche Konformität, durch falsche Kompromisse um des gesicherten Fortkommens willen so oft ersticken (159).

It is interesting to note that Bahro also argued that the state and party apparatus actively encouraged this kind of mediocrity in all spheres of life in order to maintain the status quo in the GDR (160).

Kuczynski called for more freedom for the development of individual thought in the educational system. Citing the appeal of Margot Honecker, the Education Minister, at the Ninth SED Congress to teachers to promote school pupils' ability to develop their own ideas, Kuczynski argued that instead of a highly rigid, centralized syllabus, the teacher should have some lee-way in developing courses. At the tertiary level of education he suggested that the number of compulsory lectures should be reduced so that students could attend a wider variety of lectures, thus broadening their education and have more time for private study (161). Although he acknowledged that the officially much-vaunted principle of collective study and communal living was character-building in certain respects, he believed there should also be time for private study and contemplation (162). Furthermore, he suggested that a system of seminars and colloquia would be more likely to promote
discussion and develop the ability to apply one's knowledge than the lecture system (163). He suggested that these measures would counteract the tendency towards 'Verschulung' in university education (164). In a similar vein, Poppe conceded that there had been a trend to rigidity in the administrative structures of the educational system with the concomitant risk of a certain 'regimentation' and 'levelling out' (165).

Kuczynski also joined others in criticising the university education system for producing narrow-minded specialists (166). He considered the Marxist-Leninist element common to all university courses, which effectively gave scientists a certain social science training, to be a step in the right direction and regretted that there was no equivalent for social scientists (167).

In 1973 Kuczynski proposed that the universities should have two main, separate tasks. Almost the whole population should have comprehensive university training over a three-year period in diverse subjects. After this 'studium generale' between 5 and 10% — according to social needs — of the 20-year old population would begin a specialised scientific training (168). This proposal of a university-level 'studium generale' was later reiterated by Bahro in Die Alternative. A GDR educationalist, Gerhard Neuner, agreed with Kuczynski that premature specialisation could stunt the individual's overall development and that the concept of flexible specialisation upon the foundation of a general education was particularly relevant in a technological age. However, Neuner rejected Kuczynski's specific proposals as utopian and undesirable in the immediate future. Neuner argued that it was already a great achievement to provide 89% of young people in the GDR with a 9 or 10-year school education. Furthermore, he claimed that it was not
expedient to design an education system for the whole age-group purely from the point of view of training future scientists (169). Robert Alt objected to Kuczynski's proposal to select a small percentage of an age-group for higher scientific training. For him, this was tantamount to an elite theory, according to which intellectual, creative work was the privilege of the 'pure scientist' (170).

These concepts of a high-level, multidisciplinary study for individuals, in order that they might fulfil their true potential and play a full role in the social processes, were also clearly an integral part of Havemann's and Bahro's utopian concepts.
4if. Heuer's concept of the individual and individuality in actually existing socialism

Heuer's basic argument was that the individual should have some say in issues which directly affected him. Here he was, by his own admission, criticising certain concepts prevalent in the social sciences, whereby the individual was considered merely the object of scientific study (171). For Heuer, the party had primarily an educational function: namely on a scientific basis and according to the objectively pertaining conditions to educate GDR society in the art of self-government (172). In Recht und Wirtschaftsleitung im Sozialismus he warned that this ideological work could not be confined to a one-way flow of information and was not merely a question of raising the political awareness of the masses to the necessary level, as official theorists suggested. Information should be combined with discussion. There should be dialogue between the masses and the party (173). He pointed out that the Poland crisis had shown that the party should always be aware of the mood of the masses and ignored the interests of the people at its peril (174). The subsequent events which led to the collapse of the GDR seem to have proved him right.

Heuer welcomed the trend after 1971 in the social sciences to analyse the actually existing situation in socialism, rather than to try and make the individual fit in with abstract scientific theory. In this context he quoted G. Junghählen and S. Tackmann on the question of norms:

Der sogenannte Normenzentrismus bedeutet im Grunde genommen eine Herabsetzung der sozialistischen Persönlichkeit und der sozialistischen Weltanschauung bei der Gestaltung der moralischen Beziehungen (175).

On the other hand, he did not advocate an anti-authoritarian
concept of education, which would permit the unbridled development of all aspects of an individual's personality, including the more negative, socially destructive aspects (176). Social and legal norms should provide a framework for the individual's activity.

In other words, Heuer recognised that the masses, and hence the individual as a constituent part of the masses, were not merely the passive object of the ideological process and scientific study, but a real force with concrete interests and needs which existed independently of the abstract theorising in the higher echelons of the party and state apparatus. In his view, this apparatus, indeed the political organisation of society as a whole, existed to serve the needs and interests of the masses.

In a 1983 Einheit article Heuer put forward the mainstream SED view that, in contrast to capitalist society, socialist society provided the objective conditions for individual development and that the individual had to actively and consciously participate in social affairs if he was to develop his potential:


Elsewhere he took an apparently more differentiated view, arguing that the development of individuality and the universal development of individuals could only occur at a certain stage of economic development and were themselves the necessary prerequisites for all subsequent economic development. Like Kuczynski, he stated that socialism was not yet sufficiently developed in the GDR to fulfil
the needs of all individuals:

Der Stand der Produktivkräfte innerhalb der sozialistischen Gesellschaft selbst, vor allem aber die Erfordernisse der Auseinandersetzungen mit dem Imperialismus bis hin zum wachsenden Aufwand für Verteidigung bringen auch heute häufig noch Konflikte zwischen der Entwicklung der Produktion und der Persönlichkeit hervor. Schichtarbeit und Monotonie am Arbeitsplatz bilden dafür Beispiele. Die objektiv notwendige und für den Sozialismus, für die Entfaltung der produktiven Kräfte unverzichtbare Verteilung nach der Leistung kann noch nicht die Ungleichheit in den sozialökonomischen Lebensbedingungen beseitigen (178).

He took the view that it would be wrong to conclude from this that the development of production and the development of the individual would take place independently of each other. He believed that the unity of economic and social policy was an expression of the SED's attempt to simultaneously achieve these two goals (179).

Arguing that the development of an increasing number of people and the satisfaction of their needs was a basic social interest in socialism, Heuer stated that contradictions between the development of the individual and the development of material production were not contradictions between social and individual interests, but rather contradictions within the social interests. The development of production was the key interest in actually-existing socialism, but the individual would become an increasingly important factor of production and his development the criterion of economic planning and development (180). This complex process was however currently hindered by the burden of the struggle between socialism and capitalism. It is interesting that here Heuer, like Bahro, made the development of individuality a future criterion of economic planning and development in socialist society.

Heuer devoted a section of Recht und Wirtschaftsleitung im Sozialismus to the question of the development of the individual's
needs in socialism. He made a basic distinction between the physical and social needs of the individual. According to Heuer, it was generally agreed amongst Soviet and GDR theorists that as socialism progressed and was able to fulfil the most basic physical needs, there would be a shift towards the needs relating to the social existence of the individual, for example the need to communicate with others and to be integrated in society. This process was an important, indeed decisive condition for the full development of the potential of socialist conditions of production (181).

In his discussion of the relationship between the two groups of needs Heuer made the interesting point that the phenomenon of consumerism in socialism was due to the lack of satisfaction of immaterial needs, for example the lack of job satisfaction. The excessive and ostentatious consumption of goods had become the individual's way of expressing his personality and social status (182). This is very similar to aspects of Bahro's thesis of compensatory and emancipatory interests. For his part, Kuczynski put the trend towards privatisation down to the lack of discussion of social problems in GDR newspapers:

Unsere Massenmedien privatisieren durch ihr vorsichtiges Verhalten zur Kritik zahlreiche gesellschaftliche Auseinandersetzungen. Kämpfen... ist eine Sache des persönlichen Engagements, und wer will kann bei uns auch kampflos neben dem Fortschritt leben, ihn passiv entgegennehmen - wodurch der Fortschritt natürlich verlangsamt wird (183).
4ig. Heuer's and Kuczynski's contribution to the debate about the nature of social laws

Both Heuer and Kuczynski made important contributions to the intensive debate of the early seventies on the nature of the laws governing social development in socialism. This was a key ideological question since it was a basic tenet of Marxism-Leninism that, unlike previous social orders, socialist society was able to comprehend the social processes in their totality and that it should research the nature of objective laws and plan its development accordingly.

In the debate the intellectuals basically divided into two camps. The first group, which included G. Ebert, G. Koch, F. Matho and H. Milke, expressed the view that in socialism objective laws required conscious implementation, that they did not automatically take effect. They considered that the party and state were both necessary elements of the objective mechanism whereby economic laws were fully realised (184).

The second group of theorists thought that this was a confusion of the objective and subjective and made a distinction between the action of individuals and the objective mechanisms of the laws governing social development. This view was prevalent in the GDR after the debate about subjectivism at the 14th Meeting of the Central Committee of the SED and the Eighth SED Party Congress.

As Heuer pointed out, the weakness of the first view was that it made the objectivity of the social laws dependent upon their recognition and tended towards subjectivism, whereas the weakness of the second view was that it failed to draw conclusions from the fundamentally new quality of socialist production and from the new
quality of the planned management of society in order to construct a theory of social and economic laws and their mechanisms (185). The Western economist Wolfgang Biermann has highlighted the political implications of the debate. Whereas the first view stressed the planned management of socialist society and therefore the dominant role of the communist party, the second view, in stressing the objectivity of the laws governing social development, tended to minimise the role of political organisation (186).

Heuer's position seemed to lie somewhere between the two above-mentioned views. He believed that one should differentiate between specific types of laws, that is between the laws resulting from the demands of social production and those which resulted from the anarchic nature of capitalist society. In this he differed from most GDR theorists who did not acknowledge that certain social laws could take effect in more than one social order. He concluded that most of the laws governing social development in socialism could either be exploited or not exploited, blocked or not blocked. He agreed with Kuczynski that they could take effect spontaneously, even if their nature was not understood. The extent to which they were exploited was determined by the efficiency of the political organisation in socialism (187).

Both Kuczynski and Heuer agreed that since there were no absolute boundaries to scientific knowledge, there could be no absolutely valid social law or closed system of essential social laws in socialism (188). Heuer, however, deduced from this that political activity in a socialist society could not consist of merely putting into practice recognised economic and social laws. Thus, he challenged the view of most GDR theorists, including Kuczynski, that the scientific recognition of social laws was the only basis
for an objectively-defined action and that the key function of political organisation was to bring the actions of individuals into line with these objective laws (189). This official view implied a hierarchical relationship between the individual and the state. For Heuer, the economic and social laws formulated at the highest levels of the state and party should serve increasingly to satisfy the needs of the individual and society and not vice versa:

Die Arbeiterklasse handelt nicht um der Gesetze willen, sondern sie handelt gesetzmäßig aufgrund ihres Seins und nutzt dabei Gesetze aus (190).

Although Heuer seemed here to challenge the authority of the party, he did also stress that without the political organisation of socialism the growing needs of the population could not be fully recognised or satisfied (191) and there would be individualism:

Ermittelt jeder einzelne nur seine Lage, nur seine Bedürfnisse, so kann die Verbindung prinzipiell nur in derselben Weise wie in der Gesellschaft des kapitalistischen Privateigentums erfolgen, ob ausdrücklich vom Privateigentum gesprochen wird oder nicht (192).

In other words, Heuer advocated collective solutions to the problem of satisfying the individual's needs in socialism (193).

Kuczynski argued that there would always be contradictions in socialism due to the fact that one could never comprehend all the laws governing social development. In addition to the laws which were recognised and consciously implemented by individuals, there were also laws which acted spontaneously and so could counteract those which were consciously promoted (194). The existence of the laws governing imperialism also adversely influenced socialist society in the sense that some laws of socialist society could only be partially implemented or not at all (195).

Kuczynski differentiated between the conscious implementation and
the spontaneous action of laws. In his view many, if not all laws, required conscious implementation if they were to have full effect (196). Whilst arguing in favour of the objectivity of the social laws, he did not ignore the role of political organisation in socialism.

These arguments have implications for the position of the individual in actually existing socialism. Kuczynski was in fundamental agreement with the official view laid down in the seminal work Grundlagen des Marxismus-Leninismus (1964) (197), that the true freedom of the individual could not lie in his imagined independence of natural or social laws, since he was not a supernatural being and could not withdraw from the effect of social laws. The individual could only be free if he changed his social conditions so that the social laws could be more effectively implemented (198).

The official philosopher Otto Reinhold criticised the first group of theorists mentioned at the beginning of this section, Neuer and Kuczynski for making consciousness, that is the subjective factor, a constituent element and condition for the objectivity of social laws (199). He wrote that this could lead to subjectivism. He directly rejected Neuer's view that the individual not only consciously implemented laws, but created new laws by creating the conditions in which they could take effect (200):

Obgleich für die Entstehung der sozialistischen Produktionsverhältnisse und ihrer Gesetze die Bewuβtheit
der Arbeiterklasse erforderlich ist, ist diese Bewuβtheit
als Erkenntniser der objektiven Erfordernisse abgeleitet,
sekundär. Die ökonomischen Gesetze selbst machen die
Bewuβtheit notwendig, verleihen ihr den objektiven
Inhalt, sie sind primär und nicht umgekehrt: die
Bewuβtheit schafft keine Gesetze (201)

Reinhold, Kuczynski and Neuer all argued that in actually existing
socialism economic laws could spontaneously take effect, even if they were not fully recognised or if they were misinterpreted. This kind of spontaneity could lead to economic losses and even conflicts. However, as socialism progressed and society gained a deeper insight into the nature of social and economic laws, there would be less spontaneity of this kind (202). It is interesting to note that only Heuer did not view spontaneity in purely negative terms, but as an embryonic form of political consciousness (203).
4ii. The criminality debate

The debate about the nature of contradictions existing in GDR society had practical implications. In 1977 John Lekschas, a professor in the Faculty of Social Sciences at the Humboldt University, influenced by the contradictions debate (204), put forward a more differentiated view of the sources of crime in actually existing socialism. His views provoked a debate amongst criminologists which primarily took place in the journals Neue Justiz and Staat und Recht over the period 1983 – 1984. In the following section I shall trace this debate as it threw up some points which are relevant to the topic of this thesis and which deviate from the orthodox view of crime.

The official view held that crime was not a product of human nature, but of social and economic conditions. It was a basic tenet of Marxism-Leninism that crime would decline during the first stage of socialism and be fully eradicated in communist society (205). Given that official theorists firmly linked the origins of crime with the exploitation and repression of the workers and with the antagonistic contradictions between social production and private appropriation in capitalism and that they therefore considered crime an anachronism in socialism, the question then arose why crime should exist at all in socialism. Official theorists attributed GDR crime primarily to the after-effects of capitalism upon the thought processes and the behaviour of GDR citizens and also to the ideological influences of capitalism; that is to historic genetic and external factors in Kuczynski's terms. However, it was also conceded that a variety of phenomena arising from the internal contradictions and conflicts associated with the complex development of socialist society could also lead to some
crimes:

Der Kriminalität in der DDR liegen auch Ursachen und Bedingungen zugrunde, die mit den Entwicklungswidersprüchen beim Übergang von der alten Ausbeutung zur neuen, sozialistischen Gesellschaftsordnung und bei der Weiterentwicklung und Festigung der sozialistischen Gesellschaft, beziehungsweise mit Mängeln bei der Bewältigung dieser Entwicklungswidersprüche verbunden sind. Sie werden jedoch nur dann zu Ursachen und Bedingungen der Kriminalität, wenn sie auf rudimentäres Denken beziehungsweise Einflüsse des Imperialismus treffen.

In 1976 an unpublished study by the Criminology Department of the Humboldt University suggested that crime would continue to exist in the GDR due to the persistent shortages of consumer goods (206).

Lekschas did not dispute the official view that the phenomenon of crime was a characteristic of capitalism, which could only be overcome with the elimination of the private ownership of the means of production. However, he believed that official theorists had tended to see crime as merely the product of the conditions of exploitation, rather than of the totality of social conditions (207). For Lekschas, the elimination of crime required a revolutionary change in social relations as well as a change in the life-style and personality of the individual (208). He emphasised the linkage between the contradictions of actually existing socialism and the continued existence of crime in the GDR and therefore urged social scientists to study these contradictions more closely (209).

For Lekschas, crime was a form of conflict between the individual and certain spheres of social life, not, he carefully noted, a conflict between the individual and the totality of social relations (210). He argued that in socialism crime was of a fundamentally different nature than in previous historic periods: it was no longer an expression of protest against the status quo,
but the remnant of 'egoistic, individualistic, spontaneous and anarchistic behaviour' (211).

He disputed the official view that the private ownership of the means of production continued to be the primary source of crime in socialism. Lekschas pointed out that even in developed socialism where no such obvious direct link could be made, official theorists transferred this link into the realm of ideology, referring to 'gesellschaftswidrige individualistische, egoistische Denk- und Verhaltensweisen ('Privateigentümerpsychologie')'. He rejected what he considered to be a fixation with the link between the private ownership of the means of production and crime and suggested that in developed socialism the social behaviour of the individual, of which crime was a variant, was determined by the actually existing objective material and ideological conditions and the inherent contradictions of that society (212). Analysed from this viewpoint crime in its most general form was:

eine spontan-anarchische und sozial-destruktive Widerspruchslösung im Rahmen der Auseinandersetzung zwischen Individuum und Gesellschaft, die sich im Prozeß der Bedürfnisbefriedigung, Interessenverwirklichung, Konfliktbewältigung und zwischenmenschlicher Kommunikation beziehungsweise auch emotionaler Entladung vollzieht und störend in den Prozeß gesellschaftlicher und individueller Lebenssicherung eingreift (213).

As a negative form of interaction with society, crime always disturbed the fundamentally new socialist relations between the individual and society and was a disruptive factor in the process of social integration (214). Crime was an unfruitful form of conflict between the individual and society and the state because it prevented the individual from attaining his full potential (215).

Lekschas agreed with the official theorist Karl Polak that
'Gesellschaftsblindheit' (an indifference to society) was the most
general characteristic of the motivation of most crimes, the
characteristic of the subjective non-integration or partial
integration of the individual into socialist society and that the
'Gesellschaftsblindheit' behind some crimes could be rooted in the
ideology and expression of anti-social attitudes. However, he
believed that 'Gesellschaftsblindheit' could also have its roots in
the underdevelopment of individual awareness, the socially abnormal
development of the personality, a lack of ability to deal with
conflicts and to recognise the coincidence of basic personal and
social goals, a lack of identification on the part of the
individual with social goals and the basic norms of social life, or
in the individual's lack of self-discipline or self-control (216).
Lekschas also concluded from the results of research on juvenile
crime that 'Gesellschaftsblindheit' in this case was not merely the
characteristic of specific individuals, but a social phenomenon in
socialist society (217). In other words he rejected as inadequate
the official methodology of examining the apparent deficiencies of
the individual merely in terms of the influence of anti-socialist
ideological positions.

Many of Lekschas' views, for example that crime was an expression
of the lack of social integration of the individual, were taken on
board by criminologists (218). His concept that when, for objective
or subjective reasons, contradictions could not be resolved,
individuals took it upon themselves to spontaneously resolve them
for themselves, was, for example, taken up by the work
Kriminologie. Theoretische Grundlagen und Analysen (219).

In 1986 Günter Kräupl wrote that GDR criminologists had taken on
board the theory that mass social behaviour, including crime, was
essentially dependent upon the opportunities open to individuals for the development of their talents and skills and for shaping their environment (220). Whereas Lekschas wrote at an abstract level about the links between contradictions in socialist society and crime, Kräupl and others were more specific. Kräupl and Uwe Ewald suggested that crime in actually existing socialism was rooted in the contradictions between the division of labour and the individual's need for creative work (221). Kräupl claimed that the latest research findings on juvenile crime had demonstrated a linkage between this and the failure to stimulate young people in their social activity, to give them a sense of responsibility for their work, an ability to communicate and cooperate in social groups and institutions and the willingness to overcome conflicts (222). In order to prevent crime, he argued, one possible measure might be to increasingly tailor work to the needs of the individual, giving him creative work and responsibility (223). He warned that if this was not done, the individual would be less willing to participate in social affairs, to give of his best at work, there would be a certain one-sidedness in his development and the individual would place greater importance on the satisfaction of his immediate, individualistic needs (224). The parallels between this reasoning and Bahro's theory of compensatory satisfactions is striking.

Kräupl also wrote about crime as an expression of a clash between the individual and society. He argued that some crimes were due to a lack of comprehension for, indeed even abuse of the individual's increased room for manoeuvre, (Entscheidungsfreiheit) in developed socialism (225). He believed that most violations of social discipline resulted from the contradiction between the awareness of
the increased parameters of individual action as a function of education and a well-developed social security system and insufficient awareness on the part of the individual of his responsibility (226).

Schmidt wrote that whilst most crimes were the consequences of social conditions in capitalism, there was a smaller number of crimes which were relatively invariant since they resulted from the coincidence of a disadvantaged background and certain personality traits (227). He regarded the official interpretation of the law of the gradual eradication of crime in socialism as one-sided and too mechanistic and agreed with Lekschas that one should take a dialectical view of the problem of the sources of crime in actually existing socialism (228).

The official legal theorist Erich Buchholz argued that individualistic, egoistic modes of thought and behaviour coincided with conditions in GDR society which, although they themselves did not produce crime, did provide a fertile breeding-ground for crime. Here Buchholz cited the following as examples of these conditions: the inadequate protection of socialist property and weaknesses in the education system and in the implementation of discipline and security. He concluded that in order to fight crime in actually existing socialism the social conditions had to be changed so that the main sources of crime could not take root in the first place. Elsewhere he referred to the unity of economic and social policy as being the ‘main link in the chain’ in the strategy of fighting crime in the GDR (229). He reasoned that with the better satisfaction of material and cultural needs, the difficulties and inequalities which individuals currently attempted to resolve themselves would disappear. Nevertheless, he did add that an
increase in the standard of living would not automatically lead to an decrease in the crime rate. He assumed that the conditions for the existence of crime were linked with contradictions in the development of GDR socialism and would therefore continue to exist for the foreseeable future.

Buchholz accepted Lekschas' definition of crime and his concept of crime resulting from the individual's attempts to solve conflicts himself:

Kriminalität, kriminelles Verhalten hängen also wesentlich gerade mit der seit Auflösung der Gentilordnung über Jahrtausende hinweg wachsenden Vereinzelung und sozialen Isolierung des Individuums zusammen, das aus dieser gesellschaftsfremden und gesellschaftsblinden Position heraus einen eigenmächtig-anarchistischen Lösungsweg zur Überwindung eines gesellschaftlich-individuellen Konflikts beschreitet (230).

He also shared Kräupl's view that crime in actually existing socialism stemmed from the division of labour and the lack of development of the individual (231). For him, the key to solving the problem of crime lay in overcoming the isolation of the individual through a process of social integration (232). Erich and Irmgard Buchholz did not contradict the widely held view that some individuals were morally unstable and were therefore easily pushed into situations where they acted irresponsibly and that other individuals with extreme individualistic and egoistic attitudes were always ready to benefit at the expense of others (233). For them, however, the external, objective factors had precedence over subjective factors in explanations of the existence of crime in GDR socialism (234).

During the debate the basic tenets of Marxism-Leninism regarding the causes of crime generally were not challenged. Widespread agreement was reached that crime in the GDR was related to the
conflicts associated with the development of socialism, occurring when the individual spontaneously attempted to resolve these conflicts and that crime was an expression of egoism and individualism and a result of the non-integration or only partial integration of the individual into socialist society. Where a more orthodox theorist such as Buchholz differed from his colleagues was in his stress upon the link between the private ownership of the means of production and crime and, as an extension of this, his greater adherence to the official 'diversion and subversion' theory, whereas others involved in the debate looked at the existence of crime in the GDR almost exclusively in terms of the contradictions of the development of socialist society.
4iii. Irene Dölling on the individual in actually existing socialism

In this section I intend to examine the concepts of Irene Dölling, Professor of cultural theory at the Humboldt University in Berlin. She considered the philosophical and ideological dimension of the relationship between the individual and society to be one of the central questions of cultural theory. However, at the same time, she noted the lack of a systematic analysis of the individual from the perspective of a cultural theorist for cultural scientists, hence her publication *Individuum und Kultur. Beitrag zur Diskussion* (1986), the culmination of a series of articles and works written by her which dealt with aspects of the individual's relationship with society in actually existing socialism (235). She wrote that it was increasingly necessary to gain a greater scientific insight into the relationship between the individual and society firstly, in order to increase productivity in line with the official economic policy of the eighties of intensifying the use of all resources including manpower, and secondly, to help the individual in the search for his identity, in his efforts to overcome the problems facing him in life and to obtain an overview of his life and his place in society (236). Dölling therefore put forward her critical theories on the relationship between the individual and society in actually existing socialism as primarily a contribution to achieving the official goal of higher productivity. This was a standard ploy used by critical theorists within the system to make their views more acceptable to the GDR leadership.

For Dölling, Marxist-Leninist cultural theory provided the theoretical basis for implementing cultural policy, specifically for examining the actual needs of individuals, their historical and
future development and for drawing practical conclusions as to how these needs could be satisfied, influenced or changed (237). Amongst the important questions facing GDR cultural theorists were the following: Which factors affected the development of the socialist personality? How did the process of the development of the socialist personality actually take place with regard to the specific individual? Which subjective conditions influenced and modified the process of development of the socialist personality, and how? Amongst these subjective conditions she included the psychological system of conditions which filtered all external, social factors and the biological structure (biologische Konstitution) of the individual which had both an indirect and direct effect upon the productivity of the individual in society (238).

In her many works and articles on the subject Dölling tried to develop the Marxist philosophical theory of the individual and draw practical conclusions from this for the implementation of SED cultural policy. Writing in 1978, Dölling claimed that although within the disciplines of historical materialism, ethics and cultural theory various researchers were working on different aspects of the position of the individual in socialism, there was a lack of effective interdisciplinary cooperation and no basic, comprehensive presentation of the Marxist theory of the individual. She believed that this was due to there being no philosophical theory of historic forms of individuality to link the 'social' with the 'individual'. Therefore on the one hand philosophy produced statements on the relations between the individual and society which were too abstract to be of use to other disciplines. On the other, research into the 'individual' was seen as a separate area,
the legitimate task of individual disciplines alongside the theory of social conditions and philosophical statements on the individual as an agent of the class struggle (239). She stated that there were relatively few GDR publications on these specific theoretical questions and that Soviet philosophy was more advanced in this area (240).

In 1978 she also wrote that despite an increasing volume of information on the cultural significance of work and free time and the effects of changes in the environment, relaxation and mass-communication on the development of all-round personality, despite the statements in aesthetic theory on the links between art and the development of the individual, significant aspects of individuals’ lives had yet to be studied. Given this, she argued, very little could be said about the overall influence of all the determinant factors of the individual’s development (241).

Dölling put the lack of development of the Marxist theory of the individual in the GDR down to historical reasons. In the early stages of socialist society in the GDR questions relating to the meaning of life and the right of the individual to happiness and self-fulfilment had been linked to the overturning of the old society and the construction of the new society. Given the ideological nature of Western attacks on the Marxist concept of the individual, GDR theorists had in this period tended to avoid the whole question of the individual’s role in socialism as an ideologically sensitive area (242). With the establishment of socialist society and the emergence of historically new forms of individual behaviour, there was, however, an increasing practical need to give a more precise theoretical explanation of the concrete interaction between individual and social development. She argued
that in the eighties the ideological task of the philosophical theory of the individual lay in convincing the individual of the superiority of the socialist system over capitalism and in making him aware of the potential which socialism offered for his development (243). She warned that if these questions were not addressed, ideological statements would become merely abstract ideals, and concepts of a universally developed personality illusory (244).

Dölling criticised the existing Marxist-Leninist theory of the individual for being inaccurate and inconsistent in the distinction between the social process of the development of class-typical modes of behaviour on a mass scale and the process of the formation of the needs, abilities and attitudes of the specific individual. In her view the latter were generalised in the theory and merely treated as a statistical average in terms of their social significance and measured against the ideal of the universally developed socialist personality. The inadequate distinction between the two above-mentioned levels, in Dölling’s view, led to anthropological statements referring to an abstract individual endowed with the capacity to put into practice the norms and goals of social behaviour associated with his class. Furthermore, the use of terms such as ‘the individual’ and ‘man’ blurred the specific historic basis of social wealth and its use for the development of class-individuals. In other words, this theory did not give sufficient emphasis to the historic analysis of the social conditions of individuals and of the potential for the individual’s development.

Secondly, she stated that the lack of interest shown by GDR philosophy in the relationships between the basic social structure,
social conditions of the different classes and strata and the potential for individual development had led to idealistic concepts. According to her, this not only presented an obstacle to the laying down the historic, materialist basis for the socialist-communist ideal of the universally developed personality, but it could lead to individuals thinking that the ideal of the universally developed personality could only be achieved in communism and to the development of the socialist way of life being postponed to a later date.

Thirdly, she objected to the implicit abstract opposition of society and the individual in GDR philosophy. This abstract opposition was expressed in the fact that in most studies the development of the socialist personality was considered to be primarily the educational goal of the social institutions rather than the development of socially significant behaviour through the individual's own activity (245). Here she was rejecting official studies which were based upon a hierarchical view of the relationship between the individual and GDR society, in which ideologically correct values and behaviour were inculcated into the individual by society led by the omniscient party.

Dölling focussed on the specific individual by highlighting the psychological dimension of the interaction between the individual and society. She argued that psychological conditions such as hereditary skills, temperament, sensitiveness, reaction speeds, physical and mental endurance and personal qualities were the result of the interaction of the socially determined learning process and the biological stages of maturity. Social influences were always mediated, filtered through these psychological conditions as determinant factors of individual behaviour. In
practice this meant that from a range of objectively possible courses of action the individual selected those most likely to complement his needs and capabilities, whilst ignoring others on the basis of his social experience, education and other factors. Thus the same set of social conditions did not produce the same 'internal conditions' within individuals. Dölling argued that the Marxist theory of the individual did not yet sufficiently take account of this qualitative independence of the psychological, internal conditions vis a vis the social determination of individual behaviour. In her view, given the need to encourage the individual to consciously act in the social interest, the psychological imput into the Marxist theory of the individual was extremely important (246). Thus, like others including Hanke, Dölling rejected the widely-held 'mechanistic' view that the social determination of personality development meant the direct transformation of social conditions into individual attitudes (247).

The qualitative independence of the psychological, internal conditions vis a vis the social determination of individual behaviour is of course a convenient explanation for apparently anachronistic forms of behaviour in actually existing socialism. In this context Dölling cited Hager:


She thought that Marxist–Leninist theory should analyse in greater depth the formation of attitudes, examining the contradictions between old and new attitudes and how such contradictions could be
resolved. She took Hager's observation that improved social conditions did not automatically lead to a higher cultural and ideological level of society and concluded that this had both subjective and objective causes (249). This contrasts with the official view, particularly prevalent in the sixties, that contradictions between individual and social interests only existed at a subjective level and were due to a lack of the correct consciousness on the part of the individual.

By including this psychological dimension in her examination of the interaction between the individual and society, Dölling clearly focussed on the specific individual, with his actual experiences, needs and skills, rather than an individual who was representative of a class or stratum. She also moved away from the official deterministic view of the individual, whereby the individual merely implemented the objective laws governing the development of socialist society, and towards a model of the individual and society where the individual had more autonomy.

In her work Naturwesen – Individuum – Persönlichkeit (1979) Dölling devoted some time to attacking Western 'biologicist' concepts of the individual. According to her, the theoretical premise of such concepts was the identification of the 'human nature of man' with 'the individual'. These Western theorists therefore examined the relations between the individual and society from the viewpoint of the individual and considered the individual and his psychological structures to be the constitutive element and actual basis of society rather than its product.

Dölling was scathing about the Western concept of individuality. For her, the Western preoccupation with the uniqueness of the
individual and his specific interests and skills was a means of differentiating one individual from another in the general competition within capitalist society and also the frantic attempt of the individual to preserve his individuality in the midst of circumstances over which he had no control. She also stated that Western individualism was nothing but 'die im ideologischen Gewande der personalen Einmaligkeit erscheinende millionenfache Konformitat der Entwicklungslosigkeit' (250).

In her critical examination of Western theories of the individual she seemed to be seeking to explain that whilst her proposed approach, like that of Western theorists, focussed upon the specific individual, she, unlike them, was putting this specific individual into a social context and showing how his specific experiences, needs and skills were socially determined. By delimitating her approach from Western theories in this way, she was presumably covering herself in case she was attacked for being too Western.
4iiia. The interaction of hereditary and social factors in the development of the individual

Writing in 1974, Dölling welcomed the 1973 debate about the influence of genetic and social factors upon the relations between the individual and society in Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie (251). In her view, however, the content and scope of the philosophers' contributions to this debate were an indication that questions relating to the role of the individual biological structure in the process of personality development were at that time rarely considered research topics in their own right (252). She believed that it was ideologically important to deal with such issues in order to counter Western claims that Marxist-Leninist theory was not concerned with the individual. Intensive discussion of such issues, based upon an analysis of how the psychological and physical productivity of members of a specific class was realised and limited by the living conditions and the social demands made upon that class, would allow cultural theorists to progress beyond the construction of abstract models (253).

In a 1979 assessment of the debate on the relationship between hereditary and social factors in their influence on personality development Dölling quoted the view of the GDR philosopher Wolfgang Eichhorn in 1966, which she seemed to consider to be still the dominant and official view a decade later. Eichhorn had written the following:

In dem thesenhaft erwähnten grundlegenden Ansatz des historischen Materialismus sind die natürliche, körperliche Existenz der Menschen, ihr biologischer Lebens- und Fortpflanzungsprozeß, die Problematik der physiologischen und psychologischen Konstitution (auch bestimmter möglicher Invarianzen in dieser Entwicklung) und deren Wechselwirkung mit dem gesellschaftlichen Entwicklungsprozeß wie überhaupt die Tatsache, daß der Mensch Teil des Naturganzen ist und bleibt; auch wenn er
Dölling stated that, whereas in the sixties this view was the correct response to the attempts of Western theorists to 'complement' Marxism with their own anthropological theories, in the seventies it was necessary to move beyond the basic statement that individuals have a characteristic physical structure. Comprehensive answers from a Marxist-Leninist viewpoint should be found to the questions raised by Western theorists (255). She considered her own work Naturwesen – Individuum – Persönlichkeit to be an initial contribution to the interdisciplinary debate on the dialectical relationship between biological and social factors in the process of personality development (256).

For Dölling, the development of a range of needs and talents in the daily interaction of individuals with their social conditions was a process which was partially determined and mediated by the 'natural makeup' of the individual (257). She drew the practical implications from this that society should always take into consideration the biological structure of the individual. Educational and training establishments should, for example, adapt their demands to the psychological and physical abilities of their students. Indeed, she argued that as society progressed, the specific biological limitations of the individual would become increasingly significant. The greater the intervention in natural processes through industrialisation and the greater the development of production, the more necessary it would be to predict the effects of environmental changes upon the individual biological structure and to take these into consideration when planning social changes (258).
In her view, managers of enterprises had a 'cultural responsibility' to ensure that all changes in the work process optimally corresponded to the 'natural' conditions of their staff and that, where possible, extreme physical and psychological demands upon their staff were avoided. They should match work tasks, the demands for training and higher qualifications, the allocation of management functions with individuals' abilities and interests. The individual too had a responsibility consciously to make optimal use of the available facilities, to use his free time rationally and to be self-disciplined in his life-style in order to maintain his social productivity (259).
4iiiib. Dölling's theory of forms of individuality

For Dölling, the existing Marxist philosophy of the individual was primarily concerned with researching the social conditions and the potential for the development of the productivity and creativity of class-individuals as a social, mass process. The individual was only a socialist personality in as far as he had developed the socially desirable qualities in the course of social activity. At this theoretical level the individual only played a role as an 'average individual' (Durchschnittsindividuum). Statements made at this level could not therefore be directly applied to a specific individual (260). It should be also noted, however, that Dölling stressed that a Marxist theory of the individual should take as its starting-point social conditions, rather than the individual himself (261). She rejected the suggestion of Western theorists that taking social conditions as the starting point detracted from the study of real individuals, as an inadmissible theoretical opposition of the individual and society, leading to a mechanistic view of the relationship between these two 'opposing' poles (262).

According to Dölling, the process of the individual's socialisation, (individuelle Vergesellschaftung) was also the developmental process of the individual's psychological structures, needs and capabilities, which formed the basis for behaviour appropriate to the social conditions (Individuation). There were thus two basic theoretical levels of questions regarding the individual:

1. the analysis of socio-economic conditions as 'matrices', (Aktivitätsmatrizen), of individual behaviour. The Western theorist Lucien Seve referred to this level as the 'theory of general, historic or social forms of individuality'.
2. the development of the psychological structures of the individual, this process being determined by specific social conditions and the individual's biological structure. According to Seve, this level could be considered a psychology based upon historic materialism, (Theorie des konkreten Individuums).

In her work Individuum und Kultur (1986), Dölling further developed the theory of individuality forms, distinguishing between the following four levels:

1. the social determination of the individual set by the basic relations of production. These necessarily imposed certain social characters upon individuals according to their status and position in the system of the social division of labour
2. differences between socialism and developed communism in terms of the social determination of the individual
3. the creation of historical-concrete types, according to factors such as age, sex, nationality and class or stratum
4. the personal ways of processing the links between the individual and society.

She noted that the theory of individuality forms did not provide for an analysis of social conditions generally, but in their role as matrices for the activity of individuals, a point which she believed got lost during the 1973 discussions on Seve's work in the interdisciplinary work-group 'The formation of socialist personalities' at the Academy of GDR Educational Sciences. During these discussions Eichhorn had rejected the need for an analysis of social conditions as matrices for the activity of the individual with these comments:

Wenn ich hier einmal von den Fragen absehen darf, die sich aus der Verbindung des Persönlichkeitsproblems mit den natürlichen Voraussetzungen des menschlichen Lebens ergeben, würde ich sagen, daß die Spezifik des
Philosophischen und der marxistisch-leninistischen Theorie überhaupt in dem besteht, was Lenin die Zurückführung des Individuellen auf das Soziale nennt, wird durch die gesamte marxistisch-leninistische Theorie, insbesondere durch die Theorie von Klassen und Klassenkampf, geleistet (263).

Whilst Dölling agreed with Eichhorn's remark that the Marxist theory of the individual was based upon pursuing 'the individual' back to its roots in 'the social' (264), she believed that the individual could not be fully explained in terms of the theory of social orders, classes and the class struggle. She further believed that Eichhorn's concept risked either equating objective and subjective determinant factors, or making a complete separation between them so that the specifically subjective element in the individual's behaviour was considered at only the most abstract level, or the individual was seen as merely the medium for the interaction of existent conditions. Both interpretations led, in her view, to a deterministic view of the individual (265). She wrote that the theory of forms of individuality allowed one to overcome the abstract opposition of 'the social' and 'the individual' made by official theorists like Eichhorn and to bring the concept of the individual as a 'socially produced', active individual into philosophical theory, thereby counteracting Western claims that Marxist-Leninist theory neglected the individual (266).

According to Dölling, in the discussions amongst philosophers and cultural theorists insufficient or inadequate attention had been given to the question of which forms of individuality were typical for the various classes and strata in actually existing socialism. She, for instance, rejected the characterisation of members of the working class in socialism as producers, owners and consumers as too vague for a formulation of their historic form of individuality, especially given the division of labour and the
distribution of wealth according to productivity within actually existing socialism (267). Here she seems to be rejecting the narrowly economic definitions of the individual put forward by official theorists.

For her, the individual's hereditary talents and characteristics were natural 'tolerance levels' within the matrices set by the social conditions (268). Hereditary talents and characteristics gave rise to a great degree of differentiation and variety of individual behaviour in a given set of social conditions and to achievements over and above the average capacity of individuals in a given society (269).

She wrote that there would be social equality in communism because natural inequalities would then be the only differentiating factor in the process of personality development. Social equality in communism was therefore not tantamount to 'Gleichmacherei' in the sense that all people should do the same on the basis of the same set of social conditions, nor to a levelling-out and uniformity of individual achievement and behaviour (270). In terms of personality development social equality would be achieved when the only socially imposed limits upon the formation of needs and capabilities were set by the historic level of the forces of production. It would then depend upon the individuals themselves as to what use they actually made of the objective potential for self-development (271). Whereas in actually existing socialism social recognition was only given to natural inequalities inasmuch as they were positive or negative determinant factors in the development of the needs and capabilities of class individuals, in communism individuals would be considered as specific individuals, only differentiated by their natural inequalities (272). In order to
achieve this objective of social equality, she wrote that it would be necessary to gradually overcome the traditional forms of the division of labour and their social consequences in actually existing socialism. In this context she welcomed the social policy measures implemented after the Eighth SED Party Congress (273).

Although Dölling sought to shift attention towards the individual and to this extent was in agreement with the radical critics, she, unlike Havemann and Bahro, took the natural inequalities and characteristics of individuals into consideration when discussing her vision of communism. Furthermore, she implicitly rejected their view that in a future communist society individuals would achieve their full potential by participating in all work tasks and activities as utopian:


Dölling linked her theoretical discussion of the concept of individuality forms with the problems facing GDR society under Honecker. Thus, she wrote that the 'activity matrices', the limitations, imposed upon the development of the subjectivity of women throughout history and continuing to exist in actually existing socialism were rooted in economic conditions and defined by the individuality forms of men (275).

According to Gransow, the concept of individuality forms was only
widely accepted in the various disciplines after a colloquium on this theme was held at the Humboldt University in 1981 (276). At this colloquium the sociologists Lötsch and Frank Adler, for instance, elaborated on the historically determined personality types characteristic of different social orders and of groups within the same order (277). Writing in 1986, Dölling noted the growing interest of cultural theorists in constructing a theory about the linkages between the social and individual reproduction process, coupled with an increasing emphasis upon the culture of everyday life and upon the cultural forms and conditions in which individuals have, organise and interpret their various experiences and in which they process the contradictions of their society (278). She noted that other theorists had directly adopted Marx's formulas such as 'economic character-masks', historical types of individuality and referred to individuals as 'personified agents of the relations of production' (279). In 1982 Lothar Parade called upon his fellow cultural theorists to investigate more closely what function and potential culture had in terms of realising given forms of individuality in the individual's life (280). Dölling's claim that the theory of individuality forms initially developed by Western Marxist sociologists had found a positive resonance in the GDR would therefore seem to be justified.
Dölling on the ideal of the universally developed personality

For Dölling, writing in the seventies, the official concept of the universally developed personality was not purely a moral, humanist demand, but an attainable objective of individual development on a mass scale in socialism/communism. This was because it was based upon a stage of the historic development of the forces of production which made possible, indeed required the development of all individual needs and talents, and which guaranteed the social wealth which was an objective condition for the development of this ideal (281). This view was in line with those of other leading cultural theorists such as Parade, Rosemarie Zimmermann, Dieter Strützel and Werner Geidel, and also of Hager (282). Honecker also emphasised the non-utopian aspect of the ideal of the socialist personality at the Eighth Congress of the SED in 1971:

Eines der edelsten Ziele und eine der größten Errungenschaften der sozialistischen Gesellschaft ist die allseitig entwickelte sozialistische Persönlichkeit. Dabei handelt es sich nicht um ein Ziel, das erst in ferner Zukunft erreicht wird. Wenn wir hier von 'Persönlichkeit' sprechen, meinen wir eine besonders charakteristische geistige und moralische Ausprägung des menschlichen Individuums (283).

Dölling also stated that the ideal of the universally developed personality was not an abstract list of all possible positive qualities to be acquired by GDR citizens. She observed that this mistaken view had been particularly prevalent in the fifties and sixties due to both an unrealistic assessment of the time needed for the GDR to progress to communism and also to the fact that 'Allseitigkeit' was a convenient term to express the acquisition by the individual of an array of new skills for Ulbricht's economic expansion (284). However, there are indications that this kind of thinking still existed in the GDR under Honecker. This official
view rejected by Dölling (285) and Koch reflected a hierarchical view of the relationship between the individual and society, in which the individual had a submissive, passive role.

Dölling wrote that social conditions and processes should be assessed as to whether they promoted the capacity of individuals. Given that the universally developed personality was an ideal in the sense of a goal, this concept necessarily incorporated a contradiction between what had already been achieved and future development. She therefore conceded that some of the individual's needs in actually existing socialism were not reconcilable with the official ideal of the socialist personality (286). For her, the existence of the ideal of the universally developed individual encouraged theorists to examine and implement practical steps to promote the development of socialism, on the basis of existing social contradictions and conditions (287). Finally, the ideal of the universally developed personality had been developed in conscious opposition to the life-style of the individual in capitalism and therefore had an important organisational and directive function in socialist society (288). However, she later implied that the ideal of the universally developed personality was so abstract that it exerted a relatively weak influence upon the individual's behaviour (289).

Dölling's earlier arguments for the universally developed socialist personality being an attainable goal would seem to be belied by her own detailed examination of the problems in the work sphere and of female emancipation in the GDR. Furthermore, whilst she often made vague statements that the ideal of the universally developed socialist personality was attainable in socialism-communism, she specifically stated on one occasion that it would be illusory to
expect this goal to be attained in actually existing socialism (290). Later, in 1986, she stated that the emotional value placed upon individuality by many GDR citizens resulted from the perceived discrepancy between the social goal of a universally developed individual and the existing social conditions which were hindering progress towards this goal. GDR citizens continued to have the traditional, capitalist perception of individuality, namely that the individual's uniqueness was a value in itself and that society merely provided the framework in which the individual could express his uniqueness in differentiation from his fellow citizens. Dölling believed that as new forms of collectivity developed in socialism, the individual would change this anachronistic perception of individuality (291). Over the period under study Dölling appeared to become disillusioned regarding the realisation of the ideal of the universally developed individual as did Heym (292).
Although Dölling followed the official view that work was the single most important activity for individual development (293), she also stressed that individual behaviour was determined by the totality of one's living conditions (294). In this way she deviated from the official almost exclusive preoccupation with work as a determinant factor of individual development. She wrote that in socialism as the first stage of communist society work remained a means to an end rather than the individual's primary need. This meant that the distribution of consumer goods according to the productivity principle and remnants of the traditional division of labour in the form of specialist jobs continued to exist in actually existing socialism. In actually existing socialism the individual was both the producer and owner of the means of production, but only at an abstract level. This function as owner was realised through activity in political organisations and the delegation of responsibility to the party and state organs, rather than directly in the production process. However, she argued, the definition of the nature of work in socialism as a means to an end did not exclude the development of elements of the work process characteristic of communism such as innovation, socialist competition and discussions about the plan (295).

Unlike Bahro, Dölling thought that industrialisation of the production process was basically a positive phenomenon since the corresponding development in social conditions led to greater potential for the development of the individual's needs and talents (296). However, she conceded that the industrialisation process was also ridden with conflicts arising from the new demands made upon the individual biological structure. In this context she referred
to how the physical and psychological demands made on individuals doing physically heavy or health-threatening work or on shiftworkers could hinder the personality development of the individuals involved, given that during the working week these workers were forced to give priority to rest and relaxation to the detriment of all other needs. Like Bahro, Dölling stressed that those at the bottom of the hierarchy of labour-functions were adversely affected in terms of personality development. In this sense she comes close to Bahro’s concept of the subalternity of the individual:

Körperlich schwere, gesundheitsschädigende Arbeit ist häufig unqualifizierte Arbeit. Niedriges Qualifikationsniveau aber bedeutet: relativ einfache, häufig monotone, an die geistigen Fähigkeiten wenig Anspruch stellende Tätigkeiten; niedriges Bildungsniveau; daraus resultierende eingeschränkte Möglichkeiten (im Vergleich zu anderen sozialen Gruppen) für die Übernahme demokratischer Leitungsfunktionen der Gesellschaft und des Staates, die in wachsendem Maße das Durchschauen und Beherrschern komplizierter politischer und ökonomischer Zusammenhänge zur Voraussetzung haben; niedrige Einkommensgruppen, was . . . unterschiedliche Möglichkeiten der individuellen Konsumtion nach sich zieht usw. (297).

However, unlike Bahro, she also said that, given the unavoidable increasing need for multi-shift and night work in all sectors of the economy, there was little point in criticising these phenomena from a moralistic viewpoint. Instead it was necessary to ensure that the negative consequences of the above phenomena were minimised as far as possible (298). She therefore welcomed the social and cultural policy measures undertaken to create more favourable conditions for the personality development of manual and shift workers.

Dölling argued against the official view which tended to equate the inclusion of most GDR women in the workforce with their emancipation. She took the view that the financial independence of
women was a prerequisite for their emancipation, not emancipation per se. She noted that GDR women were usually found at the bottom of the hierarchy of labour functions, that is in unskilled and semi-skilled work (299). This was because many women gave priority to their family commitments and deliberately chose jobs for which they were often over-qualified and which were less demanding in terms of man-management skills, further training, travel-time between the workplace and home and working-hours. This meant that many GDR women did not make full use of the opportunities to develop their skills and needs in the sphere of work. The fact that GDR women were not able to fulfil their potential in the work sphere also reinforced the traditional separation of the individual's life into work time and free time, the latter being considered the time when the individual 'really lives', and the trend towards an emphasis on family life in a 'private sphere' (300). These criticisms of actually existing socialism are diametrically opposed to the official concepts that the work sphere was the primary sphere in which the individual could develop his potential and also that the work and leisure spheres were complementary to each other and interlinked.

Despite the increasing trend towards shift-work, Dölling was optimistic regarding the overall trend in the production process: namely towards a decrease in the number of physically arduous and health-threatening jobs and a corresponding increase in the number of jobs requiring a higher level of education and qualifications, the life-long training of the individual, which also meant an improvement in living conditions for many workers. She did note, however, that the elimination of the most extreme forms of physical and psychological demands upon the individual did not automatically
lead to a rise in the cultural level of the population and that the
traditional demands upon the individual might be replaced by new,
more psychologically-orientated demands in the production process
(301).

Like Bahro, she noted the increasing polarisation of labour
functions between those which were intellectually demanding and
those requiring minimal qualifications and giving little potential
for the development of creativity, for example work on assembly-
lines and as machine-operators. This was partially an expression of
the current level of the forces of production and partially due to
the fact that work was still organised on the Taylorism model.
However, unlike Bahro, she did not draw political implications from
this economic development: that is that those in power sought to
monopolise the creative, intellectual forms of work for themselves,
thereby deliberately depriving others of the opportunity to
develop the skills needed to fully participate in political
affairs.

Dölling advocated a new form of work-organisation, where one-sided,
monotonous work could be reduced at all levels of technology
through new forms of the division of labour (302). In her view,
automation and the increasing scientific basis of production would
bring about new forms of the division of labour based on
collectives of specialised, cooperating individuals:

Indem sich in diesem Kollektiv unmittelbar kooperierender
Individuen jeder als Spezialist seinen besonderen Teil als
Teil eines Gesamtzusammenhanges zum Gegenstand macht, kann
dem einzelnen der Arbeitsgegenstand wieder als Ganzes
entstehen. Auf diese Weise kann die Eigentümerfunktion
der Produzenten im Arbeitsprozeß, im 'realen
Arbeitsverhalten' verwirklicht werden, wird Kontrolle über
die Bedingungen und damit 'motiviertes' Handeln in der
entscheidenden Lebenssphäre der Individuen möglich (303).

In this collective the individual would be able to fully develop
all relevant specific skills, needs and general qualities, in short his individuality. Dölling nevertheless conceded that this development lay in the future and that in actually existing socialism there was a discrepancy between the social promotion of education and training of the individual on the one hand and the opportunities open to the individual to develop his potential at work on the other (304).

Similarly, the leading GDR cultural functionary Koch pointed to conflicts between self-fulfilment and economic requirements in GDR socialism and concluded that the ensuing costs to both the individual and society should be openly discussed:


Whilst in the Honecker era there was widespread agreement that the negative aspects of the work-process would not be eradicated in the immediate future, different solutions were offered to resolve this problem in the long-term. For Dölling, the solution lay primarily in the restructuring of work, for the sociologist Albert Kreschmar in an ideological propaganda campaign to persuade the individual of the social necessity of unpleasant or unfulfilling work-tasks (306).
Dölling's work can be seen in the context of a growing awareness of social conflicts in the GDR (307). She herself quoted the following from the foreword to Maxie Wanders *Guten Morgen, Du Schöne. Protokolle nach Tonband* (1977):

Wir können uns eigentlich nicht wundern, daß in der sozialistischen Gesellschaft Konflikte ans Licht kommen, die jahrzehntelang im dunkeln schmörten und Menschenleben vergifteten. Konflikte werden uns erst bewußt, wenn wir uns leisten können, sie zu bewältigen (308).

She also expressed her agreement with Eichhorn's thesis that one could not yet use the concept of 'advanced socialism' for GDR society as this would be an exaggeration of its current possibilities (309). On this basis she advocated a problem-oriented approach to the question of individual development in actually existing socialism:

Eine weltanschauliche Programmatik der individuellen Entwicklungsmöglichkeiten im Sozialismus und Kommunismus ist ohne Anerkennung und Analyse der Widersprüche zwischen Gesellschafts- und Individualentwicklung, ohne Bewertung von sozialen Lebensbedingungen hinsichtlich ihrer positiven und negativen Folgen für die Individuen und das Aufzeigen von gesellschaftlichen Möglichkeiten für die Lösung dieser Widersprüche nicht zu leisten. Philosophie wird ihrer Funktion als Weltanschauung nicht gerecht, wenn sie sich diesen Aufgaben nicht stellt. Harmonisierende Konzeptionen, die die objektive Widersprüchlichkeit des Aufbaus der kommunistischen Gesellschaftsformation und deren historisch-konkrete Erscheinungsformen verdecken, können nicht zur wissenschaftlichen Fundierung von Gesellschaftspolitik beitragen, sondern verurteilen sich-selbst zur politischen und ideologischen Wirkungslosigkeit; schlimmer noch: Sie wirken hemmend, weil sie Illusionen verbreiten (310).

For her, there was a contradiction between the proclaimed official goal of the universal development of the socialist personality and the divergent possibilities and conditions for attaining this goal in GDR society (311). Moreover, she implied that these contradictions between individual and social development would
continue to exist in communism (312).

Dölling referred to contradictions between the social demands upon the individual on the one hand and social goals and the demands of the individual regarding personality development on the other. This kind of contradiction existed for social groups like economic managers, whose functions and responsibilities made excessive demands upon the individual’s time, where excessive demands were made upon the individual’s biological structure over prolonged periods and where there were restricted opportunities for leading a varied life (313). Widespread phenomena such as anxiety, exhaustion and the increase in the number of fatal heart attacks suffered by GDR managers indicated, in her view, discrepancies between the social demands upon the individual and the range of the social activities open to the individual on one hand, and the limitations of his biological structure on the other.

She conceded that, given restricted resources and manpower, socialist society was not yet able to provide adequate facilities for all individuals to satisfy their specific needs for relaxation (314). Therefore GDR citizens had to spend a considerable part of their own time and resources safeguarding their health. However, she warned that individual attempts to resolve the new conflicts arising from the increasing demands upon the individual in the work process often led to psychological difficulties and neuroses and that these conflicts should therefore be resolved at a social level (315). The individual alone was incapable of solving social problems such as density of traffic, urbanisation and pollution, which produced factors detrimental to his development (316). Thus, in common with most of the other theorists studied in this thesis, she proposed collective solutions to the problems of socialist
society. This, however, did not mean that socialist society could offer the individual rules and ready solutions for solving all his problems. It could influence objective conditions, but it could not automatically guarantee individual happiness. It was the individual's responsibility to make full use of his opportunities on the basis of his demands and needs (317).

Dölling noted that conflicts experienced by individuals in the 'private sphere', such as the 'double burden', (Doppelbelastung), upon GDR women, were socially determined and therefore did not stem from the inferiority or subjective failure of the individuals involved. Such problems should therefore not remain in the private domain, since this would falsely suggest, in her view, the existence of individual spheres of activity outside society and limits upon the social context of individuals (318). Given that the individual's existence together with the specific conditions which promoted or hindered the individual's development were socially produced and therefore could be transformed as society developed, the individual should neither be fatalistic, resigning himself to his current living conditions, nor should he invest all his efforts and hopes in creating a haven of modest, private happiness in the midst of conditions which were in need of reform (319).

Like official theorists, Dölling rejected the division of an individual's life into a public and private sphere. In her view the family should not have the function of shielding its members from society, but the main task of culturally influencing the personality development of its members (320). In these statements she therefore rejected the concept of a private sphere existing independently of society, where the individual spontaneously attempted to resolve the problems, personal or otherwise, directly
affecting him.

She argued that the arts and social sciences should have the function of opening up a public discussion of the social causes of conflicts directly experienced by individuals in their 'private lives' (321). For her, the arts played an important role in enabling the individual to perceive his place in the greater order of things:


Like Kuczynski, she pointed out that GDR writers had hitherto dealt with the problems of their fellow-citizens, in particular highlighting their social dimension, more readily than social scientists:

She noted that the problems facing women trying to reconcile the demands made of them in the home and at work, their resulting feelings of guilt and the loss of their female identity were already major themes tackled by female writers such as Maxie Wander (324). She spoke of the need to look at the specific experiences of women in order to demonstrate the social dimension of their problems and resolve them:

Um die 'Privatheit' individueller Erfahrungen und Konflikte von Frauen aufzubrechen, ist es notwendig, die Besonderheit dieser Erfahrungen zu erschließen. Das verlangt auch, die marxistisch-leninistische Theorie nicht nur auf Zusammenhänge 'anzuwenden' sondern sie in der Analyse des Besonderen weiterentwickeln, 'mit der Erweiterung des Blick-Winkels, der Neustellung der Tiefenschärfe' zu einer 'Erweiterung dessen, was wirklich ist' zu erfassen, also die besonderen Zusammenhänge, Bereiche usw. in ihrer konkreten gesellschaftlichen Bestimmtheit sichtbar zu machen, ist auch die Voraussetzung für die Überwindung der theoretischen und weltanschaulichen Beschränktheiten des Feminismus, der sich als eine spezifische Variante der 'Privatisierung' der von den Frauen erfahrenen Bedingungen und Konflikte heraustellt (325).

With the priority she gives to the specific needs and experiences of the individual and the concept that literature can explore social conflicts in actually existing socialism by homing in on an individual's specific problems, Dölling is close to Christa Wolf's concept of subjective authenticity which will be examined below.
4iii. Dölling on the needs of the individual

During the Honecker era questions relating to the development of individual needs in socialism were studied by an increasing number of social scientists. Dölling positively interpreted this as an expression of the maturity of socialist society. GDR socialism had reached a phase of its development where the individual had to become increasingly aware of the social significance of his actions if GDR society was to progress. She also argued that the linking of production with the individual's needs, evident in the SED's 'main task' – the unity of social and economic policy – had only been made possible because the GDR had reached the necessary level of economic and technological development at the beginning of the seventies (326).

Dölling explained that the development of individual needs was historically determined. In actually existing socialism work was, for instance, not yet the individual's primary need, but essentially the means to an end. The goal of socialist production was to guarantee the prosperity of the population and to satisfy needs which mainly lay outside the direct sphere of production (327). Improving the quantity and quality of consumer goods, the opportunities for training and satisfying cultural needs in one's free time were the forms in which needs were developed in actually existing socialism (328). The consumption of material goods according to the productivity principle gave the individual the impetus to act in the social interest. However, like Koch, she stressed that the development and satisfaction of needs primarily through individual consumption had to be linked to relations within the community. The apparent trends in the GDR towards an excessive interest in the acquisition of consumer goods and abstractly
defining oneself in terms of material wealth were at a superficial level 'bourgeois', but they were also symptomatic of the individual's underdeveloped relations with the collective, or even of his negative experiences of the collective (329).

Like Bahro, Dölling was critical of the trend towards conspicuous consumption in the GDR and put this down to conflicts within actually existing socialism. However, unlike the radical critics, she did not condemn the consumption of material goods per se. Indeed, she supported the unity of social and economic policy as conducive to the individual's development.

For Dölling, the future development of individual needs was not tantamount to the satisfaction of existing needs, nor merely the quantitative expansion of needs, as implied by official theorists, but was the radical and qualitative transformation of the structure of the individual's needs. Under the new structure of individual needs, individuals would not be distinguished from each other by their degree of material wealth, but they would develop their individuality in the process of individually consuming the socially produced wealth (330). As the GDR progressed towards communism, the development of the individual's 'productive' needs would become increasingly important and gradually gain priority over his material needs (331).

In Dölling's view, the intellectualistic equation of material and cultural needs with 'base' and 'high' needs respectively was an obstacle to understanding the nature of the relationships between these two groups of needs (332). She noted that although GDR theorists and politicians often spoke of the necessity of meeting the actual needs of individuals, usually the demands for more and
higher-quality consumer goods, entertainment, social events and sports activities, these needs were often termed 'base' or bourgeois needs and remnants of the old ways of thinking. Dölling argued that this discomfiture over the population's existing needs could only be overcome if these needs were seen as the product and expression of the existing level of socialist development in the GDR. Indeed, Dölling stated that the population's actual needs should be taken seriously:

Das Akzeptieren vorhandener Bedürfnisse, gegründet auf der Kenntnis der konkreten empirischen Subjektivität der Individuen, schließt dann selbstverständlich auch ein, die gesellschaftliche Sicherung ihrer Befriedigung als notwendig anzusehen, eben weil sich in ihnen individuelle Existenznotwendigkeiten manifestieren. Ursachen und konkrete Formen individueller Leistungsbereitschaft und -fähigkeit können ohne deren Kenntnis nicht hinreichend aufgedeckt und entsprechend für gesellschafts- und kulturpolitische Entscheidungen genutzt werden. Das Akzeptieren vorhandener Bedürfnisse verlangt aber auch, diese selbst als Moment in einem historischen Prozeß zu begreifen, das heißt zum Beispiel, den Blick dafür zu schärfen, in welcher Weise - oft einseitig, aufs Private gerichtet, mit kompensatorischer Funktion - in den vorhandenen Bedürfnissen 'produktive' Aspekte enthalten sind, die potentiell Entwicklungsmöglichkeiten enthalten, in denen sich die Sehnsucht nach einem Inhalt verbirgt (333).

Dölling repeatedly stressed that cultural theory should examine the actual living and working conditions of individuals, that cultural policy should be directed towards the actual needs of individuals. There are clear parallels between these views and those of Heuer.

Whereas Dölling's radical and qualitative transformation of the structure of the individual's needs seems to be similar to Bahro's proposed 'Revolutionierung der Bedürfnisse', she clearly rejects the intellectualistic dismissal by the radical critics and others of the individual material needs in actually existing socialism.

Dölling argued that when the individual experienced lack of control over areas of social life he compensated for this by voluntarily
restricting himself to socially approved spheres of activity. This was expressed in the priority given to satisfying his material needs, a predominant orientation towards 'private' relationships, especially within the family, and the guaranteeing of material wealth by adapting to the given social conditions (334). This form of behaviour was associated with apoliticism:

Die Angst gegenüber unkontrollierbaren Bedingungen individueller Existenz wird psychisch so 'verarbeitet', daß die Individuen sozusagen mit ihr leben können, sie wird positiv 'gewendet' in Wertungen und Haltungen wie 'Bescheidenheit', des resignativen Zufrieden-Seins mit dem Erreichbaren, eines mehr oder weniger betonten Desinteresses an Politik beziehungsweise generell an Geschehnissen, die über den unmittelbaren 'sozialen' Bereich hinausgehen usw. Diese emotional stark getönten Wertungen und Haltungen sind - eben weil sie unter diesen Bedingungen für die Individuen existenznotwendig sind - durch rationales Argumentieren und Aufzeigen von Zusammenhängen allein nicht 'aufzubrechen' (335).

This passage reads like Bahro's description of the individual's subalterity in actually existing socialism - astonishing when one considers that this passage is taken from a book published by the SED's own Dietz publishing house. The writer Helga Schutz also made the point that individuals compensated for their problems in other spheres of life by investing their energies and placing their expectations in their private relationships, a factor which, in her view, led to the high divorce-level in the GDR (336).

Dölling rejected the warnings of some GDR theorists, including Bahro, Havemann and the authors of Grundlagen des historischen Materialismus (1976) (337) against unrestrained consumption and a drift towards a consumer society, citing the arguments of the cultural theorist Kühne against the use of the term of the consumer society for the GDR: firstly that this term was defined by Western ideologists and secondly that it disregarded the fact that individual consumption in socialism was socially determined (338).
Dölling's comments on cultural activities

Dölling drew important practical conclusions for the work of cultural functionaries from her theoretical deliberations. She noted that the intensive use of physical and mental forces in the work process influenced how individuals spent their free time. The social demands upon the individual gave rise to a certain priority of needs which in the main had to be satisfied outside the sphere of work. According to Dölling, the intensity of the stresses of the work process upon the individual could only be borne if enough priority was given to rest and relaxation in leisure time. This was not only important for the reproduction of the workforce as an economic factor, but important for the individual's biological structure and for his social and political activity (339).

For Dölling, the widespread interest in gardening in the GDR possibly indicated a deep-rooted need for rest and relaxation, for a change of activity outside the work-sphere and the need to express one's creativity. In other words, it was intrinsically a compensatory activity (340). In the same way, she referred to the popularity of trips to the country in search of tranquility and the ownership of second homes and allotments, as an element of the socialist way of life and a legitimate method of maintaining individual physical and psychological stamina (341). Thus Dölling fully acknowledged the needs of the majority of the GDR population for relaxation in their free time. In her view, activities directed towards this goal were cultural activities in the sense that they promoted behaviour which was important for both the individual and society (342).

She warned that if GDR cultural functionaries did not give sufficient thought to work pressures upon individuals and their
concomitant need to relax and be entertained in their free time, to practical aspects such as transport, shopping and creche facilities and to the experience of their target audience of socialist democracy in the social organisations and at work when planning the range of intellectual and cultural activities, then their work would be less effective (343).

She disagreed with theorists, including Bahro, who deduced from certain traditional forms of satisfying the needs for relaxation and entertainment and their ideological consequences that they were 'baser' needs which regrettably still existed in socialist society, whilst the 'real' characteristics of socialist personalities were expressed in intellectual, aesthetic needs and in progressive political and ideological attitudes (344). She also disagreed with the widely held view amongst cultural functionaries that existing needs were static and their satisfaction a concession to underdeveloped tastes, rather than an opportunity to broaden the individual's social experience within the framework of the familiar forms of satisfying these needs (345).

She suggested that the well-established forms of organised cultural activity in socialism; for example 'the house of culture', public lectures on science, discussion groups and propaganda work, offered one type of intellectual activity in line with an ideal view of the 'socialist personality', but did not meet the predominant needs of the bulk of the GDR population. The cultural organisations should, in her view, offer a varied range of opportunities to relax, do sport, socialise and discuss politics and art. This would, in her opinion, mean a more effective implementation of cultural policy (346).
She argued that if cultural theory and cultural work were not based upon an analysis of actual social conditions, then individuals would be less willing and able to take an active part in the social processes. Like Heuer, she warned that if the coincidence of social and individual interests was not apparent to individuals in their daily lives, then they might withdraw from the public sphere (347). Interestingly in this context she rejected the term 'identity', (Identität), in favour of the term 'unity', (Einheit), of individual and social interests.

Nevertheless, Dölling made it clear that she was not arguing against the official concept of organised cultural activity per se (348). Indeed, she put forward the argument that if individuals were encouraged to participate in organised cultural activities this could have a positive 'knock-on effect' upon their behaviour in other spheres: for example the choice of free time activities undertaken with family and friends (349). Proceeding from the argument that individual needs and capabilities, although formed in the various spheres of activity, did not exist independently as psychological phenomena, but rather formed an overall structure of attitudes which had a tendency to generalise and direct individual behaviour, Dölling argued that if the activity of cultural functionaries was directed at all spheres of the individual's life, then it was more likely that the individual's attitudes would be cohesive as a subjective factor conditioning the formation of socialist modes of behaviour. Restricting cultural activity to satisfying individual aesthetic needs, she argued, was an ineffective strategy, often linked with the view that success solely depended upon the selection of the appropriate educational methods. It could also lead to the individual perceiving the range
of cultural activities on offer to be external conditions, irrelevant to his way of life and needs, and to him rejecting them (350).

Finally she, like Heuer, emphasised that the individual should be treated as the subject rather than object of organised cultural activities and that he should be consulted as to his needs, interests and capabilities (351). In her eyes, the socialist cultural revolution could not be reduced to the changing of attitudes through education, but also involved the transformation of the social conditions, which in turn formed the basis for transforming individual behaviour (352).
Iva Eberhard Poppe on 'personal rights'

As we saw in chapter two, official theorists recognised three groups of rights: socio-economic rights, political rights and cultural rights. Although according to official theory these groups had equal status and were indivisible, in practice throughout the seventies official theorists laid particular emphasis upon socio-economic rights, thus implying their primacy over the other groups of rights. The lack of detailed discussion of political rights in the official media during the seventies was, according to Poppe, due to an initial reluctance of GDR legal theorists to deal with political rights, given their history in capitalism and to a tendency to turn to the groups of socio-economic and cultural rights with which it was relatively easy to highlight the new relations between the individual and society in socialism (353). At the end of the seventies this situation seemed to change as theorists realized that it was politically and ideologically necessary to develop the theory of political rights in socialism in order to mount a counteroffensive against the West on the question of human rights.

By the late seventies some legal theorists (354), influenced by social scientists and writers (355), began to recognise a further category of rights, namely 'persönliche Rechte' (individual or personal rights). In a key article published in Staat und Recht in 1979 and in the work Die politischen und persönlichen Grundrechte (1979) Poppe argued the case for recognising personal rights as a separate group of rights, referring to international documents and declarations including: the 1977 Soviet constitution; the two UN Covenants on human rights; the Helsinki Final Act and the declaration adopted at the Moscow Meeting of the Political
Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty member states on 23 November 1978. He also wrote that the greater emphasis upon individual rights alongside other groups of rights was a natural progression from SED policy in the GDR, the goal of which was the welfare of the citizen and the development of the socialist personality (356).

Poppe listed the following individual rights enshrined in the GDR constitution: the inviolability of the individual and his freedom (Articles 19 paragraph 2 and 30); the respect, protection and promotion of the family and marriage (Article 38); the inviolability of the secrecy of the post and of telegrams (Article 31), freedom of movement within the GDR (Article 32); freedom of conscience (Article 20); freedom to adhere to a religion and faith (Articles 20 and 39); the right to legal protection outside the GDR (Article 33); the inviolability of one's home (Article 37); the right to own property (Article 11); the right to inherit (Article 11); the right to a defence lawyer in criminal cases (Article 102); the right to be heard in court (Article 102) and the right to hand in petitions to the appropriate authority (Article 103). These personal rights did not imply absolute freedom of the individual, but were restricted by the qualification that they could not be exercised to the detriment of the social interests, the interests of the state or any third party (Article 11, paragraph 3). Article 31 (2) stated for example that the inviolability of the mail and telegrams could be restricted if there was a threat to state security or a criminal investigation in progress.

Poppe distinguished between political and personal rights in terms of their primary function. In his view political rights guided the citizen in the development of his personality by taking an active
part in building GDR socialism, whereas personal rights primarily protected the citizen from the unlawful and arbitrary encroachment of state organs, individual civil servants or other citizens upon his private sphere. In defining personal rights in socialism Poppe referred to the private sphere as an area of the individual's life where the citizen had no legal obligations towards the state or society (357).

Poppe nevertheless adhered to the official view that (personal) rights in socialism were not subjective in the Western sense of guaranteeing a private sphere for the individual absolutely free from state or social intervention:

Unter sozialistischen Gesellschaftsbedingungen wäre sie (eine solche Konzeption L.G.)...ein Anachronismus. Der sozialistische Staat ist das Machtinstrument der Werktätigen. Sie brauchen sich nicht vor der Macht zu schützen, die sie selbst revolutionär geschaffen haben und ausüben (358).

Like Klenner, he argued against Western-style subjective rights in the context of socialism on the grounds that this would be irreconcilable with the socialist concept of 'Interessenübereinstimmung'.

In drawing the distinction between personal and political rights Poppe essentially made the distinction between the two main functions of subjective rights in socialism recognised by legal theorists; namely on the one hand to protect the socialist personality and on the other to further the development of the socialist personality. It is significant that whereas other GDR theorists gave priority to the function of subjective rights to further the development of the socialist personality, in other words essentially a socialisation function, Poppe considered the protective function of socialist subjective rights so important as
to categorize those directly associated with it as an independent group of rights. Indeed, he stated that personal rights would have an increasing role to play as socialism developed, reflecting the growing emphasis upon the personality (359). By underlining the importance of personal rights Poppe shifted the emphasis away from the stress on socialist rights as 'Mitgestaltungsrechte' that was characteristic of the official view. In doing so, despite protestations to the contrary, Poppe would seem closer than most official legal theorists to the Western concept of subjective rights.

Although I have seen no reference to a separate group of personal rights in GDR reference works, in the seventies and eighties there does seem to have been increasing recognition of this category of rights. Honecker himself acknowledged the importance of these rights in key speeches to the First Secretaries of the district organisations of the SED in 1987 and 1988 (360). In 1988 Honecker stated that socialism was more progressive than capitalism in the area of political and personal rights, but that more needed to be done to make the individual aware of this in his daily life (361). During the eighties the principle of personal rights was recognised by the GDR at an international level. In 1987 there was a specific reference to personal rights in the SPD-SED paper 'Der Streit der Ideologien und die gemeinsame Sicherheit'. In the same year the Multilateral Scientific Committee on Human Rights Questions, a body set up by the East European states, decided that more research was needed into politics and democracy in socialism from the viewpoint of political and personal rights (362).

Although GDR reference works did not carry specific entries for subjective rights or personal rights, the 1974 edition of the
Wörterbuch zum sozialistischen Staat did feature the entry 'Persönlichkeitsrechte' (personality rights or the rights of the individual), defining these as 'specific expressions of constitutional basic rights' (363). According to this entry, the most important personality rights included the right to physical inviolability and the right to the protection of patents and of inventions. Personality rights were characterised by the fact that they were absolute rights in the sense that all other legal subjects should respect them and that they could not be restricted in the social interest or in the interests of security. If personality rights were violated the individual was able to assert his legal rights to redress the situation or prevent it from recurring. The function of personality rights was thus clearly seen as protecting the individual vis à vis all other parties, indeed reference is made to them as 'Schutzrechte' (protection rights) elsewhere in the same dictionary (364).
4ivb. The debate on subjective rights

In the above section Poppe's concept of 'persönliche Rechte' (personal rights) and the official narrower concept of 'Persönlichkeitsrechte' (personality rights) were examined. In the following section the wider debate amongst GDR legal theorists on subjective rights will be studied.

It was generally argued by legal theorists that subjective rights had developed in capitalism as rights belonging to an individual to protect his interests against the opposing interests of the state. Their function in capitalism was to guarantee essentially a specific free space for the individual. In the sixties GDR legal theorists attempted to overcome the objections that the Western concept of subjective rights was based upon the model of a conflict between the individual and society and associated with individualism and egoism. The point upon which they all agreed was that the rights of the individual in socialism should in some way reflect the new relations between the individual and society.

Whilst authors such as Poppe, Klenner and R. Schüsseler believed that it was possible to give a new qualitative and functional definition to the concept of subjective rights based upon the nature of socialist society and socialist law, others, including Polak, G. Haney and M. Posch, rejected the concept of subjective rights for socialism out of hand. Of these Haney presented the most detailed objections to subjective rights in the context of the socialist legal system. He argued that in socialism the activity of the individual, the product of this activity and society were no longer phenomena alienated from the individual and set against him. The individual therefore did not need protection against society
(365). Whereas the Western concept of subjective rights implied the separation of subjective and objective rights, the function of socialist law in general and in its specific forms, for example the rights of the individual, had as their goal the 'socialised individual' and the extension of the role of the subjective factor. In this sense there could be no conflict between the implementation of individual rights and the rights of socialist society. Finally, in capitalism the concept of the subjective right was seen from the point of view of the isolated individual, with the consequence that the social interests were only seen in a negative light as a factor restricting the interests of the individual.

The main thrust of Haney's arguments then was that the Western concept of subjective rights proceeded from the assumption that the relations between the individual and the state or society were of an antagonistic nature and thus inappropriate for the socialist system. Like others, Haney objected to the concept of subjective rights in socialism on the grounds that they expressed a mistrust of the socialist state and society. However, as Klenner pointed out, the complete rejection of subjective rights, on the other hand, expressed a mistrust of the individual (366).

Writing in the eighties, Klenner commented that the official view of subjective rights amongst legal theorists in the sixties as expressed by Haney and others gradually became sociologically and philosophically untenable (367). In the seventies all GDR legal theorists gradually came to accept the concept of subjective rights in socialism. What brought about this change in the dominant view of subjective rights in socialism?
The GDR theorists who opposed the concept of subjective rights in socialism during the sixties essentially rejected the possibility of contradictions of interests in socialism. In doing so, however, they failed to do anything to overcome these contradictions (368). However, as early as 1961 others such as Klenner began to see subjective rights as a tool with which to reconcile conflicting interests in GDR society:


As mentioned above, the contradictions debate of the early seventies resulted in the widespread and explicit acceptance of contradictions, albeit of a nonantagonistic nature, in actually existing socialism, thereby opening up the way for the development of subjective rights theory. Given that theorists began to see basic and subjective rights as a tool with which to reconcile conflicting interests in socialist society, one can understand why Poppe referred to them as 'institutions which contribute to the stabilization and the development of socialist power and democracy' (370).

The influence of Soviet legal theorists also seems to have been a factor in the change in the most widely held and official views of subjective rights in the GDR. In *Studien über die Grundrechte* (1964) Klenner remarked that Soviet legal theorists in particular believed that the formulation of a system of subjective rights for a socialist society was long overdue (371). In *Marxismus und*
Menschenrechte (1982) Klenner pointed to the influence of some Soviet theorists who had rejected as 'unlawful' a situation where all rights were deemed to be on one side and all obligations on the other and who had proved that civil rights without the corresponding obligations of the state were mere declarations and that the rights of the state without the corresponding duties of the citizen were nothing more or less than pious wishes. According to Klenner, the conclusion of these progressive Soviet theorists was:

Grundrechte seien hingegen im Sozialismus wie Grundpflichten objektiv bedingte Widerspiegelung wechselseitiger Ansprüche von Individuum und Gesellschaft (372).

In particular, the intense debate about socialist subjective rights after 1975 in the GDR was influenced by the Soviet legal theorists Lukascheva, Matuzov, Jawitsch and Strogovitsch, by the German translation of the Soviet work The Marxist-Leninist general theory of the state and law which was published in four volumes in the period 1974 - 1976 and by the work of the Hungarian theorist Szabo.

Honecker's unity of social and economic policy meant that the GDR citizen could claim from the state a plethora of welfare benefits and services. Thus, after 1971 there was an increasing need for procedural forms whereby the citizen could press his claims and appeal against administrative decisions relating to the allocation of these benefits and services. Hence the renaissance of administrative law (Verwaltungsrecht) in the GDR during this period.

The legal theorist Heuer wrote that the fact that creative writers and social scientists increasingly turned to questions regarding the individual and individuality in the seventies provided an
impulse for legal theorists to reexamine the theory of subjective rights (373).

The focus of the debate in the seventies then shifted from questioning whether the concept of subjective rights was appropriate in a socialist system to the nature, function and form of subjective rights in socialism. All theorists tried to establish a discontinuity between the Western and socialist concepts of subjective rights. This was ideologically necessary because the setting of an individual’s rights against the rights of others and of society as a whole implied in the Western concept of subjective rights, was a key element of individualism as defined by both the Kleines Politisches Wörterbuch (1985) and the Wörterbuch der marxistisch-leninistischen Soziologie (1983) (374).

From the late seventies onwards the Academy of Sciences and the Department of Law at the Karl Marx University in Leipzig provided the main forum for the debate about subjective rights. The most important literature on the subject was the Lehrbuch des Verwaltungsrechts der DDR (1979), the 'Schriftenreihe Methodologie der marxistisch-leninistischen Rechtswissenschaft' (5/78) and the 'Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift der Karl-Marx Universität Leipzig. Gesellschaft- und Sprachwissenschaftliche Reihe' (3/82) which was devoted to the theme 'The socialist subjective right - problems and results'.

As stated above, GDR theorists identified two main functions of subjective rights: the protective and socialisation functions. Just as socialist basic duties were considered not to be rights of the socialist state against its citizens, so were socialist basic rights not rights of citizens against their state. It was argued
that this was objectively impossible in actually existing socialism where the state represented the interests of society as a whole and where there was a basic coincidence of interests. Furthermore, the inviolability of the personality and the freedom of the citizen were under the formal protection of the state and social organs (Article 30 of the GDR constitution). It was argued that it was in the interest of the socialist state and society that the individual realised his subjective rights which served to protect and develop his personality (375). In this sense subjective rights were considered to be not only individual rights but also 'social rights' (gesellschaftliche Rechte).

However, it was recognised that conflicts could arise between an individual and a specific organ or state functionary (376). Conflicts between interests at this specific level were attributed to subjective factors, for example a functionary's ignorance of the legal regulations. Theorists recognised that the citizen needed subjective rights to protect his legitimate interests in this situation (377). It should be noted here that the legitimate interests of the citizen, which were to be protected by subjective rights, were however defined by the SED. All constitutional rights, the most important group of subjective rights, were subordinated to the recognition of the supremacy of the SED as laid down in the first article of the constitution. This meant that the citizen could not avail himself of constitutional rights to protect himself and his interests against those of the state or of the party at a general level without going against the spirit of the constitution.

Subjective rights were deemed to protect the individual from arbitrary behaviour, bureaucracy and abuse of office, all of which were considered bourgeois phenomena. Given that the need to
counteract bureaucratic tendencies was a recurrent theme in SED documents and Einheit articles in the Honecker era, there were clearly problems in this area. As one might expect, official theorists did not, however, refer to conflicts, actual or potential, between the individual and society, or between the citizen and the state at the most general level. To do so would have meant undermining the official concept of 'Interessenübereinstimmung'.

So far the protective function of subjective rights has been discussed. Klenner wrote that to stress only this function of subjective rights in socialism was to come close to the Western concept of subjective rights (378). For him, the main function of basic rights in socialism was to stimulate the activity of the individual in society and to organise the general development of the personality (379). In his view the main thrust of basic rights and duties was to overcome the nonantagonistic contradictions which were to be found not so much between the backwardness of individual state organs and the citizen's opportunities for self-development, but rather between the objective requirements of personality development on a mass scale in socialism and various habits and traditions (380). In other words, unlike subjective rights in capitalism, subjective rights had essentially a socialisation function in socialism.

Most definitions of the subjective right revolved around the notion of the scope for potential action on the part of the legal subject, a certain freedom within the legally defined boundaries. When considering the element of individual freedom embodied in the concept of the subjective right it is important to remember that the Marxist-Leninist concept of freedom is very different from the
Western concept (381). The orthodox Marxist–Leninist view holds that the individual acquires greater freedom as he gains a deeper insight into the laws governing social development. Since the party defines the social interests, the notion of individual freedom embodied in GDR definitions of the subjective right implies that the individual understands and identifies with the social interests.

The legal theorists Carola Luge and Karl Bönniger placed greater importance upon the aspects of personal freedom and autonomy in their definition of the subjective right than most of their colleagues. Luge basically gave the following three components of subjective rights in socialism: the possibility of using specific social goods; the authority to act within the law and to demand others to do the same and the freedom to act within the limits set by the law (382).

A certain freedom of the individual to organise his life (Dispositionsfreiheit) was linked with these three components of subjective rights. Luge distinguished between five types of decision which defined this individual freedom (383); namely the decision
- whether the individual availed himself of his subjective right
- as to how this took place
- as to which of all the subjective rights at his disposal the individual chose to realise
- as to which of the legally defined alternatives open to him he chose in order to realise his subjective rights
- as to the motives and to what purpose he availed himself of a subjective right.
From the point of view of the position of the citizen vis-à-vis the means of production and the state in socialist society Bönniger classified the subjective rights of certain branches of GDR law into 'freedoms' (for example the right to behave as one wished within the framework of the law), 'claims' (the right to demand a benefit or service), 'protective rights' (the right to turn to the state if a protected good was damaged in order that it could stop the continued violation of this right) and 'Mitwirkungsrechte' (the right to participate in the exercise of state power).

Theorists close to the official view argued that legal procedures were not the sole or most effective means with which to guarantee all subjective rights. They emphasised the role of political, economic and ideological guarantees for the realization of basic rights (384). Buchholz, for instance, referred to the system of the petitions procedure as an effective and popular form of guaranteeing the rights and interests of citizens and spoke derisively of the Western fetishism with the legal system (385). Willi Büchner-Uhder and Poppe similarly argued that to concentrate exclusively upon court procedures to enforce subjective rights would promote a view of an isolated individual seeking justice rather than that of a citizen fully participating in the political processes (386).

The most important guarantees of subjective rights laid down in the GDR constitution under Honecker were the right to compensation for injury to a citizen or damage to his property as the result of illegal actions undertaken by employees of state organs (Article 104) and the right to petition (Article 103). In the seventies and eighties it became increasingly apparent that the petitions procedure was not always very effective as a legal guarantee of
subjective rights. According to Western sources, petitions, for example, submitted by critical thinkers and activists in the independent peace and ecological movements were not officially answered, or answered beyond the legally defined deadline. In the late seventies and eighties there were a striking number of references to the need to fight bureaucracy in the context of the petitions procedure in the the SED journal Einheit (387). It is evident that the SED leadership was concerned that this kind of bureaucracy might alienate the individual citizen from the state and lead to apoliticism and indifference to social and political matters (388). The new legislation regarding local representative bodies of the people which went onto the statute book in July 1985 obliged state organs

mit Hinweisen, Anliegen und Beschwerden der Bürger gewissenhaft umzugehen; Bürgeranliegen mit menschlichem Verständnis sachkündig, fristgemäß auf der Grundlage der Rechtsvorschriften zu entscheiden und überzeugend zu beantworten. . . (389).

Bönniger called for a more precise legal formulation of the petitions procedure. As he pointed out, the legal regulations relating to the satisfaction of the individual's interests usually only determined which state administrative organ was responsible for the decision and certain guidelines as to the institution of the procedure by the citizen. He further noted that under the system the citizen bringing the claim usually had no influence upon the decision. Petitions were not examined by an independent arbitrator but by the organs, organisations concerned in an internal inquiry. Bönniger therefore argued in favour of the citizen having certain procedural rights, for example the right to be heard before the state organ involved (390).

These suggestions had a parallel in the eighties discussion about
the reinstitution of administrative courts to deal with citizens' appeals against administrative decisions. It is significant that whilst those who spoke out in favour of a system of administrative courts were in the minority in the GDR, they included 'dissidents' such as Havemann and Heym and some legal theorists within the official sphere including Heuer. The main difference between these groups seemed to be that the former went as far as to also demand the political independence of the court-system.

There were however ideological and practical obstacles to the setting-up of administrative courts. Their institution would have involved a renunciation of the socialist principle of a unity of powers. Furthermore, according to a Western source, there were simply insufficient lawyers to deal with the potential number of cases (391). The GDR leadership therefore concentrated on extending and improving the already existing petitions procedures.

Given the concept of 'Interessenübereinstimmung' and the Marxist-Leninist concept of personal freedom, it is clear that the development of the socialist subjective rights theory by GDR theorists did not signify a return to individualistic positions (392). Far from it. The majority of legal theorists who adhered to the official view of basic rights in socialism were primarily concerned with developing the theory of subjective rights in order to optimise the contribution of the individual to fulfilling the social tasks set by the party. It should be noted that Poppe, Zschiernich and Klenner all referred to subjective rights as an 'instrument of the state' (393).

Although the subjective rights debate in the GDR did not represent a return to individualistic positions, it did reflect the growing
awareness of the need to develop the potential of the individual. It was clearly in the social interest that all individuals achieved their full potential, maximised their creativity and developed their self-initiative. However, the individual needed a certain space, room for manoeuvre, to develop this creativity. The question facing the SED was how to increase this measure of personal freedom, particularly in the economic and cultural spheres, without political repercussions. This dilemma was expressed in a letter published in Forum in 1971, which quoted the following remark of Karl Liebknecht to stress the need for the SED to promote the initiative of the individual:

Die bisherige Erziehung des Proletariats zur Unterordnung des einzelnen unter die Gesamtheit, unter dem von ihr umständlich gebildeten Entschluß bedarf bitter notwendig einer Ergänzung durch Erziehung zur freien, kühnen Initiative des einzelnen für den richtig gewählten Moment: durch Erziehung, zum Handeln auf eigene Verantwortung. (Stengel's own emphasis) (394).

The reader highlighted the tension in GDR socialism between the political necessity of repressing the formerly dominant classes and stemming the influence of the West on the one hand and allowing the individual sufficient freedom to fulfil his potential. He stated that if the GDR were to draw the logical conclusion from the fact that the West exploited the remaining differences existing in socialism to destabilise the socialist system and sought to counteract the ideological influence of the West by eliminating all such differences, then this would lead to the 'sterility' of the socialist system (395).

The subjective rights debate, indeed the whole debate about the nature of the relations between the citizen and the state, between the individual and society in the seventies and eighties reflected the striving of the SED to increase the personal freedom of the
individual whilst containing this freedom within strictly controlled limits in order to maintain the stability of the political system. It is also an example of how the SED sought to respond to the new climate in the GDR with tentative reform.
4va. The debate on the emphasis upon the private sphere during the Honecker period

In the following section the discussion of the concentration upon the private sphere by social scientists will be examined and comparisons made with the views put forward by radical critics and official theorists. Particular attention will be given to the views of Helmut Hanke (396), who provoked much discussion with the publication of his seminal work Freizeit in der DDR (1979).

In the above-mentioned work Hanke, like the radical critics, criticised the phenomena of consumerism and political inactivity in the GDR;

Dabei versteht es sich von selbst, daß der Genuß des Lebens in der auf allgemeiner Arbeit beruhenden sozialistischen Gesellschaft kein Leben in Müßiggang oder Beschaulichkeit bedeutet, sondern eine aktive und produktive Lebenshaltung, die sich in ein bewußtes Verhältnis zur Lebenszeit setzt und das Individuum befähigt, sozial aktiv und individuell erfüllt zu leben (397).

For him, excessive interest in increasing one's material wealth and excessive concentration upon one's private life were the expression of old traditions which died hard and of underdeveloped needs, which were not compatible with the concept of a socialist way of life (398). He made it clear that the GDR was only beginning the long cultural process of overcoming the negative aspects of these traditions and developing new socialist traditions (399). Like Kuczynski, he put the continued existence of negative old traditions down to both internal and external causes. The GDR had inherited a form of work organisation, division of labour and social infrastructure which had developed under capitalism and thus constrained the development of the individual in actually existing socialism. These factors were responsible for the continuing
anonymity in social relationships especially in the GDR's larger cities and for the subalternity, (Untertanengeist) and blind loyalty to authority of some of his fellow-citizens (400). More specifically, he put the trend towards a withdrawal into the private sphere down to the lack of positive social controls, in particular the lack of the work collective's positive influence upon the individual outside work, and also to the lack of appropriate recreational facilities (401). Hanke also repeated the official argument that the capitalist world was intent on hindering the development of socialism by encouraging negative behaviour such as egoism, consumerism, apoliticism and apathy towards social affairs amongst the GDR population (402).

Hanke nevertheless did point out that the concentration upon home life was a positive German tradition when it did not include the above-mentioned negative, isolationist tendencies. It could, in his view, promote a healthy family life, the feeling of social wellbeing and permit a greater insight into the compatibility of individual needs and social interests. He was therefore critical of official theorists who continued to associate the concentration upon homelife per se with an individualist or bourgeois way of life. He argued that there was nothing inherently wrong in GDR citizens working in their free time to improve their living conditions:

die arbeitenden Massen leben eben in jeder Hinsicht von ihrer eigenen Arbeit, sie können sie auch in der Freizeit nicht auf andere abwälzen. Es handelt sich hier also nicht bloß um einen Ausdruck von Mangel an Arbeitskräften und Dienstleistungen .. und meines Erachtens auch nicht um eine vorübergehende Erscheinung, sondern um ein objektives Ergebnis der Beseitigung aller Formen der Aneignung fremder Arbeit (403).

The chief editor of the journal Forum Klaus Hilbig also stated that it was perfectly legitimate for the socialist citizen to have pride
in his home, providing that he also invested his energy and skills in society and was willing to act in the wider, social interest (404).

DIY work, carpentry, gardening and other home-based hobbies reflected, so Hanke and Günter Lehmann, Professor of Aesthetics at Karl-Marx University, argued, a growing need to express one's individuality and a reaction to the mass manufacture of goods, the uniformity of architecture and the lack of variety in clothes (405). Hanke believed that the growing trend towards home-based activities would continue with the increasing intensification of the production process, increasing urbanisation and the increasing role of shiftwork amongst other factors (406). Whereas official theorists argued that the work and leisure spheres were closely interlinked, the discussion of the problem of consumerism and apoliticism by Hanke, Heuer, Dölling and Bahro implied that this official view was idealistic, that many GDR citizens made a clear separation between the two spheres in terms of their attitudes and behaviour. Hanke implied that it would be some time before the two spheres were closely interlinked (407).

The sociologist Kretzschmar similarly argued that the widespread enthusiasm for DIY and gardening was not simply a reaction to the shortfall in goods and services, but indicative of a deep-rooted need of the individual to be involved in all aspects of a work-operation and to overcome the division of labour in his free time. He saw this as a positive sign of the creative potential of the GDR population (408). This positive interpretation of the importance of the private sphere for many GDR citizens is at variance with the official view that the individual was a social animal in society and could only develop his potential within society.
In *Freizeit in der DDR* Hanke argued that for cultural and economic reasons it was inappropriate for theorists in actually existing socialism to adopt a moralistic tone and criticise the above-mentioned free time activities as 'petty-bourgeois' (409). Like Dölling, he stressed that one should examine the actual leisure interests of the majority of the population and not have preconceived ideals. Thus Hanke included physical relaxation, sleep, family activities, playing with children and eating amongst the free time activities of the average GDR citizen, unlike many of the official theorists, Havemann and Bahro who regarded only 'meaningful' activities such as social activity, education, information, appreciation of the arts and creative activities as true free time activities (410). He argued that, even given the restricted resources in actually existing socialism, the working and living conditions of the individual would be improved if more emphasis was placed upon the his needs for socialising, entertainment, communication and pleasure and if the real cultural needs of all sections of the population were taken seriously (411).

Like Dölling, Hanke had a fairly negative view of the working conditions of many GDR citizens. He specifically referred to the problems of noise and other forms of pollution in the work environment of manual workers. He too concluded that jobs should be matched more precisely to the individual’s capabilities and personality (412). He seemed to share Bahro’s view that free time activities were essentially compensatory activities given the level of development of work processes in the GDR, even if he did not actually use the term 'compensatory':

*Dieses Bedürfnis (für aktive Erholung im Freien) hat seine gesellschaftlichen Ursachen in den vorherrschenden Arbeits- und Lebensbedingungen in unserer Gesellschaft: Intensive Arbeit während des ganzen Jahres, überwiegend*

He argued that, given the range of monotonous jobs, individuals could often only develop certain skills and qualities in their free time. All the more reason therefore why individuals should pursue a wide range of leisure activities and why there should be better leisure facilities (414).

Similarly, in Jugend Konkret, a collection of articles by researchers at the Central Institute for Youth Research in Leipzig, it was conceded that some university graduates dissatisfied with their work looked for compensation in their leisure activities. However, the volume warned that even a fulfilled family life and a wide range of leisure activities could not fully compensate for conflicts in the individual's professional life in the long term (415).

Professor Günter Kräupl of the Department of Law at the Friedrich-Schiller University in Jena warned that if the individual did mainly manual work and did not have to take on any personal responsibility in his job, he might be less capable and willing to participate in social activity and seek compensation in trivial, personal interests and conspicuous consumption. Indeed he went further and linked crimes against publicly owned property with the individual's compensatory activities in his free time. Again, he believed that this problem could be overcome by matching jobs more specifically to the individual (416).
This criticism of the work conditions and environment directly contrasted with the official view that production provided the main sphere for the development of the individual, at least in terms of new socialist collective relations at work if not yet in terms of actual job content. Official theorists explicitly rejected the view that leisure activities had a compensatory function. Otto Finger, Professor of Marxism-Leninism at the Humboldt University, for instance, stated:

Man sollte die Auffassung vermeiden, als sei die Kultur, das geistige Leben eine Art Ersatz und Trost für das Produzieren in vielen Bereichen unserer Industrie, in denen tatsächlich monotone Arbeiten ausgeführt werden müssen (417).

Although the official view was that the work and leisure spheres were objectively interlinked, as seen in chapter two it was conceded that subjectively there could be a separation between the public and private spheres, between work and free time for some GDR citizens. Official theorists tended to suggest that only a relatively small number of specific individuals made this separation between the public and private sphere and put this primarily down to the lack of the correct consciousness on the part of the individual. They therefore suggested that the solution to this problem lay in the improvement in political and social organisation in residential areas and in the development of the individual’s needs for social communication and contact in his free time (418). The radical critics and the theorists examined in this chapter, however, believed that consumerism and apoliticism was a mass phenomenon, whose roots lay in the objective conditions of GDR society, specifically in the traditional division of labour and the limited resources that could be invested in leisure amenities. Their solutions therefore emphasised the need for a change in the division of labour.
GDR education experts were concerned by the discrepancy between the public and private opinions of young GDR people (419). Political ritualism was also characteristic of older age-groups. The vice-president and First Secretary of the Cultural Federation Karl-Heinz Schulmeister complained at the Eleventh Federal Congress of the Cultural Federation that many members and functionaries of his organisation tended to withdraw into private life and use the organisation merely as a means of pursuing their leisure interests (420).

Like Dölling, Hanke stated that in actually existing socialism recreation was essentially a social problem requiring collective solutions (421).

Like Dölling and Heuer, Hanke criticised cultural functionaries for not taking the range of cultural needs into consideration when planning leisure activities (422). He shared Dölling's view that greater attention should be given to the individual's needs for relaxation, entertainment and indeed went further by stressing that greater attention should be given to the need for privacy. In this context he cited an interesting statement by Johannes R. Becher, Minister for Cultural Affairs in the fifties, defending the individual's right to privacy:

> Der Mensch, auch der gesellschaftlich noch so tätige, hat ein Recht auf seine vier Wände. Er soll sich innerhalb seiner vier Wände wohl fühlen und dieses Wohlbefinden soll nicht vermindert werden dadurch, daß es verboten wird, daß es kleinbürgerlich sei, sich innerhalb von vier Wänden wohl zu fühlen. Der Mensch soll ohne schlechtes Gewissen seinen Lieblingsbeschäftigungcn nachgehen, um so freudiger wird er danach seinen gesellschaftlichen Verpflichtungen nachkommen. Es gibt Zeiten, wir kennen sie alle, die das Privatdasein reduzieren, es verkümmern oder gar absterben lassen. Dies geschieht nicht zum Nutzen der öffentlichen Tätigkeit, sondern diese erhalt dadurch einen bitteren Beigeschmack, eine Art von
Zwangscharakter. Ein solcher Verzicht aufs Privatdasein möge als ein Ausnahmezustand betrachtet werden, und man soll darauf hinarbeiten, daß die Reproduktion der Arbeitskraft, ein Ausgleich, möglichst bald wieder stattfindet (423).

Hanke believed that the social activity of individuals was greatly determined by whether his right to a private life was respected in socialist society (424).

The cultural theorists Werner Geidel and Dieter Strützel also noted the primacy of the needs for recreation and relaxation in the leisure sphere. They conceded that all the sociological evidence indicated that work in a socialist collective had not led to the expected development of cultural needs. Geidel implied that only a radical change in the individual's working and living conditions could bring about a change in the individual's lifestyle (425).

Hanke suggested that free time should be defined as the time for the development of the individual and the socialist way of life outside the sphere of work. This necessarily entailed a subjective element; free time activities were those which the individual himself found stimulating (426). In an article published in 1987 he stated that free time was, from the individual's point of view, self-determined time outside work time and other socially necessary activities (427). Thus activities such as holding positions of responsibility in social organisations, studying for further qualifications and political activity were not in his view true leisure activities, even if undertaken outside work time, a view expressed by many readers of journals such as Für Dich (428). In other words, he implied that, given the choice, most GDR citizens were not at all interested in political affairs and were therefore far from the idealistic official concept of the socialist personality.
Although Hanke considered the individual viewpoint when defining free time, he, unlike Dölling, nevertheless stated that the cultural theorist should proceed from a more objective definition of free time than merely from the subjective preferences of a specific individual (429).

In a 1987 article Hanke made a strong appeal for a more flexible policy on free time activities:


At the same time he stressed that this did not mean giving a carte blanche for alcoholism, the indiscriminate use of the media and devotion to Western fashions and trends. In his view, cultural theorists and functionaries should devise an interesting range of leisure activities to counter complacency, passivity and a narrow life-style and to inculcate socialist values in the leisure sphere (431).

Kretzschmar also stated that the individual needed a 'private space' in his free time which was self-determined and free from the demands to perform associated with the work-sphere. He implied that the need of the individual to assert his subjectivity in this way was a reaction to the necessarily structured nature of other spheres of his life. He noted that some GDR educationalists were consciously using the individual's need for self-determination to develop his independence, creativity and activity. As was seen above in chapter two, functionaries of state travel bureaux were also beginning to take into consideration the individual's wish to
spontaneously arrange his activities within the framework of the organised holiday facilities (432).

Official sociologists critical of the trend towards spontaneous, individual-based activities, pointed out that this trend was most pronounced where individuals believed that they did not have sufficient free time, where there was a lack of appropriate recreational facilities and where participation in the mass organisations was considered to be an obligation, but not a form of relaxation (433).

Like Hanke, Peter Voß at the Central Institute of Youth Research in Leipzig made the point that increasing prosperity had led to more comfort in the home, which in turn encouraged home-based leisure activities. Families had become relatively independent of public leisure facilities (434). He conceded that this sometimes led to a total rejection of collective forms of leisure activity.

He noted the general trend towards spending most of one's free time in the private sphere with correspondingly relatively little time spent in public cultural institutions (435). However, he immediately rejected the obvious conclusion that this demonstrated a trend towards the individualisation of free time in socialism as superficial (436). Voß argued that one should not simply consider individual activities negatively and collective activities positively, since both had an important role to play in personality development (437). The most important thing, in his view, was that there should be the correct balance between individual, private activities and social and political, collective activities (438). He nevertheless made it clear that ultimately priority should be given to collective activities (439).
According to Voß, social relations based upon collectivity were already developing in the sphere of work and would later also develop in the leisure sphere (440). Whilst the relative significance of collective, organised activities would objectively increase in advanced socialism, this would not lead to the complete elimination of individual activities:

Solche überspitzten Forderungen sind der sozialistischen Kulturpolitik fremd (441).

In the meantime young people in particular should be convinced that the development of collectivity did not entail the sacrifice of their individuality. Schools, factories and youth organisations should concentrate upon developing attractive social and collective forms of leisure activity starting from the basis of individual interests (442). As we have seen above, Hanke was more pragmatic than Voß, envisaging a continuation of the trend towards individual/family-biased leisure activities for the foreseeable future.

The sociologist Lothar Bisky stated that the trend towards individual-based leisure activities strengthened rather than diminished the strong need felt by young people for social contact, discussion and leisure-activities with friends. He therefore saw individual-based activities as complementary to the organised forms of leisure activity and thought that they played a role in promoting the personality (443).

In the period under study the dominant view appeared to shift towards regarding home or family-based leisure activities as complementary to organised, collective activities in all spheres of life, whilst maintaining the ideological position that collectivism was an increasingly typical feature of GDR socialism. It was
strenuously denied by official theorists that the apparent preference for home-based leisure activities was a reaction to the collectivised nature of GDR political and social organisation (444). This is yet another example of how the ideology changed to accommodate the reality of GDR society.

Voß explained the increasing dominance of television viewing in all sections of the population by the ease with which the individual could satisfy his needs for entertainment, information or education using this medium. Given that the majority of the GDR population tuned into West German television, this increasing dominance of television viewing was itself problematic, for, as the cultural theorist and Central Committee member Koch noted, Western entertainment was imbued with values which were at direct variance with socialist values (445). Joachim Streisand, the late President of the Society of GDR Historians and Professor at the Humboldt University, was also concerned that television might promote a false separation between the spheres of work and leisure: namely between a socially active life at work and an exclusively private way of life in one’s leisure time. He argued that the tendency to spend most leisure time with one’s family or friends was only a negative phenomenon if there was this clash of values between the work and leisure spheres (446).

The official view towards television viewing changed since the infamous FDJ campaigns in the sixties to prevent the reception of West German television. In the early seventies Honecker made a famous speech in which he commented upon the ease with which GDR citizens could watch West German television, the first public recognition of this fact. The GDR government later laid plans for installing cable television in some areas of the GDR to facilitate
the reception of Western television. One can postulate various reasons for this apparent U-turn in official policy under Honecker. Firstly, West German television was always far more successful than its GDR counterpart in satisfying the basic needs of the GDR population for relaxation and entertainment. Furthermore, it provided a pressure-valve for the various pent-up frustrations of living in actually existing socialism (447). Finally, although Western television propagated negative 'bourgeois' values, it also depicted some of the grim realities of Western society such as the high crime-rate, violence and unemployment, thus reinforcing the SED's own propaganda. During the 1984 wave of emigration from the GDR the number of applications to leave the country were disproportionately high from the Dresden area, one of the few areas where it was impossible to receive Western television (448).

According to the official view, active participation in social and political affairs was a key characteristic of the socialist way of life (449). At first sight the youth membership figures for social and political organisations were impressive: 30% of young people were, for example, members of the sports organisation DTSB, over 80% are members of the Society for German-Soviet Friendship. According to Voß, most GDR teenagers belonged to at least three social organisations and 50% held positions in these organisations (450). However, the youth involvement in these organisations seems to have been largely ritualistic. Time-budget studies showed that GDR teenagers spent on average between 1 and 2 hours per week, that is 4 or 5% of their free time, on political activity. This was a very small percentage of their free time compared to that spent watching television. Indeed, as Voß conceded, many teenagers were not involved at all in political affairs (451). The true picture
underlying the above figures was therefore that in their free time a small minority of young people were extremely politically active in the officially organisations, the majority however were largely indifferent to political and social affairs.

As for the minority of young people involved in the 'new social movements', Voß stated that there could be no effective political activity in socialism outside the socialist organisations (452). In this way he, not surprisingly, neatly sidestepped the issue of the 'new social movements' which developed in the early eighties.

As stated above, the general trend in the GDR population was towards home-based activities undertaken with the family. Young, unmarried GDR citizens represented the one social group which did not follow this trend. They pursued activities outside the home, partly because they did not have a home of their own and partly because they felt a strong need to socialise with others of the same age (453). This 'Geselligkeit' of young people, so Voß argued, explained the apparently aimless and inactive 'hanging around' of teenagers on the streets. He explained that this form of socialising could lead to the formation of social groups with more specific aims regarding the content of their activity (454). Unlike official theorists who tended to view with suspicion the non-organised groups of young people, Voß took a more positive view of this form of socialising. For him, 'Geselligkeit' was an important condition for the development of the young individual's personality and should be recognised as such by all those involved in education. Interests in sport, politics, and cultural activities could be developed working on the basis of the obvious interest of young people in socialising. Given that teenagers placed socialising high in their list of priorities when selecting free
time activities and that widening one's social contacts was often the secondary effect of leisure activities, the average GDR teenager spent relatively little of his free time alone (455).

Voß argued that there were no fundamental differences between the organised and non-organised groups of young people, given that young people often belonged to both non-organised and organised groups and that the same values, patterns of communication and symbols were often common to both types of group (456). The values and behaviour promoted within informal groups were not usually in conflict with the goals of socialist society (457). He carefully stressed that the informal groups formed by GDR youth neither constituted a youth subculture, nor were they a form of protest against society as they often were in the West (458). He stated that the informal activity in non-organised groups complemented and extended the primary socialisation process within the family and organised groups and collectives (459). He quoted statistics according to which teenagers who belonged to non-organised groups were more likely to belong to organised groups (460).

Voß explained the existence of non-organised groups of young people in socialism by the fact that young people could most readily pursue their specific interests, for example listening to music, dancing, sport and cinema visits in this type of group (461). He also conceded that many young people rejected the discipline and obligations entailed in formally organised leisure activities (462). Finally, although he did not present this argument for obvious reasons, the empirical data presented by Voß indicated that the formation of non-organised groups was a reaction to political and ideological indoctrination. It is noticeable that political discussions were amongst the least popular activity undertaken by
informal groups of young people (463).

Voß did not condemn the trend amongst young GDR citizens to go on self-organised holidays – almost 66% of young people went on privately organised holidays and about 33% on trips organised through the travel bureau of the communist youth organisation FDJ, the trade union or work. According to Voß, the attraction of camping and similar holidays lay precisely in the fact that the individual could organise the holiday himself. He recognised the validity of non-organised tourism, given that the institutions could not yet meet the specific needs of the individual.

Voß' views on informal youth groups and informal leisure activities can be interpreted as the beginning of a shift in the official view under Honecker. In the sixties the FDJ and SED were apparently convinced that informal groups were a fertile ground for the propagation of Western ideology amongst young people and vigorously discouraged their formation (464). After 1971 official policy became more orientated towards the interests of young people with the extension of the network of youthclubs, the official acceptance of rock and pop-music and the promotion of 'home-grown' rock groups.

Havemann and Bahro were not alone in their radical criticism of the trend towards withdrawal into the private sphere. Reiner Hoefer, a qualified engineer and scientific assistant at the College of Architecture and Housing in Weimar, believed that the trend towards a withdrawal into the private sphere resulted from the constant barrage of the individual with political propaganda. In his experience, students in particular reacted to the excessively structured and formalised education system by cultivating interests
and activities in the private sphere (465). The population as a whole had, in his view, learnt the technique of participating in political and social affairs at a merely superficial level, of distinguishing between their public and private opinions (466).

Some critics pointed to the political consequences of the withdrawal into the private sphere. At a church meeting the radical poet Wolf Biermann warned against the consequences of political passivity, which he referred to as:

das Abhauen nach innen, die Republikflucht in die Republik, die Flucht in die private Idylle

and asked:

Was soll aus der DDR werden, wenn immer diejenigen davonlaufen, die endlich in Widerspruch zu den Verhältnissen geraten sind? (467).

Similarly, a GDR sociologist attributed the lack of an organised opposition in the GDR to the withdrawal into the private sphere and, in particular, to the influence of West German television within this sphere. She argued that the GDR citizens practising a form of 'internal emigration' were not forced to confront reality and the need for change in their society (468).

Activists of the autonomous peace movement criticised the 'unity of social and economic policy' as an official measure to quieten the masses and deprive them of their political rights. They were particularly concerned that official policy had led to young people prematurely withdrawing into bourgeois family life and to consumerism amongst the younger generation (469). In an interview with the West German magazine Der Spiegel the Berlin rock group Pankow criticised the abdication of political and social responsibility associated with the withdrawal into the private sphere:
Die Leute hier steigen aus, indem sie sich privatisieren, indem sie den Job machen, da sind, ihn erfüllen und dann nach Hause gehen, und dann geht ihre Welt los samt Fernseher und Freizeithobbys. Das hat auch seine Ursachen. Wir finden das unheimlich bedrückend, daß sich zu wenig Leute verantwortlich fühlen, wie sie leben, und Mut haben, gegen das, was sie stört, vorzugehen und einfach aktiver leben (470).

The aspiration of many GDR citizens to ownership of a datscha or an allotment was not welcomed by everyone. Several members of an agricultural enterprise interviewed by Gabriele Eckart were critical of their colleagues who were, in their view, so obsessed with obtaining extra income from their privately owned land that they put all their energies into this to the exclusion of other free-time activities (471). They believed that this obsession reduced the quality of their emotional and personal lives. Furthermore, a team leader interviewed by Eckart stated that the increased emphasis upon food production from privately owned land had a negative effect upon the cooperative's production. Individuals stole materials from the cooperative for their own private use and were generally unwilling to work overtime for the cooperative (472).
Footnotes


13. J. Kuczynski, 'Meinungskriege heißen Widerspruch', Spektrum, 6 (no.11, 1975), 12 - 17 (p.13); J. Kuczynski. 'Meine Orte - mein Ort', Neue Deutsche Literatur, 34 (no.4, 1986), 6 - 8 (pp.6 - 7).


The most comprehensive Western examination of the GDR discussion on the nature of contradictions is to be found in P. C. Ludz, Ideologiebegriff und marxistische Theorie. Ansätze zu einer immanenten Kritik, Westdeutscher Verlag (Opladen, 1976) and P. C. Ludz, 'Widerspruchstheorie und entwickelte sozialistische Gesellschaft', Deutschland Archiv, 6 (1973), 506 - 518.


23. ibid., pp.1270 - 1271.


30. ibid., p.1279.


33. H. Kant, Neue Deutsche Literatur, 28 (no.6, 1980), 5 – 12 (p.7).

It should be noted that as early as 1972 Hager conceded that there were conflicts between the individual's expectations and social

34. J. Kuczynski, 'Jürgen Kuczynski an Hermann Kant', Neue Deutsche Literatur, 28 (no. 10, 1980), 156 - 65 (pp. 159 - 160). Kuczynski also stated the following in Dialog mit meinem Urenkel, p. 277:

Ich glaube, es handelt sich dabei um ein wirklich interessantes Problem, denn hier fallen Humanismus in Form von Sorge für den einzelnen und Sorge für den Staat schon in einer Zeit zusammen, in der der einzelne noch häufig dem Wohle des Ganzen geopfert werden müßte und Sorge für den einzelnen und das Ganze noch keine Einheit bilden konnten - was ja auch noch heute keine Seltenheit ist.


40. Bollhagen, Stiehler, 'Widersprüche als Quelle', p. 198; Pawelzig, 'Die Rolle der Widersprüche', p. 335.

41. Stiehler, 'Stiehler antwortet Kuczynski', p. 10.


46. Eichhorn, 'Sozialismus und Dialektik', p. 141.

47. Marxistische Philosophie. Lehrbuch, p. 482; A. Kosing,


50. ibid., p.332. Similarly, the philosopher Wolfgang Harich argued that if deformations of socialism existed in the GDR, these were either the remnants of capitalists or the result of the continuing struggle between capitalism and socialism. He rejected the notion of system-immanent aberrations within socialism, W. Harich, 'Der entlaufene Dingo, das vergessene Floß', *Sinn und Form*, 25 (no.1, 1973), 215 – 220 (p.218).


52. ibid., pp.330 – 1.


Dagegen meinen manche noch heute, daß öffentliche Kritik an diesem oder jenem uns in der Welt nur schaden, denn Feinde bei seiner Propaganda gegen uns nur nutzen konnte. Aber das ist eine rein defensive Linie, und wir sollten sie an ein Wort von Lenin erinnern, der sagte: Wir dürfen unsere Fehler nicht verheimlichen, weil der Feind das ausnutzen konnte. Wer das fürchtet, ist kein Revolutionär.


65. ibid., 375 – 377.


71. ibid., p.658.


73. ibid., p.27.

74. ibid., p.29.


80. Heuer, Recht und Wirtschaftsleitung, p.27.

82. Heuer, Gesellschaftliche Gesetze, p.134.

83. ibid., p.148.


85. Heuer, Rechtsleitung und Wirtschaftsleitung, p.100.

86. ibid., p.101.

87. ibid., p.153.

88. ibid., p.157.

89. Heuer, Gesellschaftliche Gesetze, p.142.


91. Heuer, Recht und Wirtschaftsleitung, p.196.


95. Heuer, Wirksamkeit des Wirtschaftsrecht, p.269.


97. Heuer, Recht und Wirtschaftsleitung, p.179.

98. ibid., p.180.

99. ibid., p.221.

100. For similar view see Quilitzsch, Segert und Will, 'Interessenwidersprüche', p.662.

102. Heuer, Gesellschaftliche Gesetze, p. 137.


106. Heuer, Gesellschaftliche Gesetze, pp. 146 - 147, 165; See also Heuer, Sozialistisches Wirtschaftsrecht, pp. 11 - 12 and Heuer and Mollnau, 'Sozialistische Demokratie', p.547.


108. ibid., pp. 146 - 148. See also U. - J. Heuer, 'Überlegungen zur Anwendung der Marxschen Demokratieauflassung', Neue Justiz, 37 (no.9, 1983), 346 - 349 (p.349):

Je komplizierter die ökonomischen Bedingungen sind, desto weniger kann es gestattet sein, auf die Reserven der sozialistischen Demokratie zu verzichten. Unsere gegenwärtige Situation macht in vielen Fällen ein höheres Maß an operativer Leitung unumgänglich. Es wäre aber verhängnisvoll, wenn Leiter daraus die Schlußfolgerung zögen, Demokratie, Mitwirkung der Werktätigen, als Hemmnis, nicht als Quelle des Fortschritts anzusehen, Disziplin und Demokratie als Gegensatz, nicht als dialektische Einheit zu betrachten.


120. ibid., pp.203 – 204. Heuer, 'Sozialistische Demokratie und ökonomische Strategie', 976 – 981.


123. ibid., pp.24 – 27.


127. Kuczynski, Menschenrechte, p.61.


130. Kuczynski, Dialog mit meinem Urenkel, p.36.

131. ibid., p.36.


133. Kuczynski, Menschenrechte, p.113.

134. ibid., p.106.


137. ibid., p.23.

138. Kuczynski, Menschenrechte, p.156.
139. ibid., p.160.
140. ibid., pp.163 - 164.
142. ibid., p.9.
144. Ein Gespräch mit Jürgen Kuczynski, p.97.
146. Kuczynski, 'Es ist gerade umgekehrt', p.2.
150. A. Lemnitz, 'Was ist gesellschaftlicher Fortschritt?', Forum (no.15, 1978), 5 – 6 (p.6).
152. ibid., p.110.
156. ibid., p.9.
162. ibid., pp.110, 121.
163. ibid., p.111.
164. ibid., p.111.
169. see G. Neuner in ibid., p.32.
170. see R. Alt in ibid., p.41.
174. ibid., p.81.
179. ibid., p.37.
180. ibid., p.41.
182. ibid., pp.40 - 41.


190. Heuer, Gesellschaftliche Gesetze, p.129.


193. See Heuer in Gesellschaftliche Gesetze, p.127:

Die Überwindung des Privateigentums bedeutet gesellschaftliches Eigentum, gesellschaftliche Organisation, die auf die gemeinsame Erkenntnis, des eigenen Seins, der eigenen Bedürfnisse und auf das gemeinsame Handeln entsprechend dieser Erkenntnis gerichtet ist.

See also Heuer, Gesellschaftliche Gesetze, pp.111 – 112.


195. ibid., p.24.

196. ibid., pp.43 – 44.


202. ibid., p.1450; Kuczynski, Gesellschaftsgesetze, p.41.


205. Kleines Politisches Wörterbuch, Dietz Verlag (Berlin, 1985),
p.529. Interestingly during a discussion with writers Kurt Hager conceded that even in communism human weaknesses would give rise to a certain level of minor crime, reported by J. Seyppel, *Ich bin ein kaputter Typ. Ein Bericht über Autoren in der DDR*, Limes Verlag (Wiesbaden and Munich, 1982).


208. Ibid., p.1147.


211. Hennig and Lekschas, p.1150.


213. Lekschas, 'Widerspruchsdialektik', p.582.

214. Ibid., p.583.

215. Ibid., p.583.

216. Lekschas, 'Methodologische Überlegung', p.934.

217. Ibid., p.935.


221. Ewald, 'Vergesellschaftung', p.481, 484.


223. Ibid., p.954.

224. Ibid., p.954.

226. ibid., p.304.


228. ibid., p.949; Ewald, 'Vergesellschaftung', p.485.


231. ibid., p.560.

232. ibid., p.561.


234. ibid., p.933.


236. ibid., pp.6 - 7, 8.


238. ibid., p.36.


247. See also Dölling, Individuum und Kultur, pp. 14, 66 - 67, 115
- 116, where Dölling stated that the individual was not merely the point of intersection of social conditions and not the player of well-defined social roles.


249. ibid., p.54.
At a colloquium on the socialist way of life held in May 1975 G. Lauer expressed the view that there were still factors existing in the material living conditions of socialist society which spontaneously produced and maintained a fertile breeding-ground for Western influences, J. Cernansky and U. Huar, *Sozialistische Lebensweise*, Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie, 23 (1975), 1519 – 1523 (p.1521).


255. ibid., pp.15 – 16.

256. ibid., pp.16, 118.

257. ibid., p.8.

258. ibid., pp.38 – 40.


262. ibid., p.50.


268. Dölling, Naturwesen, p.50.

269. ibid., pp.49 - 50.


273. Dölling, Naturwesen, p.140.

274. ibid., p.52.


277. See Arnold, Was formt die Persönlichkeit, p.21. See also the definition of 'Persönlichkeit' in Wörterbuch zur marxistisch-leninistischen Soziologie, Dietz Verlag (Berlin, 1983).

278. Dölling, Individualum und Kultur, p.15.


According to Dölling, the monotonous nature of many jobs in GDR socialism reenforced the traditional separation between the public and private spheres, Dölling, *Individuum und Kultur*, p.243.


304. ibid., pp.244 - 246.
See also Heidrun Radtke, a leading GDR sociologist, cited by H.
Bussiek, Die real existierende DDR. Neue Notizen aus der
unbekannten deutschen Republik, Fischer Verlag (Frankfurt/Main,

305. H. Koch Sonntag, 36 (no.43, 1982), p.3.

306. A. Kretzschmar, 'Sozialistische Persönlichkeit und erweiterte
Reproduktion', Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie, 33 (1985), 21
- 30 (p.25).

307. C. Lenke, 'Ein neuer Kulturbegriff', Deutschland Archiv, 13
(1980), 872 - 874 (p.872).

308. M. Wander, Guten Morgen, Du Schöne. Protokolle nach Tonband,
culturtheoretischen Analyse', p.59.

309. W. Eichhorn, 'Sozialismus und Dialektik', Deutschland Archiv,
20 (no.2, 1972), pp.146 - 147, cited by Dölling, 'Zu den
subjektiven Bedingungen', p.59.

310. Dölling, 'Kulturtheorie als angewandter historischer
Materialismus', p.446.

311. I. Dölling, 'Solo Sunny', Weimarer Beiträge, 26 (no.6, 1980),
92 - 94 (p.93).
Hanke also referred to limits upon the development of the
personality in actually existing socialism in H. Hanke,
'Kulturrevolution in der entwickelten sozialistischen Gesellschaft
- über Kriterien und Entwicklungsprobleme ihrer neuen Etappe',
Weimarer Beiträge, 19 (no.8, 1973), 91 - 116 (pp.103 - 104).

312. Dölling, 'Kulturtheorie als angewandter historischer
Materialismus', p.444.


315. Dölling, Naturwesen, pp.130, 142.

316. Dölling, 'Biologische Konstitution', pp.113 - 114; Dölling,

Similarly Kretzschmar argued that society could only give the
individual guidelines as to the correct resolution of conflicts,
Kretzschmar, 'Sozialistische Persönlichkeit und erweiterte
Reproduktion', p.28. See also O. Finger, 'Robinson und das
Kollektiv', Sonntag, 27 (no.40, 1973), 3 - 5 (p.5).

318. Dölling, Naturwesen, p.57.


320. ibid., p.144.


323. ibid., p.100.

324. ibid., p.157.


327. ibid., pp.188 - 189.

328. ibid., pp.189 - 190.


331. ibid., p.223.

332. ibid., pp.224 - 225.

333. ibid., pp.226 - 227.

334. ibid., pp.213 - 214.

335. ibid., p.216.

Dölling did, however, put forward the conventional view that as it progressed towards communism GDR society was gradually creating the conditions for the individual to gain control over his living conditions, Dölling, *Individuum und Kultur*, p.223.


341. ibid., pp.130, 142.


349. ibid. pp.56 – 57.


361. E. Honecker, 'Mit dem Volk und für das Volk realisieren wir die Generallinie unserer Partei zum Wohle der Menschen', Neues Deutschland, February 13/14 1988, pp.3 – 11.

362. F. Berg, 'Zu Fragen der Menschenrechte', Einheit, 42 (no.12, 1987), 1130 – 1132. See also Gregor Schirmer, Deputy Head of a department of the Central Committee, on the GDR's willingness to increase international cooperation on questions relating to all rights including personal rights, G. Schirmer, 'Sozialismus und Menschenrechte', Einheit, 42 (no.5, 1987), 397 – 404.


364. ibid., p.280.


369. ibid., p.74.


376. ibid., p.236.


379. ibid., pp.51, 74; Szabo, 'Die sozialistische Demokratie', p.239.


382. Die Kategorie des subjektiven Rechts ist eng mit der marxistisch-leninistischen Auffassung von der Freiheit der Persönlichkeit und dem sozialistischen Kollektivismus verbunden


392. See Luchterhandt, Der verstaatlichte Mensch, p.86.

393. The Western theorist Luchterhandt has referred to a 'state management function' closely associated with the socialisation function of subjective rights. Luchterhandt rather cynically considers that the subjective right in the GDR meant basically the right of the individual to execute the will of the party, even in those areas where the party would normally come up against resistance, presumably the private sphere, ibid., pp.78 - 79. He also argued that the socialisation and individualisation of the socialist personality were in practice mutually interchangeable, given the expected total identification of the individual with party policy. Luchterhandt therefore considers the term 'Kompetenzen' rather than subjective rights to be applicable to basic rights in socialism, ibid., p.249. Like the Western theorist Siegfried Mampel, he states that the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of religious belief, (Articles 20 and 39), was the only true Western-style subjective right in the GDR because it was the only constitutional right without a corresponding duty and because it had no immediate relevance for SED economic policy, ibid., p.268; S. Mampel, Die sozialistische Verfassung der DDR. Text und Kommentar, Alfred Metzner Verlag (Frankfurt/Main, 1972), p.548. Furthermore, the formation of a religious community, Christian testimony and services could not come under the jurisdiction of the atheist state. Therefore, he argues, the constitutionally guaranteed freedom to practice religion clearly belonged to the private sphere of the individual and had no function outside this sphere. However, one must note that all articles of the GDR constitution were subordinated to Article 1 of the constitution, that is the supremacy of the SED and the GDR state. Therefore I cannot agree with Luchterhandt that the freedom to practice religion in the GDR was a subjective right in a Western sense.


395. ibid., p.9.

396. In 1986 Hanke was demoted from his post as Professor of Social Sciences at an Institute under the authority of the Central Committee of the SED to a post at the GDR School of Film Studies. Hanke was essentially a pragmatist. His realistic view of GDR socialism was expressed by his preference for the term 'Lebensweise im Sozialismus' (lifestyle within socialism) rather than 'sozialistische Lebensweise' (socialist lifestyle).

397. H. Hanke, Freizeit in der DDR, Dietz Verlag (Berlin, 1979), p.27. See also H. Hanke, 'Zur Rolle von Traditionen in Lebensweise und Kultur', Weimarer Beiträge, 26 (no.1, 1980), 35 - 57 (p.48):

(Es) besteht auch Grund zur Besorgnis, denn Tendenzen eines Rückzuges ins Private, eine Reduzierung des Lebensanspruchs und Abstinenz gegenüber gesellschaftlichen Problemen sind im Verhalten mancher
Zeitgenossen wohl auch nicht zu übersehen.

Hanke is, to my knowledge, the only GDR social scientist to use the phrase 'Rückzug ins Private' in reference to the GDR.


401. Hanke, Freizeit in der DDR, p.145. Hanke argued that whilst the improved furnishing of the home and television encouraged people to stay at home, on the other hand increasing car-ownership and hence mobility encouraged people to venture further afield, particularly at weekends, Hanke, Freizeit in der DDR, p.81. See also Hanke, 'Zur Rolle von Traditionen', p.52.

It was widely acknowledged by GDR cultural theorists that there were often insufficient amenities to meet the leisure needs of the population, especially young people, in rural areas and new urban housing developments.

In a 1975 Forum debate on the trend towards consumerism in the GDR Günter Herlt stated, like Hanke, that non-socialist values existing in the GDR were the result of Western influences and remnants of the capitalist past, which thrived when the individual withdrew from the positive influence of the collective, G. Herlt, 'Fiat fahren – Spießer werden?', Forum (no.11, 1975), pp.6 – 7. Bodo Lochmann, Gerda Wippold and Dieter Gerold believed that bourgeois behaviour could also be system-immanent. Consumerism could, for example, be generated by the incorrect use of the productivity principle, B. Lochmann, 'Kommunisten sind keine Asketen', Forum (no.15, 1975), p.4; G. Wippold and D. Gerold, 'Hemmt das Streben nach persönliche Engagement für gesellschaftliche Belange im Sozialismus?', Forum (no.15, 1975), p.5.


403. Hanke, Freizeit in der DDR, p.119.

Hanke also wrote:

Eine Entgegenstellung von Werten wie Sensibilität, Individualität, Fürsorge, Anteilnahme gegenüber solchen Werten wie Disziplin, Effektivität, Organisiertheit und Rationalität halten wir schlicht und einfach für unmarxistisch und außerdem für höchst unzeitgemäß. Vor allem möchten wir nicht, daß das berechtigte und produktive Streben der arbeitenden Menschen nach besseren Lebensbedingungen, sozialer Sicherheit und Geborgenheit als 'kleinbürgerliche Konsumentenideologie' und
'egoistisches Besitzstreben' gescholten wird

H. Hanke, 'Zu Fragen der sozialistischen Lebensweise und Kultur', Weimarer Beiträge, 24 (no.8, 1978), 5 - 26 (p.18).


409. See also Hanke, 'Freizeit in der DDR. Tendenzen', p.1076.

410. ibid., p.1066.

411. Hanke, Freizeit in der DDR, p.176.


413. Hanke, Freizeit in der DDR, pp.100 - 101. For the same point see also P. Voß, Freie Zeit was nun?, Dietz Verlag (Berlin, 1986), p.21.

At the conclusion of the debate initiated by Kuczynskis on the nature of work in actually existing socialism the cultural theorist Lothar Kühne also argued that individuals who did not experience full personal development in their work had a tendency to develop 'eine kompensierende Freizeitbeschäftigung', L. Kühne, 'Epilog eines Meinungsstreits', Forum (no.22, 1978), pp.8 - 9.

The author Daniela Dahn also questioned whether work could provide the meaning of life in GDR society:

Auch erstes Lebensbedürfnis ist noch nicht Sinn. Wichtig ist die Arbeit schon, wohl das Wichtigste. Meine, deine, seine, unsere, eure, ihre. Millionen arbeiten für mich und ich für Millionen. Das ist schon was. Aber ist es DAS? Ist es nicht nur Grundbedingung für etwas danach, darüber hinaus?

D. Dahn, 'Gedanken-Spiele', Neue Deutsche Literatur, 18 (no.7, 1980), 79 - 89 (p.87).

414. Hanke, Freizeit in der DDR, p.144. See also P. Voß, 'Freizeitgestaltung der Jugend', in W. Friedrich, W. Gerth, Jugend konkret, Dietz Verlag (Berlin, 1984), 158 - 182 (pp.168 - 171) and P. Voß, Die Freizeit der Jugend, Dietz Verlag (Berlin, 1981),
pp.54, 62.


421. Hanke, 'Kulturrevolution', p.5. See also Hanke, 'Freizeit in der DDR. Tendenzen', pp.1072 - 1073, 1075.

422. Hanke, *Freizeit in der DDR*, p.92. Voß also advocated a wider range of leisure facilities. For him, all forms of leisure activity were valid, the most important thing was that the individual should have a well-balanced range of leisure activities; Voß, 'Freizeitgestaltung der Jugend', pp.180 - 181.


426. Hanke, *Freizeit in der DDR*, p.70.


430. ibid., p.1071.

431. H. Hanke, 'Freizeit - Tendenzen und Bedürfnisse', *Theorie und


436. ibid., pp.20 - 21.

437. ibid., pp.19 - 20.

438. ibid., p.27.

The cultural theorist Leo Fliege similarly argued that both individual, home-based activities and collective activities based in the cultural institutions had a role to play in personality development and were not mutually exclusive. For him, the most important thing was that there should be a balance between the former and latter. Like Voß, he suggested that more should be done to enhance collective forms of leisure activity:


440. ibid., p.236 - 237, 252.

441. ibid., p.251.

442. ibid., p.253.


H. Koch for example stated:

Nicht wenige Menschen. ...mögen mit dem Sozialismus politisch einverstanden sein, durch ihre Arbeit und gesellschaftlich-politischen Aktivitäten bewußt zu seiner Gestaltung beitragen. Aber künstlerisch-kulturell leben sie in dem (falschen) 'Bewußtsein', als gehe hier die Dynamik der Entwicklung von der kapitalistischen Welt aus,


Kraüp1 similarly stated that the family sphere bred a conservatism which could be at variance with the positive socialist values developed at the work-place, Kraüp1, 'Familiäre Fehlentwicklung und Jugendkriminalität', p.303.

See Micksch, Jugend und Freizeit, p.94.

For statistics see V. Ronge, Von drüben nach hüben. DDR-Bürger im Westen, Verlag Hartmann und Petit (Wuppertal, 1985).

Programm der SED, Dietz Verlag (Berlin, 1976), p.73.


ibid., p.100.

ibid., p.105.


Voß, Freizeit der Jugend, p.235.

ibid., p.236.

ibid., p.247.

ibid., p.249.

P. Voß, 'Vergruppt oder vergesellschaftet?', Sonntag, 26 (no.16, 1982), p.7; Voß, Freizeit der Jugend, p.244.

Voß, Freizeit der Jugend, p.245.

ibid., p.248.

ibid., p.248; see also Micksch, Jugend und Freizeit, p.49.

Voß, Freizeit der Jugend, pp.103, 253.

ibid., p.246.

Micksch, Freizeit in der DDR, pp.49 – 50.
465. 'Die Talfahrt ist beängstigend', *Der Spiegel*, 41 (no.20, 1979), 30 – 32.

466. 'Ein Nährboden für Neurosen', *Der Spiegel*, 41 (no.20, 1979), 32 – 33 (p.33).


469. 'Er ist das Konzept, die Bevölkerung politisch zu entmündigen', *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 13 May 1986, p.12.

